Pershing and His Generals: Command and Staff in the AEF

PERSHING AND HIS GENERALS

Pershing, the AEF Staff, and the Baker Commission, Paris, July 1917. Courtesy of the Military History Institute.

PERSHING AND HIS GENERALS Command and Staff in the AEF JAMES J. COOKE

PRAEGER

Westport, Connecticut London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cooke, James J. Pershing and his generals : command and staff in the AEF / James J. Cooke. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-275-9536^-7 1. Pershing, John J.Qohn Joseph), 1860-1948. 2. United States. Army. American Expeditionary Forces—History. 3. World War, 1914-1918—Regimental histories—United States. 4. United States. Army—Biography. 5. Strategy. 6. Generals—United States— Biography. I. Title. D570.C66 1997 940.4'1273—dc21 97-12319 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 1997 by James J. Cooke All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 97-12319 ISBN: 0-275-95363-7 First published in 1997 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10

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CONTENTS Introduction

vii

1.

The Genesis of the AEF Staff

2.

Someone to Command

17

3.

Refining the AEF Staff

31

4.

Getting Organized

47

5.

Evaluation and Classification

61

6.

Into the Fight, Spring 1918

75

7.

Dennis Nolan and Intelligence in the AEF

91

8.

Formation of the First U.S. Army

107

9.

The Meuse-Argonne Offensive

123

Aftermath and Lessons Learned

139

Selected Bibliography

155

Index

163

10.

Photographic essay follows p. 74

1

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INTRODUCTION John J. Pershing was born in Laclede, a small, rural Missouri town, in 1860. He attended the United States Military Academy at West Point from 1882 to 1886. As a cavalry officer Pershing served on the frontier and proved himself to be a superb leader of men. While on the frontier Pershing served with the black 10th Cavalry Regiment earning him the lifelong nickname of "Black Jack." Pershing's association with black troops was not unsatisfactory, but he never liked the name. In 1891 he was posted to the University of Nebraska as a professor of military science, and he earned a law degree while there. During the Spanish-American War Pershing's reputation as a commander of men grew. In 1905 this son of rural America married well, taking as his wife Francis Warren, the daughter of the powerful U.S. Senator Francis E. Warren of Wyoming. Returning to the United States after observing the Russo-Japanese War (1905-1906), Pershing attracted the attention of President Theodore Roosevelt, who promoted him over 862 other officers from captain to the rank of brigadier general. From 1907 to 1913 Pershing was in the Philippines, where he served with almost every officer who would rise to high rank under him in the Great War. In 1915 his beloved wife and three daughters were killed in a tragic fire that consumed their home at the Presidio, a military base in San Francisco. The grieving general threw himself into his next assignment, the expedition into Mexico to catch the legendary Mexican leader Pancho Villa. Pershing left Mexico two months before a troubled President Woodrow Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war against the German empire. Much to Pershing's surprise, he was tapped to command the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF).

VIII

Introduction

At age fifty-seven, John J. Pershing was the true American success story, the young lad from rural America who through native intelligence and hard work rose to positions of power in a life of service to his nation. The general firmly believed in merit, and he was determined to promote those who could meet his personal standards. He liked strong-willed, ambitious men who were loyal, brave, and competent. "Black Jack" Pershing could not stand the self-serving, the physically unfit, or the intellectually dull, and he never hestitated to dismiss those who could not measure up. Those standards were a part of Pershing, impressed on his life by frontier America, West Point, and a patriotism based on the belief that Americans could do anything, be as good as anyone, and shape the world. Those were the concepts that Pershing carried to France in 1917, and they would guide him as he selected generals to be on his staff or command the "doughboys" of the AEF. "Follow Me!," the old army adage, certainly applied to John J. Pershing as commander in chief of the AEF. When Pershing sailed on the USS Baltic in the summer of 1917, he took with him a small coterie of officers, men he had personally selected. That was the starting point of Pershing's task of building a command and staff system. By the last great battle of the war there would be well over a million soldiers in the AEF and many millions more training in the United States for eventual deployment to France. Those American soldiers possessed, in the main, good physical condition and high morale. They were confident in their combat abilities, and they had faith in the leadership of the army. This was something the British and the French had lost over the three years of bloody conflict on the Western Front. Soldiers, however, are only as good as their training and their leaders. Pershing understood this, and while his belief in the primacy on the battlefield of the infantryman with his rifle would cost many lives, "Black Jack" Pershing pushed for training and for good commanders. Successful commanders rely on their own military education, their leadership skills, and a professional and knowledgeable staff to advise and to take burdens off their own shoulders. The battlefields of the Great War were technological and three-dimensional. Telephonic communications meant that the commander no longer had to be present at the actual battle. The airplane and balloon looked farther than any observer on the ground could. Artillery could fire at unseen targets and make adjustments quickly. Combat operations were integrated, with soldiers being supported by aircraft that could observe, strafe, or bomb the enemy. The machine gun in a well-selected location, taking advantage of good cover and concealment, could tear huge holes in advancing regiments. The days of a general mounted on his horse at the head of his advancing troops, encouraging his lads, was over. Pershing's generals were to be young men, trim, educated, and loyal, who could be modern combat leaders. His selection process was severe but in most instances produced a good fighting commander. When

Introduction

ix

men failed to meet Pershing's standards or expectations, they no longer commanded in the AEF. General Pershing was not the kind of officer who inspired deep love from his troops. There were no cheers for Pershing—but there was respect. In the AEF there seemed to be a sense that it had embarked on a new journey, a new phase in American history. There was not much need to bombard the troops with patriotic rhetoric or slogans. For the doughboys it was combat with their friends at their side. For officers, the war offered a chance to prove their mettle, to cast off a stifling promotion system based on seniority. Pershing was the unsmiling exemplar of this. On the other hand, Pershing had his failures in his construction of the AEF and its command and staff system. He was no infallible, modern god of war. The focus of this work is on Pershing and his command and staff: how did the staff grow and become a professional organization in a so short period of time? How did the AEF, when trained "Leavenworth men" were in such short supply, man the growing number of combat divisions? This work is about Pershing and his command and staff, not on the many critical issues that Pershing faced with the allies in Europe and the government in Washington. Those questions have been well covered by the late Donald Smythe and Professor Frank Vandiver. David Trask's recent book, The AEF and Coalition Warmaking (1993), deals with the severe problems t Pershing and the allies had with one another. There is no reason to repeat Trask's excellent study. Of great benefit to this author were the groundbreaking works by Allan R. Millett (on Robert Lee Bullard) and Timothy K. Nenninger (on the Leavenworth system and the effect of that training on the professionalization of the officer corps). Historians do not need a rehash of material, from the same sources, that has already been so well presented. Very little, for example, can be added to what Forrest Pogue wrote in the first volume of his monumental biography of George C. Marshall. There is also no great need to recount the two main battles that the AEF fought in 1918. James H. Hallas's Squandered Victory: The American First Army at St. Mihiel (1995) deals quite well with that operation in early September 1918, which so clouded Pershing's judgment going into the Meuse-Argonne operation. Paul F. Braim's The Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign (1987) is an excellent analysis of the battle by an experienced soldier and historian. The confusion of the AEF in the final days of the Meuse-Argonne over the taking of Sedan has already been analyzed in this author's The Rainbow Division in the Great War, 1917-1919 (1994). As with Pershing's dealings with the allies, there is no need to cover again the well-discussed operations of the last three and a half months of the war. Much has been written saying that the AEF reached the end of its rope in November 1918 and that the American breakthrough in the Meuse-Argonne was due not to American battle prowess but to the cracking of the German

X

Introduction

army. There is little to contradict historians who have posited this. But there is a positive side to what the AEF did. By the time of the heavy fighting of October and November 1918, the AEF had made great strides in creating efficient staffs, and commanders of divisional or corps units were better at their jobs than anyone had a right to expect. Bullard and Liggett were good army commanders, and their division commanders were obviously learning their jobs. Brigadier General Dennis Nolan, Pershing's G-2, for example, had built a very efficient intelligence system that extended down to the major subordinate elements, including regimental intelligence organizations. The inexperienced operations sections at General Headquarters, AEF, and at First U.S. Army were now turning out coherent orders and responding to changing battlefield situations. That they were all clumsy at times and made amateurish mistakes no one can deny. But look at how far the AEF had come in so short a time! Eighteen months passed between Pershing's arrival in Europe and the end of the war. The United States was totally unprepared for war when Congress acted in April 1917. While it is true that the AEF was running out of steam and its supply system was a shambles, not all was dismal failure by 11 November 1918. It is on the successes in the area of command and staff that this study will concentrate. A number of people assisted greatly in this research effort. Mitchell Yockelson of the National Archives in Washington has an in-depth knowledge of the AEF's records and the holdings in the archives. His professionalism always makes a research trip a great pleasure, and his assistance is invaluable for the researcher in this period. Much can be said about the staff of the Library of Congress, and all of it is good. These public servants are among the best. Their willingness to help and their knowledge of the holdings are first-rate. Dr. Richard Sommers, Chief Archivist at the Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, deserves special thanks. He and his small, very competent, staff go above and beyond the call of duty in helping the researcher. I must thank Dr. Dale Abadie, Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, and Dr. Michael R. Dingerson, Dean of the Graduate School of the University of Mississippi, for a small but useful travel grant. Dr. Robert Haws, Chair of the Department of History of the University of Mississippi, went out of his way to juggle schedules and give his support for this work. Joanna Williams, secretary of the history department, made numerous corrections on the manuscript. Last but not least, I must thank my wife who reads manuscripts, moves commas around, and makes suggestions that are usually correct and to the point. For every completed manuscript there is a battalion of people who supported the effort. They are all appreciated more than they will ever know. James J. Cooke Oxford, Mississippi

Chapter 1

THE GENESIS OF THE AEF STAFF It was a warm day in Washington, D.C., that 28th of May 1932. The nation was in the grip of the depression, but the great economic and political crisis was not on the minds of the fifty men gathered in the nation's capital. Most were obviously in their sixties, but a few were much younger. Among the young men was an imposing figure, a person of unbounded energy and outgoing good humor—Major George S. Patton, Jr., the host for this gathering of ex-Army officers. They called themselves The Baltic Society. The Baltic Society was made up of those officers who had sailed to France with General of the Armies John J. Pershing to begin building the American Expeditionary Forces when the United States became a belligerent in the Great War that had ravished Europe since August 1914. The society had been formed soon after the war ended in 1918; it was the brainchild of Major General Merritte W. Ireland, Pershing's chief medical officer. Dues were a mere three dollars per year, and over the years affluent members acted as host for the yearly meetings. The heart of the society was the now-retired General of the Armies, a living icon. In 1932 Patton regarded his expenditure of funds for the meeting as almost a religious duty. Pershing had announced his intention to attend the gathering to celebrate the fifteenth anniversary of the sailing of the British White Star Line's SS Baltic for Europe.1 When Congress declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917, the United States had no true professional army to send to France. What it had was vast reservoirs of manpower and a number of energetic but low-ranking officers who had great potential. Held back by a stifling, outmoded system of promotion-by-seniority, many knew that decades might pass before they achieved high rank. The General Staff system was only fourteen years old,

2

Pershing and His Generals

and the War Department was a hodgepodge of conflicting bureaus, each one guarding its turf as if under siege by an enemy Pershing was an exception. In 1906 President Theodore Roosevelt promoted him from captain to brigadier general, bypassing 862 senior officers. In 1916 Pershing commanded the punitive expedition into Mexico. Born in Missouri in I860, Pershing was the picture of physical health, ramrod straight, and dedicated to mental and physical discipline. He was not blinded by the task that faced the United States. Patriotic speeches by politicians might be fine to whip up support, but the United States would need a vast, trained army to go to France. John J. Pershing fully expected to play his role; specifically, he wanted to command the 1st Infantry Division. When Pershing returned from Mexico he was stationed at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, near San Antonio, where regular army troops were being assembled. With the declaration of war issued, Pershing threw himself into the training of those regulars who would probably be some of the first Americans to go to France. John J. Pershing firmly believed that the regular army would be the heart of any combat effort, and many of the regulars would have to train the mass of citizen soldier-volunteers and draftees which would be needed in Europe. He wrote on 28 April 1917 from his base in Texas to an old friend, "We are preparing very complete courses of instruction here for recruits that are coming into the regular army, and I am whipping them into line as instructors for the immense army that we will undoubtedly have to train in the near future."2 On 3 May Pershing received a telegram from his father-in-law, Senator F. E. Warren, asking him how well he spoke French. Immediately Pershing wired back that he had studied the language in France in 1908 and could speak it quite well. While that was not exactly true, Pershing would not let anything stand in the way of his commanding the first combat infantry division sent to France.3 Another telegram from the Army Chief of Staff, Major General Hugh L. Scott, confirmed in Pershing's mind that he was to be the first American divisional commander to go "Over There." When he arrived in Washington and met with General Scott, Pershing was still under the impression that he was the commander-designate of the 1st Infantry Division. After less-than-satisfactory meetings with the General Staff, Pershing returned to his Washington lodgings to plan what combat and support troops the 1st Division would need for battle. Much to his surprise, he was called back to the War Department for a meeting with Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and told that he had been designated to be the overall commander of American army forces in France. With no combat staff available, Pershing faced the daunting task of creating an army from raw, untrained, inexperienced officers and men. Many of the officers who eventually went with Pershing had graduated from the General Staff school at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, but they had had precious little opportunity to practice their lessons. James Guthrie

The Genesis of the AEF Staff

3

Harbord, a man close to Pershing, expressed his own inadequacies as a staff officer when he said, "The organization of [the French combat staff] does not differ very greatly from the theoretical organization of our own, but of course theirs is standing the test of actual war."4 Pershing was an officer with immediate, higher-level, operational command experience, and he was an officer who, while often unimaginative and doctrinally hidebound, understood operations in the field in a hostile environment. The Mexican border operation of 1916-1917 had afforded Pershing a glimpse of the new technological battlefield. In his General Order number 1, issued at Columbus, New Mexico, in March 1916, Pershing had designated his staff for the punitive expedition. He had a chief of staff, an assistant to the chief of staff, an adjutant, an intelligence officer, an inspector, a judge advocate, a quartermaster, a surgeon, a chief engineer, a signal officer, and several aides. While this is not striking in any way, it does show that Pershing was well aware of the commander's need for a staff to provide him with information and to plan for operations. By June 1916, Pershing had identified problems that would surface again in France in 1917-1918. There was always a shortage of trucks, and rations, forage, and other supplies were in very short supply. Electronic communications did not function as planned, and there were never enough radio and wireless sets. In an early operations report, Pershing wrote the War Department, "As wireless communication is indispensable under modern war conditions, the shortage of wireless machines should also be given consideration."5 (They were, however, not given the consideration Pershing urged.) Also of great interest to General Pershing had been the employment of the 1st Aero Squadron with the punitive expedition. Very quickly Pershing grasped the obvious: aviation, if up to date and well maintained, could win the reconnaissance battle. The airplane could look further, faster, than any cavalry unit.6 Pershing would spend a great deal of time as commander of the AEF working with air matters. By the time he left Mexico and returned to Texas, Pershing had gained valuable field experience with hints of what modern warfare could be. By the time Pershing reported to Washington he knew most of the energetic young officers in the army and had a good idea of their mettle. Pershing did not like what he saw at the War Department. Very few recommendations from Pershing in the field had been even considered, let alone acted upon. The General Staff did not fill him with much confidence either. It had been created in 1903 by law, a law which aimed at correcting the errors leading to America's poor performance in the Spanish-American War. What emerged was the position of Chief of Staff of the United States Army and a General Staff made up of three units—administration and coordination, intelligence and information, and planning. In 1908 and 1911 the staff was reorganized and its functions severely limited. The new staff had run into the entrenched political power of the bureau chiefs within the

4

Pershing and His Generals

War Department, who jealously guarded their own domains. By the National Defense Act of 1916, the power of the General Staff was further restricted. There was almost no war planning prior to the entry of the United States into the European conflict.7 General Johnson Hagood, who would serve the AEF as the chief of staff of the Service of Supply, became a bitter critic of the War Department and General Staff. He argued correctly that between 1914 and 1917 the staff did almost nothing to profit from the lessons being learned on the battlefields of Western Europe.8 As an example, Major George O. Squier, the U.S. military attache in London when the Great War broke out, toured the front in 1915. His reports reflected the great changes in warfighting. He covered every possible topic but was most fascinated by the emergence of airpower on the modern battlefield.9 A number of energetic young officers saw Squier's reports, but as far as the upper echelons of the War Department or the General Staff were concerned, they were ignored. Pershing himself was distressed at the inability of Washington to comprehend that the nation faced an almost insurmountable task in getting an army ready to fight on the Western Front.10 Pershing was also upset at the lackadaisical attitude of those working at the War Department. No one seemed to have any sense of urgency. General Robert Lee Bullard, who would end the war as the Commanding General, Second U.S. Army, visited the War Department to receive the order sending him to France. Bullard was shocked at the slow pace of activity at the department; he wrote in his diary, "Of my stay in Washington the great impression left is that if we really have a great war, our War Department will quickly break down. To me it appeared fearfully weak and complicated and centralized."11 At some point it would take a strong, almost tyrannical, officer to bring the department and the General Staff in line, and that officer would be Peyton C. March. March and Pershing, however, would end the war and their lives as bitter enemies. Pershing did have a supportive Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker. Baker had been a prominent Cleveland, Ohio, lawyer and mayor, and he had campaigned vigorously for his old college professor Woodrow Wilson in 1916. Shortly after reelection Wilson asked Baker to become his Secretary of War, although Baker had been a self-proclaimed pacifist in 1916, openly acclaiming Wilson's pledge to keep America out of war. Ironically, Baker quickly became one of America's best secretaries of war. He had a quick mind and was able after April 1917 to see what had to be done to support Pershing and the AEF in France. Later in life, Baker, the diminutive pacifist, took great pleasure in his continued association with officers with whom he had served in the War Department.12 Much of what Baker thought at the time has been lost, since he kept no wartime diary and took very few personal papers with him when he left Washington;13 in any case Baker had more to do than make long diary entries. What he had was a gigantic task:

The Genesis of the AEF Staff

5

preparing American soldiers to fight in the great war that at one point he had so vocally decried. Baker usually worked in his office at the War Department until midnight.14 Pershing was anxious to get to Europe to begin putting together the AEF. It was a daunting task, because no one really knew what he was doing. There were some vague outlines as to what would be required, but beyond that tasks would have to be addressed as needs became clear. One thing already clear was that Pershing had wide-ranging authority. Baker gave Pershing a document that directed him to proceed to France and build the AEF. The guidance from the Secretary of War was specific: Pershing was to create an American army that would eventually fight under its own flag with its own, American commanders.15 For a career army officer, guidance was important, and much to Pershing's relief, it was obvious Baker meant that Washington would interfere as little as possible in the operations and ixinning of the AEF. Given the all-too-apparent confusion in the War Department, Pershing could not have hoped for a better arrangement. In later years a controversy would arise over who wrote the letter that gave Pershing a military kingdom over which to rule. General (then a major on the General Staff) Francis Kernan claimed to be the author of the letter. Baker, however, believed that the document he signed had been composed by the Acting Chief of Staff, Major General Tasker Bliss.16 Baker had come to rely on Bliss for every type of military advice. Baker would write, "Bless the dear old soldier's heart; what a time he had educating a green Secretary of War and how generously proud he is of the job, both his part in it and mine."17 Regardless of who wrote the letter, it surely reflected Bliss's view that Pershing had to have carte blanche, or near it, to conduct the war. Pershing, in preparing to go to France, had the task of selecting those officers who would go with him to build the AEF. For Pershing there were rigid standards to be met. The men who would staff and command the AEF had to be fairly young and in fine physical shape. They had to be disciplinarians, able to enforce "the discipline of West Point." Pershing could be ruthless in judging those potential staff officers and commanders. Of course, any officer worth his shoulder straps wanted to go with the AEF, but service and longevity would count for little with Pershing. He wrote to a friend in late 1917, "There are a great many of the old men who have served long and well but will have to go to the 'scrap-heap' on account of age, which, sooner or later, overtakes us all."18 The selection process promised to be difficult, but Pershing was determined that the AEF would be in his image. This became apparent when Pershing selected Major James Guthrie Harbord to be his first chief of staff. Few men in the AEF had Pershing's confidence and respect as did James G. Harbord. Harbord was instrumental in implementing key policies and advised Pershing on critical matters. He was Pershing's shadow, often his alter ego. He was born in Illinois in 1866 but moved to Kansas with his

6

Pershing and His Generals

parents. In 1886 Harbord graduated from Kansas State Agricultural College in Manhattan and began a career in teaching. Within two years, however, Harbord found life as a rural Kansas teacher to be unrewarding and boring. Despite having obtained a position at his alma mater, Harbord enlisted as a private in the U.S. Army in 1889. Within three years he was selected for a commission, a testimony to his superior soldiering skills. In 1895 he was the distinguished graduate at the School of Cavalry and Infantry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Harbord saw no combat in the Spanish-American War, but in 1902 was ordered to the Philippines, where he remained for twelve years. It was during this time that Harbord began his lifelong friendship with John J. Pershing. On 24 May 1917, while a student at the Army War College, Harbord received a note to report to General Pershing, who was then at the War Department. When he arrived in Pershing's office he was astounded to be asked two questions: first, did Harbord want to go with Pershing to France as his chief of staff, and second, did he speak any French at all? Yes, he wanted to go, but no, he did not speak the language. When Pershing indicated that he was also considering two other officers for the post, Harbord quickly told Pershing that he could do the work better then the other two, and he got the job.19 On 26 May Harbord officially assumed the position and was recommended for the necessary promotion to brigadier general, which was given him in August 1917. But what did Harbord have to work with? A large number of officers selected to accompany Pershing to France were at the captain or major level; they would all have to be promoted at some time. None of the original fifty-plus officers who sailed on the Baltic had any practical experience at all in higher staff functions. What they did possess, however, was a high level of intelligence, a willingness to work extraordinary hours, and best of all, the confidence of Pershing. The officers who went with Pershing were men he knew. Of course Pershing was inundated with requests to be selected for service, which he usually ignored. Those who were chosen to go in this advance party were certain that they had hitched their wagon to a star. Youthful Captain Hugh A. Drum was ecstatic over his selection, writing in his diary that "I appreciated this very much as, in addition to the responsibility, it insured me an entree in France to the class of officers I desired to know. This detail coupled with my promotion to major completed my happiness."20 Major John Leonard Hines, who had known Pershing for many years, simply recorded in his diary that he, "reported to General Bliss—told would go to France. Spoke with Pershing and Pershing confirmed this."21 Hines had every reason to be satisfied with his selection, because in April 1917 he had been told by Pershing, who then believed he would command the 1st Division, that there would be a command for him in France.22 On 28 May 1917 Pershing and his staff of 191 officers and enlisted men assembled in New York to go to France. The attempt to cloak the movement

The Genesis of the AEF Staff

7

in complete secrecy, a pet topic for Pershing, failed totally when Pershing's orderly tagged all of the general's luggage "General Pershing, Paris, France."23 Captain H. B. Moore of the Army Transport Service was the first on the ship, overseeing the berthing, meal schedules, and the allocation of space for meetings. Of great worry for Moore was the danger of enemy submarines and what might happen if the Baltic were sunk and Pershing taken prisoner by the Germans. Unknown to Pershing, Major Robert Bacon had become Pershing's double. In the case of an enemy attack and a possibility of capture, Bacon would take the role of the general. Moore enlisted the captain of the Baltic in the plan and ordered that all military personnel to remain in civilian clothes until they docked in England. If the worse happened, only Bacon, who resembled the general, would be in uniform and be taken prisoner. Pershing never knew of the elaborate plans, and of course they were never needed.24 The week-long crossing from New York to Halifax, Nova Scotia, and then to England was indeed dangerous, because of the German submarine menace. While on board the Baltic, Pershing and Harbord came to an understanding as to the basic problems facing the AEF, and they were immense. No one really knew what size division the United States would deploy to France. Basic choices had to be made as to staff assignments, even though the form and structure of the AEF's General Staff was not yet set. During the crossing a few major decisions were made that would have lasting impact on the AEF staff. For example, Pershing decided that Major Dennis E. Nolan would head the military intelligence section of the staff. He had served in that area on the General Staff in Washington from 1903 to 1906 as a captain and again from 1915 to 1916. Well educated and organized, Nolan was the officer best prepared to head the AEF's yet-to-be formed military intelligence section. But there were few such decisions on the Baltic, nor could there be until the Americans had time to study what the British and French had been engaged in for the past three years.25 The Baltic, much to Captain Moore's relief, arrived at Liverpool on 8 June 1917, and Pershing began a grueling schedule of official and social meetings with his British counterparts. By 17 June, when Pershing and his party were scheduled to leave for France, a number of items had been accomplished by the staff. It had been realized first, and of primary importance, that the size of Pershing's AEF staff was inadequate, and second, that its structure would not support a large American war effort. Basically, the staff that Pershing took to Europe was divided into three functional areas: combat, administration, and intelligence. The Army Regulations of 1914 (corrected to 15 April 1917) were vague as to what tasks those sections were to accomplish. In fact, United States Army documents never envisioned missions of the size and scope given to Pershing, nor did they provide any guidance for a commander who found himself three thousand miles from

8

Pershing and His Generals

America, preparing to go into combat with "foreign allies." As Harbord quickly realized, there was no real precedent for his own position as chief of staff.26 While Pershing came to grips with the realities of fielding a modern army and with the dire condition of American logistics, he set his staff officers to work learning as much as possible, as quickly as possible. Major Hugh Drum was sent from Paris to look at the base facilities being prepared for the arrival of American troops. His diary reflects the underestimation of what it would take to build the AEF in France. On 13 June he "went to St. Nazaire. Inspected the camp and docks. French are putting up barracks for our troops. A few of the troops will have to camp, but the French are arranging everything nicely for 15,000 men and 2,000 animals."27 Dennis Nolan had begun his work in London by visiting the intelligence sections in the War Ministry, and upon his arrival in France he went immediately to see how the British and the French operated in the field. Nolan soon found out quickly how the American staff was regarded by their counterparts. He recalled that, "the British staff seemed to be sort of stunned that we had brought so few officers with us. They took it to mean that we had very little comprehension of what we were going up against."28 The British were quite correct, and the French added their doubts as well. There were too few staff officers with any experience, and there were not enough sections within the staff to handle the problems that would beset the AEF. On 5 July Pershing reorganized his staff along the lines suggested by the British and the French. The new AEF staff now had five functional staff areas, each presided over by "chief of section." The administration section was under James A. Logan, intelligence remained the bailiwick of Nolan, operations was headed by Lieutenant Colonel John McAuley Palmer, coordination was handled by the capable William D. Connor, and the newest addition to the staff, the training section, was the province of Lieutenant Colonel Paul B. Malone. Colonel Benjamin Alvord was the Adjutant General, ably assisted by the bright, ambitious Robert C. "Corky" Davis. By the end of the summer, however, both Palmer and Alvord were showing signs of the strain of the hectic pace of work. On the whole Pershing was well served by his staff at Chaumont, but there were problems with such a group of highly motivated, but inexperienced officers. The staff had no precedents upon which to base their actions; a comprehensive staff manual would not be produced until after the end of the war. This manual, produced under the direction of Brigadier General Harold Fiske, who became head of the 5th, or Training, Section, was a model standing operating procedure (SOP) for combat units down to the regimental and battalion levels.29 On 7 and 8 July, Pershing and his newly organized staff met with the newly formed Baker Commission in Paris to discuss what the AEF would eventually look like. On 28 May 1917, Newton Baker had appointed an independent commission of twelve officers under the leadership of Colonel

The Genesis of the AEF Staff

9

Chauncey B. Baker, a Quartermaster Corps officer. The Baker Commission was to recommend to Washington just how the AEF was to be structured. Pershing was very wary of the commission, feeling that this duplication of effort was simply War Department business as usual. To make matters worse, Pershing had no authority over Baker and his officers. Colonel Baker, however, was an old classmate of Pershing's and suggested a meeting with Pershing and the Operations Section to coordinate their activities. What emerged from meeting this was an agreement on a number of critical issues—for example, the size of an American division was set at twenty-eight thousand soldiers—and Pershing met on the Baker Commission a number of officers whom he wanted for service with the AEF. Those officers would make their mark on the AEF's staff and in combat units; they were Charles P. Summerall, D. E. Aultman, Hanson E. Ely, and J. G. Quekemeyer.30 Pershing certainly had an eye for talent, and as soon as he saw an officer with promise he did everything possible to get him to France. There were two problems with this approach, however. There were precious few trained staff officers in the army prior to the outbreak of the war, and this meant that the trained manpower pool was small. The army commands back in the United States preparing troops for deployment to France needed good men as well. Pershing's attitude was understandable but selfish, and his constant demands for specific officers meant in the long run that soldiers engaged in training were not always the best. Even those officers Pershing brought to France lacked skills. General Pershing firmly believed that the American officer with training from the General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth was the equal of any officer in the world, but there were few of them. To compensate for this critical shortfall, training section chief Lt. Col. Paul Malone convened a board during the summer of 1917 to establish an AEF school system to train officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Throughout August 1917, Malone and his section worked on a program to instruct soldiers in everything from shoeing horses to working competently at the general-staff level. Ambitious to say the least, the Malone program had as a centerpiece the opening of a General Staff School modeled on the one at Fort Leavenworth. There would be divisional and corps schools, which would have as their mission training soldiers who would in turn train soldiers back in their home units.31 What gave Malone's proposal force was work by Lt. Col. Fox Connor and Maj. Hugh Drum of the operations section. On 30 August Harbord read the proposal and submitted it to Pershing for his approval, which Pershing gave. Since Pershing then had only a few troops actually in France, the question of finding time for schooling was not especially pressing. What did concern Pershing was the actual training the soldiers of the 1st Division were getting from the British and the French. He was not pleased with the allied emphasis on trench warfare, firmly believing that the trenches had dulled the allied offensive spirit.32

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Once Malone had Pershing's and Harbord's blessing, he began the process of putting the school together. He set a target date of the end of November to have the first class enrolled, and this was to prove a monumental task. To build the General Staff School from the ground up, Malone had a great ally in Brigadier General James W. "Dad" McAndrew, a man close to Pershing who would become Harbord's handpicked successor as AEF chief of staff. "Dad" McAndrew had graduated in 1886 from West Point, where he had known Pershing. He had served in the Philippines and, like Pershing, had been on the General Staff in Washington. McAndrew was known as a tireless worker and was totally dedicated to Pershing; his labors in France as chief of staff would aggravate a heart condition that would kill him in 1922. McAndrew oversaw the actual formation of the General Staff School, the Army Line School, and Army (Officers) Candidate School, the Infantry Specialists School, and the Tank School. Malone and McAndrew would indeed spin gold from straw in making these schools ready to open and receive their first classes, but at this point the AEF's vision was exceeding its capacities; the general headquarters of the AEF, now located at Chaumont in eastern France, had only now instituted a method of opening and sorting mail, getting the right letter or memo to the correct section.33 Pershing also needed help dealing with the Europeans in acquiring war materials. Basically, the AEF was, and would continue to be, a beggar army, because America had entered the war unprepared. At one point there was not enough wool to make the Model 1917 uniforms that the majority of the doughboys wore to France. To compensate for this, Pershing knew he would have to make European purchases and that his supply section had neither the time nor the expertise to accomplish this daunting task. To deal with the matter, Pershing found an old friend, Charles Gates Dawes, and made him a brigadier general. A highly successful Chicago banker, Dawes had known Pershing when the general was an instructor and law student at the University of Nebraska. They shared Progressive Republican leanings and had remained in contact with each other over the years. When the war broke out, Dawes obtained a commission as a major of engineers, but as soon as possible Pershing had him in the AEF. One of the very few men who addressed Pershing as "My Dear John," Charles Dawes quickly became indispensable. He always looked a bit amused in uniform and usually sported a long, expensive cigar, but he quickly discerned what was needed for the AEF and found a way to obtain it. A purchasing board as envisioned by Pershing might indeed be illegal, since Congress had not authorized it, but the general waived objections aside and established this critical staff function.34 On 20 August 1917, orders were issued establishing the General Purchasing Board, which coordinated all European purchasing for the AEF, the Red Cross, and Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA).35 Dawes literally

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11

had a blank check to buy what the various department heads and organizations said they needed, without going through the Washington bureaucracy. Harbord had doubts about this civilian so recently turned soldier; Dawes, he believed, was "outspoken and apparently impulsive[;] he generally thinks things over and then puts them out in the impulsive manner. The air of impulsiveness is no indication that his verbal output is not based upon due deliberation."36 James G. Harbord, and indeed many of the AEF staff officers, found Dawes's civilian outspoken methods to be disquieting. Dawes was a successful man of business who was quick to make decisions and to speak his mind. He had little association with the methodical, often slow, military staff system which recognized rank as a key part of arriving at actions. To AEF Chief of Staff Harbord, Dawes's impulsive nature was not military, but that did not detract from Dawes's brilliance or from his growing importance to Pershing and the AEF. Of course Harbord was skeptical of a man who never seemed able to wear his uniform properly or remember correct military etiquette, but also Harbord jealously guarded his own personal relationship with Pershing. Charles G. Dawes was a man who could get things done and who was personally loyal to Pershing. On 30 August, Dawes, still a lieutenant colonel, was made the head of the General Purchasing Board by official orders. To make certain that Dawes did not totally upset the military applecart, Pershing assigned him a staff of eight bright and energetic regular army officers. Among them was the brilliant Maj. Edgar Staley Gorrell, one of the most knowledgeable soldiers in the area of aviation.37 Within the short space of three months, Pershing had seen his original group of officers grow considerably, and the staff had begun to take form. Pershing had a primary staff with five sections, and a special staff that functioned both at Chaumont and in Paris, but there were great pressures on everyone. The general had to continually resist attempts by the British and the French to amalgamate American soldiers into the depleted ranks of both armies. In this, Pershing was stubborn; he could hardly have been otherwise given his guidance from Newton Baker and Woodrow Wilson. In view of the tremendous patriotic outpouring for the war in the United States, no one could have done anything other than hold out to have U.S. troops fight under an American flag in an American sector. But Pershing was not the only one under pressure from the allies. As staff members made visits to learn from their counterparts in the field, they were continually told about the superiority of one system over another. Dennis Nolan visited the British army's intelligence section, where he met with Gen. John Charteris, Gen. Sir Douglas Haig's chief of intelligence, who extolled the superior virtues of the British system. Much to Nolan's surprise, Charteris told him that if he was not careful the French would try to run the AEF's intelligence. Charteris told Nolan not to let the French get near his section at Chaumont—"Don't even give them a desk," the English-

12

Pershing and His Generals

man warned.38 Nolan had already experienced French aggressiveness in intelligence matters, and he had no intention of allowing either the French or the British to run his section. On the other hand, the British and the French did have a point. The Americans had no experience whatsoever, and their staff was quite young, the average age being forty-three years. No one really knew if the AEF would ever have enough staff officers at any level actually to prepare and lead troops through combat. Pershing and his training officers had worked out a three-month rotation for training AEF divisions under British and French tutelage in the trenches. As far as the British and French were concerned in the fall of 1917, that was long enough, but at the same time Pershing did not really have any troops to train. The 1st Infantry Division was in the first stages of training, and by the late fall of 1917 the 2nd, 26th, and 42nd divisions would be ready to begin the cycle. The time line, then, for committing troops to battle was long indeed. One can only imagine the allies' frustration with the AEF when Dennis Nolan visited Marechal Philippe Petain's headquarters intelligence section and was given an eyeopening presentation on the breaking of German tactical codes and ciphers. Certainly Nolan wanted to use the French techniques, and he would have a certain Major Moorman, Nolan's codes and cipher officer, trained in the procedures. When Petain's staff asked at what time this Major Moorman would arrive for instruction, Nolan had to admit that he had yet to leave the United States.39 There were a number of missed communications among the various staffs. In late June, Fox Connor, Hugh Drum, and others traveled to Petain's headquarters to discuss training areas for the AEF. Petain's operations officers believed that they were to allocate areas for the 1st Division, which was slowly arriving in France. Connor then told the French that the Americans planned to have a million soldiers in France by the spring of 1918. There was silence; the French took a recess until late afternoon to discuss among themselves the now rather substantial areas required by the Americans. After consultation with senior French officers, an adjusted plan was formulated that would meet the needs of the AEF.40 What the French did not realize at the time was that even in the 1st Division almost two-thirds of the infantrymen were recent recruits, and that most companies had half the officers and NCOs required for leadership in combat.41 Reality was setting in for Pershing and his operations and training sections. It would be many months before the first doughboy fired a shot in anger at the enemy. By the end of August 1917, the AEF had good reason to feel inadequate for the task set before it. Troops were coming in slowly, and their state of training was minimal at best. It would be almost two months before the 1st Division went into quiet trenches, under the watchful eyes of the French. The euphoria of June had faded as the allies continually asked where the Americans were. American newspapers had announced that

The Genesis of the AEF Staff

13

American airplanes would soon darken the skies of Europe. Where were the planes? The United States did not have any that could be sent to France. The doughboys did not even have a satisfactory automatic rifle to train with. In September the first gas service units were formed, but they had to be trained. Soldiers preparing to go into intensive training using live ammunition did not have helmets and would have to buy or borrow them from the British. It was a dismal picture for Pershing and his staff at Chaumont. Pershing had a clear intent as far as training doctrine was concerned: the AEF would strive to implement maneuver warfare, getting the troops out of the trenches to engage and destroy the enemy. As one staff officer stated, the allies were not fighting to win—they were struggling not to lose. In Pershing's mind only the spirit of the offensive—the infantryman, his rifle and bayonet—was the key to eventual victory. What is important here is that Pershing's view became the position taken by the Chaumont staff. Pershing had impressed upon the staff his concepts, and, equally as important, the staff reflected his personality. It is wise to begin a military unit with a solid staff and then build around it. The AEF was on the right track as far as the staff was concerned. But would time allow the AEF to evolve into a combat unit? The general had every reason to be pleased with his staff, but he certainly was not happy with the flow of troops from the United States. Supplies were in a shambles, and the allies had not, by any means, given up their ideas of amalgamation. In the early winter of 1917 allied leaders were asking just where was the American army? The euphoria over seeing the first doughboys marching through Paris had faded. Many French and British leaders as well wondered if their battered armies could withstand another year of bloodshed. They had hoped that America would provide the necessary manpower to continue the fight, but as 1917 ended, there were no new troops ready for the battle. Would the slowness of the AEF prove to be more of a hindrance than assistance for the allies on the Western Front?

NOTES 1. Ireland to Society Members, Washington, 24 November 1925; and letter from Ireland to Society Members, Washington, 25 January 1932, in the John L. Hines Papers, Library of Congress, Washington. (Hereafter cited as LOC, with the collections individually cited.) 2. Pershing to John L. Hines, Fort Sam Houston, TX, 28 April 1917, in the John J. Pershing Papers, LOC. 3. John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, I (Blue Ridge Summitt, PA: Tab Books Reprint, 1989), 1. 4. James G. Harbord, Leaves from a War Diary (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1925), 63. 5. Operational Report, Mexico, 7 October 1916, in the Henry T. Allen Papers, LOC. 6. Ibid.

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7. Francis T. Julia, Army Staff Reorganization, 1903-1985 (Washington: Analysis Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), 1-^. 8. Johnson Hagood, The Services of Supply: A Memoir of the Great War (New York: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1927), 23-27. 9. Report by Major George O. Squier, 26 February 1915, in the George O. Squier Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute Archives, Carlisle Barracks, PA (hereafter cited as MHI). See also the Squier Diaries, also contained in the Squier Papers. 10. Pershing, Experiences, 1,16-17. 11. Robert Lee Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences of the War (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1925), 23. 12. Baker to Payton March, Cleveland, 3 October 1932, in the Peyton C. March Papers, LOC 13. Baker to March, Cleveland, 17 October 1932, Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Pershing, Experiences, I, 37-40. 16. Baker to March, Cleveland, 18 October 1929, March Papers, LOC; and Hagood, Services of Supply, 296-297. 17. Baker to March, Cleveland, 10 July 1928, March Papers, LOC. 18. Pershing to Allen, Chaumont, 11 November 1917, Allen Papers, LOC 19. James G. Harbord, The American Expeditionary Forces: Its Organization and Accomplishments (Evanston, IL: Evanston Publishing Co., 1929), 12-15. 20. Entry for 22 May 1917, Drum Diaries, Hugh Drum Papers, MHI. 21. Entry for 15 May 1917, Hines Diaries, John L. Hines Papers, MHI. 22. Pershing to Hines, El Paso, 28 April 1917, Pershing Papers, LOC. 23. Donald Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 13. 24. Moore to General S. H. Wolfe, New York, 3 November 1924, Hines Papers, LOC. 25. Harbord, Leaves, 10,14-16. 26. Harbord, American Expeditionary Forces, 19-20. 27. Entry for 13 June 1917, Drum Diaries, Drum Papers, MHI. 28. Nolan's typescript memoir commenting on Pershing's memoirs, completed between 1931 and 1932, p. 33, in the Dennis Nolan Papers, MHI. 29. "Staff Manual for Combat Units, United States Army," in the General H. B. Fiske Papers, Records Group 200, National Archives, Washington. 30. Pershing, Experiences, I, 100-1, Smythe, Pershing, 35-38, and Harbord, American Expeditionary Forces, 18-19. 31. Memo by Malone, Chaumont, 27 August 1917, in Records Group 120, Records of the AEF, General Headquarters, Carton 1608, National Archives, Washington. 32. Pershing, Experiences, 1,150-153. 33. Memo from Alvord to Pershing, Chaumont, 8 August 1917, Pershing Papers, LOC 34. Pershing, Experiences, 1,148-149. 35. General Orders No. 23, 20 August 1917, Pershing Papers, LOC 36. Harbord, Leaves, 353. See also Smythe, Pershing, 41-44. 37. General Orders No. 28, 30 August 1917, Pershing Papers, LOC

The Genesis of the AEF Staff

38. 39. 40. 41.

Nolan's typescript, 85, Nolan Papers, MHI. Ibid., 69. Entry for 28 June 1917, Drum Diaries, Drum Papers, MHI. Entry for 19 July 1917, ibid.

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Chapter 2

SOMEONE TO COMMAND In January of 1910, Captain John Leonard Hines was stationed in Nagasaki, Japan, and he was enjoying this strange and exotic land. However, nothing seemed to move at a rapid pace in the Orient. He had just received a telegram from Brigadier General John J. Pershing, an officer he knew well and respected greatly. In August 1908, before Hines arrived in the Orient, General and Mrs. Pershing, who were on their way to the Philippines, had stopped in Japan, where Mrs. Pershing had purchased a set of fine china. As yet the set had not arrived at their home in the Philippines, and Mrs. Pershing was somewhat dismayed. Would Hines try to find the missing china and send it either to Manila or to Zamboanga? Hines found the missing crate, and much to Mrs. Pershing's delight, it arrived in good shape.1 Over the years Hines had ample opportunity to work with Pershing, and in 1916, when Pershing was selected to command the punitive expedition into Mexico, he took Major Hines as his adjutant.2 Hines's wife was a constant correspondent with Pershing, especially after the tragic fire that took the lives of Mrs. Pershing and his three daughters in August 1915. She would write anything that might amuse the still-grieving widower. In 1916 an orchid was named for Pershing, and she described it for him; he replied, "I hope it sold at a high price, as I would not want anything named for me to be considered cheap."3 Even before Pershing left for Washington in April 1917, he told Hines, who was then serving at the headquarters of the Eastern Military Department at Governors Island, New York, "I miss you very much and if anything turns up I shall certainly want to have you with me."4 Hines was on the SS Baltic with his mentor and friend when it sailed for France. He went to Chaumont, as one of the assistants to the adjutant general, Benjamin Alvord. When asked by Pershing what he really wanted,

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Pershing and His Generals

Hines, now a colonel, requested a combat command. It was a wish that "Black Jack" Pershing could certainly grant. Pershing's ability to promote officers gave him tremendous power. There are very few commissioned officers who do not aspire to promotion, especially to general officer rank, and Pershing held the key; but there was a catch to General Pershing's authority, which came through the National Army, not the regular army. The so-called National Army, a force of draftees, had been created by law in 1916. With the declaration of war in 1917 National Army divisions were activated. To provide officers and commanders for those units, there were a large number of temporary high ranking officer positions created. There were also provisions for temporary general officer ranks to provide corps level staff and command structures. To find general officer positions for his officers, Pershing used the National Army structure to find stars. By law and regulations these general officer promotions, through the National Army, were only temporary, for the duration of the crisis. A colonel such as Dennis Nolan, as Chief of Intelligence for the AEF, had to be promoted to general officer in order to effectively deal with his British and French counterparts. Nolan could not, at that time, be promoted to brigadier general because no such slot existed in the regular army. His rank, and rank for others like him, had to be found in the temporary rank structure of the National Army. When hostilities ceased and the AEF became a memory, officers would have to revert to their former, lower grades. Despite that fact, if one did well as a general officer in France the chances of promotion after the war were greatly enhanced. Pershing certainly knew his powers, and if he tended to forget, James G. Harbord would forcefully remind him. This was an extraordinary situation, brought on by the rapid expansion of the army in 1917 and 1918 and by the unwillingness of the Army Chiefs of Staff, Hugh L. Scott and Tasker H. Bliss, to interfere with Pershing's prerogatives in selecting officers for command and staff positions. Pershing made up lists of officers for National Army promotion and sent them to the War Department. On 3 August 1917, for example, the general informed Washington that he wanted Benjamin Alvord, George B. Duncan, and James G. Harbord promoted to brigadier general. Pershing did not see the need to justify his selections to the War Department.5 Pershing could also use his powers to take away rank. He was determined that his subordinate commanders be youthful, physically fit, and competent. A good case in point is Pershing's relationship with Major General William L. Sibert, whom the War Department selected to command the 1st Infantry Division. Pershing was furious that the first American soldiers in France, regulars all, would be commanded by an engineer officer, and one who was fairly old and did not exude youth. Sibert had been an important figure in the building of the Panama Canal, where he served under Major General George Washington Goethals. Since his commissioning, Sibert had held

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engineering posts and had had no service with combat troops. His unfamiliarity with training and organization quickly began to tell on the 1st Division; in October there was a terrible scene at Sibert's command post after a badly mishandled critique of a field training exercise. It was clear that Pershing had no regard for Sibert at all.6 Harbord was worried that because Sibert had powerful friends in the United States, for Pershing to send him home could cause a firestorm in Washington. General Pershing knew that by virtue of his command and rank Sibert was actually the second-ranking officer in the AEF. But the time had come for Sibert to go.7 In mid-August Pershing had pondered a change in command in the 1st Division. In a memo to Harbord on the 18th the General stated that he was considering placing Charles T. Menoher in command and making Colonel Hanson Ely his chief of staff, with Colonel Beaumont Bonaparte Buck as the provost marshal.8 Menoher would get a divisional command, and he would do a fine job, but the time was not yet right to relieve Sibert. It soon came to Pershing's attention that there were other training problems within the division as well, and that these problems could be traced back to Sibert. Robert Bullard, who would eventually command the 1st Division, had very little respect for Sibert, dating back to the embarkation of the division from the docks at Hoboken, New Jersey; Bullard had been angered that Sibert was not present to oversee the sailing of his troops and seemed to manifest little interest in the operation.9 Bullard also clashed with Sibert over the question of schools, with Bullard favoring the idea of intensive training before committing the division to combat. It seemed to Bullard that Sibert had little enthusiasm for implementing the policies of AEF general headquarters.10 On 6 September, Sibert, without Pershing's permission, left his division for an unspecified purpose. Pershing exploded and on 7 September sent a stinging reprimand to Sibert.11 The final straw came in December, when word reached Pershing that Americans who had visited the training areas had come away with a distinct impression that the local commanders were pessimistic about future operations of the AEF. The general exploded once again and sent a letter to selected general officers in the AEF, but it was clear that the missive was meant especially for Sibert. The letter outlined the failure of general officers to convey a spirit of optimism and confidence to visiting civilians. Pershing asserted that pessimistic statements could only sap the confidence and fighting elan of the troops under their command. He then warned, "Whenever the visible effects of it [pessimism] on the command of such an officer reach me in the future, it will constitute grounds for his removal without application."12 This was serious because "without application" meant that the removed officer could not apply for an immediate hearing. His loss of command was, therefore, permanent, and the chance of ever getting another divisional command was nil. The letter was sent to Sibert and other generals on 13 December, but the orders relieving him and placing Robert Lee Bullard in command had been

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prepared on the 12th by Colonel "Corky" Davis.13 Both documents reached Sibert at the same time, and Sibert responded in a bitter letter that disputed each point of the pessimism directive and challenged the orders that relieved him. Realizing that he was fighting for his military career, Sibert told Pershing that he wanted to remain in France until a formal court of inquiry could decide the validity of his relief.14 Davis prepared a reply for Pershing, stating that though the orders relieving him of command had been prepared before the pessimism letter was sent, Sibert was to report in person to the Adjutant General in Washington for further assignment. There were no charges, only orders for Sibert to leave for the United States for a change in assignment.15 The lesson was clear to those who wore stars or aspired to command or staff positions at general officers: Sibert did indeed have powerful friends, but Pershing was supreme in France. The Chief of Staff in Washington and Newton Baker were certainly not inclined to challenge him. Another case in point was the relief of General William Mann, commander of the National Guard's 42nd, or "Rainbow," Division. Mann had several strikes against him as far as Pershing was concerned. First, he was sixty-three years old and overweight; second, he challenged Pershing's authority and won, and third, Mann was associated with the politically powerful National Guard lobby, having been the chief of the Militia Bureau when the war broke out. It was Pershing's policy that every fourth division to arrive in France would be used as a depot division, to provide men and equipment to the three previously arrived divisions. The depot division was to actually serve the needs of an army corps, once corps were constituted by the AEF. The 42nd Division was scheduled to arrive after the 1st, 2nd, and 26th Divisions and would therefore be the depot unit. But Pershing had opened a political can of worms. The 42nd Division was made up of National Guard units from twenty-six states and the District of Columbia, its formation had been approved by Newton Baker, and it was a favorite of state governors who had been badgering the White House to get their militia units to France. Pershing had no faith in National Guard commanders and made no bones about it. He became determined to use the division exactly as he planned, but General Mann and his young chief of staff, Colonel Douglas MacArthur, cabled the United States and called in a lot of political muscle. Eventually, in early November 1917, Pershing had to back down and make the 41st Division the first depot division, but he never forgot what the overaged, overweight, and not especially energetic Mann had done.16 The 42nd went on to compile a superb combat record, and eventually Pershing used them in hot combat situations. On 15 December 1917, Pershing ordered Charles T. Menoher to take command of the Rainbow to replace Mann, and his record became one to be envied. While Pershing had failed to use the division as he wished, he did get rid of Mann and find a divisional

Someone to Command

21

command for Menoher. It was a good object lesson for those in the AEF, even for those with political connections. There certainly was never hesitation in the AEF to remove an officer seen as not up to the Pershing standard; a few were unfairly treated but few unfit officers survived the system. There were constant requests that officers be sent to the AEF, and General Bliss was only too happy to comply. The shortage of officers was as critical to Washington as it was for the AEF, and no one could be certain which officer selected to command a division or brigade would do well. In the fall of 1917, Newton Baker decided to send a group of officers, all selected to command divisions, to France to see the AEF and the type of warfare upon which they were about to embark. Pershing was not pleased with Baker's modest initiative, but he used it to the AEF's advantage. The General decided to use the trip as in effect a job interview; the AEF would be watching closely as those officers observed activities at Chaumont and at the front. The questions, basically, were: did the officers meet Pershing's high standards of appearance? Did they have stamina? What was their grasp of the situation? Finally, could they relate what they saw with clarity? (Pershing had little time for officers who wasted his time with verbosity and vagueness. At one point he told Harbord that certain staff officers' memos and bulletins were "too rambling, too much language, too many circumlocutions, too many indefinite phrases.")17 Harbord was to oversee the feedback from the visiting officers. Pershing was direct and to the point: there was to be a short oral presentation with no personal anecdotes. No one would repeat what was common knowledge, and an outline of the verbal report was to be submitted to Harbord beforehand.18 Once the officers completed their grueling schedule they took a physical examination, the results of which went to Harbord. (Henry T. Allen, who commanded the 90th Division—known as the "Tough Ombres," made up of Texans and Oklahomans—made a special point in his after-action report to Pershing of his excellent physical condition.19 A few weeks later he sent Pershing a personal letter that, among other things, stressed his first-rate health and stamina.20 Allen was lucky in that Pershing already wanted him in the AEF; he fit into Pershing's scheme of high command.) Usually the visiting major generals received a bad report from Pershing, which reduced their chances of going to the AEF considerably.21 An officer was not allowed much margin of error in the AEF. In March 1918 Pershing pressured Washington to relieve incompetent officers before their divisions left for France. He instructed Harbord, "Let us take up again the question of weeding out inefficient officers before departure of divisions from the States. I think this should be made especially applicable to National Guard divisions, in which our experience shows there is a tendency to hold on to weaklings and weed them out over here. This is a mistake, because we have not men to replace them."22 Pershing never did address the question of who was competent to do the weeding in the United States,

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Pershing and His Generals

inasmuch as he had most of the solid officers with him in the AEF. In the National Army divisions there was such a turnover of officers and men that it was very difficult to tell who was or was not competent. Well into 1918 there was a severe problem with keeping the new divisions intact. Henry Allen, who was getting his 90th Division ready to go to France, complained to a friend on the General Staff, "Under the existing policy we find our divisions still being depleted, largely to fill up so called Regular Divisions. . . . It is simply heart-breaking to continually take away trained men from company, battalion, regimental, and brigade commanders."23 Very early in the war Baker and General Hugh Scott discussed how the AEF would be reinforced. The decision, which Pershing accepted because he could not very well direct policies in the United States and also keep the AEF moving, was to form entire divisions rather than use a replacement pool. Commands would go from basic to advanced training as units, rather than having men go through basic training individually and then be assigned to a division. Baker's rationale was, "If we had set up a couple of camps containing say one hundred thousand men for the training of replacement troops as such, the country at the outset would have been shocked to discover how large we thought the losses were likely to be."24 Baker and Bliss also decided that it would be best to have unit cohesion from the start, with men being always associated with one combat unit. The arguments for morale, unit identification, and esprit de corps were valid, but the depletion of units to fill others departing for France hurt badly. The shifting of officers and men often also meant that large numbers of troops went to departing units with little or no experience or training, and the results would be tragic. Pershing was well aware of the training problems in the United States and continually complained about the poor preparation of the troops arriving in France. His main concerns, however, focused on the AEF, and his difficulties mounted every day. When it was announced that Secretary of War Baker would visit France, Harbord could hardly contain himself. "Certainly the time has arrived," he wrote to Pershing, "when you must cease to deal with divisions and other units and deal with Generals. You are confronted with conditions where you have to exact results without partiality, favor or affection for the claims of any individual, be it based on seniority or anything except efficiency"25 But Harbord was not finished with his advice. "The time has come," he continued, "when you should in cold blood throw overboard all considerations of seniority and reach for the man you want to have as low as the grade of captain or lower to get him."26 Harbord had good reason to be concerned about Pershing's selection of general officers, because there was a new major player on the scene. In March 1918 Major General Peyton Conway March became Acting Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Pershing had been associated with March in the AEF when March had served as 1st Division's artillery brigade

Someone to Command

23

commander and then as chief of artillery for the AEF. Of more importance, however, was the fact that Harbord regarded Peyton March as an enemy and a potential troublemaker. March had graduated from West Point in 1886 and had known Pershing from Academy days. Their paths had crossed over the years, most recently when Colonel March commanded the 8th Field Artillery on the Mexican border from 1916 to 1917. He held, as did Pershing, the rank of major general in the regular army, but they had never been competitors. Very few officers who had any lengthy contact with March liked him; he was arrogant and overbearing. His personality traits grew from his immense capability and his drive to excel in any task given to him. It was fairly obvious that March would not be content to be a carbon copy of Hugh Scott or Tasker Bliss. He was not Pershing's first choice as Chief of Staff, but when the appointment was made Pershing did not object.27 If anyone was unhappy with the selection it was James Guthrie Harbord, and he intended to let Pershing know about it. Had personalities been different, the selection of March would have been a godsend for the AEF. Since the summer of 1917 Pershing had been locked in an endless round of complaints to the War Department, over everything from the slow movement of troops to France to the confused nature of shipping of supplies. For example, in September 1917 Pershing nearly exploded with anger over a breakdown in logistics; four ships lay in the harbor at Saint Nazaire for days with nothing done to unload them—further, they had no cargo manifests, so no one could tell what they contained.28 By the end of the year the AEF had only four divisions in France—1st, 2nd, 26th, and 42nd—and almost no non-divisional artillery units. The shipment of goods on French railroads from the ports had never really started. The failure rested with Major General R. M. Blatchford, who was overwhelmed by the task of organizing the line of communication (LOC) running from the base ports to the troops at the front. Pershing replaced Blatchford with General Francis Kernan, and Harbord appointed Colonel Johnson Hagood as commander of the advance section of the LOC. When Hagood arrived in the city of Neufchateau to take over his duties, he found Blatchford billeting officers and allocating office space.29 This was a major general doing a captain's job while waiting to be returned to the United States and military oblivion. Things were moving at a snail's pace just when the allies wanted American troops in combat. There could be no question that March got things done as the Chief of Staff, with sheer ruthlessness and by terrorizing his subordinates. The War Department began to change rapidly30 He allowed very little interference from Newton Baker, who had a very confused view of the relationship of his office, the Chief of Staff, and Pershing. Tasker Bliss had seemed content as Chief of Staff to subordinate himself to Pershing, and had Baker approved. But, as one observer stated, "Bliss was disliked by most people in the War Department; he was the kind who was always pussy-footing

24

Pershing and His Generals

around, standing behind posts to listen in on conversations, spying on clerks to see what they were doing, etc." 31 This was not March's way of doing business, even with Newton Baker. March himself recounted an incident that was indicative of the new style in the War Department. Baker asked him a question about artillery matters, and March gave him an answer. Baker then asked if March was going to send the matter to the War College Division for further study and possible recommendations; March fell silent, then said, "Mr. Secretary, this is my answer." He turned on his heels and left a stunned Baker sitting at his desk. A few days later Baker brought up March's unorthodox manner toward his civilian superior. March quickly informed Baker that he knew the subject and had made a decision; time was too precious to waste sending decisions to other people for evaluation. 32 Certainly, this man was neither Hugh Scott nor Tasker Bliss. In a 1947 interview March continually referred to himself as, during his tenure as Chief of staff, "the rude March" and the "uncouth March." With two strong personalities, Pershing at Chaumont and March in Washington, there were bound to be clashes, and none were more bitter than those over officer assignments and promotions. March intended to be a Chief of Staff, not a rubber stamp for Pershing and the AEF, but March had a poor staff to work with. Major General Henry T. Allen wrote to Pershing after a brief trip to Washington, "The lack of team work in the War Department proper is in my opinion primarily due to the emasculation of the General Staff by sending away nearly all its members, and in this I fear Bliss was the principal sinner." 33 This was quite true, in that Pershing had gotten the lion's share of first-rate officers, while those like Allen were sent to command National Army or regular army divisions. Almost all of the qualified Air Service officers were in France, and the Quartermaster Corps was gutted by detachments for service in the AEF. This was a situation March could not tolerate for very long, and he planned to do something about it. March had a sensible plan for both staffs. He wanted to rotate qualified staff officers from the War Department to the AEF and bring experienced ones from Chaumont to Washington. This would give both groups of men a new perspective on wartime operations, and each group could come to appreciate the problems of the other. This cross-fertilization might indeed provide timely answers to some vexing problems. This plan first surfaced in March 1918, while the AEF staff was undergoing internal changes in the way it did business. Since January, Harbord had been trying to get Pershing to provide information about his many visits to units; the men who went with Pershing were not forthcoming as to what they had seen and, Harbord told Pershing, this lack of information for the staff "invites crossing of wires and lack of coordination." 34 Detailed reports from such visits were vitally important, as they are today. No staff officer, by the nature of his position, can ever hope to know what is going on in subordinate commands unless someone

Someone to Command

25

tells him. These reports either validate policies or indicate the need for reevaluation or change. Normally there is a reluctance to send staff officers to subordinate units, because those commands quickly feel they are being meddled with. Harbord at least had staff officers who went with Pershing on tours or who went on visits take notes and share them. It was a major step forward in the professionalization of Pershing's staff, and Harbord deeply resented what he perceived to be March's unwarranted tinkering. When the question of the exchange of staff officers surfaced, the entire Western Front was in the grip of the first great German offensive of 1918. Since the number of divisions in the AEF had increased dramatically after the new year, the pressures on Pershing to commit American troops to battle were enormous. Under great stress, in late March Pershing released the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 42nd divisions. That meant, much to the General's displeasure, that only infantry and machine-gun units would be shipped from the United States, and divisions already in training would have their schedules shortened. It is little wonder that Pershing had scant time to worry about the AEF staff and deferred to Harbord, who had his own agenda. March never intended to disrupt the AEF staff with wholesale interchanges of officers, but this is how Harbord chose to interpret the matter. On 16 March, only five days before the German offensive began, Harbord wrote to Pershing, "This is war and you can not in justice to your command or yourself, rob it of officers you have selected and trained in order to provide General March with an efficient staff."35 Harbord then suggested that Pershing go directly to Newton Baker, who was visiting in France at the time, and have Baker simply kill the March proposal. Pershing had no intention of having a civilian intervene in a problem between career army officers; he would at some point contact March directly. Also, the General was concerned about the health of the Secretary. On 29 March, at Chaumont, Pershing talked to Ralph A. Hayes, Baker's personal secretary, about Baker's hectic schedule, which included tours of every facility in France. Baker planned on the morrow to visit Major General Clarence Edwards and the 26th Division, and later to go to the Menoher's 42nd Division. Pershing pointed out to Hayes the obvious, that Baker was not accustomed to the rigors of the front after being in an office in Washington, and the personal secretary promised to bring u p his concerns to Baker. The next day, in a driving rainstorm, Baker departed Chaumont to visit the 26th Division. 36 It would simply have been bad form to bring up the question of officer exchanges with Baker at that time. The former pacifist, now sporting a military overcoat, high leather boots, and doughboy steel helmet, could not be drawn into the question. With only partial information, Pershing responded to March, who must have been somewhat surprised by the tone of Pershing's response. The tone of the letter was an unmistakable "no"; as the General indicated, the AEF was in the process of forming three corps and was building the base of the

26

Pershing and His Generals

First United States Army (FUSA). Also, Pershing had a policy of rotating staff officers with the combat troops, which meant that potential staff officers in France at any one time were limited in number. March must have wondered just how effective the General Staff School at Langres was if, as Pershing said, there were only sixty-one qualified general staff officers in the AEF. Then, and it must have stung March, Pershing wrote, "A much broader view of the question should be taken than the consideration of personal wishes of officers in Washington for service abroad. In any exchange of officers those from America should arrive before any leave France."37 That was, however, what Pershing himself had done in 1917, taking into consideration the wishes of those he knew to be effective officers and bringing them to France regardless of the needs of the staff or the War Department at home. If relations soured between Pershing and March, it was because both men allowed them to deteriorate. John J. Pershing's view of the war was oriented to the Western Front and the AEF. March had to struggle with a staff that had been allowed to atrophy, while there were more men training in the United States than Pershing would ever have in the AEF. The AEF under General John J. "Black Jack" Pershing was a highly personal affair. Pershing had set his standards—good physical condition, efficiency, aggressiveness, smart appearance, etc.—and those who met, or who had met in the past, those standards were Pershing's officers, both in command and staff. They formed a closed shop. His men wore the jaunty overseas cap and the expensive Sam Browne belt, and they sported overseas stripes, wound stripes, decorations, and eventually the left-shoulder unit patches. He had created a world apart. James G. Harbord remembered Pershing's lavish praise for "his men": "This body of officers, both as individuals and as an organization have, [sic] I believe, no superiors in professional ability or loyalty."38 Some, like John L. Hines, would go far, while others, like Beaumont Bonaparte Buck, would fall by the wayside, but Pershing prized loyalty, and those who evinced had promising futures. In keeping with this personal structure, Pershing involved himself deeply, probably too deeply, in overseeing the command and staff of subordinate units, even down to the company, battery, and troop level. Here is one of the interesting anomalies of the AEF: the command and staff structure was highly personal, yet Pershing comes across to us as cold and aloof. No troops would ever cheer for "Black Jack" Pershing as they had for Robert E. Lee or George B. McClellan, but he could elicit the highest forms of devotion. Harbord, as his chief of staff, knew that this condition existed and in his own way sought to make the General aware of it. During the great expansion of the AEF in 1918, Harbord wrote to Pershing, "There is not . . . the close feeling which there should be on the part of those generals toward you. They respect you and are afraid of you, but I fear drifting into the latter attitude too much to the exclusion of a warmer feeling

Someone to Command

27

which means so much in the soldier business— I think it is time to go after a more personal loyalty and enthusiasm from your command."39 Pershing could not be a back-slapping general full of bonhomie because it was not in his nature; he was never loved by his troops. But he was made into a living icon. Woe betide those who felt the stony stare of a John J. Pershing. When Pershing left Chaumont to visit units either at the front or in training, he did not limit himself to a briefing from the divisional staff and a visit with the unit's commander. He wanted to see for himself the status of those he was preparing for mortal combat. Pershing inspected below the divisional level, to brigades and regiments. In February, when Pershing visited the 1st Infantry Division, he even went to individual gun positions.40 Visiting Base Hospital Number 36 at Vittel, Pershing was livid that the installation "was dirty and it was very evident that the discipline was poor."41 When he put in an appearance at the newly arrived 80th Division under Major General Adelbert Cronkhite, he was pleased and had a feeling that this would become a solid division. In July, when Pershing inspected every element of the 30th "Old Hickory" National Guard Division, he was ecstatic. "This division," Pershing confided to his diary, "is composed of men from the mountains of North Carolina, East Tennessee, and Alabama, and is extraordinarily good material for making soldiers." However, he went on, "The Division Commander [Major General John Faison] had not arranged any program for visiting his troops. . . . He seemed to have no energy or grasp of the situation."42 Before the great battles of the fall of 1918, the 30th Division would have a new, Pershing-selected, commander. The case of General Omar Bundy displays a Pershing more cautious in the matter of replacing divisional commanders. Bundy, who had known Pershing at West Point, came to France early; Pershing assigned him to command a brigade in the 1st Division. Robert Lee Bullard commanded the other brigade. By October Pershing had enough confidence in Bundy to give him command of the hybrid 2nd Infantry Division, which had one army infantry brigade and one Marine Corps brigade. Bundy's promotion to major general in the National Army dated from 21 August 1917, which made him one of the most senior in the AEF. But by the spring of 1918 Pershing had begun to have grave doubts about Bundy's ability to command the 2nd Division, although it gave every indication of becoming one of the best fighting units of the AEF. James G. Harbord had been sent on 30 April 1918 to command the marine brigade of the division, when Brigadier General Charles A. Doyen, USMC, was found by a medical board to be physically unable to continue in command.43 About the same time, Pershing began to record in his diary his doubts about Bundy. The two events are unrelated, but with Harbord at 2nd Division Pershing made more inspection trips to the unit. There is, however, an interesting comment in Pershing's diary for 4 June: "Had a long talk with Harbord There are some reports that General Bundy is not equal to the task."

28

Pershing and His Generals

On 9 June Pershing again visited the division, and he wrote, "General Bundy disappoints me. He lacks the grasp. I shall have to relieve him at the first opportunity."44 Between May and July there were no less than three bad reports on Bundy, coming from AEF inspectors directly to Pershing. Colonel Leroy Eltinge and Major General Andre Brewster, the AEF's inspector general, criticized Bundy; on 15 July Brewster urged Pershing to relieve him. Pershing did so that very day, by orders dated 14 July.45 Bundy, however, was not sent immediately back to the United States; on 19 August he was given command of the not-yet-formed VI Corps. It was not until 11 October that Bundy was ordered to report to the Chief of Staff in Washington.46 Unlike Mann or Sibert, Bundy was "kicked upstairs" until it was clear that he would have to have an active corps command or be sent home. When an officer was relieved, except in extraordinary circumstances, he was sent to the Officer Reclassification Center at Blois, where a process of examination and evaluation was started. Those who offered some promise were sent to other jobs, usually in the Service of Supply. Many National Guard officers who had been relieved from duties with combat units had civilian skills that could be used by the supply organization. In a massive expansion such as began in 1917, there were many round pegs trying to fit into square holes. Some regular officers who had been engineers or quartermasters prior to 1917 were simply unsuited to command infantry or artillery units in combat, but there was no reason to send these men back to the United States. Pershing was concerned about it and directed Harbord, as chief of staff, to find "the best disposition to make of officers who are found unsuited for service at the front; that something should be done with them other than sending them to the United States, as some worthless officers are liable to take advantage of this means of getting back home."47 Once Blois was established, it did offer those officers who knew that they were not combat leaders an opportunity to seek other jobs without ruining their careers in the army or their reputations back home. Symptomatic of an expanding, modern army with its exploding paperwork, detailed records of every officer who passed through Blois were kept. Staff and command, as the army rapidly expanded after April, 1917, was not an easy job for anyone, because there were no precedents to follow. Tensions between the AEF in France and the General Staff and the War Department in Washington were bound to mount, especially after Peyton March became the Chief of Staff and actually acted like a Chief of Staff instead of one of Pershing's subordinates, as Hugh Scott and Tasker Bliss had done. By the time March arrived in Washington in the spring of 1918 the patterns were set, and trying to get the army's house in order would be a very difficult task indeed. Things were not made any easier by the AEF's becoming a highly personal organization, with Pershing protective of men who loyally served him. He could be stern, often ruthless, with officers who failed, but the rewards of the general's favor were to be great and long-

Someone to Command

29

lasting. M o s t of the p r o m i s i n g officers in the service w e r e w i t h P e r s h i n g in France, a n d this created a gulf b e t w e e n t h e m a n d those w h o r e m a i n e d b e h i n d . The p a t t e r n s set b y Pershing a n d the m e n w h o w e r e his successful s u b o r d i n a t e s w o u l d affect the a r m y for d e c a d e s to come.

NOTES 1. Pershing to Hines, Manila, 27 January 1910, in the John J. Pershing Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. (Hereafter cited as LOC, with the collections individually cited.) 2. Operational Report, Mexico, 7 October 1916, Henry T. Allen Papers, LOC. 3. Pershing to Hines, San Antonio, TX, 28 April 1928, Pershing Papers, LOC. 4. Ibid. 5. Pershing to the War Department, Chaumont, 3 August 1917, in the James G. Harbord Papers, LOC. 6. Donald Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 54-56. 7. James G. Harbord, Leaves from a War Diary (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1925), 200-203. 8. Pershing to Harbord, Paris, 18 August 1917, Harbord Papers, LOC. 9. Robert Lee Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences of the War (Garden City: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1925), 28-29. 10. Ibid., 63-65. 11. Pershing to Sibert, Paris, 7 September 1917, John J. Pershing Papers, Records Group 200, National Archives, Washington, D C (Hereafter cited as RG 200.) 12. Pershing to General Officers, AEF, Chaumont, 13 December 1917, Charles P. Summerall Papers, LOC. While Summerall was not a target of the warning, he received a copy "for information and guidance." 13. Special Orders No. 185,12 December 1917, Records Group 120, Records of the Adjutant General, AEF, National Archives, Washington DC, Carton 2267. (Hereafter cited as RG 120.) 14. Sibert to Pershing, France, 15 December 1917, ibid. 15. Davis to Sibert, Chaumont, 15 December 1917, ibid. 16. For a detailed discussion of the controversy see James J. Cooke, The Rainbow Division in the Great War, 1917-1919 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 1994), 20-24. See also Smythe, Pershing, 61-62. 17. Pershing to Harbord, Chaumont, 7 March 1918, Harbord Papers, LOC. 18. Pershing to Harbord, Chaumont, 9 October 1918, ibid. 19. After Action Report, Allen to Pershing, Camp Travis, TX, 27 January 1918, Allen Papers, LOC. 20. Allen to Pershing, Camp Travis, TX, 1 March 1918, ibid. 21. Smythe, Pershing, 54. 22. Pershing to Harbord, Chaumont, 28 February 1918, Harbord Papers, LOC. 23. Allen to Colonel Daniel W. Ketchum, Camp Travis, TX, 10 March 1918, Allen Papers, LOC 24. Baker to Peyton C March, Cleveland, 3 October 1932, Peyton C March Papers, LOC.

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Pershing and His Generals

25. Harbord to Pershing, Chaumont, 8 March 1918, Harbord Papers, L O C 26. Ibid. 27. Smythe, Pershing, 88. 28. Pershing to Harbord, Chaumont, 15 September 1918, Harbord Papers, LOC. 29. Entries 24 October and 1 November 1917, Hagood Diaries, Johnson Hagood Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute Archives, Carlisle Barracks, PA. (Hereafter cited as MHI); and Johnson Hagood, The Services of Supply: A Memoir of the Great War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1927), 43. 30. Smythe, Pershing, 90-91. 31. Interview with Grace L. Palmer, Washington, 3 December 1947, Army General Staff Interviews, MHI. 32. Interview with Peyton C. March, Washington, 13 October 1947, ibid. 33. Allen to Pershing, Camp Travis, TX, 1 March 1918, Allen Papers, LOC. 34. Harbord to Pershing, Chaumont, 25 January 1918, Harbord Papers, L O C 35. Harbord to Pershing, Chaumont, 16 March 1918, ibid. 36. Ralph A. Hayes, Secretary Baker at the Front (New York: The Century Co., 1918), 80-81. 37. Pershing to March, Chaumont, 28 March 1918, Harbord Papers, L O C 38. James G. Harbord, The American Expeditionary Forces: Its Organization and Accomplishments (Evanston, IL: The Evanston Publishing Co., 1929), 30. 39. Harbord to Pershing, Chaumont, 8 March 1918, Harbord Papers, LOC. 40. Entry for 16 February 1918, Pershing Diaries, Pershing Papers, LOC. 41. Entry for 18 February 1918, ibid. 42. Entry for 1 July 1918, ibid. 43. Harbord, Leaves, 278. 44. Entry 9 June 1918, Pershing Diaries, Pershing Papers, LOC 45. Davis to Bundy, Chaumont, 14 July 1918, RG 120, Records of Robert C Davis, Adjutant General, AEF, Carton 2267. 46. Pershing to March, Chaumont, 11 October 1918, ibid. 47. Entry for 17 April 1918, Pershing Diaries, Pershing Papers, L O C

Chapter 3

REFINING THE AEF STAFF John J. Pershing knew that building a staff did not mean just having five sections with a number of competent officers in each. His primary staff would serve him well with long hours, hard work, and good advice. Pershing also needed a special staff—officers with critical, specialized skills who would handle technical questions beyond the time and training of the primary staff. Chemical warfare, medical support, communications, combat engineering, and aviation were fields requiring experts who would be available to assist the staff and the commander in training and in combat operations. Of particular interest to "Black Jack" Pershing was aviation. In that new area he needed a good man at AEF general staff headquarters to give expert opinions, work with the intelligence and operational sections, and plan for what must be a rapid expansion of the U.S. Air Service in France. In the fall of 1917 Pershing had to make a choice, and he had before him the records of one Colonel William D. "Billy" Mitchell. Mitchell, a rated pilot, had been an observer in Europe before the arrival of the AEF and brought a good deal of experience to Pershing's growing staff. But Mitchell had a bad reputation as being not a real team player, and his manner was usually abrasive. After listening to those around him, Pershing decided that Mitchell would be placed "in charge of tactical aviation when necessary."1 Early in the life of the AEF, Billy Mitchell had earned the distrust of Pershing and had garnered the enmity of some key staff officers. Pershing fretted a good deal over his aviation. He had seen the potential of air during the punitive expedition into Mexico in 1916 and 1917. Of all the American general officers, Pershing was one of the most air-minded, and in 1916, when Pershing requested more air support, Secretary of War

32

Pershing and His Generals

Newton Baker was inclined to send him what he wanted. Baker brought up the question with General Tasker Bliss, who exploded. Newton Baker would recall, "I can still hear him telling me that 'airplanes are all nonsense, what you need Mr. Secretary is cavalry' "2 Baker tried to get aircraft and pilots to Pershing but found out that the 1st Aero Squadron had obsolete, unserviceable planes and that what planes did reach Pershing's expeditions needed large amounts of maintenance and repair. It was a good lesson for Baker and for Pershing. On 3 September 1917, Brigadier General William Kenly became chief of the air service at Chaumont. This assignment elevated the air service of the AEF to general level, and it made the chief of the AEF's air arm equal in rank to the chief signal officer in Washington. The air service was a part of the Signal Corps in 1917, and Pershing wanted to create a separate service in France under dedicated air officers. It was a major step in the formation of the special staff of technical experts that would have to function if Pershing's plans for the AEF were to materialize.3 In many ways it was easier to build a special staff than his regular one, because Pershing could bring in competent civilians from civilian life, like Charles G. Dawes, and assign lower-ranking career officers to see that they remained focused on the task and did not become swamped with military paperwork and terminology. This is what Pershing did with Brigadier General William W. Atterbury, who ran the AEF's railway system. On the other hand, very little in civilian life could prepare a person to be an operations or intelligence officer. It was to overcome this serious shortfall that Pershing authorized the establishment of the General Staff College at Langres, France. What concerned Pershing in September 1917 was the length of time an officer would spend at Langres learning the basics of being a staff officer. Colonel Paul B. Malone of the training section proposed three months as the minimum; General Pershing lamented the fact that although three months would lay the groundwork, the rest would have to be learned while actually doing the staff job in combat.4 The staff problems were compounded for Pershing in that he had to see that each combat division had competent staffs and that the projected corps had men who knew something about staff procedures. As the AEF looked forward to forming the First United States Army in the summer of 1918, there was also a need to have a staff prepared to handle army-level functions. Basically, staffs began at the regimental level where the emphasis, because of the combat nature of the regiment, was on operations, intelligence, and logistics. For example, the regimental intelligence officer (not yet called an S-2) had to be able to receive information from the division and make it applicable to the combat mission of the regiment, collect patrol reports from the companies and battalions and make sense of those, direct communications-intercept activities, and provide the commander and the

Refining the AEF Staff

33

operations section an accurate picture (one hoped) of the enemy order of battle in the sector in which they were operating. The regimental intelligence officer had to oversee the processing of prisoners of war and their documents, and to speed enemy prisoners with information back to the division. The intelligence officer also had to coordinate with the air officer to get photographs from air reconnaissance missions, and he had to be in touch with intelligence personnel in the artillery regiments and brigade for information received from balloon observation. The tasks were daunting indeed, and foolish was the regimental or divisional commander who did not put into that position an officer with intelligence, education, and initiative. The brigade staff, which oversaw the combat activities of two infantry or three artillery regiments, played a small role in the intelligence flow from regiment to division. The divisional intelligence officer had to tie all elements together, inform corps of activities, and be a mirror of the corps and regimental intelligence staffs. When the United States went to war in April 1917, there were four intelligence-oriented officers on the General Staff at the War Department. Obviously the shortage of trained intelligence officers and NCOs was critical. Could the staff school at Langres produce intelligence officers in sufficient quantity? Probably not. There were several critical problems with the whole concept of schools for the AEF. The first was time. Pershing was under great pressure to get doughboys into the fighting, and schools would prolong that time. The British and French were openly critical of the length of time it took to get Americans into the trenches. When an American soldier driving a motorcar in Paris hit a Frenchman, the joke was that the Americans were spending their time killing Frenchmen, not Germans.5 The next problem was one that all commanders face. If one has an excellent combat officer who promises to be a first-class staff member does the commander want him to be away from his unit for several months just at the time the commander is trying to build cohesion in the staffs of the division or regiment? Also, how many British and French officers would have to be employed at the General Staff College at Langres to make the curriculum really worthwhile for combat units? This was a sore point for General Pershing, because, as noted, he believed that the British and French had been robbed of their offensive spirit and had become tied to the trenches. Pershing was committed to the "cult of the rifle," and a massive influx of British and French instructors worried him.6 On the other hand, Pershing certainly could not strip his staff to provide large numbers of permanent teachers. Since Langres was only about thirty miles away from Chaumont, a guest lecture by a staff officer would not hurt the operations of the AEF staff, but beyond that Pershing could not spare the Leavenworth-trained men. The decision Pershing made was the only one he could make. Despite all of the drawbacks for the AEF, the school system was to be put into place.

34

Pershing and His Generals

Units were training in ever-increasing numbers, and staff officers had to be trained in an accelerated program. Langres was selected by Malone, Fox Connor, and Hugh Drum because it fit all of the requirements of centrality for the AEF. It was on a major paved road and could accommodate a number of schools in facilities that offered economy of space and enough billets for the troops. It was close enough to the front that visits could be made by students, but the schools were "far enough away from the front to be comparatively safe from hostile air craft."7 With the establishment of the school system at Langres, another of Pershing's ideas was reinforced. He wanted AEF facilities and training areas close to the area he had selected as the zone of operations. Malone knew what Pershing wanted, and it was spelled out in the original August 1917 document, which Pershing approved. On 19 September Pershing cabled the War Department announcing the creation of the General Staff College at Langres. At the same time Pershing requested that a hundred line officers with the rank of major or above be sent to France on 1 October to prepare to undertake the course of study. Weeks passed without response from the War Department, which infuriated Pershing, whose relations with Washington were already icy cold. On 28 October the War Department sent a cable stating that it had detailed fourteen officers to proceed to France, but no one else could be spared. Colonel Malone enlisted the aid of General Harbord to make up the eighty-six-officer shortfall from the divisions that were already training or were arriving in France.8 This was something that Pershing had wanted to avoid; he had felt that by requesting officers from the United States he would take pressure off the four divisions (1st, 2nd, 26th, and 42nd) that constituted the only United States combat presence in France. As Pershing expected, reaction to the detailing of promising officers to the General Staff College was immediate. General Sibert, commanding the 1st Infantry Division, resisted sending anyone, and Major General Clarence Edwards of the 26th Division did likewise, but the decision had been made. Those divisions, like it or not, would send officers of sufficient rank to attend the course of instruction. Of course, the AEF was trying to run the staff school on a shoestring as well, using as few qualified, trained American officers as possible. Brigadier General James "Dad" McAndrew was the overall commandant of all of the schools at Langres, but Pershing intended "Dad" McAndrew to devote a great deal of his energies to the staff school. McAndrew had three American, four British, and four French instructors, and very few administrative personnel. Of the American instructors, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred W. Bjornstad, destined to become a controversial figure in the AEF, was the best qualified to train general staff officers. Bjornstad was a born teacher, and McAndrew made him director of the General Staff College. The problem with Bjornstad was that he believed general staff officers had one function, and that was to develop their sections and advise the chief of staff. Bjornstad's concept was basically that

Refining the AEF Staff

35

the staff advised the chief of staff, who then put plans and operations into motion. The chief of staff's duty was to be a key player and keep the commander either out of trouble or free to oversee the subordinate commands in combat.9 This approach would cause trouble later. With the students now coming from the combat divisions, the course at Langres opened on 28 November 1917. McAndrew and Bjornstad devised a mission statement for the General Staff College; its purpose was "to train selected officers for staffs of divisions, corps, armies and lines of communication. Such training is to be of a practical character in order to fit the student officers to take up their duties immediately upon assignment to staff positions." Initially McAndrew and Bjornstad set their sights on a class of 150 officers. However, after surveying the officers in the AEF they increased the number of potential enrollees to 250 even though the French General Staff College warned against trying to train so many in one class.10 The work load was heavy, with little time for rest. The students were to be in class over six hours a day and devote two hours to study and research per day. Actual instruction would go on over a six-day week, with only Sunday for rest and preparation. Interestingly, McAndrew requested that a squadron of experienced cavalry be assigned to help teach equitation. McAndrew stated that "this is important not only that staff officers may know how to ride, but also as a means of exacting necessary exercise on the part of the personnel of the school."11 Equitation remained a part of the course at Langres during the lifetime of the school. The school itself was housed in a large stone building, which had been the Carteret—Trecourt barracks. When Bjornstad arrived to take possession of the building from the French he found that it was still set up as a barracks. One large room, which had housed French soldiers was converted into a classroom and named Sherman Hall. Sherman Hall was on the second floor; the first floor, which had smaller rooms, was used for administrative and instructors' offices. Another large barracks room was converted into a library, with Second Lieutenant Adolph A. Ochs as the librarian. To handle the paperwork another second lieutenant, Benjamin Keisinger, was named adjutant of the school, but he was soon overwhelmed with the mounting requirements.12 One of the great problems for the staff college was heat. Each room had a typically French, inefficient sheet-metal heater, but there was no coal available. Green firewood was furnished, but it was nearly impossible to get it to burn. There was no electricity available for the barracks, and coal oil lamps had to be used for lighting. These problems, coupled with rude benches and stone floors, which were always cold and damp, made life at the Carteret-Trecourt barracks grim. Most of the officers were billeted with French families, but there was also a lack of heating in the homes, due to the wartime shortage of coal and seasoned wood.13

36

Pershing and His Generals

Despite the primitive nature of the school, Bjornstad developed the course of study. The first course was based on a series of twenty Leavenworth-style map excercises. The "problems," however, were based on a Western Front scenario, which made them as practical as possible. There was a series of lectures on various topics to give to the students a basic overview of operations at echelons above the regimental level, the assumption being that most of the graduates of the General Staff College would go to divisional or higher staffs. The first lecture on the first day was on military map reading; this was vital in that most Americans arriving in the AEF had never encountered the sophisticated contour map system that the British and French had been using for several years. Once the instructor, a British officer, was satisfied that the students could indeed read a military map, lectures began on the organization and tables of organization and equipment for divisions, corps, and armies. This type of generalized instruction continued from 3 December (Monday) until Friday night, 7 December, when the first of the map problems was introduced. It basically dealt with the movement and quartering of an infantry division in a combat environment. 14 Saturday and Sunday were spent in preparing the responses for the problem. The second week brought a number of map problems that focused on practical tactical and operational questions raised by combat on the Western Front. In looking at the course of study, one sees that little time was actually spent on the role of the staff officer in preparing orders supporting the map exercises. Most of the lectures on staff duties were delivered by British and French instructors. The British appear to have been assigned the lectures on staff organization, while the French dealt with intelligence classes. Between 28 November 1917 and 10 March 1918, only two hours were devoted to aviation, and there were no lectures on either chemical or tank warfare. The entire course of study was heavily oriented to the combat infantry division, not on combined-arms operations. 15 When all was completed, the results had to be gravely disappointing for Pershing and those who had advocated the General Staff School. Seventyfive students reported to Langres, but only forty-two actually graduated and were sent to staff positions in the AEF.16 That means that almost half of those who went to Langres would be of no use to the staff of a combat division or corps. The prepared material handed out to the students provided information that was correct and important but was probably above the level of experience of those in the class. A lecture presented by a British staff officer offers some insights into the quality and the depth of instruction. The lecturer defined the role of the higher headquarters: "The commander decides; the staff prepares, organizes, notifies and controls." He placed great emphasis on the role of the chief of staff as the director and the coordinator of the staff, and he gave good insight into how a staff officer advises his commander. 17 That was all well and good, except that the experienced officer talked in generalities and placed much of his emphasis

Refining the AEF Staff

37

on corps or higher headquarters. Of the four divisions of the AEF in France at that time, not a single primary staff officer or chief of staff from the divisional or regimental level was in attendance at the school. Once the graduates had finished with their classroom work, they went on a tour of British and French divisions and corps in the field at the front. Between 15 February and 10 March they saw combat units in operation. That could very well be useful, but by February every one of the original four divisions were in the trenches, from the 1st Division just finishing its tutelage under the French, to the 42nd Division entering the trenches near Luneville for its first real experience with an armed enemy facing them across no-man's-land. However, regardless of the less-than-sterling results, Pershing was determined to push ahead with the General Staff College. By the start of 1918, there was a rising tide of complaints over the strain the school system was causing for the combat divisions. Robert Lee Bullard, commanding the 1st Division, had originally been a staunch supporter of the school system, but he came to see the drain on his key officers for school. 18 To obtain competent officers for the staff school, requests were made for officers to be detailed for duty at Langres. One such officer was Lieutenant Colonel William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, who in February 1918 commanded the 1st Battalion of the 165th Infantry Regiment, 42nd Division. Donovan had already commanded his unit in the trenches and won the French Croix de Guerre for valor. When Donovan was informed that Langres wanted him just at a time when his regiment was to move into a critical phase of trench training, Donovan went to Major General Charles T. Menoher, the division commander, and to Colonel Douglas A. MacArthur, chief of staff. Menoher, who owed his command and two stars to Pershing, simply refused to send Donovan, and the matter was dropped. 19 What had emerged at Langres was an educational center, and "Dad" McAndrew and A. W. Bjornstad were determined not to fail to show its usefulness to the AEF. Besides the staff college, McAndrew and Bjornstad organized short refresher courses tailored to staff and regimental commanders. On 20 January 1918, the brigade and regimental commanders of the 41st and the 42nd divisions arrived at Langres for a short course, which was to last until 30 January. Of course, there was useful information taught by French and British instructors, on such important topics such as the use of trench mortars, anti-aircraft fire, automatic weapons (in detail), camouflage, tanks, gas, engineer troops, and grenades. On the other hand, there was also a lengthy lecture on the expansion of the British army and on the hygiene of the troops. It being an American school, under the influence of Pershing and the "cult of the rifle," there was a detailed presentation on "bayonet fighting in modern war." 20 While all of the program of instruction sounded fine, it was too tactical in nature for brigade and regimental commanders who had never used a staff. This was information that should have passed on to special staff officers and to company and battalion commanders.

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This type of course was more than Langres could really handle. After much complaining to Harbord, McAndrew finally got a supply officer, Second Lieutenant H. G. Saunders. In January, Saunders and the adjutant embarked on the ambitious project of transforming the crude conditions of the school into something resembling an academic environment. New chairs and study tables were constructed, and with the help of the excellent 29th Engineer Regiment the Langres complex got electricity. The engineers also undertook the task of constructing more efficient heaters for the library and all of the offices and classrooms.21 In the middle of all this intensive labor, which McAndrew wanted completed before the second course assembled for training, Saunders and Adjutant Keisinger had to stop their work to prepare for the arrival and billeting of four brigadier generals and eight colonels. Twelve suitable houses were located and a survey made of the types of heating materials required. Everyone required an extra allotment of wood and heating oil. Colonel Edward R. Bennett, of the 168th Infantry Regiment, 42nd Division, was billeted with Mademoiselle Bayonette, who resided in the Rue Roger.22 This was a good omen for the start of the short course. As historians have pointed out, the educational system of the AEF was working against itself. After the new year of 1918, Pershing was under mounting pressure to get American units into the line to fight. If the AEF divisions were in dire need of command and staff training and intensive battalion and company-level instruction, would it not be better to use American soldiers as fillers for the depleted British and French regiments?23 Pershing was determined not to commit American divisions to battle until they were trained, but he had been raised, as a regular army officer, in the tradition that it would take many months, maybe years, to get the citizen officer and soldier ready to fight. This view harkened back to the influence of Brigadier General Emory Upton of the post-Civil War army, who based his concepts on what he had seen on the battlefields of the War between the States. Uptonianism was then a matter of faith, just as was the cult of the rifle.24 Uptonianism colored Pershing's negative views of the National Guard, and it deeply effected AEF training philosophy, because every one of the regulars at Chaumont believed it. Most of them had seen the debacle known as the Spanish-American War, and they were taught the same philosophy at Leavenworth and at the Army War College in Washington. The old army adage, "You fight as you trained," is true, and training is the business of a peacetime army. (If one doubts this, all one has to do is to look at the combat performance of many of the army units sent to Korea and sacrificed in June 1950.) In defending the complex school system of the AEF, Pershing wrote, "A school system would have been desirable in the best of armies, but it was indispensable in an army which had to be created almost wholly from raw material. The training of troops for combat was, of course, the primary objective, and schools . . . were merely a means to that end."25

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Brigadier General Harold B. Fiske, who ended the war as Pershing's G-5, or head of training, stated orthodoxy when he wrote in his 1919 after-action report, "The truth must be recognized that this war has not reversed all the lessons of the past by proving that tacticians can be made in a few months training in service at the front; or that handy,flexible,resourceful divisions can be made by a few maneuvers or by a few months association of their elements."26 Generals training divisions in the United States who toured the AEF in France, and who met with Pershing's approval, reflected the same orthodox train of thought—until they came face to face with the realities of having to provide key personnel to attend various schools. Major General Henry Allen, commanding the first-rate 90th Division, is a good example of the adherence to the orthodox position in regard to schools. In a report written for Pershing after his job interview-tour in 1918, Allen stated that he believed the basics could be accomplished while the division was still in the United States, but that "after our arrival [in France] their training should be completed by an intensive course in the specialties of trench war."27 Allen would reverse himself once he was actually in France and preparing to meet the enemy. Bjornstad began to prepare for the second class, which would arrive sometime in late February. There needed to be major changes in the program for the next class, and that was an area in which Bjornstad excelled. Pershing began to bombard the War Department for more officers for the next group to be instructed. Although the General had requested that a hundred officers be sent to form the nucleus for the class, Washington informed Chaumont that forty-eight officers would sail for France on 20 December. At that point Pershing asked that twelve more officers in the rank of major or above be sent as quickly as possible; then he dropped an impossible bombshell. The majority should be chiefs of staff of the newly formed divisions and the heads of the divisional staff sections. The War Department was then informed that "it is contemplated that these students will be returned as far as practicable to the divisions from which detailed where they will perform actual staff duty" 28 It was probably not lost on the War Department that the AEF did not feel it necessary to guarantee that key players would go back to their divisions. The request for officers included three officers from each divisional staff: the operations section chief, a key officer from the logistics section, and the head of the intelligence section or his deputy. Interestingly, Pershing placed great emphasis on the intelligence section, which reflected the growing awareness that the AEF was totally unprepared to deal with the sophisticated intelligence requirements of the modern battlefield. At the close of the cablegram Pershing added that it was "deemed highly important that some or all General Staff officers of Divisions receive training at the General Staff College here."2*

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This lengthy communication between Chaumont and Washington was the product of a series of discussions between Pershing, Harbord, Malone, and Bjornstad. Pershing had developed by January 1918 a feeling that conditions were so chaotic in the United States in regard to supplies, forming and training divisions, and preparing staff officers to assume their duties once in the AEF that real progress could be made only after troops were in France. The General Staff in Washington had failed, Pershing believed; he wrote to Harbord, "Let us not fall into the habit which seems to prevail in the War Department of allowing things to become buried in the General Staff."30 His irritation was increased by the fact that the British and French continued to press for American battalions and regiments to be integrated into their battle-weary units. It was felt that at some time early in 1918 the Germans would launch a major offensive, and this would have an impact on everything Pershing was trying to do in forming an American army Hugh Drum, who had a number of critical posts in the AEF and was privy to the thinking of Pershing and his staff, wrote in his diary, "If those troops once get into the hands of the British and French for two months they cannot be withdrawn during a German offensive." Reflecting Pershing's orthodoxy, Drum continued, "What we need is the training of division and corps commanders and staffs." 31 The warnings of a German offensive in February or March, 1918 were stronger than ever before. With Russia out of the war the enemy had new troops available to concentrate on the Western Front, and the German high command had too many solid soldiers not to let a good opportunity, perhaps their last opportunity slip by. On the other hand, the American 1st Division was the only unit, as a division, ready to go into the line under command of its own officers. In the middle of January the 1st Division began to move to trenches just south of the St. Mihiel salient, and the 26th Division was in the process of going into the trenches under French guidance. The 42nd was evaluating its experience in the French training area near Rolampont; Major General Menoher had been informed that his Rainbow Division would move into the trenches near Luneville in mid-February. Hugh Drum, watching all of this, lamented the fact that the AEF still had only 125,000 doughboys, in four combat divisions. 32 At the end of January Drum would strongly urge Pershing to create I U.S. Corps in order to protect U.S. troops from being taken up by the British and French, and to facilitate training. While these great events were closing in on Pershing and the AEF, plans to build the AEF school system were being carried out. Continually briefed by Colonel Paul Malone and by Harbord, the General seemed content to allow the Langres complex to expand its scope. It was certainly not an error sending A. W. Bjornstad to Langres. Every general officer who came into contact with Bjornstad stated that he was a great teacher, and that was where his talent lay. But Bjornstad was not content to organize Langres; he began

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to see the AEF General Staff College as equal to the school at Leavenworth or the Army War College in Washington. For the army, and in Bjornstad's mind that meant the AEF, the General Staff College not only taught, it became a source of doctrine and organizational concepts. In January Bjornstad sent a memo to Chaumont arguing for major changes in the way AEF tactical units at the brigade level did business in battle. What he argued for made very good sense, in that the AEF brigade was simply an administrative unit which mostly transmitted information from division to regiment and from regiment to division. The brigade commander was a tactical commander, but he did not function that way until actual combat began, and even then it was not unusual for a divisional commander to go directly to a regimental commander. As subsequent fighting would show, however, the brigade could be a very useful level of operational command. What Bjornstad proposed was the institution of the position of "brigade major," who would be a general staff officer. At that time the key player at brigade level was the adjutant, usually drawn from the Adjutant General Corps. The brigade major would handle the staff work that was done at divisional level by the operations and training officer, the intelligence officer, and the logistics officer. This reorganization, Bjornstad argued, would be critical if the brigade were detached from its parent division and acted independently. Of course, the brigade major, once selected, would be trained by the General Staff College at Langres. 33 The proposal, one of many made by Bjornstad, did not radically alter the structure of the AEF divisions at that time. However, later fighting in the Meuse-Argonne in the fall of 1918 would show that better command and control was seriously needed in the fighting units. As will be seen, some good brigade commanders were relieved of command because they did not have the wherewithal to direct a battle in which their two infantry regiments were involved; the flow of information and orders broke down even in the most experienced divisions, like the 1st or the 42nd. At any rate, Bjornstad continued his work to improve the college and the course of study. Of primary importance was the revision of the course that would be taught to the second class, scheduled to arrive at Langres starting 20 February. As one could have imagined, the second iteration received a much expanded course of study; the literature issued to each student was staggering. The course index was six pages long, and the reference material was centralized into seven massive volumes. Map problems were increased to twenty-two in number, with a larger number of maps per exercise. Each lecture had a lesson plan or "advanced sheet," which the student was required to study before each class along with the references pertinent to the class. In addition to lectures, there were now smaller group conferences, each with its own plan and references.34 Colonel Malone was involved heavily in the training of the AEF divisions, and "Dad" McAndrew was busy organizing other schools of instruc-

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Pershing and His Generals

tion at Langres. Consequently, Bjornstad had a rather free hand in developing the second course. The first seven training days were devoted to map reading and terrain exercises using the European contour maps. With that completed and, one hoped, every student proficient in map reading, the actual course began on 4 March with a welcoming speech and pep talk by McAndrew. Reflecting Bjornstad's own interests, the second course stressed the staff functions within the division and the corps. This course did a much better job of integrating artillery and aviation into the combat operations of the division.35 Numbers remained a grave disappointment for Bjornstad and McAndrew. When map reading began on 23 February there were only ninety officers ready for instruction. But a few days later Chaumont informed Bjornstad that seventy-six officers had arrived from the United States and would be enrolled in the course of study. This meant that Langres now had 166 students and the college had a very expanded teaching staff. The British and French contingent were increased, and Captain John Millikin was assigned as Bjornstad's executive officer. (Being a captain and not having graduated from Langres, Milliken could not assume the title of assistant director.) An engineer officer, Second Lieutenant J. A. Galvin, was assigned to the school to see to the many engineering tasks.36 By March the General Staff College was in full swing. McAndrew was busy organizing the School of the Line and other facilities such as the gas school. What no one could possibly foresee was the start of the first German offensive on 21 March 1918. The whole of the Western Front reeled from the terrific bombardment, and huge holes were torn in the allied lines. American troops were needed more than ever before in that time of crisis, yet Pershing stubbornly held that few Americans units were ready to go into the line. If that was the case, the allies replied, then send them by battalions to the British and French divisions resisting the German advance. On 28 March, much to Pershing's distress, the Americans agreed to ship combat infantry and machine-gun units to France on a priority basis. Pershing's plans for building the First U.S. Army were knocked into a cocked hat. Not only was Pershing disheartened, but his staff was also. Hugh Drum confided to his diary, "We must have an American army here to win the war. The British and French are down and out. They can fight defensively, but have no punch left in them."37 The first German offensive greatly affected the General Staff School at Langres. As Pershing slowly shifted American units to fight, those divisions demanded that their officers be returned to them as soon as possible. Robert Lee Bullard, commanding the 1st Division, needed every good officer he had, and Pershing allowed the transfer from the school back to the division. In fact, many of the divisions in training requested their troops back.38 The British pulled out their entire contingent of instructors as British casualties mounted.

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One casualty of the German offensive, which lasted until July, was the concept of division schools to train officers and NCOs in such combat specialties as the machine gun, sniping, grenades, and rifle maintenance. This was a good concept for peacetime, but it was not really practical for the AEF, given the short time the divisions had to prepare for the trenches. The training philosophy was simple: the divisional schools trained instructors. Pershing believed that the schools, especially at the divisional level, with standards and syllabii sent down from the training section (G-5) at Chaumont, would insure uniformity of training and doctrine.39 However, it quickly became clear that the divisions were resistant to the idea of taking the best officers and NCOs away from troops and making them primary instructors for any length of time. With combat raging on the Western Front, the system was not working. As one historian has pointed out, the elaborate system of schools, with their drain on good manpower, worked at crosspurposes with the idea of a well-trained division with units having a high state of morale and cohesion.40 The General Staff College at Langres began to examine the whole question and suggested to Malone and the Training Section that the AEF go to a corps school system. By spring the corps system was in place.41 In the process of building a staff at Chaumont and staffs for the corps and divisions (and of looking at the possibility of First U.S. Army), the AEF instituted an elaborate school system, the capstone institution being the General Staff College at Langres, under the direction of A. W. Bjornstad. Of all the actions of the AEF, the school system remains one of the most controversial, in that it produced low numbers of staff officers and took good officers away from units when they were needed most. But the school system became Pershing orthodoxy, and it was supported by the staff at Chaumont because the staff officers were personally loyal to Pershing. Pershing's Uptonianism colored his views, to be sure. It was certainly better to hold the AEF out of combat until the mass of citizen soldiers could be trained for battle, but time was not on Pershing's side, as the great German offensive of March 1918 showed. Yet orthodoxy was self-perpetuating, and the school system remained intact, with certain modifications, during the life of the AEF. By the summer there would be an expansion of the system, with an AEF Intelligence School at Langres. There is no question that training and refinement was needed; the question is, basically, whether so much was needed. It was all part, however, of John J. Pershing's mission to build an American army that would fight as an army, with American commanders. Just as Pershing was trying to refine his staff, he continued to work with his commanders—the men who, with their staffs, would take the AEF into the great battles of the summer and fall of 1918.

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NOTES 1. Pershing to Brigadier General George Squier, Chief Signal Officer in the War Department, Chaumont, 29 July 1917, Records Group 18, U.S. Air Forces, National Archives, Washington, DC. (Hereafter cited as RG 18.) 2. Baker to Peyton C March, Cleveland, 10 July 1928, Peyton C March Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. (Hereafter cited as LOC, with the collections individually cited.) 3. John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, I (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Tab Books Reprints, 1989), 159-62. 4. Ibid., 155-56. 5. Donald Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 69. 6. Pershing, Experiences, 151-52. 7. Memo by Colonel Paul B. Malone, Chaumont, 27 August 1917, Records Group 120, Records of the AEF, General Headquarters, Carton 1608, National Archives, Washington, DC. (Hereafter cited as RG 120.) 8. Malone to Harbord, Chaumont, 14 November 1917, ibid., Carton 1591. 9. Interview with Major General William D. Connor, Washington, 21 October 1947, Army General Staff Interviews, United States Army Military History Institute Archives, Carlisle Barracks, PA. (Hereafter cited as MHI.) 10. The Plan for the General Staff College, c. 1 November 1917, RG 120, Carton 1591. 11. Ibid. 12. Army General Staff College, Fourth Course, October/December, 1918 (Chaumont: Base Printing Plant, 29th Engineers, 1918), 31. 13. Ibid., 31-32. 14. Course of Instruction, General Staff College, AEF, France, 28 November 1917 to 10 March 1918 (prepared by Bjornstad), RG 120, Carton 1966. 15. Ibid. 16. Army General Staff College, Fourth Course, 32. 17. Army General Staff College, Lecture 4,4 December 1917, RG 120, Carton 1603. 18. James W. Rainey, "The Questionable Training of the AEF in World War I," Parameters XXE, 4 (Winter, 1992-93), 97. 19. Entry for 10 February 1918, Donovan Diaries, Donovan Papers, MHI. 20. "Program for 12 Officers, 41st and 42nd Division (Regimental and Brigade Commanders)," RG 120, Carton 1721. 21. Army General Staff College, Fourth Course, 32. 22. "Program for 12 Officers," RG 120, Carton 1721. 23. Rainey, "Questionable Training," 91-92,100-2. 24. Ibid., 95-97. 25. Pershing, Experiences, 1,154. 26. After Action Report, G-5 Section, Brigadier General Harold B. Fiske, 30 June 1919, in the H. B. Fiske Papers, MHI. 27. After Action Report, Allen to Pershing, written at Chaumont, 27 January 1918, Henry T. Allen Papers, LOC. 28. Pershing to War Department, Chaumont, 3 January 1918, RG 120, Carton 1592.

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29. Ibid. 30. Pershing to Harbord, Chaumont, 17 October 1917, James G. Harbord Papers, LOC 31. Entry 1 January 1918, Hugh Drum Diaries, Hugh Drum Papers, MHI. 32. Entry 30 January 1918, ibid. 33. Memorandum by Bjornstad, Langres, 19 January 1918, RG 120, Carton 1606. 34. Literature Issued to Student Officers, 22 May 1918, ibid., Carton 1592, and Second Course Issues to Students, c. May 1918, ibid., Carton 1593. 35. Army General Staff College, Second Course, Course of Instruction, 20 February 1918, ibid., Carton 1593. 36. Army Staff College, Fourth Course, 33. 37. Entry for 31 March 1918, Drum Diaries, Drum Papers, MHI. 38. Army Staff College, Fourth Course, 33. 39. Pershing, Experiences, 1,154-155. 40. Rainey, "Questionable Training," 96. 41. General Staff College, Precis of Matters Dealt with in Conference, 10 May 1918, RG 120, Carton 1596.

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Chapter 4

GETTING ORGANIZED Major General Charles T. Menoher and Colonel Douglas A. MacArthur of the 42nd Infantry Division received numerous cases of instructional material sent by AEF Adjutant General Benjamin A. Alvord. The cases consisted of over four thousand training manuals, ranging from "Viven-Bossieres Rifle Grenade" to "Tactical Employement of the Lewis Gun" to the "Light Trench Mortar." The cases arrived on 26 December 1917, just a few days prior to the division's moving, in heavy snow to a new training area. The last thing Menoher and MacArthur needed was a massive number of training manuals to be inventoried and issued to the commands.1 Menoher had just taken over the 42nd Division, when John J. Pershing relieved William Mann and sent him back to the United States. Menoher was a classmate of Pershing's at West Point, and after graduation in 1886 he had selected the artillery as his branch of service. After seeing combat in the Spanish-American War, he was assigned to duty in the Philippines, again coming into contact with the General. During the Mexican border operation, 1916-1917, he commanded a field artillery brigade. When Pershing went to France he took Menoher and considered him for the command of the 1st Infantry Division. Instead of command, however, Pershing sent him to establish an American artillery school at Samur, France. When the opportunity arose, Menoher, an artilleryman, got command of the 42nd Infantry Division.2 The Rainbow Division had been in France only a few weeks, and it was about to undertake a lengthy road march in bad weather. It was a divisional movement from one training area to another, a distance of eighty miles, which took four days of hard marching. The division was not prepared to make such a march, and it would show. This is an example of the problems

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involved in organizing the AEF; it was far too early to ship to the division training manuals. Events were moving too fast for the capabilities of the AEF. The new year, 1918, would have to be a time of getting organized for the combat that would surely follow in the spring and summer. The problem for Pershing and the AEF, as has been stated, was that they were building something from nothing with very little time. The situation on the Western Front was growing critical. The British and French divisions were depleted after three years of merciless combat, and the allies wanted Americans to fill those shrunken ranks. That Pershing could not allow. His mission was to build an American army to fight under the American flag and American commanders. Yet there was too much to do, and as in any organization just getting off the ground, there were critical errors. Pershing moved to establish a series of schools, the capstone being the General Staff School at Langres, with other schools at the divisional level to train instructors. By 1918 Pershing understood that all was not well with the staff structure at Chaumont. It was too crowded at General Headquarters, AEF. Every staff section was there, close to the General, and the various sections did not have enough room to do what they needed to do. The staff that had been organized in the fall of 1917 was now unworkable as the AEF expanded its functions. In early February Pershing and his chief of staff, James Guthrie Harbord, knew that the time had come to reorganize the staff once again, and, they hoped, for the last time. Of immediate concern to Harbord and Pershing was a growing crisis with the line of communication, that massive supply system from the ports to the AEF forward areas. General Francis Kernan, chief of the line of communication, was critically short of staff officers. Ships were backing up, and there still appeared to be little organization in the shipping of men and material to France. The man most concerned with this breakdown was Colonel Johnson Hagood, who was destined to become one of the key players in bringing some order out of the chaos characterizing the AEF those early months of 1918. On 7 February 1918, Hagood received a cable from Harbord informing him that he had been selected to head a board to reorganize the AEF staff, totally if need be. 3 Hagood took a night train from Tours that arrived early in the morning of 8 February at Chaumont, where he was met by Colonel Frank R. McCoy, who was serving as secretary of the general staff and who had also been selected by Pershing to serve on the reorganization board. If anyone knew the internal problems it would be McCoy, a West Pointer, class of 1897. It was rumored that Pershing had in mind for McCoy an infantry regiment at the first opportunity. McCoy took Hagood to his billets so they could work closely together.4 Colonel Hagood had been born in Barnwell, South Carolina. His father had been a private in the Confederate Army. His uncle was Brigadier General Johnson Hagood, who fought under Robert E. Lee in the Army of

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Northern Virginia and later served as governor of the Palmetto State. In 1888 Hagood entered the University of South Carolina but longed for a military career. In 1892 he went to West Point, where he was a contemporary of Dennis Nolan. While at West Point he came to know Leroy Eltinge, Fox Connor, W. D. Connor, Paul Malone, "Corky" Davis, Harold B. Fiske, and Malin Craig—all key players in the AEF hierarchy. From 1905 to 1912 he served in Washington, and later in the Philippines with George C. Marshall. Hagood had brought a coastal artillery regiment to France in July 1917. He was intelligent, well educated, witty and urbane, and with his connections and friends already in place in Chaumont he was a perfect person for this complex task. On the evening of 8 February he dined with John J. Pershing and became one of Pershing's lifelong admirers and defenders. Hagood was treated to Pershing at his most inspiring in a one-on-one conversation after dinner. Colonel Hagood confided to his diary that "I have never been so impressed with anyone in my life as I was with General Pershing. He talked in a very quiet simple and familiar way, speaking of the biggest projects in this war in the same simple language as if he were discussing the minor routine of an army post and at the same time indicating his absolute mastery of the whole situation." 5 After discussing what Hagood was to do, Pershing added that "the man who did things in this war would be the man to succeed. He said the time was not far distant when the young aggressive men would come to the front and the old men promoted by seniority would have to go." 6 These were themes Pershing stated over and over, and the implications were clear: do a good job for Pershing and the AEF in the war and there would be rewards (i.e., general's stars) in the future. In an intimate setting, in the afterglow of a good meal followed by brandy and cigars, Pershing was relaxed, and his approach was one that made an ambitious officer like Johnson Hagood ready and willing to do his very best. Pershing never got cheers from his troops, but he did get the most from his close officers. It is an interesting glimpse into Pershing's command style. The Hagood board had a very high-quality membership, and Harbord, who selected the board, made it clear that Pershing wanted results. Nothing was to interfere with the activities of the group, which consisted of Hagood, McCoy, Corky Davis, and a Major S. P. Wetherill of the Quartermaster Corps. Wetherill was a civilian efficiency expert from American industry and had worked with Johnson Hagood on reorganizing the supply service. All of the men agreed that Chaumont was simply not the place for every section and every bureau. Most of them recognized that "Black Jack" Pershing and Harbord had a bad tendency to immerse themselves in details that were best left to subordinate staff officers. At one point Pershing was actually signing cables requesting airplane magnetos and wiring harnesses. Cables left Chaumont complaining about the quality of mules sent to the AEF, and Pershing was definitely involved in such matters.

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What was proposed for General Headquarters, AEF, was a complete overhaul of the structure. Chaumont would become an operational center, the emphasis there being on preparing the combat organizations—from divisions to armies—to train, take the field, fight, and win. Pershing and Harbord would be taken out of the personnel and supply business, with the responsibility resting on the head of the supply service, which Johnson Hagood suggested be called the Service of the Rear. Other section heads would be moved to Tours: the chief quartermaster, chief surgeon, chief engineer, chief ordnance officer, chief signal officer, chief of the air service, chief of the gas service, director general of transportation, and provost marshal general. 7 That would leave at Chaumont a "fighting staff" which would comprise the general staff, the adjutant general, the inspector general, and the staff judge advocate. This made good sense in that a commander's time must be protected by his staff, while in a wartime situation there are demands made by staff officers who feel it necessary to get command decisions. This system, which Pershing heartily approved, would force him to focus on combat matters, not on mules, unloaded ships, or airplane magnetos. There were dangers in creating this type of tactical and operational center at Chaumont. One of the greatest threats to overall AEF staff cohesion could be the feeling that those going to Tours would be away from the center of power, away from the commander—the man who would send the promotion lists to Washington. Another problem, unless handled with finesse, could very well be an impression that the "fighting staff" took precedence over the support staff. In most modern combat formations, the two functions are split in the field, but given rapid and secure communications and air transport, coordination can be achieved quickly. Pershing did have the telephone, and there were trains dedicated to the trip between Tours and Chaumont. Despite inherent difficulties, Pershing had a lengthy conversation with Hagood on 2 March 1918 in which he accepted, in toto, the recommendations of the board. He stressed "decentralization . . . cutting out red tape and leaving staff officers to work out the details of staff administration." 8 The Hagood board also made a recommendation that would have longlasting implications for the AEF and for the entire army The section heads at Chaumont would become assistant chiefs of staff, with their sections numbered from 1 to 5. While this sounds cosmetic, the effects were not. The use of the G system was instituted at the General Staff College at Langres, based primarily on what the French and British were doing. It defined a clear line of authority from the chief of staff to his assistants, and it made the staff the principal set of workers, advisors, and experts for the commander, through the chief of staff, at Chaumont. According to a lecture prepared by Bjornstad and taught throughout the life of the Langres staff school, the thrust of this change was seen as benefiting the chief of staff.

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"The Chief of Staff should organize the General Staff of his unit in such a way as to free himself of details and to be in a position to study pending or proposed operations, training plans, etc., to coordinate and supervise the work of the General Staff, and to assist the commander and the unit by frequent visits to subordinate commanders and troops."9 Eventually a deputy chief of staff was created to assist the chief of staff, and to conduct the business of the staff when the commander and the chief of staff were absent from Chaumont. Pershing was too experienced a soldier to think that there would be universal acceptance of the new staff organization. Many AEF officers were going to believe themselves threatened by the shift from Chaumont to Tours. He called in each senior officer who was to move from the general headquarters and explained to each what the changes meant and what their continued role in the AEF would be.10 This was typical of Pershing in dealing with handpicked officers, who served him with great loyalty. But the fact remained that the changes would make for a more streamlined, combat-ready staff at Chaumont. Colonel (later General) William D. Connor, as chief of coordination at Headquarters, recalled that even with the change the chief of staff still had some difficulty in orchestration. Comparing Harbord's and his own coordination job to driving a team of horses, Connor said it was often a matter of hollering "speed up, slow down, go right, go left."11 James Harbord certainly understood what these changes meant for the AEF. "The relief to General Pershing's time," Harbord later commented, "and the increased efficiency of the supply branches were almost instantaneously evident."12 While this was not exactly accurate, the benefits were great, and they certainly helped Pershing in the months to come. Another side effect of the Hagood board was to increase dramatically the scope and mission of the adjutant general at Chaumont. Colonel "Corky" Davis had been named to the board, evidence of his growing importance at general headquarters. In fact, Davis would become and remain one of the Chaumont "inner circle," which included Fox Connor and Malin Craig.13 Davis would become the Adjutant General of the Army from 1922 to 1926, a post secured for him by Pershing, Harbord, and John L. Hines. During the years prior to America's entry into the war, there had been constant pressures and disputes between the Army Chief of Staff and the Adjutant General in Washington. Pershing chose simply to dictate to the Adjutant General on matters of personnel and policies, and he was usually successful in doing so. With Davis's input, the adjutant general at Chaumont became a part of the general staff and became the clearinghouse for all cablegrams, decorations, orders, personnel decisions, and coordination between the G sections in all matters except actual combat operational planning and intelligence.14 Davis, in March 1918, was still assistant to Brigadier General Benjamin Alvord, but Alvord's health was failing, and in

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April he would be sent back to the United States.15 "Corky" Davis then became adjutant general and one of Pershing's most devoted disciples in the "GHQ clique."16 After Pershing retired from the army his influence remained tremendous, and in 1926 Pershing and Davis, who was still Adjutant General of the Army, worked together to secure the position of Chief of Staff of the Army for General Charles P. Summerall.17 With the changes at Chaumont in place, Pershing continually spent time inspecting units. Pershing's time was to be protected, but no one, not even Harbord, could curb the general's interest in all of his combat units. On the other hand, he spent a good deal of time in his office, seeing a large number of people. There was little Harbord, or anyone else for that matter, could do to stop the flow of visitors to Chaumont. On 20 February, for example, Pershing took up several hours visiting with the head librarian of Johns Hopkins University and an important member of the YMCA. But it was also on 20 February that Pershing had a face-to-face meeting with Major General Leonard Wood, who was visiting Europe at that time.18 The presence of General Wood was not a welcome respite for "Black Jack" Pershing, and Wood would become a problem with which the War Department, Newton Baker, and President Wilson would have to deal in the late winter of 1918.19 There was another question that Pershing preferred to deal with himself, regardless of the staff changes at Chaumont and the shifting of the supply and technical bureaus to Tours. For him the question of rail transportation for the AEF was becoming a very sensitive matter. The old army adage that "infantry wins battles, logistics wins wars" was something that Pershing knew to be true. For the AEF, however, the railroads were in the hands of a career civilian—very competent, but a civilian nonetheless. He was Brigadier General Wallace W. Atterbury once the vice president of the Pennsylvania Railroad system. As with Charles G. Dawes, Pershing respected his great organizational ability, and Pershing would allow him, like Dawes, to work at will.20 But Pershing kept Atterbury close to him at Chaumont, and as Pershing's diaries reflect, they spent a great deal of time together. The Hagood board recommended that the director general of transportation be moved to Tours, and Atterbury, who possibly wanted to get away from the very military atmosphere at Chaumont, heartily concurred. While Pershing and his staff had some chuckles over Atterbury's very civilian-sounding orders and memoranda, Atterbury would have to function if the AEF was to fight and win battles. Brigadier General Wallace W. Atterbury came to Pershing in a roundabout way. General Tasker Bliss, Acting Chief of Staff, cabled Pershing in August 1917 that after conferences with Newton Baker it had been decided to offer Atterbury's services as the director of transportation for the AEF. Bliss, who believed his main role in the war was to support John J. Pershing, suggested that Atterbury come to France as a civilian with a salary of

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$12,000 per annum and take the title of director general of transportation. After a while, Atterbury could be given some unspecified military rank, if it was "mutually satisfactory to you and Mr. Atterbury." 21 That was not satisfactory for Pershing, who had no intention of letting a key player run around Europe in civilian clothes. What Pershing did accept was Bliss's title for Atterbury; if he was a general, he should wear general's stars. 22 In fact, when Pershing accepted him, Atterbury was already in Paris, residing at the expensive Hotel Meurice on the fashionable Rue de Rivoli, as befitted a captain of industry. Atterbury had traveled to Paris and engaged the rooms on his expense account; Newton Baker had suggested this so that he could get to work immediately. 23 Pershing had no intention of letting Atterbury stay there for long. As Pershing had learned the hard way in the summer of 1917, Paris could detract anyone from his labors. John Pershing was under no illusion as the task facing the AEF in rail transportation. In July 1917 he found out that the existing French tracks and trains were strained to the very limit; they were worn out after three years of war. Pershing was already receiving valuable advice from Major William John Wilgus, a civilian transportation expert from the United States, but someone of Atterbury's experience and vast knowledge was needed. 24 Atterbury bought a uniform in early September, and by the middle of the month he was at Chaumont, bewildered by the military atmosphere and the terminology. One thing that did not dismay him was the responsiveness of General Pershing. In an early interview Atterbury remarked in an offhand way that Pershing needed a personal train. The next day, to Atterbury's suprise, Pershing presented him with a written order to prepare a train of four cars. One would be a sleeper/office for Pershing; another for the chief of staff and two aides; third would be an office on rails with space and equipment for a typist, a stenographer, and a telegraph operator; and the fourth would contain luggage, food, etc.25 Thus was born the "Attaboy Special." On 9 October Atterbury was given his stars as a brigadier general, National Army, but more importantly, he received a pledge of total support from General Pershing. 26 Wallace Atterbury brought a great deal to the AEF, and Pershing knew it. Atterbury, born in Indiana in 1866, had graduated from Yale in 1886 and immediately went to work for the Pennsylvania Railroad. During the Mexican border operation he was instrumental in devising plans to move large numbers of regular and National Guard troops and supplies to the southwest. He was no soldier—and he continually began his reports with "My Dear General Pershing," which certainly was not military form. He faced, however, a task that was daunting indeed. The supply system of the AEF had grown over the space of a few months, with little planning. It was not anyone's fault that the supply and transportation systems were breaking under the load. Supply areas had been created initially along existing French rail lines; they stretched from the ports to the training areas and

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trenches in eastern France, with a massive number of facilities in between. As new areas were created for supply or training there had to be new rail lines, and these lines the French could not provide. A good case in point was the major supply base at Gievres, near the city of Tours. In early April 1918, when Hagood inspected the area, he recorded that "it is certainly a tremendous proposition. It is arranged in the shape of a diamond and is six miles from end to end. It contains engineer, medical, quartermaster, ordnance and gas depots, 225 miles of track and 256 separate storehouses, the covered space being 4Vi million square feet."27 Hagood was also amazed to find over a thousand Chinese contract laborers working there. 28 Feeding off of Gievres were rail lines rtrnning south about fifty miles to the huge American air service training base at Issoudun, and then south to another air service center at Chateauroux. Issoudun had been a muddy, flat stretch of farmland when Pershing first saw it in June 1917; by the end of the war the United States was funding Issoudun at an amazing $27 million in one year.29 What was known as the "Intermediate Area" continued to expand as the AEF grew larger and more complex, and with the expansion the rail transportation section enlarged as well. Atterbury faced problems no American army had ever dealt with before. Another key problem for both Pershing and Atterbury was the simple fact that the AEF was preparing to do battle in France, not the United States. The AEF had to deal with allies who had their own concerns, their own particular problems. Also, there was the French bureaucracy, which was difficult for Americans like Atterbury to work with. In early January 1918 reports reached Pershing that supplies were simply not moving out of the port areas to the depots around France. There were huge backlogs of material just sitting near the docks, and spoilage in food and fodder was growing at an alarming rate. Too many arriving soldiers were wasting days near the docks until they could be moved by rail to training areas. On 20 January Pershing and Atterbury went to Paris to see the French minister of public works, who was responsible for the ports and for railcars, engines, and the like. What Pershing needed was to open up the critical port of St. Nazaire. The French had assigned a number of officers to the port, each with specific areas of control, and when the Americans tried to move supplies or men they had to make a round-robin of all the French officers. What Pershing requested made great sense to an American—to have just one officer in charge. The minister promised to make that change and assign one superior officer to the port for the AEF.30 Atterbury then complained that though railcars for moving troops had been promised by the minister, nowhere near the number required had ever been delivered. Pershing was able to get a commitment that, indeed, cars would be made available. The minister stated that two French transportation officers would be assigned to Atterbury's section as liaison officers with direct communication to the French G-4 for better coordination. 31 This was

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a major change, which did help somewhat, even though cars were never provided in the numbers promised and a certain amount of French territorial squabbling at St. Nazaire was never fully solved. But it was not always a French problem or a bureaucratic bottleneck. Johnson Hagood found that many of the Americans offloading poorly loaded ships had little idea of what they were doing and that there was a serious lack of American supervision of the AEF soldier-stevedores as well. 32 Atterbury had been acting under a set of guidelines that he and Pershing had discussed in their early meetings. Pershing had agreed to a staff of seven officers, mainly civilians who would be granted military rank as promotions allowed. Two of the original seven came directly from the regular army—Brigadier General William C. Langfitt and then-Colonel Charles McKinstry. Langfitt was the manager of light railroads and McKinstry was the manager of roads. The other staff officers oversaw such areas as engineer construction, general business management, finances, and liaison with the units in the field. Three were from the Pennsylvania Railroad, and one had been a member of the management of the Long Island Railroad. 33 By 1918 it was becoming painfully obvious to Pershing and to Major General Francis Kernan that Atterbury was having a difficult time adjusting to the needs of an army in combat. Simply put, Atterbury was still a civilian, used to civilian board meetings and decisions by consensus. Some of the problem rested with the General Staff at Chaumont, which had believed in the fall of 1917 that civilians like Atterbury would be responsive to the combat requirements of an army. Johnson Hagood had warned otherwise in December 1917, but he was not heeded. 34 The problem surfaced in a series of meetings in mid-March between Kernan and Hagood on one side and Atterbury on the other. Kernan, by virtue of his regular army commission and major general's rank, was most explicit. His basic thrust was a simple "Take command, don't manage." 35 It was indeed one thing to fret about the timetable between Philadelphia and New York City, insuring that ladies and gentlemen would make their reservations at Delmonico's and the first act at the theater. It was entirely a different matter to move ammunition, canned corned beef, rough-cut army brogan shoes, and medical supplies to men in sodden trenches facing fine German troops. Kernan opted for the ammunition, brogans, and corned beef. On the other hand, Atterbury had secured the services of a number of civilian railroad men from corporations in the United States, who when they could acted as a board of directors. Pershing continued to hope that Atterbury would see the light and become a soldier, at least for the duration of the war. He told Charles Dawes as much in March 1918, but Dawes was skeptical that that transformation would happen. 36 In April, Pershing decided to relieve Atterbury and send him back to the United States.

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Ironically, Charles G. Dawes was no more military than Atterbury. When he was not in his office as head of the General Purchasing Board in Paris, he was in evidence in those places where only wealth and influence can take a person. Always looking bemused at his new-found general's stars, Dawes was, however, a valuable source of common sense for Pershing. Their "Dear Charley/Dear John" correspondence reflects the long-standing personal friendship the two men enjoyed. Dawes knew that removing Atterbury, while possibly the smart military move, was not good politics in the United States. Dawes quickly informed Pershing that the politicians in Washington were well satisfied to see these men of power and influence doing their part in the AEF, and that to remove Atterbury would only hurt the AEF. "My father once told me," Dawes wrote to Pershing, "never attempt to propitiate an enemy by placing him in a position of power to do you injury." Then Dawes told Pershing that to send Atterbury home, even if the AEF got another civilian director, would create a very bad impression of Pershing and his willingness to work with civilians. "It would seem my especial duty in every way to strengthen Atterbury and his organization." 37 Dawes then volunteered to work with Atterbury, on a businessman-tobusinessman level, and to make sure that Atterbury understood that he had a friend in Dawes. At any rate, Dawes had come to believe that all of the supply sections were shorthanded, the result of decisions made when the first of the great German offensives began in March 1918. That had to be taken into account as well. Pershing dropped his idea of sending Atterbury home, but the situation festered, ameliorating only slightly in the spring of 1918. On the other hand, Pershing had avoided what could have been a serious gaffe as far as the AEF was concerned. Lessons were learned, however; Pershing came to understand that the AEF could not function outside the politics of Washington. Word reached Atterbury that John J. Pershing was deeply disappointed in the director general of transportation. In the middle of the long-running controversy, W. W. Atterbury received a cable from the Secretary of the Treasury requesting that he return to the United States for a period of three months to discuss railroad matters and financing for the production of rail stock for the AEF. That Pershing could not allow, and the newly promoted Colonel Wilgus returned in his stead. 38 Regardless, Pershing continued to remain upset over Atterbury's handling of the situation and the slow rate of progress in rail transportation for the AEF. In April 1918 the German offensives of March and April were still being felt in all their ferocity on the Western Front, and Pershing was under mounting, irresistible pressure to place doughboys in the line of battle. While struggling with these great events, Atterbury again aggravated Pershing. It seems that Atterbury went directly to the American Section of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and complained about the slow arrival of rolling stock from the United States. Major General Tasker Bliss, who had

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been appointed as the United States representative to the council organization, informed Pershing that members of the American Section were preparing letters to send back to the War Department. Pershing exploded and sent a caustic letter to Atterbury that left no doubt about the General's displeasure. Atterbury was after all wearing the stars of an American general, but Pershing proceeded to lecture him as one would an obtuse school boy. "Of course you know," he wrote, "as well as I do, that everything has been done that can be done to get railway equipment from the States, and it really seems to me a waste of time on the part of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council to write letters of this sort on subjects which are being handled promptly and completely by these headquarters, as you, of course, must know." 39 An irate Pershing then told Atterbury to make sure that the representatives at Versailles tended to their own business. He ended this curt letter with "I see you have called for 1500 cars and 100 engines in April and suppose you will call for as many as possible in May, when the available tonnage is known. In the meantime get behind the repair question with all possible energy."40 Quite possibly Atterbury had never been spoken to in that way before, certainly not as an executive of the Pennsylvania Railroad. The lesson stuck for a few months. When the question of locomotives, cars, and manpower surfaced in May, Atterbury and Brigadier General Langfitt went directly to the G-4 of the Service of Supply to work out the details, which was the military way to do things, not the way the boardroom of the Pennsylvania Railroad did them. 41 In March 1918, Charles Dawes warned that there was another problem looming large on the horizon, with Major General Leonard Wood. From his political contacts back home Dawes had come to believe that the former Chief of Staff of the Army was shamelessly lobbying the halls of Congress to replace John J. Pershing as head of the AEF. There was a warning for Pershing. There were those in the War Department who were venting their frustration at Pershing and his AEF staff because conditions were in shambles.42 Pershing had been in the army too long not to know that there were many in Washington who felt totally left out of the great events taking place in France. Men who had thought all their lives about a great war where reputations could be made and high honors won from a grateful nation suddenly found themselves reduced to, in their eyes, the position of a bank teller, going to the office every morning and home to wife and hearth after work. But, entree into the AEF was controlled by Pershing in Chaumont. Not to be called to a post there, or with the combat divisions, was a humiliation. Much of this natural frustration came to focus on Major General Leonard Wood, who was no doubt a superb organizer, a brilliant man, and a forward-thinking Chief of Staff of the Army. Wood had been born in New Hampshire in 1860 and earned a doctorate in medicine from Harvard Medical School in 1884, no mean feat for one so young. Longing for

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adventure beyond the confines of Boston, Wood had joined the army and served in the Indian campaigns in the desert Southwest. He won the Congressional Medal of Honor while campaigning against the Indians, and during the Spanish-American War he had fought beside Teddy Roosevelt and his famous Rough Riders. In 1898 he rose through the general ranks, ending as a major general. Between 1910 and 1914 Wood served as Chief of Staff of the Army, where his watchword was preparedness. In his mid-fifties, when America went to war, Wood was a strikingly handsome man who, on the surface, was the picture of physical and mental strength. No one would ever doubt the intelligence of Leonard Wood, but he had the problem of a driving political ambition and a serious lack of discretion in his words. Wood arrived in Europe for the obligatory general's tour. In London and Paris he continually downgraded American war efforts, which seriously eroded confidence in the AEF. That Pershing could not in any way tolerate, and it was an icy meeting between Pershing and Wood in Pershing's office on 20 and 21 February 1918 43 When General Wood and his aide left to visit the 1st Infantry Division, Pershing did not offer either to accompany them or send a representative from the AEF staff. In fact, Pershing had already determined that Wood would never come to the AEF. Pershing was not the only one determined that Wood would not go to France. Wood had two very powerful enemies in Newton Baker and President Woodrow Wilson. Baker, when faced with deciding who was to command the AEF, had considered Wood, but after attending maneuvers with him he had come to the conclusion that Wood was simply in bad health. During the spring of 1918 the 89th "Mid-West" Division was scheduled to leave for the AEF, and Wood was in command. He had done a very credible job of preparing this unit, which would distinguish itself in the fall fighting. Before seeking Pershing's input, Baker decided that Wood would remain in the United States. "The fact is," Baker recalled, "that I primarily decided that Wood should not go abroad, told General Pershing my reason for it; told President Wilson so and gave him my reasons to which President Wilson added his."44 Pershing was informed and with a large sigh of relief concurred with Baker. "I was resolute about it," Baker later stated. Wood took out all of his anger, frustrations, and humiliation on Pershing, and his loathing for "Black Jack" Pershing becoming almost pathological.45 But it was Baker and Wilson who made the decision, a decision with which Pershing heartily agreed. The AEF had reached a point in the spring where there could not be any severe external distractions, and having Leonard Wood in Europe would have been akin to letting the firebug into the match factory unattended. There was no reason to believe that Wood would have been content to command the 89th Division. Pershing had just gone through a major reorganization of his staff, and there were some wounded egos to soothe among those who were deployed to Tours to work with the supply service

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there. There were also new divisions coming into France to train, and the older "Big Four"—1st, 2nd, 26th, and the 42nd—were in the trenches and taking casualties. Wood had too many powerful friends, especially in the Republican Party, who would have welcomed a chance to hear things from the general they could use to criticize the Wilson administration. Baker's decision was the correct one indeed. Despite these vexing personnel problems, Pershing had to look forward to more and more Americans going to battle, usually integrated into French corps. This was no time to waste any time on other problems. John J. Pershing watched his men fight in increasing numbers, and now he was ready to form an American corps and prepare for the birth of the First United States Army.

NOTES 1. Alvord to Menoher, Chaumont, 26 December 1917, Records Group 120, Records of the 42nd Division, AEF, Carton 44, National Archives, Washington, DC. (Hereafter cited as RG 120.) 2. James J. Cooke, The Rainbow Division in the Great War, 1917-1919 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 1994), 20-21. Also see Chapter 2. 3. Johnson Hagood, The Services of Supply: A Memoir of the Great War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1927), 134-35. 4. Entry for 8 February 1918, Johnson Hagood Diaries, Hagood Family Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute Archives, Carlisle Barracks, PA. (Hereafter cited as MHI.) 5. Entry for 9 February 1918, ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Hagood, Services of Supply, 138-42. 8. Entry for 2 March 1918, Hagood Diaries, MHI. 9. "Staff Organization U.S. Army, Fourth Course," RG 120, Carton 1983. 10. Entry for 15 February 1918, Pershing Diaries, John J. Pershing Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. (Hereafter cited as LOC with the collections individually cited.) 11. Interview with Major General William D. Connor, Washington, 21 October 1947, Army General Staff Interviews, MHI. 12. James G. Harbord, The American Expeditionary Forces: Its Organization and Accomplishments (Evanston, IL: Evanston Publishing Co., 1929), 26. 13. Interview with Major General Irving J. Phillipson, Washington, 2 December 1947, Army General Staff Interviews, MHI. 14. Lecture Delivered by Major General Robert C. Davis to the Army War College, Washington, 7 December 1922, John L. Hines Papers, LOC 15. Pershing to Alvord, Chaumont, 30 April 1918, Pershing Papers, LOC. 16. Interview with Phillipson, MHI. 17. Pershing to Davis, Washington, 10 June 1926, Pershing Papers, LOC 18. Entry for 20 February 1918, Pershing Diaries, Pershing Papers, LOC 19. Donald Smythe, in his Pershing: General of the Armies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), Chapter 15, deals with the Wood controversy. I will touch

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on it only as it reveals Pershing's command at Chaumont and his relations with his command and staff. 20. Hagood, Services of Supply, 75-76. John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, I (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Tab Books Reprint, 1989), 135. 21. Bliss to Pershing, Washington, 15 August 1917, Pershing Papers, LOC. 22. Pershing to Adjutant General, Paris, 30 July 1917, ibid. 23. Baker to Atterbury, Washington, 15 August 1917, ibid. 24. Pershing to Bliss, Paris, 14 August 1917, ibid. 25. Pershing to Atterbury, Chaumont, 17 September 1917, ibid. 26. Pershing to Atterbury, Chaumont, 9 October 1917, ibid. 27. Entry for 14 April 1918, Hagood Diaries, Hagood Papers, MHI. 28. Entry for 11 April 1918, ibid. 29. Edgar Staley Gorrell, The Measure of Americas World War Aeronautical Effort (Northfield, VT: Norwich University, 1940), 18. 30. Entry for 21 January 1918, Pershing Diaries, Pershing Papers, LOC. 31. Ibid. 32. Hagood, Services of Supply, 105-8. 33. Pershing to Baker, Chaumont, n.d., c. September, 1917, Pershing Papers, LOC. 34. Entry for c. mid-December 1917, Hagood Diaries, Hagood Papers, MHI. 35. Entries for 19 and 20 March 1918, ibid. 36. Pershing to Dawes, Chaumont, 6 March 1918, Pershing Papers, LOC. 37. Dawes to Pershing, Paris, 16 May 1918, ibid. 38. Atterbury to Pershing, Paris, 24 February 1918, ibid. 39. Pershing to Atterbury, Chaumont, 12 April 1918, ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. Hagood, Services of Supply, 300-1. 42. Dawes to Pershing, Paris, 2 March 1918, Pershing Papers, L O C 43. Entries for 20 and 21 February 1918, Pershing Diaries, Pershing Papers, LOC. 44. Baker to Peyton March, Cleveland, 7 March 1928, Peyton C March Papers, LOC. 45. Smythe, Pershing, 123-24.

Chapter 5

EVALUATION AND CLASSIFICATION It was the spring of 1918, and great battles had shaken the Western Front. From the sea in the north to near the Swiss border, armies locked in mortal combat as the Germans continued to try to break the Western allies and end the war. To Major General Robert Alexander it was only a matter of hearing distant guns, seeing the flashes in the east, and following the course of the struggle by reading the communiques from Chaumont or Paris. He commanded the 41st Division and knew that it would never see combat as a division. The 41st was made up of troops from the National Guards of Oregon, Washington, Idaho, North and South Dakota, Wyoming, and Colorado. Fate had so disposed that in December 1917 the 41st became the first depot division in France. Pershing's policy was that every fourth division arriving in France would be a depot unit, supporting other divisions within a corps. The fourth to arrive was the 42nd Rainbow Division, but through powerful political maneuvering this division, drawn from twenty-six states and the District of Columbia and formed by Secretary of War Newton Baker, remained intact. The next division to arrive, which was the 41st, became the depot division. The 41st's first commander was the solid, rotund, and unflappable Hunter Liggett. On 13 February 1918, Robert Alexander assumed command of the 41st.1 The "Sunset Division," as it was called due to its insignia's resemblance to the sun setting in the west, was in real confusion. As Alexander quickly found out, soldiers were continually being sent to fill the manpower needs of other divisions. When Hunter Liggett departed to form I U.S. Corps, he took most of the experienced staff with him. Like other ambitious officers, Alexander knew that Pershing would allow no failure, even in a depot unit, and that things had to change quickly.

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Alexander turned to an old friend, Colonel John L. Hines, who was commanding the 16th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Division, for help. A letter reached Hines while he was in the trenches with his regiment; after leaving the line on 9 March 1918, Hines took a great deal of time to write a lengthy letter to Alexander. 2 The advice was sound, AEF orthodoxy: first train your staffs at the regimental and at the divisional levels, and at some point thereafter the training of the units could begin very quickly 3 In January the two brigade and four regimental commanders of the 41st had attended a two-week staff course at Langres, and they had been active ever since in training what troops they had. The problem remained, however, that officers and men were continually leaving the division, and new arrivals from the United States varied widely in their state of training. Alexander had to be very careful lest word reach Pershing that former 41st men were not up to standard when they reported to their units. Pershing had an embarrassment of riches as far as potential brigade and divisional commanders were concerned. The General's problem was that he did not have units for them to command. The question of trained staff officers for those units continually haunted Pershing as the number of units grew, and he played command musical chairs with the material he had. Much of this problem rested with the method of raising divisions that had been devised by Newton Baker and the War Department. Divisions would be created with skeleton staffs and units, then filled as draft levies came available. Units were continually going back to the basics as new men entered. Even the best divisional commanders had little idea how good their men really were. There was a rigid schedule for shipping divisions to France; consequently, some units received large groups of very green troops prior to departure in order to replace men pulled from the division to make up shortages in divisions that left before them. 4 Almost every soldier was aware of the widely varying quality of soldiers arriving as replacements from the depot and replacement divisions. The older National Guardsmen of the 31st ("Dixie") or 39th ("Delta") divisions were able to make a contribution to their new units rather quickly, but others were not. The experience of Lieutenant Colonel William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan was fairly typical of the frustrations felt over replacements. On 26 January he "received 60 recruits per company from the 41st Div. These men were inexperienced, many of them recently drafted." 5 Those were soldiers who had been sent to the "Sunset" Division just before sailing for France so that the division could leave the United States with all twenty-eight thousand slots filled. It was not a wise policy at all. Major General Robert Lee Bullard, commanding the 1st Division, lamented the fact that even officers were arriving unschooled. "I have much difficulty," he complained to his diary, "in getting officers who know anything. All are untrained." 6 This situation was very well known to Pershing, who bombarded the War Department with complaints that newly arriving soldiers were defi-

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cient in the school of the soldier and in rifle training. Pershing constantly visited the units in training, inspecting down to the company level, so he knew the problems of the AEF intimately. On 20 June, for example, Pershing spent a long day with Major General WilUam G. Haan and the 32nd Division (National Guard). Haan, a solid West Pointer, class of 1889, joined the 32nd in August 1917 as commander of the division's 57th Artillery Brigade. At that time, the divisional commander had been Major General James Parker, whom Pershing later rejected as too old for the job. Pershing really wanted the younger "Bunker" Haan to bring the division to the AEF. In late March there had been a set of divisional maneuvers, which the G-5 and Pershing rated as unsatisfactory. Usually that meant the beginning of the end for a commander, but Pershing opted to keep Haan and let him whip the 32nd into shape, which he did. When Pershing visited the division again in June, he was well satisfied with Haan and his brigade commanders, he found one regimental commander and one battalion commander to be still unsatisfactory, but was greatly impressed with a certain First Lieutenant Baccus, a company commander.7 Pershing developed a complex, several-tiered system for the evaluation of officers in his command. When the army had been small and promotion had been earned by the seniority system, there had been little need for a comprehensive system of officer evaluation. Since Pershing had been promoted to brigadier general over so many officers, regardless of seniority, he knew that he had been the subject of some serious subjective evaluation. The first stage of Pershing's rating system was the well-known general's visit and "job interview," which included a physical exam. Pershing rejected most major generals who visited France, but some, like Henry A. Allen, commanding the 90th Division, were certainly approved. There were a few generals Pershing could not turn down, and one of those was Major General John F. O'Ryan, commander of the New York National Guard's 27th Infantry Division. Pershing had little faith in any National Guard commander, believing them to be unprofessional political appointees.8 O'Ryan had been born to Irish immigrants in the Bronx, New York, in 1874, and had attended the City College of New York. After leaving CCNY in 1898, O'Ryan entered Columbia Law School and enlisted as a private in the fashionable 7th New York Infantry Regiment. Law was not O'Ryan's first love; soldiering was. In 1900 he was commissioned in the artillery and began a rise through the ranks of the guard. "We create soldiers for war, and in all our National Guard doings we must never lose sight of that idea."9 O'Ryan was a strong disciplinarian and had a strong dislike for overweight soldiers. He found an oppornunity to attend the Army War College, no small feat for a National Guardsman prior to World War I, and when the 27th Infantry Division was formed O'Ryan was selected to command it. During the Mexican border operation, O'Ryan took eighteen thousand New York Guardsmen to the border. In November 1917 O'Ryan

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made the obligatory tour of Europe, but Pershing had been noncommittal as far as O'Ryan's return to the AEF was concerned. In May of 1918 O'Ryan's Roughnecks arrived in France and began preparing for combat. The big question was whether Pershing would allow this 100 percent National Guard commander to retain his position. He was forty-three years old, athletic in build, trim and energetic, with a tour at the Army War College and on the Mexican border to recommend him to John J. Pershing. Pershing allowed the division to get settled and begin training, and then he descended upon the Rough Necks for one of his in-depth inspections. After taking a long look at the infantry and engineer regiments as well as the staff, Pershing "had a long talk with General O'Ryan, who made a rather favorable impression. The 27th Division is a typical militia organization, but has great possibilities. General O'Ryan has developed a certain esprit which is good." 10 It is rather doubtful that Pershing could have removed O'Ryan without a serious fight. First of all, O'Ryan was a solid commander, and second, no Democratic administration in Washington would have wanted to alienate New York Irish voters. Much more typical is what happened to the 29th Division, from the National Guards of Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, Delaware, and the District of Columbia. The division was commanded by Major General Charles G. Morton, a regular who had extensive service with the Inspector General's office. In the fall of 1917 Morton received his two stars and was assigned to bring the 29th to France. Upon their arrival in July 1918, several of Pershing's staff were sent to command units in the division. Harry H. Bandholtz, AEF provost marshall, got command of the 58th Infantry Brigade, while Lucius R. Holbrook took command of the 54th Artillery Brigade. Bandholtz successfully commanded his brigade in combat; Pershing later sent John MacAuley Palmer to the division to take command of the 58th. When Pershing did his usual inspection of the 29th Division, he spent a great deal of time with Bandholtz and found his brigade, including two National Guard regimental commanders, to be competent. The general, however, found the 57th Brigade to be wanting, and he ordered Major General Charles Morton to get rid of a number its officers.11 Pershing never used unit command positions as dumping grounds for officers. It was policy in the AEF that staff officers be rotated between staff positions and combat commands. This was a wise decision by Pershing, and it certainly staved off any complaint that the staff at Chaumont had safe jobs or had lost touch with conditions in the field. No one was exempt from the policy, and in fact there was universal and enthusiastic acceptance by the Chaumont staff of the rotation scheme. A combat command is always coveted by an officer, and to have a successful one insured promotion after the war. A good case in point was Brigadier General Dennis Nolan, Pershing's extraordinarily effective G-2. Nolan was sent to command the 55th Infantry

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Brigade of the 28th Division, a National Guard division from Pennsylvania. From 28 September to 9 October Nolan was in combat, and on 1 October Nolan won the Distinguished Service Cross for valor at Appremont. 12 In the process of evaluating officers, this was an important phase for John J. Pershing, who was determined that his staff and command elements have a number of different experiences. Staff officers at Chaumont could also expect to spend time with the combat divisions to get a feel for what their state of training actually was and to experience conditions in the trenches. For example, Colonel Hugh A. Drum, who was slated for important staff assignments, spent well over a month during February and March of 1918 with Charles Menoher's 42nd Division in the trenches near Luneville. Drum's time was spent mainly with the two infantry brigades and four infantry regiments, actually observing the course of training. It was valuable time for Drum, who left the Rainbow Division in mid-March with a real understanding for what the doughboys endured in the trenches. 13 The AEF was a modern army in that it generated vast amounts of paperwork. The records of the AEF were massive; usually the adjutant general at Chaumont oversaw the disposition of the tons of documents. There was established a Central Records Office at Bourges, about a hundred kilometers to the East of Tours. Originally located in Tours with the Service of Supply, the Central Records Office became too big and was moved. One of the offices at Bourges handled a continual flow of officer evaluations, which were viewed as permanent documents to be retained. "Corky" Davis, the powerful adjutant general at Chaumont, was directly responsible for the center and for the growing number of officer evaluation reports used by the AEF. Senior officers, as one would think, wrote reports on subordinates. Davis developed a format for the evalutaions, which dealt with matters from a grasp of tactical maneuvers, to supply functions, to the enforcement of discipline. These forms were required, and they were filed and duly stored at the facility. It was in the area of general officer evaluations where a particularly great deal of paper work was generated. Davis devised a lengthy form and a rating scheme as to who rated whom. These documents were read by Pershing; they were usually the only rating forms he actually saw. "Corky" Davis also put in motion a procedure for recording all documents and evaluations that pertained to officers who had been relieved from command and sent to Blois for reevaluation. There can be Uttle doubt that by the end of the war each officer, successful or relieved, had a lengthy dossier that went far beyond anything the United States Army had employed before. In the system of evaluations, no one was more important than Major General Andre W. Brewster, Inspector General, AEF. Brewster was one of the original members of the AEF staff, having sailed with Pershing on the Baltic in 1917. Pershing had great faith in his judgment, and Brewster's

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reports through Davis to Pershing could make or break officers. In the spring and early summer, with the AEF growing in numbers of divisions, Brewster was constantly driving between units, observing officers. Brewster went beyond tactical, operational, and administrative matters, however. In a report on Major General Robert Lee Bullard in July, Brewster wrote, "He is very loyal, and always desirous of carrying out the policies of the Commander-in-Chief, a very valuable asset." 14 In the same report, the inspector general was highly critical of Major General Clarence R. Edwards, the popular commander of the 26th "Yankee" National Guard Division. This was noted by Davis, who appended a note that there were continual complaints about Edward's handling of the 26th Division. Obviously Davis was building a dossier that Pershing would use in the subsequent messy relief of Edwards. It was wise not to run afoul of either "Corky" Davis or Andre Brewster. Sometimes the system broke down, regardless of how much attention was paid to it. The adjutant general's office and the inspector general's office had a growing mound of paperwork, including inspections, officer evaluations, and unit reports. As the workload grew, the need for more inspectors became obvious, and mistakes were made. A good case in point concerned Brigadier General Lucien G. Berry, commanding officer of the 60th Field Artillery Brigade, 35th Infantry Division. Berry was an old-line, regular army, artillery officer who had come to the Missouri and Kansas National Guard's 35th Division when it needed help in organizing its artillery brigade. During the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, the division had difficulties, and a First Lieutenant Michael Jacobs was sent from the inspector general's office. Jacobs filed reports that were highly critical of Berry and the 35th's artillery brigade. As if that were not enough, Jacobs urged that General Berry be removed from command for his alleged failures. When Major General Peter E. Traub, the divisional commander, found out about the seriously critical report, he complained bitterly that no first lieutenant of four years' service could possibly evaluate a general of thirty-two years in the artillery. The issue went to Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett, commanding the First United States Army, and to the adjutant general and inspector general at Chaumont. The entire report was reversed, but it was clear that the need for more officers for inspectors had created a situation allowing an overzealous junior officer to feel he could call for the removal of a senior officer, a brigadier general at that. 15 The relief of officers placed a strain on the system. A reclassification board was established at Blois, France, early in the history of the AEF. In January 1918, Colonel Charles C. Pulis, a coastal artillery officer, was ordered to go to Blois to establish the center. Johnson Hagood followed Pulis to the city and found very little to his satisfaction. What was envisioned was a facility far from the hectic activity of other AEF centers, where officers from the United States could report to be evaluated and then

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assigned to a unit. After much seardiing, Hagood was able to find enough billets for senior officers, but company-grade officers had to stay in an uninviting unused French barracks.16 Blois, however, began to take on an ominous tone when the board that reassigned relieved officers came into being. This board sent officers either to other duties or back to the United States. Hagood, who viewed the reclassification center as a second chance, was in a minority17 To be "blooeyed," as the doughboys called it, meant failure and often the end of a regular army career. The question of inefficient officers was on Pershing's mind quite a bit in the late fall of 1917. After discussions with Harbord, General Order number 62, dated 16 November 1917, was published by AEF headquarters at Chaumont. It established the reclassification center for all army officers; the order stipulated that a commander had to document his displeasure with an officer, then the higher authority at division, bureau, or section level could then convene a board to examine him. The boards, especially in the case of a regular army officer, were required to maintain a complete dossier of all materials pertinent to his relief and reclassification. The general order envisioned that most officers would be sent back to the United States and discharged.18 Pershing then became concerned that cowardly officers might actually try to be sent to Blois, knowing that their probable fate would be a trip back to the safety of the United States.19 Little was done to deal with that problem until June 1918. Pershing in 1917 probably could not have believed what would happen to the size of the AEF over several months. The board was a good idea, but it became obvious that simply sending men back to the United States was not a good idea. In an expansion such as the one the United States Army underwent in the Great War, there were good men who found themselves square pegs trying to fit into round holes. A large number of National Guard and National Army officers, and a few regulars, had great skills that could be used in the Service of Supply, constantly short of competent technical officers. Brigadier General Johnson Hagood, chief of staff of the Service of Supply in the spring of 1918, made a solid case for the reclassification board at Blois becoming a place for a second chance. In early June Pershing approved this, and many officers who might have been lost to the AEF found their niche in the supply and logistics area.20 By the end of the war, 1,371 officers of all ranks had been processed at Blois, and 236 had been returned to the United States, forty-eight being discharged from the service outright.21 The relief of a general officer was a matter of great concern to Pershing; in some cases he simply preferred to relieve the officer, reassign him to a meaningless post in the AEF for a short period, and then send him home. Major General John E. McMahon, for instance, was relieved from command of the 5th Division on 16 October 1918 and given command of the 41st Depot Division. A few weeks later McMahon, whose division had indeed suffered

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from a serious lack of discipline and leadership, was ordered to report to the Adjutant General in the War Department in Washington. 22 Another interesting case was that of Major General Beaumont Bonaparte Buck, a flamboyant Mississippian who came to the AEF with the 1st Infantry Division. On 16 October he was relieved from command of the 3rd Infantry Division by Pershing. Buck had done well with the AEF, rising to command a solid regular army division, but during the Meuse-Argonne offensive Buck showed distressing signs of strain. Once relieved, Buck was given command of the 34th Infantry Division, which was being used as a replacement division. In a few days Buck was ordered, with McMahon, to return to the United States, whereupon he reverted to his regular army rank of colonel. 23 Here were two cases of officers being relieved with no action taken at Blois, reassigned internally by Pershing to another division command, and then returned to the United States. Buck, however, was one of the very few relieved generals who retired from the army as a major general. Throughout the life of the AEF, the reclassification center at Blois continued to function in a fairly efficient manner. Once the Service of Supply became involved in the process, a number of officers, especially National Guard and National Army, had their careers and reputations saved, and the service had a number of very efficient key officers added to their number. In August, before the St. Mihiel offensive, the authority of the reclassification board was expanded. This particular change in the reclassification system gave much more authority to the commander of the Service of Supply, at that time Major General Harbord. For all practical purposes, Harbord gained full control over any officer relieved from the combat divisions. 24 The serious work on reclassification would come during the heavy fighting in the St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne offensive in the fall of 1918. The next major change in officer reclassification came in December 1918, after the end of fighting. Pershing decided to split the authority over reclassification between supply and combat officers. By General Order 231, 18 December 1918, the AEF established a reclassification center for combat officers at Gondrecourt, close to where the combat divisions were located after the armistice. The Gondrecourt center did not have the authority to do anything but process officers who had been relieved, with Adjutant General "Corky" Davis claiming control over the final disposition of relieved combat officers. The Blois center would process only supply officers. While this sounded like an efficiency move, the whole process at Gondrecourt proved a failure. The board received a number of officers who had been relieved in a very hasty manner by divisions who were preparing for occupation duty in Germany. In an internal evaluation, it was decided that the center for combat officers was failing in its mission and confusing the issue as far as combat officers were concerned. In the final after-action report, it was found that only 30 percent of all of the officers sent to Gondrecourt for reclassification were found actually to be wanting. In the

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case of junior officers (first and second lieutanants and captains) sent to the board, only 24 percent were found to be inefficient or incompetent. 25 Pershing then sent Brigadier General L. M. Nuttman to command the reclassification center at Gondrecourt; later Nuttman sent an after-action report to Pershing. Nuttman, who had knowledge of the workings of the boards at Blois, stated that he believed the center had been used by commanders for the wrong purposes. The results of the boards were fair and honest. A large number of junior officers were sent to Gondrecourt after their platoons or companies failed one inspection. The purpose of an army inspection was not (and is not) to punish officers or troops, but to find deficiencies and then take immediate corrective action. Many of the officers were never allowed to make those corrections but found themselves, with no warning and much to their dismay, being sent to the center. Some officers never learned why they were in front of the board at Gondrecourt until their hearing. Most of the officers who went before the board were found to be competent officers who had never been counseled by their superior officers. Nuttman believed that the process at Gondrecourt flew in the face of everything an army officer had been taught. To be fair, and Nuttman certainly was, most senior officers were preparing their units for duty in Germany, but this did not excuse their flagrant disregard of some of the army's long-held and time-tested tenents. 26 The center at Gondrecourt was soon shut down. Despite the Gondrecourt fiasco, Pershing did have a complex system of evaluations. His rejection of the seniority system made evaluation a pressing need. The General had before him a series of written evaluations done by senior generals on their subordinate generals and colonels. Pershing read every evaluation, and he believed that they were helpful in making decisions as to key players in the command structure. Davis devised a format for senior generals and required that these be filled out and sent to the adjutant general's office at Chaumont. Copies were retained in the permanent files, and a copy went to John J. Pershing. The form was two large pages long and included such topics as the basis for judgment of an officer; the rated officer's knowledge of tactics, staff functions and discipline; and an estimation of an officer's potential for higher command or staff work. 27 In a memorandum to army, corps, and divisional commanders, Davis made it very clear what Pershing wanted as far as the rating system was concerned. "These reports," he wrote, "are not to be perfunctory letters, prepared in a stereotyped manner, but confidential reports, expressing as clearly as possible, the reporting officer's view of the efficiency and capabilities of the officer reported upon." To insure that every reporting officer understood the gravity of the report, Davis added, "Reporting officers are advised that these reports are to be used personally by the Commander-in-

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Chief, to enable him to arrive at his own final judgement of the man reported upon."28 No rating scheme can be a good one unless the rater actually takes the time to consider seriously what he is doing. Pershing got the cooperation he desired, and his two army commanders, lieutenant generals Hunter Liggett and Robert Lee Bullard, were diligent. Every army, corps, and divisional commander had the responsibility for doing an evaluation, and the records indicate that every commander did what was expected. Some reports were negative; and they reflected problems that certain officers had. A case in point was the relief of Major General Charles C. Ballou, commander of the 92nd Infantry Division, on 17 November 1918 due to the failure of the division to perform assigned tasks on 10 and 11 November 1918 while assigned to Bullard's Second Army29 Bullard was highly critical of the fighting mettle of the division, and in his diary he recorded that Ballou, despite his continual efforts, could not motivate his troops to fight.30 But a few weeks later Bullard's evaluation of Ballou was even more stinging. Writing about Ballou's capabilities as a line or staff officer, he stated that Ballou was "not in my opinion qualified for either. In many efforts he never succeeded in planning and executing a successful raid or attack."31 Ballou was an early member of the AEF and had received his brigadier general's star on 1 December 1917, along with Charles T. Menoher, Andre Brewster, and Charles H. Muir (who ended the war in command of IV Corps). Bullard's evaluation and Ballou's relief, then, were no ordinary matters, and "Corky" Davis ordered an investigation into the entire affair. In the meantime Ballou was sent to command the 86th Division, which was a skeletonized replacement division at the time. Colonel J. N. Greely, a member of the staff at Chaumont, was sent to investigate; he upheld Bullard's evaluation and Ballou's relief from command. The whole review was then sent to Brigadier General Fox Connor, then G-3 at Chaumont, who determined that the investigation and evaluation were valid and that Ballou was indeed wanting as a commander.32 When Pershing received the rather large dossier he concurred with the findings. The system could also work in favor of an officer who found himself in difficulties. The rating, evaluation, and relief scheme had some built-in safeguards. Brigadier General Michael J. Lenihan, commanding the 83rd Brigade, 42nd Infantry Division, was one who found the system could reverse bad evaluations. Lenihan was an old regular, West Point class of 1887. He had served his career in the infantry and had received excellent reports throughout his service. During the Meuse-Argonne offensive his brigade came up against very strong, well-defended German positions. The corps commander, Major General Charles P. Summerall, threatened to relieve Lenihan and the 84th Brigade commander, Douglas A. MacArthur, unless progress was made. The 84th, with extremely heavy casualties, took

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its objectives, but heavy German machine-gun, artillery, and small-arms fire held up the 83rd Brigade. Despite his best efforts and extraordinary acts of courage and self-sacrifice on the part of the troops engaged, the 83rd simply could not penetrate the German wire and obstacles. Lenihan was relieved of command on 17 October 1918.33 The actual relief had been done by Major General Menoher, at the direction of Summerall. Lenihan refused to be relieved without a hearing, however, and Brigadier General Brewster sent an inspector to review the circumstances. Colonel S. Field Dallam found that Lenihan had done all he could. Before the October battles, Hunter Liggett had selected Lenihan to command the 26th Infantry Division because of excellent record as a brigade commander.34 Liggett then overrode the actions of Menoher and Summerall and assigned Lenihan to command the 153rd Brigade, 77th Division, a solid combat unit.35 When Davis required Summerall to do an evaluation for Lenihan, who was by then in a different corps, the report was highly critical. Summerall wrote, "General Lenihan is in my opinion not qualified for line work. He is well qualified for certain other duties connected with supply." He summed up, "It is believed that he is not of value as a brigade or as a division commander in peace or war."36 General Liggett ignored the evaluation, which according to AEF inspectors was not accurate, and kept Lenihan as a brigade commander. Michael J. Lenihan retired from the army with the rank of brigadier general, surviving the bad reports. Pershing concurred with Liggett's opinion, but later, as Chief of Staff of the Army, Pershing took no steps to secure higher rank for Lenihan before his retirement from the Army. There were some rather strange evaluations as the system progressed. "Corky" Davis asked that Brigadier General Hagood prepare a report on Colonel George C. Marshall. At the time Marshall was in the operations section of 1st Army37 and Johnson Hagood was on his way to Germany to become commander of 3rd Army Artillery on the Rhine River.38 Hagood had not had an opportunity to actually to observe Marshall in his capacity as an operations planner, but Davis wanted his evaluation as a part of Marshall's permanent file. Hagood wrote a glowing report, which said in part, "He is so much better qualified to command that I would prefer to serve under him."39 Davis did not ask Hagood to give a basis for his judgment, but Hagood did state that he had known Marshall before the war and that Marshall had served as his adjutant in the Philippine Islands.40 What he did not say was that since 1914 he had been a vocal Marshall advocate and believed Marshall to be among the finest officers in the army 41 Pershing felt that he had little problem with the new Chief of Staff of the Army, Peyton Conway March. March knew firsthand the problems in the AEF as far as training officers, especially staff officers, was concerned. Since he had served in the AEF as artillery chief for some time, he was well aware of Pershing's need to find commanders he felt could do the job when actual

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combat began. March was initially content to allow the AEF the widest possible latitude in establishing mechanisms to train and evaluate; he was himself not happy with the seniority system of promotion. Inherent in the March-Pershing relationship, however, were potential problems. March viewed the position of Chief of Staff of the Army in its proper light: he was the Chief of Staff, and he believed that the AEF was simply one part of the army. By law the Chief of Staff had certain powers, and March was determined to maintain those rights and prerogatives. Also, March was charged with raising an army to send to the AEF. In July 1918,465,000 men would be called to the colors; March directed that they be formed into divisions. He would ruthlessly push those in charge of shipping and transport to get the doughboys to France. March knew the AEF and had seen Pershing become immersed in detail. Even though the General Staff reorganization of February 1918 had helped free Pershing, March considered his task too large for one man. By July Pershing had begun to see a red flag raised as far as March was concerned. This was a general who would not act like Tasker Bliss. March made it clear that Washington was deeply concerned about the myriad duties which Pershing had to attend to and indicated that soon he would take some of the burdens off of Pershing's shoulders. 42 What Peyton March had in mind was not clear, but Pershing and March had already disagreed over a transfer of staff officers between Chaumont and Washington. In mid-March of 1918 March had suggested an exchange of officers, as discussed above, but Pershing, under the influence of James Harbord, resisted the move. The clash was a harbinger of things to come. Certainly March needed new, efficient blood for the slow-moving General Staff, and it was his right to build up his own staff. Pershing, on the other hand, had just begun staff training at Langres, which he hoped would produce staff officers with some understanding of their tasks. The problem was quite simple—there were not enough to go around. The clash over staff officers was perhaps inevitable. What Pershing did not know in the spring of 1918 was how far March was prepared to go in altering the AEF. In April 1918 Pershing had other, more pressing, matters on his mind. Divisions were now arriving in Europe, and others were on the way. In January 1918 Pershing had organized the I U.S. Army Corps, but it had yet to function. Major General Hunter Liggett had assembled a staff, but as yet he had no troops. By June Pershing planned to have II, III, and IV corps operational, and plans were made for the eventual activation of the First United States Army. What had been bleak prospects in January were certainly brighter by the spring of 1918. There were commanders and staffs, but as yet they were untested in battle. However, despite frustrations, great progress had been made. It now remained for Pershing to put the right men into the right positions. Pershing also knew that it would take some doing to bring plans to fruition. "Black Jack" Pershing, however, would be per-

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sistent, a n d his task w o u l d b e to p u s h his allies to accept a n A m e r i c a n a r m y w i t h A m e r i c a n c o m m a n d e r s , fighting together u n d e r the A m e r i c a n flag.

NOTES 1. Robert Alexander, Memories of the World War, 1917-1918 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931), 20-21. 2. Entry for 9 March 1918, Hines Diaries, John L. Hines Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. (Hereafter cited as MHI.) 3. Hines to Alexander, n.p., 10 March 1918, ibid. 4. James W. Rainey, "The Questionable Training of the AEF in World War I," Parameters, XXII, 4 (Winter, 1992-93), 92-94. 5. Entry for 26 January 1918, Donovan Diaries, Donovan Papers, MHI. 6. Robert Lee Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences of the War (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1925), 116. 7. Entry for 20 June 1918, Pershing Diaries, John J. Pershing Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. (Hereafter cited as LOC, with collections individually cited.) 8. John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, I (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Tab Books Reprint, 1986), 124. 9. Robert Lee Bullard, Fighting Generals (Ann Arbor, MI: J. W. Edwards, 1944), 286. 10. Entry for 2 July 1918, Pershing Diaries, Pershing Papers, L O C 11. Entry for 20 August 1918, ibid. 12. Special Edition, M.I.R.S. Bulletin, VI, 4 (April, 1936), 5-8. 13. Entries for 11 February to 15 March 1918, Hugh Drum Diaries, Hugh Drum Papers, MHI. 14. Memorandum by Brewster, 18 July 1918, Records Group 120, Records of the Adjutant General, AEF, National Archives, Washington, DC, Carton 2262. (Hereafter cited as RG 120.) 15. "Brief History in the Case Brigadier General Lucien G. Berry," 1 October 1918, Records Group 200, John J. Pershing Papers, National Archives, Washington, DC, Carton 8. (Hereafter cited as RG 200). 16. Johnson Hagood, The Services of Supply: A Memoir of the Great War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1927), 127-29. 17. Memorandum by Hagood, Tours, 22 May 1918, RG 120, Carton 2254. 18. After Action Report, Deputy Chief of Staff, Service of Supply, c. 1919, ibid. 19. Entry 17 April 1918, Pershing Diaries, Pershing Papers, L O C 20. Memorandum, Adjutant General, AEF, 1 June 1918, ibid. 21. After Action Report, Deputy Chief of Staff, Service of Supply, c. 1919, RG 120, Carton 2254. 22. "The Case of Major General J. E. McMahon/ 7 c. February, 1919, RG 200, Carton 2267. 23. "The Case of Major General B. B. Buck," c. February, 1919, Pershing Papers, LOC. 24. General Order No. 231,18 December 1918, RG 120, Carton 2254. 25. After Action Report, Combat Officers Depot, 27 April 1919, ibid. 26. Nuttman to Pershing, Gondrecourt, 28 April 1917, ibid.

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27. Copies of all of the files are in RG 120, Cartons 2262 thru 2267. 28. Memorandum from Davis, Chaumont, 10 December 1918, RG 120, Carton 2254. 29. "The Case of Major General C C Ballou," c. November 1918, ibid. Carton 2267. 30. Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences, 296. 31. Bullard's Evaluation of Ballou, 13 December 1918, RG 120, Carton 2262. 32. Connor's Endorsement, Chaumont, 27 November 1918, "Case of . . . Ballou," ibid., Carton 2267. 33. James J. Cooke, The Rainbow Division in the Great War,1917-1919 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 1994), 168-81. 34. "In the Matter of the Relief of Brigadier General Michael J. Lenihan," c. 3 November 1918, RG 200, Carton 8. 35. Lenihan wrote but never published his memoirs entitled "I Remember, I Remember," and he never really dealt with his relief. What he does recount is his considerable experience in combat in World War I. On page 67 he states that he had spent over 185 days in actual combat in the trenches or in open warfare. Lenihan was certainly no poor commander, and Liggett obviously recognized that Summerall had acted unfairly. Lenihan's manuscript is found in the archives of the MHI at Carlisle Barracks, PA. 36. Report from Summerall to Davis, n.p., 21 December 1918, RG 120, Carton 2265. 37. Forrest C Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), 188-89. 38. Hagood, The Services of Supply, 358. 39. Hagood to Davis, Coblenz, 19 December 1918, RG 120, Carton 2264. 40. Ibid. 41. Pogue, Marshall, 123-24. 42. March to Pershing, Washington, 5 July 1918, Peyton C March Papers, LOC.

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Pershing and his GHQ Staff, 1918. Lheft to right: Fiske, Andrews, McAndrew, Eltinge, Pershing, Nolan, Connor, Davis, van Horn Moseley. Courtesy of the National Archives.

Robert Lee Bullard, 1918. Courtesy of the National Archives.

•

Pershing and Charles P. Summerall, 1919. Courtesy of the Military History Institute.

Dennis E. Nolan, 1918. Courtesy of the National Archives.

Left to Right: Campbell King, John L. Hines (seated), George C Marshall, 1918. Courtesy of the Military History Institute.

Johnson Hagood, 1918. Courtesy of the National Archives.

'4-

•,,••"••:.

••:. i .-,

.

..,•.

Left to Right: James G. Harbord, Charles Gates Dawes, 1918. Courtesy of the Military History Institute.

Hugh Drum, 1918. Courtesy of the Military History Institute.

Chapter 6

INTO THE FIGHT, SPRING 1918 Pershing continued to resist allied efforts to rush Americans into the line. Although it was frustrating to the British and the French, he tenaciously stuck to the spirit of the orders he had been given in the spring of 1917. He would have an American army; but when? He had formed I Corps under Hunter Liggett, but the corps had no soldiers, only staff officers and a few dedicated corps troops. On 30 April 1918, on paper, the corps had the 1st Division, under Robert Lee Bullard, training with the French Fifth Army; the 2nd, under the suspect Omar Bundy, training with the French Tenth Army; the 26th, under Clarence Edwards, working under the French XXXII Corps near Toul; the 32nd, under William G. Harm, starting training under the French in a training area; and the 42nd, under Charles T. Menoher, in the trenches near Baccarat, finishing their trench training with the French VII Corps. The hapless 41st, still commanded by Robert Alexander, was located near the town of St. Aignan, in the middle of the Intermediate Zone of the Service of Supply, and far from the fighting in the West.1 The 77th Division was in the port waiting to move to a training area, and other combat divisions were scheduled to arrive soon. "Black Jack" Pershing was depressed by the fact that in one year the United States had only about 125,000 combat troops and about 400,000 support troops "Over There." Clemenceau, the Old Tiger of France, said of the American fighting forces, "That is not a satisfactory proportion."2 In January 1918 Pershing had successfully resisted a British proposal, made by Sir William Robertson, to bring to France 150 battalions of U.S. infantry and integrate them into the depleted allied ranks. Pershing argued for bringing six complete American divisions over instead. The General, who had traveled to Paris for the meeting, found the British temper rising

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as he refused to agree to the 150-battalion proposal. On 9 and 10 January the two men met at the Crillon Hotel, and on the evening of 10 January Pershing refused outright. Robertson, wrote Pershing in his diary, "urged sending a cable [to Washington], but I did not see fit to do it." 3 Wary now of the allies, Pershing went to Marechal Petain's headquarters to discuss plans for putting the 1st Division into the line, and schedules for the training of the 26th and 42nd divisions. Everything went well with Petain until the question of the Robertson proposal came up; Pershing refused again. After the meeting he made sure that Colonel Carl Boyd, a training officer who accompanied Pershing to Paris, recalled everything that was said, in case Boyd had to be a "witness to the conversation." 4 Reflecting on the clash with Roberston, Pershing wrote, "But, of course, the British were not thinking in terms of an American army at all." 5 Pershing was not in a good humor after his meetings, but his sprits were lifted when his old friend Colonel Charles G. Dawes took him to lunch at the Ritz Hotel in Paris. While at lunch, Dawes told Pershing that he supported Pershing's obstinate refusal to integrate the AEF into allied unites. After warning Pershing to remember the feelings of the War Department and to bring them in on any decision, Dawes indicated that he personally felt the French, at least, were feeling good about the conduct of the war. 6 If anyone in the AEF could buoy the feelings of "Black Jack" Pershing, it was Charlie Dawes. The general returned to Chaumont convinced he was right to resist efforts to parcel out the soldiers of the United States to the allies. The general staff at Chaumont fully supported Pershing's position, because they believed in it. James G. Harbord continually urged the General to stand firm in dealing with the British and French. Harbord's view was that the United States was in France "to settle our own row with the Germans, not merely help in one started against our allies." 7 Since Harbord was the closest officer to Pershing, his views had a certain resonance. While less provincial in attitude, the operation and training sections were adamant in supporting the continual training of American forces by division. Colonel Hugh Drum had a special view of the problem. Reflecting the position of the operations and training sections, Drum believed that by concentrating on bringing only infantry to France, the supply section—at the time, the line of communication—had been slighted to a dangerous point. Too many infantrymen were being detailed to work for the line of communication. 8 When Pershing was at Chaumont he received constant affirmation of his position, and his dealings with the allies hardened. But that is exactly what Pershing believed should happen; he had had his orders from Washington, dating back to the spring of 1917. Pershing also knew, however, what the allies did not. In the winter of 1917-1918 the American army was a hodgepodge of men training with broomsticks and wooden machine guns. To have brought 150 battalions of

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infantry over would have been tantamount to murder on the battlefield and a supreme embarrassment to the United States. There was great distress both in Washington and in Chaumont when General Leonard Wood arrived in Europe and began telling the allies about the confused state of affairs in the United States.9 There had been some pretty clear hints that things there were not as they should have been. In February Pershing had received clippings from the American press that stated that there were "thousands of fliers in Brest and that thousands of American aeroplanes are flying above American forces in Europe today." Pershing was livid, especially after some allied generals sarcastically refered to the American claims. The French did not need to point out that they were bearing the brunt of training the American air service at Issoudun and that the majority of aircraft flown by American aviators were French. Pershing cabled the War Department, "Emphatically protest against newspaper publicity of this nature and urgently recommend drastic steps be taken to stop publication of such articles."10 Pershing, as well as the War Department, was a prisoner of the system that mandated that full divisions be formed and then sent to France. The non-combat troops were easy to send; they were the stevedores, the engineer regiments, the corps-level and army-level artillery regiments; the aviators and ground crewmen to form the aero squadrons, which would observe, fight, and bomb when fully trained; and the quartermaster troops, which would man the ever-enlarging depots all over the Intermediate Zone of the supply service. A compromise was hammered out in late January whereby 150,000 American troops, or six full divisions, would be brought to France as quickly as possible. It was not the 150 infantry battalions that Robertson had hoped for, and for Pershing it was a victory.11 On 21 March 1918 the long-anticipated German offensive was unleashed with full fury, staggering the allies. By early April the Germans were forty miles from Paris; still there were no Americans in the battle. The I U.S. Corps, under Hunter Liggett, was moved to Toul in case the five American divisions were needed and could be committed to battle as a corps. Liggett's staff was solid and was ready for the fight. He had Colonel Malin Craig as his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Stuart "Tommy" Heintzelman as the G-3, and the abrasive Colonel Billy Mitchell as his chief, air service. Major General Robert Lee Bullard felt that his 1st Infantry Division was as prepared as it would ever be to meet the Germans in battle. 12 But Pershing hesitated, and he was under great pressure to send American divisions to fight under allied command. These dire circumstances caused Pershing to back off from forming and fighting I Corps and to support the hard-pressed British and French. 13 On 9 April another German offensive struck the allies and tore huge holes in the British lines. An infantry division from Portugal, never considered to be reliable, broke, failed to destroy vital bridges at Lys, and fled in disorder. Try as valiantly as they could, the British could not stem the tide of

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twenty-seven select German divisions that were now attacking along a twenty-five-mile frontage. On 11 April General Douglas Haig told his battered men to stand and fight it out to the last Tommy. With great trepidation, Pershing agreed to commit Robert Lee Bullard's 1st Infantry Division to the fight. On 16 April officers of the 1st Division went to Chaumont, where Pershing wanted to speak to them. Colonel John L. Hines, commanding the 16 Infantry Regiment in Brigadier General George B. Duncan's 1st Brigade, recalled that Pershing's emotional speech "was like the talk the football coach gives his team just before they go onto the field for the championship game. The General threw the whole of his forceful personality into this short talk; every officer was inspired to do his best out of personal loyalty to such a chief even if for no other motive." 14 If this movement of the 1st Division was like ninning onto the field to play for a championship, then it must be concluded that Pershing had in the 1st Division a team of true championship caliber. Robert Lee Bullard was a first-class commander, and his chief of staff, Colonel Campbell King, was a solid West Pointer. As G-3, Bullard had Colonel George C. Marshall, as competent and brilliant a planner as the U.S. Army has ever produced. His 1st Brigade was commanded by George B. Duncan, who was one of Pershing's favorites. Duncan's regimental commanders were colonels John L. Hines (16th) and Frank Parker (18th). The 2nd Brigade was commanded by the colorful Mississippian Beaumont Bonaparte Buck, who had two solid regimental colonels in Hamilton A. Smith (26th) and Hanson Ely (28th). The divisional artillery brigade was under the command of Brigadier General Charles P. Summerall. 15 Robert Lee Bullard's health, however, was bad. A few days before the 1st Division was due to depart for service with the French, Bullard had a severe attack of neuritis in his right arm and shoulder; he had to spend two days in the hospital at Toul. "All my life I had known sickness and suffering," Bullard wrote, but "nothing to equal this." 16 Pershing was aware of what was happening with Bullard, and he had to make a critical decision about the command of the division, a division upon which Pershing had pinned so much hope. By 15 April Pershing was convinced that Bullard should remain in command of the division, and Bullard was present when Pershing made his inspirational talk on 16 April. 17 Part of Pershing's decision was professional. The eve of a battle was not the time to change commanders. Either Duncan or Charles P. Summerall were certainly competent to command the division, but Bullard had worked with his staff and knew the whole structure of the division. John J. Pershing had a genuine affection for Bullard, having known him in the old Army and in the Philippines. Last, but certainly not least, Bullard had the support of James G. Harbord.

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On 13 April Harbord went to see Bullard and reported back that Bullard had smashed his fingers in a car door (at least that was what Bullard was telling anyone from higher headquarters) and that he was suffering from an anti-tetanus injection. Harbord always had his ear to the ground and quite possibly knew of Bullard's severe bout with neuritis, but Harbord wanted to take command of the division's 1st Brigade after Duncan, whom Pershing had slated for divisional command at the first opportunity, and he would do nothing to irritate Robert Lee Bullard. Harbord wrote to Pershing, "I also believe that the assignment would be acceptable to General Bullard."18 Had Harbord not accepted Bullard's story of the hurt fingers, an assignment would not have been acceptable. According to Harbord, Bullard encouraged him to seek out the command when Duncan was promoted. Just as the 1st Division moved to new positions, Bullard faced a question over securing and policing of a section of the trenches which had just been turned over by the 1st to Major General Clarence Edwards and the 26th "Yankee" Infantry Division. Edwards was irate over the condition of the area, accusing the 1st Division of poor policing. More serious than sloppy police calls was the allegation that classified documents were found in the area. In fact, Malin Craig, chief of staff, I Corps, had ordered a thorough inspection of the trenches. Craig then suggested strongly to James Harbord that Summerall and other officers be court-martialed for the breach of security.19 Bullard was furious with Edwards, whom he despised. "It was altogether the most irritating experience of my life. It was a vicious blow from behind. It may, of course, be said that observers from corps or higher headquarters made the reports."20 Bullard's rage was directed at Edwards, but Harbord promised that GHQ at Chaumont would look into the matter. Later, Pershing told Bullard not to concern himself with the complaints. John J. Pershing had known Edwards since West Point and did not like him at all. Edwards also had a tendency to be openly critical of Pershing and the AEF staff, believing them to be hostile to any National Guard unit. While that was certainly true for Pershing, the results of the incident are still curious. Pershing had been zealous in preaching operational security, and most certainly leaving classified documents laying about was in violation of it. There was no question of a court martial for Summerall or the regular officers of the 1st Division when the unit was preparing for such a critical mission. Bullard was not going to be relieved over the matter, either. It does appear that when the situation dictated, Pershing could turn a blind eye to the faults of the 1st Division. It certainly did not help that Pershing was waiting for the right moment to send General Edwards back to the United States. Clarence Edwards was not a soldier that his contemporaries really liked, and Pershing had had continual difficulties with him since his division arrived in 1917. Even the usually mild- mannered and conciliatory Newton Baker did not care for Edwards and approved of his removal in October

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1918.21 Born in Ohio in 1859, Edwards had a remarkable ability to make enemies and accumulate black marks. Having commanded the 26th Division from early December 1917 up to his relief in mid-October 1918, Edwards left the AEF without the usual Meritorious Service Medal, which was usually awarded almost pro forma by Pershing. On 20 April 1918, Edwards and the 26th Division chalked up an indelible black mark when the unit was hit by a massive German raid at Seicheprey. German infantry, outnumbering the Yankee fighters, overran the trenches in late afternoon after a violent bombardment; well over six hundred Americans were down as a result of the fight, and Pershing was furious. Edwards falsely claimed that the 26th had actually inflicted more casualties than it sustained. While everyone felt that the soldiers had fought with daring and courage, Pershing believed that the leadership, especially Edwards, had failed to prepare for the raid. 22 The word of the massive German assault reached Pershing five days before he found out that, on 19 April, Newton Baker had agreed with the British to send about 120,000 infantry and machine-gun troops to Europe every month during April, May, June, and July. Pershing was furious with the decision, because it threw a monkey wrench into the plans to build an American army capable of sustaining itself in combat. 23 On 27 April there was a contentious meeting between Pershing, Marechal Foch, and General Tasker Bliss, now the American representative to the Allied Supreme War Council. Pershing continued to resist the allied efforts to bring just infantry and machine gunners to Europe, without the other units needed to make complete divisions. Foch continued to express his view that an American army would indeed be formed, but John J. Pershing knew that as long as there were incomplete divisions there could be no American army.24 For American purposes, Pershing was right. There were eleven divisions in the United States awaiting transportation to Europe—the 3rd, 4th, 5th (regular), 27th, 28th, 30th, 33rd, 35th (National Guard), 78th, 80th, and the 82nd (National Army). The 77th Division, under the temporary command of Brigadier General Evan Johnson, was already on the way to France. Pershing had already made up his mind to give command of the 77th to his old friend George B. Duncan. By April, Chief of Staff Peyton C. March had done a good job of stabilizing the divisions in the United States and preparing them for shipment to the AEF. Both Pershing and March were too good soldiers not to realize that just when those whole divisions were ready to go they should not be "tinkered" with again. The structure of the AEF division made it a self-contained unit and a combined-arms team. To prepare for combat, soldiers would have to get used to working with organic artillery, machine guns, and mortars. The combat elements had to be comfortable working with the support elements—supply, ammunition trains, and medical and signal units. Command and staff elements of the division faced a huge task in getting acquainted with and utilizing attached

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units, such as gas and flame companies, aviation assets (both airplane and balloon), and eventually even tanks. If only infantry and machine-gun units arrived for four months, the difficulties of training these divisions increased a hundredfold. Pershing was right also from a soldier's point of view. In late April Pershing remained steadfast and hammered out an agreement with the British that basically returned to the six-division program agreed to in January 1918. Infantry and machine-gunners would come first in the month of May, but as tonnage allowed, artillery and other troops would quickly follow. Finally, in late April, Newton Baker came down on the side of Pershing. There were still allied concerns about the quality of American command and staff at the divisional and higher levels, and as troops arrived it was clear that much training would have to be carried on before they would be ready to fight the enemy. Be that as it may, Pershing was moving toward the establishment of the First U.S. American Army. Pershing was not blind to his command and staff problems, however. He had invested much time and effort in the staff school and the school of the line at Langres. He had grave concerns about the schools established at the divisions, and in an important training meeting with members of the G-3 and G-5 sections most concerned with schools, Pershing indicated that he believed three and four-week schools were too long. The general directed that steps be taken to cut the time that key officers and NCOs were kept away from their units.25 General Pershing expressed no such doubts about the three-month length of the General Staff College at Langres, and there were no efforts to reduce the time an officer would spend there. By the spring, however, it was clear that the whole concept of divisional schools had failed. The divisions that were now on their way to the AEF had no such expertise, and to train all of the divisions to open their own schools would take too much time. In late April and early May, while Pershing was jousting with the allies over shipment of troops, a conference at Langres decided to scrap the division-school concept and shift responsibilities to the newly formed corps. This was an important move for the AEF, in that the corps became the agency responsible for "training the trainers" for their major subordinate commands. At the corps level the so-called "parent" institution was the Infantry School, from three to five weeks long (as it worked out). Its basic function was to train the company commanders, platoon leaders, and platoon NCOs in commanding a company or a platoon in combat. Affiliated with the Infantry School was a school which worked with the trench mortars, machine guns, and signal operations. Also associated with it was an important anti-gas school, of one week's duration.26 A corps-level artillery school was established for the NCOs, lieutenants, and battery commanders; it dealt with practical matters, such as map reading, range finding, radio communications, and firing charts. Harold B. Fiske also moved some instruction to "Base Schools," which would function

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under the G-5 at various bases in the Intermediate Zone of the Service of Supply. Those included schools for such people as cooks and bakers (critical for the new divisions), clerks, saddlers and horse-shoers, vehicle drivers, and many others. This took a major burden off the shoulders of the corps and allowed the corps G-5 to concentrate on preparation for combat. The divisional support elements would be trained in the Service of Supply areas, where the expertise was anyway.27 The AEF now required that the divisions coming over in the spring send an advance party to France to attend the corps-level schools. They were to complete their training when their division arrived, and they in turn would become major trainers within the divisions. This was a first-rate idea, which could have had nothing but the best effect on the arriving units.28 To have maintained divisional-level schools would only have contributed to the training burden that continued to exist within the AEF. Since Pershing had put so much into the General Staff College at Langres and believed it to be a success, its third course was to be the largest yet. Because of the arrival of the new divisions, the G-5 enlarged the class to 250 class members, and priority went to the incoming units. Many of those units had sent staff officers as a part of their advance party to attend the course. Colonel Alfred W. Bjornstad had requested field duty, and after two iterations of the course he was assigned to be the Chief of Staff for the newly formed III Corps. Brigadier General James W. "Dad" McAndrew had taken over the position of chief of staff at GHQ, Chaumont. In their place, Brigadier General W. M. Fassett became the director and Major John Millikin was designated executive officer. Fassett, after inspecting the facilities, informed Chaumont that it would be impossible to teach 250 officers in the old Carteret-Trecourt Barracks; and the French were prevailed upon to turn over a larger complex, Galland Barracks.29 The course graduated 169 officers in September 1918; and the makeup of the course tells much about the emphasis of Pershing and the G-5. Of the graduates, 114 came from the newly arrived divisions; this was 67.5 percent of the class membership. The 3rd Division had eight graduates, the 4th had eleven, the 5th (the weakest of the new units) had a dozen, the 27th had five, the 30th had seven, the 33rd had six, while the 35th had eight graduates. Of the National Army divisions, the 77th and 80th had nine each, while the 78th and 83rd accounted for seven graduates. The 82nd Division, one of the better ones to come to the AEF, had only five. The 32nd Division, which had been with the AEF for some months and was certainly a premier National Guard Army division, obtained eight graduates.30 Lieutenant Colonel George S. Patton was one of the graduates of the third course; he returned to lecture on tank warfare during the fourth and final course. Before he left for his duty as III Corps chief of staff, Colonel Bjornstad reorganized the course curriculum. Classrooms were wired for telephones, and during the many map exercises those rooms became divisional PCs

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(command posts), approximating what a staff officer would encounter in combat.31 Bjornstad had also turned his considerable academic talents to the question of divisional training for units that had already served in the trenches and were in rest and refit areas. The General Staff College and the G-3 and G-5 sections at Chaumont knew that the best time to correct errors and reinforce what had been done right was as soon after the fact as possible. The main focus was on training in the skills of individual soldiers and on collective training, for entire units. Bjornstad and Fiske, at the G-5, both preached that training had to have a clear focus on teaching or reinforcing definite skills.32 Bjornstad and Fiske made quite a good team as far as training and military education was concerned. What they advocated was basically correct, and there could be no argument with their emphasis on corrective or reinforcement training. The problems for those men, and for the entire AEF, were first the political conditions under which Pershing and the American forces had to operate, and second, time. The continual pressures to send infantry and machine-gun units to France during the crisis of 1918 was as much political as it was military. It disrupted much of the planned divisional training. Time, the one factor over which no one had control, dictated that units had to be pushed forward to combat much faster than anyone had imagined. Reflecting back, Fiske believed that time had worked constantly against the AEF and that many of the problems of some divisions in the Meuse-Argonne offensive was due to a lack of training time and the scrapping of the procedures to train divisions in phases.33 Harold B. Fiske was just the sort of hard-nosed officer that Pershing needed at Chaumont. A realist, Fiske knew that as the AEF grew and committed divisions to combat, the need for staff officers would become more critical. He was a true believer in Pershing orthodoxy and supported the concept of an American army fighting in an American sector. Like his commander, Fiske was firmly convinced that the British and the French had lost much of the will to fight on to total victory; to the extent that he could, he replaced allied instructors at every level with competent American officers and NCOs. His complete commitment to training, even in rest areas and after the end of the fighting in November 1918, earned him a reputation as "the most hated man in the AEF." Born in Oregon in 1871, Fiske was a solid regular. During the SpanishAmerican War, serving with the 1st Nebraska Volunteer Infantry, he was cited for exceptional gallantry in combat near Manila in October 1898. He arrived in France in June 1917 and began his work with training, rising to G-5 and to the rank of brigadier general in 1918. Fiske was present at all major meetings over the disposition of American forces, and Pershing valued his loyalty and his dedication to training. His near-religious zeal, however, cost him. In 1918 Fiske was on a list to be made major general, but the War Department halted all general officer promotions after the armistice

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went into effect. He quickly regained his brigadier general's star, but when Chief of Staff Douglas A. MacArthur recommended him for his second star in 1934 there was an outcry from AEF veterans who remembered his stern, unrelenting emphasis on training when the war was over and the troops were ready to return home. Many of the veterans recalled this with great distaste, preferring to believe that Fiske and his G-5 Section were subjecting them to an unreasonable, "Regular Army" schedule. Given the fragile nature of the November 11, 1918 Armistice, there were good reasons to continue a demanding training schedule, but in the post-hostilities euphoria most soldiers' minds were on thoughts of going home, not open warfare maneuvers. Congress hesitated to confirm him, but old friends, such as Jonathan Wainwright and Walter Short, testified for him. Fiske was finally promoted when the powerful Senator Hugo Black of Alabama championed Fiske's cause and got the Senate to confirm the list of general officers. Fiske would retire in 1935. John J. Pershing needed a man of Fiske's loyalty, dedication, and proven record of achievement when in May 1918 he reorganized his staff because of the departure of James Gutherie Harbord, chief of staff. Harbord had for some time been telling Pershing that he wanted a combat command; Pershing agreed but had never specified when or what. In April Harbord sought a choice assignment as 1st Brigade commander, 1st Infantry Division. 34 Pershing was not yet ready to give George B. Duncan command of the 77th Division, however, so Harbord remained at Chaumont. In late April a medical board found a number of senior officers unfit for duty in the combat zone and ordered them back to the United States. Among the number was Brigadier General Benjamin Alvord, the adjutant general at Chaumont; "Corky" Davis immediately assumed his duties. Brigadier General Charles Doyen, USMC, was also deemed unfit for combat service; Doyen, commander of the Marine Brigade in the 2nd Division, left France. This left a brigade without a commander, and Pershing then decided that Harbord was to take command of the unit. 35 This brought into play Pershing's ideas about having other services under his command. John J. Pershing's concept was that it really did not matter that an officer came from the army or the marines. If they were competent, they could command. When Brigadier General John Archer Lejeune reported to Chaumont in June 1918, "Dad" McAndrew told him in no uncertain terms how John J. Pershing viewed his command. McAndrew told Lejeune that "the Marine Corps has no authority over you while you are on duty with the AEF. Your assignment to duty is entirely in the hands of General Pershing." 36 Lejeune went first to the 35th Division and then to the 32nd Division. On 28 July, Lejeune was informed by Harbord, now commander of the 2nd Division, that he would take command of the regular army-marine division. 37

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Even after Harbord left Chaumont for the 2nd Division, Pershing continued his special relationship with him. McAndrew was a good choice for the job, but he lacked the drive that James G. Harbord had had. With Harbord's departure, Pershing decided that Brigadier General Leroy Eltinge was to be the deputy chief of staff. In view of the growing tasks of the AEF, the chief needed help. However, something was missing at Chaumont. When Johnson Hagood visited Chaumont for a conference a few weeks after the changes, he noted the difference. McAndrew delegated responsibilities and got involved with too much detail. To Hagood there seemed to be too many meetings to decide things that Harbord would have decided on his own, and in a very short time. 38 Pershing made Fox Connor the G-3, it was a wise selection. Brigadier General Dennis Nolan remained the G-2 and continued to preside over the building of a highly professional intelligence operation for the AEF. What emerged, however, was an inner circle at Chaumont, consisting of Davis, Fox Conner, Malin Craig, and John L. Hines, the later two generals being in the field.39 If there was any question of how highly Pershing regarded James G. Harbord, it was answered in May when Pershing spent three full days with the 2nd Division. Pershing continued to look for the right time to relieve Major General Bundy, and his inspection was detailed. On 13 May Pershing spent a great deal of time with Harbord behind closed doors. 40 When Pershing returned to Chaumont he expressed his opinion that Harbord was doing very well, and that Colonel Paul Malone, the former G-5 who now had an infantry regiment in the 2nd Division, showed great promise. There was no such praise for Bundy. Events were moving quickly for Pershing and the AEF, and the month of May and June saw a number of critical changes for the American forces. On 17 May Pershing met with his new chief of the air service, Major General Mason Patrick. Pershing had decided to make a major change in the command structure of U.S. aviation in France. Brigadier General William Kenly, who had been involved with the massive buildup of airpower for the AEF, returned to Washington to become chief of the air service there. Kenly had done a good job, considering that when the United States declared war on Germany the Air Service had sixty officers (not all of them aviators) and one aero squadron, the 1st, with totally unserviceable, obsolete aircraft.41 Mason Patrick, a career engineer officer, had known Pershing for many years and had an excellent relationship with him. Patrick arrived in France in August, and Pershing put him in charge of the AEF's engineer school near Chalons-sur-Marne. He was astounded by the magnitude of the task. "My job is staggering me. I do not see how to go at it."42 Throughout the fall of 1917 Patrick did the job Pershing intended him to do, and his stock rose. Much to Patrick's surprise, Pershing selected him to head the air

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service; based on Patrick's past performance, the general felt confident that Patrick could command an aggressive and growing service. In their first real meeting, Pershing delivered an oration on American airpower. 43 There was purpose in Pershing's selection, because he believed that the time had come, with the growing number of aero squadrons and support units, for the American air service to play an expanding role, just as the combat ground units were to play a greater role, in the war. On 18 May, the day after the meeting with Patrick, Pershing went to Versailles to meet with Marechal Foch to discuss future plans for the AEF. May had been a difficult month for both Pershing and the allies, due to wrangling over the shipment of American infantry to Europe. After the bitter discussions at Abbeville, the allies had tried to get around Pershing by appealing to Newton Baker and to Woodrow Wilson to agree to their demands for more infantry. Even though Baker continued to support the general, pressures were growing for the Americans to fight.44 On 18 May Foch proposed an American sector, at some unspecified date. 45 The question of the establishment of an American First Army again surfaced, and while Foch agreed in principal, the decision was put off. While everyone was dissatisfied with the situation over American troop levels and movements to Europe, Pershing looked forward to the first American offensive operation of the war, scheduled for 28 May. The United States had been in the war almost fourteen months, and doughboys had seen only limited action in the trenches. Now the 28th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Division was to make an attack at Cantigny The 28th was under the command of the solid Colonel Hanson Ely; and Charles P. Summerall orchestrated its artillery support, and Colonel George C. Marshall did the basic operational planning for the attack. Marshall's planning had to be exact and detailed, because the skeptical British and French were watching and the hopeful Pershing was so concerned that the attack prove that Americans were ready to become an army. Colonel Hanson Ely was born in Iowa in 1867. His father was a book salesman, and he developed a love of education and athletics. In 1887 won an appointment to West Point. Although graduating very low in his class (sixty-three out of sixty-five), Ely began to demonstrate his military skills in the Philippines. In 1916 he served on the Mexican border, training National Guard troops; when the United States declared war in 1917 he went to France with the 1st Division. When the orders were given to Robert Bullard to prepare to take and hold Cantigny, both he and his staff, with no hestitation, selected Ely to do the fighting.46 Ely was a hard fighter who demanded much from his troops and could be tactless with his superiors. In the context of the entire war, the Cantigny attack was like a tick attacking a bull elephant—only four thousand doughboys would be involved; but the stakes were neither tactical nor operational. The allies did not believe that the AEF could plan and execute even

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such a minor operation.47 Robert Bullard knew what it meant when he wrote, "But Cantigny was, nevertheless, one of the important engagements of the war in its import to our war-wearied and sorely tried allies. To both friend and foe it said, Americans will both fight and stick."48 Pershing also knew what it meant. On 27 May the Germans launched a violent offensive, their third of 1918. If Cantigny failed, then most probably the formation of an American army in 1918 would be doomed as well. After a brief barrage, well planned by Summerall, the heavily reinforced 28th began the attack, swept through Cantigny, and took the high ground beyond the town. The French, who had heavily reinforced Summerall's artillery brigade, now began to withdraw their guns to firm up French combat units, and for five days German artillery pounded the 1st Division. Pershing made it very clear to Bullard that under no circumstances would the doughboys of the division be driven from the town.49 They were not. The Cantigny attack, while greatly pleasing for the AEF, was overshadowed by the ferocity of the German offensive. By 30 May the Germans had advanced over thirty miles, and the field gray-clad troops had captured large numbers of guns, ammunition, and a staggering sixty thousand prisoners of war. By the end of 30 May, the Germans had arrived at the Marne River. Pershing fully believed that the crisis of the Great War had been reached; it was time for him to commit troops to the bloody battles raging along the Marne.50 In a bitter meeting at Versailles on 1-2 June, however, Pershing again held his ground in the face of intense allied military and political pressure. At the same time, the 2nd and 3rd divisions were moving to assist the beleaguered French along the Marne. The 3rd Division deployed against the Germans at Chateau Thierry, and the 2nd Division moved to the Belleau Wood area. On 6 June the Marine Brigade attacked into Belleau Wood and fought a terrific battle lasting nineteen days. James G. Harbord commanding the Marine Brigade, was ecstatic over the fighting ability of his tough leathernecks.51 The rest of the fierce 2nd Division was fighting as well. The 3rd Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier E. M. Lewis, was in the Verdun sector acting as a combat infantry brigade for the French 52nd Infantry Division. While the division was scattered, plans were being made to bring its components back under divisional command authority52 While the 2nd Division was making its reputation at Belleau Wood and the 3rd was becoming known as the "Rock of the Marne," the 1st Division was holding in the Cantigny-Montdidier area. Plans were being made to bring Charles T. Menoher's 42nd Division out of the trenches near Baccarat and commit it to action; its place would be taken by the 77th Division. The 26th was ready to be placed in harm's way to stem the German tide. June had become a turning point for Pershing and the AEF as doughboys marched and rode, en camion, to new positions to serve under allied commanders. It was a far cry from the 1st U.S. Army that Pershing really

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wanted, but the AEF was able to play its role in the last great German offensive of the war. May and June would see the stream of doughboys grow to a flood. The spring of 1918 was one in which Pershing resisted allied attempts to scuttle his plans for an American army. It was time for the combat divisions to assert themselves. But perhaps equally important, "Blackjack" Pershing had reason to feel his staff was maturing, ready to face the great tasks which lay before them. Far from expert, the staffs at GHQ down to division had nonetheless grown, had become professionalized. Pershing had had faith that they would, and the summer would prove that in the operations and intelligence area his staff was ready for the job. The Service of Supply had also matured, but it still nursed organizational and manpower problems due to the demands of sending infantry and machine-gun units to the Western Front. Rail transportation was a continual problem, as was the management of the ever-enlarging depots, stretching from the ports to the combat areas. Despite a growing strain in their relationship, Peyton C. March and John J. Pershing continued to cooperate. In the long run, March's ruthlessness became a godsend for the AEF. Troops were moving to France in an efficient way, and training for all services was better organized. Pershing had every reason to be optimistic as the spring became warmer. NOTES 1. John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, II (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Tab Books Reprint, 1986), 17. 2. Ibid., 21. 3. Entry for 9 and 10 January 1918, Pershing Diaries, John J. Pershing Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. (Hereafter cited as LOC, with collections individually cited.) 4. Entry for 11 January 1918, ibid. 5. Pershing, Experiences, I, 289. 6. Charles G. Dawes, A Journal of the Great War, I (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921), 67-68, 70-72. 7. James G. Harbord, Leavesfroma War Diary (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1925), 217. 8. Entry for c. 20 January 1918, Hugh Drum Diaries, Hugh Drum Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. (Hereafter cited as MHI.) 9. Donald Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 83-85. 10. Pershing to War Department, Chaumont, 28 February 1918, Records Group 18, Records of the U.S. Air Force, Entry 96, Carton 27. National Archives, Washington, DC (Hereafter cited as RG 18.) 11. Smythe, Pershing, 79-80. 12. Robert Lee Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences of the War (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1925), 181-82. 13. Pershing, Experiences, I, 368-69.

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14. Entry for 16 April 1918, John L. Hines Diaries, John L. Hines Papers, MHI. 15. Statistical Division, AEF, Roster of Officers, AEF, dated 7 April 1918, Major General Briant Harris Wells Papers, MHI. 16. Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences, 177. 17. Allan R. Millett, The General: Robert Bullard and Officership in the United States Army, 1881-1925 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 356. 18. Harbord to Pershing, Versailles, 13 April 1918, Pershing Papers, LOC. 19. Millet, The General, 355-56. 20. Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences, 175. 21. Baker to Peyton C March, Cleveland, 18 September 1928, in the Peyton C March Papers, L O C 22. Smythe, Pershing, 107-8. 23. Ibid., 108-10. 24. Pershing, Experiences, II, 10-14. 25. Entry 18 January 1918, Pershing Diaries, Pershing Papers, L O C 26. Army General Staff College, Langres, Conference, 10 May 1918, Records Group 120, Records of the AEF, National Archives, Washington, D C , Carton 1596. (Hereafter cited as RG 120.) 27. After Action Report by Major General Harold B. Fiske, 30 June 1919, in the Harold B. Fiske Papers, MHI. 28. Ibid. 29. Army General Staff College, Fourth Course, October-December, 1918 (Chaumont: Base Printing Plant, 29th Engineers, 1918), 33. 30. General Staff College, List of Graduates, 14 September 1918, RG 120, Carton 1606. 31. Army General Staff College, Fourth Course., 34. 32. Army General Staff College, Conference, 1 April 1918, RG 120, Carton 1537. 33. After Action Report by Fiske, MHI. 34. Harbord to Pershing, Versailles, 13 April 1918, Pershing Papers, LOC. 35. Harbord, Leaves, 278. 36. John A. Lejeune, The Reminiscences of a Marine (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Co., 1930), 256. 37. Ibid., 284-85. 38. Entry 18 July 1918, Johnson Hagood Diaries, Hagood Family Papers, MHI. 39. Interview with Major General Irving J. Phillipson, Washington, DC, 2 December 1947, Army General Staff Interviews, MHI. 40. Entries 12-14 May 1918, Pershing Diaries, Pershing Papers, LOC. 41. See: James J. Cooke, The U.S. Air Service in the Great War, 1917-1919 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 1996), Chapter 2. 42. Entry 26 August 1917, Mason Patrick Diaries, U.S. Air Force Academy Library Archives, Colorado Springs, CO. 43. Entry 17 May 1918, Pershing Diaries, Pershing Papers, LOC. 44. Smythe, Pershing, 116-19. 45. Entry 18 May 1918, Pershing Diaries, Pershing Papers, LOC 46. Robert Lee Bullard, Fighting Generals (Ann Arbor, MI: J. W. Edwards, 1944), 44-45. 47. Smythe, Pershing, 125. 48. Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences, 198.

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49. Robert Lee Bullard, American Soldiers Also Fought (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936), 31-33. 50. Pershing, Experiences, II, 61-65. 51. Harbord, Leaves, 294-95. 52. The Second Division (Coblenz: Coblenzer Volkszeitung, 1919), 9-11.

Chapter 7

DENNIS NOLAN AND INTELLIGENCE IN THE AEF It was an axiom: if Pershing was unhappy it then followed that James Guthrie Harbord was equally unhappy. There was simply too much operational information given out to the press in Washington, and there was only one place that that information could have originated. General Pershing, who had preached security since arriving in France, was highly agitated by reports that stated where divisions were and what they were doing. Harbord set out to track down the problem, and he turned to Dennis E. Nolan, the AEF's G-2, who had the responsibility of keeping the War Department informed on a daily basis of the progress of the AEF. Nolan, of course, had no control over what the War Department or the Army Chief of Staff did with the information cabled from France. Pershing had issued very strict orders concerning security. Units were not to display distinctive unit insignia on uniforms, vehicles, or equipment. Soldiers' letters were heavily censored—an officer appointed from each company or battalion read every letter home and had the authority to cut out offending sentences, even whole paragraphs. Some officers were sent home for keeping diaries (although many did) in the field.1 Nolan had a system for sending communiques to Washington. The documents were prepared by a section presided over by Colonel Arthur Conger, and Nolan reviewed the document before it was sent to the cable office. After a conference with Pershing, it was decided that no daily AEF communique would be issued from Chaumont until there was an actual, functioning U.S. Army Corps.2 The press, much to its irritation, was kept in the dark. At home, loved ones saw that each letter began with the generic "Somewhere in France." Security was a special area of interest for John J.

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Pershing, and his G-2, Dennis Nolan, was the staff officer responsible for seeing that policies were implemented. The intelligence section of the AEF had at the outset the greatest distance to travel if it was to be of any use to Pershing. John J. Pershing understood the need for correct and current intelligence. He had learned that in the Philippines and then again in Mexico, but France was not the Philippines, nor was the German military machine anything like Pancho Villa. Most of the men who staffed the operations (G-3) section of the GHQ had at least been to the General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The writing of operational plans and orders, the using of proper and consistent formats, and the need to issue coherent and realistic orders in a timely matter were a part of their training. At the AEF General Staff those men became known as the "Leavenworth Clique," and as one historian has stated, "they spoke the same language; they understood each other." 3 There were only about two hundred Leavenworth-trained staff officers in 1917, and Pershing had the lion's share of them. But there was no Leavenworth for intelligence officers. When the United States went to war there were only four men in the War Department who were really trained as intelligence officers. The Department tried to institute a short course for designated intelligence officers at the Army War College, but that did little to help, because the AEF was moving much faster than Washington ever could. By August 1918, as the AEF was preparing for the St. Mihiel operation, the army in the United States still did not have a school in place. The training of intelligence officers in the divisions getting ready to embark for France was chaotic; there was hope that Brigadier General Nolan might send instructors from France to the United States to develop a school in Washington. 4 The G-3 had men like Fox Connor, Hugh Drum, and George C. Marshall that they could use at Chaumont or send to the subordinate commands; they were trained to act together, with a common body of knowledge. The intelligence officers were not, and that would be a task that Dennis Nolan would have to address. Dennis E. Nolan can very well be called the father of U.S. Army intelligence. He looked like a professor, but he could fight with daring and courage, winning the Distinguished Service Cross on 1 October 1918. Born in Akron, New York, to Irish immigrant parents, Nolan graduated from West Point in 1896, after an excellent academic and a stellar football career. Twice cited for gallantry during the Spanish-American War, Nolan saw service in the Philippines. From 1902 to 1903 he was a professor of history at West Point, and he was selected to serve on the first General Staff in Washington, in the intelligence section. Onboard the Baltic in 1917, Pershing selected Nolan as his intelligence chief. Nolan went about the business of establishing the intelligence service of the AEF, and he built it from nothing. Having served as Pershing's adjutant general while in the Philippines, Nolan had been hesitant to press Pershing

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for a position on the AEF staff. James Harbord also knew Nolan from the Philippines, as Nolan had served under him on the island of Luzon. It was Harbord who got Nolan a spot on the original staff and convinced Pershing to make him the intelligence chief.5 Even before arriving in France, Nolan knew that three things had to be done to make intelligence work for the AEF. The intelligence officers of the AEF down to division level had to be trained; there had to be a flow of accurate information upon which to base tactical and operational decisions; and the AEF would have to take advantage of every opportunity to learn from the British and French and adopt what methods and procedures worked for them. Nolan knew that Washington could not be relied upon for information, that in fact the AEF would have to be the source of information for the War Department. "Nothing gets old so quickly as intelligence," Nolan later wrote: "You have no interest in what occurred before or during the last battle as you are getting ready for the new always." 6 Nolan's personality was that of a studious academic, a personality that did not invite informality. He never became part of the AEF's so-called inner circle, but he did have the unlimited respect of Fox Connor and "Corky" Davis. 7 Certainly Nolan was loyal to Pershing and would remain so throughout his life. Colonel Dennis Nolan also knew how to use subordinate officers who exhibited intelligence and would work hard long hours. Where would Nolan get those all-important subordinate officers? The Chief of Military Intelligence of the General Staff in Washington cooperated fully with Nolan and instituted a short course for junior officers at the War College. Most of the first officers who graduated from it were from the reserves, and all of them came from the engineer branch of the army. The first set of seven lieutenants had originally been assigned to the Adjutant General's statistical section, and were then selected, because of their knowledge of either French or German and their aptitude, for intelligence work. 8 Nolan was happy to get them and put them to work when they arrived in France in November 1917. At the same time, Nolan had to deal with a very new situation for any intelligence officer. In late October, Brigadier General William L. Kenly submitted to Nolan a memorandum on the use of air as an intelligence asset. Pershing certainly had a feel for what air reconnaissance could do for intelligence and the ground units, and it followed that, once in France, the AEF would follow their allies in developing aviation as a part of intelligence. The key elements in the memorandum were designated intelligence officers located with the AEF's units to interpret aerial photographs and reports from airborne observers. Since the AEF considered aerial observation as the primary mission of the air service, this was important. The key function of the intelligence officer was to disseminate information rapidly to the units the aero squadrons served; if the information obtained from the air directly affected

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artillery, then the intelligence officer would communicate directly with the artillery units of the unit supported.9 What eventually emerged from the Kenly memorandum was the establishment of the position known as the branch intelligence officer in the aero squadrons dedicated to air observation. What began as one intelligence officer grew to a team of five soldiers per squadron.10 There was an inherent danger in borrowing much from the British and French, even though it was needed. Each unit visited, be it French, British, or Canadian, firmly believed that its way was the best way of conducting intelligence operations. Nolan wanted to see every system he could as soon as practical. When Pershing and his small staff first visited Britain in 1917, Nolan got the definite impression that the British were "sort of stunned" over how small Pershing's staff was and how little actual experience they had.11 By the end of June, Dennis Nolan, Arthur Conger, the chief of the information section, and two other officers were with the French intelligence sections. The French urged that the AEF adopt their system in toto, and in fact the AEF eventually did rely heavily on it.12 Nolan and his officers left General Petain's headquarters and arrived at British headquarters, where General John Charteris, General Douglas Haig's intelligence chief, tried to convert Nolan to the British system, by criticizing the French one. While Nolan personally liked Charteris, he became skeptical of how the British conducted operations after observing British attacks in the summer of 1917. Petain had assigned a Major Hue as the French intelligence liaison officer for Nolan, and the major, though hindered by severe war wounds, quickly became an asset; Hue's mother being an American, he spoke English with facility. Nolan tried to steer an even course between the French and the British, and while he liked many elements of the British system, the location of American units in combat dictated a close relationship with the French.13 In the late fall and early winter of 1917, Nolan and his subordinates were constantly visiting allied intelligence organizations. Nolan was really not interested in the so-called romantic aspects of intelligence—espionage and counter-espionage. Those officers around Nolan realized that potential intelligence officers had to be quickly disabused of the notion that they were going to be "cloak and dagger" men having secret rendezvous with sirens like Mata Hari.14 The magnitude of the task hit Nolan in January 1918, when his subordinates made a series of lengthy visits to both the British and the French armies. They studied the intelligence sections down to division level and sent lengthy reports to Nolan, who in turn paid careful attention to their observations. One officer made it quite clear that the British divisions maintained maps that pertained only to their own particular areas of operations. The number of maps maintained at corps and army levels, on the other hand, was larger than any American had ever envisioned.15 As Nolan worked out the system at Chaumont, all maps were to be kept

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up-to-date by the G-2 section, even the maps that contained the current AEF tactical and operational situation. It certainly appears that by the spring of 1918, the G-2 section was the center of expertise on maps and on the posting on maps of data which ranged from the enemy order of battle to the progress of AEF units.16 Since the AEF did not develop a briefing system for General Pershing, the location of the maps forced the G-3 to communicate with the G-2. The man Nolan wanted to communicate with, however, was John J. Pershing. Nolan was too loyal and too good a staff officer ever to see his commander caught short of information when dealing with the allies or making key decisions. Pershing preferred to meet with his staff officers on an individual basis, and as 1918 progressed, Pershing's time became quite limited. Starting in February 1918 he began to see Nolan in his office every day. James G. Harbord felt that the general needed a daily update and that if something was happening in the intelligence area, Nolan could not simply sit and wait in "Black Jack's" outer office. Harbord set a policy that affected Nolan only: if something critical occured, Nolan had immediate access to Pershing.17 There can be little as detrimental to a functioning staff as being in the dark about critical matters and important events. Staff sections could not operate as independent agencies; they had to be interrelated. As long as all of the bureau and section chiefs were at Chaumont, the dissemination of information on a formal basis was almost impossible; there were simply too many senior officers to have briefings or meetings. Once the Hagood staff reforms went into place and a large number of senior officers went to Tours, formal meetings could be held. Harbord, as chief of staff, was in control of the staff meeting, which included all of the G staff, the adjutant general, the inspector general, and the judge advocate general. The meeting began with a summary of intelligence from Nolan, who tried to limit his remarks to ten minutes. The meeting began at 9 A.M. and lasted for from thirty minutes to one hour. As soon as the meeting ended, Nolan went directly to Pershing and presented much of the intelligence material to him.18 Nolan was a highly organized staff officer who, like any good staff officer, guarded the commander's time. During the morning intelligence update he usually showed Pershing the main concentrations of German troops, identified those troops by unit, and indicated to Pershing what the G-2 section believed the intentions of those forces to be. Pershing had an unmarked map of the Western Front in his office, and Nolan worked from it. At the end of the conference, Nolan gave to Pershing copies of the daily intelligence summary and the review of the press. Nolan marked items of importance to Pershing so he could read them later. This was a highly professional sifting of information to keep the commander informed and to preserve his time.19

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Pershing, on the other hand, constantly pushed Nolan to get as much operational information as possible from the British and the French. In March, and again in May, Pershing asked Nolan to step up his efforts as to the exact situation at the front. Nolan had great difficulty in finding out what the status of combat was, due to the chaotic nature of the fighting at the time. This was a valuable lesson, for in the fall of 1918 he would have difficulty in getting the exact same information from the American divisions engaged in battle. Normally Nolan spent the day in the offices of the G-2 section, not leaving until about 9 P.M. He was concerned that his own section might lose sight of their relationship with other general staff sections. Reflecting on the AEF G-2 section, Nolan later wrote, "It is a tendency of each division of the general staff to get into a watertight compartment and stay in it without knowing the activities that are going on in the other divisions of the staff. This is especially true of the intelligence service the members of which frequently prided themselves on not knowing anything about their own army and everything about the enemy."20 Nolan made certain that the G-2 section had a representative at every important meeting at Chaumont. While he usually did not attend himself, he sent his deputy, Colonel Arthur Conger. One of main functions of each day was the preparation of the summaries of information and of intelligence, two separate documents. The summary of information was more general in nature and gave updates as to what was happening in the diplomatic and economic world. The intelligence summary was very much akin to the modern summary known as the INTSUM. This document contained the situation of the day, both allied and enemy, special items of interest (such as new weapons, etc.), and other items of information, such as techniques for handling prisoners of war. The main thrust was to identify enemy units in the line and describe their activities and locations. This document was sent to subordinate commands, such as corps and divisions. A copy was usually mailed to the War Department in Washington. Usually a weekly summary was prepared for the War Department, but when the AEF went into combat the weekly summary was simply dropped. 21 As the months went by, Nolan continually worried about the state of intelligence at the units, especially at the divisional and regimental levels. His own G-2 section was accumulating rather rapidy a solid body of information about the intelligence service, and it was functioning quite well. As officers visited French units in January, February, and March it become clear to Nolan that more had to be done to prepare the combat units in the area of intelligence. As more officers visited French army commands, it became obvious that if the American First Army was ever to meet and defeat an enemy, a good deal of training had to take place. Once committed to battle, the flow of intelligence and information to divisions, corps, and First Army would be from two directions—from GHQ down, and up from

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patrols, at the lowest level, to battalions, regiments, and divisions. The strain on intelligence in battle would be immense. Nolan began to ponder the need for an AEF intelligence school to train those who would do the job once doughboys met the enemy. Nolan had arranged with the British for American intelligence officers to be trained in the field with British armies and divisions. From all reports, the Americans were doing well and getting valuable training, but the effort was not organized, nor could it cover everything a divisional or corps-level intelligence officer should know. Of interest to officers who conducted visits for the AEF's G-2 was the fact that the British had established an intelligence school in London; and every new officer in the intelligence section was required to attend the six-week course.22 Nolan noted some similarities in the British and American situations. British officers detailed for intelligence work came either from the combat units or from civilian life, with little or no intelligence training. Initially the British were not pleased with the results.23 The need for an accelerated, but comprehensive school was apparent. Knowing the limitations of the American intelligence service, Nolan became quite interested in establishing an AEF school of some sort to meet what everyone knew would be the growing needs of divisions and corps. The General Staff College at Langres could not do what Nolan believed needed to be done, nor was the purpose of the staff college to train officers in specific tasks and techniques. The college dealt in general concepts and their application. The one exception to the rule was the orders process, but that would not really help Nolan and his immediate problem. The General Staff College's first course contained a number of very general lectures on intelligence, which were delivered by a British officer. What was stressed was time and coordination between commands; this was a valuable point. The lecture stressed that intelligence information sent to subordinate commands had to arrive quickly enough so that corps, divisional, or regimental intelligence personnel could use it to brief commanders, staff, and subordinate units. In combat, intelligence, like operations, does not exist in a vacuum; the exchange of information must be timely to be effective.24 While this was important for potential G-2s to know, it really did not tell them how to get it done with the assets at hand. The second and third courses at the staff college were a bit more suited to what Nolan and the AEF needed. Major R.G.C. Glyn of the British General Staff taught a course on the training of intelligence personnel in the corps and the divisions.25 Glyn's course, however, was basically what the British were doing to train their personnel; the AEF was moving in a different direction, simply because of the proximity of the French. An American officer taught another course on the organization of the G-2 in the corps and divisions that more nearly reflected the reality of what was being done in the four combat divisions Pershing had in March 1918. "It is not always possible or desirable for the personnel of intelligence to go

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across No Man's Land and obtain the information desired," the lecturer warned. To get the information needed, the intelligence officer should use his many assets wisely. Those assets available were varied; they included prisoners of war, captured documents, radio and telephone intercepts, patrols, raids, observation posts, and aviation. 26 By the end of the second course, the potential G-2s were being taught what an integrated battlefield could do for them. By using aircraft, radio and telephone intercepts, and aerial photographs, the intelligence sections were moving onto a modern battlefield. Being taught what to use, however, was quite different from actually using what was available; Nolan remained concerned that those at the subordinate level were still not well enough versed to orchestrate all of their tools. Throughout February and into the spring of 1918, Nolan became convinced that the complexities of the modern battlefield were more than incoming intelligence officers could handle unless they were trained in specifics, not just the generalities being taught at Langres. At the same time Nolan came to understand that only so much information would be of use to the combat units. By the spring of 1918, Nolan had established a secret summary of intelligence to be circulated at GHQ and army-commander levels only. This summary dealt with critical events on every front, including the Italian, Turkish, Russian, and Salonikan theaters. This was information that could have no bearing on the units preparing for combat. Even the headquarters of First U.S. Army did not get a copy, only the commander. "We didn't want to send that down to division and corps headquarters or to army headquarters as they could have no interest as to what was happening on the other fronts and would have a tendency to distract their attention rather then center it on the Germany Army," Nolan later wrote. 27 Dennis Nolan knew what type of soldier he wanted as a G-2 or as a member of an intelligence section. "A gullible mind has no place in an intelligence system," Nolan wrote: "Military men trained in historical research, newspaper men of long training who can spot propaganda, and generally the skeptically minded group have good training for this work." 28 With that in mind, Nolan assembled his staff with an eye to a constantly changing situation as far as personnel was concerned. Nolan believed that his best men would eventually go to corps and divisional-level intelligence assignments. "It was perfectly understood that the members of my staff best qualified on the day a new staff was created would go to the front. Consequently, there was great competition among them for all wanted to leave GHQ and go to the divisions, corps, and the Army staff The G-2 section at GHQ was a training school." 29 That was a fine idea, and those who went to the combat divisions did well, but what would they have to work with once they were G-2s at lower levels? The situation became critical in May and June when a large number of new divisions arrived in France. Everyone at GHQ knew that training in

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the United States left much to be desired. Nolan was convinced that the time had come to go beyond training only potential higher-level intelligence officers. In June Nolan made up his mind that an AEF intelligence school had to be established to serve the needs of the divisions coming into France. He tasked his staff to devise an intelligence school that would teach the basics in a practical manner. This concept had to be coordinated with Brigadier General Harold B. Fiske's G-5 section; Fiske agreed that the proposed school would be a good addition to the AEF's educational system. On 13 July, only two days before the last great German offensive, Nolan formally proposed the school to "Dad" McAndrew, chief of staff. Nolan informed McAndrew that Fiske was in agreement and that Langres could accommodate a class of fifty students. The course of study, to run about eight weeks, was in place, and Nolan had a senior instructor and four instructors from the G-2 section of the GHQ ready to teach. The British and French would contribute one instructor each.30 The ratio of Americans to allies would please both Pershing and Fiske, who continued to have grave doubts about the offensive spirit of the British and French. Only ten days after Nolan's memorandum the school opened, with classes starting on 25 July. Pershing would not allow an eight-week course, and Nolan had to settle for five weeks and was glad to get that. The instructional staff went from the original seven to eleven, three being allied instructors. Major Thomas Catron was the director, and First Lieutenant J. H. Marsching was designated as the Adjutant and also instructed on the interrogation of enemy prisoners of war. Captain S. T. Hubbard, who had been with Nolan's intelligence section since 1917, taught enemy order of battle. One instructor handled aerial photography, reflecting the growing awareness of what aviation could do for the army. Forty-one officers enrolled for the first course at Langres.31 Brigadier General H. A. Smith, commandant of all of the AEF schools at Langres, approved the course of study on 23 July, the forty-one students arrived on 24 July and were processed, and at 9 A.M. on 25 July the course began with a study of the principles of intelligence. The day's work began at 9 A.M. and finished at 9 P.M., Monday through Saturday. There was no room for superfluous material, except perhaps for a few lectures devoted to the organization of the Swiss, Turkish, and Italian armies. A great deal of time the first week was spent on general principles, aerial photography interpretation, and the handling of enemy prisoners of war.32 The question of handling prisoners of war and the use of information garnered from interrogation had been a special-emphasis item for Nolan since he had visited with the French in the late summer of 1917. He and his section observed an interrogation and "was very much impressed with the information these men gave seemingly without much reservation."33 Dennis Nolan continued to believe that they were the greatest source of information for the units in contact with the foe. He also firmly believed that Americans,

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when taken prisoner, would tell just as much to their captors as the Germans did to theirs. 34 Lieutenants, captains, and a few majors constituted the vast majority of the class. Their course of study did not overlap with the School of the Line at Langres. The course was aimed at those who would be battalion or regimental intelligence officers and at those who would be part of the G-2 staff at division and corps levels. There were a number of courses on intelligence work at the lower levels of command, to include scouting, patrolling, the capturing and examination of prisoners and documents, the organization and the equipment of the German army, raids, artillery liaison, and air operations. There was one course on counter-espionage, to give some insight into how the Germans might obtain information from soldiers not in the line, but there was no one course on espionage. The school was a very practical one, with no "nice-to-know" frills.35 When Newton Baker visited the AEF in March 1918, he was amazed at the professionalization of the G-2 section, exclaiming to Nolan, "Why, the War Department intelligence is doing nothing like this." 36 The Secretary of War had every reason to be pleased with what he saw, but then the AEF had access to fine-tuned British and French organizations, which had been at the business since 1914. By the summer of 1918 there was only one U.S. Army intelligence school in operation, and that was at Langres. When Colonel R. H. van Deman visited Langres he was impresssed with what he saw; he informed Colonel Marlborough Churchill, chief of the military intelligence branch at the War Department, that Nolan hoped to develop a "duplicate set" of instructors to send back to the United States, if needed. 37 Van Damen also passed on to Churchill that the National Guard and reserve officers were doing well, but arrived at Langres woefully lacking in such basic skills as map reading. Van Damen suggested, in the strongest terms, was that officers slated for intelligence work in the AEF's divisions be given serious training at least in map reading. 38 Events had moved rapidly for Nolan and the intelligence section. The school at Langres seemed to be working well, and the combat units could look forward to cadres of trained personnel. Nolan, however, who never left anything to chance, sent one of his best-trained subordinates to the First United States Army G-2 when that force began to take shape in the late summer of 1918. Colonel Willey Howell was commissioned from the ranks in 1898 and attended Leavenworth's staff college from 1908 to 1909. When Nolan selected Howell for that choice assignment, he was the AEF's expert on the German order of battle. In addition to Howell, Nolan sent some of his very best men to staff the sub-sections of the G-2 section.39 Brigadier General Hugh A. Drum was a consummate chief of staff for First Army. Drum, considered to be as good a planner as the army had, obtained Colonel Robert McCleave as his G-3, with George C. Marshall as an assistant. Both men were Leavenworth graduates—McCleave in 1911

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and Marshall, as honor graduate, in 1908. Certainly Drum had to have a G-2 who could match the operations section in expertise and training, and Nolan sent Howell. Drum was free to accept or reject him, but having an eye for military talent, he kept Willey Howell. Once Howell was in place, Nolan transfered a great deal of material to the G-2 at First Army. For several months, Colonel Kerr T. Riggs, a member of Nolan's GHQ G-2, had been working on an in-depth study of German defenses on the Western Front. All of Riggs' material was duplicated and sent to Howell, who had a head start as far as planning for the St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne operations was concerned.40 This tells something about Nolan's section during the months preceeding the establishment of First U.S. Army. It was engaged in valuable studies of the Western Front and had amassed a great deal of valuable and detailed material about the battlefields over which doughboys were about to fight. Dennis Nolan firmly believed that "there are two phases of combat intelligence. One relates to obtaining aggressively information regarding the enemy and the second relates to precautions to be taken by combat troops to defeat similiar operations of the enemy intelligence service."41 The officers which went from GHQ to First Army reflected Nolan's near obsession with understanding what the enemy was, where he was, and how he was deployed. The intelligence courses taught at Langres reflected this preoccupation, with a great deal of material being presented every day about the German army.42 Nolan maintained his interest in the officers he sent to the combat units. In June 1918 he sent Colonel Arthur Conger, his long-time deputy, to serve as G-2,2nd Division, during the Belleau Woods fight. Conger immediately informed Nolan that they had no good maps of the area, nor did the French. Every staff officer and commander in the 2nd Division had the same problem. It seems that the French G-2 and the French mapmaking authorities had never coordinated the mapping of the Belleau Woods area.43 Once alerted by Conger, Nolan had the air service photograph the area, and a reasonable substitute for contour maps was made.44 Nolan learned a valuable lesson about the use of air and intelligence, and that AEF engineers who produced maps had the ability to react to a critical situation and produce maps for a serious battle. During the heavy fighting in the St. Mihiel salient and in the Meuse-Argonne, Nolan constantly visited his former staff officers to see their progress and to learn firsthand what their problems in intelligence were. On a visit to Colonel Willey Howell, Nolan learned that Brigadier General Billy Mitchell was difficult to deal with on questions of air reconnaissance missions for the G-2 section of the First Army. Nolan, who had never cared a great deal for Mitchell, went to see Chief of Staff Hugh Drum, who certainly never liked Mitchell; Drum ordered Mitchell to cooperate with the G-2.45 Several times during the heavy fighting in the Meuse-Argonne,

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Nolan had reason to complain about Mitchell's unwillingness to work with Howell, who wanted as much air reconaissance as possible.46 In the long run, Mitchell had made two very powerful enemies in Drum and Nolan. Nolan was well known as a team player with an even personality. He did not have a reputation as a man who made enemies or carried a grudge. Nor was Nolan hidebound in his selection of officers to fill intelligence positions. As far as he was concerned, there were certain qualifications which had to be met, and it really did not matter whether the qualified officer was a regular, a Guardsman, or a reservist. When the G-2 position at I Corps came open in the fall of 1918, Nolan selected Lieutenant Colonel Noble Brandon Judah, the G-2 of the 42nd Division. Judah, a lawyer from Chicago, came to France as a National Guardsman, serving in a Guard division. What appealed to Nolan was Judah's record of solid accomplishment with the Rainbow Division, regardless of the source of his commission.47 Pershing had every reason to be pleased with Nolan's performance as the AEF's G-2. He had built a solid organization based on experience and a very well-run intelligence school at Langres. Nolan realized the ultimate reward for his work when, on 28 September 1918, he was assigned to command the 55th Infantry Brigade of the 28th Infantry Division. The 28th, a National Guard unit from Pennsylvania, was under the command of Major General Charles H. Muir and was involved in the heavy fighting in the Argonne Forrest. Dennis Nolan had been cited for gallantry during the Spanish-American War, and on 1 October 1918 he won the Distinguished Service Cross. The 55th Brigade had taken the town of Apremont, and the Germans prepared for a counterattack to retake the ruined town. During a particularly violent artillery barrage, Nolan went into the ruins to personally direct the tanks in support of the brigade. Under heavy small-arms, machine-gun, and artillery fire, Nolan completed his task.48 A few days later Pershing brought his hero-G-2-inf antry brigade commander back to Chaumont to preside over the AEFs intelligence apparatus. Having a competent, aggressive, and innovative G-2 took a great burden from Pershing's shoulders. The AEF had gone beyond anything the army had ever envisioned for military intelligence, and it had certainly left Washington and the War Department in the dust. Newton Baker continually pushed for enlarging the intelligence section at the War Department, and he had, at least until the summer of 1918, the assistance of the very capable Colonel Ralph H. van Damen.49 By the end of war, the War Department had four sections in operation: codes and ciphers, maps, translation, and photographs.50 The real progress in military intelligence, however, was in France, with Dennis Nolan and the intelligence school. Ambitious intelligence officers found a away to get to the AEF, and this left Washington shorthanded. Van Damen, when he reported to Chaumont, was told by Pershing that he should learn all he could about intelligence in the AEF and then return to Washington to pass along the information. Somehow van

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Damen found a friend in Nolan, who in turn convinced Pershing to keep him in France. 51 Consequently, a man of the quality of van Damen was lost to the War Department and to the General Staff. Going into the great battles in the fall of 1918, Pershing had a solid G-2 section, built from the ground u p by Dennis Nolan. The G-3 section, under Fox Connor, was also a solid, professional, Leavenworth-trained group of officers eager to take on the great tasks of preparing for fighting in the St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne operations. It remained to be seen, however, how much the G-2 and the G-3 would coordinate in preparing for the operations. Could the staff integrate the massive number of assets such as air, gas and flame, tanks, etc., that would be available? What also was not clear was how well the commanders Pershing had selected for divisional and corps command would do once under total AEF control. It was one thing to demand an American sector with an American army fighting under an American flag; it was another to see that they could indeed do the job under the stress of combat that promised to be out-of-the-trenches, open warfare. This would be the next and the greatest test for Pershing, his command and staff, and the entire AEF.

NOTES 1. One such officer was Colonel Edward R. Bennett, commanding officer of the 168th Infantry Regiment, 42nd Division. See James J. Cooke, The Rainbow Division in the Great War, 1917-1919 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 1994), 146-47. 2. Memorandum, Nolan to Harbord, Chaumont, 4 May 1918, John J. Pershing Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. (Hereafter cited as LOC, with the collections individually cited.) 3. Edward M. Coffman, "The American Military Generation Gap in World War I: The Leavenworth Clique in the AEF," W. Geffen (ed.), Command and Commanders in Modern Military History (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), 41. 4. Van Damen to Marlborough Churchill, Chaumont, 13 August 1918, Major General R. H. van Damen Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute Archives, Carlisle Barracks, PA. (Hereafter cited as MHI.) 5. From Nolan's typescript copy of his lengthy notes on Pershing's memoirs, completed c. 1931-32, page 11, Dennis Nolan Papers, MHI. 6. Ibid., 30. 7. Interview with Major General Irving J. Phillipson, Washington, DC, 2 December 1947, Army General Staff Interviews, MHI. 8. Memorandum to Nolan, Washington, 15 October 1917, Records Group 120, Records of the AEF, General Headquarters, Carton 1592, National Archives, Washington, DC. (Hereafter cited as RG 120). 9. Kenly to Nolan, Chaumont, 23 October 1917, ibid., Entry 805.

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10. Notes on Branch Intelligence (Chaumont: Base Printing Plant, 29th Engineers, 1919), U.S. Air Force Historical Agency Archives, File 167.4-20, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. 11. Nolan typescript, 33, MHI. 12. Ibid., 67-68. 13. Second draft on an unpublished history of the war by Nolan, completed c. 1936, Nolan Papers, MHI. 14. Memorandum by Captain S. T. Hubbard to Nolan, Chaumont, 29 December 1917, Arthur L. Conger Papers, MHI. 15. Hubbard to Nolan, Chaumont, 3 January 1918, ibid. 16. Memorandum by Major General R. H. van Damen, San Diego, CA, 5 June 1950, Van Damen Papers, MHI. 17. Nolan typescript, 102. 18. Ibid., 102-3. 19. Ibid., 103. 20. Nolan's second draft of his history of the war, 14. 21. Ibid., 15-16. 22. Memorandum from Captain Royall Tyler to Nolan, Chaumont, 7 March 1918, Conger Papers, MHI. 23. Memorandum from Lieutenant Biddle to Nolan, 16 January 1918, ibid. 24. Army General Staff College, Conference/Lecture, "Intelligence before Operations," 30 January 1918, RG 120, Carton 1966. 25. Army General Staff College, Lecture by Major R.G.C. Glyn, British Army, "Training Intelligence Personnel of the Divisions and Corps," 16 May 1918, ibid., Carton 1599. 26. "Organization in Divisions and Corps," 11 March 1918, Ibid., Carton 16Q0. 27. Nolan typescript, 120-22. 28. Ibid., 136. 29. Nolan's second draft of his history of the war, 7. 30. Nolan to McAndrew, Chaumont, 13 July 1918, RG 120, Carton 1739. 31. Major J.H. Marsching, "History of the Army Intelligence School," After Action Report, c. March 1919, ibid., Carton 1737. 32. General Schedule of the Army Intelligence School Course, 23 July 1918, ibid. 33. Nolan typescript, 70. 34. Nolan's second draft of his history of the war, la-lb. 35. General Schedule, RG 120, Carton 1737. 36. Nolan typescript, 326. 37. Van Damen to Churchill, Chaumont, 13 August 1918, Van Damen Papers, MHI. 38. Ibid. 39. Nolan typescript, 426-427. 40. Ibid., 426. 41. Nolan's second draft of his history of the war, la. 42. General Schedule, RG 120, Carton 1737. 43. James G. Harbord, Leaves from a War Diary (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1925), 298-300. 44. Nolan typescript, 302, 305.

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45. Ibid., 148-49. 46. Entry for 15 October 1918 in Nolan's unpublished manuscript for his memoirs, MHI. 47. Nolan typescript, 430. 48. Department of the Army, Appointment of New Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff, 13 September 1924, John L. Hines Papers, L O C 49. Frederick Palmer, Newton Baker: America at War, II (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1931), 46,158. 50. Memorandum by Major General R. H. van Damen, 8 April 1949, van Damen Papers, MHI. 51. Memorandum by Major General R.H. van Damen, San Diego, 5 June 1950, ibid.

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Chapter 8

FORMATION OF THE FIRST U.S. ARMY Pershing believed that the men he picked to command the combat divisions and corps of the First Army were the best America had to offer, equal to any group of generals in the world. Most he had known for decades and had served with in the Philippines. These newly minted generals owed Pershing their loyalty because they knew that by hitching their wagons to Pershing's star they paved the way for promotion and honors. Those who failed were sent back to the United States or remained in the Service of Supply, where some refurbished their reputations. While Pershing adjusted and fine-tuned his roster of AEF generals, he was suprised to learn that one of his handpicked men, George B. Duncan, would have to be relieved of command of the 77th Infantry Division. When word reached Pershing, he wrote to Duncan, "With your fine soldierly instincts and ambition, your physical incapacity to continue field service in France is the keenest disappointment I have felt."1 George B. Duncan had been born in Kentucky on 10 October 1861 and raised in the turmoil the Civil War wrought in that state. He graduated from West Point in 1886, along with his friend John J. Pershing. After service on the southwest frontier and in the Spanish-American War, he went to the Philippines, where he served with Pershing and James Harbord. A Leavenworth and Army War College graduate, Duncan was given command, as a regular army colonel, of the 26th Infantry Regiment, a part of the 1st Infantry Division, which was preparing to embark for France in 1917. In August 1917 Duncan was the first American officer to win the Croix de Guerre, while serving with the French 94th Infantry Regiment near Verdun.2 A few weeks later Pershing gave him command of the 1st Infantry Brigade, 1st Division, a sure sign that Duncan's star was on the rise in the AEF.

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In May 1918 Pershing assigned Duncan to take command of the 77th Division, the first National Army division to arrive in France. They began training with the British and gained a reputation as a first-class unit. The 77th Division had arrived in France under the command of Brigadier General Evan Johnson, but Pershing really wanted this choice command for Duncan. 3 In June Pershing paid a visit to the division and made a point of having a special lunch with Johnson to smooth any ruffled feathers that might exist over Duncan's elevation to divisional command. In June and July the division participated in combat on the Vesle River and did well, but Duncan exhibited signs of fatigue and weakness. In early August Duncan failed a physical examination; the findings were devastating. He was suffering from "locomotor ataxia . . . cerebro-spinal syphilis." The medical board went on to tell Pershing that it "could not but feel that to allow such an officer to occupy a position of serious responsibility in the Army involved grave risk." 4 On 9 August 1918, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas W. Salmon, the AEF's senior doctor for neuro-psychiatry gave the same opinion about the nature of the illness.5 On 15 August the Adjutant General in Washington ordered Duncan home, and on 16 August "Dad" McAndrew issued orders complying with the directive from Washington. 6 But there still appeared to be some question about the accuracy of the diagnosis. Duncan had been sent home to the United States from the Philippines in 1909 because of the effects of tropical disease. Pershing, McAndrew, and Davis found a loophole for Duncan, and he was allowed to take a recuperation leave for several weeks. Pershing, an old Philippines hand, felt that Duncan was suffering from the effects of tropical disorders— and he was right. After reexamination, Duncan was found not to be suffering from syphilis but from that old illness.7 On 2 October, George B. Duncan assumed command of the 82nd Infantry Division and took it into the fighting in the Argonne Forest. This meant, however, that Major General William P. Burnham, who had been with the 82nd Division since its training in the United States, lost his command. Burnham was assigned to be the U.S. military attache in Greece, but in him, on the eve of the 82nd's being committed to battle, it had lost its commander of long standing. In this command selection Pershing showed two sides. First, and commendably, he remained loyal to an old friend in whom he had the greatest confidence; the 82nd, which had had very little training in France, would fight well under George B. Duncan. On the other hand, it was very risky changing commanders prior to a great battle. The 82nd had not become operational in France until 16 May, and June and July were spent in trench training. During the St. Mihiel operation the division served under Hunter Liggett's I Corps and saw only limited combat action. During the early days of the Meuse-Argonne operation the 82nd remained in corps reserve but received orders to prepare for battle on 6 October.

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George B. Duncan had only four days to acquaint himself with his staff and his combat commands. This was not enough time for any commander, no matter how good, but Pershing was willing to accept the risk for George B. Duncan. Had Duncan not had a solid staff and command structure under him, the situation might very well have turned out quite differently. But George B. Duncan was a graduate of the AEF's generals prep school—the 1st Division. Other selections for divisional command, as will be seen, did not work out quite so well. There were problems with Pershing's orchestration of his commanders. They had very little time to evaluate what they were doing. For instance, John L. Hines began his AEF career as a regimental commander in 1917; eight months later, on 2 May 1918, he took command of the 1st Brigade, 1st Division. On 26 May, however, Pershing informed Hines that he had been nominated for his second star as a major general. 8 Hines was ordered to take command of the 4th Infantry Division on 25 August. 9 This meant that he had spent only two months as a brigadier general and as a brigade commander. Some commanders had even less time to adjust to new commands. Another problem was the stress on those being shifted to higher command. John L. Hines had unspecified stomach problems in the spring of 1918;10 Robert Lee Bullard had reoccurring problems with neuritis, and Beaumont B. Buck showed definite signs of mental exhaustion during the Meuse-Argonne offensive.11 Brigadier General Peter E. Traub, commanding the 35th Division, overworked himself due to the inexperience of his command and staff elements. 12 Under the circumstances, Traub did his best, but circumstances were simply too much for one person to control. While Pershing's commanders were solid officers with great potential, one must question how he could staff the divisions that he believed would arrive in vast numbers between the summer of 1918 and the spring of 1919. Pershing wanted a hundred divisions in France for the spring offensive of 1919; how could they be staffed and commanded, under the circumstances? On the other hand, much was expected of the Americans. On 15 July, the day the final German offensive began, the Supreme War Council at Versailles issued a document entitled "Allied Plan of Campaign for Autumn and Winter of 1918, and Summer of 1919." Basically the document pointed out that when the Germans began their series of offensives in March they had had a numerical advantage of thirty combat divisions over the Allies on the Western Front. The Americans had more than offset the German's advantage, and as more AEF troops poured into Europe the Germans' numerical superiority was reduced even more. The allies now believed that the Americans could be a decisive factor by the summer of 1919.13 The question which had to be asked was, what did Pershing believe was the optimum number of divisions for the upcoming spring 1919 offensive? It appears that Pershing pulled the hundred-division program out of his hat. 14

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When Pershing began discussing his hundred-division scheme he had not yet communicated with the Chief of Staff, Peyton C. March. It was bad military form to ignore March, who was making great progress in forcing the War Department to meet schedules and deal with day-to-day problems. When March finally heard about the hundred-divisions, he was aghast at what the program entailed: the program meant that 2,800,000 doughboys would be needed for the combat commands. No one considered what would be needed in the Service of Supply to keep an army of that size in the field. Out of sheer anger and frustration March wrote to General Tasker Bliss informing him that there was not enough wool for uniforms for the soldiers already being trained. For a hundred divisions, March wrote, "the solution . . . is extremely difficult. The problem alone of getting wool for woolen uniforms for such a command in Europe is practically prohibitive. We have commandeered the entire wool supply of the United States and civilians will have to wear shoddy during the coming winter in order to put woolen clothing on the backs of the men in the trenches even if we go through with a less program."15 Already chevrons worn to indicate enlisted rank had been reduced from both arms to the right arm to save wool. There were other pieces of military equipment that had to be changed radically because of shortages. Leather was in short supply as well. March had to deal with the constant demands of raising an army, and to do it he had to spin gold from straw; American industry was not keeping up with the demands of the AEF and the training army in the United States. "Getting the men is the simplest part of it," March complained to Bliss, "and that is apparently all that anybody considers."16 To complicate matters, March knew that members of Pershing's staff were difficult and demanding and that many of them had disliked March when he was chief of artillery for the AEF.17 March followed artillery matters in the AEF because he had been involved and knew the dire circumstances of artillery for the American army, which had become a beggar army as far as artillery was concerned. World War I was an artillerist's war, and March had suggested that the chief of artillery be a permanent member of Pershing's staff at Chaumont. There was opposition from the staff, and one can see the hand of James Harbord in the opposition. But in May Pershing appointed Major General Ernest Hinds as his chief of artillery and brought him to the general staff at GHQ.18 In a response to Pershing, March made it clear that he blamed certain members of the staff for such a slow reaction to a growing need. March also rubbed it in a bit, when he told Pershing that he had reorganized the whole artillery section at the War Department and now had a fully functioning Chief of Artillery.19 In June Pershing held a conference at Chaumont to outline an enlarged troop program, by which he believed there would be a total of about three million American troops to be in Europe by the spring of 1919. McAndrew, Kernan, Langfitt, Atterbury, Fox Connor, Charles Dawes, and a few others

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were present in Pershing's offices to hear his plan, and according to Pershing, there were no objections raised. 20 At dinner, Pershing outlined his concept of what the Americans could do while the massive troop buildup continued into 1919. Charles Dawes recalled that Pershing returned to his consistent theme of maneuver warfare as the key to victory over Germany To his dinner guests, "Black Jack" Pershing stated his determination "to keep the war one of movement as far as possible. He believes in a constant harrassing by raids in the intervals between larger attacks, thus in every way keeping the enemy nervous and on the defensive." While the new troops arrived, Pershing would take command of the army in the field and use the troops he had as the newly arrived divisions trained for the great battles of maneuver of 1919.21 One historian has written that "open warfare became not just a tactical concept, but an 'American' way of fighting and a symbol of the AEF's psychological fervor for battlefield victory" 22 Pershing combined his obsession for maneuver warfare with his determination that the American professional officer corps would be seen as the equal of any in the world. That being the case, and no one could doubt that Pershing was totally committed to the concept, why were the officers of the all-important G-5 section of the general staff at Chaumont not present at that critical June meeting? Brigadier General Harold B. Fiske was not in evidence; nor was any ranking officer from the school system at Langres. If indeed Pershing was to have sixty-six to a hundred divisions between the summer of 1918 and the spring offensives of 1919, a vast number of officers had to be trained at the School of the Line and at the General Staff School at Langres. There had been only two classes graduated at the staff school, and not all who entered were certified for staff work at the end. Divisions meant not only divisional staffs but corps staffs as well. The requirements for training would be staggering, and certainly what the AEF had in place at the corps and AEF levels could not possibly handle the job. Where would new instructors come from if the schools at corps level and at Langres were enlarged? Obviously they would have to come from the cadre of trained officers and noncommissioned officers, who themselves would be needed in the combat units. Pershing simply would not countenance enlarging the British and French participation in training; to suggest that they had something to offer to the open-warfare-minded AEF was to risk being labeled as a "defeatist." 23 What also appears to have been missing here for Pershing was an answer to the question of how a novice army like the AEF could support logistically such a massive buildup? The quartermaster and rail systems were already strained to the limit, and even someone as experienced as Brigadier General W. W. Atterbury had a difficult time making the "trains run on time." Pershing was continually pushing Atterbury to greater efforts in moving supplies for the AEF, but it was becoming more difficult to get the proper

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amounts of ammunition, replacement equipment, food, and fuel to the existing divisions. Not all was Atterbury's fault, and Pershing knew it. He continually exhorted Atterbury to go to Paris to demand more rolling stock.24 In July, Pershing wanted a reorganization of the entire transportation area, suggesting to Atterbury that he obtain Johnson Hagood's help and that the rail department be placed under the G-4 at Chaumont. In very diplomatic language, Pershing told his chief of railroads to be more forceful and to do a better planning job.25 On 6 July 1918 Hagood met with Pershing and outlined what he thought needed to be done to bring order out of chaos in the Service of Supply. The major change in the structure came with the reduction of the scope of Atterbury's transportation department; he was now left with just railroads and motor transport. Pershing believed that Atterbury was doing his best but simply lacked the military knowledge to deal with people in government and the military in wartime.26 Another point emerges here. If Pershing had such grandiose plans for the spring of 1919 (less than a year away), was he certain that the supply and transportation problems would be corrected? No one in the AEF had ever supplied a modern army in the dead of winter over poor roads and a rail system that was nearly worn out. The French had not been forthcoming with all they had promised months prior to the July reorganization, and there was little reason to believe that they would be now. All this was not lost on General Peyton Conway March, who was grappling with his own serious problems back in the United States. A massive increase in the AEF's strength met with understandable opposition from March; it is often easier to see problems when one is outside looking in than inside and looking around. In the early summer of 1918 March not only had to find ways to raise and equip troops to go to the AEF, but there was pressure on him to send troops to Siberia, to oppose the new Bolshevik regime in Russia. Neither Pershing nor March favored any diversion of American combat forces to Siberia when the center of attention was riveted on the Western Front. March had just instituted a series of replacement training camps to train men who were not assigned to divisions. When the divisions were ready to embark for France, trained men could fill the ranks; divisions would not be savaged to provide trained or nearly trained men to fill formations leaving for the AEF. It was a wise move, but it was only just in place. General March in July directed the Provost Marshall General to issue a draft call for 465,000 men and planned similiar future call-ups to enlarge the United States Army. Being an experienced soldier, March knew that not every man sent to divisions or directly to the AEF would be expertly trained.27 But March was also concerned about the growing burden on Pershing. He indicated in early July that a representative to the Supreme War Council would be sent from the United States. General Tasker Bliss was sent to fill that position, and that was acceptable to John J. Pershing. At the same time, March tried to explain to Pershing the grave difficulties in raising such a

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force to fight. It was a simple matter to get the troops, but it was another matter to uniform, equip, train, and transport them. "The simple problem of getting woolen uniforms for such a force of course will require taking away from civilians practically all the wool which they would use in their clothing for the next year," March wrote to Pershing. Training, equipping, and leading into combat a huge army was a military question, while commandeering all of the wool supply in the United States was a political issue.28 Implied in March's communication was that supply was becoming a matter not just for soldiers but for politicians as well, and that put a new light on the matter. In June, March dispatched Assistant Secretary of War Edward Stettinius, a prominent industrialist, to France to represent the United States on the Inter-Allied Munitions Board. Stettinius worked very closely with Charles Dawes.29 Peyton March believed that he would be a valuable asset, and Dawes and Pershing both found him to be a welcome addition to the American team in France.30 From time to time March had sent officers and civilians to Europe, as was his right as the Chief of Staff. As the AEF grew, March became more and more concerned over the entire supply situation. As Pershing talked about taking command of the First United States Army when it was activated, March worried about the many tasks Pershing was trying to perform. March suggested and Newton Baker agreed that Major General George Washington Goethals be sent to the AEF to take charge of the ever-growing supply system. In a letter to Pershing, Baker indicated that Goethals would be in a coordinating status with Pershing, which meant that he would not be Pershing's chief of the Service of Supply The Service of Supply needed a stronger hand at the wheel, but Pershing would not hear of it.31 March should have expected "Black Jack" Pershing to object. Even before Baker's letter arrived at Chaumont on 26 July Pershing had told March in no uncertain terms that "so far as the military affairs are concerned, no one can handle that but myself There can be no dual control. It must be centered in one man."32 Pershing certainly knew of the Goethals scheme before Baker's letter arrived, and he was ready for it. On 26 July Pershing ordered James G. Harbord to report to him at Chaumont. Pershing came directly to the point: he wanted Harbord to leave the 2nd Division and take command of the Service of Supply. According to Harbord, Pershing was unhappy with General Francis Kernan's administration of that service, and after discussions with his staff it was decided that Harbord was the only man who could bring order to the supply system. Of more importance to Pershing was the maintaining of unity of command, that is, keeping all functions of the AEF in Pershing's hands.33 Harbord's change in command also enhanced the power of Brigadier General Johnson Hagood, chief of staff of the Service of Supply. Hagood had clashed several times with the G-4, Brigadier General George Van Horn Moseley, and now Harbord, one of Pershing's closest confidants, had to rely heavily on the

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supply-experienced Hagood. As Hagood's power increased, Van Horn Moseley observed that the source of that authority was Harbord.34 Rather than reorder the Service of Supply, Pershing's selection of James G. Harbord muddied the waters between Chaumont and Tours. No one incident marred the relationship between March and Pershing more than did the Goethals proposal. After the war Peyton March continually referred to Pershing's actions with bitterness, and in his lengthy correspondence with Newton Baker he constantly brought up the incident. It did not help that James G. Harbord kept the embers stirred. While Harbord was trying to make the Service of Supply work better, he found time to warn continually Pershing about March, Goethals, and anyone else who was in Washington and not with the AEF. Even during the hard fighting in the Meuse-Argonne, Harbord had time to send lengthy letters to Pershing. At one point he blamed General Goethals and unnamed "big civilians" of causing inefficiency in the War Department's supply section.35 Probably Harbord had forgotten that Goethals was an 1880 West Point graduate and a respected career army engineer who had won fame in building the Panama Canal. As late as October, Harbord was still filling Pershing's ears with any rumor he heard about March and Goethals. He wrote to "Black Jack" on 25 October that he had "some reason to believe that the plan to separate the S.O.S. from your command and send here General Goethals is not yet dead." From a third-hand source, Harbord reported that March was overheard telling General Goethals, "By God, I have not yet given up. I will put it over yet."36 James G. Harbord appeared to have the time to send such notes to Pershing even as the AEF's supply system was breaking down. As far as Harbord was concerned, and this he continually transmitted to Pershing, Peyton Conway March was the evildoer. In reality, the suggestion to send Goethals to France came from Newton Baker after consultations with President Wilson and with civilians who had been to see the activities of the AEF. Many of those civilians were industrialists, men who understood the flow of goods and supplies. Many years after the war Baker wrote that at the time he believed the supply problems of the AEF, coupled with preparation for the activation of the First Army, had grown "to be a super-human task for any one man." The decision to send Goethals to Pershing, according to Baker, was made to take "mere business off his shoulders and promised to free him for field operations."37 It appears to be the case that Goethals did not know that Baker's letter to Pershing mentioned his being in a coordinating rather than in a subordinate status; General Goethals discussed the matter many times with his son after the war and insisted that he never knew until later what the Baker letter entailed.38 Baker also indicates in his postwar letters that March was not aware of the content of the letter to Pershing. It does appear that March believed that Baker had made a decision; it was March who told Goethals

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to pack his bags and reserve a stateroom on the massive troopship Leviathan for passage to France. The result of the Goethals affair was the souring of relations between Washington and Chaumont, between Pershing and March. Of course, a fine career officer with a splendid record of exemplary service to his country was put in a very embarrassing situation. It did not help that Harbord continually stirred up smoldering embers. Until Harbord retired from the army he continually brought up the Goethals matter with Pershing. In his memoirs Pershing tried to put the best possible face on the situation by saying that Harbord was the right man for the Service of Supply job, but as far as Goethals was concerned, "I should have been glad to have him under other circumstances." 39 Certainly Goethals did not believe that, and he often communicated it to his son, who did not believe it either. What started out as Newton Baker's sincere attempt to help turned into a nasty incident that still rankled decades later. Another problem that surfaced between Pershing and March was over promotion to general officer rank. As Pershing moved officers from one command to another, the demand for more generals rose. As Chief of Staff, March had to concern himself with the entire army, including officers who were serving in areas like the Philippines. To promote only within the AEF would have been unfair to those who for whatever reason could not serve in France. Peyton March did not see fit to promote every officer who was recommended by Pershing. Newton Baker fully supported a policy whereby personnel throughout the entire army would be considered for promotion in the National Army during the war.40 While much has been made of the Pershing-March relationship, it must be said that March did nothing to impede the development of the AEF as a fighting force. When the First U.S. Army was activated on 10 August 1918, March was quick to congratulate Pershing but to take some of the credit for the AEF's progress. In a cable to Pershing, March pointed out that sending Bliss to the Supreme War Council and dispatching Edward Stettinius to work with Dawes on munitions had taken a number of burdens off Pershing's shoulders. In his 12 August cable of congratulations March pointed out that it had been decided by the War Department to wipe out differences between the regular army, the National Guard, and the Reserve Corps in insignia, supply, and most importantly, promotions. March did warn, however, that he was concerned with "making a large batch of General officers" and that he would consider all officers for promotion to higher ranks, not just those in the AEF.41 Pershing was continually angered that not all of his recommendations were followed, and the situation was made worse by Harbord's continual meddling in GHQ business. In October, when the AEF was pounding against the German defenses known as the Kriemhilde Stellung, Harbord wrote a long letter urging Pershing to recommend lieutenant general rank

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for "Dad" McAndrew because of his position as chief of staff at Chaumont. His reasoning was that the position should be equal to the rank being requested for Hunter Liggett, commanding First U.S. Army, and for Robert Lee Bullard; commanding second U.S. Army. Having the same three stars, Harbord reasoned, would make it easier for McAndrew to work with Liggett and Bullard. Harbord chided Pershing for not sending McAndrew's name to the War Department for a third star. Harbord wrote/'You cannot afford to have your own people think that the War Department or anyone else will do more for them than yourself."42 Perhaps there were good reasons why "Dad" McAndrew was not recommended for promotion. AEF officers who continually observed him ranked him lower than Harbord in energy and in managerial skills. Whatever the reason for McAndrew's omission from the list, however, it was certainly no longer in Harbord's sphere of action or interest. One must wonder if the GHQ chief of staff should hold a rank equal to an army commander. The chiefs of staff at First and Second U.S. Army held the rank of colonel. With Harbord's constant advice to Pershing, it is little wonder that Johnson Hagood emerged as such a force in the Service of Supply. Pershing and March had exchanged cables over the question of promotion to lieutenant general. According to "Black Jack," he had initially wanted the three-star rank for those who were to command "armies and groups of armies." As he outlined his plan to March, "Counting eighty divisions, we would have by the spring something like ten or twelve such armies, and these will have to be arranged in groups of two or three armies in each group which would give us fifteen or more lieutenant generals in command of troops." Then Pershing indicated that he considered his corps commanders at that point were only temporary; they would have to prove themselves in battle to become permanent corps commanders. But because division commanders were major generals, might it not be best to give three-star rank to the permanent corps commanders? 43 March did not respond to Pershing's grandiose plan for creating a firmament of stars. Harbord must have been deeply disappointed that he was not to receive a corps command, at least. General Harbord had some good men working under him, and his chief of staff, Johnson Hagood, was aggressive and effective. But the Service of Supply was not where medals were won for gallantry, and it was not a place where one could forge a military reputation for meeting and destroying the best that Germany had to offer. Harbord must have had regrets when in August John L. Hines took the 4th Division and Beaumont Buck took the 3rd. New divisions were arriving in France, and John J. Pershing was looking forward to the realization of his hopes— the activation of the First Army. No general since U. S. Grant, in 1864-65, had held a command with such size and in combat power. His corps commanders were solid fighters, and the future, despite continual allied misgivings, looked bright for the AEF.

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There were, however, danger signs for the AEF that were overlooked in the mid-summer euphoria. Hunter Liggett's I Corps was the best and most experienced that Pershing had. It contained battle-tested units, such as the 1st, 2nd, 26th, 32nd, and 42nd divisions, with the 41st as the depot unit. These were the old warhorses of the AEF. When one went to the II Corps, there was a different picture: the 4th, 28th, 35th, and 77th were finally complete divisions, but the 30th did not have its supply train (logistical) units, and the 82nd found itself in the same condition. Ill Corps had even greater problems, in that only the 3rd and 80th were complete divisions. The 5th Division, in which Pershing had little faith, was short one artillery regiment and also its supply trains. The 27th Division had its full field artillery brigade and its supply organization in training. The newly arrived 78th Division did not even have a full headquarters, although all of its combat regiments were in place. IV Corps was in even worse shape, with the advance party of the 29th Division having only just arrived, one infantry regiment of the 83rd disembarked and in training, and only the 89th's advance party and headquarters in France.44 But these were not the types of corps that "Old Sam Grant" had hurled at Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia in the last campaign of the Civil War. These soldiers were going to fight on a modern, integrated, electrified battlefield; they would have to take into consideration everything from air observation to gas warfare, telephonic communication, motorcars, and trucks to tanks. What Pershing had was some very fit, motivated, and brave soldiers. His command and staff was a problem. His school system produced only a fraction of the staff officers and combat trainers needed by the AEF, and the supply system was suspect. With the activation of First Army, things moved at a rapid pace. After much bitter wrangling with the allies, Pershing finally had his army and his own AEF offensive—the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. The attack on the salient was scheduled to begin in early September, but was the AEF ready for the task as far as command and staff was concerned? The third course at the General Staff College at Langres would not be graduated until 15 September, and some students were pulled from the course to particpate in the fighting. The fourth course was scheduled to begin on 7 October and would not be complete until mid-January 1919. There were 316 officers designated to take the course, which was almost two hundred short of what G-5 Harold Fiske had recommended earlier. All of the designated students came from divisions already in France, although the 1st sent no one.45 Several schools enlarged quickly, however. The Gas Defense School at Langres began a new class on 26 August, with 189 officers present to take the week-long course.46 The School of the Line increased its gas training in August as well, scheduling two full days of practical work, including drills with the mask, drills in two gas chambers (one with tear gas and another with a modified chlorine), and work on modern gas defense tactics.47 Other

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schools also increased the tempo of their instruction to accommodate the new status of the First Army. Corky Davis's adjutant general section became involved in making the AEF a more efficient combat organization. With Pershing's agreement, promotions within corps and divisions at the discretion of the corps commander were permitted up to the rank of colonel. Davis established a form for the corps' adjutant generals to inform Chaumont and the personnel center in order properly to record the temporary promotions. 48 At the same time Davis required the corps to survey their officers; if because of age, incompetence, or job incompatibility an officer was to be reassigned (sent to Blois), Chaumont and Blois had to be informed quickly. With the St. Mihiel offensive looming large, there was no time to follow the old, slow methods of reassigning officers. Davis told the corps commanders that speed was "of manifest importance to the entire AEF."49 All was not running well, however. The Service of Supply was shorthanded, and there were problems in coordinating what Chaumont was planning and how the SOS could support it. There was a morale problem in the SOS, and Harbord was hard pressed to deal with it. He informed Pershing that with the activation of the First U.S. Army a large number of officers wanted to transfer to supply or combat units. One-third of all AEF troops were committed to the supply and administrative areas, but as Harbord warned, "Most Americans who come to France want to fight. They do not wish to stay in the S.O.S." Harbord then reported the obvious—that for the AEF to conduct combat operations as an American force there had to be a permanent logistical and administrative structure. But, he wrote, "On the sordid ground of self-defense and duty to his family, regular officers cannot afford to go through the war occupying an inconspicuous position in the S.O.S." Harbord then proposed a massive upgrade in the ranks assigned to positions in the SOS and recommended that Johnson Hagood be promoted to major general and other supply officers be elevated at least one grade. As an aside, Harbord pointed out that the British quartermaster general was a lieutenant general, and although Harbord did not mention this, it was clear that he compared his position to the British post. 50 While Harbord was proposing a several-page list of promotions, Johnson Hagood, his chief of staff, was becoming more concerned about the ability of the supply system to support combat operations. Two days before the opening of the St. Mihiel operation, Hagood confided to his diary that "conditions in the matter of supply and transportation are not improving but, on the contrary, are getting worse." 51 The day after the St. Mihiel attack began, Hagood wrote in his diary that "I got in the reports from the bureau chiefs as to the slowing up of SOS activities. The situation is certainly serious." Johnson sent a telegram to Chaumont outlining his grave concerns about the apparent conditions in the supply service of the AEF. It was clear from the message that Hagood

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did not believe that the SOS could properly support large-scale operations in the future. 52 Problems with Atterbury's transportation section had surfaced again in late August, and it appeared that this long-standing problem had not been solved. 53 Atterbury had been unable to obtain the rolling stock that he needed, and men and supplies were moving slowly at best. The St. Mihiel attack, which began on 12 September 1918, went well, as it should have. Pershing had his best, most experienced divisions in the assault. The AEF was supported by French troops, artillery, aircraft, and tanks. The planning was good, the objectives obtainable, and the scheme of maneuver was simple. Last, but certainly not least, the Germans had decided to evacuate the St. Mihiel salient prior to the American attack, and their defenses were primarily concentrations of artillery and well-placed machine-gun nests. 54 It just so happened that Newton Baker was on his second trip to France and witnessed the St. Mihiel victory. The ex-pacifist turned war-maker, in his leather trench coat, military leggings, and steel helmet, was euphoric. He believed it was a vindication of his support for Pershing and the AEF.55 No sooner was the fight over than Baker began a long tour of the Service of Supply, and what he found was disturbing. A man of great intelligence and perception, Baker could see the growing congestion, and he heard tales of woe over rail and motor transport. On 22 September Baker and Harbord met alone for some time after dinner, and Harbord, being James Harbord, discussed a number of such GHQ questions as promotions. In an extraordinary moment, Harbord surfaced the possibility of Pershing's being wounded, killed, or disabled during the fighting. Who would take command of the AEF in the event of such a calamity? Baker told Harbord that if such an event occurred a successor would be chosen from the AEF; he promised Harbord that upon his return to Washington he would tell General March about his decision. If March, said Harbord, "wished to be in the running he would have to give up his position as Chief of Staff and return to France and take his chances." 56 There is no reason to disbelieve Harbord's account of his conversation with Baker. In the state of excitment and exultation after the St. Mihiel fight, it did appear that the AEF had come into its own and that the months of bitter wrangling between Pershing and the allies had finally paid great dividends. From these around Pershing down to the combat units, all were now true believers. Pershing prepared for the next great battle, the MeuseArgonne Offensive, with a sense of the invincibility of American arms. As Donald Smythe later wrote, "No judgment was ever more wrong." 57 James G. Harbord later recalled that to doubt was to be a defeatist, a traitor to the United States. 58 Pershing did have a mass of very brave men, a few trained and battle-tested divisions, and a very small cadre of staff officers, who would have to carry a terrible burden in the weeks to come. It was not clearly understood at Chaumont or at First Army just what the opposition was in the salient. There was no time actually to inquire what the combat

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in the St. Mihiel area h a d b e e n like. By m i d - S e p t e m b e r all eyes w e r e fixed o n the next great fight in the hills a n d ravines of the heavily fortified a n d well d e f e n d e d M e u s e - A r g o n n e .

NOTES 1. Pershing to Duncan, Chaumont, 22 August 1918, John J. Pershing Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. (Hereafter cited as LOC, with collections individually cited.) 2. Duncan to Pershing, France, 15 September 1917, ibid. Pershing to Duncan, Chaumont, 27 September 1917, ibid. 3. Entry for 22 June 1918, Pershing Diaries, ibid. 4. Medical Evaluation Report by Colonel W. S. Thayer, Tours, 8 August 1918, Records Group 200, Papers of John J. Pershing, National Archives, Washington, DC. Carton 8. (Hereafter cited as RG 200.) 5. Letter from Lieutenant Colonel T. W. Salmon, 9 August 1918, ibid. 6. Special Orders No. 228, Chaumont, 16 August 1918, ibid. 7. Duncan to Pershing, Castres, France, 1 May 1919, Pershing Papers, LOC. 8. Entry 26 May 1918, Hines Diaries, John L. Hines Papers, LOC. 9. Entry for 26 August 1918, ibid. 10. Entry for 11 June 1918, ibid. 11. Buck to Pershing, Camp Travis, TX, 27 April 1921, Pershing Papers, L O C 12. Dossier, "Brief History in the Case of Brigadier General Peter E. Traub," 1919, RG 200, Carton 8. 13. "Allied Plan of Campaign for Autumn and Winter of 1918, and Summer of 1919," Briant Harris Wells Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute Archives, Carlisle Barracks, PA. (Hereafter cited as MHI.) 14. Donald Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 144-45. 15. March to Bliss, Washington, 8 July 1918, Peyton C. March Papers, LOC. 16. Ibid. 17. March to Pershing, Washington, 6 June 1918, ibid. 18. Pershing to March, Chaumont, 5 May 1918, ibid. 19. March to Pershing, Washington, 6 June 1918, ibid. 20. John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, II (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Tab Books Reprint, 1989), 104-8. 21. Charles G. Dawes, A Journal of the Great War, I (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921), 127-28. 22. Allan R. Millett, The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army, 1881-1925 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 315. 23. Ibid. 24. Pershing to Atterbury, Chaumont, 30 August 1918, Pershing Papers, LOC. 25. Pershing to Atterbury, Chaumont, 9 July 1918, ibid. 26. Johnson Hagood, The Services of Supply: A Memoir of the Great War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1927), 227-28. 27. March to Pershing, Washington, 5 July 1918, Peyton C. March Papers, LOC. 28. Ibid. 29. March to Pershing, Washington, 6 June 1918, ibid.

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30. Dawes, Journal, 170-71. 31. Smythe, Pershing, 162-63. 32. Pershing to March, Chaumont, 19 July 1918, March Papers, L O C 33. James G. Harbord, Leaves from a War Diary (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1925), 338-40. 34. Van Horn Moseley to Major General Clarence C Williams, Fort Bliss, TX, 10 May 1928, March Papers, LOC. 35. Harbord to Pershing, Tours, 31 October 1918, Pershing Papers, LOC. 36. Harbord to Pershing, Tours, 25 October 1918, ibid. 37. Baker to March, Cleveland, 4 April 1933, March Papers, L O C 38. George R. Goethals to March, New York, 12 March 1931, ibid. 39. Pershing, Experiences, II, 179-81. 40. Baker to March, Washington, 26 June 1931, March Papers, LOC. 41. March to Pershing, Washington, 12 August 1918, ibid. 42. Harbord to Pershing, Tours, 14 October 1918, Pershing Papers, L O C 43. Pershing to March, Chaumont, 27 July 1918, March Papers, LOC 44. Memo from GHQ to Colonel Wells of the Supreme War Council, 19 June 1918, Briant Harris Wells Papers, MHI. 45. Army General Staff College, Fourth Course, October-December, 1918 (Chaumont: Base Printing Plant, 29th Engineers, 1918), 34-35. 46. Army Gas School, Report on Students, Langres, 26 August 1918, Records Group 120, Records of the AEF, Carton 1732, National Archives, Washington, D C (Hereafter cited as RG 120.) 47. Schedule of Instruction, Army Gas School, 20 and 21 August 1918, ibid. 48. Memo from Davis to commanders, Chaumont, 19 August 1918, Charles P. Summerall Papers, LOC. 49. Memo from Davis to commanders, Chaumont, 24 August 1918, ibid. 50. Harbord to Pershing, Tours, 19 August 1918, Pershing papers, L O C 51. Entry for 10 September 1918, Hagood Diaries, Hagood Family Papers, MHI. 52. Entry for 13 September 1918, ibid. 53. Hagood, Service of Supply, 280. 54. Paul F. Braim, The Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1987), 84—86. 55. Frederick Palmer, Newton Baker: America at War II (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1931), 341-43. 56. Harbord to Pershing, Tours, 23 September 1918, Pershing Papers, L O C 57. Smythe, Pershing, 195. 58. James G. Harbord, The American Army in France (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1936), 436.

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Chapter 9

THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE Alabama-bom Robert Lee Bullard was a true believer as far as John J. Pershing was concerned. They both had supreme confidence that the attack into the Meuse-Argonne would vindicate the AEF and "Black Jack" Pershing. Bullard's III Corps was arrayed along a fairly narrow front, with his right flank anchored on the Meuse River. His line extended five miles, with the 33rd Division under George Bell on the right, the 80th under Adelbert Cronkhite in the center, and the 4th Division under the tried and tested John L. Hines on the left. A few miles behind Bullard's line was the 3rd Division, under Beaumont Buck. The 3rd and the 4th had seen some action in the summer of 1918, but the 33rd and the 80th had seen little real combat. If that bothered the man named for the god in gray, Robert E. Lee, he did not show it. "Doubt always and difficulty almost always disappear before action.... No obstacle stops men determined to go ahead," Bullard firmly believed.1 On 25 September, the day before the attack was to begin, Pershing visited Bullard's III Corps. He wanted to see each commander personally before the artillery began firing. The skies were threatening and offered little fair weather for battle on the morrow. He came away from the line very satisfied with the preparations Hines and Conkhite had made for the assault.2 One recent historian has recorded what Pershing could not see. He wrote, "But the Americans had little or no experience in active combat; only four of the divisions had had any front line duty. Over half of the troops were recent draftees; some had only received individual training; a few said that they had never had the chance to fire their rifles."3 They were brave, they were confident, and they held a belief that they could overcome anything. The German defenders felt that way as well.

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Incredibly, on the eve of that great battle, the AEF stripped the battle staffs of many of the least-trained divisions. The fourth course for the General Staff College at Langres was scheduled to start on 1 October, and the class members had already been selected and separated from their units. The Fourth Course was to be the AEF's own; French and British instructors were reduced to an advisory capacity and gave only a few lectures. The school proudly proclaimed that "the American Army had reached a point in the new staff work, where, unassisted, it could and did use its own personnel for all instructional purposes."4 The administrative staff had grown to 6 officers, and the instructional staff had increased to fourteen. The class had a majority of field grade officers (majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels), and there was one brigadier general, Frank S. Cocheu, who was assigned to the 80th Division. Of the 233 students who finally processed into the course, sixty-seven were from the assaulting divisions. There were a number of officers from the staffs and troops of the various corps who would fight in the Meuse-Argonne.5 Donald Smythe, in his biography of Pershing, states simply that those divisions were "scalped" just before going into battle.6 At the same time, the School of the Line at Langres enlarged its permanent staff to five administrators and thirty-four officer instructors. A greatly enhanced clerical staff was also added, making the total of enlisted men seventy-seven, including an army barber, an army private who could do pressing, cleaning and tailoring, and a corporal who would make schedules for the use of baths.7 In early October the school expected several hundred junior officers and NCOs to attend the school. In comparison, the School of the Line in July had three administrative officers, and four American, two British, and two French instructors, for about two hundred students.8 The School of the Line had obviously grown by leaps and bounds, and it demanded more students to justify its existence. The lion's share of the new enrollees came from divisions committed to the attack into the Meuse-Argonne. While the General Staff School and the School of the Line opened new classes, the Intelligence School had a new class of fifty-six students and twelve instructors. The doors opened on 30 September, four days after the Meuse-Argonne offensive began. The course was scheduled to end on 18 November; this meant that a large number of select officers, highly intelliegent and motivated, would not be available for combat service throughout the entire fight in the Meuse-Argonne.9 Those divisions certainly did not need any impediments in the way of the difficult missions assigned to them. Bullard's HI Corps, possibly the best in the line on 26 September, had on its left V Corps, under Major General George H. Cameron. Cameron's divisions were commanded by solid regulars. The novice 79th was under the command of Joseph E. Kuhn, the 37th, equally inexperienced, was commanded by Charles S. Farnsworth, and the 91st, physically fit men from the American Northwest, was led by John A.

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Johnston. In reserve was the battle-tested 32nd Division, with the gruff William G. Hann in charge. The weakest division, the 79th, had the hardest task, which was the taking of Montfaucon, high ground that promised to be defended by a battle-wise enemy. Anchoring the left of the AEF line was I Corps, commanded by Pershing's most experienced large-unit commander, Major General Hunter Liggett. Liggett had been born in Reading, Pennsylvania, in 1857 and graduated from West Point with the class of 1879. He served in Cuba during the Spanish-American War and had the obligatory service in the Philippines. When the rotund Liggett arrived in France, John J. Pershing made it very clear that such an overweight officer had no place in the AEF; Liggett faced Pershing down and went on to become the senior corps commander in the AEF. Since 1 June Liggett had been in direct tactical control of American divisions, and his experience was extensive. Of all his divisions, the 77th, under the command of Robert Alexander, was the best trained and best commanded. Alexander, born in Maryland in 1863, was a West Pointer and a graduate of the Leavenworth Staff College. During the Mexican border operation he had commanded the 17th Infantry Regiment, and later served on Pershing's staff.10 Alexander was totally dedicated to John J. Pershing, and he was one the strongest advocates of the Leavenworth general staff school system. 11 The 77th was on the left of the I corps line and would attack into the forbidding Argonne Forest. To the right of the 77th was the 28th Division, a solid Pennsylvania National Guard unit under Charles H. Muir, a West Pointer from Michigan and a Pershing favorite, who had been in command of the division since mid-May 1918. Muir would go on to command IV Corps later in the Meuse-Argonne campaign. The weakest division was the 35th, a Kansas-Missouri National Guard outfit that had had very little training. Its commander, Peter E. Traub, would literally wear himself out trying to overcome training and staff shortfalls in the division. In reserve was the Black 92nd Division, in which no AEF officer had any faith. The 92nd Division had received very little infantry training, and had no artillery training to speak of. General Pershing and other AEF officers felt that the staff was weak and ill-prepared for combat. Pershing did not particularly care for the division commander, Charles C. Ballou, either. The ground over which the three corps had to fight was an infantryman's worst nightmare. The battlefield was about twenty miles by twenty, with a series of strongly defended hills. It was heavily wooded and slashed by deep ravines. Thick growths of scrub brush offered a determined enemy camouflage and concealment. The right of the zone was bordered by the Meuse River, which provided the Germans natural protection for their left flank. On the left of the line the Aire River and the dense Argonne Forest helped the enemy by guarding his right flank. In the V Corps area was Montfaucon, a high hill that offered observation for the Germans.

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Further complicating the doughboys' task was a series of well-constructed defensive positions. The first the attackers would hit was a network of wire obstacles and bunkers. About four miles from the line of departure, the Americans would encounter the Giselher Stellung. Three miles to the north they would have to try to fight through the Kriemhilde Stellung, which was the strongest of all the lines of defense. Once through that, if they made it, the Americans would have to tackle the Freya Stellung. Unlike the St. Mihiel salient, where the Germans had allowed their wire to rust and crumble, the obstacles in the Meuse-Argonne were new and complex. German infantry and engineers had constantly improved their positions. They could depend on good roads for resupply and reinforcement, and they held the good observation points. Pershing had agreed to attack into the Meuse-Argonne after Marechal Foch had given the green light for the St. Mihiel operation. Pershing had had to begin one battle on 12 September but be ready for a much larger operation on 26 September. It was a gigantic job for an experienced army, which the AEF certainly was not. The first team for the AEF had fought in the St. Mihiel and would not be available to start the fight on the 26th. The 1st, 2nd, 26th and 42nd, the "Grand Old Men" of the AEF, were still many miles away. The veteran 32nd Division, commanded by William G. Hann, was in III Corps reserve but had not closed on its positions when the fight started. Harm's parents had been born in Germany, but he harbored a deep hatred toward their birthland. When fighting against the Germans, Hann could be counted on to press the fight with a personal rage. 12 None of Pershing's experienced divisions would be present for the battle on 26 September. "Black Jack" Pershing knew his weaknesses. He later wrote that the non-availability of the best units "compelled the employment of some divisions which had not entirely completed their training. Four of the nine divisions which were to lead the assault were without their own artillery and had brigades assigned to them with which they had never previously been in combat." 13 Even that does not tell the whole dismal story. Most of the assaulting divisions had never had an aero squadron assigned to them; precious few had ever had a gas and flame company, specialist engineers, or tanks attached. The detailed coordination between parent and attached units is complex, and few staffs had ever had even to contemplate the vast nature of modern warfare, let alone conduct it against a well-prepared, motivated, and experienced enemy. Having painted a dismal picture of the AEF on 26 September, it would be wise to say what positives Pershing had with which to fight that battle. First of all, he had a cadre of handpicked, youthful, trained, confident, and aggressive generals. At First U.S. Army there was a highly competent, if not yet battle-tested, staff. Second, the generals and the staff knew their commander's intent as far as the battle was concerned, and they believed in

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Pershing's concepts of open warfare. Third, the AEF was not motivated by propaganda slogans, and except for a few officers like William G. Hann, there appeared to be little emotional involvement in the process of killing Germans. What did move Pershing, his generals, and his staff was a deep desire, a near religious fervor, to show the world that the American officer corps was the equal of any in the world. This was not an army that ran on sentiment; it was goal-driven. On the darker side, this could very well produce a ruthlessness, a determination to "get the job done at any cost," and that is exactly what happened. WTien Pershing took command of First U.S. Army, he still had his staff at GHQ and was overall commander of the AEF. Frankly, it was too much for any one man to handle, as Pershing would find out, but his self-inflicted burdens were lifted somewhat by a highly organized and trained staff at First Army. The army had come into being in mid-July, when Pershing ordered it formed secretly. He selected as his chief of staff Brigadier General Hugh Aloysius "Drummie" Drum. Immediately the energetic Drum set to work filling his staff positions with as many Leavenworth men as possible. Hugh Drum was not a West Pointer. Bom at Fort Bradley, Michigan, in 1879, Drum had attended Boston College. His father had been killed in the charge up San Juan Hill, and President William McKinley offered Drum a direct commission into the army. He saw service in the Philippines and served brilliantly as a staff officer during the Vera Cruz operation in 1914. A Leavenworth graduate, Drum had been selected by Pershing as one of the favored few who went with him on the Baltic in June 1917. Assigned to the G-3 section, Drum became a vocal disciple of John J. Pershing. He served with the 26th and 42nd divisions during their training, and with the 1st Division he worked with Robert Bullard in planning trench raids. "I am trying to have our people pull off a raid. We should do something to insure their morale. This thing of letting the Boche do it all is getting on their nerves," Drum confided to his diary 14 Drum had very definite ideas regarding the role of the chief of staff. "The successful commander receives advice from a staff, especially from his Chief of Staff. After coming to a definite decision as to a plan of action, he turns over to such a staff the arrangements for the plan and its execution. By this mode of action, the commander is free to visit and inspect his troops, and inspire them with his own personality and offensive spirit," he wrote in 1919.15 In selecting his staff, Drum made wise choices. His deputy was Colonel Walter S. Grant, an honor graduate from Leavenworth; Colonel A. B. Barber, the G-l, was a 1912 Leavenworth graduate. The G2, Colonel Willey Howell, was Dennis Nolan's selection, a 1909 Leavenworth man. As G-3 Drum had Colonel Robert McCleave (Leavenworth, 1911) and the incomparable George C. Marshall, who had made his mark as the 1908 Leavenworth honor graduate. Colonel John L. DeWitt (Leavenworth, 1907)

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was the G-4, and as G-5 Colonel L. H. Watkins (Leavenworth honor graduate, 1916) rounded out the staff.16 Drum had very definite ideas about the direction of the First Army staff. He believed that there were three critical functional areas in which the staff had to operate: fighting, supply, and maintenance. Of the three, fighting was obviously the most important. In Drum's mind this included planning for battle, the orders process, and oversight of the units committed to combat. In preparing critical orders to get the First Army to the line of departure (LD), Drum was most fortunate to have the services of his close friend Colonel George C. Marshall, who overcame the chaos and confusion of moving divisions from staging areas to the LD.17 Marshall had to contend with every possible mistake, from refusal to feed French lorry drivers at American messes to congestion on the war-battered roads leading to the LD. 18 One area that would eventually give the First Army a vast amount of trouble was supply. There was an overly optimistic assessment of what the Service of Supply could deliver and what the supply units in the combat zones could do to get those materials forward to the units in contact with the enemy. In the planning process main supply routes were designated and the priority need for ammunition was identified, with food and medical supplies given second priority Not far into the operation, however, it all broke down, and resupply became a critical area that threatened to disrupt the entire operation. The maintenance area, as defined by Drum, consisted of road repair, railroad repair, construction of bridges, and the location and installation of water points, ordnance depots, and the like.19 Johnson Hagood had felt for some time that the AEF would have a nearly impossible task in supplying units in combat. His warnings went unheeded. As arrangements broke down, Hagood lamented in his diary, "In my judgement if the GHQ had paid more attention to the SOS and less to the units, we would have been in a better position on the front. The mad race for for schools, the training and getting of troops, etc., had resulted in neglecting the SOS in the matter of proper material and personnel. The whole difficulty at the front now is practically one of transportation." 20 It did not help that the Meuse-Argonne offensive marked the low point in the relations between Hagood and Brigadier General George Van Horn Moseley, the G-4 at Chaumont. Moseley firmly believed that Johnson Hagood was conducting a vendetta against him. Moseley, himself, was doing everything possible to get away from Chaumont and command a combat unit in the field.21 There were other problems areas emerging before the AEF crossing the LD. John L. Hines, commanding the 4th Division in Bullard's III Corps, recorded that he had problems with supply and had to intervene personally with brigade and regimental supply.22 Four days before the battle started, the 4th Infantry Division got two artillery regiments from Buck's 3rd Division and two regiments of artillery from the French.23 Hines's unit was on

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the move into position to begin the attack, and there was little time for his staff to plan for the use of the attached regiments. To confuse the issue even more, on the day of the fight the 4th Infantry received a shipment of captured German 77 MM howitzers to reinforce its artillery.24 WTiile that reinforcement sounded good to the planners at higher levels, Hines's artillery experienced severe shortage of ammunition after only three days of combat. 25 If an experienced commander like Hines was having problems and his division, which had seen combat north of the Ourq River in August 1918, was having supply problems, then a brand-new division like the 79th was in grave difficulty. As historian Paul Braim has pointed out, this unit, made up mainly of draftees from Maryland and the District of Columbia, had seen thousands of soldiers taken from its ranks to fill up other divisions. Almost half of the division's troops had been assigned after 25 May, when the division received its alert orders to prepare to go to France. Divisional artillery had been left in training areas while the 79th received the artillery from another division. 26 Unit cohesion, unit morale and espirit de corps, and confidence—in officers by the ranks and by officers in their men—was and is something that cannot be built overnight. There was no chance for the 79th to develop the psychological attributes required for an effective combat unit. To make matters worse, they had the toughest job—to capture the Montfaucon high ground. The best that Major General Joseph Kuhn could do with the task and with the material at hand was to tackle the job head-on, with one brigade in the attack and the other in support. All in all, First Army had failed to recognize that simply being called a combat infantry division does not mean that that unit will fight like one. Robert Lee Bullard, looking at the map, realized that the 79th probably could not take Montfaucon, and he worried what effect that would have on the 4th Division's left flank. Things did not look promising for John L. Hines' "Ivy" Division once the battle started. 27 Bullard had more to worry about than the 4th Division's left flank. He was not getting along at all with his corps chief of staff, Brigadier General Alfred W. Bjornstad. Of the many diverse figures of the AEF, Bjornstad can be one of the most perplexing. He was the high priest of the Leavenworth system, a member of the "Leavenworth Clique," and the man who had organized and run the General Staff College at Langres for two full courses. Tall, sturdy, and fine-looking, Bjornstad was from Minnesota and had served with courage and skill in the Philippines as a captain in the 13th Minnesota Volunteer Infantry. In 1901 he was tendered a commission as a first lieutenant, bypassing regular West Point graduates in seniority and rank. He was brilliant, and no one doubted it, but his personality was that of a professor addressing obtuse students. Bjornstad was a man who could teach well, because then he had center stage, but in actual practice he was hard on his staff and allowed its members little individual initiative, even though that was contrary to what

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he had taught at Langres. Bullard did not like him at all.28 When Hines took over III Corps he found that Bjornstad was not telling him everything that was going on. Finally Hines, in sheer frustration, told Hunter Liggett, then commanding First Army, that either Bjornstad had to be given a new job or John L. Hines needed a new command. Bjornstad was quickly replaced by Brigadier General Campbell King.29 Bjornstad's officer efficiency reports were bland, but everyone pointed out his superior teaching skills. There was, however, a great gulf between what he taught at Langres and what he actually practiced as a chief of staff of III Corps. He held all actions in his own hands, and the corps staff became literally Bjornstad's appendage with no real responsibility except to tell Bjornstad what was going on.30 If anyone should have known how to make a staff work on the eve of and during a desperate battle, it should have been Bjornstad, but when the time came he failed. It was a bad time to fail, with the Meuse-Argonne fight just starting. Not everything was going badly, however, for the AEF on the eve of the Meuse-Argonne. There were a few bright spots. GHQ G-2 Dennis Nolan, who had built the AEF's intelligence establishment from nothing into a respectable organization, planned personal visits to the First Army's G-2, Colonel Willey Howell. Nolan established a routine of visits every two or three days to army headquarters, "to find out how he was getting along and to see how his various sub-sections were functioning and to see especially if his recommendations regarding air reconnaissance were being observed. He had considerable trouble with General Mitchell... in getting reconaissance missions carried out."31 Nolan detected a growing alienation between Howell, who had every right to task the air service with intelligence-reconnaissance missions, and Mitchell. As GHQ G-2, Nolan went directly to Hugh Drum, who ordered Mitchell in no uncertain terms to get his observation aero squadrons into the air. Nolan's professional relationship with Howell had no precedent as far as the AEF was concerned, but Nolan was beginning to act as if he were the G-2 at a higher headquarters. Not even Fox Connor, the brilliant G-3 at Chaumont, had seen the need for Chaumont to be a higher authority—but that need would become clear rather quickly. On 4 September Hugh Drum prepared a troop list of the units not associated with the impending St. Mihiel attack. His analysis of divisions did not paint a pretty picture of the condition of AEF units, particularly those units with no artillery units.32 Between 4 September and 26 September, Drum's staff produced a vast number of orders bringing units into staging areas and then into position on the LD. On 21 September Drum sent to Pershing another update on the units on the move into positions. As the 26th approached, Hugh Drum, from his office at Ligny-en-Barrois, produced plans for the employment of everything from the air service to tanks to gas and flame companies. The attention to detail in assigning missions was considerable, and the orders were coherent and to the point if a bit

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wordy. What the orders could not reflect was the actual state of training and preparation of the divisions assigned to make the initial assault. Regardless of the state of training or preparation, the infantry was to leave the trenches was at 5:30 A.M., 26 September. Almost three thousand artillery pieces opened fire. The allies—almost half of the artillery firing was served by French gun crews—achieved a ratio of one gun for every eight meters of ground. The pounding went on until the sky began to lighten; at dawn the infantry, in a rainstorm, moved forward. After advancing a few hundred yards the German machine-gunners and infantry opened fire, inflicting heavy casualties and causing confusion. The first situation reports indicated that the divisions were moving forward, taking assigned objectives, but almost immediately commanders like the veteran John L. Hines noted that resupply operations were not going well at all.33 Hines's 4th Division had moved beyond the area of Montfaucon and had begun to get heavy fire from the German defenders on his left flank. The 79th Division had failed to maintain contact with the advancing 4th and was actually a mile behind. Hines's 4th Division now had a dangerously exposed flank, and the German defenders on Montfaucon quickly took advantage of it. "Black Jack" Pershing was at his headquarters trying to keep up with the battle despite the fact that reports were slow to arrive, were confusing, or did not reach First Army headquarters at all. During the morning the situation reports that filtered into Ligny-en-Barrois indicated an advance, but by noon it was clear that the 79th was pinned down at Montfaucon. By the end of the day it was painfully evident that the units assigned to the attack were not doing well at all. There were a few bright spots, such as Hines's 4th Division, but Pershing sensed confusion in the 28th, 35th, and 37th divisions. He wrote in his diary that "they were new, their staffs did not work particularly well, and they generally presented the failings of green troops." 34 That should not have come as any surprise, since Hugh Drum had been making critical assesments of the assault divisions for several weeks. Pershing was now finding out the hard way that staff training, good orders preparation, and the selection of potentially good generals could all be for naught if the troops could not carry out the missions assigned. Hugh Drum had planned for the AEF to be pounding on the Kriemhilde Stellung by the second day of the battle. As many had feared, Drum included, the resupply and reinforcement advantage rested with the German defenders. 35 According to a German staff officer who fought in the battle, American operational security techniques were good, and the Germans had taken no prisoners, which would have given proof that the AEF was preparing a major assault into the Meuse-Argonne. But through some lucky guesses based on experience in combat, the Germans had divined that a major assault would take place sometime after 25 September.36 A combination of German determination and well-placed defensive battle positions, bad

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roads, and American inexperience at all levels caused the assault to bog down almost from the start. By nightfall Pershing was confiding to his diary that it had been a near impossibility to cross the land between the LD and enemy positions because of the wet condition of the ground and the absence of roads. The next day Pershing wrote, "Our advance is somewhat checked by rather persistent action of Germans with machine guns. This is due to a certain extent to the lack of experience and the lack of push on the part of the division and brigade commanders." 3 7 In response to this deteriorating situation, Pershing issued an order that the 79th was to take Montfaucon, "by one means or another." 38 Trying to reorganize troops in the middle of the night, under fire, with no clear idea where anyone was, was simply beyond the capabilities of the commanders. After trying all night to bring order out of chaos, the first general was relieved of his command; Brigadier General Evan Johnson, commanding an infantry brigade, was ordered from the field at 6 A.M. by his division commander. 39 Evan Johnson would not be the last good soldier so ruined during the Meuse-Argonne fight. On 28 September an alarmed Pershing, with key members of his staff, went to the front, where obviously the AEF attack had failed. He tried to find General Traub at his command post but could not. Pershing did encounter Brigadier General Lucien Berry, commander of the 35th's artillery brigade, who appeared to be distraught, complaining that he had become "a millstone about the neck of General Traub." The headquarters of the 35th seemed to be in a state of total confusion. From there "Blackjack" went to 28th Division to visit with Charles H. Muir. Conditions were so bad there that Pershing left Dennis Nolan and Arthur Conger to help bring order out of the chaos. Pershing realized that division commanders were now playing "to a certain extent the role of regimental commander." 40 He then ordered the 3rd Division to come up and relieve the ineffective 79th Division, and the 32nd to take the place of the of the 37th Division. The 1st Infantry Division, under Charles P. Summerall, was alerted to move with all possible speed to relieve the disorganized and combat-ineffective 35th.41 By 29 September the First Army attack had come to nothing, and Pershing could do little except plan for a renewed offensive in early October. The AEF was now paying the price for a number of critical oversights. Johnson Hagood's complaints about the neglect of the Service of Supply were realized. Supplies were simply not coming up; men were out of ammunition, they had no food, and traffic jams were monumental. Traub and Muir were good generals, but they were paying a price for having so many staff officers and line officers at school. Their divisions were green troops, incapable of taking objectives assigned. The Montfaucon objective assigned to the 79th was far beyond their capabilities; they should have been given to John L. Hines's more experienced 4th Division. Also, "Black Jack" Pershing was "down in the weeds," in that he was becoming more

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and more concerned with how brigades and regiments were aligned for attacks. On 30 September he spent a great deal of time drawing up tactical schemes of maneuver for when the next assault began. He dictated that divisions would advance with brigades abreast and regiments en echelon. In effect, Pershing had become the G-3 for the divisions, micromanaging the army at a tactical level.42 On 4 October the attack began again, with basically the same result. Pershing noted, "Met considerable resistance; advance very slow.... There is no course except to fight it out, taking the best possible advantage of the ground which now lays to the advantage of the Germans."43 For the doughboys of the AEF that meant continuing the frontal assaults against German positions, with mounting casualties. Heads continued to roll as the fighting continued unabated. A general push on 14 October against the heart of the Kriemhilde Stellung caused great dislocation in the AEF. Attacking in mid-October, the 1st Division and 42nd were bled white. On 16 October Beaumont B. Buck was relieved from command of the 3rd Division, and John E. MacMahon was also ousted from command of the 5th Division.44 George Cameron, V Corps commander, was replaced by the hard-driving, ruthless Charles P. Summerall; and Cameron was assigned to command John L. Hines's 4th Division. Hines got command of III Corps, and Joseph T. Dickman took over I Corps, since Hunter Liggett had been tagged to command First Army. Hard-fighting Robert Lee Bullard left III Corps to take command of Second Army45 Pershing split his ground forces into two armies on 12 October, but he continued to deal with matters better left to other subordinate commanders. How fair had Pershing been to his generals? In the case of John E. McMahon, his relief was indeed justified by conditions in the 5th Division. Pershing had had a very low opinion of the 5th for several months, but he basically trusted McMahon, a West Point classmate, to make a fighting unit out of it. Nonetheless, the 5th was badly disorganized and dispirited, and its staff seemed unable to function. John L. Hines, who initially requested McMahon's relief, found the division had employed very poor tactics.46 The case of Buck, a 1st Division alumni, is much less clear. Some of Buck's difficulties stemmed from two causes. First, Buck tended to be away from his command post too much overseeing his brigades and regiments. That was a command style, to be sure, but it left the divisional staff with little guidance. Secondly, Buck and his chief of staff, Colonel J.R. Brewer, did not get along, and Brewer was responsible for rumors that Buck intended to lead a bayonet charge himself a la George Pickett.47 When Hines later wrote Buck's efficiency report, he was not full of praise as far as Buck's command of the 3rd Division was concerned; he commented that Buck's greatest problem within the division was staff work.48 Pershing knew that German resistance against green American troops was fierce. On 12 October he recorded in his diary, "Am not altogether

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pleased with progress of attack, however, the 1st Division made no better progress than the others. This shows that the German resistance has been considerable."49 It is interesting to note that Pershing could understand the difficulties of the battlefield when it came to the 1st Division, which was indeed the best trained and most experienced, but could not extend the same understanding to other units. Hunter Liggett, never a commander to be rushed into a battle, decided that the whole First Army had to stop and reorganize before another major attack began. "The condition of the First Army was such," Liggett wrote, "that it was imperative to rehabilitate our divisions, get necessary replacements into condition for action, gather up a mass of stragglers and return them to their proper commands, and, while keeping up pressure on the enemy, prepare for a powerful, well-coordinated effort Now, however, we needed rest and reorganization."50 Liggett clearly understood that the AEF was reaching the end of its tether and was battered almost to inaction. Pershing, however, continued to push his army and corps commanders, by a message telling his subordinates that they would be held personally responsible for failure.51 The rotund Liggett also recognized that prolonged combat in very bad weather conditions was taking a toll on his men both physically and psychologically. As First Army staff began to plan for the renewal of the attack in late October, Liggett directed Hugh Drum to prepare a memorandum for all corps commanders to stress psychological preparation for combat. Corps commanders and division commanders were directed to gain "personal contact with the lower ranks and explaining to them the situation."52 This was very sound advice, which good commanders have followed. A soldier fights better when he is informed and sees his higher commanders. Liggett and Drum certainly understood this critical factor of the command relationship. The date for the renewed battle was set for 1 November. Liggett's operational alignment was good, with solid divisions organized under three first-rate corps commanders: from right to left there was III Corps under Hines, then V Corps commanded by Summerall, and on the left I Corps directed by Theodore Dickman. Pershing took the opportunity to send to each army, corps, and division commander a letter outlining what he saw as lessons learned since the start of the Meuse-Argonne fight up to the formation of the armies in mid-October. In many ways it was an extraordinary document. Pershing began the letter by saying, "I think that the training of our divisions has not always been such as to insure the necessary tactical direction of the personnel in the sort of warfare that now confronts us. This probably results from too much attention to trench warfare methods and from actual service in the trenches."53 In fact, the problems of the AEF were not from trench warfare training; they were the result of a misunderstand-

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ing of maneuver warfare. There was little maneuver, but a great deal of direct assault on positions held by determined German infantry and machine-gunners. The terrain gained was taken not by fire and maneuver but by blood. Commanders, under threat of relief and ruination, were pushed into pointless attacks; the costs of such victories as were won in the MeuseArgonne were terribly high. With all of the training and schools and warnings from the allies, Pershing realized that commander-staff coordination was not working well at all. In his letter Pershing stated the obvious: that commanders made the final decisions, and that staffs served the commanders and must keep in mind also the interests of the troops. What was not said was that most divisional and corps staffs were simply too inexperienced in their jobs and had had little time to learn their duties and techniques. Overall, the First Army and I Corps staffs functioned smoothly, because they had been together awhile. Hugh Drum and George C Marshall would have been brilliant in any circumstance, as would also Wiley Howell, the army's G-2, but there were not enough Drums, Marshalls, and Howells to go around. It took almost a month, for example, for John L. Hines to get Alfred W. Bjornstad transfered from chief of a corps staff to the position of chief of staff, 30th Infantry Division. Historian Paul Braim, in his study of the AEF in the Meuse-Argonne campaign, has stated, "It was a victory produced mostly by improperly trained leaders and soldiers, and it was won by determination, esprit, and the exhaustion of the enemy" 5 4 No one could argue with Braim's assessment of the AEF in that final battle of the war. The AEF came very close to losing the fight and had just about reached the end of its abilities in November of 1918. At the same time, the AEF nearly lost any credibility it had in an amateurish attempt to take the long-occupied city of Sedan. On 3 November Pershing had a conference with a number of French generals. It was obvious that the Germans were in retreat everywhere along the line. The American First Army's forward lines were approaching the Meuse River and had outdistanced the French Fourth Army, under Henri Gouraud. Pershing claimed that there was no real opposition to the First Army's taking Sedan, which is very hard to believe. Sedan had emotional overtones for the French—it was the site of the French disaster in 1870 and had been fought over during the present war. On 6 November Pershing issued an order for units of the First Army to take Sedan. GHQ G-3 Fox Connor and George C. Marshall drew up the initial order to move against Sedan, but Hugh Drum, at First Army, appended a line stating that "boundaries will not be considered binding." 55 That started a footrace for Sedan, which was in no American zone but belonged to Henri Gouraud's Fourth French Army. From about thirty miles away, the 1st Division, under Brigadier General Frank Parker, moved to the

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west, cutting across the 77th and then the 42nd division's sectors. It was mass confusion, and casualties were caused by friendly fire, especially in the area of the 42nd Division. The 1st Division then began to wander into Gouraud's sector, where his artillery had preplanned fires. Eventually the whole mess was straightened out, and the French Fourth Army finally took and liberated Sedan. However, the debacle caused a black mark on the already suspect record of Pershing's AEF.56 While Hunter Liggett's First Army continued to move forward against depleted and worn-out German units, the AEF gave orders to Robert Lee Bullard to prepare his Second Army for an attack toward Metz. Bullard was perplexed, because Pershing's "instructions were more exhortation than tactical guidance." 57 Of course, Pershing pushed Bullard to use maneuver warfare and be ready to exploit a German collapse. Bullard quickly put together a good staff, with Brigadier Stuart "Tommie" Heintzelman as chief of staff and Colonel William Haskell as the G-3. Basically the Second Army attacked for two days, with combat ending on 11 November. When Bullard left HI Corps for Second Army command, he took a number of key staff officers. He later wrote, "To take these men from the III Corps in the midst of a battle had made me feel like a robber, but the imminence of the offensive for the Second Army soothed my conscience. I needed them." 58 There were good commanders, but there were too few competent, trained staff officers who could lift the burdens from commanding officers and bring form and structure to the chaos of war. Worn out, overworked commanders relieved for cause—Cameron, Buck, Traub, and many others—littered the road to victory in November 1918. The great question for Pershing and the army was whether the lessons learned would be put into organizational doctrine in preparation for future wars.

NOTES 1. Robert Lee Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences of the War (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1925), 265. 2. Entry for 25 September 1918, Pershing Diaries, John J. Pershing Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. (Hereafter cited as LOC, with collections individually cited.) 3. Paul Braim, The Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the MeuseArgonne Campaign (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1987), 96. 4. Army General Staff College, Fourth Course, October-December, 1918 (Chaumont: Base Printing Plant, 29th Engineers, 1918), 34. 5. General Staff College, AEF, List of Graduates, Fourth Class, Records Group 120, Records of the AEF, Carton 1606, National Archives, Washington, DC. (Hereafter cited as RG 120.) 6. Donald Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 192.

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7. Memorandum from Colonel J. K. Miller, Director, School of the Line, 22 October 1918, RG 120, Carton 1720. 8. Memorandum by Colonel Kirby Walker, Director, School of the Line, 9 April 1918, ibid. 9. Major J. H. Marsching, "History of the Army Intelligence School," After Action Report, c. 1919, ibid., Carton 1737. 10. Robert Alexander, Memories of the World War, 1917-1918 (New York: The Macmillian Co., 1931), 4-5, 97. 11. Ibid., 103. 12. Robert Lee Bullard, Fighting Generals (Ann Arbor, MI: J. W. Edwards, 1944), 242-43. 13. John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, II (Blue Ridge Summitt: Tab Books Reprint, 1989), 286-87. 14. Entry for 10 February 1918, Drum Diaries, Hugh Drum Papers, United States Army Military History Institute Archives, Carlisle Barracks, PA. (Hereafter cited as MHI.) 15. Typescript copy of Drum's definition of a chief of staff, 1919, ibid. 16. Typescript copy of the roster of First U.S. Army staff, 1919, ibid. 17. Braim, Test of Battle, 90-91. 18. Forrest C Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939 (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 176-77. 19. Typescript copy of Drum's concept of the principle Tasks of the First U.S. Army Staff, c. 1918, Drum Papers, MHI. 20. Entry for 10 October 1918, Hagood Diaries, Hagood Papers, MHI. 21. Van Horn Moseley to Major General Clarence C Williams, Fort Bliss, TX, 10 May 1928, Peyton C March Papers, LOC 22. Entry for 19 September 1918, Hines Diaries, John L. Hines Papers, MHI. 23. Entry for 23 September 1918, ibid. 24. Entry for 26 September 1918, ibid. 25. Entry for 29 September 1918, ibid. 26. Braim, Test of Battle, 102-3. 27. Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences, 277-78. 28. Allan R. Millett, The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army, 1881-1925 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 378-79. 29. Interview with John L. Hines, Washington, 21 October 1947, General Staff Interview Series, MHI. 30. Interview with W. D. Connor, Washington, 21 October 1947, ibid. 31. From Nolan's typescript copy of his lengthy notes on Pershing's memoirs, completed 1931-32, pages 148-49, Dennis Nolan Papers, MHI. 32. "Status of Corps and Divisions of the First Army," Center of Military History, United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919, IX (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1990), 51-52. 33. Entry for 26 September 1918, Hines Diaries, Hines Papers, MHI. 34. Entry 26 September 1918, Pershing Diaries, Pershing Papers, LOC. 35. Smythe, Pershing, 194. 36. Major Hermann von Giehrl, "Battle of the Meuse-Argonne," Infantry Journal XIX, 2 (August 1921), 131-33. 37. Entry for 27 September 1918, Pershing Diaries, Pershing Papers, LOC.

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38. Ibid. 39. Braim, Test of Battle, 106-7. 40. Entry for 28 September 1918, Pershing Diaries, Pershing Papers, LOC. 41. Entry for 29 September 1918, ibid. 42. Entry for 30 September 1918, ibid. 43. Entry for 4 October 1918, ibid. 44. "Brief History in the Case of Major General B. B. Buck," c. 1919 in ibid; and "Brief History in the Case of Major General J. E. McMahon, N.A." c. 1918, RG 120, Carton 2267. 45. Smythe, Pershing, 111. 46. Entry for 15 October 1918, Hines Diaries, Hines Papers, MHI. 47. Buck to Pershing, Camp Travis, TX, 27 April 1921, Pershing Papers, LOC. 48. Hines to Davis, Report on General Officers, 13 December 1918, Charles P. Summerall Papers, LOC. 49. Entry for 12 October 1918, Pershing Diaries, Pershing Papers, LOC. 50. Hunter Liggett, Commanding an American Army (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1925), 102. 51. Smythe, Pershing, 223. 52. Drum to Corps Commanders, Ligny-en-Barrois, 23 October 1918, Hines Papers, LOC. 53. Pershing to Commanders, Chaumont, 24 October 1918, Pershing Papers, LOC 54. Braim, Test of Battle, 168. 55. G-3, First Army, Memorandum to I, V Corps Commanders in Army in the World War, IX, 385. Also see George C Marshall, Memoirs of My Service in the World War (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1976), 189-92. 56. This situation has been discussed at length. See James J. Cooke, The Rainbow Division in the Great War, 1917-1919 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 1994), 190-200; Smythe, Pershing, 227-30; and Braim, Test of Battle, 141-43. 57. Millet, The General, 423-24. 58. Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences, 290.

Chapter 10

AFTERMATH AND LESSONS LEARNED It was a good thing for the AEF that the armistice came on 11 November 1918. The American force in the Meuse-Argonne had almost exhausted its ability to fight on. Poor supplies, breakdowns in command and staff, and bad weather had weakened the effort. Donald Smythe, Pershing's biographer, later wrote, "That the First Army was able to break through on November 1 was due not to any new method like open warfare, nor even to the Army's growing competence, but in large part to the steady deterioration of the enemy."1 In his after-action report Charles P. Summerall, the ruthless and hard-driving V Corps commander, stated, "By desperate fighting, the fresh divisions were able to carry the line forward to the Kriemhilde Stellung, where it was again temporarily stabilized. In spite of successive efforts, the gains were slight during a period of two weeks."2 Summerall's use of the word "stabilized" really meant that the troops were unable to advance and simply remained in position in the face of the determined and skilled enemy. Pershing's own written evaluation of the performance of the AEF in the last battles of the war would have to wait for some months, because of several factors. Pershing had agreed to send an American combat force into Germany to occupy positions on the west bank of the Rhine River. To do this he created the Third U.S. Army, under Major General Theodore Dickman, and assigned to it a number of experienced combat divisions, including the 1st, 2nd, and 42nd. The armistice that went into effect on 11 November was only that, an armistice; there was no peace treaty in force, and it was possible that combat could begin again at any time. There was also a need to send combat forces to guard the line of communications, which ran from Antwerp, Belgium, through Luxembourg, to the forces in

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Germany. Since the best combat divisions had been sent forward, the divisions that had arrived in France most recently were the first to leave, and that did not please troops who had been in France for some time. 3 "Black Jack" Pershing was under pressure as well to close down costly AEF functions. The president and the Congress wanted to reduce the vast sums of money being spent in Europe. There was a problem with this, however. If things were closed down quickly, contracts cancelled, and troops sent home, what would happen if hostilities began again on the Rhine? Pershing was thus pulled between two great forces that had not existed when the focus of the AEF was combat operations. Of immediate concern were those divisions on duty in Germany. There was a very obvious shift in the center of gravity of the GHQ, from Fox Connor's G-3 section to Harold B. Fiske's G-5. Fiske, who became known as the "most hated man" in the AEF, turned his attention to a training program for the soldiers on the Rhine. He firmly believed that "most of our divisions were lacking in skill. Given plenty of time for preparation, they were capable of powerful blows; but their blows were delivered with an awkwardness and lack of resource that made them unduly costly and rendered it impracticable to reap the full fruits of victory... ."4 With those concepts firmly fixed in his mind, Fiske went about the business of postwar training. He wrote to his wife, "You asked why I thought I'd be kept to the last in France. We have had in G5 for seven months extensive plans for educational work after peace is declared and before the troops can get home." 5 Even some of the hard-fighting generals were perplexed by the hectic pace of training. Major General Henry Allen wrote to his wife in midDecember, "We are in the midst of intensive training as of yore, but I suspect there will be some relaxation ere long. We have a multiplicity of terrain exercises, maneuvers, and lectures, but there is a growing tendency towards granting short leaves." 6 The workday was eight hours, five days a week, with inspections on Saturday, and Fiske continually sent out inspectors to oversee and report on training. While Fiske was becoming the bete noire of the AEF, Pershing began to dismantle training facilities in France. Training areas were given back to the French army, the majority of all training at the huge air field at Issoudun would be closed by 15 December, and combat divisions not involved in Third Army operations were moved to ports of embarkation. For the army school system at Langres there was the problem of deciding how much staff and line training was needed for the combat divisions remaining on duty. In early December Pershing held a conference with Harold Fiske and "Corky" Davis, and a schedule for closing the schools was established. The General Staff School was closed on 31 December with the graduation of the fourth class. The School of the Line would cease operations on 28 December, and all officer candidate schools would close their doors on 31 December. The Gas School, once considered to be vital to the AEF in combat, ended

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instruction on Christmas Eve. The last school to end operation would be Dennis Nolan's pride, the Intelligence School, and it would close on 11 January 19197 There is little evidence that the General Staff College made a great deal of difference for the AEF. James Guthrie Harbord put the number of actual graduates at 537 officers.8 Not all graduates, however, were rated as ready for general staff work at the division or corps level. The fourth course, which was carried on during the Meuse-Argonne fight, probably hurt combat efforts, especially for green units. It does appear that the lack of trained officers on the staff contributed to the poor performance of the 35th Division and added to Major General Peter Traub's problems. In a sound analysis of the whole AEF school system, James W. Rainey has stated, "Pershing's school system required cadre. Sometimes these were the best officers and NCOs, who were dragooned out of their divisions.... The resultant damage to unit training is apparent in either case. Further, units continuously had to send other officers and NCOs to the schools as students. The training of such units proceeded, leaderless." 9 One can certainly agree with Rainey's assessment of the extensive AEF school system, but one might add that it was a good idea—just not for the AEF. This was an army with little expertise in war and time was not on Pershing's side. If schools such as those established in France had existed a year prior to April 1917 they might have contributed, but there were then no institutions of the number and type eventually required. To build them in France frittered away manpower resources. The role and the size of the AEF expanded too rapidly for the training vision; nonetheless, the vision was never questioned. The schools, it appears, took on a life of their own. The Leavenworth-trained officers who came to the AEF were good and were ready to assume their duties at Chaumont or in subordinate combat units. The problem was that at the outbreak of the war there were only about two hundred available for duty, and Pershing tried to get them all; staff preparation in the United States suffered accordingly. Pershing wanted to show that the trained American professional officer was as good as any officer in the world; they made mistakes, as any officer new to combat would do, but they justified Pershing's faith. A good example of this well-placed reliance on the Leavenworth man was Dennis Nolan, who built the AEF's intelligence community into a functioning and highly efficient section. His intelligence school was something that was needed in the United States army, and except for those pulled from their units during the Meuse-Argonne fight, intelligence officers reached a high stage of professionalization and made a contribution. Fox Connor and George C. Marshall proved their worth to the AEF many times over in the area of operations. But there were too few such men for the tasks at hand.

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At the philosophical base of the AEF school system, the building of the staff, and the selection of commanders was the concept of the "cult of the rifle," of which Pershing was the high priest. He never waivered in his belief that the infantryman, trained with rifle and bayonet, supported by a host of new weapons and technologies, was the key to final victory—to achieve which the infantryman, with all of his support, must engage in open warfare. To the end, Pershing remained stalwart in his insistence on open, or maneuver, warfare. In a letter sent to all of his commanders near the end of the Meuse-Argonne campaign, it was clear that "Black Jack" blamed the reverses of the past weeks on too much trench warfare training. 10 But to what extent were maneuver or open warfare tactics employed by the AEF? Paul Braim, in his work on the Meuse-Argonne, has correctly stated, "In the main, there weren't any tactics employed. Committing hundreds of thousands of infantrymen in a narrow zone directly against heavily fortified and defended positions guaranteed high casualties and small gain." 11 James Rainey concludes, "The AEF succeeded not because of imaginative operations and tactics nor because of qualitative superiority, but by smothering German machine guns with American flesh."12 One must conclude that both Braim and Rainey are correct in their assessments of AEF tactics and combat performance. That being so, one must ask what the AEF did contribute to the victory in November 1918. In fact, the very presence of over a million doughboys in France, with thousands arriving every day, meant that the allies had a continuous supply of fresh, physically fit, and motivated troops. In transatlantic cable conversations between Pershing and Chief of Staff Peyton C. March, the number of divisions to arrive in France was constantly discussed. Pershing talked in terms of having a hundred divisions in France by the spring campaign of 1919. More realistically, March thought in terms of sixty-six or eighty, with the other men going to build the Service of Supply. Regardless of who wanted what, the fact remains that in the last months of the war the United States could think in terms of millions of soldiers crossing the Atlantic. Germany simply could not match that constant flow of soldiers. Once in the field, Pershing was more than willing to commit Americans to decisive battle; with tragic consequences at times, doughboys showed they were more than willing to fight. Could the AEF have provided the necessary command and staff elements for the divisions that would have had to fight in a spring campaign in 1919? Pershing constantly fretted over the problem of building competent staffs for the combat formations. It was clear to him that by 1919 there would be armies and groups of armies, with many corps and divisions. Would they have the staffs necessary to commit them to battle? Pershing had grown concerned over command and staff during the Meuse-Argonne. In a letter to Robert Lee Bullard, newly selected to command the Second U.S. Army, "Black Jack" said, "Army and other commanders are too much

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given to leaving the management of affairs to their staffs. They should meet oftener with their staffs and not wait for matters of importance to be brought to them."i3 The General Staff College at Langres graduated, in four courses, fewer than six hundred officers. If indeed it could have filled a class to capacity, about five hundred men, and given two three-month courses between the new year and the spring campaign of 1919, there would have been only a thousand officers with any staff training. Presumably there would be a good deal of on-the-job training going on in the new divisions, and a number of especially competent officers would leave older divisions and take higher assignments, but the numbers of trained staff officers that would have been available simply would not have matched what the AEF would have needed to fight in 1919. The School of the Line had four sessions and graduated almost five hundred soldiers; 14 it also was of three months' duration. Even if the numbers attending the school had been dramatically increased, the AEF would still have been short of expert trainers for the subordinate combat commands. Over ten thousand second lieutenants were created at the various officer candidate schools in France during the lifetime of the AEF. The three-month course that created the "ninety-day wonders" had to be shortened because of a growing and critical shortage of lieutenants. 15 Given the nature of combat, especially as evidenced in the Meuse-Argonne, there would also be a growing need for company-grade officers, which, it appears, the AEF could not fill. Another question for Pershing, looking forward to the 1919 spring campaign was: would there have been enough qualified commanders for AEF divisions? Pershing had been known for relieving division commanders, and even one corps commander. Some, like McMahon of the 5th Division and Omar Bundy of the 2nd Division, had needed to be dismissed. On the other hand, Major Generals Burnham of the 82nd and Buck of the 3rd were perhaps separated from their commands arbitrarily. At some point, and the AEF was reaching that critical point, the pool of potential division commanders would dry up. Pershing did want staff officers to get command experience. Dennis E. Nolan, the expert G-2, courageously led a brigade, winning a Distinguished Service Cross. Eventually, however, sending good staff officers to command divisions would be "robbing Peter to pay Paul." There is no reason to believe that Fox Connor, "Corky" Davis, Hugh Drum, George C Marshall, Harold B. Fiske, or others would not have received two stars and command of divisions in the upcoming 1919 campaign. What would Pershing do then for staff officers at GHQ, army, and corps level? Generals sent back to the United States, by way of Blois would have to return again in command of units. Simply put, the United States Army was paying the bill for years of indifference to preparedness and training an officer corps.

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The AEF's logistical system broke down during the Meuse-Argonne campaign. Could it have been fixed by the spring of 1919? There never was a satisfactory answer to the question of who actually controlled and directed the logistical functions of the AEF. There was a G-4 at Chaumont, and there was the commanding general, Service of Supply, at Tours. By the end of the war Brigadier General Johnson Hagood and Brigadier General George van Horn Moseley were hardly on speaking terms. Hagood, as chief of staff of the Service of Supply, was convinced that logistical matters belonged in the hands of the SOS, because it actually had to perform the quartermaster functions to keep the AEF fighting. In late October Hagood wanted all G-1 and G-4 functions transfered to the SOS, and the area of responsibility for supplies to "extend to the trenches."16 Harbord jumped into the controversy, arguing for greater areas of influence for the SOS. The armistice ended the struggle for power, which was also a personality clash between Hagood and Van Horn Moseley Pershing never did solve the problems with Atterbury and rail transportation. By the end of the war there was a greater appreciation of the difficulties under which Atterbury and his staff worked.17 There had been fears in the AEF that Pershing's enemies might use the breakdowns in the transportation system to criticize the AEF's entire logistical operation, and steps were accordingly taken to make known what W. W. Atterbury and his staff actually did accomplish with worn-out rail lines and constant shortfalls in what the French had promised to deliver to the transportation section of the AEF.18 It did not help that returning doughboys recounted stories of shortages of food, ammunition, blankets and the like. It is doubtful, however, that the AEF logistics system could have done much better in 1919, because of certain simple facts. The Quartermaster Corps, like any other branch of the army, had entered the war as a small, inexperienced group of men who had to find their way. There were grave difficulties in procuring supplies in Europe, and had it not been for Charles Gates Dawes's efforts there could well have been a disaster. The Service of Supply was always short of trained officers and enlisted men, and those who did see service were overworked and underappreciated. It is doubtful that the supply system, as it functioned in 1918, could have sustained a massive 1919 campaign. There was a morale problem within the SOS, because many officers wanted to be with the combat units as fighters, not as quartermasters. Few supply men ever won a Distinguished Service Cross or commanded a regiment, brigade, or division. This is a real problem in all armies, and it was something that Harbord recognized but could not correct. The campaign of 1919 did not occur, and the logistics system, free of the stresses of combat, was equal to the task of serving the occupation troops on the Rhine.

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What was of more importance to Pershing than the reordering of the supply system was the question of what was going to happen to him, now that the war was over and the probability of a peace treaty after the new year seemed great. What Pershing wanted was to become the Chief of Staff of the Army, but Peyton Conway March occupied that position. It was taken for granted that "Black Jack" Pershing would retain his four stars, but March also held the full general rank. Almost every general in the AEF faced the displeasing prospect of reverting to their regular army, prewar ranks. Unless that was handled with great care, the army could suffer severe morale problems. The possibility of the United States Army's splitting into two competing and hostile camps was great. It should come as no surprise that during the conflict disputes arose between March and Pershing over the promotion of army officers. Pershing was intensely loyal to his successful commanders, and he was angered by refusal in Washington to allocate to the AEF any promotion to general rank he recommended.19 Pershing was very much aware that when fighting ended, so would promotions. Rank and decorations were the normal rewards for doing a good job on the battlefield, and if they were denied to the AEF, many who had held high staff and command position would not receive what they and Pershing believed they had earned. James Harbord, always ready to advise Pershing, began urging him to push promotions as hard as possible. Starting in mid-October 1918, Harbord bombarded Pershing with letters over the whole question.20 In any evaluation of the command and staff within the AEF, the questions of promotions, postwar assignments, and selection to attend schools in the United States that marked officers for higher position and rank must be considered vital. Pershing had his agenda, and Newton Baker and Peyton March had theirs. Newton Baker became concerned that the army would split asunder once peace came. In a discussion with Harbord at Tours in April 1919, this was much on Baker's mind. As Harbord recalled, "He seems very sensitive on the point of possible bad feeling between that part of the army which has fought in France and that which has fought in the United States, for fear they will fight each other in the United States later."21 Peyton March, however, was more than ready to join the fray. While Harbord was acting as Pershing's personal advisor, March was telling Baker what needed to be done. Baker was given a scheme whereby Pershing would become a figurehead Chief of Staff, while selected deputies would do his work; what March did not explain was who would pick the underlings.22 There were hard feelings on March's part, which grew as AEF officers came back to the United States. When Major General W. D. Connor returned from France and reported to March, the Chief of Staff dismissed him, saying, "You're another one of those Pershing boys."23 While Harbord was continually whispering in Pershing's ear about the pernicious intent of Peyton C. March, George Washington Goethals, the War

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Department, self-serving politicians, relieved officers (whom Harbord called the "Grouches"), and other assorted miscreants, March was hearing bad reports from officers who resented the close-knit staff at Chaumont. 24 Brigadier General A. J. Bowley, who had commanded artillery in a number of combat divisions, was only too happy to tell March about the plans and schemes of the AEF general staff, especially about Harold B. Fiske. There had been open enmity between Fiske and Bowley for some time over artillery doctrine, and when Bowley returned to the United States he filled March's ear with tales of a plot to create a permanent General Staff (G-1 through G-5) and to place one of Pershing's Chaumont staff officers as commandant of West Point. Fiske, Bowley warned, was the architect of the West Point coup d'etat. Bowley finished one of his warnings with the extraordinary statement that "in war time I believe that leadership is worth 90% and military knowledge the remaining 10%."25 It was that type of thinking that had caused so much grief to the AEF in the first place. Professionalization of the army was certainly lacking when war came, and it took a great deal of time even to try to correct it. The building of the General Staff, the opening of the General Staff College at Langres, and the enhancement of the staffs at corps and divisional level were all attempts to overcome the years of apathy and neglect within the army. It can be argued that Langres did not really produce officers with enough experience and expertise to do the job properly. Certainly the schools there were a drain on the combat units, often when they could least afford the loss of key players, but they were a response to a serious need. One cannot argue with the motivation for the schools. Only a fool could downplay the role of leadership in the army, but leadership must be grounded on knowing one's job and being proficient. In war, leadership is not a display of managerial skills; it is, first, gaining the respect and confidence of the soldiers one has to lead into battle. Ignorance is a poor starting point for military leadership. One of the great success stories of the AEF was that a general staff worthy of the name was built from nothing. Dennis E. Nolan built, for example, the G-2 into a formidable section, the equal of any in the allied armies. In the main, Fox Connor at Chaumont and the G-3s at army, corps, and divisional levels did a creditable job in preparing and issuing orders. Who could criticize the work of a George C. Marshall, either at 1st Division or the First Army? That they made mistakes was obvious, but they started from nothing, and the GHQ staff only had a lifespan of a little over a year. By contrast, Pershing continued to experience serious problems with his supply system. There were open, bitter conflicts between the Service of Supply and the G-4 at Chaumont. The system for getting supplies from the ports through depots to the troops at the front never did work smoothly. The AEF did not have enough time or enough expertise to make the logistical sections of the army run well.

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But all of that did not matter after the armistice of November 1918. The AEF went into a new phase, the final phase of its existence. Troops were returning home, schools were ending instruction, and equipment was being either sold off or prepared for shipment back to the United States. Between November 1918 and the spring of 1919 Pershing tried to see every division that was scheduled to go back to America. A great deal of time was spent in writing the narratives for decorations, especially the Meritorious Service Medal. The staff at Chaumont began to dwindle as officers were assigned to other positions, either with the Third Army in Germany or back in the United States. There again, of course, was the great question—what would happen to John J. Pershing? In the spring of 1919 Secretary of War Baker was in Europe, and James Harbord brought up with him the question of Pershing's future. Baker, aware of the growing tensions between Pershing and March, told Harbord that he did not know how to employ a four-star general in the United States. Harbord, never at a loss to speak for Pershing, replied, "Well, Mr. Secretary, there is, in my judgement, only one thing in the army of the United States which is adequate employment for General Pershing and that is the position of Chief of Staff." Baker replied that there was a problem with that, and it was Peyton March. Harbord quickly responded that were March to get command of the Army of the Rhine, he could keep his four stars. 26 Pershing, however, had already selected Henry Allen for that command, and besides, army commanders in the AEF flew a three-star flag, not four. Harbord, as he had in the past, turned his attention to being "Black Jack's" prime minister. He railed against the politicians who sought all the glory of the victory for themselves; against the War Department bureau chiefs who resented deeply Pershing's actions during the war; and of course the March-Goethals alliance. His letters to Pershing were, as Harbord called them, "a case for the defense." 27 As Baker had feared, hard feelings were growing between those who had remained at home and those who had fought; the air was becoming charged as more officers returned to the United States and reverted to their former regular army ranks. 28 Before Pershing's return to the United States, he tried to orchestrate the remaining forces. In late August he cabled March that prior to his actual departure he wanted to divide all forces in Europe into two groups: American forces in Germany, under Henry Allen, and American forces in France, under W. D. Connor. Connor would oversee the final end of the AEF and ultimately transfer all record-keeping, files, and other functions to Allen's Coblenz headquarters. 29 March moved quickly, however, to end all American presence in France and bring Connor home. "Black Jack" Pershing continued, with no success, to recommend Harbord, Liggett, Dickman, McAndrew, Summerall, and others for promotion to the next higher rank. Newton Baker remained concerned about rank for both Pershing and March; he sincerely wanted March, for whom he had developed a genuine

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respect and friendship, to retain his four stars. On 29 July 1919 Baker wrote to Senator James W. Wadsworth, chairman of the Senate's Committee on Military Affairs, requesting that both Pershing and March receive permanent four-star rank.30 Congress said no, and on 3 September 1919 Pershing alone received a commission as a four-star general. Nothing stung Peyton March more than this. His own temporary rank as a full general would come to an end on 30 June 1920, which distressed Newton Baker, who had seen more of the two wartime generals than any other civilian official.31 When March announced his plans to retire in the summer of 1921, Newton Baker urged him to write his memoirs. What Baker wanted was "justice to the men who served on this side, which I am consistently trying to do in one way or another."32 When March retired, John J. Pershing became Chief of Staff of the Army, and James Harbord became his deputy. Once in the office of Chief of Staff, Pershing began to remake the office in the AEF's image. One of his first actions was to restore the wearing of the Sam Browne Belt. James Harbord, who was sent to command the 2nd Division at Camp Travis, Texas, had constantly urged Pershing to bring back the belt to "restore the dead-and-gone morale of our officers." Of course, Harbord hastened to point out that it was Peyton March who had banned the use of the belt.33 Pershing did bring back the belt, and while he was at it he brought Harbord to Washington. This was just as well, because Harbord, true to past form, never tired of telling Pershing whom to promote and whom to assign where.34 In August 1922, Pershing announced that "Corky" Davis would become the Adjutant General of the Army. Davis, upon his return to the United States, had commanded the 6th Infantry Brigade of the 3rd Division, with duty as general in charge of all infantry training in the division.35 There could be little question that Davis was one of Pershing's generals, and his elevation to the position of Adjutant General, which he had held in Chaumont, marked another stage in the AEF's dominance over the army. In 1922 James Harbord received an offer to become president of the Radio Corporation of America in New York, with a salary undreamed of by any army officer. Pershing selected John L. Hines to be Harbord's replacement, and, for all intents and purposes, to be the next Chief of Staff of the Army. While it is true that the army languished during the 1920s and 1930s for lack of political support and proper funding, and that often the Chief of Staff had largely ceremonial duties, Pershing had power through his appointments to general officer commands. Often these commands were mere shadows of what had existed on the Western Front, but they carried with them stars. The energetic and ambitious Charles P. Summerall, commanding 1st Division at Camp Zachary Taylor, Kentucky, in late 1919, wrote to Hines, "Naturally our chief energy is directed just now towards developing the Educational and Recreational Branch."36 This was a far cry from the dynamic and deadly situation in the Meuse-Argonne.

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There were positions available for those who had done well in the AEF. As Deputy Chief of Staff, Harbord made sure that Hines got command of the 2nd Division, and then made certain that men like Colonel Arthur Conger got an infantry brigade command and a brigadier general's star.37 Dennis Nolan was put to work as a colonel directing a military intelligence course, and Pershing and Hines both secured for Nolan command of 2nd Division in 1922. Colonel John McAuley Palmer, who had gone to France with Pershing and had served on the staff at Chaumont, became a special assistant to Chief of Staff Pershing and in 1922 a brigadier general. Robert Lee Bullard got command of II Corps at Fort Jay, New York, as a regular army major general. Charles H. Muir, who had served Pershing as IV Corps commander in the AEF, was named to be III Corps commander with headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland. Pershing kept Mason Patrick as head of the Air Service, with the rank of major general. George C. Marshall became Pershing's aide while "Black Jack" was Chief of Staff. The list is endless, but what is clear is that Pershing had placed his stamp on the U.S. Army for decades. Pershing was determined to do exactly that upon assuming the office of Chief of Staff on 1 July 1921, but he had begun to plan the remaking of the War Department and the army in the AEF's image well before. For example, in the early spring of 1921 Pershing visited Charles P. Summerall, who was commanding the 1st Infantry at Camp Dix, New Jersey, and asked him what new post he wanted when Pershing became Chief of Staff. Summerall indicated that he wanted IX Corps, the Hawaii Department, or the Panama Canal Zone, in that order.38 In 1921 Summerall packed his bags for Hawaii. While Pershing had a few personal doubts about Summerall, he supported him to succeed John L. Hines in 1926 as Chief of Staff. There were those who were not especially happy with Pershing, however. Beaumont Bonaparte Buck found that Pershing would not respond to his letters and, frankly, expected him to retire as a colonel in 1921. Colonel Ernest Hinds, who had been Pershing's chief of artillery from August 1918 to the end of the war, bombarded Pershing with requests to be promoted to major general, but with no results. 39 Colonel Hugh Drum, who was one of the highest-rated officers in the AEF, remained frustrated that there was no brigadier general's star for him. (After repeated letters, Pershing promoted him in late 1921.)40 Pershing had created a "GHQ Clique" centering around the office of the Chief of Staff.41 This group included Harbord, Hines, Davis, Connor, and Marshall, as well as Malin Craig, head of the Cavalry School. These were men with whom Pershing felt comfortable, men who had proven their worth in the AEF in combat. In John J. Pershing's mind there was no more important position than the office of Chief of Staff, and once it was clear that Harbord was going to retire and take a position as President of RCA, Pershing began to work on a replacement. There was no question about the

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officer to fill Harbord's and Pershing's shoes. It would be John Leonard Hines. On 22 April 1922 Pershing formally offered the job of deputy to Hines, saying, "I believe that it would be to your advantage to come here and be with me. You know that I have only a little more than two years on active service, even if I remain that long." 42 On 2 May 1922 Hines accepted, and prepared to leave VIII Corps command at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.43 All was not clear sailing for Pershing and Hinds, however. Peyton C. March, now retired, continued to snipe at Pershing and the staff. In the summer of 1922, March toured Europe, making a lengthy stop in Germany to see how Henry T. Allen, who had been handpicked by Pershing, was commanding the Army of Occupation. Of course, March found little to his liking and wrote directly to Secretary of War John W. Weeks to complain, "I recommend strongly to you to take the troops out. Of course, from the military situation alone their presence is of no value." March then severely criticized Allen for the large staff he maintained at Coblenz. "They have in Coblenz," he wrote, "a gigantic staff... officers falling over each other and doing nothing except play polo "u March did not have to point out that it was Pershing who had worked out the command and staff details with Allen before he returned to the United States. While there was certainly merit in what March complained about, it was bad form to bypass Pershing and his staff and bring criticisms directly to the Secretary of War. Peyton C. March did not like John Leonard Hines either; their relationship deteriorated so much that neither man would speak to each other. The officers closest to the situation believed that March openly disliked Hines because Hines had been Pershing's handpicked successor as Chief of Staff. While Hines was Pershing's deputy March constantly had belittled his work, and the situation got worse after 1924 when Hines became Chief of Staff in his own right. 45 John L. Hines, who was not in the best of health after the war, had to face some business left over from Pershing's tenure as Chief. Many of Pershing's generals were close to retirement, and Hines would have to prepare for that. In the spring of 1924 he contacted Colonel George Cameron, a relieved corps commander. He told Cameron that he wanted to promote him to brigadier general a few months before his retirement as a token of respect for his war service. 46 In a curt note reflecting bitterness over his treatment in the Meuse-Argonne, Cameron wrote, "I have consulted my family and we are all agreed that the suggested B. G. means nothing to us." He then asked Hines to push his retirement along quickly 47 Hines needed a deputy Chief of Staff; Pershing suggested to "Corky" Davis and Hines that Dennis Nolan would be the best man for the job. Nolan had been promoted to brigadier general by Pershing, and now he would receive his second star as Hines's second in command. While never considered to have been in the AEF staff's inner circle, Nolan was known as a man of vast intelligence, capable of getting things done. Since Hines

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was not always well, it was wise to select a man of Nolan's ability for the deputy position. Alfred Bjornstad, now a colonel teaching in the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, appealed to Hines for help in December 1924; his nomination for the rank of brigadier general was in serious trouble in the Senate. He had run afoul of Senator Davis Elkins of West Virginia. In late October 1918, Bjornstad had been commanding the 13th Brigade of the 7th Infantry Division in France, and Elkins, then a major and a candidate for the U.S. Senate, was his adjutant. They had clashed badly, and now Elkins seemed determined to stop Bjornstad's promotion.48 While Hines had his doubts about Bjornstad, dating back to the AEF, he did intervene, and eventually Bjornstad got his star. The case of the flamboyant Beaumont Bonaparte Buck was a different matter entirely Hines was never really satisfied that Buck had been fairly relieved of command in the Meuse-Argonne. In 1924 Colonel Buck wrote to Hines saying, "It would be a great satisfaction to me personally and to my friends and an inestimable joy to my family and aged parents, and a matter of fairness to me, I believe—if I could retire as a Brigadier General."49 At the time, Buck was an advisor to the 90th Infantry Division of the "Organized Reserve" and was not in the category eligible for promotion, but Hines and Davis found a loophole and detailed Buck to recruiting duty with the rank of brigadier general.50 In 1932 Beaumont Bonaparte Buck retired from active military service as a major general, the only relieved AEF officer ever to achieve such a rank. In 1950, at age ninety, Buck attended a dance with his thirty-four-year-old wife and died on the dance floor after a vigorous foxtrot. When John L. Hines stepped down as Chief of Staff in 1926 he was succeeded by Charles P. Summerall, who bought with him many of the old 1st Division officers.51 "Black Jack" Pershing's influence remained just as strong in the War Department as it had been when Hines was there. His domination of the army was still intact. On 15 July 1948, John J. Pershing passed away. He had been obscured by the great conflict that had been World War II, but his stamp was on the army that achieved the great victory in 1945. Pershing had sailed on the Baltic with a small group of officers who had motivation and dedication but little else. He had built the AEF from that modest start to the point at which it would be a dominant factor in the campaign of 1919. "Black Jack" had been obstinate, irritating, and single-minded in his insistence on an American army in France. He had his orders, he could do nothing else. Regardless of orders, however, he was an American patriot and wanted to show the world that the American soldier and officer was just as good as any soldier and officer anywhere. He made mistakes. Too much time was spent on schools, but this was an army long on ignorance, short on real training. His obsession with maneu-

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ver, or open warfare, cost the lives of many troops, but victories are won by closing with and destroying the enemy. By its very nature there could be little "closing with" in trench warfare. Pershing built a command and staff system that worked. As with anything new there were errors made, but Pershing and his generals were building something from nothing. The United States and its army were unprepared for war in April 1917, but a little over a year later the clumsy AEF was fighting desperate battles on the Western Front. The AEF had gone from the few men on the Baltic to two armies in battle, and then three armies in France and Germany. What is often overlooked in the criticism of the AEF is that in a short period of time a fighting force was born and took its first, faltering steps. Could the allies have survived without the AEF? One can seriously doubt it. Pershing's funeral procession marched in a driving rainstorm to Arlington National Cemetery. It was as heavy as any rain in the MeuseArgonne. Pershing had asked to be buried close to his doughboys, near to the Unknown of that war. Dwight David Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, and of course George C. Marshall led the slow march. Peyton C. March was there, as was Charles P. Summerall. Pershing rested, awaiting the last roll call with his soldiers, with the army that he had built from a few officers, a couple of regiments, and a mass of willing men. For "Black Jack" Pershing it was finally over, "Over There." NOTES 1. Donald Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 237. 2. After Action Report by Summerall, c. December 1919, (written after a V Corps command and staff conference), Charles P. Summerall Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. (Hereafter cited as LOC, with collections individually cited.) 3. Dickman's 3rd Army had three corps: III, under John L. Hines (2nd, 32nd, 42nd divisions); IV, commanded by Charles H. Muir (1st and 4th divisions); and VII, under William Hann (89th and 90th divisions). The 5th, 33rd, and 37th divisions were ordered into Belgium to guard the Line of Communication. 4. After Action Report, Brigadier General Harold B. Fiske, 30 June 1919, Harold B. Fiske Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute Archives, Carlisle Barracks, PA. (Hereafter cited as MHI.) 5. Fiske to Wife, Chaumont, 11 December 1918, ibid. 6. Allen to Wife, Montigny-sur-Aube, France, 12 December 1918, Henry Allen Papers, LOC. 7. Memo by Davis, Chaumont, 2 December 1918, Records Group 120, Records of the AEF, General Headquarters, Carton 1738, National Archives, Washington, DC. (Hereafter cited as RG 120.) 8. James G. Harbord, The American Expeditionary Forces: Its Organization and Accomplishments (Evanston: Evanston Publishing Co., 1929), 66-67.

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9. James W. Rainey, "The Questionable Training of the AEF in World War I," Parameters, XXII, 4 (Winter, 1992-93), 96. 10. Pershing to Commanders, Chaumont, 24 October 1918, Pershing Papers, LOC. 11. Paul Braim, The Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the MeuseArgonne Campaign (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1987), 153. 12. Rainey, "Questionable Training," 100. 13. Pershing to Bullard, Chaumont, 1 November 1918, Pershing Papers, LOC. 14. Fiske, After Action Report, Fiske Papers, MHI. 15. Ibid. 16. Johnson Hagood, The Services of Supply: A Memoir of the Great War (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1927), 322-27. 17. Harbord to Pershing, Tours, 4 December 1918, Pershing Papers, LOC. 18. Harbord to Pershing, Tours, 5 April 1918, ibid. 19. Entry for 6 October 1918, Pershing Diaries, ibid. 20. Harbord to Pershing, Tours, 14 October 1918, ibid. 21. Harbord to Pershing, Tours, 30 April 1919, ibid. 22. Interview with General Peyton C. March, Washington, 13 October 1947, General Staff Interviews, MHI. 23. Interview with Major General William D. Connor, Washington, 21 October 1947, ibid. 24. Harbord to Pershing, Tours, 5 April 1919, Pershing Papers, LOC. 25. Bowley to March, Luxemburg, 28 December 1918, Peyton C. March Papers, LOC. 26. Harbord to Pershing, Tours, 30 April 1919, James G. Harbord Papers, LOC. 27. Harbord to Pershing, Tours, 5 April 1919, Pershing Papers, LOC. 28. Smythe, Pershing, 254-55. 29. Pershing to March, Chaumont, 19 August 1919, Allen papers, LOC. 30. Baker to Wadsworth, Washington, 28 July 1919, March papers, LOC. 31. Baker to March, Washington, 30 June 1920, ibid. 32. Baker to March, Washington, 21 June 1921, ibid. 33. Harbord to Pershing, Camp Travis, TX, 23 March 1921, Pershing Papers, LOC 34. Harbord to Pershing, Camp Travis, TX, 1 February 1921, ibid. 35. War Department, News Release No. 2,10 August 1922, ibid. 36. Summerall to Hines, Camp Zachary Taylor, KY, 20 December 1919, John L. Hines Papers, LOC. 37. Harbord to Hines, Washington, 30 July 1921, ibid. 38. Summerall to Pershing, Fort Dix, NJ, 28 May 1921, Pershing Papers, LOC. 39. Hinds to Pershing, Fort Sill, OK, 18 July 1920, 13 September 1921 and 26 October 1921, Pershing Papers, LOC. 40. Drum to Pershing, Tours, 20 June 1919, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9 May 1920 and 9 June 1920, ibid. Also see Elliott L. Johnson, The Military Experiences of General Hugh A. Drum, 1898-1918, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1975, 363, 366-67. 41. Phillipson interview, Washington, 2 December 1947, MHI. 42. Pershing to Hines, Washington, 22 April 1922, Pershing Papers, LOC. 43. Hines to Pershing, Fort Sam Houston, TX, 2 May 1922, ibid.

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44. March to Weeks, Washington, 26 August 1922, March Papers, LOC. 45. A manuscript prepared by Major General Charles L. Bolte, January, 1967, Hines Papers, MHI. 46. Hines to Cameron, Washington, 3 April 1924, Hines Papers, LOC. 47. Cameron to Hines, Hartford, 9 April 1924, ibid. 48. Bjornstad to Hines, Fort Benning, GA, 12 December 1924, ibid. 49. Buck to Hines, San Antonio, TX, 14 January 1924, ibid. 50. Buck to Hines, San Antonio, TX, 15 August 1932, ibid. 51. Phillipson interview, MHI.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ARCHIVAL SOURCES Air Force Historical Agency Archives. Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL. Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division. The Papers of John J. Pershing, James G. Harbord, Henry T. Allen, Charles P. Summerall, Peyton C. March, John L. Hines, and Benjamin Foulois. Washington, DC. The Mason Patrick Diaries. U.S. Air Force Academy Archives. Colorado Springs, CO. National Archives, Records Group 98 (Records of the U.S. Air Force). Washington, DC. National Archives, Records Group 120 (Records of the AEF). Washington, DC. National Archives, Records Group 200 (Pershing Papers, Fiske Papers). Washington, DC. United States Army Military History Institute Archives. Carlisle Barracks, PA. OFFICIAL, PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS Ayres, L. P. The War with Germany: A Statistical Summary. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919. Chief of Air Service. Final Report of the Chief of the Air Service, AEF. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921. Crowder, E. H , Provost Marshal General. Second Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War on the Operations of the Selective Service System to December 20,1918. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919. France, Etat-Major de I'Armee, Service Historique. Les Armees Frangaises dans la Grande Guerre. 40 vols. Paris: Imprimiere Nationale, 1933-1937. General Service Schools. The German Offensive of July 15 1918: Marne Source Book. Fort Leavenworth: General Service Schools Press, 1923.

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Home, Charles F., and Walter F. Austin. Source Records of the Great War. 7 vols. New York: National Alumni, 1923. Office of Air Force History. The U.S. Air Service in World War I. 4 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978. Pershing, John J. Final Report of General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, AEF. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920. Pershing, John J., and Hunter Liggett. Report of the First Army, American Expeditionary Forces: Organization and Operations. Fort Leavenworth: General Service Schools Press, 1923. U.S. Army, Center of Military History. The United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919. 17 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, reprint, 1989. U.S. Army War College, Historical Section. The Genesis of the American First Army. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938. The Signal Corps and the Air Service. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922. U.S. Office of the Surgeon General. The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War. 8 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1926. U.S. War Department. Air Service, History of the Supply Section. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919. America's Munitions, 1917-1918: The Report of Benedict Crowell. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919. Battle Participation of Organizations of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, Belgium and Italy, 1917-1919. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920. The Official Record of the Great War. New York: Parke, Austin and Lipscomb, 1923. Regulations for the Army of the United States.Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917. Wilgus, William John. Transporting the AEF in Western Europe, 1917-1919. New York: Columbia University Press, 1931.

MEMOIRS, DIARIES Alexander, Robert. Memories of the World War, 1917-1918. New York: Macmillan, 1931. Allen, Henry T. The Rhineland Occupation. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, Co., 1927. Andrews, Avery. My Friend and Classmate John J. Pershing. Harrisburg: Military Services Publishing Co., 1936. Baker, Newton. Frontiers of Freedom. New York: Doubleday, Doran, and Co., 1931. Why We Went to War. New York: Harper Brothers, 1936. Baruch, Bernard M. American Industry in the War. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921. Bland, Larry I. The Papers of George Catlett Marshall (Vol I): The Soldierly Spirit, December 1880-June 1939. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.

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Broun, Heywood. The A.E.F: With General Pershing and the American Forces. New York: Appleton and Co., 1918. Buck, Beaumont B. Memories of War and Peace. San Antonio: The Naylor Co., 1935. Bullard, Robert Lee. American Soldiers Also Fought. New York: Longmans, 1936. Fighting Generals. Ann Arbor: J. W. Edwards, 1944. Personalities and Reminiscences of the War. Garden City: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1925. Chandler, Charles De F., and Frank P. Lahm, How Our Army Got Wings. New York: Ronald Press, 1943. Dawes, Charles G. A Journal of the Great War. 2 vols. New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1921. Dickman, Joseph T. The Great Crusade. New York: Appleton, 1927. Foch, Ferdinand. The Memoirs of Marshal Foch. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, and Co., 1931. Foulois, Benjamin, and C. V. Glines. From The Wright Brothers to Astronauts. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968. Gorell, Edgar Staley. The Measure of Americas World War Aeronautical Effort. Northfield: Norwich University, 1940. Hagood, Johnson. The Services of Supply: A Memoir of the Great War. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1927. Harbord, James G. The American Army in France. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1936. Leaves from a War Diary. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1925. The American Expeditionary Forces: Its Organization and Accomplishments. Evanston: Evanston Publishing Co., 1929. Hayes, Ralph A. Secretary Baker at the Front. New York: The Century Co., 1918. Johnson, Thomas M. Without Censor. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1928. Lansing, Robert. War Memoirs. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1935. Lejeune, John A. Reminiscences of a Marine. Philadelphia: Dorrance and Co., 1930. Liggett, Hunter. AEF: Ten Years Ago in France. New York: Dodd, Meade and Co., 1928. Commanding an American Army: Recollections of the World War. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1925. MacArthur, Douglas. Reminiscences. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. March, Peyton C. The Nation at War. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1932. Marshall, George C. Memoirs of My Service in the World War, 1917-1918. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1976. Mitchell, William. Memoirs of the World War. New York: Random House, 1960. Mott, T. Bentley. Twenty Years as a Military Attache. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1937. Palmer, Frederick. America in France. New York: Dodd Meade, 1919. Our Greatest Battle. New York: Dodd, Meade, 1919. Patrick, Mason. The United States in the Air. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1928. Pershing, John J. My Experiences in the World War. 2 vols. Blue Ridge Summit: Tab Books, 1989. The World War I Diary of Col. Frank P. Lahm. Maxwell Air Force Base: Historical Research Division, Air University, 1970.

158

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UNIT HISTORIES American Battle Monuments Commission. 1st Division: Summary of Operations in the World War. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944. 2nd Division: Summary of Operations in the World War. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944. 3rd Division: Summary of Operations in the World War. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944. 4th Division: Summary of Operations in the World War. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944. 32nd Division: Summary of Operations in the World War. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943. 42nd Division: Summary of Operations in the World War. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944. 77th Division: Summary of Operations in the World War. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944. 82nd Division: Summary of Operations in the World War. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944. 89th Division: Summary of Operations in the World War. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944. Bach, Christian A., and Henry Hall. The Fourth Division. Garden City: Country Life Press, 1920. Fifth Division Society. The Official History of the 5th Division. New York: Fifth Division Society, 1919. History of the Seventy-Seventh Division, August 25, 1917-November 11, 1918. New York: Wynkoop, Hallenback, Crawford Co., 1919. A History of the 90th Division, n.p.: The 90th Division Association, 1920. Meehan, Thomas F. History of the Seventy-Seventh Divison in the War, 1917-1919. New York: Dodd, Meade, and Co., 1921. Miller, Henry Russell. The First Division. Pittsburgh: The Crescent Press, 1920. Official History of the 82nd Division, American Expeditionary Forces. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1929. Reilly, Henry J. Americans All: The Rainbow at War. Columbus: F. J. Heer Printing Co., 1936. Report on the St. Mihiel Offensive, 89th Division. Fort Leavenworth: Army Service Schools Press, 1919. Spaulding, O. L. The Second Division, American Expeditionary Force in France, 19171919. New York: Hillman Press, 1937. Wallace, E. S. (ed). The Twenty-Eighth Division: Pennsylvania's Guard in the World War. Pittsburgh: 28th Division Society, 1924. White, L. Panthers to Arrowheads: The 36th Division in World War I. Austin: Presidial Press, 1984.

SECONDARY WORKS Addington, Larry H. The Pattern of War since the Eighteenth Century. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1994.

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Army Times Publishing. The Yanks Are Coming: The Story of John J. Pershing. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1960. Asprey, Robert B. At Belleau Wood. New York: Putnam, 1965. Barnett, Corelli. The Sword-Bearers: Supreme Command in the First World War. New York: William Morrow, 1964. Beaver, Daniel R. Newton Baker and the American War Effort. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966. Braim, Paul F. The Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the MeuseArgonne Campaign. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1987. Carroll, John, and Colin F. Baxter. The American Military Tradition. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1993. Cecil, Hugh, and Peter Liddle (eds.). Facing Armageddon: Tlie Great War Experienced. Barnsley: Pen and Sword Books, Ltd., 1996. Center of Military History. History of Military Mobilization of the United States Army, 1775-1945. Washington: Center of Military History, 1989. Chambers, Frank P. The War behind the War, 1914-1918. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939. Chambers, John W., II. To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America. New York: The Free Press, 1987. Charteris, John. Field Marshal Earl Haig. New York: Scribners, 1929. Chase, Joseph C. Soldiers All: Portraits and Sketches of the Men of the AEF. New York: Scribners, 1920. Clary, David, and Joseph W. A. Whitehorne. The Inspector Generals of the United States Army, 1777-1903. Washington: Center of Military History, 1987. Clifford, John G. The Citizens Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1972. Coffman, Edward M. The Hilt of the Sword: The Career of Peyton C. March. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966. The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986. Cooke, James J. The Rainbow Division in the Great War, 1917-1919. Westport: Praeger, 1994. The U.S. Air Service in the Great War, 1917-1919. Westport: Praeger, 1996. Cramer, C. H. Newton D. Baker: A Biography. New York: World Publishing Co., 1961. Crowder, Enoch H. The Spirit of Selective Service. New York: Scribners, 1920. Dickinson, John. The Building of an Army: A Detailed Account of Legislation, Administration, and Opinion in the United States, 1915-1920. New York: Century, 1922. Doughty, Robert A., et al. Warfare in the Western World. Vol. II. Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1966. Douglas, Lawrence J. Fighting Soldier: The AEF in 1918. Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1986. Dupuy, Trevor N., Curt Johnson, and David L. Bongard. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography. Edison: Castle Books, 1995. Ellis, John. Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I. New York: Pantheon Books, 1976.

160

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Ernst, Otto. The Battle of Blanc Mont, October 2 to October 10,1918. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1930. Every, Dale van. The AEF in Battle. New York: Appleton, 1928. Freidel, Frank. Over There: The Story of America's Great Overseas Crusade. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990. Frothingham, Thomas G. The American Reinforcement in the World War. Garden City: Doubleday and Page, 1927 Giffen, W. (ed). Command and Commanders in Military History. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969. Goldhurst, Richard. Pipe Clay and Drill—John J. Pershing: The Classic American Soldier. New York: Thomas Crowell, 1977. Hall, George, M. The Fifth Star: Command in an Era of Global War. Westport: Praeger, 1994. Hallas, James H. Squandered Victory: The American First Army at St. Mihiel. Westport: Praeger, 1995. Hankey, Maurice. The Supreme Command 1914-1918. 2 vols. London: Longmans, 1951. Harris, Frederick (ed.). Service With Fighting Men. 2 vols. New York: Y.M.C.A. Association, 1922. Hayes, Grace P. A Brief History of the World War. New York: McMillian, 1922. Heller, Charles E. Chemical Warfare in World War I: The American Experience, 19171918. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1984. Herwig, H. H , and Neil M. Heyman. Biographical Dictionary of World War I. Westport: Greenwood, 1982. Holley, I. B. General John M. Palmer: Citizen Soldiers and the Army of Democracy. Westport: Greenwood, 1982. House, Jonathan M. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century Tactics. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1984. Hurley, Alfred F. Billy Mitchell: Crusader for Air Power. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975. Huston, James A. The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775-1953. Washington: Office of the U.S. Army Chief of Military History, 1966. Infantry Journal. Infantry in Battle. Washington: Infantry Journal, Inc., 1939. James, D. Clayton. The Years of MacArthur (vol. I): 1880-1941. Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 1970. Johnson, Ellis J. The Military Experiences of General Hugh A. Drumfrom1898-1918. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975. Julia, Francis T. Army Staff Reorganization, 1903-1985. Washington: Analysis Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987. Kaspi, Andre, Le Temps des Americains a la France en 1917-1918. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1976. Kennedy, David M. Over Here: The First World War and American Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. Kennett, Lee. The First Air War. New York: The Free Press, 1991. Lefebure, Victor. The Riddle of the Rhine: Chemical Strategy in Peace and War. New York: The Chemical Foundation, 1923. Lonergan, Thomas Clement. It Might Have Been Lost. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929.

Selected Bibliography

161

Lyons, Michael J. World War I: A Short History. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1994. Marcosson, Issac F. The Business of War. New York: John Lane, 1918. Marshall, S.L.A. World War I. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1985. Maurice, Frederick B. The Last Four Months: How the War Was Won. Boston: Little Brown, 1919. Mayo, Virginia. That Damned Y. New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1920. Millett, Allan R. The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army, 1881-1925. Westport: Greenwood, 1975. Nenninger, Timothy K. The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education Professionalism and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881-1918. Westport: Greenwood, 1978. Palmer, Frederick. Bliss Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of General Tasker Howard Bliss. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1934. John J. Pershing: A Biography. Westport: Greenwood, 1948. Newton Baker: America at War. 2 vols. New York: Dodd, Meade and Co., 1919. Pogue, Forrest C. George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939. New York: Viking, 1963. Risch, Erna. Quartermaster Support of the Army. Washington: Center of Military History, 1962. Rutenberg, David C, and Jane S. Allen (eds.) The Logistics of Waging War: American Logistics, 1774r-1985. Montgomery: Air Force Logistics Management Center, 1985. Smythe, Donald. Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing. New York: Scribners, 1973. Pershing: General of the Armies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986. Stallings, Lawrence. The Doughboys: The Story of the AEF, 1917-1918. New York: Harper and Row, 1963. Sweetser, Arthur. The American Air Service. New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1919. Toland, John. No Man's Land: 1918-The Last Year of the Great War. New York: Doubleday, 1980. Toulmin, H. A. Air Service: American Expeditionary Force, 1918. New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1927. Trask, David F. The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993. The United States in the Supreme War Council: American War Aims and InterAllied Strategy, 1917-1918. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961. Van Creveld, Martin. Technology and War. New York: The Free Press, 1991. Vandiver, Frank. Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing. 2 vols. College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1977. Voisin, General de. La Doctrine de Vaviation frangaise de combat au course de la querre, 1915-1918. Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1932. Wallach, Jehuda. Uneasy Coalition: The Entente Experience in World War I. Westport: Greenwood, 1993. Webster's American Military Biographies. Springfield, IL: G.&C. Merriam Co., 1978. Wilson, Dale E. Treat 'Em Rough: The Birth of American Armor, 1917-1920. Novato: Presidio Press, 1989.

162

Selected Bibliography

ARTICLES, PRIMARY AND SECONDARY Baker, Newton D. "America's War Effort." New York Times Current History Magazine (August 1918). Bliss, Tasker Howard. "The Evolution of Unified Command." Foreign Affairs (December 1922). "The Strategy of the Allies," Current History, XXIX (November 1928). Bright, Charles. "Air Power in World War I: Sideshow or Decisive Factor?" Aerospace Historian Qune 1971). Cooke, James J. "The American Soldier in France, 1917-1918." Hugh Cecil and Peter Liddle (eds). Facing Armageddon: Tlie Great War Experienced. Barnsley: Pen and Sword, Ltd., 1996. Coffman, Edward M. "Conflicts in American Planning: An Aspect of World War I Strategy." Military Review (June 1963). Greer, Thomas H. "Air Arm Doctrinal Roots, 1917-1918," Military Affairs, XX, 4 (Winter, 1956). Kennett, Lee. "The AEF through French Eyes." Military Review, 52 (November 1972). Liddell Hart, Basil H. "Pershing and His Critics." Current History (November 1932). Mitchell, William, "The Air Service at the Argonne-Meuse." World's Work XXXVIII (September, 1919). "The Air Service at St. Mihiel." World's Work XXXVIII (August 1919). Nenninger, Timothy K. "Tactical Dysfunction in the AEF, 1917-1918." Military Affairs (October 1987). Paxson, Frederic L. "The American War Government, 1917-1918." American Historical Review XXVI (October 1920). Pershing, John J. "The Meuse-Argonne." Foreign Service XV (August 1927). Rainey, James W. "Ambivalent Warfare: The Tactical Doctrine of the AEF in World War I." Parameters XIII, 3 (Fall 1983). "The Questionable Training of the AEF in World War I." Parameters, XXII, 4 (Winter 1992-93). Smythe, Donald, "A.E.F. Snafu at Sedan." Prologue, V (September 1973). "AEF Strategy in France, 1917-1918." Army Quarterly and Defense Journal (April 1985). Spector, Ronald. "You're Not Going to Send Soldiers Over There, Are You?: America's Search for an Alternative to the Western Front, 1916-1917." Military Affairs (February 1972). Williams, Ernest W. "The Role of Transportation in WWI." Defense Transportation Journal (January-February 1969).

INDEX Alexander, Robert, 61-62, 75,125 Allen, Henry T., 39,140; 90th Division, 21, 22; occupation of Germany, 147,150; relationship with Pershing, 21, 24, 63,147 Alvord, Benjamin, 8,17,18,43,47, 51, 84 Army War College, 38, 92 Atterbury, Wallace W.: early career, 53; Charles Dawes, 52, 55-56; Director General of Transportation, AEF, 53-54, 55-56,111-12,119; Johnson Hagood, 112; relations with the French, 54-55; relationship with Pershing, 32, 52-53,5557,144; Supreme War Council (Versailles), 56-57 Aulrman, D. E., 9 Bacon, Robert, 7 Baker, Chauncey B., 8-9 Baker, Newton D., 11, 21; Baker Commission, 8-9; Tasker Bliss, 5, 32,52; early career, 4-5; Goethals Affair, 113-15; Intelligence School, Langres, 100,102; Peyton March, 2 3 24,119,145; reinforcing the AEF, 22, 62, 80; selects Pershing to command AEF, 2; support for

Pershing, 4, 5, 20, 81,147-48; visits AEF, 21, 22, 25,119,145-47; Leonard Wood, 52, 58, 59 Ballou, Charles C , 70,125 The Baltic Society, 1 Bandholtz, Harry H , 64 Bell, George, 123 Berry, Lucien G., 66,132 Bjornstad, Alfred W., 43; Chief of Staff, III Corps, 129-30; Chief of Staff, 30th Division, 135; curriculum, General Staff School, Langres, 35-37, 39,41, 82-83; doctrinal concepts, 34-35,40-41, 50-51; early career, 129; post-war career, 151 Blatchford, R. M., 23 Bliss, Tasker, 6, 23-24, 28; W. W. Atterbury, 52-53,56-57; Newton Baker, 5,32; John J. Pershing, 18, 23, 80; Supreme War Council (Versailles), 56,110,112 Blois, Officer Reclassification Center, 28, 66-67, 68,118 Buck, Beaumont Bonaparte, 26; 1st Infantry Division, 78; John L. Hines, 133; post-war career, 149, 151; relationship with Pershing, 19,

164 149; 3rd Infantry Division, 109, 116,128,133,143 Bullard, Robert Lee, 4,27, 66; Cantigny, 86-87; Commands 2nd Army, AEF, 70,133,136,142-43; Clarence Edwards, 79-80; 1st Infantry Division, 19-20,37,42, 62, 75, 77,78; James G. Harbord, 7879; health, 78-79; post-war career, 149; relationship with Pershing, 78-79; William L. Sibert, 19; III Corps, 123,128,129-30 Bundy, Omar, 27-28, 75, 85,143 Burnham, William P., 108,143 Brewster, Andre, 28, 65-66, 70, 71, Cameron, George H , 124,133,150 Central Records Office, 65 Chateauroux, 54 Churchill, Marlborough, 100 Clemenceau, Georges, 75 Conger, Arthur, 91,94, 96,101,132, 149 Connor, Fox, 9,34,49,92,141,143, 147; G-3 AEF, 85,135,140,146 Connor, William D., 8, 49,51,145 Corps, U.S.: 1,40,45; composition, 108,117,125; Joseph T. Dickman, 133,134; Hunter Liggett, 61, 72, 75, 77,125 —H, 72,117 —El, 74; Alfred Bjornstad, 80,129-30; composition, 117; Robert L. Bullard, 124,129-30; John L. Hines, 133,134; Meuse-Argonne, 126 —IV, 70, 72,117,125 —V, 124,125,132,134,139 —VI, 28 Corps-level schools, 43, 81-82 Craig, Malin, 49,77,85,149 Cronkhite, Adelbert, 27,123 Davis, Robert "Corky," 49,51, 65, 66, 143; Adjutant General, AEF, 70,84, 93,117,140; Adjutant General, United States Army, 51, 84,148; assistant to Benjamin Alvord, 8, 51-52; officer evaluations, 69-70,

Index 71; officer reclassification policy, 65,68, 69-70; post-war career, 148; relief of William Sibert, 19-20 Dawes, Charles Gates: W. W. Atterbury, 55-56; General Purchasing Board, 10-11,113,115,144; James G. Harbord, 11; relationship with Pershing, 10, 32, 52, 55, 56,70,76, 111; Leonard Wood, 57 DeWitt, John L., 127-28 Dickman, Theodore, 134,139,147 Divisional level schools, 43 Divisions, U.S.: 1st, 2,20, 25, 27,42, 77,87,117,126; arrives in France, 12; Cantigny, 86-87; Kriemhilde Stellung, 133-34; occupation of Germany, 139; Pershing's attitudes toward, 133; Sedan, 135-36; William Sibert, 18,19, 34; training of, 9,12, 37, 75 —2nd, 20, 25, 27-28,117,126; Belleau Wood, 87,101; James G. Harbord, 23, 87; occupation of Germany, 139; training, 12,40; U.S. Marine Corps Brigade, 87 —3rd, 66, 80, 82, 87,132,143 --1th, 80, 82,109,117,123,128 —5th, 67, 80, 82,133,143 —26th, 20, 25,117,126; Clarence Edwards, 66, 7&-79, 80; Seicheprey, 80; training, 26,40,75 —27th, 63-64, 80, 82,117 —28th, 64-65, 80,102,117,125,132 —29th, 64 —30th, 27, 80, 82,117 —31st, 62 —32nd, 63, 75, 82,126 —33rd, 80, 82,123 —35th, 66, 80,109,117,125,132,135 —37th, 124,132 —41st, 18,61-62, 67, 75,117 —42nd, 25, 43, 70,117,126,133; Hugh Drum, 65; Kriemhilde Stellung, 133; William Mann, 20-21; Charles T. Menoher, 20-21,37,40; occupation of Germany, 139; Sedan, 136; training, 12, 37,40, 75,87

Index

165

—77th, 75,80,82,87,108,117,125 —78th, 80,117 —79th, 124,125,129,131,132 —80th, 27,80,82 —82nd, 80, 82,108,117 —83rd, 117 —89th, 117 —91st, 124-25 —92nd, 70,125 Donovan, William, "Wild Bill," 37,62 Doyen, Charles, 27, 84 Drum, Hugh A., 6, 8,9,12, 34,37,42, 92,143; Chief of Staff, 1st Army, 100-101,127-28,130,134; early career, 127; 42nd Division, 65,127; George C Marshall, 100,127; Meuse-Argonne planning, 127-28, 131-32; Billy Mitchell, 101-2,130; Dennis Nolan, 101-2; post-war career, 149; Sedan, 135-36; support for Pershing, 76,127 Duncan, George B.: commands 82nd Division, 108; commands 77th Division, 80, 84,107; early career, 107; 1st Infantry Division, 78,79, 107; health, 107-8; relationship with Pershing, 18, 80,107-08

Gas Defense School, Langres, 81,117 General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth), 2, 36,92 General Staff College(Langres), 26,43, 50, 83,101, 111, 143,146; allied instructors, 33,36,37,42,97, 111; Alfred Bjornstad, 34-35,37,39, 40-42,50-51; courses: 1st, 35, 3637; 2nd, 39,41-42; 3rd, 72, 82,117; 4th, 82,117,124; Harold Fiske, 39, 83, 111; instructional methodology, 36, 50-51, 82-83; James W. McAndrew, 10,34,35,37,41,42, 82; Paul Malone, 8-9, 32, 34, 39,40, 81, 82; Pershing's support for, 32,34,39, 40, 81, 82; short courses for divisional officers, 37-38 Gievres, 54 Glyn, R.G.C., 97 Goethals, George Washington, 18, 145; Newton Baker, 11S-15; Harbord's views on, 114,147; Peyton March, 147; Pershing refuses service, 113-15,147 Gorrell, Edgar S., 11 Gouraud, Henri, 135 Grant, Walter S., 127

Edwards, Clarence R., 25,34; Newton Baker, 79-80; Robert Bullard, 7980; early career, 80; relationship with Pershing, 79-80; Seicheprey, 80; 26th Division, 26,66,74,78-79, 80 Eltinge, Leroy, 28,49, 85 Ely, Hanson E., 19, 78, 86-87

Hagood, Johnson, 4; W. W. Atterbury, 112; Blois, 66-67; Chief of Staff, Service of Supply, 111, 113,116, 118-19,128,132,144; Commander, Advanced Section, 23; early career, 48-49; James G. Harbord, 23, 85, 113-14,116; George C Marshall, 49, 71; George Van Horn Moseley, 113-14,128,144; relationship with Pershing, 49; reorganization of the AEF Staff (Hagood Board), 49-50, 51 Hann, Willam G., 63,125,126,127 Harbord, James Guthrie, 5, 7,10,18, 141; Chief of Staff, AEF, 24-25,51, 52, 84-85,95; early career, 5,6; Johnson Hagood, 113-14,116; influence on Pershing, 9,19,22,75, 85,114,115,116,143,145-46,147, 148; joins RCA, 148,149; Peyton

Farnsworth, Charles S., 124 Fassett, W. M., 82 Fiske, Harold B., 8,49,143; Base Schools Concept, 81-82; Chief, G-5 Section, 82,84,101,117,140; early career, 83; post-war career, 83-84, 143,146, post-war training, AEF, 82,140; relationship with Pershing, 82, 111; training philosophy, 39, 82 Galvin, J. A., 42

166 March, 23, 25,114; morale questions, 26-27,116,118,144; Dennis Nolan, 93,95; officer reclassification policy, 21,115-16; promotion policies in AEF, 21,118,119; Second Division, 27, 84-S5; selected as Chief, Service of Supply (S.O.S.), 113-14; selected as Chief of Staff, AEF, 5-6; selected as Deputy, Chief of Staff, Army, 148,149 Haskell, William, 136 Hayes, Ralph A., 25 Heintzelman, Stuart, 77,136 Hinds, Ernest, 110,149 Hines, John L., 6, 26, 85; Chief of Staff, Army, 150-51; early relationship with Pershing, 17-18; 1st Infantry Division, 78; 4th Infantry Division, 109,116,123,128-29,131; post-war career, 148,149 Holbrook, Lucius R., 64 Howell, Willey, 100,101-2,127,130 Ireland, Merritte W., 1 Issoudun, 54, 77,140 Jacobs, Michael, 66 Johnson, Evan, 80,108,132 Johnston, John A., 124-25 Judah, Noble B., 102 Keisinger, Benjamin, 35 Kenly, William, 32, 85, 93-94 Kernan, Francis, 5, 23, 55,113 King, Campbell, 78 Kuhn, Joseph, 124,129 Langfitt, William C , 55,57 Lejeune, John A., 84 Lenihan, Michael J., 70-71 Liggett, Hunter, 71; early career, 125; 1st Army, 66,125,130,133,134, 136; 1st Corps, 61, 72, 77,108; relationship with Pershing, 125 McAndrew, James W. "Dad," 10; Chief of Staff, AEF, 82, 84, 99,108;

Index early career, 125; General Staff School, Langres, 34-35, 37, 41, 42 MacArthur, Douglas A., 20, 37, 70 McCleave, Robert, 100,127 McCoy, Frank R, 49 McKinstry, Charles, 55 McMahon, John E., 67-68,133,143 Malone, Paul B., 8, 9-10, 32, 34,40, 41, 49,85 Mann, William, 20-21 March, Peyton C : Newton Baker, 2 3 24,115,145,147-48; Tasker Bliss, 110; Chief of Artillery, AEF, 22-23; Chief of Staff, 28, 71-73,145; deteriorating relations with Pershing, 26, 88,145-46,147; early career, 23; G. W. Goethals, 113-15; James G. Harbord, 110,113-16; John J. Pershing, 3,110,115; personality, 23; post-war career, 148,150; promotion policy, 115,116,145; staff rotation policy, 23-24, 25-26; troop strength, 80, 88,110,112-13,116, 142 Marsching, J. H , 99 Marshall, George C , 49, 71, 78, 92, 128,135,141,143,146 Menoher, Charles T., 19, 20, 70 Millikin, John, 42, 82 Mitchell, William D. "Billy," 31, 77, 101-2 Moore, H. B., 7-8 Morton, Charles G., 64 Moseley, George Van Horn, 113-14 Muir, Charles H , 70,102,125,132,149 Nolan, Dennis, x, 8,18,49, 92,102, 141,146; air intelligence, 9S-94; British Intelligence, 8,11-12, 94, 97; General John Charteris, 11, 94; Arthur Conger, 91, 94,96,101; early career, 7, 92-93; French Intelligence, 8,11-12, 94, 97; James G. Harbord, 93,95; Willey Howell, 100,101-2; intelligence doctrine, 94-96, 97-98,101; Inelligence School, Langres, 43,99-100,101, 124,141; Billy Mitchell, 101-2,130;

Index post-war career, 149,150-51; relationship with Pershing, 91-92, 95, 102; selected as Chief, AEF Intelligence, 7, 92-93; 28th Division, 6465,102,132,143; Work Habits, 84, 96 Nuttman, L. M., 69 Ochs, Adolph A., 35 O'Ryan, John F., 63-64 Palmer, John McAuley, 8, 64,149 Parker, Frank, 78,135 Parker, James, 63 Patrick, Mason, 85-86,149 Patton, George S., 1, 82 Pershing, John J., 43, 72,76, 78; Baker Commission, 8-9; Newton Baker, 2,4, 5, 8, 20, 21, 23, 25,52-53, 81, 86,145,147; Campaign of 1919, 109-10,142,143,144; closes AEF schools, 1 4 0 ^ 1 ; combat doctrine, 13, 33, 111, 134-35,142,143,148; "Corky" Davis, 8, 20, 51-52, 65, 6970,150; Charles Dawes, 10-11, 52, 55,56, 76; early career, vii-viii, 2, 17; 1st Army, 26,32,42, 81, 86,113, 114,116,127,131-32,133; General Staff College, Langres, 32-33, 34, 36, 37,38,39,43,80,141; Goethels affair, 113-15; Johnson Hagood, 48-49,112; James G. Harbord, 3,5, 21, 51,114,115; Mexican Border Operation, vii, 2, 3,31, 92; National Guard, 21, 38, 63-64; officer reclassification policy, 28, 67, 68-69,148; officer selection, 5, 8,9,18, 21, 22, 24, 27, 63,107-8; post-war career, 145,146-47; resists Allied efforts at amalgamation, 42, 75-76,80; se-

167 lected to Command AEF, 2-3; training philosophy, 2,12,43, 8082; Leonard Wood, 52, 57-58, 77 Petain, Marechal Philippe, 12, 76 Pulis, Charles C , 66 Riggs, Kerr T., 101 Robertson, Sir William, 75-76 Roosevelt, Theodore, vii, 2, 58 Scott, Hugh, 2,18, 22, 23, 28 Short, Walter, 84 Sibert, William L., 18-20, 34 Smith, Hamilton, 78 Squier, George O., 4 Stettinius, Edward, 113,115 Summerall, Charles P., 9, 52,147; Cantigny, 86, 87; Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 151; V Corps, 71-72,134, 139; 1st Infantry Division Artillery, 78; Traub, Peter E., 66,109,125,141 van Damen, Ralph H., 100,102-3 Wainwright, Johnathan, 84 Warren, Senator Francis E., 2 Watkins, L. H , 128 Weeks, John W., 150 Wilgus, William J., 53, 56 Wilson, Woodrow, vii, 4,11, 52, 58 Wood, Leonard: activities in Europe, 58, 77; Newton Baker, 58,59; early career, 57-58; Pershing, 52,57,58; Woodrow Wilson, 58

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About the Author JAMES J. COOKE is Professor of History at the University of Mississippi. His most recent books are 100 Miles from Baghdad (1993), The Rainbow Division in the Great War (1994), and The U.S. Air Service in the Great War, 1917-1919 (1996), all published by Praeger.