Perceiving, Imagining, and Being Mistaken M. J. Baker Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 14, No. 4. (Jun., 1954), pp. 520-535. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205%28195406%2914%3A4%3C520%3APIABM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research is currently published by International Phenomenological Society.
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http://www.jstor.org Tue Jul 17 21:39:35 2007
PERCEIVING, IMAGINING, AND BEING MISTAKEN
I think that most of us would agree that we are not mistaken concerning our mode of perceiving an object when we are perceiving it. Nor are we mistaken concerning our mode of perceiving the non-physical effects of objects. And by 'non-physical effects of objects' I mean phenomena such as reflections, e'choes, shadows, rainbows, blue skies, after-images, etc. (In this discussion I shall use 'perceiving objects' in place of 'perceiving objects and their non-physical effects'. What is said regarding perceiving objects is applicable, with the necessary amendments of the text, to the perception of their non-physical effects.) We may mistake non-physical effects for objects, in which case we suffer from illusions; but in no case do we mistake the mode of perceiving. I might say "I thought that I saw the train approaching, but what I saw was something else moving in the far distance near the track"; but not "I thought that I saw the train, but I heard it." If we are speaking sincerely we should not say that we see something when we hear, touch, smell or taste it. The modes of perception are so distinct that even if it is possible to confuse them we do not do so. And apart from a few excepted cases we do not confuse perceiving objects with any other experience. The expected cases are all instances of imagining, and sometimes this is confused with perceiving objects. The extent to which this is possible appears to be limited, first, by the fact that many cases of perceiving objects and imagining are so distinct that we are in very little danger of confusing them; and, secondly, by the fact that a mode of imagining is confused only with its corresponding mode of perceiving objects. Thus I may confuse visually imagining something with seeing something; but not visually imagining with hearing something. Furthermore, although it is common to mistake imagining for perceiving objects, it is seldom the case that we mistake perceiving objects for imagining. Thus it is fairly common for a person to say "I thought that I saw something move, but I was imagining." But not common for someone to say "I thought that I was imagining something moving, but I saw a movement." Often a person says "I thought that I heard a sound, but I was imagining." But not often "I thought that I imagined hearing a sound, but I did hear the noise of something." These facts involve interesting questions concerning the nature of perceiving objects and imagining, and concerning the conditions in which we are liable to be mistaken in these matters and the conditions in which no such liability is present. But before we proceed further let us give examples of cases in which perceiving objects and imagining are not confused and cases in which such confusion may arise. 520
Sometimes when I am observing what is before and around me the content of the experience is so opaque and complete that I cannot avoid believing that I am perceiving objects: no case of imagining is like this. At the same time I may imagine the scene and happenings in another place some miles away. The content of this experience is so tenuous and sketchy, and so much a figment of my thinking and recalling to mind that there seems to be almost no possibility that I am not imagining: so few cases of perceiving objects could be like this. These are the kind of cases in which perceiving objects and imagining seem to be almost as distinct as any two modes of perceiving, and usually we do not confuse one with the other. But there are other cases which lack this distinctness. I may be in bed at night sleeping at least intermittently. At sometime during the night I think that vaguely I see you enter the room, take a book, and go out. If you live in the same building as I do and I do not know whether you are away or not then in the morning I may not be sure whether I dreamed that you entered the room or whether I perceived you. If I find that you are away then I shall conclude that I dreamed that you entered. If you are not away and assert that you entered the room then, most probably, I shall conclude that I perceived you. If you deny that you entered then I may or may not come to this conclusion. Many other examples could be given. Often when we are listening expecting to hear certain sounds of persons or objects, we imagine that we hear someone or something when no-one or anything has emitted noise. And yet we may believe mistakenly that we hear the person or thing we expect to hear. In this discussion I want to consider why the modes of perceiving are not confused and why it is that in some cases we are liable to confuse perceiving objects and imagining while in other cases no such liability is present. Such a consideration may help to illuminate questions concerning the natures of perceiving and imagining. Let us begin by considering the logic of mistakes and confusions. Something correct or incorrect is not so in itself but only in reference, in respect of correctness, to something-else. This something-else and what has this reference to it are facts, or assumed to be, otherwise it would be senseless to say that what has this reference is correct or not. If I say "The object at place X is a dog" and there is no place X and no object and no-one assumes that there is, then it is senseless to describe my statement as either correct or incorrect. But these epithets are rationally applicable if there is a place X and it is true, or assumed to be, that someone makes a statement about it. If I move to the right without an intention or order to go in any particular direction then it is senseless to describe my moving as either correct or incorrect. It becomes rationally describable in this manner if the movement has reference to an intention or order to go in a particular direction. So a necessary condition of something being correct or incorrect
is that it has reference, in respect of correctness, to something-else, and both it and the something-else are facts, or are assumed to be. This is also a sufficient condition for correctness or incorrectness. Let us speak of a fact, or assumed fact, which has reference in respect of correctness, as being a referent; and a fact, or assumed fact, to which it has this reference, as being a referum. Anything rationally claimed to be correct or incorrect is a referent, and all referents are correct or incorrect. Referents are found among statements, thoughts, and acts; and only as referents are they correct or incorrect. (In this discussion I shall use 'statement(~)'in place of 'statement(s), thought(s) or act(s)'. What is contended concerning statements is applicable, with the necessary amendments of the text, to the appropriate classes of thoughts and acts.) A statement which is correct corresponds with its referum. An incorrect statement lacks this correspondence. (Acts correspond by fulfilling or being the means to the fulfilment of an intention or order.) And by 'correspondence' here is meant that what is claimed or implied to be true concerning the referum, is true. Some referent statements do no more than report their refera. "I feel a pain now," said when the speaker feels pain, simply reports its referum. (Moving to the right when no more is intended than to move to the right, directly fulfils its intention.) Such sincere statements have immediate correspondence with their refera: they may be said to have congruent correspondence. To the speakers (or writers) concerned they are therefore known to be correct and not incorrect. Between such statements and their refera there is no gap which will admit the possibility of non-correspondence. Some referent statements do no more than deny their refera. "I feel no pain now," said when the speaker is in pain, simply denies its referum. (Moving to the left when the intention is simply to move to the right and it is known that there is no impediment to moving right, belies the intention.) Such insincere referent statements have an immediate lack of correspondence with their refera. To the speakers concerned they are therefore known to be incorrect and not correct. Between such statements and their refera there is no connection which could introduce a possibility of correspondence. In contrast with these two types of referent statements there is the very large class in which a statement reports its referum, but also does more. "My pain is due to indigestion," said when the speaker is in pain, does more than report the pain: it attributes to it a particular cause. (Some acts refer to an intention, but do not fulfil it directly: they are performed as means to fulfilment.) Such a statement may or may not correspond with its referum: the pain may or may not be caused by indigestion. (An act may or may not be a means to the fulfilment of an intention.) Between
such statements and their refera there is connection, but there is also a gap which admits the possibility of incorrectness. Statements of this class are either correct or incorrect; but investigation is pertinent to the determination of their status. The correctness or incorrectness of these statements may be known, but their correspondence, or lack of it, with their refera is not immediate. When the status of such statements is not known, investigation has to be carried out in order to establish it. Let us call these statements attributing referent statements: the mediation of investigation is pertinent to the establishment of their correctness or incorrectness. Insincere referent statements which deny their refera but also do more, have immediate lack of correspondence with their refera, and to the speakers concerned are known to be incorrect and to have no possibility of being correct. The statement "As I feel no pain now, I am not ill," said when the speaker is in pain, cannot be correct. Such statements, having no connection with their refera, are not attributing and no investigation is pertinent to the establishment of their status. Making a mistake involves more than uttering (or writing, etc.) an incorrect statement: making a correction more than uttering a correct statement. A mistake is made when a statement is uttered which is believed, perhaps only tentatively, to be correct when it is incorrect. Thus mistakes can be made only within the class of incorrect attributing referent statements. A statement not a referent cannot be either correct or incorrect, and so cannot be believed to be correct when it is incorrect. A referent statement not attributing cannot be mistaken as its correspondence, or lack of it, with its referum is immediate, and so its correctness or incorrectness is known to the utterer of it. No mistake is made when a correct attributing statement is uttered even if the belief that it is correct is at the time only tentative and not established, since no investigation will show the statement to be incorrect. No mistake is made when an incorrect attributing statement is uttered by someone who knows that it is incorrect, as such a statement is not uttered in the belief that it is correct. If I say "The moon is made of cheese" then I do not make a mistake although I may lead otheqs to do so. Mistakes are a sub-class of incorrect attributing statements. A correction is made only when a correct statement is uttered as a substitution for a mistake. Uttering a statement such as "5 7 = 12" is not making a correction unless this is done to replace a statement such as "5 $ 7 = 13." Corrections are a sub-class of correct statements. A mistaken statement claims to be correct and it is its attribution to its referum which is in error. I t thus demands a statement of its own type as its correction. The mistaken statement "My pain is due to indigestion" is not corrected by an utterance such as "I feel pain now." "5 f 7 = 13" is not
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corrected by "5 is to be added to 7." As mistakes are all attributing statements so all corrections belong to this class. Even if the correction of the first statement is "My pain is momentary and has no physical basis" this does more than report its referum and is an attributing statement. So only attributing referent statements can have the relationship of mistake and correction. The correction of a mistake is correct with reference to the same referum as the mistake which it corrects: otherwise it would not be a correction of the mistake. '13' in "5 7 = 13" is mistaken only if it is known, or assumed, that 5 and 7 are to be added; and 12 is correct only if it has reference to the addition of 5 and 7. The correct statement "My pain is due to appendicitis" corrects "My pain is due t o indigestion" only if both statements refer to the same pain. This necessary reference to a common referum for the relationship of mistake and correction is not affected by the fact that investigations which involve factors other than the common referum are pertinent to the establishment of the mistakeness or correctness of attributing statements. Reference to addition tables and doctors may be necessary to establish that 5 7 = 12 or that pain is due to appendicitis. So whenever it is possible for two statements to have the relationship of mistake and correction then it is possible for both to have reference, in respect of correctness, to a common referum. A further condition for the relationship of mistake and correction is that any such pair of statements be incompatible with one another. The mistaken statement "The object at place X is a dog" is not corrected by the correct statement "The object at place X is an animal." Substituting 'cat' for 'dog' might correct it. A mistaken statement requires a correction of the same type, and as one is incorrect and the other correct they have characteristics which are incompatible when they have reference in the same manner to a common referum. In order that two statements may have the relationship of mistake and correction it is necessary that they are referents with a common referum, are attributing and incompatible. Statements not satisfying these conditions are excluded from the possibility of the relationship of mistake and correction. Attributing referent statements attribute something indicated by their subject, object or complement, to a referum. (Attributing acts attribute instruments as means to the fulfilment of intentions or orders.) What is attributed to a referum may be called an attributed subject. (I shall use 'subject' in place of 'subject, object or complement'.) Only that which may be a subject of attributing referent statements is attributable. When the utterance of an incorrect statement makes a mistake its attributed subject is confused with the attributed subject of the correct statement
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which, if it were uttered, would correct the mistake. If the cat is at place X then the mistaken statement "The dog is at place X" confuses the cat with the dog. For something to be confused with something-else is for it to be the attributed subject of a statement which makes a mistake or of the statement which would correct it. Confusion of subjects occurs only when mistakes are made. When the mistaken nature of a statement is known then no confusion of its attributed subject with others occurs. If I say "Pillarboxes in England are blue" then I do not confuse red with blue. Only someone believing the statement to be correct confuses the two colors. Confusion of subjects is possible only when they may be the attributed subjects of statements which may have the relationship of mistake and correction. Confusable subjects are a sub-class of the possible subjects of attributing referent statements. Only attributable subjects may be confused. Stated summarily my contentions are as follows: 1. X may be correct or incorrect only if it is a referent. 2. Referents are found among statements, thoughts and acts. 3. X is correct only if it is a referent and corresponds with its referum. 4. X is incorrect only if it is a referent and lacks correspondence with its referum. 5. If X is a referent and has immediate correspondence with its referum then it is known to be correct and not incorrect. 6. If X is a referent and has immediate lack of correspondence with its referum then it is known to be incorrect and not correct. 7. If X is an attributing referent then it may not be known whether it is correct or incorrect. 8. Mistakes are made only when there is an occurrence of an incorrect attributing referent which is believed to be correct. Mistakes are a sub-class of incorrect attributing referents. 9. Corrections are made only when there is an occurrence of a correct attributing referent as a substitution for a mistake. Corrections are a sub-class of correct attributing referents. 10. The correction of a mistake is the same type of referent as the mistake. 11. Only attributing referents can have the relationship of mistake and correction. 12. A mistake and its correction have a common referum. 13. Mistakes and corrections are incompatible. 14. When a referent makes a mistake its attributed subject is confused with the attributed subject of the referent which could be its correction. 15. When the mistakeness of a referent is known no confusion of attrib-
uted subjects occurs. Confusion occurs only when an incorrect attributing referent is believed to be correct. 16. Only attributed subjects of incompatible attributing referents having a common referum can be confused.
The important implications of these contentions are:
1. If a referent is not incorrect and attributing then it cannot be mistaken. 2. If subjects may not be attributed subjects of incompatible attributing referents then they cannot be confused. Let us consider a little further this relationship of mistake and correction. When a statement is correct it corresponds with its referum and there can be no incompatibility between it and this referum. '5 7 = 12' is a correct statement and there is no incompatibility between it and the addition of 5 and 7 or between it and the additions which equal 12. 'Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo' is a correct statement and there is no incompatibility between it and the accepted beliefs of what happened in 1815. And between a correct statement and its referum no incompatibility can be introduced legitimately by a consideration of further factors: its correspondence with its referum cannot be disturbed. No further consideration of the rules of 7 = 12' and its addition will introduce an incompatibility between '5 referum. If Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo then no further investigation into the happenings in that battle will introduce incompatibilities between the statement and the accepted beliefs in reference to which it is correct. So we may note that correspondence, in the sense in which we deal with it here, involves perfect compatibility between referent and referum: that is, not only is there no incompatibility between what is correct and its referum, but none can be introduced legitimately by a consideration of other factors. When a statement is mistaken it may be incompatible with 7 = 13' is incompatible with the addition of 5 and 7. its referum. '5 Whoever makes this mistake makes it because for some reason-lack of familiarity with the addition of figures, or inattentiveness, etc.-this incompatibility is not noticed. But a mistake may be compatible with its referum. The statement 'Napoleon won at Waterloo' may be compatible with a certain selected set of accepted beliefs concerning what happened in the battle. But although there is compatibility there is not correspondence and perfect compatibility. For if other accepted beliefs are considered then an incompatibility is introduced. Anyone uttering this mistaken statement may do so through lack of sufficient evidence or through improper appraisal of the evidence. I may hear the opening notes of a tune and say that tune T is being played. The beginning of the tune may be compatible with the notes which I hear. But there may not be perfect compatibility: I may be mistaken. For the following notes may be unexpected, and I may find that it is tune U which is being played.
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So that which is correct is perfectly compatible with its referum. But what is mistaken may be compatible or incompatible; but it never corresponds with its referum-if it did it would not be mistaken. When a mistake is compatible with its referum then it is readily understandable how it may occur and so confuse one subject with another: its lack of perfect compatibility is not apparent-further considerations have to be introduced before this can be noticed. But if a mistake may be incompatible with its referum then it would appear to be possible for any two attributing referent statements, provided that they are incompatible, to have the relationship of mistake and correction, and, consequently, for any two of their attributed subjects, however distinct, to be confused: all that is necessary is that the incompatibility of the mistaken statement with its referum is not noticed. Is this conclusion and the others which we have stated, consistent with our contention that some subjects-modes of perceiving objects and certain cases of perceiving objects and imagining-are not confused? In some cases the incompatibility of a statement and its attributed subject with a referum is apparent at least to some observers, and when this is so the incorrectness of the statement is evident: no mistake is made and no confusion of subjects occurs. So in these cases certain observers will not confuse subjects which may be confused by others who are not aware of the incompatibility of the statement and attributed subject with the referum. But although certain subjects may not be confused by some observers when a particular referum is involved, these observers may be liable to confuse these subjects when the referum is different; for in these cases no incompatibility may be noticed. Such circumstances prevent confusions only in certain special cases. What we need to find are the conditions in which certain subjects are never confused or have almost no possibility of being confused. In cases of perceiving objects there are always involved what I will call, non-committally, sense-qualities. Seeing is always visual, hearing always auditory, etc. The sense-qualities of seeing are colors and shapes, of hearing sounds, of smelling-smells, etc. The type of sense-qualitiesdetermines the mode of perceiving and as one type is not confused with another, modes of perceiving are not confused. What account can be given of this? The non-mistakable natures of modes of perceiving is due to the fact that sense-qualities, when they occur as items in an observer's perceptual experience, are not, in respect of the experience, attributable subjects-they may be employed only as refera. Sense-qualities are involved necessarily as factors in an observer's experience, and while he may employ them as refera and attribute other subjects to them, he cannot attribute them to his experience. To attempt to do this is simply to report them, and reporting sense-qualities as factors in an experience is not attributing something to the experience.
As the sense-qualities of an observer's perceptual experience are not, in respect of that particular experience, attributable subjects, he cannot be mistaken concerning their nature. And as the type of sense-qualities occurring is as much a factor of the experience as the nature, he cannot be mistaken concerning the type; and so cannot be mistaken concerning his mode of perceiving. He may report or deny the sense-qualities of his perceptual experience; but in this he will not be mistaken. Statements such as "Blue shapes occur for me now" are not attributing and admit no possibility of mistakes. This possibility is admitted only if the observer attributes something to his experience. It may be thought that the non-mistakable nature of types of sensequalities is due to the fact that the occurrence of each particular type involves the employment of a distinct sense-organ: seeing uses eyes, hearing --ears, etc. But such employment is not essential, and statements concerning the use of sense-organs are attributing and so liable to be mistaken. The nature of the sense-qualities determines the mode of perceiving, not the sense-organs employed. Blind men fail to see ultimately not because of impairment of the functioning of their eyes but because in their experience there are no visual sense-qualities. It may be contended that the non-mistakable nature of modes of perceiving is due to self-evident incompatibilities between these modes. But irrespective of whether or not their differences are self-evident, no observer could confuse them in his experience, as here they are not attributable subjects. Concerning another person's perceiving we may confuse the modes involved. This account of the non-mistakable nature of modes of perceiving objects admits the fact that often we are mistaken concerning the objects which we perceive. Sincere statements reporting the perception of objects, such as "I see a dog" do more than report a current occurrence of sense-qualities: they attribute the physical being of objects to the occurring sense-qualities and imply possible further occurrences. (Statements claiming to perceive the non-physical effects of objects attribute physical being as the cause of the effects.) So in this respect they are attributing and may be mistaken in their claim to perceive a particular object. The correctness or mistakenness of these statements is determined by noticing what further sense-qualities do occur. But these statements contain an indication of the type of sensequalities occurring-in the example given this is the 'I see'-and as this part of the statement is nothing more than a report of the type of sensequalities occurring, it is not attributing and cannot be mistaken. But the claim to see a dog is attributing. Dogs, cats and other objects are attributable subjects, and concerning the perception of these an observer may be mistaken. So while we may be mistaken concerning what subjects we perceive we are not mistaken concerning how we perceive them.
How is it that this impossibility of confusing modes of perceiving is consistent with the fact that in some instances we are liable to confuse perceiving objects and imagining while in others such confusion seems to be either not possible a t all or very unlikely? For it may appear that our account of the possibilities of being mistaken is too stringent, since the manner in which it disallows the possibility of modes of perceiving being confused seems to exclude the possibility that they, as experiences of an observer, may be confused with anything-else. I think that the first point to notice is that the modes of imagining are not confused. We do not say "I thought that I imagined I saw a dog, but I imagined I heard it." Secondly we should notice that among the modes of imagining are modes agreeing with those of perceiving objects-we imagine that we see, hear, touch, smell or taste. We may call these the perceptual modes of imagining. And it is with corresponding perceptual modes that these may be confused. To account for this possibility of confusion our discussion of mistakes and confusions might lead us to search for a common referum distinct from both perceiving and imagining, to which, on some occasions, both could have attributed reference, thus admitting the possibility of their being confused. But such a search would be fruitless. For if I claim sincerely to see something then my claim has a basis; and the basis is the occurrence for me of visual sense-qualities. And although the physical being of objects is attributable to sense-qualities, these, as items in an observer's experience, are not themselves attributable: perceiving-as an observer's experience-is not an attributable subject. So let us turn our attention to cases of imagining. What is the basis of a sincere claim to imagine in a particular mode? Why do I say on certain occasions that I imagine I see rather than I imagine I hear, or smell, etc.? I think that it will be found that the correct answer to this question is that the basis of the modes of imagining which agree with those of perceiving objects is the occurrence of sense-qualities. That this is so seems to be readily apparent in some forms of imagining although in others much more doubt may at first be entertained. But any other view of the basis of claims to imagine meets with many difficulties. It may be contended that imagining is primarily a contemplating activity rather than a passive experience, and that often it has perceptual experiences as its object. Being an activity, persons indulging in it will know what its object is on any particular occasion. Imagining, according to this view, does not have qualities although these will be possessed by what is imagined. But if this is so, how is it that imagining may be confused with perceiving objects? What are the common refera involved? It may be contended that imagining has qualities, but these are not sense-qualities. If this is so, why do we claim to imagine we see, hear, etc.? Why does imagining invade the realm of perceiving? If the qualities of perceiving
objects and imagining, in the modes which we are considering, are distinct in kind, what common refera can be found to account for their being confused sometimes?Accepting the view that, in its perceptual modes, imagining has sense-qualities, accounts for the fact that we claim to imagine we see, hear, etc. It also provides common refera for the corresponding modes of perceiving objects and imagining and so admits the possibility of confusion occurring. So let us consider what account, according to this view, can be given of the distinction between imagining and perceiving objects. The basis of a claim to perceive an object is that sense-qualities occur. The claim attributes the physical being of an object to these sense-qualities, and this involves expectations that in specified conditions certain other sense-qualities would occur. According to whether the involved expectations are confirmed or falsified, so the claim is regarded as being established or is found to be mistaken. If it is mistaken then it may be thought to be corrected by a claim to perceive another object or by a claim to have imagined. The basis of a claim to imagine is that sense-qualities occur. The claim attributes the mental state of the observer as the cause of these sensequalities and involves no expectation of the further occurrence of particular sense-qualities except to exclude the occurrence of those which together with those occurring would be regarded as sufficient to establish a claim to perceive an object. (Or its non-physical effects.) As the sense-qualities occurring are such that an attribution of the physical being of an object is rejected it is unlikely that further sense-qualities will form with them a series regarded asl sufficient to establish a claim to perceive an object. According to whether the excluded expectations of the claim to imagine are falsified or confirmed so it is regarded as established or is found to be mistaken. If it is mistaken then it may be thought to be corrected by a claim to perceive an object. Certain conclusions follow from these two contentions. When there is s claim to perceive an object then only certain series of further sense-qualities are compatible with this claim. If other series occur then the claim is mistaken. The other series occurring may be compatible with the perception of other objects or with imagining. Thus the possibility of perceiving another object or of imagining may reveal that a claim to perceive an object is mistaken. When there is a claim to imagine then any series of further sense-qualities is compatible with the claim except those which with those occurring would form a series which would be regarded as sufficient to establish a claim to perceive an object. Such occurrences are unlikely. And these conclusions agree with our experience. We often find that we think that we mistake one object for another or mistake imagining for
perceiving an object. But it is less common to think that we mistake perceiving an object for imagining. Only rarely do we say "I thought I imagined I was seeing the dog, but I saw it." And we do not find ourselves thinking that we mistake one case of imagining for another. We do not say "I thought I imagined I was seeing the dog, but I imagined I was seeing the cat." The admission that sense-qualities are the basis and refera of claims to imagine as well as of claims to perceive objects allows that confusions may occur in making these claims, as sometimes it does. In another discussion I have contended that the appearance of visual sense-qualities is a necessary and sufficient condition of seeing. Without visual sense-qualities no-one sees; but anyone to whom they do appear does see. If visual sense-qualities began to appear in the experience of a blind man then we should say that he had begun to see. I have contended that there is only one sense of 'see' and that the term is used in such statements as "I see a dog" in a non-strict manner: the strict use occurs in statements such as "I see colors and shapes." These contentions can be extended to apply to all types of sensequalities so that all cases of the appearance of sense-qualities are cases of perceiving. According to this view, imagining, in its perceptual modes, is based upon perceiving and perceptual verbs will be applicable to it. The person who claims that when he imagines visually then he sees something is making a correct claim. These contentions are supported by what we have said here concerning the attributing nature of statements claiming to perceive objects or to imagine. When I claim to see an object the basis and referum of the claim is the appearance of visual sense-qualities-colors and shapes. This claim does more than report its referum. It is established not by the appearance of physical being, but by the occurrence of particular further sense-qualities. Thus an established claim to see an object has correspondence with its referum; but it does not have congruent correspondence with it-it does not simply report it. When I say sincerely "I see blue shapes" I do see blue shapes: blue shapes appear in my experience, and my statement is strictly used. When I say "I see an object" no physical being appears in my experience and my statement is a non-strict use. If physical being appeared my statement would not be attributing and would not be liable to be mistaken. If the 'see' of 'see an object' were a second sense of the term this would be a sense in which the appearance of what is seen is not a necessary condition of its being seen. Attributing statements make claims. But when the claims are established the attributing nature remains and non-strict uses of terms are involved. If establishing a perceptual claim produced congruent correspondence between the claim-making statement and its referum the statement would lose its attributing nature and its
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PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGIC~~L RESEARCH
liability to be mistaken. Perceiving objects, if it occurred, would be perceiving sense-qualities and perceiving them sense-qualities of objects. Perceptual imagining, if it occurred, would be perceiving sense-qualities and perceiving them caused by the observer's mental state. Perceiving objects and perceptual imagining would be forms of perceiving. But these forms do not occur. Sense-qualities occur in our perceptual experience; but their being of objects or their being caused by mental states does not appear: this we attribute to them. So the phrase 'perceiving an object' and the term 'imagine' as we employ them are non-strict uses. (I shall continue this practice.) The use is to make claims. The claims are regarded as being established or found to be mistaken; but their attributing nature and nonstrict use remains. So far in this discussion I have spoken of perceptual imagining without distinguishing its various forms. I have spoken of its perceptual modes and have claimed that it is based upon perceiving and that the every day use of the term 'imagining' is non-strict. I t is now desirable to distinguish certain forms of imagining. Suffering from hallucinations is often admitted to be one form, and when this is so the sufferer's mental state is attributed as the cause of the hallucinatory appearances. In this form sense-qualities occur and the observer is very liable to confuse them with sense-qualities of perceiving objects. Usually they are caused by the unconscious operation of the observer's hopes, wishes, fears, etc. Dreaming is often admitted to be a form of imagining and the observer's mental state attributed as the cause of the dream. This form may be described as suffering from hallucinations during sleep. While he sleeps the observer usually is deceived by the sense-qualities occurring; but, in most cases, readily recognizes his mistake when he awakes. The unconscious operation of hopes, wishes, fears, etc., is usually the cause of the sense-qualities occurring. Very frequently perceptual imagining occurs as an effect of thinking. When the objects of our thinking are things which have been, or may be, perceived, sense-qualities may be produced. Unless our hopes, wishes, fears, etc., are involved, these sense-qualities are usually of a very tenuous and sketchy nature. The thinker is not likely to be deceived by them. Thus when I think of the scene in Trafalgar Square, very often I imagine in a very sketchy manner the monuments, buildings, people, and traffic; but I am not likely to mistake them for perceiving. Perceptual imagining may arise from our thinking; but it may occur in our recalling to mind past perceptions. (Our purpose in this may be to contemplate possible future perceptions.) I may recall to mind the scene in Trafalgar Square. Again sense-qualities, usually of a very tenuous and sketchy nature, are produced. This imagining may stimulate my thinking and lead me to think about the square and what is seen there.
Both of these forms of imagining may be called imagining proper, as the sense-qualities in one case arise from our recalling to mind past perceptions, and in the other they arise from our thinking about what has been, or may be, perceived. Thus we tend to think of imagining proper as an activity rather than as an experience. Thinking and imagining are closely allied. Some imagining accompanies most of our thinking, and most imagining stimulates some thought. It is very common for the term 'imagining' to be used t o denote both thinking and imagining when they occur together. When the emphasis of the occurrence is upon noting conclusions from our thinking and imagining, we speak of thinking; but when it is more upon contemplating what we imagine and think about, we speak of imagining. Thus I may say when I am thinking about the scene in Trafalgar Square that I am imagining. Most cases of confusion between perceiving objects and imagining involve cases of suffering from hallucinations or dreaming: confusion between perceiving objects and imagining proper is unlikely to occur. As imagining proper results either from our thinking or our recalling to mind, it is, in certain respects, pointless to ask an observer to observe or inspect the sensequalities of his imagining: what he thinks about or recalls he knows in the acts of thinking or recalling. We should now be in a position to attempt to discuss our remaining question. It is that of why in some instances there seems to be almost no possibility of confusing perceiving objects with imagining. Yet statements claiming to perceive objects or to imagine are attributing referents and may have common refera in sense-qualities: also they are incompatible. They satisfy the conditions for the confusion of their attributed subjects and sometimes this does occur. The cases which involve no confusion appear to be of the type in which the incompatibility of mistaken statements with their refera is evident to most persons. In every branch of knowledge certain persons well-informed and experienced concerning that particular subject are not liable to make mistakes which less informed and experienced persons may make: they notice incompatibilites not noticed by others. Few persons make mistakes in adding 2 and 2, and it may be forgotten that answers to such tasks are attributing referents and that there is a possibility of mistakes being made: that this is so is revealed when children first begin to add small numbers. In the matters of perceiving objects and imagining most of us are sufficiently experienced to avoid certain confusions. What is the ground of this avoidance? In the kind of perceiving objects in which there seems to be no possibility of confusion with imagining the sense-qualities have a high degree of opaqueness and completeness. By opaqueness of a sense-quality is meant here the characteristic of excluding others of its own kind from the place
where it appears. Thus an opaque color excludes other colors from the place where it appears; an opaque sound excludes other sounds from the place from which it emanates; an opaque smell excludes other smells. By completeness of a sense-quality is meant here the characteristic of being just what it is as distinct from being an outline or sketch and suggesting more than is present. These characteristics belong to sense-qualities as refera and concerning them we are not mistaken. When sense-qualities occur having these qualities in a high degree then their incompatibility, as refera, with statements claiming that the observer is imagining is evident to most observers. The sense-qualities of imagining do not attain this high degree of these characteristics, and confusion of some cases of perceiving objects and imagining does not occur. The cases of imagining in which there seems to be almost no possibility of confusion with perceiving objects are usually, and perhaps exclusively, cases of imagining proper; and in these the sense-qualitieshave a very low degree of opaqueness and completeness. They are very tenuous and sketchy and suggest more than they are themselves. In these cases the sensequalities are dependent either upon the thinking of the observer or his recalling to mind, and the observer knows that he is thinking or recalling and what sense-qualities are likely to be produced. Dependence upon the thinking or recalling of the observer is not a characteristic of sense-qualities; but when the conditions for this dependence occur in an observer's experience they are apparent to him. When sense-qualities occur having only a, very low degree of opaqueness and completeness and the conditions for their dependence upon the thinking or recalling of the observer are apparent then the high probability of their being incompatible, as refera, with claims that the observer is perceiving objects is evident to most observers. And so confusion of some cases of imagining with perceiving objects is very unlikely to occur. But there remains a number of cases in which sense-qualities have a moderate or low degree of opaqueness and completeness and either the observer is not thinking or recalling in a manner which might produce these or if he is, the degree of opaqueness and completeness is such that it casts doubt upon the dependence of the sense-qualities upon him. In these cases confusion may occur. In cases of hallucinations and dreams the sensequalities may have a considerable degree of opaqueness and completeness, and here no thinking or recalling to mind accompanies their occurrence. Observers do not confuse the modes of perceiving objects and imagining as the logic of mistakes and confusions excludes this possibility. They avoid confusion of some cases of perceiving objects and imagining not because this is impossible but because it is a matter of the recognition of incompatibilities, or high probability of incompatibilities, between some sense-
qualities, as refera, and some claims to perceive objects or to imagine. Some cases of perceiving objects have sense-qualities with a high degree of opaqueness and completeness which is not attained by the sense-qualities of imagining. The sense-qualities of many cases of imagining have a low degree of opaqueness and completeness seldom occurring in those of perceiving objects, and in cases of imagining proper they are accompanied by thinking or recalling which might have produced them. The coincidence of these two conditions usually occurs only in cases of imagining proper; but it may occur occasionally in the perception of objects. Our thinking may have the form of hoping to hear the sounds of certain objects, and when we listen we may be doubtful whether certain audible sense-qualities are or are not dependent upon our hoping. I have now dealt with the questions which were raised at the beginning of this discussion and have advanced certain contentions concerning them. If my contentions are correct then not only is it the case that the modes of perceiving are not confused, but this cannot happen. And as claims to perceive objects and to imagine have a common basis in the perception of sense-qualities, confusion may, and does, occur in the making of these claims, although differences in the opaqueness and completeness of sensequalities and the accompaniment or absence of certain types of thinking or recalling prevents, or renders very unlikely, confusion in some cases.
M. J. BAKER.
