Pensamiento, Vol. 64, num. 242 (Special Series No. 2 - ''Science, Philosophy and Religion'')

serie especial núm. 2 (2008) PENSAMIENTO Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica CIENCIA, FILOSOFÍA Y RELIGI...

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serie especial núm. 2 (2008)

PENSAMIENTO Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica

CIENCIA, FILOSOFÍA Y RELIGIÓN Serie Especial

vol. 64 • núm. 242

EDITORIAL The contribution of science/philosophy/religion dialogue to transdisciplinary and inter-confessional approaches towards a better society. 579-590 ARTÍCULOS

ROBERTO POLI SUSUMU SHIMAZONO

Person and Value ..........................................

PIOTR BYLICA y DARIUSZ SAGAN

God, Design, and Naturalism: Implications of Methodological Naturalism in Science for Science-Religion Relation ..........

621-638

Mathematics, Reason & Religion ...............

639-663

Some Relational Theories on the Structure of Space-Time: Physics, Philosophy, Theology ...................................................

665-691

Quantum Neurology: A Key Within Physics Toward the Knowledge of the Consciousness? ...............................................

693-713

Physics, Consciousness and Transcendence: The Physics of Roger Penrose and David Bohm as Regards a Scientific Explanation of the Human Mind Open to Reality ........................................

715-739

PENSAMIENTO

JAVIER LEACH MIGUEL LORENTE PÁRAMO FERNANDO LÓPEZ AGUILAR MANUEL BÉJAR GALLEGO

591-602

Individualization of Society and Religionization of Individuals: Resacralization in Postmodernity (Second Modernity) ..... 603-619

(El índice sigue en la tercera página de cubierta — The Index continues in the inside of the back cover)

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Vol. 64, núm. 242, serie especial núm. 2 (2008), págs. 577-1136, ISSN 0031-4749 Número publicado en julio de 2008

vol. 64 • núm. 242

serie especial n.º 2 (2008)

(Viene de la cubierta.)

EDICIÓN Y ADMINISTRACIÓN EDICIÓN Y ADMINISTRACIÓN (suscripciones, pedidos, pagos, giros, etc.): PENSAMIENTO. Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad Pontificia Comillas. C/ Universidad Comillas, 3.—28049 Madrid. Teléfono: 91 734 39 50. Fax: 91 734 45 70. E-mail: [email protected]. Hay un formulario de suscripción en la página web. Talones y giros postales deben dirigirse a: PENSAMIENTO. Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad Pontificia Comillas. C/ Universidad Comillas, 3.—28049 Madrid. Transferencias bancarias a: PENSAMIENTO. Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad Pontificia Comillas, en: CAJA MADRID, C/ Blasco de Garay, 38.—28015 Madrid. C.C.: 2038-1760-89-6000482372. Código IBAN: ES56-2038-1760-8960-0048-2372. Código SWIFT: CAHMESMM. SUSCRIPCIÓN.—Precios para el año 2008 (impuestos y transportes incluidos): SUSCRIPCIÓN ANUAL: España: 33,00 €, 31,73 sin IVA.—Europa: 62,50 €, 60,10 sin IVA.—Iberoamérica y África: 70,00 €.—Otros países: 76,00 €. NÚMERO SUELTO: España: 13,40 €, 13,93 con IVA.—Europa: 22,70 €, 23,60 con IVA.—Iberoamérica y África: 26,00 €.—Otros países: 26,00 €. LIBROS PARA RECENSIÓN.—Deben remitirse al Coordinador de Crítica de Libros, Ricardo Pinilla Burgos. C/ Universidad Comillas, 3.—28049 Madrid. MANUSCRITOS.—Deben remitirse al Director.

IGNACIO NÚÑEZ DE CASTRO

Génesis de la vida desde la dinámica procesual de la materia .......................

741-770

JOAN BERTRÁN

A Darwinian Process: The Molecular Evolution of Enzymes ..........................

771-782

Teología de la evolución (II): La llamada creadora trinitaria. Karl SchmitzMoormann, 1997 ...................................

783-814

Alfred N. Whitehead on Process Philosophy and Theology: Cosmos and Kenosis of Divinity .....................................

815-845

Los orígenes del materialismo en India y Grecia: similitudes y diferencias ........

847-864

MANUEL G. DONCEL JAVIER MONSERRAT MARTÍN SEVILLA RODRÍGUEZ

ALFONSO GÓMEZ FERNÁNDEZ Nagarjuna y la dialéctica del origen condicionado ...............................................

JUAN MASIÁ y MOE KUWANO El retorno a la unidad cuerpo-mente. EnMANUEL CABADA CASTRO

RESERVADOS LOS DERECHOS DE PROPIEDAD LITERARIA

GAMAL ABDEL-KARIM ÓSCAR CASTRO GARCÍA

Queda prohibida la reproducción total o parcial de esta revista por cualquier procedimiento, sin permiso escrito de la Editorial

cuentro de ascesis, terapia y filosofía en Japón ................................................

889-902

Infinitud divina y visión mística en Nicolás de Cusa ............................................

903-930

El sufismo y el Islam ..................................

931-946

El «yo» interior. Reflexiones transdisciplinares sobre la experiencia de lo numinoso ...................................................

947-985

ESTUDIOS, NOTAS, TEXTOS Y COMENTARIOS

IVÁN ORTEGA RODRÍGUEZ

Este número especial de PENSAMIENTO se publica en colaboración con la Cátedra CTR, dentro del Programa Ciencia, Tecnología y Ética-Social, de la Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingeniería (ICAI) de la Universidad Comillas Madrid y en desarrollo del Proyecto Sophia Iberia in Europe

865-887

The Relevance of Jan Patocˇka’s Phenomenology in Questions of Science and Religion ..........................................

987-1001

JOSEP PUIG MONTADA

Farah. Ant.uˆn: Active Reception of European Thought ........................................ 1003-1024

J. SERAFÍN BÉJAR BACAS

Cristianismo, Islam e Ilustración. A propósito del discurso de Benedicto XVI en la Universidad de Ratisbona ......... 1025-1042

JESÚS ROMERO MOÑIVAS

La reformulación de la dogmática teológica desde la metafísica del devenir .. 1043-1086 PERFILES EN CIENCIA Y RELIGIÓN

JAVIER MONSERRAT

Mathematical Models Beyond Space and Time: Michael Heller Reflects on the ‘Big Questions’ of Cosmology ...... 1087-1092 (El índice continúa en la pág. 1136)

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PENSAMIENTO REVISTA CUATRIMESTRAL DE INVESTIGACIÓN E INFORMACIÓN FILOSÓFICA, PUBLICADA POR LAS FACULTADES DE FILOSOFÍA DE LA COMPAÑÍA DE JESÚS EN ESPAÑA

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PENSAMIENTO Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica www.upco.es/revistas/pensamiento

DIRECTOR: Javier Monserrat. C/ Universidad Comillas, 3.—28049 Madrid. Teléfono: 91 540 61 98. E-mail: [email protected] CONSEJO DE REDACCIÓN: Juan Manuel Almarza (Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao), Carlos Beorlegui (Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao), Alfonso Drake Diez de Rivera (Universidad Comillas, Madrid), Josep M.ª Coll (Universitat Ramon Llull, Barcelona), Miguel García-Baró (Universidad Comillas, Madrid), Leandro Sequeiros (Facultad de Teología, Granada). SECRETARIO DE REDACCIÓN (en funciones): Alfonso Drake Diez de Rivera. Teléfono: 91 734 39 50, ext. 25 62. E-mail: [email protected]. C/ Universidad Comillas, 3.—28049 Madrid. BIBLIOGRAFÍA Y CRÍTICA DE LIBROS: Ricardo Pinilla Burgos. Teléfono: 91 734 39 50, ext. 25 62. E-mail: [email protected]. Envío de libros para recensión a: Ricardo Pinilla Burgos. C/ Universidad Comillas, 3.—28049 Madrid.

CONSEJO ASESOR Juan Antonio Estrada (Universidad de Granada). Pedro Cerezo Galán (Universidad de Granada). Juan Carlos Scannone (Universidad de El Salvador, Buenos Aires). Raúl Fornet-Betancourt (Universidad de Aachen, Bremen). Mauricio Beuchot (Universidad Autónoma de México). Rudolf Bernet (Universidad de Lovaina). Laszlo Tengelyi (Universidad de Wupperthal). Salvi Turró (Universidad de Barcelona). Gabriel Amengual (Universidad de las Islas Baleares). Manuel García Doncel (Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona). José Gómez Caffarena (Universidad de Comillas). Joao José Miranda Vila-Cha (Universidade Católica Portuguesa). Alberto Rosa Rivero (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid). Amalio Blanco Abarca (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid). Jesús Conill (Universidad de Valencia). Pedro Gómez García (Universidad de Granada). Manuel Cabada Castro (Universidad Complutense, Madrid). Adela Cortina (Universidad de Valencia). Juan Arana (Universidad de Sevilla). Pascual Martínez-Freire (Universidad de Málaga). Juan Miguel Palacios (Universidad Complutense, Madrid). Antonio Pintor Ramos (Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca). Víctor Gómez Pin (Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona). Francesc Torralba (Universitat Ramon Llull, Barcelona). Carlos Alonso Bedate (Centro Biología Molecular, CSIC, Madrid). José María Guibert (Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao). Ana Rioja (Universidad Complutense, Madrid). Rafael Ramón (Universidad Complutense, Madrid)

ISSN 0031-4749 Depósito legal: M. 919-1958 PENSAMIENTO es editado y administrado por el Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad Comillas, Madrid ORMAG ([email protected]) • Avda. de la Industria, 8. Nave 28 • Tel. 91 661 78 58 • 28108 Alcobendas (Madrid)

EDITORIAL

THE CONTRIBUTION OF SCIENCE/PHILOSOPHY/RELIGION DIALOGUE TO TRANSDISCIPLINARY AND INTER-CONFESSIONAL APPROACHES TOWARDS A BETTER SOCIETY Dr. Eric L. Weislogel Executive Director & Vice-president of the Metanexus Institute for Science and Religion, Philadelphia

T

he publication of the second issue in the special series «Ciencia, Filosofía y Religión» (Science, Philosophy & Religion) of the PENSAMIENTO magazine (July 2008) coincides with the Metanexus World Conference 2008 to be held in Madrid at the Universidad Pontificia Comillas. This event is the reason for this second issue in the series being devoted to the Metanexus Institute. But if we focus on our magazine’s objectives —and in particular the «Ciencia, Filosofía y Religión» (Science, Philosophy & Religion) series—, as well as the Science, Technology and Religion chair within the Sophia Iberia project funded by the Templeton Foundation and the Science, Technology and Social Ethics programme at the Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingeniería at U.P. Comillas, there is an obvious alignment with the objectives of the Metanexus Institute. This means that we do not have to step outside our interests in order to join together with the interests of the Metanexus Institute. In both cases, these are interests aimed at encouraging «ideas» and «nexus» that lead to a better society and greater human cohesion. But what interests are we talking about? Broadly speaking, we are dealing with what the Templeton Foundation has called «the great issues and questions» that have been present throughout history and which are raised again today with perhaps even more force. Questions that, as such, do not necessarily require an answer, but which encourage us to look towards the ancient concerns of human beings: expanding knowledge to the essence of the universe, the ultimate metaphysical foundations, the meaning of life, values, ethical, moral, personal and social obligations and commitments, the search for and exercising of freedom, the value of religions, ideological and worldview pluralism, solidarity, respect and tolerance, scientific, intercultural and inter-religious dialogue, poverty and compassion for those who suffer,

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poverty, justice, the development of civilisation, etc. These are undoubtedly important issues, which affect the moral conscience of people, groups of humans, nations and cultures. However, are there answers to these important questions? Just by observing the world stage of societies and cultures we can immediately see the huge variety of metaphysical beliefs, religions and ideologies. This seems to show that the universe in which man lives and in which he aims to understand his own self —in order to live— is disconcerting, dark and enigmatic. It is like a polyhedron of infinite sides that reflect different images taken on in a creative way by the different metaphysics, religions, ideologies, cultures and ways of life. Despite so much factual diversity however, we, as humans, hope to fulfil one of humanity’s ancient desires: to base our lives on the idea of inter-human communion, to live as brothers in society, to achieve perfect cohesion not only with our immediate fellows, but with the universal human species. This instinctive drive to «live with» others is more deeply-rooted and fundamental than the drive for «aggression towards others». Suspicion and aggression between humans probably resulted from a dysfunction that was already imbedded in prehistoric times, an existential mistake, the «mismanagement of co-existence». We have already reflected on this topic in the editorial of issue no. 1 of this series (2007, no. 238 of PENSAMIENTO) – «Contributing to social cohesion for a harmonious co-existence in an ideal community». THE «LINKS» THAT LEAD TO «SOCIAL COHESION» The burning question is therefore «how do we achieve inter-human communion»? At first glance, it seems that the already mentioned huge diversity of «existential, personal and communal designs» is the main obstacle to «social cohesion». We shouldn’t forget that diversity (difference) has often been the reason for conflict throughout history; at least amongst people who continued to follow this ancient «mismanagement of co-existence». For this reason, there have always been, and continue to be, people who think that we must overcome, or remove diversity in order to achieve co-existence: in other words, we must strive for a «shared universal design of existence» (i.e. all Christians, all Muslims, all Buddhists, all Agnostics, all Atheists, or all «the same thing»). We believe however that this kind of standardisation is not only unfair, it is also impossible. We strongly believe that existential diversity is a natural right which is not an obstacle to achieving what we have called «inter-human communion» and «social cohesion». Diversity is an inevitable consequence of human freedom; creative freedom exercised in a complex, dark and enigmatic universe. Diversity naturally arises in a dark world that appears to be made for creativity. Metaphysical constructs, ideologies, religions, cultures, ways of life, etc. are a wonderful product of creativity. It is therefore fantastic that people stick to their traditions, both personal and communal. This attachment is based on the fact that these traditions are the result of creative freedom and the fact that they continue to make creative freedom possible. Moving towards «inter-human communion» does not require one’s own tradition to be rejected: it would be unfair and impossible for «human cohesion» to be incompatible with diversity. What is then this path towards «inter-human communion»? We believe that the answer may be the following: to make use of creative freedom —which exists in all human traditions and «existential designs»— in order to find the «links» (nexus) that connect them, so that knowledge about these links shows us the way towards mutual understanding, towards respect and towards mutual enrichment. In order to «go beyond» (meta) towards a utopian future of increasing «inter-human communion», we must first focus on the nexus that joins us with other peoples, cultures, ideologies, religions and ways of life. Every one of us can be true to our own traditions and existential design; but we can all be aware of the nexus that PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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joins us to other human beings. This could be one way of interpreting the concept of metanexus (transcending networks) from the humanist and co-existing background of its social commitment. In chapter four of his most outstanding work, Die Phenomenologie des Geistes (The Phenomenology of Spirit), Hegel brilliantly formulated the ultimate meaning of history: to reach a collective state (Spirit) where «the I is We and the We is I». He understood the path towards this «inter-human communion» (towards this careful balance between the individual and the communal). He called it «mutual recognition» (gegenseitliche Anerkennung). Only when people engage in mutual recognition of each other as «free men» is «communionbased existence» possible. Only then are respect, tolerance, true appreciation, compassion, mutual enrichment and peace between people of different metaphysics, ideologies, cultures and religions possible. SCIENCE AS THE LINK TO «INTER-HUMAN COMMUNION» Human diversity is shown in the different metaphysical possibilities. But not only in metaphysical terms, as diversity is also shown in many other ways. The metaphysical element is essential, because it affects a human being’s most deeply-rooted senses. It is true that in our society, some people have very little sensitivity for and interest in metaphysical issues; but they are a minority. In fact, we make a distinction between atheists, agnostics, theists and «religious» people (members of organised religious groups). There is still a lot of aggression between these different groups (although in the past, there was even more): between atheists and theists, between atheists and theists and religious people, between different religious groups, etc. This multi-directional aggression is, at the end of the day, the result of a lack of understanding between the different groups, contempt, a lack of tolerance and inter-human «mutual recognition». How can we overcome these tensions and inter-human misunderstandings? In other words: how can we create «links» that enable «mutual recognition» and progress towards increasing «inter-human communion»? Here is where we need to express our strong belief that science is currently emerging as a powerful factor in inter-human community and cohesion. There are obviously other possible cohesion factors; but science is emerging today as a special force. Science has been and is an effective cognitive tool for the technological control of the world. But today, it is also emerging as a powerful social factor in «metaphysical cohesion». Why? Science’s emerging role is a result of its own nature. 1) It creates highly reliable and rigorous knowledge (although it is always hypothetical and subject to critical review). 2) This information is created with the guarantee of levels of objectivity that can easily be agreed upon, although it is sometimes debateable. 3) Science has a deep understanding of decisive aspects of ontology and the universe’s procedural dynamic. 4) Due to its own method however, it doesn’t enter into the ultimate metaphysical knowledge of what is real. 5) It is growing in social prestige because of its methodical rigor, because of its use of technology, its in-depth information about the world and because of its metaphysical neutrality. Although science is therefore not metaphysics, it provides results that should be considered by metaphysics (philosophy). It is incorrect to use science in itself to provide «metaphysical results». Science is metaphysically neutral. It is only philosophical reasoning (from another legitimate knowledge discipline, but not scientific) that discusses scientific results with a view to metaphysics. The inevitable consequence of science’s current prestige is that metaphysics, ideologies, religions, cultures and ways of life, etc. look for reinterpretation in light of the image of the world expressed through modern science. Atheists and agnostics use science to argue (but this is now philosophy) their metaphysical stance. The big religions PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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do the same: Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, etc. They all want to emphasise their ancient beliefs in light of scientific knowledge, because they know that they cannot present a view of the universe that conflicts with science. When reinterpreting themselves using science however, they should use what we called before «creative freedom», which initially creates and constantly updates respective existential traditions. Those who look to science for clarification (atheists, agnostics, religions, etc.) are therefore within traditions that demonstrate «different diversity». But science represents a compact body of knowledge that is metaphysically neutral (although with many obscurities and uncertainties that form a part of the same image of the world in science). We could describe what is happening by saying that, from an existential diversity point of view, a modern creative effort has been made towards convergence in science. Different origins flow together in the neutral field of science and there the most varied metaphysical traditions meet. In this situation, it is almost inevitable that we see science as a wonderful «communications hub» where metaphysical streams from different origins converge, but which —through science— are able to link with the streams (or motorways) that lead to «the heart» of other metaphysics. Differences can be connected through science and here they form the link that allows the metaphysical pulse of other humans to be felt. Science is therefore a neutral territory that enables «communication links» between metaphysics, ideologies, religions and cultures to be formed. The path towards inter-human community and cohesion could be opened up through convergence in science. THE METAPHYSICAL PROJECTION OF THE «IMAGE OF THE WORLD IN SCIENCE» The question, then, has primarily a twofold aspect: 1) What is the image of matter, of the universe, of life and of man from the perspective of science? 2) What consequences does this image have for our metaphysical knowledge of reality? Yet there is also a third aspect: 3) What «nexus» or «modes of communication» do this image and these «metaphysical consequences» leave open between the diverse metaphysical systems and religions? We have already said that science is metaphysically neutral; but it produces kinds of knowledge that must be considered by metaphysics, and constructed in a philosophical discourse. When all is said and done, science as much as metaphysics (i.e., ideologies, religions, cultures, etc.) aspires to know «the same reality». It is therefore correct for metaphysics to turn to science, so the latter can help shed light upon its idea of reality. But those points which interest metaphysics about science are those crucial fields in which science draws close to the ultimate, the metaphysical, the ground, the final and absolute explanation of the universe. Metaphysics interprets in a certain manner «the ultimate»: atheism, agnosticism and religions effectively have their own «metaphysics». In general, all metaphysical systems have a «humanist» idea of man, as a personal being who creates his history by means of free decisions. Religions, in addition, believe that there exists transphenomenologically (i.e., beyond our immediate phenomenological experience through the internal and external senses) a mysteric reality that will welcome human life after death and that, for almost all religions, responds to a God understood as creator-ground. Nevertheless, does the image of matter, the universe, life and man from the perspective of science permit us to think that our «humanist» idea of man is legitimate? Does it permit us to think that the existence of a «metaphysical mystery» or of a «ground-creator God» is plausible? Let us think about what would happen if science effectively «demonstrated» or «almost demonstrated» the existence or non-existence of God. The consequences this would have for agnostics, atheists, theists, or religious persons are evident. It is certainly a fact that there is an open discussion between them for the purpose of arguing that the results of science support one particular metaphysics PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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more than another. But what is really the case? To what kind of evaluation of metaphysics is science leading? To respond to these questions we should first demarcate the realms involved in the answer. For this, were we to commence by establishing the concept of the «metaphysical field» of science, we would define it as those «sensitive zones» in which the results of science have a special implication (special consequences) for metaphysics. They are zones where science reaches its limits, so that the answer to the questions that science itself raises cannot be provided by the scientific method; consequently, it connects with philosophy and metaphysical argumentation. Here we highlight three «metaphysical fields» of science which we consider most important, although they are not the only ones. They are important by their very nature and because, in fact, they have been posed throughout history as well as today. These three «metaphysical fields of science» are the following: first, the problem about the «consistency and stability of the universe», second, the problem about the «causes of the physical and biological orders», and third, the problem about «the origin and nature of animal and human psychism». The problem about the consistency and stability of the universe Science always begins with facts. Thus, the phenomenological experience of our body and of the objective world confirms the existence of a system-of-real-things as a dynamic structure of interdependent events. A cell, a living organism, a rock, a planet, the solar system, a galaxy, the universe, etc., are «real» as «structures», as «systems of interdependent events». The expectation of human reason from science (as it was from philosophy in the beginning) is that this «existent real system» exists in fact because it «can exist». So the universe «can exist», it is expected to possess some properties. 1) Its dynamic contents should maintain in time a systemic relation and interdependence (consistency). 2) This consistency should be stable in time (reason postulates dynamic stability only, but not staticity). 3) Consequently, reason postulates that the consistent and stable reality is «sufficient», i.e., it is «absolute» in the sense that it needs nothing other than itself to maintain its dynamic consistency and stability in the course of time. 4) This sufficiency would involve attributing to existent reality the «necessity» of maintaining itself: since if it ceases to exist at some point in the past, present or future, it could no longer justify its actual existence. Nevertheless, the real manner by which the universe is made —and described in science— makes it difficult to understand how these rational expectations can be met. Thus, the problem about its consistency and stability is posed. The gravitational universe of Newton and Einstein made a stable, consistent, and eternal universe intelligible. But new unquestionable empirical facts supported the Big Bang theory, the «the standard cosmological model» and the «standard model of physics» (particles). It was not easy to attribute consistency and stability to a universe that seems to have begun at a particular moment in time and that seems to be directed to a future «heat death». Science reacted by constructing theories (hypotheses and suppositions) about other models of the universe that assumed the big bang but presented a dynamic consistency and stability. We cite Hawking’s «oscillation model», and above all, the «bubble universe» and of multi-universes (multiverses) theories. The string and super-string theory would also offer theoretical support to the multi-universes theories, since it presents a complex supposition about the germinal ontology of matter that would explain how and why multi-universes could have been produced. In any case, science today poses the problem of how to explain the consistency and stability of the universe. Undoubtedly, all these are related to one of the principal «metaphysical fields» of science, since it seems that the universe actually makes it difficult to explain its own consistency and stability. In other words, given how the universe presents itself, it becomes difficult to PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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understand how it can be «self-sufficient» insofar as its own «existing reality» is concerned. This problematic leads science to engage in metaphysical suppositions. The problem about the causes of the physical and biological orders Science confirms the existence of a dynamic and evolving universe, the product of the organization of matter through an evolution process in time. Expansive energy, particles, atoms, celestial bodies, physical objects, living beings emerged in the primordial genesis of matter. And it is a fact that the evolution process produced an organized universe: the physical order and the more complex biological order. Science therefore asks about the causes that made the production of these orders possible, as confirmed by empirical experience. Science initially searched for the response in one direction, expecting the real properties of matter (its ontology) to be the causes of the physical and biological orders. Within a Darwinian scheme, physical ontology (physical laws), chaos, chance, and necessity would explain why our world was organized in this manner. However, the physical laws and circumstances of the evolution process led science to understand that the world at certain moments could have evolved in different directions. For example: Variables that could have had some or other qualitative values could have influenced significantly the organization of universes different from ours. Thus it is confirmed that the universe has an «anthropic construction» (a precise manner —among many others— of being constructed making life and the human being possible). When looking for the causes of this «anthropic construct», science posed the possibility of the so-called «anthropic principle», interpreted in a weak or strong sense. But whether another cause we should call «design», aside from the ontology of matter, should be admitted is the question. It is related to the multi-universes theory, since within a «Darwinian cosmology» one can explain the random production of the surprising «anthropic» properties of the universe’s physical and biological orders without recourse to any design. In any case, the problem regarding the causes of the physical and biological orders is undoubtedly one of the «metaphysical fields» discussed in science. A «metaphysical design» of evolution could perhaps be attributed to a divine designer-mind. In turn, the design would pose the problem about how to conceive the manner by which God a radice would have designed a universe that is simultaneously anthropic (directed to man) and autonomous (evolving by itself without the need for a «God-of-gaps»). The problem about the origin and nature of psychism (consciousness) The existence of the physical universe and life is surprising. Even more surprising perhaps is the existence of human and animal psychism. The existence of the capacity «to sense» the physical world and life itself is baffling. Limited to superior animals and man, psychic experience as a fact is usually called the experience of consciousness. Consciousness, psyche, or the human mind produced history, society, and science itself. Psychism is a phenomenological experience that, as such, should be described. Various authors agree on emphasizing three of its phenomenological features: the unity of the subject (mind) as an information-response system, the indeterminacy or openness of responses (freedom in man) and the «field» or «holistic» nature of psychic experience. As subjects, we «sense» by means of the senses the unitary «field» experience of our body as a «totality», and, at the same time, our immersion in the world, above all, in the «fields of light» that link our ontology to the external ontology of the cosmos. Science should explain all natural phenomena; thus, it cannot ignore the epistemological necessity of understanding the causes of psychism. In principle, the expectation of science PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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is monist, since it seeks to explain psychism by means of its physical and biological causes. First, the physical world was organized; from the physical world emerged the biological world; within this physico-biological world, psychism slowly emerged. The unity of evolution leads science to suppose that life and the human/animal psyche (consciousness) were constructed from a «physical support» that made them possible within the evolution of the universe. For many centuries, this strange psychic experience has been related to the world of «spirit», different from the purely physical or material world, that would connect us to a metaphysically transcendent dimension. From the time of the Renaissance, modern science has also tried to explain psychism, although not always successfully, as we will see. In any case, science and philosophy are engaged with an old theme whose modern version is the so-called theories of mind and consciousness. THE MECHANICIST-DETERMINIST PARADIGM AND THE REDUCTIONIST EXPLANATION The interaction and dialogue of metaphysics and religions with science cannot be understood independently of the paradigm that dominated science for many years (and has not been completely surpassed yet). We refer to the reductionist paradigm grounded on a mechanicist-determinist image of the physical world (applicable also to the biological and human world). Science explained the consistency and stability of the world from the perspective of mechanicism-determinism; and because of reductionism, the same perspective was employed to explain the physical and biological orders, as well as psychism, consciousness, and man. But are mechanicism-determinism and reductionism the correct scientific paradigm? Are they necessary for science? Do they explain «everything» or do they provide only «part of the explanation»? Reductionism makes it easy to understand the difficulties that metaphysics and religion had for many years in their dialogue with science. However, to understand the current parameters of the science-metaphysics-religion dialogue, it is necessary to note that the reductionist paradigm is not absolute, and that science is actually moving towards a «new paradigm», to which I will refer later. This «new paradigm» makes it possible for metaphysics and religions to find a powerful and enriching light in science. Consequently, what we said earlier is now made possible: that the confluence in science creates «meta-nexus», the transdisciplinary nexus of communication with metaphysics and religions. Reductionism effectively did not make the creation of these «meta-nexus» possible because it did not even make the metaphysics-religion nexus with science possible. Born from classical mechanism, reductionism explained entire reality as action-reaction systems (or classical cause-effect systems). Its consideration of external interactions (by «friction» or «tangential contact») was limited to independent and autonomous entities —some separated from others— that acted according to four natural forces (gravitational, electromagnetic, strong and weak nuclear). Reductionism was «reduced» to consider only the existence of a world organized by what we today call «fermionic matter»: particles (protons, neutrons, electrons, etc.) or autonomous vibratory fields whose «wave function» makes their unity in «quantum coherence» difficult, maintaining their differentiation and producing the organization of objects that we find in the macroscopic world of classical mechanics. This manner of thinking produced a biology that is reductionistic and mechanicist-deterministic, and a robotic image of man expressed concretely in current computational theories of man (following the «strong metaphor» of the computer) or in new versions of «neural determinism». Reductionism also had epistemological consequences: a «dogmatic» science, a science of absolute and unquestionable truths, reflecting a natural objective world of determination and mechanicism. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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EDITORIAL

THE «NEW PARADIGM» OF SCIENCE AND THE SCIENCE-METAPHYSICS-RELIGION METANEXUS What, then, is the «new paradigm» of science? It is important to have a very clear idea about its profile, since it establishes the kind of science that should be promoted for the science-metaphysics-religion dialogue to be viable. First, let us look at the «identikit» of this new paradigm. Second, the nexus that connects it with the metaphysical and the religious. Third, the intercommunication nexus opened between metaphysics and religions that make a greater communion and interhuman cohesion possible. The «new paradigm» of science 1) It assumes that the explanation of the world —physical, biological, and human— should be made according to a mechanicist-determinist image. Today no one seeks to deny the fact that the determination and interaction among «fermionic» objects explain a large part of our macroscopic and microscopic experience. Determination makes possible physical objects and living beings, as well as time and space that make our freely constructed personal biography possible. Genetic heredity and the stability of species would not be possible without the rigid determination of the genetic code. 2) But the «new paradigm» insists on things that were already known from the time quantum mechanics was born in the twenties. The individual and differentiated type of «fermionic» matter that produced the world is not only real. Quantum mechanics presents a microphysical world different from the classical world (although the macroscopic-classical world is always born from the microphysical-quantum world). New and strange phenomena are confirmed in this quantum world: 1) quantum coherence; 2) quantum superposition; 3) indetermination; 4) action-at-a-distance (EPR effects). 3) Thus, the physical world is not only classical, but also quantum. It was born from the big bang as a field of radiation; although the differentiated objects of the mecano-classical world were produced, the physical world also contains unitary fields of matter in «holistic» states where differentiation disappears in particles; this happens in bosonic matter, and can even happen in fermionic matter, although with great difficulty. These holistic states can also interact at a distance (EPR effects). And in the microphysical world, an important role is played by an indeterministic causality —related to quantum superposition— that extends to the classical macrophysical world, which is partly indeterminate because of the effects of a chaotic, statistical, and probabilistic flow. 4) Living beings are explained not only by means of classical causality (for example, in the embrio-genetic development beginning with DNA) because life made possible, within the classical living body, the emergence of quantum states of matter that possess quantum coherence, quantum superposition, indetermination, and interaction-at-a-distance (EPR). Living beings thus appear as the coordination between the classical world (differentiation, determinism) and the quantum world (holism, indetermination). In this way, the «new paradigm» can provide a «physical support» —more intelligible than that of reductionism— to explain the phenomenological properties of animal and human psychism, like «experiential holism» and «behavioral indetermination» (freedom). 5) Especially with reference to man, neurology also explains the nature of mind as a functional complementarity between classical neural patterns (Edelman) and networks of quantum states (quantum neurology). 6) Cosmology speculates about the origin of the universe by coming up with hypotheses concerning the germinal state of matter much beyond Plank’s Era. In this hypothesis fits, among other hypotheses, the strings and super-strings theory. In any case, the universe of the «new paradigm» is no longer the deterministic system of Einstein and Newton, but a PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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process born from the big bang and produced in time by the equilibrium between determination and chaotic, probabilistic, and statistical indetermination. 7) Finally, the «new paradigm» overcomes the «dogmatism» of positivist epistemology and already moves within the Popperian and post-Popperian framework. Science does not expound absolute truths, but only systems of hypotheses and conjectures about the world. Science today is more modest than in the 19th century: It is aware that the universe is an enigma, and that it should refer to philosophy the responses to certain questions that it cannot respond by means of its own methodology. Consequently, the «new paradigm» is also monist, like reductionism. The origin of everything is matter, but it has a richer idea of matter that allows one to understand how the evolution process made possible the emergence of «different modes of being real», although produced from the ontology of matter itself. It is therefore a monistic paradigm, specifically, an «emergentist-monist» paradigm. Nexus of the «new paradigm» with the metaphysical and religious Atheism, agnosticism, theism, and religions (a form of theism) pertain to the metaphysical. Reductionism could hardly connect with the metaphysical, and where reductionism persists, the metaphysical remains unconnected. But the «new paradigm» offers an image of the universe, life, and man that profoundly enriches the metaphysical. 1) It makes possible a phenomenologically describable «humanistic» image of man coherent with personal and social experience. Man is not a robot, but a free and personal being that responsibly constructs his own biography. «Deterministic robotism» could not even make atheism and agnosticism possible as metaphysical positions. 2) It presents an enigmatic image of the universe, employing an epistemology that insists on the interpretative and provisional character of scientific conjectures. It thus leaves an opening for philosophical reason to construct diverse hypotheses and conjectures about the enigmatic ultimate nature of things. 3) It makes possible, without imposing, a philosophical interpretation (thus, no longer scientific) of the enigma of the universe according to an agnostic or atheistic metaphysics. 4) It also makes possible, without imposing, a philosophical interpretation according to a theistic, and thus, religious, metaphysics. It therefore allows conjectures about the existence of a «mysteric transcendent reality» or the existence of a «transcendent creatorGod». 5) The proposal and discussion of various types of metaphysics (atheism, agnosticism, theism, and religions) is always referred to the previously explained «metaphysical fields»: the problems about the consistency and stability of the universe, the causes of the physical and biological orders, and the origin and nature of psychism (consciousness). Theism, for example, grounds on these «metaphysical fields» its argument about the «plausibility» of the existence of God (God as fundament, as designer, as holistic ground of the world of the psyche). 6) The holistic orientation of the «new paradigm» of science has a special importance for theism and religions. The evolution of matter produced a world of differentiated entities: it is the classical macroscopic world. But holism shows that the depth ontology of matter and of the universe is unitary and undifferentiated, responding to an ontology that makes possible the sensibility-consciousness present in animals and man. This «sensitive» holistic ontology of universe-matter undoubtedly makes more plausible the philosophical conjecture about the divine ontology as the omnipresent and ultimate ground of the universe, along the lines similar, for example, to the pan-en-theism of Arthur Peacocke. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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EDITORIAL

Science as a nexus of intercommunication between metaphysics and religions As we were saying, the profound aspiration of humanity on its way toward a better society has always been to achieve «inter-human communion» and «social unity». For this, respect for individual, metaphysical, and religious freedom is essential. A society in which some think that others are «in error» or that they should be where in fact they are not, or worse, if persons attribute to each other dishonest moral attitudes, in no way is this a society in communion or in inter-human unity. The attitude of religious groups which harshly judge atheism, or of atheistic groups which mercilessly attack everything that seems religious (as is the case with Dawkins or Dennett) is lamentable. No less lamentable is the attitude, so common in the past, of religions which harshly criticize each other and of religions that attempt to impose themselves on others. As we have said, the «new paradigm» of science allows the creation of a series of «metanexus» which permits human respect for the freedom of each person. One learns to see metaphysical diversity not as a hindrance to, but as assuming and truly enriching «communion and existential cohesion». And in this sense we believe that the investigation of those «metanexus» which from science unite metaphysics and religions is an important and necessary contribution to a better society: one that is tolerant, open to valuing the existential richness of others, and not polemical. But what are these «nexus of intercommunication»? In the first place it is very important that the «new paradigm» presents with modesty the image of a metaphysically enigmatic universe, which human reason (in science and philosophy) endeavors to understand by means of hypotheses and conjectures open to critical revision. For this, a nexus of respect is created between atheism, agnosticism, theism and religions, because all understand that diverse metaphysical positions are the fruit of the free, honest and legitimate creativity of each person. Now far from aggression and disdain —and from mockery as well— communion and social unity are founded on a deep respect for the person and for freedom. This is undoubtedly a better kind of society. In the second place, theism and religions tend to understand each other inasmuch as they all endeavor to be inspired by the image of the numinous and of the creator-God which science makes «plausible». It is the rational conjecture about God as fundament of the universe, designer of its anthropic order and holistic ground of the depth ontology of the world of the psyche. Religious or mystical experience in diverse religions has always meant a sensation of immersion of one’s «human spirit» in the higher reality of God that embraces us from the depths of the cosmos. Thus, mystical experience in the history of religions is an experience of unity with the cosmos, i.e., an experience of ontological holism with divinity and with the cosmos. Reductionism made this experience incomprehensible. But the holistic «new paradigm» of science leads us to understand that, in effect, the omnipresent ontology of God could «embrace us» from the depths of the holistic ontology of the universe. The «new paradigm» thus makes extraordinarily plausible a religious experience in which different religions converge and remain united. But we should also note that there is no reason for atheism and agnosticism to fear that the holistic image of the universe «imposes» what is strictly religious. Holism renders plausible the experience of God but does not impose it. In other words, the scientific holism spoken today in the «new paradigm» is also compatible with an atheist or agnostic interpretation. Lastly, science permits new «nexus of connection» between traditional religions which until now have been very distant. Religions turn to science to illuminate the idea of God in their respective traditions, for the purpose of attempting to update their theologies. In doing so, the gaze of diverse traditions is unified in the image of God which science makes possible. A process of convergence, then, is produced through science which permits the identification PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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of «points of similarity» that unite all religions. The same happens in mystical religious experience —surprisingly common in diverse traditions— which, as we were saying, becomes extraordinarily plausible in the new holistic ontology of science. Religions learn from science that they all possess an «essential nucleus» that unites them in a powerful fashion. They also learn from science that there exists a «differential nucleus» —thus leaving each religion in its proper history and traditions, i.e., in its «small print»— which profoundly enriches other traditions. Religions may thus respect their own tradition while simultaneously being enriched by the profound knowledge of other traditions. THE CONTRIBUTIONS WE PRESENT… This issue of Pensamiento offers valuable contributions to the process of the sciencereligion dialogue, the general framework for which we have outlined. We have arranged its contents in such a way that the articles, studies and profiles are placed in sections which illuminate their content and interrelationship. First, the propaedeutic section. The article by Poli marks the starting point: the human person, open to values and in search of his authentic existence. Modern culture put into crisis the personal value of the religious, but sociology today shows the rebirth of new communal forms of religious authenticity (Shimazono). The role of «methodological naturalism» in science is important in the crisis of the science-religion dialogue; this naturalism plays a decisive role in science, and religion needs to learn to dialogue with it (Bylica/Sagan). We believe that this is so, and that religion should admit a certain amount of mechanicismdeterminism as a means to explain the universe. In this process of dialogue religion should pay attention to the manner by which science depends on logic (the mathematical, the formal) so that metaphysical arguments can be valued in various scientific communities (Leach). We then present a psycho-physical and cosmological section. Lorente studies the cosmology of space-time in light of physical theories which would explain its ontology, and the references to God within those theories. M. Bejar ventures into an explanation of psychism starting from connections between the thoughts of Bohm and Penrose. Finally, López Aguilar discusses the Hameroff-Penrose hypothesis as a proposal for a «physical support» of consciousness. In one way or another, these different approaches facilitate an intensive understanding of what we have called the holistic image of the universe in the «new paradigm» of physics. Complementing this section, two commentaries on the characteristics of string theory (Leo Smolin) and on the events beyond Planck’s Era (Michael Heller) are provided in «Profiles in Science and Religion». The third is the classical biology section: It deals with how the explanation of life in biology presents an evolutive mechanicist-determinist dimension serving as a base from which one already glimpses an opening to the free and religious human being (Núñez de Castro y Bertrán). In the fourth section, dedicated to a cosmo-biological synthesis, two authors of unquestionable importance are introduced and considered: Schmitz-Moormann (Doncel), who is essential today to interpret the work of Teilhard de Chardin, and Whitehead (Monserrat). This section is complemented by two commentaries found in the Profiles: the first, on the emergentism of Clayton; and the second, on Stuart Kauffman and his reference to the quantum explanation of consciousness. Then we proceed to the Hindu and Buddhist philosophies section, which permits us to follow the connections between the «new paradigm» and oriental philosophy. M. Sevilla shows the presence of materialism in Indian philosophies, and A. Gómez considers Hindu and Buddhist ontology in depth. Masiá-Kuwano show that the idea of mind-body unity is present in some aspects of Japanese philosophy and psychology. The religious experience PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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section shows the mystical experience of union with God through an experience of the cosmos: in the Christian experience of Nicholas of Cusa (Cabada), in Sufi mysticism (Gamal), and in connection with diverse religious traditions from the point of view of mystic neurology or neuro-theology (Castro). This section on the connection between mystical experience and the holistic experience of the cosmos is complemented by two commentaries in the Profiles: on the ecological thought of Rolston and the mysticism of St. Francis of Assisi. Finally, the complementary studies section presents the figure of Jan Patocka (Ortega), Farah Antun (Puig), and the study of reason in Islam in light of the speech of Pope Benedict XVI (Serafin). The final study by J. Romero considers theology from the dynamic point of view of sociology, concluding with a proposal for a dynamic program that would make possible a theology dynamically adapted to the development of concepts in history. THE 2008 METANEXUS WORLD CONFERENCE IN MADRID The journal Pensamiento dedicates this issue of the special series «Science, Philosophy and Religion» (no. 242, 2008) to the concerns of Metanexus Institute, convoked in Madrid in June 2008. The Institute is concerned with finding the «meta-nexus» that permit communion and inter-human cohesion between individuals, groups, cultures, ideologies, metaphysics and religions, both within nations and in the international forum. It is also concerned with contributing to the nexus that make a better world. Knowing and spreading these «meta-nexus» is essential for possible ways of building human intercommunication through a transdisciplinary, multi-metaphysical and interconfessional dialogue. We have said that science is assuming today an emerging role with regard to social cohesion. Today, to look to science is to shed light on one’s own traditions and, at the same time, to cultivate knowledge and respect for other traditions, metaphysics and religions. All metaphysical traditions and religions should consider what is the core of their beliefs which unite and shed light upon the other traditions. We do not see God. Metaphysics and religions live within the enigma of the universe, and each person lives courageously the hard experience of life, of suffering, and the final orientation toward death (as Heidegger would say), maintaining with integrity one’s personal fidelity to a metaphysical or religious tradition. From my point of view, when Christianity today looks at science from the perspective of its own tradition, it should dynamically reformulate the essence of its theology, saying that our belief in the revelation of God, given in the Mystery of the Death and Resurrection of Christ, is the word of God that exhorts us to trust in the reality of a Deus absconditus who creates an autonomous world, making our freedom possible, and in the reality of a Deus liberator who saves within the context of the transcendent history —personal and collective— of all people and human traditions. Our journal Pensamiento invites everyone to commit themselves and to participate —from transdisciplinary, multi-metaphysical and interconfessional perspectives— in the task of looking at science in order to immerse oneself in the «new paradigm», in order to shed light from there on one’s own traditions and to communicate to others in an enriching manner the essence of one’s metaphysical and religious traditions. Without doubt, this will create among everyone appreciation, admiration, respect, tolerance and above all, mutual edification. JAVIER MONSERRAT Director of Pensamiento

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PERSON AND VALUE ROBERTO POLI University of Trento and Mitteleuropa Foundation

ABSTRACT: Preliminary to any adequate theory of the person is clarification of its ontological structure. For this purpose, it is useful to draw a distinction among at least three different ontological aspects of person, respectively corresponding to the dignity of life, to the acceptance or rejection of ethical values and the dignity corresponding to the qualities of an authentically human biography. It is reasonable to suppose that some of the traditional difficulties concerning the theory of the person depend on a failure to distinguish among these different ontological aspects. This paper presents some of the intricacies of the intermediate dimension of being a person, namely the idea of person as a subject with values, an entity that may, with greater or lesser ability, accede to values and accept or reject them intentionally. KEY WORDS: Person, value, emotion, Stein, Hartmann.

Persona y valor RESUMEN: La clarificación de su estructura ontológica es previa a una teoría adecuada de la persona. Para esto es pertinente perfilar una distinción entre, al menos, tres aspectos de la persona ontológicamente diferentes, respectivamente referidos a la dignidad de la vida, la aceptación o rechazo de valores éticos y la dignidad correspondiente a las cualidades de una biografía auténticamente humana. Es razonable suponer que algunas de las dificultades tradicionales sobre la teoría de la persona dependen de la falta de distinción entre estos diferentes aspectos ontológicos. Este artículo presenta algunas de las peculiaridades de la dimensión intermedia de ser una persona, a saber la idea de una persona como un sujeto con valores, una entidad que puede con mayor o menor habilidad, acceder a valores y aceptarlos o rechazarlos intencionalmente. PALABRAS CLAVE: persona, valor, Stein, Hartmann.

1.

INTRODUCTION

I define a «person» as a subject with values, an entity that may, with greater or lesser ability, accede to values and accept them intentionally (For more detailed treatment see Poli 2006a). Unfortunately, discussion on «personhood» suffers from a serious lack of conceptualization. The necessary preliminary to any adequate theory of the person is clarification of its ontological structure and of the concepts that make up its content. I believe that it is heuristically useful for this purpose to draw a distinction among at least three different aspects of «person», which for lack of a better terminology I shall call person1, person2 and person3. These can be exemplified by referring to different thinkers who have authoritatively expounded their characteristics. I shall therefore associate Peter Singer with person1, Nicolai Hartmann and Edith Stein with person2 and John Finnis and Martha Nussbaum with person3. Given that these three aspects of person have essentially different ontological natures, it is reasonable to suppose that some of the traditional difficulties concerning the theory of the person depend on a failure to distinguish among them. Each of the three types of person has value, but each of the values differs from the © PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749



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others. Person1 has the value corresponding to the dignity of a living being, while person2 has the dignity corresponding to the acceptance or rejection of ethical values, and person3 has the dignity corresponding to the qualities of an authentically human biography. Person1 is structurally conditioned and pertains to the sphere of biological reality; person2 is structurally conditioned and pertains to the sphere of spiritual reality; person3 is structurally conditioned and pertains to the sphere of social reality. All of us are born a person1; some of us become a person3. Being a person1 is a matter of fact, it is intrinsic to our nature as living beings. The quality of being a person1 is not acquired, but nor is it never lost. Being a person3 is instead structurally fragile: one can become a person3 and one can cease to be one. A person3 can accede to a higher plane of reality, but then may be unable to remain at that level, and may even choose or be compelled to leave it. Possessing the dignity of a living being or having a biography are two different aspects of the person as a subject with values. In this paper I shall focus on person as the entity that may accede to values [i.e., to person2, leaving the analysis of person1 and person3 for another occasion (Poli 2006a, 2008a, b)].

2.

EMOTIONS

AND VALUES

The connections between emotions and ethics have been widely investigated in recent decades. Two arguments in particular have been put forward: (1) emotions are important for correctly judging the ethical components of the situations in which we find ourselves and then act on the basis of those judgements; (2) the emotions are important because they activate the agent’s will, while the thought alone of a duty is not sufficient to prompt action. The interesting aspect of these – and similar – positions is that they view the emotions as essentially instrumental elements or components. In the former case, the emotions serve to make correct judgements; in the second they serve for action. In both cases, the emotions function as instruments for performance of something different. If these positions were correct, it should be possible to judge morally sensitive situations correctly and act appropriately with no emotional perception (Stark 2004, 360). At bottom, if this were the case, the ancient Stoic idea of proceeding by annulling the emotions, or at least by reducing them to the minimum, may be correct. The alternative is to recognize that the emotions – besides being good for something or other – also have intrinsic value. The idea is not a new one, because there are explicit traces of it in Aristotle, but it is worth recalling here. For theorists of the virtues, the emotions are not important just because they are parts of a morally correct action; they are important because they have a value independent of the value of the action. It is evident that there are appropriate (correct) or inappropriate (incorrect) emotions even in situations where no action is taken – or more simply, which are so independently of action. Being distressed PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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by the pain of others or rejoicing at their happiness – even when the situation is structured so that we can do nothing about it – are the two most obvious cases of emotions that are correct independently of any possible action. Conversely, rejoicing at the pain of others or feeling distressed at their happiness are obvious cases of incorrect emotions. The development of virtues entails the development of appropriate emotional attitudes 1. The series of cognitive acts defined by Brentano – presentations, judgements, and acts of love and hate – provide a good framework within which to defend the thesis that emotions have intrinsic value. Brentano’s third class of intentional acts, that of acts of love and hate, has all the requisite characteristics. These acts are not directed or instrumental to either the judgement (on which, as we have seen, they depend and which in their turn influence) or action (which may or may not ensue, according to the circumstances). The joint development of a satisfactory theory of emotions and a satisfactory theory of values should lead to recognition of the correspondence between emotions and value responses. A situation cannot be simultaneously viewed as «agreeable» and «exciting». If one response is correct, the other cannot be 2.

3.

FROM BRENTANO

TO

HUSSERL

Brentano’s distinction between acts of judgement and evaluative acts was taken up by Husserl, with his distinction between objectifying acts and nonobjectifying acts. Objectifying acts are those which contribute to knowledge about objects, whilst non-objectifying acts do not contribute to knowledge about objects. As for Brentano evaluative acts presuppose acts of judgement, so for Husserl non-objectifying acts presuppose objectifying acts. For Brentano and Husserl, moreover, both cases involve intentional acts. The problem that now arises is the apparent conflict between the thesis that evaluative acts (Brentano) or non-objectifying acts (Husserl) are intentional acts, i.e. acts which by definition are directed towards an object, and the thesis that non-objectifying acts do not contribute to knowledge about objects. 1 Here I depart from Stark 2004. On p. 363 Stark refers to Anderson 1993 and repeats her confusion between concrete particulars («persons, animals, communities and things») and states of affairs. Stark and Anderson maintain that concrete particulars «are objects of our values», «have intrinsic value» and are «the building blocks of value», while states of affairs have extrinsic value, a value which depends on that of the concrete particulars «contained in them». But concrete particulars, precisely because they are concrete, for reasons of categorial consistency cannot be parts of states of affairs. Moreover, it is imprecise to say that concrete particulars are objects of our values. If anything, they are objects of our acts of valuation. 2 Hartmann 2003, p. 57, with reference to Hildebrand 1916. More recently, Feinberg has sought to distinguish between what is deserved and the basis of desert, or the characteristic of the person by virtue of which s/he deserves something. It would indeed be very interesting to distinguish between the various bases of desert and what they make specifically deserved. As Hurka 1998, p. 315, points out, for every virtue only some goods are appropriate rewards.


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Husserl’s solution is that non-objectifying acts are founded acts, or acts which must be grounded on other acts. If this is so, two different interpretations are possible: according to the first, the object of non-objectifying objects is the object of the underlying objectifying act; according to the second, the object of the nonobjectifying act is the underlying objectifying act (and only secondarily, so to speak, its object). Both interpretations have been defended (e.g. by Gigliotti 2004 and Benoist 2004). Whichever of them is correct, the objects of value are in any case founded objects, or as the Meinongian school puts it, they are higher-order objects. Both Brentano and Husserl defend the intentionality of mental acts, defining it as directedness towards an object. But Husserl introduces an important distinction not present in Brentano: that between «empty» intentional acts and «filled» intentional acts. In the former case, the object is anticipated in the form of a typical schema and may be only implicitly present to the agent’s awareness. In the latter case, the object is given «in concrete». The distinction is important because it allows us to maintain the thesis that all intentional acts have correlates even when we are not aware of such correlates or do not notice them. To be pointed out is that the distinction among different types of act has extended and enriched the traditional distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason. These are no longer viewed as reified instances of distinct faculties but rather, as we have seen, as the articulations of different families of acts with specific forms of inner organization and dependency. Thus far, I have presented the dependence of non-objectifying acts on objectifying acts according to the «univocal» and linear format introduced by Brentano: higher-level acts depend on – in the sense of «require» – lower-level acts. Husserl views the matter in more sophisticated terms. He replaces Brentano’s unilateral dependence with a reciprocal multilateral dependence. Indeed, he talks of an interweaving among the various types of act, and therefore of their reciprocal co-determination. Husserl’s idea is probably that of a twofold constitution phase in which the dependence of non-objectifying acts on objectifying acts is accompanied by feedback from non-objectifying acts to objectifying ones. The situation should therefore be viewed in dynamic terms. Hence, the two parts of the problem consist in the following two theses. On the one hand, «the evaluative act, essentially because it constitutes the phenomenon of value, is founded on the intellective act»; on the other, «the theoretical reason and the evaluative reason are everywhere intertwined» (Husserl 1988, p. 72).

4.

EMOTIONAL

ACTS

So far, so good. But we have only touched upon the problem of personhood. In order to frame the problem of the person and its nature more precisely, we must explore the level of emotional acts. In the architecture described thus far, emotional acts are complex acts founded on other types of act. We now need a more fine-gauge classification of emotional acts and their internal relations. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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Phenomenologists have discovered that for every level of the constitution of living beings there are appropriate families of emotional acts which convey specific contents. The lowest level is the organic one of life. I call it the «level of the living». The emotional acts relative to this level are the bodily feelings that inform us about the state of our organism (the discomfort of being cold, the pleasure of being warm), The second level is the «vital» one: I call it the «level of moods». This is the subject’s mental level, and the information pertinent to it corresponds to situations of joy, happiness, boredom, sadness, excitement, depression, and so on. This still has nothing that to do with the person as the bearer of value, which enters the scene only at the third level of constitution, the «spiritual» one. Here, two different sets of values are associated with the person: the values that constitute the person, and the values that the person decides to follow once s/he has been constituted. The first set is well exemplified by the value of «strength of character»: the person sees him/herself in the way in which s/he reacts to pain, for example. We define a person as strong or weak according to how s/he responds to life-situations. However, we have still not entered the realm of authentically ethical values. A strong person may be bad, and a weak person may be good. Besides the level of the constitution of the person, therefore, we must recognize the further level of the person’s ethical values. In this regard, the most important decision is between good and evil, this being immediately followed by its articulations in terms of virtues and vices 3. Only now have we entered the realm of ethical values. Strictly speaking, the emotional acts described by Brentano concern only this third class of emotional acts. However, only by following the intricate layering of acts can we gain an accurate idea of their complexity. In the next section I shall distinguish the values that constitute the person (strength of character, for instance) from the directly ethical values of the virtues.

5.

THE

VALUES THAT CONSTITUTE THE PERSON

The person is articulated along a number of dimensions, each of which is a cline ranging from a positive extreme to a negative extreme, both obviously understood in the ethical sense. The first dimension varies from activity to passivity. By «activity» is meant stance-taking or commitment; by «passivity», indifference, inertia or apathy. The second dimension ranges from the capacity to suffer to the incapacity to suffer. The positive valence assigned to the capacity to suffer is signalled by the patent negativity of the incapacity to suffer. The former consists of resistance against the adversities of life, the character’s tempering through suffering; the latter consists of inner fragility. 3 The scheme presented follows Edith Stein’s classification of egological acts. Hartmann uses a very similar classification.


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The third dimension centres on the opposition between a person’s strength or weakness. Strength and activity are not synonymous: also passivity may be strong. The stance-taking associated with activity may be strong or weak; and inertia may be strong in the sense of stubborn. The fourth dimension is anticipation: a more or less broad vision of the future to which the person may accede. In this case, the opposition takes the commonsense form of the difference between a broad and narrow outlook on the future. The fifth dimension is the ability to select goals and to find the means with which to achieve them. I call this ability «purposefulness». The sixth and final dimension, the one that sums up all the others, is freedom or free choice (Hartmann 2003, pp. 137-143. I have changed the order of the dimensions). A person is therefore defined as active, capable of suffering, strong, anticipatory, purposive, and free. These six characteristics influence each other in various ways. Each characteristic consists of a continuum ranging from an extreme of value to an extreme of disvalue. Each dimension also has points of breakdown where values change directly into disvalues (different from disvalues as complements). Consider the capacity to suffer. It is true that suffering tempers the character, so that the person is able to achieve higher thresholds of value. However, if the suffering exceeds the ability to withstand it, the person is destroyed and the suffering changes directly into disvalue. Note that all the values discussed are values of act. The person is constituted in the acts that constitute her. In ethical terms, the person thus constituted still tells us nothing, because s/he can choose to do both good and evil. The person only enters the realm of values, or correspondingly of disvalues, when s/he opts in favour of the good or the bad.

6.

ARCHITECTONIC

VALUES

Standing midway between person-constituting values and authentically moral values are architectonic values. The family of architectonic values comprises three values that can be better defined if the values space is conceived as a territory which extends before the internal organ that sees values. With respect to the multiplicity of values and disvalues that spread out before us, architectonic valuation (a) chooses one single value (or a few interconnected values) and seeks to take them to their maximum level; (b) chooses the greatest possible number of values and seeks to synthesise them into an organic set; (c) ignores disvalues. Other structurally coherent options are obviously possible. But militating in favour of the three that I have mentioned is the fact that they are options which moralists have long recognized, although they adopt a different reasoning to do so. If they are given their traditional names, they are more easily recognized. Value (1) is nobility, value (2) is fullness, and value (3) is purity. Although my description is cruder than the usual ones, it has the merit of bringing out the structural conditions. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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Nobility is the value oriented to loftiness. Its opposite value – not to be confused with its opposite as disvalue – is the common or ordinary. Fullness instead aims at the fusion, coordination and synthesis of all values. Its opposite is the inability to see values: a blindness to values, but not yet wickedness. Purity does not see disvalues: it views everything positively as endowed with value (Hartmann 2003, 204 fgg).

7.

PERSON-REALIZING

VALUES

I call moral values «values of virtue». This sharp distinction between values of good and values of virtue remedies a major error committed by ancient ethics: that of considering virtue to be a good, albeit a higher-level one 4. Three families of virtues» values can be distinguished: ancient values, Christian values, and modern values. The first two families rotate around a central value: justice for ancient ethics, love of one’s neighbour for Christian ethics. Perhaps it would not be too bold to claim that if modern ethics is to be authentic, it must organize itself around love for the «distant one». With reference to ancient ethics, I would mention two significant aspects of Plato’s virtues and the particular organization of Aristotle’s virtues. Plato’s four virtues – justice, wisdom, strength and control – well sum up the character of ancient ethics. Justice is defined as equality with those who are recognized and accepted as equal. Wisdom – the highest virtue – governs the entire array of values and actions. The wise recognize the value of what is endowed with value. Strength transforms the vision into reality: merely seeing values is not enough; also required is the moral strength to realize them. The final value, control, consists in a sense of proportion and scale. Aristotle defines virtues as the «medians» between two negative extremes. Thus, courage is midway between recklessness and cowardice; generosity is midway between extravagance and avarice; temperance is midway between selfindulgence and insensitivity; and pride is midway between vanity and humility (Nicomachean Ethics, 1106 a26-b28). If one does not interpret this middle way among virtues correctly, one is almost forced to regard virtue as some kind of «golden mean». As Hartmann writes: «This theory has always been subjected to the mockery of critics. It appears only too ridiculous that the seriousness of virtue should resolve itself into the triviality of a «golden mean», that is, into a mediocrity» (Hartmann 2003, p. 254). To understand Aristotle’s theory correctly, it should be borne in mind that virtues may grow without losing their nature as values by doing so. In fact, 4 Hartmann 2003, p. 155. Brentano’s distinction between acts and their correlates (as objects of acts) provides the basis for the difference between ethical values (as modes of acts) and values of goods (values of the objects of acts). By construction, therefore, the values of goods are never ethical values. For details see Poli 2006a.


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«temperance, strength, justice, taken as features of value, do not have upper limits». The key is provided by Aristotle when he writes: «Thus, according to its substance or the definition stating its essence, virtue is a mean, but with respect to the highest good and to excellence, it is an extreme» (Nicomachean Ethics, 1107 a 6-8). In one sense, therefore, virtue is a mean, in another it is an extreme. These two senses relate to two dimensions of the space of values: ontologically, values are means between two disvalues, axiologically they are points of elevation (Hartmann 2003, p. 256). The second family of values of virtue centres on love for one’s neighbour. While justice may be external, love for one’s neighbour is deeper-lying: it involves the person more profoundly. The two central values of justice and love for one’s neighbour may conflict. Justice may be loveless, love may be unjust (Hartmann 2003, p. 271). Tied to love of one’s neighbour are the virtues of sincerity, loyalty, humility, and behaviour. The third and final group is by far the most indeterminate; it may not even be a real and proper group of virtues. It comprises the value of the personality, personal love, love for the «distant one» and future-sightedness, responsibility for future generations 5. The value of the personality, unlike the other values mentioned thus far, is not a general value. It can be understood as the individual ethos which each of us must accomplish, but we may always fail to accomplish. Also personal love, like the value of the personality, is oriented solely to the individual: it is the value of a strictly personal relationship of joint accomplishment. With love for the «distant one» and future-sightedness we return to general values. The distinctive feature of these values is that we can expect nothing from them in return. The discovery of love for the distant one was made by Nietzsche, who called it thus in order to contrast it with love for one’s neighbour (Nietzsche 1999).

8.

VALUES

OF GOOD AND BAD

The person-realizing values are eminently values of good and bad. We know at least some of the difficulties that hamper definition of good and bad. With respect to the person, good and bad relate to each other like merit and guilt. This means that for a person badness is not an error, a deficiency or a lack. A bad person is not someone who lacks something. A bad person is just as much a person as a good person. S/he is a person who has not chosen the good and bears responsibility for it. A clarification is now necessary. Perhaps the most important lesson that we have learnt from Socrates is that human beings never choose the bad because 5 Hartmann 2003, p. 317. Da Re 1996, p. 188, points out that Hartmann does not mention the typical bourgeois virtues of diligence, parsimony, etc.


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it is bad. Even when they choose a disvalue, they do so because they think that it is a value. Every purpose, qua purpose, is a value. Socrates’ intuition is fundamental for ethical discourse because it allows disvalue to be defined as the choice of the lesser value. Suppose that we must choose between A and B. If A and B are comparable and the value of A is greater than the value of B, we regard the choice of A as good and the choice of B as bad. This elementary situation demonstrates the importance of Brentano’s analysis of the preference relation. On the other hand, the situation’s intrinsic shortcoming is the assumption that values are comparable and therefore organizable into a single hierarchy. A final remark is relevant: if ethical good and evil are in the tendency toward some purpose, then not only are the values of virtue involved, but the personconstituting values also have a role to play, although it is a subordinate one. By way of example, consider the difference between being narrow-minded and broad-minded. To the extent that the subject chooses one of the two options, s/he bears responsibility for it.

9.

THE

STRENGTH AND HEIGHT OF VALUES

I distinguish between two organizing principles of values: that of strength and that of height. These two principles operate in opposite directions: the strongest values are also the least high values, whilst the highest values are the least strong ones. Usually, the lower values, the stronger ones, are also the simplest values; the superior values are the most complex. Values of goods are stronger than values of person, but they are not as high as the latter. The theory of values which uses the criteria of strength and height has consequences which at first sight seem surprising, but prove to be correct when considered carefully. The main consequence is this: from an ethical point of view, violating a lower value is more serious than violating a higher value. On the other hand, fulfilling a higher value has greater value than fulfilling a lower value: «sinning against lower values is ignominious, shameful, revolting, but their fulfilment only reaches the level of decency, without rising above it. Offending against higher values, by contrast, does indeed have the character of moral failure, but nothing of the directly degrading, while fulfilment of these values may have something uplifting, liberating, indeed thrilling about it» (Hartmann 2003, p. 53). By way of example: «heroism warrants admiration, but a lack of heroism arouses neither contempt nor indignation». On the other hand, whilst trustworthiness warrants respect, «a lack of trustworthiness warrants contempt or even indignation» (Hartmann 2003, p. 450). The ultimate rationale for the principles of strength and height resides in the general nature of the levels of reality. These principles therefore orient the entire spectrum of the real and are not restricted to the particular case of actions which PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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fulfil or violate values. The organization of the strata of reality reflects the law of strength. Although there are conditions which limit the efficacy of the law, it nevertheless performs a crucial role in organizing the strata 6. The strata are also subject to a law of freedom whereby the higher level is always free from the lower one. The higher level is defined with respect to a novum which distinguishes it from the levels that precede it and function as its bearers. As Hartmann puts it: the strength of the lower structure is only «as building stones, as material» (Hartmann 2003, p. 448 and elsewhere). The freedom relationship holds between values of person and values of goods, as well as internally to them. Multiplicities of values organized in terms of strength and height are also present in the contexts of values of person and values of goods. These too, therefore, are organized in a way such that the higher level is free from those beneath it. The strength of a value indicates the gravity of its violation. The height of a value expresses the merit deriving from its fulfilment. Offence and merit proceed in parallel but are not identical. Offending against life is a grave offence and has very little merit. More in general, harm to material goods is more serious than harm to spiritual goods (Hartmann 2003, p. 453). But fulfilment of spiritual goods, and ethical goods in particular, is a merit much greater than the merit corresponding to respect for more elementary goods. Respect for more elementary goods is often the condition for acceding to higher goods. Those who violate lower goods are wicked. But the reverse does not hold: a person who violates higher goods, someone who fails to fulfil them, «is not on that account a bad man; his conduct threatens no one; it merely lacks the higher moral content» (Hartmann 2003, p. 440). Structuring by levels is important not only because it furnishes us with the tectonic laws governing values, but also because it provides us with criteria to distinguish, at least in some cases, authentic values from bogus ones. If the architecture of values is based on levels of dependence, then the authentic elevation of value is also divided into levels; it develops through intrinsic stages from the lower values to the higher ones. Although the situation may still lack full theoretical analysis, it is well known in practice. A person whose behaviour is oriented to a higher value, but does not simultaneously respect the values that support it, is structurally discordant. The higher values to which s/he refers are not credible. Loving with distrust or giving with cowardice are not authentically virtuous behaviours (Hartmann 2003, p. 456). Values are constructed step by step, proceeding from the most elementary levels upwards. 6 More thorough analysis should explicitly compare Hartmann’s theory of the levels of reality with other theories developed in recent years. For most recent developments see Poli 2006b,c,d. In my theory, the presence of bifurcations in the levels, «interwoven’ levels, the possibility of «downwards’ causal effects – from higher levels to lower ones – and the forms of anticipation that characterize all levels from the life level onwards, produce a theory very different from Hartmann’s. As a first approximation, however, it is convenient to maintain the latter.


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10.

ATLASES

601

OF VALUES

I have discussed the two dimensions – of strength and of height – along which values are organized. A third values-organizing component consists of proximity relations among homogeneous types of value. I shall call a family of values an «atlas». The realm of values is therefore a series of atlases (which may have zones in common) with different levels of strength and height. The latter characterizes the structure of the atlas. Many aspects of values are still obscure, because we do not know the dynamics operating among the various atlases. Some dynamics depend on the person subject to the value – his/her age and maturity, for example – other on historical and social conditionings. Other dynamics are structural and depend on how the atlases are arranged, and on their intrinsic strength 7. In figurative terms, an atlas map can be viewed as an island. The set of atlases forms an archipelago. The currents represent the forces that flow from one atlas to its neighbour. Unfortunately, we are still trying to draw the maps of individual values, and we are not yet able to draw the overall map of the entire realm of values.

11.

BETWEEN

HOPE AND RESPONSIBILITY

The person-constituting values include stance-taking, commitment, anticipation (meaning the person’s broad or narrow outlook on the future), purposefulness (the capacity to set goals and find the means to achieve them), and freedom. This multidimensional network of values is structurally future-oriented. A person is a forward-looking entity. Assuming responsibility for the future is constitutive feature of the person: an inability to look forward debases and falsifies the person. As we know, however, the person-constituting values are not yet ethical values. Those that we have just seen are therefore the preconditions for ethical stancetaking. This set of conditions find direct ethical supplementation in the third group of values of virtue, which includes the values of love for the «distant one» and future-sightedness, and therefore responsibility for future generations. Apparently, we have reasons to start seeing good and bad as embedded in the tendencies towards values and disvalues.

REFERENCES ANDERSON, E. (1993): Value in Ethics and Economics, Harvard University Press, Harvard. 7

Not to be confused with the strength of the values making up the map.


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BENOIST, J. (2004): «La fenomenologia e i limiti dell’oggettivazione: il problema degli atti non oggettivanti», in B. CENTI e G. GIGLIOTTI, a cura, Fenomenologia della ragion pratica. L’etica di Edmund Husserl, Bibliopolis, Napoli, pp. 151-176. BRENTANO, F. (1969): The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, Routledge, London. — (1973): The Foundation and Construction of Ethics, Routledge, London. DA RE, A. (1996): Tra antico e moderno. Nicolai Hartmann e l’etica materiale dei valori, Guerini e associati, Milano. GIGLIOTTI, G. (2004): «Materia e forma della legge morale nell’interpretazione husserliana del formalismo di Kant», in B. CENTI e G. GIGLIOTTI, a cura, Fenomenologia della ragion pratica. L’etica di Edmund Husserl, Bibliopolis, Napoli, pp. 13-114. HARTMANN, N. (2003): Moral Values, Vol. 2 of Ethics, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London. HILDEBRAND, D. VON (1916): «Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung», Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Furschung, 3. HURKA, T. (1998): «Two Kinds of Organic Unity», The Journal of Ethics, 2, pp. 299-320. HUSSERL, E. (1988): Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre, Kluwer, Dordrecht. NIETZSCHE, F. (1999): Thus spake Zarathustra, Dover Publications, Mineola NY. POLI, R. (2006a): Fra speranza e responsabilità. Introduzione alle strutture ontologiche dell’etica, Polimetrica, Monza. — (2006b): «First Steps in Experimental Phenomenology», in A. LOULA, R. GUDWIN, J. QUEIROZ (eds.), Artificial Cognition Systems, Idea Group Publishing, Hersey, PA., pp. 358-386. — (2006c): «Levels of Reality and the Psychological Stratum», Revue Internationale de Philosophie, special issue on Ontology, 2006, 2, pp. 163-180. — (2007): «Three obstructions: forms of causation, chronotopoids, and levels of reality», Axiomathes, 16, pp. 1-18. — (2008a): «Three Concepts of Person», forthcoming. — (2008b): «On the Concept of Person: The Social Nature of Persons», forthcoming. STARK, S. (2004): «Emotions and the Ontology of Moral Value», The Journal of Value Inquiry, 38, pp. 35 5-374. Dipartimento di Sociologia e Richerca Sociale Piazza Venezia, 41 38100 Trento [email protected] http://www.mitteleuropafoundation.org

ROBERTO POLI

[Artículo aprobado para publicación en abril de 2008]


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GOD, DESIGN, AND NATURALISM: IMPLICATIONS OF METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM IN SCIENCE FOR SCIENCE-RELIGION RELATION PIOTR BYLICA - DARIUSZ SAGAN University of Zielona Gora, Polonia

ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to analyze the implications flowing from adopting methodological naturalism in science, with special emphasis on the relation between science and religion. Methodological naturalism, denying supernatural and teleological explanations, influences the content of scientific theories, and in practice leads to vision of science as compatible with ontological naturalism and in opposition to theism. Ontological naturalism in turn justifies the acceptance of methodological naturalism as the best method to know the reality. If we accept realistic interpretation of scientific theories, then methodological naturalism conflicts science with religion. Theistic evolution does not seem to be a proper way to reconcile Darwinism and methodological naturalism with theism. Many of such propositions are boiled down to deism. Although evolution can be interpreted theistically, it is not the way in which majority of modern scientists and respectable scientific institutions understand it. KEY WORDS: methodological naturalism, ontological naturalism, evolutionary theory, theistic evolution, teleology, randomness.

Dios, diseño y naturalismo: Implicaciones del naturalismo metodológico en la ciencia para la relación ciencia-religión RESUMEN: El objetivo de este artículo es analizar las implicaciones derivadas de la aceptación del naturalismo metodológico en la ciencia desde la perspectiva de la relación entre la ciencia y la religión. El naturalismo metodológico, que niega explicaciones sobrenaturales y teleológicas, influye en el contenido de las teorías científicas y en la práctica conduce a una visión de la ciencia como compatible con el naturalismo ontológico y en oposición al teísmo. El naturalismo ontológico por su parte justifica la aceptación del naturalismo metodológico como el mejor método para conocer la realidad. Si aceptamos una interpretación realista de las teorías científicas, entonces el naturalismo metodológico hace entrar en conflicto a la ciencia con la religión. La evolución en sentido teísta no parece ser una vía adecuada para reocnciliar el darwinismo y el naturalismo metodológico con el teísmo. Muchos de sus enunciados se reducen al deísmo. Aunque la evolución puede ser interpretada en perspectiva teísta, esta no es la forma en que la entienden la mayoría de los científicos modernos y de las instituciones científicas de prestigio. PALABRAS CLAVE: naturalismo metodológico, naturalismo ontológico, teoría de la evolución, teoría teísta de la evolución, teleología, probabilidad.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the implications flowing from adopting of methodological naturalism in science, with special emphasis on the relation between science and religion. We show that the naturalistic principle may lead to acceptance of metaphysical naturalism and that, on the other hand, it is exactly the ontological position that justifies the acceptance of methodological naturalism as the best way to gain knowledge about the reality. After presentation of the most important statements of methodological and metaphysical naturalism and theism, we discuss some prospects on the relation © PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749



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between science and religion. At first we look at the problem from the point of view of beliefs maintained by scientists and promoted by scientific institutions and we analyze the concept according to which science «is silent on religion». Further, we discuss the relation of methodological naturalism and teleological explanations. We also point at the importance of science in modern culture and show why theistic evolution does not seem to be a proper way to reconcile Darwinism and, more generally, methodological naturalism with theism. Finally, we discuss the implications of methodological naturalism for the issue of truth in science and its implications for science-religion relation. We present an instrumentalist interpretation of science as a way of circumvent the problem of its conflict with religion and we show the flaws of this approach. If scientific theories are interpreted in realistic way, as the source of adequate description of reality, then the conflict between naturalistic science and theistic religions arises.

METHODOLOGICAL

AND METAPHYSICAL NATURALISM AND THEIR RELATION TO THEISM

In this paper we are interested in the understanding of the concept of «naturalism» which refers to methodological and metaphysical premises of science. The methodological naturalism is usually understood by scientists as a part of the definition of science 1. We would like present two crucial characteristics of this position. The first is well described by Niles Eldredge, one of the most prominent evolutionists, and Eugenie C. Scott, the executive director of National Center for Science Education: «If there is one rule, one criterion that makes an idea scientific, it is that it must invoke naturalistic explanations for phenomena, and those explanations must be testable solely by the criteria of our five senses 2. (…) scientists are constrained to frame all their statements in “naturalistic” terms simply to be able to test them 3. Science is a way of knowing about the nature – composition and behavior – of the natural, material world. (…) By its own rules, science cannot say anything about the supernatural. Scientists are allowed to formulate solely ideas that 1 See e.g. WILLIAM LANE CRAIG and J. P. MORELAND, «Preface», in: WILLIAM LANE CRAIG and J. P. MORELAND (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, Routledge, London-New York, 2000, p. xii [xi-xv]; DAVID RAY GRIFFIN, Religion and Scientific Naturalism. Overcoming the Conflicts, New York, 2000, State University of New York Press, pp. 8, 11; DALLAS WILLARD, «Knowledge and naturalism», in: CRAIG and MORELAND (eds.), Naturalism…, p. 30 [24-48]; PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, «Evolution as Dogma: The Establishment of Naturalism», in: ROBERT T. PENNOCK (ed.), Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological, and Scientific Perspectives, The MIT Press, Cambridge-A Breadford Book, London, 2001, pp. 59-76. 2 NILES ELDREDGE, The Monkey Business: A Scientist Looks at Creationism, Washington Square Press, New York, 1982, p. 82. 3 ELDREDGE, The Monkey Business…, p. 87.


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pertain to the material universe, and they are constrained to formulate those ideas in ways that can be testable with empirical evidence detectable by our senses. (…) [Science] does not rule out the existence of the supernatural; it merely claims that it cannot (…) study the supernatural – if indeed, the supernatural exists 4. Most scientists today require that science be carried out according to the rule of methodological materialism: to explain the natural world scientifically, scientists must restrict themselves only to material causes (to matter, energy, and their interaction). There is a practical reason for this restriction: it works. By continuing to seek natural explanations for how the world works, we have been able to find them. If supernatural explanations are allowed, they will discourage – or at least delay – the discovery of natural explanations, and we will understand less about the universe» 5.

Methodological naturalism is conceived as a scientific principle, application of which guarantees the empirical testability of scientific explanations. Science cannot conduct empirical research on the nature, motives and the ways of God’s (or any other supernatural being’s) actions, even though its existence and the fact that such research can be done on the ground of theology and philosophy are not excluded. Methodological naturalism not only rejects the possibility of scientific studies of supernatural, but it also limits the scientific explanations to materialistic ones. In another formulation, made by Michael Ruse, we find reference to the nature of causes invoked in scientific explanations: «I believe that the first and the most important characteristic of science is that it relies exclusively on blind, undirected natural laws and naturalistic processes 6. […] the most important characteristic of modern science is that it depends entirely on the operation of blind, unchanging regularities in nature. We call those regularities “natural laws”. Thus, scientists seek to understand the empirical world by reference to natural law and naturalistic processes» 7.

According to methodological naturalism scientists explain the natural world, including people, in terms relating to objects and processes occurring in the natural casual order. Any reference to something supernatural, transcendent or to any teleological factor is denied and excluded from the range of science. According to metaphysical (or ontological) naturalism, nature is the ultimate reality, in other words: «nature is all there is». Nature is understood here as «a 4 NILES ELDREDGE, The Triumph of Evolution and the Failure of Creationism, W. H. Freeman and Company, New York, 2001 (2000), p. 137. 5 EUGENIE C. SCOTT, «“Science and Religion”, “Christian Scholarship”, and “Theistic Science”: Some Comparisons», Reports of the National Center for Science Education, 1998, vol. 18 (2), pp. 30-32, http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/articles/6149_science_and_religion_ chris_3_1_1998.asp (Last accessed: 18 Feb., 2008). 6 MICHAEL RUSE, «Witness Testimony Sheet McLean v. Arkansas», in: MICHAEL RUSE, But Is It Science? The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy, New York, 1996, Prometheus Books, p. 296 [287-306]. 7 RUSE, «Witness Testimony…», p. 301.


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permanently closed system of material causes and effects that can never be influenced by anything outside of itself. (…) To speak of something as «supernatural» is therefore [from the naturalistic position] to imply that it is imaginary (…)» 8. From the metaphysical naturalism perspective, to claim that a supernatural being also exist is to say at the same time that the being has never intervened in the workings of the world. Ontological naturalism is equivalent to atheistic interpretation of the world. Scientists relying on methodological naturalism principle do not claim to prove that there is no God. For them referring to God as the Creator, however, is to violate the Ockham’s razor, because purely naturalistic forces seem to be enough to explain the origin of universe, life and human beings, and the scientifically built picture of the world is for scientists as just the true one. In this sense the principle of methodological naturalism leads to ontological naturalism. On the other hand, it is the metaphysical naturalism that provides justification for naturalistic methodology of science understood as the way to discover «how the things really are». There are some scientists who perceive metaphysical roots of methodological naturalism and naturalistic scientific theories. One of them is Richard Lewontin, prominent geneticist and evolutionist from Harvard University. Lewontin wrote: «We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. The Eminent Kant Scholar Lewis Beck used to say that anyone who could believe in God could believe in anything. To appeal to omnipotent deity is to allow that at any moment the regularities of nature may be ruptured, that miracles may happen» 9.

Metaphysical naturalism is, of course, not in reconciliation with theism. By theism we mean the view that there is some personal, omnipotent and omniscient entity, i.e. God, who created the universe, life and human beings, and although transcendent to nature he still takes an active role in the world. It is crucial to distinguish this attitude from deism, according to which in the beginning God established the laws of nature and thereafter left nature to its own devices. There is no contradiction between deism and metaphysical naturalism so understood. 8 PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, Reason in the Balance: The Case against Naturalism in Science, Law & Education, InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove, 1995, p. 38. 9 RICHARD LEWONTIN, Review: Carl Sagan, The Demon Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark, The New York Review of Books, 9 January 1997, pp. 28, 31.


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Of course, we cannot say that there is a logical contradiction between methodological naturalism and the theistic doctrine. These approaches belong to two different domains: epistemology and metaphysics. We can, however, analyze the metaphysical implications of that methodological position. We can also refer to the picture of reality which is provided by naturalistically based science and consider whether there is a contradiction between these two ways of understanding the reality or not.

IS

SCIENCE SILENT ON RELIGION?

SCIENTISTS’

AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS’ POSITION

There is no doubt that methodological naturalism is widely accepted among scientists. But what about ontological naturalism? In 1996 and 1998 American scientists were asked about their religious views 10. 90% of members of the elitist National Academy of Sciences (NAS) declared themselves as non-believers. Among the representatives of biological sciences the percentage amounted to 95%. Among the rank-and-file scientists the degree of «disbelief» was smaller (amounted to about 60%). It seems that these results confirm the James Leuba’s thesis (who conducted similar polls in 1914 and 1933), stating that because of extensive knowledge and greater experience the prominent scientists are less willing to accept the possibility of supernatural phenomena. It is also necessary to remember that members of NAS, established in 1863, chose their successors by themselves. Thus, it is possible that this mechanism is responsible for widespread acceptance of atheism among scientists, recognized as the most prominent, that these polls have revealed. In fact, all greatest authorities of contemporary Darwinism, such as Theodosius Dobzhansky, George Gaylord Simpson, Ernst Mayr, Richard Dawkins, Stephen Jay Gould and Douglas Futuyma, deny any divine intervention or teleological explanation of creation of life and human beings. We can read for example: «Man is the result of a purposeless and natural process that did not have him in mind 11. Some shrink from the conclusion that the human species was not designed, has no purpose, and is the product of mere mechanical mechanisms – but this seems to be the message of evolution 12. All appearances to the contrary, the only watchmaker in nature is the blind forces of physics (…). Natural selection, the blind, unconscious, automatic process which Darwin discovered, and which we now know is the explanation for the existence and apparently purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in mind. It 10 See EDWARD J. LARSON and LARRY WITHAM, «Scientists and Religion in America», Scientific American, September 1999, no. 281, pp. 88-93. 11 GEORGE GAYLORD SIMPSON, Meaning of Evolution, rev. ed. 1967, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1949, pp. 344-345. 12 DOUGLAS FUTUYMA, Science on Trial: The Case for Evolution, Pantheon Books, New York, 1983, pp. 12-13.


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has no mind and no mind’s eye. It does not plan for the future. It has no vision, no foresight, no sight at all. If it can be said to play the role of watchmaker in nature, it is the blind watchmaker 13. Let me summarize my views on what modern evolutionary biology tells us loud and clear, and I must say that these are basically Darwin’s views. There are no gods, no purposive forces of any kind. No life after death – when I die, I am absolutely certain that I am going to be completely dead! That’s going to be the end of me. There is no ultimate foundation for ethics, no ultimate meaning in life, and no free will for humans, either» 14.

Another most prominent contemporary evolutionary biologist Edward. O. Wilson assures that evolution is a new myth that will replace Christianity. According to Wilson, «(…) the final decisive edge enjoyed by scientific naturalism will come from its capacity to explain traditional religion, its chief competition, as a wholly material phenomenon. Theology is not likely to survive as an independent intellectual discipline» 15.

One could say that the polls and the above quotes shed light only on personal beliefs of particular scientists. But let us look at official statements of public educational and scientific institutions due to relation of theory of evolution and religious beliefs. We find there a popular view that science and religion answer different questions and refer to different domains of reality so we cannot say about conflict between them. For example, in the official Position Statement of the American National Association of Biology Teachers we can read that «[…] evolutionary theory, indeed all of science, is necessarily silent on religion and neither refutes nor supports the existence of a deity or deities» 16.

According to a pamphlet of National Academy of Sciences, Science and Creationism: A View from the National Academy of Sciences, it is «false (…) to think that theory of evolution represents on irreconcilable conflict between religion and science. (…) A great many religious leaders accept evolution on scientific grounds without relinquishing their belief in religious principles» 17. 13 RICHARD DAWKINS, The Blind Watchmaker, Longman Scientific & Technical, Harlow, 1986, p. 5. American edition of the book has a telling subtitle: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe without Design. 14 WILLIAM PROVINE in: WILLIAM PROVINE and PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, Darwinism: Science or Naturalistic Philosophy? Video Study Guide, Access Research Network, Colorado Springs, 2001 (1996), p. 33. 15 EDWARD O. WILSON, On Human Nature, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1978, p. 192. 16 AMERICAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BIOLOGY TEACHERS, The American Biology Teacher, January 1996, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 61-62 (quoted in: PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, Defeating Darwinism by Opening Minds, InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove, 1997, p. 120). 17 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Science and Creationism: A View from the National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Science and Creationism, Washington, 1984 (quoted in: JOHNSON, Reason in the Balance…, p. 190).


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But is science really silent about religion if in the booklet of ANABT mentioned above we read: «The diversity of life on earth is outcome of evolution: an unsupervised, impersonal, unpredictable and natural process of temporal descent with modification that is affected by natural selection, chance, historical contingencies and changing environments» 18.

In another quotation from NAS we read: «Scientists seek to relate one natural phenomenon to another and to recognize the causes and effects of phenomena. In this way, they have developed explanations for the changing of the seasons, the movements of the sun and stars, the structure of matter, the shaping of mountains and valleys, the changes in the positions of continents over time, the history of life on Earth, and many other natural occurrences. (…) it is the job of science to provide plausible natural explanations for natural phenomena» 19.

Naturalistic evolution indeed seems not to be in conflict with deism. But in what sense the doctrine that our creator is an unsupervised, impersonal and blind (as Dawkins argues) process is silent on doctrine saying that life and human beings were created by personal, loving creature for some purpose? It is claimed here that creation of life and man has naturalistic explanations. It means that those events, so important for Christian theism, took place without any supernatural intervention and don’t require teleological explanation. Scientists who successfully promote metaphysical naturalism in their popular publications are, among others, Steven Weinberg, Stephen Hawking, Richard Leakey, Stephen Jay Gould, Francis Crick and Richard Dawkins. Dawkins who wrote that Darwin’s theory «made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist» 20 does not hide his antireligious attitude in his books. He stresses the philosophical implications of theory of evolution characterizing its mechanism as «blind watchmaker». In his publications Dawkins makes it clear that there is no need to appeal to supernatural Creator since natural abiogenesis of life and process of natural selection and random mutations of DNA are enough to explain the diversity and complexity of life. As «the scientist who has done the most to further the public understanding of science» 21 in 1990 Dawkins received the Michael Faraday Award from British Royal Society. Carl Sagan, also promoting metaphysical naturalism, received in 1994 Public Welfare Medal from the National Academy of Sciences for his contribution to public education. So in the eyes of the public it may look like they speak in the name of SCIENCE. 18 AMERICAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BIOLOGY TEACHERS, The American Biology Teacher…, pp. 61-62 (quoted in: JOHNSON, Defeating Darwinism…, p. 15). 19 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Science and Creationism: A View from the National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Science and Creationism, 2nd ed., Washington, 1999, http://books.nap.edu/html/creationism/ origin.html. 20 RICHARD DAWKINS, The Blind Watchmaker, Penguin, London, 1991, p. 6. 21 JOHNSON, Reason in the Balance…, p. 76.


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METHODOLOGICAL

NATURALISM AND TELEOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS

As we have seen, the concept of blind, naturalistic evolution seems to be compatible with deism, but not with Christian theism. It is clearly seen by Gould, who remarked: «Before Darwin, we thought that a benevolent God had created us» 22. From the evolutionary point of view, however, the reality looks quite different: «No intervening spirit watches lovingly over the affairs of nature (though Newton’s clock-winding god might have set up the machinery at the beginning of time and then let it run). No vital forces propel evolutionary change. And whatever we think of God, his existence is not manifest in the products of nature» 23.

To show more clearly how different are theistic and naturalistic visions of reality let’s compare the last Gould’s statement about lack of God’s manifestation in nature with Romans 1:20: «Ever since the creation of the world [God’s] eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been understood and seen through the things he has made.» Gould, as well as many scientists, deny possibility of empirical evidence of design in nature. Such possibility was once widely accepted in Western science and was crucial assumption of natural theology. Its medieval formulation we find in Thomas Aquinas five arguments for God’s existence. In XIX century popular version of natural theology was William Paley’s argument from design in nature. The contemporary science is rooted in works of Charles Darwin. The problem situation of his research was constituted by Paley’s argument from design explaining the origin of living structures by reference to a Creator. In the Origin of Species Darwin provided naturalistic explanation to Paley’s crucial examples. Darwin denied special creation and any theistic and teleological interpretations of evolutionary theory. Contemporarily teleological explanations justified in science are only those understood as functional explanations. As Wesley Salmon puts it: «In evolutionary biology functional considerations play a crucial role, and – since the time of Darwin – it has been appropriate to deny that such appeals to functions involve the conscious purposes of a creator, or any other sort of final causation» 24.

Works of Darwin provided not only a new vision of history of life on earth but also consolidated a special role of methodological naturalism in science. Let us take a closer look at contemporary version of design argument presented by advocates of intelligent design theory and its relation to methodological naturalism. Some advocates of scientific legitimacy of the design argument point at two elements of methodological naturalism: it not only rejects the possibility of STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Ever Since Darwin, Pelican, W. W. Norton, New York, 1977, p. 267. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, «In Praise of Charles Darwin», in: CHARLES L. HAMRUN (ed.), Darwin’s Legacy, Harper & Row, 1983, pp. 6-7. 24 WESLEY C. SALMON, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, University of Minnesota Press, Michigan, 1989, pp. 31-32. 22 23


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scientific studies of supernatural, but it also limits the scientific explanations to materialistic ones invoking solely categories of chance and necessity. While adopting the principle of methodological naturalism in the first sense seems to be indispensable and desirable in science, second understanding of the principle is the subject of much controversy. It is because narrowing the possible scientific explanations to materialistic ones is equivalent to eliminate from science theories maintaining that some intelligent cause played or still plays an active role in the origin and/or development of nature and its constituents, and that such an activity can be investigated in accordance with methods of science. Note that in quotation presented earlier Eugenie Scott discerns the practical reasons for adopting the principle of methodological naturalism: it leads to successes. Thereby Scott suggests that in some circumstances the principle could be rejected. In the same spirit William A. Dembski, a proponent of intelligent design theory (ID), which claims are anti-naturalistic in essence and concern mainly the area of biology, indicates that if methodological naturalism is really regarded as a working hypothesis that is successful, then scientists should be free to reject it when it fails. But when design theorists are pointing out that there are some reasons to reject methodological naturalism, the scientific status of their theory is denied and the rationale for that is interpreting the principle as a necessary condition of scientific theories. Critics of intelligent design claim that the theory invokes supernatural explanations and thus violates the principle of methodological naturalism. The problem is, however, that ID theory does nothing like that. Failure of ID critics is in that they confuse the two different meanings of methodological naturalism represented here by the words of Eldredge and Ruse. According to a polish philosopher of science Kazimierz Jodkowski anti-naturalism of ID theory is not due to naturalism-supernaturalism opposition (understanding presented by Eldredge), but to opposition of naturalism and artificialism (understanding presented by Ruse): «The first oppose natural to supernatural or extranatural causes. The second oppose natural to artificial, purposeful and intelligent causes. (…) Intelligent design theory maintains that impersonal and unintelligent causes do not suffice to explain both origin of the life itself and subsequent evolution of diversity of its forms» 25.

Notice that acceptance of the second sense of methodological naturalism implies acceptance of the first sense – after all, exclusion of intelligent causes entails rejection of supernatural causes. Thus, these two senses can be combined as two ingredients of one meaning, as it is in the case of majority of modern scientists, but they can be considered in separation as two different, independent meanings – acceptance of the first sense doesn’t imply acceptance of the second. 25 KAZIMIERZ JODKOWSKI, «Antynaturalizm teorii inteligentnego projektu» (Anti-naturalism of Intelligent Design Theory), Roczniki Filozoficzne 2006, vol. LIV, no. 2, p. 73 [63-76], http://www.nauka-a-religia.uz.zgora.pl/index.php?action=tekst&id=110 (Last accessed: 18.02.2008).


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From the perspective of naturalism-supernaturalism opposition, ID theory could be scientific, because its explanations aren’t inherently supernatural. Design theorists don’t identify the designer, at least not on scientific grounds. ID is studying, first of all, the structures and phenomena in nature, which might be the result of intelligent agency, but identity, motives and ways of action of the designer aren’t the subject of inquiry (unless by support of additional information it is possible). Design proponents hold that one can know whether given structure or phenomenon was designed, independently of the knowledge about the designer’s identity and regardless of whether he is natural or supernatural entity. It follows that science might be able to study not only the results of natural intelligent causes but effects of supernatural causes too – in both cases these results would be, after all, the part of natural world. Consider the following example. In Mount Rushmore there are sculpted faces of four American presidents. If these faces haven’t been sculpted by a human, but by some supernatural being, we still would be able to conduct a scientific design inference; one can find that no known natural, unintelligent process has the ability to produce such structures and that they could be explained by application of our knowledge about the results of intelligent agency. According to design theorists, we infer intelligent agency from the features, so-called specificational patterns or specifications, which are characteristic to signs left by such a type of activity, coupled with high complexity of object or phenomenon in question 26. We have to remember, however, that it is relatively easy to recognize design in the faces sculpted in Mount Rushmore and in many other structures, but recognizing it in biological systems seems not to be so simple at all and such a possibility is disputable. Anyway, it shouldn’t be doubted that empirical detection of intelligent design in natural structures is theoretically possible, though it could be unfeasible in practice. Note, by the way, that at least to some extent we can detect design in biological systems. We discern design, for instance, when we observe a cluster of trees growing in even rows and even distances from each other. Our current knowledge enables us to infer that such an arrangement of trees wasn’t directed by some natural law and it was too improbable to have been produced by chance. At the same time, we are in possession of background information that people can plant trees in such a way, so we can legitimately infer that this cluster of trees was produced by intelligent agency, even if we hadn’t saw the process of planting itself. And it holds true even if this specific cluster of trees was produced by some other intelligence than human one, for we infer design from the similarities of signs leaved by it to effects produced by human intelligence. It should be also noted that to detect intelligent agency we don’t have to know what exactly intelligence (human or any other) is. It suffices to know one or more features that distinguish the activity of intelligent agents from processes 26 See e.g. WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, «Reinstating Design within Science», in: JOHN ANGUS CAMPBELL and STEPHEN C. MEYER (eds.), Darwinism, Design and Public Education, Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, 2003, pp. 408-414 [403-417].


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operating in accordance with necessity and chance alone. One such a feature is making a choice between different possibilities. On that basis one can establish, for instance, whether an animal displays an intelligent behavior (regardless of what animal intelligence is). Imagine that we introduce a rat into a complicated maze in which there is only one way out and every wrong turn prevents the rat to exit outside. If the rat exits successfully and he’ll repeat it every time when introduced in the maze, then we could say that the rat indeed learned how to exit the maze and we would not ascribe it to chance, let alone necessity 27. But whether this type of inference could be applied to the problem of the origin of body plans, biochemical structures and processes and the like is quite different matter. It seems, however, that even methodological naturalism in the sense of naturalism-artificialism opposition is regarded as a necessary condition of a theory to be scientific one (at least in disciplines not having interest in the results of human activity – one exception is SETI research program which aims to find an extraterrestrial intelligence, but its proponents generally don’t regard the program as a proof that the design of nonhuman intelligence can be detected also here on earth). Dembski rightly claims that by natural explanations scientists don’t have on mind simply to explain phenomena occurring in nature. Instead, natural explanations involve only material causes: matter, energy, and their interaction. In other words, in natural sciences merely unintelligent causes, expressed in categories of chance and necessity, are acceptable. Dembski says, however, that one cannot assume what must be demonstrated. How do we know that only natural, i.e. unintelligent, causes were and/or are at work? Defining science by a principle of methodological naturalism in the sense of naturalismartificialism opposition is to impose an artificial restriction on it and to a priori exclude the possibility of the involvement of intelligence in the course of natural history. In that case the one and only option is unintelligently guided, blind (though maybe not Darwinian) evolution which in these circumstances is true by definition – it doesn’t require support of evidence as we usually would expect from science because we already «know» that some naturalistic theory is true 28. Let’s look at one example of such naturalistic thinking. In the booklet Science and Creationism members of the National Academy of Sciences try to show the superiority of the naturalistically based science over creationism. At one point authors write: «For those who are studying the origin of life, the question is no longer whether life could have originated by chemical processes involving nonbiological components. The question instead has become which of many pathways might have been followed to produce the first cells» 29. It is evident from this quotation how a priori methodological assumptions eliminate the need to DEMBSKI, «Reinstating Design…», pp. 411-414. See WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, «Expert Witness Report: The Scientific Status of Intelligent Design», 29 March 2005, pp. 7-8 [1-51], http://www.designinference.com/documents/2005.09. Expert_Report_Dembski.pdf (Last accessed: 19.02.2008). 29 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Science and Creationism…, p. 6. 27

28


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indicate evidence showing that (most generally understood) naturalistic theories are true, whereas nonnaturalistic theories seem to be false by definition. Although it is unknown exactly which process produced first life, without invoking appropriate evidence it is «known» that it was some natural process, and this «knowledge» is gained thanks to adopting the principle of methodological naturalism. Otherwise, how could we know «that», since we don’t know «how»? Of course, there are cases when we could know «that» despite we don’t know «how»; namely, when we can observe such a phenomenon. For example, when we shake a closed container filled with gas, the temperature of gas will increase. We would know «that» this phenomenon have occurred but if we wouldn’t be in possession of the Boltzmann’s kinetic theory, then we wouldn’t know «how» actually it happens to occur. However, the emergence of life from chemicals has never been observed.

SCIENCE

IN MODERN CULTURE

As Phillip E. Johnson puts it, «Every culture must have a creation story as a basis for things like philosophy, education and law. If we want to know how we ought to lead our lives and relate to our fellow creatures, the place to begin is with knowledge about how and why we came to be» 30. For many centuries in Western civilization such a creation story has been provided by religion. In the nineteenth and twentieth century the source of creation story became science. In contemporary culture it is the science that tells the rational story of creation, it is science that tells «how things really are». In the light of this view, «Darwinian evolution is not primarily important as a scientific theory but as a culturally dominant creation story» 31. Of course, the description of reality provided by science based on methodological naturalism uses language which ontology is free from notions referring to any supernatural being acting in the history of universe and responsible for the origin of life and human beings. According to this new creation story, all living creatures evolved by unguided, material, purposeless process of random genetic mutations and natural selection. From this perspective «man is the result of a purposeless and natural process that did not have him in mind». And that is how Douglas Futuyma sees the dominant element of Western civilization: «By coupling undirected, purposeless variation to the blind, uncaring process of natural selection, Darwin made theological or spiritual explanations of the life processes superfluous. Together with Marx’s materialist theory of history and society and Freud’s attribution of human behavior to influences over which we have little control, Darwin’s theory of evolution was a crucial plank in the 30 31

JOHNSON, Reason in the Balance…, p. 12. JOHNSON, Reason in the Balance…, p. 12.


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platform of mechanism and materialism – of much of science, in short – that has since been the stage of most Western thought» 32.

THEISTIC

EVOLUTION

In cultural context contemporary science has a strong connection with metaphysical naturalism. The success of naturalistic understanding of science and naturalism in contemporary culture is rooted in the scientific triumph of Darwinism which rejects teleological interpretation of history of the development of life on earth. In result, we obtain general opposition between religious and scientific view of reality maintained in Western culture of our days. Popular theological ways of neutralization of this conflict are concept of theistic evolution and viewing science and religion as complementary domains of knowledge. Both these ways involve a considerable reinterpretation of theistic doctrine, because they reject the possibility that God’s action is empirically discernible in the world of nature. Theistic evolution is meant to be a way of reconciliation of Christian religion with Darwinism, and methodological naturalism in general. According to this position God controls and guides the process of evolution. Evolution is the God’s way of creation and if it is correctly understood, it reveals the existence of Creator, his endless wisdom, goodness and goals he gave to the creation. But there are some problems with this stance. If God guides the evolution and is responsible for every event, then he is also responsible for every evil. He also seems to be a mischievous demon deceiving people by attaching importance to his interventions to make them always look in the way we would expect from naturalistic evolutionary process. Let’s refer again to Ockham’s razor: if naturalistic explanations seem to be adequate, then God is a redundant hypothesis. Another problem for Christian theism is that it cannot resign from supernatural explanation of such events like virgin’s conception, resurrection, multiplying of bread, or changing water into wine. Should the biblical description be understood only allegorically, like the first chapters of the Book of Genesis? Evolution can be interpreted theistically, but it cannot be equivalent to a genuine Darwinism. Consistent theistic evolution approach requires rejection of chance playing such a crucial role in the current scientific theory of evolution. Creation made by a reasonable God has to be far from random. Chance cannot have so great power as to defeat God’s plan of creating humanity. But it appears it is exactly the role chance plays in Darwinism: «Replay the tape a million times (…) and I doubt that anything like Homo sapiens would ever evolve again» 33. Thus, in the 32

DOUGLAS FUTUYMA, Evolutionary Biology, 3rd ed., Sinauer Associates, Sunderland, 1998,

p. 3. 33 STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History, Norton, New York, 1989, p. 289.


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divinely governed world chance must be somehow restricted, though it does not mean that there cannot be some portion of genuine randomness. Nevertheless, since God’s goal was to create human beings, some historical evolutionary pathways had to be nonrandom (i.e. God intervened at some points of natural history) inevitably leading to the development of humans. To be sure, God might have predicted that some authentically random evolutionary pathway will produce human beings and choose it as his way of creation. If that was the case, however, the role of God would be limited only to deliberately choosing one pathway from a large array of different possible evolutionary pathways and then he let it work on its own. For example, Howard Van Till outlines the following reasoning arguing that that even a genuine, and not restricted to one result only, randomness of biotic evolution does not rule out purpose: «Suppose there were a perfectly honest gambling casino in which no game was rigged – every turn of the cards, every roll of dice, every cycle of the slot machines, was authentically random. Does that rule out the possibility that the outcome of the casino operation cannot possibly be the expression of some preestablished purpose? Clearly not. In fact, the operators of the casino depend on that very randomness in their computation of the payout rates to insure that they will have gained a handsome profit at the end of the day. Now, if human casino operators can employ random events to accomplish their purposes, could God not do so on a scale far more grand in the formational history of the creation?» 34.

But there is a problem. In traditional sense, theism means that God actively intervenes in the workings of nature, so the idea that God used a self-contained evolutionary process to create humanity isn’t the idea of theistic, but of deistic evolution, where God merely establishes boundary conditions and set the process in motion. According to theistic evolutionists, after God created the world and gave it the laws (also the laws of evolution) he had still constantly upheld the existence of the universe and operated through the laws in undetectable way. As Johnson states, «Wise metaphysical naturalists will smile at these transparent devices (…)» 35. He would surely agree with Provine who explicitly evaluates such a position: «A widespread theological view now exists saying that God started off the world, props it up and works through laws of nature, very subtly, so subtly that its action is undetectable. But that kind of God is effectively no different to my mind than atheism» 36.

By the way, we should also ask what implications do methodological naturalism bears on the issue of canonization. If, from the perspective of theistic evolutionists, 34 HOWARD J. VAN TILL, «The Fully Gifted Creation», in: J. P. MORELAND and JOHN MARK REYNOLDS (eds.), Three Views on Creation and Evolution, Zondervan, Grand Rapids. Mich., 1999, p. 168 [161-218]. 35 JOHNSON, Reason in the Balance…, p. 101. 36 WILLIAM B. PROVINE, «Progress in Evolution and Meaning of Life», in: MATTHEW N. NITECKI (ed.), Evolutionary Progress, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988, p. 70.


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science must proceed in accordance with the principle of methodological naturalism and since God’s action is empirically undetectable, then God cannot perform empirically discernible miracles (of course, in the usual meaning of the term). But such miracles are the basis to proclaim someone a saint. Here, miracle means something inexplicable by science and thereby violating the principle of methodological naturalism. For example, one of evidences in the canonization process of Pope John Paul II is a miracle of a «sudden and complete cure» of a French nun who was dying of cancer; it happened «after the members of her community prayed for the intercession of the late Pope» 37. Thus, either theistic evolutionists will reject methodological naturalism or they’ll eliminate the basis for canonization. Finally, we should remember that even if Catholics would accept that God could have used evolution to create human body, the spiritual soul is always created directly by God. It means that, as Pope John Paul II wrote, «the passage into the spiritual realm» presents an «ontological leap», a «great ontological discontinuity», and cannot be explained by science. The Pope stated that «the experience of metaphysical knowledge, of self-consciousness and self-awareness, of moral conscience, of liberty, or of aesthetic and religious experience – these must be analyzed through philosophical reflection, while theology seeks to clarify the ultimate meaning of the Creator’s designs» 38. It turns out, however, that naturalistic evolutionary theory explains these things in the framework of science and without any reference to God. From evolutionary perspective, religiously interpreted morality, ethics, and the like, are just delusions – nothing more than the means of survival. For example, Michael Ruse and Edward Wilson claim that «As evolutionists, we see that no [ethical] justification of the traditional kind is possible. Morality, or more strictly our belief in morality, is merely an adaptation put in place to further our reproductive ends. Hence the basis of ethics does not lie in God’s will. (…) In an important sense, ethics as we understand it is an illusion fobbed off on us by our genes to get us to cooperate. It is without external grounding. (…) Ethics is illusory inasmuch as it persuades us that it has an objective reference. This is the crux of the biological position» 39.

Regarding above considerations, we may ask: how one can be a Christian theist and consistent evolutionist and methodological naturalist at the same 37 «Miracles Reported; Could Speed John Paul’s Canonization», Catholic World News, 30 November 2005, http://www.cwnews.com/news/viewstory.cfm?recnum=41004 (Last accessed: 22.02.2008). 38 See POPE JOHN PAUL II, «Message to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences: On Evolution», 22 October 1996, http://www.ewtn.com/library/PAPALDOC/JP961022.HTM (Last accessed: 24.02.2008). 39 MICHAEL RUSE and EDWARD O. WILSON, «Evolution of Ethics», in: J. E. HUCHINGSON (ed.), Religion and the Natural Sciences: The Range of Engagement, Harcourt Brace, Orlando, 1993 (quoted in: JEFFREY P. SCHLOSS, «Evolutionary Accounts of Altruism & the Problem of Goodness by Design», in: WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI (ed.), Mere Creation: Science, Faith & Intelligent Design, InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove, Ill., 1998, p. 236 [236-261]).


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time? It seems that one can be consistent theistic evolutionist only after crucial reinterpretation of theistic doctrine or of evolutionary theory.

METHODOLOGICAL

NATURALISM AND THE TRUTH

Consider the following remark made by a theoretical physicist and Nobel Prize winner, Steven Weinberg: «only way that any sort of science can proceed is to assume that there is no divine intervention and to see how far one can get with this assumption» 40. It seems Weinberg suggests here that science could encounter something that it wouldn’t be able to explain and scientists will have to admit that explanation of this is beyond the competence of science, but may be explained by theology or philosophy. However, the methodological naturalist always could hope that natural explanation, filling a gap in the scientific knowledge, will be found in the future. In the framework of naturalistic science there exists no criterion suggesting to scientists when they should abandon that hope. Nonnaturalistic criterions, on the other hand, are ignored and recognized as unscientific. Such an attitude could in turn lead to a situation when a scientist would prefer to place credit in speculations lacking appropriate support of evidence. For example, the advocate of such a position is the origin of life researcher Robert Shapiro: «Some future day may yet arrive when all reasonable chemical experiments run to discover a probable origin for life have failed unequivocally. Further, new geological evidence may indicate a sudden appearance of life on the earth. Finally, we may have explored the universe and found no trace of life, or process leading to life, elsewhere. In such a case, some scientist might choose to turn to religion for an answer. Others, however, myself included, would attempt to sort out the surviving less probable scientific explanations in the hope of selecting one that was still more likely than the remainder» 41.

Loyalty to principle of methodological naturalism, interpreted as a necessary condition of scientific theories, entails a requirement that scientists have to look only for materialistic explanations. But in case when reality cannot be appropriately described in such a way, this loyalty could lead to a common acceptance of a false picture of the world – at least in societies where science enjoys considerable respect. If we acknowledge that scientists’ aim should be the attempt to develop a theory describing the real world, i.e. a true theory of the natural world, then if an intelligent agent has intervened and/or intervenes in nature and methodological naturalism is recognized as a necessary condition of scientific theories, the picture of the world provided by science so understood is inherently untrue. As Dembski noted: 40 STEVEN WEINBERG, Dreams of a Final Theory: The Search for the Fundamental Laws of Nature, Pantheon, New York, 1992, p. 247. 41 ROBERT SHAPIRO, Origins: A Skeptic’s Guide to the Creation of Life on Earth, Summit Books, New York, 1983, p. 130 (quoted in: MICHAEL J. BEHE, Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution, The Free Press, New York, 1996, p. 234).


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«(…) methodological naturalism isn’t saying that we have to encounter empirical evidence of design in nature but we should stay open to it in case it comes along. Rather, methodological naturalism insists that one is most logical, most scientific, if one pretends such an empirical possibility is logically impossible. Instead of holding methodological naturalism as a working hypothesis, methodological naturalists hold it as a dogma» 42.

It follows that if scientists would encounter some compelling evidence of design in biological systems, being restricted by methodological naturalism, they would have to ignore it and search for a natural, and therefore false, explanation. This problem would vanish if methodological naturalism – but merely in the sense of naturalism-artificialism opposition – will be treated only as a working hypothesis, leading to successes in scientific practice, i.e. to finding natural explanations, and not excluding teleological explanations by a convenient definition of science. But in that case, science must allow theories incompatible with methodological naturalism. As to relation of science and religion, the prospect in which we surely cannot say about conflict between them is the instrumentalist understanding of scientific theories. According to this view, scientific theories are regarded only as tools to organize our experience and tools are nor true nor false. They are valuable because of their usefulness for technological progress or for making predictions – simply speaking, they make our lives much easier and safer. One problem concerning instrumentalist understanding of scientific theories is that it isn’t clear what is the value of the theories about origin and past development of nature if not just the correspondence with reality. After all, what we want to achieve studying course of historical events if not the knowledge about the real events in a true history? Naturalistic science and theistic religions are clearly in conflict if we adopt a realistic interpretation of scientific theories and theistic doctrine, i.e. if we accept that their claims refer to objective reality and describe «how things really are». In our culture, however, science is the source of adequate description of reality. Nor metaphysical naturalists nor theistic evolutionists regard scientific theories only as tools. In practice, methodological naturalism leads to acceptance of metaphysical naturalism which, on the other hand, justifies the acceptance of methodological naturalism as the best way to know the reality. Scientific theories refer to reality and what they say is restricted by principle of methodological naturalism. The naturalistic picture of the world given by science is essentially different from the one given by religion. It is the reason why methodological naturalism leads to conflict between science and religion. CONCLUSIONS We have reached the following conclusions: 1) in practice, methodological naturalism leads to acceptance of ontological naturalism which in turn justifies 42 WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, The Design Revolution: Answering the Toughest Questions about Intelligent Design, InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove, Ill., 2004, p. 171.


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the acceptance of methodological naturalism as the best method to know the reality; 2) if science is to be an enterprise devoted to seeking the truth about reality, then methodological naturalism – but only in the sense of naturalism-artificialism opposition – couldn’t be regarded as the necessary condition of scientific theories; 3) if we accept realistic interpretation of scientific theories, then methodological naturalism conflicts science with religion; and 4) theistic evolution does not seem to be a proper way to reconcile Darwinism and, more generally, methodological naturalism with theism. Evolution can be interpreted theistically, but it is not the way in which majority of modern scientists and respectable scientific institutions understand it. University of Zielona Gora Institute of Philosophy Chair of Logic and Philosophy of Science Al. Wojska Polskiego 71 A 65-762 Zielona Gora [email protected] [email protected]

Piotr Bylica, Ph. D. Dariusz Sagan, M. A.



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MATHEMATICS, REASON & RELIGION JAVIER LEACH Universidad Complutense de Madrid

ABSTRACT: This paper will study the relationship between mathematics and religion from the perspective of reason and the role played by reason in human knowledge. Firstly, I will study the relationship between reason, logic and mathematics. From this starting point, I will study the relationship between reason and natural science and finally, I will draw some conclusions on the relationship between reason, philosophy and theology. The relationship between mathematics, reason and religion will be studied within the context of the global unity of human knowledge. This paper intends to explain how the ‘pure deductive reason’ is present in all human thinking. Mathematics and natural science share this universal presence with metaphysics and religion. Pure deductive reasoning is somehow an absolute value that transcends all aspects and levels of human knowledge, including metaphysical and religious knowledge. Metaphysical and theological arguments need to be able to span different cultural communities. Pure deductive reasoning is a kind of reasoning that can fully span communities and it forms a basis for interdisciplinary, inter-cultural and inter-religious communication. KEY WORDS: mathematics, reason, pure deductive reason, logic, natural science, metaphysics, religión, revelation.

Matemática, Razón y Religión RESUMEN: En este artículo voy a estudiar la interrelación entre matemática y religión desde el punto de vista de la razón y del papel de ésta en el conocimiento humano. En primer lugar estudiaré la relación entre la razón, la lógica y la matemática. Partiendo de ahí estudiaré la relación entre la razón y las ciencias de la naturaleza y por último sacaré conclusiones acerca de la relación entre la razón, la filosofía y la teología. Estudiaré la relación entre matemáticas, razón y religión dentro del contexto de la unidad global del conocimiento humano. Este artículo pretende explicar la presencia y el rol de la ‘pura razón deductiva’ en el conocimiento humano. La matemática y las ciencias de la naturaleza comparten esa presencia universal con la metafísica y la religión. La pura razón deductiva es de algún modo un valor absoluto que trasciende todos los aspectos y todos los niveles del conocimiento humano, incluyendo el conocimiento metafísico y religioso. Los argumentos metafísicos y religiosos necesitan ser capaces de alcanzar a las distintas comunidades culturales. La pura razón deductiva es capaz de alcanzar a todas las comunidades y constituye una base para la comunicación inter-disciplinar, intercultural e inter-religiosa. PALABRAS CLAVE: matemática, razón, pura razón deductiva, lógica, ciencias de la naturaleza, metafísica, religión, revelación.

INTRODUCTION At first sight, it appears that mathematics and religion are two different and unconnected topics; that the one has nothing to do with the other. History however demonstrates how many thinkers have discovered different kinds of relationship between mathematics and religion. We know that the Pythagoreans gave certain mathematical structures a religious meaning 1. In the last few years, 1 PRIYA HEMENWAY, Divine Proportion: Phi In Art, Nature, and Science, Sterling Publishing Company Inc., 2005, p. 56.



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some interesting ideas have surfaced on the relationship between mathematics and religion 2. I will study the relationship between mathematics and religion from the perspective of reason. The concept of reason has been used in various ways in different contexts. Generally speaking, reason is linked to the human ability to structure, assimilate and convey knowledge. Of all the sciences, it is mathematics and logic that most clearly and precisely use reason. Developments in the last 150 years in both the fields of mathematics and logic have shown that we can consider mathematical logic to be a part of mathematics. Through mathematics and logic, reason has taken on great importance in scientific knowledge. But reason is not only linked to mathematics and logic. As we will see throughout this paper and in broad terms, reason is linked to the ability to structure and make conveyable all kinds of human knowledge. I will consider the relationship between mathematics, reason and religion within the context of the global unity of human knowledge. Within the unitary and global reality of human knowledge, I will aim to uncover the specific role played by reason. Two poles or extremes can be identified within human knowledge. Using a geometric image, human knowledge can be illustrated as a sphere or an ellipsoid with two hemispheres and two poles. One of the hemispheres of knowledge unifies reason and the other hemisphere contains multiple perceptions through which knowledge receives new experiences and senses. Logic, mathematics and language are inside the hemisphere of reason. In this hemisphere of reason, knowledge is actively organised and can be conveyed. The other hemisphere of human knowledge is the hemisphere of experiences, perceptions, observations, feelings and emotions. In this hemisphere, called the hemisphere of experience or perception, knowledge is receptive and increases with new perceptions. It is impossible to separate these hemispheres without destroying the internal unity of knowledge. Without the hemisphere of reason, human knowledge becomes obscure and cannot be conveyed. Without the hemisphere of experience, knowledge becomes isolated and impoverished. This paper will essentially study knowledge from the pole of reason, which I will call the pole of pure deductive reason. I will consider the importance and influence of this pole not only in relation to the areas or aspects of knowledge within the hemisphere of reason that are directly under its influence, but also in relation to the areas and aspects within the other hemisphere of knowledge that depends more directly on experiences and perceptions. Finally, I will pay special attention to the relationship between reason and experience in global philosophical and religious intuition and views. This paper will continuously bear in mind both the global unity of human knowledge and the bipolar approach to this knowledge. It is important to remember however that this is not a simple bipolar approach whereby the specific 2 RUSSELL W. HOWELL and W. JAMES BRADLEY (eds.), Mathematics in a Postmodern Age: A Christian Perspective, Wm. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2001; JOHN BYL, The Divine Challenge: on Matter, Mind, Math and Meaning, Banner of Truth Trust, 2004.


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characteristics inherent in each aspect of knowledge can be fully explained from just two poles. The general bipolar nature of knowledge can also be seen in the individual and specific areas of knowledge, such as mathematical knowledge or logical knowledge, which are also bipolar. Although logic and mathematics are areas of knowledge within the hemisphere of reason, we will also discover an internal local bipolarity: one pole is more intuitive, receptive and somehow more experiential and the other pole is more active and rational (Figure 1). This local bipolarity of logic and mathematics will help us to clarify the internal nature of the rationality inherent in logic and mathematics. This analysis of logical and mathematical rationality will lead us to the final extreme of the pole of reason, which I will call the pole of pure deductive reason. Pure deductive reason is located at the edge of the hemisphere of reason and its ability to rationally clarify and structure not only effects logic, mathematics and other realities that are within the hemisphere of reason, such as natural languages, but also all human knowledge as a whole and especially philosophical and religious knowledge.

FIGURE 1

The first part of this paper will study the nature of mathematics and mathematical logic as realities that fall within the hemisphere of reason, but which are likewise bipolar. Mathematics also has two poles and two hemispheres (Figure 2): the different kinds of logic responsible for providing internal coherence to the many mathematical intuitions are in the rational mathematical hemisphere. The other, more receptive, hemisphere contains mathematical intuitions, received and taken in by the mathematician in a contemplative or passive way. Mathematical intuitions begin to take on a structure when they become statements and axioms in a mathematical language. There are also two hemispheres and two poles in relation to logic (Figure 3). Pure deductive reason is at one extreme. At the other extreme there are different logic-based intuitions and views that are also expressed in logical statements and axioms, which in turn can be analysed in a standard way from the pole of pure deductive reason. I will show how the pole of pure deductive PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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FIGURE 2

FIGURE 3

reason not only brings dynamic unity, clarity and objectivity to logic and mathematics, but also how it brings dynamic unity, clarity and objectivity to the rest of human knowledge. The dynamic unity and clarity demonstrated by the pole of pure deductive reason cannot be separated from the plurality and complexity inherent in the different kinds of experiences, intuitions, perceptions and feelings required to produce all kinds of knowledge. I intend to show how in mathematics, empirical science and theology, deductive reason interlinks a variety of fields where there are many intuitions, perceptions, observations, views, feelings and emotions. In summary, I will aim to show how the hemisphere of reason is based on a pole or extreme of pure deductive reason, which in turn gives structure to a large amount of human knowledge, both scientific and religious. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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The second part of the paper will consider the rationality of empirical knowledge. Empirical knowledge (Figure 4) also has two poles and two hemispheres. The hemisphere of reason contains logic and mathematics. The hemisphere of experience contains scientific observations. In the centre, connecting both hemispheres, are scientific hypotheses, which will form the basis of scientific and mathematical theories once they have been formulated in a suitable language.

FIGURE 4

In the third part of the paper, I will consider the rationality of global religious views. As a result of their own nature, global religious views need to be conveyed and they therefore need to be reasonable. The quasi-absolute nature of the pole of deductive reason has meant that at times, reason is seen to compete with and antagonise religion, while at other times, reason has helped support different religious views.

1.

THE

HEMISPHERE OF REASON

Firstly, we need to be aware that when we talk about reason, we are not always saying the same thing; the meaning of the word varies. Reason has been linked to language, to logic, to the mind, to the conscience, etc. Distinctions have also been made between theoretical reason, which considers how things are, and practical reason, whereby we justify our actions. In this paper, I will try to provide a clear, simple and specific view of reason, focusing on mathematics. Before dealing with reason from a mathematical point of view, I will provide a brief summary of some aspects of reason that go beyond mathematics. Reason and natural language. Mathematics is a formal language developed in close connection with natural languages. Many different natural languages PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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have appeared in the context of different communities and cultures (English, Chinese, Hindu, Arabic, Spanish, etc.). Distinctions can be made between different natural languages as a result of their use of different words and sounds and because they have different grammatical rules that refer to different syntax and semantics. All the different syntax of natural languages however share a relationship with the human race, a common reality among all men and women that enables them to communicate with each other. Reason is an essential characteristic of human communication and languages are the basic tool. Syntactic analysis of languages shows how the rationality shared by the human condition can be seen in syntactic and grammatical similarities between different natural languages. These syntactic similarities demonstrate the unity of human reason. The highest level of unity is shown in the most deeply rooted syntax, where the same structures found in mathematical logic appear in different ways. For example, the conjunctions «y», «pero», «and», «but», «und», and «aber» convey in three different languages and in two different ways the same conjunction used in mathematical logic to connect two statements confirming that the two are true. Another example uses the conjunctions «o», «or» and «oder», which convey in three different languages the same logical disjunction, although here there is a certain ambivalence in the natural languages: for example, in the sentence «Juan prays or smokes», the statement can be considered true both if Juan only prays or only smokes, as well as if he does both at the same time. In the formal languages used in mathematics, ambivalence is not allowed and in the first case an exclusive disjunctive is used and in the second case, an inclusive disjunctive. However, although there is no conjunction in Spanish used in an explicitly disjunctive manner and no conjunction used in an explicitly exclusive way, in Spanish it is easy to explain the disjunction’s inclusive and exclusive use. This is the case in all natural languages: although there is no explicit use of a logical mathematical structure in natural language, we can always explain the meaning of logical structures in mathematics in the natural language. The fact that we can explain basic logical structures used in mathematics in any natural language enables us to translate mathematical proofs into any language. To summarise, we can assert that in mathematical logic is present the deeply-rooted rational unity of the different natural languages. Reason and the human mind. Reason has also been linked to the human mind. The mind is the most specific phenomenon of human nature; in some ways, mental activities could be considered to be the most specifically human of activities. There is a wide-ranging, rich and lively debate around the qualities that characterise the human mind; beyond this debate, we can assert that rationality is a characteristic specific to the human mind. At the same time as they are made up of feelings and emotions, activities of the human mind are governed by basic rational structures that make them coherent and conveyable. The human mind is able to construct rational models that represent reality and to use these models to act in a reasonable way with other human beings, thus changing reality. In order to construct these rational models, the human mind PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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uses concepts to convey perceptions and knowledge; the mind formulates qualities in relation to the things it has perceived; and the mind structures its ideas in a rational way linking concepts. As we will see, there are different kinds of rational model, but mathematics plays a fundamental role in all these models when demonstrating their rational nature. Rational coherence and the human conscience. Human beings are also characterised by having reached a high level of awareness. A human being’s conscience manages to create a whole sense of the world and of itself that distinguishes the human condition from other living beings with a lower level of awareness. The ability to reason is an essential characteristic that allows the human conscience to reach a higher level of internal coherence in the way it perceives the world. The ability to use thought and reasoning to capture the internal coherence of what is perceived is a characteristic specific to the human conscience. The critical rigor inherent in mathematics also demonstrates the highest level of coherence that can be expressed in a rational way. Theoretical reason and practical reason. Finally, we can draw a distinction between two basic types of human reasoning; reasoning about how things are or about how we should act. Theoretical reason is used to justify our certainty and doubt about how things are. Practical reason is used when we justify our actions. Theoretical reasoning is linked to statements about how things are. These statements are often called declaratives. For example, «today it is raining» is a declarative statement that attributes the quality of rain to today; «John is clever» is another declarative statement that asserts a quality belonging to John. Using theoretical reasoning, we can deduce declarative statements from other declarative statements. Theoretical reason analyses facts in an impersonal and public way, facts which are in theory accessible to anyone. Natural and social sciences use theoretical reason. Theoretical reason makes practical reason possible. Before we decide to act in the world, we need to know how the world is. Theoretical reason justifies our beliefs about the world, transcendence and God. Practical reason justifies our actions in accordance with our beliefs. Using practical reasoning we think about how we should act. Practical reasoning is linked to normative statements. For example, «you must eat to live» is a normative statement. Practical reason is used when we justify our actions. Using practical reasoning we justify the options we take in situations where several different options are open to us. Practical reason is about clarifying which option is best. While theoretical reason aims to explain how things are, practical reason aims to assess events adequately in order to determine which option is best. Practical reason assesses and weighs up the facts from an individual and group point of view depending on whether individual or group decisions need to be made. There are links between theoretical and practical reason and there can be no contradiction between the two. Both theoretical and practical reasoning can be PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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formalised 3 and as a consequence, the critical rigor inherent in mathematics can be applied to both. Although theoretical reason alone is not sufficient to determine our actions and practical reason is also required, for methodological reasons I will focus on theoretical reason in this paper, based on the use of theoretical reason in mathematics.

2.

MATHEMATICS

AND THEORETICAL REASON

The study of how mathematics uses theoretical reason will reveal to us the deductive ability of reason, shared by both theoretical and practical reason. The critical rigor inherent in mathematical reason will demonstrate fundamental characteristics of the pole of pure deductive reason, which is located in one extreme of mathematics and logic. Logic, mathematics and language. We have considered the study of reason as a study of one pole of human knowledge seen as a global unity. Let us focus therefore on the hemisphere containing this pole of reason: this hemisphere contains logic, mathematics and language. More specifically, let’s firstly focus on mathematics as the part of language that aims to logically describe and structure mathematical intuitions. As we have said, we can see that there are also two poles and two hemispheres in mathematics. In one mathematical hemisphere there is logic and in the other, mathematical intuitions. In the middle, between the two poles, there are mathematical axioms and statements (Figure 2). Not all mathematics is pure logic. Logicism 4 dates back to the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century and aimed to reduce mathematics to logic. Logicism failed however and it was proved that mathematical knowledge cannot be reduced to logic. Opposite the pole of logic in mathematics, there is a rich and complex world of mathematical intuitions that cannot be reduced to logic. Unlike empirical intuitions, mathematical intuitions are characterised by their simplicity and clarity and this means that they can easily be structured in a logical way. In fact, it is in relation to mathematical intuitions and within the context of the study of mathematical logic that we find concepts and arguments that can clarify our ideas about the rational extreme of logic, which we call pure deductive reason. Deductive reason and logical intuition. If we look at Figure 2, we see that mathematical logic is a part of mathematics within the mathematical ellipse in the hemisphere of reason. But there is also an internal tension between two poles in mathematical logic. Mathematical logic itself is not pure deductive reason. In one pole of logic there is deductive reason and in the other logical intuitions 3 GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, «Norms, Truth and Logic», in GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, Philosophical Papers I. Practical Reason, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983; trans. by CARLOS CABRERA ALARCÓN, Normas, verdad y lógica, Fontamara, México, 1997. 4 Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) & Bertrand Russell are the best known advocates of this logistical movement.


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(Figure 3). If mathematical logic were pure deductive reason, all logic would be the same or certain logical questions could be narrowed down into others. But not all logic is the same, not all logic accepts the same basic intuitions. The principle of excluded middle for example is accepted by classical mathematical logic, but not by constructivist logic 5. There is no reason why all logicians have to accept the excluded middle principle 6. The excluded middle principle is based on an intuition that is accepted by classical mathematics, which constitutes the majority of mathematical statements and proofs, but which is not accepted by constructivist mathematics. The excluded middle principle is a logical axiom and is located between the pole of deductive reason and the pole of logical intuitions (Figure 3). Pure deductive reason. Pure deductive reason answers questions about the reason for things: Why? Pure deductive reason does not assign this question a specific object. The pure question about reason can be applied to any object of knowledge. At the beginning of this paper, I considered the idea of knowledge as a reality containing two extremes or poles and I have also said that this is not a simple bipolar approach whereby everything can be explained using just these two poles. By studying the hemisphere of reason, where we have placed logic, mathematics and language, we have described a new polarities within logic and mathematics that help us to clarify the concept of reason. The pole of pure deductive reason with the question Why? is at one edge of the hemisphere of reason and is applied to much logic and mathematics. But pure deductive reason is not only applied to logic and mathematics; pure deductive reason is a pole of all rational knowledge and by studying it we can also clarify other realities of human knowledge and in particular, scientific, philosophical and religious views.

3.

THE

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MATHEMATICS

Up until this point, we have broadly discussed reason, mathematics and logic, but without specifying in detail what we are referring to when we speak of mathematics and logic. Below is a more detailed summary of what is meant by mathematics. To do this, we need to look at the historical development of logic and mathematics starting with important historical events and moments that have caused cultural changes in the world of mathematics and which have 5 The principle of excluded middle asserts that given a statement A, A is either false or true. Constructivist logic does not accept that one of the two possibilities A or not A is inevitably true, only that the two possibilities cannot be true at the same time, as we would be faced with a contradiction. Constructivist logicians can only assert A when A can be proved and can only assert not A when not A can be proved, but if neither A nor not A can be proved, we cannot assert: «A or not A». 6 In order to understand these ideas it is important to distinguish between the excluded middle principle that states that «A or not A» is true and the principle of no-contradiction that states that «A and not A» cannot be both true.


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resulted in the vision we have today of logic and mathematics. This historical summary will help us to see how mathematics has changed and to discover the role that mathematics has taken on over time in human knowledge and also how mathematics has helped to clarify the role of reason in knowledge and, more particularly, the role of pure deductive reason in knowledge. The relationship between mathematics and empirical science has been a very important factor in the historical development of mathematics. As well as its intrinsic value, mathematics has become the basic tool used by natural sciences to express the laws of nature. Defining scientific laws using mathematical statements has provided them and scientific reasoning based on them with the highest level of rigor and accuracy. But the aim of this paper was not to limit myself to just mathematics and natural sciences. Further on, I will comment on the use of pure deductive reason in metaphysics and theology using the way in which reason is understood in mathematics. In this paper, I intend to show that the rigor of mathematical reasoning is not only useful and necessary in natural sciences, but also in metaphysics and theology. Mathematics in different cultural and historical contexts. In line with both the holistic and bipolar approach to knowledge that I considered at the beginning of this paper, I will not describe mathematics as an isolated science to be studied without relation to other subjects. From a holistic point of view of knowledge, mathematics is not understood as an isolated subject. By studying the relationship between mathematics and other kinds of knowledge throughout the different historical and cultural moments experienced by mathematics, we will have a better understanding of the true nature of mathematics. From a bipolar diversity approach to knowledge, we are however able to isolate mathematics as part of the hemisphere of reason and study it separately. During the first half of the 20th century, much thought was given to mathematics itself. The study of pure mathematics, as considered during the first half of the 20th century, became so independent that it tried to back up mathematics with mathematical methods. The study of mathematics using mathematical methods is called metamathematics. Metamathematical reflection has clarified very important issues about the nature of mathematics. Before mathematics had developed sufficiently and was mature and independent enough for metamathematics to be considered, there was an historic process of growth and development that lasted centuries and which shone much light on the nature of mathematics. Mathematics has grown and developed over different periods throughout history. Historical analysis of the complex development of mathematics helps us to gain a better understanding of what mathematics is in itself and in relation to other knowledge. Three historical periods of mathematics. I will highlight three historical periods in the development of mathematics: 1. Pre-modern mathematics. Premodern mathematics spanned a historical period that started when man learned to count and measure for the first time up until the advent of modern science around the beginning of the 17th century. 2. Modern mathematics. Science in the modern age began a new stage in relation to mathematics. The mathematical PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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formulation of the empirical laws of nature is characteristic of modern science. 3. Post-modern mathematics. This third period is characterised by the formal rigor of mathematics as an independent science capable of being founded in itself (in part). 3.1.

The pre-modern period

The pre-modern period stands out for two reasons: (a) During this period, mathematics appears as a formal science. Mathematical formalisms are used for the first time. (b) Although the origin of mathematical formalisms cannot be separated from the use of these formalisms in trade, the measuring of fields and in astronomy, the pre-modern period in mathematics is characterised by the fact that mathematics was still not applied to physics as a structured science. (a)

The use of formalisms in the pre-modern period

Thousands of years ago, human beings carried out formal mathematical reasoning. The first historical evidence of signs, lines, knots and other symbols used to represent numbers dates back around 50,000 years 7. This evidence proves the existence of primitive mathematical reasoning. Similar formal reasoning has been applied for thousands of years in different situations. Man began to use mathematical reasoning when he started to represent the first numbers 1, 2, 3, etc., with different kinds of formalisms and to convey these formalisms with words. When numbers were first expressed vocally, different words were probably used to represent different objects. The word «two» was not the same when used to mean two men or two horses for example. In English, we still distinguish between: Team of horses, span of mules, yoke of oxen, brace of partridge, pair of shoes, couple of days 8. Words became standardised and abstract calculations began to made, such as three minus one equals two, which could be used in different situations: if I have three apples and I give two to somebody, then I will be left with one; the same will happen if I have three fish and I give two to somebody. Formal axiomatic methodologies appear in the pre-modern period of mathematics. Euclid’s Elements (323 BC to 283 BC) is a geometric treatise that introduces geometric statements that can be deduced from a small set of axioms. Geometry that is deduced from the axioms in the Elements is currently called Euclidean geometry. The deductive axiomatic method presented by Euclid in the Elements is still the most common method in mathematics of deducing statements using axioms. The deductive axiomatic method begins by defining a set of axioms whose truth is obvious and using these axioms, other statements 7 HOWARD EVES, An Introduction to the History of Mathematics, Ed. Saunders College Publishing, 1992, p. 9. 8 HOWARD EVES, An Introduction to the History of Mathematics, Ed. Saunders College Publishing, 1992, p. 11.


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in a theory can be deduced. Euclidean geometry forms part of the foundations of current geometry studies. In the 19th century, Nikolai Ivanovich Lobachevski (1792-1856) developed non-Euclidean based geometry for the first time. Lobachevski’s geometry was different from Euclid’s in that it accepted the first four axioms in Euclid’s geometry, but rejected the fifth. Nowadays, Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry co-exist as two kinds of geometry that are deduced using two different sets of axioms. Mathematical axioms. Mathematical axioms are formal postulates that can be accepted or rejected, but they cannot be falsified by an observation. Mathematical axioms are accepted as true because they are perceived as such by mathematical intuition, but there is no argument, regardless of intuition, that requires an axiom to be accepted or rejected. For example, the appearance of non-Euclidean geometry does not negate the validity of Euclidean geometry. There is no empirical observation that confirms one kind of geometry and falsifies the other. Mathematical axioms are independent of empirical observation. The fundamental difference between mathematical axioms and scientific hypotheses inherent in empirical science, is that mathematical axioms are accepted on the basis of mathematical intuitions, whereas scientific hypotheses are induced from experience and are confirmed by other new experiences and by their logical coherence to other scientific hypotheses. As we will see however, although mathematical axioms belong to a world that is autonomous and independent of empirical observation, the mathematical theories deduced from them can be applied to empirical explanations. Whereas traditional Euclidean geometry can explain the empirical phenomena of Newtonian physics, Einstein’s theory of relativity is explained using non-Euclidean geometry. Formal logic. In the pre-modern period, a formal methodology began to be developed for logical arguments. Aristotle was the first philosopher to study the formal laws of logic in a systematic way. In fact, the laws of logic suggested by Aristotle, together with later contributions by stoic philosophers, are almost the only systematic and scientific study of the laws of logical reasoning up until the 19th century. Formal logic and language syntax. Aristotle suggested a certain kind of formal argument called syllogism. A syllogism contains two statements called premises, which have a certain syntactic shape to them and a statement called a conclusion, which also has a certain syntactic shape. The conclusion is only deduced from the premises because of the syntactic shape of the premises and the conclusion. Aristotle’s syllogisms and the stoic philosophers’ formal logic were based on the syntactical shape of language. The development of formal logic after Aristotle and the stoic philosophers was almost non-existent until the beginning of the post-modern period of mathematics towards the middle of the 19th century. Categorical logic. Aristotle’s logic is categorical in the sense that for Aristotle, a statement about a ‘fact’ is either true or false. Although we may not know whether the statement is true of false when we make it, the statement is always PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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‘objectively’ true or false. In other words, it is true or false regardless of whether we know it or not. In Metaphysics 9 Aristotle defines truth as: «To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true». According to this classical view of the truth, a statement is true when we can form a correspondence between what is asserted and the ‘object’ about which we are asserting something. This classical view of the truth is also called truth as correspondence, because it is based on the correspondence between a statement and the object to which the statement refers. Truth as correspondence. The view of truth as correspondence characterised mathematics up until the 20th century. Logical positivism took on this view particularly in the first half of the 20th century. As we will see, this view of the truth caused problems during the post-modern period in mathematics. The problem lies in the fact that the definition of truth as a correspondence between a statement and an object assumes that reality is made up of a set of objects about which we can make a set of statements that will be true or not, according to whether the statements correspond to the objects referred to or not. In other words, this view of the truth as correspondence assumes that reality is made up of a set of different and distinguishable objects. And the assumption that reality is made up of a set of different and distinguishable objects caused problems in the post-modern period for both mathematical and empirical reasons. (b)

The division of mathematics and physics in the pre-modern period

Mathematics and physics. During the pre-modern period, the relationship between mathematics and physics was still weak. Aristotle’s physics (384 BC to 322 BC) was very important in the pre-modern period. In fact, Aristotle’s physics was taught in Europe until the 17th century. Aristotle’s physics does not study the causes of physical phenomena using quantitative methods and mathematics, as happens in modern physics. Based on a modern view of speculative, nonempirical criteria, Aristotle distinguishes between four causes: material, formal, efficient and final. The empirical and mathematical study of modern physics has brought together these causes. Aristotle’s’ works were studied and spread by Arabic philosophers like Avicena (980-1037), Avempace (1080-1138) and Averroes (1126-1198). Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) incorporated Aristotle’s philosophical beliefs into Christian theology. For purely speculative reasons, Aristotle thought that the laws governing the movement of stars were different from the laws governing the movement of earthly bodies. Mathematics and reality. The first physicist to discredit Aristotle was Galileo (1564-1642), based on modern scientific criteria. Empirical observations and 9

ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, 1011b25.


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mathematical calculations led Galileo to assert that the earth was just another planet. Galileo defended a mathematical explanation of the laws of nature: Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which stands continuously open to our gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language and interpret the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, without which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it; without these one is wandering about in a dark labyrinth 10. 3.2.

The modern period

The modern period was characterised by the use of mathematics to describe the scientific laws of nature. Mathematics was first used to describe the laws of physics and later the quantitative mathematical methods that have crossed over into other sciences such as chemistry, biology and sociology, etc. Empirical hypotheses and mathematical axioms. Isaac Newton (1643-1727) demonstrated that the mathematical laws governing mechanics are the same on earth as those that govern celestial bodies. Newton’s law of universal gravitation can be applied to all bodies. The uniformity of this law is a scientific hypothesis. Unlike Euclid’s mathematical axioms, the law of universal gravitation can be falsified by subsequent observations and it was indeed falsified, as understood by Newton, by observations explained using the laws of relativistic mechanics. Rational optimism. Mathematics is a formal science and the laws expressed through mathematics are mechanic and automatic. Alongside Newton, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716) developed infinitesimal calculus with a possibly clearer formal notation, which helped its development. Leibniz’ huge formal and mathematical ability meant that he took modern optimism as far as possible, being able to explain mathematically all of nature’s laws. Leibniz’ optimism led him to express the principle of sufficient reason, which states that all events can be explained. The principle of sufficient reason understood in mathematical language represents the optimistic side of the mathematical representation of the laws of nature. Formal optimism also led Leibniz to think that all debates between two willing people could be resolved by formalizing the arguments. Leibniz’ optimism led to a logical belief in the causal determinism of the laws of nature. The narrowing down of causes to mathematics and mathematical optimism led to an almost inevitable belief in causal determinism. Causal determinism. Pierre-Simon Laplace 11 (1749-1827) believed in causal determinism. Laplace believed that, just as astronomical phenomena could be 10 GALILEO GALILEI, Opere, 4, 171 (translation into English as quoted by Machamer in the Cambridge Companion to Galileo, p. 64f). 11 Laplace developed Newton’s mechanics. Laplace’s equations are important, as is his partial differential equation.


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predicted by Newton’s laws, all phenomena could be predicted using the location and momentum of the atoms making up material. Laplace explained his determinist view by saying that if there were a demon that new the location and momentum of all the atoms in the universe at any given moment, this demon would be able to predict all future events using Newton’s equations. Wide variety of scientific disciplines. Throughout the modern period, mathematics was applied to other sciences such as chemistry, biology, geology and many branches of medicine. Units of measurement for volume, length, time, intensity of electric current, temperature, light, etc. were established and mathematics was incorporated into more and more areas of scientific knowledge. 3.3.

The post-modern period

The most characteristic feature of mathematics in the post-modern period is possibly the development of the deductive reason of logic. The deductive reason of logic. Formal logic had not developed further since Aristotle. The causal determinism of the modern period assumed that the causes described by mathematical laws created a complete system of causes through which each of its effects could be predicted. But this assumption was not proved. Modern mathematicians did not understand the logical rules governing mathematical language and the semantics of mathematics was not clear either. Neither the semantics nor the syntax of the mathematical language was accurately known. Two levels of language analysis. A first level of analysis of classical mathematical logic is the logic of propositions. A second and more subtle level is the logic of predicates. The logic of propositions. The logic of propositions was studied by the stoic philosophers. George Boole (1815-1864) carried out the first full study on the logic of propositions using formal algebraic methods 12. Propositional logic only analyses mathematical statements up to the level of basic atomic propositions. An atomic proposition is a mathematical statement that can be either true or false and is not made up of other more simple atomic statements. Atomic propositions are connected using syntactic connectives, thus forming molecular propositions. «And», «or», «only when» are examples of syntactic connectives. For example, «John eats and Louise dances» and «John eats only when Louise dances» are two molecular propositions formed using the basic atomic propositions «John eats» and «Louise dances». From an atomic physics point of view, the logic of propositions 12 GEORGE BOOLE, The mathematical analysis of logic, New York: Philosophical Library, 1948 (first published in 1847. Cambridge: Macmillan, Barclay, & Macmillan; London: George Bell); GEORGE BOOLE, An Investigation of the Laws of Thought, Prometeus Books, New York, 2000 (first published in 1854).


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only analyses language up to the level of atoms, without analysing electrons and elementary particles. The logic of predicates. The logic of predicates analyses the inside of atomic statements. Inside atomic statements, the logic of predicates discovers quantifiers that refer to a certain domain and predicates whose meaning is also interpreted in a certain domain. The quantifiers required to express all mathematical statements are the universal «all» (∀) and the existential «exists» (∃). Aristotle had already used universal and existential quantifiers as the basic elements of syllogisms. In 1879, Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) published Begriffsschrift 13 (Concept Script) with the subtitle: «a formal language of pure thought modelled upon that of arithmetic». Begriffsschrift contains the first formal logical system to take on board all deductive reasoning in mathematics. He introduced the quantifiers ∀, ∃ and specific symbols for logical relationships. Concept Script enabled logical inferences to be represented as formal mechanical operations based only on the symbols themselves. Semantics of mathematical language. The logic of predicates as formulated by Frege offered syntactic foundations for mathematics. But these foundations were still not specific, unlike the models referred to in mathematical language. The objects referred to in mathematical statements that make the statement either true or false were not specified. Georg Cantor (1845-1918) uniformly described all mathematical objects as sets. A set is defined as a group of its elements, which at the same time can be other sets or original elements. Cantor defined a set as «a collection into a whole of definite and separate objects of our intuition or our thought». The idea of collection helped Cantor to express what mathematical objects are in a uniform way: collections of elements. As a result of set theory, mathematical logic acquired standard semantics. Mathematical logic could deal with numbers, points on a map and the seconds in the day in the same way as sets. All objects that can be dealt with by mathematics are collections of objects and mathematics deals with them as collections of objects. Paradoxes. The formal explanation of the entity of mathematical objects using set theory came up against Russell’s paradox. According to Cantor’s definition, if P is a well defined property, we can form a set of all elements with the property P. Russell’s paradox is as follows: Q is a set containing all sets that are not elements of themselves. Q is a set according to Cantor’s definition, as it collects together in a whole objects that contain a property P. If Q is a set, we will know whether Q is an element of Q or not. If however Q is an element of Q, we have to conclude that Q is not an element of Q and if Q is not an element of Q, we have to conclude that Q is an element of Q. To avoid Russell’s paradox, restrictions were placed on the cases when a well defined property defined a set. A well defined property can only define a subset of a set. With this restricted definition, all mathematical objects can be constructed avoiding Russell’s paradox. 13 GOTTLOB FREGE, Begriffsschrift: eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle, 1879.


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The search for completeness. Avoiding mathematical paradoxes prevented contradictions, but this did not go far enough to test the complete causal determinism suggested by modern science. In 1920, David Hilbert (1862-1943) aimed to prove that all mathematical statements can be deduced using a set of axioms in a consistent way, in other words, without arriving at a contradiction. For Hilbert, mathematical axioms were statements about signs whose meaning is clear prior to all argument 14. 0 and 1 for example are signs and when an element belongs to a set it is also a sign because it’s meaning is clear prior to all arguments. An example of an axiom in set theory is the statement that says that if two sets contain the same elements, then they are the same. By proving that all mathematics could be consistently deduced using a set of axioms, which at the same time could be mechanically built, Hilbert aimed to provide mathematics with complete deductive reason. If Hilbert’s programme was successful, all mathematics could be deduced with complete formal rigor using certain obvious axioms for mathematical intuition. Incomplete deductive reason. Kurt Gödel (1906-1978) proved that whenever arithmetic axioms do not lead to a contradiction (i.e. a proposition of the A ∧ ¬A kind), there will be a proposition U, which is valid in arithmetic models but which cannot be deduced in the arithmetic system. In other words, it cannot be effectively deduced in the formal arithmetic system if U is deduced from axioms or not. Therefore, we cannot «decide» if U belongs to the system or not. Gödel also proved that if arithmetic is consistent, the formal statement that expresses arithmetic consistency can not be proved within this arithmetic system. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem proves that deductive reason applied to arithmetic proves the incompleteness of any axiomatic arithmetic system. Logical axioms. The failure of Hilbert’s programme led to a crisis in mathematical logic, but the critical rigor of mathematical knowledge did not suffer this crisis. It was precisely this critical rigor in the proving of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem that led to the failure of Hilbert’s programme. The failure of Hilbert’s programme showed that in mathematical logic there are not only reason and critical rigor, but also logical axioms that are based on logical intuitions. Classical logic accepted the principle of excluded middle, according to which a statement is either true or false. This axiom coincides with the way logic is commonly used in mathematical reasoning. In fact, one very common type of argument in mathematics has always been the apagogical argument. An apagogical argument implicitly assumes the principal of excluded middle, in other words it implicitly assumes that A is either true or false. To argue that A is true using an apagogical argument, we assume that A is false and if we can demonstrate that this is a contradiction, then we have proved that A is false. The failure of Hilbert’s programme questioned the excluded middle axiom. Critical 14 DAVID HILBERT (1926), «Über das Unendliche», Mathematische Annalen, 95: 161-90. Lecture given Münster, 4 June 1925.


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rigor does not require the excluded middle axiom to be accepted. The excluded middle axiom can be accepted and classical mathematical logic developed or it can be rejected and constructive mathematical logic can be developed whereby we can assert that A is true or false only when we can effectively prove that A is true or we can effectively prove that A is false. L. E. J. Brouwer (1881-1966) is considered to be the founder of intuitionism 15, which is a type of constructivism. Constructivism does not accept the excluded middle logical axiom.

4.

NATURAL

SCIENCES AND DEDUCTIVE REASON

There is a gap between the formal world of mathematics and the real world of empirical science. This gap leaves a number of questions unanswered: What is the relationship between mathematics and the real world? What does a mathematician discover outside his mind when he has a mathematical intuition? Some mathematicians believe that the objects Hilbert called signs, and about which the mathematician felt direct intuition, really exist in a platonic world. But what is this platonic world? Where is this platonic world? What relationship is there between the platonic world and the real world? What is perceived by a mathematician when he senses that there is a number called one and another number called two and that the number two follows the number one in the same way as the number three follows the number two? Mathematical theories help to represent empirical observations. The use of mathematics to formulate empirical knowledge is a characteristic of modern science. Mathematics’ ability to formulate physical, biological and neuroscientific theories, etc. shows that mathematical intuition is not completely alien to empirical science; that the abstract objects in mathematics somehow exist in the real empirical world. We can only claim to fully understand and know about an empirical science when we are able to translate its statements into mathematical language. Mathematical statements and proofs written in mathematical language can be translated into any natural language. Mathematics is the most universal nucleus of natural languages. When the theory of relativity was mathematically formulated using Minkowski’s mathematical theories 16 based on non-Euclidean geometry, this theory could be explained with the same precision in a mathematical language, regardless of the words, metaphors and statements about non-mathematical symbols used in the empirical and physical explanation of this theory. Mathematical formulation and technological application. The mathematical formulation of theories enables them to be applied to technology. For example, the precise and mechanical nature of the mathematical explanation of the theory 15 L. E. J. BROUWER, On the significance of the principle of excluded middle in mathematics, especially in function theory, 1923. 16 S. WALTER, The non-Euclidean style of Minkowskian relativity. The Symbolic Universe, J. Gray (ed.), Oxford University Press, 1999.


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of relativity makes possible technological applications such as cathode rays, particle accelerators and GPS systems. Formal mathematical language enables descriptions of the mechanical processes used in machines and the instructions given so that machines can work mechanically to be written. Communication between man and machines is carried out using a formal mathematical language. Mathematical proof is a mechanical process itself. Mathematical theories cannot fully represent empirical observations. Minkowski’s mathematical theories are only mathematical theories and their meaning is purely mathematical. The theory of relativity explains the physical behaviour of empirical reality. Minkowski’s theories do not in themselves explain the physical meaning of the theory of relativity. Empirical sciences use empirical information and mathematics does not have empirical information. There is a gap between the information dealt with in the formal abstract world of mathematics and the information from the real world of empirical science. Mathematical reasoning manipulates the information from mathematical intuitions formulated using mathematical axioms, whereas empirical science reasoning uses information from scientific hypotheses prompted by observations of empirical reality (Figure 5).

FIGURE 5

The difference between the intuition of an abstract mathematical object and a hypothetical induction using observations lies in the fact that the intuition of abstract mathematical objects cannot be contradicted by empirical observation. For example, Euclides’ fifth axiom hypothesis can be accepted or rejected, but the decision to accept of reject it does not depend on empirical observations. The acceptance or not of quantum physics hypotheses however does depend on whether these hypotheses are contradicted or confirmed by new empirical PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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observations. Empirical sciences are sciences open to empirical observation. They are based on hypotheses that explain observed facts, but which can be proved to be false by new observations. The gap between the abstract world of mathematics and the empirical world implies that natural science observations can only be partially explained using a formal mathematical language. Empirical science needs to remain open to possible new observations and to new hypotheses about these observations. Mathematical signs and scientific metaphors. In order to explain the gap between the world of mathematics and the empirical world, I will distinguish between the formal signs used by the syntax of mathematical logic and the metaphorical symbols used by the languages of natural science to represent observed objects. Formal signs are linguistic objects that represent mathematical objects. For example, +, and |0> classical bit states of the standard Computer Science. However, the number of states for each tubulin can be infinite from a quantum physics point of view, since the state of each tubulin can be defined by a superposition of alpha and beta states, in such a way that a quantum state is defined by |x>=A|alpha>+B|beta>, where A, B are complex numbers where the sum of the squares of their modules is the unity. The meaning of these numbers within Quantum Mechanics is related to the probability amplitude of that the |x>-state in a given time can collapse in either the state |alpha> (the value |A|^2) or |beta> (the value |B|^2). When this collapse is due to the environment interaction with the corresponding |x>-state it is named einselection (see Zurek 2003). This terminology refers to a genuine quantum theory action whose meaning is the selection of a given eigenstate of a physical variable (magnitude). Each eigenstate of a given physical magnitude has an associated eigenvalue which becomes determined via a secular equation H|n>=a|n>, where H is the hermitic operator defining the magnitude, |n> is the eigenstate and the a-parameter is the corresponding eigenvalue. As a consequence, there are infinite possible states for each tubulin and each given state is defined by its two complex numbers A and B. An paradigmatic metaphor that allows the clarification of the different PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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F. LÓPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE?

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philosophies within the Classical and Quantum Physics of the tubulins is the well-known Schrödinger’s cat example. This example serves for distinguishing between the standard bits and the quantum qubits. In a normal global state of a neuron or neuron set, each tubulin is in a different one-body state, i.e. each tubulin contain different A and B values and thus, the neuron is in an incoherent random state which does not contain and not store any computable information. The external excitations (stimulations) produce nervous streams that are transmitted towards brain, which starts a process that becomes represented by a quantum state in the tubulins. In principle, the individual states are different in each tubulin and the global many-tubulin state is then incoherent. The brain acts as an observer of the global state and this observation is equivalent to a measurement process in it. This process leads to the collapse of each tubulin wavefunction which implies the selection of a eigenstate of each tubulin corresponding to the eigenvalue which is the result of this measurement. When this selected state is simultaneously equal in the tubulins of a neuron, the global state of this cell coherently oscillates. The obtained coherence allows the information storing of the external excitations, since a correlation between the nervous streams produced by the external signal and the coherent global state is established. The internal coherent global state can be transmitted to the network of connected neurons by means of a Josephson-like effect similar to that occurring in superconductor-insulating-superconductor devices. There is multiple nature and structure for the dynamic reasons that are able to undo the quantum superposition of the individual tubulin states and that impel the election of a given eigenstate, either alpha or beta. As a continuation, we will give some of these reasons that are extended in the section of proposals in this paper. In September of 2007 at the Madrid Sophia-Iberia congress, several concepts from a philosophical point of view were placed in discussion with a clear symbolic and metaphoric sense in order to understand the behaviour of matter from a non experimental point of view. The most striking ideas were those concerning the existence of two kinds of matter, bosonic and fermionic, whose different structure and properties have certain similarities with those of the same physical denomination. The fermionic matter was defined, in this occasion, as the matter composed of individual and separable elements so that the properties of the whole should be considered as the sum of those of their components. In contrast, the bosonic matter was described as a global and inseparable bulk whose properties are those of the whole in itself. Obviously, the physical definition is much more precise referring to the elementary particles. The fermionic particles such as electron, proton, neutron, electronic and muonic neutrinos, etc, are defined as those particles that occupy an individual state (one-body state) and, in addition, each of these states contains only one particle. On the other hand, the bosonic particles such as photon, phonon, gluon, graviton, exciton, magnon, etc., can share any arbitrary (even infinite) number of these particles in the same state. Furthermore, other two properties distinguish the fermionic from bosonic particles: i) the first are those that suffer interactions among themselves and the second are messengers and transmitters of these interactions, ii) the fermions PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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have a half integer spin and the bosons have an integer spin (the spin is the internal angular moment which is the total angular moment in the repose reference system). The property of different spin value for each kind of particle is equivalent to that of different state occupation according to the spin-statistic principle. Another important phenomenology arises from the associations of even numbers of fermions whose resulting entities are bosons: each two half integer spin particles joined via an attractive interaction generate a new bosonic composite particle. An indefinite number of these new particles can occupy the same state and thus the global many body state of either one or several neuron cells is coherent in itself. Two examples of global coherent states are, on one hand, the case of superconductors based on electron pairs, the so-called Cooper pairs, and on the other hand, the cases of some Bose-Einstein condensate whose elemental pair components are excitons formed by electron-positron (hole) pairs. It seems that the mental and brain actions arise from the appearance of global coherent states that evolve in the neuronal lattices. We say «seems» since there is yet not a conclusive and apodictic theory that confirms and ratifies this point. The storing and reproduction properties of these global states are due to the easy intersynapses transmission of external signals via tunnel and Josephson effects. Moreover, these states become perfectly characterized with the internal parameters required in their construction. However, the issue that the global coherence implemented within the neuron lattice can be representative of assigned mental/brain actions present difficulties that do not invalidate the theory but three serious objections should be previously answered before a future and possible consolidation of this assertion. i) The dynamics in the brain are almost exclusively provided by electrons in such a way that the inclusion of the Quantum Neurology within the Electronic Physics discipline is legitimated, and these particles are fermions. As a consequence, in order to build up the coherence with global states, the coupling of either electronelectron or electron-hole pairs is necessary. As it is well known, the interactions among electron are repulsive and those existing between electrons and positrons though are attractive, the excitation of an electron from the valence band to the conduction band is necessary. Therefore, in both cases there are difficulties, not impossibilities, for obtaining pairs. The remedy for attaining the coherent global state via pair couplings (either e-e or e-h) is in the interaction between the tubulin system and the environment. This interaction is mediated by the circulation of water, lipids and polipeptides inside the microtubule hole yielding a dielectric medium in which the coupling of two tubulins (or pair coupling ) is then favoured. These dimmers have a bosonic spin character and then the coherent states can be transmitted among synapses of the neuronal lattice. The theoretical and experimental problem is to know how the dimmers can be formed, this question being a point that presents similarities from a physical point of view with the antiferromagetic dimmers construction via Rostoker-Kittel-Kasuya-Yosida (RKKY) exchange interaction. The antiferromagnetic lattices acquire the appropriate PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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conditions via the existence of a determined medium that is equivalent to the cellular environment in the neuronal systems. The tubulins are submerged in a medium containing proteins, lipids, water and peptides such as oxotina, serotonina, noradrenalina, oxicetina, riboflavina, endoforfina, etc., which are responsible for the microtubule bath that favours the evolution of tubulin dynamics. A large biochemical experience has improved the neurological studies in such a way that there is a huge amount of experimental data about which nourishment can aid to the development of the performance of the brain and mind actions. ii) The second problem is more complicated and is related to the quantum coherence. This quantum property is extremely subtle and easy to break. The possibility of obtaining coherent states is relatively easy and normal in electronic many-body systems, but these usually have a very short half life and therefore, their processed implementation and recording even in the appropriate brain zone is not possible. A coherent state requires at least a thousandth of second to attain a mental representation and this time is extraordinarily large for the permanence of a coherent state. This is the reason for the requirement of catalytic activators of the memory which fulfils the task of lengthening the half life of the quantum coherent states in order to facilitate their recording. The analysis of the macromolecules, proteins, amino acids, etc., that are necessary for favouring the memorizing of mental and brain actions is an important point within the biochemical and biophysical Neurology. iii) The third problem constitutes the most important objection of the socalled classical neurologists against Quantum Neurology. This is, maybe, the strongest criticism and the most substantial discrepancy in the development of Quantum Physics in the issue of coherence and the quantum coherent states within Neurology. This objection is founded on the fact that the coherence of neuron-neuron propagated states are constructed via internal interactions within the brain. Consequently, this property should be maintained only at very low temperatures: 125º C below zero would be the maximum temperature at which this coherence is possible, this being, at least, the opinion of the quantum neurology objectors. Temperature is the variable that implies the increase of the electronic white noise whose strength grows with this variable from –273º C, which is the absolute zero. In addition, the electronic noise at +36,5º C (average temperature of the brain) presents a widespread of frequencies implying the existence of interacting waves which generate an environment that interacting with the tubulin states completely break the coherent global state. At the present time, a hard debate between classical and quantum neurologists is based on whether the coherence is or not possible for temperatures around 309 K. Two researcher groups challenge the hegemony in this theme using these contradictory arguments. Tegmak’s group maintains that the correlation between the consciousness actions and cerebral states can not be explained by quantum coherence and proposes robust, not apodictic but well structured, arguments against the fact that this quantum property can be held at these high temperatures. Therefore, this group refutes Quantum Neurology as a possible theory for explaining the mental actions and prefers to pay its attention to the neuronal classical lattices as solutions for PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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the physical scenario for Neurology. In contrast, the group led by Hameroff, who joined Penrose proposed the orchestrated objective reduction model (see HameroffPenrose 1996) for the consciousness physical definition, defends, with good arguments but not totally conclusive, that microfilaments and hydrophobic liquids produce an environment with a dielectric and plasma medium in the intertubulin space. The interaction between this environment and neuronal tubulins allows the maintenance of the coherent states up to higher temperatures than that of the human body. Concretely, these authors with their model justify that the dielectric medium modifies the dipole-dipole interaction among alpha-beta pairs in such a way that a quantum protectorate of the coherent state is created allowing the isolation of the tubulins implicated in this quantum system. In other words, the cerebral medium inundated by proteins and other macromolecules screens to the neurons of the thermal noise. The semantic term «quantum protectorate» was introduced by the 1998 Physics Nobel Prize, Laughlin in the Quantum fractional Hall effect (Laughlin 1999); according to this author, some coherent states can be built by means of the interaction with determined magnetic fields so that these states can be maintained up to high temperatures with procedures similar to the optic pumping of the laser state. Some new technical subjects such as the magnetoencephalography applied to the cerebral diagnostic uses the existence of certain magnetic behaviour of the brain, which implies that the neuronal magnetic behaviour might have the conditions for the appearance of a quantum protectorate that preserves the coherence up to high temperatures. In any case, the criticism of Tegmark’s group is a robust idea that should induce reflexion to the quantum neurologists in order to dispel the existing doubts about the applicability of Quantum Mechanics to the physical knowledge of consciousness. The aim of the following sections is to present both some known and other novel solutions to the existing problems concerning the applicability of the Quantum Theory to the cerebral processes exposed in the former section.

7.

KNOWN PROPOSALS

Penrose and Hameroff in 1996 published the orchestrated objective reduction model, which is founded in the genuine philosophy of the Quantum Mechanics, using the superposition principle of those eigenstates which constitute a basis of the Hilbert space. We start heuristically explaining some of the necessary concepts of Quantum Mechanics required for understanding this model. In Quantum Mechanics, the first step is the determination of those physical variables whose measurements can lead us to the understanding of the reality in a better way. Each variable, also named physical observable, has assigned a hermitical linear operator using the correspondence principle with the Classical Physics. Each observable, A, has a set of eigenstates {|x1>, |x2>,…..|xn>} with its corresponding eigenvalues {a1,a2,…..an} which can be deduced via the above cited secular equation: A|xi>=ai|xi>, where the i-index runs over 1,2,…..n. In PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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order to determine the physical reality we require a complete set of variables, such as mentioned above, whose corresponding hermitical operators commute and then, all these observables share the same set of eigenstates. Furthermore, the commutation property of these sets of operators implies that the corresponding variables can be simultaneously measured. Obviously, although the eigenstates are the same for all complete sets of operators which commute, each variable has different eigenvalues for the same eigenstates. For instance, we suppose the complete set of variables A1, A2,…… An, and the corresponding eigenvalues for a given eigenstate |x>, are a1, a2, …..,an, then, we can identify the |x>-state with the corresponding eigenvalues (|x>=|a1,a2,….an>), in such a way that a given variable of the complete set Ai satisfies the following equation: Ai|a1,a2,….an>=ai|a1,a2,….an> . Then, if one measures the variables Ai in the system when it is in the |x>-state, it will obtain the value ai and will achieve a bit of reality. The eigenstate set constitutes a basis of the Hilbert space, and the dimension of this vector space can be either finite or infinite. Classically (i. e. from a Classical Physics point of view), only the states of the basis ought to exist, however, from a quantum mechanics point of view, there are infinite states which completely fulfil the Hilbert space. The mutation of the system from a superposed state toward an eigenstate is equivalent to the conversion of a quantum situation with total ignorance of the values of the observables to a clear and deterministic realistic knowledge of them. Those states different from the ones belonging to the basis are obtained by means of a linear superposition of the type: |y>=c1|x1>+c2|x2>+c3|x3>+….cn|xn>,where the numbers c1,c2,c3,…..,cn are complex. Then, the square of the module of each number, for instance ci, is interpreted as the probability that by measuring a given variable of the complete set, we obtain the corresponding eigenvalue, ai, of this given eigenstate |xi>. Moreover, the sum of all these |ci|’s is equal to the unity, since it is the sum of all probabilities corresponding to the possible classical states. When a given variable measurement is carried up, the non existence of a value for this variable in a superposed state implies the degree of ignorance that the observer, apparatus or brain, has about the reality. This can be justified because the only values that can be obtained in a measurement are the eigenvalues. In addition, if the |xi>states are located in different regions and these are defined by punctual particle positions, the superposition implies that each particle has probabilities to simultaneously be in different space positions. This fact has not any sense within Classical and deterministic Physics. On the other hand, when the external signal produces in the brain one of the superposed states, it perceives a conceptual blurredness which is only dispelled when this superposition state is converted into an eigenstate. Then, the corresponding eigenvalue, in contrast, is clearly exempt of uncertainty and the correlation between the signal and the state is converted in knowledge that can be reproduced and stored. Consequently, the existence of a superposed state proportions no mental action and therefore, it does not yield any recorded knowledge. The application of these ideas to the case of a Hilbert space whose basis is constituted of two tubulin eigenstates, alpha and beta, has already been explained PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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in a former section.The quantum superposition implies the definition of an infinite number of states of the type |x>= a|alpha>+b|beta>. All these states not belonging to the basis of Hilbert space are modified when a measurement of any observable is carried out in them. The cerebral mechanisms for which the brain selects a determined state for confectioning the mental knowledge is yet unknown and only conjectures can be established. The cornerstone idea of the Penrose-Hameroff model is the attribution of this eigenselection to the difference in the gravitational interaction of the mass corresponding to an eigenstate with respect to the superposed state. Then, the minimal energy principle due to the attractive sense of the gravitational energy difference induces the selection and therefore conscious knowledge. The collapse of the wavefunction of a superposed state by means of its objective reduction can be effective in a simultaneous way in a determined set of tubulins and then the recording of this state implies the conscious knowledge of the external signal which provoked the superposition. This can be explained because the conscious brain actions produce the wavefunction collapse, this point is clearly the key idea of the Penrose-Hameroff model. 8. 8.1.

OUR

PROPOSALS

Excitonic model

The Penrose-Hameroff model for the physical concept of the consciousness is brilliant and fascinating but intuitive and conjectural and, to my knowledge, is not justified by either any experimental reason or data obtained from any measurement. The gravitational incidence in this point may be a smart argument which can have theoretical intern charm and coherence but has the additional difficulty that it theoretically adjoins the intervention of two theories, General Relativity and Quantum mechanics which, at least at the present time, seem to be incompatible. In the first place, we describe the excitonic model, which presents certain similarities with the photosynthetic conversion of the sun light for the green vegetable world [see Engel et al. (2007)]. The charge density inside the tubulins is such that a geometrical distribution of positive and negative unity charge appears in the microtubules. This implies the existence of an alpha-beta state lattice in the microtubules within each neuron cells. Each alpha-beta state pair presents a strong attractive binding energy which allows us to treat these pairs with a similar dynamics to hydrogen atoms. The positive-negative charge structure has a clear image within the condensed matter theory and this is that of the excitons, concretely, Wigner’s excitons. These excitonic structures are constituted of two elemental quasiparticles, similar to an electron and a positron, whose half integer spin is equal to ½. Therefore, the resulting excitons are composite particles with integer spin (this can be either 1 or 0), and consequently, these composite particles are bosons in such a way that an undefined number of them PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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can occupy the same state. The occupation of states is governed by the minimal energy principle and therefore all will occupy the state with null linear moment. In other words, the total energy of the microtubule system formed by the alphabeta dimmers is decreased by the attractive energy of the binding potential of the excitons (here excitons and dimmers are two equivalent words). The microtubule global state is, obviously, coherent because when these excitons start to be moved before either an electric or magnetic fields, all dimmers move with the same linear moment a kinetic energy. Hence, the resulting global many-body state is formed by bosons and therefore, it is a coherent Bose-Einsten condensate. On one hand, an external signal produces an electric excitation which implies a wave of linear moment and kinetic energy changes within the coherent BE condensate. The resulting many-body state presents a new set of quantum numbers. Then this excitation remains labelled by the new and modified BEC state, a correlation existing between an external signal and the physical change of the resulting modified condensate. The tunnel effect is responsible for the intercommunication across the intersynaptic gaps. This effect is not the normal tunnel crossover of electrons between conductors through an insulating layer, but the transmission of a many-body coherent BEC state that pass by the dielectric medium existing among synapses of different neuron cells. This anomalous tunnel effect is more similar to the superconducting Josephson one than that arising from the metal-insulating-metal devices. The existence of an electric field between the device electron exit element and that of electron input can favour both the strength of the normal tunnel and Josephson effects. However, the coherent BEC state is built up with excitons whose total charge per composite particle is null and therefore the electric field is not necessary (it is useless) for favouring the intersynapses crossover. This fact implies that the transmission of coherent state among synapses of different neurons is due to the Josephson-like effects rather than the normal tunnel because the strength of this later quantum effect is zero for null electric field charge acceleration, in contrast to the Josephson intensity that can be different from zero for a null electric field. Moreover the transmission of the coherent BE condensate oscillates between synapses even for continuous field, this being an additional experimental fact that gives support to the Josephson channel. The existence of this oscillating transmissions, perfectly characterized by means of fixed quantum numbers corresponding to a coherent BE condensate propitiated by a external signal is the fact that can allow the establishment of a correlation between a conscious mental action described by the BEC state and the corresponding cited signal that provoked it. This correlation serves for attributing the recorded BEC to the information arising from the external signal, this attribution being established in an unconscious and automatic way. An example that could shed light and illuminate this crucial point, which has analogies with the photosynthetic function of the green vegetable world is the optic image construction by the interaction between the electromagnetic radiation to visible frequencies and the ocular cells of the retina. The EM interaction produces an optic excitation in these sensible ocular cells similar to excitons which are transmitted by means of nervous streams toward the brain, generating in it a PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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coherent state whose association with the cited exterior EM field gives us the idea of the exterior optical image. Obviously, a quantitative evaluation of these processes should be carried up for obtaining a true analysis from a physical point of view. In order to satisfy this objective, it is necessary to calculate the energy and linear moment of the ground many-body state formed before and after the presence of the exterior stimuli as well as the possible excitations of the total neuronal system. This requires a quantitative study which can only be analyzed from the quantum field theories, and whose technical details will be published in a specialized journal. 8.2.

Dipole-dipole interaction: biexcitonic and interacting boson model

The tubulin dimmers, named tubulin pairs too, as mentioned in former sections, constitute dipoles which are Wigner’s excitons from a Condensed Matter theory point of view. These dipoles, as it is well known, interact between themselves via dipole-dipole interaction, forming exciton pairs, i. e. the so-called biexcitons. These biexcitons are also bosons since they are constructed of two composite particles of integer spin, and therefore each biexciton is a new complex bosonic particle, equivalent to a hydrogen molecule. The interesting question is when the microtubule global state will prefer the existence of either single excitons or biexcitons. This preference will depend on whether the interaction electronpositron is more or less stronger than the Van der Walls-like interaction existing between two hydrogen atoms (equivalent here to a pair of excitons). The natural selection will depend on which one demands less energy between the two possibilities: the energy arising from the global state only formed by excitons or that from a many-body state built up by biexcitons. Another important and decisive point in the above cited selection model, apart from the minimal energy reason is: what global state model presents more straightforwardness in the intersynapses and interneuronal transmission of the resulting coherent many-body state? Obviously, nature will choose the condition for one of the two models of ground state according to the balance of influences in each case between the two phenomena: minimal energy and Josephson interneuronal transmission. The dipole system developed in the microtubules based on the tubulin pairs presents similarities to a Hopfield lattice (see Behrman 2006) and whose dynamic is similar to certain antiferromagnetic classical lattices that can be solved via Ising’s models. These models are particular cases within the Heisenberg exchange interaction issue. As it is well known, characteristic features of the brain, experimentally ratified in multiple and several experiences, are its plasticity and its capability of self-transformation before successive neuronal actions. These features will allow us to consider this plastic organ as a ferroelectric system with hysteretic behaviours similar to a dielectric with the permanent dipoles, also named electrete. The hysteresis cycle implies that the external agent stimuli would produce multivalued responses in the brain, this fact having a clear psychological meaning in the tiredness and boredom produced in the brain before repetition of the same stimulation. This effect presented in the brain is similar to that of an elastic string PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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when is successively forced and stretched inducing in it deformations. These deformations are never equal for each stretching process due to the recording that is produced in the material before the successive application of exterior forces. The idea of the elastic behaviours of the neuronal system as well as the existence of dielectric hysteresis cycles give support to the philosophical concept of the supervenience since several phases of the neuronal hysteretic process would be related to the same mental action. On the other hand, these elastic behaviours similar to the ferro-antiferromagnetic and ferroelectric materials can justify the biexcitonic model since these behaviours are consequence of the dipole-dipole interaction which is only considered in this model and it is excluded in the single excitonic one. Moreover, the dipole-dipole interaction can produce transitions from ferroelectric to paraelectric phases, the temperature being the responsible physical variable that induces the phase change. This change occurs at the transition temperature that can be sufficiently high for ensuring the permanence of the biexcitonic coherent state for temperatures higher than 309 K which is that of the brain. However, it is necessary to be careful in choosing a model for analyzing a determined mental action and the choice will be conditioned by the experimental clues of the corresponding states generated in the neuronal system. What are the experiments that can shed light on this election? The answer to this question is an interesting task which depends fundamentally on the experimental data, and can serve to generate a syncretism between the Quantum Field Theory and genuine Neurology. In any case, according to the available experimental data, at the present time, it seems that the coherence states in their different possibilities and phases are a correct way to deepen the relationship between these two areas of knowledge.

9.

COMMENTS

ABOUT THE DIFFERENT MODELS

A general comment deserves the possible consistence of each of these three models summarized in the former sections as well as the concurrence and concomitance between all them for acting altogether. The physical sense of the consciousness can require several directions of thought. In a first place, the Penrose-Hameroff model stress the idea of the eigenselection of a superposed quantum state for all one-body states in an orchestrated way as a simultaneousness action arising from the gravitational incidence over these starting point states. The experimental justification for this overwhelming idea does not seem easy to give because even from a theoretical point of view it is difficult to reconcile the general relativity, theory of the gravitational interaction, with the quantum field theory, theory of the coherent states. The excitonic model is inserted within the generation of the coherent states via pair coupling that in this case is due to the electron-hole attractive interaction. This model is compatible with the biexcitonic generation and the possible prevalence of any of the two models depends on the PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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imbalance of total energy yielded via the electron-hole potential versus the Van der Walls-like interaction among single excitons in a similar way as the hydrogen atoms are joined for constituting the hydrogen molecules. Even one can argue that these two models could coexist in either simultaneous or successive neuronal actions. The selection of any model will depend on which is the experimental data that have to be explained.

10.

EPITOME

AND LAST CONSIDERATIONS

The fundamentals of this paper are, on one hand, the insertion of Neurology in the dialectic between the experimental sciences and Theology, and on the other hand, the analysis of mental actions from the perspective of Quantum Physics. The bases of thought in the assertions of this paper should be found in establishing correlations between the mental conscious actions of the human self and determined states generated in the complex neuronal system. But it is difficult to explain the will and the spirit of self-improvement implemented in the human consciousness. These human virtues are inspired and induced by the spiritual impulse of the human soul whose existence can only be justified by the transcendent existence of the Prime Creator and do not seem likely to be predetermined by any brain state, neither quantic nor classic. However, we look for correlations of the mental actions produced by the consciousness with phenomenology occurred in the brain. Another important point established in this work is the dynamics of the brain, which can not be explained by means of the deterministic laws of Classical Physics. Moreover, there are sufficient reasons and certain experimental data that give support to fact that the coherence of some many-body states within the tubulin system is the main cause and better representation of these mental actions. The analysis and discovery of the correlations between the different coherent states and mental functions as well as the representation in the brain of the exterior signals will allow a scientific valuation of the interesting philosophical concept of the supervenience. The teleological study of these correlations by means of general theories avoiding the «ad hoc» simple models is the objective in Quantum Neurology, this being my Physical research in progress. Probably, this task will be difficult to be completed in all its terms, since some mental actions arising from no algorithmically procedures can not be represented by known coherent states and their analysis can depend on other, at the present time, unknown brain phenomena. The challenge of the discovering of the methodology for these situations can inspire fascinating issues which make worthwhile the spending of efforts in their research. On the other hand, I want to express my personal opinion that our human anthropology is dependent on the existence of the Great Architect, but, in order to maintain the dialogue between Science and Theology, the belief in this principle does not preclude our philosophical acceptance of non theist principles and argumentations that explain the meaning of our own nature. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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REFERENCES

1. TEGMARK, M.: «Importance of quantum decoherence in brain process», Phys. Rev. E, 61, 4194 (2000). 2. HAGAN, S.; HAMEROFF, S. R., and TURZYNSKI, J. A.: «Quantum computation in brain minitubules: decoherence and biological feasibility», Phys. Rev. E, 65, 061901 (2002). 3. DRAGUHU, A.; TRAUB, R. A.; SCHMITZ, D., and JOFFERYS, J. G. R.: «Electrical coupling indelies high frequency oscillations in the hippocampus in vitro», Nature, 394, 189 (1998). 4. SCHOFFELEN, J. M.; OESTENVELD, R. O., and FRIES, P.: «Neuronal coherence as a mechanism of effective corticospinal interaction», Science 308, 111 (2005). 5. ENGEL, G. S.; CALGHOUM, T. R., and READ, E. L.: «Evidence for wavelike energy transfer though quantum coherence in photosynthetic systems», Nature, 446, 782 (2007). 6. OUYANG, M., and AWSCHALOM, D.: «Coherent spin transfer between Molecularly Bridged Quantum Dots», Science, 301, 1074 (2003). 7. TUSZYNSKI, J., and WOOLF, W.: «The path ahead», in the The emerging Physics of conciousness, pp. 1-24, Springer (2006). 8. HAMEROFF, S.: Consciousness Neurobiology and Quantum Mechanics, pp. 193-244, Springer (2006). 9. BEHERA, L.; KAR, I., and ELITZUR, A. C.: Recurrent Quantum neural network and its applications, pp. 337-348, Springer (2006). 10. BEHRMAN, E.; GADDAM, K.; STECK, J. E., and SKINNER, S. R.: Microtubules as a Quantum Hopfield Network, pp. 351-369, Springer (2006). 11. CHO, M., et al.: «Exciton analysis in 2d electronic spectroscopy», J. Phys. Chem., 109, 10542 (2005). 12. BRYNER, T.: «Two dimensional spectroscopy of electron coupling in photosynthesis», Nature, 434, 625 (2005). 13. MURPHY, N.: «Supervenience and the downward efficacy of the mental: a non reproductive Physicalist account of human action», in Neuroscience and the Person, pp. 147-164, Vatican Observatory Publications and Centre for Theology and The Natural Sciences (1999). 14. ZUREK, W. H.: «Decoherence, einselection, and the quantum origins of the classical», Rev. Mod. Phys., 75, 715 (2003). 15. HAMEROFF, S., and PENROSE, R.: «Orchestrated reduction of quantum coherence in brain microtubules: A model for consciousness», Math. and Comp. in Simul., 40, 453 (1996). 16. LAUGHLIN, R. B.: «Nobel Lecture: Fractional quantization», Rev. Mod. Phys., 71, 863 (1999). Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona 08193 Barcelona [email protected]

FERNANDO LÓPEZ AGUILAR



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PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE The physics of Roger Penrose and David Bohm as regards a scientific explanation of the human mind open to reality MANUEL BÉJAR GALLEGO Universidad Pontificia Comillas (CTR Chair), Madrid

ABSTRACT: The works of David Bohm and Roger Penrose per se represent a major contribution to the study of physics and consciousness. It is not an easy task to engage in rigorous analysis of one of the most profound philosophical-scientific problems; namely explaining the nature of consciousness. This article explores the global vision that emerges from Bohm and Penrose’s approach to physics and consciousness. It focuses on examining the way in which their respective physical-metaphysical proposals can be bound together in a general model, thus shedding more light on the phenomenological characteristics of consciousness. The philosophical consequences of this model are closer in many respects to the experience of transcendence as described in religious works. What emerges is a unitary image of man in the cosmos that harmonises notions of mind and matter, open to a transcendent connection between the conscious subject and reality. KEY WORDS: mind, determinism, emergentism, intuition, holism, microtubules, quantum gravity.

Física, conciencia y transcendencia RESUMEN: Las obras de David Bohm y Roger Penrose representan per se dos contribuciones de orden mayor al estudio de la física y la conciencia. No es una tarea fácil abordar con rigor científico uno de los más profundos problemas científico-filosóficos; a saber, la naturaleza de la conciencia. Este artículo explora la visión global que emerge desde el acercamiento de Bohm y Penrose a la física de la conciencia. Se centra en el examen de la forma en que sus respectivas propuestas físico-metafísicas pueden converger conjuntamente en un modelo general, que pueda explicar mejor las características fenomenológicas de la conciencia. Las consecuencias filosóficas de este modelo están en muchos aspectos más cercanas a la experiencia de transcendencia tal como es descrita en las obras religiosas. Lo que emerge es una imagen unitaria del hombre en el cosmos que armoniza una idea de mente y materia, abierta a una conexión transcendente entre el sujeto consciente y la realidad. PALABRAS CLAVE: mente, determinismo, emergentismo, intuición, holismo, microtúbulos, gravedad cuántica.

Consciousness is a phenomenon and a problem. The phenomenon of consciousness indisputably refers to man as a subject open, from both a psychic and physical point of view, to reality. Equally, consciousness is a problem as we are unable to explain this psychic, experiential and subjective phenomenon in relation to the biophysical, experimental and objective environment in which it is manifested. This is the so-called psychophysical problem of the mindconsciousness. There is currently no clear solution to the problem of consciousness; a conundrum that dates back to the origins of the history of philosophy, despite attempts by eminent thinkers such as Aristotle, Descar© PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749



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M. BÉJAR, PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE

tes, Kant, Hegel and Husserl. At the beginning of the twenty-first century consciousness remains an enigma. From classical dualism of body-soul and positive-materialist reductionism we now move towards a new paradigm that, without becoming engulfed in an attempt to explain reality from fundamental material bases, seeks to provide a scientific understanding of psychism within a evolutionary and unitary framework in which structures, the morphology and function of which are irreducible to the material properties of other physical regimes, emerge, that is say emergentism. As the physical properties of the quantum regime cannot be understood through Classical-Mechanist epistemology, we maintain in this article that the phenomenon of consciousness has proven a problem in the history of thought as the emergent properties of the quantum regime of matter have been long relegated to the margins. Roger Penrose and David Bohm are pioneers in the discussion of the physical problem of consciousness. Their illuminating contributions open out ingenious avenues of thought from which to approach the problem of consciousness by adopting an epistemology that closely resembles emergentism in their in-depth exploration of pyschophysical, global, unitary and coherent reality. This article ends with a consideration of the transcendent dimension of man, in the light of the Bohm-Penrose physical model of consciousness, which lends support to a rational interpretation of religious phenomenon.

1.

THE

PHYSICAL DIMENSION OF THE PHENOMENON OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In contrast to a physical particle or a biophysical structure, consciousness is more resistant to objectiveness and the rigours of experimentation. We cannot measure its mass, length or charge as if it were an electron. When we study a cell we can verify its weight and surface area, and even analyse the charge of the respective ions involved in an osmotic process; but it is more interesting to examine the functionality of its membrane, of its endoplasmatic structures or the genetic material stored in its nucleus. The continual formation of the membrane, the collective dynamics of the cytoplasm or the nuclear changes during cellular division constitute biological processes governed by physical-chemical changes, the functionality of which is more important than mere quantitative data on its principal physical dimensions. At this level of sophistication of matter purely physical properties are less important than the function performed by the total matter organised in the cell. Even though physics has shown us that a cell is composed of electrons and quarks, scientific study of the same is approached from new material structures which, at a cellular level, are considered to be fundamental. The biophysical properties of these structures differ qualitatively from the physical attributes of the elemental particles and their functionality cannot be explained by corpuscular mechanicism in a strict sense. Matter has organised itself, reaching a level of cooperation that permits biophysical functionality. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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The physical study of matter makes way for biophysical analysis in biological structures. Historically, consciousness has been seen as a problem as a scientific approach to the phenomenon has not been discovered. We cannot take a sample of consciousness, dye it and examine it using a microscope or on a microscope slide. Nor can we give a full account of it by examining its constituent physical particles in detail. Faced with these seemingly insurmountable difficulties, dualists have opted to consider the nature of consciousness as a soul that is essentially distinct from matter thereby initiating a strand of thought parallel to that of material scientific thought. Such contributions can be evaluated from the standpoint of rationality, logic and internal coherence but they can never be assessed scientifically, as they have positioned themselves in an epistemology outside scientific praxis. Science can provide alternative explanations but it cannot refute dualist affirmations, as they are based on a spiritual principle that is orthogonal to material empiricism. A scientific approach to the study of consciousness does not necessarily require a physical reduction ab initio of consciousness to particles and fundamental interactions, as physical science per se understands that the fundamental element depends on the energy level involved. Consciousness is manifested at a psychic level, in which the collective dynamics of a group of biophysical systems capable of functioning psychically is the most important element. Breaking down this psychic architecture in biophysical systems and then into physical constituents does not provide us with any clues about the nature and functioning of consciousness. The dualists would argue that a reductionist dissection of this kind neglects the fundamental psychic principle. In order words such approach would fail to discover the matter of consciousness. In the same way that life cannot be broken down to amino acids as vital elements, consciousness cannot be reduced to a basic material element of consciousness. Scientific research into consciousness requires accepting the emergent nature of the properties of matter. Physical matter is capable of organising itself until the properties of the living matter emerge and, at a higher cooperation level, produce the emergent psychic properties manifest in higher animals. Matter produces consciousness as a result of global cooperation, which cannot be explained from an exacerbated corpuscular atomism. Indeed, it would not be a scientific option if these emergent properties of matter were not supported by phenomenological approaches. The phenomenon of consciousness is manifested in living beings endowed with a complex psychic system, stemming from the biophysical development of matter. Conscious states are produced by a psychic subject with a living material body, which is sufficiently well organised and evolved to feel, perceive and interpret reality. In other words, a material organism that feels the energetic pressure of the physical environment. Focusing on this physical side of the phenomenology of consciousness implies testing the rational hypotheses followed in order to explain what is observed, pursuant to scientific laws, and proposing an explanatory model based on existing scientific theories. For this purpose, we describe below the physical phenomenology of consciousness outlined by Bohm and Penrose, highlighting several psychophysical correlations guiding physical PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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research into animal psychism within an emergentist scientific paradigm. We conclude discussion of this first point by formulating a phenomenological hypothesis on the structural and functional unity of consciousness. 1.1.

Physical phenomenology of consciousness in Roger Penrose

Any scientific explanation of a fact of nature such as consciousness requires a detailed observation of its phenomenology, that is, the sum total of its inherent characteristics. Thoroughgoing knowledge of phenomenology of the consciousness is needed in order to identify the best course of action to take in order to build a model to explain such a commonplace and enigmatic phenomenon. The richer the phenomenological content of the consciousness is, the more fertile the scientific explicandum will be and, as a result, the higher the probability will be of achieving a general explicans free of epistemological bias (stemming from prioritising certain phenomenological points over others). It is therefore advisable to outline the phenomenology of the consciousness as perceived by a range of scientists from the fields such as psychology, epistemology and neuroscience. Without losing sight of the phenomenological nuances of these sciences, in this article we have elected to focus on the physical phenomenology of consciousness; physics being the paradigmatic science par excellence, as by concentrating on the physical dimension of consciousness it is possible to evaluate the reasonableness of scientific research that does not involve reductionism as an alternative to dualism. The works of Roger Penrose, physicist-mathematician from the University of Oxford who worked with Steven Hawking on black holes and quantum gravity, address the physical phenomenology of consciousness on a number of occasions 1. Throughout his works 2, amid arguments against reductionists and dualists, or intercalated in the exposition of his physical model of the mind, we find characteristics that define the phenomenon of the mind precisely as Penrose sees it himself. Attributes of the physical nature of the mind abound in this phenomenology. Hence Penrose’s approach to physical phenomenology is of interest here, especially given the eminence of the author and the importance of his publications. The main phenomenological feature of consciousness highlighted by Penrose is the psychophysical connectivity of the mind, closely linked to matter. Consciousness is shown as a phenomenon exclusive to psychic subjects endowed with an evolved living material structure. There is no phenomenological evidence to alert us to the presence of a consciousness other than the psychobiophysical structures that produce it. Consciousness emerges from matter and there is no phenomenological consciousness without matter. But it does not follow that all material reality is conscious. It is evident from the way in which matter is manifested in the world that most matter is nonliving matter without psychic activity. When we consider the phenomenon of consciousness, a psychobiological 1 2

Cf. R. PENROSE, The Emperor’s New Mind (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989). Cf. R. PENROSE, Shadows of the Mind (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994).


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unity can be observed that defines a second phenomenological feature. Consciousness manifests itself as the product of the psychic and biophysical cooperation of specific biological structures grouped together in a unitary psychic architecture governed by physical processes. There is no consciousness without a nervous system, there is no brain without neurones, there are no neurones without biological structures and there are no functional biostructures without physical processes. Consciousness appears as a unitary psychobiophysical phenomenon in which it is not possible to separate clearly psychic elements from biological or physical ones. This psychobiophysical unity leads us to the third phenomenological feature, which is highlighted through the high degree of correspondence between the psychobiophysical structures of consciousness and physical changes in the environment. By interacting with the physical environment the psychobiophysical being becomes a psychic subject that feels conscious of being an individual in a physical environment through the biophysical body. The psychobiophysical subject perceives consciousness as a highly ordered state, integral to his biophysical psychism, which enables him to go beyond stimulusresponse behaviourism, following less predictable behavioural patterns of a more unitary and personalised nature. These three phenomenological features together form the pyschobiophysical structural unit of the conscious subject; notions shared in large part by David Bohm, another eminent physicist whose ideas we outline next. It is worth noting that Bohm’s approach here is less specific than Penrose’s as he stresses the indeterminist, non-computability of consciousness. The conscious thought of psychobiological subjects possesses higher qualities distinguishing it from the computable processes of a computer. Although the psychobiophysical subject issues a range of regular automatised responses in order to survive in the environment (automatisms), the richness of conscious behaviour manifests other phenomenological qualities that cannot be reduced to computable processes and do not require specific responses for survival purposes such as affiliation with beauty and truth (intuitionisms). Penrose refers to ethical judgements, aesthetic activity or the search for the meaning of existence. He particularly stresses those blissful moments when the mathematician finds a way of advancing his reasoning effectively, intuitively, incapable of anticipating the advent of the same. During such instants the past and the future overlap in a prolonged present, thus enabling us to experience coherence and unity. 1.2.

Physical phenomenology of consciousness in David Bohm

Following a different and complementary line to the phenomenology of Penrose, David Bohm underlines the holistic nature (experiential, spatial and temporal) of consciousness, departing from a psychobiophysical foundation, resulting from the natural evolutionary development of primal matter affected by physical and psychic activity. Bohm, an influential American physicist, chose to address this issue and managed to tackle the problem of physical determinism handed down by Albert Einstein with greater success. Bohm ended his days PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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working on the physical nature of consciousness at Birkbeck College (University of London) 3. His phenomenological analysis centres on the holistic dimension of consciousness. Conscious perceptions are characterised by the unity between the observersubject and the object observed. By experiencing his own body the conscious subject perceives his own psychocorporal unity. He perceives a single organic whole not unconnected parts of his body. The fourth phenomenological feature of this article explores how the conscious subject perceives his body as a nonlocated sum of sensations, which are synthesised holistically in self-perception. Perception of self entails the creation of a psychic identity or self-consciousness, which opens out to the outer world. Movement through our environment is not perceived as being remote controlled, but as an organic identity that moves through the environment in a relatively autonomous way. In line with Penrose, as self-perception is consolidated, the individual perceives his body with greater precision and is capable of better directing his will through the environment; thereby reaffirming himself as a conscious individual and the possibility of anticipating in the mind actions that might occur later emerges. The fifth phenomenological feature involves the free action of the conscious individual, capable of anticipating future actions, thinking them over and taking the decision at will. The sixth and seventh phenomenological features concern the conscious subject’s holistic experience of space and time. Holistic experience of space is a highly significant remote perception, which consolidates the indeterminism of the conscious individual and the freedom of his operations referred to above in the fifth phenomenological feature. The conscious individual, who perceives the space holistically, is predisposed to accent his temporal sensibility. He is a free individual, capable of performing indeterminate actions to break the shackles of a conditioned present and free himself to the possibility of distinguishing the past from the future, in a phenomenological present in which it is possible to anticipate events. Ordinary, spatial and temporal perceptions are all always mediated by the subject’s consciousness. However, we acknowledge the existence of perceptions independent of the epistemological mediation of the subject; these are direct perceptions: what Penrose calls intuition and Bohm refers to as insight, and these make up the eighth phenomenological attribute of consciousness. The last five characteristics of phenomenological consciousness describe the functional aspects of consciousness. Bohm places special emphasis on the eighth, which he refers to as insight: the holistic experience of reality in which the conscious individual passively receives its true meaning. Man is the psychic individual most predisposed to experience direct perception or insight, thereby becoming a fully cogniscent being, open to knowledge of reality. Just as consciousness knows mediate reality as a psychobiophysical structural unit similar to the environment, the mind opens directly to an understanding of the 3

Cf. D. BOHM, The Undivided Universe (London, Routledge, 1993).


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absolute in its transcendent dimension. This higher level of consciousness, cognitive conscious psychism, is an extension of the material biophysical body that becomes conscious of the global meaning of totality and experiences the coherence and internal unity of the cosmos. Subject and object are bound together in an eternal moment bestowing order, clarity and full openness on the mind. In Bohm’s terms the individual’s mind (conscious, free and observant) is bound with the cosmic mind thus conferring meaning and freedom on the whole. Despite the fact that such phenomenological experiences of harmony and unity are less everyday than other simpler conscious perceptions, they are still psychological verifications ascribed to several different effects, including mystical, psychopathological, psychotropic effects. Nonetheless, they are experiences lived by the conscious psychic subject, which must be explained scientifically. 1.3.

The structural and functional unit of consciousness

The first three phenomenological aspects of consciousness that describe the psychobiophysical morphological characteristics of the conscious being correspond to the most primitive states of natural evolution. Living beings as simple an amoeba possess a psychobiophysical structuring that is essential to enable it to adjust its responses to environmental stimuli. As the configuration of the nervous system advances, more intense levels of consciousness are displayed, characterised by a holistic perception of the environment, which enhances the survival of the individual enabling it to distance itself from the stimulus-response adjustments of lower animals. For instance a dog possesses a psychobiophysical architecture that is sufficiently developed to enable it to take decisions at will, which are difficult to explain within a strictly behaviourist framework. Here we are referring to the five functional aspects of consciousness. In man the sophisticated psychobiophysical structures widely unfold their psychic potential and predispose the conscious subject to seeing reality fully: both physically and cognitively. Notwithstanding, consciousness is verified as a phenomenon of the material reality that activates in one way or another its functional potential: physical and psychic. In sum, the phenomenon of consciousness manifests itself as a structural and functional unit the goal of which is to perceive reality (physically and psychically), in other words, as the emergent product of psychobiophysical cooperation aiming at full understanding of the whole.

2.

THE

PHYSICAL PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Phenomenologically speaking, consciousness is the emergent product of a psychobiophysical process in matter. The conscious psychic subject has greater capacity to perceive space holistically, foresee events and choose freely. The harmony between its psychism and the physical world is so great that its perceives intuitions that are key to survival. All these psychophysical relations comprise PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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the psychic explicandum to be explained by science. Driven by the set of psychophysical phenomena of consciousness, physics needs to investigate heuristic proposals that explain conscious psychism. Bohm and Penrose have worked on such proposals based on analysis of the principal physics theories. Each author has focused on an internal problem in physics to initiate propedeutically speculative proposals that explain consciousness physically, that is, an explicans that renders the phenomenology of the mind understandable in a scientific framework. In both cases the research concludes that there is something in physical theory per se that needs and, in turn, is projected towards the phenomenon of the mind. 2.1.

The psychic-physical problem according to Roger Penrose

Penrose’s formal approach to the problem of consciousness can be understood based on the phenomenological description he provides, centring on indeterminist aspects of the way in which it functions. Conscious thought, particularly nonanalytical mathematical reasoning, reveals behaviour by the consciousness that it is difficult to understand from a strictly determinist position. In relation to the phenomenological issue of the non-computability of consciousness, Penrose poses the internal problems of physics, calling into question the completeness of the science. He stresses the impossibility of constructing a complete physics theory of the physical universe unless elements that explain conscious psychism are included. He highlights three internal problems in physics: i) the temporal symmetry of physical theories vs. the asymmetric perception of phenomenological time, ii) the absence of a formal explanation of the classical-quantum transition vs. the information that the conscious observer acquires after a measurement of the quantum system, iii) General Relativity vs. Quantum Mechanics and its relation with consciousness as a phenomenon between the macrocosm and the microcosm. Penrose’s brilliant idea lies in disclosing that the central problem of physics coincides fully with the problem of consciousness and, as a corollary, an explanation of consciousness requires a complete physical theory that integrates non-computable processes. We analyse below each of the psychophysical problems reviewed. i) Temporal symmetry vs. asymmetric perception. The passing of time is a profoundly human conscious experience. Man perceives the temporal flow from past to future: he perceives how he grows older, he recalls past events and projects future events etc. In sum, he orders his life according to a temporal arrow that differentiates asymmetrically the inaccessible past from a future that he cannot remember. This phenomenological experience of time is not covered by the physical theory of time, namely, Relativity. Since 1905 when Einstein presented the relativity of time measurements by observers in relative movement, nobody has managed to explain the physics of time better. The theory of Relativity, the prevalent theory of time, is a physicalgeometric construction that maintains a causal relation between events, without differentiating the past from the future. Relativity determines the evolution of PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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a system based on environmental conditions. Akin to all local theory, its equations pre-dict the future evolution of the Universe and retro-dict the past based on explicit environmental conditions. No distinction is drawn between the past and the future because there is no temporal flow. Everything is in a vast space of phases that describes every possible physical condition of matter, that is, the combination of all physical events. This phase space is a structure that lacks dynamism. It does not grow or alter. It is always the same, without a temporal arrow. So, how can consciousness of time be explained in a geometric structure without temporal flow? Consciousness requires a physical support for the asymmetric experience of time. ii) Classical-quantum transition and the conscious observer. Alongside Relativity, the Quantum Field Theory is one of the mainstays of modern physics. Relativity is the theory of time and gravity whereas Quantum Theory describes the other physical interactions that govern the microcosm: electromagnetism, strong and weak nuclear force. Despite the descriptive force of these two theories they are incompatible and there appears to be no way of uniting them. At present, no theory of gravity exists that integrates quantum effects: gravity and quantum theories are still irreconcilable. This is a lacuna on the border between classical gravity and quantum theories; that is to say, no quantum gravity theory has been developed yet to explain how the classical-quantum transition occurs between the indetermination of quantum field systems and classical realization of ordinary conscious experience. In phenomenological terms, consciousness is manifest in living beings with an appropriate psychism, which are part of the physical world halfway up the scale between the quantum microcosm and macrocosm dominated by gravitatory interaction. Psychic experience is found in animals with an evolved nervous system governed by a brain, capable of perceiving the physical pressure of the environment and of producing mental images in psychophysical correspondence. This psychophysical connectivity is displayed in the correlations between psychic states and physical states. Psychic conditions have repercussions on the biophysical conditions, a state of stress causes stomach pains, and vice versa, tooth ache conditions the state of mind. This phenomenological evidence leads to the existence of interdependency between psychic and physical elements. The study of the mind should not be separated from the study of physics. The problem of the mind involves explaining why physics does not explain the mental reality if it is manifested as an intrinsic property of the physical world. Determinist laws of Classical Mechanics describe the physical regime of ordinary experience. Newtonian mechanics, which is so powerful in determining the future behaviour of gravitatory systems, has not borne fruit in its attempt to solve the problem of the mind. Its determinist epistemology collides headlong with the phenomenological indeterminism characteristic of conscious experience. As there is psychophysical evidence, neither classical nor quantum deterministic physics, cannot reach a scientific resolution of the problem so Penrose adopts a heuristic view that permits a new approach. The indetermination of the classical-quantum transition, the PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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source of much discussion in quantum physics, could be of interest when it comes to understanding how the consciousness emerges from reality after the process of information analysis of the environment through the senses. If this is not the case, what alternatives do we have? Consciousness requires us to reconcile the indeterminism experienced by the psychic subject and the epistemological determinism of physical theories. iii) Microcosm, macrocosm and the phenomenon of consciousness. The human mind is capable of understanding the space-time structure, the foundation of all material reality, of representing macroscopic physical objects (planets, galaxies, the Cosmos etc.) and understanding the smallest structures of the microcosm (electrons, neutrinos, quarks etc.). Physics explains both the largescale dynamics of the Universe (General Relativity) and the interactions between basic particles (Quantum Field Theory), supported by a high level of experimental evidence. Existing physical models are excellent at describing both macroscopic and microscopic states but we lack a convincing physical explanation for the psychic process that produces them in the human mind. Man is halfway between the microcosm and the macrocosm. In phenomenological terms, consciousness is manifested in the psychic activity of biological nervous systems coordinated by the brain. There is no evidence of conscious beings without this psychobiophysical structure. The body does not appear to be a mere recipient capable of storing a psychic entity like the soul as described by the dualist school of thought. Nor can it be broken down into functional, simple components without this being to the detriment of its richness and organic unity. In contrast, experience reveals a unitary mind-body organism with interrelated physical and psychic faculties. The psychic conditions of the individual have an impact on his biophysical states (somatization) and vice versa: toothache conditions state of mind. This phenomenological evidence leads to the existence of interdependence between psychic and physical faculties. Consciousness emerges from the physical world. Therefore rather than separate the study of the mind from the study of physics, it should be integrated in the scientific explicandum. Consciousness is the borderline between the microcosm and the macrocosm. The conscious being is a material psychic subject who lives in a natural environment halfway between the cosmic and the microscopic. On a large scale, the macroscopic universe appears to be dominated by collective, regular and predictable dynamics. In contrast, on a small scale, the microscopic universe is also dominated by collective dynamics, albeit less regular and more unpredictable. The conscious subject lives on the border. As a corollary we can see consciousness as a specific reality of a sector of nature in which the properties of the micro and macrocosms play an important role. Indeed Penrose has raised these ideas in his book The Large, The Small and the Human Mind. The intense connectivity between psychic and the physical faculties, combined with the absence of a physical theory to describe the universe in a unified manner, lead Penrose to suspect that the problem of the mind (a PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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phenomenon halfway between large and small elements) and the problem of physics (a science with two irreconcilable pillars) are simply part of the same basic problem: the physical explanation of the mind on the threshold of the micro and the macrocosm. Penrose starts the aforementioned study with the hope of resolving the psychophysical problem from a complete theory of gravity that unitarily explains the universe: macroscopic or microscopic, physical or psychic. This theory would necessarily solve both problems. The difficulties in developing quantum gravity, a physical theory with temporal asymmetry or a physical explanation of the mind halfway between the large and the small, are inherent in approaching the same basic problem sectorially. The problems of physics and the problem of the mind constitute the same basic question, requiring advances in physics and neuroscience in order for them to achieve fruitful qualitative development. 2.2.

The psychic-physical problem according to David Bohm

In broad terms David Bohm agrees with the psychophysical problems posed by Penrose in relation to the problem of consciousness: temporal experience, conscious perception and the consciousness as a phenomenon on the threshold of the macroscopic and the microscopic. While Penrose lays the stress on the formal problems of physics in contrast to the phenomenon of the conscious, Bohm concentrates on the underlying physical/metaphysical questions 4. Bohm is also fully aware of the confrontation between Relativity and Quantum theory in the spaces where their application as experimental physical theories is put under strain. He highlights the head-on collision between relativist theory, which represents a continuous, local and causal space-time order and quantum theory, which establishes a discontinuous, non-local threshold without a causal explanation. While Relativity establishes a leapless space-time fabric in which each object is influenced exclusively by causes that act locally as disturbance at below the speed of light speeds, Quantum Theory lacks a well-defined substrate that allows for the existence of quantum leaps and remote instantaneous interactions that break with the relativist localness. This purely physical problem is translated into a psychophysical problem linking technical issues of physics with the psychic experience of the conscious subject. The following psychophysical problem can be traced in the works of Bohm 5. i) Conscious perception and relativist space-time. The sum total of perceptions of reality does not lead to the existence of blocks of matter, which are individually separated and independent; rather to a profound reality that is unique and continuous, in which a variety of individual objects emerge, ordered in their totality. In his book The Special Theory of Relativity 6, Bohm includes an 4 5 6

Cf. D. BOHM, Wholeness and the Implicate Order (London, Routledge, 1980). Cf. L. NICHOL (ed.), The Essential David Bohm (London, Routledge, 2002). Cf. D. BOHM, The Special Theory of Relativity (London, Routledge, 1965).


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appendix on physics and perception highlighting some of the conclusions of one of the greatest psychologists of the twentieth century, Jean Piaget, drawn from his studies on child psychology. Piaget contends that the structure of the knowledge of a child differs greatly from the outcome of his later development in adult life. An infant experiences and perceives in a virtually undifferentiated whole. Initially the child simply possesses a series of reflexes that enable him to distinguish certain smells, movements and pleasurable objects, which are essential to his survival. Gradually the infant learns to follow objects with his eyes and recognise the invariant shape thereof during movement. Through movement of objects and handling of objects he discovers the basic properties of space in which each body occupies a place, which can be modified as a result of movements in different directions. Finally, the child is capable of representing the absent object by evoking an image in his memory. As he reaches maturity, man interprets his actions based on the mental suppositions of his childhood, consolidated through his experience over time and constantly corroborated intersubjectively through language, experience and concepts. The adult has empowered to such an extent a particular way of perceiving the physical world that he interprets it quickly according to these mental reflexes without intelligence intervening. Objects from the physical world are represented according to the individual perspective and knowledge of the observer. In general, objects are ordered following a three-dimensional Euclidean geometry. Einstein’s theory generalizes Newtonian space-time concepts and therefore limits the supposed universality of the system of evident perceptions in accordance with the three dimensional Euclidean geometry of space adopted by Newton. Relativist space-time geometry differs substantially from the standard geometry of perception in which the objects of reality are ordered in Euclidean way. Furthermore, there is a difference between the simultaneous observerobservable nature of perception and the relativist laws of space-time. When we look at the sky on a starry night we do no see a unique present of stars simultaneous to the observer. The image perceived corresponds to the star of the observer’s past which generated particles of light received through the retina in future time for the star. The sensation of absolutely universal present of the observer is contrary to the relativist suppositions on simultaneity. This simultaneity is the consequence of the imperceptible time that light takes in communicating two regions of ordinary life. The validity of the common sense of the experience of absolute space and time is the consequence of the negligible time light takes during an everyday process. The conscious idea of a singular temporal order that permits us to order events in time in absolute terms and generate concepts of past, present and future can only emerge under this physical low-speed regime where life occurs. As soon as one leaves this domain of validity empirical security disappears. ii) The experience of free will and physical determinism. A strictly determinist universe is far from compatible with the idea of free will perceived by conscious beings. The mechanicist determinism of classical physics, either in its microscopicPENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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individual or macroscopic-statistical version, is a long way from being able to explain phenomenological characteristics of consciousness such as intuition, the ethical dimension or free will. The psychic experience of control over the body, of governing it at will through the environment, and the sensation of being able to decide by taking part in the natural dynamics of physical phenomena, contrasts with the determinism prevalent in physical theories. The unitary evolution of a quantum state and the dynamics of a relativist event are both strongly conditioned by laws that predict in a determinant way a state or future event based on the previous environmental conditions. Bohm reviews the evolution of Newton’s mechanics by centring on the problem of determinism 7. Departing from the most deterministic Newtonian mechanics proposed by Newton, Laplace and D´Alambert, Bohm shows how in an evolutionary sense physical theories do not concern themselves with determining the conditions of speed and the position of the systems of many bodies, and focus instead on statistical questions of wholeness, which suffice to describe thermodynamic phenomena accurately. We refer to nineteenth century Statistical Mechanics, in which determining the microscopic features was seen as critical while ensuring that the rigour or accuracy of the statistic predictions was maintained. The notion of statistical fluctuation did not sit well in a classical epistemological framework, as there was not a corresponding objective material entity. However, said thermodynamic fluctuations do exist in other physical contexts and can be predicted statistically with a high level of experimental accuracy. If this is so, as experiments have proven, it shows that the observable macroscopic physical properties emerge from the action of the totality of the physical constituents, regardless of the exact position and speed of each individual particle in the system. The global dynamics are therefore more important than individual ones. And hence the physical observables are products emergent from an interaction of the whole in which the importance of the dominion of the strictly corpuscular is diluted. The canonical epistemology of quantum theory invalidates any reference to causal laws that might predict well-determined results. Heisenberg’s Principle of Indetermination blocks the classical dream of being able to predict the future of a physical system based its environmental conditions. It is not possible to measure simultaneously with complete accuracy the position and speed of its constituents. As a result it is necessary to disregard the classical concept of trajectory in favour of the idea of quantum leaps. A quantum leap, the realization of a state of quantum indetermination over a classical state, creates an opening in physical indeterminism, which is more compatible with the psychic sensation of freedom. Physical indeterminism and the sensation of freedom depended on the quantum fluctuations that realize classical states from quantum dynamism. The epistemology of the Copenhagen School eschewed an interpretation of the causes 7

Cf. D. BOHM, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (London, Routledge, 1957).


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of quantum indeterminism, maintaining an instrumental concept of the quantum leap. It was Bohm, in line with De Broglie’s proposals 8, that put forward a causal, physical-metaphysical explanation of the dynamic activity of the quantum void. Both propose that matter evolves by virtue of its own energy driven by active information transmitted via a quantum pilot wave. The matter has the capacity to move (energy), controlled by means of potential energy which informs it how it should activate itself. His 1952 interpretation 9 on the hidden variables that regulate these processes mistakenly categorised Bohm as a determinist of the Einstein school. Bohm, who accepts the validity of the Uncertainty Principle, states that the result of an individual physical process is unpredictable —in line with Bohr and the positivists—, but he argues that a (physical-metaphysical) causal explanation of the processes that produce the classical realization of a quantum system is plausible. Bohm assumes the existence of subquantum variables that cause quantum disturbance. Rather than coming from pure physics this hypothesis serves as causal-ontological complement from which to gain a better understanding of quantum phenomena. In this sense, the Heisenberg Principle is considered the expression of the minimal degree of indetermination that is accessible in the quantum order, but this level could be reduced (not eliminated) in a non-manifest subquantum order, in other words, a metaphysical one. Bohm seeks to analyse which aspects this subquantum dimension should possess in order to explain the characteristics of the quantum world. This ontological concept is coherent with the sensation of free will, as is the proposal of pure quantum fluctuations. Notwithstanding Bohm’s idea on active information that directs the matter that floats in a quantum chaos at will seems much more plausible as regards accounting for freedom of choice. iii) Stability of conscious experience and dynamism of the quantum content. The Planck scale, in which quantum and relativist laws are expected to fail, presupposes the existence of a single flowing motion in which quantum disturbance is so high that it is impossible to conceive Einstein’s gentle space continuum. Instead it suggests that a new quantum space-time order would emerge with a highly intensive flowing activity that would lead to the constant formation and destruction of microstructures. This quantum space-time would behaviour as a swarm of matter where space-time twists and turns in angular shapes that in fold in on one another. In phenomenological terms, states of consciousness appear as a holistic experience. Conscious perception is not seen as an active point enclosed in the brain but as the outcome of the organic coordination of the corporal whole. The stability of consciousness in particular, which offers a stable, coherent and 8 Cf. P. R. HOLLAND, The quantum theory of motion: an account of the Broglie-Bohm causal interpretation of quantum mechanics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993). 9 Cf. D. BOHM, «A suggested interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of hidden variables», Physical Review, 85 (1952), 166-180.


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unitary image of reality, and of the observable physical world in general, contrast sharply with the dynamic nature of the energetic quantum content as described in physics. How does classical stability emerge from such a chaotic quantum order? How is the stability of the conscious perception possible in underlying quantum dynamism? This question led Bohm to explore in greater depth the study of the physical/ metaphysical properties of subquantum ontology. According to Bohm the essential foundation of nature is its unceasing activity. Every motion and everything is created through motion: matter, life and psychism (sensations, perceptions, thoughts etc.). Nothing of a material nature can exist outside this creative activity called holomovement: the movement of the whole. As a consequence, life and psychism are not explained through abstractions of the whole. The multiple explicit manifestations of matter simply represent the different outcomes of unfolding a single implicate order that is infinitely connected. In Bohm’s holistic framework, the implicate order, which is essentially dynamic, is a metaphysical substratum that enables us to explain coherently the psychophysical unity based on the movement of the whole. The physical world remains in direct relation with the movement of the underlying universal order. Physical objects are structures arising in the implicate order, which are dissolved again in the same. In this holistic framework, things are merely abstractions of an indivisible whole; the essence of which is movement. If consciousness emerges from this whole as the total sum of physical phenomena, then it must draw on the quantum ontology that sustains reality and submit itself to processes of classical realization that stabilise perceptions, in accordance with the stability of the macroscopic physical order. 2.3.

Ontological and formal perspectives of the psychophysical problem

Up to this point we have emphasized the psychophysical, phenomenological and formal correspondences between consciousness and the physical world. Consciousness appears as a phenomenon affected by physical determining factors, moreover, the internal problem of the unity and coherence of modern physics reflects in many ways the physical problem of consciousness. For this reason authors such as Penrose have sought to link the questions surrounding physics and psychism in a single psychophysical problem of consciousness by analysing the formal aspects of the incompatibilities of physics with the formal characteristics of the phenomenon of consciousness. In pursuit of this goal, Penrose seeks a complete theory of quantum gravity that necessarily integrates the physical mechanisms of consciousness in order to be able to formulate a unitary and coherent image of the physical and psychic universe as a whole. The implementation of quantum rudiments in the biophysical being that produces states of consciousness, represents an intellectual enterprise that intrinsically links psychophysical matter and quantum gravity with the Big Bang. To some extent, Penrose’s worldview anticipates the material psychophysical unity that Bohm would explore in greater depth, at the risk of crossing from one side to the other of the diffuse physical-metaphysical border. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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In his in-depth exploration of the problem of consciousness, Bohm stresses fully the ontological nature of matter in order to be able to understand psychobiophysical reality. In Bohm’s thinking, the problem of consciousness can be summed up to a large extent as a search for the causes that activate physically and psychically the psychophysical potential energy of matter. The underlying ontology is an incessant energetic activity with quantum properties, as endorsed by fundamental physical results and theories. This underlying metaphysical order is called the implicate order (enfolded), in contrast to the total sum of physical phenomena that constitutes the explicate order (unfolded). Bohm aims to explain the interrelation between the physical and psychic phenomena of the explicate order, based on the ontological mind-matter unity of the implicate order. The unfolding of this enfolded psychophysical wholeness is produced globally in time to the holistic movement or holomovement as Bohm calls it. Seeking to explain the causes of physical and psychic phenomena, as well as their mutual psychophysical relationship, is an intellectual endeavour that intrudes on metaphysical ground, armed with scientific data and theories. This ontological venture, of a clearly holistic nature, complements the formal proposal made by Penrose in order to understand the phenomenon of consciousness in relation to the physical properties of material nature.

3.

PHYSICAL

EXPLANATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Given the phenomenologies of Bohm and Penrose’s consciousness, as well as their respective studies of the internal problem of physics related to consciousness, in this section we proceed to explain their respective explanatory models. Penrose drew up his model in collaboration with the American anaestheisist Stuart Hameroff 10. It involves the implementation of physical concepts in biological and neurological systems that in coordination could explain consciousness as the product of special psychobiophysical architecture 11. We will refer to this as the Penrose-Hameroff model. In addition, we will outline the physical/metaphysical contributions made by Bohm. These are intuitive ideas, of a marked holistic nature, which shed light on the common nature of physical and psychic processes. Although Bohm did not construct as detailed an explicit model as Penrose’s, his ideas are particularly interesting and complementary to those of Penrose-Hameroff. Hence we end by highlighting some of the key complementary ideas in a joint model that it is better equipped to comprehend the total sum of phenomenological characteristics of consciousness, namely the Bohm-Penrose-Hameroff (BPH) model. The BPH model is a heuristic interpretation of consciousness, which draws 10 Cf. S. R. HAMEROFF and R. PENROSE, «Orchestrated Reduction of Quantum Coherence in Brain Microtubules: A Model for Consciousness», in S. R. HAMEROFF, A. W. KASNIAK and A. C. SCOTT (eds.), Toward a science of consciousness I, 507-542, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1996. 11 S. R. HAMEROFF, Ultimate Computing. Biomolecular Consciousness and NanoTechnology, Tucson, Personal edition, 2003.


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on the observations and physical theories in Bohm and Penrose-Hameroff’s contributions and brings us closer to reaching an understanding of the mysterious nature of psychophysical matter. 3.1.

The Penrose-Hameroff model

From a mathematical point of view, Penrose’s motivation behind constructing a physical-mathematical model of consciousness stems from the existence of noncomputable mathematical structures, which could serve as a formal structure to explain the non-computational behaviour of the mind. His model is closely related to the quantum space-time geometry based on a fundamental physicalmathematical postulate, that is, the nullity of the Weyl tensor in the Big Bang. The peculiar geometry of the Big Bang, the nullity of the Weyl tensor, permits us to link the theory that describes space-time dynamics (General Relativity) with the Second Law of Thermodynamics and explain both the high level of order of the primitive physical universe and its temporally asymmetric nature. From the Big Bang to the present day all physical processes have been evolving towards more disordered states, thus enabling us to define a temporal arrow that distinguishes objectively between today and yesterday. Penrose relates this temporal asymmetry of physical evolution with an aspect of quantum theory that lacks physical foundation: the temporally asymmetric reality of the nonunitary reduction of the quantum state. The irreversible transition of the quantum regime to the classical one involves a decrease in the entropy or disorder of the physical system, caused by a sufficiently intense fluctuation in space-time geometry. This gravitatory disturbance leads to an increase in the entropy that offsets the decrease produced in the quantum-classical transition and generates a global increase of the total entropy of the system, in accordance with the Second Law. Thus, Penrose constructs a quantum-gravity theory of a thermodynamic nature, which explains objectively the reduction of the quantum state as a physical distinction of before and after. In sum, it provides a physical explanation of the conscious temporality of physical events, based on a model depending on noncomputable quantum/gravitatory fluctuations. Penrose aims to explain consciousness as the evolutionary outcome of the physical geometry prior to the physical universe. After verifying the total sum of phenomenological characteristics of consciousness, belonging to the structural block, he seeks biophysical structures capable of producing coherent quantum states. He enters the new field of quantum neurology in which formal elements are integrated to provide a better explanation of the functional indeterminism of consciousness. Departing from a Fröhlich’s study of states of quantum coherence and particularly the work by Hameroff 12 on the analysis of neuronal microtubules and associated proteins (MAPs), Penrose develops a neurological quantum model of consciousness. 12 Cf. J. TUSZYNSKI (ed.), The emerging physics of consciousness (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heildelberg, 2006).


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Microtubules are self-assembling hollow crystalline cylinders, 25 nanometers in diameter on the outside and 14 nanometers on the inside, found in the cytoplasm of nearly all animal and vegetable cells. Each microtubule is a polymer of globular proteins known as tubulins, 8 nanometers long and four nanometers wide and deep. Each tubulin has two conformational states, being able to jump from one state to another with ATP energy. Microtubules are hollow cylindrical structures well isolated from the noisy thermal environment of the brain. The structure, dimensions and sophisticated isolation of the microtubules make them the principle biological element of the Penrose-Hameroff model of consciousness. These characteristics permit the formation of collective quantum states among the tubulins. During the pre-conscious state, the quantum connection of the tubulins permits a quantum processing of sensorial information, governed by unitary laws of Quantum Mechanics. This stage is dominated by macroscopic quantum coherence phenomena that connect the microtubule tubulins, or even microtubules, cytoskeletons or different regions of the brain. During this pre-conscious phase the MAPs (microtubule-associated proteins that bind their internal action with the cellular environment) locate themselves in strategic position so as not to interrupt the coherent quantum dynamics of the processing. Each MAP will occupy a node of the wave function until objective quantum reduction occurs, caused by gravitatory disturbance of these proteins. The functional indeterminism of consciousness is explained based on the movement of the MAPs which, when displaced from the wave function nodes, disturb the system in a gravitatory sense inducing a quick transition of decoherence in the microtubules, until the realization of the conscious classical state. Out of all the possible quantum biophysical states during the processing phase, the psychobiophysical system becomes the only conscious classical state, which coincides with the start of a new quantum processing of information, followed by a different conscious state. The reduction process of the state of quantum superposition of the tubulins that produces the conscious state is directly related to the non-local nature of the energy in General Relativity. The gravitatory energy disturbance that initiates the collapse of quantum processing in a conscious state after the MAPs move is not localised; it is phenomenon that, like a gravitatory wave, that is delocalised throughout space favouring the appearance of non-local interactions. This gravitatory distance breaks the temporal physical symmetry; it produces an objective reduction in the quantum state and generates a temporal arrow related to entropy and the information that can be obtained from a system, mirroring what must have happened in the process of formation and creation of physical structures after the Big Bang 13. In synthesis, according to the Penrose-Hameroff model, consciousness is the biophysical product of quantum cooperation between microtubules, which connect distinct regions of the brain in a quantum way. The isolation of the 13 Cf. R. PENROSE, «Gravity and state vector reduction», in R. PENROSE and C. J. ISHAM (eds.), Quantum Concepts in Space and Time, New York, Oxford University Press.


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microtubules means that the physical information from the environment can be processed until the realization of a neuronal engram correlated with phenomenological psychic experience. This quantum-classical transition between the preconscious and conscious state is mediated by the MAPs, which originate an objective reduction orchestrated from gravitational disturbance. The brain therefore operates in a quantum and unconscious way most of the time until the MAPs induce a process of decoherence when quantum uncertainty has been resolved. Then the brain can produce a psychic image of the reality it perceives physically. 3.2.

Bohm’s physical/metaphysical proposals

Interest in Bohm’s interpretation of the phenomenon of consciousness is growing as more and more scholars become aware of the ontological problem between space-time relativist physics and quantum physics. The physical phenomena of quantum coherence and non-local action provide such unity to the physical universe that they spurred Bohm in his search for a metaphysical ontology to explain the surprising coherence of the physical order, as well as to generalise the laws proposed by the physics in favour of a single holistic physical/metaphysical connection. His work has focused on searching for an ontological structure that causes psychophysical phenomena stemming from a coordinated global movement: the holomovement that generates an unfolded phenomenical order. In this holistic ontological structure, mind and matter form an indivisible part of a single metaphysical reality of implicate orders with various degrees of consciousness. Bohm explains consciousness as another intrinsic property of this ontological content that shows its psychophysical potential energy by unfolding in the holomovement 14. Consciousness cannot be separated from the movement of matter. It is another element of the universal dynamics of mind-matter. Mindmatter of the psychophysical universe has been interlinked with the temporal dimension of the explicate order, but its ontological nature is essentially atemporal. Beyond the ordinary perception caused by the energy of the explicate order, the psychic-material subject can transcend the temporality of the world and become conscious of the universal wholeness after experiencing a direct perception or insight caused by the action of the cosmic mind on psychism. The psychic material subject is therefore open to envisaging the integral unity of existence and discovering its real psychic identity in the transition of the determinist thought mode to the intuitive consciousness mode. Bohm introduces the concepts of super-potential energy and quantum potential energy as physical-metaphysical links that concentrate energy to synthesize particles from the implicate energy content and guide them thereby 14 Cf. M. BÉJAR, «Conciencia, creatividad y libertad: sobre la naturaleza creativa libre de la conciencia en la correspondencia entre David Bohm y Charles Biederman», Pensamiento (in press).


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permitting their association in macroparticles. Each particle is therefore the explicate outcome of the joint action on a universal content of energy of quantum potential energies. The quantum super-potential energy operates on the cosmic sea of energy to generate a multidimensional implicate order that unfolds to form a temporal phenomenical order of particles with three dimensions (strictly spatial). The quantum potential energy’s action on these synthesised particles from the implicate order explains the oscillating, field and potentially unitary nature of the physical order: waves, fields, macro particles etc. Consciousness is the emergent product after the quantum binding between multiple neurones from different parts of the brain. The conscious experience is a qualitatively novel phenomenon that emerges when the brain operates holistically as if it were a single macro neuron 15. In this special quantum state the brain is governed by the quantum potential energy, which maintains quantum coherence. In Bohm’s terms the brain would behave like the implicate order: dynamic, coherent and unitary. In this way, the brain could be affected by the implicate cosmic order and would experience (beyond space-time) the action of the cosmic mind, namely, insight. The quantum super-potential energy would serve to undo the quantum coherence of the brain, making it operate classically and producing the state of consciousness. In synthesis, Bohm’s model is best described as metaphysics of the physical nature of consciousness which concerns itself with applying the ontology of the cosmos to the individual mind. In our view, these holistic intuitions are more fruitful in collaboration with the biophysical structures of the Penrose-Hameroff model, constituting the so-called Bohm-Penrose-Hameroff (BPH) model. 3.3.

The Bohm-Penrose-Hameroff model

The biophysical explanation of consciousness in the Penrose-Hameroff model is based on the coherence wave in the microtubules’ tubulins. This model can be enriched by the physical/metaphysical ontology of Bohm, better suited to explaining the holistic functional aspects of consciousness. If the coherence wave in the microtubules is represented as a pair of coordinated axes, the x-axis represents time and the y-axis the level of internal quantum coherence or Bohm’s quantum potential energy. At any given time, say zero time, the tubulins are in a classical state forming individual entities: a classical system of multiple tubulins in classical interaction described by null quantum potential energy. As time passes, a quantum interaction begins to take place, supported by psychism in the implicate order, defined by a finite value of the quantum potential energy. In a few tenths of a second, the quantum potential energy has intensified to such an extent that the physical states of the tubulins begin to acquire quantum properties, in other words, coherence superposition states emerge. 15

Cf. D. BOHM and B. J. HILEY, The undivided universe (London, Routledge, 1993).


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As these individual quantum states are consolidated, the growing intensity of the quantum potential energy leads to the interlinking of the tubulins’ quantum states, which lose their identity to become a coherent microsystem capable of processing in a quantum way the physical information gathered by the senses. In less than half a second, the psychism reaches the highest degree of coherence accessible biophysically and saturates: quantum potential energy is maintained more or less constant. In this phase, psychism resembles the implicate order. It is a mind-matter system with maximum internal coherence, limited by the constraints of the biophysical matter itself. In other words, the quantum potential energy saturates at a finite limit because the matter it is composed of is in degenerate state in comparison to primordial matter, unaffected by entropy, from the Big Bang. Thus the holistic intuitions of Bohm and Penrose’s geometric proposals are connected in the Big Bang. Unless another action mediates, the system would maintain its internal coherence until the thermal chaos of the environment causes quantum decoherence. Hence the chance ordinary quantum reduction of the phenomena belonging to the physical world would occur. The action of the super quantum potential energy prevents this thermal reduction and permits the orchestrated gravitatory reduction. As the levels of quantum potential energy are saturated in the psychobiophysical system, the super-quantum potential energy regulates the displacement of the MAPs prior to the formation of the conscious state. The active information from the super-quantum potential energy causes the MAPs to move, resulting from the energy from the biophysical system, towards positions that modify the internal gravitatory energy. The resulting increase of gravitatory energy, above the elemental quantum of gravity, initiates the induced decoherence phase that concludes with the formation of the conscious state. As a consequence, psychism (Bohm’s individual mind) is connected to the temporal reality of a world subject to constant change thus favouring a generalised increase of entropy. The information produced by the psychic subject on perceiving consciously a specific external reality, from the wide variety of virtual quantum realities that exist during the quantum process of sensorial information, represents a decrease in the entropy, offset by the increase in the gravitatory entropy in the quantumgravitatory collapse orchestrated by the MAPs. This serves to explain the temporal experience of the psychic subject, which distinguishes the memory of the past from the unpredictable nature of the future. The psychic changes caused in the brain by these perceptions during a more or less atemporal phase need temporal consciousness in order to be consolidated as conscious experiences that are capable of modifying conduct or action. Conscious experience, as we observe it, requires psychism to remain interlinked with time. The temporal connection of the psyche reproduces the large-scale primordial binding of the explained cosmic order, after the development of a disturbance in the implicate order, consolidated by the super-quantum potential energy. The functioning of psychism, constituted over time in an evolutionary way, is regulated by the same guidelines that have existed since the Big Bang. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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Just as the explained order of the psychophysical phenomena reached relative independence from the implicate orders, consciousness needs to be partly disconnected from the coherent integrity of underlying orders. The action of the super-quantum potential energy is essential to cut short the coherent processing of the brain and cause a state of individual and temporal knowledge that we call consciousness. If the quantum-classical transition were random, temporal continuity of the conscious subject would not be possible. Consciousness, therefore, would not exist, only independent instants of pseudo-consciousness, that is, spasms of consciousness, which are far from conscious experience. In conclusion, the temporal binding of psychism is an essential element in order to understand the conscious phenomenon constituted by individual subjects, the essence of which persists over time. The information encoded in the energy of the environment by the superquantum potential energy generates an implicate order structure in the psychism of conscious beings. The action of this energy over the psychobiophysical body starts the formation of a coherent quantum state among diverse microtubules located in different cells distributed throughout the organism. This holistic structure of microtubules functions as a resonator of the information received from the environment. The active information from the environment, which indicates how the field energy from the environment should be structured and guided, passes directly to the global structure of the microtubules, which form conformational states in line with said information; in other words, they are organised according to the information received by the super-quantum potential energy. The conscious image therefore comes directly from external reality in the psychism and is felt holistically. The immediate outside world imposes itself on the microtubules as a whole and these in turn copy the information received integrating it in the global structure of microtubules integrated throughout the body. Consequently, the conscious perception of reality acquires holographic properties. A spatially ordered and continuous conscious image is formed, in which objects display mutual coherence. In the BPH model, the microtubules are biophysical resonators of the quantum information. The resonance modes are limited in a microtubule; the combination options between the vibration modes of all the microtubules of the body are sufficiently broad to cover the extensive phenomenological register of conscious states. Penrose’s model does not explain why a specific quantum interconnection pattern is produced in the tubulins, although it does explore how a coherent pattern is reduced by the action of the MAPs. In our proposal, the MAPs must also play an important role in constituting a specific conscious state. In one way or another, the MAPs should modify their position in line with the active information received from the environment. The microtubules start to look for possible states of mutual coherence, compatible with the relative position of the MAPs, which are positioned in the wave nodes during the quantum processing phase. Out of all the patterns from this reduced group of possible quantum psychic states, the ones that reach the highest degree of PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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coherence would be resolved, in order words, those that resonate with greatest intensity, in line with the main characteristics of the conscious state: unity and coherence. Thus, for instance, in visual perception, the super quantum potential energy that operates in the electromagnetic field establishes the relative position of the MAPs from certain microtubules, which begins to generate compatible states of quantum macro-coherence. The resulting quantum coherence wave, constituted by microtubules distributed throughout the body, reaches a maximum level of coherence and saturates: psychism cannot generate a more coherent quantum state due to its psychobiophysical limitations, and it initiates the decoherence phase induced by the MAPs until it forms the classical conscious state. Psychism is ordered according the quantum information received from the environment. It organises itself to receive directly the encoded information in the light received from the wholeness of the physical environment and consequently produces a conscious holographic image. If ordinary conscious perceptions per se are sufficiently complex to merit lengthy explanations in existing models, insights add extra speculative content. However, they also have a place in the BPH model. They can be explained in the BPH models as direct input from the informational reality at ordering levels well above standard levels, which spurs psychism to seek a wave with a high degree of quantum coherence. In the intuition or insight the action of the external energetic-informative block is so intense that the marred psychic control forces pre-established by thought become negligible. As a consequence, psychism does not saturate as easily. The previous schemes of thought remain dysfunctional and psychism is forced to seek psychic coherence faced with the intensely coherent reality that imposes itself. The MAPs, still constrained by biophysical limitations, are freed from psychic impositions and perform their function with greater faithfulness to external reality. To a large extent, Bohm’s conscious direct perception requires energy of maximum order whose light constructs the conscious reflex image in psychism. The action of the cosmic mind over psychism would operate directly on the microtubules, independently from the MAPs, and transmit their coherence directly on the microtubules binding them in a non-local connection. The nonlocal connection system of microtubules would represent the explained reality closest to the implicate dimension of maximum coherence. In the final analysis, the decoherence of the MAPs must take place in order for the subject to be conscious of the cosmic experience. The MAPs, then, represent the essential psychic element that grants individuality to the conscious subject and differentiates it from the rest of the whole. Without the objective reduction orchestrated by the MAPs the subject would be subsumed in the cosmic mind and reduced to a quantum cellular automaton of ordinary perception. Consciousness, therefore, represents the holistic, unitary and coherent image, which emerges after the quantum processing of the direct dump of external information on psychism. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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CONCLUSION

The epistemological and metaphysical analysis of the BPH model enables us to be aware of the ontological nature and meaning of the psychobiophysical reality. The joint BPH model, characterised by an evolutionary-emergentist line of the psychophysical material reality, offers us an ontological and functional perspective of coherent consciousness with scientific phenomenology. The metaphysics of the BPH model provides us with a more profound vision of the human being as a participatory element of existence. Consciousness is the main evolutionary element that provides unity to the whole of creation. It is the clear result of an original cosmic consciousness capable of recognising in its individual nature the very essence of the cosmos. Just as we call the sum of psychobiophysical events that occur in a primordial explained order the existential phenomenological cycle, we can say that conscious individual knowledge of the cosmic consciousness is the conscious act that closes a higher existential cycle from the explicate order to the energetic content of the implicate orders: the existential hypercycle as personal conscious knowledge of the cosmic essence of each psychic subject. The emergence of consciousness marks a point of inflection in the development of the universe, as it enables us to understand the holistic unity of the evolution of the psychobiophysical universe and therefore become relatively independent from structural evolutionary dynamics. The ontological nature of consciousness is similar to that of other material processes observed in the universe. The BPH model proposes a formation process for consciousness based on the physical cooperation of the psychic architecture of a living being. The conscious subject possesses matter that is capable of manifesting physical and psychic activity. Physical, biological and psychic evolution has produced a psychobiophysical being in which the psychophysical echoes of a fundamental ontological reality resonate. The universe becomes conscious and reveals itself as an active part of a unitary psychobiophysical process. This is a creative universe (it produces conscious beings) and a revelatory one (it unfolds the potential of matter), where structures emerge that are ontologically akin to their fundamental essence. This essence unfolds and originates the universe of matter, life and consciousness. Man, emergent in this psychobiophysical universe, is capable of understanding and transcending this through the experience of insight. The ontological identification of man with the cosmos, as well as his ability to transcend it thanks to the direct intervention of the cosmic mind, offers a metaphysical perspective, stemming from a philosophical physical reflection and scientific interest in understanding the phenomenon of consciousness. Man is linked to the material essence of the cosmos by virtue of his psychobiophysical constitution. At the point of maximum resonance with the cosmos he can reach a direct perception of the wholeness of reality and bestow meaning on his existence. This is the most intense rebinding with creation, the maximum tuning PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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with the cosmic mind, the closest to identification with the essential cosmic content that creates, unfolds and rebinds. The image offered to us by a scientificphilosophical reflection of an emergentist nature, shows consciousness as a window wide open to the essential content of reality. For man the universe is a conscious physical system, in which he is capable of questioning its raison d’être and playing an active role in rebinding himself with the essence thereof. Cátedra Ciencia, Tecnología y Religión Universidad Comillas c/ Alberto Aguilera, 25 28015 Madrid [email protected]

MANUEL BÉJAR GALLEGO



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GÉNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINÁMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA * IGNACIO NÚÑEZ DE CASTRO Universidad de Málaga

RESUMEN: La Biología no trata de la vida, sino de la descripción fenomenológica de los organismos vivos; el estudio de la vida es propio de la Filosofía natural. Para tener un discurso coherente para describir un ser vivo necesitamos una serie de categorías: comprensión holística, sistema, proceso, emergencia de novedad, teleología, epigénesis y evolución; matrices conceptuales que conforman una racionalidad diferente a la racionalidad mecanicista predominante en la Física. El pensamiento sistémico es siempre pensamiento procesual. La Filosofía del proceso es un buen instrumento intelectual para la comprensión del viviente. Ninguna realidad es un hecho estático; debemos pasar de la metafísica de substancia (ser) a la metafísica del devenir. Las propiedades emergentes surgen a un cierto nivel de complejidad. La explicación del sistema no se encuentra en los componentes básicos (análisis), sino en la organización jerárquica del mismo como una unidad, que posee una finalidad, un «télos». El genoma es el programa que fundamenta la estructura y comportamiento del organismo, que se desarrolla epigenéticamente. Los organismos vivos son sistemas abiertos en continuo intercambio con el medio de materia, energía e información. La célula es la unidad de análisis elemental de los vivientes, tanto microorganismos como vegetales o animales. Toda célula es una unidad dinámica y se encuentra siempre en una fase del proceso de división celular. El tiempo es una categoría esencial para la comprensión de todo organismo vivo; contemplada la serie de los vivientes a grandes escalas de tiempo, nos lleva a la afirmación de que vivir es evolucionar y de que nada en Biología tiene sentido sino es a la luz de la evolución. PALABRAS CLAVE: Biología, Filosofía natural, vida, ser vivo, pensamiento sistémico, proceso, emergencia, teleología, epigénesis, evolución.

Genesis of life from the matter dynamic process ABSTRACT: Biology does not deal with life, but the phenomenological description of living beings; the life study belongs to the Natural Philosophy. For a coherent discussion in order to learn what a living being is, several categories as: holistic comprehension, system, process, novelty emergence, teleology, epigenesis and evolution are needed. In this way a different rationality, non-mechanicist, may be constructed. The systemic thought is always a process thought. Therefore, the process philosophy is good tool for understanding the living organisms. Reality is not static, but dynamic; we must pass from the substance (being) metaphysics, to that of becoming. The novelty emergence is achieved from the complexity. The system explanation is not found in the elements (analysis), but in the hierarchical organization of the system as a whole, which has an internal teleology. Genome, which is epigenetically developing, is the program that bases the structure and performances of organisms. The elemental analysis unit for microorganisms, vegetables and animals, the cell, is a dynamic unity always in the process of mitosis. Time scale is essential for the understanding of living organisms; if the living being’s series is observed in big time periods, we conclude that to live is to be in development and nothing in Biology has meaning, but in the light of evolution. KEY WORDS: Biology, Natural Philosophy, life, living being, systemic thought, process, emergence, teleology, epigenesis, evolution.

* La mayor parte de la argumentación y de los conceptos expuestos en este trabajo forman parte del capítulo del libro «De la dignidad del embrión. Reflexiones en torno a la vida humana naciente», Cátedra de Bioética, Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, 2008. © PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749



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I. NÚÑEZ DE CASTRO, GÉNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINÁMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA

ES LA VIDA?

La Biología como ciencia, no trata de la vida en sí misma, el concepto vida pertenece a la Filosofía natural; la Biología, en cuanto ciencia experimental, trata de las manifestaciones o fenómenos de los seres a los que llamamos organismos vivos 1. Así lo entendieron Treviranus y Lamarck, quienes al comienzo del siglo XIX acuñaron el término Biología para describir: «todo lo que es común a vegetales y animales, como todos las facultades que son propias a estos seres sin excepción» 2. Definir la vida, poder responder a la pregunta: «¿qué es la vida?» ha sido una cuestión ardua y compleja desde Aristóteles hasta nuestros días 3; quizá el camino más obvio, para responder a esta pregunta, sea la descripción de los fenómenos que manifiestan los organismos que llamamos vivos, en cuanto organismos vivos. Por eso muchas de las definiciones clásicas de la vida 4 son fenomenológicas, insistiendo en los rasgos que diferencian los seres vivos de aquellos que son inanimados, como nacer, crecer, reproducirse y morir; estos rasgos nos permitirán identificar los organismos vivos, no la vida misma. «¿Qué es la vida?». Se preguntó Edwin Schrödinger 5 en su famoso ciclo de conferencias tenido en Dublín a comienzo de los años cincuenta del siglo pasado. Schrödinger intentó responder a la pregunta teniendo en cuenta las aporías que, desde los supuestos de la Física moderna, la pregunta implicaba; según algunos autores las reflexiones de Schrödinger, supusieron el comienzo de la moderna Biología Molecular. Lo cierto es que tanto para Schrödinger, como para nosotros, al intentar responder a la pregunta: «¿qué es la vida?», partimos de nuestra propia experiencia; quizá remedando a San Agustín en el libro XI de las Confesiones 6 nos atreveríamos a decir: «La vida, si no me lo preguntan, sé lo que es, pero si quiero explicar al que me lo pregunta, no lo sé». Parece, pues, que este apo1 OANA IFTIME, «Life sciences, apophatism and Bioethics», en European Journal of Science and Theology, 2, 2006, pp. 21-46. 2 Citado por ÁNGEL MARTÍN MUNICIO, Discurso inaugural del Año Académico 1980-1981, Ciencia y Aristobiología, Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Físicas y Naturales, Madrid, 1980, p. 23. Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus (4 de febrero de 1776-16 de febrero de 1837) nació en Bremen (Alemania). Estudió medicina en Göttingen, donde se doctoró en 1796; en 1802 publica el libro Biologie oder Philosophie der lebenden Natur, por lo que es considerado, junto con Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, uno de los primeros en acuñar el término Biología. 3 ÉTIENNE GILSON, De Aristóteles a Darwin, y vuelta. Ensayo sobre algunas cuestiones de la Biofilosofía, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1976. Un tercio de los tratados conocidos como el Corpus aristotelicum son escritos sobre Biología: Sobre el alma, De la generación y corrupción, De las partes de los animales y la Historia de los animales. Cf. ALFREDO MARCOS, Aristóteles y otros animales. Una lectura filosófica de la Biología aristotélica, PPU, Barcelona, 1996. 4 Pueden verse algunas definiciones de la vida en la obra de GIOVANNI BLANDINO, S.J., Problemas y Teorías sobre la Naturaleza de la Vida, Editorial Razón y Fe, Madrid, 1964, pp. 42-43. 5 EDWIN SCHRÖDINGER, ¿Qué es la vida?, Tusquets, Barcelona, 1983. 6 SAN AGUSTÍN, Confessiones, Libro XI, Cap. XIV: «Quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio»: «¿Qué es el tiempo? Si nadie me lo pregunta, lo sé; si quisiera explicarlo al que me pregunta, no lo sé».


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fatismo 7 del que nos habla Oana Iftime es inherente a la condición del ser vivo; «este es el punto en el que la vida escapa a la ciencia» 8. A lo largo de la historia del pensamiento muchos filósofos y hombres de ciencia han intentado darnos un atisbo de respuesta 9 a esta pregunta: «¿Qué es la vida?», puesto que como seres vivos, nos inquieta la pregunta; al fin, la respuesta es parte del «conócete a ti mismo» 10. Sin embargo, podemos afirmar que a pesar de los innumerables descubrimientos de la Biología Molecular en la segunda mitad del siglo XX y comienzos del siglo XXI; a pesar de que conocemos el código genético universal en el que está cifrada la herencia; a pesar de que conocemos el genoma de muchas especies de microorganismos, vegetales y animales, e incluso del hombre; a pesar de que tenemos muchas certezas que nos dan las ciencias experimentales de la vida, son muchas más nuestras aporías, ignorancias e incertidumbres sobre aquello que constituye la vida. El concepto ser viviente pasa por la propia experiencia. Todos tenemos experiencia de lo que es estar vivo y de la no vida, la muerte. Todos sabemos distinguir entre una escultura y un ser humano vivo que nos mira con sus ojos brillantes, entre el león de bronce que custodia la entrada del Congreso de los Diputados y el viejo león que dormita o juega en el zoológico. Durante mis largos años de dedicación a la enseñanza y a la investigación he procurado, en la medida de mis posibilidades, responderme a la pregunta sobre la naturaleza de la vida, en aquella parcela (la Enzimología) que era objeto de mi dedicación diaria en la docencia, el trabajo experimental y la reflexión filosófica. Un gran compañero y amigo, el Profesor José Antonio Lozano de la Universidad de Murcia, me pidió que prologara un manual de Bioquímica 11. Se me invitó a qué hiciera una reflexión sobre la naturaleza de la vida y cómo la Bioquímica y la Biología Molecular pueden ayudarnos a comprender: «¿Qué es la vida?»; recuerdo que en aquel tiempo intenté en pocas palabras dar mi visión y se me ocurrió el siguiente cuento: «Había una vez un violín que oyó cantar a un ruiseñor. El pajarillo producía registros inauditos para el violín: gorjeos, trinos, floreos agudos y alegres. El violín tuvo envidia y quiso cantar como el ruiseñor; al ver que no podía imitarlo, le preguntó: “¿Tú, de qué estas hecho?”. El pajarillo le respondió: “¿Y 7 Neologismo deducido por la autora del adjetivo «apofático»; referido en Teología a la Teología apofática, como la vía negativa para el conocimiento de Dios. 8 OANA IFTIME, op. cit. (nota 1). «La vida es un concepto abstracto, difícil de definir, pero de fácil comprensión, puesto que estamos en contacto muy directo con los seres vivos empezando por nosotros mismos». JOSÉ VÍLCHEZ, El don de la vida, Desclée de Brouwer, Bilbao, 2007, p. 13. 9 Puede verse la obra clásica: E. M. RADL, Historia de las ideas biológicas: I. Hasta el siglo XIX, y II. Desde Lamarck y Cuvier, Introducción de JOSÉ MARÍA LÓPEZ PIÑERO, Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1988. 10 Nosce te ipsum, MARCO TULIO CICERÓN, Tusculanes disputationes, 1, 52. 11 JOSÉ ANTONIO LOZANO, J. D. GALINDO, J. C. GARCÍA-BORRÓN, J. H. MARTÍNEZ-LIARTE, R. PEÑAFIEL y F. SOLANO, Bioquímica para ciencias de la salud, Editorial Interamericana McGraw-Hill, Madrid, 1995; IGNACIO NÚÑEZ DE CASTRO, Prólogo, pp. XI-XIII.


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tú?”. El violín, que había tocado delante de reyes manejado por las manos más virtuosas de la época, se molestó por la insolencia del ruiseñor y le respondió: “Yo estoy hecho de la más fina haya alemana, mis cuerdas están bien templadas, tengo sesenta y nueve piezas, y no hay dinero para pagar el arco que obtiene mis notas timbradas y brillantes”. El ruiseñor siguió cantando, el día era soleado y tenía ganas de mostrar al viento primaveral que en un rincón del bosque entre brezos y jarales se puede oír el mejor concierto. El violín insistió: “¿Pero de qué estás hecho?”. Entonces el ruiseñor le contestó: “Yo tengo el alma de la música”. Y comenzó a volar…».

Posiblemente los cuentos nos puedan sugerir mucho más que una seria reflexión sobre las características fundamentales de los organismos vivos, comparados con los que llamamos inanimados. También aquí nos puede ser fácil pasar del mito al logos. El ruiseñor del cuento ¿en qué se diferenciaba del Stradivarius? Espontáneamente responderíamos: «El ruiseñor estaba vivo». Diríamos que el pajarillo en todas sus manifestaciones era un torrente de vitalidad y podía cantar y volar por sí mismo. Sin embargo, el violín necesitaba de unas manos hábiles que fueran capaces de sacar de sus cuerdas las timbradas notas. También cuentan que cuando Miguel Ángel terminó de esculpir el Moisés, admirado de su propia obra, le tiró el martillo y le dijo: «Parla, cane». Sabemos que el Moisés de Miguel Ángel nunca habló y que el Stradivarius del cuento tampoco pudo cantar por sí mismo, como hizo el ruiseñor a la vez que arrancó el vuelo. El ruiseñor podía cantar, volar, picotear, aparearse, construir un nido, cuidar de las crías y, tal vez, una pedrada de un chiquillo o un ave rapaz podría acabar con su vida. Quizá la diferencia más fundamental entre los organismos vivos y lo no vivos sea ésta: los seres vivos reaccionan como una unidad, como un todo, como el pajarillo que echó a volar. Así pues, desde un punto de vista descriptivo, en primera aproximación, podríamos decir que un ser vivo, desde una bacteria, pasando por todo el reino vegetal y animal hasta el hombre, se comporta: como una unidad de estructuras y funciones jerárquicamente integradas en todas sus manifestaciones, tendiendo siempre a conservar su estructura.

LA

RACIONALIDAD SISTÉMICA EVOLUTIVA

Ahora bien, para tener un discurso coherente que nos describa todas las manifestaciones que observamos en los organismos vivos necesitamos delimitar una serie de categorías, que conformen un nuevo paradigma de comprensión en una nueva racionalidad; racionalidad que llamaremos sistémica evolutiva, contrapuesta a la racionalidad lineal mecanicista, que ha servido a la ciencia de instrumento para el conocimiento del Universo desde el siglo XVII 12. La racionali12 HENRYK SKOLIMOWSKI, «Problemas de racionalidad en biología», en Estudios sobre la Filosofía de la Biología, F. J. AYALA y T. DOBZHANSKY (eds.), Editorial Ariel, S.A., Métodos, Barcelona, 1983, pp. 267-291.


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dad sistémica interpreta al universo mediante un discurso no lineal, sino complejo, en el que están siempre presentes diferentes niveles de significación, que se relacionan entre sí a partir de bucles interactivos 13, intentando de alguna manera traducir en nuestro discurso la complejidad de la realidad. Las categorías fundamentales de este discurso de comprensión de los organismos vivos serían: comprensión holística (o totalidad), sistema, proceso, emergencia de novedad, cambio (evolución), teleología (ejecución de acciones encaminadas a un fin) y desarrollo epigenético. Para llegar, pues, a un discurso coherente sobre el ser vivo necesitamos clarificar cuáles son los contenidos de estas matrices conceptuales que son necesarias para la descripción de un organismo vivo 14. Ludwig von Bertalanffy en la Teoría general de sistemas afirma: «En comparación con el proceder analítico de la Ciencia clásica, con resolución en elementos componentes y causalidad lineal o unidireccional como categoría básica, la investigación de totalidades organizadas de muchas variables requiere nuevas categorías de interacción, transacción, organización, teleología, etc., con lo cual surgen muchos problemas para la epistemología y los modelos y técnicas matemáticos» 15. Los organismos vivos son por excelencia esas totalidades organizadas de las que nos habla Bertalanffy. Nos situamos, pues, muy lejos del universo mecanicista que concibió la Física clásica post-newtoniana apoyándose en la concepción de un espacio absoluto e isótropo, un tiempo absoluto y reversible, una causalidad eficiente determinista y la postulación de la ausencia de toda finalidad 16; racionalidad mecanicista que ha dominado nuestra cultura occidental y ha conformado, en gran parte, el mismo devenir de las sociedades modernas. Somos herederos de una cultura en la que se ha dado un predominio analista, con la pretensión de que el análisis exhaustivo de las partes llevaría a la comprensión del todo. La racionalidad sistémica en cambio actúa por aproximaciones, utilizando conceptos preñados de significación, con gran apertura semántica y complementariedad comprensiva. La misma palabra originaria sistema indica: conjunto estructurado de hechos y acontecimientos, que relacionados ordenadamente entre sí, contribuyen a un determinado fin. La racionalidad sistémica supone un enfoque holístico de la realidad a estudiar. Cualquier elemento estructural o funcional de un sistema no puede entenderse sino en relación con los otros elementos estructurales o funcionales del mismo. Todo sistema es un todo, aunque no clausurado en sí mismo, puesto que el sistema puede estar en continua interacción con otros sistemas jerárquicamente relacionados, formando parte de un nuevo sistema de nivel superior, 13 EDGAR MORIN, La Méthode, I, La Nature de la Nature, Éditions de Seuil, Paris, 1977, y II, La vie de la Vie, Éditions de Seuil, Paris, 1980. 14 IGNACIO NÚÑEZ DE CASTRO, «Las categorías del discurso biológico», en Evolucionismo y cultura, A. DOU (ed.), Biblioteca Fomento Social, Mensajero, Bilbao, 1983, pp. 17-55. 15 LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY, Teoría general de los sistemas, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, Ediciones F. C. E. España, Madrid, 1976, p. xvi. 16 IGNACIO NÚÑEZ DE CASTRO, «Ciencia y Post-utopía», en Después de las utopías, A. DOU (ed.), Publicaciones de la Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, 1993, pp. 17-52.


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así «una función nunca viene determinada por una estructura particular, sino por el contexto de la organización y del medio en el que dicha estructura se encuentra sumergida» 17; el control jerárquico es una de las características esenciales y diferenciales de las manifestaciones de la materia viviente. Si volvemos al pajarillo del cuento, podemos decir que el ruiseñor era un sistema: toda su anatomía y todos sus órganos los podemos considerar como elementos estructurales y funcionales, jerárquicamente organizados para construir ese todo: el pajarillo que proclamaba alegremente su territorio en un día primaveral. Pero el mismo pájaro y su canto no pueden entenderse sin otro sistema, el de su pareja con la que intentaba nidificar y la pareja tampoco podemos comprenderla sino dentro del ecosistema del bosque y el bosque lo debemos considerar dentro del ecosistema general, el planeta Tierra. La organización jerárquica de los conjuntos sistémicos implica que pueden considerarse múltiples niveles en la estructura de un sistema, de tal manera que el fenómeno observado dependerá de la escala de observación a la que se le someta; es muy citada la sentencia del físico Charles Eugène Guye quien afirmaba: «la escala crea el fenómeno». De la misma manera, en el orden funcional pueden observarse también múltiples niveles de organización. A este respecto nos dice Fritjof Capra: «En el marco mecanicista de la ciencia cartesiana hay estructuras fundamentales y luego hay fuerzas y mecanismos a través de los cuales estas interactúan dando lugar a procesos. En la ciencia sistémica cada estructura es vista como la manifestación de procesos subyacentes. El pensamiento sistémico siempre es pensamiento procesual» 18. Así en el mismo pajarillo del cuento podemos considerar diferentes niveles de organización estructural: partículas subatómicas que forman átomos, átomos que se enlazan para formar biomoléculas, macromoléculas que se entretejen para dar las estructuras celulares, como membranas y otros orgánulos que constituyen una célula, células que forman los tejidos y órganos que se entrelazan dinámicamente tanto en la estructura como en la funcionalidad de donde resulta ese todo, el pajarillo que canta, picotea, y vuela por sí mismo. También el violín del cuento, en sí mismo, es un sistema estructurado y organizado en sus piezas pero por una finalidad externa a sí mismo que le impuso el luthier y además nunca pudo cantar por sí mismo; el violín no estaba no vivo, le faltaba esa respuesta integral, creadora y juguetona que tan descaradamente manifestaba el pajarillo. El violín era una parte que, junto con la fricción del arco y los ágiles dedos comandados por el cerebro del violinista, podría forma una unidad jerárquica superior y entonces cantar un solo en una sala de concierto, pero en 17 Sobre la jerarquización en los sistemas puede verse: H. H. PATTEE, «El problema de la jerarquía Biológica», en C. H. WADDINGTON y OTROS, Hacia una Biología teórica, Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1976, pp. 531-555. 18 FRITJOF CAPRA, La trama de la vida. Una nueva perspectiva de los sistemas vivos, Editorial Anagrama, Colección Argumentos, Barcelona, 1998, p. 62. Puede verse también: MICHEL WEBER, «La vie de la nature selon le dernier Whitehead», en Les Études Philosophiques, n.º 3, 2006, pp. 395-408.


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ese momento el violín estaría integrado en un sistema jerárquico superior compuesto por el violinista y su instrumento.

EL

PENSAMIENTO PROCESUAL

En este punto del discurso, en el esfuerzo por entender qué es un organismo vivo conviene aclarar el término proceso, tal como es entendido en la llamada filosofía procesual. El pensamiento procesual parte de una cosmovisión dinámica, frente a una visión estática del ser. Todo sistema tiene, pues, una dimensión temporal, tiene un antes y un después inherente a su mismo ser y a su comportamiento. En la extensión temporal se realiza el proceso; el proceso es duración o coextensión en el tiempo sin ruptura de la continuidad. En todo organismo vivo, desde los unicelulares a los pluricelulares, cuando es analizado fenomenológicamente en su extensión temporal, nos encontramos con una continua sucesión de fases en las que no hay ningún tipo de cesura o cambio cualitativo. Desde el punto de vista ontológico, la relación de una fase con respecto a otra no es una relación de potencia a acto, puesto que en cualquier momento de su ciclo vital se manifiesta actualmente todo el organismo en su fase correspondiente. La filosofía del proceso introduce el proceso frente al ser como referencia ontológica, lo dinámico frente a lo estático. Así pues, se puede definir el proceso como el resultado de un conjunto secuencialmente estructurado de sucesivos estadios o fases en el que no existe solución de continuidad. Todo proceso es complejo y posee una estructura jerarquizada temporal coherente. Al ser todo proceso temporal y poder distinguir un comienzo y un fin, todo proceso es direccional y tiene un «télos», una finalidad interna. La filosofía del proceso acepta como categorías fundamentales para la comprensión de la realidad: el cambio, la temporalidad, la actividad, la unidad, la continuidad, la totalidad, la relación con otros procesos, la emergencia de novedad y la teleología interna o finalidad. Según Alfred N. Whitehead, «la descripción newtoniana de la materia abstrae la materia del tiempo. Concibe la materia en un instante. Así lo hace la descripción de Descartes» 19. Sin embargo, todos los hechos del universo sólo podemos concebirlos como una minuciosa selección de sus relaciones con otros hechos o procesos. «Así los datos consisten en lo que ha sido, en lo que podía haber sido y en lo que puede ser (…) Tales son los datos; y de estos datos emerge un proceso en forma de transición. Esta unidad del proceso es el “especioso presente” de la actualidad en cuestión» 20. El mismo Whitehead dirá que «ninguna actualidad es un hecho estático. El carácter histórico del universo pertenece a su esencia» 21. Si interpretamos la realidad como proceso las actua19 ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD, Modos de pensamiento, Taller de ediciones Josefina Betancor, Madrid, 1973, p. 104. 20 Ibidem, p. 104. 21 Ibidem, p. 105.


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lidades del presente están derivando de sus características antecedentes y confi riendo sus características al futuro: «la inmediatez es la realización de las potencialidades del pasado y es el almacén de las potencialidades del futuro» 22. El organismo vivo podemos concebirlo como un proceso de desarrollo epigenético (más adelante reflexionaremos sobre la epigénesis). La categoría fundamental para la comprensión no será entonces la substancia (lo que subyace a los cambios) sino la «fluencia», el devenir como consecuencia de los acontecimientos. Whitehead en el capítulo dedicado al proceso en su obra fundamental Proceso y realidad nos habla de la experiencia integral humana: la afirmación de que «todas las cosas fluyen». Para el filósofo británico, elucidar el significado de esta frase es la tarea de la Metafísica; también afirma él, existe la experiencia de la permanencia de las cosas. Para Whitehead los dos primeros versos de un himno famoso podrían sintetizar las dos experiencias humanas: «Quédate conmigo; rápida cae la tarde».

«Los filósofos que parten del primer verso nos dieron la metafísica de la “substancia”, y los que parten del segundo desarrollan la metafísica del “fluir”» 23. El teólogo Hans Küng nos ha hecho caer en la cuenta de la similitud de la ontología procesual de Whitehead y de la metafísica de fondo que subyace al pensamiento de Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Hans Küng, en su libro ¿Existe Dios? afirma: «como Teilhard en Teología, Whitehead se preocupa en Filosofía por mantener estrecha conexión con el pensamiento de las ciencias naturales modernas. También él entiende la naturaleza entera como un proceso gigantesco en el que un número infinito de unidades mínimas (…) entra en activa relación con otras, y todas ellas se desarrollan juntas en pequeños procesos igualmente infinitos en número» 24. El jesuita francés habla de una metafísica del unire 25, como Ibidem, p. 115. ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD, Proceso y realidad, Editorial Losada, Buenos Aires, traducción de J. Rovira Armengol, 1956, pp. 284-285. El texto inglés del poema citado por Whitehead es: «Abide with me; Fast falls the eventide», citado por ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD, Process and Reality. An essay in Cosmology, Cambridge at the University Press, Cambridge, 1929, p. 296. Ver el siguiente texto de Guillermo Armengol: «Sin embargo, un fluir de eventos microfísicos constituía y daba cierta estabilidad en el tiempo a los objetos macrofísicos, aunque también abiertos en su interior a la evolución y transformación continua. Para Whitehead era evidente que la física de comienzos del siglo XX describía un mundo que fluía por eventos inestables, que se relacionaban entre sí por prehensiones físicas para constituir entidades actuales, como sociedades de eventos organizados, que se transformaban dinámicamente en un proceso continuo» [«Whitehead y la imagen de Dios desde la Ciencia. Alfred North Whitehead y la filosofía del proceso», en Pensamiento, vol. 63, n.º 238 (Serie especial, n.º 1), 2007, pp. 801-806]. 24 H. KÜNG, ¿Existe Dios? Respuesta al Problema de Dios en nuestro tiempo, Ediciones Cristiandad, Madrid, 1979, pp. 249-250; la cursiva es nuestra. 25 «Sustituyamos, por ejemplo, una Metafísica del Esse por una Metafísica del Unire… ¿Qué ocurre entonces? En la Metafísica del Esse el Acto puro, una vez planteado, agota todo lo que hay de absoluto y necesario en el Ser; y ya no hay nada que justifique, hágase lo que se 22 23


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la expresión de su concepción de toda la evolución tendente al punto omega; es decir, en lugar de una metafísica del ser, una metafísica del converger de todo lo que está en devenir. Joseph A. Bracken a propósito de la Filosofía procesual nos dice estas interesantes consideraciones: «Le pido al lector que sea paciente si inicialmente algunos conceptos básicos de Whitehead le parecen más bien extraños, incluso estrafalarios. Desde mi propia experiencia le puedo decir, si uno persevera en el esfuerzo de comprensión, la profunda lógica de esta aproximación a la realidad irá gradualmente haciéndose clara. Esto enciende la imaginación y finalmente uno se encuentra a sí mismo inesperadamente enganchado en el pensamiento de Whitehead. El fue sin duda uno de los más originales pensadores del siglo XX, alguien digno de hacer un esfuerzo extra de lectura y de comprensión» 26. La filosofía procesual puede reducirse a estos puntos básicos: 1. 2. 3.

4.

El cambio y el tiempo son las dos categorías principales para la comprensión metafísica de la realidad. El proceso es la principal categoría para la descripción ontológica de la realidad. Los procesos son más fundamentales que las cosas. La mayor parte de los elementos del repertorio metafísico son comprendidos como procesos: las substancias materiales, los organismos vivos, la naturaleza como un todo, incluso las personas. La contingencia, la emergencia de novedad, la creatividad deben considerarse categorías fundamentales para la comprensión metafísica. Para la comprensión de la realidad procesual debe cambiarse el operari sequitur esse (el operar sigue al ser), metafísica de la substancia, por el esse sequitur operari (el ser sigue al obrar), metafísica del proceso, del devenir 27.

La filosofía del proceso juntamente con la teoría general de sistemas puede ser un buen instrumento intelectual para la comprensión del ser vivo en general y, en particular, para comprender el desarrollo ontogenético de un organismo. A este propósito Fritjof Capra afirma: «La filosofía procesual de Whitehead, el concepto de homeostasis de Cannon y el trabajo experimental sobre metabolismo, ejercieron una fuerte influencia sobre Ludwig von Bertalanffy llevándole a la formulación de una nueva teoría de los sistemas abiertos» 28.

haga, la existencia del ser participado. Por el contrario, en una Metafísica de la Unión, es concebible, que supuesta la realización de la unidad divina inmanente, sea aún posible un grado de unificación absoluta». PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, Como yo creo, Taurus Ediciones, Madrid, 1970, p. 196. 26 JOSEPH A. BRACKEN, S.J., Christianity and Process Thought. Spirituality for a changing world, Templeton Foundation Press, Philadelphia, 2006, p. xviii. 27 Process Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/process-philosophy 28 FRITJOF CAPRA, op. cit. (nota 18), p. 63. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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PROPIEDADES EMERGENTES

Nos hemos referido a la emergencia de novedad como una de las categorías fundamentales para la comprensión de los procesos. Llamamos propiedades emergentes a aquellas que surgen a un cierto nivel de complejidad, pero que no se dan en los niveles inferiores. Las propiedades emergentes brotan de las interrelaciones de los elementos del sistema, aparecen a medida que el sistema evoluciona con el tiempo y están siempre referidas a la totalidad; estas propiedades no pueden ser anticipadas o deducidas antes de que se hayan manifestado por sí mismas. La coherencia del proceso correlaciona los elementos separados de nivel inferior a una unidad de nivel superior. El paradigma emergentista supone que la realidad no es estática, sino dinámica en continuo cambio y desarrollo. La evolución del proceso está produciendo continuamente realidades nuevas en los distintos niveles que conforman la totalidad. En estos diferentes niveles de organización, aunque codependientes, cada uno de los mismos manifiesta su propio patrón y distintas formas de causación 29. Los emergentistas cuyo eslogan podría ser: «Más es diferente» se alzan contra los reduccionistas, para los cuales el todo puede explicarse por la suma de las partes y la imagen del todo real representa con fidelidad los constituyentes básicos y puede dar razón del todo a partir de sus elementos constituyentes 30. Por contraposición, según John Polkinghorne: «La emergencia fuerte correspondería, en cambio, a un caso en el que un nuevo principio causal —de una clase distintiva no presente en niveles de complejidad inferiores— cobra actividad en un sistema complejo. Entonces «más» sería radicalmente “diferente”» 31. En el microcosmos las propiedades de los hadrones (protones y neutrones) no son las propiedades de los quarks y gluones que los constituyen. Las propiedades de los átomos no son deducibles de las características de las partículas elementales (protones, neutrones y electrones). Las propiedades de las moléculas no son deducibles de las propiedades de los átomos. Así, las propiedades químicas del agua no son deducibles de las propiedades del oxígeno y del hidró29 «Modification of a paradigm», entrevista a PHILIP CLAYTON por MATT DONELLI, en Science and Theology News, March 2006, pp. 21-22. JEFFREY GOLDSTEIN, «La idea de emergencia», en www.galatel.webcindario.com/index.htm PHILIP CLAYTON en su libro Mind and emergence: from quantum to consciousness (Oxford University Press, 2004) desarrolla un argumento complejo y polifacético para una visión del mundo basada en la llamada emergencia fuerte: sistemas nuevos y complejos pueden llegar a la existencia con sus propias estructuras, leyes y mecanismos causales. Clayton admite que este concepto de emergencia supone cuatro elementos: monismo ontológico, la emergencia de nuevas propiedades, la irreductibilidad de lo emergente a niveles más bajos y a interacciones y, por último, la influencia causal del todo sobre las partes. TAEDE A. SMEDES, «Review of Mind and Emergence», en Ars disputandi, vol. 5, 2005. No admitiría personalmente el monismo ontológico, puede concebirse un emergentismo no monista. 30 JOHN H. HAUGHT, Is Nature enough? Meaning and Truth in the Age of Science, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 77-97. 31 JOHN POLKINGHORNE, Explorar la realidad. La interrelación ciencia y religión, Editorial Sal Terrae, Presencia Teológica, Santander, 2007, p. 28.


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geno. Las propiedades de una proteína no son sin más deducibles de las propiedades conocidas de los aminoácidos que las constituyen. Se cumple siempre que el todo es más que la suma de las partes. En los seres que llamamos vivos las propiedades de la célula, como unidad viviente no son deducibles de las características de las biomoléculas de que están compuestas; igualmente, las propiedades de los organismos pluricelulares no son deducibles de las propiedades de las células de que están constituidos. Las propiedades del todo no están determinadas por las propiedades de las partes. «En biología y bioquímica, la emergencia cubre los dominios desde los átomos hasta los organismos. Algunos de los grandes periodos de la historia natural pueden describir niveles de emergencia: la aparición de la vida, la aparición de la experiencia sensorial, de la conciencia y de la reflexión moral» 32. Podríamos decir que las propiedades de un ecosistema están siempre referidas al conjunto de todos los elementos estructurales y funcionales que lo componen, pero no al análisis de cada uno de ellos. A este propósito F. Capra nos dice: «El gran shock para la ciencia del siglo XXI ha sido la constatación de que los sistemas no pueden ser comprendidos desde el análisis. Las propiedades de las partículas no son propiedades intrínsecas, sino que sólo pueden ser comprendidas en el contexto de un conjunto mayor. En consecuencia, la relación entre las partes y el todo ha quedado invertida. En el planteamiento sistémico las propiedades de las partes sólo pueden comprenderse desde la organización del conjunto, por lo tanto, el pensamiento sistémico no se encuentra en los componentes básicos, sino en los principios esenciales de organización. El pensamiento sistémico es “contextual”, en contrapartida con el analítico. Análisis significa aislar algo para estudiarlo y comprenderlo, mientras que el pensamiento sistémico encuadra este algo dentro de un contexto todo superior» 33.

EL

ORGANISMO VIVO COMO SISTEMA ABIERTO

De acuerdo con Capra: es el conjunto del sistema, al nivel de organización analizado, el que nos hará comprender las propiedades de sus elementos constituyentes. En esta visión procesual y sistémica consideramos los organismos vivos como sistemas abiertos en continuo intercambio con el medio ambiente de materia, energía e información. Esta información, no es una información genética, debe ser correctamente entendida siempre como información en orden a desarrollar el programa inscrito en el DNA propio de la especie biológica. La Termodinámica clásica nace con la pretensión de explicar todos los intercambios energéticos que se dan en el mundo físico, fundamentalmente la relación entre trabajo mecánico y calor, teniendo en cuenta las variables de presión, volumen y temperatura. Se definen de este modo una serie de funciones de estado, 32 HAROLD MOROWITZ, «In defense of emergence. Emergence is quickly becoming a strong alternative to reductionism», en Science and Theology News, July/August, 2006, p. 6. 33 FRITJOF CAPRA, La trama de la vida. Una nueva perspectiva de los sistemas vivos, op. cit. (nota 18), p. 49.


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funciones que no dependen de la historia del sistema, es decir, del camino por el que se ha alcanzado un estado determinado del sistema, sino de las variables del sistema; estas funciones de estado son la energía, la energía libre, la entalpía y la entropía. La Termodinámica clásica se refiere siempre a sistemas aislados en los que no hay intercambio de materia, energía o información con el medio. El ser vivo, en cambio, se nos presenta como un sistema abierto en continuo intercambio de materia, energía e información con el medio en el cual se desarrolla. «No sucede meramente, afirma Hans Jonas, que la conservación del sistema se lleve a cabo en su actividad, sino que depende de esta última. La actividad consiste en conservarse mediante la renovación de los estados de equilibrio a los que la dependencia del entorno no permite que duren largo tiempo, por tanto la conservación como continua elaboración, es el contenido del funcionamiento del sistema, y con ello el sentido de su existencia» 34. La energía puede ser intercambiada bien en forma de calor (Qi), bien en forma de energía radiante (hv) bien en forma de trabajo (Wi), mecánico, eléctrico, etc. Supongamos una levadura que fermenta glucosa a anhídrido carbónico (CO2) y etanol; desde el punto de vista termodinámico, no es fácil estudiar el conjunto de las reacciones, a no ser que operemos con cajas negras y encerremos dentro de un bloque todas las reacciones que van desde un mol de glucosa a dos moles de anhídrido carbónico y dos moles de etanol 35. Ante la continua llegada de materia, energía e información, el organismo vivo reacciona como un todo. Así, el universo está constituido por redes dinámicas de procesos interrelacionados en el que «ninguna de las propiedades de ninguna parte de la red es fundamental; todas se derivan de las propiedades de las demás partes y la consistencia total de las interrelaciones determina la estructura de la red» 36. El intercambio de materia, energía e información de un organismo vivo con su medio constituye el metabolismo. El pajarillo del cuento es un sistema abierto; picoteaba granos de semillas con los que se alimentaba, digería los granos, asimilaba sus componentes bioquímicos esenciales, recibía la energía radiante del sol primaveral, consumía energía al volar y sus pequeños músculos pectorales convertían la energía química ligada a la molécula de adenosín trifosfato (ATP) en el grácil movimiento de sus alas. Su canto era una señal informativa que lanzaba al medio proclamando su territorio, y él, a su vez, oía el canto de otros congéneres que avisaban de su presencia. Desde el punto de vista químico podemos distinguir dos tipos esenciales de reacciones que tienen lugar dentro de las células: las reacciones anabólicas, por las que la célula construye a partir de sillares elementales las biomoléculas y son reacciones generalmente reductoras; por otra parte, las reacciones catabólicas o reacciones degradativas son reacciones oxidativas y la célula aprovecha la 34 HANS JONAS, El principio Vida, Hacia una biología filosófica, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2000, p. 104. 35 IGNACIO NÚÑEZ DE CASTRO, Enzimología, Ediciones Pirámide, Madrid, 2001, pp. 26-39. 36 FRITJOF CAPRA, op. cit. (nota 18), p. 59.


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energía calorífica desprendida en forma de compuestos de alta energía y que pueden ser utilizados inmediatamente como la molécula de ATP. Todas estas reacciones dentro de la célula están siempre fuera del equilibrio termodinámico; el equilibrio termodinámico supondría la muerte celular. La Termodinámica clásica se fundamenta en los famosos tres principios. Estos principios son leyes sacadas de la experiencia y del sentido común. Por sí mismos no tienen base teórica y, por tanto, no son deducibles, actúan como primeros principios que cumplen las condiciones de completitud, es decir, explicación de todos los fenómenos que caen bajo su ámbito, consistencia interna, es decir, no hay contradicción entre ellos, independencia en su formulación, y no son muy numerosos. Han sido bastante las formulaciones de los principios termodinámicos. El primer principio es el principio de conservación de la energía. El segundo principio es el principio de aumento de entropía. El tercer principio nos da un punto de partida: en el cero absoluto la entropía es cero. El segundo principio de la Termodinámica nos dice que los sistemas aislados espontáneamente cambian a situaciones de mayor homogeneidad o desorden. Nos habla, pues, de la dirección de los cambios en la naturaleza, cosa que no tenía en cuenta el primer principio. Tenemos la experiencia de que el calor fluye de los cuerpos calientes a los cuerpos fríos y no al contrario. No todo el calor se puede convertir en trabajo, pues parte del calor queda ligado al sistema por el mero hecho del cambio. La relación entre este calor ligado al sistema y la temperatura de la transformación considerada del sistema nos define otra función de estado, llamada, a semejanza de la entalpía y de la energía, entropía. El término entropía proviene del griego (ejn trophv), y significa en el cambio 37. En los sistemas aislados que sufren un cambio reversible espontáneo la entropía alcanzada es la máxima. En los sistemas abiertos debe tenerse en cuenta el intercambio de entropía con el exterior. Podemos definir la entropía en el interior del sistema Si y la entropía en el exterior del sistema Se. En los organismos vivos la disminución entrópica en todos los cambios de organización molecular y, en general, en las reacciones anabólicas se logra a consta de un aumento de la entropía del medio, lo que hizo decir a Schrödinger en la década de los cincuenta «que los seres vivos se alimentaban de entropía negativa» en su famosa Conferencia ya citada: ¿Qué es la vida? No es, pues, correcto decir que los seres vivos no siguen las leyes de la Termodinámica y que escapan de la tendencia general hacia el desorden o aumento de entropía.

EN

BUSCA DE LA CÉLULA Y EL CICLO VITAL DE TODO ORGANISMO VIVO

La unidad de análisis elemental de los organismos vivos es la célula. Todo organismo vivo sin excepción, desde la bacteria al ser humano está constituido o por una sola célula, los organismos unicelulares, o por una asociación de célu37

La entropía se denota por el símbolo S (de shift, cambio en inglés).


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las jerárquicamente estructuradas, organismos pluricelulares; más aún, estos organismos pluricelulares de generación sexuada, en un momento de su desarrollo ontogenético, están constituidos también por una sola célula: el cigoto. El término cigoto proviene del griego zugwtov~, que significa lo unido. Desde el punto de vista fenotípico el cigoto es una célula única, formada por la unión del óvulo y el espermatozoide en el proceso de la fecundación. Teilhard de Chardin ha afirmado que solamente existe un modelo estructural para la vida; modelo que en virtud de la diversidad nunca se repite en su concreción externa. El modelo a nivel físico es la célula. La teoría celular propuesta en 1839 por Th. Schwann en su tratado Las investigaciones microscópicas sobre la coincidencia en la estructura de los animales y plantas, sigue todavía vigente y ha sido confirmada en todos los organismos vivos 38. La vida propiamente dicha sobre la superficie del planeta Tierra comenzó cuando empezó a existir la primera célula. Teilhard de Chardin llamaría a la célula «el grano natural de vida, tal como el átomo es el grano natural de la Materia inorganizada» 39. Teilhard acusaba a los citólogos e histólogos de haber congelado a la célula para su estudio 40. Cualquier tipo celular, tanto procariota como eucariota, es una unidad dinámica procesual siempre en trance de división celular. La célula es, por tanto, la unidad de constitución de los organismos vivos pluricelulares en los que, decíamos anteriormente, se da una organización jerárquica. Pero la misma célula no puede entenderse sino como un proceso, como una sucesión de fases de su ciclo vital, conocidas como las fases G1, S, G2, M del ciclo celular 41. La duración de la fase G1 difiere de un tipo celular a otro; siempre cualquier célula que analicemos se encuentra en una fase de su ciclo vital. Durante la fase G 1 la célula aumenta su tamaño por la fabricación de nuevas proteínas. Esta fase puede durar como hemos dicho un tiempo mayor. La célula detiene su actividad reproductora, es la llamada fase G0 que se encuentra dentro de la fase G1; durante esta fase la célula puede decidir también entrar en apoptosis o muerte celular programada. Durante la fase S la célula duplica su DNA. Durante la Fase G2 la célula se prepara para el proceso de división celular que tiene lugar durante la fase M (mitosis). El paso de una fase a otra dentro de un proceso acontece sin ningún tipo de cesura. El que la célula pueda morir, o mejor dicho el que todo ser vivo pueda morir, pertenece de modo inseparable a su misma esencia. Hans Jonas nos dice: «la vida es mortal no aunque, sino porque es vida; es mortal en su más originaria constitución, pues ese modo de ser revocable, no garan38 E. M. RADL, Historia de las ideas biológicas. II, Desde Lamarck y Cuvier, op. cit. (nota 9), pp. 66-70. Puede verse: A. ALBARRACÍN TEULÓN, La teoría celular. Historia de un paradigma, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1983. 39 P. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, El fenómeno humano, Taurus Ediciones, Madrid, 1971, p. 99. 40 La moderna Biología Celular fundida con la Biología Molecular y Bioinformática, disciplinas que Teilhard no pudo conocer, encenderían el entusiasmo innato de Teilhard de Chardin. 41 BRUCE ALBERTS, DENNIS BARY, JULIAN LEWIS, MARTIN RAFF, KEITH ROBERTS y JAMES D. WATSON, Molecular Biology of the cell, 3.ª ed., Garland Publishing Inc., New York-London, 1994, pp. 863-910.


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tizado, es la relación entre forma y materia en la que descansa. Su realidad, paradójica y en constante contradicción con la naturaleza mecánica, es en el fondo una continua crisis, cuyo control nunca es seguro y en todo momento no es sino la continuación de la propia crisis como tal» 42. Decíamos que todos los organismos pluricelulares de reproducción sexuada en el primer momento de su existencia están constituidos por una sola célula, el cigoto, que nace de la fusión de los gametos masculino y femenino; comienza, así, con la fecundación una nueva unidad estructural, una nueva vida, constituida por un nuevo genoma diploide. El nuevo organismo comienza un nuevo ciclo vital a través de su desarrollo epigenético, ciclo vital característico para cada especie biológica, hasta llegar a la madurez sexual, con lo que el nuevo organismo podrá comenzar nuevos ciclos reproductivos en su descendencia. El pajarillo del cuento comenzó su existencia también cuando su progenitor fecundó a la hembra, después ésta puso el huevo; huevo que era una sola célula envuelta en una gran cantidad de material nutritivo. Durante la incubación los padres le dieron calor y humedad, iniciando el desarrollo embrionario y la consiguiente organogénesis del pajarillo hasta la eclosión del huevo; luego fue alimentado por los padres hasta que aprendió a volar y, por último, llegó a la madurez sexual. Al llegar la primavera el pajarillo comenzó su canto buscando pareja; cuando la hembra atraída por el canto del macho fue fecundada en el apareamiento, posibilitó el comienzo de otros nuevos ciclos vitales en otros tantos pajarillos.

LA

FINALIDAD EN LOS ORGANISMOS VIVOS

Todo proceso es direccional, presentándose consecuentemente la pregunta por el sentido. El término sentido dice J. Ferrater Mora puede usarse para «designar alguna tendencia o dirección que sigue una cosa o un proceso» 43. Los seres vivos, como organismos que son, deben ser comprendidos en la visión sistémica como totalidades organizadas jerárquicamente en las que aparece una finalidad, un «télos» interno 44. Jacques Monod en su libro El azar y la necesidad nos ha hecho caer en la cuenta cómo la emergencia, la aparición continua de novedades no previsibles y la finalidad, a la que llamó teleonomía, por pudor metafísico, constituyen la trama sobre la que se teje la comprensión de los procesos biológicos. «En lugar de rehusar esta noción (como ciertos biólogos han intentado hacer) es, por el contrario, indispensable reconocerla como esencial en la definición de los seres vivos. Diremos que se distinguen de todas las otras estrucHANS JONAS, El principio vida, op. cit. (nota 34), p. 18. JOSÉ FERRATER MORA, Diccionario de Filosofía, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1981; Entrada «sentido», Tomo IV, p. 2992. JOSÉ GÓMEZ CAFFARENA, «Semántica del término sentido», en Papeles del Seminario: «Racionalidad científica y convicción creyente», Instituto Fe y Secularidad, Memoria Académica 1979-1980, A. G. Luis Pérez, Madrid, 1980, pp. 71-81. 44 MICHEL WEBER, «La vie de la nature selon le dernier Whitehead», op. cit. (nota 18). 42 43


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turas de todos los sistemas presentes en el universo por esta propiedad que llamaremos teleonomía» 45. La finalidad, teleología interna de los organismos vivos, podemos verla en los varios niveles de organización. Aparece un «télos» en las estructuras macromoleculares, en los ajustes finos de la conformación espacial de una proteína, en las interacciones de los complejos macromoleculares: proteína-proteína y proteína-lípidos, en los mosaicos lípido-proteicos que forman las membranas, en las interacciones de proteínas con los ácidos nucleicos. Hay, así mismo, un «télos» en la estructura y funcionalidad de una célula, en las interacciones celulares que constituyen un organismo pluricelular, en el desarrollo epigenético a partir del cigoto, en la organogénesis y funcionamiento de los órganos, en el comportamiento de los organismos, como el canto del pajarillo proclamando el territorio e invitando a la hembra a la anidación, en la construcción del nido y en la interdependencia de los componentes (seres vivos y medio) de un ecosistema. El mismo Jacques Monod en su citada obra El azar y la necesidad afirma: 1. 2. 3.

Los organismos vivos son seres dotados de un proyecto que representan en sus estructuras y lo llevan a cabo en sus actuaciones. Esta propiedad —a la que Monod llama teleonomía—, y no teleología, los distingue de todos los otros seres presentes en el universo. La teleonomía es condición necesaria pero no suficiente, puesto que no propone criterios objetivos para distinguir a los seres vivos de otros artefactos producidos por la actividad del hombre.

François Jacob, que compartió con Monod el Premio Nobel en su obra Lógica de lo viviente, afirma que es necesario perder el pudor de que habla Monod 46: «ya hace tiempo que el biólogo se ve enfrentado a la teleología como una mujer de la que no puede prescindir, pero con la que no quiere ser visto en público. El concepto de programa da ahora el estatuto legal a esta relación oculta» 47. El porqué algunos biólogos han huido del término finalidad o teleología, puede entenderse por el predominio casi exclusivo en la ciencia de la racionalidad física, que monopolizaba para sí el carácter de científico, y sobre todo por el temor de que, tras la explicaciones teleológicas, pudieran entrar en el discurso científico elementos ajenos a la construcción de la ciencia 48. 45 JACQUES MONOD, Le hasard et la nécessité. Essai sur la philosophie naturelle de la biologie moderne, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1964, p. 25; IGNACIO NÚÑEZ DE CASTRO, «Azar, finalidad y trascendencia: una visión post-monodiana de la vida», en Descifrar la vida. Ensayos de Historia de la Biología, J. CASADESÚS (ed.), Universidad de Sevilla, 1994, pp. 337-352. 46 JACQUES MONOD, «La teleonomía es la palabra que puede utilizarse, si, por cierto recato, se quiere evitar hablar de finalidad. No obstante todo sucede como si los seres vivos estuviesen estructurados, organizados y condicionados de cara un fin: la supervivencia del individuo y sobre todo de la especie», en Lección inaugural (viernes, 3 de noviembre de 1967), Cuadernos Anagrama, n.º 40, pp. 10-43. 47 FRANÇOIS JACOB, La lógica de lo viviente. Una historia de la herencia, Editorial Laia, Barcelona, 1973, p. 17. 48 HENRYK SKOLIMOWSKI, «Problemas de racionalidad en biología», op. cit. (nota 12).


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El epistemólogo Ernest Nagel en su monografía La estructura de la Ciencia 49 aborda muy claramente el problema de las explicaciones teleológicas. Resumimos brevemente su argumentación: 1. 2.

3.

Las explicaciones teleológicas en Biología son explicaciones funcionales que no suponen propósitos intencionales. Si las explicaciones teleológicas pueden ser expresadas sin perder su contenido en formulaciones no teleológicas, entonces la pretendida equivalencia debe afrontar una objeción clara: toda explicación no finalista puede ser reemplazada por formulaciones finalistas. Luego debe haber alguna diferencia entre los enunciados teleológicos y los no finalistas.

Francisco José Ayala ha insistido a lo largo de toda su obra, cómo las explicaciones teleológicas constituyen la distinción más fundamental entre la racionalidad física y la racionalidad biológica 50. Para Ayala hay tres fenómenos para los cuales sería legítima la explicación teleológica: 1. 2. 3.

Cuando un estado final es anticipado por un agente. Los mecanismos autorreguladores por los que un sistema abierto mantiene una propiedad a pesar de las fluctuaciones del medio. Las estructuras anatómicas y fisiológicas designadas para cumplimentar una función.

Para los darwinistas es clave en sus explicaciones sobre la vida la ausencia de toda finalidad en los seres vivos, en los organismos en particular y en el proceso evolutivo en general. Ocurre muchas veces que los epígonos de un autor son mucho más radicales que el autor mismo. Quisiera romper una lanza a favor de la honestidad de C. Darwin, quien en su correspondencia con Asa Gray afirmó expresamente lo contrario que aseveran los darwinistas ortodoxos. Asa Gray publicó en la revista Nature un artículo (4 de junio de 1874) titulado sencillamente: «Charles Robert Darwin», en la que afirmaba que Darwin había tenido el mérito de unir la morfología a la teleología. Darwin respondió subrayando 49 ERNEST NAGEL, La estructura de la Ciencia. Problemas de la lógica de la investigación científica, Paidos Studio Básico, Barcelona, 1981, pp. 365-403. 50 La obra de Francisco José Ayala ha sido ampliamente estudiada por DIEGO CANO ESPINOSA en su Tesis Doctoral: Epistemología del discurso biológico de Francisco J. Ayala, Departamento de Filosofía, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Málaga, 2002. Del mismo autor, «Autonomía y no reduccionismo de la Biología en el pensamiento biofilosófico de Francisco José Ayala», en Pensamiento (en prensa). Pueden consultarse las siguientes obras de FRANCISCO JOSÉ AYALA: «Teleological explanations in evolutionary Biology», en Philosophy of Science, 37, 1970, pp. 1-15; «Biology as an autonomous Science», en American Scientist, 56, 1968, pp. 207-221; «Comments on Methodology in the Physical, Biological and Social Sciences», en Global Systems Dynamics, E. O. ATTINGER (ed.), S. Skarger, Basel, 1970, pp. 28-33. Puede consultarse también: IGNACIO DE CASTRO, «La teleología: polisemia de un término», en La mediación de la Filosofía en la construcción de la Bioética, FRANCESC ABEL y CAMINO CAÑÓN (eds.), Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, 1993, pp. 27-39.


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que le era profundamente grato escuchar lo dicho por Asa Gray sobre la teleología, y que era Gray el hombre más indicado para darse cuenta 51. La ausencia de finalidad o teleología no se limita a la teleología interna (teleología instrumental o funcional o teleonomía) 52, sino que también en el puro darwinismo se niega desde la ciencia toda posibilidad de una teleología externa o teleología histórica que daría cuenta de los procesos selectivos generadores de sistemas más evolucionados. A este respecto es muy interesante la correspondencia entre dos genetistas famosos: Theodosius Dobzhansky y John Greene 53. Una vez más se comprueba que las posturas ante el problema del progreso evolutivo y del sentido de la evolución dependen mayormente de la sensibilidad, convicciones previas y opciones personales, que de argumentos racionales. Uno de los problemas que se planteó más agudamente en la correspondencia entre los dos amigos fue el problema del uso de concepciones finalistas o de la teleología en los escritos evolucionistas. Greene como buen positivista confesaba que estaba desconcertado, pasmado y perturbado (baffled, astounded and perturbed) por el vocabulario usado por Dobzhansky. De hecho Dobzhansky usaba términos como fin, ensayo y error, creatividad y mejora (purpose, trials and errors, creativity e improvement), cargados de una fuerte connotación finalista, puesto que algunos procesos evolutivos suponen la aparición de algo nuevo lo que hemos llamado emergencia; en segundo lugar, tienen una coherencia interna ya que mantienen y hacen avanzar la vida y finalmente pueden, de hecho, tener como resultado un éxito o un fracaso. A lo largo de la correspondencia se puede comprobar que el desacuerdo es fruto de dos sensibilidades: desde una mentalidad positivista se comprende la postura de John Greene, desde los presupuesto de otra racionalidad, la racionalidad biológica, se comprende la postura de Dobzhansky. El pajarillo del cuento ejecutaba acciones que van encaminadas a un fin y aunque las juzguemos con una fuerte carga antropológica —ya decía Teilhard que no tenemos otro punto de mira que el hombre— 54, no podemos dudar que el canto proclamando un territorio tiene una finalidad, la de buscar pareja para anidar. La construcción de un nido es una actividad teleológica: prevé de alguCitado por ÉTIENNE GILSON, De Aristóteles a Darwin, y vuelta, op. cit. (nota 3), p. 195. ALFREDO MARCOS, «Teleología y Teleonomía en las ciencias de la vida», en Diálogo Filosófico, 11, 1992, 42-57. Pittendrigh usó el término teleonomía por vez primera en 1958, como una reacción a la polisemia del término teleología, según sus palabras: «parece desafortunado resucitar el término teleología y creo que se ha abusado de él». 53 Correspondencia de JOHN GRRENE y THEODOSIUS DOBZHANZKY, publicada en Biology and Philosophy, 11, 1196, n.º 4, pp. 445-491. Puede verse IGNACIO NÚÑEZ DE CASTRO, «Evolución y sentido en la correspondencia de Theodosius Dobzhansky», en La nueva alianza de las Ciencias y la Filosofía, A. BLANCH (ed.), Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, 2001, pp. 109-114. 54 «En primer lugar y de una manera subjetiva, resultamos ser inevitablemente centro de perspectiva en relación con nosotros mismos. (…) Quiéralo o no, desde ese momento el Hombre vuelve a encontrarse a sí mismo y se contempla en todo lo que observa». PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, El fenómeno humano, op. cit. (nota 39), pp. 43-44. 51 52


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na manera la puesta de huevos, la incubación y el cuidado de la prole en la función generativa. EL

GENOMA FUNDAMENTA LA CORPOREIDAD Y COMPORTAMIENTO DEL VIVIENTE

El 25 de abril del año 2003 se celebró el cincuenta aniversario de la publicación por James Watson y Francis Crick del modelo de la doble hélice de los ácidos desoxirribonucleicos (DNA) 55. La hipótesis de trabajo del cristalógrafo inglés Crick y del joven científico norteamericano Watson es, sin duda, una de las más fecundas de la ciencia contemporánea. Casi un siglo fue necesario para dilucidar la estructura de los ácidos nucleicos desde que fueron descubiertos en 1869 por Friedrich Miescher, médico de Basilea, que trabajaba en Tübingen en el laboratorio del gran fisiólogo alemán Felix Hoppe-Seyler. A partir de la publicación del modelo de Watson y Crick se sucedieron una serie de descubrimientos como la confirmación por M. Meselson y F. W. Stahl de la duplicación semiconservativa del DNA, el desciframiento del código genético por S. Ochoa, M. W. Nirenberg y H. G. Khorana, el descubrimiento de las endonucleasas de restricción por D. Nathans y H. O. Smith, y el método enzimático de secuenciación del DNA propuesto por Frederick Sanger, descubrimientos, que a la vez que validaban el modelo, hicieron avanzar de manera espectacular en unos pocos años la Biología Molecular 56. En el año 2001 se publicó el primer borrador del genoma 57 humano y en el año 2003, a los cincuenta años de la publicación del modelo de Watson y Crick, 55 RAFAEL GIRALDO, «50 años del descubrimiento de la doble hélice del DNA», en Razón y Fe, 248, n.º 1259-1260, 2003, pp. 185-195. Tres artículos de la revista Nature podemos decir que fueron el punto de arranque de la nueva revolución: J. D. WATSON y F. H. C. CRICK, «A structure for deoxyribonucleic acid», en Nature, 171, 1953, pp. 737-738; M. H. F. WILKINS et al., «Molecular structure of deoxypentose nucleic acids», en Nature, 171, 1953, pp. 738-740; R. E. FRANKLIN y R. G. GOSLING, «Molecular configuration in sodium thymonucleate», en Nature, 171, 1953, pp. 740-741. Pueden encontrarse copias facsímiles de los tres artículos en Nature, 421, 2003, pp. 397-401. Sobre el genoma humano puede consultarse: IGNACIO NÚÑEZ DE CASTRO, «Análisis antropológico del Proyecto Genoma Humano», en Genes y Máquinas. Aspectos éticos y sociales de las Biotecnologías de la información, ANTONIO DIÉGUEZ y JOSÉ M.ª ATENCIA (coods.), Universidad de Málaga, Thema, 2006, pp. 229-276. 56 MARGARITA SALAS, «Historia de la Biosíntesis de Proteínas», en Historia de la Bioquímica, Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Físicas y Naturales, Madrid, 1985, pp. 143-155; J. D. WATSON y J. TOOZE, The DNA story, A documentary history of gene cloning, Freeman and Company, San Francisco, 1981; JUAN-RAMÓN LACADENA CALERO, Historia «nobelada» de la Genética: concepto y método, Instituto de España, Real Academia de Farmacia, Madrid, 1995. 57 En primera aproximación nos referimos al genoma como: «Conjunto de los genes de un individuo o de una especie, contenido en un juego haploide de cromosomas», en Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Real Academia Española, 22.ª ed. IGNACIO NÚÑEZ DE CASTRO, «Reflexiones éticas en torno a la Declaración Universal sobre el Genoma Humano», en La Moral cristiana como propuesta, F. J. ALARCOS (ed.), San Pablo, Madrid, 2004, pp. 477- 510; «El Proyecto Genoma Humano, discurso bioquímico y discurso antropológico», en La Fe interpelada, Jornadas de Estudio y Diálogo entre Profesores Universitarios, El Paular, 2-5 de junio de 1992, Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, 1993, pp. 29-48.


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veía la luz la secuencia completa de las bases adenina (A), timina (T), guanina (G) y citosina (C) del genoma humano con una fiabilidad de más del 99,9%. Como ha escrito recientemente Francis Collins «la era genómica es ahora una realidad» y «ha comenzado una revolución en la investigación biológica» 58.En Septiembre del año 2005 la revista Nature publicaba el primer borrador de la secuencia del genoma del chimpancé (Pan troglodytes), el primate más cercano evolutivamente a Homo sapiens 59. El término «genoma» significa en general: «el conjunto de la información genética de un organismo». El término genoma fue originariamente usado para referirse al conjunto haploide de cromosomas en un organismo eucariota, más el pequeño cromosoma mitocondrial. Tal como se ha venido usando el término genoma desde el comienzo del Proyecto Genoma Humano se refiere tanto: 1) al mapa físico de la localización de los genes en los cromosomas; 2) como a la secuencia completa de pares de bases del DNA; recordemos que el DNA es una doble cadena y que las bases adenina y timina se emparejan mediante dos puentes de hidrógeno (A = T) y las bases guanina y citosina se emparejan mediante tres puentes de hidrógeno (G – C). Es decir, el genoma debe ser entendido en su doble aspecto, como material genético y como información genética y conjunto de genes que constituyen una especie biológica determinada como puede ser el Homo sapiens 60. Estarían de acuerdo todos los biólogos moleculares en definir funcionalmente un gen como «un segmento de DNA que contiene información biológica y que, por tanto, codifica para la síntesis de los diferentes tipos de RNA y/o una cadena polipeptídica». Esta definición muy usada hoy día tiene el peligro de dejar fuera de la definición de gen las secuencias de DNA cuya función no es codificar para la síntesis de RNAs o proteínas, sino de servir de reguladores de la transcripción del DNA, como son los segmentos del DNA antecedentes al inicio de un gen a los que se une la enzima RNA polimerasa para iniciar la transcripción. Sabemos que el genoma humano está compuesto por unos 3.200 millones de pares de nucleótidos y que consta aproximadamente de 25.000 genes en el sentido de marcos abiertos de lectura (ORF) o secuencias delimitadas por un codón de iniciación y un codón de terminación. Podemos preguntarnos qué parte del genoma corresponde a genes estructurales con información, y qué parte del genoma corresponde a secuencias relacionadas con genes. Las secuencias con información de los genes estructurales representan aproximadamente 48 Mpb, es decir, el 1,5% de todo el genoma. Las secuencias relacionadas con genes representan el 36% de todo el genoma con una extensión de 1152 Mpb. El resto del genoma 2000 Mpb (62,5%) es conocido como DNA intragénico 61. No conocemos 58 FRANCIS S. COLLINS, ERIC D. GREEN, ALAN E. GUTTMACHER y MARK S. GUYER, «A vision for the future of genomic research», Nature, 422, 2003, pp. 835-847. 59 The chimpanzee sequencing and analysis Consortium, «Initial sequence of the chimpanzee genome and comparison with the human genome», Nature, 437, 2005, pp. 69-87. 60 A. D. SMITH y otros (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 260. 61 T. A. BROWN, Genomes, 2.ª ed., John Wiley and Sons Inc., New York, 2002, p. 23.


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cuál sea la función fisiológica de esta gran cantidad de DNA, cerca de dos tercios a los que no se les ve, por ahora, que contengan ninguna misión en el genoma o en el desarrollo del organismo. Puede ser que esta porción notable del genoma tenga una función tan sutil que al presente se nos escape. Podemos, pues, referirnos al genoma de un ser vivo y, por tanto, del hombre como el fundamento de corporeidad, en el sentido de que en el genoma está contenida toda la información de lo que ha de ser este determinado organismo a lo largo de su desarrollo epigenético. El genoma diploide se establece en la unión de los dos pronúcleos, el masculino y el femenino en la formación del cigoto durante el proceso de fecundación que más adelante se describirá. La constitución del nuevo genoma por la unión de los dos genomas haploides, materno y paterno, es, pues, condición necesaria para la constitución del nuevo individuo. Puede, pues, afirmarse que el nuevo programa se constituye en el proceso de la fecundación. En los organismos pluricelulares todas las células que van formando el nuevo individuo en su desarrollo ontogenético contienen el mismo programa escrito en la secuencias de bases de los ácidos desoxirribonucleicos (DNA). La implementación del programa a lo largo del desarrollo tiene lugar mediante la respuesta de las capacidades contenidas en el genoma a las señales recibidas en el entorno del organismo que se está desarrollando. No podemos olvidar que una de las características del organismo vivo es la de responder como un todo al conjunto de señales recibidas que pueden ser iones, nutrientes, cambios energéticos del entorno e información tanto química (acción de una hormona en un receptor de membrana), como física (respuesta a una radiación, como puede ser la luz solar); esta respuesta del genoma a las interacciones ambientales constituye el desarrollo epigenético que estudiaremos a continuación. Aunque cada célula del organismo adulto contiene todo el genoma, sin embargo ese genoma está programado para expresarse como un tipo celular determinado y no son capaces estas células programadas de desarrollar un individuo completo; las células del organismo han perdido la totipotencia. Encontramos la totipotencia solamente en las células de los meristemos de las plantas, blastómeros de los mamíferos (células de las primeras divisiones celulares en los embriones de los mamíferos) y en el cigoto, la célula totipotente por antonomasia. Así pues, aunque el genoma es condición necesaria para el desarrollo de un nuevo organismo, no es condición suficiente, necesita desplegarse en el proceso de desarrollo epigenético. Sin embargo, podemos afirmar, con las salvedades arriba señaladas, que cuando un nuevo genoma es constituido en la singamia, como es el caso del cigoto, nos encontramos con un nuevo individuo de la especie biológica a estudiar que se irá desarrollando epigenéticamente, como sistema abierto, en el continuo intercambio de materia, energía e información. Si comparamos al genoma con un programa informático diríamos que el programa debe implementarse en el tiempo para desplegar todo el contenido del programa; igualmente si comparamos el genoma con la partitura de una sinfonía, diríamos que para oír la sinfonía es imprescindible la interpretación instrumental de la partitura. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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El genoma es, pues, el fundamento de la corporeidad y, por tanto, de la diversidad biológica; pero, como decíamos anteriormente, es condición necesaria, pero no suficiente. En cada momento del desarrollo ontogenético, cada célula del nuevo organismo irá expresando un conjunto diferente de ácidos ribonucleicos mensajeros (mRNA) correspondientes a los genes que estén activos en ese momento. Así como el genoma es el mismo para todas las células de un organismo y no varía a lo largo del tiempo, salvo en el caso de una mutación puntual, en cambio el transcriptoma (conjunto de mRNA), así como el proteoma (conjunto de proteínas) son conjuntos dinámicos y dependen del momento vital de cada célula; se da, por tanto, en el proteoma, así como en el transcriptoma una interdependencia espacio-temporal, es decir, una influencia de la historia vivida por cada organismo en su continua interacción con el medio. A pesar de que conocemos el genoma, es difícil que podamos conocer completamente el transcriptoma, puesto que este irá variando según el momento de desarrollo epigenético del organismo humano y más complejo aún será conocer las diferentes expresiones en el tiempo del genoma, es decir el proteoma de un individuo. Sin embargo, sí podemos afirmar que la corporeidad y la singularidad de un organismo están fundamentadas en su genoma, establecido en el proceso de fecundación; genoma que irá manifestándose en una secuencia temporal en los sucesivos transcriptomas y, consecuentemente, proteomas que irán constituyendo el nuevo organismo en su desarrollo temporal. LA

EPIGÉNESIS

La epigénesis es el proceso de desarrollo de un individuo a partir de la célula originaria o cigoto por la interacción de los genes y su entorno. Fue C. H. Waddington quien desenterró el vocablo usado por Aristóteles, epigénesis, aplicado al desarrollo: «Hace algunos años (hacia 1947) introduje la palabra “epigenética”, derivada del término aristotélico “epigénesis”, y que ha caído más o menos en desuso, como un nombre adecuado para la rama de la Biología que estudia interacciones causales entre los genes y sus productos, interacciones que dan el ser al fenotipo» 62. Mediante el desarrollo epigenético la estructura del organismo en cuestión irá diferenciándose y haciéndose más y más compleja. Aristóteles, luego de observar el desarrollo de los pollos, formuló la teoría de la epigénesis. Esta teoría sostenía que un nuevo organismo se podía desarrollar partiendo de una porción de material viviente amorfo, mediante un proceso de diferenciación de sus partes 63. 62 C. H. WADDINGTON, «Las ideas básicas de la Biología», en C. D. WADDINGTON y otros, Hacia una Biología teórica, op. cit. (nota 17), p. 27. 63 GIOVANNI BLANDINO, S.J., Problemas y Teorías sobre la Naturaleza de la Vida, op. cit. (nota 4), pp. 33-36. Puede verse: E. M. RADL, Historias de las Ideas Biológicas, op. cit. (nota 9), tomo I, pp. 241-249. Puede consultarse: CHRISTIAN KUMMER, Philosophie der organischen Entwicklung, Kon-Wissenchaften in Philosophischer Perspektive Texte 2, Verlag W. Kohlhammer Gmbh, Stuttgart Berlin Köln, 1996.


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El desarrollo epigenético se lleva a cabo, pues, por interacción del DNA con el medio en respuesta a las señales recibidas, señales autocrinas, paracrinas, endocrinas y ectocrinas. «Toda interacción de los genes con el entorno determina el fenotipo. Según Waddington, desacreditado durante cuarenta años, este término reencuentra un vivo interés y evoluciona. En filosofía de la Biología designa toda variabilidad estructural del sistema (por tanto, de complejidad) fenotípica, sin variación del genoma. La Biología molecular lo limita a las variaciones heredables reversibles de la expresión génica sin mutaciones en la secuencia del DNA» 64. La epigénesis representa, por tanto, el proceso mediante el cual el organismo se va adaptando a su entorno y expresando su programa a partir de sus propias capacidades 65. Las reglas que gobiernan la regulación fisiológica y celular, y los niveles más elevados de organización no residen en el genoma sino en las redes interactivas epigenéticas que organizan las respuestas genómicas a las señales del medio a lo largo del desarrollo 66. La complejidad biológica, ese tercer abismo de la complejidad del que hablaba Teilhard de Chardin 67, depende menos del número de genes y mucho más de cómo esos genes se expresan a lo largo del desarrollo debido a los mecanismos epigenéticos. Como ejemplo de lo que acabamos de decir está el hecho de nuestra diferenciación con los primates superiores. Muy recientemente se ha terminado de secuenciar el genoma del chimpancé. Dentro de los segmentos codificantes de DNA para proteínas las diferencias con el genoma humano son aproximadamente de 1,06%. Como afirma T. A. Brown: «esto es solamente parte del problema, porque muchas de las diferencias claves yacen en los cambios sutiles en los patrones de expresión génica que están implicados en el proceso de desarrollo y en la especificación e interconexiones dentro del sistema nervioso» 68. Así, pues, los estudios en epigenética nos están revelando otro nivel de información genética en el interior de los cromosomas mucho más maleable que la información lineal contenida en la secuencia de bases del DNA. En efecto, la información del DNA no consiste en un texto lineal estático, sino que por el contrario es una compleja máquina bioquímica que opera en un espacio tridimensional y consta de distintos elementos dinámicos que interaccionan entre sí 69. Hoy día 64 PHILIPPE DALLEUR, «Fécondité de la notion “bord” des formes vivantes chez Thom», en Revue Philosophique de Louven, 104 (2), 2006, pp. 312-346. 65 MIKHAIL SPIVAKOV y AMANDA G. FISHER, «Epigenetic signatures of stem-cell identity», en Nature reviews Genetics, 8, 2007, pp. 263-271. 66 RICHARD STROHMAN, «Epigenesis: The missing Beat in Biotechnology?», en Biotechnology, 12, 1994, pp. 156-163. 67 PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, El grupo zoológico humano, Taurus, 5.ª ed., Madrid, 1967, p. 37. 68 T. A. BROWN, Genomes, op. cit. (nota 61), p. 480; IGNACIO NÚÑEZ DE CASTRO, «La Biofilosofía de Pierre Teilhard de Chardin», en Pensamiento, vol. 61, n.º 230, 2005, pp. 231-252; Teilhard de Chardin: el hombre de Ciencia y el hombre de Fe, Cuadernos de Fe y Cultura, Universidad Iberoamerica, Iteso, México, 2006. 69 W. WAYT GIBBS, «El nacimiento de la epigenética», en Investigación y Ciencia, abril 2004, pp. 17-23.


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conocemos también que además de la información del DNA que da lugar a proteínas, hay un segundo plano de información en el DNA que se transcribe en RNA activos que alteran el comportamiento de los genes codificadores lo que ha venido en llamarse el genoma oculto 70; el DNA redundante que antaño se desechó por ignorarse su función, podría convertirse en el fundamento de la complejidad humana. Por otra parte, conocemos también que el silenciamiento de algunos genes es de capital importancia para explicar los cambios fenotípicos que se dan a lo largo del desarrollo en hermanos gemelos monocigóticos. Los dos mecanismos bioquímicos mejor conocidos para explicar la epigénesis son: en primer lugar, la metilación de citosinas en el DNA de las células germinales 71 y en el embrión temprano; y, en segundo lugar, en la acetilación 72 o metilación 73 de las histonas (H2A, H2B, H3 y H4), proteínas que junto con el DNA forman los nucleosomas que componen los cromosomas. De esta manera la epigénesis guarda mayor relación con la historia del individuo, la ontogénesis, que con la historia de la especie, la filogénesis. Así, pues, «la construcción de un ser vivo es un proceso dinámico de autoconstrucción, que no tiene un determinismo fijista o preformista» 74. La información no está fijada de antemano. «En efecto, la información no está predeterminada en la secuencia de nucleótidos del genoma heredado de los progenitores, al modo como está fijada de antemano, por ejemplo en los planos de la construcción de un edificio. Las configuraciones de los materiales no son estables, ni estáticas sino activas porque contienen información genética, esta se amplifica, se retroalimenta y se regula» 75. La información se implementa a lo largo de la ontogénesis. Recientemente el profesor Diego Gracia ha defendido la llamada información extragenética. Refiriéndose al proceso que va desde la información genotípica a la información fenotípica, afirma: «Es un proceso complejo en el que intervienen distintas informaciones, unas genéticas, pero otras claramente extragenéticas. Cuando las últimas no hacen acto de presencia, el fenotipo se altera, W. WAYT GIBBS, «El genoma oculto», en Investigación y Ciencia, enero 2004, pp. 7-13. PETER L. JONES, GERT C. JAN VEENSTRA y PAUL A. WADE et al., «Methylated DNA and MeCP2 recruit histone deacytylase to repress transcription», en Nature Genetics, 19, 1998, pp. 187191; EN LI, «The mojo of methylation», en Nature Genetics, 23, 1999, 5-6. 72 J. BLAND, About Gender: Epigenesis, 2003; http://www.gender,org.uk/abou/38aepgen.htm. MARÍA ELENA TORRES PADILLA, ANDREW J. BANNISTER, PAUL J. BURD, TONY KOUZARIDES y MAGDALENA ZERNICKA-GOETZ, «Dynamic distribution of the replacement histone H3.3 in the mouse oocyte and preimplantation embryos», en International Journal of Developmental Biology, 50, 2006, pp. 451-461. 73 KATHERINE L. ARNEY, SIQIN BAO, ANDREW J. BANNISTER, TONY KOUZARIDES y AZIM SURANI, «Histone methylation defines epigenitic asymmetry in the mouse zygote», en International Journal of Developmental Biology, 46, 2002, pp. 317-320. 74 NATALIA LÓPEZ MORATALLA y MARÍA J. IRABURU ELIZALDE, Los quince primeros días de una vida humana, EUNSA, Pamplona, 2004, p. 42. 75 NATALIA LÓPEZ MORATALLA, «Indeterminación biológica y alma humana», en Sobre el alma, ALFONSO PÉREZ LABORDA (ed.), Facultad de Teología San Dámaso, Collectanea Matritensia, Madrid, 2005, pp. 119-162. 70 71


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o simplemente resulta inviable. Esto quiere decir que ambas informaciones, la genética y la extragenética, son necesarias para la aparición de un organismo vivo y el defecto de una de las dos hace imposible el logro de la nueva realidad biológica» 76. Según Diego Gracia la negación de la existencia de esa información extragenética y la afirmación de que la información genética sería condición no sólo necesaria sino también suficiente para constituir un nuevo ser vivo, daría lugar a un nuevo preformismo distinto del antiguo, pero también determinista. El profesor Diego Gracia asevera que para los biólogos epigenetistas actuales el genoma es condición necesaria y suficiente para el desarrollo del organismo vivo. «Llamábamos preformacionistas, en ese sentido nuevo o distinto del clásico, a quienes consideran que el genoma tiene la información necesaria y suficiente para constituir un nuevo ser vivo» 77. La Embriología comparada nos describe claramente el desarrollo embrionario de los animales, no mamíferos, como los ovíparos en los que la información está toda ella contenida en el huevo, y no reciben otras señales extragenéticas que las correspondientes al oxígeno, la temperatura y humedad del medio, como el huevo del que nació el pajarillo del cuento que fue incubado por sus padres. En los mamíferos placentarios, sí vamos a encontrar desde el comienzo de la vida del nuevo organismo un diálogo molecular entre la madre y el embrión. Este diálogo no corresponde a una nueva información extragenética añadida al programa impreso en el genoma, sino a la implementación o desarrollo del programa mediante las señales autocrinas, paracrinas, endocrinas y ectocrinas, señales que no son genéticas, sino que median en el desarrollo epigenético. La comprensión actual de la epigenética no consiste, como algunos han malentendido, en volver a la antigua tesis del preformismo o del homúnculo 78. La epigenética nos lleva a una nueva comprensión del dinamismo interno de la implementación del programa genético por la interacción con el medio en lo que van a intervenir, como hemos indicado, factores autocrinos, señales que se producen dentro de una misma célula; factores paracrinos, señales que van de célula a célula, siendo muy importante la topología celular en el embrión para aclarar las interacciones entre los blastómeros; factores endocrinos hormonas producidas por el mismo individuo en desarrollo, y factores ectocrinos provenientes del exterior. En el caso de los mamíferos tendrá una gran importancia la interrelación molecular con factores ectocrinos maternos, ya desde la fecundación en el oviducto y a través de la placenta posteriormente a la anidación. Decíamos 76 DIEGO GRACIA, Como arqueros al blanco. Estudios de bioética, edición de José Lázaro, Triacastela, Madrid, 2004, pp. 370-371. Del mismo autor, «El estatuto de las células madre embrionarias», en Gen-Ética, CARLOS ALONSO y FEDERICO MAYOR (coords.), Editorial Ariel, Barcelona, 2003, pp. 67-93. 77 Ibidem, p. 374. 78 «Las confusiones en este tema, por otra parte tan delicado, son difíciles de deshacer si no se desmonta primero la equivocación de percibir el comienzo de la fecundación como si fuera una chistera de prestidigitador, de la que, poco a poco sale todo cuando estaba ocultamente encerrado allí antes». JUAN MASIÁ CLAVEL, S.J., Tertulias de bioética. Manejar la vida, cuidar de las personas, Sal Terrae, Santander, 2005, p. 115.


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anteriormente que todo ser vivo es un sistema abierto en continuo intercambio de materia, energía e información que va modulando la expresión del genoma fundamento de la corporeidad. «A diferencia de lo que sucede en la construcción de un ser inerte o un artefacto, que sigue una actividad y un plan externo a él mismo, el ser viviente se autoorganiza determinando su propia información, disponiendo los elementos materiales para que el proceso vital continúe» 79. El pajarillo del cuento se desarrolló dentro del huevo en el nido que construyeron sus progenitores a partir del genoma que había heredado, sus progenitores le suministraron las condiciones de humedad y calor en el proceso de incubación; las células del embrión respiraban el oxígeno que permeaba a través del cascarón del huevo y creció como un individuo de la misma especie biológica que sus padres desplegando los mismos colores en sus plumas y la misma armonía en su canto con los mismos gorjeos, trinos y floreos que primavera tras primavera lo habían hecho sus antecesores. La epigénesis representa, por tanto, el proceso de sintonización final mediante el cual cada individuo se va adaptando de forma eficiente a su entorno a partir de las capacidades contenidas en su programa genético. «La aparición de nueva información con el proceso mismo, implica el refuerzo incesante de la información del inicio: una información emergente no contenida en el genoma en la situación de partida, sino en su proceso de constitución y desarrollo» 80. Los sistemas más evidentes de capacidad de aprendizaje molecular lo constituye el sistema inmunitario y el sistema nervioso central. En el caso del sistema nervioso central, esta capacidad de aprendizaje es de capital importancia, pues el número de conexiones sinápticas en el cerebro humano supera con creces el número de nucleótidos del genoma; el número de pares de nucleótidos es 3.200 millones, el número de neuronas supera los 100.000 millones y el número de conexiones sinápticas supera los 100 billones. Nos asomamos de nuevo al abismo de la complejidad teilhardiano.

VIVIR

ES EVOLUCIONAR

Hemos visto que todo viviente debe ser considerado como un proceso. El ser vivo, como todo proceso, no puede ser definido atemporalmente. El viviente lo definimos desde el tiempo y dependerá de la escala de observación del tiempo que utilicemos la consideración total del proceso concreto. Consecuentemente dependerá de la ventana temporal que apliquemos al ser vivo, el que veamos únicamente su reactividad inmediata a los estímulos, al que llamaremos tiempo metabólico. La consideración del devenir del organismo desde su comienzo hasta su fin nos definirá su tiempo ontogenético. Si consideramos poblaciones 79 NATALIA LÓPEZ MORATALLA y MARÍA J. IRABURU ELIZALDE, Los quince primeros días de una vida humana, op. cit. (nota 74), p. 43. 80 NATALIA LÓPEZ MORATALLA, «Indeterminación biológica y alma humana», op. cit. (nota 75), p. 145.


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de individuos y los mecanismos hereditarios en virtud de los cuales se transmiten los caracteres genéticos de padres a hijos, tendremos como resultado un tiempo genético. Por último, en una escala cronológica que abarque centenares de generaciones, se registrarán los lentos procesos de cambio en los caracteres de los individuos de una población determinada, pudiendo hacer que esta población se escinda en dos grupos, no fecundos entre sí, o especies biológicas diferentes 81. Es el tiempo filogenético o tiempo evolutivo. Vivir es permanecer en un proceso continuo de cambio. Vivir es, pues, evolucionar; el tiempo como categoría biológica es el tiempo de la evolución. Sería interesante antes de seguir adelante reflexionar sobre qué queremos decir cuando decimos que vivir es evolucionar. La evolución no es nada más que la visión humana en la escala temporal filogenética de esa continua emergencia de novedad propia de todo viviente. «Nada en Biología tiene sentido si no es a la luz de la evolución» decía Theodosius Dobzhansky 82. Desde el punto de vista etimológico el término evolución proviene de la raíz latina «evolvere» que significa la acción o efecto de desenvolverse, desarrollarse, desplegarse algo. La palabra evolución implica la idea de proceso gradual y ordenado a diferencia de revolución que indica más bien despliegue súbito y posiblemente violento. La historia del término evolución aplicado a los fenómenos biológicos tomó cuerpo de doctrina en el siglo XIX, cuando Charles Darwin la aplica al origen o transformación de las especies de vegetales y animales. El término evolución, tomado de la filosofía de Spencer 83, aparece en los escritos de Darwin en la sexta edición del Origen de las especies, publicada diez años después que la primera (1859) 84. Podemos igualmente leer a Lamarck sin encontrar el término evolución. Probablemente Darwin, conociendo el término no quiso usarlo en las primeras ediciones, porque en el pensamiento biológico de la primera mitad del siglo XIX, el término evolución era usado en biología del desarrollo, en contraposición a los preformistas. Sin embargo, después de la introducción del término por Darwin, han quedado fijados los términos evolución, para indicar el origen de las diferentes especies y evolucionismo, para indicar la doctrina que afirma que los diferentes organismos vivos proceden por cambios sucesivos de 81 Sobre las escalas temporales en Biología puede consultarse: C. H. WADDINGTON, La naturaleza de la vida, Editorial Norte y Sur, La Aventura de la Ciencia, Madrid, 1963, pp. 36-37. Sobre las teorías evolutivas puede verse: MIGUEL DE RENZI, «El neodarwinismo y las críticas impuestas a su reduccionismo radical por la paleontología y la Biología del desarrollo», en Evolucionismo y Cultura, op. cit. (nota 14), p. 80. ALFREDO MARCOS, «Sobre el concepto de especie en Biología», en La mediación de la Filosofía en la construcción de la Bioética, op. cit. (nota 50), pp. 41-60. 82 Citado por NATALIA LÓPEZ MORATALLA, La dinámica de la evolución humana. Más con menos, EUNSA, Pamplona, 2007, p. 52. 83 «Un año antes de abandonar su puesto en el Economist, Spencer comenzó a publicar unos Principios de Psicología, posteriormente incorporados a su sistema, en los que, con anterioridad a la formulación por Darwin de su doctrina de la selección natural (1859), concibió la idea de una interpretación general de la realidad a base del principio de evolución». JOSÉ FERRATER MORA, Diccionario de Filosofía, tomo IV, op. cit. (nota 43), p. 3107. 84 ÉTIENNE GILSON, De Aristóteles a Darwin, y vuelta, op. cit. (nota 3), p.117.


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otros organismos anteriores, en contraposición al fijismo. Los términos evolución y evolucionismo se refieren a los organismos vivientes y son usados, desde entonces, como categorías biológicas. Étienne Gilson atina muy bien cuando afirma: «la verdad esencial que creía poner en evidencia Darwin era doble: primero que con el paso del tiempo las especies han cambiado; y segundo, que éstas se han modificado en virtud de un fenómeno general que él (Darwin) llamaba la selección natural» 85. Es interesante hacer notar que fue el cambio de escala temporal, por influencia del geólogo Charles Lyell, el que hizo ver a Charles Darwin el mundo con los ojos de un biólogo desde el tiempo filogenético, o tiempo evolutivo. Miradas las poblaciones de individuos a escalas de tiempo genético es muy difícil asistir al maravilloso espectáculo de la evolución. Hemos de tomar la distancia de las grandes escalas temporales, con la ayuda sobre todo de la Paleontología, para poder atisbar el proceso evolutivo —tanto la anagénesis (o evolución dentro de la especie) como la cladogénesis (o aparición de una nueva especie)—. Como muy bien apuntaba Bergson, el filosofo autor de l’Évolution créatrice, la idea del evolucionismo se halla en germen en la clasificación general de los seres vivos llevada a cabo por los naturalistas. El naturalista aproxima entre sí los organismos que se asemejan y luego divide el grupo en subgrupos, en el interior de los cuales es mayor aún la semejanza, pero a los naturalistas, desde Aristóteles a Carlos Linneo, les faltó mirar el universo con una ventana temporal de centenares y miles de años. No podemos olvidar que hasta bien entrado el siglo XIX se calculaba que habían pasado ¡unos seis mil años desde la creación del mundo! En el estudio de la evolución hemos de distinguir dos facetas: en primer lugar, el hecho biológico en sí mismo, que nos dice que todos los organismos vivos, microorganismos, plantas y animales, proceden por evolución de un tronco común desde que comenzara la vida sobre el planeta Tierra hace unos 3.500 millones de años. Hemos de considerar también antes de la aparición de la vida una evolución química prebiológica, proceso por el cual se fueron seleccionando las macromoléculas, sillares fundamentales de los organismos vivos. Cómo pudo esto acontecer es hoy día sujeto de numerosas investigaciones y se apuntan diferentes teorías explicativas. En segundo lugar, hemos de estudiar las diferentes teorías propuestas para explicar este hecho biológico, hecho que tiene las características de todo hecho histórico, siendo la más relevante el ser irrepetible. Por otra parte, una teoría es un conjunto de doctrinas basadas en hipótesis falsables por la experiencia, que tienen coherencia interna y que pueden dar explicación de los hechos observados; qué duda cabe que a escala pequeña, en el laboratorio, pueden producirse pasos evolutivos por selección natural. En este sentido la evolución hemos de afirmarla hoy día como un hecho histórico que pertenece a la historia natural, como fue un hecho histórico la caída del Imperio romano o la batalla de las Navas de Tolosa. Como todo hecho his85

Ibidem, p. 122.


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tórico son hechos únicos y, por tanto, irrepetibles, aunque nadie duda de que ambos acontecimientos tuvieron lugar. Son verdades cuyo estatuto epistemológico es diferente a las verdades de la Física. Los vestigios de la civilización romana nos hablan de la historia del Imperio. Los relatos de la batalla de las Navas de Tolosa narrados por los protagonistas de la misma, las huellas arqueológicas encontradas en el lugar de la batalla, nos confirman el hecho que tuvo lugar el 16 de julio de 1212 entre los ejércitos cristianos y los almohades capitaneados por Miramamolín. Igualmente, las huellas fósiles, pertenecientes a organismos que vivieron en el pasado, nos permiten construir la historia filogenética de los organismos actuales. Pero es más, las técnicas modernas de secuenciación de los genomas y proteínas de los seres vivos actuales, permiten ver las homologías, diferencias y puntos de divergencia, a escala molecular, de los organismos vivos y reconstruir desde este corte sincrónico la diacronía del proceso evolutivo. La evolución es, pues, un hecho histórico; todo está en continuo cambio y devenir. Otro aspecto, muy distinto, es considerar las diversas teorías que en la actualidad nos explican cómo ha podido acontecer el hecho evolutivo. Para responder a la segunda cuestión: ¿cómo ha tenido lugar el hecho evolutivo?, se han propuestos varias teorías. Lamarckismo y darwinismo aparecen como dos grandes conjuntos de explicación. Lamarck creyó en la herencia de los caracteres adquiridos. Teoría no confirmada por la experiencia. Darwin acudió a la criba de la selección natural de las variedades, a semejanza de la selección artificial tan en boga entre los horticultores centroeuropeos del siglo XIX. Darwin no conoció la obra de Gregorio Mendel, por lo tanto le faltó el apoyo conceptual de la genética para explicar las variaciones encontradas en los seres vivos. El neodarwinismo conserva el concepto de selección natural como mecanismo cernidor o criba de todas las posibles mutaciones al azar. El neodarwinismo ha sido capaz de sintetizar el hecho evolutivo y la genética como ciencia explicativa de la herencia. Hans Jonas en la Introducción a su libro El principio vida sintetiza una serie de características que para él describen lo que es la vida: «Entregada a sí misma y en completa dependencia de su propio rendimiento, para cuya prestación está sin embargo en manos de condiciones que no puede controlar y que se le pueden negar; dependiente por tanto del favor o disfavor de la realidad externa; expuesta al mundo, contra el cual y simultáneamente a través del cual tiene que ir afirmándose; independizada de la causalidad del mundo a la vez que sometida a ella; habiendo salido de la identidad de la materia y necesitada de ella; libre, pero dependiente, aislada, si bien precisada de contacto; buscando el contacto, amenazada de destrucción por él, y no menos amenazada por la carencia del mismo; puesta en peligro por todos los lados, tanto por el poder, como por la fragilidad del mundo, y situada en la más floja de las cuerdas entre uno y otro riesgo; fácilmente perturbable en su proceso, que sin embargo no debe detenerse nunca; vulnerable en su reparto organizado de funciones, que sólo es eficaz en su totalidad; en su centro mortalmente atacable y en su temporalidad expuesta en cualquier instante al final; así es cómo la forma viva lleva su atrevida existencia particular en PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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la materia, paradójica, lábil, insegura, rodeada de peligros, finita, profundamente hermanada con la muerte» 86.

Como decíamos al principio, no somos capaces de definir la vida. Cuando nos enfrentamos a un organismo vivo un cierto apofatismo se apodera de nosotros, pero sí podemos, a pesar de lo elusiva que resulta la comprensión total de un organismo vivo, describir aquellos rasgos que nos hacen distinguir el Moisés de Miguel Ángel, que nunca habló, de un pajarillo que canta y revolotea por el bosque. Ésta es la tarea de la Biofilosofía o Filosofía Natural de la vida en nuestro tiempo. c/ Virgen de las Flores, 23 29007 Málaga (Spain) [email protected]

IGNACIO NÚÑEZ DE CASTRO


86

HANS JONAS, El principio vida, op. cit. (nota 34), p. 18.


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A DARWINIAN PROCESS: THE MOLECULAR EVOLUTION OF ENZYMES JOAN BERTRÁN Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

ABSTRACT: New concepts as ambiguity, promiscuity and plasticity have allowed getting a deeper insight in the mechanism of the Darwinian process implied in the molecular evolution of enzymes. Directed evolution in the laboratory collapses the time scale for evolution from millions of years to months or even weeks due that the key processes: mutations, recombination, screening or selection are carefully controlled by the experimenter. In order to get a more meaningful vision a more enlarged scientific background is presented. The philosophical reflections focus on the increasing information in the evolution process, which goes beyond the dualism matter-spirit, and on the successive emergences. Finally some ethical and theological reflections are proposed. KEY WORDS: darwinian process, enzyme promiscuity, molecular evolution, information, emergence, biotechnology, creation, intelligent design.

Un proceso darwiniano: evolución molecular de los enzimas RESUMEN: Nuevos conceptos tales como ambigüedad, promiscuidad y plasticidad han permitido proponer una visión más profunda del proceso Darwiniano que se da en la evolución molecular de las enzimas. La evolución dirigida en el laboratorio recorta la escala temporal de la evolución de millones de años a meses o incluso semanas, debido a que los procesos claves: mutaciones, recombinación, ensayo individualizado o selección están perfectamente controlados por el experimentador. Para obtener una visión más rica se presenta un panorama científico más amplio. Las reflexiones filosóficas se centran en el aumento de información a través de la evolución, que supera el dualismo materia-espíritu, y en las sucesivas emergencias. Finalmente se proponen algunas reflexiones éticas y teológicas. PALABRAS CLAVE: proceso darwiniano, promiscuidad de las enzimas, evolución molecular, información, emergencia, biotecnología, creación, diseño Inteligente.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Molecular evolution emerged as a scientific field in the 1960’s as researchers from molecular biology, evolutionary biology and population genetics sought to understand recent discoveries on the structure and function of nucleic acids and proteins. Some of the key topics that spurred development in the field have been the evolution of enzyme functions and the use of nucleic acid divergence as a «molecular clock» to study species divergence. Here I focus on the topic: molecular evolution of enzymes. Enzymes speed up the rates of specific reactions, in such a way that they control the processes in living beings. They display enormous reaction rate enhancement in water at moderate pH values and mild pressures and temperatures, which correspond to the standard physiological conditions of live organisms. In fact, reactions with half times approaching the age of Earth are accelerated in many orders of magnitude up to 1020, reaching time scales compatible with life. Examples © PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749



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J. BERTRÁN, A DARWINIAN PROCESS: THE MOLECULAR EVOLUTION OF ENZYMES

can be found in the survival of paper documents or ancient ships for long periods under water, which can be explained by the fact that the glycosidic bonds of cellulose are very resistant to hydrolysis in the absence of cellulases that catalyse their hydrolysis [1]. The enzymes are proteins, which are very complex macromolecules. From a structural point of view, four levels of complexity can be distinguished: primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary structures. The primary structure describes the sequence in which amino acids have joined together to form the polypeptide. For instance, with twenty natural amino acids, in a small protein with 100 amino acids there are 20100 possibilities, which mean an astronomical amount. Only few sequences have been used by nature. Hydrogen bonds between different parts of the peptide chain backbone determine the secondary structure, α-helices and β-sheets being the most important three-dimensional conformations. Tertiary structure describes the way in which the secondary structure is packed to form regions of defined three-dimensional shape. Finally, these subunits may associate in a more complex system. It is the quaternary structure. The folding of a protein plays an important role in its functional behaviour. It must be emphasized that it is not straightforward to deduce the three dimensional structure of the protein from the knowledge of its sequence of amino acids. In fact, this goal has been only reached in proteins with a small number of amino acid residues. There are so many local minima in the energy conformation space that prevent to reach the global one. Moreover, it would be even more difficult to relate the structure of the protein and the function. Optimizing the enzymatic function is a much more subtle problem, since mutations of residues in the active centre, that presumably could improve the efficiency of the enzyme, can decrease the stability of the full protein. Enzymes have evolved under selective pressure to both maintain the stability of the overall structure and the biochemical function. Two opposed trends, on one hand enzymes fold into compact structures; on the other hand they must also be active to catalyze chemical reactions. The active site of an enzyme is highly strained because is designed to develop favourable interactions with the transition state of the catalyzed reactions. This strain diminishes the stability of the global structure of the enzyme and thus a trade-off between stability and function can be established [2]. Enzymes must be of the adequate shape in order to exhibit specificity: they must be able to recognize and bind the correct substrate. However, an enzyme’s structure must also be flexible in order to reach a complementary shape of a particular substrate and of its transformations. Furthermore, for an efficient catalysis the dynamic of the protein must be coupled to the dynamic of the reaction. Overall, they push the reactants to reactive conformations and stabilize preferentially the transition state [3]. One can to state that enzymes are more efficient machines than any machine designed by man. A feeling of admiration fulfils the researcher and, if he is a believer of a creator God, of adoration. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 [2008), núm. 242

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2.

773

ENZYME EVOLVABILITY

Evolvability, the capacity of evolutionary adaptability to external conditions, together with reproduction, characterizes the living beings. In this section, this feature of life will be stretched out to enzymes. A traditional view of enzymes holds that their catalytic activities, while optimized by evolution, also represent highly dead ends (one gene, one function). However, it has been recently suggested that this paradigm, that has dominated thinking in this field, could be too simplistic. In this sense, despite an enzyme is generally defined as a selective catalyst capable of differentiate between different substrates and speed up the rate of a particular chemical reaction, some enzymes have been found to present promiscuous activity, accepting alternative substrates and catalyzing secondary reactions [4]. This promiscuity provides a raw starting point for the evolution of enzymes, as a new duplicated gene presenting low activity would provide a start for adaptative evolution. In fact, new enzymatic functions can evolve in the period of years or even months, as happened recently with new synthetic chemicals or drugs [5]. Promiscuity may be classified as substrate promiscuity (ambiguity), the enzyme accepts structurally distinct substrates but catalyzes the same chemical reaction, or catalytic promiscuity, the enzyme accepts different substrates and catalyzes different overall reactions [6]. An example of the substrate promiscuity can be illustrated with the Cytochrome P450 (CYP), a vast family of enzymes found in almost all life forms. One of the most striking characteristics of some CYPs is that individual enzymes can interact with numerous structurally diverse substrates. This broad specificity usually serves by its obvious benefits playing an important role in metabolism. In fact, it is thought that more than 90% of drugs and chemicals oxidations in human are mediated by these promiscuous enzymes, probably based on the fact that they are not restricted to a particular substrate. These enzymes determine the bioavailability of drug molecules by converting them to more soluble, often inactive products that are readily excreted [7]. Another example of substrate promiscuity is the existence of antibiotic resistance mainly due to a family of enzymes called β-lactamases. The ancestral substrate of this enzyme was the penicillin but, after new generations of antibiotics are introduced these enzymes have co-evolved, broadening their activity to ever more elaborate antibiotics. β-lactamases hydrolyze β-lactam antibiotics’ ring and thereby allow survival of pathogenic bacteria challenged by treatment with these agents. Metallo-β-lactamase (MBLs), which contain one or two Zinc ions bound in the active site, has become a severe clinical problem due to their especially broad substrate spectra and potential for horizontal transfers [8]. An example of catalytic promiscuity can be found with an enzyme that belongs to a new group of lactonases, the phosphotriesterase (PTE). It appeared on this planet only several decades ago from a pre-existing hydrolase with promiscuous activity to organophosphates. This system provides a powerful demonstration of the evolvability of enzymes. It has evolved for the purpose of degradation of synthetic insecticides introduced in the 20th century and may be considered as a PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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vestige of its progenitor which are likely to have existed for many millions of years. Interestingly, no naturally occurring substrate has been identified for PTE [9]. All these previous examples of promiscuity illustrate the enzyme evolvability, which means that enzymes are not dead ends but their efficiency can be enhanced or new catalytic activities derived from existing enzymes. Enzymes exhibit a remarkable evolutionary adaptability. The enzymes favour, in a deterministic way, particular reactions inside a reaction network. A new function means an increase of catalytic space and an increase of complexity in the cell. It can be done in a chaotic form or in ordered one. As it has been frequently emphasized the life is at the edge of chaos. Nevertheless, what it is surprising in the self-organization of matter is to lead to stable systems able to reproduce in heritance.

3.

DARWINIAN PROCESSES

Natural selection is a key factor in organism evolution, but the particular mechanism, by which it is carried out, is not well understood in the macroscopic world of phenotype. More information is available at the microscopic level of enzymes. It is widely accepted that many enzymes evolved from pre-existing enzymes via gene duplication. According to previous studies, promiscuous activity exhibit high plasticity as they can be readily increased by means of one or few mutations, allowing reaching the threshold for being improved under selective pressure. Instead, primary activity presents a large robustness against mutations, frequently they are neutral mutations. Divergent evolution requires duplication to free a gene from its previous functional constraints. Random drift will cause an accumulation of mutations in duplicated genes, however, many of which will be deleterious to structure and function, thus rendering the probability of obtaining a new function extremely low, even in evolutionary terms. If random drift has such low probability of generating a functional gene, how have enzymes evolved to catalyze such a remarkable diversity of reactions? Perhaps enzymes that evolved to catalyze one chemical transformation can, with some frequency, also catalyze alternative reactions at a low level. Such alternative activities might then provide the raw material for the evolution of new enzymes, as a newly duplicated gene that has an activity near the threshold level required to provide a selective advantage would have a head start towards being captured by adaptive evolution. Before this, there was only a latent function [4]. As previously mentioned, several contemporary enzymes catalyze alternative reactions distinct from their normal biological reactions. In some cases the alternative reaction is similar to a reaction that is efficiently catalyzed by an evolutionary related enzyme. Alternative activities could have played an important role in the diversification of enzymes by providing a duplicated gene a head start towards being captured by adaptive evolution. The alkaline phosphatase superfamily and the enolase superfamily will be presented as examples. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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The catalytic promiscuity, the ability of an enzyme to catalyze, at low level, a reaction other than its cognate reaction that is maintained via selective pressure, provides a unique opportunity to dissect the origin of enzymatic rate enhancement via a comparative approach. The alkaline phosphatase (AP) superfamily is a perfect system to use in making such comparison. Thus, AP family, which catalyzes the hydrolysis of phosphate monoesters, presents promiscuous activities towards sulphate monoesters, phosphate diesters and phosphite [10]. Starting from this promiscuous activity, few mutations would be needed to reach a threshold value that could provide a selective advantage, allowing natural selection to optimize new enzymes in the superfamily. These observations explain the divergence of superfamilies from a common ancestor. This could be the case of nucleotide pyrophosphatase/phosphodiesterase (NPP), that present a highly common structural features with AP but preferentially hydrolyzing phosphate diester [11]. Conservation of structural and catalytic features in the enolase superfamily strongly suggests that enzymes of this superfamily arose via divergent evolution from a common ancestor to accept different substrates and catalyze different reactions. Divergent evolution of function in enolase superfamily presumably begins with duplication of the gene encoding a progenitor so that the original function can be retained as the mutations required for a new function to accumulate in the copy. The progenitor would catalyze a different chemical reaction, although it would employ the conserved catalytic strategy of using the Mg2+ cation to stabilize an enediolate intermediate. Important questions to answer include (a) whether the progenitor is promiscuous and already catalyzed the new function, (b) the number and location of mutations required for the new function to provide a selective advantage, and (c) the number and location of additional mutations required to optimize catalysis [12].

4.

PROTEIN ENGINEERING

Scientists have been always looking at Nature in order to find a source of inspiration to mimic the great power and efficiency of its processes. One of these astonish processes is the catalytic properties of the enzymes; very complex molecular machines capable of enhancing the rate constant of chemical reactions. One of their typical characteristic is evolvability. In fact, new enzymes or improved ones may be obtained, as it has been done through many millions of years by nature. It is important to point out that improving the efficiency of an enzyme does not necessary means to increase the rate constant of the catalytic process; it can be interesting to improve the robustness of the protein structure against a wider range of temperatures and solvents. This target could be useful for certain industrial purposes. The practical procedure to modify an existing enzyme is the field of protein engineering. One day, we shall be able to a priori design amino acid sequences that will fold into proteins with desired functions. As this is not yet possible, scientists have PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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used directed evolution to generate molecules with novel properties starting from natural enzymes. Evolution, normally applied to animals and plants, requires the generation of variants and differential propagation of those with favourable features. Biologists and chemists have recently begun to use evolutionary strategies to tailor the properties of individual molecules instead of the whole organisms. Random mutations or recombination, can, in many cases, be done efficiently, leading in this way the molecular evolution in the laboratory. The successful variants can be identified either by screening or by selection. While screening requires an active search of all variants, selection is based on the exclusive survival of organisms containing the desired variants of the protein mimicking the true Darwinian evolution. This is an iterative process that requires, before starting new iterations of the process, the favourable variants to be amplified by clonation. The challenge is to collapse the time scale for evolution from millions of years to months or even weeks. Evolution does not work towards any particular direction, nor is there a goal; the underlying processes occur spontaneously during reproduction and survival. In contrast, the laboratory evolution experiments often have a defined goal, and the key processes (mutation, recombination, and screening or selection) are carefully controlled by the experimenter. The general techniques of directed evolution mimic natural evolution processes such as random mutagenesis and sexual recombination [13]. Thus, new proteins with new desired functions can be derived through mutations of few residues or recombining fragments swapped between two parent sequences. In this last technique it is possible to explore distant regions of sequence space, while this is not generally possible using random mutations [14]. In both cases these techniques allow to engineer enzymes without understanding them in great detail. Another option is the rational design approach that consists in direct mutation of residues on selected specific positions of proteins [15]. The selection of residues to be mutated is deduced from X-ray diffraction structures of the complex between the protein and a stable molecule (an inhibitor, a transition state analogue, a Michaelis complex, an intermediate or a product). Moreover, information of the molecular mechanism of the chemical reaction is required. Mutation of few amino acids can render an important change in the active site of the enzyme, while structure of the full protein remains almost invariant. As a consequence, significant catalytic effects can be derived. However, the lack of knowledge on the relationship between amino acid sequence, protein structure and function, together with the extreme sensitivity of catalytic activity to seemingly modest structural perturbation, make redesign of an enzyme in the laboratory so difficult. In this strategy, a computational study of the catalytic function of the protein can provide the information needed to design successful mutations directed to a particular purpose [16, 17]. It is interesting to note that while rational design is usually focused on mutations close to the active site, directed evolution are based on random mutations that, most of the times, belong to regions of the protein far from the active site. So, both strategies can be satisfactorily combined to get an improved PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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function. Once a gene with a new function at low level has been obtained by rational design, it may be optimized by directed evolution. The starting point in biological catalysts design not necessary must be a preexisting enzyme. In particular, almost three decades ago, immune-globulin proteins have been used to produce Catalytic Antibodies [18]. Catalytic activity has also been introduced sometime in inert protein scaffolds [19].

5. 5.1.

REFLECTIONS

ON MOLECULAR EVOLUTION OF ENZYMES

At scientific level

The first question to be addressed would be, what is the connexion between molecular evolution of enzymes and human evolution? Molecular evolution of enzymes is part of human evolution. In particular, it has been shown in this chapter that Cytochrome P450 evolution allows the elimination of new therapeutic drugs, mainly in human liver. Furthermore, in other cases evolution can take place in bacteria, affecting human life. β-lactamases evolution in pathogenic bacteria explains the existence of antibiotic resistance, a serious clinical problem. But the evolution of enzymes in bacteria has sometimes a beneficial impact, as it happens with the apparition of a new enzyme; the phosphotriesterase (PTE). Organophosphate triesters have been widely used as insecticides for the last 60 years. Although toxic to humans, bacteria have evolved ways of degrading these compounds so that they do not accumulate in the environment. Evolution is a well established scientific theory. As Dobzhansky pointed out in 1973, «nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution» [20]. Natural selection is the key factor proposed by Darwin to explain the complex organization and functionality of living beings [21]. Nevertheless, the mechanism through which this job is carried out it is not clear at all. There is a big gap between the microscopic mutations of genome and the macroscopic changes in the phenotype. Molecular evolution of enzymes allows getting a deeper insight in the mechanism through which mutations in genome can translate in new enzymes. The promiscuous activity of some enzymes catalyzing secondary reactions is the key concept. It has been suggested that this promiscuity provides a raw starting point for the evolution of enzymes, as a new duplicated gene presenting low activity would provide to start for adaptive evolution [4]. Some neutral mutations with respect to the primary activity may increase the secondary one, in such a way that the threshold for being improved under selective pressure is reached. This property is known as plasticity. A last remark, promiscuity refers exclusively to catalytic functions. Nevertheless, many enzymes have been found to moonlight, it means to serve additional functions that are generally not enzymatic, but rather structural or regulatory [22]. The active site of an enzyme represents only a small part o its surface. Thus, there is ample opportunity to use other parts of the protein for other functions, which may be optimized by a similar mechanism. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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Emergence, the occurrence of unexpected characteristics in complex systems, and creativity are the surprising looks of evolution. Natural selection by a selective pressure explains, at least in part, this fact. Nevertheless, for some authors selforganization of matter to an increased complexity is also required [23, 24]. The profound power of self-organization in complex systems is not yet well understood. The self-organization may be a prerequisite or the precondition of evolvability itself, since it generates structures that can benefit from natural selection. The particular topology of the fitness landscape of a function precedes the evolution by natural selection of this function. Proteins are complex systems with a characteristic structural and dynamic behaviour, that scientists have started to understand. At present the connexion between amino acid sequence, the three dimensional structure and the function has started to be understood, in spite that it is not yet full clarified. That is why molecular evolution of enzymes may be a favourable ground to get a deeper insight on the role of self-organization and natural selection in evolution. Directed evolution of proteins in laboratory allows testing many hypotheses on molecular evolution of enzymes. As it has been previously mentioned, the challenge is to collapse the time scale for evolution from millions of years to months or even weeks. This is achieved controlling carefully the key processes: mutations, recombination, screening and selection by the experimenter. Nevertheless, this is not the main goal of the present effort. The real purpose is to get new robust enzymes that allow catalyzing industrial processes leading to new products of commercial interest. Biotechnology is one of the main fields of the current technology and introduces ethical issues as it will be discussed in other section. Here the present spectacular achievements must be emphasized. Genomics and proteomics are deeply connected with each other at various levels. In this chapter a proteomic topic, deeply connected with a genomic one, has been developed. Both are technology-driven fields in exponential growth. Proteins are the most complex macromolecules; a cell is the next step in the scale of complexity. Synthetic genomics or genome engineering, from a fundamental alteration of gene content in existing microbes up to creation of rationally designed and fully synthetic life forms, is yet another addition to the postgenomic gallery. Franken cell is not a new concept, what is definitely new is its migration from the world of fantasy to the world of real. The first steps leading to this long-range goal has been given in two different directions. The first one may be defined by the genome reduction projects motivated by both academic and industrial interests with the most fundamental questions of life at heart. It is a top-down approach searching the minimal gene set needed for sustaining life in a defined environment [25]. The second is a bottom-up approach in order to obtain artificial cells, starting with the synthesis of various infrabiological systems, where the topic of the present chapter is included. The main challenge now is to encapsulate the components in a single cellular compartment and ensure that they will work in concert in a controlled manner [26, 27]. Synthetic biology is a new and very active field of research. One nice example is the synthesis of artemisinin, an efficient anti-malarial drug. It is a natural compound found in some plants in northern China, but it is PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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too expensive for large-scale use in the countries where it is needed most. To reduce the cost Keasling’s group has used synthetic biology to engineer microorganisms to produce artemisinin from renewable resources [28]. As it has been mentioned before, in the cell a complex network of interactions and reactions goes on in an ordered way. This is only the starting point of life evolution, being the emergence of sensibility in advanced organisms and of intelligence in complex neuronal systems the main steps of this wonderful process. 5.2.

At philosophical level

The evolutive functionality of enzymes in teleonomic order of organisms allows arising some philosophical reflections. Enzyme selection introduces information on the way in which dynamic systems may maintain its functional stability in a determined environment. Furthermore, it supplies also an insight on evolutive logic, following a blind Darwinian process. This logic will imply structural changes which will cause the emergence of sensibility. In this way the evolutive logic is building up an objective rationality which leads the emergence of a psychical, conscientious and spiritual world shown in superior animals including the human species, in such a way that evolution rationality may be understood. These emergences appear to be not radical new things but as new forms of being linked to new matter organization, in a continuous process. Molecular evolution of enzymes, implying self-organization of matter and the emergence of new functions, arises two philosophical issues: the spirituality of matter and the problem of emergence itself. Enzymes recognize some specific molecules and catalyze its transformation. It means a lot of information in its structure and dynamics. As it has been mentioned before genomics and proteomics are deeply connected. The whole information in living beings is coded in a macromolecule, the ADN. This macromolecule plays a central role not only as material support of information, but also in its transmission and development in living beings. The concepts behind self-assembly have accustomed chemists to the idea that molecules can be programmed to interact and come together in very specific ways, and artificial replicating molecules have demonstrated the principles by which chemical information can be transmitted and amplified. Supramolecular chemistry has lead to the discovering of chemistry as an information science. As supramolecular chemists and Nobel laureate Jean-Marie Lehn stated «for me, chemistry has a most important contribution to make to the biggest question of all: how does self-organization arises and how does lead the Universe to generate an entity able to reflect on its own origin». Information is not a material reality but an immaterial one, going beyond the dualism matterspirit. The information is a quite different thing than the material support. Nowadays, in a non dualistic conception of matter-spirit, causality can be seen as transmission of information. This vision of spiritual dimension of matter is a new version of what Pierre Teilhard de Chardin stated in a more poetic language in the spiritual power of matter [29]. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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Emergence itself is a serious philosophical problem. Through evolution new complex systems with new qualities appear and what is new must be explained. The reductionism denies the existence of radical emergence and what is new may be explained from properties of the components of the complex system. Holism looks at the new properties of the whole system, which can not be explained from the properties of parts. In this perspective there are problems to explain where the new features come from. To talk about potentiality of the new system in the old one or talk about its latent state before its apparition, may seem to be a game of words. In a more dynamical conception of being probably it is easier to find a more satisfactory philosophical explanation. Any way, the scientific method tries, by definition, to explain complex systems from more simple ones and, consequently it adopts a reductionism point of view. In molecular evolution of enzymes an emergence of new functions, catalysis of new reactions, is produced, but it cannot be asserted that this is a radical emergence. Darwinian Theory is a gradual one, with natural selection going on as an effect of selective pressure. 5.3.

At ethical and theological levels

Gene modifications in order to get new enzymes are only examples of the present biotechnology. The projects of artificial life, of organisms modified genetically or of gene modifications in humans with therapeutic goals or other purposes are also biotechnology activities, which arise at present exciting ethical debates. As contribution to these debates I should like to do some personal reflections. First of all, when one perturbs a complex system, one is never sure of the results. It means that there is always some risk. Risk is part of the adventure of life and the amount of tolerable risk in human action is function of the conservative or progressive mentality of each person. Nevertheless, it must be remarked that in the present growth of human population the most conservative position may imply the most risky one. In a responsible attitude on the tolerable risk, the first ethical duty is to increase the basic research in order to minimise the surprises. In the perspective of evolution theory, as the one adopted in the present paper, the vision of a fixed nature is not compatible. The man as the arrows of the evolution, in Hefner’s expression «created co-creator» [30], has the responsibility to lead the process. Our task is to make God present in the world, by transforming it. This engagement is not playing God but properly playing human. To see as sacred every thing belongs to an ancient attitude far away from the present scientific and technical one. Looking to gene modifications of the man genome, a special responsible attitude is required, but if this patrimony for the following generation may be improved, there is a duty to do it. Finally, if one is not an expert in biotechnology problems, there is a prudent position to be careful taking part in the ethical debate. Creativity of life, of nature or of man, as pointed out in this chapter on the molecular evolution of enzymes, suggests a central theological topic, a creator PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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God. When people criticise creationism or intelligent design refer to literal interpretation of Genesis text, known as young earth creationism, or a particular theory of intelligent design, ID, which is at fashion in States the last years [31]. Believers do not question the creation of cosmos by God and his wonderful design of the world pointing out to man apparition. As stated in the introduction, the admiration of the researches for the rich complexity of nature becomes adoration in the heart of the believer. In particular, Christian doctrine has been rethought for the better in the light of Darwin. He has helped us to recover the sense that God’s creative work is continuous. In Darwin’s time there were many deists who took the heretical view that, though God has created things once for all at the beginning, he was no longer actively involved in creation. Darwin helped people to understand that creation is an ongoing project for God. Evolution is a remarkable way for God to have brought species into being. Ayala asserts that Intelligent Design theory, ID, is a bad science and a bad theology [32]. The evolution is accepted to explain the origin of different species; nevertheless there are irreducible complexities like: eye complexity, bacterial flagellum, blood coagulation or immune system, which can not be explained by evolution and require the direct intervention of an intelligent designer. These irreducible complexities have not been proved and so, ID has no solid basis at the scientific level. The Darwin’s fundamental discovery is that there is a process that is creative although not conscious. It is a creative process because it causes favourable mutations to combine and accumulate, yielding a great diversity of organisms over eons of time. There is a design without designer. The existence of mistakes, suffering, cruelty and sadism in evolution is consequence of the nature of this process, and must not be assigned to God, as it happens in Intelligent Design. For this reason Ayala thinks that this theory is also a bad theology [32]. Science and religion are at different levels and between them it may not be contradiction. Questions on the meaning and purpose of the universe and life, on the relationship between humans and their Creator or on moral values can not be answered by science. On the other hand, it is not the job of the religion to supply scientific explanations of natural phenomena.

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c/ Bailén, 32, pral. 1.ª 08010 Barcelona [email protected]

JUAN BERTRÁN RUSCA



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TEOLOGÍA DE LA EVOLUCIÓN (II): LA LLAMADA CREADORA TRINITARIA. KARL SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1997 MANUEL G. DONCEL Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona

RESUMEN: Continuamos presentando la tríada de intuiciones valiosas para elaborar una teología de la «creación en evolución» [ver PENSAMIENTO, vol. 63 (2007), pp. 605-636]. Presentamos la intuición del biólogo y teólogo católico alemán Karl Schmitz-Moormann, publicada póstumamente en 1997. Inspirado por Teilhard y su metafísica de la unión, introduce su concepto de «uni-totalidad», y observa tales uni-totalidades a lo largo del progreso evolutivo, desde las partículas subatómicas hasta las agrupaciones humanas. Observa la diversidad de unión, explicada por interacción nuclear o por amor interpersonal. Ve por analogía nuestro Dios tri-uno como la Uni-totalidad suprema unida por amor, a la que se acercan las uni-totalidades creadas, como auténticos «vestigios trinitarios». Y en el centro de su intuición ve la creación continua evolutiva como la respuesta a una «llamada creadora», una llamada del Creador tri-uno que invita a la nada (absoluta o relativa) a acercarse hacia su riqueza de ser, sin forzar a nadie, sólo invitando a unirse a los elementos próximos de cada nivel. Esta acción, no imperativa, sino amorosa por la que está llegando a ser toda la creación nos descubre un Creador que está también realizándose en suprema unión amorosa, según habría de describirse en una metafísica del llegar-a-ser. La creación progresiva de información acerca también a la omnisciencia divina, y la de la libertad posibilita responder amorosamente a la invitación de la llamada creadora. Ofrecemos los textos más auténticos de Schmitz-Moormann e investigamos su origen. Esta intuición sobre la «llamada creadora» enriquece teológicamente la de Karl Rahner sobre la acción trascendental que sostiene la «autotrascendencia activa», y será ulteriormente enriquecida por la de Denis Edwards, que la ve como «acción propia del Espíritu» dentro de una ontología relacional. PALABRAS CLAVE: K. Schmitz-Moormann, P. Teilhard, metafísica de la unión, uni-totalidad, Uni-totalidad suprema, metafísica del llegar-a-ser (gignontología), llamada creadora, vestigios trinitarios, creación de información, creación de libertad.

Theology of Evolution (II): Karl Schmitz-Moormann (1997) and the Trinitarian Creative Call ABSTRACT: We continue the presentation of three sets of valuable insights for elaborating a theology of «creation in evolution» [cf. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 63 (2007), pp. 605-636]. In this article, we focus on the insights, published posthumously in 1997, of the Catholic German biologist and theologian Karl Schmitz-Moormann. Inspired by Teilhard and his metaphysics of union, Schmitz-Moormann introduces his concept of «uni-totality» and observes uni-totalities in the course of the process of evolution beginning from sub-atomic particles to human groups. He observes the diversity of union, explained by nuclear interaction or by interpersonal love. He analogously considers the triune God as the supreme Uni-totality united by love, which created uni-totalities approximate as authentic «trinitarian vestiges». His central insight is to see continuous creative evolution as the response to a «creative call» by the triune Creator who does not force but only invites nothingness (absolute or relative) to approach the richness of its being by joining the next elements in every level. This non-imperative but loving action that allows entire creation to come-to-be reveals to us a Creator that is also realizing himself in a supreme loving union according to a metaphysics of coming-to-be. The progressive creation of information about divine omniscience and freedom also allows a loving response to the invitation of the creative call. We offer here the authentic texts of Schmitz-Moormann, and we also investigate their origin. His insight concerning the «creative call» theologically enriches Karl Rahner’s insight about the transcendental action that sustains «active self-transcendence», which the insight of Denis Edward will later enrich, since he sees «active self-transcendence» as the «Spirit’s own action» within a relational ontology. © PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749



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M. G. DONCEL, TEOLOGÍA DE LA EVOLUCIÓN: KARL SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1977

KEY WORDS: K. Schmitz-Moormann, Teilhard de Chardin, metaphysics of union, uni-totality, supreme Uni-totality, metaphysics of coming-to-be (gignontology), creative call, trinitarian vestiges, creation of information, creation of freedom.

LA «LLAMADA CREADORA», DENTRO DE LA «METAFÍSICA DE LA UNIÓN» TEILHARDIANA El contexto inmediato de esta intuición de Karl Schmitz-Moormann (19281996) es una reflexión global sobre la evolución cósmica y biológica, investigada por él como científico, y sobre la nueva concepción metafísica que la realidad de esa evolución nos impone: especialmente la idea teilhardiana de que el ser se va enriqueciendo por unión. Su interés de teólogo era elaborar, dentro de ese contexto, un tratado sobre la creación, que ciertamente compuso durante su estancia investigadora en el Center for Theological Inquiry de Princeton (1995-1996). Sin duda es en ese período creativo, al final de su vida, en el que hemos de situar el conjunto de esa profunda intuición teológica: contemplar el acto de creación continua (uno en la eternidad de Dios y desplegado en el tiempo a través de la evolución progresiva) como una llamada del Creador a la creación, invitándola a «acercarse» a la riqueza de su Ser trinitario, que está uniéndose en supremo amor.

1.

LAS IDEAS CENTRALES DEL LIBRO BÁSICO DE SCHMITZ-MOORMANN (1997)

El manuscrito de ese tratado, redactado necesariamente en inglés, sabemos que fue utilizado didácticamente en un curso de doctorado de la Lutheran School of Theology de Chicago, y en otro curso de licenciatura en la Weston Jesuit School of Theology de Cambridge, Massachusetts. Para este último curso, el manuscrito fue lingüística y didácticamente retocado en inglés, con la colaboración de James F. Salmon, S.J. Fue también redactado de nuevo en alemán. Así surgieron las dos ediciones en alemán y en inglés, preparadas en 1996, poco antes de su muerte, y aparecidas póstumamente en 1997 1. La edición alemana es algo más breve: se ha suprimido en ella el capítulo introductorio sobre «La teología de la creación como tarea permanente» —que ya en el siglo XIII se realizaba en el contexto de la ciencia aristotélica, y hoy ha de realizarse en el de la visión evolutiva— y se han suprimido también diversos elementos de interés didáctico como introducción y resumen de cada capítulo, figuras, apéndices, cuestionario final de autoevaluación, bibliografía e índice de personas y conceptos. Por razón de completitud, la edición española 2 se tradujo de la inglesa, pero una vez maquetada para la imprenta, descubrimos que bastantes párrafos podían quedar más claros retocándolos según la versión alemana, y así se hizo. 1 La edición alemana, SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1997a, está prologada en Cambridge Mass., a 19 de mayo de 1996, y la inglesa, SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1997b, en Princeton, a 27 de octubre de 1996. Fallecía en Princeton el 30 de octubre de 1996. 2 SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 2005.


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Esa obra póstuma constituye, pues, el documento impreso fundamental y último para estudiar esa intuición de Schmitz-Moormann. A continuación la presentaremos en nueve fragmentos, siguiendo el orden del documento mismo. En estos fragmentos presentaremos concisamente el contexto completo del libro (prescindiendo del capítulo introductorio, suprimido en la edición alemana), y entre comillas los párrafos fundamentales para nuestro estudio. Por ser más asequible, utilizaremos la numeración de los capítulos y apartados de la edición española 3, pero conste que todos los párrafos entrecomillados han sido pacientemente contrastados y modificados según la edición alemana, que es evidentemente obra exclusiva de Schmitz-Moormann y en muchas ocasiones, como lo notaremos, resulta mucho más precisa en su conceptualización filosófica. De esos nueve fragmentos, tres corresponden al capítulo 2: «El concepto de “unitotalidad” en la emergencia evolutiva» (§§2.5 y 2.6), «La “metafísica de la unión” teilhardiana» (§2.7), «Dios como “Uni-totalidad suprema”» (§2.7), y seis al capítulo 6: «La creación divina como “llamada creadora”» (§6.2), «Hablar de Dios en el “lenguaje del llegar-a-ser”» (§6.3), «La Trinidad como suprema Unión amorosa» (§6.3), «Vestigios e imágenes trinitarios» (§6.3), «Creación de la información» (§6.4) y «Creación de la libertad» (§6.5). Concluiremos con un breve estudio sbre los orígenes y el contexto de esta intuición. 1.1.

El concepto de «uni-totalidad» en la emergencia evolutiva (§§2.5 y 2.6)

Tras indicar que su teología de la creación no pretende probar la existencia de Dios, sino descubrir en nuestro mundo rasgos del Creador (§2.1), y presentar concisamente el cuadro de la evolución cósmica y biológica (§2.2), SchmitzMoormann comienza por rechazar la «falacia cuantitativa» (que lo más importante del universo y de la vida es lo cuantitativamente más abundante, §2.3), y justifica que la única clave razonable para entender el universo es partir del ser humano. Parte, pues, de nuestra conciencia personal, en la que nos experimentamos a nosotros mismos como un alguien, distinto del resto del mundo aunque profundamente relacionado con él. Nos experimentamos como un centro unificado, que consta de numerosas partes, los miembros y capacidades que nos constituyen. Y la cuestión es: «¿Cómo se ha realizado esa unidad que experimentamos en nosotros? ¿Fue creada como ser humano a partir de una materia prima —como a partir de barro—? ¿O ha habido estadios previos del desarrollo evolutivo que conducen a esa unidad?» 4 (§2.4). A esta cuestión dedica el §2.5, «La unidad y la creación de unidad como aspectos básicos de la evolución». Partiendo de los seres humanos va buscando seres Citaremos los apartados en la forma §n.m, siendo n el número del capítulo de la edición española o inglesa, y m el número del apartado (que en la edición inglesa no consta). En la edición alemana ese apartado corresponde al explícitamente numerado como n-1.m, ya que en ella se ha suprimido el capítulo introductorio. 4 SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1997a, p. 33. 3


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análogos a esos «estadios previos» entre los primates, tal como los descubre la moderna etología, entre los animales superiores e inferiores, hasta los unicelulares eucariontes y las bacterias. Y va subrayando en todos ellos cómo se comportan frente a su mundo ambiente como «unidades» y «totalidades» centradas, por más que el «radio de acción» en ese universo ambiente vaya reduciéndose más y más en la medida que disminuye su «horizonte de percepción». Su visión retrospectiva continúa con las macromoléculas —que poseen también una unidad estructural y actúan en su reducido mundo ambiente, por ejemplo como enzimas—, y sigue con las simples moléculas y átomos y partículas y quarks. Todos ellos actúan, al menos por contacto, con un «radio de acción» prácticamente nulo. Y concluye: «Nuestra mirada retrospectiva nos ha hecho conocer «unidad y totalidad» («Einheit und Ganzheit») como una característica que ha de adscribirse a todas las realidades que nos salen al encuentro en la historia de la evolución. Si bien esta característica señala todo cuanto ha evolucionado, hay sin embargo niveles cualitativamente diferenciables de «uni-totalidad» («EinGanzheit»)» 5. Así introduce Schmitz-Moormann su neologismo «uni-totalidad», para designar con más concisión esa característica filosófica, que acaba de denominar «unidad y totalidad» 6. Este concepto de «uni-totalidad» es ampliamente aclarado en el §2.6: «La unificación como característica general del proceso evolutivo». Sigue en ella ese proceso de unificación en su orden cronológico, a partir de la «sopa inicial de quarks y gluones». Explica en detalle cómo «los quarks se unen para formar protones y neutrones. Neutrones y protones se unen para formar núcleos, que se pueden unir a electrones para formar átomos. Los átomos se unen para formar moléculas sencillas, que se observan por todo el universo, y que a su vez se convierten en elementos que formarán las macromoléculas». Subraya cómo en ese proceso se da verdadera emergencia de novedad: «Por ejemplo, la unión de dos átomos de hidrógeno y un átomo de oxígeno forma una molécula de agua. A este nivel se hace evidente que la nueva entidad no surge de una causa —sus elementos— que contenía lo nuevo de una manera oculta. Más bien los elementos se unen para formar una entidad totalmente singular y nueva que no se encontraba contenida en los elementos. Los elementos son ciertamente un requisito necesario (conditio sine qua non) para que emerja la nueva realidad, pero ellos no la contienen. Lo más aparece aquí surgiendo de lo menos. Lo más llega-a-ser en la unión. Y puesto que aquí se trata de objetos bien observables, podemos entender aquí más claramente el proceso del llegar-a-ser como un proceso de unión» 7. Ibídem, p. 39. Es lástima que en la versión inglesa, SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1997b, haya desaparecido totalmente ese importante término filosófico, que es traducido allí simplemente por «unity» o «union». La versión española SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 2005, recupera el término del texto alemán, y lo traduce suavemente por «totalidad unida» (pp. 83ss). 7 Traducimos como «llegar-a-ser» el alemán «werden» (verbo no auxiliar o sustantivo), que como veremos el propio Schmitz-Moormann nota con orgullo que en alemán es una palabra simple. 5 6


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Indica cómo en ese proceso de unión van apareciendo distintos tipos de ligadura estudiados por las ciencias, pero subraya que tales ligaduras tampoco explican la riqueza de ser resultante de la unión: «Se podría pensar que la unión de elementos en nuevas unidades es del mismo tipo en los diferentes niveles de llegar-a-ser, pero resulta que la ligadura entre los elementos puede ser de muy diversos tipos. Los gluones, las fuerzas que ligan a los quarks en el protón y el neutrón, se describen de un modo diferente a las fuerzas electromagnéticas que ligan los electrones al núcleo. Los átomos se ligan para formar nuevas unidades mediante fuerzas descritas generalmente como ligaduras iónicas, covalentes, o de puente de hidrógeno. Sin embargo, se ha de tener presente que la descripción científica del modo en que se ligan estos elementos no proporciona ninguna explicación definitiva de la unidad interna que se manifiesta en ellos. La descripción de las fuerzas de ligadura no explica la unidad más de lo que los tornillos y tuercas de una máquina explican la unidad de ésta. Deben existir medios de conexión como condición necesaria para que se forme una “uni-totalidad”; de lo contrario la nueva unidad podría ser considerada como un milagro sobrenatural. Sin embargo, estas partes elementales y estas fuerzas no explican la totalidad de la unidad recién creada. El todo es más que la suma de sus partes. Éste manifiesta nuevas propiedades que no pueden sospecharse cuando estudiamos las partes. Este fenómeno se hace más evidente aún, cuando encontramos de nuevo esos elementos primitivos a un nivel superior de la evolución. Nadie podría predecir jamás que un átomo de carbono desempeñaría el papel que realmente desempeña dentro del cerebro para el pensamiento humano». A continuación va presentando las uni-totalidades, cada vez más claras del mundo biológico: virus o estructuras similares, bacterias y otros procariontes, células eucarióticas fruto de endosimbiosis, y organismos pluricelulares. Subraya su enorme complejidad creciente, y cómo la evolución biológica puede describirse bajo el aspecto de una unificación progresiva responsable de la emergencia de novedad. Pero sobre todo subraya el que, por más que experimentamos esas realidades como uni-totalidades, no podemos decir qué es lo que conforma su unidad: «Esta laguna de nuestro conocimiento sobre los medios por los que las realidades individuales quedan ligadas y lo que conforma su unidad, podía en los elementos simples como átomos y moléculas quedar todavía borrosa, pero en los seres vivos se hace cada vez más evidente. En los seres vivos el principio de unidad se denomina alma, una entidad desconocida para la ciencia. El hecho de que la mayor parte de los idiomas utilicen esta palabra, expresa claramente la universal experiencia humana de la uni-totalidad como más que la suma de sus partes». Y concluye mencionando que «la vida misma evoluciona hacia seres centrados cada vez más claramente conscientes y finalmente autoconscientes, los cuales, a su vez, pueden llegar-a-ser elementos de estructuras más elevadas». Subraya por fin que la unión no destruye la identidad de los elementos implicados en la uni-totalidad: «El átomo de carbono sigue siendo un átomo de carbono incluso cuando está integrado en una neurona del cerebro humano. La unión no es pues una especie de fusión que elimina la identidad de los elemenPENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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tos. Más bien, esta unión potencia la identidad del elemento. Al integrarse en una unidad más elevada, al elemento se le abre un futuro que estando aislado le quedaba cerrado: sólo un átomo de carbono integrado en un aminoácido puede llegar-a-ser parte de una proteína y finalmente una parte de la vida y el pensamiento. Por tanto la unión no disuelve los elementos. Tal como Teilhard de Chardin afirmó a principios del siglo XX: la unión diferencia a los elementos que se unen». Y concluye la sección resumiendo así su visión de la evolución: «Una panorámica del proceso evolutivo del universo, desde el big-bang hasta hoy, pone, pues, de manifiesto a la unión como un fenómeno que recorre todo ese proceso. Cierto que no constituye el único aspecto de la evolución, pero este fenómeno se puede seguir a lo largo de toda la historia del universo, desde el inicio hasta un punto en el que nosotros mismos aparecemos actualmente, como las creaturas más evolucionadas en el horizonte de nuestro conocimiento. Esto nos lleva a la siguiente tesis: El proceso evolutivo se realiza mediante unión de elementos en uni-totalidades superiores, en las que algo nuevo llega a la existencia». Pero se ve obligado a matizar inmediatamente su tesis, introduciendo explícitamente el carácter análogo de los nuevos conceptos de «unión» y «uni-totalidad»: «Esta tesis general se tiene que matizar. Tal como hemos visto, los procesos de unificación de elementos son de diversos tipos. Del mismo modo que el concepto de «ser», el término central de la metafísica clásica en un mundo estático, se utilizó como análogo, en un mundo evolutivo el concepto de «unión» se utiliza también como análogo: obviamente, los medios y los grados de unión alcanzados difieren entre sí. La unidad de un átomo, al que no le atribuimos ningún alma, difiere de la unidad de un ser vivo. Externamente se capta ya en detalle esa diferencia en la uni-totalidad, en la misma diversidad de medios utilizados para realizar concretamente la unidad. El universo aparece en su conjunto como un proceso evolutivo de unión que da lugar a realidades siempre nuevas a niveles cada vez más elevados de ser, de uni-totalidad, un proceso que parte de los elementos más simples y alcanza el más alto nivel —al menos dentro de los límites de nuestra experiencia— en los seres humanos. ¿Qué implicaciones conlleva este proceso de unión para los teólogos?». 1.2.

La «metafísica de la unión» teilhardiana (§2.7)

Schmitz-Moormann dedica la primera parte de su siguiente apartado, «La unión, un aspecto del modo divino de crear», a exponer esta nueva metafísica. Comienza citando a Teilhard de Chardin y su afirmación de que «Dios crea mediante la unión», la cual armoniza con la tesis que acaba de formular. Pero reconoce que hablar así de la creación divina es una afirmación claramente teológica, que cabría incluso completar con la idea de la autorrevelación de Dios en la creación (ver, por ejemplo, Sal 104). Volviendo al nivel metafísico, comienza así su exposición: «La creación se nos hace visible como un proceso continuado bajo el aspecto básico de la unión, que produce lo nuevo, como emergiendo de los elementos PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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que se unen, pero sin ser idéntico a ellos. Por lo tanto, podemos afirmar: a través de la unión llega a la existencia más ser. Cuanto más unido está algo en sí mismo formando una “uni-totalidad”, más se realiza como ser. La formulación teilhardiana, plus esse (ser más) = = plus a pluribus uniri (estar más unido, a partir de más elementos), o bien = plus plura unire (unir más, más elementos) 8, da en el clavo. Desde esta perspectiva, “ser” no es ya el concepto más general que podemos concebir; más bien se ha convertido en algo definible. El ser es realizado y —como se decía antes— conservado en el ser mediante la unión. En el universo, donde esta unión resulta más evidente es en los seres vivos. La uni-totalidad de cada uno de ellos, que físicamente es un sistema abierto con una necesidad constante de consumo energético, decae fácilmente. Por consiguiente, en el universo no hay una cantidad constante de ser, como exige para la energía el primer principio de la termodinámica. En el mundo evolutivo, el ser se crea mediante la unión de elementos».

Hace ver inmediatamente que esta metafísica nada tiene que ver con un monismo materialista, pero que supone un drástico cambio cosmovisional: «Los modos de unión remiten a niveles de ser, desde el nivel atómico al nivel humano o personal. El aspecto material es secundario. En la metafísica clásica del ser, el principio que representa a la materialidad se puede reducir a la materia primera, que es pura potencia 9. Este principio pasivo de la potencialidad se opone al principio activo, la forma substancial, y no se debe confundir con una noción —al menos dentro de esa metafísica— errónea de materialismo, en el que el ser se identifica con la materia. En esa concepción materialista, el ser se reduce a las partículas elementales más primitivas. En un mundo estrictamente materialista no habría emergencia alguna de ser a través de la unión, mientras que, en la metafísica de la unión, el principio de potencialidad se concretiza en los elementos que son el requisito (la conditio sine qua non) para la formación de unidad más elevada. El ser se identifica aquí con la unificación 10. La ruptura lingüística de esta formulación, que identifica el ser con la unificación que nunca llega a concluirse sino que ha de seguirse realizando siempre de nuevo, es una indicación del cambio radical de cosmovisión, cuando abandonamos el mundo estático, para entrar en el mundo evolutivo del llegar-a-ser». Nota la dificultad en describir mediante este proceso de unificación el primer instante de esa creación continua: «En nuestra reflexión sobre el proceso de llegar-a-ser mediante la unión, hemos excluido conscientemente la cuestión del comienzo de la creación. Esta cuestión, o bien nos llevaría en una regressio 8 TEILHARD, Œuvres VI, p. 208, n. 1; versión española, p. 168, n. 26 (confusamente traducida). 9 Esta idea de materia describe un estado de no existencia, mientras que la materia concreta, como Tomás de Aquino afirmó, es ya materia formada (informada). [Nota de K. S.-M.] 10 Traducimos el alemán «Einswerdung» por «unificación», en el sentido de «el hacerse, o llegar-a-ser uno».


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ad infinitum hasta el punto en que las preguntas no se pueden responder dentro del horizonte de nuestra experiencia, o bien nos precipitaría en especulaciones descabelladas acerca de la singularidad cósmica. Tales especulaciones no nos llevarían a una mejor comprensión de cómo crea Dios, aunque algunos puedan sentirse impresionados por un big-bang visualizado —la gigante bola de fuego— como una expresión del Dios todopoderoso. La cuestión más interesante para el futuro del universo que se puede localizar en estos primeros momentos, que de una manera muy derrochadora transformaron la energía original en partículas con masa, es el hecho de que la producción de estos primeros elementos simples pone en marcha el proceso de unión. La forma en que Dios crea el mundo evolutivo resulta menos visible en los comienzos que más tarde, cuando la creación a través de la unión da lugar a niveles de ser siempre nuevos y superiores». Ve su metafísica de la unión como un intento aristotélico de comprender la naturaleza que conoce, y aun la ve enraizada en el trascendental clásico de la unidad: «Podría parecer que esta comprensión de la realidad guarda una cierta relación con las intuiciones filosóficas clásicas de Platón y Aristóteles. Esto es cierto porque la metafísica aristotélica tenía como presupuesto su física. Separada de la física que él conocía, su metafísica se convierte en una invención conceptual abstracta sin relación con la realidad en la que vivía. El intento que aquí proponemos es más bien una empresa aristotélica o tomasiana 11 que se esfuerza por comprender el mundo que conoce. Y encontramos al menos una afirmación paralela en la filosofía escolástica, que tiene sus raíces en la tradición platónica: la afirmación de que la unión crea ser tiene su equivalente en uno de los trascendentales, a saber, que omne ens est unum (todo ser es uno). Esto se traduce a la metafísica de la unión por omne ens est unitum (todo ser es unido), es decir, existe como ser que se está uniendo». Concluye de aquí la universalidad y el carácter metafísico de la acción creadora de Dios a través de este proceso de unión: «Esta afirmación es aplicable a todos los seres de este mundo que conocemos y que vemos en la fe como creación de Dios. Podemos decir que las creaturas de Dios entran en el ser en la medida en que se unen a partir de elementos. Esto casi nos permite ver en acción al Creador oculto. No existe ninguna intervención en el proceso por parte de Dios, al menos ninguna intervención visible, mesurable. Es obvio que los caminos de Dios son más sutiles que los descritos en el relato de la creación (Gn 1,1-2,3). Como diría Teilhard, Dios actúa desde el interior de las cosas, que las ciencias no pueden alcanzar. Dios actúa como inmanente al mundo. Volveremos sobre esta cuestión 12, pero quisiéramos retener aquí tan solo que la fe cristiana considera la inmanencia de Dios como contrapunto de su absoluta trascendencia». 11 Término, introducido por G. Soehngen en Bonn, que hace referencia al pensamiento del propio Tomás de Aquino, como opuesto a los intérpretes escolásticos. [Nota de K. S.-M., adaptada.] 12 Véase nuestra sección 1.4.


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1.3.

791

Dios como «Uni-totalidad Suprema» (§2.7)

A continuación enfoca Schmitz-Moormann este nuevo tema, por el camino de ver a Dios como el que posee en grado supremo las perfecciones de las creaturas, especialmente las de un grado de ser superior: «Sin embargo, la trascendencia de Dios no le trasplanta a una total lejanía del mundo; Dios es a la vez lejano y próximo. Como cristianos, hemos confesado tradicionalmente a Dios como el Ser Supremo. Así, los Padres de la Iglesia y la tradición medieval enseñaron que todas las perfecciones se realizan y están presentes en Dios. La idea misma de Dios, tal como se expresa en el argumento ontológico de la existencia de Dios, está asociada con esta presencia de todas las perfecciones en Dios. Esta asociación condujo a los pensadores medievales a la conclusión de que todo lo que existe posee su ser en la medida en que se asemeja a Dios. No puede existir nada cuyo nivel de ser, de perfección, sea totalmente ajeno a Dios. Por consiguiente, todo debe ser semejante a Dios de algún modo. Puede que esta semejanza resulte tan débil que escape a la percepción humana, que extinga el ser, la perfección del existente. Cuanto más pálida es la semejanza, menor es el grado de ser. Los seres humanos, que según la tradición fueron creados a imagen y semejanza de Dios (Gn 1,26), se parecen a su Creador más que las otras creaturas». Este enfoque y la analogía del ser le llevan a pensar el ser supremo de Dios como análogo al ser de las creaturas que se realiza en la unión: «Las comparaciones en la escala del ser caben dentro de la doctrina clásica de la analogía del ser, la analogia entis. … Si se aplica esta analogía a la metafísica de la unión, podemos plantearnos la cuestión de si ser unido, es decir, existir en un estado de unión continuamente realizada, se puede identificar con el propio ser de Dios. Si el ser se define mediante la unión, tendremos que aceptar esta posibilidad como una consecuencia necesaria de la definición del ser en la divina creación que se realiza y evoluciona. Esto nos obligará a reconsiderar el significado del discurso clásico sobre Dios como acto puro y ser absoluto. Estas afirmaciones sobre Dios se hicieron en una época en la que el mundo era estático y no se creía posible nada nuevo bajo el sol (Qo 1,9), y en la que se imaginaba a Dios como el ser supremo e inmutable descansando en sí mismo (Gn 2,3). En nuestro mundo en el que, por el contrario, Dios se revela creando por unión, parece inevitable la tarea de hallar en Dios mismo la analogía con su forma de crear. Si la analogia entis es correcta y debe ser firmemente mantenida, resulta razonable pensar a Dios no simplemente como el Ser Supremo, sino como el Ser Supremo realizado siempre de nuevo en una suprema unión». Este nuevo concepto de Ser Supremo sólo puede verificarse teológicamente, por coherencia con nuestra fe en el Creador: «Llegados a este punto ya no tenemos ninguna posibilidad de verificar nuestras afirmaciones por referencia a alguna información que puedan proporcionarnos el saber humano: nos encontramos en el mundo de las especulaciones teológicas. Nuestras afirmaciones sólo pueden verificarse por su coherencia con el contenido de la fe. Hablamos ahora como cristianos que creen en el Creador. Si Dios se revela a través de su creación, Dios es el Ser Supremo realizado y actualizado en el supremo y continuo acto de la unión». PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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Esta suprema unión ha de realizarse entre elementos que sean (al menos) personales, lo cual pone serias dificultades dentro de un monoteísmo estricto como el de las tradiciones judía e islámica: «Esto hace que se nos plantee la cuestión del nivel supremo de esta unión divina. Según nuestra experiencia, el nivel más elevado de unión entre elementos se da cuando los seres humanos se unen a un nivel personal con otras personas, formando una unidad que trasciende al individuo. Se podría incluso decir que el individuo se hace persona en gran parte uniéndose personalmente con otras personas 13. Si Dios existe uniéndose, los «elementos» de esa unión no pueden ser infrapersonales. Dios, como constituyente de la suprema Uni-totalidad, como el supremo Ser que se realiza en una unión, tiene que ser (al menos) una Unión de personas. Esto deja al monoteísta estricto sumido en un dilema: o Dios carece de la cualidad de ser persona, o Dios necesita crear otras personas, la humanidad, para unirse a ellas. La primera respuesta haría de Dios un ser no-personal al que no cabe hablar, por ser inaccesible a la comunicación personal: esta respuesta no resultaría aceptable dentro de la tradición judeocristiana o islámica. La segunda respuesta haría a Dios dependiente de la creación divina; el Creador tendría necesidad de su creación. Obviamente, esta idea no resulta compatible con la idea tradicional del Dios trascendente y libre, el Ser Supremo, que las tres religiones mencionadas confiesan». Pero esta suprema unión personal es bien coherente con el Dios tri-uno de la tradición cristiana: «El Dios de la tradición cristiana, el Dios tri-uno, existe en la constante realización de la unión de tres personas. Dios aparece así como el “Arquetipo” (Urbild), en semejanza al cual toda la creación llega a la existencia. Puesto que por toda la eternidad realiza este acto supremo de unión personal en la Trinidad, Dios no necesita al mundo». El amor, la esencia divina, es la fuerza constitutiva de Dios y, por analogía, del proceso evolutivo: «La fuerza que une, especialmente la fuerza que une a las personas, es el amor. Dios existe en perfecta unión, podríamos decir, porque Dios es amor (1 Jn 1,4). Ese texto bíblico adquiere un significado más profundo en el horizonte de una metafísica de la unión, porque hasta ahora el amor se ha concebido principalmente como una acción moral. Si nuestra comprensión de la creación de Dios y de su dimensión revelatoria es correcta, el amor se convierte en la fuerza constitutiva de la vida de Dios. El amor de Dios es el puro acto de la unión. Esto se refleja en su creación convirtiéndose el amor en la fuerza constitutiva, en la fuerza conductora del proceso evolutivo de una unión progresiva». Schmitz-Moormann concluye este rico capítulo ponderando el papel inspirador de las ciencias para la teología: «Lo que se ha dicho de forma teológica no constituye una visión científica del mundo. Es más bien lo que aparece cuando a este mismo mundo conocido y descrito por el saber humano, tratamos de Según esta perspectiva la moderna, sobrestimación del individuo es evidentemente regresiva. Para la idea de la persona, cf. BUBER, 1958; GUARDINI, 1937; MOUNIER, 1948. [Nota de K. S.-M.] 13


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verlo con los ojos de la fe como creación de Dios. En esta visión a los teólogos no les resulta extraño el mundo del saber humano y de las ciencias de la naturaleza; más bien, se ha convertido en una fuente de intuición teológica. La percepción teológica del mundo como creación no está en contradicción con el mundo que los científicos ven, aunque es posible que algunos, como científicos y/o como agnósticos, no quieran aceptar éste o cualquier otro punto de vista fundado en la fe». 1.4.

La creación divina como «llamada creadora» (§6.2)

Tras estudiar en el capítulo 2, según acabamos de ver, «la unión» en relación con el enriquecimiento en el ser, Schmitz-Moormann dedica los tres capítulos siguientes a otros tres «parámetros cualitativos», como él los llama, del progreso evolutivo. Así, el capítulo 3 está dedicado a «la conciencia», que progresa con la complejidad creciente, según otra temática también profundamente teilhardiana. Los capítulos 4 y 5 los dedica respectivamente al progreso de «la información», subrayando su carácter espiritual (en contraposición a la materialidad de los soportes informativos), y al progreso de «la libertad», subrayando el mal que ha costado ese progreso (mal físico en la prehistoria de ese progreso, y mal moral en su historia). El capítulo 6 y último, plenamente teológico, está dedicado a «Dios, creador del universo evolutivo». Comienza ponderando lo poco que se ha dejado impactar nuestra teología de la creación por esta concepción evolutiva, desde los escritos filosóficos y teológicos de Teilhard, publicados en los años sesenta y setenta del siglo XX. Cita tratados dogmáticos para hacer ver qué pocos muestran ese impacto al tratar de la creación. Menciona, ciertamente, que «la referencia a la presentación de Karl Rahner de la “autotrascendencia” se encuentra hoy en muchos textos». Pero describe más largamente cómo la consideración hoy frecuente del Espíritu Santo como «principio de la creatividad a todos los niveles de la materia y la vida» lleva a algunos teólogos a usarle «para cubrir los agujeros en nuestra comprensión científica de la evolución». Subraya finalmente que la idea de «inicio del tiempo no puede ser captada por nuestro pensamiento aprisionado en la temporalidad», y este mismo pensamiento nos sigue haciendo «caer en la trampa de dividir el acto creador de Dios en un acto fundamental constitutivo de la creación y otro acto sustentador de esa creación». Su pregunta, central para una teología actual de la creación en perspectiva evolutiva, es: «¿De qué manera actúa Dios en su creación?» (§6.1). Este es el tema del §6.2, «Creatio appellata» («Creación llamada»). Tras considerar la pobreza del universo primordial según el modelo cosmológico estándar y la necesidad de repensar el relato del Génesis desde nuestro cambio de cosmovisión (de un mundo del ser a un mundo del llegar-a-ser), resulta evidente que «la representación de un Dios que actúa como soberano supremo, a cuya imperiosa palabra todo entra en el ser de forma inmediata y perfecta, no se corresponde con la historia del universo». Por otra parte «parece inapropiado postular un acto especial de creación inicial, complementado con un acto de PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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creación continua que mantenga el universo en existencia». Y concluye: «Más bien hemos de considerarlo como un solo acto, que es uno en la eternidad de Dios y que se despliega en el tiempo en toda su diversidad». Y comienza así la presentación de su interesante intuición teológica: «La mejor forma de representarse la relación de la creación hacia el Creador —evidentemente esta es una opinión subjetiva, pero a mi juicio, en la medida en que yo pueda juzgarlo, concordante con el universo evolutivo— me parece ser la que quisiera denominar creatio appellata, “creación llamada a acercarse”. La idea básica es que el universo es llamado por Dios a salir de la nada hacia Él. El proceso del llegar-a-ser es la respuesta de la creación. El proceso total, que es el esfuerzo continuo por responder a la llamada creadora y creativa de Dios, es la creación continua. No hay en ella un primer acto, al que siguió después la elaboración de la materia que compone el universo. La acción que logró realizar el inicio del proceso y la acción que mantiene el proceso en marcha son la misma llamada de Dios, de la cual depende la existencia de todo y mediante la cual todo se mantiene en el ser —o más exactamente en el proceso de llegar-a-ser—». Y matiza así la omnipotencia del Creador que surge de esa intuición: «Esta imagen básica de Dios llamando a salir de la nada al proceso universal del llegar-a-ser, necesita una serie de calificaciones, para evitar una interpretación asociada a la imagen del Creador de la teología clásica, que veía al Creador “en primer lugar” como el Dios omnipotente. Aunque el universo sigue siendo en ciertos aspectos una demostración de omnipotencia —la inmensidad del universo, con sus miles de millones de galaxias, necesita obviamente de un Creador muy potente, omnipotente—, al menos no lo es “en primer lugar”». En esa matización de la omnipotencia del Creador subraya la nueva calificación de su «paciencia infinita»: «Como se ha mostrado, Dios no se impone por la fuerza a sus creaturas. Es infinitamente paciente, no ha catapultado a la existencia en seis días a nuestro mundo. Su llamada al universo para que salga de la nada hacia Él —lo que en teología hemos aprendido a denominar creatio ex nihilo— no produce creaturas ya preparadas, sino que deja aparecer en escena a las estructuras y elementos más simples, que hoy seguimos encontrando en gran abundancia por el universo». Los miles de millones de años desde el big-bang hasta la aparición de las primeras estrellas y planetas, cierto que, para el Dios eterno son como un instante, «pero en la medida en que Dios se ha insertado en este mundo y se apropia en cierto modo su temporalidad, esos tiempos interminables permiten reconocer al Dios que aguarda, con paciencia infinita, la respuesta a su llamada creadora. Si los espacios infinitos repletos de miles de millones de galaxias dejan traslucir el infinito poder del Creador, estos tiempos infinitos permiten reconocer al Creador como infinitamente paciente». La llamada creadora es, pues, paciente, y es una invitación al proceso de unificación que enriquece en el ser: «El modo en que Dios crea no es una demostración de poder, la cual forzaría a ir directamente a Dios a todo cuanto es llamado a la existencia… Dios parece que no hace que las cosas sucedan, más bien PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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les permite que sucedan… Este proceso de unión es rectamente mantenido mediante la persistente llamada creadora de Dios. Evidentemente, Dios no está presionando a los elementos, para obligarlos a que se unan… Si esto fuera así, tendríamos la situación paradójica de que la mayoría de los elementos del universo escaparían a la presión divina. Dios seguiría siendo visto entonces en primer lugar como causa eficiente, se convertiría en una causa más dentro de la cadena causal. Y, sin embargo, en la realidad no se ve nada de eso». Más bien Dios dirige a esos elementos la invitación a unificarse, haciéndose presente en ellos e invitándolos a acercarse a su Suprema Unión: «Otra comprensión mejor de la actividad creadora, compatible con la realidad evolutiva, sería ver a Dios actuando desde el interior de los elementos. La realidad más íntima de todas las cosas se concebiría como la presencia de Dios, o más bien del llamamiento de Dios a venir a Él. Fijémonos en dos aspectos relativos a esta forma de entender la acción Dios». El primero de ellos es el carácter activo de la inmanencia divina en las creaturas: «La omnipresencia de Dios adquiriría así un nuevo significado: ya no un estar en todas partes totalmente abstracto, sino la concreta inmanencia de Dios que invita a unirse a los elementos próximos. Esta inmanencia del Dios que llama desde el interior de los elementos mantiene intacta la integridad del elemento. Podemos decir a la vez y con más precisión que sin esta presencia de la llamada de Dios el elemento recaería en la nada. Como hemos visto, la abertura hacia un futuro evolutivo es tanto menor, cuanto más bajo esté situado el elemento en la escala del llegar-a-ser». Lo ilustra con los átomos de hidrógeno, los más abundantes del universo, que tienen escasa probabilidad de fusionarse en átomos más complejos o de unirse a otros átomos para formar moléculas. Y confiesa gráficamente que «en esos niveles más bajos de la evolución… parece apenas audible la llamada creadora». Describe los rasgos amorosos que encierra la manera de hacerse esa invitación divina: «Cuando Dios invita a unirse a los elementos, no los está forzando a ello. Su llamada no es la orden de un poder dominante. En cierto modo, bajo el disfraz de un elemento seduce al elemento próximo para que se le una. No existe presión externa alguna, tan sólo una tendencia interna hacia el elemento próximo. De este modo el Creador limita el poder de su llamada creadora hacia la unión a aquello de lo que es capaz el elemento. Nunca se autoimpone, sino que permite al elemento próximo y al propio elemento que sean lo que son: elementos infinitamente pequeños que tienen su existencia en una semejanza infinitesimal con el Creador, cuya presencia en el interior de ellos parece ser adecuada a esa semejanza. Su llamada creadora desde el interior del elemento se adapta así a la realidad del elemento, sin ejercer poder alguno. En el ámbito de las relaciones humanas damos un nombre a esta forma de aceptar al otro, ofreciéndose uno mismo pero sin imponerse: amor». Describe también los rasgos amorosos que encierra el contenido de esa invitación: «Esto resulta todavía más evidente si consideramos el segundo aspecto de la forma en que Dios crea mediante su llamada desde el interior. No hay ningún camino directo por el que el elemento pueda ir a Dios. Sólo puede resPENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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ponder a la llamada del Creador uniéndose a otro elemento. El elemento humano, la persona humana, experimenta esa fuerza que le une a otro elemento humano sin imponérsele, como amor: el amor no se impone. De forma análoga, esto puede aplicarse a todos los niveles de unión, donde se debe respetar siempre la integridad del otro elemento, y donde ambos llegan a ser más mediante la unión, al acercarse infinitesimalmente al Creador. Descubrir el amor como la fuerza creadora fundamental abre una perspectiva que parece muy adecuada a la actividad de Dios: le confesamos como Amor, e incluso si atribuimos la acción creadora especialmente al Espíritu Santo, esto concordaría al menos razonablemente con la enseñanza teológica, ya que el Espíritu Santo se ha considerado a menudo, en las especulaciones trinitarias, como la fuerza unificadora del amor». Presenta esta llamada amorosa como la fuerza impulsora de la evolución, pero subraya que no modifica ni completa la descripción científica: «De este modo, la amorosa llamada de Dios se podría considerar, teológicamente hablando, como la fuerza impulsora de la creación y, por tanto, de la evolución. Esto no contradice en modo alguno las observaciones de la ciencia. Los elementos, a todos los niveles, son exactamente lo que son. Los resultados científicos no se modifican en nada; la afirmación teológica no añade nada a la descripción científica en cuanto científica, aunque ésta es en algún sentido incompleta. Más bien esta descripción incompleta de la realidad concreta de la creación es la descripción verificable más exacta que podemos obtener». Comenta que, desde el punto de vista de la fe, todo lo que la ciencia descubre es parte de la realidad que ha llegado a ser gracias a la llamada creadora de Dios. Pero que esto mantiene totalmente intactas nuestras ciencias, y no ayuda a solucionar sus problemas, porque el Dios de esta llamada amorosa no es ningún Deus ex machina. Comenta también la complementariedad de las tareas científica y teológica, y concluye: «La ciencia puede, al menos en gran parte, describir el universo en su historia físico-química-biológica, e incluso en su historia humana; la teología, como forma de expresar el sentido de las verdades reveladas de la fe, en su relación con el estado actual que ha alcanzado la creación en evolución, intenta decir cómo actúa Dios en este mundo, en su creación». Concluye la sección afirmando que, «desde el punto de vista de la fe, este universo existe porque es mantenido en la existencia y en su proceso progresivo de llegar-a-ser por la llamada creadora del amor divino, presente de forma infinitesimal en todas las creaturas». Y comenta que en esa llamada creadora divina, inmanente a toda la creación, podemos ver el «panenteísmo» de que nos habla San Pablo (Ef 1,23; 1 Co 12,6 y 15,28), pero debemos traducir su lenguaje del ser (ontológico) a un lenguaje del llegar-a-ser («gignontológico») 14. Pero lo que hemos de intentar inmediatamente es traducir a este lenguaje del llegar-a-ser la formulación misma del misterio de la Trinidad. Permítaseme el neologismo (del griego gígnon gígnontos, el que llega-a-ser, en vez de ón óntos, el que es) que Schmitz-Moormann introducirá más tarde en la dura forma híbrida: «fierología» (del latín fieri, llegar-a-ser). 14


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1.5.

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Hablar de Dios en el lenguaje del llegar-a-ser (§6.3)

El apartado siguiente, «La Trinidad, creadora del universo en devenir», enfoca plenamente el tema de esa traducción de la formulación del Dios tri-uno. Comienza presentando, en el contexto de la trascendencia del Creador sobre la creación (que fácilmente lleva a una teología negativa y apofática) y del misterio revelado de la Trinidad, el hecho de que desde Tomás de Aquino hemos separado los tratados De Deo Uno y De Deo Trino, haciendo este último inútil para la praxis cristiana, que resultaba estrictamente «monoteísta». En los años sesenta del siglo XX Karl Rahner, junto con cierta teología protestante iniciaba una reacción ante ese hecho. Criticaba, por ejemplo, que la reducción de la Trinidad a una terna de hipóstasis consustanciales, cualquiera de las cuales podría haberse encarnado, hace que la encarnación no nos diga nada del Logos. Y subrayaba que la «Trinidad económica» (la comprometida con la historia de salvación y con el mundo) es inseparable de la «Trinidad inmanente» (la de la vida trinitaria íntima). A la idea griega de Ser Supremo eterno e inmutable, elaborada a partir de la de actus purus e introducida en el dogma cristiano, Rahner añadía la verdad revelada de que «el Logos se hizo carne», y formulaba: «un descubrimiento importante de la teología moderna es que “Dios puede hacerse (o llegar-a-ser) algo”», frase que Schmitz-Moormann cita con evidente satisfacción. Porque lo que para su tema le preocupa es el contraste entre esa idea del Creador, como Ser Supremo inmutable, y la de la creación, como universo en un proceso de unión en el que van emergiendo nuevas realidades. Se pregunta explícitamente si la idea del Creador tri-uno no debería repensarse también en el contexto de una metafísica de la unión. Y comienza a formular su respuesta, ponderando la necesidad y las dificultades de esa traducción que exige liberarnos de nuestro lenguaje y nuestro pensamiento tradicionales: «Evidentemente, esto no pretende cuestionar el contenido revelado de la doctrina del Dios tri-uno. Pero puesto que todo lenguaje vivo de una época es siempre determinado por el horizonte metafísico de esa época, ya no tenemos para mucho tiempo la posibilidad de pensar en el horizonte de un mundo estático, por más que nuestros hábitos de pensamiento estén aún vinculados a esas formulaciones clásicas. Esto constituye un verdadero handicap: porque hasta el presente no hemos elaborado plenamente una metafísica de la unión, del universo del llegar-a-ser, mientras que estamos todavía acostumbrados al lenguaje claro y refinado (aunque ya no necesariamente significativo) de nuestra tradición filosófica desde Platón y Aristóteles a Tomás de Aquino y Buenaventura y aun a Kant 15 y Hegel. Por ello nos resulta muy difícil liberarnos de nuestros hábitos de pensamiento que hemos mantenido durante tanto tiempo como leyes del ser y del pensar».

Pone el problema metafísico central de la evolución emergente, y concluye de él la radical dificultad de descubrir al ser como aspecto instantáneo del llegar-a15 Podría resultar útil recordar que Kant fue incapaz de pensar en ningún tipo de devenir evolutivo (KANT, Gesammelte Werke, 8:54). [Nota de K. S.-M.]


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ser: «Estamos acostumbrados a mantener como correcta la afirmación clásica de que lo más no puede salir de lo menos, aplicando la formulación lucreciana: “De nihilo nihil” (“De la nada, nada [sale]”). Pero en la historia del universo vemos que esto ocurre constantemente: a partir de una nada relativa 16 —la nada absoluta no podemos ni encontrarla ni pensarla— vemos que con frecuencia aparece algo nuevo, un plus. Toda la historia de la evolución, que es la historia de la creación, es justamente esto: un continuo llegar-a-ser de algo nuevo, de un plus, a partir de una nada relativa. Y este algo nuevo no es, digamos, algo totalmente inmóvil que descansara en sí mismo, como si tuviese su existencia asegurada. Más bien, la realidad propia de cada cosa es un proceso continuo de unificarse a sí misma. Así que, el ser es un aspecto instantáneo del proceso general del llegar-a-ser.—Si esto es correcto, nuestros argumentos basados en la analogia entis (analogía del ser) necesitarán una revisión al menos parcial: tendremos que pasar a una analogia fientis (analogía del llegar-a-ser), de la cual la analogia entis es tan sólo un aspecto instantáneo. Volveremos sobre esta cuestión». Con todo, mediante la clásica analogía del ser, pero en la perspectiva de la «llamada creadora», podemos avanzar una semejanza entre la realidad del Creador y la de las creaturas, semejanza que deberíamos poder enunciar en el lenguaje del llegar-a-ser: «Pero aun teniendo muy presente esa dificultad, podemos decir, sin embargo, en la línea clásica de la analogia entis que nada puede existir en este universo que sea totalmente diferente de Dios —si esto último fuese posible, podría existir algo totalmente ajeno a Dios; pero todo cuanto llega a ser, llega a ser gracias a que presenta una cierta semejanza con Dios, por infinitesimal que ésta sea—. Todo cuanto ha llegado a ser, existe, porque participa en Dios mediante alguna semejanza. En la perspectiva de la creatio apellata, se puede decir que Dios llama a sí a los elementos, para que lleguen a ser más y más semejantes a Él. Sin embargo, el hecho de ser semejante a Dios ya no se debería enunciar mediante la idea del existir, sino la del llegar-a-ser, del unirse» 17. Schmitz-Moormann, continuando su argumento sobre el enunciado de esa semejanza en la línea de la definición teilhardiana del plus esse, insiste en que, pese a toda teología negativa, nuestro lenguaje sobre la realidad del Creador no puede ignorar lo que sabemos sobre la realidad de la creación evolutiva, como proceso de unión impulsado por la llamada del amor divino. Y concluye que a Dios hemos de atribuirle un proceso de unión semejante, más que el clásico ser inmutable: «De acuerdo con la metafísica de la unión, el proceso básico de la evolución es la unión continuada de elementos en niveles cada vez más eleva16 La nada relativa es, por ejemplo, el átomo en relación a la molécula, que comparada con el átomo tiene un plus de ser, de realidad. [Nota de K. S.-M.] 17 Ya que la metafísica de la unión carece de un lenguaje plenamente desarrollado, no podemos evitar retomar a menudo el lenguaje de la metafísica del ser. En la mayoría de los idiomas ni siquiera disponemos de un término apropiado para hablar del «llegar-a-ser» (sino términos compuestos «devenir», «become», o pasivos «fieri», «gígnomai»). No así en la lengua alemana («werden»), acuñada en su pasado metafísico. [Nota de K. S.-M., adaptada a la traducción.]


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dos del llegar-a-ser. Todo cuanto existe, existe mientras y en tanto que sus elementos están unidos. En la unión y mediante ella el proceso del llegar-a-ser produce nuevos niveles de ser, es decir, nuevos niveles de semejanza con Dios. Aunque, según el principio de la teología negativa, no podemos sacar conclusiones sobre la realidad divina a partir de lo que sabemos sobre las creaturas, sin embargo al menos no resulta absurdo que, con respecto a la realidad de Dios, pongamos en cuestión la posibilidad de hablar sobre el ser sin pensar y considerar lo que sabemos acerca del ser en la creación de Dios. ¿Podemos hablar del ser de Dios sin saber algo del ser de las creaturas? Evidentemente no, pues todo lo que hablamos del ser está basado sobre nuestra experiencia del ser en la creación, de la que nosotros somos una parte. Si la definición teilhardiana del ser es correcta (véase §2.7 más arriba) —y yo opino que lo es—, entonces esta definición posee al menos cierta importancia para el discurso humano acerca del ser de Dios. El camino que abre esa definición para hablar de Dios está al menos tan justificado —si la definición de esse es correcta—, como la clásica costumbre de atribuir ser a Dios. Puesto que ya no vivimos en un mundo estático del ser, tenemos que intentar entender cómo centellea la reverberación de Dios en el mundo del llegar-a-ser. Puesto que reconocemos el proceso del llegar-a-ser en la creación como un proceso de unión impulsado por la llamada creadora del amor divino, podríamos preguntarnos si existe en Dios una analogía a este proceso básico de la creación». 1.6.

La Trinidad como continua unión amorosa (§6.3)

Schmitz-Moormann presenta a continuación la imagen que aquí surge de Dios como Unión absoluta y Uni-totalidad suprema, y las dificultades que esto presenta a una concepción monoteísta estricta. Vienen a ser las mismas que veíamos en nuestra sección 1.3, sobre la necesidad que, para unificarse, tendría Dios del mundo. Las complementa aquí con las de la filosofía procesual de A. N. Whitehead. En ella Dios se introduce como un factor en el proceso universal que desarrolla la función «creatividad», y se afirma explícitamente: «Pero desde luego “creatividad” no tiene sentido fuera de sus “creaturas”, y no lo tiene “Dios” fuera de la creatividad y de las “creaturas temporales”…» 18. SchmitzMoormann lo califica de «caso especial de panteísmo», y propone «en general, esa integración del Dios monoteísta en el universo… como la única solución racional al problema planteado por un mundo en evolución que llega al ser mediante la unión». Comenta a continuación que ese monoteísmo estricto aísla a Dios del mundo, y le hace el Ser Supremo que creaba el mundo infantil de la edad media: un mundo perfectamente regulado y ordenado, que sólo el hombre libre podía desordenar con sus pecados, ocasionando el mal físico como castigo de Dios por ellos. Pero esto plantea el problema de que el mal golpea a pecadores y a justos (desde 18

WHITEHEAD, 1929, p. 343 [nota de K. S.-M.]; trad. esp., p. 307.


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los planteamientos del Libro de Job a los de Voltaire en el terremoto de Lisboa de 1755). Frente a esta teología, Schmitz-Moormann presenta la suya, en la que la evolución implica un mundo estructurado por unión y creado por la llamada amorosa de Dios, de un Dios que es Arquetipo de todo lo creado, y no puede ser estrictamente único e inmutable. Y concluye prudentemente: «Sería ciertamente falso decir, que podemos deducir la realidad de la Trinidad a partir del proceso de unión que mantiene a este universo acercándose a Dios mediante su evolución. Pero podemos afirmar, que esta realidad revelada del Dios trinitario y eternamente unido se refleja en el proceso universal de la evolución que tiene lugar mediante una unión progresiva». Pondera a continuación esa realidad revelada del Dios tri-uno, el mysterium magnum, que sobrepasa toda comprensión humana. Sobrepasa especialmente una comprensión basada en la metafísica del ser, en la que Dios aparece como el Ser absoluto e inmutable, difícil de compaginar incluso con el Dios de Abraham, de Isaac y de Jacob, vinculado a este mundo. Rahner, ponía en segundo término esa inmutabilidad, afirmando que «aquí la ontología ha de orientarse según el mensaje de la fe, y no censurar ese mensaje». Schmitz-Moormann critica esa pretensión de que los teólogos «sigan diciendo a la ciencia cómo funcionan los cielos», y recuerda que la metafísica «no es ninguna construcción arbitraria del espíritu humano, sino el resultado del más amplio esfuerzo por entender el universo, es decir la creación —parte también ella de la revelación divina—», y que de la actual «física» evolutiva ya no brota una metafísica del ser (u «ontología»), sino una del llegar-a-ser (o «gignontología») 19. Cierto que era esa ontología griega la que impuso en el Concilio de Calcedonia la terminología de las tres hipóstasis consustanciales (que se interpretarán «intercambiables»). Porque vivimos en una historia de la humanidad en la que va evolucionando nuestra idea misma de Dios. Del Dios infantil del Génesis como padre que da normas sin deber razonarlas, pero castiga y perdona, hemos pasado al Dios adolescente medieval 20 como Ser Supremo, eterno e inmutable, omnipotente y universal, que tiene todo bajo control, «todo ordenado con medida, número y peso» (Sab 11,20), a excepción del hombre, que ha decidido crear libre. Y continúa proponiendo su «fierología», y resumiendo de nuevo las dificultades que en ella tiene un monoteísmo estricto: «La ontología vinculada a esta visión adolescente de la realidad parece que necesita ser reemplazada. Esto no debería asombrarnos, si observamos la historia de la revelación, que prosigue al menos a nivel de la creación continua. Ya no vivimos en el cosmos, sino en un mundo del llegar-a-ser. A este mundo le corresponde la metafísica de la unión, a pesar de que sólo contemos con un tosco esbozo de ella. Puesto que en esta metafísica el ser se define mediante la unión, uno podría afirmar que Dios se une a Dios mismo. Ver nota 14 anteriormente. Schmitz-Moormann dice que los teólogos medievales le recuerdan a «bachilleres que lo saben todo, que aún no han llegado a sondear los límites de su conocimiento y la infinitud de su ignorancia». 19 20


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Como ya hemos indicado, si se afirmase esto acerca de un Dios monoteísta, Dios habría de ser considerado como un compuesto o bien como necesitando un universo, tal como le sucede al Dios whiteheadiano. Ambas ideas resultan insatisfactorias. La concepción whiteheadiana conduce a la integración de Dios como un factor dentro del proceso universal, y la idea de unidad compuesta exige una materia a partir de la cual Dios haya sido compuesto. De este modo se verían comprometidas tanto la eternidad de Dios como su trascendencia. Pensar que Dios es tri-uno (esto es, que no se puede pensar a Dios como uno sin pensarle a la vez como tri-uno) abre una nueva perspectiva para la metafísica de la unión».

Subraya cómo el misterio de ese acto de unión interpersonal amorosa constituye, en la metafísica de la unión, la nueva acepción del actus purus, el acto puro de ese amor perfecto que supera nuestra comprensión: «Puesto que según esa metafísica el ser se realiza mediante la unión y existe tan sólo porque esta unión se realiza de nuevo a cada momento, el Ser absoluto tiene que definirse mediante la Unión absoluta. El supremo nivel de unión que conocemos es la unión personal, que en los seres humanos se da sólo muy imperfectamente. En Dios las tres personas son una sola cosa en un amor total y eterno, que se renueva a cada momento de la eternidad —naturalmente ésta es la forma de hablar propia del ser humano, que no dispone de ninguna posibilidad real de hablar sobre la eternidad—. El viejo concepto de Dios como actus purus recibe un nuevo significado: es el acto de unión eternamente renovado y siempre ya completamente realizado, que une en perfecto amor a las tres personas divinas de la Trinidad: el Padre, el Hijo y el Espíritu Santo. La imaginación humana no puede alcanzar a comprender la plenitud de esta unión en el amor divino. El amor humano, el que conocemos, puede intentar darse a sí mismo, pero en realidad nunca lo consigue del todo. En la Trinidad la relación amorosa carece de defecto alguno. Cada persona de la Trinidad es una sola cosa con las demás en amor total. Estando unidas en un amor perfecto más allá de toda comprensión humana, las tres personas divinas son un único Dios. El misterio de la perfecta unión amorosa nos permitirá la paradójica afirmación: cada una de las personas divinas, en perfecta unión con las demás, actúa como un único Dios». Schmitz-Moormann precisa esta última afirmación notando que la diferencia entre las personas no es puramente relacional, sino producida por la unión misma, que diferencia profundamente: «Esta afirmación ha de precisarse, recordando que la unión no fusiona, la unión diferencia. Uno se hace más uno mismo al unirse al otro. La diferenciación tradicional entre Padre, Hijo y Espíritu Santo tendría que ser algo más que una simple diferenciación de tipo relacional. Esta teoría, que depende del Concilio de Calcedonia, se desarrolló en el horizonte de una metafísica ontológica, para la cual todo tenía su naturaleza en su esencia. Según esta concepción, cualquiera de las personas de la Trinidad podría tomar el lugar de una de las otras. En la metafísica de la unión no puede haber una identidad esencial entre las tres personas: éstas más bien llegan a ser lo que son a través de su unión. Las tres personas son un solo Dios, unidas de tal modo que PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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cada persona participa completamente de las otras 21. Podríamos afirmar también que, más allá de toda comprensión humana, las tres personas divinas se diferencian tanto más como personas cuanto más profundamente se unen en el amor». Comenta a continuación lo reducido del fruto obtenido dentro de esta nueva metafísica de la unión, justificándolo con lo reducido de la explicación anterior dentro de la metafísica del ser, y con lo incipiente del nuevo lenguaje. Resume ese fruto en la imagen de un Dios que trasciende la creación y no la necesita para existir. E insinúa los recientes estudios sobre el papel de cada una de las personas respecto a la creación, además del papel del Hijo descrito en el himno de la carta a los Colosenses (Col 1,16-17). 1.7.

Vestigios e imágenes trinitarios (§6.3)

Al hablar del papel de cada persona en la creación, le surge el tema de los vestigios de la Trinidad en la creación. Recuerda los intentos clásicos de descubrir ternas que recuerden las tres personas divinas: Agustín (memoria, entendimiento y voluntad), Anselmo (fuente, río y desembocadura), Lutero (ser, forma y potencia). Recuerda también la crítica a esa idea misma de los vestigia Trinitatis por parte de Barth y de la moderna apologética católica. Rahner notaba que en la teología escolástica tales vestigios eran imposibles, y que «no puede ser así, pues la Trinidad es un misterio de salvación» 22. Schmitz-Moormann comenta que, contra lo que pase en una metafísica el ser, en la del llegar-a-ser todo progreso evolutivo es un vestigio de la Trinidad: «Si tomamos seriamente la analogia fientis, podemos decir, con confianza de no equivocarnos, que esta creación, en sus estructuras del llegar-a-ser, es ad similitudinem Trinitatis. Todo lo que evoluciona hacia un estado de ser más elevado lo hace mediante la unión, reflejando así, al modo de las creaturas, el Ser absoluto en el acto absoluto y eterno de la Unión divina. La evolución nos acerca así a Dios y contesta la llamada amorosa del Creador imitando la unión divina en aproximaciones infinitesimales, mediante la unión con otros elementos en el nivel del llegar-a-ser entonces alcanzado». Comenta a continuación Schmitz-Moormann cómo no hemos de buscar los vestigios de la Trinidad en aquellas ternas clásicas, sino en los procesos de llegar-a-ser por unión, especialmente por unión interpersonal amorosa, donde, a nuestro juicio, podríamos incluso hablar de «imagen» trinitaria, interpretando trinitariamente el texto de la creación humana (Gen 1.27): «El vestigium trinitatis más evidente no se ha de buscar en primer lugar en alguna realidad tripartita que de algún modo refleje a las tres personas, sino en el propio proceso 21 Uno podría sentirse tentado a decir que cada una participa completamente de la esencia de las otras, pero eso sería sucumbir al lenguaje de la ontología, lo cual intentamos evitar. [Nota de K. S.-M.] 22 RAHNER, Escritos IV, p.117. [Nota de K. S.-M., adaptada.]


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del llegar-a-ser. La unión produce nuevas realidades que en su llegar-a-ser unitotalidad reflejan cada vez más la realidad divina. Hemos de recordar aquí dos cosas: La unión no fusiona, sino que diferencia. Esto vale en gran medida para la unión trinitaria, la unio trinitatis. Y tampoco hemos de olvidar, que una persona en cuanto tal sólo puede existir en su relación con otras personas; que no puede darse, como persona, una persona que exista sola y aislada. Así pues, mediante la unión, que es diferenciadora, la creación y por tanto los seres humanos, pueden acercarse a Dios. La unión entre seres humanos que respeta su personalidad 23 se realiza en el amor. Por consiguiente, la afirmación «Dios es amor» es más que una sentencia moralizadora: afecta a la fuerza central de unión en la Trinidad, que es la fuerza central de la creación». Concluye subrayando, con Teilhard, el mandamiento del amor como el principio ontológico de la evolución al nivel humano. Pero no se ve que triunfe en la noosfera. Sin embargo, ese amor desinteresado es la fuerza decisiva que nos abre el camino al futuro. Es la respuesta a la llamada amorosa de Dios que nos invita a compartir su vida trinitaria: «No hay ningún otro camino para acercarse al Dios tri-uno. Como ya afirmaba Teilhard, el mandamiento del amor ha dejado de ser una exigencia puramente moral, para convertirse en el principio ontológico de la evolución, de la creación. Esta creación sólo alcanzará su meta, el punto que está invitada a alcanzar, si el amor se convierte cada vez más en la fuerza dominante que abra nuevas vías hacia el futuro. Sea como sea ese futuro dominado por la fuerza del amor, apenas parece compatible con un individualismo exagerado y una autorrealización egoísta. Lo que Teilhard denominó la noosfera no puede desarrollar una estructura de soporte humanamente aceptable, si no está dominada por el amor. La creación, llamada a participar en la vida de Dios, puede perder su oportunidad a causa de un rechazo individualista del amor. Pues, como lo han mostrado los grandes filósofos personalistas de la primera mitad del siglo XX, uno no conquista su personalidad mediante la autorrealización egoísta, sino amando a otras personas. Paradójicamente, los que aman se realizan a sí mismos sin buscar la autorrealización egoísta. La fuerza dominante de la evolución sólo se trasluce confusamente en los niveles más tempranos —es decir, los más bajos— de la evolución, aunque se puede distinguir claramente como la fuerza de unión. Pero en el nivel humano, desde el punto de vista de la fe que ve al Dios trinitario como el Arquetipo a ser imitado por la creación, el amor se convierte en la fuerza decisiva. Para aproximarse al Dios tri-uno, para seguir el camino de la creación evolutiva, tan sólo existe una ley: «amaos los unos a los otros» (Jn 13,34). No hay ningún otro camino hacia el futuro que conduzca a la plenitud —al pleroma— de la creación que ha sido invitada a compartir la vida trinitaria. Esta es la respuesta que Dios espera a su fiel llamada creadora del amor». Forzar a las personas a que se unan de acuerdo con el slogan de la Revolución Francesa («Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité ou la Mort») no es fomentar la unión, sino fomentar la individualización, convertir a las personas en cifras anónimas. [Nota de K. S.-M.] 23


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Y concluye esta larga sección: «Habiendo descubierto con cierta confianza un vestigium trinitatis en la creación evolutiva, hemos de plantearnos si los otros grandes parámetros de la evolución nos permiten descubrir algún otro, y si nos permiten reconocer nuevos aspectos del Creador y de sus propósitos hacia este universo». 1.8.

Creación de la información (§6.4)

Este nuevo apartado, «Creatio informata» («Creación informada»), presenta la información —el gran parámetro de la evolución al que, como dijimos, dedica el capítulo 4— como otro vestigio divino, al ver su patente crecimiento progresivo como un acercamiento a la omnisciencia divina. Pero plantea pronto el tema de la posibilidad de que Dios trasmita información a la creación por «causalidad descendente» (top-down causation), declarando ese concepto, inspirado en la explicación psicológica (ni reductivista ni dualista) del hecho misterioso y patente de que nuestra mente transmite información a nuestro cuerpo. Y discute las opiniones sobre la aplicación real de esa causalidad divina en relación a las leyes del universo, el ajuste fino de cuyas constantes está relacionado con el «principio antrópico». Se plantea incluso si la llamada creadora hacia la unión habría de concebirse como un tipo de causalidad descendente, pero excluye rápidamente esta concepción que reintroduciría al Dios omnipotente, que decide mediante la unión el detalle de las nuevas uni-totalidades: «La unión crea nueva información, nuevas estructuras; lo que hace el Creador es permitir que éstas aparezcan, más que causar su aparición como estructuras específicamente informadas». Y resume así el ámbito de la causalidad descendente: «El modelo de la causalidad descendente tiene una función explicativa cuando Dios habla a la humanidad a través de los profetas, cuando Dios escucha las plegarias, cuando la gracia de Dios llega a la persona humana. Tal tipo de causalidad descendente resulta útil como modelo de la interacción de Dios con la creación para que ciertos acontecimientos puedan concebirse como acción de Dios en la historia de su creación, sin que sea éste el único modelo a aplicar. Dios no se limita a usar un modelo único». Presenta así la relación que tiene, con esa información espiritual, la habitual y amorosa llamada creadora, que es propiamente gracia: «Parece ser que la forma habitual en que Dios interactúa con este universo es sosteniendo su creación, sosteniendo la materia/espíritu en su camino hacia niveles superiores de complejidad, centralización, conciencia y espiritualidad mediante la llamada creadora del amor. Dios llama a salir de la nada al universo para que llegue-a-ser cada vez más semejante a Él. Y por convertirse cada vez más en información y hacerse más creativo en la producción de información (como ocurre de forma bien visible al nivel humano), el universo en su cima evolutiva se hace esencialmente espiritual, y esto significa, hasta cierto punto, más semejante a Dios. Esto no ha de hacernos olvidar que la amorosa y creativa llamada de Dios constituye, a su propio estilo, la base informativa de este universo. No impone ninguna inforPENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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mación, pero ofrece la posibilidad de crear información, si se aprovecha esta posibilidad —siempre que se den las condiciones para ello—). Este ofrecimiento siempre presente, esta permanente llamada de Dios, debe denominarse con toda propiedad: gracia. Puesto que la gracia es el activo amor de Dios a su creación, puesto que la fuerza conductora de la historia evolutiva del universo es el amor de Dios, podemos decir que la creación entera es gracia». 1.9.

Creación de la libertad (§6.5)

Este último apartado, «Creatio libera» («Creación libre»), presenta la libertad —el parámetro cualitativo de la evolución al que dedica el capítulo anterior— como el elemento básico para que la llamada creadora pueda tener, al nivel humano, una respuesta de amor: de unión amorosa con el prójimo y con Dios. Comienza recordando la visión tradicional escolástica de un mundo perfectamente ordenado por el determinismo de las leyes de la naturaleza, en el que por decisión divina los seres humanos gozan de libertad. Recuerda ampliamente cómo en esa visión, la convicción de una ordenación perfecta de la creación según el plan de Dios llevó al dilema teológico de combinar el libre albedrío humano con la predestinación divina —y a sus intentos de solución mediante la premoción física y la ciencia media—. Contrapone a eso nuestra visión evolutiva, actual en la que descubrimos una prehistoria de la libertad en la naturaleza, y no descubrimos «evidencias de que Dios actuase predestinando cuanto ha sucedido». Cierto que en el proceso evolutivo descubrimos como «una propensión en la naturaleza» hacia una mayor complejidad, conciencia, información y libertad, pero esta propensión —que tiene rasgos de predestinación y es la que SchmitzMoormann explica mediante la llamada creadora— no corresponde a la concepción escolástica de predestinación divina experimentada en el movimiento regular de los cielos y la naturaleza, dentro de un universo estático y determinista, en el que Dios hacía «salir el Sol sobre malos y buenos» (Mt 5,45). De todo eso concluye que «la creación divina en evolución indica más bien que no existe predestinación alguna ejercida por el Creador», que «esta creación presenta más bien la imagen de un universo que evoluciona libre y dolorosamente» y que «la única orientación mantenida por los vectores de complejidad, información y conciencia crecientes parece dirigirse hacia la evolución de la libertad». Así en los últimos párrafos presenta el sentido profundo de esta libertad: ella permite responder amorosamente a la llamada creadora. Comienza reafirmando que Dios está dispuesto, por el bien superior de esa libertad, a pagar el precio del derroche y el mal en el mundo: «Como ya hemos dicho antes 24, podríamos especular que la intención de Dios al crear este mundo no es la de establecer un orden perfecto, la de imponer la voluntad divina, sino la de llamar con amor 24

Capítulo 5, al final. [Nota de K. S.-M.]


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hacia sí a una creación que un día llegará a ser capaz de responder con amor a la llamada creadora de Dios. Y Dios acepta no sólo el precio de un universo lleno de desechos, sino también el precio, aún más agobiante, del mal. Por una parte, es razonable que no pueda haber una evolución libre sin ciertos males inevitables —como la muerte—, ni sin otros males en principio evitables pero estadísticamente posibles y probables. Cuando las cosas pueden ir mal, más tarde o más temprano irán mal. Sólo en un mundo estático y estrictamente determinado se podría evitar el mal. Enfermedades, accidentes y muertes prematuras son parte del precio. No cabe duda de que perturba nuestra sensibilidad y nuestra exigencia de felicidad ver que el Creador acepte este precio, pero no existe forma alguna racionalmente imaginable de que la evolución de la libertad se lleve a cabo sin el mal creciente que ésta conlleva. Aún así nos espanta abandonar el bello cuadro infantil de un mundo bien ordenado en el que se tenía cuidado de todo, y nos resulta muy difícil aceptar que Dios está dispuesto a pagar el precio de la aparición del mal a todos los niveles de la evolución para que la libertad pudiera alcanzar el nivel de la libertad humana». Y prosigue su argumento, hasta mostrar que Dios está dispuesto a pagar como precio de la libertad humana el más impensable de los males, la muerte en cruz de su Hijo: «Por otra parte, esta dificultad para comprender la presencia del mal en la creación divina no es nueva. La teología clásica trataba el problema como mysterium iniquitatis. Hoy podemos ver la relación inevitable entre la estructura de la creación orientada hacia la libertad y la aparición del mal. El precio que el Creador estaba dispuesto a pagar por el llegar-a-ser de la libertad puede parecer extremadamente elevado. Quizá el misterio se encuentre ante todo en el hecho de que este mundo, como un mundo libre que responde a la llamada creadora del Amor, sea tan importante para el Creador, que Éste aceptó el más impensable de los males: que el Hijo de Dios, el Logos, se convirtiese en hombre y muriese en la cruz la más horrible de las muertes. Quienquiera que intente resolver el problema del mal, al menos si esto ocurre en una perspectiva cristiana, tendría que meditar el misterio de la cruz, el precio máximo pagado para que la libertad humana pudiese existir 25. Esto puede indicar cuán altamente valora Dios la realidad de la libertad». La llamada creadora interviene indirectamente en la unión creadora. Esto permite a Schmitz-Moormann razonar que, a nivel humano, Dios llama a la unión amorosa a través del prójimo, y espera una respuesta de amor al prójimo (que Dios acepta como amor a Él, según la parábola del juicio final). Esta misma llamada indirecta, el envío de profetas, cobra un sentido profundo en la encarnación de su Hijo a una humanidad extraviada, y constituye la base de una moderna cristología: «El gran misterio de la creación no residiría tanto en el viejo dilema del Dios predestinante y el libre albedrío humano, sino en el amor Esto nos conduce a la temática de la cristología, la cual parece necesitar una revisión global para que muestre a Cristo como el Redentor o, por usar un término más adecuado, como el Salvador y Consumador de este universo. [Nota de K. S.-M.] 25


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de Dios que se abstiene de imponer un orden que evite el mal, para que las creaturas lleguen-a-ser libres y puedan amar a Dios. Si la interpretación propuesta no resulta equivocada, esta libertad realizada en los seres humanos necesita el apoyo constante de la llamada creadora y amorosa de Dios. Como en todos los niveles de evolución, la llamada llega a través del prójimo a cada individuo humano, el cual puede responder a esta llamada a amar a Dios mediante el amor al prójimo, mediante la unión amorosa con el prójimo (cf. Mt 25,30-45). Dios no llama al individuo humano directamente hacia sí como Dios imponiéndose y avasallándolo. Dios más bien se hace presente a través de otros seres humanos: envía profetas. En un sentido muy profundo, en completa coherencia con su intención creadora, Él, el Logos, la Palabra de Dios, se hace hombre, dejando a los seres humanos la libertad para amarle o rechazarle 26. La llamada creadora del amor divino, que llama hacia sí a todo a partir de la nada por el camino de la evolución mediante la unión creadora, sostiene la creación a todos los niveles, por lejos que ésta pueda haberse extraviado: el Creador no le quita nunca la sustentadora llamada del amor. Los seres humanos no son una excepción: existen, como todo lo demás, porque son mantenidos en la existencia mediante la llamada amorosa del Creador. Los seres humanos pueden rechazarla, pueden buscarse sólo a sí mismos: aún así, Dios no aparta su amorosa llamada, que ha de ser respondida mediante el amor». Insiste en que esa llamada creadora es invitación amorosa y no imposición omnipotente, por lo que resulta ser lo que denominamos «gracia»: «La creación, que existe sólo porque es llamada con amor por el Creador, alcanza en el ser humano la capacidad de responder o rechazar el ofrecimiento divino del amor. En el nivel humano se hace así evidente que el poder creador que trabaja en el universo, no es tanto la voluntad omnipotente del Creador, como la gracia de Dios que penetra el universo entero. Todo en este universo se mantiene en la existencia mediante la gracia de Dios, mediante su amor». Concluye nuestro documento notando que ese carácter gracioso de la llamada creadora se refleja en la creación entera a través de la nueva calificación del Creador como infinitamente paciente (cf. nuestra sección 1.4), incluso en su invitación al pecador a que responda con amor: «El amor de Dios es infinitamente paciente, tal como se ha documentado mediante la lenta respuesta del universo: Dios nunca aparta su amor creador. Ni tampoco aparta Dios su gracia de ningún ser humano. Éste puede rehusar el amar a Dios, el amar a su prójimo, pero el ofrecimiento divino del amor, de la gracia, nunca le será retirado. Incluso el pecador, el ser humano que rechaza a Dios, puede en cualquier momento agarrarse libremente a ese amor pacientemente ofrecido, que impregna el universo entero. En un sentido muy preciso podemos decir: la creación entera es gracia. Y la creación, que ha llegado a ser capax Dei en la humanidad, está llamada a responder con amor al Creador, adorando ese eterno Amor».

26

Este aspecto de una cristología futura necesita un mayor desarrollo.


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2.

EL CONTEXTO DE ESTA INTUICIÓN DE SCHMITZ-MOORMANN

Podríamos decir que ese contexto fue toda su vida intelectual. Pero distingamos, por claridad, entre unos precedentes previos a la idea concreta de la «llamada creadora», y las primeras menciones de esta idea. 2.1.

Precedentes

Karl Schmitz-Moormann (1928-1996) era un biólogo y teólogo alemán, católico y seglar. El diálogo interior entre sus ciencias y su teología está directamente influido por el de Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, que sólo póstumamente comenzará a hacerse público. Schmitz-Moormann, más agraciado, podrá dedicarse públicamente a ese diálogo, e incluso trabajar en su difusión por toda Europa, como Co-fundador y primer Presidente de la European Society for the Study of Science and Theology (ESSSAT). Su trabajo teológico se desarrolla, en efecto, a partir del Concilio Vaticano II, y la publicación de la Constitución Gaudium et Spes (1965), que renovó la atmósfera de la teología cristiana. Ya el 1969 publicaba un trabajo sobre el pecado original, distinguiendo en él entre su «presentación anticuada» y lo que nos dice «la fe permanente», y en 1970 otro sobre «Teilhard teólogo» 27. Su interés científico y teológico por Teilhard le llevó a editar, en colaboración con su mujer Nicole, en 1971 los once volúmenes de su Obra Científica completa, y en 1974-1978 los tres volúmenes de su Diario personal 28. En 1986, para relanzar en Alemania ese diálogo, edita en alemán un libro titulado Teilhard de Chardin en la discusión 29. Y para relanzar el diálogo a nivel europeo, ese mismo año y en su propio lugar de trabajo, promueve como organizador local la celebración del primer congreso europeo (ESSSAT-1986, Loccum, Alemania), sobre el tema Evolución y creación: una perspectiva europea 30. En él presenta dos importantes comunicaciones de carácter teológico. Una de ellas, «Evolución en la tradición teológica católica», concluye mostrando cómo algunos teólogos recientes se interesan en la visión evolucionista global en cuanto les obliga a modificar el concepto teológico clásico de ‘creación’ 31. La otra comunicación, «La visión teilhardiana sobre la evolución», es aún más interesante, pues desarrolla dos ideas centrales de esta visión: que la evolución es un proceso de unión, y que sólo resulta inteligible desde el final (y por tanto la evolución biológica sólo desde los seres humanos) 32. En 1987 publica en Zygon, la SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1969 y 1970. TEILHARD: L’Œuvre Scientifique, Tagebücher y Journal. Schmitz-Moormann recordará al final de su vida, que la lectura de esos diarios le convenció de que Teilhard era un teólogo, por más que él pretendía negarlo: SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1995, p. 125. 29 SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1986. 30 Véanse las actas del congreso: ANDERSON Y PEACOCKE (eds.), 1987. 31 Ibídem, pp. 121-131. 32 Ibídem, pp. 162-169. La primera de esas ideas es especialmente interesante para nuestro tema. Aunque sea muy concisamente (cinco líneas), testifica el interés de Schmitz-Moor27 28


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prestigiosa revista de Chicago, un artículo sobre «Evolución de la libertad humana», sobre uno de sus nuevos parámetros de la evolución 33. Tres años más tarde aprovechó el tema del tercer congreso europeo (ESSSAT1990, Ginebra), La ciencia y la teología de la información, para coordinar el taller número 3, sobre «La evolución de los sistemas codificadores... e información en los sistemas biológicos», y presentar en él una comunicación sobre «La evolución de la información», o sea, sobre el otro de sus nuevos parámetros 34. En septiembre de 1991 tuvimos ocasión de tratarle personalmente en Cataluña, con ocasión de una reunión de jesuitas científicos europeos celebrada en el Centro Borja de Sant Cugat del Vallés, a la que él deseaba asistir y en la que nos deleitó con una comunicación titulada «¿Se puede hacer teología ignorando las ciencias?» 35. El año siguiente, participó de nuevo en el cuarto congreso europeo (ESSSAT 1992, Rocca di Papa, Roma), siendo coeditor de sus actas Orígenes, tiempo y complejidad, en las que figura una breve comunicación suya sobre «El concepto de complejidad a la luz de la evolución de [sistemas] complejos» 36. 2.2.

Primeras menciones de la «llamada creadora»

Hasta aquí no hemos visto ninguna alusión al tema central de la «creatio appellata». Pero en 1992 Schmitz-Moormann publica dos documentos que, según hace constar en ellos, habían sido presentados previamente, y en los que menciona concisa pero repetidamente su nueva idea de la «llamada creadora». El primero es un artículo, «Teología en un estilo evolutivo», aparecido de nuevo en la revista Zygon en junio de 1992, pero «presentado al Seminario Avanzado sobre Religión y Ciencia de Chicago, el 27 de mayo de 1991» 37. El artículo defienmann, ya en 1989, por esta generalización «al dominio metafísico» de «el concepto de unión como el proceso básico de la evolución creadora», y da la referencia al vol. XI de las obras de Teilhard, y los enunciados latinos de su definición del «plus esse»: ibídem, p. 166. 33 SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1987. Este artículo es un anticipo del capítulo 5 y el apartado §6.5 de nuestro documento fundamental. Pero curiosamente, no se hallan en él los temas más teológicos y relacionados con la amorosa «llamada creadora»: ni el del mal como precio de la libertad, ni el de la necesidad de la libertad para poder responder con amor a esa llamada. 34 SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1992a. Esta comunicación es análogamente un anticipo del capítulo 4 y el apartado §6.4 de nuestro documento. Pero sólo sus dos últimos párrafos aluden al aspecto espiritualizador de la información y aun a la «creación en su camino hacia el encuentro con el Creador»: ibídem, p. 181. 35 SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1991. Esta comunicación está muy relacionada con un apartado del capítuo introductorio de nuestro documento, §1.2. 36 SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1994: «The Concept of Complexity Seen in the Light of the Evolution of Complexes», en G. V. COYNE y K. SCHMITZ-MOORMANN (eds.), Origins, Time & Complexity, Geneva, Labor et Fides, Part II, pp. 236-241. Esta comunicación, a través de la ley teilhardiana de complejidad-conciencia, tiene una relación remota con el capítulo 3 de nuestro documento, sobre el parámetro «conciencia». 37 SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1992b. La referencia a este Advanced Seminar, que hemos de suponer en el mismo Chicago Center for Religión and Science responsable de la revista, está al final de su nota al pie introductoria. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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de la importancia de la evolución y de la ciencia en general para la teología, considera «el mundo en evolución como fuente teológica», se pregunta sobre las «posibilidades de pensar teológicamente en un mundo evolutivo» y concluye presentando dos «ensayos preliminares de hacer teología en un contexto evolutivo», de dos páginas justas cada uno. El primer ensayo, «Dios el Creador y su Creación», comienza contrastando nuestra fe en la creación con lo que resulta de una simple reflexión sobre el modelo del big-bang: que el universo no era perfecto al principio, y que «el Creador ya no aparece como poder omnipotente que impone su voluntad divina sobre la creación». En ese contexto cita «la teoría de la unión creadora desarrollada por Teilhard de Chardin en 1917, la cual declara esencialmente que las cosas sustanciales vienen a la existencia, no mediante la acción de cierto poder externo, sino mediante la unificación de elementos que componen una totalidad esencialmente nueva (por ejemplo, los átomos se unen para formar una molécula, y las personas para formar un equipo)» 38. A continuación rechaza desde su perspectiva teológica la afirmación de Stephen Weinberg como científico «puro», de que «este universo es absolutamente sin sentido». Pero reconoce que en este universo no se descubre un orden creciente, sino desorden y libertad crecientes, lo que demuestra que «la libertad… es muy importante para Dios omnipotente» (y cita sobre este tema su artículo de 1987, también en Zygon). El párrafo final del ensayo dice: «Basándose en el proceso evolutivo (que exige demasiado detalle para resumirse aquí), podemos describir la relación entre Dios y la creación, no como una relación de dominio, sino como un llamar hacia sí (“calling forth”) en amor, un Dios que no impone su divina voluntad. Todo esto tiene sentido por cuanto que Dios no parece interesado en demostrar omnipotencia, sino en llamar hacia sí (“calling forth”) una creación capaz de encontrar y amar a Dios —algo que nunca podría hacer una creatura totalmente determinada—. No hay amor sin libertad».

El segundo ensayo, «Encarnación en un mundo evolutivo», comienza: «Podríamos aceptar tal visión del Creador y de la creación inacabada. Pero en este teatro, ¿cuál es el papel del Hijo de Dios encarnado? Es evidente que la teoría clásica de un redentor que ha de expiar el pecado de Adán, no tiene sentido en este universo evolutivo 39. … Por otra parte, puesto que la encarnación no se hizo necesaria después de concluida la creación, sino más bien durante el proceso en curso de creación, ella se convierte en un elemento del acto global de la creación. Especulemos sobre esto. Hemos dicho que esta creación es llamada hacia sí (“is called forth”) por un Dios amoroso. Pero para amar uno ha de hablar al otro al nivel de este otro. Esto es verdad para todos los aspectos de la creación. Si Dios hablara a los seres humanos o a una parte de la creación con toda su 38 K. S.-M. da aquí en nota las definiciones del «plus esse» y la frase «la unión diferencia», con la referencia vaga «véase Teilhard para más detalles». 39 Cf. K. SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1969. [Nota de K. S.-M., inserta en el texto.]


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gloria, esto significaría autoimponerse y forzar lo que Dios por lo visto quiere dejar libre. Por consiguiente Dios nunca llama hacia sí (“calls forth”) a ninguna cosa desde un nivel que no sea el de esa cosa. Dios habla a los seres humanos como los padres hablan a los niños pequeños —en su propio lenguaje…—. El amor acepta al otro como es, sin autoimponerse 40. Dios estaba siempre encubierto cuando hablaba a los humanos: el Antiguo Testamento deja esto claro. Hay una nube, un fuego, una voz, un ángel, pero nunca una presencia que del todo se impone. La llamada creadora (“the creative call”) de Dios parece ser siempre una llamada indirecta, que viene en una forma humana.—Aunque la Encarnación no puede ser deducida del proceso de llamar Dios hacia sí (“God’s calling forth”) a la creación, tiene un profundo sentido que, cuando las creaturas de Dios podían libremente amar, la Palabra de Dios se hiciese presente entre los humanos en la forma de un humano, pidiendo ser amado por aquellos que habían sido creados». Como vemos, la idea de la «llamada creadora» estaba clara en la mente de Smith-Moormann ya en mayo de 1991, y parece haber llegado a ella en el proceso de dar sentido a la creación y a la libertad humana, y sobre todo en el de presentar la encarnación como un nuevo acto de esa misma creación. El segundo documento de 1992 es un librito alemán, Creación y evolución: Nuevos planteamientos para el diálogo entre las ciencias y la teología, editado y mayoritariamente redactado por él 41. Este librito viene a recoger las actas de dos congresos distintos celebrados en la Academia Católica de Baviera, establecida en Munich. La mayor parte de su contenido corresponde a las jornadas sobre «Teoría de la evolución y fe en la creación» (los días 5 y 6 de octubre de 1991), promovidas por la conocida carta de Juan Pablo II a George V. Coyne, S.J., en 1988, que se publica por primera vez en alemán al final del librito. Sus cinco conferencias —sobre cosmología, biología evolutiva, historia de la tensión darwiniana, interpretación bíblica y la de Schmitz-Moormann sobre «Posibilidades y perspectivas de la fe en la creación en un mundo evolutivo»—, siendo interesantes, no llegan a dar una elaboración teológica positiva. Pero una tal elaboración se vio necesaria, y se organizó para ella un día de estudio (el 1 de febrero de 1992), a cargo de Schmitz-Moormann, que pronunció las tres conferencias. La primera es más bien introductoria, pero las otras dos retoman, con mucha más extensión, los temas de los dos ensayos que había presentado en Chicago ocho meses antes, y en las que acabamos de comentar las menciones de la acción creadora. La segunda conferencia, «El mundo evolutivo: Creación de Dios», afirma hacia el final: «El Dios trinitario es el arquetipo de la unión suprema que toda la creación parece imitar». Y su último párrafo menciona así la acción creadora: «El amor del Dios trinitario, que no necesita el mundo, puede sin embargo libremente y a partir del amor graciosamente ofrecido, llamar al mundo a que 40 41

K. S.-M. cita ya aquí a Martin Buber, Romano Guardini y Emmanuel Mounier. SCHMITZ-MOORMANN (ed.), 1992c.


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llegue-a-ser (“die Welt ins werden rufen”). Pero este llegar-a-ser mismo se presenta como proceso de la unión, y ésta se presenta en último término a los ojos de la fe como un suceso soportado por la fuerza del amor. La creación evolutiva aparece así esencialmente como haciéndose a partir del amor de Dios y soportada en su hacerse por ese mismo amor de Dios» 42. La última conferencia, «Evolución y redención», menciona repetidamente la llamada creadora. Cinco veces para indicar que esta llamada no es impositiva ni directa: «El amor no avasalla, no se impone. Por consiguiente Dios, que es el amor, tampoco crea una máquina que funcione según leyes deterministas, más bien llama al mundo a partir de la nada hacia sí (“ruft er die Welt aus dem Nichts zu sich”), para que pueda encontrarle con amor. … La llamada de Dios (“Der Ruf Gottes”), que llama al mundo a partir de la nada hacia sí (“der die Welt aus dem Nichts hervorruft”) no es tampoco una llamada impositiva. Nada indica que las cosas surgieran bajo una llamada directa de Dios (“unter einem direkten Anruf Gottes”) como si la llamada creadora (“der Schöpferruf”) fuera una llamada que obliga a la creación primordial a dirigirse directamente a Dios. El amor como principio creador permite esperar algo muy distinto, a saber, que se dirija a los diversos seres al nivel en que ellos existen. Dios no llama a nadie directamente hacia sí, sino sólo a través de los elementos próximos. Dios se hace presente al átomo en cierta manera como átomo, a la molécula como molécula, a la célula como célula, al ser vivo como ser vivo, al ser humano como ser humano» 43. Y en esa misma conferencia menciona aún la llamada creadora seis veces más en relación a la respuesta libre de la creación y a la presentación de la encarnación: «La realidad de la creación evolutiva orientada a la libertad, permite sospechar que Dios llama hacia sí la creación (“Gott die Schöpfung zu sich ruft”) para que le responda amando en libertad. … Sin embargo, como ya hemos dejado claro, Dios no fuerza a la creación, sino que deja percibir su llamada a unirse amorosamente (“seinem Anruf zur liebenden Vereinigung”) … a partir del correspondiente elemento próximo. Se hace átomo al átomo, molécula a la molécula, célula a la célula, ser vivo al ser vivo. Es evidente que su presencia se configura de una manera distinta en cada caso, que la llamada de Dios (“der Anruf Gottes”) que sale del interior de las cosas, es perceptible de maneras distintas. Ahora bien, si esta representación de la manera de actuar del Dios creador en la creación e correcta, … Dios habla a los hombres en forma humana: primero a través de otros hombres, pero definitivamente viniendo a este mundo en su Hijo: Así que, en la encarnación, la actividad creadora de Dios llega a una primera plenitud de la llamada creadora (“des Schöpferanrufs”) a la realidad libre y personal llegada-a-ser por evolución, plenitud que en cierta manera… representa la quintaesencia del proceso creador. En el hombre Jesús, el Hijo de Dios, llama Dios a los hombres hacia sí (“ruft Gott die Menschen zu sich”). … Dios, en defensa de la libertad de una respuesta amorosa de la creación a su llamada 42 43

Ibídem, pp. 115-130; especialmente p. 130. Ibídem, pp. 131-148; especialmente pp. 137-138.


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(“auf seinem Anruf”), la cual se ha hecho hombre en Jesús como la Palabra de Dios, está dispuesto a pagar cualquier precio incluso el precio de la muerte en cruz» 44. Se confirma, pues, la conexión de la elaboración de la idea de «llamada creadora» con la presentación novedosa de la encarnación como un nuevo acto de la misma creación. Indiquemos, por fin, que en 1995 Schmitz-Moormann publicó un último artículo en Zygon, «El futuro de la teología teilhardiana», en el que no menciona la llamada creadora, pero en el que insiste en el interés de la metafísica teilhardiana, describiendo así sus fuentes: «El texto de 1917, la Union Créatrice (Unión creadora), complementada con la Centrología de 1943 y numerosas notas de sus diarios, bosquejan una nueva metafísica, que es la teoría que abarca los rasgos más generales del universo, reaparecidos a todos los niveles de la evolución». Menciona su idea central de que «en la concepción de Teilhard, la unión produce novedad», y que estas ideas muy abstractas pero verificables «necesitan una exploración ulterior». Menciona también una tesis doctoral reciente titulada La fuerza primordial del Cosmos: Dimensiones del amor en la obra de Pierre Teilhard de Chardin 45, y comenta que «este es un buen punto de partida para una teología de la creación más completa, que ha de redactarse más sistemáticamente en una concepción teilhardiana, basada sobre la metafísica de la unión». Entendemos que éste era su proyecto concreto cuando se retiró en 1995-1996 al Center for Theological Inquiry de Princeton, y redactó el manuscrito del que procede su obra fundamental que hemos presentado.

BIBLIOGRAFÍA ANDERSON, S., y PEACOCKE, A. R. (eds.): Evolution and Creation: A European Perspective (ESSSAT, 1986), Aarhus University Press, 1987 (especialmente pp. 121-131 y 162-169). BUBER, MARTIN (1958): Ich und Du, Gerlingen; trad. esp.: Yo y tú, Madrid, 1995, Caparrós Editores. GUARDINI, ROMANO (1937): Welt und Person, Nürnberg, Werkbund Verlag; trad. esp.: Mundo y persona, Madrid, 2000, Encuentro Ediciones. MOUNIER, EMMANUEL (1948): Le Personnalisme, Paris, Seuil; trad. esp.: El personalismo, Madrid, 1997, Acción Cultural Cristiana. SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, KARL (1969): Die Erbsünde, Überholte Vorstellung-Bleibender Glaube, Olten/Freiburg, Walter-Verlag. — (1970): «Teilhard théologien», Études Teilhardiennes 3, 63-69. — (1986) (ed.): Teilhard de Chardin in der Discusión, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. — (1987): «On the Evolution of Human Freedom», Zygon 22, 443-458. — (1991): «Can Theology Be Done ignoring Science», Bulletin Jesuits in Science 7, 12-16. Ibídem, pp. 145-147. TRENNERT-HELWIG, 1993, recensionada por Philipp Heffner en el mismo volumen del artículo: Zygon 30 (1995), pp. 146-149. 44

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SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, KARL (1992a): «The Evolution of information», en CH. WASSERMANN et al. (eds.), The Science and Theology of information (ESSSAT, 1990), Geneva, Labor et Fides, pp. 172-184. — (1992b): «Theology in an Evolutionary Mode», Zygon 27, 133-151. — (1992c) (ed.): Schöpfung und Evolution: Neue Ansätze zum Dialog zwischen Naturwissenschaften un Theologie, Dusseldorf, Patmos. — (1994): «The Concept of Complexity Seen in the Light of the Evolution of Complexes», en G. V. COYNE et al. (eds.), Origins, Time & Complexity (ESSSAT, 1992), Part II, Geneva, Labor et Fides, pp. 236-241. — (1995): «The Future of Teilhardian Theology», Zygon 30, 117-129. — (1997a): Materie-Leben-Geist: Evolution als Schöpfung Gottes, Mainz, Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag. — (1997b): en colaboración con JAMES F. SALMON, S.J., Theology of Creation in an Evolutionary World, Cleveland, The Pilgrim Press. — (2005): en colaboración con JAMES F. SALMON, S.J., Teología de la creación de un mundo en evolución, Verbo Divino, Estella (Navarra). TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, PIERRE (1973): Œuvres XI, Les directions de l’Avenir, Paris, Editions du Seuil; versión española: Las direcciones del porvenir, Madrid, 1974, Taurus. — (1971): L’Œuvre Scientifique, 10 vols. y 1 vol. de mapas, Walter-Verlag, Olten y Freiburg. — (1975): Tagebücher, 3 vols., Walter-Verlag, Olten y Freiburg 1974-78; Journal I (191519), Paris, Fayard. TRENNERT-HELWIG, MATHIAS (1993): Die Urkraft des Cosmos: Dimensionen der Liebe im Werk Pierre Teilhards de Chardin, Freiburg, Herder. WHITEHEAD, A. N. (1929): Process and Reality, Cambridge University Press & New York, Macmillan; versión argentina: Proceso y realidad, Buenos Aires, 1956, Editorial Losada. Llaceres, 30 08172 Barcelona [email protected]

MANUEL GARCÍA DONCEL



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ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD ON PROCESS PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY Cosmos and Kenosis of Divinity JAVIER MONSERRAT Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

ABSTRACT: The modern dialogue between religion and science has to take into account the process philosophy and theology. Science, for the authors in this movement, is the thoughts of Whitehead: a science of the first half of the 20th century, understood according to a certain philosophy of process proposed by Whitehead (which is not only science but a risky, complex and subtle philosophy based on science). In this article we are only referring to one of the episodes in the philosophy of process: that which is characterised by Alfred Whitehead and some of his followers in the creation of the philosophy-theology of process in the Anglo-Saxon, and especially American world. Our intention is to present an evaluation and discussion that is oriented towards what we feel is important: the discussion of his cosmology and theology of kenosis. However, in order to do this we need to make our points of view fit in with a line of thought that makes reference to his metaphysics and philosophy of religion. Whitehead does not question the world at this ultimate level of «primary causality» (in its absoluteness and necessity) given that the world is eternal: that is absolute and necessary. Whitehead’s problem is that of explaining the system of «secondary causes», because they do not seem to constitute a system that is sufficient but rather introduce the reference of God and an element of the world that contributes to what the world is from the inside. God, for Whitehead, is also not responsible for Evil because he does not create the world; on the contrary, he is subject to the conditions established in the same world and tries to overcome it and guide it to perfection. Kenosis or divine auto-limitation, for Whitehead, is only partial because a large part of divine limitation is imposed by the nature of the eternal world (not created) of which God form a part. KEY WORDS: Whitehead, process philosophy, process theology, divine self-limitation, cosmic process, whiteheadian metaphysics, concept of God, kenosis.

La filosofía y teología del proceso de Alfred N. Whitehead: El Cosmos y la Kénosis de la Divinidad RESUMEN: El moderno diálogo entre la ciencia y la religión debe tener en cuenta la filosofía y teología del proceso. La ciencia, para los autores de este movimiento, es la visión de Whitehead: una ciencia de la primera mitad del siglo XX, entendida en conformidad con una cierta filosofía del proceso propuesta por Whitehead (que no sólo es una ciencia, sino una arriesgada, compleja y sútil filosofía fundada en la ciencia). En este artículo nos referimos sólo a uno de los episodios en la filosofía del proceso: el protagonizado por Alfred Whitehead y algunos de sus seguidores en la creación de la filosofía y teología del proceso en el mundo anglo-sajón y en especial americano. Nuestra intención es presentar una evaluación y discusión que se orienta hacia lo que consideramos importante: la discusión de su cosmología y teología de la kénosis. Sin embargo, para hacerlo, necesitamos ajustar nuestros puntos de vista con la línea de pensamiento que se refiere a su metafísica y filosofía de la religión. Whitehead no pone en cueatión el mundo en su nivel último de «causalidad primera» (en su absolutez y necesidad), dado que el mundoes eterno: dado que es absoluto y necesario. El problema de Whitehead es explicar el sistema de las «causas segundas», porque no parecen constituir un sistema suficiente, sino que introduce la referencia a Dios como un elemento del mundo que contribuye a lo que el mundo es desde sí mismo. Dios, para Whitehead, no es, por tanto, responsable del Mal porque no ha creado el mundo; al contrario, está sujeto a las condiciones establecidas por el mismo mundo y por ello intenta superarlo y llevarlo a la perfección. La kénosis, o autolimitación divina, para Whitehead, es sólo parcial porque una gran parte de la limitación divina está impuesta por la naturaleza eterna de un mundo (no-creado) del que Dios forma parte fundamental. PALABRAS CLAVE: Whitehead, filosofía del proceso, teología del proceso, proceso cósmico, autolimitación divina, metafísica whiteheadiana, concepto de Dios, kenosis. © PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749



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J. MONSERRAT, ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD ON PROCESS PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

INTRODUCTION The philosophy of process was born out of the ideas of the English physicist and philosopher Alfred Whitehead (1861-1947), soon after he settled in Harvard University. His philosophy is already a philosophy of process. However, the birth of this philosophy as a real philosophical movement is connected with a group of his disciples, among whom Charles Hartshorne is, with out any doubt, the most relevant. The importance of this philosophical-theological movement covers a period from the 1950’s until it is consolidated in the 1970’s; in these years it is identified with the Chicago school and the journal Process Studies is founded. At the end of the 1960’s and also in the 70’s, there was also a theological movement that was known as theology of secularization or as the death of God that was influenced by the theology of process. However, these movements should not be confused with the theology of process, even though they have many similarities —although perhaps a different sensibility— and respond to a group of similar problems with respect to the meaning of religion in modern times. From those founding years, there has been the constant presence of the philosophy-theology of process in Anglo-Saxon theology, principally in America. There still exists today an orthodox movement of this philosophy-theology that is linked by the lines of thought of its principal authors: A. N. Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, John B. Cobb, David Ray Griffin y W. H. Vanstone. In any case, the process philosophy and theology is constantly considered to be one of the principal protagonists in the current dialogue between science and religion. Basic traits of processual thought Some of the traits of the philosophy-theology of process allow its special historical significance to be understood. However, its importance does not only depend on its intrinsic contents but also on its unquestionable social presence —which can still be seen today— throughout the last sixty years of English philosophy and theology. In this, a new and original way of looking at the philosophical-theological theme of divine kenosis has been considered. In our understanding, what it offers to how kenosis is thought about is one of its great values but at the same time, it is where the most significant problems and lack of focus can be seen. Liberal innovation. The philosophy-theology of process stands out, above all else, for its creative and liberal attitude. This attitude does not depend on the need to maintain true to the tradition of a given religious paradigm nor on the fear of possible reactions from an «ecclesiastic authority». This school of thought thinks with complete liberty so that Christianity can be understood and make sense in the context of modernity. Its analysis came from the hypersensitivity to the modern world and from complete freedom from the past. This liberal «talent» has many existential aspects, such as those that are tragically conscious of evil and human suffering. Nevertheless, if only paying attention to tradition PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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can cause insensitivity to the present, paying too much attention to the modern threatens an insensitivity to the opposite: a disconnection with the essence of tradition and the core values of Christianity that are present in the faith of Christian churches in the past and the present (and not only of the catholic church). Theology from science. The process theology has tried to be a theology from science. This can be understood, as science is one of the essential characteristics of modern times. Thinking about Christianity from the point of view of modernity requires that it be approached from the perspective of science. Therefore science, for the authors in this movement, is the thoughts of Whitehead: a science of the first half of the 20th century, understood according to a certain philosophy of process proposed by Whitehead (which is not only science but a risky, complex and subtle philosophy based on science). The philosophy-theology of process should be understood as an image of the cosmos, of man and of God which is made possible by modern science. The dialogue between science and religion. Theology based on science, throughout the 20th century, has been a point of reference for the dialogue between science and religion. Whoever promotes, from other perspectives, the modern dialogue between religion and science has to take into account the process philosophy. Many examples can be found. For example, Ian Barbour identifies with many processual assumptions, although he is critical of others: his work is a well-considered and critical connection of the Christian tradition. Other authors such as Peacocke and Polkinghorne are explicitly removed from process but discuss and nuance its assumptions; at their base, some of their positions, in fact, have a certain relation to viewpoints that are derived from the influence of the philosophy-theology of process. In fact, many current opinions about divine omniscience and omnipotence —which can be seen in authors such as George Ellis, W. Stoeger or George Coyne— with out any doubt, have their origin in the process philosophy and theology. Devine self-limitation and kenosis. The themes of self-limitation and the kenosis of divinity can be found in the philosophy of Whitehead. It is about self-limitation or perhaps, even better, as a divine «limitation» in the world that effects omnipotence and omniscience. Nevertheless, these ideas have been assumed by the theology of process in order to justify the inaction of God against Evil and go even farther than that. God does not resolve the problem of Evil because God has a limited ability to intervene in things that happen in the world; he is not responsible for things that happen «inevitably». Therefore it is not only about a «divine self-limitation» against human freedom but rather a limitation that goes much deeper and much more radical than that «imposed» on God by reality. As we will see, this is one of the most radical and problematic points of traditional Christian theology. Nevertheless, this theology of process is with out a doubt «religious»: it has been the founding, in out times, of an understandable belief in a God that is personal and creates a feeling of a community of faith in Christian churches. This theological perspective has understood and taken seriously the PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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fact that a modern explanation of Christianity requires the acceptance of divine limitation and kenosis. In the face of the theology of process —we insist— a new type of theology was born in and around the 1960’s and 70’s called theology of secularization or the death of God, which is characterized by its radical choice to be a-religious (Robinson, Van Buren, Hamilton, etc.). However, the theology of process and the theology of secularization do not coincide: the latter is not born out of the former (although it is without a doubt influenced by it) nor is it a school that has been derived from it, at least from our point of view. They are, in effect two independent yet connected movements differentiated by their basic roots. The theology of secularization assumes a new analysis of the way that the absence of divinity was extended in the world and as a consequence, a new anthropology. Nevertheless, in this article our attention will only centre on the philosophytheology of process.

1.

ORIGIN

AND EVOLUTION OF THE PROCESS PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

Precedents and initial context. The cosmos or universe is not a static reality but rather a dynamic universal process. In contrast to the static and stable, this philosophy confirms processual transformation as the essence of the universe. In contrast to the classical metaphysics that had followed preferentially in the footsteps of Parmenides (the stable Parmenidian being transformed into the «eidos» of Plato and then to Aristotelian «form» while action is only attributed to matter) an alternative conception is being considered in the line of Heraclitus which establishes the process —and is some way action— as the metaphysical essence of the universe. As a consequence, there is no doubt that the history of philosophy (as well as science) allows for the finding of numerous antecedents to the philosophy of process: we have mentioned Heraclitus but we could also cite modern authors such as Henri Louis Bergson, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James or John Dewey. In reality, it is science that gives a processual (this is the real term and should be used previously…) description and itself constitutes the most important manifestation of processual thought. This is what Whitehead understood and as a consequence had the desire to construct a «processual metaphysics» that was in agreement with science. However, as mentioned before, in this article we are only referring to one of the episodes in the philosophy of process: that which is characterised by Alfred Whitehead and some of his followers in the creation of the philosophy-theology of process in the Anglo-Saxon, and especially American world. In reality, theology has been the true place where Whitehead’s ideas (which were not theological but rather philosophical) have had the most impact: these have been theologies that have valued and cultivated their philosophy and have extended it to establish a hermeneutical outlook that allows for the understanding of human life and for the construction of a new theology that could explain Christianity in a way PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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that could be understood from modern culture (principally from modern science). Lastly, Whitehead constructed a metaphysics of process because he understood that modern science described the world as a process: his metaphysics of process was, as a consequence, the only metaphysics that sciences allowed. It was the metaphysics of science that the modern world needed and Whitehead consciously wanted to shape. 1.1)

The roots

Alfred North Whitehead. Whitehead was born in 1861 (died in 1947) and his scientific career began while at university as a mathematician oriented towards physics. He was a lecturer in mathematics in Cambridge until 1911; in mathematics and physics in London until 1924, when he moved to Harvard as a professor of philosophy. His first period stands out for his collaborations with Bertrand Russell; above all in the Principia Mathematica (3 volumes, 1910-1913) where the logical foundations of mathematical reasoning are justified. However, the first works that introduce us to his nascent philosophy, come later on: The Organisation of Thought (1917), An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge (1919) y The Concept of Nature (1920). One of his most important books, Science and the Modern World, SMW (1925), was written during his time as a professor at Harvard. It is the first book where references to God appear, although it is in a strictly metaphysical context as a reference to «divine limitation». Whitehead, nevertheless, thought that the most fruitful way to gain access to God was through the religious experience of humanity. This was treated later on in his Religion and Making (1926). But it was with the Gifford Lectures in 1927-28 that he derived the preparations for his main work, which was published under the title: Process and Reality, PR, (1929). In it, he explains his processual metaphysics in complete detail: not as pure science or objective description but as a «metaphysic cosmology» that always refers to a subject, a privileged witness to the flowing process of reality. This is what is now known as «organic philosophy» (philosophy of organism). Four more books, which were written in the same period or before, are also important in order to interpret and compliment Process and Reality. In the Function of Reason (1929) the role of reason in the process of evolution and culture are explained more simply. Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect (1927) is a wide-ranging epistemological refection, from primordial perception to higher representational processes. His work Adventures of Ideas, AI (1933), in which he studies how ideas drive social evolution and create human values, is also very important. Modes of Thought, MT (1938), his last book, in which he offers a general presentation of his philosophy that more revealing, less technical and accessible is probably one of his most important works 1. 1 I will cite Whitehead’s works following the acronyms found in the text, like SMW for Science and Modern World. Works not cited in the course of the article do not have their own acronyms. I will put inside parentheses either the page of the edition used or the corresponding part or chapter, the latter being difficult to identify because of the various available editions.


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First followers in America. It is evident that Whitehead arrived at Harvard with an already established reputation. Many important people came to study under him, attracted by his reputation: On some, for example Willard Van Orman Quine, Whitehead did not leave a particularly strong influence. This however, was not the case with his other followers, with whom his influence was a determining factor, although without impeding the specific biases of each one. His students, with his help, were able to escape the control of the positivist philosophy that was dominant at that time. Some of his main students were Paul Weiss, F. S. C. Northrop and Susanne K. Langer. In Yale, Paul Weiss held a prestigious professorship and defended an original metaphysics with many publications that were inspired by Whitehead. His last work was The God We Seek (1964). Northrop also worked at Yale, in the philosophy of law. There, he put forth a perspective that was influenced by Whitehead but also tried to find connections with eastern philosophy. In 1961 he published an anthology on Whitehead’s ideas. Lastly, Susanne Langer, friend and student of Whitehead, applied his ideas to the philosophy of art, culminating with the work: Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling (2 volumes, 1967-1972). Among his students of theology, Nels Ferré stands out as probably one of the first to contribute to the creation of a theology based on Whitehead’s ideas by insisting on a more transcendent idea of God and the autonomy of the world (Reason in Religion, 1963; The Living God of Nowhere and Nothing, 1966; The Universal Word: A theology for a Universal Faith, 1969). Victor Lowe, another of his students of theology, wrote one of the best introductions to Whitehead, still valid today (Understanding Whitehead, 1962). Lastly, we cannot forget to mention Dorothy Emmet, personal friend of Whitehead, who wrote Whitehead’s Philosophy of Organism (1932) and later on, an important work dealing with a metaphysics that was in line with Whiteheads ideas: The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking (1945). 1.2)

The theology of process

Charles Hartshorne. With out a doubt, Charles Hartshorne was the other great theological student of Whitehead’s. It is probable, that without his support in the beginning and his efforts to appropriately extend the consequences that were implicit in Whitehead’s philosophy to theology, the process philosophy and theology would not have been born. Because of this, it is fair to say that the American philosophy-theology of process began with Hartshorne just as much as with Whitehead. Apparently, Hartshorne (1897-2000) had already finished his PhD and had already developed, to a large degree, his personal ideas, when in 1925, he began to hear Whitehead’s lectures at Harvard and began to teach with him. From 1923 to 1925 he had a fellowship in Germany where he could have heard lectures from Husserl or Heidegger, but they did not interest him so much. He did however have interest in C.S Peirce whose Collected Papers were edited by Weiss and Hartshorne. We can imagine that Hartshorne found, in the positions of Whitehead, PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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a way to deepen his own intuitions on gestation. As the years past, his identification with Whitehead’s metaphysics grew as can be seen by his explicit recognition of related works and the acceptance of the same terminology. Despite this, while Whitehead preferred to orient himself toward the metaphysics of science, Hartshorne oriented towards the philosophy of religion and theology; which explains how each ones work mutually compliments the others. Hartshorne was always a professor of philosophy; in Chicago, between 1928 and 1955; nevertheless, he drew his main influence from the School of Divinity. Ever since, Chicago has been a centre of the process theology and future home of the journal Zygon. From 1955 to 1962 he worked at Emory University and form 1962 to his death he was at the University of Texas in Austin, as emeritus professor. Although Hartshorne himself recognised his influence in theology, he felt himself as more of a philosopher or philosopher of religion. His body of work is made up of 22 books, all with different significance. We will mention several of them with the purpose of gaining access to his most meaningful works and at the same time reaching a unified vision of the beginnings of his philosophy (theology). Man’s Vision of God (1941) y The Divine Relativity (1948) represent the first criticisms of the unmoving nature and omnipotence of divinity in classic metaphysics through the perspective of his «neoclassic metaphysics» (this is what he called it based on Whitehead’s metaphysics of process). In The Logic of Perfection (1962), he defends the ontological argument of Saint Anselm (which is studied later in another monographic work: Anselm´s Discovery, 1967) and offers a global synthesis of his processual metaphysics. His evident link with Whitehead is professed in Whitehead’s Philosophy (1972). The following is a list of books that clarify his ideas during the last part of his life: A Natural Theology for Our Time (1967), Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (1970), Aquinas to Whitehead (1976), Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (1984), The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne (1991) and the last book he wrote, three years before his death, The Zero Fallacy and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics (1997). 1.3)

The eminence of Whitehead in distinct schools

The ideas of Whitehead had a much wider influence than people under his direct tutelage. This can be seen in academic theses (that of Charles Hartshorne being of note) and published works in America and other countries from the 1930’s up to and including the 1960’s and 70’s. In order to follow what these scholars have offered, it is necessary to describe their specific bibliographies. The schools in Chicago and Claremont, CA. The profound influence that Whitehead and Hartshorne had over the theology professors in the Divinity School of the University of Chicago is one of the decisive factors that confirmed the prestige of the philosophy-theology of process in America. Nevertheless, the Chicago school already existed, even before Whitehead’s arrival at Harvard. It PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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was in 1926 when Henry Wieman, in Chicago, began to become interested in Whitehead. Wieman’s identification with Whitehead was complete throughout many published works until 1958. Daniel Day Williams also followed the theology of process; but it was Bernard Loomer who was most influenced in this way. Bernard Meland and Schubert M. Orden who also contributed to the theology of process in Chicago through many works (Christ without Myth, 1961; The Reality of God, 1966) created some extremely interesting ideas under the direct influence of Charles Hartshorne who consequently participated in the theological movement of the Divinity School. It is also worth mentioning another of the most important students in Chicago, John B. Cobb, Jr., who soon went to California to spread processual ideas. It was California —the School of Theology at Claremont University— that ended up assuming the forefront in America of processual thinking. The founding of the Centre for Process Studies in Claremont gained stature, in effect, in 1973 because of the work of John B. Cobb and David Ray Griffin. Later on, Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, Mary Elisabeth Moore y Philip Clayton came to be co-directors. The founding of the journal Process Studies was in 1971 and was edited by Lewis S. Ford and co-edited by the same John B. Cobb, Jr. An open field of productive discussion. Here we have presented a short revision of some of the extremes regarding the genesis and evolution of the process philosophy and theology (not meant to replace revisions or bibliographies that are more specialized) for one reason: to open an understandable perspective of how the true dimension, from its beginnings with the arrival of Whitehead at Harvard and his encounter with Hartshorne, has achieved and influence that has encompassed the last two thirds of the 20th century and continues on our times. When one considers the themes that the philosophy-theology of process deals with, its relevance cannot be denied. It has dealt with the new «metaphysical ontology» that could reconcile Christianity with modern science; it has dealt with the revision of Christianity in order to adapt it to the present culture and make it understandable to modern man; it has dealt with important theological questions such as the problem of Evil and human suffering; it has tried to represent the Christian God through a renewed theodicy that is congruent with the modern world; it has dealt with the problem of divine limitation or selflimitation and of divine kenosis; and it has also reconsidered innumerable moral questions. All of this is encapsulated in a theology that is theistic, Christian and centred on religion. Catholic theology, in its time during the 1970’s, took the interpretation and discussion of the theology of secularization seriously. However, it was always reluctant (more in Europe than in America) to undertake a profound dialogue with the process theology. We are aware that many of the affirmations of the theology of process enter into conflict with the basic principles, not only of the Catholic Church, but also other Christian denominations such as the Church of England. Despite this, a greater interest in the process philosophy and theology PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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would have enriched many of the contents of the philosophy and theology of modern Christianity 2.

2.

THE

METAPHYSICS OF

ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

Whitehead began his career as a mathematician in order to enter, at a later point, into the field of physics and at last into metaphysics. It is in this last field where his ideas become densely cryptic; perhaps not so much for his ideas (which, in the end, are understandable) as for his style, his terminology, a certain degree of disorganization in his presentation and his inability to be understood clearly. In this article, we are not looking for a new review of his metaphysics. Rather, our intention is to present an evaluation and discussion that is oriented towards what we feel is important: the discussion of his cosmology and theology of kenosis. However, in order to do this we need to make our points of view fit in with a line of thought that makes reference to his metaphysics and philosophy of religion (a reference that is perhaps more necessary for the reader that is not used to following an author as difficult as Whitehead is to read). 2.1)

Whiteheads view of metaphysics

Mathematics and physics: the image of the world in science. For a large part of Whiteheads life, he was centred exclusively on the study of science. His dedication to metaphysics came later: it began to develop in the 1920’s and reached its zenith with his arrival in America as a professor of philosophy at Harvard and the publication of his two fundamental books (Science and Modern World, SMW, 1925, y Process and Reality, PR, 1929). It is clear that when he began with metaphysics, he already had the image of the modern world in his 2 From the variety of cited authors and schools, we see that process philosophy-theology is much more than the literal interpretation that Whithead gives it. It is actually a philosophicotheological school of thought constituted by various authors united by common principles, but who differ in terms of the significant influence of their personalities. Hartshorne, Cobb, Vanstone and Griffin are the principal personalities of this school. Process philosophy-theology has three strong points: 1) Seeking to be in harmony with modern science by means of an evolutive metaphysics of process grounded on Whithead. 2) Explaining the problem of evil by admitting the limitation of divine power and omniscience, thus liberating God from the moral responsibility of not being a «responsible creator» and considering him rather as a «companion who contributes to controlling and overcoming evil». Whitehead also considered God as such, but his ideas about it were not fully developed. 3) Presenting moral principles founded on a «naturalist enthusiasm» inserted in the experience of life as something positive, thus overcoming some Christian groups’ morals that are rigid and in some manner «quasi-manichean». Whitehead did not contribute much to this last point, unlike later authors like Cobb or Griffin. Aside from these three points, we also consider as significant Whitehead’s contributions to the theology of kenosis, which we will discuss after presenting his thought. One can say that, in the course of the 20th century, the theology of kenosis has found in process theology one of its principal supports.


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mind. What’s more, it gives the impression that the critical factor that causes him to crossover into metaphysics is the idea that science had turned traditional metaphysics head over heals and that is was necessary to create an new metaphysics that was congruent with it. It was is his 1925 work (SMW) that he says that science demands a transformation of the world in order to make it «modern»: it is science that makes the world modern requiring both a metaphysics and religion that are «modern». In SMW, he presents the scientific image that conditions the philosophy of Whitehead. One should keep in mind that the «matrix mechanics» of Heisenberg and the «wave mechanics» of Schrödinger are formulated between 1924 and 1925, the same time as this work. Upon writing PR in the following years, until 1929, he had time to follow the deliberation of quantum mechanics during his most creative years: it was however still a preliminary period when, for example, they only new of the existence of the proton and electron (the existence of the neutron was not even experimentally proven). Nevertheless, upon reading chapter VIII of SMW about quantum mechanics (throughout the history of the development of scientific concepts analyzed in previous chapters) we understand that, for Whitehead, it was enough, given that science had worked well enough up until 1925 to reach a precise intuition about the nature of the physical world that would be confirmed in the future development of science up until present times. Physical reality (SMW, chapter VIII) consisted of a corpuscular material that was made up from individuality, discontinuity, distance and interactions between things (that could be described by mechanics); but this corpuscular matter was at the same time a wave (that demanded a field physics in the framework of physical continuity). Primordial microphysical events (e.g. the electron in its quantum orbit) could not be attributed to a stable temporal identity. Nevertheless, the flow of microphysical events constituted and gave certain stability in time to macrophysical objects. These objects were nevertheless open, in their interior, to continual development and transformation. For Whitehead, it was obvious that the physics of the beginnings of the 20th century describes a world in «flux» with unstable events that interacted with each other by way of physical prehensions in order to construct real entities in the same way that societies of organized events dynamically transformed a continuous process. Metaphysics. The 19th century had introduced a perspective that was radically new to the understanding of the world: the evolutionary point of view. Classical metaphysics and philosophy (up until Kant) responded to the world in a «constructed» state; evolution, in turn, imposed the view of a dynamic world continually in process. To understand the general properties of this new world described by science, the «first philosophy»: graeco-scholastic or cartesianmechanistic metaphysics was not enough. Many thinkers noticed this trend. Because of this, the philosophy of the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries was full of attempts to create a new metaphysics; the metaphysics of a new image of the world born out of science. One of the trends of this new philosophy was made up of vitalism. In effect, the world up until this point was PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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understood from the point of view of a static, dualist graeco-scholastic philosophy or from the scientific paradigm of the machine (cartesian mechanicism). It was urgent to build an understanding of the world from an organic paradigm of life in evolution. This gestating virtalism was present throughout Europe, mainly in France and Germany but was also an essential ingredient of the so-called North American pragmatism. Whitehead therefore formed part of a movement of the times that was clearly following the trend of «vitalism». We do not believe, as it is sometimes said, that authors such as Santayana, Spengler o Ralph Waldo Emerson influenced him significantly. Nevertheless, we are convinced that authors such as Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and above all the French philosopher Henri Bergson did have a large influence on his work. When Whitehead arrived at philosophical maturity, Bergson already had published his great works and had international fame. It is most probable that Whitehead knew him and was inspired by him. We believe this to be true (as it can be seen by Whitehead’s frequent mention of Bergsonian metaphysics in SMW). But why study metaphysics at all? Whitehead understood, in effect, that human understanding is always constructed from some metaphysical framework. Science was concrete, quantative and precise, although limited in its analysis. However, science is based on the presupposition of many (metaphysical) ideas that are anchored in ordinary understanding (these days it would be called «ordinary metalanguage»). Scientist always take on their work, understanding (and using) a natural grouping of concepts that pertain to their «primal or first philosophy» or metaphysics: the talk of objects, essence (what objects are made of), distance, cause, effect, time, properties, qualities, sensations etc. This group of metaphysical concepts were regulated by classical philosophy, by the scholastics, and through a long influence, for many centuries, by Christianity. It was the metaphysics that had reached the ordinary understanding of the people and the scientists. Because of this, a new metaphysics was necessary. There was a need for a new general conceptual framework that more precisely allowed for the explanation of both ordinary human experience and the new scientific image of the world. Bergson, in effect, clearly tried to tackle the construction of a metaphysics derived from the new image of a work based in science; he wanted to do so based on a dynamic idea of «life» and «evolution». Whitehead also saw the necessity to construct this new metaphysics, revising bergsonian thought, giving it more precision, adjusting it to fit in better with science, taking out the more lyrical passages and formulating a new terminology that was less poetic and more technical, although much more «cryptic». In place of «life», Whitehead used the concept of organism and he talks about an «organicist» philosophy. To sum up, Bergson as much as Whitehead, at least for our understanding, move within the same vitalist-processural intuition that responds clearly to the feeling of belonging to a specific time in history. The Spanish philosopher Xavier Zubiri (1898-1983) also felt the need for a new metaphysics or a «first philosophy» and also constructed his own proposal. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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The method: intuition and experience

Method. So, now, how is metaphysics constructed? There are two different questions: how a normal person would create it (where does an intuitive metaphysics come from) and how a philosopher would create it. Science is created through effort that is rational, organized systematic and quantative. Metaphysics, however, cannot be constructed like that. Bergson said that metaphysics was the fruit of «intuition»: it was an intuition of the profound nature of vital movement by way of immediate experience. It is intuition that perceives life as duration of a continuous future (in a similar way to William James’ «current of conscience»). Whitehead also thought that metaphysics was born out of intuition. However, he thought it was an intuition based on experience. Alix Parmentier 3 has convincingly systematized his metaphysics and his defence of an intuitive access to it through experience; he has even studied the description of those contents of immediate experience that Whitehead considered essential for gaining access to metaphysics (Parmentier, o.c., 141ss). Human experience is one form of prehension; man has an «apprehension perspective of the world», and feels a part of the world because of this prehension that anchors it in a world that transcends his own existence (Adventures of Ideas, AI, 1933, 293). Going up against the conventional abstractions of the epistemology in use at the time, in order to express the concrete fact of experience and prehension, Whitehead uses the term feeling which has the merit of implying the double meaning of «subjective form» and «apprehension of an object» avoiding the disjecta membra that comes out of abstraction. It will be seen that this sentient-apprehension, when it is seen as understanding, is not limited to the use of the five senses. Whitehead tells us that the living organ of experience is «the living body in its entirety», being itself continuous with the rest of nature (AI, 1933, 290; Parmentier, 160). Experience is not arrived at through «data» (as is said in modern epistemology) but rather through sentient-prehensions that unifies the body at one with nature. What, then, is the bodily experience that is at the base of human existence and of metaphysics? Whitehead specifies that: a) it is the experience of the insertion of our body into a nature that is forms part of; b) it is the experience of our bodily unit; c) finally, it is the experience of the fine coordination between our bodies and its experiences, in the sense that we understand «as a unifying function of a plurality of things that are distinct from ourselves» (Science and Modern World, SMW, 1926, 210, referenced by Parmentier). This unity with the world as a functional dimension of our own bodies is for us, the fundamental experience 4. 3 PARMENTIER, ALIX, La Philosophie de Whitehead et le Probleme de Dieu, Bibliotèque des Archives de Philosophie, Beauchesne, Paris, 1968. We think this is one of the books whose 645 pages offer a broad, profound, and correct presentation of Whitehead’s synthetic vision. 4 Whitehead’s phenomenology of psychic experience presents extraordinarily interesting features: the unity of consciousness and a holistic experience connecting the experience of one’s body to an external field of reality. In this way, his «sentient» focus, also emphasized correctly by Parmentier, also has clear similarities with the «sentient» philosophy of X. Zubiri and, generally, with the importance of sensation and emotion in modern neurology (cf. Damasio).


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Objectivist realism. Whitehead claims that humanity has a fundamental intuition that is present in the daily life of everyone and that the poetry of romanticism strongly claims this intuition, as it is explained in the commentaries of Wordsworth and Shelly (CMM, chapter V). In this way, natural experience is not the result of the subject’s cognitive actions. Our body is the «organism» whose state regulates our «sentient» knowledge of the world. Whitehead defines perceptual knowledge as the conscience of prehensive unification that connects us to the world through sensation. This functioning of our senses in determined spatial places reveals to our awareness, as said by Whitehead, some aspects of a distant medium. This therefore, produces the knowledge of the existence of things «beyond us». If this awareness transmits knowledge of a transcendent world, it must be because the bodily event unifies, in and of itself, these aspects of the universe (SMW, 128-129, referenced by Parmentier). It then gives the impression that for Whitehead, experience is not the world represented in the mind (created by subjective actions) but rather that the objective reality of the external world is felt directly in itself. In experience, man perceives sensory «fields» open for the subject to organically integrate prehensions in an external world that he is a part of. The intuition of Whitehead is therefore gibsonian 5. From intuition to metaphysics. Metaphysics is thus reached by way of intuition. It comes from experience as from the perception of ones own body in an objective world that is organically open. Nevertheless, while philosophy is based on «intuitive experience», it is something more: it is a rational and reflective construction of general concepts that refer to reality that are applied to the understanding of all concrete situations; in addition, they give meaning to precise and particular knowledge whether it is in daily life or in the sciences. Metaphysics can be arrived at «intuitively» but it is not formulated without rational and philosophical reflection. Metaphysics, for Whitehead, is an abstraction that tries to create universal concepts that are general and cover all possible manifestation of reality. Natural man approaches his life from a metaphysical «background», but this is also done by scientists by constructing science on top of reality. Whitehead’s metaphysics did not come about like a passing emotion accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction: it was created during hours and hours of reflection, formulation adjustment and correction of concepts. In this rational reflection, without doubt, four factors, that cannot be forgotten, were present: first, intuition based on experience, of the organic self in the world (in this sense, it is true that metaphysics is born out of experiential intuition); second, his knowledge of the surprising scientific image of the world in the beginning years of quantum mechanics; third, his knowledge of the authors that were trying to 5 The connections with James J. Gibson and his theory concerning direct experience and ecological optics are also clear. Whitehead’s «holistic» thought is along the same line, and expressed by concepts such as «occasion for experience», prehension, concrescence, and the like. Whitehead’s holism is not only physical, but is simultaneously psycho-bio-physical. Evolution is a holistic process culminating in man.


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formulate the general concepts of a new metaphysics that integrated this «experiential intuition» with modern science (we can recall vitalism, Bergson, Pierce or James); fourth, his original elaboration of a system of concepts that allowed the integration of all of our ordinary, religious and scientific experiences in a unified metaphysical system. Whitehead knew that scientific knowledge had changed drastically in the 19th and th 20 centuries. Because of this, he searched for a new metaphysics that overcame the static nature of graeco-scholastic philosophy as well as the mechanistic nature of Cartesian perspectives. In SMW (chapter IX) the reconstructs the role philosophy has played in the last centuries up until, in his time, there is a need to have a vitalist and «organicist» metaphysics (here we can cite Bergson). Whitehead wants to contribute to the formulation of this new metaphysics in order to help the modern world in its intellectual education and creativity, integrating experiential intuition and science. Without being constructed or taught, this metaphysics could not serve its function of education the creativity of modern man (SMW, chapter XIII). 2.3)

Basic metaphysics

It would be necessary to systematize the, more radical, fundamental metaphysical concepts that permit the understanding of the real world, both for the natural person and the scientist. It is clear that the metaphysical concepts created by Whitehead looked to be congruent with the image of the real world in science. Actual entities. This is, without a doubt, Whiteheads basic concept, although it does cove a wide range of existing realities. This actual entity is organized in a tree, an elemental particle and also God. Despite this, an entity as a tree, for example, is real because of a complex association of a large number of more basic entities. In scientific terms, we would say (and this is what Whitehead had in mind) that all objects are the result of the interactions between multitudes of microphysical events. In this way, the first entities would be the primordial microphysical events, the basis of more complex entities (that Whitehead called «societies» or «nexus»). There exists, therefore, degrees in the actual entities: those that can be found in «empty space»; those that are found in stable objects that are not alive; and finally, those that are found as moments of stable objects with conscious awareness. Throughout his work, however, we find an evolution in terms that refers to, one way or another, the same concept of «actual entities» (actual event, actual occasion, occasion of experience, actuality, res verae, etc.); this absence of terminological unity is another reason it is difficult to understand how Whitehead is thinking. Whitehead establishes some principles that clarify how to understand reality from «actual entities». The «ontological principle» affirms that everything that is real is always produced by actual entities; it is produced by the entity, from the ente, from something that exists. Furthermore, there are multiple existent entities and they come from their own existence to interact amongst themselves in multiplicities: the universe can be understood PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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as solidarity of actual entities. This is what is formulated in the beginning of relativity (or, we should say, «out of reference» or using a zurbirian term, «out of respectivity»). This actuality of the entities is also presented as «dynamic», as active existence, like a process. Therefore, the principle of process tells us that actual entities are not static but in process. All entities are open to «possibility» or «potential» for their dynamic processual evolution in solidarity with other entities. For Whitehead, all actual entity is a process of experience that is constructed through its relationship with other entities: this solidarity is always «sensed». Whitehead calls this the reformed subjective principal: the elements that the universe is constructed out of are discovered in this sentient subjective experience. It is experience that, in effect, «senses» the human subject in its connection with the world and it is experience that Whitehead universally attributes to all processes of relationship between other entities and themselves, including those that are the most primordial. There are no actual entities that are lacking in some degree of «subjective experience». This principle can be seen in the universal Whiteheadian panpsychism and holism that ends in man. Eternal objects. For Whitehead, entities can be actual (real things that exist) or ideal (pure forms that do not exist but are able to define existent realities). These ideal entities are known as «eternal objects». They define a realm of possibilities, of conditional potentials of existent reality and therefore of actual entities and their dynamic processes of association in their complex evolution. There is a terminological diversity that revolves around this concept: forms, ideal identities, abstract entities, universals, potential forms, etc. Man comes to know eternal objects by experiencing them in action through actual entities or by conceiving of them abstractly, discovering pure formal potentialities that could perhaps be realized in the real processes of actual entities. Whitehead formulated his «metaphysics of forms» in his theory of eternal objects: the abstract world of pure forms accessed via experience of the real world. It is, at its root, his metaphysics of the formal sciences and above all mathematics, which is an essential part of modern science; but not only mathematics because for him «blackness» or «colour» are abstract forms that may or may not be manifested in the world. Eternal objects do not, by themselves, form a harmonic world but rather a multiplicity of potentials that may or may not have an effect in the real world. Concrescence. A genetic study of actual entities tells us that they are the result of the process of «concrescence». This term comes from the vocabulary of biology: it is the union and the growing together of parts that were originally separate. It is the constitution of unity in the universe of multiple things until the final result of a new unitary entity. The evolutionary process of the universe has been a process of concrescence because the original actual entities are dynamic and produce a process that is made up of continual relationships between entities. This is therefore a natural result of processural nature and «solidarity» (respective) of the actual entities that make up the primordial nature. Concrescence, for PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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Whitehead, is an open process without limit in which all the entities of the universe are set out in a unitary process of growing convergence. The universe is then a unitary all. This is where the individuality of classical metaphysics breaks down and where every entity «lives» its connection with the unity of all and produces its effects over it. This is how Whitehead’s own «organic» (vitalist) metaphysics manifests itself. Prehension. Concrescence describes a genetic process in which multiple things in the universe organically «unify». «Prehension» is a term that describes the activity of each of the actual entities when they make a concretion or unit with other entities. The unity of the universe is constructed by way of the «prehension» of entities upon others. It is the active essence of the actual entity: to be dynamic in a process that configures the concrescent unit with other entities. A) The process of the union of entities to others or «prehension» is on one hand physical, given that it makes up a relational union between diverse actual entities. B) On the other hand, it is also an «occasion of experience»; that is to say, a «pulsation of actuality» (a term probably inspired by William James) or a «drop of experience». Therefore, for Whitehead, by attributing everything to prehension, including the most primordial and primitive actual entities, the quality of «experience» continues to move within an evident panpsychist concept. This «prehensive» dynamics as an «occasion or event of experience» is a necessary metaphysical consideration for a unitary vision of the universe. Without it, a metaphysics that understood the harmony between human and animal life as «processes of experience» open to the universe as a unitarily lived environment (in the style of Gibson) would not be possible. Terminal psychic experience is possible because actual entities are always produced (a radice) by a «germinal occasion or event of experience». Representative apprehension and feeling. Nevertheless, the «occasion of experience», attributed by Whitehead to all actual entities in their prehensive dynamic, should not be confused with given and eventual representative and cognitive apprehension in the higher animal and of course in the human world. The general concept of prehension does not include, therefore, consciousness, thought or knowledge (nor the «psychic subject» derived of these). Knowledge can be thought of as a higher «a-prehension» or «con-prehension « that unifies complex groups of actual entities that mutually imply and modify one another. However, the perception of knowledge is founded in the germinal primordial «prehensive unification»; it is already perceptive, a «complex occasion of experience». So, for Whitehead, all knowledge is formed in a «non-cognitive» prehension united with the primordial actual entities. Prehension is «to sense» sensation. It is the operation by which the prehended produces and effect in the subjectivity of the actual entity. Experience, which is the same as sensing, is likewise a state of «affective tonality» (to notice) produced for what is prehended (object or data) in the actual entity that prehends (active subject of concrescence). Whitehead therefore is not Kantian: it is not the subject that constitutes experience but rather the experience (sensation) that constitutes PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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(a posteriori, dynamic, through evolution, through concrescence) actual entities as subjects. Therefore, if prehension always implies «sensation», the knowledge built on top of complex groupings of previous prehensions is always knowledge built from sensation. It is always in some way, a representative knowledge or apprehension that is «sensitive» or «sentient» (this is also what X. Zubiri thinks). The organic prehension of the universe. The actual entity is dynamic and creator, by way of concrescence, of the unity of the universe. But this unity is organic, systematic and open to the whole universe; and in this sense, it not individually isolated, closed, localizable in a simple way in time or space apart from everything. Prehension refers an actual entity to other places and other times. The experience or sensation of this prehensive entity is the experience of space and of time. Because of this, the experience or sensation of spatial distance or the reference to the past or future, overflowing the non-organic singular here and now, are produced by the fact that the actual entities are bound to the whole universe by prehension. An actual entity, be it man or animal, from its senses, is open to the sensation of the existent outside world; and this can only be explained by the fact that the animal or human body is open, or prehensively unifies in itself the different contents or environments of the universe. Whitehead describes this (in SMW, chapter V) appealing to the experience of the romantic poets and their integrating experience of outdoor space, as we have previously mentioned. Factors of the structure of prehension: the physical and mental spectrum. Prehension is therefore the essential process of the universe. Concrescence up until its integration and growing unity are produced by it. Whitehead indicates that there are three things in all prehension: a) the subject or actual entity which is doing the prehension, b) the data or content (another actual entity) that is being prehended and lastly c) the subjective form (sensation) given in the prehensive assimilation (physical) of the data on the part of the subject. These three factors must also refer to the prehension that the subject performs on eternal objects, whose content is specifically prehended and the feeling that this assimilation (here only conceptual) produces. It is here in his metaphysics where Whitehead distinguishes between the «physical pole» and the «mental pole» of the concrescence of the prehensions. But the conceptual feelers and the eternal objects are the mental pole at the same time. So, the human dynamic of concrescence is open to a physical pole and a mental pole.

3.

THE

THEISTIC METAPHYSICS OF

WHITEHEAD

The «original metaphysics» of Whitehead has always been theistic, at least since he introduced the idea of God, for the first time, in his system (in SMW, 1925). The fact is, he considered God as an essential element that could not be substituted, in the coherence of his metaphysical image of the physical world. He does not try to «religiously» apply the concept of God, but rather presents it as a PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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coherent metaphysical element (rational and ultimately, even physical) of the universe. Without God, the coherence of the «basic metaphysics» shown in the previous point could not be maintained. As God was necessary for the Aristotelian system, Whitehead considered that is was necessary for his metaphysics as well. The truth is, however, that it is not always easy to admit —or even consider permissible— what Whitehead, as we will see, says about God. 3.1)

Arguments for a theistic metaphysics

God as a coherent factor of metaphysics. The metaphysics espoused here is a response to the image of science (the quantum image that Whitehead had in 1925) but also responds the «vitalist» intuition (Bergson) of the universe in process that produces the «psychic experience» because it is part of its ontological basis. Up to this point, everything is permissible. Why introduce in this the real presence of a divine being? In Aristotle, in scholastic writings or in any other classical philosophy, it was always necessary to have an argument that justified the introduction of theistic elements. In Whitehead, we also clearly find, in all its detail, arguments that justify his theism. The first argument is based on the «ontological principal». Actual events are always the origin of what exists: everything that exists necessarily derives itself from real entities. However, these entities are by their own nature limited: they are what they are and they cannot be more than what they are by their own nature (ontological principle). Nevertheless, nature as a process is continual springing forth of new things by way of prehensions and concrescence; in this springing forth, there is a configuration of a surplus of being that goes beyond the being of the entities that which prehension is made up of. Because of this, in the evolutionary process of the general potentiality of the universe, its creative rise towards newness must be founded in a special non-temporal actual entity that is always given as the ontological base of the universe. This is what Whitehead calls God. Nothing can come from non-being to be introduced in the actual world: God is the fundamental actual entity that gives birth to the (ontological) potentiality of the universal process. The second argument that Whitehead puts forth is also related with the «ontological principle», although now it refers to eternal objects. These are by nature of their pure potentiality, abstract forms without realization and without relation to actual entities; above all if we pay attention to their most germinal and primogenital forms. Nonetheless, eternal objects have been made by way of an evolutionary process: how could they then have entered into the creative process of actual entities? Whitehead responds to that by saying God is precisely the mediation between the potential (eternal objects) and the actual (its actualization in the world as a concrescent process). The existence of God as the ontological basis of the world therefore explains that the eternal objects have in God, as an eternal actual entity, an ideal, representative conceptual actuality. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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God is the guide of the realization of the «eternal objects» (formal) in the concrescence of the actual entities 6. God is, therefore, that fundamental entity that allows for the transformation from potentiality to actuality, including ontological potentiality (the first argument) or as formal potentiality, eternal objects (second argument). God as the foundation of the possible transformation of formal potentiality into actuality appears to us as «primordial nature» (like for example the «mental pole» of God). At the same time, considered as the foundation of the produced transformation form ontological potentiality to physical actuality in time, we would be referring to the «consequent nature of God» (its «physical pole»). According to the conception of Whitehead, God is eternal like the world (reality is finite and limited but lacks a beginning and an end). However, God does not form part of the world because its fundamental functions are always alleged to be the «ontological basis of the world»; a «ground» where actual entities assume their temporal role. God is, in this sense, above time or in a nontemporal condition that makes the space-time of the world possible by way of its formal and ontological being. God is the foundation of the world without being a part of it. God as an unexplained but necessary explanation. The world of actual entities, in the «first metaphysics» of Whitehead, is insufficient to explain «what they have produced by themselves» in the process of concrescence in the history of the universe. They are insufficient and need to have reference to a fundamental basis, understood to be God, which contains, representatively, the universe of formal possibilities (mental pole) and ontologically, the universe of the physical possibilities of concrescence in the enriching evolution of the universe (physical pole). Therefore Whitehead thinks in a similar way to traditional theist philosophy: the world is insufficient to give reason to itself and it is necessary to postulate the existence of God as the basis of being. To metaphysically conceive of the world and go toward its ultimate fundamental roots, we arrive at the ultimate limitation, which is God. There is nothing beyond that limit; it is the last thing, ontologically stable and without time which confers to the world a basis. This 6 Note that Whitehead’s arguments are worthy of attention. The first is congruent with something that modern physics has noticed from many perspectives. Quantic flow —the appearance and disappearance of particles— assumes an ontological background as reference, which is currently called «quantic vacuum». Whitehead understands this «ontological background» as necessary, and identifies it with divine reality; in contrast, modern science limits itself to the hypothesis about an impersonal background from the fluctuations of which emerges reality. Whitehead’s presupposition that God is the «ontological background» is also justified because the organization of the world in its concrescence process should be regulated by «eternal objects» that could only be in «God’s mind». With the same presupposition, modern science sees things differently: It is the nature itself of matter that, according to its ontological properties, blindly determines the rational structure which gradually, through an evolutive Darwinian process, shapes the complex structure of the world. Modern science thus explains the process as autonomous: God or a «soul of the world» that guides the natural process is not necessary for science. We will refer to these extremes later.


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basis, God, is the beginning of determination and the concrete nature of nature but is not in itself derived from anything. It is «the last» in the sense that it is necessary to postulate metaphysically of an entity that is the basis for and determines unstable events without itself being founded or determined. We refer to God as being «necessary»; as the necessary principle to base the world (the real and the formal). God is, then, the fundamental explanatory factor. Nevertheless, at the same time, God is not a possible as a rational explanatory object. It is the ultimate irrationality that rationally explains the universe. In a famous quote from the last page of chapter eleven of SMW, we are told in a slightly cryptic way: God is the ultimate limitation, and His existence is the ultimate irrationality… God is not concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality. No reason can be given for the nature of God, because that nature is the ground of rationality (SMW, cap. XI). How can we understand what «divine irrationality» means? My personal interpretation is the following: The world, in the previous sense, is not self sufficient or absolute: it must be based on an entity that is neither concrete or determinable from a subsequent dimension: it must be the last, the ontological basis, sufficient and non-temporal: we can infer that it is the basis and we can attribute to it necessity (the necessary permanence in being once we know that it exists). However, this entity that is the basis for the rationality of the world is not, in turn by itself rational because we cannot explain it. We know that God exists but not how or why. We cannot speak rationally about the ultimate limit. We cannot say, for example, that God is that whose essence is to necessarily exist; we do not know what God is like or what its essence is. The world, for Whitehead tells us that god should exist and as the basis for being we consider it necessary. But if the world does not bring us to God but rather to another explanatory entity (like for example, a pure world, without God), we should also postulate the need for that entity. Nevertheless, classical questions such as «why does something exist instead of nothing?» do not have a rational answer and belong to the last realm of the irrational (what we can not explain) of which Whitehead tries to explain 7. This is the interpretation that is also offered by Alix Parmentier. As can be seen from the following quote: «Whitehead, at the same time affirms the need 7 I emphasize in the text some considerations about the metaphysics of the natural mind that I deem important. 1) Human reason primarily seeks to explain empirical facts by situating them within a reference system considered as «sufficient», «self-sufficient», or «absolute» from the viewpoint of maintaining its own existence. 2) The attribution of necessity is produced in a second moment: whatever is established as «absolute» (pure world or God) should be considered as «necessary». 3) Thus, reason, in principle, could attribute necessity both to God and to a «pure world» without God. In our opinion, the principle of some schools of classical metaphysics is not acceptable, since it considers «necessity» as attributable only to God. These considerations are essential in order to understand that man, situated in the interior of an enigmatic universe, remains equally open to a «God-creator» hypothesis and to a «pure-worldwithout-God» hypothesis.


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for human intelligence to be guided, to establish the existence of God and the impossibility to find a way to form a concept (of God). We can metaphysically discover that God exists (and this is the ultimate requirement of human intelligence and its grandeur) but we cannot know what it is. We can know its existence but not its determination» (Parmentier, 491ss). He also observes that to put God as the beginning of necessary determination does not imply that we should give him a «reason»: it is the ultimate limitation, that it is not possible to give a reason it escapes all rationality that is on top of it and is able to explain it. From there, «God does not allow itself to be deduced» (Parmentier, 492) and it is the ultimate irrational that is necessary in order to confer rationality to the world. The primordial nature of God. The primordial nature of God is considered to be the basis of absolute universal potentiality. Nevertheless, as pure potentiality, God does not yet have any real physical entity; as a consequence, God does not have consciousness, it is unconscious. It is really difficult to see Whiteheads point of view. It is clear, if we think that God, although eternal and non-temporal, does not have identity apart from the world: it is realized through the actual identities that make concrete and real being and the formal possibilities based in the formal and ontological potentiality of divinity. The evolutionary process of the universe comes up through the basic potentialities that are sustained by divinity. The ontological rise, the new perfection in the creation of the eternal objects as well as the subjective aspiration (feeling) of all the actual entities make God (both ontologically and formally) the object of desire in the universal process. The consequent nature of god. It is not possible to understand Whitehead if God is attributed a «primordial nature» that maintains an existence at the margin of its «consequent nature». God eternally keeps primordial nature and consequent nature like an untiring base of the world. The distinction that a philosopher makes when describing the does not suppose a real distinction between them (God has never existed as pure primordial nature at the margin of its consequent nature). Enjuto Bernal 8 explains the nature of Whitehead’s God in similar terms to other authors (e.g. Alix Parmentier). «God created the world by way of his primordial nature, although we should not interpret create here in its classical sense: it is more akin to make possible. The continuing process of creation that is given in the temporal world, made possible by the principle of divine materialization, makes it possible to continue the enrichment of that phase of Divinity» (153). God then, from the perspective of eternity, is based on the actual entities in «concrescence»: only in them the transfer from potentiality to actuality is produced and God does not have an actual being apart from the world. This physical actualization of God is given through the world, in both actual entities and their process: it does not have another form of physical actualization and only in it does it come to make its formal and ontological potentialities concrete. 8

ENJUTO BERNAL, JORGE, La filosofía de Alfred North Whitehead, Tecnos, Madrid, 1967.


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These are made actual by way of the impulse that God offers to the process of the world. God therefore does not create the world: god and the world have always existed. However, the work of God brings the best out of the world and tries to act over it to make it perfect 9. Through this «consequent nature», God prehends each and every one of the actual entities. They are able to be distinguished because God is not another element in the world but rather its formal and ontological basis. God is a personal being, actualized from and by the actual entities. Whenever Whitehead speaks of God, it seems that he is talking about a personal being that somehow responds to what everyone calls God and gives meaning to religion. But its consequent nature is incomplete, new born and processual, actual and conscious, constant and eternal, without beginning or end; God is in «process» by way of the «process of the world». However, because of the process of the world, God is open to the potential realm of its primordial nature; potentiality that only by way of consequent nature makes god real and conscious as such. The «superjective» nature of God. Whitehead considers that the vision of the universe, in order for it to be congruent, attributes a pole of subjective experience or feeling to all actual entities. When we refer to lower actual entities, we cannot attribute to them the condition of being a psychic being (and a fortiori consciousness). However, they should possess a certain primordial feeling or experience. From this ontological condition of the actual entities, the complex psychic experience in biology and humanity can be derived. Whitehead is to some degree panpsychist. The experience is united with the physical construction of the actual entities and to the process of the prehensions that integrate one another in the universe’s unitary process of concrescence. A feeling of satisfaction, fruition or ontological enjoyment can be attributed to this experiential pole of «process». Because the process is a realization of ontological and formal potentialities that are founded by Divinity, the process is a «fruition» of Divinity. Life, whether it is known or not by the one living it, is a fruition of the divine. 9 In our opinion, the idea that God is not a creator and should be conceived as the «soul of the world», understood in a more or less platonic sense, is one of the principal weaknesses of Whitehead’s thought. 1) In the first place, such idea makes it difficult for traditional Christian theology, whether Catholic or Protestant, to accept his metaphysics. 2) Furthermore, this idea of God entails a mode of understanding divine kenosis that is basically insufficient. The divine limitation before the world is not a full «self-limitation» because it is imposed by a cosmos that is eternal like God and that imposes the constrictions (to which God is subject) of its own ontology. It is true that, for Whitehead, this God that is subject to the world seeks to relate with man not by imposition but by persuasion. But there is a manner of understanding kenosis that is richer than presenting the creation of an autonomous world that presupposes God’s absolute self-limitation before human freedom and history. In our opinion, which we will explain later, one should speak of an «epistemological kenosis» (the creation of an autonomous world where God creates freedom by not imposing himself on human knowing) rather than an «ontological kenosis» (which presupposes the real loss of God’s omnipotence and omniscience). The development of process philosophy-theology towards a new understanding of God and kenosis would be necessary for its full integration in the mainstream Christian Churches.


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Applying God to the subjective nature of the world, given that God makes it happen by way of its consequent nature in the «physical pole» of the actual entities, results in God taking on the global subjectivity present in the process of the world and creating it from that. This is, for Whitehead, the «superjective nature» of God. That in which Divinity takes on the fruition created in the totality of the process. With respect to whether God is one thing or another, rather than the base of all things, it can also be said that this divine feeling is integrated within the pure formal and ontological potentiality present in divinity; it is universal subjectivity physically constituted in the real process of the world and the opening to the horizon to the next enrichment by way of the process of concrescence. In this superjective nature of god, which opens everything and all has a real presence; all subjective individual experience is assumed or integrated. This is what happens with human beings and it is one of the ways to approach the problem of immortality from the perspective of Whitehead’s philosophy. Theistic metaphysics as an option for congruence. It is important to note that Whitehead constantly rejected the idea that his metaphysics could be something like the object of a «demonstration». It seems that Whitehead only attributed a certain proven value to the ontological argument (that which Hartshorne later gave so much importance) and even then, it was not so clear. So then, what value should we attribute to his «primary metaphysics»? One must admit that it is the work of reason and therefore should be presented as a rational option for congruence to fit into the world. Man intuits that the process that weighs him down responds to this metaphysical framework: it is congruent, rational and illuminating but it cannot be demonstrated. Because of this, we can say, in line with Whitehead, that it has even more value when man can freely place himself in this congruence. It is a congruence that is assumed but cannot be demonstrated. It is what happens with philosophical viewpoints given that demonstrations are things of science, and even then it is difficult. 3.2)

Religious metaphysics

Whitehead, in the context of metaphysical congruence, argues for an idea of God that is quite different from that of the Christian religion and theology (both for protestants and Catholics). Nevertheless, he does maintain the idea of a personal God similar to the idea of God in Christian theology. In fact his metaphysics is religious and based on the so-called Christian theology of process. Criticism of the religious idea of God in Christian theology. We can find in Whitehead, in effect, a recurring and radical critique of Christian theology (Parmentier, 447ss). This critique is based on two reasons: first, his connections with Greek philosophy; second, his connection with society in his times, referring socio-politically to an absolute monarchy (in the world of the Romans or in Mesopotamian despots). But, faced with this theology that induces a false idea of God, the modern world and processural metaphysics offer a distinct image of God. We will be able to see how closely Alix Parmentier will be able to explain it. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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The God that comes from the teachings of Christ is «instead of a Despot-God, a Loving God that works for love and persuasion. Instead of Motor-immobile, a Loving God that endures the suffering of the world. In place of a Moralistic God, a loving God that saved the present immediacy by way of constantly assuming it within its own harmony». «God is the Eros that communicates with every actual entity, freely and without imposing its subjective tendency, its finality and the ideal of its pure realization (primordial nature). God is that which receives the reaction of the physical world and transforms, upon accepting it, all suffering (consequent nature). God is that whose loving immanence penetrates the immediacy of all experience; the end of which his providence orders all, is an immediate fruition (superjective nature)» (Parmentier, 453-54). For Whitehead, the traditional Greco-roman Christian theology assumes the metaphysics of an absolute being that is all powerful and omniscient, the only source of all being, immutable, existing independently and indifferent before all relation with the world. This idea of God that has subsisted up till now must be substituted by the idea of a God of process, inside the bounds of time and space, that gives space for a better reinterpretation of the same Christianity; that is to say, of the teachings of Christ. Divine persuasion. The idea that God does not works upon the world in a coercive way but rather through persuasion, is a meaningful formulation of which Whitehead constantly repeated in the theology of process. This discovery makes him realize that God works by way of persuasion which is one of the greatest advancements in the history of religious thought; it is the advance that pretends to break away from the classical philosophy-theology of Christianity, which in its grand theological systems always worked within the framework of god as a dominator that always imposed by way of reason and moral order and as such constituted a coercive principle that dominated the lives of individuals. We can see this idea in many of his works, but above all others in Adventures of ideas. The continuous action of God is to move, from within, the concrescient opening of beings towards the achievement of their formal and ontological growth: it is an action that is persuasive, loving and gentle because it does not interfere with or put conditions on the freedom of movement of nature and only comes from itself, although under the impulse of a divine force that is persuasive and not coercive which tries to bring the world to better itself. The action of God is the victory of persuasion over force. This is the way of thought that introduced Whitehead to the philosophy of Plato, but he thought it should constitute one of the axes of the modern reform of religion. Evil and the divine limitation of omnipotence and omniscience. The God of Whitehead is not a creator: this is the type of God that belongs to classical Christianity and should be rejected. Whiteheads metaphysics does not have a divine being that lives transcendently apart from the world and that decides to «create» at a certain time. For Whitehead, the Christian God is the God-Foundation of a world that is understood as eternal. God and the world, the process, are what they are and he did not create them. He is, therefore, not responsible for the PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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process of the world. God is the foundation that makes the formal and ontological process possible and moves it forward towards good, towards the optimal. However, God is not the designer nor creator of process. God must abide by what is: he is not omnipotent to interfere, without limit, with process. God is only the ultimate limitation necessary and the beginning of the concrescence of process. What’s more, in the same way, he is not omniscient with respect to the final development of the process, given that it depends on itself and its own impulses and in ultimate terms, its freedom. The God of Whitehead is a God limited by the world, and in this sense, cannot be characterized as «self limited» given that he is not the creator of designer of his own limits. Evil, then, is inherent in the universe in the sense that disorder and disorientation of process can be derived from order, harmony and the good of process by way of its own autonomous and free dynamic. God, in some sense, suffers evil in the same way that actual entities do, by seeing the impulse towards good blocked. God, immersed in process (by way of its primordial, superjective and consequent nature) is not responsible for Evil but rather the fellow sufferer that understands, the faithful friend that suffers as we do, who accompanies us and who understands us. Whitehead as a religious thinker. The way in which God is, in effect, justified and described in Whitehead’s metaphysics can arouse doubts. There are doubts as to whether the God that is described is a personal being and also as to whether the personal life of man is individually saved in an afterlife. There is no doubt, however, as to what Whitehead believes with respect to congruence, within his system, of a personal God that assumes and saves for eternity the survival of all personal life. He is conscious of it being argued in a new form of religion, more appropriate for the modern world, but definitely a way of religion that assumes the original form of human religion that has always been and in all cultures. «Whatever Whitehead is —according to Parmentier— he is a religious thinker. There are three main reasons that we consider sufficient to make this claim. For him, the universe would not now how to exist without God (although God did not create it ex nihilo); without God, the reality that would exist would be unintelligible. A metaphysics without God would be contradictory. He has seen that the religious attitude was a fundamental dimension of man; a dimension without which man would not know how to be himself. He has seen that the essential part of religious attitude was adoration. Evidently, this adoration, for Whitehead, is not directed at a “creator” in the strong sense of the term; what’s left is nothing less than that man, for Whitehead, could not exist without God and that the recognition of this relationship is translated as adoration and the adoration of love. He has understood that the religious attitude was not intrinsic in metaphysics but rather that there not only could be but should be cooperation between religious intuition and speculative intelligence. Underlining this has nothing to do with wanting to assimilate Whitehead into Thomism or even into the teachings of Aristotle or wanting to make him a believer of orthodoxy. He would not even be allowed to his system of though into a church or the traditional philosophy of Catholicism» (Parmentier, 537). PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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CRITICAL

SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION FROM A PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL

PERSPECTIVE

The complex «adventure of ideas», proposed by Whitehead has been the object of enthusiastic evaluations —from these, the philosophy-theology of process was born— and negative critical judgements, as much from the perspective of classical protestant theology (for example the Church of England) as from catholic theology. However, before evaluating the theological aspects it is convenient to consider Whitehead from a purely scientific and philosophical perspective. 4.1)

The processualy autonomous universe of science

Whitehead’s «first metaphysics» or «basic metaphysics» is easily integrated into modern science: the world is presented as a complex structure of «actual events» that order themselves in physical, biological and human systems within the evolutionary process of the universe oriented towards unitary concrescence; science also respects (as does Whitehead, we believe) the margin of entropy and negantropy of the ascendant processes that empirical evidence must admit. The theistic science of Whitehead. Whitehead’s metaphysics is essentially theistic. Starting from the potentiality open in the formal and in the ontological, divine reality is postulated as a condition of possibility of this «universal potentiality». Thus, God is necessary: a metaphysics without God would not be viable because the universal process could not be given without a potential base, without a formal and ontological «founding force» (God). For Whitehead, it is the same science that explains the world that must be «theistic». It is true that Whitehead does not pretend to «demonstrate» or «impose» the existence of God but he defends that only a theistic «open hypothesis» towards the universe is truly able to be explained by the same science. Nevertheless, the norm in modern science is the explanation of the ontological and formal power of the universe away from theistic hypotheses. Science conceives of a universe that contains intrinsic principles (non theistic) that have their own explanation. Because of this, it is difficult for a «first metaphysics» that is congruent with modern science to be «theistic». Ontological sufficiency of the universe. It is evident that today we do not think that the universe is explained for a fixed number of particles that have existed since the beginning and that for blind interactions have produces the advance towards a higher natural order. The universe is today, on a microphysical level, that strange world described by quantum mechanics: with superposition, apparition, annihilation of particles, uncertainty, balance and electrodynamic interactions, strange fields, action at a distance, non local causation, quantum coherence and holistic phenomenon, etc. In this context, science has searched for an ontological base to refer to that acts like a profound stage from which the phenomenological scene of the empirical world is born. Before it was called PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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ether and today it might be called «quantum vacuum» (remember the concept of «implied order» in the heterodoxical philosophy of physics of David Bohm). This background field, that is purely physical and impersonal, this offers the ontological resources that are necessary for the evolution, apparition and disappearance of particles, order, novelty, creativity and ontological ascent of the universe. However, how is the universe born out of the primordial ontology of the universe? We can know things, but we do not know the last theory. String theory and superstrings are an example of the huge speculative effort of modern theoretical physics to conceive of the primordial properties of matter that —beyond the era of Plank— generate the universe and produce both quantum mechanics and classic relativist mechanics. Formal sufficiency of the universe. Modern science also explains why evolutionary processes have moulded complex formal structures (what Whitehead called «eternal objects»). The reasons that have driven their evolution in the way that science has shown depend on the very same ontology as that of matter. Matter, in effect, presents certain properties by default that are measureable as constants and variables that respond to certain values; from there, their progressive organization is born and the laws of this organization respond. The laws are, therefore, the description of the factual result of evolution: they are not a previous presupposition. In this way, matter has gone on producing forms that do not depend on a quasiplatonic world of «eternal objects» but rather they bud from the same dynamic of structural organization in function of their primordial properties. Form and structure is born from ontological material. However, man, because of reason (as it is explained in epistemology), being inspired by the structures that have already been produced, can imagine other possible forms and structures. This is how formal sciences are definitively born as products of the human mind; they do not reflect an intuition of eternal objects (in the platonic style of Whitehead) but rather they are an imaginative product constructed by human reason that is inspired by real structures. The evolutionary-processual sufficiency of the universe. In any case, modern science offers a description of the universe as a consistent and congruent system in itself like the structure of dynamic interactions in space and time. For modern science, it is very difficult to introduce God as an immediate and precise factor of intelligibility for the universe. To put God into the world is to put him in a secular context where science builds its explanations without the need for theism. 4.2)

Philosophical evaluation of Whitehead’s metaphysics

Classical Christian metaphysics. Recall how classical metaphysics was constructed based on Christian philosophy. For this, facts were always the world of experience, understood as a basis for argument. If something is real and exists, it should have a fundament for its being: that is to say, it should be based in something «sufficient» or more specifically «auto-sufficient» (it is enough in and PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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of itself) to be real and existent. The foundation of being should be «absolute», in the sense that it should not need external references to give «sufficient reason» for its own real self. «Necessity» should also be an attribute of this «absolute foundation of real being»: it should be real in the past, present and future, given that if in some moment is stops existing, it would not be possible to explain its movement from nothingness to real being. The expectation of an auto-sufficient and necessary foundation is not only part of classical (philosophical) metaphysics but also of scientific reasoning. This search, in effect, describes phenomenon and fits them inside structural systems in cause and effect interactions that are sufficient. If this sufficiency is not accounted for in certain real systems, it would then refer these systems to each other in order to reach more and more complex sufficient causal interaction systems (an atomic particle is in a molecule which is part of a physical or organic object… and so on leading up to the ultimate system of the universe). However, while looking for «sufficiency», science reached frontiers that, with their own methods, cannot keep on looking and end up being referred to by other arguments; for example philosophy. This is what happens in philosophical speculation of what happened before the big bang. Classical Christian metaphysics, according to this, is constructed with clarity: the real being does not have «sufficiency» as such (it is «contingent») and must infer existence from a foundation of being (given that it is contingent and must be founded in the being by something that is not part of the world). From there, Christian metaphysics postulates transcendent existence (which does not form part of the world but rather transcends it) of a «foundation of being» which is absolute and necessary and must produce the world through creation. In creation, only the existence of that which creates (God) is presupposed (with its own ontology). The rational argument to admit the existence of God is that this «being» can «found» the universe for creation. This is where the rational foundation to think of God in a specific way is: as personal, transcendent, omnipotent, omniscient, etc. If God wasn’t like that (for example, was not transcendent or personal), it could not be the «creative foundation». Whitehead’s metaphysics. Whitehead proposes a different analysis. In the first place, the world is not «contingent» in the previous sense. It is eternal and was not created nor can a beginning be attributed to it. It advances forward in an unprescribed way. The world is absolute and auto-sufficient. However, this absolute universe is not intelligible if the existence of God is not postulated. God is and essential explanatory element to found, as Whitehead said, both the ontological and formal potentiality in the universal process of concrescence. However, the God that Whitehead postulates is not the classical God of transcendence but rather a God that «forms part of the world». This God is something like the «soul of the world» or platonic Demiurge. It is the foundation of the universe and contributes essentially to this so that it is in effect what it is. God is something like an essential cog in the functional and evolutionary gears of the universe. Because of this, Whitehead said that his metaphysics needed God PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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in the same way that Aristotle needed the «unmoving motor». In reality, the God of Aristotle like that of Whitehead is a part of a universe that is eternal in itself. This theistic reasoning —distinct from that of classical Christianity— prompts certain considerations. These will follow below. Problems of Whitehead’s metaphysics. Classical metaphysics considers the world to be contingent; that is to say it is not sufficient, absolute nor necessary. In order to justify its point of view, Christian metaphysics has a modern dialogue with science. It takes into account facts like the origin of the universe, its development in time towards the future, its eventual consistency and stability as a system, the rationality of its design, etc. The universe does not seem to have in and of itself, as it is constructed, absoluteness or sufficiency. Because of this, it makes sense to place them in a transcendent reality in the universe. A reality that should have sufficiency, absoluteness and necessity, as well as the ability to found and produce the universe through creation attributed to it. This classical metaphysics therefore understands that God, as said by scholars, is not found in «secondary causes» but rather as the «primary cause»; this is when ultimate absoluteness and necessity are searched for within a proper philosophical, not only scientific, discourse. Because of this, the world is a system of coherent secondary causes that present a functional autonomy and sufficiency. The universe, once created, «works by itself»; without a God that needs to correct errors. In this way, classical «theistic» arguments float on the metaphysical edges of science. Whitehead in turn, does not question the world at this ultimate level of «primary causality» (in its absoluteness and necessity) given that the world is eternal: that is absolute and necessary. Whitehead’s problem is that of explaining the system of «secondary causes», because they do not seem to constitute a system that is sufficient but rather introduce the reference of God and an element of the world that contributes to what the world is from the inside. Here is an example to understand the idea better, although we are aware that is presents it in a simplified way. Consider a complex device (a computer, a car, etc.). Classical metaphysics does not question whether this device functions autonomously in a congruent and sufficient way, as it is presented here. It would question these things in ways that science could not answer: their undefined persistence in time, their origin, their ration design, etc., focusing on the problem of their ultimate absoluteness and necessity. In turn, Whitehead would take for granted that this device is absolute necessary and eternal in time. Because of this, he would not ultimately question the sufficiency of the world. Nevertheless, his argumentation would say that this device does not show an intelligible function if the existence of a God that forms part of its internal ontology is postulated. According to our image, God would be necessary for the functioning of the device whether it be a computer, a car or whatever. Whitehead’s way of thinking, according to my understanding, presents many difficulties. A) The first is that today, science shows its ability to explain how and why the universe has evolved from the initial properties of matter. Science PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), núm. 242

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constructs, in a continuous way without gaps, an explanation of the evolutionary process: of matter, of the universe, of life and of man. It is autonomous. It is not possible to introduce a «soul of the world» (God) as an explanative factor that forms part of the world. B) The second is, nevertheless, that although the process of evolution is autonomous, there are certain enigmas that persist and that science can not resolve with certainty: the origin of the universe in time, sufficiency, rational design, the causes of physical and biological order, anthropic design, the existence (or not) of multiple universes, the nature of «consciousness» and psychist, etc. However, these enigmas do not permit the argument for a «soul of the world» God (Whitehead) but rather a «transcendent foundation of being» God. This is to say, that the possible arguments for admitting the existence of God seem to more plausibly guide towards a transcendent God (in the classical sense) than towards a «soul of the world» God (in the sense of Whitehead). C) The third reason is that the explanatory autonomy of the universe, from the viewpoint of science, even allows the argumentation of an absolute autosufficiency (and as a consequence, necessity): therefore, the arguments in favour of a credible explanatory hypothesis of a «transcendent foundation of being» God does not eliminate the possibility that science constructs a credible atheist hypothesis, without a God, that can explain the enigmas of the universe. This would mean that the hypothesis of a «soul of the world» God (in Whitehead’s sense) would be even less credible from the perspective of science and philosophy.

5.

WHITEHEAD

FROM THE THEOLOGY OF KENOSIS

Assuming that God exists and is real, for both Catholic and Protestant Christian theology, it would be the «fundamental reality» and «origin of being» that transcends the universe and to which we attribute creation. Therefore, God would have created the universe that our reason understands (in science and philosophy). The universe, according to this, is presented as an enigmatic universe that (from the point of view of science and philosophy) permits arguments that make the atheist hypothesis, without God, credible (as well as being agnostic). Therefore, if god exists, it has created a universe in which his existence is not evident (given that atheism is possible). Therefore, God, the creator, has not «rationally» imposed its presence in the world (although there are arguments that make his existence rationally «credible»). Therefore God the creator has renounced the creation of a theocentric world, in which his existence is imposed by evidence: God has been hidden (kenosis) 10. 10 I defended many years ago the importance of a theology of kenosis as a means to rethink Christianity within a scientifically modern world. My article entitled Kenosis: Towards a New Theology of Science is found in Pensamiento, vol. 63, nº 238 («Science, Philosophy and Religion», Special Series, nº 1, 2007), pp. 637-658. The explanation of how I understand kenosis in this article can complement the comprehension of the value I give to the thought of Whitehead and his theology of kenosis.


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The theology of kenosis can be reconciled with the classical idea of God in Christianity. The real God should be thought of as omnipotent and omniscient (including the knowledge of the previsions of probabilistic, statistical, and chaotic development of an autonomous universe created in time). God should be understood as a foundation of the universe in the modern panentheistic sense (Arthur Peacocke). God created the autonomous universe that, from the point of view of human understanding, appears enigmatic and by which man should decide the path of his life by way of a free and personal commitment. The kenosis of God in creation is not «ontological» (because god never looses his omnipotence) but rather «epistemological» (because he creates an enigmatic world for human understanding). The Christian God is the God which trough kenosis (not having imposed its presence) creates a universe that makes human freedom possible. One of the things that Whitehead’s thinking has given has been the rethinking of kenosis and the auto-limitation of God in the world. God, insists Whitehead, does not seek to impose himself but rather seeks a relationship with man based in offering, friendship and persuasion. In addition, his idea of the union of the world with God has allowed for the presentation of a positive vision of morality, based on the enthusiasm of natural experience. God, for Whitehead, is also not responsible for Evil because he does not create the world; on the contrary, he is subject to the conditions established in the same world and tries to overcome it and guide it to perfection. Kenosis or divine auto-limitation, for Whitehead, is only partial because a large part of divine limitation is imposed by the nature of the eternal world (not created) of which God form a part. If we consider Whitehead from the point of view of his possible harmony with classical Christian theology (both catholic and protestant), the most important problem is the idea of a non-creator God, limited by a conditional and eternal universe. In our opinion, not only is it difficult to find a balance between this «soul of the world» God and science and philosophy but also with theology and the traditional religious experience. In our understanding, this is the crucial point that the theology of process must revise and develop (by trying to avoid, shall we say, being confined within its own «scholasticism»). If it develops, the theology of process would not only be compatible with traditional Christian theology but would mean an unquestionable enrichment for this theory both in the essential idea of Christianity as freedom and in substantial questions of moral theology and in theology related to Evil in personal life and in history. c/ Universidad Comillas, 7 28049 Madrid [email protected]

JAVIER MONSERRAT



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LOS ORÍGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA: SIMILITUDES Y DIFERENCIAS MARTÍN SEVILLA RODRÍGUEZ Universidad de Oviedo

RESUMEN: Comparando fuentes para la historia del primitivo materialismo indio y griego, el autor señala las similitudes y diferencias que pueden apreciarse dentro de las características generales de ambas tendencias filosóficas. PALABRAS CLAVE: filosofía india, filosofía griega, historia del materialismo, Ca¯rva¯ka, loka¯yatas, Aristipo de Cirene, Teodoro el Ateo, Epicuro.

The Origins of Materialism in India and Greece: Similarities and Differences ABSTRACT: Comparing sources for the history of primitive Indian and Greek materialism, the author indicates the similarities and differences that can be appreciated into the general characteristics of both philosophical tendences. KEY WORDS: indian philosophy, greek philosophy, history of materialism, Ca¯rva¯ka, loka¯yatas, Aristippos of Cyrene, Theodorus the Atheist, Epikurus.

1. Desgraciadamente, como fuentes para la historia del materialismo indio 1 no contamos más que con las referencias a su sistema en la crítica de sus adversarios filosóficos y religiosos, los diversos sistemas de la ortodoxia y heterodoxia hindú. De la obra básica o manual de la escuela materialista, el Br.haspatisu¯tra, sólo quedan algunos fragmentos reproducidos ocasionalmente. Ello dificulta notablemente la ‘reconstrucción’ de los rasgos de su pensamiento, ya que las diversas fuentes 2 no suelen ofrecer un panorama desapasionado de las características que pretenden criticar en sus adversarios materialistas 3. 1 FRAUWALLNER, E., History of Indian Philosophy, I (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1953 [first Indian edition, 1973]), 215-226; WARDER, A. K., A Course in Indian Philosophy (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1998), 32-39, 119-123; vid. SEVILLA RODRÍGUEZ, M., Los materialistas indios en el código de Manu: Pensamiento 60 (2004) 137-143; La etiología del materialista indio Ca¯rva¯ka en el Maha¯bha¯rata: Pensamiento 62 (2006) 321-328. El materialismo indio es conocido en los textos con el término sánscrito loka¯yata y a sus seguidores se les conoce como loka¯yatas o loka¯yatikas (¿‘dirigidos al mundo’: loka-a¯yata-?). Otro término con el que son conocidos es el de na¯stikas, ya que consideran que nada trascendente existe; na¯stika es un derivado nominal de na¯sti, contracción de na asti «no es, no existe». También se les denomina como ca¯rva¯kas por referencia a un primitivo fundador no divino de tal corriente de pensamiento, conocido como Ca¯rva¯ka (la letra c nota una africada palatal sorda, como el dígrafo ch en español, en la transcripción de la escritura devana¯garı¯). 2 Véase CHATTOPADHYAYA, D., Ca¯rva¯ka / Loka¯yata. An Anthology of Source Materials and Some Recent Studies (South Asia Books, New Delhi, 1994), para las fuentes. 3 Una de tales fuentes es la obra dramática Prabodhacandrodaya, de Kr.s.n.a Mis´ra, siglo XI, vid. NAMBIAR, S. K., Prabodhacandrodaya of Kr.s.n.a Mis´ra (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1971), 1, en la que los materialistas indios aparecen ridiculizados por el autor, tal como ocurre con



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M. SEVILLA, LOS ORÍGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA

Las primeras referencias a rasgos constituyentes esenciales del materialismo indio, como por ejemplo la opinión de que la conciencia o pensamiento radica en el cuerpo como constituido por elementos materiales y no en un yo o alma extracorpórea, aparecen ya puestas en boca de los ‘ásuras’ o demonios 4 en la Ch#ndogya Upani{ad, VIII,8, o en la Maitr#ya

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