Peacekeeping in the Middle East as an International Regime (Studies in International Relations)

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Studies in International Relations

Edited by

Charles MacDonald Florida International University

A Routledge Series

Studies in International Relations Charles MacDonald, General Editor Promoting Women’s Rights The Politics of Gender in the European Union Chrystalla A. Ellina Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity A Constructivist Approach Yücel Bozdağlioğlu Organizing the World The United States and Regional Cooperation in Asia and Europe Galia Press-Barnathan Human Rights in Cuba, El Salvador and Nicaragua A Sociological Perspective on Human Rights Abuse Mayra Gómez Negotiating the Arctic The Construction of an International Region E. C. H. Keskitalo The Common Fisheries Policy in the European Union A Study in Integrative and Distributive Bargaining Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt Malaysia and the Development Process Globalization, Knowledge Transfers and Postcolonial Dilemmas Vanessa C. M. Chio International Environmental Treaties and State Behavior Factors Influencing Cooperation Denise K. DeGarmo

Political Corruption in the Caribbean Basin Constructing a Theory to Combat Corruption Michael W. Collier International Election Monitoring, Sovereignty, and the Western Hemisphere Idea The Emergence of an International Norm Arturo Santa-Cruz Human Rights Treaties Considering Patterns of Participation, 1948–2000 Mark Sachleben A Global Union for Global Workers Collective Bargaining and Regulatory Politics in Maritime Shipping Nathan Lillie The United Nations and Democracy in Africa Labyrinths of Legitimacy Zoë Wilson Peacekeeping in the Middle East as an International Regime Kenneth R. Dombroski

Peacekeeping in the Middle East as an International Regime

Kenneth R. Dombroski

Routledge New York & London

Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 270 Madison Avenue New York, NY 10016

Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 2 Park Square Milton Park, Abingdon Oxon OX14 4RN

© 2007 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” International Standard Book Number‑10: 0‑415‑98105‑0 (Hardcover) International Standard Book Number‑13: 978‑0‑415‑98105‑7 (Hardcover) No part of this book may be reprinted, reproduced, transmitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without written permission from the publishers. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging‑in‑Publication Data Dombroski, Kenneth R. Peacekeeping in the Middle East as an international regime / Kenneth R. Dombroski. p. cm. ‑‑ (Studies in international relations) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN‑13: 978‑0‑415‑98105‑7 (alk. paper) 1. Arab‑Israeli conflict‑‑1993‑‑‑Peace. 2. Peace‑keeping‑‑Middle East‑‑International cooperation. 3. Peace‑keeping‑‑Middle East‑‑History. 4. Conflict management‑‑Middle East‑‑International cooperation. 5. Conflict managment‑‑Middle East‑‑History. I. Title. DS119.76.D66 2006 956.05‑‑dc22 Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at http://www.taylorandfrancis.com and the Routledge Web site at http://www.routledge‑ny.com ISBN 0-203-94436-4 Master e-book ISBN

2006025981

To the memory of those military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization who died in the service of peace in the Middle East.

Contents

List of Tables

ix

Glossary

xi

Preface

xiii

Introduction

1

Chapter One Peacekeeping as an International Regime

7

Chapter Two The Genesis of a Middle East Peacekeeping Regime

25

Chapter Three Establishing the Middle East Peacekeeping Regime

39

Chapter Four The Evolution of the Peacekeeping Regime during the Cold War

69

Chapter Five Peacekeeping in the New World Order, 1988–1994

99

Chapter Six Peacekeeping in the Middle East Reconsidered

121

Appendix A

139

vii

viii

Contents

Appendix B

141

Notes

143

Bibliography

171

Index

183

List of Tables

Table 1

Table 2

Summary of Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East Peacekeeping Regime

94

Israel’s Attitude toward the Middle East Peacekeeping Regime

126

Table 3

Evolution of the Middle East Peacekeeping Regime

132

Table 4

Effectiveness of the Middle East Peacekeeping Regime Reconsidered

133

ix

Glossary

IDF

Israeli Defense Forces

IPA

International Peace Academy

MAC

Mixed Armistice Commissions

MFO

Multinational Force and Observers

MNF

Multinational Force

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PLO

Palestinian Liberation Organization

SCUA

Suez Canal Users’ Association

SLA

South Lebanese Army

SSM

Sinai Support Mission

UN

United Nations

UNDOF

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

UNEF

United Nations Emergency Force

UNFICYP

United Nations Forces in Cyprus

UNIFIL

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNPREDEP

United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia

ONUC

United Nations Operation in the Congo (Operation des Nations Unies au Congo)

UNRWA

United Nations Relief and Works Agency

xi

xii

Glossary

UNSCO

United Nations Suez Clearance Organization

UNTSO

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

Preface

Violence once again flared in the Middle East in July 2006, just as the final edits of the manuscript for this book were completed. First Hamas, from Gaza, and then Hezbollah, from southern Lebanon, launched raids into Israel, killing and capturing several soldiers. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) retaliated in attempts to crush these groups threatening Israel’s southern and northern frontiers. In Lebanon the conflict was particularly nasty. Hezbollah launched hundreds of rockets against Israel’s northern towns and cities, while the IDF bombed and shelled Hezbollah positions throughout southern Lebanon—as well as enclaves in Beirut—causing hundreds of civilian casualties and creating a massive displacement of the population. Unfortunately, this round of fighting was probably inevitable. After the IDF withdrew from southern Lebanon in May 2000, following an eighteen year occupation of a “security zone,” Hezbollah commandeered the old Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) positions overlooking northern Israel and, as had the PLO in the 1970s, built a state within a state. The Lebanese government’s inability to move its security forces to its southern frontier after the IDF withdrawal set the stage for a replay of the disastrous wars of 1978 and 1982. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), originally deployed into the area following Israel’s 1978 incursion, has been the most problematic of peacekeeping missions in the Middle East. During the years of Israel’s occupation, it was unable to fulfill its mandate to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore peace and security, and assist the government in Beirut in restoring its authority over southern Lebanon. It was only after the IDF withdrew in 2000 that UNIFIL was able deploy along the international frontier. Having been reduced in 2003 to little more than an observation group, UNIFIL was powerless to prevent or contain the renewed fighting in July 2006. The inherent dangers of peacekeeping in the xiii

xiv

Preface

region were once again accentuated when Israeli bombs killed four unarmed military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) working in conjunction with UNIFIL at the Khiam observation post along the Lebanese border. By the end of the summer UNIFIL was reinforced and given more robust rules of engagement to secure southern Lebanon. For a longtime student of peacekeeping in the Middle East, this latest conflict seemed like “it’s déjà vu, all over again,” to quote the inimitable Yogi Berra. As a young officer in the United States Army, I served as a military observer with UNTSO along the southern Lebanese frontier in 1986. There, I experienced first-hand the frustrations of trying to be a peacekeeper in the middle of a civil-war with no peace to keep. While the players have changed to some extent—Hezbollah having become the dominant force in southern Lebanon—the game is all too familiar. The playing field has not changed much in twenty years. I spent several tours of duty on the Khiam observation post—and it was a dangerous place then. As this latest round of fighting played out, it seemed a given that UNIFIL would once again be thrust into a situation where keeping the peace has been, at best, a temporary respite from this most enduring of conflicts. Hopefully, the changes to the structure of the peacekeeping arrangements in Lebanon following this crisis will be more successful. This study shows that among the Arab-Israeli conflict dyads, peacekeeping has been least effective in the Lebanon-Israel case and constructing more viable security arrangements is a necessary condition for resolving their conflict. This latest crisis, however, has not altered the central theme of my study—the enduring presence of a peacekeeping regime in the Middle East, despite its limitations, demonstrates the value of international institutions in assisting states avoid accidental war. This book is based on my dissertation for the doctoral degree in politics at the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. I am most grateful for the comments and assistance by Wallace Thies, who served as director for the dissertation, to Michael Foley and James O’Leary, who served as readers, and to W. Mark Habeeb, Bard O’Neill, Robert Rood, and Mark DeLancey, who provided comments on earlier drafts of several of the chapters. Rich Hoffman, director of the Center for Civil-Military Relations, provided me with the time and support to complete the manuscript. Todd Myers and Vino Roy of Teleologic Learning Company helped convert my graduate seminar in peacekeeping into a polished distributed learning course for the Naval Postgraduate School. Students in that seminar over the last several years stimulated and challenged my theories; some have gone on to become peacekeepers themselves. Special thanks to Nancy Sharrock,

Preface

xv

who formatted the draft, and to Elizabeth Skinner, who did the copy editing of the final draft. My appreciation to Charles MacDonald, editor of Routledge’s Studies in International Relations series, for his endorsement of my manuscript and to Benjamin Holtzman at Routledge for his help in getting the manuscript published. Responsibility for the content of this study, and for any errors or omissions, is solely mine, and the views expressed in this study do not necessarily reflect those of any agency of the United States government. Kenneth R. Dombroski Monterey, California

Introduction

The nonviolent nature of United Nations peacekeeping operations is at the same time their most important and their least understood characteristic. . . . The principle of nonviolence sets peacekeeping forces above the conflict they are dealing with: Violation of the principle almost invariably leads to the peacekeepers becoming part of the conflict and therefore part of the problem. Brian Urquhart1

THE PROBLEMS OF PEACEKEEPING What is peacekeeping? During the Cold War the image of a blue-helmeted Scandinavian or Canadian sentry guarding a buffer zone in the Sinai, on the Golan Heights or on Cyprus typified the mind’s eye view of traditional peacekeeping for over forty years. By 1995, the image of U.S. fighter aircraft conducting North Atlantic Treaty Organization-directed air strikes while British artillery fired in support of French United Nations armored forces in Bosnia had not only blurred this traditional notion of contemporary peacekeeping, but called into question the purpose and efficacy of such operations among academics and policy makers alike. After the dramatic failures in Somalia and Bosnia, the prestige of the United Nations in conducting peacekeeping operations was at its lowest point in years. As Chester Crocker pointed out in 1994: “A backlash against United Nations peace operations is in full swing in America.” The Republican-controlled House of Representatives pushed to reduce the U.S. contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping budget from thirty-three to twenty-five per cent, and to strictly limit involvement of American troops 1

2


in United Nations peacekeeping operations. “Gone is the 1992-93 euphoria in Washington and New York over a new, more assertive and, if necessary, more muscular multilateralism.”2 One of the most significant and divisive debates in the field of world politics concerns the importance of international institutions. Realists argue that such institutions are unimportant because the foreign policy actions of states are based on self-interest, while liberal institutionalists argue that institutions do indeed matter because they can influence and alter state behavior, thus becoming a cause of peace. The challenge for both schools of thought is to provide sufficient empirical evidence to support their approach while offering evidence to contest that of their rivals. To date, neither school has prevailed nor has the debate been settled.3 This study investigates the research question: Can an international institution influence state behavior and thereby contribute to the peaceful resolution of a conflict? This research focuses on the series of interrelated peacekeeping efforts undertaken to help resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1948 to 1994, in an effort to determine the relative importance of institutions in a state-centric international system. A secondary purpose is to offer some conceptual clarity to the study of peacekeeping by describing and explaining the evolution of peacekeeping operations carried out during and immediately after the Cold War in the Middle East in terms of an international regime. The relevance of this approach to studying peacekeeping is becoming more obvious as the multiple peacekeeping missions conducted in the former Yugoslavia, Congo, Haiti, and East Timor, among others, demonstrate the interrelationship between the missions themselves and the overarching goal of restoring peace in those volatile regions. In complex conflicts involving multiple actors, a study of the relationship between sequential peacekeeping operations and the advancement of peace is likely to produce a richer and more comprehensive picture of the long-term effects of these operations on state behavior than can be derived from discrete case studies of individual missions.

WHY ANOTHER STUDY OF PEACEKEEPING? Existing studies of peacekeeping in the Middle East have concentrated on only one or a very limited number of case studies. The insights they provide do not allow for broader generalizations about peacekeeping.4 Those studies that did look more broadly at peacekeeping operations tended to be primarily descriptive or historical narratives comparing various types of operations, many of which were not adequately defined as peacekeeping missions.5 Most of the rest are either out of date or based on such limited

Introduction

3

data sets that their conclusions are in need of revalidation to account for the changes to the international environment since the end of the Cold War.6 Although the scholarly literature on peacekeeping has significantly increased in volume since the end of the Cold War, it has provided insufficient evidence to help resolve the realist-institutionalist debate on the importance of international institutions. Most contemporary authors in the field use comparative analysis of discrete case studies to develop generalized statements about causal relationships that apply to the whole universe of peacekeeping missions.7 This approach has several significant limitations. First, because the cases are treated as discrete, their relation to each other in time is not fully examined. Second, these analyses do not designate a crucial case that constitutes a prototype for peacekeeping missions.8 Third, particularly in the cases involving the Arab-Israeli conflict, discrete cases do not provide sufficient long-term evidence to determine whether peacekeeping missions had a significant impact on state behavior and led to the peaceful resolution of conflict. An alternative approach to evaluating the long-term effects of peacekeeping missions on state behavior, and the effects of varying state behavior on peacekeeping missions, is to reduce the universe of missions to welldefined subsets. Of the peacekeeping missions conducted between 1948 and 1994, those that involved Israel and one or more of her neighbors constitute such a clear subset. Additionally, focusing on this subset of peacekeeping missions will allow closer examination of their relation to each other in time, and facilitates the identification of a crucial case that can constitute a prototype. This study offers an alternative approach to the analysis of international peacekeeping that evaluates the long-term effects of peacekeeping on state behavior, and concomitantly, the effects of varying state behavior on an international regime. The findings of this study offer new perspectives on the relative importance of regimes, the utility of regime analysis in explaining the importance of international institutions, the significance of a peacekeeping regime’s role in influencing state behavior, and the effect of varying state behavior on regime evolution. The thesis of this study is that the individual peacekeeping missions conducted in the Middle East to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict can be conceptualized as components of a Middle East peacekeeping regime, which in turn is a subset of, and operates within the “policy spaces”9 defined by, a broader international peacekeeping regime. While some studies cover several of the United Nations peacekeeping missions, no study to date treats all these peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, including the non-United Nations missions, as part of a distinct international regime.10 Indeed, few contemporary authors who

4


study peacekeeping have adopted regime theory11 as an approach to understanding the relative importance and efficacy of peacekeeping. Those that do employ regime theory tend to treat peacekeeping as a type of security regime.12 There has been no similar analysis of international peacekeeping as a distinct regime type to assess the ability of institutions to influence state behavior in the promotion of peaceful resolution of conflict as described here.13 In addition, this study will analyze the effects of varying state behavior on the evolution of the regime. The crucial case selected for this study is the United Nations Emergency Force in the Sinai from 1956 to 1967, the first modern peacekeeping mission undertaken by the United Nations and the model for future missions. To track and evaluate the formation and evolution of the peacekeeping regime in the Middle East, all eight of the peacekeeping missions undertaken by the United Nations and by multinational arrangements to mitigate the Arab-Israeli conflict will be analyzed: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Palestine, 1948-present, involving Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai, 1956-67, involving Israel and Egypt. United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) in the Sinai, 1973-79, involving Israel and Egypt. United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights, 1973-present, involving Israel and Syria. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), along the southern Lebanese frontier, 1978-present, involving Israel and Lebanon. Multinational Force I (MNF I) in Beirut, 1982, involving Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Multinational Force II (MNF II) in Beirut, 1982-84, involving Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, 1982-present, involving Israel and Egypt. The methodology used in this study will consist primarily of qualitative regime analysis. The analytical focus is on the cumulative impact of the eight peacekeeping missions in the Middle East on the creation, maintenance and evolution of the Middle East peacekeeping regime during the

Introduction

5

period of 1948-1994. Particular emphasis will be placed on the influence of the Middle East peacekeeping regime on the behavior of Israel (and Israel’s effect on the evolution of the regime), as it was the only state actor directly affected by all eight peacekeeping missions. Chapter 1 outlines the conceptual debate between realists and liberal institutionalists, describes peacekeeping theory, explains the relationship between peacekeeping and regime theory, and argues the case for classifying peacekeeping as an international regime. Chapter 2 describes the foundations of modern peacekeeping and analyzes early efforts by the United Nations to create and maintain an armistice regime in the Middle East. Chapter 3 describes and analyzes the crucial case study of the United Nations Emergency Force, the first modern peacekeeping mission and the prototype for an international peacekeeping regime. Chapter 4 traces the evolution of the peacekeeping regime in the Middle East during the Cold War era, analyzing how various changes to the norms, principles, rules and procedures affected the functioning of the regime. Chapter 5 analyzes the dramatic changes to international peacekeeping in the early post-Cold War period, and how those changes influenced the Middle East peacekeeping regime. Chapter 6 provides a summary of findings and conclusions, focusing on how the Middle East peacekeeping regime had an effect on Israel’s behavior, and offers a reinterpretation of the effectiveness of peacekeeping in the Middle East. Evidence presented here concerning the evolution of the peacekeeping regime in the Middle East indicates that institutions do matter. In addition, this study concludes that the behavior of interested state actors also influenced the evolution of the regime, indicating the presence of a feedback loop, and supporting the contention that institutions are intervening variables between causal factors in international politics.

Chapter One

Peacekeeping as an International Regime

THE CONCEPTUAL DEBATE Peacekeeping during the Cold War never lived up to the expectations of its advocates. Ernst Haas, in his study of the impact of United Nations (UN) intervention during the Cold War era, found that success was relative. He rated the first United Nations peacekeeping mission, the 1956–1967 United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), a “great” success in isolating a dispute, a “limited” success in stopping hostilities, and not a success in settling a dispute. Haas found that between 1945 and 1985 the United Nations had less impact in managing disputes after 1965, was not consistently successful in stopping ongoing hostilities after the early 1960s, and that its record in settling disputes “has almost always been dismal.”1 Despite the problematic record of United Nations peacekeeping during the Cold War, between 1988 and 1992—a period in which the Cold War diminished and then ended—there was a dramatic resurgence in the use of United Nations peacekeepers to help settle international as well as civil conflicts. Although enthusiasm began to wane as a result of the perceived failures of the Somalia and Bosnia operations, by the end of 1994 seventeen peacekeeping missions involving more than 77,000 troops and civilians were in operation around the world; most of these operations were launched after 1988. United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was one of the chief architects of post-Cold War international institutionalist policy, and he was instrumental in redefining peacekeeping as an international institution. He believed that the United Nations, with the Security Council at its center, could effectively deal with the challenges to peace and security in the post-Cold War era. Great Power cooperation within the Security Council at the end of the Cold War stimulated this reassessment of 7

8


peacekeeping, which the U.S. government administration of George H.W. Bush actively encouraged. Liberal institutionalists in academia and multilateralists in the William Clinton administration embraced this “new thinking.” They rejected the realist notion that international stability is based on balance-of-power politics among great nations, and instead believed that international institutions could and did have an independent effect on state behavior.2 In his 1992 manifesto, An Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali outlined four areas of action which he believed provided a coherent program for maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the UN Charter: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building.3 It was clear from his recommendations to the Security Council that Boutros-Ghali envisioned a much deeper and broader role for the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security than it had had since 1945. This was particularly evident in his proposed use of military forces in every category of operations, ranging from humanitarian assistance and nation-building to “peace enforcement” operations. It was also clear that the Secretary General did not view these uses of military force as separate and distinct operations, but rather as a direct progression of institutional means to achieve peace, thereby fundamentally changing the international peacekeeping regime in the post-Cold War era. This approach to peacekeeping was considerably different from the more traditional view prevalent during the Cold War, which focused almost exclusively on truce-keeping by a neutral force interposed between consenting belligerent states, and viewed enforcement operations as distinctly separate.4 Peacekeeping, in the traditional conception, was not the imposition of a solution by outside powers using military force to overwhelm all the belligerents and impose a peace settlement. Nor was it a limited intervention by outside powers to help one of the belligerents prevail. For advocates of the realist school of international politics, the Cold War-era use of limited, ad hoc peacekeeping operations to contain international conflict in an essentially anarchical international system was a useful, but limited, tool.5 Peacekeeping during the Cold War dealt with conflicts on the margin of the super-power rivalry; emphasized the preservation of state sovereignty and the international status quo; and avoided the use of UN forces in civil conflicts or as a means to compel states to modify their behavior. As John Mearsheimer pointed out, realists place little faith in the liberal institutionalist belief that international institutions such as a UN


9

peacekeeping regime can independently modify state behavior and prevent war. Realists admit that great powers sometimes find institutions useful, but they maintain that, “institutional outcomes reflect great power interests, and are essentially tools that great powers employ for their own selfish purposes.”6 Mearsheimer has argued that the debate between liberal institutionalists and realists moved beyond the academic realm and had significant policy consequences in the early post-Cold War period. Multilateralists such as President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher subscribed to the theory that international institutions such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were the key to promoting world peace, and that worrying about the balance of power in the international system was “old thinking.”7 Their foreign policy actions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia reflected their beliefs. To be fair, these were not entirely unreasonable policy choices at the time, considering the precedent set by the George H.W. Bush administration in emphasizing coalition building and securing United Nations approval during the 1991 war with Iraq. The chief difference in the Clinton administration’s approach, however, was the degree to which policy makers relied on international institutions to take the lead in dealing with international security issues. Mearsheimer concluded: This perspective makes sense only if there is evidence that institutions can get the job done. But so far, the evidence indicates that institutions do not provide a sound basis for building a stable post-Cold War world. . . . The bottom line on institutions seems clear: despite all the rhetoric about their virtues, there is little evidence that they can alter state behavior and cause peace.8

PEACEKEEPING THEORY The theoretical approach to Cold War-era United Nations peacekeeping used in many earlier studies was primarily based on the theory and definitions adopted by the International Peace Academy (IPA), a nongovernmental organization.9 Both the United Nations and its member states have been wrestling with definitions of peacekeeping and its related activities for years.10 Before formal definitions of peacekeeping were adopted by the United Nations in 1992, IPA standards had been used by both theoreticians and practitioners of peacekeeping to provide a common frame of reference when dealing with traditional peacekeeping operations,

10


such as those undertaken by the United Nations in the Middle East and on Cyprus. Arguably, much of the current academic and political debate on the merits of international peacekeeping hinges on definitional and theoretical disagreements over what peacekeeping is all about. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to review some of the key concepts involved in the study of traditional Cold War peacekeeping operations. International peacekeeping, as defined by the International Peace Academy, is: “The prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.”11 Peacekeeping as defined by the IPA is distinguished from peace enforcing, which is “the imposition of peace by an outside force, either unilaterally or multilaterally.”12 Enforcement actions are authorized under Chapter VII, Articles 41 to 43 of the United Nations Charter. The collective enforcement actions taken by the United Nations in Korea in 1950 and those authorized by the Security Council against Iraq in 1990-1991 fall into this category and are usually not regarded as peacekeeping operations. Peacemaking is defined as, “an effort to settle a conflict through mediation, negotiation or other forms of peaceful settlement.” Mediation is the effort by a neutral party to assist in the settlement of a dispute between the parties in conflict. Negotiation involves the “discussions between parties to a conflict directed toward the arrangement of a settlement.” The final stage in this process, conciliation, is defined as “an act of pacification through the reconciling of two opposing positions held by the parties to the dispute.”13 Peacebuilding is the process of social change, by means of altering “the patterns of social action and interaction,” which attempts to eliminate the likelihood of further violence in interstate conflict situations. This relates primarily to the values of power, safety, and prestige.14 Peacekeeping theory is usually associated with the liberal institutionalist school of thought of international relations as a variant of collective security theory. Essentially, collective security theory postulates that states must renounce the use of military force as a means of settling disputes, must act in the greater interests of the international community instead of pursuing their egoistic self-interests, and must trust each other. Liberal institutionalists reject the realist notion that international stability is based on the balance of power politics of great nations. They believe that international institutions such as the United Nations can and do have an


11

independent effect on state behavior, that they can prevent war, and that they can cause peace.15 Realists tend to minimize the contributions of peacekeeping theorists because of the latter’s bias toward institutions rather than states. From a realist perspective, the use of peacekeeping in an essentially anarchical international system is based on the assumptions that the parties to a conflict are rational; they have interests that they seek to advance; and they will be amenable to peaceful solutions if they can be shown that peace works better to further their interests than does violence.16 As Mearsheimer notes: Realists also recognize that states sometimes operate through institutions. However, they believe that those rules reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power. The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it. In this view, institutions are essentially “arenas for acting out power relationships.” For realists, the causes of war and peace are mainly a function of the balance of power, and institutions largely mirror the distribution of power in the system. In short, the balance of power is the independent variable that explains war; institutions are merely an intervening variable in the process.17

Despite their starkly different views on the role and importance of international institutions, realists and institutionalists share certain views of traditional peacekeeping. In general, both schools of thought agree that traditional Cold War-era peacekeeping did not involve the imposition of a solution by outside powers using military force to overwhelm the belligerents and impose a peace settlement. Both schools of thought accept (but for different reasons) the norm, or what the IPA calls a “theoretical concept,” “that the control of violence in interstate and intrastate conflict is possible without resort to the use of force or enforcement measures.”18 Peacekeeping theory, however, has an ideological component that places it in opposition to realist thinking on international security and that distinguishes it from liberal institutionalist theory. Its central premise is rejection of the notion espoused by many realist theorists that force must be met with force. Peacekeeping theory argues that the use of enforcement measures is unacceptable because they tend to expand and prolong conflicts, rather than curtail them. Peacekeeping theorists maintain that the interposition of a neutral third-party force can provide stability in a conflict situation and enhance the peacebuilding process by its presence, neutrality,

12


impartiality, and moral authority. Such a force can buy time for other thirdparty agencies to mediate the situation and address the political, social, and economic problems that caused and exacerbated the conflict.19 Therefore, a second premise of peacekeeping theory is that controlling violence through the use of third-party interposition will contribute to a political resolution of the underlying conflict. Realists are skeptical of this claim because the empirical evidence to date does not support this causal link.20 Liberal institutionalists, on the other hand, believe that international institutions can have an independent effect on state behavior and thus that a causal link between peacekeeping and conflict resolution exists. For institutionalists, peacekeeping is not an end in itself, but only a stage in the conflict resolution process. Without effective peacemaking (negotiation and mediation) and peacebuilding (social change through social and economic development) institutions, a peacekeeping operation may only serve to prolong the dispute by freezing the situation, thus relieving the pressures on the parties involved to find a solution to the conflict. Although they draw different conclusions regarding the relative importance of peacekeeping operations in resolving international conflict, both realists and institutionalists would probably agree with the conclusions of the members of the IPA: “Often the peacekeeping operation has done all that it was created to do in bringing about a cessation of hostilities and a measure of stability, but the advantages that have resulted from a reduction in the violence and fighting have not been exploited by the politicians.”21

PEACEKEEPING AND REGIME THEORY To analyze UN peacekeeping properly, it is preferable to start from a theoretical perspective that encompasses norms, procedures, and institutions, and thus is likely to be able to describe the activities of both states and non-state actors; explain the successes and failures of institutions based on a common frame of reference; and offer some predictive insight into how institutional outcomes vary when such institutions change. Both liberal institutionalist and peacekeeping theories share a number of common elements. As Mearsheimer pointed out, however, after more than a decade of research liberal institutionalists failed to produce convincing evidence that institutions can prevent war by independently altering state preferences and thereby changing state behavior away from shortterm power maximizing.22 Realists disagree with liberal institutionalists on the importance of studying institutions because they neither believe that institutions function as independent variables nor accept that they are an


13

important cause of peace. Institutions, according to Mearsheimer, “matter only on the margins.”23 Mearsheimer’s realist perspective, however, is too dismissive of international institutions to form an impartial basis for analyzing peacekeeping.24 A third possibility offers a potentially better approach to examining the relative importance of institutions—namely, regime theory, which provides an excellent theoretical foundation from which to analyze the various interrelated peacekeeping missions in the Middle East, and their individual and collective impact on state behavior over an extended period of time. There are several reasons why regime theory offers a better standpoint from which to gauge the importance of institutions in international politics. First, regime theory is based on the realist assumption that the international system is anarchical and state-centric. Therefore, cooperative institutional arrangements are presumed to arise from the self-interests of states. International institutions were not created to substitute for the power politics of state actors, but are useful for reducing areas of uncertainty and friction in state actors’ behavior. Second, because regime theory is issue-centered, a focus on specific issue areas, such as peacekeeping or arms control for example, would not include those elements of complex international organizations, such as the United Nations, not directly involved in the issue area. How well the United Nations functions in unrelated issue areas, such as environmental regimes, therefore would not factor into a study of its behavior in security or peacekeeping regimes. This concept is an improvement over older theories of international integration, which looked for linkages between unrelated issue areas in international politics, and was severely criticized by realists for its failure to prove conclusively that such “spillover” behavior existed. Because regime theory starts by focusing on specific issue areas, it avoids the shortcomings that characterize the functional approach. Third, the theory of regime creation and evolution provides an analytical framework with which to examine how regimes are formed, explain why they persist, and develop insights as to how they “constrain state behavior despite the fact that they do not have the power to do so.”25 John Ruggie introduced the concept of international regimes in 1975, defining them as “a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies, and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states.”26 In 1983, a conference of subject matter experts worked out a refined definition, describing international regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making

14


procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”27 Theoretically, regimes are intervening variables between basic causal factors in world politics and outcomes of behavior by actors.28 This concept of regimes includes four main components: “Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.”29 Principles and norms provide the basic defining characteristics of a regime. Changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within a regime. Changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself. When norms and principles are abandoned, there is either a change to a new regime or the disappearance of a regime from a given issue area. A regime is weakened when the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures become less coherent, or if actual practice is inconsistent with established principles, norms, rules, and procedures.30 Oran Young criticized this consensus definition of international regimes, claiming it was “conceptually thin” and “really only a list of elements that are hard to differentiate conceptually and that often overlap in real-world situations.”31 To mitigate some of the criticism of the complex-consensus definition of regimes, Robert Keohane offered a “lean” definition: “Regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations.”32 In Keohane’s definition, the complex differentiation of explicit or implicit regime principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures is simplified into the overarching concept of explicit rules. As Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger pointed out, however: The hierarchy of regime components implied in the consensus definition had enabled Krasner . . . to categorize two kinds of regime change and, at the same time, specify the identity conditions of a regime in terms of these components: only if principles or norms are altered does a change of the regime itself take place; all other changes in regime content are changes within a regime. No such strategy is available to those who adopt Keohane’s “lean” definition. It is therefore not surprising that the consensus definition has never run out of supporters.33

Since there is no general agreement in the field on a precise definition of regimes, Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger argued instead for a working definition and concluded:


15

In the longer run, the breakdown of the consensus, far from damaging the cause of regime analysis, may even lead to a better understanding of the nature and workings of regimes, provided that proponents of the complex definition take up the challenge of Keohane and Young, and others by doing two things: first, demonstrate that the four components can indeed be distinguished with reasonable precision, and second, come up with theoretical and/or empirical arguments to show that the complex structure makes an empirical difference as well.34

For the purposes of this study, Krasner’s consensus definition of regimes will be followed. Given the ad hoc nature of peacekeeping arrangements in the Middle East, and the general lack of consensus on whether a peacekeeping regime actually existed, the definition developed by Keohane seems inadequate to address the implicit rules and procedures which seem to define the peacekeeping regime described in this study. How then can we distinguish the differences between international institutions, organizations, and regimes? Early criticisms of the concept of regimes called them “woolly” because of the difficulty in discerning the elements and boundaries of regimes.35 Oran Young provides a usable distinction: Organizations and regimes form international institutions. Organizations are “material entities” that possess tangible elements such as physical locations, offices, personnel, equipment, and budgets. Organizations have “legal personality.”36 Regimes, in contrast, are essentially normative entities that define the “policy spaces”37 within which organizations operate. While some organizations may be almost indistinguishable from the regime they administer, others may be the agents for several regimes. For the purposes of this study, the various peacekeeping missions in the Middle East operated under United Nations or other international auspices are hypothesized to constitute an international regime of Middle East peacekeeping, while the functional elements (such as the military missions: UNTSO, UNEF, UNDOF, MNF, and UNIFIL) would be the international organizations that administer the regime. All are elements of a broader international peacekeeping regime. Regimes may be formal—the result of legislation or treaties—or they may consist of informal arrangements based on actors’ mutual interests. Regimes may also be the result of “common aversion,” in which actors may not agree on a preferred outcome but do agree on an outcome they wish to avoid. In such cases, the regimes do not require policy collaboration among the actors, but merely coordination or acquiescence.38 Krasner offered several causal variables to explain the creation of regimes: Egoistic self-interest; political power, including power in the service of the common good or power in the service of particular interests;

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diffuse norms and principles that condition behavior of actors (the principle of sovereignty for example); usage (regular patterns of behavior based on actual practice) and custom (long-standing practice); and knowledge (a cognitive approach).39 Robert Keohane’s theory of hegemonic stability, a structural approach, argued that strong international regimes depend on hegemonic power. Regimes may be imposed through coercion by the hegemon, or a dominant state actor may take the lead in forming and maintaining a regime that serves its interests and also is generally accepted in the international system. Fragmentation of power leads to fragmentation of regimes. Regime creation is related to his concept of complex interdependence.40 Under conditions of complex interdependence, the number and types of actors are greater and governments are less inclined to use force in international disputes. Expanded participation leads to regime creation in order to help managers deal with complex common issues, limit the scope of problems to specific issue areas, and limit the actions of states that pursue myopic self-interests.41 Ernst Haas offered a cognitive approach to the study of regime creation. He argued that the structural approach is inadequate to explain and predict changes in international regimes because it relies on a high correlation between hegemonic power and regime creation, plus an assumed connection between the two based on the theory of collective goods. Haas argued that the need for regimes arises when sufficient consensus exists among statesmen and decision-makers about the benefits of participating in international cooperative efforts, as a means of regulation under conditions of complex interdependence. Knowledge creates a basis for cooperation.42 Keohane’s functional theory of regimes under post-hegemonic cooperation incorporated elements of his structural theory and cognitive thinking. He admitted his theory of hegemonic stability was not sufficient to explain the maintenance of international regimes and continued cooperation among states after the decline of a hegemonic power. Those regimes with a relatively small number of states involved are more likely to survive after the decline of a hegemon because both equitable burden sharing and monitoring are easier. International regimes depend on complementary interests that are perceived by leaders to be necessary and beneficial. Since regimes are costly and difficult to create, existing ones will tend to evolve rather than be destroyed or replaced by new ones.43 Oran Young maintained that regimes can change due to internal contradictions, transformations in the power structure among participants or alterations in behavior that render the regime unworkable. Although it is difficult to change existing regimes, there often will be a conscious effort


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to restructure an existing regime in the event of the collapse of a pre-existing order. Young differentiated between three types of regimes: Spontaneous, imposed and negotiated. Spontaneous regimes arise, unplanned, out of common behavior among actors. Imposed regimes are deliberately created by a dominant actor. Negotiated regimes are characterized by “conscious efforts to agree on their major provisions, explicit consent on the part of individual participants, and the formal expression of the results.” Such regimes often are inconsistent, and they tend to rely on the experience of their members to refine responses to problems. Negotiated regimes often reflect the power distribution within the organization itself.44 Regime theory is not without its critics who study international institutions. Susan Strange dismissed it as a “fad.” She criticized the early scholarship on regimes for being imprecise in its definitions, too normative in its approach, and prone to overemphasize the unchanging nature of regimes. Strange argued that the use of the term “regime” implies a recognized locus of power over time and that such a characterization is unrealistic in the contemporary international system.45 Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons, reviewing the state of regime theory development a decade later, criticized regime analysts for the lack of research in the field on whether regimes “matter,” and whether they have independent influence on state behavior.46 Similarly, Charles Lipson, in his survey of the field of regime theories, concluded: Although we now have dozens of empirical studies of specific regimes, we have no overarching theory about how international politics is fragmented into distinct regimes, no real explanation of which issues will lack well-formed regimes (or when or why), and no real analysis of how different regimes dovetail with one another to create an overall international system. Taken together, these are serious attacks on the possibilities of creating a true “regime theory.”47

CLASSIFYING PEACEKEEPING AS AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME The study of peacekeeping as an international regime has its roots in neofunctionalist integration theory, such as the work by Jack Citrin on United Nations peacekeeping and organizational task expansion.48 Citrin’s work was based on the conceptual framework Ernst Haas proposed for the study of international integration. Haas hypothesized that there was a positive correlation between the task expansion of international organizations,

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through the successful performance of certain organizational tasks that help widen their mandates, and international integration.49 Haas described international integration as a process through which the international system evolves from “a condition of society,” characterized by the frequent use of force by the various actors to settle conflicts, to “a condition of political community,” where the actors rely on more peaceful means to settle disputes. This process of integration is made possible by a gradual transfer of loyalties by the actors from national institutions to supranational institutions (such as the United Nations). Haas believed that the role of international organizations in this process is to expand organizational tasks to facilitate the gradual integration process toward political community.50 Citrin’s focus was on the relationship between the task performance of peacekeeping forces and organizational task expansion in the United Nations. His monograph offered a systematic analysis of four case studies of early UN peacekeeping in intrastate conflicts.51 Using these case studies as evidence, Citrin examined the hypothesis that international integration and task expansion are positively correlated. Citrin believed that the nature of the international system, its environment, and the quality of organizational leadership were key factors in the organizational task expansion process. Reflecting on the bipolar international system locked in the Cold War of the 1960s, Citrin concluded in his study: Only the naïve will deny the fragility of the international community in the contemporary world. International organizations are founded on the conviction that this tenuousness is not permanent and that a strong sense of international community can be created by national cooperation in common endeavors. This, in a sense, is the meaning of the hypothesis that organizational task expansion contributes to international integration.52

His conclusions on the role of United Nations peacekeeping in organizational task expansion, however, were less optimistic: The ability of the United Nations to undertake military operations in the pursuit of international peace depends, in the contemporary world order, on the convergence of widely conflicting private interests. Since such a convergence is unlikely to be more than partial and very temporary, organizational task expansion in this area is an uneven and tenuous process. The benefits which are dispensed by several moderately successful instances of task performance . . . can be


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wiped out by one partial failure. . . . Furthermore, changes in the international environment can make irrelevant the authority that an international organization has laboriously built up over a period of years. In short, it is a hard struggle simply to stay even.53

In a later study of the impact of United Nations intervention during the Cold War era, Ernst Haas found that success was relative and varied over time. Haas concluded that the United Nations’ record in actually settling disputes “has almost always been dismal.”54 While regime theory may have had its roots in integration theory, regime analysis abandoned the causal dynamic of neofunctional integration theory—that technical solutions to regional issues would facilitate the creation and expansion of supranational institutions, producing a spillover effect into other interest areas, and lead to progressive political integration. Regime literature, however, primarily in the field of political economy, adopted the “analytical shift” from later integration studies that de-emphasized the study of specific institutional procedures and focused instead on examining the management of common international problems.55 Few contemporary authors who study peacekeeping have adopted regime theory as an approach to understanding the relative importance of peacekeeping as an international regime. More typical have been studies such as Paul Diehl’s, which cover several of the United Nations peacekeeping operations.56 Diehl’s work is a classic use of discrete case studies to develop generalized statements about causal relationships that apply to the whole universe of peacekeeping operations.57 Other studies of peacekeeping, particularly those dealing with operations in the Middle East, tend to fall into one of three categories: Histories of particular missions, autobiographical accounts by senior peacekeepers, and analyses limited by time or setting. 58 Those authors who do employ regime theory tend to treat peacekeeping as a type or component of security regimes. Janice Gross Stein conducted a groundbreaking study of two “regimes of conflict management” between Israel and Egypt, 1956–1967 and 1975–1978.59 Stein, following Lipson and Robert Jervis, maintained that security regimes are more difficult to establish than regimes in political economy issue areas. Security regimes also are “more fragile, less resistant to change, and more easily destroyed.”60 Jervis, finding the consensus definition of international regimes too general, proposed a more narrow definition for security regimes: “Those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their

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behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate. This implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation, but a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run interest.”61 Jervis explained that security regimes are different from regimes in other issue areas in four fundamental ways. First, security issues involve a higher degree of competitiveness between states than other issues; war is by nature a zero-sum game. Second, both the stakes and error costs are much higher in the security arena; states rarely get a second chance to amend wrong policy choices, and delayed responses can have disastrous consequences. Third, because of the difficulty in differentiating offensive and defensive motives in security policy choices, both status quo states and those states desiring to change the security balance may engage in similar behavior. Finally, policy choices in the security arena involve a high degree of uncertainty; detecting and interpreting the behavior of competitors and measuring one’s own level of security are inherently difficult. As Jervis concluded: The primacy of security, its competitive nature, the unforgiving nature of the arena, and the uncertainty of how much security the state needs and has, all compound the prisoners’ dilemma and make it sharper than the problems that arise in most other areas. Furthermore, decision makers usually react by relying on unilateral and competitive modes of behavior rather than by seeking cooperative solutions. Both course of action are dangerous; each of these strategies has worked in some cases and failed in others. But statesmen usually think they should “play it safe” by building positions of greater strength; rarely do they consider seriously the possibility that such a policy will increase the danger of war instead of lessening it. The result is that security regimes, with their call for mutual restraint and limitations on unilateral action, rarely seem attractive to decision makers.62

If establishing a security regime is so difficult, then under what conditions could we expect states to form one? Jervis listed four necessary conditions: First, the great powers must prefer the status quo and want to establish a security regime to help preserve it; second, the actors involved must believe that they share common values of mutual security and cooperation; third, none of the actors must believe that security is best provided for by expansion; and fourth, “war and the individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly.” Jervis concluded: The most propitious conditions for regime formation, then, are the cases in which offensive and defensive weapons and policies are dis-


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tinguishable but the former are cheaper and more effective than the latter, or in which they cannot be told apart but it is easier to defend than attack. In either of these worlds the costs or risks of individualistic security policies are great enough to provide status quo powers with incentives to seek security through cooperative means, but the dangers of being taken by surprise by an aggressor are not so great as to discourage the states from placing reliance on joint measures.63

As Stein pointed out, new security regimes are often created by powerful states following a significant change in the distribution of power in the international system, particularly after a major war. The security regimes embedded in the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations and the United Nations are examples of this phenomenon. Stein also saw the configuration of interests among regime members as an important condition for the formation of a regime. She argued that regimes are easier to form when the actors are motivated by egoistic self-interest rather than competition in a zero-sum game. Stein acknowledged that “the pursuit of egoistic self-interest is not especially conducive to the effective management of conflict and the creation of international regimes.” She found, however, that regime formation can occur in situations where egoistic self-interested actors under the security dilemma share either “common interests” in ensuring a particular outcome or “common aversions,” where they all desire to avoid a particular outcome—such as war. Stein cited the “common aversion” of the United States and the Soviet Union to nuclear war during the Cold War era as an example of autonomous, rational self-interested decision-making that led to informal, and later formal, security policy coordination between the two superpowers to avoid accidental war. When leaders compete, when they share no common aversion or common interest and emphasize the difference between their own returns and those of others, the likelihood of successful conflict management is very low. And when egoists pursue their self-interest and can achieve optimal outcomes without coordination, the incentive to cooperate is slight. Only under special conditions, when the pursuit of egoistic self-interest creates anomalies, does the possibility of regime creation and policy coordination increase. 64

Stein’s analysis found that such anomalies “occur much more frequently” and cover a greater number of issues than realists admit. She argued that increasingly destructive military technology leads to a more

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intense aversion to war among political leaders. In the case of Egypt and Israel, “the shared interest in avoiding war became the dominant theme in their attempts to coordinate policy” in the decade following the 1973 war.65 Since 1995, several studies of peacekeeping using regime theory as the basis for analysis have appeared. Similar to the problems of regime analysis in other fields of inquiry, definitional ambiguities and disagreement over the scope and boundaries of regimes persist among these works. Noam Arad argued that the establishment of a peacekeeping mission implies the formation of a security regime. Jerzy Ciechanski saw peacekeeping as an extension of a broader UN security regime. Aryeh Shalev, in his excellent study of the Israel-Syria armistice arrangements from 1949 to 1955, described them as a regime, although he did not employ regime analysis. Two volumes edited by Israeli academics dealt with the more familiar regional security regime approaches, addressing arrangements such as confidence building measures, tacit security regimes, arms control regimes, and the role of a hegemon.66 This study offers an alternative approach designed to evaluate the long-term effects of peacekeeping on state behavior, and concomitantly, the effects of varying state behavior on an international regime, by reducing the universe of peacekeeping missions to well-defined subsets. Among peacekeeping missions conducted between 1948 and 1994, those that involved Israel and one or more of its neighbors would constitute such a well-defined subset. Additionally, focusing on this subset of peacekeeping missions will allow closer examination of their relation to each other in time. This study posits that the various peacekeeping missions conducted in the Middle East in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict operated within the policy spaces defined by a Middle East peacekeeping regime. The analytical focus of this study is on the impact of the various peacekeeping missions in the Middle East on the creation, maintenance, and evolution of the peacekeeping regime during the period of 1948–1994, and the influence that regime had on state behavior, particularly Israel’s, the one state actor directly affected by all of the missions. Before the peacekeeping missions in the Middle East can be classified as a distinct international regime, it is necessary to select a crucial case through which to explore the similarities and differences between that case and others of the same regime, and to establish a prototype as a basis for comparative analysis.67 The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), created to supervise the cease-fire between Egypt and Israel after the 1956 Sinai war, was the first modern peacekeeping mission. It became the model for United Nations peacekeeping operations and served as the catalyst for the principles developed by United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold on the con-


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duct of peacekeeping operations. Hammarskjold defined these principles during the creation of UNEF as: Consent and cooperation of the parties in dispute; troop contingents provided by member nations other than the permanent members of the Security Council (Britain, France, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States); impartiality; and the use of force by peacekeepers only in self-defense. UNEF operated successfully in the Sinai and Gaza for over ten years. Ultimately, though, the United Nations was unable to expand this successful peacekeeping function into a lasting peacemaking process. Political tensions in the region intensified, and in May 1967, Egypt withdrew its consent to the presence of UNEF on its territory; consequently, United Nations Secretary General U Thant recalled the Force. The abrupt manner in which U Thant terminated UNEF in 1967 without referring the action to the General Assembly or the Security Council left the Secretary General and the United Nations itself open to criticism. The June 1967 war between Israel and the Arab coalition, and the subsequent failure of the United Nations to reinstate a peacekeeping force after the war, were seen by many as the death knells for United Nations peacekeeping.68 Although United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) observers remained in the region after the 1967 war, no new peacekeeping mission was mounted until after the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when a second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) in the Sinai and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights were created. Following Israel’s 1978 incursion into southern Lebanon to destroy Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) bases, the United Nations established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, maintain peace and security, and assist the Lebanese government to restore effective authority in the area. The March 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel assumed a UN peacekeeping mission would be established to monitor the parties’ compliance, but the Security Council failed to accept the mandate due to Soviet and Arab opposition. UNEF II ceased operations in July 1979 and Egypt, Israel, and the United States established an independent international organization, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), which became operational in April 1982 and remains on duty in the Sinai as a component of the peace treaty. Interestingly, despite UNEF’s mixed record and ultimate failure, subsequent peacekeeping missions in the Middle East, including those outside of United Nations auspices, maintained UNEF as a model. What explains this phenomenon? The key to this puzzle is to examine the relative importance of institutions through the conceptual lens of regime theory,

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which provides an excellent theoretical perspective from which to analyze the various interrelated peacekeeping missions in the Middle East and their individual and collective impact on state behavior over an extended period. Analysis of a crucial case study will serve to address two critical research questions: How does an international regime come into existence, and does it persist even when the circumstances in which it was created change? To discover the long-term significance of a regime (a current trend in regime theory literature), it will be necessary to look beyond this particular case study to subsequent related cases to discern patterns and change both within and of the regime.69 Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger proposed two primary ways to evaluate the significance of an international regime: Its degree of effectiveness and its degree of resilience. First, a regime is effective to the extent that its members abide by its norms and rules. Second, a regime is effective to the extent that it achieves the objectives or fulfills certain purposes. The most fundamental and most widely discussed of these purposes is the enhancement of the ability of states to cooperate in an issue-area. In contrast, regime robustness (resilience) refers to the “staying power” of international institutions in the face of exogenous challenges, and to the extent to which prior institutional choices constrain collective decisions and behavior in later periods, i.e., the extent to which “institutional history matters.”70 Marc Levy, Oran Young, and Michael Zurn, in their survey of regime theory literature, discussed three methods used to study the effectiveness of regimes: A legal or contractual definition, a policy-oriented definition, and a political definition. Their political definition considered a regime effective if it causes change in the actors’ behavior and patterns of interaction in ways that enhance management of the specific problems the regime was created to address.71 Stein measured the effectiveness of security regimes by highlighting two critical regime functions: Improving the accuracy of detection to reduce uncertainty both about the behavior of other actors and about the boundaries of the conflict; and reducing the probability of defection by actors from the regime, especially under the circumstances of a common aversion to war.72 Due to the nature of peacekeeping and the cases under examination, this study will focus only on the political definition of effectiveness and make use of measures of effectiveness that correspond to Stein’s two critical security regime functions. The subsequent chapters in this study describe the foundations of modern peacekeeping and analyze the evolution of the peacekeeping regime in the Middle East.

Chapter Two

The Genesis of a Middle East Peacekeeping Regime

Paul Diehl observed that the ends of wars often act as an impetus for the creation of international organizations that may provide “institutional safe guards against threats to international peace and security.”1 The security arrangements anticipated by the League of Nations after World War I and the United Nations after World War II are examples of previous attempts to deal with threats to international peace and security through the structures of international organizations. The failure of the League to prevent Japanese and Italian aggression in the 1930s and the stalemate in the United Nations Security Council during the Cold War illustrate how such security institutions may fail to live up to their high expectations when faced with adverse situations.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING In the years before World War I, the great powers of Europe conducted several joint military expeditions in Crete, the Balkans, and China that served as precursors to later peacekeeping operations. Diehl contended that these early efforts at collective military action shared a number of characteristics. First, they operated on an ad hoc basis, organizing and disbanding as the need arose and according to the crisis at hand. This characteristic would carry over into modern peacekeeping operations. Second, these early collective military actions operated without specific guidelines and with little coordination between national units. And third, these forces operated without the approval of an international body, since formal international organizations such as the United Nations did not exist at the time.2 At the end of World War I, “the war to end all wars,” the first general purpose international organization was created. The League of Nations contained within its covenant a concept of collective security that 25

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recognized “the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League” and the duty of the Council of the League to recommend military action to “protect the covenants of the League.”3 The requirement for unanimity of members on the Council to undertake military action proved to be the downfall of the League as an instrument of collective security. In 1931, when Japan invaded Manchuria, the Council recommended that Japan withdraw its troops, but was unable to take stronger action because of the ability of the Japanese to block such action. League observers were sent to the scene where they witnessed the dismemberment of Manchuria and the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo. Japan later withdrew from the League.4 The League experienced only slightly better results when confronted by Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. The imposition of economic sanctions against Italy failed to halt Italian aggression against Ethiopia, and the League was forced to contemplate the use of military means to counter this aggression. Britain and France, however, blocked military action in hopes of winning Italian recognition of their own colonial possessions in Africa and support of a policy of containment against Nazi Germany.5 The failure of the League in collective security can be traced to the unanimity rule for collective action, in combination with the inability and unwillingness of major powers to act against their own short-term interests. Similar problems would plague the collective security mechanisms of the League’s successor organization, the United Nations. Despite the League’s failures as a collective security institution, its experiences with peace observation and inquiry missions would become important precedents for the development of later United Nations peacekeeping missions. A dispute over the Aaland Islands between Sweden and Finland, for example, led to the League’s first action in the form of a neutral fact-finding mission regarding the status of the islands. The League acted as an effective neutral arbitrator and the protagonists accepted the League’s fact-finding report.6 In 1921, the League sent sixteen battalions of troops from Britain, France, and Italy to supervise a plebiscite in Upper Silesia to determine whether Germany or Poland would have control over the region. The nations involved in this mission maintained control of their own forces. Though different from later peace observation missions, which tended to use small teams of unarmed observers rather than armed units, this mission represented a key instance of the use of internationally sanctioned forces in a supervisory role.7 During the Greek-Bulgarian Crisis of 1925, the League required the establishment of a cease-fire before sending a fact-finding mission. The mission established the need for a buffer zone between the warring parties that would be supervised by neutral observers.


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Both of these criteria would become essential elements of future peacekeeping operations. The League also intervened in 1920, somewhat less successfully, to resolve a dispute between Poland and Lithuania over the province of Vilna. The planned intervention involved a provisional demarcation line, and the establishment of a demilitarized buffer zone to be occupied by 1,500 neutral troops to supervise the plebiscite over the territory. Great power disagreements between France and the Soviet Union prevented this force from ever assuming its role, but the League mediation efforts did contribute to the avoidance of war. This proposed mission served as a model for later United Nations peacekeeping operations.8 The largest and best-known of the League’s interventions occurred in 1934–1935 within the Saarland, which had been under League administration since the end of the war. Military forces from Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden, along with Czech police, were deployed to supervise a plebiscite and to minimize conflict between France and Germany over the status of that region. The experience of a peace observation force made up of troops from European countries under a League-appointed commander, General J.E.S. Brind, made important contributions to the evolution of peace observation and peacekeeping. General Brind recommended that the composition of future operations should come from states with no direct interest in a dispute. He emphasized the importance of moral influence in successfully executing a peace observation operation, and that a small number of troops were sufficient for executing a mission defined by these limited parameters. The neutrality of the force, its limited size, and its reliance on moral authority in preserving peace were three criteria later incorporated into modern peacekeeping practice.9

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS LEGACY While most historians judge the League of Nations to be a failure because it did not restrain Japanese, Italian, and German aggression, Diehl noted that the League established some procedures and precedents about the proper timing and form of international intervention. He listed four lessons that emerge from the League’s experience: Interventions were most successful when the major powers were not involved; the League’s interventions were most successful when hostilities had not reached the intensity of full-scale war; support from the disputants was critical to the success of any League action; and the establishment of a physical buffer zone between combatants proved to be useful for facilitating negotiations and conflict resolution.10 Other experiments and experiences of the League would also play a substantial role in the evolution of peacekeeping. The League increased

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its autonomy by utilizing troops from neutral nations, but its interventions remained ad hoc affairs, often being undertaken only after violence had already become widespread. The League discovered that the utility of fact-finding missions was hampered by the reality that a dispute could be resolved in favor of an aggressor before the fact-finding mission had completed its process of inquiry. Also, combining responsibilities for a cease-fire and negotiations for conflict resolution within a single peace observation team appeared to increase the likelihood that if negotiations broke down, the cease-fire would also collapse, suggesting that peacekeeping and peacemaking should be two separate functions. Many of these lessons and experiences would be significant in the later development of United Nations peacekeeping. While the League may have failed in its enforcement of collective security, its development of peace observation mechanisms helped lay the groundwork for more flexible tools for managing international conflict. Nevertheless, although the United Nations headquarters in 1947 apparently studied these League missions, it would have to relearn many of these lessons the hard way.11

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN PEACEKEEPING The development of modern peacekeeping was an evolutionary process. Henry Wiseman, a noted scholar on peacekeeping, outlined five distinct historical periods from the end of World War II to the mid-1980s: The Nascent period, 1946-1956; the Assertive period, 1956-1967; the Dormant period, 1967-1973; the Resurgent period, 1973-1978; and the Maintenance period, 1978-1985.12 For the purposes of this study, the 1988–1994 period can be described as the Renaissance period of peacekeeping.13 Wiseman characterized the 1946–1956 Nascent period as a time when the United Nations mounted small-scale special commissions primarily concerned with observation, fact-finding, and reporting. The conflicts of this period involved post-colonial problems or situations emerging from World War II. In addition to its efforts in Palestine, the United Nations intervened in the Balkans in 1946, Indonesia in 1947, and between India and Pakistan in 1948. Wiseman identified several common characteristics in these early UN efforts that became features of subsequent peacekeeping operations. Most importantly, in each case consent of the parties involved in the conflict was secured. The Security Council and the Secretary General were important actors in every instance. Financing of these efforts was accepted as a part of the regular UN budget. With the exception of the intervention in Korea, none of these operations involved the enforcement provisions of the United Nations Charter. Interestingly, the permanent Member States of


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the Security Council participated in these operations, a practice that would be avoided in later UN missions.14 The following sections in this chapter examine those events in the Middle East during Wiseman’s first, so-called Nascent, period that served as the foundations of a Middle East peacekeeping regime. Historical Context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict Much of the evolution of modern peacekeeping during the Cold War era was inextricably linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Not only did this conflict occupy much of the United Nations’ time from 1947 to 1988, but it also served as the arena for the organization’s first military observer mission (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in 1948) and its first peacekeeping force (United Nations Emergency Force in 1956). The root cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict was fundamentally a struggle between two communities—the Palestinian Arabs and the Jews—for control of the same territory. The Palestinians cited centuries of continuous habitation as their claim to the land. The Jews, and more specifically the Zionists, based their claim to the land on the historical precedent of the ancient Jewish Kingdoms of Israel and Judah, as well as through the more modern acquisition of land through legal purchase during the waning days of the Ottoman Empire. During World War I, Britain set the stage for political conflict between these two communities. In an attempt to garner Arab support in the war with the Ottomans, Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, established a correspondence with Husain Ibn Ali, the Sharif of Mecca. The British aim was to induce Husain, a recognized leader on the Arabian peninsula, to undertake a revolt against the Ottoman Empire, thus opening a second front in the region and assisting British forces in military operations against the Turks in the Levant. In return, Britain would support Husain’s claim for the restoration of the Caliphate and his leadership of an independent Arab state or confederation. Although the issue of Palestine was not directly addressed, subsequent Arab claims to the area were based, in part, on these correspondences. Britain later denied these claims, citing a letter from McMahon to Husain in October 1915, which seemed to exclude at least parts of Palestine not purely Arab from the agreement.15 Meanwhile, British and French diplomats in Europe were planning the post-war division of the Ottoman Empire. Sir Mark Sykes for Britain and Charles Georges-Picot for France drafted a document that essentially divided the Arab territory under Ottoman rule into protectorates to be administered by Britain and France. Britain would administer Palestine (including the trans-Jordan region) and Iraq, while France would administer

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Syria and what would become Lebanon.16 In November 1917 the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour, in a calculated attempt to gain support for the British war cause among the overseas Jewish communities, wrote a letter to Lord Rothschild, the president of the English Zionist Federation. In this letter, which became known as the Balfour Declaration, Lord Balfour outlined the British government’s position: His Majesty’s Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.17

With the end of the war, neither the Arab nor the Jewish communities’ aspirations were realized. Instead, the newly-created League of Nations decided to follow the general provisions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and place Arab territories of the former Ottoman Empire under League mandates to be administered separately by Britain and France. The Council of the League of Nations granted formal approval of the British mandate over Palestine in July 1922.18 Over the next twenty-five years, Britain found practical implementation of the League mandate increasingly difficult, due primarily to Arab and Jewish intransigence over the desired end-state of the mandate. Through a series of political settlement proposals, commissions, and white papers, all of which were rejected by one or both of the parties, Britain vainly attempted to find a compromise. Violence became endemic to the conflict, and often was directed at the mandatory authority as well as against the opposing community.19 The Palestinian Arabs feared the emergence of a Jewish majority and pressured the British to curtail Jewish immigration into Palestine. The restrictions imposed by the British, for the most part, were ineffective. At the time of the Balfour Declaration, Jewish inhabitants of Palestine made up only seven percent of the population.20 Between 1922 and 1937, the Jewish population in Palestine grew from 80,000 to over 400,000. On the eve of World War II, Jews made up almost one-third of the total population in Palestine. Increasingly, the Jewish community in Palestine felt betrayed by Britain’s actions. The original League mandate contained provisions requiring Britain to facilitate and encourage Jewish immigration to Palestine, as well as “placing the country under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home.” In May 1942, the Zionists made their political views clear


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by adopting the “Biltmore Program,” which rejected British attempts to limit Jewish immigration into Palestine. The Zionists called for open Jewish immigration for those refugees fleeing Europe, and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.21 Following the end of World War II, tensions increased between the Jewish community and the British mandate authority. As the terrible toll of the Nazi Holocaust on European Jewry became known to the world, the Zionists’ efforts to resettle the survivors in Palestine gained political support in the West, especially in the United States. British reluctance to increase the official Jewish immigration quotas to Palestine, denounced by the Jewish community as an attempt to placate opinion and curry favor within the Arab world, resulted in a violent campaign by Jewish underground paramilitary groups against British military installations in Palestine.22 By early 1947 the British had had enough. In London, the government made three crucial decisions. First, the problem of Palestine would be turned over to the League’s successor, the United Nations, when the mandate expired in May 1948. Second, independent of whatever actions the United Nations prescribed, Britain would give up the mandate and withdraw from Palestine as soon as possible. Third, Britain would not be involved in enforcing a political arrangement that was not acceptable to both the Arab and Jewish communities.23 Britain’s withdrawal from involvement in the future of Palestine reflected its overall decline as a major world power after World War II. United Nations Involvement in Palestine Britain brought the Palestine issue before the United Nations General Assembly in April 1947. The General Assembly appointed a Special Committee on Palestine to make recommendations for the future status of the area. The committee recommended Palestine be partitioned into an Arab state and a Jewish state, with Jerusalem placed under an international regime. The General Assembly adopted the committee’s partition plan as Resolution 181 in November 1947 and set up a United Nations Palestine Commission to oversee the implementation of the partition. While the Jewish community accepted partition as the only workable solution, the Arab Palestinian community and the neighboring Arab states rejected the plan. True to its policy, Britain did nothing to facilitate the commission’s efforts, and the ensuing political impasse led to increased violence between the Arab and Jewish communities.24 In an attempt to end the fighting, the Security Council called for a cease-fire, and on 23 April 1948 established a Truce Commission for Palestine composed of the Belgian, French, and American consular

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representatives in Jerusalem, to supervise the cease-fire. The General Assembly on 14 May appointed Count Folke Bernadotte, president of the Swedish Red Cross, as United Nations Mediator for Palestine to work with the Truce Commission in supervising the truce while mediating the dispute between the two warring communities. On the same day, the British mandate expired and the Jewish Agency in Palestine proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel in the territories under its control. The United States immediately recognized the new state, followed within three days by the Soviet Union. On 15 May, armed forces from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Transjordan entered Palestine and joined with Arab irregular forces in an attempt to destroy the newly-created Jewish state. Although the combined Arab forces outnumbered the Israeli forces in manpower and equipment, political divisions among the Arabs and a lack of operational coordination between their armies allowed the more cohesive and better organized Israeli forces to check the Arab offensive by early June.25 Establishing a Peace Observation Mission At the United Nations, disagreement over the authority and jurisdiction of the Security Council in this matter prevented the Council from authorizing the establishment of a UN military force to maintain order in Palestine, despite a request from the chairman of the Palestine Commission. Instead, the Security Council on 29 May called for a four-week cease-fire and authorized sending military observers to assist the Mediator in supervising the truce. A truce agreement went into effect on 11 June, and military observers from the nations comprising the Truce Commission (Belgium, France, and the United States), along with senior staff officers from Sweden, were dispatched to the region.26 These observers would form the nucleus of what was to become the UN’s most versatile, and longest standing, peacekeeping operation—the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO). The truce ended on 8 July 1948, when Egyptian forces renewed their offensive. Fighting erupted throughout Palestine, with Israeli forces recovering much of the territory they lost in May. On 15 July, the Security Council adopted a tough resolution ordering the belligerents to establish a cease-fire or face “further action under Chapter VII of the Charter as may be decided upon by the Council,” thus implying the use of enforcement procedures if necessary. Instead of a short-term truce, the Security Council called for an open-ended truce, supervised by the Mediator and his military observers, to remain in force “until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached.”27 This decision, Security Council Resolution 54 (1948), in effect served as the open-ended mandate for UNTSO to operate in the


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region. Since no final agreement has ever been reached as to the status of Palestine, to this day UNTSO continues to operate under this resolution. All parties initially complied with the cease-fire order, and fighting stopped on 18 July. UNTSO observers deployed throughout the region, watching each of the armies, the ports, and the road between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The area, however, did not remain calm for long. In September, Count Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem by members of a Jewish underground group called the Stern Gang, following his recommendation to the General Assembly that the Negev region be assigned to the Arab state. American diplomat Ralph Bunche was appointed Acting Mediator.28 The truce collapsed in the south as Israeli forces moved to wrest control of the Negev desert from Egypt. Fighting continued on and off throughout the fall of 1948, with both the Arabs and the Israelis attempting to gain control over as much territory as possible between cease-fire resolutions. By early January 1949, Israel had control of the Negev and Egypt’s forces in Gaza were in danger of being cut off from their lines of communication. On 6 January, Egypt agreed to enter into negotiations for a United Nations supervised armistice. Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria soon followed suit, and a series of armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors were concluded in July 1949.29 UNTSO’s role changed with the implementation of the General Armistice Agreements. The role of the Mediator ended, and UNTSO became an autonomous mission reporting to the Security Council. UNTSO supervised the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MAC) set up between Israel and each of its Arab neighbors to investigate complaints by the parties concerning the observance of the armistice. In 1951, the Secretary General gained greater control over UNTSO when the status of its military Chief of Staff was changed from observer to Principal Director and later Assistant Secretary General.30 Although each of the armistice agreements included provisions for the truce to transition to a permanent peace between the belligerents, progress to that end did not follow. Instead, in what has become the strongest criticism of United Nations peacekeeping operations, a stalemate ensued. With the fighting ended and the sense of urgency removed from the situation, the belligerents’, as well as the international community’s, incentive to resolve the underlying conflict in Palestine diminished.31 Israel had achieved independence and expanded its territory beyond that allocated by the United Nations partition plan. Transjordan occupied and later annexed the West Bank portion of Palestine. Egypt occupied Gaza. Syria and Lebanon had gained nothing. The Palestinian Arabs had lost everything. Almost a million were displaced and stateless, most being consigned to living in refugee

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camps throughout the area.32 No one was in the mood for compromise. The international community seemed satisfied to have ended the immediate threat of a regional war and turned its attention to the more pressing problems of the US-Soviet Cold War rivalry.

ANALYSIS OF THE ARMISTICE REGIME The series of bilateral armistice agreements brokered by the United Nations between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria formed the basis for an international armistice regime in the region. These armistice agreements constituted an important stage in the peacemaking process. The earlier ceasefires and truces were merely temporary cessations of hostilities between the belligerent parties, while the armistice agreements implied the parties had decided to stop fighting pending the implementation of a final peace settlement, the ultimate objective of the Security Council. Aryeh Shalev, in his study of the Israel-Syria armistice regime, contended that Israel also had these expectations, at least initially, but the Arab states did not share this view. According to Shalev, the Arabs saw the armistice agreements as “a means to stabilize the ceasefire and prevent additional debacles in war.” Shalev argued that as Israel became aware that the Arab states were not likely to enter into peace negotiations, it modified its goal to that of preserving the armistice regime, in a sense preserving the status quo.33 The Arab states, having lost so much during the war—in pride as well as territory—were less interested in maintaining the armistice; preserving the status quo was not in their interests.34 As Shalev concluded: A temporary agreement can remain in effect for a limited period despite basic differences between the adversaries. However, it cannot overcome and resolve acute disparities. If such an agreement becomes permanent, the danger is that it will perpetuate and perhaps aggravate the disputes, until finally the agreement collapses under its own weight, and fighting resumes.35

Norms, Principles, Rules, and Procedures of the Armistice Regime The actual General Armistice Agreements constituted the formal basis of an international regime. The international organization that administered the regime was UNTSO, as the primary agent for the United Nations. The implied principles of the armistice regime were based on Article 40, Chapter VI, of the United Nations Charter: The United Nations would


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only intercede with the consent of the parties concerned, and coercive force would not be used by the United Nations, or the parties themselves, to end the conflict. Stephen Krasner has pointed out that diffuse principles “condition behavior in specific issue-areas. In international relations, the most important diffuse principle is sovereignty.” He also maintained that “sovereignty is not an analytic assumption, it is a principle that influences the behavior of actors.”36 While the armistice regime clearly respected this principle, the United Nations maintained its position that the agreements could not be unilaterally abrogated. Examples of explicit principles of the Israel-Syria armistice regime included an injunction against the resort to military force by the parties, and the provision “that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce.” Most importantly: “It is also recognized that no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military, and not by political, considerations.”37 The armistice regime was based on the norm that the control of violence could be achieved without resorting to the use of force or enforcement measures. The United Nations did not impose a solution by outside powers using military force; instead it offered the interposition of neutral third-party observers to oversee armistice agreements between sovereign, consenting states. Under the auspices of the Mixed Armistice Commissions, these observers, by their presence, neutrality and impartiality, and moral authority were intended to provide stability in a conflict situation. The armistice regime was a series of agreements between belligerent military forces—not political arrangements between states. It was not designed to be an end in itself, but was assumed to be a means to facilitate the political conflict resolution process. Regime rules and decision-making procedures also were outlined in the armistice agreements. For example, the “Rule of Procedure of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission”38 was based on Article VII of the Armistice Agreement, and specified how meetings of the MAC were to be convened; the composition and roles of the members; the meeting, voting, decision-making, and reporting procedures; and how those rules and procedures could be amended. The armistice regime by itself, however, could not resolve the ArabIsraeli conflict; it was but one dimension in the peacebuilding process. The United Nations recognized that without effective political peacemaking (negotiation and mediation), the armistice regime might only serve to prolong the dispute by freezing the situation, thus relieving the pressures

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on the parties involved to find a solution to the conflict. In terms of success in a conflict resolution process, Diehl found two conditions which he considered crucial: The willingness of the belligerents to make concessions, and the actions taken by third-party states to mediate the conflict.39 Evidence indicates the first condition was not met by any of the parties, particularly after 1953. Shalev argues that the collapse of the armistice regime was gradual. Both sides violated the rules and norms of the regime, inciting a cycle of violence and reprisals.40 Mona Ghali listed three factors that inhibited UNTSO from fulfilling its mandate: Lack of cooperation from the parties to the conflict; poorly marked demarcation lines; and UNTSO’s structure of unarmed observer parties, which was inadequate to handle the types of problems in the demilitarized zones.41 Despite these limitations and the ultimate failure of the MAC, UNTSO functioned in arenas outside the MAC to maintain the rudiments of a peacekeeping regime in the region. UNTSO conducted its own investigations of incidents, reporting to the Secretary General and the Security Council, which produced a restraining effect on the parties. UNTSO also had a stabilizing effect in the areas of the armistice demarcation lines. It arranged local cease-fires, escorted convoys, operated fixed observation posts, and most importantly, often defused volatile situations and prevented the escalation of military action. At the political level, UNTSO provided a crucial means of contact between states that did not have diplomatic relations with each other. As Alan James concluded about UNTSO’s effectiveness: “It was probably essential for the maintenance of overall stability—which, for most of the time, was what both sides wanted. If war was actually sought—as it was by Israel in 1956 and 1967—[UNTSO] could do nothing about it. But short of that situation, its impartial presence was a huge help in preventing unwanted conflagrations.”42 While the United Nations was prepared to mediate the conflict, its ability to function depended on the willingness of the belligerents to compromise. However, the parties were not prepared to make significant political concessions. Stalemate in the peacemaking process led to a weakening of the armistice regime, as actual practice gradually became inconsistent with established principles, norms, rules, and procedures. The result was failure in the conflict resolution process, disintegration of the armistice regime, and ultimately the resumption of military conflict. The armistice regime eventually collapsed,43 but UNTSO, the peacekeeping organization that administered it, remained in place, to become the nucleus of the first modern peacekeeping regime. As Robert Keohane posited, because regimes are costly and difficult to create, existing ones


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will tend to evolve rather than be destroyed or replaced by new ones.44 The principles, norms, rules, and procedures of the early armistice regime would be incorporated into the peacekeeping regime established after the 1956 Sinai war.

Chapter Three

Establishing the Middle East Peacekeeping Regime

This chapter examines events in the Middle East during Wiseman’s 1956– 1967 Assertive period, and describes the emergence of a modern peacekeeping regime during the 1956 Suez Crisis, with a focus on the crucial case study of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). While the earlier United Nations Truce Supervision Organization was tasked with maintaining the armistice regime between Israel and its Arab neighbors, UNEF would prove to be a model for future peacekeeping missions in the Middle East as well as other conflict arenas. The Mixed Armistice Commissions set the framework for a peacekeeping regime in the Middle East, and UNEF was to borrow many of the norms and principles of that earlier regime. The emergence of a distinct peacekeeping regime, defined in terms of its recognizable norms, principles, rules, and procedures, however, began with the creation of UNEF. At its inception, UNEF was unique; it could lay claim to being the manifestation of a new category of military operations that would come to be known as peacekeeping. As such, UNEF served as the catalyst for the peacekeeping regime’s principles, developed by United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold: Consent and cooperation of the parties in dispute; troop contingents provided by member nations other than the permanent members of the Security Council; impartiality; and the use of force by peacekeepers only in self-defense.1 Despite what many critics would see as the ultimate failure of the Middle East peacekeeping regime to prevent the outbreak of war, both UNEF’s strengths and weaknesses would reappear in future peacekeeping missions. UNEF therefore is not just another historical mission; it is the crucial case study that for decades defined, for better or worse, the mind’s-eye view of international peacekeeping among policy makers.

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THE SUEZ CRISIS AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT The development of the first modern peacekeeping mission would occur within the crucible of the Middle East. Diplomatic efforts had failed to resolve the tensions underlying the Arab-Israeli conflict that had brought the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to the Middle East. Despite armistice agreements, low-level violence continued intermittently between Israel and its Arab neighbors from 1949 to 1956. Tensions remained highest along the Egyptian-Israeli armistice demarcation line, especially in the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip, where thousands of displaced Palestinians languished and Cairo-instigated raids into Israel were a regular occurrence. In July 1952, a bloodless military coup replaced the Egyptian monarch, Farouk, with the Revolutionary Command Council led by members of the Free Officers movement, whose political agenda included anti-imperialism, social justice, and pan-Arabism. General Mohammed Naguib was selected by the officers to be the prime minister and provisional president of the new Egyptian republic. After an internal power struggle among the leaders of the movement, Lieutenant Colonel Gamal abd al Nasser, the real leader of the junta, replaced Naguib as prime minister in April 1954. Nasser’s popularity increased following his successful renegotiation of a treaty with Britain in July, in which Britain agreed to end almost eighty years of military presence and withdraw its forces from the Suez Canal Zone over the following twenty months. Nasser completed his consolidation of power in November when Naguib was removed from office and Nasser ascended to the presidency.2 During this same period, tensions between Israel and Egypt became increasingly more volatile. Egypt had steadfastly refused to allow Israeli ships to use the Suez Canal or transit the Strait of Tiran into the Red Sea, despite several UN resolutions calling upon Egypt to do so. Nasser’s growing popularity in the Arab world and his attempts to unify the Arabs under his leadership posed the threat of a coordinated Arab encirclement of Israel.3 In Israel, meanwhile, hard-liner David Ben-Gurion returned to the Israeli government in 1955 as defense minister following the Lavon Affair, a mishandled intelligence operation in Egypt that resulted in the execution of several Israeli agents and the resignation of Defense Minister Pinchas Lavon. Palestinian fedayeen raids from Gaza and a Czech arms deal with Egypt that same year, along with Nasser’s bellicose statements that Egypt remained in a state of war with Israel despite the General Armistice


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Agreements, convinced Ben-Gurion that another war with the Arabs was inevitable. His fears seemed to be justified when in October 1955, a joint Egyptian-Syrian military command was formed. Although France had been secretly supplying Israel with weapons in contravention of the 1950 Tripartite arms agreement with the United States and Britain, Ben-Gurion was afraid that the Soviet arms pouring into Egypt would eventually tilt the balance of power in favor of the Arabs.4 Israel recognized that the Egyptians would need eighteen to twenty-four months to integrate the new Soviet weapons into their forces, which meant that Israel had a window of opportunity with which to deal with Egypt before the balance of military power shifted to Cairo’s advantage.5 By the summer of 1956, Ben-Gurion, who became prime minister in November 1955, and his Army Chief of Staff, Major General Moshe Dayan, had prepared their plans for war. The official pretext for launching a military operation into the Sinai and Gaza would be that it was only a police action aimed at destroying the fedayeen strongholds. In his book The Middle East in World Affairs, however, George Lenczowski argued that Israel’s leaders were planning a preventive war. Their objectives, he said, were to destroy the military power of Egypt, deflate Nasser’s prestige, open the Suez Canal and Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and once the immediate threat to Israel was eliminated, to restart the diplomatic process that would lead to a final peace settlement with the Arabs.6 Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 provided the Israelis with two powerful potential allies, Britain and France. In August, during a visit by a senior Israeli officer attempting to expedite French arms shipments to Israel, French military officials approached the officer and asked him if Israel would cooperate in the event France and Britain conducted military operations to regain Suez. From July to October 1956, the Israelis conducted deliberate offensive-operations planning and secretly made plans with the French, and through them the British, for a coordinated strike on Egypt in late October.7 On 14 October, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden was informed of the French and Israeli discussions, and he immediately directed British military planners to join in the talks. These joint sessions culminated in a 24 October meeting in Sevres, France, during which a secret agreement between Israel, France, and Britain for coordinated action against Egypt was formally adopted. The United States was not informed of these plans.8 The Israelis for their part were not concerned with taking the Suez Canal. Their intention was to grab control of the Sinai Peninsula, sweep south to break the Egyptian blockade of the Strait of Tiran, and complete the mop-up of Egyptian forces in Gaza. By moving their forces close to

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the Canal, Israel would give Britain and France an excuse for intervening. Crucial to the plan was the destruction of the Egyptian air force. British medium range bombers would handle this, while French aircraft would fly protective missions over Israeli cities. The ruse was completed in October 1956, following Jordan’s entry into the Joint Arab Military Command. Israel mobilized its forces, threatened to strike Jordan, and on 29 October, surprised the Egyptians by attacking their positions in the Sinai.9 Israeli airborne forces parachuted near the eastern end of the Mitla Pass, only thirty miles from the Suez Canal. Other Israeli armored and motorized units, which had appeared to be heading toward Jordan, turned and attacked along three axes toward Egyptian positions in the Sinai.10 The United States immediately requested a meeting of the UN Security Council to consider the Israeli attack on the Sinai. The Security Council was convened on the morning of 30 October, and under the provisions of Article 31 of the Charter, both Egypt and Israel were invited to attend. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major General E.L.M. Burns, reported to the Security Council that Israeli forces had violated the armistice and crossed into Egyptian territory. During that day’s session, both the United States and the Soviet Union condemned the Israeli action. Later that afternoon, the Israeli representative, Abba Eban, defended his nation’s action under Article 51 of the Charter, claiming it was self-defense, aimed at eliminating the fedayeen bases in the Sinai.11 In accordance with the secret Sevres agreement, Anthony Eden issued a statement the same afternoon that was relayed to the Security Council. In it, Eden revealed that the governments of Britain and France had sent joint ultimatums to Egypt and Israel calling upon them to “stop all warlike action” and “to withdraw their military forces to a distance of ten miles from the Canal.” Egypt was also asked to accept Anglo-French forces to be positioned along the Canal “in order to separate the belligerents and to guarantee the freedom of transit through the Canal by the ships of all nations.” If both belligerents did not comply with these conditions within twelve hours, “British and French forces will intervene in whatever strength may be necessary to secure compliance.”12 The British representative to the Security Council, Sir Pierson Dixon, explained that the Anglo-French action was necessary to protect the Canal, and since the Security Council had no military forces at its disposal, this action was being undertaken by Britain and France “in the general interest and in the interest of security and peace.” The Security Council did not accept Dixon’s explanation. The United States submitted a draft resolution calling on Israel to withdraw its forces and United Nations members to “refrain from the use of force or threat of force in the area.” Despite British and French objections, the draft resolution was put to a vote. Both France


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and Britain vetoed this resolution and a subsequent similar Soviet resolution.13 President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles were furious over both the Anglo-French ultimatum and veto. The timing could not have been worse. Eisenhower was facing an election in less than a week. With the Soviets turning the Hungarian revolt into a bloodbath, and his closest allies attempting to settle the Suez crisis with old-fashioned gunboat diplomacy, Eisenhower decided to support the United Nations Charter to the letter in both cases.14 As expected, the Egyptian government rejected the Anglo-French ultimatum. As planned, the Israeli government did accept the ultimatum, but only on condition that the Egyptians followed suit. Also as planned, British and French aircraft began attacking Egyptian airfields on 31 October. An Anglo-French amphibious force, which had earlier been assembled on Malta and had left port on 30 October, was headed for Port Said at the entrance of the Suez Canal. As Nasser became aware of the threat arrayed against him, he ordered a partial withdraw of Egyptian forces in the Sinai to protect the Canal and at the same time ordered the sinking of a number of ships in the Canal to block passage.15 The Security Council met again on the afternoon of 31 October, following the initiation of Anglo-French operations against Egypt. With the Council paralyzed by the British and French vetoes, and the conflict in the Sinai threatening to spread with the imminent introduction of Anglo-French forces, Yugoslavia proposed that an emergency session of the General Assembly be convened under the provisions of General Assembly Resolution 377 A (V) of 1950, the “Uniting for Peace Resolution.”16 With US support, the Yugoslav proposal was put to a vote and adopted. Both Britain and France voted against the resolution, but because it was a procedural matter, the vote was not subject to the permanent member veto rule.17 The General Assembly met in its first emergency special session on 1 November. The following day, the Assembly passed Resolution 997 (ES-1), based on a US draft, which called on all parties involved to accept a cease-fire, withdraw their forces, observe the provisions of the existing armistice, refrain from introducing any more military material into the area, and take steps to reopen the Suez Canal. Egypt accepted the resolution, but argued it could not be implemented because of the presence of Israeli forces on its territory. Having reached its objectives on 2 November, Israel agreed to a cease-fire, but only if Egypt also complied.18 On 3 November, both Britain and France replied that they would cease operations once Israel and Egypt agreed to a cease-fire and the United Nations provided a force to separate the belligerents. In addition,

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the allies required that both belligerents accept the Anglo-French troops as an interposition force between their armies until such time as a United Nations force could be organized and dispatched to the area.19 While these conditions were unacceptable to the General Assembly, they provided impetus for an idea Lester Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, had earlier proposed to Secretary General Hammarskjold. Pearson initially had proposed that the Anglo-French force be sanctioned by the General Assembly to act as a United Nations force to supervise the cessation of hostilities.20 Support for this proposal was not forthcoming, and Pearson offered an alternate proposal for the creation of an international force under UN command to be sent to the Sinai and Suez Canal region to separate the belligerents and supervise their withdrawal. Hammarskjold had serious doubts that such a proposal could be supported in the General Assembly. Pearson was able, however, to get Henry Cabot Lodge, the US ambassador to the United Nations, to support the concept on 3 November. Encouraged by this development, Hammarskjold began work with Pearson to gain support within the Assembly for the proposal.21 Pearson’s proposal was adopted as Resolution 998 (ES-1) by the General Assembly on 4 November. It called on the Secretary General “to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.”22 The General Assembly also adopted Resolution 999 (ES-1) on that same day, reaffirming its 2 November Resolution 997 call for an immediate cease-fire and prompt withdrawal of all forces behind armistice lines. This resolution also authorized the Secretary General to arrange the cease-fire, and requested him to report back to the Assembly on his progress within twelve hours.23 Hammarskjold submitted his first report to the General Assembly later that day. After consulting with a number of delegates, he was able to report that Colombia and Norway had agreed to contribute troops to the proposed force. Hammarskjold proposed immediately establishing a United Nations Command with Major General E.L.M. Burns, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, to be appointed the force commander. Hammarskjold also recommended that General Burns be authorized to recruit officers from UNTSO to form a skeleton staff for the force.24 During the early morning of 5 November, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1000 (ES-1) which accepted the Secretary General’s plan and established “a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-1) of 2 November 1956.” General Burns was appointed Chief of the Command and authorized to recruit


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from UNTSO officers “who shall be nationals of countries other than those having permanent membership in the Security Council” to form the nucleus of the new command.25 Despite these developments, British and French forces landed at Port Said and Port Fouad at the Canal’s outlet to the Mediterranean Sea on 5 November. The Soviet Union heightened the tension by sending notes on 5 November to Britain, France, and Israel threatening military action unless they accepted the cease-fire.26 The Soviet Union also requested an immediate convening of the Security Council, where it submitted a draft resolution that was an ultimatum to Britain, France, and Israel to accept a cease-fire. If the conditions of the ultimatum were not complied with, the proposed resolution called on the Security Council to invoke Article 42 of the Charter and “give military and other assistance to the republic of Egypt.” Distrustful of Soviet motives, the Security Council declined to adopt the resolution.27 Faced with overwhelming international political opposition, a serious drain of gold and dollar reserves due to American actions in the International Monetary Fund, and the escalating Soviet threat, the British government agreed to accept a cease-fire the evening of 5 November. France quickly followed suit. Israel, having captured both Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh at the southern tip of the Sinai, also accepted the cease-fire the same day.28

UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION Following intense debate in the General Assembly and behind-the-scenes negotiations with various parties involved in the crisis, the Secretary General submitted his second report to the Assembly on 6 November 1956. In it, Hammarskjold outlined the fundamental principles to govern the new command, its functions, size, organization, means of recruitment, and method of financing.29 He further described three different possible concepts for the proposed force. First, the force could be set up according to the principles of the United Nations Charter, with the chief of the new command appointed by, and responsible to, the General Assembly or the Security Council. His relationship to the Secretary General would be similar to that of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, and his status and authority would make him independent of the policies and influence of any single nation. As a second alternative, the force could be organized similarly to the United Nations Command in Korea. One nation, or a group of nations, could be charged by the United Nations with providing a suitable force to undertake missions determined by the United Nations. Hammarskjold recognized that this force would be far less independent of national policies than the first

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type of force. Under the third option, United Nations authority could be conferred on an existing force from one or more nations for the purposes of undertaking United Nations missions. In this case, Hammarskjold was referring to the proposal to grant United Nations authority to the Anglo-French forces already present in Egypt. As with the second option, Hammarskjold recognized the problems this type of force would have in terms of national policies. Hammarskjold concluded that the General Assembly, in its decision to establish a United Nations Command in Resolution 1000, had already chosen the first alternative. By doing so, the General Assembly had also established several of the guiding principles of the force: The independence of the Force Commander in recruiting; the exclusion of the five permanent members of the Security Council from the force; the neutrality and temporary nature of the force; the requirement for consent of the parties concerned; and the recognition that this was not an enforcement action. Referring to the provisions in Resolution 998 that called for the establishment of a United Nations Force “with the consent of the nations concerned” and empowered to “secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities,” Hammarskjold laid out his plan: These two provisions combined indicate that the functions of the United Nations Force would be, when a cease-fire is being established, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government, in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the other terms established in the resolution of 2 November 1956. The Force obviously should have no rights other than those necessary for the execution of its function, in co-operation with local authorities. It would be more than an observer corps, but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it is stationed—nor, moreover, should the Force have military functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions on the assumption that the Parties to the conflict take all necessary steps for compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly. Its functions, on this basis, can be assumed to cover an area extending roughly from the Suez Canal to the Armistice Demarcation Line, established in the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel.30

Hammarskjold left open the exact size and precise organization of the new force, deferring to the judgment of the Chief of Command, but he did recommend that contributing nations provide self-contained units


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of battalion strength that would be immediately available for service. The Secretary General also recommended “a balanced composition in the force,” with as broad participation by member states as possible. This would be in keeping with the force’s international character, and prevent any single nation or bloc of nations from exercising undue influence. As for financing the force, Hammarskjold recommended further study, but he did argue “a nation providing a unit would be responsible for all costs for equipment and salaries, while all other costs should be financed outside the normal budget of the United Nations.” Recognizing that there was no accurate way to estimate the cost for such an operation, Hammarskjold recommended the General Assembly “vote a general authorization for the cost of the Force.”31 Hammarskjold concluded his report by recommending that the General Assembly establish an advisory committee to the Secretary General to further explore the questions left open regarding the operation of the force. With acceptance of the Secretary General’s second report as the basis for ending the crisis, Britain, France, Israel, and Egypt accepted a cease-fire. The General Assembly approved the Secretary General’s second report and authorized its implementation in Resolution 1001 (ES-1) on 7 November. A second resolution, 1002 (ES-1), was adopted the same day, again calling on Israel, Britain, and France immediately to withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory. Hammarskjold informed Egypt at the same time that the United Nations Force was ready to begin operations. However, Cairo withheld permission for the new command to enter its territory until the Secretary General clarified its purpose and its legal effect on Egyptian sovereignty. Following several conversations between Egyptian government representatives and Hammarskjold, on 14 November, Cairo accepted the Secretary General’s interpretations and consented to the entry of United Nations troops into its territory.32 Pattern of Superpower Support for United Nations Intervention During the initial Security Council debates, the United States and the Soviet Union supported and encouraged UN efforts to resolve the crisis. While the United States hoped international pressure would dissuade the British, French, and Israelis from escalating the crisis and force them to cease their operations against Egypt, the Soviets seemed more interested in using UN enforcement authority to take direct action that would divide the United States from its traditional allies, and possibly destroy the Atlantic Alliance. When France and Britain used their veto power to prevent the Security Council from taking effective action, both the United States and the Soviet Union supported Resolution 119 calling for an emergency special session of

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the General Assembly under the “Uniting for Peace” resolution. In a sense, this was extraordinary, since the Soviets had previously maintained that this resolution was in violation of the United Nations Charter and that it was a move to usurp the powers of the Security Council. The superpowers’ voting pattern was consistent throughout these sessions. The United States voted in favor of all the General Assembly resolutions. This was in accordance with President Eisenhower’s policy to follow the rule of law in this instance as well as in the concurrent Hungarian crisis. The Soviet Union, while wishing to punish Britain and France and curry favor with the Arabs, remained opposed to a force created by the General Assembly. The Role of the Secretary General Before, during, and after the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold played a vital role. His attempts during the initial phase of the Suez crisis to secure a cease-fire and halt the movement of armed forces into the area, and his critical role in outlining the guiding principles behind the creation of UNEF, have been detailed above. The General Assembly, through Resolutions 1000 and 1001, requested the Secretary General to take the necessary administrative measures to implement the plan for the creation of UNEF, to issue all regulations and instructions for its functioning, and to enter into discussions with Member States concerning their participation in the force. In this capacity, Hammarskjold issued regulations for UNEF in February 1957, which gave his office authority and responsibility for the administrative, executive, and financial aspects of UNEF. This included arrangements with member states for airlift and over-flight rights, supply, and equipping of the Force. Hammarskjold also saw to it that the Chief of the Command (later to be designated the Force Commander) directly reported to, and exercised his command authority in consultation with, the Secretary General. Hammarskjold was instrumental in arranging several key agreements on the status and functioning of UNEF in Egypt, and his explanations to Cairo (among other governments) of the Force’s character and role convinced Egypt to accept UNEF on its territory. Agreements concerning the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli armed forces from Egypt were made under his authority. In his additional capacity as chairman of the UNEF Advisory Committee, a consultative body with no executive powers, the Secretary General was required to bring to it matters concerning the planning, operation, and regulation of UNEF. The Committee was also


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empowered to request the convening of the General Assembly if necessary, to consider matters of urgency and importance regarding the force.33 While the actions of two permanent members (Britain and France) of the Security Council effectively frustrated the Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations had shown itself to be resilient enough to handle the crisis. Using the provisions of the “Uniting for Peace Resolution,” the General Assembly, guided by the personal dedication of Hammarskjold, found a means to uphold the basic principles of the United Nations Charter and ease tensions in the Middle East. Although ad hoc in its creation, the United Nations Emergency Force was to serve as the model for future UN and multinational peacekeeping forces. The guiding principles set down by Hammarskjold in his two reports to the General Assembly, created in only a few rushed and hectic hours, became, and continued to serve throughout the Cold War era, as the basis for United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the requisite principles for the peacekeeping regime in the Middle East.

CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF UNEF Hammarskjold’s efforts to convince the Egyptian government to accept the United Nations Emergency Force on its territory were successful once it was understood that UNEF would operate in Egypt only with Cairo’s consent. On 15 and 16 November 1956, the advance parties of the Danish, Norwegian, and Colombian contingents arrived in Egypt. By 23 November, almost 1,000 UNEF troops were in the area of operations. Within three months, UNEF would reach its peak strength of 6,000 troops from ten member states.34 UNEF’s original mission, as stated in General Assembly Resolution 1000, was “to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities” in the area.35 Initially, this entailed three responsibilities for UNEF: Supervise the withdrawal from Egyptian territory of the Anglo-French forces positioned around the Suez Canal area; provide security for an international effort to clear the Canal of sunken ships; and act as a moving interposition force between the Israeli and Egyptian forces in the area, to facilitate a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai.36 In February 1957, following the withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the 1949 Armistice Demarcation Line and the international frontier, UNEF was assigned a long-term mission as an interposition buffer force along the Armistice Demarcation Line in the Gaza Strip and along the international frontier in the Sinai. UNEF was to remain in place for over ten years, and through its presence was instrumental in preventing incidents, maintaining a truce, and reducing anxiety in the area.37

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What UNEF did not do, nor was it ever designed to do, was to prevent the resumption of full-scale hostilities between Israel and Egypt. When political tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors intensified in May 1967, Egypt withdrew its consent for UNEF to operate in its territory and requested Secretary General U Thant (who succeeded Hammarskjold after his death in 1961) to withdraw the UN troops. The Secretary General reluctantly complied, and UNEF ended its operational role on 19 May. On 5 June, during UNEF’s month-long evacuation process, Israel launched a pre-emptive attack into the Sinai. Within six days, Israeli forces defeated the Arab coalition armies and occupied all of the Sinai as well as the Syrian Golan Heights and the West Bank of Jordan. This time, Israel remained in the territory it had conquered. While United Nations observers from UNTSO remained in the region occupying outposts along the new cease-fire lines, it would take another war in 1973 before a subsequent UN peacekeeping operation would return to the region.38

THE PEACEKEEPING STRUCTURE AND FORCE COMPOSITION The organizational structure established by the General Assembly for UNEF became the model for sixteen subsequent peacekeeping force or observer missions created by the Security Council over the next thirty-five years. The new peacekeeping regime contained components that existed prior to the Suez crisis as well as those that were specially created for this initial operation. The existing structure comprised the General Assembly as the authorizing body, the Secretariat as the executive manager, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), UNTSO and its Mixed Armistice Commissions, and the various member states in their roles as disputing parties, force contributors, or host nation. Those components that the Assembly created for the first time were the Advisory Committee, the office of Special Military Advisor to the Secretary General, the United Nations Suez Clearance Organization (UNSCO), and UNEF. In addition to the operating agencies of UNEF, UNTSO, UNRWA, and UNSCO, the Secretariat provided elements from several of its functional offices to support the operation. These included Public Information, the Comptroller, and General Services. The General Services provided significant numbers of civilian representatives for the Field Operations Service, Special Political Affairs, Personnel, and Legal Counsel offices in the area of operations.39 These international civil servants provided the military organization and other operating agencies with the necessary administrative, financial, and facilities maintenance support. They also played a key role in arranging host-nation support agreements for UNEF. Because they


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typically were career UN personnel, these civilians provided continuity and served as the institutional memory for UNEF, whose military members usually were seconded to the organization for only a year.40 The Secretary General’s initial task was to provide UNEF with its formal mandate. Defined as the will and intent of the United Nations in creating a peacekeeping force, the mandate included five parts. The first part consisted of the various resolutions passed by the General Assembly in emergency session, which established the requirements for a peacekeeping force, gave the Secretary General executive responsibility, and defined the Force’s role.41 The second component, a Status of Forces Agreement, was worked out between Hammarskjold and the government of Egypt, and signed on 20 November 1956. In addition to defining the Force’s status in Egypt and providing the members with certain immunities, the agreement authorized the Force to maintain arms and established the principle of freedom of movement by members of the Force within the area of operations. Israel refused to allow UNEF to operate in its territory, so no status of forces agreement was negotiated between Tel Aviv and the United Nations. The third part of the mandate comprised the several agreements negotiated by the Secretary General and concluded on 21 June 1957, with those member states contributing forces to UNEF. Some nations placed limitations on the uses to which their forces would be put, while others requested time limits. 42 The remaining two components of the mandate outlined the internal functioning of UNEF. Normally, the Secretary General would issue formal Terms of Reference to the Force Commander, similar in nature to military general orders. Initially, however, Hammarskjold did not provide this document to the Force Commander. General Burns understood that the rushed and improvised manner in which the force was created prevented the Secretariat from issuing him such a document, but as he wrote later, “my difficulties were increased by the absence of a definite instruction as to how it was intended that the force would be constituted and would function, and its relations to the Egyptian authorities.”43 In the end, no single document containing the Terms of Reference seems to have been created. Instead, the reports issued by the Secretary General during the first two years of UNEF’s operation contain the elements of what would be found in such a document in later missions.44 The document detailing Force Regulations also was late in being issued, and for most of the same reasons. The Secretary General, following consultations with the Advisory Committee, issued the Regulations on 20 February 1957, with an attached note stating that they were intended to continue the orders and instructions previously issued to the Force, and to codify the practices under which UNEF had been operating.45

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The two UN organizations operating in the region prior to the Suez crisis, UNTSO and UNRWA, assisted UNEF in the first few months of its existence. When UNTSO Chief of Staff General Burns was appointed the first UNEF commander, he brought with him a small planning staff made up of officers from UNTSO, to assist in creating an operational staff for UNEF. Later, UNTSO’s Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission was placed under UNEF’s operational control to help resolve disputes and maintain a channel of communication between Israel and Egypt. UNRWA helped UNEF with civil affairs and public works management during the temporary UN administration of the Gaza Strip following the Israeli withdrawal in early March 1957, until Egyptian authority could be restored in the area.46 UNEF itself was configured similarly to a division-sized military force, but without the usual complement of armor, artillery, or heavy weapons. Battalion-sized units ranging from 500 to 1,000 men were the standard contingents supplied by the various contributing states. These contingents included seven infantry and two reconnaissance units, along with military police, communications, aviation, engineering, medical, transportation, personnel services, logistics, and maintenance units. The actual strength of UNEF varied over its ten-year existence, from its initially authorized level of about 6,000 troops in September 1957 to a reduced level of 3,378 at the time of its withdrawal in May 1967.47 Following discussions with General Burns and the government of Egypt, the Secretary General accepted the offers of contingents from ten member states, basing his decisions on the principles of balanced representation and exclusion of the permanent members of the Security Council from the Force. Infantry battalions were supplied by Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, and Sweden. Denmark and Norway supplied a combined infantry battalion. Finland sent a large infantry company. Yugoslavia sent a reconnaissance battalion and Canada furnished a reconnaissance squadron. Canada and India provided most of the support and logistical assets, with Norway and Sweden sending medical units, and Yugoslavia and India furnishing additional support elements. The governments of India and Finland had agreed to provide contingents for only a limited time, and their units were withdrawn in late 1957. The Columbian battalion withdrew in 1958, and the Canadian reconnaissance squadron left in 1966 as part of an overall force reduction. Also, as part of the same force reduction, the combined Danish-Norwegian battalion and the Swedish battalion served on an alternating basis.48 Using standard military organization procedures, Secretary General Hammarskjold and General Burns created a balanced international military


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force that functioned well for over ten years, and would serve as the model for future United Nations peacekeeping forces. The Scope of UNEF’s Activities Prior to the first contingent’s arrival in Egypt, the Secretary General had secured a cease-fire among the four disputing parties. It went into effect at midnight GMT on the night of 7 to 8 November 1956, and with the exception of a few minor incidents, was maintained until the arrival of UNEF.49 The initial elements of the newly created United Nations Emergency Force entered Egypt on 15 November 1956, ten days after authorization by the General Assembly and one day after consent was given by the Egyptian government for the force to operate in its territory. Due to the rushed and ad hoc creation of the force, national contingents arrived piecemeal into the area of operations over the next three months. UNEF deployed into the area of operations in four phases. The first phase began on 12 November 1956 with the arrival in Cairo of General Burns and a temporary staff detached from UNTSO. This phase lasted until late December 1956, and entailed the movement into and positioning of the force around Port Said, Port Fouad, and the Suez Canal, to take temporary control and provide a static interposition buffer line to facilitate the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces. The second phase, from late December 1956 to early March 1957, had UNEF maintain a moving interposition buffer zone during the phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai. During phase three in March 1957, UNEF assumed control of an area of responsibility in the Gaza Strip and the Sharm el Sheikh area from Israeli forces. The fourth and final phase saw UNEF establish a static interposition line between Israeli and Egyptian forces along the Egyptian side of the Armistice Demarcation Line in Gaza, and an interposition screen along the Egyptian side of the international frontier in the Sinai. UNEF also controlled an area of responsibility around Sharm el Sheikh and a portion of the waters of the Strait of Tiran. This phase lasted over ten years, from March 1957 until the Force was withdrawn in May 1967.50 As UNEF became operational in mid-November 1956, the situation on the ground was complicated by the close proximity of the belligerents’ military forces to each other. Anglo-French forces occupied Port Said and Port Fouad at the northern end of the Suez Canal. Israeli forces had overrun most of the Egyptian positions in Gaza and the Sinai, and were in control of the entire peninsula including Sharm el Sheikh at the southern tip overlooking the Strait of Tiran. Israeli front-line forces were deployed approximately ten kilometers east of the Suez Canal, while the bulk of the effective Egyptian

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forces were west of the Canal, with some units on the outskirts of Port Said and Port Fouad.51 UNEF’s first task was to form an interposition buffer line between the Anglo-French forces and the Egyptians in the Port Said area, to supervise the cease-fire and assist in the withdrawal of the allied forces. After arrangements were made between General Burns and the Anglo-French force commanders for their withdrawal, UNEF entered the Port Said area to establish a safety cordon around the allies’ evacuation staging areas. UNEF assumed temporary responsibility for maintaining order in the city and also secured “vulnerable points” such as power plants, water-pumping stations, and telephone exchanges, conducted “show the flag” patrols, and manned checkpoints in the area.52 Other tasks performed by UNEF included reporting violations of the cease-fire, guarding UNSCO salvage vessels, clearing mines in the Suez Canal area, arranging for prisoner-of-war exchanges, handling damage claims, distributing food and fuel, and providing civil administration and humanitarian aid services to the local population.53 During the final withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces in December 1956, UNEF entered into its second phase of activities and arranged for a phased Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. Initial Israeli resistance was based on Tel Aviv’s position that the 1949 Armistice Agreement with Egypt was no longer valid. The government of Israel declared that its forces would not withdraw until Israel’s security could be ensured against the resumption of fedayeen raids and the closing of the Strait of Tiran. In addition, Egypt needed to clarify its position and intentions regarding Israel.54 Under intense pressure from Washington, and following General Assembly Resolution 1120 (XI) of 24 November, which again called on Israel to withdraw its forces behind the armistice lines,55 the Israeli government informed Secretary General Hammarskjold that its forces would begin withdrawing on 3 December 1956.56 In the first phase, Israeli troops pulled back fifty kilometers from the Canal. General Burns and the Israeli commander, Major General Moshe Dayan, arranged for further Israeli withdrawals in the first two weeks of January 1957. General Burns wanted “to ensure that there would be no unforeseen contact between the Israeli forces and UNEF” as the Israelis pulled back and UNEF pushed its interposition buffer zone eastward. Company-sized elements of UNEF moved east along three axes following the Israeli forces. Egyptian forces followed behind UNEF.57 The withdrawal, organized in three stages, was completed by 22 January 1957.58 In addition to acting as a moving buffer force between the withdrawing Israelis and the returning Egyptians, UNEF also carried out extensive mine clearing and road repair along the routes. UNEF arranged for the exchange of prisoners of war between the Israelis and Egyptians, and assumed some


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temporary security functions until Egyptian civil authority could be reestablished.59 Israeli forces remained in control of Sharm el Sheikh and the Gaza Strip after 22 January 1957, necessitating another round of discussions between the Secretary General and the Israeli government, further deliberations and resolutions in the General Assembly, and arm-twisting by Washington. On 1 March, Israel agreed to complete its withdrawal behind the Armistice Demarcation Line, provided that UNEF would temporarily administer Gaza and maintain a presence at Sharm el Sheikh to keep the Strait of Tiran open. Within a few days, General Burns concluded an arrangement with General Dayan, and phase three of UNEF’s operation began. UNEF troops occupied areas of responsibility in Gaza on 6 March and Sharm el Sheikh on 8 March, while UNEF headquarters assumed temporary civil administration responsibility for Gaza, with Egypt’s consent, on 7 March. Its tasks during this phase included providing internal security, ensuring public safety, safeguarding public utilities, establishing checkpoints to control entry and exit, preventing infiltration into Israel, and working with UNRWA to provide humanitarian aid and social services. With approval from the Egyptian government, a UNEF detachment established an observation post at Sharm el Sheikh to observe the Strait of Tiran.60 By 8 March 1957, UNEF was deployed along the Egyptian side of the Armistice Demarcation Line around the Gaza Strip and along the Israel-Egypt international frontier, eventually covering a distance of 273 kilometers. During the fourth and final phase of its operation, UNEF provided a static interposition line between the Egyptian and Israeli forces in Gaza and maintained an interposition screen along the international frontier in the Sinai. During this phase, UNEF’s main task was to supervise the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Egypt. In addition to providing a buffer between the two forces, UNEF was tasked to prevent illegal line-crossings; observe and report all ground, air, or sea violations of the Armistice Line, international frontier, and territorial waters; and to observe the Strait of Tiran to ensure freedom of navigation. To accomplish these tasks, UNEF established and manned seventy-two observation posts along a fifty-nine kilometer stretch of the Armistice Demarcation Line and part of the international frontier. To cover the remaining rough terrain along the international frontier in the Sinai, UNEF conducted vehicle patrols between eight outposts along the frontier and flew aerial patrols several times a week.61 In performing its tasks, UNEF operated under several key principles: consent and cooperation of the parties involved, non-use of force, and freedom of movement. Cooperation from the Egyptian authorities was crucial during the ten years UNEF operated along the Armistice Demarcation Line

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and international frontier. Cairo made it clear to the inhabitants of Gaza that it was opposed to infiltration, for whatever reason, across the Armistice Line. Civilians were forbidden to approach the Armistice Line closer than fifty to one hundred meters by day and five hundred meters by night. UNEF was authorized to apprehend, disarm, and interrogate infiltrators, which it would then turn over to Egyptian authorities. Both the Egyptian and local Palestinian police cooperated with UNEF in the apprehension of line-crossers and those persons suspected of mining roads. Officers from UNTSO assigned to the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission had remained in Gaza during the Israeli occupation, and once UNEF moved in they were placed under operational control of the Force Command. They played a significant role in maintaining liaison with Egyptian authorities and investigating incidents and violation of the Armistice. Egypt granted UNEF full freedom of movement in its area of operations. This included over-flight rights for United Nations aircraft over the Sinai and Gaza Strip. Cooperation with Israeli authorities was more difficult. Israel refused to allow UNEF troops to operate in its territory, so UNEF activities were limited to the Egyptian side of the Armistice Line and the international frontier. Israel claimed that the General Armistice Agreement of 1949 was no longer valid, and it refused to participate further in the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission. Instead, Tel Aviv referred all complaints directly to UNEF. As a practical matter, UNEF assumed some of the responsibilities of UNTSO when dealing with the Israelis.62 Although lightly armed, UNEF troops were not authorized to use force in accomplishing their tasks, except in self-defense. UNEF could not initiate fire but it could respond with appropriate armed force if attacked. Reaction forces were maintained at intervals behind the line of observation posts to intervene if needed. Nighttime “flashlight ambushes” were conducted by foot patrols to apprehend infiltrators, but UNEF troops were not allowed to fire on the infiltrators unless fired upon.63 In the performance of its operational tasks, UNEF also accomplished its main task—keeping the peace along what had once been a very volatile and dangerous frontier. By its visible presence, UNEF provided “a tranquilizing atmosphere of law and order in which the normal, stabilized and self-sufficient population of an area or city could go about their daily routines safely.”64

THE IMPACT OF UNEF ON THE PEACEKEEPING REGIME The ad hoc structure, guiding principles, and operational functions of peacekeeping designed by Hammarskjold during the creation UNEF in 1956 had both immediate and long-term effects on the role of the United Nations in


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maintaining international peace and security, and on the nature of future missions in the Middle East peacekeeping regime. The Suez crisis was political in origin, with the antagonists resorting to military force to achieve their various political goals. The international community reacted with political, economic, and military means to resolve the conflict. The United Nations specified its requirements for intervening and undertaking a peacekeeping operation by calling on member states to provide the troops, material, and funds for the operation. It also created a unique structure to manage the regime, one responsible to the organization and not to the interests of any single nation.65 The political arrangements of the regime were ambiguous, however, and over time tended to be neglected by both the organization and the international community. Nothing in UNEF’s mandate specified how the Force’s peacekeeping operations would enhance the peacemaking process. Lester Pearson of Canada voiced an early criticism of this omission during the initial emergency session debates in the General Assembly: “Surely we should have used this opportunity to link a cease-fire to the absolute necessity of a political settlement in Palestine and for the Suez, and perhaps we might also have been able to recommend a procedure by which this absolutely essential process might begin.”66 Israel and most of the Western member states agreed in principle with linking the cease-fire to a political settlement, but the urgency of the situation demanded quick compromise to field the peacekeeping force. In contrast, Egypt and other Arab states, as well as the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc, interpreted UNEF’s mandate to be temporary and its activities confined to securing a cease-fire, supervising the withdrawal of foreign forces, and restoring the conditions of the original armistice. Consequently, the compromise over creating UNEF neither made provisions for a political-diplomatic element within the regime, nor provided any incentive for the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to accept mediation or undertake negotiations as part of the regime.67 For its part, UNEF kept the international frontier quiet and produced a stalemate. While it was not really peace, at least it was not war. Ultimately though, the failure by the United Nations, the parties to the conflict, and the superpowers to expand the regime by undertaking effective peacemaking between 1956 and 1967 was to have a disastrous outcome in May 1967, when the underlying conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors once again turned violent. The economic requirements of creating and sustaining the regime initially were met through contributions of troops, equipment, and logistical support from various member states. By all accounts the military requirements of maintaining the regime were successfully met.68 In the mid-1960s,

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political differences over the legality of peacekeeping operations mandated by the General Assembly resulted in refusal by the Soviet Union, France, and several other member states to fund such operations. The resulting financial crisis in the United Nations nearly crippled its ability to fund peacekeeping missions until a compromise could be worked out.69 The peacekeeping regime structure was ad hoc by design. UNEF, organized as a self-contained “lightly-equipped, semi-mobile, austere division-sized formation”70 with an appropriate mix of infantry, reconnaissance, and support units, served as the military element of the regime. It was deployed first to prevent the resumption of hostilities, then later to pacify an area prone to violent confrontations. Although military by nature, it operated under the peacekeeping regime principles of consent, neutrality, freedom of movement, and non-use of force. The peacekeeping regime performed a variety of military, economic, social welfare, and public administration tasks. Some, such as the prevention of further hostilities and pacification of a demarcation line, were delineated in UNEF’s original mandate. Other tasks, such as civil administration, humanitarian assistance and normalization of activities within an area of responsibility, were not anticipated during the initial planning for the mission, and can be considered examples of regime organizational task expansion.71 Several members of the International Peace Academy (IPA), themselves former peacekeepers, cautioned critics of UNEF to remember that: It was the first of the force level operations conducted by the United Nations based on the principle of third-party peaceful intervention rather than enforcement. There were no guidelines from history, no standing procedures, no previous practical experience for the planners to follow. . . . This was a first for the organization itself, as well as for the national contingents that made up UNEF.72

UNEF was designed primarily to perform security tasks. The organization itself did not have a political or diplomatic element, as its successors would, to deal with political problems or manage organizational task expansion. Two other critical elements were missing from UNEF’s mandate: a prescribed, and renewable, period of operations; and consent from Israel to operate on its territory. If UNEF had operated under a six-month renewable mandate, as did later missions, then the hasty withdrawal in May 1967 might have been averted, and further negotiations undertaken to prevent new outbreaks of hostilities. Israel’s refusal to allow UNEF to operate on its territory added to the force’s operational difficulties and gave it


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no flexibility when Cairo withdrew its consent to have UNEF stationed on Egyptian soil. Despite these limitations, as the IPA members concluded: In a military sense much was learned from the UNEF operation that has been applied with advantage in successive operations. . . . Possibly the most far-reaching experience of all was the development of operational procedures and wide-ranging techniques for use by multinational forces. . . . UNEF can take credit for being the pioneer of this development.73

The Middle East peacekeeping regime was successful in averting an accidental war between Israel and Egypt. What the regime did not accomplish, nor was it ever really designed to do, was to prevent the resumption of full-scale deliberate hostilities between Israel and Egypt. As Alan James pointed out: Rather, it helped these two states to implement their temporary disposition to live in peace. It was a derivative rather than a substantive obstruction to the worsening of the situation, making it a secondary rather than a primary contribution to peace. But that is not at all to say that it was of little importance. Without [UNEF] anxiety in the area might well have been appreciably higher, and it is very probable that there would have been border incidents. . . . In these circumstances, escalation could have all too easily have taken place, and a serious confrontation have developed. . . . Accordingly, [UNEF] can be given credit not only for having played a significant role in the defusing and immediate resolution of the Suez crisis, but also for having made a contribution of great importance to the maintenance of a very quiet truce between Egypt and Israel from 1957 until 1967. The attitude of the parties, however, and particularly of Egypt, meant that the situation was no more than a truce.74

With the establishment of UNEF, the pattern for maintaining international peace and security as envisaged by the framers of the United Nations Charter in 1945 was changed from collective security measures to what Secretary General Hammarskjold called preventive diplomacy. By this he meant the use of relatively small UN forces to prevent the deterioration of situations that might threaten international peace, while buying time for peaceful negotiations to begin. Instead of reliance on enforcement measures, the United Nations adopted a peacekeeping regime as a method of fulfilling its primary responsibility to maintain international peace.

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The roles and responsibilities of the principal organs of the United Nations—the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretariat—were altered and redefined to accommodate this change. Although the Security Council had as its primary responsibility the maintenance of international peace and security, its role was diminished by having to refer the crisis to the General Assembly under the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, following the sustained vetoes by Britain and France. The General Assembly assumed a much more active role in maintaining international peace and security by first taking up the debate, and then authorizing a peacekeeping operation. As the leadership of the Security Council diminished, the roles and responsibilities of the Secretariat greatly expanded. As originally envisioned, the Secretary General was to be primarily the chief administrative officer of the United Nations. The active participation as mediator, planner, and executive agent for the peacekeeping regime by Dag Hammarskjold not only enhanced the stature of the office of the Secretary General, but established a precedent for the Secretariat’s authority in managing peacekeeping missions. That the organization and its member states were able to make these changes in both methodology and philosophy is a tribute to the original framers and “a reflection of the flexibility and willingness of the majority of the membership . . . to make the adjustments to fit actual political circumstances.”75 In his analysis of the impact of the creation of UNEF, John Ries stated that the United Nations’ response to the Suez crisis “proved once again the ability of the real distribution of power in the international community to override ideals.”76 He gave much of the credit to Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson, for combining pragmatism with idealism in first proposing to designate the Anglo-French forces at Port Said as an international force under United Nations authority, then helping work out the compromise among the great powers that resulted in the substitution of UNEF for the Anglo-French occupation of the Suez Canal. Looking at the resulting change in the method of conflict resolution this brought about, Ries commented: The contrasts between UNEF and collective security should be noted. First and foremost, no one was branded an aggressor. Second, and equally important, the consent of the states in which the international forces were to operate was sought. Third, force would not be used except in self-defense. Finally, the composition and duties of the forces were completely ad hoc in nature. The Secretary General eventually developed a conceptual scheme to rationalize the force—Preventive Diplomacy. . . . In the absence of agreement among the great powers, it seemed to be a viable and desirable alternative.77


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In comparison to subsequent peacekeeping missions, Ernst Haas rated UNEF a “great” success in isolating a dispute, a “limited” success in stopping hostilities, and not a success in settling a dispute.78 As a distinct mission, UNEF probably did warrant these ratings; however, Haas’s evaluation of UNEF understated its importance to the evolution of the Middle East peacekeeping regime, as well as to the development of a broader international peacekeeping regime. James Boyd summarized UNEF’s impact on the peacekeeping regime’s structure and activities during Wiseman’s Assertive period, 1956-1967, by noting several trends in peacekeeping that characterized this period. The roles of the General Assembly and the Secretary General were expanded as a result of the “Uniting for Peace” resolution and their involvement in establishing UNEF. Both of these changes reflected decreasing reliance on the Security Council, primarily because of the polarizing competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. During this time, UNEF established a pattern for mounting peacekeeping missions. A similar-sized UN force was deployed to Cyprus (1964-present). Smaller, but similarly organized forces were used in West New Guinea (1962–1963) and in Yemen (1963– 1964). All of these missions shared common characteristics: They operated with the consent of the nations involved; each had a limited mandate; they avoided combat operations; the use of force was limited to self-defense; and their presence fostered a political climate in which peacemaking might be undertaken.79 The major exception was the operation mounted in the Congo (1960–1964). Although initially conceived of a peacekeeping mission, it quickly took on the characteristics of an enforcement operation, a radical departure from the norms and principles of the international peacekeeping regime.80 From Paul Diehl’s perspective, UNEF was very successful in facilitating the removal of Israeli, British, and French troops from the region and interposing itself between Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai and the Gaza strip. The period from 1957 to 1967 was relatively quiet, though many technical violations of the cease-fire occurred during this time, including incursions by the Israeli air force into prohibited air space. UNEF ended operations in 1967 when President Nasser of Egypt requested that the force be removed from Egyptian territory in anticipation of an impending war with Israel. Shortly after the force was removed, Israel launched what became known as the Six-Day War with a preemptive strike against the united Arab forces massing on its borders.81 The 1967 War may be taken as an indication that the Middle East peacekeeping regime failed to limit armed conflict, but that conclusion would neglect the substantial reduction in conflict that occurred along

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the Egyptian-Israeli border from 1957 to 1967. Militarized disputes between Israel and Egypt were kept to two, with minimal casualties, during the tenure of UNEF, while violent incidents on the Egyptian-Israeli border in general were few. This is in contrast to numerous incidents along Israel’s borders with Jordan and Syria, where the prevailing armistice regime was ignored. In this respect, UNEF can be judged a moderate success in containing armed conflict. However, the outbreak of war in 1967 and the deepening resentments between Israel and the Arab countries offer a much more pessimistic assessment of the peacekeeping regime’s role in resolving conflict. The creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the emergence of Nasser as a Pan-Arab leader, and an increasing level of terrorist activity may have made the ArabIsraeli conflict more intractable after the 1967 war than it was before the Suez Crisis in 1956. By those criteria, the regime failed to facilitate the resolution of the issues underlying the Arab-Israeli conflict.

NORMS, PRINCIPLES, RULES, AND PROCEDURES OF THE PEACEKEEPING REGIME As described earlier in this study, an international peacekeeping regime is based on the norm that the control of violence in both internal and international conflicts can be achieved without resorting to the use of force or enforcement measures. Their use is unacceptable because they tend to expand and prolong conflicts, rather than limit them. Peacekeeping is not the imposition of a solution by outside powers using military force. Instead, peacekeeping involves the interposition of a neutral third-party force, with the consent of the parties to the conflict, to provide stability in a conflict situation by its presence, neutrality and impartiality, and moral authority. Such a force is designed to be a confidence-building measure, intended to buy time for other agencies to mediate the situation and address the political, social, and economic problems that caused or exacerbated the conflict.82 Peacekeeping is not assumed to be an end in itself. It is intended to be one means in the conflict resolution process. A peacekeeping regime by itself is not intended to resolve the underlying conflict. Absent effective peacemaking and peacebuilding institutions, even an operationally successful peacekeeping regime may do little more than create a political-military stalemate, with the unintended consequence of relieving the pressure on the parties involved to find a solution to the conflict. Recognizing that national sovereignty was the prevailing diffuse principle of the United Nations Charter as well as of the contemporary


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international system, Secretary General Hammarskjold in 1958 outlined what he considered to be the general principles governing UN peacekeeping operations based on the UNEF experience: 1. That the consent of the host country, as well as that of contributing countries, is necessary for U.N. peacekeeping operations; 2. That the U.N. must take into account the viewpoint of the host government in deciding on the composition of its emergency force; 3. That such operations should have purposes not requiring any initiative in the use of armed forces or interference in internal conflicts; 4. That the cost of such operations should be subject to the normal financial rules and should be allocated in accordance with the scale of contributions to the United Nations Budget; 5. That no United Nations Force should include units from any of the permanent members of the Security Council or from any country having a special interest in the situation which called for the operation.83

Commenting on operational procedures, Major General I.J. Rikhye, past president of the International Peace Academy and former UNEF commander, specified two basic operational rules for the effective use of peacekeeping forces: The use of force only in self-defense; and freedom of movement throughout the area of operations.84 Paul Diehl offered the guideline of proper geographic deployment of the peacekeeping force as a condition for success in limiting armed conflict. He found that peacekeeping forces performed best “when their areas of deployment adequately separated the combatants, were fairly invulnerable to attack, and permitted easy observation.” In terms of success in the conflict resolution process, Diehl found two factors which he considered crucial: The willingness of the belligerents to make concessions, and the actions taken by third-party states to mediate the conflict.85 Janice Gross Stein described the post-war arrangements in the Sinai as “the rudiments of a security regime.” Her analysis was that the regime “was very limited in scope, tacit rather than explicit; and informal; the two adversaries participated in no collective decision-making.” However, both Egypt and Israel shared expectations regarding the maintenance of security arrangements in the Sinai, and those expectations remained stable

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for over ten years. Consequently, the regime “exerted an autonomous and benign impact on conflict management between two adversaries” (Israel and Egypt). Stein described three explicit principles of the regime. First, there was recognition by Israel and Egypt that the Straits of Tiran would not be blockaded. Second, UNEF would be deployed on Egyptian territory, with Egyptian permission. UNEF would have the authority to set up observation posts and patrol the armistice demarcation line and international frontier to prevent infiltration. While attempts were made by the United Nations to clarify the procedures for withdrawing UNEF should Egypt renege on its permission for the force to operate on its territory, those procedures were not explicitly institutionalized. In 1957, Hammarskjold opined that withdrawal would, as a minimum, require consent by the host government (Egypt), the United Nations Secretary General, and the Advisory Committee on UNEF of the General Assembly. U Thant’s interpretation in 1967, however, considered consent to be a unilateral decision of the host country. This interpretation became the regime’s undoing. Third, by tacit agreement, Egypt would maintain only limited forces in the western Sinai, thus reducing the immediate threat to Israel. As Stein pointed out: The scope of the demilitarization of the Sinai was indeed very limited. There was no formal recognition by either side of the tacit limits and, consequently, no system of inspection or accompanying international guarantees. . . . Nevertheless, the regime functioned both as a hedge against a miscalculated accident and again as a smoke detector. By limiting contact between the crack units of the Israeli and Egyptian armed forces, the likelihood of a miscalculated war was diminished; in this sense, the regime worked effectively to avoid an outcome that neither side wanted.86

The regime functioned not because Egypt and Israel shared common interests, but because they shared a common aversion—accidental war—for over ten years. As Stein found: “Even though the regime was narrowly defined, because it worked simultaneously on the twin perils of defection and detection, it was extraordinarily useful to parties who shared a ‘common aversion.’”87 Stein noted that despite significant changes in the distribution of power during the life of the regime, Egyptian policy toward Israel remained consistent and could not be easily explained “solely in terms of the calculation of its short-run interest.” Instead, Stein concluded that the regime “acted autonomously to enhance the management of


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conflict because it provided valuable resources to both of its principal members.”88 Evidence of this can be found in the circumstances of the regime’s demise. According to Stein, the regime’s end was not the result of “a premeditated repudiation of its principles or procedures,” but instead resulted from a series of miscalculations by Egypt compounded by an error in judgment by the UN Secretary General. She claimed: “The value of the regime is attested by the fact that when its procedures were dismantled, when the warning system was taken out, both Egypt and Israel immediately recognized that a war which neither sought directly was now inevitable.”89 While Stein’s conclusions as to the effectiveness of the regime and its impact on actors’ behavior remain valid, her categorization of the arrangements between Egypt and Israel as a security regime seems premature; that description does not provide a good fit for the regime until after 1979. Instead, if the post-1956 arrangements are categorized as a peacekeeping regime, as outlined above, a better fit is achieved for both the description and explanation of how the regime functioned. As a peacekeeping rather than a security regime, its range of functions was generally adequate for the tasks assigned. The expectations of both Israel and Egypt were met, and while several of those expectations were based on tacit rather than explicit arrangements, over the course of the regime’s life the United Nations provided an explicit framework for the conduct of the regime’s operation.90 Stein’s description of UN peacekeeping between Israel and Egypt as an informal security regime minimizes the regime’s status under international law. The present case study differs with her analysis, because it postulates that the peacekeeping regime constructed by the United Nations was formal. In the first place, the General Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949 provided the basis for the UN intervention and subsequent operations along the Egypt-Israel armistice demarcation line and international frontier. After UNEF took up positions along the Egyptian side of the frontier, the United Nations transferred responsibility for monitoring the armistice from UNTSO to UNEF. The Mixed Armistice Commission also was placed under operational control of UNEF. That Israel rejected the continuing validity of the armistice did not end its status under international law. The United Nations upheld the position that the armistice was a valid international agreement, signed by both parties, and under Article XII, would remain in force until Egypt and Israel achieved a peace settlement. In addition, the peacekeeping regime was formally authorized by the United Nations General Assembly, its legal status on Egyptian territory was based on a Status of Forces Agreement,

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and the composition of UNEF was the result of a series of formal bilateral agreements between contributing states and the United Nations. Equally important for a regime’s functioning, the United Nations formally adopted the guiding principles of the regime and prescribed regulations for UNEF. These documents, along with the convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, explicitly described the norms, principles, rules, and procedures for the peacekeeping regime.91 It may not have been called a peacekeeping regime at the time, but as this case study has demonstrated, the arrangements undertaken by the UN to ameliorate the situation between Israel and Egypt after the 1956 war met the criteria for, and functioned as, an international regime. Furthermore, rather than try to categorize these arrangements as an informal security regime, they more accurately fit the description of a formal international peacekeeping regime, with specific and defining norms, principles, rules, and procedures. The conclusion that this was indeed a unique regime-type was reinforced by subsequent United Nations decisions to construct similar peacekeeping regimes when faced with comparable circumstances.

COMMENTARY UNEF, with all of its strengths and weaknesses, would serve as a template for future peacekeeping missions within the Middle East peacekeeping regime. One characteristic of the early years of this regime is that the parties in conflict did not undertake direct negotiations or even dialogue. As a result, and as demonstrated in the case of UNEF, the prospects of the peacekeeping mission leading to peacemaking were slim. No theory of peacekeeping suggests that such a mission can force or coerce parties to the table. The best that can be hoped for is that the peacekeeping mission will help provide an environment—specifically, one devoid of open conflict—that will help lay the groundwork for peacemaking. In a situation of extreme hostility, in which there is no direct dialogue between the antagonists and no efforts to establish a negotiation process, a peacekeeping mission can claim to have influenced the actors’ behavior merely by preventing the outbreak of war. This may seem to be a minimal accomplishment, but in a situation as heated and unstable as the Middle East it is a remarkable one. Unfortunately, the introduction of a peacekeeping force also influenced state behavior, in the case of Israel and Egypt, through the unintended consequence of removing the urgency to negotiate a final settlement. Israel was, at best, reluctantly cooperative with UNEF, although it benefited from the ten conflict-free years of the peacekeeping regime’s existence. UNEF’s removal, at the request of Egypt, created an


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environment sufficiently threatening to Israel that its leaders began planning a preemptive strike. While the removal of UNEF and the movement of the Egyptian army deep into the Sinai may have been the trigger for Israel’s preemptive attack, the military alliance concluded in 1967 between Egypt, Syria, and Jordan was the catalyst. Much like Germany in 1914, Israel in 1967 calculated it could not win a war on multiple fronts if it waited for its enemies to fully mobilize and attack. Nasser’s decision to order UNEF out of the Sinai prompted Israeli leaders to give the green light to the Israeli Defense Forces to attack. One can reach two conclusions from this concerning the peacekeeping regime’s effect on Israeli behavior: Either Israel, perhaps grudgingly, recognized the peacekeeping value of UNEF and felt alarmed at its removal; or, Israel had long-term plans to recapture the Sinai and used UNEF’s withdrawal as an excuse to launch the attack. In either case, it is clear that the peacekeeping regime’s existence (and especially UNEF’s rather sudden removal) influenced Israeli behavior. Had the regime not been created, and its norms and principles generally adhered to by the parties, it is likely (although, like all hypothetical situations, not provable) that open war between Israel and Egypt would have erupted prior to June 1967. And had Egypt not provoked Israel by constructing a threatening alliance around Israel and subsequently ordering UNEF’s withdrawal, it is probable (although again, not provable) that war would not have erupted in June 1967. UNEF was not an international security guarantee, but a trip-wire. Removal of that trip-wire signaled Israel that it was on its own. War was inevitable; the only question remaining was who would strike first. The 1967 Six-Day War was a serious setback for the Middle East peacekeeping regime, as well as for peacekeeping as an international institution. In the following chapter, the evolution of a broader international peacekeeping regime and the rehabilitation of the Middle East peacekeeping regime in particular are analyzed in light of the lessons learned from the UNEF case.

Chapter Four

The Evolution of the Middle East Peacekeeping Regime during the Cold War

This chapter addresses several important questions: How did the peacekeeping regime in the Middle East evolve? How was it changed? How were the guiding principles and procedures for conducting peacekeeping operations during the Cold War adapted or changed? What were the consequences for the peacekeeping regime as these changes became institutionalized? The ad hoc structure, guiding principles, and operational functions of peacekeeping designed by UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold during the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force in 1956 had both immediate and long-term effects on the role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security through the creation of a peacekeeping regime. As was described in Chapter 3 above, UNEF became the model for subsequent UN peacekeeping missions and served as the catalyst for the norms, principles, rules and procedures developed by Hammarskjold for a peacekeeping regime in the Middle East.

EXPANDING THE PEACEKEEPING REGIME BEYOND THE MIDDLE EAST The creation of UNEF in 1956 established UN peacekeeping as an international regime. It was followed by major operations in the Congo in 1960 and on Cyprus in 1964, which, while not elements of the Middle East peacekeeping regime, had significant impacts on that regime. UNEF maintained an effective interposition between Israel and Egypt for over ten years. The United Nations Operation in the Congo maintained, despite extensive difficulties, the sovereign integrity of the newly created state that was renamed Zaire. On Cyprus, the peacekeeping force formed an effective interposition between the Greek and Turkish communities, but the mission there was prolonged well beyond its intended mandate because of the failure of both 69

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communities and the United Nations to achieve a political settlement to the conflict.1 During the Assertive period (1956–1967, according to Wiseman’s chronology), United Nations peacekeeping operations were used in limited areas at the edge of American and Soviet alliances to prevent the regional conflicts from escalating into broader disputes directly involving the superpowers. The United Nations peacekeeping forces and observer missions deployed to the Middle East during this period are examples of this use. Peacekeeping also was used in areas where decolonization left a power vacuum or where newly independent states were unable to maintain law and order. The United Nations forces dispatched to the Congo and Cyprus fall into this category.2

PEACEKEEPING IN THE CONGO The United Nations Operation in the Congo (Operation des Nations Unies au Congo, or ONUC) was the most perplexing and controversial peacekeeping mission of the Cold War era.3 As a case study, it bears a remarkable resemblance to the post-Cold War operations in Somalia and Bosnia. At the request of the newly independent Congolese government, the UN Security Council in 1960 sent a peacekeeping force to assist in restoring order in the violence-plagued country and to supervise the withdrawal of Belgian forces. The political situation in the Congo degenerated rapidly after the introduction of ONUC. In what today is known as “mission creep,” ONUC’s mandate was expanded to authorize intervention directly in Congolese civil affairs by using military force to reconvene the parliament, suppress the rebellious Katanga province and expel mercenaries. As Paul Diehl surmised: “This was far more authority than had previously been granted peacekeeping operations and probably violated some basic principles of peacekeeping, including neutrality and not affecting the balance of power in the area.”4 On 30 June 1960, the Congo received its official independence from Belgium. Independence ushered in a period of intertribal conflict that got completely out of control with the mutiny of the Congolese army and the Belgian-supported Katangan secession. The Congolese prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, appealed to the United Nations for assistance. His calls for help were met by a Security Council mandate for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and the creation of a peacekeeping operation (ONUC) to insure the territorial integrity of Congo, assist in restoring law and order, and supervise the withdrawal of Belgian troops.5 Though trying to avoid becoming entangled in the internal affairs of the Congo, ONUC nevertheless was drawn into the new nation’s

The Evolution of the Middle East Peacekeeping Regime

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chaotic politics. Division emerged within the Congolese government when Lumumba launched an unsuccessful offensive with Soviet support to conquer Katanga. The president of the Congo, Joseph Kasavubu, disapproved of the failed venture and dismissed Lumumba. Civil war ensued and the Security Council debated whom to support and how to respond to the arrest and later murder of Lumumba by Katangese rebels. In the wake of Lumumba’s death, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold received approval from the Security Council to intervene in the civil affairs of Congo by reconvening the Congolese parliament. The United Nations negotiated a cease-fire among most of the factions but eventually resorted to the use of force to bring an end to the chaos produced by the Katangan secession. Initial attempts at resolving the Katangan secession failed and military force was once again applied. The secessionist forces in Katanga finally capitulated and the central government eventually gained control of the whole country. ONUC’s role in this operation changed from peacekeeping to military enforcement actions.6 As a peacekeeping mission whose purpose was to limit armed conflict, ONUC was a failure. Its presence did not contain or reduce violence. It had to resort to military enforcement measures to salvage the remains of a failed state. ONUC was, however, eventually partially successful in restoring some semblance of civil order in the Congo. Unfortunately, the credibility of UN peacekeeping in general and, by extension, the peacekeeping regime in the Middle East, was damaged by this deviation from the norms and principles of peacekeeping articulated by Hammarskjold in 1958. William Durch concluded that ONUC’s contentious record had several long-term effects on the United Nations’ ability to conduct peacekeeping operations. The debate over funding missions resulted in no further peacekeeping operations being underwritten by general assessments of the UN membership until 1973. This had a chilling effect on the United Nations’ ability even to consider undertaking further peacekeeping operations. Additionally, after the Congo operation, and until the end of the Cold War, the United Nations avoided military intervention in civil wars in Africa. Most importantly, with the death of Hammarskjold in a plane crash in the Congo in September 1961, no other Secretary General during the remainder of the Cold War era was able, or willing, to take the same degree of initiative in dealing with international security issues. The UN Operation in the Congo lacked every element that history now says is necessary for a successful peacekeeping mission; namely effective support from the Great Powers, consistent support of all local parties, a clear mandate, stable and adequate funding, and sufficiently good

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Peacekeeping in the Middle East as an International Regime command, control, communications and logistics. Evaluated by these criteria, the operation was a muddle from start to finish.7

The failures and flaws of ONUC affected how future peacekeeping missions in the Middle East were designed and implemented. Despite the fact that the situation on the ground in the Congo was very different from that of the Middle East, the lessons learned from ONUC’s failure were applied to peacekeeping generally. If anything, a failure along the lines of ONUC in the Middle East context—in which both superpowers were more directly involved and had greater interests at stake—would have had far more dangerous consequences for world peace. ONUC’s experience thus reverberated especially strongly among diplomats involved in the Middle East peacekeeping regime.

PEACEKEEPING ON CYPRUS The Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus had long been embroiled in conflict, and Britain’s grant of independence to the island in 1959 resulted in a boiling over of ethnic animosities between the two communities. In December 1963, a dispute over the island’s administration broke out in response to the majority Greek community’s proposal to introduce a majority–rule system of government. The conflict was of particular interest to the international community because of its potential to expand into a general war between Greece and Turkey, two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. The United Nations responded to this crisis by creating a peacekeeping operation, based on the UNEF model, with a mandate to prevent a recurrence of fighting, restoring law and order in the area, and promoting a return to normality on the island.8 The United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) weathered four major incidents that threatened the peace on the island: Fighting in August in 1964 that involved the Turkish air force; factional armed conflict in 1967; the Turkish invasion of the northern part of the island in 1974; and the declaration of independence by Turkish Cypriots in 1983. Casualties associated with these incidents were minimal, and the declaration of independence caused no renewal of violence. The extended deployment of UNFICYP has seen few casualties within the force, and it has facilitated the de-escalation of the numerous armed conflicts, but the parties have not been deterred from using military force when their interests have been threatened. UNFICYP has played an important role in limiting armed conflict, but to date there has been no resolution of the dispute acceptable to both sides.9 Although UNFICYP had no direct connection to the peacekeeping


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regime in the Middle East, its continued presence in the region after the demise of UNEF maintained the viability of the broader UN peacekeeping regime. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, units from UNFICYP were rushed to the Sinai to form the initial contingent of a second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II).

CONFLICTS AND CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS The accomplishments of UN peacekeeping operations from 1956 to 1967 unfortunately were overshadowed by controversies that weakened the regime over time, as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures became less coherent and the actual practice came to be perceived as increasingly inconsistent with the established principles and norms articulated in the United Nations Charter. The Soviet Union opposed UNEF in principle because the operation was mandated by the General Assembly, a move the Soviets insisted was in violation of the Charter. The Soviets also opposed the Congo operation, where they accused the United Nations of siding with pro-Western forces. The Soviet Union and France eventually refused to pay their assessments for UNEF and the Congo operations. As Henry Wiseman pointed out, peacekeeping was regarded by many as a phenomenon linked to the process of decolonization, as a neo-colonialist institution by many African states, as an ad hoc device without basis in the United Nations Charter, and as an international tool overly subject to the discretion of the Secretary-General for its implementation.10 The abrupt manner in which UNEF was terminated in 1967 by Secretary General U Thant without referring the action to the General Assembly or the Security Council left both him and the United Nations itself open to criticism. The experience of ONUC, as well as the political controversies surrounding United Nations peacekeeping in general, seriously affected the Middle East peacekeeping regime. The June 1967 war between Israel and the Arab coalition, and the subsequent failure of the United Nations to reinstate a peacekeeping mission after the war, can be interpreted as a failure of the peacekeeping regime.11 The regime entered what Wiseman described as a Dormant Period from 1967 to 1973, during which no new operations were either proposed or implemented.12 Interestingly, after the 1956 war the United Nations, with US and Soviet support, was able to create a viable peacekeeping regime, but was unable to design a meaningful peace settlement. In contrast, following the 1967 war, the United Nations, now without support of the superpowers, was unable to reestablish a peacekeeping regime to reduce tension among the belligerents, but it did produce a

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framework for peace—Security Council Resolution 242.13 As Michael Oren pointed out, however, it would take a combination of favorable domestic, regional, and international circumstances before a link between ceasefires and peace initiatives would prove feasible.14 Despite this setback, the broader international peacekeeping regime was not destroyed. As Robert Keohane posited, since regimes are costly and difficult to create, existing ones will tend to evolve rather than be destroyed or replaced by new ones.15 UNTSO military observers remained in the region, but with Israel’s unilateral abrogation of the remaining armistice agreements, the Mixed Armistice Commissions became irrelevant. UNTSO continued to observe and report activities along the various ceasefire lines, but it was unable to limit conflict and it had no role in contributing to conflict resolution. After six years on life-support, the Middle East peacekeeping regime was revived following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, but its original principles, rules and decisionmaking procedures were modified as the regime became less a tool of the Secretary-General, and more a device of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union.

PEACEKEEPING IN THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER THE 1973 WAR The Dormant period from 1967 to 1973 was characterized by an environment of persisting disputes and intermittent conflicts in the Middle East. From July 1967 to August 1970, Egypt and Israel engaged in the so-called War of Attrition. This low-level conflict was characterized by artillery duels across the Suez Canal, Israeli air raids into Egyptian territory, commando raids on both sides, and naval engagements along the Sinai coastline. The most serious phase of this conflict began in January 1970, when Israel launched deep-penetration air strikes into Egypt. To counter these actions, Egypt turned to the Soviet Union, which provided 15,000 military personnel, air defense missiles and radar systems, and fighter aircraft to defend Egypt from the Israeli air raids. Eventually, the United States sponsored, and the Soviet Union supported, a ceasefire between Israeli and Egyptian military forces. A period described as “No Peace; No War” by Egyptian commentator Mohamed Heikal emerged following the death of Nasser in late September 1970. Vice President Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser, and he spent the next year consolidating his position. Attempts by US Secretary of State William Rogers to get the belligerents to begin negotiations toward a peace settlement under the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 242 were


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unsuccessful. Sadat, convinced the Israelis and the superpowers were content with the status quo, decided to prepare for another war. Frustrated by slow deliveries of Soviet advanced weaponry, Sadat, in July 1972, demanded Soviet military advisors leave Egypt. Subsequent SovietEgyptian negotiations resulted in a flood of Soviet arms pouring into Egypt beginning in late 1972.16 This Dormant period ended with a surprise attack by Egyptian and Syrian forces against Israeli positions on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, 6 October 1973. Israel’s successful counteroffensive and its crossing of the Suez Canal into the Egyptian heartland heightened tensions between the superpowers. With the possibility that the Soviet Union would be drawn into the conflict to rescue its Egyptian and Syrian clients, the United States elevated its military alert level, raising the danger of direct superpower confrontation. This threat prompted the United Nations to attempt to de-escalate the conflict by reviving the peacekeeping regime in the region. During Wiseman’s Resurgent period from 1973 to 1978, the United Nations established three new peacekeeping missions, all in the Middle East. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the United States and the Soviet Union jointly sponsored Security Council resolutions for the establishment of a second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai, and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) between Syrian and Israeli forces on the Golan Heights. The UNEF II mandate was considerably more extensive than its predecessor’s. UNEF II not only monitored the disengagement agreement between the Egyptians and Israelis, but it was also empowered to control a buffer zone and verify force and armament limitations in designated zones.17 The third new UN peacekeeping mission in the region was established in 1978, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978. The Security Council established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to “confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces,” restore “international peace and security,” and to assist the Lebanese government “in ensuring the return of its effective authority in this area.”18

A SECOND UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE IN THE SINAI The October 1973 war had a profound impact on efforts to revitalize the Middle East peacekeeping regime. After years of planning, on 6 October 1973, Egyptian forces launched a surprise attack across the Suez Canal

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in coordination with a Syrian attack against Israeli forces on the Golan Heights. Initial Security Council deliberations were deadlocked due to conflicting American and Soviet positions. Although initially successful, the Arab offensives stalled and counterattacks by Israel turned the tide. By 21 October, Israeli armored forces had crossed the Suez Canal and cut off the Egyptian Third Army on the east bank. The Soviet Union and the United States jointly requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council, and on 22 October, the day after Israel crossed Suez, the Council adopted resolution 338 (1973) which called for a ceasefire and a start to implementing resolution 242 (1967). It further requested the Secretary General to send United Nations observers into the area immediately. The fighting continued, and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat called on the Soviet Union and the United States to intervene militarily to enforce a ceasefire. The United States opposed such an idea, but the Soviet Union agreed, thus setting the stage for a potential superpower confrontation.19 At the request of Egypt, the Security Council convened again on 24 October, and in consultation with the Secretary General, worked out a resolution calling for an increase in UNTSO observers in the area and the formation of a new UN peacekeeping force, which became UNEF II. Several contingents serving with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) were rushed to Egypt to form the nucleus of the force, and a provisional headquarters, staffed with personnel from UNTSO, was set up in Cairo, with Major General Ensio P. H. Siilasvuo of Finland, the UNTSO Chief of Staff, as interim commander.20 Secretary General Kurt Waldheim issued a report requested by the Security Council that established guidelines for the functioning of UNEF II, as well as a plan for the initial stages of the operation: (a) Three essential conditions must be met for the Force to be effective. First, it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full cooperation of the parties concerned. Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit. (b) The Force would be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. The command in the field would be exercised by a Force Commander appointed by the Secretary-General with the Council’s consent. The Commander would be responsible to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General would keep the Security Council fully informed of developments relating to the functioning of the Force. All matters which could affect the nature or the


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continued effective functioning of the Force would be referred to the Council for its decision. (c) The Force must enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and other facilities necessary for the performance of its tasks. The Force and its personnel should be granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The Force should operate at all times separately from the armed forces of the parties concerned. Consequently, separate quarters and, wherever desirable and feasible, buffer zones would have to be arranged with the cooperation of the parties. Appropriate agreements on the status of the Force would also have to be concluded with the parties. (d) The Force would be composed of a number of contingents to be provided by selected countries, upon the request of the SecretaryGeneral. The contingents would be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographical representation. (e) The Force would be provided with weapons of a defensive character only. It would not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the Security Council’s mandate. The Force would proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict would take all the necessary steps for compliance with the Council’s decisions. (f)

In performing its functions, the Force would act with complete impartiality and would avoid actions which could prejudice the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned.

(g) The costs of the Force would be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Members, as apportioned by the General Assembly.21

The Security Council approved the report on 27 October in resolution 341 (1973) and authorized the new mission, centered around a predominantly light infantry force of 7,000 troops, for an initial period of six months, subject to extension. The original mandate was to last until 24 April 1974, and it was subsequently renewed eight times. In July 1979, after the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, Soviet opposition in the Security Council blocked further extensions and the mandate lapsed.22

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Once established, UNEF II conducted its operations in four main phases. During the first phase, October 1973 to January 1974, the Force’s immediate objective was to stop the fighting and prevent all forward movement of Israeli and Egyptian forces. In addition, UNEF II facilitated the delivery of emergency non-military supplies to Suez city and the Egyptian Third Army trapped on the east bank of the Canal. UNEF II forces interposed themselves between the forward positions of the opposing forces, set up observation posts and checkpoints, and conducted patrols with the assistance of UNTSO observers in sensitive areas. The situation on the ground was stabilized, the ceasefire was generally observed, and there were only a few incidents, which were resolved with the assistance of UNEF II. In the meantime, US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger worked out a preliminary agreement between Egypt and Israel for the implementation of Security Council resolutions 338 and 339 (1973).23 These arrangements were signed at the kilometer-marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road, and except for the provision calling for the return of Israeli forces to their 22 October positions, the agreement was implemented without much difficulty. Under UNEF II protection, convoys of non-military supplies operated to and from Suez, and an exchange of prisoners of war took place in midNovember. In late November, Egypt broke off further negotiations over the issue of Israel’s refusal to withdraw to the 22 October positions. However, UNEF II was able to maintain the ceasefire.24 During the first half of January 1974, Kissinger, in what became known as his “shuttle diplomacy,” worked out an agreement that established a zone of disengagement manned by UNEF II, and delineated areas of limited forces and armament on both sides of that zone. The second phase of the operation, from January 1974 to October 1975, had UNEF II establish temporary buffer zones between Egyptian and Israeli forces. The role of UNEF II in facilitating the disengagement of forces stabilized the situation in the Sinai.25 In September 1975, Kissinger negotiated a further agreement between Egypt and Israel for a broader disengagement of their forces from the Sinai. The new agreement provided for the further redeployment of Israeli forces eastwards, the redeployment of the Egyptian forces westwards, and the establishment of buffer zones between them controlled by UNEF II. During the third phase, from November 1975 to May 1979, a joint commission, under the auspices of the United Nations Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East (a newly created position), was set up to deal with problems arising from the agreement and to assist UNEF II in the execution of its mandate.26


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The pattern of exclusive United Nations involvement in peacekeeping operations in the Middle East began to change in 1975. As a result of Israeli insistence on a US presence as a prerequisite for an interim agreement concerning the situation in the Sinai, the civilian US Sinai Support Mission (SSM) was created. As part of the agreement, the United States offered to establish an early warning system in the area of the Giddi and Mitla Passes in the Sinai, consisting of three watch stations monitored by the SSM and two surveillance stations, one operated by Egyptian personnel and the other by Israeli personnel. The SSM also managed a tactical early-warning system that monitored Israeli and Egyptian surveillance outposts above the Giddi Valley. The SSM did not supplant UNEF II, but served as a complement to the UNEF II troops who continued to patrol a demilitarized buffer zone.27 Although the SSM was not a UN mission, it was only made possible because of the existence of UNEF II. In that sense, both were integral parts of the Middle East peacekeeping regime. From November 1975 to February 1976, UNEF II oversaw the phased redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces. Once the redeployment was completed, UNEF II carried out its long-term functions specified in the protocol. Its tasks were to establish and monitor demilitarized zones in the north and south by operating checkpoints and observation posts, and conducting ground and air patrols throughout the area. UNEF II also monitored the agreed limitations of forces and armament within the areas specified in the agreement through bi-weekly inspections carried out by UNTSO military observers under UNEF II operational control.28 The visit of Anwar Sadat to Israel and the eventual negotiation of the Camp David Accords led to a peace treaty concluded in March 1979 between Egypt and Israel. The treaty called for a phased Israeli withdrawal over three years from the remaining areas it had occupied since the 1967 war, and permanent security arrangements on both sides of the Egyptian-Israeli border with the assistance of United Nations forces and observers. The UN forces (UNEF II or a successor) would perform similar duties to what they were doing in the Sinai: Operating checkpoints, conducting reconnaissance patrols and manning observation posts within a demilitarized zone, and ensuring freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran. In addition, UN forces were also to be stationed along the Egyptian side of the international border, and UN observers were to patrol a specified area on the Israeli side.29 But because of strong opposition to the treaty from the Palestine Liberation Organization and most of the Arab states, and the threat of a veto by the Soviet Union in the Security Council, the Security Council decided to allow the UNEF II

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mandate to lapse on 24 July 1979. The fourth phase of the mission, from May to July 1979, was an anticlimax. The mission quietly ended and the participants were repatriated to their home countries. With the UNEF II mandate lapsed, it remained to UNTSO military observers to facilitate the final withdrawal of Israeli troops and the redeployment of Egyptian forces in the Sinai. While the initial interposition of UNEF II met with difficulties, diplomatic maneuvering by US President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger permitted incremental progress. During the time of its deployment, UNEF II experienced no major incidents and its presence provided stability. In that sense, UNEF II can be seen as a success in reducing armed conflict. UNEF II ended its tenure with the achievement of a resolution to the conflict (under the auspices of the United States rather than the United Nations) between the belligerents that it had separated. As a peacekeeping regime, the arrangements set up after the 1973 war were far superior to those of either the earlier armistice agreements or the peacekeeping regime supervised by UNEF I. The peacekeeping regime negotiated between Israel and Egypt in 1975, with the United States acting in the role of hegemon committed to its creation, was from the beginning more comprehensive and stable than the earlier regime. It rested on the overarching principle accepted by both Israel and Egypt, to reject the use of military force and resolve their dispute by peaceful means. The regime benefited from the operational principles for UNEF II, the organization responsible for supervising the regime, as articulated in Secretary General Waldheim’s 27 October 1973 report to the Security Council. The issue of regime defection was of particular concern to Israel, since it was Egypt’s unchallenged withdrawal from the earlier peacekeeping regime in 1967 that induced Israel to launch its preemptive attack in June of that year. The intricate procedures for monitoring activities in the Sinai, coupled with the UNEF II-occupied buffer zone and the zones of limitations for military forces, made detection of unauthorized activity much easier for all the regime members. As Janice Gross Stein surmised, “because detection was easier, defection became less likely.”30 As the hegemon, the United States offered substantial benefits to both Israel and Egypt to reduce the risk of their defection from the regime. In addition to the military and economic assistance given to Israel, the United States provided assurances that it would look out for Israel’s interests in the Security Council and guarantee the viability of the peacekeeping regime, even if the United Nations were to decide to withdraw its forces from the region. By placing US personnel in the Sinai


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Support Mission, Washington signaled its commitment to the regime. Egypt received technical assistance to help construct its early warning system in the Sinai, and was offered economic assistance as an inducement to remain in the regime. While these arrangements still did not meet the criteria for a formal security regime—there were no regularized collective decision-making procedures—they were much more explicit in articulating roles, responsibilities, benefits, and penalties to the participants than the earlier attempt had been. Most importantly, the new peacekeeping regime mitigated the effects of the security dilemma for Egypt and Israel by acting as a confidence building measure. As Janice Gross Stein pointed out: This regime was put in place in the aftermath of a bitter war that neither Egypt nor Israel won. Both sides consequently viewed war as an unattractive option and shared a “common aversion” to its renewal. Within this context, a major power was able to broker agreements about a general principle and a series of functional proposals which resulted in lower risks of defection and improved accuracy of detection.31

Perhaps the most important factor contributing to UNEF II’s success was the inclusion of a peacemaking component for the regime. This peacemaking component had its roots in Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, and it was dramatically accelerated by Sadat’s bold visit to Israel in November 1977. Once the two parties became committed to peacemaking—at the time, a first in the Middle East conflict—the mission of the peacekeeping regime represented by UNEF II became significantly easier to carry out.

UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE The equivalent peacekeeping mission created on the Syrian-Israeli front, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), was more problematic than UNEF II, in large part because it was not followed by a serious peacemaking effort. Moreover, while the terms of reference and operational principles outwardly resembled those given to UNEF II, UNDOF initially found implementation of its mandate much more difficult, due to misinterpretations of the United Nations’ authority by both Syria and Israel. UNDOF was given a mandate to supervise the 1974 ceasefire between Israel and Syria and facilitate the redeployment of Syrian and Israeli armed forces. Like UNEF II, UNDOF’s mandate, which was thoroughly negotiated with the United States and Soviet Union involved, was a considerable improvement over the original, hastily constructed UNEF I

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and UNTSO mandates. After the phased disengagement of Israeli and Syrian units was completed, UNDOF shifted its mission to controlling a narrow buffer zone on the Golan Heights between Israeli and Syrian forces, and verifying force and arms limitations in designated zones.32 The agreement, signed in May 1974 in Geneva by Israel and Syria, established an eighty kilometer-long buffer zone from Mount Hermon to the Jordan River, with a varying width from one-half to eight kilometers. The agreement also established three zones of limitations, extending ten, twenty, and twenty-five kilometers from the buffer zone on each side. Within the ten kilometer zone, each side was restricted to six thousand troops, seventy-five tanks, and thirty-six short range artillery tubes (122 mm or less). In the twenty kilometer zone, each side could station up to 450 tanks and 162 artillery tubes with ranges under twenty kilometers. The twenty-five kilometer line marked the closest area that either side could station surface-to-air missiles.33 Headquartered in Damascus and operating under a six-month renewable mandate, UNDOF was organized as a relatively small force of two infantry battalions supported by two logistics companies. Supported by observers from UNTSO, UNDOF manned forty-eight observation posts in or near the zone of separation, conducted patrols in the zone, and performed bi-weekly inspections of force levels in the zones of limitation.34 Supplementing UNDOF was an aerial photography mission provided by the United States as part of the verification regime for the disengagement agreement, so that both sides could monitor each other’s military deployment within the disengagement zones.35 UNDOF has been described as a “quiet success.”36 The cease-fire has been maintained and the area has been relatively peaceful, at least in part because the mission has continued to receive tacit support and cooperation from both Israel and Syria. Some restrictions on freedom of movement and inspections were imposed by each side in certain sensitive areas in the zones of limitations, and those restrictions were never resolved. During the first few years of UNDOF’s operation, problems centered on Syrian insistence that it maintain civilian administrative control over the buffer zone, and Israeli demands that UNDOF take a more active role in preventing terrorist attacks originating in Syria and targeting Israeli settlements in the Golan. Syria’s support to Palestinian and later Lebanese guerillas operating in southern Lebanon who attacked Israeli settlements, combined with Israel’s annexation of the Golan in 1981, further complicated the situation. While based on similar arrangements such as the UNEF II peacekeeping mission in the Sinai, the arrangement between Israel and Syria more


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closely resembled the earlier (1956 to 1967) Sinai peacekeeping mission. Unlike the situation between Israel and Egypt, there was no equivalent of the 1975 Geneva accords to advance the conflict resolution process. The United States played a significant role in brokering the disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel, but Syrian alignment with the Soviet Union tempered US influence as a hegemon, particularly in its ability to influence Syria. As Doron Kochavi observed: Although the basic situation on the Golan Heights remained unsettled, UNDOF stood between the parties and checked on the execution of their obligations to limited forces. This did not in itself keep the peace, and if Israel was provoked or if Syria decided to return to war UNDOF could do nothing about it. As noted, UNDOF’s central function was less interposition than to provide an impartial and credible “presence” to observe and reduce the chance of a future confrontation. Above all, the United Nations Force was perceived by both Israel and Syria as non-threatening and impartial.37

Unlike the Egyptian-Israeli element of the peacekeeping regime, acceptance by both Israel and Syria of the peacekeeping norms—rejection of the use of military force to resolve conflict and agreement to resolve their dispute by peaceful means—was tenuous at best. The proxy war in Lebanon demonstrated this. As in its regime with Egypt, Israel was concerned with the issue of defection. The procedures for monitoring activities in the zones of limitations for military forces made detection easier, but the depth of the zones was considerably less than those in the Sinai, which greatly reduced the warning time should Syria decide to defect. Unlike UNEF II, UNDOF did not function as a link between the belligerents. That UNDOF remained a “quiet success” was due more to the self-interests of Israel and Syria in avoiding accidental war, than to the outward influence of the peacekeeping regime. In that sense, it was a success since one of the goals of a peacekeeping regime is helping the parties avoid accidental war. Both Israel and Syria had an interest in avoiding war, but because they had no diplomatic relations or direct contact, it was UNDOF that served as the guarantor of both sides’ interests. Quiet or not, this was a significant accomplishment.

UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON Lebanon’s role in the Arab conflict with Israel had been relatively detached from 1949 to 1973. The Mixed Armistice Commission functioned fairly well up until 1967, and for a while after the 1967 war the frontier remained

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relatively calm. In the early 1970s, tension along the Israel-Lebanon border increased, especially after the relocation of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters from Jordan to Lebanon. Palestinian guerilla operations against Israel and Israeli reprisals against PLO bases in Lebanon intensified after the eruption of civil war in Lebanon in 1975. The killing of thirty-seven tourists in Israel by Lebanon-based Palestinian guerrillas on 11 March 1978 led to the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon to eliminate PLO forces in the area and establish a security zone within Lebanese territory. The United Nations responded to this situation with the authorization and deployment of a new peacekeeping force—the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)—with the missions to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international peace and security, and aid the Lebanese government in gaining effective control over the area.38 The UNIFIL mission was unpopular with both the PLO, who viewed it as a limitation to its prerogative to carry out operations against Israel from southern Lebanon, and Israel. Having little confidence in UNIFIL’s ability to prevent Palestinian attacks into Israel, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) gave control of a ten kilometer-deep “security zone” along the northern border to a Lebanese Christian militia, the South Lebanese Army (SLA), instead of UNIFIL. In 1982, conflict intensified when Israel concluded that neither UNIFIL nor the SLA was able to prevent attacks against northern Israeli settlements. The IDF invaded Lebanon, pushing through UNIFIL positions, and engaged both PLO and Syrian forces on Lebanese territory. After the Israelis pulled back from Beirut following the deployment of the Multinational Force, they established outposts in the “security zone.” In conjunction with the Lebanese civil war, low-level conflict raged for years as Iranian-backed Shiite militias battled both the SLA and the IDF in southern Lebanon. Because UNIFIL was unable to fulfill its mandate, most analysts concluded that UNIFIL was a failure in terms of reducing armed conflict, though conflict in the UNIFIL area of operations during the Lebanese civil war was slightly below the norm for regions controlled by other actors involved in the conflict. Despite the severe limitations on UNIFIL’s ability to carry out its mission, at the request of the Lebanese government its mandate continued to be extended every six months. Beirut requested these extensions because it was the basis for the government’s diplomatic efforts to effect Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, and because the peacekeepers provided much-needed humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in southern Lebanon. In retrospect, as a peacekeeping force, UNIFIL was deployed too early; in 1978 there was no peace to keep. The Lebanese civil war was still raging, the national government had virtually no control over its ter-


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ritory in the southern part of the country, and Israel still had military objectives in Lebanon—the removal of the PLO enclaves. Consent of the parties to the conflict was essentially ignored as a principle. Despite the fact that UNIFIL had an ambitious mandate, more akin to the mission in Congo and what would later be called second-generation peacekeeping, it was organized and deployed in a manner similar to the earlier, more traditional UNEF and UNDOF peacekeeping missions. Given the tenuous circumstances surrounding UNIFIL’s creation, it should have been no surprise that the force would be incapable of fulfilling this mandate. At best, the mission was an attempt by the international community to do something—even if that something was the wrong tool, at the wrong time, in the wrong place. After a long and unsuccessful conflict with Lebanese Shiite guerrillas, Israel unilaterally withdrew from its self-declared security zone in May 2000. After twenty-three years, UNIFIL finally was able to move into positions along the Israeli-Lebanon frontier to undertake its original mandate. Following Israel’s withdrawal, UNIFIL was able for a time to play a more traditional role of maintaining peace between two sides that do not have an ongoing diplomatic peace process. UNIFIL underwent a force reduction in 2003 so that it resembled UNDOF, both in size and mission. The government of Lebanon, however, continued to refuse to move its security forces to the border, and essentially ceded control of that area to the militia of the anti-Israeli Shiite political organization Hezbollah. This led to a dangerously unstable situation, particularly since similar inaction on the part of the Lebanese government in the 1970s with regard to the PLO led to the first Israeli invasion in 1978. Hezbollah’s cross-border incursion in July 2006, in which guerrillas ambushed an IDF patrol and captured two Israeli soldiers, provoked a major escalation of violence, which UNIFIL was unable to constrain. Israel retaliated by attacking Hezbollah positions throughout Lebanon. Hezbollah responded by launching hundreds of rockets against Israeli towns and cities. To prevent the escalation of violence, the UN Security Council authorized sending additional forces to southern Lebanon to reinforce UNFIL and separate the belligerents.39 In his assessment of peacekeeping during the 1973–1978 Resurgent period, Wiseman (writing in the early 1980s) noted a number of features that characterized this era, and which arguably modified the peacekeeping regime: There is no role played by the General Assembly, neither the Soviet Union or the United States propose or wish it; the relationship

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Peacekeeping in the Middle East as an International Regime between the Security Council and the secretary general is clarified and resolved; and the modes of financing are agreed upon. . . . The principle of consent is still operative, but diminished in at least two respects: . . . Israel had to give way on the participation of Poland (in UNDOF); and . . . in contrast to UNEF I, the mandate of UNEF II clearly enunciates the authority of the Security Council in that regard. Another change occurred in the matter of composition namely, the participation of a Soviet-sponsored communist state and that of the permanent members of the Security Council, i.e., the Soviet Union in UNTSO after 1973 and France in UNIFIL.40

Wiseman also listed four other features which he believed changed the nature of peacekeeping during this period: The joint American-Soviet sponsorship of UNDOF, an example of detente; the general support of nonaligned states for peacekeeping operations, which was a major departure from their earlier attitude of peacekeeping as a vestige of Western neo-colonialism; the innovative use of the US civilian Sinai Field Mission, a non-UN remote-sensing unit in the Sinai, to support UNEF II; and the involvement of UN forces in complex civil and humanitarian functions in Lebanon, which went well beyond the traditional peacekeeping role of an interposition force.41 After the establishment of UNIFIL, the broader international peacekeeping regime entered into what Wiseman called the Maintenance period, from 1978 to 1988, during which no new UN operations were launched. At the time of the Camp David peace accords in 1978, nearly 14,000 United Nations troops were serving in various peacekeeping forces and observer groups in the Middle East, Cyprus, and Kashmir.42

MULTINATIONAL FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST The Camp David accords and the subsequent March 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel assumed a United Nations peacekeeping force and observers would be established to monitor the parties’ compliance with the treaty terms. However, Arab and Soviet condemnation of the Camp David accords and the peace treaty precluded the continued presence of UNEF II troops in the Sinai. Under the threat of an expected Soviet veto of the establishment of a new United Nations force, the president of the Security Council reported on 18 May 1981, that the members of the Security Council were unable to reach an agreement that would authorize a peacekeeping force and observers as called for in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Without Soviet support in the Security Council, the United Nations


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could not continue UNEF II. In July 1979 the mandate expired and UNEF II ceased operations. Consequently, Egypt and Israel, with the assistance of the United States, negotiated a protocol in August 1981, which established an independent international organization, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) as an alternative to a UN peacekeeping force. The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai The MFO became operational in April 1982 and to this day remains on duty in the Sinai. Headquartered in Rome, the MFO units operate checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts along the international boundary between Egypt and Israel, and conduct periodic verification of the forces in four security zones. The MFO has approximately 2,000 personnel; about half are provided by the US military. The MFO is an independent international organization, not affiliated with the United Nations, and it derives its continuing mandate from an August 1981 protocol negotiated between Israel and Egypt, with the assistance of the United States.43 Despite its independent provenance, the MFO’s mandate, organization, functions, operating principles, and procedures were based on the UN model of peacekeeping. This was not a coincidence. The staff officers who designed the MFO studied UNEF and UNEF II operations in detail. In many cases, the operating procedures used by the United Nations peacekeeping forces were adopted wholesale; staff officers simply substituted “MFO” for “UNEF” in a number of relevant documents.44 The MFO was given the mission to supervise implementation of the security provisions of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. The peace treaty established four security zones that placed limitations on military forces and equipment—three in the Sinai in Egypt and one in Israel along the international border. Along with its responsibilities for checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts, the MFO was tasked to verify periodically the implementation of the treaty’s security provisions and ensure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran.45 While its tasks resembled those of a traditional peacekeeping mission, the mandate of the MFO went beyond the parameters of the peacekeeping regime, and in effect, provided the basis for a security regime. It became a permanent arrangement as part of a final peace treaty, unlike either the earlier armistice agreements or United Nations peacekeeping missions. This change in the Middle East peacekeeping regime was instructive not only for future peacekeeping possibilities in the Middle East, but also for an understanding of the utility of peacekeeping elsewhere. UNEF II has been described as “one of the most extensive, sophisticated, and successful UN operations to the present time.”46 Ironically, however, UNEF II became

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a critical supporting element to a peacekeeping process that was run outside UN channels. For the reasons discussed above, the United Nations was unable to translate this successful peacekeeping function into a lasting peacemaking process. That task was left to the good offices of the United States. Multinational Forces in Lebanon The attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador to Britain, Shlomo Argov, in London on 3 June 1982, by members of Abu Nidal’s Fatah Revolutionary Council, a Palestinian splinter group, and the retaliatory Israeli air strike against Palestinian bases in southern Lebanon, exacerbated a situation already made tense by the deployment of Syrian missiles in the Bekaa Valley of eastern Lebanon. When the Palestinian guerrillas responded to the Israeli air strike by shelling Galilee, Israel reinvaded southern Lebanon with the explicit purpose of establishing a security zone north of the Israeli-Lebanese border. Israeli forces quickly overwhelmed PLO and Syrian forces and only resisted invading West Beirut, where Palestinian forces were trapped, because of American pressure and their own hesitancy to engage in house-to-house fighting. Israeli leaders had for some time been looking for a pretext to reoccupy southern Lebanon and inflict a defeat on the PLO, and probably used the attack on the ambassador as an excuse for action. By destroying the PLO in Lebanon, and hopefully decapitating its leadership, Israeli strategists reasoned that Palestinians in the West Bank would more easily succumb to Israel’s wishes. In part, this helped explain why UNIFIL had such a hard time carrying out its mandate—UNIFIL was trying to keep the peace in a region where the interested actors, including Israel, shared neither common interests nor common aversions to using military force to settle disputes. The Israeli Defense Forces siege of Beirut in mid-June led to calls for a diplomatic solution to this crisis, but Israel refused to accept a UN force because of its difficult experience with UNIFIL and its general alienation from the United Nations during that time. The Multinational Force, composed of American, French, and Italian troops, played the role that would normally be undertaken by a UN peacekeeping mission, and became an interposition force between the IDF and Palestinian fighters. The initial phase of the mission proved successful, as PLO and Syrian forces were evacuated from Beirut in August. The MNF withdrew in early September, but the assassination of Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel less than a week later, the subsequent Israeli occupation of West Beirut in contravention of the cease-fire agreement, and the massacre of


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over one thousand Palestinian refugees by Lebanese Christian militiamen led the Lebanese government to request the MNF to be redeployed.47 Lacking a clear mandate or mission, American, French, and Italian elements of the second MNF began arriving back in Beirut in late September 1982. A smaller British contingent joined them in early 1983. Following the bombing of the American embassy in Beirut by the proIranian Islamic Jihad Organization in April 1983, and the redeployment of IDF units to southern Lebanon later that summer, French and US contingents in the MNF II became increasing allied with the Christian-led Lebanese government, ostensibly the legitimate authority in the country. The MNF II lost its neutrality and became perceived by various factions in Lebanon as a Western intervention in the civil war. Muslim militias, encouraged by their Iranian and Syrian sponsors, began to target American and French MNF II positions, which led the MNF II to respond with high levels of force, including air strikes and bombardments from ships offshore. MNF II compounds were attacked by terrorist truck bombings, and the general levels of support for MNF II within Lebanon rapidly deteriorated.48 The collapse of the Lebanese army and the deployment of Shiite militiamen into West Beirut acted as the impetus for the eventual withdrawal of all MNF II troops by March 1984. While the first stage of MNF’s involvement were successful in reducing armed conflict, the second stage appears to have intensified the conflict, though it may have prevented the recurrence of any massacres similar to the incidents that called for its reentry into West Beirut. The continuance of the Lebanese civil war and the presence of Israeli and Syrian troops within that country for many more years indicate that the MNF, just as UNFIL, failed to significantly reduce the violence or enhance peace.49 The impact of the MNF on the peacekeeping regime in the Middle East was manifested through second-order effects. The failure of the second MNF mission soured Washington policy-makers from further active involvement in the Lebanese civil-war and in dealing with the SyriaIsrael conflict resolution process until the end of the Cold War. Absent a hegemon to influence the peacemaking process, as was the case between Egypt-Israel, the situation in Lebanon remained unresolved. It is interesting to contrast the MNF’s failures with the MFO’s successes; the MFO also was an American-led force, but it operated in an environment significantly more conducive to successful peacekeeping. In a sense, the second MNF was the exception that proves the rule when it comes to Middle East peacekeeping. The MNF II was far from being a neutral mission designed to maintain a tenuous peace—in reality, there was no peace to keep—and it was seen by the parties to the conflict to

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express the interests and policies of the United States, and by extension those of Israel. The MNF was an example of how not to structure a peacekeeping mission. Unlike the MFO, which had the consent and sponsorship of the antagonists, the MNF II mandate lacked legitimacy in the eyes of several of the warring factions, and it was perceived by them as an armed intervention force supporting the interests of the Christian Maronites, who dominated the Lebanese government, and their Phalangist militia. The MNF II was inadequate in size for its mission, which was never properly defined and fluctuated between peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and combat operations. The various battalions were geographically isolated from each other, they tended to report to their own governments, and the command structure was unfocused, with the national contingents only loosely coordinating their activities with each other. The MFO, on the other hand, was the model of a well-designed peacekeeping operation. Though not a part of the United Nations system, the MFO was more than just a temporary coalition of the willing; it had a formal structure and the status of an international organization, complete with a regular funding source and civilian bureaucracy to manage it.

PEACEKEEPING NORMS, PRINCIPLES, RULES, AND PROCEDURES DEVELOPED DURING THE COLD WAR ERA To determine the independent and dependent variables in case studies of peacekeeping operations, it must be remembered that peacekeeping, as practiced during the Cold War era, was considerably different in nature and purpose than more traditional military operations conducted during war. Consequently, the original guiding principles of peacekeeping differed from the traditional principles of war that govern the conduct of military operations. The fundamental principles of UN peacekeeping operations were based on the premises that the United Nations would only undertake such operations with the consent of the parties concerned, and that coercive force would not be used by UN troops to end a conflict or to maintain the peace. Historically, UN peacekeeping operations had been undertaken at the request of one or all of the parties to the dispute. As a rule, UN peacekeeping troops did not use their weapons except in self-defense. While peacekeeping forces were to be reasonably capable of defending their positions so that they were not easily pushed aside, engaging in combat was not their primary purpose. Their mission was to supervise, mediate, and assist the belligerents in the peaceful settlement of the dispute. Because of the nature of their mission, peacekeepers were


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required to subordinate purely military considerations to the requirements of politics and diplomacy.50 As was seen in the UNEF case study, Secretary General Hammarskjold recognized that national sovereignty was the prevailing diffuse principle of the UN Charter as well as the contemporary international system. In 1958, he outlined what he considered to be the general principles governing United Nations peacekeeping operations: Consent and cooperation of the parties in dispute; troop contingents provided by member nations other than permanent members of the Security Council; impartiality; and the use of force by peacekeepers only in self-defense. Over the years several noted scholars of peacekeeping have added to this list of principles. Mitchell Sharp, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, in 1972 prescribed several general prerequisites for Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations. Among them were that a peacekeeping operation should be associated with an agreement for a political settlement, and that it must operate under a clear mandate. The mandate was defined as the will and intent of the United Nations Security Council in undertaking the peacekeeping mission.51 John Child, in his study of peacekeeping in the inter-American system, added the principle of approval by the major powers. At the international-system level the peacekeeping operation must receive at least tacit support from the regional power or powers.52 Experiences in early peacekeeping missions, the deliberations of the UN General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping, and Secretary General Kurt Waldheim’s report53 to the Security Council concerning the proposed mandate for a second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) in the Sinai following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, led to the development of a more comprehensive list of general principles to guide the deployment and employment of United Nations peacekeeping forces (see above). As Brian Urquhart, chief author of the report, observed, the terms of reference for UNEF II were specifically designed to avoid the problems associated with the termination of UNEF I in 1967. These new principles were accepted by the Security Council and served as guidelines for subsequent peacekeeping operations during the Cold War era.54 To reiterate, international peacekeeping is based on the norm that violence in both internal and international conflicts can be controlled without resorting to the use of force or enforcement measures. Although peacekeeping was not specifically described in the United Nations Charter, during the Cold War it evolved as an internationally accepted means for controlling conflicts and promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes through the general acceptance of the principles, norms, and rules formulated during

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the creation of UNEF, which were then institutionalized in subsequent UN peacekeeping operations. While peacekeeping operations may not have been envisioned by the framers of the Charter as the primary military means for the Security Council to deal with international conflict resolution, during the Cold War the United Nations developed formal decision-making procedures for establishing a peacekeeping force. When a member state, a group of states, or the Secretary General proposed to establish a peacekeeping operation, at least three basic conditions had to be met. First, the proposal had to enjoy broad support from the international community; in practical terms, it needed to obtain the necessary votes in the Security Council to be adopted. Second, member states had to volunteer the troops needed to carry out the mission. Third, and most critical, the parties to the conflict had to agree to accept the peacekeeping operation.55 The will and intent of the Security Council to undertake a peacekeeping mission was expressed in the force’s mandate, which spelled out the nature of the mission—observation or peacekeeping. The size of the force varied depended on the particular mission. James Wise, in his study of peacekeeping operations, listed three factors that determined the size of a peacekeeping force: “It must be large enough to defend itself and establish a visible presence, but not so large as to be tempted to impose its will on either party in the conflict. Finally, it must be large enough to have the flexibility to concentrate forces in response to a local threat. Within the force, no one national element can appear to dominate over the rest.”56 Peacekeeping forces and observers had varied missions. They were assigned to observe and report on military activities, to investigate cease-fire violations, and to supervise the withdrawal of belligerent forces. Peacekeeping forces were used to patrol buffer zones, where their presence was supposed to prevent the resumption of hostilities by physically blocking the movement of belligerent forces. This critical mission of peacekeeping, however, also was the cause of its greatest failures. Deployed UN peacekeeping forces were unable to prevent the 1967 Arab-Israeli war or constrain Israeli forces from invading Lebanon in 1982. Though not normally part of their mandate, on several occasions peacekeepers also provided medical services, assisted in refugee resettlement, and helped restore normal civilian activities in former battle areas.57 Commenting on these operational procedures, Major General I.J. Rikhye, past president of the International Peace Academy and the last UNEF commander, specified two basic operational rules for effective peacekeeping, the use of force only in self-defense and freedom of movement throughout the area of operations.58


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Charles Raymond, in his study of several UN peacekeeping operations, added to these rules the concepts of force integrity and a single manager for peacekeeping operations. Put simply, the peacekeeping force should be responsive to a single commander, who in turn reports to the Secretary General. The national contingents should not have any hidden agendas, and no national contingent should dominate the force.59 Paul Diehl offered the guideline of proper geographic deployment of the peacekeeping force. He found that peacekeeping forces were most successful “when their areas of deployment adequately separated the combatants, were fairly invulnerable to attack, and permitted easy observation.”60 In terms of success in the conflict resolution process, Diehl found two factors which he considered crucial: The willingness of the belligerents to make concessions, and the actions taken by third-party states to mediate the conflict.61

ANALYSIS OF COLD WAR PEACEKEEPING For the purposes of this study, these principles, guidelines, and factors are grouped into four categories of essential conditions (independent and intervening variables) that are necessary if a peacekeeping mission is to succeed—defined as containment or reduction of violence and enhancement of peace (dependent variables). First, the disputing parties must accept intervention by the United Nations or the multinational arrangement. This entails not only explicit consent to the type of mission, but also includes acceptance of the force composition and stationing requirements. Second, the mission must be supported by the permanent members of the Security Council, especially the United States. This includes active political support in the Security Council (or at least tacit support by non-use of the veto) and financial support (this condition will be modified when considering the non-United Nations missions). Third, the peacekeeping force must be operationally effective as measured against the principles of non-use of force, impartiality and neutrality, single-manager operations management, force integrity, freedom of movement, proper geographic deployment, and a clear and workable mandate. Finally, the separation of the belligerents by a peacekeeping force must create a political climate within which a resolution to the conflict becomes more possible, as evidenced by the degree of willingness of the belligerents to make concessions and the level of involvement by third-party states to mediate the conflict. In one of the better case study analyses of traditional peacekeeping, Paul Diehl concluded that: “Peacekeeping is most appropriate in an interstate conflict in which all parties are willing to halt hostilities and accept

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a peacekeeping force.”62 In the Middle East, this conclusion seems valid for all of the missions in the regime. The particular cases of UNIFIL and MNF II demonstrate the validity of this hypothesis. Based on evidence from his case studies,63 Diehl derived several conclusions about the nature of traditional peacekeeping during the Cold War. First, the main reason for failure in Cold War-era peacekeeping operations had been the opposition of third-party states and sub-national groups. Second, since superpower acquiescence was the minimum requirement for organizing a peacekeeping operation, during the Cold War the superpowers did not take strong opposing action to the peacekeeping missions authorized by the Security Council. Third, “the internal characteristics of a peacekeeping operation (mandate, financing, and command and control mechanisms) were generally found to have a relatively minor impact on the mission’s success.” Proper geographic deployment and the perception of the force’s neutrality, however, had clear impacts on the success of Cold War peacekeeping missions. Fourth, “unlike the great variation across peacekeeping operations in their ability to limit armed conflict, there is virtually uniform failure in these same operations when it comes to conflict resolution.” In the case of UNEF II (the only case that led to conflict resolution), the operational effectiveness of the mission appeared to have had little effect on resolving the conflict. Instead, the willingness of the parties involved to make concessions, and the active involvement of the United States in mediation, were found to be more significant factors.64 Table 1. Summary of Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East Peacekeeping Regime Mission

Containment or Reduction of Violence

Enhancement of Peace

UNTSO

Failure

Failure

UNEF I

Moderate Success

Failure

UNEF II

Success

Success

UNDOF

Success

Failure

UNIFIL

Failure

Failure

MFO

Success

Success

Success Stage I

Failure both Stages

MNF

Failure Stage II


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Diehl’s criteria for success, which tend to reflect other criteria generally held by peacekeeping analysts,65 is reflected in Table 1, which summarizes the performance of the peacekeeping missions under investigation in this study, in terms of their success in containing or reducing violence and enhancing peace between the parties to the conflict. Evidence from peacekeeping missions in the Middle East suggests that variations in the regime’s principles, rules, and procedures were associated with differing outcomes in terms of success and failures. For example, UNEF I was successful in containing and reducing violence between Israel and Egypt from 1956 to 1967. It was operationally effective, enjoyed support from the major powers, and maintained the consent of the parties involved until May 1967. Because neither Israel nor Egypt was willing to make concessions and the superpowers were either unable or unwilling to mediate the conflict, the political climate did not become conducive to peace. As a result, when Cairo withdrew consent for UNEF I to operate on Egyptian territory, Secretary General U Thant ordered the force to leave, and as Egyptian armed forces began to move into the former UNEF area of deployment Israel launched a pre-emptive attack. In this case, the containment of violence depended on Egyptian consent to UNEF I being stationed on Egyptian territory. However, despite the sustained ten-year success in containing and reducing the violence, the political climate did not become more conducive to peace. It could be argued that the stalemate in the political climate produced by the lack of a peacemaking component within the regime made further violence likely when one of the independent variables changed from a positive to a negative value. UNEF II, which was successful in containing and reducing violence, did contribute to a political climate in which both Israel and Egypt were willing to make concessions for peace. The United States also was actively involved in mediating the conflict, much more so than it had been during the first UNEF’s tenure. The role of the hegemon (the United States) was crucial to reviving the regime and providing measures of confidence to both Israel and Egypt. Without Secretary of State Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy and President Carter’s sponsorship of the Camp David peace process later on, it is doubtful UNEF II would have fared much better than its predecessor. In this case, a positive change in the degree of support was crucial in affecting a positive change in the political climate, which in turn led to a positive change in peace enhancement. However, UNEF II did not independently alter Israeli behavior. Rather, it was the interposition by the United States—in the person of Henry Kissinger—that motivated Israel to accept redeployments in the Sinai. UNEF II helped to provide insurance of peace during the ensuing negotiations between Israel and Egypt, but Israel’s

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actions were not altered by the existence of UNEF II. As Janice Gross Stein surmised: “The evidence we have suggests that Egypt and Israel were able to extend and expand their regime in part because of their common aversion to a renewal of war and in part because of the ‘sunk costs’ to both of dismantling the agreement on principles and procedures already in place.”66 In the case of UNDOF, it might be argued that its presence on the Golan Heights served to prevent Israel from directly retaliating against Syria for the actions of Syrian forces and Damascus’s allies in Lebanon. Most likely, Israel had no interest in provoking another war on the Golan Heights. Nevertheless, UNDOF’s presence provided a reasonable guarantee that a war on that front would not break out unintentionally. The presence of UNDOF did not prevent Israel from taking the politically aggressive action of annexing the Golan in 1981. Without UNDOF’s presence, however, it is conceivable that Israel’s annexation could have provoked a Syrian military response because of domestic pressure on Syrian President Hafez al Asad. UNDOF provided Asad with an excuse not to respond. Evidence suggests that the independent variables chosen for this study are not dichotomous but relative. For example, there are degrees of consent, support, and effectiveness. In Lebanon, UNIFIL operated with differing levels of consent from a variety of belligerents until the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in 2000. Lebanon fully consented to the UNIFIL mandate while Israel and its client militia limited the activities and deployment of UNIFIL in areas under their control and frequently violated UN-controlled areas to pursue the PLO, Hezbollah, and other guerrilla groups. These guerrillas also offered varying degrees of consent to UNIFIL, from limited cooperation to violent opposition when it suited their purposes. Support for UNIFIL was half-hearted at best. Although its sixmonth mandates were regularly renewed in the Security Council, since the early 1980s the United States and other major-powers have avoided becoming involved in mediating the conflict. UNIFIL’s operational effectiveness was not nearly as successful as UNEF I, II, and UNDOF. UNIFIL’s freedom of movement was constrained, the force was not properly deployed, and its mandate was only partially workable. Since the independent variables were relatively negative and the political climate remained untenable, the dependent variable of containment of violence remained relatively negative. UNIFIL did not alter Israeli behavior because Israel still had strategic objectives in Lebanon it was determined to fulfill and UNIFIL’s presence was perceived by Jerusalem as an impediment to achieving those objectives. The record shows that traditional peacekeeping missions were not a great success in facilitating mediation between warring ethnic or religious


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communities vying for the same territory. Though originally designed to be temporary and transient, these missions tended to become long-term fixtures. UN troops, for example, have been in Lebanon since 1978, on the Golan Heights since 1974, on Cyprus since 1964, and in Kashmir since 1949. What the evidence does indicate is that international peacekeeping in the Middle East during the Cold War generally followed the pattern of behavior ascribed to an international regime. This peacekeeping regime was not static, but dynamic, modifying its rules and decision-making procedures in response to changes in both its external environment and its internal functions. The basic norms and principles remained relatively constant, however, thus indicating that the observed changes were primarily within the regime. Indirectly, the Middle East peacekeeping regime was weakened when the attempt to expand the established norms, principles, rules, and decision-making procedures of United Nations peacekeeping during the Congo mission brought mixed results. More directly, the regime became less coherent following the demise of UNEF I. However, peacekeeping as an international institution remained viable, as evidenced by the Middle East peacekeeping regime’s renewal after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. This conformed to Keohane’s analysis that existing regimes, because they are costly and difficult to create, will tend to evolve rather than be destroyed or replaced by new ones. The long-term (thirty-three years) process of conflict resolution between Israel and Egypt presents an interesting model of the progressive stages of a peacekeeping regime. From 1949 to 1956, Egypt and Israel were parties to the UN-sponsored and UNTSO-administered armistice regime. That regime evolved in 1956 to a peacekeeping regime, and was maintained by the United Nations through an agent (UNEF) until war put a halt to the regime’s practical use in 1967. UNTSO maintained some vestiges of the regime from 1967 to 1973, but the parties’ failure to adhere to regime norms led to further conflict in 1973. The peacekeeping regime was reestablished with a new agent, UNEF II, in 1974, and further refined and expanded through the intercession of the United States as hegemon in 1975. This stage of the regime continued until 1979 when, despite fulfillment of its goal, the Security Council as authorizing organization was unable to expand, or even continue, the regime’s responsibilities in light of a change in the regional dynamics (a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt). Once again, the hegemon stepped in to create a more permanent security phase of the regime, with an independent international organization (the MFO) to administer it. That this new international organization adopted virtually wholesale the UN peacekeeping regime’s norms, principles, rules, and

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operational procedures is a tribute to the regime’s practicality. This case presents a potential model of the conflict resolution process for other actors in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and perhaps in other arenas. Similar patterns of behavior can be discerned in the partial evolution of the peacekeeping regime in both the Lebanon-Israel and Syria-Israel cases. The one interesting outlier is the Jordan-Israel case, where a peacekeeping mission was not installed after the demise of the Mixed Armistice Commission in 1967. Aharon Klieman describes the evolution of the post-1967 relationship between Israel and Jordan prior to their final peace treaty in October 1994 as a “tacit” security regime, defined by political stability, economic viability, and physical security. Characteristics of this regime included: “a relatively quiet border;” effective border surveillance and patrolling; quiet information exchanges; and conventions to regulate commercial air and sea passage. The two countries have moved in time from wary antagonists to silent but quite active, informed, responsible partners enjoying enhanced security and sustaining a climate of cooperation. Built up incrementally and regularized by these unspoken rules and “gentlemen’s” agreements, the Israel-Jordan “mutual security zone” has widened [from 1967–1992], extending now beyond security into other functional areas that reflect a “configuration of interests.”67

In the cases involving Syria and Lebanon, the lack of progress in peacemaking resulted in both cases remaining fixed in the peacekeeping regime stage. As of this writing, the effects on the regime by the resumption of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in July 2006 remained undetermined. The next chapter will examine the significant changes—both actual and proposed—that took place within the broader international peacekeeping regime after the end of the Cold War, and discuss how these changes had an effect on the Middle East peacekeeping regime.

Chapter Five

Peacekeeping in the New World Order, 1988-1994

Between 1948 and 1978, the United Nations sponsored thirteen peacekeeping operations around the world, six of those in the Middle East. Although the fortunes of the international peacekeeping regime waxed and waned over its first forty years, from 1988 to 1994 there was a resurgence in the use of UN peacekeepers. As the old Cold War-related threats to international peace and security faded, new threats emerged in the forms of “brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife.”1 These new threats created new problems, including the collapse of states and massive refugee migrations. Much of the work performed by UN peacekeepers and other agencies in the immediate post-Cold War years of 1988-1994 revolved around dealing with the consequences of failed states and the resultant humanitarian problems of massive migrations of refugees and internally displaced persons. Of the twenty-two United Nations peacekeeping missions undertaken from 1988 to 1994, thirteen were related to intrastate conflict.2 Changes in the United Nations’ role in the post-Cold War international system, especially its interventions to protect refugees and displaced persons through the use of peacekeeping forces in operations known as “preventive protection”3 or “preventive deployment,” led to fundamental changes in the international peacekeeping regime. This evolving regime, while retaining many of the characteristics of the earlier regime, saw the roles and responsibilities of the UN peacekeeping structure expand to include “peace enforcement” between belligerents and intervention in civil wars to protect refugees and internally displaced persons. How did the international peacekeeping regime evolve after the Cold War? What were the guiding principles and procedures for conducting “second generation multinational operations?”4 How were they adapted or altered to include preventive protection operations? What were the consequences for the 99

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international peacekeeping regime? These questions need to be addressed in order to understand peacekeeping in the 1990s and its impact on the existing Middle East peacekeeping regime.

REDEFINING PEACEKEEPING IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA At the invitation of the Security Council to prepare a report recommending “ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity for the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping,”5 UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992-1997) offered An Agenda for Peace, a blueprint for transforming the international peacekeeping regime in the post-Cold War era, in July 1992. Boutros-Ghali believed that the United Nations, with the Security Council at its center, could effectively deal with the challenges to peace and security around the world. In his manifesto, the Secretary General outlined four areas of action that he believed constituted a coherent program for maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building. Boutros-Ghali re-defined Dag Hammarskjold’s original concept of preventive diplomacy to include the use of confidence-building measures, fact-finding, early warning, demilitarized zones, and preventive deployment. Preventive deployment, the stationing of military forces prior to a conflict to discourage hostilities, represented a major shift from the traditional use of peacekeeping forces by the United Nations. In a crisis between countries, United Nations forces were to be positioned along a border, either at the request of one or with the consent of both parties, to prevent violence from breaking out. Boutros-Ghali also envisioned preventive deployments of UN forces within a country during internal crises, again either at the request of the government or with the consent of all parties concerned.6 The United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia (UNPREDEP), launched in 1995 to preclude the Balkans conflict from spreading to the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, was an example of a preventive deployment operation. Most importantly for the broader international peacekeeping regime, the Secretary General re-defined peacemaking as “action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI” of the United Nations Charter.7 Absent the pressures and constraints of the Cold War, Boutros-Ghali argued that the United Nations could facilitate peacemaking by taking international action to ameliorate factors contributing to a crisis. For example,


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the United Nations could coordinate the resources of international agencies to provide humanitarian assistance of various types to a country to forestall internal or external crises caused by refugee flight, droughts, disasters, etc. Under Article 41, Chapter VII, the United Nations Security Council could impose sanctions not involving the use of military force, including interrupting economic relations, interdicting communications, and severing diplomatic relations. Harry Summers pointed out that during the Cold War the United Nations imposed such sanctions only twice (Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977). However, in the early post-Cold War period, various sanctions were imposed seven times (against Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Libya, Haiti, Somalia, Liberia, and the Khmer Rouge-controlled area of Cambodia).8 This new definition of peacemaking also included the use of military force in response to outright aggression under the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, Chapter VII, as well as the use of “peace enforcement units” as a “provisional measure” under Article 40 for truce and ceasefire enforcement missions.9 Boutros-Ghali’s concept of peacemaking was a significant departure from the traditional Cold War-era definition, which limited the means to end disputes and resolve issues underlying a conflict primarily to diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement. The use of military force by the United Nations under Chapter VII was usually addressed separately under peace enforcement provisions, the exception being the 1960 operation in the Congo, which started out as a peacekeeping mission but turned into an enforcement action. In An Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali provided the first formal United Nations definition of peacekeeping: “The deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.”10 While noting that peacekeeping tasks had both increased and broadened in recent years, the Secretary General stated that the conditions for the success of peacekeeping operations remained virtually the same as those outlined by Dag Hammarskjold in 1956: A clear and practicable mandate, the cooperation of the parties involved, the continued support of the Security Council, the readiness of member states to contribute required forces, effective United Nations command, and sufficient financial and logistic support.11 However, the traditional definition of peacekeeping was more restrictive in that it equated peacekeeping with the use of an interposition force or observers for truce-keeping; it emphasized the need for consent of

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the belligerents for establishing and maintaining the mission; and it required the strict impartiality and neutrality of the peacekeeping force. Peace building, as re-defined by Boutros-Ghali, was not only a corollary to peacekeeping, but a primary mission of the post-Cold War peacekeeping regime in which countries and international agencies would undertake combined actions to increase economic and social development, reform or strengthen government institutions, monitor elections, rebuild infrastructures such as roads and bridges, disarm former belligerents, destroy weapons, repatriate refugees, and remove minefields.12 For the most part, these missions were to be established after a resolution to the conflict had been negotiated. The peacekeeping mandate was to specify that the United Nations forces and agencies would help implement the peace settlement. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 1992-1993, was an example of an ambitious peace building mission, and was heralded as the new model for peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. Similar operations, with varying degrees of success, were conducted in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, and El Salvador, states involved in longstanding Cold War-associated intrastate conflicts. It was clear from his recommendations to the Security Council that Boutros-Ghali envisioned a much greater role for the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security than it had had since 1945. This was particularly evident in his proposed use of military forces in every category of operations, ranging from humanitarian and nation assistance to combat operations in response to acts of aggression and for peace enforcement. It was also clear that the Secretary General did not view these uses of military force as separate and distinct categories of operations, but, rather as a progressive transformation of the international peacekeeping regime. What he proposed was a fundamental shift in the principles and norms of the peacekeeping regime, which, as Krasner pointed out, would transform the regime itself. Earlier modifications (most notably those associated with the 1973-1978 Resurgent period) dealt with rules and decision-making procedures and were therefore changes within, but not of, the regime.

THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE At about the same time Boutros-Ghali was proposing these changes to the international peacekeeping regime, Francis M. Deng, a human rights official in the UN Secretariat, was tasked to “examine existing international human rights mechanisms, the applicability of humanitarian and refugee laws and standards to the protection of displaced persons, and the provision of relief assistance to them.”13 Between 1988 and 1994, the number of


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registered refugees had grown from 13 million to 26 million.14 Estimates in 1993 classified another 24 million people as internally displaced.15 In his report, Deng concluded: “Internal displacement constitutes a humanitarian and human rights crisis of major proportions that calls for clear guidelines that could be applied to all internally displaced persons, regardless of the cause of their displacement, the country concerned, or the legal, social, political, or military situation.”16 The primary cause of this increase was, according to Boutros-Ghali and Deng, “the new breed of intra-state conflicts” that shared common characteristics: Militias and guerrilla forces that lacked clear chains of command were prevalent; front lines were unclear; civilians were often targeted and in many cases the main victims of the violence; state institutions had collapsed; there was usually a breakdown of law and order; and political authorities lacked the resources and will to deal with the problems of displaced persons.17 Internal preventive deployment interventions were undertaken in Somalia and Bosnia to avert humanitarian disasters. Authorized to use military force under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, technically these UN missions were designed to remain neutral and impartial, and avoid siding with any of the warring factions. The United Nations troops did not have a mandate to stop the fighting, and in reality there was no peace to keep. The “safe areas” concept extended limited UN protection to civilian populations in Bosnia, but UN forces were unable to facilitate an end to the war.18 Numerous brokered cease-fires were violated or ignored. In Somalia, UN forces attempting to safeguard humanitarian food convoys came under attack by various factions. Eventually, US troops were dispatched in December 1992 to take the lead in a peace enforcement mission. In a process similar to the Congo mission over thirty years before, however, the Security Council, with the full backing of the newly installed William Clinton administration in Washington, expanded the mandate of the force. What had begun as an impartial humanitarian relief effort in 1992 changed when the UN Security council voted in March 1993 to alter the mission to “political reconciliation” and helping Somalia rebuild its “national and regional institutions and civil administration.” Called “peace building” by the United Nations and “nation building” by the United States, this change in mission led to disaster.19

During an attempt to arrest Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid, US troops were ambushed by Aidid’s gunmen in October 1993, resulting in eighteen American troops killed and seventy-eight wounded. American

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public reaction to this debacle led to a Congressional ultimatum to withdraw US forces. By early March 1994, American troops were gone and the remaining United Nations forces became increasingly ineffective until the mission was terminated in March 1995.20

ANALYSIS OF EARLY POST-COLD WAR PEACEKEEPING What were the consequences for the international peacekeeping regime of these changes in norms and principles? In regards to humanitarian assistance and the use of UN forces for preventive protection of refugees and internally displaced persons, the evidence indicated that, like traditional peacekeeping missions, these deployments had the best chance of success only if all parties to the conflict agreed to the operation. Paul Diehl’s assessment was that “a peacekeeping force supplying humanitarian assistance during a civil conflict is a risky proposition,” and “it would be suicidal for a peacekeeping force to intervene without the approval of all relevant actors.”21 He cited the problems encountered by the United Nations and other neutral humanitarian organizations in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Bosnia: Traditional UN peacekeeping operations have provided humanitarian assistance to local populations, but such a role was secondary and in some cases peripheral to the main missions. Making humanitarian assistance the primary role of peacekeeping forces appears to present some serious problems when those troops are deployed in the middle of a civil war. This functional alternative seems more promising in the context of the aftermath of a natural disaster, although the cooperation of host governments and subnational actors is still a prerequisite for success.22

Diehl also believed that the use of enforcement measures by peacekeepers to intervene in a conflict so they might provide humanitarian assistance and protection would have “serious detrimental consequences”23 for United Nations peacekeeping, and would cloud the perspective of what peacekeeping is all about. Enforcement measures undertaken in the guise of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period compromised the international peacekeeping regime’s ability to perform the more traditional roles of monitoring and defusing conflicts. A maxim of traditional peacekeeping was that when peacekeepers open fire, they have clearly lost their neutrality and become a party to the conflict. Such was the case for the United Nations in 1960 in the Congo, the US Marines in Lebanon in 1982, the American


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forces in Somalia, and the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia. Brian Urquhart, longtime Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs responsible for UN peacekeeping operations, compared peacekeepers to “superintendents in a lunatic asylum.” He explained: “If they get down on the floor and start fighting with the loonies, they lose the only position they have, which is being above the general melee. Then they can’t do anything; they’re stuck.”24 Canadian General Ian Douglas echoed these sentiments when he described the Somalia operation as a case “where the use of offensive UN force disrupted the peace process/cycle, and caused not only a slowing down of the process, but indeed saw the UN force becoming part of the problem.”25 Even Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, in his 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, seemed to back off from his earlier attempts to transform the international peacekeeping regime when he belatedly acknowledged that adhering to “certain basic principles of peacekeeping” was essential for success: “Three particularly important principles are the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defense. Analysis of recent success and failures shows that in all the successes those principles were respected and in most of the less successful operations one or other of them was not.”26 Boutros-Ghali nevertheless remained convinced that the United Nations should take the lead in meeting threats to international security, and to that end he advocated developing a capacity “in the long term” within the United Nations to “deploy, direct, command and control” enforcement operations.27 Diehl opined that if the United Nations decided in the future to undertake enforcement measures, such as preventive protection, it would be best accomplished by a different, non-peacekeeping, force.28 In effect, Diehl was calling for the creation of a completely new type of regime, as opposed to any attempt to transform the existing peacekeeping regime. The United Nations Mission in Haiti following US military intervention in September 1994 is an example of this concept of separating peacekeeping and enforcement missions. Two other prominent peacekeeping analysts, John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, tended to agree with Diehl on this point and called such arrangements “second generation multinational operations.” They argued that more effective military response from the United Nations was needed to deal with the newly defined tasks, as outlined by Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda for Peace. They concluded that the existing international peacekeeping regime could not be further adapted and that a new “more practical instrument” was needed.29

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A new peace enforcement regime, however, would have entailed the creation of a standing UN military force, and support for that idea became even less likely in light of the failures of the United Nations in Somalia and Bosnia. The strongest arguments against such a regime transformation were not new and they continued to hinge on the perceived validity of the ordering principle of national sovereignty in international politics. William J. Durch offered one of the best arguments against such change: All proposals that suggest that the UN should go further and either develop its own military forces or actively command forces seconded to it from member states will sooner or later run up against the basic resistance of national sovereignty, even eroded as it has been over past decades. The nation-state has been the highest political unit with a monopoly of legitimate military power for the better part of five centuries. The acquisition of military power traditionally has been the first step toward establishing governance over a territory, and states are wary of taking any step that appears to begin a process that could result in the ceding of such power to the UN. To invest the organization with the power to recruit, command, and pay for military forces of its own, however minimal to begin with, would be seen to start a process of establishing a higher, global power above the nation-state, which invokes deep-seated government opposition in virtually all parts of the globe.30

Evidence from case studies of the Cold War-era peacekeeping regime and the post-Cold War variant indicate that changing the international peacekeeping regime is not the answer to solving the security threats posed by the consequences of failed states and the resultant humanitarian problems of massive migrations of refugees and internally displaced persons. Instead, the enforcement measures contained in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter offer adequate justification for multilateral action on a limited, ad hoc basis, but only if a major power or powers consents to create “coalitions of the willing” to conduct these enforcement operations. The United States was able to do so against North Korea in 1950, against Iraq in 1991, with NATO against Serbia in 1999, against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2002, and, albeit without explicit Security Council approval, against Iraq in 2003. Similarly, Australia led a coalition of forces into East Timor in 1999 to enforce peace before eventually handing the mission over to a UN transitional administration supported by a more traditional peacekeeping force. Interestingly, the changes to the international peacekeeping regime discussed above did not seem to have had much of a direct impact on the


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existing peacekeeping regime in the Middle East or the proposals for a future peacekeeping arrangement between Israel and Syria. The explanation for this may be that the changes to the international peacekeeping regime in the early 1990s primarily applied to the new United Nations role of intervention in intrastate conflicts, while the Arab-Israeli conflict has been and continues to be interstate in nature.

ATTEMPTS TO CONSTRUCT A SECURITY REGIME ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS Conflict over the Golan Heights has been the most contentious issue in the Israel-Syria conflict ever since Israel seized control of the area in the 1967 war. Historically for the Israelis, the Heights were the key terrain protecting the upper Galilee and northern Israel from Syrian artillery. For the Syrians, they were the key terrain protecting the Plain of Damascus and the capital from Israeli ground forces. From both their points of view, whichever side controlled the Golan Heights had a distinct strategic advantage over the other. The acquisition of longer-range ballistic missiles by both Israel and Syria during the last two decades has lessened the strategic military value of the Golan Heights. Nonetheless, both belligerents retain deep emotional attachments to the area, dramatized by two hard-fought wars that are seared into the collective psyches of both peoples. Attempting to secure a peace agreement in the Golan has always proven difficult. Both Israel and Syria face strategic dilemmas concerning the area. If Jerusalem were to conclude a peace treaty with Damascus and withdraw from the Golan, it would need long-term security guarantees. Should a peace with Syria disintegrate, Israel would lack the strategic depth that the Golan provides to allow time for mobilization and deployment of its reserves to protect the northern Galilee. For Damascus, any peace treaty with Israel that does not return sovereignty of all the Golan to Syria and that is not part of a comprehensive regional agreement risks undermining the government’s legitimacy with the Syrian people as well as with other Arab states. Syria attempted, but failed, to regain the Golan by joining Egypt in launching the 1973 war against Israel. Following that war, in which Israel succeeded in recapturing the Golan Heights, a peacekeeping force, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force was deployed to the area. Since 1974, both Syria and Israel have worked to avoid a resumption of outright warfare on the Golan Heights. Even during incidents of direct Israeli-Syrian confrontations in Lebanon, both sides have studiously avoided renewed hostilities on the Golan. This section provides an overview of the

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situation on the Golan and outlines the attempts by the United States up through early 2000 to broker a final peace treaty between Israel and Syria to create the conditions for a security regime between them. Conflict over the Golan Heights The Golan Heights overlook Israel’s Hula Valley, upper Jordan Valley, and Lake Tiberias to the west, ranging in altitudes from 150 to 600 meters above the valley floor. In the east they overlook the plain leading north to Damascus. The Golan extends sixty-five kilometers north to south and twelve to twenty-five kilometers east to west, encompassing about 1,750 square kilometers. The most commanding terrain feature, Mount Hermon in the north, rises to 2,224 meters and overlooks the Golan, northern Israel, southern Syria, and southern Lebanon. The landscape is generally rolling plateau covered by grass or brush, interrupted in many places by rocky volcanic hills or tels. These volcanic hills run southward from the slopes of Mount Hermon and are natural strong-points that provide observation and fields of fire over the surrounding lower elevations.31 The Golan Heights contain several strategically important regional water sources. The headwaters of the Jordan River flow from Mt. Hermon down through the Hula Valley into Lake Tiberias, Israel’s only fresh water reservoir. Between 1949 and 1967, Israel and Syria were engaged in an ongoing low-level conflict over the control and diversion of water sources in the Golan. That conflict intensified in the early 1960s during Israel’s construction of its national water carrier, a conduit built to carry water diverted from the Jordan River to the Negev in southern Israel. In retaliation, Syria attempted to build its own diversion canal, but Israeli air raids in July 1966 destroyed both the canal and construction equipment.32 Prior to the 1967 war, Israelis in the north felt particularly vulnerable because Syrian artillery on the heights overlooking Lake Tiberias and at the base of Mount Hermon could easily range Israeli settlements in the region. Capturing the Golan Heights in 1967 became a prime objective of the Israeli Defense Forces. The security their capture provided allowed Israel to expand its economic development in the north, especially in the Hula Valley.33 Israel’s military strategy of deploying a relatively small active force backed by a large reserve was dependent on its ability to obtain accurate early warning of potential threats until forces could be mobilized to defeat the threat. Surveillance sites on the Golan Heights provided warning against a Syrian surprise attack, making the Golan Heights rather than the Hula Valley the potential main battle area. From positions on Mount Hermon and several prominent hills along the


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line of separation, Israeli military observers could monitor ground and air activity in Syria with high-powered binoculars, ground surveillance radars, and communications intercept equipment. Israel deployed relatively few troops on a full time basis to defend the Golan Heights. These forces were not intended to withstand a full-scale Syrian assault, but to delay the initial thrust while reserves mobilized and moved north. Following the 1967 war, the IDF constructed a complex and sophisticated network of physical barriers—minefields, anti-tank ditches, obstacles, and prepared firing positions along avenues of approach to disrupt and delay a Syrian attack.34 By the end of the Cold War, missile proliferation in the region and the diminishing threat of a Syrian ground offensive reduced the value of the Golan Heights as a strategic buffer. As was vividly demonstrated during the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi surface-to-surface missiles could over-fly Israeli forward defensive positions on the Golan and strike major population centers anywhere in Israel with little warning. In light of this, a poll in 1992 indicated that seventyone percent of IDF reserve generals believed that sufficient security arrangements could be established even if most of the Golan was given to Syria.35 Israel’s commanding position on the Golan remains a constant reminder to Damascus of its defeats in 1967 and 1973, and its continuing vulnerability. Israeli defensive positions are just thirty-five kilometers from Damascus. The Syrians felt disgraced by the performance of their troops and the seemingly effortless manner in which the IDF captured the Golan Heights in 1967. Hafez al Asad was defense minister at the time (and later president) and he undoubtedly felt some responsibility for the loss of the Heights. The Syrian army regained much of its pride by its fierce and tenacious fighting during the first few days of the 1973 war, but in the end it was unable to retake and hold the Golan Heights. The importance of the Heights to Syrian security was vividly demonstrated when, in the later stage of the 1973 war, advancing IDF gunners were able to shell the outskirts of Damascus. For the Syrians, there can be no peace without the return of the Golan Heights.36 Since 1967, Syria has lacked both the geographic high ground and the comprehensive intelligence-gathering means that Israel possesses. The Syrians have only a limited technical capability to collect intelligence on Israeli forces beyond the Golan Heights. As a confidence building measure in the disengagement agreement of 1974, aerial photography was provided by the United States on a scheduled basis to both sides as part of the peacekeeping regime so that they could monitor each other’s military deployments within the disengagement zones.37 Nevertheless, aerial photo and electronic reconnaissance missions at best provide the Syrians with only a snapshot of Israeli forces at any given time.38

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Between 1967 and 1973, Syrian strategy to regain the Golan focused on achieving sufficient military strength so that, in alliance with Egypt and Jordan, it could retake the Golan by military force.39 After the failed attempt to wrest the area from Israel in the 1973 war, President Asad pursued his ambition for creating a military and political “Greater Syria” through a coordinated eastern front comprising Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestine Liberation Organization. He desired to end Syria’s dependence on Egyptian leadership, especially since Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was moving to accept a separate peace with Israel.40 Syria’s perception of itself was as an uncompromising champion of Arab rights and the only major regional Arab power capable, and willing, to stand up to Israel over the issue of Palestine. President Asad shaped Syrian foreign policy to achieve its goals, the most crucial of which was to regain the Golan Heights, by carefully analyzing ends and means, and selecting a course of action to accomplish those goals by the means deemed most appropriate for the interest of the regime and the state. He was a realist and a pragmatist who was in no hurry to enter into a final peace agreement with Israel without reciprocity, defined as an Israeli commitment to a total withdrawal from the Golan Heights.41 The intensive efforts to achieve peace in 1999 and early 2000, mediated by US President Bill Clinton, failed in large part because Syria demanded the return of all of the Golan Heights captured in 1967, and Asad refused to budge off that negotiating position.42 Until his death in June 2000, Asad’s ultimate objective remained the containment of Israel within its pre-1967 borders, and with that the curtailment of its power in the region. According to Mahmud Faksh, this is what Asad meant by his phrase “peace of the brave.”43 Despite their bitter animosity over the Golan Heights, Israel and Syria have adhered to the disengagement agreement they signed in 1974. With few exceptions, the Israel-Syria sector has remained quiet since 1977. United Nations peacekeepers usually had little to report other than Syrian shepherds and their flocks crossing the line of separation in search of better grazing.44 Since its establishment in 1974, UNDOF has been a “quiet success” in maintaining stability on the Golan Heights, despite a number of events, such as conflict in Lebanon and Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights, which could potentially have caused an outbreak in hostilities. But UNDOF’s success is probably due to the fact that neither Israel nor Syria has had a strategic interest in renewed fighting along the Golan front. As the fate of UNIFIL in Lebanon demonstrated, if Israel perceives it to be in its national security interest to undertake a military operation, it will do so, regardless of the presence of a UN peacekeeping


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mission. The underlying point is that in order for a peacekeeping mission to succeed, there must be a “peace” to “keep.” Although Syria and Israel officially remain in a state of war, there has been a de facto state of peace in the Golan since 1974, achieved primarily through mutual consent by both parties to avoid an accidental war. As pre-conditions for any peace treaty with Syria, Israel had insisted on the following: Security of its water sources; modifications to the 1949 armistice demarcation line to retain the escarpments overlooking the Hula Valley and the northern shore of Lake Tiberias; demilitarization of the Golan Heights; maintenance of the IDF warning station on Mount Hermon; redeployment of Syrian armored forces north of Damascus; a lengthy and phased IDF redeployment from the Golan; zones of limitation on armaments and forces (including, however, only a symbolic portion of Israeli territory); and the establishment of a buffer zone patrolled by an international force and observers similar to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force or the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers.45 If an agreement could be brokered similar to the proposals that came close to being realized in early 2000, a phased Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, whatever the timeframe, would require intricate planning. Unlike the Sinai, the Golan Heights is a relatively small area that offers no comparable defensive high ground for a phased withdrawal between the forward positions now occupied by the IDF to the original 1949 armistice line. The only such defensive position near the armistice line is the Galilee Hills in Israel, west of the Hula Valley and the Jordan River. There are, nevertheless, workable interim lines of withdrawal: An initial IDF pullback of several kilometers while retaining most of the Golan’s high ground; a further removal to positions along the escarpment overlooking the Hula Valley and Lake Tiberias; and a final withdrawal to the 1949 armistice line—or to an adjusted international border.46 Israel’s position has been to insist on integrating Lebanon into any final security arrangements. Syria withdrew its forces from Lebanon in 2005, thus fulfilling one of Israel’s long-standing conditions. In addition, Israel has insisted that Hezbollah must be disarmed, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards must be expelled from Lebanon, and the Lebanese government must regain control over its territory and prevent groups hostile to Israel from operating on its soil.47 These terms were reiterated during the July 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. For the Syrians, there can be no peace settlement without the full return of the Golan Heights. Damascus has, however, indicated it would compromise over such issues as early warning posts, an international

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presence, and the stationing of Syrian troops on the Golan Heights. It would probably accept a demilitarized zone as well, but only if such a zone covered both the Israeli and Syrian sides. A phased IDF withdrawal would also be acceptable; however, Damascus has insisted on a much shorter withdrawal period than Jerusalem initially proposed.48 In addition to the key conditions for peace outlined above, any future agreement would have to satisfy the security requirements for both Israel and Syria. In particular, Israel would expect reasonable guarantees that Syria would not violate any of the following historical casi belli: 1. A threatening concentration of Arab military forces on one or more of its borders (especially when combined with new military treaties among Arab neighboring states directed against Israel). 2. The closing of the Strait of Tiran or any other direct air and sea routes to Israel. 3. An intolerable level of Arab guerrilla activities or any other form of intensified military semi-warfare that cannot be countered by reprisal or retaliation policies. 4. An attempt by an Arab state more powerful than Jordan or Lebanon to take control of either of these and change the balance of power on Israel’s eastern or northern border. 5. A situation in which Israel’s security is seriously undermined by unbalanced arms supplies to Arab countries not matched by similar supplies to Israel. 6. Any unilateral attempt by a neighboring Arab country to divert the waters of the river Jordan.49

Israel launched the Sinai campaign of 1956 primarily due to the third and fifth casi belli; the 1967 war was a consequence of the first and second. The 1973 war, while not initiated by Israel, can be viewed as a result of the first casus belli, while the third and fourth gave rise to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. The Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osiraq in 1981 was viewed as necessary by Israel in light of the fifth casus belli in order to prevent the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Arab arsenal.50 In addition, before Israel would agree to withdraw from the Golan Heights, some regime would have to be in place to satisfy Jerusalem’s concern that Syria may attempt to divert the waters of the Jordan River, a problem the Israelis have not had to worry about since 1967.51


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Missions and Structure of a Future Peacekeeping Regime If and when Israel and Syria reach a peace agreement, as they came tantalizingly close to doing in 2000, a peacekeeping mission would almost certainly be an important component.52 A future peacekeeping mission on the Golan could have the following objectives: To provide a moving interposition force to observe and facilitate the withdrawal of the IDF; observe and monitor the terms of the peace treaty; control a buffer zone; verify arms and forces levels in designated zones of limitations; provide security to Golan inhabitants inside the buffer zone; clear minefields and obstacles throughout the demilitarized zone; investigate violations of the security agreements; provide a neutral forum for military-to-military exchanges between the IDF and the Syrian army; and install a credible military presence as a tripwire against aggression by either side. The international status of a future Golan peacekeeping force undoubtedly would become an issue for debate between Syria and Israel. Damascus would probably insist on a United Nations-sponsored force similar in size and mission to UNDOF. Israel would probably push for a nonUN force similar to the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).53 An alternative to launching peacekeeping missions through the auspices of the United Nations is to create a force through the direct cooperation of states—a “coalition of the willing.” Such a multinational force would have three important characteristics that would in some ways differentiate its activity from a UN mission. First, coalition forces are drawn from groups of states and have no ties to an international organization. Second, the troops presumably would be from countries outside the Middle East and are likely to come from several different regions. Third, multinational forces are deployed with the authority of agreements negotiated with the parties to the conflict.54 Two cases of peacekeeping missions involving multinational forces outside the auspices of the United Nations—the Multinational Forces in Lebanon (MNF) and the MFO in the Sinai following the withdrawal of UNEF II—were integral to the Middle East peacekeeping regime. These cases represent both a successful (MFO) and an unsuccessful (MNF) example of peacekeeping operations undertaken through the mechanism of a multinational force. Despite their different circumstances (the MFO was placed into an ideal environment for a peacekeeping operation, whereas the MNF was placed into a much more challenging environment), these missions shared certain structural characteristics: the operations were carried out under open-ended mandates and personnel were drawn from relatively few countries. The command structure differed between the two missions,

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however, with MFO having a strong centralized command and MNF utilizing a looser model of coordination involving liaison officers.55 A third possibility would be to use multinational forces from an international organization other than the United Nations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union. In recent years, NATO has gained peacekeeping experience in Bosnia and Kosovo and has shown a willingness to conduct out-of-area military operations in Afghanistan. Regardless of which force option is contemplated, as Andrew Bacevich, Michael Eisenstadt, and Carl Ford pointed out: “There are no substitutes for comprehensive security arrangements between the parties, dealing with early warning, demilitarization, force reductions and restructuring, phased withdrawal, water security, and Lebanon.”56 Such arrangements would require something more than the UN peacekeeping mission currently in place on the Golan. With the exception of unarmed UNTSO observers, no UN peacekeeping force has ever operated in Israeli territory. Israel is skeptical of the United Nations’ peacemaking abilities, it views UN peacekeepers as mostly pro-Arab, and it considers the General Assembly to be openly anti-Israel. The IDF maintains cordial relations with UNTSO and UNDOF, but the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the IDF often clashed. Israel considers UNDOF to be a quiet success, but it prefers the security guarantee the Sinai MFO offers: Permanence backed by a peace treaty, a strong United States commitment and presence, and the confidence building measure of direct contact with the Egyptians. Bacevich, Eisenstadt, and Ford saw several advantages of a coalition versus a United Nations mission: For the United States, the MFO model has several advantages over an expanded UNDOF: it would enable the United States to have a higher degree of control over the operation; it would ensure that the peacekeeping effort does not become hostage to UN politics; it would promote a leaner, more efficient, and less expensive organizational structure; and it would institutionalize a more significant element of cooperation and interaction between Israel and Syria.57

Using the basic structure and mandate of UNDOF, coupled with the electronic early-warning and compliance verification mechanisms of a Sinai Support Mission, and incorporating an aerial photography verification program, along with some confidence building measures found in the Sinai MFO (military-to-military coordination and information exchanges), workable security arrangements could be constructed on the Golan Heights that would satisfy, in part, the security requirements of both Syria and Israel.58


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To be successful in the long term, however, such a regime must be incorporated into a larger peace building process that addresses the region’s political, military, and economic problems. The Egypt-Israel path from armistice agreement to peacekeeping to security arrangements would be a viable model for the Syria-Israel situation on the Golan, and would be consistent with the evolutionary changes that have taken place within the Middle East peacekeeping regime. Before such arrangements could be implemented, however, a change in the political climate domestically, regionally, and internationally, must first occur. Current international institutions such as the United Nations and its peacekeeping agent UNDOF have been unable to effect this change. The key variable in both cases is the role of hegemon as regime creator and guarantor. While the United States attempted to fill this role in the 1990s, as it had done for the Egypt-Israel case, its window of opportunity closed for the foreseeable future in 2000. With the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, the subsequent US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the continuing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, another window of opportunity is unlikely to reopen until the political climate changes. In the meantime, the peacekeeping regime appears stable on the Golan and remains valuable to maintaining stability on a potentially dangerous front.

THE MIDDLE EAST PEACEKEEPING REGIME AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT One arena of the Arab-Israeli conflict that has not experienced international peacekeeping is the ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. The nature of this conflict has not made it amenable to a peacekeeping mission consistent with the norms and procedures of the Middle East peacekeeping regime as that regime has evolved. Most importantly, the conflict does not involve two sovereign states. Even after the creation of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, in reality only Israel remained capable of maintaining any semblance of sovereign authority over the entire area of historic Palestine. Since the collapse of the Oslo peace process in 2000 and the resumption of violence, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has begun to take on more of the characteristics of an intrastate, inter-communal conflict.59 Thomas Friedman explained the dilemma facing Israeli leaders in 2000: If Israel keeps all the settlements and the Arab areas around them, demographically it will become an apartheid state or a non-Jewish state. If it tries unilaterally to uproot some of the settlements, without any

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Peacekeeping in the Middle East as an International Regime commitments from the Palestinians, it will trigger a Jewish-Jewish civil war. It will also provide a huge victory for Palestinian radicals—who will have gotten land for war. If Israel uprooted only some settlements and put up a wall, it would leave behind a chopped-up Palestinian ministate that would be totally non-viable. It would be a seething cauldron, uncontrolled by Israel, that could easily acquire heavier weapons from Iraq and become a strategic threat.60

Friedman concluded that the Oslo process was a failure and Israel’s only way out of its security dilemma was to invite the United States and NATO to intervene and set up a post-conflict state-building mission, similar to the arrangements in Kosovo and Bosnia, as a prelude to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza: “The Palestinians can have their state—but no army—under NATO’s watchful eye.”61 It is not surprising, therefore, that some analysts have sought inspiration in the “new” peacekeeping theories espoused in the 1990s. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Martin Indyk and others called for an internationalization of the conflict resolution process. Indyk’s was the most extreme version, insisting on a trusteeship, while others suggested humanitarian and state-building forces in Gaza. Secretary General Annan’s proposal for a “multinational force formed by a coalition of the willing” authorized under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, was put forward in a closed session of the Security Council on 18 April 2002. Indyk maintained that trusteeships in East Timor and Kosovo, and most recently in Iraq, have facilitated the creation of democratic institutions.62 Steven Evert of the Centre for European Reform echoed Friedman’s idea, arguing that “the Europeans and the US should prepare plans for a NATO-led peacekeeping force to police a final settlement between Israel and the Palestinians” and that “an international force should take over the occupied territories after Israel withdraws.”63 Thorbjorn Jagland, head of Norway’s parliamentary foreign affairs committee, described the primary tasks of such a NATO force, suggesting that it “could be deployed between Israel and a future Palestinian state to prevent attacks from either side, on the condition that the two parties agree on such arrangement and on the nature of the zones where the patrols should be.64 US Senator John Warner, chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, sent letters to President George W. Bush in August 2002 and again in March 2003, asking him to include NATO peacekeepers in the administration’s “road map” to a final peace agreement between the Palestinians and Israel. The president’s reply was non-committal.65


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Robert Kagan doubted that such an arrangement was feasible in the current environment arguing that “the options are less than enticing.” Kagan argued that no matter what is agreed to between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, factions such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad will oppose any settlement and continue to attack Israel, as well as any Western international force introduced into the area. He concluded by noting that, “the proposal for an international peacekeeping force looks less like a real plan than a desperate if noble attempt to solve the insoluble in the Middle East.”66 While there were some in NATO who saw the potential for such a mission, others were doubtful that the Palestinians would see NATO as a neutral force, and insisted that a multinational coalition would be a better solution. According to Annalisa Monaco, if the parties agreed to the insertion of a NATO military force, “NATO would do what it did in Bosnia, that is, separating the two parties, disarming irregular groups and guaranteeing the security of the two states.” She estimated that a NATO force deployed to Palestine would need up to 60,000 troops and would be expected to remain in the region for an indefinite period of time.67 As Kagan and others have pointed out, given the commitments of US military forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and NATO’s assumption of the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan, it is unlikely that either the United States or NATO will have the troops or money to undertake such an extensive operation in the near future.

ANALYSIS OF POST-COLD WAR PEACEKEEPING PROPOSALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST Besides being “an appallingly bad idea,”68 the proposal for an international intervention in the Israel-Palestine case, as outlined above, is not consistent with the norms and procedures of the Middle East peacekeeping regime that has slowly evolved since 1948. As has been described in this study, what is being called peacekeeping today is very different from the concept of peacekeeping operationalized by its practitioners during the Cold War. Evidence indicates that the early postCold War versions of peacekeeping did not function as expected because tasks were attempted that exceeded the core competencies of the regime. The distinct separation between enforcement and peacekeeping operations seems necessary if the international peacekeeping regime is to have any future utility. Attempts to change fundamentally the peacekeeping regime by altering its norms and principles have not met with success in the past (UN operations in the Congo and Bosnia, as well as the Multinational

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Force in Beirut, for example). A gradual evolution, rather than radical transformation, of the peacekeeping regime seems more likely to lead to success. Arguably, the withdrawal of the United Nations Protection Force from Bosnia and its replacement by a NATO force followed a pattern not dissimilar to the staged progression of the Egypt-Israel case discussed in this study. In both instances, the key variable to success in moving from peacekeeping to actual peace and establishing the rudiments of a security regime was intercession by a hegemon, the United States. Rather than creating a new international organization, as was done in the Egypt-Israel case, in Bosnia the hegemon, after first using its considerable military power during a two-month air campaign to coerce the Serbs into accepting an intervention force, expanded the role of a long-standing security organization, NATO. Surprisingly, the changes to the broader international peacekeeping regime from 1988 to 1994 had little direct impact on the existing peacekeeping regime in the Middle East or the proposals for a future security arrangement between Israel and Syria. The explanation for this is that the transformation of the broader international peacekeeping regime in the early 1990s primarily applied to the new UN role of intervening in intrastate conflicts, while the Arab-Israeli conflict was interstate in nature. The Egypt-Israel example of a measured progression from armistice agreement to peacekeeping to permanent security arrangements is a viable model for the Syria-Israel situation on the Golan, and that approach would be consistent with the evolutionary changes that have taken place within the Middle East peacekeeping regime since its inception. Given the nature of the Israel-Palestine conflict and the corresponding lack of security and state institutions in the West Bank and Gaza, constructing a viable peacekeeping mission will be problematic at best. As Eliot Cohen cautioned: To be sure, what we now call peacekeeping is a necessary military function at some times—it is important today in Afghanistan and Yugoslavia, as it was half a century ago in Germany and Japan. But no one should doubt the level of effort it would require—an increase in military end strength of 100,000 or more troops would not be an unrealistic estimate of what it would take. More importantly, though, Israel and the Palestinian territories are profoundly unripe for such a venture.69


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Cohen’s use of the term “unripe” referred to the growing body of literature among students of conflict negotiation on the concept of “ripeness” as a prerequisite for successful negotiations. William Zartman argued that timing is as important as the actual substance of the negotiations: Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so— when alternative, usually unilateral, means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament. At that “ripe” moment, they seek or are amenable to proposals that offer a way out.70

In the Israel-Palestinian case, actions on both sides since the beginning of the second intifada in September 2000 mitigate the prospects of a negotiated settlement in the near future.71 An important consideration for the prospects of any future peacekeeping mission in Palestine is the lack of physical separation between the Jewish and Arab populations. Although the barrier being constructed by Israel in the West Bank will alleviate this problem to some degree, approximately one million Arabs live in Israel proper. For them, as well as the Palestinians living outside the barrier, this physical separation of Arab communities is likely to lead to continued resentment among the Palestinians. As Cohen noted: Between Israel and the Palestinian Authority there is no trust, no agreed demarcations of a cease-fire line, let alone a boundary. The threat to security comes not, on the Palestinian side, from a regular armed force with which one can have conventional liaison relationships, but from several shadowy organizations, several of which operate independently of the Palestinian Authority.72

Evidence from the 1990s of the failure of UN-led second generation peacekeeping missions in similar situations, and the difficulties encountered by the American-led coalition in suppressing the insurgency in Iraq (a security situation not dissimilar to that in the West Bank and Gaza), indicate that the operative framework of the Middle East peacekeeping regime described in this study is not a good fit for the current IsraeliPalestinian situation. If a viable Palestinian state emerges, then it might be possible to implement an MFO-type mission. But even then, its role would most likely be to prevent cross-border terrorist attacks (and the

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subsequent Israeli reprisals) rather than interstate war, and that would be a very dangerous and different one from the MFO in the Sinai or UNDOF on the Golan.

Chapter Six

Peacekeeping in the Middle East Reconsidered

This study offers an alternative approach to the study of international peacekeeping that evaluates the long-term effects of peacekeeping on state behavior, and concomitantly, the effects of varying state behavior on an international regime. Evidence in the preceding chapters supports the thesis that the individual peacekeeping missions conducted in the Middle East in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict can be conceptualized as components of a broader Middle East peacekeeping regime, which in turn is a subset of, and operates within, the policy spaces defined by an international peacekeeping regime. By reducing the universe of peacekeeping missions to a well-defined subset—specifically those international peacekeeping missions conducted between 1948 and 1994 that involved Israel and one or more of the neighboring Arab states—it becomes possible to make a closer examination of their relation to each other in time, and their collective impact on Israel’s behavior. This methodology also facilitates examining the effects varying state behavior—particularly Israel’s—had over time on the evolution of a regime. The findings of this study, summarized below, provide new perspectives on the significance of a peacekeeping regime’s role in influencing state behavior in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the effects of varying state behavior on regime evolution, the relative importance of regimes, and the utility of regime analysis in explaining the importance of international institutions.

IMPACT OF THE PEACEKEEPING REGIME ON STATE BEHAVIOR AND EFFECTS OF STATE BEHAVIOR ON THE REGIME The evidence presented in this work supports the realist argument that states will pursue their perceived interests, particularly in the realm of security, 121

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how and when they see fit, despite the existence of regimes. Israel was the one state actor directly involved in all the conflict dyads of the Middle East peacekeeping regime. As such, it is interesting to note that Israel’s security requirements have always had priority in its decisions on whether or not to conform to the rules and norms of the peacekeeping regime. Israel never allowed the peacekeeping regime to override its own security strategy. When the regime supported that security strategy, as interpreted by Israel, the regime functioned successfully. In looking at the correlation between the evolution of the Middle East peacekeeping regime and Israel’s behavior, the evidence indicates the presence of a feedback loop. Not only did the regime condition Israel’s behavior, but, as much of the evidence in the preceding chapters has shown, varying state behavior by Israel had an impact on the evolution and behavior of the peacekeeping regime. Dennis Ross provided a compelling analysis of Israeli concepts of security and attitudes toward the peace process: They did not want to live under siege, or behind an “iron wall,” if there was an alternative. They believed there was no alternative to their own strength, and the importance of the Arabs fully appreciating that strength, but they did not want to forgo opportunities for peace. They believed they had little room for error, and that their concerns about security would always have to be kept paramount. At the same time, the Israeli perception of their needs could clearly be influenced by Arab behavior—by the perception that they had a genuine partner for peace. Alternatively, when they saw no partner for peace, unilateral impulses to ensure security came to the fore.1

Israeli national security strategy traditionally has been based on the following tenets: Israeli security policy is strategically defensive, but achieved by offensive military operations, when necessary; Israel should maintain close and supportive relations with a major power, (the United States since 1967) for military assistance, but it will not rely on outside powers or an alliance for its security; Israel maintains sufficient military power to deter an attack by any coalition of Arab forces, and should deterrence fail, it maintains sufficient military forces to defeat any such attack; and any fighting must be transferred to and conducted on enemy territory.2 Strategy can be defined, according to Raymond Aron, as the choice between war and peace. Nadav Safran, defining strategy in much the same context as Thomas Schelling,3 concluded that Israeli national security strategy between 1948 and 1967 was based on the concept of deterrence,


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while the period between 1967 and 1973 was marked by a strategy of compellence. Safran’s thesis was that Israeli planners, faced with limited resources immediately after the 1948-49 war, devised a strategic plan to maximize those resources to deter any Arab state or coalition from initiating a war against Israel and to maintain the capability to repel such an attack if deterrence failed. Safran argued that the military doctrine and force structure the Israel Defense Forces developed between 1948 and 1967 were specifically tailored to facilitate this strategy of deterrence. Safran viewed the 1967 war as the result of the failure of deterrence. Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, misperceived the strength of Israel’s forces in comparison to his own and consequently decided the balance was in his favor. The key to deterrence as a strategy is perception. When Nasser misperceived Israel’s strength, the deterrent aspect of Israel’s national security strategy became ineffective.4 The failure of deterrence led Israeli planners to revise their basic national security strategy to one based on compellence. By using the territorial depth gained in the 1967 war, maintaining a qualitative military superiority, and holding the Occupied Territories as bargaining chips, Israeli leaders hoped to force a favorable peace settlement. Compellence as a strategy, however, also was a failure. The Arabs were not induced to accept the post-1967 situation, and the possibility of recovering the Occupied Territories by military means remained an Arab strategic goal until the end of the October 1973 war. In fact, as Safran argued, the political elements of Israel’s compellence strategy “impelled the Arabs to gamble on a surprise general war rather than yield to open-ended demands.”5 In 1974, Israeli strategy moved back to deterrence, with several notable exceptions. The 1982 invasion of Lebanon was designed to compel the Syrians to withdraw from Lebanon and induce them to keep tighter control over PLO actions aimed at Lebanon. Compellence met with only limited success. Hezbollah replaced the threat of the PLO along Israel’s northern border, and the Syrians were in de facto control of most of Lebanon up through 2005. Israel’s occupation of its self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon, while a “relatively low-cost venture”6 that was mostly successful in preventing attacks from Lebanon aimed at Israel proper continued to complicate the formula for a negotiated peace with Syria until the IDF withdrawal in 2000. During the summer of 2006, Jerusalem switched back to a compellence strategy in dealing with the Hamas-led Palestinian government and Lebanon in an attempt to coerce both to halt guerilla attacks against Israeli territory. In 1989, Yitzhak Rabin, then defense minister, outlined Israeli national security strategic thinking:

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Peacekeeping in the Middle East as an International Regime Our main strategy is to prevent war through credible deterrence, and once war is enforced [sic] on us, to win it as quickly and decisively as possible. We believe that having the most offensive type of conventional forces—being a modern, efficient air force is the best way to achieve both goals, and that’s why it has first priority.7

No Israeli government to date has openly articulated a national security policy of deterrence based on nuclear capability. While Israel has never admitted possessing nuclear weapons, and consequently has no declared strategy for their employment, many analysts believe the Israeli inventory may number 300 weapons of various yields and types. Jerusalem’s stated position is that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, but it will maintain a nuclear option as a precaution in case another state in the region acquires such a capability.8 Israel’s attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osiraq clearly demonstrated Jerusalem’s resolve to prohibit the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region by a power it considers a threat to Israel’s security. While Israel’s nuclear capability is an assumed fact in the Middle East, whether or not that capability is a deterrent is arguable. As Geoffrey Kemp pointed out, rather than acting as a deterrent to war, Israel’s nuclear capability may be an incentive for confrontational Arab states to acquire a similar “bomb in the basement” capability. Should such a capability be suspected, Israel may once again strike, as it did at Osiraq, leading to the possibility of increased hostilities, and perhaps even war.9 The historic, geographic, demographic, and economic factors that influenced Israel’s national security strategy also influenced the military doctrine and force structure developed by the IDF.10 That doctrine, as it evolved through Israel’s wartime experiences, was based on two assumptions. First, the destruction of Arab forces in a war would give Israel only a temporary advantage, since Arab resources would permit relatively quick rebuilding. Second, conquered territory would be difficult to hold and would be used primarily as a strategic advantage in bargaining for a peace settlement.11 As was noted earlier in this study, in a situation of extreme hostility, in which there is no direct dialogue between the parties in conflict and no efforts to establish a negotiation process, a peacekeeping regime can claim to have had an effect on the actors’ behavior merely by preventing the outbreak of war. This may seem to be a minimal accomplishment, but in a region as volatile as the Middle East it is a remarkable one. Israel’s attitude toward UN involvement in the Middle East peacekeeping regime has been generally unenthusiastic. Looking at specific


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peacekeeping missions as examples, Israel initially cooperated and actively participated in the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MAC) administered by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization up through 1956—and in the case of the Israel-Lebanon MAC, up to 1967. Israel’s perception of the inability of the armistice regime to satisfy its security requirements led, in part, to the demise of that regime. Israel was, at best, reluctantly cooperative with the United Nations Emergency Force. And yet, Israel benefited from the ten conflict-free years that the peacekeeping regime helped to bring about. UNEF’s removal, at the request of the Egyptians, created an environment sufficiently threatening to Israel that its leaders began planning an immediate preemptive strike. In this case, the peacekeeping regime’s existence, and especially, UNEF’s rather sudden removal, affected Israeli behavior. Had the regime not been created, and its norms and principles generally adhered to by the parties for over ten years, it is likely that open war between Israel and Egypt would have erupted prior to June 1967. Had Egypt not recklessly requested UNEF’s withdrawal, it is probable that Israel would not have launched its preemptive attack in June 1967. It is difficult to conclude that after the 1973 war UNEF II independently altered Israeli behavior. Rather, it was the interposition by the United States that motivated Israel to accept redeployments in the Sinai. However, UNEF II helped to provide a stable environment during the ensuing peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt. Israel’s actions during the negotiations were not altered by the existence of UNEF II, although the argument can be made that absent UNEF II, the conditions would not have been “ripe” for a peace process. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force presence in the Golan Heights likely served to dissuade Israel from directly retaliating against Syria for the actions of Syrian forces and Damascus’s allies in Lebanon, although Israel has shown no interest in provoking another war on the Golan Heights. Nevertheless, UNDOF’s presence provides assurances that an accidental war on that front would be unlikely to occur. While the presence of UNDOF did not prevent Israel from taking the politically aggressive action of annexing the Golan Heights in 1981, without UNDOF’s presence it is conceivable that Israel’s annexation could have provoked a Syrian military response because of domestic pressure on Syrian President Hafez al Asad to respond. UNDOF provided Asad with an excuse not to repeat Nasser’s mistake. Of the post-1973 missions in the Middle East peacekeeping regime, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon was the least successful in altering Israeli behavior. Israel had strategic objectives in Lebanon it was determined to fulfill, and consequently, Israel proceeded with its 1982 invasion despite the presence of UNIFIL forces in the south of Lebanon.

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Since Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, however, UNIFIL has played a more traditional role as a peacekeeping buffer force between two opposing sides that do not enjoy a diplomatic relationship. Arguably, UNIFIL has contributed to peace and stability along what remains a very tense and unstable border, but when Israel’s perceived interests in Lebanon change—as they did following the Hezbollah raid into Israel in July 2006— UNIFIL’s presence was unable to deter Israel from taking whatever steps it deemed necessary to keep its northern frontier secure. Similarly, Israel’s attitude toward the short-lived Multinational Forces in Beirut was problematic. The presence of US military forces gave the IDF pause, but there were several incidents in which the IDF tested the MNF. The MNF II was far from being a neutral mission designed to maintain a tenuous peace—in fact, there was no peace to keep, and the parties to the conflict saw the MNF II as representing the interests and policies of the United States. The MNF interfered with Israel’s strategic goals, and consequently, Israel did little to support it. Israel’s attitude toward the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, by contrast, has been supportive. Israel, as well as Egypt and the United States, finance the mission as part of the permanent peace treaty. The MFO’s presence, and in particular Washington’s contribution of troops, are integral to the ongoing peace between Israel and Egypt. As has been described in this study, the example of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and deployment of the MFO provides the basis for a security regime in the Middle East. That it operates outside United Nations auspices is undoubtedly perceived as a benefit by Israel. Table 2 Israel’s Attitude toward the Middle East Peacekeeping Regime Mission

Israel’s Level of Cooperation

Regime’s Ability to Achieve Goals

UNTSO

Accept and cooperate until 1956

Failure after 1956

UNEF I

Cooperate

Moderate Success until 1967

UNEF II

Accept and cooperate

Success

UNDOF

Accept and cooperate

Success

UNIFIL

Limited cooperation

Failure 1982-2000 and 2006

MFO

Accept, cooperate, and support

Success

Cooperate in Stage I

Success Stage I

Limited cooperation in Stage II

Failure Stage II

MNF


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Table 2 summarizes Israel’s attitude toward the various missions of the Middle East peacekeeping regime and the ability of the regime to achieve its goals. Not surprisingly, Israel’s level of cooperation is directly correlated to the ability of the regime to achieve its goals. Those missions that maintained the highest levels of Israeli cooperation—UNEF II, UNDOF, and MFO—were the most successful.

PEACEKEEPING AS AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME This study demonstrated that there is a distinct Middle East peacekeeping regime that has developed its own norms, principles, rules, and decision-making procedures over the years. Its successes have been limited but important. Even in cases such as on the Golan where the regime has not led directly to peacemaking, it has nevertheless served to contain tensions and help prevent the outbreak of accidental war. As Janice Gross Stein concluded, egoistic self-interested actors under the security dilemma form regimes in situations where they share either common interests in ensuring a particular outcome, or common aversions in avoiding an undesired outcome.12 In the case of the Middle East peacekeeping regime, the parties to the conflict share a common aversion to the outbreak of accidental war, and thus find the regime to be useful. The General Armistice Agreements negotiated after the first ArabIsraeli war constituted the formal basis of this international regime. The international organization that administered the regime was the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization as the primary agent for the United Nations. The implied principles of the armistice regime were based on Article 40, Chapter VI, of the United Nations Charter, by which the United Nations would only intercede with the consent of the parties concerned and coercive force would not be used by the United Nations, or the parties themselves, to end the conflict. While the armistice clearly respected the principle of national sovereignty, the United Nations maintained the position that the armistice agreements could not unilaterally be abrogated. The armistice regime was based on the norm that violence could be controlled without resorting to the use of force or enforcement measures. The United Nations did not impose a solution; instead it offered the interposition of neutral third-party observers to oversee armistice agreements between sovereign, consenting states. These observers, by their presence, moral authority, neutrality, and impartiality, supported by the mechanisms of the Mixed Armistice Commissions, were intended to provide stability in a conflict situation. The armistice regime was a series of agreements between belligerent military forces, not political arrangements between states, and was never

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designed to be an end in itself. It was assumed to be a means to facilitate a resolution to the political conflict. Over time, stalemate in the peacemaking process led to a weakening of the armistice regime, as actual practice gradually became inconsistent with established principles, norms, rules, and procedures. The result was failure in the conflict resolution process, disintegration of the armistice regime, and ultimately the resumption of military conflict in the region. Despite these limitations and the ultimate failure of the MAC, UNTSO functioned in arenas outside the MACs that maintained the rudiments of a peacekeeping regime in the region, providing a crucial means of contact between states that did not have diplomatic relations. While the armistice regime eventually collapsed, the international organization that administered it, UNTSO, remained in place, eventually forming the nucleus of the first modern peacekeeping regime. As a case study, the Arab-Israeli armistice regime supports Robert Keohane’s contention that because regimes are costly and difficult to create, existing ones will tend to evolve rather than be destroyed or replaced by new ones.13 The principles, norms, rules, and procedures of the armistice regime would be incorporated into the peacekeeping regime established after the 1956 war. Building on the existing armistice regime, UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold designed the ad hoc structure, guiding principles, and operational functions of a peacekeeping regime during the creation of UNEF in 1956. Hammarskjold’s work had both immediate and long-term effects on the role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security, and on the nature of future missions in the Middle East peacekeeping regime. The regime structure designed in 1956 comprised political, economic, social, and military elements, and operated under the basic principles of consent and neutrality. UNEF served as the military element of the structure, functioning first to prevent the resumption of hostilities, then later to pacify an area prone to violent confrontations. While the nature of the force was essentially military, it operated under the peacekeeping regime principles of consent, neutrality, freedom of movement, and non-use of force. As in the case of the earlier armistice regime, the peacekeeping regime did not prevent the resumption of deliberate war between Israel and its Arab neighbors. With the establishment of UNEF, the template for maintaining international peace and security as envisaged by the framers of the United Nations Charter in 1945 was changed from collective security measures to what Secretary General Hammarskjold called preventive diplomacy—the use of relatively small United Nations forces to prevent the deterioration of situations that might threaten international peace while buying time for


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peaceful negotiations to begin. Instead of reliance on enforcement measures, the United Nations adopted a peacekeeping regime as a method of fulfilling its primary responsibility to maintain international peace. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war was seen at the time as an indication that the Middle East peacekeeping regime failed to limit armed conflict, but that conclusion neglects the substantial reduction of conflict along the Egyptian-Israeli frontier from 1957 to 1967. Militarized disputes between Israel and Egypt were negligible during UNEF’s tenure. In contrast, numerous incidents occurred along Israel’s frontiers with Jordan and Syria, where only the UNTSO observers, as vestiges of the neglected armistice regime, remained. In this respect, UNEF can be described as a conditional success in limiting armed conflict. However, as was noted previously, the outbreak of war in 1967 and the deepening resentments between Israel and the Arab countries offered a much more pessimistic assessment of the peacekeeping regime’s role in resolving conflict. The peacekeeping regime functioned not because Egypt and Israel shared common interests, but because they shared a common aversion— avoiding accidental war—for over ten years. The expectations of both Israel and Egypt were met, and while several of those expectations were based on tacit rather than explicit arrangements, the United Nations, over the life of this phase of the regime, provided an explicit framework for the conduct of the regime’s operation. Equally important for its functioning, the United Nations formally adopted guiding principles for the regime and prescribed regulations for UNEF. These documents, along with the convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, explicitly described the norms, principles, rules, and procedures for the peacekeeping regime. It may not have been called a peacekeeping regime at the time, but as this study demonstrated, the arrangements undertaken by the United Nations to ameliorate the situation between Israel and Egypt after the 1956 war met the criteria for and functioned as an international regime. The argument that this was indeed a unique regime-type was reinforced by subsequent UN decisions to construct similar peacekeeping regimes when faced with comparable circumstances. UNEF would serve as a model for future missions of the Middle East peacekeeping regime, and both its strengths and weaknesses would reappear in future missions.

REINTERPRETATION OF PEACEKEEPING IN THE MIDDLE EAST USING REGIME ANALYSIS Using a case-study approach to evaluate peacekeeping, Paul Diehl found that, “unlike the great variation across peacekeeping operations in their

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ability to limit armed conflict, there is virtually uniform failure in these same operations when it comes to conflict resolution.” UNEF II (the only case Diehl found that led to conflict resolution), which was successful in containing and reducing violence, also contributed to a political climate in which both Israel and Egypt were willing to make concessions for peace and the United States was actively involved in mediating the conflict. In this case, a positive change in the degree of support was crucial in affecting a positive change in the political climate that led to a positive change in peace enhancement. As Diehl surmised, the operational effectiveness of the various missions appeared to have had little effect on resolving the conflict. Instead, the willingness of the parties involved to make concessions and the active involvement of the United States in mediating were found to be more significant factors.14 Based on Diehl’s criteria for success, which tend to reflect other criteria generally held by peacekeeping analysts, the individual peacekeeping missions in the Middle East, particularly those undertaken by the United Nations, generally have been rated as only marginally successful in containing and reducing violence and not successful in enhancing peace. UNEF II and its successor the Multinational Force and Observers are the exceptions. While the first Multinational Force (MNF I) was successful in reducing violence for a time, MNF II appeared actually to have intensified the conflict, though it may have prevented the recurrence of any massacres similar to the incidents that called for its reentry into West Beirut. As this study has shown, using discrete case studies does not necessarily provide an adequate long-term appreciation of the interrelation of sequential peacekeeping missions dealing with a particular set of issue areas. By using regime analysis and classifying these various missions as components of a Middle East peacekeeping regime, however, the evolution of these interrelationships becomes clearer, the cumulative impact of these peacekeeping missions on the patterns of behavior among the actors becomes recognizable, and, as a consequence, the significance (measured in terms of effectiveness and resilience) of the regime leads to a different evaluation of the outcome of the peacekeeping process. Evidence from peacekeeping missions in the Middle East suggests that variations in the regime’s principles, rules, and procedures were associated with differing outcomes in terms of success and failures. In addition, it is evident that traditional peacekeeping missions, though originally designed to be temporary and transient, were long-term ventures and thus quite resilient. Evidence indicates that international peacekeeping in the Middle East during the Cold War generally followed the pattern of behavior ascribed to an international regime. This peacekeeping regime was not static but dynamic, modifying its rules and decision-making procedures in response


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to changes in both its external environment and its internal functions. The basic norms and principles remained relatively constant, however, thus indicating that the changes were primarily within the regime. Indirectly, the Middle East peacekeeping regime was weakened by the attempt to expand established norms, principles, rules, and decision-making procedures during the Congo mission; more directly the regime became less coherent following the demise of UNEF I. The Middle East peacekeeping regime nevertheless remained viable, as evidenced by its renewal after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, thus conforming to Keohane’s prediction that existing regimes will evolve rather than be replaced. The long-term (thirty-three years) process of conflict resolution between Israel and Egypt presented an interesting model of the progressive stages of a peacekeeping regime. From 1949 to 1956, Egypt and Israel were parties to a UN-sponsored and UNTSO-administered armistice regime. That arrangement evolved in 1956 to a peacekeeping regime and was maintained by the United Nations through an agent (UNEF) until war put a halt to the regime’s practical use in 1967. UNTSO maintained vestiges of the regime from 1967 to 1973, but failure on the part of the parties to adhere to the basic regime norms led to further conflict in 1973. The peacekeeping regime was reestablished with a new agent, UNEF II, in 1973, and further refined and expanded through the intercession of a hegemon (the United States) in 1975. This stage continued until 1979 when, despite fulfilling its goal, the authorizing organization (the Security Council) was unable to expand, or even continue, the regime’s responsibilities in light of a change in the regional dynamics (a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt). Once again, the hegemon stepped in and created a more permanent security phase of the regime, and established an independent international organization (the MFO) to administer it. In this case, although the administering agent changed, the basic norms, principles, rules, and operating procedures of the regime remained intact, thus demonstrating the resilience and practicality of the regime. The Egypt-Israel case offered a model of the conflict resolution process for other actors in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and perhaps those in other arenas, to emulate. Similar patterns of behavior arose in the evolution of the peacekeeping regime in both the Lebanon-Israel and Syria-Israel cases. In the cases involving Syria and Lebanon, however, absent progress in peacemaking, both remain fixed in the peacekeeping stage. Of the two, the Israel-Lebanon case remains the most problematic. The inability of the government of Lebanon to exercise sovereignty over its southern border area demonstrates the limitations of the peacekeeping: The Middle East peacekeeping regime functions best when state actors abide by the regime’s norms and principles.

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The one interesting outlier is the Jordan-Israel case, where a peacekeeping mission was not installed after the demise of the Mixed Armistice Commission. Aharon Klieman described the evolution of the post-1967 relationship between Israel and Jordan, prior to their final peace treaty in October 1994, as a “tacit” security regime, defined by political stability, economic viability, and physical security.15 The Palestine-Israel case differs from the others in that it did not involve sovereign states: Jordan occupied and later annexed a significant portion of what was supposed to be an Arab state in Palestine in 1949, and Israel occupied that same area in 1967. Therefore, the sequence described above did not take place. The Oslo arrangements for the creation of a Palestinian Authority, and their initial implementation, had the considerable assistance of outside mediators, but lacked an international peacekeeping component. The Palestine-Israel conflict dyad is included in the Middle East peacekeeping regime because it has the potential, given the appropriate

Table 3. Evolution of the Middle East Peacekeeping Regime Peacekeeping Phase

Conflict Dyad

Armistice Phase

Egypt-Israel

MAC-UNTSO (1948-56)

UNEF I (1956-67) UNEF II (197379)

Syria-Israel

MAC-UNTSO (1948-67)

UNDOF (1973-present)

Lebanon-Israel

MAC-UNTSO (1948-67)

UNIFIL (1978-present) MNF I (1982) MNF II (1982-84)

Jordan-Israel

MAC-UNTSO (1948-67)

Palestine-Israel

Security Phase

Peace Treaty (1979) MFO (1982-present)

Tacit Security (1967-94) Peace Treaty (1994) Oslo Arrangements (1994-2000)


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circumstances, of being an arena for a future international peacekeeping mission. Table 3 depicts the evolution of the Middle East Peacekeeping regime as described in this study. The evolution from armistice to peacekeeping to security phase is sequential and evident, to one degree or another, in virtually all the conflict dyads, and the interrelationship between the various missions is more recognizable than in Table 1. An analysis of the Middle East peacekeeping regime and its impact on the conflict dyads produces quite a different set of outcomes from those observed by Diehl and other analysts who used the discrete case study approach to evaluate the effectiveness of peacekeeping. First, the Middle East peacekeeping regime has been effective because its members generally have abided by its norms and rules. Second, the regime achieved the objectives for which it was intended. In the case of Egypt-Israel, the regime, when its rules and norms were being observed by its members, was successful in containing and reducing violence, and it eventually led to a peace treaty and mutual security arrangements. The Syria-Israel case has not evolved to the point of a peace treaty, but the framework for such an agreement has been established. The regime has been successful in reducing conflict between the parties. The Lebanon-Israel conflict dyad was an exception on numerous occasions from 1978 to 2000, and again in 2006, but strengthening the peacekeeping regime through the introduction of a more robust UNIFIL was undertaken in September 2006 to help contain violence along the Israel-Lebanon border. As the exception that seems to prove the rule, the Jordan-Israel conflict came to a peaceful resolution despite the lack of formal peacekeeping. While the Middle East peacekeeping regime has yet to be involved in the Palestine-Israel conflict dyad, indications are that the Table 4. Effectiveness of the Middle East Peacekeeping Regime Reconsidered Conflict Dyad

Containment or Reduction of Violence

Enhancement of Peace

Egypt-Israel

Success

Success = Peace Treaty

Syria-Israel

Success

Moderate Success

Lebanon-Israel

Ineffective

Failure to Date

Jordan-Israel

Success

Success = Peace Treaty

Palestine-Israel

Failure

Failure to Date

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regime, in one form or another eventually will play a role in conflict reduction and containment. Using regime analysis rather than discrete case studies to evaluate the peacekeeping arrangements in the Middle East reveals that over the long term the Middle East peacekeeping regime is more effective and resilient than most analysts have observed. This regime has existed for over fifty years, evolving in one case into a permanent security arrangement, while in three others it remains the basis for future security arrangements. Table 4 depicts these findings.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF REGIME CHANGE This study also argued that attempts to change fundamentally the Middle East peacekeeping regime, as opposed to letting it evolve, would not be wise. The regime has worked best when certain conditions apply; UNIFIL and MNF II are examples of missions deployed in situations that did not meet these conditions. Expanding the regime’s purpose and missions, as some have suggested vis a vis the West Bank and Gaza, would be a dangerous step. This danger becomes evident in light of the broader international peacekeeping regime in the immediate post-Cold War period, which evolved into something quite different from its Cold War-era predecessor. Evidence indicates that the post-Cold War versions of peacekeeping did not function as expected because tasks were attempted that exceeded the core competencies of the regime. Enforcement measures undertaken in the guise of peacekeeping in that period complicated the broader international peacekeeping regime’s ability to perform the more traditional roles of monitoring and defusing conflicts. A maxim of traditional peacekeeping was that when peacekeepers open fire, they have clearly lost their neutrality and have become a party to the conflict, as evidenced in the Congo, Lebanon, Somalia, and Bosnia. Evidence also indicates that radically changing the broader international peacekeeping regime is not the answer to solving the security threats posed by the consequences of failed states and the resultant humanitarian problems of massive migrations of refugees and internally displaced persons. Instead, the enforcement measures contained in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter offer adequate justification for multilateral action on a limited, ad hoc basis, but only if a major power has mustered the will to undertake such actions. The United States was able to do so against North Korea in 1950, against Iraq in 1991, with NATO against Serbia in 1999, and more recently against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Australia performed similar services leading a coalition into East Timor.


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The distinct separation between enforcement and peacekeeping operations seems necessary if the broader international peacekeeping regime is to have any future utility. Attempts to transform the regime by altering its norms and principles have not met with success in the past, notably during the Congo operation, and more recently in Somalia and Bosnia. A likely consequence of these failures will be greater reluctance on the part of major powers to support its use in the future, particularly in arenas where their interests are at stake. The inability of UN peacekeeping missions to achieve success through military enforcement measures in many recent intrastate conflicts has fostered substantial reflection on the utility of peacekeeping. To its credit, the United Nations leadership has been self-critical when examining its track record. The Brahimi Report,16 named after former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi, who chaired the panel commissioned by Secretary General Kofi Annan, contained a variety of recommendations that promise to improve the outcome of UN peacekeeping operations. How these recommendations are operationalized and what impacts they will have on the broader international peacekeeping regime over time provide further opportunities for research.

CONCLUSIONS The evidence presented in this study indicates that regime theory is a useful tool to evaluate peacekeeping as a long-term phenomenon. It provides new insights to describe and explain the successes of peacekeeping (i.e., those missions that closely conformed to the regime’s established norms, principles, rules, and procedures) and the failures (those missions that significantly deviated from them). Such a theoretical approach also is reasonably predictive for analyses of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War international system. This study provides a new interpretation of the long-term effectiveness and resilience of peacekeeping as an international regime. Evidence of the evolution of the peacekeeping regime in the Middle East indicates that institutions do matter. The progression from cease-fire through armistice to peacekeeping to a peace treaty and permanent security arrangements in the case of Egypt-Israel would not have been possible without the involvement of the United Nations and the various peacekeeping organizations. However, the role of a hegemon—in this case the United States—was critical for advancing the conflict resolution process, and along with other interested state actors, influenced the evolution of the regime, indicating the presence of a feedback loop. Rather than independently altering state behavior, the peacekeeping regime facilitated incremental Israeli and Egyptian agreements

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to modify their behavior because of their common aversion to accidental war. In turn, the peacekeeping regime adapted its rules and procedures in response to variance in state behavior. Evidence from this study supports the contention that international institutions are intervening variables between causal factors in international politics, as many regime theorists have consistently maintained. Proponents of an expanded post-Cold War international peacekeeping regime apparently ignored the historical evidence of the effects a radical transformation would have on an existing regime. Instead of relying on a succession of evolutionary steps to expand the regime’s tasks gradually, as had been the practice during the Cold War for the Middle East peacekeeping regime, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and others chose to try transforming the broader international peacekeeping regime rapidly into peace-enforcement and peace-building regimes. That they failed should have come as no great surprise to students of regime theory. Interestingly, this study found that the changes to the global peacekeeping regime in the 1990s did not seem to have had a direct impact on the existing regime in the Middle East or the proposals for a future peacekeeping arrangement between Israel and Syria. A partial explanation for this is that the changes to international peacekeeping in the early 1990s primarily applied to the new UN role of intervention in intrastate conflicts, while the Arab-Israeli conflict has been and continues to be interstate in nature. The presence of a feedback loop between state and regime behavior also partly accounts for this condition. Middle East peacekeeping is unlikely to change dramatically as long as the hegemon (the United States) and other interested state actors (Israel and the Arab confrontations states) do not support expansion of the regime beyond its accepted principles and norms. The findings of this study support the realist argument concerning state sovereignty. Where the Middle East peacekeeping regime has succeeded, this is because it has helped to bolster or protect, not undermine, state sovereignty. When the regime has conflicted with the sovereign interests of states, it has failed in its mission—as was the case of UNIFIL, for example. What the evidence does not indicate, either from this research or that of the other analysts cited, is that peacekeeping, as an international regime in the Middle East, independently altered state behavior or caused peace during the Cold War. In fact, the peacekeeping record provides no sound basis for the overly optimistic expectations and faith liberal institutionalists were to ascribe to it in the years immediately following the Cold War. While evidence presented in this study supports Mearsheimer’s contention that “institutional outcomes reflect great power interests, and are


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essentially tools that great powers employ for their own selfish purposes,”17 his conclusion that “institutions do not provide a sound basis for building a stable post-Cold War world,”18 is not entirely compelling. In the ArabIsraeli conflict, as this study demonstrates, the Middle East peacekeeping regime did, and continues to, matter.19 The enduring presence of the Middle East peacekeeping regime in the region for over five decades, and the inclusion of its principles and norms as the basis for security arrangements in potential agreements between Israel and Syria, as well as Israel and the Palestinians, demonstrates its continuing value.

Appendix A

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 (1967) Text of S/242, 22 November 1967, available online from the United States Department of State website: http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/21974.htm. UN Security Council Resolution 242 November 22, 1967 The Security Council, Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security, Emphasizing further that all member states in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, 1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 2. Affirms further the necessity 139

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(a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; 3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a special representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the special representative as soon as possible

Appendix B

EXCERPT FROM THE DRAFT ISRAEL-SYRIA PEACE TREATY (2000) This draft of an Israel-Syria Peace Treaty was presented by United States government negotiators in January 2000. The entire draft treaty is available online from the “United Jerusalem” archive: http://www.unitedjerusalem. com/SYRIAN_RECORD/US_treaty_Doc_Israel-Syria/us_treaty_doc_israelsyria.as. The Annex referenced in the draft was not appended to the document and it is unlikely that it had ever been completed. This document was leaked to Israeli news media, and the section dealing with the security arrangements is reproduced below. Note that items in parentheses represent the differing positions of Israeli (I) and Syrian (S) negotiators. ARTICLE IV – Security A. Security Arrangements Recognizing the importance of security for both Parties as an important element of permanent peace and stability, the Parties will employ the following security arrangements to build mutual confidence in the implementation of this Treaty and to provide for the security needs of both Parties: 1. Areas of limitation of forces and capabilities, including limitations on their readiness and activities, and on armaments, weapon system and military infrastructure, as described in the Annex. 2. Within the areas of limitation of forces and capabilities, the establishment of a demilitarized zone (I: encompassing both the area from which Israeli forces will be relocated and the existing Area of Separation established 141

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under the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces of 31 May 1974) (S: of equal scope on both sides of the border). As described in the Annex, no military forces, armaments, weapon systems, military capabilities, or military infrastructure will be introduced into the demilitarized zone by either Party and only a limited civil police presence may be deployed in the area. (I: Both sides agree not to fly over the demilitarized zone without special arrangements.) 3. Early warning capabilities, including an early warning ground station on Mt. Hermon (I: with an effective Israeli presence) (S: operated by the United States and France under their total auspices and responsibilities). Arrangements for the unimpeded, efficient and continuous operation of this station are as detailed in the Annex. 4. A monitoring, inspection and verification mechanism (I: composed of the two Parties and a multinational component and including on-site technical means) (S: through an international presence), to monitor and supervise the implementation of the security arrangements. Details regarding these security arrangements, including their scope, positioning and nature, as well as other security arrangements, are specified in the Annex.

Notes

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION 1. For a detailed discussion of the critical importance of the non-use of force by peacekeepers, see F.T. Liu, United Nations Peacekeeping and the NonUse of Force (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992). Brian Urquhart’s quote is taken from his “Forward” to this work on page 7. 2. Chester Crocker, “Peacekeeping We Can Fight For,” editorial, Washington Post (May 8, 1994), C4. 3. This debate was most famously played out in the pages of International Security and International Organization in 1994 and 1995. The critique of liberal institutionalist theories was led by John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 5-49. Liberal institutionalist critiques of realism include: Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994); and the responses to Mearsheimer in International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995) by Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory;” Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “The Promise of Collective Security;” John G. Ruggie, “The False Premise of Realism;” and Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics.” Mearsheimer’s response to his critics, “A Realist Reply,” is contained in the same issue. 4. For example, see Bjorn Skogmo, UNIFIL: International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978-1988 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989); Nathan A. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984); and Anthony McDermott and Kjell Skjelsbeck, ed., The Multinational Force in Beirut, 1982-1984 (Miami: Florida International University, 1991). 5. For example, see: William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993); United Nations, Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, 2d. ed. (New York: United Nations, 1990); Indar Jit Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of International Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin’s,

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6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

1984); and Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics (London: Macmillan, 1990). For example, International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper’s Handbook (New York: International Peace Academy, 1978 and 1984 editions); and the works edited by David Wainhouse, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973), and International Peace Observation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966). See Paul Diehl, International Peacekeeping, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). Diehl probably comes closest to providing an understanding of why and how peacekeeping missions succeed or fail. In his study, he concentrates on filling “some of the theoretical and policy gaps in our understanding of international peacekeeping operations,” by looking for explanations for the success or failure of six traditional Cold War era peacekeeping missions. Other examples of general studies on peacekeeping include: John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israeli Interface (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); A.B. Featherston, Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping (London: Macmillan, 1994); and John Hillen, Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s. 1998). On the use of crucial case studies, see: Helmut Breitmeir, Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zurn, “The International Regimes Database as a Tool for the Study of International Cooperation,” Working Paper 96-160 (Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, December 1996), 19-21; Alexander George, “Case Studies and Theory Development,” in Paul Laren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979); Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, ed., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Press, 1975); and Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). This description is found in John G. Ruggie, “International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends,” International Organization 29, no. 1 (Summer 1975): 573. Comprehensive peacekeeping studies such as Durch’s The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping and the United Nations’ Blue Helmets cover only United Nations missions, not the multinational missions. International regimes have been defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2. Regimes include structural as well as process components. Analysis focuses on how regimes are created, what organizational form they take, how their decision-making process

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functions and the consequences of their resulting outputs. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, 3rd. ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), 168. 12. Studies that use regime theory as a basis for analyzing peacekeeping are Noam Arad, Security Regimes, Peacekeeping Operations and the Possibility of a NATO Peacekeeping Role in the Middle East, Monograph Series, No. 13 (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2002); and Jerzy W. Ciechanski, “The Extension of the United Nations Security Regime,” Ph.D. dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1995. Another significant work that deals with the possibility of security regimes in the Middle East is Efrain Inbar, ed., Regional Security Regimes: Israel and its Neighbors (Albany: State University Of New York Press, 1995). 13. Janice Gross Stein did a groundbreaking study of two “regimes of conflict management” between Israel and Egypt, 1956-67 and 1975-78. Janice Gross Stein, “Detection and Defection: Security ‘Regimes’ and the Management of International Conflict,” International Journal 40 (Autumn 1985): 591-627.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 1. Ernst Haas, “The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945– 1984” in United Nations Institute for Training and Research, The United Nations and the Management of International Peace and Security (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 12, 59–60. 2. This argument is made most forcefully by John J. Mearsheimer in his article “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter1994/95): 5–49. Examples of post-Cold War academic liberal institutionalists include Robert O. Keohane, “The Diplomacy of Structural Change: Multilateral Institutions and State Systems,” in Helga Haftendorn and Christian Tuschhoff, ed., America and Europe in an Era of Change (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); John G. Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization 46, no. 3 (Summer 1992); and Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). For a liberal institutionalist critique of realism see Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 249–277; and the institutionalist responses to Mearsheimer in International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995) by Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory;” Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “The Promise of Collective Security;” John G. Ruggie, “The False Premise of Realism;” and Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics.” Mearsheimer’s response, “A Realist Reply,” is contained in the same issue. For examples of the Clinton administration’s embrace of multilateralism see Bill Clinton, “American Foreign Policy and the Democratic Ideal,” Campaign speech, Pabst Theater,

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3. 4.

5.

6. 7.

8. 9.

10.

11. 12.

Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 1, 1992; Anthony Lake’s comments as reported in Steven A. Holmes, “Choice for National Security Advisor Has a Long-Awaited Chance to Lead,” New York Times, Jan. 3, 1993; and Warren Christopher, “Toward a More Integrated World,” statement at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Ministerial Meeting, Paris, June 8, 1994, as referenced in Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 5–6. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations Press, 1992). For an excellent discussion of this distinction, see Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1993), chapters I, VI, and VII. Ibid., especially chapters III and IV. See also Mearsheimer, “False Promise of International Institutions,” 34–37; William J. Durch, The United Nations and Collective Security in the 21st Century, (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993); Donald M. Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and PeaceEnforcement, (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993); and Harry G. Summers, Jr., The New World Strategy, (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1995), especially Part III. Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” 82–83. For example, in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1993, President Clinton stated, “UN peacekeeping holds the promise to resolve many of this era’s conflicts.” See U. S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, History of the Department of State During the Clinton Presidency (1993–2001), 06. United Nations, UN Peacekeeping, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/8522.ht. Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” 93. International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper’s Handbook (New York: International Peace Academy, 1978), Chapter I. The IPA is an international institute that trains civilian and military officials in peacekeeping skills, mediation, and negotiation techniques, and the art of conflict resolution. Although the IPA is a private institution with no formal connections to the United Nations, many of its members during the period these handbooks were written were former United Nations peacekeepers. For example, during a conference on peacekeeping doctrine held at the United States Army War College, definitional debates raged over exactly what to call post-Cold War multinational military operations. The United Nations called them “peace support operations;” the United States military referred to them as “peace operations;” the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) preferred “crisis response operations;” and Canada’s Pearson Peacekeeping Centre had decided to remain with “peacekeeping.” Conference briefing notes, “Challenges of Peacekeeping: The Doctrinal Dimension,” United States Army Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, Army War College, Carlisle, Pa., 22–26 May 2000. IPA, Peacekeeper’s Handbook, III/1. John Child, “Peacekeeping in the Inter-American System,” Military Review 60 (October 1980): 42.

Notes to Chapter One 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27.

28.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34.

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IPA, Peacekeeper’s Handbook, I/6. Ibid. See Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions.” This succinct definition was provided by Wallace Thies in his comments on an earlier paper I prepared on peacekeeping. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 13. IPA, Peacekeeper’s Handbook, I/1. Ibid. Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” 93. IPA, Peacekeeper’s Handbook, I/6. Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” 82–83, and 87. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 7. Mearsheimer finds little room for compromise with collective security theorists: “Realism and standard collective security cannot be married to each other because the two theories are mutually exclusive. States that are ‘heavily influenced by balance-of-power considerations’ are, by definition, going to be mainly concerned about the balance of power, not about maintaining peace.” Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” 89. Jerzy W. Ciechanski, “The Extension of the Untied Nations Security Regime,” Ph.D. dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1995: 16–19. John Ruggie, “International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends,” International Organization 29, no. 2 (Summer 1975), 570. Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2. This volume originally appeared as a special edition of International Organization 36 (Spring 1982) devoted to the study of regimes. In his chapter “Security Regimes” in the same publications, Robert Jervis offered a description of security regimes. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” 1. See also, Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 57–64. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” 2 (emphasis added). Ibid., 3–5. Oran R. Young, “International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions,” World Politics 39: 104–22. Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 4. Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittenberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 12–13. Oran Young later offered a middle-ground definition that he found more applicable to the environmental regimes he was studying: “Regimes are sets of rules, decision-making procedures, and/or programs that give rise to social practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices, and govern their interactions.” Oran R. Young, Governance in World Affairs, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 5. Ibid., 14.

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35. Susan Strange, “Cave! Hic Dragones: a Critique of Regime Analysis,” in Krasner, International Regimes, 337–354. 36. Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 32. 37. Ruggie, “International Responses to Technology,” 573. 38. Ernst B. Haas, “Words Can Hurt You; Or, Who Said What to Whom About Regimes,” in Krasner, International Regimes, 27. 39. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” 11–20. 40. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). 41. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 74–100. 42. Ernst Haas, “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes,” World Politics 32 (April 1980). 43. Keohane, After Hegemony, 85–109. 44. Oran R.Young, “Regime Dynamics: the Rise and Fall of International Regimes,” in Krasner, International Regimes, 98–101. 45. Strange, “Cave! Hic Dragones,” 337–354. 46. Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organization 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 492. 47. Charles Lipson, “Are Security Regimes Possible? Historical Cases and Modern Issues,” in Efraim Inbar, ed., Regional Security Regimes: Israel and Its Neighbors (Albany: State University Of New York Press, 1995), 11. 48. Jack Citrin, United Nations Peacekeeping Activities: A Case Study in Organizational Task Expansion (Denver: University of Denver, 1965), 11. 49. Ibid., 3-9. 50. Ibid. For a discussion of Haas’s theory of international integration, see Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 1-136. A decade later, Haas himself critiqued neofunctionalism because it did not address “the most pressing and important problems on the global agenda or policy and research.” Neofunctionalism research was motivated by a “sense of orderly process and by the assumption that states manage to cope collectively according to the rationality of disjointed incrementalism.” Considering the contemporary “turbulent field” of profuse global and regional issues in international politics, Haas considered the neofunctionalist approach inadequate. Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, Research Series no. 25 (Berkley: University of California, 1975), 17. 51. Citrin’s cases were the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL); the United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC); the United Nations Temporary Emergency Authority in West Irian (UNTEA); and the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). 52. Citrin, United Nations Peacekeeping Activities, 68. 53. Ibid., 69-70. 54. Ernst Haas, “The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945– 1984” in United Nations Institute for Training and Research, The United


55. 56.

57.

58.

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Nations and the Management of International Peace and Security (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 12, 59–60. Lipson, “Are Security Regimes Possible,” 6–8. Diehl, International Peacekeeping. Diehl selected his six case studies from traditional peacekeeping operations during the Cold War era: The United Nations Emergency Forces in the Sinai (UNEF I and II); the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC); the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL); and a mission not affiliated with the United Nations, the Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut. Diehl had several criteria for selecting these cases: All were considered examples of traditional peacekeeping missions that involved the use of a neutral interposition force on the territories of consenting states; the missions followed the agreement to a cease-fire; and the missions deployed prior to a resolution to the dispute. Other comprehensive peacekeeping studies tended to cover only UN missions, not the multinational operations. See, for example, William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993); United Nations, Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, 2d. ed. (New York: United Nations, 1990); Indar Jit Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of International Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin’s, 1984); Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics (London: Macmillan, 1990); Weiss et al., The United Nations and Changing World Politics; A.B. Featherston, Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping (London: Macmillan, 1994); and John Hillen, Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s. 1998). Mission histories include, Bjorn Skogmo, UNIFIL: International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978–1988 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989); Anthony McDermott and Kjell Skjelsbeck, eds., The Multinational Force in Beirut, 1982–1984 (Miami: Florida International University, 1991); Mala Tabory, The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai: Organization, Structure and Function (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); and Gabriella Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). Autobiographical accounts include E.A. Erskine, Mission with UNIFIL: An African Soldier’s Reflections (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989); Ensio Siilasvou, In the Service of Peace in the Middle East, 1967–1979 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); Odd Bull, War and Peace in the Middle East (London: Leo Cooper, 1973); Carl von Horn, Soldiering for Peace (New York: David McKay, 1966); and E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (London: George Harrap, 1962). Studies bounded in time or by setting include Bertil Stjernfelt, The Sinai Peace Front: UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Middle East, 1973–1980 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); Nathan A. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984); Doron Kochavi, “The United Nations’ Peacekeeping in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1973–1979 (Ph. D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1980); and John Mackinlay,

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59.

60.

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

67.

68. 69.

70. 71. 72.

The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the ArabIsraeli Interface (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). Mackinlay examines four post-1973 war peacekeeping cases in the Middle East (UNIFIL, UNDOF, MNF, and MFO) to develop lessons learned at the tactical level. Janice Gross Stein, “Detection and Defection: Security ‘Regimes’ and the Management of International Conflict,” International Journal 40 (Autumn 1985): 591–627. Ibid., 601. For discussions on the possibilities of security regimes, see Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, International Regimes, 173–194; and Lipson, “Are Security Regimes Possible,” 3–55. Jervis, “Security Regimes,” 173. Ibid.,174–176. Ibid., 175–178. Stein, “Detection and Defection,” 606–608. Ibid., 608. Noam Arad, Security Regimes, Peacekeeping Operations and the Possibility of a NATO Peacekeeping Role in the Middle East, Monograph Series, No. 13 (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2002); and Ciechanski, “The Extension of the United Nations Security Regime.” Other significant works that deals with the possibility of security regimes in the Middle East include Efrain Inbar, ed., Regional Security Regimes: Israel and its Neighbors (Albany: State University Of New York Press, 1995); and Zeev Maoz, ed., Regional Security in the Middle East: Past, Present and Future (London: Frank Cass, 1997). On the use of crucial case studies in regime analysis, see Helmut Breitmeir, Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zurn, “The International Regimes Database as a Tool for the Study of International Cooperation,” Working Paper 96–160 (Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, December 1996), 19–21. Citrin, United Nations Peacekeeping Activities, 45–46. Adapted from “the four sets of questions driving most research on international institutions” in Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zurn, “The Study of International Regimes,” European Journal of International Relations 1, no. 3 (1995): 268. Hasenclever et al.,, Theories of International Regimes, 2. Levy et al., “The Study of International Regimes,” 291–293. Stein, “Detection and Defection,” 611 and 624.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 1. Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1993), 1. 2. Ibid, 14–15. For a concise history of collective military actions prior to 1945, see Thomas F. Arnold and Heather R. Ruland, “The ‘Prehistory’ of Peacekeeping” in Barbara Benton, ed., Soldiers for Peace (New York: Facts On File, 1996), 11–23; also Erwin A. Schmidl, “The Evolution of Peace


3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8. 9.

10. 11. 12. 13.

14.

15.

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Operations from the Nineteenth Century,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 10 (Autumn 1999): 4–20. From Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Full text available online from the Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http:// www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leagcov.ht. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 16. See also W.W. Willoughby, The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1969). Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 17. See also George Baer, Test Case: Italy, Ethiopia, and the League of Nations (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1976). Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 17. See also James Barros, The Aaland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 17–18; Schmidl, “Evolution of Peace Operations,” 9; Arnold, “Prehistory of Peacekeeping,” 18–19. See also Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990). Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 18–19; Arnold, “Prehistory of Peacekeeping,” 20–21. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 19–20; Schmidl, “Evolution of Peace Operations,” 9; Arnold, “Prehistory of Peacekeeping,”19–20. See also Sarah Wambaugh, The Saar Plebiscite, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). Gen. Brind’s recommendations are reprinted in David Wainhouse, International Peace Observation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1973), 27–28. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 20. Ibid., 20–21. See also Schmidl, “Evolution of Peace Operations,” 19, fn 13. Henry Wiseman, ed., Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 31–33. This designation is based on the characterization of the period by then Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar in his Forward to United Nations, The Blue Helmets, 2d. ed. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1990), xv. Wiseman, Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals, 30–31. See William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993) for case studies on these early peace observation missions. Text of the letter reprinted in Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, ed., The Israeli-Arab Reader, 6th ed. (New York: Penquin Books, 2001), 11–12. For concise treatments of Palestine during World War I and the British Mandate see George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 4th ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 52-110 and 388-435; and William R. Polk, The Arab World Today, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 161–182. For an extensive treatment of British involvement in the creation of the modern Middle East see David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace (New York: Henry Holt, 1989).

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16. Reprinted in Laqueur and Rubin, The Israeli-Arab Reader, 13–16. 17. Ibid., 16. 18. Istavan S. Pogany, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 17-18. 19. Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 52-110 and 388-435. 20. Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr, A Concise History of the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1983), 235. 21. Estimates from “The Churchill White Paper (June 1922)” and “The Palestinian Royal Commission (Peel Commission) Report (July 1937),” reprinted in Laquer and Rubin, The Israeli-Arab Reader, 27 and 42. Quote from Article 2 of the British Mandate as reprinted in Laqueur and Rubin, The Israeli-Arab Reader, 31. The text of the Biltmore Program is in Laqueur and Rubin, The Israeli-Arab Reader, 55–57. 22. Pogany, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 20. 23. James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, 152. 24. Pogany, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 21-23. The texts of the Summary Report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (I) of 29 November 1947 can be found in Laqueur and Rubin, The Israeli-Arab Reader, 65–77. 25. Pogany, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 30-35. For a relatively balanced discussion of the first Arab-Israeli war, see Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (Fairfax, Va.: HERO Books, 1984), 3–125. 26. Pogany, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 41-43; and UN, The Blue Helmets, 15-20. 27. The text of United Nations Security Council Resolution 54 (1948) is reprinted in George J. Tomeh, ed., United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1974 (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1975), 127-128. 28. Lenczowski, 408. 29. Pogany, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 43-48. 30. For a detailed, but uncritical, treatment of UNTSO see UN, The Blue Helmets, 15-28. Updated information is available online through the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations web site: http://www.un.org/ Depts/dpko/dpko/home.shtm. For a critical analysis of UNTSO see Mona Ghali, “United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, 1948-Present,” in Durch, Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, 84–103. For firsthand observations of UNTSO during this period see E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (London: George Harrap, 1962), 62. Lieutenant General Burns was UNTSO Chief of Staff from 1954–1956 and became the first commander of the United Nations Emergency Force in 1956. 31. UN, The Blue Helmets, 24-27. 32. Estimate from Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 410. 33. Aryeh Shalev, The Israel-Syria Armistice Regime; 1949–1955 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 3–4. Although Shalev does not use regime analysis,


34.

35. 36.

37.

38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43.

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his study provides a masterful description of how the armistice regime was created, functioned, declined, and ultimately failed. Revisionist historians in Israel have contended that Israel, rather than the Arab states, was to blame for the deterioration of the armistice agreements. See for example, Benny Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, 1949–1956 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Mordechai Bar-On, The Gates of Gaza: Israel’s Road to Suez and Back (New York: St. Martin’s, 1994). For a listing of the “leading Israeli new history works” see Jerome Slater, “Lost Opportunities for Peace in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Israel and Syria, 1948–2001,” International Security 27, no.1 (Summer 2002) 81–82, footnote 3. Slater, himself a revisionist historian, claimed: The new history movement has produced a sweeping reassessment of the entire course of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It demonstrates that since 1949 the policies of the most important actors—Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinians, Saudi Arabia, and Syria—have been considerably more complex and differentiated than was previously understood. These Arab actors at various times have been genuinely open to the possibility of fair compromise settlements. On the other hand, if Arabs have been more flexible, the Israelis have been considerably less so on two central issues: resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and settlement of Israel’s territorial conflicts with neighboring states. (81) For a contrasting view, see the works of Michael B. Oren: Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Presidio Press, 2003), 9–12; Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 29–34; and “Escalation to Suez: The Egypt-Israel Border War,” Journal of Contemporary History 24 (April 1989): 347–373. Shalev, The Israel-Syria Armistice Regime, 202–203. Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regimes Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 17–18. S/1353/Rev.1, 20 July 1949. See Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, No. 126 (381st meeting), 53. Also reprinted in Shalev, The Israel-Syria Armistice Regime. Reprinted in Shalev, The Israel-Syria Armistice Regime, as an appendix. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 95. Shalev, The Israel-Syria Armistice Regime, 200–203. The Israel-Lebanon armistice was an exception; the MAC functioned until 1967 and the area remained relatively quite until the 1970s. UN, The Blue Helmets, 27. Ghali, “United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, 1948-Present,” 98. James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, 154–156. Israel abrogated the armistice with Egypt in 1956 and with Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon in 1967. The United Nations, however, did not recognize these unilateral actions. Ghali, “United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, 1948-Present,” 93–95.

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Notes to Chapter Three

44. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 107.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 1. The norms, principles, rules, and procedures of peacekeeping are discussed in detail in Chapter 1 of this study. 2. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 4th ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 521–527; and William R. Polk, The Arab World Today, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 196–205. 3. Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 431-435. The end of the Cold War and the opening of government archives led to a profusion of works dealing with the Suez Crisis of 1956. See for example: Scott Lucas, Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996); Muhammad Haykal, Cutting the Lion’s Tale: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes (New York: Arbor House, 1987); Steven Z. Freiberger, Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953–1957 (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1992); Michael B. Oren, The Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War (London: Frank Cass, 1993); Mordechai Bar-On, The Gates of Gaza: Israel’s Road to Suez and Back, 1953–1957 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1995); Benny Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, 1949–1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991); William Roger Louis and Roger Owen, ed., Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 4. Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (Fairfax, Va.: HERO Books, 1984), 132-134. See also Michael B. Oren’s Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Presidio Press, 2003), 7–12; Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War, 29–34; and “Escalation to Suez: The Egypt-Israel Border War,” Journal of Contemporary History 24 (April 1989): 347–373. 5. Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1970). 6. Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 431-432. 7. Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 137-138; Anthony Moncrieff, ed., Suez Ten Years After (London: BBC, 1967), 67-70; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 63. 8. On the Sevres meeting see Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 141-143; Moncrieff, Suez Ten Years After, 83-107; Hugh Thomas, Suez (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 110-24; Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956: A Personal Account (London: Trinity Press, 1978), 164; and Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life (London: William Morrow,1967), 176, 179-182. 9. Dupuy, Elusive Victory,138-143; and Moncrieff, Suez Ten Years After, 67-73. 10. Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 141-143 and 147-150; and E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (London: Harrap, 1962), 177-179.


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11. Istavan S. Pogany, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 65-66. Pogany’s study of the actions of the Security Council during the Suez crisis is a detailed, first-rate analysis with extensive source citations, particularly Chapter 4, “The Security Council and the Suez Crisis,” 55-84.; See also Rosalyn Higgins, ed., United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, Vol. I, The Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 226. Higgins’s study provides one of the best analyses available of the United Nations deliberations on peacekeeping up through 1967. 12. Text of Eden’s statement before the House of Commons and the Anglo-French communiqués to Egypt and Israel on 30 October 1956, reprinted in Noble Frankland, ed., Documents on International Affairs, 1956 (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 252-263. 13. Pogany, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 72. 14. For example, see Eisenhower’s radio and television address of 31 October 1956, reprinted in Frankland, Documents on International Affairs, 1956, 265-269. For a new interpretation of U.S. policy toward Egypt during the Suez crisis see John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 167–176. Gaddis maintains that the Eisenhower Administration “in effect encouraged the Egyptians to go ahead and align with the Soviet camp,” as a means to undercut both, similar to a strategy Dulles had conceived to strain ChineseSoviet relations. 15. Pogany, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 73. 16. Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, 227. The Uniting for Peace Resolution was originally adopted in November 1950 during the Korean conflict, which had begun in June when North Korean forces invaded South Korea. Within the Security Council an unusual situation existed: The Soviet delegation had left the Security Council in protest when its attempts to replace Nationalist China as a permanent member of the Security Council with the People’s Republic of China proved unsuccessful. With the Soviet Union absent, the United States was able to dominate the Security Council and push through several resolutions that resulted in the establishment of a United Nations Command and a call on member states to “furnish such assistance as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security in the area.” The return of the Soviet delegation to the Security Council in August 1950 ended the Council’s effectiveness in dealing with the Korean conflict. In anticipation of future deadlocks in the Security Council, the General Assembly, where United States power and prestige still held sway, adopted the Uniting for Peace Resolution as a means for “providing Assembly supervision of enforcement action under the limitations of its recommendatory authority.” United Nations Security Council Official Records, Fifth Year, No. 16 (June 27, 1950), 4. The Soviet Union, as well as its allies, viewed the Uniting for Peace Resolution as a clear violation of the United Nations Charter and as an attempt by the General Assembly to usurp the powers of the Security Council. In part the Uniting for Peace Resolution provided:

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17. 18.

19. 20.

21.

22.

23. 24. 25.

26.

Notes to Chapter Three That if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the Permanent Members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force where necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefore. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377 A (V), 3 November 1950, reprinted in part in D. W. Bowett, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study (New York: Praeger, 1964), 90. Pogany, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 77. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 997 (ES-1), 2 November 1956, reprinted in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, 227-228. Text of the British letter reprinted in Frankland, Documents on International Affairs, 1956, 272. For a concise discussion of Lester Pearson’s role in creating the peacekeeping force concept, see Jocelyn Coulon, Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and the New World Order, trans. Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 18–27. Longer treatments of Pearson’s role include John English, The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson 1949–1972 (Toronto: Vintage, 1993); and Geoffrey A. H. Pearson, Seize the Day: Lester B. Pearson and Crisis Diplomacy (Ottawa: Carelton University Press, 1993). Gabriella Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 27-28; Bowett, United Nations Forces, 91; and Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, 187. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 998 (ES-1), 4 November 1956 reprinted in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, 230-231. For a first-hand account of the actual planning for UNEF at UN headquarters, see Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 131–143. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 999 (ES-1), 4 November 1956, reprinted in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, 232. Text of Secretary General’s first report reprinted in Frankland, Documents on International Affairs, 1956, 281-283. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1000 (ES-1), 5 November 1956, reprinted in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, 233-234. Texts of the Soviet notes reprinted in Frankland, Documents on International Affairs, 1956, 295-301.


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27. Pogany, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 77-78. 28. Ibid. 29. Text of Secretary General’s second report reprinted in Frankland, Documents on International Affairs, 1956, 295-301. For insights into Hammarskjold’s ideas regarding UNEF, see Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, 131–139. 30. Text of Secretary General’s second report, reprinted in Frankland, Documents on International Affairs, 1956, 295-301. 31. Ibid., 299-300. 32. Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force, 52. Texts of resolutions reprinted in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, 234-236. Text of British reply reprinted in Frankland, 301. 33. Bowett, United Nations Forces, 99-104. 34. United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, 2d ed. (United Nations Department of Public Information, 1990), 54, 56-57; Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, 206-208. 35. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1000 (ES-1), 5 November 1956, reproduced in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, 233-234. 36. Ann Florini and Nina Tannenwald, On the Front Lines (New York: United Nations Association of the USA, 1984), 17. 37. Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 216-219. 38. Ibid., 219-223. See also Indar Jit Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder (London: Frank Cass, 1980) for a first-hand account of the withdrawal of UNEF by its last commander. 39. Charles W. Raymond, III, “A Military Perspective on International Peacekeeping,” MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College (1975), 36-39. 40. These observations were based on discussions with Field Service members during my tour of duty with UNTSO from November 1985 to October 1986. 41. Raymond, “A Military Perspective on International Peacekeeping,” 26-27. 42. UN, Blue Helmets, 51-55; see also Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, 335-338. 43. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, 218. 44. For a listing of these reports see Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, 527. Several are reprinted in part in her text. 45. Reprinted in ibid., 288-292. 46. UN, Blue Helmets, 70-75. 47. Ibid., 56-59; Raymond, “A Military Perspective on International Peacekeeping,” 41-43. 48. UN, Blue Helmets, 56–79. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid., 70-75; Raymond, “A Military Perspective on International Peacekeeping,” 43-52. 51. Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 204-208.

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52. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, 220-239; Raymond, “A Military Perspective on International Peacekeeping,” 45-49; UN, Blue Helmets, 70-71. 53. Raymond, “A Military Perspective on International Peacekeeping,” 29; Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force, 71-73; UN, Blue Helmets, 70-71. 54. UN, Blue Helmets, 61-62; Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, 385-392. 55. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1120 (XI), 24 November 1956, reprinted in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, 237-238. 56. United Nations Document A/3410, Letter from Permanent Representative of Israel to the Secretary General, 1 December 1956, reprinted in part in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, 393. 57. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, 240-241. 58. UN, Blue Helmets, 71-72. 59. Ibid., 72; Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, 242; Raymond, “A Military Perspective on International Peacekeeping,” 50; United Nations Document A/3694 and Add. 1, Report of the Secretary General, 9 October 1957, reprinted in part in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, 259. 60. Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, 239-241 and 394-405; UN, Blue Helmets, 63-67 and 72–73; Raymond, “A Military Perspective on International Peacekeeping,” 50-51; Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force, 73 and 88. 61. UN, Blue Helmets, 73-74; Raymond, “A Military Perspective on International Peacekeeping,” 51–52; Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force, 100-102. 62. UN, Blue Helmets, 74–75. 63. Ibid., 74. 64. Raymond, “A Military Perspective on International Peacekeeping,” 53. 65. Ibid., 54-55. 66. General Assembly Official Record, 1st emergency special session, 562d plenary meeting, reprinted in part in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, 228-229. 67. Ibid., 241-256. 68. Raymond, “A Military Perspective on International Peacekeeping,” 55-57. 69. See Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, 415-456, for a discussion on the financial debates in the United Nations. 70. Raymond, “A Military Perspective on International Peacekeeping,” 56. 71. Ibid., 57. 72. Indar Jit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge, The Thin Blue Line (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 63. 73. Ibid., 70. 74. James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, 219-220. 75. James M. Boyd, United Nations Peace-keeping Operations: A Military and Political Appraisal (New York: Praeger, 1971), 215.

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76. John C. Ries, Peacekeeping and Peace Observation: The Canadian Case, Arms Control Special Studies Program, Vol. IX (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1968), 13. 77. Ibid., 14. 78. Ernst Haas, “The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945-1984,” in The United Nations and the Management of International Peace and Security, United Nations Institute for Training and Research (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 12, 59-60. 79. Boyd, 216-217. 80. For case studies of these operations see UN, Blue Helmets, and William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). John Hillen found the Congo operation so different from the other peacekeeping missions that he calls it the first of the “second-generation” peacekeeping missions. Most other authors tend to associate that term with later post-Cold War UN operations. John Hillen, Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1998), 25–29. 81. Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 45–47. 82. International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper’s Handbook (New York: International Peace Academy, 1978), I/1–6. 83. Reprinted in R. B. Tackaberry, “Keeping the Peace: A Canadian Military Viewpoint on Peace-Keeping Operations,” Canadian Institute of International Affairs 26 (September 1966): 6. 84. Indar Jit Rikhye, Preparation and Training of United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces, Adelphi Papers 9 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, April 1964), 5. 85. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 90 and 95. 86. Janice Gross Stein, “Detection and Defection: Security ‘Regimes’ and the Management of International Conflict,” International Journal 40 (Autumn 1985): 615–618. 87. Ibid., 619. 88. Ibid. 89. Ibid., 620. 90. Stein’s analysis emphasized the limitations of a security regime in the IsraelEgypt case, drawing attention to those functions normally ascribed to security regimes that were not undertaken in the this case. 91. For a discussion on the legal status of UNEF, see Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force, 97–100 and 142–157.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR 1. Henry Wiseman, ed., Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 31–45. 2. Indar Jit Rikhye, “Peacekeeping and Peacemaking,” in Wiseman, Peacekeeping, 7–9.

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3. For case studies of ONUC see William J. Durch, “The UN Operation in the Congo,” in Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993), 315– 352; United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, 2d. ed. (New York: United Nations, 1990), 215–259; and Paul Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). 4. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 51. 5. Ibid., 50; Durch, Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, 319 and 326–328; UN, Blue Helmets, 218–222. 6. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 50–53. 7. Durch, Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, 345–348. 8. For case studies on the Cyprus mission, see Karl T. Birgisson, “United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus,” in Durch, Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, 219–236; UN, Blue Helmets, 281–311; and Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 53–56. 9. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 54–56. 10. Wiseman, Peacekeeping, 31–45. 11. One of the better works dealing with the role of the United Nations during the 1967 war is Arthur Lall, The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). For an excellent history of the war and its implications for the Middle East using recently declassified primary sources, see Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Middle East (New York: Presidio Press, 2003). 12. Wiseman, Peacekeeping, 45–46. 13. Text of S/242 is reproduced as Appendix A of this study. See Lall, UN and the Middle East Crisis, 230–270, for a discussion on the negotiations over S/242 and copies the draft resolutions proposed by various member states. 14. Michael B. Oren, “Escalation to Suez: The Egypt-Israel Border War,” Journal of Contemporary History 24 (April 1989), 367. 15. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 107. 16. For an account of the War of Attrition period see Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947–1974 (Fairfax, Va.: HERO Books, 1984), 343–383. 17. Nathan A. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 5–6. 18. Security Council Resolution 425, 19 March 1978, available from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations website: http://www.un.org/ Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/unifilDrs.ht. 19. For case studies of UNEF II, see UN, Blue Helmets, 79–98; Mona Ghali, “United Nations Emergency Force II,” in Durch, Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, 131–151; and Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 47–49.


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20. For a first-hand account of the UN deliberations and headquarters planning, see Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 234–253. 21. S/11052/Rev. 1, 27 October 1973, Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Supplement for October, November, and December 1973, reprinted in UN, Blue Helmets, 81–82. 22. UN, Blue Helmets, 82. Security Council resolutions pertaining to UNEF II are available from the UN Department of Peacekeeping web page: http:// www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unef2res.html. 23. For Kissinger’s account of these and subsequent negotiations see Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), 747–853. See also Edward Sheehan, “Step by Step in the Middle East,” Foreign Policy 22 (Spring 1976): 3–70. 24. UN, Blue Helmets, 89–92; Ghali, “United Nations Emergency Force II,” 142–144. 25. UN, Blue Helmets, 95–97; Ghali, “United Nations Emergency Force II,” 144. 26. UN, Blue Helmets, 95; Ghali, “United Nations Emergency Force II,” 144. For text of the Geneva agreement signed on 4 September 1975, see Department of State Bulletin 73, no. 182 (29 September 1975), 457–480. 27. B. Cherniavsky, “Early Warning Systems and the American Peace Keeping Mission: The Case of the Sinai II Agreement,” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 6 (1982): 24–43. See also United States Department of State, Watch in the Sinai and Peace in the Sinai (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State Publications, 1980 and 1983) for an organizational history of the SSM. 28. UN, Blue Helmets, 96–97; Ghali, “United Nations Emergency Force II,” 144–145. 29. Text of “Treaty of Peace between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel,” 26 March 1979, available from the Multinational Force and Observers web page: http://www.mfo.org/Site_tree/54/document_library.AS. 30. Janice Gross Stein, “Detection and Defection: Security ‘Regimes’ and the Management of International Conflict,” International Security 40 (Autumn 1985): 621. 31. Ibid., 623. 32. Robert B. Houghton and Frank G. Trinka, Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Service Institute, 1984), 5–7. 33. Ibid., 7. 34. Ibid., 8–12. Current force composition and updated information available from the UN Department of Peacekeeping website: http://www.un.org/Depts/ dpko/dpko/home.shtml. 35. Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1991), 158; and Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1253–1254.

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36. Houghton and Trinka, Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East, 15. 37. Doron Kochavi, “The United Nations’ Peacekeeping Operations in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1973–1978” (Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1980), 73. 38. For case studies on UNIFIL see Mona Ghali, “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,” in Durch, Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, 181–205; UN, Blue Helmets, 111–152; Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 56–58; Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts, 17–24, and 47–51; John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israeli Interface, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); and John Hillen, Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1998), 109–138. 39. For updates on the situation in Lebanon see the “Background” section of the UNDPKO website for UNIFIL: http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unifil/unifilB.htm. 40. Wiseman, Peacekeeping, 55. 41. Ibid. 42. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts, 6. 43. Case studies on the MFO include Cornelis Horman, “MFO: Peacekeeping in the Middle East,” Military Review 63 (September 1983), 2–13; Houghton and Trinka, Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East, 83–91: Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 112–121; Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers, 160–198; Mala Tabory, The Multi-national Force and Observers in the Sinai: Organization, Structure, and Function (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 111–121: and Noam Arad, Security Regimes, Peacekeeping Operations and the Possibility of a NATO Peacekeeping Role in the Middle East, Monograph Series, no. 13, (Rome, NATO Defense College, 2002), 79–102. 44. These observations were based on the author’s interviews with US Army staff officers working on the creation of the MFO. See also Alfred W. Baker, “Peacekeeping: A New Role for US Forces” (Essay, United States Army War College, 1983), 11. 45. From the mission statement of the MFO, available from the MFO web site: http://www.mfo.org/Homepage/homepage.ASP. 46. Wiseman, Peacekeeping, 49. 47. For case studies of the MNF, see Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 58–60; Richard Nelson, “Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model,” International Affairs 61 (1984–85): 67–89; and Anthony McDermont and Kjell Skjelsbaek, ed., The Multinational Force in Beirut, 1982–1984 (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991). 48. For an understanding of the difficulties of translating vague mandates into tactical operations, see Major Ronald F. Baczkowski, USMC, “Tactical Lessons for Peacekeeping: U.S. Multinational Force in Beirut 1982–1984,” CSC, 1995, Global Security.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ library/report/1995/BRF.htm. 49. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 48–50. See Donald Neff, “Israel Charged With Systematic Harassment of U.S. Marines,” Washington Report (March


50. 51.

52. 53.

54. 55. 56.

57. 58. 59.

60. 61. 62. 63.

64.

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1995), which provides an interesting account of how political gamesmanship by Israel had an effect on the Marines’ operations in Lebanon. Ann Florini and Nina Tannenwald, On the Front Lines (New York: United Nations Association of the USA, 1984), 12-14. John H. Sigler, ed., International Peacekeeping in the Eighties: Global Outlook and Canadian Priorities, Carleton International Proceedings (Ottawa: Carleton University, Fall 1982), 39. John Child, “Peacekeeping in the Inter-American System,” Military Review 60 (October 1980): 42-43. United Nations Document S/11052/Rev 1, paragraph 3, Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council, 27 October 1973. For an account of how this report was written, see Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, 239–242. Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, 241–242. International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper’s Handbook (New York: IPA, 1978), II/2–9. James C. Wise, “How to Not Fight: Putting Together a U.S. Army Force for a U.N. Peacekeeping Operation,” Military Review 57 (December 1977): 25. IPA, Peacekeeper’s Handbook, III/12–14. Indar Jit Rikhye, Preparation and Training of United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces, Adelphi Papers 9, Institute for Strategic Studies, April 1964, 5. Charles W. Raymond, III, “A Military Perspective of International Peacekeeping,” (MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1975), 125–128. Maj. Raymond’s thesis had a significant impact on the US Army’s thinking and doctrine on peacekeeping twenty years later. While little read outside the Army, Raymond’s analysis was incorporated into numerous staff studies, particularly as the US military became increasingly involved in peacekeeping in the 1980s, and in the 1990s it served as one of the basic documents in the development of Army peace operations doctrine. William Flavin, “Basis for US Army Peace Operations Doctrine,” lecture draft notes, US Army Peacekeeping Institute, 5 February, 2002, in author’s files. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 90. Ibid., 95. Ibid., 90. Ibid., 43. Diehl selected six case studies from traditional peacekeeping operations during the Cold War era: the United Nations Emergency Forces in the Sinai (UNEF I and II), the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and the Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut. Diehl’s criteria for selecting these cases included: All were considered examples of traditional peacekeeping missions which involved the use of a neutral interposition force on the territories of consenting states; the missions followed the agreement to a cease-fire; and the missions deployed prior to a resolution to the dispute. Ibid., 89–92.

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65. For example see Ernst B. Haas, “The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945–1984” in United Nations Institute for Training and Research, The United Nations and the Management of International Peace and Security (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987); and Jack Citrin, United Nations Peacekeeping Activities: A Case Study in Organizational Task Expansion (Denver: University of Denver, 1965). 66. Stein, “Detection and Defection,” 623. 67. Aharon Klieman, “The Israel-Jordan Tacit Security Regime,” in Efraim Inbar, ed., Regional Security Regimes: Israel and Its Neighbors (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 130–131, 138.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE 1. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992), 6. 2. United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, A/50/60 or S/1995/1, 3 Jan. 1995, II. 11. For case studies on the thirteen missions started between 1988 and 1992, see Willaim J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martins’s, 1993). Up-to-date information on current UN peacekeeping missions can be found on the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations web page: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ home.shtm. 3. For a detailed discussion of this preventive protection paradigm, see Bill Frelick, “Preventing Refugee Flows: Protection or Peril?” in US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1993 (Washington, D.C.: USCR, 1993), 7-8. 4. The term “second generation multinational operations” was coined by John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, “Second Generation Multinational Operations,” Washington Quarterly 15, no.3 (Summer 1992): 113-134. 5. Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace, 1. 6. Ibid., 7-19. 7. Ibid., 18-19. 8. Harry G. Summers, The New World Strategy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 167-168. 9. Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace, 22-27. 10. Ibid., 11. 11. Ibid., 29. 12. Ibid., 32-34. 13. Francis M. Deng, Protecting the Dispossessed: A Challenge for the International Community (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993), 2. 14. UN A/50/60, II. 12. 15. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World’s Refugees (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), iii. 16. Deng, Protecting the Dispossessed, 9.

Notes to Chapter Five 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

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UN A/50/60, II., 10-13. Ibid., 19. Summers, New World Strategy, 64. Ibid., 179-182. Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 154. Ibid. Ibid., 163. Quoted in Richard W. Nelson, “Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model,” in Anthony McDermott and Kjell Skjelsbeck, ed., The Multinational Force in Beirut 1982-1984 (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), 35. Quoted in Summers, New World Strategy, 177-178. UN A/50/60, III. B. 33. Ibid., III. F. 77. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 164. Mackinlay and Chopra, “Second Generation Multinational Operations,” 113-134. William J. Durch, The United Nations and Collective Security in the 21st Century (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993), 33. Muhammad Muslih, “The Golan: Israel, Syria, and Strategic Calculations,” The Middle East Journal 47 (Autumn 1993): 621. Ibid., 619-621. Ibid, 621. For an in-depth discussion of Israeli military doctrine and its implications in the Israel-Syria conflict see Ariel Levite, Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), and Dov Tamari, “The Syrian-Israeli Balance of Forces and Strategic Parity,” in Joseph Alpher, ed., The Middle East Military Balance 1989-1990 (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post Press, 1990), 81-100. Muslih, “The Golan,” 625. Edward B. Atkeson, A Military Assessment of the Middle East, 1991-96 (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 60-63. See Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1991), 158; and Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), 1253-1254, for the text of the agreement. Atkeson, Military Assessment of the Middle East, 60-63. Stephen Zunes, “Israeli-Syrian Peace: The Long Road Ahead,” Middle East Policy, vol. II, no. 3 (1993): 64. Mahmud A. Faksh, “Asad’s Westward Turn: Implications for Syria,” Middle East Policy, vol. II, no.3 (1993): 55. Muslih, “The Golan,” 625-630. For a narrative and analysis of the Israeli-Syrian peace process, see Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2004). Ross indicates that Asad’s perception of Israeli equivocation, along with Asad’s

166

43. 44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49. 50. 51.

52.

53.

54. 55. 56.

57.

Notes to Chapter Five own preoccupation with succession issues, doomed the negotiations in 2000. See page 589. Faksh, “Asad’s Westward Turn,” 59. Author’s observations and interviews with United Nations peacekeepers while assigned as an UNTSO staff officer to Observer Group Golan 19851986. See also United Nations, Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, 2d. ed. (New York: United Nations, 1990), 109. Ze’ev Schiff, Peace with Security: Israel’s Minimal Security Requirements in Negotiations with Syria (Washington: Washington Institute, 1993), 87102. See also Ross, Missing Peace, for the evolution of Israeli bargaining positions regarding a peace settlement with Syria. In the spring of 1994, the Israeli press reported on the “leak” of an IDF and foreign ministry document discussing the framework for agreement with Syria based on the analyses by Schiff. See “Ministry Prepares Working Paper on Golan Security,” Ha’aretz, translated in FBIS-NES, 5 April 1994, 28. Schiff, Peace with Security, 91-92; See also Jerome Slater, “Lost Opportunities for Peace in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Israel and Syria, 1948-2000,” International Security 27, no. 1 (Summer 2002): 98-102. Faksh, “Asad’s Westward Turn,” 59; Muslih, “The Golan,” 625-632; Slater, “Lost Opportunities for Peace,” 98; Zunes, “Israeli-Syrian Peace,” 63-66; and Ross, Missing Peace, particularly Chapters 21 and 22. Michael Handel, Israel’s Political-Military Doctrine (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1983), 64. Ibid., 92; and Mark Heller, ed., The Middle East Military Balance 1983 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1983), 29-31. For a discussion on the issue of water, see Slater, “Lost Opportunities for Peace,” 103. Slater argues it was Israeli nationalism rather than water that held up an agreement during the 1990s. See the Draft Israel-Syria Peace Treaty presented by US negotiators January 2000, (excerpt reproduced in Appendix B of this study) available online from the “United Jerusalem” archive: http://www.unitedjerusalem. com/SYRIAN_RECORD/US_treaty_Doc_Israel-Syria/us_treaty_doc_israelsyria.asp. This document was leaked to Israeli news media. Dennis Ross discusses the impact of the leak of this document; see Ross, Missing Peace, 552-53, 556-59, and 565-66. Slater, “Lost Opportunities for Peace,” 98. See also Stephen H. Gotowicki, “Considering a U.S. Military Force on the Golan: Confronting the Hyperbole, Paranoia, Hysteria and Agendas,” in Stephen C. Pelletiere, ed., The Peace Process, Phase One: Past Accomplishments, Future Concerns (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), 22-23. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 131. Ibid., 132-142. Andrew Bacevich, Michael Eisenstadt, and Carl Ford, Supporting Peace: America’s Role in an Israel-Syria Peace Agreement (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994), executive summary. Ibid.

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58. See Slater, “Lost Opportunities for Peace,” 98; and Gotowicki, “Considering a U.S. Military Force on the Golan,” 17-18 and 38-40. Gotowicki favored an expanded UNDOF rather than either a unilateral US force or an MFO-style independent international force. He stated that Clinton administration officials, while supportive of the idea of using American troops as part of any peacekeeping force on the Golan, were reluctant to reveal specifics of their plans. In 1993-94, while assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I worked on several analyses of the Golan and its importance to Israeli strategic planning in support of contingency planning for putting a US peacekeeping force on the Golan; the ultimate makeup and controlling authority of that force, as Gotowicki surmised, was not specified. 59. For a narrative and analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, see Ross, Missing Peace. 60. Thomas Friedman, “A Way Out of the Middle East Impasse,” New York Times, 24 August 2001. 61. Ibid. Friedman revisited this idea in another editorial the following year, “Israel, Palestine, and NATO,” New York Times, 12 December 2002. 62. For the debate on Annan’s proposal, see “Security Council, Taking Up Middle East Situation, Hears Discussion of Proposal by Secretary-General for Deployment of Multinational Force,” UN Press Release SC/7367, 18 April 2002. Indyk’s proposal was outlined in Martin Indyk, “A Trusteeship for Palestine?” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 3 (May/June 2003): 51-66. 63. Steven Evert, “How Europe Can Help the Middle East Peace Process,” Centre for European Reform Bulletin 28 (Feb-Mar 2003), available online: http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/28_everts.html. 64. “Norway Wants NATO to Act as Barrier between Palestinians, Israelis,” Palestine Chronicle (4 February 2003), available online: http://www.palestinechronicle.com. 65. See “Chairman Warner Statement on Possible NATO Role in Middle East,” Press Release, 11 June 2003, available online from Senator Warner’s website: http://warner.senate.gov/pressoffice/pressreleases/20030611.htm. Links to his 14 March 2003 letter to President George W. Bush, and the President’s 29 April 2003 reply, also are available on the same web page. 66. Robert Kagan, “Can NATO Patrol Palestine?” Washington Post, 18 April 2002, A21. 67. Annalisa Monaco, “NATO Peacekeepers in the Middle East,” NATO Notes 5, no. 4 (29 April 2003), available online at the Centre for European Security and Disarmament website: http://www.cesd.org/natonotes/ notes54.htm. 68. Eliot Cohen, “Keepers of What Peace?” Wall Street Journal, 17 April 2002. 69. Ibid. 70. I. William Zartman, “Ripeness,” Intractable Conflict Knowledge Base Project, Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, available online at: http://www.intractableconflict.org/m/ripeness.jsp. Additional works on this topic by Zartman and others include: I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven: Yale

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University Press, 1982), 66-78; I. William Zartman, “The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts,” in Alexander George, ed., Managing US-Soviet Rivalry (Boulder: Westview, 1983); Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, ed., International Mediation in Theory and Practice (Boulder: Westview, 1985), ll, and 258-60; and I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution (New York: Oxford, 1985/1989). 71. See Ross, Missing Peace, particularly chapters 23-25, for a narrative on attempts by the Clinton administration to facilitate a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. For an empirical study of the phenomenon of ripeness and its impact on the Israel-Palestine case, see Philip A. Schrodt, Omur Yilmaz, and Deborah Gerner, “Evaluating ‘Ripeness’ and ‘Hurting Stalemate’ in Mediated International Conflicts: An Event Data Study of the Middle East, Balkans, and West Africa” (University of Kansas: Center for International Political Analysis), available online at: http://www.ku.edu/~keds/papers.dir/Schrodt.etal.ISA03.pdf. 72. Cohen, “Keepers of What Peace?”

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX 1. Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2004), 28. 2. Bard E. O’Neill, “The Defense Policy of Israel,” in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, ed., The Defense Policies of Nations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 18. 3. “Military strategy can no longer be thought of, as it could for some countries in some eras, as the science of military victory. It is now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence. The instruments of war are more punitive than acquisitive. Military strategy, whether we like it or not, has become the diplomacy of violence.” Thomas E. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 34. 4. Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), 222-239. 5. Ibid., 223. 6. Augustus Richard Norton, “(In)Security Zones in South Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 23, no.1 (Autumn 1993): 75-77. Israel unilaterally withdrew its forces from Lebanon in May 2000. 7. “Rabin: Meeting the Missile Threat,” Jane’s Defense Weekly (June 10, 1989), 1141. 8. O’Neill, “The Defense Policy of Israel,” 392-393; and Edward B. Atkeson, A Military Assessment of the Middle East, 1991-96 (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 22-23. 9. Geoffrey Kemp and Shelley A. Stahl, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991), 102. 10. O’Neill, “The Defense Policy of Israel,” 383.

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11. Israel Tal, “Israel’s Defense Doctrine: Background and Dynamics,” Military Review 58 (March 1978), 23. 12. Janice Gross Stein, “Detection and Defection: Security ‘Regimes’ and the Management of International Conflict,” International Journal 40 (Autumn 1985): 606-608. 13. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 107. 14. Paul Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 89-95. 15. Aharon Klieman, “The Israel-Jordan Tacit Security Regime,” in Efraim Inbar, ed., Regional Security Regimes: Israel and Its Neighbors (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 130-131, 138. 16. “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” contained in UN Document A/55/305 – S/2000/809, dated 21 August 2000, available on the UN web site: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations. 17. John Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 82-83. 18. Ibid., 93. 19. This argument was buttressed by the Israeli government’s opposition to US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s proposal to reduce significantly the US military contingent assigned to the Multinational Force and Observers and suspend American U2 aircraft flights monitoring the separation of forces on the Israel-Syria frontier. See “Israel Opposes Cut in U.S. Contingent to Sinai Observer Force,” Ha’aretz (23 January 2003).

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Index

A Aaland Islands 26 aerial photography 109 Afghanistan: coalition of the willing in 106; NATO peacekeeping experience in 114, 117, 134; US intervention in 115 Africa 71 Aidid, Mohammed Farah 103 Al Qaeda 106, 134 An Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali) 8, 100-1, 105 Angola 102 Annan, Kofi 85, 116, 135 Arab-Israeli conflict: common aversion as factor in war avoidance in 22, 129; historical casi belli in 112; peacekeeping regime’s influence on state behavior in 121-7, 137; revisionist Israeli historians on 153n34; root causes of 29 Arab states 34, 57; see also individual states Arad, Noam 22 Argov, Shlomo 88 Armistice Demarcation Line of 1949 49, 55 armistice regimes 33-7, 125, 127-9 Aron, Raymond 122 Asad, Hafez al 96, 109-10, 125 Assertive Period of peacekeeping 39, 61-4, 70 Australia 106, 134

B Bacevich, Andrew 114 Balfour Declaration (1917) 30

Balkans 25, 28, 100; see also individual countries Bekaa Valley 88 Belgium 70 Ben-Gurion, David 40-1 Bernadotte, Folke 32-3 Biltmore Program 31 Blair, Tony 85 Bosnia: humanitarian assistance 104; NATO peacekeeping experience in 114, 116-18; peacekeeping’s failure in 1, 105-6, 134-5; preventive deployment in 103 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros: basic principles of peacekeeping 105; peacekeeping vision for the UN 8, 100-2, 136 Boyd, James 61 Brahimi, Lakhdar 135 Brahimi Report 135 Brazil 52 Brind, Gen. J. E. S. 27 Bulgaria 26 Bunche, Ralph 33 Burns, Maj. Gen. E. L. M.: British-FrenchIsraeli withdrawal from Suez 54; as UNEF commander 44-5, 51-3; as UNTSO commander 42 Bush, George H. W. 8-9 Bush, George W. 116

C Cambodia 101 Camp David Accords (1978) 79, 86, 95 Canada 52, 91 Carter, Jimmy 95

183

184 Child, John 91 China 25 Chopra, Jarat 105 Christopher, Warren 9 Ciechanski, Jerzy 22 Citrin, Jack 17-18 Clinton, William J.: as liberal institutionalist 9; Somalia intervention 103; Syria-Israel negotiations 110; UN role in peacekeeping 8 coalitions of the willing 106 Cohen, Eliot 118-19 Cold War-era peacekeeping: analysis of peacekeeping during 93-8; changes in 69, 90-2; common aversion as motive for policy coordination during 21; definitions used in study of 10; limited nature of operations during 8; UN’s record as dismal 19 collective security 59-60, 128 collective security theory 10 Colombia 49, 52 common aversion 15, 21-2, 129, 136 common interests 21 compellence 123 competitiveness 20 conciliation 10 confidence building 81, 100, 109, 114 conflict resolution: internationalization of process for 116; Middle East failures in 94; model for progressive stages of peacekeeping 97-8; necessary conditions for 36, 63, 135; peacekeeping as element in 62; peacekeeping’s effectiveness and 129-30; timing for 119 Congo, Republic of the 261, 134; see also United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) (1960–1964); Zaire Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 66, 77, 129 Crete 25 Crocker, Chester 1 Cyprus 86, 97; challenges for UNFICYP 72; creation of UNFICYP 61, 72; effectiveness of UNFICYP 69; UN mission as long-term in 97; UNFICYP forces deployed to Sinai 73

Index D Dayan, Moshe 54 decolonialization 73, 86 demilitarized zones 100 Deng, Francis M. 102-3 Denmark 49, 52 deterrence 122-4 Diehl, Paul: Cold War-era peacekeeping 93-5; conditions needed for conflict resolution 36; ends of wars as impetus for new organizations 25; generalizing from specific cases 19, 133; geographical deployment guidelines 63, 93; humanitarian assistance 104; ONUC 70; peace enforcement missions 105; peacekeeping and conflict resolution 130; peacekeeping lessons from the League of Nations 27; UNEF as successful peacekeeping regime 61 displaced persons; see refugees Dixon, Pierson 42 Dormant Period of peacekeeping 73-4 Douglas, Gen. Ian 105 Dulles, John Foster 43 Durch, William J. 71, 106

E early warning 100 East Timor: peace enforcement 106, 134; peacekeeping in 2; UN trusteeship in 116 Eban, Abba 42 Eden, Anthony 41-2 Egypt: Arab-Israeli War (1948) 32-3; conflict management and UNEF 64; conflict resolution’s longterm process 131; Czech arms sales to 40; Israel peace treaty 78-9, 110; Joint Arab Military Command 41, 67; overthrow of King Farouk 40; reestablishment of authority over 55; Soviet relations 75; Suez Canal Treaty (1954) with UK 40; UN Status of Forces Agreement with 51, 65, 77; UNEF accepted by 47, 49; UNEF withdrawn from 23, 59, 61, 65-6, 95, 125; Yom Kippur War 75; see also

Index United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I and II) Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) 56, 65 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 43, 48 Eisenstadt, Michael 114 El Salvador 102 Ethiopia 26, 104 European Union 114 Evert, Stephen 116

F fact-finding 100 failed states 99 Faksh, Mahmud 110 Farouk, King of Egypt 40 Fatah Revolutionary Council 88 feedback loops 135-6 Finland 26, 52 flashlight ambushes 56 Force Regulations (UNEF) 51 Ford, Carl 114 Ford, Gerald 80 France: arms sales to Israel 41; BritishIsraeli military coordination with 41; Italian invasion of Ethiopia 26; as Mideast colonial power 29; peacekeeping assessments refused by 73; Saarland dispute 27; Suez War (1956) 43-5, 54; UNIFIL participation 86 Friedman, Thomas 115-16

G Gaza: Egyptian occupation of 33; Israeli capture of 41, 45, 53; peacekeeping as difficult in 118, 134; raids into Israel from 40; see also Israel; Palestine; UNEF administration of 49, 55-6; UNEF operation in 23 Gemayel, Bashir 88 General Armistice Agreement (1949) 34, 65, 127 Georges-Picot, Charles 29 Germany 26-7 Ghali, Mona 36 Golan Heights: buffer zone established 82; de facto peace in 110-11; future peacekeeping regime for 113-15; Israeli annexation of

185 82, 96; Israeli defenses on 109; Israeli seizure of 50, 108; Lebanon conflicts and 107, 110; security regime attempted on 107-12; strategic value of 107, 109; Syrian 1973 attack on 75; Syrian strategy for regaining 110; UN mission as long-term in 97; US military force for 167n58; see also Israel; Syria Greater Syria 110 Greece 26, 72 Greek-Bulgarian Crisis (1925) 26 guidelines: for Cold-War era peacekeeping 93; for geographical deployment 63, 93; for UNEF II 76-7 Gulf War 10, 106

H Haas, Ernst: cognitive approach to regime creation 16; Cold War UN intervention 19; international integration 17-18; peacekeeping success as relative 7; and political will 12; UNEF rated as peacekeeping mission 61 Haggard, Stephan 17 Haiti 2, 101, 105 Hamas 117 Hammarskjöld, Dag: death of 50, 71; expansion of peacekeeping role 60; Israeli withdrawal from Suez 54; peacekeeping options considered by 45-6; peacekeeping regime principles as developed by 39, 49, 56-7, 63, 69, 91, 128; preventive diplomacy 59, 100, 128; regulations for UNEF 48; UN Congo intervention 71; UNEF created 44-7 Hasenclever, Andreas 14-15, 24 hegemonic stability 16, 135 Heikal, Mohamed 74 Hezbollah: Israeli attacks on 85, 98, 123; Israelis on disarmament of 111; opposition to peace settlement 117; raids on Israel 126; UNIFIL relations with 96 humanitarian assistance 8, 54-5, 58, 84, 101-4 Hungarian revolt (1956) 43, 48 Husain Ibn Ali 29

186 I imposed regimes 17 India 28, 52 Indonesia 28, 52 Indyk, Martin 116 information exchanges 114 integration theory 19 internal displacement 103 international institutions: defined 15; effect on state behavior of 2-4, 8, 10-12; ends of wars as impetus for creation of 25; importance of 2-3, 9, 13, 121, 136 international integration 17-18 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 45 international peacekeeping defined 10 international regimes: common aversion in formation of 15, 21-2, 129, 136; creation of 13, 15-16; criteria for evaluation significance of 24; defined 13-14, 19-20, 144n11; as distinguished from organizations 15; effectiveness of 24, 135-6; General Armistice Agreement as basis for 34; as intervening variables 14; peacekeeping as type of 2-3, 17-24, 127-30; resilience of 24; variables in creation of 15-16; as woolly 15 intra-state conflicts: change in peacekeeping regime for 107, 118, 136; Israeli-Palestinian conflict as 115-16; numbers of missions related to 99; preventive deployment for 100; refugees from 103 Iran 89 Iranian Revolutionary Guards 111 Iraq: Arab-Israeli War (1948) 32; British control of 29; Gulf War 10, 106; Israeli attack on Osiraq 112, 124; trusteeship in 116 Iraq War (2003-) 106, 115, 119 Islamic Jihad 89, 117 Israel: armistice arrangements with Syria 22; British-French military coordination with 41; conflict management and UNEF 64; conflict resolution’s long-term process 131; draft peace treaty with Syria 141-2; Egyptian peace treaty 78-9, 110; French arming of 41; Hezbollah raids

Index on 126; independence declared by 32; influence of peacekeeping regimes on 22; Jordan peace treaty (1994) 98, 132; Lebanon invasion (1978) 23, 75; Lebanon invasion (1982) 84, 88, 123; Lebanon invasion (2006) 85, 98; MACs 125; nuclear weapons of 124; Palestinian conflict with 115-19, 132-3; peacekeeping attitude of 124-7; security strategy 122-4; state behavior and peacekeeping regimes 121-7; Syria peace risks for 107; Syrian preconditions for peace treaty with 111-12; tacit security regime in Jordanian relations with 132; Tiran Strait blockade 40; UNDOF agreement with Syria 82; UNEF not allowed in 56; UNEF’s mandate as interpreted by 57, 66; withdrawal from Lebanon 85, 126; withdrawal from Suez 54; see also Gaza; Golan Heights; Palestine; West Bank; Israeli Defense Forces: force structure of 123-4; Lebanon 84, 88; military doctrine of 123-4; MNF and 126; Six-Day War 67; UN missions’ relations with 114 Italy 26, 89

J Jagland, Thorbjorn 116 James, Alan 36, 59 Japan 26 Jervis, Robert 19-21 Joint Arab Military Command 42, 67 Jordan: Arab-Israeli War (1948) 32-3; border incidents during Assertive Period 62; Israeli peace treaty (1994) 98, 132; Joint Arab Military Command 42, 67; tacit security regime in Israeli relations with 132 Jordan River waters 112

K Kagan, Robert 117 Kasavubu, Joseph 71 Kashmir 86, 97

Index Katanga 70 Kemp, Geoffrey 124 Keohane, Robert: hegemonic stability 16; regime definition of 14-15; retention of existing regimes 36-7, 74, 97, 128, 131 Khmer Rouge 101 Kissinger, Henry A. 78, 80-1, 95 Klieman, Aharon 98, 132 Kochavi, Doron 83 Korean War 10, 106, 155n16 Kosovo 114, 116 Krasner, 14-16, 102

L Lavon, Pinchas 40 Lavon Affair 40 League of Nations 25-8 Lebanon: Arab-Israeli War (1948) 32-3; French control of 30; Israeli invasion (1978) 23, 75; Israeli invasion (1982) 84, 88, 123; Israeli invasion (2006) 85, 98; Israeli withdrawal from 85, 126; limits to peacekeeping in 131; MAC 83, 125; proxy war in 83; Syrian role in 82, 88-9, 96, 123; UN mission as long-term in 97; UNIFIL supported by 84; US intervention in 89, 104 Levy, Marc 24 liberal institutionalists: on international institutions 2, 8-9; overly optimistic approach to peacekeeping of 136; peacekeeping theory and 10; prevention of war by institutions 11-12 Liberia 101 Libya 101 Lipson, Charles 17, 19 Lithuania 27 Lodge, Henry Cabot 44 Lumumba, Patrice 70-1

M Mackinlay, John 105 McMahon, Henry 29 Maintenance Period of peacekeeping 86 Malta 43 Manchuria 26 Maronites 90 Mayer, Peter 14-15, 24

187 Mearsheimer, John: approach to international institutions 8-9; on the Clinton administration 9; institutions as marginal 13, 137; on realist approach to peacekeeping 11, 136-7 mediation 10 mercenaries 70 military strategy 168n3 military-to-military coordination 114 mine clearing 54 mission creep 70 Mixed Armistice Commissions (MAC): armistice regime and 35; creation of 33; intention of 127; Israeli role 125; for Lebanon 83, 125; as peacekeeping regime framework 39; post-1967 74; UNEF role of 52 Monaco, Annalisa 117 Mozambique 102 Multinational Force and Observers (MFO): creation of 23; as integral to Middle East peacekeeping regime 113-14; as security regime element 87; study of 4; as success 90, 130; UN peacekeeping regime as model for 87-8; US troop reduction plans in 169n19 Multinational Force I (MNF I): creation of 88; IDF and 126; as integral to Middle East peacekeeping regime 113-14; Israeli troops in Lebanon 84; study of 4; as temporary success 130 Multinational Force II (MNF II): deployment of 89; failure of 90, 130; IDF and 126; Israeli support of 126; study of 4; withdrawal of 89

N Naguib, Gen. Mohammed 40 Namibia 102 Nascent Period of peacekeeping: characteristics of 28-9; regime of 32-7 Nasser, Gamal abd al: misjudgments about Israeli force strength 123; Naguib replaced by 40; panArab leadership role for 62; Suez Canal blocked by 43; UNEF withdrawal requested by 61, 67 national sovereignty 35, 62-3, 91, 106, 136

188 Negev 33 negotiated regimes 17 negotiation 10 neocolonialism 73, 86 neofunctional integration theory 19 neofunctionalism 148n50 neutrality 27, 35, 46, 58, 93-4, 127-8 Nidal, Abu 88 norms of regimes 14; control of violence 62; during Cold War era 90-2; evolution of 117; of IsraelSyria armistice 35; of ONUC 97; UNEF’s borrowing from UNTSO of 39; weakening of 73 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 72, 114-16 North Korea 106, 134 Norway 49, 52 nuclear weapons 124

O Oren, Michael 74 Osiraq 112, 124 Oslo peace process 115-16, 132

P Pakistan 28 Palestine: boundary lack in 119; British control of 29-30; British surrender of the mandate 31; Israeli conflict with 115-19, 132-3; NATO role in 116-17; partition of 31; see also Gaza; Israel; West Bank; violence in 30 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): creation of 62; Israel attacks on Lebanese bases of 23, 96, 123; Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty 80; relocation to Lebanon of 84 Palestinian Authority 132 peace 2, 99 peace building 100 peace enforcement: Boutros-Ghali’s vision for 8; conditions for success in 134; IPAs definition 10; peacekeeping as separate from 105, 135; as UN post-Cold War role 99 peacebuilding 10, 101 peacekeeping: analysis of post-Cold war proposals for 117-20; basic operating rules for 63; Brahimi Report

Index 135; Cold War era’s operations analyzed 93-8; conditions for success of 101; as cornerstone of Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda 8, 100-2, 136; decolonialization and 73, 86; definitions 10, 101; during the Cold War 8, 69-70; early post-Cold War analysis of 104-7; effect on state behavior of 2-4, 8, 10-12, 66, 121-7, 137; evolution of 2; failures of 1, 90, 92, 135; geographical deployment guidelines 63, 93; humanitarian assistance and 8, 54-5, 58, 84, 101-4; as international regime 17-24, 127-30; Israeli attitudes toward 124-5; modern periods of development in 28; neutrality as important in 27, 35, 46, 58, 93-4, 127-8; nonviolence as most important characteristic of 1; ONUCs effect on 71-2; organizational structure for 50; and organizational task expansion 18-19; peace enforcement as separate from 105, 135; peacemaking as separate from 28; in the pre-World War I era 25; rating of Middle East missions 94-5; redefining in the post-Cold War era 100-2; regime analysis used for reinterpretation of 129-34; as regime type 4; resurgent period changes in 85-6; second-generation 85, 99, 119; and task expansion 17-18 peacekeeping regime: ad hoc nature of design of 56-8; change vs. evolution 134-5; core competencies of 117; detente’s effect on 74, 86; as dynamic 130-1; effectiveness of 133tab, 134; evolution in the Middle East of 69, 130-4; expansion beyond the Middle East of 69-70; impact of UNEF on 56-62; Israeli attitudes toward 124-7; Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s effect on 115-17; peacebuilding as primary postCold War mission of 102; with peacemaking components 81; political arrangements of 57;

Index principles as developed by Hammarskjöld 39, 49, 56-7, 63, 69, 91, 128; state behavior and 66, 121-7, 135; UNEF as 65-6 peacekeeping theory: definitions used in 9-10; on enforcement 11-12; liberal institutionalist approach to 10-11, 136; realists approach to 11, 136; violence control 12 peacemaking: armistice agreements as stage in process of 34-6; as component in peacekeeping regime 12, 81; as cornerstone of BoutrosGhali’s Agenda 100-1; defined 10, 100-1; failure of 23, 57, 62, 131; peacekeeping as separate from 28 Pearson, Lester 44, 57, 60 Phalangists 90 Poland 26-7, 86 preventive deployment 99-100 preventive diplomacy 59-60, 100, 128 preventive protection 99, 104 principles of regimes: Boutros-Ghali’s list of 105; defined 14; during the Cold War 90-2; of Israel-Syria armistice 34-5; of ONUC 97; UNEF II 76-7; UNEF regime 64; UNEF’s borrowing from UNTSO of 39; UNEF’s establishment 45-7; weakening of 73 prisoner-of-war exchanges 54, 78 prisoner’s dilemma 20 procedures of regimes: defined 14; during Cold War era 90-2; evolution of 117; of Israel-Syria armistice 35; of ONUC 97; of UNEF 63, 65-6; weakening of 73

R Rabin, Yitzhak 123 realists 2, 8-13, 136 refugees: increase in numbers of 103; international mechanisms for protection of 102; migration of 99; Palestinian 33-4; preventive protection of 99, 104 regime analysis 129-34 regime change 134-5 regime concept 2–3; see also international regimes regime defection 80

189 regime development 33-6 regime dynamics 17 regime formation 21-2, 127 regime theory: as basis for study of institutions 12-17; as issue-centered 13; as rarely used 4; usefulness of 135; weaknesses in 17 Resurgent Period of peacekeeping 75, 85 Rhodesia 101 Ries, John 60 Rikhye, Maj. Gen. I. J. 63, 92 ripeness 119 Rittberger, Volker 14-15, 24 Rogers, William 74 Ross, Dennis 122 Rothschild, Lord 30 Ruggie, John 13 rules of regimes: defined 14; during Cold War era 90-3; of Israel-Syria armistice 35; of ONUC 97; of UNEF 66; of UNEF II 77; weakening of 73 Rumsfeld, Donald 169n19

S Saarland 27 Sadat, Anwar 74-6, 79, 110 Safran, Nadav 122-3 Schelling, Thomas 122 security regimes 4; conditions for establishment of 20-1; defined 20; MFO as element in 87; Sinai Assertive Period arrangements and 63; tacit 98 Serbia 106, 134 Shalev, Aryeh 22, 34, 36 Sharm el Sheikh 55 Sharp, Mitchell 91 Shiites 84-5, 89, 98 shuttle diplomacy 78, 81, 95 Siilasvuo, Gen. Ensio P. H. 76 Simmons, Beth 17 Sinai: Egyptian forces limited during Assertive Period in 64; Israeli seizure of 50; MFO in 4; monitoring activities in 79-80; Pearson’s proposal for peacekeepers in 44; redeployment of forces from (1975–1976) 78-9 Sinai Support Mission (SSM) 79, 81, 114 Six-day War (1967): as failure for peacekeeping regime 129; motivations

190 for 67; UNEF withdrawal and 50, 61 Somalia: humanitarian assistance 104; peacekeeping’s failure in 1, 105-6, 134-5; preventive deployment in 103; UN sanctions against 101 South Africa 101 South Lebanon Army (SLA) 84 Sovereignty 35, 62-3, 91, 106, 136 Soviet Union: Camp David accords condemned by 86; detente with the US 74, 86; Egyptian ceasefire call 76; Egyptian relations 75; Suez War (1956) 45, 47-8; UNDOF’s mandate negotiated with 81; UNEF II mandate lapsed 80; UNEF opposed by 48, 73; UNEF’s mandate as interpreted by 57; UNTSO participation 86 spontaneous regimes 17 state behavior 2-4, 8, 10-12, 66, 121-7, 135 Status of Forces Agreements (UN-Egypt) 51, 65, 77 Stein, Janice Gross: conditions for regime formation 21-2, 127; miscalculations leading to UNEF withdrawal 65; monitoring in the Sinai 80; security regimes’ fragility 19; UNEF arrangements as tacit security regime 63-5; on UNEF II 81, 96 Stern Gang 33 Strange, Susan 17 Sudan 104 Suez War (1956): British-French aerial attacks 43; British-French invasion 44-5, 53-4; cease fire 45, 47; Israeli attack 42; modern peacekeeping regime emerges from 39; as political in origin 57; post-ceasefire location of forces 53; Soviet position 45, 47-8; UNEF deployment following 53; US position 42 Summers, Harry 101 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali) 105 Sweden 26, 52 Sykes, Mark 29 Sykes-Picot Agreement 29-30

Index Syria: Arab-Israeli War (1948) 32-3; armistice arrangements with Israel 22; border incidents during Assertive Period 62; draft peace treaty with Israel 141-2; French control of 30; intelligence-gathering capacities of 109; Israel peace risks for 107; Israeli preconditions for peace treaty with 111-12; Joint Arab Military Command 41, 67; Lebanon role of 82, 88-9, 96; UNDOF agreement with Israel 82; Yom Kippur War 75; see also Golan Heights

T Taliban 106, 134 task expansion 17-18 Terms of Reference (UNEF) 51 Terrorism 82-3 Thant, U: criticism of 73; recall of UNEF 23, 50, 64-5, 95 theoretical concepts 11 Tiran, Strait of: Egyptian blockade of 40; Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty arrangements re 79; MFO objectives for 87; UNEF forces along 55 Transjordan; see Jordan Truce Commission for Palestine 31-2 trusteeships 116 Turkey 72

U uncertainty 20 United Kingdom: French-Israeli military coordination with 41; Italian invasion of Ethiopia 26; as Mideast colonial power 29; Palestine control by 29-31; Suez War (1956) 43-5, 53-4; withdrawal from Suez 54 United Nations (UN): standing military force for 106; task expansion in 18; US cuts in funding for 1; see also individual agencies and missions United Nations Charter: Article 31 42; Article 40 34, 101, 127; Article 41 10, 101; Article 42 10, 45, 101; Article 43 10, 101; Article 51 42; Chapter VI 35, 100, 127;

Index

United

United

United

United United

191 Chapter VII 10, 32, 101, 103, 106, 116, 134; Chapter XII 65 Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF): creation of 75, 81-2, 107; as quiet success 82-3, 110, 125; study of 4, 96 Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II): creation of 23, 75-6; ending of 80, 86-7; guidelines for 76-7; Israel as affected by 125; as leading to conflict resolution 130; phases in initiation of operation 78; study of 4, 95-6; UNFICYP units reassigned to 73 Nations Emergency Force (UNEF): characteristics of 49-50; collective security contrasted with 60; Egypt-Israel MAC as controlled by 65; as first modern peacekeeping operation 22-3; formal mandate for 51; funding of 57-8; Gaza administered by 55; as influence on state behavior 66; mission of 49; as model for future missions 4, 66; norms and principles borrowed from UNTSO by 39; performance of 49-50, 129; principles for establishment of 45-7, 49; principles of 55-6; rated as peacekeeping mission 61; regulations for 48; Soviet position 48, 73; stages in becoming operational 53; study of 95; tasks of 54, 58; troop strength 52; UNDOF’s similarity to 82-3; weaknesses in mandate of 58-9; withdrawal from Egypt of 23, 59, 61, 65-6, 95, 125 Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 61, 69, 72-3 Nations General Assembly: expanded peacekeeping role for 60-1; Palestine partition plan 31; as peacekeeping component 50; Resolution 997 (ES-1) 43-4; Resolution 998 (ES-1) 44, 46; Resolution 999 (ES-1) 44; Resolution 1000 (ES-1) 44, 46, 48; Resolution 1001 (ES-1) 47-8; Resolution 1002 (ES-1)

United

United United United

United United

United United

United

47; Resolution 1120 (XI) 54; Special Committee on Peacekeeping 91; UNEF created 44, 65; Uniting for Peace Resolution 43, 60, 155n16 Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL): creation of 23, 84; Hezbollah relations with 96; Israeli disregard for 110, 125-6; mandate for 75; as second-generation peacekeeping 85; study of 4, 96 Nations Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (UNMIBH) 117-18 Nations Mission in Haiti 105 Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) (1960–1964) 61, 70-2, 97, 101, 104, 117, 134-5 Nations peacekeeping; see peacekeeping Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) 100 Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 50, 52 Nations Secretariat: expanded peacekeeping role for 60-1; functional offices of 50; as peacekeeping component 50; post-1967 peacekeeping role of 74; Status of Forces Agreement with Egypt 51; UNEF creation role 48-9; UNTSO reports to 36 Nations Security Council: cease-fire call by 32; Cold War stalemate in 25; diminished role with UNEF for 60; Gulf War authorization 10; Korean War authorization 10; mandate for peacekeeping 81, 92; Mideast peace settlement as objective of 34; Nascent period peacekeeping operations 28; ONUC established by 70; Resolution 54 (1948) 32; Resolution 119 (1956) 47; Resolution 242 (1967) 74, 76, 139-40; Resolution 338 (1973) 76, 78; Resolution 339 (1973) 78; Resolution 341 (1973) 77; Resurgent Period peacekeeping missions

192

United United United

United

Index mandated by 75; sanctions 101; Somalia mission 103; Suez War (1956) 42-3, 45, 49; UNTSO reports to 36; Waldheim’s UNEF II report to 91 Nations Suez Clearance Organization (UNSCO) 50 Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 102 Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO): as administrator of armistice regime 127; along post-1967 ceasefire lines 50; border incidents 129; continuing role of 33, 128; Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission 52; establishment of 32; factors inhibiting the work of 36; functions outside of MAC of 36; as peacekeeping component 50; post-1967 war 23, 74; post-Armistice role 33; Soviet participation 86 States: Beirut embassy bombing 89; detente with the Soviet Union 74, 86; Haiti intervention of 105; as hegemon in IsraeliEgyptian treaty 80, 95, 135; mission success as affected by involvement of 94; preferred model for peacekeeping regime 114; Sinai Support Mission (SSM) 79, 81, 114; Somalia

mission 103-4, 134; on the Suez War (1956) 42; UNDOF’s mandate negotiated with 81 Upper Silesia 26 Urquhart, Brian 1, 91, 105

W Waldheim, Kurt 76, 80, 91 War of Attrition 74 Warner, John 116 West Bank 33, 50, 134 West New Guinea 61 Wise, James 92 Wiseman, Henry: peacekeeping and decolonialization 73, 86; periods of development in peacekeeping 28, 70, 75; Resurgent Period changes in peacekeeping 85-6

Y Yemen 61 Yom Kippur War (1973) 75 Young, Oran 14-17, 24 Yugoslavia: peacekeeping in the former 2; Suez War (1956) 43; UN sanctions against 101; UNEF troops from 52

Z Zaire 69; see also Congo, Republic of the Zartman, William 119 Zionism 29-31 Zurn, Michael 24

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