Partisan Appointees and Public Servants: An International Analysis of the Role of the Political Adviser

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Partisan Appointees and Public Servants

Partisan Appointees and Public Servants An International Analysis of the Role of the Political Adviser

Edited by

Chris Eichbaum Senior Lecturer in Public Policy, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand

Richard Shaw Associate Professor and Coordinator, Politics Programme, Massey University, New Zealand

Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© Chris Eichbaum and Richard Shaw 2010 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2009937760

ISBN 978 1 84720 747 0 Printed and bound by MPG Books Group, UK

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Contents List of contributors Acknowledgements

vii ix

Introduction Chris Eichbaum and Richard Shaw 1. The United Kingdom Paul Fawcett and Oonagh Gay 2. Canada Peter Aucoin 3. Australia Maria Maley 4. New Zealand Chris Eichbaum and Richard Shaw 5. Ireland Bernadette Connaughton 6. The United States B. Guy Peters Conclusion Chris Eichbaum and Richard Shaw Index

1 24 64 94 114 151 180 198

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Contributors Peter Aucoin is Eric Dennis Memorial Professor of Government and Political Science and Professor of Public Administration at Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. He has authored and edited 13 books and authored over 80 articles and book chapters. He is currently on the editorial boards of Governance, International Public Management Journal and Public Management Review (UK). He prepared a report on deputy minister (chief executive) staffing for the Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities (the Gomery Commission). Bernadette Connaughton lectures in public administration in the Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Limerick. Her teaching and research interests include environmental policy and administration, the impact of EU policy making on national administrative systems, and political-administrative reform in a comparative perspective. Her publications include journal articles in Public Administration, Regional and Federal Studies, Irish Political Studies and as co-author of Europeanisation and New Patterns of Governance in Ireland (Manchester University Press, forthcoming). Chris Eichbaum is a Senior Lecturer (Public Policy) in the School of Government at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. He has worked in both the Australian Commonwealth and New Zealand public service, and as a ministerial and Prime Ministerial adviser. With Richard Shaw he has published extensively on the roles and responsibilities of ministerial advisers in the executive branch of government and has an ongoing interest in the politics of central banking. Paul Fawcett is a Lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney, Australia. He has recently published a book chapter on central government in the UK (with Rod Rhodes) and two separate research papers on special advisers and the centre of government (with Oonagh Gay). Oonagh Gay has worked in the House of Commons Library for 25 years, currently heading the Parliament and Constitution Centre. She co-edited vii

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Partisan appointees and public servants

Conduct Unbecoming: The Regulation of Parliament Behaviour for the UK Study of Parliament Group in 2004 and is the author of numerous articles on electoral law and constitutional watchdogs. Maria Maley is a Lecturer in Political Science in the School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. She has published widely, based on her doctoral research on the roles of Australian ministerial advisers in the period 1991–6. She has worked as a public servant and a ministerial adviser. B. Guy Peters is Maurice Falk Professor of American Government at the University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA, and Professor of Comparative Politics at Zeppelin University in Germany. He is founding co-editor of the European Political Science Review, and Associate Editor of the IPSA Encyclopedia of Political Science. His recent publications include Debating Institutionalism (co-edited with Jon Pierre and Gerry Stoker) and the Politics of Bureaucracy, 8th edition. Richard Shaw is an Associate Professor in and Coordinator of the Politics Programme at Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand. With Chris Eichbaum he has published extensively on the roles and responsibilities of ministerial advisers in the executive branch of government. He is also – with Chris Eichbaum – coauthor of Public Policy in New Zealand: Institutions, Processes and Outcomes (2008; Auckland: Pearson/Prentice Hall).

Acknowledgements We wish to thank Professor John Wanna – the ANZSOG Foundation Professor for the Sir John Bunting Chair of Public Administration based at the Australian National University – who saw merit in a collection of this kind, and on whose recommendation we approached Edward Elgar. We would also like to acknowledge those colleagues and students who have contributed in a variety of ways to debates about and discussions – both scholarly and applied – on the issues traversed in this book. It is with a sense of deep gratitude, too, that we thank Peter Aucoin, Bernadette Connaughton, Paul Fawcett, Oonagh Gay, Maria Maley and B. Guy Peters, each of whom has generously given of their time and intellect to this collection. And we thank, without implicating in any way, those whose past contributions to the disciplines that inform this collection have encouraged critical reflection on our own part and established such a robust foundation for this contribution. We would like to thank Catherine Elgar, Felicity Plester, Jenny Wilcox, Bob Pickens and others at Edward Elgar without whose support, patience, and expertise this collection would not have been possible. Finally, we thank the members of our immediate and extended families for the many and varied ways in which they have aided us in this endeavour. Chris Eichbaum and Richard Shaw A note from the editors We are conscious that, by their very nature, political environments are fluid. Inevitably, this presents challenges to those attempting to capture contemporary events and institutional changes. The chapters in this collection were finalized towards the end of 2008, but the approach taken has been to identify issues that will be of continuing relevance to academic and practitioner communities going forward.

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Introduction Chris Eichbaum and Richard Shaw PROLOGUE In one jurisdiction, a political adviser’s immediate response to the horrors of 11 September 2001 is to send out an email to civil servants suggesting that it is a ‘very good day’ to ‘get out anything we want to bury’. The following year, the same adviser reputedly sought to exploit the day of Princess Margaret’s funeral to release unfavourable statistics that would not reflect well on her minister’s stewardship of his portfolio. The head of communications in the department – a ‘permanent’ civil servant – responded with an email of his own: ‘Dear Jo, there is no way I will allow this department to make any substantive announcements next Friday. Princess Margaret is being buried on that day. I will absolutely not allow anything else to be.’ The Public Administration Select Committee of the House of Commons inquires into these ‘unfortunate events’ in the Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions, and concludes in part that: the handling of the events demonstrates serious flaws in the management and accountability of special advisers. The crisis was caused partly by the fact that Ms Moore took on a series of executive and, in effect, managerial tasks without reference to proper procedures. In addition, a number of civil servants abandoned professional standards by leaking information and misinformation in a way intended to undermine Ms Moore. Management found itself unable to prevent a catastrophic taking of sides at senior level in the department. (United Kingdom Parliament 2002, p. 5)

In another jurisdiction, the Government of the day, in the course of an election campaign, makes much of the fact that asylum seekers, attempting to enter the country illegally, are threatening to ‘throw their children overboard’. Subsequently it emerges that political staff in the relevant minister’s office were aware of the fact that photographs purportedly providing evidence of children having been thrown overboard were, in fact, of individuals being rescued following the sinking of their vessel. The responsible minister and indeed the Prime Minister, deny ever being 1

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advised of the actual import and providence of the photographs. Issues of national security and border protection are to the fore in the election – the Government is returned. A Committee of the Australian Senate inquires into the incident, and concludes that: The Committee’s inquiry has highlighted a serious accountability vacuum at the level of ministers’ offices. It appears to be a function partly of the increased size of ministers’ staff, but more significantly of the evolution of the role of advisers to a point where they enjoy a level of autonomous executive authority separable from that to which they have been customarily entitled as the immediate agents of the minister. . . . The situation is that there now exists a group of people on the public payroll – ministerial advisers – who seem willing and able, on their own initiative, to intervene in public administration, and to take decisions affecting the performance of agencies, without there being a corresponding requirement that they publicly account for those interventions, decisions and actions. (Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident 2002, p. xxxiii)

The country case studies in this volume report on other events and incidents, unfortunate and otherwise. Prime facie, the evidence would seem to suggest that the advent of political staff in executive government has not been without its problems. For those of a traditional persuasion, events such as these provide a strong argument for a return to the days of a more exclusive bilateral relationship between the public service and their political principals. But the evidence is not as condemnatory as these two vignettes might suggest. Indeed, the report of the Public Administration Select Committee referred to above also contained the following: [W]e had a good deal of evidence that, in the vast majority of departments today, good sense, flexibility and loyalty of both special advisers and other civil servants to their Ministers have prevented trouble of this sort. . . . We also heard evidence from civil servants and others of the benefits that special advisers can bring: they can for example protect civil servants by carrying out work that might raise doubts about Civil Service neutrality. They may also provide valuable insights which can improve a policy by adding a political dimension. Policy has to work in the real world, and a good special adviser can help contribute to this reality check. In a well-managed department, good relationships between Ministers, special advisers and permanent officials can generate an excellent working environment. (United Kingdom Parliament 2002, pp. 14–15)

The intention in this collection is neither to praise nor to bury, although as will be clear from a reading of the case studies, the contributors to this volume – as befits individuals who, to varying degrees, are engaged at both an applied and a more theoretical level with issues of contemporary

Introduction

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governance in their respective jurisdictions – have clear views on the risks and opportunities presented by the advent of the third element, and on how both might be appropriately managed. Equally, there is no intention to understate the kinds of risks posed by such developments. One common feature across the country case studies is that there are risks to be managed, if not indeed evidence of an administrative malaise attributable to the actions of political staff (and their political principals) and/or dysfunctional relationships between political and administrative staffs. A key issue going forward is whether the existing institutional architecture within advanced liberal democracies of the kind that feature in this collection can accommodate the advent of the third element in executive government (and perhaps are challenged by that development). These issues, among others, will be addressed in the concluding chapter to this volume. We do not deny the important issues of accountability that are raised by the advent of political staff in executive government (and with which respective legislatures engaged in response to the two incidents referred to above). But our canvas here is a more expansive one. This collection seeks to locate the advent of the third element in the broader context of relationships between political and administrative actors in executive government – a perennial but never more relevant issue for students and practitioners of public administration and policy alike. Moreover, while the two incidents cited above suggest that communications issues are a central consideration (as perhaps they are in most cases of administrative malaise) the focus in this collection is more on the role of political staff as actors within the policy process, and particularly in the formative stages of policy development, and the increasingly problematic stages of policy implementation. In this introductory chapter our objectives are fourfold: ●

●

● ●

To locate issues raised by the advent of political staff in executive government in the context of some enduring principles and conventions informing the practice of public administration in liberal democracies; To provide a framework within which to explore the issues raised by the country case studies that follow. In broad terms that framework is suggested by the imperatives of independence and responsiveness. More specifically, we focus on aspects of political neutrality, politicization, and modes of competence; To provide an overview of the country case studies that constitute the heart of this volume; To anticipate some of the key issues that are common to all of the case studies and to which we return in the concluding chapter – principally the drivers behind the advent of, and increased recourse

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to, political staff in executive government and the consequences for public administration and governance in the twenty-first century.

POLITICIANS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS: THE CLASSICAL FORMULATION Our point of departure is provided by Northcote and Trevelyan, and their indictment of the British civil service as they found it in 1854: Admission into the Civil Service is indeed eagerly sought after, but it is for the unambitious, and the indolent or incapable, that it is chiefly desired. Those whose abilities do not warrant an expectation that they will succeed in the open professions, where they must encounter the competition of their contemporaries, and those whom indolence of temperament, or physical infirmities unfit for active exertions, are placed in the Civil Service, where they maintain an honourable livelihood with little labour, and with no risk; where their success depends upon their simply avoiding any flagrant misconduct, and attending with moderate regularity to routine duties; and in which they are secured against the ordinary consequences of old age, or failing health, by an arrangement which provides them with the means of supporting themselves after they have become incapacitated. (Northcote and Trevelyan 1854, p. 4)

The indictment having been levelled, Northcote and Trevelyan observed that: It cannot be necessary to enter into any lengthened argument for the purpose of showing the high importance of the Permanent Civil Service to the country in the present day. The great and increasing accumulation of public business, and the consequent pressure upon the Government, need only be alluded to; and the inconveniences which are inseparable from the frequent changes which take place in the responsible administration are matters of sufficient notoriety. It may be safely asserted that, as matters now stand, the Government of the country could not be carried out without the aid of an efficient body of permanent officers, occupying a position duly subordinate to that of the Ministers who are directly responsible to the Crown and to Parliament, yet possessing sufficient independence, character, ability, and experience to be able to advise, assist, and to some extent influence, those who are from time to time set over them. (1854, p. 3; emphasis added)

Northcote and Trevelyan’s singular contribution was to recommend, to a less than enthusiastic set of political principals, a move away from a system of patronage of the ill-equipped to one of appointment and progression on the basis of merit.1 And the durability of that settlement, or bargain, is reflected in the fact that Northcote and Trevelyan continue to be evoked as a benchmark against which contemporary principles and

Introduction

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practices of sound public administration – or, in the discourse of the time, good governance – might be assessed. But there is a fundamental tension at the heart of the Northcote and Trevelyan settlement, and it is central to the issues traversed in this book. The tension is between the notion of a ‘sufficient’ degree of independence on the one hand, and the necessary capacity and propensity to serve those political principals ‘set over’ their administrative agents. In essence, what is at issue is the appropriate measure of responsiveness and independence on the part of administrative agents to and from their political principals. These matters are not new – indeed they enjoy a perennial status in the theory and practice of public administration and governance. But in the context of what has been a somewhat exclusive relationship between politicians and administrators they are given a particular salience by the advent of a third element in executive government; neither politician nor administrator: the political adviser. Issues of independence and responsiveness, and the extent to which the Northcote and Trevelyan institutional settlement may have been challenged (and perhaps even repudiated) by the advent of this third political element in executive government, are at the heart of this collection. For as Andrew Blick has observed: Essential to an appreciation of the special adviser is an understanding of the emergence, during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, of a politically neutral, generalist, career Civil Service, dominated by the Treasury. The Northcote–Trevelyan report of 1854 has long been regarded by career officials as the foundation of their profession and values. It requires examination. (2004, pp. 30–31)

However, it may well be the case that the use of the word ‘settlement’ to characterize the import of Northcote and Trevelyan is an overstatement. As an Australian practitioner has recently observed in reference to the Northcote and Trevelyan legacy, ‘[w]e have still not resolved the tension between “due subordination” and “sufficient independence”, between “assisting” and “influencing”’ (Faulkner 2008, p. 1).2 While most of the case studies that follow are drawn from Westminster styled political and administrative systems, it would be wrong to see the core issues – contested as they are – as bounded by parliamentary systems of this kind. They are not. Indeed, the conceptual bifurcation between politics and administration has its genesis in a seminal contribution to the progressive movement in US public administration. There is a remarkable confluence between the normative import of Northcote and Trevelyan, Westminster conventions applying to relationships between administrative and political actors, and the principles advanced by Woodrow Wilson in his seminal essay, ‘The study of administration’. Wilson’s argument was for a ‘science

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of administration’, one which would ‘seek to straighten the paths of government, to make its business less unbusinesslike, to strengthen and purify its organization, and to crown its duties with dutifulness’ (Wilson 1887, p. 201). Administration was to lie outside politics, with Wilson arguing that while ‘politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices’ (Wilson 1887, p. 210). The ideal would be a ‘civil service cultured and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor, and yet so intimately connected with the popular thought, by means of elections and constant public counsel, as to find arbitrariness of class spirit quite out of the question’ (Wilson 1887, p. 217). Again, the themes of independence and responsiveness are clearly evident, which reinforces the point that the question of how best to align political and administrative imperatives in executive government is not confined to parliamentary systems of the Westminster kind. Certainly, there are particular considerations associated with the partial application of the doctrine of the separation of powers in systems of that kind, but that notwithstanding, the case for a measure of independence on the part of administrative agents from political principals has a constitutional quality to it in both the Northcote/Trevelyan and Wilsonian formulations. In a somewhat more contemporary vein, that normative case is perhaps best expressed in Wildavsky’s (1987) admonition that public administration is required to ‘speak truth to power’. There is, then, a common point of confluence, and importantly, it shifts us from the particular features of distinctive forms of government to a generic space in which political and administrative actors engage in a policy process common to a range of liberal-democratic political and administrative systems.

NEUTRALITY, POLITICIZATION, AND DEGREES OF RESPONSIVENESS In most liberal-democratic systems the normative ideal is captured by the notion of public or civil service neutrality. In Westminster systems in particular, one of the defining elements in the ‘family of ideas’ that constitute the Westminster type is that systems of this kind will be characterized by ‘a constitutional bureaucracy with a non-partisan and expert civil service’ (Rhodes and Weller 2005, p. 7). Two aspects of this definition have a particular salience: the constitutional status of the civil or public service, and the non-partisan and expert nature of those civil or public servants. We have already foreshadowed the issue of the constitutional nature of the relationship between political and administrative actors, and noted that it is not confined to systems of the Westminster kind. Rhodes and

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Weller’s use of the adjective ‘constitutional’ in reference to the role of the ‘bureaucracy’ in Westminster systems is not without significance. In a system in which, by definition, the doctrine of the separation of powers is repudiated (in part) by the fusion of the (political) executive and legislative branches, the bureaucracy plays the role of a constitutional counterbalance. As Wanna has observed: there are grounds to accept an independent, neutral, career civil service as an important attribute of Westminster and an institutional counterbalance to the majoritarian concentration of power in the executive – especially on independent, professional policy development and frank-and-fearless advice. (Wanna 2005, p. 175)

The counterbalance Wanna refers to takes specific constitutional form in the convention of public service neutrality and in a norm of bureaucratic independence (Sossin 2006).3 That the public service ought to be non-partisan and expert is also central to the Westminster family of ideas. In somewhat stark terms the distinction is drawn between political neutrality on the one hand, and politicization on the other. In the context of this collection, establishing the nature and extent of the risk – real or imagined – that political advisers in executive government pose to the impartiality of the civil service rests upon some reasonably firm determination of what is meant by the term ‘politicization’. Interestingly, a recent UK House of Commons Select Committee Inquiry suggested that orthodox definitions ‘hark back to Northcote and Trevelyan, whose seminal recommendations were intended to ensure that the civil service attracted able and energetic people’ (UK Parliament 2005, p. 1). Traditional understandings of politicization have tended to focus on the bases on which top officials are appointed. Mulgan (1998, 1999) offers a good example of this approach and distinguishes between: 1.

2. 3.

Partisan politicization: the appointment of people with well-known partisan tendencies who are likely to be unacceptable to an alternative Government; Policy-related politicization: the appointment of people with wellknown commitments to a particular policy orientation; Managerial politicization: the replacement of incumbent heads of departments by a new Government so as to facilitate the imposition of its authority on the bureaucracy (Mulgan 1998, p. 7).

In this perspective, the procedures for – and, more pointedly, the decisions taken regarding – the appointment of the most senior civil servants

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are central to the politicization of the bureaucracy (and, by extension, to its insulation against partisan imperatives). But focusing exclusively on systems of appointment and reward for senior public servants draws an arc around ministerial advisers. Much of the literature has little to say on the trilateral relationship between ministers, ministerial advisers, and public servants. Consequently, the third element is frequently the elephant in the room. Plainly, however, in the context of this collection, one important question to be addressed is the extent to which the advent of political staff in executive government has resulted in forms of politicization other than the kind suggested in those more traditional approaches that have focused on formal appointment procedures. Indeed, there is a strong case to be made for a much more nuanced notion of politicization, and one that entertains, a priori, a distinctive procedural dimension (see Eichbaum and Shaw 2007, 2008). Moreover, as Mulgan has noted (2006), there are other, less formalized, more subtle but nonetheless important issues suggested by the pressures (whether exogenous or endogenous) to politicize government. Politicization may be a consequence of the erosion of a necessary measure of distance between administrative agents and political principals: The context of public service politicisation is to be understood within the context of the values associated with a professional public service. In order to be able to offer the same degree of loyal service to governments of differing political persuasions, professional public servants are expected to maintain a certain distance from the concerns of their political masters. ‘Politicisation’ is the term used to describe the erosion of such distance. (Mulgan 2006, p. 3)

Macdermott has recently characterized this erosion of distance, and consequential public administration failures, as being attributable to circumstances in which ‘responsiveness tips into complicity’ (2008, p. 2). The evidence does suggest that levels of responsiveness which result in public administration failures may be internally generated or ‘self-inflicted’ in circumstances under which public servants surrender the safety of distance in an attempt to best serve the wants of their political masters (see Mulgan 2006). But in the context of this volume, central questions are whether the advent of political staff may have reconfigured the balance between independence and responsiveness and, if so, with what kinds of consequences. At the level of relationships between political and administrative actors in executive government one can identify different mixes of independence and responsiveness. In the best tradition of Northcote and Trevelyan, and indeed the Wilsonian contribution to the progressive movement in US public administration, ‘neutral competence’ has been defined as ‘the ability [of government officials] to do the work of government expertly, and to do

Introduction

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it according to explicit, objective standards rather than to personal or party or other obligations and loyalties’ (Aberbach and Rockman 1994, p. 461). In the context of policy development in particular, this is perhaps not too distant from what Plowden has characterized as ‘institutional scepticism’ (Plowden 1994). ‘Responsive competence’, on the other hand, suggests an appreciation of the reality of politics in policy making and governance (and the status of the electoral mandate in shaping the policy programme of the Government of the day). The picture is much more complex than that suggested by the oft-quoted maxim that politicians propose and public servants dispose, but it can be argued that responsive competence tends to give a relatively greater weight to policy implementation, relative to policy development in contemporary public administration. (We return to this issue in our concluding observations in this volume.) As a former Australian Prime Minister observed in 1993, referring to the public administration reforms in that country in the mid- to late-1980s: Central to our reforms of the public service was the desire to ensure that the government of the country belonged to the elected politicians. We stated at the outset that a key objective was to make the Public Service more responsive to the government of the day, more responsive in the sense that it would be better able to recognise and achieve the Government’s overall policy objectives. (Paul Keating, quoted in Macdermott 2008, p. 3)

There are perhaps risks at both ends of the scale: at one extreme of overreaching responsive competence leading to responsive incompetence (Aberbach and Rockman, 1994, p. 466), and at the other of neutral competence leading to resistant scepticism. As Aberbach and Rockman observe in relation to the US system of public administration (and the comment is applicable across a range of political systems): Just about everyone agrees that neutral competence is desirable, and for the most part possible, at lower levels of administration where tasks are relatively easy to define and lines of control are clear. The issue is where in the bureaucratic hierarchy and in what positions the emphasis on neutrality should give way to an emphasis on responsiveness. (1994, p. 463)

The advent of political staff in executive government may be viewed as an institutional change designed to effect a movement along the continuum between neutral competence and institutional scepticism on the one hand, and responsive competence on the other. Equally (and this issue, too, we return to), it may be seen as an adaptive mechanism which has had the consequence of better allowing those vested with the responsibility – constitutional or otherwise – to tender neutral competence to do so safely and well.

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THE COUNTRY CASE STUDIES This is a book about the tension between independence and responsiveness in executive government. We seek to illuminate the nature of that tension in contemporary public administration and governance by reference to the advent of a relatively new and distinctive institutional actor in executive government: the political adviser. In the chapters that follow, we track the emergence of the political adviser in a number of jurisdictions – the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Ireland, and the United States. Each chapter follows a similar pattern. First, the institutional arrangements within executive government are summarized, following which an outline is provided of the particular role played by political staff – that is, staff typically employed on fixed term contracts and working to members of the political executive. The background to and drivers behind the advent of political staff are then rehearsed, and the contribution such staff make in the context of the policy process (including the relationship between political and permanent/professional staff in the civil or public service) is examined. Finally, the nature of the accountability arrangements that apply to political staff are detailed. The United Kingdom As Andrew Blick notes in People who Live in the Dark, there is a longstanding tradition in the British context of political leaders appointing aides and advisers from beyond established circles of influence (2004, p. 30). The most recent manifestation of this takes the form of the special adviser – a constant and ever more influential institutional fixture in British politics and policy making in the modern era since the Wilson Labour Party Government of the 1960s. In Chapter 1, Paul Fawcett and Oonagh Gay identify three themes that have been particularly evident in the evolution of the civil service since the mid-20th century: 1. 2. 3.

The injection of specialist policy advisers into the civil service; The growth of a cadre of assistants to prominent MPs who then followed their leaders into Government on a personal basis; An emphasis on creating a specialist Prime Ministerial office to support the role.

As Fawcett and Gay note, ‘special adviser’ as a term can be dated from the 1960s at which point in time individuals were appointed directly by

Introduction

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ministers to assist them with policy development and media management. The employment of such individuals – contra Northcote and Trevelyan – was not regulated by Civil Service Commissioners responsible for the maintenance of the principle and practice of appointment on merit. In recent years, as Fawcett and Gay observe, special advisers have been the ‘lightning rod’ for debate regarding the politicization of the civil service, a debate that has involved the executive and the legislative branches of government in the UK, advisory and oversight committees of various kinds, the news media, and the community at large. Having reviewed the history of political advisers in the UK government, Fawcett and Gay provide an overview of the capacities, capabilities and role of special advisers. They identify two streams in the literature that has sought to illuminate and analyse the role of the special adviser in British politics and governance. The first of these is analytic and starts from the premise that it is possible to categorize advisers on the basis of their functional role. As Fawcett and Gay note, the generic term ‘special adviser’ masks significant differences in function and role depending on the location of political staff of this kind within executive government. There are marked differences as between special advisers co-located with their ministerial principals in departments of state, those located in Number 10, and those based in the Treasury. There is, moreover, a difference in the role (and significant differences in terms of potential risks arising from engagement with established administrative actors) of the technical specialist, for whom partisan affiliations and activities may be less relevant, and what former Cabinet Office Permanent Secretary Sir David Omand describes in Chapter 1 as the ‘chefs de cabinet and progress-chasers’. Fawcett and Gay chart the growth in special advisers and analyse the backgrounds of those appointed to positions of this kind, before advancing three reasons for the increase in their numerical strength (and influence): the professionalization of politics, a lack of trust and confidence in the permanent civil service, and the need to respond to the demands of, and manage, a 24-hour media environment. While all three are significant, and speak to the key issues traversed in this collection, it has been the last of these drivers that has commanded the most attention in the British context. The ‘unfortunate events’ at the Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions, the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr David Kelly in the summer of 2003, and the imprint left by both the personality and institutional role of Alastair Campbell all form part of the narrative exposition in this chapter. The chapter also examines the influence that the institution of the special adviser has had both on public policy and the permanent civil service, before reflecting on some of the challenges of accountability and the emergent British regulatory regime

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that have sought both to clarify the nature of the role, and establish appropriate boundaries and rules of engagement in a political and administrative system that continues to evoke the principles and standards of Northcote and Trevelyan. Canada In Chapter 2, Peter Aucoin suggests that the advent of political staff – referred to in the Canadian context as ‘exempt staff’ – is but one aspect of what he has labelled the New Public Governance. This new mode of governance, he argues, manifests itself in the concentration of political power in the centre, increased political attention being directed to the staffing of the upper levels of the public service, an expectation of public service enthusiasm for the agenda of the Government of the day (with associated pressure to provide a ‘pro-Government spin’ on what might otherwise be non-political government communications), and increased weight being given to political factors in the development of public policy. In short, Aucoin’s view is that there has been a significant diminution of Westminster principles and practices in the Canadian context and an incremental progression towards the more politicized institutions and processes one finds in Canada’s proximate southern neighbour (and which are discussed more fully by Guy Peters in his contribution to this volume). Aucoin suggests, too, that a resiling from some of the Westminster virtues reflects aspects of the Canadian institutional topography: a concentration of power in the office and person of the Prime Minister (with a tendency for Prime Ministerial government to supplant Cabinet government per se), and the responsibility of the Prime Minister for the staffing of the deputy minister cadre. In a formal sense these institutional arrangements hold out at least the prospect for some measure of orthodox politicization: political considerations trumping merit in the appointments process of senior members of that public service. In the Canadian context, the office of the Prime Minister is a powerful one. As with a number of the jurisdictions discussed in this collection, Canada effectively operates with a two-party system, but unlike most members of the Westminster family the parliamentary caucuses of the two major parties do not possess the capacity to dismiss a Prime Minister as party leader. Moreover, the Prime Minister not only has the power to appoint and dismiss ministers, and assign portfolio responsibilities, but also to appoint deputy ministers and associate deputy ministers (the two top tiers of the Canadian public service). Aucoin argues that this concentration of power – a move from Cabinet government to a form of courtier government – has had its effects on both the role and influence of political staff.

Introduction

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Aucoin notes that as part of the Canadian public service bargain – in which ministers gave up the power to staff the public service – ministers retained the right to employ a private secretary, an official who assisted the minister with his or her ‘partisan-political’ functions. Such staff were ‘exempt’ from the standard statutory provisions relating to the staffing of the public service at large. While not considered as public servants per se (inasmuch as political neutrality is neither a requirement nor, one imagines, necessarily viewed as desirable), such staff are paid from the public purse. As with political staff in other jurisdictions, their appointment and tenure is contingent on that of their minister. Until 2007, however, such exempt staff – provided that they had been employed for a period of no less than three years – were entitled to be appointed to a public service position at an equivalent level of rank. As Aucoin observes, this unique feature of the Canadian system means that – in an institutional sense – the ‘professional public service’ has been subject to a risk of partisan-political influence in a more subtle manner than some of the standard accounts of politicization would suggest. Aucoin maps the history of partisan-political staff from the 1950s and 1960s and the incremental growth in numbers over this period. As was the case in Australia under the Whitlam Government (see Maria Maley’s chapter in this volume), on coming into power in 1984 the Mulroney Conservative Party Government chose to expand the number of partisanpolitical staff as an explicitly preferred alternative to the ‘systemic’ politicization of the senior ranks of the public service that one finds in the US and in some European countries. And while the growth in numbers has not been strictly linear, Aucoin notes that in recent years the total number of exempt staff has exceeded 500. The existence of partisan-political staff in the Canadian context is, as Aucoin observes, evidence of the fact that the permanent or professional public service is, by definition, non-partisan and politically neutral. But as he also notes, institutional arrangements and aspects of political culture in the Canadian context have resulted in an expansion of the ‘political arm of government’, with partisan-political staff acting as a useful – or even necessary – counterweight to the ranks of the non-partisan public service. The issue is whether political and administrative systems (responsive and ‘neutral’ competence) are in a state of balance, or whether the political arm risks subverting the integrity of the public service. The tension between responsive and ‘neutral’ competence underpins Aucoin’s analysis of recent developments in the Canadian context, including the report of the Gomery Commission, and the response to the recommendations of that Commission by the Harper Government.

14


Australia Ministerial advisers of the political kind have, in a formal sense, been a feature of the Australian institutional topography since the election of the Whitlam Labor Party Government in 1972. Maria Maley reviews the history of ministerial advisers in the Australian federal government noting that, notwithstanding a measure of opposition to the introduction of political staff on the part of the permanent public service, they have become a permanent fixture. Governments of both the left and right have had recourse to ministerial staff of a political kind, and as Maley notes, a principal imperative in the Australian context has been a desire on the part of Governments to exercise greater political control over the bureaucracy. That imperative, however, has tended to result in an accommodation with – rather than a complete repudiation of – Westminster principles, practices and institutional arrangements. The Hawke Labor Party Government, elected in 1983, made a conscious policy choice not to proceed with a manifesto commitment to create a political tier at the upper levels of the Australian Public Service (a US-styled system of politicized appointments), and opted instead to increase the number of political appointments into ministers’ offices. A separate legislative platform for appointments of this kind was provided by the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984, a statute that has been the subject of some attention on the part of Australian legislators in the period since its passage, as the role and accountability of political staff has become an issue of public debate. Again, as Maley notes, the Act was designed to allow for a greater measure of political capacity within executive government, while at the same time maintaining the principle and practice of public service neutrality. A noteable feature of the Australian arrangements, however – although not, in the light of the other case studies in this volume, an exclusive one – is a legislative facility that permits public servants to ‘disengage’ from the permanent or professional public service, work in a political advisory role for a period, and ‘re-engage’ afterwards. The institutional settlement arrived at by the Hawke Government in the early 1980s has endured in the period since (although, as Maley notes, the process of institutional shaping and reshaping is a continuing one), and it has also defined the principal way in which Governments have sought to assert political control over the bureaucracy. As with the other case studies, the advent of political staff in ministerial offices is part of a wider and inter-related constellation of institutional changes. Successive Australian Governments have prosecuted an Australian variant of the New Public Management (NPM), institutional

Introduction

15

changes have tended to increase the power of the Prime Minister as a political and policy actor, and an increased emphasis on policy and programme implementation (and additional capacity in these areas) has also altered the balance between political and administrative actors. But as Maley points out, the initial institutional settlement of the Hawke years was an incomplete one. And the actions of political staff (and their ministerial principals) in a number of highly controversial episodes over the past seven years have highlighted significant weaknesses in the accountability of political staff, and the need to ‘regulate’ the actions of such staff more effectively. The Australian Labor Party committed itself to addressing this lacuna in the accountability arrangements for political staff in the course of the 2007 Australian federal election, and with the election of the Rudd Labor Party Government there was an expectation that the weaknesses in that earlier institutional settlement would be addressed. In this respect, and as Maley explains, the introduction of a dedicated code of conduct for ministerial staff, a code that came into effect on 1 July 2008, represents an important new development in Australia’s institutional arrangements. New Zealand In Chapter 4, Chris Eichbaum and Richard Shaw note that New Zealand has also seen an increase in the number and influence of political advisers in executive government, with the kind of consequential sensitivities regarding relationships between political and administrative actors common to the other jurisdictions surveyed in this collection, and the implications for governance more generally. What makes the New Zealand experience somewhat different is the overlay of a significant constitutional change: the adoption in 1993 of a German-styled Mixed Member Proportional electoral system, and a shift – to date at least – from single-party majority Government to multi-party Governments of various forms. Notwithstanding the adoption of a proportional electoral system, with the not unexpected changes to the party system (in particular a movement away from a pure duopoly) New Zealand still manifests, and in a normative sense asserts a commitment to, defining features of Westminster political and administrative arrangements. More specifically, it retains a commitment to a politically neutral and expert public service. While the New Zealand variant of the NPM (which predates the adoption of that descriptor) did see a move away from permanency on the part of those heading administrative departments and ministries, and a move away from a unified career structure in the core public service, in every

16


other salient respect New Zealand’s system of public administration and management continues to be predicated on merit-based appointment provisions, and a politically neutral and expert public service enjoined (on a quasi-constitutional basis) to protect the public interest, while being appropriately responsive to the Government of the day. But as Eichbaum and Shaw note, the New Zealand variant of the NPM – ‘the New Zealand model’ – was one characterized by a particular relationship between doctrine and design, in which the former was particularly influenced by rational actor accounts of the relationship between political principals and administrative agents. That being the case, the leitmotif of New Zealand’s public administration reforms was one that entertained an additional character on the political and administrative stage, one that was neither politician nor administrator, but that assisted in aligning the actions of the latter with the preferences of the former. Clearly the advent of a new electoral system – with spheres of activity which, of their very nature, precluded the participation of politically neutral public servants – was also a factor. In this respect New Zealand shares with the other jurisdictions reviewed here the challenges associated with policy complexity, a changing configuration of role and influence as between state, market, and civil society, and new modes of governance. The New Zealand case study draws on data generated by survey questionnaires completed by senior public servants, political staff (‘ministerial advisers’ in the New Zealand context) and Cabinet ministers. On the basis of an analysis of this data, the authors discuss aspects of policy (and political) capacity and capability within executive government, the contribution of ministerial advisers to the policy process, their impact on relations between political and administrative actors within executive government, the threat posed by such advisers to the political neutrality of the public service (and the integrity of Westminster-style institutions of policy advice and implementation), and issues of accountability and regulation. Republic of Ireland While the establishment of an independent Irish state in 1922 represented a clear break in constitutional arrangements, in Chapter 5, Bernadette Connaughton notes that the principle and practice of political neutrality on the part of the civil service was inherited without question. Moreover, she suggests that this principle is so ingrained in the Irish civil service that overtly political advice and loyalty of a partisan kind is only to be found from outside the ranks of the civil service. In the case of Ireland, the third element in executive government has been a feature since 1973. But as Connaughton observes, the advent of

Introduction

17

political staff in the Irish context owes as much to the exigencies of the Irish electoral and party systems as it does to a desire on the part of political principals to assert some measure of control over bureaucratic agents. One political party – Fianna Fáil – has dominated Irish politics in recent times and, as Connaughton notes, the party has not been out of office for more than one term in the period since 1932. A lack of trust in the civil service – as a driver of the development of a distinct political capacity in executive government – has tended to be associated with other parties (and in particular parties of the centre-left) participating in coalition Governments of differing compositions over time. While the left has been somewhat sceptical of the capacity and capability of the civil service to be appropriately responsive to and accept responsibility for the implementation of their policy agenda, Fianna Fáil has been less inclined to seek contestable advice or second guess the civil service. Not surprisingly, therefore, where large political staffs have been appointed – as was the case in the Fianna Fáil–Labour coalition of 1993–4 – this has predominantly been at the behest of the Labour Party as the junior coalition partner. Political staff have been designated both as special advisers (as is the case in the UK) and as Programme Managers. The latter date from the Fianna Fáil–Labour coalition of 1993–4, and were initially viewed as an Irish variant of the European style chef du cabinet. Tasked principally with oversight of the implementation of the Government’s programme, Connaughton notes that they were: perceived as a combination of advisers and managers operating along the lines of an underdeveloped ministerial cabinet system and within the blurred borders between politics and administration. They constituted a new management structure that would enable ministers to take strategic political decisions with minimal damage to the cabinet’s operational morale and cohesion.

The advent of political staff in Ireland has been variously perceived as constituting a threat both to the political neutrality of the civil service, and as contributing to political instability from time to time. In respect of the former, an entitlement on the part of political staff to permanent civil service positions at the end of their period of employment has raised the spectre of a form of ‘back-door’ politicization. Interestingly, the process has also operated in the opposite direction, with Fianna Fáil tending to recruit political staff from the ranks of the civil service. While special advisers were provided with specific statutory recognition (and a role description) in the Public Service Management Act of 1997, the number of special advisers decreased in the post-1997 period. However, the current Government (Fianna Fáil–Progressive Democrats–Greens) has appointed a full complement of political advisers.

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Drawing on extensive interviews with special advisers, conducted over the period from late 2006 through to early 2007, Connaughton discusses their role, interactions between special advisers and their civil service counterparts, and the risks of politicization. The United States It is an often cited fact that a change of President in the United States occasions significant shifts in the composition of those at the senior levels of the federal public service (with over 4000 positions changing with a change in Administration). This kind of system, it is argued, stands in stark contrast to the kind of permanency and political neutrality associated with Westminster styled systems, with their capacity for amassing a greater store of institutional knowledge over time, and for checking the majoritarian excesses of Governments (typically formed under constitutional arrangements that offend against the doctrine of the separation of powers) by way of ‘institutional scepticism’. But the contrast tends to mask significant points of commonality between the US and other members of the Westminster family. For one thing, the need for effective methods of policy making are common to both (captured by the requirement that Governments are provided with the advice that they need to hear, as well as – or perhaps in sharp distinction to – that which they want to hear). Indeed, Woodrow Wilson’s admonition that ‘politics sets the task for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its office’ (1887), and Wildavsky’s enjoinder to ‘speak truth to power’ (1987) are, in substance and normative import, qualitatively no different to the Westminster test that sound policy advice should be ‘free, frank, and fearless’. Yet there are differences. As B. Guy Peters reminds us in Chapter 6, it is over 30 years since Hugh Heclo coined the term ‘A Government of Strangers’ to describe the executive branch of the federal US government. Heclo, as Peters observes, was concerned with the ‘revolving door’ of politically appointed officials who would be recruited into the executive branch, with their tenure tied to that of the Administration. Contra Northcote and Trevelyan and Westminster conventions and principles, these ‘officials’ were neither politically neutral, nor permanent, and in a traditional sense, not appointed on the basis of merit. Peters notes that there are now more political appointees than there were when Heclo first drew attention to this engagement of strangers, that their influence is now more pervasive, and that political dimensions are tending to dominate the policy process at the expense of effective policies. This growth in influence and reach on the part of political staff has been characterized as the

Introduction

19

‘thickening’ of the federal government. For Peters, that thickening has in recent times been associated with a situation in which partisan loyalty has trumped competence in the making of political appointments. While Peters focuses on the array of advisers within the executive branch, he also notes that the US Congress employs far larger staffs than any other legislature in the world – a reflection in no small part of the clear separation and tension between the executive and legislative branches in the US system of government – and that the US system is characterized by policy networks that span government and non-government institutions. He suggests that political appointees in the Washington bureaucracy tend to have three roles: managing particular government programmes, monitoring bureaucratic agencies to ensure that the Administration’s policy and political priorities are to the fore (an enforcement role) and, third, providing political and policy advice. The political imperative of exerting control over bureaucratic actors – particularly in organizations tasked with the more politically sensitive areas of policy – is evident in the United States, as it is in a number of the other case studies in this volume. The ‘politicization’ of advisory and support structures is, as Peters notes, most marked in the Executive Office of the President (EOP), and while that Office does contain some career officials, the larger part of its 1700 staff are selected on the basis of political criteria. Indeed, the EOP, with policy advice structures mirroring those in the executive branch, provides a further layer of contestability (if not separation) in the US system. As Peters notes, this ‘mirroring principle has been designed in part to ensure that the President is not dependent upon advice from departments, reflecting a rather high level of distrust of the permanent bureaucracy and the persistence of their “departmental views” in a number of policy areas’. In the concluding chapter of this volume we return to the patterns of similarity and difference across the country cases; at this point, suffice to say that there are parallels here with the tendency for Prime Ministers in Westminster systems to increase capacity – including political capacity – at the centre of government as a check against the predations of departmentalism. Rehearsing another recurrent theme, Peters observes that the shift towards higher levels of politicization in advice reflects a need ‘to balance the values of “neutral competence” with those of “responsive competence”’. In this vein, Chapter 6 examines the drivers behind both the greater recourse to political staffs in the US system, and the tendency to blend administrative and political roles. Peters also identifies a number of problematic aspects of the US system – including a diminution over time in the effectiveness of the policy making system, a retreat from professionalization on the part of members of ‘political’ policy elites, and a move

20


away from a consensual style of policy – before reflecting on the challenges posed by a system that will increasingly require a higher level of analytic policy capacity, and a reduced focus on serving partisan interests.

CONCLUSION: DRIVERS AND CONSEQUENCES The country case studies that follow provide a rich seam of evidence, analysis and commentary, and in the concluding chapter to this volume we attempt to draw out common issues and themes. The focus is particularly on drivers and consequences; on why there has been increasing recourse to political staff in executive government, and with what kinds of consequences. At one level the issues are those suggested by the two overarching themes that have informed this introductory chapter: independence and responsiveness. The ‘downside’ risks have already been alluded to, namely that increased recourse to political staff may result in responsive competence that overreaches into responsive incompetence, or the narrowing or erosion of the ‘safe’ distance between political principals and administrative agents. In essence, this risk may represent a failure on the part of appointed administrative staff to properly speak truth to power. At another level, especially when one departs from a set of benign assumptions regarding the proclivities of administrative actors, neutral competence and institutional scepticism may simply mask the budget maximizing and bureau shaping tendencies of ‘rational’ administrative actors pursuing sectional interests: the triumph of vested interests over the public interest. Viewed through this lens (which does not require a full and complete surrender to public choice accounts of bureaucratic behaviour), increased recourse to political staff may simply be an appropriate way of ensuring that political principals are better able to secure and monitor appropriate bargains with administrative agents. In this context the advent of political staff might be viewed as one manifestation of the NPM. And in a similar vein, one may perhaps view political staff as an adaptive response to the inadequacies and unintended consequences of particular varieties of the NPM; in circumstances under which public administration/ management reforms have seen a loss of horizontal coordination across government, recourse to political staff may reflect one means of ensuring better capacity and capability across the whole of government. The advent of the third element in executive government may also suggest a move away from a Westminster styled bilateral monopoly (in which ministers and their senior permanent officials are the only actors) to a much more polycentric and contested policy environment. In this kind of

Introduction

21

context, political advisers may be either policy initiators in their own right, and/or policy brokers working across a range of sources of policy advice (from both the government and the non-government sector). Moreover, recourse to political staff may well reflect a transition from hierarchical (and relatively orderly and ordered) systems of policy advice (characterized by some as being consistent with the Westminster mode of government) to the kind of more nuanced and contingent forms of policy making and implementation suggested by networked, market, and community modes of governance. In the context of Westminster styled political and administrative systems (and all but one of the country case studies falls within this family), a key question is whether the advent of political staff constitutes yet further evidence of the repudiation of the so-called Westminster model, or whether the core features of that model – including the principles and conventions that go to relationships between political and administrative actors – are proving to be resilient and enduring in the face of this and other changes. The increased salience of policy implementation per se, and the desire on the part of Governments to build additional implementation capacity and capability, may also provide a further explanation for greater recourse to political staff. As we note in the concluding chapter to this volume – and in the light of the lessons to be drawn from the country case studies – resorting to political staff may be viewed as part of a wider process of lifting implementation capacity and capability in the face of the need to ensure that Government commitments are met, and that implementation challenges associated with greater policy complexity and ‘wicked’ or messy policy issues are met. In this sense recourse to political staff may provide a relatively soft and non-structural means of lifting implementation capacity and capability. While the focus of this collection is as much on the role played by political staff in the policy process, all of the country case studies engage, quite properly, with issues of accountability and transparency. The risk that political staff may pose to what one writer has recently characterized as the principle of public integrity is not to be minimized (Mulgan 2008). Whether by virtue of the fact that systems of public accountability have failed to keep pace, or that political executives have resisted attempts (particularly on the part of legislators) to appropriately hold political staff to account, these case studies raise important issues – and the potential for useful policy transfers – regarding public integrity and accountability. Finally, while the country studies provide an opportunity to distil patterns of similarity, they also illuminate the circumstances which may give rise to the need for the kind of capacity and capability offered by political staff. Whether those circumstances are suggested by a transition to a new Government following a long period of incumbency on the part of a

22


Government of a different political hue (and a low level of trust between political and administrative actors, particularly in the formative stages of a new Government), or the requirement to adapt to the exigencies of a changed electoral system, the case studies that follow provide insights of both a particular and a more general kind.

NOTES 1. See the commentary on Northcote and Trevelyan in Blick (2004, p. 31–5). 2. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, reprising the influence of Northcote and Trevelyan on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the publication of their report, touched on the vexed relationship between independence and responsiveness that is central to the Northcote and Trevelyan settlement, when he commented that ‘No government owns the Civil Service. It belongs to the public that it serves’ (Blair 2004, p. 8). 3. Sossin suggests that the norm, or convention of bureaucratic independence suggests a spectrum of separation between bureaucratic and political decision-making. Kenneth Kernaghan has outlined the content of the convention in an oft-cited list of six key principles: 1. Politics and policy are separated from administration; thus, politicians make policy decisions and public servants execute these decisions; 2. Public servants are appointed and promoted on the basis of merit rather than of party affiliation or contributions; 3. Public servants do not engage in partisan political activities; 4. Public servants do not express publicly their personal views on Government policies or administration; 5. Public servants provide forthright and objective advice to their political masters in private and in confidence; in return, political executives protect the anonymity of public servants by publicly accepting responsibility for departmental decisions; and 6. Public servants execute policy decisions loyally, irrespective of the philosophy and programmes of the party in power and regardless of their personal opinions; as a result, public servants enjoy security of tenure during good behaviour and satisfactory performance (in Sossin 2006, pp. 29–30). Sossin also suggests an important omission from the list: ‘The Convention also includes the duty of public servants to question, and if necessary, to decline to follow instructions which are motivated by improper partisan interests’ (2006, p. 30).

BIBLIOGRAPHY Aberbach, J.D. and B.A. Rockman (1994), ‘Civil servants and policymakers: neutral or responsive competence?’, Governance, 7, 461–9. Blair, A. (2004), ‘Speech on modernisation of the Civil Service’, 24 February, Office of the Prime Minister, UK Government, accessed 1 August 2008 at www. number10.gov.uk/Page5399. Blick, A. (2004), People who Live in the Dark, London: Politico’s Publishing. Eichbaum, C. and R. Shaw (2007), ‘Ministerial advisers, politicization and the retreat from Westminster: the case of New Zealand’, Public Administration, 85 (3), 609–40. Eichbaum, C. and R. Shaw (2008), ‘Revisiting politicization: political advisers and

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public servants in Westminster systems’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 21 (3), 337–65. Faulkner, Senator J. (2008), ‘New directions: setting the agenda on accountability and integrity’, 16 July, accessed 1 August at www.smos.gov.au/speeches/2008/ sp_20080716.html. Macdermott, K. (2008), Whatever Happened to Frank and Fearless?: The Impact of the New Public Management on the Australian Public Service, Canberra: ANU E-Press, Australian National University. Mulgan, R. (1998), ‘Politicization of senior appointments in the Australian public service’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 57 (3), 3–14. Mulgan, R. (1999), ‘Politicising the Australian public service?’, Parliament of Australia: Parliamentary Library, research paper 3. Mulgan, R. (2006), ‘Truth in government and the politicization of public service advice’, Australian National University discussion paper 06-02, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government, Canberra. Mulgan, R. (2008), ‘How much responsiveness is too much or too little?’, Australian Journal of Public Administration 67 (3), 345–56. Northcote, S.H. and C.E. Trevelyan (1854), Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service. London: House of Commons/Her Majesty’s Printing Office. Plowden, W. (1994), Ministers and Mandarins, London: Institute for Public Policy Research. Rhodes, R.A.W. and P. Weller (2005), ‘Westminster transplanted and Westminster implanted: explanations for political change’, in H. Patapan, J. Wanna and P. Weller (eds), Westminster Legacies: Democracy and Responsible Government in Asia, Australasia and the Pacific, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press. Senate of Australia (2002), ‘Report of A Senate Select Committee into A Certain Maritime Incident’, Canberra: Senate, Parliament of Australia. Sossin, L. (2006), ‘Defining boundaries: the constitutional argument for bureaucratic independence and is implication for the accountability of the public service’, Report, a Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities. Restoring Accountability Research Studies Volume 2: The Public Service and Transparency, Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services. United Kingdom Parliament (2002), ‘These Unfortunate Events’: Lessons of Recent Events at the Former DTLR, 8th report, House of Commons Public Administration Committee, 19 July. United Kingdom Parliament (2005), ‘Politics and administration: ministers and civil servants. Issues and questions paper, House of Commons Public Administration Committee’, House of Commons Public Administration Committee issues and questions paper. Wanna, J. (2005), ‘New Zealand’s Westminster trajectory: archetypal transplant to maverick outlier’, in H. Patapan, J. Wanna and P. Weller (eds), Westminster Legacies: Democracy and Responsible Government in Asia, Australasia and the Pacific, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press. Wildavsky, A. (1987), Speaking Truth to Power: the Art and Craft of Policy Analysis, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Wilson, W. (1887), ‘The study of administration’, Political Science Quarterly, 2: 197–222.

1.

The United Kingdom Paul Fawcett and Oonagh Gay

BACKGROUND Sir Christopher Foster (2005, p. 1), a former special adviser and senior civil servant, recently argued that: We are badly governed. Some reasons for this are now widely acknowledged: Cabinet being replaced by Prime Ministerial government; the dominance of a political culture of spin; the rise of unelected special advisers and political cronies to positions of great power; the marginalising of Parliament and the substitution of the media as a 24 hour a day forum for political debate.

This apocalyptic assessment displays many of the concerns sparked by recent trends in government in the United Kingdom (UK). On the other hand, Estelle Morris (cited in CSPL 2003, p. 43), a former Cabinet minister, has expressed the alternative view that: ‘Having the political advisers there actually protects the civil servants from being asked to do an overtly political job.’ Where does the truth lie? This chapter concentrates on the role of special advisers in the UK. It covers the period up until the end of the Blair Administration and the immediate transition period under the new Government led by the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown. ‘Special advisers’ is a term that came into use in the 1960s in the UK to define individuals appointed directly by ministers to assist them with policy development and media contacts. So, unlike recruitment to the Senior Civil Service (SCS), their selection is not regulated by the Civil Service Commissioners, who are otherwise responsible for upholding the principle of appointment by merit. However, their activities have been subject to other forms of regulation, which has allowed them to develop as a permanent part of the British political constitution since 1974. As such, special advisers are classed as temporary civil servants, who are absolved from the usual requirement to act in a politically impartial way. They are appointed directly by the minister who they work for and their 24

The United Kingdom

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appointment terminates with the resignation or dismissal of that minister. They are consequently expected to step down as civil servants during election campaigns. Until 1997, a distinction was maintained between expert advisers and political advisers. The former had policy expertise, often as economists, whilst the latter often had a background in party organization and management. However, this distinction was abandoned by the Blair Administration because those with specialisms often had distinct political loyalties, whilst party loyalists often developed expertise whilst in post. Special advisers are the main form of partisan appointee in the UK so their recruitment is not regulated by the Civil Service Commissioners, who have otherwise acted to prevent UK ministers from appointing senior civil servants for political reasons since 1855. Nor is it the same as the recruitment process that is used for executive appointments to head public bodies (colloquially known as quangos), which has been regulated since 1996 by the non-statutory Commissioner for Public Appointments. The Commissioner has been successful in embedding the use of external advisers on appointment boards, restricting ministers to a choice between two candidates. As the earlier quotes suggest, special advisers have acted as the lightning rod for debate in the UK about the politicization of the civil service. Politicization has been defined as marking: ‘the crossing of a line between proper responsiveness to the elected government and undue involvement in the government’s electoral fortunes’ (Mulgan 2007, p. 570). He (p. 571) notes that there are two aspects to politicization: appointments to public service; and the activities of public servants. Special advisers are relevant to both. The minister appoints them personally and they can also act as his or her gatekeeper by filtering the policy advice coming from civil servants.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UK SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT This section summarizes the culture within which special advisers operate. The UK has a very strong ideology based on a permanent, generalist, impartial civil service. The continuing existence of an intellectually able, but non-specialist, Senior Civil Service (SCS) is a remarkable, almost unique, achievement, resulting from the Northcote–Trevelyan reforms of 1854 (Hennessey 1989; Theakston 1995). This ideal has withstood many reform attempts and is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. In typically British fashion, there has been no statutory enactment of these principles but this oversight is due to be rectified in legislation sponsored by Prime Minister Gordon Brown. A draft bill was published in March

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2008, which would enshrine in statute the principle of appointment solely on merit, and define the term ‘civil servant’ for the first time (Maer 2008). Four features of the British SCS set it apart from American or European models. These are: ● ● ● ●

Accountability through ministers to parliament; Selection and promotion on merit – the SCS survives changes of government; Political neutrality; Strong departmental culture, with a relatively weak centre.

Civil servants in the British system are not directly accountable to Parliament, since they are servants of the Crown and owe their loyalty to the Government of the day. The doctrine of ministerial accountability makes a neutral and permanent civil service possible and the two developed in parallel from the mid-nineteenth century. Special advisers are therefore the only ‘political’ civil servants that the British system of government allows, but, by performing this role, they can help to insulate the SCS from the more partisan aspects of the Government’s work. Three themes have become evident in the evolution of the civil service since the mid-twentieth century. These are: ● ●

●

The recruitment of specialist policy outsiders into the civil service; The growth of a cadre of assistants to prominent Members of Parliament (MPs) who have then followed their leaders into Government on a personal basis; An emphasis on the creation of a specialist Prime Ministerial office based in Number 10 with support from the Cabinet Office.

During both world wars, many temporary civil servants were brought in to Government, but they were dispensed with in peacetime. By the beginning of the 1960s there was a sense that the permanent civil service could not hope to offer comprehensive advice for the multitude of issues facing modern Governments. A key personality was Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who launched the Fulton Review into the future of the civil service, published in 1968 (Fulton 1968). With a background as a temporary civil service economist until he became a parliamentary candidate in 1944, Wilson wanted to recreate what he saw as the fluidity and innovation of the wartime public service. Fulton’s plans for a more specialist service were not fully implemented, but a decade later, the Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher took office, determined to introduce business methods into what was seen

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as an over-large, under-responsive public service. She devolved much of the executive civil service into separate agencies, leaving the ministerial departments to develop policy. Throughout her administration, critics expressed concern that the SCS was being politicized, that, in effect, only those seen as ‘one of us’ were promoted into the most senior position, namely permanent secretary of a ministerial department (Richards 1997). The evidence was mixed, as, inevitably, competence tended to remain the overriding criterion for promotion. However, senior civil servants have become more visible from 1979 onwards, as the system of Departmental Parliamentary Select Committee hearings developed, and this has placed a strain on the doctrine of ministerial accountability. The adoption of New Public Management techniques intensified in the 1990s and the incoming Labour Government of 1997 increased the emphasis on performance and monitoring. Delivery became the mantra of New Labour, which was frustrated by the slow pace of public service reform (Barber 2007). Despite considerable pressure from think tanks from the 1980s onwards to move towards a system of fixed term contracts for senior civil servants and to open up more senior posts to outsiders, the principle of permanent employment remains (Lodge and Rogers 2006). The key change has been to allow more outsiders in; 43 per cent of vacancies into the SCS were opened up to external competition in 2004 and 2005 and just over two-thirds of these were won by outsiders (PASC 2007b; Levitt and Solesbury 2005). However, the use of external consultancies for both policy advice and implementation has also increased markedly since the mid-1990s (NAO 2006). Richards (2007, p. 155) concludes that these trends do not suggest that the SCS has been politicized under New Labour; indeed, if anything, the present administration has taken an essentially conservative attitude in its attempts to reform the SCS. However, what they do suggest is a dilution of the traditional monopoly of civil service advice. Individual departments are traditionally responsible for policy development in the UK with only a small office for the Prime Minister, who relies on the Cabinet Office for administrative support; once again, this model has not operated consistently, breaking down during war-time and coming under strain with interventionist post-war Prime Ministers who sought alternative sources of policy advice independent from Whitehall. The trend towards central control of policy development was particularly marked under Tony Blair, who used his own team of special advisers based in Number 10 to shadow and intervene in the activities of departments (Kavanagh and Seldon 2000). As detailed below, the Blair Administration transformed the operation of the Prime Minister’s Office so that it had a central focus on delivery and special advisers played an instrumental role in that process.

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The regulation of special advisers must also be understood in the context of the emphasis on conduct that has become a permanent part of the UK political scene since the 1990s (O’Toole 2006a). Propriety has replaced accountability as the most important political virtue to be demonstrated by Government. Hine (cited in PASC 2007c p. 77) has argued that: ‘“public ethics” . . . runs everything from old-fashioned ministerial accountability to issues of personal propriety. It is all in there and rather mixed up in the public mind, and an awful lot of it is to do with values and principles rather than hard rules of behaviour which are justifiable.’ Provided the correct procedures have been followed, according to the appropriate code, the question of resignation does not arise. The key document for regulating the conduct of ministers was first published in 1992 as Questions of Procedure for Ministers and renamed the Ministerial Code in 1997 (Cabinet Office 2007c). The code rapidly became a standard against which the behaviour of individual ministers could be judged. Its contents and interpretation was also subject to external scrutiny by bodies, such as the (Nolan) Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL), which was created in 1994. The CSPL’s subsequent reports have been the catalyst for the regulation of public life, through codes for each sector, including the civil service, local government, public bodies and inevitably special advisers (O’Toole 2006a). This development marks a major move away from the informal self-regulation, which had prevailed before, christened by Hennessey (2000) as the ‘good chaps’ theory of government. Indeed, the trend towards the regulation of behaviour has been marked across British public life for the last two decades, as deference has crumbled and the scope of judicial review has increased. The creation of codes for special advisers suggests that this has presented a problem area for Government and a target for critics of the current administration. The civil service has become much more diverse and a key training issue is socialization, ensuring that the values of political neutrality are sustained. Unease remains about the potential impact of outsiders on the culture of the SCS, which has led to calls for the development of a specific public sector ethos, led by the CSPL. Core values are set out in a Civil Service Code, overseen by the Civil Service Commissioners (Cabinet Office 2006). Overall, therefore, the traditional civil service has adapted to modern trends, one of the more important of which was the arrival of the specialist adviser as a distinct cadre within the service. However, strains are apparent, leading to calls for legislation to ensure that the SCS remains politically neutral and appointed on merit. These were answered by incoming Prime Minister Gordon Brown, in 2007, with an immediate commitment to legislation.

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HISTORY OF POLITICAL ADVISERS IN UK GOVERNMENT Throughout the twentieth century, Prime Ministers have employed personal or political staff to advise on policy or presentation. Blick (2004) has drawn attention to the importance of Harold Wilson in first creating a formal system of advisers. Wilson planned in opposition to bring in key advisers to the cabinet secretariat and implemented his plan in 1964, influenced by both the French cabinet and the American spoils system (Blick 2004). It was in the same year that the term ‘special adviser’ was first used officially to describe the half dozen temporary civil servants who were recruited to the Cabinet Office, Treasury and Foreign Office. The most influential was the Labour sympathiser and economist Nicky Kaldor, who operated as a specialist adviser with a real impact on economic policy. But, John Harris, the adviser used by Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, was employed mainly because of his background in journalism and personal connections. He was commonly believed to engage in selective briefing against individual ministers. So, both types of advisers were in evidence from the very start and their location within a permanent civil service was already producing strains. The Conservative Heath Government created a larger external pool of advisers in 1970 to develop policy alternatives for the Prime Minister. The Central Policy Review Staff, as it was known, was split 50:50 between prestigious outsiders and mainstream civil servants, before it was finally killed off by Margaret Thatcher in 1983 (Blick 2004). The next Wilson Administration of 1974 was determined to build on the 1960s experiment, following proposals contained in the Fulton Review. Ministers were encouraged to bring in advisers and a new Policy Unit was established in Number 10 headed by Bernard Donoughue. It became an influential alternative centre of advice to the Prime Minister. The number of advisers increased to around 30 and a 1992 publication called Questions of Procedure for Ministers set out the ground rules for their employment (Donoughue 2004). The Orders in Council governing the appointment of civil servants were adapted to cope with the new phenomenon. In practice, a number of these new advisers were undertaking a political apprenticeship before attaining selection as an MP, including current Minister of Justice Jack Straw. Mrs Thatcher had not examined the merits of special advisers before taking power in 1979 and allowed the appointment of only half a dozen for her ministers. Yet, by 1990, the overall total had returned to nearly 30, reflecting demand for their services. Her interests in radically downsizing the public sector led her to appoint external advisers, such as Derek Rayner, from Marks and Spencer, and Alan Walters, a messianic

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economist whose continued employment eventually led to the resignation of Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson in 1989. Increasingly, special advisers based in her Policy Unit monitored the work of departments, causing irritation across Whitehall. However, most of the concern during Thatcher’s premiership was directed towards accusations that the permanent civil service was being politicized, following the appointment of senior figures, including her Foreign Affairs Private Secretary Charles Powell, and Chief Press Secretary Bernard Ingham (Richards 1997). The trends visible in the Thatcher years continued under her successor. As John Major’s Administration succumbed to accusations of sleaze, the regulation of special advisers became a prominent issue for the Labour Opposition, which took advantage of the growing disquiet. Achieving appropriate regulation has been combined with a growing criticism of the unprecedented growth in the number of special advisers since 1997. We return to this point below, but, before doing so, we consider in further detail the capacities, capabilities and role of special advisers.

THE CAPACITIES, CAPABILITIES AND ROLE OF SPECIAL ADVISERS It goes without saying that the authority of special advisers comes from their personal appointment by the minister concerned. As Romola Christopherson (cited in CSPL 2003, pp. 38–9), the former Director of Press and Publicity at the Department of Health, observes: I have always said that any Minister in charge of a Department, any Secretary of State, will have more to do and rely upon more with four civil servants than any other civil servants. Those are the Permanent Secretary, the Private Secretary, the Press Secretary and the special adviser . . . it is absolutely vital that those four people have the confidence and trust of the Minister.

As such, special advisers occupy a privileged institutional position, but how they work with the three other civil servants that Christopherson identifies is still unclear. Different underlying concerns underpin the way in which the existing literature has sought to characterize this role. We identify two different characterizations, which we describe as the analytic and constitutional approaches. The analytic approach starts from the premise that it is possible to categorize special advisers according to the function that they perform. This was the Government’s approach until recently and it is the one still used in most academic texts. For example, Elcock (cited in evidence to CSPL 2003) has divided the work of special advisers into three different

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categories: expert advice; media relations; and all-purpose political guidance. Similarly, Lowe (2005, p. 502) has argued that special advisers can be differentiated according to whether they are: disinterested experts; partisan experts; or ‘non-expert’ political advisers. These are useful distinctions, but it is also necessary to place the functions that special advisers perform into the overall context provided by their institutional position in the machinery of government. It may seem obvious, but the actions of special advisers in departments are likely to be different from those based in Number 10 or the Treasury. Sir David Omand, a former Permanent Secretary at the Cabinet Office, drew on this distinction when he gave evidence to the Public Administration Select Committee (PASC): It is quite dangerous to use the label ‘Special Adviser’ to cover what are entirely different kinds of people. . . . Very, very briefly, you have experts, and the public service is very lucky to have the services of a number of experts recruited through that Special Adviser route, who are acknowledged experts but they have political affiliations. . . . That has never caused a problem, as far as I am aware. You have another group, media minders and media assistants. . . . Ministers have to have somebody who can go and pad the corridors of the newspapers and put their side of the story in a political sense. There is nothing wrong with that, and it is enormously helpful to the Government Information Service because it does not lead to pressure on them to become political. . . . The third group is the Number 10 Special Advisers, 24-odd, another nine in the Treasury, who are bright, young, policy-makers, and there are issues there about how those groups interrelate. Then finally you have a smaller number, who their Ministers hope will act as chefs de cabinet and progress-chasers, general chiefs of staff. . . . There, there are very significant risks of upsetting proper relationships with the official machine and relationships between junior Ministers and the Secretary of State, if a Special Adviser actually is being used as a chef de cabinet. (PASC 2007a p. 36)

These categories have been subject to the customary debate over whether they adequately represent the work of special advisers and whether it is indeed possible, or desirable, to categorize appointees into one group or another. The analytic approach nevertheless highlights the danger of referring to special advisers as one homogenous group, all performing the same task. Ministers appoint special advisers for different reasons and ask them to perform different tasks according to the skills that they bring to the job. The Government’s attitude towards these two different characterizations of the work of special advisers has also changed over time. More recent formulations have favoured lists of the type of work that a minister might ask his or her special adviser to do, rather than the approach discussed above of categorizing special advisers according to the core activity

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that they perform. Cabinet Office guidance on special advisers continued to allude to two categories of appointee, ‘political’ and ‘technical’, but this distinction was dropped in 1997 in recognition of the fact that political appointees often carried out both roles during the course of their day-today work. As the CSPL (2003, pp. 45–6) observed in its Ninth Report: ‘in practice, it is difficult to draw defined lines between these functions because the range of activities undertaken by special advisers is such that the categories inevitably overlap significantly with each other’. The clearest official account of the work of political appointees is found in the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers (Cabinet Office 2007a). This includes a list of 12 different types of work that a minister might instruct his/her special adviser to perform, including: briefing party MPs and officials on issues of Government policy; representing the views of their minister to the media; providing expert advice as a specialist in a particular field; attending party functions and maintaining contact with party members; and taking part in policy reviews organized by the party with the purpose of ensuring that those undertaking the review are fully aware of the Government’s views and their minister’s thinking (Cabinet Office 2007a, pp. 1–2). This is a useful list, but it is noticeable that some (but not all) of these functions are also performed by the SCS. As such, it still doesn’t really answer the question posed earlier about how ministers work with special advisers and their permanent counterparts. We further investigate this question below, but, for now, we examine the reasons why we have witnessed a postwar growth in the number of special advisers, with a particular focus on the period since 1997.

GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF SPECIAL ADVISERS SINCE 1997 There have been two periods of notable growth in the number of special advisers. The first period of growth began with the Wilson Government of 1974, following the establishment of the Policy Unit in Number 10 and the appointment of a number of other advisers across government. The total number of appointees jumped from six to approximately 30 (CSPL 2000, p. 68) but, following this growth, the number of political appointees remained fairly stable up until the beginning of 1997. Since then, the overall number of special advisers has more than doubled from 38 to 84 (a difference of 46), whilst the number working in the Prime Minister’s Office has trebled from eight to 28. Most of this expansion took place in the first two years of the New Labour Government. Table 1.1 shows the year-byyear growth in the number and cost of special advisers since 1994.

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Table 1.1 Financial year (a)

1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07

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Special advisers – costs and numbers since 1994 of which: Total

No 10

Departments

34 38 38 70 74 78 79 81 70 72 84 82 68

6 8 8 18 25 26 25 26 27 26 28 25 20

28 30 30 52 49 52 54 55 43 46 56 57 48

Special adviser pay (£m) 1.5 1.5 1.8 2.6 3.5 4.0 4.4 5.1 5.4 5.3 5.5 5.9 5.9

Change in pay on previous year (%) – 0 20 44 35 14 10 16 6 22 4 7 0

Figures correct as of November 2007

This was growth on an unprecedented scale. At one level, it meant that special advisers had a physical presence that was simply not there before 1997, but it also fuelled the controversy over exactly what role they played in government. Commentators talked of a ‘transition team’ based on a US model and argued that it was further evidence of a creeping presidentialization of the UK executive (Hennessey 2000). If this was so, then it was probably more evident in the Prime Minister’s Office, where the number of special advisers grew proportionately faster than in any other department. However, the total number of advisers, whilst significant for the UK, was still tiny in comparison to the US. This was still a rapid growth in the number of special advisers that led some to conclude that the SCS was in danger of being covertly politicized. Lord Robert Armstrong, a former Head of the Home Civil Service, expressed such concerns when he warned that: ‘what [New Labour] have done and are doing puts the . . . maintenance of a non-political, professional career civil service at risk’ (Armstrong, cited in Richards 2007, p. 181). Nevertheless, both the CSPL and successive heads of the Home Civil Service have consistently argued in favour of special advisers: ‘precisely because they are free to act and advise in a way that a politically impartial civil servant cannot’ (CSPL 2000, p. 71; 2003, p. 43). What is clear, however, is that the impact of special advisers was uneven. Their

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influence varied over time and their concentration at the centre of government suggests that they had more of an impact here than elsewhere. The remainder of this section of the chapter will focus on New Labour’s preference for appointing special advisers and the issues and questions that it raises. We begin by examining the background of special advisers, before asking why the New Labour administration felt that it was necessary to make such a historically unprecedented number of appointments. The Background of Special Advisers The background of special advisers is not dissimilar to that of their SCS counterparts. Many special advisers are graduates with Oxbridge connections, whilst women and ethnic minorities continue to be underrepresented. Various dynasties are also prominent amongst political appointees, with examples including: the Miliband brothers; Hilary Benn, the son of Tony Benn, a former Cabinet minister; Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair’s former Chief of Staff, whose brother was a civil servant adviser to Margaret Thatcher; and, Dan Corry, the present Head of the Number 10 Policy Unit, whose father was Bernard Corry, a Labour special adviser in the 1970s (Blick 2004, p. 304). There are, however, clear differences between the SCS and special advisers once we start to examine their working background. Unlike the SCS, many special advisers have experience of working for a political party or as a parliamentary research assistant. This growth can be partly explained by the public money that has become available to MPs and Opposition spokespersons since the introduction of Short Money in 1975 (Kelly 2007). MPs have used this public subsidy to employ full-time researchers, but it has also had the unintended effect of becoming a prime recruiting ground for special advisers. The strength of political appointees coming from this background is that they are well versed about the party’s political stance on various issues, but their weakness is that they sometimes lack an elementary knowledge of how Whitehall works. This raises the potential for misunderstandings between special advisers and civil servants. A second trend is for special advisers to have some experience of working in a think tank, the majority of which have strong connections with one political party or another. For example, the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) and Demos both have strong links with the Labour Party. As think tanks, they both played an important part in remoulding the party in the 1980s and 1990s (Bentham 2006, p. 166) and since the election of Labour they have taken on a role more akin to that of an outside advisory body. Think tanks therefore supplied a significant number of the special advisers that were subsequently appointed by New Labour. Since

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BOX 1.1 THE REVOLVING DOOR SYNDROME Alastair Campbell had a background in tabloid journalism before he became Tony Blair’s press adviser in 1994. He played a crucial role in the Labour Party’s news management before and after the election in 1997. Blair subsequently made him his official spokesman but he resigned in August 2003 to work in public relations. He worked for Labour in the 2005 election, publishing his diaries only after Gordon Brown became Prime Minister in June 2007 to minimize any political damage caused by revelations of disputes between Blair and Brown. Dan Corry has had a varied career. Between 1989 and 1992 he was Head of the Economic Secretariat at the Labour Party before he moved to become Senior Economist at the IPPR (1992–7). He has been a special adviser at the Departments of Trade and Industry (1997–2001), Transport, Local Government and the Regions (2001–02), Education and Skills (2005–06), as well as HM Treasury, where he was Chair of the CEA from July 2006. Between September 2002 and January 2005, he was Director of the New Local Government Network (NLGN) which is a think tank founded in 1996 to ‘transform public services, revitalise local political leadership and empower local communities’ (NLGN 2007). Corry is now Head of the Number 10 Policy Unit. Chris Leslie entered Parliament in 1997 and was a minister between 2001 and 2005. He held portfolios at the Cabinet Office (2001–02), the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2002–03) and the Department for Constitutional Affairs (2003–05). Since September 2005, he has been Director of the New Local Government Network. Geoff Mulgan was a former co-founder and Director of the think tank Demos (1993–8). He left that post to become Head of the Number 10 Policy Unit as a special adviser before then making the unusual move of becoming a permanent civil servant as Head of the Performance and Innovation Unit and founder of the Forward Strategy Unit. They have since been merged to create the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit which still exists today. Mulgan left government in 2004 and created the Young Foundation which describes itself as a centre for social innovation.

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Nick Pearce was a former special adviser to David Blunkett at the Department for Education and Employment (1999–2001) and the Home Office (2001–03) before he became Director of the Institute for Public Policy Research (2003–07). He is now a special adviser in Number 10. Jonathan Powell served as Tony Blair’s Chief of Staff from 1997– 2007. His brother, Charles Powell, served Margaret Thatcher as her Private Secretary, and was also considered to have considerable influence over the Prime Minister. The brothers were sons of an air vice marshal and worked initially in the Foreign Office. Charles Powell was made a peer in 2000. Ed Richards was Senior Policy Adviser to Tony Blair for media, telecoms, internet and e-government and the architect of the Communications Act 2003 which established Ofcom as the regulator for the UK communications industry. He previously worked for the BBC and as a research assistant to Gordon Brown. He was appointed Chief Executive of Ofcom in October 2006. Matthew Taylor was a former election campaign coordinator and director of policy when the labour party were in opposition. he was an assistant general secretary by the time that he left the party in december 1998 to become Director of the Institute for Public Policy Research (1999–2003). He was subsequently appointed Head of the Number 10 Policy Unit and following the 2005 general election he was given the title of Chief Adviser on Strategy to the Prime Minister. Since November 2006, he has been Chief Executive of the Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce.

then, there has been some evidence of a revolving door syndrome, where ex-think tank staff are recruited as special advisers and ex-special advisers are recruited as think tank staff; notable examples are provided in Box 1.1. The media picked up on this trend and portrayed a generally negative view of think tanks as: ‘preparatory schools for spin-doctors and as floating houses for new Labour ideas’ (Bentham 2006, p. 166). Why has there been a Growth in the Number of Special Advisers? We have already identified two waves of expansion in the number of special advisers (1974 and 1997), but now we turn our focus to the question of why

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there has been a recent doubling in the number of political appointees. We identify three reasons for this growth: the professionalization of politics; a lack of confidence and trust in the permanent civil service; and the need to respond to a 24-hour media environment. The professionalization of politics Ministers will always value loyalty and a strong personal relationship when selecting their special advisers. What made the New Labour Government distinctive in this respect was its 18-year period in opposition. During that time, the Labour Party leadership had made a series of reforms often in the face of fierce resistance from its own party members. This meant that, perhaps more than usual, the incoming Government placed a high value on the trust and loyalty that ordinarily follows from a strong personal and long working relationship. Indeed, some of the aides that Blair appointed were people who had helped him to introduce controversial policy reforms, such as the removal of clause IV from the party’s constitution. As Riddell (cited in CSPL 2003, p. 44) explains: There was . . . a particular phenomenon in 1997 with one of the most inexperienced governments in our history coming in and being used to working with a group of people . . . and then wanting them around. . . . It was a reflection of a more general thing, of politicians wanting more outside advice, more political advice.

Anji Hunter, who was Tony Blair’s gatekeeper for over a decade, is often cited as one example of this tendency. Hennessy (cited in Blick 2004, p. 289) has also spoken of the ‘very personal coterie’ (Ed Balls, Ed Miliband and Charlie Whelan) that surrounded Gordon Brown when he was Chancellor. The particular importance of personal loyalty was also evident in the bilateral governing style of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. This, combined with the personal relationship that both men had developed in opposition, meant that Government policy was often settled in small policy networks. Special advisers were also responsible for intensifying the personal rivalry that existed between both men by selectively briefing the media in an effort to gain positional advantage (Scott 2004, p. 23). These developments have also been used to advance the argument that we are seeing the professionalization of politics and the emergence of a new ‘political class’. For example, the journalist, Peter Oborne (2007) has argued that British politics has returned to the eighteenth century, with a professional political class obsessed with personal status and divorced from the needs of the electorate. Sir Christopher Foster (2005, p. 243) has also observed that: ‘the relationship of partnership between ministers and

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Table 1.2 Occupational background

Special advisers appointed in 1997 – occupational background Special adviser

Think tank

Politician

Consultancy

Business

Other

Special advisers working in the Prime Minister’s Office only Total 18 6 1 3 2 2

2

2

Special advisers working across Whitehall Total 70 16 8 15

9

4

11

Media

7

Notes: The category ‘Politician’ includes MPs, MSPs, peers, councillors and Ministers. The table excludes unpaid advisers. Source:

Adapted from GMB Union (2006).

civil servants . . . has been replaced by close relationships between ministers and a new, unelected, political class who are no longer just advisers’. In effect, experience of working in party politics or a think tank has become a necessary prerequisite for a career as a special adviser at just the same time as an increasing number of special advisers have made the transition into elected office. This has become particularly apparent over the course of the current Labour administration, as a number of ex-special advisers have used their former role as a staging post for a political career. Table 1.2 confirms this trend. It takes the list of special advisers appointed in November 1997 as a baseline and then compares this with the employment sector that those same advisers were working in as of April 2006. The table is further divided into advisers that worked in the Prime Minister’s Office and those that worked in other departments in Whitehall. This table shows that six out of the 18 (33 per cent) special advisers working in Number 10 as of November 1997 were still advisers in May 2006 (although not necessarily in the same role), three (17 per cent) had become politicians and a further three (17 per cent) worked for either a think tank or a consultancy. Consequently, half of the political appointees working in Number 10 were either politicians as of April 2006 or special advisers. If we take all 71 appointees then 16 (23 per cent) were still special advisers, 15 (21 per cent) were politicians and 19 (27 per cent) were working for either a think tank or a consultancy. Although the number of special advisers who have subsequently become politicians is still small in comparison to the overall number of Labour MPs, what is noticeable is how many of that cohort have since been appointed to senior ministerial positions. Box 1.2 illustrates this point by providing the career profiles of several former special advisers who have subsequently become senior Government ministers.

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BOX 1.2 THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF POLITICS Andrew Adonis was an academic and journalist before he joined the Number 10 Policy Unit in 1998 to become Tony Blair’s adviser on education and public services. He spent a brief spell as Head of the Policy Unit between 2001 and 2003 before he was granted a peerage in 2005 and became a Department for Education and Skills junior minister in the House of Lords. Wendy Alexander, Leader of the Scottish Labour Party and MSP, started as a research officer for the Scottish Labour Party in 1988 before she ended a short career in management consultancy to become special adviser to the Secretary of State for Scotland in 1997. She was elected as an MSP in 1999. Ian Austin started working for the Labour Party in 1995 and held several positions before he was appointed as special adviser to Gordon Brown in June 1999. He fought and won the seat of Dudley North in the 2005 general election. He was named Gordon Brown’s Parliamentary Private Secretary in June 2007 and attended Cabinet in that capacity until becoming an assistant whip in 2008. Ed Balls was Gordon Brown’s Economic Adviser between 1997 and 1999 and his Chief Economic Adviser between 1999 and 2004. He left the Treasury following his selection as a prospective parliamentary candidate in 2004. During the interim period between his selection and the 2005 general election he was a research fellow at the Smith Institute which is a think tank with close links to the Labour party. In 2006 he was elected Vice Chair of the Fabian Society and the following year he became its Chair. In May of the same year, he was appointed Economic Secretary to the Treasury. He was promoted in Brown’s first Prime Ministerial reshuffle and took over a new but important portfolio as Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families. Hilary Benn has been Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs since June 2007. Son of Tony Benn, he worked for the trade unions and the Labour Party before becoming special adviser to the Secretary of State for Education and Employment, David Blunkett, in 1997. He became an MP in 1999 in a by-election.

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Andrew Burnham was a research assistant to Tessa Jowell MP (1994–7) before he became a special adviser at the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (1998–2001). He fought the 2001 general election and since 2003 he has held various ministerial posts. In June 2009 he was appointed Secretary of State for Health. Jon Cruddas has worked for the Labour Party since 1979, acting as a Number 10 special adviser from 1997–2001. He stood for the Deputy Leadership of the Labour Party in 2007. His wife was a special adviser to the former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam. Pat McFadden was a research assistant to Donald Dewar MP (1988–93) before he became a speechwriter and policy adviser to the late John Smith. He held a variety of posts in Number 10, including Political Secretary to the Prime Minister. He entered Parliament as an MP in the 2005 general election. Since then, he has held one junior ministerial post until his June 2009 promotion to the position of Minister for Business, Innovation and Skills. David Miliband was an IPPR researcher between 1992 and 1994 before he became Head of Blair’s Policy Unit. When Labour won the 1997 election he was appointed Head of the Number 10 Policy Unit before he left to fight the safe Labour seat of South Shields in 2001. He has since moved up the ministerial ranks and in June 2007 he became the second youngest person to be named Foreign Secretary. Ed Miliband was a research assistant to Harriet Harman MP (1993–4) and then Gordon Brown (1994–7). Between 1997 and 2002, he was a special adviser to Gordon Brown before he took up a sabbatical at Harvard University. He returned to the Treasury in 2004 and became Chair of the CEA. He entered Parliament in the 2005 general election and held one junior ministerial before he was promoted to the position of Minister for the Department of Energy and Climate Change. James Purnell was a research assistant to Tony Blair between 1989 and 1992 when Blair was Shadow Employment Secretary. After graduating, he went to Hydra Associates (1992–4) before he became a research fellow at the IPPR (1994–5) where he worked on their media and communications project. He went on to become Head of Corporate Planning at the BBC from 1995–7

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but returned to work for the Prime Minister as his special adviser on culture, media, sport and the knowledge economy between 1997 and 2001. He entered the Commons in 2001, becoming Junior Culture Minister in 2005, and Secretary of State for Culture Media and Sport in 2007. In 2008 he became the Work and Pensions Secretary, but resigned in 2009 in the MP expense claims scandal. Shriti Vadera spent 14 years working for investment bank UBS Warburg before she became a member of the Treasury’s CEA, a position that she held from April 1999 until June 2007. She acted as the Chancellor’s main point of contact between the City and business community and oversaw many of the more technical aspects of Treasury policy including: public–private partnerships and the controversial part-privatisation of the London Underground; the administration of Railtrack; and areas of international development policy such as the International Finance Facility for Immunisation the ‘Education for All’ initiative which Gordon Brown launched with Nelson Mandela in 2006. One official characterized her as ‘Gordon’s representative on Earth’ and Stephen Byers, the former Secretary of State at the DTLR, once said of her: ‘Shriti’s Shriti. She can be forceful and sometimes she can be a real sweetie. She’s a significant player in Whitehall’ (Osborne 2005). She was created a life peer following Brown’s appointment as Prime Minister and as Baroness Vadera is Parliamentary Under-Secretary of the State for Economic Competitiveness, Small Business and Enterprise in both the Cabinet and the Department for Business Innovation and Skills.

A lack of confidence and trust in the permanent civil service Eighteen years of opposition also meant that New Labour’s ministerial team had virtually no experience of working in government or working with the civil service. Moreover, Tony Blair had no prior experience of running a large-scale organization, apart from the Labour Party. It was against this background that, according to Sir Michael Barber (2007, p. 45), some ministers lacked trust in the SCS. This can be partly explained by the conspiratorial view held in some quarters of the Labour Party that ‘senior civil servants were part of the establishment and [were] therefore not to be trusted’, as well as a concern that there would be a ‘Thatcherite bias against’ the Government (Barber 2007, p. 45; Richards 2007, pp. 148–154). This second point had already been made by Mandelson and

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Liddle (cited in Richards 2007, p. 155) back in 1996, when they argued that 18 years of Conservative rule had created a SCS that was: ‘too quiescent for their own or the Government’s health’. Despite these concerns, Richards (2007, p. 155) concludes that, once in government, New Labour had ‘no intention of inflicting a “night of the long-knives” on the senior Civil Service’ and it was, in fact, rather more concerned to ensure ‘the establishment of a cooperative and productive relationship with Whitehall’. Sir Michael Barber (2007, p. 45) has also argued that any suspicions that the Government may have had concerning the motives of the SCS were quickly dismissed and Sir Robin Mountfield (cited in Blick 2004, p. 252), a former Permanent Secretary at the Cabinet Office, has since suggested that some officials even displayed almost ‘too much anxiety to please’. What seemed to replace the initial suspicion of the civil service was, in fact, a growing frustration with the slow pace of change in public sector reform. This became clear in July 1999 when Tony Blair (cited in Seldon 2005, p. 423) told an audience of entrepreneurs: ‘You try getting change in the public sector and public services, I bear the scars on my back after two years in Government.’ Blair and his ministers appeared to use advisers and consultants as a means of navigating their way through this morass. They also offered some way of cutting through and communicating the message. But, as we outline below, the Blair Government’s frantic attempts to develop and implement radical policies in respect of the wider public sector also led to a blurring of roles between special advisers, ministers and civil servants. The need to respond to a 24-hour media environment The importance that the Labour Government attached to news management is a development that has received far more critical attention than either of the other two factors identified above. It has spawned a whole new vocabulary of ‘spin doctors’, ‘photo opportunities’ and ‘sound bites’, but it has also been cited as a reason for the growth in the number of special advisers (Gaber 2000). Throughout the Blair Administration, the sometimes relentless focus on the activities of this relatively small number of ‘spin doctors’ meant that they at times became the subject of their own news story with damaging consequences for the Government’s image. This prompted Gordon Brown to declare the ‘end of spin’ in preparation for his appointment as Prime Minister (Jones 2007). As a party in opposition, New Labour had successfully reformed to meet the new demands of a 24-hour news environment by professionalizing its news management activities, appointing several high profile figures with close media connections and developing an emphasis on the presentation

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of policy as well as its contents. This emphasis was carried forward into government and led to changes in the way that Number 10 and the departments worked both individually and collectively. As Campbell told the PASC (1998 Q 412): ‘In opposition we made it clear that communications was not something that you tagged on the end, it is part of what you do. That is something that we have tried to bring into government.’ Assessing this change solely in terms of the growth in the number of special advisers working on press related issues has been a contested area. PASC’s (2001) analysis of the work of special advisers drew attention to the fact that most aides were not primarily engaged in media relations. A similar point has been made by Lord Richard Wilson (2002, p. 387), the former Head of the Home Civil Service, who judged that: ‘eleven out of 81 [special advisers] are employed primarily in the field of communications and perhaps another 30 deal with presentations and speeches, as well as policy development, without necessarily talking to the press themselves.’ Mike Granatt (cited in CSPL 2003, p. 20), a former Head of the Government Information and Communication Service (GICS), also spoke of ‘an imprecise figure’ of about 40 special advisers who had at least some responsibility for the presentation of Government policy or talking to the media. The increasing number of special advisers working on press related issues was overshadowed by the practice of unofficial briefings and leaks to the media by ministers and their advisers. There was nothing particularly new in this practice but, as in the past, it caused embarrassment to the Government because it exposed internal disunity and highlighted inequalities in media access. The most notable examples of internal disunity to be leaked to the press involved relations between the Prime Minister and the Chancellor. The eventual resignation in January 1999 of Charlie Whelan, the Chancellor’s media adviser, was prompted by intense speculation that he had leaked information regarding the personal finances of the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Peter Mandelson (Blick 2004, p. 291). Mandelson was a close confidant of Tony Blair, as well as a key figure in the Labour Party’s communications strategy. The appointment of special advisers and the practice of unofficial briefings was only one aspect of a number of other reforms that were designed to strengthen the Government’s media and communications capacity. These were introduced in Number 10 shortly after New Labour’s first election victory. Alastair Campbell, who had been Tony Blair’s Press Spokesman since 1994, was appointed to the post of Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman, a role previously held by a career civil servant. The media frequently portrayed Campbell as a powerful player in government. For example, the journalist, Peter Oborne (cited in Blick 2004, p.

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288), wrote in 1999, that: ‘well-informed people started calling Campbell “Deputy Prime Minister”’. In defending Campbell’s role, Lord Wilson (cited in Blick 2004, p. 288) described a lot of his work as ‘extremely dull’ and Campbell himself has frequently argued that his influence within government was inflated by a self-obsessed media lobby (Blick 2004, p. 288). In September 1997, Sir Robin Mountfield led an internal review of the Government Information Service (GIS) in the context of the well-known view of many advisers, led by Campbell, that the GIS lacked the skills necessary to deal with a 24-hour media. In addition, and perhaps more controversially, it also coincided with a massive shakeout within the organization itself. Within a year, just two out of 17 Heads of Information remained in the same post that they had occupied under the previous Conservative administration; the other 15 had either been sacked or moved to a different job (Jones 2003; Mountfield written evidence to CSPL 2003). The mass departure of so many Heads of Information led to allegations that ministers had been involved in the appointment of their successors and there was a fear that the role of the GIS would be usurped by special advisers who would act quickly to fill the gap. The Mountfield Review reported back in November 1997, upholding the need for a politically impartial information service. Nevertheless, allegations remain that we have seen the emergence of a two-tier system of information in which the special adviser has become the dominant partner. The publication of the Mountfield Review also prompted a number of institutional reforms in Number 10. A new Strategic Communications Unit (SCU) was established to focus on short-term media management and news coordination. It was led by Alastair Campbell and staffed by six civil servants and special advisers who were answerable to the Prime Minister, via his Press Secretary. A new Research and Information Office (RIO) was also created, staffed by a mixture of special advisers and civil servants. These units allowed Campbell to strengthen the ability of the centre to control the presentation of Government policy and to transfer into Government the news management techniques that Labour had pioneered whilst it was in opposition. Jones (1999 p. 13) argues that: ‘Campbell’s determination to control and coordinate the presentation of policy announcements paid handsome dividends, and the weeks when the Government failed to set the news agenda were few and far between’. Campbell’s announcement at the beginning of Labour’s second term in Government that he would withdraw from lobby briefings in favour of two press officers recruited from within the civil service led to claims that the influence of spin would weaken. However, many have questioned this claim. Labour ministers have continued to spend more time than their predecessors with their press advisers and lobbies and there were reports

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of continued tensions between special advisers and GICS staff. Such tensions did eventually become public following the ‘Jo Moore Affair’. Jo Moore was a special adviser at the Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR). She sent an internal email to her department on the afternoon of 11 September 2001, urging release to the media of ‘anything we want to bury’ in the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York (PASC 2002). Civil servants apparently leaked the email to the media leading to a collapse in the relationship between the DTLR Minister, Stephen Byers, and his Director of Communications, the civil servant Martin Sixsmith. Sixsmith was effectively sacked in February 2002 and retaliated by going to the media, provoking a public response from the Permanent Secretary. The events at the DTLR have been used to criticize a system that allows proactive, politically committed, public relations advisers to work alongside a traditionally neutral civil service, but they have also come to symbolize the wider dangers when hostile relationships develop between ministers, special advisers and their permanent equivalents. As Richards (2007, p. 192) notes: ‘there have been occasions . . . when both ministers and their special advisers have not operated within the informal rules of the Whitehall game, which have led to some very public break-downs in core executive relations’. A subsequent inquiry by PASC (2002, p. 5) concluded that serious flaws in the management and accountability of special advisers meant that: ‘the senior management [at DTLR] were unable to prevent a catastrophic taking of sides at a senior level in the department’. The CSPL also drew on these events in its own report, which we discuss below. The activities of special advisers, particularly those engaged with the press, was put under the spotlight for a second time in the summer of 2003 following what has come to be known as the David Kelly Affair. Dr Kelly, a government scientist, was accused of briefing a journalist to the effect that the intelligence on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) had been ‘sexed up’ in order to bolster the case for the invasion of Iraq. The Government was accused of ‘outing’ Kelly as the media source to a Select Committee that was investigating the issue, resulting in his suicide. Subsequently, the Hutton and Butler Inquiries examined allegations that Alastair Campbell, as special adviser with executive powers, had coordinated the content of the intelligence briefings and bullied the BBC about its investigative journalism (Hutton 2004; Butler 2004). The Hutton Inquiry focused on the narrow question of why Dr Kelly committed suicide in July 2003, whereas the Butler Inquiry examined the intelligence failures that had led to the belief that Iraq had WMDs. While Campbell was not found to have drafted the dossier of evidence, the overall conclusion from

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both inquiries was that an informal style of governing had taken root in Number 10, leading to a dilution in the usual standards of record-keeping and decision-making. Campbell’s position at the centre of the David Kelly Affair highlighted the role of special advisers in Number 10 in the same way as the Jo Moore Affair illuminated the role of special advisers in departments. The proximity of these events meant that there was a great deal of advance interest in the recommendations of both the CSPL’s report on executive government, which was published on 8 April 2003, and the Interim Report of the Phillis Review of Government Communications, which was published on 27 August 2003. Campbell announced that he would resign from his post two days after the Phillis Review published its interim report. He cited family reasons, but also accepted that he had become the subject of media reports that were damaging to the Government. Campbell’s replacement was not given line management powers over civil servants and overall responsibility for government media strategy and personnel was handed over to a new Permanent Secretary based in the Cabinet Office.

INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC POLICY AND THE PERMANENT CIVIL SERVICE It is challenging to attempt to assess the influence of special advisers on public policy because most of their advice is given in private. However, it is noticeable that the majority of senior civil servants have publicly defended the role of special advisers. Lord Wilson (2002, p. 387) noted in his valedictory lecture that they had a legitimate contribution to make by: acting as the political eyes and ears of a minister; helping the department to understand the mind of the minister; working alongside officials on the minister’s behalf; and handling the party political aspects of government business. He has also argued, along with his predecessor Lord Butler, that, even taking account of their recent growth, there were still only 81 special advisers compared with 3429 senior civil servants (Butler cited in CSPL 2000, p. 74; Wilson cited in CSPL 2000, p. 74; Wilson 2002, p. 387). This statistic has also been used by Tony Blair, but for a different purpose. Arguing against the assertion that he had politicized the civil service and overseen an excessive concentration of power in Number 10, Blair referred to: ‘the United States of America [where] there are 3500 or even 4000 political appointments; we have 80 special advisers for the whole-of-government . . . I think we need to get this in context’ (Blair cited in Liaison Committee 2002, Q 8). While it was natural that the headline increase in the number of special

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advisers has gained the most public attention, disentangling the actual impact that political appointees have had on public policy making and the SCS is fraught with difficulty. Our assessment is divided into two parts. The first part looks at the effect that special advisers have had on the centre of government, including Number 10 and the Treasury, whilst the second part looks at their effect within departments. We also briefly review how existing institutional structures have been adapted to accommodate the growing number of political appointees. Effect on the Centre of Government Number 10 has always been one of the most ‘political’ of all of the offices in government, yet the manner in which Tony Blair took office in May 1997 almost guaranteed early friction with the permanent civil service. In his first few days in Government, Blair succeeded in acquiring the support of Lord Butler, the Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service, for an amendment to the Civil Service Order in Council. This set aside the usual rules preventing special advisers from having executive authority over civil servants for up to three posts in the Prime Minister’s Office.1 Blair subsequently granted executive powers to Alastair Campbell, in his role as the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman, and Jonathan Powell, who occupied the newly created post of Chief of Staff. A third special adviser with executive powers was planned, but it never materialized. The Prime Minister’s decision to grant executive powers received a lot of public attention and criticism, but Lord Butler has since warned against an overexaggeration of its importance. He, like his successor Lord Turnbull, justified the amendment as more of a technicality and regularization of what had actually taken place in practice under previous Governments (CSPL 2000, pp. 78–9; 2002, p. 14). Blair also succeeded in almost abolishing the role of Principal Private Secretary (PPS), which is the most senior post that a civil servant can hold at Number 10, and replacing it with the new post of Chief of Staff, filled by a special adviser. The Prime Minister eventually backed down in order to placate the sensitivities of Lord Butler, but the new arrangement, where the two roles co-existed, resulted in some confusion over who was actually in charge of what in Number 10.2 When this came under scrutiny by a Parliamentary Committee, it was clear that there had been a diminution of the PPS’s role (PASC 2001). The Chief of Staff was now ‘in charge’ of Number 10. He had oversight of the Press Office and the Policy Unit, while the PPS was responsible for the Private Office, the Garden Room, awarding of honours and appointments and the day-to-day management of Number 10. This change created some discomfort in the SCS. It was not

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the first time a non-civil servant had directed public relations, as Harold Wilson had appointed a special adviser, Joe Haines, to this role in 1974, but since then the Orders in Council governing the civil service had been tightened to ensure that special advisers were only responsible for advice (Gay 2000). Clearly, giving special advisers formal executive powers was an innovation, but their roles differed widely. Alastair Campbell’s diaries reveal his close involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process and the special role played by Jonathan Powell in effectively taking over negotiations from the Northern Ireland Secretary, Mo Mowlam (Campbell and Stott 2007, pp. 296–7). This was new in British government, but it was a development that highlighted the determination of the Blair Administration to obtain mastery over the SCS. It adapted the existing structures to allow a more political, but also more delivery-based, approach. The other innovation was a determination to impose a central will on outlying departments. This went against the strong departmentalism in the Whitehall system and it did not go unnoticed. Lord Lipsey, himself a special adviser under Callaghan, commented in evidence to the CSPL that: ‘[the current administration] work with special advisers in departments in a way we did not. . . . You go into a department and you see a Number 10 adviser there’ (Lipsey cited in evidence to CSPL 2003, p. 19). Another development was Blair’s use of unpaid advisers who were usually rich and influential. Two examples are Lord Levy, who operated as Blair’s unofficial Middle East envoy, having been a successful businessman and Labour Party fundraiser, and Lord Birt, who was the Prime Minister’s Strategy Adviser between 2001 and 2005. It was in this role that Lord Birt was charged with providing confidential ‘blue skies thinking’, mainly for the Prime Minister, on a range of issues. His work included reports on London, drugs, health, education, transport and crime. As well as these unpaid appointments, Blair also became known for appointing ‘tsars’ or outside experts to tackle high profile issues, such as drugs and homelessness, some of which he employed on special adviser terms. Other special advisers at Number 10 also had authority. Robin Cook recorded how he and other senior ministers attended meetings at Number 10 chaired by the special adviser, Andrew Adonis, who is now a Government minister in the House of Lords (Cook 2003, p. 51). Mo Mowlam, the Northern Ireland Secretary, also voiced her complaints about the unprecedented influence that Number 10 advisers had in her department (Mowlam 2002, p. 355). ‘Sofa government’ came under scrutiny in the Butler Report (2004a) and former ministers spoke out against the abandonment of collective cabinet decision making in the run up to the Iraq War (Cook 2003, p. 3; Short 2004, p. 71). This failure was also

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replicated at an official level. Lord Butler (cited in O’Toole 2006a, p. 174) expressed his concern that the Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat and the Head of European Affairs had been combined with the special adviser posts on Foreign Affairs and European Affairs, so confining decision-making to a small handful of people. Such developments sparked real alarm, as former ministers and senior civil servants suggested that special advisers had penetrated into the processes of government to an unprecedented extent. However, these changes also blurred the line between the separate constitutional roles of ministers, special advisers and civil servants. This was compounded by a series of institutional changes in the centre, including reforms that were made in Number 10 shortly after the 2001 general election victory. Up until then, the overall structure of the Prime Minister’s Office had changed little since 1974. It still consisted of a Private Office, Political Office, Press Office and Policy Unit. The manifestation of the Prime Minister’s desire to strengthen the policy capacity of Number 10 could be seen in the Policy Unit, which was dominated by his new cohort of special advisers. But, in June 2001, the Private Office was merged with the Policy Unit to form a single Policy Directorate. This worked alongside two other directorates, known as Communications and Strategy (which brought together the Press Office, the SCU and the RIO) and Government and Political Relations (which merged the Political Office with the Events and Visits Office and the Corporate and Direct Communications Units). These changes meant that it was increasingly difficult (if not impossible) to formally divide the ‘official’ work of civil servants from the ‘political’ work of special advisers. Some effects were also felt in the Cabinet Office. Despite an earlier review by Lord Wilson that rejected the idea of creating an independent Prime Ministerial Department, Tony Blair nevertheless created several new units in the Cabinet Office which reported directly to him (Fawcett and Gay 2005; Fawcett and Rhodes 2007). In the process, he further blurred the boundaries between Number 10 and the Cabinet Office, which changed the latter’s role from serving the Cabinet to serving the Prime Minister. The founders of two of the new units that Blair created were former special advisers: Michael Barber, a former political appointee in the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) between 1997 and 2001, who subsequently joined the SCS as the Prime Minister’s Chief Adviser on Delivery and Head of the newly created Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit; and Geoff Mulgan who left his job as a special adviser in the Prime Minister’s Policy Unit in 2000 to join the SCS as the Head of the newly created Forward Strategy Unit, which he combined with a second role as Head of the already existing Performance and Innovation Unit. Bogdanor

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(cited in evidence to CSPL 2003) drew attention to how these appointments had the potential to undermine the permanence of the SCS. This trend is likely to continue and the traditional differentiation of roles is unlikely to be reinstated under Prime Minister Gordon Brown, despite promises of greater regulation through civil service legislation. The final institution at the centre is the Treasury. Parallels can be drawn with the reforms that took place in Number 10 and the Cabinet Office, although the changes were on a much smaller scale. Like Blair, Brown came to the Treasury with a personal entourage. An outstanding individual was Ed Balls. His role is key to understanding how the Treasury worked under the Brown Chancellorship. Even before Brown came to power, Sir Terry Burns (1998), a former Permanent Secretary at the Treasury, reported that most of his pre-election meetings had been with Balls, not Brown. This trend continued once Labour was in Government. Officials often found that their main channel of briefing was with Balls in his capacity as Brown’s Economic Adviser between 1997 and 1999 and his Chief Economic Adviser between 1999 and 2004 (Deakin and Parry 2000, p. 183). Balls’s influence extended into policy making and he was known to be behind many of the policy decisions in the Treasury, including the decision to make the Bank of England independent. The extent of his involvement led civil servants to complain that these and other policies were being orchestrated without their advice (Cameron 2007). It seemed to confirm that, in high profile policy areas, Treasury civil servants were being sidelined in favour of this tightly-knit group. Brown also innovated by creating the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), which was a mechanism that enabled him to make more special adviser appointments than his ministerial colleagues. It was partly used by Brown to bring in outsiders who would quickly inject their own perspective on particular areas of domestic policy making. The number of appointees never exceeded double figures, but the Council demonstrated the grip of the expert adviser over the economy and it displaced career civil servants in the process (Blick 2004, pp. 294). Effect on Departments Roughly half of all special advisers work in departments, yet their influence is an under-researched area compared with that of political appointees working in the centre of government. There are, however, some clear differences between the two. For a start, contrary to the expansion that had taken place in the centre, Tony Blair introduced an amendment to the Ministerial Code, which limited departmental ministers to a maximum of two appointees each. This meant that all departmental special advisers

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were located in the ministerial private office. They therefore benefited from regular contact with their minister but the extent of that contact also provoked concerns that they had become unhealthily integrated into the fabric of the SCS. This critique of a more informal style of governing and decision making began as a criticism of Tony Blair, but it was soon viewed as a more generic problem. At its worst, this would typically involve a special adviser acting as a conduit to his/her minister and conveying his or her wishes to civil servants. The controversial decision to take Railtrack into administration is typically cited as one such example (Osborne 2005). According to Martin Sixsmith, who was working as a civil servant at the DTLR at the time, this decision was taken in deep secrecy by the then Secretary of State Stephen Byers, and a number of special advisers from the department, Number 10 and the Treasury, including Jo Moore, Alastair Campbell and Shriti Vadera: Few if any civil servants were allowed anywhere near it. The official explanation was that the project involved market sensitive information and civil servants just could not be trusted to leak it. But was the real reason, perhaps, that the civil service might have told them that they were doing something in bad faith [to the shareholders]? (Sixsmith 2005)

Whilst denying that this state of affairs had been reached, Lord Wilson nevertheless drew attention to the potential dangers of policy being developed by networks of ministers and special advisers in departments communicating directly with their counterparts in Number 10 (PASC 2003). At the same time, there are also examples of relationships breaking down between special advisers working in the centre and those working in the departments. Blick (2004, p. 275) cites evidence to suggest that John Prescott, the former Deputy Prime Minister, felt that measures to decrease car usage were blocked by advisers at Number 10. It was also reported that the former Education Secretary Estelle Morris was uncomfortable with the introduction of variable tuition fees for universities, which was a policy that was devised and supported by Tony Blair’s education adviser, Andrew Adonis. Yet, Dan Corry, a special adviser himself, has still argued that a determined Secretary of State who ‘knows what he wants and is prepared to argue it, can say no to Number 10’ (Blick 2004, p. 276). The policy impact of special advisers within particular departments varied from minister to minister and department to department. One example is David Clark who was appointed in 1997 to assist Robin Cook, having acted as his parliamentary research assistant from 1994. Clark became closely associated with Cook’s emphasis on an ethical foreign policy during the course of his work. This is not to say that Cook would

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not have been able to pursue this agenda without Clark, but Clark is one example of a special adviser who developed his expertise as a foreign affairs analyst whilst he was in his post. In contrast, Sir Michael Barber was brought into the DfES as both an educational expert and a Labour sympathizer to push through the standards agenda. He worked with civil servants and could easily have been appointed to his post as a civil servant on merit. Finally, the career of Kieran Simpson is one example of a long-standing special adviser, who served in the Chief Whip’s Office, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries and the Department for Work and Pensions. He worked behind the scenes, moving on to a career in lobbying. Further examples were given in Box 1.2.

THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF SPECIAL ADVISERS IN THE WESTMINSTER SYSTEM The Government has introduced a Code of Conduct in response to the concerns that have been expressed about the role of special advisers. Codes of conduct are intended to clarify acceptable modes of behaviour yet they have not been wholly successful in dispelling concerns. This is because an emphasis on propriety tends to divert attention from the lack of accountability within the tradition of ministerial responsibility. For example, Hine argued in his evidence to the CSPL (2003), that ministers can avoid taking direct responsibility for the actions of their special advisers because political appointees are not socialized into either the SCS and nor do they face the political accountability of elected office. This has resulted in an accountability gap which grew during the Blair years, when advisers occupied prominent positions, but were protected by their ministers from appearing before Select Committees. Reacting to Special Advisers: the Development of Codes Under the procedures introduced by Harold Wilson in 1974, special advisers, whether expert or political, were appointed directly by ministers as temporary civil servants, free from the usual requirements of impartiality. They are given personal contracts which terminate with the resignation of their minister or a general election. A model contract is used, which sets out the rules necessary to ensure that government resources are not used for party political purposes. Special advisers must resign if they are selected as a parliamentary candidate or if they assist full-time in an election campaign. They are bound by the terms of the Civil Service Code (Cabinet Office 2006), apart from those aspects relating to impartiality

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and objectivity. They are governed by the same rules as ministers in relation to examining the papers of a previous administration. Security clearance is required before access to sensitive material is granted and advisers are subject to the Official Secrets Act. Following changes in 2005, special advisers are able to offer not just advice, but also assistance to ministers. Regulation of the activities of special advisers began in the mid-1990s. Labour was successful in raising concerns about their post-employment activity and the first report from the CSPL recommended that they be brought within the framework of the post-employment rules for civil servants. This was accepted by the Government in 1995. The incoming Labour Government of 1997 made a virtue of publishing a model contract and introducing a new pay system, but, as we have seen, it also doubled the number of special advisers.3 The activities of special advisers came under further scrutiny by both the CSPL under Lord Neill in 2000 (CSPL 2000) and the PASC in February 2001 in a report whose pithy title encapsulated the controversy: ‘Special Advisers: Boon or Bane?’ The PASC took a broader line of enquiry, examining the impact of special advisers on the civil service. It complained that political paranoia was being fuelled by a lack of transparency about the career history and work of special advisers. Its report recommended a scheme (first devised by Lord Lipsey) to equate the money spent on special advisers with the Short Money spent on research assistants for Opposition frontbenchers (PASC 2001). Unsurprisingly, the Government did not accept this recommendation as it wished to see special advisers retain civil service funding and status. The CSPL has also investigated the role of special advisers in accordance with its remit to uphold propriety in public life. For example, its Sixth Report, published in January 2000, concluded that the model contract introduced by New Labour was insufficient for accountability and lacked credibility. It recommended a new Code of Conduct for Special Advisers, to sit alongside the existing Civil Service Code, itself a product of the first CSPL report in 1995. The code would list the types of work a special adviser might perform at the request of their minister. The report also recommended legislation to regulate the civil service, including a statutory cap on the number of advisers. The Government was prepared to codify, but not to cap, the number of appointees. A new code therefore came into effect in July 2001, although its contents were criticized. The code excluded unpaid advisers and O’Toole (2006b, p. 75) described it as ‘a series of exhortations without much in the way of practical guidance as to how those covered by it should behave’. At the same time, in response to pressure from the CSPL and Parliament, the Government agreed to publish an annual statement with

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the names, expertise, pay range, number and cost of all political appointees. This has been published in Hansard since July 2002. The CSPL re-examined the relationship between ministers, special advisers and the SCS in the wake of the controversy surrounding the roles of Jo Moore and Alastair Campbell (CSPL 2003). The Committee’s Ninth Report recommended the introduction of a Civil Service Act that would define special advisers (paid and unpaid) as government servants distinct from the permanent civil service. They also recommended that the Act include provision for: parliamentary approval of the Civil Service Code and a redrafted version of the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers; a cap on the number of political appointees set by both Houses of Parliament;4 and an end to the Order in Council allowing special advisers to exercise executive powers. Finally, amendments to the Ministerial Code were recommended to clarify that ministers were personally accountable to the Prime Minister and to Parliament for the management and discipline of their special advisers. The CSPL did not favour the PASC recommendation concerning the use of Short Money, reasoning that advisers should be encouraged to serve the Government of the day, rather than their political party. The government accepted the case for civil service legislation, but rejected plans for parliamentary approvals of codes or caps, so changing its stance on numbers compared with its earlier response to the Committee’s Sixth Report. Amendments to the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers were drafted in detail in the Government’s response to the Committee’s Ninth Report. These amendments initially sparked concern from the Chairman of the CSPL, Sir Nigel Wicks. The proposed amendment would have enabled special advisers to convey the ‘instructions’ of ministers to officials. Wicks believed that that this would change the status of special advisers, reasoning that it would allow them to instruct civil servants. Following an exchange of correspondence, the Prime Minister deleted the word ‘instructions’ from the code (Gay and Fawcett 2005). Thereafter, the question of special advisers lost prominence. The Opposition continued to complain about their numbers, but lacked hard evidence of impropriety. The attention of PASC turned to the implementation of the promise of civil service legislation, which the Committee hoped to prompt by publishing its own draft Bill in January 2004 (PASC 2004). As part of the draft Bill, PASC drew attention to the inconsistency between the Special Adviser’s Code and the 1995 Civil Service Order in Council, which referred to the role of special advisers as that of ‘giving advice only’. PASC (2004) recommended the alternative wording ‘providing assistance’. In July 2005, it emerged that the Government was in the process of

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changing the terms of the Order in Council governing the role of special advisers and was drafting a new version of the Code of Conduct and Model Contract. The Prime Minister announced these changes in a parliamentary written statement on 21 July 2005. The announcement sparked alarm from the CSPL, whose combative Chairman, Sir Alastair Graham, made public his annoyance that the Order in Council had been amended without the scrutiny of either his committee or PASC, and that the changes were being made without the accompanying civil service legislation (Gay and Fawcett 2005). However, the Opposition did not mount a campaign and the changes were eventually accepted. Concerns over the existence of unpaid advisers also diminished with the departure of Lord Birt from Number 10 in December 2005. Brown made minor amendments to the code and contract in 2007 (Cabinet Office 2007a, 2007b), leading to the reinstatement of the term ‘providing assistance’ in both the Order in Council and the Code of Conduct. Problems of Accountability The forthcoming civil service legislation will provide another forum for the discussion of the role of the special adviser.5 The legislation is likely to be similar to the draft Civil Service Bill published by PASC in 2004. Areas of controversy remain, particularly as to whether there should be a cap on the number of special advisers and whether there should be parliamentary endorsement of the code, or of any cap. Opposition parties do not object to the use of special advisers, nor does the option of equating their funding with Short Money appear to be a serious possibility. However, these details do not resolve the question of accountability. Here, the position of the special adviser is entangled with the strains on the traditional doctrine of ministerial accountability that have become so evident over the past three decades. The SCS has become more visible and more diverse, but it is accountable for its actions only through ministers reporting to parliament. At the same time, ministers continue to express frustration that civil servants are not disciplined when policy advice is found to be inadequate or defective. Similarly, special advisers are not held to account for poor policy advice. Dismissal rarely occurs, since appointments are limited by ministerial tenure, but witnesses to the CSPL were concerned that this also resulted in ‘loose cannons’, whose advice and actions were not held to account in any way (O’Toole 2006b). Determined attempts by MPs to elicit information about reporting arrangements between special advisers and civil servants at Number 10 were obstructed, leading PASC to complain about the difficulty of ensuring any transparency. Requests for Campbell and Lord Birt to appear

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before Select Committees were resisted (PASC 2001; DTLR 2002). Only the death of Dr Kelly brought Campbell before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee.6 Yet, he was a lynchpin of the administration and chaired groups such as the cross-departmental Iraq Communications Group, which included senior officials from Number 10, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence (Blick 2004, p. 281). Moreover, as the Foreign Affairs Select Committee noted with disapproval, he chaired a meeting to discuss a document prepared for ministers by the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2003, para 78). Select Committees were also intensely frustrated by the failure of their efforts to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr Kelly in 2003 and Jonathan Powell never appeared before a Select Committee in his capacity as Chief of Staff at Number 10.7 These examples raise broader questions about the limits of parliamentary scrutiny in a Westminster system where a government majority in the Commons is likely to prevent the use of the formal powers of Select Committees to send for persons, papers and records. But, special advisers tend to illustrate these limitations in a particularly acute manner, since they fall outside the Osmotherly Rules which govern the appearance of civil servants before Select Committees (Gay 2005). Following Hutton, the Liaison Committee put pressure on the Government to allow special advisers to give evidence before Select Committees and the Leader of the House promised that special advisers would be included in the revised Osmotherly Rules allowing named civil servants to appear before committees. But, PASC found that advisers at Number 10 were still excluded, so they failed to secure the attendance of either Julian Le Grand, an adviser on choice, or Lord Birt (PASC 2005).8 This is an area where the artificiality of treating special advisers as a subgroup of civil servants is particularly strained.

THE FUTURE FOR SPECIAL ADVISERS Business as usual is the most likely scenario. In his first day in office on 27 June 2007, the incoming Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, made a point of revoking the 1997 Order in Council which had given three special advisers in Number 10 executive powers. But, by the time of Blair’s departure, this power was only being used by one appointee, Jonathan Powell. On the same day, Brown announced a restructuring of positions within Number 10 and the Cabinet Office. He appointed a career civil servant, Tom Scholar, as Chief of Staff and Principal Private Secretary, so ending the division of the two roles under Blair. However, the Deputy Chief of Staff,

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Gavin Kelly, was appointed on special adviser terms. Michael Ellam, a civil servant, was appointed as the Prime Minister’s spokesman, along with Damien McBride, who was, until April 2009, Brown’s special adviser on political press issues. It is worth noting that McBride is actually a former civil servant himself having previously worked at the Treasury on tax issues. Ellam is still a civil servant, but he has been characterized as being fiercely loyal to Brown, having acted as Director of Policy and Planning at the Treasury (Nelson 2006). Brown’s Director of Government Relations, Sue Nye, is a special adviser who has served him since 1997, as is the new Head of the Number 10 Policy Unit, Dan Corry, who was previously Chair of the CEA at the Treasury. As such, the same blurring of roles between senior civil servant and special adviser is already evident. Apart from the inner circle, the more peripheral special advisers may decline in numbers, since the Brown Government is confident in its use of the machinery of power and does not have a new phalanx of advisers for whom it needs to secure employment. The decline in numbers evident in Table 1.1 illustrates this point. Brown’s personal style has been to advance selected experts (whether special advisers or senior civil servants) into positions of prominence, thus emphasizing the concept of a ‘Government of All the Talents’. For example, Baroness Shriti Vadera, one of Brown’s former special advisers at the Treasury, is now a junior minister in the Department for International Development, Mark Malloch Brown became a junior Foreign Office minister, having previously held the post of Deputy Secretary General at the UN, whilst Jonas Eliasch, a former Treasurer for the Conservatives, is now an unpaid adviser to the Prime Minister on sustainable energy. In the winter of 2008, Brown revamped Number 10 and the Cabinet Office, bringing in a public relations strategist, Stephen Carter. However, in October 2008, Mr Carter was sent to the Lords, indicating that the constant changes of personnel at the centre, so prevalent under Blair, would continue. Following the next election, a Conservative Government or a coalition/ minority administration may also bring some changes. The current Conservative leader, David Cameron, is a former special adviser and many of his Shadow Cabinet have similar backgrounds. A Conservative Administration would not abandon the use of advisers, but might reduce their numbers as part of a move to downsize government. A coalition at Westminster would bring particular strains on the use of special advisers, as inter-party strife might intensify. In Scotland, the First Minister, Donald Dewar, attempted to appoint advisers to a central policy unit in an attempt to avoid Blair–Brown type hostility during his coalition with the Liberal Democrats.

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More open policy making is now a given within the SCS, which no longer expects to hold a monopoly over ministerial advice (O’Donnell 2006, p. 5). Attention now focuses on policy delivery, with critics concerned that the civil service does not have enough experience on the ground and that an over-centralized bureaucracy fails to take the challenges of policy implementation seriously enough (Lodge and Kalitowski 2007). The tendency to appoint advisers or outside specialists to tackle this in Number 10 was a feature of the second Blair Government and it may indicate a move back to expert advisers, rather than party political careerists. Brown’s (2007) initial recruitment of specialists from other parties to develop policy, for example, Liberal Democrat lawyer Lord Lester on constitutional reform and the Conservative MP Patrick Mercer on security, could be seen in this light.

CONCLUSION Does any of this matter? Are special advisers any more than a manifestation of the new plurality of policy advice to British governments, to be set alongside think tanks, management consultants and external task forces or tsars? Outside the central policy making departments of Number 10, the Cabinet Office and the Treasury, the role and influence of the special adviser will remain less certain and less documented, at least until more records become available of policy making under Blair (Lowe 2005). So far, the distinctive features of the British SCS survive unchallenged. There has been no serious attempt under Blair to construct ministerial Cabinets in each department, or to introduce fixed term contracts for the heads of these departments, despite two decades of persuasion from think tanks (Richards 2007; Straw 2004). Instead, the decade after 1997 has focused on delivery and capability; in essence, organic reform to ensure that the service realizes its own potential. The recent change in focus reflects the confidence that the Labour Government currently displays in using the existing levers of power. PASC reflected in its Report on Ministers and civil servants that: ‘As the only politically appointed members of the civil service, [special advisers] are a testimony to the general absence of politicisation rather than evidence of its presence’ (PASC 2007a, pp. 36–7). However, the future of political special advisers remains assured. Blick (2004) draws attention to the special adviser as political apprentice, relieved of the duty of nursing a constituency, or of achieving selection through merit, but given a passport into departmental policy making through political associations made at a young age. The growth of personal staff for MPs ensures a ready supply of such advisers, but there are questions of quality control that need to be addressed. The expert adviser’s

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role is expanding, but, with the reform of the government communications machinery, the job description of the all-purpose adviser requires more clarity. Since special advisers are classified as civil servants, they should be subject to its rules and guidance and the forthcoming legislation on the civil service has a role to play here. However, the temptation for a Government to further evade regulation in the cause of flexibility may result in legislation that fails to deliver the required level of clarity. Postscript: the Brown Government and Special Advisers The trends visible under Tony Blair and set out above also developed under the premiership of Gordon Brown. The same mixture of special advisers and permanent civil servants roles within Number 10 continued, despite an initial suggestion that numbers and powers of advisers would be trimmed. As Brown’s personal popularity declined in late 2007, he brought in a public relations strategist, Stephen Carter, as a special adviser to overhaul communications in Downing Street. There followed some predictable tension as Mr Carter sought to stamp his authority on other advisers and civil servants, and bring in his own small team. The blurring of roles between adviser and civil servant so evident under Blair, has continued under his successor. Brown has made use of his patronage powers to make personal appointments to the House of Lords. Shriti Vadera, a special adviser at Brown’s Treasury, was given a peerage in the first few days of Brown’s premiership in 2007 and made a junior minister in the new department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR). The trend continued with the appointment of Mr Carter in the October 2008 reshuffle as junior minister for communications, technology and broadcasting with a peerage to enable him to hold ministerial office. This raises questions about the suitability of the House of Lords as a final destination for important special advisers. Brown’s policy of a Government of All the Talents was also resurrected after the credit crunch of October 2008, with the creation of a nineteen-strong National Economic Council, in effect a Cabinet Committee, but taking advice from outsiders, building on his tendency to work with advisers in the Treasury. At the same time, Brown did accept the arguments for regulation, promising civil service legislation to be contained in a Constitutional Renewal Bill, promised for 2009. The legislation will define the role of special advisers, and provide for a statutory code of conduct, but not limit their numbers. Two parliamentary committees, the Public Administration Select Committee and the Joint Committee on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill have made some detailed recommendations for improvement, including a tighter definition of role and parliamentary scrutiny

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of the code. The planned legislation is really a statement of current constitutional understandings of the position of special advisers. The key conclusions outlined in this chapter stand. A small number of advisers at the centre of the UK Government have a role in coordinating strategic thinking and media management across the administration. The influence of such advisers has increased in the last couple of decades, but not so far as to threaten an impartial civil service.

NOTES 1. Special advisers are appointed in accordance with Article 3(2) of the Civil Service Order in Council 1995. The Civil Service Order in Council 1997 amended the 1995 Order to allow up to three appointments of advisers with executive powers. 2. Butler (cited in Blick 2004, p. 283) recorded his concerns that a neutral PPS was required to liaise with the Palace and the Opposition at election times. 3. The Cabinet Office does not make public the decisions of the Special Advisers Remuneration Committee. 4. There was a precedent, in that advisers in the Scottish Executive and Welsh Assembly are limited by Order in Council (see Gay 2000). 5. On 25 March 2008 the Lord Chancellor Jack Straw announced the introduction of a Constitutional Renewal Bill, Part 5 of which would, for the first time, put the civil service on a statutory footing by ensuring the core values of Civil Service – importantly, integrity, honesty and objectivity – into law, as well as the historic principle of appointment on merit. The Bill makes provision for special advisers and the Civil Service Commission. 6. Campbell did appear before the PASC in 1998 (PASC 1998). 7. In the course of its proceedings, the Hutton Inquiry released an unprecedented amount of material on the internal workings of a Government still in office. 8. Lord Birt finally appeared before a Select Committee, but only after he had resigned from his post as the Prime Minister’s Chief Strategy Adviser (PASC 2006).

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Cabinet Office (2007b), Model Contract for Special Advisers, London: Cabinet Office. Cabinet Office (2007c), The Ministerial Code, London: Cabinet Office. Cameron, Sue (2007), ‘Brown, Stalinism and hopes for glasnost’, Financial Times, 20 March, p. 2. Campbell, Alastair and Richard Stott (eds) (2007), The Blair Years. Extracts from the Alastair Campbell Diaries, London: Hutchinson. Cook, Robin (2003), The Point of Departure, London: Simon & Schuster. CSPL (Committee on Standards in Public Life) (2000), Sixth Report – Reinforcing Standards: Review of the First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, Cm 4557, London: TSO. CSPL (2002), ‘Public hearings day five afternoon session – Friday 5 July 2002’, accessed 5 July at www.public-standards.gov.uk/publications/reports/9th_ report/unedited%20transcripts/Unedited_Transcript_Day5pm.doc. CSPL (2003), Ninth Report – Defining the Boundaries within the Executive: Ministers, Special Advisers and the Permanent Civil Service, Cm 5775, London: TSO. Deakin, Nicholas and Richard Parry (2000), The Treasury and Social Policy, Basingstoke, UK and New York: Macmillan Press and St Martin’s Press. Donoughue, Lord Bernard (2004), The Heat of the Kitchen, London: Politico’s. DTLR (Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions Select Committee) (2002), The Attendance of Lord Birt at the Transport, Local Government and the Regions Committee, HC 655 2001-02, London: TSO. Elcock, Howard (2002), ‘The proper and improper use of special advisers’, Public Policy and Administration, 17 (1), 1–4. Fawcett, Paul and Oonagh Gay (2005), ‘The centre of government: Number 10, the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury’, House of Commons Library research paper 05/92, accessed 21 December at www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/ rp2005/rp05-092.pdf. Fawcett, Paul and R. A. W. Rhodes (2007), ‘Central government’, in Anthony Seldon (ed.), Blair’s Britain 1997–2007, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 79–103. Foreign Affairs Select Committee (2003), The Decision to go to War in Iraq, HC813-I 2002-03, London: TSO. Foster, Sir Christopher (2005), British Government in Crisis, London: Hart. Fulton, Lord John (1968), The Civil Service, Volume I, Report of the Committee, 1966–68, Cmnd 3638, London: HMSO. Gaber, Ivor (2000), ‘Government by spin: an analysis of the process’, Media and Society, 22 (4), 507–8. Gay, Oonagh (2000), ‘Advisers to Ministers – House of Commons Library research paper 00/42’, accessed 5 April at www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/ research/rp2000/rp00-042.pdf. Gay, Oonagh (2005), ‘The Osmotherly Rules – House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/PC/2671, accessed 4 August athttp://www.parliament.uk/ commons/lib/research/notes/snpc-02671.pdf. Gay, Oonagh and Paul Fawcett (2005), ‘Special advisers – House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/PC/3813’, accessed 21 November at www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/notes/snpc-03813.pdf. GMB Union (2006), ‘Where are they now? Special advisers to the Labour Government 1997/98’, accessed 1 December, 2007 at www.gmb.org.uk/Shared_ ASP_Files/UploadedFiles/5D3DCAA1-15AB-4CF0-B7A5-EB449C165AF2_ ListofAdvisersApril2006congressFINAL.pdf.

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Hennessey, Peter (1989), Whitehall, London: Secker and Warburg. Hennessey, Peter (2000), The Prime Minister: The Job and Its Holders since 1945, London: Allen Lane. Hood, Christopher and Martin Lodge (2006), The Politics of Public Service Bargains: Reward, Competency, Loyalty – and Blame, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Hutton, Lord Brian (2004), Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr David Kelly CMG, HC247 2003-04, London: TSO. Jones, Nicholas (1999), Sultans of Spin, London: Victor Gollancz. Jones, Nicholas (2003), ‘Romola Christopherson’, accessed 25 January athttp:// news.independent.co.uk/people/obituaries/article36200.ece. Jones, Nicholas (2007), ‘Gordon Brown: on probation on spin and media manipulation’, accessed 2 September at www.spinwatch.org/content/view/4308/29/. Kavanagh, Dennis and Anthony Seldon (2000), The Powers Behind the Prime Minister – The Hidden Influence of Number Ten, London: HarperCollins. Kelly, Richard (2007), ‘Short Money – House of Commons Library standard note SN/PC/1663’, accessed 24 May at www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/ notes/snpc-01663.pdf. Levitt, Ruth and William Solesbury (2005), ‘Evidence-informed policy: what difference do outsiders in Whitehall make?’, ESRC Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice working paper 23. Liaison Committee (2002), Evidence presented by the Rt Hon Mr Tony Blair MP, Prime Minister, HC1095 2001-02, London: TSO. Lodge, Guy and Susanna Kalitowski (2007), Innovations in Government: International Perspectives on Civil Service Reform, London: IPPR. Lodge, Guy and Ben Rogers (2006), Whitehall’s Black Box: Accountability and performance in the senior civil service, London: IPPR. Lowe, Rodney (2005), ‘Grit in the oyster or sand in the machine? The evolving role of special advisers in British government’, Twentieth Century British History, 16 (4), 497–505. Maer, Lucinda (2008), ‘Civil Service Legislation – House of Commons Library standard note SN/PC/2863, accessed at www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/ research/notes/snpc-02863.pdf. Mandelson, Peter and Roger Liddle (1996), The Blair Revolution: Can New Labour Deliver?, London: Faber. Mowlam, Marjorie (2002), Momentum, London: Hodder & Stoughton. Mulgan, Richard (2007), ‘Truth in government and the politicization of civil service advice’, Public Administration, 83 (3), 569–86. National Audit Office (2006), Central Government’s Use of Consultants, HC128 2006-07, London: TSO. Nelson, Fraser (2006), ‘The eight who know Britain’s future’, The Spectator, 23 September. New Local Government Network (2007), ‘About NLGN’, accessed 1 December at www.nlgn.org.uk/public/about-nlgn/. Oborne, Peter (2007), The Triumph of the Political Class, London: Simon & Schuster. O’Donnell, Sir Gus (2006), ‘Our 21st century civil service: creating a culture of excellence’, speech delivered at the Public Service Reform Conference, QE II Conference Centre, London, 6 June, accessed 6 June at www.civilservice.gov.uk/ documents/speeches/psr_speech060606.pdf. Osborne, Alistair (2005), ‘Former minister denies “targeted malice” to force

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administration’, accessed 14 July at www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main. jhtml?xml=/news/2005/07/13/nbyers13.xml. O’Toole, Barry J. (2006a), The Ideal of Public Service, Abingdon and New York: Routledge. O’Toole, Barry J. (2006b), ‘Freedom with or freedom of information: the role of “special advisers” in British central government’ in Richard A. Chapman and Michael Hunt (eds), Open Government in a Theoretical and Practical Context, London: Ashgate, pp. 69–82. Phillis, Bob (2003), ‘Government Communications Group interim report’, accessed 27 August at archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/gcreview/News/interimreport.pdf. Prime Minister (2003), The Government’s Response to the Ninth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, Cm 5964, London: TSO. PASC (Public Administration Select Committee) (1998), The Government Information and Communication Service – Minutes of Evidence 23 June 1998, HC770 1997-98, London: TSO. PASC (2001), Special Advisers: Boon or Bane?, HC293 2000-01, London: TSO. PASC (2002), ‘These unfortunate events’: Lessons of Recent Events at the former DTLR, HC303 2001-02, London: TSO. PASC (2003), A Civil Service Act – Minutes of Evidence 19 June 2003, HC837-i 2002-03, London: TSO. PASC (2004), A Draft Civil Service Bill: Completing the Reform, HC128 2003-04, London: TSO. PASC (2005), The Attendance of the Prime Minister’s Strategy Adviser before the Public Administration Select Committee, HC690 2005-06, London: TSO. PASC (2006), Governing the Future – Minutes of Evidence – Lord Birt, a Member of the House of Lords – 20 April 2006, HC756-iii 2005-06, London: TSO. PASC (2007a), Politics and Administration: Ministers and Civil Servants, HC122 2006-07, London: TSO. PASC (2007b), Skills for Government, HC93 2006-07, London: TSO. PASC (2007c), Ethics and Standards: The Regulation of Conduct in Public Life, HC121 2006-07, London: TSO. Richards, David (1997), The Civil Service under the Conservatives, 1979–1997: Whitehall’s Political Poodles?, Brighton: Sussex Academic Press. Richards, David (2007), New Labour and the Civil Service: Reconstituting the Westminster Model, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Runciman, Lord Walter Garrison (ed) (2004), Hutton and Butler: Lifting the Lid on the Workings of Power, British Academy occasional paper, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Scott, Derek (2004), Off Whitehall – A View from Downing Street by Tony Blair’s Adviser, London and New York: I.B. Tauris. Seldon, Anthony (2005), Blair, 2nd edn, London: Free Press. Short, Clare (2004), An Honourable Deception? – New Labour, Iraq, and the Misuse of Power, London: Free Press. Sixsmith, Martin (2005), ‘How they spun Railtrack into oblivion?’, Sunday Times, 3 July. Straw, Ed (2004), Reforming the Civil Service and Public Services, London: Demos. Theakston, Kevin (1995), The Civil Service since 1945, Oxford: Blackwell. Wilson, Lord Richard (2002), ‘Portrait of a profession revisited’, Political Quarterly, 73 (4), 381–91.

2.

Canada Peter Aucoin

INTRODUCTION In Canada, the increased number, role and influence of partisan-political staff operating out of ministers’ ‘private’ offices is an integral part of what I have labelled the ‘new public governance’ (Aucoin 2006c). This phenomenon as it applies to Canada, and, in whole or part, to most Westminster systems, includes the concentration of power at the centre of government under the Prime Minister, increased political attention to the staffing of the senior public service that is not regulated by independent staffing, increased expectations of public service enthusiasm for the government’s agenda, increased pressures on the public service to provide a pro-government spin on government communications, and increased weight given to political factors in public policy making. Over the past four decades, political staff have added a major new element to the structures of executive governance and public administration primarily because they do not function exclusively in a ‘staff’, that is, purely advisory, role to ministers. Rather, Canadian political staff assist ministers with their political and governmental duties in a variety of ways, at least some of which require them to have extensive interactions with public servants over whom they have no formal authority but where they often exercise considerable, albeit invariably undefined, influence by acting for their minister. They are their minister’s ‘agent’. In this capacity, they exercise considerable power in the administration of public affairs. As their minister’s agent, however, they have no personal constitutional status, and thus are responsible and accountable to no one other than their minister. Ministers are thereby personally and fully responsible for their political staff. Unlike a minister’s responsibility for the actions of their departmental public servants, ministers cannot escape personal responsibility when things go wrong. They cannot claim the ‘I did not know or should not or cannot be expected to have known’ qualification to personal responsibility that applies to public service maladministration in cases where the minister actually did not know or could or should not have been expected to have known. That is the theory; practice is something else, however. 64

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In response to a recent major scandal involving senior ministers, political staff and public servants, Canada has recently reformed certain aspects of the political staff regime, one of which was unique to Canada, and further reforms have been proposed. Unfortunately, the politicization of public administration that occurred in this scandal has not generated a serious public discussion on the public value of political staff in governance and public management. For the most part the political and bureaucratic elites deny that a significant problem or systemic shortcoming exists, and they have few critics of their denial in the private sector, the media or the academic community.

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: THE CANADIAN WESTMINSTER MODEL The Canadian system of executive government has been characterized for over a century by the classic dual features of the Westminster model: a Prime Minister and Cabinet as the political executive in a parliamentary system that requires the confidence of the House of Commons for its continuance as government and a non-partisan, career public service that, except at the two highest ranks, is staffed independently of ministers. The second element, the non-partisan, career (or permanent) public service, is not required by the constitutional convention of responsible government but it has long been a distinguishing feature in all the major Westminster systems. In comparative Westminster perspective, however, the office of Canadian Prime Minister is a powerful one. For almost a century, Canadian Prime Ministers have come from one of two political parties (Liberal and Conservative) neither of which gives the parliamentary caucus the capacity to dismiss a Prime Minister as party leader (Weller 1994). The Prime Minister not only has a free hand in appointing, assigning and dismissing ministers, he or she also appoints deputy ministers and associate deputy ministers, the two highest ranks of the professional public service. Combined with various other powers of the Prime Minister to act unilaterally without Cabinet approval, these factors have led to what appears to be an inexorable concentration of power in the office of the Canadian Prime Minister, especially over the past four decades (Savoie 1999). As discussed below, this concentration of power has had its effects on the role and influence of political staff in the Canadian system. The public service has a long tradition of independent staffing below the level of deputy minister and associate deputy minister (the latter rank being a development of the last three decades). The authority to staff the

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public service below these two ranks, that is, from assistant deputy minister down, is vested by statute in the Public Service Commission (formerly the Civil Service Commission), an independent executive agency that reports directly to parliament. A major reform to the public service regime in 2003 retained this staffing–authority structure, and thereby rejected the option of giving statutory authority directly to deputy ministers to staff their departments, as had occurred in other Westminster systems. At the same time, the new regime explicitly assumes that the Commission will delegate its staffing authority to deputy ministers and then provide oversight and control as required, and this has been the reality. In the 2003 reform, the Commission retained this authority in part because the Prime Minister staffs the deputy minister cadre (Aucoin 2006a); the Commission thus constitutes a safeguard against political influence in staffing the public service (Aucoin 2006b). Although the Prime Minister staffs the deputy minister cadre, he or she does so with the advice of the Clerk of the Privy Council who is the statutorily designated ‘head’ of the public service. The Clerk, who also holds the title of Secretary to Cabinet, is the Prime Minister’s deputy minister, and the administrative head of the Privy Council Office, the central agency that is the Prime Minister’s public service department and the Cabinet’s secretariat. The Clerk has the responsibility of managing the deputy (and associate deputy) minister cadre as the senior executive cadre of the professional public service and is assisted in this role by a Committee of Senior Officials (a select number of senior deputy ministers). The Canadian approach to the corporate management of the deputy minister cadre is given high marks (Bourgault 2007). Notwithstanding an increase over the past decade in appointments from outside the federal public service to senior positions in the public service, deputy ministers and associate deputy ministers are appointed, with very few exceptions, from the ranks of the federal public service. In only a handful of instances over the past four decades have Prime Ministers appointed partisans to deputy minister posts, and the very few recent cases of outsiders being appointed have been non-partisan in character. Although appointed by the Prime Minister, deputy and associate deputy ministers, especially those from the public service, have always regarded themselves as remaining a part of the professional public service after their elevations to the deputy and associate deputy minister cadre; indeed, they see themselves as the leaders of the public service as an institution of government, and not merely as the administrative superiors of their departments. On the basis of these arrangements and practices, the Canadian public service has long prided itself, and continues to pride itself, on securing the proper balance of democratic responsiveness to

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ministers, including to both their individual and collective or corporate responsibilities and agendas, and non-partisan and professional administration, including both public policy advice and administration (Lindquist 2006). The relationship between ministers and public servants, however, has been affected by long periods of single-party majority government, primarily with the Liberals in power. In the modern era, that is, dating from the late 1930s with the flowering of the non-partisan professional public service, the Liberal Party has been in power for three long periods: from 1935 to 1956; from 1963 to 1984 (ignoring a nine-month interlude with a Conservative minority government in 1979–80); and from 1994 to 2006. The Conservatives, elected as a minority government in 2006, were in power previously in the modern period only for two periods: from 1957 to1963 and from1984 to1993. Only in the 1984–93 period were the Conservatives able to win two successive majorities in the House of Commons. For those who are wont to colour the senior public service with a partisan stripe, accordingly, the colour invariably has been red for Liberal. The presumed glory days of the public service, led by a handful of legendary mandarins (Granatstein 1982), constitute the period coinciding with the election of the Liberals in 1935 and ending with their defeat in 1957, that is, throughout the long Liberal reign, including under Mackenzie King (1935 to 1948), himself a former deputy minister. Not surprisingly, the Conservatives, in coming to power in 1957, 1984, and 2006, were in each instance concerned with what they assumed was a Liberal bias in the public service, including especially in its leadership. This was not without justification in 1957, given the significant role that the public service leadership played in drafting the governing party’s manifesto for the 1957 election (Meisel 1962). It is also the case that a handful of high profile deputy ministers left the public service for the political arena and in every case joined the Liberal side, including, most notably, Lester Pearson who became Prime Minister in 1963. In the 1984 election campaign, and echoing the anti-bureaucracy rhetoric of conservative leaders such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, Conservative leader Brian Mulroney declared that senior mandarins who did not understand that they were subordinates of ministers would be given ‘pink slips and running shoes’ (Savoie 2003, p. 9). In the 2006 election campaign, Conservative leader Stephen Harper spoke openly about what he referred to as the ‘Liberal public service’, a public service, he said, that would act as a ‘check’ on him and the Conservatives if they were elected (May 2006).

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‘EXEMPT STAFF’ AS MINISTERIAL POLITICAL STAFF In stating that the public service would be a check on his Conservative government because of the decade of Liberal rule, Harper ignored an important feature of the Canadian professional public service that perhaps might have tempered his view of the public service. This feature is one that was established at the creation of the Civil Service Commission and the design of the independent merit-based staffing system that took the power to staff the public service from ministers. At that time, ministers gave up the authority to staff their departments, with one exception. The one exception was the minister’s private secretary, an official who assisted the minister with a minister’s partisan-political functions. These positions were exempt from the statutory requirements governing the staffing of the public service by the Commission and these staff, now numbering many more than a private secretary and a few clerks, thus became known as ‘exempt staff’. They are not considered public servants. They constitute a separate category of official paid from the public purse. These partisan-political staff are appointed by ministers at their pleasure and their appointments are contingent on their appointing minister’s appointment (Canada 2007b). However, until 2007, those who were employed as exempt staff for any minister for a total of three years were entitled, if deemed qualified, to be appointed by the Commission, without competition, to a public service post at an equivalent level of rank. It is this feature of the Canadian system that enabled political staff to enter the public service through a ‘back door’. Over the years, many did so, although the exact number is not known, as the Commission did not keep records until recently. What is known is that several of them subsequently rose to senior positions in the public service, including to the top rank of deputy minister. As might be expected, many exercised this option when it appeared that a change of government was a certainty, or at least a distinct possibility. In 2006, in other words, Harper ignored the fact that a number of political staff who had served Conservative ministers during the period of 1984 to 1993 had undoubtedly exercised this option to enter the public service and, by 2006, had risen to the senior ranks of the public service. To have known who these persons were, however, he would have had to have personal knowledge of the careers of individual public servants as records were not kept by the Commission. This unique Canadian feature of the political staff system is important to introduce at the outset because it means that the professional public service has long been subject to a risk of partisan-political influence in what otherwise is meant to be a non-partisan public service that is staffed

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independent of ministers. It should be noted, of course, that the risk became a significant one only in the past four decades with the substantial increase in the number of political staff in the system. Moreover, in 2007, the entitlement of exempt staff to appointment without competition was removed by an amendment to the Public Service Employment Act. The amendment was introduced by the Harper Conservative government as part of a larger package of reforms promised in the 2006 election campaign, a campaign that was decided almost exclusively by the electorate’s response to a scandal in which political staff were prominent, including one who had secured the senior public service post responsible for the programme that was the subject of the scandal (Aucoin 2006c; Canada 2006). As was the case with a number of items in this package, what was actually introduced after the Conservatives won the election was somewhat less than promised or expected. In this case, political staff retained some ground: they now are entitled to enter competitions for positions that are not open to candidates from outside the public service and, in the Canadian case, this can still provide a considerable advantage for them in securing entry to the public service. The fact that public service managers have been open to the appointment of political staff is further illustrated by a related practice that was first identified by an allegation to the Commission, which acted by revoking two appointments, and then conducting an audit that was released in late 2007 (Canada 2007a). At issue was the return of public servants to public service posts after having been granted a leave of absence to work in a minister’s office as exempt staff, that is, not as departmental officials serving in a minister’s office for the purposes of liaison between the office and the department. In these cases, their return to the public service is governed by the rules pertaining to leaves of absences by public servants for any of a range of reasons. Not surprisingly, however, the Commission’s concern here is that a public servant’s return to the public service from a minister’s office should not raise any perception of political influence in the process of their return to posts in the public service. The Commission’s audit covered the period 1990 to 2006. It found several instances of inappropriate staffing actions by 15 departments and agencies involving 20 public servants who had been on leave to work in ministers’ offices. The matter has been referred to formal investigations of each case. The Commission has recommended that the government improve its policy respecting the ‘movement’ of public servants between the public service and ministers’ offices and back again (Canada 2007a, p. 18). In late 2007, there were 44 public servants on leave as exempt staff in ministers’ offices (May 2007).

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY TO POLITICAL ARM OF GOVERNMENT Beginning in the 1950s, the number of partisan-political staff began to increase beyond the model of a very modest personal office, and one in which almost all exempt staff were clerical. The modern version began in the 1960s, not under the Conservatives who were in office from 1958 to 1963, after a very long Liberal rule as noted, but rather under the Liberals in coming back to office in 1963. The number of political staff has increased gradually since then but with no major reversal or change in pattern. As noted below, there was a substantial increase in 1984 when the Mulroney Conservative government first came to power and this was reversed when the Liberals under Jean Chrétien returned to office in 1993. The Liberal reduction was, in part, as noted below, to demonstrate restraint in government spending and, in part, to respond to criticism from the newly formed Reform Party that too many unelected officials had influence in Ottawa. It did not take too long for the number to rise under Chrétien, however. While in power from 1957 to 1963, the Conservatives did nothing to alter the non-partisan character of the public service, notwithstanding a legitimate claim that the public service had become too closely linked to the Liberal governments it served, if not to the Liberal party per se. It might appear ironic, accordingly, that the Liberals, on their resumption in office as the ‘natural governing party’ in 1963 under Prime Minister Lester Pearson, presided over the modernization of the private secretary post. It might appear doubly ironic because Pearson himself, as noted above, had been a career public servant who had risen to be deputy minister: indeed, he had risen to become a highly respected Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, at the time the elite department of the federal public service. On the other hand, having been a senior public servant through the long reign of Liberal rule he no doubt fully appreciated the use of exempt staff to perform functions that ought not to be performed by non-partisan public servants. In this sense, political staff take some, if not all, of the political pressure off the non-partisan public service to be inappropriately responsive to political direction. At the time, political direction in Canada was rarely ideological; rather, it meant pork-barrelling and patronage by ministers in the regionalized partisan-politics of a highly decentralized federal system. The growth in numbers came incrementally in both the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and ministers’ offices, although the PMO began in the 1960s to take on a public profile as a centre of political power that it has not relinquished. The growth in ministers’ offices, as opposed to the PMO, has been for some time regulated by the government by way of Treasury

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Board limits on both staff numbers and salary budgets (Canada 2007b). The number of authorized staff in ministers’ offices went from five in the 1940s to 12 in the 1970s, with variations coming into being in the 1970s with the explicit recognition of some ministers as junior ministers (ministers of state or secretaries of state, as they have been called, and who usually assist a senior minister) and the acknowledgement that the performance of the responsibilities of those ministers designated by the Prime Minister as ‘regional ministers’ required the support of political staff. The total number of political staff for the entire government also changed with the expansion in the number of ministers beginning in the 1960s. With the exception of the Chrétien government (1993 to 2003), which had junior ministers outside the Cabinet, the Cabinet and ministry have been one and the same. The regional representative imperative in Canada, whereby a Prime Minister must design a government that allocates portfolios to provinces, regions or cities within provinces, while respecting population differences, had always been regarded as prohibiting the use of the traditional British design of a Cabinet of senior ministers and a host of junior ministers who are members of the ministry or government but not members of the Cabinet. The consequence in Canada has been a larger Cabinet than in Britain to cope with the expanded role of government and, during the period of the 1960s and 1970s, a significant growth in the number of portfolios (Campbell 1985). On coming to power in 1984, the Mulroney government expanded the number of political staff as an explicitly chosen alternative to the partisanpoliticization of the senior ranks of the public service in the American style, although it did make a couple of partisan appointments to the deputy minister cadre (Aucoin 1995). The decision to enhance the ‘political arm of government’ (Osbaldeston 1987) as constituted by exempt political staff in the PMO and ministers’ offices was taken by the Conservative’s transition to Government team at the very last moment. The decision included the elevation of the top position of executive assistant to the minister to that of chief of staff to the minister, with an accompanying and major elevation in rank and pay (Plasse 1994). By 1990–91, there were 460 exempt staff, 99 of whom were in the PMO. (Ministers’ offices also contain departmental public servants in liaison positions or on secondment, thereby increasing the total number serving in these offices, although these should not, with one or two exceptions, be counted as political staff (Bakvis 1991).) Following the election of the Liberals in 1993, the absolute number of political staff diminished somewhat, at least for a period, for three major reasons. First, the number of political staff, especially in the high profile PMO, had become an issue in itself before the 1993 election. This issue was made salient primarily by the Reform Party, a party that constituted

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a breakaway of ideological conservatives and conservative populists in Western Canada from the Conservative Party then, of course, in power under Prime Minister Mulroney. The issue was significant for the populists in the Reform Party because it was framed as one of unelected political staff having a disproportionate influence in government in contrast to elected representatives – ministers as well as backbench MPs. Second, the ideological conservatives in the Reform Party had put the size of the Cabinet (then consisting of the entire ministry) on the political agenda. It was widely reported in the media that Canada had the largest Cabinet in the Western liberal democracies, a fact that was accurate but also misleading for the reasons noted above. (It was never clear if this misrepresentation of the comparative experience was intentional, as neither the Reform Party nor the press ever appeared to understand that other systems had ministers who were not included in the Cabinet.) Finally, the Reform Party had made the fiscal situation of the Canadian government into a major political issue and called for substantial cuts to government spending and especially to the size of the governmental apparatus. It did so with an enthusiasm and vigour that the Liberal Opposition was initially hesitant to emulate, as it had been the governing party most responsible for the great bulk of programmes that would have to be candidates for cuts. In coming to power in 1993, nonetheless, the Chrétien Liberal government cut the number of political staff everywhere, including the PMO, to signal the government’s response to the popular appeal of these three issues. Chrétien also eliminated the position of chief of staff in ministers’ offices (but not in his own): a largely symbolic move as the return to the title of executive assistant for the top post in ministers’ offices did nothing to change the basic role or influence. It helped, of course, that Chrétien had extensive ministerial experience in the Trudeau Governments, and had full confidence in his ability, and in those of his closest political aides, who were also experienced in government, to direct, manage and control the affairs of state alongside the professional public service (Goldenberg 2006). And, he was willing to have a smaller Cabinet, partly because he was also willing, for the first time in Canadian government, to have ministers outside the Cabinet. He not only had fewer ministers in total, he made it appear that there were even fewer ministers than was the case, especially since he called junior ministers ‘secretaries of state’ rather than ‘ministers of state’ (previously the title given to junior ministers) and both the media and the opposition parties accepted the idea of a smaller Cabinet without question. Finally, he was further willing to embark on a major expenditure reduction that called upon the entire government system to take serious measures to eliminate the huge federal deficit. To achieve this objective, it was recognized that all parts of the government system, including the

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political arm of government, had to endure some reductions. By 1994–5, the total complement of exempt staff had been reduced to 427, with 76 in the PMO (down from 99 in 1990–91). The Chrétien government’s expenditure reduction exercise, formally titled ‘Program Review’ (Aucoin and Savoie 1998), was successful in several respects, not the least of which was the elimination of the federal deficit and, since then, reductions in the federal debt. With the elimination of annual deficits came very large surpluses, only some portion of which ended up being used to reduce the debt. Some portion went to increased government spending, including an effort to rebuild the human resource capacity of the government (Aucoin and Bakvis 2004). While primary attention has been given to the efforts to renew the professional public service, where staff numbers had reverted to those of the 1950s, the political arm of government also was refurbished. By 1999–2000, the total complement of exempt staff was 525, even greater than the Mulroney era. The PMO’s staff complement stayed steady (up only to 80 from 76); the big increase came in ministers’ offices, where the number went from 351 to 445. Since then the numbers have been more or less steady.1 In the 2007 Harper Conservative government, the PMO had 82 exempt staff and ministers’ offices had 431 for a total of 513 (Hill Times, 26 February 2007). By late 2007, the PMO listed 93 exempt staff (Hill Times, 15 October 2007).

THE POLITICAL ARM OF GOVERNMENT AS COUNTERWEIGHT Ministers have always needed assistance with their partisan-political functions as leaders of the governing party in parliament, as elected MPs with a constituency to represent, and, in some cases, as ‘regional’ barons in the ministry charged with political responsibilities for a region (variously defined, as noted, as part of a province, a province, or even a ‘region’ of provinces, in the case of the Atlantic and Western provinces) (Bakvis 1991).2 The post of private secretary recognized the partisan-political dimension of responsible government in the Westminster system of parliamentary government. Everything follows from the initial acknowledgement that ministers wear two hats: as ministers of the Crown and as leaders of a governing party in parliament.3 In one sense, of course, the political arm of government – partisanpolitical staff to ministers – is the result of the development of the nonpartisan and professional public service. When ministers appointed public servants, they may have needed a private secretary to formally separate the assistance they required to perform their political functions, as distinct

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from their governmental functions, but they hardly needed political staff to advise them on policy separately from their departmental public servants or to monitor the implementation of their decisions by their public servants. They appointed their public servants and, presumably, could trust them as much as they could trust their private secretaries. Indeed, there was no distinction here: private secretary and public servant alike sought to ensure that the minister succeeded in the two roles, even though each was responsible for assisting their minister in only one of the two roles. With the independent staffing of the public service so that it could become a non-partisan institution of government, everything changed. In the Canadian system, nonetheless, the need for a strong political arm of government has always been tempered by two factors. First, as noted, the Prime Minister appoints the deputy minister cadre, and this has always been a major Prime Ministerial power and function (Aucoin 2006a). While Prime Ministers have only occasionally used this power to pursue partisan-political appointments,4 they have usually given serious attention to the staffing of the deputy minister cadre, including what could be termed the personal-politicization of appointments (Campbell 1988). Deputy ministers, as also noted, are appointed almost exclusively from the public service. But they are appointed and assigned, and dismissed, ‘at pleasure’. The deputy minister cadre has never been able to isolate itself from the government in this regard, as have the other Westminster bureaucracies. On the contrary, Prime Ministers have long considered their power to staff the deputy minister cadre almost as important as their power to staff the Cabinet. Indeed, with Prime Ministers required to pay close attention to various ‘representational imperatives’ in selecting and assigning ministers (Campbell 1985), the staffing of the deputy minister cadre has been at times more important than the staffing of the Cabinet because a Prime Minister may be forced to appoint as ministers, persons whose only or primary claim to a ministerial post is representational in character. In these instances, competence in leading the portfolio in support of the Prime Minister’s Government falls on the shoulders of the deputy minister. As a consequence of this first factor, deputy ministers have long regarded the Prime Minister, and not their minister, their ultimate superior, the superior to whom they are also accountable (Osbaldeston 1989). This factor is one reason for the continuous reassignment of deputy ministers to different departments. It is partly a function of rotation so that deputy ministers are not captured either by their minister or by their department’s bureaucracy, but remain focused on the government’s corporate agenda. It is also partly in response to the ever changing dynamics of the government’s political priorities, administrative problems and personality conflicts, whereby the Prime Minister attempts to manage her or his strategic

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apex of ministers and deputy ministers. Some say that the rotations are too frequent for the purposes of good public management, but that concern has not had a great effect on the willingness of successive Prime Ministers, with advice from her or his public service and political advisers, to manage the public service leadership in this way. The second factor is no doubt affected by the first but it has achieved an independent standing. This is the strong norm that has developed in the Canadian system which demands that the public service be responsive to the government of the day. While this is a basic principle of the Westminster model, in Canada it has functioned to reduce the extent to which the ‘Yes, Minister’ caricature of the professional public service was ever an accurate portrayal of the Canadian public service. The Canadian tradition does not speak to a public service that protects or preserves the ‘public interest’ independently of ministers. The Canadian language has tended to focus on non-partisanship and impartiality in staffing and managing the public service and in managing and administering public services. There has tended to be less talk of ‘speaking truth to power’, the function essentially taken for granted. The effect of long periods of one-party rule, primarily by the Liberals, no doubt accounts for the emphasis on this norm, given that public service leaders not only had an incentive to be seen to be responsive to ministers but could usually assume that the presentation of objective advice would be seen to be, by ministers and their advisers, as integral to being responsive. But the norm also goes some way to explain why federal public servants have tended to be not only professional in coping with the realities of changes in the governing party, especially from the Liberals to the Conservatives, but also sophisticated and nuanced in their capacities to distinguish between the partisan-political and the political. At least at the level of rhetoric the public service leadership has not succumbed to the simplistic idea of a public service that is ‘promiscuously partisan’ to whatever party is in power (Wilson 1991). For those who must view everything from a dualist perspective, one is either a non-partisan or a partisan (promiscuous or not). Those who think this dualism too simplistic, and yet do not see themselves as hypocritical, argue that one can be responsive to partisans without necessarily acting inappropriately. At the same time, the Canadian public service leadership has no doubt felt more than comfortable with the fact that Liberal and Conservative governing parties have been required by the political dynamics of Canada to eschew extreme or rigid ideological positions. Although party-partisanship between these two parties has always been intense in terms of political competition, and has significant effects on particular aspects of public administration, in particular the administration of those programmes

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which afford ministers considerable discretion to distribute public largesse, these two parties have been required, or have the incentive, to govern from the centre or the middle of the political spectrum (Flanagan 2007). This is a position that has favoured the Liberal Party, a centrist party in a three-party system (with the New Democratic Party as a major secondary party to the left of the Liberals). This party system, until recently perhaps, distinguished the Canadian party system from the essentially left–right two-party systems of other Westminster systems (and, in recent decades, the United States). The comparative distinction has been diminished somewhat as Labour parties in the other Westminster systems have moved to the ideological centre and thus into the territory of the moderate wings of their conservative opponents. The clearest instance of this perhaps was the development of the celebrated ‘third way’ of Tony Blair’s New Labour, an agenda that could well have been drafted in the backrooms of the Canadian Liberal Party. The effect of this dynamic in Canada has been to diminish the extent to which ministers decide policy on ideological grounds and thus the extent to which they are open to policy options based on evidence-based analysis. At the same time, of course, this very openness to objective public-policy advice, as expected from the public service, is tempered by the degree to which ministers, and especially the Prime Minister and her or his political advisers, are inclined to give primacy to public opinion (and thus polls) in selecting which policy issues to address and which options to pursue in order to stay in power. A corollary to this reality is that the two Canadian governing parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, have rarely come to power with a comprehensive and substantive policy agenda. A heralded exception of sorts occurred in 1993 when the Liberals came back to power with a blueprint of reforms contained in a Red Book (Greenspon and Wilson-Smith 1996), although even its authors did not give it the attention that the media (and some public servants) gave it. As a general rule, these parties come to realize that once in power they need advice on policy and its implementation. The Conservatives in power from 1957 to 1963 failed to govern well in some part because they never came to trust the public service but would not turn to political advisers, even the few they had (Doern 1971). After 1963, the Liberals came to appreciate that they would not be well served if they allowed advice on either the policy formulation or the policy implementation functions to be monopolized by the public service. Ministers without a well developed policy programme are always at risk of being captured by their public service advisers, even if these advisers are not simply pursuing their own organizational or personal preferences or self-interests. To rely exclusively on their public service advisers would be

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to give them too great an influence, an influence that ministers could not be assured would always be exercised in their best political interests. The practical effect of this appreciation has been the expansion of the ‘political arm of government’ (Osbaldeston 1987) so that ministers are also advised by fellow partisans; a partisan-political counterweight to complement the non-partisan public service is thereby introduced.

ADVISING AND ASSISTING MINISTERS The advice and assistance that ministers receive from their political staff covers the full spectrum of ministerial responsibilities and political leadership functions. In part, political staff are the ‘minders’ of ministers, to use an Australian description, seeking to keep them from falling into political quagmires. In part, they attend to internal party matters, including liaison with the governing party caucus of MPs and senators and their national and local constituency party associations. In part, they deal with the media, on a wide range of matters, in an effort to manage the media to the political advantage of their ministers and government. And, in part, they deal with the business of government: the development of policy and programmes and their implementation and delivery. In the first two functions, they are largely on their own, although senior public service officials will have a non-partisan interest in keeping their ministers out of political trouble and thereby indirectly assisting political staff with their duties. Media management is primarily and increasingly a partisan function, and increasingly centralized, although official government communications via the media is also a public service function, even if the line separating the two is often not clear or is purposely fudged for partisan advantage. The policy development and implementation functions are necessarily more complicated. They require political staff to deal not only with the public service, other ministers’ offices, and those who are affected by public policy – interest groups and their lobbyists and assorted national, regional and local ‘stakeholders’ – as well as with those active in the networks of policy communities that populate all major areas of public policy. Their roles, in short, take them out into the political arenas that extend beyond the confines of their parliamentary caucus and their extraparliamentary political party across the country (O’Connor 1991). The various roles of political staff are reflected in official government policies and regulations pertaining to political staff. For instance, the Treasury Board has established that a minister’s office will have the following ‘position structure’ beyond the chief of staff: senior policy adviser, director of communications, director of parliamentary affairs, and then

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various posts one level below for these functions, including the traditional private secretary. In brief, the posts are seen as engaged in three critical areas: policy, communications, and parliamentary liaison, with some senior ministers also having major responsibilities for ‘regional representation’, with a senior staff post assigned to this function. In addition, the hierarchy of the governing party’s political staff is acknowledged by the Treasury Board’s descriptions of the duties of these senior posts that include the requirements that these staff ‘liaise’, ‘consult’ or ‘work closely with’ the Prime Minister’s Office (Canada 2007b, pp. 59–60). In the Canadian case, the advent of an institutional role in policy advice for political staff began with the election of the Pearson Liberal Government in 1963 when the Liberals returned to power with a policy agenda established at an unprecedented policy conference in 1960. A major player in this Liberal Party policy development process was Tom Kent, Pearson’s chief policy adviser when the Liberals were in Opposition. With the Liberals elected in 1963, Kent joined Pearson’s PMO as a special policy adviser. In today’s terms, Kent was a policy guru and, with the new Prime Minister’s blessing, he led the Liberal Government’s implementation of the Liberal Party’s policy agenda. As Bruce Doern notes: His presence [in the PMO] represented, especially in the first two years of the Pearson era, a direct political extension of the Liberal party. It represented a policy and policy presence in a much more visible and direct sense than ever before. Kent was an active initiator and transmitter of policy ideas, with an authority derived directly from the Prime Minister, to negotiate with, and prod other cabinet ministers and deputy ministers respecting policy issues. (Doern 1971, p. 49)

Kent’s role was not so much to counterbalance policy advice from the public service as it was to give the bureaucracy policy direction for formulating the details of government policy and to oversee its implementation. In 1966, after the Government had initiated the policy changes most critical to its 1963 agenda, and his role had become more reactive to policy proposals emanating from the public service, Kent became a deputy minister himself, at the time an unprecedented appointment of a political adviser in a minister’s office (albeit the Prime Minister’s Office) to a deputy minister post. By 1968, however, with the Liberals securely in power following Trudeau’s majority win in 1968, the bureaucracy began to regain some of its former influence, although much of this influence was now to be found located in the Privy Council Office (PCO), that is, at the centre of the bureaucracy rather than in the line departments. The dominance of the centre was confirmed in the mid-1970s when Trudeau appointed

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a close confidant, Michael Pitfield, a career bureaucrat and then deputy minister, to the post of Clerk of the Privy Council and thus head of the PCO. Pitfield’s appointment was seen at the time as a highly personalized choice by Trudeau since he selected Pitfield over a number of contenders who were favoured by the public service leadership, including the outgoing Clerk, Gordon Robertson (Campbell 1988). (Trudeau sought to appease the deputy minister cadre by retaining Robertson, for some time, as his principal adviser on deputy minister appointments in place of Pitfield.5) The conventional wisdom in Canada is that the concentration of executive power under the Prime Minister has continued unabated since the outset of the Trudeau regime. The thesis gained public prominence during the decade-long reign of Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. The concentration of power has shown no signs of abatement either with the change of Liberal leadership from Chrétien to Paul Martin in 2004 or with the election of the Conservatives under Stephen Harper in 2006. Indeed, even as the leader of a minority government, Prime Minister Harper’s regime has concentrated power to levels not undertaken by his predecessors. Savoie calls this concentration of power ‘court government’ (Savoie 1999), a form of Prime Ministerial ‘command and control’ government (Aucoin 1999) that goes well beyond the executive dominance of the legislative power inherent in the Westminster systems. What has been overtaken by ‘court government’ is ‘Cabinet government’, that is, Cabinet government in its collective or collegial mode of government decision-making. In the Prime Minister’s court there are a few key Cabinet ministers, but most ministers are not included and key members are not Cabinet ministers. The court also includes a few key deputy ministers as well as, most crucially, key political staff in the PMO. Who is in the court at any time is, of course, the Prime Minister’s call, and the court functions in relation to the Prime Minister in ways that make all ‘courtiers’ the staff or advisers of the Prime Minister, including the few Cabinet ministers who belong to this inner circle. This concentration of power has had important implications for both the public service in line departments and the political staff in ministers’ offices. First, the policy advisory influence of line-department bureaucracies has been diminished. The focus in departments generally has been directed more to the implementation of policy decisions coming from the centre, most notably from the PMO, the PCO and Department of Finance. (Efforts to improve the management of government generally, under the rubric of public-management reform beginning in the 1980s, reinforced this development; and, the budgeting exercise that was THE Program Review in the mid-1990s furthered it even more as almost all departments cut their policy research and analysis capacities on the grounds that they

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were less critical to their responsibilities than were their service-delivery capacities.) The policy process itself has been increasingly monopolized by political-based analysis and advice as against policy-based analysis and advice, and the diminished demand for the latter has led to a diminution in the capacity to develop evidence-based information and knowledge (Good 2007). Second, it has meant that the political staff of ministers, especially those who had anything to do with policy, including communications, are as much, if not more, extensions of the PMO as they are personal staff to individual ministers. The role of the PMO in the appointment of staff to ministers’ offices has varied with regimes, over time within a single regime, and, as might be expected, with individual ministers. But just as ministers must defer to the Prime Minister in the Canadian system, and have been progressively required to do so, the PMO is clearly the centre of the universe for political staff.

THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL STAFF The influence of political staff will vary with different governments, especially given the dominance of the Prime Minister in structuring the distribution of influence in Canadian government. In part, the influence of political staff has to be understood in respect to the differences between ‘staff’ and ‘line’ positions in a Westminster government context. In Canadian government, as elsewhere, political staff, at least senior staff, tend to surround their minister, notwithstanding the role of the chief of staff; line department officials, on the other hand, are organized in a vertical hierarchy with only the deputy minister, as the most senior line official, in a direct reporting relationship with the minister. Senior staff, in other words, invariably have more access to their minister than do the senior line officials, except for the deputy minister. Further, the partisan staff of a minister are expected to be the minister’s agents, in contrast to public service officials who are the minister’s ‘subordinates’. The traditional title of ‘private secretary’ signified this personal relationship from the outset. Political staff, especially if they have been personally chosen by their minister (that is, not imposed on the minister by the Prime Minister’s political staff) are ‘personal’ advisers in every sense. Importantly, they are not merely state or government officials, as are the minister’s departmental public servants. Not surprisingly, most ministers, including Prime Ministers, are more inclined to trust the advice they receive from their political staff advisers than the advice they receive from their public service advisers, even when the political dimension is not at issue. They also expect them to act for them in public communications, especially in

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defending their policies and actions, and in relating to others, both inside and outside Government. But aside from the fact that ministers are usually inclined to trust their personal advisers over their official advisers, they are well advised to use the former as counterweights to the latter in any event. In this sense it was not ironic that it was the Liberals, rather than the Conservatives, who initiated the modernization of the political arm of government. The Liberals were deemed the ‘natural governing party’ precisely because they were the experienced governing party, and their experience during the presumed glory era of the bureaucracy had made them increasingly leery of a monopolistic advisory structure, however professional and objective it was meant to be. Seen from this perspective, the public value of political staff, and thus the democratic justification for their employment by ministers on the public payroll, is the extent to which they are able to protect their minister from being captured by their public service advisers. This value can be acknowledged even by those who do not adhere to the public-choice theory of self-serving bureaucrats (Blais and Dion 1991). The reality is that public service advisers will always have their own policy preferences in framing advice to ministers on matters and these will be especially important whenever the evidence does not dictate a preferred option and personal judgement must thus be brought to bear in assessing the merits of different policy options. The evidence of political-adviser influence is necessarily anecdotal and the influence of political staff appears to be primarily, if not exclusively, dependent on individual ministers. While this may be the case in most jurisdictions, it is especially the case in Canada given that neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives have had anything resembling a powerful policy establishment separate from the parliamentary leadership of the party (Canada 1991). Political staff do not function as the extension of the governing party’s policy establishment, as they might in regimes with strong extra-parliamentary parties. The influence of political staff is thus a function of the executive-leadership style of the minister: the more political the minister, the more influential the minister’s political staff. The rule applies to Prime Ministers, of course, and they set the tone, or the limits, for their ministers. Although ministers, including Prime Ministers, use their political staff as a counterweight to their public service bureaucracy, they do not do so primarily to serve a predetermined political-party agenda but rather one that is personal and often one that only emerges over time. Public servants are especially likely to see political staff as a policy counterweight when political advisers are fully engaged in helping their minister develop policies and programmes that are not simply the implementation of a governing party’s declared agenda, as found in a

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campaign platform or Throne Speech. Rather, when ministers use them to advance their personal policy agendas, as Prime Minister Trudeau did, for example, by appointing his own foreign policy adviser in the PMO, much to the chagrin of the External Affairs bureaucracy, departmental officials invariably feel challenged, if not left out in the cold. The same can be said for ministers who seek to use their political staff in concert with outside advisers or even departmental officials seconded to their offices as their principal sources of policy ideas, as was amply demonstrated by Lloyd Axworthy, the Canadian minister who probably set the record for the largest coterie of personal staff (political and departmental), in two different portfolios in the 1980–84 Trudeau government (Bakvis 1991). Political staff have influence not only because they usually have better access to ministers than public servants but because they operate at a level where substantive policy, policy process and policy implementation expertise is either challenged or outweighed by political expertise relating, among other things, to considerations of public opinion, interest groups or social movement demands, media focus and viewpoints, parliamentary opposition, and intergovernmental and international relations. To the degree that ministers view virtually everything from a perspective of political strategy and/or tactics aimed at generating public support for their governing party, political expertise will trump policy expertise. Most recently, for example, the consensus among media commentators is that the Harper minority Government has governed almost exclusively from this perspective as it seeks to secure the level of public support necessary for a majority in the House of Commons. In this context, political staff assume importance as political advice on policy options is critical. This was also the case for the Trudeau Government during its two-year stint as a minority government from 1972 to 1974. In Harper’s case, it is widely accepted that the Prime Minister’s greatest strength is his skill at political strategy and tactics, so in this instance the imperatives of the political context and Prime Ministerial style coincide. In Trudeau’s case, by contrast, the Prime Minister was willing to give greatest emphasis to political considerations in policy and governance after four years in office only because of his unanticipated near defeat in 1972. At the other extreme, the short-lived Conservative Government of Joe Clark (nine months in 1979–80) was sunk by the Prime Minister’s failure to seek or pay attention to political advice (Simpson 1980). The influence of political staff is also likely to vary over the tenure of Governments. In Canada, as elsewhere, changes in government have proven to be the times when politics trumps almost everything as the new government seeks to establish itself vis-à-vis the bureaucracy as well as

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with the players in the policy communities and networks that do not turn over with a new Government. On these occasions, of which there have been only four over the past four decades: 1979, 1984, 1993 and 2006 (not counting the 1980 return of the Liberals after a nine-month interlude), the chances of policy influence on the part of political staff are high, especially for those who have served ministers in their previous capacities and thus have personal relationships; they are the advisers ministers know and trust. However, at these times political staff are also most likely to be not only inexperienced in their roles as political staff to a minister but to have no or precious little experience in government or knowledge about its workings. Not surprisingly, these have been the times when conflict and tension between political staff and public servants has been the greatest; at the outset, they are almost all strangers to one another. It is always exacerbated by the fact that political staff are invariably younger than the senior public servants with whom they interact most frequently, with all that that usually implies, including, as Benoit graphically puts it, being ‘slightly punch drunk with their newly found authority’ (Benoit 2006, p. 159). Even for the PMO the transition can be less than smooth. The 1984 transition was particularly troublesome as the PMO struggled from the outset, and eventually had to be rescued by none other than a senior public servant who was willing to be seconded to the office as Prime Minister Mulroney’s chief of staff. The 2006 transition, by contrast, was seen as demonstrating competence and discipline, although the Prime Minister decided that he had to dismiss his director of communications in the first week of the new government. The 1993 Liberal transition was different in its own way: the new Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, had extensive ministerial experience and his newly appointed senior advisers were equally experienced in government. The Liberals came to power – back to power – ready to pick up where they had left off a decade previously. The story of the next decade, as told by Eddie Goldenberg, Prime Minister Chrétien’s chief policy adviser throughout the life of the Chrétien regime, was one in which governance was directed and managed by the Prime Minister, the PMO, the Finance Department, and a handful of others. Goldenberg explicitly rejects the Savoie thesis of court government and then proceeds, in his ‘inside Ottawa’ account, to provide all the evidence anyone would need to confirm it (Goldenberg 2006). In a Prime-Ministerial government regime, the political arm of government is likely to be the most powerful arm of government. The public service, as represented by the PCO, will be able to compete only to the extent that it is willing to enter the partisanpolitical vortex and function in a promiscuously-partisan manner, as has sometimes been the case.

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THE POLITICAL ARM OF GOVERNMENT IN ASCENDANCY The political arm of government reflects the Canadian political leadership in more ways than one. The elected Government governs, even if its capacity to manage the administration of public affairs is often inadequate. The public service bureaucracy and the public businesses it operates through, a complex of ministerial departments and arm’s length agencies, are not easily controlled by ministers. However, as Bakvis notes, the critical issue is not control in any event; it is whether ministers and their political staff are able ‘to mobilize the department, or elements within it, to accomplish specific goals’ (Bakvis 1991, p. 188). The political arm of government exists to help ministers accomplish their political tasks. Although they are ‘staff’ to ministers, they do not just advise ministers; they also try to help them make things happen, even if they almost always have to use the bureaucracy to accomplish things. At the same time, the model of the nonpartisan, professional public service does not just assume that the public service is there to implement ministerial decisions; it also assumes that the public service advises ministers on what to do. In the early years of the Trudeau regime, the respective heads of the PCO and PMO sought to elucidate the complementary character of the two agencies. The Clerk’s formulation quickly became the accepted version: ‘The Prime Minister’s Office is partisan, politically-oriented, yet operationally sensitive. The Privy Council Office is nonpartisan, operationally oriented, yet politically sensitive’ (Robertson 1971, p. 506). This formulation has stood the test of time. ‘Operational’, of course, means policy advice, policy implementation, and the management of the many and diverse operations of government: public servants, in other words, are to be fully engaged in governance, except that they must eschew the explicitly partisan dimensions of politics. Campbell has argued for the critical importance of ministers engaging their public servants in order to secure both responsiveness and competence in public management (2007). It follows that to the extent ministers ignore or override their public service advisers they run the risk of politicized incompetence on the part of political staff as a consequence of displacing the professional and non-partisan public service that is meant to be an integral part of the system of counterweights. Counterweights work well only when there is sufficient attention given to both sides of the equation. The greatest danger is that the presumed power of the bureaucracy leads ministers to exaggerate its institutional capacity to remain robust without being fully engaged. This is especially dangerous when inexperienced and/or less able ministers, prodded by inexperienced and/or less

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able political staff, confuse the complexity of the government machine and the wickedness of many policy problems with the willingness of the public service generally to serve ministers. Concern that developments over the past four decades have been building to the point where the institution of the public service is at risk have led to proposals to have the public service better secured as a critical and separate institution of government, with its own ‘personality’, against the pressures of partisan-politics (Savoie 2006). Among other things this could, perhaps should, entail the independent staffing and management of the deputy and associate deputy minister cadre, thereby bringing the leadership of the public service into the same public service regime (Aucoin 2006a). However, neither the recognition of the public service as a separate institution of government nor this independence in staffing and management of the public service as an institution should be viewed as suggesting any change in its duties and responsibilities to ministers: a non-partisan public service, whatever its institutional status, is meant to serve ministers, and not to obstruct or undermine the government’s exercise of its constitutional and legal powers. The Gomery Commission that assessed the behaviour of ministers, political staff and public servants in a scandal over several years during the Chrétien era also focused on this risk. The scandal involved, among other officials, the Prime Minister and his chief of staff, a departmental minister and both his chief of staff and deputy minister as well as junior-executive level departmental managers in his department (one of whom was the minister’s chief of staff before becoming one of these managers via the previously noted privileged route into the public service for political staff). The Gomery Commission found them all responsible for one or more aspects of the scandal. The Commission was particularly concerned about the obfuscation about the roles of political staff in directing public servants and in obtaining positions in the public service. It commissioned and published a major study of political staff in ministers’ office and its author, Liane Benoit (2006), found considerable evidence to support assumptions about the influence of political staff not only on policy development, as was to be expected of political advisers, but also, and more problematic, on administration. She found significant variations in how individual ministers, minister’s offices and departments managed their respective relationships. Further, she found the expected development of ministerial staff leaving for positions with lobby firms as well as leaving for positions in the public service via the special access provided them. As events unfolded, however, the recommendations of the Commission on these matters were not published until after the election of the

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Conservative Party and, more importantly, the formulation of its campaign promises to address some of these matters, including tighter controls over the post-employment of political staff and their special access to the public service. Much of what was proposed by the Conservatives was predicated on the assumption that they would not form the Government after the election and hence their proposals were clearly designed to hold what they expected to be another Liberal minority Government in check. In several respects, nevertheless, the newly elected minority Conservative Government followed through: it eliminated the worst aspect of the special access of political staff to the public service; it designated political staff as falling into the category of ‘public office holder’ and subjected them, among others, to a new conflict of interest regime that includes enhanced restrictions on post-employment lobbying. The Government did not issue a code of conduct for political staff, as the Gomery Commission subsequently recommended, but its guidance to ministers document (Canada 2007d) elaborated more explicitly on what would be expected to be in a code, including the expected statements on the status of political staff vis-à-vis public servants, the public service code of values, the process of communicating ministerial directives to public servants through the hierarchy, and the personal responsibility of ministers for the conduct of their political staff. The Gomery Commission also addressed the issue of the status of the public service but, in critical places, did so in a vocabulary that suggested naiveté or ignorance to seasoned participants and commentators. With one exception, its recommendations to better position the public service in the governmental context received no public consideration (Aucoin 2006c). The exception – the recommendation to adopt the accounting officer regime whereby deputy ministers are designated as accounting officers for their departments in order to account personally for departmental management before the public accounts committee of the House of Commons – had already been included in the Conservative’s campaign platform and was passed into law in 2006. Unfortunately, the new accounting officer regime was then immediately obfuscated by the Government’s directions to deputy ministers (Canada 2007c; Franks 2007).

THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF POLITICAL STAFF The accountability of political staff is clear, at least on paper. They are the personal staff of ministers and accountable solely to them. Ministers, in turn, are personally accountable to Parliament and the public for the actions of their staff. The most recent formal statement of instructions to

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ministers which is set out in the 2007 document Accountable Government: A Guide for Ministers and Secretaries of State, could not be clearer: ‘Ministers and Secretaries of State are personally responsible for the conduct and operation of their offices’ (Canada 2007d, p. 37). Under ministerial responsibility, ministers are responsible in Parliament for the actions of their departmental public servants. These public servants are the subordinates of ministers in clearly established hierarchical structures, from the minister’s deputy minister down to the lowest clerk. The constitutional principle of ministerial responsibility, however, does not require a minister to accept personal responsibility when something goes wrong in his department unless the minister was personally involved, knew what was being done or not done, or should have known. The convention stipulates that when these conditions do not apply, the minister’s personal responsibility, and culpability, only kicks in when the alleged or real wrongdoing surfaces and the minister becomes aware or should have become aware (Aucoin et al. 2004). The constitutional logic here is that public servants are the minister’s public service subordinates and not their political agents. As subordinates, they exercise their minister’s authority, under the convention of delegation, in carrying out their departmental duties for implementing the law and administering programmes. Public servants are responsible and accountable for their actions to their superiors up the hierarchy to the deputy minister who, in turn, is accountable to the minister, among others. Political staff, on the other hand, are agents of their minister, both individually and collectively, whatever the organizational structure of the minister’s office, hierarchical or otherwise. As agents, they are an extension of their minister. They are appointed by their minister personally and their appointment begins and ends with this minister. As staff, they have no authority to exercise on their own; nor may their minister delegate authority to them, as a minister does with public servants in the line structure. Political staff cannot therefore direct their minister’s departmental public servants in the administration of public business. Nor are they positioned in the hierarchy between the minister and his deputy minister. They can communicate a minister’s directives, although the protocol is that they do so via the deputy minister (or at least with the deputy minister’s knowledge). Under the principle of agency, what political staff do or know, their minister is deemed to have done or known. It simply does not matter whether they informed their minister or whether the minister was aware of the matter. The minister cannot escape ‘personal responsibility’ for their ‘conduct’; under ministerial responsibility, political staff are owned by the minister personally and ministers are fully accountable and culpable for whatever they do or do not do.

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This is the constitutional principle. Unfortunately, it has little contemporary currency, in part because there is so little agreement or shared understanding of the constitutional principle of ministerial responsibility itself. In practice, ministers, including the Prime Minister as recently as 2007, have come to apply the same rule to political staff that is accepted in the case of public servants, namely, ‘if I did not know or was not personally involved, then I am not responsible’ (and, of course, they always leave out the ‘and should not have been expected to know’ part of this justification). An accountability vacuum is immediately established insofar as ministerial responsibility is concerned. The convention is rendered void. The first major case in Canada occurred in 1991 when the minister of foreign affairs denied responsibility for a matter by asserting that a public servant and his chief of staff had not brought the matter to his attention (Sutherland 1991). Subsequently, the first Ethics Commissioner contributed to the problem by twice allowing ministers to escape responsibility for the actions of their political staff (Benoit 2006, pp. 200–204). To its great credit, the Gomery Commission did get the constitutional principles correct in its analysis, and this was critical given that political staff were front and centre, in several respects, in the scandal it examined. Unfortunately, as noted above, the Commission’s findings in this regard have failed to generate any concern, let alone consideration of the matter. The problem of this vacuum in the Canadian case is compounded by an unrealistic assumption about, and flawed understanding of, ministerial responsibility, in particular and public accountability generally. This is the assumption that an effective system of responsibility and accountability requires that when something goes wrong or is alleged to have gone wrong someone must immediately accept personal responsibility and the consequences. This is wrong on two counts. First, the process of responsibility and accountability implies two parties: one who is responsible and must account, and the other who is to hold the responsible person to account. It is a two-sided structure. Second, the system only works in a political setting when the second party fulfills the ‘holding to account’ part of the equation, since it should be assumed that the first party, unless caught redhanded with a hand in the cookie jar, will do everything to escape being held to account. In politics, this is not necessarily a moral failure; it simply reflects that responsibility and accountability can be complicated matters (Aucoin and Jarvis 2005). The obvious issue in the Canadian case is for parliament to make it clear that the House and the Senate will hold ministers to account for any wrongdoing on the part of their political staff, that is, that parliament will apply what the Government has long declared as the official version of ministerial responsibility for political staff. The House of Commons has

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recently defied the government, a minority government, and has adopted as standing orders the Public Accounts Committee’s protocols governing the appearance of deputy ministers as accounting officers, protocols that are clearly at odds with the government’s position (Murphy 2007). But even in a majority Government context, the Opposition could declare the minister’s responsibility for political staff to be personal. Parliament, of course, cannot discipline ministers for the actions of political staff; only the Prime Minister has the power to discipline ministers. Parliament can name, blame and shame them, of course. However, in the Canadian case, the power of Parliamentary committees to insist that individual political staff appear before them as required is well established. Ministers cannot protect themselves from Parliamentary scrutiny by refusing to allow their political staff to appear before committees.

CONCLUSION Political staff, as partisan-political advisers, constitute a useful, even necessary, counterweight to the public service in the service of ministers. They bring a partisan-political perspective that the public service cannot be expected, and should not attempt, to provide. Although ministers do not serve themselves well, let alone the public for whom they are meant to provide good governance, if they fail to engage their public service advisers and rely exclusively on their political staff, their failure here raises no serious issues of constitutional propriety. Ministers are fully responsible and accountable for what they decide to do or not do on the basis of the advice they accept or ignore from either of these quarters (or any quarter, for that matter). And, ministers simply cannot ever escape responsibility for matters of policy by attempting to attribute blame for policy to others. Any attempt to do so would make them appear either fully incompetent or entirely foolish, either of which is, in effect, an admission of responsibility. Everything is different on matters of administration – actions or inactions, things that are done or not done, including communicating or not communicating information. Here political staff are much more than advisers, they are agents who act on behalf of their minister to get things accomplished. They do so in a variety of circumstances and in relation to a variety of other political or governmental actors. They act sometimes with the knowledge of their minister and sometimes not. When ministers want to disassociate themselves with the actions or inactions of these agents, however, the principle of agency demands that they not be able to do so. But, of course, ministers, as noted, have disassociated themselves when

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things go awry, and, more often than not, they have been successful in getting away with it. In doing so, they create a gaping hole in the accountability regime. Even if political staff are summoned before parliamentary committees and named and blamed and shamed for their behaviour, the hole remains if these committees do not conclude that the ministers of these staff must be held personally and fully accountable for their agents. Not to do so would be equivalent to allowing a Prime Minister and Government to disassociate themselves from a minister whenever that was politically convenient. That approach to ministerial accountability disappeared with the adoption of responsible government in the mid-19th century. The obvious solution to the problem created by the use of political staff to do more than give advice to ministers is to treat them as a category of unelected political officials who are deemed an integral part of the ministry, in the same way that a minister would have to accept responsibility for a junior minister in her or his portfolio or even for her or his parliamentary secretary. This is probably the only solution as well, given that ministers are not going to restrict their political staff exclusively to advisory roles and it is completely unrealistic to expect a code of conduct, even regulations, to efficiently or effectively govern how political staff relate to public servants below deputy ministers in acting on behalf of ministers. Political staff can be made to respect the neutrality of the public service, but that covers, or is likely to effectively cover, only the worst cases of what is essentially corrupt behaviour. The political arm of government needs to be, and to be seen to be, fully connected to the political body – the ministry.

NOTES 1. These numbers are taken from various years at the ‘Proactive disclosure’ site of the Privy Council Office, see www.gc.ca 2. Although appointed, Senators can be ministers and a Cabinet will always include at least one – the Government Leader in the Senate. In some cases, there will be one or two more to represent a province or a city without any representation in the House of Commons on the Government benches. The definitive study is by Herman Bakvis (1991). 3. In a coalition government, ministers would be leaders of two or more governing parties. This might have a major effect on the role and influence of political staff, but, for Canada, this is still hypothetical. 4. In contrast, at the provincial level in Canada, with variations across provinces and over time and partisan regimes, premiers have used their power to appoint deputy ministers to appoint partisans, in some cases with scant regard to competence (Lindquist, 2000). 5. Trudeau retained the services of Robertson by appointing him to the newly and specially created post of Secretary to the Cabinet for federal-provincial relations.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Aucoin, Peter (1995), ‘Politicians, public servants, and public management: getting government right’, in B. Guy Peters and Donald J. Savoie (eds), Governance in a Changing Environment, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, pp. 113–37. Aucoin, Peter (1999), ‘Prime Minister and Cabinet’, in James Bickerton and Alain Gagnon (eds), Canadian Politics, 3rd edn, Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press. Aucoin, Peter (2006a), ‘The staffing and evaluation of Canadian deputy ministers in comparative perspective: a proposal for reform’, in Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, Restoring Accountability, research studies, vol. 1, Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, pp. 297–336. Aucoin, Peter (2006b), ‘The new public governance and the public service commission,’ Optimum Online, 36 (1), accessed at www.optimumonline.ca/article. phtml?id=252. Aucoin, Peter (2006c), ‘After new public management goes awry in Canada: changing the way government works or simply changing the guard?’ Public Sector, 29 (2), 3–6. Aucoin, Peter and Herman Bakvis (2004), ‘Public service reform and policy capacity: recruiting and retaining the best and the brightest’, in Martin Painter and Jon Pierre (eds), Challenges to State Policy Capacity, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 185–204. Aucoin, Peter and Mark D. Jarvis (2005), Modernizing Government Accountability: A Framework for Reform, Ottawa: Canada School of Public Service. Aucoin, Peter and Donald J. Savoie (eds) (1998), Managing Strategic Change: Lessons from Program Review, Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development. Aucoin, Peter, Jennifer Smith and Geoff Dinsdale (2004), Responsible Government, Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development. Bakvis, Herman (1991), Regional Ministers: Power and Influence in the Canadian Cabinet, Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. Benoit, Liane E. (2006), ‘Ministerial staff: the life and times of parliament’s statutory orphans’, in Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, Restoring Accountability, research studies, vol. 1, Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, pp. 145–252. Blais, Andre and Stephane Dion (eds) (1991), The Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat: Appraisals and Evidence, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh. Bourgault, Jacques (2007), ‘Corporate management at the top level of governments: the case of Canada’, International Review of Administrative Sciences, 73 (2), 257–74. Campbell, Colin (1983), Governments under Stress, Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. Campbell, Colin (1985), ‘Cabinet committees in canada: pressures and dysfunctions stemming from the representational imperative’, in Thomas T. Mackie and Brian W. Hogwood (eds), Unlocking the Cabinet: Cabinet Structures in Comparative Perspective, London: Sage, pp. 61–85. Campbell, Colin (1988), ‘Review article: the political roles of senior government

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officials in advanced democracies’, British Journal of Political Science, 18, 243–72. Campbell, Colin (2007), ‘Spontaneous adaptation in public management: an overview’, Governance, 20 (3), 377–400. Canada (1991), Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy, vol. 1, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Ch. 5, pp. 207–320. Canada Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities (2006), Restoring Accountability: Recommendations, Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada. Canada Public Service Commission (2007a), Audit of the Movement of Public Servants between the Federal Public Service and Ministers’ Offices, October, Ottawa: Public Service Commission of Canada. Canada Treasury Board of Canada (2007b), Policies and Guidelines for Ministers’ Offices, Ottawa: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, January. Canada, Privy Council Office (2007c), Accounting Officers: Guidance on Roles, Responsibilities and Appearances before Parliamentary Committees, Ottawa: Privy Council Office. Canada, Privy Council Office (2007d), Accountable Government: A Guide for Ministers and Secretaries of State, Ottawa: Privy Council Office. D’Aquino, Thomas (1974), ‘The Prime Minister’s office: catalyst or cabal?’, Canadian Public Administration, 17 (1), 55–80. Doern, G. Bruce (1971), ‘The development of policy organizations in the executive arena’, in G. Bruce Doern and Peter Aucoin (eds), The Structures of Policy Making in Canada, Toronto, ON: Macmillan of Canada. Flanagan, Tom (2007), Harper’s Team: Behind the Scenes in the Conservative Rise to Power, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Franks, C.E.S. (2007), ‘The unfortunate experience of dueling protocols: a chapter in the continuing quest for responsible government in Canada,’ paper prepared for the conference in honour of J.E. Hodgetts, University of Guelph, September. Goldenberg, Eddie (2006), The Way it Works: Inside Ottawa, Toronto, ON: McClelland and Stewart. Good, David (2007), The Politics of Public Money, Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. Granatstein, J.L. (1982), The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935– 1957, Toronto, ON: Oxford University Press. Greenspon, Edward and Anthony Wilson-Smith (1996), Double Vision: The Inside Story of the Liberals in Power, Toronto, ON: Doubleday. Kernaghan, Kenneth (1976), ‘Politics, policy and public servants: political neutrality revisited’, Canadian Public Administration, 19 (3), 432–56. Lalonde, Marc (1971), ‘The changing role of the Prime Minister’s office’, Canadian Public Administration, 14 (4), 509–37. Lindquist, Evert (ed) (2000), Government Restructuring and Career Public Services, Toronto, ON: Institute of Public Administration of Canada. Lindquist, Evert (2006), A Critical Moment: Capturing and Conveying the Evolution of the Canadian Public Service, Ottawa: Canadian School of Public Service. Mallory, J.R. (1967), ‘The minister’s office staff: an unreformed part of the public service’, Canadian Public Administration, 10 (1), 25–34. May, Kathryn (2006), ‘Harper’s suspicions of PS hint at rocky relations to come’, Ottawa Citizen, 18 January.

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May, Kathryn (2007), ‘Federal audit probes political neutrality of public service’, Ottawa Citizen, 12 November. Meisel, John (1962), The Canadian General Election of 1957, Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. Murphy, Shawn (2007), ‘The appearance of accounting officers before the Public Accounts Committee’, Canadian Parliamentary Review, 30 (2), 4–6. O’Connor, Loretta J. (1991), ‘Chief of Staff’, Policy Options, 12 (3), 23–6. Osbaldeston, Gordon F. (1987), ‘The public servant and politics’, Policy Options, 8 (1), 3–7. Osbaldeston, Gordon F. (1989), Keeping Deputy Ministers Accountable, Toronto, ON: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. Plasse, Micheline (1994), Ministerial Chiefs of Staff in the Federal Government in 1990: Profiles, Recruitment, Duties and Relations with Senior Public Servants, Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development. Robertson, Gordon (1971), ‘The changing role of the Privy Council Office’, Canadian Public Administration, 14 (Fall), 487–508. Savoie, Donald J. (1999), Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics, Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. Savoie, Donald J. (2003), Breaking the Bargain: Public Servants, Ministers, and Parliament, Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. Savoie, Donald J. (2006), ‘The Canadian public service has a personality’, Canadian Public Administration, 49 (3), 261–81. Simpson, Jeffrey (1980), Discipline of Power, Toronto, ON: Personal Library. Sutherland, S.L. (1991), ‘The Al-Mashat Affair: administrative accountability in parliamentary institutions’, Canadian Public Administration, 34 (4), 573–603. Weller, Patrick (1994), ‘Party rules and the dismissal of Prime Ministers: comparative perspectives from Britain, Canada and Australia’, Parliamentary Affairs, 47 (January), 133–43. Wilson, Graham K. (1991), ‘Prospects for the public service in Britain. Major to the rescue?’ International Review of Administrative Sciences, 57 (3), 327–44.

3.

Australia Maria Maley

INTRODUCTION Partisan ministerial advisers were introduced into the Australian political system in 1972, and have since become a permanent part of the machinery of Australian government.1 Their numbers, and their role, have grown significantly over this period. In 1984 their employment was formalized as partisan and outside the public service. This has proved to be an effective way of distinguishing their work from that of the apolitical public service. Today partisan ministerial advisers and non-partisan public servants work closely together in advising ministers and in policy making. However since 1996 there have been concerns raised about the scope of their role, their impact on the public service and the need for greater management of their conduct. Recent reforms have attempted to address these problems.

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT The Australian federal government is a Westminster style system, drawing elements initially from both the British and American governing structures. Government is formed in the lower house – the House of Representatives – by the party with the majority of the 150 members of parliament (MPs). The upper house – the Senate – is half the size of the lower house and its members are elected in each state and territory. The Prime Minister is chosen by the MPs and senators of the governing party. The Prime Minister, in turn, selects ministers from the members of the governing parties in the two houses. A distinctive feature of Australian government is the legislative power of the Senate, through which all legislation must pass, as well as passing through the House of Representatives. Since 1949 the Senate has rarely been controlled by the Government (though from July 2005 to November 2007 this was the case), with minor parties and some independents often holding the balance of power and able, with the Opposition, to reject and amend legislation. Because of its powers and the fact that it is usually not controlled by the government, the Senate plays a crucial role in scrutiny of the executive and 94

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is known as a house of review. Its committees closely examine government expenditure, and can command the attendance of public servants and ministers who sit in the Senate to answer questions. Special committees are often formed, chaired by non-government senators, to probe political scandals. There has been considerable tension between the executive and the Senate at times, relating to the Senate’s powers to examine the behaviour of ministerial advisers. One famous scandal in 2001, known as the Children Overboard Affair, brought a focus on problems in the behaviour and accountability of ministerial staff (see discussion below). The 30 Australian federal ministers are organized in a two-tier structure. Numbers vary, but generally Cabinet comprises the most senior 20 ministers, and there are ten junior ministers who form the ‘outer’ ministry. There is also a group of 12 parliamentary secretaries. Every portfolio is headed by a ministerial ‘team’ comprising a Cabinet minister, a non-Cabinet minister and a parliamentary secretary. Each of these has ministerial staff. In May 2008 there were 334 ministerial staff working for the Government. The Australian Prime Minister leads on the basis of party room support and can be challenged at any time. The Cabinet system is strongly collective in its operation (Weller 2007). The Australian federal public service is defined as non-partisan. The Public Service Act 1999, under which all public servants are employed, states that it is a career-based service, with appointments made on merit, and ‘is apolitical, performing its functions in an impartial and professional manner’. However, since 1994, the heads of departments, known as departmental secretaries, are appointed on contracts of up to five years. The Prime Minister appoints the secretaries and is not legally constrained by the merit principle (Podger 2007). There have been some partisan appointments to such positions, but they represent the minority of secretaries, who tend to be long-serving career public servants. Ministerial advisers are defined as partisans, and are employed separately to public servants. They are employed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (MOPS Act) and their employment can be terminated at any time. The Act enables public servants to disengage from the public service while they are employed as advisers, and to re-engage as apolitical public servants when their employment as staffers ceases.

A SHORT HISTORY OF MINISTERIAL ADVISERS IN AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT Partisan ministerial advisers first appeared in Australian federal government in 1972 with the election of the Whitlam Labor Government. Prior

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to this, ministerial offices had been largely staffed by seconded public servants who were not partisans and who performed largely administrative and liaison roles. In 1972 Labor came to office after 23 years of Coalition rule and brought a new style of ministerial office into government – one which featured partisans from outside the public service, with expanded functions which included policy advising.2 These changes represented a radical departure from past practice and incited much controversy. They were termed ‘Whitlam’s experiment’ and were seen by some as a sinister development, a ‘mistaken departure from the earlier role of the minister’s private office’ (RCAGA 1976, p. 103). Some saw it as a temporary phenomenon which could be wound down after a period of adjustment between the new Government and the public service. There was considerable tension between advisers and departments, particularly with staff who were involved in policy advising. Evaluations of ‘Whitlam’s experiment’ (done in the late 1970s) did not judge it to have been a success, arguing advisers had limited policy roles and were effectively resisted and circumvented by the public service. This was because they were too few to influence more than a small number of issues, too inexperienced in Government to dominate the bureaucracy, and they faced considerable resistance from departments (Hawker et al. 1979). Key Labor figure Peter Wilenski argued that ministerial staff were only part of the mechanism needed to deliver political control and that they would be ineffective until the public service was itself reformed (Wilenski 1979). When the Coalition returned to power in 1975, Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser was advised by the public service to abandon the new system of advisers. He did not, but their numbers were greatly reduced and many ministers reverted to staffing their offices mainly with seconded public servants. Research on the Fraser government advisers showed that they generally reverted to more traditional non-partisan administrative roles (Forward 1977; Walter 1986). However Prime Minister Fraser boosted the numbers and policy capacity in his own office, which played an important role in his policy dominance within the ministry and kept alive the concept of the partisan policy adviser (Walter 1986). Labor returned to power in 1983 with a detailed plan for Government and a determination to gain political control over the bureaucracy. Partisan ministerial staff were seen as crucial to gaining this control (Commonwealth of Australia 1983, pp. 21–3). In an important trade-off which established the structure of Government which would continue to this day, the Hawke Government decided not to proceed with an election commitment to create a political tier within the public service (by politicizing departmental heads and 5 per cent of the second division), but instead

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to greatly increase the number of ministerial advisers (Halligan 1997, p. 51). In 1984 it established a legislative basis for the employment of advisers – the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984.3 This Act meant that ministerial staff were no longer in public service positions and had a distinct type of employment which was personal and political. The Act also clarified the rights of public servants who worked in ministerial offices, enabling them to disengage from the public service while working in adviser positions and re-engage afterwards. This Act solved many of the problems experienced in other countries, since it ensured that no one working as a (partisan) ministerial adviser was at that time also a (non-partisan) public servant. The design of the MOPS Act was important in giving political leaders the support they needed but avoiding the corrosion of public service neutrality. This was an important moment in the development of Australia’s advisory institutions. It confirmed the institutional components of a nonpartisan public service with a separate, clearly partisan ministerial office structure. This crucial choice defined the way that Governments would pursue political control in Australia from the 1980s onwards. The Labor period, comprising 13 years of Government under Prime Ministers Hawke (1983–91) and then Keating (1991–6), was a critical period in the development of the ministerial office. The role of adviser grew, developed in new ways and was entrenched as a permanent part of the machinery of government in Australia. The number of ministerial advisers grew strongly (Maley 2000b) and there is evidence of a normative shift to acceptance of advisers as part of executive government, by both major parties and by many of the highest public servants. It was also a time of change in other political institutions in Australia. There were significant changes to the public service and to the operation of Cabinet over this period (Campbell and Halligan 1992). With the ascendancy of New Public Management, Labor made major administrative changes in the 1980s which forced the public service to be more responsive to Government and, some have suggested, resulted in a weakening of the bureaucracy and a shift in power towards ministers and ministerial offices (Campbell and Halligan 1992, Halligan and Power 1992). Reforms to Cabinet, aimed at increasing its effectiveness, reduced the amount of Cabinet business and enabled more decisions to be made outside Cabinet. These changes created an important role for ministerial advisers in coordination surrounding the Cabinet process (discussed below). When the Coalition returned to power in 1996, the new Prime Minister John Howard immediately reduced the number of ministerial advisers by 18 per cent (Maley 2000b). However, numbers soon gradually increased and within three years they had almost reached the levels of the previous

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Labor Government. Initially there was much friction and distrust between the new government and the public service, whose numbers were also slashed, and ministers relied heavily on ministerial staff, with the public service having to prove its relevance and loyalty (Stewart and Maley 2007). By the end of the 11 years of Coalition Government (1996–2007), the number of ministerial advisers had grown beyond the level they had reached at the end of the Labor period.4 They were more highly paid and ranked higher in status than ever before. The Prime Minister’s office grew disproportionately, reaching 50 staff.5 The Coalition period was marked by effective central control and coordination of ministerial offices. This can be explained by the dominance of the Prime Minister within the Government, as well as the large number of Prime Ministerial staff, their unusual longevity, and centralized control over the employment of senior staff in ministers’ offices (Tiernan 2007). The Coalition years (1996–2007) were also marked by major change to the public service. The New Public Management reforms begun by the previous Government accelerated after 1996. Initial severe cuts to the size of the public service were combined with a strong drive to marketization. Ideologically driven, the Coalition Government transformed the public service ‘by taking an unrelenting and unequivocal approach to pushing the core of the public sector towards the private sector’ (Aulich, Halligan and Nutley 2001, p. 18). The position of departmental secretaries also weakened during this period. In an unprecedented move, when the new government took office in 1996 it immediately sacked one third of all secretaries. It installed a combative new head of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Max Moore Wilton, from the private sector. It introduced performance pay for secretaries in 1999 and reduced their contracts to less than five years. During this period the public service came under enormous pressure to be responsive to Government, provoking concerns about politicization, especially in a few celebrated cases (discussed below). A former Public Service Commissioner warned that the balance had tipped too far towards responsiveness and away from being apolitical and professional (Podger 2007). In 2007, the newly elected Rudd Labor Government came to power with a pledge to restore greater integrity to the relationships between ministers, ministerial advisers and public servants. In a reaction to the perceived excesses of the previous Government, it made a series of reforms, termed its ‘accountability and integrity agenda’. While in Opposition, Labor was critical of the growing influence of ministerial advisers and their unregulated behaviour. On taking Government, Labor reduced the number of

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ministerial staff it employed by one third – to the level that had existed in the final days of the last Labor Government.6 In June 2008 it introduced a code of conduct for ministerial staff, which specified, amongst other things, that staff do not have the power to direct public servants or to make executive decisions. Labor had also accused the previous Government of ‘a systematic assault on the independence of the public service’. On taking Government, Labor did not sack any departmental secretaries. It established a transparent, merit-based process for their appointment (to limit political appointments), gave them greater job security and abolished the system of performance bonuses paid at the Prime Minister’s discretion. It thus removed the mechanisms and practices which had put departmental heads under pressure to be responsive and weakened their ability to be apolitical and professional. Labor described these reforms as ‘restoring Westminster traditions’. To summarize, partisan ministerial advisers first appeared in Australian politics in the 1970s, but it was only in 1984 that a systematic and legislative basis for their employment was created. This pragmatic approach established them as clearly partisan, employed separately from the public service. This successfully distinguished their work from that of public servants and maintained public service neutrality. The role of partisan advisers grew steadily over the 1980s and 1990s, but was seen as working effectively. However in the Coalition period (1996–2007) the behaviour of ministerial staff was criticized as threatening Westminster traditions. Along with a series of changes which deliberately weakened the independence and authority of departmental heads, there were claims that partisan advisers had produced excessive responsiveness and politicization of the public service. When Labor returned to power in 2007 it addressed these problems directly, reducing the number of advisers and regulating their conduct, and strengthening the job security and independence of departmental secretaries. The lesson had been learnt during the previous Government that the system of partisan ministerial advisers worked best when countered by a strong and independent public service.

DRIVERS BEHIND THE INCREASE IN NUMBERS, AND CAPABILITIES ADVISERS BRING TO EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT Partisan advisers are seen by political executives as essential to addressing the problems of steering modern government. The drivers behind their emergence in 1972 were the rapid growth in government and increase

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in its complexity, higher community expectations of government, and dissatisfaction with the performance and responsiveness of the public service. These forces are still keenly felt by the executive in Australia today, but have been joined by the pressure of constant media scrutiny, which demands firm political management and executive coordination for success. Modern political leaders in Australia face enormous demands and consider partisan advisers to be essential to the performance of their jobs. However the development of the adviser role is one element, alongside reforms to the public service and reforms to the Cabinet process, in a number of institutional developments aimed at gaining political control of government. Partisan advisers can be seen to provide three types of help to Australian federal ministers. First, they help ministers to perform their jobs, enabling political leadership. Second, they help ministers to steer policy. Third, they help the ministry to coordinate and support the work of Cabinet. All this help is vital to modern political management. These roles grow out of advisers’ location in government: their proximity to ministers, and because the ministerial office is the place where the political and administrative worlds meet, at the confluence of the many forces that seek input to government. This empowers advisers, who can move amongst the many stakeholders located inside and outside government, and who are able to reach into the bureaucracy, the ministry, policy networks and out into the wider community. The ministerial office is a locus of political authority and a key site of communication and negotiation in government. This central location made possible the expansion of advisers’ roles in Australian government. Helping Ministers to Perform their Jobs Partisan advisers help Australian ministers perform their jobs through personal support and political support. In the 1970s there was a recognition that ministers were becoming overloaded, and needed more resources to be able to ‘cope’ with their jobs (Weller and Grattan 1981). Partisan advisers were justified as a way of increasing the capacity of ministers, and thus of bolstering existing structures to manage pressures from a changing political and social environment (Fraser 1978, RCAGA 1976, Whitlam 1974). The overloading of ministers was seen as threatening the concept of ministerial responsibility (RCAGA 1976). It was felt that some jobs should be delegated to allow ministers to concentrate on their most important work – policy making and deciding the overall policy framework (Hughes 1976, p. 72) – but that such jobs could not be delegated to the department due to the principle of ministerial responsibility (Fraser 1978,

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p. 5). There was thus a need for appropriate surrogates to whom ministers could delegate some of their work. One of the most important forms of personal support advisers provide to ministers is managing their time. Ministers have a crippling workload, involving what they call ‘an avalanche of paper’ and ‘a kaleidoscope of issues and pressures’. More than just managing paper flow, advisers act as a buffer, shielding ministers from the barrage of demands on them and selecting what receives the minister’s attention at any time. This filtering role is important to ministers and, as it involves a clear sense of the minister’s objectives and priorities, requires political judgement. Partisan advisers also provide important political support to ministers. In the 1970s Australian ministers were seen as needing help to cope with the political aspects of their jobs, and this was work which departments could not do (Briot and Lloyd 1976). Enabling ministers to perform these functions within their own office strengthened the concept of the political neutrality of the public service. This political support involves communicating with the party room, negotiating with other parties in the parliament, preparing ministers for question time, and working with the party organization (on electoral matters, policy issues and party conferences). It also involves political communication tasks such as speech writing, helping ministers to develop ‘lines’ and ‘stories’ to use in talking to the media, and the presentation and ‘packaging’ of policy decisions. Helping Ministers to Steer Policy Australian ministers in the 1970s and 1980s clearly felt that directing policy and the work of departments was a problem; they desired political control and saw advisers as a mechanism for pursuing it. In 1974 Prime Minister Whitlam commented that: ‘There have been notable cases in Australia in the past of a remarkable lack of ministerial control over departments and over policy. The lack of competent ministerial staff undoubtedly contributed to this’ (1974, p. 15). He saw ministerial control over policy as an essential part of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility: Central to [the Westminster] system is the principle that ministers as individuals and the cabinet as a whole must exercise real control over the public service and accept full responsibility for policy. . . . To the extent that the appointment of a competent personal staff assists ministers to exercise their proper constitutional authority we are enhancing the basic Westminster tradition. (1974, p. 15)

In 1983 the Hawke Labor government made it clear that a desire to strengthen ministerial control over policy drove its plan to employ more ministerial advisers:

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The balance of power and influence has tipped too far in favour of permanent rather than elected office holders. . . . Ministerial – that is democratic – control will be bolstered only if large numbers of politically committed people can have a close involvement in the development and implementation of policy. (Commonwealth of Australia 1983, pp. 21–3)

Steering policy has two aspects. One involves ministers directing and controlling the work of departments. The second aspect involves policy work independent of departments, an ability to shape policy within the diverse interests and networks that constitute modern governance (Maley 2000a). Political control of departments The desire for greater political control over the work of departments was a driving force behind the emergence of partisan advisers in Australia (Campbell and Halligan 1992). The problem of political control was perceived as twofold: that ministers were too dependent on the bureaucracy; and that the bureaucracy was not sufficiently responsive to the ministry (RCAGA 1976). Partisan advisers were seen as a solution to both aspects of this problem. They could provide or procure independent advice for the minister and help the minister to evaluate the advice received from the department, reducing the minister’s dependence. They could also increase the minister’s ability to direct the department and monitor its behaviour, thereby forcing greater responsiveness. A study of the work of partisan advisers to the Keating government (Maley 2002a) established that advisers could play a vital role in helping ministers to engage departments. There were two aspects to this work which contributed to partisan steering. By working closely with the department, advisers greatly expanded the minister’s resources and authority within the portfolio. By providing an alternative source of advice to the department, advisers reduced the minister’s reliance on the bureaucracy. Advisers’ day-to-day work with departments involved supervising, orienting and mobilizing the department. This involved scrutinizing documents going to the minister for approval, and ongoing dialogue with public servants about issues in the portfolio. Advisers had considerable leverage in their dealings with public servants because of their power as gatekeepers, controlling the flow of documents to the minister. Another important part of the adviser’s role was orienting the department to focus on and work towards the minister’s or Government’s agenda. It involved directing the department on the minister’s behalf; clarifying the minister’s preferences and priorities; and interpreting the minister’s agenda for the department. It could also involve taking minor

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decisions on the minister’s behalf. Fundamental to this work was the adviser’s capacity to act as the surrogate of the minister. This work greatly expanded the minister’s authority within the department. As the surrogate of the minister, the adviser could invoke the minister’s authority in a wide range of departmental activities, and thus shape them towards the ministers’ objectives. Advisers’ work with departments also involved mobilizing the department to work on the minister’s key projects or to deliver policy change. This was a crucial part of directing Government and delivering a partisan agenda. While ministers were critical in inspiring or driving a department to deliver that agenda, advisers had an important role in day-to-day mobilization. In their interaction with officials, this could involve enthusing them about the agenda; providing energy or momentum to push the agenda forward; pushing progress by setting dates for the department to have achieved key milestones; and checking and chasing the department. Engaging in policy making Traditional accounts of policy making which describe policy ideas as being framed in the bureaucracy, receiving approval of the minister and going to Cabinet for endorsement, before being transmitted to officials for implementation, have been challenged by the large body of writing about the horizontal linkages between policy actors, who interact in complex ways to shape policy outcomes. In his description of the policy process, Colebatch (1998) identifies two dimensions to policy – a ‘vertical’ and a ‘horizontal’ dimension. The ‘vertical’ dimension refers to the interaction of authorized decision makers and officials, encompassing the processes of ministers and departments working together in policy making, as well as hierarchical decision making in the minister’s office and the Cabinet (1998, pp. 37–9). The ‘horizontal’ dimension involves policy activity across organizational boundaries, with relationships among policy players in different organizations (1998, p. 39). Australian ministerial advisers can participate in both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of policy activity. In terms of the former, at least one study (Maley 2002a), showed that advisers could be involved in three areas of policy making traditionally conducted between ministers and departments. These were generating ideas; policy development; and policy implementation. In these areas advisers often worked closely with departments. Some advisers also engaged in policy work in the ‘horizontal’ dimension, which involves ministers interacting with other policy actors in a complex set of relationships involving interest groups, Cabinet colleagues, senior public servants, backbenchers and other political parties. There were five types of this policy work: agenda setting; linking ideas,

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interests and opportunities; mobilizing; bargaining; and delivering (Maley 2000a). In this work partisan advisers could have significant input to policy making. These roles could be critical in steering policy because they enabled ministers to develop partisan agendas; manage the political environment; and steer policy proposals through complex, often tortuous, political processes. These policy roles grow out of advisers’ location, their access to information and their linkages with other key players. This work could be a powerful resource in helping ministers to devise, develop and deliver partisan policy goals (Maley 2000a). Helping to Coordinate the Ministry The third type of capacity that partisan advisers can provide to Australian ministers is help in coordinating within the ministry and support for the work of the Cabinet. Advisers can coordinate at two levels: within a portfolio (between senior and junior ministers); and within the ministry (between ministerial offices). This work ranges from keeping channels of communication open and information flowing within the ministry, to negotiation and even de facto decision making. This work is vital to political control because ‘a government’s ability to determine political direction and priorities depends on its capacity to function collectively’ (Campbell and Halligan 1992, p. 17). This was a major development in the role of Australian ministerial advisers over the Labor years (Dunn 1997; Maley 2002a). This role grew because of changes to the way the Cabinet operated in this period. As the Cabinet acted to reduce its workload and prioritize the matters ministers decided formally, an increasing amount of business had to be decided outside the Cabinet, in informal interactions between ministers. Yet ministers were busier than ever. By using advisers for much of the preliminary and detailed discussions, it was possible to delegate much of this work to partisan actors who carried the authority of ministers. Thus the informal interactions between advisers became an important adjunct to the Cabinet system at this time, enabling Cabinet to operate efficiently and creating an alternative mechanism for coordination within the executive. This mechanism became essential to the effective operation of the executive. These roles were formalized and became even more important to the government in the Coalition period (1996–2007) with the establishment of the Cabinet Policy Unit (Stewart and Maley 2007; Tiernan 2006, 2007). This work particularly involves advisers in the Prime Minister’s Office and is important in enabling the executive to manage conflict within Government and develop policy coherence. The strongly collective nature

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of the Australian Cabinet tradition (Weller 2007) makes this work possibly more important than in other countries. If political control is understood as being able to effectively steer Government, then it requires not only control over the bureaucracy, but also an ability to prioritize and coordinate amongst ministers; management of political relationships; and an ability to devise and develop partisan policy goals. It also involves managing multiple political relationships inside and outside Government, and in engaging in complex, multiplayer policy processes. The roles partisan advisers can play are directly related to the problems of political control faced by modern executives. This explains why advisers have become so important in Australian government and provides a reason for the growth in their role.

INFLUENCE AND ROLE IN THE POLICY PROCESS When considering the influence and role of partisan advisers in the policy process in Australia it is important to note that it is both difficult to know and difficult to generalize. First, there is very little evidence of the contribution of particular advisers to particular policy changes. This is because very little of what they do is written down, or reported publicly. Public servants are also bound, by their code of conduct, to ‘maintain appropriate confidentiality about dealings that the employee has with any minister or minister’s member of staff’. Because Australian advisers are not directly accountable to parliament (see discussion below) there is no way of publicly exploring their actions or influence on particular policies. Some studies of particular policy processes include references to the work of advisers (for example Edwards 2003; Goldfinch and t’Hart 2003; Hawker 2006; Howard 2001; Ryan 1995; Stewart and Maley 2007). However it is hard to detect their influence in the group process of policy making. It is often difficult to do more that conclude they are ‘key figures’ who played ‘significant’ or ‘indispensable’ roles in particular policy processes (Ryan 1995). It is also difficult to generalize about their work in policy making. The only detailed Australian study so far of their policy work (Maley 2002a) – which examined the Keating Government advisers – found great variation in how active they were in policy making. Some had minimal involvement in policy making for a variety of reasons. These included their role conception and motivation; that they had managerial or strategic, rather than policy oriented, responsibilities in the office; or that they did not have the skills or experience to have significant input to the policy areas they were

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responsible for. How active they were in policy making also varied according to their minister’s style or approach and the scope and demands of the portfolio. Some were active, but only at some times and on some issues, while others were continuously very active in pursuing policy change or policy agendas. Australian partisan advisers have the potential to be very influential and centrally involved in policy making. Whether they are depends on a number of factors relating to their ministers, the portfolio and themselves.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE INFLUENCE OF ADVISERS IN THE POLICY PROCESS The growth in the numbers of partisan advisers, and the scope of their role over the last 36 years, presents a number of challenges to the apolitical public service. This has led to concerns about the impact of advisers’ work. Where ministerial advisers play a very active role in policy making, this has increased the ability of ministers to steer policy making in their portfolios. However there are concerns that this empowerment of ministers can result in an overemphasis on responsive rather than neutral competence in policy making. This can occur where there is a reduction of the role of the public service in the policy process (Fitzgerald 1996). Generally there is a normative view in Australia that the policy roles of ministerial advisers and senior public servants should be different (partisan/non-partisan) and complementary, and that there is a need for both in the policy process (Hollway 1996; Shergold 2004). Dunn’s (1997) study of ministers, advisers and public servants in the Hawke and Keating Labor periods concluded that ministerial advisers contributed to an optimal blend of responsive and neutral competence in policy making. However in the Coalition period (1996–2007) questions were raised about whether the balance had tipped towards responsive competence, because of the Government’s characteristic style of political management of the policy process (for example Kelly 2006; Stewart and Maley 2007). Walter (2006) has argued that in some recent cases, advisers have been detrimental to the policy process: ‘[i]nstead of expanding the domain of advice and contributing to the sort of contestability that leads to robust policy, they have had a funnelling effect – narrowing the options only to those predetermined by an ideological agenda rather than seriously “testing reality”’ (2006, p. 7). The contestability created by ministerial advisers can put the public service under pressure to ‘keep its place at the table’ in policy making. There are concerns that this can lead to public servants becoming overly

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responsive to ministers in their policy and advising work. Claims of politicization (public servants being too responsive, too protective of ministers and self-censoring their advice) were raised in the Coalition period (1996–2007) (see Kelly 2006; Walter 2006; Weller 2002). One example was the advice provided by the Office of National Assessments (ONA) to the government about the existence of weapons of mass destruction prior to the Iraq War in 2003. The accusation was that excessive loyalty had prevented the ONA from giving objective analysis and advice; it had delivered what the Government wanted, rather than needed, to hear (Flood 2004; Wilkie 2007).7 However the role and conduct of ministerial advisers is only one of the factors putting pressure on the public service to be responsive to Government. Equally important are the loss of tenure for the heads of departments and performance pay systems, which can distort incentives and create precarious employment situations (Podger 2007). The final implication of the increasing role of ministerial advisers in policy making is a loss of transparency in the policy process. This concerns the lack of documentation of the work of advisers and the difficulty of distinguishing their input from that of the public service; in particular the inability to detect the impact their views have had on the advice provided by the public service.

ACCOUNTABILITY The lack of visibility of the work of ministerial advisers raises the critical issue of their accountability within the current Australian system of government. Not only is their work and conduct rarely documented and hard to discern; they are also not subject to the same accountability mechanisms that exist for public servants and ministers. Some argue they represent a serious ‘accountability vacuum’ in Australian government (Keating 2003; Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident 2002; Tiernan 2007). It is difficult to know what Australian ministerial advisers do or even who they are. Their names are not published or available publicly. By general agreement of all parties, they are not named in parliament or in committees except in special circumstances. Up until very recently there have been no mechanisms for holding them personally accountable for their actions. They were not subject to a code of conduct and successive Governments have resisted attempts by the Senate to call advisers to testify before Senate committees. Several scandals in the 1990s and 2000s focused on the conduct of

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ministerial staff (amongst other issues).8 Most famous was the Children Overboard Affair of 2001, in which false claims by ministers (that asylum seekers threw their children into the water) were not corrected publicly until after the election on 10 November 2001, despite the fact that officials knew them to be untrue before this. A 2002 Senate inquiry into the matter found that there were ‘haranguing interventions’ by the Defence Minister’s media adviser, an inability for officials to communicate directly with ministers, and ‘deliberately misleading’ claims by ministers, who said that though their staff had been told of the department’s views, they themselves did not know this information (Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident 2002, p. xxxviii). The committee also found that ministerial advisers were ‘intervening inappropriately in agency operations and corrupting the proper administrative channels’ (2002, p. xxxvii). Despite requests, the Government refused to allow its ministerial advisers to testify before the committee. This meant that the allegation that ministers had lied to the public was not able to be proved or disproved. Two years later, one of these advisers wrote to a national newspaper outlining what he would have said had he appeared at the inquiry (Scrafton 2004). A special Senate inquiry was established to hear his testimony (Senate Select Committee on the Scrafton Evidence 2004). He stated that he had in fact briefed ministers about the truth of the ‘children overboard’ claims.9 This suggested that ministers had been able to use the silence and invisibility of their advisers to lie about what they knew. Following on from the initial ‘Children Overboard’ inquiry, the Senate conducted a special inquiry into ministerial staff which recommended a number of reforms to the management of ministerial advisers and their accountability arrangements (Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee 2003). These included a code of conduct, training and an ethics adviser for staff. The committee accepted the principle that ministers should be held accountable for the actions of their staff, but recommended that ministerial staff appear before parliamentary committees under certain circumstances (2003, pp. xix–xx). The Coalition government (1996–2007) did not respond to these recommendations. There have been many calls to increase the accountability of Australian ministerial advisers (for example Keating 2003; Tiernan 2007; Walter 2006). The major impediments to greater accountability for advisers are questions about how a code of conduct should be enforced; and how to protect the confidentiality of the relationship between ministers and their staff should advisers be able to be called before parliamentary committees (Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee 2003). It is also seen as important not to break the principle that advisers are extensions of the minister (rather than actors in their own right) and

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therefore that ministers should be held responsible for their actions. The problem is that at times ministers have not accepted responsibility for the actions of their staff. As seen in the Children Overboard Affair, they instead used their advisers as a ‘firewall’ to weaken their own accountability before parliament (Walter 2006). In 2008 the newly elected Rudd Labor Government announced a code of conduct for ministerial staff, which sets out standards to which they are expected to conform. These include that they must be aware of the code of conduct that binds public servants and must ‘facilitate direct and effective communication between their minister’s department and their minister’. It also makes clear that they do not have the power to direct public servants and cannot make executive decisions. The Chief of Staff of the Prime Minister is given the power to impose sanctions for non-compliance with the code, but must act on the advice from the Government Staffing Committee (comprising the Deputy Prime Minister, the Special Minister of State and the Chief of Staff of the Prime Minister). Labor also brought to government a policy that it would make ministerial advisers available to appear before Senate inquiries in certain circumstances – where the minister has refused to take responsibility for their actions. Neither this policy, nor the code of conduct, has yet been tested.

CONCLUSION Partisan ministerial advisers have become institutionalized in Australian federal government. Their numbers, and their role, have grown significantly since they first appeared in 1972. They play a critical role in supporting the work of the executive, as it struggles to cope with the demands of modern governance. They provide support in three ways: they help ministers to perform their jobs, they help ministers to steer policy, and they help the ministry to coordinate. This work is vital to modern political management. They can be involved in policy making in several ways. They often work closely with departments in generating ideas, policy development and policy implementation. Some advisers also engage in policy work in a ‘horizontal’ dimension: agenda setting; linking ideas, interests and opportunities; mobilizing; bargaining; and delivering. This work can be critical in steering policy because it enables ministers to develop partisan agendas; manage the political environment; and steer policy proposals through complex, often tortuous, political processes. This work can be a powerful resource in helping ministers to devise, develop and deliver partisan policy goals.

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It is difficult to generalize about the influence of Australian ministerial advisers in policy making. Evidence is scant and the level of their involvement depends on a number of factors relating to their ministers, the portfolio and their own motivation and experience. They have the potential for considerable influence. Where partisan advisers are very active in policy making they can pose challenges for the optimum blending of neutral and responsive competence in the policy process. They can be one of the factors leading to pressure on the public service to be overly responsive and even politicized. The issue of greatest concern in Australia in recent times has been the lack of a clear accountability mechanism and management framework for ministerial advisers. The traditional accountability mechanism (that they are accountable through their ministers to the parliament) is not working and in fact has led to a weakening of the accountability of ministers themselves to parliament. There has been mounting pressure to address this accountability vacuum. The newly elected Labor Government (2007–) has taken significant steps in this direction.

NOTES 1. Australia has a federal system of government and ministerial advisers exist also at the state level. There is much variation in arrangements for them amongst the states, and therefore this chapter focuses solely on developments in the federal government. 2. Not all Whitlam ministers employed partisans; some continued with the practice of nonpartisan seconded public servants in their offices. 3. The Act does not define the role or responsibilities of the ministerial adviser. It merely states that ‘an office-holder may, on behalf of the Commonwealth, employ, under an agreement in writing, a person as a member of the office-holder’s staff’. This must be done ‘in accordance with arrangements approved by the Prime Minister’ and ‘subject to such conditions as are determined by the Prime Minister’. 4. In October 2007 there were approximately 470 staff compared to 356 at the end of the Keating period in 1996 (Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee 2008). 5. Compared to 30 staff who worked for former Prime Minister Paul Keating in 1996. This figure equals the number of advisers to the PM plus the Cabinet Policy Unit in October 2007 (Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee 2008). 6. The number employed dropped from approximately 470 (under the Coalition Government in October 2007) to approximately 330 on 1 February 2008 (Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee 2008). 7. There was a parliamentary committee inquiry (PJCAAD 2004) and an independent inquiry into this matter (Flood 2004) and the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security was tasked to conduct periodic reviews of ONA’s statutory independence to ensure the integrity of its advice in the future (Commonwealth of Australia 2007). 8. These include the 1993 ‘Pay TV’ and 1995 ‘Sport Rorts’ Affairs in the Labor period, and the 1997 ‘Travel Rorts’ affair and problems in the Regional Partnerships grant scheme in 2005 from the Howard years (Tiernan 2007). 9. His testimony was disputed by the Prime Minister in media releases. Scrafton took a

Australia

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polygraph to prove the veracity of his claims (Senate Select Committee on the Scrafton Evidence 2004).

BIBLIOGRAPHY Aulich, C., J. Halligan and S. Nutley (2001), ‘Public sector management’, in C. Aulich, J. Halligan and S. Nutley (eds), Australian Handbook of Public Sector Management, Sydney, NSW: Allen & Unwin, pp. 11–19. Briot, G.T. and C.J. Lloyd (1976), Ministerial Staff Members’ Submission to RCAGA no 466, Canberra: AGPS. Campbell, C. and J. Halligan (1992), Political Leadership in an Age of Constraint: Bureaucratic Politics under Hawke and Keating, Sydney, NSW: Allen & Unwin. Colebatch, H. (1998), Policy, Buckingham: Open University Press. Commonwealth of Australia (1983), Reforming the Australian Public Service: A Statement of the Government’s Intention, Canberra: AGPS. Commonwealth of Australia (2007), Inspector General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2006–2007, 5 October, Canberra: Office of the Inspector of Intelligence and Security. Dunn, D. (1997), Politics and Administration at the Top: Lessons from Down Under, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Edwards, M. (2003), Social Policy, Public Policy: From Problem to Practice, Sydney, NSW: Allen & Unwin. Fitzgerald, V. (1996), ‘Advice on public policy: the changing balance between the public service and political advisers’, in J. Disney and J.R. Nethercote (eds), The House on Capital Hill: Parliament, Politics and Power in the National Capital, Sydney, NSW: Federation Press, pp. 119–32. Flood, P. (2004), Report of the Inquiry into the Australian Intelligence Agencies, July, Canberra: Australian Government. Forward, R. (1977), ‘Ministerial staff under Whitlam and Fraser’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 36 (2), 159–67. Fraser, J.M. (1978), ‘Responsibility in government’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, XXXVII (1), 1–11. Goldfinch, S. and P. t’Hart (2003), ‘Leadership and institutional reform: engineering macroeconomic policy change in Australia’, Governance, 16 (2), 235–70. Halligan, J. (1997), ‘Labor, the Keating term and the senior public service’, in G. Singleton (ed.), The Second Keating Government, Canberra: University of Canberra and IPAA, pp. 50–62. Halligan, J. and J. Power (1992), Political Management in the 1990s, Melbourne, VIC: Oxford University Press. Hawker, G. (2006), ‘Ministerial consultants and privatisation: Australian Federal Government 1985–88’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 52 (2), 244–60. Hawker, G., R. Smith and P. Weller (eds) (1979), Politics and Policy in Australia, St Lucia, QLD: University of Queensland Press. Hollway, S. (1996), ‘Departments and ministerial offices: an essential partnership’, in J. Disney and J.R. Nethercote (eds), The House on Capital Hill: Parliament, Politics and Power in the National Capital, Sydney, NSW: Federation Press, pp. 133–48.

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Howard, C. (2001), ‘Bureaucrats in the social policy process’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 60 (3), 56–65. Hughes, C. (1976), ‘Ministers and departments – Appendix 1.H’, in Report of the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration, Canberra: AGPS, pp. 210–21. Keating, M. (2003), ‘In the wake of “a certain maritime incident”: ministerial advisers, departments and accountability’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 62 (3), 92–7. Kelly, P. (2006), ‘Rethinking Australian governance: the Howard legacy’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 65 (1), 10–15. Maley, M. (2000a), ‘Conceptualising advisers’ policy work: the distinctive policy roles of ministerial advisers in the Keating government 1991–1996’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 35 (3), 449–70. Maley, M. (2000b), ‘Too Many or Too Few? The increase in federal ministerial advisers 1972–1999’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 59 (4), 48–53. Maley, M. (2002a), ‘Partisans at the centre of government: the role of ministerial advisers in the Keating government 1991–1996’, unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National University. Maley, M. (2002b), ‘Ministerial advisers and the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 61 (1) March, 103–7. PJCAAD (Parliamentary Joint Committee into ASIO, ASIS and DSD) (2004), Inquiry into Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, Parliamentary paper no. 47/2004, tabled 1 March. Podger, A. (2007), ‘What really happens: departmental secretary appointments, contracts and performance pay in the Australian public service’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 66 (2), 131–47. RCAGA (Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration) (1976), Report, Canberra: AGPS. Ryan, N. (1995), ‘Ministerial advisers and policy making’ in J. Stewart (ed.), From Hawke to Keating: Australian Commonwealth Administration 1990–1993, Canberra: Centre for Research in Public Sector Management, University of Canberra and RIPAA, pp. 141–61. Scrafton, M. (2004), letter to The Australian, 16 August. Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee (2008), Hansard, additional estimates, 19 February, Canberra: Senate, Parliament of Australia. Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee (2003), Report of the Inquiry into Staff Employed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984, October, Canberra: Senate, Parliament of Australia. Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident (2002), Report, October, Canberra: Senate, Parliament of Australia. Senate Select Committee on the Scrafton Evidence (2004), Report, December, Canberra: Senate, Parliament of Australia. Shergold, P. (2004), ‘Once was Camelot in Canberra? Reflections on public service leadership’, Sir Roland Wilson Lecture, 23 June, Canberra. Stewart, J. and M. Maley (2007), ‘The Howard Government and political management: the challenge of policy activism’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 42 (2), 277–93. Tiernan, A. (2006), ‘Advising Howard: interpreting changes in advisory and

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support structures for the Prime Minister of Australia’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 41 (3), 290–309. Tiernan, A. (2007), Power Without Responsibility, Sydney, NSW: UNSW Press. Walter, J. (1986), The Ministers’ Minders: Personal Advisers in National Government, Melbourne, VIC: Oxford University Press. Walter, J. (2006), ‘Ministerial staff and the “lattice of leadership”’, Democratic Audit discussion paper 15/06, April. Weller, P. (2002), Don’t Tell the Prime Minister, Melbourne, VIC: Scribe. Weller, P. (2007), Cabinet Government in Australia 1901–2006, Sydney, NSW: UNSW Press. Weller, P. and M. Grattan (1981), Can Ministers Cope?, Richmond, VIC: Hutchinson. Whitlam, E.G. (1974), Australian Public Administration and the Labor Government, Garran Oration, Canberra: RIPA (ACT). Wilenski, P. (1979), ‘Ministers, public servants and public policy’, Australian Quarterly, June, 31–45. Wilkie, A. (2007), ‘The military and intelligence services’, in C. Hamilton and S. Maddison (eds), Silencing Dissent, Sydney, NSW: Allen & Unwin, pp. 175–98.

4.

New Zealand Chris Eichbaum and Richard Shaw

INTRODUCTION As have most of the other countries studied in this collection, New Zealand has also experienced an increase in the number of political advisers at the centre of executive government. Equally, as elsewhere, this has heightened sensitivities around such issues as the influence advisers have on the policy process, the bearing they have on relations between the political and administrative executives, and the risks they allegedly pose to the impartiality of the permanent civil service. Recent institutional developments have, however, given the New Zealand case a particular flavour. Specifically, the formal bifurcation of ministers’ purchase and ownership interests in the public sector, and the adoption in the mid-1990s of an electoral system based on the principles of proportional representation have significantly shaped the context within which trilateral relations – between ministers, officials and political advisers – in the executive branch have evolved. Those developments, then, provide the backdrop to this chapter. The discussion begins by briefly sketching the particulars of the executive landscape in New Zealand. There follows a discussion of some of the reasons behind the increasing number of political advisers, and of the capacities and capabilities these staff bring to processes of executive government. Advisers’ roles and contributions to the policy process are then considered, as are the various consequences their advent has had for relations between ministers and officials, and for the integrity and independence of the permanent public service. We have tried to set the chapter on a firm evidential footing. A robust evidence base, it seems to us, is a valuable precondition for a detailed assessment of the kinds of issues canvassed both in the chapter and throughout this book. Accordingly, where possible we seek to illuminate the various issues with data generated by survey research we have conducted with New Zealand ministers, senior officials and ministerial advisers.1

114

New Zealand

115

THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT Unlike the arrangements at Westminster and Whitehall, but not dissimilar to those obtaining in Canberra, New Zealand ministers of the Crown are located in a purpose-built Executive Wing which is adjacent to the New Zealand Parliament. Typically, a minister’s office will include officials seconded from the departments or agencies for which he or she is responsible (referred to as private secretaries in Wellington and Whitehall, and departmental liaison officers in Canberra), a senior private secretary responsible for overall office administration, other administrative staff, at least one designated press secretary, and one or more ‘political’ (or, to use the New Zealand nomenclature, ‘ministerial’) advisers. The provision of support to ministers is through a business unit (Executive Government Support) of the Department of Internal Affairs. There is a specific budgetary allocation, with the appropriation for the 2008–09 year totalling NZ$27 282 million, the bulk of which is directed to ministerial support, including office administration, accounting, personnel, information technology, facilities management, media and advisory services, and the management of residential accommodation provided for ministers. As is the case with other members of the Westminster family of nations, New Zealand has a neutral and professional public service, comprising at the time of writing (2008) 35 government departments listed in the First Schedule to the State Sector Act 1988. The size of departments varies considerably. As at June 2007 there were 42 047 full-time equivalent positions (FTEs) in the public service (SSC 2007). A handful of large departments accounted for the bulk of this employment: 11 departments had more than 1000 FTEs, and three – the Ministry of Social Development, the Department of Corrections and the Inland Revenue Department – had more than 3000 FTEs each. The Ministry of Social Development (which amongst other things administers the income support system) is the largest department: with 9323 FTEs it accounts for nearly a quarter of all public service jobs. At the other end of the scale, some departments employ very few staff. In 2007, for instance the Ministry of Women’s Affairs had only 34 FTEs. As a consequence of a process of structural reform that began in the mid-to-late 1980s (see Boston et al., 1996), in addition to core government departments, the New Zealand state sector is also populated by a battery of other institutions which operate with varying degrees of autonomy from the political executive. There are close to 3000 Crown entities (most of which are school boards of trustees), as well as some 50 tertiary education institutions and state-owned enterprises. Still further out on the

116


institutional landscape, 86 city, district, and regional councils collectively comprise the local government sector. In addition to a core policy advisory function, some departments retain service delivery responsibilities. However, a political preference for contestability of supply and the vertical division of departmental functions means that, these days, a great deal of publicly-funded service delivery is now undertaken by Crown entities and agencies, by local government, and by organizations in the not-for-profit and private sectors. The challenges this institutional diversity creates for ministers, and the part ministerial advisers play in responding to them, are an important aspect of the New Zealand story.

THE ‘THIRD ELEMENT’ IN THE NEW ZEALAND EXECUTIVE In the sense of a formally designed and recognized role, ministerial advisers of the political kind are a relatively recent development in New Zealand, but in a functional sense one can date their emergence from the mid-1980s (see Table 4.1). In at least one of the countries surveyed in this book – Australia – the Whitlam Government’s decision to introduce ministerial advisers reflected an explicit policy preference (Maley, 2000; Tiernan, 2004). In New Zealand the process has been rather more ad hoc. In 2008 every minister’s office features at least one ministerial adviser, but during the late 1980s and early-to-mid-1990s, ministers chose whether or not to have a ministerial adviser (or, in the administrative nomenclature of that period, an ‘executive assistant’) on their staff. A number did, but some did not. In New Zealand, unlike Australia, there is no separate statute under which ministerial staff are employed; and unlike the United Kingdom, there is no dedicated code of conduct for ministerial advisers. In a formal sense the regulation of advisers is established largely through contracts of employment, whether individual or collective. New Zealand public servants are technically employed by the chief executive (CE) of their department or agency; in the case of ministerial advisers, the CE of the Department of Internal Affairs is ‘the employer’. Typically, too, the contract of employment includes a job profile which specifies the mix of tasks and duties for which an adviser is accountable. There are at least three explanations for the gradual increase in the number of political advisers over the last decade. Two of these are largely specific to the New Zealand context. First, the New Zealand model of state sector reform was – organizationally and institutionally – about

New Zealand

Table 4.1

117

Staff in ministers’ offices 1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

Ministerial adviser/senior adviser Executive assistant Press secretary/media assistant

0 15 24

11 16 21

19 10 22

26 10 23

27 3 23

25 3 30

Total

39

48

51

59

53

58

Note: These data were obtained from Executive Government Support under the Official Information Act (1982). Data regarding the number of events-based contract staff are not available before 1998. While the line of demarcation between the administrative and the political is indistinct at best, ministerial advisers/senior advisers, executive assistants, and press/media staff tend to engage in political functions.

positioning ministers as (political) principals responsible for purchasing outputs from (administrative) agents. An institutional prescription anchored in the assumptions of public choice and agency theory suggested the need for formal supports for ministers – and not sourced from their administrative agents – to enable efficient and effective purchasing decisions to be made (Boston et al., 1996). Arguably, then, the reforms generated a political demand for advice of a sort which political advisers are well placed to offer. In addition, the imperatives of proportional representation – and in particular the processes of multi-party government formation and management which have become the norm under mixed member proportional representation (MMP) – require the provision of advice and support that, under Westminster conventions, non-partisan public servants do not provide. Indeed, when asked to identify the reasons for the growth in the number of ministerial advisers, more respondents to our officials’ survey pointed to the advent of MMP than to any other single factor (Table 4.2). Specifically, they saw ministerial advisers as a response to the clutch of new political relationships – principally within administrations, and between Governments and parliamentary support parties – attendant upon the advent of multi-party and minority governments. One put it simply: ‘MMP has resulted in more complexity in government processes, and the need for relationship management’ (O039). Much the same point was made by the minister who concluded that the rise and rise of the ministerial adviser is ‘[b]ecause post-MMP government is more party political and sensitive to political wins and losses’ (M21). Much of what this entails in practice – forming Governments, brokering

118

Table 4.2


Factors behind the increase in ministerial advisers

MMP Policy complexity Pressure on ministers Ministers mistrust officials Other Total

Count

Responses (%)

Cases (%)

75 54 21 34 83

28.1 20.2 7.9 12.7 31.1

46.3 33.3 13.0 21.0 51.2

267

100.0

164.8

Note: n = 162; missing = 26.

agreements on the policy agenda, planning tactics in the House with support parties, negotiating trade-offs around legislation – is off limits to public servants, but grist to the ministerial adviser’s mill. Bluntly, there has been an ‘increased “busyness” . . . of ministers following MMP. Ministerial advisers can negotiate policy positions with other parliamentary parties on behalf of the minister, when public servants cannot’ (O091). But other factors – not necessarily a function of electoral reform, and certainly not specific to New Zealand – are also behind the trend. Consistent with Weller’s analysis of the systemic challenges facing the institution of Cabinet government (Weller 2003), our research detects a sense that – well beyond the consequences of MMP – policy making is simply more difficult these days than it once was. Respondents to each of our surveys have identified intractable policy problems, hostile media, exponential increases in the amount of information ministers must master, and a more demanding and discerning public as characteristics of a contemporary policy environment which places ministers under increasing pressure. And in response, ministers have turned to political advisers for support and advice. As one senior official put it, the increase in advisers is: [i]n large part due to public pressure. Expectations now from all sectors of society have risen. The requirement on ministers to be well briefed, to a very detailed level [and] on a wide range of issues, to allow them to respond quickly, is widely acknowledged. They can’t do this alone. Hence ministerial advisers [which] ministers can trust in greater numbers. (O014)

Ministers, too, have commented on this phenomenon. As one explained: ‘Government has become more complex. Demands on ministers’ time have expanded. Enormous departmental effort is wasted by the misuse of the [Official Information Act], and [written parliamentary questions], leaving shortfalls in departmental capability to serve ministers’ (M61).

New Zealand

119

A significant minority of respondents to our officials’ survey also thought that the growing number of political advisers reflects a certain loss of faith in officials amongst ministers. The more positive view of this is that ministers are increasingly inclined to probe officials’ advice; part of the job of the ministerial adviser is to ‘provide more contestable advice and to check departmental advice against ministerial and party policy’ (O034). A second, somewhat more pointed position on the matter is that governments have become more sceptical of officials’ motives. Labour-led administrations, in particular, were believed to: ‘distrust senior public servants: [they] perceive them as withholding information, or perhaps not providing quality, contestable advice. Also, ministers want this advice to be tested against their political strategy/agendas. After all, they want to remain in power’ (O099). Other respondents also indicated that since 1999, when a centre-left administration took office following nearly a decade of centre-right Government, there has been some ‘distrust of permanent officials and their ability to be politically neutral – or more correctly, [to] provide advice reflecting different political objectives’ (O108). There is a view amongst some senior officials, too, that centre-left administrations are inclined to want to exercise tighter management of the policy process. In other words, not only do ministers seek contestable advice, there is a ‘wish to ensure stronger political management of policy issues, [and] a possible feeling among politicians that the public service isn’t sufficiently responsive to changes in policy direction’ (O023). To some extent, that view was borne out by ministers, one of whom noted that ‘[t]here is a greater need for contestable policy advice as issues have become more complex. Policy advice from officials tended to be single focused and rarely provided realistic (as opposed to ‘straw men’) alternatives’ (M04). On the other hand, one of the more interesting suggestions was that the arrival of the ministerial adviser simply reflects that public servants are doing what they’re expected to – and doing it well. As one official put it, ‘[t]he public service has always been mindful of the need for neutrality. Ministers want their advisers to be partisan. In many ways it’s a [positive] reflection of the integrity of the public sector’ (O055). From this view the existence of ministerial advisers is, in essence, a testament to the professionalism of officials.

CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY The arrival of ministerial advisers on the stage of executive government begs any number of important questions. One is: what capacities

120


(understood as structural and organizational endowments) and capabilities (the opportunity to realize these endowments) do political staff bring to the table?2 An increasingly complex policy and institutional environment has generated demands – from both ministers and senior officials – for new capacity in the management of political relationships and the wider policy process. The advent of ministerial advisers can, in part, be interpreted as a response to those demands. That much is explicitly acknowledged in the newly revised Cabinet Manual (2008), paragraph 3.19 of which notes that ‘In addition to taking advice from the public service and other parts of the state sector, ministers may take advice from other sources, including political advisers in their offices. Political advisers have an important role in supporting ministers to manage relationships with other political parties, to manage risk, and to negotiate support for policy and legislative initiatives’. A more detailed sense of the capacities sought by ministers is suggested by Table 4.3.3 Ministers value process-related (and in particular negotiation) skills; they also place a premium on more substantive skills relating to policy research, evaluation and analysis. Perhaps a little surprisingly – at least in the context of the prevailing popular discourse regarding ministers’ recourse to political staff – ministers placed a little less emphasis on the need for ministerial advisers to share their political principals’ ideological disposition. And only two respondents ranked ‘membership of the same political party’ as an important attribute. (In short, neither of the two competencies listed in Table 4.3 which, arguably, should not comprise part of the public service tool kit, was accorded much priority by ministers.) Similarly, as a group, ministerial advisers did not take an especially strong stance on the importance of a partisan affinity with ministers. Rather – and this perhaps reflects their institutional location at the nexus of ministers and officials, and Governments and parliamentary support parties – they placed a much greater emphasis on political negotiation skills. For both ministers and ministerial advisers an understanding of the processes of executive government also ranked as a valued attribute. For both, too, prior relations with either external interests or (to a lesser extent) the public service were accorded somewhat less importance (although ministers tended to value connections with the latter more highly than did ministerial advisers). A slightly different means of engaging with issues of capacity and capability is to explore ministers’ motives for appointing political advisers. Not all New Zealand ministers have, in fact, engaged advisers. The case for not doing so was expressed by the former National Party Minister (and one

121

Note:

3.1 9.4 6.3 0 12.5 0

0 0 23.8 0 14.3 0

4.8 4.8

0

33.3 0

4.8

4.8

14.3

9.5

4.8

9.5

9.5

M%

2

3.1 3.1

3.1

28.1 15.6

3.1

0

12.5

6.3

9.4

12.5

3.1

MA %

28.6 4.8

0

14.3 0

4.8

9.5

14.3

9.5

4.8

14.3

0

M%

3

12.5 0

3.1

15.6 15.6

0

0

25

3.1

3.1

12.5

12.5

MA %

9.5 0

4.8

4.8 9.5

4.8

19

19

4.8

0

4.8

9.5

M%

4

18.8 0

3.1

15.6 9.4

3.1

3.1

6.3

9.4

3.1

15.6

12.5

MA %

0 0

4.8

0 4.8

4.8

0

9.5

14.3

14.3

9.5

0

M%

Data are from ministers (M) (n = 21); and ministerial advisers (MA) (n = 32). (Where 1 = most important; 5 = least important).

0

3.1

4.8

4.8

0

0

3.1

43.8

19.0

4.8

9.4

MA %

14.3

M%

1

Ranking ministerial advisers’ skills and aptitudes

Policy expertise Political negotiation skills (e.g. brokering agreements on policy) Communications/media expertise Same ideological preferences as the minister Ability to network with government departments or agencies Pre-existing links with the public service Pre-existing links with interest groups Understanding of processes of executive government Skills in policy evaluation Membership of same political party as the minister Policy research and/or policy analysis skills Speech-writing skills

Skill

Table 4.3 5

6.3 0

0

9.4 9.4

6.3

9.4

25

15.6

6.3

6.3

6.3

MA %

122


time Chairman of the OECD Round Table on Sustainable Development) the Rt Hon. Simon Upton, who observed that: I always used a seconded staff member from the ministries for which, for the time being, I was responsible. I was always very clear about the particular attributes and qualifications I was after, but inevitably had to leave the choice to the Chief Executive. At no stage did I entertain any paranoias that such seconded staff were anything other than fully motivated to assist me – whether in dealing with the public service or with the world beyond it. . . . If I had a one line view on the matter I would, on balance, be inclined to the view that using seconded staff is a good way for ministers to force themselves to respect the neutrality and independence of the public service. That might seem paradoxical, but I suspect that more pressure is placed on political appointees to do things than might be asked of a public servant . . . I rather like the idea of a professional public service that provides free and frank advice, while elected people are left to apply their philosophical/ideological prisms to that advice.

A similar point was made by another former National Party minister who suggested that ‘ministers and policy units in departments should drive policy, being open to views from outside sectors, but not captured by them. The minister, with Cabinet colleagues, should deal with the politics, not the hired help. Partisan help is just that: very limited’ (M26). Increasingly, however, the Westminster traditionalism reflected in these views has ceded ground to a tendency to engage at least one ministerial adviser in each ministerial office. When asked why they had appointed political staff, respondents to our ministers’ survey offered these views: [They provided] independent advice (i.e. non-departmental). (M08) [Ministerial advisers] help to make sure there is not departmental capture of the minister. (M21) I employed only one as I felt the department concerned were not fully supportive of the Government’s policies in that . . . portfolio. (M17) My ministerial advisers acted as a check and balance on the advice I received, and where appropriate would advise that I get another opinion. Also, the adviser helped negotiations with officials over policy options. (M21)

In addition to the need for support in managing the dynamics of multi-party and minority government, then, it seems that for some ministers ministerial advisers constitute a check against the predations of departmentalism. Arguably, concerns that departments occasionally place their own agendas ahead of those of their political principals can also be detected in ministers’ responses to questions inviting them to rank the

New Zealand

123

frequency with which their ministerial advisers undertook various activities. Ministers indicated that the most frequent activity was participating in meetings between the minister and his or her officials. This was followed by conveying and or clarifying ministerial wishes to officials, attending meetings with external interest groups, and assisting with questions in the House and written parliamentary questions. Other frequently performed tasks included reading officials’ advice before it reached the minister’s desk, meeting with ministerial advisers from other ministers’ offices, meeting with officials to develop and/or implement policy, assisting with responses to Official Information Act requests, and assisting with coalition consultations and/or management. A similar pattern emerges from ministers’ assessments of the importance of different aspects of the ministerial adviser’s role as it relates to the policy process and engagement with officials. In our research, ministers attached relatively higher importance to roles such as ‘conveying or clarifying the minister’s wishes for officials’, ‘scrutinising advice from officials’, ‘testing the political ramifications of advice from officials and others’ and ‘monitoring policy implementation’ (see Eichbaum and Shaw, 2007b). A third means of ascertaining what ministerial advisers bring to the table was to establish – via a survey of ministerial advisers – a profile of the sorts of activities advisers themselves routinely undertake. The most frequently reported tasks occurred within the core political executive. Over two-thirds of survey respondents (68.7 per cent) met with members of the Prime Minister’s staff frequently or very frequently, and 78.1 per cent regularly accompanied their minister to meetings with other ministers and met with other ministerial advisers. Some 59.4 per cent of respondents assisted with coalition consultation and/or management matters on a more or less regular basis. Ministerial advisers also engaged in various activities which straddle the boundaries of the executive and legislative branches. In part, this conduct goes to issues of executive accountability. Virtually all ministerial advisers (96.9 per cent) prepared their minister for Question Time in the House, and assisted with responses to written parliamentary questions. Many (78.2 per cent) also responded to Official Information Act requests (which are frequently lodged by non-government MPs). Further, over two-thirds (78.2 per cent) of our respondents interacted with either MPs or political staff from parliamentary support parties on at least an occasional basis, and 43.8 per cent of them did so on a frequent or very frequent basis. Unsurprisingly, interactions with officials comprise a sizeable portion of ministerial advisers’ work. Ninety per cent of respondents conveyed and/or clarified their minister’s wishes to officials on a frequent or very

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frequent basis. Interestingly, however – both in light of the data reported by ministers in Table 4.3, and in the context of the case that ministerial advisers constitute an alternative source of policy advice – rather fewer (50.1 per cent) met with officials to develop and/or implement policy on a regular basis. But in and of itself that cannot be interpreted as evidence of a disengagement from policy making, as 93.8 per cent of respondents regularly attended meetings ministers had with officials, and only slightly fewer (87.5 per cent) read and commented on officials’ advice before it reached their minister’s desk.

MINISTERIAL ADVISERS IN THE POLICY PROCESS In New Zealand, any discussion of the contribution ministerial advisers make to the policy process must account for the nature of Cabinet government under proportional representation. There is a general view that ministerial advisers undertake a range of important MMP-specific roles and, moreover, that these constitute a valuable contribution to the management and operation of coalition and/ or minority Governments. In the main, these roles stem from the demise of single-party and/or majority Governments. Since the implosion of the National/New Zealand First government in August 1998, New Zealand has experienced a sustained period of multi-party minority Government. Such arrangements rest upon relationships – within the political executive, and between Governments and parliamentary support parties – which ministerial advisers are ideally placed to assist with. That is certainly the view from the political executive. Of the 21 ministers who participated in our research, only two disagreed that ministerial advisers are now a legitimate feature of executive government. Likewise, all but two concurred that advisers add value to the policy process under conditions of minority and/or multi-party Government (and just a single respondent disputed that ministerial advisers facilitate relations between coalition partners, and between Governments and their parliamentary support parties). As one minister explained, in the political environment characteristic of governing under MMP ministerial advisers assist in the ‘negotiations across parties [needed] to gain support for my legislation in the House. No-one else was deputed to do this – certainly not the ministry secondments’ (M45). Ministerial advisers themselves also see these sorts of contributions as central to their raison d’être. Virtually all of the 32 ministerial advisers we surveyed agree (the majority of them strongly) that they add value to the policy process under coalition and/or minority Government conditions, and facilitate relations between coalition partners.

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Many, however, see their chief contribution as lying outside the core political executive. Twelve of those surveyed did not think that mustering support for their minister’s policy initiatives amongst other ministers was an important role (and only six identified it as a very important one). And respondents were split – virtually down the middle – on the importance of gaining the support of other ministerial advisers for their minister’s policies. Ministers themselves, a good few of our respondents seemed to be saying, can resolve the politics of policy with their Cabinet colleagues. On the other hand, a majority of ministerial advisers were of the view that garnering support for the government’s policies amongst parliamentary support parties was a central responsibility for an adviser. An especially good example of this was provided by the adviser who offered this response to a question probing the nature and extent of ministerial advisers’ contribution to policy making: Advisers can work out policy and legislation with other parties. In an MMP environment it is other parties, as well as officials, with whom policy now needs to be developed. . . . The Greens and the government’s coalition agreement made transport legislation and policy a ‘Category A’ issue. This meant that all matters to do with government policy were to be agreed with [the Greens]. I conducted most of these negotiations, and was pivotal to the development of most legislation and policy documentation’. (MA10)4

The evidence also suggests that officials are reasonably positive in their assessment of the ministerial adviser’s role in the policy making contexts fast becoming the norm under MMP. For instance, data from our officials’ survey suggest the existence of a broad consensus that advisers add value to what one senior official described as ‘the “backroom” stuff’ (O024) with coalition partners and support parties which is both a defining feature of policy-formation – and of governance more generally – under MMP, and well beyond the pale for public servants. More particularly, those who agreed or strongly agreed that ministerial advisers add value to the policy process under conditions of coalition and/or minority Government outnumbered those who had no view on that statement and who disagreed with it to a greater or lesser extent (see Table A4.1, 15). More respondents agreed that ministerial advisers foster relations between coalition partners (Table A4.1, 16), and between Governments and other political parties (Table A4.1, 17), than did not, and few dispute that advisers enhance policy input from interest groups (Table A4.1, 14). (Regarding the latter, whether or not this is perceived as a good thing cannot be inferred from these responses, but the data do tend to support the view that MMP has increased the scope for external interests to gain access to policy elites.)

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Ministerial advisers’ contributions in these respects are not, however, universally endorsed. Some respondents to our officials’ survey were openly scathing of the political ‘make-work’ they felt has become a hallmark of governing under MMP. Others were sceptical of the wider role played by ministerial advisers. One echoed the sentiments of other respondents when she noted that ‘on occasion [ministerial advisers] can “capture” a minister and get in the way of frank advice, or create unnecessary work if they do not know a policy or operational area well’ (O034). Another indicated that his experience ‘has been entirely negative: the adviser made decisions and dabbled in day-to-day management putting his minister at risk’ (O062). For a third (whose views anticipate issues concerning mandates which we return to shortly), ministerial advisers’ ‘only major “contribution” is in driving ministers’ pet projects that they [ministers] might think would not be prioritized or got onto quickly enough otherwise’ (O154). Our sense, however, is that such dispositions are less common than is the view that ministerial advisers are now central to the policy process in New Zealand, simply because of ‘the need to manage coalition partners, and to negotiate policy options that bridge the political views’ (O108). The adviser’s role in all of this is to ensure ‘co-ordination and facilitation across several ministers, both within the same portfolio and with interests in the issues; [and to provide] some coalition co-ordination across parties’ (O099). In addition, not only have the politics of multi-party and minority government increased ministerial advisers’ leverage in the policy design stages, they have also become key players in the implementation phase. Thus, advisers have a critical role as ‘brokers around legislation’ (O140), and ‘often manage the negotiation between coalition partners or other parties when a majority is being assembled to move things through the legislative process’ (O088). In other words, MMP provides ministerial advisers with a constant flow of opportunities for influencing both the substantive and procedural dimensions of policy. They do not exist simply to expedite process. Beyond a certain point it is futile to attempt to quarantine those aspects of policy making which are MMP-specific from those which are not. Nonetheless, when asked to elaborate more generally on what ministerial advisers have to offer the policy process, senior officials drew attention to several things which are not wholly a function of MMP (or at least, which would conceivably exist regardless of electoral arrangements) (Table 4.4). Particular mention was made of advisers’ ability to co-ordinate actors and issues within a core executive the boundaries of which are increasingly fluid. In such a context ‘a very skilled adviser can add enormous value and good governance [and] can help embed strategies across ministers’ (O013).

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Table 4.4 Ministerial advisers’ contribution to the policy process*

Add contestability Add political perspective Stakeholder management Assist ministers Other Total

Count

Responses (%)

Cases (%)

14 43 45 53 71

6.2 19.0 19.9 23.5 31.4

9.2 28.1 29.4 34.6 46.4

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100.0

147.7

Notes: * The data slightly understate the frequency with which respondents referred to ‘contestability’. Where participants first indicated that ministerial advisers assisted ministers, and then described an action that might be construed as adding contestability, that response was placed in the category ‘assist ministers’. n = 153; missing = 35.

The cross-cutting dimensions of that role were explained by an official for whom ministerial advisers serve as: a useful ‘sounding board’ for officials. Where they support the officials’ view, they will assist and facilitate decisions by ministers. [They] [a]ssist also in management of relations between ministers’ offices, which has been important with the increase in the numbers of ministers, associate ministers and parliamentary undersecretaries. (O028)

Sir Richard Wilson, a former head of the British Civil Service, has noted that ministerial advisers are able to ‘help the department understand the mind of the minister, work alongside officials on the minister’s behalf and handle party political aspects of government business’ (Wilson 2002, p. 387). For many senior officials who participated in our research, the most valuable contribution a ministerial adviser can make is in assisting officials to understand and negotiate the political context which wraps around ministers’ preferences. Good political staff earn their keep when they serve as ‘the bridge between “neutral” advice and . . . what is and isn’t on the table for a particular government’ (O181). The importance of this was conveyed by two senior officials who indicated that effective ministerial advisers: provide a useful conduit/liaison with the minister. They can also provide useful information to departments on the political imperatives impacting on or driving the minister. They can communicate the areas of policy which are non-negotiable. (O113)

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facilitate the flow of information to and from busy ministers, exercising judgment and synthesizing information so that ministers can be informed efficiently and in an up-to-date way. [They] [c]an integrate information from different sources which aids ministers, but can also help to inform the policy process by incorporating different perspectives. (O179)

Clearly, that advisers are able to offer insights on the state of ministers’ thinking ‘does not mean we [officials] should only deal with those issues’ (O049), but it can reduce the slippage which occurs when ministers and their officials talk past each other. It also helps officials understand the political drivers behind ministers’ choices. Policy is not shaped in a vacuum, and rational, evidence-based criteria are not the only considerations taken into account when policy options are framed and decisions reached. Ministerial decision-making (both individual and collective) is inherently political – for much policy, the point of departure is an electoral mandate that is clearly political – and this presents challenges for impartial officials who must get close, but not too close, to the political crucible. But by hovering between ministers and public servants, ministerial advisers can both ‘ensure that appropriate political dimensions are part of the advice’ (O087) and absorb much of the political heat which might otherwise be directed at officials. In a nutshell, ministerial advisers: ‘provide advice on the political impact of policy choices [which] can provide a “reality check” for options presented by officials. In some respects they help preserve the neutrality of officials’ advice (since political factors are drawn from elsewhere)’ (O151). There are, however, other ways of making sense of the data in Table 4.4. ‘Contestability’, for instance, is itself a contested term. There are some officials who regard ministerial advisers as valuable because they ‘can be more closely attuned to the extremes of public opinion, and be more aware of non-Wellington viewpoints than public servants’ (O090); or because they possess the ability to ‘question the work and conclusions of public servants’ (O057), to ‘see the bigger picture [and] provide fresh eyes to question assumptions and probe technical issues’ (O065), or to ‘provide a “reality check” [and] a clearer sense of the political context in which advice will be received and judged’ (O096). But alongside these views sits a more cautious assessment, which is that, as governments increasingly turn to political appointments for advice, officials will play an ever more marginal part in the policy process (a point we return to shortly). Some of the categories in Table 4.4 describe actions or interventions by ministerial advisers which some senior officials felt can have precisely this effect. For instance, while adding a political perspective can mean ‘inserting viewpoints that might be overlooked by core public sector advisers’ (O081), it can also mean ‘inhibit[ing] the policy process by seeking to rule out options deemed politically unacceptable’ (O081).

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Comments such as these demonstrate that the line between enhancing contestability and diluting officials’ contribution is a fine one, and that its precise location depends on who is asked to find it. They are also a reminder that, in the context of the policy process, adviser/official relations cannot be approached as a zero-sum game. The material experience of both parties is altogether more complex than that, as these contributions make plain: I have worked with some (excellent) advisers who have seen their role as ‘adding value’ – using the strengths, skills and expertise of the public servants, and augmenting that with political and in some cases sector knowledge. Other advisers have, it seems, explicitly regarded themselves as sources of contestable advice – and have blocked advice from officials to ministers, compromising the policy process. (O147) Working well, ministerial advisers can add value – if they understand the policy area, and where the department is coming from. They can then provide a useful constructive ‘challenge’ role, which can result in better (more ‘pragmatic’) advice to the minister. Unfortunately, many ministerial advisers aren’t particularly knowledgeable or competent and can undermine good policy process because of this. (O161)

THE IMPACT OF MINISTERIAL ADVISERS ON RELATIONS WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE One thematic constant across the contributions to this book is the implications of the advent of political advisers for relations within the executive branch. Typically – at least in jurisdictions with historic ties to Westminster – the presumption is that the emerging state of affairs threatens certain fundamental Westminster principles and practices. For instance, there are those for whom the advent of ministerial advisers threatens the traditional bases of relationships between the political and administrative executives. Not surprisingly, this view is held in some sections of the official family in New Zealand. These participants are reasonably comfortable as long as advisers stick to their political knitting (managing political relationships, brokering policy coalitions, attending to coalition management issues and so forth), but take umbrage when they begin to, or are perceived to be intruding in the relationship between ministers and officials. Thus, when presented with a forced-choice question asking if ministerial advisers have any bearing on the receptiveness of ministers to officials’ advice, 55.8 per cent of respondents to our officials’ survey were firmly of the view that they do (17.7 per cent felt they do not, while 26.5 per cent were undecided). When pressed to elaborate on the nature of that impact,

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however, respondents adopted one or other (and occasionally both) of two approaches. Some characterized the impact as being either positive or negative. The reasons given by the former generally referred to the benefits of contestability and role clarity. Those proffered by the latter invariably invoked either the threat of politicization, generally via an adviser’s efforts to dilute officials’ advice before it reached ministers, and/or by impeding access to ministers. For instance, one senior official reported having ‘experienced a ministerial adviser . . . whose view appeared to be accorded more weight [by the minister] than the evidence might have reasonably suggested was appropriate’ (O092); another that advisers ‘tend to provide a framework that politicises what are operational/policy responses’ (O007); and a third that ministerial advisers ‘sometimes forget they are not the minister. It is often hard to know if the adviser is speaking for the minister or him/herself until too late’ (O079). The alternative tack was to offer a more contingent response. And, gauging from the tenor of these, a good deal seems to depend upon the minister rather than the adviser. There is a perception that experienced, senior ministers are ‘as aware of their advisers’ foibles as of officials’, and can discount both’ (O011), ensuring that the streams of advice coming from both sources are complementary rather than contradictory. Junior or less able ministers, however, are felt to be rather more prone to poor judgement and capture by their ministerial advisers: ‘[the] biggest risk is ministers with less experience or [who are] very political in nature, and whose advisers are junior, inexperienced or unfamiliar with policy processes. This can pose a real risk to the departmental/minister relationship’ (O018). And yet other senior officials were reasonably sanguine – if not positive – about the bearing their partisan colleagues have on relations between ministers and public servants. As one respondent noted: The presence of a ministerial adviser/s in ministers’ offices can provide a competing source of policy advice to departments’ advice. Ministerial advisers can also provide political and practical technical advice around implementation issues that cannot be, or which it is inappropriate to provide, as part of departments’ advice to ministers. This means ministers consider departmental advice alongside the advice of advisers [original emphasis]. (O041)

Officials have also pointed out that ministerial advisers can help protect officials from pressures which may result in politicization. In this, our data are consistent with findings from Australia, where public servants recognize that political staff can reduce the chances of ministers asking them ‘to do things that are verging on the political’ (Briggs 2005, p. 7). In this respect ministerial advisers function as a sort of institutional filter,

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absorbing ministers’ political demands and enabling officials to concentrate on the provision of free and frank advice. And as one minister saw things, the value of his ministerial adviser lay in ‘linking the politically neutral state sector to the partisanship of [the] government-of-the-day’ (M46). Far from muddying the waters, then, there is a view amongst some officials that ministerial advisers can ‘help ensure this [political] dimension is part of the decision-making process and, in doing so, help keep departments apolitical’ (O087). The majority of ministers seem not to be overly concerned that ministerial advisers are adversely influencing relationships between the political and administrative executives. Comfortably over half of the 21 ministers we surveyed indicated that ministerial advisers had either little or no impact on public servants’ personal access to them (the minister), and only two strongly disagreed with this. Just four agreed that ministerial advisers actively hinder officials’ personal access to ministers and, while a third thought that ministerial advisers have a tendency to dilute officials’ advice before it reaches the ministerial desk, 16 respondents disputed the proposition that advisers actively prevent officials’ advice from reaching the minister. On the whole, then, ministers tended to regard ministerial advisers as facilitators of, or indeed helpful adjuncts – rather than impediments to – relations between ministers and officials. As one put it, ‘wise officials knew that the advisers would likely understand my stance on issues, and this could help officials make faster progress’ (M03). Another found, after she had engaged a ministerial adviser, that her ‘time was much more efficiently used on the more important policy issues [because] the adviser could negotiate out the trivia. Also, advisers helped to keep the work flowing and cleared log-jams’ (M21). Finally, as another minister acknowledged, ‘officials generally prefer unimpeded access to ministers. A capable and knowledgeable adviser will force officials to lift their game and provide better (i.e. less departmental agenda) advice’ (M08).

MINISTERIAL ADVISERS AND THE PERMANENT PUBLIC SERVICE The nature of relations between political and professional public servants is also an enduring feature of discussions regarding the impacts of ministerial advisers. For their part, New Zealand’s senior officials are relatively positive in their assessment of the state of their relationships with their partisan colleagues. We tested this through a composite measure comprising 21 statements relating to various aspects of the ministerial adviser’s

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role, and the relationship between advisers and officials (see Table A4.1). A high overall score (out of 105) on the scale indicated a positive inclination towards ministerial advisers; a low score, the reverse. In the event, the mean score of 61.5 suggested our respondents were reasonably well disposed towards their partisan counterparts. In fact, only 13.9 per cent of cases registered an aggregate score of 52/105 or less. This overall orientation was most clearly revealed in officials’ views on the state of the relationship between officials and ministerial advisers (Table A4.1, 1). Two-thirds of respondents were of the opinion that, in general terms, the relationship is in pretty good health: not one person strongly disagreed with this. When asked to describe their own relations with ministerial advisers, rather than to assess the health of a notional generic relationship, respondents were, if anything, more positive. Clearly, there are instances in which relationships are strained. One official had this to say: I have experienced, over the last 4 years, increasing pressure on departmental staff to capitulate to particular political positions and write advice supportive of such positions. In some instances we have had political advisers working directly on interdepartmental issues to bias advice given to ministers. Staff in departments are either becoming political or risk-adverse in response to this pressure. (O006)

But those sorts of experiences tended to be the exception, and most officials appear to regard the advent of ministerial advisers as a positive development. The view of one CE provides an insight into why this might be. That CE was: initially sceptical about the position of ministerial adviser for all the usual reasons; e.g. they would not be impartial, they would exercise or attempt to exercise too much influence, that there would be confusion between their role and that of officials in departments, and that it would be difficult to speak frankly to them. On balance, however, over time I think they have a role and can be useful in providing a political perspective about policy issues which one often needs to know. They can often provide a perspective on how a minister views the conventional policy advice he or she is getting from departmental officials. (O160)

For many advisers, too, there is much to be gained through (appropriately managed) contact between ministerial advisers and public servants. As one expressed it: I think advisers help the public service to be more impartial. We can give the political advice, or the politics of the situation. We can suggest options or alternatives to ministers that public servants probably should not, or feel they

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cannot. Often, I found this combination – of political and departmental advice – of real value. So did my ministers [original emphasis]. (MA10)

That most of our participants are rather more relaxed about the roles and influence of political advisers than appears to be case amongst their peers in, say, Australia, where ministerial staff advisers have been described as ‘the “junk-yard attack dogs” of the political system’ (Weller 2002, p. 72) may be attributable to contextual factors. The most obvious of these is MMP or, more specifically, the relative attenuation of executive power which has been a consequence of New Zealand’s new electoral arrangements. The advent of non-majority and multi-party Governments has placed something of a natural constraint on the extent to which ministerial advisers can enforce the power of the parliamentary executive. MMP was consciously designed to limit the tendency in the New Zealand system to executive excess. It is understandable, then, that under conditions of minority and/or coalition Government, a somewhat less cavalier approach to matters of public administration might be adopted within the political executive. Relatedly, our data suggest that many of the distinguishing roles and functions of ministerial advisers are not perceived as threatening by public servants. Advisers’ core activities – those associated with oiling the wheels of the political relationships which are integral to MMP governments – are not ones with which impartial public servants could safely engage. Our respondents acknowledged that by attending to these particulars ministerial advisers protect public servants – to some extent at least – from political pressures which might otherwise be brought to bear on them. More broadly, too, it may be that the implementation of major institutional change within the public sector, and in particular the formal de-coupling of the responsibilities of ministers and officials, has given a certain institutional legitimacy to the role of the ministerial adviser in New Zealand. Jointly, perhaps, the reforms of both the electoral system and the public sector have given rise to a systemic climate in which officials are, if not wholly comfortable with ministerial advisers, then at least open to the case for the provision of partisan advice at the heart of the political executive. For their part, ministerial advisers also tend to confirm the relatively healthy state of affairs between political and public service advisers (see Table A4.2). To a degree advisers’ assessments of officials point in two directions. On the one hand there is some unease regarding certain aspects of the motives and conduct of officials. Nearly half of advisers we surveyed felt more or less strongly that officials are not sufficiently responsive to the policy priorities of the Government of the day (Table A4.2, 1). Over half

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agreed or strongly agreed both that officials are selective in the advice they tender to ministers (Table A4.2, 2), and that they tend to assert departmental priorities at the expense of the policy agenda of the Government of the day (Table A4.2, 3). But on the more specific issue of the state of relations between officials and ministerial advisers, the latter are, in the main, as positive in their assessment as are their departmental counterparts. They overwhelmingly agreed with the proposition that relationships between advisers and officials are mostly positive – not one respondent disputed this (Table A4.2, 8). Nearly half were of the view that officials understand the role of ministerial advisers (Table A4.2, 9), and even more agreed or strongly agreed that officials generally respect advisers’ contributions (Table A4.2, 10). Clearly, not all respondents were upbeat on the matter, with one noting that while ‘[s]enior officials understood [my role], many lower down ones simply don’t get it. They would often do things to get [me] into trouble’ (MA14). On the whole, however, the following responses typify ministerial advisers’ assessments of the tenor of relations with public servants: My relationships were always positive, because I helped them get their job done – i.e. helped them get policy passed, helped them understand what their minister wanted and how what they were working on fits with the wider government picture. Mutual respect is key. (MA08) There is a healthy tension between ministerial advisers and officials. Officials need to recognize that ministers are entitled to have and receive advice from sources other than government departments – it all adds to the comprehensive development of policy and its implementation. Government [is] not just about policy but also about political management. (MA26)

ARE ADVISERS A THREAT TO WESTMINSTER FUNDAMENTALS? Section 3.17 of New Zealand’s Cabinet Manual enjoins ministers to: ensure that staff and advisers in their offices understand the principles governing the Minister’s role and the Minister’s relationship with public service officials and entities in the state sector. Like Ministers, staff in Ministers’ offices must take care to ensure that they do not improperly influence matters that are the responsibility of others.

Those provisions go to some of the most serious concerns voiced regarding the implications of the increasing influence of ministerial advisers for the independence and integrity of the permanent public service (Edwards

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2002; Holland 2002; Keating 2003; Maley 2000; Senate of Australia 2002; Tiernan 2005, 2007; Walter 2006). The issue for some is that advisers shield ministers from officials, and politicize the policy process – and the public service – by privileging political imperatives over the provision of free, frank and fearless advice. Additionally, there are fears that ministerial advisers are inclined to sacrifice the long haul at the altar of short-termism, such that the capacity of the public service to provide institutional scepticism (Plowden 1994, p. 104) – by which is meant an antidote to the attenuated time horizons that can drive ministerial decision-making – is threatened. The risks that advisers allegedly pose to the impartiality of the permanent public service are widely documented. In our view, though, any assessment of the nature and extent of this threat should rest on a clear and appropriate conceptualization of ‘politicization’. Politicization is an elusive term (see Mulgan 1998; Peters and Pierre 2004). As Peters and Pierre have noted, politicization of the public (or civil) service is generally taken to refer to ‘the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards and disciplining of members of the public service’ (2004, p. 2). Such conceptions do not easily accommodate the advent of the trilateral relationship within the executive branch. By directing attention to relations between ministers and officials (and to those between public service employers and their employees), they tend to exclude consideration of partisan advisers, and are therefore of limited value in assessing the consequences of those advisers’ activities for the independence and integrity of public servants. Elsewhere, therefore (see Eichbaum and Shaw 2008), we have proposed an alternative conception, administrative politicization, which describes an action or intervention which is contrary to the principle of an impartial and professional civil service. Reflecting that the politicization of policy content can be distinguished from the politicization of the policy process, administrative politicization has both substantive and procedural dimensions. Ministerial advisers offend in a procedural sense if they act in a manner intended to, or having the effect of constraining public servants’ ability to furnish ministers with advice in a free, frank and fearless manner. Examples might include an adviser who obstructs officials’ access to the minister, who consciously prevents departmental advice from reaching the minister, and/or who questions officials’ competence in front of the minister. While procedural interference may constrain officials’ contribution to policy formation, or detract from the overall quality of policy advice, it seems unlikely to contaminate the contents of officials’ advice per se. But ministerial advisers can behave in ways which have exactly this effect. The

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substantive dimension of administrative politicization, then, describes conduct which is intended to or has the effect of colouring the content of officials’ advice with partisan considerations. Examples might include changing the content or presentation of officials’ advice, demanding substantive changes to papers before they are submitted to ministers, directly intervening in a department’s operations or work-programme, and misrepresenting officials’ advice or views to the minister. Our research has not established any widespread concern regarding politicization amongst either ministers or (less surprisingly) ministerial advisers (see Eichbaum and Shaw 2007a, 2008). But we thought it important also to seek the views of those allegedly at risk from the predations of ministerial advisers, for while it is commonly alleged that the public service is being increasingly politicized, ‘the evidence supporting that belief is often subjective, anecdotal and rather diffuse’ (Peters and Pierre 2004, p. 1). To be sure, a number of participants in our officials’ survey were decidedly cautious about the effects of ministerial advisers. Some 36.3 per cent of those surveyed, in fact, indicated that they felt ministerial advisers threatened the impartiality of the public service. (If there is a surprise here, it may be that so many respondents did not identify a risk.) For the most sceptical of these, ministerial advisers do damage in both substantive and procedural respects; they are felt to function as a nefarious pre-ministerial filter, colouring all advice with a partisan dimension before permitting it to proceed into the inner sanctum. Worse, some reported instances in which a ministerial adviser has ‘confused self and own opinions with [those of] the minister’ (O060). Another recalled experiences ‘where advisers have asked to review policy papers and seek changes before being submitted to ministers’ (O006). Cases in which advisers have ‘asked for papers to be rewritten to reflect their [the adviser’s] needs, not departmental advice’ (O060), or attempted to ‘edit out full/complete advice, and block out sensitive material that may damage political interests’ (O167), were also recounted. Even when somewhat less caustic, a number of senior officials remained wary that political staff are inclined to try (often unsuccessfully) to exclude officials from the design phases of the policy process. Many of these respondents did not detect much evidence of substantive administrative politicization, but did worry that ministerial advisers may be undermining robust procedural arrangements and producing a procedural malaise. Much the same concern has been expressed in the Australian context, where Walter (2006) has noted the asymmetrical advantage political advisers enjoy over public servants by virtue of their institutional proximity to ministers. Political staff are thus able to come between ministers and senior officials and produce a ‘funnelling’ effect, narrowing the range of policy options down to those pre-determined by an ideological agenda.

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New Zealand officials are split in their perceptions of the extent to which these effects are accruing in Wellington. Certainly, there is general agreement that ministerial advisers exercise greater influence now than they might once have (Table A4.1, 3). Correspondingly, there is now a risk, as one senior official put it, that ‘if an adviser seeks to inject political tradeoffs too early in the policy development process they can significantly undermine and compromise the robustness of the process and integrity of the outcome’ (O086). However, we did not detect a clear sense amongst officials that the influence ministerial advisers wield is being routinely exercised to ill effect. Indeed, over 50 per cent of our respondents are of the view that the policy contribution made by ministerial advisers is a positive one, and only 10.3 per cent take issue with that proposition (Table A4.1, 4). On some funnelling-related matters – such as whether or not advisers seek to keep certain matters off the policy agenda – there is a view that there is an issue (Table A4.1, 6). But on other conduct which would be central to a funnelling strategy – including discouraging the provision of free and frank advice to ministers (Table A4.1, 8), and hindering officials’ access to ministers (Table A4.1, 11) – officials are more equivocal about the effects of ministerial advisers’ behaviour than might be expected. At a theoretical level, the concern suggested by these data is that advisers are contributing to a diminution in the ‘neutral competence’ (see Peters and Pierre 2004, p. 4) which the public service contributes to executive government. At least in Westminster contexts, the public service has long constituted a counter-weight to political short-termism, expediency and naivety. The fear expressed by some senior officials is that if officials are routinely excluded from the deliberations which precede policy decisions, then the institutional scepticism they provide will gradually cease to inform the policy process in particular, and the body politic more generally. At the very worst, over time this would undermine the long-standing compact between the political and administrative wings of the executive. A more likely consequence, perhaps, would be a tangible shift in policymaking dynamics within the continuing context of existing arrangements. Depending on one’s assessment of the value an impartial bureaucracy adds to the policy process, this might be seen either as compromising the integrity of the policy process or, conversely, of ensuring a more ‘responsive competence’ on the part of the bureaucracy. In the New Zealand case, however, data from officials themselves do not support the contention that public servants are being marginalized as a matter of course. Again, those who are of the view that ministerial advisers are a threat to officials’ access to ministers tend to be in the minority. Most respondents are disinclined to accept that advisers exercise little or

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no influence over their access to ministers whatsoever (Table A4.1, 9), but most also stop short of indicating that advisers seek actively to hamper that access (Table A4.1, 11). Even fewer endorse the view that advisers prevent departmental advice from reaching ministers (Table A4.1, 12). Indeed, when asked if advisers pose a risk to the public service, one departmental CE retorted: ‘Quite the reverse. They free us much more than would otherwise be the case from being drawn into the political process’ (O096). The same respondent also volunteered that, although advisers had interfered in their department’s work, they had done so ‘only in the sense that their advice was contrary to ours, resulting in the minister choosing an alternative approach – which seems entirely legitimate!’ Furthermore, returning briefly to an earlier point, what some saw as politicization others regarded as contestability. The latter tended to the view that ministerial advisers provide a useful check on the quality of public servants’ advice to ministers. Put differently, ministerial advisers provide officials with incentives – if such were needed – to lift their performance and the quality of their advice. As Shergold has opined: There is nothing in the Westminster tradition that suggests that public servants should have a monopoly in the advice going to government: indeed, from a democratic perspective there is everything to be gained by a contestable environment, in which the well-honed policy skills and experience of public servants are challenged by alternative perspectives from within and outside government. (2005, p. 6)

That view was endorsed in our research with New Zealand officials. As one expressed it, when ministerial advisers are around, public servants’ ‘ideas and arguments need to be strongly robust and comprehensive, thus adding a level of cost [to officials]. Every angle and argument needs to be covered and countered’ (O092).

ACCOUNTABILITY AND REGULATION The arrangements regulating the conduct of ministerial advisers in New Zealand are – comparatively speaking – fairly unsystematic. As noted earlier in this chapter, advisers are appointed by ministers, but are formally employed by the Department of Internal Affairs on events-based employment contracts. Typically, the contract of employment also includes a job profile which specifies the mix of tasks and duties for which an adviser is accountable. Further, as state employees, and therefore subject to the provisions of the State Services Code of Conduct, ministerial advisers must (a) fulfil

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their lawful obligation to the government with professionalism and integrity, (b) perform their official duties honestly, faithfully and efficiently, respecting the rights of the public and colleagues, and (c) not bring the public service into disrepute through their private activities. In addition, ministerial advisers are subject to the Department of Internal Affairs’ own Code of Conduct. In respect of ministerial advisers, elements of that code are clearly anomalous, with sections variously requiring employees to ‘[e]nsure that their personal interests or convictions do not interfere with the duty to serve the Minister through the Secretary of Internal Affairs’, and to ‘provide honest and impartial advice to Ministers’ [emphasis added]. By comparison with those in other countries covered in this volume, New Zealand’s regime seems somewhat underdeveloped. For one thing, it lacks the legislative equivalent of Australia’s Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984. Neither is there a dedicated code of conduct for ministerial advisers as there is in the United Kingdom, amongst the functions of which are to identify where advisers’ responsibilities end and those of public servants begin, and to articulate a grievance process for officials who feel that an adviser’s actions may have compromised their impartiality. There are no formal limits here on the numbers of ministerial advisers, as is also the case at Westminster (even if that is typically observed in the breach). And in New Zealand there are no provisions (as there are in Australia) requiring Government to report on the size of ministers’ staffing complements, and the number of political advisers.5 This elasticity extends to the regulation of relations between ministerial advisers and officials. The relevant guidelines in the Cabinet Manual (Cabinet Office 2008, para 3.20) require that both ministers and departmental CEs ‘must establish a clear understanding to ensure that . . . departmental officials know the extent of the advisers’ authority’.6 In practice, however, there is considerable variability in the protocols which govern relations between advisers and officials within ministerial offices. In fact, just 27.1 per cent of the senior officials we surveyed said that there were protocols in place regulating contact between ministerial advisers in their minister’s office and departmental officials. Over a third (35.1 per cent) said their engagement with ministerial advisers was not subject to a protocol (at least one respondent expressed surprise that when he had ‘checked the intranet, nothing was there!’), and 33.5 per cent were unsure one way or the other whether such arrangements existed. Much the same patchiness on the matter of protocols was evident among ministers. Only five of the 21 ministers we surveyed had, or had had, formal protocols governing relations between their ministerial advisers and departmental officials. And some of those arrangements were on the less formal side of ‘formal’; one minister, for instance, recalled that

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there had been protocols ‘only in so far [as] I advised officials of the role I expected my advisers to take, and how officials might like to work with them’ (M03). Other arrangements, to be fair, are altogether more robust, including those put in place by the minister for whom ‘the [CE] of the department would stipulate the acceptable contact points in the department. In most cases, all inquiries had to go through the Secretary’s office’ (M21). Evidently, then, there are various approaches taken to the form and content of protocols. The core distinction seems to be between written and unwritten protocols. Where respondents to the officials’ survey worked to formal written agreements (and relatively did so), these tended to be reasonably prescriptive, and directed either at processes ‘for seeking requests for briefings, information etc.’ (O112), or at the level at which contact between advisers and officials can take place. On the whole, though, the preference – at least amongst public servants – seems to be for more informal and non-codified understandings (see Table A4.1, 20/21). Quite a few respondents would recognize this CE’s explanation that the relevant protocols ‘are many, subtle and mainly preserved in the culture rather than in writing. They boil down to clear understandings of role boundaries’ (O128). And many would probably agree that it is not a formal credo but ‘the personal judgement of officials contacting ministers’ offices [which] is the more significant factor in determining the nature of the contact’ (O041). On matters such as these, it would seem, the view is that a point is quickly reached where the optimal way of managing contact is more by ‘relational’ and informal modes of ‘contracting’, with far less recourse to more ‘classical’ and prescriptive contractual vehicles. Much, then, depends on the conduct and disposition of individuals. And in particular, our respondents were strongly of the view that much depends upon the minister. The importance of strong leadership from the minister was a recurrent theme in our research (even though it tends not to feature in the wider literature as a determinant of relations between officials and ministerial advisers). Many respondents made it clear that, as far as the state of working relationships is concerned, ministers’ expectations and actions matter quite as much as the motives and dispositions of officials and advisers. Above all else, the clarity with which ministers specify the nature and scope of their delegations to ministerial advisers is seen as crucial to role clarity. And for at least some respondents, altogether too little effort is invested in ensuring that all parties understand the bases of the authority with which ministerial advisers speak. One senior official framed the matter thus: ‘In my experience advisers’ delegations are generic and broadbased, leaving them substantial room for action. The nub of the issue is

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whether they act in accordance with ministers’ understanding of their delegations’ (O041). There are really two dimensions to the issue. The first is whether or not, in general, ministerial advisers comply with their delegated authority. Most of our respondents believe they do: only 20.2 per cent of them reported personal experience of instances in which a ministerial adviser had – in the official’s view – exceeded his or her delegated authority. Just over half had never experienced an adviser over-stepping the mark, while 20.7 per cent felt the issue did not apply to them. The second and more substantive matter concerns the nature of the delegations made to ministerial advisers. Specifically, it has to do with the extent to which ministerial advisers’ dealings with officials are based on, or legitimized by, an authority which has been formally delegated by ministers. For some officials this simply wasn’t a concern. One respondent suggested that advisers are like a ‘filtering mechanism rather than manipulative. There do not appear to be many (or any) “Sir Humphreys”’ (O061). But for others, including the 20 respondents who, in response to a question regarding the nature of advisers’ ‘transgressions’, volunteered that they were not at all sure what delegated authority ministerial advisers actually possessed – it was a very significant matter. We tend to share that view, as the absence of clear understandings of the extent of an adviser’s authority may threaten the relationship between ministers and their officials. Sir Humphrey Appleby was, of course, a senior civil servant, not a political adviser. But behind the Yes Minister analogy lies an assumption that advisers are essentially an extension of the ministerial persona; a sort of cipher for conveying ministers’ preferences to officials. (Much the same understanding is suggested by the existing accountability arrangements, according to which ministers are individually responsible for the conduct of the ministerial advisers they appoint.) But the very act of clarifying a minister’s views, or communicating his or her directions to officials, necessarily requires the adviser to exercise a degree of discretion and agency, and so is vulnerable to a sort of ‘Chinese whispers’ syndrome in which an original instruction is subtly altered – either consciously or unwittingly – in the process of transmission. At the very least, confusion about the degree of delegated authority can create uncertainty for public servants as to the identity of the authorial voice; at worst, it can generate the appearance – if not the reality – that an adviser has arrogated executive authority. As one put it, when the limits of a ministerial adviser’s delegation are unclear it can be difficult for officials ‘to tell whether the line that the adviser is giving us is her line or the minister’s line. It’s hard to ask [an adviser] “is this just what you think, or is it what the minister thinks?”’ (O117).

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Plainly, then, the specification and communication of delegated authority is important, if not to guard against the adviser who would deliberately substitute his or her own preferences for those of the minister, then to ensure some clarity on the respective – and at times quite possibly shared – roles and responsibilities of advisers and officials. But if clarity on this count is central to the definition of roles and responsibilities, so too are effective and workable protocols governing relationships between ministerial advisers and officials. And so we return to the importance of the minister. For it falls to the minister, of course, to decide upon the extent to which an adviser speaks with his or her voice, to establish the working arrangements that will obtain within the ministerial office, and to set the climate of expectation about how things will and will not proceed on his or her watch. And as one official noted, failure to do these things can have unfortunate results: There’s a lack of accountability with ministerial advisers that makes it very difficult when things go badly. Who are you supposed to complain to? How do you know when they’re misrepresenting the minister’s views, and what’s to stop them doing that? Who are they accountable to? Most ministers certainly don’t have time to review their [advisers’] performance, and most ministers don’t have any management skills anyway. We have also had issues when staff inside the minister’s office don’t get on, and bicker constantly, withhold information from each other, and give the department different messages. Again, who is meant to be responsible for resolving that? (O162)

As to possible future arrangements governing ministerial advisers’ conduct, there is a lack of enthusiasm for the formal codification of protocols. Only a third (35.7 per cent) of those officials whose involvement with ministerial advisers is actually subject to a formal protocol believed that this helps clarify roles and relationships. There is, on the other hand, much stronger support – certainly amongst officials – for the articulation of a dedicated code of conduct for ministerial advisers (Table A4.1, 20). (A majority of ministerial advisers were also in favour of such a code. Ministers, on the other hand, were markedly less eager; only five of those we surveyed endorsed the idea.) Such an initiative might, one would imagine, substantially clarify the present anomaly that advisers are currently subject to codes of conduct which, by enjoining them to act impartially and objectively, appear to proscribe the very activities they are employed to undertake. In addition, senior officials indicated that such a code could also be designed so as to clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of ministerial advisers and officials. Such clarity – which others believed could be made through amendments to the Cabinet Manual – was felt to be central

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to placing the relationship between advisers and officials on a more transparent footing, and to minimizing the potential for officials’ relationships with ministers to be compromised. Talk of a code necessarily raises the thorny question of responsibility for enforcement, on which subject officials, at least, were distinctly unenthusiastic about grounding a code in legislation (Table A4.1, 21). A number of alternative options were put forward, including that the State Services Commission should appoint and appraise the performance of ministerial advisers; that the discretion of the Audit Office to undertake effectiveness reviews of public agencies should be extended to advisers; that their names and salary ranges should be made publicly available; and that an interest register should be established for ministerial advisers. On the question of placing a formal limit on the number of ministerial advisers, the distribution of responses from officials was fairly homogenous: more respondents agreed or strongly agreed that this should be the case than did not, but a significant percentage were undecided on the matter (Table A4.1, 18). And of those who expressed a definitive position on whether Parliament should control the number of advisers (Table A4.1, 19), noticeably more were of the view that it should not than felt that it should. Ministers and ministerial advisers were similarly unenthusiastic about extending parliamentary oversight. A solitary (former) minister strongly agreed that a dedicated code for ministerial advisers should be grounded in legislation; all others disagreed with that proposition to a greater or lesser extent. There was a little more support for the idea amongst ministerial advisers, although here, too, the balance of opinion (75 per cent) was firmly against a statutory solution. Relatively light-handed regulation, it would seem, is the preferred order of the day in New Zealand. There was, on the other hand, rather more support within the political executive for placing formal limits on the number of ministerial advisers. Just over half of the ministers we surveyed felt this should be the case, and only one felt strongly that it should not be. Almost a quarter of ministerial advisers also concurred that there ought to be a cap on their number.

CONCLUSION Relationships between political actors are substantially fashioned by the institutional contexts – both formal and informal – in which they are played out. A central thesis of this chapter has been that two features of the New Zealand polity, in particular – the institutional organization of the public sector and the electoral system – have shaped the ministerial

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adviser’s role, and the tenor of relationships within the executive branch of government. In general terms it seems reasonable to regard ministerial advisers as an adaptive response to some of the consequences of New Zealand’s experience of institutional reform. For instance, one of the features of the New Zealand case is the degree to which ministerial advisers work across the spectrum of core departmental responsibilities, and have policy competencies in a range of areas. This cross-portfolio modus operandi makes sense in the context of the fragmented institutional landscape that emerged from the first generation of New Zealand’s state sector reforms. The separation of ministers’ ownership and purchase interests, and of the purchaser and provider roles within departments and agencies, created a demand for non-public service advice on ministers’ purchase activities. With other innovations, such as the introduction of budgeting on the basis of outputs (and, more recently, outcomes), these developments help explain the frequency with which ministerial advisers in New Zealand help ministers to develop and/or implement accountability arrangements. Equally, ministerial advisers may be considered an institutional response to the ‘bargaining uncertainty’ (Dickinson 2003) which confronts New Zealand Prime Ministers. The term describes the inability of political actors to reliably predict the outcome of bargaining exchanges with other actors (Dickinson 2003, p. 28). In the current New Zealand context, it neatly captures the challenges variously associated with knitting together and managing a multi-party Administration, and with making legislative progress from a position of relative parliamentary uncertainty. And therefore, it also helps to make sense of the ministerial adviser’s place in the scheme of things. Prime Ministers who lead coalition minority Administrations must consistently bargain with other political actors in order to achieve political and policy outcomes. Advisers play an important role in fostering and negotiating the requisite executive, legislative and policy coalitions. Notwithstanding that individual ministerial advisers are appointed by their ministers, as a collective resource advisers are deployed to manage the risks associated with multi-party and/or minority Governments, and to facilitate the knitting together of disparate policy positions into a single Government agenda. Institutional particulars aside, New Zealand ministers’ recourse to political staff needs also to be understood in the much wider – and comparative – context of the challenges associated with governing in increasingly complex environments. This particular adaptive response to exogenous circumstances necessarily prompts reflections on the future status of some of the eternal verities of Westminster. The conventional view – fed in no small part by a popular emphasis on high profile instances of misconduct

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– is that political staff represent a fundamental threat to relations between ministers and officials, and to the best traditions of bureaucratic professionalism and neutrality. But a concern with the scandalous exception does not disprove what is, in our view, a rather more prosaic rule. The evidence from New Zealand, at least, is that relations between ministers, officials and ministerial advisers are, on the whole, more fruitful and less fraught than the orthodox view would allow for. Ministers have indicated that political advisers assist them to negotiate the thickets of multi-party and minority Government, and help keep officials honest. And while the enthusiasm is far from universal, many senior public servants acknowledge some complementarity in roles, and accept that the partisans can shield them from pressures which might otherwise lead to politicization. For those of a cautious bent, however, there remain nagging concerns about the relative looseness of the existing accountability arrangements. Wellington’s approach to the regulation of ministerial advisers – when compared with those taken in Canberra, Dublin, Ottawa, Washington and Westminster – is surprisingly light-handed. As yet, there has been no equivalent in New Zealand of Australia’s Children Overboard furore, the Hutton and Butler Inquiries in the United Kingdom, or the events scrutinized by the Gomery Commission in Canada. But it is entirely likely that, at some point, the conduct of a ministerial adviser will feature prominently on the front pages of the national press. When that happens, the relatively congenial climate that currently prevails in Wellington will surely be tested.

NOTES 1. Between 2005 and 2007 we administered three surveys: of senior New Zealand officials (n = 188; response rate 34 per cent), past and current ministers (n = 21; response rate 42 per cent), and political advisers (n = 32; response rate 43 per cent). When reporting qualitative data in this chapter, responses from ministers use the prefix M (e.g. M12), those from officials the prefix O (e.g. O123), and those from ministerial advisers the prefix MA (e.g. MA4). The data are reported more fully in Eichbaum and Shaw (2006, 2007a/b/c, 2008). 2. See Tiernan and Wanna (2006) for an extended discussion of capacity and capability in the public sector. 3. Table 4.3 sets out responses to a question in our ministers’ and ministerial advisers’ surveys asking respondents to rank what they felt were the five most important skills a ministerial adviser should possess. 4. Following the 2005 election the centre-left Labour/Progressive minority administration negotiated three legislative coalition agreements with parliamentary support parties. Agreements allowing a Government to be established, and specifically providing support to the Government in respect of votes of confidence in it, and approval of its budget, were signed with the New Zealand First and United Future parties. A co-operation agreement

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was entered into with the Green Party. The agreement provided that, for Level I (i.e. ‘Category A’) issues such as the Buy Kiwi Made and energy efficiency campaigns, a Green spokesperson would be fully involved in the development and implementation of policy proposals. For full details see www.greens.org.nz/searchdocs/other9314.html (accessed 23 June 2008). 5. In Australia, the Department of Finance and Administration provides twice-yearly documents at Estimates hearings which detail the numbers and classifications of Government personel (Tiernan 2004). 6. The State Services Commission’s ‘Fact Sheet 3: The Relationship between the Public Service and Ministers’ (available at www.ssc.govt.nz) advises on how these guidelines might be operationalized. It restates the relevant contents of the Cabinet Manual, and specifies six principles which should underpin arrangements within ministers’ offices.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Boston, J., J. Martin, J. Pallot and P. Walsh (eds) (1996), Public Management: The New Zealand Mode, Auckland: Oxford University Press. Briggs, L. (2005), ‘A passion for policy?’, ANZSOG/ANU public lecture series, 29 June. Cabinet Office (2008), Cabinet Manual, Wellington: Cabinet Office. Dickinson, M.J. (2003), ‘Bargaining, uncertainty, and the growth of the White House staff, 1940–2000’ in B.C. Burden (ed.), Uncertainty in American Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 27–47. Edwards, M. (2002), ‘Ministerial advisers and the search for accountability’, Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration, 105, 16–19. Eichbaum, C. and R. Shaw (2006), ‘Enemy or ally? Senior officials’ perceptions of ministerial advisers before and after MMP’, Political Science, 58 (1), 3–23. Eichbaum, C. and R. Shaw (2007a), ‘Ministerial advisers, politicization and the retreat from Westminster: the case of New Zealand’, Public Administration, 85 (3), 609–40. Eichbaum, C. and R. Shaw (2007b), ‘Ministerial advisers and the politics of policy making’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 66 (4), 453–67. Eichbaum, C. and R. Shaw (2007c), ‘Minding the minister? Ministerial advisers in New Zealand’, Kotuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Science On-Line, 2 (2), 95–113. Eichbaum, C. and R. Shaw (2008), ‘Revisiting politicisation: political advisers and public servants in Westminster systems’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 21 (3), 337–65. Holland, I. (2002), ‘Accountability of ministerial staff’, Australian Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, research paper no. 19 2001–02, Canberra: Australian Commonwealth Parliamentary Library. Keating, M. (2003), ‘In the wake of “a certain maritime incident”: Ministerial advisers, departments and accountability’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 62 (3), 92–7. Maley, M. (2000), ‘Conceptualising advisers’ policy work: the distinctive policy roles of ministerial advisers in the Keating government, 1991–96’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 35 (3), 449–70. Mulgan, R. (1998), ‘Politicisation of senior appointments in the Australian public service’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 57 (3), 3–14.

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Peters, B. Guy and J. Pierre (eds) (2004), Politicisation of the Civil Service in Comparative Perspective, London: Routledge. Plowden, W. (1994), Ministers and Mandarins, London: Institute for Public Policy Research. Senate of Australia (2002), ‘Report of a senate select committee into a certain maritime incident’, Canberra: Senate, Parliament of Australia. Shergold, P. (2005), ‘“The need to wield a crowbar”: political will and public service’, Dunstan Oration, Adelaide, 7 April. SSC (State Services Commission) (2007), Human Resource Capability Survey, Wellington: SSC, accessed 17 June 2008 at www.ssc.govt.nz. Tiernan, A.M. (2004), ‘Ministerial staff under the Howard government: problem, solution or black hole?’, PhD in Department of Politics and Public Policy, Griffith University: Brisbane. Tiernan, A. (2005), ‘Minding the minders: addressing the problem of ministerial staff’, paper presented at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, Otago University. Tiernan, A. (2007), Power Without Responsibility, Sydney, NSW: University of New South Wales Press. Tiernan, A.M. and J. Wanna (2006), ‘Competence, capacity and capability: towards conceptual clarity in the discourse of declining policy skills’, presentation to an ICPA forum workshop, the Australian National University: Canberra, 28 November. Walter, J. (2006), ‘Ministers, minders and public servants: changing parameters of responsibility in Australia’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 65 (3), 22–7. Weller, P. (2002), Don’t Tell the Prime Minister, Melbourne, VIC: Scribe Publications. Weller, P. (2003), ‘Cabinet government: an elusive ideal?’, Public Administration, 81 (4), 701–22. Wilson, R. (2002), ‘Portrait of a profession revisited’, Political Quarterly, 73 (4), 381–91.

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Table A4.1

Officials’ views on their relations with ministerial advisers

Statement 1

2 3 4 5

6 7

8

9 10 11 12 13

14

15

Relationships between advisers and public servants are generally positive Advisers are a legitimate feature of executive government Advisers are more influential now than they used to be Advisers make a positive contribution to the policy process Advisers have too much influence in shaping the government’s policy agenda Advisers try to keep certain items off the policy agenda Advisers, through their actions, constitute a risk to the political neutrality of the public service Advisers do not encourage free and frank advice on the full range of policy options available to government Advisers have little or no bearing on officials’ access to ministers Advisers sometimes exceed their delegated authority Advisers hinder officials’ access to ministers Advisers prevent departmental advice from reaching ministers It is appropriate for advisers to be drawn from the public service, and to return there on leaving a minister’s office Advisers facilitate interest group engagement with the policy process Advisers add value to the policy process under coalition and/or minority government conditions

1 (%)

2 (%)

3 (%)

4 (%)

5 (%)

3.4

63.1

24.6

8.9

0

7.1

70.1

17.9

3.8

1.1

19.0

40.8

33.0

6.7

0.6

4.9

47.3

37.5

9.2

1.1

4.4

21.9

47.0

24.0

2.7

8.3

39.2

31.5

18.8

2.2

6.1

24.0

33.5

32.4

3.9

7.8

27.9

25.1

33.5

5.6

2.2

18.7

20.9

44.0

14.3

6.8

43.8

43.8

5.7

0

1.7

20.7

39.1

35.8

2.8

2.3

13.1

35.8

43.2

5.7

9.3

38.5

23.6

21.4

7.1

3.9

38.3

43.9

12.2

1.7

7.3

45.3

40.2

5.6

1.7

New Zealand 16

17

18 19 20 21

Advisers play a positive role in facilitating relations between coalition partners Advisers play a positive role in facilitating relations between governments and their parliamentary support parties There should be a limit placed on the overall number of advisers Parliament should control the number of advisers There should be a special Code of Conduct for advisers A Code of Conduct for advisers should be provided for in statute

149

8.9

38.5

49.7

1.7

1.1

5.6

37.3

53.7

2.8

0.6

7.8

27.9

45.3

17.9

1.1

5.7

17.6

44.9

26.7

5.1

27.6

53.6

14.4

4.4

6.7

12.8

38.3

33.3

Notes: The table uses ‘advisers’ rather than ‘ministerial advisers’; 1 = strongly agree; 2 = agree; 3 = neither agree/disagree; 4 = disagree; 5 = strongly disagree. n = 188.

0 8.9

150


Table A4.2

Ministerial advisers’ view on their relations with officials

Statement 1

2 3

4

5 6 7 8

9 10

Officials are insufficiently responsive to the policy priorities of the government of the day Officials are selective in the advice they tender to ministers Officials assert departmental priorities at the expense of the government’s agenda Officials sometimes substitute their own policy preferences for those of ministers Officials generally try to facilitate ministers’ policy objectives Officials strive to provide free, frank and fearless advice Officials are often hostile towards ministerial advisers Relationships between ministerial advisers and officials are mostly positive Officials understand the role of ministerial advisers Officials generally respect the contribution of ministerial advisers

1 (%)

2 (%)

3 (%)

4 (%)

5 (%)

3.1

37.5

28.1

21.9

9.4

18.8

46.9

15.6

15.6

3.1

9.4

43.8

12.5

31.3

3.1

0

50.0

18.8

25.0

3.1

12.5

75.0

6.3

6.3

9.4

50.0

9.4

25.0

6.3

3.1

28.1

65.6

3.1

9.4

84.4

6.3

0

0

3.1

43.8

25.0

28.1

0

6.3

53.1

21.9

15.6

3.1

0

0

Notes: 1 = strongly agree; 2 = agree; 3 = neither agree/disagree; 4 = disagree; 5 = strongly disagree. n = 32

5.

Ireland Bernadette Connaughton

INTRODUCTION The Republic of Ireland is a parliamentary democracy situated on the western periphery of Europe – an ‘island behind an island’. Upon its independence from Britain in 1922 the response of the new Irish Administration was to predominantly absorb the organization and principles of its predecessor (Chubb 1992). As a result the Irish Administration retained core features of the British model – namely accountability through ministers to parliament, selection and promotion on merit and political neutrality of senior civil servants. In the decades that followed, the civil service served effectively inexperienced Governments that were reliant on their expertise (Kissane 1995). The presentation of partisan appointees and alternative advice was rare. To a large degree the bureaucracy remained rooted in the early twentieth century traditions and practices of the traditional model of public administration, as opposed to adapting and modernizing with the times. The Irish case differs, however, from several of its Westminster cousins in that a politicized attack on bureaucracy did not occur during the late 1970s and 1980s. Active, as opposed to prescribed, reform of the administrative system has largely been a development of the 1990s in the form of internal modernization and an emphasis on a more effective delivery of services to the citizen-client. Reform of politico-administrative relations has concentrated on attempts to clarify responsibility and accountability relationships, rather than wholly displacing the traditional ethos and core public service values with managerialism. This does not mean, however, that partisan appointees have not become a feature of the Irish system in contemporary times. The ‘third element’ in executive government – ministerial or special advisers – has been entrenched since 1973. In the Irish system, however, ministerial advisers are deemed to have their genesis in the facts of Irish electoral life, rather than the tortuous history of mainstream civil service reform (O’Halpin 1997). To place the role of these special advisers under scrutiny is important since it relates to the structures of government, policy making and

151

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implementation, to ministerial effectiveness and to the relevance of politics to administration. The role of advisers has not been precisely defined but the main qualification for the job would appear to be personal loyalty and a trusted relationship with the minister. Advisers may be members of the minister’s political party but many of them are not, and approximately half of Irish ministerial advisers are drawn from the civil and public service. This chapter traces the historical development and current operation of the adviser system and outlines the characteristics of the institutional context within which it operates. It is argued that the main drivers in their origin and development are coalition Government, the piecemeal reform of the Irish administrative system and the necessity to avoid politicizing a neutral civil service. Despite occasional tensions between individual advisers and the civil service, the former are perceived as a legitimate feature of the administration through their contribution to the political aspect of ministerial policy work. In the Irish case, scrutiny of the role indicates that ministerial advisers generally have not enhanced policy capacity in terms of an injection of specialist expertise. Rather they provide assistance of a partisan nature and contribute to the effective coordination of Government business through their role as conduits between the political and official worlds. Their involvement in executive affairs has not been without controversy, however, and the discussion will address the tensions between theory and practice regarding accountability arrangements and the status of advisers within departments.

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT – INHERITANCE OF THE WESTMINSTER MODEL AND ADAPTATION Constitutional Framework The influence of British tradition on the Irish state is evident in that the parliament, government and bureaucracy were consciously modelled on British institutions (Chubb 1992). In 1937 the constitution of the Irish Free State (1922) was replaced by the current constitution Bunreacht na hÉireann. Its main features included an emphasis on the republican and unitary nature of the state, a bicameral legislature – the Oireachtas composed of an upper house, Seanad Éireann, and a lower house, Dáil Éireann, together with the government and independent court system. Bunreacht na hÉireann promoted Irish as the official language of the state and largely reflected the Fianna Fáil Government’s more nationalistic stance. It also gave prominence to Catholic social thinking which had considerable impact on numerous public and social policy developments.

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The head of government in Ireland is the Taoiseach and the head of state is the President who is elected by the people every seven years. Bunreacht na hÉireann, 1937, sets out the powers of the President, which are largely ceremonial and rest on the advice of the Government. It is largely viewed as a secondary political office devoid of expectations of political leadership (Elgie and Fitzgerald 2005). The Taoiseach is by far the central figure in political decision making and he (so far no women) is appointed by the President on the nomination of the Dáil. The Taoiseach nominates ministers and is the central coordinator of their work and that of government departments. Article 28 of the constitution sets out the basic functions and authority of the Government and fixes its size to not less than seven but not more than 15 members, all of whom must be a member of one of the Houses of the Oireachtas. Nowhere in the constitution does the word ‘cabinet’ appear, though the system laid out in article 28 describes a Cabinet modelled along British lines. In practice no item can be tabled at Cabinet meetings without the Taoiseach’s approval and decision making processes are affected by collective responsibility and through the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. Cabinet discussions are strictly confidential under the constitution and only decisions are recorded in the minutes by the secretary general to the Government. The Irish system is characterized by a strong party Government and the legislature tends to have relatively little policy effect. Despite reforms to strengthen the role of Oireachtas committees, the legislature remains very restricted in its oversight role. There are 166 Teachta Dála (TD – member of the Dáil) and elections are held every five years in 43 multi-seat constituencies. The Seanad has 60 members who in theory are supposed to represent the main vocational groups in society. It is in reality dominated by members of political parties, largely because it is elected by members of the Dáil. Eleven members are directly elected to the Seanad by the Taoiseach. Party and Electoral System The party system in Ireland is different to most European party systems since the core divisions between the main political parties are not religious but rather reflect the pro and anti-treaty forces in the civil war (1922–3). The partition of the country into two separate states had largely removed the main cultural cleavage between the Protestant Unionists and the Catholic Nationalists. The major issue after independence in 1922 was the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The divisiveness this created within the population fuelled the creation of and commitment to pro and anti-treaty parties. In contemporary times, civil war politics has faded into the background

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and alignment to parties is now more on the basis of tradition and economic factors. Both of these parties, Fianna Fáil (Soldiers of Ireland) (FF) and Fine Gael (Irish race) (FG), are centre-right parties. It is generally argued that policy differences between them are often indistinct and vague, making the ability to clarify positions objectively difficult (Mair and Weeks 2005). The main Irish parties also tend to be run on personalist lines, whereby internal disputes have focused largely on personalities rather than on policies. A second distinctive feature of the Irish party system is the weakness of the left, with the exception of the ‘Springtide’1 in 1992 whereby the Labour Party secured 19.2 per cent of first preference votes in the Dáil. Generally the Irish Labour Party secures approximately 10 per cent of the national vote. Other smaller, non-traditional alternatives represented in the Dáil are parties such as Sinn Féin (We Ourselves) advocating a 32-county democratic socialist republic, the Green Party–Comhaontas Glas, and the Progressive Democrats (a liberal party). Both the Green Party and Progressive Democrats are part of the current coalition Government with Fianna Fáil. Since 1981 every Government, bar a minority Fianna Fáil Government in 1987–9, has been a coalition and this is likely to endure. Although Fianna Fáil’s ability to form an administration independently has diminished, its success reflects how they have developed into a type of ‘catch-all’, ‘electoral professional’ party that pragmatically appeals to the electorate at large. Fighting an election as a coalition, however, can be beneficial given the nature of the Irish electoral system. Elections to Dáil Éireann are conducted under proportional representation (PR), and specifically by the single transferable vote (STV) system in multi-member constituencies. There is a strong tendency to vote for candidates as individuals rather than along party lines, as PR-STV enables voters to rank candidates. Voters can therefore decide on the basis of candidates, parties or a mix of both. This can result in considerable intra-party as well as inter-party competition between candidates within a constituency. PR-STV therefore has consequences for the party system and Government stability, as well as for the role of the TD (Sinnott 2005). It puts significant pressure on Irish TDs to undertake local clinics and general constituency work in comparison to other countries. If a TD fails to concentrate on the local constituency it is possible that he/she may lose their seat. This perceived necessity of attending every ‘cock fight and funeral’ can greatly detract attention from legislative and oversight functions. In addition, the clientilist nature of the Irish system is reflected in the image of TDs ‘going around persecuting civil servants’ in order to gain access to services for local constituents (Chubb 1992). Even though the PR-STV system fuels clientilism in Irish politics, a public desire to reform it is not evident.

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BUREAUCRATIC LEGACY, CHALLENGE AND CHANGE Political independence did not constitute an administrative problem in Ireland. Approximately 21 000 civil servants, many of whom were senior officials, transferred their services to the new state (Barrington 1980). Steeped in the British tradition, these officials did not deem it necessary to create new administrative machinery despite the break in constitutional tradition. Another maxim of British civil service, that of ‘clear sight over short distances’ also became a hallmark of the Irish administration (ibid, p. 31). This continuity rather than change did not occur, however, in the absence of a cultural imprint. The ‘greening’ of the civil service had gradually developed as a consequence of open recruitment for lower civil service grades from 1970 and a discriminatory policy of promoting civil servants with a nationalist persuasion (McBride 1991). In the early decades of the new state the service was composed principally of young men from similar backgrounds in rural Ireland, typically educated by the Christian Brothers and from families that were unable to afford tertiary education. They were described as intellectually able and hard working, but rather narrowly practical in their approach and deeply conservative (see Chubb 1992). Senior civil servants were not regarded as an elite akin to the French Grands Corps, or in comparison to the UK Oxbridge graduates that dominate the higher echelons of the British Civil Service. Yet these officials were extremely influential in steering policy and contributing to the consolidation of the Irish state. The British legacy was also apparent in the generalist pattern of recruitment that enshrined a ‘cult of the amateur’ within the service (Lee 1989, p. 93). From 1923, civil service entry was underpinned by a centralized competitive examination system in order to ensure that appointment to the institutions of the state would be based on merit only. Changes in the appointment system occurred in 1984 with the establishment of the Top Level Appointments Committee authorized to recommend that a secretary general or assistant secretary be selected by open competition. As a result the profile and calibre of top civil servants is enhanced and the damaging effects of promotion only by seniority and within, rather than between, departments has been reformed. The tradition of civil servants’ political impartiality was also inherited from Britain without question (Millar and McKevitt 2000, p. 48). The civil Code of Standards and behaviour states that all civil servants above clerical officer level are totally debarred from engaging in any form of political activity. Any attempts by ministers to reshape or even subconsciously interfere within these parameters are condemned.2 An illustration from the

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perspective of civil servants may be gleaned from Dooney and O’Toole’s comments that ‘they rarely discuss party politics, and the vast majority of civil servants do not know how their colleagues vote at elections’ (1998, p. 144). A consequence of this is that overtly political advice and partisan loyalty must come from outside the ranks of the civil service, unlike the situation which exists in several continental European states and, to some extent, in a number of the cases in this volume.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MINISTERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS IN THE POLICY MAKING PROCESS Observing the interface between ministers and civil servants yields considerable insight into policy making in Ireland. The system of policy making and implementation is preponderantly sectoral with a poor tradition of cross-departmental interactions. The legal basis for the civil service is contained in the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924 to 1995 which designates the minister in charge of each department a ‘corporation sole’, whereby the minister would essentially be the department and the acts of the department would be the acts of the minister for which he/she would be responsible to the Dáil. From a legal point of view, the civil service played a subservient role, thus parliamentary control of the civil service has been indirect in nature, occurring through the minister and the Government. In effect the minister is the department, and his/her servants have no separate existence. Over time this system clearly had a major impact on the way in which the civil service did its work and bred an over-cautious approach aimed in particular at ensuring the minister was not embarrassed by civil service actions/decisions (Dooney and O’Toole 1998). Instead of being preoccupied with broad questions of policy making, ministers became burdened with a considerable quantity of detailed business and reluctant to release their grip on the levers of power. Attempts to address these rigidities are evident in the general reform programme Delivering Better Government (DBG) 1996 and in the Public Services Management Act (PSMA) 1997. The crux of this act is the intention to allocate authority and accountability for service delivery to those who provide the service, and to develop a performance management culture and a results-oriented approach to decision making. Responsibility and accountability relationships for the minister, secretary general and special advisers are addressed in the PSMA. Section four outlines the role of the secretary general as an accounting officer. It may be argued that despite this greater clarity, the interactions between ministers and senior civil servants still remain a largely grey and undefined area, especially when

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ministers are in the spotlight for administrative lapses within departments. The Irish model continues to be based on the principle that ministers are collectively accountable for the performance of the functions assigned to their departments and secretary generals are accountable to their ministers (see Connolly 2005; MacCarthaigh 2005). Commentators have also referred to the civil service as being too dominant in its influence on policy formulation (Farrell 1994; Zimmerman 1997). For Irish ministers the time and opportunities to shape policy effectively are rather limited. From this viewpoint it is possible to understand Farrell’s assertion that only the most ‘dogged and creative ministers’ can impact significantly on policy (1994, p. 86). Ministers are deemed to be at a significant disadvantage in seeking to impose themselves on the ‘permanent government’ and drive departments in new directions (ibid., p. 83). As a consequence, outsourcing through reliance on external input from the private sector has increased, as has recourse to policy advisers and private consultants. Ironically, however, the raison d’être for the development of advisers is derived principally from the idiosyncrasies of Irish electoral life.

BRIDGING POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES – INTRODUCING THE MINISTERIAL ADVISER The appointment of special advisers to ministers commenced with the inter-party Government of 1954–7 whereby a solicitor, Richie T. Ryan, served as an adviser to the Minister for Justice, James Everett. The Civil Service Commissioners Act 1956 and the Civil Service Regulation Act 1956 enacted during this Government granted the Minister of Finance wide powers relative to regulating the civil service. The Acts allowed certain exceptions to the requirement that positions be filled by competition and so facilitated the appointment of advisers. Despite this the next special adviser position was not until 1970 when the Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, engaged Dr Martin O’Donoghue,3 a Trinity College academic (Dooney and O’Toole 1998, p. 40). O’Donoghue’s selection was exclusive and no other Fianna Fáil minister employed advisory staff during the lifetime of the government (1970–73). The practice of appointing special advisers commenced in earnest with the 1973–7 Fine Gael–Labour coalition steered by Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave (FG) and Tánaiste Brendan Corish (Labour). The Fine Gael– Labour coalitions of 1973–7 were held together foremost in an attempt to exclude the more dominant Fianna Fáil party from Government, rather

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than on the basis of a shared direction on policy. All parties subscribed to Government on this basis and one reason why the coalition proved workable was that it was driven to a large degree by the lack of expectation of the junior partner. The coalition designated six special advisers to provide them with non-departmental advice.4 Five of them worked with Labour ministers, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Garret Fitzgerald, was the only Fine Gael member to avail himself of this option. The initiative was influenced by the experience of socialist and social democratic parties in Government throughout Europe, and as a ‘defence’ mechanism given concerns that the civil service would be biased against the new Government given the longevity of Fianna Fáil Administrations. Initial problems arose with this innovation when Labour advisers were told that they would have to resign as party members in order to take up temporary civil servant status (Quinn 2005, p. 112). This was resolved but civil servants remained suspicious that upon a minister’s departure from office advisers would be facilitated with a permanent post. Up to 1981, advisers who wished to remain in the Administration were often appointed established civil servants ‘in the public interest’ (Dooney and O’Toole 1998). An example of this was the retention of the Fianna Fáil press officer, Frank Dunlop, who was appointed as a permanent civil servant, with the rank of assistant secretary, when he became press secretary to the government in 1977. The widespread implementation of this practice would undoubtedly have led to politicization of the service and impacted upon promotion prospects for the career civil service. When Fianna Fáil returned to Government following their 1977 landslide victory, the practice of appointing ministerial advisers continued in the Departments of Taoiseach, Finance, Agriculture, Economic Planning and Development, Industry and Commerce, Energy and Labour. Their roles consisted largely of assisting ministers in preparing for Government discussions on areas outside their department’s accepted responsibilities, specialized advice and advice on the political ramifications of different policy options. Advisers during these administrations did not generally become involved in any executive roles within departments. Nor did they take up the mantle of a political ‘go between’ within the system. At the level of the constituency, the minister’s local political power-base, a new form of external assistance called the ‘constituency manager’ (or personal assistant), was introduced after 1977. As opposed to policy advice, the constituency manager alleviates the minister’s workload by dealing with local constituency matters while they hold office. It is a practice widely accepted by all and it is usually a minister’s previous Dáil secretary who fills the post (O’Malley 1996, p. 7). The institutionalization of the adviser system continued during the terms of the Fine Gael–Labour coalitions

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of 1981–2 and 1983–7. The Labour Party at this time was still characterized by an older generation of people who held rigidly to the philosophy of organized labour and this made coalition difficult with Fine Gael. The 1983–7 government did serve its term but its method of ‘business management’ yielded a legacy that informed participants in later coalitions whereby greater effort was made to avoid irretrievable rifts between the partners. A significant juncture in the history of the political adviser in the Irish system was the first (and only to date) Fianna Fáil–Labour coalition of 1993–4. This Government appointed the largest political staff in the history of the state, predominantly at the behest of the Labour Party. Labour was fully aware of the difficulties that the Progressive Democrats encountered in coalition with Fianna Fáil between 1992 and 1993 when Albert Reynolds was Taoiseach. On several occasions the Progressive Democrats became informed of policy developments through the media as opposed to their coalition partners (Collins 2005). Labour’s own unsatisfactory encounters in coalition with Fine Gael also shaped their approach to coalition with Fianna Fáil and led to the initiation of several support/ coordination mechanisms. The leader of the Labour Party, Dick Spring, insisted upon the introduction of new implementation mechanisms for the programme for government, including the creation of a separate office of the Tánaiste (Deputy Prime Minister). Previously it was just a title with few functions and no resources. It was envisaged this new office would support him and operate on par with the Department of Taoiseach in terms of the simultaneous dissemination of proposals requiring a Cabinet decision. But more significant than this was the establishment of a new class of public official. Labour advisers proposed a new system whereby each minister would have a European style chef du cabinet. This gave rise to immediate opposition from the civil servants in the Cabinet Office who felt threatened by the title (Finlay 1998, p. 149). Following negotiations and at the suggestion of Secretary to the Government Frank Murray it was agreed that each minister would have a ‘programme manager’ with the specific task of monitoring the implementation of the programme for government as far as their department was concerned.5 In addition, each minister would also appoint a special adviser. The programme managers and the advisers represented the political corpus of the minister between departments, when the minister was in his/her constituency or attending EU business in Brussels (Quinn 2005, p. 297). The programme manager assigned to the Taoiseach chaired weekly meetings which assessed progress on legislative output and systematically reviewed coalition goals. The new Department of Tánaiste was resourced by a legal adviser, policy adviser

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and programme manager. Hence, programme managers had a very clear brief to oversee the implementation of commitments in the programme for Government across the entire administrative system. They acted as a coordination mechanism between departments, and as a method of keeping ministers fully aware of policy developments both within and across portfolios. The programme managers were perceived as a combination of advisers and managers, operating along the lines of an underdeveloped ministerial Cabinet system and within the blurred borders between politics and administration. They constituted a new management structure that would enable ministers to take strategic political decisions with minimal damage to the Cabinet’s operational morale and cohesion. In Ruairi Quinn’s words, advisers and programme managers were ‘political gladiators’ that ‘would, up to a point, bargain on behalf of their political masters, in a way that was impossible for a civil servant, whose loyalty was to the department first and then the minister’ (2005, p. 297). Labour ministers largely selected their appointments from technical experts who were also party activists. On the Fianna Fáil side, programme managers were largely drawn from the civil service ranks. Of the nine Fianna Fáil ministers only David Andrews appointed a programme manager from outside the civil service (ironically a former Labour Party member). It has been argued that Fianna Fáil perceived the programme manager trial as a device by which the coalition partners could support party functionaries and trusted colleagues out of the public purse (O’Halpin 1997), and therefore stuck with the civil service. They had been the mainstay of the previous Government and therefore had built up solid working relationships with individual civil servants. In some departments the programme manager system was quite successful but this tended to depend on the individual minister and individual programme manager and adviser as opposed to the overall system. On the one hand, the civil service responded to the introduction of programme managers with suspicion and in some areas tried to isolate these advisers, since the senior civil servants perceived that their roles were being usurped and access to the minister diluted. On the other hand, some civil servants saw opportunities in a system whereby it was possible to secure a political response to an issue when a minister was unavailable. Prior to the introduction of this system there had been a tendency to loosely refer to advisers as constituting a ministerial Cabinet. In fact, only the Tánaiste Dick Spring had what could conform to a cabinet since all his political staff were outsiders. In the continental European style the programme manager system could not be interpreted as a Cabinet and its emphasis was as a coordination mechanism for implementation. This new

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system had the effect of strengthening political rather than administrative/managerial control. Unfortunately, the possibilities of building and refining it were marred by derision from the media which emphasized the notion of ‘jobs for the boys’ (Irish Times editorial, 2 March 1993). In tandem with the additional cost to the taxpayer, the unhealthy influence unelected advisers had in Government was focused upon. One of Dick Spring’s principal advisers, Fergus Finlay, afterwards commented that he was painted as a ‘sinister Rasputin like figure’ that had a disproportionate amount of authority for a non-elected official (Finlay 1998, p. 274). The new system also provoked hostility from TDs within the Labour Party itself. Labour was accused of neglecting relations with the parliamentary groups and some TDs felt marginalized in the decision-making process (O’Halpin 1997). One label coined to describe the programme managers was the ‘Tánaiste’s non-elected kitchen Cabinet’ coupled with ‘spin doctors for ministers’. The Fianna Fáil–Labour coalition unraveled acrimoniously in December 1994 and was replaced by a ‘rainbow coalition’ of Fine Gael–Labour– Democratic Left.6 A Dáil committee was established to inquire into the circumstances of the Government’s demise. It did not yield any substantive conclusions but one interpretation of its proceedings described an atmosphere of insinuations that the Government had been ‘fatally undermined by the Machiavellian machinations of unelected advisers’ (Finlay 1998, p. 275). Although Fine Gael had been disparaging about the barrage of political appointments during the Fianna Fáil–Labour administration, the programme manager system continued and the number of political appointments actually increased. In answering a question about the Fine Gael appointments in the Dáil, Taoiseach John Bruton argued that in order to avoid any possibility of the politicization of the civil service the system was more properly operated by ‘people who have a clear political perspective’ (Dáil Debates, 25 January 1995). Although programme managers had no formal policy formulation function, it is obvious that some individual programme managers did provide policy advice (O’Halpin 1997, p. 83). Under the Fianna Fáil–Progressive Democrats Administration (1997– 2002 and 2002–07) the number of programme managers was drastically scaled back to two (Taoiseach and Tánaiste) and the Department of Tánaiste was dissolved. The number of political advisers was reduced from over 50 to 37 (including press advisers). Unfortunately, the instances whereby programme managers facilitated the working of the overall system were not set down in any systematic way. From 1997 an emphasis was placed on the role of ministers of state, and the co-ordination role of the Taoiseach’s advisers included elements of the former programme

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manager function. Hence, while the system had been modified, both government partners remained adamant that political advisers were needed to ensure the programme for government was implemented. The Progressive Democrats perceived their role as junior partners in government whereby political responsibility travelled beyond the strict confines of each department such that they needed independent advice. The current coalition Government – Fianna Fáil–Progressive Democrats–Green Party – formed in June 2007, has appointed a full complement of advisers. The Taoiseach Bertie Ahern and the coalition partners have retained the role of a programme manager (one for each party) to advise and coordinate Government business on their behalf.

ROLE PERCEPTIONS, POLICY CAPABILITIES AND ASSISTANCE TO THE MINISTER The legislative base for advisers is the Public Service Management Act (PSMA) 1997, section 11(1) of which makes provision for special advisers. The 1997 Act describes duties as including provision of advice, monitoring, facilitating and securing the achievement of Government objectives and performing such other functions as may be directed by the minister. A minister (other than the Taoiseach or the Tánaiste or the leader of a political party) cannot have more than two special advisers. Special advisers are accountable to the minister in the performance of their functions. As provided for in section 11(3) of the Act, the terms and conditions of these appointments are subject to determination by the Minister for Finance. Such appointments are exempt from the general rules governing civil servants and politics; for example, special advisers can be members of political parties. The appointments are, however, also subject to the Civil Service Regulations Acts 1956 to 1996. Therefore advisers are fully governed by compliance with the Ethics in Public Office Act 1995. The appointments are temporary and are terminated when the minister leaves office. In all, the legislation provides a very sterile account of what advisers can do, and political attention has tended to focus on terms of pay and ethical issues. Further scrutiny is required of who the advisers are, what they actually do and whether they meaningfully contribute to the policy process. What is apparent is that the number of those appointed on temporary contracts to the ranks of political advisers peaked during the coalitions of the early 1990s. Yet despite the fall in their numbers, these politically committed outsiders (and insiders) appear to be a permanent feature of the executive. In general, advisers add a political dimension to the advice available to ministers. But do advisers in the Irish executive provide ministers

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with the qualified advice of a distinguished ‘expert’? It would appear that Dooney and O’Toole’s (1998, p. 41) explanation carries more weight, whereby advisers act as an ‘extension of the minister’s political personality. . . as an extra pair of eyes and ears doing for him what the minister would do himself if he had the time’. An interpretation of this role is that advisers discuss the political and electoral implications of advice coming from the civil service, including the likely reception from the media (ibid). As noted, there is cautiousness in the Irish Administration about involving civil servants in political activity, though it is anticipated that the secretary general will have a good understanding of the pressures a minister is under politically. Rather than threatening impartiality, advisers themselves perceive their role as a positive addition, since prior to 1992, secretary generals did ‘find themselves in the situation whereby they were often advising the minister of the political consequences of a decision taken’ (Adviser 7). Senior civil servants remain the protectors of the institutional memory and advisers can protect them from partisan risks that may be attached to requests from ministers. Advisers may also provide a counterbalance to institutional memory by taking the role of an ‘embedded sceptic in the system’ (Adviser 9). In the Irish system, political advisers are appointed from quite diverse backgrounds. Some of them may have been ‘party backroom boys’ and others appointed civil servants with extensive experience in ministerial private offices. Many advisers are not members of political parties. The perceived advantage of using private secretaries is that they are familiar with every part of a department, have contacts and the position has given them exposure to the political nuances of policy. Prionsias de Rossa, Leader of the Democrat Left who served in the Rainbow Coalition 1994–7, employed a civil servant because he had no experience of Government and required assistance on how the administrative system worked. Of the cohort of advisers serving the Fianna Fáil–Progressive Democrats coalition 2002–07 previous occupations were as varied as teacher, union official, chartered accountant, director of semi-state company, self-employed, civil and public service, local councillor, energy specialist, student union official, and aide to a member of the European Parliament. Special advisers tend to comprise a mix of individuals whose roles are either partisan, policy related, managerial or possibly a mixture of all three. The highest academic qualification of 14 advisers interviewed was a Masters degree (29 per cent). It was commented that advisers are a ‘very mixed bag’, who are: picked for very different reasons by ministers. [S]ome want glorified constituency gophers, some want policy specialists, some want experts, most want good

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generalists to cover as many bases as possible. [T]he bulk are in the generalist space providing political coordination. (Adviser, 9)

The majority of advisers perceive themselves as generalists who attempt to undertake a whole-of-government policy coordination role. The ‘parish pump’ remains important given national politics remain highly localized, with politicians engaged in networks built on personal relationships and acting on behalf of their constituents. The electoral cycle inevitably has a major impact on advisers’ roles and how they change over time. Despite this, approximately half of the adviser group is either seconded from the civil service or drawn from the wider public service. Advisers normally move to other departments with ministers following Cabinet reshuffles as trust and confidence of the minister at a personal level was identified as one of the most important criteria for the job. Their effectiveness will also be determined by the effectiveness of their minister. Political support to the Taoiseach in terms of policy advice and coordination comes principally from his team of programme managers and special advisers. There has, however, been a very large variation in the extent to which this system has been used in different Governments (Fitzgerald 2004). Under the direction of the programme manager, the primary function of the advisers is to monitor, facilitate and help secure the achievement of Government objectives and to ensure effective co-ordination in the implementation of the programme for Government. Each of the other special advisers has responsibility for a number of departments and liaises with them on items of the Cabinet agenda and issues that are working through sub-committees of Cabinet. What emerges from this overview is that qualification and previous experience is not aligned with specific policy expertise and departmental portfolio. Few special advisers within the current cohort are qualified experts in the field relating to the department in which they operate. The advisers interviewed provided a variety of views on this but a common view was that the role of an adviser should be to keep the minister focused on their political priorities ‘and not get distracted by a supplementary agenda from the official system’ (Adviser 1). Advisers who were not drawn from the civil service spoke of the limited amount of time ministers have for policy formulation in the Irish system and referred to the ‘official answers’ that could be proffered from their seconded civil service counterparts. In other words: Ministers have an entire department of experts at their disposal – often what they need is an independent view. It’s the adviser’s job in my view to make sure that the minister thinks about all the options available to them and not just

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those favoured by officials. Being from outside the civil service means you are likely to question why things are done a particular way rather than accept that that’s how it has always been done. Ministers are politicians elected to deliver a political agenda and the department’s agenda may not always be the same. (Adviser 8)

Role perceptions indicated that technical expertise is an important but not overriding factor in making a good adviser, since the ‘political feel’ is crucial.

DRIVING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADVISER SYSTEM, THE POLICY PROCESS AND COALITION MANAGEMENT In Pursuit of an Effective Policy Making Process In the Irish system the minister takes policy decisions while the civil service plays a dominant role in the detailed development and implementation of that policy (see Connolly 2005). The Cabinet retains responsibility for new policy initiatives, or significant departures from existing policy, and the Department of Finance acts as a clearing house for the financial implications of these. The horizontal dimension of policy making, concerned with cross-cutting issues transcending departmental boundaries, has long been diagnosed as a problem in Irish administration. Ineffective interdepartmental coordination was noted in the Report of the Public Services Organisation Review Group (PSORG or Devlin Report) in 1969 – most of which was not implemented – and was further exacerbated by EU membership. Part of the challenge has been the difficulty of working through the traditional civil service structures. Despite interdepartmental promotions, significant numbers of career civil servants have not had experience of more than one department, impeding mutual understanding and leading to different cultures and a silo mentality (Whelan et al. 2003, p. 76). The fragmentation of departments and offices into units, originally put in place to deal with specific issues, made responsibility for addressing longer term cross-cutting policy issues no-one’s responsibility (Boyle et al. 2002). The absence of institutional structures to facilitate discussion by secretary generals on cross-cutting issues and a wholeof-government agenda, as evidenced in other countries, also militated against progress. Such issues were not comprehensively addressed by the PSMA 1997. There is a provision for assignment of responsibility in respect of crossdepartmental matters but in practice this has not been used (Whelan et al.

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2003). The silo mentality is also exacerbated by the role of the secretary general as accounting officer. The limitations of Governmental capacity for effective long-term planning are also evident in the qualifications and experience of the career civil service. There are significant gaps in civil service expertise coupled with the fact that continuity of policy can be vulnerable to short-term political interventions (Hughes et al. 2007, p. 291). Out-sourcing Government extends to reports, consultancy and other advisory or PR commissions. For example, between 1998 and 2005, 2983 consultants’ reports and contracts were commissioned by Government (Brennock 2005), illustrating the breadth of policy in which the Government now routinely seeks external advice.7 Maley, in her analysis of advisers in the Australian system, claims that advisers are far from peripheral actors in the policy making process. Rather, their location so close to the decision makers provides significant potential to have an effect on policy process and outcomes (2000, p. 468). In regard to the features of the Irish politico-administrative system, the introduction of ministerial advisers would appear to compensate for the rigid operation of the system influenced and governed by the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924. The ‘extension of the minister’ can strive to correct imbalances within the administration and strengthen political control (Connaughton 2006; Dooney and O’Toole 1998; Mitchell 2000). Relationships are perceived to be easier with advisers who are public servants while relationships with those from outside, while generally good, can be viewed as ‘tolerance and acceptance of “a necessary evil” at times’ (Adviser 4). Political advisers typically play the role of political ‘watchdog’ in the policy process. At the political level, political advisers play an important role in the context of cross-cutting issues (Whelan et al. 2003, p. 58). Advisers can address horizontal coordination through building support inside and outside Government departments for policy initiatives, consulting with interest groups and monitoring implementation. Prior to 1997, the bilateral and trilateral meetings with programme managers also assisted in resolving interdepartmental disagreements and provided a regular and structured conduit for relations between the departments and the Attorney General’s office (O’Malley 1996, p. 34). Non-public service advisers perceive themselves to bring ‘new energies and a better public citizen focus’ (Adviser 12), or contributions through politically addressing some of the ‘uneven’ features of the career civil service (Adviser 9). Speech writing and vetting parliamentary questions also involve advisers. In respect of the latter, advisers will look at how the answer may be perceived in the local constituency as opposed to the evaluation of the civil service delivery system.

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RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIVIL SERVANTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY In regard to interactions with civil servants the principal relationship to be managed is that between adviser and secretary general. As guardians of institutional memory and upholders of continuity the secretary general remains an extremely important actor. The secretary generals still provide advice in much the same ways but do so in a more competitive environment whereby ministers will look to other sources. However, there is no general trend to replace them with the genre of a ‘can do’ manager and neither do advisers fit that kind of profile. Secretaries are the point of principal contact with ministers, and where ministers are less than competent they may dominate the relationship (Rhodes and Weller 2001, p. 238). With respect to the ‘fitting in’ of advisers, situations vary across departments and much can depend upon the personalities of individual advisers and secretary generals regarding the degree of disturbance in the latter’s ‘habitat’. A general interpretation of the accounts relayed by advisers of their experience implied that the added value of their contribution was enhanced when working in conjunction with the secretary general. As one adviser reflected, ‘you don’t usurp the secretary general’s role – it won’t work . . . [you] have to bring added value to the work . . . and keep an eye on politics’ (Adviser 7). The point of departure for many of them was to meet with the secretary general of their department and informally set out a working relationship with them. Rhodes and Weller (2001, p. 238) comment that secretaries traditionally wielded influence because of their control of information and privileged access to the minister. This begs the question: to what extent has the role of advisers changed this, and to what degree have accountability relationships been affected? Advisers may potentially be veto players that are able to choke off or facilitate the flow of information and advice into and out of ministerial offices and ‘control the minister’ (see Eichbaum and Shaw 2007). The advisers corresponded with referred to themselves as political ‘buffers’ between minister and civil service but not in respect to access/ restricting information to the minister. Rather, they saw their role as ‘conduits’, a ‘sounding board’, a ‘handy way of getting stuff to the minister’, and/or ‘the vehicle through which bad news is broken’. The perception was that their role ensured the minister enjoyed a better flow of information within and out of their department, and that there cannot be a ‘departmental view’ on issues until and unless the minister has decided upon it by virtue of his/her position as a corporation sole. As with other Westminster type systems, in Ireland, public management reform has sought to strengthen accountability relationships. In

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this instance NPM has provided a new framework for the relationship between minister and senior official through the reassertion of the politics/administration dichotomy whereby managerial competence is ‘more highly valued than good judgement in discerning what will serve the public interest’ (Litton and MacCarthaigh 2007, p. 58). Ministers are responsible for policy formulation and achievement of the functions assigned to their departments, and advisers are directly accountable to them. Secretary generals, together with the top management team at Management Advisory Committee (MAC) level, play a vital role in advising ministers on policy formulation and development. Civil servants continue to see their role as being to serve the government and the minister of the day on an anonymous and confidential basis, and to avoid exposing them to criticism even when they are under pressure from the Public Accounts Committee (O’Reilly 2005). In this system, managerial accountability has been weak, dealt with internally within the departmental hierarchy, and civil servants are rarely held publicly to account for their actions/inactions. With regard to political accountability it has been extremely rare for Irish ministers to resign due to administrative errors or poor performance. The PSMA does not alter the concept of ministerial responsibility which remains an essential feature of democracy. Several questions regarding the roles and accountability of ministers, civil servants and advisers arose in 2005 in the wake of a policy fiasco concerning illegal nursing home charges8 (see Connaughton 2006). An investigation on the case, the ‘Travers Report’,9 was presented to the Houses of the Oireachtas and prompted considerable debate at the time. The blame for the situation was apportioned squarely and unambiguously with officials, in what was described as a ‘persistent and systematic corporate failure within the Department of Health and Children’ (Travers 2005, para. 6.2). The minister was exonerated and the secretary general of the Department of Health and Children forced to resign. Travers also scrutinized the role of advisers, since two of the minister’s advisers were in attendance at a significant meeting of the Department of Health MAC in December 2003 in which it was decided to seek the advice of the Attorney General on this issue. It was argued by the secretary general of the department that advisers should have briefed the minister on this problem and been more proactive. The advisers claimed they did not read the briefing material and consequently did not discuss matters with the minister. Media interpretations of the affair disparagingly referred to individual advisers as ‘dumb and dumber . . . and deaf’. Travers’ interpretation and recommendation for the role of advisers was that they should not stray beyond the roles set down for them in legislation and neither should they be regarded as part of the line management

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system of a department (2005, para. 4.66). Advisers cannot be interpreted as being available to act as intermediaries or in loco parentis with senior civil servants. The briefing of special advisers by departmental officials and the fact that advisers attend particular meetings should not be accepted as alternatives to the direct briefing of a minister on important areas of business. For: a Department is an administrative system in its own right. Special advisers are not part of its day to day management system. While they need to be kept informed of the many issues of interest to the Department and the Minister, I do not see them as part of line management. Therefore, Departments need to act in a way that reflects this fact. (Evidence of John Travers to the Joint Committee, 12 April)

Part of the fallout of this case is the claim that the system of special advisers has not worked effectively given the failure to analyse the political and financial consequences of the debacle. The only advisers corresponded with who referred to the fiasco and the consequent Travers report were those who are currently or were previously connected to the Department of Health and Children. One adviser has commented that: ‘The Travers Report was an experience in itself that was not taken seriously by either the civil service or advisers themselves. It will only be reopened again if another controversy arises’ (Adviser 4). The civil service, however, remains scarred by the affair and is largely unwilling to comment on it. Arguably the real fall-out from this case is not the failure of political accountability per se, but the undermining of the civil service (O’Cinneide 2005). The secretary general continues, however, to set the management tone of individual departments. The civil service system remains hierarchical and direct interaction between advisers and civil servants is largely mediated by the secretary general. One adviser surmised that special advisers have facilitated ‘the civil service down the line having more access to the minister by default rather than design’, and noted that ‘I am constantly dealing with Assistant Secretaries, Principal Officers and Assistant Principals and constantly getting their opinion on views, information, whatever. I am channelling them, so effectively those people that I am dealing with on the policy issues [ ] actually have more access’ (Adviser 9). The question may be posed as to whether this may be interpreted as indirect politicization (see Peters and Pierre 2004, pp. 2–3). Interactions beneath the level of the most senior official, two or three layers down, may threaten the neutrality of public servants; such interactions, or direct interference in departmental activities by advisers, arguably constitutes secondary procedural politicization (Eichbaum and Shaw 2007, pp. 632–3).

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There is no evidence, however, that this prevents the civil servant from providing advice frankly. It has been recommended that communication with a special adviser should not be regarded as a substitute for communicating with the minister even if they are a direct channel to the minister (Travers 2005). The authority for advisers to give instructions to civil servants, as illustrated in the UK case, does not exist in Ireland. This has been clarified by the Travers Report (2005, para 4.66) and it would appear that both advisers and civil servants agree with this recommendation in principle (Connaughton 2006, p. 271). Advisers deny that they give officials direct instructions and regard this as inappropriate. Rather they perceive themselves as ‘acting as middle person’, ‘speaking with [the] secretary general’, ‘conveying the instruction of the minister’, and/or ‘couch[ing] things in terms of suggestions’. Such comments imply that advisers communicate the minister’s wishes in conjunction with agreed protocol but may also ‘use the minister’s teeth to bite them [civil servants]’ (Adviser 14). The programme for Government, since it is the fulfilment of the political mandate, is deemed the priority in the context of driving agenda setting and policy formulation. Discussions in Cabinet, however, come predominantly from the advice of the civil service and special interest groups rather than advisers. As noted in the New Zealand case, advisers may disagree with and contest the substance of advice, as distinct from directing on a unilateral basis that changes be made (Eichbaum and Shaw 2007). As one adviser noted, ‘I would never rewrite their advice or put words in their mouths that didn’t exist. If I did disagree with something I would be fairly clear’ (Adviser 14). An evaluation role is important and advisers often perceive official advice as being more assertive than argued on an evidential basis. Again the departmental line will attempt to endure in conjunction with incremental adjustments to the way in which policy has previously been undertaken.

COALITION GOVERNMENT – MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION In the Irish case it could be argued that democratic stability is enhanced by the relatively small number of political parties. However, the dominance of Fianna Fáil is illustrated by the fact that they have never been out of office for more than one term since 1932. Following the results of the general election in May 200710 it would appear that Government formation in Ireland for the foreseeable future remains conditioned by who will join Fianna Fáil as opposed to a solid alternative. In terms of this coalition formation it must be noted that though the single transferable vote (STV) system has

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enabled proportionality, it can indirectly lead to disproportional outcomes (see Sinnott 2005). Minor coalition partners have succeeded in achieving control and ministerial allocation in excess of their political representation in the Oireachtas. This is illustrated in the position of both the Progressive Democrats and Green Party in the outcome of the last election. The Progressive Democrats have only two seats in the Dáil and hold the health portfolio. The Green Party has six seats and two ministers (Departments of Environment, Heritage and Local Government and Communications, Energy and Natural Resources) plus one junior minister (Department of Agriculture and Food). Furthermore, the entrenchment of coalition Government since 1989 has also required structures to facilitate them (Murray and Teahon 1997, p. 40). As discussed, the Fianna Fáil–Labour Government of 1993–4 is noted for the introduction of more formal mechanisms for coalition management. Two of these mechanisms have endured, namely the programme for Government and programme managers. The first comprehensive programme for government – i.e. the strategic statement of government priorities – was the Fianna Fáil and Labour Programme for a Partnership Government 1993–7. This was a new departure in terms of specific commitments to policy targets and is deemed important for smaller parties in coalition. The existence of a formal programme for Government ensures that the implementation of party policy is not derailed by the obstructive behaviour of coalition partners (Mitchell 2000, p. 145), and that agreed-upon issues are not relegated to the background. The effectiveness of the smaller coalition partner is also judged more strenuously in terms of their ability to deliver while in Government since elements of the party may view the trade-offs to participate in government as ‘selling out’ party principles.11 Negotiating the programme for Government is an intensive bargaining process whereby a team is proposed by each party and party leaders are not directly involved. The civil service supports the process through advising the parties on the costing of programmes, the state of social partnership, European Union requirements and the internal structure of government. There are no formal arrangements in Ireland covering the provision of such advice (Seyd 2002, p. 68). Advisers have also participated in proofing these documents and can provide a role as acting as a go-between within the system. Finlay, with reference to the Labour Party’s experience in Governments during 1993–7, claimed Labour was in effect negotiating with the civil service: since every time we would put forward a sentence or an idea, back would come position papers which had all the hallmarks of having been prepared in government departments. There was little or no sign, apart from one or two issues, of

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any personal input from the Fianna Fáil members of the government. (Finlay 1998, p. 149)

This presents an example of where advisers can constitute a ‘third element’ in the policy formulation role, albeit one that depends upon the party in question. At a more advanced stage of the policy process, advisers play a significant role on behalf of their ministers in ensuring that the various strands of the programme for Government are implemented. It is generally claimed that coalition Government makes it more difficult for politicians to exercise control over the bureaucracy than having single party majority governments (Peters and Vass 2005). In 1993 the Labour Party wanted to ensure that their policy proposals within the programme for a partnership Government would be subject to informed, detailed tracking and review by trusted Labour officials. In contrast, commentators have argued that it was not the Fianna Fáil tradition to seek alternative policy advice or generally ‘second guess’ the civil service (O’Malley 1996; Finlay 1998). From the civil service perspective, programme managers were an additional layer between civil servants, advisers and ministers that disturbed a carefully balanced system as they operated as a ‘collective’ as opposed to the ‘singular’ role of a political adviser (Connaughton 2005). The provision for joint meetings of programme managers certainly represented a new departure in Irish administrative practice. Up until this point in time the convention had been that no such collective meetings of departmental secretaries should occur as this could be interpreted as supplanting the role of the Cabinet. The programme managers met weekly on Wednesdays, the day after the Cabinet’s normal meeting. The main purposes of these meetings were to review progress under the programme for Government on a department by department basis, to identify blockages in the system, to facilitate interdepartmental exchanges on matters of common interest and shared responsibility, to ensure legislative targets were in the process of attainment, and generally to provide a forum where difficulties could quickly be ironed out (Connaughton 2005; O’Halpin 1997). The Taoiseach and the Tánaiste’s programme managers also sat on the Legislation Committee, a body also established in 1993 to monitor the progress of draft bills. Unfortunately, the instances in which programme managers facilitated the working of the system were not set down in any systematic way. Despite this it is claimed that the experiment did have a positive influence on the policy-making process through pushing the orderly and timely advancement of legislative commitments (O’Halpin 1997). It also marked a further step in the transformation of Irish parties into organizations with the capacity for the sustained development and projection of coherent and distinctive policies (ibid.).

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What is interesting is that although the numbers of programme managers were drastically scaled back from 1997, it could be argued that a similar type of system operates today. First, secretary generals now meet informally as a group. It would also appear that despite civil service reservations about the programme managers usurping their role and politicizing the service, it was recognized that a coordination mechanism at the managerial level between departments, at least in relation to legislation, was desirable (Connaughton 2005). Second, the current special adviser/ programme manager group meets weekly on a Monday in order to go through the Cabinet agenda. The meetings are chaired by the Taoiseach’s programme manager. Within the Department of Taoiseach, the programme manager directs the Taoiseach’s advisers to monitor, facilitate and help secure the achievement of Government objectives, and one of the advisers liaises with the ministers of state since they do not have advisers. Advisers sometimes attend meetings of Cabinet sub-committees and cross-departmental teams relevant to their responsibilities. The three programme managers for the Taoiseach, Progressive Democrats and Green Party liaise closely in order to ensure coalition relations remain harmonious. It is evident therefore that although the extensive system of programme managers was initially rejected by the civil service, elements of the modus operandi have persisted in a diluted form.

CONCLUSION Ireland’s civil service has retained the features of political neutrality, impartiality and continuity it inherited from the British in 1922. Although the absorption of British practice and the retention of the Northcote– Trevelyan settlement served the new Irish state well, a lack of subsequent reform diluted the capacity of the system to respond to contemporary governance and ministerial needs. Their roles in the local constituency notwithstanding, Irish ministers have had to become more consciously politicians in executive office. In order to direct public policy by means of strategic planning and monitoring the implementation capacities of the public service, ministers need personal assistance and support. Ironically the introduction of advisers in 1973 was, however, largely due to a suspicion that the civil service had become socialized to the Fianna Fáil mindset rather than a concerted effort to upgrade existing policy capabilities. The Labour Party in particular also acknowledged the necessity to appoint advisers to enhance the political element of ministerial work and insulate the apolitical status of the civil service. This rationale remains and advisers are adamant that if parliamentary democracy is to be meaningful then the

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political aspect of ministerial policy work must be stressed. In this respect: ‘political advisers can serve as a bulwark against the cooption of ministers as temporary assistants to the public service. A minister must have many qualities and one of them is resources to ensure that they are politically focussed and effective over time’ (Adviser 9). Secretary generals, however, operate in a culture with deep-rooted traditions that are not easily changed (Zimmerman 1997, p. 540) and continue to play a significant role in the policy-making process. Advisers have challenged their monopoly of access to the minister’s ear but do not appear to have adversely affected their professional independence in terms of asserting their perspectives in policy formulation and implementation. New public management reform has not adversely affected the timehonoured balance between minister and secretary general. This is largely retained with advisers facilitating the minister’s political control in terms of setting directions and maintaining oversight. The operation of the adviser system in Ireland has not developed into a system whereby alternative structures for policy advice are in place. Over time, the appointment of advisers has been pragmatic and driven by the exigencies of the party political system. Coalition partners in particular have had recourse to advisers in order to look out for their interests in the implementation of the Government programme. Statements of the programmes of various Governments have evolved from a series of points in 1989 to a comprehensive document negotiated by the relevant parties’ leadership. The new systems and structures created from 1992 onwards provided for greater transparency and an enhanced flow of information between Government coalition partners seeking to provide the ‘junior members’ of a coalition with more influence on decision making (Hughes et al. 2007, p. 295). This has had the additional effect of strengthening political rather than administrative control. The increase in the number of junior ministers/ministers of state to 20 in the current Government is also reflective of this. Political appointments climaxed with the introduction of the programme managers which were perceived as ‘a step too far’ by the civil service. This system had the potential to deflect some of the difficulties of horizontal coordination but also illustrated the possibility that the civil service would lose some of its status in the long run. Rather than making it more responsive to its political masters, undermining the apolitical status of the civil service was a likelihood since political parties would seek to position their trusted supporters (O’Halpin 1997). The programme managers were largely disbanded in 1997 reflecting the Progressive Democrats’ concern over their cost to the public purse and the desire to usher in a more low-key, informal style to coalition management. However, some of

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its operational characteristics appear to be inherent in the way the adviser system currently functions. In the current administration all ministers employ the services of ministerial advisers. Advisers appear to be accepted by the civil service once they are an additional layer but not formalized in a parallel administration or cabinet type structure, such as the Belgian case, which effectively isolates civil servants from the policy advice role. As noted by Dooney and O’Toole (1998, p. 41) the introduction of such a system would ‘necessitate radical changes affecting the patterns, traditions and values of Ireland’s political culture to an extent that would probably be unacceptable’. Labour politicians have been the only ministers to seriously advocate a cabinet structure, notably Conor Cruise O’Brien in the 1970s and Dick Spring in the 1990s. The establishment of a cabinet system was also advocated by the Oireachtas Committee on Health and Children in 2005 as a possible alternative to bridge politics and administration in the wake of the Travers Report. But this has not gained favour amongst politicians and civil servants alike. It may be argued that this would lead to the civil service role being significantly usurped by political appointments and result in an administration working ‘back to back’ with its political masters and a chosen few (Connaughton 2006, p. 274). As illustrated, the advisers in the current Irish Administration are quite a diverse mix though many have experience in the civil and public service. The appointment of experts reflecting the policy directions of a department are few. Advisers continue to be appointed by ministers by virtue of party affiliation and a trusted working relationship. They generally fulfil roles as political ‘watchdogs’, ‘buffers’ and policy coordinators, prioritizing Government policies and pushing the civil service for results. It is asserted that the Irish Administration has not yet developed a systematic approach whereby the political system can clearly articulate its priorities across the whole-of-government and mobilize a wide range of actors in support of implementation (Whelan et al. 2003). The fact that advisers predominantly coordinate – as opposed to routinely provide – policy advice would imply that they have the potential to contribute more to this. As one adviser interviewed commented: I think the term special assistant as in the US White House explains the role more accurately . . . (I) would be comfortable with the name special assistant – [but] not comfortable with special adviser. . . . You provide a lot of back-up, provide a lot of advice . . . a role facilitating the policy process but a policy coordination role. (Adviser 4, Interview March 2007)

An additional comment from the adviser cohort was that while advisers help shoulder the minister’s workload, ‘people overestimate the role of

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advisers. The minister remains the principal’ (Adviser 11). In the Irish case, partisan appointees appear to be here to stay as part of a parallel universe as opposed to integrated in the civil service management system. They are a reminder to ministers that in Government they remain members of a political party with a political mandate.

NOTES

1. 2.

3.

4. 5.

6.

7. 8.

9.

A number of comments are drawn from interviews conducted with ministerial advisers within the Irish Administration during late 2006 and early 2007. All the advisers who participated wish to remain anonymous. Many of them have returned to serve as special advisers to the Fianna Fáil–Green Party–Progressive Democrat Government formed in June 2007. The ‘Springtide’ takes its name from Dick Spring who was the leader of the Labour Party 1982–97. An example of this arose in 2007 when the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Micheal Martin was reprimanded for inappropriate behaviour by the Standards in Public Office Commission. The matter arose because he instructed a civil servant to brief Fianna Fáil politicians. The Commission decided that the minister’s behaviour did not warrant a formal investigation under the Ethics in Public Office Act 1995. However, it concluded that in order to avoid any perception of partiality, civil servants should not be asked to engage in political briefings, unless on an all-party basis. Such demarcations are of course more likely to be blurred given that Fianna Fáil has been in office for 16 of the last 19 years. O’Donoghue later became recognized as the architect of the Fianna Fáil election manifesto in 1977 and was elected to the Dáil. He was appointed as a minister of the newly created Department of Economic Planning and Development on his first day as a TD. Tony Brown, Willie Scally, Niall Greene, Flor O’Mahony and Nicholas Simms were the Labour advisers and an economist, Brendan Dowling, worked with Garret Fitzgerald. In reply to a parliamentary question on 29 March 1993, the Minister for Finance stated: ‘The role and function of the new managers is quite distinct from that of departmental secretaries general and senior line managers. Senior civil servants will continue to have responsibility for the development of policy proposals, the overall management of schemes and programmes and have charge of their departments generally.’ In 1994, controversy arose regarding the handling of the extradition file on the paedophile priest Brendan Smyth within the Attorney General’s office. The appointment of the Attorney General in question, Harry Whelehan, to be President of the High Court, caused the Labour Party to withdraw from Government, thereby bringing about its collapse. The source of Brennock’s article was a parliamentary question to each government department on 28 June 2005. The figures did not include the Department of Justice or the Department of Health and Children. The crux of this case is that for 28 years, charges were imposed on residents (with ‘full eligibility’) in long-stay public institutions without any legal basis. The case represented a major failure of administration spanning both the period prior to the 1997 reforms and afterwards. An attempt to introduce legislation retrospectively was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and left the state facing a bill approximating two billion euros in order to pay back those illegally charged. The precise title of the report is ‘Interim report on the report on certain issues of

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management and administration in the Department of Health and Children associated with the practice of charges for persons in long stay health care in health board institutions and related matters presented to the Houses of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Health and Children 9th March 2005’. It is referred to as the ‘Travers Report’ after its author, John Travers. The vote share of the main political parties was Fianna Fáil 41.6 per cent, Fine Gael 27.3 per cent, Labour Party 10.1 per cent, Green Party–Comhaontas Glas 4.7 per cent, Sinn Féin 6.9 per cent, Progressive Democrats 2.7 per cent. For example, the Green Party decision to join Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats in Government was criticized by the more ‘fundi’ factions of the party. They perceived the ‘realios’ to have compromised party principles by signing up to a programme for Government which, for example, contains significant portions of Fianna Fáil electoral manifesto on the environment as opposed to their own.

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6.

The United States B. Guy Peters

INTRODUCTION One of the strengths of the American federal government has been the wealth of information and advice available to policy-makers. Both the executive and the legislative branches have built substantial capacity for policy advice within their institutions. Furthermore, Washington DC and its suburbs are filled with numerous think tanks, consulting firms and individual consultants more than ready to provide advice to policymakers. The number and wide range of sources for policy advice have created an active marketplace for ideas in American politics and, if anything, the number of options for advice, beyond that formally available within government, has increased over recent decades. The existence of that marketplace for ideas is one of the defining characteristics of policy advice in the federal government. That market for policy advice is still present, but three important and interrelated changes have tended to reduce some of its utility for the policy process. The first change has been the segmentation of the market for information. Certain research organizations have always been associated with one political party or another, but the degree of ideological and partisan difference between the sources has increased markedly. The second change is that the individuals who come to Washington as policy advisers and as politically-appointed administrators have also become more partisan and paradoxically appear less linked with the established policy communities in Washington. The final change in the market for policy analysis and information has been the increased involvement of lobbyists, consulting firms, and similar private sector actors in the process. Although many members of the community available for policy advice were always clearly committed to particular positions, that level of policy commitment has increased and now ‘hired guns’, who are strongly engaged with one or another of the available policy options and who may not be as willing or able to provide impartial advice, are more common. Over 30 years after Hugh Heclo (1977) coined the term ‘A

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Government of Strangers’ to describe its executive branch, the federal government of the United States has become stranger still. Heclo was concerned with the revolving door of politically appointed officials who were spending only a short time in Washington before returning to their careers in the private sector, and with the effects of that turnover in key personnel on policy and management in the federal government. Although the number and influence of political advisers and other political appointees in the federal government was significant at the time at which Heclo wrote, there are more political appointees in 2008 and their influence appears more pervasive. That said, however, these advisers often appear less capable of providing useful policy advice, and are more interested in the political dimensions of governing than in creating more effective policies. In this chapter I will be discussing the full range of political appointees in the federal government and attempting to understand their role in the process of governing. I will be focusing attention on the executive branch of government and the policy analysts, and their kin, who are employed by the President, the Cabinet departments, and the other federal agencies (see Campbell 2006). The history of the public sector in the United States has seen a gradual extension of the career public service, although Paul Light and others have noted the ‘thickening’ of the political layers on top of the career service over the past several decades. Also, many Presidents come to office saying they will cut their own staffs and the number of political appointees. Few do, and even when they do cut those positions early in their administrations the number often creeps back up later. The interest in the executive branch does not exhaust the range of policy advisers in Washington, and Congress has its own significant array of advisers. The Congress of the United States employs by far larger staffs than any other legislature in the world, and individual Congressmen and their committees and sub-committees are capable of generating their own expert advice on politics and policy. Furthermore, there are a number of organizations serving Congress that provide a wide range of advice and monitoring. The separation of powers logic of the American Constitution requires that both of these branches arm themselves with information and engage in the competition of ideas to attempt to create the best possible policies. Furthermore, as pointed out below, there is an inherent conflict between the two branches so that even when they are controlled by the same political party they may still be competing for control over policy and their own views of good policy. Another distinguishing feature of policy advisers in the United States is that they exist both inside and outside formal positions in government. I will focus primarily on those advisers inside government, but the array of sources for policy advice outside the public sector makes identifying who

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is serving in these capacities, and their modes of influence more difficult. That part of the United States inside the Washington Beltway is heavily populated with individuals and organizations involved in thinking about and ‘selling’ policy ideas. Political leaders can therefore pick and choose among a wide array of resources and use that advice to shape policy and perhaps also to shape their own political destinies. Probably more than in any other democratic political system there are very strong links between policy advisers – individual and organizational – within the surrounding society and formal policy-makers in government. The expansion of the number and role of policy advisers to some extent mirrors changes in American government as politicization and political division have increased. With the creation of something approximating responsible political parties (Rae 2007) the demands for partisan loyalty and ideological purity have come to dominate much of political discourse (Peters 2004). In part because of the emphasis on loyalty and commitment in government, however, the revolving door is moving somewhat more slowly and many of the advisers and other political appointees spend a longer time in their positions and may be able to shape policy more effectively than they could when they were birds of passage (see Maranto 2005).

POLICY ADVICE IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH The growing emphasis on political commitment within government has made it more difficult to distinguish political from non-political actors in the Washington political environment. There are relatively few employees in the executive branch of government, outside the White House (see below), who can be identified solely as political advisers. If one were to examine the organizational chart of a Cabinet department or executive agency, officials with strictly political or policy advice positions are not readily apparent. Most political appointees are in line positions that appear to have some administrative functions, and generally do. Even officials such as an Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs will be managing an organization and a staff, albeit one primarily concerned with preparing policy initiatives. That appearance is, in part, genuine but may also be somewhat deceptive. Positions such as General Counsel of a department may be legal officers and do have some role in the chain of command within the organization, but may also be the political confidantes of the Cabinet secretary or agency director. Given the conflation of various expectations of their activities, the political appointees in the Washington bureaucracy have three roles. The first is manager. The majority of the political appointees will have some managerial

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responsibilities, and indeed most of them will spend the majority of their time in Washington managing programmes rather than thinking about and making policy per se. There has been a great deal of discussion about the managerial failings of these appointees (Cohen 1998; Durant and West 2001) but somewhat less about their failings in policy knowledge, but both deficiencies represent real challenges for an effective federal government. The other role, and a more visible role in contemporary government, is the political enforcer. Individuals performing this role are not much interested in developing policy or in shaping the political strategies of executive branch officials. Rather, these agents have the tasks of monitoring the bureaucratic agencies responsible to their principal, ensuring that those organizations are following the programmes of that principal, and attempting to bring them back to the political straight and narrow if they stray. This role and that of policy adviser need not be exclusive, and often are not, but the emphasis in recent Administrations appears to have been on enforcing the programme of the President or the secretary, rather than on creativity in developing new policy initiatives. This role can be justified in terms of accountability, but also produces a great deal of micro-management of public programmes. Finally, the appointed officials are political advisers, and also perhaps policy advisers. As already noted, relatively few appointed people on the public payroll fit neatly into the category of policy advisers, especially in the executive branch. Cabinet secretaries and other senior federal executives certainly do receive policy advice, but much of it comes from career public servants or from sources outside government such as think tanks and consultants (Saint-Martin 2004). Further, given that these officials, although clearly political, may not have needs for political advice in the same way that a minister in a parliamentary regime may have, the advice function is not as fully developed. To some extent the ‘thickening’ of the federal government, with the appointment of more ‘special assistants’, ‘chiefs of staff’ and the like (Light 1995; 2004) has expanded the number of appointees concerned with policy but even those officials may have some managerial roles. The treble nature of the role of many political appointees in Washington – managers, political advisers, and political enforcers – appears to have been increasing. Paul Light’s now familiar analysis (1995) of the ‘thickening’ of the federal government argued that political appointments were being extended further down into the public bureaucracy, and that these officials were being used primarily to ensure political control over the career public bureaucracy. Other research has demonstrated that the thickening of government has been rather systematic, with organizations having the most politically sensitive tasks being affected substantially more than less politically salient organizations (Ingraham et al. 1995).

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The perceived need to control bureaucratic organizations and their career employees has led to some strategic use of the appointment process. The tendency appears to have been to appoint officials who run counter to the prevailing policies, and especially to offset the preferences of interest groups associated with the agency. In other words, the appointment process may be a means of controlling, if not altering, the alliances between interest groups and career members of agencies that can dominate policy (Bertelli and Feldman 2007). In addition to the mixture of politics and administration with political appointees exercising many administrative duties, officials whose careers are nominally administrative also exercise political duties. In particular, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 allowed up to 10 per cent of the general Senior Executive Service to be political appointees, and Presidents have tended to take advantage of this opportunity.1 Further, civil servants may take temporary political positions, enhancing their careers in the short term but running the risk of becoming too closely identified with one party and thus undermining their career in the long term. The large political staff available to the President of the United States would appear to be a contradiction to the above statement concerning the blending of administrative and political roles. The Executive Office of the President (EOP) includes a number of professional career employees, notably in the Office of Management and Budget, but the bulk of the approximately 1700 employees in the EOP are selected primarily for political reasons (Dickinson 2006). That being said, however, again it may be difficult to separate the political dimensions of the advice that members of, say, the National Security Council give to the President and their own best professional judgement of what is best for the country. The policy advice structures within the Executive Office of the President are designed to mirror the structure of the executive branch, and to provide the President with more or less independent advice about the issues being processed through the Cabinet departments. For example, the National Security Council (NSC) mirrors the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Adviser who heads the NSC is at least as powerful a player in making foreign and defense policies as the two Cabinet secretaries.2 The President also has independent economic advice, coming from both the Council of Economic Advisers and the Office of Management and Budget, which supplements the Department of the Treasury. Domestic policy advice is less institutionalized,3 but there is still a substantial policy apparatus in the White House for those areas, for example the Domestic Policy Council, the Council on Environmental Quality, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the EOP. This mirroring principle has been designed in part to ensure that the

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President is not dependent upon advice from the departments, reflecting a rather high level of distrust of the permanent bureaucracy and the persistence of their ‘departmental views’ in a number of policy areas. Even in the area of national security policy where the Department of Defense and the State Department tend to have rather different perspectives on policy, the National Security Council develops perhaps a third position to ensure that there is a Presidential stamp on the policies that it will pursue. Furthermore, given the disagreement between the two Cabinet departments, the President may need a more synthetic perspective. Although many Presidents have claimed that they would reduce the size of the EOP this has not happened and the organization has tended to increase both in size and in its level of institutionalization (Ragsdale and Theis 1997). There have been short-term ups and downs in employment and in the influence of the President’s own staff. The Nixon years, for example, had a major increase in Presidential staff, as the President attempted to create ‘the administrative presidency’ (Nathan 1983). The general trend, however, has been toward gradually increasing size, and generally also increasing influence over policy. Furthermore, as studies of the EOP have demonstrated, the organization has been tending to create sufficient internal complexity to be able to mirror the complexity of the organizations the EOP is attempting to control on behalf of the President (Ragsdale and Theis 1997). The final point about the Executive Office of the President and its policy advice is that to be successful, policy advisers require an able and willing client. Different Presidents manage policy advice differently. Dwight Eisenhower famously wanted all advice on one side of one sheet of paper with a suggested decision, while other Presidents (Kennedy and Ford, for example) seemed more interested in hearing different perspectives and then making up their own minds. Still other Presidents (Clinton) tended to have their own ideas about policy and perhaps used less advice than had previous Presidents (Porter 1986; Ponder 2000). Although less well-documented than some previous administrations, the general interpretation is that the Administration of George W. Bush was more concerned with loyalty than with independent and fearless policy advice (but see Suskind 2004).4

POLICY ADVICE IN CONGRESS As already noted, the Congress of the United States is very well-served with advice and other staff services. Relatively few of the huge number of staff members serving individual members of Congress are policy advisers, but most of the committee staffs have some relationship to policy. Congress is

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also provided information by the Congressional Research Service, nominally a part of the Library of Congress but in practice a policy analytic and drafting organization. While most legislatures have some drafting capacity and perhaps some library, the magnitude of the staff and resources available to CRS overshadow them by far. The CRS is non-partisan and generates a large number of analytic and advice papers for Congress, and these papers are largely also available to the interested public. The largest policy analytic organization available to Congress is the General Accountability Office (GAO). The GAO has a substantial capacity to monitor and analyse programmes and policies but generally acts only when asked to by a member of Congress. Further, the GAO tends to be largely retrospective, dealing with problems in previous legislation rather than specifically the design of new programmes. This retrospective consideration is important for enforcing the accountability of the executive branch, and these analyses become important evidence for continuing reforms of policy, but the GAO is not as helpful as it might be in preventing initial mistakes in policy design. The GAO has gained some more prospective capacity through their continuing identification of programmes and policies at risk. Although in general the Congress is well served, the advice available on the budget and on many aspects of economic policy is particularly well developed. Following widespread uses of impoundments during the Nixon Administration, Congress passed the Congressional Budgeting and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.5 One of the more important products of this legislation was the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), created to provide a foil to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and its capacity for advice to the President. Over time this organization has developed some capacity to also provide alternative advice to that coming from the Council of Economic Advisers. The strength of policy-analytic units in Congress helps to institutionalize the separation of powers in American government. Without that capacity Congress would be at the mercy of the information coming from the Executive Branch, whether from the bureaucracy or from the political appointees. Indeed over time the CBO has become better regarded as a more reliable source of information on economic policy and the budget than is the OMB. Furthermore, the CBO helps with staff assistance for the Joint Economic Committee, one of the few institutions that links the two institutions of Congress and therefore serves as an even more effective counterweight to the economic policy team in the Executive Branch. It is important, however, not to assume that the policy advice capacity in Congress is better than it actually is. While extremely well-developed compared to other legislatures, the policy advice capacity in Congress

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does have several important weaknesses. First, although there are some institutions that serve both sides of the aisle fairly equally, most are tied to party so that the questions asked and the answers delivered are likely to be coloured by partisan considerations. That partisanship can also lead to terminating potentially important sources of advice such as the Office of Technology Assessment (Bimber 1996) even though they were providing often excellent policy advice in an important policy area. Further, the rapid attention shifting in Congress (to some extent a function of the partisanship of the institution) means that few policy issues are ever tracked or monitored over an extended period of time, while the problems certainly do continue.

EXPLAINING THE ROLE OF POLITICAL ADVISERS IN THE UNITED STATES The presence of a large number of political appointees in the US federal government, and the tendency to blend administrative and political roles, has several roots. Likewise, the shift toward higher levels of politicization of the advice function also reflects underlying political dynamics in the system, and the continuing need to balance the values of ‘neutral competence’ with those of ‘responsive competence’ (Aberbach and Rockman 1994; Kaufman 1956). The American political system has typically placed greater emphasis on the responsive competence dimension for civil servants than have most other democracies, but the balance between the competencies continues to shift, and to be the subject of political contestation. The first explanation of the high levels of political appointment in the executive branch is history, and path dependency. The ‘spoils system’ played a major part in American administrative history (White 1954) and, despite gradual professionalization of the civil service, the idea that political leaders should be able to appoint a significant number of allies to posts in the public sector persists (Ingraham 2005). As Pierson (2000) has pointed out, path dependent processes are supported by elites who are able to gain positive feedback from the processes. In this case the availability of patronage positions supplies such feedback. The wide-scale use of political appointees was supported historically as a part of the democratic ideal, ensuring that the policy choices made by the electorate would not be defeated by an entrenched and unresponsive public bureaucracy. Although there is evidence that most civil servants are willing to accept direction from their political ‘masters’, even those with whom they may not agree, the traditional disdain for the permanent bureaucracy persists. The creation of the Senior Executive Service (SES)

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during the Carter Administration was intended to provide some halfway house between the career system and pure political appointment, with the possibility for Presidents to appoint up to 10 per cent of the general SES, while the careerists may be more subject to political assignment and control. In addition to the cultural reasons for the large number of political appointees, the role of political advisers and the perceived need to counter the apparent policy powers of the permanent bureaucracy have been institutionalized, at least for the President. The Executive Office of the President mentioned above contains several significant advisory organizations, notably the National Security Council and the Council of Economic Advisers. Both of these organizations were created in the late 1940s as the American government appeared to accept the reality of big government and the need to professionalize. Furthermore, these advisory organizations were created in part to provide the President with advice independent of the established Departments of State and Defense, and to a lesser extent the Departments of Commerce and Labor. Policy advice for the President on most domestic issues is not as well institutionalized, although all Presidents in recent memory have had some structure for that type of advice.6 Third, the institutional politics of the federal government tends to contribute to the utilization of large numbers of political advisers and other political appointees. Unlike most parliamentary regimes, the President and other executive branch officials are confronted by an active and wellstaffed legislature, and a good deal of the politics of policy making revolves around the (sometimes acrimonious) interaction of these autonomous branches of government (Rose 2006). Rather than being concerned with internal controls over their own organizations, at this level political advisers must attempt to develop policy positions to counter those of the ‘opposition’, realizing that the opposition may come from members of the same political party. To be able to compete with the thousands of Congressional staffers, whether they are employed by individual Congressmen, by the numerous committees, or by the Congressional Research Service,7 executive branch officials require their own rather ample and skilled staffs. Another aspect of the institutional politics of the federal government is that the executive itself is not well-integrated, and the President’s ‘friends’ in the Cabinet have not always been so. Even in an Administration, such as the Republican Administration under George W. Bush, with a great deal of internal ideological agreement, the individual agency directors and even the Cabinet secretaries may not have been as personally loyal to his programme as the President may like. Given that agencies in American government do enjoy a good deal of autonomy (see Seidman 2000), the

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President may need to be able to place his (or maybe her) stamp on policy and on the activities of the Administration. Finally, the relatively low levels of development of American political parties has meant that the parties were not themselves regularly feeding ideas to political executives, or indeed different wings of the parties may be feeding a number of different ideas to those executives. Therefore, the executives would want to have closer associates who could provide them advice as well as providing assistance in managing their organizations. The political parties now have a good deal more ideological consistency than in the past but they still have not institutionalized the policy advisory capacity that many of their European counterparts have, such as the party foundations in Germany.

PROBLEMS IN THE ADVICE SYSTEM The American policy-making system should be better served by information and analysis than most others. The wide array of public and private sources of advice, the general openness of the system to ideas and information, and the institutionalization of many channels of advice makes the use of advice more feasible than in most other systems. Despite that openness, there is some evidence that the contemporary political advice and enforcement system is not as effective as it might be. Furthermore, the changes since the time that Heclo wrote have tended to undermine the effectiveness of the policy-making system. When Hugh Heclo wrote about ‘strangers’ coming and going in government, the individuals who were coming were increasingly more professional and more capable of coping with the complexities of modern governing. Another of Heclo’s observations (1978) about the federal government at the end of the 1970s was that the development of policy networks surrounding each of the policy areas was contributing to the professionalization of policy. While the infamous ‘iron triangles’ of American pluralism had represented limited involvement of interest groups and other sources of advice, Heclo identified an opening of the system to a wider range of ideas. The development of these policy communities represented three important changes in American political history. The first was the increasing knowledge and skill levels of the ‘strangers’ who were coming to Washington. For much of American political history many, if not most, of the political appointees who accepted positions in the federal government were there for political reasons, or perhaps to advance their own careers.8 One classic appointment pattern was that the chair of the

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winning Presidential campaign would become the Postmaster General of the United States. However, by the end of the Nixon and Carter Administrations an increasing number of the appointees were experts in the fields for which they were responsible, and were able to interact effectively with other experts in the field. In addition to having increased levels of expertise, the members of the policy communities were coming to stay in Washington, and to remain involved in the policy area. The available evidence is that many of the ‘in-and outers’ (Mackenzie 1987), once out of office joined think tanks, consulting firms, universities, or similar organizations and remained involved in generating and disseminating policy ideas. They thereby remained readily available when their party returned to power and they could (they hoped) return to formal policy roles within government. These advisers, whether in or out of office remained policy professionals, rather than strictly political professionals. Finally, reflecting in part the general opening of the political process after the Nixon Administration, as well as other democratizing changes, the exclusivity of advice and of the involvement of interest groups, was eroding. As Charles Jones (1982) wrote, the iron triangles were becoming big sloppy hexagons. Each party might still have its own favourite advisers, both in and out of government, and some interest groups might be more at the centre of the policy process, but now more groups, and a more diverse set of groups, could be involved. This change opened the market for policy advice and provided more and more opportunities for would-be advisers to ply their trade. And again it is important to note that policy advice activity was not confined to official positions but permeated the discourse inside the Beltway. The institutionalized and continuing interactions of policy analysts in Washington mirrored to some extent the consensus style of governing that had emerged in the federal government (see Lijphart 1999). The absence of clear ideologies and the internal divisions within the political parties meant that most major policy innovations were brokered across policy lines, with policy entrepreneurs such as Lyndon Johnson or Gerald Ford, inter alia, building coalitions.9 In that political environment characterized by bargaining and negotiation, the availability of information and policy analysis could play an important role in shaping policy. This importance of information was reflected further in the importance of evaluation research at the time. The increased emphasis on ideology and on partisan loyalty has begun to erode that more or less consensus style of policy. The role for political appointees was always to advance the political agenda of their party and their President, but that was being done in the context of the bargaining

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culture in Washington. Dating the shift toward a more ideological and partisan style of making policy, and managing political appointees, is at best inexact. One possible date would be the beginning of the Reagan Administration, while the 1994 election of the Republican majority and its ‘Contract with America’ is perhaps a better starting point. Whenever the trend began, it is clear that American government has become highly polarized. With this increased polarization, the improvements in the quality and commitment of the political appointees that were apparent in the 1970s and into the 1980s have begun to decay. First, partisan loyalty has come to outweigh competence in making political appointments (Edwards 2001). The evidence of numerous appointments made more recently, especially during the Administration of George W. Bush, has been that many appointments are put into positions for which they have no particular prior qualifications (see New Republic 2005). The case of Michael Brown as Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency at the time of the debacle in responding to Hurricane Katrina has been perhaps the most egregious example of this tendency, but by no means the only example. As well as questions of competence, there are also emerging questions of the increased openness of policy making and advice. Again, there are a number of readily available examples of individuals being appointed to positions that appear to represent a conflict of interest with their previous employment and perhaps the public interest. For example, in August 2001 one former lobbyist for a pharmaceutical firm was appointed as the counsel for the Food and Drug Administration, a key position in the regulation of that firm and other drug companies. Such an appointment may be very good for the purposes of political loyalty but perhaps not so good for the quality and democracy of policy. This appointment and others like it have tended to narrow the type of information, and the number of groups, involved. The paradox of this large-scale appointment of political officials is that in the end they may not really help the President or his friends. Paul Light, one of the most prescient analysts of federal appointments, has argued that the numerous political appointees in most federal organizations prevent the free flow of information within these organizations, and likewise prevent potentially good advice coming from the career employees from reaching the top of the organizations.10 Further, the climate of distrust and opposition created by parachuting so many loyalists into positions undermines morale and has led to a number of senior career employees leaving their posts. Thus, paradoxically adding more people who may have some policy and management tools may in fact reduce the overall policy capacity of the system.

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The other apparent danger of relying so heavily on loyalists and on narrow views of public policy is that the capacity of government to make ‘credible commitments’ about many important policy areas will be undermined. This danger is lesser in economic policy because of the insulation of the Federal Reserve from immediate political pressures, but is apparent in many other areas of policy (see Miller 2000). The creation of the policy networks over several decades had helped to create some underlying consensus about the directions of policy, but those consensus positions appear sufficiently weakened now that there may be substantially greater oscillations in policy depending upon partisan control. Some failed attempts to undermine those consensus positions during the Bush Administration, for example Social Security and reimbursement for physicians in Medicare, have demonstrated the strength of those positions and to some extent of the networks that support them.

THE THINK TANKS AND CONSULTANTS No discussion of policy advice in Washington would be complete without some discussion of the role of the think tanks and consulting firms in generating and promoting policy ideas. Although there have been some organizations of this type since the Brookings Institution was created in 1916, there has been an explosion of the number of organizations and perhaps also of their influence over policy. These organizations are, of course, outside government but often have strong ties to particular political actors and often close connections with political parties. They are also the refuges to which members of the party out of power repair in order to stay involved with policy and to await opportunities to return to an official position in a subsequent Administration more to their liking. The think tanks are therefore, to some extent, Governments in waiting, with many members going from positions in those organizations to a new Administration. The role and influence of the think tanks also helps to substantiate the point that there is a marketplace of ideas in Washington, with policy-makers able to find advocates, and supporting evidence, for almost any position. Although the large majority of think tanks continue to be nonideological, the development of think tanks since the 1980s has been most noticeable on the political right. Although there are certainly some notable policy-advice organizations on the left and centre – the Brookings Institution, the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, for example – the major expansion over the past several decades has been in organizations with conservative and libertarian views. Notable among these think

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tanks are the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute.11 During the Administration of George W. Bush these organizations have had a significant influence over policy, although some had some notable failures, such as the privatization of Social Security and numerous aspects of foreign and security policy. The ‘K-Street Corridor’ in Washington tends to be the home of major consulting firms often populated by former members of Congress and previous administrations. In some instance these consulting firms are thinly disguised lobbying organizations, while in others they are more genuine purveyors of policy advice. Indeed, in some policy areas, notably energy, consultants are now doing some of the work for departments and agencies that would have been done within the organizations before significant downsizing. And it is often the same people who once were civil servants who are now the consultants. The major differences would be that the individuals often earn much higher incomes than when they were public employees, and they must also take more care that their advice is compatible with the current Administration. In short, the policy advice has become more politicized. Although it may be dignifying them to refer to them as either think tanks or consultancies, the ‘blogosphere’ that now surrounds policy and politics in Washington represents another source of influence from society over policy (Wallsten 2007). This is certainly not formal policy advice, and it is often highly politicized, but what is happening in these unmediated areas of discussion about politics and policy is having an increasing impact on how politicians gauge public sentiment about policy and also even can be the source of some policy ideas. If nothing else, the blogosphere and the other forms of communication through the internet provide alternatives for a wider range of people to have some say in policies, but they also require the formal actors to government to have the capacity to filter and synthesize the huge volume of information available.

CONCLUSION Compared to political executives in other industrial democracies the President of the United States, as well as the individual Cabinet secretaries, have immense appointment powers. The over 4000 appointments available in an Administration permit employment of numerous political advisers and political enforcers, and more commonly people who combine those two roles. These appointment powers and the number of political advisers in Washington, both in and out of government, continue to increase. Much the same is true for Congress and although the number of legislative

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staffers has largely stabilized it remains huge compared to legislatures in other democratic governments. For both sets of advisers the degree of partisan commitment of those advisers is also increasing as American politics becomes more ideological and, in some cases at least, emphasizes loyalty more than competence. The decline in comity and consensus in the federal government, and the apparent associated decline in competence, poses important challenges for American government. The policy-making system has been, and continues to be, blessed with a wide range of policy advice and advisers, but somewhat paradoxically that advice is becoming narrower and less inclusive, and in some ways less useful for making ‘good’ public policy. Furthermore, much of the use of political appointees appears to be moving away from advice and toward enforcing the agenda of the party and President in office. The role of the political appointees in the federal government is now more political than in the past, but ultimately the change in the advice and appointment systems may produce less effective government. At least one consideration in the 2008 Presidential campaign was the need to restore both comity and competence within the federal government. The emphasis on ideological affinity that characterized the Bush Administration reduced the policy analytic capacity, and the management capacity, of the federal government. The obvious need, however, is to restore some greater capacity for solving problems, and for solving longterm problems, than has been available for some time. A large part of that capacity development will need to be in the ability to provide high quality advice that is addressed at solving problems rather than at serving partisan interests.

NOTES 1. 2.

3. 4. 5.

6.

This provision was once called ‘Carter’s gift to Reagan’ who, as President, immediately began to insert his people into those positions (see Benda and Levine 1988). The strength of this position is to some extent dependent upon the individual involved. Condoleezza Rice was extremely visible and powerful while in this position while Stephen J. Hadley who has served in the second term of George W. Bush has been much less visible. Both the National Security Council and the Council of Economic Advisors were created by legislation in the late 1940s. Aaron’s Wildavsky’s famous dictum was that the role of the policy adviser was to ‘speak truth to power’. The holders of power must, however, want to hear the truth. Congress may appropriate money in the budget but the President could choose not to spend it. Under the 1974 legislation the President could attempt to impound money but could be stopped from so doing if one House of Congress disagreed. He could defer spending money more easily, but delay could become termination in some instances. In the White House of George W. Bush there was an Office of Policy Development

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8.

9.

10.

11.

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employing approximately 40 people, as well as an Office of Science and Technology Policy. In 2007 the Congress of the United States employed some 30 000 individuals, with roughly 20 000 working for individual members and for the committees, more than 700 working for the Congressional Research Service, and another 230 working for the Congressional Budget Office. For example, many lawyers from Wall Street firms found it advantageous to spend some time in the Securities and Exchange Commission in order to understand better how the securities market was actually regulated, and to make personal contacts with the career regulators. There was, in essence a four-party system until the 1990s – Southern Democrats were different from Northern Democrats and Western Republicans were different from Eastern Republicans, with Western Republicans and Southern Democrats often having more in common than they had with members of their own parties. One of the classic analyses of organizations (Thompson 1960) argued that a major problem of (then) contemporary organizations was the concentration of information at the bottom and the concentration of decision-making at the top. This analysis remains very true, and perhaps more true for public organizations, even a half-century after it was first made. See, for example, Rich (2004). The Heritage Foundation is usually identified as being conservative while the Cato Institute identifies itself as libertarian.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Aberbach, J. D. and B.A. Rockman (1994), ‘Civil servants and policymakers: neutral or responsive competence?’, Governance, 7 (4), 461–69. Benda, P. and C.H. Levine (1988), ‘Reagan and the bureaucracy: the bequest, the promise and the legacy’, in C.O. Jones (ed.), The Reagan Legacy, Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. Bertelli, A. and S.E. Feldman (2007), ‘Strategic appointments’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 17 (1), 19–38. Bimber, B.A. (1996), The Politics of Expertise: The Rise and Fall of the Office of Technology Assessment, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Campbell, C. (2006), ‘The complex organization of the executive branch’, in J.D. Aberbach and M.E. Peterson (eds), The Executive Branch, New York: Oxford University Press. Cohen, D.M. (1998), ‘Amateur government’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 8 (4), 450–97. Dickinson, M.J. (2006), ‘The executive office of the president: the paradox of politicization’, in J.D. Aberbach and M.E. Peterson (eds), The Executive Branch, New York: Oxford University Press. Durant, R.F. and W.F. West (2001), ‘Merit protection, federal agencies and the new personnel management’, Administration and Society, 32 (6), 627–67. Edwards, G. C. (2001), Why Not the Best?: The Loyalty–Competence Trade-off in Presidential Appointments, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Heclo, H. (1977), A Government of Strangers?, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Heclo, H. (1978), ‘Issue Networks and the executive establishment’, in A. King (ed.), The New American Political System, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.

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Ingraham, P.W. (2005), Foundations of Merit, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Ingraham, P.W., J.R. Thompson and E.F. Eisenberg (1995), ‘Political management strategies and political/career relationships: where are we now in the federal government?’, Public Administration Review, 55 (3), 263–72. Jones, C.O. (1982), The United States Congress: People, Place and Policy, Georgetown, ON: Dorsey Press. Kaufman, H. (1956), ‘Emerging conflicts in the doctrine of public administration’, American Political Science Review, 50 (4), 1057–73. Light, P.C. (1995), Thickening Government: The Federal Hierarchy and the Diffusion of Accountability, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Light, P.C. (2004), Fact Sheet on the Continuing Thickening of Government, 23 July, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Lijphart, A. (1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Mackenzie, C.G. (1987), The In and Outers, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Maranto, R. (2005), Beyond a Government of Strangers: How Career Executives and Political Appointees Can Turn Conflict to Cooperation, Lanham, MD: Lexington. Miller, G. (2000), ‘Above politics: credible commitment and efficiency in the design of public agencies’, Journal of Public Policy Administration and Theory, 10 (2), 289–328. Nathan, R.P. (1983), The Administrative Presidency, New York: John Wiley. New Republic (2005), ‘Welcome to the hackocracy’, 17 October, 21–5. Peters, B. Guy (2004), ‘Governing the United States: from consensus to majoritarian democracy’, in G. Peele, C. Baily, B. Cain and B. Guy Peters (eds), Developments in American Politics IV, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Pierson, P. (2000), ‘Increasing returns, path dependence and the study of politics’, American Political Science Review, 94 (2), 251–67. Ponder, D. (2000), Good Advice: Information and Policy Making in the White House, College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press. Porter, R.B. (1986), ‘Advising the president’, PS, 19, 867–69. Rae, N. (2007), ‘Be careful what you wish for: the rise of responsible parties in American national government’, Annual Review of Political Science, 10 (1), 169–91. Ragsdale, L. and J.J. Theis (1997), ‘The institutionalization of the American Presidency, 1924–1992’, American Journal of Political Science, 41 (October), 121–39. Rich, A. (2004), Think Tanks, Public Policy and the Politics of Expertise, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rose, R. (2006), ‘Giving direction to government in comparative perspective’, in J.D. Aberbach and M.E. Peterson (eds), The Executive Branch, New York: Oxford University Press. Saint-Martin, D. (2004), Building the New Managerialist State: Consultants and the Politics of Public Sector Reform in Comparative Perspective, 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Seidman, H.B. (2000), Politics, Power and Position: The Dynamics of Federal Organization, 6th edn, New York: Oxford University Press. Suskind, R. (2004), The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House and the Education of Paul O’Neill, New York: Simon and Schuster.

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Thompson, V. (1960), Modern Organizations, New York: Knopf. Wallsten, K. (2007), ‘Agenda-setting and the blogosphere: an analysis of mainstream media and political blogs’, Review of Policy Research, 24 (6), 567–87. White, L.D. (1954), The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History, New York: Macmillan. Wilson G.K. and B. Guy Peters (2007), ‘Heck of a job, brownie’, paper presented at Conference of Research Committee 27 of the International Political Science Association, Seoul Korea, October.

Conclusion Chris Eichbaum and Richard Shaw INTRODUCTION One of the key objectives in inviting contributions to a collection of this kind was to harvest interesting research data and commentary that goes to what we believe are significant changes in the conventional, if not formal, terrain inhabited by those who occupy executive and political roles. But we also wanted to locate these developments on a much larger canvas – that constituted by the impressive body of academic writing within public administration and political science more generally. Our introductory observations also signify a desire to place recent developments of a conventional and formal kind in the context of traditional (and historically) grounded normative notions of the relationship between politicians and administrators. In that sense we identified two imperatives as characterizing those relationships: independence (to a degree) of administrative agents from political principals, and responsiveness of those agents to the electorally mandated policy preferences and priorities of political principals (together with an acknowledgement that, in a constitutional sense, on any issue, whether anticipated or not, it is the latter who bear the burden of accountability, whether to legislatures, electors, or to standards of good governance). In this conclusion we want to engage with some of the seminal contributions of recent decades – some of which contributors to this volume have been responsible for – and use that wider canvas to illustrate the nature and consequences of political actors in executive government. The relevant literature in both public administration and political science means that the canvas is an expansive one. And for the purposes of this final chapter we have chosen to focus on aspects of the canvas that – in terms of illuminating the relationship between political and administrative actors in executive government, and the influence of the advent of political staffs in particular – might be deemed to be seminal. In retrospect we believe that a number of those seminal contributions both anticipated and, somewhat presciently, now serve to illuminate, the issues that have been traversed in this collection. 198

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We open the discussion by harnessing Aberbach et al.’s (1981) notion of ‘images’ of relationships between political and bureaucratic actors. We focus on one image in particular, deserving of a somewhat more prosaic characterization than that attached to it over time: Image IV. It is this particular image, we contend, that both anticipated and – to a degree – now serves to provide a relevant conceptual framework for the new terrain of executive government, and in particular the relatively new class of political actor that now inhabits that terrain. Campbell and Peters’ (1988) development of the initial formulation suggests a more refined means of examining that same terrain and the implications for political and administrative actors. Images give way to ideal types in our review of yet another benchmark contribution to the literature, and from one of the contributors to this collection – B. Guy Peters. Peters (1987) brings Weberian ideal types to the analysis of relations between administrative actors, a number of which entertain – if not anticipate – the advent of the political staffer as a third element in executive government. While not subscribing to an orthodox rational-actor or public choice framework of analysis, Peters admits of that possibility in both conceptual and practical terms, and provides an excellent transition to our discussion of the influence of the New Public Management (NPM), and more specifically of the extent to which increased recourse to political staff in executive government is a consequence of the institutional and conventional changes attendant upon various forms of the NPM. In discussing the influence of the NPM we draw on a third seminal contribution, and again it is from one of the contributors to this volume. Peter Aucoin’s 1990 article is now seen as one of the contributions that marked the point of departure for the voluminous literature directed to the NPM and variants of it. We then address the issue of the institutional context and, in particular, the mix of opportunities and constraints attendant upon particular institutional arrangements, and episodes of significant institutional change or dislocation. Clearly, in some jurisdictions (and Ireland and New Zealand provide evidence in this collection), the constitutional context, and specifically a tradition of or transition to multi-party Government, opens up institutional spaces that political actors, and political staff in particular, may be required to fill. The penultimate section of this conclusion addresses matters that, hitherto, have largely dominated academic and lay commentary on the implications of increased recourse to political staff, namely issues of accountability and regulation. We agree that these are important and, in some cases, pressing matters; indeed, each of the contributions to this

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volume has addressed the matter of how best to regulate relations between political principals, their administrative agents, and political staff as the third element in an evolving equation. Finally, we close this collection with some concluding comments which connect the various case studies with Hood and Lodge’s recent work on the evolving nature of public service bargains.

IMAGE AND IDEAL TYPES: COMBINATIONS OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PREFERENCES AND IMPERATIVES Images: Aberbach, Putman and Rockman Aberbach et al. published Bureaucrats and Politicians in 1981. In a subsequent reprise for the first edition of what is now acknowledged as one of the leading journals in the field (Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration), Aberbach and Rockman revisited one of the ideal types, ‘Image IV’, that speaks directly to so much of what has been traversed in the preceding chapters in this collection. In the initial contribution Aberbach et al. developed four ‘role images’ that related both to the evolving roles of bureaucrats and politicians over time, and as they have developed in the discipline of public administration. The first image represented the strict Weberian or Wilsonian distinction between policy making and administration. Political actors are proactive and directive; administrative actors reactive and passive. The relationship is perhaps best captured in the aphorism that politicians propose and administrators – dutifully and unquestioningly – dispose. The second image – which almost evokes the classical Downsian (Downs 1957) public choice characterization of the motives of politicians – views the same as driven by a calculus of compromise and voter catchment. As Aberbach and Rockman so aptly summarize the features of Image II: ‘The distinction here is between ‘administrative’ and ‘political’ rationality – that civil servants will follow the trail of evidence in an unblinkered way while politicians need to satisfy appropriate political coalitions, constituencies, and significant social groups’ (1988, p. 3). One might observe that this latter reference admits of other than a public choice informed lens on the relationship, and would entertain variants of both a neo-pluralist and/or neo-Marxist analysis. In some respects, this distinction highlights the civil servant’s often perceived role as guardian of the state against the particularistic motives of politicians. This last point has recently been captured in a fascinating debate regarding the

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consequences of ‘public value’ models of policy development and delivery and the perceived risks attendant upon elevating administrative elites to the status of ‘platonic guardians’ (see Alford 2008; Rhodes and Wanna 2007, 2008 for a defence of ‘platonic guardians’, or the ‘mandarinate’, see Lind 2005). Aberbach and Rockman noted that the ideal type of Image II was not particularly validated by their own empirical research, ‘because our empirical evidence was very compelling on the point that senior civil servants, themselves, are abundantly involved in interest mediation’ (1988, p. 4). Image III, which at the time of writing (1981) the original authors described as the dominant modality, conceived of both political and administrative actors as being involved in policy making, but on the basis of different styles of engagement. That is: [w]hile in a grand sense, politicians still directed policy change, bureaucrats, by their detailed knowledge of programmes and of relevant policy ideas, often provided the ‘solutions’ for politicians to pick from the shelf. Especially relevant to Image III is the idea that bureaucrats’ knowledge of both programme detail and the specific concerns, relevant to their responsibilities, or organised interests virtually required them to conduct the politics of small-scale policy adaptations. In sheer volume, this would mean ‘most adaptations’. (1988, p. 4)

But Aberbach and Rockman were also finding evidence of a hybrid, linking the traits of bureaucrats and politicians; moreover, this was a hybrid making the transition from the informal to institutionalization (1988, p. 4). What was in evidence was a new form of ‘official’ (although the term was clearly at variance with Northcote and Trevelyan-informed and more traditional Westminster meanings attached to that term). A variety of factors were identified as responsible for the emergence of Image IV, including ‘new executive structures and roles being filled by a corps of politically attuned civil servants’ (Aberbach and Rockman, 1988, p. 6). Again, the use of the term ‘civil servant’ is somewhat problematic in this regard. But what is of particular interest in this regard is the salience of the notion of responsiveness (or, more to the point, of a need for greater policy and political responsiveness) as a driver of some of the informal and institutional patterns suggested by Image IV: ‘governing could not be principally delegated to relatively autonomous bureaucratic organizations distanced from the central political leadership if there was to be political and policy responsiveness to the leadership (Aberbach and Rockman, 1988, p. 6, emphasis added). Moreover, the pure hybrid suggested by Image IV implied the advent of a new class of political/administrative actors: ‘[r]oles that provide close links to leading political officials are often a hallmark of the positions

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inhabited by the newer officials implied by Image IV’ (Aberbach and Rockman, 1988, p. 8, emphasis added). A desire on the part of political principals to exert greater control over ‘their’ administrative agents was identified as one of the key drivers or imperatives. Two principal motives were seen as being at work in the emergence of this new image of political and administrative tendencies, the first of which ‘derives from the desire of the political leadership to impose more direction, control and coordination over policy through less unwieldy mechanisms than the traditional line departments’ (Aberbach and Rockman, 1988, p. 9). (And, to anticipate the argument that follows, these are the very attributes that Aucoin identifies as being associated with one strain of the NPM.) In the initial formulation of the Image IV model the underlying assumption was one of a hybrid construct. On the one hand, it had an organizational or institutional manifestation: the executive agency close to the centre of political power, and purpose-designed to give better effect to political preferences (Aberbach and Rockman refer to this as a role, but it is our contention that it has a wider institutional import). On the other, the construct had a functional manifestation in new ‘species of official’ (Aberbach and Rockman, 1988, p. 10). Different combinations of these two variables open up the possibility of different types, or subcategories, of Image IV. Of particular interest in the present context is the combination of new roles and new personnel. Aberbach and Rockman comment that this was ‘the most obvious approximation to what we had in mind when we developed the notion of the ‘pure-hybrid’ (Aberbach and Rockman, 1988, p. 14). Kemp (1986) is cited as capturing the essence of institutions or roles, and new types of personnel: [P]olitical staffing and advisory structures recruited from outside of the public service have been elaborated, particularly around the Prime Minister, but extending to other ministers as well. . . . Alongside these political staffing structures analytical, advisory and coordinating units, responsible to the Prime Minister, developed within the public service. (Kemp, quoted in Aberbach and Rockman, 1988, p. 14)

This volume is not about tendencies towards what might be characterized as the presidentialization of hitherto Parliament or Cabinet forms of government per se, nor is it principally about the tendency for political staff to be associated with the emergence of quasi (or proto) presidential institutional arrangements in parliamentary and Prime Ministerial contexts. But the affinity between the two was clear to Aberbach, Rockman and others in the late 1980s, as much as it is clearly in evidence in a number

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of the country case studies in this volume. The advent of political staff in executive government is not a sufficient precondition for a tendency towards presidential modes in institutional design and practice, but it is clearly a necessary one. So for Aberbach and Rockman, writing with considerable prescience two decades ago: much of what we had in mind was exemplified by the emergence of these central techno-political roles – roles that were designed to attract personnel different from that normally coughed-up through traditional procedures of civil service selection. Another characteristic of such roles is that incumbency was likely to last only as long as a particular government or administration being served. (Aberbach and Rockman, 1988, p. 15)

Moreover, in reviewing the particular characteristics and tendencies of the US system (and the broader range of possibilities suggested by Image IV within that system), Aberbach and Rockman anticipate the very argument advanced in this collection by B. Guy Peters; namely that extragovernmental organizations such as think-tanks and the relationships that they enjoy with political parties constitute a particular confluence of the political and the administrative (where the latter relates to the formative stages of the policy process). As Aberbach and Rockman might say, ‘the “pure-hybrid” . . . may be found off-stage in the wings either ready to enter or having recently exited’ (1988, p. 17). Aberbach and Rockman do note three inhibiting factors, each of which can be detected in the various trajectories of institutional reshaping rehearsed in earlier chapters in this collection. Administrative culture can indeed be resilient, and it is instructive that the systemic failures associated with the advent of political staff in executive government, as manifest publicly, tend to be about offences against the existing order by new political interlopers (even if these cases are exceptional and fail to capture the normalization of relations that has occurred between political staff and members of the permanent public service). That said, as Aberbach and Rockman noted in 1988, even at that point in time the self-serving and self-perpetuating nature of public service elites was already an issue for parties of the left and the right. The two decades since have certainly seen a measure of institutional resilience by established elites, but ethos – which privileges independence and responsiveness – has trumped institutional stasis. The idea of Westminster is still a compelling one (including in a normative sense) but its form has changed and will continue to do so. Variability of style (and of enthusiasm for change) is also noted by Aberbach and Rockman as an inhibiting factor. And there can be no doubt, as the preceding country case studies attest, that leadership style

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and temperament have played an influence. However, that influence – we would contend – is one of pace, and of institutional form at the margin: political staff in executive government are increasingly ubiquitous. Two decades ago Aberbach and Rockman suggested that: The key elements of our thinking were about Image IV, however, we were focused on the development of organizational machinery located toward the centre of the executive (and thus, the centre of political power) and staffed by personnel who were relatively atypical of the line bureaucracy in the ministries. This primarily was where we envisioned the fusion of bureaucratic and political thinking. (1988, p. 22, emphasis added)

With the benefit of a good deal of hindsight, and with the insights available from a collection of this kind, we contend that this view can now be seen as both partial, and somewhat premature. The first issue of Governance also provided a further reprise on what the editors, Campbell and Peters, described as the ‘most innovative segment of the APR framework – Image IV’ (1988, p. 83), and proposed three distinct variations on Image IV. The first of these, somewhat inelegantly termed Image IV.1, is characterized as the reactive and defensive mode of bureaucratic behaviour. As we note below, this characterization is captured in some of the seminal public choice contributions to the analysis of bureaucratic and political behaviour, and was one of the imperatives behind the NPM. Images IV.2a and IV.2b view officials in a more benign light (Campbell and Peters, 1988, p. 84). The fundamental point of distinction with Image IV.1 is that while officials in this mode may operate in a reactive and defensive (even perhaps obstructive) manner, in the other two variants proactivity is a defining element. As Campbell and Peters put it, ‘Image IV.2a encompasses those who base their contributions on astute knowledge of how to negotiate initiatives through the labyrinth of power. . . . These attributes . . . qualify IV.2a officials as policy professionals’ (1988, p. 84). The point of distinction between IV.2a and 2.b – which is directly apposite to the key themes and issues traversed in this collection – is that the actions of officials of the IV.2b variety are informed by a consciously held partisan view of the world. That is, ‘whereas all Image IVs reveal strong elements of politicization, only IV.2b officials explicitly identify with the fortunes of a specific political party. They are party-political officials’ (Campbell and Peters, 1988, p. 84). Clearly, in the light of the country case studies reviewed in earlier chapters this is perhaps too blunt a characterization, in that it fails to capture the fact the ‘political staff’ may indeed be policy professionals engaged by political principals to advance policies (or even to develop if not oversee

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the implementation of such policies). There is a danger of equating Image IV.2b – even as a heuristic – with the notion of the political apparatchik. Indeed, Campbell and Peters make this very point themselves in distinguishing between policy professionals (who, on a procedural basis, may be political appointees) and what they describe as ‘political operatives’ (Campbell and Peters, 1988, p. 92). Policy professionals they style as ‘amphibians’, ‘because they do not find themselves restricted to government or politics in order to trade on their skills’ (Campbell and Peters, 1988, p. 92). On the other hand: Political operatives . . . normally do not bring to their work an ability to contribute substantively to the resolution of policy issues and to get what they want through the standing bureaucratic apparatus. Further they usually worked their way into the trusted circle of political advisers through party organisation and work on election campaigns. (Campbell and Peters, 1988, p. 92)

From the preceding chapters in this collection there is no doubt that both amphibians and operatives populate the new terrain of political and bureaucratic relationships; indeed, both may be found within a particular institutional or organizational context (see Campbell and Peters, 1988, p. 93). But there is perhaps here the risk of a reification of the Wilsonian distinction between politics and administration. In respect of communications functions – and this is, as we have seen, an area in which some of the more egregious failings on the part of political operatives (and the institutional and regulatory contexts in which they have operated) have been made manifest – there may be some basis for a distinction of this kind. But the focus of this collection has been principally on the role that political staffs play in the policy process (net of the cruder ‘elements selling’, or spin, associated with some aspects of policy implementation). It is entirely possible that the political operative may well possess the knowledge and experience of the policy professional, and indeed that the very synthesis of these two elements may constitute one of the reasons why the role of ‘political staffer’ constitutes a valuable and valid learning path for the aspiring (elected) politician. Moreover, as the preceding chapters make clear, the institutional space has been variously cleared or created to allow particular organizational homes for the amphibians that Campbell and Peters describe. Central policy or strategy units close to the centre of Government are now somewhat ubiquitous, but it is not at all clear that they are staffed by amphibians as such. That is, the imperatives of responsiveness (and to a degree the challenges of horizontal integration across government) have resulted in what we would traditionally conceive of as career members of the traditional public or civil service assuming amphibian type roles without the

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kind of politicization inferred by Campbell and Peters’ initial formulation. It is not at all clear that these kinds of functions can be fairly described as constituting ‘partisan policy posts’. Furthermore, the tendency to find an institutional home for the policy professional has not, as Campbell and Peters suggested in 1988, been a substitute for the more ‘adhocratic’ resort to political staff, whether in ministers’ offices or in departments. (See Lindquist (2006) on ‘adhocracies’ and recourse to adhocratic responses on the part of political executives in the face of implementation challenges.) Indeed, we have seen increasing resort to both and, in respect of a number of the country case studies in this collection, evidence not only of both developments but of a fusion – not of roles but of personnel, with both career civil servants or policy professionals and ‘political operatives’ working in the same organizational unit (the UK experience provides perhaps the clearest evidence of this). Ideal Types: B. Guy Peters The 1980s was, of course, the formative decade for the NPM, and Campbell and Peters, writing in 1988, noted attempts to ‘refocus the role of the civil service as management rather than policy making’ (1988, p. 96). Before focusing briefly on the NPM and seeking to identify the drivers behind and the consequences of increased recourse to political staff in executive government, we want to reflect on a further ideal typology which, by seeking to illuminate the nature of relationships between political and bureaucratic actors by reference to notions of rational choice, provides a particularly useful bridge between the ‘images’ discussed thus far, and the NPM. The architect of the typology which we, as editors, have found particularly useful is B. Guy Peters. To be fair, while we evoke Peters’ typology in this context as a bridge to our discussion of the NPM, Peters himself does not subscribe to an orthodox ‘public choice’ account of political or administrative motives: [P]olitical executives are constantly reporting that they believe themselves to be thwarted in their policy making efforts by the power of an entrenched public bureaucracy. The roadblocks actually presented by the bureaucracy are not placed there because of a desire to sabotage one set of political leaders or another for partisan reasons. Rather these blocks arise as large organisations tend to proceed from inertia and to persist in their routine unless stopped. (Peters, 1987, p. 256)

Peters’ quest is for a framework – comparative and theoretical – to more fully illuminate the patterns of interaction between political and

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administrative actors in the policy process. His response is a Weberian recourse to a set of ideal types that model patterns of behaviour between political and administrative actors. There is no need in the present context to rehearse the detail of the Peters’ typology. Rather, our purpose here is to pose two questions: to what extent do the various models explain the increased recourse to political staff within executive government and, second, to what extent do they accommodate an additional functional role – that of the political staffer? The formal model, while it evokes both Wilson and Weber, also characterizes the classical bureaucrat (Peters, 1987, p. 258) and as such could be seen to be the embodiment of the endowments of independence and responsiveness suggested by Northcote and Trevelyan. However, as Peters observes, it is: despite being a caricature to more detached analysis in academe, a model that many real world executives (especially political executives) carry with them into their work. This can, of course, present a great deal of difficulty for those political executives, and may be the source of much of their reported frustration in exercising the powers of their office. (1987, p. 259)

In the present context one might observe that frustrations arising from what – in terms of the perceptions of political agents – is viewed as too much independence and too little political responsiveness might suggest recourse to political staff as part of a rebalancing exercise. For Peters, ‘village life’, by contrast, entertains such a fusion of political and administrative preferences that there is no need for recourse to any third element. However, as he observes, the functional separation of administrative and political elites that one finds in the British context is not necessarily replicated in other jurisdictions. In others – and the French grand corps is often cited as an exemplar (Peters, 1987, p. 260) – elite structures are both more fluid and more porous, with movement between political and administrative roles. In such cases one may indeed find ‘village life’, but it is less to do with an enduring bargain between distinct classes of actor, and more to do with the breaking down of the distinction between the political and the administrative. Indeed, the third ideal type, ‘the functional model’, is predicated on vertical integration within particular policy domains or silos. Again the suggestion is of an elite in which commonality of ideas and purpose prevails over the distinctions suggested by the formal model. But the functional model also admits of the kind of budget-maximizing and bureau-shaping behaviour that one finds at the heart of much of the public choice literature. And so Peters entertains circumstances in which ‘political and administrative elites within a specific policy sector will be allied against

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political and bureaucratic elites from other sectors’ (1987, p. 261). In such circumstances, and notwithstanding the degree of elite integration, one might entertain a role for the political staffer as policy specialist and/or personal (as distinct perhaps from partisan) loyalist. Peters suggests that the fourth ideal type – the adversarial model – is perhaps the most commonly articulated (1987, p. 262). And he rehearses at some length the imperatives that might result in an adversarial relationship between political principals and administrative agents. It is in the discussion of this particular model that one comes closest to the standard kind of rational-actor or public choice accounts of political and administrative relationships: that is, to a particular kind of institutional politics. And it is clearly the model that so readily entertains a role for the institution and the functional contribution of the political staffer. Whether the imperative is of a structural kind (the institutional politics associated with budgetmaximizing or bureau-shaping), or of the kind that comes with a form of creeping politicization (perhaps socialization) associated with long-term Governments and responsive bureaucracies, the political staffer represents a counterweight; a means of mitigating or even overcoming the reality of information asymmetries, or of ensuring that the partisan preferences of the Government of the day are more assiduously prosecuted.

THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT – POLITICAL STAFF AS A CONSEQUENCE OR A CORRECTIVE? In Chapter 2 of this collection Peter Aucoin locates the increased recourse to political staff on the part of their elected principals as one characteristic of what he describes as the ‘new public governance’. He defines this tendency, which he sees applying to Canada and to most Westminster systems, as including: [t]he concentration of power at the centre of government under the Prime Minister, increased political attention to the staffing of the senior public service that is not regulated by independent staffing, increased expectations of public service enthusiasm for the government’s agenda, increased pressures on the public service to provide a pro-government spin on government communications, and increased weight given to political factors in public policy making (Aucoin, this volume: Chapter 2 opening paragraph).

In an earlier – and seminal – contribution, Aucoin examined the characteristic features and internal tensions (if not contradictions) associated with an emergent NPM (Aucoin 1990). Since the publication of that earlier paper the NPM has been widely researched, conceptualized, and

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commented upon. What was – at least in respect of academic analysis and commentary – an emergent concept or set of doctrines in 1990, is now viewed as having passed through a number of evolutionary ages or phases (see Barzelay 2001; Christensen and Lægreid 2007; Hood and Peters 2004; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Indeed, some have suggested that we are now seeing the emergence of a post-NPM regime (Christensen and Lægreid 2007), one evoking some of the attributes and qualities of ‘traditional’ public administration (Whitcombe 2008). Aucoin’s earlier contribution does, however, illuminate the essential and enduring features of the public management reforms that, to varying degrees and with contextually different organizational and institutional forms, were implemented in many of the advanced industrial democracies in the latter decades of the twentieth century (including all of the jurisdictions reviewed in this collection). Aucoin captures the essential identity of the families of ideas informing the NPM in the following manner: The first set of ideas, emanating from the school of thought known as public choice theory, focuses on the need to reestablish the primacy of representative government over bureaucracy. The second set of ideas, now generally referred to as the ‘managerialist’ school of thought, focuses on the need to reestablish the primacy of managerial principles over bureaucracy. Taken together, they have had a profound impact on the ways in which governments are structured for the purposes of administering public affairs. (Aucoin, 1990, p. 115)

In respect of the first set, Aucoin suggests that the imperative is one of reinforcing the power of elected representatives – and especially executive authorities – against bureaucracy, and that what he describes as a concentration of power requires attention to effective centralization, coordination and control (1990, p. 119). Centralization is about shifting the locus of power from administrative agents to political principals, with implications for the way in which political executives are structured, for the relative status of Prime Ministers and premiers vis-à-vis their cabinet colleagues, and for relationships between those ministers and department or agency heads, with the former assuming authority (but often not responsibility) for both policy and administration. Coordination is viewed as the antidote to ‘departmentalism’ and is associated with the increased resourcing of the political and administrative ‘centre’, and with the use of other institutional and organizational instruments designed to enhance the prospects for what we now recognize as ‘whole of’ or ‘joined up’ government or governance. Control is about ensuring that policies – or more to the point the policy preferences of the Government of the day – are implemented as intended (Aucoin, 1990, p. 121). Among other things, this may involve the politicization of staffing:

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In some cases this has meant the proliferation of partisan appointments of outsiders to support staff positions or even to line positions (Ingraham 1987); in others, it has meant the promotion of career public servants who have demonstrated either partisan attachments to the governing political elite or sympathies to their policies or approaches (Bourgault and Dion 1989). In the case of the former, the expansion of the number of outsiders, brought in explicitly to assist in the control of bureaucracies, is overt; in the latter instances, it is often covert. In either case, however, it stems from a distrust of the permanent bureaucracy – its objectives and/or its perceived biases in staffing positions and promoting career public servants. (Aucoin, 1990, p. 121)

While it is clearly not a matter of the embrace of the NPM, in its various forms, giving effect in some deterministic fashion to the advent of political staff in executive government, there is a clear sense in which the logic of the NPM, and the imperatives of centralization, coordination and control, are strongly permissive of the kind of political and administrative capacity that the advent of political staff represent. Fundamentally, what Aucoin refers to as the ‘reassertion of the political dimension of representative government’ is both suggestive of that capacity and consistent with the evidence adduced from the case studies in preceding chapters. As we noted above, a constant and consistent theme in those case studies is the quest for more effective control on the part of political principals of their administrative agents. The advent of political staff in executive government may, then, be viewed as a consequence of the NPM in its various manifestations. But a caveat is in order, and it takes the form of the distinction between association and causality. Commenting on the influence of the NPM in the US context Lewis has recently observed that: The empirical evidence reveals no support for the view that presidents subscribing to the New Public Management politicize more than presidents that do not . . . Presidents of different ideologies do prefer different techniques for obtaining bureaucratic control, however. Liberals are more likely to build parallel processes or increase ministerial staff as a means of politicizing since these techniques avoid direct confrontation with government employees and their unions. Those adopting conservative ideologies are less concerned with antagonizing federal employees and unions and are more inclined to politicize through replacement and reductions-in-force. (Lewis, 2008, p. 203)

One can, however, view the advent of political staff in executive government as a response or even remedy to the tensions and contradictions generated by the confluence of the reassertion of the political over the bureaucratic on the one hand, and the ascendancy of the managerialist school on the other. The latter is viewed as being characterized by decentralization, deregulation, and delegation. One of the consequences of the application of managerialist prescriptions to public sector and

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public service institutions has been the tendency towards fragmentation. The political logic of control associated with public choice leads to and has a direct affinity with the kind of institutional solutions suggested by managerialism. And so in the name of remedying insider capture (and the kind of budget-maximizing and bureau-shaping activities attendant upon information asymmetries that disadvantage political principals relative to administrative agents) one sees, in some jurisdictions at least, the separation of policy and delivery or regulatory functions into separate organizational units. It needs to be emphasized that this is not a universal tendency, and the contrast between Australian and New Zealand trajectories of institutional and organizational change associated with the NPM is instructive in this regard (Australia having moved to aggregate public service units into mega departments of state, whereas New Zealand, at least in the formative period of its NPM reforms, followed a course of organizational disaggregation). Managerialist institutional design principles stressed singular rather than multiple organizational objectives, with a consequential move to agencification. In the area of human resource management – and again New Zealand is an exemplar here – uniform systems of reward and progression through a unified public service career structure (with a single employer) gave way to enterprise bargaining arrangements with managers freed up to manage. The logic was one of change along a vertical axis: functions were devolved down and classical contracting arrangements used to encourage accountability up the vertical line. Again, recourse to political staff might be viewed as a corrective to the disaggregating tendencies associated with variants of the NPM. Indeed, the imperatives of whole-of-government coordination, particularly in response to the demands attendant upon responding to messy or ‘wicked’ policy challenges, increase the requirement for effective horizontal coordination. It is interesting in this regard that one of the contributors to this collection has recently argued that political staff in Australia’s federal executive have played a significant role in horizontal coordination (Maley forthcoming).

INSTITUTIONS MATTER Plainly, institutional specifics influence responses to the conundrum of balancing the values of responsive and neutral competence. As B. Guy Peters points out, the logic of the American separation of powers model has encouraged the institutionalization of significant policy capacity within both the executive and legislative branches. In each of the other case

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studies, however, developments within the executive branch attract most attention. But here, too, context matters. For example, in two instances – Ireland and New Zealand – the evolution and current particulars of the role of political staff reflect the imperatives of proportional representation electoral arrangements. Because they embody the distinction between the political and the nonpolitical requirements of their principals, political staff make a variety of contributions in the policy-making conditions which tend to prevail under proportional representation. They assist the formation of multiparty Governments, the construction of which is an inherently partisan task in which political staff play a key role (and which is clearly off limits to professional public servants). Further, where responsible Government applies, but where political executives tend to lack inbuilt parliamentary majorities (as is typically the case in, for instance, New Zealand), political staff are central to brokering the legislative coalitions via which minority Administrations deliver policy. In such environments, recourse to political staff constitutes an institutional adaptation to – amongst other things – circumstances which heighten the risks (particularly of politicization) to permanent civil servants. In this respect, proportional representation demands capacity and capability within the executive branch additional to that which has traditionally been sourced from the civil service. Under conditions other than single party majority Government, in particular, that capacity can be deployed to ensure officials are not subject to inappropriately partisan requests from political principals. In this context, too, the capacity and capability that political staff bring to the table complements that which public servants contribute to the business of governing, inasmuch as – following Aucoin’s observation in the Canadian context – the former can facilitate the ongoing engagement with policy formulation which sustains and nourishes public service capacity. In other words, a diminished role for public servants in the policy process is not a necessary outcome of ministers’ recourse to political advisers. But capacity and capability considerations are not a function of electoral arrangements alone. They also reflect the demands placed on all political (and administrative) executives which stem from other drivers in the increase in political staffs internationally, including the professionalization of politics, the increasing complexity of policy issues, the 24-hour news cycle, and so forth. That is, they reflect the deeply and inherently political nature of governing. Recourse to political staff parallels in some respects recourse to a range of adhocratic arrangements designed to better facilitate the effective implementation of policy. The drivers so much in evidence in the case studies in this volume are remarkably similar, at least

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in part, to those that have been identified as being behind development of implementation and delivery units in a number of jurisdictions: that is, the desire to deliver on electoral mandates, the assertion of political control, the need to anticipate policy challenges, the need to navigate implementation challenges, the desire to promote a cultural change within the public or civil service, and the need to be perceived as being committed to policy and programme delivery (Lindquist, 2006, pp. 315–16). Recourse to political staff is, in this sense, a particular form of adhocratic response to the challenges of governing – whether those challenges relate to policy or to politics. Clearly, insofar as they are at once more nebulous and more institutionally dense than was perhaps once the case, political staff assist their principals negotiate the mosaic of policy stakeholders, networks and communities that characterize contemporary governance environments.

BOON OR BANE? REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT OF POLITICAL STAFFS So much for the case for political advisers. But whether the drivers are institutional exigencies, or the additional resourcing needs of political executives in increasingly challenging environments, the contributions to this collection have illustrated the range of challenges associated with the size and influence of political staffs. Admittedly, they also suggest a range of views amongst communities of interest regarding the desirability of political staff. Such staff are regarded by some as a clear and present threat to the permanent public service; others take a more sanguine position, and see in the presence of political staff both a potential buffer to politicization and an additional means of ascertaining the mind of political principals (and of enforcing an electoral mandate). That said, the persistence of concerns about political staff is more or less a constant. The potential and actual consequences of the conduct of errant political advisers features repeatedly. But beyond the causes célèbres which have, in some countries, generated intense public and media attention, issues such the clarity of roles, the nature and extent of delegation from ministers, and the scope for political staff to regulate officials’ access to political principals also recur widely as matters of concern. In short, while there may be increasing normative acceptance of the political adviser as part of the landscape of executive government, the risk remains that in the absence of an appropriate regulatory framework they may, in fact, erode neutral competence, with attendant consequences such as a diminution in public service capacity and, perhaps, an impoverished policy process. As a partial aside, it is worth noting that, if politicization is the issue,

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attention should not rest solely on political staff. Threats to public service impartiality do not stem solely from what is done by, for or to political staff. They are heightened when relatively unregulated political advisers function in an environment in which the independence of the public service itself has been compromised (through, for example, reforms such as the introduction of performance pay systems for departmental heads). As Maria Maley makes clear, checks and balances are essential: a system of partisan advisers works best in conjunction with a strong, independent public service. In their chapter Fawcett and Gay usefully distinguish between concerns with propriety and those to do with accountability. In terms of appropriate behaviour, what is frequently at issue is the need for clear and unambiguous ‘rules of engagement’ which govern relations between political advisers and public servants and which, in broad terms, ensure that, as B. Guy Peters puts it, the ‘political dimensions of governing’ do not squeeze out effective policy making. The menu of institutional responses to the issue encompasses various instruments ranging from dedicated codes of conduct through to legislation, which specify numbers, tasks and functions, and exemptions from impartiality provisions; and which articulate the bases of relations between ministers’ offices and departments. However, the comparative experience of such initiatives has been variable (it remains unclear, for instance, that legislation can effectively transform a former political adviser into a non-partisan public servant), suggesting that it is important that formal regimes are complemented by norms which foster relations between political actors based on trust and good faith. Yet the cultivation of such environments – at a juncture in history in which, as some contributors have demonstrated, Government is becoming more, and not less, ideologically opposed and confrontational – poses challenges that go well beyond (but likely include) the articulation of codes of conduct or statutory provisions. Plainly, proper conduct and accountability for that behaviour are related. In parliamentary jurisdictions, the failure to resolve issues to do with accountability suggests that, as a principal instrument for holding political staff to account, the convention of individual ministerial responsibility has been found wanting. (Or it may be that extant understandings and applications of the convention are wanting.) As Aucoin notes, inasmuch as political advisers are ministerial agents, rather than subordinate staff, the principle of agency dictates that what a political adviser does or knows, his or her minister necessarily also does or knows. However, the comparative evidence is that, in practice, things work differently: principals typically apply to political staff the same rules that apply to public servants, with a resultant accountability vacuum.

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A related and recurrent theme is the debate over the locus of responsibility for overseeing and administering accountability regimes, however constructed. Historically, the trend has been for Governments essentially to self-regulate; with some exceptions, approaches to accountability can most kindly be described as light-handed. At least in the parliamentary democracies included in this collection, however, the case for strengthening the hand of the legislative branch has become more compelling, the more so as the search for a resolution to accountability issues appears, in a sense, to rest on establishing an appropriate means of classifying political advisers. In some jurisdictions (Canada and Australia, for instance) a distinct category of employment has been created for political advisers; elsewhere (as in New Zealand), the formal distinction between the partisans and the professionals remains unclear. Aucoin’s position on the issue appeals: that the sundry challenges posed by the institutionalization of political staff are likely to be dealt with most effectively by formally acknowledging that they are an increasingly integral, albeit unelected, part of the ministry. To the extent this is occurring, not only does it clearly distinguish political advisers from non-partisan public servants, it also delineates a clear role for legislatures consistent with the convention of individual ministerial responsibility (although the challenges regarding the application of said convention remain). Just as ministers, in jurisdictions with responsible Government, cannot avoid parliamentary scrutiny, neither should they be able to shield their political staff from such oversight. However, even if the ‘to whom?’ dimension of accountability is clarified, the ‘for what?’ element is likely to remain a challenge. From one view, the long and short of it is that political advisers (or their principals) are accountable for their conduct. But by its very nature much of the work undertaken by political advisers is opaque; as Maley explains, the ‘lack of visibility’ of a good deal of what advisers do makes it difficult to establish benchmarks against which their conduct can be measured. Those challenges are amplified when, in the absence of transparent classification, it is not entirely clear who they even are. In short, getting the boundaries right is central. Further, the need to do so is the more pressing if, as the contributions to this collection suggest can be the case, the partisan-political dimension of the role of political staff (a) not infrequently trumps the expert/policy development role, and (b) obstructs the flow of good advice from the public service into political principals’ offices. And while we might query the assumption that political imperatives are necessarily at odds with those associated with sound policy making, we would also acknowledge that, just as there is a case for deploying political advisers as a counter-bureaucracy, so, too, it is

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important to appropriately regulate the activities of those tasked with enhancing political control or encouraging a greater measure of administrative responsiveness.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS This volume has sought to illuminate the tension between independence and responsiveness that, we posited in our introduction, rests at the heart of traditional Northcote and Trevelyan-informed notions of relationships between political principals and administrative agents, and that is also shared by and reflected in the progressive tradition of public administration in the US context. Both parliamentary and presidential systems privilege (for sound if different constitutional reasons) responsiveness which is mediated by a measure of independence. Plainly, there are tradeoffs. As Lewis has observed so acutely with reference to the US system of government: When the U.S. Congress and the president make choices about politicization, they are choosing between less-expert and more-expert bureaus. They are also choosing between more-responsive and more autonomous bureaus. Their choices result in an administrative state that, in one sense, is less efficient than it could be. It could be more expert, more professional, better managed, and more effective; however, it would also be more autonomous, less subject to democratic control, and more dangerous to liberty. (Lewis, 2008, pp. 205–6)

Choices perhaps imply different kinds of contracts or bargains as between political and administrative actors. Indeed, less optimistic accounts of tendencies in contemporary public administration and management suggest that traditional bargains have been broken or repudiated (Savoie 2003). What is the case is that bargains have evolved over time. Northcote and Trevelyan principles underpin a particular variant of what Hood and Lodge characterize as a public service bargain (PSB) in the early 1970s (Hood and Lodge 2006). In what they term the Schafferian bargain: [Broadly] . . . civil servants gave up some of their political rights (such as the right to openly criticise the government of the day) in exchange for permanence in office. And for their part, elected politicians in their role as departmental ministers gave up their right to hire and fire civil servants at will in exchange for loyalty and competence. (2006, p. 19)

Moreover, competence, we would contend, extended to the Northcote and Trevelyan-informed requirement to temper responsiveness with an appropriate measure of independence. The intention is not to rehearse

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at this point the superb contribution that Hood and Lodge have made in their analysis of PSBs, as much as it is to suggest that making sense of the advent of, and increased recourse to, political staffs in executive government is greatly assisted when one views the contested terrain of politics and administration through the lens provided by PSBs. In simple terms, the advent of political staff does suggest a movement away from trusteetype to agency-type PSBs, with reforms of the NPM kind – and recourse in some cases to classical contracting arrangements – strongly suggestive of the latter. But the layered complexity (and analytical utility) of PSBs rests in the fact that, in the Hood and Lodge articulation, different sub-types of PSB are suggested. That complexity reflects not just the distinction between trustee- and agency-type PSBs, but also the overlay of sometimes compatible and at other times contradictory mixes of reward, competency and loyalty, and responsibility. As the authors wryly observe: [O]n the kind of more sophisticated bicycle where there are two gear shifts (one for the crank wheel that the pedals turn and the other on the bike’s rear wheel) most positions of each shifter are compatible with most positions of the other, but selecting some extreme combinations is liable to make your chain fall off. PSBs are like that. (Hood and Lodge, 2006, p. 133)

At the risk of pushing the metaphor too far, the issue in the present context is whether the advent and increased recourse to political staff is the kind of positioning that risks the loss of the bike chain. We think not: our assessment, on balance, is that the contributions to this volume suggest that while they present a risk of ‘gear failure’, given the proper alignment between and regulation of political and administrative actors and institutions, political staff can assist the proper functioning of the political and administrative machine, respecting and even reinforcing the imperatives both of independence and responsiveness. Indeed, as Hood and Lodge note there is a sense in which the advent of the political staffer represents the continuation of at least one of the traditional elements of the kind of role and bargain suggested by Northcote and Trevelyan: the ‘statespeople in disguise’ element was the central competency of a new group of political-appointee ‘special adviser’ that civil servants developed from the 1970s, when their position was first formalised. Indeed, one British political adviser described the adviser’s key skills to us in terms that thirty years earlier could have been a standard account of regular senior civil service skills: ‘. . . making sure ministers got lively interesting advice, that they knew where advice was coming from, put it into context, smoothing it with other departments’. (Hood and Lodge 2006, p. 107)

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In the light of our earlier comments – by way of Peter Aucoin’s characterization – it is entirely possible that some variants of the NPM have resulted in competencies associated with the pre-reform period being assumed by political staff, by default if not by design. Moreover, the lens of the PSB also allows us to make sense of the particular relationship or bargain between political principal and political staffer. Commenting on the nature of the loyalty dimensions to bargains of this kind, Hood and Lodge observe that: More commonly, as in the German and US cases, and in the growing class of temporary political advisors in the UK system itself, the partnership-type loyalty bargain has approximated more to that of a one-time monogamist, or at least a much less automatic pattern of serial monogamy than in the traditional UK case. In many cases it looks more like the traditional practice of suttee in Hindu marriage than serial monogamy, with the confidant likely to have to go on the funeral pyre on the political demise of their partner. (2006, p. 120)

And so one might conceive of the typical bargain between minister and political staffer as a personal-loyalist sub-type of the agency bargain. But clearly the specific nature of the bargain is going to reflect the endowments that both parties bring to it. Therefore, one can envisage, as the case studies in this collection suggest, bargains designed to address the shortcomings of political principals, as well as bargains where the level of trust is such that the political staffer is capable of being the pebble in the policy shoe; even, indeed, to the extent of speaking truth to power. Moreover, as our case studies suggest, the central notion that a bargain, as such, may be between a ministerial principal and a political staffer is questionable. Political staffers can and do work to and for multiple principals and may be positioned to advance the interests of a Prime Minister or premier, notwithstanding their proximate relationship with a particular minister. The alternative futures for PSBs is a matter outside of the scope of this discussion (but see Lodge 2009). Suffice to say that political staff, and their relationships both with political principals and the permanent public or civil service will be a key element in shaping future PSBs. While the notion of a PSB does not, in and of itself, suggest a narrow bilateralism, our contention is that the future of institutional and conventional arrangements attendant upon the advent of and increased recourse to political staff requires other than a bilateral frame of reference. That sense was captured in comments made by the UK Cabinet Secretary Sir Andrew Turnbull at the time of his retirement in 2005. Commenting on the somewhat jaundiced assessment of special advisers by the members of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL), Turnbull commented that the Committee:

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acknowledge[s] the need for special advisers to work collaboratively with officials but in practice many of their proposals seek to ghetto-ise them. I have met objections to the proposition that special advisers should be able to request papers from officials rather than going through a process like the request for the royal piece of toast in which a special adviser asks the private secretary who then asks officials who return the material to the private office and hence back to the special adviser. My approach has been that ministers, special advisers and officials are three parts of a triangle, each with separate roles, each respecting that of the other. There is nothing worse than a special adviser who sticks like a limpet to the minister, feeding his prejudices and paranoia, largely ignorant of the work of officials. The key element is trust. This is not, in my view, achieved if traffic does not flow freely along all three sides of the triangle. (2005, p. 11)

Turnbull went on to make three appeals to the CSPL: First. Please set aside the thinly disguised hostility which pervades much of your thinking about special advisers. Secondly, please think constructively about the way special advisers, as an important resource for ministers, can work more effectively. Thirdly, please go and visit some departments to see how special advisers are working day to day. (2005, p. 11)

Turnbull’s gentle admonition could be equally directed to those in the academy who have tended to problematize the advent of political staff by casting the issues solely in terms of failures of accountability within particular public management regimes. We find Turnbull’s notion of a triangular relationship conceptually sound, empirically valid, and – to the extent that it was designed to make a normative point about the nature of relationships going forward – timely and appropriate. In this collection we have not provided the kind of ethnographic material that would act as a proxy in response to Turnbull’s invitation to ‘go and visit some departments’, but we have attempted to illuminate the role of the political staffer or adviser in a number of different contexts, to locate this particular development in executive government within both traditional and conventional narratives of political and administrative relationships, and – in the context of the academic literature – to locate these developments on the canvas provided by disciplines of Political Science and Public Administration.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Aberbach, J.D. and B.A. Rockman (1988), ‘Image IV revisited: executive and political roles’, Governance, 1 (1), 1–25.

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Aberbach, J.D., R.A. Putnam and B.A. Rockman (1981), Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Alford, J. (2008), ‘The limits to traditional public administration, or rescuing public value from misrepresentation’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 67 (3), 245–377. Aucoin, P. (1990), ‘Administrative reform in public management: paradigms, paradoxes, and pendulums’, Governance, 3 (2), 115–37. Barzelay, M. (2001), The New Public Management: Improving Research and Policy Dialogue, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Bourgault, J. and S. Dion (1989), ‘Governments come and go, but what of senior civil servants? Canadian deputy ministers and transitions in power (1867–1987)’, Governance, 2 (2), 124–51. Campbell, C. and B. Guy Peters (1988), ‘The politics/administration dichotomy: death or merely change?, Governance, 1 (1), 79–99. Christensen, T. and P. Lægreid (eds) (2007), Transcending New Public Management: the Transformation of Public Sector Reforms, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. Downs, A. (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row. Hood, C. (1995), ‘The “New Public Management” in the 1980s: variations on a theme’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 20 (2/3), 93–109. Hood, C. and G. Lodge (2006), The Politics of Public Service Bargains: Reward, Competency, Loyalty – and Blame, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hood, C. and B. Guy Peters (2004), ‘The middle aging of New Public Management: into the age of paradox’, Journal of Public Administration, Research and Theory, 14 (3), 267–82. Hughes, O.E. (2003), Public Management and Administration, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Ingraham, P.W. (1987), ‘Building bridges or burning them? The president, the appointees, and the bureaucracy’, Public Administration Review, 47 (5), 425–35. Kemp, D.A. (1986), ‘The recent evolution of central policy control mechanisms in parliamentary systems’, International Political Science Review, 7, 56–66. Lane, J.E. (ed.) (1987), Bureaucracy and Public Choice, London: Sage Publications. Lewis, D.E. (2008), The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lind, M. (2005), ‘In defence of mandarins’, Prospect, 115 (October), 34–9. Lindquist, E. (2006), ‘Organizing for policy implementation: the emergence and role of implementation units in policy design and oversight’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 8 (4), 311–24. Lodge, M. (2009), ‘Strained or broken? The future(s) of the public service bargain’, Policy Quarterly, 5 (1), 53–7. Maley, M. (forthcoming), ‘Strategic links in a cut-throat world: rethinking the role and relationships of Australian ministerial staff, Public Administration. Peters, B. Guy (1987), ‘Politicians and bureaucrats in the politics of policy-making’ in Lane, J.E. (ed.), Bureaucracy and Public Choice, London: Sage Publications, pp. 255–83. Pollitt, C. and G. Bouckaert (2004), Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rhodes, R. and J. Wanna (2007), ‘The limits to public value, or rescuing

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responsible government from the platonic guardians’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 66 (4), 406–21. Rhodes, R. and J. Wanna (2008), ‘Stairways to heaven: a reply to Alford’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 67 (3), 330–67. Savoie, D.J. (2003), Breaking the Bargain: Public Servants, Ministers and Parliament, Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. Turnbull, A. (2005), valedictory lecture, 27 July, London, accessed 3 April 2009 AT http://politics.guardian.co.uk/whitehall/story/0,9061,1537060,00.html. Whitcombe, J. (2008), ‘Policy, service delivery and institutional design: the case of New Zealand’s social sector government agencies, 1984–2007’, PhD thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, accessed at http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/handle/10063/589.

Index Aberbach, J.D. 9, 187, 199, 200, 201–4 accountability of political staff 21, 214–16 Australia 107–9, 110 Canada 64, 86–90 Ireland 167–70 New Zealand 138–43, 145 United Kingdom 45, 52 codes of conduct 28, 32, 52–5, 59–60 problems 55–6 adhocracies 206, 212–13 Adonis, Andrew 39, 48, 51 adversarial model (ideal type) 208 agency principle political advisers: ministerial agents 64, 87–8, 89–90, 108–9, 214 Ahern, Bertie 162 Alexander, Wendy 39 Alford, J. 201 Andrews, David 160 Armstrong, Robert 33 Aucoin, P. 64, 66, 69, 71, 73, 74, 79, 85, 86, 87, 88, 199, 208–10 Aulich, C. 98 Austin, Ian 39 Australia 1–2, 94, 109–10, 133, 215 accountability 107–9, 110 capabilities and role of ministerial advisers 99–100, 109 coordination 104–5, 211 helping ministers perform their jobs 100–101 policy making 103–4, 105–7, 109–10, 136, 166 political control of departments 102–3 steering policy 101–2 Children Overboard Affair (2001) 1–2, 95, 108, 109 codes of conduct

political staff 107, 108, 109 public servants 105 communications functions 101 drivers: growth in numbers 99–100 history of ministerial advisers 95–9 institutional context 94–5 neutrality of public service, political 95, 99, 101, 106–7 New Public Management (NPM) 97, 98, 211 policy process, influence and role in 103–4, 105–6, 109–10, 166 helping ministers to steer policy 101–2 implications 106–7, 136 Prime Minister’s office 96, 98, 104–5 Axworthy, Lloyd 82 Bakvis, H. 71, 73, 82, 84 Balls, Ed 37, 39, 50 Barber, Michael 27, 41, 42, 49, 52 Barrington, T.J. 155 Barzelay, M. 209 Benn, Hilary 34, 39 Benoit, L.E. 83, 85, 88 Bentham, J. 34, 36 Bertelli, A. 184 Bimber, B.A. 187 Birt, Lord 48, 55–6 Blair, Tony 22, 27, 37, 41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50–51, 58, 76 Blais, A. 81 Blick, A. 5, 10, 29, 34, 37, 42, 43–4, 50, 51, 56, 58 blogosphere 193 Boston, J. 115, 117 Bourgault, J. 66 Boyle, R. 165 Brennock, M. 166 Briggs, L. 130 Briot, G.T. 101

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Brown, Gordon 25, 28, 37, 42, 50, 55, 56–7, 58, 59 Brown, Michael 191 Bruton, John 161 Burnham, Andrew 40 Burns, Terry 50 Bush, George W. 185, 188, 191, 192, 193 Butler, Lord 47, 49 Inquiry/Report 45–6, 48 Byers, Stephen 45 Cameron, David 57 Cameron, S. 50 Campbell, Alastair 35, 43–4, 45–6, 47, 48, 51, 55–6 Campbell, C. 71, 74, 79, 84, 97, 102, 104, 181, 199, 204–6 Canada 64–5, 89–90, 215 accountability of political staff 64, 86–90 advising and assisting ministers 77–80 communications 77–8, 80–81 conflict of interest regime 86 ‘exempt staff’ as ministerial staff 68–9 influence of political staff 80–83 institutional context 65–7 non-partisan public service 65–7, 68–9 policy formulation/implementation 76–8, 79–80, 81–3, 84–5, 89 political arm of government in ascendancy 84–6 as counterweight 73–7, 81 from private secretary to 70–73 Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) 70, 71, 72, 73, 78, 79, 80, 82, 84 change of government 83 Carter, Jimmy 188, 190 Carter, Stephen 57, 59 Chrétien, Jean 70, 71, 72–3, 79, 83, 85 Christensen, T. 209 Christopherson, Romola 30 Chubb, B. 151, 152, 154, 155 Clark, David 51–2 Clark, Joe 82 Clinton, Bill 185 codes of conduct: political advisers 90

Australia 107, 108, 109 New Zealand 116, 138–9, 142–3 United Kingdom 28, 32, 52–5, 59–60 Cohen, D.M. 183 Colebatch, H. 103 Collins, S. 159 communications functions 205 Australia 101 Canada 77–8, 80–81 United Kingdom 42–6, 47–8, 49, 59, 60 conceptions/definitions of politicization 7–8, 25, 135–6 conflicts of interest 86, 191 Connaughton, B. 166, 168, 170, 172, 173, 175 Connolly, E. 157, 165 contracts of employment Australia 95, 97, 99 performance pay 99, 107 fixed term 27, 95 New Zealand 116, 138 performance pay systems 107, 214 United Kingdom: fixed term 27 Cook, Robin 48, 51–2 Corish, Brendan 157 Corry, Dan 34, 35, 51, 57 Cosgrave, Liam 157 Cruddas, Jon 40 Deakin, N. 50 definitions/conceptions of politicization 7–8, 25, 135–6 Demos 34 Dewar, Donald 57 Dickinson, M.J. 144, 184 Doern, G. 76, 78 Donoughue, Bernard 29 Dooney, S. 156, 157, 158, 163, 166, 175 Downs, A. 200 Dunn, D. 104, 106 Durant, R.F. 183 Edwards, G.C. 191 Edwards, M. 105, 134 Eichbaum, C. 8, 123, 135, 136, 167, 169, 170 Eisenhower, Dwight 185 Elcock, H. 30–31 Elgie, R. 153

Index Eliasch, Jonas 57 Ellam, Michael 57 employment contracts Australia 95, 97, 99 performance pay 99, 107 fixed term 27, 95 New Zealand 116, 138 performance pay systems 107, 214 United Kingdom: fixed term 27 ethnic minorities 34 Everett, James 157 Farrell, B. 157 Faulkner, J. 5 Fawcett, P. 49 Finlay, F. 159, 161, 171–2 Fitzgerald, Garret 158, 164 Fitzgerald, V. 106 Flanagan, T. 76 Flood, P. 107 Ford, Gerald 185, 190 formal model (ideal type) 207 Forward, R. 96 Foster, Christopher 24, 37–8 France 207 Fraser, J.M. 96, 100 Fulton Review 26, 29 functional model (ideal type) 207–8 Gaber, I. 42 Gay, O. 48, 54, 55, 56 Germany 189 Goldenberg, E. 72, 83 Goldfinch, S. 105 Gomery Commission 85–6, 88 Good, D. 80 Graham, Alastair 55 Granatstein, J.L. 67 Granatt, Mike 43 Greenspon, E. 76 Haines, Joe 48 Halligan, J. 97 Harper, Stephen 67, 68, 69, 73, 79, 82 Harris, John 29 Hawke, Bob 96–7, 101–2, 106 Hawker, G. 96, 105 Heath, Edward 29 Heclo, H. 180–81, 189 Hennessey, P. 25, 28, 33, 37

225

Holland, I. 135 Hollway, S. 106 Hood, C. 209, 216, 217, 218 Howard, C. 105 Howard, John 97 Hughes, C. 100, 174 Hughes, I. 166 Hunter, Anji 37 Hutton Inquiry 45–6 ideal types 199, 206–8 images, role 199 Image II 200–201 Image III 201 Image IV 199, 201–5 impartiality see neutrality of civil/ public service, political independence and responsiveness 5–6, 7, 8–9, 20, 203, 207, 216 see also neutrality of civil/public service, political Ingham, Bernard 30 Ingraham, P.W. 183, 187 Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) 34 institutional context 199, 211–13 Australia 94–5 Canada 65–7 Ireland 152–4, 199, 212 New Zealand 115–16, 143–4, 199, 212 United Kingdom 25–8 internet 193 Iraq War 48, 107 Ireland 151–2, 173–6 accountability and relations with civil servants 167–70 bureaucratic legacy, challenge and change 155–6 coalition government: management and coordination 170–73, 174 history of ministerial advisers 157–62 institutional context 152–4, 199, 212 neutrality of public servants 161, 169–70, 174 New Public Management (NPM) 168, 174 policy making process 152, 153, 158, 160, 161, 168, 169, 170, 171–3

226


coordination 160, 175 in pursuit of effective 165–6 relationships between ministers and civil servants 156–7, 174 proportional representation 154, 170–71, 212 role perceptions, policy capabilities and assistance to minister 162–5 Jenkins, Roy 29 Johnson, Lyndon 190 Jones, C.O. 190 Jones, N. 42, 44 judicial review 28 Kaldor, Nicky 29 Kaufman, H. 187 Kavanagh, D. 27 Keating, M. 107, 108, 135 Keating, Paul 9, 97, 102, 105, 106 Kelly, David 45–6, 56 Kelly, Gavin 57 Kelly, P. 106, 107 Kelly, R. 34 Kemp, D.A. 202 Kennedy, John F. 185 Kent, Tom 78 King, Mackenzie 67 Kissane, B. 151 Lawson, Nigel 30 Le Grand, Julian 56 Lee, J. 155 Leslie, Chris 35 Lester, Lord 58 Levitt, R. 27 Levy, Lord 48 Lewis, D.E. 210, 216 Light, P.C. 181, 183, 191 Lijphart, A. 190 Lind, M. 201 Lindquist, E. 67, 206, 213 Lipsey, Lord 48, 53 Litton, F. 168 Lodge, G. 27, 58 Lodge, M. 218 Lowe, R. 31, 58 Lynch, Jack 157

McBride, Damien 57 McBride, L.W. 155 MacCarthaigh, M. 157 Macdermott, K. 8, 9 McFadden, Pat 40 Mackenzie, C.G. 190 Maer, L. 26 Mair, P. 154 Major, John 30 Maley, M. 97, 102, 103, 104, 105, 116, 135, 166, 211 Malloch Brown, Mark 57 managerial politicization 7 managerialism 151, 209, 210–11 see also New Public Management Mandelson, Peter 41–2, 43 Maranto, R. 182 Martin, Paul 79 May, K. 67, 69 media, 24-hour 212 Australia 100 United Kingdom 42–6 see also communications functions Meisel, J. 67 Mercer, Patrick 58 Miliband, David 34, 40 Miliband, Ed 34, 37, 40 Millar, M. 155 Miller, G. 192 Mitchell, P. 166, 171 Moore, Jo 1, 45, 51 Morris, Estelle 24, 51 Mountfield, Robin 42, 44 Mowlam, Mo 48 Mulgan, Geoff 35, 49 Mulgan, R. 7, 8, 21, 25, 135 Mulroney, Brian 67, 70, 71, 72, 83 multi-party governments 212 Ireland 170–73, 174, 199 New Zealand 117–18, 124–6, 133, 199, 212 Murphy, S. 89 Murray, F. 171 Murray, Frank 159 Nathan, R.P. 185 Neill, Lord 53 Nelson, F. 57 neutrality of civil/public service, political 2, 6–9, 213–14

Index Australia 95, 99, 101, 106–7 Canada 65–7, 68–9 Ireland 161, 169–70, 174 New Zealand 119, 122, 128, 130–31, 132–3, 145 administrative politicization 134–8 United Kingdom 25–7, 28 New Public Management (NPM) 20, 64, 199, 202, 204, 217 Australia 97, 98, 211 Ireland 168, 174 political staff and 208–11 New Zealand 114, 143–5, 215 accountability and regulation 138–43, 145 capacities and capabilities of ministerial advisers 119–24 codes of conduct 116, 138–9, 142–3 contracts of employment 116, 138 executive, impact of ministerial advisers on relations within 129–31 growth in number of ministerial advisers 116–19 impartial civil service 119, 122, 128, 130–31, 132–3, 145 administrative politicization 134–8 institutional context 115–16, 143–4, 199, 212 mixed member proportional representation (MMP) 117–18, 124–6, 133, 212 New Public Management (NPM) 211 permanent public service and ministerial advisers 131–4 impartial service 119, 122, 128, 130–31, 132–3, 134–8, 145 policy process and ministerial advisers 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124–9, 130, 134 administrative politicization 134–8 Nixon, Richard 185, 186, 190 Northcote–Trevelyan reforms 4–5, 25–6 NPM (New Public Management) 20, 64, 199, 202, 204, 217

227

Ireland 168, 174 political staff and 208–11 Nye, Sue 57 Oborne, Peter 37, 43–4 O’Brien, Conor Cruise 175 O’Cinneide, S. 169 O’Connor, L.J. 77 O’Donnell, Gus 58 O’Donoghue, Martin 157 O’Halpin, E. 151, 160, 161, 172, 174 O’Malley, E. 158, 166, 172 Omand, David 11, 31 O’Reilly, E. 168 Osbaldeston, G.F. 71, 74, 77 Osborne, A. 51 Osmotherly Rules 56 O’Toole, B.J. 28, 49, 53, 55 partisan politicization 7 path dependency 187 Pearce, Nick 36 Pearson, Lester 67, 70, 78 performance pay systems 99, 107, 214 Peters, B.G. 135, 136, 137, 169, 172, 182, 199, 206–8, 211, 214 Phillis Review 46 Pierson, P. 187 Pitfield, Michael 79 Plasse, M. 71 Plowden, W. 9, 135 Podger, A. 95, 98, 107 policy development/implementation 20–21, 212, 213 Australia 101–2, 103–4, 105–7, 109–10, 136, 166 Canada 76–8, 79–80, 81–3, 84–5, 89 Ireland 152, 153, 158, 160, 161, 168, 169, 170, 171–3 coordination 160, 175 in pursuit of effective 165–6 relationships between ministers and civil servants 156–7, 174 New Public Management (NPM) 208, 209–10, 211 New Zealand 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124–9, 130, 134

228


administrative politicization 134–8 policy professionals and political operatives 205–6 United Kingdom 27, 46–52, 58 United States 180, 181–2, 194 policy advice in Congress 181, 185–7 policy advice in executive branch 181, 182–5 problems in advice system 189–92 role of political advisers 182–3, 187–9 think tanks and consultants 190, 192–3, 203 policy-related politicization 7 Pollitt, C. 209 Ponder, D. 185 Porter, R.B. 185 Powell, Charles 30 Powell, Jonathan 34, 36, 47, 48, 56 Prescott, John 51 presidentialization of executive 33, 202–3 professionalization of politics 37–41, 212 proportional representation 212 Ireland: single transferable vote (STV) 154, 170–71, 212 New Zealand: mixed member (MMP) 117–18, 124–6, 133, 212 public choice theory 20, 81, 117, 199, 206, 207, 208, 209, 211 public service bargains (PSBs) 216–18 Purnell, James 40–41 Quinn, R. 158, 159, 160 Rae, N. 182 Ragsdale, L. 185 Railtrack 51 rational-actor accounts 20, 199, 208 Rayner, Derek 29 Reagan, Ronald 191 responsiveness and independence 5–6, 7, 8–9, 20, 203, 207, 216 see also neutrality of civil/public service, political Reynolds, Albert 159 Rhodes, R. 6–7, 167, 201

Richards, D. 27, 30, 33, 41, 42, 45, 58 Richards, Ed 36 Robertson, Gordon 79, 84 Rose, R. 188 Rudd, Kevin 109 Ryan, N. 105 Ryan, Richie T. 157 Saint-Martin, D. 183 Savoie, D.J. 65, 67, 79, 85, 216 Scholar, Tom 56 Scott, D. 37 Scrafton, M. 108 Seidman, H.B. 188 Seldon, A. 42 separation of powers 7, 181, 186, 211 Seyd, B. 171 Shergold, P. 106, 138 Short, Clare 48 Simpson, J. 82 Simpson, Kieran 52 Sinnott, R. 154, 171 Sixsmith, Martin 45, 51 Sossin, L. 7 Spring, Dick 159, 160, 161, 175 Stewart, J. 98, 104, 105, 106 Straw, Ed 58 Straw, Jack 29 Suskind, R. 185 Sutherland, S.L. 88 Taylor, Matthew 36 tenure, security of heads of departments 99, 107 Thatcher, Margaret 26–7, 29–30 Theakston, K. 25 think tanks United Kingdom 27, 34–6, 58 United States: consultants and 190, 192–3, 203 Tiernan, A. 98, 104, 107, 108, 116, 135 Travers, J. 168–9, 170 Trudeau, Pierre 78–9, 82, 84 Turnbull, A. 218–19 United Kingdom 24–5, 58–60 accountability of special advisers 45, 52

Index codes of conduct 28, 32, 52–5, 59–60 problems of 55–6 capacities, capabilities and role of special advisers 30–32, 58–60 centre of government, effect on 47–50 departments, effect on 50–52 future 56–8 codes of conduct 28 special advisers 28, 32, 52–5, 59–60 expert and political advisers, distinction between 25, 29, 30–32, 58–9 future of special advisers 56–8 growth: special advisers since 1997 32–4 backgrounds 34–6 confidence/trust in civil service, lack of 41–2 media, 24-hour 42–6 professionalization of politics 37–41 history of political advisers 29–30 influence of special advisers 46–7 centre of government 47–50 departments 50–52 neutrality of civil service, political 25–7, 28 New Public Management (NPM) 27 policy development 27, 46–52, 58 presidentialization of executive 33 Prime Minister’s Office 26, 27, 33, 47–50, 56–7, 58, 59 system of government 25–8 United States 180–82, 193–4 career public service 181, 183, 184, 187–8, 191 temporary political positions 184 conflicts of interest 191 Executive Office of President (EOP) 184–5, 188–9

229

New Public Management (NPM) 210 policy process 180, 181–2, 194 policy advice in Congress 181, 185–7 policy advice in executive branch 181, 182–5 problems in advice system 189–92 role of political advisers 182–3, 187–9 think tanks and consultants 190, 192–3, 203 political parties 189, 190 separation of powers 181, 186, 211 trade-offs between independence and responsiveness 216 Upton, Simon 122 Vadera, Shriti 41, 51, 57, 59 ‘village life’ ideal type 207 Wallsten, K. 193 Walter, J. 96, 106, 107, 108, 109, 135, 136 Walters, Alan 29–30 Wanna, J. 7 Weller, P. 65, 95, 100, 105, 107, 118, 133 Whelan, Charlie 37, 43 Whelan, P. 165, 166, 175 Whitcombe, J. 209 White, L.D. 187 Whitlam, E. Gough 100, 101, 116 Wicks, Nigel 54 Wildavsky, A. 6 Wilenski, P. 96 Wilson, G.K. 75 Wilson, Harold 26, 29, 32, 48, 52 Wilson, Richard 43, 44, 46, 49, 51, 127 Wilson, W. 5–6 women 34 Zimmerman, J.E. 157, 174

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