Parliamentary Socialisation: Learning the Ropes or Determining Behaviour? (Understanding Governance)

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Understanding Governance series General Editor: R. A. W. Rhodes, Professor of Government, University of Tasmania and Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Australian National University Understanding Governance encompasses all theoretical approaches to the study of government and governance in advanced industrial democracies. It has three longstanding objectives: 1. To understand the process of change 2. To develop theory to explain why change occurs 3. To set this change and its causes in comparative perspective. The series includes titles that adopt post-structural and post-modern approaches to political science and challenge notions such as hollowing-out, governance, core executives, policy networks and the new institutionalism. It also publishes material with traditional institutional and historical approaches to topics such as prime ministers, ministers, the civil service and government departments. All titles meet not only the conventional standard of theoretical and empirical rigour but also seek to address topics of broad current interest that open the field of study to new ideas and areas of investigation. Titles include: Michael Rush and Philip Giddings PARLIAMENTARY SOCIALISATION Learning the Ropes or Determining Behaviour? Paul ’t Hart and John Uhr (editors) HOW POWER CHANGES HANDS Transition and Succession in Government Robert Hazell, Ben Worthy and Mark Glover THE IMPACT OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ON CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UK Does FOI Work? Ann Scott ERNEST GOWERS Plain Words and Forgotten Deeds Kevin Theakston AFTER NUMBER 10 Former Prime Ministers in British Politics Titles previously published in the Transforming Government series include: Simon Bulmer, Martin Burch, Caitríona Carter, Patricia Hogwood and Andrew Scott BRITISH DEVOLUTION AND EUROPEAN POLICY-MAKING Transforming Britain into Multi-Level Governance Nicholas Deakin and Richard Parry THE TREASURY AND SOCIAL POLICY The Contest for Control of Welfare Strategy

Neil C. M. Elder and Edward C. Page ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTROL IN NEXT STEPS AGENCIES Oliver James THE EXECUTIVE AGENCY REVOLUTION IN WHITEHALL Public Interest Versus Bureau-Shaping Perspectives David Marsh, David Richards and Martin J. Smith CHANGING PATTERNS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM Reinventing Whitehall? Iain McLean THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM Edward C. Page and Vincent Wright (editors) FROM THE ACTIVE TO THE ENABLING STATE The Changing Role of Top Officials in European Nations Hugh Pemberton POLICY LEARNING AND BRITISH GOVERNANCE IN THE 1960s B. Guy Peters, R. A. W. Rhodes and Vincent Wright (editors) ADMINISTERING THE SUMMIT Administration of the Core Executive in Developed Countries R. A. W. Rhodes (editor) TRANSFORMING BRITISH GOVERNMENT Volume One: Changing Institutions Volume Two: Changing Roles and Relationships David Richards NEW LABOUR AND THE CIVIL SERVICE Reconstituting the Westminster Model Martin J. Smith THE CORE EXECUTIVE IN BRITAIN Kevin Theakston LEADERSHIP IN WHITEHALL Kevin Theakston (editor) BUREAUCRATS AND LEADERSHIP Patrick Weller, Herman Bakvis and R. A. W. Rhodes (editors) THE HOLLOW CROWN Countervailing Trends in Core Executives Understanding Governance Series standing order ISBN 978–0–333–71580–2 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

Parliamentary Socialisation Learning the Ropes or Determining Behaviour? Michael Rush Emeritus Professor of Politics, University of Exeter, UK

Philip Giddings Head of the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading, UK

© Michael Rush and Philip Giddings 2011 Foreword © Peter Riddell 2011 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–0–230–28489–0 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Contents

List of Tables and Figures

vi

Foreword by Peter Riddell

xi

Preface

xiv

Acknowledgements

xvii

1 Changing Westminster

1

2 The Role of the Member of Parliament

9

3 Legislative Socialisation: Surveying the Landscape

28

4 Functional Socialisation: A Steep Learning Curve

59

5 Attitudinal Socialisation: Clones or Mavericks?

100

6 Behavioural Socialisation: Making Choices

135

7 Parliamentary Socialisation

174

8 2010 and Beyond

195

Appendix A: Questionnaires

209

Appendix B: Selected Questionnaire Responses

220

Appendix C: The Parliamentary Activity of MPs

236

Bibliography

246

Index

253

v


Tables 2.1 2.2 7.1 B.1 B.2 B.3

B.4

B.5

B.6

B.7 B.8

B.9

B.10

The three roles of the Member of Parliament Parliamentary activity and output in selected sessions Attitudes and socialisation Respondents completing all three questionnaires by party, age, gender and length of parliamentary service Do you think that being a Member of Parliament should be a full time or a part time job? (% replying ‘full time’) How do you expect to divide your time/how is your time divided between the various aspects of your job as an MP? (rank order scale 1–3) In carrying out your role as a representative, which of the following do you think are the more important? (rank order scale 1–3) Which of the following aspects of the job of being an MP do you think are the most important? (rank order scale 1–4) In deciding how to act and vote in Parliament, do you expect to be/are you strongly influenced by the advice of your party leadership, your personal opinions, constituency opinion, representations from interest or pressure groups? (rank order scale 1–5) Do you hope to become a minister in due course? (% replying ‘yes’) From whom have you sought advice about how to do your work as an MP and how helpful have you found it? (Questionnaires 2 and 3 and to longer-serving MPs) How helpful were the arrangements made by the House of Commons authorities after your election? (Questionnaire 2 and questionnaire to longer-serving MPs only) (rank order scale 1–4) How helpful was the assistance provided by your party after your election to help you learn about your job as an MP? (Questionnaire 2) (rank order scale 1–4)∗ vi

18 22 184 220 221

222

223

225

227 228

229

232

232


B.11

B.12 B.13

B.14

B.15 B.16

B.17

C.1

C.2

C.3 C.4 C.5 C.6 C.7 C.8

Do you intend to be/are you active in your parliamentary party’s subject committees? (% replying ‘yes’) Do you intend to be/are you active in any all-party groups in Parliament? (% replying ‘yes’) Have you been appointed to any standing committees (now public bill committees)? If so, have you found serving on them worthwhile? (Questionnaires 2 and 3 and questionnaire to longer-serving MPs) Have you served on a select committee? If so, have you found serving on it worthwhile? (Questionnaires 2 and 3 and questionnaire to longer-serving MPs) How familiar would you say you are with parliamentary procedure? (rank order scale 1–4) Has your experience of being a Member of Parliament since 1997 changed your view of what the job entails? (Questionnaire 3 only) (all respondents) Reflecting on your experience since becoming an MP, which of the following would you say has been most influential on how your view of your role has developed? (Questionnaire 3 1997 only) (all respondents) House of Commons Chamber: participation 1992–93, 1994–95 and 1999–2000 (contributions to debates per sitting day) House of Common Chamber: participation 1997–98, 1999–2000 and 2003–04 (contributions to debates per sitting day) Westminster Hall: participation rates 1999–2000 and 2003–04 Westminster Hall: contributions to debates per sitting day Oral Questions answered 1992–93, 1994–95 and 1999–2000 (per sitting day) Oral Questions answered 1997–98, 1999–2000 and 2003–04 (per sitting day) Written Questions answered 1992–93, 1994–95 and 1999–2000 (per sitting day) Written Questions answered 1997–98, 1999–2000 and 2003–04 (per sitting day)

vii

232 233

233

234 234

235

235

237

237 238 238 239 239 240 240

viii List of Tables and Figures

C.9 C.10 C.11 C.12 C.13 C.14 C.15 C.16 C.17 C.18

Early Day Motions signed 1992–93, 1994–95 and 1999–2000 (per sitting day) Early Day Motions signed 1997–98, 1999–2000 and 2003–04 (per sitting day) Standing committee membership 1992–93, 1994–95 and 1999–2000 (% of backbenchers appointed) Standing committee membership 1997–98, 1999–2000 and 2003–04 (% of backbenchers appointed) Standing committee attendance rates 1992–93, 1994–95 and 1999–2000 (% of meetings) Standing committee attendance rates 1997–98, 1999–2000 and 2003–04 (% of meetings) Investigative committee membership 1992–93, 1994–95 and 1999–2000 (% of backbenchers appointed) Investigative committee membership 1997–98, 1999–2000 and 2003–04 (% of backbenchers appointed) Investigative committee attendance 1992–93, 1994–95 and 1999–2000 (mean number of meetings attended) Investigative committee attendance 1997–98, 1999–2000 and 2003–04 (mean number of meetings attended)

241 241 242 242 243 243 244 244 245

245

Figures 1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 4.1 4.2

4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6

The number of new MPs, 1945–2010 Turnover of membership of the House of Commons and proportion of newly elected MPs, 1945–2010 MPs’ relative views of their roles and activities MPs’ view on their ‘most important’ roles and activities A model of parliamentary socialisation The training of legislators: comparative data, 2007 Respondents’ views of the induction arrangements made by the House of Commons authorities, 1992 and 1997 (scale of 1–4) Respondents’ views of the induction arrangements made by their parties, 1992 and 1997 (scale of 1–4) Respondents’ views of informal sources of advice after election in 1992 and 1997 (scale of 1–4) The making of maiden speeches, 1992 and 1997 Newly elected MPs receiving replies to Questions for oral answer, 1992 and 1997

2 11 16 17 57 66

68 73 75 87 89


4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10 6.11 6.12 6.13 7.1

7.2 7.3

Newly elected MPs receiving replies to Questions for written answer, 1992 and 1997 Newly elected MPs signing EDMs, 1992 and 1997 Newly elected MPs tabling EDMs, 1992 and 1997 Backbencher serving on public bill (standing) committees, 1992 and 1997 The representative role of the Member of Parliament (rank order scale 1–3) The relative importance of different aspects of the job of being a Member of Parliament (rank order scale of 1–4) Influences on MPs’ parliamentary activity (rank order scale of 1–5) Parliamentary activity in five sessions, 1992–2004 Number of contributions to debates in the House of Commons in selected sessions Number of contributions to Westminster Hall debates in selected sessions Number of Questions given oral answers in selected sessions Number of parliamentary Questions given written answers in selected sessions Attendance rates at standing committees on bills in selected sessions Attendance at investigatory committees in selected sessions Number of EDMs signed per sitting day Proportion of MPs rebelling, 1997–2001 Rebellions by Labour MPs, 1997–2001 Rebellions by 1997 and 2001 intakes of Labour MPs Attitudes of rebel MPs in 1997 Labour intake Proportion of MPs with 75–100 per cent ACA expenses, 2004–05, by intake Has your experience of being a Member of Parliament since 1992/1997 changed your view of what the job entails? (% answering ‘yes’) Sources of influence on MPs’ view of their role (1997 intake) Parliamentary activity by newly elected MPs within the first 50 days of the 1992 and 1997 Parliaments

ix

90 93 94 96 106 110 114 137 144 146 148 150 153 155 160 163 164 165 166 170

176 177

180

x


7.4

7.5

7.6 7.7

Familiarity of the 1992 and 1997 intakes with parliamentary procedure towards the end of their first Parliament Familiarity of the 1992 and 1997 intakes with parliamentary procedure compared to longer-serving MPs Attitudinal socialisation: a summary Behavioural socialisation: a summary

182

182 192 193


Members of Parliament (MPs), like the rich, are not like the rest of us – or that is what we, the public, think. Talk about the ‘Westminster village’ – Parliament has its share of village idiots – reinforces this belief that, once people arrive in the House of Commons, they behave differently and become cut-off from the public. But do MPs really change, and how, once elected? Michael Rush and Philip Giddings offer a comprehensive, structured and convincing account of the influences affecting MPs. Their starting point is that most MPs do not arrive at Westminster as complete neophytes. As I noted in my 1993 book, Honest Opportunism – The Rise of the Career Politician, the formidable hurdles involved in being selected by a party in a winnable seat favour those who are already committed to a life of politics – and have experience as political advisers and researchers, as lobbyists and as local councillors. Just look at the current three leaders of the main parties – David Cameron, Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg: the vast majority of their pre-MP careers were devoted to full time political activities. The complete political virgin – a term used about some of the Social Democratic Party candidates ahead of the 1983 general election – is a rarity, particularly in safe seats. For every Rory Stewart, with no party background, there are many times more already committed politicians. Landslide victories, as in 1983 and 1997, do admittedly throw up unexpected, and in some cases, reluctant, MPs. But they are in a minority. Most new MPs arrive with long-established views, and, above all, committed to their parties. However, as Rush and Giddings show, while new MPs mostly have clear-cut political viewpoints, few know much about the way Parliament works. Well under 10 per cent of MPs in 1992 and 1997 were ‘very familiar’ with parliamentary procedures. So, as they write, ‘a degree of socialisation is inevitable: newly elected MPs have to learn how to do their job, how the House of Commons operates, how to use various parliamentary procedures and how to deal with constituency issues and constituents’ problems’. We have moved a long way from the ‘jumping in at the deep end’ approach of the past, where no help was provided to new Members. In May 2010 the Commons authorities and the party whips offered a well-organised induction programme, supplemented by xi

xii Foreword by Peter Riddell

the Hansard Society and the Institute for Government. This ‘functional socialisation’ allows MPs to make a mark quicker than in the past – asking questions, as well as the chore of serving on legislative (public bill) committees. The most fascinating part of the book is what happens then. This is not a static process, but is dynamic, depending on a combination of values, attitudes, personalities and experience. The authors underline the importance for most MPs of their role in looking after their constituents – the personal bond which many Members view in an almost proprietorial sense (it is always ‘my constituency’), even though most cruelly find out that this does them little good when the national political swing goes against their party. Defeated MPs have to reflect on how limited their constituents’ affection is for them personally. At Westminster, the key factor is party. MPs were elected as members of parties and this shapes their attitudes and behaviour within Parliament. Crucial here is whether their party is in government or in opposition. That affects attitudes towards scrutiny, seen as a much greater opportunity by opposition MPs. But this does not mean that Westminster has been static. Not only are more MPs now full time – and the vast majority of Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs believe they should be – but party cohesion has been challenged by the increasing number of MPs willing to defy their party whips (as documented by Philip Norton and Philip Cowley). Of course, MPs serve in many different roles during their time in the Commons, in part obviously depending on the safeness of their seats. A surprisingly high number of those serving in two or three Parliaments serve either as ministers or on the opposition frontbench at some stage. While it is wrong to draw too clear-cut a distinction between frontbenchers and backbenchers – in view of movements between the two – many MPs are clearly executive minded, either in currently serving on the frontbench or aspiring to do so. Some MPs are marked out as highflyers from the start, serving a minimal amount of time on the backbenches (often just a year) before going on the frontbench and remaining there for most of the rest of their careers. That is true of both David Cameron and Ed Miliband, as well as Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, Michael Howard and William Hague. Such men, and occasionally women, of office have different attitudes and ambitions from the lifelong backbenchers. Many would probably not enter the Commons but for the prospect of office. This area deserves more attention than it receives in the book.


xiii

The main trigger – if not underlying cause – for the public’s disapproval of MPs has been over their ethics, notably their personal financial affairs: in the 1990s their outside interests, and, most recently, their expenses. This is the clearest case of a distance between most MPs and the outside world: where their socialisation at Westminster, or, rather, their response to the rules on expense payments, puts them at odds with the views of their constituents. The research was mainly carried out during the 1992–97 and 1997– 2001 Parliaments, augmented by work that the Hansard Society carried out after the 2005 election. But there has not been time to update the surveys for the 2010 general election. The authors do, however, acknowledge how the creation of the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition could change the attitudes and behaviour of the Liberal Democrats, previously the least socialised and integrated into Westminster, of the main party MPs. There could be a division between the ministerial MPs and backbenchers. The Commons has already changed since the May 2010 election and could change further. ‘There is a window of opportunity: a potentially vulnerable coalition government; a public mood of dissatisfaction with the way the Commons has been performing; a large group of new MPs elected with a commitment to bring about a change in the style of politics; ministers, and opposition leaders, also committed in principle to effecting change.’ The authors have made the case for a second edition. Peter Riddell is a Senior Fellow of the Institute for Government and has chaired the Hansard Society since 2007. Until July 2010 he was chief political commentator of The Times and has written six books on British politics.

Preface

This book has its origins in a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Study of Parliament Group (SPG)1 some months before the 1992 general election, at which one of us – Giddings – suggested a research project on how newly elected Members of Parliament learned how to do their job and whether, in the longer term, MPs were subject to a process of socialisation. It so happened that the other of us – Rush – was about to have a book on political sociology published, a chapter of which dealt with political socialisation.2 An SPG study group was set up and financial support was provided by the Nuffield Foundation through its Small Grants Scheme. This financial support and the efforts of the study group enabled us to administer a series of questionnaires to MPs first elected at the 1992 general election and to conduct interviews with key officials in the House of Commons and with party officials. Our findings were fed back to the House authorities and party officials in anonymised and aggregate form, but as our ultimate interest was whether a process of parliamentary socialisation had been at work, we continued the research for the length of the 1992–97 Parliament. However, as the next election drew near, the combination of a large number of MPs retiring and Labour’s persistently substantial opinion poll lead presaged a large number of new MPs. In the event, it was twice the post-1945 norm. We therefore decided to repeat the research in the 1997–2001 Parliament and successfully applied for an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) grant.3 By covering two Parliaments rather than one – one in which the Conservatives were in government and Labour in opposition, and the

1 The Study of Parliament Group was founded in 1964 and has rather more than a hundred members, most of whom are either academics with an interest in Parliament or the devolved legislative bodies in the UK or are officials or former officials in the House of Commons or House of Lords or the devolved bodies. Over the years the Group has presented evidence to parliamentary committees and, through its study groups, has produced a number of authoritative studies on Parliament and the workings of parliamentary government. 2 Michael Rush, Politics and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology, Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1992. 3 ESRC Award R000222470.

xiv

Preface

xv

other in which their roles were reversed, we intended to provide a fuller picture and explore more effectively the concept of parliamentary socialisation. In both cases we also extended the behavioural aspects of the research into the succeeding Parliament – 1997–2001 for the 1992–97 Parliament and 2001–05 for the 1997–2001 Parliament. We have also been able to take advantage of research undertaken by the Hansard Society into the experience of newly elected MPs after the 2005 general election.4 We believe that our research findings show not only how newly elected MPs learn about their job but also that they are subject to a process of parliamentary socialisation. The latter is not a totally deterministic process but one of a number of factors affecting how MPs do and view their job. It is also important to note that as a process it allows for change as well as continuity. Thus, the House of Commons in 2010 is not a fundamentally different institution from that elected in 1992, 1997, 2001 and 2005, but nor is it the same. Changes have taken place in the way it works and yet more may follow, and not merely because 2010 produced the first coalition government for 65 years. The scandal of MPs’ expenses raised questions about the standing of Parliament and its role in British politics. Whether significant change takes place depends in part upon the attitudes and behaviour of MPs, especially those first elected in 2010: 1997 produced the largest number of new MPs since 1945 and 2010 came close to equalling it, but the changes in the way Parliament operated that followed 1997, though important, were limited; will those that follow 2010 be more fundamental? We could not have carried out this research nor written this book without the help and support of many people and organisations. It would not have been possible in the first place without the support of our two universities and grants from the Nuffield Foundation and the ESRC, for which we are most grateful. Nor could it have been completed without the co-operation of the MPs who completed and returned our questionnaires, not least because most were asked to do so not once but three times! A number of our respondents provided us with valuable additional information by writing in detailed comments – the source of many of our quotations. We would also like to thank those Members who gave us interviews, particularly at the beginning of the two Parliaments. Similarly, the advice, information and support we received

4 See Gemma Rosenblatt, A Year in the Life: From Members of the Public to Member of Parliament, Hansard Society, London, 2006.

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Preface

from various House of Commons officials was invaluable, and particular mention should be made of Helen Irwin, Carole Andrews, Oonagh Gay, Richard Kelly, Paul Evans and Andrew Kennon. We also received valuable help from party whips, but especial thanks are due to Alan Haworth (now Lord Haworth), former Secretary of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), who helped us circumvent the ban the PLP placed on Labour MPs responding to questionnaires after 1997. A number of our academic colleagues helped with planning and advice at various stages of the project: Nicholas Allen, Sarah Childs, Nigel Jackson, David Judge, Philip Norton, Judith O’Carroll, Colin Seymour-Ure, Malcolm Shaw and Donald Shell. We would also like to thank the Hansard Society, particularly Gemma Rosenblatt, Matt Korris and Ruth Fox, for providing us with data from the Society’s 2005 project on new MPs. We are grateful to Palgrave Macmillan’s anonymous reader, whose advice helped us improve the book, but its publication owes much to Amber Stone-Galilee, Palgrave’s Commissioning Editor for politics, and Liz Blackmore, her assistant editor and those responsible for the very efficient copy-editing – Priya Venkat, the Project Manager, Jackie Mace, the Language Editor, and Shanmuga Priya, the Technical Editor. Finally, we owe a debt to our wives, Jean and Myfanwy, who, like us, have lived with this project and book for more years than we care to remember! Michael Rush, Philip Giddings

Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge permission to use copyright material by the following: The Controller of HMSO on behalf of Parliament for parliamentary material; Dod’s for material from The House Magazine; and Elsevier for material from the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences, Amsterdam, 2001. The photograph on the dustjacket of the first meeting of the House of Commons after the General Election of 2010 is reproduced with the permission of Parliament.

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1 Changing Westminster

In 2010, as in 1997, an exceptionally large number of Members of Parliament (MPs) was elected to the House of Commons for the first time (see Figure 1.1). In both years, though for different reasons, the election result was seen as an opportunity for change not only to government policy but also to the House of Commons itself. In 1997 pressure for change came as part of New Labour’s ‘modernisation’ programme, particularly constitutional reform. The new government swiftly set up a Select Committee on the Modernisation of the House, with wide terms of reference. Unusually it was chaired by a minister, the Leader of the House, Ann Taylor, who declared that a vital and effective House of Commons was central to a revival of confidence in politics and public life, and that the new government intended to embark upon ‘a significant programme of change’. Initially this included the handling of legislative proposals, the means by which the House holds ministers to account, the impact of the House’s procedures and practices on the working lives of MPs, and the style and forms of proceedings.1 In 2009 pressure for change came in response to the MPs’ expenses scandal and the perception that Westminster was out of touch with the wider world. In response to the public outcry, a Cabinet minister and the two main opposition party leaders spoke of the need to review the workings of parliamentary politics as a whole.2 In both 1997 and 2010 there was

1 The Modernisation Committee, First Report on the Legislative Process, 1997–98, HC 190, Appendix 1, Memorandum submitted by Rt Hon. Ann Taylor, MP, President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons, July 1997. 2 Alan Johnson, BBC News, 25 May 2009; David Cameron, ‘A new politics: We need a massive, radical redistribution of power’, The Guardian, 25 May 2009; Nick Clegg, ‘No holidays for MPs till we fix politics’, The Guardian, 27 May 2009.

1

2

Parliamentary Socialisation

350

No. of new MPs

300 250 200 150 100 50 2010

2005

2001

1997

1992

1987

1983

1979

1974 (Oct)

1974 (Feb)

1970

1966

1964

1959

1955

1951

1950

1945

0

Figure 1.1 The number of new MPs, 1945–2010 (including two Sinn Fein candidates elected in 1955 while serving prison sentences and Sinn Fein candidates elected in 1983 (1), 1997 (1), 2001 (2) and 2005 (1), who did not take their seats).

an expectation that the arrival of so many new MPs would result in significant change. But some commentators had a different expectation: that as the newly elected became more familiar with the world of Westminster they would gradually adapt to its existing patterns and modes of behaviour and lose their radical cutting edge. Is that expectation simply cynicism or is there evidence that MPs’ behaviour and attitudes change when they actually experience what it is like to be an MP? That is the central question we are exploring in this book. In this opening chapter we set out our plan by, first, discussing the nature of the question – the meaning of ‘socialisation’ – and, second, outlining the shape of the argument we advance through the rest of the book. Finally, we set out the methods we used to gather evidence for this study of the extent to which MPs are willing and able to change the world of Westminster.

The nature of the question But change what exactly? The perception of many people, inside and outside Westminster, was that change needed to go beyond the wellworn debates about ‘parliamentary reform’, with its emphasis on revising procedure and creating new committee structures, to the deeper task of changing the very character of the House – the culture, values and dispositions which had developed over the years. The perception

Changing Westminster

3

of critics was that its style and culture still owed more to the world of the Victorian gentlemen’s club than a twenty-first century legislature. As any would-be reformer soon discovers, it is far easier to change formal rules, procedures and structures than it is to change the underlying culture of an institution, particularly one such as the House of Commons whose traditions and practices have developed over centuries. Changing the culture of an organisation means changing the values and assumptions, often informal and implicit, which are, to a greater or lesser extent, embedded in the organisation. Rules and procedures are often an expression of those values and assumptions, but they are not the values and assumptions themselves. When new people join an organisation they are often invited to participate in an induction process, perhaps with a mentor, so that they can learn ‘the way we do things’. That process often combines passing on basic information with something like an apprenticeship period, in which the new person sits with an ‘old hand’ to observe how the organisation works. ‘Passing on’ is the key term here: it refers to the transmission of the organisation’s culture, its assumptions and values, to those who have newly joined. Described in those terms the process is inherently conservative if the newcomer simply adopts what is intended to be ‘passed on’. But, by accident or design, newcomers may adapt as well as adopt – and the more conservative ‘old hands’ may be anxious to ensure that any ‘adaptations’ are at least ‘within the spirit’ of the existing (‘traditional’) way of doing things. The interplay between ‘adopting’ and ‘adapting’ will determine the degree of change – and in some cases the ‘old hands’ will accept, perhaps readily, that the adaptations – ‘new ways of doing things’ – are to be welcomed and will adopt them themselves. This interplay may take on an adversarial character between a newcomer seen as a ‘radical firebrand’ and an ‘old hand’ seen as an ‘inflexible diehard’. The outcome of this process will depend on two things: (1) how many newcomers there are and (2) where they are placed within the organisation. If there are many newcomers – as with a merger or takeover – and especially if they are placed in strategic positions of authority within the organisation, the outcome may be very substantial and long-lasting change in the organisation as a whole. If there are few newcomers, and they are in positions marginal to decision-making within the organisation, then the odds are that the pressure for change will be absorbed. In the course of the interplay between newcomer and old hand their positions may change: the newcomer may become persuaded by, or accustomed to, the value of the existing way of doing things, losing his/her cutting edge or

4


‘going native’; the old hand may be persuaded by or even attracted to the opportunity to do things differently. In this book we explore the extent to which newcomers to the Westminster Parliament become ‘accustomed to’ its ways of working and, in parallel, the extent to which those newcomers become ‘persuaded by’ the opportunity of doing things differently. The process of ‘becoming accustomed to’ is referred to by social scientists as ‘socialisation’. As we shall see, it encompasses both aspects of cultural transmission we referred to above – passing on information about, and the effect of experience of operating within, the organisation. We shall explain this more fully later. In this introductory chapter we outline the structure of the book and the methods we have used in the research which underpins it.

The structure of the argument In Chapter 2 we note that there has already been a good deal written about the ideological de-radicalisation of MPs, so we concentrate on two other questions: (1) how, when newly elected, do MPs learn their job and (2) to what extent are they socialised into a particular role of the Member of Parliament? In answering these questions we first discuss what the job of the British MP actually is. From that discussion we conclude that it has three aspects: the party, the constituency and Parliament’s scrutiny role. In Chapter 2, in addition to our own research for this project, we draw on work published by Donald Searing,3 the Hansard Society4 and Michael Rush.5 In Chapter 3 we begin with a discussion of the concept of legislative socialisation and how it has been dealt with in the academic literature. We see this in terms of knowledge, values and attitudes, which leads us to present the researcher’s task as discovering what MPs learn about their job, when they learn it and how. As we follow this through we draw on data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union and academic studies

3 Donald D. Searing, Westminster’s World: Understanding Political Roles, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994. 4 The Challenge for Parliament: Making Government Accountable, Report of the Hansard Society Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny, chaired by Lord Newton of Braintree, Vacher Dod, 2001. 5 The Role of the Member of Parliament Since 1868: From Gentlemen to Players, OUP, 2001 and Parliament Today, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2005.


5

conducted in the United States and Canada, and on the European Parliament. After exploring the impact of the shape of the Chamber and examples of differences between the two Chambers in bicameral legislatures we then consider how the trio of knowledge, values and attitudes affect legislative behaviour. We examine partisan cohesion and dissent, the gap between MPs’ and the general public’s attitudes to what constitutes corruption and other aspects of what we call legislative ethics. We note here the implications of the increased institutionalisation of the House of Commons, following the work of Nelson Polsby and John Hibbing.6 Legislative socialisation is a process, one by which newly elected members of a legislature become acquainted with the institution’s rules and norms of behaviour. We explore the extent to which that process may shape British MPs’ attitudes towards the House of Commons and their role and behaviour in it, and in particular whether there is evidence of convergence between the attitudes, role and behaviour of newly elected and longer-serving members. In Chapter 3 we develop a threetype model of legislative socialisation, which we see as a complex rather than a simple process, involving a variety of agents, mechanisms and processes. In Chapters 4–6 we deal in turn with each of the three types of legislative socialisation, beginning with functional socialisation – how MPs ‘learn the job’. We present an analysis of the findings of the questionnaires we administered in the 1992–97 and 1997–2001 Parliaments, focusing on how MPs learn the ropes through training, induction and experience. We look in particular at the induction arrangements made by the House of Commons authorities and the parties, and respondents’ attitudes towards them, and also consider some comparisons with how members of other legislative assemblies ‘learn the job’. We also draw on research undertaken by the Hansard Society. After the 2005 general election, the Society conducted a survey of newly elected MPs, replicating a number of our survey questions in two questionnaires, the first immediately after the election and the second a year later. The data generated provides a valuable comparison with our findings, enabling us to extend our work beyond the second of the two Parliaments we cover,

6 Nelson W. Polsby, ‘The institutionalisation of the US House of Representatives’, American Political Science Review, 62, 1968, pp. 144–68 and John R. Hibbing, ‘Legislative institutionalisation with illustrations from the British House of Commons’, American Journal of Political Science, 32, 1988, pp. 681–712.

6


and we report the Hansard findings at appropriate points throughout the book.7 In Chapter 5 we focus directly on MPs’ attitudes to their role, looking particularly at the full time versus part time issue, the question of who they believe they represent, and then on ethical attitudes as illustrated by the recent expenses scandal. Then, in Chapter 6, we turn from learning the job to actually doing it – behavioural socialisation, and the impact of personality and experience. Here we present an analysis of MPs’ participation in debates in the Chamber and Westminster Hall, in asking parliamentary Questions, in the use of Early Day Motions (EDMs) and in committee activity, examining the extent to which they are socialised into behavioural practices and patterns. We consider how the choices MPs make about their role and how they play it are affected by two factors: (1) party and (2) whether their party is in government or opposition; and then how these choices are reflected in levels of parliamentary activity – debates, questions, committees and so on. Finally in this context we consider the crucially important question of party cohesion – revolts, rebellions and dissent. In Chapter 7 we pull the three strands together to consider parliamentary socialisation as a whole: who shapes their space? Here we return to the model of socialisation presented in Chapter 3, extend it and apply it to our findings on the three types of socialisation. How does this help us to understand how MPs ‘carve out their own role’? To what extent are MPs socialised? Is it just a matter of learning the ropes, of how to carry out the job of an MP, of how to use the tools available? Or is it a matter of being socialised into already existing patterns of behaviour? In the final chapter we summarise the arguments and findings of the book and consider their implications, particularly the extent to which there are lessons to be drawn for other legislatures from the UK Parliaments we have studied.

Research methods The outline of our argument and findings just given draws not only on the literature but also on empirical research we have ourselves

7

See Gemma Rosenblatt, A Year in the Life: From Member of Public to Member of Parliament, Hansard Society, London, 2006. The response rates to the questionnaires were 35.3 and 43.7 per cent respectively. We are grateful to the Hansard Society for providing us with a copy of the dataset to enable us to undertake further analysis.


7

conducted covering the two Parliaments, 1992–97 and 1997–2001. Here we set out how we conducted that empirical research. In both cases three questionnaires were sent to newly elected MPs, one as soon as they were elected, a second 18 months into the Parliament and a third a year before the anticipated end of the Parliament. Questions were replicated in each questionnaire to test whether MPs’ attitudes had changed and essentially the same questions were directed at a control group of longer-serving MPs. Where appropriate in our analysis of the questionnaires, we used responses from all newly elected MPs who completed questionnaires regardless of whether they responded to all three. In addition, we used the responses of those who did reply to all three as focus groups, especially in Chapter 5 in seeking to track changes in their attitudes. We also conducted interviews with a small number of newly elected Members, with officials of the House of Commons and with party officials, and documentary material (particularly that circulated to newly elected MPs) was gathered from House and party officials. In addition, in order to test behavioural trends, statistical data on the parliamentary activity of MPs was collected, but in this case extended to the last full session of the next Parliament, that is 1999–2000 for the 1992–97 Parliament and 2003–04 for the 1997–2001 Parliament, with the purpose of comparing in the longer term the parliamentary activity of the 1992 and 1997 intakes with that of longer-serving MPs.8 Our first questionnaire was designed to elicit the expectations of newly elected MPs – what they had anticipated being a Member of Parliament entailed, from whom they had sought and received advice, how they expected to divide their time between different aspects of the job, what services and facilities they had expected would be available to them, their anticipated staffing arrangements and how they saw their parliamentary careers developing, including whether they had ministerial ambitions. Similar questions were repeated in the second and third questionnaires and in the questionnaire to the longer-serving control

8 The response rates for the 1992 intake were 61.4 per cent, 49.6 per cent and 31.2 per cent; for the 1997 intake 47.7 per cent, 56 per cent and 41.6 per cent. Those for the longer-serving control groups were 31.2 per cent in 1992–97 and 30.1 per cent in 1997–2001. MPs have been increasingly reluctant to respond to questionnaires; indeed, since 1997 Labour MPs have been strongly advised not to reply to them and we were fortunate in that the then Secretary of the Parliamentary Labour Party made an exception in our case. In general, we judged the number of respondents to be sufficient for viable analysis, although the small number of Liberal Democrats in the 1992–97 Parliament and of all other parties in both Parliaments should be borne in mind.

8


group. Most questions were closed, offering alternative responses or asking respondents to rank-order or place their views on nominal scales, but some also gave respondents the opportunity to expand on their answers and many did so, providing us with additional rich material to elucidate their answers. Together, these three questionnaires provided longitudinal data on the expectations, experience and attitudes of the 1992 and 1997 intakes, which we were then able to compare with the responses of longerserving MPs. Our interviews were used to gather more in-depth material from a range of newly elected MPs in 1992 and 1997 and, in particular, from the House of Commons authorities and parties details of the arrangements they made for their new intakes. A separate analysis was made of the parliamentary activity of newly elected and longer-serving MPs – their participation in debates in the Chamber of the House of Commons (and from 1999 Westminster Hall debates), their use of parliamentary Questions for oral and written answer, their membership and attendance of legislative and investigative committees and their use of EDMs. This was done for the first and third sessions of the two Parliaments – 1992–93 and 1994–95 for the 1992–97 Parliament and 1997–98 and 1999–2000 for the 1997–2001 Parliament. In addition, to test longer-term behavioural trends, the same analysis was undertaken of a full session in the Parliament following, that is, 1999–2000 for 1992–97 and 2003–04 for 1997–2001. This analysis covered all backbench MPs, but excluded ministers, members of the official opposition’s ‘Shadow Cabinet’ and the leader of the Liberal Democrats, though not their frontbench spokespersons, since many Liberal Democrats had such responsibilities, especially in the 1992–97 Parliament when initially they numbered 20, although this increased to 26 through by-election victories and defections. The data and material from these two Parliaments have enabled us to explore in some depth both how newly elected MPs learn to be MPs and, more importantly, whether, in that learning process and beyond, parliamentary socialisation has been at work. We have in this introduction analysed the basic question, outlined the structure of the argument we present and explained the methods we adopted. Now we turn to consider the role of the Member of Parliament in the United Kingdom: what do MPs actually do?

2 The Role of the Member of Parliament

But what do you do as an MP, daddy? (Keith Simpson, Conservative MP for Mid Norfolk, 1997–2010, for Broadland since 2010 general election)1 In his book, the Accidental MP, Martin Bell remarked, ‘Becoming an MP is one thing. Being an MP is quite another.’2 Bell had not expected to become a Member of Parliament (MP). Standing as an anti-sleaze candidate in 1997, he famously defeated the sitting Conservative MP, Neil Hamilton, who had been accused of abusing his position by accepting payments in return for parliamentary favours.3 Bell was unusual in that he was the first fully Independent MP to be elected since the abolition of the university seats in 1950; all other ‘independents’, of whom there were four, had been dissident party MPs who had successfully defied their party machines.4 However, Bell was not unusual in not expecting to be elected: all general elections produce candidates surprised to find

1 Question asked by his six-year-old son (The House Magazine, 6 October 1997, p. 18). Keith Simpson’s son was not alone: the ten-year-old son of Jim Knight, Labour MP for South Dorset 2001–10, similarly asked: ‘Well, it’s very nice, but what do you do?’ (The House Magazine, 1 October 2001, p. 64). 2 Martin Bell, An Accidental MP, Penguin, London, revised and updated ed. 2001, p. 57. 3 See Geoffrey Lock, ‘The Hamilton Affair’ in Oonagh Gay and Patricia Leopold (eds), Conduct Unbecoming: The Regulation of Parliamentary Behaviour, Politico’s, London, 2004, pp. 29–58. 4 These were Sir David Robertson (Independent Conservative, Caithness and Sutherland 1959); S. O. Davies (Independent Labour, Merthyr Tydfil 1970); Dick Taverne (formerly Labour, Social Democratic, Lincoln 1973 and February 1974); and E. J. Milne (Independent Labour, Blyth February 1974).

9

10


themselves MPs, especially when one or more of the parties achieve unexpectedly large electoral swings, but most do so as candidates of an established party. It is hardly surprising that such unexpected MPs should be uncertain of what awaits them at Westminster, let alone what is expected of them. But Bell’s distinction between becoming an MP and being an MP is an important one, applicable not just to those who did not expect to be elected but also to many who expected to be elected and for the first time. To paraphrase Bell: arriving at Westminster and taking the oath or affirming is one thing; learning how to be a Member of Parliament is quite another. As an Independent MP, Bell was at a particular disadvantage when first elected because he had no party whip to tell him what to do.5 On the other hand, as he himself relates, there was no shortage of advice: Since my new colleagues did not see me as a threat to the system, but rather as a curiosity and an anomaly and a bit of a lost soul, they showered me with advice . . . Ivor Stanbrook,6 former Tory MP for Orpington, sent me a copy of a useful little manual he had written, the fruits of twenty-two years in the House, ‘How to be an MP’. His counsel to new Members was to bide their time and keep their heads down for the first five years. But the first five years would probably be all the years I would have! Paul Flynn, the independent Labour MP for Newport West, sent his list of ‘Backbenchers’ Ten Commandments’,7 containing the rather contrary advice to make as many waves as possible.8 Every Parliament sees an influx of new MPs, but the numbers vary markedly. Apart from the exceptional case of the general election in 1945,9 in the post-war period they have ranged from 7.5 per cent

5 In contrast, their equivalents in the House of Lords are sufficiently numerous (more than 200) to have their own intra-parliamentary organisation and website http://www.crossbenchpeers.org.uk. 6 Stanbrook, in fact, had retired from the Commons in 1992, having served as MP for Orpington since 1970. 7 His advice was published later in 1997 – Paul Flynn, Commons Knowledge: How to be a Backbencher, Seren, Bridgend, 1997. Bell could also have read a similar guide by David Davis, MP for Boothferry 1987–97 and Haltemprice and Howden since 1997, first published in 1989 – David Davis, A Guide to Parliament, Penguin/BBC Books, London, 1997. 8 Bell, op. cit., p. 59. 9 In 1945 there had not been an election for ten years because of the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. More than half (50.2 per cent) of those elected

The Role of the Member of Parliament

11

100 90 80 70 60 %

50 40 30 20 10

Turnover

2010

2005

2001

1997

1992

1987

1983

1979

1974 (Oct)

1974 (Feb)

1970

1966

1964

1959

1955

1951

1950

1945

0

New MPs

Figure 2.1 Turnover of membership of the House of Commons and proportion of newly elected MPs, 1945–2010

(October 1974) to 36.9 per cent (1997), with a mean of 18.7 per cent. Thus, as Figure 2.1 shows, one of the cohorts we surveyed had the highest post-war turnover:10 Labour’s massive victory was largely responsible for a turnover of 41.9 per cent and twice the average proportion of new MPs – 36.9 per cent.11 By contrast, for our other cohort – the previous Parliament, elected in 1992 – turnover at the general election was 24 per cent and the proportion of new MPs 19.5 per cent.

in 1945 were new to the House of Commons; nearly three-quarters had not been elected in the previous election (1935). The turnover figure was the highest since 1832. 10 Turnover is defined as the sum of the number of MPs elected for the first time at the election concerned, those elected at by-elections between then and the previous election and re-elected to the current one, and ‘retreads’ – those who served in an earlier Parliament but not the previous one. By definition turnover is therefore greater than the number or proportion of newly elected MPs. 11 The 1997 figures include Martin McGuinness, who like all Sinn Fein MPs did not take his seat. If McGuinness is excluded, the proportion of new MPs is 36.7 per cent.

12


The 2010 general election also produced a high turnover and a large proportion of new MPs: 37.3 and 34.9 per cent respectively, reflecting the retirement of 149 MPs, larger even than in 1945, when 129 MPs retired – an unusually high number, widely linked with the scandal of MPs’ expenses, an issue we examine in Chapters 5–6.12 Whether the number of new MPs is large, as in 1997 and 2010, or small, as in October 1974, the same three questions arise. First, how do newly elected MPs learn to do their job? Secondly, to what extent are they socialised into the role of Member of Parliament? Thirdly, to what extent are MPs de-radicalised in their views on policy? Our concern in this book is with the first two of these questions rather than the third. This is partly because a good deal of attention has been paid in the existing literature to the ideological de-radicalisation of members of legislatures13 and much less to how they learn about and perform their role. More particularly, however, it is precisely because until recently most studies of de-radicalisation have focused on the moderating of legislators’ views on policy. That is only one dimension of socialisation and raises much wider concerns beyond that of the role of the MP.14 Until relatively recently the answer to the first question, ‘How do newly elected MPs learn to do their job?’, was short and simple – by doing it. In their ‘on the job’ learning they had the assistance of the staff of the House of Commons and, in many cases, advice and help from their colleagues, mainly of their own party but sometimes those of other parties. It was only in the 1980s that any systematic provision of information or training was provided either by the House authorities or any of the parties. Learning how to be an MP was, and to a significant degree still is, a matter of trial and error. The second question, ‘To what extent are newly elected MPs socialised into the role of being an MP?’, is more complex. To begin with there is the definitional issue of the extent to which learning how to do the job is itself a form of socialisation. But the more significant question for investigation is whether socialisation extends beyond learning

12

See Chapter 5, pp. 116–20 and Chapter 6, pp. 166–71. See, for example, Donald D. Searing, ‘A theory of political socialisation: institutional support and de-radicalisation in Britain’, British Journal of Political Science, 16, 1986, pp. 341–76 and Anthony Mughan, Janet Box-Steffensmeier and Roger Scully, ‘Mapping legislative socialisation’, European Journal of Political Research, 32, 1997, pp. 93–106. 14 In the very different context of the use of terrorism as a means to political ends, a good deal of more recent research has focused on de-radicalisation as a counter-terrorist technique. 13


13

how to do the job to attitudes towards it and to behaviour in performing it. We shall therefore need to examine the concept of socialisation in general and legislative socialisation in particular, which we do in Chapter 3. But, first, we need to consider how the role of the MP can be defined. For the Westminster Parliament there is no formal definition to be obtained from constitutional documents or even the House’s Standing Orders (though Speakers’ rulings and reports from the Procedure and Privileges Committees over the years provide important pointers to how the role has developed). We shall therefore draw on empirical work on how MPs themselves appear to define their role: work conducted first, in the early 1970s, by the American political scientist Donald Searing; secondly, by ourselves largely in the 1990s; and thirdly, more recently, by the Hansard Society.

The role of the Member of Parliament The most comprehensive discussion of the role of the Member of Parliament is found in Donald Searing’s Westminster’s World,15 which draws on an extraordinarily rich range of material, based on no fewer than 521 interviews with MPs in 1972–73 – a remarkable 83 per cent response rate – supplemented by postal questionnaires (with a 79 per cent response rate), published parliamentary records and records of intraparliamentary bodies such as Labour’s Tribune Group and the right-wing Conservative Monday Club, and participant observation.16 In seeking to delineate the roles of MPs Searing used a series of linked, open-ended questions, the first about MPs’ ‘broad role as a Member of Parliament’, the second about what type of political activity in Parliament they found ‘most satisfying’ and the third about their political ambitions, including ministerial office. From their responses Searing developed a series of roles, drawing a basic distinction between what he called ‘positional’ or ‘leadership’ roles (ministerial posts and the position of Parliamentary Private Secretary (PPS)), for which MPs are recruited or chosen, and

15

Donald D. Searing, Westminster’s World: Understanding Political Roles, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994. See also Anthony King, British Members of Parliament: Self-Portrait, Macmillan, London, 1974 and Lisanne Radice, Elizabeth Vallance and Virginia Willis, Member of Parliament: The Job of a Backbencher, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2nd ed. 1990. 16 Such response rates from MPs are now mainly the stuff of dreams: MPs have become increasingly resistant to responding to requests for interviews and replying to questionnaires. The highest response in our surveys was 61.4 per cent in the 1992–97 Parliament and 56 per cent in the 1997–2001 Parliament. For further details, see Chapter 1, footnote 8.

14


‘preference’ roles, which MPs select or choose for themselves. This led him to suggest four different backbench roles: . . . each framed by one of Parliament’s institutional tasks: checking the executive (Policy Advocates); monitoring institutional structures (Parliament Men); making ministers (Ministerial Aspirants); and redressing grievances (Constituency Members). Backbenchers make their roles with a view to making themselves useful in the established framework of rules that they find at Westminster. They pass over some of these roles, adopt others, and then interpret and modify them to suit their preferences. They certainly do make their own roles, but they make them in and for Westminster’s world.17 The largest group among Searing’s four preference roles was that of ‘policy advocate’ (40.7 per cent), followed by two smaller groups of similar size – ‘constituency members’ (25.4 per cent) and ‘ministerial aspirants’ (24.6 per cent), leaving a small group of ‘Parliament men’ (9.3 per cent). Searing, however, found some differences between the two major parties: ‘policy advocates’ were more numerous among Conservative than Labour MPs (44.3 vs 35.8 per cent), whereas ‘constituency members’ were more commonly Labour (29.8 per cent) than Conservative (21 per cent). More Labour MPs were ‘ministerial aspirants’ (27.8 per cent vs 22.7 per cent), but more Conservatives were ‘Parliament men’ (11.9 per cent vs 6.6 per cent). By designating one of his roles as ‘ministerial aspirants’, Searing draws attention to the crucial role that many MPs play as ministers. Between one-third and two-fifths of MPs actually hold ministerial office or serve as Speaker or Deputy Speaker during their parliamentary careers.18 Others serve on the opposition frontbenches without actually becoming ministers or holding parliamentary office. However, our focus is on the activities, attitudes and aspirations MPs might develop over time, rather than on what they were at one particular point in time. For this reason we focused mostly on backbench MPs, rather than ministers and opposition frontbenchers.19

17

Searing, Westminster’s World., p. 16. See Michael Rush, The Role of the Member of Parliament Since 1868: From Gentlemen to Players, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, Table 5.10. 19 Party leaders, members of the Official Opposition’s ‘Shadow Cabinet’, and the Speaker and Deputy Speakers were excluded from our surveys and analyses. However, Liberal Democrat frontbench spokespersons, and those of other, 18


15

Thus, although Searing’s backbench roles are still readily recognisable, Westminster’s World was a snapshot and the balance may have changed since 1972–73, both between roles and between parties. Although our more recent data is not directly comparable, it suggests that the proportion of MPs seeing their role as ‘constituency members’ has increased and that Labour MPs are more likely than Conservatives to see their role in those terms. Our data also suggests that Conservatives are more likely to be ‘ministerial aspirants’ than Labour MPs, but this may reflect both the timing of the surveys (Searing’s in mid-Parliament and our initial surveys at the beginning of the two Parliaments) and the prevailing political situation (whether the party is in power and its expectations of winning or losing the next election). Searing’s approach tends to compartmentalise the role of the MP, rather than facilitate a multifunctional analysis, as he acknowledges when he writes the ‘ . . . four principal backbench roles are not completely mutually exclusive. Backbenchers play several roles at the same time and, in the course of their careers, transfer their predominant interest from one to another.’20 The second point is well taken and even a cursory look at the career patterns of MPs would provide ample evidence, particularly in the case of ‘ministerial aspirants’ and those who achieve ministerial office. In contrast to Searing we have chosen to adopt a multifunctional approach in exploring parliamentary socialisation, that is, we argue that MPs perform a number of roles, even though they may focus their activities on some aspects of those roles more than others. A similar approach to ours was adopted for the survey of MPs conducted in 2000 on behalf of the Hansard Society Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny.21 The Hansard Society survey had a response rate of 27.1 per cent, but was broadly representative of the parties, slightly under-representing Labour and over-representing the Conservatives. The published responses to individual questions were not broken down by party, but they provide a viable picture of what MPs think their roles are.

minor parties (other than party leaders) were included since almost all had some frontbench responsibilities but continued to perform normal backbench roles as well. 20 Ibid., p. 416. 21 Hansard Society, Report of the Hansard Society Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny: The Challenge for Parliament – Making Government Accountable, Vacher Dod Publishing, London, 2001.

16


Protecting the constituency Constituents’ grievances Holding the govt to account Examining legislation Voting with my party Informing constituents Working on a deptl comm. Speaking in the chamber Writing/giving speeches Appearing on radio/TV Writing articles 0

20

40

60

80

100

% Very import. Figure 2.2

Quite import.

MPs’ relative views of their roles and activities

Note: We regard some of these ‘roles’ as ‘activities’ in support of other roles, as explained on p. 18 below. Source: Hansard Society, Report of the Hansard Society Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny, Appendix 4, Table 3.2.

As Figure 2.2 shows, when presented with a range of roles and activities, MPs placed the greatest emphasis on ‘protecting the interests of their constituency’ and ‘dealing with constituents’ grievances’, followed by ‘holding the government to account’ and a little further behind ‘examining legislation’. In each case, those saying these were ‘very important’ exceeded those saying they were ‘quite important’. However, on ‘voting with my party’ and all other options those regarding them as ‘quite important’ outnumbered those seeing them as ‘very important’ by considerable margins. However, when asked explicitly which of these roles and activities was the ‘most important’ opinion shifted (see Figure 2.3). ‘Holding the government to account’ was seen as the most important (38.3 per cent), followed by ‘protecting the interests of their constituency’ (21.4 per cent) and ‘dealing with constituents’ grievances’ (17.5 per cent). If the latter two roles are amalgamated into a single ‘constituency role’, the ‘accountability’ and ‘constituency’ roles attract equal support (38.3 and 38.9 per cent respectively). Similarly, if ‘examining legislation’ and ‘holding the government to account’ are taken together they total


17

Holding the govt to account Protecting the constituency Constituents' grievances Examining legislation Voting with my party Working on a deptl comm. Informing constituents Speaking in the chamber Writing/giving speeches Appearing on radio/TV Writing articles 0

10

20

30

40

50

% Most import. Figure 2.3

MPs’ view on their ‘most important’ roles and activities

Source: Hansard Society, Report of the Hansard Society Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny, Appendix 4, Table 3.2.

53.2 per cent, and there is a strong case for taking them together, since most legislation passed is government legislation, although the distinction between the two is less clear than that between ‘protecting the interests of their constituency’ and ‘dealing with constituents’ grievances’. However, by itself, ‘examining legislation’ is regarded as most important by little more than 1 in 7 respondents (14.9 per cent) and ‘voting with my party’ less than 1 in 40 (2.6 per cent); all other options fell below 1 per cent. The Hansard Society survey also asked MPs how important representing various interests was to them. The constituency again loomed large, again with the interests of the constituency as a whole (‘very important’ – 69.1 per cent) ahead of those of individual constituents (48.6 per cent). Representation of the interests of ‘the nation as whole’ (59.4 per cent), however, was second in importance, followed some way behind by the MP’s party (27.4 per cent), but other interests – ‘a particular cause’, ‘sectional interests’ and the MP’s constituency party – were regarded as much less important.22

22

Ibid., Appendix 4, Table 3.1.

18


The Hansard Society survey extended this picture by gathering data on the number of hours Members spent on various activities, the number of letters they received, what staff they employed, what support and training they had received, and what parliamentary and ministerial goals they had. Taken as a whole, the survey results provide a strong case for arguing that being an MP is a multifunctional role, however much individual MPs may focus on particular aspects of their work in the sense of Searing’s positional and preference roles. However, it is also clear from the Hansard Society survey that some of the ‘roles’ MPs were asked about were not so much specific roles as activities in support of other wider roles. For example, ‘examining legislation’ and ‘working on a departmental committee’ can be taken together as aspects of ‘holding the government to account’. Other ‘roles’ or activities, such as ‘informing constituents about government activity’, ‘speaking in the Chamber’, ‘writing or giving speeches’ and ‘appearing on radio or television’ could be seen as ancillary to ‘protecting constituency interests’ and ‘dealing with constituents’ grievances’, as well as other means of ‘holding the government to account’, on the one hand, and as part of the wider party role, particularly ‘supporting my party’, on the other. This leads us to suggest that the Member of Parliament has three major roles: the partisan role, the constituency role and the scrutiny role, as set out in Table 2.1. Our rationale for adopting this analysis is that these are three distinctive roles applicable to virtually all MPs. Indeed, they cannot escape Table 2.1

The three roles of the Member of Parliament

Role

Description

The partisan role

Supporting the party in debates, in the asking of parliamentary Questions and in the signing of motions, in committee work and, above all, in the division lobbies.

The constituency role

Helping constituents with individual problems, e.g. access to welfare, housing and other local council issues, and immigration cases. Dealing with the collective interests of the constituency, e.g. promoting local business, seeking funds for the constituency, environmental issues.

The scrutiny role

Assessing government policy proposals, examining primary and secondary legislation, evaluating expenditure and taxation, checking on the implementation and administration of government policy.

Source: Michael Rush, Parliament Today, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2005, p. 67.


19

them, however effectively they may or may not perform them and regardless of the relative importance they place on them or the time they choose to devote to each. The only exceptions are the rare and genuine Independent Members and, perhaps to a lesser extent, those who eschew the party whip but sit with an independent party label. The overwhelming majority of UK MPs are elected with party labels and continue to accept them once in the House of Commons. They are expected by their parties, and themselves expect, to support the party, not just in the division lobbies but in all their parliamentary activities. This does not preclude disagreeing with the party, even not voting with it on occasion, but persistent and widespread disagreement and rebellion are likely to lead to estrangement, even ejection from the party. ‘Crossing the floor’ is not especially common, averaging less than four in each of the Parliaments elected between 1945 and 2010 – less than two per Parliament if the mass migration to the Social Democratic Party in 1981 is excluded.23 In any case, ‘crossing the floor’ involves exchanging one party for another. MPs’ attitudes are therefore to a significant degree seen through the prism of party: supporting the party inside (and outside) Parliament is a major part of the British MP’s role. If party is important, so too is the fact that every MP represents a territorial constituency; a fact that is reinforced by the use of singlemember constituencies for election, so that in his or her constituency the MP has no parliamentary rival. Rival party candidates in the Member’s constituency may seek to establish a reputation for dealing with constituency matters and enhance their prospects of defeating the sitting MP at the next election, but they lack the MP’s cachet and entrée in dealing with such matters. It has long been the case that an MP is expected to and expects to look after the various economic, social and other interests in the constituency and to deal with complaints, grievances and other problems raised by constituents. This does not mean that the MP will respond positively to all constituency issues, whether collective or individual, but to ignore them is no longer a viable option. The Hansard Society survey suggests that MPs regard ‘holding the government to account’ as their single most important role, and this was emphasised in the survey even more when they were asked what

23

See David Butler and Gareth Butler, Twentieth Century British Political Facts, 1900–2000, Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hants., 2000, pp. 247–9 and David Butler and Gareth Butler, British Political Facts Since 1979, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 112–14.

20


they thought Parliament’s functions were. ‘Scrutinising legislation’ and ‘scrutinising government departments’ were seen as the most important functions by 47.8 and 20.3 per cent of respondents respectively, compared with 15.2 per cent ‘solving constituents’ problems’ and a mere 2.2 per cent ‘supporting party policy’.24 The contrast between the various roles MPs perform and parliamentary functions is interesting, suggesting that, while scrutiny is important as a role and as a parliamentary function, the constituency role is seen very much as a matter for the individual MP rather than the House of Commons collectively. Furthermore, ‘party’ does not rate highly in either role or functional terms. There is an interesting tension, perhaps even paradox, here: while British MPs are first and foremost party creatures who are far more likely to agree than disagree with their parties, most nevertheless view their constituency service role as a largely separate one, affected but not driven by the ideological beliefs and attitudes that stem from party. Analytically, it is possible to distinguish between the partisan, scrutiny and constituency roles, but they also need to be seen in a multifunctional context. Therefore, in exploring them in relation to parliamentary socialisation, we have treated them as interrelated roles which constitute the job of being an MP. We have not sought to categorise MPs by placing them in exclusive or predominant roles, largely to the exclusion of others, but to elicit their relative rather than their categorical importance to MPs. In addition, by adopting a panel study of newly elected MPs, with a control group of longer-serving MPs, we seek to examine how the newly elected learn the job of being a Member of Parliament and, by comparing their attitudes and parliamentary behaviour with the control group, see whether and, if so, to what extent they have been subject to a process of parliamentary socialisation.

The work of the Member of Parliament If describing the role of the Member of Parliament is complex, describing his or her work is both simple and complex – simple because relating what MPs can do in fulfilling their role is easy enough but complex because describing what they actually do is far more difficult. Basically, the work of UK MPs is divided into two broad categories, parliamentary and constituency work. Although for analytical purposes it

24

Hansard Society, op. cit., Appendix 4, p. 131.


21

is helpful to separate these two categories, there is inevitably significant overlap between them in practice. The activities and procedures of the House of Commons provide MPs with a variety of opportunities to advance or defend the interests of their constituency or seek to solve individual constituent’s problems. Conversely, while MPs will seek to advance or defend the interests of their party in their constituency, they also use their constituency work as a source of first-hand evidence with which to scrutinise government policy and administration in Parliament. The House of Commons is a busy place. Excluding weekends and statutory holidays it meets between 150 and 160 days a year – about three-fifths of the days available. It does not, however, operate solely in plenary mode, through the Chamber of the House, but makes extensive use of committees, some concerned with scrutinising legislative proposals in the form of bills and draft regulations (mostly known as statutory instruments), others concerned with scrutinising government policy and administration. In addition, since 1999 complementary plenary sessions have been held in a large committee room off Westminster Hall (hence they are known as Westminster Hall sittings), which add about 30 per cent to the time available to backbenchers. Some measure of the work of the House of Commons can be gathered from the data shown in Table 2.2, which provides details of parliamentary activity, on the one hand, in the form of sittings and committee meetings, and parliamentary Questions and output, on the other, in the form of Acts of Parliament and statutory instruments. The three sessions shown in Table 2.2 were of normal length25 in each of the Parliaments covered by our study. Data for earlier sessions would show that, while the Commons has been meeting for a similar number of days for most of the period since 1906, the number of Acts of Parliament passed each year has fallen, and the number of Questions answered orally has declined since 1945,26 whereas all other measures of the volume of output have substantially increased. In 1911, for instance, the 50 Acts passed by Parliament comprised 430 pages; the 50 passed in 1950 had 730 pages; and the 58 passed in 1970 had 1110 pages.27

25 Sessions immediately before and after a general election are invariably shorter and longer respectively than usual because the timing of general elections does not normally coincide with the parliamentary year (see Chapter 5, footnote 12). 26 This was due largely to the growing practice of allowing supplementary Questions after the original Question had been answered. 27 House of Commons Library, Parliamentary Trends, p. 7, Table 2.

22


Table 2.2

Parliamentary activity and output in selected sessions

Activity Sitting days Chamber Westminster Hall∗ Public bill committee meetings Investigatory committee meetings Acts of Parliament Pages of Acts Statutory instruments Pages of SIs Oral parliamentary Questions reached Written parliamentary Questions Early Day Motions

1993–94

1998–99

2003–04

154 – 237

149 105 219

157 103 243

652

861

878

52 (1993) 2,640 (1993) 3,276 (1993) 7,940 (1993) 2,127

42 (1998) 2,490 (1998) 3,319 (1998) 7,480 (1998) 1,943

45 (2003) 4,073 (2003) 3,354 (2003) 9,334 (2003) 2,060

41,051

32,149

54,875

1,691

1,009

1,941

∗ Westminster

Hall was set up in 1999 and its sittings are shorter than those in the Chamber, averaging 3–4 hours compared with 7–9 hours in the latter. Sources: House of Commons Library, Parliamentary Trends: Statistics about Parliament, Research Paper 09/69, 29 July 2009 and House of Commons, Sessional Returns and Sessional Digests for the sessions concerned.

Statutory instruments have seen an even greater expansion, from under 1000 in 1900 to over 2000 in 1950, and from 330 pages in 1911 to 2970 pages in 1950.28 In response to this increased volume of work the House of Commons has expanded its use of committees, both for dealing with legislation and for scrutinising government policy and administration. Thus, whereas in 1901 legislative committees held 60 meetings and investigatory committees held 63, in 1961–62 the numbers were 216 and 40: although the number of investigatory committees had at that point actually declined, that proved to be the low point as there was a major expansion of such committees in the next 40 years, notably with the creation of the departmental select committees in 1979.29

28

Butler and Butler, op. cit., p. 217 and House of Commons, Parliamentary Trends, p. 7, Table 2. 29 See Michael Rush, The Role of the Member of Parliament, Table 7.4 and pp. 194–9 and Gavin Drewry (ed.), The New Select Committees: A Study of the 1979 Reforms, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1st ed. 1985, 2nd ed. 1989.


23

MPs have also vastly increased their use of parliamentary Questions, with many more tabled for oral answer (though mostly not answered because the time available has not increased). But the greatest expansion has been in the use of Questions for written answer, mainly to extract information from the government. The 1966–67 session was the last in which more Questions were tabled for oral answer rather than written answer. In 1976–77 more than 25,000 Questions for written answer were tabled; in 1989–90 more than 41,000; and by 2005–06 the total was 95,041.30 Similarly, Early Day Motions (EDMs), essentially expressions of backbench opinion, did not exceed a hundred before 1951–52 and did not do so regularly until 1959–60, rising to more than a thousand in 1983–84, as MPs found them an effective way of expressing their views, both in partisan and cross-party fashion.31 Now in a normal-length session the number is more than 2000.32 A Member of Parliament elected in 1900 would have had no difficulty in recognising the House of Commons at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, not just physically33 but procedurally as well. The executive was dominant and remains dominant. Nevertheless, there have been significant changes, particularly in the last 50 years. The most obvious visual change is the presence of women MPs, who after the 2010 general election constituted 22 per cent of MPs, yet as recently as 1979 only 3 per cent were women. But there have been less obvious changes in the socio-economic make-up of the Commons, in educational and occupational backgrounds, for example. More importantly from the point of view of the role of the MP, however, the House and its members have become much more active across a wider range of issues as government responsibilities have expanded and in a greater variety of ways procedurally. In addition to the Westminster Hall sittings, there is greater use of committees, parliamentary Questions and EDMs. MPs are now paid and their salaries and, more importantly, the expenses, services and facilities available to them have increased substantially. MPs now have offices and personal staff and the job of the MP is increasingly seen as full time rather

30

House of Commons, Sessional Digests. House of Commons, Parliamentary Trends, p. 16, Table 11. 32 By 1997–98 the number had reached 1757, reaching a peak of 2924 in 2005–06. The number per sitting day (a better indicator of volume given the varying length of sessions) doubled from 7 in 1997–98 to 15 in 2003–04. 33 The House of Commons Chamber destroyed in 1941 was rebuilt to the same size and layout. 31

24


than part time, even though many MPs, especially Conservatives, continue to have jobs outside Parliament. The role of the MP has been professionalised.34 The Commons has also increased its workload significantly as a result of the UK’s membership of the European Union, mainly by establishing committees to scrutinise the mass of draft regulations emanating from Brussels.35 But there have been other changes, too. After 1997 in particular, to a large extent in response to demands from the many newly elected Labour MPs, adjustments were made to the working practices of the House, notably by making the sitting hours on some days more ‘family friendly’, by introducing regular nonsitting of ‘constituency’ days during the normal parliamentary week and by giving longer notice of forthcoming business and the dates of recesses. The parliamentary side of the MP’s job is thus both extensive and varied, but MPs neglect their constituencies at their peril. Indeed, the demands of the constituency role, whether in the form of helping individual constituents with their problems or looking after the social, economic and other interests of the constituency, have increased enormously. These demands from the constituency are not new, but there is little doubt that their growth has been exponential.36 One simple measure of this is the number of letters received by MPs, most of which come from their constituents. In 1920 it was estimated that MPs received 50 letters a week, rising to 80 in 1945;37 in 1967 three-fifths of MPs received between 25 and 74 letters a week and another quarter 75 or more;38 in 1986 another survey found that nearly half of all Members received

34

See Rush, op. cit., Chapter 5. See Philip Giddings and Gavin Drewry (eds), Britain in the European Union, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2004. 36 See Michael Rush, Pushing Back the Constituency Role: Exploring the Representations of Constituents’ Interests by British MPs, paper presented to the Sixth Workshop of Parliamentary Scholars and Parliamentarians, 31 July–1 August 2004, Wroxton College, Banbury. For further discussion of the constituency role see Michael Rush, The Role of the Member of Parliament, pp. 199–211 and Philip Norton and David Wood, Back from Westminster: British Members of Parliament and their Constituents, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, 1993. 37 Sir Ivor Jennings, Parliament, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd ed. 1957, p. 27. 38 Anthony Barker and Michael Rush, The Member of Parliament and His Information, Allen and Unwin, London, 1970, pp. 404 and 412. 35


25

between 120 and 210 letters a week, and more than a quarter between 216 and 300;39 and in 2000 the Hansard Society survey found that more than four-fifths of MPs received more than 100 letters a week, half more than 200 and a fifth more than 300.40 Bearing in mind that the overwhelming majority of MPs can now be contacted by email and a high proportion has websites accessible to the public, constituency demands are likely to have increased yet further.41 In order to cope with the demands from their constituency, most MPs spend a considerable amount of time in their constituency, holding ‘surgeries’, attending meetings and functions, liaising with local councillors and officials, and so on. It is therefore hardly surprising that survey after survey has found that most MPs devote more time to ‘constituency work’ than any other single activity in carrying out their job as an MP. The surveys suggest two things: (1) the balance between the ‘constituency’ and ‘parliamentary’ work has increasingly shifted towards the constituency, but (2) more time is still spent on parliamentary than constituency work when the House is sitting, although in recesses constituency work takes priority. And, as we relate in Chapter 5, in our survey of MPs’ attitudes, MPs regard dealing with constituents’ problems and looking after constituency interests as the most important part of their job. This contrasts with the 2000 Hansard survey finding that ‘holding the government to account’ was MPs’ most important role, but not with the 2005/06 Hansard surveys, which essentially mirror our own. The explanation of this difference may lie in the context of the surveys: the 2001 Hansard survey was part of research into the accountability of government to Parliament; our research focuses very much on the role of the MP and the 2005/06 Hansard survey questions replicated our questions.

39 Letter Writing Bureau survey cited in Robert Blackburn and Andrew Kennon, Griffith and Ryle on Parliament: Functions, Practice and Procedure, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2003, p. 106. 40 Hansard Society, Report of the Hansard Society Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny, p. 147. 41 See Nigel Jackson, ‘Email and political campaigning: the experience of MPs at Westminster’, Journal of Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics, 2, 2004, pp. 66–7; Nigel Jackson, unpublished PhD, University of Bournemouth, 2008, Chapters 6–8; and Nigel Jackson, ‘MPs and their e-newsletters: winning votes by promoting constituency service’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 14, 2008, pp. 488–99.

26


An MP in the United Kingdom thus has a multifaceted job, with parliamentary and constituency dimensions, both of which make considerable and complex demands on the MP. In this context, Searing’s distinction between ‘positional’ and ‘preference’ roles is crucial. MPs are appointed to ‘positional’ roles, either by their parties in the case of party leaders or by their party leaders in the case of ministerial or frontbench positions. All other roles are ‘preference’ roles, ones which the individual MP chooses to follow, including, of course, that of ‘ministerial aspirant’. In other words, Members decide for themselves how they will be MPs. Their choice is, nevertheless, subject to various constraints, not least those exercised by the party whips. Yet the role of the whips illustrates the nature of those constraints and the extent to which MPs can decide for themselves how to fulfil their various roles. The whips naturally expect MPs to toe the party line in divisions, but they also expect them to support the party in debates and during Prime Minister’s Question Time, in their use of parliamentary Questions, their committee activity and so on. To encourage this behaviour the whips have at their disposal carrots and sticks – the prospect of ministerial office or a position as a frontbench spokesperson, membership of parliamentary delegations travelling abroad, and, until 2010, membership of select committees, on the one hand, and threats of remaining on the backbenches or even de-selection as a parliamentary candidate, on the other. The choice, however, remains with MPs. There are other constraints, too, particularly procedural ones: participation in debates depends on ‘catching the Speaker’s eye’, the choice of amendments to bills and motions to be debated is not in the Member’s hands. But activities such as tabling parliamentary Questions for written answer or signing or tabling EDMs are subject to fewer and less significant constraints. In sum, then, it is MPs as individuals who decide how to divide their time between their parliamentary and constituency roles, whether to seek to participate in a debate, ask a Question, be active on a committee once appointed, table or sign an EDM, as well as join party subject committees or all-party groups. Similarly, while by its very nature much of an MP’s constituency work is generated by and from the constituency itself, MPs can and do decide how to respond to constituency demands – how much time they spend in the constituency, how often they hold ‘surgeries’, how closely they work with people living and working there. In order to exercise any or all of these choices newly elected MPs must first learn about the role of actually being an MP, and how to perform the tasks involved in that role. In that learning process MPs will also come to a view about which activities they prefer, which they


27

regard as the most effective, and which suit their ‘style’. Our argument in this book is that socialisation is a significant part of this process, not in a simplistic and deterministic sense, but as part of a complex process which contributes to their attitudes and behaviour as Members of Parliament.

3 Legislative Socialisation: Surveying the Landscape

. . . every boy and every girl That’s born into the world alive, Is either a little Liberal, or Else a little Conservative.1 Socialisation refers to all processes by which an individual learns the ways, ideas, beliefs, values and norms of his particular culture and adapts them as part of his own personality in order to function in his given culture.2

The concept of socialisation Socialisation is a widely recognised sociological concept which is of interest and concern in most of the social sciences, including political science.3 However, it is also a problematic concept to isolate empirically, for three reasons. First, it deals with how one generation in

1

W. S. Gilbert and Arthur Sullivan, Iolanthe, Act II. K. A. Schneewind, ‘Socialisation and Education: Theoretical Perspectives’ in Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (editors-in-chief), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2001, Vol. 21, p. 14507. 3 See L. Steinberg, ‘Socialisation in Adolescence’, Vol. 21, pp. 14512–16; R. D. Parke and R. Buriel, ‘Socialisation in Infancy’, Vol. 21, pp. 14516–22; M. Kent Jennings, ‘Socialisation: Political’, Vol. 21, pp. 14522–5; V. Gecas, ‘Socialisation, Sociology of’, Vol. 21, pp. 14525–30 all in International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences. See also T. Parsons and R. F. Bales, Family Socialisation and Interaction Process, Free Press, New York, 1955; Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Action, Free Press, Glencoe, 1957; M. Rosenberg, Conceiving the Self, Basic Books, New York, 1979; and S. Stryker, Symbolic Interaction: A Social Structural Version, Benjamin/Cummings, Menlo Park, CA, 1980. 2

28

Legislative Socialisation: Surveying the Landscape 29

a given culture or society transmits its ideas and values to the next generation, which can be seen as essentially a conservative process, militating against change. But cultures and societies do change: some change slowly over a period, often a long period, of time, others suddenly and rapidly; and in either case it can be argued that the forces of change are stronger than those of socialisation. Secondly, although there is broad agreement on the agents of socialisation – the family, the education system, peer groups, the workplace and so on – their relative importance and the processes by which they operate remain matters of dispute. This is partly because more attention has been paid to childhood socialisation than to adolescent or adult socialisation. The third reason for the problematic nature of socialisation is that it is not clear to what extent it is an overt rather than covert process. The difficulty here is very much an empirical one: distinguishing the deliberate inculcation of values and attitudes from their incidental inculcation or acquisition is by no means straightforward. Parents, for example, may instruct their children on how they wish them to behave in various situations, but the values underlying such behaviour may or may not be learned and, if they are, may be learned incidentally. In totalitarian societies such as the former Soviet Union and Nazi Germany the overt and deliberate inculcation of the values and attitudes favoured by the regime occurred through the education system and youth organisations. This is still the case in societies such as the People’s Republic of China and North Korea. Although such regimes are exceptional, it is nevertheless true that all education systems reflect to some degree the values of the society concerned. In some cases this is overt and conscious, explicitly using the education system and youth movements; in other cases it is implicit, even covert – a matter of learning in the sense of acquiring and developing (‘picking up’) rather than being directly taught. The researcher’s task is therefore to explore which factors (events, activities, processes, experiences) contribute to the acquiring of attitudes and values, how this acquisition occurs, and with what consequences. But, first, we have to clarify the concept of socialisation itself; to what does it refer?

A model of socialisation Analytically socialisation can be reduced to a series of questions. What is ‘learned’? When is it ‘learned’? How is it ‘learned’? And, crucially, what is the relationship between socialisation and behaviour? By answering these questions it is possible to develop a general socialisation

30


model, which in turn can be adapted into models applicable to political socialisation and legislative socialisation. In this chapter we seek to develop a model of legislative socialisation.4 To develop such a model we start by examining socialisation in general by taking each of the questions in turn. First, what is ‘learned’? The short answer is knowledge, values and attitudes about society and its environment. For our purposes: . . . knowledge is defined basically, though not exclusively, as factual information about society, individuals and groups of individuals, and about the world beyond . . . It may not always be factual information because individuals may be misinformed but treat such information as though it were true. Values are defined as basic beliefs about the nature of society, about individuals and groups of individuals, and about the world beyond. They may be moral, religious, social or political beliefs, for example, simple or complex, well-founded or less well-founded, positive or negative, but to varying degrees will underpin and inform individuals’ attitudes or opinions on specific matters, individuals, issues and events. Similarly, an individual’s knowledge will underpin and inform both values and attitudes, but more importantly in that knowledge, rather than preceding the formation of a particular value or attitude, may be used to support it after its formation.5 Secondly, when does this ‘learning’ occur? Although most of the attention in socialisation research has focused on childhood and, to a lesser extent, adolescence, socialisation can continue into adulthood; indeed it is a lifelong process. This is most obvious in the way in which the knowledge, values and attitudes acquired through earlier socialisation processes are reinforced by experience. However, it is also possible that experience may form the basis of a process of re-socialisation, by contradicting or undermining previously acquired knowledge, values and attitudes. More importantly for our purposes socialisation is likely to play a part in enabling individuals to adapt to new situations – a new job, a different location, a change of circumstances, even a different society – and is therefore of particular relevance to becoming a member of a legislature.

4 For a discussion of political socialisation see Michael Rush, Politics and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology, Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1992, Chapter 5. 5 Ibid., p. 90. Emphasis added.


Thirdly, how does this ‘learning’ occur? As a general phenomenon socialisation operates through a number of agents – family, school, peer groups, work groups, religious and other social groups, and the media, sometimes openly and overtly, at other times subconsciously and covertly. Various mechanisms exist: instruction (formal and informal learning of appropriate behaviour); imitation (copying consciously or otherwise the behaviour of others) and motivation (learning from experience the rewards and penalties associated with particular forms of behaviour). Such an analysis immediately raises the question of the nature of the relationship between socialisation and behaviour. The first point to be made here is to stress that, however important socialisation may be in the acquisition of knowledge, values and attitudes, it is not a simple deterministic process. If it were, societies would never change their fundamental values and any new attitudes developed by individuals would simply reflect their unchanging values. The reality is, however, that societies and individuals do change their values and attitudes, both in the light of experience, and also according to their personalities. While we do not have the expertise to determine the significance of personality in influencing an individual’s behaviour, we nonetheless acknowledge its significance and therefore have built it into our model. We argued earlier that socialisation is the process by which a society transmits its ideas and values from one generation to the next – how it transmits its culture. We are not assuming in that argument that societies necessarily have a single culture. Indeed, it is important to acknowledge the possibility, even the likelihood, that there may be more than one culture in any given society, and that even where a society is characterised by a dominant culture, there are also likely to exist a number of subcultures. Indeed, some of those subcultures may conflict with the dominant culture or with other subcultures in whole or part. The concept of subcultures is particularly important in considering political socialisation, since it is likely to reflect different conceptions of how a given society should develop. There is a substantial body of literature on what is termed ‘political culture’ – the ideas, values and attitudes that underpin a particular political system.6 Political culture is no

6 See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1963; Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1965; and William L. Miller, Annis May Timpson and Michael Lesnoff, Political Culture in Contemporary Britain: People and Politicians, Principles and Practice, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996.

32


less important in considering legislative socialisation, not least because among the important agents of legislative socialisation are political parties, which often reflect distinct legislative subcultures. Legislative socialisation We shape our dwellings, and afterwards our dwellings shape us. (Winston Churchill on the rebuilding of the House Commons, 1943)7 Churchill, speaking in a debate on the rebuilding of the House of Commons following its destruction in an air raid in 1941, was arguing for retaining its size and shape as a means of retaining its intimate – and often confrontational – atmosphere and traditions. What difference changing the shape of the Chamber might have made is, of course, highly debatable: would a hemisphere, providing sufficient seating, even individual desks, for all its members as in the European Parliament, make the clash between government and opposition less physically confrontational and thus fundamentally alter the way in which the House operated and, more widely, the nature of British politics? Although the layout of the Canadian House of Commons replicates the physical confrontation of government vs opposition, the fact that MPs have individual desks in no way lessens that confrontation. On the other hand, in 1999 the newly established Scottish Parliament opted for a hemispherical Chamber, but here too the party clash remains fierce. Thus, even a newly established legislative body can adopt a mode of operation and a concomitant set of procedures and practices reflecting pre-existing values and attitudes, to which its members will be expected to conform. Conforming to pre-existing values and attitudes is likely to be, to a considerable degree, a consequence of legislative socialisation. Nonetheless, Churchill’s point is an important one: all legislative bodies develop modes of operation reflected in procedures and practices peculiar to some extent to the institution concerned. These normally develop and change over time in response to changing values and attitudes, needs and demands, so that new members, whether elected or appointed, are faced with and generally expected to conform to an existing mode of operation. Furthermore, not only are modes of

7

HC Debs., 393, 28 October 1943, c. 403.


operation and norms likely to vary between legislatures, they can also vary significantly between Chambers in the same legislature. An illustration of that point can be found in the United States Congress. A number of older studies of Congress drew attention to differences between the Senate and the House of Representatives. The first rule of Senate behaviour . . . is that new members are expected to serve a proper apprenticeship . . . the new Senator is expected to keep his mouth shut, not take a lead in floor fights, to listen and to learn.8 When one enters the House of Representatives . . . the sound attitude is not simply to put the best foot forward, but to stamp it for emphasis . . . But when one enters the Senate one comes to a different place altogether. The long custom impels [the new Senator], if he is at all wise, to walk with a soft foot and speak with a soft voice and infrequently.9 In the House [of Representatives] the new member felt lost in the crowd. By the time he had gained familiarity with its role, he must be worrying about re-election. In the Senate, on the other hand, the new member felt himself an individual, with far wider scope for making his own opinion count by speech and vote . . . The representative finds himself one of 435 Congressmen, the majority of whom may be as inexperienced as is he . . . The Senator . . . enters a continuing body, two-thirds of whose members normally have been colleagues for at least two years.10 There are exceptions, but they tend to support the general rule. William White cites the cases of Hubert Humphrey and Lyndon Johnson. Humphrey came to prominence as a radical mayor of Minneapolis and established himself as a champion of civil liberties at the Democratic National Convention in 1948 immediately before his election to the Senate. He was an extremely active Senator from the start.11

8 Donald R. Matthews, US Senators and Their World, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 1960, p. 93. 9 William S. White, Citadel: The Story of the United States Senate, Harper, New York, 1956, p. 82. 10 George H. Haynes, The Senate of the United States: Its History and Practice, Russell and Russell, New York, 1938, pp. 1017–18. 11 White, op. cit., p. 113.

34


Johnson’s rise to prominence in the Senate was even more spectacular, as his biographer, Robert Caro, relates: After . . . two years in the Senate Lyndon Johnson was Assistant Leader of his party. In another two years, while he was still in his first term, he became his party’s leader, the Democratic Leader of the Senate . . . when, two years later, the Democrats became the majority, he became Majority Leader, the most powerful man in the Senate after just a single term.12 However, Johnson was exceptional but not entirely the exception: after initially trying to force his way into prominence, as he had successfully done when he first became a member of the House of Representatives, he adopted a deferential attitude towards other Senators. Caro quotes one senatorial assistant as saying, ‘He took his time to ingratiate himself with Senators. Once he got settled down, he saw that [it was necessary]. He saw he needed to take his time.’13 Johnson spent long hours in the Senate Chamber observing other senators, who talked to whom and who deferred to whom. Caro sums up Johnson’s early behaviour in the Senate by remarking that, unlike the House of Representatives, ‘ . . . in the Senate, he saw at once, waiting – patience – was necessary. So there would be patience’.14 The distinction drawn between United States Congressmen and Senators is understandable. Arguably a similar distinction can be seen in the United Kingdom between the House of Commons and the House of Lords. As we shall show in Chapter 4, members of the Commons quickly ‘get into the action’, whereas, as a close observer of the Lords has noted, ‘New peers were expected to wait until they understood the Chamber before claiming its attention.’15 In any case, although the House of Lords experiences an influx of new members from time to time, the numbers involved are small and not comparable to the turnover experienced by the House of Commons.16 For the purposes of comparison, therefore, it is the US House of Representatives and other similar elected bodies that

12

Robert Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Vol. 3 – Master of the Senate, Pimlico, London, 2003, p. xxii. 13 Ibid., p. 149. 14 Ibid., p. 153. 15 Emma Crewe, Lords of Parliament: Manners, Rituals and Politics, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2005, p. 8. 16 This remained the case after 1997, when Tony Blair, as Prime Minister, recommended the creation of a substantial number of life peers, largely in order to


are more likely to be useful comparators with the House of Commons in exploring legislative socialisation. While legislative socialisation is subject to the same problems and limitations as socialisation generally, legislatures offer a number of advantages in the study of socialisation: they have a more or less finite membership over a particular period, operating within more or less clearly defined rules and norms in an institutional setting. Moreover, legislative socialisation is potentially important in its own right. Because legislatures have rules and norms, newly elected legislators need to become aware of them in order to carry out their role and function effectively. The extent to which they accept the values underpinning the rules and norms has to be explored, as does the extent to which they adapt their behaviour to those rules and norms. Developing a model of legislative socialisation The literature on legislative socialisation is interesting but limited in both volume and the range of legislatures it covers. What follows now is a summary of this literature to provide a comparative perspective and, more importantly, to help us develop a model of legislative socialisation applicable to the UK House of Commons. In developing our model, we have changed the order of the questions discussed earlier to fit in more easily with the temporal aspects of legislative socialisation. We therefore examine, first, when socialisation takes place; secondly, how it takes place – who the agents of socialisation are – thirdly, what is learned; and, finally, what the relationship is between legislative socialisation and legislative behaviour.

When does legislative socialisation take place? An early political socialisation study by Heinz Eulau focused on the stage at which members of four state legislatures in the United States felt they had been socialised into political values and attitudes. Unlike other studies of political socialisation, which had placed great emphasis on childhood and adolescent socialisation, Eulau found that nearly half his respondents (48 per cent) claimed that adulthood rather than

achieve parity between the Conservative and Labour Parties in the upper house. Between 1997 and leaving office in 2006, Blair was responsible for the creation of 366 life peers (excluding Law Lords under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876), 163 of whom were Labour – an average of 41 per year (see Donald Shell, The House of Lords, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2007, Table 3.2).

36


childhood (37 per cent) or adolescence (15 per cent) was the most important stage.17 Eulau’s research was replicated by Allan Kornberg and Norman Thomas in relation to Canadian MPs, with similar findings – adulthood 41 per cent, childhood 13 per cent and adolescence 46 per cent.18 Work in this area was taken a stage further by Kenneth Prewitt and his colleagues, whose study included not only 400 state legislators in the United States but also more than a hundred local councillors. This research found ‘a consistent lack of relationship between initial socialisation into politics and incumbent orientation’, that is towards legislative or council roles once elected. They went on to suggest that ‘ . . . intervening between initial socialisation and incumbent behaviour are political experiences that condition subsequent behaviour irrespective of factors associated with initial socialisation. . . . such experience was closer in time and in kind to those of the incumbent office-holder’.19 The political experiences, they suggested, would involve the constituents they sought to represent, parties and interest groups. Charles Bell and Charles Price applied the Prewitt hypothesis in a panel study of members of the California Assembly first elected in 1966 and found ‘that life experience prior to legislative service is one of the major factors in the determination of a legislator’s representative role orientations’,20 but ‘that it is pre-legislative political experience which is most significant’.21 That distinction between pre-election and post-election socialisation is of particular interest, since it raises the possibility that newly elected legislators have, prior to their election, already undergone elements of political socialisation directly relevant to the legislative roles they are about to assume. Richard Price and his colleagues explored this aspect of legislative socialisation in respect of MPs first elected to the Canadian House of Commons in 1974. They found that a ‘considerable amount of

17 Heinz Eulau, ‘Recollections’ in John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchan and LeRoy C. Ferguson (eds), The Legislative System: Explanations in Legislative Behaviour, Wiley, New York, 1962, p. 81, Table 4.2. 18 Allan Kornberg and Norman Thomas, ‘The political socialisation of national legislative elites in the United States and Canada’, Journal of Politics, 27, 1965, p. 765. 19 Kenneth Prewitt, Heinz Eulau and Betty H. Zisk, ‘Political socialisation and political roles’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 30, 1966, p. 582 (original italics). 20 Charles G. Bell and Charles M. Price, ‘Pre-legislative sources of representational roles’, Midwest Journal of Political Science, 13, 1969, p. 268. 21 Ibid., p. 269.


political learning does occur’ before MPs are elected,22 with 38.3 per cent claiming to know ‘a few things’ and 46.8 per cent ‘a great deal’ about the job of an MP. On the other hand, when asked in an open-ended question to name basic features of the job, respondents appeared on less sure ground, in that 46.8 per cent named two features and only 8.5 per cent named three.23 The aspect of the job most frequently mentioned was, hardly surprisingly, constituency work. ‘Freshmen MPs’, Price and his colleagues observed, ‘are not political neophytes . . . A substantial proportion [had] been active in party politics (78.7 per cent) or had actually held local or provincial public elective office (21.3 per cent) prior to their nomination.’24 In sum, the answer to the question ‘When does legislative socialisation take place?’ is that for many, possibly most, legislators, important aspects of it occur before they are elected. For most, general political socialisation occurs in adulthood rather than earlier, and for some, aspects of specifically legislative socialisation occur prior to election: newly elected legislators arrive with expectations of what their role is to be and how they should go about it.

How does legislative socialisation take place? In their research on the Canadian MPs, Price and his colleagues sought to identify who was involved in both pre- and post-election socialisation. The agents of socialisation mentioned most frequently were the mass media, political office-holders, political parties, colleges or universities, community and professional organisations, and family. Among these the most important were political office-holders and political parties. In Canada, in contrast to the United Kingdom, there is a significant gap between a general election and the first meeting of the new

22 Richard G. Price, Harold D. Clarke and Robert M. Krause, ‘The Socialisation of Freshmen Legislators: The Canadian Case’ in Jon H. Pammett and Richard S. Whittington (eds), Foundations of Political Culture: Political Socialisation in Canada, Macmillan, Toronto, 1976, p. 213. 23 Ibid., p. 214. These levels of knowledge were almost identical to those found in an earlier study by the same authors of members of provincial legislatures in Canada (Harold D. Clarke, Richard G. Price and Robert M. Krause, ‘Timing and agents of Legislative Role Socialisation: the case of Canadian Provincial Legislators’, unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of Windsor, 1975, cited in Price, Clarke and Krause, op. cit., p. 213). 24 Ibid., p. 214.

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Parliament; in 1974 it was two-and-a-half months. New MPs therefore have an opportunity to change their conception of the role of the MP in this period and as many as 71.1 per cent did so, though 60 per cent only ‘somewhat’. Of particular interest was that, apart from less familiar activities (such as aspects of the legislative process), it was their view of their constituency role that changed most and the partisan role least.25 The agents of post-election change were the party caucus, other MPs, constituents, civil servants, former MPs and party activists, of which the most important were the caucus, constituents and other MPs. Price and colleagues concluded that the most important pre-election influences came via political parties in that ‘ . . . ideological differences between MPs . . . may reflect specific differences in pre-nomination conceptions of the job of a Member of Parliament . . . ’ and that ‘ . . . the content of post-incumbency role socialisation will vary not only from one legislature to the next, but between parties in a single legislature’.26 Similarly, Allan Kornberg, in an earlier article, also points to differences between parties, drawing attention to the much higher levels of party cohesion in parliamentary systems by comparing the Canadian Parliament with the United States Congress. Among Canadian MPs he found ‘ . . . the perceptions of functions performed by their caucus varied strongly with the respondents’ left-right party affiliation’.27 Parties are thus seen, unsurprisingly, as the most important agents of pre-election socialisation: after all, for all but a few would-be legislators, party is the context of and vehicle for their ambition to win membership of the legislature. Although parties emerged as the most important pre-election influences and continue to play a crucial post-election role, the legislative authorities also play a prominent part, so it is helpful that Price and Bell also looked at post-election socialisation. A formal induction programme organised by Assembly officials in California was available to newly elected members and a number had also attended sessions arranged by party officials.28 At the time of their research – 1966–67 – 44

25

Ibid., p. 217. Ibid., p. 235. 27 Allan Kornberg, ‘Caucus and cohesion in Canadian political parties’, American Political Science Review, 60, 1966, p. 92. 28 Charles M. Price and Charles G. Bell, ‘Socialising California freshmen Assemblymen: The role of individuals and legislative sub-groups’, Western Political Quarterly, 23, 1970, pp. 168–9. 26


of the 50 state legislatures in the United States had some type of formal induction programme,29 so these were clearly the norm. However, Price and Bell argued that, in addition to such programmes, informal socialisation was important. They found that this came from two sources: individuals and legislative sub-groups. Individuals involved included the Speaker of the Assembly and his staff and other Assembly members, especially those who shared ‘paired’ desks in the legislative Chamber. Legislative sub-groups included committees, regional voting blocs, ‘the class of ’67’, dining groups, study and educational groups, and the party caucuses. They found, however, that Democrats were more group oriented than Republicans, stressing not only the importance of party but also a difference between the parties. It is only to be expected that parties will continue to play a major part in post-election socialisation, especially in reinforcing the values and attitudes of the newly elected, but also in shaping their views about their role as a member of the legislature. However, the literature on post-election socialisation has so far focused mainly on the role of the legislative authorities and the learning of legislative rules and norms of behaviour. Formal induction processes are, of course, the most obvious example of socialisation by instruction, but it is highly likely that both imitation (observing and following the advice and example of longerserving members of the legislature) and motivation (seeking to develop effectiveness as a legislator and to fulfil legislative and political ambitions) are also crucial socialisation mechanisms. However, the literature on legislative socialisation has largely neglected them, and we hope that our study will go some way to remedying that omission.

What is learned through legislative socialisation? The importance of imitation and motivation is well-illustrated by what is learned through the socialisation process. Not surprisingly, the most common finding is that, simply to function at the most elemental level, newly elected legislators need to learn the basic legislative rules and norms. For example, the study of state legislatures in the United States by John Wahlke and his colleagues, published in 1962, found that ‘legislative rules of the game’ were crucial and that ‘ . . . some knowledge of the rules of the game is so basic to individual operation in the legislature that every member readily acquires sufficient familiarity to feel in

29

National Council of State Legislatures, American State Legislatures: Their Structures and Procedures, Chicago, 1967, p. 17, cited by Price and Bell.

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command of them’.30 In this context it is important to note that ‘rules of the game’ means ‘widely shared beliefs about how the government, or various categories of political actors, ought to behave’ and are therefore ‘essentially normative . . . [and is] . . . rarely used to refer to formal or written rules . . . but usually refers to informal and unwritten rules, attitudes, and expectations’.31 Similarly, Charles Price and Charles Bell asked newly elected members of the California Assembly to suggest ‘rules of the game’ they thought appropriate to their role as Assembly members, initially before and then after their election. At pre-election interviews most suggestions concerned interpersonal relationships, such as ‘treat all with courtesy and respect’ and ‘don’t personally attack other members’, rather than ‘inhouse’ norms, such as ‘relying on legislative leaders’ and party loyalty. However, a ‘whole host of “in-house” norms were cited after legislative experience had been acquired. Rules pertaining to committee decorum and management of bills were frequently cited in the second and third interviews; they were not often cited in the first interviews.’32 This led Price and Bell to conclude, ‘What the freshman knew of the rules before his legislative career appears not to be very important. What he learned during his first term appears very important.’ A panel study of the US House of Representatives by Herbert Asher, conducted at about the same time, provides a useful comparison.33 It consisted of Congressmen first elected in 1968, interviewed initially in late January 1969, when the new Congress convened, and then for a second time in February, and compared their responses with a group of longer-serving Congressmen. Rather than asking his interviewees to suggest their own norms, Asher put to them a series of norms drawing on earlier work, such as that of Wahlke and his colleagues. These included that friendly relations with other Congressmen were important, that the House rules were important, that important work of the House was done in committees and that ‘freshmen should serve an apprenticeship’ – some nine in all. More importantly, Asher focused almost entirely on interpersonal relationships, leaving the legislative

30

Wahlke et al. (eds), op. cit., p. 167. Donald R. Matthews, ‘The Rules of the Game’ in Smelser and Baltes, op. cit., Vol. 21, p. 571 (original italics). 32 Charles M. Price and Charles G. Bell, ‘The rules of the game: political fact or academic fancy?’, Journal of Politics, 32, 1970, p. 855. 33 Herbert B. Asher, ‘The learning of legislative norms’, American Political Science Review, 67, 1973, pp. 499–513. 31


and party norms addressed by Price and Bell unexplored. The findings led Asher to a different and arguably surprising conclusion, ‘that freshmen largely know the House norms prior to entering Congress . . . simply because they are rules of behaviour appropriate to many institutional settings’.34 This may well be the case as far as interpersonal relations are concerned, but other evidence suggests that it does not extend to even a basic knowledge of legislative rules and norms of behaviour. It is difficult to disagree with most of Asher’s suggested norms, given his finding of widespread agreement among the newly elected and the longer-serving.35 The only exception was serving an apprenticeship, which was supported by 57 per cent of freshmen but only 38 per cent of non-freshmen.36 Lest it be thought that, among newly elected Congressmen, attitudes towards an apprenticeship stemmed from having previously served or not in a state legislature; this proved not to be the case and Asher does not suggest that experience at state level has any relevance to the attitudes of his interviewees towards legislative norms. Unfortunately, Asher did not seek to elicit views on the role of members of Congress, either suggested or self-generated, which would have provided other norms to test. His focus was firmly on interpersonal relationships between individuals, rather than norms specific to the role of Congressmen as members of a legislature, as he implicitly acknowledges: ‘personal criticism and unfriendly relationships may be dysfunctional to one’s own institution or group or one’s own career . . . [And] . . . that almost any type of prior experience would make freshmen sensitive to the basic rules of behaviour.’37 Significantly, Asher’s study did not take account of James David Barber’s finding a few years earlier, in a detailed study of the Connecticut legislature, that initially for newly elected members ‘ . . . information about the legislature and its work is almost entirely second-hand . . . ’38 As Barber points out, this places the newly elected at a distinct disadvantage compared with their longer-serving colleagues: the ‘legislative process is essentially . . . organised and scheduled as to enable the institution

34

Ibid., p. 512. Ibid., p. 503, Table 2. 36 There was, however, a difference between Republicans and Democrats, with the former much more likely to agree that an apprenticeship was necessary (ibid., p. 509, Table 8). 37 Ibid., p. 512. 38 James David Barber, The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1965, p. 246. 35

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to do its work effectively; it is not directly functional for the needs of the individual member . . . ’39 In a more recent study, Mark Shephard suggests that socialisation concerns learning institutional rules and practice rather than attitudes and behaviour towards policy. Using proposals for term limits for members of the House of Representatives, he argues that attitudes and behaviour towards these are driven mainly by the views of members of Congress on their careers. He examines legislative proposals arising out of the Republican ‘Contract with America’ in the mid-1990s and points out that all were passed except that on term limits. He concludes ‘that socialisation in itself is not about de-radicalisation in orientations towards public policy. It is only about de-radicalisation when the institutional rules of the game are challenged.’40 Learning how to operate as a member of a legislature is addressed more broadly by David Docherty in his study of the Canadian House of Commons, Mr Smith Goes to Ottawa: Life in the House of Commons,41 which is by far the most comprehensive study of legislative socialisation to date. He concludes: ‘An overwhelming socialisation process occurs for new Members, one that encourages them to pursue career satisfaction in a direction that does not threaten the existing hierarchy.’42 His study is based on a series of extensive questionnaires administered to newly elected MPs, supplemented by interviews. In particular, he stresses the importance of party as a socialisation factor. He argues that by taking advice and direction from ‘veterans’ or longer-serving MPs: . . . new MPs soon come to alter or modify their expectations and professional roles. How these Members view their role as a representative comes to mirror the norm of their caucus colleagues. These socialising influences are aided and abetted by the adversarial nature of the Commons itself. The very structure . . . reinforces the need for party solidarity and encourages Members to think of themselves not as lone entrepreneurs but as members of a part that performs best when cohesive.43

39

Ibid., p. 247. Mark P. Shephard, ‘Term limits: evidence of careerism and socialisation’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 2, 199, p. 262. 41 University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 1997. 42 Docherty, op. cit., p. 262. 43 Ibid., p. 25. 40


Docherty also found that attitudes varied according to whether the party was in government or opposition.44 Keith Jackson paints a similar picture of New Zealand MPs: MPs are socialised into the practice of parliamentary parties informally. The legally structured nature of parliamentary proceedings, with its emphasis on competing teams, the frequent meetings of caucus and the constant emphasis on the contributions of MPs to the overall good of the party, means that, with or without formal rules, this is a highly-disciplined existence . . . Once MPs accept the framework within which they work, they are less conscious of formal discipline.45 In sum, on what is learned through legislative socialisation, the literature suggests that it is mostly the rules and practices of the specific institution to which members have been elected and the expectations laid on them by their parties.

The relationship between legislative socialisation and legislative behaviour It seems self-evident that legislative socialisation would have a direct and significant impact on the behaviour of legislators. Indeed, we ask in our subtitle whether legislative socialisation is a matter of ‘determining behaviour’. Yet relatively little attention has been paid to this aspect of the topic: such studies that have been made are limited to particular aspects of behaviour or simply take legislative socialisation for granted. Whereas some studies have focused on the de-radicalisation of newly elected legislators’ views on policy, to which we will return,46 we focus next on research on aspects of legislative behaviour, in particular legislative dissent47 and political corruption and ethics. Legislative dissent, of course, is highly relevant to legislative socialisation because of the stress

44

Ibid. Keith Jackson, The Dilemma of Parliament, Allen and Unwin, Wellington, 1987, p. 55. 46 See Chapter 3, pp. 49–50 below. 47 For the UK House of Commons see Philip Norton, Dissension in the House of Commons, 1945–74, Macmillan, London, 1975; Conservative Dissidents: Dissidence within the Parliamentary Conservative Party, 1970–74, Temple Smith, London, 1978; Dissidence in the House of Commons, 1974–79, Martin Robertson, London, 45

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parties place on party cohesion. Party managers are therefore potentially key agents of socialisation. Their prime objective is to maximise party cohesion, and party whips therefore quickly seek to instil into the newly elected the importance of supporting the party. Nevertheless, the literature concentrates on levels of dissent and takes socialisation for granted. The literature on corruption and ethics, on the other hand, pays rather more attention to socialisation and it is therefore to the learning of appropriate ethical behaviour that we now turn. Ethics are particularly important because unethical or corrupt behaviour can undermine the functional effectiveness of members of the legislature to the point of undermining the legislature as an institution. The main focus of most of the published work in this area has been ‘political corruption’, for which socialisation tends to be seen as a possible explanation rather than the main focus. An immediate problem is the lack of an agreed definition of the term ‘corruption’, more particularly a lack of agreement as to what actions are regarded as corrupt and what are not. For our purposes, corruption may be defined as ‘the misuse of authority . . . [for] . . . personal gain, which need not be monetary’.48 In the same collection of readings from which this definition is taken, Arnold Heidenheimer suggests that there are levels of corruption: • ‘black’, which attracts almost universal condemnation • ‘white’, upon which opinion is divided between the public and political elites • ‘grey’, which occupies the areas between the two. Heidenheimer argues that attitudes may vary between cultures and over time and that political elites are more tolerant of corruption than the public generally.49 The latter point is of particular interest in the study of legislative socialisation, since it raises the question of whether the

1981; and ‘Behavioural Changes’ in Norton (ed.), Parliament in the 1980s, Blackwell, Oxford, 1985. For the period since 1997 see Philip Cowley, Revolts and Rebellions: Parliamentary Voting Under Blair, Politico’s, London, 2002 and The Rebels: How Blair Mislaid His Majority, Politico’s, London, 2005. 48 David H. Bayley, ‘The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation’ in Arnold J. Heidenheimer (ed.), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, NJ, 1970, p. 522. On political corruption generally see also Robert Neild, Public Corruption: the Dark Side of Social Evolution, Antler Books, London, 2002. 49 Heidenheimer, op. cit., pp. 18–28.


ethical attitudes of legislators are the result of pre- or post-election socialisation or some combination of the two. This pre-election, post-election dichotomy has been the focus of much of the research done on the attitudes of legislators towards corruption. For example, in the late 1970s Susan Welch and John Peters surveyed more than 400 state senators in the United States on their attitudes towards a series of hypothetical corrupt scenarios, a methodology common to a number of subsequent studies in both the United States and other countries, including the United Kingdom. Following Heidenheimer, Welch and Peters posited what might be regarded as ‘black’, ‘grey’ and ‘white’ scenarios to their respondents. In addition to eliciting the senators’ personal reactions, they also asked them what they thought would be the reaction of public officials and the public in general. The mean score for senators themselves was 69.7 per cent; their estimate of the assessment of public officials was 62.7 per cent; and their estimate of the public’s assessment was 79.4 per cent. These estimates reflected the senators’ perception of near unanimity on ‘black’ scenarios to widespread disagreement on ‘grey’ and ‘white’ scenarios, particularly between legislators, on the one hand, and the public, on the other.50 From these and other findings Welch and Peters concluded that, ‘ . . . there are differences among legislators in their tolerance of corrupt acts. Some of these differences are attributable to . . . environmental, personal and attitudinal factors . . . However, clear-cut cleavages across these categories have not emerged, suggesting that an intra-legislative socialisation process may be at work.’51 Adapting the Welch and Peters scenarios, Michael Jackson and Rodney Smith surveyed parliamentarians in New South Wales in 1990, exploring the relationship between parliamentarians’ own views and what they thought were the attitudes of public officials and the public. This research produced results similar to Welch and Peters’ findings: legislators themselves rating an average of 73.5 per cent of the scenarios corrupt and estimating that whereas the public’s rating would average 82.9 per cent, public officials would fall in between at 75.3 per cent.52

50 Susan Welch and John G. Peters, ‘Attitudes of US state legislators towards political corruption: some preliminary findings’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2, 1977, pp. 445–67. 51 Ibid., p. 461. 52 Michael Jackson and Rodney Smith, ‘Everybody’s doing it! Codes of ethics and NSW parliamentarians’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 54, 1995, pp. 483–94.

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Although attributing views to others may not reflect the reality, other scholars have combined surveys of legislators and of public opinion to establish whether there is a genuine difference in attitudes towards corruption between the two. Two pieces of research conducted in 1996, one in Australia and one in Canada, confirmed that a significant gap does indeed exist. For Australia, Ian McAllister used a series of statements on ethical behaviour, which he divided into ‘black’, ‘grey’ and ‘white’ categories for analytical purposes, to test the attitudes of federal MPs and members of the public. The mean score for MPs was 48 per cent and for the public 66 per cent believing such behaviour to be ‘extremely important’. McAllister concluded that ‘although elite social background is significant, there are more substantial influences attributable to elite and party socialisation’.53 In the Canadian case, Michael Atkinson and Gerald Bierling, drawing on a survey of 208 federal and provincial legislators and a national survey, found significant differences on what might be thought of as ‘corrupt’ between politicians and the public on 12 of the 15 hypothetical scenarios. The other three scenarios were actually regarded as more corrupt by the politicians than by the public, leading the authors to surmise that the public were less aware of the rules.54 Atkinson and Bierling used the apt phrase ‘worlds apart’ to describe the attitudinal gap between politicians and the public. They adopted it from an article about the Poulson scandal that rocked British political life in the 1970s, in which Steven Chibnall and Peter Saunders argued that the actions of individuals are perceived differently by different sections of society.55 Architect John Poulson was convicted of corruption involving local councillors and a senior civil servant, and also implicating a number of MPs. In this case it was clear that the distinction between ‘normal practice’ and ‘corruption’ was very much in the mind of the beholder. Atkinson and Bierling suggested that the ‘worlds apart’ model ‘ . . . posits a fundamental difference of opinion between politicians and the public on how government works and how politics ought to be conducted . . . Politicians see the public as naive about the requirements of politics . . . ’56

53 Ian McAllister, ‘Keeping them honest: public and elite perceptions of ethical conduct among Australian legislators’, Political Studies, 48, 2000, p. 33. 54 Michael Atkinson and Gerald Bierling, ‘Politicians and political ethics: worlds apart’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 38, 2005, pp. 1003–28. 55 Steven Chibnall and Peter Saunders, ‘Worlds apart: notes on the social reality of corruption’, British Journal of Sociology, 28, 1977, pp. 138–54. 56 Atkinson and Bierling, op. cit. p. 1010.


This gap between politicians and the public extends further, as is illustrated by the research into their respective levels of tolerance on much wider issues. For instance, in a study based on surveys of MPs and the general public carried out in 1985 and 1986 respectively, David Barnum and John Sullivan found that MPs were much more tolerant towards political groupings on the extreme left and right of the political spectrum than the general public. In being prepared to allow members of such groups to engage in various activities, including teaching in schools, running for political office and holding public meetings, the mean tolerance score for MPs was 63 per cent, compared with 35 per cent for the public.57 In a later article comparing these results with studies in Israel, New Zealand and the United States Sullivan and colleagues attributed this gap to adult socialisation, a process likely in their view to be particularly applicable to members of legislatures.58 This broader view of the attitudinal gap between politicians and the public suggests that any examination of the ethical behaviour of legislators should reach more widely than ‘corruption’. Thus, Alan Doig, who has written extensively about the ethical behaviour of politicians, especially MPs and public officials in Britain, draws a distinction between ‘corruption’ and ‘misconduct’, which he defines as ‘conduct which falls short of that expected of people in public positions’.59 Most organisations (and legislatures are no exception) have norms of ethical behaviour, that is behaviour regarded by its members as morally appropriate to their role.60 Among the most important are those relating to conflicts of interest: most legislatures have long-standing rules restricting the activities of members in matters in which they have a direct pecuniary interest. These restrictions typically affect the right of members to speak, vote or table motions and amendments on such matters. More recently, many legislatures have also adopted registers of interests, in which members must record various financial interests, the receipt of hospitality and gifts, election donations and so on.

57 David G. Barnum and John L. Sullivan, ‘Attitudinal tolerance and political freedom in Britain’, British Journal of Political Science, 19, 1989, pp. 136–46. 58 John L. Sullivan, Pat Walsh, Michael Shamir, David G. Barnum and James L. Gibson, ‘Why politicians are more tolerant: selective recruitment and socialisation among political elites in Britain, Israel, New Zealand and the United States’, British Journal of Political Science, 23, 1993, pp. 51–76. 59 Alan Doig, Corruption and Misconduct in British Politics, Penguin Books, London, 1984, p. 26. See also F. F. Ridley and Alan Doig (eds), Sleaze: Politicians, Private Interests and Public Reaction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995. 60 These are invariably couched in negative terms, i.e. what is regarded as inappropriate rather than appropriate.

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Other rules and practices relate to how members conduct themselves in debates and other proceedings of the legislature – how members should address each other, what is appropriate language and behaviour during debates, and relations with the chair, for instance. Some of these rules and practices are laid down in standing orders; others are found in authoritative texts. The best known of these texts is probably Sir Thomas Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings, and Usage of Parliament, first published in 1844 and now in its 23rd edition.61 In addition to its central importance to the Westminster Parliament, Erskine May’s Treatise is widely acknowledged as an authority in Commonwealth legislatures where their rules are silent. But Erskine May was not the first in the field. He was preceded in 1801 by Thomas Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary Practice for the Use of the Senate of the United States, relevant parts of which were published with the Rules of the Senate until 1977 and still are published with the Rules of the House of Representatives. Much of Jefferson’s Manual would be familiar to present-day UK MPs, not least because Jefferson drew heavily on British parliamentary practice, including matters relating to the conduct of members, such as modes of address and behaviour in debates.62 Mason’s Manual of Legislature Procedure performs a similar function for more than 30 state legislatures in the United States.63 The term ‘legislative ethics’ therefore covers not only potentially corrupt behaviour, but also the conduct of legislators in performing their roles and carrying out their duties generally. As with corrupt behaviour, what is regarded as unethical by one person may not always be regarded as unethical by another. In the area of conflict of interest, for example, some legislatures either forbid their members from having jobs other than as a member of the legislature or limit how much they can earn through outside jobs. Similarly, what is regarded as acceptable behaviour in some legislatures, in areas such as the use of language,

61 Sir William McKay (ed.), Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, Lexis-Nexis, London, 23rd ed., 2004. Erskine May (1815–88) was Clerk of the House of Commons from 1871 to 1886. 62 Jefferson himself cites authoritative texts, such as John Hatsell’s Precedents and Proceedings in the House of Commons, published in 1781. Hatsell was also Clerk of the House (1768–1820). The Canadian equivalent of Erskine May is Beauchesne’s Rules and Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, first published in 1922 – 6th ed., ed. by Alistair Fraser, W. F. Dawson and John Holtby, Carswell Legal Publications, Scarborough, Ontario, 1988. 63 Originally published in 1935 and now published by the National Conference of State Legislatures.


is not acceptable in others: the Australian Parliament, for instance, is well-known for the robust language used by some of its members. In seeking to promote what are considered to be appropriate standards of ethical behaviour legislatures use both formal and informal rules and practices. These are in most cases either enforced by the presiding officer in the legislative chamber or committee, or, if necessary, by disciplinary committees and resolutions by the legislature directed at a particular member. More recently, however, a number of legislatures have adopted codes of conduct or ethics. This is the case, for example, with the German Bundestag, the Japanese Diet, the UK Parliament and the United States Congress.64 How legislators acquire knowledge of the ethical norms of the legislature, and the extent to which they do so, are likely therefore to have a significant effect on how MPs carry out their various roles. Indeed, as we shall see the ethical dimension is arguably more important than learning about procedure and how to cope with the demands of party and constituents.

Legislative socialisation and the UK House of Commons The UK House of Commons has also been the subject of scholarly attention in the field of legislative socialisation. Edward Crowe, in an article on legislative norms and party discipline, agrees on the importance of parties in socialising newly elected MPs, but argues that ‘. . . early learning . . . in the legislature may be less important to norm consensus than pre-entry socialisation’, since the very act of standing for election ‘exposes the candidate to institutional norms . . . [Promoting] . . . knowledge of the norms as well as conformity.’65 Crowe may be correct in terms of party discipline or cohesion, but not necessarily with regard to other norms, particularly those directly affecting the effectiveness or otherwise of being an MP. Other studies of the UK House have focused on the de-radicalisation of MPs, although the emphasis has often been more on policy than

64 For Germany, for example, see http://www.bundestag.de/htdocse/documents/ legal/annex/pdf. and on the United States Congress see House of Representatives, Rule XXIII – Code of Official Conduct at http://www.house.gov and The Senate Code of Official Conduct (Rules 34 through 43 of the Standing Rules of the Senate at http://www.senate.gov). 65 Edward Crowe, ‘Consensus and structure in legislative norms: party discipline in the UK House of Commons’, Journal of Politics, 45, 1983, p. 294.

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institutional de-radicalisation. However, Donald Searing has sought to distinguish between the two. He points out that ‘ . . . since the 1950s . . . many American studies have argued that political leaders are more likely than the public to support procedural rules of the game. And since at least the 1930s, many . . . European commentaries have argued that . . . members of the parliaments become more moderate than their parties’ activists.’66 He compared the views successively of the general public, political activists, candidates, and, finally, MPs. He showed that, whereas political activists and candidates are more radical than the general public, MPs are closer to the latter. While this gives a good historical fit with the Conservative and Labour Parties generally, it fits less well with their more recent history in the late 1970s and 1980s, when Conservative MPs moved to the right ideologically and Labour MPs moved to the left. Searing therefore argues that socialisation should be seen as ‘probabilistic rather than universal’ in its impact, which does ‘not hold at all times, nor for all members of a collectivity at any one time’.67 In short, change can and does occur in spite of socialisation. Although Searing does not seek to explore the socialisation process, another study of socialisation and de-radicalisation among British MPs suggests that length of institutional membership is the crucial factor.68 Anthony Mughan and his colleagues use the House of Commons vote in 1988 on the televising of its proceedings as a case study. As this was held some seven months after the general election of 1987 it was possible to make a comparison between newly elected and longer-serving MPs. Mughan and colleagues found that length of service had no impact on how Conservative MPs voted but that there was a clear difference in the case of Labour: their newly elected MPs were much more substantially (98.3 per cent) in favour compared with longer-serving MPs (79.9 per cent).69 This interesting but obviously limited finding accords with Shephard’s findings regarding Congressmen and matters directly affecting the legislature. It is therefore potentially very relevant to our concern with how the newly elected learn to be MPs, what their views are on their role as an MP and whether their behaviour comes to resemble that of their longer-serving colleagues.

66 Donald D. Searing, ‘A theory of political socialisation: institutional support and deradicalisation in Britain’, British Journal of Political Science, 16, 1986, p. 341. 67 Ibid., pp. 342–3. 68 Anthony Mughan, Janet Box-Steffenemeier and Roger Scully, ‘Mapping legislative socialisation’, European Journal of Political Research, 32, 1997, pp. 93–106. 69 Ibid., p. 96.


As we saw in Chapter 2, in Westminster’s World Donald Searing addresses the question of the role of the Member of Parliament at length. He argues that there are a number of different roles available to MPs, but that it is they who decide which roles they wish to adopt – ‘positional’ or leadership roles (those of minister, junior minister, whip and parliamentary private secretary (PPS)) and ‘preference’ roles (‘policy advocate’, ‘ministerial aspirant’, ‘constituency member’ and ‘parliament man’).70 He goes on to say that: [as] politicians play roles, they modify their existing goals and develop new ones in order to adapt to institutional environments and problem situations. The learning process occurs only slowly in reaction to new experiences and becomes part of their evolving interpretations of their roles. It proceeds through both sociological ‘sublimation’ and economic ‘calculation’.71 Searing’s focus is firmly on roles, not ‘socialisation’ – the term does not even appear in his index. Although one chapter is entitled ‘Ministerial Aspirants: Anticipatory Socialisation’ and he discusses how lower rank ministers and PPSs learn about the ministerial role, socialisation is assumed, not explored. Yet at the very end of his book, while arguing that MPs can and do make role choices, Searing does acknowledge the impact of the House of Commons, stating: The sociological constraints in these institutional contexts can be seen clearly even in the evolution of backbench preference roles. For although individual desires and beliefs shape these roles, the fact is that backbenchers are at the same time adjusting to roles that already exist in an already-existing institutional context . . . Institutional constraints work by setting up situations. They also work by shaping the desires and beliefs of politicians who encounter the roles and pass through the situations.72 Turning now specifically to ethical socialisation in the House of Commons, this has received quite a lot of scholarly attention and not simply as a consequence of the scandal over MPs’ expenses. In a major

70

For further discussion of the roles delineated by Searing see Chapter 2. Donald D. Searing, Westminster’s World: Understanding Political Roles, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994, p. 20. 72 Ibid., p. 402. 71

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book-length study, published in 1995, Maureen Mancuso explored the ethical world of British MPs.73 It is worth noting her research was carried out between 1986 and 1988, before the tide of sleaze that engulfed the Conservative Party in the first half of the 1990s. Using the Welch and Peters study cited earlier, Mancuso put a number of hypothetical scenarios to a hundred MPs, securing a 40 per cent response rate. Of the fourteen scenarios, eight involved MPs, three Cabinet ministers, two local councillors and one a local civil servant, so that respondents were not always expressing a view on situations in which they would be directly involved. The mean score of those regarding the scenarios as corrupt was 56.9 per cent, ranging from 100 per cent to 2 per cent. However, if only those scenarios directly concerning MPs were counted, the mean was 38.8 per cent, ranging from 87 per cent (exchanging a first-class air fare for an economy one and pocketing the difference) to 2 per cent (employing a family member as the MP’s secretary). Overall, Mancuso concluded that ‘MPs did not have much difficulty in recognising and condemning acts involving bribery and the misappropriation of public funds.’74 Twenty years later, in 2005, Nicholas Allen replicated Mancuso’s study.75 Although the response rate was much lower (15 per cent), his survey appears to have been representative and included just over twice as many MPs as Mancuso’s study. However, because of limitations beyond his control, Allen was able to cover only 12 of Mancuso’s 14 scenarios. Thus, discounting the other two, Mancuso’s mean score of those regarding various scenarios as corrupt is reduced from 56.9 per cent to 49.8 per cent, compared with a mean of 64.6 per cent in Allen’s study. Because neither of the discarded scenarios directly involves MPs, Mancuso’s mean for MPs remains at 38.8 per cent, while Allen’s is 55.1 per cent. Not surprisingly Allen concludes, ‘ . . . in 2005 . . . MPs are more intolerant of ethically questionable behaviour than the MPs interviewed by Mancuso’.76 An obvious possible explanation is that the Nolan Report and the changes that followed77 had a direct impact,

73

Maureen Mancuso, The Ethical World of British MPs, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal and Kingston, 1995. 74 Ibid., p. 36. 75 Nicholas Allen, ‘A new ethical world of British MPs’ Journal of Legislative Studies, 14, 2008, pp. 297–314. 76 Ibid., p. 308. 77 Committee on Standards in Public Life, First Report: Standards in Public Life (The Nolan Report), Cm. 2850-I, May 1995. See below, Chapter 5, pp. 116–20 and Chapter 6, pp. 166–7.


but Allen also suggests other, though not necessarily mutually exclusive, explanations – that the massive turnover in the membership of the House of Commons since Mancuso’s 1986–88 research has changed the type of individual elected to Parliament and that ‘MPs are much more conscious of the need for high standards of conduct.’78 Just as Mancuso’s research pre-dated the sleaze of the 1990s, so Allen’s pre-dated the 2009 expenses scandal. Nonetheless, in his 2008 article Allen points out that ‘recent years have witnessed a spate of allegations concerning the misuse of parliamentary facilities, allowances and expenses’.79 In a subsequent paper, co-authored with Sarah Birch, he took his analysis a stage further by comparing the attitudes of MPs towards corruption with those of parliamentary candidates and, more importantly, the public.80 Again using Mancuso’s scenarios, Allen and Birch found that the mean of those regarding various scenarios as corrupt had risen to 68.4 per cent for MPs,81 71.8 per cent for candidates and 79.1 per cent for the public; a gap between MPs and the public of 10.7 per cent. If the scenarios are restricted to those directly involving MPs, reducing the number from nine to five, the percentages are 58.1 for MPs, 61 for candidates and 71.3 for the public; a gap of 13.2 per cent between MPs and the public. These findings are clearly in line with the studies of American, Australian and Canadian legislators noted earlier and with the ‘worlds apart’ model highlighted by Atkinson and Bierling.82 It is also worth recalling that all the legislator–public studies discussed found substantial agreement between legislators and the public on some corrupt scenarios, but differed markedly on others. This phenomenon is also found in Allen and Birch’s work. Furthermore, they also found, as did Atkinson and Bierling, that some scenarios were regarded as corrupt by higher proportions of MPs than members of the public, though not massively so. As Allen and Birch surmised, this might be because MPs were more

78

Allen, op. cit., p. 310. Ibid., p. 312. 80 Nicholas Allen and Sarah Birch, On Either Side of the Moat: Elite and Mass Attitudes Towards Right and Wrong, paper presented to the Political Studies Association Parliamentarians and Legislatures Specialist Group, Annual Conference, The Constitution Unit, UCL, London, 24 June 2009. 81 The different mean score compared with that reported in the earlier article (64.6 per cent) is the result of using nine scenarios rather than Mancuso’s original fourteen. 82 See Chapter 3, pp. 37–9 and 46. 79

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aware than the public of strict rules regarding such scenarios. What is also clear from the research into British MPs is that the ethical world is a shifting one, changing as new situations arise and as attitudes change. What was once ethically acceptable becomes unacceptable, new norms develop and new rules and means of enforcement are introduced. Legislative socialisation: an overview Although legislative socialisation is both widely acknowledged and has been the subject of a good deal of attention, nevertheless as a concept it remains underdeveloped. We seek to remedy that situation, at least as far as the UK Parliament is concerned – hence our choice of title ‘Parliamentary Socialisation’. This emphasises the importance of the institutional setting in several respects. First, as we have already seen, legislative socialisation varies between legislatures and, indeed, between Chambers in the same legislature, as the US Senate and the House of Lords illustrate in comparison with the House of Representatives and, as we hope to show, the House of Commons. Secondly, the impact of legislative socialisation is likely to be affected by how well-established the legislature is, particularly though not only as measured over time, and the level of turnover in its membership. Thus, Nelson Polsby has argued that institutionalisation and turnover of its membership played a major role in the development of the US House of Representatives.83 By institutionalisation Polsby means the extent to which a legislature has acquired autonomy and developed internal complexity and universalistic rules. Similar cases could be made for the House of Lords and the House of Commons. John Hibbing applied Polsby’s institutionalisation criteria to the Commons, but argued that, as an explanation of legislative change, institutionalisation requires more research. However, our focus here is on whether a legislature has a well-established mode of operation and behavioural norms. We conclude that the House of Commons most certainly does.84 By contrast, in the case of the European Parliament, Julien Navarro has suggested that legislative socialisation has been a weak influence, not least because it is a young institution in which, as one of his interviewees put it, ‘the role of the European parliamentarian is full of shadows

83

Nelson W. Polsby, ‘The institutionalisation of the US House of Representatives’, American Political Science Review, 62, 1968, pp. 144–68. 84 See John R. Hibbing, ‘Legislative institutionalisation with illustrations from the British House of Commons’, American Journal of Political Science, 32, 1988, pp. 681–712.


and uncertainties about our very role inside the Parliament’.85 However, Navarro goes further, pointing out that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) remain closely linked to their national politics, that the European Parliament has a high turnover rate and that some MEPs for national or ideological reasons consciously resist socialisation.86 Nevertheless, it is likely in our view that some significant socialisation of MEPs takes place within parties, both national and the European party groups. Thirdly, in performing their roles members of legislatures operate to a large extent within a set of norms and formal rules. Many of the latter are written down in procedural forms, such as standing orders; others may be contained in written constitutions. In both cases, however, they are open and subject to varying degrees of interpretation by those responsible for enforcing them and, indeed, by those to whom they apply. Norms, by definition, are less fixed and formal and may be particularly important in governing interpersonal relationships. However, neither formal rules nor norms are immutable: new rules may be introduced, others may fall into disuse. Legislatures can and may adapt to changing demands and circumstances, but change is possible, not inevitable, as the history of the UK Parliament so clearly demonstrates.87 Finally, setting legislative socialisation within the wider constitutional and political context is crucial. Taking account of where and how the legislature fits and operates within the wider political system is vital to understanding and explaining legislative socialisation, not least because members of legislatures also perform their roles within that wider system. In doing so they are affected by political parties, especially their own party, by pressure groups, by their electorates, by the wider public, and so on. Institutions matter – but so does the context within which they operate.88

85 Julien Navarro, Converging Patterns of Behaviour in the European Parliament: The Limited Impact of Socialisation on Members of the European Parliament, paper presented to the Third ECPR Conference, Budapest, 8–10 September 2005, p. 22. 86 Ibid., p. 23. 87 See Michael Rush, The Role of the Member of Parliament Since 1868: From Gentlemen to Players, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, Chapter 3 and Donald Shell, The House of Lords, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2007, Chapters 1–2. 88 For further discussion see James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organisational Basis of Politics, Free Press, New York, 1989; B. Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Politics: The ‘New Institutionalism’, Pinter, London, 1999; and Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, The New Institutional Politics: Performance and Outcomes, Routledge, London, 2000.

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We have defined legislative socialisation as the process by which newly elected members of a legislature become acquainted with the institution’s rules and norms of behaviour. This process may, to a significant degree, shape their attitudes towards the legislature and their role and behaviour in it, resulting in a convergence between the attitudes, role and behaviour of newly elected and longer-serving members. We divide legislative socialisation into three types: • Functional socialisation: learning the rules and procedures of the legislature and how to undertake their job as a member of the legislature. • Attitudinal socialisation: consciously or unconsciously adapting their attitudes to legislative norms and their roles as a member. • Behavioural socialisation: consciously or unconsciously adapting their behaviour to legislative norms in performing their roles as a member. We do not, however, suggest that socialisation is inevitable and absolute, nor that the experience of new entrants necessarily involves accepting a received set of behavioural norms and attitudes resulting in uniformity. This clearly could not be so for at least two reasons: first, because party is a major factor in influencing responses to norms and attitudes, and party composition changes from one election to another; and, secondly, because legislatures as institutions are themselves subject to change, which may lead to changes in the norms and attitudes of their members. Thus, actual experience becomes an important factor, leading to the reinforcement of existing norms and attitudes or to a process of resocialisation, as norms and attitudes change. As Price and Bell comment in their study of the California Assembly, ‘ . . . the legislature is not static. With each session there is a new cast of characters, plots and settings’.89 Socialisation is a complex rather than a simple process, involving a variety of agents, mechanisms and processes. In the case of parliamentary socialisation the agents include the House of Commons authorities and its various office-holders, the party organisations within Parliament, MPs of both the Member’s party and other parties, and various outsiders, such as the party organisations outside Parliament, pressure groups, trade unions and the media. The mechanisms include instruction (the formal induction arrangements made by the House authorities

89

Price and Bell, op. cit., p. 178.

Experience

Agents House of Commons House authorities. Office-holders. Party Party organisations in Parliament. MPs of own party. MPs of other parties. Outsiders Party organisations outside Parliament. Pressure groups. Trade unions. Media.

Mechanisms

Processes

Instruction

Socialisation

Formal induction by House authorities and parties.

Learning new rules, norms and values.

Informal advice and assistance. Imitation Observing and following advice and example of other MPs. Motivation Seeking to develop effectiveness as an MP. Seeking to achieve parliamentary and political ambitions.

Perceptual screen

Knowledge

Adopting appropriate behaviour. Reinforcement Confirming and strengthening knowledge of existing rules, norms and values.

Behaviour Values

Confirming and strengthening existing behaviour. Re-socialisation Replacing existing rules, norms and values.

Attitudes

Adopting new behaviour patterns.

Personality

A model of parliamentary socialisation

57

Figure 3.1

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and the parties, and the informal advice and assistance provided by the staff of the House), imitation (learning by observing others, especially more experienced Members, positively by adopting what appears to be good practice and negatively by eschewing the bad) and motivation (the adoption and acceptance of roles and norms as a means, even a necessary part, of becoming an effective MP and seeking to fulfil parliamentary and political ambitions). The socialisation process consists of not just the learning and acquisition of previously unknown rules, norms, values and appropriate behaviour, but also reinforcement – the strengthening or pre-existing norms, values and behaviour, and re-socialisation – the replacement or modification of previously held norms and values by more appropriate institutional ones and modifying behaviour accordingly. The relationship between these elements of socialisation is shown in Figure 3.1 and the ensuing chapters will, in turn, explore functional, attitudinal and behavioural socialisation.

4 Functional Socialisation: A Steep Learning Curve

For the newcomer it’s a recipe for a nervous breakdown. . . . Nowhere to live, nowhere to work, no staff, a mountain of mail in the first few days. . . . All normal reference points gone and replaced with what can only be described as bizarre ritualistic practices and a series of initiation ceremonies not far removed from flushing new boys’ heads down the toilets. (Patsy Calton, Liberal Democrat MP for Cheadle, 2001–05)1 . . . the first few weeks pass in a confusion of doors, corridors and lobbies. (Meg Munn, Labour and Co-operative MP for Sheffield Heeley since 2001)2 I doubt that I am alone among new Members in finding that the imagined desire to make ‘an important contribution’ quickly gave way to a desperate attempt to avoid breaking unwritten rules or offending unknown precedents. (Philip Hammond, Conservative MP for Runnymede and Weybridge since 1997)3

Introduction As we explained at the end of Chapter 3, we divide legislative socialisation into three types. Here we deal with the first type, functional socialisation, by which we mean learning the rules and procedures of

1 Patsy Calton, ‘House in Need of Renovation’, The House Magazine, 24 September 2001, p. 60. 2 Meg Munn, ‘Time to Break Free of Tradition’, The House Magazine, 1 October 2001, p. 61. 3 Philip Hammond, ‘Maintaining the Dignity of Parliament’, The House Magazine, 6 October 1997, p. 34.

59

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an institution (here the House of Commons) and how to undertake the job of being a member of it (that is, an MP). Drawing on our own and others’ research material on the experiences of newly elected MPs in the last four Parliaments, we shall look, first, at the extent to which they are able to prepare themselves for the role to which they hope to be elected and the steep learning curve they face immediately on their election. Secondly, and as the main focus of the chapter, we examine what we call the induction process, even though it extends much wider than the formal induction processes. So we look in this section at the induction processes offered by the House authorities and the parties, at other sources of advice available to newly elected MPs, at the process of accessing office accommodation, services and facilities, and finally at the ‘ethical dimension’ – the norms of behaviour MPs are expected to observe. Thirdly, we examine ‘getting in on the action’ – using the opportunities to participate in the work of the House through speeches, Questions, Early Day Motions and committees. Our intention here is not simply to describe the learning process and MPs’ responses to it but to assess the extent to which it operates as a vehicle whereby new MPs are socialised into the patterns of behaviour and practice, norms and values adopted by their longer-serving colleagues.4 We do this principally by drawing on our questionnaire data and our analysis of MPs’ parliamentary activity.

A steep learning curve On 1 May 1997, 243 MPs were elected to the House of Commons for the first time, although only 242 subsequently took their seats;5 less than a week later, on 7 May, the newly elected House of Commons met for the first time. There was nothing unusual, however, about the House

4

Peter Riddell, Honest Opportunism: The Rise of the Career Politician, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1993, Chapter 5, ‘Entering the Commons’, provides a very useful account and commentary on the experience of being a newly elected MP. 5 This was because Martin McGuinness, Sinn Fein MP for Mid Ulster, following Sinn Fein practice, did not take his seat in the House of Commons. In 2002 Sinn Fein MPs, of whom there were four, were allowed office accommodation at Westminster and to draw parliamentary allowances, though not a salary, in order to assist them in fulfilling their obligations to their constituents. However, because they did not take their seats and were unable to participate in any parliamentary proceedings, Sinn Fein MPs have been excluded from subsequent analysis.

Functional Socialisation: A Steep Learning Curve

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meeting so soon after the election: the mean number of days between the election and the meeting of Parliament since 1945 is 8.2 days, but in two cases Easter intervened and ignoring these reduces the mean to 7 (the median was 5). What was unusual was the sheer number (242) and proportion of new Members – 36.9 per cent,6 twice the post-war mean of 18.7.7 Almost as soon as they arrive at Westminster election victors are expected to function as fully fledged MPs by their parties, on the one hand, and by their constituents, on the other. The parties can allow a few days, even a week or so, for new MPs to acclimatise. The immediate concern of the whips is that new MPs support their parties, especially in the division lobbies, but also in other ways: in the parliamentary Questions they ask, in the debates they participate in, in the Early Day Motions they sign and in ensuring that committees, especially those on legislation, are properly manned and functioning. But constituents’ demands begin immediately; indeed a backlog of correspondence will have been building up since the dissolution of the previous Parliament. Moreover, constituents’ demands are many and various, raising issues and problems ranging from health to housing, education to the environment – the whole gamut of governmental responsibility. Some, perhaps many, of these issues and problems will have been raised before with the new MP’s predecessor, whether of the same or a different party. MPs are also frequently contacted by constituents seeking help with matters that are not directly the concern of the UK government at Westminster but matters for which either local authorities or the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland are responsible.8 All these demands mean that the new MP needs basic office resources: an office, a telephone, a personal computer and secretarial and other

6

The number of newly elected MPs in 1992 was 127 – 19.5 per cent. That is, 1950–2010. In 1945, no less than 50.2 per cent of MPs (321) were elected for the first time, but, quite apart from Labour’s massive victory, there had not been a general election since 1935. 8 See Philip Norton and David M. Wood, Back From Westminster: British MPs and their Constituents, University of Kentucky Press, Lexington, KY, 1993 and Greg Power, ‘Party Politics vs. People Politics: Balancing Westminster and Constituency’ in Greg Power (ed.), Under Pressure: Are We Getting the Most from Our MPs?, Hansard Society, London, 2000, pp. 9–22. This has been further complicated by the devolved arrangements now in place in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 7

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staff. Before and during the election, candidates will have been too busy campaigning to worry about what to do if and when they are elected, even if they are confident of winning. Although historically a high proportion of seats were thought to be safe seats for their party, since the 1970s British electoral politics has become increasingly volatile. Nevertheless, the scale of the Conservative Government’s defeat in 1997 was exceptional: more than a few new Labour MPs were surprised, even shocked, to find themselves at Westminster. However, the swiftness with which new Members are expected to be up and running was not peculiar to 1997: it applies after all general elections, except those few where a longer gap between election and the meeting of Parliament fortuitously intervenes. For most new MPs this comes as something of a shock. In addition to the immediacy and the volume of those initial demands placed upon them from their parties and their constituents, few newly elected MPs are familiar with the way in which the House of Commons actually operates, or more specifically with parliamentary procedure. One Labour newcomer in 1992 said, ‘I had little idea what it entailed before I was elected’ and a new Liberal Democrat MP spoke similarly in 1997. ‘It was’, remarked a Conservative MP first elected in 1997, ‘much harder work than I expected’ and one of the Labour intake that year said, ‘I knew about the parliamentary work, but had no idea about the amount of [constituency] casework’; ‘vastly more casework than I expected’, wrote another, while a new Ulster Unionist Party Member commented on ‘the sheer amount of paperwork to deal with’. The complexity of parliamentary procedure might be expected to be particularly challenging, so in our surveys we asked our respondents how familiar they were with it. We found that in both 1992 and 1997 well under 10 per cent of newly elected MPs claimed to be ‘very familiar’ with procedure, although many more (44 per cent in 1992 and 50 per cent in 1997) said they were ‘somewhat familiar’. This meant that in 1992 nearly half the new MPs (49.3 per cent) and well over two-fifths (45.5 per cent) in 1997 knew little about procedure. The Hansard survey produced similar findings for the 2005 intake: fewer than 10 per cent of their respondents claimed to be ‘very familiar’ with parliamentary procedure, 50 per cent claimed that they were ‘somewhat familiar’ and 41.7 per cent ‘not very familiar’ or ‘not at all familiar’.9 Parliamentary

9 Gemma Rosenblatt, A Year in the Life: From Member of Public to Member of Parliament, Hansard Society, London. 2006, dataset.


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procedure is, of course, complicated, so such limited familiarity is hardly surprising. Our data also showed that newly elected Conservatives and Liberal Democrats were more likely to claim familiarity with procedure than their Labour counterparts. This was in spite of the Labour MPs being substantially more likely to have had local government experience before election than the Conservatives – though not the Liberal Democrats: 64 per cent of the Labour intake in 1997 had been local councillors compared with 69.2 per cent of Liberal Democrats, but only 21.2 per cent of Conservatives. Those Labour MPs with local government experience did claim greater familiarity than those without such experience. Thus, immediately upon election new MPs are confronted by a steep learning curve: with hardly time to draw breath or catch up on sleep after the campaign and election day, their parties and their constituents are making significant demands upon them as they begin to adjust to the strangeness of Westminster, its procedures and culture. The greater volatility of British elections notwithstanding, candidates reasonably confident of election might be expected to prepare themselves for the role of MP. At the beginning of both the 1992 and 1997 Parliaments we therefore asked newly elected MPs from whom they had sought advice about the work of a Member of Parliament before they were elected. Busy as they had been campaigning, almost all had sought some advice. The most obvious source of advice for a new job is someone doing it already. We found that in 1992 nine out of ten had sought the advice of sitting MPs (Conservative 92.9 per cent, Labour 88.9 per cent and three of the four Liberal Democrats). A second common source of advice was party officials (Conservative 46.4 per cent, Labour 33.3 per cent and two of the four Liberal Democrats) and, thirdly, the prospective MP’s family (Conservative 21.4 per cent, Labour 33.4). A fifth of Labour respondents had sought the advice of other organisations, mostly trade unions. A similar pattern was evident in the 1997 cohort. The most common source of advice was again sitting MPs (Conservative 92.9 per cent, Labour 82.5 per cent, Liberal Democrat 78.9 per cent), but in 1997 more Labour MPs (46.3 per cent) than Conservative MPs (21.4 per cent) had approached party officials. Advice from MPs’ families came third, at almost the same level (1992 – 29.5 per cent, 1997 – 27.3 per cent) and, again, a fifth of Labour MPs had sought advice from trade unions and other organisations. As in other respects, the Hansard survey produced a similar picture: the advice of longer-serving MPs was most commonly

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sought, followed by party officials and family, with trade unions again being important for about a fifth of the new Labour entrants.10 Although such findings were predictable, there was an interesting further point. A rank ordering showed that whereas new MPs largely replicated the behaviour of the longer-serving Members of their own parties, longer-serving MPs were more likely to consult MPs of other parties, though this was considerably truer of Conservative MPs than Labour MPs. In the 1992 Parliament, similar proportions of new Conservative and Labour Members (50 and 48.7 per cent respectively) consulted MPs of other parties, compared with 75.9 per cent of longerserving Conservative and 58.1 per cent of Labour MPs. The figures for 1997, while showing almost identical figures for Labour (45.7 per cent of new Members and 58.3 per cent of longer-serving MPs), reveal an increased proportion of both new and longer-serving Conservatives consulting MPs of other parties (80 and 94.7 per cent respectively), a reflection perhaps of the vastly reduced number of Conservative MPs overall. Our data also shows that Conservatives were much more likely to find advice from MPs of other parties helpful. Although we did not ask our respondents to provide details of the particular advice they sought from other MPs, additional comments made by a number suggested that many MPs seek advice from fellow Members about procedure and other matters throughout their careers. Preparation for a new Parliament might be expected of the parties at Westminster as well as the hope-to-be MPs. On the other hand, with actually winning the election being the priority for both parties and candidates, it might be thought that only limited pre-election efforts would be made by the parties. In fact, what we found was a difference in attitude between the parties, with Labour taking the view that newly elected MPs do need help from the party as well as from the House authorities. In contrast, the Conservatives saw little need for help from the party. Indeed, a number of our longer-serving Conservative respondents volunteered the view that new MPs were best left simply to learn on the job. Thus, in 1992 fewer than a fifth of new Conservative MPs reported that they were offered assistance and advice by the party organisation before their election, whereas, in marked contrast, more than half the new Labour MPs said they did receive help. In 1997 Labour went further – all Labour’s prospective candidates were sent a Pre-Induction Guide in October 1996, and (even) the Conservatives made greater efforts to

10

Ibid.


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provide informal advice. This was reflected in the fact that half of our Conservative and four-fifths of our Labour respondents said they had received pre-election help from their parties. Moreover, both 1992 and 1997 were a marked improvement on what had (not) happened before: fewer than 10 per cent of longer-serving Conservative and only 29 per cent of longer-serving Labour MPs said they received any pre-election help from their parties. Of course, many in all parties received help from the national party organisation in fighting the election – as one Liberal Democrat respondent said in 1997, the assistance he received was ‘Essentially on how to get elected!’

Induction: the post-election experience We examine in this section the second stage of the learning experience a newly elected MP will undergo – the induction processes, formal and informal, offered by the House authorities and the parties; the other sources of advice available to newly elected MPs; the process of accessing office accommodation, services and facilities, and finally at the ‘ethical dimension’, the norms of behaviour Members are expected to observe. As we have noted, newly elected MPs are faced with a range of daunting practical tasks on arriving at Westminster. Apart from those representing London constituencies or within easy commuting distance, they have to find living accommodation. At Westminster itself they need to arrange office accommodation, appoint staff, find out what and how they and their staff are paid and what allowances and expenses they are entitled to claim,11 quite apart from finding out exactly what their job as a Member of Parliament is and how to carry out that job, both at Westminster and in the constituency, and finding their way around the maze that is the Palace of Westminster. Nowadays, anyone starting a new job or joining an organisation expects some sort of formal or informal induction process. At Westminster, however, induction is a relatively recent innovation, whether by the House of Commons authorities or the parliamentary parties. Of course, a degree of induction has always been available, even if it was not called that: the new MP could seek advice or help from Commons’ staff or longer-serving MPs, as the normal practice until at least the 1980s. But times have changed, and so – albeit more

11 Before their election in 1997 some 30 prospective MPs contacted the Fees Office in the House of Commons for information about pay, allowances and expenses.

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100 90 80 70 60 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 Training/ induction Figure 4.1

Documentary material

Provided by legis. auths.

Provided by parties

Provided by both

The training of legislators: comparative data, 2007

Source: www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports.

slowly – have parliamentary practices. The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) has reported that, across the world, training or induction programmes and the provision of various types of documentary material for newly elected legislators are now common (see Figure 4.1). The IPU data covers the elected lower houses or single Chambers in 29 countries, including 22 members of the European Union, plus Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States. Of the EU members, only Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg make no provision. In most cases, a combination of legislative authorities and party groups are responsible for the provision, but in two-fifths it is entirely the responsibility of the legislative authorities, whereas parties are solely responsible in fewer than 8 per cent of the countries covered. How does the practice of the UK’s House of Commons compare with these international counterparts? We will look in turn at the provision made by the House authorities and the political parties. The House authorities Before 1992, at Westminster, information was provided to newly elected MPs by each of the departments of the House of Commons separately.12 However, representations made by MPs after the 1987 election resulted in the production of a Members’ Handbook and since then the House authorities have made increasingly elaborate arrangements, including

12 We are grateful to those staff of the House of Commons who provided documentary material made available to newly elected MPs and in particular to those staff who kindly agreed to interviews.


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particularly the setting up of a formal induction course.13 The Members’ Handbook was successively improved and made more user-friendly. In 1992 it had been made available to new MPs via the whips, but not all of them received it. In consequence, from 1997 onwards copies were sent directly to all MPs. Short briefing pamphlets were also introduced and in 1997 the Clerk’s Department put on a series of seminars on procedure – in effect, a limited induction course was set up. In addition, the Clerk’s Department produced a short but more detailed guide to procedure, which was of particular value since MPs are not supplied with free copies of the ‘Parliamentary Bible’ – Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges and Usage of Parliament, nor is it available on the internet. However, other information was made available via the parliamentary intranet, and the House of Commons Library produced a video on its services, as well as short guides. In 2001, in a further innovation, a reception area for new MPs was set up for two days before the House first met and continued in operation for two weeks, and more extensive briefings were arranged. Yet more elaborate arrangements were made in 2005.14 Separate from these arrangements were those made by the Fees Office, which, until 2010 when the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority was established, was responsible for the administration of MPs’ salaries and allowances. All newly elected MPs were provided with a detailed financial guide, first published in 1987 and known as The Green Book, and offered an extensive briefing interview with a member of the Fees Office staff, an opportunity most new MPs took. This included advice about the employment of staff. The data reported in Figure 4.2 shows a fairly high level of satisfaction with the arrangements made by the House authorities, with greater satisfaction among Conservative than Labour or Liberal Democrat respondents. The departments securing the greatest level of satisfaction were the House of Commons Library and the Fees Office (which dealt with salaries and allowances) and those with the lowest the departments of the Clerk and the Serjeant at Arms, though the ratings of both

13 For details of the arrangements made in 1992 and 1997 see Rush and Giddings, ‘Learning to be a Member of Parliament’, in Greg Power (ed.), Under Pressure: Are We Getting the Most from Our MPs?, Hansard Society, London, 2000, pp. 9–22 and for those made in 2005 see Rosenblatt, op. cit., pp. 22–5. 14 For further discussion of the 2005 arrangements see Rosenblatt, op, cit., pp. 22–5 and for a more detailed listing see Memorandum from the Services Information Group, Select Committee on the Modernisation of the House, First Report: Revitalising the Chamber: the Role of the Backbencher, HC 377, 2006–07, Evid. 116-22.

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4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 1992

1997 Cons.

Lab.

LD

Figure 4.2 Respondents’ views of the induction arrangements made by the House of Commons authorities, 1992 and 1997 (scale of 1–4) Note: The number of Liberal Democrats first elected in 1992 was too small to permit inclusion. Source: Questionnaire 2 to the 1992 and 1997 intakes.

rose as new MPs became more familiar with working at Westminster. It was not, however, surprising to see the comment of one of the 1992 Labour intake: ‘The Serjeant at Arms and the Clerks remained a mystery for a long time!’ But the key point at this stage is the significant contrast with previous practice, under which individuals were left largely to sort things out for themselves. This is best captured by a comment from a long-serving Labour Member, first elected in 1966, subsequently defeated and later re-elected: ‘Then it was just awful and non-co-operative; now it is very helpful.’ The political parties Independently of the House authorities, the parliamentary parties at Westminster also made arrangements for welcoming and helping their new MPs, although among the small parties, including the Liberal Democrats in 1992, these were largely informal.15 Indeed, in 1992 the Scottish National Party had no new MPs to welcome. However, of the two major parties, the arrangements made by the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) were much more elaborate than those made for new Conservative MPs.

15 We are grateful to the party officials and members of the whips offices who provided us with much of the information on which this section is based.


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The Conservatives The only formal ‘induction’ occasion organised by the Conservatives in both 1992 and 1997 was a meeting with the party whips some three to four days after the meeting of the new Parliament. At this meeting a fairly narrow range of matters was considered, mainly relating to the whipping process and party meetings; all other assistance was ad hoc and informal. The meeting with the whips after the 2001 election was described by Hugo Swire (Conservative MP for East Devon since 2001): [Then] it was the turn of the party whips to have their fun. Herded into a committee room like naughty schoolchildren, we were spoken to by the Chief Whip and his deputies. It was exactly like being back at school . . . Having been through the public school system and served in a Guards regiment, I felt slightly inured to intimidation. Whips, however, remain important and none more so than the Deputy Chief Whip who is responsible for the allocation of office space.16 In 2001, however, the Conservatives arranged a one-day seminar for their new intake, of whom there were 26, and in 2005 extended that to two days. It was not until after the 2005 election that the Conservatives introduced a two-day formal induction.17 Anne Milton, newly elected MP for Guildford, described this as ‘incredibly useful’.18 In addition, in 2005 the Conservatives introduced a mentoring system, pairing new MPs with longer-serving colleagues, some of whom among our 1997 respondents were less than sympathetic towards the whole idea of induction. ‘Why do they need help?’ was one comment and ‘Stop feeding them. They should take some time to find their feet . . . ’ and ‘You learn by experience and they should so the same’ were others. Against this, contrast another longer-serving Conservative, first elected in 1983 but defeated in 1997, who argued there was ‘too much “sink or swim” in the initial stages . . . ’ The Parliamentary Labour Party In 1980–81 the PLP had conducted a major review of its activities and operation, including the induction of new MPs. As Bryan Davies (now

16 Hugo Swire, ‘New Recruit Enlisted to the Cause’, The House Magazine, 8 October 2001, p. 34. 17 See Rosenblatt, op. cit., p. 25. 18 Ibid.

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Lord Davies, then MP for Oldham East), the former Secretary of the PLP, related, ‘Before that new MPs were dropped in the deep end!’ Bill Michie (Labour MP for Sheffield Heeley), first elected in 1983, described his experience thus: No gentle introduction in the weeks or months ahead of the election, no information about travel passes or offices or accommodation . . . Just instructions to make your way to Parliament bringing a sheaf of election leaflets for recognition by the . . . police in order to get through the gates and be given a key to your locker – if you can find it! . . . It took me the best part of a week to find where I was.19 As a result of the review, after the 1983 election the PLP used three experienced Members – Willie Hamilton, Jeff Rooker and Andrew Bennett – to talk to new MPs. After further improvements were made in 1987, another review of the induction arrangements took place in 1988–89. Not surprisingly, as Davies said, ‘83 was better than ’79, ’87 was better than ’83, and ’92 was much better than ’87’. The 1988–89 review placed considerable emphasis on the need for better preparations for new MPs. The working party took the view that the House authorities should do more and both the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats agreed. As we have noted, this resulted in much better documentation in 1992 than ever before, notably in the form of the Members’ Handbook, but, of the parties, only Labour put on a formal induction course for its new MPs. The day after the 1992 election, the Secretary of the PLP sent a detailed document entitled The Induction of New MPs to all new Labour MPs. It was subtitled ‘So you’ve won, now it gets difficult!’ and covered a wide range of matters in a helpful and logical fashion. After a brief introduction, there followed a valuable piece of advice: ‘During your first two or three months as an MP, try not to make any decision about your job that you cannot easily change, in the light of experience.’20 The document went on to give notice of when the PLP would first meet, instructions about expressing preferences for membership of party committees and select committees, and sections on each of the following:

19

Bill Michie, ‘Leaving the Awkward Squad’, The House Magazine, 2 April 2001, p. 11. 20 The Parliamentary Labour Party, The Induction of New MPs: So You’ve Won, Now it Gets Difficult, London, April 1992.


• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

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financial arrangements arriving at Westminster accommodation in London office accommodation at Westminster computers hiring staff constituency work travel allowances the weekly Whip PLP meetings, elections PLP committees and regional groups the PLP Resource Centre PLP staff parliamentary documentation procedural advice the making of a maiden speech the transfer of pension rights.

Curiously, however, the PLP induction document made no mention of the major innovation made for the 1992 intake – the PLP’s induction course itself. The course lasted several days and involved a series of meetings with the whips and senior backbenchers on a variety of subjects, such as parliamentary procedure, the geography of the Palace of Westminster and the various outbuildings, and the operation of the PLP itself. Notice of the course was sent to all new Labour Members immediately after their election and although not all attended, the great majority did. One consequence of the induction course was an initiative taken by new Labour MPs themselves, a number of whom formed the 1992 Group to exchange information and experiences as new MPs. At first the Labour whips were suspicious of the Group – they thought it was a ‘political’ group, but once disabused of this notices of the 1992 Group meetings appeared in the Labour Whip. Initially the group met weekly, then fortnightly and later monthly. Attendance varied from six to thirty or so, the topics ranged widely and included sessions with the whips and various frontbenchers. One new Labour MP said that the meetings were particularly helpful, not least as a form of ‘stress management’! None of this prevented some of the new intake responding with ‘What induction course?’ and another simply saying that help from the party ‘doesn’t exist’.

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Building on the 1992 experience and feedback, Labour made yet more elaborate arrangements in the run up to the 1997 election. As noted earlier, in October 1996 all Labour candidates were sent a Pre-Induction Guide for Labour PPCs.21 The purpose of this was to draw ‘attention to some of the main practical and logistical issues that Labour PPCs may want to consider in advance of being elected’.22 The guide dealt briefly with the immediate aftermath of election, accommodation in London, office accommodation at Westminster, the hiring of staff, the organisation of the PLP, MPs’ parliamentary duties, pay and allowances, and advice on ‘cash flow’ for those who would be without continuing or immediate income. In addition, an improved version of the 1992 induction document, now called A Guide to the PLP, was produced. The 1997 and subsequent induction courses were modified and improved in response to feedback from new Labour MPs. The mentoring of new MPs also operated on an informal basis. All this was a far cry from earlier times: one veteran left-wing MP, first elected in 1974, stated that his induction by the party had consisted of ‘a friendly chat with the whips’! Another said he had received no help, but that ‘since I have been holding private sessions – teaching procedure – in my office for new Members . . . ’. The Liberal Democrats In 1992 the Liberal Democrats had four new MPs. No pre-election preparation was provided, but with such a small number it was not difficult to integrate them fairly quickly into the parliamentary party. The Liberal Chief Whip saw each of them and his secretary gave them a brief training session on how to table a parliamentary Question, an Early Day Motion (EDM), an amendment to a bill, and so on. However, in 1997 the Liberal Democrats had no fewer than 26 new MPs. Once again no preelection arrangements were made, but soon after the election the Liberal Democrat Chief Whip, Paul Tyler, and his colleagues in the whips’ office divided the whole parliamentary party into what they termed ‘portfolio teams’. These were mixed groups of more experienced and newly elected Liberal Democrats, each between three and six in number and led by an experienced Member. The intention was not only to help the new Liberal Democrats to learn as quickly as possible how Parliament operates, but also to involve them from the start in the discussion

21

Prospective Parliamentary Candidates. The Labour Party, Pre-Induction Guide for Labour PPCs, London, October 1996, p. 1. 22


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and promotion of party policy. Newly elected Liberal Democrats were also advised to make use of the briefings offered by the House authorities and encouraged to seek advice and support from the Chief Whip’s Office. Outside Parliament the Association of Liberal Democrat Councils provided constituency management advice and training. Evaluation The evaluation of new MPs of the assistance offered by their parties is shown in Figure 4.3. Given the more elaborate arrangements made by the PLP and that these were more extensive in 1997 than 1992, it might have been expected that new Labour MPs would be more appreciative than new MPs from other parties, especially the Conservatives. This was indeed the case in 1992, but not in 1997, and this would appear to reflect two factors. First, that new Labour MPs generally had higher expectations than members of other parties and, secondly, that these evaluations were based on little if any knowledge of what had happened after earlier elections. Indeed, after organising what was undoubtedly a significantly better induction process in 1997 compared with 1992, the Secretary of the PLP told us that each cohort or generation of new Labour MPs was dissatisfied and thought yet more should be provided. 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 1992

1997 Cons.

Lab.

LD

Figure 4.3 Respondents’ views of the induction arrangements made by their parties, 1992 and 1997 (scale of 1–4) Note: The number of Liberal Democrats first elected in 1992 was too small to permit inclusion. Source: Questionnaire 2 to the 1992 and 1997 intakes.

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Figure 4.3 also shows that the efforts made by the parties rated lower than those made by the House authorities, although the gap was greater for Conservative than for Labour respondents, probably reflecting the more limited party arrangements for Conservatives. However, it was clear from some of the responses to our 1992 and 1997 questionnaires and from the Hansard Society study of 200523 that new MPs did not always distinguish clearly between the induction arrangements made by one rather than the other. The Hansard study also found that there was insufficient co-ordination between the House and party arrangements to the point that in some cases there were timetabling clashes.24 Some of our respondents also thought that induction should mainly be a matter for the House authorities, but a more common view was that there was a role for both and simply that better co-ordination was needed. Clearly, the greater resources available to the House authorities places them in a better position to provide a comprehensive and systematic induction process, but it is also clear that much valuable experience is available in the parties and, moreover, that they have their own particular messages to impart to their newly elected colleagues. Other sources of advice As far as we know, no other organised sources of advice were available to newly elected MPs in 1992, but in 1997 advice came from at least one other source – The House Magazine, which, with the co-operation of the House authorities, produced a special issue and a short MP’s Guide to Parliament. In addition, in the 12 months before the 1997 election complimentary copies of The House Magazine were sent to all prospective candidates standing for the main political parties. The special issue was published on 12 May and contained a list and photographs of every MP, plus brief details of Commons’ business from the Queen’s Speech on 14 May until the following week, and significant dates, such as the deadlines for motions for adjournment debates, the date of the ballot for Private Members’ Bills and, finally, a full list of the members of the Parliamentary Press Gallery and their telephone extension numbers. According to our survey, the MP’s Guide was used by four-fifths of the new Conservative and Labour MPs and by more than half of the Liberal Democrats, and was most highly rated by the latter, scoring 3.17 on a 1–4 scale, against 2.94 for Labour and 2.86 for the Conservatives. The

23 24

See Rosenblatt, op. cit., p. 25. Ibid., p. 26.


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4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 1992

1997 Cons.

Lab.

LD

Figure 4.4 Respondents’ views of informal sources of advice after election in 1992 and 1997 (scale of 1–4) Note: The number of Liberal Democrats first elected in 1992 was too small to permit inclusion. Source: Questionnaire 2 to the 1992 and 1997 intakes.

House Magazine was also widely used by MPs of all parties, but found least useful by the Liberal Democrats (1.78) and most useful by the Conservatives (3.14). Once they had arrived at Westminster, newly elected MPs, not surprisingly, sought advice from MPs of their own party – nine out of ten in 1992, well over four-fifths in 1997 – but not far behind came MPs of other parties and members of the Library staff. Other sources of advice were the chairs and officers of the parliamentary party, other party officials and other House staff, but also some outside organisations and individuals, especially trade unions in the case of newly elected Labour MPs. The satisfaction rates in Figure 4.4 are slightly higher than those for formal party arrangements but lower than those for the arrangements made by the House authorities, with above average ratings for MPs of the Member’s own party, Library staff, Clerks and other House officials. A more detailed breakdown also shows that Conservative respondents rated the advice of House officials and Library staff more highly than Labour respondents and that the Liberal Democrats were significantly more likely to value the advice of MPs of other parties. Accommodation and other services and facilities The biggest problem faced by all newly elected MPs is the provision of office accommodation and other, related services and facilities. Almost

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immediately, MPs, new and returning, are expected to deal with normal parliamentary business and the demands of constituents. This situation is made more difficult by the need to arrange office accommodation and appoint staff. Office accommodation is allocated to the parties by the House authorities, but the allocation of offices to individual MPs is in the hands of the whips, who are not averse to using it as a means of control over Members and demonstrating just who is in charge. Consequently, most new MPs do not get an office until three or more weeks after Parliament first meets. Office accommodation was the most frequent subject of complaint by new MPs in 1992 and 1997. In the past this related as much to its availability (in the sense of offices for all MPs and their staff) as to its allocation, but since the opening of Portcullis House in 2000 availability (and, to a large extent, suitability) has not been the issue. Allocation, however, in particular the delay in providing office accommodation, remains a source of considerable complaint. One of Labour’s 2001 entrants compared the situation unfavourably with the European Parliament: . . . I couldn’t help comparing my first few weeks at Westminster with my induction to the European Parliament twelve years ago. Despite being based in two places, Brussels and Strasbourg, all room allocations were made within days of the Parliament assembling and all new Members had the benefit of a secretarial agency until they had the opportunity to appoint their own staff.25 Complaints continued after the 2005 election, as comments made in the 2006 Hansard study vividly illustrate: If you start any new job, you usually have an induction, get shown round the office, you’re given a desk and a chair. This place was ridiculous. I was getting casework from constituents but I had no office, no computers, no desk to work from. It was about three months before I had an office. Then I had no computer. Then I got computers but no furniture. Then I got furniture but no stationery. (Sadiq Khan, Labour)26

25 Wayne David (Labour MP for Caerphilly since 2001 and MEP for South Wales 1989–94 and for South Wales Central 1994–98), ‘Results on the Ground’, The House Magazine, 1 October 2001, p. 66. 26 Rosenblatt, op. cit., p. 28.


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I had a pile of things to reply to – but no computer, no ’phone, no desk, no staff. What I used to do was stay up until 2.30 a.m. handwriting letters. I had nowhere to type them and nowhere to print them off. The only option was to handwrite them. (Philip Davies, Conservative)27 In fact, as with our 1992 and 1997 respondents, reactions varied after 2005: John Hemming (Liberal Democrat) told the Commons’ Administration Committee’s inquiry into post-election services for MPs that, as far as office accommodation was concerned, ‘I was OK with it’;28 Robert Flello (Labour) said, ‘I received very good accommodation and more quickly than I anticipated’;29 and another Labour MP, Alison Seabeck, acknowledging the complications, commented, ‘Although I was one of the last MPs to be allocated an office, I do accept that . . . these arrangements take time.’30 Others agreed with Sadiq Khan and Philip Davies: Robert Goodwill (Conservative) described office allocation as ‘intolerable’;31 another Conservative, Adam Afriyie, said that if ‘the army can achieve it within 24 hours, then I’m sure Parliament can sort it out within 72, even if MPs know that they may have to move again several weeks later’;32 while Labour’s Nia Griffith described the ‘slow allocation of offices’ as ‘immensely discourteous and disruptive’, adding that the ‘whips must be told this was unacceptable’.33 One of the Administration Committee’s recommendations was that all MPs should be provided with ‘permanent office accommodation within a month of a general election’.34 The House of Commons Commission agreed with the recommendation and said it aimed to achieve it at future elections.35 However, the Commission pointed out that the allocation of offices was complicated by the type and location of offices

27

Ibid. House of Commons Administration Committee, First Report: Post-Election Services, HC 777, 2005–06, Evid. 1. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid., Evid. 3. 31 Ibid., Evid. 1. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid., Evid. 2. 34 Ibid., para. 13. 35 Public Administration Select Committee, First Special Report: Response to the Committee’s First Report, HC 1027, 2005–06, para. 1. 28

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available, for both Members and their staff,36 the fact that returning MPs do not necessarily keep the same offices, and the continuing role of the party whips in allocating office accommodation. Indeed, one of our newly elected Labour respondents in 1992 said that the best piece of advice he had received after arriving at Westminster was, ‘Be nice to Ray Powell, Labour’s Accommodation Whip!’ Practice in other countries largely appears to follow Westminster: of eight countries,37 only one, Canada, leaves the matter entirely in the hands of the parties and two, Italy and Norway, entirely in the hands of the parliamentary authorities.

Appointing staff A key task that newly elected MPs face soon after their election is the appointment of staff, most importantly a secretary, and also in many cases a research assistant. Respondents were therefore asked whether they anticipated any difficulty in finding or appointing staff. In 1992 more than a fifth of all respondents (23.4 per cent) expected some difficulty in appointing a secretary, but this was a particular concern for Labour MPs, of whom 29.5 per cent anticipated some difficulty. Not surprisingly, rather more than a quarter of all respondents (26.9 per cent) expected appointing a research assistant would be a problem and this was applicable to 36.7 per cent of new Labour MPs. In practice, slightly fewer MPs reported actually experiencing difficulty. All new Members expected to and did appoint secretarial staff, but only about two-fifths of the new Conservative and nearly half of the new Labour MPs anticipated appointing a research assistant, with a third of the former and a quarter of the latter not expecting to do so, leaving a quarter in both parties who were unsure. In the event, three-quarters did appoint a research assistant. This compares with significantly fewer longer-serving Conservatives – 58.6 per cent, but rather more longerserving Labour MPs – 83.9 per cent.

36 There is and never has been standard office accommodation at Westminster and it is scattered around the parliamentary estate, consisting of the Palace of Westminster itself and a number of nearby buildings. For a brief history of accommodation and current provision see Public Administration Select Committee, Third Report: House of Commons Accommodation, HC1279, 2005–06. 37 Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, and Portugal.


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All the 1997 intake anticipated appointing secretarial staff or, in the case of a number of Labour MPs, case-workers based in their constituencies who would handle much of their correspondence, but there was a significant increase in the proportion expecting to appoint research assistants: in 1992, 42.9 per cent of Conservative and 48.9 per cent of Labour entrants expected to appoint research assistants; in 1997 these proportions had risen dramatically to 71.4 and 80 per cent respectively. In 1992 all three Liberal Democratic respondents had expected to appoint research assistants and in 1997 the proportion was 94.7 per cent. Like their 1992 counterparts, however, Labour’s 1997 newcomers were more likely to anticipate some difficulty in finding and appointing staff. For secretarial staff this applied to 7.1 per cent of Conservative but 25.4 per cent of Labour respondents; and for research assistants to 20 per cent of Conservative and 32.2 per cent of Labour respondents. This may have been because more Labour MPs were surprised to find themselves elected to Parliament, but, as in 1992, in practice new MPs found making staff appointments easier than they had anticipated.38 The location of staff also differed between the parties: Conservative MPs were more likely to locate most of their staff at Westminster and Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs more likely in their constituencies. Thus, full time staff working for Conservative MPs were much more frequently based at Westminster and part time staff in the constituency, with the reverse situation for Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs. This reflected the pattern among longer-serving MPs. The stronger Labour and Liberal Democrat tendency to locate staff in the constituency may also reflect the greater stress Labour MPs place upon constituency work in response to questions on their perceptions of the role and work of being a Member of Parliament.39 The ethical dimension As we noted in Chapter 3,40 legislatures, like most organisations, develop norms of ethical behaviour which its members are expected to observe. Some are enforced by formal rules, others informally. Although these are

38 The average number of staff (including research assistants) per MP in 1997–98 was 2.66, in 2001–02 3.31, in 2005–06 3.99, and 2007–08 4.17 (House of Commons Library, Parliamentary Trends: Statistics about Parliament), Research Paper 09/69, p. 62, Table 46. 39 See Chapter 5, pp. 105–9. 40 See Chapter 3, pp. 44–9.

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often seen as essentially applicable to potentially morally ambiguous situations, such as conflicts of interest, they also apply more broadly to the conduct or behaviour of members. Thus, over its long history, the House of Commons has developed rules and practices designed to enable it to conduct its business without undue or unreasonable obstruction by MPs. These rules and practices cover a range of ‘offences’, such as ‘prolonging a debate by irrelevance and tedious repetition’, ‘the use of disorderly or unparliamentary expressions’ and ‘grossly disorderly conduct’, or abuse or misuse of parliamentary procedure to obstruct business.41 Indeed, the Speaker has the power to require a Member to withdraw from the Chamber, and the House may suspend and even expel a Member.42 Establishing and maintaining such norms of behaviour is important to the operation of the House of Commons, and newly elected MPs need to acquire at the very least a sense of what is regarded as appropriate behaviour in the Chamber, Westminster Hall or committee work. This is not to suggest that, once established, norms are immutable or, indeed, should be, but to note that when new MPs are elected they will be faced with a given set of behavioural norms. In practice, however, far more academic, media and public attention has been paid to ethical issues involving actual or alleged corruption, mainly financial but also non-financial abuse of office. Thus, MPs have long been required to declare any conflict of interest when participating in parliamentary proceedings. Particular concern about MPs’ lobbying on behalf of outside interests resulted in the setting up of a Register of Members’ Interests in 1975. More recently, in the early 1990s there was increasing disquiet about what was widely termed ‘sleaze’ among MPs, culminating in what became known as the ‘cash for Questions’ affair, when two Conservative MPs agreed to table parliamentary Questions on behalf of two ‘businessmen’, who were, in fact, Sunday Times journalists. The Prime Minister, John Major, responded by appointing a Committee on Standards in Public Life (the Nolan Committee) in October 1994. Up to this point the guidance on ethics available to MPs was piecemeal and limited, found primarily in Erskine May and the rules relating to the Register of Members’ Interests. In 1987, the Fees Office, which was responsible for the administration of MPs’ salaries and allowances, published The

41 See Sir William McKay (ed.), Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges and Usage of Parliament, Lexis-Nexis, London, pp. 448–51. 42 Ibid., pp. 452–5.


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Green Book, subsequently issued to each Member after each election, giving details of the allowances and expenses available to MPs and the process for claiming them. On ethics, however, it was silent. The Nolan Committee marked a watershed by proposing a Code of Conduct for Members and the appointment of a Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards to investigate allegations of misconduct.43 The Code was adopted by the House of Commons in 1996 and was absolutely clear on the attitude MPs should adopt towards expenses and allowances: Members shall at all times ensure that their use of expenses, allowances, services and facilities provided from the public purse as strictly in accordance with the rules laid down on these matters, and that they observe any limits placed by the House on the use of such expenses, allowances and facilities.44 Although post-Nolan editions of The Green Book were increasingly explicit, it would appear that MPs were not especially familiar with the Code or the detailed rules concerning their conduct. For instance, following interviews conducted before and after the 2005 election, Nicholas Allen commented: ‘MPs are fully aware of the Code’s existence, but judging by the responses of those interviewed most MPs rarely consult it . . . Some MPs never consult the Code’.45 He went on to quote a senior select committee chair: ‘Once you’ve seen it, there’s no need to return to it’. He reported that another said: ‘I’ve no idea what the Code says, I’m entirely indifferent. I’ve never read it’, adding for good measure, ‘It’s balls and it’s bullshit.’46 Overall, nine of Allen’s 38 interviewees admitted to never having read the Code. Some believed the Code was solely concerned with outside interests and, not having such interests, felt no need to read it. Such attitudes suggest that the ethical dimension

43 Standards in Public Life, First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, Cm. 2850-I, May 1995. On the regulation of Members’ conduct generally see Oonagh Gay and Patricia Leopold (eds.), Conduct Unbecoming: The Regulation of Parliamentary Behaviour, Politico’s, London, 2004. 44 House of Commons, The Code of Conduct together with the Guide to the Rules relating to the Conduct of Members, HC 735, 2008–09, V, para. 14. In earlier versions of the Code, para. 14 was worded, ‘No improper use shall be made of any payment or allowance made to Members for public purposes and the administrative rules which apply to such payments and allowances must be strictly observed.’ 45 Nicholas Allen, ‘Voices from the shop floor: MPs and the domestic effects of ethics reforms’, Parliamentary Affairs, 62, 2009, p. 91. 46 Ibid., p. 91.

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of their job was taken largely for granted by Members primarily concerned with the practicalities of parliamentary life. This would appear to endorse Maureen Mancuso’s conclusion that‘ . . . ethical standards are instilled as if by osmosis’.47 It also suggests that the ‘worlds apart’ syndrome is a crucial element in the ethical views of MPs and therefore in their socialisation. This is not to suggest that MPs lived in an ethical vacuum but rather that they lived, and may still live, largely in an internalised ethical world, a world exposed by the expenses scandal in 2009. Induction: an overview There is no doubt that, since the 1980s, the formal post-election induction arrangements for newly elected MPs, both by the House authorities and the parties, have improved election on election. Nevertheless, perhaps inevitably, some members of each new intake feel that more could have been done or that parts of it could have been done better. Consequently, after each election the House authorities and the parties review their efforts and seek to install improvements for the next time and they succeed to the extent that complaints about induction are far less widespread than in the past. However, demands for further improvement are to be expected and what satisfies one new MP will not necessarily satisfy another. Thus, after 2005, Adam Afriyie commented that the ‘induction programmes were far too early and far too-in-depth’,48 but Nia Griffith said, ‘I would have liked to have seen an intensive two-day course to cover all the main aspects of the job’.49 Similarly, most new MPs appeared to welcome the provision of mentors by their parties, but Nia Griffith noted that experience varied and suggested that mentors should be given guidelines and a checklist of issues to cover.50 Part of the problem, as the then Secretary of the Parliamentary Labour Party told us, is that more provision tends to generate demands for not just improvements but for more extensive provision. Support for formal induction varied among the parties, with some longer-serving Conservatives, as already noted, being markedly hostile and some of their more recently elected colleagues favouring induction but not too much of it. They argued that induction in its various

47

Maureen Mancuso, The Ethical World of British MPs, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal and Kingston, 1995, p. 17. 48 Public Administration Select Committee, First Report, HC 577, 2005–06, Evid. 1. 49 Ibid., Evid. 2. 50 Ibid.


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forms was all very well, but that there was no substitute for the experience of ‘learning on the job’. One longer-serving Conservative in 1997 said: ‘I was thrown in the deep-end – and it worked!’, a view echoed by a longer-serving Liberal Democrat: ‘The only way is to be dropped in the deep end’, while a longer-serving Labour respondent, acknowledging that ‘considerable improvements’ had been made in the induction process, asserted, ‘in truth you can only learn on the job’. None of this, however, lessens the steepness of the learning curve. This brings us back to the question of the gap between the election and the first sitting of the House of Commons. In comparison with the seven countries for which information is available, Westminster is alone in having such a short gap between election day and the first meeting of the legislature: four of the seven normally meet between 11 and 20 days after the election,51 one after 21 to 30 days,52 one after 31 to 40 days,53 and one after more than 40 days.54 None could match the massive gap between the election of a new United States Congress in November and its first meeting in January, but all seven were parliamentary systems. In its inquiry in 2007 into the role of the backbench MP, the House of Commons Modernisation Committee took evidence on the induction of new MPs and recommended that there should be a gap of 12 days between election day and the first sitting day.55 During this period the committee envisaged that systematic and co-ordinated induction arrangements would take place, but accepted that the learning process extended well beyond the early days of a new Parliament and argued that this too should be taken into account. After the 2010 election on 6 May there was indeed a 12-day gap, with the House first meeting for the election of the Speaker and the swearing-in of MPs on 18 May.

Getting in on the action As we noted in Chapter 3, what is expected of newly elected members of the American House of Representatives and the British House of Commons, on the one hand, and new members of the Senate and

51

France, Italy, Norway, and Portugal. Austria. 53 New Zealand. 54 Canada. 55 House of Commons Select Committee on the Modernisation of the House, First Report: Revitalising the Chamber: the Role of the Backbencher, HC 337, 2006–07, para. 39. 52

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the House of Lords, on the other, differ markedly. Newly elected Members of Parliament are more like their counterparts in the United States House of Representatives than those in the Senate or the House of Lords: they are keen to get in on the action. To this end, the induction arrangements we have just examined are undoubtedly welcome and helpful, but they probably lessen the steepness of the learning curve only marginally. They can deal with the procedural and practical matters, such as asking parliamentary Questions, participating in debates, tabling and signing motions, and so on, and parliamentary staff are readily available to inform and advise MPs. But instruction is one thing, doing it another, especially so soon after the euphoria (or shock) of election to the reality of being an MP. The government, whether re-elected or newly elected, is intent on getting on with its legislative programme and the whips, both government and opposition, are intent on ensuring that new MPs know what their most important role is in this process –supporting their party in the division lobbies. The whips, of course, can be very helpful to new Members, informing, advising, even generously suggesting Questions a new MP might like to ask! But there is no experience like the real thing, giving new MPs a strong incentive to engage quickly in parliamentary activity – and they do, as various data we gathered vividly demonstrates. Engaging in various parliamentary activities is, however, subject to a number of constraints. There are, for instance, limits on the number of Questions for oral answer an MP may ask and more are always tabled than will be answered, and there is the need ‘to catch the Speaker’s eye’. Although election of select committee chairs and members, and the new Backbench Business Committee was introduced at the beginning of the 2010 Parliament, in the periods covered by our research the membership of committees was in the hands of the whips. Nonetheless, there were activities MPs could engage in more or less at will, notably asking Questions for written answer and signing or tabling EDMs.56 Questions for written answer are more restricted, particularly in requiring a Question to relate to a matter of government responsibility, but there is no restriction on the number that may be asked.

56 These are motions, which despite their name, are not normally debated (the few that are debated are usually ‘prayers’ or motions seeking the annulment of a statutory instrument or regulation). Essentially, they are expressions of opinion and, although some are accurately described as ‘parliamentary graffiti’, most are political in content and are a major means by which backbenchers express their views.


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EDMs are virtually restriction-free, the main exception being sub-judice matters (awaiting a decision in the courts).57 Moreover, not only may any Member table an EDM but as many as wish may sign it or table an amendment. Maiden speeches The main political preoccupation of all new MPs is, of course, the maiden speech . . . giving the speech wasn’t as nerve-wracking as I thought it would be . . . I remember how glad I was to be called after waiting nearly six hours. (Wayne David, Labour MP for Caerphilly since 2001)58 I was fortunate to be able to make my maiden speech on the very first day of the new Parliament . . . I was hugely relieved to get through this baptism of fire . . . (David Laws, Liberal Democrat MP for Yeovil since 2001)59 I am enormously grateful finally to have caught someone’s eye to make my maiden speech. I know the House will afford me the usual courtesies for such an occasion. If I appear to be reading the speech, that is because I am. I should like to pay tribute to the taxi driver – anonymous – in whose taxi I left the speech this afternoon and who took the trouble to return it to the House. (Peter Butler, Conservative MP for Milton Keynes North East, 1992–97)60 The House of Commons can be an intimidating place, as many MPs have attested. A number of prime ministers have confessed to being highly nervous before Prime Minister’s Questions, even to the point in feeling physically sick in the case of Harold Macmillan.61 Others who

57 Occasionally, the Table Office will reject a proposed motion on the grounds, for example, that it is personally offensive, as it did in June 2006, when a motion proposed by a Liberal Democrat was judged ‘to mock’ the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott (Daily Telegraph, 22 June 2006). 58 David, op. cit., p. 66. 59 David Laws, ‘Following in Paddy’s Footsteps’, The House Magazine, 24 September 2001, p. 62. 60 HC Debs., 225, 20 May 1993, c. 430. Butler was the last of the 1992 intake to give his maiden speech. However, apart from asking a number of PQs, he had intervened in three debates earlier in the session, the first in July 1992. 61 Alistair Horne, Macmillan, 1957–86, Macmillan, London, 1989, p. 154.

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have found Question Time an ordeal have included Edward Heath,62 Harold Wilson63 and Tony Blair.64 Nonetheless, the Chamber lies at the heart of the parliamentary process and, while levels of participation vary considerably from Member to Member, few MPs seek to emulate Sir John Leigh, a Conservative MP between 1922 and 1945, who acquired the sobriquet ‘the silent MP’.65 The maiden speech, therefore, is in many respects the most important hurdle a newly elected MP has to surmount. The whips are keen that new members of their flocks get in on the action as quickly as possible. It is therefore no surprise to find that the majority of newly elected MPs in 1992 and 1997 made their maiden speeches within 30 sitting days and virtually all did so within 50 days (see Figure 4.5). There were party variations, however, with the Liberal Democrats quickest off the mark after both elections and Labour well ahead of the Conservatives in 1992 but lagging behind them in 1997, no doubt due partly to the massive influx of new Labour MPs in that election, but also perhaps to a degree of uncertainty among the new Labour intake. In 2001, the figures were back to normal, with 95.6 per cent having given their maiden speeches within 30 days. The early giving of maiden speeches is not a new phenomenon, however: after the 1950 election 63.6 per cent of new MPs did so within 30 days – the two newly elected Liberals within 10 days and Labour again leading the Conservatives, 92.3 per cent against 52.6 per cent within 30 days.66 Moreover, although Erskine May states, ‘It is the custom of the House, but not an absolute rule, that a new Member should not participate in proceedings in the Chamber (for example by asking a Question) before making his maiden speech,’67 one in eight new MPs in 1992 and

62

Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, The Powers Behind the Prime Minister: The Hidden Influence of Number 10, Harper Collins, London, 1999, p. 91. 63 Ibid., p. 104. 64 John Rentoul, Tony Blair: Prime Minister, Little Brown, London, 2001, p. 333. 65 See Michael Rush, The Role of the Member of Parliament Since 1868: From Gentlemen to Players, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, pp. 40–1. Throughout his time in the Commons, Sir John never spoke in the Chamber, although he did table Questions for written answer, but from 1935 there is no record of any activity on his part, other than voting in divisions. 66 HC Debs. for the sessions concerned. 67 Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, ed. Sir William McKay, LexisNexis, London, 23rd ed. 2004, p. 428.


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100 80 60 % 40 20 0 10

20

30 1992 Sitting days Cons.

40

50

Lab.

Note: Two of the four new Liberal Democrats made their maiden speeches within 10 days and all four had done so within 20 days. Source: HC Debs., 1992–93.

100 90 80 70 60 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 10

20


Lab.

40

50

LD

Source: HC Debs., 1997–98.

Figure 4.5

The making of maiden speeches, 1992 and 1997

nearly one in five in 1997 had oral Questions answered before they had given their maiden speeches. Indeed, the figure was as high as one in three in 1950, but was the case with only one new MP in 2001. It is a measure of speed with which many newly elected MPs get in on the action that 35.8 per cent in 1992 and 45.9 per cent in 1997 had had replies to Questions for written answer and 46.5 per cent in 1992 and no fewer than 74 per cent in 1997 had signed EDMs before making their maiden speeches.

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Questions for oral answer Question Time, especially Prime Minister’s Questions, has become the best-known of all parliamentary activities, but its prominence is of relatively recent origin. Indeed, Prime Minister’s Questions did not achieve the sort of prominence it now has until it became ‘the occasion for many verbal jousts’ when Harold Macmillan was Prime Minister and Harold Wilson Leader of the Opposition in the early 1960s.68 Question Time is also the most partisan of all parliamentary activities, with MPs from the opposition parties seeking to criticise and embarrass the government and government MPs seeking to support and defend it. The number of MPs tabling Questions for oral answer has increased since 1945, but the number answered declined from 41.4 per Question Time69 to 13.1 in 1992–93, 14 in 1997–98 and 13 in 2005–06.70 Question Time, however, remains an opportunity for backbench MPs to achieve a degree of prominence, not least by being noticed by the party leadership, and the newly elected are invariably not averse to such prominence. Notwithstanding the restrictions on Questions for oral answer, new MPs in 1992 and 1997 were remarkably successful in being actively involved in Question Time (see Figure 4.6). No doubt this was largely a function of the number of Questions they tabled, but there is no reason to believe that the ‘shuffle’ or ballot used to select which Questions will be answered from the many more tabled can be biased in favour of newly elected Members, nor that it was the sheer weight of the number of Questions they asked. In fact, analysis of supplementary Questions available for the 1997–98 session shows similar levels of participation for new and longer-serving Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, but lower levels for new Labour MPs compared with their longer-serving colleagues. Thus, once again, the 1997 Labour intake lagged behind new Conservative and Liberal Democrat MPs.

68 George Jones, ‘The prime minister and parliamentary Questions’, Parliamentary Affairs, 26, 1973, p. 262. More generally on parliamentary Questions see D. N. Chester and Nona Bowring, Questions in Parliament, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962; Mark Franklin and Philip Norton (eds.), Parliamentary Questions, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993 and House of Commons Information Office, Factsheet 1: Procedure Series – Parliamentary Questions, revised 2008. 69 Adapted from Helen Irwin, Andrew Kennon, David Natzler and Robert Rogers, ‘Evolving Rules’ in Franklin and Norton, op. cit., Table 2.1. 70 House of Commons, Sessional Returns.


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100 90 80 70 60 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 10

20


40

50

Lab.

Note: All four Liberal Democrats had Questions answered within 40 days. Source: HC Debs., 1992–93.

100 90 80 70 60 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 10

20

30 1997 Sitting days

Cons.

Lab.

40

50

LD


Figure 4.6 and 1997

Newly elected MPs receiving replies to Questions for oral answer, 1992

Questions for written answer Just as Questions tabled for oral answer have increased enormously in number, so also have those for written answer, but in this case exponentially – from 22 per day in 1946–47 to 69 in 1966–67, 277 per day in 1992–97, and 330 in 2001–05.71 Questions for written answer

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Adapted from Irwin et al., op. cit., Table 2.1 and House of Commons, Sessional Returns. In addition, Questions tabled for oral answer not reached during Question Time are mostly given written answers, but they only constitute about 10 per cent of Questions given a written answer.

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100 90 80 70 60 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 10

20


40

50

Lab.

Note: All four Liberal Democrats had Questions answered within 20 days. Source: HC Debs., 1992–93.

100 90 80 70 60 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 10

20


Lab.

40

50

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Figure 4.7 Newly elected MPs receiving replies to Questions for written answer, 1992 and 1997

usually serve a very different purpose from those for oral answer in that they are a major means of seeking and extracting information from the government, often information that would not otherwise be published. They therefore tend to be used more by opposition than government backbenchers, although far from excluding the latter. They are also a major source of information for opposition frontbenchers.


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The data for Questions for written answer shows even higher levels of early parliamentary activity than for Questions for oral answer, almost certainly reflecting the fewer restrictions on the tabling of such Questions. This is also reflected in the greater speed with which this activity builds up and probably accounts for the similar levels of activity between new Conservative and Labour MPs. The Liberal Democrats, however, again lead the charge, with all four new Liberal Democrats receiving answers within 20 days in 1992 and three-quarters in 1997 (see Figure 4.7). The government–opposition dichotomy is less apparent among new MPs than it is among MPs generally and that may well reflect a desire by the newly elected to engage in parliamentary activity sooner rather than later, especially as Questions for written answer are easy to initiate. Similarly, in 1997, though not 1992, newly elected women Labour MPs were initially ahead of their male colleagues in using Questions for written answer. Early Day Motions Early Day Motions (EDMs) are essentially expressions of backbench opinion.72 Some are used to congratulate individuals or groups of individuals from particular constituencies on sporting or other achievements, others to mark the anniversary of particular events, and so on (sometimes referred to as ‘parliamentary graffiti’). However, most address policy matters and may be tabled or signed by supporters from a single party or a number of parties. Similarly, some are highly partisan, others not. Despite their name, they are rarely debated. Their function is to allow MPs to make their views known publicly with the possibility that they may well influence government policy, as well as keep party leaders in touch with the views of their backbench supporters. The whips therefore take a close interest in what EDMs are being tabled and who is signing them. The tabling and signing of EDMs has grown enormously, but so also has their use by the parties. In 1939–40, the earliest session for which data is available, a mere 21 were tabled; during the Second World War their use grew, rising to 88 in 1943–44 and numbering 71 in 1945–46. In recent sessions they have hovered around the 2000 mark, averaging 9.9 per sitting day in the 1992–97 Parliament, 7.2 in 1997–2001 and

72 They are also used, mainly by the Leader of the Opposition, to oppose draft regulations in the form of delegated legislation, but these constitute only a small percentage of the total.

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11.6 in 2001–05.73 However, in the 1945–50 Parliament the 177 EDMs tabled by MPs of the two main parties divided more or less equally between Conservatives and Labour – 52.1 and 47.8 per cent. In the following Parliament, (1950–51) the balance shifted to the Conservatives, still in opposition but faced with a vastly reduced government majority – 56.8 per cent as against 43.2 per cent for Labour – and it looked as though the difference was between government and opposition rather than party. This was certainly the case in the next Parliament, 1951–55, when opposition Labour MPs tabled 72.9 per cent of EDMs compared with the government Conservatives’ 27.1 per cent.74 This continued into the 1955–59 Parliament, with Labour MPs tabling two-thirds of the 178 EDMs.75 More recent evidence, however, suggests that the use of EDMs is no longer simply a function of being in government or opposition. The House of Commons EDM Database which goes back to the 1989–90 Session shows in that and all subsequent sessions Labour MPs signed and tabled many more EDMs than Conservatives, surpassed only by Liberal Democrats. The picture presented by EDMs is thus rather different from the position with oral and written Questions, with new Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs being much more active than newly elected Conservatives (see Figures 4.8 and 4.9). Although the latter were more active earlier in 1992 than 1997, by the 40-day mark the 1997 cohort had reached the same level and there was little overall difference between the parties. It is the earlier period, when the overwhelming majority of new Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs had signed within 20 days, that provides the contrast. There is, however, a further contrast that is not apparent from the figure: the sheer volume of EDMs signed by Labour and Liberal Democrat Members dwarfs the Conservative figure – in 1997–98 the mean number of EDMs signed by new Labour MPs was 140, by Liberal Democrats 257, but by Conservatives a mere 56.76

73 House of Commons Information Office, Factsheet P5: Early Day Motions, revised January 2007. 74 H. B. Berrington, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons, 1945–55, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1973, Table 27. 75 S. E. Finer, H. B. Berrington, and D. J. Bartholomew, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons, 1955–59, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1961, pp. 8–9. 76 The comparable figures for 1992–93 are 509, 523 and 24, but they need to be treated with caution, since the POLIS data on which they are based excludes MPs retiring or defeated in 1997.


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100 90 80 70 60 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 10

20

30 40 1992 Sittings days

Cons.

50

Lab.

Note: All four Liberal Democrats signed EDMs within 10 days. Source: House of Commons, EDM Database, 1992–93.

100 90 80 70 60 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 10

20

30 1997 Sitting days

Cons.

Lab.

40

50

LD

Source: House of Commons, EDM Database, 1997–98.

Figure 4.8

Newly elected MPs signing EDMs, 1992 and 1997

In the tabling of EDMs, a similar picture emerges: Labour MPs and Liberal Democrats were significantly more active than the Conservatives, but the Liberal Democrats were again even more active than new Labour Members. However, the data also shows that newly elected Labour MPs were considerably more active in 1992 than in 1997, providing further evidence that the latter were generally slower off the mark than their predecessors and, indeed, than their longer-serving colleagues in 1997. As with the use of Questions for written answer, there was some evidence in 1997 that newly elected women Labour MPs were more willing to sign and table EDMs than their male colleagues.

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100 90 80 70 60 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 10

20

30 40 1992 Sittings days Cons.

50

Lab.

Note: Two of the four new Liberal Democrats tabled EDMs within 10 days. Source: House of Commons. EDM Database, 1992–93.

100 90 80 70 60 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 10

20

30 40 1997 Sitting days Cons.

Lab.

50

LD

Source: House of Commons, EDM Database, 1997–98.

Figure 4.9

Newly elected MPs tabling EDMs, 1992 and 1997

Committee membership Much of the work of the House of Commons is done through committees, legislative,77 on the one hand, and investigative,78 on the other. The systematic use of committees has expanded considerably since the nineteenth century, first to deal with the growing amount

77 Legislative committees are those which deal with the committee stage of many bills, with domestic and European delegated legislation, and, sometimes, with draft bills. 78 That is, the departmental select committees, the Public Accounts, Public Administration, and Environmental Audit Committees.


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of legislation being passed by Parliament, mainly initiated by the government of the day, and later to scrutinise government policy and administration.79 To deal with the detailed consideration of bills, standing committees (now known as public bill committees) were regularly used from the early part of the twentieth century and, as the number of regulations in the form of delegated legislation increased, committees were set up to deal with these too. For much of the nineteenth century investigatory select committees were used to conduct inquiries into particular matters and issues, but their systematic use for scrutiny purposes did not take hold until the second half of the twentieth century, culminating in the establishment of the departmental select committees in 1979.80 Newly elected MPs quickly become involved in public bill (formerly standing) committees, which deal with the committee stage of bills. Crucially, they constitute a significant part of new MPs’ activity, especially compared with that of longer-serving MPs, and are therefore an important means of learning the ropes, as a number of our respondents acknowledged in comments in our questionnaires. They are clearly an important instrument of socialisation, in that public bill committees mirror the confrontational clash found in the Chamber, reinforcing for new MPs the importance of party cohesion and providing significant procedural experience for both government and opposition supporters. As Figure 4.10 shows, almost all members of the 1992 and 1997 intakes served on public bill committees during their first parliamentary session, contrasting markedly with their longer-serving colleagues, except for the smaller number of Liberal Democrats, new and longer-serving, in the 1992–97 Parliament of whom served on standing committees because of their small number. With more than double the number after 1997, the Liberal Democrats fell into the Conservative–Labour pattern of most new and many fewer longer-serving MPs. As with other forms of parliamentary activity, this is not a new phenomenon, a similar pattern being found in the first session of the 1950 Parliament. Furthermore, the use of new intakes of MPs was not peculiar to the first session of each new Parliament, but continued throughout both Parliaments. In contrast, longer-serving MPs are more frequently found serving on other legislative committees, particularly those dealing with domestic and European delegated legislation, which meet less often than public bill committees and are therefore less onerous. As one

79

See Michael Rush, The Role of the Member of Parliament, pp. 69–71, 193–9. See Gavin Drewry (ed.), The New Select Committees: A Study of the 1979 Reforms, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2nd ed. 1989.

80

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longer-serving Conservative responded when asked whether he had served on any standing committees, as they then were, ‘Not for years!’ However, whatever encouragement the whips may give their new MPs in the early giving of maiden speeches, the tabling of Questions and signing and tabling EDMs, membership of committees is firmly in their hands. The patterns shown in Figure 4.10 cannot reflect other than a deliberate policy on the part of the whips, as well as a clear indication of ‘who is the boss’, an important means of supplementing party discipline in the division lobbies, especially for government

100 90 80 70 60 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 1992 intake

Longer-serving MPs Cons.

Lab.

Note: All Liberal Democrat MPs served on standing committees in 1992–93, inevitable given that they numbered only 20. Source: House of Commons, Sessional Return, 1992–93.

100 90 80 70 60 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 1997 intake

Longer-serving MPs

Cons.

Lab.

LD

Source: House of Commons, Sessional Return, 1997–98.

Figure 4.10 and 1997

Backbencher serving on public bill (standing) committees, 1992


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backbenchers. Whether they call it socialisation or not, the whips clearly regard membership of public bill committees in particular as socialising new MPs into the ways of the House of Commons. This was effectively acknowledged by a number of our respondents, both new and longerserving and across all parties, who described them as ‘useful debating experience’, ‘a really good experience about how the House and legislation works’, and ‘seeing the working of the system’, while another said they were part of ‘the learning curve’. One of the 1997 Conservative intake found himself ‘thrown in the deep-end on the ’97 Finance Bill and . . . learned the parliamentary process’ and a longer-serving Labour MP, looking back, ruefully admitted it ‘ruins your life when on a major committee, but I learnt a lot’. The whips also ensured that some new MPs got experience on investigative select committees, but this was a more haphazard process, with longer-serving Members often getting priority on more prestigious committees, such as Defence, Foreign Affairs, and the Treasury, but others, such as Environmental Audit and Health had substantial majorities of new MP. No doubt this was to some extent deliberate policy: not only is membership of the investigative committees more competitive, but common sense dictates that use is made of the experience of longerserving MPs. It also depends on the number of new MPs and whether a party is in government or not. It is obviously easier to accommodate a smaller number of new Members, even more so when a significant number of longer-serving MPs are ministers and therefore ineligible to serve on investigative committees, as was the case for the Conservatives in 1992. On the other hand, Labour found it more difficult in 1997, with its huge influx of new MPs, despite being in government. However, by the end of the 1999–2000 session, for example, 87.8 per cent of the 1997 Conservative intake, 73.6 per cent of Labour’s, and 53.8 per cent of the Liberal Democrats had had experience of investigative committees. The situation changed in 2010 and control of the membership of select committees was taken out of the hands of the whips. In 2009, the Select Committee on the Reform of the House of Commons (the Wright Committee) recommended that both the chairs and the members of select committee should be elected.81 This was agreed by the House and implemented after the 2010 election.82 Elections for members of the

81 Select Committee on the Reform of the House of Commons, Rebuilding the House, HC 1117, 2008–09, paras. 85, 87. 82 HC Debs., 506, 4 March 2010, c. 1095. We are grateful to Richard Kelly of the Parliament and Constitution Centre, the House of Commons Library for providing us with detailed information on these arrangements.

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committees were conducted by each of the party groups and resulted in 61.9 per cent of newly elected Conservatives, 71.4 per cent of new Labour MPs and 41.2 per cent of new Liberal Democrats becoming members of investigative committees. Because of the large Conservative intake this meant that three-quarters of the Conservative members of investigative committees were newly elected, compared with two-fifths of the much smaller Labour intake. Our analysis of the committee activity of newly elected MPs suggests that they play an important part in the learning process, but that some distinction needs to be drawn between legislative and investigatory committees. The former, mostly in the form of public bill committees, play a major role in the socialisation of new MPs into the importance of party cohesion and providing procedural experience. In contrast, investigatory committees introduce MPs to a major aspect of parliamentary scrutiny, and given the less partisan way in which they operate, do little to reinforce party cohesion. All committees, however, give new MPs experience of dealing with the details of policy.

Coping with the learning curve Our data suggests that newly elected MPs cope with the learning curve pretty well, notwithstanding the initial frustrations with office accommodation and equipment and finding their way around the Westminster village, all compounded by the rapidity with which the new Parliament gets down to work. No one suggests it is easy. On the contrary, while many of our respondents expected being a Member of Parliament to be hard work, a number expressed surprise at just how hard, both at Westminster and in the constituency. Most new MPs quickly learn how to take part in debates, ask parliamentary Questions, and sign and table EDMs and also soon get involved in committee work, even if it is mainly the drudgery of the committee stage of bills. No doubt there is much hit and miss in the process, as one of the few of Labour’s 1992 intake who had not served on a standing committee demonstrated: when, after two years as an MP, she was asked whether she thought they were ‘worthwhile’, she replied ‘I’m still not sure what they are!’ The learning curve thus remains steep well beyond the first session of a new Parliament, but learn they do. The induction arrangements made by the House authorities and their parties, the documentation they receive, the advice they get from fellow MPs and Commons staff, and the experience they garner can legitimately be called socialisation,


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but it is clearly functional socialisation, finding out how to function as an MP, how to do the job. It is also clear that, important as the induction arrangements made by the House authorities are, they take place largely within the context of party and through the prism of party. Newly elected MPs do not forget and are constantly reminded that they represent parties as well as constituents. What of its longer-term significance? While ‘getting in on the action’ can be seen as the initial part of the socialisation process, that does not necessarily mean that new MPs will develop attitudes towards their role as MPs and patterns of parliamentary behaviour just like those of their longer-serving colleagues. They may be fairly rapidly socialised into how to use the various tools available, but they may then develop their own role, attitudes and patterns of usage. By analysing responses to our questions about the role of the MP and the participation patterns of new and longer-serving MPs, we can explore whether these first steps are an important but limited learning process or a longer-term attitudinal and behavioural phenomenon. This is the subject of Chapters 5 and 6.

Acknowledgement Early versions of parts of this chapter were first published in Michael Rush and Philip Giddings, ‘Learning to be a Member of Parliament’ in Greg Power (ed.), Under Pressure: Are We Getting the Most from Our MPs?, Hansard Society, London, 2000, pp. 9–22.

5 Attitudinal Socialisation: Clones or Mavericks?

If it’s a choice between being seen as clones or being seen as disunited . . . then I’d choose the clones any day. (Labour MP)1 . . . there is a genuinely-held respect in this place for individuals in all parties, some of whom are described by the press as ‘maverick’, some of who are called ‘independently-minded’ and some ‘trouble-makers’. (Charles Kennedy, MP, former Leader of the Liberal Democrats)2

Clones or mavericks? The media tends to divide MPs into two categories – clones, who simply follow their parties in whatever direction they are led, and a relatively small number of mavericks, of whom the whips despair but who bring a bit of life and colour to the House of Commons and whose passing is lamented as that of an ever-dying species. Originally a nineteenthcentury American term, ‘maverick’ is variously used to describe MPs who habitually do not conform to the norms of their party, ranging from the idiosyncratic or eccentric to those who are ideologically at odds with their parties, but also used as a synonym for persistent rebels. Thus, among recent Conservative MPs, Teresa Gorman (1987–2001), Anthony Steen (1974–2010) and Sir Nicholas Winterton (1971–2010) have all been called mavericks, as have Tam Dalyell (1962–2005), Frank Field (1979–) and Dennis Canavan (1974–2000) in Labour’s ranks, and

1 Quoted in Philip Cowley, The Rebels: How Blair Mislaid His Majority, Politico’s, London, 2005, p. 56. 2 HC Debs., 353, 13 July 2000, c. 1106.

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Attitudinal Socialisation: Clones or Mavericks?

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Lembit Opik (1997–2010) among the Liberal Democrats. Politically, the use of ‘clone’ is of more recent origin and gained particular currency with the huge influx of new Labour MPs in 1997. They were widely seen as consisting almost exclusively of clones, yet, in terms of supporting their party in the division lobbies, there is ample evidence that the term would be more appropriately applied to MPs in the 1950s and earlier.3 Most MPs are neither clones nor mavericks, nor are they blank canvasses waiting for a parliamentary artist when they first arrive at Westminster. They may not be particularly familiar with parliamentary procedure or the way in which the House of Commons works, but they come to Parliament with views and attitudes about their role which precede their election and, probably, their selection as parliamentary candidates. Our focus in this chapter is therefore on whether MPs’ attitudes towards the role of the Member of Parliament change between the time they are first elected and the end of their first Parliament, when they will normally have had several years’ experience of actually being an MP. In particular, we are interested to see whether they are socialised into different or significantly modified attitudes or whether post-election socialisation reinforces their initial views. In addition, given the emphasis placed on party as an agent of socialisation in the literature reviewed in Chapter 3,4 we explore to what extent their attitudes reflect a party rather than a House of Commons view. To elicit these views and attitudes we asked our respondents a series of questions about the role of the Member of Parliament – whether MPs should be full time or part time, who they believed they represented in Parliament, what they thought the job of being an MP was, what influenced their behaviour in deciding how to act and vote in Parliament, and how they saw their career as an MP developing. These questions were asked in our first questionnaire, administered immediately after they were elected and then repeated in the second and third questionnaires. Their responses were then compared with those of longer-serving MPs in the two Parliaments.

3 For a summary of this evidence see Michael Rush, Parliament Today, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2005, pp. 284–6 and The Role of the Member of Parliament: From Gentlemen to Players, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 170–83 For detailed accounts of recent Parliaments see Cowley’s, The Rebels and Revolts and Rebellions: Parliamentary Voting Under Blair, Politico’s, London, 2002. 4 See Chapter 3, pp. 35–46.

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Full time versus part time MPs I do not believe I would be able to do this job properly on a part time basis. (Conservative, 1992 intake) It is full time; it ought to be. (Labour, 1992 intake) Done properly there is no time for anything else. (Liberal Democrat, 1992 intake) . . . there is no room for other activities. (Conservative, 1997 intake) With 72,000 constituents, how can it be anything but a full time job? (Labour, 1997 intake) Even full time, you don’t get through all the work. (Liberal Democrat, 1997 intake) . . . because the workload dictates full time. (Longer-serving Conservative MP, 1995) It’s already overtime! (Longer-serving Labour MP, 1995) It’s impossible to do both constituency and Commons work in less than 60 hours per week. (Longer-serving Liberal Democrat MP, 1995) Impossible to take the seriously otherwise. (Longer-serving Ulster Unionist MP, 1995) Because it requires 16 hours plus a day and availability seven days a week. (Longer-serving Conservative MP, 1999) Constituency and other demands continue to grow. There’s always voluntary work if MPs have time to spare. (Longer-serving Labour MP, 1999) Members must have limited continuing outside experience. (Conservative, 1992 intake) Experience of and contact with the outside world is essential. (Conservative, 1997 intake) Totally ‘professional politicians’ become divorced from the real world, particularly the business world. (Longer-serving Conservative MP, 1995) . . . other activities help people be more effective MPs. (Longer-serving Conservative MP, 1999)


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In these days of the professional Member of Parliament,5 it might seem unlikely that many MPs believe that their job should be part time rather than full time, but this was the view of significant proportions of our Conservative respondents, in both the 1992 and 1997 intakes and among longer-serving MPs. Nine out of ten of the 1992 intake began by believing that the job should be full time, but by the third questionnaire this proportion had fallen to just over three in five, much the same as their longer-serving colleagues. In 1997, those believing the job should be full time comprised a much lower proportion initially – 55.6 per cent, declining to 44.4 per cent in the second and third questionnaires, again matching longer-serving Conservatives. This shift in view could be seen as evidence of the socialisation of Conservatives, with pre-existing views modified by experience, but it was tempered by the widespread recognition that the demands of the job made it full time in practice, even though many of them believed that part time Members were better able ‘to keep in touch with the real world’. A few Conservatives, however, went so far as to argue: ‘There is not enough work to be full-time’, but these were longer-serving MPs and no-one in the 1992 or 1997 intakes did so. One of the possible factors underlying this Conservative view was the level of the parliamentary salary, and to explore this we asked respondents to the first questionnaire whether the parliamentary salary would be more, about the same or less than their pre-election income. In both 1992 and 1997 Conservatives were more likely to have earned about the same or more than the parliamentary salary, whereas Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs were more likely to have earned about the same or less. Indeed, one or two of our Conservative respondents said the parliamentary salary was ‘insufficient’, with one saying, ‘I need to earn a living!’ A twist on this view, by MPs who had experienced election defeat and re-election, was that they ‘need to ensure they have alternative employment should they lose their seats’, while another raised the spectre of deselection by the constituency party. Yet others asserted that ‘full-timers are more dependent on the whips’. For Labour and Liberal Democrat respondents, however, there was no question that MPs should be full time, a case they saw as strongly

5

For a discussion of the professionalisation of MPs see Michael Rush, The Role of the Member of Parliament Since 1868: From Gentlemen to Players, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, Chapter 5. See also Anthony King, ‘The rise of the career politician in Britain – and its consequences’, British Journal of Political Science, 2, 1981, pp. 249–85.

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reinforced by experience. That said, some longer-serving Labour respondents, while agreeing that the job should be full time, argued that ‘Members should be allowed to keep in touch with outside interests and their previous job’ and another ‘full time, but with outside interests to keep you in touch with the real world’. Some took a much harder line, regarding being a part time Member as ‘a corruption of democracy’ or stating ‘I do not wish to compromise my role as an MP by taking outside consultancies’. None of this is particularly surprising, but it demonstrates a clear party divide. However, it is a divide with the Conservatives on one side and all the other parties on the other. Thus, although most MPs recognise that the demands of the job have increased, especially at the constituency level, Conservatives inside and outside Parliament have long taken the view that the only way to keep in touch with ‘the real world’ is for MPs to have outside interests and that it is entirely appropriate, sometimes in their view necessary, to be remunerated. Party differences, however, not only pervade MPs’ attitudes towards whether their job should be full time or part time and whether paid outside interests are desirable, necessary or should even be permitted, but to other, arguably more important aspects of their work, as a series of questions on their representative role, on different aspects of the job and influences on their behaviour demonstrate.

The representative role Edmund Burke famously told the electors of Bristol, ‘Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with the one interest, that of the whole . . . You choose a Member indeed: but when you have chosen him, he is not the Member for Bristol, but he is a Member of Parliament.’6 He was not the first to express such a view, but his articulation of it has come to epitomise the idea that MPs are not delegates but representatives, free to use their judgement in carrying out their parliamentary duties. Burke was not arguing that MPs should ignore the views and interests of their constituents, but that MPs should not be obliged to act on their instructions. However, this did not prevent constituents from expecting, even demanding, that a Member should act in accordance with their wishes.

6

Edmund Burke, ‘Letter to the electors of Bristol’, Works, George Bell, London, 1883, pp. 446–7.


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Although Burke’s view preceded the development of the modern party system, party was not unknown and his view had important implications for the relationship between MPs and their parties. Both these relationships – between MPs and their constituents and MPs and their parties – became increasingly important as the constituency role grew and highly disciplined parties developed during the nineteenth century. In addition, other ideas about the MP–constituents and MP– party relationships developed, particularly collectivist ideas, in which the doctrine of the mandate and MPs being more akin to delegates were prominent. Such ideas became widespread in the Labour Party, which stressed the importance of the election manifesto as the basis of a mandate between electors and elected and referred to representatives as ‘delegates’ in its constitution.7 This raises the question of who MPs represent and, therefore, in the context of parliamentary socialisation, who they see themselves as representing. As we argued in Chapter 2, the role of the Member of Parliament is multifunctional, reflecting, on the one hand, differing views on who MPs represent and, on the other, competing demands from Parliament, constituents and party. In order to explore the representative role, we asked respondents to indicate which of the following they thought most important – the nation, their constituents or their party – by placing them in rank order. The results are shown in Figure 5.1. One 1997 Labour respondent described this question as ‘a silly political science question’ – perhaps, but he has to explain why there are clear party differences in the responses. A majority of respondents in all three parties placed representing their constituents first, but Conservatives consistently placed the nation second and party third, whereas Labour respondents placed party second and the nation third, leaving the Liberal Democrats feeling more strongly about constituents and the party than Labour but less strongly than the Conservatives about the nation. The Conservative–Labour divide on this is vividly illustrated by the fact that in the 1997 Parliament 80 per cent of Conservative respondents, new and longer-serving, ranked representing the nation first or second, compared with 15 per cent of Labour respondents; whereas the figures for ranking party first or second were reversed – 22 per cent for Conservatives and 80 per cent for Labour. The comparable figures for the

7 For a discussion of these issues see A. H. Birch, Representative and Responsible Government, Allen and Unwin, London, 1964, particularly Parts II and III; Hannah Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1967; and David Judge, The Parliamentary State, Sage, London, 1993.

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Scale 1–3

3 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 New Q1

New Q2 Nation

New Q3

Constituents

Longer-serving Party

Scale 1–3

Conservatives 1992–97

2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 New Q1

New Q2 Nation

New Q3

Constituents


Scale 1–3


3 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 New Q1

New Q2 Nation

New Q3

Constituents


Labour 1992–97

Figure 5.1 The representative role of the Member of Parliament (rank order scale 1–3) Note: The election of only four new Liberal Democrats in 1992 makes detailed analysis impossible. Source: Questionnaires 1, 2 and 3 to the new intakes and questionnaire to longer-serving MPs, 1992–97 and 1997–2001.

Scale 1–3


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3 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 New Q1

New Q2 Nation

New Q3

Constituents


Labour 1997–2001

Scale 1–3

3 2.5 2 1.5 1 New Q1

New Q2 Nation

New Q3

Constituents


Liberal Democrats 1997–2001

Figure 5.1

(Continued)

Liberal Democrats were 45 per cent placing the nation first or second and 54 per cent the party first or second. One longer-serving Conservative’s comment, ‘the Burkean tradition has stood the test of time’, is clearly far truer for Conservative MPs than for those of other parties. These party differences are almost certainly pre-conceived, given that the first question was administered immediately after each election, but appear to be reinforced by experience. In terms of socialisation, therefore, our data suggests that, while some convergence is a consequence of socialisation, it is principally a case of socialisation reinforcing existing views. However, there were also differences between the new intakes and longer-serving MPs. Although by the third questionnaire the members of the new intakes had moved towards their longer-serving colleagues,

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the former still placed greater emphasis on representing their party and the latter on representing the nation regardless of party. We explored this further by comparing our results with those of the 2005 and 2006 Hansard surveys, which asked exactly the same question. This confirmed our rank order findings – constituents, nation, party for Conservatives and constituents, party, nation for Labour, with Liberal Democrats between the two main parties. However, the Conservative emphasis on representing the nation was weaker in 2005 and had weakened further a year later, whereas representing constituents had strengthened further by 2006. Labour was similarly weaker on representing the nation, the same on party, but had increased on representing constituents. Representing the nation had also weakened for the Liberal Democrats, but was the same for party and constituents.8 Taking the whole period for which data is available, from 1992 to 2006, the Burkean notion of representation clearly appears to have weakened, even among Conservatives, with party staying the same but a marked strengthening in the constituency role. This parallels the growing demands from MPs’ constituents, both collectively in looking after the interests of the constituency and in dealing with the problems of individual constituents. Whether those demands are the cause of changing attitudes towards the constituency role is not clear, but the increased prominence of representing constituency coincides with other available data. An analysis of pre-election connections with their constituencies shows that a growing number of MPs had had direct local connections before they were selected and first elected.9 Such connections were common in the nineteenth century and earlier: in 1868, 1874 and 1880, for instance, a majority of MPs had direct local connections, but their incidence gradually declined, falling to just over a quarter in 1979. Since then, however, direct local connections have increased, especially among Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs and, more recently, the trend has been upward in the Conservative Party too.

8

Hansard dataset. Direct local connections are defined as involving one or more of the following: being born, educated, living or working in the constituency; having property interests or served as a member of a local government body in the constituency, or, in the case of towns or cities divided into two or more constituencies, with the town or city within which the constituency lies. 9


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The 1992 and 1997 Labour intakes included 63.6 and 56.7 per cent respectively MPs with direct local connections and three of the four new Liberal Democrats in 1992 and 73.1 per cent in 1997 had direct connections, compared with a mere 9.2 and 6.1 per cent respectively of new Conservative MPs. The Labour and Liberal Democrat figures for 2001 and 2005 remained high – 57.9 and 45 per cent for Labour and 57.1 and 60 per cent for the Liberal Democrats, but the Conservative proportion rose to 15.4 per cent in 2001 and 31.4 per cent in 2005. This trend continued in 2010, with the proportion of newly elected Conservatives with direct connections increasing to 37.4 per cent, new Labour MPs to 74.6 per cent, and new Liberal Democrats to 70 per cent. Since the selection of candidates remains primarily a matter for local constituency parties, these figures doubtless reflect their preferences, but a pre-existing constituency connection and growing demands from the constituency may well combine to strengthen attitudes towards representing constituents.

The job of the MP Attitudes towards the representative role are bound to have an important impact on the practicalities of carrying out the job of an MP and their attitudes to it. We therefore asked respondents to place in order of importance four key aspects of their job: • scrutinising or keeping a check on the government and civil service • supporting the party and helping it achieve its policy objectives • influencing or changing the party’s policy • helping constituents with their problems and dealing with constituency matters. The results are shown in Figure 5.2. All parties ranked dealing with constituency matters highly, but with the greater emphasis once again on the part of Labour and Liberal Democrat respondents. More strikingly, there was a clear difference between whether the two major parties were in government or opposition, with Conservatives actually placing scrutiny above constituency matters in the 1997–2001 Parliament and Labour rating scrutiny more highly in 1992–97. In addition, Labour respondents, both new and longer-serving, placed more stress on supporting the party than on

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4

Scale 1–4

3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 New Q1

New Q2

New Q3

Supp. party

Influ. party

Constituency

New Q1

New Q2

New Q3

Longer-serving

Scrutiny

Supp. party

Influ. party

Scrutiny

Longer-serving


4

Scale 1–4

3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1

Constituency

Conservative 1997–2001

Figure 5.2 The relative importance of different aspects of the job of being a Member of Parliament (rank order scale of 1–4) Note: The election of only four new Liberal Democrats in 1992 makes detailed analysis of the 1992–97 Parliament impossible. Source: Questionnaires 1, 2 and 3 to the new intakes and questionnaire to longer-serving MPs, 1992–97 and 1997–2001.

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4

Scale 1–4

3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 New Q1

New Q2

New Q3

Supp. party

Influ. party

New Q1

New Q2

New Q3

Scrutiny

Supp. party

Influ. party

Scrutiny

Longer-serving Constituency

Labour 1992–97

4 3.5

Scale 1–4

3 2.5 2 1.5 1

Labour 1997–2001

Figure 5.2

(Continued)


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4 3.5

Scale 1–4

3 2.5 2 1.5 1 New Q1 Scrutiny

New Q2

New Q3

Supp. party

Influ. party


Liberal Democrat 1997–2001

Figure 5.2

(Continued)

influencing its policy, while Conservatives, though supportive of party, placed more emphasis on influencing party policy, especially in the 1992 Parliament; a reflection, perhaps, of its conflict over Europe. The same picture emerged from the Hansard survey: dealing with constituents’ problems was markedly higher in all three parties, but with the Conservatives continuing to stress the scrutiny role (again placing it above the constituency role in the second Hansard survey) and Labour respondents ranking supporting the party higher than those from other parties. In general, the differing attitudes towards the scrutiny role apart, these responses appear to reflect pre-conceived attitudes, with the most important differences between rather than within parties. The prominence of the constituency role is reinforced by the anticipated and actual amount of time the new intakes devote to it: almost all respondents across the parties said that they spent much more time on constituency matters than in the House of Commons Chamber or on committee work. This was again confirmed by data gathered by the Hansard study10 and conforms to our data for longer-serving MPs. This is hardly surprising, given that Chamber and committee work is more fragmented

10

Hansard survey dataset.


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and variable and that constituency demands have increased substantially historically. Moreover, the introduction of constituency days and weeks adds focus to such activity. However, because most MPs spend more time on constituency matters than any other activity, it should not be assumed that the constituency is attitudinally dominant in every respect, as we found when we examined what influenced MPs’ behaviour.

Influences on MPs’ behaviour To find out what influenced Members of Parliament in deciding how to act and vote in Parliament we asked our respondents to place in rank order four options (see Figure 5.3): • • • •

the party leadership their personal opinions constituency opinion representations from pressure groups.

Despite the emphasis placed on representing constituents and dealing with constituency matters, constituency opinion comes a clear, even poor third in influencing the behaviour of MPs, although it weighs more heavily with the 1997 Labour and Liberal Democrat intakes. There is also a greater emphasis on the party leadership among newly elected MPs, remaining high for the Conservative and Labour intakes in 1992, but converging with longer-serving Members in 1997. In both cases, however, personal opinion vied with the party leadership for first place. The 1997 Liberal Democrats have a similar ranking for the party leadership, but their longer-serving colleagues are markedly lower. Representations from pressure groups scored poorly, though their influence was greater among Labour respondents, both new and longer-serving, than Conservatives or Liberal Democrats, probably reflecting trade union influence in the Labour Party. The Hansard survey again accords with our findings: constituency opinion was consistently ranked third and pressure group influence fourth, but with a greater juxtaposition between the influence of the party leadership and personal opinion. The prominence respondents gave to their own opinions gives little support to the clone theory of parliamentary behaviour, but it is as well to remember that this is generally within the context of party, not separate from it. Party thus looms large in determining what influences MPs’ behaviour, but tending to reinforce pre-election attitudes rather than change them. In addition to the differences between parties, we also found that, among the 1997 Labour intake, women MPs consistently ranked

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5 4.5

Scale 1–5

4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 New Q1

New Q2

New Q3

Longer-serving

Party leadership

Personal opinion

Constit. opinion

Pressure groups


5 4.5

Scale 1–5

4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 New Q1

New Q2

New Q3

Longer-serving

Party leadership

Personal opinion

Constit. opinion

Pressure groups


Figure 5.3

Influences on MPs’ parliamentary activity (rank order scale of 1–5)

Source: Questionnaires 1, 2 and 3 to the new intakes and questionnaire to longer-serving MPs, 1992–97 and 1997–2001.

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5 4.5

Scale 1–5

4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 New Q1

New Q2

New Q3

Longer-serving

Party leadership

Personal opinion

Constit. opinion

Pressure groups

Labour 1992–97

5 4.5

Scale 1–5

4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 New Q1

Labour 1997–2001

Figure 5.3

(Continued)

New Q2

New Q3

Longer-serving

Party leadership

Personal opinion

Constit. opinion

Pressure groups

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5 4.5

Scale 1–5

4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 New Q1

New Q2

New Q3

Longer-serving

Party leadership

Personal opinion

Constit. opinion

Pressure groups

Liberal Democrat 1997–2001 (Note: The election of only four new Liberal Democrats in 1992 makes detailed analysis of the 1992–97 Parliament impossible)

Figure 5.3

(Continued)

influence by the party leadership higher than their male counterparts. This accords with the findings of Cowley and Childs that the new Labour women MPs were less likely to rebel than male MPs during the 1997–2001 Parliament,11 though that began to change during the 2001–05 Parliament which saw increased rebellion by the 1997 female cohort.12

Ethical attitudes Ethical attitudes are more difficult to pin down than those relating to other aspects of the role of the MP. Partly because of that definitional

11 See Philip Cowley and Sarah Childs, ‘An Uncritical Mass? New Labour’s Women MPs’ in Philip Cowley (ed.), Revolts and Rebellions: Parliamentary Voting Under Blair, Politico’s, London, 2002, pp. 127–47 and Sarah Childs and Philip Cowley, ‘The New Labour Women MPs’ Loyalty’ in Sarah Childs (ed.), New Labour’s Women MPs: Women Representing Women, Routledge, London, 2004, pp. 144–65. 12 See Cowley, op. cit., 2005, chapter 3.


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issue, and also because when we began this research, ethical issues had not assumed the prominence they have subsequently, we did not include them in our first questionnaire. As the issue developed, however, we drew on material gathered by others so that we could explore the potential impact of socialisation on ethical attitudes. Some approaches deal with the definitional point by deducing what is ethical or not either from hypothetical scenarios of the sort discussed in Chapter 313 or from actual behaviour. In the latter case, however, it is invariably derived from behaviour that is challenged as being unethical rather than ethical. Moreover, while under challenge, the ethical status of particular behaviour often remains uncertain and is resolved only if and when new rules are introduced or new norms are established. This is wellillustrated by the events that led to the appointment in 1995 of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, chaired by Lord Nolan, and the expenses scandal more than ten years later. Maureen Mancuso’s pre-Nolan study14 and Nicholas Allen’s replication of her research15 illustrate the hypothetical scenario approach. As noted in Chapter 3, of those scenarios applying to MPs, 38.8 per cent of the MPs interviewed by Mancuso regarded them as corrupt, ranging from 87.7 per cent (exchanging a first-class air fare for an economy one and pocketing the difference) to 2 per cent (employing a family member as the MP’s secretary). By the time of the expenses scandal in 2009, employing family members remained widely acceptable and indeed practised among MPs, but no less widely regarded as ethically unacceptable by the public generally. Allen’s replication, a decade later, found that on average 55.1 per cent of his respondents regarded various scenarios as corrupt. Clearly a significant change in attitude had taken place, although, writing before the expenses scandal broke, Allen wisely sounded a note of caution, pointing out that ‘recent years have witnessed a spate of allegations concerning the misuse of parliamentary facilities, allowances and expenses’.16 The Nolan inquiry and the expenses scandal illustrate the actual behaviour approach to ethical attitudes. The scenarios used by Mancuso and Allen barely touched on the conflict of interest issues that lay

13

See Chapter 3, pp. 45–53. Maureen Mancuso, The Ethical World of British MPs, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal and Kingston, 1995. 15 Nicholas Allen, ‘A new ethical world of British MPs’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 14, 2008, pp. 297–314. 16 Ibid., p. 312. 14

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at the heart of the Nolan inquiry and recommendations, particularly those involving MPs acting as paid advisers to businesses, pressure groups and political consultancies or lobbying firms, a practice which had grown considerably in the two decades before Nolan. The impact of Nolan, however, was considerable: in 1975, 15.8 per cent of MPs (excluding ministers, the Speaker and Deputy Speaker) registered employment as advisers or consultants; in 1985 the proportion had nearly doubled to 27.7 per cent; and in 1995, after the appointment of the Nolan Committee but before it had reported, to 41.6 per cent. By 2005, however, it had fallen dramatically to 11 per cent. Attitudes towards conflicts of interest had changed because the rules had changed. The 2009 expenses scandal similarly illustrates the actual behaviour approach to ethics. MPs have long been able to claim for some expenses arising out of their parliamentary duties, going back as far as 1924, when they were allowed to claim for rail journeys between their constituencies and Westminster. However, it was not until 1972 that a clear distinction was drawn between the Member’s salary and parliamentary expenses and it was then that the basis of the present system of expenses and allowances was established. However, it developed in a piecemeal fashion over a number of years, with existing allowances being increased and new allowances introduced. Increasingly central to the whole system was what began as a limited subsistence allowance developed into a much wider one, known as the Additional Costs Allowance (ACA), which MPs could use to fund second homes in London or their constituencies, covering mortgage interest, utility costs, furniture, maintenance and repairs, and so on. Although salaries were subject to regular reviews by the Senior Salaries Review Body (SSRB), successive governments were often reluctant to accept the SSRB’s recommendations, but less reluctant to allow increases in expenses and allowances. In addition, governments were vulnerable to cross-party backbench rebellions on salaries and allowances and from time to time encouraged MPs to see allowances a more acceptable means of increasing their remuneration. Thus, when, in 2001, the SSRB proposed an increase in the ACA, the government offered only token resistance to a backbench amendment to increase the allowance by a massive 46.1 per cent, ostensibly to bring the ACA in line with allowances paid to members of the House of Lords. The vote was not whipped; indeed, some ministers and opposition frontbenchers voted for and some against, while others did not vote.


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Those supporting the increase outnumbered those against by 2 to 1, but the largest group was those who did not vote. However, that group was not evenly divided between the three main parties, the Conservatives dominating with 57.9 per cent, followed by almost identical proportions of Labour (42.4 per cent) and Liberal Democrat MPs (42.3 per cent). While similar proportions of Conservative and Labour MPs voted for the increase (34.8 and 38.8 per cent), for the Conservatives it was the 1992 intake that was most in favour (44.8 per cent), whereas for Labour it was the 1997 and 2001 intakes (43.6 and 47.4 per cent). However, an analysis of ACA expenses claimed and paid for in the 2004–05 session shows that these variations counted for little, certainly among Conservative and Labour Members: four out of five Conservative and three out of four Labour MPs entitled to claim received 75–100 per cent of the ACA in 2004–05 irrespective of whether they voted in favour of the 2001 increase or not. The position with the Liberal Democrats is different to the extent that all eight of those supporting the increase received 75–100 per cent of the ACA. It can therefore be argued that the relative similarity of expenses received supports the view that socialisation has been at work, that when MPs were elected has little or no effect on their expenses. This would suggest that the newly elected Members quickly learned what they could claim for and were socialised into a culture of entitlement.17 However, there is a crucial difference between the conflict of interest issues of the early 1990s and the expenses scandal of 2009: the former applied to a minority of MPs, though most came from one party and it was a substantial minority; that arising out of MPs’ expenses applied to the overwhelming majority of MPs across all parties. What they have in common is that the scandals they gave rise to were caused by a lack of appropriate ethical norms rather than a flouting of them. Nolan changed the rules, as has the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA), the expenses administrator and watchdog set up in 2009. Nolan produced changes in behaviour and almost certainly ethical attitudes; IPSA will, perforce, change behaviour, but to what extent it will change ethical attitudes and, if so, how quickly remain longer-term questions. What seems to be crucial is that a high standard of ethics was taken for granted until problem cases arose, usually in the form of scandals. Hypothetical scenarios can explore attitudes to ethical issues but they do

17

For an analysis by intake, see Chapter 6, pp. 170–1.

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not put them to the test. Thus, while increasing effort has been invested by the House authorities and the parliamentary parties in helping newly elected MPs learn how to do their job, the emphasis was on practice – how to do things at Westminster and how to deal with constituency matters. Underlying ethical values were largely taken for granted. Information packs, induction courses, informal advice – all were directed almost exclusively at coping with the many demands on the MP; ethical standards were assumed. Even after the adoption of a Code of Conduct and the publication of increasingly explicit rules on expenses in The Green Book, this appeared to remain the case. Moreover, what was ethically acceptable to MPs appeared not to be acceptable to the public, a question we take up in Chapter 6.

Parliamentary careers and ministerial ambitions In examining the attitudes of newly elected MPs and the extent to which they are socialised into attitudes similar to those of their longerserving colleagues, it is important to take account of the likely length of their parliamentary careers and whether they have ministerial ambitions. In principle, the longer a Member’s parliamentary career the greater the potential for socialisation, whereas regarding election to Parliament as the beginning of a short parliamentary career might tend to reduce the impact of socialisation. Similarly, ministerial ambitions might encourage the new MP to greater conformity to win the favour of the party leadership by establishing a reputation as a loyal and reliable supporter of the party; lack of or the repudiation of such ambitions might encourage less conformity. As we have already seen from our data, with few exceptions, newly elected MPs accept that being an MP is a full time job in terms of its demands. This is part of the professionalisation of the role of the Member, a process further reflected in the level of MPs’ salaries and the range of allowances and facilities provided. It is also reflected in the length of parliamentary careers: most MPs are elected between the ages of 35 and 45 and most end their Commons’ careers by retiring at or around 65. Of course, some have their parliamentary lives cut short by electoral defeat, but the number varies considerably from election to election. In three of the four elections between 1992 and 2005, for example, the number of MPs retiring outnumbered those defeated, but the massive swing to Labour in 1997 resulted in 132 MPs being defeated compared with 117 retiring. Of those defeated, no fewer than


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126 were Conservatives, nearly twice the number retiring.18 Some of those defeated are later re-elected in a by-election or a subsequent general election, but most are unsuccessful in persuading local parties to select them, often on grounds of age.19 In short, most MPs begin their parliamentary careers a bit later than a normal career, serve on average about 20–25 years and then retire at about normal retirement age. As part of that career a significant minority achieve ministerial office or at least opposition frontbench status. We were therefore interested in finding out how long our respondents expected to remain MPs and whether they hoped to achieve ministerial office. However, because the 1992 and 1997 intakes have been affected by different circumstances regarding the electoral status of their constituencies and whether their parties were in government or opposition, it makes sense to deal with the two intakes separately. The 1992 intake In the general election of 1992 there was a 3 per cent swing from Conservative to Labour,20 resulting in a net gain for Labour of 42 seats. In the run-up to the election, Labour had expected and had been expected to win, ending 13 years of Conservative rule, but in the event the Conservatives won and Labour had to wait another five years before coming to power.21 The electoral status22 of seats held by Conservative newcomers immediately after the 1992 election appeared reassuring with at least two-thirds apparently safely ensconced in ‘impregnable’, ‘safe’ and ‘comfortable’ constituencies they could expect to retain, even in the

18 In 2005, 86 MPs retired and 62 were defeated and in 2010 149 retired and 76 were defeated. 19 Between 1992 and 2010 47 former MPs, often dubbed ‘retreads’, were re-elected after being defeated. In 1992 there were 13 ‘retreads’, in 1997 17, 2001 7, 2005 4 and 2010 5, and 1 at a by-election between 1997 and 2001. 20 John Curtice and Michael Steed, ‘The Results Analysed’ in David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh (eds), The British General Election of 1992, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1992, p. 322. 21 For a discussion of the 1992 election see Butler and Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1992, especially Chapters 6 and 7. 22 Marginal = a percentage majority of less than 5 per cent, semi-marginal = 5.0– 10.9 per cent, comfortable = 11.0–16.9 per cent; safe = 17.0–30.9 per cent; and impregnable = 31.0 per cent or more. See S. E. Finer, H. B. Berrington and D. J. Bartholomew, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons, 1955–59, Pergamon Press, London, 1961.

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event of a modest Labour majority at the next election. Conversely, more than three-fifths of the Labour newcomers were the beneficiaries of gains, all but two marginal or semi-marginal seats. A failure by Labour to improve on 1992 could place a number of its 1992 intake in jeopardy. However, in the 59 months between the 1992 and 1997 general elections, Labour held an opinion poll lead (often of massive proportions) in 57 polls, the Conservatives in one, leaving one in which the two parties were equal.23 In essence, the Conservatives never recovered after their reputation for economic competence was destroyed by ‘Black Wednesday’ in September 1992, when Britain was forced out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. But even after ‘Black Wednesday’ no one could be certain that the Conservatives would not recover, so that the 1992 Conservative intake remained hopeful and the Labour intake wary, as their responses showed when we asked them about how long a parliamentary career they anticipated. In response to our first questionnaire, more than three-fifths of the newly elected Conservatives anticipated a parliamentary career lasting more than 20 years and just under a fifth up to 20 years. The Labour intake, however, was less certain. Not only were there nearly a third who were ‘don’t knows’, well under a fifth expected a career of more than 20 years, less than 10 per cent 20 years, and more than half 15 years or fewer. As the Parliament progressed, so Conservatives became less sanguine, but the reverse did not happen with Labour. As the next election neared, uncertainty appeared to increase, notwithstanding the favourable opinion polls and, although the proportion of ‘don’t knows’ declined, so also did the proportion anticipating a longer parliamentary career. Age may also have been a factor, since only four (7.4 per cent) of the 1992 Conservative intake were 50 or older, compared with 13 (21.7 per cent) of the Labour newcomers. However, given the massive swing to Labour in 1997, it is not surprising that two-fifths of the 1992 Conservatives were defeated.24 A further two had died,25 two more unsuccessfully sought

23 David Butler and Gareth Butler, Twentieth Century British Political Facts, 1900– 2000, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000, pp. 277–8. The mean Conservative rating was 27 per cent and the mean Labour support 52 per cent. 24 The number of Conservative MPs defeated in 1997 was increased by tactical voting. Curtice and Steed estimate that between 25 and 35 seats were lost by electors voting tactically for Labour or Liberal Democrat candidates to oust Conservatives (Curtice and Steed, ‘The Results Analysed’ in David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh (eds), The British General Election of 1997, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p. 313). 25 Judith Chaplin (Newbury) in 1993 and Stephen Milligan (Eastleigh) in 1994.


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selection elsewhere following boundary changes to their constituencies26 and one retired in the face of deselection.27 The 1997 survivors were all re-elected in 2001 and all but two were re-elected in 2005.28 Of the 1992 Labour intake, all but Jimmy Boyce (Rotherham), who died in 1994, were re-elected in 1997 and none was defeated in 2001, although three retired29 and a further seven retired in 2005.30 All the retirees were over 50, although Malcolm Chisholm retired after being elected to the Scottish Parliament, and six were over 60. In summary, our Labour respondents appeared less confident that they were embarking on a long-term parliamentary career than their Conservative counterparts, although the latter’s attrition rate was a massive 53.7 per cent compared with Labour’s 16.7 per cent. Nonetheless, electoral vicissitudes apart, there was little or no evidence that any of our respondents saw election to Parliament as an interlude in their former career. What of their ministerial ambitions? We asked our respondents whether they hoped to become ministers in due course. Once again, a party difference emerged. No Conservative respondent denied ministerial ambitions, whereas among Labour respondents just under a quarter in the first questionnaire and one in six in the third said they did not, while the proportion of ‘don’t knows’ was as high as one in four when first asked, declining to one in six by the third questionnaire. The decline in the proportion of Conservatives with ministerial hopes was small – from four-fifths to three-quarters – but there was a sharp increase among Labour respondents – from nearly half to three-quarters – towards the end of the Parliament, with a corresponding decline in the proportion of ‘don’t knows’. And what happened in practice? Ministerial office, of course, is possible only so long as the MP’s party is in government, although opposition does offer the possibility of frontbench status as an opposition spokesperson. Clearly, the 1992 Conservative intake had only five years in which to achieve ministerial office between 1992 and 2005, but nearly a quarter (23 per cent) of them

26

Hartley Booth (Finchley) and Michael Stephen (Shoreham). Roy Thomason (Bromsgrove). 28 Nick Hawkins (Blackpool South 1992–97) moved to Surrey Heath in 1997 but was deselected in the run-up to 2005 and Michael Trend retired after criticism of his use of parliamentary allowances for housing costs (see Chapter 6, p. 167). 29 Malcolm Chisholm, Eric Clarke and John Gunnell. 30 Kevin Hughes, Helen Jackson, David Jamieson, Estelle Morris, Colin Pickthall, Llew Smith, and George Stevenson. 27

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did. In addition, nearly two-thirds served as Parliamentary Private Secretaries (PPSs) – unpaid aides to ministers, leaving only 17.5 per cent who remained on the backbenches throughout the period. Two-fifths of the Labour intake served as opposition frontbenchers between 1992 and 1997 and more than two-fifths became ministers, while more than a quarter were PPSs after 1997, leaving 27.7 per cent who remained as backbenchers. None of the Conservatives got as far as the Cabinet, but six of the Labour intake became Cabinet ministers between 1997 and the 2005 election. If account is taken of members of the 1992 Conservative intake who achieved office following the formation of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010, the total achieving office rises to 38.9 per cent, including four who became Cabinet ministers. In contrast, no additional members of the 1992 Labour intake became ministers after 2005. As the principal third party, the Liberal Democrats are in a different position from the Conservatives and Labour. Since the mid-1950s, most Liberal and Liberal Democrat seats (some inherited from the defunct Social Democratic Party) were originally electoral gains, often in by-elections but also in general elections. Once gained, however, many such seats were retained until the sitting Liberal or Liberal Democrat retired, sometimes with substantial majorities, but once the sitting MP retired or died the constituency almost invariably fell to the Conservatives or Labour. In other words, few Liberal or Liberal Democrat seats were electorally secure to the point of virtually guaranteeing a Liberal or Liberal Democrat successor. Only two constituencies between 1950 and 2010, Montgomeryshire and Orkney and Shetland, have continuously been held by Liberals or Liberal Democrats with successive candidates.31 Thus, the Liberal Democrats may often start with small majorities but usually manage to retain their seats, opening up the prospect of a

31 Of other constituencies, Rochdale and Tweeddale, Etterick and Lauderdale come closest to this. Rochdale was gained for the Liberals by Cyril Smith in a by-election in 1972 and held by him until 1992, when he was succeeded by Liz Lynne, but she lost it to Labour in 1997. Tweeddale, Etterick and Lauderdale is a more complex case: David Steel (now Lord Steel) gained Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles from the Conservative in a by-election in 1965 and held the seat until substantial parts of it were absorbed into the new Tweeddale constituency in 1983. He held this new seat until succeeded by Michael Moore in 1997. In addition, in 2001 Alan Reid succeeded Ray Michie (subsequently Baroness Michie) as Liberal Democrat MP for Argyll, after she had gained the seat in 1987. In 2010, however, the Liberal Democrats lost Montgomeryshire with the defeat of Lembit Opik, first elected in 1997.


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relatively lengthy parliamentary career. Of course, no Liberal or Liberal Democrat held ministerial office between 1945 and 2010, so that hopes of ministerial office on the part of individual MPs might be expected to be at best low. On the other hand, until the number of Liberal Democrat MPs increased dramatically in 1997, virtually all Liberals and Liberal Democrats served as frontbench spokespersons. Three of the newly elected Liberal Democrats in 1992 gained seats, the fourth, Liz Lynne, (as already noted) inherited Rochdale, but three of the four were marginal or semi-marginal. In 1997, however, two had become ‘comfortable’ and one ‘safe’, although (again as already noted) Liz Lynne lost her seat to Labour. In these circumstances it is not surprising that newly elected Liberal Democrats should anticipate a fairly lengthy parliamentary career, with three of the four expecting to remain MPs for at least 15 years or more than 20 years. The three 1997 survivors were re-elected in 2001 and two in 2005, with one choosing to retire.32 Surprisingly, perhaps, bearing in mind they related to the 1992–97 Parliament, the three newly elected Liberal Democrat respondents all hoped to become ministers in due course, although they acknowledged that this would require at the very least a hung Parliament and, in the longer term, a major shift in British politics. In the event, of course, the 2010 election did produce a hung Parliament and Liberal Democrats did indeed become ministers, but only one of the two survivors of the 1992 intake, Nick Harvey, was appointed a minister. The 1997 intake The 10.5 per cent swing from Conservative to Labour at the 1997 general election meant that many of the 1997 intake were elected for marginal or semi-marginal seats, Conservatives because what had been much safer seats were now electorally vulnerable33 and Labour because 136 of its new Members were the beneficiaries of electoral gains. The Conservative defeat bore comparison only with those the party suffered in 1832, 1906 and 1945, so that, while more than half the seats the newcomers

32 Nigel Jones (57) retired on health grounds, having been seriously injured in an ‘attack by a deranged constituent’ (Byron Criddle,‘MPs and Candidates’ in Dennis Kavanagh and David Butler, The British General Election of 2005, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, Br. GE series, 2005, p. 150). 33 Using the 1992 electoral classification, none of the 33 survivors of the 1992 intake had marginal or semi-marginal seats; 2 were comfortable, 19 safe and 12 impregnable.

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held were electorally vulnerable, unless the party experienced a further significant swing against it at the next election, they were likely to survive the latter if they sought re-election. In contrast, it was not unreasonable to argue that a swing back to the Conservatives was likely at the next election – after all, this is what happened in 1835, 1910 and 1950. Thus, the nearly two-fifths of Conservative newcomers who sat for marginal or semi-marginal seats might have felt somewhat uncertain about their fate at the next election but, according to our respondents, were remarkably sanguine, with substantial majorities of respondents in the first two questionnaires expecting a career of more than 20 years. But, as the party failed to make any significant advance in the opinion polls, the Conservative intake became less hopeful, although they all expected to survive the next election. The polls were right and 2001 proved to be a standstill election: a swing of 2.2 per cent from Labour to Conservative produced a net loss of six seats for Labour, all members of the 1997 intake and the Conservatives made a net gain of just one seat, losing three of the 1997 intake in the process – all to the Liberal Democrats.34 There were two more casualties and a retirement in 2005. The casualties were Tim Collins, who lost Westmorland and Lonsdale to the Liberal Democrats, and Howard Flight (Arundel and Shoreham), who, unusually, was deselected by the party leader, Michael Howard, after being recorded saying at a private meeting that the Conservatives would introduce greater tax cuts than had been publicly announced. The retiree was Archie Norman, the former chairman of ASDA, who was ‘disillusioned with the ways of politics’.35 The massive 1997 Labour intake was only marginally depleted in 2001, with five defeated in marginal or semi-marginal seats and the remarkable defeat of David Lock (Wyre Forest), a junior minister, by a former hospital consultant, Richard Taylor, standing for the Kidderminster Health Concern Campaign;36 and two retirements, both women MPs, one of whom, Jenny Jones, ‘it was claimed had never intended serving more than one term’ and the other, Tess Kingham, ‘critical of Westminster’s arcane political practices and its

34 Christopher Fraser (Mid-Dorset and Poole N. – held by the Liberal Democrats in 2005), but re-elected for the safe seat of S. W. Norfolk in 2005; Nick St. Aubyn (Guildford – regained in 2005 but with a new candidate); and David Prior (N. Norfolk – held by the Liberal Democrats in 2005). 35 Criddle, op. cit., 2001, p. 149. 36 Dr Taylor was re-elected in 2005, but defeated in 2010.


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incompatibility with family life’.37 However, 2005 was a different story: although only ten of the 1997 intake retired, the 4.2 per cent swing to the Conservatives produced 28 defeats among the 1997 intake. In addition, one was deselected by her local party38 and two were victims of boundary changes.39 All but five of those defeated sat for marginal or semi-marginal seats and six of the retirees were aged 50 or over and two others retired on health grounds.40 Thus, like their Conservative counterparts, most of the 1997 Labour intake had completed two parliamentary terms by 2005. At this point, the attrition rates were 18.2 per cent for the Conservatives and 28.1 per cent for Labour. However, if these rates are extended to take account of the 2010 election, they rise to 24.2 per cent and a massive 74.2 per cent respectively, reflecting in Labour’s case three-quarters of the defeats and two-thirds of the retirements in 2010. The confidence shown by Conservative respondents from the 1992 intake is repeated among those from the 1997 intake, almost certainly with greater justification, and the greater Labour caution found in 1992 is repeated with the 1997 newcomers. Substantial majorities of the Conservatives again anticipated a parliamentary career of more than 20 years, although this confidence lessened by the time of the third questionnaire in 2001, as the poll ratings stubbornly refused to move significantly towards the Conservative Party. This resulted in a doubling of the proportion of ‘don’t knows’. For Labour, caution remained in spite of the polls. By the time of the third questionnaire, over 70 per cent expected to complete two terms, but far fewer were confident that a longer career beckoned. Similarly, the patterns regarding ministerial ambitions are broadly repeated. As with the 1992 intake, no Conservative respondent denied hoping to become a minister and the proportion hoping for office remained remarkably constant – nearly 10 per cent higher than 1992, despite the electoral disaster of 1997. Although more than half the 1997 intake now sat for marginal or semi-marginal seats, this was a reflection of the massive anti-Conservative swing in 1997 and most clearly

37

Criddle, op. cit., 2001, p. 184. Jane Griffiths (Reading East). 39 Lynda Clark (Edinburgh Pentlands) ‘fell on her sword to provide a seat for Alistair Darling’ (Criddle, op. cit., 2005, p. 148), following a reduction in the number of Edinburgh constituencies, and Malcolm Savidge failed to be selected when the number of Aberdeen seats was reduced from three to two. 40 Criddle, op. cit., 2005, p. 148. 38

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expected to retain their seats at the next election, suggesting that they thought a shift back to Conservative government and the prospect of ministerial office would fall well within their parliamentary careers. The pattern for Labour also mirrored 1992, with respondents appearing less confident of achieving office in the first questionnaire, rising to 55 per cent in the second but falling back somewhat in the third. Here the huge influx of new Labour MPs may have been a factor, making them feel that the odds were stacked against them, doubtless reinforced for those passed over in ministerial reshuffles. Ministerial office was, of course, beyond the grasp of Conservative MPs between 1997 and 2005 (and, indeed beyond), but nine out of ten of the 1997 intake became opposition spokespersons. Moreover, in 2005 five were members of the Shadow Cabinet, equalling the number drawn from the 1992 intake. Opposition frontbenchers come and go more quickly than ministers, however, so it is not surprising to find that a third of the 1997 Labour intake had achieved ministerial office by the 2005 general election, including five as members of the Cabinet, while two others joined the Cabinet when Gordon Brown formed his government in 2007. Promotion to ministerial office can be swift, but only for a small minority. Among the 1997 intake, for example, Charles Clarke and Patricia Hewitt were appointed parliamentary under-secretaries in 1998 and became members of the Cabinet immediately after the general election of 2001,41 but only six of the 1997 intake became ministers during the 1997–2001 Parliament, two of whom as law officers, drawing on a limited recruitment pool.42 Most had to wait until the 2001–05 Parliament to secure office. Given the huge influx, the 1997 Labour intake did well to exceed the proportion of Labour MPs achieving office up to 2005, but they benefited from the now annual ritual of the ministerial reshuffle, much rarer occurrences some 40 or more years ago. If this analysis is again extended to take account of the 2005–10 Parliament and the appointment of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition, no less than 44.9 per cent of the 1997 Labour intake became ministers and 36.4 per cent of the 1997 Conservatives were appointed to office in 2010. However, the principal

41 Peter Mandelson’s accession to the Cabinet was even faster: first elected in 1992 and having served as an opposition whip and frontbench spokesperson before 1997, he was appointed a minister in the Cabinet Office when Labour came to power in May 1997 and Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in July 1998. 42 Ross Cranston, Solicitor-General 1998–2001 and Lynda Clarke, AdvocateGeneral for Scotland 1999–2005.


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beneficiaries of the formation of the coalition government were the 2005 intake, of whom 49 per cent were appointed to office in 2010.43 Only two of the 1997 Liberal Democrats inherited seats from Liberal Democrat predecessors – Lembit Opik in Montgomery and Michael Moore in Tweeddale, the rest were the beneficiaries of gains from the Conservatives, but only two lost their seats in 2001 and one other retired, having won a seat in the recently established Scottish Parliament. Two-thirds of the survivors actually increased their majorities in 2001, including three-fifths of those who had gained seats in 1997. Only one was defeated in 2005, but four retired; one, Richard Allan (Sheffield – Hallam) at the early age of 39. Like their 1992 counterparts, most of the 1997 Liberal Democrats managed to dig themselves in electorally and most anticipated parliamentary careers of at least 15 years, a substantial minority of more than 20 years. Three of the 1997 intake retired in 201044 and two were defeated, Lembit Opik and Evan Harris. The 1997 Liberal Democrats were also optimistic about achieving ministerial office and, by the time of the third questionnaire in 1999, more than half hoped to do so. They could not, of course, have known that in 2010 their party would be in government, though some doubtless hoped that a hung Parliament might eventually come about and with it ministerial office. It is worth noting that the 2005 intake followed firmly in the footsteps of their predecessors in hoping to achieve ministerial office – four out of five respondents in 2005 and two out of three in 2006.45 The career patterns of the 1992 and 1997 intakes, as reflected in their responses to our questionnaires and in their subsequent experience, do not differ markedly from those of longer-serving MPs, with the important exception of the high attrition rate among Conservatives who entered the Commons in 1992 and the even higher rate for Labour’s 1997 intake. The 1992 Conservatives were partly victims of Labour’s 1997 victory but most of the attrition is attributable to natural wastage, mainly retirements. Labour’s 1997 intake, however, was the victim of a unique combination of defeat and the expenses scandal, which was

43 High hopes of office were indeed expressed by clear majorities of the Conservative and Labour respondents in the Hansard surveys of 2005 and 06 (Hansard survey dataset). 44 Colin Breed (S. E. Cornwall), Paul Keetch (Hereford) and Mark Oaten (Winchester). However, all three constituencies were lost to the Conservatives in 2010. 45 Hansard survey dataset.

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a major factor in the retirement of an unusually large number of MPs in 2010. Such attrition rates, while unusual, are by no means unique: the massive Labour intake of 1945 – at 244 actually larger than Labour’s 1997 intake – suffered an attrition rate of 45.9 per cent if the 1950 and 1951 general elections are taken together, mostly as a result of electoral defeat but also because of major parliamentary boundary changes in which only 88 constituencies were unaffected. As regards ministerial careers, the chances of becoming a minister have increased since 1945, partly because the number of ministerial posts has increased and partly because ministerial reshuffles now take place more frequently, having become an annual ritual in addition to the occasional mini-reshuffle forced by circumstances. However, compared to recent administrations, the 1992 and 1997 intakes have fared at least as well as their predecessors. We have spent some time and effort analysing the career patterns of the 1992 and 1997 intakes because we believe that the relative longevity of Members’ careers at Westminster not only extends the opportunity for socialisation to take place, but also that it takes the form of reinforcing existing attitudes, as our earlier analysis suggests. Furthermore, career expectations also reveal important party differences, with Conservatives more confident of their prospects than their Labour counterparts, and the Liberal Democrats adopting a distinctive stance reflecting their third-party status and their hopes for a hung Parliament.

Changing attitudes: reinforcement and re-socialisation In our model of legislative socialisation we suggested that, in addition to socialisation in the sense of learning rules, norms and values on becoming members of the legislature, the newly elected could be subject to two further aspects of the socialisation process – reinforcement and re-socialisation.46 By ‘reinforcement’ we mean the confirming and strengthening of their knowledge of existing rules, norms and values and by ‘re-socialisation’ replacing or modifying existing rules, norms and values. Our review of the literature found that a number of studies stressed the importance of pre-election socialisation.47 Although our first questionnaire to newly elected MPs was sent to them immediately after the 1992 and 1997 elections respectively, where appropriate the

46 47

See Chapter 3, p. 56. Ibid., pp. 35–7.


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questions were couched in terms of their expectations in order to secure a sense of their pre-election views. It would seem highly unlikely that, within a short time of arriving at Westminster, they would have fundamentally changed their attitudes on matters such as who they thought they represented, what were the important aspects of the job, and who was most likely to influence them. Thus, by asking essentially the same questions at the beginning, in the middle and towards the end of the two Parliaments, we were able to explore to what extent their attitudes had changed. Our data suggests that, apart from the important exception noted below, the attitudes of our respondents remained fundamentally the same. This leads us to conclude that attitudinally the impact of socialisation was largely one of reinforcement and that these attitudes reflected pre-election views. In some respects, notably in attitudes towards the constituency role, MPs held similar views regardless of party, but, as our literature review suggests and our data confirms, it was party that provided the context within which reinforcement took place. The important exception to this was attitudes towards the scrutiny role. Here attitudes appeared to be affected more by whether the party was in government or opposition. For newly elected MPs in the Conservative and Labour Parties their first experience is determined by the outcome of the election: if their party has won an overall majority, then being a government supporter would be their first experience; if their party failed to win an overall majority and was unable to be part of a coalition or able to form a minority government, then opposition would be their first experience. For other parties, opposition without the advantages of being the Official Opposition is the norm, unless, as the Liberal Democrats found after the 2010 election, the prospect of coalition beckons. Our data shows that being in government or opposition affects attitudes towards the scrutiny role, opposition MPs placing much greater stress on it than government MPs. This has implications for Members’ behaviour, which we will address in Chapter 6,48 but it also raises the question of whether MPs are subject to re-socialisation. Of course, if periods in government and opposition are short – less than a normal-length Parliament – then MPs will fairly quickly get experience of both, but prolonged periods in one or the other role, as happened between 1951 and 1964, 1979 and 1997, and 1997 and 2010, may make the readjustment more difficult, requiring a more sustained

48

See Chapter 6, p. 136ff.

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period of re-socialisation. But there are other circumstances in which re-socialisation may come into play. Significant changes in the procedures or the operation of the House of Commons may involve an element of re-socialisation. For example, the fixing of a set time for Prime Minister’s Question Time in 1961 and the willingness of Harold Macmillan and subsequent prime ministers to allow it to develop into a weekly confrontation between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition meant that MPs had to learn how best to use it (and, indeed, exploit it).49 The development of the departmental select committee system after 1979 also involved many more MPs learning how to operate in a less confrontational environment than that which often characterised the Chamber. And our data suggests that longer-serving MPs needed to readjust to the opportunities offered by the Westminster Hall sittings after 1999. If these examples involved a degree of re-socialisation, so also, we suspect, has the transformation of the Liberal Democrats from a party in permanent opposition to a party in government, with the formation of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition in 2010. That transformation is likely to have been greatest for those Liberal Democrats who became ministers, but those remaining on the backbenches will have had to come to terms with being government rather than opposition backbenchers. Finally, although it is too early to say whether the expenses scandal and its aftermath have brought about a marked change in ethical attitudes, such a change would undoubtedly involve a significant element of re-socialisation.

The attitudinal picture There are clearly attitudes common to all parties about what being a Member of Parliament entails, most obviously with the emphasis on the constituency role and the significance of party, but there are also important differences. Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs, new and longer-serving, were firmly of the view that MPs should be full time, with one solitary longer-serving Labour Member conceding that there was still a role for the part time MP (though he himself did not fall into that category). Conservatives, however, still hankered after the part time Member. In part, this was a reflection of the financial circumstances

49

See G. W. Jones, ‘The Prime Ministers and parliamentary questions’, Parliamentary Affairs, 26, 1973, pp. 260–73.


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of MPs in that, when we asked respondents whether they thought the parliamentary salary was ‘appropriate for the job’, Conservatives overwhelmingly thought it too low, with none in 1992 and only a few in 1997 thinking it too high, whereas a majority of Labour respondents thought it ‘about right’, with Liberal Democrats somewhere in between the other two parties. However, when we asked whether respondents’ pre-election income was more or less than or about the same as their parliamentary salary, Conservatives were much more likely to have had a higher income and Labour and 1997 Liberal Democrat respondents a lower pre-election income. However, once elected, the proportion of respondents in all parties saying the parliamentary salary was too low tended to rise, an attitude reflected in the behaviour of new and longerserving MPs alike in their use of parliamentary allowances and expenses, as we relate in Chapter 6.50 Nonetheless, many Conservatives also argued in favour of part time MPs on the grounds that, once elected, MPs were likely to become increasingly isolated not so much from their constituents but from ‘the real world’. Since many MPs, particularly on the Conservative side of the House, have continued to have outside occupations, notwithstanding the demands made on them as MPs, as successive Registers of Members’ Interests show, it would be unwise to dismiss ‘the real world’ view as simply a financial matter, but it is likely to become increasingly difficult to sustain in the face of the demands on MPs, constituency and otherwise. Nostalgic for the part time Member or not, once elected, new Conservative respondents were more likely to see their election as the start of a long-term parliamentary career than their Labour and Liberal Democrat counterparts. They were also more ambitious for ministerial office, with from the outset one in four hoping to become a minister in due course. Liberal Democrat hopes were understandably lower, while only gradually did more Labour respondents in 1992 and 1997 increase their hopes for office. Similarly, the Burkean view of the role of the Member of Parliament is in better health among Conservative than Labour or Liberal Democrat MPs in representative terms, though even most Conservatives ranked constituency before nation. On the other hand, it is not so much Burke’s ghost as Disraeli’s – ‘Damn your principles, stick to your party!’51 – who

50 51

See Chapter 6, pp. 167–71. Remark to Edward Bulwer Lytton attributed to Disraeli.

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appears to be at work in all the parties when it comes to who influences MPs in their behaviour, even if their party’s view is interpreted as being what is in the national interest. Broadly speaking, there are not fundamental differences either between or within the parties, but rather differences of emphasis. Nor do our findings suggest that the majority of MPs are either clones or mavericks, but rather that they lie between these two extremes. Furthermore, although we do not have specific evidence to argue that the attitudes of MPs towards their role changed fundamentally over the period covered by our study, we do have evidence that to a degree MPs carve out their own concept of their role to an extent to which counteracts the impact of socialisation and facilitates changes in both the concept and the reality of the role of the MP.

6 Behavioural Socialisation: Making Choices

There are, after all, as many ways of being an MP as there are MPs. (Anthony King)1 Each man makes his own role; that’s what it comes to, you know. (Labour backbencher)2 Each Member constructs their own role. There is not a job in the normal sense. (Longer-serving Labour respondent) I had no real concept of the role and the role shifts from MP to MP, depending on constituency, party, majority, role in the party, etc. (Liberal Democrat respondent) In fulfilling their various roles, Members of Parliament have choices. They can decide the relative importance of different roles, how to divide their time between them and which procedural devices to use. Although, as we noted in Chapter 4,3 these procedures are subject to various constraints, there is considerable leeway for variations in behaviour. Indeed, it would be surprising were all MPs to perform their roles in an essentially similar fashion, even within parties, a situation of total legislative socialisation. It would be no less surprising if all MPs were to behave differently, a negation of socialisation. Quite apart from the initial learning process, we have already seen from our attitudinal analysis in Chapter 5 that socialisation is a matter of tendencies, not absolutes.

1 Anthony King (ed.), British Members of Parliament: A Self-Portrait, Macmillan in association with Granada Television, London, 1974, p. 6. 2 Quoted in Donald D. Searing, Westminster’s World: Understanding Political Roles, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994, p. 1. 3 Chapter 4, pp. 84–5.

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We suggested in Chapter 34 that knowledge, values and attitudes were important variables in the socialisation process and this was illustrated by our analysis of respondents’ views of their roles. Now two other elements of our socialisation model come into play – personality and experience. Our data does not allow us to develop a systematic analysis of MPs’ personalities and experience (except, of course, in the latter case whether they are newly elected or longer-serving), but their importance cannot be doubted. Moreover, while personality may remain relatively constant, experience is a changing variable. We have already seen in Chapter 55 that a significant proportion of the 1992 and 1997 intakes had had ministerial or opposition frontbench experience by 2005, even more by 2010, while others may continue to harbour frontbench ambitions. Among longer-serving MPs, some will have already held ministerial or frontbench positions and some may still live in hope, but others will recognise that a ministerial career or frontbench experience has passed them by. Yet others hold or will have held parliamentary positions as chairs of legislative or investigatory committees, or both. All such experiences may affect their attitudes towards their roles as MPs to the point that these attitudes may vary significantly over the period of their parliamentary careers.

The impact of government, opposition and party Again in Chapter 5, we have seen that party is a major factor in influencing MPs’ attitudes. Which party they support is therefore likely to be an important factor in influencing their parliamentary behaviour and whether their party is in government or opposition, or a minor party at Westminster. Attitudes towards the scrutiny of the executive have already been shown to be affected by whether Conservative or Labour respondents sat on the government or opposition benches6 and this is reflected in levels of parliamentary activity. We examined seven types of activity: • • • • 4

contributions to debates in the House of Commons Chamber contributions to debates in Westminster Hall parliamentary Questions for oral answer parliamentary Questions for written answer

Chapter 3, pp. 30–2. Chapter 5, pp. 120–4, 127–30. 6 See Chapter 5, pp. 131–2. 5

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• attendance at standing committees on bills • attendance at investigatory committees • the signing of Early Day Motions (EDMs). In each case we analysed activity over five sessions – 1992–93, 1994–95, 1997–98, 1999–2000 and 2003–04, except for Westminster Hall debates, which began in 1999–2000, where analysis covers the last two sessions. We present the complete analysis first in graphical form in Figure 6.1, followed by exposition and commentary. The parliamentary activity of MPs over the five sessions shown in Figure 6.1 shows several patterns. First, procedural constraints clearly affect the extent of various activities, so that the greater the constraint the more limited the incidence of the activity, ranging from oral Questions at one extreme to EDMs at the other. Secondly, with the exception of EDMs and to a lesser extent investigatory committees, a major factor affecting Conservative and Labour MPs was whether their party was in government or opposition. Thirdly and following on from this, with the important exception of standing committees on bills, official opposition MPs were more active than those from the governing party,7 particularly in debates8 and written parliamentary Questions. Fourthly,

Contributions per MP

35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Govt.

Opp.

LD

PC

SNP

UUP

DUP

SDLP

The House of Commons Chamber (Source: House of Commons, Parliamentary On-line Information Service (POLIS).)

Figure 6.1

Parliamentary activity in five sessions, 1992–2004

7 This same pattern is found in other legislative committees, notably those dealing with domestic and European delegated legislation. 8 This includes Westminster Hall debates, following their introduction in 1999.

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Contributions per MP

6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Govt.

Opp.

LD

PC

SNP

UUP

DUP SDLP

Westminster Hall debates (Source: POLIS.)

Questions answered per MP

25 20 15 10 5 0 Govt.

Opp.

LD

PC

SNP

UUP

SNP

UUP

DUP

SDLP

Oral parliamentary Questions (Source: POLIS.)

Questions answered per MP

300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Govt.

Opp.

LD

PC

Written parliamentary Questions (Source: POLIS.)

Figure 6.1

(Continued)

DUP SDLP

139

100 90 % Meetings attended

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Govt.

Opp.

LD

PC

SNP

UUP

DUP SDLP

Standing committees on bills (Source: House of Commons Sessional Returns.)

Mean no. of meetings per committee member

35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Govt.

Opp.

LD

PC

SNP

UUP

DUP

SDLP

Investigatory committees (Source: House of Commons, Sessional Returns; Note: The figure for DUP covers three sessions and that for the SDLP four sessions.)

400 No. signed per MP

350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Cons.

Lab.

LD

PC

SNP

UUP

DUP

SDLP

Early Day Motions (Source: House of Commons Early Day Motions (EDMs) Database.)

Figure 6.1

(Continued)

140


minor parties tend to have to work harder by being more active to get their message across.9 And, finally, minor parties were more selective in their parliamentary activity; the Northern Ireland parties generally being less active and more selective; Plaid Cymru being substantially more active than the Scottish National Party, both before and after devolution. What distinguishes legislative committees from the other activities is that procedurally they matter more to the government: attendance at these committees is crucial to the government’s legislative programme, including delegated legislation, especially as votes are often frequent and their timing unpredictable. Although attendance at meetings of investigatory committees varied between Members and committees,10 attendance by Conservative and Labour committee members tended to be similar, averaging 25 and 27.5 meetings respectively in 1999–2000, but it was more variable for minor parties – the Liberal Democrats averaged a similar number of meetings to Conservative and Labour backbenchers in 1997–98 but fewer (20.3 ) in 1999–2000, and the smaller parties ranged from 15 for the Democratic Unionist Party to 33 for the Ulster Unionist Party in 1999–2000. EDMs constitute an interesting and important variation. As we noted in Chapter 4,11 the use of EDMs has shifted from being a function of government and opposition to one of party, with Labour, Liberal Democrat and Plaid Cymru Members tabling and signing many more EDMs than Conservative MPs. In addition, the use to which they are put has broadened almost beyond recognition: once mainly partisan, both interparty and intra-party, they now range from the serious to the trivial, from the international to the personal, and from high politics to the non-political. In practice, levels of parliamentary activity vary considerably from Member to Member and from one type of activity to another. For example, an analysis of the 20 MPs most active in each category shows many of the same MPs session after session. The same is true, though to a lesser degree, with the 20 least active MPs. Thus, in the 1997–98

9 This appears to be an historical as well as a contemporary phenomenon: see Michael Rush, The Role of the Member of Parliament Since 1868: From Gentlemen to Players, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, pp. 157–65. 10 In 1999–2000, attendance rates ranged from 80.7 per cent for the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 80.1 per cent for Defence and 78.3 per cent for Social Security to 49.8 per cent for the Environmental Audit Committee and 51.8 per cent for Education and Employment – House of Commons, Select Committee Return, 1999–2000, HC 000, 2000–01. 11 See Chapter 4, pp. 90–4.


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and 1999–2000 sessions nine Conservatives and fourteen Labour MPs were among the twenty most active MPs in Commons’ debates and similar figures emerge for other activities – eleven and five for oral Questions eight and twelve for supplementary Questions; nine and eight for written Questions; and thirteen and twelve for EDMs. However, there is more variation among the least active Members, with fewer of the same MPs being less active over the two sessions. The Liberal Democrats present a similar picture, but with higher levels of activity generally. This pattern is confirmed by the analysis of other sessions, both in the 1992–97 and 2001–05 Parliaments. Some MPs – Nicholas Winterton and John Wilkinson for the Conservatives and Dennis Skinner and Tam Dalyell for Labour, for instance – were highly active session after session over long parliamentary careers, whereas others varied in their levels of activity. Few Members were highly active across all types of parliamentary activity, but a number were especially active in the Chamber, whether contributing to debates or asking Questions, while others were less active in these areas and much more active in asking written Questions, tabling and signing EDMs, or serving on committees. However, there were also differences between newly elected and longer-serving MPs and it is to them we now turn.

Behavioural socialisation We saw in Chapter 4 that newly elected MPs are subject to functional socialisation in which they learn how to operate as Members of Parliament, especially in using the various procedures available. Now we wish to focus on whether socialisation extends to their behaviour. Total socialisation would result in a perfect or near-perfect match between the patterns of behaviour of newly elected and longer-serving MPs. Of course, given the significance of party apparent in our analyses of both functional and attitudinal socialisation, it might be expected that the behaviour patterns of newly elected Conservatives would be closer to longer-serving Conservatives than to longer-serving Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs, and so on. This could mean two very different things: that behaviour patterns would vary little within parties or that there would be differences at first, but these would largely disappear over time under the impact of socialisation. We therefore sought to test these possibilities by examining the behaviour patterns of backbenchers over two sessions of the 1992–97 Parliament (1992–93 and 1994–95), two sessions of the 1997–2001 Parliament (1997–98 and 1999–2000) and one of the 2001–05 Parliament (2003–04). This enabled us to compare the

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behaviour of each of the 1992 and 1997 intakes with that of longerserving MPs over three parliamentary sessions, two in the Parliament in which they were first elected and one in the Parliament following. Our analysis covers both participation, as measured by the proportion of MPs who engage in a particular activity, and contributions, as a measure of the extent of each Member’s activity. Gross participation is a crude measure, since it simply records engagement in a particular parliamentary activity. Furthermore, the first session of a new Parliament is often invariably substantially longer than subsequent sessions,12 providing more opportunity for MPs to participate. Nonetheless, although not all MPs participate in every type of activity, all contribute at some point during a session to debates in the Chamber, though not those in Westminster Hall; virtually all table Questions for written answer and participate in Question Time, but not all are successful in having their Questions selected for answer or manage ‘to catch the Speaker’s eye’ to ask a supplementary Question; many participate in committee work, but significant minorities of backbenchers do not serve on committees; and almost without exception all MPs (other than ministers13 ) sign EDMs, though far fewer table them. By analysing the contributions per sitting day made by MPs, we are able to compare more effectively their levels of activity, both between parties and between newly elected and longer-serving MPs. The House of Commons Chamber MPs should come into the Chamber and listen to speakers. (Longerserving Conservative, 1999) The Chamber is losing its daily central importance. (Conservative, 1992 intake, questionnaire 3, 1999) I now recognise that much more time is spent outside the Chamber than in. (Labour, 1997 intake, questionnaire 3, 1999)

12 The normal parliamentary session runs from Autumn in one year to the Autumn of the next and lasts between 150 and 160 days, but all elections since 1979 have been held in the Spring or early summer and the first session of the new Parliament has run for 18 rather than 12 months. Thus, the 1992–93 session had 240 sitting days and the 1994–95 159; the 1997–98 session had 241 sitting days and 1999–2000 170, a little longer than usual; and the 2001–02 session had 201 sitting days and 2003–04 157. 13 In addition, Parliamentary Private Secretaries (i.e. MPs acting as unpaid aides to ministers) do not usually sign EDMs.


143

It has become commonplace to observe that attendance in the Chamber of the House of Commons, other than for occasions such as Prime Minister’s Questions, Budget Day and times of high drama, has declined and that the Chamber is of much less importance than it was. Whatever the truth of such observations, we found them reflected in our questionnaire responses, though not as unequivocally as might have been expected. With the important exception of the 1997 Labour intake, the ranking of time spent in the Chamber fell over the three questionnaires, bringing it into line with the view of longer-serving Members. Labour’s 1997 intake alone claimed to spend less time in committees, possibly because the sheer number of new Labour MPs enabled the whips to spread committee work more thinly. Of the various forms of parliamentary activity, the Chamber of the House of Commons offers the least opportunity for involvement, other than as a spectator of and listener to the contributions of others, particularly those on the frontbenches. As spectators, of course, MPs can be actively involved in supporting their frontbench colleagues, collectively, individually and, not infrequently, vociferously, but the constraints on more active involvement in debates, especially in making a speech, are considerable. There are invariably more MPs wishing to speak than can be accommodated in the time available and, apart from ministers and the frontbench spokespersons from all the other parties, until 1997–98, privy counsellors (mostly former ministers) took precedence over other Members. The latter may inform the Speaker that they wish to speak, but the Speaker is under no obligation to call them and, in any case, more often than not more do so than he or she is able to call. The Speaker also has to have regard to the balance of opinion in the House, especially, though not exclusively, in respect of party. It is largely a case of many wishing to be called but few being chosen. Nonetheless, in each of the sessions we analysed virtually all MPs participated in proceedings in the Chamber, although the Liberal Democrats in particular tended to show lower levels after the first session of each Parliament, reflecting perhaps their need to be more selective in their participation. More importantly, the number of contributions varied between parties and between newly elected and longer-serving MPs, as the graphs in Figure 6.2 show. Although the government–opposition dichotomy is evident in the Conservative and Labour graphs, clear differences emerge between the parties and, in particular, between newly elected and longer-serving MPs. In both 1992 and 1997 the new Conservative intakes were more active than the longer-serving group, especially in 1997, but were much

144

No. per MP per sitting day

0.25

0.2

0.15

0.1

0.05

0 Session 1

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake

Conservative


0.25

0.2

0.15

0.1

0.05

0 Session 1

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake

Labour

Figure 6.2 Number of contributions to debates in the House of Commons in selected sessions Source: POLIS.


145


0.25

0.2

0.15

0.1

0.05

0 Session 1

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake

Liberal Democrat

Figure 6.2

(Continued)

closer by the third session analysed, suggesting socialisation may have been at work. The median number of contributions made by the 1997 intake and longer-serving Conservatives were 40 and 27 in 1997–98, 26 and 15 in 1999–2000, but 14 and 17 in 2003–04. In the Labour case, an initial, small gap between the newly elected and longer-serving quickly closed and remained small by the third session. The median figures were 11 and 13 in 1997–98, 8 and 6 in 1999–2000, and 9 and 10 in 2003–04. However, what distinguished the Labour picture was that in both Parliaments new Labour MPs were slower off the mark compared with the longer-serving Labour group and new Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. New Liberal Democrats, however, presented a different picture, although the very small 1992 intake needs to be borne in mind in making comparisons. Initial divergence, with longer-serving Liberal Democrats the more active, is followed by convergence; this held for the 1992 but not the 1997 intake, which became increasingly active. Overall, there is evidence of convergence in the case of newly elected Conservative and Labour MPs and their longer-serving colleagues, but not with the Liberal Democrats, who seem more likely to carve out their own role or way of using the Chamber.

146


Westminster Hall Westminster Hall sessions present a marked contrast with debates in the Chamber (see Figure 6.3). These sessions began in 1999 and in effect replaced and extended those Fridays devoted to Private Members’ motions. The data therefore covers the 1999–2000 and 2003–04 parliamentary sessions only. More newly elected than longer-serving Conservative and Labour MPs initially participated in Westminster Hall debates, though there was no difference between newly elected and longer-serving Liberal Democrats. In terms of contributions per day, however, newly elected MPs in all three parties were more active in 1999–2000, the Liberal Democrats especially. Westminster Hall was clearly much more attractive to new than to longer-serving MPs. This gap had closed for the Conservatives in 2003–04, but not for Labour and the Liberal Democrats, although in both cases participation and the mean number of contributions increased. And, as with contributions to the Chamber, the Labour intake was slower off the mark than those of other parties. There seems little doubt that the 1997 intake took to Westminster Hall more rapidly and readily than their longer-serving 0.05


0.045 0.04 0.035 0.03 0.025 0.02 0.015 0.01 0.005 0 Session 1

Figure 6.3 sessions

Session 2

Cons. 1997 intake

Cons. LS

Lab. 1997 intake

Lab. LS

LD 1997 intake

LD LS

Number of contributions to Westminster Hall debates in selected

Source: POLIS.


147

colleagues. Indeed, the latter appeared to undergo or be in need of a process of re-socialisation. Parliamentary Questions for oral answer The constraints on asking Questions for oral answer are considerable, consisting of a limit on the number a Member can table for answer on a given day, a limit on the period of notice, the lottery of the ‘shuffle’, by which the Table Office selects the order of Questions, and simply how many Questions are reached for answer at each Question Time. Although ‘catching the Speaker’s eye’ in seeking to ask a supplementary Question allows more MPs to participate, it also increases the element of chance. Nevertheless, participation in Question Time tends to be high and usually attracts the highest attendance in the House, particularly for Prime Minister’s Questions. However, our data suggests that over the course of a Parliament the number of MPs participating in Question Time, both asking the original Question and supplementary Questions declines, only to rise again at the beginning of the next Parliament. It also appears to reflect the government–opposition dichotomy, with more answers to Questions, both substantive and supplementary, being secured by Conservative and Liberal Democrat than by Labour Members. As Figure 6.4 shows, in 1992–93 and 1997–98, newly elected Conservatives secured more oral answers to Questions than their longer-serving colleagues and this pattern continued over the three sessions examined, with little or no evidence of convergence. In contrast, new Labour MPs again lagged behind the longer-serving, before eventually converging with them. Further analysis of data on supplementary Questions from the 1997–2001 and 2001–05 Parliaments confirms this Labour pattern. The 1997–98 data shows that longer-serving MPs were more successful in asking supplementary Questions than newly elected MPs, but this difference was not apparent in the two later sessions, suggesting, perhaps, that the Speaker may have found it easier to recognise longerserving MPs in the first session.14 The Liberal Democrats, on the other hand, showed more evidence of divergence than convergence, especially between the 1997 intake and longer-serving Liberal Democrats. Socialisation thus appeared to be at work among the Labour intakes, but not the Conservative or Liberal Democrats.

14 Specific data on supplementary Questions for the 1992–97 Parliament was not available.

148

No. answerd per MP per sitting day

0.14 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0 Session 1

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake

Conservative

0.07

No. per sitting day

0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 Session 1

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake

Labour

Figure 6.4

Number of Questions given oral answers in selected sessions

Source: POLIS.


149

0.1 0.09

No. per sitting day

0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 Session 1

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake

Liberal Democrat

Figure 6.4

(Continued)

Parliamentary Questions for written answer The principal restriction on Questions, whether for oral or written answer, is that they must relate to matters for which the minister concerned is constitutionally responsible, although there are other restrictions, such as matters which are sub judice or certain matters relating to the exercise of the royal prerogative on the advice of ministers. However, there are fewer restrictions on those for written answer. In particular, there are no restrictions on the number a Member may ask. Consequently, Questions for written answer vastly outnumber those for oral answer by between eight and nine to one. Because they are subject to fewer restrictions and will normally receive an answer, they are popular with MPs, especially as a means of eliciting information from the government. Participation rates are therefore high, with virtually all backbenchers using them, and show little sign of tailing off during a Parliament. Moreover, to a greater extent than Questions for oral answer, they are more widely used by the official opposition and third parties than by government backbenchers. For the two sessions of the 1992–97 Parliament, the mean number of Questions for written answer was 47.7

150


and 26 for Conservatives, then in government, but for the Labour opposition, both frontbenchers and backbenchers, it was 134.1 and 112.4. In contrast, when the roles were reversed in 1997–2001, the mean number of Questions was 92.2 and 61.5 for the Conservative opposition and 71.2 and 49.8 for the Labour government’s backbenchers. For the Liberal Democrats the figures were 181 and 143.2 for 1992–97 and 236.3 and 186 for 1997–2000, again both frontbenchers and backbenchers. The 1992 and 1997 Conservative intakes both started at the same level as their longer-serving colleagues, but then outstripped the latter, especially in the third session covered (see Figure 6.5). Similarly, the Liberal Democrats began at similar levels, but then diverged, with the 1997 intake and longer-serving 1992 groups being the more active. In both cases, this again suggests the new intakes carving out their own role. In contrast, the two Labour intakes converged with longerserving Labour MPs in the third session and the 1997 intake in particular lagged behind longer-serving MPs, suggesting that socialisation had been at work. 1.4

No. per sitting day

1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 Session 1

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake

Conservative

Figure 6.5 sessions

Number of parliamentary Questions given written answers in selected

Source: POLIS.

151

1 0.9

No. answered per day

0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 Session 1

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake

Labour

1.6 1.4

No. per day

1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 Session 1

Liberal Democrat

Figure 6.5

(Continued)

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake

152


Committee activity Committees, both legislative and investigatory, offer a more systematic form of parliamentary activity, meeting at more or less regular intervals and providing a more sustained focus than other procedures. Membership is largely in the hands of the whips, but that for legislative committees dealing with bills and most of those dealing with delegated legislation are reformulated each time business is referred to them, so that their membership is variable. Investigatory committees, however, have a more stable membership, particularly over the course of a session. Thus, in 1997–98 the average turnover was 19.5 per cent, ranging from nil for the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees to 64 per cent for Social Security, and, in 1999-2000 it was 25.4 per cent, ranging from nil for Culture, Media and Sport and Trade and Industry to 64 per cent for Public Administration. There is, however, another difference: all legislative committees, other than a number of select committees15 which make recommendations on legislation, are subject to whipping, but investigatory committees are not whipped and whips are precluded from membership. Understandably, the whips are much more concerned with attitudes in legislative committees, especially those on bills, than they are about investigatory committees for the simple reason that much of the government’s legislative programme must pass through the former, whereas no government business is dependent on investigatory committees. Those draft bills referred to the latter are examined and reported on, but are not subject to their approval as part of their passage through Parliament. That said, persistent non-attendance at investigatory committees is likely to be frowned upon by the chair of the committee and other committee members, not least in maintaining a quorum and, in any case, such absence will not go unnoticed by the whips. Certainly, the whips take a strong interest in the membership of investigatory committees: one of our Labour respondents from the 1997 intake claimed that for two years after his election the whips had kept him off the select committee most appropriate to his background and expertise and then ‘as a “jolly wheeze” put me on the most boring [the Regulatory Reform Committee]’. And, of course, in 2001 the Blair government famously miscalculated the mood of its backbenchers when it sought to exclude two ‘difficult’ select committee chairs – Donald Anderson, who had been Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and Gwyneth Dunwoody, Chair of Transport – and the Commons rejected

15 That is, the Select Committees on Statutory Instruments, European Scrutiny, Regulatory Reform, and the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills.


153

their exclusion. However, once on an investigatory committee, Members are less susceptible to the machinations of the whips and the committees develop a significant level of behavioural autonomy. But, as we have already seen in Chapter 4, legislative committees are used by the whips to socialise newly elected MPs, and longer-serving MPs are given a degree of priority in assigning the membership of investigatory committees.16 Not surprisingly, given the pressure of the whips, attendance rates at standing committees on bills (see Figure 6.6) were high and showed little difference between newly elected and longer-serving MPs, although, and equally unsurprising, rates tended to be marginally higher for governing compared with opposition parties. The slightly lower figures for Labour after 1997 are probably a product of the huge majorities the party enjoyed after the 1997 and 2001 general elections, allowing the whips to take a somewhat more relaxed approach. The lower and more variable attendance rates for the Liberal Democrats reflect the more 100 90

% Meetings attended

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Session 1

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake

Conservative

Figure 6.6

Attendance rates at standing committees on bills in selected sessions

Source: House of Commons Sessional Returns.

16

See Chapter 4, p. 96.

154

100 90

% Meetings attended

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Session 1

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake

Labour

100 90

% Meetings attended

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Session 1

Liberal Democrat

Figure 6.6

(Continued)

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake


155

selective approach the party adopts towards its parliamentary activity, a pattern repeated among other third parties, although they also reflect their concern with their respective parts of the United Kingdom – Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. A similar pattern applied to the standing committees appointed to deal with delegated legislation, both domestic and European, with higher government and lower opposition and third-party attendance, but somewhat lower attendance overall, since the whips are generally more relaxed about these committees. The data on investigatory committee attendance is more variable (see Figure 6.7), with the mean number of meetings attended inevitably being higher in the much longer first sessions of the two Parliaments. However, the differences between newly elected and longer-serving Members were in most cases small. The major exceptions were in the 1999–2000 session, when the gaps between the two were much larger for both Labour and the Liberal Democrats, although in the first case it was longer-serving MPs who attended more meetings and in the second it was the newly elected. In both instances, the likely explanation is frontbench appointments, with an increasing number of the 1997 Labour intake achieving ministerial office and more longerserving Liberal Democrats being frontbench spokespersons. The other exception is that none of the four new Liberal Democrats in 1992 were

Mean no. of meetings attended

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Session 1

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake

Conservative

Figure 6.7

Attendance at investigatory committees in selected sessions

Source: House of Commons Sessional Returns.

156


40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Session 1

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake

Labour


40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Session 1

Liberal Democrat

Figure 6.7

(Continued)

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake


157

appointed members of investigatory committees in 1992–93, their first session, since the smaller total of Liberal Democrats entitled them to fewer committee places and priority was given to their longer-serving colleagues. More generally, and probably more importantly from a socialisation point of view, turnover of investigatory committee membership was much higher among the new intakes than longer-serving MPs. This is partly explained by ministerial and opposition frontbench appointments, as noted above, but is also likely to reflect the more settled interests among longer-serving MPs. Of particular interest are our respondents’ views about committee activity. These did not fall neatly into two categories – ‘investigatory committees good’, ‘standing committees bad’. Certainly, both newly elected and longer-serving MPs overwhelmingly thought investigatory committees a ‘worthwhile’ experience, but a substantial majority also thought that serving on standing committees was ‘worthwhile’. Where opinions differed was that few respondents regarded investigatory committees in a totally negative light, whereas the view that standing committees, whether on bills or delegated legislation, were ‘a total waste of time’, ‘a deplorable lack of scrutiny’ or ‘utterly pointless’ was more widespread. One of the 1992 Conservative intake said that, as far as standing committees on delegated legislation were concerned, he felt like ‘a rubber stamp’. Nevertheless, standing committees had their defenders: ‘It’s where the real work is done’ (Conservative, 1992 intake, third questionnaire); ‘Real scrutiny. [Provide the] opportunity to table amendments, to press ministers on important points, and to obtain assurances on the record’ (Conservative, 1997 intake, third questionnaire); ‘A chance to influence government legislation’ (longer-serving Labour); ‘Worthwhile, but boring in format . . . ’ (longer-serving Conservative). For a number of respondents, the government–opposition dichotomy affected responses: ‘Depends whether you are on the government side or opposition’, said a longer-serving Conservative; ‘Yes in opposition, no in government’, echoed a longer-serving Labour MP. And one of the 1997 Labour intake remarked, ‘As a government Member, not allowed to speak.’ A somewhat more complex view came from another of the 1997 Labour intake, who said that he had fulfilled three different functions on bill committees – providing ‘clear interest, expertise and involvement’, to ‘make up the numbers’ and, as a Parliamentary Private Secretary (PPS), assisting with the passage of departmental bills; while one of his colleagues commented, ‘Yes, on technical bills, others no.’ The attitude of ministers also emerged as a significant factor: ‘Some bill committees have been a pleasure, where the minister and the whip

158


keep members informed of issues, hold progress meetings and encourage interventions where appropriate. Conversely, where the minister and whip want to charge through the clauses and discourage interventions or participation, it can be numbingly tedious’ (Labour 1997 intake, third questionnaire). There was no shortage of positive responses on investigatory committees: just as one of the 1992 Conservative intake thought that standing committees on bills were where ‘the real work is done’, so a longer-serving Labour respondent said that investigatory committees constituted the ‘real work of Parliament’; an ‘excellent opportunity to scrutinise expert witnesses from industry, pressure groups and the government’ (Conservative, 1997 intake, second questionnaire) and ‘a genuine opportunity to influence policy’ (Labour, 1997 intake, second questionnaire) were typical. One Labour Member, elected in 1997, went as far as to say, ‘I would not have stood [for election] again but for my Culture, Media and Sport [Committee] experience.’ Others were less impressed: one of the 1992 Conservative intake said of the committee he served on, ‘It was interesting to see how badly it did its work’;17 a longerserving Labour MP said that only the Public Accounts Committee was effective; and one longer-serving Conservative was of the opinion that investigatory committees ‘are exercises in keeping MPs occupied and out of mischief’. For members of the minor parties, views can be sharply divided: one of the four newly elected Liberal Democrats in 1992 said he found them ‘a wonderful source of information’, another became disillusioned and ‘asked to step down’. It should not be forgotten, however, that, whereas almost all MPs will have had experience of standing committees on legislation, particularly in the early stages of their parliamentary careers, not all MPs have served on investigatory committees and those that have often on only one or two, so that their experience is narrowly focused. Perhaps the view of an experienced third-party MP is the most accurate: ‘I have served on several dozen of them – they vary considerably.’ Committees thus serve two rather different socialisation roles. Legislative committees play a major role for the newly elected, not just in their first session but well into their first Parliament. Investigatory committees probably play a longer-term role, providing those newly elected MPs appointed to them with experience and thus socialising them into a major aspect of the scrutiny role and developing their knowledge and expertise, but also helping new Members decide whether they wish to play a significant scrutiny role through such committees.

17

Original emphasis.


159

There are, however, two other types of committees in which MPs can be involved – party subject committees and all-party groups (APGs). Party subject committees serve both as backbench forums for the discussion of party policy and also as two-way channels of communication between ministers or opposition frontbenchers and their backbench supporters. APGs are cross-party groupings, often linked to pressure groups and other extra-parliamentary interests and sometimes financially supported by them. They seek to promote particular issues or policy areas, often proposing particular policies. As many as eight or nine out of ten of our respondents said they intended to be active in party committees, but there was a tendency for the number who actually became active to be much lower in practice, broadly in line with longerserving MPs. APGs attracted somewhat less attention and intentions similarly tended to decline in reality to the levels of the longer-serving. Such committees and groups are likely to play a socialising role in widening the experience and knowledge of the new intakes, especially by bringing them into contact with longer-serving MPs, both in their own party in the case of party committees and other parties with APGs. Early Day Motions Early Day Motions (EDMs) are subject to few constraints. As with all matters considered in parliamentary proceedings, they are subject to the sub judice rule (matters awaiting a decision in the courts), but, unlike Questions, they are not restricted by ministerial responsibility and can therefore address virtually any subject or matter, hence their use to congratulate individuals, organisations, sporting teams and the like on their achievements. The Speaker may disallow motions which reflect ‘on a Member’s mental condition . . . are clearly ironic or “tendered in a spirit of mockery” . . . [include] . . . obscenities, or are merely designed to give annoyance’.18 In addition, they should not normally exceed 250 words, but this too barely restricts their scope and use. However, none of this prevents an EDM from criticising a minister or another Member, or, of course, government policy and administration, even less expressing support for a minister or policy, sycophantically or otherwise. Procedurally easy to table and even easier to sign, it is hardly surprising that, as we have already noted, the number of EDMs tabled has increased enormously

18

Robert Blackburn and Andrew Kennon, Griffith and Ryle on Parliament: Functions, Practice and Procedure, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2nd ed., 2003, p. 287.

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from just under one per sitting day in 1959–64 to more than ten times that number. The whips take a close interest and, while encouraging the tabling and signing of those favourable to the party line, actively discourage less favourable ones, but this does little to deter MPs, other than PPSs, who seldom sign EDMs. In the 1997–98 and 1999–2000 session, for example, the only Conservative backbencher not to sign an EDM was the former Prime Minister, Sir Edward Heath; all the non-signing Labour backbenchers were PPSs; and every Liberal Democrat signed at least one EDM. Figure 6.8 confirms the much greater use made of EDMs by Labour and Liberal Democrat Members compared with the Conservatives, although the latter showed a marked increase in their use in 2003–04. However, the figure also shows that the Conservative and Labour 1997 intakes and their longer-serving colleagues followed close and parallel patterns of usage, whereas the 1997 Liberal Democrats did so for the first two sessions analysed but diverged in the third. These parallel patterns are also found for Conservative and Labour backbenchers in the partial data available for the 1992 Parliament, though not for the Liberal Democrats, where the three members of the 1992 intake for whom data was available were noticeably more active than their longer-serving colleagues. The 2003–04 Conservative surge may have

No. signed per sitting day

0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 Session 1

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake

Conservative

Figure 6.8

Number of EDMs signed per sitting day

Source: House of Commons EDM Database; Note: Only partial data is available for the 1992 intake and longer-serving 1992 MPs because the POLIS records concerned exclude MPs who retired or were defeated in the 1997 general election.

161


2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

0 Session 1

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake

Labour


3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 Session 1

Liberal Democrat

Figure 6.8

(Continued)

Session 2

Session 3

1992 intake

1992 LS

1997 LS

1997 intake

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been the result of a conscious effort to increase the use of EDMs, but without detailed analysis of the intervening sessions and the subject matter of the motions signed, it is not possible to say. What is clear is that in spite of increased Conservative use, they were outstripped by the other parties and that, within the two main parties, there is little difference between new and longer-serving MPs. Further evidence of lower EDM activity among Conservatives is found in the proportions of Members signing 200 or more EDM in a session. In 1997–98 and 1999– 2000 less than 1 per cent of Conservatives signed 200 or more EDMs, although with a surge in activity in the next Parliament in 2003–04 it had reached 24.1 per cent. However, for Labour MPs the figures were 25.3 per cent (1997–98), 23.1 per cent (1999–2000) and 31.1 per cent (2003–04) and, for the Liberal Democrats, 60 per cent, 46.7 and 47.2 per cent respectively. The divide between the Conservatives and other parties is reinforced when comparing their new intakes: 55.9 per cent of newly elected Conservatives tabled motions in 1997–98 compared with 75.8 per cent of new Labour MPs and all Liberal Democrats. In addition, the mean number of EDMs co-sponsored, as distinct from merely signed, was 1.7 for Conservatives, 2.9 for Labour and 8.9 for Liberal Democrats. In fact, EDMs were, with one exception, the only procedure in which newly elected Labour MPs were more actively involved than their Conservative counterparts in their first parliamentary session. The sole exception was written Questions in 1992–93, when Labour was in opposition. This ‘slower off the mark’ feature was also characteristic of newly elected Labour MPs compared with their longer-serving colleagues in respect of the Chamber and oral Questions in the first session of both Parliaments and of written Questions in 1997–98, but here the exception was Westminster Hall, where the 1997 Labour intake was more active than longer-serving MPs. Party cohesion Party cohesion became an increasingly important feature of Westminster politics during the nineteenth century and by 1900 was close to 100 per cent, a situation that lasted well into the second half of the twentieth century.19 Indeed, in a study published in 1965, the level of party cohesion understandably led a leading American commentator on British politics to comment that it ‘was so close to 100 per cent that there

19

See Rush, The Role of the Member of Parliament, pp. 47–9, 170–83.


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was no longer any point in measuring it’.20 It was not obvious at the time, but things were about to change – backbench behaviour has been characterised by significant levels of dissent since the 1960s.21 It had its greatest impact between 1974 and 1979, when the then Labour government had either only a small majority or no majority at all. However, backbench rebellions have continued, notwithstanding large government majorities under Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair.22 In the 1997–2001 Parliament there were 96 rebellions by Labour MPs, 163 by Conservatives and 30 by Liberal Democrats. The average Labour rebellion consisted of fifteen MPs, compared with six for the Conservatives and two for the Liberal Democrats. These in turn 100 90

% MPs rebelling

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Cons.

Lab. 1997 intake

Figure 6.9

LD

Longer-serving

Proportion of MPs rebelling, 1997–2001

Source: Cowley, Revolts and Rebellions, Appendices 3–8. 20 Samuel H. Beer, Modern British Politics: A Study of Parties and Pressure Groups, Faber, London, 1965, p. 350. 21 See Philip Norton, Dissension in the House of Commons, 1945–74, Macmillan, London, 1975; Conservative Dissidents: Dissidence within the Parliamentary Conservative Party, 1970–74, Temple Smith, London, 1978; Dissidence in the House of Commons, 1974–79, Martin Robertson, London, 1981; and ‘Behavioural Changes’ in Norton (ed.), Parliament in the 1980s, Blackwell, Oxford, 1985. 22 For the period since 1997 see Philip Cowley, Revolts and Rebellions: Parliamentary Voting Under Blair, Politico’s, London, 2002 and The Rebels: How Blair Mislaid His Majority, Politico’s, London, 2005.

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comprised two-fifths of Labour backbenchers, more than three-quarters of Conservatives and three-fifths of Liberal Democrats.23 However, the 1997 intake showed differences between the parties: only 28 per cent of the new Labour intake rebelled, compared with 88 per cent of new Conservatives and 61 per cent of Liberal Democrats, in both cases at broadly similar levels to their longer-serving colleagues (see Figure 6.9).24 At first sight none of this might seem surprising: the 1997 election brought Labour back to power after 18 years in opposition and at the first meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party, Tony Blair stressed the need for unity, in spite of Labour’s massive majority. Nevertheless, the figure for longer-serving Labour MPs was, at 54 per cent, nearly double that for the new intake. Moreover, as the Parliament progressed, the proportion of the 1997 Labour intake willing to rebel increased, only falling away in the fourth and final session, as Figure 6.10 illustrates. Thus, as a proportion of all Labour rebels, the 1997 intake’s score was 28.6 per cent in 1997–98, 32.1 per cent in 1998–99 and 40 per cent in 100 90 80 % MPs rebelling

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1997–98

1998–99

1999–2000

1997 intake Figure 6.10

2000–01

Longer-serving

Rebellions by Labour MPs, 1997–2001

Source: Cowley, Revolts and Rebellions, Appendices 3–6.

23 24

Cowley, Revolts and Rebellions, p. 89. Table 10.5 and Appendix 8. Ibid., p. 110.


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100 90 % MPs rebelling

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1997 intake Figure 6.11

2001 intake

Rebellions by 1997 and 2001 intakes of Labour MPs

Source: Cowley, The Rebels, p. 167.

1999–2000, falling away to 11.l per cent in the final session as the general election approached. Was this a phenomenon peculiar to newly elected government MPs? As Figure 6.11 shows, the behaviour of the 2001 Labour intake was very different: ‘Of the 38 new Labour MPs elected in 2001, 24 – or nearly two-thirds had voted against their whips by the time the 2001 Parliament came to an end.’25 In contrast, there were fewer Conservative rebellions in the 2001–05 Parliament, though Liberal Democrat rebellions were at a similar rate to the previous Parliament.26 Party cohesion is, of course, much affected by whether a party is in government or opposition, but it is also affected by the circumstances of and issues dealt with in a particular Parliament. Most of the time MPs vote with their parties – that is the norm of which MPs are well aware before they are elected, and socialisation plays a part in maintaining it. It is also a norm familiar to newly elected Members, emphasising the importance of reinforcement in the socialisation process, especially in MPs’ attitudes towards their role. As Figure 6.12 illustrates, members of the 1997 Labour intake who placed most emphasis on representing the nation or their constituency, following constituency or personal opinion, and denied ministerial ambitions were more likely to rebel than those who emphasised party and aspired to ministerial office.

25 26

Cowley, The Rebels, p. 167. Ibid., pp. 279, 283.

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100 90 80 % Rebel MPs

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Rep. role Nation Figure 6.12

Influ. behaviour Constit.

Party

Personal

Min. ambitions Yes

No

Attitudes of rebel MPs in 1997 Labour intake

Source: Cowley, Revolts and Rebellions, p. 110.

Ethical behaviour For Brutus is an honourable man; So are they all, all honourable men. (Shakespeare, Julius Caesar)27 . . . there is widespread support in the House for the view that it is right to rely on the general good sense of Members rather than on formalised rules. (William Whitelaw, Leader of the House of Commons, 1971)28 Members shall at all times conduct themselves in a manner which will tend to maintain and strengthen the public’s trust in the integrity of Parliament and never undertake any action which would bring the House of Commons, or its Members generally, into disrepute. (Code of Conduct for Members of the House of Commons 1996)29

27

William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, Scene 2. HC Debs., 812, 3 March 1971, cc. 1703–4. 29 House of Commons, Code of Conduct, HC 688, 1995–96 and repeated in subsequent editions of the Code. 28


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As we argued in Chapter 5,30 ethical attitudes are often deduced from hypothetical scenarios or by the challenging of actual behaviour, but it is the latter, especially in the form of scandals, which provides the opportunity to explore ethical behaviour. Thus, the setting up of the Register of Members’ Interests in 1975 followed scandals about the relationship between MPs and outside interests, and it was scandals about conflicts of interest that led to the appointment of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (the Nolan Committee) 20 years later. It was Nolan that led to the adoption of a Code of Conduct, which sets out in some detail an ethical framework for Members of Parliament. And it was Nolan that led to the appointment of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards (PCS) to investigate complaints against MPs. The Register and the Code were acknowledgements by the House of Commons that MPs behaving honourably was a necessary but not sufficient condition for ethical behaviour. Moreover, the Nolan reforms were a recognition that a significant minority of MPs lacked the good sense to behave honourably or, indeed, were dishonourable. The introduction of detailed rules and machinery to enforce them almost inevitably produced an increase in complaints against Members, particularly about failures to register interests but also from time to time about misuse of allowances or facilities. However, many of the latter, while important in principle, were relatively trivial, often related to the misuse of allowances for partisan purposes. Moreover, many of the allegations of failure to register interests were partisan in origin, made by MPs of one party against MPs of another or by party supporters outside Parliament. Although the rules and guidance were adjusted in response, the partisan tit-for-tat continued, but almost imperceptibly the media attention began to shift more specifically to MPs’ expenses. Initially the media focused on particular cases as they arose, without looking at the wider picture. In 2003, for example, following allegations in The Mail on Sunday, Michael Trend (Conservative) was found by the Standards and Privileges Committee to have ‘acted negligently rather than with dishonest intent’ in claiming ‘second home’ costs under the Additional Costs Allowance (ACA).31 It was a case that should have set the alarm bells ringing, but they remained silent. In another case, in 2004, David Blunkett, then Home Secretary, was found to have misused

30

See Chapter 5, pp. 116–7. Standard and Privileges Committee, Third Report: Complaint Against Mr Michael Trend, HC 435, 2002–03, para. 16. 31

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rail tickets available to an MP’s spouse.32 A third case was that of Derek Conway (Conservative), who was found by the Standards and Privileges Committee to have misused his staff allowance by employing his son, a full time student at the University of Newcastle, and paying him at a higher rate than was appropriate to his age and experience.33 There were other straws in the wind. Tony Wright, Labour Chair of the Public Administration Committee, reminded the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CPSL) in 2009 that, in 2002, he had warned it that sooner or later the misuse of MPs’ expenses would become a significant issue.34 Similarly, Sir Alistair Graham, at the end of his term of office as Chair of the CPSL in 2007, told it ‘that there was an urgent need for a review of MPs’ allowances and expenses’.35 But there was also complacency. The Commons’ Standards and Privileges Committee submitted a memorandum to the Senior Salaries Review Body (SSRB), which reviewed MPs’ pay and allowances in 2007, in which it acknowledged that there had been ‘concern that the allowance structure is unduly generous; and concern that MPs are misusing the system by making unjustified claims. However, press comment in particular rarely makes clear the precise root of any concerns expressed . . . ’.36 And in its 2007 report on pay and allowances, the SSRB remarked: ‘Although there is much comment about MPs’ allowances in the press, we have received no substantive evidence to suggest MPs are abusing the system.’37 Be that as it may, beginning in 2005 a number of journalists sought to secure details of the expenses of individual MPs. They met with strong resistance from MPs, the House authorities38 and the then government.

32

Standards and Privileges Committee, Second Report: The Conduct of Mr David Blunkett, HC 189, 2004–05. 33 Standards and Privileges Committee, Fourth Report: The Conduct of Mr Derek Conway, HC 280, 2007–08. 34 Committee on Standards in Public Life, Twelfth Report: MPs’ Expenses and Allowances – Supporting Parliament and Safeguarding the Taxpayer, Cm. 7724, June 2009, Evidence E557. 35 Alistair Graham, ‘Restoring Trust in British Politics’ in Michael Rush and Philip Giddings (eds.), When Gordon Took the Helm: The Palgrave Review of British Politics 2007–08, Palgrave Macmillan and the Hansard Society, Basingstoke and London, 2008, p. 90. 36 Standards and Privileges Committee, Evidence to the SSRB Review on Parliamentary Pay and Allowances, HC 330, 2006–07, para. 2. 37 SSRB, Report No. 64: Review of Parliamentary Pay and Allowances 2007, Cm. 7270, January 2008, para. 5.3. 38 In this context this refers to the House of Commons Commission, chaired by the Speaker, the Leader of the House, and three other MPs, which has overall


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Indeed, in 2007, a Conservative MP, David Maclean (a member of the House of Commons Commission and a former Conservative Chief Whip), steered through the Commons a Private Member’s bill exempting the two Houses of Parliament from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FoI). However, no member of the House of Lords was willing to sponsor the bill and it lapsed. Meanwhile, the House authorities conceded that details of MPs’ expenses should be published under the FoI, but sought to limit the amount of detail released. These limitations were overturned on appeal by the Information Commissioner, whose ruling was upheld by the Information Tribunal and the High Court. Then, in January 2009, the government tabled a draft order exempting the release of information on the allowances claimed by MPs (and members of the House of Lords) from the FoI, leaving the House control over what information would be published. Such was the furore over the proposal that the draft order was withdrawn by the government and it was announced that, although detailed information about MPs’ claims would be published, significant parts would be redacted or blacked out.39 Events then took control: in early May the Daily Telegraph published the first batch of expenses revelations, followed by week after week of more revelations – the expenses scandal had arrived. MPs’ reactions to the ensuing furore were not to examine the ethical implications of the revelations, but to mount two defences. First, they argued, expenses had been ‘within the rules’ and approved by the Fees Office; and, secondly, that successive governments had encouraged MPs to maximise their use of allowances, in effect treating them as part of their salary. In a letter to The Times, one former MP recalled his experience in the mid-1970s: ‘MPs came to regard the total package as their “remuneration” and increasingly to see their only obligation as to obey the letter of the deliberately lax rules for claiming allowances.’40 As for the Fees Office, it found itself ‘piggy-in-middle’, epitomised by the ‘John

responsibility for the administration of the House, and the Select Committee on the Members Estimate, which has the same membership and has financial oversight. However, the Clerk of the House, who is its chief executive, had also expressed concern about the disclosure of the details of MPs’ expenses. 39 For a detailed account see Oonagh Gay (Parliament and Constitution Centre, House of Commons Library), MPs’ Allowances and FoI Requests, Standard Note SN/PC/04732, 22 June 2009. 40 Letter from Mike Thomas (Lab. 1974–81, SDP 1981–83) to The Times, 28 February 2009. For other similar comments see Sir Patrick Cormack, http://www. epolitex.com/mpwebsite/mparticles_29May2009.; http://www.public-standards. gov.uk/Library/MP_expenses_E559_Alan_SimpsonMP.PDF; and ibid., letter from

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Lewis list’ metamorphosing from a set of guidelines to a list of entitlements. These two defences were the basis of what we earlier described as a ‘culture of entitlement’, into which newly elected MPs were rapidly socialised, as an analysis of MPs claiming 75–100 per cent of the ACA in 2004–05 suggests. Not only did a high proportion claim expenses of between 75 and 100 per cent of the ACA, but variations between parties and intakes were limited (see Figure 6.13). Only the pre-1992 Liberal Democrats were significantly lower – 50 per cent compared with 78.5 for the Conservatives and 73.5 for Labour. Moreover, variations between the pre-1992 cohort with the 1992, 1997 and 2001 intakes, generally, were not great: the pre-1992 and 1992 intakes were marginally lower, but the differences were within a narrow range. A quartile analysis by intake shows a similar pattern – the differences between parties and the various intakes are not marked. The behaviour of MPs towards their expenses and the expenses scandal illustrates the ‘worlds apart’ syndrome we described in Chapter 3.41 100 90 80 70 60 %

50 40 30 20 10 0 Pre-1992

1992 intake Cons.

Figure 6.13 by intake

1997 intake Lab.

2001 intake

LD

Proportion of MPs with 75–100 per cent ACA expenses, 2004–05,

Source: www.parliament.uk/about_comons/hocallowances/1 Oct 07.

Eric Illsley, MP, dated 5 June 2009, Ibid., E518. Illsley later pleaded guilty to fraud in claiming expenses and was sentenced to 12 months’imprisonment. 41 See Chapter 3, pp. 46–7, 53.


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Public opinion polls taken in 1985 and 2009 showed that the proportion of respondents believing that MPs did not have ‘high moral code’ increased from 35 per cent to 58 per cent.42 And in August 2009, after the expenses scandal had been in the news for some months, MPs were asked who they blamed for the erosion of their reputation: half said MPs themselves, but 64 per cent blamed the press and 20 per cent the Fees Office.43 Ethically, the socialisation of MPs appears to have ensured that they and the public remain ‘worlds apart’ and there is little sign that the setting up of the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority has yet produced a significant change in that situation.

Behavioural socialisation: an overview Our analysis suggests that, to a significant degree, newly elected Members of Parliament are subject to behavioural socialisation, but that it is neither absolute, nor does it apply in equal measure to all parties. Because MPs can only fulfil various aspects of their roles through parliamentary activity a degree of socialisation is inevitable, not just in learning how to use particular procedures but in the extent to which they use them. However inevitable a degree of socialisation may be, it does not preclude change. Since 1945, for example, the use of oral and written parliamentary Questions has increased enormously; EDMs are now numbered in their thousands rather than hundreds; and investigative committee activity has expanded exponentially. In addition, the pay and resources available to MPs have increased hugely and Members of Parliament have essentially become full time. And, unobtrusively, successive Procedure Committees became increasingly active in revising the rules and operation of the Commons, mostly having a positive though not always immediate effect. However, each new intake enters Parliament with its own preconceptions, some positive but many negative. The 1997 intake, especially on the Labour side of the House, was highly critical of the House of Commons and its procedures, not just initially but towards the end of their first Parliament, when they answered our third questionnaire, as the responses of three Labour MPs illustrate: I find the conventions and introversion of the House of Commons extremely frustrating and, in a modern democracy, unhealthily,

42

Ipsos MORI polls, 1985 and 2009. BPRI poll cited in Robert Winnett and Gordon Rayner, No Expenses Spared, Bantam Press, London, 2009, p. 355.

43

172


self-obsessed and self-serving. This impression has taken a stronger hold since 1997. Greater frustration than I thought I would feel about the repetition and archaism of process and procedure. . . . I had no idea how obstructive this place could be in respect of achieving good quality government and democracy.

Such views were not confined to Labour, however: note the views of a Conservative backbencher first elected in 1987 – ‘Parliament is riddled with archaic and arcane practices beloved of the old hands . . . ’ and of one of the 1997 Liberal Democrats, who said his experience ‘has impressed on me how weak Parliament is and how, to influence things, you have to find roundabout ways and ruses, whilst being realistic as to what you can actually influence (mainly things in your constituency)’. On coming to power in 1997, the Labour government set up a Select Committee on the Modernisation of the House, which produced a series of reports proposing various changes in the procedure and operation of the Commons. Unusually, it was chaired by the Leader of the House, the government’s business manager and a member of the Cabinet. Although its recommendations, most of which were adopted, undoubtedly modernised some of the House’s procedures and its operation, arguably their main impact was to enhance the government’s ability to secure the passage of its legislative programme, notably by the greater timetabling of bills. Changes in the sitting hours to make the House more ‘family friendly’ received more publicity, however, and went some way to mollify the critics of the way it operated, even though many favour further change. Interestingly, our questionnaire data would suggest that it is Labour MPs who are most likely to be socialised into the behaviour patterns of their longer-serving colleagues, somewhat less so the Conservatives, and least of all the Liberal Democrats, who appear most likely to carve out their own roles. Moreover, it is new Labour MPs who are initially cautious in embarking on different parliamentary activities. Whether this caution reflects a more measured approach or a lack of confidence or a mixture of the two is unclear. It was evident with the 1992 intake but more marked with that of 1997, possibly because more of the latter did not expect to be elected. Whatever the explanation, more broadly our data suggests that in their early years in Parliament newly elected MPs feel their way, often differing from their longer-serving colleagues


173

in the use of particular procedures, but in many cases gradually coming to resemble the latter in levels of parliamentary activity. This convergence in levels of parliamentary activity leads us to conclude that behavioural socialisation of newly elected MPs is to a significant extent a process of reinforcement. Just as their attitudes do not change fundamentally, nor does their behaviour, as measured by parliamentary activity. However, changes in the way the House of Commons operates can result in changes in Members’ behaviour, often involving an element of re-socialisation. One of the most obvious is the change in the levels of party cohesion, which we discussed earlier in the chapter.44 Voting with their parties remains the norm, but beginning in the late 1960s an increasing number of MPs showed a willingness to defy the whips. Attitudes and then behaviour changed. Similarly, as already noted in Chapter 5,45 attitudes towards the scrutiny role change when parties move from government to opposition or vice versa, and this too is reflected in the behaviour of MP, as we showed earlier in the chapter.46 We also suggested in Chapter 5 that the participation of the Liberal Democrats in the 2010 Conservative–Liberal coalition is likely to have an impact on attitudes and, similarly, that ethical attitudes could well change as a result of the MPs’ expenses scandal.47 These too would be likely to affect MPs’ behaviour. All these are examples of a degree of re-socialisation, actual or likely, and reinforce our argument that whilst fundamental changes in behaviour are not the norm, this does not mean that socialisation is a totally deterministic process precluding change.

44

See pp. 163–6 above. See Chapter 5, pp. 109–12, 131. 46 See pp. 152–9 above. 47 See Chapter 5, pp. 117–20. 45

7 Parliamentary Socialisation

I suspect that the main change that has affected every new MP over the past year is that we are now fully institutionalised. (Damian Green, Conservative MP for Ashford since 1997)1 Newly elected Members of Parliament do not arrive at Westminster to find a fully-equipped office and personal staff awaiting them but rather a confusion of meetings, information packs, receptions, invitations, and bulging postbags. Of course, there are the well-oiled machines of the House of Commons and, for the most part, their parties, but as far as these are concerned the newly elected are more akin to passengers than learner-drivers. There is much to do and much to learn. But are they then simply socialised into their role? The short answer is yes, but understanding parliamentary socialisation requires answers to other, more complex questions, four in particular: • • • •

When are MPs socialised? In what respect are they socialised? How are they socialised and by whom? What is the relationship between their socialisation and their behaviour?

A degree of socialisation is inevitable: newly elected MPs have to learn how to do their job, to learn how the House of Commons operates, how to use various parliamentary procedures and how to deal with constituency issues and constituents’ problems. This is the simplest and

1

The House Magazine, 27 July 1998, p. 22. 174


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most obvious form of socialisation to which the new MPs are subjected. It is concentrated in the period from when they arrive at Westminster and the months that follow, though longer in terms of refining their learning experience. We have termed this functional socialisation. Parallel with this, but stretching further into the future, are two other forms of socialisation – attitudinal socialisation, in which the MP’s knowledge, values and experience come together to produce attitudes towards their role and carrying out the job of being an MP; and behavioural socialisation, in which the Member develops his or her mode of carrying out that job. Both encompass an ethical dimension, in which the Member acquires and develops moral stances pervading their attitudes and behaviour. In each case the socialisation process to varying degrees contributes towards the development of attitudes, behaviour and ethical views which may come to resemble those of longer-serving MPs, but not necessarily totally nor precluding the development of different attitudes, behaviour and ethical positions. This chapter reviews the evidence gathered in our research in an attempt to assess the extent to which socialisation takes place. Before doing so, however, we want to return to the model of parliamentary socialisation we presented in Chapter 3 and apply it to our findings.

Applying the model of parliamentary socialisation In Chapter 3 we discussed the agents, mechanisms and processes of parliamentary socialisation. We suggested that the three principal agents of socialisation were the House of Commons, the parliamentary parties, and various organisations and bodies outside Parliament. We further suggested that there were three key mechanisms – instruction, imitation and motivation. Finally, we divided the socialisation processes into three: socialisation (learning new rules, norms and values and adopting appropriate behaviour), reinforcement (confirming and strengthening knowledge of existing roles and rules and strengthening existing attitudes and behaviour) and re-socialisation (replacing existing rules and norms and adopting new behaviour patterns). We suggested that the behaviour of MPs is governed, on the one hand, by their knowledge, values and attitudes and, on the other, by their personalities and their experience. By knowledge and values we mean in particular what they know and believe about Parliament, their role as members of the House of Commons and politicians; and about the world beyond, knowledge and values which underpin their attitudes or specific opinions about the institution, their role in it and in the larger

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world. These are in turn shaped by their personalities and experience and the continuing interplay between these and their knowledge, values and attitudes. This inevitably leaves us with areas which our data does not enable us to explore or that we are not qualified to explore, notably that of personality, but it should not and does not prevent us from suggesting that it and similar areas must be left to others to explore. To give us a broad view of whether socialisation has been at work, in our third questionnaire we asked respondents whether their experience as an MP had changed their view of their role. As Figure 7.1 shows, about half said it had, but there were differences between the parties, with Labour and Liberal Democrat respondents more likely to say it had. Furthermore, although there was a small difference between the two Conservative intakes, the 1992 Labour and Liberal Democrat intakes were more likely to say ‘yes’ than their newly elected colleagues in 1997. Whether this is a function of the much larger intakes in both parties in 1997 is unclear, but there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that the 1997 Labour intake in particular had strong views about the way in which the House of Commons operated, especially about what they saw as archaic and arcane procedures, its sitting hours and unnecessary 100 90 80 70 60 %

50 40 30 20 10 0 Cons.

Lab.

LD 1992

All

1997

Figure 7.1 Has your experience of being a Member of Parliament since 1992/ 1997 changed your view of what the job entails? (% answering ‘yes’) Note: The number of Liberal Democrats first elected in 1992 was too small to permit inclusion, but all three respondents said that their experience had changed their view. Source: Questionnaire 3 to the 1992 and 1997 intakes.


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ceremonial practices – views they were still expressing in comments made in response to our third questionnaire towards the end of the 1997 Parliament. Of course, the fact that half our respondents and substantial majorities among the Conservatives said that their view had not changed does not mean socialisation had not been at work, since their existing views may have been reinforced rather than changed by the socialisation process. We explored this question further with the 1997 intake by asking who they thought had had the most influence on their view of their role – the House of Commons, their party or other people and organisations outside Parliament (see Figure 7.2). More than four-fifths of our respondents overall and nine out of ten Conservative and Labour respondents but only two-fifths of Liberal Democrats said that the House of Commons was either ‘very important’ or ‘quite important’. When it came to their parties, however, greater differences emerged, with 75.5 per cent of Labour respondents and 69.2 per cent of Conservatives rating the party as ‘very important’ or ‘quite important’, compared with no Liberal Democrats saying it was ‘very important’ and eight out of ten that it was ‘quite important’. Other people and organisations were least important for Conservatives, 4

3.5

Scale 1–4

3

2.5

2

1.5

1 Cons.

Lab. House of commons

Figure 7.2

LD Party

All Other

Sources of influence on MPs’ view of their role (1997 intake)

Source: Questionnaire 3 to the 1997 intake.

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more important for Labour and most important for the Liberal Democrats, reflecting perhaps Labour’s trade union and other organisational links and the strength of the Liberal Democrats at grass-roots level. These variations are reflected in the rank order scores in which the order of importance for Conservative and Labour MPs is House of Commons, party, and other people and organisations, but with the Conservatives being more strongly influenced by the Commons than Labour and the latter more strongly influenced by party than the Conservatives. In contrast, for the Liberal Democrats the rank order is other people and organisations, party and, some way behind, the House of Commons. Our respondents thus acknowledge, if not in name but certainly in terms of experience and influence, that socialisation has been at work, but we need to explore this further by returning to our three types of socialisation, relating them to our model, and then considering the big issue which has arisen subsequently – the ethical dimension.

Functional socialisation In Chapter 4 we related how newly elected MPs prepared for and learned how to perform the various roles MPs carry out, including the assistance provided by the House of Commons authorities and their respective parties after the general elections of 1992 and 1997, and how and when the new Members became active in Parliament. Our questionnaire data makes it clear that most newly elected MPs in 1992 and 1997 found the induction efforts of the House authorities and their parties useful – the former more than the latter, however, with least value placed on other sources of help and advice. It would be surprising if these efforts did not have some socialising effect in learning how to be an MP and we are more concerned here with how quickly new MPs became involved in various types of parliamentary activity. However, for many, probably most, their earliest substantive involvement was not with this or that parliamentary activity – Questions, debates, committees or signing motions – but with the constituency role. In addition to the constituency issues and individual constituents’ problems they inherit from their immediate predecessors, especially where the latter was a member of the same party, newly elected MPs find that bulging postbags are the norm on arrival at Westminster. These will, of course, contain a good deal of non-constituency material – more invitations to meetings and receptions than can possibly be accepted,


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other invitations to become a member of various bodies inside and outside Parliament, pressure group propaganda, and so on – but collective and individual constituency problems do not go into abeyance because of the election and may even grow apace with the election of a new Member of Parliament. An early task will therefore be the making of arrangements to establish a constituency office and set up regular ‘surgeries’ and other means of contacting the MP. Indeed, some new MPs will already have taken some initial steps to do this, especially in constituencies already held by their party with a substantial majority.2 An oft-related task is the appointment of staff, both at Westminster and in the constituency. Again, some would have already made arrangements in anticipation of election, though it is likely that in this respect and more generally in relation to coping with the constituency role more newly elected Labour MPs than usual in 1997, and probably a number of Liberal Democrats, would have made no such contingency plans, since they had not expected to be elected. Nonetheless, although the burden may vary, no MP escapes the constituency role and it is likely that it was this aspect of the job of being a Member of Parliament of which they were most aware before arriving at Westminster. Indeed, one of the 1997 Labour intake relates how, after election night, ‘My husband and I finally got home to bed at six in the morning. The ‘phone went at 7.30. My first bit of case-work – a blocked drain.’3 Once at Westminster, the pressures to be involved quickly build up, not least through the activities of the whips, but also through longerserving Members seeking signatures for Early Day Motions (EDMs) and members for party subject committees and all-party groups (APGs). In seeking to assess how quickly new MPs become involved in various parliamentary activities we gathered data on maiden speeches, parliamentary Questions for oral and written answer and EDMs. The results are summarised in Figure 7.3. It is clear from the data presented in Figure 7.3 that in both 1992 and 1997 newly elected MPs were quickly involved in a wide range of parliamentary activities, the only exception being the tabling of EDMs, particularly by Conservative MPs. In general, Liberal Democrats tended to be quickest off the mark, followed by Conservatives, and then Labour.

2 The ‘nursing’ of a constituency by a candidate following their selection has been common for many years and prospective parliamentary candidates take up constituency issues and individual constituents’ problems as part of this process. 3 Shona McIsaac, Labour MP for Cleethorpes since 1997, The House Magazine, 29 September 1997, p. 18.

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100 90 80 70 60

%

50 40 30 20 10 0 Maiden speeches

Oral PQs

Written PQs EDMs signed EDMs tabled

1992 Intake Cons

Lab

LD

100 90 80 70 60

%

50 40 30 20 10 0 Maiden speeches

Oral PQs

Written PQs EDMs signed EDMs tabled

1997 Intake Cons

Lab

LD

Figure 7.3 Parliamentary activity by newly elected MPs within the first 50 days of the 1992 and 1997 Parliaments Source: HC Debs. and EDM Database.


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This was more marked in 1997, however, and may have been in good part a function of the large influx of Labour MPs. A similar pattern emerged with subject committees within the parliamentary parties and APGs. High proportions of newly elected Members said in the first of our questionnaires that they intended to join party subject committees and indeed had done so by the time of our second questionnaire, though there was a falling away by the time of the third questionnaire, suggesting greater discrimination in such activity and bringing them broadly into line with their longer-serving colleagues. The only exception was the 1992 Labour intake, who claimed a continuing high level of involvement in party subject committees. The pattern with APGs was little different as far as Conservatives and Liberal Democrats were concerned, but tempered by some uncertainty as to what exactly they were, but activity had also increased by the time of the second questionnaire and then later coming broadly into line with longer-serving Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. Both Labour intakes were exceptions to this, claiming a high level of involvement in both the second and third questionnaires, while their longer-serving colleagues claimed lower levels. In Chapter 4 we noted that well under 10 per cent of the 1992 and 1997 intakes said they were ‘very familiar’ with parliamentary procedure and that ‘in 1992 nearly half the new MPs (43.3 per cent) and well over two-fifths (45.5) in 1997 knew little about parliamentary procedure’.4 As we remarked, this was ‘hardly surprising’ and it is similarly unsurprising that, by the time they had nearly completed one parliamentary term, the 1992 and 1997 intakes were much more familiar with procedure (Figure 7.4). By the time of the third questionnaire, all Conservative respondents from both intakes said they were either ‘very familiar’ or ‘somewhat familiar’ with procedure and only 18.2 per cent of the 1992 Labour intake and 12.5 per cent of the 1997 intake said they were ‘not very familiar’, and a lone Labour respondent from 1997 claimed to be ‘not at all familiar’. This progression through the three questionnaires can be seen in Figure 7.5, showing that by the time of the third questionnaire the 1992 and 1997 intakes were not far behind their longer-serving colleagues. Newly elected MPs clearly do learn fairly rapidly how to use the various procedures available to them, though their knowledge of actual procedure understandably develops more slowly. To this extent, and it

4

Chapter 4, pp. 62–3.

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100 90 80 70 60 %

50 40 30 20 10 0 Very familiar

Somewhat familiar

Not very familiar

1992

Not at all familiar

1997

Figure 7.4 Familiarity of the 1992 and 1997 intakes with parliamentary procedure towards the end of their first Parliament Source: Questionnaire 3 to the 1992 and 1997 intakes.

4 3.5

Scale 1–4

3 2.5 2 1.5 1 New Q1

New Q2 1992

New Q3

Longer-serving

1997

Figure 7.5 Familiarity of the 1992 and 1997 intakes with parliamentary procedure compared to longer-serving MPs Source: Questionnaires 1, 2 and 3 to the new intakes and to longer-serving MPs.


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is an important extent, MPs experience functional socialisation. They experience a mixture of straightforward or basic socialisation involving formal induction, informal advice and assistance, observing and learning from more experienced colleagues, motivated by a need and desire to become effective Members of Parliament and to realise their political ambitions. This brings us to the question of whether they undergo more extensive socialisation affecting their attitudes towards the role of the MP and how they carry it out – in short, are they also subject to attitudinal and behavioural socialisation, including the ethical dimension? Attitudinal socialisation The idea that the newly elected MP is a tabula rasa on which the House of Commons or the parliamentary party can stamp its image does not take account of the pre-election socialisation found by studies of American state legislatures and the Canadian Parliament and provincial legislatures in Canada. These concluded that the most important pre-election influence was the newly elected legislator’s party5 and this is confirmed in respect of British MPs by our questionnaire data, which shows that, before they were elected, as many as nine out of ten respondents had consulted sitting MPs and substantial minorities had consulted party officials.6 The significance of party, however, goes beyond particular advice, in that the party provides a framework or setting for the legislator’s political career, not just in a narrow ideological sense but in a much wider attitudinal and behavioural sense. For all but a few newly elected MPs, their socialisation will have begun not after their election, nor necessarily from the time they were selected as a parliamentary candidate, nor even from the time they joined the party, but in all probability when they began to take an interest in politics and came to sympathise with a particular party. They will already have acquired various values about and attitudes towards social and political matters which attract them to one party rather than another. Once active in a party, attitudes towards political concepts such as representation and democracy and political institutions in local and national government, including, of course, Parliament, are likely to become apparent, as is the idea of party discipline or cohesion. Most MPs assume membership of the House of Commons not only with party

5 6

See Chapter 3, pp. 35–7. See Chapter 4, p. 75.

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labels but also imbued with party ideas. They are far more likely to agree with their party colleagues on the role of Parliament and of the Member of Parliament than with MPs members of other parties, as is evident from the data we presented in Chapter 4 on MP’ attitudes towards their role. Attitudinal socialisation therefore takes the form of reinforcing values and attitudes held before election, especially in areas such as the representative role and what is likely to influence the behaviour of MPs once elected, and a mixture of reinforcement and re-socialisation over various aspects of the job, particularly as priorities change over time through periods of government and opposition or intra-party conflict. The relationship between attitudes and socialisation reflected in our data is summarised in Table 7.1. As elected representatives MPs see themselves first and foremost as representing their constituents at Westminster, but beyond that important party differences emerge.7 We found that Conservatives, both newly elected and longer-serving, placed the nation as a whole before representing their party; Labour, in contrast, emphasised party ahead of nation; and the Liberal Democrats also emphasised party ahead of nation but less so than Labour. Moreover, the views of newly elected MPs did not change markedly through the course of each of the Parliaments, supporting the interpretation that this is not so much the consequence of parliamentary socialisation but the reinforcing of attitudes well-established before election. A similar pattern emerges when influences on MPs are analysed.8 According to our data, party and personal opinion tend to dominate, constituency opinion and that of pressure groups and other outside interests much less so. MPs’ contact with pressure groups and other outside interests are frequent and often important, but, the occasional Table 7.1

Attitudes and socialisation

Attitude

Conservative

Labour

Liberal Democrat

Representation Influence

Reinforcing Reinforcing

Reinforcing Reinforcing

The job

Reinforcing/ re-socialisation

Reinforcing/ re-socialisation

Reinforcing Reinforcing/ re-socialisation Reinforcing/ re-socialisation

7 8

See Chapter 5, pp. 105–9. See Chapter 5, pp. 113–16.


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unsolicited contacts apart, the more important are with those whom the Member has regular and often sympathetic contact. Their views will therefore often coincide with the MP’s, again reinforcing rather than socialising. However, in spite of the emphasis placed by respondents as constituency representatives helping individual constituents and dealing with constituency issues, the influence of constituency opinion is limited. There is no doubt that on particular matters, both individual and collective, MPs respond positively to the views of their constituents, but only on occasion will conflict arise with the party line at Westminster, a situation well understood by the whips and invariably treated sympathetically. Party therefore tends to be paramount and more often than not coincides with personal opinion. Post-election experience therefore tends to be reinforcing in all parties. However, in the case of the Liberal Democrats, reinforcement over the two Parliaments may have been associated with a degree of re-socialisation as they adjusted to their increased numbers in the Commons. In 1992 20 Liberal Democrat MPs were elected, an increase of three on the previous general election in 1987. During the 1992–97 Parliament, the Liberal Democrats won a further four seats at by-elections and two Conservatives defected to the party, bringing the total by October 1996 to 26, but the 1997 general election nearly doubled the number of Liberal Democrat MPs and almost certainly increased the importance of the party as an influence over its MPs. Our questionnaire data, although based on small numbers in the case of the Liberal Democrats, suggests that the influence of the party leadership increased during the 1992–97 Parliament and continued at a high level, particularly among newly elected Liberal Democrats. This is likely to have involved an element of socialisation and re-socialisation for the party’s MPs. The result of the 2010 General Election and the coming into being of the Coalition Government has involved, and is likely to continue to involve, further re-socialisation for the Liberal Democrats as they adjust to being part of the governing majority. It was, however, in attitudes towards various aspects of the job of being a Member of Parliament that re-socialisation appeared to be most important, partly because it affected all the parties and partly because it involved changes in attitude among the longer-serving as well as the newly elected. The key change for the Conservatives and Labour was their respective shifts from government to opposition and vice versa.9

9

See Chapter 5, pp. 109–13.

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Not surprisingly, in the Conservative case this was most apparent during the 1997–2001 Parliament, which was marked by a major shift in attitude towards the scrutiny role, ranked fourth in all three questionnaires by the 1992 intake and second, alongside ‘supporting the party’, by longer-serving MPs. In the 1997–2001 Parliament scrutiny outranked the constituency role among all Conservative respondents and ‘supporting the party’ became more important than ‘influencing the party’. The increasing likelihood of a Labour government in the period before the 1997 election resulted in a clear growth in the importance of ‘supporting the party’ among Labour MPs, new and old, between 1992 and 1997, which levelled off and declined during the 1997–2001 Parliament. The importance of the scrutiny role increased between 1992 and 1997, levelled off and then increased again in 1997– 2001, perhaps as the massive Labour intake of 1997 found its feet, not just procedurally but also politically. Similarly, intra-party conflict saw a shift in priorities, creating a degree of re-socialisation. During the 1992–97 Parliament, for example, Conservative divisions over Europe had a major impact on the behaviour of the party’s MPs, notably the bitter battle over the Maastricht Treaty. Our questionnaire data10 shows that the rank-order scores on ‘influencing the party’ among Conservative respondents were higher during the 1992–97 Parliament than during its successor, when Europe became a less prominent issue. On the other hand, ‘influencing the party’ was not only consistently ranked fourth among Labour MPs between 1992 and 1997, when the emphasis on maintaining party unity was considerable, but scored well below other aspects of the job. Attitudinal socialisation in Parliament thus appears to be largely a matter of the reinforcement of existing, pre-electoral attitudes towards the role of the MP, tempered by a significant degree of re-socialisation, but re-socialisation extending to the longer-serving as well as the newly elected. Nonetheless, there is scope for newly elected MPs to carve out their own role. For instance, newly elected MPs in all three parties identified less strongly with representing the nation and more strongly with their parties than their longer-serving colleagues, notwithstanding a clear tendency to converge with the latter. This in turn was reflected in the higher proportions in the new intakes placing the nation first or second or the party first or second among the Conservatives and Labour respectively compared with longer-serving respondents.

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Differences were also found between intakes, as was the case with the Conservative and Labour intakes in 1992, who recorded higher levels of influence by the party leadership and their own opinion than was the case with the 1997 intakes. Our analysis of attitudinal socialisation also illustrates a further important feature of legislative socialisation, as of socialisation in general: it is not absolute but relative and this is also apparent as we turn to behavioural socialisation. Behavioural socialisation Behavioural socialisation may begin largely as functional socialisation, with newly elected Members learning how to operate as MPs, both at the constituency and Westminster levels. As we have already noted, Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs placed a greater emphasis on the constituency role than Conservatives, arguably reflected in the location of staff in the constituency and at Westminster. Fulfilling the constituency role is bound to vary according to the nature and location of the constituency and the Member’s preferences, but as we noted in Chapter 1, there are marked differences between the parties in the extent to which MPs have direct, pre-election connections with their constituencies.11 Thus, in 1997 fewer than one in ten Conservative MPs (9.9 per cent) had direct local constituency connections, compared with 56.9 per cent of Labour MPs and 65.2 per cent of Liberal Democrats. This may not only help to explain emphases in attitudes towards the constituency role but also the manner in which that role is performed, and it is reasonable to attribute this in part to socialisation as a logical extension of strong constituency connections. At Westminster, the initial learning process of functional socialisation increasingly shades into behavioural socialisation, as the operational and behavioural norms of the House of Commons exert themselves. It is not surprising to find that the behaviour of the new intakes in engaging in various parliamentary activities moves closer to that of their longerserving colleagues. This is the case, for example, in all parties with participation in debates in the Commons Chamber, serving on public bill (formerly standing) committees and in the signing and tabling of EDMs.12 It is true that the new intakes come under pressure from

11

Defined as being born, educated, living or working in the constituency; having property interests or serving or having served as a member of a local government body in the constituency, or, in the case cities or towns divided into two or more constituencies, with the city or town within which the constituency lies. 12 See Chapter 5, pp. 136–41.

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the whips to table parliamentary Questions, especially for oral answer, to participate supportively in debates, and serve on legislative committees, while the whips take a close interest in the signing and tabling of EDMs. But MPs have choices: they are not obliged to engage in parliamentary activities, other than supporting their parties in whipped divisions (and even here, as Norton and Cowley have shown, dissent has become much more common since the late 1960s). It is also true that MPs who regularly resist the threats and blandishments of the whips may find their ministerial or frontbench ambitions thwarted or slowed down, their would-be membership of select committees treated less sympathetically, their opportunities to join overseas delegations curtailed, and even adverse comments passed to their constituency parties, but those choices remain. Furthermore, they are wider than any attempted constraints from the whips in that different activities and procedures are conducive to addressing the particular interests and concerns of MPs, whether personal or constituency. Questions for written answer, for instance, are an effective way of extracting and gathering information on particular matters; EDMs can be used to express views on issues and build up a body of opinion; adjournment debates are a common means of raising constituency issues, and so on. Thus, individual MPs can focus their efforts on particular types of activity – some Members are regular contributors to Question Time; others are serial users of Questions for written answer or the tabling and signing of EDMs; yet others concentrate their efforts on investigative committee work, especially through the departmental committees. In short, MPs can and do carve out their own roles and our data13 suggests that they do so with some activities and procedures more than others and that there are differences between the parties and between intakes in the extent to which they carve out their own roles. This is, of course, facilitated by the fact that procedurally MPs have much more control over some activities than others – over the tabling of Questions for written answer and the signing and tabling of EDMs, for example. In contrast, in seeking to participate in debates, whether in the Chamber or Westminster Hall, the securing of answers to Questions for oral answer or the membership of committees are dependent on factors beyond their control – being called by the Speaker, the ‘shuffle’ used to select Questions to be answered, being nominated for committee membership by the whips – but even here MPs have some control.

13



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They decide whether to attend debates and seek to speak, whether to table Questions and whether to seek committee membership. Moreover, in debates much depends on the business being discussed and there is more competition for speaking in the Chamber than in Westminster Hall; Prime Minister’s Questions are more limiting than oral Questions for other ministers; and there is little difficulty in securing membership of legislative committees, while competition for membership of investigative committees varies from committee to committee. Our questionnaire data found little difference between the Conservative new intakes and longer-serving MPs on how they divided their time, whereas Labour’s 1992 intake spent less time in the Chamber and the 1997 intake more than their longer-serving colleagues. In terms of contributions to debates in the Chamber, the 1997 Conservative intake was much more active than in the first two sessions analysed, before converging with the lower levels of their colleagues, while both new intakes of Liberal Democrats diverged from the longer-serving after earlier convergence. Both the 1992 and 1997 Conservatives made greater use of Questions for written answer (the 1997 intake in particular), as did the 1997 Liberal Democrats. In using EDMs, the Conservative and Labour intakes followed the established pattern of their longer-serving Members, but the Liberal Democrat intakes went their own way. The behavioural picture is in many respects similar to the attitudinal one, in that to a considerable degree the behaviour of newly elected MPs tends to converge with that of their longer-serving colleagues. However, unlike attitudinal socialisation, behavioural socialisation is primarily the result of functional socialisation combined with experience and it is the latter, no doubt affected by individual Members’ personalities, which shapes their behaviour. Operating as they must largely within the norms, practices and procedures of the House of Commons, the newly elected divide their time between different roles, participate in debates and committee work, ask Questions, table and sign motions, but not to the extent that they are simply clones, any more than they all become mavericks. That said, the one area in which clone-like behaviour appears much more widespread is that of ethical attitudes and behaviour.

The ethical dimension For most of its history the House of Commons has relied upon the integrity of its members to establish and maintain appropriate ethical attitudes and behaviour, on what may be termed ‘the honourable Member’ syndrome. It has trusted in self-regulation and developing rules

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to deal with particular situations and issues, rather than wide-ranging rules, elaborate machinery and codes of conduct. Particular problems or issues, such as conflicts of interest, have been dealt with ad hominem. Thus, on arrival at Westminster new MPs were faced, on the one hand, with rules setting out what was ethically appropriate in particular situations or circumstances and, on the other, detailed guidance about the financial arrangements applying to MPs. Before 1996 neither the House authorities nor the political parties provided the newly elected with a formal ethical framework or set of rules. That changed as a result of the Nolan Report, with the adoption of a Code of Conduct in 1996, but Nolan and the Code did not transform the situation. Certainly, the behaviour of MPs regarding conflicts of interest changed, especially over paid advocacy, but that largely reflected changes in the rules. Particular ethical issues continued to be seen as affecting particular MPs, not MPs in general, and most regarded themselves and most of their colleagues as ‘honourable Members’. The expenses scandal reinforced that picture. Referring the remuneration of MPs to an independent review body was partly successful in taking some of the political sensitivity out of MPs’ salaries and expenses. However, successive government muddied the waters, partly by sometimes rejecting and sometimes modifying the Review Body’s recommendations and partly by using increased and additional allowances as a covert means of increasing MPs’ remuneration. The Review Body itself contributed to the problem, particularly on expenses, by playing a part in what may be described as ‘allowance creep’, the introduction of new allowances and the extension of existing ones, a situation which suited both governments and MPs. From an ethical point of view Bernard Crick’s list14 of the ‘essentials’ a Member needs ‘to do his job’ was a defensible claim, but once allowed it is easy for such claims to be seen as ‘entitlements’: the line between defensible expenses and entitlements is easily crossed. No sooner were they elected, than MPs were told by the Fees Office and through the Green Book what they may claim and how to claim it, information they need to function effectively as a Members of Parliament, but little or no emphasis was placed on the ethical dimension before Nolan. And, even after Nolan and explicit references in the Code and the Green Book to the appropriate claiming of expenses, the ethical dimension 14 I.e. ‘. . . secretary, office, postage, telephone and travel’ – Bernard Crick, The Reform of Parliament: The Crisis in British Politics, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 2nd rev. ed, 1968, pp. 66–7.


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did not appear to have penetrated far into MPs’ consciousness. Members’ knowledge of the rules, whether on conflicts of interest or on the use of allowances, was limited and piecemeal. Thus, when the expenses scandal broke, one of the commonest defences advanced by MPs was, ‘It was within the rules’ – they regarded allowances as entitlements. Furthermore, our analysis of the vote on the massive increase in the Additional Costs Allowance in 2001 and of the expenses paid to MPs suggests that newly elected MPs quickly matched the behaviour of their longer-serving colleagues when it came to expenses.15 In addition, the second major defence of the claims made, that MPs were encouraged by successive governments to regard allowances as supplementing their income, merely reinforces the view that there was a widespread culture of entitlement, quickly adopted by the newly elected. Ethical socialisation is still more by osmosis than by overt learning and instruction. Whether and how far this will change remains unclear. Problems arising out of conflicts of interest and, more recently, the abuse of allowances have been dealt with mainly in a traditional manner by changing the rules and introducing regulatory mechanisms. Past experience suggests this will change behaviour, but changing ethical attitudes is a more difficult and longer-term task. Ethical attitudes and behaviour appear to be the area in which newly elected MPs are most likely to follow the example of their longer-serving colleagues, but in other aspects of attitudes and behaviour there seems to be more variation. We need therefore to consider to what extent they are socialised and to what extent they are able to carve out their own role.

Parliamentary socialisation: who shapes their space? To assess the extent of parliamentary socialisation we have aggregated our data on the attitudes and behaviour of the 1992 and 1997 intakes. Thus, in the case of attitudinal socialisation we have aggregated our data at the time of the third questionnaire – on whether newly elected MPs thought the job should be full time or part time, who they thought they represented, the relative importance of different aspects of their role, and who influenced them – and compared that data with that from our longer-serving control group. Similarly, we aggregated our

15


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12 11 10 Scale 1–12

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Cons 1992 Cons 1997 Figure 7.6

Lab 1992

Lab 1997

LD 1992

LD 1997

Attitudinal socialisation: a summary

Source: The scale was constructed by taking each of 12 attitudinal responses of the new intakes discussed in Chapter 5 and scoring 1 where these responses converged with those of the longer-serving control group and 0 where they did not.

behavioural data concerning participation in debates in the Chamber and Westminster Hall, the use of Questions for oral and written answer, committee activity, and participation in party subject committees and APGs over the three sessions covered and compared it with the behaviour of longer-serving MPs. The results for attitudinal socialisation are shown in Figure 7.6. Figure 7.6 shows differences between parties and between intakes. Leaving aside for the moment the 1997 Labour intake, the differences between parties are not great, with some suggestion that the Liberal Democrats are less prone to attitudinal socialisation than either the Conservatives or Labour and that Labour is somewhat more prone to attitudinal socialisation than the Conservatives. What stands out, however, is the 1997 Labour intake, with a score of 10 out of 12, far ahead of all other intakes. Was this because the massive swing to Labour in 1997 resulted in many Labour candidates being surprised, even shocked, to find themselves at Westminster? Even though the opinion polls before the 1997 general election, up to and during the election campaign, relentlessly predicted a huge swing to Labour, few observers, and doubtless many candidates, dared believe it until the results began to come in. We cannot say, but we suspect it was an important factor. However, we would also argue that, in spite of Labour’s majority, another important


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12 11 10 Scale of 1–12

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Cons 1992 Cons 1997 Figure 7.7

Lab 1992

Lab 1997

LD 1992

LD 1997

Behavioural socialisation: a summary

Source: The scale was constructed by taking each of 12 parliamentary activities of the new intakes reported in Chapter 6 and scoring 1 where the level of these activities converged with those of the longer-serving control group and 0 where they did not.

factor was that this was Labour’s first taste of power at Westminster for 18 years and rocking the party boat was not part of the agenda. The aggregate results for behavioural socialisation tell a similar by no means the same story (see Figure 7.7). Certainly, the Liberal Democrats, especially the 1997 intake, again appeared less susceptible to the process of socialisation, but the differences between the respective Conservative and Labour intakes is not especially marked. Our interpretation here is that the important difference is between the 1992 Conservative and 1997 Labour intakes, on the one hand, and the 1997 Conservative and the 1992 Labour intakes, on the other. The 1992 Conservative and 1997 Labour intakes show higher levels of behavioural socialisation; conversely, the 1997 Conservative and 1992 Labour intakes show lower levels of socialisation. We believe that what link these pairs are their respective roles in government and opposition: being in government strengthens socialisation, being in opposition lessens it. If we now turn to the mirror image of socialisation – carving out their own role, we again see the contrast between the Liberal Democrats and the other parties and the particular contrast between the 1977 Labour intake and all other intakes. And, of course, the government–opposition contrast. Taking an overview of socialisation, on the one hand, and carving out their own role, on the other, leads us to argue that, in terms of the parties, the Liberal Democrats are least subject to socialisation, both

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attitudinal and behavioural, and are more likely to carve out their own role, followed by the Conservatives, who while closer to Labour, are somewhat less prone to socialisation and more likely to carve out their own role. Our data on the relative importance of different aspects of the job of being a Member of Parliament strongly suggests that for the Conservatives and Labour whether their party is in government or opposition is a major factor, but for the Liberal Democrats the situation is different. As long as they remained outside government, the Liberal Democrats were less likely to be affected by the forces of socialisation and could afford to go their own way more than the Conservative or Labour Parties in Parliament. As members of the coalition government, however, Liberal Democrat MPs, newly elected or longer-serving, may find themselves less able to carve out their own role and become the subject of a powerful socialisation process. Who, then, shapes their space? There is little doubt that party is the most important agent of socialisation, both before MPs are first elected and after they enter the House of Commons. Party plays a major role in shaping attitudes towards different aspects of the role of the MP, towards their views on representation, and who is most likely to influence their behaviour once in Parliament. However, once at Westminster party operates within the norms, practices and procedures of the House of Commons, but these are largely interpreted through the prism of party. Initially, the House of Commons looms large and plays a crucial role in functional socialisation, but as new MPs learn how the House operates then party increasingly affects their behaviour, in some cases, perhaps, producing clones, in others mavericks. Between the clones and the mavericks, however, lie the majority of Members, who are neither one nor the other, content to conform to party norms for much of the time but working out their own way of being a Member of Parliament as well.

8 2010 and Beyond

Is there evidence that MPs’ behaviour and attitudes are changed when they actually experience what it is like being an MP? To what extent do newcomers to the Westminster Parliament become ‘accustomed to’ its ways of working and, in parallel, ‘persuaded by’ the opportunity of doing things differently? These are the central questions we have been exploring in this book. Our findings show that MPs’ behaviour and attitudes do change and that the degree of change (including no change) is influenced by socialisation – functional, attitudinal and behavioural. What is the significance of these findings? Are they unique to the parliaments we have examined, with their particular political circumstances? Are there implications for future parliaments? Does our research have implications for parliaments, or other forms of legislative assembly, in other states? We approached this task as neither reductionists nor absolutists: we did not believe that it was likely that there was one single explanation of legislative change, or lack of it, nor that socialisation was the sole explanatory factor or even always the most significant one. The findings of our research have confirmed that a variety of factors has been at work, which we have drawn together in our model of parliamentary socialisation in Chapter 7. We note there in particular the significance of the differences between the three main parties and whether MPs are supporters of the government of the day or not. We have also noted the importance of the opportunity Westminster’s procedures and cultures, and the wider political system, provide for MPs to ‘shape their own space’. Party plays the major role, mediated through the procedures, norms and practices of the House of Commons – which are themselves interpreted through the prism of party. Although ‘clones’ and ‘mavericks’ are still a significant feature, the majority of MPs are 195

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neither one nor the other: they are content to conform to party norms for much of the time – but nevertheless work out their own way of being a Member of Parliament. Thus, although the attitudes, values and behaviour of (virtually) all MPs are shaped by party, they are not shaped to the same degree.

Political context In assessing the significance of our work we have to take into account political context: the extent to which our findings depend upon the particular, even unique, circumstances of the period of parliamentary politics in which our research was conducted. We began this study in the final year of the Parliament elected in 1987. That Parliament had begun with Mrs Thatcher’s Conservative Party winning a ‘historic third successive election victory’1 and the second largest post-war overall majority of 102. During that Parliament the Prime Minister was controversially deposed by her own party and replaced by the ‘more moderate and reasonable’2 John Major whose personal and governmental styles were very different. With a rejuvenated, and judging by the opinion polls, relatively popular Opposition, it was widely expected that there would be a change of government and a substantial number of new MPs. In fact, Mr Major led his party to an unprecedented fourth successive election victory, leading one much respected political commentator to suggest Britain ‘no longer has two major political parties. It has one major party, the Conservatives; one minor party, Labour, and one peripheral party, the Liberal Democrats.’3 There were, as we have noted, relatively few new MPs and the Government’s overall majority was a small one (21), which during the course of the 1992 Parliament was to be eroded by defections and by-election defeats. This was certainly an unusual, if not unique, parliamentary situation in which to begin an exploration of the way in which MPs at Westminster ‘learn the job’. In contrast the Parliament of 1997–2001, as we have noted, contained an exceptionally large number of new MPs as a result of the first of three electoral triumphs won by Tony Blair’s New Labour in

1 David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1987, Macmillan, London, 1988, p. xiii. 2 K. Newton, Britain at the Polls 1992, Chatham House, London, 1992, p. 133. 3 Anthony King, The Daily Telegraph,13 April 1992 and cited by himself in Newton, op. cit., p. 224 where he suggested Britain was showing signs of becoming a Sartori-style ‘predominant party system’.

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1997. That Parliament could rightly be called unique, bearing comparison with 1906 and 1945. The 2001 election saw a repeat substantial Labour victory and 2005 a third, albeit not so substantial. Each of the Blair victories also saw an increasing number of Liberal Democrat MPs. Thus, through the period we have surveyed there has been a reversal of electoral fortunes, and significantly different inter-party (and therefore infra-party) dynamics in the House of Commons. Our study was concluded before the 2010 general election, with its again exceptional outcome of a coalition government. It would be a truism to say that every election, and therefore every Parliament, is different; that the political context for each Parliament is unique. Certainly the Parliaments we have studied have witnessed some remarkable events: the UK’s forced departure from the Exchange Rate Mechanism, and Conservative internecine warfare over the Maastricht Treaty in 1992–97; the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the resulting invasions of, first, Afghanistan and then, more controversially, Iraq with British Government support; the increasingly bitter and occasionally public feud between Prime Minister Blair and Chancellor Gordon Brown, accompanied by growing rebelliousness among the governing party’s backbenchers; the expenses scandal, which seriously damaged public confidence in MPs of all parties and the institution of Parliament itself. These were indeed remarkable events which had, and are still having, profound consequences. But the occurrence of such events was not unique to those Parliaments. It is characteristic of democratic government and politics that remarkable events will occur and that from time to time these events will transform the political landscape. All three main political parties won and lost large majorities in twentieth-century Britain. Revolts against party leaders, and prime ministers, were frequent though not always successful. Changes in electoral support for those parties, and in the balance of opinion streams within them, were a continuing phenomenon. We are therefore entitled to resist the charge that our findings depend upon unique political or electoral circumstances. We accept that the attitudes, values and behaviour of MPs in the Parliaments we have surveyed were affected by the political context of those Parliaments. It would be odd, indeed incredible, if they were not. But that does not mean that their attitudes, values and behaviour, and a fortiori any changes in them, were determined by those particular events so that no conclusions can be drawn from them to be applied to parliaments and legislatures in different times and places. Our task now – undeniably a difficult one – is to attempt to discern what those more widely applicable conclusions might be.

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Institutionalisation A particularly significant development in the last three decades has been the further institutionalisation of the House of Commons – and, perhaps to a lesser degree, of the House of Lords as well. Writing in 1988, John R. Hibbing observed: ‘Casual observation of the British House of Commons indicates that it is not very institutionalized. Some of the more publicized features of the body, such as the paucity of staff, office space, and powerful committees, all lead to this conclusion.’ However, he went on to show how more thorough investigation revealed that in many respects the House had evolved, and was evolving, in ways consistent with those predicted by the concept of institutionalisation: boundaries had become more firmly established, internal complexity had increased and a growing reliance upon universalistic rules was evident. Hibbing concluded: ‘Many features of the Commons, including careers, leadership positions, party and committee machinery, general complexity, and the provisions for Question Time, have become institutionalized, and this process is often taken to indicate the body itself has institutionalized.’4 Those processes have continued in the two decades since Hibbing’s article appeared. As we show in Chapter 4, the increasing self-consciousness of the Commons as an institution in its own right is reflected in the House as well as the political parties playing a more visible role in the induction of new Members, although this has not so far developed to the extent of providing training programmes as in some other legislative assemblies.5 The most visible aspect of institutionalisation has been the creation by statute of the House of Commons Commission in 1978.6 The Commission is described on its website as ‘the overall supervisory body of the House of Commons Administration’, with its responsibilities including appointing the staff of the House, its budget and administrative organisation. The Ibbs Inquiry of 1990 had identified a profoundly unsatisfactory situation in terms of responsibilities, structure and operation, with

4 John R. Hibbing, ‘Legislative institutionalisation with illustrations from the British House of Commons’, American Journal of Political Science, 32, 1988, pp. 681–712. Hibbing was drawing on Nelson Polsby’s seminal 1968 article on legislative institutionalisation, ‘The institutionalization of the US House of Representatives’, American Political Science Review, 62, 1968, pp. 144–68. 5 Ken Coghill, Peter Holland, Ross Donohue, Andy Richardson and Cristina Neesham, ‘Capacity Building for New Parliamentarians: Survey of Orientation and Induction Programmes’, Working Paper 11/08, September 2008, Department of Management, Monash University, ISSN 1327–5216. 6 House of Commons (Administration) Act 1978.

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no mechanisms for financial management, and the House not in control of substantial areas of parliamentary expenditure.7 In order to achieve better management, planning, information and control the Ibbs team recommended that the Commission should be given a strategic role; the House’s domestic committees re-organised and an active Board of Management set up under the Clerk of the House who would have overall responsibility for services. Although the latter was achieved by the Parliamentary Corporate Bodies Act 1992, progress on implementing the rest of the Ibbs’ agenda was slow. It was reviewed and accelerated by the Braithwaite Review in 1999, which recommended more effective centralised management and the designation of the Clerk as Chief Executive.8 The outcome, according to the Commission’s most recent report, has been greater integration in the planning and delivery of services, a Corporate Business Plan and a substantial improvement in the House’s control over its own expenditure – the 2010–11 Administration estimate agreed in December 2009 was £231 million, not a paltry sum.9 The creation and on-going work of the Commission has thus given greater visibility and awareness to the House as a distinct institution with a corporate identity, its own governance arrangements and substantial autonomy over its own resources and public profile – an aspect which has been very prominent since the expenses scandal of 2009. In the Westminster model of parliamentary government it can be thought paradoxical to speak of Parliament’s autonomy from the executive branch of government. It is the essence of this model of government that the executive is drawn from Parliament and is politically and procedurally dependent on retaining its confidence. That dependence generated the disciplined parliamentary parties which emerged during the nineteenth century, sustained by country-wide party organisations based in constituencies. The single-party majorities which have been prevalent since the Second World War resulted in a culture of executive dominance which only began to wane as the Conservative and Labour Parties encountered increasing difficulty in maintaining the high levels of party cohesion and discipline in the Commons which had become the norm in the 1950s.

7 House of Commons Services: Report to the House of Commons Commission (the Ibbs Report), HC 38, 1990–91. 8 Review of Management and Services: Report to the House of Commons Commission (the Braithwaite. Report), HC 745, 1998–99. 9 The House of Commons Commission, 32nd Report, HC381, 2010–11, p. 8.

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Executive dominance was also increasingly challenged by backbenchers on all sides (and some frustrated Opposition frontbenchers), reflected in successive attempts to ‘reform’ Commons procedures, attempts which were able to make progress when windows of political opportunity occurred, such as the Wilson–Callaghan minority governments in the 1970s, a decisive electoral defeat for a discredited government (1970; 1979; 1997) or a major scandal such as that over expenses in 2009. Those opportunities have enabled some re-balancing of the relationship between ministers and the Commons as a whole, for example the setting up of a new select committee system in 1970, the extended role of the National Audit Office and Public Accounts Committee, and adoption of the Wright Committee proposed reforms – the report’s title Rebuilding the House signified radical intent10 – in 2010. It should not be thought, however, that this was ‘one-way traffic’. Although with the election of ‘New Labour’ in 1997 expectations of further reforms were high, the change in Prime Minister’s Questions without consultation and control of the Modernisation Committee through its being chaired by a Cabinet minister, the Leader of the House, proved to be a more accurate sign of what was to come – until the political authority of the Blair government began to wane. As a new window of opportunity opened, so did the desire of many MPs to (re-)assert the autonomous role of the Commons and the need to strengthen substantially their ability to exercise effective scrutiny and accountability of the executive. The absence of a single-party majority and the need for a coalition government following the 2010 General Election would appear to provide an extended window of opportunity for non-ministerial members of the House of Commons to continue to re-assert themselves. We shall return to this point later.11

The changing party system In the 1950s the British party system could be plausibly described as two monolithic parties, tightly disciplined and ideologically based.12

10 Select Committee on Reform of the House of Commons, Rebuilding the House, HC1117, 2008–09. See also Select Committee on Reform of the House of Commons, Rebuilding the House: Implementation, HC372, 2009–10. 11 See below, pp. 205–8. 12 S. Beer, Modern British Politics: A Study of Parties and Pressure Groups, Faber & Faber, London, 1965.

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That characterisation was contested then13 and has become less and less plausible in the ensuing decades. In terms both of the social bases of the parties – de-alignment – the distribution of votes, and especially the number of parties represented in the Commons a more plural system has emerged. In those circumstances it is not surprising that the dominance of the adversarial culture in the Commons has come under challenge. The development of select committees has been both an indicator of that change and an incentive to it as more MPs have had more exposure to the consensual mode in which those committees usually work, a mode which is often seen as the key to their effectiveness.14 Moreover, the cohesion of the two largest parties has been challenged by a succession of loyalty-straining issues: nuclear weapons/defence policy; reform of industrial relations; reform of the House of Lords; incomes policy; support for America in the Vietnam War for Labour; Europe; economic/monetary policy for the Conservatives. The European issue in particular gave an opportunity for informal alliances of dissenters across the two parties, particularly in the passing of the legislation on entry to the EEC and in the referendum in 1975. Such events demonstrated that monolithic, whip-dominated party was not always the only way of working in the House of Commons. And some MPs, and perhaps many observers of Westminster, considered that consensual working was a better way of working. When general elections failed to deliver secure single party majorities (February 1974 and 2010) or when the governing party lost its majority after 1992, some degree of cross-party working was inevitable. For longer-serving MPs these developments were a deviation from the norm of their past experience to which, they assumed, parliamentary politics would sooner or later return. For the newly elected, however, such ‘deviations’ were the only experience of parliamentary politics they had – and in many cases a more consensual style, a politics of accommodation, was more familiar to them from their pre-entry experience in local government. When they came to Westminster and encountered its procedures, norms and practices, they did not come with a blank sheet. As we have seen, socialisation does not take place in a vacuum: new Members bring their backgrounds, experiences, personal and party values with them when they take up their seats.

13 Robert T. Mckenzie. British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power within the Conservative and Labour Parties, Heinemann, London, 1st ed., 1955, 2nd ed., 1963. 14 Gavin Drewry (ed.), The New Select Committees: A Study of the 1979 Reforms, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1st ed., 1985, 2nd ed., 1989.

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The relevance of MPs’ pre-entry experience brings us to another aspect of institutionalisation, or perhaps more accurately professionalisation of the House of Commons and its membership. This very significant change in both the role and the image of the job is reflected in three developments over the last 30 years: the provision of dedicated, equipped offices for all MPs; the staffing of those offices, and particularly the recruitment of research assistants and a constituency capability; and the growth of allowances to resource MPs’ parliamentary activities. Although, as we have seen, there remain some dissenters, particularly among longer-serving Conservative MPs, the dominant assumption now is that being an MP is a full time job – a profession. That professionalisation was reflected in, and strongly reinforced by, the increasing number of MPs who had previously been local councillors and/or worked for their party or a campaigning group – in short, career politicians. This feature has been strongly echoed in our findings on the views of MPs about their role and their ambitions. It also has implications for party managers, whose leverage has been (slightly) reduced now that office accommodation is not scarce and the strength of the adversarial culture has waned.

The constituency role Linked with professionalisation and ‘the full-time member’ has been the expansion of the constituency role of the MP. ‘Nursing the constituency’ has always been obligatory in marginal seats for the MP who wants to be re-elected (and the party in whose interest the seat is held). The changed electoral context which has come with de-alignment and the decline of two-party dominance has meant that the concept of marginality is more problematic, and predicting the scale and incidence of shifts in electoral support much more difficult. Both the 1992 and 1997 elections illustrated this, with the result that not a few MPs were surprised to be elected then. It is far from clear how an MP’s (or candidate’s) work in and for the constituency affects voting behaviour. But there is no doubt that constituents’ expectations of what ‘my MP’ will do have increased significantly, particularly as electronic communication has been developed. MPs’ surgeries are now an almost universal phenomenon, along with websites and research assistants dealing with constituency correspondence. We have noted earlier the impact of this increased activity on written parliamentary Questions. It remains to be seen whether, and how, a continuing increase in this level of activity in Westminster and

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Whitehall can be maintained in an era of significant reductions in public expenditure. Our findings on MPs’ perceptions of their role reflect the strong emphasis on the constituency role. The link between this and the expectation of ministerial response to MPs’ enquiries and questions, which is in part the residue of the British constitutional doctrine of ministerial responsibility, may mean that the constituency factor is less significant in polities with different constitutions and electoral systems. Nevertheless, it certainly is still important where parliamentary government is accompanied by single-member electoral constituencies. Moreover, the development of electronic media and 24-hour media are worldwide phenomena, not limited to Westminster-style polities.

Learning points It is a contemporary truism to say that we live in a global age. Certainly the day is past when Westminster likes to think of itself as ‘the mother of parliaments’ with everything to give and nothing to learn from legislative assemblies elsewhere. For the comparatavist recent decades have provided a wealth of examples of parliamentary systems with which Westminster could be plausibly compared, not least with the development of devolved assemblies in the UK and of longer and deeper experience of parliamentary forms of government in the Commonwealth. Although, therefore, there are distinctive, perhaps unique, features of Westminster which limit comparisons and inhibit transplanting of procedures and experiences, there remain substantial similarities which are fertile ground for learning. Two examples make the point forcibly: as mentioned in the previous section, the development of IT and the 24-hour media are not unique to the UK; they are common to most states. Their impact may vary according to culture and economic development, and not least the character of the media in different states, but the phenomenon is common and politicians and parliamentary administrators face a common task in responding to it. Clearly there is more to learn from polities which are most similar and in the case of Westminster the devolved assemblies in the UK, the Dail Eirann and, to a lesser extent, the European Parliament are likely comparators. For much of its history Westminster has few if any comparators, but even in modern times it has, until recently, acted as though little or nothing could be learned from other legislatures. In the last 40 years, however, the UK Parliament has been actively

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willing to examine and learn from what others do, not only from other countries but also from the devolved assemblies it itself established. Forums such as the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and conferences of presiding officers and clerks are also contexts in which experiences, even lessons, can be shared. The findings of our research as recorded in this volume suggest that in the sharing of learning across legislative assemblies a number of interconnected factors will be particularly significant. Here we limit ourselves to six: • First, the nature and culture of the political parties, itself linked to the electoral system, and the importance of remembering these can and do change: witness New Zealand as well as the UK. • Second, the degree of professionalisation of the role of assembly member, and the resources which can be made available to sustain and, if appropriate, develop it: as always the location of the power to allocate those resources is of crucial importance. • Third, institutionalisation: has the assembly developed, or is it developing, a separate/autonomous identity and the self-confidence to sustain it? • Fourth, also linked to professionalisation, the background – social, economic, educational – of members of the assembly and the impact of background on their perception of their role. Consequential to this is the scale and importance of induction and training of newly elected members. • Fifth, members’ motivation: how do they themselves wish to shape their role and the degree of their individual and corporate determination to effect change, if necessary against the wishes of other power-holders, particularly the executive, when they – the members – perceive change is needed? When the window of opportunity occurs, will they have the will to seize that opportunity – and the energy to sustain the momentum needed to take full advantage of it? • Finally, the crucial issue of public engagement with, or confidence in, the assembly as an institution, and the wider political process in which it operates. This is necessarily part of the ongoing debate about democratic participation, the tension between representative and direct democracy, the impact on public confidence of political and parliamentary ethics, and perceptions of political parties and interest groups, in which the media have an important, perhaps dominant, role to play.

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2010: a historic opportunity? We concluded the writing of this volume five months into the Parliament elected in 2010. The political events leading up to the 2010 general election and the coalition government which resulted from them present an unusual opportunity for those wishing to effect change at Westminster. This is obviously true in the sense of achieving legislative change to institutions and processes, such as the electoral system, the second chamber, the committee system, party finance. It is also true in the sense of the mindset of those who have been elected to Parliament in the aftermath of the expenses scandal, the global financial downturn, and the end of 13 years of ‘New Labour’ government. As we have noted, there are a large number of new MPs who are currently being socialised into ‘Westminster politics’ – and even more returning MPs who are having to learn to operate in the new context of coalition politics. The coalition agreement is intended to last for a full five-year Parliament. That may or may not prove to be the case but, whether it does or not, an important question is whether after the coalition the changes made will continue, and even gain further momentum – or whether parliamentary politics will revert to the old pattern, with a single-party government dominating decision-making in Westminster as well as Whitehall. The answer to that question lies not just in the outcome of the next general election. As Norton and Cowley have shown, even in the two main parties in periods of single-party government, the willingness of backbench MPs to rebel or frustrate the intentions of the whips has been growing. Many MPs (and others) are also aware of the substantial challenge to parliamentary democracy which would arise from further alienation of the public at large from the electoral and parliamentary processes, and particularly partisan politics. More positively, some are also aware of the opportunities which IT and the internet offer for enhancing public participation in decision-making – e-democracy – which poses acute questions about the role of MPs as representatives and intermediaries between ‘government’ and ‘people’. Is this window of opportunity sufficient? Have current MPs the desire and the will to effect change? The answer to that question lies in MPs’ attitudes and values which, as we have shown, are not given, but change as events unfold, and as their experience of the Commons grows. MPs in the 2010 Parliament will become aware, if they are not already, of long-term dissatisfaction with the ‘balance of power’ between government and Parliament, frontbenchers and backbenchers. They will be aware of the widespread view that Parliament needs to improve its

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performance in scrutinising government and ensuring public accountability. They will also be aware of their party managers and the whips and the consequences of falling foul of them for their political career prospects. Improving parliamentary performance means more than raising the chances of defeating the government in a division. Ministerial and official minds can be influenced, even changed, in other ways. There are five main ways in which this may come about: first, the prospect of ministerial defeat: this is the most effective route. Ministerial listening, and the prospects of substantive ‘concessions’, are always improved if party managers perceive that there is a real chance of defeat in a division. In most circumstances governments prefer to avoid defeat and the appearance of having lost control of the House. This is an unusual circumstance, but more likely in a coalition or minority government situation than with a single-party majority – hence the importance of the outcome of the debate on electoral reform, since any move away from the current ‘first past the post’ system will reduce the likelihood of a single-party majority (which is not to say that first past the post guarantees a single-party majority; it doesn’t). Secondly, pressurising the parliamentary timetable. As parliamentary time is a scarce commodity, those who dissent from the government line – whatever their party – can put pressure on the government by using up that time, especially when debating legislation. Recent changes to the annuality principle – enabling bills to be carried over from one parliamentary session to the next – have reduced the significance of this to some extent, but it remains the case that the government’s business managers have an incentive to show some willingness to respond to criticism/dissent in order to ensure smooth and timely passage of their legislation and carry-over inevitably delays the bill concerned. The ability of the House of Lords to delay progress by insisting on its amendments to bills can also come into play here (subject to possible changes if a measure to reform the Lords is passed). Thirdly, sheer weight of argument: there are circumstances, particularly through the committee processes, where argument based on expertise and well-supported evidence can succeed in persuading ministers to change their minds or at least look again. There are two keys to this possibility: first, the resourcing of individual MPs, and the opposition parties, so that they have the time and resource to conduct the necessary research and investigation; secondly, the powers and resources available to select committees, and the ability of the whips to ‘manage’ them. Much will depend in this respect upon how the

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Wright Committee’s recommendations are implemented and whether Government and Opposition backbenchers have the will to maintain the momentum developed at the end of the 2005–10 Parliament. Fourthly, the mobilisation of shame: scrutiny and accountability procedures give MPs the opportunity, if armed with appropriate material, to embarrass, even shame, ministers into a change of line. Normally, to be successful in this regard parliamentary pressure needs to be supplemented by media and interest group pressure as the leverage point for ministers is the effect on their individual or collective reputations. The extension of the select committee system and the televising of evidence sessions have enhanced the opportunities for this ‘shaming’ effect. Potential impact on ministerial reputations is likely to attract the attention of the whips and party managers, particularly if there is perceived to be opportunity for partisan advantage. For this reason there is a view that cross-party parliamentary campaigns are more likely to be successful. Examples of this can be seen in cases such as the Equitable Life affair15 and the concerns about suicides and bullying in the military which eventually led to the setting up of an independent service complaints commissioner.16 When such campaigns develop and the whips begin to take an interest, backbench MPs have to assess where their primary interest or loyalty lies. This is the point at which MPs’ view of their role, and relative importance of ‘supporting my party’ is of critical significance. Here is the fifth and most crucial way of influencing or even changing ministerial minds: overriding party loyalty or the willingness to rebel. This is a test of MPs’ values and wills and where they are most likely to be influenced by the views and experiences of parliamentary colleagues. It is evident that the willingness to rebel has grown significantly in both the major parliamentary parties in the last 40 years. This phenomenon can no longer be dismissed as merely the outworking of ‘unique’ issues like Europe or unusual events such as the Iraq War. MPs, like voters, have become progressively less deferential, more willing to challenge the wisdom of their leaders. Necessarily where the governing party has a small majority, and inevitably when there is a minority or coalition government, ministers

15 For a summary of this complex and long-running saga, see House of Commons Research Paper 10/53, Equitable Life (Payments) Bill, August 2010. 16 See Service Complaints Commissioner, (First) Annual Report 2008, accessible from www.armedforcescomplaints.independent.gov.uk, Chapter 1 (Accessed 21 March 2011).

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are more vulnerable. The question is the desire and willingness of their backbenchers to exploit their position. Will the experience of the 2005–10 Parliament feed through into the new Parliament, in which there is no single-party majority? The different dynamics of coalition management – in which Westminster politicians and their officials have little experience (though such experience is to hand in the devolved assemblies and a number of county halls) – will complicate the socialisation effect which we would expect on the basis of our research. There is certainly a window of opportunity: a potentially vulnerable coalition government; a public mood of dissatisfaction with the way the Commons has been performing; a large group of new MPs elected with a commitment to bring about a change in the style of politics; ministers, and opposition leaders, also committed in principle to effecting change. The potential for change is, therefore, substantial: but what sort of change? Will the opportunity for change be taken? Or will the pressures to revert to type prevail? We know that MPs, new and returning, will be subject to socialisation – indeed, already have been in the weeks since the election. We will need to watch carefully to establish what the effect of socialisation upon the momentum for change will be: will it enhance or constrain it? Will the process of being accustomed to the procedures and styles of Westminster dull or blunt the reforming edge? Only time and further research will tell.

Appendix A: Questionnaires The questionnaires reproduced below are those sent to MPs first elected in 1997 and to a control group of longer-serving MPs. Apart from one or two minor changes of wording, the same questionnaires were sent to MPs first elected in 1992 and to a control group. Where appropriate, the questionnaires asked respondents to explain their views or make any other comments they wished.

First questionnaire to MPs first elected in 1997 (Sent immediately after the General Election of 1997)

The role of a Member of Parliament 1. Do you think that being a Member of Parliament should be a full time or a part time job? (full time/part time) 2. How do you expect to divide your time between various aspects of your job as an MP? (constituency work/Chamber of the House of Commons/committee work/other) 3. In carrying out your role as a representative, which of the following do you think are the most important? (Rank order: representing the nation as a whole/my constituents/my party) 4. Which of the following aspects of the job of being an MP do you think are the more important? (Rank order: scrutinising or keeping a check on the government and the civil service/supporting my party and helping it achieve its policy objectives/influencing or changing my party’s policy/helping constituents with their problems and dealing with constituency issues/other) 5. In deciding how to act and vote in Parliament do you expect to be strongly influenced by the advice of your party leadership/your own personal opinion/constituency opinion/representations from interest or pressure groups? (Nearly always/usually/sometimes/ rarely/never) 6. Do you expect to specialise in one or more policy areas? (Yes/no) 7. Do you intend to become active in any of your Parliamentary Party’s subject committees or groups? (Yes/no) 8. Do you intend to become active in any all-party groups in Parliament? (Yes/no) 9. Are you interested in becoming a member of any select committees? (Yes/no) 10. Do you see your election as the start of a long-term parliamentary career that will last 5 years/10 years/15 years/20 years/more than 20 years/don’t know? 11. Do you hope to become a Minister in due course? (Yes/no/don’t know)

Services and facilities 12. How adequate do you expect the following services and facilities to be in meeting your requirements as an MP? (Entirely adequate/adequate/somewhat inadequate/entirely inadequate/don’t know) 209

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Appendix A: Questionnaires Office accommodation Secretarial assistance Research assistance Library and information services Telephone services Postal services Travel allowances Administrative support (i.e. arrangements for paying staff, pension contributions, etc., the acquisition of office equipment, stationery, etc.)

13. What secretarial arrangements do you expect to make? (full time secretary/part time secretary/other arrangements) 14. Do you expect to appoint a research assistant? (Yes/no/don’t know) 15. Do you expect the task of appointing a secretary or a research assistant to be very difficult/difficult/relatively straightforward/easy/not applicable – separate boxes for secretary and research assistant?

Salary 16. Do you believe the (current) salary of £30,854 you will receive as a Member of Parliament to be appropriate for the job? (Ranked from 1 – too high to 5 – too low) 17. Will your salary as a Member be more or less than your present income, or about the same? (More/about the same/less)

Preparing to become a Member of Parliament 18. Is your present occupation likely to be of value in terms of expertise and skills in Parliament? (Yes/no/don’t know – separate boxes for expertise and skills) 19. Has your party offered you any specific assistance in preparing you for the job of being an MP? (Yes/no) 20. Have you sought advice from others in preparing for the job of being an MP? (Other MPs/party officials/family/trade union or other organisation/other) 21. How familiar would you say you are with parliamentary procedure? (Very familiar/somewhat familiar/not very familiar/not at all familiar) 22. What assistance do you expect to receive when you arrive at the Palace of Westminster and from whom? (Open-ended)

Second questionnaire to MPs first elected in 1997 (Sent January/February 1999)

The role of a Member of Parliament 1. Do you think that being a Member of Parliament should be a full time or a part time job? (full time/part time) 2. How is your time divided between various aspects of your job as an MP? (constituency work/Chamber of the House of Commons/committee work/other)


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3. In carrying out your role as a representative, which of the following do you think are the most important? (Rank order: representing the nation as a whole/my constituents/my party) 4. Which of the following aspects of the job of being an MP do you think are the more important? (Rank order: scrutinising or keeping a check on the government and the civil service/supporting my party and helping it achieve its policy objectives/influencing or changing my party’s policy/helping constituents with their problems and dealing with constituency issues/other) 5. In deciding how to act and vote in Parliament are you strongly influenced by the advice of your party leadership/your own personal opinion/constituency opinion/representations from interest or pressure groups? (Nearly always/usually/sometimes/ rarely/never) 6. The Labour Party no longer recognises ‘pairing’. Has this proved a problem for you in your role as a Member? (Yes/no) 7. Do you seek to specialise in one or more policy areas? (Yes/no) 8. Are you active in any of your Parliamentary Party’s subject committees or groups? (Yes/no and specify whether, e.g. office-holder, regular attender) 9. Are you active in any all-party groups in Parliament? (Yes/no and specify whether, e.g. office-holder, regular attender) 10. Have you been appointed a member of any select committees? (Yes/no) (a) If Yes, have you found serving on it a worthwhile experience? (Yes/no) (b) If No, do you want to be appointed a member of any select committees? (Yes/no) 11. Have you been appointed a member of any standing committees? (Yes/no) (a) If Yes, have you found serving on them a worthwhile experience? (Yes/no) 12. Do you see your election as the start of a long-term parliamentary career that will last 5 years/10 years/15 years/20 years/more than 20 years/don’t know? 13. Do you hope to become a Minister in due course? (Yes/no/don’t know)

Services and facilities 14. How adequate do you find the following services and facilities to be in meeting your requirements as an MP? (Entirely adequate/adequate/somewhat inadequate/entirely inadequate/don’t know) Office accommodation Secretarial assistance Research assistance Library and information services Telephone services Postal services Travel allowances Administrative support (i.e. arrangements for paying staff, pension contributions, etc., the acquisition of office equipment, stationery, etc.)

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15. What secretarial arrangements have you made? (full time secretary at Westminster/full time secretary in constituency/part time secretary at Westminster/ part time secretary in constituency/other arrangements) 16. Have you appointed a research assistant? (Yes/no/don’t know) (a) If Yes, what are his or her principal tasks? (e.g. drafting parliamentary Questions, preparing background briefings, drafting speeches, photocopying, etc.) 17. Did you find the task of appointing a secretary or a research assistant to be very difficult/difficult/relatively straightforward/easy/not applicable? (Separate boxes for secretary and research assistant)

Salary 18. Do you believe the level of salary you receive as a Member of Parliament to be appropriate for the job? (Ranked from 1 – too high to 5 – too low)

Learning the job of a Member of Parliament 19. Do you consider your occupation at the time of your election to have been of value in terms of expertise and skills in Parliament? (Yes/no/don’t know – separate boxes for expertise and skills) 20. Did your party provide you with any assistance after your election to help you learn about your job as an MP? (Yes/no) (a) If Yes, how helpful did you find that assistance? (Very helpful/quite helpful/not very helpful/not at all helpful/don’t know) Formal meeting(s) with the whips Informal meeting(s) with the whips Documentary material Induction course Other 21. Are there any improvements you would like to see in the assistance provided by your party to newly elected MPs? (Yes/no) 22. How helpful were the arrangements made by the House of Commons authorities after your election? (Very helpful/quite helpful/not very helpful/not at all helpful/don’t know) Fees Office Serjeant’s Department House of Commons Library Clerk’s Department Administration and Finance Department The Police Other


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23. Did you find the following useful? (Very useful/quite useful/not very useful/not at all useful/don’t know) Members’ Handbook (House Authorities) The Library Video The Guide to the Services of the Library Short Guide to Practice and Procedure (Clerk’s Department) 24. Are there any improvements you would like to see in the assistance provided by the House Authorities to newly elected MPs? (Yes/no) 25. Did you find The MPs’ Guide to Parliament produced by The House Magazine useful? (Very useful/quite useful/not very useful/not at all useful/don’t know) 26. Copies of The House Magazine were sent to prospective candidates for several months before the election. Did you find them useful in preparing to become an MP? (Very useful/quite useful/not very useful/not at all useful/don’t know) 27. From whom have you sought advice about how to do your work as an MP and how helpful have you found it? (Very useful/quite useful/not very useful/not at all useful/don’t know) MPs of own party MPs of other parties Chairperson or officers of parliamentary party Ministers/frontbenchers Party officials Clerks Library staff Other Commons staff Organisations outside Parliament (e.g. professional bodies, trade unions, pressure groups) Others (e.g. consultants, journalists) 28. How familiar would you say you are now with parliamentary procedure? (Very familiar/somewhat familiar/not very familiar/not at all familiar) 29. Are there any particular improvements (in addition to those you mentioned earlier) you would like to see? (Open-ended) (a) In helping newly elected Members learn about their job? (b) In helping you fulfil your role and duties as a Member of Parliament? (c) In helping the House do its job?

Third questionnaire to MPs first elected in 1997 (Sent February 2001, that is shortly before the 2001 General Election)

The role of a Member of Parliament 1. Do you think that being a Member of Parliament should be a full time or a part time job? (full time/part time)

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2. How is your time divided between various aspects of your job as an MP? (constituency work/Chamber of the House of Commons/committee work/other) 3. In carrying out your role as a representative, which of the following do you think are the most important? (Rank order: representing the nation as a whole/my constituents/my party) 4. Which of the following aspects of the job of being an MP do you think are the more important? (Rank order: scrutinising or keeping a check on the government and the civil service/supporting my party and helping it achieve its policy objectives/influencing or changing my party’s policy/helping constituents with their problems and dealing with constituency issues/other) 5. In deciding how to act and vote in Parliament are you strongly influenced by the advice of your party leadership/your own personal opinion/constituency opinion/representations from interest or pressure groups? (Nearly always/usually/sometimes/ rarely/never) 6. Do you seek to specialise in one or more policy areas? (Yes/no) 7. Are you active in any of your Parliamentary Party’s subject committees or groups? (Yes/no and specify whether, e.g. office-holder, regular attender) 8. Are you active in any all-party groups in Parliament? (Yes/no and specify whether, e.g. office-holder, regular attender) 9. Have you been appointed a member of any departmental select committees? (Yes/no) (a) If Yes, have you found serving on it a worthwhile experience? (Very worthwhile/quite worthwhile/not very worthwhile/not at all worthwhile) (b) If No, do you want to be appointed a member of a departmental select committee? (Yes/no) 10. Have you been appointed to any of the following select committees: PAC, Public Administration, Environmental Audit? (Yes/no) (a) If Yes, have you found serving on it a worthwhile experience? (Very worthwhile/quite worthwhile/not very worthwhile/not at all worthwhile) (b) If No, do you want to be appointed a member of one of these committees? (Yes/no) 11. Have you been appointed a member of any standing committees? (Yes/no) (a) If Yes, have you found serving on them a worthwhile experience? (Very worthwhile/quite worthwhile/not very worthwhile/not at all worthwhile) 12. Have you served on any committees dealing with draft bills or proposed legislation? (Yes/no) (a) If Yes, have you found serving on them a worthwhile experience? (Very worthwhile/quite worthwhile/not very worthwhile/not at all worthwhile) 13. Have you served on the European Legislation Committee? (Yes/no) (a) If Yes, have you found serving on it a worthwhile experience? (Very worthwhile/quite worthwhile/not very worthwhile/not at all worthwhile) 14. Have you served on any standing committees dealing with domestic or European delegated legislation? (Yes/no)


215

(a) If Yes, have you found serving on them a worthwhile experience? (Very worthwhile/quite worthwhile/not very worthwhile/not at all worthwhile) 15. Do you intend to stand for re-election? (Yes/no) (a) If No, please state briefly why. (b) If Yes, do you expect to be re-elected? (Yes/no) (c) If you are re-elected, do you see your parliamentary career lasting another Parliament/10 years/15 years/20 years/more than 20 years/don’t know? 16. If you have not already been appointed a Minister, do you hope to become a Minister in due course? (Yes/no/don’t know)

Services and facilities 17. How adequate do you find the following services and facilities to be in meeting your requirements as an MP? (Entirely adequate/adequate/somewhat inadequate/entirely inadequate/don’t know) Office accommodation Secretarial assistance Research assistance Library and information services Telephone services Postal services Travel allowances Administrative support (i.e. arrangements for paying staff, pension contributions, etc., the acquisition of office equipment, stationery, etc.) 18. What personal support staff do you have? (a) Secretarial (full time at Westminster/full time in constituency/part time at Westminster/part time in constituency/other arrangements) If Yes, what are his or her principal tasks? (b) Personal assistant (full time at Westminster/full time in constituency/part time at Westminster/part time in constituency/other arrangements) (c) Research assistant (full time at Westminster/full time in constituency/part time at Westminster/part time in constituency/other arrangements) If Yes, what are his or her principal tasks?


Learning the job of a Member of Parliament 20. From whom have you sought advice about how to do your work as an MP and how helpful have you found it? (Very useful/quite useful/not very useful/not at all useful/don’t know)

216

Appendix A: Questionnaires MPs of own party MPs of other parties Chairperson or officers of parliamentary party Ministers/frontbenchers Party officials Clerks Library staff Other Commons staff Organisations outside Parliament (e.g. professional bodies, trade unions, pressure groups) Others (e.g. consultants, journalists)

21. How familiar would you say you are now with parliamentary procedure? (Very familiar/somewhat familiar/not very familiar/not at all familiar) 22. What written sources of information have you found useful? (Very useful/quite useful/not very useful/not at all useful/don’t know) The Members’ Handbook The Short Guide to Procedure and Practice (issued by the Clerk’s Department) The Handbook of House of Commons Procedure (published by Vacher Dod) The House Magazine Other 23. Are there any particular improvements (in addition to those you mentioned earlier) you would like to see? (Open-ended) (a) In helping newly elected Members learn about their job? (b) In helping you fulfil your role and duties as a Member of Parliament? (c) In helping the House do its job?

An overview 24. Speaking generally, do you approve of the changes introduced as result of the work of the Modernisation Committee? (Yes/no) (a) Are there any changes of which you particularly approve? (please specify) (b) Are there any changes of which you particularly disapprove? (please specify) (c) Are there any changes which you feel should be introduced? (please specify) 25. Has your experience of being an MP since 1997 led you to change your views about what the job entails? (Open-ended) 26. Reflecting on your experience since becoming an MP, which of the following would you say has been most influential on how your view of your role has developed? (Very influential/quite influential/not very influential/not at all influential) Your party The House of Commons Other people/organisations (please specify)


217

27. Please add any further comments on matters not covered by the earlier questions about your experience of learning the job of a Member of Parliament. For example, are there areas in which your attitudes towards Parliament have changed significantly?

Questionnaire to longer-serving MPs (control group) (Sent January/February 1999)

The role of a Member of Parliament 1. Do you think that being a Member of Parliament should be a full time or a part time job? (full time/part time) 2. How is your time divided between various aspects of your job as an MP? (constituency work/Chamber of the House of Commons/committee work/other) 3. In carrying out your role as a representative, which of the following do you think are the most important? (Rank order: representing the nation as a whole/my constituents/my party) 4. Which of the following aspects of the job of being an MP do you think are the more important? (Rank order: scrutinising or keeping a check on the government and the civil service/supporting my party and helping it achieve its policy objectives/influencing or changing my party’s policy/helping constituents with their problem and dealing with constituency issues/other) 5. In deciding how to act and vote in Parliament are you strongly influenced by the advice of your party leadership/your own personal opinion/constituency opinion/representations from interest or pressure groups? (Nearly always/usually/sometimes/ rarely/never) 6. The Labour Party no longer recognises ‘pairing’. Has this proved a problem for you in your role as a Member? (Yes/no) 7. Do you specialise in one or more policy areas? (Yes/no) 8. Are you active in any of your Parliamentary Party’s subject committees or groups? (Yes/no and specify whether, e.g. office-holder, regular attender) 9. Are you active in any all-party groups in Parliament? (Yes/no and specify whether, e.g. office-holder, regular attender) 10. Have you served as a member of any select committees? (Yes/no) (a) If Yes, have you found serving on them a worthwhile experience? (Yes/no) 11. Have you served as a member of any standing committees? (Yes/no) (a) If Yes, have you found serving on them a worthwhile experience? (Yes/no)

Services and facilities 12. How adequate do you find the following services and facilities to be in meeting your requirements as an MP? (Entirely adequate/adequate/somewhat inadequate/entirely inadequate/don’t know) Office accommodation Secretarial assistance

218

Appendix A: Questionnaires Research assistance Library and information services Telephone services Postal services Travel allowances Administrative support (i.e. arrangements for paying staff, pension contributions, etc., the acquisition of office equipment, stationery, etc.)

13. What secretarial arrangements have you made? (full time secretary at Westminster/full time secretary in constituency/part time secretary at Westminster/ part time secretary in constituency/other arrangements) 14. Do you have a research assistant? (Yes/no/don’t know) (a) If Yes, what are his or her principal tasks? (e.g. drafting parliamentary Questions, preparing background briefings, drafting speeches, photocopying, etc.)


Learning the job of a Member of Parliament 16. Do you consider your occupation at the time of your election to have been of value in terms of expertise and skills in Parliament? (Yes/no/don’t know – separate boxes for expertise and skills and asked to state previous occupation) 17. Did your party provide you with any assistance after your election to help you learn about your job as an MP? (Yes/no) If Yes, how helpful did you find that assistance? (Very helpful/quite helpful/not very helpful/not at all helpful/don’t know) 18. Are there any improvements you would like to see in the assistance provided by your party to newly elected MPs? (Yes/no) 19. How helpful were the arrangements made by the House of Commons authorities after your election? (Very helpful/quite helpful/not very helpful/not at all helpful/don’t know) Serjeant’s Department House of Commons Library Clerk’s Department Administration and Finance Department (Fees Office) The Police Other 20. Are there any improvements you would like to see in the assistance provided by the House Authorities to newly elected MPs? (Yes/no) 21. From whom have you sought advice about how to do your work as an MP and how helpful have you found it? (Very useful/quite useful/not very useful/not at all useful/don’t know)


219

MPs of own party MPs of other parties Chairperson or officers of parliamentary party Ministers/frontbenchers Party officials Clerks Library staff Other Commons staff Organisations outside Parliament (e.g. professional bodies, trade unions, pressure groups) Others (e.g. consultants, journalists) 22. How familiar would you say you are now with parliamentary procedure? (Very familiar/somewhat familiar/not very familiar/not at all familiar) (a) Are there any particular improvements (in addition to those you mentioned earlier) you would like to see? (Open-ended) (b) In helping newly elected Members learn about their job? (c) In helping you fulfil your role and duties as a Member of Parliament? (d) In helping the House do its job?


The tables in Appendix B relate to respondents who completed all three questionnaires to newly elected MPs and to those longer-serving MPs who responded to our questionnaires. The only exceptions are Tables B.15 and B.16, which are based on all respondents who replied to the third questionnaire to newly elected MPs. The rank order scales were calculated by scoring 1 for the lowest ranking, 3 or 4 for the highest, according to the number of choices involved, and then producing a mean by dividing by the number of respondents.

Table B.1 Respondents completing all three questionnaires by party, age, gender and length of parliamentary service Conservative∗ Age (median yrs) 1992 intake 1992–97 longer-serving 1997 intake 1997–2001 longer-serving

Gender (male/ female)

Parl. service (median yrs)

n

38 55

90.9/9.1 96.2/3.8

n/a 13

11 26

41 58

88.9/11.1 93.3/6.7

n/a 17

9 30

Gender (male/ female)

Parl. service (median yrs)

n

44 54

61.5/38.5 90.3/9.7

n/a 13

13 31

47 61

75/25 91.2/8.8

n/a 17

40 23

Labour∗ Age (median yrs) 1992 intake 1992–97 longer-serving 1997 intake 1997–2001 longer-serving ∗ Ages

for newly elected respondents were at the time of their election and those for longerserving respondents, together with parliamentary service, were at the time the questionnaire was administered.

220


221

Liberal Democrat Three of the four Liberal Democrats elected for the first time in 1992 responded to all three questionnaires. They were all male and aged between 30 and 45. Of the two out of fifteen (excluding the Leader) longer-serving Liberal Democrats in the 1992–97 Parliament who responded to their questionnaire, both were male and aged between 40 and 55. They had served as MPs between five and ten years. Ten of the 26 Liberal Democrats elected for the first time in 1997 responded to all three questionnaires. Their median age was 40 and all were male except one. Of the three out of nineteen (excluding the Leader) longer-serving Liberal Democrats in the 1997–2001 Parliament who responded to the questionnaire, all were male and aged between 30 and 55. They had served in the Commons between 10 and 20 years.

Questionnaire results Abbreviations: Q1 – Questionnaire 1; Q2 – Questionnaire 2; Q3 – Questionnaire 3; LS – Longer-serving MPs.

The role of the Member of Parliament Table B.2 Do you think that being a Member of Parliament should be a full time or a part time job? (% replying ‘full time’) Party

Q1

Q2

1992 1997

Conservative 90.2 72.7 55.6 44.4

Q3

LS

63.6 44.4

57.1 41.4

100.0 100.0

96.7 100.0

100.0

100.0

Labour 1992 1997

100.0 100.0

100.0 100.0

Liberal Democrat 1992∗ 1997 ∗ The

100.0

100.0

election of only four new Liberal Democrats in 1992, three of whom replied to all three questionnaires, makes detailed analysis impossible, but all three replied ‘full time’.

222 Table B.3 How do you expect to divide your time/how is your time divided between the various aspects of your job as an MP? (rank order scale 1–3) Conservative Job aspect

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS

Constituency 1992 1997

2.70 2.40

2.91 2.60

2.89 2.60

2.76 2.88

Chamber 1992 1997

1.80 2.80

1.82 1.70

1.56 1.80

1.62 1.92

Committee 1992 1997

2.10 1.40

1.82 1.80

1.89 1.11

1.89 1.62

Labour Job aspect

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS

Constituency 1992 1997

3.00 2.88

3.00 2.94

3.00 2.94

2.65 2.86

Chamber 1992 1997

1.69 1.63

1.46 1.81

1.23 1.81

1.67 1.52

Committee 1992 1997

2.00 1.97

1.77 1.66

2.00 1.59

1.52 1.95

Liberal Democrat Job aspect

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS

Constituency 1997

3.00

3.00

3.00

3.00

Chamber 1997

1.63

1.81

1.81

1.52

Committee 1997

1.97

1.66

1.59

1.95

Note: In 1992 the three Liberal Democrat respondents ranked ‘constituency’ a clear first, as did all longer-serving Liberal Democrat respondents, with ‘chamber’ second and ‘committee’ third.

223 Table B.4 In carrying out your role as a representative, which of the following do you think are the more important? (rank order scale 1–3) Conservative Representative role

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS

Nation 1992 1997

1.73 2.00

1.82 2.11

2.00 2.00

2.32 2.32

Constituents 1992 1997

2.82 2.56

2.55 2.56

2.56 2.67

2.52 2.57

Party 1992 1997

1.55 1.43

1.64 1.33

1.55 1.33

1.20 1.21

Labour Representative role

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS

Nation 1992 1997

1.33 1.63

1.50 1.43

1.42 1.60

1.68 1.87


2.67 2.60

2.67 2.74

2.67 2.69

3.00 2.70

Party 1992 1997

2.00 1.89

1.92 1.89

2.00 1.80

1.86 1.57

Liberal Democrat Representative role

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS

Nation 1997

1.27

1.55

1.36

1.67

Constituents 1997

3.00

2.91

3.00

2.67

Party 1997

1.73

1.56

1.64

1.67

Note: In 1992 the three Liberal Democrat respondents ranked ‘constituents’ a clear first, as did all longer-serving Liberal Democrat respondents, with ‘nation’ second and ‘party’ third.

224 Table B.4

(Continued) % placing ‘nation’ first or second

Party

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS

Conservative 1992 1997

63.6 55.5

45.5 66.7

63.6 66.7

80.0 89.3

Labour 1992 1997

16.7 42.9

33.3 31.4

25.0 42.9

50.0 60.9

Liberal Democrat 1992 1997

2/3 27.3

2/3 45.5

2/3 36.4

2/3 1/3

% placing ‘party’ first or second Party

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS


45.5 44.4

54.5 33.3

36.4 33.3

20.0 17.9

Labour 1992 1997

91.7 74.3

66.7 74.3

75.0 71.4

63.6 56.5


1/3 72.7

0/3 54.5

1/3 63.6

0/3 2/3

225 Table B.5 Which of the following aspects (mentioned in table note) of the job of being an MP do you think are the most important? (rank order scale 1–4) Conservative Job aspect

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS

Scrutiny 1992 1997

2.09 3.44

2.00 3.33

2.00 3.56

2.32 3.28

Supporting party 1992 1997

2.36 2.11

2.09 2.00

2.55 1.89

2.26 2.10

Influencing party 1992 1997

2.27 2.11

2.45 1.78

2.18 1.67

2.31 1.90


3.45 3.00

3.45 3.00

3.27 2.89

3.19 2.93

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS

Scrutiny 1992 1997

2.36 2.11

2.91 2.11

3.18 2.61

2.59 2.96

Supporting party 1992 1997

2.45 2.56

2.73 2.53

2.82 2.22

2.41 2.17

Influencing party 1992 1997

1.55 1.97

1.27 2.17

1.18 1.94

1.89 2.04


3.55 3.50

3.36 3.25

3.09 3.31

3.26 3.04

Labour Job aspect

Note: Scrutinising or keeping a check on the government and the civil service. Supporting my party and helping it achieve its policy objectives. Influencing or changing my party’s policy. Helping constituents with their problems/dealing with constituency issues. ∗ In 1992 Liberal Democrat respondents consistently placed ‘helping constituents’ first, ‘scrutiny’ second, and ‘supporting the party’ before ‘influencing the party’.

226 Table B.5

(Continued) Liberal Democrat

Job aspect

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS

Scrutiny 1997

2.38

2.88

2.75

3.00

Supporting party 1997

2.50

1.75

2.38

2.33

Influencing party 1997

1.25

1.50

1.25

1.67

Constituents 1997

3.88

3.88

3.75

3.00

% placing ‘scrutiny’ first or second Party

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS


27.3 77.8

18.2 77.8

27.3 100.0

40.0 82.8

Labour 1992 1997

36.4 36.1

45.5 27.8

63.6 52.8

44.4 65.2


2/3 50.0

2/3 80.0

2/3 70.0

2/3 2/3

% placing ‘supporting the party’ (‘influencing the party’) first or second Party

Q1

Q2

Q3


45.5 (36.4) 33.3 (18.2)

36.4 (45.5) 33.3 (18.2)

54.5 (27.3) 11.1 (18.2)

38.5 (34.6) 27.6 (24.1)

Labour 1992 1997

45.5 (18.2) 52.8 (30.6)

63.6 (0.0) 58.3 (33.3)

63.6 (0) 38.9 (27.8)

48.1 (22.2) 39.1 (30.4)

1/3 (0/3) 60.0 (0.0)

2/3 (0/3) 10.0 (10.0)

2/3 (1/3) 20.0 (10.0)

0/3 (0/3) 1/3 (0/3)


LS

227 Table B.6 In deciding how to act and vote in Parliament, do you expect to be/are you strongly influenced by the advice of your party leadership, your personal opinions, constituency opinion, representations from interest or pressure groups? (rank order scale 1–5) Conservative Influence

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS

Party leadership 1992 1997

4.00 4.22

4.70 4.44

4.70 4.11

4.19 4.03

Own opinions 1992 1997

4.55 4.44

4.36 4.33

4.36 4.22

3.81 4.31

Constituency opinion 1992 1997

3.50 3.22

4.00 3.56

3.80 3.33

3.30 3.34

Pressure groups 1992 1997

2.40 2.78

2.20 2.56

2.30 2.89

2.41 2.10

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS

Party leadership 1992 1997

4.25 4.51

4.25 4.36

4.50 4.10

4.28 4.14

Own opinions 1992 1997

3.92 4.15

4.31 4.23

4.15 4.15

3.11 4.18

Constituency opinion 1992 1997

3.58 3.67

3.67 3.36

3.33 3.54

3.39 2.95

Pressure groups 1992 1997

3.17 2.56

2.33 2.62

2.67 2.67

2.46 2.82

Labour Influence

228 Table B.6

(Continued) Liberal Democrat∗

Influence

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS

Party leadership 1997

4.51

4.36

4.10

4.14

Own opinions 1997

4.15

4.23

4.15

4.18

Constituency opinion 1997

3.67

3.36

3.54

2.95

Pressure groups 1997

2.56

2.62

2.67

2.82

∗ In

1992 the Liberal Democrats consistently placed ‘own opinion’ first and ‘pressure groups’ fourth; they varied between ‘the party leadership’ and ‘constituency opinion’.

Table B.7 Do you hope to become a minister in due course? (% replying ‘yes’) Party

Q1

Q2

Q3


81.9 88.9

72.7 88.9

75.0 88.9

Labour 1992 1997

46.2 45.0

61.5 55.0

76.9 50.0


2/3 45.5

2/3 45.5

3/3 54.5

229

The post-election experience Table B.8 From whom have you sought advice about how to do your work as an MP and how helpful have you found it? (Questionnaires 2 and 3 and to longerserving MPs) Conservative Source of advice

Q2

Q3

LS

100.0 100.0

100.0 88.9

100.0 89.7

MPs of other parties 1992 1997

45.5 66.7

63.6 44.4

75.8 58.6

Chair/officers of parliamentary party 1992 1997

36.4 55.6

72.7 33.3

82.8 48.3

Ministers/frontbenchers 1992 1997

54.4 66.7

90.9 66.7

86.2 69.9

Party officials 1992 1997

36.4 55.5

63.6 55.5

75.9 51.7

Clerks 1992 1997

63.6 66.7

100.0 77.8

93.1 72.4

House of Commons librarians 1992 1997

100.0 55.6

100.0 66.7

93.1 72.4

Other House of Commons officials 1992 1997

54.5 55.6

90.9 55.6

75.9 55.2

Outside organisations 1992 1997

36.4 33.3

63.6 33.3

65.5∗ 41.4

Outside individuals 1992 1997

27.3 44.4

63.6 44.4

65.5∗ 34.3

MPs of own party 1992 1997

∗

Outside organisations and individuals combined.

230 Table B.8

(Continued) Labour

Source of advice

Q2

Q3

LS

100.0 100.0

100.0 90.2

93.5 87.0


61.5 58.5

92.3 61.0

54.8 60.9


84.6 61.0

84.6 63.4

77.4 60.9


84.6 58.5

84.6 58.5

80.6 69.6


76.9 75.6

84.6 73.2

71.0 69.6

Clerks 1992 1997

84.6 70.7

100.0 75.6

87.1 73.9


84.6 82.9

100.0 80.5

83.9 87.0


69.2 68.3

92.3 65.9

80.6 78.3


69.2 56.1

100.0 56.1

58.1∗ 65.2


76.9 39.0

84.6 36.6

58.1∗ 34.3


∗

Outside organisations and individuals combined.

231

Liberal Democrat Source of advice

Q2

Q3

LS

3/3 100.0

3/3 100.0

3/3 100.0


3/3 54.5

3/3 72.7

3/3 66.7


2/3 27.3

3/3 81.8

3/3 66.7


2/3 45.5

2/3 63.6

3/3 66.7


3/3 36.4

2/3 63.6

3/3 66.7

3/3 100.0

3/3 100.0

3/3 100.0


3/3 54.5

3/3 90.9

3/3 100.0


3/3 63.6

2/3 81.8

3/3 100.0


3/3 36.4

2/3 81.8

2/3∗ 66.7


3/3 36.4

2/3 72.7

2/3∗ 100.0


Clerks 1992 1997

∗ Outside

organisations and individuals combined.

232 Table B.9 How helpful were the arrangements made by the House of Commons authorities after your election? (Questionnaire 2 and questionnaire to longerserving MPs only) (rank order scale 1–4) Intake/LS

Conservative

Labour

Liberal Democrat

3.30 3.06 3.53 3.27

3.13 3.05 3.01 3.12

– – 2.99 2.73

1992 LS 1997 LS

Table B.10 How helpful was the assistance provided by your party after your election to help you learn about your job as an MP? (Questionnaire 2) (rank order scale 1–4)∗ Form of assistance

Conservative

Labour

Liberal Democrat

Formal meetings with the whips

2.00 3.00

2.40 2.56

1.67 2.33

Informal meetings with the whips

2.30 3.00

2.63 3.00

1.67 2.33

Documentary material

2.50 2.33

3.00 2.75

1.67 2.67

Induction course

None None

3.00 2.44

None 2.33

∗ 1992

responses in italics; 1997 responses in roman.

Table B.11 Do you intend to be/are you active in your parliamentary party’s subject committees? (% replying ‘yes’) Party

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS

81.8 100.0

81.8 100.0

55.6 55.6

51.7 67.9

Labour 1992 1997

92.3 82.5

92.3 87.5

92.3 67.5

71.0 56.5


2/3 81.8

3/3 72.7

3/3 54.5

3/3 66.7


233 Table B.12 Do you intend to be/are you active in any all-party groups in Parliament? (% replying ‘yes’) Party

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS


45.5 77.8

72.7 77.8

63.6 66.7

69.0 55.2

Labour 1992 1997

61.5 77.5

84.6 80.0

92.3 85.0

74.1 60.9


2/3 72.7

1/3 81.8

1/3 90.9

2/3 0/3

Table B.13 Have you been appointed to any standing committees (now public bill committees)? If so, have you found serving on them worthwhile? (Questionnaires 2 and 3 and questionnaire to longer-serving MPs) Party

Q2∗

Q3†


77.8 88.9

90.9 100.0

73.0 77.8

Labour 1992 1997

81.8 60.0

69.2 73.7

82.8 77.3


1/3 63.6

1/3 54.5

1/3 1/2

∗%

LS∗

saying ‘worthwhile’. † % saying ‘very worthwhile’ and ‘quite worthwhile’.

234 Table B.14 Have you served on a select committee? If so, have you found serving on it worthwhile? (Questionnaires 2 and 3 and questionnaire to longer-serving MPs) Q2∗

Party Conservative 1992 1997

90.9 66.7

80.0 (3.10) 100.0 (3.29)

95.8 77.9

100.0 93.5

100.0 (3.75) 97.0 (3.61)

91.7 100.0

None served 100.0

(2/2) 100.0 (3.63)

2/2 3/3

Labour 1992 1997 Liberal Democrat 1992 1997 ∗%

LS∗

Q3†

saying ‘worthwhile’. † % saying ‘very worthwhile’ and ‘quite worthwhile’.

Table B.15 How familiar would you say you are with parliamentary procedure? (rank order scale 1–4) Party

Q1

Q2

Q3

LS


2.36 3.00

3.18 3.44

3.27 3.33

3.38 3.50

Labour 1992 1997

2.42 2.35

2.69 2.78

2.77 2.90

3.42 3.41


2.33 2.50

3.00 3.00

3.33 3.00

3.00 3.33

235 Table B.16 Has your experience of being a Member of Parliament since 1997 changed your view of what the job entails? (Questionnaire 3 only) (all respondents) Party

Yes

No


40.0 41.7

60.0 58.3

Labour 1992 1997

58.3 47.8

41.7 52.2


3/3 53.8

0.0 46.2

All

47.9

52.1

Table B.17 Reflecting on your experience since becoming an MP, which of the following would you say has been most influential on how your view of your role has developed? (Questionnaire 3 1997 only) (all respondents) Very important + quite important

Not very important + not at all important

House of Commons Conservative Labour Liberal Democrat

92.3 90.9 40.0

7.7 9.1 60.0

All

84.6

15.4

69.2 75.0 80.0 75.3

30.8 25.0 20.0 24.7

30.8 58.0 80.0 56.3

69.2 42.0 20.0 43.7

Influence

Party Conservative Labour Liberal Democrat Other people, organisations∗ Conservative Labour Liberal Democrat

∗ Most

commonly mentioned: constituents, pressure groups, local organisations, local party, fellow MPs, the media.

Appendix C: The Parliamentary Activity of MPs

The data used to measure the parliamentary activity of MPs in selected sessions of the 1992–97, 1997–2001 and 2001–05 Parliaments was gathered or compiled from the following parliamentary sources in the ways indicated: • For debates in the House of Commons Chamber and Westminster Hall and for the number of oral and written answers to parliamentary Questions, the Parliamentary On-line Information Service (POLIS) was used. • For committee activity House of Commons Sessional Returns; and for Early Day Motions (EDMs) the House of Commons EDM Database. • The data covered all backbench MPs and therefore excluded ministers and members of the Official Opposition ‘Shadow Cabinet’, and the Leader of the Liberal Democrats, though not their frontbench spokespersons, since many Liberal Democrats had such responsibilities, especially in the 1992–97 Parliament, when initially the number of Liberal Democrats was less than half that in later Parliaments. • The analysis of contributions to debates in the Chamber and Westminster Hall, the number of parliamentary Questions to which answers were secured and the number of EDMs signed were calculated per sitting day to facilitate comparisons between sessions. • Committee membership was calculated as the percentage of MPs who served on them. • Attendance at standing (public bill) committees was calculated as a percentage of meetings attended. • Attendance at investigative committees was calculated as the mean number of meetings attended.

236

237

The House of Commons Chamber Table C.1 House of Commons Chamber: participation 1992–93, 1994–95 and 1999–2000 (contributions to debates per sitting day) Session

1992 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1992–93 1994–95 1999–2000

0.093 0.131 0.130

0.080 0.078 0.122

0.083 0.088 0.123

Labour 1992–93 1994–95 1999–2000

0.073 0.095 0.053

0.090 0.088 0.067

0.086 0.090 0.065

Liberal Democrat 1992–93 1994–95 1999–2000

0.103 0.116 0.073

0.143 0.129 0.122

0.135 0.126 0.115

Table C.2 House of Common Chamber: participation 1997–98, 1999–2000 and 2003–04 (contributions to debates per sitting day) Session

1997 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1997–98 1999–2000 2003–04

0.201 0.204 0.126

0.136 0.123 0.139

0.151 0.141 0.136

Labour 1997–98 1999–2000 2003–04

0.060 0.055 0.064

0.086 0.060 0.075

0.069 0.060 0.070


0.124 0.126 0.150

0.151 0.115 0.075

0.126 0.121 0.129

238

Westminster Hall sittings Table C.3 2003–04

Westminster Hall: participation rates 1999–2000 and

Party and session

1997 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1999–2000 2003–04

93.3 79.2

69.4 80.5

74.6 78.4

Labour 1999–2000 2003–04

78.3 86.8

61.0 73.0

69.8 79.6

92.3 100.0

95.0 92.3

93.5 94.4

Liberal Democrat 1999–2000 2003–04

Note: Westminster Hall sittings began in 1999.

Table C.4 Westminster Hall: contributions to debates per sitting day Session

1997 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1999–2000 2003–04

0.028 0.021

0.016 0.019

0.019 0.019

Labour 1999–2000 2003–04

0.015 0.021

0.009 0.011

0.012 0.016

Liberal Democrat 1999–2000 2003–04

0.047 0.048

0.019 0.021

0.035 0.036

Note: Westminster Hall sittings began in 1999.

239

Parliamentary Questions Table C.5 Oral Questions answered 1992–93, 1994–95 and 1999–2000 (per sitting day) Session

1992 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1992–93 1994–95 1999–2000

0.074 0.106 0.103

0.056 0.056 0.050

0.059 0.066 0.060

Labour 1992–93 1994–95 1999–2000

0.043 0.065 0.039

0.059 0.056 0.042

0.055 0.059 0.041


0.059 0.058 0.037

0.078 0.089 0.055

0.074 0.082 0.052

Table C.6 Oral Questions answered 1997–98, 1999–2000 and 2003–04 (per sitting day) Session

1997 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1997–98 1999–2000 2003–04

0.047 0.053 0.033

0.026 0.019 0.020

0.031 0.027 0.023

Labour 1997–98 1999–2000 2003–04

0.021 0.028 0.023

0.030 0.016 0.016

0.025 0.022 0.019


0.041 0.031 0.034

0.021 0.015 0.015

0.033 0.024 0.027

240 Table C.7 Written Questions answered 1992–93, 1994–95 and 1999–2000 (per sitting day) Session

1992 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1992–93 1994–95 1999–2000

0.243 0.234 0.565

0.187 0.147 0.221

0.199 0.164 0.285

Labour 1992–93 1994–95 1999–2000

0.543 0.868 0.310

0.565 0.648 0.286

0.559 0.707 0.292


0.642 0.600 0.847

0.784 0.981 1.026

0.754 0.901 0.998

Table C.8 Written Questions answered 1997–98, 1999–2000 and 2003–04 (per sitting day) Session

1997 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1997–98 1999–2000 2003–04

0.431 0.639 1.281

0.367 0.285 0.368

0.383 0.362 0.565

Labour 1997–98 1999–2000 2003–04

0.199 0.294 0.392

0.416 0.292 0.367

0.296 0.293 0.379


0.997 1.165 1.369

0.958 0.998 1.121

0.980 1.094 1.279

241

Early Day Motions Table C.9 Early Day Motions signed 1992–93, 1994–95 and 1999–2000 (per sitting day) Session

1992 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1992–93∗ 1994–95∗ 1999–2000

0.100 0.054 0.089

0.109 0.131 0.127

0.106 0.107 0.120

Labour 1992–93∗ 1994–95∗ 1999–2000

2.123 1.886 0.952

1.912 1.263 0.844

1.983 1.465 0.872

Liberal Democrat 1992–93∗ 1994–95∗ 1999–2000

2.181 1.679 1.711

0.978 0.976 1.145

1.236 1.127 1.235

∗ Partial

data, since MPs retired or defeated in 1997 are not included in

POLIS.

Table C.10 Early Day Motions signed 1997–98, 1999–2000 and 2003–04 (per sitting day) Session

1997 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1997–98 1999–2000 2003–04

0.232 0.164 0.749

0.195 0.141 0.651

0.204 0.146 0.672

Labour 1997–98 1999–2000 2003–04

0.580 0.815 1.328

0.733 1.067 1.228

0.648 0.940 1.276


1.066 1.241 1.855

1.100 1.235 2.490

1.081 1.239 2.084

242

Standing (public bill) committees Table C.11 Standing committee membership 1992–93, 1994–95 and 1999–2000 (% of backbenchers appointed) Session

1992 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1992–93 1994–95 1999–2000

96.2 93.6 80.0

54.3 33.8 45.4

62.9 45.2 51.9

Labour 1992–93 1994–95 1999–2000

90.8 87.7 42.5

55.7 36.4 27.7

65.1 50.2 31.4

100.0 100.0 33.3

100.0 100.0 37.5

100.0 100.0 36.8


Table C.12 Standing committee membership 1997–98, 1999– 2000 and 2003–04 (% of backbenchers appointed) Session

1997 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1997–98 1999–2000 2003–04

81.8 93.3 66.7

52.4 51.9 49.4

59.4 60.9 53.2

Labour 1997–98 1999–2000 2003–04

85.4 84.0 65.9

40.8 31.4 33.3

65.6 57.9 48.9


76.9 88.5 82.6

42.1 36.8 23.1

69.2 66.7 61.1

243 Table C.13 Standing committee attendance rates 1992–93, 1994–95 and 1999–2000 (% of meetings) Session

1992 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1992–93 1994–95 1999–2000

92.6 90.4 90.2

87.1 81.5 82.0

89.4 86.0 84.8

Labour 1992–93 1994–95 1999–2000

79.8 73.4 90.4

73.6 69.2 78.3

76.3 71.2 83.4


63.8 63.0 94.2

57.4 53.4 70.2

59.6 55.7 81.7

Table C.14 Standing committee attendance rates 1997–98, 1999–2000 and 2003–04 (% of meetings) Session

1997 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1997–98 1999–2000 2003–04

93.6 84.8 77.3

96.3 84.8 69.4

95.1 84.8 71.9

Labour 1997–98 1999–2000 2003–04

86.3 71.5 71.6

86.6 83.4 81.5

86.4 84.9 81.7


80.3 71.5 71.6

62.2 85.0 81.5

75.0 74.1 72.6

244

Investigative committees∗ Table C.15 Investigative committee membership 1992–93, 1994–95 and 1999–2000 (% of backbenchers appointed) Session

1992 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1992–93 1994–95 1999–2000

82.7 72.3 30.0

33.7 43.8 46.6

43.8 49.2 43.5

Labour 1992–93 1994–95 1999–2000

35.4 60.0 41.5

36.9 29.5 38.1

36.5 37.8 39.0


0.0 25.0 33.3

40.0 46.7 81.3

31.6 42.1 73.6

Table C.16 Investigative committee membership 1997–98, 1999–2000 and 2003–04 (% of backbenchers appointed) Session

1997 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1997–98 1999–2000 2003–04

84.8 60.0 50.0

33.3 43.5 43.7

45.7 47.1 45.0

Labour 1997–98 1999–2000 2003–04

53.9 63.6 45.7

44.4 39.0 46.1

49.7 51.4 45.9


38.5 34.6 34.8

52.6 73.6 30.8

44.4 51.1 33.3

∗ That is, the departmental select committees, the Public Accounts, Public Administration, and Environmental Audit Committees.

245 Table C.17 Investigative committee attendance 1992–93, 1994–95 and 1999–2000 (mean number of meetings attended) Session

1992 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1992–93 1994–95 1999–2000

27.6 19.9 21.2

35.0 24.5 25.2

32.1 23.2 24.7

Labour 1992–93 1994–95 1999–2000

36.8 23.8 35.7

31.4 25.2 37.0

32.8 24.6 36.7


0.0 13.0 20.0

26.5 12.5 15.2

26.5 12.6 15.6

Table C.18 Investigative committee attendance 1997–98, 1999– 2000 and 2003–04 (mean number of meetings attended) Session

1997 intake

Longer-serving

All

Conservative 1997–98 1999–2000 2003–04

32.6 25.9 15.1

31.4 24.7 23.1

31.9 25.0 21.2

Labour 1997–98 1999–2000 2003–04

30.5 22.0 29.3

38.8 36.7 29.6

33.8 27.5 29.4


34.2 27.8 26.0

28.7 15.6 26.3

31.5 20.3 26.1

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Index

Note: Entries in bold refer to tables in the appendices. Acts of Parliament, number, 21–2 Additional Costs Allowance (ACA), 118–19, 167, 170, 191 Administration Committee, House of Commons, 77 Afriyie, Adam, 77, 82 Allan, Richard, 129 Allen, Nicholas, 52–3, 53–4, 81, 117–18 all-party groups (APGs), 26, 159, 179, 181, 192, 233 Almond, Gabriel A., 31n Anderson, Donald, 152–3 Asher, Herbert, 40–1 Atkinson, Michael, 46, 53 attitudinal socialisation and behavioural socialisation, 141 and the constituency role, 105–9, 109–13 definition of, 56 full time v. part time MPs, 102–4, 132–3, 221 and influence on MPs’ behaviour, 113–16 and the job of MP, 113–16 and ministerial ambitions, 123–4, 125, 127–9, 228 and parliamentary careers, 120–30 and parliamentary socialisation, 100–1, 132–4, 183–7, 191–4 and the partisan role, 109–13 and reinforcement, 130–2, 184–6 and the representative role, 104–9 and resocialisation, 130–2, 184–6 and the scrutiny role, 109–13 Australia, 45, 46, 48–9, 49, 53, 66 Austria, 66, 78n, 83n Backbench Business Committee, House of Commons, 84

Bales, R. F., 28n Baltes, Paul B., 28n, 40n Barber, James David, 41–2 Barker, Anthony, 24n Barnum, David G., 47 Bartholomew, D. J., 92n, 121n Bayley, David H., 44n Beauchesne, 48n Beer, Samuel H., 163n, 200n behavioural socialisation and attitudinal socialisation, 141 and committee activity, 152–9 definition of, 56 and Early Day Motions, 159–62 and ethical behaviour, 166–71 and functional socialisation, 141, 187 and government and opposition, 136–41 and House of Commons Chamber, 142–5 and parliamentary socialisation, 135–6, 171–3, 187–9, 191–4 and party cohesion, 162–6 and Questions for oral answer, 146–7 and Questions for written answer, 149–51 and resocialisation, 146–7 and Westminster Hall sittings, 146–7 Belgium, 66 Bell, Charles G., 36, 38–9, 40, 41, 56 Bell, Martin, 9–10 Bennett, Andrew, 70 Berrington, H. B., 92n, 121n Bicameralism and legislative socialisation, 5, 32–5 Bierling, Gerald, 46, 53 Birch, A. H., 105n 253

254

Index

Birch, Sarah, 53–4 Blackburn, Robert, 25n, 159n Blair, Tony, xii, 34–5n, 86, 152–3, 163, 164, 196–7, 200 Blunkett, David, 167–8 Booth, Hartley, 123n Bowring, Nona, 88n Box-Steffensmeier, Janet, 12n, 50n Boyce, Jimmy, 123 Breed, Colin, 129n Brown, Gordon, xii, 128, 197 Budget Day, 143 Bulwer Lytton, Edward, 133n Bundestag, German, 49 Buriel, R., 28n Burke, Edmund, 104–5, 107–8, 133–4 Butler, David, 19n, 22n, 121n, 122n, 125n, 196n Butler Gareth, 19n, 22n, 122n Butler, Peter, 85 California Assembly, 36, 38–9, 40, 56 Callaghan, James, 200 Calton, Patsy, 59 Cameron, David, xi, xii, 1n Canada, 5, 32, 36–7, 37–8, 42–3, 46, 48n, 53, 66, 78, 83n, 183 Canavan, Dennis, 100 Caro, Robert, 34 Chaplin, Judith, 122n Chester, D. N., 88n Chibnall, Steven, 46 Childs, Sarah, 116 Chisholm, Malcolm, 123 Churchill, Winston, 32 Clarke, Charles, 128 Clarke, Eric, 123n Clarke, Harold D., 37n Clark, Lynda, 127n, 128n Clegg, Nick, xi, 1n Clerk, Department of the, 67, 68, 75, 213, 216, 218, 219, 229–31 Clerk of the House of Commons, 48n, 169n, 199 Code of Conduct, House of Commons, 81, 120, 166, 167, 189–90 codes of conduct, 49, 190 Coghill, Ken, 198n

Collins, Tim, 126 committee activity, 152–9, 187–9, 222, 234, 242–5 committees departmental, 22, 94, 95, 188 investigative, 22, 94–5, 97–8, 137, 139, 140, 152–3, 155–8, 188, 236, 244–5 legislative, 22, 94–5, 95–7, 137n, 140, 152–3, 158, see also committees, standing (public bill) membership, 94–8, 157, 188, 233–4, 236, 242, 244 public bill, see committees, standing (public bill) select, 22, 26, 70, 94n, 95, 97–8, 152, 188, 201, 206, 234 standing (public bill), 95–7, 137, 139, 153–5, 157–8, 187–9, 233, 242–3 see also names of individual committees Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, 204 Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, 124, 128–9, 132, 173, 185, 194 Conservative MPs and all-party groups, 181, 233 appointing staff, 78–9 and behavioural socialisation, 172, 187–9 committee activity of, 152–9, 222, 233, 234, 242–5 and committee membership, 94–8, 233, 242, 244 compared with Labour MPs, 162 and the constituency role, 105–9, 109–13, 184–6, 222, 223–8 division of time, 188–9, 222 and Early Day Motions, 91–4, 160–2, 180, 241 and the expenses scandal, 167–71 full time v. part time MPs, 102–4, 221 and House of Commons debates, 142–5, 222, 237

Index impact of House of Commons on, 177, 178, 194–5, 232 impact of party on, 163–4, 177, 178, 183–4, 194–5, 232 induction arrangements, 67–8, 73–4 influences on behaviour, 113–16, 184–5, 227–8 and investigative committees, 97–8, 155–8, 244–5 and the job of the MP, 109–13, 222, 225–6 local connections, 108–9, 187 local government experience, 63 maiden speeches, 85–7, 180 ministerial ambitions, 123–4, 127–9, 228 and office accommodation, 75–7 parliamentary activity of, 137–41, 142–62, 222, 232, 233–4, 237–45 and parliamentary careers, 121–30 and parliamentary procedure, 63, 181, 234 and the parliamentary salary, 103, 132–3 and the partisan role, 109–13, 183–7, 222–8 and party cohesion, 163–4 and party subject committees, 181, 232 and pressure groups, 114–15, 227–8 and Questions for oral answer, 88–9, 147–9, 180, 239 and Questions for written answer, 89–91, 149–51, 180, 240 rebellions by, 163–4 and the representative role, 105–9, 184, 223–4 and the scrutiny role, 109–13, 185–6, 225–6, 227–8 and select committees, 234 sources of advice, 63–4, 74–5, 229–31 and standing committees, 153–5, 157–8, 233, 242–3 and Westminster Hall sittings, 146–7, 238 and the whips, 69, 232, see also party cohesion

255

Conservative Party and deradicalisation, 50 induction arrangements, 69, 73–4 and 1992–97 Parliament, 196–7 and 1997–2001 Parliament, 196–7 and sleaze, 52–3 whips, 69, 232, see also party cohesion Consolidation Bills, Joint Committee on, 152n constituency role, the, 16, 18, 19–20, 24–5, 26, 38, 105–9, 109–13, 131, 132, 178–9, 184–6, 187, 202–3, 222–8 Conway, Derek, 168 corruption, political, see political corruption Cowley, Philip, xii, 44, 100n, 101n, 116, 163–6, 187, 205 Cranston, Ross, 128n Crewe, Emma, 34n Crick, Bernard, 190 Criddle, Byron, 125n, 126n, 127n Crowe, Edward, 49 Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 140n, 152, 158 Curtice, John, 121n, 122n Dail Eirann, 203 Daily Telegraph, 169 Dalyell, Tam, 100, 141 Darling, Alistair, 127n David, Wayne, 76n, 85 Davies, Bryan, 69–70 Davies, Philip, 77 Davies, S. O., 9n Davis, David, 10n Defence Committee, 97, 140n, 152 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), 137–40 departmental committees, see under committees Diet, Japanese, 49 Disraeli, Benjamin, 133–4 Docherty, David, 42–3 Doig, Alan, 47 Donohue, Ross, 198n Drewry, Gavin, 22n, 24n, 95n, 201n Dunwoody, Gwyneth, 152–3

256

Index

Early Day Motions (EDMs), 22, 26, 33, 84n, 85, 87, 91–4, 96, 98, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 159–62, 171, 179, 180, 187–9, 236, 241 Economic and Social Research Council, xiv, xv Education and Employment Committee, 140n Environmental Audit Committee, 94n, 97, 140n Equitable Life affair, 207 Erskine May, 48, 67, 80, 86 Ersson, Svante, 55n ethical attitudes and behaviour, 44–9, 79–82, 116–20, 166–71, 189–91 Eulau, Heinz, 35–6 European Parliament, 5, 32, 54–5, 76, 203 European Scrutiny Committee, 152n European Union, 5, 24, 60 Exchange Rate Mechanism, 122, 197 expenses scandal, 1, 6, 51–2, 81–2, 117–19, 129–30, 169–71, 173, 190, 197, 199, 205 Fees Office, 65n, 67, 80–1, 169–70, 171, 190 Ferguson, Leroy C., 36n Field, Frank, 100 Finer, S. E., 92n, 121n Flello, Robert, 77 Flight, Howard, 126 Flynn, Paul, 10 Foreign Affairs Committee, 97, 152–3 France, 78n, 83n Franklin, Mark, 88n Fraser, Christopher, 126n Freedom of Information Act (FoI), 169 functional socialisation and behavioural socialisation, 141, 187 and committee membership, 94–8, 158 definition of, 56, 59–60 and Early Day Motions, 91–4 and ethical behaviour, 79–82 and maiden speeches, 85–7, 180 and parliamentary socialisation, 59–60, 98–9, 177–83

post-election, 65–75, 79–83, 84–99 pre-election, 63–5 and Questions for oral answer, 88–9 and Questions for written answer, 89–91 Gay, Oonagh, 9n, 81n, 169n Gecas, V., 28n general elections, 9–10, 21n, 24 1868, 108 1874, 108 1880, 108 1945, 10–11n, 12 1945–2010, 2, 10–12 1950, 130 1951, 130 1974 (Feb.), 201 1974 (Oct.), 11, 12 1979, 108 1992, xiv, 11, 70, 108, 121–5, 122, 125, 178, 201 1997, 1–2, 12, 60–1, 72, 74, 108, 122, 125–30, 153, 164, 186, 178, 202 2001, 69, 153, 197 2005, xii, xv, 5, 69, 76, 81, 124, 128 2010, 1–2, 12, 23, 131, 185, 197, 201, 205–8 and first meeting of House of Commons, 60–1, 83 Germany, 29, 49, 78n Giddings, Philip, xi, xiv, 24n, 67n, 99, 168n Gilbert, W. S., 28n Goodwill, Robert, 77 Gorman, Teresa, 100 government MPs, parliamentary activity of, 137–40 government and opposition, 32, 84, 92, 95, 109, 131–2, 136–41, 143, 153, 165, 173, 184, 185–6, 193, 207 Graham, Sir Alistair, 168 Green Book, The, 67, 80–1, 120, 190 Green, Damien, 174 Griffith, Nia, 77, 82 Griffiths, Jane, 127n Gunnell, John, 123n

Index Hague, William, xii Hamilton, Neil, 9 Hamilton, Willie, 70 Hammond, Philip, 59 Hansard Society xii, xiii, xv, 4, 13 Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny, 4, 15 survey (2000), 15–18, 19–20, 25 surveys (2005/2006), 5–6, 25, 62, 63–4, 74, 76, 108, 112, 113, 129 Harris, Evan, 129 Harvey, Nick, 125 Hawkins, Nick, 123n Haynes, George H., 33n Health Committee, 97 Heath, Edward, 86, 160 Heidenheimer, Arnold J., 44 Hemming, John, 77 Hewitt, Patricia, 128 Hibbing, John R., 5, 54, 198 Holland, Peter, 198n Honest Opportunism (Riddell), xi, 60n Horne, Alistair, 85n House of Commons Administration Committee, 77 attitudes towards, 2–3, 5, 32, 85–6, 101, 126–7, 137–40, 171–2, 176–7, 189–90 Backbench Business Committee, 84 Canadian, 32, 36–7, 38, 42–3 Chamber, 5, 18, 21, 22, 23n, 32–3, 54, 80, 86, 95, 112, 131–2, 136, 137, 141, 142–5, 146, 162, 187–9, 192, 222, 236, 237 Code of Conduct, 81, 120, 166, 167, 189–90 committees, use of, 22, 94–5, see also committees compared with House of Lords, 34, 54, 83–4 compared with US Congress, 34–5, 83–4 debates, 142–5, 237 and deradicalisation, 12, 49–50 and European Union, 24 impact on newly elected MPs, 51, 177, 178, 194, 232, 235 induction arrangements, xi–xii, 5, 66–8

257

and institutionalisation, 5, 54, 198–200, 202, 204 Leader of, 1, 166, 168n, 172, 200 management of, 142–5 Members’ Handbook, 66–7, 70 modernisation of, 1–2 rebuilding of, 32 Serjeant at Arms Department, 67, 68 sessions, 21 sitting days, 21, 22 and socialisation, 1–4 standing orders, 13, 48, 55 Table Office, 85n, 147 turnover, 10–12, 120–1 work of, 21–2 House of Commons Commission, 77–8, 168n, 169, 198, 199n House of Commons Library, 67, 75, 229–31 House of Lords, 10, 34, 54, 84, 118, 169, 198, 201, 206 House Magazine, The, 74–5 Howard, Michael, xii, 126 Hughes, Kevin, 123n Humphrey, Hubert, 33 Illsley, Eric, 170n Independent Parliament Standards Authority (IPSA), 4, 67, 119, 171 institutionalisation, 5, 54, 198–200, 202, 204 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), 4, 66 Irwin, Helen, 88n, 89n Israel, 47 Italy, 78, 83n Jackson, Helen, 123n Jackson, Keith, 43 Jackson, Michael, 45 Jackson, Nigel, 25n Jamieson, David, 123n Japan, 49, 66 Jefferson, Thomas, 48 Jennings, M. Kent, 28n Jennings, Sir Ivor, 24n ‘John Lewis list’, 169–70 Johnson, Alan, 1n Johnson. Lyndon, 33–4 Jones, George, 88n, 132n

258

Index

Jones, Jenny, 126 Jones, Nigel, 125n Kavanagh, Dennis, 86n, 121n, 122n, 196n Keetch, Paul, 129n Kelly, Richard, 97n Kennedy, Charles, 100 Kennon, Andrew, 25n, 88n, 159n Khan, Sadiq, 76, 77 King, Anthony, 13n, 103n, 135, 196n Kingham, Tessa, 126–7 Knight, Jim, 9n Kornberg, Alan, 36, 38 Krause, Robert M., 37n Labour MPs and all-party groups, 181, 232 appointing staff, 78–9 and behavioural socialisation, 172, 187–9 committee activity of, 152–9, 222, 233–4, 242–5 and committee membership, 94–8, 233–4, 242–5 compared with Conservative MPs, 162 and the constituency role, 105–9, 109–13, 184–6, 222–8 division of time, 222 and Early Day Motions, 91–4, 180, 241 and expenses scandal, 167–71 and full time v. part MPs, 102–4, 221 and House of Commons debates, 142–5, 222, 237 impact of House of Commons on, 177, 178, 194, 232 impact of party on, 163–4, 177, 178, 183–4, 194, 232 and induction arrangements, 67–8, 73–4, 232 influences on behaviour, 113–16, 184–5, 227–8 and investigative committees, 97–8, 155–8, 244–5 and the job of MP, 109–13, 225–6 local connections, 108–9, 187

local government experience, 63 maiden speeches, 85–7, 180 ministerial ambitions, 124, 128, 165–6, 228 and office accommodation, 75–8 parliamentary activity of, 137–41, 142–62, 222, 232, 233–4, 237–45 and parliamentary careers, 121–30 and parliamentary procedure, 63, 181, 234 and the parliamentary salary, 103, 132–3 and the partisan role, 109–13, 183–7, 222–8 and party cohesion, 163–4, 232 and party subject committees, 181 and pressure groups, 114–15, 227–8 and Question for oral answer, 88–9, 147–9, 180, 239 and Questions for written answer, 89–91, 149–51, 180, 240 rebellions by, 163–5 and the representative role, 105–9, 184, 223–4 and the scrutiny role, 109–13, 185–6, 225–6, 227–8 and select committees, 234 and sources of advice, 63–4, 74–5, 229–31 and standing committees, 153–5, 157–8, 233, 242–3 and Westminster Hall sittings, 146–7, 238 and the whips, 71, 72, 143, 152–3, 232, see also party cohesion Labour Party Accommodation Whip, 78 and deradicalisation, 50 induction arrangements, 69–72, 73–4 1992 Group, 71 and 1992–97 Parliament, 196–7 and 1997–2001 Parliament, 196–7 whips, 71, 72, 143, 152–3, 232, see also party cohesion Lane, Jan-Erik, 55n Laws, David, 85

Index legislative socialisation agents of, 5, 32, 35, 37–9, 44, 56, 57, 101, 175, 194 in Australia, 45, 46, 48–9, 53, 66 in Austria, 66, 78n, 83n in Belgium, 66 and bicameralism, 5, 32–5 in Canada, 32, 36–7, 37–8, 42–3, 46, 53, 66, 78, 83n, 183 defining, 35 and ethical behaviour, 45–9, 51–4, 79–82 in European Parliament, 54–5 in European Union, 66 in France, 78n, 83n in Germany, 49, 78n in Israel, 47 in Italy, 78, 83n in Japan, 49, 66 and legislative behaviour, 43–9, 57 and legislative dissent, 43–4 in Luxembourg, 66 in New Zealand, 43, 47, 66, 78n, 83n in Norway, 66, 78, 83n and political corruption, 43–6 and political culture, 31–2, 55 and political parties, 38–9, 49–50, 55, 56, 57, 101 in Portugal, 78n, 83n pre-election and post-election, 36–7, 38 and procedure, rules and norms, 47–9, 55 and reinforcement, 58–9 and resocialisation, 58–9 in Switzerland, 66 in United States, 33–4, 35–6, 38–9, 39–42, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 66, 183 and Westminster model, 203–4 and the whips, 71, 77, 143, 165, 232, see also party cohesion see also attitudinal socialisation; behavioural socialisation; functional socialisation; parliamentary socialisation; socialisation legislators, training of, 65–6, 198, 204

259

Leigh, Sir John, 86 Leopold, Patricia, 9n, 81n Lesnoff, Michael, 31n Liberal Democratic Party induction arrangements, 72, 73–4 whips, 72–3, 232, see also party cohesion Liberal Democrat MPs and all-party groups, 181, 233 appointing staff, 78–9 and behavioural socialisation, 172, 187–9, 191–4 carving out own role, 172–3, 193–4 committee activity of, 152–9, 222, 233–4, 242–5 and committee membership, 94–8, 233–4 and the constituency role, 105–9, 109–13, 183–7, 222–8 division of time, 222 and Early Day Motions, 91–4, 160–2, 241 and the expenses scandal, 167–71 full-time v. part time MPs, 102–4, 221 and House of Commons debates, 142–5, 222, 237 impact of House of Commons on, 177, 178, 194, 232 induction arrangements, 67–8, 73–4 influences on behaviour, 113–16, 227–8 and investigative committees, 97–8, 155–8, 244–5 and the job of MP, 109–13, 227–8 local connections, 108–9, 187 local government experience, 63 maiden speeches, 85–7, 180 ministerial ambitions, 125, 129, 228 parliamentary activity of, 136–41, 142–62, 232, 232–4, 237–45 and parliamentary careers, 124–5, 129 and parliamentary procedure, 63, 181, 234 and the parliamentary salary, 103, 132–3 and the partisan role, 109–13, 183–7, 222–8

260

Index

Liberal Democrat MPs – continued and party cohesion, 163–4, 165 and party subject committees, 181, 232 and pressure groups, 114–15, 227–8 and Questions for oral answer, 88–9, 147–9, 180, 239 and Questions for written answer, 89–91, 149–50, 180, 240 rebellions by, 163–4 and the representative role, 105–9, 184, 223–4 and the scrutiny role, 109–13, 185–6, 225–6, 227–8 and select committees, 234 and sources of advice, 63–4, 74–5, 229–31 and standing committees, 153–5, 157–8, 233 and Westminster Hall sittings, 146–7, 238 and the whips, 72–3, 232, see also party cohesion local connections, 108–9, 187 Lock, David, 126 Lock, Geoffrey, 9n longer-serving MPs and all-party groups, 233 committee activity of, 95–8, 152–9, 222, 233–4, 242–5 and the constituency role, 105–9, 109–13, 184–6, 222–8 division of time, 222 and Early Day Motions, 159–62, 241 full time v. part time MPs, 102–4, 221 and House of Commons debates, 5, 142–5, 222, 237 influences on behaviour, 113–16, 184–5, 227–8 and investigative committees, 97–8, 155–8, 244–5 and the job of MP, 109–13, 184, 185–6, 225–6 and legislative committees, 95–7 local connections, 187 and newly elected MPs, 162 parliamentary activity of, 137–41, 222, 232–4, 237–45

and parliamentary procedure, 181–3 and the partisan role, 109–13, 183–7, 222–8 and party subject committees, 232 and pressure groups, 114–15, 227–8 and Questions for oral answer, 147–9, 239 and Questions for written answer, 149–51, 240 and the representative role, 105–9, 184, 223–4 and the scrutiny role, 109–13, 225–6, 227–8 sources of advice, 64, 229–31 staffing, 78–9 and standing committees, 95, 153–5, 157–8, 233, 242–3 and Westminster Hall sittings, 146–7, 238 Luxembourg, 66 Lynne, Liz, 124n, 125 Maclean, David, 169 Macmillan, Harold, 85, 88, 132 maiden speeches, 85–7, 96, 180 Major, John, 80, 196 Mancuso, Maureen, 52–3, 82, 117–18 Mandelson, Peter, 128n March, James G., 55n Mason’s Manual, 48 Matthews, Donald R., 33n, 40n McAllister, Ian, 46 McGuinness, Martin, 11n, 60n McIsaac, Shona, 179n McKay, Sir William, 48n, 80n, 86n McKenzie, R. T., 201n Members’ Handbook, 66–7, 70 Members’ Interests, Register of, 80, 167 Members of Parliament (MPs) and all-party groups, 26, 159, 179, 181, 191, 233 and behavioural norms, 79–80 and behavioural socialisation, 135–6, 171–3, 187–9, 191–4 carving out own role, 172–3, 193–4 as ‘clones’, 100–1, 134, 189, 194, 195–6 committee activity, 94–8, 152–9, 187–9, 222, 233–4, 242–5

Index and the constituency role, 19–20, 24–5, 61, 183–5, 187, 202–3, 222–8 constraints on parliamentary activities, 84–5, 147 and ‘culture of entitlement’, 119, 169–70, 191 and deradicalisation, 12, 49–50 division of time, 222 and Early Day Motions, 22, 56n, 91–4, 159–62, 187–9, 241 ethical attitudes, 116–20 ethical behaviour, 79–82, 166–71, 173, 189–91 and the expenses scandal, 116–20, 167–73 full time v. part time MPs, 23–4, 102–4, 132–3, 221 and House of Commons debates, 142–5, 222 ‘independent’, 9–10 induction arrangements, xi–xii, 65–74 influences on behaviour, 113–16, 184–5, 227–8 and the job of MP, 109–13, 176–8, 185–6, 222, 225–6 local connections, 108–9, 187 local government experience, 63 as ‘mavericks’, 100–1, 134, 189, 194, 195–6 ministerial ambitions, 13, 14, 15, 123–4, 125, 127–9, 133, 165–6, 228 multi-functional role of, 15–20, 26–7 number of newly elected, 1–2, 10–12, 60–4 parliamentary activity of, 136–62, 222, 232–3, 237–45 parliamentary careers, 120–30, 133 and parliamentary procedure, 62–3, 181–3, 234 and the parliamentary salary, 103, 118, 132–3, 169 and the partisan role, 18, 19, 133–4, 183–5, 222–8 and party cohesion, 162–6, 173, 184–6, 207–8

261

and party subject committees, 159, 179, 181, 192, 232 ‘and positional roles’, 13–14, 26 post-election experience, 65–79, 82–3, 101–16, 130–4, 185, 229–31 pre-election experience, 63, 64–5, 103, 108–9, 113, 130–1, 133, 183–4, 187, 229–31 and ‘preference roles’, 13–14, 26 and pressure groups, 56, 57, 113, 114–15, 118, 158, 159, 184, 227–8, 235n professionalisation of, 5, 103, 120, 202, 204 and Questions for oral answer, 21, 22, 87–9, 147–9, 162, 187–9, 192, 239 and Questions for written answer, 89–91, 149–51, 162, 187–9, 192, 240 representative role of, 104–9, 133–4, 184, 223–4 resources for, 23, 61–2, 190 roles of, 13–20, 26–7, 223–4 salaries, 23 and the scrutiny role, 19–20, 131, 173, 185–6, 225–6, 227–8 and socialisation, 1–4, 12–13 socio-economic background of, 23, 204 sources of advice, 63–4, 74–5, 229–31 turnover, 10–12 and Westminster Hall sittings, 146–7, 188, 238 and the whips, 69, 71, 72–3, 143, 152–3, 232, see also party cohesion women, 23, 113, 116 work of, 20–7, 221–2, 237–45 Merton, Robert K., 28n Michie, Bill, 70 Michie, Ray, 124n Miliband, Ed, xi, xii Miller, William L., 31n Milligan, Stephen, 122n Milne, E. J., 9n Milton, Anne, 69

262

Index

ministerial ambitions, 123–4, 125, 127–9, 133, 165–6, 228 Modernisation of the House, Select Committee on, 1, 67n, 83, 172 Monday Club, 13 Moore, Michael, 124n, 129 Morris, Estelle, 123n MP’s Guide to Parliament, 74 Mughan, Anthony, 12n, 50 Munn, Meg, 59 National Audit Office, 200 Natzler, David, 88n Navarro, Julien, 54–5 Neesham, Cristina, 198n Neild, Robert, 44n newly elected MPs and all-party groups, 181, 232 carving out own role, 172–3, 193 as ‘clones’, 100–1, 194, 195–6 committee activity, 152–9, 222, 233–4, 242–3 and the constituency role, 61, 105–9, 109–13, 178–9, 184–6, 222–8 division of time, 222 and Early Day Motions, 91–4, 159–62, 241 ethical behaviour, 170–1 and full time v. part time MPs, 102–4, 221 and House of Commons debates, 142–5, 222, 237 impact of House of Commons, 177, 178, 194, 232, 235 impact of parties on, 161–4, 177, 178, 183–4, 193–4, 232, 235 and induction arrangements, xi–xii, 65–74 influences on behaviour, 117–19, 184–5, 227–8 and investigative committees, 92–8, 155–8, 244–5 and the job of MP, 109–13, 176–8, 184, 185–6, 225–6 and legislative committees, 95–7 local connections, 108–9, 187 local government experience, 63 and longer-serving MPs, 162

maiden speeches, 85–7, 180 as ‘mavericks’, 100–1, 194, 195–6 ministerial ambitions, 123–4, 125, 127–9, 133, 165–6, 228 number of, 1–2, 10–12, 60–4 and parliamentary procedure, 62–3, 181–3, 234 and the parliamentary salary, 103, 132–3 and the partisan role, 109–13, 183–7, 222–8 and party cohesion, 163–4, 165 and party subject committees, 181, 232 post-election experience, 61–2, 65–83, 101–16, 130–4, 185, 229–31 pre-election preparation, 60–4 and pressure groups, 114–15, 227–8 and Questions for oral answer, 88–9, 147–9, 239 and Questions for written answer, 89–91, 149–51, 240 and the representative role, 105–9, 165–6, 184, 223–4 resources for, 61–2, 65 and the scrutiny role, 109–13, 185–6, 225–6, 227–8 and select committees, 234 sources of advice, 63–4, 74–5, 229–31 staffing, 78–9 and standing committees, 95–7, 153–5, 157–8, 233, 242–3 and Westminster Hall sittings, 146–7, 238 New South Wales Parliament, 45 Newton, Ken, 196n New Zealand, 43, 47, 66, 78n, 83n, 204 Nolan Committee/Report, see Standards in Public Life, Committee on (the Nolan Committee) Norman, Archie, 126 Norton, Philip, xii, 24n, 43n, 44n, 61n, 88n, 163n, 188, 205 Norway, 66, 78, 83n Nuffield Foundation, xiv, xv

Index Oaten, Mark, 129n Olsen, Johan P., 55n Opik, Lembit, 101, 124n, 129 Opposition, Leader of, 88, 90n, 132 opposition MPs, parliamentary activity of, 137–40 Pammett, Jon H., 37n Parke, R. D., 28n parliamentary activity constraints on, 26, 84–5, 135, 137, 142, 143, 147, 159, 188 levels of, 21–3, 136–41, 142–62 Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards (PCS), 81, 167 Parliamentary Corporate Bodies Act, 1992, 199 Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), 7, 68, 69–72, 82, 164 Parliamentary Labour Party, Secretary of, xvi, 7, 82 Parliamentary Private Secretaries (PPSs), 13, 51, 124, 142n, 157, 160 parliamentary procedure, 62–3, 181–3, 234 parliamentary Questions, see Questions for oral answer; Questions for written answer; Questions, supplementary parliamentary socialisation and 2010 general election, 205–8 and attitudinal socialisation, 100–1, 132–4, 183–6, 191–4 and behavioural socialisation, 135–6, 171–3, 187–9, 191–4 comparative lessons of, 203–4 and the constituency role, 105–9, 109–13, 178–9, 184–6, 202–3 definition of, 56–8, 174–5 and Early Day Motions, 159–62 and ethical attitudes, 116–20 and ethical behaviour, 79–82, 166–71, 189–91 and functional socialisation, 59–60, 98–9, 178–83 and institutionalisation, 5, 54, 198–200, 202, 204

263

and investigative committees, 158 and legislative change, 195–6, 205–8 and legislative committees, 158 mechanisms, 57 model of, 57, 175–7 and the partisan role, 109–13, 131, 173, 185–7 and the party system, 196–7, 200–2 and the political context, 196–7 processes, 57 and reinforcement, 57, 130–2, 184–5 and resocialisation, 57, 130–2, 184–6 the scrutiny role, 109–13, 131, 173, 185–6 Parliaments 1987–92, 196 1992–97, xii–xv, 5, 7–8, 63, 89, 91, 95, 109, 125, 141, 147n, 149–50, 185, 186, 196–7, 220, 221, 236 1997–2001, xiii–xv, 5, 7–8, 13n, 63, 91, 109, 116, 128, 141, 147, 150, 161, 163, 185–6, 196–7, 220, 221, 236 2001–05, xv, 89, 92, 116, 128, 141, 147, 165, 236 2005–10, 128, 207, 208 Parsons, T., 28n partisan role, the, 18, 19, 33–4, 38, 109–13, 131, 173, 183–7, 222–8 party cohesion, 162–6, 183–4, 207–8 Peters, B. Guy, 55n Peters, John G., 45, 52 Pickthall, Colin, 123n Pitkin, Hannah, 105n Plaid Cymru, 137–40 political corruption, 43–7 political culture, 31–2, 55 political parties and behavioural socialisation, 136–41 impact on newly elected MPs, 177, 178, 183–4, 194 and induction of MPs, 68–74 and legislative socialisation, 38–9, 49–50, 55, 56, 57, 101 minor, 137–40, 155

264

Index

political parties – continued Northern Ireland, 137–40 and parliamentary socialisation, 55, 56–8, 102–16 and party cohesion, 162–6, 183–4, 207–8 subject committees, 26, 159, 179, 181, 232 see also individual parties Polsby, Nelson, 5, 54, 198n Portugal, 78n, 83n Poulson scandal, 46 Powell, Ray, 78 Power, Greg, 61n, 99 Prescott, John, 85n pressure groups, 55, 56, 57, 58, 113, 114–15, 118, 158, 159, 184, 227–8, 235n Prewitt, Kenneth, 36 Price, Charles M., 36, 38–9, 40, 41, 56 Price, Richard, 36–7, 37–8 Prime Minister’s Questions, 26, 85–6, 87–8, 132, 143, 147, 188, 200 Prior, David, 126n Procedure Committee, 171 professionalisation of MPs, 5, 103, 120, 202, 204 Public Accounts Committee (PAC), 94n, 158, 200 Public Administration Committee (PASC), 77n, 78n, 82n, 94n, 152, 168 public bill committees, 95–7, 137, 139, 153–5, 157–8, 187–9, 233, 242–3 Pye, Lucian, W., 31n questionnaires, 209–19, 221–35 Questions for oral answer, 21, 22, 88–9, 147–9, 162, 187–9, 191, 239 Questions, supplementary, 21n, 88, 141, 142 Questions for written answer, 89–91, 149–51, 162, 187–9, 192, 240 Question Time, 86, 87–8, 89n, 142, 147, 188, 198

Radice, Lisanne, 13n Rayner, Gordon, 171n Reform of the House of Commons, Select Committee on (the Wright Committee), 97–8, 200 Regulatory Reform Committee, 152 Reid, Alan, 124n reinforcement, 56, 57, 58, 130–2, 165, 173, 175, 184–6 Rentoul, John, 86n representative role, the, 104–9, 133–4, 184, 223–4 research methods, xiv–xv, 6–8, 14n, 20, 209–19, 220–1, 236 resocialisation, 30, 56, 57, 58, 130–2, 146–7, 173, 175, 184–6 respondents, 7, 220–1 Richardson, Andy, 198n Riddell, Peter, xi–xiii, 60n Ridley, F. F., 47n Robertson, Sir David, 9n Rogers, Robert, 88n Rosenberg, M., 28n Rosenblatt, Gemma, xv, 6n, 62n, 67n, 69n, 74n, 76n Rush, Michael, xi, xiv, 4, 14n, 18n, 22n, 24n, 30n, 55n, 67n, 86n, 95n, 99, 101n, 103n, 140n, 162n, 168n Saunders, Peter, 46 Savidge, Malcolm, 127n Schneewind, K. A., 28n Scottish National Party (SNP), 68, 137–40 Scottish Parliament, 32, 123, 129 scrutiny role, the, 18, 19–20, 109–13, 131, 158, 173, 185–6, 225–6, 227–8 Scully, Roger, 12n, 50n Seabeck, Alison, 77 Searing, Donald D., 4, 12n, 13–15, 18, 26, 50, 51, 135n Seldon, Anthony, 86n Senior Salaries Review Body (SSRB), 118–19, 168, 190 Serjeant at Arms Department, 67, 68 Services Complaints Commissioner, 207

Index Shadow Cabinet, 8, 14n, 128, 236 Shamir, Michael, 47n Shell, Donald, 35n, 55n Shephard, Mark P., 42, 50 Simpson, Alan, 169n Simpson, Keith, 9 Sinn Fein, 2n, 11n, 60n Skinner, Dennis, 141 Smelser, Neil, 28n, 40n Smith, Cyril, 124n Smith, Llew, 123n Smith, Rodney, 45 Social Democratic and Labour Party, 137–40 Social Democratic Party, xi, 19, 124 socialisation concept of, 28–32 model of, 29–32, 35 and political culture, 31–2 see also attitudinal socialisation; behavioural socialisation; functional socialisation; legislative socialisation; parliamentary socialisation Speaker, the, 13, 14, 26, 80, 83, 84, 118, 142, 143, 147, 159, 168n, 188 Stanbrook, Ivor, 10 Standards and Privileges Committee, 167, 168 Standards in Public Life, Committee on (the Nolan Committee), 52–3, 80, 81, 117–18, 119, 167, 168, 189–90 standing committees, see under committees statutory instruments, 21–2, 152n Statutory Instruments, Select Committee on, 152n St. Aubyn, Nick, 126n Steed, Michael, 121n, 122n Steel, David, 124n Steen, Anthony, 100 Steinberg, L., 28n Stevenson, George, 123n Stewart, Rory, xi Stryker, S., 28n Study of Parliament Group (SPG), xiv Sullivan, Arthur, 28n

265

Sullivan, John L., 47 Sunday Times, 80 Swire, Hugo, 69 Switzerland, 66 Table Office, 85n, 147 Taverne, Dick, 9n Taylor, Ann, 1 Taylor, Richard, 126 Thatcher, Margaret, 163, 196 Thomas, Mike, 169n Thomas, Norman, 36 Thomason, Roy, 123n Times, The, 169 Timpson, Annis May, 31n Trade and Industry Committee, 152 Transport Committee, 152–3 Treasury Committee, 97 Trend, Michael, 123n, 167 Tribune Group, 13 Tyler, Paul, 72 Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), 137–40 United States, 5, 197 legislative socialisation in, 33–4, 35–6, 38–9, 39–42, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 66 state legislatures, 35–6, 38–9, 39–40, 41–2, 45, 48, 56, 183 United States Congress, 33–4, 38, 40–1, 42, 49, 50, 83–4 United States House of Representatives, 5, 33–4, 40–1, 42, 48, 49n, 50, 54, 83–4 United States Senate, 33–4, 48, 49n, 54, 83–4 Vallance, Elizabeth, 13n Wahlke, John C., 36n, 39–40 Walsh, Pat, 47n Welch, Susan, 45, 52 Westminster Hall sittings, 6, 8, 21, 22, 23, 80, 132, 136, 137, 138, 142, 146–7, 162, 188, 192, 236, 238 Westminster’s World (Searing), 4n, 13–15, 51, 135n

266

Index

whips, xi–xii, xii, 26, 44, 61, 68n, 69, 71, 72, 72–3, 76, 77, 78, 84, 86, 90, 96–7, 100, 103, 143, 152–3, 155, 160, 173, 179, 185, 187–8, 205, 206, 207, 232, see also party cohesion Whitelaw, William, 166 White, William S., 33 Whittington, Richard S., 37n Wilkinson, John, 141

Willis, Virginia, 13n Wilson, Harold, 86, 88, 200 Winnett, Robert, 171n Winterton, Nicholas, 100, 141 Wood, David, 24n, 61n ‘worlds apart’ syndrome, 46–7, 53–4, 82, 170–1 Wright, Tony, 97, 168, 200, 207 Zisk, Betty H., 36n

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