Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy

This collection makes available in English twelve papers by a distinguished French scholar of ancient philosophy. The e...

Author: Jacques Brunschwig

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This collection makes available in English twelve papers by a distinguished French scholar of ancient philosophy. The essays deal with problems arising in the texts and doctrines of the three major philosophical schools of the Hellenistic period - Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism. The author's strategy is to focus on some specific problem and then to enlarge the conclusion of his discussion so as to reformulate or reassess some more important issue. The main subjects tackled are: problems in Epicurean cosmology and linguistic theory; aspects of Stoic logic, ontology and theology; the history of Scepticism; and analysis of some of the conceptual tools used by the Sceptics in their antidogmatic arguments. Two of these pieces are published here for the first time. The others, with one exception, have previously appeared only in French. This will be a most valuable book for all scholars and advanced students working in the field of Hellenistic philosophy.

Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009


Papers in Hellenistic philosophy



Papers in Hellenistic philosophy JACQUES BRUNSCHWIG Professeur d'Histoire de la Philosophie Ancienne, Universite de Paris - /

Translated by Janet Lloyd

| CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS


Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 IRP 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY IOOI 1-421 I, USA 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia © Cambridge University Press 1994 First published 1994 A catalogue recordfor this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress cataloguing in publication data Brunschwig, Jacques. Papers in Hellenistic philosophy / Jacques Brunschwig; translated by Janet Lloyd. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ISBN 0 521 41712

1. Epicurus.

0

2. Stoics.

3. Sceptics (Greek philosophy) I. Title. B512.B78 1994 i8o-dc2O 93-7923 CIP

ISBN 0 521 41712 0 hardback

Transferred to digital printing 2003


CONTENTS

Acknowledgements Preface I

xi

EPICUREANISM 1 Epicurus' argument on the immutability of the all 2 Epicurus and the problem of private language

II

page ix

i 21

STOICISM 3 Remarks on the Stoic theory of the proper noun

39

4 Remarks on the classification of simple propositions in Hellenistic logics

57

5 The conjunctive model

72

6 The Stoic theory of the supreme genus and Platonic ontology

92

7 On a Stoic way of not being

158

8 Did Diogenes of Babylon invent the Ontological Argument?

170

III SCEPTICISM 9 Once again on Eusebius on Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho

190

10 The title of Timon's Indalmoi: from Odysseus to Pyrrho

212

11 Sextus Empiricus on the Kpirrjpiov: the Sceptic as conceptual legatee

224

12 The ooov inl TO) Xoyco formula in Sextus Empiricus

244

Bibliography

259

Index of subjects

267

Index of names

269

Index of passages cited

273



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Chapters 1-7 and 10-12 appeared in their original form in the following publications, and we are grateful for permission to publish them in English. Chapters 8 and 9 are previously unpublished. 1

'L'argument d'Epicure sur l'immutabilite du tout', in Permanence de la philosophie (Melanges Joseph Moreau), Neuchatel, La Baconniere, 1977, pp. 127-50.

2

'Epicure et le probleme du "langage prive"', Revue des Sciences humaines 43, 1977, 157-77-

3

'Remarques sur la theorie stoi'cienne du nom propre', Histoire Epistemologie Langage 6, 1984, 3-19.

4

'Remarques sur la classification des propositions simples dans les logiques hellenistiques', Philosophie du langage et grammaire dans VAntiquite, Brussels/Grenoble, 1986, pp. 287-310.

5

'Le modele conjonctif', in Les Stoi'ciens et leur logique, ed. J. Brunschwig, Paris, 1978, pp. 59-86.

6

'La theorie stoi'cienne du genre supreme et l'ontologie platonicienne', in Matter and Metaphysics, Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum, ed. J. Barnes and M. Mignucci, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1988, pp. 19-127.

7

'Sur une fa9on stoicienne de ne pas etre', Revue de theologie et de philosophie 122, 1990, 389-403.

8

'Did Diogenes (unpublished).

9

'Once again on Eusebius on Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho' (unpublished).

of Babylon

invent

the

ontological

argument?'

10 'Le titre des "Indalmoi" de Timon: d'Ulysse a Pyrrhon', Recherches sur la philosophie et le langage 12, 1990, 83-99. 11 'Sextus Empiricus on the /criterion: the Skeptic as conceptual legatee', in The Question of'Eclecticism'- Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, ed. J.M. Dillon and A.A. Long, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, University of California Press, 1988, pp. 145-75. ix Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

12

'La formule ooov eirl rco Xoyco chez Sextus Empiricus', in Le Scepticisme antique, Cahiers de la Revue de Theologie et de Philosophies ed. A.J. Voelke, Geneve/Lausanne/Neuchatel, 1990, pp. 107-121.


PREFACE

I am very happy and proud to have been given the opportunity of presenting the following papers, for the most part translated from French, to an Englishspeaking readership. At a time when voices are heard in my country, sometimes with distinctly chauvinistic overtones, standing out against the socalled tyranny of the 'Publish in English or perish' injunction, I do not feel any urge whatsoever to apologize, especially since a similar, if not exactly identical, collection is about to be published by the Presses Universitaires de France. But I must confess that I am by no means displeased that the present volume will slightly anticipate it. This is because its publication is something of a tit-fortat: for my taste for Hellenistic philosophers and my attempts to work on them have been, if not wholly aroused, at least enormously stimulated and fostered by the powerful revival of interests which they have enjoyed in Englishspeaking countries (not to mention others, Italy in particular) for the last twenty years or so. Not that French scholarship and academic teaching have neglected them: witness the works of Victor Brochard on the Sceptics, of Emile Brehier on the Stoics, of Victor Goldschmidt on the Stoics and Epicurus: pioneering works indeed, as everyone would agree, I believe, and not in the least dated. Similarly, French academic teaching never forgets the Hellenistic philosophers for long: the national programme for the 'Agregation de Philosophie' always contains some ancient philosophy, and when Plato, Aristotle, and sometimes Plotinus have had their turn, either the Stoics or the Epicureans come next, thus compelling all French universities to make room for them, at a quite high level, in their teaching schedule. Thus, as a student, I was lucky enough to follow a memorable course of lectures by Victor Goldschmidt, at which all who attended were rewarded by very good marks: this course of lectures was to become Le Systeme sto'icien et Videe de temps (1953). Nevertheless, to devote one's attention to Hellenistic philosophy in my country always smacks, to a greater or lesser degree, of accepting some sort of pis aller. The royal road in ancient philosophy, and for many people in philosophy tout court, is still the Platonic way, as it has been for centuries (so much so that any student who ventures to criticize Plato on some point still expects his instructor to be utterly scandalized). Since the beginning of the sixties, Aristotle in France has eventually emerged from a long 'Cartesian' xi Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009

Xll

PREFACE

purgatory. Compared to these giants, the Hellenistic philosophers are considered, at best, as interesting dwarfs. Even after the 'rehabilitation' of Stoic logic by Lukasiewicz and others, Hellenistic philosophies still look coarse, rudimentary, all too easy to understand. If a tree is to be judged by its fruit, there is nothing really delectable in the Hellenistic philosophical output: a utilitarian distaste for disinterested speculation; various forms of 'sordid' materialism, pantheistic immanentism, sceptical deadlocks on the doctrinal level; a mixture of dry pedantry and talkative populism on the formal one. Quite significantly, introducing a volume in the series of the Symposium Hellenisticum, Victor Goldschmidt drew a parallel between the philosophical situation of post-Aristotelian Hellenistic times and that of our own postHegelian contemporary period (nor was this a matter for self-congratulation): the Hellenistic period, Goldschmidt wrote, offers us a mirror, even if we do not take any pleasure in contemplating ourselves in it. Recent English-speaking work in Hellenistic philosophy helped me to shake off the last traces of such unease and come fully to appreciate the argumentative wealth, the intellectual vigour, the philosophical radicality of Hellenistic debates. In a way, I can also boast of having been, albeit through my shortcomings, a quite indirect and fortuitous cause in a not unimportant part of this development. If I may evoke a personal recollection, the crucial encounter took place for me in September 1976. At that time I had been entrusted by my University (then the Universite de Picardie at Amiens) to organize a conference; the subject chosen was 'The Stoics and their logic'; the conference was to meet in the Centre Culturel des Fontaines in Chantilly. I was then new and inexperienced in organizing conferences, and it seemed quite natural to me to send invitations to many people whom I had not personally met before, but whom I knew from their work as interesting people, and interested in the subject, whether French or not. The conference was a success in one sense (as can be seen, I think, from its publication two years later under the title Les Sto'iciens et leur logique); but in another it was a downright failure. In proportion to the time allotted to the conference, there were too many participants, too many speakers, too little time left for discussion. Much later on, I heard that two English participants managed to have a private talk together, when walking around the little pond at the back of the garden. They considered the possibility of organizing more conferences on this kind of subject. I was not present, but I have no doubt that they assessed the possibilities of keeping the good sides of the Chantilly meeting, while avoiding its blatant drawbacks. This talk by the pond eventually gave birth to the 1978 Conference at Oriel College, Oxford, published later as Doubt and Dogmatism. This conference, in its turn, was so to speak the number zero of the Symposium Hellenisticum series, so called after its respected ancestor the Symposium Aristotelicum. From 1980 to the present day the Symposium Hellenisticum has met every third year; the successive volumes of proceedings constitute, in my opinion, one of the brightest pieces of evidence of the vitality and


PREFACE

Xlll

philosophical interest of recent studies in Hellenistic schools. For me, they also incorporate the memory of most enjoyable meetings with other scholars whom I respected and admired from the outset and who are now also very good friends of mine. 1 The papers included in this collection do not conform to any definite, preconceived strategy, and I have made no attempt to disguise their miscellaneous character. I simply wrote each one of them when I came across a text or a problem about which I imagined I had something new, and hopefully reasonable, to say. I would like to think that their method and style of research give them a unity of sorts; but it is not up to me to say whether that claim is justified. Apart from correcting one or two obvious mistakes, I have not revised or added to them or tried to answer the objections which might be raised or have been raised against the views I express in them - not that I find them perfect, far from it, but because I do not feel myself able to improve upon them further. I preferred to leave them as they originally were; I doubt whether texts of this kind are really substantial enough to warrant more than one version. Out of laziness, I have not even attempted to bring the oldest ones up to date, from the bibliographical point of view: I am sure that many valuable instruments are available to the reader who would wish to do so. With the agreement of the Cambridge University Press, I have not included in this collection a number of papers which bear on similar subjects, but either are too recent, or have already been published in English, in journals or collections easily available to the English reader. These are the items mentioned in the bibliography as Brunschwig 1980, 1986, 1991, 1992 and forthcoming. On the other hand, I have included two pieces as yet unpublished: the paper on Diogenes of Babylon and the one on Aristocles, Timon and Pyrrho. It is my pleasure and my duty to thank all the persons, known or unknown to me, who made the present publication possible. Quite special and friendly thanks must go to Janet Lloyd, who bore my pedantic observations with equanimity, and produced a magnificent translation, which I have read myself with an unexpected pleasure. She also kindly agreed to revise the two unpublished papers, which I had ventured to write directly in English. I dedicate this book to all my English-speaking friends, past and present. Through them, I would like to acknowledge a much more general debt to the British people, a debt of which it is easy to understand why I shall be conscious as long as I live. J.B. La Roque-Gageac, August 1992 1

For a different, more poetical version of the story, cf. Sorabji in J. Barnes and M. Mignucci (edd.) Matter and Metaphysics (Naples, 1988).



I EPICURUS' ARGUMENT ON THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE ALL

The few lines in the Letter to Herodotus (39.4-8)1 that I propose to study here have often been discussed by editors and translators of Epicurus. As early as 1920, Ettore Bignone, in his translation of the fragments, devoted a three-page appendix to this passage, which he described as 'very difficult'.2 More recently, these lines have constituted one of the - in truth, numerous - points over which Jean Bollack, who has proposed a new interpretation of the text, has been strongly criticized, in particular by Pierre Boyance and Olivier Bloch.3 One of my own reasons for returning to this controversial passage is that I believe I can suggest for the problem that it poses a solution which I (of course) consider satisfactory. Another is that, by closely linking our analysis of the text with an analysis of the discussions to which it has already given rise,4 we shall raise questions to do with methodology and, more generally, hermeneutics, the interest of which may even eclipse that of their pretext - questions which are, perhaps, not unconnected with the preoccupations of Joseph Moreau, the Greek scholar and philosopher in whose honour these pages are written. Our text comes at the beginning of the Letter to Herodotus. It follows on immediately after the statement and demonstration of thefirsttwo fundamental physical theses: nothing is born from the non-existent and nothing is lost in it. Although the word for the all, TO nav, has not yet been mentioned in the text, a new thesis is introduced which affirms and demonstrates the immutability of that all. This thesis is constructed as a set of three propositions, the first presented as an assertion, the next two as explanations. ( A ) Kal fJLTjV Kdl TO TT&V OL€l TOLOVTOV YjV OLOV VVV €OTL KCLl OL€L TOLOVTOV €GTaL'.

'furthermore, the all has always been what it is now, and will always be such'. (B) ovSkv yap ioTiv els o /xerajSaAAei (/xerajSaAeiUsener). (c) napa yap TO irdv ovdev €OTLV o dv elaeXOov els avTO TTJV fieTaôXrjv TTOirjoaiTO.

For the moment, I shall refrain from translating propositions (B) and (c) for, as we shall see, their contents and the way they are linked are precisely what are 1

2 4

For convenience's sake, the Letter to Herodotus is quoted according to the traditional paragraphs, using the line numbering of the edition produced by Jean Bollack. Cf. Bollack, Bollack and Wismann 1971, p. 76. All three authors are referred to by the name Bollack. 3 Bignone 1920, pp. 253-6. Boyance 1972, pp. 72-3; Bloch 1973, pp. 457-9. Apart from the works cited above, I have consulted the following: Usener 1887; Hamelin 1910, pp. 397-417; Apelt 1921; von der Muhll 1922; Ernout 1925; Hicks 1925; Solovine 1925; Bailey 1926; Gigon 1949; Arrighetti 1973; Isnardi Parente 1974. I

2

EPICUREANISM

problematical. In connection with statement (A), let us immediately note that it is no more than weakly connected with what precedes it, seeming to be juxtaposed to it rather than coordinated with it.5 Nevertheless, this statement does seem to be logically related with the theses established before it: for if nothing is created absolutely nor is lost absolutely, it is clear that the sum total of all that exists can undergo no modification, in the sense that nothing can be added to it or taken away from it. If this is why the immutability of the all is affirmed at precisely this point rather than at any other, one would be led to understand that immutability as quantitative (the all is immutable in that it can neither increase nor decrease); however, the vocabulary used to state the thesis (TOLOVTOV . . . otov) definitely prompts a qualitative interpretation (the all is immutable in that it cannot change). Herein lies a first difficulty, upon which the explanations (B) and (c) should throw some light. It is important that they should do so because, at this particular point in the Letter to Herodotus, one of Epicurus' preoccupations must be to prevent his reader drawing from the classically Parmenidean principles that he has just set out equally Parmenidean conclusions. His concern to do so reveals itself in the very name of the subject to which Epicurus attaches the predicate of immutability, which is also altogether Parmenidean. It is 'the all' that is immutable; and although we do not yet know what this all is composed of (only later are bodies and the void mentioned), the use of that totalizing term already deflects us from the monism and immobilism of the Eleatics and allows us to assume that the immutability of the all is itself a global immutability, which by no means rules out the possibility of movements and changes affecting the parts of this all.6 But the fact that we already have an inkling of the sense in which we should not understand immutability makes it all the more pressing for us to know the sense in which we should understand it. Without further ado, then, let us pass on to an examination of the explanatory statements (B) and (c). Both are introduced by yap: at a first reading, it would thus seem that the function of (B) is to explain thesis (A) and that of (c) is to explain (B). This 'Chinese box' structure is automatically reflected in the translations (all those, that is, which respect the double occurrence of yap).7 Sentence (B), ovdkv yap ionv eh o /xerajSaAAei, has not posed many problems for translators and commentators. All understand it more or less as 5 6 7

8

Cf. Denniston 1954, pp. 351-2: *#cat jxiqv often introduces a new argument, a new item in a series, or a new point of any kind'. 'The invariability of the all, as all' is what Bollack, quite correctly, says (p. 175). As do Bignone, Apelt, Hicks, Solovine, Bailey, Gigon, Bollack; Hamelin, Ernout, Arrighetti, Isnardi Parente do not. Later, we shall have to consider whether or not it is out of pure negligence that they do not do so. Cf. Hamelin ('il n'y a rien d'autre en effet en quoi il puisse se changer'), Bignone ('perche non vi e nulla in cui possa mutarsi'), Apelt ('denn es gibt ja nichts, worein es sich verwandeln konnte'), Ernout ('il n'y a rien en effet en quoi il puisse se transformer'), Hicks ('for there is nothing into which it can change'), Solovine ('en effet, il n'y a rien en quoi il puisse se transformer'), Bailey ('for there is nothing into which it changes'), Gigon ('denn es existiert nichts, in das es sich verwandeln konnte'), Arrighetti ('nulla esiste in cui possa tramutarsi'), Bollack ('car il n'y a rien en quoi il change'), Isnardi Parente ('nulla esiste in cui esso possa mutarsi').

THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE ALL

3

8

follows: 'in effect, there exists nothing into which it (i.e. the all) changes (or can change)'.9 The nuances that crop up from one translation to another are of little importance alongside the unanimity with which all the different translators, having given the verb fjueraâXXetv its most natural interpretation, which is 'to change', 'to alter', 'to be transformed', consequently understand the preposition els as referring to a change described metaphorically as a movement, rather than as an actual movement: the complement of els is accordingly understood as the state in which the thing that changes finds itself once the change is completed, rather than the place that would be reached by the thing moving through space.10 The traditional interpretation thus gives this part of Epicurus' argument the following meaning: the all cannot change because for it to change, there would have to exist something into which it could change, something other than the all, for otherwise the all would not change by changing into it; but, by definition, nothing other than the all does exist. So the all is immutable.11 We shall be returning to the particularities of this argument. For the moment, let us see how, in the traditional interpretation, it fits in with the argument contained in sentence (c), whose function appears to be to justify (B). This sentence (c) (7rapa yap ro TTOLV ovdev eonv o av eloeXOov els avro rrjv fjLerafioXfjv TToirjoairo) is understood, very generally,12 as follows: 'for, apart from the all, there exists nothing which (o, nominative, the subject of 7Toir)oaiTo), by introducing itself into it (i.e. into the all) could bring about a 9

10

Some scholars have considered the present tense iierafiaXXei unsuitable for conveying the idea of a. possibility of change; Usener, followed by von der Muhll, Hicks and Arrighetti, substitutes the future iierafiaXei. Bailey, Bollack and Isnardi Parente preserve the manuscript reading. No correction is necessary since, as we shall see, in Epicureanism, the consequence follows not only from esse to posse, but also from posse to esse. Linguistically speaking, it is change that is a species of movement, rather than the converse; passing from one state to another is described metaphorically as moving from one spot to another. Introducing the term indicating a process of change by els is, of course, classic practice in Greek. Still in paragraph 39 of the Letter to Herodotus, the term occurs twice, first in line I (el e<j>Be(,pero 8e TO d(f>avLôfxevov els ro /AT) 6V), then in line 3 (els a SueXvero). Cf. also

11

12

41.2; 42.9; 54.8; 55.8. In English, the metaphor is somewhat obscured by the existence of two prepositions of place, each with a special function: compare 'to change into a devil' and 'to move from Oxford to Cambridge'. It is worth quoting the following comment from Bailey, who is, as usual, very clear and explicit (1964, pp. 277-78): 'Among phenomena two conditions are always required for change, (1) something for the original "thing" to change into, something which it may become . . . B u t . . . the universe cannot change into something else, for there is nothing else which it could become.' For the second condition, see below, n. 14. Cf. Hamelin ('il n'y a . . . rien non plus, en dehors de lui, qui puisse agir sur lui pour le faire changer'), Bignone ('infatti oltre il tutto non vi e nulla, che possa penetrandovi produrvi mutazione'), Apelt ('denn ausser dem Ganzen gibt es nichts, was in es eindringen und es dadurch verandern konnte'), Ernout ('et en dehors de l'univers il n'y a rien qui puisse s'y introduire pour le modifier'), Hicks ('for outside the sum of things there is nothing which could enter into it and bring about the change'), Solovine ('car il n'existe rien en dehors de l'univers qui puisse y penetrer et y produire un changement'), Bailey ('for outside the universe there is nothing which could come into it and bring about a change'), Gigon ('denn neben dem All gibt es nichts, was in es eindringen und die Verwandlung hervorrufen konnte'), Arrighetti ('ne oltre il tutto vi e nulla che penetrandovi possa produrre mutazione'), Isnardi Parente ('ne al di la del tutto vi e alcunche che, penetrando in esso, possa provocare in esso un mutamento'). Bollack's translation, which differs widely from all these, will be cited and examined below.

4

EPICUREANISM

change there (TTJV fjLerafSoArjv Troi-qoairo, middle with an object, with an active meaning)'. 13 This interpretation is in itself perfectly plausible: change requires there to be not only a final state that is different from the initial state, but also an agent that is external to the thing which changes and that is capable of producing this change in it; and it is this second condition that is now, following the first, excluded in the case of the all. 14 However, this interpretation of sentence (c) raises two considerable difficulties when it is set alongside sentence (B) as it is generally understood: (1) The preposition eh, used metaphorically in (B) to describe a process of change and the end result of that process, is used here with its literal meaning, to designate the movement in space of a hypothetical agent external to the all, which could introduce itself into it (elaeXdov els avro) and thereby bring about changes in it. Such an alteration in meaning between line 6 and line 7 would in itself be upsetting. But even more so, surely, is the abrupt switch that Epicurus is here supposed to make, from a level of thought so abstract as to be impossible to express except through metaphor, to a completely different level of thought, where the representations are all concrete and the spatial expressions are to be taken quite literally. In the earlier proposition (B), the 'outside', where it would be vain to seek something into which the all could change, is not a real space that contains that all, but - as it were - a space of possibles that 'surrounds' the 'real' with a margin of variation; in the second proposition (c), in contrast, it is in a physically real 'outside' that it would be vain to seek a place external to the all that could serve as a 'launching base' for an agent of physical aggression which, erupting into the universe from the outside, would bring about hypothetical transformations there. (2) There is a second difficulty: it is impossible to see how sentence (c), as generally understood, could serve as a justification for sentence (B), as usually interpreted, although it seems that that is what it ought to do (irapa yap TO TTOLV). If there exists no place outside the universe, no existent that is not included within the all, which could act upon it by invading it from outside, in what way can these declarations support the idea that there exists no state in which, on completion of a supposed change, the all could possibly find itself? The disparity between the levels on which the two sentences are situated prevents the one from functioning as a proof of the other. Furthermore, (B) excludes the very possibility of a change, in principle, whereas (c) excludes only one possible source of change; for the argument to function correctly, it would also be necessary to establish that there exists no other possible source of change, and this the text does not do. This disparity between the two levels and this fault in the logical construc13

14

Usener corrected TroirjacuTo to Trooyaat, and Cronert suggested TTOLrjoau (hvvai)To. The following editors return to the form given by the manuscripts: von der Muhll, Hicks, Bailey, Arrighetti, although some find it 'curious' (Bailey). As we shall see, the argument over the form of the verb restarted following Bollack's adoption of his position. Bailey (cf. above, n. 11) refers to this second condition as follows: '( 2 ) some external agent to effect the change - by means, as Epicurus held, of a blow'.


5

tion of the passage will now be manifest, I think, if we reread the text in its entirety in the translation of, for example, Solovine, which, rendered into English, runs as follows: The universe has always been the same as it is now and will be the same throughout all eternity. For there is nothing into which it can be transformed, for outside the universe there exists nothing which can penetrate it and produce a change.' There is clearly something amiss in these few lines. As we shall see later, a number of interpreters and editors have more or less clearly perceived this difficulty, to which they have responded by proposing to operate upon the text in various, sometimes heavy-handed, ways. But, in the interests of clarity, let us first examine Jean Bollack's more recent attempt to rectify the traditional interpretation without tampering with the text of the manuscripts. The reasons for Bollack's dissatisfaction with the traditional interpretation are not those that we have seized upon above; and perhaps the inadequacies of the new solution that he proposes may eventually be traced to an inadequate analysis of the faults in the solution that he sets out to supplant. Here, at any rate, is how Bollack sums up and criticizes the work of his predecessors: The argument is usually understood as follows: the all is always as it is: for (yap), in order for there to be a change, it would be necessary for there to exist an into which (eh o . . . ) it could turn itself; for (yap) outside the all there is nothing from which something could come and penetrate into it (o .. . elo-) so as to produce a change. The absence of an outside, as a place towards which, would thus be justified (see the second yap) by the absence of an outside as a place from which that which produces the movement could come (nothing into which . . ., for outside . . . nothing which into . . .). It is a vicious circle . . . 15

The summary of the traditional interpretation (thefirstsentence in the passage quoted above) produced by Bollack is absolutely correct, even if he explains the metaphorical meaning that is usually given to sentence (B) in rather unusual terms ('in order for there to be a change, it would be necessary for there to exist an into which it could turn itself). But when he moves on to criticize that traditional interpretation (from The absence of an outside . . .' on), Bollack, curiously, produces a kind of retranslation of the metaphorical acceptation, changing it into a spatial one, the effect of which is, in the first place, to give the traditional translation of sentence (B) an interpretation which, so far as I know, has been suggested by virtually nobody else (to wit: there exists no outside as a place towards which the all could go, and by doing so change).16 The second effect of Bollack's retranslation is to do away with the traditional interpretation's incoherent shift from metaphorical to real space, 15

16

Bollack 1971, p. 175; author's italics. The fragments of English, given without any reference, may come either from Hicks or from Bailey. The elliptical expression 'the absence of a place towards which' is imprecise anyway. No doubt we should understand not 'there is no place where the all could go, where it could undergo any qualitative changes', but rather 'there is no place to which the all could go, undergoing a change through that very removal or expansion'.

6

EPICUREANISM

since in the image that Bollack now produces all the expressions of place are literal and spatial ('the absence of an outside, as a place towards which, would thus be justified by the absence of an outside as & place from which that which produces the movement could come'). Thirdly and lastly, Bollack's retranslation exposes the traditional interpretation not to the reproach for incoherence which it deserves, but to the criticism that it is a vicious circle ('on tourne en rond') which it does not seem to merit. Bollack's retranslation of the traditional interpretation seems to recast Epicurus' argument as follows: (A) The all is always as it is. (B) For outside it there exists noplace towards which it could go; (c) for there exists outside it no place from which that which produces movement could come. Strictly speaking, this schema does not really deserve to be accused of being a vicious circle: if the absence of an outside as a place towards which is justified by the absence of an outside as a place from which, for there to be a vicious circle you would have to go on also to justify the absence of an outside as a place from which by the absence of an outside as a place towards which. Nevertheless, it certainly does seem, to say the least, a hollow and tautological argument: there is no outside as aplace towards which because there is no outside as a place from which, which simply boils down to saying: there is no outside because there is no outside. Having forged this phantom of an interpretation, which falls into a vicious circle or what appears to be one because all the spatial expressions in it are taken literally - both in (B), where the traditional interpretation was otherwise, and in (c), where it was not - Jean Bollack, logically enough, proposes a new solution which goes to the very opposite extreme, and attempts to give a metaphorical sense to all the spatial expressions in the passage (both those in (B), where he thus finds himself in agreement with the true traditional interpretation, 17 and those in (c), which is precisely where he explicitly diverges from it). 18 The treatment of the spatial expressions in this passage may thus be described schematically as follows:

Sentence B Sentence c

traditional interpretation

'phantom' interpretation

Bollack's interpretation

Metaphorical Literal

Literal Literal

Metaphorical Metaphorical

Bollack's reworking is accompanied by two other suggestions for changing the traditional interpretation. In the first place, being keen to make sentence (c) authentically explanatory regarding sentence (B), for which one can but applaud him in principle, Bollack is led to see the expression els avro rfjv 17

18

That agreement is clearly detectable when one reads the various translations of sentence (B): cf. above, n. 8. Bollack's translation - for once - is in agreement with the others. Cf. the very definite affirmation of pp. 175-76: 'The movement towards the outside . . . is here (i.e. in sentence (c)) only a metaphor for transformation into something' (author's italics).


7

lA€rafSo\r)v TTonqoairo, in (c), as a periphrastic development of the expression els o fierafidWei, in (B). And he detects confirmation for this idea in the middle form TTOLrjoairo, which, ever since Ambrogio Traversari, the first translator of Diogenes Laertius, has been mistakenly rendered by an active ('to produce change'), thereby for years on end attributing to Epicurus a 'vicious argument', 19 when all the time the intransitive and reflexive sense of this middle form should have been respected ('to change itself, transform itself). Secondly, this correction makes it necessary to recast the grammatical structure of sentence (c) in its entirety: given that the all is now the subject of TTOLrjoaiTo, the relative o, which has ovdev as its antecedent, can no longer be in the nominative and now has to be interpreted as the prepositionless complement of the compound verb els-eXdov; this participle eloeXdov can no longer itself refer to a hypothetical agent which might penetrate the all, but must instead refer to the all itself, which is the subject of TT-OI^CTOUTO; finally, avro designates no longer the all but, instead, the hypothetical term for the process of change that is to be denied. When put all together, these corrections produce the following translation; '(B) for there is nothing into which it changes, (c) since outside the all, there is nothing into which, if it penetrates there, it can transform itself. One of the weaknesses of this solution is obvious: namely, that it is not integrally in agreement with the main idea behind it, which is to give all the spatial expressions in the passage a systematically metaphorical sense. Jean Bollack summarizes his own interpretation in non-spatial terms. He writes as follows:20 'the all cannot change ( = B), because there is nothing that it is not already ( = c)'. But that metaphorization is not followed through in his translation as a whole: in the words 'if it penetrates there', a trace of spatial literality subsists, immediately creating an unease and uncertainty analogous to the unease and uncertainty aroused by the traditional interpretation; one and the same entity, ill-defined and difficult to define, plays both the spatial role of a place into which the all might penetrate and the metaphorical role of a term of transformation into which it might change. 21 At this point one wonders why, having taken the plunge, the translator did not give a metaphorical meaning to the words o dv elaeXOov, instead of rendering them by this awkward 'if it penetrates there'. But the answer is not hard to find: he would then have ended up with a patent absurdity, for a wholly metaphorized translation, with the grammatical construction that he has adopted, would produce something more or less as follows: 'outside the all, there is nothing into which, if it changes itself into it, it can change'. It is so as to avoid this absurd repetition that Bollack finds himself forced, at the cost of the coherence of his interpretation, not to carry through his original intention but instead to retain a little literal island amid his flow of metaphor. But should one not 19 2J

20 Cf. Bollack 1971, p. 18. Bollack 1971, p. 176. A point that was not lost upon Boyance, who writes, in the review cited above (p. 72): 'Bollack seems not to notice the strangeness of this all which changes into that into which it penetrates'.

8

EPICUREANISM

abandon a trail when one cannot follow it right to the end? This attempt to rectify the traditional interpretation seems no more satisfactory than what it seeks to supplant.22 To rescue the debate from the situation in which it has become bogged down, should we turn to Lucretius for help? Many scholars have thought so, and Jean Bollack has shocked several of his critics by refusing, as a matter of principle, to make use of Lucretius to explain Epicurus. Pierre Boyance taxes him severely for forgetting that Lucretius too had written about the immutability of the all, when the comments of other scholars (Giussani, Bignone, Bailey, Arrighetti, Robin) should have 'spurred him in that direction'.23 Olivier 22

Let us not get too deeply involved in the debate over the meaning of the middle TroLr/oairo, t h o u g h it is one that has been fuelled from all sides. T h e g r a m m a r here seems to provide interpreters with contradictory instruments and does not appear to be able to resolve disagreements in interpretation. In m y own view, however, the matter is of no m o r e than secondary and derivative importance c o m p a r e d with the crucial choice between a literal or a metaphorical meaning for the expressions of place and movement. However it is worth recalling a few of the points m a d e in this debate! ( i ) Boyance (1972, p . 73), basing his remarks on the Bailly and Liddell-Scott dictionaries, points out that, in classical usage, the middle 7TOLCLodaL with its object forms an expression that is the equivalent of a verb of the same family as that complement; for example, oSov noieiodai is frequently used to m e a n 'to m a k e a journey'; so TTJV yberaôX-qv Troieladat means the same as nerafiaXXeiv, with the active meaning o f ' t o change', just as it is u n d e r s t o o d in the customary interpretation of the passage in question. (2) In the pamphlet which he published in reply to Boyance's criticisms, Jean Bollack alluded briefly to this objection, maintaining that he alone respects ' b o t h the g r a m m a r and the internal logic of the text' (1971, p . 29). (3) Bloch (1973, p. 458) acknowledges that the presence of the article before /xerajSoA^v is 'unusual', but nevertheless agrees with Boyance and other supporters of the usual interpretation. H e points out that, in another passage (53.7-9), Bollack himself has n o qualms a b o u t giving iroitlodai an active meaning. T o set the record completely straight, I should p e r h a p s add that, in my own view, this passage does not include an article {roiavTTjv €K6XH/JLV ... Troieiodai), and that elsewhere, where the same expression does include an article (54.8: ras êraôXas . . . 7roi€io6ai), Bollack produces a translation which is consistent with his translation of the passage in which we are interested. F o r polemical ends, the occurrence of the article that it would have been w o r t h citing is rather the one at 44.2-3, where it appears, with an article, in the expression TTJV virepeioiv . . . TroieioQai, yet where Bollack a d o p t s an active meaning ('to provide support'). Finally, Bloch adds a few more suggestions to explain the use of the middle form. Given that this form characterizes a process where the subject is 'internal to the process in which it is the agent' (Benveniste), the agent whose intervention is first invoked, then p r o m p t l y denied by Epicurus, could be a divine power which 'changes itself in and by its action u p o n the universe', like the Stoic logos or its Presocratic antecedents; or, alternatively, it might be a god intervening in the universe, like the Demiurge of the Timaeus, to organize it with particular ends in mind, that is to say, in Epicurus' view at least, in his own interest. These suggestions, however ingenious, are probably unnecessary, as we shall see at the end of this investigation. (4) In a reply to Bloch's review (1974, 395-97), W i s m a n n , Bollack's c o - a u t h o r of L a Lettre d'Epicure, again returns to this point, and defends his interpretation, appealing to the parallel of p a r a g r a p h 54 and seizing with rather too m u c h alacrity u p o n the half-concession m a d e by Bloch with regard to the presence of the article. In my own view, the example of 44.2-3 shows that these squabbles should not be assigned too m u c h importance, for they are clearly inspired by other preoccupations.

23

A p a r t from the references given above, n. 4, cf. Giussani 1896, vol. 11, pp. 195-96. Boyance (1972, p . 72, n. 1) complains of being unable to find, as indicated, the note 22 to which Arrighetti refers on p. 452 of the first edition. His reference is in fact to the texts and references collected under no. 22 on p. 186, all of which concern Book 1 of the IJepl ucrecos\ In the second edition of Arrighetti's work, the reference cue appears on p . 494 and refers to note 23, that is to say to the texts collected under n o . 23 on p p . 189-90.


9

Bloch, for his part, is amazed at Bollack's virtually constant refusal to resort to Lucretius' interpretations, when certain passages in the Letter to Herodotus, in particular the one in which we are interested, in his view 'demand' to be compared with the De rerum natura. It is, however, only fair to recognize that, to judge by the diversity of the readings extracted from Lucretius by those who have turned to him in attempts to illuminate this passage, a study of Lucretius gives rise to as many if not more problems than it resolves. If we rapidly consider a few of those attempts, we shall see that in making the comparisons that they consider 'demand' to be made, these interpreters, in their selection of 'parallel' texts, exercise a free and fallible choice that leads to widely divergent conclusions. From a first analysis, the relevant texts from Lucretius seem easy to identify and isolate. Pierre Boyance cites two of them, the first from Book n, lines 303-7 ('Nor can any power change the sum total of things; for there is no place without into which any kind of matter could flee away from the all; and there is no place whence a new power could arise to burst into the all, and to change the nature of things and upset their motions' (tr. W.H.D. Rouse, Loeb Classical Library, 1943, slightly modified).24 The second passage appears both in Book in, lines 816-18, and in Book v, lines 361-3 ('even as the sum of all things is eternal,... there is no place without it into which its elements may leap apart, nor bodies to fall upon it and dissolve it asunder with a strong blow'). 25 In my opinion, as in Olivier Bloch's, a comparison with these texts is fatal to Jean Bollack's interpretation of Epicurus' sentence (c). Pierre Boyance is assuredly correct when, in connection with the first of those two passages from Lucretius, he writes: . . . it is clear that the second part of the sentence, which begins with neque in omne, corresponds exactly with Epicurus' rrapa yap TO TTOV KTX. In omne inrumpere is parallel to elaeXOov els avro, and one can see that, for Lucretius as for Traversari, avro designates the all and that, for both of them, that which penetrates into the all (this time referred to as omnem naturam rerum in Lucretius) determines the change within it (Lucretius adds: 'and upset their motions'). He is also correct in saying, of the second passage in Lucretius: 'Incidere corresponds to the elozXOov in the text of the Letter and applies, quite obviously, to that which penetrates the all, not to the idea of the all penetrating something else'. 26 24

25

26

Nee rerum summam commutare ulla potest vis; \ nam neque, quo possit genus ullum material \effugere ex omni, quicquam est (extra}, neque in omne \ unde coorta queat nova vis inrumpere, et omnem \ naturam rerum mutare et vertere motus. Sicut summarum summast aeterna, neque extra \ quis locus est quo diffugiant, neque corpora sunt quae \ possint incidere et valida dissolvere plaga. Boyance 1972, p. 73. In his Lettre a un President, Jean Bollack responds to the attack simply by swamping it with disdainful generalities: 'Because you know of a passage in Lucretius which presents a few resemblances with Epicurus' reasoning on the immutability of the all which, you see fit to pretend, is unknown to me, you rule against respecting both the grammar and the internal logic of the text, issuing the solemn warning: " / trust that nobody would wish to accuse

10

EPICUREANISM

But although we are bound to recognize that Boyance scores a point here, we should also note how deliberately he proceeds to delimit the field in which he knows he can win. Let us see how he plays his cards. On the first of Lucretius' texts, he writes: 'If we leave aside the first leg of the sentence introduced by 'neque\ it is clear that the second, which begins with neque in omne, corresponds exactly with Epicurus' irapa yap TO TT&V KTX\21 And on the second, he writes as follows: This eternity (i.e. that of the all) is founded on the fact that there is nothing outside it into which its constitutive elements could escape, nor anything that could penetrate it and dislocate if.28 It could hardly be made clearer, both by the words themselves and by the typography, that Lucretius is here invited to speak only when his evidence is favourable, and that Boyance has no hesitation whatever in leaving aside what Lucretius says wherever the correspondence with Epicurus becomes less 'clear' and less 'obvious'. What does Lucretius actually say? He establishes a close coordination between two possible sources of change in the universe: (i) the all could, in theory, transform itself by expanding, by a kind of leakage or outpouring of its parts to outside itself; it is prevented from doing so because, precisely, there is no place outside it; (2) in symmetrical fashion, the all could also be transformed by being penetrated by some body from outside itself; however, it is protected from that kind of aggression since there is, precisely, no body outside it. To set out the symmetry of these two hypotheses schematically, let us call the former excursive, and the latter incursive. It is immediately apparent that nothing in the passage of Epicurus which interests us, as it has been interpreted so far, corresponds to the excursive hypothesis: sentence (B), as understood by all interpreters (Bollack included), expresses a completely different idea, namely the impossibility for the all to change itself into anything that it is not already. As we have already noted, what it thus excludes is the very possibility of change in the all, not, as in the excursive hypothesis, a particular source of such a change. In contrast, Epicurus' sentence (c) corresponds exactly to the incursive hypothesis in Lucretius. It is also noticeable that the two Lucretian hypotheses are coordinated {neque . . . neque), whereas the two propositions in Epicurus are subordinated (A .. .Jor B .. .Jor c). That is why it is fair to say that Pierre Boyance was only able to score a point against Bollack by dint of lifting out of Lucretius' text whatever he needed in order to do so, and that he was only able to make that selection by dismembering the structure of Lucretius' text. The partiality of this use of the Lucretian evidence will become even more apparent if we compare Pierre Boyance's attitude with the attitudes of a number of his precursors in this field. Carlo Giussani, in the notes to his edition of Lucretius, starts off by declaring Book 11, lines 303-7 to correspond closely

27

Lucretius of having at three points misunderstood Epicurus' thought" No doubt in your view, a scholar's objectivity amounts to no more than an accumulation of evidence. If Lucretius were to say something different from Epicurus, Mr Chairman, that would not be called a contradiction, a mistake or even a solecism.' 28 Boyance 1972, p. 73; my own italics. Boyance 1972, p. 73; author's italics.


II 29

to the passage from the Letter to Herodotus that we are studying. But he soon notices that the distinction between on the one hand a mode of transformation of the all through addition (or 'incursion' originating from outside) and, on the other, a mode of transformation through loss (or 'excursion' of matter towards the outside), a distinction that is 'clearly expressed here by Lucretius' 30 is, in contrast, no more than 'confusedly present' in Epicurus' text. That is why, instead of ignoring the faults in the parallelism so as to retain only the convergences between Lucretius and Epicurus, Giussani has no hesitation in proposing to rewrite Epicurus' text entirely, in order to make it agree with Lucretius', and he suggests that it should be read as follows:... del TOLOVTOV ecrrcu. Flapd yap TO rrdv ovdev eoTiv els o /xera/JaAef rj o dv eloeXdov els avro KTX.31 This extraordinary suggestion is assuredly one that no scholar would hazard today. It treats the data provided by the manuscripts as so many pieces in a puzzle, to be moved about at will. Drawing the material now from one side, now from another, it puts together a text the structure of which has nothing at all in common with that of the text of the manuscripts. 32 It should be added, furthermore, that the exact meaning that the text in its reconstituted form was supposed by Giussani to possess does not emerge at all clearly.33 However, despite these considerable faults, which have been pointed out by, in particular, Bignone and Bailey, Giussani's suggestion was prompted, as we shall see, by a remarkably accurate intuition. Ettore Bignone, for his part, certainly criticizes Giussani for having 'rewritten the text too freely' and for having assumed there to be a corruption the origin of which is unintelligible. Nonetheless, he too believes that, in the light of the Lucretian data, Epicurus' text is in need of correction. According to Bignone, of the two possible causes of change mentioned, not only by Lucretius but also by Plutarch, 34 (that is to say the loss and the addition of 29

30 31

32

33

34

' 3 ° 3 - 3 ° 7 e tal quale la sentenza di Epicuro, e traduce quasi il testo della epitome a d E r o d o t o ' (Giussani 1896, vol. 11, p . 195). Giussani also alludes to line 296 (nam neque adaugescit quicquam neque deperit inde). ' L a distinzione t r a Yadaugescere e il deperire, espressa chiaramente qui in Lucrezio, appare confusa nel testo di Epicuro, che io leggerei: TOLOVTOV e a r a t . IJapa yap TO ndv KTA.' W e should note in particular that one of the y a p s disappears a n d is replaced by a n 17, of which there is n o trace in the manuscripts. T h e structure of Lucretius' text has been imported into the text of Epicurus. Giussani gives n o translation of his hypothetical text. T h e logic of his correction dictates that he should give the first occurrence of els (in els o /xerajSaAcf) the same, spatial, meaning that this proposition has when it occurs later (eloeXdov els CLVTO). But he undoubtedly interprets the verb /LterajSaAAeiv in its traditional sense o f ' t o be transformed'; for, pointing out (p. 196) that Lucretius uses the verb effugere in his description of the excursive hypothesis, at line 305, he notes: 'it is because the idea of a. place outside the all is naturally implied that Lucretius was able to substitute effugere for Epicurus' /u-erajSaAAeiv'; so he was n o t tempted t o see effugere as a translation of/LterajSaAAetv. Accordingly, it m a y be assumed that he would have translated his hypothetical text m o r e o r less as follows: 'the all has always been as it is now, a n d it will always be such. F o r , outside the all, there is nothing into which it c a n transform itself o r which, penetrating into it, could p r o d u c e any change.' It is true that Giussani adds that the t h o u g h t is 'tutt'altro che perspicuo'. Adversus Colotem 13, 1114A (Usener 296): TO TTOV . . . /XTJT' avôfievov \JLT)T€

Bignone also refers to Empedoclean precedents (DK 31B 17, 27f.).

12

EPICUREANISM

elements), Epicurus here recalls (sic)35 only the second. Accordingly, it seems to him highly probable that a number of words have been dropped out. He proposes making good this lacuna as follows: ovdev yap iariv els o /zera/3aAer irapa yap TO irdv ovdev iartv, O(TTOL av TL e£e\6oi, rj o^> av elaeXdov els avro rrjv iJLerafioArjv nonqoano', which would produce the following meaning: 'there is nothing into which the all can change for, outside the all, there is nothing which, by penetrating it, could produce a change there'. Bignone is thus faced with a parallelism between Epicurus' sentence (c) and the incursive hypothesis of Lucretius' text, and another parallelism (forged by himself) between 'Epicurus' and the excursive hypothesis. But he does not let it rest there. There is still Epicurus' (B) sentence to cope with, the affirmation of the impossibility, in principle, of any change in the whole. None of the commentators so far mentioned has proposed any Lucretian parallel for this sentence. Bignone has two points to make on this subject: (i) in Book n, lines 297-302, which immediately precede the first of the passages studied above, Lucretius affirms the permanence of atomic movements and likewise the permanence of the laws of birth and development for natural beings;36 (2) in the summary of Epicurus' physics given by the pseudo-Plutarch, we encounter the idea that nothing absolutely new comes about in the all. 37 This idea is set out immediately after the thesis of the immutability of the all (cf. Letter to Herodotus 39.4-5) and immediately before the idea that the all is composed of bodies and the void (Letter to Herodotus 39.13)38 . From these two observations Bignone draws the conclusion that Lucretius and the pseudo-Plutarch, following an Epicurean model more fully developed than the Letter, but similarly arranged, are here summing up the well-known doctrine according to which, in the infinite universe and throughout the infinite time of the existence of atoms, which are infinite in number but whose forms are not themselves infinite in number, all the possible combinations of atoms and the void have already been realized at one time or another, in one place or another. 39 This 35

36

37

38

39

'Epicure qui ricorderebbe solo la seconda' (ibid., p. 256). It would be amusing to find a scholar such as Bignone writing that this text of Epicurus' does not recall all the points mentioned by Lucretius and Plutarch. But, to be absolutely fair, perhaps he simply meant that he does not mention them. Apparently, the Italian verb ricordare does lend itself to this ambiguity. Quapropter quo nunc in motu principiorum \ corpora sunt, in eodem ante acta aetate fuere, \ et post haec semper similirationeferentur, \ et quae consuerintgignigignentur eadem \ condicione, et erunt et crescent vique valebunt, \ quantum cuique datum est per foedera natural. Pseudo-Plutarch, Stromates 8 (Diels, Doxographi Graeci, p. 581, I7(f.): ovSev £evov iv TW TTCLVTL d7roTeAeiTCu, napa TOV 17817 yeyevrj/jievov xpovov a-neipov. Usener places this sentence at the beginning of his collection of fragments of physics (no. 266), adding in a note: gravissimum est axioma et disciplinae Epicureae necessarium. Although that is true only if a conjectural emendation is accepted in each text. Pseudo-Plutarch reads as follows: o n TTOLV ion acofxa, which Bignone suggests completing as follows: on (TO) rrdv ion acL»/Lx,aTaor/xara, which are images of objects, as well as to 7ra0rj), but also that it involves a historical error. 2 5 It seems that Epicurus may indeed have known of conceptions of the origin of language in which the earliest phase of human language was represented on an animal model, as the inarticulate expression of emotions, and that he deliberately rejected that representation. It was probably present in Democritus, if we agree to follow the many historians who attribute to him the fundamental elements of a cultural history traces of which are to be found in much later authors such as Vitruvius and Diodorus Siculus.26 In Diodorus, for example, the first stage of the genesis of language is constituted by the appearance of confused sounds devoid of meaning (66yyoi) and deems it necessary to specify that by this he means the nouns and verbs (ovofjidrcov KOLL prjixdrcov) that men 'born from the earth' emitted for the very first time. 29 Natural language is thus represented as possessing a semantic and syntactic organization from the very first moment of its emergence. In that case why, on an apparently speculative point, did Epicureanism insist upon distancing itself from a representation of the genesis of languages which, if it is true that that representation originated in Democritus, probably formed part of its horizon of references? The answer to this question will require us to specify what was at stake when Epicureanism declared its own position to be different. In the first place, it may be assumed that its rejection of that representation constituted a response to its 'positivist' desire to advance no hypothesis concerning a past that, by definition, is impossible to seize upon 25 28 29

26 27 See Vlastos 1946, p p . 51-9. See Cole 1967. D i o d o r u s 1.8, 3. Lucretius v . i 0 8 7 - 9 0 . See Chilton 1967; 1971 (fragment 10); 1962, p p . 159-67; and the judicious assessment of the discussions on this point by Rodis-Lewis 1975, p p . 312-18.


THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE LANGUAGE

35

directly unless it is guaranteed, in one way or another, by some phenomenon that is perceptible in our own current experience. Now, the current use of language, as the Epicurean authors saw it, contains no perceptible trace of a presemantic and inarticulate state of voice usage, nor of any phase of purely private language. Lucretius notes that, in the individual evolution of a child, what precedes the use of language is the gesture of pointing a finger at things, and this behaviour already refers to the things that the child wants and the people to whom it is appealing. 30 No doubt Epicurean epistemology does admit, indeed even recommends, the practice of making conjectures that are impossible to verify directly, in order to explain phenomena that it is possible to apprehend. But it does not recommend, indeed positively forbids, forging hypotheses which cannot be checked by any direct or indirect method of confirmation - or, at the very least, 'non-infirmation'. But it is possible to move beyond this first response to the question. As has already been pointed out, one genetic theory can be set up in opposition to another, not simply on the grounds that it gives a better account of the observable data concerning the phenomenon under inspection, but also because it believes itself to be more faithful to the essential characteristics of that phenomenon. A diachronic analysis, an account of origins, the conjectures to which these give rise, and the polemics that they provoke very often are substitutes for the discussion of problems to do with essences, and also for the synchronic analysis of concepts and the necessary links between concepts. To include or not to include a phase A in the history of phenomenon B is to pronounce upon the essential content of the concept of B. If that is so, it is possible to see that the Epicurean refusal to conceive of primitive language as an animal and inarticulate expression of the subjective states of human consciousness corresponds to an analysis of human experience in which sensations and affections are through abstraction separable from the language that articulates and structures them. The label 'sensualism' is particularly misleading here, because there is a danger that it will make one forget that what ensures the epistemological (incontestable) quality of sensation in Epicureanism is, precisely, an analysis which, in abstract fashion, takes to bits a totality whose elements are never apprehended separately in psychological experience: the famous thesis of the infallibility of sensations is only valid for a sensation defined as the abstract limit of the analysis. Epicurus says: 'All sensation is mute (aAoyo?) and admits of no memory (^77^77? ovSefjiias SeKTLKrj)\3 1 in other words, as soon as there is added to a sensation a memory which links it synthetically to other previous sensations of the same kind together with the word which formulates that which is felt in the sensation, something other than the sensation itself has already come into play. This other 'something', which does not possess the infallibility of sensation, but is unaffected by the limitations of the present moment and the 30

Lucretius v.i030-2.

31

Cited by Diogenes Laertius x.31.


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EPICUREANISM

proviso that it be unexpressed, is §d£a, judgement, the fundamental tools of which are notions and words. The role of concepts and judgements in the Epicurean psychology of knowledge is so vast and so fundamental that it would not be exaggerated to speak of intellectualism in this connection. To be convinced of that, one has only to read the rather astonishing passage in which Lucretius analyses the illusion that makes us believe that our shadow is following us and copying our movements.32 It informs us that our eyes are only judged capable of seeing light and shade wherever the latter happen to be and at the particular moment when they happen to be there. In contrast, it is up to reason (ratio) to decide (at the risk of making a mistake) whether a series of images which successively occupy adjoining positions should be interpreted as the perception of the movement of a single object which remains identical even when it moves (as is usually the case), or whether, on the contrary (as in the case of the shadow that seems to be moving), it is a matter of an illusory synthesis which confers the status and consistency of a real object upon what is in reality no more than a cinematographic succession of apparitions which then disappear immediately. There could be no better way of showing that, in Epicurean doctrine, the fundamental categories of objectivity (unity, identity, permanence) stem from what, in Kantian vocabulary, might be called logic, rather than aesthetics. What we perceive of our sensations is not the brute fact of them but the result of the form that conceptual structures impose upon that brute fact. It is thus impossible for the history of human culture to dissociate, in a succession of separate phases, two moments that may be distinguishable in theoretical reflection but which, as experienced, are inseparable. Language, in its original form, could not be the pure expression of sensation, for when sensation speaks it is no longer sensation that is speaking. Yet - it might be argued - there would be nothing to prevent primitive language being a conceptual elaboration of experience, even if it were elaborated in a purely individual fashion which differed from one individual to another. It would be mistaken to confuse an interpretation which presents it as a multiplicity of'individual, precise and coherent systems' (Jean Bollack), with an interpretation which imagined it as 'emotional cries, expressing love, fear and other sentiments of this kind, but saying nothing that could be specifically related to external objects' (Phillip De Lacy). Nevertheless, having recognized that difference, in every individualist interpretation, whatever form its details may take, we notice the effect of the questionable extrapolation of the model of the atom into the psychological domain. This model - if it is a model - seems to me to play a normative role in Epicurean thought, rather than a descriptive one. The ideal of the individual self (the ideal of the sage) is to come to resemble an atom, to become, like it, invulnerable, imperishable, inviolate. In this respect, Epicurus' morality might be presented as a programme for imitating an atom, which really is the same as a programme for imitating God. But when 32

Lucretius iv.365-86.


THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE LANGUAGE

37

it comes to describing the constitution of man, Epicurus never forgets that man is an atomic compound. This physical status includes negative aspects (every compound is decomposable), but also positive ones: it is thanks to his composition that man is able to sustain ordered exchanges with the environment that surrounds him, and to derive from it enrichment on the physiological and the psychological levels; it is man's composition that makes him capable of possessing a history. So if physics can provide a model of intelligibility for the history of human culture, we must expect that model to be at the level of compound bodies, which evolve in constant interaction with other ones, rather than at the level of atoms, which pass through the void of space and time without being intrinsically affected by it. This compound nature is at the same time a specific nature, and if we take the specificity of human nature into consideration, we are bound to rectify the effects of a unilateral accentuation of the principle of individuation in Epicurus on the interpretation. It is perfectly true that, in his eyes, no natural being is exactly the same as another; but it is equally true that individual differences only count within a field of variation strictly delimited by the laws of the constitution of natural species. It is a prototypical case of the application of a schema of free variation within well-defined limits - a schema the importance and polyvalency of which have been judiciously demonstrated in every area of Epicurean thought. 33 The stability and specificity of human nature are but one of the aspects of the regularity that reigns throughout nature universally, and that, basically, is why it is legitimate for us to extend our knowledge by the use of induction and analogy. In this respect, it is very revealing to observe the positions adopted by the Epicureans in the discussions in which they were opposed by the Stoics over the norms for interpreting natural signs. (An echo of those discussions is preserved in the De signis of the Epicurean Philodemus.) 34 According to a simplistic and stereotyped schema (Stoic 'rationalism', Epicurean 'empiricism'), one would expect to find the Stoics taking their stand on the basis of the rationality of reality so as to anticipate regularities by means of reason, and the Epicureans checking the tendency to generalize by underlining their warnings on the score of the unpredictable diversity of experience. However, it is, on the contrary, the Stoics who draw attention to the anomalies of the universe, the possibility that there may be exceptions to any rule, and the dangers of extrapolating from a few particular cases noted in the course of experience; while the Epicureans are busy underlining the analogies of experience, the faithful adherence of nature to its own laws and the legitimacy of amplificatory induction. Within such a framework, the Epicurean version of the naturalist response to the problem of the origin of language may well have passed beyond a summary equation between what is natural and what is universal, but it was unlikely to go to the opposite extreme and profess that originally there 33 34

See D e Lacy 1969b, p p . 172-4 (summary of a study published in full in Phoenix 23, 1969). See D e Lacy 1978.


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EPICUREANISM

appeared as many different languages as there were individuals. It is much more likely that Epicurus imagined the original languages in the form of a diversity tempered by the limitation of possible divergences and by the regularity of the determining conditions. The identity of the environment for the inhabitants of the same geographical zone and the similarity of the natural reactions of the members of the same ethnic group are in all likelihood the factors which, in combination, were judged necessary and sufficient to account for the appearance, here and there, of linguistic codes common to a particular group of individuals, even before those individuals consciously worked something out together. In support of this hypothesis, two other arguments may be mentioned:first,the fact that late doxography attributes to Epicurus a total assimilation between linguistic emissions and the production of sounds such as coughing or sneezing, which may be observed amongst all individuals placed in identical conditions35 (in a mood of polemical irony, this testimony certainly seems to simplify the matter since it overlooks the ethnic differentiation of languages which, for Epicurus, emerges right from the start; on the other hand, it prompts one not to carry the indispensable rectification beyond the point at which this doxographical tradition would become unintelligible); secondly, the few texts which attest, like it or not, the existence of an Epicurean form of'racism', asserting, for instance, that the Greeks alone are capable of philosophizing.36 The Epicurean theory of language, which reflects the essence of the philosophy of Epicurus, can thus be seen as a construction whose coherence with the Epicurean system as a whole is such that it can serve as a point of departure for a more precise and more discriminatory definition of the fundamental axes of this system. 35

36

See Proclus, In Platonis Cratylum 16 (Usener 335): the first users of language (according to Epicurus) did not institute n o u n s in a scholarly way (iTTiorrjiJLovws), but t h r o u g h a natural p r o m p t i n g (^VGIKOJS KLVOVJJL€VOL), like those w h o cough, sneeze, shriek, cry out, groan. See Clement of Alexandria, Stromates 1.15 (Usener 226). Diogenes Laertius says, similarly (x.117) that, according to Epicurus, one would not be able to become a sage without a particular physical disposition or unless one belonged to a particular people. Strangely, this passage elicits no c o m m e n t a r y in Bollack 1975, p . 23.


REMARKS ON THE STOIC THEORY OF THE PROPER NOUN*

There is not much chance of being wrong when one declares the theory of the proper noun to be positioned at a strategic crossroads in Stoic thought. It is fair to say (with the modulated reservations that such a declaration demands) that it was the Stoics who invented the grammatical category of the proper noun and it was by no mere chance that they did so. Their logic, unlike Aristotle's, allots to the singular proposition a place of fundamental importance. Their ontology attributes to every existent an individuality which makes it, in principle, discernible from every other; their theory of knowledge extends to representations the discernibility of the objects that they represent. That is to say, by tugging on the metaphorical string of the proper noun, one could easily unravel the entire skein of Stoicism, thereby vindicating the constant claims of systematicity that partisans of the doctrine were in the habit of advancing.1 In the limited space available here, I shall do no more than sketch in just such a claim on my own behalf.

The framework for the invention of the proper noun is the theory of the parts of discourse which the Stoics did not themselves invent but to which they attached great importance and also made decisive contributions. 2 In listing the classes of words that make up the logos qua discourse, the description of linguistic structures per se seems not to have been their sole concern; for they thought that such an inventory would reveal to them the very elements of the logos qua reason.3 However, in their divisions of the logical 'place' of * The present paper is a revised version of one given at the 'Logique et Grammaire' Colloquium, on 28 January 1983. In it I have tried to take account of the comments that were put to me, in particular by Claude Imbert and Francois Recanati. I delivered later versions of this paper at the Universities of Pisa and Rome, where I benefited from further extremely useful remarks. I am also particularly grateful for the comments of Anthony Lloyd and David Sedley. They should in no way be held responsible for my failure to heed all their prudent advice. 1 Cf. Cicero, Definibus m. 74; iv. 53. 2 Texts in FDS 536-93. (The abbreviation FDS refers to K. Hiilser (ed.), Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker, 4 vols., Stuttgart 1987-9.1 should like to thank Karlheinz Hiilser most warmly for putting this monumental work at my disposal before publication.) 3 Epictetus, Discourses iv.8. 12; Chrysippus in SVFn, p. 41,11. 27-33. Cf. Frede 1978, pp. 59-60. (The abbreviation SVFrefers to J. von Arnim (ed.), Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, Stuttgart 1903-5; unless otherwise indicated, the number of the volume is referred to in Roman numerals, the number of the fragment in Arabic numerals.)

39 Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009

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philosophy, they drew a fundamental distinction between the study of signifiers and that of what is signified; and it is where the signifiers are concerned that they inserted their theory of the parts of discourse.4 In this respect, they were working as grammarians when, for the first time, they introduced the proper noun as a type of signifier which they deemed it necessary to isolate and classify separately. Actually, they did not introduce the proper noun under its traditional name. The traditional name came from the ancient grammarians who, according to Philo of Alexandria, had simply elaborated the discoveries of the philosophers; 5 and on the whole modern scholarship agrees with him, dubbing the Stoics the founders of western grammar. 6 But although the grammarians themselves frequently refer to the 'philosophers' (namely, the Stoics), they do so as to a group to which they do not themselves belong; and they are often at pains to distance themselves from their doctrines, their classifications and their vocabulary, as if to underline the philosophical neutrality of their own scholarship. The case of the proper noun is one example of this: the grammarians rebaptized the child found by the Stoics. To be more precise: by Chrysippus. Before him, Zeno and Cleanthes had recognized only four parts to discourse: the noun, the verb, the article and the conjunction (or rather what they called by names which are the sources of the modern grammatical terms 'noun', 'verb', etc.); under the heading noun (OVO/JLO) they included (as had their predecessors) the common noun, the proper noun and the adjective (which is easy to turn into a noun in Greek 7 ). From Chrysippus on and in particular at the hands of Diogenes of Babylon, his disciple and second successor and the author of an influential treatise entitled Tlepl (frcovrjs, the list was increased to five8 (and in this form was to continue to be considered specifically Stoic9) by the addition of the TTpoarjyopta (appellation). This corresponded to the common noun (and to the adjective); the word ovo[xa now designated only the proper noun. The grammarians were to preserve the distinction using a different vocabulary which distinguished the ovofia Kvpiov (proper noun or, to be more exact, noun properly speaking) from the ovofjua TTpoor/yopLKov (appellative or common noun). 10 The change in vocabulary draws attention to one peculiarity of Stoic nomenclature: OVO/JLCL and Trpoorjyopia are terms that do not resemble each other. The Stoics did not wish to subdivide 6vo\xa in its wide sense into two sub-species. For them, 'proper noun' and 'common noun' are two autonomous parts of discourse which possess no more affinity with each other than they do with the three other parts (although, as we shall see, this tendency is counterbalanced by an opposite tendency to conceive each on the model of the 4 6 7

10

5 Diogenes Laertius vii.43, 44, 57, 62. De congressu 146-50 (SVF 11.99; FDS 4X6). Cf. Pohlenz 1939, Barwick 1957, Pinborg 1975, Frede 1977/87. Dionysius of Halicamassus, De Demosthenis dictione 48 (FDS 537), De compositione verborum 8 9 2 (FDS 538). Diogenes Laertius vii.57-8. Cf. FDS 542-44, 548, 549. Dionysius of Thrace, Ars grammatica 12 (FDS 564).


THE THEORY OF THE PROPER NOUN

41

other). Only the proper noun is called 6Vo/xa: it and it alone fulfils the function of naming. The TTpoarjyopta is not an ovofjua; there is nothing that is named by a common noun, for example 'man' (a critique of Platonism is latent in this refusal to identify the irpoorjyopia with a species of oVojua11). Can we understand why the common noun was called a Trpoo^yopial At first sight, the term seems ill-chosen: people are called by their proper names, addressed by their proper names; 12 and most beings with a proper name are people, beings who understand language and who answer to their names (so far as I know, the Stoics did not consider any other cases). But it is also possible to call individual X (for example, Agamemnon) 'Y' ('pastor of peoples'); such a construction may have led to the distinction between appellation and naming, as two linguistic operations that can both be carried out upon the same object, hence two operations, each of a different type. As we shall see, the Stoic definitions of the ovofjua and the Trpoorjyopia are semantic. It is worth noting, however, that morphological considerations (differences in the declension system, the presence or absence of patronymic derivations) and also syntactical ones (the possibility or impossibility of construing the noun with articles of different genders) had also been invoked to support the distinction. On the basis of a number of (over-) particular cases, the Stoics had tried to show that the proper noun and the common noun had different grammars. 13 But they had not been able to proceed very far along this track as, in Greek, their grammar is identical in two crucial respects: (a) both can be construed with an article; (b) both can be declined. I imagine that the Stoics were very much aware of these characteristics held in common. In principle, whether the Greek proper noun is presented with or without an article is not simply a matter of chance. A typical case is where, in a story, a character is introduced by his own name, X; the next time he appears, he is presented as 'the X' (i.e. who has been mentioned above). This anaphoric force of the article stems from its past as a demonstrative pronoun, of which the Stoics were well aware: they referred to both articles and pronouns as 'articles', and, in justification of this, cited Homeric examples in which the article patently possesses a pronominal character. 14 They called the article itself an 'indefinite article' on the basis of expressions such as 6 Trepnrarcbv KIVZITCLI (he - whoever he may be - who walks, moves). 15 We may suppose, accordingly, that the possibility of construing a proper noun with or without an article then suggested the following analysis: just as 6 TTepnrarcov designates him whoever he may be - who is walking, just so 6 ZcoKpdrrjs designates him whoever he may be 16 - who is Socrates; correlatively the proper noun Cf. Bestor 1980a and 1980b. Cf. the Stoic name for the apostrophe, irpooayopevrLKov (Diogenes Laertius vii.67, complemented by Ammonius, In Arist. De interpr., p. 2, 26 Busse, SVF11.188, FDS 897). Cf. Scholia in Dionys. Thr., p. 356, i6ff. Hilgard (FDS 567). Apollonius Dyscolus, Depronominibus, p. 5, 2off. Maas (FDS 550). * 5 Ibid., p. 6, 306°. For example: whether he is young or old, seated or standing, etc.


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g, considered in isolation, must designate the property that being Socrates consists in possessing. In support of this hypothesis, let me begin by citing a passage from Diogenes Laertius (vn.6i) where the notions of the supreme genus and the smallest possible species are set out alongside each other: 'the most general' (yeviKwrarov) is that which, being a genus, itself has no genus, for example the being; 'the most specialized' (elSiKwrarov) is that which, being a species, itself has no species; and the example here is not the species infima, the species beneath which there are only individuals, but the individual himself, designated by a proper noun construed with an article: 6 EcoKpdrrjs. If 6 IcoKpdrrjs designates the individual who, on his own, constitutes a species, it is plausible to interpret ZcoKpdrrjs as the designation of the property that characterizes this species. The particular syntax of the Greek proper noun must thus have made it possible for the Stoics to take up an anticipatory position on the classic problem of the theory of the proper noun, namely the problem of whether it has a meaning, as a common noun does, or only a reference. And we may suppose (but will need to produce supplementary verification) that their solution closely resembled the one that a philosopher of our own times summarizes as follows: '[proper names] have essentially a sense and only contingently a reference - they refer only on the condition that one and only one object satisfies their sense'.17 For the Stoics, the use of the article expressed that distinction graphically, by indicating that the condition in question is indeed fulfilled. Before proceeding with an examination of this hypothesis, let us turn our attention to the second grammatical characteristic that is shared by the proper noun and the common noun: declension (in which, as we know, the 'cases' still bear the names conferred upon them by the Stoics). We should note that, for the Stoics, the theory of declension belongs to the study of what is signified, not what signifies: they inferred this from the fact that a genitive, for example, is formed differently in different Greek dialects, 18 but they probably also had other reasons for thinking in this way. The declension of a proper noun raises a problem: does Socrates have but one name or several, and if he has but one, what is it? Why should it be the nominative ZcoKpdrrjs rather than the accusative ZtoKpaTrjv, or any other case? More generally, in connection with the common noun as well as the proper noun, the Stoics had argued against Aristotle on the question of whether the nominative should be considered as a case (a TTTCOOLS); but it so happens that the examples used in the sources that record this debate are all taken from proper nouns. 19 For Aristotle, Socrates' name is the 'nominative' IcoKparrfs; only the other declined forms are TTTO)O€LS of that noun, literally 'clippings' from it, various figures of its 'decline / declension'. His justification for favouring the nominative in this way is that only the nominative can 17 19

18 Searle 1958/67, p. 92. Scholia in Dionys. Thr., p. 230, 24 (FDS 773). Cf. Ammonius, In Arist. De interpr., p. 42, 3off. Busse (FDS 776).



43

combine with a verb to constitute a Xoyog that may be either true or false.20 The Stoics accept neither his argument nor his conclusion. Taking into consideration not only the standard example to which Aristotle had confined himself, but also the non-standard one in which an impersonal verb is construed with an oblique case (for example, icoKpdrei fxeraixeXec: 'Socrates repents', but literally: 'there is reason for Socrates to repent'), 21 they conclude that the expression of the subject is not always monopolized by the nominative, but always appears as one or another case of a declinable term. The nominative ceases to be that in relation to which the other cases 'decline', and itself becomes a form of'declension-declining' in relation to a matrix which is not itself able to be presented linguistically and which may be described as something signified without a specific signifier, something signified by a family of signifiers. These ideas certainly played a role in the conception of the proper noun as possessing a meaning; for when asked whence the 'cases' could 'decline', the Stoics replied 'from the concept that exists in the soul', and it was again the example of a proper noun that constituted the basis of their demonstration. 22 We have within us a 'concept of Socrates' (TO ZcoKpdrovs vorjfjia), which we 'indicate' (SÂouacu) when we pronounce the name ZcoKpdrrjs. Leaving aside the matter of what is peculiar to the case of the proper noun, this analysis makes it possible to understand how it was that the theory of declension could be considered as belonging to the study of what is signified, and why commentators continue to put forward conflicting interpretations of the notion of UTCQOIS, the position of which is difficult to pin down in relation to the distinction between signifiers and signified.23 The fact that the Stoics took into account the two grammatical characteristics that the proper noun shares with the common noun, - i.e. it can be construed with an article and it can also be declined - may thus explain how it was that they considered the proper noun to have a meaning. However, there is also the possibility that those two characteristics may lead one to represent that meaning differently, in relation to the dogmas of Stoic ontology. Following the former of these two possibilities, one is led to conceive the proper noun as the linguistic correspondent of the property which characterizes the species that a single individual constitutes; to the extent that it makes from a piece of matter an individual unlike any other, this quality may be defined as an agent and so as something as real and corporeal as the individual whom it qualifies. In contrast, following the second possibility, one is led to give the proper noun a conceptual meaning. Now the status of concepts, in Stoic ontology, is extremely flimsy: they are 'figments of the soul' of which it cannot even be said that they are 'something' (like the incorporeals which the Stoics admitted to 'subsist'); the most that can be said of them is that they are 20 21 22 23

Aristotle, De interpr., 2, i 6 a 3 2 - b 5 . A m m o n i u s , In Arist. De interpr., p . 44, 1 iff. (SKF11.184; FDS 791); cf. FDS 793 a n d 795. Cf. the text cited above n. 19. O n this point, see Frede 1978, Graeser 1978, Sedley 1982b.


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'almost something' (cboaveLTLva).24 Both these statuses are distinct from that of the well-known and problematical XeKrov (which is incorporeal but is nevertheless a 'something') - a matter to which we shall have to return. Furthermore, they are also distinct from one another; but there is no reason to doubt their compatibility. A physical object fits into a certain concept if and only if it possesses a certain quality, and this is not to prejudge either the ontological status of the concept nor that of the quality. The name that it bears relates both to the quality that it possesses and to the concept into which it fits. II

The Stoic definitions of the common noun and the proper noun that have come down to us are those of Diogenes of Babylon. It is time that we took a look at them. The appellation (Trpoorjyopia) is a part of discourse which signifies a common quality (cr^/u-cuvov KOLVTJV TroLorrjTa), such as 'man', 'horse'; the noun (OVO/JLCL) is a

part of discourse which indicates a particular quality (SrjXovv Ihiav TTOLOT^TO), such as 'Diogenes', 'Socrates' (Aioyevrjs, ZWparr?? - no article).25

These definitions are worth examining by reason of both what they share in common and also what is particular to each of them. Both define their object by its relation - a semantic relation - to a term which, in both cases, is a quality, common in the one case, particular in the other. But these definitions did not become generally accepted and the grammarians later in both cases replaced TTOLOTI^S by ovata (possibly understanding this word to mean essence in the case of the common noun and substance in that of the proper noun). 26 Neither the Stoics nor the grammarians appear to have thought of saying that a proper noun designates a substance, a common noun a quality. The categorical homogeneity of the two types of nouns seems to have been presupposed by both parties. But the reform introduced by the grammarians draws attention to what is felt to be paradoxical in the Stoic definitions: namely, the idea that a noun (whether proper or common) signifies a quality (TTOLOTTJS) rather than an object qualified in a particular manner (TTOLOV TL). And this provides confirmation that the idea was a specifically Stoic one - which is exactly what we suspected above. On the other hand, our two definitions do differ on one important point: they do not use the same word to express the semantic relationship which links the noun and the quality. The common noun signifies (orj/jiaLvov) a common quality; the proper noun indicates (SrjXovv) a particular quality. Here again, the grammarians were to intervene to restore the homogeneity between the 24

26

Diogenes Laertius VII.6I; Stobaeus, Eclogae 1, p. 136, 21 Wachsmuth (SKF1.65; FDS 316); on 25 this text, see Frede 1977/87. Diogenes Laertius vii.58. Cf. Choeroboscus, Prolegomena, p. 106, 3-12 Hilgard (FDS 563); Dionysius of Thrace, Ars grammatica 12 (FDS 564).



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27

two definitions, using OTHJLOLLVOV in both. The difference that the Stoics tried to establish is certainly significant and one might be tempted to say that it calls into question the hypothesis that I have put forward above: in avoiding the use of orjjjLdLveiv in connection with a proper noun, might not Diogenes have wished to indicate that he attributed to it no connotation, only a denotation? However, that is not a very plausible explanation, precisely because it is the quality, not the individual who is qualified, that is the object of the controversial participle SrjXovv.28 It would be more satisfying to seek the reason for the change of terminology in the difference between a particular quality and a common quality. One attractive solution might run as follows: a common quality is definable. One can state without hesitation that the noun which designates it has a meaning, because other expressions which mean the same also exist. By refraining from using the verb cr^/xcuWiv to describe the proper noun's manner of signifying, Diogenes may have wished to suggest that, on the contrary, the proper noun has no synonyms and can be replaced by no definition or paraphrase. The 'indicating' of the particular quality is a task that nothing else can accomplish in its place. Whatever the fact of the matter may be on this particular point (to which we shall also be returning), Diogenes' definition relates the proper noun to a unique correlative, the particular quality, which is a corporeal reality but is not identical to the individual whom it qualifies. In view of this, it needs to be compared with Sextus Empiricus' famous text which is traditionally cited as the canonical exposition of Stoic semantics (M VIII.I 1-12). The comparison is all the more desirable given that in this text too a proper noun is used as an example. Here, then, is a translation of this passage; but in studying it, we should not forget that it is part of a more general account of the various answers that the dogmatic philosophers produce in reply to the question of what is the proper subject of what is true and what is false. According to the Stoics, what is properly true or false is what is signified (orjfjLaLvofjLevov). Sextus comments upon this answer in the following terms: There are three [items] that are linked together: the signified, the signifier and the bearer (rvyxoivov).29 The signifier is the vocal sound ((fycovrj), for example the vocal sound 4Dio' (ALCDV, no article); the signified is the thing itself (avro TO TTpayfjia)30 which is indicated (S^Xovfjuevov) by the vocal sound and which we seize in exchange (dvTiAa/zj3avoju,£0a: in exchange for hearing the vocal sound?) as subsisting in our thought, whereas Barbarians do not understand, even if they do hear the vocal sound; the bearer is the external subject (TO IKTOS V7TOK€IJJL€VOV), such as Dio himself (OLVTOS 6 Ala>v, with an article). Of these 27

Or 8r]\ovv in both cases: cf. Scholia in Dionys. Thr., p. 357, 18 Hilgard (FDS 567), p. 215, 1 28 (FDS 568). Cf. Graeser 1978, pp. 82ff.

29

This term was for a long time understood as 'what h a p p e n s to exist'. O n the possibility of a different interpretation, derived from the expression, tTTtooecos Tvyxdvetv, cf. Pinborg 1962, p . 84; Frede 1977/87, p . 64; Graeser 1978, p . 84; Sedley 1982b, p p . 198-9. M y own translation draws on Sedley's. O n this use of TTpdyixa, cf. H a d o t 1980, p . 315, w h o translates it as 'sense'.

30


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[items], two are bodies, namely the vocal sound and the bearer; the third is incorporeal, namely the thing signified, that is to say what is said (/cat XCKTOV), and it is precisely this that is true or false. What this text seems to be saying, as explicitly as possible, is that a proper noun possesses both an incorporeal meaning (which is a lekton) and a corporeal reference (which is the actual individual who bears this name). However, it is not certain that this passage makes it necessary to call into question all that has been said up to this point. There are several hints which suggest that the example of a proper noun does not altogether correspond to the doctrine that it is supposed to be illustrating, and that it may have been mistakenly slapped on to an exposition for which it was ill-suited.31 (i) Sextus mentions the vocal sound 'Dio' to illustrate the <WT], and the physical person of Dio to illustrate the rvyxdvov; but he maintains a prudent or embarrassed silence as to what is signified by the sound 'Dio'. (2) The XCKTOV is what Greeks understand and Barbarians do not, upon hearing the same sequence of vocal sounds; Barbarians would understand if they heard a different sequence, determined in an appropriate fashion as a translation of the first sequence. But a proper noun is the worst possible example to choose in order to put one's finger on the distinct existence of such a reality, for it is the one element in a language which, in principle, it is neither necessary nor possible to translate. (3) The example of a proper noun is no better adapted to illustrate the central thesis of this passage, to wit the designation of what is signified as the proper subject of truth or falsehood; for what is signified by the proper noun, however one conceives it, is certainly neither true nor false. Indeed, Sextus himself seems to notice this: immediately after the lines cited above, he hastens to introduce a distinction between an incomplete Ac/crov and a complete one, explaining that it is only the complete XeKrov, the d^tcofjua, that is properly true or false. To this it is worth adding that in most other sources an incorporeal XeKrov is associated with only two types of linguistic expressions, neither of which is a noun, common or proper: one is a complete sentence, of which one species, the a|ico/za, carries a true or false meaning; and the other is the part of that sentence which contains the verb and whatever may complement it. There is no reason at all to believe that all the parts of a complete XCKTOV must express an incomplete Ae/crov.32 For all these reasons, it does not seem necessary to attach any particular importance, in this text of Sextus', to the example of the proper noun, or to believe that one must take account of it in order to rectify, complete or in one way or another rearrange Diogenes' definition. That definition, which associates with the proper noun neither the expression of an incorporeal XeKrov nor the immediate reference to the physical individual, may continue to serve as our guide. 31 32

Cf. the different interpretations of L o n g 1971, p p . 7 6 - 7 , 1 0 5 , 1 0 7 , n. 11; Frede 1977/8, p p . 64ff. Cf. Diogenes Laertius vii.63; L o n g 1971, p p . 104-5; Frede 1977/8, p p . 63ff.



47

III

The Stoics studied the conditions of truth in various types of propositions, including those which are composed of a proper noun and a verb. By studying their conclusions vis-a-vis the latter and trying to understand the reasons for their decisions, we may hope to throw a bridge between their grammar of the proper noun and their logic of the proper noun. As we know, they drew a distinction between simple propositions and those that are composed of several simple propositions linked by connectors. Where simple propositions were concerned, they introduced a tripartite division. This is transmitted to us by two texts, one by Sextus Empiricus (M vm.96-8), the other by Diogenes Laertius (vn.68-70). These two simple expositions are not exactly interchangeable,33 and I lack the space to compare them thoroughly, so have decided to concentrate on the text by Sextus. That by Diogenes poses a number of textual problems and does not take into consideration truthconditions, despite the fact that these seem to have played a decisive role in the establishing of this classification. According to Sextus, there are three types of simple propositions: definite ones (oopicTfxeVa), indefinite ones (dopiora) and middle or intermediate ones (fieaa). Propositions in which the subject is a proper noun fall into the third category (but are not the only propositions to do so). Definite propositions are those that are 'stated in an ostensive mode' (Kara Selîv eKêpofjueva), and accompanied by a gesture of showing, for example: This one is walking' (OVTOS 7T€pLTrar€t). In stating this proposition, says Sextus, T indicate, point to (SeLKvvfit) a particular man.' It could be objected that there is really no need for that: there is nothing to prevent one uttering that sentence without bothering to gesture. Possibly the Stoics were at this point thinking of the movements of the cheeks that accompany the emission of the sounds made by OVTOS. Chrysippus had pointed out that when pronouncing the word cyc6, we tend to drop our chin towards our chest, and from this he argued that the heart is the seat of the directing part of the soul. In the context of this argument, he goes on to mention the demonstrative eKetvos (that one over there, as opposed to OVTOS, this one right here), apparently in order to make the point that when the former word is pronounced the speaker gestures outwards with his chin, towards an object in the distance. We may presume that the demonstrative 34 OVTOS was analysed in terms of gestures in a similar fashion. This hypothesis is of more than merely anecdotal interest: given that the speaker always has a portion of matter before him, it implies that the deictic always has a reference, which would not be the case if it had to be accompanied, in a contingent fashion, by the pointing of a finger. Indefinite propositions are those in which an 'indefinite particle' governs the statement, for example: 'Somebody is seated' (TLS KadyTai). Of the various Cf. Goulet 1978.

34

Galen, PHP 11.2 (SVF 11.895).


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individuals to whom the predicate could apply, the one of whom it is said to apply is indeterminate, so that the statement could be verified by various states of affairs. It is worth noting that the labels chpioyieva and aopiora are chosen in such a way as not to constitute an exhaustive dichotomy. They leave room for a third category and this is the one that interests me most directly: the middle propositions. Unfortunately, Sextus provides no definition; he simply declares them to be neither definite nor indefinite and, as a sop, he offers us two examples, remarking that middle propositions are those which are 'of this model' (ra OVTOJS exovra). The two examples that he provides do not appear particularly homogeneous. In the first, the subject is a common noun, construed without an article: avOpajiros Kadrjrat, meaning 'a man is seated'; in the second, the subject is a proper noun, also construed without an article: ZcoKpdrrjs irepnTarei ('Socrates walks'). The problem is to understand why these two types of proposition are considered to be homogeneous and are classed in the same category, when there would seem to be plausible reasons to consider the first as indefinite (since it does not determine who the seated man is) and the second as definite (since it does define who is the subject who is walking). Sextus does volunteer a few explanations on this matter. He says that middle propositions cannot be classified as either indefinite or definite. They are not indefinite because they do 'determine the species' (ethos) - by which, of course, we should understood 'the species to which the subject belongs'; but nor are they definite, because the stating of them is not accompanied by any indicatory gesture (ov yap jjuera Seêws €/«/>€pera.!,). At first sight each of these explanations seems apposite for one of the two types of'middle' propositions and less apposite for the other; but that is precisely why they are instructive. In the interests of brevity, let us agree to refer to the type of proposition illustrated by 'a man is seated' as C, and to the type of proposition illustrated by 'Socrates walks' as P. The Stoic decision to consider neither P nor C as indefinite was, as we have seen, easily understood so far as P was concerned, but counter-intuitive in the case of C: P seems to determine its subject unequivocally (we can leave to one side cases of homonymy, even though these were frequent in the distribution of Greek proper names; grammarians often refer to them 3 5 but - so far as I know - the Stoics never do). On the other hand, C seems to differ from indefinite propositions only in the degree of indeterminacy. It is accordingly C that raises a problem in this double decision. That is precisely why the argument that is provided to justify it has the air of being tailor-made to dissipate whatever is counter-intuitive in the case of C: 'A man is seated' differs from 'somebody is seated' in that the species to which the subject belongs is determined (even if the subject himself is not), and it is this that rules out classing C as an indefinite 35

Apollonius Dyscolus, Depronominibus, p. 10, 8-17 Maas (FDS 917).



49

proposition. Does this argument apply equally well to P, in which the subject seems to be determined as an individual, not simply as a member of a particular species? Clearly, the Stoics think so, for they apply this argument to C and to P indiscriminately; and this constitutes weighty confirmation for the hypothesis upon which the present exposition rests. For what emerges is that a proper noun construed without an article is interpreted as determining (just as does a common noun) the species to which the subject belongs. In this particular case, the species comprises only one member; but that difference is not deemed a sufficient reason not to assimilate the two cases; a noun, be it proper or common, only ever designates the quality that characterizes a species, whether that species be a 'most specialized' one or not. True, this seems to result in a paradox: if ZajKpdrrjg designates the peculiar quality, not the individual peculiarly qualified, should the Stoics not have criticized the usual turn of phrase ZajKpdrrjs irepnrarei, since it is clear that it is Socrates himself who is walking, not his peculiar quality? Only with an article (o ZajKpdrrjs 7T€pnraT€i) would the expression seem to be well formed. If the Stoics in fact do nothing of the kind, that is because they assimilate P and C; in C, manifestly, that which is designated by the grammatical subject (the common quality) is not identical to whatever the predicate needs to belong to for the proposition to be true (some individual who possesses that quality); in parallel fashion, P must be interpreted as a turn of phrase in which what is designated by the expression of the subject (the particular quality) and that to which the predicate belongs if the proposition is true (the definite individual who possesses that quality) do not coincide.36 Now let us consider the second of the decisions which underlie the constitution of the category of'middle' propositions: the decision to consider neither P nor C as definite propositions. The situation here symmetrically balances that which obtains in thefirstone; this second decision goes without saying so far as C is concerned, but is counter-intuitive in the case of P. As is to be expected, the justificatory argument is designed first and foremost to cover the problematical case, that of P, that is to say to show how 'Socrates walks' differs from 'this one walks' to the point where it cannot be classified, as can the latter statement, in the category of definite propositions. Sextus tells us that this is so because the stating of 'Socrates walks' is not accompanied by a gesture of indication. Atfirstsight, the argument seems disappointing: it is as if the Stoics were stipulating that deixis is the only way of determining a subject, and that it is in order to abide by that stipulation that they refuse to attribute to P the quality of a definite proposition.37 But one might also think that the Stoics' refusal is dictated by their perception of what it is that is authentically 36

37

F o r different reasons a n d without taking into consideration the question of the article, Frede 1977/87, p . 66, arrives at c o m p a r a b l e formulae, a fact that has encouraged me to maintain the hypothesis. T h e extension of the notion of deixis has been m u c h discussed; cf. Frede 1974, p p . 54ff; Lloyd 1978, pp.286ff.


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specific in the use of the deictic, as compared simply with the use of a proper noun: namely its 'egocentric' nature, the nature of a term whose reference is fixed if, and only if, one takes into consideration the spatio-temporal conditions in which the statement is made. One forms an idea of the difference in nature between the deictic and the proper noun when one bears in mind that an operation of reference demands the presence (both spatially and temporally) of a body that is being pointed out faced by a body that is pointing it out; this is effected by the deictic, and by it alone. The reason why a proper name is not enough to render a proposition definite is not that it is equivocal; it is because its use does not require that presence and even makes it possible to speak without ambiguity of people when they are absent or dead. For the Stoics, an essential quality of the proper noun is that it can dispense with the deixis (and, correlatively, what is essential about deixis is that it is what a proper noun can do without); if the proper noun can contribute to fixing a reference, it does so under a condition such that making use of the proper noun is not sufficient guarantee of the condition being fulfilled. To specify the nature of that condition, we must examine the information that Sextus provides on the difference in the truth-conditions that apply to the various types of simple propositions; for, as we shall see, that difference dictates how they should be classified. Unfortunately, the text contains no precise information regarding the case in which we are interested, that of 'middle' propositions. In order tofillin the lacunas, we shall have to undertake a detour. A reliable hint is provided by the strategy that Sextus adopts in his attack upon the claims of dogmatists. His strategy unfolds in three phases: (i) first, one shows that it is impossible for a definite proposition to be true; (2) next, that (1) implies that the same goes for an indefinite proposition; (3) and finally, that it follows from (1) and (2) that the same also goes for a middle proposition.38 Presumably this strategy is modelled as a reflection of the Stoic doctrine, so this must have provided a direct definition of the truth-conditions for a definite proposition and must have gone on to define first those for an indefinite proposition in terms of the preceding definition, then those for a middle proposition, also in the terms used in both preceding definitions. The first two points in this programme are attested by Sextus. According to the Stoics, a definite proposition is true 'when the predicate belongs to that which falls under the deixis'39 (if it is indeed the case, as has been suggested above, that there is always something that falls under the deixis, it follows that a definite proposition is always true or false). For an indefinite proposition to be true, some definite proposition has to be true: 'Somebody is seated' is true if and only if, for some individual who can be pointed out, 'This one is seated' is true. This text of Sextus' does not define the truth-conditions for middle 38 39

M viii.99. I can d o n o m o r e than d r a w attention to the interest of the Sceptic objections to this proposition, in the next part of Sextus' text.



51

propositions; it merely allows us to suppose that they must have referred to those of the two other classes of propositions. A passage from Alexander of Aphrodisias 40 enables us to verify the legitimacy of that supposition. The context is provided by an exposition of the Stoic theory of propositional negation. As is well known, the Stoics stipulated that, to obtain a contradiction to a given proposition (which is false if the former is true and vice versa), it is necessary to prefix the negation at the beginning of the proposition as a whole. The contradiction to 'Socrates is white' is not 'Socrates is not white', but 'Not: Socrates is white' (in other words: 'It is not the case that Socrates is white'). The arguments recorded by Alexander include the following one: if the negation is not placed in that position, both the affirmative and the negative may be false. For example, 'Callias walks' (KaXXtas TTepnrareL, no article) and 'Callias does not walk' are both false if Callias does not exist. According to Alexander, the meaning of these statements is, in effect, the following: 'some Callias exists (eWi rig KaXXlas) and to him (rovrco Se) belong, respectively, the predicate "to walk" or the predicate "not to walk".' This analysis provides us with a number of important pieces of information. The first is that a middle proposition is not logically simple: it may be falsified by two different situations, one in which Callias does not exist, the other in which he does not walk. The notion of simplicity in relation to which it is classified as simple must fulfil criteria other than that of logical simplicity (on a rereading of the collection of examples used by Sextus, one might suggest that what gets a proposition classified as simple are the facts that its expression comprises no more than two words, one for the subject, the other for the predicate, and that its truth does not depend upon that of another proposition expressed within its context). Furthermore, Alexander's text implies that the truth of the middle proposition 'Callias walks' is not defined simply by reference to that of the definite proposition 'this one [pointing out Callias] walks'. 'Intermediate' as it is, it is true if and only if two other propositions are true, neither of which is simple from the point of view of the criteria that I have just indicated: (i) 'Some Callias exists' {eon ns KaXXias), a proposition which the presence of the indefinite ng makes it possible to consider indefinite, but which does not fulfil the first criterion of simplicity, since it comprises more than two words; (2) 'This one [that is to say this Callias] walks' (ovrog TTepLTraret), a proposition which fulfils the first criterion, but not the second, since the demonstrative here has an anaphoric sense, not a deictic one, its reference being determined by the context. The state of the documentation is such that there is no way of knowing if and how the Stoics then proceeded with this analysis up to a point where all that one had to deal with were simple propositions; nor will I attempt to fill this lacuna by a conjectural reconstitution of their argument. The essential point to grasp is that a proposition whose subject is expressed by a proper noun without an article is interpreted as 40

Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Anal, pr., p. 402, iff. Wallies (FDS 921).


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incorporating in its very meaning two distinct components: (i) a piece of information concerning the species whose name designates its characteristic property: namely, that this species is not empty but comprises one individual and one only, who is its sole member; (2) a piece of information concerning that individual, namely that the predicate of the proposition belongs to him (this analysis would also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the middle proposition of type C). As a result, the proper noun, in itself, has no existential value: if Callias is dead, the statement 'Callias walks' is false, but not absurd, nor impossible; the assertion of existence that it contains in what it signifies may be true or false; it is not presupposed to be true. There is another case - and a famous one - in which the Stoics analysed as false, but not impossible, a proposition in which the subject was a proper noun, the antecedent of the famous conditional 'If Dio is dead, this one is dead.') Chrysippus introduced this proposition into his discussion of Diodorus' Master Argument. 41 It is a complex affair to which many commentaries have been devoted, 42 but let us try to concentrate upon the aspects that concern us directly. As is well known, the Master Argument rests upon the incompatibility of three propositions. The one that Chrysippus chose to reject was the second, to wit: 'from what is possible, the impossible does not follow'.43 His argument for rejecting it was to propose, as a counterexample, the conditional in question: el reOvrjKe ALOJV (no article), redvrjKev OVTOS. According to Chrysippus, this conditional is true 44 if Dio is pointed out (SeLKWjjLevov rod AIOJVOS, with an article); in this case, the antecedent 'Dio is dead' is false, but possible, for it may become true at any minute; but the consequent 'this one is dead' is impossible, because the deictic OVTOS can refer only to a living person. The substitution of a proper name for a deictic thus alters the modality of the statement, which is hardly surprising if it is true - as we have seen it to be on other bases - that the use of a proper name does not presuppose the physical existence of its bearer. I have, in passing, drawn attention to the absence or presence of an article in front of proper nouns. On rereading in its entirety the passage from Alexander of Aphrodisias which informs us of Chrysippus' position in the quarrel over the Master Argument (and which has a good chance of being close to an original text 45 ), one cannot help noticing that its constitution follows the rules that one would expect on the basis of the hypothesis that I have advanced. Every time that Dio is mentioned as a living person who can be pointed out, the article is present: thus p. 177, 28-9 (heiKwybevov rod Aitovos), 34 (v^Lorarat 6 AICJV), p. 178, 3 (ore e^rj 6 ALCDV). In contrast, every time he is mentioned as dead, the article is absent: thus p. 177, 28 (el redvrjKe ZliW), 31 41 42 43 44 45

Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Anal.pr., p. 177, 25ff. Wallies (SVF 11.202a, FDS994). Cf. Mignucci 1978, who provides n u m e r o u s earlier references. Epictetus, Discourses 11.19, iff. I a m leaving aside the question of the criterion of t r u t h for conditionals that is used here. Cf. (f>r]GL yap (Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Anal, pr., p. 177, 28 Wallies).



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(airodavovros yap Aicovos), p. 178, 2 (jjuera rov ddvarov rov Aicovos), p. 180, 33 (SeLKWfjLevov Aicovos). The regularity of these instances suggests that there is nothing accidental about them. The expression 6 A LWV seems to be understood as 'this Dio whom we know, you and I, as an individual who is currently alive', so that a statement such as redvrjKev 6 ALOJV, unlike redvrjKe ALOJV, is in principle as impossible as the statement redvrjKev OVTOS. One difficulty remains and needs to be examined. If Dio is alive, 'Dio is dead' is false, but not impossible. But what if he is dead? If every proposition that begins with a proper noun X can be construed as a conjunction in which one of the conjoined propositions is 'there exists (currently) a certain X', it would appear to be impossible to say anything true about a dead man, even that he is dead; for the conjunction will always be falsified by the falsity of that first proposition. According - once again - to Alexander of Aphrodisias, this was indeed an objection that was raised against the Stoic analysis;46 but he also records the Stoics' reply to this. Let us consider a statement in which the verb is in the past tense, such as 'Socrates died' (ZcjKpdrrjs aTredavev). The Stoics claim that there are two ways to account for such a pronouncement: one that is incorrect, to wit by stating it to be composed of the noun 'Socrates' and the verb 'died'; another that is correct, to wit by interpreting the statement as a whole, in a block (SXov), as an 'inflection' (eyKXtois) of the statement in the present tense: 'Socrates is dying' {diTodvr]GK€i). As has been most pertinently pointed out, 47 this suggestion boils down to prefixing a temporal operator in front of a proposition in the present tense, the judgement of existence that this proposition incorporates being included within the scope of that operator. In other words, the correct paraphrase of 'Socrates died' is not 'There exists currently a certain Socrates who died', but 'There was in the past a moment when it was true to say "There exists currently a certain Socrates who is dying."' This analysis legitimizes historical discourse but does not mean that one should suppose that the individual's quality has survived the individual that it used to qualify, and that it is through that survival that it remains capable of providing present discourse with its subject. On the other hand, that same analysis is applicable to all the elements of a biography, so the individual's quality must determine that unique individual not only at every moment of the duration of his existence, but also that same individual from one moment to the next in that existence. The logic of the proper noun thus leads into a study of what it is that is constitutive of physical individuality. IV

The problem of this Stoic criterion of identity has recently been tackled in a remarkable study, 48 which does not treat the grammar and the logic of the 46 47

Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Anal, pr., p . 403, 1 iff. Wallies (FDS 921). 48 Cf. Lloyd 1978, p p . 293ff. Sedley 1982a.


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discourse on the individual as its specific themes. That makes it all the more impressive when it shows how exact are the correspondences between the physical side of Stoic thought on individual identity and the linguistic side. The Stoic theory of identity was evolved in response to a paradox known throughout Antiquity as the Growing Argument (avâvofjuevos Aoyos).49 In substance, the argument runs as follows: a number to which one adds or from which one subtracts something does not remain the same number. A piece of matter to which any particle is added or from which any particle is detached does not remain the same piece of matter. Now, living creatures, men for instance, are constantly receiving and losing particles of matter. So one should not say that they are growing or shrinking, as if there existed a permanent entity which constituted the subject and which remained identical to itself throughout time, in the course of a growing or shrinking process. What one should say is that at every instant beings different from one another appear and disappear. The man X does not grow between instant t and instant t1; the man X who exists at instant / is replaced by another man X 1 , who is bigger than X and who exists at instant t1. It is fair to observe at the outset that this paradox is impossible to get around if one adopts a language in which the only authorized statements are those that make use of the deictic. Whatever falls under the deixis is a transitory segment of a part of the corporeal universe: a certain mass of matter that can be pointed out, which currently possesses certain qualities, finds itself in a certain state and entertains certain relations (starting with the relation that involves being pointed out, which connects it with the body which is pointing it out). The deictic identifies its reference at each successive moment: it cannot reidentify it on the basis of the moment before. If I say first This one is seated', then This one is getting up', then This one is walking', nothing in that sequence indicates whether the reference of the deictic is the same in all three cases or different in each of them. If the only objects about which something could be said were those that are determined by deixis (that piece of matter there, in front, here and now), suspicion could systematically be cast upon their identity over time. The Stoic response to the Growing Argument consists in relativizing the notion of identity, by considering it to be defined only in relation to a given description: an object can remain the same F without remaining the same G as one instant succeeds another. The fact that a man, inasmuch as he is a material substance, possesses no permanent identity does not prevent him, inasmuch as he is a being qualified in a particular way, from remaining the persisting subject of all the processes and changes that affect him, starting with the process of living that begins with birth and ends with death. So what can one put in place of X in order to say that an individual remains the same X throughout his life? No common property seems able to fill that function, because its very nature as a common property renders it vulnerable to the 49

Evidence collected by Sedley 1982a; see in particular Plutarch, On Common Conceptions io83b-c (SKF 11.762); Philo of Alexandria, De aetern. mund. 48 (SVF 11.397, FDS 845). The obscurity of this last text has been illuminated in masterly fashion by Sedley 1982a, pp. 267-70.



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Growing Argument: since it can, by definition, belong to several different beings, it could belong in common to a series of individuals, the succession of whom could be that which, if we described it differently, we could call the life of a single individual; each one of them, for example, would be a man, but not the same man as the others. This argument disqualifies not only common properties but also the collections of common properties that could be made in such a way as to obtain a definite description, intended to identify its object in a unique fashion; for every collection of common properties, whatever it might be, remains open to the objection that could be levelled at its components.50 In contrast, the notion of individual quality is constructed in such a way that, by definition, it escapes that objection: the quality of being Dio is such that it would be immediately contradictory for Dio both to cease to be Dio and to continue to be Dio, to remain the same Dio and not to remain the same Dio. The distinction of principle between a common quality and an individual quality seems to imply the irreducibility of the latter to the former. It could be said of this reply to the Growing Argument that it is at once naive and secure, which is what Socrates said of the explanation by means of the Form, in the Phaedo.51 It is through the form that F things are F. It is through his individual quality that 'the Dio' is Dio. Platonic ontology treats the Form in its own particular way, which is to conceive of it as intelligible. Stoic ontology treats the individual quality in its own particular way, which is to conceive of it as corporeal. The agent which makes Dio the individual he is and remains throughout his life must, as an agent, be a body which mixes with the material substratum to which it communicates its particularity, meanwhile receiving from it its anchorage in space and time. And if it is true that the individual quality must not only preserve the identity of an individual throughout the duration of his existence but also make him recognizable and reidentifiable as such, it is perfectly normal that the epistemological status of perceptible reality should be attached to its ontological corporeal status. Even if, as we have seen, there are reasons to think that the Stoics believe that individual quality to be indefinable, there can be no doubt that they consider it to be, at least theoretically (that is to say: for the sage) perceptibly unmistakable. In confirmation of that point, we have only to remember with what tenacity they opposed the Academic thesis according to which two nonidentical individuals might be indistinguishable.52 The Stoic doctrine incorporates consequences which have been considered peculiar and incomprehensible. Plutarch's complaint53 is that it makes each one of us into a double being, a couple of twins, a pair of subjects (uTTo/cet/xeva), one of which is a substance in a state of permanent flux, which is the subject of no process and no permanence; the other a qualified54 individual 50 51 54

However, cf. the late texts mentioned by Sedley 1982a, p . 261 and p . 273, n. 27. 52 53 iood-e. Cf. in particular Plutarch, Comm. not. 1077c. Ibid., 1083C-C There are lacunae in this part of the text, in the manuscripts. The conjecture TTOLOV, or ISlcos TTOLOV, seems preferable to TTOLOTTJS; cf. Sedley 1982a, p. 273, n. 26. Cherniss (1976) suggests TTOI6T7)S in the text, but explains it in a note by LSLCOS TTOLOV.


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who possesses all the opposite characteristics. But, he mockingly remarks, no human being has ever been able actually to see that duality. Taking the part of the Stoics, perhaps one might retort that to discover such a tangible manifestation, one has to turn to the language involved. The composition of the linguistic expression 'the Socrates' corresponds graphically to the composition of the physical individual; in its totality, it designates a qualified individual, while each of its parts designates the indeterminate material substratum and the individual quality the mixture of which constitutes this qualified individual. If 'Socrates' designates the quality, it is the function of 'the' and 'the Socrates' to designate, respectively, the substratum that is in itself unqualified and that carries that quality, and the qualified subject that results from this qualification, that is to say the two viroKêva which so scandalized Plutarch. The hypothesis that I have put forward in this paper could thus resolve a historically recorded difficulty concerning Stoicism, while at the same time contributing new data to the case to be made out for the solidarity that obtains between the Stoics' grammar and their ontology.


REMARKS ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF SIMPLE PROPOSITIONS IN HELLENISTIC LOGICS T h e first and chief difference among propositions (d£ia>/xara), the dialecticians say, is that between simple (a7rAd) and non-simple (ovx a-nXd)' These are the words of Sextus Empiricus (M vm.93) and nobody would challenge the importance of that distinction. The declaration introduces a long passage (93129) which sets out the subdivisions within this fundamental division. It is a passage which historians of logic tend to use as one of the sources that provide us with information on the Stoic classification of propositions, despite the fact that the Stoics are not specifically named, for it is generally accepted that Sextus does refer to them as 'the dialecticians'. The task that faces us, then, is to compare his text with the classification transmitted to us by Diogenes Laertius (vn. 68-76), who possibly bases his remarks on Diocles of Magnesia, a classification which, for its part, is explicitly ascribed to Chrysippus and a number of his successors. These texts, which have often been studied, present a number of similarities and also a number of differences. They pose many problems involving an inextricable mixture of historical questions, conceptual complications and textual difficulties (Diogenes' text is not in a good state). I shall leave aside many of these problems, in particular that of the identification of Sextus' 'dialecticians', limiting myself to pointing out that it can no longer be taken for granted that he was referring to the Stoics, since David Sedley (1977) has demonstrated the existence of a 'dialectic' school which was quite separate from the school of Megara and whose principal representatives were Diodorus Cronus and his disciple Philo of Megara. More recently, Theodor Ebert (1991), in a study which was still unpublished at the time of writing this paper (see now the bibliography), has powerfully argued that the views which Sextus sets out in the passage in which we are interested, along with those set out in many other passages in which he cites 'the dialecticians', are not the views of the Stoics, but those of members of this 'dialectic' school. Whether Sextus' classification and that of Diogenes come from two different schools (the second having known and made use of the research completed by the first) or from two logicians or groups of logicians within the same school makes little difference if one intends simply to analyse the differences in the contents of these classifications, as is my present purpose. In any case, Sextus' classification, which is simpler and at the same time more clearly explained, is certainly earlier than Diogenes', which has the air of a conscious re-elaboration of it. In 57 Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009

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order to avoid pre-empting the case, I have not mentioned the Stoics in my title, and from now on I shall simply refer to DL or SE to designate the authors of the doctrines set out in the two passages. What I propose to do is study the formal characteristics of the classification of simple propositions, as it is set out by SE and by DL. My principal question will be whether or not this division is a true partition, that is to say whether it is of such a kind that every simple proposition necessarily belongs to one, and only one, of the classes that the division comprises. But in considering that question, I shall also be addressing myself to another: that of the criteria of the simplicity of a proposition. The two questions are clearly linked, insofar as they respectively concern the extension and the comprehension of the concept of propositional simplicity. That is why I think it a good idea to start off by saying a word or two about the division of propositions into simple and nonsimple, before moving on to the subdivision of simple propositions. The nomenclature used in the fundamental division is the same in both the texts that we are considering: simple propositions are designated positively as 'simple', while the other propositions are designated purely negatively as 'nonsimple'. Both authors avoid mentioning compound or complex propositions, probably because they are reserving such terms for the description of the internal composition of simple propositions, that is to say as subject and predicate (cf. M vm.79, 94), and more certainly because, even at the level of nomenclature, they are anxious to suggest the exhaustive nature of the division: it is made immediately clear that no proposition can be neither simple nor non-simple; and equally clear that none can be at once simple and non-simple. Let us nevertheless quickly deal with two possible objections on this point, (i) Just before the sentence that I cited at the beginning of this paper, Sextus was preparing the way for his sceptical offensive by writing: 'If what is true is a proposition (d£uo/xa), it is assuredly a proposition that is either simple or nonsimple, or at the same time both simple and non-simple (/cat airXovv KOLI OVX airXovv)'. However, we should not imagine from this that he envisages the possibility of a proposition being at once simple and not simple: despite the bizarre fashion in which he expresses himself, what he means, quite simply, is that truth, if it exists, will be found either in simple propositions or in propositions that are not simple, or in both, (ii) Could not a proposition be simple from one point of view and not simple from another? As we shall see, these logicians paraphrase certain types of propositions whose morphological expression resembles that of simple propositions and thereby reveal that, by virtue of their meaning, they are complex. But that does not mean to say that it would be correct to present them as at once simple and non-simple: the classifications are concerned with d£ia>/zara, that is to say Ae/crd, incorporeal items that are signified; the propositions in question should thus be classified purely and without qualification as non-simple.


THE CLASSIFICATION OF SIMPLE PROPOSITIONS

59

If one passes on from the nomenclature to the definitions of simple and nonsimple propositions, the matter becomes rather more complicated. Assuredly, these definitions aim to guarantee the exhaustivity of the division inasmuch as they make the simplicity or non-simplicity depend upon the presence or absence of the same group of characteristics. In the two texts with which we are concerned, simple propositions are the first to be defined, albeit in negative terms. According to SE (93), Those are simple which are not constructed out of a simple proposition stated twice (his Aa/zjSavo^zcVoi;), nor out of different propositions by means of one or more conjunctions, e.g. "It is day", "It is night", "Socrates is talking", and every proposition of similar form (rrjs ojjLOLas ISeas).' The lines that follow specify what that common form consists of: a simple proposition is not absolutely uncomposite; it is composed of elements which are not themselves propositions but which are 'certain other things (e£ aXXcov TLVOOV), about the number and nature of which - it should be pointed out - we are told nothing at this point except, again negatively, that none are conjunctions. Were that not so, one would presumably be faced with either a badly formed expression ('Socrates and speaks') or a disguised nonsimple proposition ('Socrates and Plato speak' = 'Socrates speaks and Plato speaks'). In DL, the definition of simple propositions is disfigured by the text that has come down to us. The best of the conjectures proposed gives a sense that is very close to that in SE: 'Simple propositions are those that are not composed either of a repeated proposition (hiopovfjL€vov) or of several propositions.' The absence of conjunctions is not mentioned, nor is the sense in which a simple proposition is itself composite. The technical term Sôpovfjievov replaces the more telling expression used by SE, 8ls Xa/jbâvofievov. Some manuscripts and editors in fact hesitate between Sujtopovfjuevov and hia£ercu is opposed to airoWvTai (7, 10, 11). Cf. Diogenes Laertius VII.I2O = S K F m . 5 2 7 ; Stobaeus, Eclogae 11.7 = SVFm.528. In this connection, see Rist 1969, pp. 81-96. The references are collected by Rist 1969, p . 82, n. 5. See Cicero, Definibus iv.56 = S F F m . 8 3 ; Seneca, Epist. 71.16 (not 75.16, as Rist mistakenly has it); Marcus Aurelius m . i ; vi.26 (ndv KadrjKov ef apidfjucbv TLVOJV ovfjL7rXrjpovTai, where it is interesting to note the recurrence of the idea of'plenitude'). Stobaeus, Eclogae 11.93.14 = SVFm.500 could also be included in this list, as well as Seneca, Epist. 95.5 a n d 12.


THE CONJUNCTIVE MODEL

8l

the vagueness of the translations and the scarcity of commentaries. Most scholars try to rule out a literal and purely quantitative interpretation of the term apidôs. Rist 1969, for example, points out that Diogenes Laertius provides two different definitions of the KCLXOV. The first makes use of the idea ofdpiOfios (the KOL\6V is the perfect good, so called because it retains or takes in, OL7T€X€LV, all the 'numbers' required by nature). The second definition seems more qualitative (the KCL\6V is, again, that which is perfectly proportioned, reXeicos avîJieTpov); it might be designed to discourage a quantitative interpretation of the first. Rist, prudently enough, concludes that the term aptdfios seems to be used to convey the idea of exact or inexact proportion; and he translates numeri officii, numeri virtutis, as 'aspects of duty' and 'aspects of virtue'. Nevertheless, it would seem that a quantitative interpretation (however 'crude' it may appear) is dictated by the contexts, which refer to 'all' the apidfjLOL, or to 'a greater or lesser number' of aptdfjuoL.29 On that account, and in perfect conformity with the conjunctive model that we have been studying, I am inclined to regard these apifyzoi as the various 'articles' or multiple 'items' which are all, without exception, present, fulfilled or satisfied in the KCLXOV or the KaropOcojjia; if a single one of these is absent or transgressed, absolute perfection forthwith turns into its opposite. It is even possible to detect a further ethico-logical parallelism: for just as all moral sins are equal, yet remain 'tolerable' to varying degrees according to the greater or lesser number of duty 'items' that they transgress (as Zeno, according to Cicero, put it 30 ), so all false conjunctive propositions are equally false, despite the fact that there is obviously more information to be gleaned from a conjunctive proposition in which all the conjuncts but one are true than from one in which all the conjuncts but one are false. In the texts relating to notions of knowledge and truth, one often comes across terms such as ovoriqixa or adpoioîa, terms to which the conjunctive model similarly invites one to give a literal or quantitative meaning (even if, here again, there is a risk of it seeming crude and, as such, to be avoided if possible). At the risk of complicating the difficult question as to how the knowledge of the Stoic sage should be conceived (a question which was tackled several times in the course of the Chantilly colloquium, 'Les Stoi'ciens et leur logique'; now see Kerferd 1978), it seems fair to say that the Stoics regarded truth and knowledge each as an integral sum of true propositions, that is to say as gigantic and flawless ovuireTrXeyixeva.31 One point in particular deserves to be clarified in this connection because, if I am not mistaken, the conjunctive 29

30

31

Cf. Cicero, Definibus iv.56 {propterea quod alia peccata plures, alia pauciores quasi numeros officii praeterirent); 111.23 (omnes numeros virtutis continent); Diogenes Laertius VII.IOO (napa TO irdvras a.7reêiv rovs iTTL^rjTOVfJLevovs apidfjiovs vrro rrjs (frvoews). Cf. Definibus iv.56: peccata autem partim esse tolerabilia, partim nullo modo, propterea quod etc. (what follows is cited in n. 29). Cf. Sextus, M VII.386°. = SVFII.841 (inLorrjiJLr) irdvTtov aArjOwv dnoâvTiKrj, avonqixariKr] r e KCLI TT\€L6VOJV adpoLOfJuo)', Galen, PHP V.3 = SVF II.841 (A6yos = ivvoiwv re TLVOJV KOLI 7TpoXrn/j€OJv aOpoLo/jia); Stobaeus, Eclogae 11.74.16 = SKF m.i 12. These texts are collected, with a pertinent commentary, by Long 1971, p. 99.


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model makes it possible to dismiss the marked hesitation on the part of the commentators. The relevant text here is one from Stobaeus, 32 in which knowledge (en-tcrny/x^) is first defined as 4a firm KaraXrjifjis, impossible to undermine by reasoning'. Having produced this definition,33 Stobaeus immediately proceeds to give another which may seem like an alternative definition designed for the same definiendum as the first one, but which could equally well be a definition of a second meaning of the word eiriGTîxr]. This second definition runs as follows: ovGrrj/jia i£ iTnorrjiJLwv TOLOVTCOV, olov fj Tcbv Kara fjiepos XoytKTj iv rep orrovSaicp imapxovoa. This text perplexed Wachsmuth, who proposed emending eTnoT-qixcbv to KaraXruJjewv. A. Long translates it as follows: 'a systerna of specific ideas, like the rational apprehension of particulars present in the good man.' 34 But he expresses his misgivings in the following note: 'I cannot be certain that this translation is quite accurate: my "items" is a translation of the mss. iTTiorrjiJLcov, for which Wachsmuth offers the likely emendation KaraXriipecov. My translation of Aoyi/o? "rational apprehension" is based on the assumption that a word like KardXrjifjis must be supplied.' 35 As I see it, it is possible to dismiss these hesitations and conjectures by applying the conjunctive model: the two definitions handed down by Stobaeus are of two different meanings of the word ^77-1(7x77^77, the second of which is a Gv^-neirXeyîvov of units which correspond to the first; the expression ITTIGT^ÔJV TOLOVTOJV shows clearly that knowledge in the second sense is the GvîTreTrXeyêvov of the totality of different items of knowledge in the first sense. These are isolated, particular items of knowledge corresponding to what is conveyed by one particular true proposition; they may be found in the mind of a man who is not a sage, just as an isolated item of virtue may be displayed in his behaviour. Knowledge in the second sense is a ovorrjiJLa, a totality whose elements are conjoined and indissociable, as is probably indicated by the last stage in the famous lesson by gestures that Zeno had delivered on the theory of knowledge: at this point, the left hand moved across to fasten upon the right, which was already clenched into a fist.36 It is this kind of knowledge, knowledge in its second sense, that is possessed by the sage, as Zeno's lesson suggested and as Stobaeus in his turn indicates, when he describes it as 'the rational knowledge of particular truths, as it is present in the person of the sage' (a formula in which it now transpires that the correct noun to complete the expression rj TCOV Kara fxepos XoyiKr} is none other than iTnarrujLT]). In exactly the same way, the practical activity of the sage includes every item of virtue, without exception. The perfection of the sage, in both the speculative sphere and the practical, is thus constructed on the model of the true 32 33 34 36

Stobaeus, Eclogae 11.74. I 6 = S K F I I I . 122. The link is made by the words erepav St €7norr}^rjv. 35 I97i,p. 99. 1971, p. 112, n. 109. Cf. Acad.pr. 11.144 = SVF'1.66. In an unpublished paper on 'The body and speech in the Stoics', delivered at the Seminaire de philosophic ancienne de Strasbourg, I tried to analyse the parallel exegesis to this text and that of Acad. post. 1.408". = SVF 1.55.60-2, which expounds the doctrinal content of Zeno's reading.



83

Finally, the theory of passions enables us to pursue the influence of this model a little further: for the intrusion of passion into a rational mind is, by reason of the devastating power of its effects, in every respect comparable to the addition of a false conjunct to a true conjunctive proposition - an addition which, as we know, is enough to render false, in its entirety, the new conjunctive proposition that is produced by this addition. I do not propose to break new ground in this domain; rather, using a few extra arguments, I aim to confirm an interpretation which has already been put forward by a number of other commentators3 7 and which runs counter to the interpretation that has in the past traditionally been attached to the Stoic theory of passions. It generally used to be said that Chrysippus' famous thesis, according to which the passions are judgements made by the hegemonic part of the soul, was a thesis of extremely frenzied intellectualism, bordering on the absurd, and it was generally believed that Posidonius had certainly been right to oppose it in the name of psychological experience and current moral practice.38 In opposition to this presentation of the matter, it has now justifiably been shown that the assimilation of passion to a judgement was in no sense a means of rationalizing it, - quite the reverse.39 If passion could really be reduced to no more than an erroneous judgement, without at the same time being a sickness of the soul, all that would be necessary to annihilate it would be to correct the error of judgement, just as one corrects an error of arithmetic or grammar. Yet it is quite clear that the Stoics place no confidence at all in an intellectual therapy of this kind. Chrysippus, on the contrary, constantly draws attention to the impotence of the logos where those who are impassioned are concerned, stressing that in their case the logos falls upon deaf ears. He distinguishes 37

38

39

Cf. Goldschmidt 1969, p. 237 ('So it is fair to say that, notwithstanding first appearances, there are few ancient doctrines which take such account of the passions or so fully recognize the "irrational passions" as the Stoic doctrine: it is true that it does so n o t to condone them, but to attempt to exorcize them.') Cf. for example, D o d d s 1951, p. 239: 'The dogmatic rationalists of the Hellenistic Age seem to have cared little for the objective study of m a n as he is; their attention was concentrated on the glorious picture of m a n as he might be, the ideal sapiens or sage. In order t o m a k e the picture seem possible, Zeno a n d Chrysippus deliberately went back, behind Aristotle a n d behind Plato, to the naive intellectualism of the fifth century, . . . There was n o "irrational soul" to contend with: the so-called passions were merely errors of judgement or morbid disturbances resulting from errors of judgement. Correct the error, a n d the disturbance will automatically cease, leaving a mind untouched by joy or sorrow, untroubled by hope or fear, "passionless, pitiless, a n d perfect" (Tarn). This fantastic psychology was adopted a n d maintained for two centuries, not on its merits but because it was thought necessary to a moral system which aimed at combining altruistic action with complete inward detachment. Posidonius, we know, rebelled against it a n d demanded a return to Plato, pointing out that Chrysippus' theory conflicted both with observation, which showed the elements of character to be innate, a n d with moral experience, which revealed irrationality a n d evil as ineradicably rooted in h u m a n nature a n d controllable only by some kind of catharsis.' Galen's text, which D o d d s himself cites, p p . 256-7, n. 16, suggests that, far from reflecting a disinterested desire to m a k e an 'objective study' of m a n as he is, Posidonius' psychology is motivated just as much as that of the ancient Stoics by a desire to provide a rational basis for a very specific concept of pedagogical practice. Cf. Rist 1969, pp. 22-36, in particular p. 31. T h e most important texts in this connection are Stobaeus, Eclogae 11.89.4 = S K F m . 3 8 9 ; Plutarch, De virt. mor. 450c = SVFm.390; Galen, De Hipp, et Plat. deer. IV 6 = S FT7 in.47 5.


84

STOICISM

clearly between purely speculative errors, which can be redressed by verbal instructions, and the errors that account for passion, which remain obdurately unresponsive to that same treatment. He often supports his views by citing the most 'pathetic' of the poets (Euripides, for instance), those who are the most convinced of the devouring force of passion and the inefficacy of words to cure those gripped by passion. As a number of texts so forcefully note, 40 what strikes the Stoics most about passion is precisely its irrationality, its impermeability to speech and reason (whether proffered by others or by oneself), a profound irrationality that is nevertheless accepted by the subject. So what is the explanation for the apparent reduction of passion to an intellectual error? Probably the alienation caused by the passions was perceived as so radical that it could no longer be explained by a conflict between two distinct forces, one rational, the other irrational. If the logos of the impassioned man was in conflict with his instincts, he would remain intact in himself. He would still be capable of allying himself with the external logos of the moralist or the director of conscience, in order to battle to overcome his passion with a better chance of success. To say that passion is an error of judgement is to say that it has taken possession of man's very reason, invaded his being and perverted him to the very marrow of his bones. If the passions are judgements, it is not because they give way before words of good counsel, but precisely because they do not. Only a logos is capable of resisting another logos, but in this case the logos that resists is an internally vitiated one. When passion breaches the defences, the bulwark of reason crumbles and disintegrates just as that of truth does in a conjunctive proposition as soon as the least falsity slips in. A military metaphor of Seneca's, in the De ira (1.8) describes this process clearly in terms in which we are at liberty to detect another echo of the conjunctive model: The enemy . . . must be stopped at the very frontier; for if he has passed it and advanced within the city gates, he will not respect any bounds set by his captives. For the mind is not a member apart, nor does it view the passions merely objectively, thus forbidding them to advance further than they ought, but it is itself transformed into the passion (in adfectum ipse mutatur) and is, therefore, unable to recover its former useful and saving power when this has once been betrayed and weakened. (tr. John W. Basore, Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge (Mass.), 1985) Faced with this description of a kind of law of the expansion of the irrational, which invades the entire available psychic space, one is again put in mind of the physical model of the total dilution of one body within the integral field offered by another. At the same time, the two sides to this theory of passions, the one psychological, the other moral, are attested: if passion is a judgement, it is an affection in which the entire person is engaged. The self commits itself totally to it and bears the entire moral responsibility for it. If pluralist theories of the 40

Cf. in particular Cicero, Tuscul. disp. in.61-73, and the comments of Brehier 1910/51, pp. 246R.



85

to it and bears the entire moral responsibility for it. If pluralist theories of the soul are unacceptable, for the master of Stoicism, that is because they tend to diminish the responsibility of the self and to appease the sense of guilt. If there is an 'irrational part' in my soul, I can make it into the scapegoat for all my imperfections; it is not I who am immoral, but another inside me, against whom I struggle, even if I do so in vain; it does not really involve me in its turpitude. In opposition to that possibility, which is open to bad faith, Stoic monism appears as a doctrine, or perhaps an experience, of the total responsibility of the self. After that threefold and, I hope, conclusive test of the productivity of the conjunctive model and the enhanced comprehension that it makes possible, I should like to round off these remarks by putting forward two hypotheses which may make them easier to understand. The first hypothesis is of a historical nature, the second of a structural one. The historical hypothesis concerns Posidonius, whose name has already been mentioned in connection with the famous critique in which he attacked Chrysippus' theory of passions. I shall try to show that Posidonius may also have opposed the classic Stoic doctrine of the conjunctive proposition and that the coexistence of those two critiques is by no means fortuitous. I am aware that I shall be venturing into very uncertain terrain here; however, if real grounds do exist for my belief, it could perhaps be held that Posidonius detected the presence of the conjunctive model in the theory of passions, and on that account found himself goaded into combating both that theory and the model that it embodied. Let us look into the matter more closely. First, let us return to an examination of Sextus' text. Sextus, it will be remembered, had taken it upon himself to reproduce the Stoic response to the first objections that he himself had raised against the theory of the conjunction: the Stoic reply had appealed to the paradigm of the torn coat. Returning to the offensive, Sextus is very scornful of this humble comparison with its overtones of the tattered Cynic philosopher. He calls it a 'naivety' (evrjdes), suggesting that one does perhaps have to allow ordinary, everyday language the use of certain catachrestic terms (KaraxpôriKois ovoixaoi) since it is not applied to what is really true but only to that which appears to be so.41 For example, we say that we 'sink a well', 'weave a tunic', 'build a house', but that is a misuse of language; for if the well exists, one is no longer engaged in sinking it since it has already been sunk (OVK opvootrai aXX opdjpvKrai); and if a tunic exists, one is no longer engaged in weaving it, for it has already been woven. The abuse of language (Karaxpyois) thus has a place in daily life and current usage. However, once we set out to explore the very nature of things, it really is necessary to insist upon precision (rrjs aKpifieias). Much could be said about these few lines, in thefirstplace about the notion of catachresis, which was destined for such a brilliant and turbulent future in 41

Cf. Sextus, M VIII. 129: fjurj TTOLVTOJS TO 7Tpos TTjv (f>voLV aArjOes ^TJTOVVTL dXXa TO npos

86£


rrjv

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STOICISM

the later history of rhetoric; 42 secondly, about the examples that show the use of the different tenses in the Greek verb, a clearly Aristotelian theme. 43 However, lack of space prevents me from following those particular paths, so let me limit myself to drawing attention to the comical side to this lecture on philosophical rigour which Sextus takes it upon himself to address to his adversaries even though, in this instance, all the rigour is manifestly to be found on their side while he himself is clearly somewhat short of it, given that he has just suggested considering as true a conjunctive proposition that comprises a false conjunct - an instance of being hoist with one's own petard, if ever there was one. But there are other reasons, too, why this passage of Sextus' deserves our attention. If I am not mistaken, it presents a number of quite unusual features. In the first place, the critique formulated by Sextus runs contrary to the habitual respect that he shows for ordinary language and dayto-day practice: frequently, in his writing, he invokes the awrjdeia in a positive sense. 44 Secondly, the accusation of laxity and lack of rigour is somewhat at odds with the criticism of the Stoics' excessive rigour that he expressed only a few lines earlier. It is bizarre to find these logicians accused, within a few lines, on the one hand of being pointlessly and paradoxically punctilious, on the other of being imprecise and more concerned about seeming than being. Now, strangely enough, this double reproach reappears in Galen, in the passage to which I have already referred, that is to say in connection with the theory of the conjunction. 45 Galen writes as follows: 'Here too, the school of Chrysippus, paying attention to verbal expression rather than to the facts (rrj Aeêi (JL&AAOV rj TOLS TTpdyfjuaGL TTpooexovres rov vovv),*6 gives the name

"conjunctives" (au/xTTCTrAey/xeva) to all sentences composed by means of the conjunctive particles (SLOL TOJV GVJJLTTA€KTIK<JI)V KaAovfievcDv ovvSeajjuov), even if

composed of incompatible propositions, or of propositions such that one follows from another.' Then he goes on to say, '[They use] names carelessly in matters in which accuracy of expression is important (iv oh fiiv avyK^nains d/cptjSeta ScSaaKaAias dfieAws xp^tievoL TOLS ovofiaaw41)', but in matters in which the words have no difference in meaning, [they legislate] for themselves private meanings (iv o?s 8e ovSev hia(j>€pov al a>val Grj/jLatvovacv avrol

vofjLodeTovvres ?8ia aT^cuvo/xeva48)' (Kieffer 1964, p. 35; the translation is slightly modified). It is noticeable that the two symmetrical criticisms, which in Sextus are quite clumsily juxtaposed, in Galen are set out in an elegant chiasmus which tones down the paradox of their co-presence and makes it 42

43 44 45 46 47

48

Cf. in particular Genette 1968; 1966, p p . 21 iff.; Ricoeur 1975, p p . 8 4 - 6 . O n the Stoic roots of the theory of tropes, cf. Barwick 1957, p p . 88ff.; K e n n e d y 1963, p p . 297ff. Cf. for example Metaph. 0 6, 1048523-35; Eth. Nic. x, 1173b2; Phys. vi.6. Cf. Mi. 170-220, 227-247, a n d the commentaries of Russo 1975, p . X L V I . Introductio dialect., chap. 4, p p . 1 0 - n Kalbfleisch. Cf. Sextus, M VIII. 127: el Se rrj voei T&V irpayixarojv irpooeKriov eoriv. Cf. Sextus, ibid. 129: O>OT€ iv fxkv rep j8ia> K<XI rfj Koivfj avvrjdeia TOTTOV €LX€V 77 K orav Se TOL irpos TTJV voiv ^rjTcbfAev TTpayfjLaTCL, TOT€ €)(€o6ai Set rrjs d/cpijScias Cf. Sextus, ibid. 126: el [izv yap eêanv avrots a BeXovoi vocoderelv.


THE C O N J U N C T I V E MODEL

87

possible to lay it at his adversaries' door. But although the form in Galen may be different, the substance, polemical tactics and a number of details of vocabulary in the two texts present undeniable affinities. In view of all this, the hypothesis of a common source cannot be dismissed (especially since we have already come across one indication that Sextus is here reproducing objections of which he is not himself the author). And although the name of Posidonius comes a little too trippingly to the tongue of those who are in need of a link to complete their chain of argument, I myself would also be inclined to invoke it. J.S. Kieffer, the most recent commentator upon Galen's Introductio dialectical9 points out that, according to a suggestion made in oral discussion by Ludwig Edelstein, the particularly sharp tone of the polemic directed against Chrysippus in chapter 4 of Galen's pamphlet could be accounted for if the source was Posidonius. Although Kieffer has not himself followed up this suggestion, in fact has seemed rather to distance himself from it, 50 it is certainly worth considering. Edelstein presumably had in mind Posidonius' Ilepl owSeufxcbv, of which a fragment has come down to us. 5 x To judge by this single fragment, this treatise was a polemical work directed against those who claimed that conjunctions designate nothing at all (ou STJXOVGL fiev TL) and do no more than link the discourse together (avro Se JJLOVOV TTJV <j)pdcnv ovvoeovcn). Posidonius, on the contrary, for his part included conjunctions in the same 'part of discourse' as the verbal prefixes, which certainly are considered as significant parts of discourse since they modify the meaning of the verbal roots to which they are joined. It would thus appear that Posidonius was opposed to a purely syntactical theory of conjunction and proposed elaborating a semantic theory. 5 2 Of course, what are at issue here are conjunctions in the grammatical sense of the term, not simply the conjunction 'and', which is the operator of conjunction in its logical sense. But concepts relating to the former necessarily affect the notion of the latter; and it is surely the same anti-formalist point of view that engenders the idea that Galen presents in criticism of Chrysippus, namely that it is impossible to speak of a conjunctive proposition without first examining the contents of the conjoined propositions in order to determine whether or not they are incompatible or consecutive. It is thus, at the very least, not unreasonable to suppose that Posidonius was behind those attacks of Galen and Sextus which converged against the Stoic theory of the GvixTTeirXeyfjuevov; and if that is so, the link that I 49 50

51

52

Kieffer 1964, p. 24. Kieffer (p. 84) points out that the use of vofxoBeTovvTts might reflect an Aristotelian influence, on account of the use of that term in Anal. post. 83a 14 to describe the conventional assignation of a meaning to a word. Elsewhere (p. 25) however, he states that Galen's argument, in this chapter 4, 'reads as if it were its own. This chapter, too, seems to be more Galen's than a transcription from a textbook source.' Apollonius Dyscolus, De conjunctione, p. 214,4-20 Schneider = Posidonius, ed. Edelstein and Kidd 1972, no. 45, pp. 59-60. The question of whether conjunctions have a categorematic or a syncategorematic value was to be examined by the commentators of Aristotle's Categories. Cf. Simplicius, In Categ. 64, 18 ( = Aristotelis Fragmenta, ed. Ross, pp. 102-3), a n ^ Graeser 1978a.


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believe I have detected between the conjunctive model and the theory of passions would be indirectly confirmed by the fact that Posidonius directed his attacks against them both. I shall now, as promised, follow that historical hypothesis with a structural one. Once one thinks one has detected an isomorphism between several theses of different types (logical, psychological, ethical), one is understandably tempted to try to determine the relations of priority or even the relations of causality between those different theses, and to aim to discern which elements in them were original and which derivative. Perhaps it would be more prudent to resist that temptation. I cannot do so, however, because the expression 'conjunctive model' that I have used might suggest that I thought that the model originated in the field of logic and was then simply exported into the otherfieldsof Stoic thought. However, that is not my view: if I had to attribute a determining role to one in particular of the structures of thought between which I have attempted to discern the links, I should be inclined to attribute it to the field of ethical structures and to normative options in Stoic thought. From a strictly logical point of view, the conjunctive connection is simply one interpropositional conjunction among others, with nothing particularly special about it. The reason why it served as a model in extra-logical sectors of Stoic thought is that, by virtue of the particular structure of its truthconditions, it presented features which could be adapted to the extra-logical role that it would be possible to give it. The conclusion that it was ethics that played the determining role could be reached, negatively, in thefirstplace from the difficulties that arise as soon as one tries to have a thesis of Stoic ethics stem from any thesis external to ethics, whether it be logical or physical. That is something that I realized when reading the study that John Rist has devoted to the theory of the equality of sins,53 a study to which I nevertheless owe much in other respects. Rist tries to link the moral thesis of the equality of sinsfirstto a logical thesis, namely that of the non-existence of degrees of truth, then to a physical one, namely that of the properties of 'pneumatic' movements. On the logical thesis, he writes as follows: 'If therefore we can see why the Stoics did not wish to posit degrees of truth, we may be helped in our enquiry [concerning the moral thesis].'54 In Rist's views that reason is 'fairly obvious': if truth tolerated degrees, there could be nothing that was absolutely true: if a is more true than b, there can exist no x of such a kind that nothing could possibly be more true than it. Now, some things are manifestly true; so truth cannot be one of those realities in which degrees are tolerated. I must confess that I find this argument less than persuasive: its major premiss is presented as self-evident; yet does not Platonic philosophy consist, precisely, in drawing from the antecedent of that major premiss a consequence that is diametrically opposed to that of Rist's argument? A Platonist would start from the same principle: some things are more x 53

Rist 1969, pp. 81-96.

54

Rist 1969, p. 83.



89

than others and some things are less x than others. And his conclusion would be: there must, then, exist such a thing as x itself, an absolute x, through which everything that is x in some degree can be so. Wherever there is more and there is less, there is also a maximum. We know furthermore that this way of arguing a gradibus was given a perfectly clear formulation on the technical level in Aristotle's early writings.55 In view of this, it seems hard to believe that the Stoics' reasons for rejecting the idea of degrees were the same as those which led some of their most impressive predecessors to accept that same idea, and one feels inclined to reverse the reasoning: if the consequences that stem from accepting or rejecting degrees are unclear on a general level (the Platonists' acceptance leads them to believe in the necessity of a maximum while the Stoics, according to Rist, conclude that a maximum must be impossible), one will not be inclined to base the exclusion of degrees, in the ethical theory of sins, upon their exclusion in the logical domain; on the contrary, one will be inclined to interpret the Stoic decision to exclude them in the logical domain as a lateral effect or reflection of their decision to exclude them, as a matter of principle, in the ethical domain. However, Rist moves on from his first suggestion. He also proposes deriving the ethical thesis of the equality of sins from another thesis that is also external to ethics, belonging as it does to the domain of psychophysiology. He writes as follows: The only possible explanation, therefore, of the Stoic position is that something of great importance happens in a similar way whenever any kind of guilty act is committed. In order to understand what this is, we shall have to turn to problems of the physiological or rather psychosomatic structure of man.'56 According to him, this important event is the physical disordering that affects the movements of the 'pneuma' in all guilty behaviour. Rist goes on to say: 'It seems, therefore, that the Stoics held that all sins are equal and that there are no degrees of guilt, because the vibrations in the human rrvevfjua are either orderly or disorderly.'57 Here again, one may hesitate to follow him, for while it may be true that the alternative between what is orderly and what is disorderly may be considered to be entirely logical, the existence or inexistence of intermediate degrees between order and disorder and equally the existence or inexistence of degrees of order and disorder are a more debatable matter, and the inexistence of such degrees cannot be affirmed in all cases without making a particular examination of the pertinent data and the meaning taken on by the notion of order in the context under consideration. The movement of a marble on an inclined surface will be ordered if the surface is smooth and the marble round, disordered if one of those conditions is not fulfilled; but the movements of a dancer will not appear so clearly as either ordered or 55

56

Cf. 7T€pl (f>i\oooLas, fragment 16 Ross (KaOoXov yap, lv ots ean n jScArtov, iv rovrois eon n KOLI apioTov, K T \ . ) . T h e Platonic character of the a r g u m e n t is noted by Simplicius, w h o passes it o n t o us. F o r m o d e r n discussions of this argument, cf. in particular Jaeger 1923, 1934/48, p . 158; Wilpert 1957, p p . 155-62; D e Vogel i960, p p . 2 4 8 - 5 1 ; Berti 1962, p p . 353-5. 57 Rist 1969, p . 86. Rist 1969, p . 88. M y italics.


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disordered. How is it possible to affirm that the vibrations of the 'pneuma', which are not observable phenomena, can only take place in absolute order or else in total disorder? And if one decided to maintain that moral faults are not equal, would it not be extremely easy to imagine that those vibrations can be, correlatively, either more disorderly or less disorderly! The thesis of the equality of sins is, moreover, a paradoxical thesis which is not really concerned about verifications; one would be hard put to it to find any kind of confirmation for the thesis in legal institutions or in common moral discourse. So it would certainly be strange for it to have been deduced from a psychosomatic thesis that itself had no empirical basis and could accordingly provide it with not the slightest credibility. Faced with the difficulties that are thus encountered when one seeks the derivation of the moral thesis of the equality of sins either in a logical thesis such as that of the absence of degrees of truth or in a physical thesis such as that of the variations in the pneumatic rovos, one is tempted to reverse the schema of derivation and, instead, consider the moral thesis to be fundamental, in the manner of an existential choice, an option for a style of life. The theses that correspond to it on levels external to ethics would thus be considered as transpositions, objectivizations or rationalizations of that fundamental choice. That, eventually, is the direction in which Rist's study moves for, in the last analysis, he suggests that the key to the dogma of the equality of sins is to be found in a particular way of responding to moral experience. He writes as follows: It is often noticed that those men who are morally the noblest do not have a high opinion of their own moral excellence. In ecclesiastical language, this comes out as the view, often held by 'saints', that they are the greatest of sinners. This does not mean that they are committing what are commonly thought of as heinous crimes. It means that they have a very strong sense of what it means to be guilty. They recognize guilt where the ordinary man would be insensitive.5*

That last sentence to my mind sums up the essence of what I understand by 'conjunctive model', and pinpoints its ethical kernel. Just such a moral hypersensitivity seems to be what is expressed in the Stoics' conviction that a partial imperfection is enough to spoil the whole, that anything that is not totally successful is no better than something that is completely unsuccessful and that one fumbled note is enough to warrant going back to replay the piece of music right from the beginning. The Stoics, more than anyone else in Antiquity, had a sense of the contagious nature of defilement, impurity that spreads like an oil-stain.59 Using psychological terminology, one might say that there is something obsessional about their perfectionism. All the Stoic theses that can be associated with the conjunctive model manifest a common decision: not to neglect what seems negligible to others. 59 The drop of wine does not disappear 58 59

Rist 1969, p . 9 1 . M y italics. Professor Verbeke a n d F . Zaslawsky have pointed out to me that this pessimism, this principle of the expansion of evil, which is n o t counter-balanced by a n y principle of the expansion of



91

in the ocean, the grain of falsity is not drowned in the sea of truth, the peccadillo is not wiped out in the good conduct of the honourable citizen. The explanation for the Stoics' recognition or decision that one should not cheat with the logic of the conjunctive proposition,60 and for their acceptance of the purely logical reasons for this,61 is that the truth-conditions of the conjunctive proposition provided them with precisely the ingredient that they needed to satisfy their appetite for purity and rigour, spiced with the pinch of paradox that appealed to their underlying cynicism. All of which perhaps goes to show that, to be formalist in logic, it is necessary to be formalist in everything. good, posed a problem within the framework of the radically optimistic interpretation of the world that the Stoics professed. It is not possible here to develop this point as it deserves; but perhaps one could say that to be as optimistic as the Stoics are, it is probably necessary to be extremely pessimistic. 60 This formulation in itself makes it possible to glimpse the implicitly polemical value of the conjunctive model to which J.-P. Dumont has been good enough to draw my attention: the non-negligible reveals itself as such to the extent that others neglect it. However, I am not convinced that the much-discussed transformation of the 'Chaldaean' conditionals into negations of conjunctives, suggested by Chrysippus (according to Cicero, De fato vin.1516 = SVF .954), can be interpreted in the light of this idea; the truth-table of the denied conjunctive, in that it is the reverse of that of the affirmed conjunctive, namely 0111, no longer presents the characteristics of the 'conjunctive model'. 6 * There is no question of reducing the force of these arguments (I hasten to say this in response to the anxiety that has been expressed by Professor A.C. Lloyd). However, it may perhaps be agreed that, through its general structures, Stoic thought favoured taking them into account and dismissed obstacles which, in other authors such as Sextus and Galen, on the contrary very clearly do diminish their force.


THE STOIC THEORY OF THE SUPREME GENUS AND PLATONIC ONTOLOGY*

TOVT

€LVai [JLOVOV O7T€p €\€L TTpOGôX^V

TCLVTOV OCJfJLCL KCLl OVOldV

Kdl ilTa^V

TIVCL,

6pL^6fl€VOL.

Clem. Alex., Strom. 11.4.15 = Plato, Sophist

A number of texts are in agreement1 in attributing to the Stoics a doctrine which may be summarized by the following four theses: (1)

(2)

(3)

Something is an existent (I shall hereafter use the abbreviation E to refer to the term 'existent') if and only if it is a body. By the same token, something is a 'non-existenf ( = NE) if and only if it is not a body. The term incorporeal (dacoârov) applies, not to any and every nameable item which is not a body, but only to a limited and determined group of such items, namely the void, place, time and the XeKrd. I shall hereafter refer to this list using the expression 'canonical incorporeals'. Only bodies and canonical incorporeals may be called something (TI'=ST).

(4)

The term not something concepts

(OVTL = NST)

denotes the ontological status of

The most striking feature of this doctrine, in the eyes of its ancient critics and modern commentators alike, is that it presents the rl as the supreme genus (yevLKcorarov), rather than the 6V, which is relegated to a lower level of ontological classification; that is why I shall hereafter refer to it as the 'TSG * This text is a much reworked version of a paper that I delivered at the Symposium Hellenisticum held at Pontignano. I should like to express my warmest thanks to all those who, either through their spoken or written comments at the time of the symposium, or in correspondence later, have contributed so much towards the final elaboration of this study: in particular, Jonathan Barnes, Bernard Besnier, Myles Burnyeat, Pierluigi Donini, Andre Laks, Tony Long, David Konstan, Mario Mignucci, Martha Nussbaum, Malcolm Schofield, David Sedley and Richard Sorabji. I have unfortunately not been able to study the paper entitled 'Une occasion manquee: la distinction du ri et de Yov dans le Sophiste de Platon', presented by Pierre Aubenque in the course of his Sorbonne seminar. It is now being revised prior to publication and is to appear in a collection of essays edited by Pierre Aubenque, entitled Etudes sur le 'Sophiste'. I deeply regret having 'missed the opportunity' to compare my views with his. (This article has now been published as 'Une occasion manquee; la genese avortee de la distinction entre "l'etant" et le "quelque chose", in P. Aubenque (ed.), Etudes sur le Sophiste de Platon, Naples 1991, pp. 365-85.) 1 Alexander of Aphrodisias,/« Top. 301.19 = SVFw.î^FDS 711; ibid. 359.i2 = 5'K/7ii.329B, FDS 709; Sextus, M 1.17 = SVF 11.330, FDS 710; ibid. x.2i8 = SVF 11.331, FDS 720; ibid.

x.234 = SVFu.33i,FDS 719. Also Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 15, mfoc = FDS 721.


THE SUPREME GENUS AND PLATONIC ONTOLOGY

93

doctrine' (the doctrine of the ri as the supreme genus) and, more specifically (as we shall have to consider a number of variants), as the 'standard TSG doctrine'. The standard TSG doctrine may be expressed by the following table: Something I Bodies (existents)

I Incorporeals (canonical)

Not something I Concepts

I ?

The TSG doctrine has often been studied, from both the historical and the philosophical points of view. It poses many problems by reason of its intrinsic obscurity, the scarcity of sources and the hostility towards Stoicism evinced by most of our informants. Amongst its many difficulties are two which have been the subject of many recent studies and about which I do not intend to say anything in the present paper: (a) the question of whether and how the Stoics tried to specialize certain verbs (in particular virapx^v and v^Loravai) so as to turn them into distinct expressions of the modes of reality or existence of bodies and incorporeals;2 (b) the question of how the TSG doctrine fits in with what is commonly known as the Stoic theory of categories.3 These two problems are undeniably related to those that I do propose to discuss here. However, so far as (a) is concerned, it is impossible to decide in advance whether the question of verbs with an ontological meaning can throw any light on the contents of the TSG doctrine or whether, on the contrary, this is a question that can only be resolved once the contents of that doctrine have been set out clearly; and so far as (b) is concerned, the question, in itself extremely complex, arises in a relatively autonomous fashion and I can see no major disadvantage in leaving it aside. My intention, essentially, is to attack a common image of the TSG doctrine, which has both historical and philosophical aspects, and - if possible - to replace it by a different image. The view that I shall be criticizing depends upon a number of indications which might suggest that the TSG doctrine is a 2

3

On this question, Hadot( 1969), pp. 115-27; Graeser 1971, pp. 299-305; Goldschmidt 1972, pp. 331-44; Sandbach 1985. According to an interpretation which goes back at least to Plotinus (VI. 1.25) and has found a number of authoritative partisans among modern scholars (cf. Brehier 1910/51/71^. 133; id. 1936, pp. 30-1; Robin 1948, pp. 414-15; Pasquino 1978, pp. 375-86), the four Stoic 'categories' fall into two groups, the first of which (substances and qualities) corresponds to bodies, the second (ways of being and relative ways of being) to incorporeals. Other commentators, in contrast, are of the opinion that the distinction established by the so-called 'categories' simply represents four aspects in which each individual body may be envisaged; cf. for example Rieth 1933, p. 90; Goldschmidt 1977, p. 21 n. 5; Hadot 1968, vol. 1, p. 161 n. 1; and most recently Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 1, pp. 163-6. (This book had not yet been published at the time of the Pontignano Symposium. I should like to emphasize how very useful it has been to me in preparing this paper for publication.) Many doubts have been expressed as to even the reality of the 'Stoic theory of categories', cf. for example Pohlenz 1967, pp. 1298*. n. 1; Gould 1970, p. 107; Sandbach 1985, p. 40.


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relatively late innovation in the history of Stoicism and that, in the course of that history, it came to replace a less exceptional doctrine, accepted by the earliest Stoics, according to which the existent (6V) was the supreme genus. I shall refer to this hypothetical doctrine as the ESG. The explanation as to why the ESG was replaced by the TSG doctrine at some point in the development of the Stoic school is supposed to run more or less as follows: when the Stoics combined the, in itself unexceptional, ESG doctrine with their 'materialist' identification of the existent (6V) and the body, they realized that they could no longer ascribe a precise ontological status to things (if there turned out to be any) which it would be impossible to conceive as bodies, yet which could not be reduced to purely mental fictions. Having discovered that such 'things' did exist and having analysed their nature, particularly in the course of developing their physics and their theory of language, they could hardly deny them any kind of reality at all. However, being unwilling to jettison their equation between the existent and the body and in order to accommodate these recalcitrant realities as well as possible, they proceeded to construct the strange status of their 'incorporeals' which are 'something' yet are not 'existents' (NEST). At this point, the existent had necessarily to lose its status as supreme genus, ceding this to the 'something', a genus which included both bodies and incorporeals. Seen in this perspective, the TSG doctrine appears as some feat of theoretical acrobatics designed to save one paradox - that of the 'materialist' thesis threatened by the attacks of 'common sense' - but succeeding in doing so only at the cost of introducing a second paradox, even more violent than the first: namely, by dethroning the 'existent', which now lost its traditional status of supreme genus. In these circumstances, more or less the only interest of the TSG doctrine would be that of a baby ontological monster born of the embraces between a stubborn dogmatism and a strategy of despair improvised in order to escape the most immediately disastrous consequences of that dogmatic stubbornness. Even amongst historians who accept the antiquity of the Stoics' TSG doctrine, one often comes across the idea that they only adopted that doctrine under constraint, to some extent forced to do so by (as Aristotle would have said) 'the pressure of things'.4 In opposition to this image, I would like to try to show that the TSG doctrine is an essential element in the Stoic philosophy, maturely elaborated in the crucible of their critical thought on Platonic ontology. The central concept 4

Cf. Zeller 1904, vol. m.i.i, pp. 94(-5) n. 2; Brehier 1970, p. 2; Pohlenz 1967, pp. 120-1 ('It is only bodies that can be said truly to exist. But that does not rule out there being also something incorporeal, in the first place the contents of our thoughts and words . . . Apart from the contents of our words, there are also other things that we are obliged to recognize to be "something", even if they lack the mark of true existents (i.e. place, the void, time). [. . . The TSG doctrine] is the necessary consequence of the assumption of the aacjfjLara). This interpretation, according to which the Stoics were (so to speak) dragged bodily into adopting the TSG, has been summarily but decisively rejected by Goldschmidt 1977, p. 14: I t (i.e. this doctrine) cannot be explained away as merely a response to polemics, for it was this doctrine itself that provoked them.' I find the rest of Goldschmidt's commentary, which presents the TSG doctrine as a development of Aristotelianism, or at least of one of its 'tendencies', less convincing, for reasons that I shall be explaining below.



95

of the doctrine, namely that of NEST, does not appear to me to be one that could possibly have been constructed using the inductive method, that is to say by collecting the properties common to a certain number of items which could only be grouped together by virtue of the impossibility of denying them some kind of reality. In my view, it is possible to suggest that this concept was constructed on the basis of theoretical considerations, within the framework of a general and abstract ontology, without paying any particular attention to the items (canonical incorporeals) which were to constitute its extension. The critical analysis of Platonism seems to have led the Stoics to discern two distinct ontological criteria: the one a strong criterion (let us agree to refer to it as the criterion of existence), in the name of which, in opposition to Plato, the existent was held to be whatever is corporeal; the other a weak criterion (let us call this the criterion of reality), in the name of which the Platonic Forms were denied any extra-mental reality. The relative independence of these two criteria (all that satisfies the strong criterion also satisfies the weak one, but the converse does not apply) leaves room for a perfectly well-determined theoretical position for items (if any such there be) which satisfy the weak criterion without satisfying the strong one, in other words for 'realities' without 'existence'. This theoretical position is that of the NESTs. The discussion upon which I shall now embark is divided into six parts. In the introduction (i), I shall make a few observations on various structural problems which spring to mind once one examines the TSG doctrine. In part n, which is devoted to the chronology of the TSG doctrine, or more precisely to a kind of chronological topology of this doctrine, I shall be analysing a number of texts which could have been and/or were used as arguments to support the adoption of the TSG doctrine at a relatively late date in the history of Stoic thought, and I shall try to show that these texts do not justify such a conclusion. In the next two parts, I shall try to establish the role that may have been played by the reading of Plato's Sophist (m) and that possibly played by critical reflection upon the Platonic theory of Forms (iv) in the elaboration of the TSG doctrine. In the last two parts, finally, I shall try to put together two kinds of arguments that confirm my general thesis: to refute the idea that the TSG doctrine is the fruit of an induction based upon an analysis of the canonical incorporeals, I shall try to bring to light the disparities that those incorporeals present and the discrepancies between the various arguments used by the Stoics tofixtheir ontological status (v). To confirm the role played by the mediation of Platonism in the construction of the TSG doctrine, I shall examine some of the objections put to the Stoics by their adversaries on the subject of this doctrine and the varying degrees of attention that the Stoics paid to those objections (vi).

The TSG doctrine raises several structural problems which it may be helpful to mention, if only briefly. Those that seem to me worthy of attention are the Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009

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following: (a) (in connection with thesis 2): is the list of canonical incorporeals fixed ne varieturi (b) (in connection with thesis 3): is the division of STs into bodies and incorporeals exhaustive? (c) (in connection with thesis 4): are concepts the only NSTs? (d) (also in connection with thesis 4): can natural species and fictional species be distinguished within those NST concepts? (e) (in connection with theses 3 and 4): why did the Stoics apparently refuse to assign a common genus to STs and NSTs? (a) It being my intention to maintain that the concept of NEST was constructed independently from what was to constitute its extension, it would have been very much in my interest to discover variants in the descriptions of that extension that are provided by the texts. However, the hunt for variants proved disappointing. By calling the four classic incorporeals mentioned in the texts 'the canonical incorporeals', I am acknowledging this situation and do so without regret: time, the void, place and the XeKra do indeed constitute a 'canonical' list. The only variant of any importance afforded by our documentation is the list provided by Cleomedes (De mot. circul. p. 16, 2-5 Ziegler) in a passage not expressly designed to provide it and the text of which is in some doubt. 5 According to what seems to me the most likely reading, Cleomedes' list differs from the canonical one in two respects: first, it features 'surface' (€7TLx VTT avrcov)\15 That is quite an acrobatic reply; it seems to imply that the rjyefioviKov can be affected of its own accord, if not in an entirely spontaneous fashion, at least on the occasion of an external stimulus; certainly, when representing proof to itself, it is passive (cf. (JHivraoioviievoi) and all passivity in principle presupposes an agent. If that agent is not the external incorporeal, it can only be the rfye/juovLKov itself. Sextus' criticisms (406-8) certainly presuppose the Stoics' acceptance of the notion of auto-affection. To strengthen their reply, they had resorted to some quite carefully chosen images. The gymnastic trainer can teach his pupil a 75

Cf. a similar use of eVt + dative, in Simplicius In Cat. 333.31 = SVF 11.185, FDS 801: it may happen that the action of the agent ceases before the passion of the patient; for instance, a son may be long-since dead, but his father will continue to grieve for him (iir'avra)).



125

movement by taking hold of his hands and impressing the movement upon them, a procedure which illustrates a case where an external body affects the rjye/jLovLKov physically. But the gymnastic trainer can also himself make the movement that he wishes to teach his pupil, at a distance, presenting himself as a model to be imitated; and it is this procedure that is regarded as illustrating what happens when the -qyeixoviKov apprehends a proof, which is a complex of incorporeal Ae/cra. Whatever the demonstrative value of these illustrations, their example shows how hard the Stoics tried to avoid having to recognize that cognitive relations involve a relationship of action and passion between the subject that knows and the object that is known. Here they adopt a variant of the reply with which the OFF might have countered the argument in the Sophist, a reply which, as we have noted, Plato neither indicated nor explored. They accept a premiss which corresponds to premiss (i) in Plato's argument, namely that, when we understand a proof, we are subjected to a passion (cf)avTaGLoviJL€voL). But they reject the premiss which would correspond to premiss (ii) of the Platonic argument, namely that every passion implies the action of an external motor upon the patient. As the Stoics see it, then, we are impressed not by the Aex-rd, but on the occasion of their occurrence and, in all probability, by ourselves. They are accordingly able to reject the conclusion that Plato forced upon the RFF; the Stoics are in a position to accept a cognitive relationship between a body - the rjyeôvLKov - and a complex of incorporeals - a proof- and this is a relationship which is compatible with the completely different ontological statuses of all the terms involved in it. If we now return to the more fundamental problem of the criterion according to which certain incorporeal realities can and must be recognized, even if the equation between the existent and the body is maintained, we are bound to recognize that here the Stoic ontology can no longer be presented as a simple juxtaposition of the OSE doctrine and the OFF doctrine. So far, we have noted the precision with which the various parts in the debate organized by Plato were re-used in the Stoic construction, once they had cleared out of the way the modifications that the author of the Sophist had introduced in order to make them fit into his own construction. 76 The coincidences are probably striking enough for it to be reasonable to suggest (even in the absence of any decisive external proof) that this dialogue played a seminal role in the formation of the Stoic ontology. Clearly, though, a fundamental difference still separates the Stoic synthesis from the hybrid system that would be obtained by purely and simply amalgamating the doctrine of the OSE and that of the OFF. The difference consists in the fact that, in Stoicism, the place of inactive and impassive incorporeal realities is no longer occupied by the 76

It is worth quoting the following passage from Cornford i960, p. 247: 'Just as the reformed materialist was induced to surrender the mark of tangibility and enlarge his conception of the real to include some bodiless things, so the reformed idealist must surrender the mark of changelessness and allow that the real includes spiritual motion, as well as the unchanging Forms.'


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intelligible Forms, but instead by the collection of canonical incorporeals whose common ontological status is that of NEST. It is to explain that difference that at this point we must, I think, introduce the second component of the Stoic elaboration: namely their critical analysis of the Platonic theory of Forms. IV

As I have indicated above, the criterion for accepting those incorporeal realities had necessarily to be distinct from the criterion to be satisfied by existents, that is to say bodies. Now, that criterion (also, a fortiori, satisfied by bodies) consists in being 'something'; and we know already that the Stoics' attitude to the Platonic Forms may be summed up by their refusal to grant those Forms any extra-mental reality, for the precise reason that they are not 'something'. One is inevitably tempted to collect together all these data. The use of the idea of a NST in the ontological disqualification of the Forms was necessarily complemented by the promotion of the idea of a ST as a criterion of reality, and if it was in the name of that criterion that the Forms were denied any extra-mental reality, one had to be ready to grant some kind of reality, in the name of that very criterion, to items which did not necessarily possess the substantial existence of corporeals. It is remarkable that, so far as we know, the Stoics never thought of challenging Plato's ontological exaltation of the Forms (as their 'ancestor', Antisthenes had)77 by declaring that they are not bodies, that one could neither see them nor touch them, or that one could attribute to them no causal activity or efficacy (v/hich, as is well known, was Aristotle's favourite criticism).78 It is in this respect that one sees that the heritage of the OFF is combined with that of the OSE in the Stoic doctrines. The mode of being that they ascribe to bodies is not that which they deny to the forms and, in this connection, nothing could be more misleading than the formula by which von Arnim attempts to sum up their doctrines: 'sola corpora esse, non esse ideas'.19 To render that formula acceptable, one would have to draw a radical distinction between the two uses of the verb esse here. The strange, new expression ovriva was certainly not introduced haphazardly to serve as an instrument in the critique of the Platonic Forms; for that critique, which is a well-known element in Stoic thought, rests upon a less frequently noted effort to understand and interpret the reasons for Plato's error. The Forms certainly are chimaeras, but the motives for introducing them were respectable, if ill-interpreted. A somewhat enigmatic passage from Syrianus,80 without parallel so far as I know, attests in its own fashion that throughout the long existence of their school, the Stoics continued to ponder 77 78 79

Cf. the famous declaration attributed to him by Simplicius, In Cat. 208.28. Cf. on this theme the excellent comprehensive study by G. Fine (1987), pp. 69-112. 80 SVFn, p. 123. Syrianus, In Met. 105.19-30 = SKF 1.494, 11.364, m Arch. 13; FDS 31 8A.



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the genesis of Platonism: according to this testimony, the reasons for the elaboration of the Forms were of a linguistic nature for Chrysippus, for Archedemus and for 'most of the Stoics', of a semantic nature according to Longinus, and of a conceptual nature according to Cleanthes; whilst Marcus Aurelius merged the ideas of Longinus and those of Cleanthes. It is true that this late text does not rate highly as documentary evidence, for it makes no mention at all of Zeno and confuses dates blithely, placing Cleanthes after Chrysippus and Longinus (third century) before Marcus Aurelius (second century). Nevertheless, it may reflect the reality of an enduring tradition of interest in the theory of Forms, interest which was not content to take it for granted that the theory had long since been refuted once and for all, and which persisted in pondering the reasons for such an unforgettable and ever-renewed mistake. The most famous texts attribute to Zeno himself and to the Stoics who followed him the reduction of what 'the ancients' called 'Ideas' to 'concepts' (ivvorujLOLTa), or, to be more exact, to 'our concepts (eworHxara Ty/zerepa)'; and by that what was meant was no more than 'figments of thought', which are 'neither something nor (something which is> qualified, but almost something and almost (something which is> qualified {fJirjre TLVOL eivai fji^re rroia, cboavel 8e Twa /cat woavel TTOLa.81 It would be impossible to underestimate the degree of the ontological devaluation to which the Forms are subjected in this verdict: the (f)avrdaiJLara are mirages, phantom-objects, the intentional objects of 'empty movements of the imagination', the prototype for which is provided by dreaming and hallucinations. 82 Nevertheless, the irreality of Ideas does not condemn Plato's statements to absurdity: it is possible to produce perfectly acceptable conceptualist paraphrases for them and, as Long and Sedley emphasize, the Stoics do not appear to have felt any compunction about reusing the vocabulary of participation, declaring for example that 'we participate in concepts'; 83 that presumably means, despite the doubts of some commentators, that, as existent individuals, we belong to the genera and species illegitimately hypostasized by Plato and that we possess the common qualities which define them. 84 It is clear that, in Zeno's view, it is the universality of concepts that makes it impossible to attribute extra-mental reality to them. But it would clearly be desirable to know whether, by using the expression ixrjre nvd . . ., waavel Se nva to characterize their way of not being real, he explicitly meant to distinguish that mode of unreality from the mode of inexistence which might belong to incorporeal realities, supposing that there were any such things. In other words, one would like to know whether the dissociation between the rl and the 6v had already been made by Zeno. What may make one hesitate to 81

83 84

Cf. Stobaeus, Eclogue 1.136.21 = SVF1.65A, FDS 316; Aetius, Placita 1. 10.5 = SKF1.65B, FDS 82 317. Cf. Chrysippus apud Aetius, Placita iv. 12.1 = SVF 11.54, FDS 2 6 8 Cf. what follows in Stobaeus' text cited above, n. 8 1 . At this point, I a m enormously indebted to the excellent c o m m e n t a r y by Sedley 1985, p . 89, summarized in Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 11, p . 182.


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advance such a claim is in particular the fact that there exists a variant to the expression considered above, a variant put forward in the anonymous definition of the ivvorjiJLa to be found in Diogenes Laertius. According to this definition, a concept is a figment of thought, ovre rl ov ovre TTOLOV, ojoavel 8e n ov KQX (baavel TTOLOV.85 The function of the word ov in these formulae prompts discussion: either one regards it as a simple copula, in which case the two variants have the same meaning and both withold from a concept the status of ST; or else ov is construed in apposition to TI, in which case, in Diogenes Laertius' version, what would be denied of a concept would only be that it is 'something existing'. In this second construction, the dissociation between ri and ov, which is a fundamental element in the TSG doctrine, would still not be clearly attributable to Zeno. But it is probably possible to argue in favour of the first construction, pointing out that the ambiguous ov in Diogenes Laertius' version in all probability represents the ehai in Stobaeus' version which, for its part, quite unambiguously does possess a copulative function. Even if a degree of uncertainty did remain on this point, other arguments could be found to attest the precise intentions nursed by Zeno when he formulated his critique of the metaphysics of the Forms with the aid of the notion of the ST. Zeno's critique may be compared with that of Stilpo, which probably provided his starting point. 86 Stilpo, we are told, used the following argument: k'Xeye rov Xzyovra avdpamov efvcu ynqheva. ovre yap rovSe €LVCLL ovre rovSe. riyap fiaXXov rovSe rj rovSe; ovS' dpa r6v8e.81 The text is far from clear and, to improve it, a number of rather heavy-handed corrections have been proposed. 88 But what at any rate is certain is that the nub of the objection was the distinction between man in general (avOpaj-nov) and any particular, determined man (roVSe). The situation envisaged by Stilpo may have been one in which man in general was simply referred to, or else one in which something was said about him; and in the second case, what was said may have been that he exists or that he is this or that. In any case, to mention man as such is not to mention any man in particular, and to state something about him is not to state it about any man in particular. To clarify the matter and because in this case it is the most probable supposition, let us assume that Stilpo had in mind a situation in which it is declared that man (in general) exists. In making that declaration, it is not affirmed that any particular, determined man exists: for why should it be one rather than another? From this, Stilpo seems to have concluded that the existence of all men, one by one, was denied; so that, 85 86

87 88

Diogenes Laertius VII.6I = SKF1.65C, FDS 315. Zeno h a d been Stilpo's pupil, cf. Diogenes Laertius 11.114, 120; vn.2, 24; a n d it is certainly correct to describe as 'Stilponian' the primacy of the particular which immediately characterizes the logic a n d the ontology of the founder of the Stoic School, as Rist does (1978), p . 349. Diogenes Laertius 11.119 = fr. 199 Doring (in Doring 1972). Roeper 1854 proposed reading Xeyetv twice instead of elvai. T h a t correction is accepted by Doring 1972, pp. 155-6 n. 6, and by a n u m b e r of scholars before him. There are other possible solutions, cf. n. 89.



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paradoxically, the declaration 'man exists' in his hands came to mean 'no man exists'; /XT/SCIS may be substituted for avdpaj-rros.89 It seems to me highly likely that Zeno discerned a flaw in this argument of Stilpo's: not to affirm the existence of any man in particular is not the same as denying the existence of all men. Even if the affirmation 'man exists' does not imply any affirmation such as 'Socrates exists', 'Plato exists', etc., the lesson to be learned from this is not that avOpooiros may be replaced by firjSeis, as Stilpo believed, but simply that avdpajiros cannot be replaced by rig. We can see from this just how much interpenetration - almost to the point of indistinguishability - there is between interpretation and critique in the Stoic reading of the theory of Forms. What Zeno understood, in the argument that I am attributing to him, is that the existence of a Form does not imply the existence of any of its sensible participants. In other words, it could perfectly well happen that man as such existed although no individual flesh-and-blood man did. Even today, that is a perfectly respectable interpretation of the Platonic XojpiafjLos.90 The status of 'figment of the soul' attributed by the Stoics to universals is simply a more economical ontological way of taking account of their 'separation' from sensible particulars, that is to say of taking account of the very character that prompted Plato to turn them into eternal Forms. 91 In the adjustment that Zeno made to Stilpo's critique of the Forms, there can thus be detected at the very least the seed of the crucial dissociation between the ri and the 6V: what the Forms do not have, and what prevents them from being seen as extra-mental realities, is not only the full mode of existence of any particular individual body, taken with all its sensible determining characteristics (oSe); furthermore, and from the start, they also lack the mode of reality that is possessed by any particular individual, even an indeterminate one (TIS). What they lack even more fundamentally than determination is particularity. 89

90

9J

T h e textual correction best suited to this interpretation of the a r g u m e n t is probably the following: rov Xiyovra avdpconov efvcu (avdpajirov elvai) fxrfSeva. Or at least of the Platonic ^topia/Ao? according to Aristotle. Cf. on this point, Fine 1984, p p . 31-87 a n d in particular the following passage (p. 44): 'if to say t h a t F o r m s are separate is just to say that they can exist independently of sensible particulars; and if, as Aristotle and I believe, F o r m s are universals, then to say t h a t the F o r m s are separate is just to say t h a t (some) universals can exist uninstantiated (by sensible particulars).' See also p p . 78-81 of this article, on the Timaeus, and the very interesting discussions between Fine and M o r r i s o n (1985, p p . 125-57, 159-65, 167-73). This could be a way of resolving the p a r a d o x of the Stoic attitude to the Platonic F o r m s , a p a r a d o x that is excellently described by Sedley (1985), p p . 89-90: 'the logical a n d metaphysical outlawing of concepts is not a denial of their epistemological value. It is a warning to us not to follow Plato's p a t h of hypostatising them.' Cf. also L o n g a n d Sedley 1987, vol. 1, p . 182. T h e fact that one and the same a r g u m e n t m a y be used to support diametrically opposed conclusions is a c o m m o n p l a c e in philosophy as it is elsewhere. Siparva componere licet, I will cite the following dialogue between a F r e n c h m a n a n d an Englishman on the comparative advantages of powdered sugar a n d l u m p sugar. I guarantee its authenticity. T h e F r e n c h m a n : 'The good thing a b o u t l u m p sugar is that you k n o w exactly h o w m u c h you are taking.' T h e Englishman: 'The good thing a b o u t powdered sugar is that you k n o w exactly h o w m u c h you are taking.'


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All that Chrysippus had to do was pick up and proceed with Zeno's thought on the Platonic Forms and also his use of the notion of the ST in the recasting of their ontological status. In his case too, a polemical intention was inseparable from an attempt at analysis and theoretical comprehension, as is shown by the remarkable interpretation of the Platonic theory that he is said by Geminus92 to have produced. He declared that certain mathematical theorems established the equality of an indefinite number of surfaces or volumes contained within the same limits; for example, all parallelograms with the same base and the same height are equal, whatever the angle at which their sides meet their base; similarly, according to Chrysippus, 'the Ideas embrace within determined limits the genesis of an infinity of things (eKetvat rwv 0L7T€ipa)v iv irepaaiv (LpLo/Jievois rrjv yeveaiv TrepiXayifiavovoivy — a statement

which Brehier judiciously comments upon as follows: The Idea only indicates the limits that an existent must satisfy in order to exist, without determining that existent's nature more closely: it can be what it likes within those limits; consequently, what is determined is not a single existent but an endless multiplicity of them.'93 Another document attests that Chrysippus may have meditated upon the debate between Stilpo and Zeno. In a passage of his commentary upon the Categories (105.7-20 = SVF 11.278, FDS 1247), Simplicius ponders the question of whether, in the opinion of those who grant existence (VTTOOTCLOIS) to the genera and the species, these may or may not be called rdSe. In this connection, he notes that Chrysippus, likewise, wondered {airopel) whether the Idea can be called roSe n. This Aristotelian expression does not appear to have constituted part of the ontological vocabulary of the Stoics; furthermore, Simplicius immediately goes on to note that, in the general opinion of the Stoics, common or universal terms (KOLVO) are called ovnva. In these circumstances, one may wonder whether Chrysippus' problem actually was formulated in these terms, and it is quite tempting to read r o S e ^ ) TL, which would make the contents of Chrysippus' aporia more interesting: should the problem of the ontological status of the Idea be posed with reference to the determined peculiarity of the roSe or with reference to the indeterminate peculiarity of the TI ? Whatever the value of that suggestion, Chrysippus may certainly be attributed a role of capital importance in elaborating a sort of test for distinguishing between STs and NSTs. We know that he had thought much about the paradox known as the paradox of the ovns, devoting to it at least two treatises, or possibly three, one comprising eight books.94 Now Simpli92 94

93 Cited by Proclus, In Eucl. 395.21-31 = SVF 11.365, FDS 458. Brehier 1970, p. 3. Cf. the list in Diogenes Laertius vii.198. Sandwiched between the two titles of treatises expressly devoted to the ovns is a third which, as Frede 1974, pp. 56-8, has shown, relates to the same subject. The exact wording of the paradox, which is incompletely cited or imperfectly transmitted by the usual sources (Simplicius, ibid.; Diogenes Laertius vii.82 = SFF11.274, FDS



131

cius, in the passage cited above, shows that this paradox constituted the basis of the Stoic reduction of the KOLVOL to the ovnva. The paradox is set out as follows: 'if someone (ris) is in Athens, he (OVTOS) is not in Megara; now man is present in Athens; so man is not present in Megara.' 95 The lesson to be learned from this paradox is that it is not legitimate to substitute a universal term such as 'man' for the indefinite ris. As Simplicius accurately notes, such a substitution boils down to using a 'not something' as if it were a 'something'. So one can see how, correctly interpreted, the paradox becomes a test for reality. It goes without saying that individual bodies pass the test successfully: if Socrates is in Athens, he is not in Megara, and he thus qualifies, without any problems, as a ST. But we should note that his corporeal nature, as such, is not in question in his lack of ubiquity. This may be borne out by submitting two antithetical examples to the ovns test: on the one hand the example of a body designated in terms of mass, 'water', for instance; on the other, the example of a particular incorporeal, the place occupied by Socrates, for instance. Although a body, the first example does not pass the test: the fact that there is water in Athens does not permit one to conclude that there is none in Megara. The second, though incorporeal, does pass the test: if the place occupied by Socrates is in Athens, that place is not in Megara. It is thus as a ST, not as a body, that Socrates himself was successful in passing the test. By collecting together the conclusions provided by the Stoic reading of the Sophist and those that may be drawn from the polemic directed against the theory of Forms, it may thus be said that their critical analysis of Platonism made it possible for the Stoics to distinguish two separate ontological criteria, a physical criterion of existence and a logical criterion of reality, and the independence between those two carves out an ontological niche for NESTs. Before bringing this section of my investigation to a close, I should like to draw attention to the care with which the Stoics so to speak mounted guard over the borders of that ontological niche. If it was not to be invaded by its neighbours, it had to be defended on two fronts, as the following schema shows: ST

E

NST

NE

In the next section, by examining the canonical incorporeals, we shall see what arguments the Stoics used to secure their peculiarity, thus avoiding both

95

1207), has been re-established by this author on the basis of a scholium to the commentary on the Categories by Philoponus (app. crit. p. J2 = FDS 1248); cf. also Elias, In Cat. 178.112 = FDS 1249. To translate this into more or less correct English (or French), one has to manipulate the Greek, which is much more direct: ei TLS ianv iv 'Adrjvais, OVTOS OVK ZOTLV iv Meydpois ' avdpioiTOS 84 ioriv iv *Adr}vais • avOpcoTros apa OVK eonv iv Meyapois.


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conceptualizing them and also thereby allowing the NSTs to cross the frontier separating them from the STs. I would like to show here that, as they developed what I have called an inflationist somatology (by virtue of which they presented as bodies many things that were not habitually conceptualized as such - qualities, virtues, etc.), the Stoic philosophers handled their criterion of corporeality, that is to say of existence, with precaution and moderation, so as to avoid having the Es encroach unduly upon the NEs. By themselves imposing a certain number of restrictions upon the legitimate use of this criterion, they demonstrated once again that their theory of incorporeals that are NESTs is not a concession that they were driven to make, but a complementary element that they were only too happy to add to their critique of the Platonic incorporeals, which are relegated to the status of NSTs. To be sure, a thing is a body if and only if it acts or is acted upon.96 But what is it to act, what is it to be acted upon? In contrast to Plato who, as we have seen, gave these words as wide a meaning as possible, the Stoics understood them in a strictly physical sense; in this way, they were not obliged to confer corporeality upon any and every item which, in a true statement, would appear in the position of the subject of an active or a passive verb. When they undertake to show that such-and-such an item is a body, they stress the purely physical character of the actions that it executes or the passions to which it is subjected. What is common to the acting and the being acted upon is the movement that impresses or is impressed (SVF 11.497) an< l that movement is defined as a local movement (SVF 11.492). The action presupposes proximity and contact (SVF 11.342); the action and the passion imply impulse, resistance and impact (SVF 11.343). To show that the voice ((/XJOVYJ), for instance, is a body, the Stoics show that it moves physically from the speaker to the hearer (SVF in, Diog. 18) and that, in the phenomenon of the echo, its trajectory may be broken by a wall, just as the trajectory of a ball would be (SVF 11.387). Similarly, to show that the soul is a body, Chrysippus supplements Cleanthes' rather impressionistic argument (*SKFi.5i8) with one whose blatant physicalism borders on provocation (SVF 11.790: 'death is the separation of the soul and the body; now nothing incorporeal can be separated from a body; for neither can the incorporeal touch the body'). In all these examples, the insistence upon the physical nature of the actions and passions which serve as 96

Like Plato, the Stoics are here using a disjunctive formula (I should like to thank R. Sorabji for showing me that the exceptions to this rule that I believed I had found were in fact no such thing). An important consequence is that the two fundamental principles of Stoic physics, the Logos-God which is active and only active, and matter which is passive and only passive, are both bodies. That is what Diogenes Laertius VII.I34 = SVF 11.299 declares, according to the MSS. However, such is the power to shock that this conclusion retains that von Arnim corrected ocofjuara to aoojfjidrovs, on the basis of the article apxrj in the Suda, and that correction has enjoyed a surprising success. It is accepted by the modern editors of Diogenes Laertius, R.D. Hicks and H.S. Long; and several commentators who are in favour of preserving the text of the MSS consider that Diogenes Laertius' testimony is substantially erroneous, either so far as the Logos on its own is concerned (e.g. Kahn 1969, p. 168, n. 21), or even concerning both principles (e.g. Sandbach 1985, pp. 73-4).



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indicators of corporeality ends up, paradoxically, by depriving the criterion of its operational value: for in order to show that x is a body, it is necessary to show that x acts or is acted upon; but for the demonstration to be conclusive, it is necessary to show that x acts or is acted upon 'corporeally' (croo/xaTiKcos, cf. SVF 11.343), not in some metaphorical or catachrestic sense (SVF 11.345). These constraints affecting the implementation of the 'official' criterion of corporeality perhaps explain why it is that, in practice, the Stoics often resort to other ways of demonstrating statements taking the form of 'x is a body'. Sometimes these supplementary procedures are used to reinforce the normal procedure; but sometimes they supplant it, and one thus perceives that the criterion of action and passion will perhaps not suffice to demonstrate the corporeality of everything that the Stoics take to be bodies. The most distinctive of these supplementary procedures is what I shall call 'the graft of corporeality'. It rests upon the following argument: x is a body because it maintains with y, which is a body, a relationship r which implies that x is also a body. 97 This procedure is used to reinforce the normal one in, for example, the case of the ojvrj to be found in Plato {Tim. 67B) and Aristotle (De an. 11.8, 42ob29): both had called it TrXrjyr] aepos. The opponents of Stoicism did not fail to seize upon that reversal and criticize it: Simplicius (in Phys. 426.1 = SVFm, Diog. 19, FDS 480) censures the Stoic definition for substituting the affected subject, namely the air that is struck, for the affection, namely the striking of it, and for wrongly concluding that the C/XJOVYJ is a body and presenting it as a species of the genus 'air'. 98 In the case of the c/xjovrj, this type of argument is a supplementary procedure, but it is used on its own when it comes to demonstrating that truth (as opposed 97

98

Naturally, not all relations have this 'corporealizing' effect: a place, for example, is occupied by a body, but does not on that account become a b o d y itself. It would be interesting to discover where the Stoics had at their disposal a precise criterion to distinguish relations that 'corporealize' from those that do not. T h e same objection, with a reminder of the Platonic definition, is to be found in Schol. in Dion. Thr. 482.5 ( = FDS4% 1), and also, with a different example, in Alexander In Top. 360.9 ( = SVF 11.379, FDS 839): a fist is not 'a h a n d in a particular state', for it is not a hand; it is in a h a n d , as in a subject. It is worth noting that this is precisely the objection that Aristotle himself (Top. iv.5, I27a3f.) m a d e to some of Plato's definitions, for instance that of snow as 'frozen water' (Tim. 59E), and that of m u d as 'earth mixed with moisture' (Theaet. 147c). The Stoics are thus using, against one of Plato's particular definitions, a type of definition that Plato himself had also used. In so doing, they take no account of the objections that Aristotle had raised against that type of definition. O n this particular point, it is fair to say that Aristotle remains outside the debate that the Stoics are engaged in with Plato.


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to what is true) is a body." In this demonstration, no attempt is made to suggest that truth acts or is acted upon. The only argument used consists in declaring that truth is a science and that science is the '^yeôviKov (that is to say a body) in a certain state', just as a fist is 'a hand in a certain state.' 100 Perhaps the author of this demonstration decided that it would be too difficult to claim that truth acts in any other sense than metaphorically. At any rate, he made no attempt to do so. By thus combining a principal criterion of corporeality, which they handle very strictly, with secondary criteria which enable them, when necessary, to make use of the 'grafts of corporeality' to which I referred above, the Stoics as it were provided themselves with a driving-wheel that enabled them to steer their course with great precision between excessive rigour and excessive laxity in their selection of candidates for membership of the club of bodies or fully paid-up existents: all of which shows yet again, should it still need to be shown, that there was nothing naive about their 'materialism' and that, far from being overwhelmed by events over which they had no control, when they safeguarded the position of the NEST they knew exactly what they were doing and were doing exactly what they meant to.

In this section I shall, as I have said, attempt to find means of confirming my hypothesis from two different points of view. In the first place, if it is true that the TSG doctrine and its essential element, the status of NESTs, were not fabricated expressly to accommodate the four canonical incorporeals on the basis of an inductive analysis of their common properties, but instead were produced from the purely theoretical interaction between two ontological criteria that had emerged from the critical analysis of Platonism, then we may expect to find the Stoics running into a number of difficulties when it comes to having to accommodate a whole collection of relatively heterogeneous items within a single ontological category which was not specially created to hold them and them alone. In my view, that expectation is fulfilled on a number of counts. It is nothing new to point out the heterogeneous nature of the group of canonical incorporeals. 101 The most glaring disparity is that which separates the 'logical' incorporeals (the Ae/cra) from the 'physical' incorporeals (place, the void and time). But that is not the most serious disparity. These days, there is an increasing tendency to devise ways of stressing that the status of the XeKTov was first defined on the basis of the case of the Kar^yoprjâra (SVF 99 100 101

Cf. Sextus, M v n . 3 8 = SVFn.132, FDS 324; P//11.81 = FDS 322. O n this text, see L o n g 1978c. A definition which, as we have seen above, n. 98, is criticized by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Cf. Brehier 1970, p . 60 ('The profound originality of this theory is to have associated within the same g r o u p such very different beings'); with a slightly different perspective, Goldschmidt 1977, p . 26 ('Incorporeals are not all inexistent to the same degree'); L o n g and Sedley 1987, vol. 1, p . 199 ('Why are they [i.e. the Aefcra] grouped together with place, void and time whose incorporeality seems unproblematic?').



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1.488, FDS 763), which subsequently, within a more comprehensive theory, were interpreted as incomplete XeKrd. Now, the incorporeal status of the KarrjyoprjjjLa is connected with a characteristic theory of causality, in which it represents the incorporeal effect of a corporeal cause acting upon a patient that is also corporeal. 102 This status is thus defined in physical terms, not logical, dialectical or semantic ones - or at least that is the case initially. Of all the differences that separate the four canonical incorporeals, I would myself stress rather those that are directly related to the various modalities of their insertion into the class of NESTs. If it is by virtue of their universality that, as we have seen, concepts are classed as NSTs, then STs are necessarily particulars, whether they are bodies or incorporeals. In this regard, two cleavages appear within the group of the four incorporeals: the first is that which separates three of them, which are continuous and infinitely divisible, namely time, place and the void (cf. SVF 11.482a, FDS 724) from the fourth, which is not (the complete XeKrov certainly does have parts some of which constitute incomplete XeKrd, but clearly division cannot be continued ad infinitum). The second cleavage is that which separates off the two of them which are both unique and infinite (namely time and the void) from the other two which are multiple and finite (places and the XeKrd). This twofold division illuminates something which is immediately manifest anyway: the special position of the XeKrd, which are multiple, finite and not infinitely divisible. There can be no shadow of a doubt that the XeKrd are particulars, even if it is quite difficult to pin down exactly what it is that constitutes their particularity. To resolve that problem, or even to express it correctly, it would no doubt be necessary to study each species of the XeKrd separately, since not all XeKrd are complete, not all complete XeKrd are d^Lcofiara, not all dgicofjuara are simple, etc. For example, an incomplete XeKrov such as is expressed by a verb without a subject ('... walks'), certainly seems to be common to an indefinite family of complete XeKrd, those that are produced by combining some subject or other with that verb ('Socrates walks', 'Plato walks', etc.). Accordingly, if two of these complete XeKrd are taken into consideration, it is highly likely that we should count them as two complete XeKrd and one incomplete XeKrov. Furthermore, one might wonder whether the peculiarity of a XeKrov results from the peculiarity of the sequence of sounds that expresses it (and if so, whether that sequence should be considered as a type or as a token, a particular sample of that type); or, alternatively, does it result rather from the peculiarity of the 'logical representation' (âvraata XoyiKrj) which might be expressed in words in such a sequence (and in this case too one ought to resolve the ambiguity between type and token, probably settling for type). 103 102 103

Cf. S F F 1 . 8 9 , FDS 762; SKF11.341, FDS 765. I c a n n o t go into these difficult problems in detail here. O n the one h a n d , the Ae/crov seems to be individualized by the 'logical representation' that it expresses: it 'subsists' /caret XoyuK-qv <j>avraoiav, as Sextus Empiricus puts it at vm.70 ( = SFF11.187, FDS 699), that is to say in liaison with a mental event which differs from one person to a n o t h e r as it does at different m o m e n t s within a single person. O n the other h a n d , however, the d£ia>/u,a, which is a


I36

STOICISM

However, whatever the difficulties to be resolved in order to determine from precisely where each XeKrov derives its peculiarity, it certainly does possess a peculiarity and, even if there exist situations in which one might be uncertain whether one was dealing with a single XZKTOV or with several, it would in principle be possible to dispel that uncertainty. The infinite divisibility of the other three incorporeals - time, the void and place - raises difficulties of a different order. If they are infinitely divisible, how can one attribute to them a peculiarity that does not forthwith crumble into an indefinite multiplicity of parts, not one of which has any chance of, in its turn, passing for 'something', since its own singularity is liable to give rise to a new dissolution? However, this problem would only be truly serious if infinite divisibility were a quality that belonged only to these incorporeals and was incompatible with the nature of corporeals. In a physical system in which bodies are not infinitely divisible, that is to say in atomist physics, the physical indivisibility of the atom would coexist uneasily with the infinite divisibility of the place that it occupied, since the unity of the atom was assumed to be incapable of impressing the slightest form of unity upon the place that it occupied (which is why Epicurean atomism very logically conceived of indivisible minima of geometrical extension at a sub-atomic level). But, as we know, the Stoics avoid that distortion by adopting the opposite course: they attribute an infinite divisibility to bodies as well as to the three incorporeals in question. They even go so far as to maintain that those three incorporeals, and likewise the geometrical limits mentioned above, are in this respect 'similar to bodies'. 104 In these circumstances, the whole problem takes on a different aspect: if infinite divisibility is a property of bodies, it must be assumed that it threatens neither their existence nor their unificatory principle (whether this, according to the well-known distinction, be e^ts", vois or ifjvxr])', nor, a fortiori, the peculiarity through which they are STs.1 ° 5 If that is the case, there is, in principle, nothing to prevent infinitely divisible incorporeals from enjoying an analogous peculiarity. It is in connection with place that it seems possible to resolve the problem in the most simple fashion. If bodies, whilst being infinitely divisible, at the same

104 105

particular species of ACKTOV, certainly does seem to subsist, and remain identical to itself, quite independently from any actual assertion m a d e at a particular m o m e n t by a particular person. It is 'assertable to the extent that it is itself concerned' (airoâvrov ooov e 0 ' eavrw), as Chrysippus says, cited by Diogenes Laertius vii.65 ( = SKF11.193, FDS 874); and it remains the same dîco/xa as the changing circumstances render it now true, now false (ibid.). Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 1, p. 202 seem to me to strike the right note: ' N o r should it be a s s u m e d . . . that rational impressions are nothing m o r e t h a n the thoughts of their corresponding lekta. The same proposition can be thought in a variety of ways by the same person or by different persons. The rational impression that my cat is hungry will be a different thought if I see the cat or hear the cat or reflect that I failed to feed it this m o r n i n g . W h a t lekta correspond to will be the propositional content, not all the circumstances and individuality, of a rational impression.' Cf. Chrysippus a p u d Stobaeus, Eclogae 1.142.2 ( = 5 f KFn.482A, FDS 724). Cf. Goldschmidt 1977, p . 38: 'one should n o t conclude from this text (SVF 11.509) that Chrysippus, teaching the infinite divisibility of time, intended to show the unreality of time, for just such a conclusion would equally reduce the reality of bodies to nothing.'



137

time possess a true and objective unity, the places that they occupy must benefit derivatively from that unity, once it is divested of the purely physical aspects (that is to say those related to modes of action and passion, and in particular avrirviria, i.e. resistance) which characterize it as the unity of suchand-such a particular body. To put it another way, the relation of bodies to the places that they occupy is enough, it would seem, to guarantee the latter their multiplicity, their limitation and their peculiarity: 'place subsists in liaison with bodies {rrapvîGrarai TOLS oco/jLaoLv) and from them it receives its limit to the exact extent that it is filled by those bodies'. 106 To be sure, we should not over-simplify the question and imagine that there exists between a body and its place a bi-univocal correspondence: even if every body occupies a place, it is not strictly true that one body corresponds to each place; for in Stoic physics, which is known to admit total mixture, a single place may be occupied by several bodies. It is no doubt so as to do justice to that possibility that Chrysippus produces a disjunctive definition of place: 107 'place is what is entirely occupied by an existent (VTTO OVTOS = by a body), or which is of a kind to be occupied by an existent and is entirely occupied either by something or by several things (eire VTTO TWOS CLTC VTTO TIVOJI/)'. Provided one does not imagine that the use of TWOS and TLVCOV in the second definition introduces incorporeal STs, this second definition clearly seems to resolve the difficulty raised by the possibility of total mixture: even if a place is in fact occupied by one or several bodies, that does not prevent it from being 'occupiable' by a single body, and this restores to it the unity that might seem threatened by the multiplicity of bodies which, in certain circumstances, might in effect occupy it. Given that two bodies could occupy the same place, there was an urgent need to find a means of preserving the identity and unity of that place, for otherwise it would not be possible to distinguish this case from one in which two bodies occupied two different places. The definition of place as 'occupiable' by a (single) corporeal existent answers that need. If we now pass on to the cases of the void and time, other difficulties come to light, stemming first from the two characteristics which are common to both of them and that distinguish them from the other two canonical incorporeals: in the first place, they are both infinite, the void in all three dimensions of space, time in the directions of both the past and the future; 108 secondly, their names both function as 'mass-terms', as likewise do the names of certain bodies: 'the word "time" can be used in two senses, as can "earth", "sea" and "void". These words designate both the whole and its parts.' 109 It is, of course, when they are considered as wholes that time and the void are infinite (except insofar 106 107 108

109

Iamblichus a p u d Simplicius, in Cat. 135.25-8 = SVF 11.507, FDS 734. Stobaeus, Eclogue 1.161.8 = SVF 11.503, FDS 728. Stobaeus, Eclogae 1.106.5 = SVF 11.509A, FDS 808. Cf. also Posidonius a p u d Stobaeus, Eclogae 1. 105. 17 = Edelstein-Kidd fr. 98: time as a whole (au/u,7ras) is infinite Kara -nav\ the past a n d the future are infinite Kara r t , since each of t h e m is limited only at the level of the present (Kara TOP irapovra fxovov). Cf. Stobaeus, Eel. 1.106.5 = S T F 11.509A, FDS SoS.


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as two parts of time, the past and the future, are equally infinite but 'only in one direction'). Moving on from there, one may well wonder whether it is the representation of time and the void as wholes or as parts that is dominant in determining their status as NESTs. But the question cannot be posed in the same way for these two cases. Let us begin with the void, which is the less complex case. Although, as we have seen, it 'resembles bodies' insofar as, like place, time and geometrical limits, it is infinitely divisible, in another sense it presents itself as the purest of all incorporeals, even, one might say, as the incorporeal par excellence. By definition 'a desert devoid of bodies (iprj [xla ac&âros)' (SVF1.95), it does not pose either the Stoics or the ancient 'physicists' in general the problem of whether it is incorporeal, but only that of whether it is real, and in what sense. For if it is real, it could not be other than incorporeal. The distinction between the void and place allows the Stoics not to conceive of the void as remaining that void once it is occupied by a body; it has the capacity to accommodate a body without ever actually accommodating it, as such;110 this capacity to accommodate a body is the only positive determination that may be attributed to it.x 11 Limitless (SVF11.503, FDS 728), without internal differentiation (SVF 11.550) and without dimensional orientation (SVF 11.557), t n e notion of the void is 'as simple as could possibly be' (SVF11.541); it coincides so perfectly, with neither excess nor default, with the notion of incorporeality that one might be tempted to wonder how there could possibly be any incorporeals other than it. Accordingly, the Stoics' main argument to prove the reality of an extra-cosmic void (that is, the need for a space in which the world can dilate when periodic conflagrations take place, cf. SVF 11.537 a n d 609) is not concerned also to show that this void is incorporeal: given that the world, by definition, contains all things corporeal, whatever leaves it room to expand must be incorporeal. The same applies in the argument of the 'space traveller',112 one which, curiously enough, does not even envisage the possibility that the traveller, having reached the limit of the sphere of the fixed stars, could then stretch out his hand through a body that does not offer sufficient resistance, be it subtle aether or even air of a more vulgar nature. The difficulty in these circumstances is to understand why the void, lacking 110

111

112

Cf. Alexander apud Simplicius, In De cael. 285.28 ( = SVF 11.535B). This capacity to accommodate a body without being actually occupied by any body itself implies incorporeality, as is indicated in a passage of Diogenes Laertius vn. 140 ( = SKF11.543, FDS 723), which seemed 'absurd' to von Arnim (cf. app. crit. adloc, and 1.95B, app. crit.) only because he took it to be a definition of the incorporeal, whereas it is no more than a justification of the incorporeality of the void. Cf. the description by Cleomedes, De mot. circ. 8.11-14: 'its notion is extremely simple: it is incorporeal and intangible, it has no form and cannot receive one, it is neither acted upon nor does it act, it is purely and simply capable of receiving a body' {SVFu.541). Cf. Simplicius, In De cael. 284.28 = SKF11.535A. I should note in passing that this is the only text I have come across which uses rt twice in the same breath, the first time to designate the void outside the world, and the next time to designate the body which would prevent a traveller from extending his hand if he was not truly at the edge of the world.



139

positive determining features to such a degree, should still be classed as a ST, rather than as a NST or even, in the manner of the early Atomists, as 'nothing'. 113 It is worth noting that the oifrt? test does not justify classifying the void among the STs; for that test is disqualified for 'mass-terms' and, as we have seen, the Stoics had recognized the void to be one of those terms. Let us consider the following syllogism: if something is outside the world, it is not in the world; there is (the) void outside the world; so there is not (the) void in the world. The position of the Stoics vis-a-vis this syllogism is a strange one: for them both premisses and the conclusion are all true, as is the consequence that may be drawn from the syllogism, namely that the void is a ST. However, the syllogism is not valid since the void is a mass-term. In that case, two alternatives follow: either the Stoics consider that it is valid, in which case they are clearly mistaken; or else they consider it invalid, in which case they forgo the means of applying to the void their habitual instrument for proving that a given item is a ST. How did the Stoics steer clear of this double reef? The first thing to note is that it did not occur to them to use the syllogism that we have imagined: even if the existence of the void outside the world is proven, they do not consider that they are dispensed from demonstrating the inexistence of the void inside the world. The two theses are presented as logically independent (cf. fjuev and 8e in SVF1.95 and 96); and the second rests, not upon an argument analogous to the syllogism cited above, but upon the 'phenomena' (SVF 11.546), that is to say the avfJLTTvoLa, the Gvvrovia (SVF 11.543) a n d the avfjiTrddeia (SVF II.546) which, between them, unite the various parts of the world. In view of all this, the solution to the problem appears to be as follows: once it has been proved, by two independent demonstrations, that there is no void within the world and that there is one outside it, the term 'void', while remaining a term denoting mass, applicable in the same sense both to the whole and to its parts, no longer means anything more than a continuous whole of a single nature when it is applied to the whole (cf. SVF1.94, ddpoov; SFF1.96, awexrj), except, that is, for the enclave within it represented by the world, which limits it internally just as a hole limits the continuity of a Gruyere cheese; 114 and when the term 'void' is applied to the parts of the whole, it 113

114

It will be remembered that the ancient Atomists had called the void ovSev, as opposed to the body or whatever was full, which they called hev (DK 68A37, A49, B156). In more poetic vein, I would like to cite the following lines from P. Valery ('Ebauche d'un serpent', in Charmes): Tu gardes les coeurs de connaitre Que l'univers n'est qu'un defaut Dans la purete du Non-etre! (You keep hearts from knowing That the universe is simply a fault In the purity of Non-being!) Needless to say, this reversal of ontological values is in no sense Stoic.


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simply designates parts arbitrarily selected from that continuous whole. In these circumstances, the void successfully passes a revised form of the OVTIS test. The double demonstration of its existence outside the world and its inexistence inside the world bestowed upon the term 'void' the more precise meaning of 'void outside the world', whether considered as a whole or in its parts. Accordingly, it may be said that if it exists outside the world, it does not exist inside the world; it thereby qualifies as a ST by the ordinary means of the OVTLS test. The Stoic theory of time is much more difficult than their theory of the void, for reasons that have to do with the very nature of the thing (well known to have embarrassed many philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle down to Bergson and Heidegger, and including Saint Augustine, and many other minds of comparable calibre), and also with the obscurity of the few remaining passages that testify to the thought of the early Stoics on this question. Finding myself following on after Victor Goldschmidt's great work, Le Systeme sWiden et Videe de temps, and in the same field as the very fine study which Malcolm Schofield (1988) devotes to a crucial aspect of the problem, I will, if I may, limit myself here to a few remarks on one particular question: is the ontological status that the Stoics attributed to time, namely that of a NEST, primarily motivated by an analysis of time as a whole, which is then extended from the whole to the parts, or is it, on the contrary, initially attributed to the parts (or to certain specific parts) of time and then extrapolated to apply to time as a whole? In studying this question, we cannot depend on the characteristics that are common to both time and the void, although these are by no means unimportant: time, like the void, is a term that is applied both to the whole and to the parts of that whole; and time, like the void, is infinite, although not in exactly the same sense. 115 However, the parallelism collapses at several points that are no less important. The parts of the void (like the parts of space) are strictly homogeneous amongst themselves and also in relation to the whole, whereas the parts of time (or at least those which could be called 'egocentric' parts: the past, the present and the future) are ontologically different from one another and also from time as a whole. 116 Furthermore, in the temporal domain, there exists no concept - or at least no term - which stands in the same relation to total and infinite time as place does to the void. It is true that one can try to re-establish the symmetry, as Goldschmidt does, by appealing to the following analogy: what the infinite void is to a place limited by the body which occupies it, total and infinite time (what Marcus Aurelius was to call the alcov) is to time limited by the action which occupies it, that is to say the present. 117 115 1x6

117

Cf. Stobaeus, Eel. 1.106.5 ( = SKFn.5O9A, FDS 808). Ibid. This is the famous text in which Chrysippus says that only the present virdpxîv, whereas the past and the future vêoravai. Despite having decided not to go into the question of interpretation raised by these verbs, at this point I cannot refrain from remarking that it remains a complete mystery to me why Chrysippus is not willing to say that the past vvrjp^ and that the future uTrapfei (particularly in view of his theory of destiny). Goldschmidt 1977, p. 39.



141

But this analogy seems to me to be flawed by several differences: in the first place, the limited parts of time are not necessarily determined by an action in the present ('last year'; 'the day after tomorrow'); and secondly, there is no such thing as 'empty' time which is beyond the limits of the time occupied by the movements of the world (SVF 11.510, FDS 807). So let us return to the specific problem of time, taking as our point of departure the extremely original idea recently put forward by David Sedley. According to him, 118 the items of a temporal nature which in the eyes of the Stoics count as 'actual incorporeals' are 'individual portions of time' (for example, 'yesterday'); time itself, as a 'species' to which those individual portions belong, is a universal concept, and so is a NST. The textual basis for this interpretation seems somewhat inadequate: it is true that, according to Sextus Empiricus, 119 the Stoics recognized four ecSr] of incorporeals, one of which was time. But that does not necessarily mean that each of the items on this list is a species that incorporates individual members of its own; the text may simply mean that the Stoics recognized four forms of incorporeals; and even if the term ciSos should be understood to mean 'species', that term, as Sedley himself notes, 120 can be used by the Stoics with a 'supremely specific' (elSiKtoTdTov) sense, according to which an individual such as Socrates is himself an eiSos with no etSo?.121 Otherwise, so far as I know, there is no text that attests that the Stoics considered time (or the void, another massincorporeal) as a whole whose relation to its parts was that of a species to its individual members. Furthermore, in the work which he has produced with Anthony Long, David Sedley himself seems to have appreciably toned down the boldness of that interpretation. It is true that he still writes that an incorporeal 'like a time' does not exist, insofar as it is not a body; and he continues to take 'today' as an example of an expression that is taken to 'name something even though that something has no actual or independent existence.' 122 But nowhere in this work, unless I am mistaken, is time 'as a species' assimilated to a 'universal concept' (certainly not in the commentary on the texts on time, pp. 306-8). On the contrary, Long and Sedley (quite rightly, in my opinion) criticize Proclus for having inferred the incorporeality of time from its purely conceptual nature, 123 remarking that this is 'probably an incorrect inference' (p. 307). Having said which, it might still be supposed that the ontological status of time was determined on the basis of an analysis of its individual parts, or those of its parts that were individualized by the particular movement of a corporeal individual, an analysis then extended to apply to time as a whole. However, the surviving texts do not support that supposition; and the infinity of time, which belongs only to time as a whole and to those parts of it that are limitless, 118 119 120 121 122

1985, p . 91 n. 5. Sextus M x . 2 l 8 ( = SVFII.331, FDS 720): TCOV SC aocofJidrcov reoaapa e'i8rj Kar 1985, p . 91 n. 19. Cf. Diogenes Laertius vn.61. O n this point, p e r h a p s I m a y refer the reader to chapter 3 above. 123 1987, vol. 1, p . 164. Cf. Proclus, In Tim.iu.9s. 7-15 ( = S K F n . 5 2 i , FDS 716).


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namely the past and the future, seems to have played a decisive role in the demonstration of its incorporeality. Chrysippus, speaking of the infinite and incorporeal void, associates it with time in the following terms: 'just as whatever is corporeal is finite, so that which is incorporeal is infinite: thus, time is infinite, as is the void.'x 2 4 This text presents infinity and incorporeality as the necessary and sufficient conditions of one another, which is something that could put the Stoics in a tricky position when they have to attribute the status of incorporeality to non-infinite realities, such as places and the XeKrd.125 At any rate, it shows clearly that when they think of time as incorporeal, they above all think of it as infinite, that is to say in its totality, and, more precisely, as being composed of the infinite past and the infinite future. 126 Nor is that all: not only does the incorporeality of time appear as a characteristic attribute of time taken in its totality, but furthermore one may well wonder whether that incorporeality is truly transmitted to all its parts, particularly the parts of time that one might call 'natural' or 'cosmic', those that are determined by the cycles of the sun and the moon. According to Plutarch, 127 Chrysippus set out the following argument in Book I of his Questions on Physics: It is not the case that the night is a body and the evening and the dawn and midnight are not bodies; and it is not the case that the day is a body and the first day of the month is not also a body and the tenth and thefifteenthand thirtieth and the month and the summer and the autumn and the year. This passage and its context are worth examining closely: are the 'cosmic parts' of time bodies? In presenting Chrysippus' argument, Plutarch tells us that it takes the form of a sorites (Kara yuKpov Xoyos). According to the current interpretation, that sorites should be understood as a modus ponens: the initial premiss ('night is a body') is considered to be accepted by Chrysippus, and the other statements that are 'step by step' implied ('the evening is a body', 'the dawn is a body', etc.) are considered to be justifiably deduced from that initial premiss. 128 This interpretation produces a definitely paradoxical consequence: namely, that 124

Cf. Stobaeus, Eclogue 1.161.8 ( = SVF 11.503, FDS 728). T h e deployment of the articles rules out any ambiguity as to the distribution of subjects and attributes: KaQairep Se TO oojâriKov

125

T h e contradiction between the theoretical finiteness of bodies and the infinity of the void, which can nevertheless be occupied by a body, is exploited by an anti-Stoic objection m a d e by Alexander a p u d Simplicius, In De cael. 285.28 ( = SKF11.535B). Cf. Stobaeus, Eel. 1.106.5 ^ S K F 11.509, FDS 808): TOV xpovov iravTa aneipov elvai l(f> €KaT€pa • /ecu yap TOV TrapeXrjXvBoTa /cat TOV /xiXXovTa aneipov efveu. Plutarch, Comm. not. 1084c ( = SVF 11.665, FDS 971). Here are a few samples of this current interpretation: Zeller 1904, vol. m . i . i , p . 124 ('Wollte Chrysippus mit diesem freilich hochst ungelenken A u s d r u c k wohl schwerlich etwas anderes sagen als, dass das Reale, was jenen N a m e n entspricht, in gewissen korperlichen Zustanden liege'); Goldschmidt 1977, p . 41 ('We k n o w , for example, that the Stoics defined winter as " t h e air above the earth, which cools as a result of being distant from the s u n " (Diogenes Laertius VII. 151 = SVF 11.693); similarly, a m o n t h , taken n o t as a purely temporal determination (and, as such, incorporeal (cf. Cleomedes, de mot. circ. 202.11-23)), but as a body, is " t h e m o o n turning its shining side towards u s " (Chrysippus a p u d Stobaeus, Eclogae 1.219.24 = SVF

7T€7T€paOfJL€VOV

126

127 128

€?VCU, OVTOJS

TO aOOJ/JLCLTOV OL7T€LpOV.



143

the cosmic parts of time are bodies and that time as a whole is incorporeal. Yet this is not an intolerable paradox: for one thing, it is not the case that there are no examples of incorporeals having parts that are not incorporeal; 129 for another, a number of texts give definitely 'corporealizing' definitions of one or another cosmic part of time. 130 This explains how it was that the positive interpretation of Chrysippus' sorites became accepted, so far as I know without challenge. I myself shall nevertheless now challenge it, for the following reasons: (a) When you look closely at the set of definitions that the Stoics produced for the cosmic parts of time, you notice that they were operating on a number of different levels, tending now to 'corporealize', now to 'decorporealize' them. The definitions of the four seasons in Diogenes Laertius (vii.151-2) are extraordinarily diverse in this respect. Those of winter and summer are, so to speak, directly corporealizing: the position of the definitional genus is occupied by a body, namely the supra-terrestrial air. 131 The definition of spring might be said to be indirectly corporealizing: here, the position of the genus is occupied by a quality, the balanced mixture {evKpaola) that affects a body, to wit the air; 132 since this quality of a body is itself corporeal, the spring may be said to be the object of one of those 'grafts of corporeality' that I referred to earlier. As for the autumn, it is defined as an effect,133 that is to say as an incorporeal. A similar heterogeneity reappears in other contexts. Chrysippus produces different definitions for a month (/XT^) and a lunar phase (jLtet?). His definition for the former is definitely decorporealizing ('the period of the course of the moon'). For the latter, he produces two alternative definitions linked by the conjunction rj: the first is, so to speak, de-objectivizing ('the visible aspect that the moon takes on from our point of view', TO L\OLVOS). (c2) In other cases, the subject is qualified in a way that implies not only an internal disposition, but also an external activity and the possession of the physical organs necessary for the exercise of that activity. In this respect, the gourmet and the wine buff are distinguished from the heavy eater and the heavy drinker (di/jo^dyos, oiVo'0Au£). The latter are only said to be heavy eaters and drinkers if they possess not only the dispositional qualities which characterize the former, but also the physical organs which allow them to function; if those organs are not operational, even if the disposition remains, the qualification disappears. A gourmet who loses all his teeth remains a gourmet; a heavy eater who loses all his teeth remains a gourmet but ceases to be a heavy eater. If a quality is a permanent disposition, a constituent part of the identity of the subject throughout the course of time, one can see how it is that the qualification 'gourmet' corresponds adequately to a quality while the qualification 'heavy eater' does not. Who were the individual Stoics whose views this passage of Simplicius 152

I should point out here that lines 212.19-22 of Simplicius' text are omitted in SVF, as a result of a haplography. They should be restored between lines 38 and 39, vol. 11, p. 128.


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STOICISM

transmits to us? The vocabulary in which the distinction between (ci) and (c2) is expressed may suggest Antipater. In a passage which we have already examined from another point of view, Diogenes Laertius passes on to us the definition that this second-century BC Stoic gave of the definition: \6yos KCLT* avdXvoLv aTTdpTLôvTOJs €Acvo€L. Cf. also the interesting T 11.


A WAY OF NOT BEING

163

because one is then referring to the 'associated predicate' (TO irapaKeLfjuevov KarrjyoprujLa) which is 'to live' (£,fjv) in a particular manner' (Tio). Long and Sedley (1987, vol. 1, p. 400) consider this distinction between evSatfiovia and evSacixovetv 'rather strained'. That seems to be because, as they can see it, the normal form of a predicate is a personal verb without a subject ('... is happy'), an impersonal infinitive ('to be happy') being only a secondary form of predicate. So they think that, to explain the idea that our end is 'a predicate', that is to say something essentially 'incomplete', it is necessary to say that our wish is that this predicate should become true of us. They write as follows: 'We aim at happiness in order that 'being happy' can be truly predicated of ourselves' (my italics). I must confess that this explanation seems to me even odder than the oddity that it is supposed to explain. To be sure, 'to be happy' can be truly predicated of us if and only if we are happy. But in an intentional context it is not legitimate to substitute one of these expressions for the other. What a peasant wants is that it should rain, not that it should be true that it is raining. What we actually want is to be happy, not that the predicate 'to be happy' should be truly predicated of us. There is no advantage in suggesting that the POI thesis is more adequately represented by the second formulation than by the first; all that this achieves is to create a difficulty which can, on the contrary, be avoided if one accepts that in the context of the POI thesis, as in that of its pre-Stoic antecedents, the normal way to express the 'predicate' is by the infinitive.6 What remains to be done is examine the most difficult and best known texts that relate to this subject, namely T1-3. Leaving aside, for the moment, the major difficulty that they incorporate, - namely the question of the exact meaning of the verbal adjectives alperov and alpereov, the doctrine that they present is a transposition of one with which we are already familiar. The general distinction between the corporeal things that we desire to possess and the incorporeal predicates that we desire is transposed, at the level of the sage's psychology, into a distinction between goods, ayaOd, and 'benefits', OX/ÂT?IJLaTa. Virtues, such as <j>povr]Gis, are goods; the corresponding 'benefits' are predicates such as (f>poveiv or e'x^v rrjv p6vrjoiv. In my view, there is no need to distort that transposition by untimely injections of'morality'. For example, there is no good reason for thinking that the beneficiary of the 'benefit' must be someone other than the virtuous man himself (even if it is also true that those close to him - his friends and fellow-citizens - may well derive some advantage from his virtuous actions). Nor can I see any reason to draw a distinction between €x€iv TVV p6vrjoiv and (f>povetv, interpreting the former expression as 6

The formulation of the predicate in the infinitive is customary, as we have seen, in the dialectici veteres, and it is equally so in the context of the POI thesis (see T2) and in that of the theory of causality, which is possibly the original context of the notions of Ae/cTov and Kar-qyopiqâ (cf. SFF1.89,488, n.341,349, and the study by Frede 1980). The formulation in the indicative is, on the other hand, customary in the possibly later context of the analysis of language (cf. SVF 11.183, 184).


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a description of a disposition ('to possess wisdom', 'to be of a wise disposition') and the latter as a description of an exercise or activity ('to exercise wisdom', 'to act in conformity with a wise disposition').7 What remains to be understood is why the distinction between the good, which is a body, and the benefit, which is a predicate, is also expressed by a distinction between two types of verbal adjectives, the one ending in -TOS, the other in -reog. If we try to give these suffixes a meaning authorized by usage and limited to whatever sense is strictly necessary in the context, I think the following suggestions may be made: (i) The benefit, which is a predicate, is alpereov, 'to be chosen'. However, the texts with which we are concerned do not say that it is alpereov because we have to choose it, or because we ought to choose it (in any sense of psychological necessity or moral obligation); they simply say that it is aipereov because we do choose it (cf. T2). The suffix -reov could thus mean no more than that the benefit is 'to be chosen' because it is, in this instance and in the domain defined by the corresponding good, the only thing that we can choose. Presented with a liquid that is drinkable and of a kind to quench thirst, the only thing that we can wish is to drink it; presented with a virtue that is 'possessible' and of a kind to make us happy, the only thing that we can wish is to possess it. (ii) The good, which is a body, is alperov. Here the situation is complicated by the multiplicity of the possible meanings of the Greek suffix. Those meanings include two to which the texts in question make no allusion: they do not say that a good is aiperov because it is possible to choose it, nor that it is aiperov because it is worthy of being chosen. They simply say that, even if goods are not alperia as benefits are, they nevertheless relate in some way to the ai'pecis, and the relationship may be expressed by the term alperov (cf. jjL€vroL in T2 and el apa in T3); and they also say that goods are alperd because to have them is what we choose (cf. Sio in T2). The term alperov - and this is also a possible meaning of the suffix - could thus mean simply that goods are 'chosen', it being understood, as is indicated by the context, that they are chosen in the particular sense that we choose to possess them. In other words, they are 'chosen' in the sense that the notion of choice is an essential element in the expression of our relationship to them. 7

Lack of space prevents me from discussing as I should the interpretation given of this passage by a number of authors, such as Dumont and Long. Favouring a differentiation between pov€Lv and e'xciv TTJV p6vr)oLv, Long (1976, pp. 87-9) bases his thesis on the difficult expression TO (f>pov€iv, o deuiptirai napa TO €X^LV TTJV $p6vr\oiv (T3), which he understands as follows: 'the exercise of practical wisdom, which is understood to depend upon the possession of practical wisdom'. Perhaps it could be objected that in the parallel texts, a perfect equivalence is posited between the simple expression of the predicate and its compound expression (cf. T 9 : TO TVX^LV TTJS evdaifjiovLas,

oirep TCLVTOV efvcu TO> €V8OLL[JLOV€IV); in T 3 itself,

that equivalence between pov€iv and ex€iv TTJV povr)oLv seems implicit (cf. aipovfjueOa JJLCV . . . TO pov€Lv, a n d eêiv auTO [ = TO alp€T6v = T7]v <j>p6vr)oiv] alpovîeQa). These arguments

suggest that the controversial expression of T3, TO <j>pov€iv, o dewpehaL -napa TO ex€iv TTJV (/>p6vr)oiv, should be interpreted as an equivalence. For my own part, I would suggest the following: Wo pov€Lv, which is the conceptual equivalent to TO CX^LV TTJV <j>povqaiv\


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The distinction between the alperov and the alpereov could thus result from there being two possible ways of breaking up statements of the alpovfjueda €X€LV TVV P°vr)<JLV type. By breaking it as follows: atpovfjueda / e'x 6tv TVV

(f>p6vrjGiv, the verbal expression of choice {alpovixeda) is isolated and the exact nature of the proper object of the choice is determined, for that object is designated by the rest of the statement (ex^tv TT)V cfrpovrjoiv). By separating da ^xîV I TVV P°vrIGLV' o n e isolates the designation of the good (rrjv and one determines the exact nature of the relation that we have with that good, a relation which is designated by the remainder of the statement { Now we must replace the POI thesis within the interesting and important context in which it appears in Ti. Nothing in Ti is incompatible with the distinction drawn between the corporeal good and the incorporeal predicate, which is the distinction with which we have been concerned so far. However, that theme is now replaced by another, in which incorporeal predicates are contrasted no longer to corporeal realities, but to other incorporeals: the d^LOjfjiara or propositions. This pair of XeKrd of different kinds is here related to two different types of psychic acts: assents (ovyKaradeoeis) are given (when they are given) to propositions whereas, in conformity with the POI thesis, impulses (opfxat) are directed towards predicates, to wit the predicates that are in some way contained (nepLexofjievd TTOJS) within the propositions which constitute the object of assents. In the texts which we examined earlier, the predicate was essentially considered as an incorporeal, and inasmuch as it was distinct from the corporeal realities to which it was related. In Ti, the predicate's essential feature is that it is incomplete, and distinct from the incorporeals which are complete, that is to say the propositions, to which it is related in some way.8 The Stoics were faced with the task of accommodating the POI thesis with the theory of assent. In itself, the POI thesis was in danger of short-circuiting the moment of moral responsibility in an action: in a possible description of the action, the <j>avraoia of a good automatically brings into being an impulse which is directed towards the predicate associated with that good; and that impulse in its turn prompts a corresponding action. But, as is well known, the Stoics were concerned to introduce into the analysis of human action the moment of assent which lies 'within our power' and in which the responsibility of the agent is concentrated. They also held (as it is reasonable to infer from the testimony of Sextus, M vn. 154) that the normal and primary object of assent is a proposition. To accommodate both the moment of assent and the moment of impulse, they accordingly had to accommodate both the propositions which are the object of assent and the predicates towards which impulses are directed. That is what Ti does, albeit, unfortunately, in a somewhat covert 8

This double perspective corresponds to the one sketched in above on the basis of the double expression of the predicate as both an infinitive and as an indicative without a subject.


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fashion, by declaring the predicates in question to be 'contained in some way (TTCOSY within the propositions in question. Is it possible at least to conjecture the substance behind that exaggeratedly unspecific TTOJS! The simplest hypothesis is to assume that the proposition which is the object of assent is what might be called a judgement of appropriateness which bears directly upon the action towards which the agent is impelled. For example, one could say:9 by giving our assent we accept the truth of a proposition such as 'I ought to take some exercise'. A genuine assent to that proposition is accompanied by an impulse to take some exercise, an impulse which would be expressed linguistically as an imperative: Take some exercise!' The impulse is directed not towards the proposition 'I ought to take some exercise' in its entirety, but towards the action to which we are impelled by the assent that we have given to it and which is expressed by the predicate contained by that proposition, namely 'to take some exercise'. But I detect in that suggestion the following difficulty. According to the analysis proposed, the predicate ('to take some exercise') is not, strictly speaking, 'contained in some way' in the judgement of appropriateness which is supposed to constitute the object of assent: on the contrary, it is contained there as explicitly as it possibly could be. 10 Furthermore, it is hard to understand the necessity for the ploy undertaken by Ti, which starts out by suggesting that all impulses are assents and then corrects that assimilation (77S77 84) by distinguishing between assent and impulse by means of the type of category to which their respective objects belong. If the proposition which constitutes the object of assent was the judgement of appropriateness 'I ought to do such-and-such a thing', there would seem to be no difference between assenting to that judgement and having an impulse to do that thing. At any rate, one of the properties of assent and impulse is necessarily common to both: if the judgement of appropriateness is true, the assent and the impulse are both correct; if that judgement is false, both the assent and the impulse are incorrect. In these circumstances, to distinguish between the assent and the impulse by invoking a difference between the types of category to which they respectively belong seems to be pointlessly pedantic. That would not be the case if there were reason to take into consideration cases in which the parallelism between the correctness of the assent and that of the impulse is broken. If, for example, it happened that assent given to a false proposition were accompanied by an impulse to act correctly, it would become crucially important to draw a distinction between on the one hand the proposition approved by the assent and, on the other, the predicate to which the impulse is directed. And this is indeed a situation which the Stoics not only studied but also considered to be of the first importance. They studied it in the context of their famous distinction between what is 9 10

See Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 11, p. 200. This remark remains valid whatever the more or less imperious formulation of this judgement of appropriateness ('I ought', 'I must', 'it is necessary', etc.).


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true and the truth. T12 explains, in this connection, why and how it is that the sage can 'speak falsely' on occasion without, however, being 'a liar'. The same applies to certain ordinary types of expert - doctors, generals, grammarians; and their example helps us to understand the behaviour of the sage. For example, a general may forge letters announcing the arrival of reinforcements, in order to raise the morale of his troops. In this way, he gets them to give their assent to a false proposition, namely 'reinforcements are arriving' and also (but implicitly) to a true judgement of appropriateness, which in a way results from that false proposition, namely 'we ought to remain at our posts'; and this also produces in them an impulse to remain at those posts. The predicate which constitutes the object of their impulse ('to remain at our posts') is, in this instance, not spelt out within the proposition which constitutes the object of their explicit assent ('reinforcements are arriving'). However, the link that I have just indicated perhaps justifies our saying that it is contained there 'in a way'. It may be objected that the above is an exceptional situation. But, on the contrary, so far is it from being exceptional that it provides the Stoics with the model according to which they conceive the operation of divine and providential destiny where men who are not sages are concerned, that is to say with regard to all of us ordinary people. According to T13, Chrysippus, wishing to show that an impression was not a sufficient cause of assent, went back to the example of the sage telling a falsehood and thereby producing false impressions in the mind of a non-sage: if the impression were a sufficient cause of assent, the sage would be morally responsible for the prejudice to which the non-sage is subjected when he gives his assent to the false proposition - and this cannot be the case. But, according to Ti 3, a god acts exactly as a sage does: both produce false impressions in the minds of non-sages, that is to say all of us ordinary people; not because they need (SeofxeVou?) us to give our assent to those impressions but because, to realize their providential plan, they need us to feel the particular impulse that will accompany our assent, and to act according to that impulse. It is we ourselves, poor, predictably credulous fools that we are, who give our assent to those false impressions; so it is we who bear the moral responsibility for that incorrect assent.11 However, that does not prevent us from acting exactly as the god 'needs' us to act. 11

It is true that the position which Plutarch here attributes to Chrysippus has sometimes been considered 'absurd'. According to Inwood 1985, pp. 85-6, Chrysippus could not have adopted it unless under extreme polemic pressure which forced him to take refuge in it in the absence of any other alternative. However, that disqualification of Plutarch's testimony would only become necessary if the text attributed to Chrysippus the notion, clearly unacceptable from a Stoic point of view, of a human action without assent; but in reality, this notion is clearly presented as a consequence that Plutarch is trying to force upon Chrysippus. For Chrysippus, the god does not need the avAos to give assent to a false proposition; but that does not mean to say that he does not need the av\os to give the slightest assent to any proposition at all. The av\os does not act without giving assent; he acts as destiny wills him to act, without destiny willing him to give the assent that he does in fact give. The idea that an end may be willed without the inevitable means to that end, as such, being willed may be disputed, but it is certainly not absurd.


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In this way - and let this be my conclusion - we can see that the POI thesis, which may have derived from the fascinating discourse of Clinomachus Ilepl dîcujjidTcov KCLL KarrjyoprjiJidTojv, eventually, having been further developed by the Stoics, served to accomplish one of the most difficult tasks that these philosophers set themselves: that of reconciling divine providence and human responsibility. God makes us chase after good predicates, at the same time giving us the chance to grant our assent to bad propositions. The Portuguese have a way of expressing this. They say that 'God writes straight in curved lines'.

APPENDIX Tl = Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus, Eclogae n, p. 88, 1-6 W = SFF111.171 = LS 331. IJdoas 8e rds opîds ovyKaraOeoeis etvat, rds 8e Trpa/crt/cas" /cat TO KLVTJTLKOV 7T€pL€X€tv. "H8rj 8e dXXto JJL€V elvai ovyKaradeoeis, err dXXo 8e opfids- /cat ovyKaradeoeis /xev a^taj/xaat'rtatv, 6pp,ds 8e eirl /car^yopTâTa, rd irepiexoyievd TTOJS ev TOIS d^LCOfjLaoiv < ols > at

ovyKaradeoeis.

T2 = ibid, n, pp. 97, 15-98, 6 = 5KFm.9i = LS 33J. Ata /cat aVoê/CTea, Kary]yopy\\xara ovra, irapaKelyLeva S' dyadols. AlpeioSai fJL€v yap r)[JLas rd alperea /cat ftovXeoOai rd fiovXrjrea /cat opeyeoOai rd opeKrea. Karrjyoprjfjidrcxjv yap at' re alpeoeis /cat opeêis /cat fiovXrjoeis ytvovrat, ojovep /cat at opfjuai • €X€LV ^VTOL alpovêOa /catfiovXofjieda/cat OJJLOICOS opeyopêda rdyaOd, 8LO /cat alperd /cat flovXrjrd /cat ope/cra rdyadd ion. Tqv yap (frpov-qoiv aipovfAeda cêtv /cat rrjv oaxfrpoovvrjv, ov jLta Aid TO (frpovetv /cat oaxfipoveiv, doajfJLara b'vra /cat Kar^yoprj/jLara. T3 = ibid. n.jS.j-i2 = SVF 111.S9. Aiacf>€p€iv 8e Xeyovoi TO alperov /cat TO alpereov. Alperov fjuev etvat < ayaôv> 77av, alpereov 8e dxf)eXr)p,a rrdv, o Becxipeirai irapd TO eyeiv TO dyadov. AC o alpovfjieda \xev TO alpereov, otov TO (frpoveLV, o dewpeiraL irapd TO exîv rrjv (frpovrjotv • TO 8e alperov ovx alpovfjueda, aAA' el apa, ex€lv CIUTO alpovjjueda. T4 = Sextus Empiricus, M viii.409 = SVF 11.85 = LS 27 E. "Qorrep yap, aoiv, 6 7Tai8orpl^T]s /cat OTrAojLtaôs" eoO' ore fjiev Xafiofievos rcbv ^^tpcoF rod TratSo? pvdfjLiêi /cat StSaa/cet rtva? Kiveiodai KLvrjoeLS, eod' ore 8e drrwOev eorajs Kai 77cos KLVOV(JL€VOS iv pvdfia) TTapeêt eavrov eKecvco irpos fiifjurjaiv, OVTOJ /cat rcbv (f>avraorchv evia fjuev olovel i/javovra /cat Oiyydvovra rod rjyefjLOVLKOV rroielrai TTJV ev TOVTCO TV7TCOGLV, OTToiov eon TO XevKOV teal fieXav /cat KOLVtbs TO acDjtxa, eVta 8e Tocavrrjv exet (jtvotv, rov TjyefjLOViKov err avrols câvraoLOVfjuevov /cat ovx ^7r> avrtov, oiTOid eon rd dacofxara Xexrd.

T5 = Plato, Symp. 206A. Mp' ovv, fj 8'^, ovTws dirXovv eon Xeyeiv on ol avdpooiroi rdyadov ipcbotv; - Nai, e(f)7]v. — TL 8e', ov irpoodereov, ecfrrj, on /cat etvat TO dyadov avrols epcooLV, — npoadereov. — Âp ovv, €rj, /cat ov JJLOVOV etVat, aAAa /cat act efvat; — Xat rovro TTpoadereov. — "Eonv apa £vXXrjl38r}v, e8e fJLTJV KXrjpOVOfJLLOLS,

dAAa TOV KXrjpovofjLrjoai • OVTOJOI 8e ov8e yvwoetos aAAa TOV yvcovai • ov8e yap TToXiTtias opOrjs, dAAa TOV TroXireveoOai • TOVTLOV OVV at evx^h ^>v KOI atVâets" • KCLI TOVTCOV at atTT/act? cov /cat at €7rtû/xtat • TO Se evxeodai KCLI opeyeodan, KaTaXXrjXous yiyveadai els TO %x€iv T®- d y a ^ d /cat TOL TrapaKeLfieva c u ^ ^ T9 = Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus, Eclogae 11, p. 77, 23-7 W = SVF 111.16 = LS 63A. . . . TTJV €v8atfjLovLav elvai XeyovTts [sc. Cleanthes, Chrysippus and all their followers] ov\ €T€pav TOV evSaifJiOvos j8toi>, /catrot ye Aeyovre? TTJV fjuev evSaifjLOVtav OKOTTOV €/c/cetor$at, TeXos 8'efvat TO ri>^€tv TTJS euSat/xovta?, oirep TOLVTOV etvat TW ev8atjLtov€tv. T10 = Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus, Eclogae 11, p. 76, 16-21 W = SVF111.3. To Se TeXos XeyeoOaL Tpix&S . . . Aeyoucrt he /cat TOV OKOTTOV TeXos, otov TOV OfJLoXoyovfxevov jStov avaopLKtos XeyovTes errt TO TrapaAcetjLtevov T i l = Herophilus, De Stoico nominum usu, apud Origen, In Psalmos, PG xn, 1053 A B = FDS 241. TEXOS 8'etvat Aeyouat KaTrjyoprjfjLa, ov eve/cev TOL XOLTTOL npaTTOfjiev, avTO 8e ovSevos €V€KCL, TO Se ov^vyovv TOVTCp, KaddiTep rj evScufjuovia TCO evSaifjioveiv, OKOTTOV • o Sr) k'

€OTL TLOV alp€TtOV.

T12 = Sextus Empiricus M vii.43-4. . . ./cat chs ol apioTOL TLOV oTpaTr^ywv irpos evdvfjLiav TLOV vnoTaTTOfjuevcov OLVTOIS OTpOLTltOTtOV IToXXaKIS €7TLGToXds OL7T6 OVjJLfJLaXL&tOV noXetOV TrXaodfJieVOL lfj€v8oS (JL€V TL Aeyofat, ov i/»euSovrat Se oca TO fjurj diro Trovrjpds yvtojjirjs TOVTO iroieiv, . . . cbSe /cat o GO(f)6s, T0VT€OTLV 6 TY)V TOV dXrjdoVS lTnGTr\\XV)V e^tOV, ip€L fJL€V 7TOT€ l/j€v80S, l/j€VO€TCLL 8e OVO€7TOT€ Old TO (JL7) €X^LV TTjV yVO)jJL7]V l/j€VO€l 6^ T13 = Plutarch, De Stoic, repugn. 1055F-1056A, 1057A-B. . . . TTJV yap avTaoiav fiovX6(j,€vos [sc. Chrysippus] OVK ovoav avTOTeXrj ovyKaTadeoetos atVtdv diTooeiKvveiv, e'iprjKev OTL flXdi/jovoiv OL oocfroi f avTaoias efnroiovvTes, dv at (âvraatat TTOLCOOLV avTOTeXcbs Tas auy/car TroAAd/ctS" y a p ol aool i/jevSet ^pcuvrat irpos TOVS (f>avXovs /cat cfravTaoiav TrapiGTaot 7ndavrjv, ov JJLTJV air lav TTJS avyKaTadeaecos, lirel /cat TTJS VTroXrji/jecos curia rfjs /cat TOV deov ip€v8eis i/jevSovs eorai /cat TYJS dwarfs. . . . avdis 84 (farjoi Xpvonnros ifjL7TOi€iv <j>avTaoias /cat TOV oocfrov, ov ovyKarariOeiJLevtov ov8' €IK6VTLOV Seo/xcvoi;? rjfjLcov dAAa TTparrovTcov JJIOVOV /cat opfxcovrcov iirl TO cfraivofjievov, rj^ds 8k (fyavXovs rais roiavrais avTaoiais. ovras vrf daSeveias ovyKararide06ai


8 DID DIOGENES OF BABYLON INVENT THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT?

The so-called 'Ontological Argument' (hereafter: OA), which claims to establish the existence of God on the basis of his essence alone, is probably, together with the Liar Paradox, the Third-Man Argument and some other jewels of the same water, one of the most fascinating legacies of the whole Western philosophical tradition. Its official inventor, as is well known, is Anselm of Canterbury (eleventh century); new versions of it were devised by Descartes and some of his most prominent followers; a radical criticism was offered by Kant; and some modern philosophers have tried to revive it under new guises (Plantinga 1965, Hick and McGill 1967, among others, offer comprehensive reviews of this long story). As usual, some historians invoked the nil novi sub sole philosophico, and claimed that the OA had been already adumbrated, or even actually elaborated, by some ancient philosophers. Plato's name was mentioned in this context, by virtue either of some 'ontological' moves in the final argument for the immortality of soul in the Phaedo (e.g. Gallop 1975, p. 217; Schofield 1982, p. 2; Dumont 1982, p. 389 n. 6), or of the unique ontological properties of the Good in the Republic (Johnson 1963); some statements of Aristotle's about necessary and eternal being have also been invoked circumstantially (Hartshorne 1965, pp. 139-49); passages from Philo, Boethius and Augustine are standardly quoted as well. But the most promising candidates for the role of Anselm's forerunners seem to be the Stoics, first because one of the key phrases of Anselm's Argument, the famous 'something than which a greater cannot be thought of, is to be found in a number of Stoic texts;1 but also, and much more importantly, because a 1

Anselm's standard formulation is aliquid quo nihil majus eogitari possit (Proslogion 2). Compare in particular Cicero, De nat. deor, 11.18 (atqui certe nihil omnium rerum melius est mundo, nihil praestabilius, nihil pulchrius, nee solum nihilest, sedne eogitari quidem quidquam melius potest), Seneca, NQ 1. 13 (sic demum magnitudo illisua redditur, qua nihil majus eogitari potest). But the phrase is not used as part of a premiss to the conclusion that God (or the godworld) exists; the argument standardly takes the existence of the world for granted, and proceeds to establish that it possesses various predicates (reason, divinity, etc.). Strangely enough, what seems to be, in the whole of Cicero, De nat. deor., the closest approximation to an 'ontological' proof of (more than one) God's existence is attributed to Epicurus, cf. 11.46 (placet enim illi [ = Epicurus] esse deos, quia necesse sitpraestantem esse aliquam naturam, qua nihil sit melius); the Epicurean school seems to have endorsed, generally speaking, inferences from notion to existence (cf. Sextus, M vm.337). But the crucial eogitari potest is missing in the De nat. deor. passage (and the argument is possibly Stoicized, cf. Pease (M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum libri m, Cambridge, Mass., 1955) adloc. 170 Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009

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definite anticipation of the OA has been found, on apparently good grounds, in a passage of Sextus Empiricus (M ix. 133-6), which reports an argument elaborated by Diogenes of Babylon.2 A disciple of Chrysippus, and later on of Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Babylon (or of Seleucia) was the fifth scholarch of the Stoa, between his master Zeno and his own disciple Antipater. According to Obbink and Vander Waerdt (forthcoming), he 'has not yet been accorded the attention his philosophical and historical importance merits'. There are many signs that this situation is beginning to change. Diogenes' chronology, standardly located between c.240 and c.150, has been revised and put somewhat later, between c.230 and c. 140 (Dorandi 1991, pp. 29-30,61,69-71); a side effect of this move is that Diogenes was a little less old when he visited Rome in 155, at the time of the famous embassy of the three Athenian philosophers; thus he was possibly able to make a better show, next to the brilliant Carneades. His originality and intellectual powers have been recognized for quite a long time, albeit in general terms (cf. e.g. Baldassari 1971, p. 549): he was known as an important philosophical writer in grammar, linguistics and dialectic (his treatises Ilepl (fxjDvrjs and Ilepl SiaXeKTiKrjs have left crucial traces in DL vn), in music and rhetoric (his views in this field being tolerably well known through Philodemus), in ethics and the theory of reXos, and also in theology. But his originality and personal contributions have been traced out much more precisely in quite recent times: suffice it to refer to the works of Frede 1977 on Diogenes' grammatical studies, Delattre 1989 and Nussbaum 1993 on his views about music, poetry and education, Nussbaum 1993 again on his psychology and theory of passions, Annas 1989 on his social ethics and his famous debate with Antipater (reported by Cicero, De off. in), Vander Waerdt 1991 and Obbink 2

I have not found out when the parallel between Diogenes' and Anselm's arguments was first proposed; I was not able to consult Esser 1910, who, according to Hartshorne 1965, p. 149, actually concludes that no genuine proof from the mere idea of God is to be found before Anselm. Diogenes' argument seems to have gone unnoticed by the hundreds of commentators of the OA; it has not been commented upon very often by scholars in ancient philosophy. Baldassari 1971 thinks that the OA has indeed been formulated by Diogenes, at least in its essential structure; he does not claim priority for his thesis, but does not mention any real predecessor either. That some of the Stoic arguments for the existence of the gods qualify as 'ontological' is taken for granted by Dragona-Monachou 1976 (cf. the index and references, p. 318). In France, the pioneering paper is Dumont 1982, to which I owe much, even if I disagree with its main claim and some of its arguments. In an unpublished, fascinating paper on the subject, composed in 1982, Schofield could still write: 'to my mind the page of the Loeb edition which contains this sequence [M ix. 133-6] is one of the more interesting pages of the four volumes which Sextus fills both from a philosophical and an historical point of view. But it has not excited much comment in the scholarly literature, nor is there any standard authoritative treatment to which the curious reader may turn.' I am extremely grateful to Malcolm Schofield for having kindly allowed me to read his excellent piece and to quote from it, although he did not wish to publish it; I shall try to indicate clearly the many borrowings I made from his work in the present paper, which is a constant dialogue with him, and which has been the subject of new talks between us. I also thank my Paris students, who diverted me from reading with them Cicero's De nat. deor. 11 (where Diogenes' argument is not mentioned) by defying me to make satisfactory sense of each and every detail of Sextus' passage. It is not for me to say whether I succeeded.


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and Vander Waerdt (forthcoming) on his political philosophy. Diogenes thus seems to emerge as responsible for some very important innovations or shifts of emphasis in Stoic doctrines, which used to be standardly attributed to the so-called 'Middle Stoa' (in particular to Posidonius), and to the general influence of the Roman world and to its particular ideology. This recent revival of interest in Diogenes should shortly take a concrete form, in new editions of his fragments, announced from various sides, and designed to replace the old collection of SVF 111.210-43 (by taking into account, in particular, the new readings of the Philodemian papyri). Here, then, is the picture before us: a fascinating argument in search of ancestors, a brilliant and long-neglected philosopher in course of reevaluation, a precise piece of apparent evidence that the philosopher came close to the argument. It is tempting to match all these terms together, and to take sides with the scholars who have already claimed that Diogenes of Babylon is the inventor of the OA. However, my main claim in what follows will be that we must resist this temptation. It is not only, in my opinion, that Diogenes simply failed to invent the OA, which would be a rather uninteresting conclusion; it is also - and this might prove more interesting - that he distinctly saw the possibility of reasoning on the lines of the OA, and he quite consciously refrained from doing so. A close and perhaps boringly meticulous analysis of the text will support this claim - or so I hope. And now, let us turn to the text (Sextus Empiricus, Mix. 133-6 - 1 give the Greek text in the Appendix to this chapter). For convenience's sake, it will be easier to set it out in the following way.3 [A) Zeno propounded the following argument: (AI) A man may reasonably honour (evAoyws av rt? TLficorj) the gods. (A2) But: those who are non-existent (rovg 8e (JLTJ ovras) a man may not reasonably honour. Therefore (A3): the gods exist. (B) TO this argument some people make an objection in the guise of a parallel (BI) A man may reasonably honour wise men. (B2) But: those who are non-existent a man may not reasonably honour. Therefore (B3): wise men exist. Now this conclusion [i.e. (B3)] was repugnant to the Stoics, who hold that their wise man has been undiscovered till now. (c) But in reply to the parallel Diogenes the Babylonian says that the second premiss (AT/JU^CI) in Zeno's argument [i.e. (A2)] is virtually (SzW/zei) as follows: 3

Bury's text (Loeb); translation after Bury and Schofield (1982). Divisions and lettering are mine; when quoting other scholars who adopted different numberings and letterings, I modify them accordingly.



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(C2) Those who are not of such a nature as to exist (TOVS Se fxrj ire^vKoras etvai) a man may not reasonably honour. For if this premiss is taken that way, it is clear that: (C3) The gods are of such a nature as to exist. (D) But if so [i.e. if (C3)], then (D3): they do actually exist (/cat elalv r/Sr]). For (DI) If they existed once upon a time (el yap arra^ irore rjoav), they also exist now (vvv) -just as, if atoms existed, they also exist now; for such things are indestructible and ungenerable according to the concept (ewoia) of bodies. Hence the argument will be conducive to a consequent conclusion. (E) AS for the wise, it is not the case that since they are of such a nature as to exist, they d o actually exist (ol 8e ye oocf>ol OVK eirel ir€vKaoiv efvcu, T/STJ KCLI

Other people4 say Zeno's first premiss [i.e. (AI)], 'A man may reasonably honour the gods', is ambiguous: for one of its meanings is (A 1 *) 'A man may reasonably honour the gods' another is (Ai**) 'hold them in honour (TLfjLTjTiKcbs e'xoi)'. But one must take the first as a premiss, which will be false in the case of the wise. (F)

Roughly speaking, what we have here is, under (A), an argument by Zeno; under (B), a 'parallel' to (A) (a irapafioXrj) by an unnamed opponent, designed to nullify (A); under (c + D + E), Diogenes' defence of (A), claiming to avoid the TrapafSoXrj by making explicit the appropriate 'potential' (hvvaixei) meaning of the second premiss of (A); 5 (F) introduces another defence of (A), based on an alleged disambiguation of the first premiss of (A). Before examining the whole passage step by step, let us first raise a general problem. On the one hand, Diogenes introduces in the whole story a new and crucial expression, 'of such a nature as to exist', which seems to convey the notion that existence is included in the concept of certain entities - an inclusion which is, of course, the very nucleus of the OA. On this account, Zeno's argument (A) was not an ontological argument, since he did not make use of this characteristic phrase. Diogenes of Babylon may thus be thought to have transformed a non-ontological argument, Zeno's, into a properly ontological one. On the other hand, Diogenes only claims to make explicit the appropriate 4

5

It is of course perfectly clear that this second defence of Zeno's argument against objection (B) has nothing to do with Diogenes of Babylon (cf. aXXot 8e <j>aoiv); SVFm Diog. Bab. 32 quite rightly omits to quote it. However, it will be seen that we should preferably keep it within sight when discussing Diogenes' argument. It seems clear (in spite of some doubts raised by Schofield 1982) that (c), (D) and (E) go together, and quite likely that they may be jointly attributed to Diogenes, at least substantially, (c) exposes what becomes of Zeno's argument when the new premiss (C2) is substituted for (A2). Since the conclusion of the revised argument is (C3), which is not an assertion of the existence of the Gods, Diogenes is committed to offer something like (D), showing the route from this new conclusion to the existential conclusion (A3) of Zeno's original argument. As for (E), it locates the exact difference between the case of the gods and the case of the wise, a task which is mandatory for Diogenes if he is to disarm this or any irafi


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meaning of one premiss in Zeno's argument; so that if we trust him, and if his own argument is actually a genuine version of the OA, Zeno's argument already was an ontological one, at least covertly. Hence there are reasons for considering Zeno's argument as substantially ontological; and there are also reasons, on the other hand, for considering Diogenes as responsible for the decisive 'ontologization' of a non-ontological argument. Both positions have found more or less confident partisans in modern literature: Zeno's argument is essentially a version of the OA according to Schofield 1982, pp. 1-14 (but not according to Schofield 1983), and Dragona-Monachou 1976, p. 41 (the latter with a question-mark, however); only Diogenes' argument is a genuine form of the OA according to Baldassari 1971 and Dumont 1982. Both positions have their drawbacks: if we adopt the first, we have to accept that the introduction of the notion of 'being of such a nature as to exisf does not, after all, make a big difference; if we adopt the second, we have to think that Diogenes was mistaken when he claimed that Zeno's (A2) was 'virtually' identical with his own (C2). These symmetrical drawbacks give some a priori reasons for preferring a third option: namely, that neither Zeno's nor Diogenes' argument is 'ontological'. This is the course I shall follow. In order to be convinced that Zeno's argument (A) is not equivalent to any version of the OA, it is enough, in my opinion, to look at the transformations imposed upon it by the scholars who did see in it a version of such an argument.6 Schofield 1982 refers to a brief passage in Barnes 1972, pp. 17-18, in which Barnes discusses a version of the O A sometimes presented (wrongly) as Descartes' argument, namely: (GI) A God is perfect. (G2) Everything perfect exists. Therefore (G3): A God exists. If such an argument can count as a form of OA, then, Barnes says, 'there is an OA to be found some 1500 years before Anselm'. He proceeds to quote Zeno's argument in Sextus, M. ix.133, which he translates as follows: (Aa): (A 1 a) A man can properly honour the gods. (A2a) A man cannot properly honour what does not exist. (A3a) Therefore: There exist gods. This argument, Barnes adds, 'might fairly be set out as follows:' 6

This is only one among the very interesting problems raised by Zeno's seemingly strange argument; these problems are acutely discussed in Schofield 1982, and more compendiously in Schofield 1983. Here I wish to concentrate on Diogenes' argument, therefore I shall be very brief on Zeno's; but I do hope that Schofield will consider publishing his paper, or some version of it. On the other hand, it does not seem necessary to defend Zeno's argument against the formal objections questionably raised by Dumont 1982, pp. 391-2.



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(Ab): (Aib) A God is worthy of honour. (A2b) Non-existent things are not worthy of honour. (A3b) Therefore: A God exists. Schofield has pellucidly shown, in both his papers on the subject,7 that Barnes' very interesting suggestion is the product of a definite choice between two construals of (AI); let us call them the anthropocentric construal and the theocentric one. In any interpretation, the meaning of (AI) must be such that it does not make (A2) redundant or pre-empted; in other words, (AI) must be construed as if it was prefixed by something like: 'whether the gods exist or not, it is reasonable to honour them'. Now, why is it or might be evXoyovl The anthropocentric answer to this question would be something like this: because it is prudentially safer. 'The gods', in this perspective, are those beings which are talked about by religious traditions, the poets, and so on. To honour them is to make sacrifices, to utter prayers mentioning their names in the appropriate form, and so forth. It is evXoyov, here 'highly reasonable', to engage in this sort of activities, because all in all it can do no harm, and it could do some good. This first, anthropocentric answer has been very aptly expressed by Schofield 1982, p. 9 (in terms which strongly recall Pascal's wager, explicitly mentioned in Schofield 1983, p. 39): I do not know whether or not there are gods, nor whether - if they exist - they care for man and pay attention to his prayers and praises. I do not know whether to trust Homer and the poets and the traditional beliefs of the Greeks in these matters. But it would be prudent in any event to honour the gods with sacrifices and the other traditional observances. If there are no gods, no great harm is done: a little time may be wasted, but after all time saved is often wasted in some other way. If there are gods, and they are as most Greeks and most of the poets believe them to be, they may well cause me injury if I omit to honour them but reward me if I give them worship. The second answer, the theocentric one, instead of paying attention to what good and harm the gods are traditionally supposed to do to men, relies rather on the intrinsic properties conceptually assigned to a god (if there is any such being) by virtue of his very nature. 'The gods', in this second perspective, are whatever beings answer to the concept of a divine being (involving every kind of conceivable perfection). To honour them is to pay them the intellectual and spiritual homage we owe to such a cluster of perfections. It is evXoyov, here 'perfectly appropriate', to endorse this sort of attitude, not because of the expectable advantages and disadvantages of playing or not playing with the gods the game of give and take, but because respect and homage are the right attitude to adopt towards their conceptual perfection, whatever may come out of it. The crucial word evXoycos, used by Zeno, does not by itself commit the 7

With more details, and more sympathy for Barnes's suggestion, in Schofield 1982 than in Schofield 1983.


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reader to any of these alternative interpretations: it may be evXoyov for X to adopt a given attitude towards Y either because this attitude is prudent, given X's basic desires and interests, or because it is justified, given Y's intrinsic nature. It is perfectly clear that Barnes's rewriting of (A),firstin the form (Aa), where the translation of evXoyws as 'properly' unobtrusively points to specific intrinsic properties of divine being, and then in the form (Ab), where 'honour' is something a God is worthy of, rather than something a man would be welladvised to pay him, implies a theocentric view of the argument.8 Such seems, then, to be the condition on which Zeno's argument can be considered as a (rather well concealed) version of the OA. It is certainly very hard, if we look only at this very brief argument, to decide which interpretation, the anthropocentric or the theocentric, hence the nonontological or the ontological, is the right one. Schofield 1983, who advocates the anthropocentric interpretation, offers only presumptions.9 Of course I could argue that Diogenes' argument is not ontological (as I shall try to show later on) and that it is just a transformation of Zeno's argument (as Diogenes himself claims it to be), so that Zeno's argument would not be ontological either. But it would be vastly preferable to have independent reasons for arguing that neither argument is ontological. As far as Zeno's argument is concerned, two indications might be invoked in favour of the anthropocentric, i.e. non-ontological interpretation: first, that the word evXoyov, in Zeno's usage, seems rather to point to prudential considerations,10 secondly, that the Stoic general line, regarding religious behaviour, seems to endorse much of the traditional notion of an exchange of services between gods and men.11 These arguments perhaps do not go much further than Schofield's 'impressions'; but I give them for what they are worth. Section (B) of our passage contains the anonymous objection raised against 8

9

10

I1

Cf. Schofield 1982, p. 13 ('One of the distinguishing features of Barnes's reading, in fact, is the way it confines the scope of the reasons adumbrated in "reasonably" to considerations about the nature of the gods or the non-existent, excluding separate attention to the rationality of propositional attitudes to them' - his emphasis) and 1983, pp. 38-9 (The major drawback to this [i.e. Barnes's] reading of [Zeno's] syllogism is its interpretation of the first premiss: it converts what looks like a thesis about the rationality of human behaviour, based presumably on empirical or at least contingent considerations, into an a priori statement about the nature of the divine (viz. that it is such as to give us reason to honour it).'). Cf. Schofield 1983, p. 39: 'It seems preferable to stick with the impression that the premiss (AI) is indeed about the rationality of pious or religious behaviour.' Cf. the definition of the KadrJKov as o npaxOev evXoyov urêi ajroXoyioyiov, 'that for which, when done, a reasonable defence can be adduced' (DL vn.107). Diogenes Laertius adds that Zeno was the first to use the term KadfJKov, and that he explained it through the etymology and TOV Kara nvas rJKew, 'from what is incumbent on certain beings'. It seems clear that nvas refers to the agents which have a reasonable motive to behave in such and such way, not to the beneficiaries towards which, given their intrinsic nature, it is reasonable to do so. Schofield 1982, pp. 4-5, discusses at length an argument quoted by Sextus, Mix. 123, which has some obvious affinities with Zeno's argument, and which might be by Chrysippus, namely: 'if Gods do not exist, piety (euae/Seia) is non-existent; but piety exists; therefore Gods exist'. In explaining the argument, Sextus quotes what apparently is a Stoic definition of eiWjSeia as 'the science of service to the gods' {kiriariqixiq Oecov depairzias). The word Oepaireia seems to imply that gods are to be pleased and taken care of, not just disinterestedly venerated. But cf. n. 15 below.



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Zeno's argument (an objection which has often been compared with the celebrated Lost Island objection of the monk Gaunilo to Anselm), in the form of a 'parallel' (TTapafioXrj). A 'parallel' is an argument which is formally and semantically as close as possible to the argument under attack, and which comes to a conclusion which is either absurd or repugnant to the adversary. It was described in some detail by Philodemus (Rhet. I . I I . 17-30), and more recently very aptly christened as 'the "You-might-as-well-say" manoeuvre' (Wisdom 1952, p. 80, both quoted by Schofield 1983, p. 35). We know of other objections to arguments by Zeno which follow the same strategy: one of them is attributed to the Dialectician Alexinos (cf. Sextus, M. ix. 108-9, who also reports the answer made by 'the Stoics' to Alexinos' rrapaôXiq.12 The TrapaôXrj in (B) is a fine instance of the kind. The premiss (BI) is quite close to (AI), the only difference being the substitution of the wise men for the gods; and it is hard to see, at first view, how one could find (A 1) plausible and (BI) not equally plausible (the authors of the second defence (F), in 136, will make a brave attempt in this direction). The premiss (B2) is identical with (A2). The conclusion (B3) is not absurd in itself; but it is unpalatable to the Stoics, who made a notorious fuss about the empirical existence of their Wise Man. The objection is therefore strictly ad hominem. It would be open to the Stoics, among other courses, to abandon, or to mitigate, their dogma about the Sage, to realize that a totally uninstantiated ideal is little sustenance, and to admit that there are or were indeed some Wise Men after all. Section (c) shows that this is not the line of argument Diogenes adopted. In order to disarm the TrapafioXrj, he rather suggested that the real meaning of (A2) was what he expressed by (C2): 'Those who are not of such a nature as to exist (TOVS Se firj ire^vKorag elvai) a man may not reasonably honour.' The exact meaning of the crucial phrase ne^vKores elvat is not immediately clear; I shall provisionally, and conventionally, refer to it by the phrase 'naturally existing'. But I think it preferable to defer the detailed discussion of what it means until we see what sort of conclusions Diogenes allows himself or forbids himself to draw from a statement saying that beings of such and such type are or are not naturally existing. For the moment, I shall only offer some preliminary remarks. It is likely that the predicate 'naturally existing' is supposed to constitute the relevant difference between the gods and the wise; the gods are 'naturally existing', the wise are quite probably not (more on this later); the introduction 12

Alexinos, a contemporary of Zeno, seems to have been a specialist in anti-Zenonian TrapafioXai (cf. Schofield 1983, pp. 34-8). In view of the narrow parallelism of the sequence in M ix. 104-1 o (argument by Zeno - TTapafioXrj by Alexinos - Stoic answer to the TrapafioXrj) and the one in M ix. 133-5 (argument by Zeno - anonymous TrapafioXr] - answer to the irapafioXr) by Diogenes of Babylon), it is more than tempting to attribute the anonymous irapaôXiq of ix. 133 to Alexinos (thus Schofield 1983, pp. 36-7 - better than to Carneades, pace Baldassari 1971, p. 549 n. 114, and Dumont 1982, pp. 391-3) and the anonymous reply of ix.109-110 to Diogenes. This is of course speculative, but note the use of the idea of'absolutely (or: once for all) better (Kaddna^ Kpelrrovy in this latter reply, and Diogenes' visible concern with various aspects of the notion of the absolute (Baldassari 1971, pp. 549fT).


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of this predicate is presumably designed to break the irapafioXri. We must understand that from (AI) and (C2) it is legitimate to conclude (C3). Are we supposed to understand that from (BI) and (C2) it would not be legitimate to conclude that (C3*) the wise men are of such a nature as to exist? In other words, is the revised syllogism immune to any new TrapafioXrp. The answer to this question is far from clear. Schofield 1982, pp. 17-18, asks the question: why could not an opponent build a new irapafioXrp. It would have the following form: (BI) A man may reasonably honour the wise. (C2) Those who are not of such a nature as to exist a man may not reasonably honour. Therefore (03*): The wise are of such a nature as to exist. (C3*) is probably no less repugnant to the Stoics than (B3) was: whatever the exact meaning of'naturally existing' may be, the wise are likely to be conceived as not naturally existing; otherwise the substitution of (C2) for (A2) could not be expected to work efficiently against the first irapafioXrj. If so, the only way of not being saddled with the conclusion (C3*) of the second irapafioXri would be to question ( B I ) , 1 3 and to turn the syllogism upside down, as follows: (Not-C3*) The wise are not of such a nature as to exist. (C2) Those who are not of such a nature as to exist a man may not reasonably honour. Therefore (Not-Bi): A man may not reasonably honour the wise. The only trouble is that this course of reasoning could perfectly well have been used against the first irapafioXr} as well: if the Stoics are committed to agree that it does not make sense to honour the wise, it matters little whether it is for the simple reason that they do not exist or for the sophisticated reason that they do not 'naturally exist'. The first premiss of the irapaôXr} (BI) should have been rejected out of hand. By choosing to revise Zeno's second premiss (A2), kept untouched by the opponent in his (B2), Diogenes seems to have aimed at the wrong target: it would have been much more reasonable of him to attack the first premiss of the irapaôXrj (BI) and to show that it was no real 'parallel' to Zeno's first premiss ( A I ) . 1 4 Let us note that this is exactly what the authors of the second defence (F) tried to do, by distinguishing two different meanings of 'honouring', one strictly applicable only to the gods ('honouring strictly speaking'), another applicable both to the gods and to the wise ('holding in honour'). If (AI) is 13

14

Schofield 1982, p. 17, detects in Section (E) 'an attempt to show why no convincing T p j to the new version of the argument [i.e. (c)] can be devised'. In my opinion, this section (E) deals not with the first step of Diogenes' argument, i.e. the revised syllogism to (C3) offered in (c), but with the second step of Diogenes' argument, i.e. Section (D), which goes from (C3) to the assertion of the gods' actual existence. Schofield 1982, p. 18, makes the point roundly: 'Diogenes' proposal to save Zeno's syllogism by reading (A2) as (C2) is ( . . . ) a disaster'.



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meant in the stricter sense, then (BI) is simply false, and Alexinos' collapses. However, it might be said that the distinction made by the authors of (F) in respect to the gods, at the level of (AI), was implicitly made by Diogenes, at the more general level of (A2) read as ( d ) , in respect to the 'naturally existing' beings. I here quote some excellent remarks on this point by Schofield 1982, pp. 18-20: '(C2) contains an idea of great interest. It is only a pity that Diogenes spoilt its presentation by offering it as a general claim about giving honour, when it is really a persuasive and penetrating observation about something else. What he has actually put his finger on is a feature of the concept of worship,15 i.e. of the concept of a particular form of honour appropriately bestowed only upon divine beings. 16 (...) We may accordingly rewrite Diogenes' argument as follows: (ci*) A man may reasonably worship the gods. (C2*) A man may not reasonably worship those who are not of such a nature as to exist. Therefore [03): The gods are of such a nature as to exist.' Such an argument, Schofield says (1982, p. 20), is immune to any since by definition there is no genuine 'parallel' whatsoever to the gods as worthy of a reasonable worship. Now, whether we consider Diogenes' original formulation of his revised syllogism, from (ci) and (C2) to (03), or Schofield's rewriting of it, from (ci*) and (C2*) to (C3), we should observe that (C3) is, precisely, a conclusion. This should drive us to make a radical distinction between Diogenes' argument (thus far) and at least some versions of the OA, namely those where the inclusion of existence in the very essence of God is given the status of an immediate and evident truth, straightforwardly readable, so to speak, in the concept of God, and only in that concept. The notion of being naturally existing, far from being discovered in the sole occasion of a scrutiny of this peculiar concept, is introduced by Diogenes in abstracto, in (C2), and then applied to the gods in the conclusion (C3). The only immediate truth about the gods is that it is reasonable to honour them; the only immediate truth about 15

16

A word which, according to Schofield, has no exact equivalent in Greek, as far as range of use and connotation are concerned. Perhaps, however, OOIOTTJS would fill the bill, at least to a certain extent. Sextus M ix.124 quotes an argument parallel to the piety argument (cf. n. 11 above), where OGIOTTJS is substituted for euaejSeia and defined as SiKaioovvr) rig npos deovs. The force of TLS could be to expel the utilitarian connotations of hiKaioovvrj, so that OOIOTTJS would correspond to a disinterested conception of the god-man relation, as opposed to evoefieia conceived as a kind of utilitarian depaneta. I cannot quite see, however, how Schofield (1982, pp. 18-19) c a n h°kl (i) that the implicit delimitations of the concept of worship by Diogenes is 'a persuasive and penetrating observation'; (ii) that the authors of the second defence (F) 'were perhaps driving at the same sort of conceptual differentiation between honouring and worship which (...) is the true basis of Diogenes' proposal'; and (iii) that this second defence 'otherwise looks like a remarkably feeble attempt to defend Zeno's argument'. It seems to me that this defence does not contain anything in addition to the conceptual differentiation in question.


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naturally existing beings is that it is reasonable to honour only such beings. There is no immediate truth linking the concept of god with the concept of a naturally existing being. Of course, the conclusion (C3) might serve as a premiss in a new argument which would be some version of the OA; but it is not a primary premiss in such an argument. Still more importantly, we must observe that (C3) is a conclusion different from Zeno's original conclusion (A3), i.e. from the assertion that the gods exist. Diogenes' revised syllogism (c) is no OA whatsoever, for the simple reason that it does not conclude to the gods' existence. To this extent, Diogenes' implicit claim that he just saved Zeno's argument against the irapafioXr} by eliciting the real meaning of its second premiss is seriously misleading: actually the substitution of (C2) for (A2) entails a radical watering down of Zeno's original conclusion, since the new conclusion (03) is not identical with (A3), but considerably weaker. In this respect, the TrapaôXrj has been quite successful: Diogenes has not been able both to disarm the irapaôXr] and to preserve the existential import of the original conclusion. If he wants not to leave the matter at that, he is committed to devise a supplementary argument, leading from the conclusion of his revised syllogism (C3) to the conclusion of Zeno's original syllogism (A3), an argument for which the model provided by Zeno obviously offers no clue. This is, I think, the job which Diogenes assigns himself in the following section of the Sextian passage, i.e. (D). 1 7

Section (D) is probably the most difficult and unmanageable section of the whole Sextian passage. It has been rather ill treated by those scholars who discussed Diogenes' argument. Dumont 1982 is silent about it. Baldassari 1971, pp. 561-2, has an enormous and tortuous sentence on the subject, the essential meaning of which seems to be that he is pretty well embarrassed by this section. Schofield 1982, p. 23, candidly confesses that something in the deduction of (D3) from (C3) is incomprehensible to him. The temporal considerations (airai; TTOT€ rjoav, vvv eloiv) which show up in the argument are obviously intriguing. Can we hope to make things a little better? A first important lesson of Section (D) is to be drawn from its very existence. For we could be otherwise tempted to think that (03), T h e gods are of such a nature as to exist', means that they actually exist and that their existence is of a 17

As a matter of fact, Diogenes commits himself to coming to the slightly different conclusion (D3) that 'the gods actually exist' (elolv ^ST?). The adjunction of rjSrj (rightly translated by Bury, I think, as 'actually') seems to be dictated by a concern for stressing the conceptual and logical distance between 'to be of such a nature as to exist' and '[actually] to exist'. Diogenes obviously wants to emphasize both that (C3), the intermediate conclusion of his revised syllogism, is not equivalent to an assertion of existence, and that nevertheless it can be used as a way to reach a full assertion of existence. Zeno's conclusion will be reached at one remove, but without losing anything of its force. But it seems clear that in Diogenes' view, (D3) does not differ substantially from (A3).



l8l

particularly strong type of existence, let us say 'necessary existence' (not only that if they exist, then they enjoy necessary, not contingent existence).18 If such were the case, Section (D) would be pointless: (D3), the Diogenian version of (A3), would be immediately implied by (C3), since (D3) is one of the conjuncts of (C3) if (03) is read as the above conjunction. The existence of Section (D) thus rules out giving to the predicate 'naturally existing' the meaning 'existing and enjoying necessary existence'. This is a first constraint, helpful though negative, on the meaning of 'naturally existing'. Another possible way from (C3) to (D3) would be to make use of an implicit universal premiss which would run as follows: 'Everything which is of such a nature as to exist actually exists', or else, still more generally, 'Everything which is of such a nature as to be F actually is F'. Combined with (C3), this premiss would yield (D3) without more ado. Such an argument would undoubtedly count as a version of the OA, since it would use a particular feature of the essence of God (C3) to deduce his actual existence (D3). We can only observe that Diogenes does not proceed in this way at all. He claims to have a way of going from (C3) to (D3): what I have dubbed Section (D) begins with the expression of this claim: el 8e rovro (i.e., if (C3)), KCLI elalv rjSrj (i.e., then (D3)). But Diogenes' way of justifying the inference from (C3) to (D3), as we shall see, is quite unexpected (and utterly frustrating) for anybody who would be tempted to see in him the inventor of the OA. On the other hand, it is quite refreshing for anybody who is suspicious about the philosophical virtues of the OA, since it is hard to deny that Diogenes was on the verge of offering some version of it (he had all the ingredients in hand). For such a reader, it is rewarding to see that the first philosopher who clearly foresaw a possibility of demonstrating the existence of gods along the lines of the OA consciously refrained from offering such a demonstration. What does he offer instead in the way of demonstration? 19 Why and how are bizarre temporal considerations (ctVa^, vvv) smuggled into the argument? The text is difficult, perhaps compressed or abridged by Sextus or his source; but I think that nothing essential to its understanding is really missing. The transition from (C3) to (D3) (el 8e TOVTO, KCLI elalv rjSrj) is supposed to be

18

19

Schofield 1983, p. 39, in his rather brief discussion of our passage seems to take this line. He glosses (C2) in the following terms: 'This interesting proposal is perhaps best considered as stating a feature of one sort of honour, namely worship: it is appropriately offered only to necessary beings (not contingent, like the wise).' If (C2) is construed this way, (C3) would presumably mean that the gods are indeed necessary beings, i.e. beings who exist and necessarily so {not: who exist necessarily if they exist at all). The reasoning from (C3) to (D3) is presented as 'conclusive' (OVVOLKTIKOS, cf. Kara OLKOXOVOOV €Tnopav ovvdgei 6 Xoyos, 135). It seems to me that, taken by itself, it possesses the characteristics of a demonstration, in the Stoic technical sense of the term (cf. Brunschwig 1980). By contrast, the syllogism concluding to (A3) or to (C3), either in the Zenonian form or in the Diogenian, seems to fall short of a demonstration, in virtue of its €v\6ya>s premiss (cf. Baldassari 1971, pp. 565, 574).


l82

STOICISM

justified (cf. yap immediately after) by a syllogism in modus ponens, the second premiss of which is left unexpressed: (DI) If the gods existed once upon a time (el yap aVa£ rrore rjoav), they also exist now (vvv). (D2, suppressed premiss). The gods existed once upon a time. Therefore (D3*):20 The gods exist now. A first problem with this syllogism is the following. As we just saw, the syllogism is supposed to justify the transition from (C3) to (D3); but it completely fails to mention (C3) among its premisses. The idea that the gods are of such a nature as to exist does not play any explicit part in the reasoning. However, it would be hard to suppose that it has been forgotten halfway through. So we have to try to find out if and how (C3) is still present and logically active, in some sense, either behind (DI) or behind (D2). Let us first try ( D I ) as a possible candidate. The principle behind the hypothesis would be something like this: (DI *) For all X, if X is of such a nature as to exist, then if X existed once upon a time, then X exists now. But to say that if something existed once upon a time, then it exists now is the same as to say that it is imperishable. Thus we can abbreviate (DI*) and express it as follows: ( D I * * ) For all X, if X is of such a nature as to exist, then X is imperishable. ( D I * * ) is not very plausible by itself in the first place, given the ordinary meaning of'nature' in such philosophical contexts. What happens to things is by no means coextensive to what they are of such a nature as to do or to undergo: lots of things happen to things contrary to their nature, if only 20

I dub this conclusion vvv elaiv (D3*), because it is at least morphologically different from (D3) (eiCTiV 17S77). But I take it that (D3*), i.e. 'the gods exist now', implies (D3), i.e. 'the gods exist actually', so that if (D3*) is validly deduced, so will (D3) be. Why does Diogenes undertake to deduce (D3*) in his modus ponens syllogism, instead of directly deducing (D3) ? Possibly because the best conditional premiss he could find to do the required job was (DI), the consequent of which involves the notion of existing now. In any case, the yap in el yap a-nat; -nork rjoav seems to indicate clearly enough that elalv 17817 is a way of anticipating the conclusion (namely vvv eloiv) of the supporting argument which follows. I realize, however, that this way of dealing with the difference between (D3) and (D3*) might be a weak point in my interpretation. Another way of construing the argument (suggested to me by Malcolm Schofield in correspondence) could be summarized as follows, (i) Elolv fj8r) (D3) means 'they actually exist at some time or other', (ii) (C3) immediately entails (D3), by virtue of a version of the so-called 'Principle of Plenitude', (iii) The modus ponens syllogism is a way of disarming the possible objection that (D3) could be true without the gods existing now. The yap-clause explains why the objection does not work, by introducing the new premiss (DI). The entire train of reasoning is thus: (C3), so (D3); now (DI), SO (D3*) - from (D3) + (DI). This is undoubtedly an attractive suggestion; however, it seems to me that the crucial inference from (C3) to (D3) needs some justification (in Schofield's reading, Diogenes would take it as obvious); now, if some justification is needed, the yap-clause is more naturally construed as precisely giving this justification (instead of answering an unexpressed objection). I am therefore inclined to stick to my proposal, which is, as will be seen below in more detail: (C3), so (D2); now (DI), SO (D3*) from (D2) + (DI); hence (D3).



183

appropriate external causes act on them in the appropriate way, preventing the standard display of their nature. Man e.g. is something which is of such a nature as to see; this does not prevent some men from being or becoming blind; similarly, something which is of such a nature as to exist can perish, if only it meets some external cause strong enough to destroy it, that is contrary to its nature in some appropriate degree. In addition to that, to suppose that (DI*) is present in the argument of Section (D) raises a number of difficulties, as might be shown by the problems which Schofield finds himself involved in when he claims (1982, pp. 22-3) that '[Sextus'] source seems to be trying to explicate the notion of "having a nature such as to exist" and its consequences by precisely assimilating them to the conception of the imperishable and its consequences' (his emphasis). The basis of this claim is the analogy with atoms which is developed in ix.135. Like the gods, the text says, the atoms are such that if they existed once upon a time, 21 they also exist now; the equivalence of this implication with the attributes of imperishability and ungenerability is ensured by what comes after (adapra yap Kal dyevrjra TOL TOIOLVTOL ian). Now the imperishability of the atoms is contained in the very notion of such bodies (Kara rrjv ewoiav rcov creo/zcn-cov). It is of course tempting to assimilate what is implied by the nature of something and what is contained in the notion of something. Thus Schofield: 'Where [C3] speaks of its being in the nature of a god to exist, Sextus' source here remarks that "according to the conception of atoms they are incapable of being created or destroyed"' (his emphasis). But the price to pay for this assimilation (which is not explicit in Sextus' text) is high, first of all because one might hold, as Schofield himself says, that there is 'a world of difference between having such a nature as to exist and being conceived of as imperishable'. Moreover, assimilating the two notions creates an insuperable muddle in Diogenes' argumentation. For the imperishability of atoms cannot and does not imply their existence - least of all for the Stoics, who are notoriously hostile to any atomistic conception of the physical world. So if (C3) was the ground for (DI), that is to say, if the 'naturally existing' character of the gods was taken as a ground for their imperishability, no advance at all would be made along the road to a demonstration of their existence, and the modus ponens syllogism from (DI) to (D3*) would be seriously in danger of total inefficiency.22 In order to save the argument from this fatal collapse, I think we must, on the contrary, keep carefully separate the two predicates of 'being of such a nature as to exist' and 'being imperishable'. The second predicate belongs both to the gods and to the atoms. It seems quite likely that, in Diogenes' view, the first belongs only to the gods. 'Being imperishable' pertains to the atoms in 21

22

T h e text simply says el aro/txot tfoav, but it is clear, from the context, that a V a f is to be understood. Cf. Schofield 1982, p p . 2 2 - 3 (after noticing t h a t the imperishability of a t o m s does n o t imply their existence): 'Is not this exactly analogous to what we should say a b o u t Diogenes' attempt to derive the existence of gods from their nature?'


184

STOICISM

virtue of their evvoia: the word is important, because we know that in the Stoic conception, there are lots of ewoiai which are notions of nothing existing (cf. DL VII. 53); the famous irpoX^Ls, which does have the force of a criterion (DL VII.54), is only a very special kind of eWoia.23 Even for a Stoic philosopher, who does not believe that there are atoms, it is perfectly possible to say, on the basis of the evvoca of atom, what properties an atom would have if there was such a thing as an atom. The choice of atoms as a support for the analogy, which has embarrassed some scholars because the Stoics do not believe that there are atoms, is, on the contrary, quite helpful: it is precisely designed, in my view, to isolate hypothetical statements about things we have evvoiai of from categorical ones about things we have 7Tpo\r)ifj€Ls of: //"something like an atom existed, it would be imperishable, an implication which is all the more interesting and useful in the argument as there is nothing like an atom. Presumably, the same implication holds good of the gods, on the sole basis of the simple evvoia of god: if there were gods, they would be imperishable. But this implication does not make use of the idea that gods are of such a nature as to exist, which is presumably based not on the eWoia, but on the TrpoXrjifjig of god. 24 Thus it seems better to give up the idea that the mode of presence of (03) in the modus ponens syllogism is its being the ground for (DI): 'being of such a nature as to exist' and 'being imperishable' must be considered as independent predicates, neither of which implies the other. Now we can turn to the second candidate, namely the suppressed premiss (D2): the gods existed once upon a time. This fairy-tale-looking premiss is charming but intriguing; we need it all the same, if the modus ponens is to work at all. So where are its credentials? Is it anyhow likely that (C3) is the justification for (D2), i.e. that because the gods are of such a nature as to exist, they existed once upon a time? There are two ways of giving an affirmative answer to this question. The first is to say that (C3) means (D2); the second is to say that (C3) is a premiss out of which (D2) can be obtained. The first way is not as completely silly as it appears. We could perhaps understand rre^vKores efvcu, in an etymologizing mood (from C/)VGLS as 'birth'), as 'having existed at the beginning of things', in particular 'having existed before the time when men began to exist'; then to say that the gods 7T€(f)VKaaLv elvai would be to say that they existed once upon a time, namely at the beginning of things, as the poets say. However, we cannot go very far along this road: for such a reinterpretation of the phrase TrecfrvKores elvac should be 23

24

O n the non-existential import of cWota or kirlvoia in Hellenistic philosophical vocabulary, cf. Sextus, M VIH.334A-336A: it is 'just a m o t i o n of the intellect', which involves no judgement, no assertion whatsoever concerning whether the conceived object exists or not. See my comments o n this question in chapter 11 below, p p . 224-43. The main distinguishing feature of the irpoXîfjis is that it is the p r o d u c t of a natural genesis ( D L VII.53-4). Presumably, a knowledge a b o u t what things naturally are is to be reached t h r o u g h the irpoXrjifHs which they causally imprint into the mind, by virtue of their own nature, and in a natural way.



185

referred back on its first occurrence, i.e. ( d ) ; and the Diogenian revised premiss would then mean that a man may not reasonably honour those who have not existed at the beginning of things. This principle would leave reasonable honourability to those beings who indeed existed at the beginning of things, but disappeared since then, e.g. evil powers overcome by the first gods; it would debar from reasonable honourability those beings who did not exist at the beginning of things, but who share some relevant features with the first gods, e.g. their sons and descendants, or the founding heroes of the cities. Whatever interest Diogenes might have in such mythological niceties, it is very doubtful that he had this sort of thing in mind. We should accordingly try the second way, namely to explore the possibility that (C3) is a premiss out of which (D2) can be obtained. In order to get this result, we must admittedly suppose a second suppressed premiss, ( D I * * * ) , SO as to build the following syllogism: (03) The gods are of such a nature as to exist. (DI ***) Everything which is of such a nature as to exist existed once upon a time. (D2) Therefore, the gods existed once upon a time. (DI ***) is interesting, because it helps to give its exact meaning to the predicate 'naturally existing'. I have already given some reasons for arguing that this predicate cannot be equivalent to 'existing and enjoying necessary existence'; (DI ***) confirms this point, since the predicate now turns out to imply nothing more than existence 'once upon a time'. On the other hand, 'naturally existing' appears to mean more than just 'possibly existing' since according to (DI ***) a being of such a nature must have actually existed once upon a time. 25 In sum, the predicate 'naturally existing' must be weaker than 'necessarily existing', and stronger than 'possibly existing'. It must be weaker than 'necessarily existing', since otherwise it would immediately imply 'actually existing', and Diogenes' argument would be a form of the OA; but the needed premiss (DI ***) shows that it implies less than that. It must be stronger than 'possibly existing', because possible existence implies no form whatsoever of actual existence, even 'once upon a time', and ( D I * * * ) precisely shows that 'being of such a nature as to exist' does imply having existing once upon a time. 26 How then to define more precisely the meaning of'naturally existing', if we try to avoid both the Charybdis of a too strong reading and the Scylla of a too 25

26

Here I disagree with an oral suggestion m a d e by A. L o n g and quoted by D r a g o n a - M o n a c h o u 1976, p . 4 3 : ' "If something is of a n a t u r e to exist" is equivalent to "If something can exist". A n d it does not follow from the fact that something can exist that it has existed, unless we a d d the premiss that nothing can exist which has not previously existed.' It seems to me that suppressed premisses are not multiplicanda praeter necessitatem, so that it is preferable to take the implication in ( D I * * * ) at its face value, rather t h a n inserting an additional premiss in order to m a k e it intelligible (even if L o n g interestingly claims that his additional premiss should be accepted by the Stoics, on the basis of their theory of the cyclical repetition of events). A n additional reason is that in the Stoic view the wise presumably are possible beings, and are not 'naturally existing'.


186

STOICISM

weak one? If we rely on the entailment expressed in ( D I * * * ) , we can perhaps suggest the following solution. As I briefly hinted above, the properties which a given type of being possesses by nature are normally possessed by any token of this type; a given token of the type cannot be deprived of any of these properties, unless by accident, or, if this language looks too Aristotelian for Stoic 'determinism', unless through the action of prohibiting external causes. This seems to be just an essential part of the concept of nature, as conveyed by phrases like 7T€vKaoiv etvai; and that is why no principle such as the OAdirected 'Everything which is of such a nature as to be F actually is F' was assumed in the first place. Let us admit, then, that (C2), 'those who are not TTt^vKores €IVOLL a man may not reasonably honour', means that it would not be reasonable to honour a being who exists only accidentally, or through the action of specific external causes which would counteract its normal inexistence (a perfectly defensible idea by itselF 7 ); and that (C3), 'the gods 7T€(f)VKaGLv elvai\ means something like: tokens of the type must normally exist, they are not such that if they exist, they do so only accidentally. It is not excluded that there are no such tokens now, or that there has been none or will be none at some other time; but if such were the case, it would be by accident, through the prohibiting action of specific external causes (cups are of such a nature as to be broken; they normally break, unless one - or even lots of them have sunk in the depths of sea). On the other hand, it is excluded that at every time in the past, the gods did not exist, because any failure of them to exist can only be accidental or contrary to their nature; now prohibiting, anti-natural causes do not regularly overcome natural ones; by definition the accident cannot be the rule (it cannot be the case that no cup ever broke). Thus, even in the case where the gods did not exist now, it would be legitimate to say that there has been, in the indefinite past, one moment (at least) when they existed. In this interpretation of'naturally existing' as 'normally existing' (understood as above), the implication expressed by ( D I * * * ) seems perfectly justified: if we give to 'normally' the appropriate meaning, everything which normally exists has existed at least at some moment of the past. Now that I have established, or so I hope, that (C3) is indeed tacitly present in the modusponens syllogism which starts from (DI) and concludes to (D3*), not however as the ground for (DI), but as the ground for (D2), we can come back to this syllogism as a whole. The two independent ideas that (i) z/the gods exist, they are imperishable, and that (ii) they are of such a nature to exist, can now combine to generate the desired conclusion. The first idea, probably extracted from the evvoca of god (given the comparison with the atoms), is the ground for the conditional premiss (DI); the second one, the conclusion of Diogenes' first revised syllogism, is the ground for the separate assertion of the antecedent (D2). All in all, Diogenes' careful procedure ensures the transition 27

'We can't help feeling that the worthy object of our worship can never be a thing that merely happens to exist' (Findlay, quoted by Schofield 1982, p. 20). But 'not merely happening to exist' is compatible both with 'normally existing' and with 'necessarily existing'.



187

from (03) to (D3*), i.e. from the conclusion of his revision of Zeno's syllogism to (a slightly revised form of) the conclusion of Zeno's syllogism. Let us see, before recapitulating the whole story, whether Section (E) confirms or disconfirms the present analysis. This section is obviously designed to point out where exactly the difference is between the gods and the wise, this time in order to disarm a possible TTapaftoXrj against Diogenes' second step. 28 At the beginning of Section (D), it was said that if (03) the gods are of such a nature as to exist, then - but not by any immediate inference - (D3) they do actually exist. Section (E) precisely says that it is not so with the wise: 'as for the wise, it is not the case that since they are of such a nature as to exist, they do actually exist (01 8e ye oool OVK €7T€i rre^vKaoiv cfvcu, 7/877 /cat ciaiV)'. In other words, the transition from (03) to (D3), successfully realized in the case of the gods in Section (D), could not be paralleled in the case of the wise. Why is it not possible? The text does not say why; and we can hesitate between two solutions: either the wise are not of such a nature as to exist, so that any inference, whether direct or indirect, from the false premiss that they are of such a nature, is straightforwardly blocked or nullified (if one accepts that e falso sequitur quodlibet); or the wise are of such a nature as to exist, but for some reason the argument which successfully proceeded from the analogous premiss about the gods to the assertion of the gods' existence is not applicable to the wise. In order to elucidate this point, we should pay attention to the form of the sentence (OVK iirei KTX): what we have here is what the Stoics dubbed a (negated) Trapaavvvrj/jievov, the distinctive feature of which, in respect to the ovvrjiJLiJLevov, is the use of eVet ('since') instead of el ('if). According to the Stoic Crinis's Art of Dialectic, quoted by DL vii.71, the force of the specific conjunction 'since', in statements of the form 'since /?, q\ is (i) that q follows from/7 (i.e. that if/?, then q\ in other words, that the associate crwT/jii/zeVov is true) and(ii) that/? is the case. DL also says (vii.74) that the irapaovwiqixevov is true if p is true and q follows from /?, false if p is false or (obviously nonexclusive) if q does not follow from/?. To understand why the TrapaowvrjiJLevov 'Since the wise are of such a nature as to exist, they actually exist' is false, let us then consider its components: (EI), the associate awqêvov. 'If the wise are of such a nature as to exist, then they actually exist'. (E2), the antecedent: 'The wise are of such a nature as to exist'. We have got several options: either (EI) is false, or (E2) is false, or both. Embarras de richesse. Let us try to find our way through these three options. First option: the -napaovv^îxevov is false because (EI) is false, (E2) being 28

Schofield 1982, p. 17, tries to read this section as if it was designed to disarm a TrapafioXrj to Diogenes'^*™/ syllogism (his revision of Zeno's syllogism). No wonder he finds the section 'not very clear', and concludes that 'we must convict Diogenes or at least the commentator of massive ignoratio elenchf.


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STOICISM

true. This means, first, that it is true that the wise ire^vKaoiv etvai. Now, the Stoics certainly would not be ready to accept that the wise normally exist, and that if they 'remained undiscoverable up till now', it is a mere matter of accident. So, in order to get a way of making (E2) true, it would be necessary to weaken the meaning of ire^vKaotv etvat down to 'possibly existing', which actually is an acceptable predicate for the wise. Secondly, in order to make (EI) false, we must give the same phrase a meaning weaker than 'necessarily existing': 'possibly existing' and 'normally existing' would both fill the bill. Thus, if we want to keep a consistent meaning for the phrase in both premisses, 'possibly existing' is the only choice. But we have found just now independent reasons for not giving such a meaning to this phrase. The first option, therefore, has nothing attractive in it. Second option: the TrapaovvrjiJLiJLevov is false because (E2) is false, (EI) being true. Now, in order to get a way of making (E2) false, we can give to TTZ$VKVKaaLV etvat, i]8rj /cat elolv. (F) 'ylAAot 8e aoL TO rrpojTOv ArjfjLfjia TOV Zrjvajvos, TO TOVS Oeovs evAoycos dv TLS TLfjLCxn], dfjL(f>LôAov €LVOLL - ev fji€v ydp orjfjLaLveLV TOVS deovs evAoycus dv TLS TLfxc[yrj9 erepov 8e TLfjurjTLKWs ^X ot - AafjiftdvecdaL 8e TO npcoTOV, oirep i/jev8os eoTOLL eirl TWV O0(f)d)V.


ONCE AGAIN ON EUSEBIUS ON ARISTOCLES ON TIMON ON PYRRHO*

I should perhaps apologize for devoting a longish paper to a very well-known document, which has been glossed again and again by every historian of Pyrrho and ancient Scepticism.l My excuse for doing so is double: first, there is a general agreement, I think, on the crucial importance of this document for any attempt to reconstruct Pyrrho's thought; secondly, I would like to offer a new, and I hope reasonable, reading, of some of the most disputed points in it. The text comes from Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica, Bk.xiv, ch. 18, paragraphs 1-5 ( = Aristocles fr. 6 Heiland = Pyrrho test. 53 Decleva Caizzi. See the Greek text in the Appendix to this chapter). Eusebius, as is well known, writes at the beginning of the fourth century AD, with the aim of exposing the absurdities and inconsistencies of most pagan philosophy. He makes abundant use of some good sources, in particular the Peripatetic philosopher Aristocles of Messina, whose date has been recently pushed back from the second half of the second century AD to the end of the first century BC. 2 The work of Aristocles used by Eusebius was an important treatise in ten books, with the title /7ept îXoooîas. Most of Eusebius' chapters 17 to 21 comes from Book vm of Aristocles' On Philosophy, dealing successively with * Afirstversion of this paper was delivered in May 1992, before the Cambridge B-Club. Many searching objections were presented to me, in particular by Myles Burnyeat, Michael Frede and David Sedley; others, no less impressive, were communicated to me in carefully written letters I received from Jonathan Barnes, Marcel Conche, Fernanda Decleva Caizzi and Nick Denyer. I thank them all warmly. If I did not draw from this salvo of criticisms the conclusion that I had better not publish the paper, it is because I still have a hunch that it is basically on the right track. I have attempted, in this new version, to answer the most powerful objections directed at the original one. Thanks are also due to Michel Poirier for his Greek expertise. Finally, I must acknowledge that I received the first insight into the views I am here expressing from two sentences in Groarke 1990, p. 81 n. 1. A propos of the possible influence of Indian thought on Pyrrho, Groarke writes en passant. 'Buddhism eliminates all individuality and duality, establishing that things are indeterminate and unmeasurable and that beliefs are neither true nor false. All distinctions are eradicated and no category is more applicable than its opposite' (my emphasis). 1 The bibliography of the subject is more or less identical with the general bibliography on Pyrrho and ancient Scepticism. Up to 1980, such a general bibliography has been compiled by L. Ferraria and G. Santese in the second volume of Giannantoni 1981. Cf. also Decleva Caizzi 1981, pp. 17-26, and now Barnes 1992, pp. 4295-301. The most important publications will be quoted or mentioned, I think, in the paper. 2 Cf. Follet's notice in Goulet 1989, s.v. Aristocles de Messine. Aristocles apud Eusebius, PE xiv. 18.29 contemptuously speaks of 'a certain Aenesidemus, who quite recently (ixOes /ecu 7Tpu)rjv), in Alexandria in Egypt, tried to revive this [Pyrrhonian] rubbish'. If Aenesidemus wrote around 40 BC, as is generally agreed, Aristocles cannot have written this way much later. 190

EUSEBIUS, ARISTOCLES, TIMON, PYRRHO

191

Xenophanes and Parmenides, the Sceptics, the Cyrenaics, Metrodorus and Protagoras, and finally Epicurus. The extracts usually include a short doxographical section and a long critical section. Eusebius quotes directly from Aristocles' book, which he seems to have to hand; at any rate, in the extract in which we are interested, he claims to quote Aristocles' ipsissima verba or nearly so (cSSe TTTJ irpos Xeîv k'xovTOs, XIV, 17.10).

Here is the translation I propose of this controversial text:3 [Title of the chapter]: Against the people called Pyrrhonian Sceptics, or Ephectics, who declare that nothing is graspable. (1)

It is necessary, first of all, to inquire about our knowledge; for if by nature we are unable to know anything, it will not be necessary to look at the rest. (2) There were some people in older times who told such a story; Aristotle contradicted them. Pyrrho of Elis gained some fame by saying such things (LOXVO€ fxev rotavra Xeycov /cat TIvppcov 6 'HAetos), but he himself

did not leave any written work. In any case, his disciple Timon (6 8e ye fjLaOrjrrjs avrov TL/JLCOV) says that it is necessary, for whoever is to enjoy happiness, to look at the three following points (cfrrjol 8eiv rov fjueXXovra evSai/jLOvrjoetv eh rpia [1*]

First, how things are by their nature {irpcorov êv,

ravra

OTTOLOL 7reu/ce TOL

TTpdyfjuara)',

[2*] Secondly, in what way we must be disposed towards them (Sevrepov Se, rt'va XPV rpoirov rjfjb&s rrpos avra Sta/cetcx0at);

[3*] Finally, what the benefit will be for people who are so (reXevralov §e, ri Trepieorai rots OVTOJS e'xovoi). (3) [1] (la) As for things, he [i.e. Timon] says that he [i.e. Pyrrho] declares them equally indifferent and unstable and undecidable4 (ra yiev ovv irpdyfjuard (f>7]otv avrov a7TO
Kal

[]

[2a] Aid TOVTO ovv fjLrjSe rnoTeveiv avrals Seiv, [2b] dAA' d8o£doTovs Kal aKXtvets Kal aKpaSdvTovs etvat, [2c] Trepl evos eKaoTOV Aeyovra? on ov fidXXov €OTIV rj OVK eanv rj Kal eon Kal OVK €OTIV r) OVT€ €GTLV OVT€ OVK €GTLV.

(4)[3] Tot? /xevrot ye Sta/cet/xevots" ovrco Trepieoeodai Tificov (frrjol rrpcoTOv fjiev d^>aatav, eVeira 8' drapaîav, AlvrjOLorjfjios S' r)oovf]v. (5)7d fjuev ovv K€dXaia TCOV Xeyofjuevcuv COTI r a u r a • GKei/jcofxeda S' el opdtbs XeyovoLV.

10 THE TITLE OF TIMON'S INDALMOL FROM ODYSSEUS TO PYRRHO

Timon of Phlius (about 325 to about 235), known as the Sillograph, was 'spokesman' (77/00^77x779, Sextus Empiricus calls him, M 1.53) for his master Pyrrho of Elis. As his nickname indicates, he is known chiefly for his Silloi, a kind of Homer in disguise into which he had poured all his satirical verve, in the service of Pyrrho. In the fragments by him that have come down to us, 1 the Silloi predominate, thanks to their dashing style and the many explicitly personal attacks directed against a large number of well-known and respected philosophers that they contain. Quite a few fragments of this work are thus preserved, and their spiciness still comes through, despite the sophistication of the vocabulary and the obscurity of the allusions. We also possess an equally valuable and quite detailed general description of the structure of the work and its author's intentions. 2 However, the Silloi by no means constitute the entire output of the Sillograph. The fragments that remain from Timon's writings testify fully to his many-sided ability. He was an enormously prolific author, who had written in the most varied of genres. Diogenes Laertius ( i x . i i o - u ) provides the following information on him: He was known to King Antigonus and to Ptolemy Philadelphia, as his own Iambi (iv TOIS idôLs) testify. He was, according to Antigonus [of Carystus], fond of wine, and in the leisure time that he could spare from philosophy, he used to write poems. These included epics, tragedies, satyrical dramas (thirty comedies and sixty tragedies) besides silloi (lampoons) and obscene poems (KIVCUSovs). There are also works of his in prose extending to 20,000 lines, which are mentioned by Antigonus, who also wrote his life. (transl. R.D. Hicks, slightly modified, Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1965) This list shows, if nothing else, that Timon had managed to 'spare from philosophy' a fairly copious dose of'leisure' time. But, strangely enough, there Principal collections of the fragments of Timon: Wachsmuth 1859 and 1885; Diels 1901; Lloyd-Jones and Parsons 1983; and now Di Marco 1989. A significant proportion of these fragments are, naturally, also assembled in Decleva Caizzi 1981. In the interests of convenience and economy, for the first occurrence of any reference to a fragment of Timon, I shall cite the number given to that fragment in all these editions (using the abbreviations W, D, DC, LJP); for later occurrences I shall simply cite the number in Diels, which is always cited in the later editions. Cf. DL ix. 111-12. Long's fine study (1978) is currently the best commentary on the Silloi. See now Di Marco 1989. 212


THE TITLE OF TIMON'S INDALMOI

213

is one work, the Indalmoi, that it does not mention although its title has come down to us, as have a number of extracts from it which are of the greatest importance.3 The meaning of several passages from this work is crucial to the understanding of Pyrrhonism in its original form and their interpretation has, on that account, been the subject of intense discussion. I do not intend to go into that discussion, but in order to convey a notion of the ideas that these fragments contain (leaving aside all the problems of text, punctuation, syntax and semantics which ought really to be tackled and resolved before any attempt at suggesting a reasoned interpretation is made), let me offer the following approximate translation: (a) Fragment 67D: This, o Pyrrho, is what my heart longs to hear: How do you, who are only a man, manage to live your life4 in such serenity, Always free from care, free from agitation, always of the same disposition, Without paying any attention to the wretchedness5 of knowledge expressed in beguiling language? Alone, you act as men's guide, like the god Who, pursuing his course right around the earth, buckles his buckle, Displaying the incandescent circle of his well rounded sphere. 3

Some (but relatively few) scholars have expressed surprise at the absence of the Indalmoi from the list of Timon's works given by Diogenes Laertius. It is indeed a surprising absence, for Diogenes twice refers to the Indalmoi in his note on Pyrrho, at 65 (p. 21. iW = 67D = 6iB 4 proposed emending lajxfiois, in n o , to ZvSaAjjLois', but even that suggestion was not enough to ensure the inclusion of the Indalmoi in the official catalogue of Timon's works. Wachsmuth (1885, p.20), followed by Decleva Caizzi (1981, p. 251), thinks that the work ought to be included amongst the e-n-rj, for reasons of metric classification. However, in my own view, there is something to be said for emending Kivaihovs to ivSaX/xovs: (i) the unusual term ivSaXfioi was mishandled by the copyists, cf. Sextus, M xi.20, where the introduction of the quotation of fragment 68D ( = p. 22. iiW = 62DC = 842LJP) was restored by Menage and Fabricius as iv TOLS TvSaAfxoLs, on the basis of the following manuscript readings: TOLS OLVSTUJLOLS N, TOLOIVSTJIJLOLS L, TOLOLV STOOLS E, TOLOL STÔIS1 S; (ii) faulty uncial lettering and word-breaks, in

conjunction with plain perversity, might explain how ivSaXfjuovs came to be KIVOLISOVS; (iii) the wounding and sarcastic wit of Timon, who had once been a dancer (DL ix. 109) was sufficiently well known for him frequently to be criticized for obscenities (cf. Brochard 1923, p. 84: 'the former tumbler also displays something of the uncouth and insulting manner of the cynics'); (iv) Wachsmuth 1859, p. 8, followed by Brochard 1923, p. 80 n. 2, proposed reading (f>iXoTTOLy}Trjs, 'connaisseur of poetry', in place of ^LXOTTOTTJS 'connaisseur of wines', in DL's text; he may be right, however prudish the emendation may be and despite one or two writers who testify to Timon's Rabelaisian inclinations (Athenaeus x.438, Aelian VH11.41): DL's text, which already contains one malicious distortion, may well have contained another, and the two prudish emendations would be mutually supportive; (v) lastly, and above all, if we accept the proposed emendation, the list of Timon's writings does become more systematically organized: literary works (epics and dramatic poems), philosophical poems (the Silloi and the Indalmoi), prose works. I am here translating Sidyeis, a conjecture on the part of Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 59, and adopted by Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 11, p. 10; the MSS give a number of different readings, none of which make sense. I am here retaining the SeiXots of the MSS, which seems to me to make acceptable sense. Among the many suggestions for replacing this word, let me cite the following: SLVOLS ('to whirlwinds', Nauck, Diels, Decleva Caizzi, Long and Sedley), Xrjpois ('to nonsense', Bekker), SeXrois ('to writings', Bergk, who had, however, initially suggested ivSaXfAols, 'to deceptive images', see below n. 12), CLLVOLS ('to stories', Bury), SOVXOLS ('to servitudes', Decleva Caizzi, p. 254, dubitanter), heXiaoa ('to charms', Lloyd Jones and Parsons dubitanter).


214

SCEPTICISM

(b) Fragment 68D (unanimously considered to be the reply, or the beginning of the reply, vouchsafed by Pyrrho, in Timon's poem, in answer to the question that his disciple has asked him in fragment 67D): I will tell you how it appears to me (Karaâiverai) To be, having the word of truth (JJLVOOV aXrjdeirjs) as my correct rule (opdov Kavova);6 I will tell you the nature of the divine and the good (17 rov Qeiov re cf>vois KOLL rayaOov), Whence there stems the most balanced life for man.7 Fragment 69D: But appearance (TO s JJLOL ivSdXXeraL rjrop . . . (b) Timon, Indalmoi fr. 67D, l.i: rovro /xot, o5 Ilvppajv, i/xetperat rjrop OLKOVOOLI . . .

(c) Timon, Indalmoi fr. 68D, l.i: rj yap iycbv ipeco, a>s etvai . . .

[JLOL

Karaâlverai

Before returning to this comparison, a study of which will constitute the essential subject of this paper, let me briefly summarize the state reached in the discussion concerning the meaning of the title Indalmoi. Nobody doubts or challenges the idea that the kernel of the meaning of the term Indalmoi has to do with the notion of an image (with the proviso that this notion may then develop in various directions: towards representation, appearance, manifestation, deceptive likeness, etc.). Most commentators are equally in agreement 10

Modern publishers of Homer print TOL here, rather than the variant iywv. I prefer, here, to keep the latter reading, which seems to have served as a model to Timon in line 1 of fragment 68D (in which case there is no need to ascribe to Timon the deliberate introduction of eyco in his parody of the Homeric text, nor to consider it as evidence of a reinforcement of the affirmative tonQ,pace Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 259). This is perhaps the place to recall Timon's own interest in the problems of Homer's text and his astonishingly modern conservatism in this connection: 'Aratus is said to have asked him how he could obtain a trustworthy text of Homer, to which he replied, "You can if you can get hold of the ancient copies, and not the corrected copies of our day" (TOLS dpâtot? avTiypdcfxus .. . /cat fxrj rots fj&r] Situpflco/xevoi?)' (DLIX. 113). The same line of Homer, with the same reading, may have served as a model to Parmenides (fr. 2.1), in a strongly dogmatic context: el S* ay iycjv ipeco, /co/xiaai 8e GV (JLVOOV OLKOVOOLS.


2l6

SCEPTICISM

in thinking that xix.224 of the Odyssey contains the key to the riddle.11 But, precisely, and above all in the context of Pyrrho's 'Pyrrhonism' and that of his earliest disciples, the whole point is to decide what is added to that initial kernel of meaning by the Homeric use of the term and Timon's re-use of it. In this respect, the interpretations that have been proposed can by and large be divided into three types: negative, positive and mixed. To many scholars, it has seemed self-evident that, in a context in which Pyrrho was considered as the first of the (neo-)'Pyrrhonist' Sceptics, the term Indalmoi was bound to have a negative sense: many interpreters consider it to refer to the deceptive appearances that lead the common run of men astray. These are appearances that may be produced either by the natural world or by the conventional world of culture and the arbitrary values that men confer upon things that are in themselves neither good nor bad, or even, more narrowly, by the vain speculations of philosophers. Wachsmuth already (1859, p. 11) believed that the term Indalmoi must refer to false and deceptive images. Brochard (1887, 1923, pp. 85-6), having criticized Hirzel's positive interpretation (1883), to which I shall be returning, adopts Wachsmuth's view: 'It is more likely that, as Wachsmuth supposed, the word Indalmoi is here given a derogative meaning; it refers to deceptive images or appearances that the false wisdom of philosophers, according to Timon, presents to the human mind, images that are the principal obstacle to a happy life.' Even though Brochard's negative interpretation is flawed by a singularly weak argument,12 many other commentators (and translators of Diogenes Laertius) have also adopted it: in particular, we may cite Robin,13 11

12

13

Cf. Hirzel 1883, pp. 51-2 n. 1; Diels 1901, p. 203 {wide tituli significatio { — (fxnvoyieva, Sofcu) elucet); Conrad 1913, pp. 12-13; Lloyd-Jones and Parsons 1983, p. 392 ("ivSaX/jiol id est 8o|cu vel ^cuvoêva, cf. fr. 68D, and Od. xix.224'). Brochard writes as follows (p. 86): 'It is in this sense [deceptive images or appearances] that the word is used in a line of Timon's, from the Indalmoi." The line in question, which he cites in a note, is the fourth line of fr. 67D. But Brochard cites it adopting the suggestion made by Bergk, who substitutes /JLTJ npooex iVSaA/xofr for the reading in Sextus' MSS (fjur) -rrpooexajv SetXois), a reading which, as we have seen, gave rise to many other conjectures, yet still seems possible to retain (cf. above, n. 5). In his note, Brochard merely says 'with Bergk's emendation', without indicating that this 'emendation', which introduces the word ivSaXpois into a text where it does not appear in any of the MSS, is the only justification for his claiming, in the main text, that the word TvSaAfjLoi 'is used in one of Timon's lines'. Robin 1944 translates the title Indalmoi as 'Appearances' or 'Likenesses' in the sense of 'false likenesses' (*Apparences\ 'Semblants\ *Faux-semblants\ p. 28). He comments as follows (p. 31): 'Perhaps these "appearances" are analogous, in particular, to Francis Bacon's "idola theatrf: the deceptive images by means of which philosophers mislead the public before whom they act out their systems, feeling obliged to stick firmly to their role. But it is also possible that Timon's view may have been more general: this is the poem in which there appears the line (fr. 69D) on the universal predominance of appearance (TO (f>aiv6fji€vov), as it presents itself to the conscious mind. In another line (fr. 70D = p. 24. ivW = 64DC = 844LJP), he writes of the distinction between good and evil, which is made arbitrarily by men's minds.' In this last sentence, Robin seems to wish to have it both ways, drawing upon both the text of the MSS (VOCO K€KpLTai) and upon Hirzel's suggested emendation (vofMco KeKpirat), adopted by Natorp 1884, p. 289, Wachsmuth 1885, p. 24 and Brochard 1923, p. 62 n. 1. It is worth noting that recognition of the two possible interpretations indicated by Robin (philosophical illusions, phenomenal illusions) is not the equivalent of what I shall be calling a mixed interpretation, despite what Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 252 says.



217

Conche, 14 and above all Decleva Caizzi, who came to this same conclusion following a long discussion to which I owe a great deal.* 5 1 shall return later to one particular element in her argument. However, a positive interpretation had long since been suggested by Hirzel (1883, PP- 2 I ~ 2 a n d 46-60 (in particular pp. 51-2 n. 1)). Criticizing Wachsmuth's negative interpretation (1859), Hirzel says that it is impossible to understand why Timon should have entitled a critique of deceptive representations 'Representations', adding that it would be as if Kant had entitled his Critique of Pure Reason 'Dogmatic Philosophy'. 16 But in a 'Sceptic' context, the notion of iVSaA/zot, which Hirzel does not distinguish from the notion of cfxuvofieva, may be put to a positive use: according to Hirzel, Timon is referring to the 'representations' which the sage needs in order to live and to act, the 'phenomena' which serve as guides for his behaviour and which thereby provide him with the practical criterion without which a Sceptic would be exposed to the constantly recurring objection of dvrpa^ta, the impossibility of living and acting. According to this theory, the Indalmoi constitute a work of an ethical nature which presupposes the principles of Pyrrhonist drapa^ta and the 'discourse of truth' of fr. 68D, accepting the consequences of those principles and indicating the stages by which they can be put into practice, in the manner of Democritus' Flepl €vdvyiirjs or a Stoic Ilepl KadrjKovros. Hirzel's thesis has been criticized by Brochard, using arguments some of which, it must be said, cut both ways. He writes as follows (1923/81, p. 85): 'It is difficult to believe that, if he had wanted to speak only of true and useful images, Timon would have entitled his book Indalmoi, without further qualification.' The argument is easily reversed: the title is no easier to understand if we assume that Timon wished to speak only of fake and deceptive images. It is accordingly natural enough that many scholars have been tempted by a mixed interpretation, according to which the word Indalmoi designates both categories of images or appearances, those that are deceptive and also those that are of practical use. This mixed interpretation has furthermore been presented in two versions, depending upon whether the title of the Indalmoi is understood as combining the two categories of images in a conjunctive fashion or as referring to them in a deliberately ambiguous manner. Revising his own negative interpretation of 1859, Wachsmuth (1885, pp. 22-3) merged it with Hirzel's positive interpretation, suggesting that we should understand the 'IvSaA/jioi to cover both the representations that mislead us and those which lead us to drapaîa.11 The idea of a deliberate ambiguity is argued explicitly by C. Stough. 18 14

15 16 17

18

Conche 1973, p. 89:'... the generally accepted hypothesis according to which the poem Images is directed against the false likenesses of dogmatic wisdom.' Cf. Decleva Caizzi 1981, pp. 251-2 and 258-9. Or, to remain within a Greek context: as if Parmenides had entitled his poem Doxa, or Doxai. According to Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 252, a similar interpretation is to be found in Voghera 1904, p. 27, a work that I have not been able to consult. Cf. Stough 1969, p. 24, n. 15: 'There is probably a deliberate play on the title {Indalmoi) itself. It means both "appearances" and "illusions".' Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 252 incorrectly presents Stough's position as purely negative.


2l8

SCEPTICISM

Those three possible interpretations, negative, positive and mixed, reappear, logically enough, in connection with the famous enigmatic line, also from the Indalmoi, which on its own constitutes fr. 69D: 'But appearance (TO <j>aiv6iA€vov) predominates everywhere, wherever one goes.' Most interpreters have thought that the cfxuvofjievov of this line must designate the same thing as the ivSaXfjiOiof the work's title. That is how it is that, in strict correlation and mutual interaction with their own respective and divergent interpretations of the title, for some interpreters this line refers to the universal domination of deceptive appearances from which only the sage can extricate himself; for others it refers to the practical usefulness of the phenomenon, which constitutes a sure and major guide for a Pyrrhonist's practical conduct; while for yet others it refers to the inevitable predominance of the phenomenon which both prevents man from knowing the world as it is, yet, despite this, at the same time provides him with a criterion that indicates how to behave in this unknowable world. Tempting though it may be, the assimilation of the IVSCLA/JLOI of the title to the v ipeoj, OJS JJLOL ivhdXXerai rjrop. What is the exact meaning of this line? It is itself ambiguous, as is most interestingly noted by the Liddell-Scott-Jones dictionary (s.v. iVSaAAojtzcu). It may be understood in a tentative sense: 'I will tell you as my memory seems to me' (LSJ), but also in a positive one: 'I will tell you as my heart pictures him' (LSJ). Those two possible meanings are, as I see it, dictated by the situation in which the character Odysseus finds himself in relation to his wife and also by the situation of the poet in relation to his reader. The tentative meaning corresponds to the psychological caution that Odysseus is obliged to observe where Penelope is concerned: she must be made to recognize that the traveller's memory cannot be expected to be infallible after so many years; and this will cause her to be all the more impressed by the extremely precise details that Odysseus is about to give her regarding the coat that he was wearing at that time and the shape and ornamentation of its clasp - details which Penelope will recognize with delight, for she knows them well, since all these items were gifts from herself to her husband. The positive sense allows the poet to aim a wink in the direction of his reader: the false stranger is, of course, well placed to know exactly what Odysseus was wearing, since he is none other than Odysseus himself- a fact that Penelope does not know but the reader does.


220

SCEPTICISM

The line in question, in all its own ambiguity (itself condensed in the ambiguity of the verb tVSdAAercu), thus sums up the complex significance of the whole scene. It is the scene that leads up to the recognition and identification, by means of precise proofs, of the prestigious character who is both present for those to whom the poem is addressed and, at the same time, absent for the one to whom his discourse in the poem is addressed. Describing and described, narrating and narrated, Odysseus-Aithon is at once the subject and the object of his own words. Through the interplay between the same and the other, Homer has him recount what he remembers of himself in the language of the memories of another. With impressive skill,21 Timon dismantles the Homeric line (avrap iywv ipeto, FIvppojv, ifjietperaL rjrop aKovoai), which keeps the word rjrop, but gets around the word ivSaWercu,, by replacing it with ifi€ip€Tai; and finally, in the first line of Pyrrho's reply (rj yap iywv epeo), (Lg fjuoL KaTas /JLOL

..., but again avoids the word iVSdAAercu, replacing it with Kara<j>aiv€rai etvai. While we may be reasonably certain that this manipulation of the Homeric material would have been perceived as such by Timon's reader, it is clearly much harder to understand exactly what meanings he was supposed to pick up from it. It is nevertheless possible to hazard a few guesses, speculative though they are bound to be. With regard to the first line of fr. 67D, the task is relatively easy. If we bear in mind the contents of this fragment as a whole, that is to say the request to Pyrrho to be so good as to reveal to his questioner the means whereby he achieves his superhuman tranquillity, we can perhaps imagine the distancing effect that Timon's text must have had upon a reader nurtured on Homer. In Timon's line, the verb tVSdAAercu of the Homeric line has been spectacularly replaced by the verb expressing desire, Ifieiperai. That is tantamount to saying, or at least strongly suggesting, that the ivSaXfioi are supposed to satisfy the desire that is expressed in this first line, namely the desire to obtain from Pyrrho, the great man whose name is here spelt out, the revelation of the secret of his contentment. Timon voices that desire in his own name (/xot); but needless to say, he considers it to be a desire felt universally by all men and presupposes that his reader is no exception.22 However, Timon can provide 21

22

Perhaps I shall be accused of exaggerating the subtlety shown by the a u t h o r of the Indalmoi in his use of the Odyssey, a subtlety with which he also credited the reader of his poem. There is no need to go so far as to invoke Rabelais to justify the co-existence of the most liberated kind of wit with the most sophisticated erudition. Let me simply refer the reader to Cortassa 1976, p. 314, who calls fragment 4 6 D of the Silloi ( = 4 W = 778LJP) 'a closely woven web of subtle satirical innuendos, m o r e or less open allusions and equivocal implications to which the interpreter must be constantly alert lest he gravely misunderstand the meaning of T i m o n ' s poem.' T h e first line of Parmenides' Poem also refers (in terms of dv^xos) to a desire that the reader is implicitly invited to identify as his own.



221

only images, iVSaAfxoi, of what it is that can satisfy that desire. Perhaps I may at this point be permitted a somewhat irreverent comparison: Timon presents his reader with an image of the product that he wants to recommend to him, not the product itself, just as a mail-order company sends its clients an illustrated catalogue, to make them want to procure the originals of the images that it contains. What, then, do the images that Timon provides represent? Surely not only Pyrrho the man, as in the context of an anecdotal biography made up of'personal memories', rather Pyrrho the inventor and model of an exceptional 'disposition' (Siddeois), the essential components of which are 'apathy' and 'drapa^ta', a disposition which - as we know - had made an intensely forceful impression upon his disciples and contemporaries.23 Naturally, the 'images' of Pyrrho that Timon dispensed to his reader were to be particularly recommended not only because they were so attractive but also on account of their authority, for they were relayed by a witness in a good position to be exact and truthful, Timon having spent a number of years in Pyrrho's company (cf. DL ix. 109). He could say quite literally of Pyrrho what Odysseus said of the shades that he had encountered in Hades: T saw him.'24 Let us press on a little further: Timon is not only the analogue of OdysseusAithon, who is capable of providing first-hand information about OdysseusPyrrho,25 together with proofs to back that information up. Objectively, and for those who know what is not known to Penelope, who is the person to whom his discourse is directly addressed, Aithon is none other than Odysseus. So the re-use of the Homeric episode, with all its contextual connotations, might well imply that Timon, the one who is speaking, is, in a way, identified with Pyrrho, the one about whom he is speaking. The fact that the very line which, in Homer, is pronounced by Odysseus, provides certain of the elements for the question that Timon asks, and certain others for the reply that Pyrrho himself gives, perhaps conveys the same message: Timon is implicitly presenting himself as Pyrrho's alter ego. The 'images' of his master and of Pyrrhonist happiness that he is about to produce are as trustworthy as those that Odysseus, under an assumed name, can present of his own coat and its clasp: 23

24

25

The documentation on P y r r h o (who, as hardly needs pointing out, himself wrote nothing) is m o r e inclined to expatiate u p o n his way of life and his character than u p o n his teaching and arguments, as is clear from the valuable collection of testimony that has at last - most proficiently - been put together by Decleva Caizzi 1981. Some of the contemporaries w h o m Pyrrho h a d impressed explicitly separated his Siddecns from his Aoyoi, cf. N a u s i p h a n e s in D L ix.64, 69. 'I also saw so-and-so' is the standardized expression used of Odysseus' encounters in the U n d e r w o r l d in the course of the Nekuia (Od. xi). The expression had already been used by the Cynic Crates of Thebes (cf. fr. i D = 347LJP a n d fr. 3 D = 349LJP), w h o had also parodied H o m e r , possibly providing a model for T i m o n ' s techniques of p a r o d y (cf. W a c h s m u t h 1885, p p . 72-3 and L o n g 1978, pp. 75-6). However, one m a y wonder whether it was really simply by chance in the transmission of texts that, of all the fragments of the Silloi preserved, the only two to use t'Sov, 'I saw', h a p p e n to be the one concerning P y r r h o (cf. £yd> i8ov, 9 D = 32W = 5 8 D C = 783LJP) and the one concerning a n o t h e r of T i m o n ' s contemporaries, Zeno of Citium (38D = 8W = 812LJP). T h e identification of Pyrrho with Odysseus is attested by fragment 8 D of the Silloi ( = 35W = 5 7 D C = 782LJP), which declares P y r r h o to be 'unrivalled', in a p a r o d y of a line from H o m e r (//. 111.223) which makes the same claim for Odysseus.


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SCEPTICISM

for Timon is as close to Pyrrho as Odysseus, twenty years on, is to himself.26 It is much more difficult to give a plausible interpretation of the distancing effect that Timon aims for and achieves when he again uses that same line of Homer's in the first line of the reply that he ascribes to Pyrrho (fr. 68D, line i): iydjv ipeco, c5? /xot /cara^cuVercu etvai. The reason for this is simple: the verb that is substituted for the Homeric iVSaAAercu is, this time, not the transparent verb [jjL€Lp€Tcu, but the extremely equivocal and controversial /cara^cuWrcu {etvcu). Should this verb be understood as a straightforward equivalent to au>eTcu? Many interpreters believe that it should and that, in conformity, already, with the spirit of neo-Pyrrhonian Scepticism, its use qualifies the entire contents of the discourse attributed to Pyrrho, suggesting that it constitutes no more than a subjective and personal appearance. 27 Unconvinced by that theory, others, on the contrary, think that the compound Karaâiverat has a different meaning from that of the simple cuWrcu, and that this intrinsically positive meaning ('to emerge from darkness to come into the light', 'to show itself, 'to manifest itself) gives Pyrrho's discourse a strongly dogmatic and assertive character. 28 26

27

28

T i m o n ' s strategy has proved remarkably effective since, twenty-three centuries after the Indalmoi, in an article entitled (as if by chance) 'The image of balance' (L'immagine delFequilibrio), a particularly sensitive and learned scholar describes the four lines of fragment 6 8 D as 'the only fully comprehensible a n d non-manipulated text in which Pyrrho speaks, setting o u t his o w n doctrine in the first person' (Ferrari 1981, p . 357, Ferrari's italics). Ferrari would perhaps not have overlooked the fact that the a u t h o r of those four lines was in fact T i m o n if, not content to write a n u m b e r of remarkable pages on the meeting between Pyrrho a n d T i m o n , which is the fundamental schema for all the works in which T i m o n speaks of his master (pp. 345-61), he h a d probed further into the other-self relationship which became established following and in consequence of that m e m o r a b l e meeting between the master and his disciple. T h a t was h o w Sextus interpreted this fragment of T i m o n (doing so, however, with a prudence rightly noted by b o t h N a t o r p 1884, p . 292 a n d Decleva Caizzi 1981, p . 256): 'We are in the habit of calling each of these things good, or bad, or indifferent, in conformity with the appearance (Kara TO (fxuvofxevov), as T i m o n seems to wish to show (eoiare SrjXovv) in the Indalmoi when he says', etc. ( M xi.20). Similarly, in m o d e r n times, see Stough 1969, p . 25 ('Everything said is qualified by " a s it appears to me to b e " , an indication that he is merely reporting his own experience'); D u m o n t 1972, p . 132 ('Is it not clear that the phenomenon is said, at least according to T i m o n , to be the criterion of t r u t h for Pyrrho?'); Conche 1973, p. 61 ('the cos /LIOI KaraâiveraL etvcu turns being into seeming'; see also p . 89); L o n g 1978, p . 84-5 n. 16 ( T h e key phrase is cos JJLOL KaraâiveraL etvat, as Sextus, the source of the lines, understood them ( M xi. 19-20). H e distinguishes between " t h e existence of goods a n d evils a n d neither of t h e s e " and their appearance (TO aiv6ixevov), which the Pyrrhonist is in the habit of calling good, bad, and indifferent. This permits us to regard the "correct r u l e " as the stating of truth " a s it seems to (me) to b e " , a n d n o unqualified existential claim a b o u t <j>vois is made.') See Ferrari's argument (1981, p . 359: 'In t r u t h the Greek term never has the negative meaning of " t o seem", " t o a p p e a r " , in the sense of uncertainty, but on the contrary always has the positive meaning of something which emerges from the darkness into the light and which accordingly " s h o w s itself", "manifests i t s e l f " ) which is taken u p by Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 256 ('the c o m p o u n d term used underlines the assertion rather t h a n obscuring it by giving it a subjective sense, as is proved by the passages in which it recurs (cf. for example H d t . 1.58, in.53, 130; in.69) and the meaning of Kara^>avr)s, /caTcuâveia'), a n d 258-9 ('it would be h a r d to deny that T i m o n ' s lines have the authoritative tone of the revelation of the truth . . . the second hemistich is replaced by the m u c h stronger cos /xoi Karacfyaiverai elvat . . . which certainly paves the way for the emphasis of the pentameter which follows.')



223

It may be impossible to disambiguate Timon's Kara<j>aiv€Tai.29 Indeed, it may be important not to attempt to do so: that ambiguity might quite deliberately be there to echo the ambiguity that Timon had probably perceived in Homer's iVSaAAercu. Different categories of addressees could understand Karavois KOLL rayaOov), Whence there stems the most balanced life for man.7 Fragment 69D: But appearance (TO s JJLOL ivSdXXeraL rjrop . . . (b) Timon, Indalmoi fr. 67D, l.i: rovro /xot, o5 Ilvppajv, i/xetperat rjrop OLKOVOOLI . . .

(c) Timon, Indalmoi fr. 68D, l.i: rj yap iycbv ipeco, a>s etvai . . .

[JLOL

Karaâlverai

Before returning to this comparison, a study of which will constitute the essential subject of this paper, let me briefly summarize the state reached in the discussion concerning the meaning of the title Indalmoi. Nobody doubts or challenges the idea that the kernel of the meaning of the term Indalmoi has to do with the notion of an image (with the proviso that this notion may then develop in various directions: towards representation, appearance, manifestation, deceptive likeness, etc.). Most commentators are equally in agreement 10

Modern publishers of Homer print TOL here, rather than the variant iywv. I prefer, here, to keep the latter reading, which seems to have served as a model to Timon in line 1 of fragment 68D (in which case there is no need to ascribe to Timon the deliberate introduction of eyco in his parody of the Homeric text, nor to consider it as evidence of a reinforcement of the affirmative tonQ,pace Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 259). This is perhaps the place to recall Timon's own interest in the problems of Homer's text and his astonishingly modern conservatism in this connection: 'Aratus is said to have asked him how he could obtain a trustworthy text of Homer, to which he replied, "You can if you can get hold of the ancient copies, and not the corrected copies of our day" (TOLS dpâtot? avTiypdcfxus .. . /cat fxrj rots fj&r] Situpflco/xevoi?)' (DLIX. 113). The same line of Homer, with the same reading, may have served as a model to Parmenides (fr. 2.1), in a strongly dogmatic context: el S* ay iycjv ipeco, /co/xiaai 8e GV (JLVOOV OLKOVOOLS.


2l6

SCEPTICISM

in thinking that xix.224 of the Odyssey contains the key to the riddle.11 But, precisely, and above all in the context of Pyrrho's 'Pyrrhonism' and that of his earliest disciples, the whole point is to decide what is added to that initial kernel of meaning by the Homeric use of the term and Timon's re-use of it. In this respect, the interpretations that have been proposed can by and large be divided into three types: negative, positive and mixed. To many scholars, it has seemed self-evident that, in a context in which Pyrrho was considered as the first of the (neo-)'Pyrrhonist' Sceptics, the term Indalmoi was bound to have a negative sense: many interpreters consider it to refer to the deceptive appearances that lead the common run of men astray. These are appearances that may be produced either by the natural world or by the conventional world of culture and the arbitrary values that men confer upon things that are in themselves neither good nor bad, or even, more narrowly, by the vain speculations of philosophers. Wachsmuth already (1859, p. 11) believed that the term Indalmoi must refer to false and deceptive images. Brochard (1887, 1923, pp. 85-6), having criticized Hirzel's positive interpretation (1883), to which I shall be returning, adopts Wachsmuth's view: 'It is more likely that, as Wachsmuth supposed, the word Indalmoi is here given a derogative meaning; it refers to deceptive images or appearances that the false wisdom of philosophers, according to Timon, presents to the human mind, images that are the principal obstacle to a happy life.' Even though Brochard's negative interpretation is flawed by a singularly weak argument,12 many other commentators (and translators of Diogenes Laertius) have also adopted it: in particular, we may cite Robin,13 11

12

13

Cf. Hirzel 1883, pp. 51-2 n. 1; Diels 1901, p. 203 {wide tituli significatio { — (fxnvoyieva, Sofcu) elucet); Conrad 1913, pp. 12-13; Lloyd-Jones and Parsons 1983, p. 392 ("ivSaX/jiol id est 8o|cu vel ^cuvoêva, cf. fr. 68D, and Od. xix.224'). Brochard writes as follows (p. 86): 'It is in this sense [deceptive images or appearances] that the word is used in a line of Timon's, from the Indalmoi." The line in question, which he cites in a note, is the fourth line of fr. 67D. But Brochard cites it adopting the suggestion made by Bergk, who substitutes /JLTJ npooex iVSaA/xofr for the reading in Sextus' MSS (fjur) -rrpooexajv SetXois), a reading which, as we have seen, gave rise to many other conjectures, yet still seems possible to retain (cf. above, n. 5). In his note, Brochard merely says 'with Bergk's emendation', without indicating that this 'emendation', which introduces the word ivSaXpois into a text where it does not appear in any of the MSS, is the only justification for his claiming, in the main text, that the word TvSaAfjLoi 'is used in one of Timon's lines'. Robin 1944 translates the title Indalmoi as 'Appearances' or 'Likenesses' in the sense of 'false likenesses' (*Apparences\ 'Semblants\ *Faux-semblants\ p. 28). He comments as follows (p. 31): 'Perhaps these "appearances" are analogous, in particular, to Francis Bacon's "idola theatrf: the deceptive images by means of which philosophers mislead the public before whom they act out their systems, feeling obliged to stick firmly to their role. But it is also possible that Timon's view may have been more general: this is the poem in which there appears the line (fr. 69D) on the universal predominance of appearance (TO (f>aiv6fji€vov), as it presents itself to the conscious mind. In another line (fr. 70D = p. 24. ivW = 64DC = 844LJP), he writes of the distinction between good and evil, which is made arbitrarily by men's minds.' In this last sentence, Robin seems to wish to have it both ways, drawing upon both the text of the MSS (VOCO K€KpLTai) and upon Hirzel's suggested emendation (vofMco KeKpirat), adopted by Natorp 1884, p. 289, Wachsmuth 1885, p. 24 and Brochard 1923, p. 62 n. 1. It is worth noting that recognition of the two possible interpretations indicated by Robin (philosophical illusions, phenomenal illusions) is not the equivalent of what I shall be calling a mixed interpretation, despite what Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 252 says.



217

Conche, 14 and above all Decleva Caizzi, who came to this same conclusion following a long discussion to which I owe a great deal.* 5 1 shall return later to one particular element in her argument. However, a positive interpretation had long since been suggested by Hirzel (1883, PP- 2 I ~ 2 a n d 46-60 (in particular pp. 51-2 n. 1)). Criticizing Wachsmuth's negative interpretation (1859), Hirzel says that it is impossible to understand why Timon should have entitled a critique of deceptive representations 'Representations', adding that it would be as if Kant had entitled his Critique of Pure Reason 'Dogmatic Philosophy'. 16 But in a 'Sceptic' context, the notion of iVSaA/zot, which Hirzel does not distinguish from the notion of cfxuvofieva, may be put to a positive use: according to Hirzel, Timon is referring to the 'representations' which the sage needs in order to live and to act, the 'phenomena' which serve as guides for his behaviour and which thereby provide him with the practical criterion without which a Sceptic would be exposed to the constantly recurring objection of dvrpa^ta, the impossibility of living and acting. According to this theory, the Indalmoi constitute a work of an ethical nature which presupposes the principles of Pyrrhonist drapa^ta and the 'discourse of truth' of fr. 68D, accepting the consequences of those principles and indicating the stages by which they can be put into practice, in the manner of Democritus' Flepl €vdvyiirjs or a Stoic Ilepl KadrjKovros. Hirzel's thesis has been criticized by Brochard, using arguments some of which, it must be said, cut both ways. He writes as follows (1923/81, p. 85): 'It is difficult to believe that, if he had wanted to speak only of true and useful images, Timon would have entitled his book Indalmoi, without further qualification.' The argument is easily reversed: the title is no easier to understand if we assume that Timon wished to speak only of fake and deceptive images. It is accordingly natural enough that many scholars have been tempted by a mixed interpretation, according to which the word Indalmoi designates both categories of images or appearances, those that are deceptive and also those that are of practical use. This mixed interpretation has furthermore been presented in two versions, depending upon whether the title of the Indalmoi is understood as combining the two categories of images in a conjunctive fashion or as referring to them in a deliberately ambiguous manner. Revising his own negative interpretation of 1859, Wachsmuth (1885, pp. 22-3) merged it with Hirzel's positive interpretation, suggesting that we should understand the 'IvSaA/jioi to cover both the representations that mislead us and those which lead us to drapaîa.11 The idea of a deliberate ambiguity is argued explicitly by C. Stough. 18 14

15 16 17

18

Conche 1973, p. 89:'... the generally accepted hypothesis according to which the poem Images is directed against the false likenesses of dogmatic wisdom.' Cf. Decleva Caizzi 1981, pp. 251-2 and 258-9. Or, to remain within a Greek context: as if Parmenides had entitled his poem Doxa, or Doxai. According to Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 252, a similar interpretation is to be found in Voghera 1904, p. 27, a work that I have not been able to consult. Cf. Stough 1969, p. 24, n. 15: 'There is probably a deliberate play on the title {Indalmoi) itself. It means both "appearances" and "illusions".' Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 252 incorrectly presents Stough's position as purely negative.


2l8

SCEPTICISM

Those three possible interpretations, negative, positive and mixed, reappear, logically enough, in connection with the famous enigmatic line, also from the Indalmoi, which on its own constitutes fr. 69D: 'But appearance (TO <j>aiv6iA€vov) predominates everywhere, wherever one goes.' Most interpreters have thought that the cfxuvofjievov of this line must designate the same thing as the ivSaXfjiOiof the work's title. That is how it is that, in strict correlation and mutual interaction with their own respective and divergent interpretations of the title, for some interpreters this line refers to the universal domination of deceptive appearances from which only the sage can extricate himself; for others it refers to the practical usefulness of the phenomenon, which constitutes a sure and major guide for a Pyrrhonist's practical conduct; while for yet others it refers to the inevitable predominance of the phenomenon which both prevents man from knowing the world as it is, yet, despite this, at the same time provides him with a criterion that indicates how to behave in this unknowable world. Tempting though it may be, the assimilation of the IVSCLA/JLOI of the title to the v ipeoj, OJS JJLOL ivhdXXerai rjrop. What is the exact meaning of this line? It is itself ambiguous, as is most interestingly noted by the Liddell-Scott-Jones dictionary (s.v. iVSaAAojtzcu). It may be understood in a tentative sense: 'I will tell you as my memory seems to me' (LSJ), but also in a positive one: 'I will tell you as my heart pictures him' (LSJ). Those two possible meanings are, as I see it, dictated by the situation in which the character Odysseus finds himself in relation to his wife and also by the situation of the poet in relation to his reader. The tentative meaning corresponds to the psychological caution that Odysseus is obliged to observe where Penelope is concerned: she must be made to recognize that the traveller's memory cannot be expected to be infallible after so many years; and this will cause her to be all the more impressed by the extremely precise details that Odysseus is about to give her regarding the coat that he was wearing at that time and the shape and ornamentation of its clasp - details which Penelope will recognize with delight, for she knows them well, since all these items were gifts from herself to her husband. The positive sense allows the poet to aim a wink in the direction of his reader: the false stranger is, of course, well placed to know exactly what Odysseus was wearing, since he is none other than Odysseus himself- a fact that Penelope does not know but the reader does.


220

SCEPTICISM

The line in question, in all its own ambiguity (itself condensed in the ambiguity of the verb tVSdAAercu), thus sums up the complex significance of the whole scene. It is the scene that leads up to the recognition and identification, by means of precise proofs, of the prestigious character who is both present for those to whom the poem is addressed and, at the same time, absent for the one to whom his discourse in the poem is addressed. Describing and described, narrating and narrated, Odysseus-Aithon is at once the subject and the object of his own words. Through the interplay between the same and the other, Homer has him recount what he remembers of himself in the language of the memories of another. With impressive skill,21 Timon dismantles the Homeric line (avrap iywv ipeto, FIvppojv, ifjietperaL rjrop aKovoai), which keeps the word rjrop, but gets around the word ivSaWercu,, by replacing it with ifi€ip€Tai; and finally, in the first line of Pyrrho's reply (rj yap iywv epeo), (Lg fjuoL KaTas /JLOL

..., but again avoids the word iVSdAAercu, replacing it with Kara<j>aiv€rai etvai. While we may be reasonably certain that this manipulation of the Homeric material would have been perceived as such by Timon's reader, it is clearly much harder to understand exactly what meanings he was supposed to pick up from it. It is nevertheless possible to hazard a few guesses, speculative though they are bound to be. With regard to the first line of fr. 67D, the task is relatively easy. If we bear in mind the contents of this fragment as a whole, that is to say the request to Pyrrho to be so good as to reveal to his questioner the means whereby he achieves his superhuman tranquillity, we can perhaps imagine the distancing effect that Timon's text must have had upon a reader nurtured on Homer. In Timon's line, the verb tVSdAAercu of the Homeric line has been spectacularly replaced by the verb expressing desire, Ifieiperai. That is tantamount to saying, or at least strongly suggesting, that the ivSaXfioi are supposed to satisfy the desire that is expressed in this first line, namely the desire to obtain from Pyrrho, the great man whose name is here spelt out, the revelation of the secret of his contentment. Timon voices that desire in his own name (/xot); but needless to say, he considers it to be a desire felt universally by all men and presupposes that his reader is no exception.22 However, Timon can provide 21

22

Perhaps I shall be accused of exaggerating the subtlety shown by the a u t h o r of the Indalmoi in his use of the Odyssey, a subtlety with which he also credited the reader of his poem. There is no need to go so far as to invoke Rabelais to justify the co-existence of the most liberated kind of wit with the most sophisticated erudition. Let me simply refer the reader to Cortassa 1976, p. 314, who calls fragment 4 6 D of the Silloi ( = 4 W = 778LJP) 'a closely woven web of subtle satirical innuendos, m o r e or less open allusions and equivocal implications to which the interpreter must be constantly alert lest he gravely misunderstand the meaning of T i m o n ' s poem.' T h e first line of Parmenides' Poem also refers (in terms of dv^xos) to a desire that the reader is implicitly invited to identify as his own.



221

only images, iVSaAfxoi, of what it is that can satisfy that desire. Perhaps I may at this point be permitted a somewhat irreverent comparison: Timon presents his reader with an image of the product that he wants to recommend to him, not the product itself, just as a mail-order company sends its clients an illustrated catalogue, to make them want to procure the originals of the images that it contains. What, then, do the images that Timon provides represent? Surely not only Pyrrho the man, as in the context of an anecdotal biography made up of'personal memories', rather Pyrrho the inventor and model of an exceptional 'disposition' (Siddeois), the essential components of which are 'apathy' and 'drapa^ta', a disposition which - as we know - had made an intensely forceful impression upon his disciples and contemporaries.23 Naturally, the 'images' of Pyrrho that Timon dispensed to his reader were to be particularly recommended not only because they were so attractive but also on account of their authority, for they were relayed by a witness in a good position to be exact and truthful, Timon having spent a number of years in Pyrrho's company (cf. DL ix. 109). He could say quite literally of Pyrrho what Odysseus said of the shades that he had encountered in Hades: T saw him.'24 Let us press on a little further: Timon is not only the analogue of OdysseusAithon, who is capable of providing first-hand information about OdysseusPyrrho,25 together with proofs to back that information up. Objectively, and for those who know what is not known to Penelope, who is the person to whom his discourse is directly addressed, Aithon is none other than Odysseus. So the re-use of the Homeric episode, with all its contextual connotations, might well imply that Timon, the one who is speaking, is, in a way, identified with Pyrrho, the one about whom he is speaking. The fact that the very line which, in Homer, is pronounced by Odysseus, provides certain of the elements for the question that Timon asks, and certain others for the reply that Pyrrho himself gives, perhaps conveys the same message: Timon is implicitly presenting himself as Pyrrho's alter ego. The 'images' of his master and of Pyrrhonist happiness that he is about to produce are as trustworthy as those that Odysseus, under an assumed name, can present of his own coat and its clasp: 23

24

25

The documentation on P y r r h o (who, as hardly needs pointing out, himself wrote nothing) is m o r e inclined to expatiate u p o n his way of life and his character than u p o n his teaching and arguments, as is clear from the valuable collection of testimony that has at last - most proficiently - been put together by Decleva Caizzi 1981. Some of the contemporaries w h o m Pyrrho h a d impressed explicitly separated his Siddecns from his Aoyoi, cf. N a u s i p h a n e s in D L ix.64, 69. 'I also saw so-and-so' is the standardized expression used of Odysseus' encounters in the U n d e r w o r l d in the course of the Nekuia (Od. xi). The expression had already been used by the Cynic Crates of Thebes (cf. fr. i D = 347LJP a n d fr. 3 D = 349LJP), w h o had also parodied H o m e r , possibly providing a model for T i m o n ' s techniques of p a r o d y (cf. W a c h s m u t h 1885, p p . 72-3 and L o n g 1978, pp. 75-6). However, one m a y wonder whether it was really simply by chance in the transmission of texts that, of all the fragments of the Silloi preserved, the only two to use t'Sov, 'I saw', h a p p e n to be the one concerning P y r r h o (cf. £yd> i8ov, 9 D = 32W = 5 8 D C = 783LJP) and the one concerning a n o t h e r of T i m o n ' s contemporaries, Zeno of Citium (38D = 8W = 812LJP). T h e identification of Pyrrho with Odysseus is attested by fragment 8 D of the Silloi ( = 35W = 5 7 D C = 782LJP), which declares P y r r h o to be 'unrivalled', in a p a r o d y of a line from H o m e r (//. 111.223) which makes the same claim for Odysseus.


222

SCEPTICISM

for Timon is as close to Pyrrho as Odysseus, twenty years on, is to himself.26 It is much more difficult to give a plausible interpretation of the distancing effect that Timon aims for and achieves when he again uses that same line of Homer's in the first line of the reply that he ascribes to Pyrrho (fr. 68D, line i): iydjv ipeco, c5? /xot /cara^cuVercu etvai. The reason for this is simple: the verb that is substituted for the Homeric iVSaAAercu is, this time, not the transparent verb [jjL€Lp€Tcu, but the extremely equivocal and controversial /cara^cuWrcu {etvcu). Should this verb be understood as a straightforward equivalent to au>eTcu? Many interpreters believe that it should and that, in conformity, already, with the spirit of neo-Pyrrhonian Scepticism, its use qualifies the entire contents of the discourse attributed to Pyrrho, suggesting that it constitutes no more than a subjective and personal appearance. 27 Unconvinced by that theory, others, on the contrary, think that the compound Karaâiverat has a different meaning from that of the simple cuWrcu, and that this intrinsically positive meaning ('to emerge from darkness to come into the light', 'to show itself, 'to manifest itself) gives Pyrrho's discourse a strongly dogmatic and assertive character. 28 26

27

28

T i m o n ' s strategy has proved remarkably effective since, twenty-three centuries after the Indalmoi, in an article entitled (as if by chance) 'The image of balance' (L'immagine delFequilibrio), a particularly sensitive and learned scholar describes the four lines of fragment 6 8 D as 'the only fully comprehensible a n d non-manipulated text in which Pyrrho speaks, setting o u t his o w n doctrine in the first person' (Ferrari 1981, p . 357, Ferrari's italics). Ferrari would perhaps not have overlooked the fact that the a u t h o r of those four lines was in fact T i m o n if, not content to write a n u m b e r of remarkable pages on the meeting between Pyrrho a n d T i m o n , which is the fundamental schema for all the works in which T i m o n speaks of his master (pp. 345-61), he h a d probed further into the other-self relationship which became established following and in consequence of that m e m o r a b l e meeting between the master and his disciple. T h a t was h o w Sextus interpreted this fragment of T i m o n (doing so, however, with a prudence rightly noted by b o t h N a t o r p 1884, p . 292 a n d Decleva Caizzi 1981, p . 256): 'We are in the habit of calling each of these things good, or bad, or indifferent, in conformity with the appearance (Kara TO (fxuvofxevov), as T i m o n seems to wish to show (eoiare SrjXovv) in the Indalmoi when he says', etc. ( M xi.20). Similarly, in m o d e r n times, see Stough 1969, p . 25 ('Everything said is qualified by " a s it appears to me to b e " , an indication that he is merely reporting his own experience'); D u m o n t 1972, p . 132 ('Is it not clear that the phenomenon is said, at least according to T i m o n , to be the criterion of t r u t h for Pyrrho?'); Conche 1973, p. 61 ('the cos /LIOI KaraâiveraL etvcu turns being into seeming'; see also p . 89); L o n g 1978, p . 84-5 n. 16 ( T h e key phrase is cos JJLOL KaraâiveraL etvat, as Sextus, the source of the lines, understood them ( M xi. 19-20). H e distinguishes between " t h e existence of goods a n d evils a n d neither of t h e s e " and their appearance (TO aiv6ixevov), which the Pyrrhonist is in the habit of calling good, bad, and indifferent. This permits us to regard the "correct r u l e " as the stating of truth " a s it seems to (me) to b e " , a n d n o unqualified existential claim a b o u t <j>vois is made.') See Ferrari's argument (1981, p . 359: 'In t r u t h the Greek term never has the negative meaning of " t o seem", " t o a p p e a r " , in the sense of uncertainty, but on the contrary always has the positive meaning of something which emerges from the darkness into the light and which accordingly " s h o w s itself", "manifests i t s e l f " ) which is taken u p by Decleva Caizzi 1981, p. 256 ('the c o m p o u n d term used underlines the assertion rather t h a n obscuring it by giving it a subjective sense, as is proved by the passages in which it recurs (cf. for example H d t . 1.58, in.53, 130; in.69) and the meaning of Kara^>avr)s, /caTcuâveia'), a n d 258-9 ('it would be h a r d to deny that T i m o n ' s lines have the authoritative tone of the revelation of the truth . . . the second hemistich is replaced by the m u c h stronger cos /xoi Karacfyaiverai elvat . . . which certainly paves the way for the emphasis of the pentameter which follows.')



223

It may be impossible to disambiguate Timon's Kara<j>aiv€Tai.29 Indeed, it may be important not to attempt to do so: that ambiguity might quite deliberately be there to echo the ambiguity that Timon had probably perceived in Homer's iVSaAAercu. Different categories of addressees could understand KaraTiKa are not Kpinqpia any longer (OVK€TL); only XoyiKa are. This word OVK€TL is supposed, it is claimed, to imply that XoyLKa clearly are already Kpirr\pia in the (2.2) sense.30 This, I take it, is a non sequitur: from the fact that something is not the case any longer, it is not possible to infer that some other thing was already the case. 31 (4) From the substantive point of view, it seems difficult to claim that Kpirrjpia XoyLKa are artificial Kpirr)pia. In fact, in the (c) division, Sextus distinguishes three meanings which are, he explicitly says, subdivisions of the Kpirrjpcov XoyiKov (M. vii.35, P//11.16); now these meanings are exemplified, respectively, by man, perception and intellection, and the application of the avTaoia - i.e., by entities, faculties, or acts that are wholly natural. In view of all these arguments, I think it better to abandon the idea of 28 29

31

So Heintz 1932, p . 84, following P a p p e n h e i m 1881, p . 102. T h e phrase irepl €KOLGTOV ra>v Kara rov fiiov in M vn.34, t o o , is understandable only if 30 fiiojTLKa covers two different classes, voLKa a n d rzyyiKa. Heintz 1932, p. 84. E.g., 'there is n o m o r e milk, there is only bread'. Y o u c a n n o t k n o w if there was already bread when there was still milk.


SEXTUS EMPIRICUS ON THE KPITHPION

237

keeping the word TtyyiKov in P//and inserting it in M, within the definitions of the KpirrjpLov in the 'quite special' meaning (2.3), i.e., of the Kpirrjpiov XoytKov. I prefer to depict the [B) division along the following lines: TTOLV fxerpov KaraXru/jeajs

(frvoLKa Ttyy1*®* XoyiKa

1

(2.1)

1 (2-2)

1 TT.fJL.K. dSlfjXoV

1

TTpayfJLOLTOS

(2-3)

This scheme is admittedly less satisfactory from a purely formal point of view, but it seems tofitbetter the ends at which this division is aiming; these are, I believe, to isolate and to specify that meaning of the word Kpirrjpiov which is of interest only to philosophers, and which is the only one really of interest to them. 32 Now, I think, we can finally come to grips with the main problem this division raises: namely, the abrupt substitution of aSÂov for irpoSrjXov as the specific object of knowledge through a Kpirqpiov. This is indeed a contradiction, since the different meanings of the word Kpirrjpiov that occur in the relevant passages (M vii.25 and 33) are both supposed to be the meaning in which the word will be used throughout the whole inquiry in Book vn. Conceptual contradiction has been officially expelled through the door, in the meanings division; it seems to come back in through the window, in the unexpected form of a SKM/HJUVIOL between Sextus and Sextus himself. This anomaly has seldom been noticed, as far as I know; those commentators who have noticed it have tried to explain it away in two different fashions. One way (that of W. Heintz) is to make it sharper, but so as to lessen its importance. The other (that of G. Striker and also of J. Barnes, as we shall see), on the contrary, is to blunt it and reduce it to ambiguity. I shall say something about both attempts before suggesting a third way out of the puzzle. As we have already seen, Heintz inserts the word T^XVLKOV into the definition of KpLTTjpiov XoyiKov in M vn.33 (on the model of the PH parallel). He knows very well that the later subdivision of this KpLrrjpLov, which specifies it as perception, intellection, and impression (34-7), is not in favour of this 32

In this second scheme, the (2.3) meaning is admittedly not 'still more special' than the (2.2) meaning. But the superlative Ihiairara can mean 'in a quite special sense', i.e., special to philosophers (let us remember that Kpirrjpiov XoyiKov is this type of KpLrrjpiov, which 'philosophers repeatedly din into our ears', M vii.34). The progression from KOLVCOS to ISLCJS and to Ihiairara is thus not necessarily rectilinear. We might also point out that in the M version, Sextus wavers between ISiaiTara (vii.31) and ISiatrepov (vii.33), whereas in the PH version, he keeps Ihiairara throughout (11.15, bis). The original version certainly gave ISiairara (cf. ps.-Galen in Dox. Graeci 604, line 1, and 606, line 10). One might suppose that in the M version Sextus allowed himself, by way of the comparative Ihiairtpov, to introduce a more linear order into the series than was the case in the original source.


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suggestion: all those are natural faculties.33 But he subtly turns the argument the other way around. 34 If T^VIKOV is read in 33, the contradiction between 33 and 34-7 is the same as that between 33 and 25; and he claims that 34-7 (in spite of what Sextus himself says) shows that when subdividing the Kpirrjpiov AoyiKov, Sextus no longer has any thought of the adelic conception of a KpLTr/pLov, which he just described in 33; as a matter of fact, according to Heintz, what he has in mind is again the prodelic conception, which occurred in 25 and will be the single topic of everything which follows in Book vn. Some kind of momentary and unconscious aberration, caused by a laborious attempt to harmonize a number of different schemes, is thus supposed to be the reason why Sextus, if only briefly, attributes to the KpLrrjptov the task of knowing aSrjXa. By the name of KpLrrjpia Aoyt/ca, in 33, he can only refer (contrary to his usual terminology) to sign and proof, i.e., dialectical (hence technical) procedures for grasping aSrjXa; those will be studied only in Book VIII, after the end of the inquiry concerning Kpinqpiov in the normal - i.e., prodelic - sense. This interpretation is questionable in several ways. First, some terminological likenesses may be pointed out, which seem to show that (pace Heintz) the notion of a Kpirrjpiov XoyiKov has the same content in 33 (T& XoyiKa KOLI arrep OL Soy/jLCLTLKol Tcbv (friAooocfxjJv 7Tap€L<jdyov(ji) as in 34 (jêpl TOV XoytKOv Kal irapa rots <J>LXOG6(J>OIS dpvXovfjievov). More generally, Heintz assigns to Sextus

an implausible mixture of awareness and unawareness of what he is doing: he is supposed to try to harmonize different conceptual systems without clearly realizing their differences. But the crucial point is to know whether Heintz is right in claiming that apart from its passing occurrence in vii.33 (and also in PH11.15), the adelic concept of the Kpinqpiov plays no part in Sextus, and the prodelic concept is given pride of place in the whole inquiry concerning Kpir-qpiov. It is perfectly true that the prodelic concept is clearly in the forefront in the prefacing and concluding sections I have already quoted. 35 But in the inquiry proper, things are far from being so clear. A first disturbing factor is that the prodelic concept of a Kpnr)piQv covers both intellectual and perceptual immediate truths (vii.25).36 Is it enough for 33 34

36

Cf. argument (4) above. Here is the central passage in Heintz's argumentation, p . 85: 'Sextus actually gives u p in 346°. the terminological scheme he has followed in 3 1 - 3 , b u t without being aware of this. H e says of course that he wants in what follows to treat only of the XoyiKov KpLrrjpLov, that this is again to be understood in three senses, etc. But in fact the new threefold division shows that here he is n o longer really thinking of the concept of the XoyiKov KpiT-qpiov. T h e XoyiKov KpiT-qpiov should refer to aSÂa TTpayîara; the Kpirrjpiov treated by Sextus in 34ff. and subsequently through the whole b o o k has nothing to d o with the aSÂa, b u t deals with the cognition of ivapyrj or aiv6iieva, the immediate sensible objects a r o u n d us. Sextus first comes to the aSÂa, in M vn, where orjfxeiov a n d a-noSeîs, as routes to cognition o f a S ^ A a , form his theme (cf. M vn.25, VIII. 140, 142, /7/11.95-6). It is these, arjêlov a n d airoSeigis, the a p p r o p r i a t e cognitive means employed by dialectic in order to grasp aSrjXa, that must be m e a n t in 33 by Kpirrjpta Aoyiwra, at least in the sense of the terminology scheme that Sextus uses there. H e himself seems n o t to 35 have been clear a b o u t this' (trans. A. A. Long). M vii.25, vm.140, PH 11.95-96. Heintz neglects this point.



239

Sextus to be allowed to count as upholders of the KpLrrjpLov (as he does in M vii.47) those philosophers who locate it in Xoyos, as well as those who locate it in the 'irrational evidences' (ev TOLLS dXoyois evapytiaisYl In order to be true to the prodelic concept, one should find Xoyos here construed as a power of intellectual intuition, able to grasp 'rational immediate truths', and not as a discursive and argumentative faculty. But the concept of a rational immediate truth and the phrase evapytia XoyiKr} occur nowhere in Sextus, as far as I know; on the contrary, ivdpyeua and Xoyos are frequently contrasted (PH 111.82, 135, 266, 272, Mxi.239). The early 'inquirers into nature', who are the historical illustrations of the identification of the Kpirripiov with Xoyos (M VII.89-140), are ratiocinators whose theories are based on a rational criticism of sensory evidence (vii.89); the principles and elements they claim to be the foundations of the physical world offer a typical example of aSÂa entities (M x.252). They cannot thus be saddled with views about the Kpirrjpiov unless a strictly prodelic conception of this notion is left aside. There are also occasions where statements about aSÂa being knowable or unknowable are explicitly classified by Sextus as views about the existence of a KpirrjpLov. Xenophanes, e.g., says that a true knowledge of gods is not allowed to man (DK 21B34); commenting on this fragment, Sextus says that the gods are here only a representative sample of the whole class of aSÂa (M VII. 50). Xenophanes' doctrine may thus be summed up by saying that no man grasps the truth, at least in the field of aSÂa (M vii.51); and this is equivalent to denying the existence of a Kpirrjpiov (vii.52).37 In many other places, Sextus can be seen to be distorting or even breaking the conceptual frame that goes along with the prodelic concept of a Kpirrfpiov (namely, the frame that opposes ivapyes and dSrjXov, avroOev and ^77 avrodev, Kpnrjpiov and cnêibv KCLI diroheiîs). He admits, at least as a theoretical possibility, that something dSrjXov might be true 'from itself (avroOev), the other horn of the dilemma being that it might be true 'as something proved' (cbs dTToSeLxOev, M vin.21). In M vm.379, he gives a syllogistic justification of the adelic conception of a Kpirrjpiov: every aSrjXov, he says, needs a decision (iniKpLGis), and what needs a decision requires a Kpirrjpiov. In M vm.26, he goes so far as to contrast immediate knowledge and knowledge through a Kpirrjpiov: if anybody is claiming that this dSrjXov is true and that one false, those statements should come either 'from themselves and without any KpiTJ]piov\ i.e., 'immediately' (e£ kroi\xov), or 'with a Kpirr)piov\ No doubt a methodical search through the texts might collect many other such observations, but I think these few examples will be enough to show that the adelic concept of Kpirf)piov is far from being as unobtrusive in Sextus as Heintz claims it to be; when we find the prodelic definition and the adelic one side by side in the first paragraphs of Book vn, we cannot dismiss this fact as a localized accident. According to G. Striker, the paradox should be explained in a completely 37

Cf. also the first of the three KpirrjpLa attributed by Diotimus to Democritus (M vii.140).


24O

SCEPTICISM

different way. She holds that the prodelic definition is the only one that Sextus inherited from previous history; despite the differences between the Epicurean concept and the Stoic concept of a Kptrrjpiov (those differences are very well brought out in her book; but more on this later), neither school is supposed to define a Kpirrjpiov as an instrument for grasping aSÂa. The adelic definition in Sextus should be construed as a kind of translation of the earlier prodelic definition into Sceptical language. According to the Sceptic, any assumption dogmatically asserted goes beyond what it is permissible to say, and thereby bears on something aSÂov. What the dogmatist calls evapyes and claims to grasp Sta KpirrjpLov TWOS is exactly the same thing as what the Sceptic polemically calls aSrjXov.38 Along the same lines, J. Barnes sees no escape from the paradox except by supposing a 'systematic ambiguity' in the terms aSÂo?, TTpoSrjXog, ivapyrjs.39

This suggestion has the undoubted merit of drawing attention to some important features of the Sceptical stance. Sextus certainly does not take the widespread distinction between ivapyrj and aSrjXa at its face value, even if he is constantly making a dialectical use of it. In M vii.364, a definition of what is ivapyeg that is substantially the same as the definition in M vii.25 40 is explicitly attributed to 'our opponents' (VTTO TCOV ivavrccov). Sextus claims on this occasion that nothing can naturally be grasped 'from itself (e£ iavrov); nothing can be said about the external world except by conjecture (aroxdô/xcu, 365), by inference from signs (a7y/x€touât, 365; crêiWi?, 367). It follows that nothing is ivapyes (364) and everything is dSrjXov (368), so that the dogmatist would do better to call dSrjXov (in the terminology which he shares with his Sceptical opponent) what he calls ivapyes; the class of ivapyrj is empty, de facto if not dejure. It is no less true that the reason why the Sceptic construes the dogmatic assertions as bearing on aSrjXa, even when the dogmatist does not say so, is that these assertions claim to express what things are in themselves, of their own nature. Any claim to KardXr)i/jis,41 let us say, immediately turns its object into an aSrjXov, however ivapyes it is said to be. As Sextus repeatedly asserts, 38

39

40 41

Gisela Striker's argument is as follows 1974, p. 106; 'Neither the criterion of the Stoics nor those of the Epicureans can be defined in accordance with the terminology of these schools as "measures of the g r a s p " of dSrjXa. T h r o u g h a KaraXrjTTrLKT) ^ a v r a a i a one of course grasps an "evident" fact (cf. M vii.25); a n d the criteria of the Epicureans can, as we saw, be used not just for testing statements a b o u t nonperceptible facts. T h e expression can most easily be explained in the context of the terminology of the Skeptics, according to w h o m nothing at all can be k n o w n a n d who therefore sometimes speak as if every seriously intended assertion refers to an dSrjXov (cf. PH 1.200-2,13,16,197-98). T h a t would m e a n that it is a polemical formula, which reflects not the terminology of the philosophical schools but only the Skeptics' interpretation of their doctrine' (trans. A. A. Long). Cf. Barnes 1983, p . 27 n. 74: 'Sextus plainly states that the Pyrrhonist attack on Kpni)pia undermines belief in ret ivapyrj (PH 11.95, Af vn.25); he also expressly defines a Kpirr)piov as fi€Tpov dSrjXov TTpdynaros (PH 11.15, M vii.33). I see no escape from that inconsistency except the appeal to a systematic and unexpressed ambiguity in such terms as dSrjXos, npoSrjXos, ivapyrjs.' This definition runs TO it; iavrov Aa/x/3avo/Lt€vov KCLI \iiqhev6s XPVK>OV €t's" TrapdoraoLV. In the strong (i.e. Stoic) sense of this w o r d , of course, according to the distinction m a d e in PH 11.4. Cf. above, p . 227.



24I

giving one's assent to something dSrjXov is enough to land one in dogmatism (PH1.16,197, 210); conversely, it seems that being a dogmatist (speaking in a dogmatic tone or mood) is enough to turn what one claims to assent to into something dSrjXov.42 These arguments, however, do not, I think, entirely justify Striker's interpretation. Dogmatists and Sceptics disagree about the reference of the terms ivapyes and ddrjXov; this does not mean they disagree about the meaning of these terms and about their conceptual contrast. If the Sceptic believes the class ofivapyrj to be empty, this does not imply that he takes the notion of an evapyes as meaningless and freely substitutable by its contrary. When the question is how to define the concept of a KpLrrjpiov, the referential equivalence between what the dogmatist calls an ivapyes and what the Sceptic calls an aSyXov does not allow the latter to substitute ivapyes for ddrjXov within the definition; it is impossible to say that defining a KptrrjpLov as an instrument for grasping 7Tp68r]Xa and defining it as an instrument for grasping dSrjXa are equivalent, undifferentiated definitions. Of course Sextus might have made the mistake, but to be sure that he did not, it is enough to point out that in the definition in M vn.33, the dSrjXov object is mentioned as a specific difference that distinguishes Kpirr\pia XoyiKa from the other kinds of KptrrjpLa; the objects of those must thus be evapyrj. If both the terms ivapyes and dSrjXov did not keep a stable and distinctive conceptual meaning, the differences among the various classes of Kpirr)pia would vanish, and the whole classification (distinction [B]) would collapse. The substantive difference between the prodelic and the adelic conception of a Kpir^ptov looks thus to be irreducible. How, then, to account for their being together in Sextus' text? I would suggest that it is, above all, a matter of conceptual inheritance, although to invoke history, in this circumstance, is not to give up trying to understand what happened. Striker's book, in this respect, offers all the materials required for an explanation which she nonetheless does not elicit. Let us look at the differences between the Epicurean and the Stoic concept of a Kpirrjpiov, as they are pellucidly described in her book. In Epicurus, the predominant use 43 of the notion is fundamentally based on 42

43

Cf. PH 1.202 SoyfjuariKcos, Tovreori nepl aSr/Aov, and Frede 1979, p. 123; 'Every opinion, whatever its content m a y be, can be dogmatic, just as, vice versa, every opinion can be undogmatic. So it is not the content of doctrines (although this too is not entirely irrelevant, as we shall see) that makes them dogmatic, but the attitude of the dogmatist, w h o thinks that his rational knowledge can answer questions and provide him with the sufficient grounds for his doctrines' (trans. A. A. Long). In order to prevent the states of affairs on which he expresses his opinions from turning into aSÂa, the Skeptic has to avoid the dogmatic traps hidden in ordinary language, above all in the verb 'to be' (PHi. 19-20). H e withdraws into d ^ a a i a , which is not muteness but a non-assertoric way of using language (PHi. 192); he employs the phrases 'indicative of aâoua put at his disposal by ordinary language - ' p e r h a p s ' and the like (PH 1.195); he makes use of mental translation (PH 1.198), 'co-signification' (PH 1.199), and KardxpyoLS ( P / / 1 . 1 3 5 , 191, 207). Cf. Stough 1984, p p . 137-64. This qualification is needed, because Epicurus also employs the word Kpirrjpiov in the sense of " p o w e r of j u d g i n g " or " p o w e r of k n o w i n g " ; cf. Ep. Herod. 3 8 , 5 1 , and the c o m m e n t s by Striker 1974, p p . 56 and 59. In order to m a r k out the p r e d o m i n a n t use, Striker writes " t h e 'Epicurean' m e a n i n g , " in q u o t a t i o n m a r k s ; I d o the same here.


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an analogy between Kpirrjpiov and KCLVWV. A KOLVCOV, a ruler or a square, is paradigmatically right and allows the problematic Tightness of a line or an angle to be tested. Similarly, a Kpirrjpiov of truth is a purveyor of truths, immediately evident in themselves, that can be used to test the truth-value of opinions (or theories or hypotheses, etc.) that bear on not perceptible or not immediately known states of affairs, and thus are neither clearly true nor clearly false. Their being intrinsically true is what allows them to function as they do; but their value as a Kpinqpiov depends on their being used to test the truth-value of statements other than themselves.44 On the other hand, the predominant Stoic use of this notion 45 is no longer determined by the /cavo^-paradigm. <Pavraoia Karak^-nriKr] is claimed to be a Kpnripiov, not because it allows one to test something other than what it 'presents', but because it allows one to state that something is the case, which is the very state of affairs 'presented' by it (and causally productive of it); 46 what makes us know that something is the case is the same as what constitutes the criterion of this knowledge being true. 47 There is, therefore, an obvious identity between the Stoic concept and what I have called the prodelic concept of a Kpinqpiov. the truths that (âvraoia KaraXrj7TTLKri is supposed to supply are immediate and evident. But, according to Striker, there is no such identity between the Epicurean concept and the adelic concept of M vii.33. Her reasons are the following.48 The Epicurean KptrrjpLa can be used for other ends than just testing statements about nonperceptible states of affairs; indeed, they can play their role in confirmatory and non-confirmatory procedures, designed to decide about perceptible cases, as well as in contestatory and non-contestatory procedures, which are designed to decide about non-perceptible cases. This observation is perfectly right, but does not establish the point at issue. The opinions tested by way of confirmation ex hypothesi bear on states of affairs that are potentially perceptible but not actually perceived. That is why they need confirmation; they are, Epicurus says, 'waiting' to be confirmed (rrpoafjiivov, Ep. Hdt. 38, KD 24). The distinction expressed in Epicurus by the pair TTpoofievov/dSrjXov is 44 45

46

47 48

Cf. Striker 1974, mainly p p . 6 1 - 3 , 73, 82. Here again, it is only a matter of p r e d o m i n a n t use, which allows some occurrences of the word KpirrjpLov in the 'Epicurean' sense (cf. Striker 1974, p p . 98-9). In order to m a r k out this p r e d o m i n a n t use, I shall similarly write 'the " S t o i c " sense'. I leave aside the question of whether (j>avraola KaraXrjTrTLKrj is only a matter of senseperception (cf. Striker 1974, p p . 107-10); let me just point out that according to Sextus it is not (cf. M vii.416-21) a n d that KpnrjpLov in its prodelic definition is not, either (cf. M vii.25). (fravraoia KaraX-qnTiKr), as u n d e r s t o o d by Sextus, is thus a KpirrjpLov in exactly the same sense as he construes the notion of a Kpn-qpiov when he a d o p t s the prodelic concept of it. Cf. Striker 1974, mainly p p . 8 2 - 4 , 90. Striker 1974, p . 106 (quoted above, n. 38); the backward reference ('as we saw') is to p . 74. I leave aside another argument of a m o r e general character, namely, the claim that the 'Epicurean' sense of Kpnr\piov was fairly quickly supplanted, in the general use, by the 'Stoic' sense (cf. p p . 102, 107). This hypothesis does not at first sight look very plausible, because the m o d e r n use of criterion is, I think, " E p i c u r e a n " o n the whole. But I have neither the space n o r the capacity to discuss this point m o r e accurately.



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thus the same as what is expressed in another terminology (Sextus M vm.i45ff.) by distinguishing two classes of dSrjXa: circumstantial aS (wpog Kaipov), which are such only de facto and for the time being, and dSrjXa by nature (/ua as airoâvrov ooov i iavrtt), apud DL vii.65. I am translating the verb ^rjTetv literally, in conformity with the officially 'zetetic' attitude of the Sceptic (cf. PH 1.1-4); but given that the Sceptic considers in advance that his 'research' is doomed to failure and that he himself is bound to the cTropj, one ought not to rule out translating it more briefly ('call into question', 'put in doubt', 'doubt'). Cf. Janacek 1972, pp. 27-37.

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245

upon not the phenomenon, but what is said about the phenomenon (ov nepl rov <j>aLVO[JL€VOV dAAa irepl €K€ivov O Aeyerat irepl rod aivofi€vov)', and that is not the same thing as questioning the phenomenon itself. For example, honey seems to us to have a sweetening action (yXvKaêiv). So much, we grant; for sensuously we undergo a sweetening effect (yAu/ Adya>), is something that we continue to wonder about: that is not the phenomenon itself; it is what is said about the phenomenon (o OVK k'on TO (fxuvofievov dXXa irepl TOV (fxxivofjievov Aeyofievov).

This passage and others like it have, of course, not escaped the attention of the recent commentators whose studies have breathed new life into the philosophical analysis of Scepticism.6 However, they sometimes fail to recognize its ambiguities and consequently sometimes produce a very definite interpretation, without weighing it up against other possible ones or providing precise arguments to support their own.7 On the other hand, when they do perceive ambiguity, they seem to consider the problem of its interpretation to remain open.8 In truth, the ambiguity is twofold: both syntactic and semantic.9 Syntactically, the restriction conveyed by oerX could bear either upon the verb expressing doubt, thereby imposing a restriction upon the modality of that doubt, or upon the proposition which constitutes the object of the doubt, thereby imposing a restriction upon the contents of that doubt. The former construction - let us call it 'adverbial' - has led to semantic interpretations of the following type: the Sceptic doubts oerA that honey is sweet; he doubts this, but only (for example) at a theoretical level; it does not prevent him from assuming it in his practical conduct. The second construction - let us call it 'objectal' - has led to significantly different interpretations: the Sceptic doubts that the honey is sweet oerA; he doubts it but only (for example) to the extent that one might claim that it is sweet by nature and in its essence; and this does not prevent him from accepting the proposition insofar as it could be understood in a different sense from that.10 It is worth trying to dispel this double ambiguity. One of the principal preoccupations of the present-day historians of Scepticism is to define the 'scope' of the various versions of Scepticism. Should Sextus' Scepticism be 6

7

8

9

10

Cf. above all Frede i979 = Frede 1987, pp. 179-200; Burnyeat 1980, pp. 20-53, reprinted in Burnyeat 1983, pp. 117-48; Barnes 1982/3, pp. 1-29; Sedley 1983, pp. 9-29; Burnyeat 1984, pp. 225-54; Frede 1984/7, PP- 255-78. Cf. Frede 1987, pp. i86ff., who translates oerA as 'to the extent that this is a question for reason'. Cf. Burnyeat 1983, pp. 136 and 147 n. 49 ('ooov inl TCO Xoyw. it is a nice question for interpretation how to take Xoyos here'); I refer the reader to all that follows in this note. Prima la sintassi, poi la semantica: I am grateful to Jonathan Barnes for reminding me of the value of this principle, freely adapted from Antonio Salieri and Richard Strauss, and for having thereby encouraged me totally to recast the first version of the present paper. Bury, for example, punctuates the sentence in PH 1.20 in an 'objectal' fashion (el 8e KOLI yXvKv €OTLV ooov em rep Xoyw, ^7}TovfjL€v) and translates it in conformity with that syntactical choice ('but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt'). The 'adverbial' construction appears if one punctuates as follows: el 8e KOLI yXvKv ionv, ooov em rw Xoyw ^ v . Antoine Leandri has also pointed this out to me.

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considered as a 'rustic Pyrrhonism', 11 that is to say as a suspension of all belief without exception, whether it be of the ordinary or the philosophico-scientific type? Or is it rather an 'urbane Pyrrhonism', which restricts the h-nox*} to philosophical and scientific dogma, and preserves the common beliefs of ordinary people?12 The studies devoted to this question have concentrated upon the notion of 'dogma' and upon the sense in which it should be understood that a Sceptic 'does not dogmatize'. In this connection, the keytext is PHi. 13, which distinguishes between two meanings of the word Soyâ, and specifies that it is in only one of those two senses that the Sceptic 'does not dogmatize'. 13 The care devoted to the study of P//1.13 stands in contrast to the relative neglect that PH 1.20 has suffered, and that is assuredly a pity since, whatever the exact meaning of the oerX formula may be, its function is clearly to specify a limit, restriction or qualification. It is accordingly essential to examine it in order to determine the 'scope' of the ijroxrj more precisely. It may be objected that the necessary work has already been done by one of the best scholars specializing in the study of Sextus: Karel Janacek devoted the first chapter of his study Sextus Empiricus' Sceptical Methods (pp. 13-20) to the expression 6'oov k-ni. This chapter, which is certainly most valuable by reason of the material that it assembles and many of the observations that it contains, nevertheless puts forward interpretations which seem to me to be extremely controversial. Janacek begins this chapter with the following loaded declaration: As the double wording of the same idea, viz. the use of a complete expression next to an incomplete one is to my mind one of the characteristic features of Sextus' style, we must be aware of it when reading his works. The concise formulation must be explained by means of a full reading, which often appears only later; it is psychologically quite comprehensible that the sterile sceptical doctrine called at least for a variation or formal improvement. This 'principle of complementation' may indeed be justified on the basis of certain declarations made by Sextus himself (such as PHi. 188-9). However, in his commentaries on PH1.20, Janacek seems to me to apply it without taking the necessary precautions. He writes as follows: 'The oerX construction is a noun form which corresponds to the verbal expression o Aeyercu (i.e. VTTO rcbv SoyfjLOLTLKwv) or to the participle TO Xeyofjuevov.' If my understanding is correct, this commentary leads to the following interpretation: we Sceptics call into question what the dogmatists say, namely that honey is sweet. But is it legitimate mentally to supply VTTO TCOV Soy/xart/ccov here, and so orientate the interpretation of the passage in the direction of an expressly 'urbane' scepticism? There are a number of reasons to think not. 11 12

13

aypoiKOTTvppojveioi'. Galen's expression (Diff. puls. viii.71 iK, Praenot. XIV.628K) is adapted like this by Barnes 1983, p. 8. Burnyeat 1984, p. 231, also, in honour of Montaigne, speaks in connection with this of the 'scepticism of a country gentleman'. Cf. in particular the articles cited by Frede 1987, pp. i86ff., Burnyeat 1983, pp. 130ft0., Barnes 1983, pp. 23ft0., Burnyeat 1984, pp. 229ft0.

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In the first place, the statement 'honey is sweet' (hereafter: statement H) is certainly not a statement on which all the 'dogmatists' would agree. Many would reject it, insisting upon an analysis of the material structure of honey, and would refuse to say that it is really sweet. Sextus, too, rejects such an assertion but does not justify that rejection by means of the oerX expression.14 Honey, which is a common food product, is not the object of a scientific proposition here. Rather, the statement H is one of those 'sentences of breakfast-time' which, according to Jonathan Barnes, are hard to deal with when you attempt to determine the scope of the Sceptic eVox^, since they constitute neither scientific assertions nor pure 'reports' of the impressions that affect us. 15 Furthermore, the first argument that Janacek puts forward to justify an implied VTTO TCOV SoyfiartKcbv is certainly unacceptable. He points out that in the following sentence Sextus refers to the 'precipitation of the dogmatists'. That is true, but this sentence is not part of the same level of the argument. There are two stages to Sextus' reply to those who accuse the Sceptics of 'suppressing the phenomena': (1) in the passage with which we are concerned he draws a distinction between the phenomenon and 'what is said about the phenomenon'; (2) in the following sentence he explains that if the Sceptic sometimes opposes some phenomena to others, it is not in order to ruin them but to show that 'if the Xoyos (which here means reason, reasoning) is so deceptive as virtually to conceal even the phenomena from our sight, there is all the more reason to mistrust it in the domain of non-evident things (iv rots a8r]\oLsy. The transition between these two stages is clearly indicated at the beginning of the second part of 20 (iav 8e KCLL KTX). The 'urbane' restriction of the eTToxfj to the bold affirmations of the dogmatists, in (2), cannot be considered to be implied by anticipation in (1), where the conflict between different phenomena is not taken into consideration. Janacek also concludes, from a general review of the uses of ooov in I in Sextus, that the particular expression is an 'incomplete', 'obscure', 'vague', and 'subjective' one which Sextus sometimes 'suppresses' when he repeats himself, so as to avoid 'monotony' (PH 111.48, M ix.439) or that he 'replaces' by expressions that are 'more correct', 'more definite', 'wider' and 'better', such as ooov €TTI rots AeyofjLevois VTTO TCOV SoyfjuaTiKcbv (PHU.22,

8 0 , 9 5 ; III. 13? 2 9> 135)

or ooov em rco iXoo6(j)co Xoyto (P//111.65, Mx.49; cf. also Mix.49 and xi. 165), or else by 'more objective' expressions, such as Sea rrjv looodeveiav (Mx.168) or 81a rfjv hiacfxjoviav (sc. TCOV Soy/juaTLKcov) (cf. PH III.65). If, before returning

to PH 1.20, we make a fairly wide detour, following in Janacek's footsteps, I 14

15

Cf. for example the exposition of the third trope (PH 1.93): euphorbia is hurtful to the eyes but not to other parts of the body; so it cannot be said to be either hurtful or not hurtful, ooov i-nl rfj iavTov vo€i, insofar as its own nature is concerned. Cf. Barnes 1983, pp. 256°. It is perhaps exaggerated to say that 'Sextus says nothing about these pronouncements'; but it is certainly true that he says nothing that is very clear.

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think we shall see (i) that the absence or presence of the ooov em restriction is by no means simply a stylistic variation, and (ii) that the various complements provided for ooov em are by no means interchangeable. (i) For example, Janacek considers as 'parallel' PH 11.22, in which Sextus declares man to be 'unintelligible' {aveTTLvorjTos), ooov em rols Aeyojjuevois VTTO ra>v SoyfjLdTLKcov, and M vii.263 where, without using the same expression, he undertakes to show that man has 'so far' shown himself to be 'unintelligible'. But the first passage is cast in the present tense, as is the series of definitions of man that follows it: Sextus has in mind a synoptic table of these definitions, to which he refers using the expression ooov em rols Xeyofxevois VTTO TCOV SoyfjLdTiKwv; a possible translation would be 'on the definite basis provided by what the dogmatists say'. The second passage, in contrast, is written in the style of a story, and precedes a history of the notion of man; here, the corpus on the basis of which man is declared to be unintelligible is not considered to be already constituted; so, quite naturally, the expression ooov em rois Xeyofxevois VTTO TCOV SoyfjLCLTLKtbv is n o t used.

Janacek also treats as 'parallel' PH 11.29, where Sextus passes, without using ooov em7, from the thesis 'man is unintelligible (dveTTtvorjrosy to the thesis 'man is unknowable' (d/caraA^Trros), and M vii.283, in which he makes the same transition by saying that the first point has been shown TO OOOV em TOLS TCOV SoyfjLOLTLKwv ivvoiais. But the technique of argumentation employed in these two passages is not at all the same: in the first, the technique is one of concession {'even if we accepted, as a hypothesis, that man can be understood, we shall see that he cannot be known'); in the second passage, the technique is one of consecution ('it has been shown, on the definite basis provided by the ideas of the dogmatists, that man is unintelligible and consequently that he is unknowable'). At PH 11.29, there was thus no place for the use of ooov, although it is perfectly justified at M vii.283. (ii) Sextus observes a distinction, sometimes with great care, between the various complements that he provides for ooov em. He uses this formula to specify in what respect a statement is legitimate {PH 11.156, 166, m.277, M xi.215), or the criterion according to which it is held to be so by a particular philosophical school {PH 1.235). We should also note the many anaphoric uses of ooov em, complemented by TOVTCO {PH 11.23, m i 9 3 > M vii.367, vm.438) or 2II TOVTOLS {PH 11.203, > 2 I 5 ) ; these make it possible to refer back to the statement or the collection of statements upon the precise basis of which a Sceptic conclusion is inferred (they could be translated well enough as 'on that account'). When the complement of ooov em refers back to the conceptions and propositions of the dogmatists, it is further differentiated by variations which appear to be neither accidental nor purely stylistic. Sextus does not express himself in the same way when he is citing an authority literally (cf. M 1.287, ooov 67Ti TO) VTT EvpiTTioov XexOevTi) as when he is drawing from a corpus of dogmatic assertions a Sceptic conclusion which was neither foreseen nor

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desired by those dogmatists themselves (cf. ooov errl rols Aeyo/zevoi? VTTO rtbv Soy/jLCLTiKoov, PH 11.22, 95, in. 13, 29, 135, and similar expressions in PH 11.26, 104,118,111.56,186,241, Mviii.3, x.33). 16 When he bases his remarks upon the dogmatic definitions of the object that he is examining, the complement to ooov em is evvoca or eirivota(PHll. 23, m.38,46, Ml.65, 90, Vll.283); when he bases them upon non-definitional statements, the complement is Aoyos or Xeyofieva (PH 11.22,95,111.13,29,135,136); cf. also PH 11.26,104,118,111.56,186,241, M vm.3, x.33). Whether it be definitions or statements that are concerned, his use of the singular and the plural is by no means haphazard. If one dogmatic definition in particular is unintelligible or leads to absurd consequences, he W r i t e s OOOV €771 TTj ivVOLCL TCLVTr) (PH

I I . 2 3 , III.46, M 1.65) Or OOOV €7TL TaVTTJ TTj

kinvoia (PH in. 38, Ml. 90); if a large number of divergent definitions manifest the unintelligibility of their common subject, he writes TO OOOV eirl rats rcov SoyfxartKcov ivvotais (M vii.283). Where a certain number of dogmatic theses, by reason of their very discordance, provide the Sceptic with a definite basis upon which he founds the necessity of his e V o ^ , he writes ooov eVi rots XeyofjuevoLS VTTO TWV SoyfjianKcov (PH 11.22, 95, III. 13, 29, 56, 135);17 but he writes ooov iirl rco cf>iXoo6(/)a) Xoyw, or uses similar expressions, when philosophy itself, quite apart from its divisions, is as a whole opposed either to the phenomena (PH 111.65, M x.49), 18 or else to the customs and laws (M ix.49), or the ordinary rules of life (Mxi.165). Let us now return to our original question and examine two cases where the expression used by Sextus is very close to oerX, although not exactly identical to this formula. At PH in.62, Sextus winds up his attack against the physical theory of mixture by declaring that, since all possible modes of composition for the elements have turned out to be unintelligible, that theory is itself unintelligible KCLI ooov em TOVTCO TCO Xoyco. This occurrence is doubly important because its syntax is definitely 'adverbial' (the restriction specifies not the sense in which 16

17

18

One particular and difficult case is that of PH 11.80, in which Sextus presents the famous Stoic distinction between the truth and what is true, saying that ooov i-rrl TOLS Xeyo/jLevois VTTO TWV hoytiariKwv what is true has no existence (avvTrapKTos) and the truth has no subsistence {avvTToorarov). In opposition to the idea that this might be a valuable doxographical piece of evidence on the ontological vocabulary of the Stoics, it is worth noting that at PH 111.253, Sextus himself refers to this passage, saying that in it he showed that the truth was avvnapKrov, thereby confusing the distinction apparently introduced at PH 11.80. At PH 11.22, dogmatic discourses are said to be both discordant if one considers them together, and unintelligible if one considers them separately. At P//111.65, Sextus writes that the existence of movement is recognized both by common sense (o jSios1) and by some philosophers {rives TOJV <j>i\oo6a>v), whereas the Eleatic philosophers deny it. He concludes that movement certainly seems to exist ooov em TOLS (fraivofievoLs, but not ooov inl Ta)i\oo6cp\6ya); the existence of one immobilist philosophy seems to him to be a sufficient reason to claim that philosophic reason per se denies movement. At Mx.45-9, he is more circumspect: he is careful to call philosophers who recognize the existence of movement 'physicists', as opposed to the avoiKoi Eleatics; by the same token, the philosophic Xoyos can easily be presented as negating movement.

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the theory must be taken if it is to be declared unintelligible, but instead the precise basis upon which the Sceptic justifies his declaring it to be so) and anaphoric (the referral operated by rovrco to the preceding argument is exactly what makes it possible to understand Xoyos here to mean 'argument'). This anaphoric use closely resembles the uses of ooov eirl rovrco (without rco Xoyco) that I mentioned above and that I translated as 'on that account'. In fact, that very translation would also do perfectly well here, bearing in mind one of the common meanings of Aoyos. The case of PHi.i 15 is more difficult. Here Sextus examines the relationship between Scepticism and Cyrenaism, which some sought to identify on the grounds that they share in common the thesis according to which 'only affects (TTOLOTJ) are knowable'. Sextus opposes that identification: 'whereas we practise the €770x17, ooov lire T(h Xoyco 7T€pl rcbv €KTOS vTroK€Lfji€vajv, the Cyrenaics

declare that the latter have an unknowable nature.' The general sense may be clear (this is one version, among many others, of the Sceptics' overt hostility to all forms of what might be termed a 'negative dogmatism' or 'meta-dogmatism'). However, the details of the expression are problematical, firstly on a syntactical level. "Ooov errl rco Xoyco may be construed adverbially, by attaching rrepl rcbv eKros vTTOKeijjLevajv to the verb irrexofjiev ('we suspend

judgement, at least at the level of the Xoyos, where external objects are concerned.') One may also, it seems to me, adopt an 'objectal' construction of ooov inl rco Xoyco by attaching irepl rcbv €KTOS VTTOK€.I\L€VCOV to Xoyco ('we

suspend judgement, insofar as it is a matter of the Xoyos relating to external objects.') The sentence about the Cyrenaics, which follows on from the one in which we are interested, perhaps favours the second of these two constructions: these philosophers do not refrain from making assertions {a7ro(j>aivovrcu) about the unknowable 'nature' of external objects; in contrast, it would be logical to take it that Sceptics do abstain from pronouncing upon such objects. But I do not think it is possible to settle the matter definitively. On the other hand, whatever the construction adopted, it is noticeable that the oerX formula here has no anaphoric force: the context contains no statement or argument to which the term Xoyos could refer back. This rapid overview thus provides two alternative models for interpreting the uses of the oerX formula that are not accompanied by any complement. The anaphoric model seems to suggest an ellipse of rovrco, which could be compensated by the context; the formula would thus mean: 'on the definite basis that is provided by the statement, or the argument, that has just been mentioned'. The non-anaphoric model seems, on the contrary, to suggest that Xoyos should be given a sense sufficiently definite for the restriction indicated by oerX to be pinned down precisely. The formula would then mean: 'insofar as the Xoyos is concerned', that is to say either the essence of the object of which one is speaking or the discourse, or type of discourse, that one is producing about it. Of the four uses of oerX mentioned at the beginning of this study, two, in my

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opinion, call for the anaphoric interpretation. At PH 111.47-8, Sextus is arguing against the existence of the body, on the grounds of the dogmatic division of beings into those that are sensible and those that are intelligible; next he shows that the body can be neither sensible nor intelligible. Then he concludes: 'as there is nothing else apart from that, it must be said, oerA, that the body does not exist either' (48). Despite the absence of a pronoun, it seems natural to translate as Bury does: 'so far as this argument goes'. The argument in question, set out in the preceding lines, is but one of those that can be constructed 'against the body' (TOVS Kara rov acofjuaros Aoyovs, 49). The Sceptic distinguishes between them and the critical analysis of the concept of the body, 19 and opposes them to the phenomena, in order to force the 677ox^.20 The negative conclusion of this argument ('the body does not exist') is not the object of an assertion detached from its specific premisses; it is put forward for the reader's approval only on the precise basis of the argument itself. The Sceptic could well put forward other arguments in favour of the same conclusion; he could no doubt also advance other arguments of equal force in favour of the opposite conclusion. The situation at P//111.72 is similar. Against those who maintain that a thing can move in the place where it is, by invoking the example of a sphere turning upon its axis, Sextus says that 'it is necessary to transfer the argument (Adyo?) [already expounded above], which applies to each of the parts of the sphere [and which shows that a thing cannot move from the place where it is to another where it is not]. By reminding [those who hold to the criticized thesis] that, ocrA, the sphere cannot move part by part, one can force them to recognize that neither can it move in the place where it is.' Here the anaphoric interpretation is surely called for, particularly as the absence of a pronoun is compensated by the occurrence of the word Adyo? in the preceding context, and as Sextus speaks specifically of 'transferring' {fxeraêpeiv) this argument directed against movement from one place to another, so as to reject movement in one spot. The case of PH 1.227 *s more difficult. Here, Sextus compares Scepticism with the New Academy. The points of divergence that he notes are the following: (a) the Academicians adopt a dogmatically negative position vis-avis theories of knowledge in general; (b) the most manifest divergence, however, occurs in the domain of discerning goods and evils, where the Academicians justify their adherence to their judgements on the grounds of their 'persuasiveness', whereas the Sceptics abstain from adhering to the judgements that they come to in this domain, since those judgements are dictated by an 'adoxastic' acceptance of the necessities of practical life. Sextus then adds (without making it clear whether or not he still remains in the domain of ethics) (c) that, according to the Sceptics, 'representations (avraaiai) are all equal with regard to their persuasiveness or non-persuasiveness (icara TTLOTLV 77 ainariav) O€TA, whereas, for the Academicians, some are 19

Cf. ooov ini rfj kvvoia rov GWfJLaros, 46 end.

20

Cf. beginning of 49.

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persuasive while others are not.' Finally, (d) we find an account of the differentiations that the Academicians introduce between persuasive representations themselves; to judge from the examples cited, the representations in question are sensible, not ethical ones. The main difficulty that this passage presents is that it is not clear whether section (c), in which the oerX formula appears, constitutes a preamble to (d) or an appendix to (b). If the latter is the case, it would be possible to read this formula in the anaphoric sense: the indifferent manner in which, according to section (b), the Sceptic proffers his ethical statements would thus constitute the grounds upon which, when he passes on from statements to the representations that they express, he declares the latter to be themselves all equal so far as persuasiveness goes. If one can say that 'X is good' without being persuaded of it, one can, on that account, represent X to oneself &$ good, without that

representation being any more persuasive than its opposite would be. However, it unquestionably seems more natural to consider section (c) as a statement of a new difference between the Sceptics and the Academicians,21 which is related, not to the particular representations of the ethical domain, but to representations in general. In opposition to the Sceptics, the Academicians distinguish first (c) between representations that are persuasive and those that are not; and they then (d) go on to draw finer distinctions between such representations as are persuasive. In these circumstances, an anaphoric interpretation of oerX would be impossible, since the caesura between (b) and (c) prevents onefindingany anaphoric reference. An adverbial interpretation of the formula that interests us would now seem indicated: 'we say that representations are equal so far as persuasiveness and non-persuasiveness are concerned, at least that is what we say at the level of theory (or rational discourse)' - the implication being: from a practical point of view, we accept their inequality when it is simply a matter of living and acting. Now, at last, let us return to our point of departure, namely PH 1.20. The possible variations noted earlier dictate that we approach this text without any preconceptions and examine all the interpretations that are theoretically possible. These may be classified schematically by crossing the adverbial vs. objectal distinction with the anaphoric vs. non-anaphoric distinction and, at the same time, allowing different variants to subsist within each schema: (a) A non-anaphoric and objectal construction: 'we doubt22 that honey is sweet, so far as Xoyos goes,' that is to say, for example, its essence as opposed to its appearance. (b) A non-anaphoric and adverbial construction: 'we doubt, so far as a Xoyos goes (that is to say either discourse in general, or discourse of a definite kind, or a theoretical question, or a question for reason) that honey is sweet.' 21

22

Sections (a) and (b) are strongly connected by LOCOS /XCV . . . &ia<j>epovoi Se. Section (c) seems tacked on to these two, by reason of the link established by r e , beginning of 227. O n this translation of ^rjrovfjLev, cf. above, n. 5.

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From other points of view, determined in opposition to the above, we do not doubt it. (c) An anaphoric and adverbial construction: 'we doubt, on the definite basis supplied by a Adyos (an argument or a statement) present in the context, that honey is sweet.' It is not excluded that, upon other bases, we might not doubt it. (d) An anaphoric and objectal construction: 'we doubt that honey is sweet, insofar as the statement "honey is sweet" rests upon a determined basis supplied by a Adyos (an argument or a statement) that is present in the context, and is itself rejected.' Against (a), it may be pointed out that the Aristotelian translation ofAdyo? as 'essence' is, so far as I know, not authorized by any parallel in Sextus. When he sets the phenomenal aspect of things in opposition to their reality, nature or essence, he uses (f>vcns, not Aoyos (cf. P//1.59,78,87, etc.). Furthermore, in the passage with which we are concerned, Sextus twice opposes 'the phenomenon itself to 'that which is said about the phenomenon' (o Aeyercu, Xeyofjuevov); it would seem that the word Aoyos, in the oerA formula, echoes these occurrences of the verb Xeyeiv, and should be understood as relating, in one way or another, to the act of saying. This same argument may be used against the versions of schema (b) which introduce the notion of reason or that of theory. On the one hand, it should be remembered that the airoplai produced by reason where phenomena are concerned are not mentioned by Sextus until the second part of his reply to the objection made by the opponents of Scepticism; to translate Aoyos as 'reason' in the first part of this reply (as must be done in the second part) would be to take no account of the force of the iav Se KOLI avriKpvs KTX transition. Meanwhile, the statement H can hardly pass for a theoretical statement, if by this what is meant is a philosophical or scientific statement concerning 'the non-evident things that constitute the subject of scientific research', in accordance with the definition that Sextus gives of the strict sense of Soy/jua at PH1.13. On the other hand, the versions of schema (b) which give Adyo? a meaning close to 'saying' seem solidly based upon the opposition indicated between the phenomenon and that which is 'said about it'. But we ought also to be able to specify the sense in which the Sceptic abstains from saying that honey is sweet, insofar as that statement is a Adyos. Three possibilities seem feasible. (bi) The statement should be rejected as a Adyos, that is to say as discourse on the phenomenon, since this cannot be equated with the phenomenon itself, for the simple reason that it is discourse on it and all 'discoursing upon' the phenomenon inevitably betrays or distorts it. (b2) The statement should be rejected as a Adyos, that is to say as discourse on the external object, as opposed to discourse which would not be called \6yos, did no more than describe the irddos of the affected subject, and would be acceptable to the Sceptic.

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(b3) The statement should be rejected as a Aoyos, that is to say as an assertion, an assertion being disqualified as such, not on account of its object, for this could just as well be the mental state of the affected subject as the properties of external objects. What would be acceptable to the Sceptic would be a 'speech-act' of a type other than a Adyo?, which expresses the affected subject's irddos in its raw state, without making any assertion concerning this TTOLOOS itself.

Interpretation (bi) seems ideally in conformity with the opposition that Sextus draws between the phenomenon and what is said about it. 23 Nevertheless, it poses a problem: can the Sceptics 'concede the fact of appearance' and also deny themselves all discourse that interprets that appearance, without condemning themselves to silence? To be sure, they recommend d(f>aola; but as the bulk of their writings testifies - this is a far cry from mutism (PH i.i92ff.). They may resort to 'indicators of ac/xioia, such as 'perhaps' or 'possibly' (PH 1.194-5), or even to 'catachrestic' uses of ordinary expressions (PH 1.191, 207); the verb 'to be' itself may, in this sense, be used perfectly legitimately (P//1.135, 198, Mxi.18-19). The chapter with which we are specially concerned also shows that the Sceptic by no means denies himself statements which do not coincide exactly with the description that he himself gives of the 'fact of appearance', and which thus deserve to be considered as 'interpretations' of the phenomenon. When it comes to describing the 'fact of appearance', the Sceptic resorts to vocabulary typical of the Cyrenaic school: 'through our senses we undergo a sweetening effect' (yXvKaôfjieda aloO^riKibs). But this statement is presented as the reason why (yap) the Sceptic agrees to (avyxcopovfjuev) another one, namely 'honey appears to us to have a sweetening action' (âiverai -qixiv yXvKa&iv TO jjueXi). Clearly, this last statement, too, 'interprets' the phenomenon, and does so in at least two senses: in the first place, it replaces the passive yXvKaôfjieda by the active yXvKdîv, tacitly justifying this by the principle of reciprocity between passion and action; secondly, and above all, it identifies and names the agent of this action, namely honey, the name of which was not pronounced in the statement couched in the passive, nor was there even a place for it there. 24 So the Sceptic does not rule out speaking of the phenomenon; he can only rule out speaking of it in a particular manner, this being characterized either by the subject that the discourse claims to be about (the external world, as 23

24

Cf. Sedley 1983, p . 27 n. 57: ' H e r e [PH 1.19-20] it emerges t h a t when the Skeptic assents to an " a p p e a r a n c e " (phainomenon) he is conceding only the fact of the appearance itself ("that it appears, we g r a n t " ) and explicitly excluding the statement (ho legetai, legomenon, logos) which interprets the appearance - e.g. the statement that the honey which appears sweet is sweet.' O n this point, the Cyrenaics are m o r e p r u d e n t a n d m o r e rigorous; professing t h a t 'the effect which takes place in us shows us nothing except itself (M vii.194), they d o not permit themselves to designate the producer of the affect otherwise t h a n by its function (TO ifJLTTOlTjTlKOV TOV TTOidoVS, I 9 I ; TO KLVOVV CLVTOVS, 1 9 3 ; TO €KTOS KCLl TOV TTOidoVS TTOLTjTLKOV,

194)-

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opposed to the irddrj), or else by the modality of the speech-act that it constitutes (assertivity as opposed to a bald expression of the irddos). The first of those possibilities corresponds to schema (b2). It has certain attractions. As is well known, Sextus frequently refers to the discourse that the Sceptic allows himself as 'reports' or 'accounts' {dirayyeXiai, P//1.4, 15, 197, 200, 203), 'expressions' or 'indications' of his nddrj ((/MJOVOLL ^rjvvrLKai, PH 1.187; a>vri SrjXojTLKrj, PH1.197,201), 'tales of what he experiences' (o iracx^ biriyovjxevos, PH 1.197). It might thus be thought that, in the passage with which we are concerned, Sextus wishes to rule out the statement H, by calling it a Aoyo?, precisely because it refers to the external object and attributes an object property to it. In contrast, the acceptable statement 'Honey seems to us to have a sweetening action' (let us call this statement 131-2, 146; 'of such a nature as to exist', 177-89; existent vs. subsistent, 'Friends of the Forms', in Plato's Sophist, 119, 121; original vs. revised position of, 121-6 forms, Platonic, 101, 116, 119, 121-2; Stoic criticism of, 126-31 gar, 18-19 genus, supreme (Stoics), 42, 92-157, part. 103, 105, 107-8, 110-13, I I 6 , 146-7, 151 gods, 170-89 grammarians, 40, 44 Growing Argument, 54-5 haireton vs. haireteon, 164 happiness, in Pyrrhonism, 191, 196, 199, 203, 205, 208, 214, 223 hexis, vs. hekton, 150-3 honey, whether sweet, 246-7, 252-3, 256-7 identity, Stoic criterion of, 53 images, see Indalmoi impulse, 158-69 incorporeals, 92-3, 96, 98, 106, 111-14, 116, 121, 124-6, 132, 134-5, X38, 141-2, 144-5, 147-8, 151-4, 158-69 indefinite propositions (Stoics), 47-9, 60-2 individuals, fictitious (in Stoicism), 98-101, 103, n o , 114 individualism, in Epicurus, 33, 37 'intellectualism', Stoic, 83 intermediate propositions (Stoics), see middle isonomia, I2n., 13-15

267

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INDEX OF SUBJECTS

katalepsis, 228; see concepts kategoremata, 134-5, J54~6, 158-69 katorthoma, 80 knowledge, in Stoicism, 81-2, 124; in Scepticism, 191 kriterion, 228-43; 'prodelic' vs. 'adelic' notion of, 230, 233, 238-43; 'Stoic' vs. 'Epicurean' notion of, 241-3; various meanings of, 233-7; vs. sign and proof, 230; and kanon, 242; and logos, 257-8 language, private vs. common (Epicurus), 21-38; animal vs. human, 34, 35 lekta, 44, 46, 124-5, X34~6, 142, 158, 162, i63n.; complete vs. incomplete, 135 limits, in Stoicism, 96-7, 103, 138 logos, insofar as is concerned, 244-58 man, unintelligible and unknowable (Sceptics), 248 Master Argument, 52, 65 'materialism', Stoic, 123, 134, 159 methodology, 1 middle propositions (Stoics), 47-51, 60-1, 63 mixture, 77, 137; unintelligible (Sceptics), 249 movement, in Epicurus, 3-20; metaphorical vs. literal use of expressions for, 3-17; sceptical arguments against, 251 nature, vs. reasoning (Epicurus), 23-4; vs. convention or institution, 25, 28-31 negation, 51 nominative, 42-3 'non-existent something', 94-6, n o , 114-16, 126,131, 134, 138, 140, 145 nooumena, see concepts not-being, 158-69 'not-something' (outi), 92-3, 103-4, 114—16, 126,130-2, 139, 141 noun, proper vs. common, 40-6, 63 One, 104, 106, 146 onoma, 40-1 ontological argument, 170-89 ou mallon, 192, 205, 208-9 outis, paradox of, 130, 139-40 parabole, 173, 177-80, 187-9 parts of discourse, 39, 40 passions, 83 place, 134-7, 142 plenitude, principle of, I3n., i82n. pneuma, 89-90 pragmata, in Pyrrho, 200-11 predicates, see kategoremata private language, see language prolepseis, 102, 184, 227 proof, 124-5, 226-7

proper noun, in Stoicism, 39-56; see also noun propositions, in Stoicism, 47; simple vs. nonsimple, 47, 57-60; various types of simple, 47, 60; affirmative vs. negative, 60-2, 69-70 prosegoria, 40-1, 44 ptosis, 42 Pyrrhonism, ethical vs. epistemological interpretation of, 198-9, 205-11; ethical dogmatism?, 214; 'rustic' vs. 'urbane1, 246-7, 257-8 quality, common vs. particular, 44-9, 55; vs qualified, 148-52; vs. predicates, 154-6 racism, in Epicurus, 38 rationalism, in Stoicism, 37 reasoning, see nature Scepticism, scope of, 245; see also Pyrrhonism semainein, 44-5 sensations, in Scepticism, 191, 196-205 sensualism, in Epicurus, 33, 35, 36 sins, equality of, 88-9 something (ti), 92-3, 103-7, 110-16, 118, 126-32, 135-6, 139-40, 146-8, 152 'Sons of the Earth', in Plato's Sophist, 119; original vs. revised position of, 120-3, I 2 6 sorites, 142-5 soul, 120-3 species, infima (Stoics), 42; fictitious (in Stoicism), 98, 101, 103, n o , 114 sumptoma, common to bodies and incorporeals, 148, 151, 153-5 surfaces, in Stoicism, 97 telos, vs. skopos, 162-3; Sceptic, 204 time, 112-13, J 34~8, 140-5; cosmic parts of, 142-5 tradition, 20 truth, vs. the true, in Stoicism, 133-4, ^ 7 , 249n.; degrees of, 88-9 truth-conditions, for simple propositions, 47, 50 truth-functions, 73 universe (holon), vs. all {pan) in Stoicism, 98-9 verb, 40 virtues, 120-1, 156, 163 voice, 132-3 void, 98-9, 112-13, I 34~4° 5 l42 wholes, vs. parts, 155-6 Wise Men, in Stoicism, 177-8, 187-8 xenophobia, 75

INDEX OF NAMES

Adler, M., 15311. Aenesidemus, 19011., 192, 193, 19611., 204 Aldobrandini, n o Alexander of Aphrodisias, 104, 13411., 13811., 14211., 146 Alexinos, 177 Annas, J., 171 Anselm of Canterbury, 170-1, 174, 177 Antiochus of Ascalon, 225n. Antipater, 105, 108, iO9n., 150-2, 154, 171 Antisthenes, 126 Apelt, O., in., 2n., 3n. Apollodorus, i6on. Aratus, 2i5n. Arcesilaus, 206-7 Archedemus, 127 Aristo of Chios, 206, 208 Aristocles, 190-211 Aristotle, 28n., 39, 42-3, 65, 77, 83n., 87n., 94, 106, i n , I29n., 133, 140, 147-8, 170 Arnim, J. von, 39n., 68, 73, 76, 78n., ii9n., 126, I32n., I38n., i56n. Arrighetti, G., in., 2n., 3n., 4n., 8, I9n., 2in., 25 Ascanius of Abdera, 208 Aubenque, P., 92n. Augustine, 140, 170 Aulus Gellius, 76 Ausland, H.W., I92n., 197-9, 205, 207-8 Bacon, F., 2i6n. Bailey, C , in., 2n., 3n., 4n., 5n., 8, 11, 13-17, 2in., 25 Baldassari, M., 171, 174, I77n., 180, 18m. Barnes, J., 92n., 98, 99n., 144, I55n., 174-6, I9on., 237, 240, 244n., 245n., 246n., 247, Barwick, K., 40n., 86n. Basilides, H5n. Bekker, I., 2i3n. Bergk, Th., 2i3n., 2i6n. Bergson, H., 140 Berti, E., 89n.

Besnier, B., 92n. Bestor, T.W.,4in. Beyssade, J.M., 23m. Bignone, E, 1, 2n., 3n., 8, 11-19, 2in., 25 Bloch, O., 1, 8n., 9, I9n. Boethius, 170 Bollack, J., 1-10, I2n., 14-18, 2on., 2in., 23n., 25, 26, 3on., 31, 36, 38n. Bouveresse, J., I58n. Boyance, P., 1, 7n., 8, 9-10, 14, 18, I9n. Brehier, E., 74n., 93n., 94n., 97n., I3on., Brieger, A., 20n. Brochard, V., 207, 2i3n., 214, 216, 217 Burnyeat, M., 92n., I98n., 2i4n., 245n Bury, R.G., 73n., 108, I72n., i8on., 2i3n., n., 23m., Canto, M., I58n. Carneades, 144-5, I 7 I » Castaneda, H.N., 2in. Cherniss, H., 55n., iO2n. Chiesa, C , I58n. Chilton, C.W., 34n. Christensen, J., U9n. Chrysippus, 40, 47, 52, 57, 65, 73, 74n., 77, 83, 85-7, 9on., 97, iO2n., 104, iO9n., 127, 130, 132, I36n., 137, I4on., 142-5, 156, 167, 171, I76n., 244n. Cicero, 80, 160-1, 207-8 Cleanthes, 40, iO9n., 127, 132 Cleomedes, 96, 143-4 Clinomachus, 160, 168 Cole, T., 22n., 24n., 34n. Colotes, 2O7n. Conche, M., I9on., 197, 216, 222n. Conrad, F., 2i6n., 218-19 Cornford, F.M., I22n., Cortassa, G., 22on. Crates of Thebes, 22 m. Crinis, 108, iO9n., 187 Cronert, W., 4n.


270

INDEX OF NAMES

Dahlmann, J.H., 2 in. Decleva Caizzi, F., 190, 19311., 19411., 197, 19811., 199, 20111., 20411. 21211., 21311., 21411., 215, 2i6n., 217, 2i8n., 22m., 22211., 223 De Lacy, Ph., 3311., 36, 3711. Delattre, D., 171 Democritus, 33, 34, 215, 217, 22611., 23411., 23911. Denniston, J.D., 211., i8n., 22811. Denyer, N., 19011., 210 Descartes, 170 De Vogel, C , 8911. Dicaearchus, 154 Diels, H., 21211., 21311., 21611. Dies, A., 12211. Dillon, J., n o n . Di Marco, M., 2i2n. Diodes of Magnesia, 57 Diodorus Cronus, 57, 206 Diodorus Siculus, 34 Diogenes of Babylon, 40, 44-5, iO9n., 132-3, 170-89 Diogenes Laertius, 7 Diogenes of Oenoanda, 34 Diotimus, 226n., 234n., 239n. Dixsaut, M., I58n. Dodds, E.R., 83n. Doring, K., I28n. Donini, P., 92n., 224n. Dorandi, T., 171 Dragona-Monachou, M., 17m., 174, i85n. Dumont, J.P., 2in., 72n., 9m., i64n., 170, 17m., 174, I77n., 180, 222n. Ebert, Th., 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 67, 69, 70, i6on. Edelstein, L., 87 Egli, U., 69, 70, iO9n., n o Empedocles, n n . Epictetus, 79 Epicurus, 1-20, 21-38, I7on., 207, 234, 24m., 242-3 Ernout, A., in., 2n., 3n., I9n., 2in., 25, 26, 27n.,29,3i Esser, M., 17m. Euripides, 84, 248 Eusebius, 190-211 Everson, S., 20in. Fabricius, 2i3n. Ferrari, G.A., 2i4n., 223n. Ferraria, L., I9on. Festugiere, A.J., n 8 n . Findlay, J.N., i86n. Fine, G., I26n., I29n. Follet, S., I9on. Frede, M., 39n., 40n., 43n., 44n., 45n., 46n., 49n., 60, 61, 62, 73, 74n., H9n., I3on.,

I43n., 24m.,

171,

n., 207,

Gabaude, J.M., 33n. Galen, 73, 74n., 75, 83n., 86-7, 9 m., 244n., 246n. Gallop, D., 170 Gassendi, P., I2n. Gaunilo, 177 Geminus, 130 Genette, G., 86n. Giannantoni, G., I9on. Gigon, O., in., 2n., 3n. Giussani, C , 8, 10-11, 14, 18, 19 Giusta, M., 160-1 Glidden, D., 228n. Goldschmidt, V., 83n., 93n., 94n 36n., 140, I42n., Gould, J., 73n., 93n. Goulet, R., 47n., 68, 69, 96n., 97n ., 156 Graeser, A., 43n., 45n., 87n., 93n. Groarke, L., I9on. Hadot, P., 45n., 68, 93n., iO4n., non., H3n., Hamelin, O., in., 2n., 3n., I9n., 2in., 25, 26, 29,30 Hartshorne, C , 170, 17m. Heidegger, M., 140 Heintz, W., 73n., 108, 227n., 233n., 235, 236n., 237, 238, 239 Herillus, 208 Herophilus, 162, 169 Hick, J., 170 Hicks, R.D., in., 2n., 3n., 4n., 5n., 2in., 23n., 25, io8n., I32n. Hintikka, J., I3n. Hippocrates, 215 Hirzel, R., 216, 217 Homer, 212, 215 Hiilser, K., 39n., io8n., 110, I48n. Iamblichus, I37n. Imbert, C , 39n., I5 Indalmoi, 212-23 Inwood, B., i67n. Isnardi Parente, M. in., 2n., 3n., i9n., 2in., 25 Jaeger, W., 89n. Janacek, K., 225n, 228n, Johnson, J.P., 170 Joly, H., I58n. Jones, O.R., 2in.

, 246-7

Kahn, Ch., I32n. Kalbfleisch, C , 151, I54n.


271

INDEX OF NAMES Kant, 170, 217 Kennedy, G., 86n. Kerfcrd, G.,81, I59n., 162 KiefTer, J.S., 87 Kneale, M., 69, 73n., 74n., 75 Konstan, D., 25, 92n., I56n. Laks, A., 92n., 244n. Lallot, J., I58n. Lcandri, A., 245n. Leibniz, 33 Lloyd, A.C., 39n., 49n., 53n., 9m. Lloyd-Jones, H., 2i2n., 2i3n., 2i6n., 2i8n. Long, A.A., 46n., 8in., 82, 92n., 93n., 97, 98n., 99, 10m., 102, iO3n., io8n., I27n., I29n., I34n., 141, I4 I5on., I53n., 158-9, 163, i64n., i66n., nM 2i2n., 2i3n., 2i4n., 22m., 222n., n., 228n., 234n., 238n., 24on., 24m. Long, H.S., I32n. Longinus, 127 Lovejoy, A., I3n. Lucian, 244n. Lucretius, 8-14, 18 MacGill, A., 170 MansfeM, J., iO9n., 224n. Marcus Aurelius, 127, 140, 244n. Markovits, F., 33n. Martha, J., 72n. Marx, K., 33 Mates, B., 73n., 74n., 79n. Mau, J., 235n. Meibom, M., 3on. Menage, G., n o , 2i3n. Metrodorus of Chios, 191 Mignucci, M., 52n., 73n., 74m, 92n. Montaigne, 246n. Moreau, J., 1, I9n. Morrison, D., I29n. Miihll, P. von der, in., 3n., 4n., 109 Mtiller,R., 224n. Mulligan, K., I58n. Mutschmann, H., 60, 73n., 107, Natorp, P., 2i6n., 222n. Nauck, 2i3n. Nausiphanes, 22 m. Numenius, 206 Nussbaum, M., 92n., 171 Obbink, D., 171 O'Brien, D., I58n. Odysseus, 212-23 Pappenheim, E., 236n. Parmenides, 191, 217m Parsons, P., 2i2n., 213n., 2i6n., 2i8n.

Pascal, 175 Pasquino, P., 93n., 11311., 11411. Pearson, iO2n. Pease, A.S., i7on. Penelope, 219, 221, 223 Philo of Alexandria, 40, 106, 170 Philo of Megara, 57 Philodemus, 37, 171-2 Pinborg, J., 4on., 45n Plantinga, A., 170 Plato, 79, 83n., 88, 92-5, 106, n o 12, 116, 118-26, 126-9, 132-3, 140, 146 7, 157, 159-60, 170, 206; see also Sophist, Timacus Plotinus, 117, 146-7, 157 Plutarch, 11, I2n., 78, 98, 116, 142, 144 5,

Pohlenz, M., 4on.,

n., i02n.,

Poirier, M., I9on. Ponnier, J., 33n. Porphyry, 66 Posidonius, 83, 85, 87, 97, iO9n., I37n., 172, 234 Potamo of Alexandria, 234 Proclus, 96, 117-19, 141 Protagoras, 191 Ptolemy, 234n. Pyrrho, 190-211,212-23 Rabelais, 220n. Reale, G., 2i4n. Recanati, F., 39n. Reinhardt, K., 2in. Ricoeur, P., 86n. Rieth, O., 93n., iO4n., iO9n., I54n. Rist, J., 8on., 81, 83n., 88-90, iO9n., 11 in., ii5n., I28n., I53n. Robin, L., 8, 93n., 216 Rodis-Lewis, G., 34n. Roeper, G., I28n. Russo, A., 73n., 86n. Salieri, A., 245n. Sambursky, S., 77n. Sandbach, F. H., 93n., I32n. Santese, G., I9on. Schmekel, A., 105-7, 151 Schofield, M., 92n, 140, 170, 17m., I72n., I73n., 174-6, I77n., I78n., 179-80, 18m.,

i82n., 183, i86n., i87n. Searle, J., 42n. Sedley, D., 25, 26, 28, 39n., 43n., 45n., 53n., 54n., 55n., 57, 92n., 93n., 97, 98n., 99, 101, iO2n., I34n., 141, 158-9, i6on., 163, i66n., ., 254m Seneca, 110-15, l 6 1


INDEX OF NAMES

272

Severus, 117-18 Sextus Empiricus, 7411., 75, 85-7, 9111., 146, 155-6 Simplicius, 8911., 148-56 Socrates, 219 Solovine, M., in., 2n., 311., 5, 2in., 25, 29 Sophist, 116, 118-26, 131, 147, 157 Sorabji, R., 92m, I32n. Spinoza, 225n. Stilpo, 128-30 Stopper, M.R., 19m., 192, 193-6, 198, 201, 211, 2i4n., 223m Stough, Ch., 217, 222n., 24m. Strauss, R., 245n. Striker, G. 228n., 233n., 234n., 237, 239, 24on., 241-2 Syrianus, 126 Tarn, W., 83n. Theiler, W., non. Theodosius, 211 Theopompus, 154, I56n. Timaeus, 117-18, I29n. Timon, 190-211, 212-23 Traversari, A., 7 Trotignon, P., 2in. Tsekourakis, D., 159, 162

Usener, H., in.,

n., I2n., 2in.

Valery, P., I39n. Vander Waerdt, P., 171-2; 2O7n. Verbeke, G., 90n. Vlastos, G., 34 Vitruvius, 34 Voelke, A., I58n. Wachsmuth, C , 82, 2i2n., 2i3n., 216, 217, 22m. Watson, G. H9n. Wilamowitz, U. von, 2i3n. Wilpert, P., 89n. Wismann, H., in., 8n., I9n. Wittgenstein, L., 2in. Wurm, K., Xenophanes, 190, 239 Xenophon, 219 Zaslawsky, F., 9on. Zeller, E., 94n., 105-6, 108, ii3n., I42n., 162, 195-6 Zeno of Citium, 40, 82, 83n., iO9n., 127-30, 133, 145, i62n., 172-80, 187, 189, 22m. Zeno of Tarsus, 171 Ziegler, K., 96n.


INDEX OF PASSAGES CITED

ACHILLES TATIUS

Isagoge (14) 15011. AELIAN

Varia historia (11 41) 21311. AETIUS Placita (1 20.5) 12711.; (iv 11) i o i n . , 10211.; (iv 12.1) 10411., 12711. ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS

In Aristotelis Analytica priora (177.19-178.8) 65; (177.25-180.33) 52-3; (402.iff.) 51; (402.16-18) 65; (403.1 iff.) 53 In Aristotelis Topica (42.27) io8n., 15011.; (301.19) 9211., 1 i8n., 14611.; (359.12) 9211., 9811., 104; (359.14-16) 14711.; (360.9) 13311., 15011. AMMONIUS

In Aristotelis De interpretatione (Busse) (2.26) 4111.; (42.30*!*.) 4211.; (44.1 iff.) 4311.; (44«i9ff.) 66 APOLLONIUS DYSCOLUS

De conjunctione (Schneider) (214.4-20) 8711. Depronominibus (Maas) (5-2off.) 4111.; (6.3off.) 4111., 64; (10.8-17) 4811. ARISTOTLE

De anima (11 42ob29) 133 Categoriae (iai6) 7811.; (ib25) 7811.; (13I310) 7811. Ethica Nicomachea (x 1173b2) 86n. De generatione et corruptione (1 328a27) 7711. Historia animalium (vm 596b23~97a30) 1711. De interpretatione (Chap) 1 2811.; (i6a32-b5) 4311. Metaphysica(m989b23~7) 14711.; (v 1 0 ^ 2 7 - 3 0 ) 65; (ix iO48b23-35) 86n.; (x iO58a6-8) 14711. De motu animalium (698b 11) 24411. Physica (1 i85b28-3i) 65; (vi 6) 86n. Politica (11127obi2) 24411.; (vm I339b29) 24411. Topica (iv I22bi5) 14711.; (iv I27a3) 13311. ATHENAEUS ( x 438) 21311. AULUS GELLIUS

Noctes Atticae (xvi 8) 64, 7311., 7611. CHOEROBOSCUS

Prolegomena (Hilgard) (106.3-12) 4411. CHRYSIPPUS

SVF (11.41.27-33)3911. CICERO

Academica posteriora (140ff.) 8211. Academica priora (11 119) 14511.; (11 144) 8211. Defato (8.15-16) 9in. Definibus (114) 226n.; (m 23) 8in.; (m 74) 39n., 72n.; (iv 53) 39n., 72n.; (iv 56) 8on., 8in.; (iv 72) 255n.; (v 22) 225n. De natura deorum (139) I45n.; (143) 226n.; (1 50) I2n.; (1118) I7on.; (1146) I7on.; (1182) i6n.; (11 147) 72n. Tusculanae disputationes (iv 21) 160, 169


274


CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

Stromateis (i 15) 3811.; (114.15) 92, 119; (vn 7) 161, 169; (vm 9) 14811. CLEOMEDES De motu circulari (Ziegler) (8.11-14) 13811.; (14.1-2) 96; (16.2-5) 96; (202.11-23) 14211., 14311. CRATES OF THEBES (Diels) ( F r . i ) 22111.; (Fr.3) 22111. DAVID In PorphyriiIsagogen ( i n . 3 - 1 7 ) 11911. DEMOCRITUS ( D K 68A37) 13911.; ( D K 68A49) 13911.; ( D K 68B156) 13911. DIODORUS SICULUS

(1 8.3) 34 DIOGENES LAERTIUS (1119) 160; (11112) 160; (11114)12811. (11119) 128; (11120)128n.;(iv62) I44n.;(vii2) I28n.;(vii24) 12811.; (vn 40) 7211.; (vn 42) 10911.; (vn 43) 4011.; (vn 44) 4011.; (vn 52-3) 100; (vn 54) 10211., 10911., 234; (VII 57) 4011.; (VII 57-8) 4011.; (vn 58) 4 4 , 6 4 ; (vn 60) 15011.; (vn 61) 42,4411., 105, 108,128,14111.; (vn 62)4011.; (vn 63) 4611., 64; (VII 64) 66, i6on.;(vn65)64,13611., 24411.; (vn 67) 4111.; (VII 68-70) 47; (vn 68-76) 5 7 , 6 7 - 7 1 ; (VII 71) 187; (VII 72) 7211.; (VII 74) 187; (VII 82) 13011.; (VII 100) 8in.; (VII 107) 17611.; (VII 120) 8on.; (vn 132) 96; (VII 135) 97; (vn 140) 13811.; (VII 151-2) 143; (vn 162) 209; (VII 190) 7511.; (VII 198) 13011.; (ix 61) 205, 208, 209; (ix 65) 21311.; (ix 70) 211; (ix 92-3) 198; (1x95) 234; (ix 105) 19711., 206,21311.; (ix 107) 204; (ix 109) 21311., 221; (ix 110-11)212; (ix i n ) 193,203; (ix 111-12)21211.; (ix 113)21511., 21811.; (ix 114) 206; (ix 115) 206; (x 31) 35; (x 31-4) 23411.; (x 33) 22611.; (x 117) 3811. DIOGENES OF OENOANDA

Fr. 10 Chilton 34 DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS

De compositione verborum (2) 4011. De Demosthenis dictione (48) 4011. DIONYSIUS OF THRACE

Ars grammatica (12) 4011., 4411. ELIAS

In Aristotelis Categories (178.1-12) 13in. In Porphyrii Isagogen (47.26-33) 11911. EMPEDOCLES

(17, 27ff.DK) 1 in. EPICTETUS

Discourses (119.8-10) 79; (11 19.iff.) 52n.; (iv 8.12) 39n. EPICURUS

Epistula ad Herodotum (37-8) 226n.; (38) 24m., 242; (39) 1-20; (44) 8n.; (51) 24m.; (53) 8n.; (54) 8n.; (75-6) 21-38 Epistula adPythoclem (86) I5n. Kuriai doxai (24) 242 On Nature (Bk.xxvm) 26 EUSEBIUS

Praeparatioevangelica(xiv6.5)206;(xiv 18.1-5) i9O-2ii;(xiv 18.5-26)2O5n.;(xiv 18.7) I96n.; (xiv 18.10) I96n.; (xiv 18.11) 193; (xiv 18.14) 193; (xiv 18.16) 193,2O5n.; (xiv 18.29) 19011., 193 GALEN

De differentiispulsuum (11 10) 75n.; (in 1) 75n.; (vm 71 iK) 246n. De dignoscendibus pulsibus (1 2) 206 Introductio dialectica (4.10-11) 73, 75n., 86-7, I46n. Deplacitis Hippocratis et Platonis (11 2) 47n.; (iv 6) 83n.; (v 3) 8in. Praenotiones (xiv 628K) 246n. PSEUDO-GALEN

Definitiones medicae (126) iO2n. Historia philosopha (Diels) (603-4) 234» 237n.; (606) 234, 237n.



275

HERODOTUS (1 58) 22211.; (in 53) 22211.; (m 69) 22211.; (m 130) 22211. PSEUDO-HIPPOCRATES

Epistulae (18.1) 215 HOMER

Iliad (in 223) 22in. Odyssey (ix 191) 100; (xix 163) 11911.; (xix 224) 215-16, 219-23 LUCRETIUS De rerum natura (11111) 3311.; (11294-6) i8n.; (11297-302) 1211.; (11303-7) 9,10-11,18; (11342ff.) 3311.; (m 816-8) 9, 18; (iv 365-86) 36; (v 181-6) 3211.; (v 361-3) 9, 18; (v 828-9) 1211.; (v 1030-2) 35; (v 1046-9) 3211.; (v 1050-5) 3 in.; (v 1057-8) 27n.; (v 1087-90) 34; (v 1252-68) 3m.; (v 1341-6) i2n.; (v 1456) 24n. MARCUS AURELIUS (in 1) 8on.; (vi 26) 8on. ORIGEN In Psalmos (iO53a-b) 162, 169 PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA De aeternitate mundi (48) 54m De agricultura (139-41) 1 o6n. De congressu (146-50) 4On. Legum allegoriae (m 175) io6n. PHILODEMUS

Depietate (11) I45n. PHILOPONUS

De aeternitate mundi (278.28) 20m.; (439.14) 20m. PLATO

Charmides (169A) 20 m. Cratylus (338B) 27n. Euthydemus (274A) 79n. Gorgias (447c) 79n. Laches (\%6c) 79x1. Meno (8OE) 226n. Phaedrus (237B) 226n. Protagoras (319A) 79n. Sophist (237D) 118, I46n.; (245E-249D) 118; (246A-B) 92, 119-21; (246c) 120-1; (246D) 120; (247A) 120, I 2 3 ; ( 2 4 7 B ) 120; (247c) 119n., I2on., i2i;(247D) 121, i47n.;(247E) I22n., I47n.; (248A) 121-2; (248c) 121-2; (248D-E) I22n.; (249B-C) 122; (254A-B) I47n.; (259E) 78n. Symposium (204E) 159; (206A) 159, 168 Theaetetus (147c) I33n.; (202B) 78n. Timaeus (27D) 117; (59E) I33n.; (67B) 133 PLOTINUS (v 1.7) 20m.; (vi 1.25) I46n., I47n.; (vi 2.1) 117; (vi 3.7) 225n.; (vi 7.16) 20m. PLUTARCH Adversus Colotem (1112E) I5n.; (1114A) 1 in.; (1 I6B-C) 92n., 116 De animae procreatione (IOI8B) 20m. De communibus notitiis (1059B) iO2n.; (1073D) 98n.; (1077c) 55n.; (1078E) 78n.; (IO8OE) 97; (1083B-C) 54n.; (1083C-E) 55n.; (1084c) I42n.; (1084F) iO2n.; (1085A) iO2n. De Stoicorum repugnantiis (1055F-7B) 167, 169 De virtute morali (450c) 83n. PSEUDO-PLUTARCH

Stromateis (8) I2n. PROCLUS

In Euclidem (89.15-18) 96; (395.21-31) 130-1 In Platonis Cratylum (16) 38n. In Platonis Timaeum (1 224.i7ff.) n8n.; (1 227.13-17) n8n.; (m 95.7-12) 96, H9n., 14m.


276


SCHOLIA IN ARISTOTELIS CATEGORIAS (Brandis) (34B8-11) io6n. SCHOLIA IN DIONYSIUM THRACEM (Hilgard) (215.1) 4511.; (230.24) 4211.; (356.i6ff.) 4111.; (357-i8) 4511.; (482.5) 13311. SCHOLIA IN PHILOPONI COMMENTARIA IN ARISTOTELIS CATEGORIAS (72) I3II1. . SENECA Epistulae adLucilium (58) 105, 110-15; (58.8-16) 110-11; (58.12) 10711.(58.13-15) 111; (58.14) n o ; (58.15)98, n o , 112-13; (58.22) 112-13; (65) n o n . ; (71.16) 8on.; (95.5) 8on.; (95.12) 8 o n . ; ( i 17.12) 161, 169 De ira (1 8) 84.

Quaestiones naturales (1 13) 17011. SEXTUS EMPIRICUS Adversus mathematicos (Af) (1 17) 9211.; (1 53) 193, 212; (1 57) 22611.; (1 65) 249; (1 90) 249; (1 170-220) 86n.; (1227-47)86n.; 0 2 8 2 ) 203; (1287) 248; (1305-6) 21411.; (m 2) 206; (11140) 100; (in 42) 100; (vn 1) 22511.; (vn 1-2) 22911.; (vn 16) 7211.; (VH 24-5) 229; (vn 25) 2 2 9 , 2 3 2 , 2 3 3 , 273-8, 240, 24211.; (VII 26) 230; (vn 27-8) 232; (vn 27-446) 231; (VH 28) 2 3 i n . ; (vn 29-37) 229,23211., 233; (VII 30) 206; (VII 31) 23711.; (VII 33) 237-8,24011., 241,242; (vn 34-7) 237-8; (vn 35) 236; (vn 38) 8 i n . ; (vn 43-4) 167m, 169; (VII 46) 232; (VII 46-7) 229n.; (vn 46-262) 232,232n.; (VII 47) 232,239; (VII 50) 239; (vn 51) 239; (vn 52) 239; (vn 89-140) 239; (vn 140) 226n., 234n., 239n.; (VII 154) 165; (VII 171) 225n.; (VII 191-4) 254n.; (VII 261) 232, 233, 234; (VII 261-2) 232; (vn 263) 248; (VII 263-342) 235n.; (VII 263-446) 232n.; (VII 283) 248,249; (VII 343-69) 235n.; (vn 364-8) 240; (vn 367) 248; (VII 370-446) 235n.; (VII 416-21) 242n.; (vn 443) 229n.; (vm 1-140) 231; ( v m 3) 249; ( v m 11-12) 4 5 - 6 , 2 0 m . ; ( v m 21) 239; (vm 26) 239; (vm 32) 107-8; (vm 40) 232; (vm 56ff.) 100; (vm 59-60) 100-1; (vm 70) i35n.; (vm 79) 58; (vm 90) 62; (vm 93-129) 5 7 - 7 1 ; (vm 94) 58; (vm 95) 59; (vm 96-8) 4 7 , 6 0 ; (vm 98) 62; (vm 99) 50, 62; (vm 108) 75n., I46n.; (vm 125-6) I46n.; (vm 125-9) 73~7; ( v m I 2 6 ) 76n., 86n.; (vm 127) 86n.; (vm 129) 85n., 86n.; (vm 140) 231,238n.; (vm 141) 230; (vm 141-299) 231; (vm 142) 232,238n.; ( v m I45ff.) 243; (vm 258) 115n.; (vm 262) 115n.; (vm 300-36) 226; (vm 300-481) 231; (vm 336-7) 226; (vm 337) i7on; (vm 332A-3A) 226; (vm 334A) 228n.; (vm 334A-6A) 227; (vm 379) 239; (vm 406-10) 124-5; (vm 409) 158-9,168; (vm 438) 248; (ix 49) 249; (ix 123) I76n.; (ix 124) I79n.; (ix 133-6) 1 7 m . , 172-89; (ix 182-4) I44n.; (ix 333) I5n.; (ix 336) 98; (ix 343) 155; (ix 393-5) 100-1; (ix 439) 247; (x 33) 249; (x 45-9) 249n.; (x 49) 247, 249; (x 168) 247; (x 218) 92n., 1 0 7 , 1 4 m . ; (x 234) 92n., 107,146n.; (x 252) 239; (xi 8) 63; (xi 18—19) 254; (xi 20) 2 i 3 n . , 222n.; (xi 21) 226n.; (xi 165) 247, 249; (xi 215) 248; (xi 224) 107; (xi 239) 239 Pyrrhoniae hypotyposeis (PH) (11-4) 244n.; (13) 224; (14) 255; (15) 258; (15-6) 229n.; (18) 204; (1 13) 246, 253; (115) 255; (116) 241; (1 19) 256; (119-20) 2 4 m . , 254n.; (1 20) 244-7, 252-8; (1 23-4) 236; (1 59) 253; (1 78) 253; (1 87) 253; (1 93) 247n.; (1 135) 2 4 m . , 254; (1 187) 255; (1 188-9) 246; (1191) 2 4 m . , 254; (1192) 2 4 m . , 254; (1194-5) 254; (1195) 2 4 m . ; (1197) 241,255; (1 198) 2 4 m . , 254; (1 199) 2 4 m . ; (1 200) 255; (1 201) 255; (1 202) 2 4 m . ; (1 203) 255; (1 207) 2 4 m . , 254; (1210) 241; (1210-41) 225; (1215) 250; (1226) 224,257n.; (1227) 244,251,252n.; (1235) 248; (111) 229n.; (114) 24on.; (1110) 228; (1112-13) 229n.; (1113-14) 231; (1114-16) 233; (1114-17) 229; (1114-79) 23 m . ; (1115) 237n., 238; (1116) 236; (1122) 247, 248, 249; (1122-47) 235n.; (11 23) 248, 249; (11 26) 249; (11 29) 248; (1148-69) 235n.; (11 70-9) 235n.; (11 80) 247, 249n.; (1180-96) 23 m . ; (1186) 107; (1195) 249; (1195-6) 231,238n., 24On., 247; (1196) 232; (11 97-133) 2 3 m . , 243; (11104)64,249; (11118)249; (11134-203) 23 m . ; (11139)73n.;(n 156)248; (11166) 248; (11203) 248; (11211) 248; (11215) 248; (11223) 107; (11234) 73n.; (m 13) 247,249; (in 29) 247,249; (in 38) 249; (m 46) 249,25 m . ; (in 47-8) 251; (in 48) 244,246; (m 49) 251; (in 56) 249; (m 62) 249; (HI 65) 247, 249; (m 72) 244, 251; (in 82) 239; (in 99) 155; (HI 135) 239, 247,249; (m 136) 249; (in 186) 249; (m 193) 248; (m 241) 249; (m 253) 249n.; (m 266) 239; (in 272) 239; (in 277) 248 SIMPLICIUS In Aristotelis Categorias (64.18) 87n.; (105.7-20) 97n., 130-1; (135.25-8) I37n.; (208.28) I26n.; (209.1) I47n., 155; (209.10-29) 150-1, 154; (2i2.i2ff.) 148; (216.19-24) 154-5; (214.24-215.2) 152-3; (217.32) 14711.; (222.30-223.2) 153; ( 3 3 3 - 3 0 In Aristotelis De caelo (284.28) I38n.; (285.28) I38n., I42n.; (563.7) 2 0 m . In Aristotelis Physica (426.1) 133



277

STOBAEUS (Wachsmuth) Eclogaei} 105.17) I37n.;(i 106.5) 13711., I42n.;(i 161.8) 13711., I42n.;(i 136.21)4411., ioin., 127; (1 138.14) 12311.; (1 142.2-6) 97, 13611.; (1 219.24) 14311.; (11 7) 8on.; (11 74.16) 8in., 82; (11 76.16-21) 163,169; (1177.23-7) 162,169; (1178.7-12) 163,164,168; (1188.1-6) 158,161,163, 165-6, 168; (11 89.4) 8311.; (11 93.14) 8on.; (1197.15-98.6) 161, 163, 164, 168. STOICORUM VETERUM FRAGMENTA (Von Amim) (165) 11311.; (174) 133; (189) 12311., 13511., i63n.;(i93) 145; (194) 139; (195) 138,139; (196) 139; (1 137) 12311.; (1142) 12311.; (1488) 16311.; (1518) 12311.; (11183-4) 16311.; (11341) 13511., 16311.; (11 343) 133; (11345) 133; (11349) 16311.; (11359)92,119; (11385) 159; (11390) 14911.; (11467) 12311.; (11482A) i35;(n5O3) I38;(H5O9) 13611., I45;(ii5io) 141,145;(11522-4)98^9;(11537) 138;(11 541) 138; (11 543) 13811., 139; (11 546) 139; (11 550) 138; (11 557) 138; (11 609) 138; (11 773-4) 12311.; (11790-2) 12311.; (11797) 12311.; (11807) 12311.; (11848) 12311., 159; (m 84-5) 12311.; (m

305)i23n.;(mDiog. 17)133 SYRIANUS

In Aristotelis Metaphysica (105.19-30) 126-7 TIMON (Diels) Indalmoi{¥x.6"i) 203,208,213,214,215,21611., 220; (Fr.68) 203,208,214,215,217,222; (Fr.69) 206, 214, 2i6n., 218; (Fr.70) 21611. Silloi (Fr.8) 22111.; (Fr.9) 22m.; (Fr.31-4) 206; (Fr.38) 22111.; (Fr.46) 22011.; (Fr.48); 203 XENOPHANES (DK2iB34)239


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