One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century

ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF SOCIAUSM THE WEST EUROPEAN LEFT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY DONALD SASSOON iH'SQII;'U Donald Sassoo...

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ONE HUNDRED

YEARS OF SOCIAUSM THE WEST EUROPEAN LEFT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY DONALD SASSOON iH'SQII;'U

Donald Sassoon was bor n in Cairo and educated in P aris, Milan and London. He is Professor of Comparative European History at Queen Mary, University of London and is the author of several highly acclaimed books, including Contemporary Italy: Politics, Economy and Society Since 1945, Mona Lisa: The Histor y of the World’s Most Famous Painting, The Culture of the Europeans and Mussolini and the Rise of Fascism. ‘A remarkable new w ork of historical analysis, which will soon establish itself as a classic’ Eric Hobsbawm, Guardian ‘remarkable … A massive and original synthesis which deserves to become a classic, there is nothing comparable to it in the English language’ David Marquand ‘[An] extraordinar y ac hievement … this book is a small masterpiece’ Sir Bernard Crick ‘Admirable ... a compelling guide to the recent histor y of Social Democratic parties’ Tony Judt, TLS ‘the author has scaled a mountain of scholarship and retur ned with an indispensable work of reference and reflection’ Norman Birnbaum, Political Quarterly ‘A majestic w ork. Nothing lik e this g reat sur vey exists in any language … an unfailing pleasure to read’ The Economist

Revised edition published in 2010 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com Distributed in the United States and Canada Exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 First published in 1996 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, reprinted 2002 Copyright © 1996, 2002, 2010 Donald Sassoon The right of Donald Sassoon to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. ISBN 978 1 84885 297 6 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress catalog card: available Printed and bound in India by Thomson Press India Ltd

Preface to the New Edition

THE FIRST EDITION of One Hundred Years of Socialism mapped out the history

of West European socialist parties in the century that followed the creation of the Second International in 1889. New archival work, the endless stream of memoirs, and the constant outpouring of interpretative books have not modified the basic story outlining the vicissitudes of West European socialist and communist parties. What has considerably changed, however, is our perception of the future of socialism. In 1996 few questioned the view that communism was dead, but many could reasonably expect that socialism, in the sense of modern social democracy, had still a lease of life. But the tasks of the two movements were quite different. The two forms of socialism – social democracy and communism – which have characterized the twentieth century were never quite comparable in terms of the tasks they had effectively set for themselves. They may have started with the same aim: the overcoming of capitalism, but they soon acquired other objectives and inevitably so since ideologies are shaped by the societies within which they operate and the relationship they have to political and economic power. Social democrats ruled only when capitalism was well-established and democracy had become the common property of the main political parties. Communists had to develop an industrial society; social democrats had to manage it. Communists prevailed in less developed societies, social democrats in developed market economies. Once it was accepted that the goal of the social democracy was the reform of capitalism and not its supersession, it could be assumed that no momentous event could deal social democracy the kind of fatal blow that history had dealt the communist movement. No one can be sure that a distinct brand of European social democracy will survive in the future except perhaps as isolated local forms in a handful of small European countries. Generic progressive politics will, of course, continue to inspire a significant proportion of Europeans and, indeed, of people throughout the world. They will advocate human and civil rights; promote legislation supporting claims made by those who have been and still are being discriminated against; and seek to widen access to education, culture, and health. One does not need to be committed to a socialist or even a social-democratic agenda to hold such views. Progressive liberals, ‘social’ Christians and even ‘compassionate’ conservatives can do so just as well. Socialists too were inspired by the principles of individual rights that originated with the Enlightenment. Though they wanted to challenge the power of capitalism, as they emerged as

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an organized political movement in the late nineteenth century they advocated an extension of democracy that was based on the idea of individual rights rather than class principles. Universal suffrage, which they advocated with passion, assumes that all individuals have exactly the same worth when voting: each, literally, counts as one. In the domain of politics, socialists, far from being class conscious, were staunch individualists. Those who, at the turn of the century, upheld a class conception of democracy were the liberals and the conservatives who defended an electoral system that allocated votes in terms of the wealth possessed or earned by each individual and who opposed the enfranchisement of women. Though socialists often did not fight for female suffrage with great vigour, they all stood firmly on the side of real universal suffrage. One could almost say that one of the great achievements of socialists was to have forced liberals and conservatives onto the path of liberalism and civil and human rights while advocating first the destruction of capitalism and then its reform. Liberals and conservatives, of course, can claim with equal vigour that they succeeded in imposing on socialists the realism of accepting market relations and the abandonment of the utopianism of the classless society. So, the socialists set about reforming capitalism – an apparently modest task when contrasted with the final goal of abolishing it. Nevertheless, reforming capitalism is exceedingly complicated. The problem lies in conceptualizing what ‘reforming capitalism’ means. The system, it is widely acknowledged – and by Marx and Engels in the first place – is one that, unlike its predecessors, has change and dynamism at its very foundation. As they explained in one of the famous passages of The Communist Manifesto, change is in the nature of the beast, it reforms itself continuously: The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real condition of life and his relations with his kind.

The dilemma of social democracy, as explained throughout this book, is that traditional social democratic reforms, such as the welfare state and redistribution of wealth, tend to strengthen capitalism by providing it with both social peace and a wider market for consumer goods. In turn, social welfare and redistribution also require a strong capitalism. Reforms that aim to regulate capitalism itself, such as setting a ceiling to the length of the working day, the regulation of pay by establishing a minimum wage, and basic labour rights such

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as maternity and paternity leave create winners and losers among capitalist firms since some, because of their size, or their position in the market or their efficiency, will benefit from the discomfiture of those that are less lucky or less efficient or too small. In some circumstances large firms are better able to cope with such reforms than small ones, but this is not a universal law: flexibility may enable some small firms to be more effective at times of rapid technological change. Social democrats, inevitably, always face the issue of which aspects of their own ‘national’ capitalism will be strengthened by their reforms. Virtually anything can unleash ‘spontaneous’ reforms – a change in the weather, taste and fashion, and above all the changes generated by capitalism itself, such as technological development and migration from the rural to industrial sector. Reforming social democrats can also use (and have traditionally used) two powerful instruments. The first was the action of their own supporters, usually organized in trade unions making demands on capitalists. The second, which became important as social democrats grew in numbers and were able to capture government, was the state and the laws it enacted. This was the basis for the Left’s acceptance of the State - not just the state as a concept, but the state as a machine, as a coercive apparatus. Such acceptance came late in the twentieth century because social democrats before 1945 were seldom in control of the government machine. In the years before the First World War, they had assumed that they would be able to force the bourgeois state to implement many of the reforms of the socialist programme. In principle, they were not wrong. Without the state there could not have been the socialization of some of the cost of reproduction of the working class (the welfare state) and a regulation of the working day. Powerful trade unions, without a political party, could have struggled alone and negotiated with employers over the length of the working day, the conditions of work or holiday pay. They could have acted as a pressure group and wrested concessions from governing political parties (prior to the Second World War, this was the British experience and the prevailing pattern in the USA). Having correctly identified the state as the principal regulator of the capitalist economy, socialists sought, successfully, to democratize it and use it. As long as the state held the position of chief regulator, social democratic strategy retained its full coherence. As various aspects of capitalism (especially its financial organization) developed in a global direction with increasing force from the 1980s onward, this state-oriented strategy began to falter. Social democrats in the West remained wedded to a national conception of politics and reinforced it constantly, ring-fencing their achievements (welfare, education, civil rights) within the territorial boundaries of the state, while capitalism set out to stride the globe. The crumbling of communism, some had hoped, might have led to a strengthening of social democracy – despite the unfounded but widespread view that it would negatively affect social democracy, which, it was said, had been tarred by its ideological association with communism. In fact, as I point out

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below, social democratic parties were strongest in the decade following the collapse of communism, a movement they had disparaged anyway well before the official demise of the USSR. The end of the USSR did, of course, affect Western communist parties deeply. The Italian Communist Party, the strongest in the West, changed its name and continued its long-standing evolution towards social democracy, an evolution punctuated by repeated changes of name, each underlining its growing distance from its roots – first as the Democratic Party of the Left (still bearing some of the symbols of its past such as the hammer and sickle), then ‘Left Democrats’ before expunging even the generic ‘Left’ to become, with unchanging prospects, il Partito democratico tout court. At least the Italian communists survived, though as a shadow of their former selves, while the Italian Socialist Party, which the corruption scandals of 1991–92 had fatally undermined, simply disappeared. The other Western communist parties were annihilated. Even here, however, one should not over estimate the impact of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. A year before the fall, at the 1988 French presidential elections, the French Communist candidate André Lajoinie obtained a miserable 6.7 per cent (in 1969 Jacques Duclos had managed a respectable 21 per cent). Worse was to follow when Robert Hue reached 3.4 per cent in 2002 and Marie-George Buffet gathered only a miserable 1.94 per cent in 2007. Even the Trotskyites did better. The French Communist Party had become a groupuscule. But its disappearance was due more to the emergence of a socialist party strong enough to rally all those who wanted to defeat the right than to events in Moscow. When the fortunes of the Parti socialiste started deteriorating after Lionel Jospin’s astounding defeat in the presidential elections of 2002, communism passed the stage of possible resuscitation. The communist story was equally dismal elsewhere. The Portuguese Communist Party, which obtained 18.9 per cent of the vote in 1979 declined throughout the 1980s, ending up with only 7.6 per cent in 2005. The fall of the communists was even more abrupt in Spain. Under the banner of Izquierda Unita it still managed to win 11 per cent of the vote in 1996, but by 2008 this had crumbled to 3.8 per cent. After 1989, social democracy was the only form of socialism left in Europe, including eastern and central Europe where the former communist parties were reborn as social-democratic parties. These were determined to defend and extend one of the positive features of communist rule, namely the welfare state and the protection of workers, protection all the more necessary since promarket forces had been unleashed and enjoyed wide local and international support. The prospects of this revitalized left with a foot in the (communist) past were good. In the first free elections after 1989 the post-communist parties were the strongest parties of the left everywhere except in the Czech Republic – where the communist party had not changed its name. The others had rechristened themselves as social democrats or some similar appellation, thus

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explicitly recognizing the failure of a movement that had sharply demarcated itself from the labour movement in the West. Lenin’s embalmed remains were still exhibited before tourists in Moscow, but Leninism was now truly dead. Social democracy lived on, even in the countries of the former Soviet bloc. In Hungary the socialist party (the post-communist party) has remained the leading left party and was able to obtain over 42 per cent of the vote in the 2008 election (it had only 33 per cent in 1994) and was in coalition with the liberals. In Bulgaria the socialist party (as part of a wider electoral bloc) obtained 34 per cent in 2005 and also returned to government in coalition with other parties. In Poland a coalition of left parties led by the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej or SLD) clearly won the 2001 elections, although it equally clearly lost the subsequent two elections. In the former communist world it has proved almost impossible to preserve a strong public sector, or contain the growth in inequalities, or enhance or even maintain the pre-existing welfare state. The fault was not (entirely) of the new social democratic parties: as I said before, a weak and barely established market economy is not the best platform for the development or preservation of social democracy. This is the setting for the present predicament of social democracy. Can social democratic reformism still be a force in Europe? The parties, of course, are still there, but has the impetus for social democratic policies exhausted itself over these last ten or twenty years? Is there any comfort for those who still regard themselves as social democrats? I write these words at a time of deep crisis for social democracy. At the end of the 1990s there seemed to be no crisis at all. The British Labour Party, led by Tony Blair, had been returned to power in 1997 after 18 years of conservative rule. In the same year in France the Parti socialiste won the legislative election and Lionel Jospin became prime minister. In 1996 Romano Prodi, at the head of a coalition of parties which included the former communists, formed the first ‘left’ government in post-war Italian history, defeating Silvio Berlusconi. In Germany, in 1998, Gerhard Schröder, leader of the Social Democratic Party, became Chancellor of Germany. Thus, for the first time ever, not only parties of the left led the four largest states in western Europe; but they also ruled (alone or in coalition) most of the countries of the European Union, including Sweden, Holland, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Portugal and Greece. Had European social democratic parties succeeded in exploiting that unique conjuncture to develop their policies at the European level, establishing, for instance, a social security net binding the whole of the European Union, or a redistributive fiscal policy across the EU, or a tight system of labour regulations enforceable throughout Europe, one would be able to write, with some degree of confidence, that social democracy, though unable to expand seriously in the rest of the world, had managed to survive and even thrive in its European redoubt. This, however, was far from being the case. How difficult it was for social

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democracy to abandon the integument of the nation-state was abundantly noted in the first edition of this book. The last ten to fifteen years seem to have confirmed this. By and large the European Union has remained a loose confederation of states with different capitalisms. As the twentieth century faded away the 15 countries of the EU still had markedly different fiscal policies, different industrial relations systems and different welfare states. In the first few years of the new millennium 12 more states entered the union, most of them poorer than the poorest of the old 15, with an ill-equipped industrial structure and a poorly-regulated capitalism. The ease with which the European Union was enlarged was widely celebrated even though the chief reason why expansion was so simple was because integration had been so perfunctory. Much of what the European Union had achieved was the removal of barriers to competition to facilitate the free movement of goods, capital and people. There was no European political or social dimension – just a group of states negotiating. There was never serious Europe-wide cooperation between socialist parties. The Party of European Socialists (PES) may comprise more than 30 social-democratic parties, but it is not a party in any of the accepted senses of the word since it does not even contest the elections for the European parliament (which are always contested by national parties and never by a European party). The European Confederation of Trade Unions is a pressure group that issues declarations and negotiates agreements; it is not a force with which employers or governments have to reckon. They have no authority over national unions and cannot call workers out on strike. They are restricted in what they do by the limitation the member-states have imposed on supra-nationalism. And everything must be subject to the goal of unrestricted competition under the guise of harmonization. Socialist parties, when in power, end up having to do what European governments are expected to do – to ensure that their own ‘national’ capitalism (namely firms operating within its borders and/or employing considerable numbers of its own people) remains strong and competitive. This is why, addressing the financial community at Mansion House on 20 June 2007, just as the cataclysmic forces of the credit crunch were about to be unleashed, Gordon Brown, then still Chancellor of the Exchequer, congratulated the City of London for their remarkable achievements, ‘an era that history will record as the beginning of a new golden age for the City of London’. He praised in particular the country’s and, by implication, his government’s openness to the world and global reach, ‘pioneers of free trade and its leading defenders’, ‘with a deep and abiding belief in open markets’ and happy that London had seen off the competition from Tokyo and New York. Politics, in fact, has remained overwhelmingly ‘national’ in character and the parties of the left, like those of the right, have continued to respond to a national electorate. The weight of their own and of their countries’ traditions inevitably constrained them. They react to the persisting differences in the levels of development and structural characteristics of their respective economies. The

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European economies are far from converging. The size of the working class may have been shrinking everywhere, but the rate of deindustrialization is highly uneven: it is far higher in Sweden and in the UK than in Germany or Austria; Greece is more inflation prone than Germany; unemployment in Spain is far higher than everywhere else; inward and outward investment prevails in Britain as does resistance to taxation. Opposition to cuts in welfare spending is more significant in France and Germany (where, however, it takes different forms) than in Britain. Social indicators suggest other differences: a higher rate of divorce and family break-ups in Britain; lower demographic growth in Italy, Greece and Spain; lower female participation in the labour force in Holland; and more part-time female work (and concentrated among the less skilled) in Britain than in France. Ecology plays a far more important role in politics in Germany and Sweden than in France or Spain. Feminism is stronger in Western than in Eastern Europe. The last 20 years witnessed the extraordinary ideological success of the proponents of the liberalization of market forces and the effective termination of the main European model of capitalist regulation, ‘national-Keynesianism’ – a termination that many came to deplore (too late) after the upheaval caused by the credit crunch of 2007–08 and the subsequent global downturn. ‘NationalKeynesianism’ assumed that national economic policy could be relatively effective in determining major economic variables such as the balance of payments, interest rates, prices, growth and employment. Irrespective of separate national traditions, economic particularities, contrasting social structures and cultural differences, the nations of the world were being enjoined to deregulate labour markets, to lower or eliminate tariffs, to privatize state property, to eliminate subsidies and, in general, to let market forces operate with as few impediments as possible. An international communication system, largely originating in the West but global in its reach, enveloped the entire planet. Consumption patterns were rapidly internationalized: similar fast food outlets, items of fashion and television programmes became available in New Delhi, Tokyo, Rome, Paris, Moscow and Cairo. The spectacular development of the internet further shortened distances and facilitated communications. A ‘grand narrative’ of global proportion, unequalled in earlier times, established itself. It told a story of progress that was sharply different from that told by the Left. The Left narrative was one in which socialism was the natural successor to the Enlightenment. A rational system of distributing resources and organizing the economy would complete the work of democracy. Against this project, so argued those on the Left, were ranked the forces of obscurantism and reaction, those who wished to protect ancient privileges under new (capitalist) guises. But the new grand neo-liberal narrative told a different story. According to this, the world market was opening up an unprecedented era of individual freedom. The state, by imposing rules and regulation, was holding back such development. By taxing people it taxed enterprise, innovation and individual effort. Socialism, in whatever form, had been defeated and deservedly so since

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it was and is, so they allege, illiberal, statist, dogmatic, rewards inefficiency and penalizes initiative. Socialism, continued the neo-liberal narrative, has remained anchored to a nation-state whose only useful tasks are now not much more than maintaining law and order and defending the national territory. There could be no global challenge to global market forces – only resurgent forms of nationalism or the rise of different varieties of religious fundamentalism – paltry local reactions rather than international countervailing forces able to challenge the Onward March of Capital. It is, of course, far too early to establish whether the so-called credit crunch of 2007–08 and the ensuing global economic crisis can lead to a revival of the fortunes of social democratic parties and the abandonment of neo-liberalism. The fact is that in the ten years following the peak of social-democratic electoral and political gains there have been no major strides towards either strengthening welfare states or redistribution, even in the economically strongest states. Today the signs are ominous and disheartening for social democrats. This may be surprising since it was widely assumed that the neo-liberal apologists of deregulation would have been the ideological losers from the collapse of banks and insurance companies and the unpopularity of incompetent bankers in receipt of absurdly large bonuses. The wave of nationalization and state intervention that followed the credit crunch of 2007–08 certainly humiliated the neo-liberals when, as Stephen Foley pointed out in The Independent of 15 October 2008, startling and unexpected events unfolded, such as the transformation of the US government under George W. Bush into the largest shareholder in the American banking system. The humiliation for those who had once been celebrated as the Masters of the Universe was compounded when their unjustified greed was revealed – spectacularly so in the case of Richard (Dick) Fuld, the Lehman Brothers’ chief executive, who admitted receiving from his company $350 million in bonuses (and not $500 million as he had been accused) between 1993 and 2007 – which works out at well over $10,000 per working hour (the US federal minimum wage was, in July 2009, $7.25). Yet, his main achievement appears to have been that of driving Lehman Brothers to the largest corporate bankruptcy in recorded history. According to a report by Jonathan D. Glater and Gretchen Morgenson in the New York Times of 15 September 2008, an institution with assets of $639 billion – more than the gross domestic product of Argentina – was not worth anything at all by the second half of 2008. In the USA the beneficiary of the crumbling of the neo-liberal state may well have been the election of the most ‘left-wing’ president since Roosevelt (though hardly a socialist as some of his opponents, such as the Republican leader in the House of Representative John Boehner claimed in March 2008). In Europe, however, the anxieties, so far, have been directed elsewhere, namely towards strengthening the already substantial vote for the parties of the xenophobic right. The left performed increasingly dismally and, by the end of 2009, there will hardly be any socialist governments left in Europe – a remarkable change since 1999.

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The global downturn, which so many have compared with the Great Crash of 1929, far from representing a springboard for a revival of socialism has confirmed the triumph of capitalism. A social order can be said to be truly ensconced not when everyone celebrates its beneficial effects, its sturdiness and strength, but when everyone rallies to its defence when it falters. The central preoccupation of political forces everywhere was, in fact, how to save the system. From Beijing to Washington through to London, Paris and Berlin left and right were united by the understanding that the system had to be saved. Few on the Left envisaged that a credible alternative to capitalism could be erected after its failure, whereas the neo-liberal right, a little humbled, simply kept a low profile ready to fight another day. The only threat to global capitalism came from its biggest supporters, the advocates of global deregulation, not from social democrats. Social democrats had never tried to rock the boat when it leaked but had done their best to find ways of keeping it afloat. They knew that their past and future successes were closely connected not only to their vision or their ability to obtain popular support but also to a multiplicity of factors, including the wealth of the economy and the prevailing political ethos and relative strength of capital and labour. For instance, in the nineteenth century, though social democrats did not yet exist, the British working class was large and well organized with, by the standards of the time, a long history of struggles and militancy. No established party could ignore the workers. The religious fragmentation of the country, especially of the working class, helped prevent the formation of a religious party along the lines of continental Christian democracy. The result was that, in the second half of the nineteenth century, Liberals and Conservatives competed with each other for the support of the labouring classes and incorporated in their own programme aspects of a social democratic platform before that could find an outlet as an organized political party. This helped delay the formation and growth of a large British socialist party along the lines of the German Social Democratic Party. On the continent, a similar process of co-option was under way: nation-building required the incorporation of demands emerging from the lower classes and took the form of what was called in Germany a form of ‘state socialism’ - built by Bismarck and supported by the socialist leader Ferdinand Lassalle. Liberal, conservative and nationalist parties were at the forefront of this movement. Church-based parties eventually joined them, particularly when the Roman Catholic Church, with the publication in 1891 of Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum novarum, abandoned its intransigent defence of the ancient regime and adopted a new position towards what it called the ‘social question’. It followed that it was no longer possible, if it ever was, to establish a clear and permanent distinction between socialists and non-socialists in terms of practical policies. The extension of democracy, the institution of the welfare state, the control of the working day were socialist aims and policies, but one can always find, at any moment, similar demands advanced and implemented by non-socialist parties, be they right, centre, conservatives, liberal, Christian

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or nationalist. From the outset, ‘socialism’ was not the prerogative of socialists. It is true that socialists were forced, in their everyday practice, to trim their demands and accept compromises, but so were the conservatives and liberals. The extension of democracy and the advance of mass society meant that no political party could hope to obtain sufficient support either by defending the status quo in toto (the essential conservative position) or by proposing to return to the status quo ante (the essential reactionary position). Reformism triumphed. It was adopted by the most varied forces: in Germany by Bismarck and later the Wilhelmine nationalists as well as the ‘social’ Christians of the Zentrum party; in Italy by the majority wing of the Liberal Party (Giovanni Giolitti) and the emerging forces of political Catholicism; in France by the Radicals of the Third Republic; in Britain by both Disraeli’s and Salisbury’s conservatives as well as Joseph Chamberlain, Gladstone, the New Liberals, Asquith and Lloyd George; in Austria by the anti-Semitic Social Christians of Karl Lüger and in Holland by the new confessional parties in alliance with the more enlightened Liberals. The success of reformist socialism, like the success of all political ideologies, lay in the fact that it did not have a monopoly on what it stood for. In politics, success consists of ensuring that what one thinks of as normal, desirable or possible becomes the shared attitude, the common property of the entire polity. To achieve this, however, it is necessary to formulate demands that are detachable from the ideological package (the symbols and language) that accompanies it. This can only be realized when the connection between ideological values and practical policies is vague and loose, and thus ready to be endlessly renegotiated. It is precisely because it is perfectly possible to be in favour of adequate pensions without signing up to the end goal of socialism that liberals and conservatives can fight for adequate pensions. Consistency and coherence may enable small political sects to survive indefinitely, but they spell certain ruin for parties and movements with real hegemonic ambitions. The commitment of socialists to the state grew as these aims became more significant and as the final aim of a post-capitalist state receded ever more into the future. Universal suffrage made the state more receptive to demands that the socialists made on behalf of all citizens. It also made it more legitimate and hence more powerful. It enabled socialists to achieve political power by ‘capturing the state machine’. This facilitated the implementation of the rest of their reform programme – the regulation of the working day and the socialization of some of the cost of production and reproduction. This transformed industrial society. It is thus hardly surprising that, as socialists proved successful in reforming their capitalist societies, they were reluctant to let go of the existing regulatory institutions – a large public sector, a powerful central bank, a mechanism of exchange control, a complex system of subsidies and regional policies, and an intricate mechanism for the control of the labour market. This regulatory aspect

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became the centre of all socialist policies towards capitalism and further reduced the importance of the older goal of abolishing capitalism. The prosperity associated with capitalist growth, the establishment of full employment, the protective apparatus of the welfare state, the patent incapacity of communist states to develop a consumer society comparable to those in the West, had almost eliminated the deep-seated antagonism to capitalism that had existed previously. Other political parties, such as those committed to Christian and conservative values, which in the past had not been major proponents of capitalism, discovered its virtues too. Thus, gradually but constantly, at varying speeds depending on differing political conjunctures and, above all, on electoral vicissitudes, the parties of the left dropped all their radical anti-capitalist symbols. This process, generally referred to as revisionism, accelerated in the late 1950s with the German SPD Bad Godesberg Congress culminating with Tony Blair’s New Labour in 1997. By then free untrammelled market capitalism had established itself as a major ideological strand in European politics to an extent unparalleled in the past when, especially in Catholic Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Austria and southern Germany), the leading non-socialist ideologies had always had a traditionalist form (Christian democracy), a national-popular one (Gaullism), or an authoritarian-populist one (fascism). Even in protestant Nordic countries, where the agrarian parties actively cooperated in the establishment of social-democratic hegemony, neo-liberalism acquired a significant position. In Britain - the original home of laissez-faire ideology - free market liberalism gained a dominant position during the 1980s. The global downturn that followed the credit crunch of 2007–08 has been greeted as a fundamental defeat for neo-liberalism, but it is unlikely that this defeat will be more than temporary unless supra-national forms of regulation can be established, which is a somewhat remote prospect given that the world is still a world of nation-states and no world power is strong enough to impose its will. The difficulty facing those who still call themselves socialist is that, while they need capitalism and the economic growth and prosperity it can generate, capitalism does not need them. Capitalist societies can be organized in an economically sustainable way by offering only minimal protection to some marginal groups (the USA) or by devolving welfare activities to organizations of civil society such as large firms, families and social groups (Japan). Moreover, socialist leaders and followers are increasingly reluctant to identify with the term socialism. No ideology can survive for long if its followers are embarrassed to identify themselves with it. The task of defending what I and others have called the ‘European social model’ – an appellation that serves a purpose even though each European states has its own ‘model’ – is all that remains of the social democratic agenda. How far this largely defensive action can go will depend on how the global crisis, which started in 2007–08, will develop. It will also depend on the longer term effect of the shift of manufacturing outside Europe, principally to China.

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Though the connection between social democratic parties and the working class had become looser over the years, there was still sufficient closeness with the organized labour movement – the trade unions – to maintain a high degree of continuity with the traditional socialist demands of the past. Nowadays, European trade unions are weak, particularly in the private sector and there are fewer industrial workers in Europe that at any time since the nineteenth century. Union density has not collapsed, yet, but it is converging with that of the USA, which is traditionally low. Comparative figures are not always reliable because the grounds for memberships are not the same, for instance in some countries, such as Italy, retired workers can remain union members, but the trend is unmistakable: Trade Union Density

1980 1993 2003

Germany

France

Italy

UK

34.9 31.8 22.6

18.3 9.6 8.3

49.6 39.2 33.7

50.1 36.1 29.3

Source: Jelle Visser, ‘Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries’, Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 129, No. 1, January 2006, pp.44–5.

The figures for Sweden and Denmark are much higher (though these have declined too) suggesting that the Scandinavian model has better chances of surviving. But this can offer few reasons for comfort. Faced with an international environment that has been and will continue to be hostile to the survival of national welfare states, the parties of the Left have adopted, more or less overtly, a defensive strategy. Its basic coordinates are an acceptance that market forces should be regulated but not so that they make the national economy uncompetitive; that the growth of public spending must be contained – particularly after the drain on resources caused by the necessity of having to save the financial system; that the welfare state can be defended but not extended; that privatization may well be desirable; that equality, though still appealing as a goal, may have to be tempered by electoral considerations; and that, despite the rhetoric of coordination used in all international forums, the power of international financial institutions cannot be contained. From this perspective, the prospects for the Left are dismal. Its parties have been forced on the defensive and they have few new ideas to propose. A defensive strategy can work only if it is temporary. The point of politics, however, is to win and not to stand still.

xxiii

xxiv


xxv

xxvii

xxviii


xxix

xxx


ABBREVIATIONS

xxxi

xxxiii

xxxiv


INTRODUCTION

xxxv

xxxvi


INTRODUCTION

xxxvii

xxxviii


INTRODUCTION

xxxix

Book One Expansion

PART ONE

The Hard Road to Political Power

CHAPTER ONE

The Establishment of Socialism Before 1914

1914 A sizeable labour or working-class movement existed in virtually all European countries. Although its politics was for the most part inspired by socialism, socialism was not its necessary precondition. Both within and beyond Europe there would have been an organized labour movement even without socialism. Prior to the First World War, Britain had no significant socialist parry. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, Japan has emerged as, arguably, the most successful capitalist country of the world, but has so far produced only a weak and ineffectual socialist party. Contrary to what virtually all socialists believed at the time, there was no necessary causal link between the rise of an organized labour movement and the ideology of socialism. As for the conjunction between socialism and industrialization, this was characteristic of only a fairly limited geographical area: continental Europe. Its subsequent diffusion outside Europe has been confined to countries without a significant industrial base and, hence, without a significant working-class movement (Australia and New Zealand provide the main exceptions). In continental Europe socialism was, so to speak, (captured' by Marxism which, at the turn of the century, dominated the labour movement. I am concerned here not with Marx's Marxism but with the interpretations of his doctrine which came to prevail in the socialist and social-democratic parties, i.e. what is sometime referred as 'vulgar Marxism' or the 'Marxism of the Second International'. The interpretation of 'Marxism' I am interested in is the one which strongly appealed to the leaders of the working-class movement and the activists who followed them. It was obviously a simplified version of Marx's work. Otto Bauer, the main theoretician of what would later be called 'Austro-Marxism', was quite candid about the necessity of such adaptation: BY

From the history of the natural sciences and of philosophy many examples could be provided which show that the simplification and vulgarization of a new doctrine is nothing but a stage of its victorious advance, of its rise to general acceptance. 1

The popular rendering of the new doctrine was diffused through the works of Kautsky and Bebel, which were read and distributed more widely than Marx's own works. 2

6

THE HARD ROAD TO POLITICAL POWER

In essence, pre-I914 vulgar Marxism, condensed into its essential outline, consisted of the following fairly simple propositions: 3 PROPOSITION ONE The present capitalist system is unfair. Its fundamental relation, the wage relation, is based on a contract between juridically equal parties, but this disguises a real inequality; the capitalists 'cheat' the workers by appropriating far more than they pay in wages and other necessary production costs. This special and statistically unquantifiable appropriation, called 'surplus-value' by Marxists, gives the owners of capital great wealth and control over the economic development of society. They thus appropriate not simply wealth but also power. PROPOSITION TWO History proceeds through stages. Each stage is characterized by a specific economic system to which corresponds a particular system of power and hence a specific ruling class. The present capitalist stage is not everlasting, but a transient historical phenomenon: the present ruling class will not rule for ever.

Workers are a fundamentally homogeneous class, regardless of differences which may exist among them. All workers are united 'in essence' by similar interests: to improve their conditions of life under capitalism; to struggle against the existing social order; and to overcome it by bringing about a new stage of history in which there can be 'real', and not merely formal, equality. It follows that workers must organize themselves into political parties and trade unions and reject any attempt to divide them. PROPOSITION THREE

The first proposition embraces the Marxist economic theory of exploitation; the second is the so-called materialist conception of history; while the third, not really elaborated by Marx, was the product of the ideas and political prac,tice of the leaders of European socialism (especially in Germany) after Marx's death. On one level of analysis these propositions express a simple 'trinity': (I) a statement on the present: 'the existing social order is unfair'; (2) a statement on the future: 'the existing social order can be changed'; (3) a strategic statement on the transition from (I) to (2): 'fate alone will not bring about this transition, we must organize and act.' Belief in this 'trinity' (the religious expression is rather appropriate) is a necessary requirement for any social movement, socialist or otherwise, whose aim is to change the status quo. What gave the socialist movement its winning edge over other rivals within the working-class movement (e.g. anarchism) was that it had more powerful ideas regarding the third proposition of the trinity, the question of 'what is to be done?' that is, the strategic aspect. Socialism appeared to be better adapted than its rivals to the mode of organization of the working class into ever larger units of production and the forms of combination of workers, such as trade unions. Socialism distinguished itself from potential rivals (such as utopian movements) by looking frankly to the future and not harking

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOCIALISM BEFORE

I9 1 4

7

back to an idealized past; though as regards the future nothing more definite than vague generalities was ever said about the end of class society and the withering away of the state. Only after the Soviet Revolution would it be possible to point to a model of 'actually existing' socialism. All this was not enough to guarantee the ideological supremacy of socialist ideology within the working-class movement. This supremacy was largely due to the far-sighted political work of socialist activists. Like earlier revolutionaries and reformers they wanted to change society. They believed the fundamental agency of change to be the working class, and in a sense this act of identification was also one of creation. The socialist activists understood, more or less instinctively, that the working class represented a social subject with tremendous political potentialities. In today's language we could say that the great intuition of the first socialist activists was that they had identified a ~new political subject' with definite potential aspirations, able to produce a coherent set of political demands for both the short and the long term. If politics is an art, then this was one of its masterpieces. Socialist politics and the socialist movement could comprehend the most varied issues: short-term demands such as an in1provement in working conditions; national reforms such as pension schemes; comprehensive schemes such as economic planning and a new legal system; major political changes such as expansion of the suffrage; utopian projects such as the abolition of the state, etc. All these demands could be embodied into a single overarching project in spite (perhaps because) of their contradictory nature. By thinking of the working class as a political class, ascribing to it a specific politics and rejecting the vaguer categories ('the poor') of earlier reformers, the pioneers of socialism thus virtually 'invented' the working class. Those who define, create. 'Democratic~ politics, that is, modern mass politics, is a battlefield in which the most important move is that which decides what the battle is about, what the issue is. To be able to define the contending parties, nan1e them and thus establish where the barricades should go up, or where the trenches should be dug, gives one a powerful and at times decisive advantage. This is what all major movements for social change have had to do. Although Marxism attempted to elaborate a theoretical definition of the working class - propertyless producers of surplus separated from the means of production - in practice this was never seriously used to define the proletariat politically. Self-definition was always more important. For example, on 19 April 189 I in Castelfiorino, a small town in the heart of Tuscany, where the prevailing social group was made up of sharecroppers, a group of \vorknlen' signed a May Day lnanifesto in which they invited the local population to join them in a banquet to celebrate May Day, the feast day designated 'exclusively' for workers, under the banner of ~unity makes us strong'.4 The workmen who signed this appeal, and who identified then1selves completely with the cause of the worklng class, were not factory workers, producers of surplus value, exploited by capital-owning entrepreneurs. They

8

THE HARD ROAD TO POLITICAL POWER

were a blacksmith, a printer, a bricklayer, a shoe-maker, a carpenter, and so in Marxist forth. All were self-employed, all were their own bosses, all terms - petty bourgeois. Nevertheless, they remained certain that their cause was the same as that of the workers, indeed that they were workers. To say that the working class was 'invented' is not to claim that its members did not exist. Practically 'all observers of the working class were agreed that "the proletariat" was very far from being a homogeneous mass, even within single nations.'s What existed was a vast array of different occupations ranked by skills, divided by territories, separated by nationalities, often segregated sexually or racially, secluded from each other by religion, traditions, prejudice, constantly reorganized by technological developments. These fragments were given an ideological cohesion and an organizational unity. Class consciousness was constructed by political activists, just as nationalism was constructed by nationalists, feminism by feminists, racism by racists. 6 This process does not, of course, depend solely on activism. For the activists to be successful, they must build on real foundations, not on thin air. The appeal must be recognized and interiorized. As Machiavelli explained, the Prince, to be successful, must rely not only on his own skills, his virtu, but also on objective circumstances, on his jortl1na. If the hegemony achieved by socialism was due in decisive part to its superior understanding of Proposition Three of the 'trinity' (strategy), the victory of Marxism in the socialist movement of continental Europe was almost certainly due to its superior handling of Propositions One and Two that is, to the fact that it had the best available theory of exploitation and the best available theory of history. These theories gave powerful intellectual backing to the moral outrage arising from the iniquities of capitalism and to the hope that a system which ought to disintegrate would eventually do so. It was important that the theories provided by Marxism should be strong and sophisticated enough to appeal to the intellectual-minded, while being amenable to simplification and diffusion at a mass level by the socialist activists who were the real NCOs of the movement. The fact that the 'theory of history' of Marxism (the succession of stages, the inevitability of socialism) could be presented in a positivist light that is, as a science on a par with Darwinism contributed considerably to its success. Those who detested capitalism could not avoid being encouraged by reading in I had abated. The fate of socialists and social democrats in the West was entirely different. They could, and did, accede to power, availing themselves of the conditions of democracy and freedom which they had so decisively helped to establish in the face of opposition, or at best grudging acceptance, from the Right. What the Cold War meant, however, was that the socialists could accede to power only once they had accepted the international hegemony of the USA, the only capitaiisl power devoid of a strong socialist party. Thus, West European socialism had to develop under the international protection of a country whose ethos, traditions and outlook were deeply hostile to socialism, and which could never offer the hope of producing a governnlent friendly to a socialist project in any form. It was an international order which could tolerate socialism on certain conditions, but never encourage it. This fundamental subordination of socialist ideas to the requirements of a bipolar world was an aspect of the decay of European power following the Second World War. The fate of socialism was inseparable from the political destiny of individual nation-states. With Europe divided and subject to outside constraints, socialists found themselves on hostile terrain. To them fell the painful task of living with a particularly grievous paradox: they must advance the cause of socialism, while fighting a 'cold wae against the only existing 'socialist' nation. The conservative and confessional parties which were the socialists' main opponents were also constrained, of course, by European weakness; but this worked to their advantage. After all, they were natural allies of the American superpower. Unlike the socialists, they did not have to demonstrate their reliability in the shadows of American suzerainty.

Book Two Consolidation

PART TWO

The Construction of Welfare Socialism 1945-50

CHAPTER FIVE

The Socialists After 1945

IN THE FEW years following the end of the Second World War, many of the 'short-term' political objectives of the Second International, adopted at the beginning of the century, were implemented. True universal suffrage had become a reality in all countries enjoying free elections, with the exception of politically backward Switzerland where women obtained the vote only in 1971. Thus, full citizenship, once granted only to male property-owners, was now finally extended to women. The Finns had been the trail-blazers in 1907. They were followed by Denmark in 1918, Austria and Germany in 1919, Norway and Sweden in 1921, Hoilland in 1922, Ireland in 1923 and Britain in 192.8. Finally, after the Second World War, France (1945), Italy (1946) and Belgium (1948) completed the transition to democracy. The eight-hour day had been adopted everywhere, if not de jure, at least de facto. This was no minor reform: Marx himself had called the legal restriction on the length of the working day 'an all-powerful social barrier' and 'a modest Magna Carta ... which shall make clear when the time which the worker sells is ended, and when his own begins.'l Later, in a passage which still deserves attention, he added:

the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour ... ceases .. ,. Beyond (the realm of necessity) begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working-day is its basic prerequisite. 2

Leisure time, the authentic basis of freedom and the necessary precondition for political activity, was now protected by law. With the introduction of genuine universal suffrage, the liberal-democratic principle of the formal equality of all had been firmly established. With the eight-hour day the principle of state regulation of the labour market had been further strengthened. Democratic rights were thus enhanced by social rights. Electorally speaking, the socialist parties emerged from the war as major political forces (see Table 5. I). Virtually everywhere they had at least onethird of the vote. Where they had less than that (for example, in Finland, Italy and France), it was because the communists had 20 per cent or more of the vote. In all cases the balance of power lay with the Left. 117

118

THE CONSTRUCTION OF WELFARE SOCIALISM

Table 5,1 Socialist, social-democratic and labour parties' share of the vote, 1945-5 0 (%) 1945

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France

1946

1948

44. 6

31.. 8

1949 38.7 29. 8

31·4 2. 5. t

195 0

35·5

39. 6

4 0 •0 26·3

23. 8

2LI

17·9

Holland Italy Norway Sweden UK West Germany

1947

a

2.5. 6 (3 I.o)b

2.8.; 20·7

41.0 c

46 ·7 4 8 .3

4 6. 1

Notes: a There were two elections in France in 1946. elections were held in 1944.

45·7 4 6. 1 29. 2 b Joint

list with the communists. C The

When the war was ended, socialist and social-democratic parties were in power in virtually the whole of democratic Western Europe, but only in Britain, Sweden and Norway were they clearly in charge. In other countries they shared power with non~socialist parties. In France and in Italy they found themselves squeezed between a powerful communist party to their left and an en1erging Christian democratic party to their right. In the previous chapter we chronicled the diverging paths of the French and Italian socialists: in France socialists repudiated the communists and opted for a coalition with the centre (1947); in Italy they pinned their hopes on an alliance with the communists. Paradoxically, these diametrically opposed tactics produced the same negative result: alone in Western Europe, French and Italian socialists became electorally weaker than their communist rivals. In France the socialists, no longer a radical force for change, became the upholders of an increasingly indecisive and visionless Fourth Republic. In Italy the Socialist Party was, until the late 1950s, politically subordinated to the PCI; then it shifted its strategy, broke with the communists and, in the early 1960s, entered into a coalition government with the Christian democrats. The fate of socialists and social democrats in the rest of Western Europe was more fortunate than that of the French and the Italians - not to mention the Portuguese and Spanish Left still under dictatorial rule. This confirmed the continuing difficulties of socialists in much of Southern Europe. Where democracy had not been fully established - as in Greece, Spain and Portugal - the main operationally active clandestine forces were those of the communists. Where democracy had been fe-established - as in France and in Italy - the communists soon emerged as the dominant party of the Left. To

THE SOCIALISTS AFTER

1945

119

find clear instances of socialist successes we must turn to north-western Europe. In Belgium there were seven coalition governments between 1945 and J 949) all led by a socialist. The all-party national unity government of 1945 gave way to socialist-led coalitions which included the communists and the Liberals, but excluded the Catholics of the CVP-PSC (Christelijke Volkspartij - Parti Social Chretien). In 1947 the Communist Party and the Liberal Party were expelled from the government and the socialists went on ruling with the CVP-PSC. Thus the POB, now rechristened the Patti Socialiste BeIgel Belgische Socialistische Pattij (PSB/BSP), although having only one-third of the vote, was able to doo1ioate Belgian politics throughout the immediate po.st-war period by being continuously in government and deciding the shape of the coalition. In Holland the Labour Party (now called the Partij van de Arbeid PvdA) , with much less than one-third of the vote, was present in all five coalition governments which ruled the country from the end of the war to 1958; furthermore, between 1948 and 1958 the prime minister was always the socialist Willem Drees. In Austria the Socialist Party (Sozialistische Partie Osterreichs - SPO) entered into a durable coalition in 1945 with the Austrian People's Party (Osterreichs Volkspartei - the OVP), a party of farmers and clerical workers, successor to the pre-\var Christian Social Party. With the brief exception of the Rennet government in 1945, however, the bvp controlled the post of chancellor. This exceptionally long 'historic compromise', which deprived Austria of a meaningful opposition for over twenty years from 1945 to 1966, was, at least in part, due to the SPO's awareness 'of the dangers of class confrontation'.3 But there were many other factors contributing to cooperation between the parties, such as the appalling economic situation and the fact that Austria was under foreign occupation. By co-operating, the SPO prevented the GVP from having to rely on the right-wing party which emerged in 1949, the Verband der Unabhangigen (after 1956 it became the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs - FPO - or Freedom Party). The tragic lessons of the 19205 had led the SPG to adopt a remarkably cautious strategy which eschewed confrontation and the risks of isolation. It was the beginning of the most important n10del of so-called consociational democracy in Western Europe, object of many political science studies. In Finland, as we saw in the preceding chapter, the socialists were engaged in a struggle against the Communist Party. Following the exclusion of the communists from the governlnent in 1948, the socialists remained in the coalition with the Agrarian League and the smaller bourgeois parties. In Denmark, the Social Den10cratic Party (Socialdemokratiet) emerged as the leading party, but it was not strong enough to form a government on its own. Furthermore, the 1945 elections had turned out to be one of the worst electoral defeats for Danish social democracy: they polled only 32.8 per cent

120


of the vote and lost eighteen of the sixty-six parliamentary seats they held before. Their wartime collaboration with the Nazi occupation forces was probably the main reason for these losses and for the communist gains, which amounted to the eighteen seats vacated by the social democrats. 4 Nevertheless the Socialdemokratiet led the all-party government of 1945, then was out of office until 1947. From 1947 to 1950 it led a minority government sustained by the communists and the neutralist Radical Liberal Party. In the remaining two Nordic countries, Sweden and Norway, socialists ruled uninterruptedly throughout most of the post-war period: in Norway until the mid-I960s and in Sweden until the mid-I970S. In Norway, the Labour Party, thanks to an electoral system less proportional than the Swedish, obtained an absolute majority of the seats (76 out of 150 seats, with only 41 per cent of the vote) and ruled without allies. In Sweden, the SAP, though by far the largest party with 46.6 per cent of the vote, could not muster more than half of the seats in the Riksdag (I I 5 out of 2;0), and had to rely on the support of the Communist Party until 1951 and then on the Agrarian Party until 1957. In occupied Germany what had once been the most influential socialdemocratic party in the world, the SPD, resurfaced after thirteen years spent under the tragic interlude of Nazism. After May 1945 there was no German state and the occupying forces took all major decisions. In the western part of the country there were no general elections until 1949. By then the high tide of radicalism had subsided; the Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU Christian Democratic Party) obtained a decisive victory and forced the Social Democrats into opposition where they remained for seventeen years. The SPD was led by Kurt Schumacher, a self-righteous and strong-willed man who had lost his right arm in the First World War and spent virtually the entire Nazi period in the concentration camp at Dachau. Like all the German social democrats of his time, Schumacher, who always professed to be a Marxist (but, emphatically, not a Leninist), believed Germany to be on the verge of a socialist transformation. At the same time he was a committed anti-communist and a stalwart upholder of parliamentary democracy. 5 The SPD was then a party of 600,000 members, but it no longer possessed the vast organizational infrastructure, including two hundred daily papers and a wire service, which had been the basis of the party's power in Weimar and before. Nor could it count on the unquestioned support of the trade unions (as had been the case in the pre-Nazi period), or on their substantial financial contribution. 6 After 1945, the SPD could no longer offer its supporters a total environment as it had in the days of Weimar and imperial Germany: a Vatethaus und Lebensinhalt (literally: Parental Home and Life Substance). In those far-off days a member could read the party's newspapers, borrow from its book clubs, drink in its pubs, keep fit in its gyms, sing in its choral societies, play in its orchestras, take part in the so-called people's theatre


1945

121

organizations, compete in its chess clubs, and join, if a woman, the SPD women's movement, and, if young, the youth organization. When members were ill, they would receive help from the Working Men's Samaritan Federation. When they died, they would be cremated by a social-democratic burial club (as an alternative to church burial). 7 In the 1930S all this had been destroyed by the devastating impact of the Nazi dictatorship; the formidable political machine of August Bebel and his successors could not be brought back to life after 1945. Such erosion of the cultural world of labour was not confined to Germany. But elsewhere, for instance, in France, Italy and Britain, it occurred more gradually. By the 19605 it had reached near-completion. 8 At first the SPD grew more rapidly in the Soviet-occupied part of the country than in the western sectors. The effective leader of the SPD in the Soviet zone, Otto Grotewohl, was in favour of a close alliance with the communists (I(PD). Schumacher made no effort to intervene. He was content to leave Grotewohl in charge of the party in the east as long as he could control it in the west from his Hanover headquarters. When Schumacher eventually tried to intervene to stop the impending merger with the I(PD, it was only to advise Grotewohl to dissolve the party. By then it was too late. The fate of social democracy in the eastern zone was sealed. In 1946 Grotewohl merged his party with the I(PD to form the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party - SED), becoming its cochairman and, in 1949, the first prime minister of the German Democratic Republic. 9 Initially, the new merged party was closer to the old SPD than to the I(PD: Lenin ceased to be a reference point and there was no explicit endorsement of the Soviet system. 10 With the development of the Cold War, the SED quickly became a pro-Soviet communist patty and its socialdemocratic component was obliterated. Once it had become clear that Grotewohl's party could not have any independence from the USSR (something which was not initially obvious), the fate of the SPD became closely bound up with the Cold War. The revival of the fortunes of the Left in Western Europe after 1945 is not quite so sweeping when we see it in the context of the division of Europe, the split with the communists in France, the necessity of coalition politics in Denmark, Austria, Holland and Belgium, the electoral defeat in Italy in 1948 and in Germany in 1949. This is the European context for the trajectory of the British Labour Party, from its historic victory in 1945 to its bizarre defeat in 195 I. The victory uJas historic: never before had a socialist party in Britain been able to rule without being constrained by Liberal Party support, as had been the case in 1924 and 1929-3 I, or by coalition government, as during the war. Leaving aside the peripheral instance of Norway, this was the first time in European history that a socialist party was elected to power with an absolute parliamentary majority. The defeat ]}Jas bizarre: the Labour Party 'lost' the 1951 elections because it obtained fewer seats than the Conservatives; however,

12.2


it had secured more votes. In fact the 195 I results were, in percentage terms, the best results in the entire history of the Labour Party, including the 'historic' victory of 1945. It is, of course, fair to point out that Labour's absolute majority of the seats achieved in 1945 could not have been ensured without the vagaries of the first-past-the-post electoral system. The fact remains that, in spite of the many difficulties it had to face, the Labour Party left office with a greater share of the poll than when it came in. Socialist politics or, at least, the policies of the Labour government did not result in unpopularity. Perry Anderson is right when he refers to the Second World War as Labour's 'historical windfall' because: 'The Party was initiated into power without having to mobilize for it; and it acquired a programme for government without having to originate the ideas behind it.'l1 But there is no reason to single out the Labour Party in this context. Wars have always been among the most formidable harbingers of vast social change: they have constituted a 'windfall' for socialists in the twentieth century, from the Bolsheviks in 1917 to virtually all the parties of the Left in 1945. The antagonism towards war which had often been so strong a component of socialist consciousness was always at odds with the recognition that a measure of social progress so often follows the most unbearable human suffering. This, of course, justifies nothing and offers no consolation. The Labour Party prevailed in 1945 because, unlike its Conservative rivals, it expressed the mood of the time: the egalitarian ethos of the war, the solidaristic feelings enhanced by having to face a common enemy, the prestige of the USSR, the failure of the Conservatives to stop Hitler before 1939, the memories of the Depression of the 19305, the readier recognition of the need for change. To the new ethos should he added a second factor: the Labour Party's full-hearted participation in the war cabinet and their acceptance of governmental responsibilities had established the 'efficiency' criterion of politics. By this I mean that the party had succeeded in effecting the difficult transition from being a party of opposition to being a party of government. The former gathers support because of its antagonism to the existing system; it is a party of protest; it expresses outrage at current injustices. The key question, however, is: can it rule? To do so it must convince friends and foes that it possesses political competence. To some extent this is a question of image, although a credible programme based on policies which exhibit some degree of realism may help. It is important that some credibility should be established even among those who will not vote for the party. To govern effectively it is essential to have the consent of opponents who must assume that even undesired and unacceptable policies can be reversed. To be both credible and legitimate has always presented difficulties for parties which seek radical change, and therefore for parties of the Left. Nearly all of them have in fact been able to accede to power only through a period of apprentice-


1945

12 3

ship in coalition with, or supported by, well-established and legitimized political forces. The Labour Party had had three previous periods in government, but only the war coalition qualifies as authentic apprenticeship: the 1924 and 1929-31 governments had been unsuccessful. What really legitimated Labour was the war coalition. The war enabled Labour to acquire a further precious asset: a nationalpatriotic identity, though such excessive attachment to the empire turned into a liability. Whatever remained of its pacifism had been successfully confined to its fringes. The idea that internationalism meant that all wars were fought in the interests of the ruling class was discarded. It is difficult to imagine how this form of pacifism could ever have been abandoned in Britain without a war as politically 'acceptable' to the Left as the Second World War. This remains the most readily available and virtually unchallenged instance of the elusive concept of the 'just war'. In other countries, violent revolutions and wars of national liberation against foreign invaders or occupiers supply the Left with an acceptable array of national memories, traditions and myths which can be used to redefine its politics in nationalpatriotic terms. In Britain's case the traditional left-wing sentiment that 'all wars are the bosses' wars' had a basis in the history of an ancient imperial country whose history was one of plunder and conquest and of narrowly defined 'national' interest. The struggle against Nazi Germany provided a real rupture with this strong commitment to pacifism. In spite of occasional power politics rhetoric, the war could justifiably be seen as a war waged by an extreme and cruel right-wing regime against the British people as a whole, not just against its rulers or its empire. The ideological dimension of the war had been foreshadowed by its prelude, the Spanish Civil War, which pitted Left versus Right and in which the defence of democracy was identified with the Left. In 1945, the Labour Party thus possessed virtually all the necessary attributes for its chrysalid-like metamorphosis into a party of government. It was this which enabled it to acquire the necessary support of many who did not identify with the working class: those nebulous and indistinct cohorts generically lun1ped in the all-embracing and ill-defined category of 'middle class', without whose support no one can rule in a democracy. The presumed acquisition of new middle-class voters should not disguise the fact that it also acquired, for the first time, the support of the majority of the workingclass vote. 12 The Labour Party was thus elected with a mandate for change. What this involved was not altogether clear. In broad outline, however, there can be no disputing that the Labour Party was expected to introduce a fairer society, one, that is, where excessive inequalities would be removed, and in which those which persisted (for there was no real support for massive levelling) would not deprive anyone of certain basic social rights, such as employment, health care and education. The presumption was that the citizenship rights

124


which had been the rallying cry of the liberal-democratic tradition - the juridical equality of all - would be supplemented by new socio-economic rights. It was also expected that, in order to make these rights generally available, determinate economic conditions of growth and prosperity would have to be established and that, since the market would not be able to achieve this on its own, it would be necessary for the state to intervene in the economy. In the rest of Europe confessional parties competed fairly successfully with the parties of the Left on the terrain of state-induced social change. Christian concern for the downtrodden and the poor, and the antiindividualistic and solidaristic basis of both the Protestant and Catholic churches, could be harnessed for a politics of social transformation. Indeed, thanks to Leo XIII's encyclical Rerum Novarum of 1891 - updated in 1931 with Pius Xl's Quadragesimo Anno - the Roman Catholic church had rejected the individualist ethos of private capital accumulation in favour of social solidarity. In Britain, however, there were no confessional parties and little, if any, populist basis for conservative forces. Their nearest equivalent, Disraeli's 'one-nation' strand of Conservatism, was far too paternalistic and old-fashioned a framework for a modern conservative social policy and was, consequently, no match for the Labour Party. Furthermore, on the Continent anti-clericalism had been one of the most characteristic traits of socialist parties and one of the causes of their lack of support among religious people. The British Labour Party faced none of these problems: the strength of the nonconformist churches in British socialism had prevented the growth of anti-clericalism. The Conservatives in Britain had been deprived of one of the traditional weapons of the Right on the Continent: the political use of religion as an instrument to divide the potential supporters of the Left, and the dread that an incoming 'red' government would desecrate all that was hallowed. The unique conjuncture which had produced a Labour government was itself the result of a set of highly singular circumstances. Once elected, the Labour government also had at its disposal a distinctive advantage which it has probably never fully appreciated. It was able to use, for the implementation of its policies, an uncommonly efficient administrative machine: the British civil service. On the continent of Europe the administrative system of the various states, without whose support and efficiency no radical policies can be implemented, had been undermined in various ways. The German system was gravely impaired and needed to be reconstructed; like the Austrian and the Italian, it had been an accomplice of the previous authoritarian regimes. Elswhere, the civil servants had been guilty of over-enthusiastic and ultimately dan1aging co-operation with the occupying Axis powers (France, Belgium and Holland). The Italian bureaucracy was corrupt and inefficient; that of Greece was fundamentally not only anti-socialist, but also anti-democratic.


1945

Outside Britain, most socialists had to deal with the fact that virtually the entire personnel of the state had been tainted with sympathies with antidemocratic forces. In Austria the purge of former Nazis was half-hearted: 524,000 were barred from voting and holding office, but by 1949 most of them were back on the electoral registers willing and able to vote for the so-called Freedom Party.13 Only the development of party patronage and many years of 'jobs for the boys' under the Proporz system after 1945 gave the socialists an uncommon degree of strength in public administration. After each election a 'Coalition Committee' composed of delegations from the main parties met to arrange a division of government jobs and patronage. 14 It is not true, as some have claimed,ls that 'The Austrians were almost alone in avoiding the politics of vengeance' by allowing those who collaborated with the previous regime to remain in situ. After an initial brief period of vendetta, the general pattern was one of unavoidable forgiveness, as had been the case in Italy where the communist leader, Palmiro Togliatti, as minister of justice, granted an amnesty in June 1946. 16 Similar policies of leniency were followed in France, Belgium and Holland. As a result most of those who had faithfully served pro-Nazi and pro-fascist political systems were left unmolested and indeed were often employed in the services of the reconstructed democratic regimes. The ensuing interminable debate on the purges, and a naive fixation with the importance of the specific personnel managing the apparatuses of the state (as if the Holocaust could have been prevented had different bureaucrats been in charge» helped to avoid confronting the far more crucial issue of reforming the institutions themselves. The absence of reform ensured the continuation of unwieldy bureaucratic machine devoid of any sense of public service, whose main function was to provide employment. The French, of course, had a great tradition of state service stretching ba~k to the days of Louis XIV, but it was confined to the higher echelons, not to the all-important middle ranks. Consequently, instead of major institutional reforms there was the much-heralded revival of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration for the training of senior civil servants in 1945. With this, the tradition of elitism continued to prevail. Britain, and consequently the British Labour Party, enjoyed the advantage of a politically reliable and efficient civil service which was not the property of anyone political party. It is true that its highest levels \vere colonized by the scions of the upper classes who had frequented the same exclusive private schools and leading universities. The great reform of the civil service following the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854 had eliminated parliamentary patronage in favour of the meritocratic principle. This ensured that the top levels of public administration would remain in the possession of the aristocracy, the class which had a virtual monopoly on the educational system that defined and classified merit.17 Together with other elites, these administrators

126


constituted an elusive establishment which was prepared to accept that the could be adequately 'national interest' - according to its own definition served, at least for the time being, by the party of the working class. This 'national' ethos of the British civil service did not make it any less 'conservative' than its continental counterparts. Revolutionary radicalism and a penchant for insurgency are not among the most characteristic features of the senior civil servants of the British crown. But they were efficient, more so than those of the whole of Latin or Slavic Europe, and more loyal towards those who had passed the democratic test by winning elections than their colleagues in any other European country. Furthermore, during the years of war they had acquired a novel capacity and taste for planning and managing the economy. Outright sabotage of Labour measures was never seriously considered by malevolent administrators. Without them it is doubtful whether the welfare state would have been erected so swiftly and efficiently.ls Thus, during the war it was the senior civil servants of the Ministries of Education and Health which set the agenda for the Education Act of 1944 and the post~war health-care reforms. 19 The incoming Labour government had designs and schemes, but no detailed legislative programme. This meant that civil servants were in charge of what is often of more consequence than devising policies: implementing them. Subsequent complaints that 'socialist' legislation was watered down by pro-establishment civil servants belong to political mythology and are to be ascribed to the unremitting desire of some socialists to find scapegoats for the Left's own shortcomings. The resulting legislation was not significantly less 'socialist' than what had been originally proposed. Because the British state had survived the war intact, the Labour Party inherited all its peculiarities: its bizarre and childish customs, its absurd invented traditions, its preposterous sense of hierarchy, its ludicrous rituals. All Labour leaders, left and right, accepted and reinforced all of these without apparent qualms. Republicanisn1 never had the slightest foothold in the Labour Party. Labour leaders and supporters had sensed that what makes no sense rationally may often be politically perfectly possible, and that consequently the monarchy, although an absurd medieval relic, was nevertheless compatible not only with capitalist efficiency Gapan), but also with welfare socialism (the Scandinavian countries). Labour's intentions on assuming office were limited to social reforms. There was no question even of minor changes in the political organization of the state. Thus, paradoxically, the existence of a complex charade of often ridiculous and, at times, mildly amusing establishment conventions helped the party of the working class in its quest for legitimacy. By embracing them and making them their own, Labour proved that it accepted the political system en bloc, including the institutions of the monarchy and even, eventually, the House of Lords. In so doing, it demonstrated its credentials as a respectable party of government, and, therefore, as a loyal opposition. The Labour


1945

12 7

Party could be treated by the establishment as a not too distant relative who was acceptable, in spite of its manifestly subversive ideas, because it was quite willing to learn how to behave decorously at dinner. Lenin, of course, might well have been right when he surmised that in order to revolutionize society, it was necessary to revolutionize the state by destroying its administrative and political machine. But the Labour Party did not want a revolution, only social reforms compatible with the existing state. As Morgan has written, any failures by the Labour government between 20 t 94 5 and 195 1 cannot be attributed to the institutional framework it inherited - though it could be argued that its real failure was in the preservation of such a framework. The absolute power of Parliament, the prerogative of the monarchy now in the hands of a prime minister, the lack of a written constitution resulting in government having free reins, an electoral system which made coalitions unnecessary, all this meant that the Labour Party was much freer to do what it wanted than any of its continental counterparts. This must go a long way towards explaining why the Labour Party, throughout its existence, has paid only lip-service to any notion of drastic institutional reform and has, on the contrary, been a strong supporter of the central peculiarities of the British political system: the electoral system, the unwritten constitution and the virtual unfettered control enjoyed by the cabinet and its leader over Parliament as a whole. In the institutional field the changes the Labour government brought about were infinitesimal: a Parliament Act in 1949 further to limit the right of the Lords to delay legislation; and a Representation of the People Act which eliminated absurdities like double-voting for university graduates and certain categories of businesspeople and landlords. In the field of civil liberties no major progress was made. There was no separation of church and state (unlike in virtually the whole of Europe) and, consequently, the Church of England maintained its privileged position as the established church. Quaint relics from the past~ such as the power of the Lord Chamberlain, an officer of the Royal Household, to censor theatrical performances, were left untouched with predictably philistine consequences. However, legal aid was introduced and corporal punishment abolished, though only for convicted criminals, not for children in schools. In England and Wales a boy could still be beaten for smoking at school, but not in later life for raping someone. Hanging was kept on the statute books. That the 'establishment' had little to fear was further confirmed by Labour's astonishing tiolidity when it catne to educational policy. The Labour government defended and upheld the 1944 Education Act, whose formal architect was the leading Conservative R. A. Butler, and the grammar school system as an avenue of improvement for the more academically gifted children of the working class. To the others, the overwhelming majority, it had nothing to offer. The 1944 Act contained no specific reference to training or vocational education, no plans to expand higher education, still narrow by

128


comparison with other countries. 21 The Act set 1945 as the target date for raising the school-leaving age to fifteen. It took the determination of the education minister, Ellen Wilkinson, to convince her reluctant cabinet colleagues to implement the decision in January 1947.22 This was her greatest success. It was also her last, for she died a few weeks later. However, Wilkinson was also committed to some form of comprehensive education but did not know how to proceed, as her sympathetic biographer admits. 23 Willcinson's Emergency Training Scheme (ETS), which might have provided the basis for a thorough and modern training scheme, failed because it was understaffed and over-centralized. 24 Training was then a Conservative platform rather than a Labour one. A considerable expansion in technical and vocational training was recommended by the Conservative Party, but not by the Labour Party, at their respective 1945 conferences. 25 This was a warning which should have been heeded. Compared to other countries, British training was already seriously backward. 26 At the time, socialist parties in general had no well-thought-out policies on education beyond a general belief that barriers to working-class advancement through education should be removed and that comprehensive schooling would facilitate this process. For example, in Sweden the School Commission produced a report in 1948 favouring a comprehensive school system, but it was not until 1962 that the Riksdag introduced comprehensive education for all children aged seven to sixteen. 27 In Austria the SPO had proposed, without much conviction, that the various Mittelschule should be abolished in favour of a common education until the age of fifteen, but nothing concrete happened. Instead, the party much preferred to fight the old battle over religious education with its social Christian rivals and allies. 28 The continental radical-republican hostility to clerical influence in schools never spread to Britain, where religious schools continued to be funded by taxpayers of all denominations and none. In the state schools of Britain the children of Christian, Jewish and atheistic parents assembled every lnorning for a formal act of (usually Christian) worship. This, in France or the USA, would have appeared as a profound breach of democratic values. The British Labour government's reluctance to engage in any major institutional reform was not, however, a British peculiarity. The Swedish and Norwegian socialists solemnly stated in every programme they published that they aimed to install a republic, while not taking the slightest step towards it in all their years in power. The Left participated in institutional changes and constitution-making only in countries where it was necessary to do so because the previous regime had been totally discredited, as in Germany and Italy. The new constitution of the French Fourth Republic was very similar to that of the Third. The main concern of the French socialists had been to prevent political instability, rather than to reform the state in a new democratic direction. But the reverse happened: all the drafts and proposals which were significantly different from those of the defunct and much-reviled Third


1945

Republic met strong opposition: Leon Blum's presidential system, Jules Mach's functional corporatist upper chamber, and Vincent Auriol's mildly federalist proposal of a regional chamber.29 The fact was that, on the whole, constitutional reforms were not given a high priority by the socialists (or by the communists), in spite of all the drafting work done during the Resistance. Austria readopted the constitution it had had prior to 5 March 1933, the date on \vhich Parliament had been suspended. 30 In Holland there were no substantial political changes. In Belgium, socialist republicanism was directed against the collaborationist I control of the economy and 'favours competition whenever free competition really exists'.54 This was followed by the most frequently quoted words of the programme: 'As much competition as possible, as much planning as necessary.' These words were not new. The Dortmund Ale.tions~PrograttJm of 1952 stated that the SPD supported real competition 'whenever it is appropriate'.S5 In 1954, at the Berlin Congress, the SPD was far from negative about the free market: it advocated an active competition policy and regulation against monopolistic and unfair competition; it maintained that planning for 'stability' would be in the interest of competition; and it championed help for small entrepreneurs to enable them to be more competitive. 56 Though Bad Godesberg was not against free competition, it was hostile to large-scale enterprises on the grounds that these were incompatible with the free market. 57 This meant that the role allocated to planning ('as much as necessary,) could be quite broad if one held the view that free competition, in advanced capitalist societies, was seriously limited by oligopolistic power. It may appear that the social democrats had joined the neo-liberals in assuming that capitalism functioned at its best under conditions of free competition - that is, in a golden and largely mythical age in which a wide array of small firms keenly competed and in which the consumer was sovereign. That may be so. But what is relevant here is that the SPD used the concept of 'free competition' as a justification for regulation of the 'new' capitalism, which was clearly large-scale and for which, so it followed, planning was necessary. Whether this mayor may not have included nationalization is left to the readers to decide; the programme is diplomatically silent. There is nothing in Bad Godesberg to deter the supporters of nationalization. It is therefore not true - as some have asserted 58 that this was necessarily 'a programme of "reformist liberalism" (in which) there was no longer any basic difference (with) the CDU social market philosophy' - though in

THE FOUNDATIONS OF REVISIONISM

practical terms (that is, when it came to legislating), many of the CDU proposals went through the Bundestag with the votes of the SPD. S9 Bad Godes berg - like most party programmes - was an open text full of ambiguities. This is precisely why it could be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the party. It followed the second principle of the Napoleonic dictum: 'constitutions should be short and obscure.' In this way it allowed for divergent interpretations and permitted the safeguarding of party unity. To understand the Bad Godesberg Programme, it is necessary to go beyond the text and examine the context. It is the programme of a working-class party which no longer wished to represent itself as such, because this had become an' obstacle to the securing of political power. This was not just electoral opportunism - although, after three defeats at the polls, it would have been quite understandable if the party had felt it necessary to divest itself of wor1cingclass 'signs' Oanguage, programme, banners and images) in order to acquire non-working-class votes. The abandonment of the SPD's working-class identity and its transformation into a Votkspartei (a 'people's party'), were necessary in order to beCOIne acceptable to the whole of West German society, and not just to its own electorate. Thus the programme was more important for its silences (no mention of Marx or nationalization), and the accompanying symbolic changes, than for what it said. In 1952, at Dortmund, the SPD had defined itself as the party of 'workers, civil servants, white-collar workers, intellectuals, middle classes, peasants and all the people who need to work', and not explicitly as a people's party.60 Two years later, in the Berlin Action Programme, came the announcement that the SPD had changed from 'a party of the workers' to 'a party of the though, schizophrenically, it reaffirmed that the people' (Partei des r/otkes) working class remained the foundation of its membership and electorate. 61 By 1959, even these positive references to a working-class identity were abandoned for good. The 'de-proletarianization' of the image of the party was a central feature of revisionisn1 everywhere, including, as we shall see, the reforn1 con1munism of Nikita S. l consciousness could be 'raised' by example, education or personal experience. Though the students were keen to break with the old and espouse the new, there was a great deal of curiosity about the past, as long as it was a 'new>, regained past, rescued from the clutches of a bourgeois class whose paid agents, the bourgeois historians, had kept it under wraps. There was a robust identification with the 'losers' in history, and a haunting search for

THE GREAT CONTESTATION

the opportunities and chances missed by the revolutionaries of yesteryear. The new 'subversives', like all subversives, needed their present to be firmly anchored in the past. Myth-making is a universal necessity. It may be impossible to demonstrate the beneficial impact of the cultural unrest of the 19605 on the decades that follow. It is difficult to minimize its importance: it contributed, directly and indirectly, to the birth of mass feminism, to the ecological movement, to the growth, expansion and diffusion of the importance of subjectivity and consciousness, to the recognition of the existence of institutionalized and disguised forms of racism and repression. In academia, the movement directly or indirectly led to a revolution in the humanities and the social sciences: the development and spread of social history in all its forms, the growth of sociology, the flowering of interdisciplinary approaches, the evolution of increasingly sophisticated theoretical methods. University reforms in Germany and France are directly attributable to student radicalism. In politics the effects appeared negligible. No political party of any major weight developed out of the organizational structures devised by the student activists. No established party suffered unduly, or prospered particularly, as a consequence of the movement. All attempts to construct a more or less revolutionary party in opposition to the traditional socialist and communist organizations utterly failed, and all efforts to capture these organizations and subvert them were successfully repelled. Yet some of the long-term influence of the I960s on politics manifested itself in unlikely quarters in the 1980s and 1990s: some of the individualism and anti-state rhetoric of the period was captured by a reconstructed conservatism with its emphasis on 'getting the state off the backs of the people' - a far more 1960$' slogan than anything subsequently invented by the parties of the Left. To some extent, May 1968 was the first step towards the dissolution of the Jacobin language of revolutionary politics which had for so long prevailed in France. 13 The extraordinary concurrence of student unrest in Tokyo and Mexico City, Prague and Berkeley, Paris and Peking may be explained by identifying some common factors. For instance, the internationalization of mass media made it possible for students of the Bocconi University of Milan to know at once of the demands and actions of students three thousand miles away, at Columbia University in New York, for all of them to read the same books, see the same films, sing the same songs. Peasants in revolt in years gone by could never be members of this new global village. The student untest, though anti-capitalist in its values, could only have occurred once capitalist development had finally brought about that mass society which had been discussed for more than half a century. What was once a consumption market of the few had become the consumer society for the majority. What had been an elite education system had expanded access to hundreds of thousands. The circulation of ideas which had for so long remained enclosed among the privileged few had become the 'mass media' available even to the few remaining illiterates.

THE REVIVAL OF IDEOLOGY

The expansion of education, the growth in the number of students in higher education, the consequent increase in the gap bet\Veen childhood and adulthood, were all contributing factors. Full employment and financial prosperity gave the youth of the 1960s a sense of confidence and certainty in their economic future, which permitted them to concern themselves with wider, non-material issues. The contrast between the elitist and liberal nature of higher education, and the increasingly technical requirements of mass schooling, also played a role in the growth of student radicalism. The overt commitment to popular rule and the democracy of Western societies somehow clashed with the obvious fact that tTlost people felt they had very little real power over their environment. The basis of the Western conception of democracy re1nained the electoral process, defined as the designation of representatives. Examined from a different perspective, this, however, could be seen as a process whereby citizens were required to divest themselves of the main powers of decision-making in favour of representatives who would exercise them on the citizens' behalf. To be able to choose the powerful is better than having them imposed by fiat; but it is not the same as having power oneself. Some journalistic explanations invoked a then fashionable term: the 'alienation of youth in modern society' - though why that occurred in the 1960s rather than in the 19505 or the 1980s, why in France more than in Germany, why in Germany more than in England, remains unclear. Others, equally vaguely, refer to the alleged cultural sclerosis of advanced industrial society. Logically, this would require at least a comparison of France in turmoil with unruffled England, and hence the scarcely defensible claim that France the Prance of Malraux, Sartre, the Notlvelle Vague film-makers, Georges Brassens, Simone de Beauvoir - was more culturally sclerotic than the England of Kingsley Amis and John Osborne. Alain Touraine, one of the main writers on 'new social movements', argued in 1968 that the May movement in France was not a rejection of industrial society and its culture, but the unveiling of the contradictions which are at its heart; that it provoked a profound crisis of the state; and that it expressed a desire for change 'on behalf of society and of the people' against the state. 14 With hindsight, such statements appear vague. The belief that students could constitute a new and essentially radical social class, or that they were the equivalent of the developing proletariat of the nineteenth century potentially revolutionary and central to the post-industrial world (as professionals and technicians) turned out to be based on sociological guesswork - a good hunch which has not stood the test of time. These and other post jactum explanations contain important nuggets of sociological interpretation, but they are far from providing a satisfactory explanation. Spontaneous n10vements of the past are difficult to investigate, because the participants tended to be illiterate and inarticulate, and thus did not provide historians with 'proper' sources. Those who participated in the


spontaneous movements of the 1960s were a quite different breed from the turbulent peasants of the past: familiar with the most recent sociological concepts and explanations, adept at examining their own activities in intellectual terms, radical students left behind them a superfluity of verbiage and sources which, however, left historians just as perplexed. 15 While I share such bafflement, my task, fortunately, is not to analyse 1968. What matters here is that the parties of the Left, like the scholars, were surprised and puzzled by the events. The radicalism of students everywhere took the form of a deep hostility towards the parties of the Left; some of the values it exhibited were distant from, or quite external to, the tradition of socialism. For example, the new youth culture expressed a profound individualism, epitomized by the phrase 'doing my own thing', and a preoccupation with the self which were quite alien to the more regimented traditions of social democracy. When youth culture - through the student Left - embraced a political-collective approach of the 'united we stand, divided we fall' variety, it tended to identify as 'youth' or 'students' the group to be united, rather than the working class. When the young radicals sought a privileged role for the working class, they believed that 'youth' would assume a leadership role, or, at least, that of the spark which started the prairie fire (to use one of Mao's expressions). When civil rights issues were embraced such as the struggle against racial discrimination or against excessive police powers - they were always approached from a libertarian standpoint which intersected, but never merged, with that of the organized Left. In challenging the alleged moral strictness of the establishment and of the older generation, the young activists were also in direct confrontation with the puritanical values enshrined in much working-class respectability, and to which the parties of the Left always paid lip-service. According to the ethos of traditional socialism, permissiveness was associated with bourgeois libertines. The dominant and dubious assumption of social-democratic and communist leaders was that their working-class supporters - had they been asked - would have expressed a strong contempt for sex, drugs and rockand-roll. The more socialist of the student activists attempted to involve workers in their struggle, but very few workers joined anti-Vietnam or anti-racist demonstrations, unless they were called by their trade unions or their parties. The chant, 'Workers! students! unite and fight!~, remained an invitation uttered by students and unheeded by workers. Some students joined older leftist organizations, usually Trotskyist, or formed new ones inspired by the thought or life of celebrated socialists such as Rosa Luxemburg, Che Guevara or Mao Zedong. None of these organizations, however, developed a significant working-class membership anywhere in the world. Fewer workers were now participating in traditional socialist politics, but nor were they joining any of the new organizations or movements. It appeared that politics was becoming a more middle-class affair, though it is important


393

to remember that the middle class was now large, not the small elite it was at the beginning of the century. Students themselves belonged in origin to this enlarged middle class. There was no major proletarian influx into higher education in the 1960s. Student unrest was not particularly concentrated in faculties or universities with a higher proportion of working-class students. If anything, the opposite seems to have been the case. The expansion of education was the most significant change affecting the young. In the 19605 the overall European trend was towards a lengthening of the period at school, a unification of school experience across classes by reducing the element of separation or 'streaming' in secondary education, and an expansion of access to higher education. These three aspects of educational policy were central to the programmes of virtually all parties of the Left and came to be adopted by most European countries. Before I 945, the majority of children left school after their primary years. In the I9605 the school-leaving age was increased to sixteen in Britain by the Labour government, though immediate implementation was postponed because of lack of funds. In Italy the school-leaving age was increased to fourteen, though the law was ignored by an estimated one in four of the age group.16 Even in Sweden there was a marked divergence between the legal and the actual situation: in I 963 only 88 per cent of fourteen-year-olds were in school. 17 Nevertheless, the standard left-wing position on education -longer schooling, comprehensive education and greater access - became the universally accepted agenda. Thus, the Gaullist regin1e in France legislated in 1959 the increase of the school-leaving age to sixteen by I 967 ~ but the original proposal had been made by Rene Billeres, education minister in the SFIO-led government of Guy Mollet (I956-7).18 By I965, the school-leaving age had been increased to sixteen in Sweden, to fifteen in Britain and most of West Germany, to fourteen in Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Norway.19 Similarly, a policy of comprehensivization (i.e. introducing a single school system throughout compulsory education) became a common feature of the educational system of Western Europe, although, once again, implementation was far more complex than policy-making. In Germany, the Brandt government produced enabling legislation for the establishment of comprehensive schools (Gesamtsehtllen) and left it to the Lander to introduce them: the SPDcontrolled ones did so rapidly; the others delayed it as long as possible. 20 In Britain some Conservative-controlled local authorities defended to the very last the elite grammar school attended by the children of their most loyal voters. In France, in 1963, the junior classes of the elite IYeees were merged with junior secondary schools into a network of comprehensive schools for pupils in the eleven to fifteen age group.21 The Education Act introduced in Italy in 1962 fulfilled a long-standing left-wing demand, by abolishing the distinction between the elite seNoIa media and the sOJola di avvia!1Jento professionale, which provided low-level training to the mass of eleven- to fourteen-year-olds.


394 Table

14.I

Expansion of university students, 1949-69 Number of students

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Greece Holland Italy Norway Portugal Spain Sweden

UK West Germany

Percentage change

1949

1959

19 69

1949-59

1959-69

2.8,000 20,000 9,200 1.2.,000 137,000 14,000 2.9,000 146,000 5,3 00 13,000 50,000 15,000 103,000 10 5,000

;6,000 29,°00 10,000 17,000 202.,000 16,000 38,000 176,000 6,100 2.2.,000 64,000 33,000 120,000 196,000

54,000 70,000 35,000 51,000 61 5,000 50,000 94,000 488,000 20,000 46,000 15 0,000 115,000 243,000 376,000

+28·5 +45. 0 + z..2. +41.6 +47·4 +14·3 +3 1 •0 +20·5

+ 50.0 +14 1.4 +25°. 0 +200.0 +2°4.4

+15. 1 +28.0 +120.0 +16·5 +86.6

+2.12.·5 +147-4 +177·3 +227·9 +1°9. 1 +134·4 +248·5

+lOz·5 +91.8

Notes: The 1949 and 1959 figures for France include the University of Algiers. The figures for Sweden include all institutions of higher education.

Source: Mitchell, 'Statistical Appendix 192.0-1970" in Cipolla (ed.), The Fontana Economic History rf Europe. Contemporary Economies, Vol. 2, Fontana, London 1976, pp. 736-7.

The inevitable consequence of this was an unparalleled expansion of the university system throughout Western Europe, as Table 14. I illustrates. Between 1959 and 1969, the number of students in higher education doubled or trebled virtually everywhere except Austria. But clearly there is no correlation between this increase and the intensity of student unrest; otherwise> there would have been a much more severe disruption of the universities in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Greece than elsewhere. Nor is there a significant correlation bet\Veen the weight of the Left in government and the expansion: France under de Gaulle, Spain under Franco, Greece under conservative and then authoritarian governments all did better than Britain under Labour or predominantly social-democratic Austria. A better correlation would probably be obtained if one used an index of university overcrowding. In France, Germany and Italy, anyone with the appropriate school-leaving certificate could enter a university. By the end of the 19608, the University of Rome had 60,000 students, though its structures could cope with at best a few thousand. The result was chronic overcrowding. Higher education became a question of being lectured at (assuming one could gain access to the lecture theatres) and passing the relevant examina~ tions. Students in Germany and Italy could stay at university as long as they liked, until they dropped out or graduated. Teachers had little or no contact with them. By 1968, in France, 95 per cent of those who passed the bacca/aureal


395

entered the universities. Fifty per cent of these were eliminated by the firstyear examination, as an education minister remarked: 'It is as if we organized a system of shipwreck in order to pick out the best swimmers.'22 It is thus not far-fetched to suggest, as Walter Laqueur has done, that 'The student protests in the 1960s were partly the outcome of this hypertrophy of the university and the resulting shortcoming in higher education.'23 Whatever the reasons behind student unrest, it is evident that the position of the Left on secondary and higher education could be reduced to a simple proposition: education should be expanded as economic resources allowed; secondary education should be reformed so that more people could have access to universities. Of course, this position was shared by many conservative parties. Politicians were evidently responding to popular pressures on the basis of the general recognition that a university education was the passport to a better job. On the Left, there was greater enthusiasm for this than on the Right, mainly because left-wing values clashed with the elitism of traditional university culture. However, the overall political strategy towards higher education was brutally quantitative: more was thought to mean better. In the absence of adequate funding, such expansion inevitably led to a relatively devalued qualification. In these circumstances, the losers, generally speaking, could be found among those who were expected to benefit the most - those least endowed 'with the inherited means of exploiting their qualifications', in other words, the children of the lower-income groups.24 Popular pressure for access was not the only factor behind the expansion. There was also a growing understanding that developed capitalism, modernization, high technology, and the scientific revolution, required highly qualified personnel. Had this been thought through, it would have resulted in a demand for greater planning - that is, matching the expansion to the required growth and, more importantly, establishing which disciplines needed expanding more than others. Such planning, which might have served capitalist growth better, would have been highly controversial. It would have required the establishment of social priorities by politicians. This was anathema to the Right, whose simplistic answer, had it asked itself the question, would have been that the market should decide: it would provide better paid jobs, and more of them, to the graduates in subjects it needed; students would flock to these faculties in greater numbers and all would be well. This, of course, never really occurred. Students entered in greater numbers into so-called 'soft' disciplines taught in the faculties of humanities and social sciences - above all, sociology - and fronl there launched their protest. Fron1 the pojnt of view of the authorities, these faculties had the immeasurable advantage of being cheap: one could cram a very large number of human bodies into a history lecture without spending an extra penny in expensive technical equipment (the teaching of this particular subject not having changed much, at least in its form, since the days of Thucydides). A planner's conception of higher education in terms of priorities would have


also been anathema to student radicals, who were appalled at the very notion that universities were expected to meet the requirements of capitalism. Anti-capitalism was in fact the most obvious ideological basis of the student movement, but its most salient feature was the assumption that politics could be based on semi-permanent mobilization. When the German 'Extra-Parliamentary Opposition' or APO (Ausserparlamentarische Opposition) advocated direct democracy, democratic councils, rule by the assembly of students (or workers in factories), rather than by delegates, it made demands which ran counter to the fundamental principles of Western representative democracy, and hence against those of all the political parties of the Left throughout Europe. It seemed clear to these parties that the historical models from which one could draw analogies with the forms of direct democracy advocated by the students - the Paris Commune, the Russian Soviets, the Italian occupation of the factories in 1920 - belonged to a rejected insurrectionary past, probably unrepeatable and certainly unsustainable. Though it failed to offer a credible political alternative, the student movement expressed a global 'and radical critique of society and its institutions which could not be so easily dismissed. Such a critique had, of course, previously been expressed by individual theorists, writers and artists. What was new in the 1960s was that this was voiced, more or less spontaneously, by a mass movement. Its cultural underpinnings were virtually ignored by the traditional Left, partly because socialist parties had little understanding of cultural politics, partly because it involved concepts which were outside the socialist tradition. What was this cultural substructure? Social theorists have described it as 'post~materialist', an expression which suggests the search for the politics appropriate to an age of abundance. Socialist and capitalist politics, in spite of their differences, shared a common terrain: if resources were scarce, the question was how to distribute them. For post-materialists this assumption did not hold. In an era of abundance, politics must, inevitably, acquire a different form. Politicians of the Left (and the Right) could fairly retort that the assumption that a post-scarcity age had been reached could only be entertained by privileged students, temporarily removed from the world of gainful employment, detached from its competitive ethos and unencumbered by family responsibilities. The real electorate had mortgages or rent to pay, children to feed and clothe, jobs to obtain or preserve. The student radicals arrogantly or childishly ignored these fundamental truths. They were right, however, when they held that human dignity should not be satisfied merely with the riches available on the shelves of supermarkets and department stores; they were wrong when they believed themselves to be the first to hold these views. Nevertheless, there was something new. The new politics, as Christopher Lasch has pointed out, can take manifold and contradictory forms: radical


397

feminism, environmentalism, pacifism, nihilism, a cult of revolutionary violence: But in spite of its anti-intellectualisnl, the infantile insurgency, and the taste for destruction so often associated with cultural politics, it addresses issues ignored by the dominant political tradition: the limits of reason; the unconscious origins of the desire for domination; the embodiment of this desire in industrial technology, ostensibly the highest product of the rational intelligence. 25

In the 1960s the political importance of 'the private', of the self, of subjectivity acquired a mass following. Freud joined Marx as an unlikely ideological sponsor of the politics of the young generation: sexual desire seemed to go in hand in hand with revolutionary aspirations, sexual liberation with political liberation. 26 As )urgen Habermas pointed out in 1969: Today, difficulties that a mere two or three years ago would have passed for private matters - for conflicts between students and teachers, workers and employers, or marital partners, for conflicts between individual persons - now claim political significance and ask to be justified in political terms. Psychology seems to turn into politics - perhaps a reaction to the reality that politics, insofar as it relates to the masses, has long been translated into psychology.27

The celebrated slogans of the Parisian days of May 1968 suggest both the limitations and the novelty of this 'new' politics: 'Be a realist, demand the impossible'; 'I take my desires for reality because I believe in the reality of my desires'; 'It is forbidden to forbid'; '1 have something to say but I don't know what'; 'Ce n'est qu'un debut.' In his study of the Italian protest movement, Tar row, when comparing the students' specific demands with those of the other groups, pointed out that students far more often demanded new rights, rather than 'more of X'.28 The parties of the Left could react only by ignoring these 'cultural underpinnings', and attempting to appropriate specific demands which could be transformed into the terminology of established political discourse. It was not possible to accept the demands of the students without fundamentally changing the established Left's own attitude that politics was something best left to professional politicians. The students, however, had asked not only for the 'impossible', but also for reform of higher education and for greatet· democracy in the universities. This was the language communists and socialists recognized. It was the language of 'normal' politics. Trade unions, the bureaucratic institutions so despised by the students, came out in support of these not impossible demands. Exploiting the palpable embarrassment of the government, the French workers added their own demands in the course of the longest general strike in European history. They did not den1and the impossible either: a real forty-hour week, a significant increase in wages, and an extension of trade union rights at the workplace. Thus, the events of May proceeded almost


from the beginning on two levels: a utopian~subjective level (whose longterm effects are still to be studied) and a practical-political one. But often as is generally the case in times of acute political crisis - the two levels appeared to be intertwined. On Monday 2.7 May workers at the RenaultBillancourt near Paris rejected the accord of the rue de Grenelle negotiated by their own once-trusted communist union leaders. The settlement, when it was eventually revised and accepted, involved a commitment to a reduction of the working week, a 35 per cent increase in the minimum wage (this was of importance only for half a million workers), and other increases ranging from 18 per cent in the clothing industry to 7 per cent for the chemical workers. 29 However, all this must have seemed rather mundane on that fateful Monday morning. At this stage, for a few days, the prevailing impression was that anything could happen, that the workers too had started to demand the impossible, that there were no longer 'normal' political solutions. In these unforeseen circumstances what did the official Left do? Very momentarily, the initiative passed to the Socialists. On Tuesday 28 May Mitterrand, assuming that de Gaulle would resign, announced his candidature for the presidency of the Republic and proposed that a caretaker government headed by Pierre Mendes-France be formed immediately. Mendes-France, because of the support he received from the small pro-student Parti Socialiste Unifie, was the 'establishment' personality most acceptable to the activists of May. Underlying this call was the assumption that elections would have to be called fairly soon. In other words, Mitterrand's strategy consisted of demanding that Parliament support an 'exceptional' government, pending elections. This was very similar to the strategy adopted by de Gaulle in May 1958 when he took over. The official Left's response had been the mirror-image of that of its opponent. Its legality was tenuous: constitutionally speaking, the Parliament elected in 1967 was the only legitimate forum for approving a new government. Had de Gaulle resigned, the existing government headed by Georges Pompidou would have had to remain in charge until a new president had been chosen. Legalistic as ever, the PCF was not enthusiastic about Mitterrand's proposal, but its Left unity strategy allowed it no alternative but to support Mitterrand. Paradoxically, when it looked as if the revolutionary crisis had come, it was Mitterrand's 'respectable' socialists who seemed to be prepared to act extra-constitutionally, not the formerly insurrectionary communists. On Wednesday 29 May, de Gaulle disappeared for five hours to consult his generals, giving the impression that no one was in effective control of the country. He reappeared the following day, Thursday 30 May, having decided not to resign. Instead, he dissolved Parliament (a presidential prerogative) and called for elections. Five hundred thousand people demonstrated on that day on de Gaulle's behalf; it was the largest demonstration of May 1968. The peF responded in the only way it could: by agreeing to fight the elections. This was not unreasonable: in 1967 the Left had obtained over 40 per cent.


399

It could expect that the radical winds of May would deliver a left-wing majority. Elections were the only realistic means by which to resolve the situation. All the established political forces -- Gaullists, communists and socialists were for different reasons committed to an electoral solution. The PCF defended this by claiming that an insurrection was impossible. The workers would have been defeated. There would have been a massacre, perhaps a bloody civil war. In reality, an insurrection was impossible since no one, students included, had ever seriously considered the possibility of staging one. Insurrectionary politics, so often celebrated in chants, slogans and speeches, was no n10re than a cathartic hope for the future, an expression of a desire to escape from the constraints of electoral politics. Leninists of the Trotskyist variety, such as Ernest Mandel, a fierce critic of the PCF's reformism, accepted that the conditions for an armed insurrection did not exist. 30 Mandel's unimaginative and predictable alternative was the adoption by the France of the 19608 of Leon Trotsky's transitional programme of 1938. More significantly, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the student 'leader' whose voice was nearer to the authentic spirit of May than that of Mandel, never really believed that there would be an insurrection. On 20 May, the weekly Nouvel Observateur carried an interview with Cohn-Bendit by Sartre. The philosopherinterviewer asked what effects the present movement would achieve. CohnBendit lucidly replied: The workers will obtain the satisfaction of a number of material demands, and the moderates in the student movement and the teachers will put through important university reforms ... There will be some progress, of course, but nothing basic will have changed and we shall continue to challenge the system as a whole ... Besides, I don't believe the revolution is possible overnight like that, I believe that all we can get are successive adjustments of more or less importance, but these adjustments can only be imposed by revolutionary action. 3 !

The 'revolutionary crowd' itself - the students demonstrating in the Latin Quarter lacked the necessary anger which could turn protest into a civil war. May 1968, far from being the proof that a violent revolution in the West was possible, confirmed what had become evident since 1945, namely that it was inconceivable. Years later, the fantasy of May '68, La Revolution, had become the object of ironic advertising; a 1986 publicity slogan to launch IKEA (the Swedish furniture suppliers) in France proposed: Mai 63, on a rifait Ie monde; Mai 86, on rifait la cuisine (in May '68 we redesigned the world, in May '86 we'll redesign the kitchen). It was in the nature of student unrest that it could not produce a new image of society around which to mobilize a majority. Anarchy can never be hegemonic. Anarchists can occasionally topple crowns, but never enjoy the results. Revolutionaries were as baffled by the events, which had caught them unprepared, as the non-revolutionaries: prior to the May events, an editorial

400


in Le Monde lamenting the unexciting political stability of Gaullist France was entitled La France s'ennuie. The exceptional crisis was resolved conventionally that is, by an electoral contest between Left and Right, both equally committed to electoral politics. Routine politics was re-established. Imagination once again abdicated. L'ennui returned. Some contemporaries concluded that it was not possible to examine the May events in a rationalist manner: 'It cannot be seen with the eyes, only with poetry and the most abstract of thoughts, and these are the two muses invoked here ... Revolutions are the ecstasy of history: the moment when social reality and social dream fuse (the act of love).'32 Medical students in Paris wrote: We don't want a revolution because we are fed up with others and with ourselves, but because we want to find each other again. We want to talk about medicine around a drink in the faculty and we want our patients to be something more than social security matriculation numbers.33

Raymond Aron, one of the most lucid representatives of conservative France, wrote that May 1968 was 'one of those strange national crises of which France holds the secret'.34 Bewildered by it all (he was hardly the only one), Aron resorted to dotty comparisons: the May events had been a 'psychodrama', he told his listeners on Radio-Luxembourg on 1 ]une,35 'a verbal delirium 36 possibly caused by overcrowding, for there were in fact too many students in the universities and they probably suffered from a neurosis of over-population which, as biology had demonstrated, affects 'rats and other animals ... when faced by an extremely high density'. 37 Fran~ois Mitterrand had a more perceptive self-criticism: 'the Left was taken by surprise ... The movement of May was an original event ... My generation ... has been blind and deaf. If I am more critical towards the Left to whom I belong and with whom I continue to express my solidarity, it is because it is the vocation of the Left to represent what is new and just.'38 Yet he poured scorn upon the leaders of the movement: ~when they wanted to explain the motivations behind their demonstrations ... what a mish-mash of quasi-Marxisn1, what hotch~potch, what confusion!'39 Commenting soon after the events, two French writers listed no fewer than eight interpretations: it was a plot, a communist conspiracy (a view favoured by de Gaulle and Pompidou), though most commentators agreed that if the PCF had contributed to anything at all, it was to a return to law and order; it was the result of a crisis in the university, of the old~fashioned and sclerotic teaching of French academics; it was the result of a 'fever' among the young, the result of an Oedipal desire to kill the father (Le. de Gaulle or the old generation); it was a spiritual revolt against a decaying civilization; it was a traditional class conflict (the view of the PCF); it was a political crisis due to the lack of a left-wing alternative and the excessive longevity of Gaullism; it was due to an unforeseeable chain of circumstances, a momentous bungle: if


401

only the police had not been called to the Sorbonne, if only Pompidou had not been abroad at the beginning of May, if only . . . 40 The elections of 1968 were a serious blow for the PCF and the socialists. Mitterrand's FGDS lost sixty-one seats, with 16.5 per cent of the votes; the peF lost thirty-nine seats, obtaining 2.0 per cent. The entire Left now held only ninety of the 487 seats in the National Assembly. There is little doubt that this result represented a vote for law and order. The Gaullists made inroads among industrial workers, obtaining more working-class votes than the communists. 41 Co-operation between the FGDS and the PCF was at a low ebb. Like all previous blows, the coup de grace for the PCF was delivered from the USSR, when it invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968. At first the PCF expressed 'its surprise and reprobation' at Mosco\v'S action an unprecedented reproach. 42 Then it pretended to believe in the agreement the Czech leader had been forced to sign with the occupying forces. This pusillanimous attitude was sufficient to provide the supporters of Mollet and Defferre with the excuse required to break the unity pact with the PCE The renewal of anticommunism in the SFIO was marked by an apparent return to fundamentalist socialist rhetotic. In an address to the National Council of the SFIO, Mollet urged his followers to reject any deviation from the 'basic principles of socialism' and, in January 1969, the SFIO changed its name to Parti Socialiste and nominated Gaston Defferre as its candidate for the forthcoming election. 43 Thus, initially it looked as if the effect of 1968 was a complete return to 'normalcy'. Gaullism was back at the helm. The Left was as divided as ever, with socialists and communists content to wallow in outdated thinking. Some argued that what was needed was a new political party to recast the socialist tradition in the light of the May events. This hope had parallels in other countries, \vhere new left-wing parties had distanced themselves from both moderate social democracy and orthodox comn1unism. In Denmark the 1960s saw the ascent of what might be called a 'spoiler' party: the SF (Socialistisk Folkeparti). This had been formed in 1958 by the then president of the Communist Party, Aksel Larsen, who, as a consequence of I because the recession had hit other countries, so that the vital remittances of Portuguese and Spanish emigrants from abroad was reduced. Portugal's balance of payments, in surplus thanks to these remittances, moved into deficit after 1974.

50

The relative absence of social conflict in Portugal (as compared to Spain) had the effect of containing the internal pressure for reform. The Portuguese diehards hampered Caetano's timid reformist initiatives. 51 In Spain, however, social unrest was one of the determinants of the transition to democracy. Attempts to buy it off through increases in wages aggravated the plight of an economy badly hit by the oil price rise. In Portugal social unrest occurred only after the military takeover, and helped to push the revolution forwards. In Greece the transition was far more restricted to the elites than in the other two countries. Econon1ic prosperity is a great engine for change. Democracies are much better at adapting to modernization than other systems. In Italy, for instance, one might have expected that the consumer boom of the late 19 50S would

606

THE END OF THE GREAT CAPITALI ST BOOM

have destabilized a traditional party like the DC. But the DC was forced by electoral politics to find new ways of keeping in touch with the changing aspirations of the population. It played the cards of tradition and modernization, both in politics and in economics. The Franco and Salazar regimes could accept the modernization of the economy, but not of the political system. When the 'economic miracle' had nearly run its course, the Italian DC could renew the political system by bringing in new blood, in the shape of the Italian Socialist Party. Franco and Salazar could bring in, at best, enlightened technocrats, at worst obtuse bureaucrats. Mass consumption is a revolutionary force. It cannot be used to pacify the workers without inducing political changes. High consumption requires high wages. But what is the point of an authoritarian regime if it cannot contain wages? As the consumer society expanded in Spain and, to a lesser extent, in Portugal, it made these two countries more similar to the rest of Western Europe. Psychologically, this meant that the Spanish middle classes were readier to experiment with democracy which, as France, Britain and West Germany testified, co-existed quite happily with consumer capitalism. The young executives recruited by foreign firms picked up the habits and culture of the international business class (including sharp clothes, airport novels and bad manners), and passed them on to their counterparts in Spanish-owned firms. 52 Traditional Catholic values, the life-support system of the regime, could not co-exist, unsullied, with the alleged delights of the consumer society: easier sex, pornography, topless bathing, hedonism, the pursuit of wealth. The tourism boom was particularly pronounced in the poorest part of Spain. Local farmers' sons were transfonned into waiters overnight. In John Hooper's perceptive words: 'Accustomed to measuring the time in hours, they were all of a sudden expected to think in minutes.'53 As a result, according to a study carried out in 1971, 90 per cent of all nonchronic mental illness in rural Malaga was among young males who had gone to work on the coast. 54 The economic successes of the two Iberian dictatorships had catapulted their societies into the modern world. But this, far from solidifying their regimes, made them appear redundant, technically obsolete, and anachronistic. S5 This had become so evident that many supporters of the two regimes began to advocate change. In Spain, Manuel Fraga lribarne, later leader of the conservative Alianza Popular, published EI desarrollo politico (Political Development) in 1971, in which he argued that Spain required modern political institutions since it had now become an industrial society. S6 In Portugal a senior general, Antonio Spinola, had written a book, Portugal e 0 futuro (Portugal and the Future), which appeared in 1974, a few weeks before the military takeover, in which he provided a plan for extricating Portugal from its unwinnable colonial \vars.

THE END OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

607

The Revoiufiio in Portugal The transition to democracy was far more dramatic in Portugal than in the other two countries. The bloodless military takeover of April 1974 was followed by twenty-seven months of political crisis and six provisional governments, before the establishment of the first constitutional government on 2.2. July 1976. It became clear, soon after the coup, that the Socialist Party (PS) was, electorally speaking, the dominant force. Consequently, the sooner a Western-type liberal democracy was established, the sooner political power would shift away from the military and their supporters, the communists. In Greece and Spain it was always clear that the only credible alternative to the old regime was a parliamentary democracy. From its inception the Portuguese Revolution - as the military takeover was called, with some justification - was strongly reminiscent of the fervour and hopes of May 1968 in Paris: the same belief that everything was possible; a similar feeling that 'normality' was suspended; the same intoxicating excitement. The way it was launched was emblematic. On the night of 2.4-2 S April 1974, a DJ working at Radio Clube Portuguesa selected a song the regime had banned, Grandola vila morena - a ballad about a village in the Alentejo. This was the agreed signal for military units to converge on Lisbon to take power. It was the first revolution launched by aDJ. That the regime was tottering was obvious to many. That it would be brought down by an internal military coup led by young officers was not. The socialist leader, Mario Soares, for instance, in a book which first appeared in France in 1972 (publication in Portugal was then impossible), referred to possible sources of opposition to the regime in the church and business circles, but not in the military. 57 The officers now in charge appointed as provisional president General Spinola, the best-known advocate of reform under the old regime, and constituted themselves as the Movinlento das For worked to the advantage of efficient firms. Socialists in charge of thriving capitalist economies will be able to demand more progressive forms of international regulation than socialists in less advanced countries. The EU is a good example of this type of regulator. Its social policy is cheaper to administer than the more traditional socialist welfare system (which socialized welfare costs), because it does not involve further public expenditure (except for public employers). The main problem with such public policy is that it will be directed merely towards the protection of those who are employed and do little to provide the unemployed with jobs. Yet unemployment will be the most important challenge facing

EPILOGUE

773

socialists in the next decades. This problem cannot be underestimated: in Western Europe in 1992., unemployment stood at 18,455,700, more than the total population of Denmark, Norway and Sweden combined. Today, as yesterday - as I<eynes stated in his 'Concluding Notes' to the General Theory - 'The outstanding faults of the economic society in which we live are its failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes.'7o Of all fields of state economic activity, monetary policy is where governments have lost the most autonomy. But many of the other traditional 'core' functions of European nation-states have been, at least in part, 'Europeanized': border controls, commerce and trade, economic management, industrial policy, immigration, equality at work, foreign policy, taxation. Welfare has remained largely in the hands of national governments. 7! In regulating their own capitalism in the interests of social justice, socialists or their inheritors will have to look - more than in the past not only to production, but also to reproduction, culture, communications, gender relations and the quality of life. Much of this remains within the reach of nationally based politics. Meaningful domestic reforms will deal mainly with issues such as the organization (rather than the funding) of the public sector, particularly education (including child-care) and health care. These are least subject to the governance of the interdependent world and, at least in the short run, the organization of education and health care (as distinct from their costs) does not affect the competitiveness of capitalist firms. In the long run, of course, education is of decisive importance to economic growth. Much of this book has been concerned with highlighting the effect that interdependence has had on socialist politics. That what happens in one part of the world may affect what happens in other parts is not new. Some of the more perceptive minds of the Left, such as the Italian communist leader, Palmira Togliatti, had indicated in the late 19 50S that this would require a change in socialist politics. 72 What is new, especially since the 1980s, is that interdependence has reached such an intensity that it has thrown into crisis traditional concepts of national politics and all political parties and ideologies. Socialists have been more affected than conservatives, because of their essential conviction that politics can govern the economy. In a global economy, national politics can survive only at a less ambitious level, although this will not necessarily lead to the end of major differences in economic policy between Left and Right. 73 How does interdependence manifest itself? In the first place, in the spectacular growth of international trade, which more than twice outstrips the growth of world output. 74 Secondly, in the development of an international money market ten times larger than that required by trade. This largely speculative market in essentially footloose money responds to the widespread uncertainty surrounding future price movements. 75 This uncertainty is the other side of the unregulated nature of the markets. It forces the operators

774


into a series of very short-term reactions to minor fluctuations. The origin of much of this has been national decisions - or the lack of them. 76 For instance, in October 1979 the British government abolished exchange controls. In so doing, it created an irreversible situation: controls could not be restored without provoking a disastrous run on the currency.77 By detaching itself from the secure moorings of the nation-state, capitalism has lost its principal regulatory framework. In the absence of a world regulator - which is what the Pax Americana had been for nearly fifty years will the system collapse in anarchy? The omens do not favour the optimists. As long as the debt burden on Third World countries remains, it will be impossible for them to aspire to any kind of prosperity. Any trade surplus they achieve quickly evaporates in debt repayment: during the UN 'decade of development', the poorer Third World countries transferred over 236 billion dollars to the advanced world a kind of 'development aid in reverse,.78 It is not only capitalism which has been 'globalized'. National politicians (including socialists) have also had to face the international effects of this globalization. Virtually all environmental problems have now become international problems, and nearly all of these are connected to economic development: car exhaust fumes, acid rain, river and sea pollution, oil spillages, nuclear power and global warming. It has become impossible to visualize self-contained 'national' problems which will not, sooner rather than later, affect other countries. In the era of mass communications, everything travels: Islamic fundamentalism as well as models of sexual behaviour, CNN news as well as pop music. The problems of the so-called Third World are not confined to the Third World. Drug addiction and terrorism have been an issue at least since the nineteenth century, but they have become a major problem of public policy requiring international co-ordination only since the 197°s. The response has been the multiplication of international agencies aimed at dealing with cross-border problems and the growth of international regional all based on nation-states. On I co-operation in fact, trading blocs January 1995, the European Union included all Western European countries except Switzerland, Norway and Iceland - thus constituting the largest single market in the world. Before then, the USA, Canada and Mexico had established the North Atlantic Free Trade Area; the countries of the Organization of African Unity had formed the African Economic Community (1991); Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia had created the Union du Maghreb Arabe (1989); in December 1991, Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Colombia had reactivated the Pacto Andino aimed at abolishing all custom duties by 1996; while Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay had established the Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR, or 'Common Market of the South'); soon after acquiring independence, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania formed a Baltic common market; while ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations, comprising Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines,

EPILOGUE

775 79

Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, was reactivated. At the international level, the General Agreen1ent on Tariffs and Trade (GATf) negotiations were completed, leading to the formation of the World Trade Organization. AU these are associations of 'sovereign' nation-states. Thus, the response to the de facto weakening of national powers has been to consolidate national governments as the best negotiators on behalf of the nation as a whole. Internal politics will increasingly become a contest between parties over who can best defend the 'national interese. The new global stage of capitalism will constrain socialists far more than conservatives. Conservatives will use their nationalist credibility to negotiate better terms in the international arena on behalf of their own nation-state. At the same time, in the name of the international requirements of modern capitalism, they will accept the abandonment of internal - that is national - regulation. Old Marxists will be left to smile wryly at this conservative embrace of terms once so central to socialism: internationalism and the 'withering away of the state'. Any political discourse which can conjoin both untrammelled global capitalism and nationalism will provide conservatism with an enormous political advantage. While capital (and its accompanying problems) is further internationalized, politics is further 'nationalized~. While nationalism is the growing force in the former communist camp, in Western Europe it is acquiring a new lease of life. In 1994, the enthusiastically pro-European French Socialist Patty was destroyed at the election by a Right signalling its coolness towards Europe. In Britain, the Conservative Party was 'defending British interests' (Le. those of inefficient British entrepreneurs able to compete in Europe only by denying their workforce rights obtained elsewhere), by opting out of the European regulation of the labour market. In Italy, a new force emerged in 1994 to snatch from the Left the victory it had sought for so long. Significantly enough, it was called Forza Italia! the roar one hears in the stadium from football nationalists. Its principal ally was Alleanza nazionale, heir to Mussolini, now fully legitimized. Elsewhere, nationalism co-exists with the trend towards integration, as in Greece, where PASOI( waves the Bag to prevent Macedonia using the same name as a Greek province, while its own economic recovery is utterly dependent on ED funds amounting to 5 per cent of GDP80 Even in so small a country as Norway, alone in voting against EU membership in 1994, some figment of national sovereignty is touchingly preserved, even though the reality is that Norway, outside a political and economic community which includes nearly the whole of Western Europe, will simply be forced to comply with rules established elsewhere and upon which it will have no say.8l National executives increase their powers at the expense of national parliaments - whose remaining function is to provide governments with democratic legitimacy. Issues will become of less relevance because, in a climate of ceaseless negotiations whose outcome can never be ensured in advance (nor, therefore, guaranteed in a pre-electoral manifesto), what will


become ever more important is the notion of fides implicita between electorates and politicians that is, the delegation of decisions to someone not on the basis of what they promise, or what they stand for, but in the belief that they can be 'trusted'.82 If policies are not clear, and we do not know what anyone will do, the question of the personality of politicians (already thrown into high relief by television) will assume ever greater significance. In principle, this should not a priori favour Left or Right. What it does, however, is to reproduce a conception of politics in which electorates - once they have chosen their rulers - remain passive spectators of a game played at some distance, although none of this prevents the increasingly frequent outbursts of campaigning on specific issues. Is it surprising, then, that under these conditions electorates wish to retain for themselves the only power which may matter - purchasing power - by electing tax-cutting governments? Impoverished nation-states, now simple actors in a complex international arena, governed by ephemeral personalities elected for their looks, their acceptable private moral habits, or their ability to face questions on television, are not likely to provide socialists with the best framework for moulding the future. Socialist activists will be tempted - and many have already succumbed to dump their values in the turmoil of renewal, forgetting Machiavelli's lesson that the true innovators are those who change their strategy and adapt it to the new terrain, not those who have lost their compass, the values which impart direction to their politics. The ideology of the 'end-of-ideology' is not that of socialists, while those who claim that the division between Left and Right has lost all meaning may do well to remember Alain's famous aphorism of 1930: 'When I am asked whether the division between Left and Right still has any meaning, the first thought which comes to my mind is that the person who asks the question is not on the Left.'8} The pressures on all parties, especially those of the Left, to remain enclosed in national shells are compelling. How they will respond to this, and how national politics will develop in the course of the next century, is impossible to predict, though for the Left to remain national, while capitalism is international, would be like becoming a shadow that has lost its body. But parties can continue to exist well after the conditions which brought them into being have disappeared. The story I have traced indicates that the fate and probably the future of West European socialism cannot be separated from that of European capitalism. The crisis of the socialist and social-democratic tradition in Western Europe is not the crisis of an ideology defeated by the superior political and organizational strength of its opponents as communisnl has been. It is an integral component of a fin-de-siecle turmoil reshaping the planet at momentous speed. The socialist design, however defined, may fade away while socialist parties survive. I do not know whether the idea of socialism will weather the great chaos of the end of this millennium and the beginning of the next. Those

EPILOGUE

777

who have had sympathy for the socialist project, shared its hopes and its values, and have been impatient with the endless prevarications, the unending compromises, the stultifying hesitations of its organized parties, may well be reminded that, when all is said and done, these parties are the only Left that is left.

Notes

Introduction 1. For a discussion of the interpretations of the centenary by the French socialists, see (fare Angenot, ISS9. Un ital du discours social, Editions du Preambule, Quebec 1989, pp. 97~7°3·

2.. For a reflection on the first centenary of 1789, see Eric J. Hobsbawm, Echoes of the darseillaise. l1vo Centuries Look Back on the French Revolution, Verso, London 1990, chapter 3. )n the decision leading to the adoption of 14 July, see Charles Rearick, 'Festivals in Modern 'rance: The Experience of the Third Republic',}ournal oj Contemporary History, Vol. 11., no. , July 1977, pp. 443-5· 3. Editorial in Le eri du peup/e, edited by the Blanquist Edouard Vaillant, Friday, 4 January 889· 4. Marc Angenot, Le cenlenaire de la revolution 1889, La documentation Paris 989, p. 12.. 5. Patrick Garcia, 'L'Etat republicain face au centenaire: raisons d'Etat et universalisme lans la commemoration de la Revolution fran~aise', in Jacques Bariety (ed.), 1889: Centenaire 'e la Revolution Franfaise, Peter Lang, Berne 1991, pp. 145-6. 6. Cited in Jean Garrigues, 'Le Boulangisme et la Revolution frans:aise', in Bariety (ed.), 'p. cit., p. 171. 7. His/oirt de la lIt Infernafionale. Congres International Quvrier Soeialiste, Paris 14-22. July 889, Vols 6-7, 1\finkoff Reprint, Geneva 1976, pp. 19-.20. 8. Patricia van der Esch, La deJJxieme internationale 1889-192), Librairie Marcel Riviere, )aris 1957, p. 2.2. 9· Ibid., p. 37· 10. Ibid., p. 40. 11. Ibid., p. 4 I; see pp. 187-279 for the resolutions of the possibilistes. 12. The working classes were absent. It is this 'fourth estate' which is depicted on the lcket of this book. 13. See, for instance, Jerzy Topolski, 'Continuity and Discontinuity in the Development ,f the Feuqal System in Eastern Europe (Xth to XVIIth Centuries)" journal of European jcono!!lic Hist0f)', Vol. 10, no. z, Fall 1981. 14. Fernand Braudel, A Histo!)' of CitJl/izafions, trans. Richard 1\1ayne, Allen Lane/Penguin, .ondon 1994, PP' 316- 1 7, reminds us that 'all liberties ... threaten each other; one limits nother, and later succumbs to a further rival'. 1 5. E. L. Jones, The BuropealJ Miracle. EtwirofJ",el1ts, Economies and Geopolitics in the Histof)1 f E'J(rope and Asia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 198 7, pp. 45, 57.

I.

The Establishment of Socialism Before 1914

I. See Otto Bauer, 'Die Geschichte eines Buches', Neue Zeit, 1908 (written in 1907 on he fortieth anniversary of the publication of the first volume of Das Kapita!), cited in

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

779

Gtintt..::r Roth, The Social Dcft/ocrats in Impcrial Germal!Jl. A Stud), in fJ70rking-Classl Isolation and National Integration, Bedminster Press~ Towota NJ 196}, p. 2.00. 1.. See Eric J. Hobsbawm, 'The Fortunes of Marx's and Engels' Writings" in E. J. Hobsbawm (ed.)~ The History 0/ Marxism, Vol. I: Marxism in Marx's Dqy, Harvester Press, Brighton 1982~ p. 33 I. 3. See Bauees own list of the principal components of vulgar Marxism cited in Roth, op. cit., p. 2.0 I • 4. See the text and the accompanying article in Simonetta Soldani, 'Un primo maggio piccolo piccolo', ltalia Contemporanea, no. 190, 1farch 1993, pp. 37-64. 5. Eric J. Hobsbawm, The 0/ Empire IS7J~lf}l4, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1987, pp. 118-21. 6. How trade union values were constructed through discourse by activists among British ,'vorkers has been ably explained by Patrick Joyce in his Visions 0/ the People, Industrial England and the Ques/ion of Class 1848-1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991, especially chapters 4 and 5. 7. Cited in Stanley Pierson, Marxist Intellectuals and the Working Class Mentaliry in Germany 1887-1912, Harvard University Press, Cambridge ~1A 1993, p. 64. 8. Carl E. Schorske, German Social Dctllocrac.} 190}-[917. The Development 0/ the Great Schism, John Wiley and Sons, New York 1965 (1St edn 1955), p. 3. 9. Friedrich Engels, Introduction to Karl Marx, Class Struggles in France 184S-18Jo, International Publishers, New York 1964, pp. 19~ 20 and 27. 10. Peter Nettl, 'The German Social Democratic Party 1890-1914 as a Political Moder, Past and Present, no. 30, April 1965, p. 65. Socialists and Catholics in pre-fascist Italy suffered a similar fate. I I. David Blackbourn, Class, Religion and Local Politics in Wilhelmine Gerrnal1)l. The Centre ParD' in Wiirttemberg before [9[4, Yale University Press, New Haven CT 1980, p. 2.6. This book provides a detailed analysis of the construction of the Centre Party as a modern mass political party. 12. Franco Andreucci, 'La diffusione e la volgarizzazione del marxismo', in Stona del Marxis1l1o. Vol. 2: 1I1Y1arxis!I1o mll'et;; della Jecollda Illterl1aziollale, Einaudi Editore, Turin 1979, pp. 16-17 and pp. 2.5-7. 13. Pierson, op. cit., p. 61. 14. Georges Haupt, Aspects of Internatiollal Socialism 187I-1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 19 86, p. 70. 15. See La Charle de Quaregnon, declaratiolt de principes dll Parti Socialiste Beige, Fondation Louis de Brouckere, Brussels 1980, pp. 146-7. 16. E. H. Krossman, The LOJ11 Countries 1730-[940, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1978, pp. 34 1, 344· 17. David Kirby, 'The Finnish Social Democratic Party and the Bolsheviks', Journal of ContemporafJl His/a!)" Vol. II, nos z-3, July 1976, pp. roo, I09-l0. 18. Haupt, op. cit., pp. 49, 59. 19. See James Joll, The Second International IS39-1914, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1974, pp. 1)-16. 20. Hugues Portelli, Le socialislJle fran(tlis tel qu'z'1 est, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1980, Pp.I3-14. 21. A useful description of the pr1ncipal tendencies can be found in Roger l'v1agraw, A His/o']lof the rr8l1ch Wl1rking Class, Vol. 2: Workers cmd the Bourgeois Repllblic, Blackwell, Oxford 199 2, pp. 82-3· 22. Jean-Marie Mayeur and Madeleine Reberioux, The Third Republic from Its Origins to the Great HJar 187[-1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984, pp. I 37-8. The name

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

was changed from Parti auvrier (PO) to Parti auvrier fran(ais (POF) out of patriotism: see Portelli, op. cit., p. 2. I. 13. Ibid., p. 141 and Magraw, op. cit., p. 86. 2.4. Portelli, op. cit., p. I 5. 2.5. lvladeleine Reberioux, 'II dibattito sulla guerra', in Staria del Marxismo, Vol. 2: II marxismo neiPeta della Seconda Internaziona/e, p. 9 I 8. 2.6. Mayeur and Reberioux, op. cit., p. 302. See also Jean Touchard, La gauche en France depuis 1900, Editions du Seuil, Paris 1977, pp. 37-9' 27. Haupt, op. cit., pp. 60-1. 2.8. Magraw, op. cit., p. 82.. 29. Tony Judt in his Marxism and the French Left, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986, p. 16. 30. Portelli, op. cit., p. 3I. 3 I. Richard Gillespie, The Spanish Socialist Party, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989, pp. 9, 15. 32.. Gaetano Arfe, Slaria del socialisftlo Italiano /392-1926, Einaudi Editore, Turin 1965, p. 1.9. 33. II Partito Socia/ista Italiano nej mot' Congressi, Vol. II, Edizioni Avanti!, Milan 19 6 I, p. 35. 34. Ernesto Ragionieri, 11 marxismo e I'Internazionale, Editori Riuniti, Rome 1972, p. 184. 35. Ernesto Ragionieri, Storia d'Italia. Dall'Unita a oggi, Vol. 4, Tome " Einaudi Editore, Turin 1976, p. 19 I o. ,6. Ibid., pp. 1905-7. The literature on this is vast. For a fine introductory article focusing on Germany and England, see Christiane Eisenberg, 'The Comparative View in Labour History. Old and New Interpretations of the English and the German Labour Movement before 1914', InternationalJournalof Social History, Vol. 34, 19 89, pp. 403-32. 38. David Kirby, ~The Labour Movement' in Max Engman and David Kirby (eds), Finland. People, Nation and State, C. Hurst and Co., London 1989, p. 206. 39. Risto Alapuro, Stale and Revolution in Finland, University of California Press, Berkeley 1988, pp. 109-10,117. See also D. G. Kirby, Finland in the Twentieth Century, C. Hurst and Co., London 1979, pp. 32-3. 40. Carl F. Brand, The British Labour Parl)', Hoover Institution Press, Standford 1974, pp·4- 1 2.. 41. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Labouring Men. Studies in the Histo!)' of Labour, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1972., p. 2.34. 41.. Ibid., p. zp. 43. See the extracts from this Fabian Report in Eric J. Hobsbawm (ed.), Labour~ Turning Point 133O-1!)OO, Harvester Press, Brighton 1974, pp. 57, 58. 44. Brand, op. cit., p. 12.. 45. Gregory Elliott, Labourisnl and the English Genius. The Stra/lge Death if Labour England?, Verso, London 1993, p. 3. 46. Iring Fetscher, 'Bernstein e Ia sfida alPortodossia\ in Storz"a del Marxisma. Vol. 2: II marxismo nell'eta della Seconda lnternazionale, pp. 244-5. 47· Eduard Bernstein, E1mluliona,]' Socialism, Schocken Books, New York 1963, pp. 5473. For a more recent translation, see Eduard Bernstein, The Preconditions of Socialism, edited and translated by Henry Tudor, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994. Here I have used the older edition. 4 8. Ibid., p. 79. 49. Ibid., p. So. 50. Eduard Bernstein, 'The Struggle of Social Democracy and the Social Revolution: 2.. The Theory of Collapse and Colonial Policy', originally in Neue Zeit, 19 January IS98; English translation in H. Tudor and J. M. Tudor (eds) Marxism and Social Democracy', The Revisionist Debate 1396-1393, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988, pp. l68-9.

,7.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

51. Netd, op. cit., p. 68. 52.. Roth, op. cit., p. 161. 53. See Herbert Tingsten, The Swedish Social Democrats, Bedminster Press, Totowa NJ 1973, (originally published in 1941), pp. 118-2.8, 139. 54. Robert Wahl, French Com"'tmislII in the Making 1914-1924, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA 1966, pp. 8-9' 5 5· II Partito Socialista Italiano net suoi Congressi, p. 30. 56. Arfe, op. cit., pp. 149-5 L 57. Marek Waldeberg 'La strategia politica della socialdemocrazia tedesca', in Storia del Marxismo, Vol. 2.: II Marxiullo nell'eta della Secondo Inlernazionale, op. cit., p. 2. I I. 58. Cited in Vernon L. Lidtke, The Out/awed Part)'.' Social DemocraQ' in Germal!y 1878-1890, Princeton Univeristy Press, Princeton NJ 1966, p. 328. 59. Judt, op. cit., p. 116. 60. Cited in Pierre Bezbakh, Histoire et jigllres du socialisme fronfais, Bordas, Paris 1994, p. 135· 61. Krossman, op. cit., p. 341. 6z. Douglas V. Verney, Parliamentary Riform in SlJleden 1866-1921, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1957, pp. 196- 8 . 63. Neil Harding, Lenin's Political Thought, l\facmillan, London 1983, Vol. I, pp. 197-9' 64. For Kautsky, see l\fassimo Salvadori, Kautsky e la n'voluziofl(j socialiSla 1880/19J8, Feltrinelli, Milan 1976, p. l4I. 65. Haupt, op. cit.\ p. 139. 66. Ibid., chapter 5. 67. See Perry Anderson, 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci', in Nelli Left Revim" no. 100, November 1976-:January 1977, PP' 64-5; see also Oskar Negt, 'Rosa Luxemburg e il rinnovamento del marxismo', in Slon"a del Marxismo. Vol. 2.: II marxismo nell'eta della Seconda Internazionale, op. cit., p. 3 I 8. See also Peter Netd, Rosa Luxemburg, Oxford University Press, abridged edn, 1969, pp. 283-4. 68. Nettl, 'The German Social Democratic Party 189°-1914 ... ', p. 73. 69. Dieter K. Buse, 'Party Leadership and Mechanism of Unity: The Crisis of German Social Democracy Reconsidered, 19 10- 1 9 14', JOllrnal of Modern HislotJ', Vol. 62., no. 3, September 1990, p. 490. 70. George Lichtheim, A Short HistofJ' qf Socia/ts!II, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1970, p. 2.z I. 71. Barrington :rv10ore, ]r, I'!!lIstice. The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt, Macmillan, London 1978, p. 219. 72. Dick Geary, Karl Kautsk;y, Manchester University Press, Manchester 1987, pp. 62~3. 73. His pamphlet on the political mass strike was published in 1905; see Massimo L. Salvadori, 'La socialdemocrazia tedesca e la rivoluzione russa del 1905', in Ston"a del tllarxisfIIO. Vol. 2.: II marxis!l:lo nell'eta della Seconda Il1fernaziollale, op. cit., p. 591. 74. Janet Polasky, 'A Revolution for Socialist Reforms: The Belgian General Strike for Universal Suffrage', JOllrnal of Contetl/porafJ' His/01)', Vol. 2.7, no. 3,July 1992.. See also Robert Gildea, Barricades and Borders. Europe 1300-1914, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1987, p. 315· 75. Kirby, op. cit., pp. 30-1. 76. Wolfgang Abendroth, A Short Histot)1 of the European n'lOrking Class, New Left Books, London 1971., p. 44. 77. Berndt Schiller, 'Years of Crisis, 1906-1914~, in Steven Koblik (ed.), jjveden's DevelopTIIent frolll P01)erty to Affluence, Universitr of Minnesota Press, l\1inneapolis 1975, p. 2.oz. 78. See Harding, op. cit., chapter 7.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

79 Merle Fainsod, International Socialism and the World War, Octagon Books, New York 1973 (first published in 1935), p. 10. 80. Cited in Joll, op. cit., pp. 94-5. 81. Cited in Netd, Rosa Luxemburg, p. 132. 82.. For Luxemburg's position, see ibid., p. 133. 83. The text used here can be found in Susanne Miller and Heinrich Potthoff, A History of German Social Democrary. From 1848 to the Present. Berg, Leamington Spa 1986, pp. 240-2.. 84. Schorske, op. cit., p. 6. 85. W. O. Henderson, The Life of Friedrich Engels, Frank Cass, London 1976, Vol. 2, p. 665. 86. Geary, op. cit., p. 40. 87. Ibid., p. 65. 88. Schorske, op. cit., p. 19. 2.

From War to War (1914-40)

I. G. D. H. Cole, A HistOf), oj Socialist Thought. Vol. V; Socialism and Fascism 19}1-19}9, Macmillan, London 1960, p. 6 I • 2.. See Raimund Loew, 'The Politics of Austro-Marxism', in NeJJ/ Left Review, no. 118, November-December 1979, pp. 2, 3-4. For a fuller account of the attitude of the Left to the First World War, see l\ferle Fainsod, Internalional Socialism and the World Ular. 3. Quoted in Joll, The Second Il1ternalionaI1889-1914, p. 168. 4. Polasky, 'A Revolution for Socialist Reforms ... \ p. 450. 5. Fainsod, op. cit., p. 36. 6. Barrington l\foore, ]r, I'!}ustice, p. 22.6. 7. Haupt, Socialism and the Greal war. The Collapse of the Second International, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1972, p. 2.2.0. 8. Ibid., p. 2I 9. 9. Netd, 'The German Social Democratic Party 189°-1914 ... ', p. 81. 10. See Fainsod's perceptive words in op. ciL, p. 41. II. Nettl, op. cit.. pp. 8;-4. 1 2.. Miller and Potthoff, A HistofJ' of Get'tnan Social Democracy, p. 48. 13. Richard J. Evans, Death in Hafllbllrg. Societ.y and Politics in the Cholera Years 18}Q-1910, Penguin, Harmondsworth 1990, pp. 553-4· 14. Hobsbawm, Labouring Men, p. 324. 15. Gareth Stedman Jones, Languages of Class, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge I 9 8;, p. 2. 37. 16. See Bob Holton, British ~Indicalisfll 190(}-I914. Myth and Realities, Pluto Press, London 1976, especially the conclusions. 17. Daniel Ligou, Histoire du socialisme en France 1871-[961, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1962., p. 242.. 18. Fainsod, op. cit., pp. 41.-3,59. 19. Charles S. Maier, Reeastblg Bourgeois Europe. Stabilization in France, Germa,!}, and Italy in the Decade after World war 1, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ 1975, p. 191.. 20. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Cmll/f)1 1914-1991, Michael Joseph, London 1994, p. 69. 2.1. On the importance of the Polish campaign, see AIda Agosti, La Terza lntet·nazionale. Stona DoclIlnentaria, Vol. I, Editori Riuniti, Rome 1974, p. 196. 2.2.. V. 1. Lenin, '''Left-Wing Communism" An Infantile Disorder' (April-May 192.0) in Collected U'70rks, Vol. 31, Progress Publishers, :Moscow 19 6 5-74, p. 97. 23. Fritz Hodne, The Nor}}!egiafl Econofl1)' 1920-1980, Croom Helm, London 198;, p. 19.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1.4. Erik Hansen, 'Crisis in the Party: De Tribune Faction and the Origins of the Dutch Communist Party I 907-9', jOlirnal of Conlef/pOrat)' HisIOf)I, Vol. I I, nos 1.-" July 1976, pp. 4,~64· 25. Judt, Marxism and the French Left, p. 121. 26. For the Italian cases, see Tommaso Detti, Serratli e la formazions del Partito c0111unista italiano, Editori Riuniti, Rome 197%., especially chapter 3. For the Spanish see Gillespie, The

Spanish Socialist Party, p.

,6.

V. 1. Lenin, 'Terms of admission into the Communist International', Collected Works, Vol. 31, pp. 206~I I. The Twenty-one Conditions can be found in Agosti, op. cit., pp. 2.8'-91. 28. See Paolo Spriano, Stalin and the European Communists, Verso, London 1985, pp. 9-10. 1.9. Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic, Unwin and Hyman, London 1988 , p. 35. 30. Eric D. Weitz, 'State Power, Class Fragmentation, and the Shaping of German Communist Politics, I 89D-I 933\ journal of Modern History, Vol. 62, no. 2, June 1990, p. 1.54. 3I. Kolb, op. cit., p. 45. 32.. David Abraham, The Collapse oj the Weimar Republic. Political Econom), and Crisis, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ 1981, p. 266. 33. See the accounts in Ben Fowkes, Communism in German,y under the Weimar Republic, Macmillan, London 1984, pp. 85-6, 91-1°9, and in Rosa Levine-Meyer's memoirs, Inside German Communism. Jt;femoirs of Party Life in the Tf7eimar Republic, Pluto Press, London 1977, pp. 50 - 6. 34. Figures in Fowkes, op. cit., pp. 204-5. The 1921 figures are almost certainly an overestimate. 35. Weitz, op. cit., pp. 285, 29 2. 36. Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, The Declinc of the Third Republic 1914-19}8, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988, p. 301. 37. Touchard, La gauche en France depuis 1900, p. 198. See also Alberto Castaldi, lntellettuali e Fronte popolare in Francia, De Donato, Bari 1978, pp. 46-150. 38. Hobsbawm, Echoes oj the Marseillaise, p. 50; the entire second chapter is devoted to this issue. 39. Daniel R. Brower, The New Jacobills. The rrench Communist ParlJ' and the Popular Front, Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY 1968, pp. 246-7. 40. Maurice Thorez, France TodtfJl and the People's Front, Victor Gollancz, London 1936, p. 178. 41. Touchard, op. cit., p. 203. 42. Data in Touchard, op. cit., p. 205 and Ronald Tiersky, rl·t!.1tch Cotl/munism 1920-1972, Columbia University Press, New York and London 1974, p. 58. 43. Maurice Adereth, The Fret1ch Communist Party. A Critical Histo1)1 (1920-84).' From Cominfern to Ihe colours of France', Manchester University Press, I\1anchester 1984, p. 72. 44. Ibid., p. 78. 45. Tiersky, op. cit., p. 72.. 46. Touehard, op. cit., p. 277. 47. For Britain the best treatment of this is Nina Fishman's The British Communist Party and the Trade Unions, 19Jj-4!, Seolar Press, Aldershot 1995. 48. See the introduction to William E. Paterson and Alastair H. Thomas (eds), The Future oj Social DelllocraD', Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986, p. 2. 49. Article in the SAP journal Tiden, quoted in Herbert Tingsten, The Swedish Social Democrats, p. 42. 5. 50. Christine Buci-Glucksmann and Goran Therborn, Le diji social-de1llocrate, Maspero, Paris 1981, pp. l87, 206. :q. The original Nineteen Conditions are in

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

51. Tingsten, op. cit., p. 20 I. 52. Ibid., pp. 251, 262.-3. ,;. Ibid., p. 2.2.8. 54. Richard Sease, Social Democrary in Capitalist SocieD': Working Class Politics in Britain and Sweden, Croom Helm, London 1977, pp. 2.9, 39, 2.2.. 55. Walter Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1983,

P·47· 56. Mario Tela, La Socialdemocrazia europea nella cnsi degli anni frenta, Franco Angeli, Milan 1985, pp. 2.64, 3°1-2. 57. This is ably explained by Sven Anders Soderplan in 'The Crisis Agreement and the Social Democratic Road to Power', in Steven Koblic (ed.), Sweden's Development /r01l1 Poverty to Affluence IJJo-1970, trans. Joanne Johnson, University of :rvfinnesota Press, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 25 8-7 8. 58. Buci-Glucksmann and Therborn, 0p. cit., pp. 2.03-5. 59. Hodne, op. cit., p. 96. 60. Sven E. Olsson, Social PoliD' and We(fare State in Sweden, Arklv forlag, Lund 1990, p. I 10. 61. Carl Landauer, European Socialism. A Histo!)' of Ideas and Movements, Vol. II, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1959, p. 1542. 62.. Ibid., p. 1551. 63. H. Arndt, The ECOflOmic Lessons 0/ the Nineteen-Thirties, Oxford University Press, London 1944, pp. 2. 14- 18 . 64. Landauer, op. cit., p. ] HI. 65. Tingsten, op. cit., p. 707. 66. W. GlynJones, Dmmark. A Modern Histo!)', Croom Helm, London 19 86 , pp. 135-48. 67· Landauer, op. cit., pp. I 556-9' 68. Paul Preston, The Coming 0/ the Spanish CilJil War, Methuen, London 1983, pp. 6-10. 69· Ibid., pp. 13-15, 84. 70. See Helen Graham, Socialism and War. The Spanish Socialist Party in P01ver and Crisis 19}6-19J9, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991. 71. Helen Graham, 'The Spanish Popular Front and the Civil War', in H. Graham and Paul Preston (eds), The Popular Front il1 Europe, :rviacmillan, London 1987. 71. Preston, op. cit.; see also his 'The Agrarian War in the South', in Preston (ed.), Revolution and war in Spain 19} 1-19}9, Methuen, London 1984. 73. This is the only conclusion possible on the basis of the research available so far. See Kolb, op. cit., p. 142. 74. W. L. Guttsman, The German Social Democratic Party 187f-I9}}, Allen and Unwin, London 1981, p. 311. 75. Miller and Potthoff, op. cit., p. 77. 76. See text of the Garlitz Programme in Miller and Potthoff, op. cit., pp. 2.53-5; the sentence quoted is on p. 2.54. 77· Ibid., p. 2.55· 78. Ibid., p . .254; emphasis in the original. 79· Guttsman, op. cit., p. 3 I 5· 80. Charles S. :Maier, In Search of StabiliD'. Explorations in Political Bcono!I',)', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987, p. 2.05. S I. Ibid., p. 2.04. 82. Abraham, op. cit., pp. 2.49-51 and Gian Enrico Rusconi, La en'si di Weimar. Cnsi di sistema e sconjitta operata, Einaudi Editore, Turin 1977, pp. 46-56. 83. Text in :Miller and Potthoff, op. cit., pp. 2.58-64. The passage quoted is on p. 2.59. 84. Ibid., p. 258.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 85. On Hilferding, see Rusconi, op. cit., pp. 177-2.30. 86. Rudolf Hilferding, speech to the SPD Conference 192.7; extracts in David Beetham (ed.), Marxis!1I in the Face of Fasdsftl, Manchester University Press, Manchester 1983 (citation on pp. 2.51-1; my emphasis). 87. David Abraham, 'Labor's Way: On the Successes and Limits of Socialist Parties in Interwar and Post-World War II Germany', International Labor and WOrking Class History, no. 2.8, Fall 19 85, p. 7. 88. Donna Harsh, German Social DemocraC)' and the Rise of Nazism, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 19931 p. q6, see also p. 163. 89. Knut Borchardt, PerspectizJes on Modern German Economic Ht'st0t:JI, trans. Peter Lambert, Cam bridge U niversi ty Press) Cam bridge 1991, pp. I 82.- 3. 90. G. Feldman, 'German Interest Group Alliances in War and Inflation, 19J4-192.3' in Suzanne D. Berger (ed.), Organizing Interests in Western Europe} Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1983, p. 172.. 91. Magraw, A Histo1)1 if the French Working Class, Vol. 2., p. 2.2.7. 92.. Touchard, op. cit., pp. 141-51 and :l>viagraw, op. cit., p. 2.42.. 93. Judt, op. cit., pp. 13 6-41. 94. Touchard, op. cit., pp. 163-5. 95. He developed these ideas in a series of articles in Le Popu/aire, between July and December 192.2.: see L'Oeuvre de Leon BlulII, Vol. III-l (1914-2.8), Albm Michel, Paris 1972., pp. 2.45-52. He later revived this distinction in a speech at the Ecole Normale Superieurej see L'Oeuvre de Lion Blton, Vol. VI-I (1945-47), pp. 4.2.7-37. This selection of Blum's writings, published in nine volumes, rather surprisingly leaves out his major speech at the congress in the Salle Bellevilloise, 10-11 January 1926, as well as seminal articles in Le Popu/aire, from 2.7 November to 2.6 December 192.9, in which he further develops his key concepts. 96. Gilbert Ziebura, 'Leon Blum a la veille de }'exercice du pouvoie, in Lion Blum chef du gouvernement 1936-37, Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Colin, Paris 1967, pp. 29-3 I. 97. Cited in :l>vIichaei Newman, john Strache], Manchester University Press, Manchester 19 89, p . .2.3· 98. Ziebura, op. cit., p. 35. 99. Julian Jackson, The Poplllar Front in France. Defending DefIJocraOj 1934-38, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988, pp.66-70, where it is pointed out that there is insufficient evidence for a definite answer on the question of communist non"participation in the Popular Front government. 100. The full text of the Popular Front programme can be found in ibid., pp. 2.99-302. 101. Etienne Gout, Pierre Juvigny and Mich op. cit., p. 141. 49. Jelavich, op. cit., p. 2.47· 50. Shell> op. cit., p. IZ.7. 51. Ibid., p. 14 2 • 51. Ibid., p. 164. 53. This is the motion of the 'Base' group, which obtained 46.1 per cent; see PSI, II Parlito sociafista italiano nei slioi congressi. Vol. V, p. 85. 54. Non-specialists can learn by reading Francesca Taddei, II socia/ismo itafiallo del dopoguerra: correllti ideologiche e sce/te politiche (1943-1947), especially pp. 268-78. 55. Paola Caridi, La scissione di Palazzo Barberiui, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Naples 199 1 , pp. 2.53-8. z8. Kurt L. Shell,

Press, 29. 30. 3 I.

NOTES TO CHAPTER

6

797

6. Building Social Capitalism 1945-50 I. Olsson, Sodal Policy and We!fare State in Sl1)eden~ pp. 95, 147-9, 116-17. 2.. Massimo Paci, 'Long Waves in the Development of Welfare Systems'> in Charles S. Maier (ed.), Changing Boundaries of tbe Politica/~ Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987, pp. I92.~3· 3, See, in particular, Walter Korpi, 'Power, Politics, and State Autonomy in the Development of Social Citizenship: Social Rights During Sickness in Eighteen OECD Countries Since 1930', American Sociological RevieJP, Vol. 54, no. 3, June 1989. 4. Harold L. Wilensky, 'Leftism, Catholicism, and Democratic Corporatism: The Role of Political Parties in Recent Welfare State Development', in Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer (eds), The Development oj We!fare States in Europe and America, Transaction Books, New Brunswick and London 1981, p. 355. The argument had been developed in his The tWc!fare State and EqualifJ', University of California Press, Berkeley 1975. 5. See Peter Flora and Jens Alber, ':Modernization, Democratization and the Development of Welfare States in Western Europe', in Flora and Heidenheimer (eds), op. cit.; see also the review of the literature in Joan Higgins, States of We!fare~ Basil Blackwell and Martin Robertson, Oxford 1981. 6. G0sta Esping-Andersen, The Three If/orlds oj We!fare Capitalism, Polity Press, Cambridge 1990, p. 1 18. 7. See these positions explained and discussed in James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, St 1\Iartin's Press, New York 1973; Ian Gough, The Political EconolJl)' of the Welfare State, Macmillan, London 1979; Claus Offe, The Contradictions of the We!fare State, Hutchinson, London 1984, chapter 3; and Ramesh Mishra, The We!fare State in Crisis, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York and London 1984. See also the review article by Theda Skocpol and Edwin Amenta, 'States and Social Policies', Annual Ret)iew oj Soci%g)', Vol. 1 l, 1986, pp. 13 I-57· 8. Paul Addison, The Road to 1945, Quartet Books, London 1977, pp. 2.2.7-8. 9. See Kevin Jefferys, The Churchill Coalition and Wartime Politics, 1940-194J, Manchester University Press, Manches ter 199 I > pp. I 12.-33. 10. See F. W. S. Craig's compilation of conference resolutions, Conservative and Labour Par!)' Conference Decisions 194J-I9Si, pp. 49, 60. II. T. K. Derry, A Histo,]' of Modern Nonvq)' 1Si4-1972, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1973, p. 4 0 9. 12.. Esping-Andersen, Politics against Markets, p. 101. 13. Dorothy Wilson, The Il7elfare State in Sweden. A Stu4J' in Comparathle Social Administration, Heinemann, London 1979, p. 9. Sven E. Olsson argues convincingly that it is excessive to present the 1946 pension reform as a specifically conservative effort: op. cit., pp. 90-107. Olsson's target is Peter Baldwin, 'The Scandinavian Origins of the Social Interpretation of the Welfare State', Comparcllive Studies ill Societ] and Histo!)', Vol. 13, no. I, 1989, pp. 3-2.4; see Baldwin's reply; 'Class, Interest and the Welfare State. A Reply to Sven E. Olsson', in International Revielv of Social HistoIJI, Vol. 34, 1989, pp. 47 1- 84. 14. Jose Harris, 'War and Social History: Britain and the Home Front during the Second World War', ContemporaT)' European HistoT)" Vol. I, Part I, :March 1992., p. 2.6-7. 15. See Eatwell, Tbe 194J-1911 Labour Governments, p. 41. 16. See text in A. Lepre (ed,), Dal crollo del fascismo all'egemol1ia moderata, Guida Editori, Naples 1973, pp. 75- 8 1. 17. David Curtis, 'Marx against the Marxists: Catholic Uses of the Young Marx in the Front poplliaire period (1934-1938)', French C"ltfl1"al Studies, Vol. 2, Part 2, no. 5, June 1991, pp. 16 5- 8 1.

NOTES TO CHAPTER

6

IS. See :Michael Balfour, West Germa11)'. A Contemporary HistoO', Croom Helm, London 1982, p. I 56 and Jeremy Leaman, The Political EconofllY of West Germaf!)" 194J-193J, Macmillan, London 1988, p. 51. 19. Text in Maria Grazia Maiorini, II Mouvement republicain populaire partito della IV Repubblica, Giuffre Editore, Milan 1983, pp. 47-9. 20. See Morgan, Labour in POIJ-'er, p. 20 and Elizabeth Durbin, New Jerusa/ena. The Labour Parry and the Economics of Democratic Socialism, especially pp. 262-3. 11. John Ramsden, 'From Churchill to Heath', in Lord Butler (ed.), The Conservatives. A History from the Origins to 196/) Allen and Unwin, London 1977, p. 423. 2.2.. Esping~Andersen, The Three Worlds of We!fare Capitalism, p. 2.7. 23. Esping-Andersen, Politics against Markets, p. 157. One should note that Beveridge's own conception of a universal subsistence minimum was more restrictive that it might have appeared at first, according to an unpublished paper by John Veit-Wilson cited by J. Harris in op. cit., p. 3 I. 24. D. Wilson, op. cit., p. 10 and Olsson, op. cit., pp. 96, ,12. 25. Tilton, The Political TheOl)' of Swedish Social Democracy, p. I 8 I . 26. See Olsson, op. cit., p. 117 and his table of Swedish welfare reforms 1945-82 on p.114· 27. Esping-Andersen, Politics against Markets, p. 91. 28. Ibid., p. I 58. 29. Leif Lewin, Ideology and Sfrateg')'. A ContN1J1 if Slvedish Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988, pp. 162-73. 30. See Susan Pedersen's remarkable FamilY, Dependence and the Origins of the Wi:(fare State. Britain and France 1914-194J, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993, pp. 413-15. 3 I . Shennan, Rethinking France, p. 1. 13. 32. Jean-Pierre Rioux, La France de /a Quatrieme. Ripublique. Vol. 1: L'ardeur et fa necessiti 1944-19J2, Editions du Seui!, Paris 1980, p. 119· 33. Ibid., p. 120. 34. Shennan, op. cit., pp. 22.2-3. See also Henry C. Galant, Histoire politique de la securite sociale franfaise, 194J-I9J2, Colin, Paris 1955 and Pierre Laroque, Stlcces el faiblesses de I'effort social franfais, Colin, Paris 1961. 35. See G. Esping-Andersen and W. Korpi, 'Social Policy as Class Politics in Post-war Capitalism: Scandinavia, Austria, and Germany\ in John H. Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conjlict in Contemporary Capitalism, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1984, pp. 190-2 and Shell, The Transformation of Austrian Socialism, p. 13;. 36. Anthony Upton, 'Finland' in McCauley (ed.), Communist PO/ver in Europe [944-1949, pp. 139-40 • 37. Maurizio Ferrera, /1 Welfare State in l/a/ia, II Mulino, Bologna 1984, p. 36. 38. Pier Paolo Donati, 'Social Welfare and Social Services in Italy since 1950', in R. Girod, P. de Laubier and A. Gladstone (eds), Social Polic)' in fPestern Europe and the USA, 19J()-SJ, Macmillan, London 1985, p. 101. 39. Ginsborg, A His/oO' of Contemporary ltab', p. 151. 40. See .Marina Bonaccorsi, 'Gli enti pubblici del settore della sicurezza sociale', in Franco Cazzola (ed.), Anatomia del potere DC Ellt; pllbblici e (Icen/ralitd detflocristiana", De Donato, Bari 1979, especially pp. 104£f. 4 I. See Camillo Daneo, La politica eCOl1otflit'a della ricost1"tlziotte 194/-1949, Einaudi Editore, Turin 1974, pp. 297-300. 42. The defeat of the DC left, and of its leader Giuseppe Dossetti, is chronicled in Gianni Baget-Bozzo, II Partito cristiano al potere. La DC di De Gasperi e di Dossetti 194J/19!4, Vallecchi, Florence 1974.

NOTES TO CHAPTER

6

799

43. See Ginsborg, op. cit., p. 187 and Carlo Pinzani, 'VItalia repubblicana', in Ragionieri, Stor/a d'ltalia. Dall'UnitJ a oggi, pp. 2520-1. 44. Paragraph 309 of the Act, cited in Howard Glennerster, 'Social Policy since the Second World War', in John Hills (ed.), The State of Welfore. The Welfare State in Britain since 1974, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1990, p. 13. 45. Morgan, op. cit., p. 172. and Paci, op. cit., p. 193. 46. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, p. 21. 47. T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essq)'s, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1950, p. 8. 4 8. Ibid., p. 44. 49. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, International Publishers, New York 1968, p. 26. 50. V. 1. Lenin, 'A Great Beginning' Ouly 19 1 9), Collected lPorks, Vol. 29, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1974, p. 42.9 (his emphasis). Quite erroneously, Lenin believed that, under capitalism, these 'shoots' would remain a rarity, confined to charities or profit-malcing bodies. 51. See A. B. Atkinson, 'Poverty and Income Inequality in Britain' and W. G. Runciman, 'Occupational Class and the Assessment of Economic Inequality in Britain', in Dorothy Wedderburn (ed.), Poverty, InequalitJl and Class Structure, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1974, pp. 43-7 0 ,93- 106 . 52.. See W D. Rubinstein, Wealth and Inequality in Britain, Faber and Faber, London 1986, pp. 78-9 and the authorities cited therein. 53. Henry Pelling, The Labour Governments 194J-JI, Macmillan, London 19 84, p. 77. '4. See Eatwell, op. cit., p. 56. 55. Peter Hennessy, NeverAgain. Britain I,94'J~I9JI,Jonathan Cape, London 199 2 , p. 198. 56. Morgan, op. cit., p. 98. 57. Ibid., p. 99. Ben Pimlott argues that Dalton had hoped that the Bank could be turned into 'the dynamo of a socialist plan" in Hugh Dalton, Macmillan, London 1985, p. 458. 58. Pelling, op. cit., p. 77· 59. Ibid., pp. 79-80. 60. :Malcom B. Hamilton, Democratic Socialislll in Britain and in SIJJeden, Macmillan, London 1989, p. 88. 61. Morgan, op. cit., p. 103. 62. Alec Cairncross, l"Cars of ReCOVel)l. British Economic PoliC)' I,94J-JI, :Methuen, London and New York 1985, p. 464. The compensation paid was 'inconceivably generous' according to Morgan, op. cit., p. 109. 63. See Addison, op. cit., pp. 273-4 and Morgan, op. cit., p. 130 64. C. Barnett, The Audit of ll7ar, p. 265. 65. See the account of this debacle in 1fartin Chick, 'Private Industrial Investment', in Helen Mercer, Neil Rollings and Jim Tomlinson (ecls), LAbour Governments and Pn'vate Indust,)" The Experience of 194J-Jl, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1992., pp. 74-90. 66. The best attempt to refute this prevailing view is Jim Tomlinson's Mr. Altlee's SI/PP!;'· Side Socialis",: SUfVV' and Speculations, Discussion Papers in Economics no. 9 I 01, BruneI University, London (no date but 1991). 67. Jean ~fonnet, Memoi1'S, trans. Richard 1\.faine, Collins, London 1978, pp. 279-80. 68. Cairncross, op. cit., pp. 30 4, 32.9. 69' Morgan, op. cit., p. 364. 70. Cairncross, op. cit., p. 501. 7J. Norman Chester, The Nationalisatiofl ~r British Industf)' 194J-fI , HMSO, London 1975)

p.

102 5. 72.

This question is raised by

~lorgan,

among others, op. cit., especially pp.

130-6.

800

NOTES TO CHAPTER

6

73. Those fascinated by these questions can turn to Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 87-92, who takes up the old challenge thrown down by Ralph Miliband in his ParliamC11lary Socialism, Allen and Unwin, London 1961, p. 288. 74. Hodne, The Norwegian EConOdl)' 1920--/980, pp. 148-9. 75. Derry, op. cit., p. 426. 76. 1944 SAP Postwar Programme, pp. I I, 1 ~. 77. Ibid., p. 1.3· 78. Lewin, op. cit., pp. I70-l and Hamilton, op. cit., p. 18o. 79. :Milward, W'1zr, Econom)' and Society 19)9- 194}, p. 32-8. 80. Sven E. Olsson, 'Swedish Communism Poised between Old Reds and New Greens', in Journal of Communist Studies, Vol. l, no. 4, December 1986, p. 362 . SI. See 1944 SAP Pos/lvar Programme, p. 34. 82. Lewin, op. cit., p. 185. 83. [944 SAP Postwar Prografllme, p. 41.· 84. See G.-~1. Nederhorst, 'Les nationalisations aux Pays-Bas confrontees it l'experience britannique', La revue socia/iSle, no. 30, October 1949, pp. 219-2.0. 85. Steven B. Wolinetz, 'Socio-economic Bargaining in the Netherlands: Redefining the Post-war Policy Coalition', West European Polilics, Vol. 12, no. 1, January 1989, pp. 81-2. 86. Miller and Potthoff, A Histof)' of German Socia/ DemocraD', pp. 155-6. 87. Abelshauser, 'Les nationalisations n'auront pas lieu', pp. 86-90' 88. Ibid., p. 90-4. 89' Leaman, op. cit., pp. 36-7. 90. Philip Armstrong, Andrew Glyn and John Harrison, Capitalism since World war II The Making and Breakup of the Great Boom, Fontana, London 1984, chapter 3; the point about Japan is on p. 55. 9 I. Volker R. Berghahn, The Americanisation of West German Industry 194}-197), Berg, Leamington and New York 19 86, p. 96. 92. Hans Kernbauer, Eduard ~Hirz, Siegfried ~fattl, Robert Schediwy and Fritz Weber, 'Les nationalisations en Autriche', Le mota)ClI1e1lt social, no. I 34, January-March 19 86, p. 56. 93. Shell, op. cit., pp. lOI-2. 0 7· 94. Ibid., pp. 2.11- 1 3. 95. Kernbauer et al., op. cit., p. 68. 96. Ibid., p. 60. 97. The development of this 'technocratic corporatism' was examined by Bernd Marin in his Die paritiitische Kommission. Arifgekldrter Techno~korporatismus in Ostcrreich, Internationale Publikationen, Vienna 1982.. 98. Shell, op. cit., pp. 215-20. 99. Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modern France, p. 202. 100. Andre Malraux, Les chenes ql/on aba! ... , Gallimard, Paris 197 I, p. 29. 101. Some have argued that in the years 1944-48 French policies were 'to the Iefe of those implemented in Austria, Germany, Italy and Britain. This may be so only if one discounts welfare reforms which were far more extensive in Britain; see Claire Andrieu, 'La France a gauche de l'Europe', Le ,"Ollvement social, no. 134, Januarr-March 1986. 102. See Jean-Charles Asselain, Histoire iconomique de la France. Vol. z: De 1919 a fa jin des annies 1970, Editions du Seuil, Paris 1984, pp. 110-1 I. 103. Kuisel, op. cit., p. 1.08. 104. See Jean-Jacques Becker, 'Le PCF, p. J63 and Serge Berstein, 'La SFIO', pp. 179-81 in Claire Andrieu, Lucette Le Van and Antoine Prost (eds) Les nalionalisations de la Liberatiolt, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris 1987; see also Kuisel, op. cit., pp. 202.-4.

NOTES TO CHAPTER

6

801

105. Berstein, Opt cit., p. 181. 106. Maiorini, op. cit., pp. 44~9. 107. Cited in Mario Einaudi, Maurice Bye and Ernesto Rossi, Nationalization in France and Ita!)', Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY 1955, p. 80. 108. Monnet, Opt cit., p. 2.38. 109. Kuisel, op. cit., p. 222.. 110. Monnet, op. cit., pp. 2.68-70.

Kuisel, op. cit., p. 1.71. Peter A. Hall, 'Economic Planning and the State: The Evolution of Economic Challenge and Political Response in France', in G. Esping-Andersen and R. Friedland (eds), Political Power and Social Theo')l, Vol. 3, JAI Press, Greenwich CT and London 1982., pp. I I I.

I 12..

1

79ff. 113. Sima Lieberman, 'The Ideological Foundations of Western European Planning',

Journal of European Economic His/o')', Vol. 10, no. 2, Fall 1981 , p. 348.

7. External Constraints: A Socialist Foreign Policy? I. Francis Castles, The Social Democratic Image of SodelJ': A Stud), of the Achievements and Origins oj Scandinavian Socicd DetllocraD' in ComparatitJe Perspective, Routledge and Kegan Paul,

London 197 8, p. 37. 2.. Derry, A History of Modem Norwt[), 18[1~19J2, p. 409 3. Helge Pharo, 'Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction. Norway faces the l\1arshall Plan', ScandinatJian Journal 0/ Histo,)', Vol. I, 1976, p. 176; Nikolai Petersen, 'The Cold War and Denmark" Scandinavian Journal of Histo1)l, Vol. 10, 19 85, p. 194· 4. This has been demonstrated by G. Lundestad, Amenca, Scandinal)ia and the Cold war 191J-I919, Oslo 19 80 . 5. See Helge Pharo, 'The Cold War in Norv.regian and International Historical Research', Scandinaz'ianJournalof History, Vol. 10, 1985, especially pp. 166-70 , 175. 6. Jonathan Schneer, Labour's Conscience. The Labour LejiI94f-J!. Unwin and Hyman. Boston 1988, p. l8. 7. Schneer identifies a group of fewer than ten pro-Soviet MPs, led by Konni Zilliacus, 5. in op. cit., 8. Leslie J. Solley, 'Europe Toda)", LabOllr MOtllbb', I\larch 1947, p. 74. 9. Schneer, op. cit., p. 3I. 10. !-.1ario Tela and Sven Schwersensky, 'L'unita tedesca e l'Europa. Difficolta di ieri e di oggi della sinistra\ in Politica Europa AmJclli 1990-1991, edited by the Sezione Politica e Istituzioni in Europa del Centro per La Riforma dello Stato, Franco Angeli, !-.1ilan 199 I, p.IOO. II. Ossip K. Flechtheim, 'The German Left and the World Crisis" in Bernard Brown (ed.), Eurocomtllunism and Eurosocialism: The Left Confronts Modernit)', eyrco Press, New York and London 1979, p. 2.93. 12. l\1iller and Potthoff, A Histo1J1 of German Soci(11 Democrao', p. 157 and Gordon A. Craig, Germaf!)' 1866-194/, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1981, pp. 418-19. 13. From Schumacher's Kiel of 2.7 October 1945; extracts in Miller and Potthoff, Opt ciL, p. 270. 14. This sceptical view is abundantly documented by Alan S. Milward in his The European Rescue 0/ tbe Nation-Stale (with the assistance of George Brennan and Federico Romero), Routledge, London 199z; see, in particular, the chapter entitled 'The Lives and Teachings of the European Saints'.

802

NOTES TO CHAPTER

7

15. Cited in Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin Foreign Secretary 191f-1911, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1985, pp. 64-5. 16. Peter Weiler, British Labour and the Cold Jrar, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA 1988 , pp. 13 1-3. 17. Margaret Gowing, 'Britain, America and the Bomb', in David Dilks (ed.), Retreat from Power. Studies in Britain's Foreign Relations in the TIventieth Centu1Jl. Vol. 2: After 19j9, Macmillan, London 1981, p. 1,0-5. 18. Morgan, Labour in Power, pp. 282-4. 19. Gowing, op. cit., p. 130. 10. Kenneth Harris writes that on all broad issues Attlee and Bevin agreed; see his Attlee, p. 2.94; R. Smith and J. Zametica disagree with this in 'The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee Reconsidered 1945-47', International Affairs, Vol. 61, no. 2, 1985. 2. I. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, p. 5 I. 2.2.. Ellwood, ItalY 194}-194J, pp. 32-5. 2.3. Vera Zamagni, 'The Marshall Plan: An Overview of its Impact on National Economies', in Antonio Varsori (ed.), Europe 1941-1990s. The End of an Era?, Macmillan, London 1995, p. 86. 2.4. Michael Newman, Socialism and European Unity. The Dilemma of the Lift in Britain and France, Junction Books, London 198" pp. 17, 20. 15. Pharo, 'Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction', pp. 134-5. 2.6. Tapani Paavonen, 'Neutrality, Protectionism and the International Community. Finnish Foreign Economic Policy in the Period of Reconstruction of the International Economy, 1945-1950', Scandinavian Economic His/o,:)' Review, Vol. XXXVII, no. I, 1989, p. 31. 2.7. Procacd (ed.), The COff/inform, p. 195. 2.8. In Finland all political parties except the communist SKDL were in favour of accepting the plan. But the government recognized that to accept Marshall Aid would alienate the USSR; see Roy Allison, Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, 1944-34, Macmillan, London 1985, p. 119. 2.9. Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State, Penguin, Harmondsworth 1977, p. ,09. ;0. Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 194f-J/, Methuen, London 1984, pp. 97- 8, 12 5. ; I. Charles S. Maier, 'The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe', AmeriCall Historical Rel/iew, Vol. 86, no. 2, 198 I, p. 341. 31. David Ellwood, Rebuilding ENrope. r'Pestern Europe, America and PostJvar Reconstruction, Longman, London 1992., p. 94. ; 3. Maier, In Search of Stability, chapter 3· 34. See the deftly drawn portrait of Bevin's character in Bullock, op. cit., pp. 81-96. ,5. See Raymond Smith, 'Ernest Bevin, British Officials and British Soviet Policy, 194547' and Anne Deighton, 'Towards a I'Western Strategy": The .Making of British Policy Towards Germany, 1945-46', in Anne Deighton (ed.), Britain and the Second World If?ar, Macmillan, London 1990. ;6. See Pimlott, Hugh Dalton, p. 390. Bevin recognized early on that there could never be peace in Palestine without taking into account Arab as well as Zionist claims; see Bullock, op. cit., p. 841. 37. Cited in Weiler, op. cit., p. 194. ,8. John Kent questions Bevin's commitment to a special relationship with the USA in 'Bevin's Imperialism and the Idea of 1945-49', in :Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (eds), British Foreign Poli~.y 194J-16, l\1acmillan, London 19 89, p. 47. Newman, op. cit., pp. 138~47·

,9.

NOTES TO CHAPTER

7

40. See the New Statesman of 10 June 1950, cited in Morgan, op. cit., p. 393. 41. Morgan, op. cit., pp. 4 1 3, 434. 42. Philip M. Williams, Hugh Gaitskelf, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1982., p. 169. 43. Eatwell, The 194/-19/1 Labour GOl}ernmenfs, p. 140. 44. Cited in Bullock, op. cit., p. 12.6. 45 . C. Barnett, The Audit of War, p. 30 4 46. H. W. Brands, 'India and Pa1cistan in American Strategic Planning, 1947-54: Commonwealth as Collaborator" Journal of Imperial and CommotJ1t'ealth HistorJl, Vol. XV, no. I, October 1986, p. 5I. 47. Cited with corroborative evidence in E. H. Carr, The Bolshepik Revolution 19]7-192), Vol. 3, Penguin, Harmondsworth 1971, p. 2.8. 48. Cairncross, Years of Recovery, p. 8. 49. Sir Richard W. B. Clarke, Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and in Peace 1942-1949, ed. Sir Alec Cairncross, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1982, p. 70. 50. Ibid., p. 152.. 51. D. C. Watt makes a similar point in his 'American Aid to Britain and the Problem of Socialism, 1945-51', in his Personalities and Politics, University of Notre Dame Press, South Bend, IN 1965, p. 66. 52.. For a succinct and lucid account see Pimlott, op. cit., pp. 42.9-41. 53. Monnet, Memoirs, p. 250. 54. Annie Lacroix-Ritz, 'Negociation et signature des accords Blum-Byrnes (Octobre I945-Mai 1946). D'apres les archives du :Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres', RelJue d'histoire moderne ef confemporaine, Vol. XXXI July-September 1984, pp. 442-6. 5 5· Shennan, Rethinking France, p. 144· 56. D. K. Fieldhouse, 'The Labour Governments and the Empire-Commonwealth, '94551', in Ritchie Ovendale (ed.), The Foreign Po/if)' of the British Labour Got}ernments, 194/-19JI, Leicester University Press, Leicester 1984, pp. 82-4. 57. Ibid., p. 85· 58. Ibid" PP· 95-7. 59. Ibid., p. 9 8. 60. Thomas Balogh, 'Britain and the Dependent Commonwealth, in A. Creech Jones (ed.), Nelv Fabian Colonial ESSq)IS, Hogarth Press, London 1959, p. 106. 61. Alhster E. Hinds, 'Sterling and Imperial Policy, 1945-1951 " Journal of Imperial and Commol11)/ealth Histor], Vol. XV, no, 2., January 1987, pp. 148-69. 62. See the comments by his senior civil servants Sir Hilton Poynton, Sir Leslie 1\10nsoo and his private secretary Sir Duncan Watson, in Nicholas Owen (ed.), 'Decolonisation and the Colonial Office' (Witness Seminar), ContelJJpol1u]' Record, Vol. 6, no. " Winter 1992., p. 502 .

63. Arthur Creech Jones, 'The Labour Party and Colonial Policy 1945-51', in A. Creech Jones (ed.), NelvFabian Colonial Ess'!,),s, pp. 21,23,24,25,36-7. For the role of the Colonial Office, see L. J. Butler, Economic Development and the fOjJicial 1I1ind': The Colonial Office and Manufacturing in West AJtica, 19}9-19JI, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of London 1991. 64. See Rita Hioden's article 'Imperialism Today' in the August 1945 issue of Fabian QuarferDt, cited in Partha Sarathi Gupta, ItllpetialislI1 and the British Labour j}/ovement 1914-1964, i\1acmillan, London 1975, p. 1.83. 65. K. Harris, op. cit., pp. 36z, 385-6; see also Nicholas Owen, 'HMore Than a Transfer of Power": Independence Day Ceremonies in India, J 5 August 1947', Conte1l1porafJI Record, Vol. 6, no. 3, Winter 1992, pp. 419-2.1. 66. Hennessy, Neller Again, p. 1. 34.

NOTES TO CHAPTER

7

67. Shennan, op. cit., p. 152. 68. Ibid., p. 16;. 69. Quoted in ibid., p. I 59. 70. Daniel Le Couriard, 'Les socialistes et les debuts de la guerre d'Indochine (19461947)', Revue d'histoire moderne el contemporaine, Vol. XXXI, April-June 19 84, p. ;51. 71. R. F. Holland, European Decolonization 1918-1981, Macmillan, London 19 85, p. 95. 72. Richard F. Kuisel, Seducing the French. The Dilemma 0/ Americanization, University of California Press, Berkeley J 99;, pp. 43 ff. 73. Holland, op. cit., pp. 90-1. 74· Ibid., p. 93· 75. Kevin Featherstone, Socialist Parties and European Integration, Manchester University Press, Manchester 1988, pp. 264-5. 76. Wilfried Loth, 'Les projets de politique exterieure de la Resistance socialiste en France', Revue d'histoire moderne et contefl1poraino, Vol. XXIX, 1977, PP' 557-67. 77. Newman, op. cit., p. 5· 78. William James Adams, Restructuring the French Economy. Government and the Rise 0/ Market Competition since World war II, Brookings Institution, Washington DC 1989, p. 12.2.. 79. Frances M. B. Lynch, 'Resolving the Paradox of the Monnet Plan: National and International Planning in French Reconstruction', Economic Histo,), Revielv, Vol. XXXVII, no. 2, May 1984, p. 242. 80. Milward, Reconstruction, p. 475. 8 I. Ibid., see chapter IV, especially pp. 129 and 159. One of the most valuable analyses of French foreign policy in this period is by John W. Young, France, the Cold War and the Western Allianco, 1914-49: French Foreigll Policy and Post- War Europe, Leicester University Press, Leicester and London 1990. 82.. William D. Graf, The German Lyl since 194J. Socialislll and Social DemocraC)' in the German Federal Republic, Oleander Press, New York 1976, p. 69. 83. Newman, op. cit., pp. 131-3 and Henry Pelling, Bnlain and the Marshall Plan, Macmillan, London 1988, p. 100. On the same theme, see also Denis Healey's 1948 pamphlet, 'Feet on the Ground', reprinted in his When Shrimps Learn to Whistle, Penguin, Harmondsworth 199 1 , pp. 70-75. 84. See conference resolution in F. W. S. Craig (ed.), Conservative and Labour Party Conference Decisions 194J-1972, p. 234. 85. This was the basis of Stafford Cripps's statement to the OEEC Council meeting on I November 1949. See Geoffrey Warner, 'The Labour Government and the Unity of Western Europe', in Ovendale (ed.), op. cit., pp. 70-71. 86. US State Department Policy Planning Staff Memorandum of July 1947, cited in Weiler, op. cit., p. 2.81. See also Pelling, op. cit., pp. 94, 126. 87. Cited in Newman, op. cit., pp. 13 1-2.; see also pp. 132.ff. 88. The words are those of the pro-Communist Labour MP Konni Zilliacus, cited in Newman, op. cit., p. 145.

8. The Golden Age of Capitalism Tiersky, French Communism 1920-1972, p. 2.10. Philip 1\1. Williams, Crisis and Compromise. Politics in the Fourth Republic, Longman, London 1971.., p. 3 14. 3. Tiersky, op. cit., p. 189. 4. This is well documented in Joanne Barkan, Visions of Emancipation. The Italian 11?Orkers' Movement since 194f, Praeger, New York 19 84, pp. 45-7. I.

2.

NOTES TO CHAPTER

8

5. Angus Maddison, Phases of Capitalist Development, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1982, p. 91; see also Stephen Marglin and Juliet Schor (eds), The Golden Age of Capitalism. Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1990. 6. Maddison, op. cit., pp. 126-7. 7. The classic exposition of this view is in Charles P. Kindleberger, Europe's Postlvar Growth. The Role of Labor Suppb', Harvard U nlversity Press, Cambridge MA 1967. 8. For a thorough account of European labour migration, see Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1985. 9. A. G. Kenwood and A. L. Lougheed, The Growth oj the International Economy 13201930. An Introductory Text, Allen and Unwin, London 198;, p. 266. 10. Data in Antonio Missiroli, La qllestione tedesca. Le due Germanie dalla ditJisione al/'unita 194J-1990, Ponte Alle Grazie, Florence 199 1 , pp. 64-6. 1 I. William Beveridge, Socia/Insurance and Allied Seroices, Cmd. 6404, HMSO, London 1942, p. 155 and p. 5I respectively. 1z. Beveridge, op. cit., p. 49; also cited in Laura Balbo, 'Familr, Women, and the State', in Maier (ed.), Changing Boundaries of the Political, p. 209. Balbo points out that women were also hired in large numbers in the expanding public sector, thus providing cheap labour for welfare services. I;. Nicholas Kaldor, Further Essq)ls on Applied Economics, Duckworth, London 1978,

P·17 0 . 14. Frank B. Tipton and Robert Aldrich, All Econ01l1ic and Social Histoo' oj Europe fr01l1 1939 to the Presellt, :Macmillan, London 1987, p. 11;.

15. The CIA figures for the USSR are cited in Philip Hanson, 'The Soviet Union', in Graham with Seldon (eds), Government and Economies in the PostlJJar World, p. 207; those for the other countries are estimates by T. P. Alton, National Product oj the Planned Econ01l1ies of Eastern Europe, New York 1987, cited in Jaroslav Krejci, ~Eastern Europe', in Graham with Seldon (eds), op. cit., p. 182. 16. Cited in Perry Anderson, 'Trotsky's Interpretation of Stalinism', in New Lift Review no. 139, May-June 19 8;, p. 5;. 17. Cited by Christopher Lasch, himself a left-wing critic of the consumer in his The Minimal Se!! PSJ'chic Survival in Trot/bled Times, Pan Books, London 19 84, pp. 34-5. 18. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition. A Stut!J, 0/ the Central Dilemmas Facing Modern Man, Doubleday Anchor Books, New York 1959, p. 116. 19. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology. 011 the Exhaustion 0/ Political/deas in the Fifties, Free Press, New York 1965 (1st edn 1960), pp. 312-1;. 20. On the death of the avant-garde in the 1950S, see Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, pp. 51 4ff. 2 I. Cited in .Marc Lazar, Maisom rouges. Les parlis cOlllfllunistes jralJ(ais et italien de la Liberation a nosjours, Aubier, Paris 199 2, p. 75. 22. Kuisel, Seducing the French, pp. 54-69. See also Pier Paolo D'Attorre, 'Sogno americano e mito sovietico nell'Italia contemporanea', in his (ed.), Nelllidper la pelle. Sogno americal10 e mito soviotieo nefPItalia contemporanea, Franco Angeli, !\.1ilan 1991, p. 31. 23. Karen Ruoff, 'Warefliisthetik in America, or Reflections on a l\fulti-National Concerd, in W. F. Haug (ed.) Warcniisthetik. Beitrage z"r Disktlssiol1 Jl7eilerentwkklung und Vermitt/llng timer KriHk, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1975, p. 57. 24. David Childs, Britain since 194}, Methuen, London 1984, p. 74. 25. Jane Jenson and George Ross, 'The Tragedy of the French Lefe, New Left RevielJJ, no. 171, September-October 1988, p. 16; Marie~Frans:oise !\'fouriaux and Rene Mouriaux, 'Unemployment Policy in France, 1976-82', in J. Richardson and R. Henning (eds) , Un-

806

NOTES TO CHAPiER

8

emplqyment: Polic), Responses of Western Democracies, Sage, London 1984, p. 149; P. A. Hall, 'Economic Planning and the State', op. cit., p. 184. 1.6. M. Balfour, West Germa'!Y, p. 147. 2.7. Volker R. Berghahn, Modern Germa'!J', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1982, p. 206 and Michael Schneider, A Brief Histo,), of the German Trade Unions, trans. B. Selman, Verlag J. H. W. Dietz Nachf, Bonn 199 1, p. 251. 28. Leaman, The Political Bconom)' oj West Ger!lIaf[JJ 194/-198J, p. I 54 and Schneider, 0p. cit., p. 2. 51. 29. Schneider, op. cit., pp. 2.54-5. ;0. The literature on corporatism is vast and tedious; those interested should start with Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds), Trends towards Corporatist Intermediation, Sage, Beverly Hills and London 1979. 3 I. See chart in Karl-Olaf Faxen, 'Incomes Policy and Centralized Wage Formation', in A. Boltho (ed.), The European Economy. Growth & Crisis, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1982., p. ;68 (the chart is derived from C. A. Blyth's paper in OECD, Collective Bargaining and Government Policies, Paris 1979)' 32. John D. Stephens, The TransitionJrom Capitaliml to Socialism, :Macmillan, London 1979, P·115· 33. Stephen Bornstein, 'States and Unions: From Postwar Settlement to Contemporary Stalemate'. in S. Bornstein, D. Held and J. Krieger. The State in Capitalist Europe, Allen and Unwin, London 1984, p. 62.. 34. Shell, The Transformation oj Allstrian Socialism, pp. 2.2.6-8. 35. Faxen, op. cit., p. 37 0 • 36. Wolinetz, ~Socio-economic Bargaining in the Netherlands, p. 82.. 37. Willy Van Rijkeghem, 'Benelux', in Boltho (ed.), op. cit., p. 585. ;8. Derry, A HistofJ' oj Modern Nonv~' 1814-1972, pp. 413, 426. 39. Walter Korpi, The Working Class in We!fare Capitalis",. WOrk, Unions and Politics in Sweden, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1978, p. 87. 40. For a succinct survey, see Berndt Ohman, La atld Labour Market Policy since the Second World Witr, Prisca, Stockholm 1974. 41. Tilton, The Political TheQt)' of Swedish Social Democracy', p. 195. 42. Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), Trade Unions and Full Emplq;'ment, (Rehn-Meidner Report), Report to the 1951 Congress, English trans., Stockholm 1953, P·9 1 • 43. Ibid., p. 89· 44. Ibid., p. 9 1 . 45· Ibid., pp. 94-6. 4 6. Ibid., p. 93. 47. Jonas Pontusson, S}lledish Social DemocroC)' and British Labour: Essay's on the Nature and Condition of Social Democratic HegflJlotD" Western Societies Program Occasional Paper no. 19, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca NY 1988 , pp. 38-9. 48. Ibid., p. ;9, 49. Gosta Rehn, 'Swedish Active Labor !\farket Policy: Retrospect and Prospece, Indllstrial Relations, ·Vol. 2.4, no. I, 1985 (SOF! Reprint Series no. 140), p. 6950. Rudolf Meidner, E1IIplf!Yee 1l11JestfJI8tlf Funds. An Approach to Collective Capital Fortnation, Allen and Unwin, London 1978, pp. 13-14. 51. See Korpi, op. cit., p. 102. 52. Olsson, Social Po/icy and Welfare Slate in SJveden, pp. lI9-2l. 53· William (Lord) Beveridge, Full E1IIplf!) 1II8tlt in a Free Socie!)', second edn with a new prologue, Allen and Unwin, London 1960, p- 199' 1

NOTES TO CHAPTER

54. Ibid., p. 55. Ibid., p.

8

1.00. I I.

9. Between Neutralism and Atlanticism I. Quoted in Geoffrey Foote, The Labour Partir Political Thought. A His/o1]', Croom Helm, London 1985, p. 103. 1.. Oliver Rathkolb, 'Die spa und der aussenpoHtische Entscheidungsprozess 19451955. Mit einem Ausblick auf die Neutralitatspolitik bis 1965', in Wolfgang Maderthaner (ed.), ANf dem Weg zur Afacht. Integration in den Staat, Sozialpartlterschaft und Regierungspartei, Loecker-Verlag, Vienna 1992, pp. 51-72. 3. Shell, The Transformation of Austnan Socialism, pp. 15 6- 8. 4. Cited in Daniel Blume et al., Histoire du rijormisme en France depuis 1920, Vol. 2., Editions Sodales, Paris 1976, p. I 11.. ,5. R. H. S. Crossman, 'Towards a Philosophy of Socialism', in R. H. S. Crossman (ed.), New Fabian Essqys, Turnstile Press, London 1952, p. 12. 6. Text in PSI, II Partito Socia/ista lta/iano lU!i suoi Congressi, Vol. V, pp. 302, 307 and 321. 7. The italics are mine; quoted in Parti communiste fran see Ellen Carol DuBois, 'Woman Suffrage and the Left: An International Socialist-Feminist Perspective', Neul Left Revielv, no. 186, 'March-April 1991, pp. 20-45. 54-Charles Sowernrine, Sisters or Citizens? JVomen and Socialism in France since [876, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1982., p. 118. 55. Harriet Anderson, Utopian Feminism. Womens Movements in fin-de-sieele Vienna, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1992., p. 42.. 56. Ibid., p. 86. 57· Ibid., p. 89' 58. Cited by I\faria Casalini in her 'Femminismo e socialismo in Anna Kuliscioff. 189°1907', /talia ContetlJporanea, no. 143, June 198I, A wider treatment of Anna Kuliscioff can be found in Casalini's La Signora del sOt'ialis!IIo italiano. Vita di Anna KttliscioJ!, Editod Riuniti, Rome 1987. 59. In ~I1 femminismo', en"fica Sociale, 16 June 1897; cited in Claire LaVigna, 'The Marxist Ambivalence Toward Women: Between Socialism and Feminism in the Italian Socialist Party', in :Marilyn J. Boxer and Jean H. Quataert (eds), Sodalist JVornen. Eut'opean Socialist Feminism in the Nineteenth and EarlY liventieth Centunes, Elsevier, New York 1978, pp. 148-9. 60. See paper given by I\faria Casalini at the conference '1892-1992. Percorsi e contrasti della sinistra italiana', organized by the Gramsci Foundation, .25 June 1991. 61. LaVigna, op. cit., p. 159. 62. Sowerwine, op. cit., p. 114. On Pelletier, see also Christine Bard (ed.), Madeleine Pelletier (1874~19j9). Logique et injortulJes d'/ill combat pour I'egaliti, ~6te-femmes editions, Paris 1991 and Claudine ~:fitchel1, 'Madeleine Pelletier (1874-1939): The Politics of Sexual Oppression', Feminist RelJiew, no. 33, Autumn 1989, pp. 72-92.. 63. James E. ~fc~fil1an, Housewife or Harlot. The PI(lce oj l1:7omel1 ill French Society [870-1940, Harvester, Brighton 198 I, p. 91. 64. Sowernrine, op. cit., p. I 18. 65. Cited in ibid., p. 2.4. 66. Ibid. See also Albistur and Armogathe, op. cit., Vol. 1., pp. 558-9. 67. Sowerwine, op. cit., p. 1°9 68. Magraw, A Histot], oj the French T1:7orking Class, Vol. 2, p. 95. 69. See 1fc11illan, op. cit., p. 14. 70. Hilden, op. cit., p. 2.68. 71. Beryl Williams, 'Kollontai and After: Women in the Russian Revolution, in Sian Reynolds (ed.), U70fl1en, State and Revolution, Wheatsheaf, Brighton, 1986, pp. 65-6; see also Stites, op. cit., p. 213. 71.. V. I. Lenin, 'International Working Women's Day', in Collected TPOrks, Vol. 31., Progress Publishers, 1foscow 1965) p. 161.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

5

73. Editorial, The Past Bifore Us. TJvenD' Years of Feminism, special issue of Feminist Revielv, no. 31, Spring 1989, p. 3. 74. See the evidence in R. Evans, op. cit., pp. 31-2. 75. Beate Fieseler, 'The Making of Russian Female Social Democrats, 1890-1917', lnter~ national Review of Social Hislory, Vol. 34, 1989, p. 208. 76. See Sowerwine's perceptive comments in op. cit., pp. 184-7. 77. McMillan, op. cit., p. 87. 78. Sheila Rowbotham, Hidden from History, Pluto Press, London 1973) p. 80. 79. Olive Banks, Faces of Feminism, Martin Robertson, Oxford 1981, p. 12.6. 80. Jill Liddington and Jill Norris, One Hand ned Behind Us. The Rise of the Women 1 Suffrage Movement, Virago, London 1978, p. Z I 0. 81. The Pankhursts' WSPU has remained the best-known suffragette organization. Liddington and Norris, op. cit., convincingly present the story of I\.fillicent Fawcetes National Union as an antidote to the over-emphasis on the Pankhursts' importance. Rowbotham's now classic Hidden from HisloO' makes no mention of 1\1i11icent Fawcetfs organization; obviously some people are always more hidden than others. 82.. Liddington and Norris, op. cit., p. 258. 83. Lenin, op. cit., p. 162. 84. Bebel, op. cit., p. 102. 85. Wollstonecraft, op. cit., p. 152. 86. Bebel, op. dt., pp. 55-6. 87. See Coole, op. cit., p. 109. 88. Rosalind Coward, Patriarcbal Precedents. Sexuality and Social Relations, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1983, pp. 168-9. 89' See text of the preamble in S. E. Finer (ed.), Five Constitutions, Penguin, Harmondsworth 1979, p. 2.75· 90. Claire Laubier (ed.), The Conditioll rf Wolllell in France 194! to the Present, Routledge, London and New York 1990, p. 1. 91. Finer, op. cit., p. 198. 92. Frevert, op. cit., p. 278. 93. Cited in Eva Kolinsky, Women in West Germal1], Berg, Oxford 1989, p. 45. 94. Text of the questionnaire originally in L'H,ltnanili, 27 July 1946; reprinted in Laubier (ed.), op. cit., p. 15. 95. Kolinsky, op. cit., pp. 200- I. 96. Gisele Charzat, Les Franraises sont-elles des citO)'ennes?, Editions Denoel, Paris 1972, p. 1.5, citing the work of 1\1. Dogan and J. Narbonne, 'Les Fran~aises face a la politique', Cahiers de la .Fondation Natiollale des Sciellces Politiqlles, no. 72. 97. Charzat, op. cit., p. z8. 9 8. Ibid., p. 29. 99. P. ~L Williams, Crisis 411d Compromise, pp. 95-6. 100. Joni Lovenduski, Women and European Politics. COlltemporaf)' Feminism and Public PoliO', Wheatsheaf, Brighton 1986, p. 12.5. 101. R. W. Johnson, 'The British Political Elite, 1955- 1 97 2 ', pp. 55-6. 102. Miriam ~fafai, L'apprendistato della politica. Le donne italiam nel dopoguerra, Editod Riuniti, Rome 1979, pp. 50-I. 103. Ibid., pp. 103-5. 104. Judith Hellman, jOllrnrys among JVome!1. Feminism in Five Italian Cities, Polity Press, Cambridge 198 7, p. 36. IOj. Palmiro Togliatti, 'Discorso alla conferenza delle donne comuniste', Rome Z-5 June 1945, in Opere, Vol. 5, p. I p.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I 5

106. Ibid., p. 15;' 107. Ibid., p. 157. 108. Palmiro Togliatti, ~Discorso aIle delegate comuniste alIa Conferenza dell'UDI', September 1946, Rome, in L'emancipazione ftmminile, Editori Riuniti, Rome 1973, p. 62.. 109. J. Hellman, op. cit., pp. 199-2.00. 110. Laura Lilli and Chiara Valentini, Care compagne. II fe,,,minismo flel PCl e nelle orgatJ~ izzazioni di massa, Editori Riuniti, Rome 1979. 11 I. Ibid., pp. 52-3. liZ. Ibid., p. 65 It;, Hellman, op. cit., especially pp. 97, 110, 134 and 17 1- 2 . 114. See her conversation with Jean-Paul Sartre in l'Arc, no. 61, 1975, cited in Albistur and Armogathe, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 63 T. I I 5. Laubier (ed.), op. cit., p. 17. 116. Cited in Albistur and Armogathe, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 632. 117. Simone de Beauvoir, Le detlxihlJe sexe, Vol. 1, Gallimard, Paris 1968, p. 2.85. I J 8. IbId., p. 16. 119. Ibid., Vol. 2., pp. 494-5, 498. 12.0. For a perceptive explanation of this connection, see Genevieve Lloyd, The Man oj Reason, (Male' and (Female' il1 Western Pbi/osop!!)', Methuen, London 1984, pp. see the criticisms of de Beauvoir on pp. laO-X, 121. Jean~Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingnes.r, trans. Hazel E. Barnes, Washington Square Press, New York 1966, p. 671; see also pp. 654~80. 122.. Frigga Haug, 'Lessons from the Women's Movement in Europe, Feminist Review, no. 31, Spring 1989, p. 108. 12. 3. Germaine Greer, The Fe1llale BIIIJllcb, Paladin, London 199 I, p. 44. 12.4. Ibid., pp. 131.-40. 12.5. Ibid., pp. 90-2. 12.6. Ibid.) pp. 68-9. I 2. 7. Ibid., p. 2. I 2.. 128. Ibid., pp. 130-1. 129. Betty Friedan, The Femilline ./v[)'stique, W. W. Norton, New York 1963, p. 15. 13 0 • Ibid., p. ;75, 131. Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex. The Case for a Feminist Revolution, Paladin, London 1971, p. I ,24. lP.. Ibid., p. 19; emphasis in original. lB. Kate 1fillett, Sexual Politics, Doubleday, New York 1970, p. 33. 134. Ibid., p. ,8. 135. Ibid., p. 44· 1,6. Ibid., p. 2.33. 137. Coote and Campbell, op. cit., p. 20. 138. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron (eds), Nell) French Feminisms, Harvester, Brighton 19 81 , p. 33. 139. 1\fonique Wittig, The Straight lHind and Other Harvester Wheatsheaf, Heme! Hempstead 1992., pp. I 140. Cited in Coote and Campbell, op. cit., p. 242.. 141. Swasti :L\.1itter, Common Fate, Comlllo/l Bond. Women in the Global Bca1l0ND', Pluto Press, London 1986, p. 15. 142.. For British data, see Catherine HakIm, 'Grateful Slaves and Self~:L\.1ade Women: Fact and Fantasy in Women's Work Orientations" European Sociological Re1)ieJJ), Vol. 7, no. 2, September 1991, p. 105; as well as her 'Segregated and Integrated Occupations: A New


Approach to Analysing Social Change', European Sociological RetJiew, Vol. 9, no. 3 , December 1993, pp. 308 , .3l 0 ' 143. Greer, op. cit., p. ;35; see also pp. 13-14. 144. Becker and Burns, op. cit., p. 6. 145. Cited in Claire Duchen, Feminism in France. From Mqy 163 to Mitterrand, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 19 86, p. 7. 146. Cited in Frevert, op. cit., p. .193. 147. Extracts of interview in Marks and de Courtivron (eds), op. cit., p. 1 I I. 148. Frevert, op. cit., p. 196. 149. Coote and Campbell, op. cit., p. 3. I 50. Duchen, op. cit., p. 10. 15 I. Victoria Greenwood and Jock Young, Abortion ill Demand, Pluto Press, London 1976,

p.2.6. 1 51. Coote and Campbell, op. cit., p. l5 3· Ibid., p. 9·

I

53.

16. The Crisis and the Left: An Overview p. 763. Ibid., Capital, Vol. " p. 2.49. 3. Jean Fourastie, Les trenltlS gloriellses I.

Marx, Capital, VOl.I,

oZ.

011

la revolution invisible de 1946 a 197f, Fayard, Paris

1979·

4. Robert Z. Lawrence and Charles L. Schultze (eds), Barriers to European Growth. A Transatlantic View, Brookings Institution, Washington DC 1987, p. 1. 5. Gottfried Bambach, Post-Jvar Economic Growth Revisited, Elsevier Science, Amsterdam 1 985, p. I 0 5. 6. Angus Maddison, Dynamic Forces ;n Capitalist Developtnent. A Long-Run ComparatitJe vteJv, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1991, p. 131. 7. Herbert Giersch, Karl-Heinz Paque and Holger Schmieding, The Fading Miracle. Four Decades of Market Economy in Germa'!J', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1992, p. 21 8; Scharpf, Crisis and Choice in Europe(lfJ Social De1l1ocraC)', p. 50; Edmond ~lalinvaud, 'The Rise of Unemployment in France' Economica, Vol. 53, 1986, Supplement to no. 2.10, Unemployment, p. S198. 8. Maddison, op. cit., p. 155. 9. Stephen A. Marglin, 'Lessons of the Golden Age: An Overview', in ~1arglin and Schor (eds), The Golden Age of Capitalism, p. 19 and the essay by A. GIyn, A. Hughes, A. Lipietz and A. Singh, 'The Rise and Fall of the Golden Age', in ibid., p. 73. See also Edmond ~falinvaud, 'Wages and the Unemployed', Economic journal, Vol. 92, no. 365, March 1982., p. 1, and :Michae1 Bruno and Jeffrey D. Sachs, Economics of tl7'orldwide Stagflation, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1985, p. 167. 10. Examples of such indictments can be found in Lawrence and Schultze (eds), op. cit., p. 7. 11. Norman Mackenzie (ed.), Conmdion, MacGibbon and Kee, London 1959, p. 15. 1:1.. Thomas Balogh, The IrreieIJdl1ce of Com)en/iollal ECOIIOttlics, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 19 82., p. 47. 13. Maddison, op. cit., p. 187. 14. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of LFe(fare Capitalism, p. 182. 15. Jim Tomlinson, Monetarism: Is There an Alternative?, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1986, p·97·

16. Denis Healey, The Time

of A{;I Lift, I\tfichael Joseph,

London 1989, p. 40 1.

NOTES TO CHAPTER

16

17. Kevin Done, 'Windfall wilts away', Survey on Norway, Financial Times, 23 June 1986,

p. i. IS. For Milton Friedman's influential redefinition of this relationship, see his 'The Role of 1:10netary Policy', Americtln Economic RelJinv, Vol. 58, 1968, pp. 1-17. 19. A. W. Phillips' classic statement on the unemployment/inflation relation (the Phillips is 'The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of l'vloney Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957', Ecol1omica, Vol. 2.5, 195 8, pp. 2.83-99' 20. Paul R. Krugman, 'Slow Growth in Conceptual Issues\ in Lawrence and Schultze (eds), op. cit., p. 58. 2. I. See the evidence in Robert J. Flanagan, 'Labor ~iarket Behavior and European Economic Growth', in Lawrence and Schultze (eds), op. cit., p. 177. ll.. Patrick Minford, UnempIO)'fItel1t: Calise and Cllre, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1985, p. 34. 23. Robert M. Solow, 'Unemployment: Getting the Questions Right', in Economica, Vol. 53, 1986, Supplement to no. 2.10, UnempIO)'1t1fJ11t, p. $33. 2.4. Paul R. Krugman, The Age of Ditninisbed Expectations, rev. edn, l'vliT Press, Cambridge Jv1A 1994, p. 34. 2.5. See Charles L. Schultze, 'Real Wages, Real Wage Aspirations, and Unemployment in Europe" in Lawrence and Schultze (eds), op. cit., pp. 2;0-89 and the comments by Jacques R. Artus, pp. 2.92.-5 and Charles R. Bean, pp. 295-9. See also C. R. Bean, R. Layard and S. J. Nickell, 'The Rise in Unemployment: A Multi-country Study" Ecol1omica, Vol. 53, 1986, Supplement to no. 2.10, UnemplO)wJellt, pp. SI-S2.2., who argue that demand factors and wages cannot be separated (p. S 19). In the same issue of Economica, however, R. Layard and S. J. Nickell argue that most of the unemployment after 1979 in the UK has been due to a fall in demand; see 'Unemployment in Britain" p. S146. 2.6. Rudiger Dornbusch, Giorgio Basevi, Olivier Blanchard, Willem Buiter and Richard Layard, 'Macroeconomic Prospects and Policies for the European Community', in Olivier Blanchard, Rudiger Dornbusch and Richard Layard (eds), Restoring Europe's Prosperi!)': Macroecoflomic Paper'S jt'OlfJ the Centre for European Polif)' Studies, :MIT Press, Cambridge ~1A and London 1986, pp. 13-14. 2. 7. Bernard Donoughue, Prime Minister. The Conduct of Polif)' under Harold Wilson andJames Callctghall, Jonathan Cape, London 1987, p. 146. 18. Maddison, op. cit., p. 110. 29. See Goran Therborn, 'Does Corporatism Really 1'.1attcr? The Economic Crisis and Issues of Political Theory',jollrnal of Public Polif)', Vol. 7, Part 3, July-September 19 87, pp. 2.59- 84. 30. See Minford, op. cit.; Herbert Giersch, Liberalt:ration for Faster Ecol1omic Gro]1)th, Occasional Paper NO. 74, Institute of Economic Affairs, London 1986, pp. 14-15. 3 I. Andrea Boitho, 'Western Europe's Economic Stagnation', in New Lq! Review, no. 201, 199" pp. 6~-6. 32. l\linford, op. cit., pp. 6-7. 33, Ibid., p. 128. 34. OECD, Historkal Statistics 1960-1989, Paris 1991. 35. Gotan Thcrborn, 1f7~y Some People Are More Unemplq)'ed than Others, Verso, London 19 86 , pp. 64-5· ,6. Richard Giorgio Basevi, Olivier Blanchard, Willem SUIter and Rudiger Dornbusch, 'Europe: The Case for Unsustainable Growth', in Blanchard, Dornbusch and Layard (eds), op. cit., pp. 48-9. 37. for instance, Glyn et aI., op. cit., p. 82.. 38. Assar Lindbeck and Dennis J. Snower, '\Vage Setting, Unemployment and InsiderOutsider Relations' Americall Economic RelJieJll, Vol. 76, no. 2, "May 1986, pp.

NOTES TO CHAPTER

16

39. Krugman,op. cit., p. 64. See the contribution by R. Layard and S. J. Nickell, 'Performance of the British Labour Market', in Blanchard, Dornbusch and Layard (eds), and Lindbeck and Snower, op. cit., pp. 2.35-9' 41. Giersch, Paque and Schmieding, op. cit., p. 200. 42. Robert Gilpin, The Political Econo"D' 0/ International Relation.r, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ 1987, pp. 135-41. See also Strange, Casino Capitalism, pp. 6-8. 43. This view found its best-known adherent in the OEeD 11cCracken Report: Paul McCracken et al., Towards Full Emplqyment and Price Stability: A Report to tbe OEeD ~Y a Group of Independent Experts, OECD, Paris 1977. 44. Bruno and Sachs, Opt cit., p. 7. 45. Scharpf, op. cit., p. 41; see also the introduction in Marglin and Schor (eds), op. cit. 46. Giersch Paque and Schmieding, op. cit., pp. 189-90. 47. Bruno and Sachs, op. cit., p. 12.2.. 48. Solow, op. cit., p. S23. 49. Therborn, W~I Some People ... , p. 91. and Scharpf, op. cit. 50. Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in tflOrld Markets. Illdustrial Po/iry in Europe, Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY and London 1985, p. 2.07. 51. Data (April 1994), reported in The Ellropeal1, 6-12 May 1994, p. 19. Source: Datastream. 52. Perry Anderson, Introduction to Perry Anderson and Patrick Camiller (eds), Mapping the West European Lift, Verso, London 1994 and Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation 0/ European Socia! Democrary, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994, p. 1. 40.

17. Social Democracy in Small Countries I.

Bob Rowthorn and Andrew GIyn, 'The Diversity of Unemployment Experience since

1973', in Marglin and Schor (eds), The Golden Age

of

Capitalisth, p. 245.

2.. Antonio 1fissiroli, 'Tra Waldheim e la eee: Democrazia consociativa e crisi eco~ nomica in Austria" in Anna!i Sinistra Europea 1983-1989, Franco Angeli, Milan 1989, p. 307. 3. Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds), Part)' OrganizationJ. A Data Hafldbook on Part)' OrganizalionJ ill Western Democracies, [960-1990, Sage, London 199 2 , p. 41. 4. Sully, ContimliD' and Change in Austrian Socialism, p. 2.09. 5. See Kurt Richard Luther, 'Consociationalism, Parties and the Party West European Politics, Vol. 15, no. I,January 199z, p. 54. Of course, the GVP was equipped with a similar range of associations. 6. Sully, ~Austrian Social Democracy" in Paterson and Thomas (eds), The Future 0/ Social DemocrafJl, 1986, p. 165. 7. 1fissiroli, op. cit., p. 305. 8. Katzenstein, Small States in World Marketsl p. 77. The storing up of bad debts became quite common throughout the banking system of most advanced countries in the I980s. 9. Paulette Kurzer, 'The Internationalization of Business and Domestic Class Compromises: A Four Country Study', West Ellropean Politics, Vol. 14, no. 4, October 1991, p. II. 10. Scharp f, op. ci t., p. 57. I l. Raimund Loew, 'The Politics of the Austrian "Miracle''', New Lift Reviell), no. 12.3, September-October 19 80, p. 75. 12. Scharpf, op. cit., pp. 56-8. 13. Sully, 'Austrian Social Democracy', p. 166. 14. Jelavich, Modern Austria, p. 305. 1 5. Sully, ContinuiD' and Change, p. 208.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 17

16. Ibid., p. 219. 17. Sully, 'Austrian Social Democracy" p. 157. 18. Wolfgang C. Muller, 'The Catch-all Party Thesis and the Austrian Social Democrats', German Polilies, Vol. 1, no. 1., August 1992., p. 186. 19. Sully, ContinuiD' and Change, p. 2.l5. 2.0. See the reluctant praise lavished on Kreisky by one of his critics, Raimund Loew, in op. cit., p. 76. 2 I. Felix Kreissler, 'Le parti socialiste Autrichien entre Ie nouveau programme (Mai 1978) et les nouvelles elections generales (I\lai 1979)' in Auslnata, Vol. 8, 1979, pp. 2.2. Sully, Continuity and Change, p. 2.01. 2.3. Cited in Felix Kreissler, 'Un bilan de dnq annees de gouvernement socialiste. Reformes et "Sozialpartnerschaft" (1970-1975)' in Austnaca, no. 1,1975, p. 39. See also Sully,

Continuity and Change, p. 2.04. 2.4. Sully, Continuity and Change, p. 2. 32. 1.5. Kreissler, 'Un bilan ... " p. 50.

26. Jelavich, op. cit., pp. 305-7. 2.7. Scharpf, op. cit., p. 58. 2.8. Kreissler, 'Un bilan ... ' pp. 34-5. 2.9. Sully, ContinuiD' and Change, pp. 2.06, 2.2.8. 30. See the praise for the Austrian model in Giles Radice and Lisanne Radice, Socialists in the Recession. The Search jor SolidariD', Macmillan, London 1986, p. 97. Even Ian Birchall, author of a Trotskyist critique of social democracy, grudgingly accepts that 'there were real reforms' in Austria; see his Bailing Out the .5j'stem. Riformist Socialism in tl7estern Europe 1944193f, Bookmarks, London 1986, p. 2.00. 3I. Wolfgang C. ~fiiller, 'Economic Success without an Industrial Strategy: Austria in the ,Journal of Public Poli,)', VoL 3, no. I, February 1983, p. l.it}. )l.. Katzenstein, op. cit., pp. 76-7. 33. Scharpf, op. cit., p. 67. 34. Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Vlram and Alfred Grausgruber, 'The Decline of "Lager men~ tality" and the New :Model of Electoral Competition in Austria', West European Politics, Vol. l 5, no. I, January 199 2 , p. 29. 35. Volkmar Lauber 'Changing Priorities in Austrian Economic Policy', West European Politics, VoL I" no. I, January 1992., p. 156. ,6. Ibid., pp. 157-8. 37. \Volfgang C. Milller, 'Privatising in a Corporatist Economy: The Politics of Privatisacion in Austria', W7estEuropean Politics, Vol. I I , no. 4, October 1988, pp. 105, 109. 38. Lauber, op. cit., p. 159. 39· Peter Gerlich, 'Deregulation in Austria', in European joumal of Political Research, Vol. l7, no. 2, 1989, pp. 209-2.2.. 40. Lauber, op. cit., p. 166. 41. Judy Dempsey, 'Austria's working class trade unionism coming to an end', Financial Times,7 October 19 87. 41,. Patrick Blum, 'An attractive deal is needed', Survey on Austria, Financial Times, 10 November 1993, p. iii. 43. R. Kent Weaver, 'Political Foundations of Swedish Economic Policy', in Barry Bosworth and Alice 1L Rivlin (eds), The S1vedish Etonol1lj', Brookings Institution, Washington DC 19 87, pp. 303-4. 44. Olsson, 'Swedish Communism Poised Between Old Reds and New Greens" p. 369' 45. OECD, BcollotJ/ic Outlook, Historical Statistics [960-[939, p. 40. 46. Kurzer, op. cit., p. 12..

NOTES TO CHAPTER

17

47. Erik Lundberg, 'The Rise and Fall of the Swedish Model', Journal of Economic 2}, March 1985, p. }. 4 8. Porter, The Competitive Advantages of Nations, p. 343. 49. G0sta Esping-Andersen, 'The Making of a Social Democratic Welfare State', in Klaus Misge1d, Karl Molin and Klas Amark (eds), Creating Social Democracy. A Centu1Jlof the Social Democratic Labor Par!;' in Sweden, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park PA, 1992., p. 50. 50. Ibid., p. 54. 51. Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle, pp. Zl 0, 22. ~ . 52.. Tilton, The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy, pp. 53· Esping-Andersen, op. cit., p. 59· 54. Lundberg, op. cit., p. 2. I. 55. See Scharpf's lucid description of these developments in op. cit., pp. 94-7. 56. Scharpf, op. dt., pp. 97-8 and Lundberg, op. dt., p. 2. 5. 57. Roger Henning, 'Industrial Policy or Employment Policy? Sweden's Response to Unemploymene, in Richardson and Henning (eds), Unemplqyment: Politjl Responses of Western Democracies, p. 197. 58. Scharpf, op. cit., pp. 99-100. 59. Kjell Lundmark, 'Welfare State and Employment Policy: Sweden', in Kenneth Dyson and Stephen Wilks (eds), Industrial Clisis, Blackwell, Oxford 19 83, p. 232.. 60. David Arter, 'A Tale of Two Carlssons: The Swedish General Elections of 1988', Parliomento1)' Affairs, Vol. 42., no. I, January 19 89, p. 94. 6 I. Hans Bergstrom, 'Sweden's Politics and Party System at the Crossroads" West European Politics, Vol. 14, no. 3, July 1991, pp. Il~I1.. 62.. See Ingemar Elander and Stij Montin, ~Decentralization and Control: Central-Local Government Relations in Sweden" Poliq and Politics, Vol. 18, no. 3, July 1990 and BuciGlucksmann and Therborn, Le diji social-detllocrate, pp. 2. 32.-3. 6}. Arne Ruth, 'The Second New Nation: The Mythology of :Modern Sweden', Daedalus, Spring 1984, p. 90. 64. Lundberg, op. cit., p. 24. 65. Rowthorn and GIyn, op. cit., p. 252. 66. Lundberg, op. cit., p. 2.1. 67. See the Programme if the Swedish Social Democratic ParD' adopted t?J1 the 197J Party Conference, Socialdemokraterna, Stockholm 1975) p. 17; English-language version. 68. Lundberg, op. dt., p. 2.5. 69. Kristina Ahlen, 'Swedish Collective Bargaining Under Pressure: Inter-union Rivalry and Incomes Policies', British Journal if Indusb7'al Relations, Vol. q, no. 3, November 1989,

Literature, Vol.

p. 337· 70. AhIen,op. cit., p. 334. 71. Robert Taylor, 'Swedes' pay deal breaks old mould', Financial Times, 30 April 1988. 72. AhIen, op. cit., pp. 340-1. 73. Gary Burtless, 'Taxes, Transfers and Swedish Labor Supply', in Bosworth and Rivlin (eds) , op. cit., p. 189. Strictly speaking, Swedish part-time workers cannot be compared with those of other countries because the Swedish definition of part-time work includes all those who work fewer than thirty hours a week; elsewhere, the cut-off point is usually twenty hours. 74. William J. Baumol, ':r..1acroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban Crisis', American Economic Revie}lJ, Vol. 57, no. 3, June 1967, PP' 4 1 9-2.0. 75. Robert Bacon and \X1alter Eltis, Bdtailts Ecol1omk Problem: Too Few Producers, London, ~1acmil1an 1978 - a work primarily concerned with the UK, where it provided a justification

NOTES TO CHAPTER

17

for cuts in public spending. See the critique in EconomicjoHrnal, Vol. 89, June 1979: George Hadjimatheou and A. Skouras, 'Britain's Economic Problem: The Growth of the NonMarket Sector?', pp. 391-401 and Bacon and Elds's reply, pp. 402.-15. 76. Barry Bosworth and Robert Z, Lawrence, 'Economic Goals and the Policy Mix', in Bosworth and Rivlin (eds), op. cit., p. 105. 77. Lundberg, op. cit., p. 27. 78. This figure is reached by adding the 8.5 per cent of unemployed to the 5 per cent of the workforce on training schemes; see Financial Times, Survey on Sweden, 21 December 1993, p. ii. 79. Peter Garpenby, 'The Transformation of the Swedish Health Care System, or The Hasty Rejection of the Rational Planning Model',joHrnal if European Social Policy, Vol. 2., no. I, 1992, pp. 17-31. 80. Jane Jenson and Rianne Mahon, 'Representing Solidarity: Class, Gender and the Crisis in Social-Democratic Sweden', New Left RevieJv, no. 201, September-October 1993, p. 9l. 8 I. See the interview with the SAP leader Ingvat Carlsson, Survey on Sweden, Financial Times, 21 December 1993, p. v. 82. Hugh Carnegy, 'Reluctant to walk the gangplank', Financial Times, 4 November 1993, p. 19, and 'Sweden shows effects of painful cure', Financial Times, 8 November 1993, p. ;. 83. Rudolf :Meidner, 'Why Did the Swedish Model Fail?', in Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch (eds), Real Problems, False Solutions, Socialist Register, 199}, London, l:vferlin Press, London 1993, pp. 84. Dietmar Braun, 'Political Immobilism and Labour :Market Performance: The Dutch Road to Mass Unemploymenf,Joflrnal of Public Policy, Vol. 7, no. 3, July-September 1987, p. 31 9, 85. G6ran Therborn, "'Pillarization and "Popular Movements". Two Variants of Welfare State Capitalism: The Netherlands and Sweden', in Francis G. Castles (ed.) The Comparative Hislo,]' oj Public Policy', Polity Press, Oxford 1989, p. 2.10. 86. G. A. Irwin, 'Patterns of Voting Behaviour in the Netherlands', in Richard T. Griffiths (cd.), The Economics and Politics of the Netherlands since I94f, Martious Nijhoff, The Hague 1980, pp. 2°9- 10 . 87. Gladdish, GOlJernillgjrolh the Centre, p. 47. 88. Ibid., p. 29, which cites as its source the OECD. 89. Braun, op. cit., p. 32 5. 90. Therborn, op. cit., p. 234. 91. Rudy B. Andeweg, 'Less Than Nothing? Hidden Privatisation of the Pseudo-Private Sector: The Dutch Case', 'FeSI European Politics, Vol. 1 I, no. 4, October 1988, p. 1.2.2. 91.. See table in Fil1al1dal Times, 1.1 July 1993, p. 3; the ranking is for non-financial transnational corporations. The ranking had not significantly changed in 1994. The fourth UNCTAD World Investment Report tanks Shell first, Philips eleventh and Unilever twentieth; see Financial Times, ,; I August 1994, p. 4. 93. Kurzer, op. cit., pp. 13-15. 94. Gladdish, op. cit., pp. 151-2.. 95. Wolinetz, 'Socio-economic Bargaining in the Netherlands', pp. 85-9. 96. Gladdish, op. cit., p. I 51. 97. Ibid., p. 153· 98. Braun, op. cit., p. 3 I l. 99. Laura Rauo, 'Forecast of meagre expansion', Survey on the Netherlands, Financial Times, 16 October 1986, p. l and 'Many losers, but some winners', Survey on the Netherlands, Financial Times, 23 November 19 87, p. 5. 100. Gladdish, op. cit., p. 155 H

NOTES TO CHAPTER

17

101. Charles Batchelor, 'Concern at decline in membership', Survey on the Netherlands, Financial Times, 16 October 19 86, p. 5. 102.. See the description of the social security cuts in Ilja Scholten, 'Corporatism and the Neo-Liberal Backlash in the Netherlands" in Ilja Scholten (ed.), Political Stability and Neocorporatism, Sage, London 1987, pp. 144-7. 10;. Wolinetz, op. cit., p. 92.. 104. Braun, op. cit., p. 3°9. 105. Therborn, op. cit., p. l3l. 106. Laura Raun, 'Facing tough decisions', Survey on the Netherlands, Financial Times, 2.3 November 1987, p. I. 107. Laura Raun, 'OECD prescribes more bitter medicine for Dutch economy', Financial Times, 7 June 19 89, p. 3· 108. See P. M. M. W. van de Ven, 'From Regulated Cartel to Regulated Competition in the Dutch Health Care System' European Economic Revie}/J, Vol. ;4, 1990, pp. 632-45. 109. Alain Franco, 'Le nouveau gouvernement donne la priorite a l'emploi', Le Monde, 16 August 1994, p. 4· 110. Henri R. Sneessens and Jacques H. Dreze, 'A Discussion of Belgian Unemployment, Combining Traditional Concepts and Disequilibrium Econometrics', Economica, Vol. 53, 1986 Supplement to no. :uo, Unempll!J'ment, p. 593. 1 I 1. Ibid., p. 597. Ill. Ibid., p. S9 5. I 13. Claude Demelenne, Le Socia/isme du possible. GJty Spitae/s: Changer la gauche?, Editions Labor, Brussels 1985, p. 39. 114. Michel ,Mignolet, 'Les economies regionales', in Guy Quaden (ed.), L'iconomie beige dans la crise, Editions Labor, Brussels 1987, p. p.o. The reader should be aware that in Belgium the statistics on relative growth rates between Flanders and Wallonia are disputed with great political vigour. 1 I 5. Demelenne, op. cit., p. 48. I 16. Dick Leonard, 'Mr. Wallonia pulls the strings', Financial Times, 12. July 1993, p. I I. 117. Dick Leonard, 'Fashioning federalism', Financial Times, I l July 1993, p. 10. I 18. Paul Cheeseright, 'Cry for help in mining crisis', Survey on Belgium, Financial Times, 13 June 19 86 , p. 3. 1 19. Mabille, His/oire politique de la Belgique, p. 365; Georges Vandermissen, 'La crisi delle relazioni industriali in Belgio', in Paolo Perulli and Bruno Trentin (eds), II sindacato nella recessione, De Donato, Bari 1983, p. 167; and Katzenstein, op. cit., p. 197. 1 lO. Dick Leonard, 'Eye on coalition chances', Survey on Belgium, Financial Times, 19 June 19 87, p. 4. 12.1. Herman Daems and Peter Van de Weyer, L'iconomie beige sous influence, Academia/ Fondation Roi Baudouin, Brussels 1993, p. 39. I l l . :Michel .l\1onitor, 'Social Conflicts in Belgium', in Crouch and Pizzorno (eds), The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1963. Vol. I: National Studies, p. 2. I. 11;. Tim Dickson, 'Flexible times" Survey on Belgium, Financial Times, 16 June 19 88 , p. 3. 12.4. Tim Dickson, 'High cost of cultural divide" Survey on Belgium, Financial Times, I; June 19 86, p. 4. 125. Andrew Hill, 'Franc fears for Belgian social pact talks', Financial Times, 7 October

1993, p. 3·

12.6. Quaden (ed.), op. cit., p. 16. :1.7. David Gardner, 'Export fall fuels recession', Financial Tillles, Katzenstein, op. cit., p. I 19. 129. Demelenne, op. cit., p. 79.

I

118.

12.

July 1993, p.

10.


18. Germany and Britain: SPD and Labour in Power 1.

William Carr, 'German Social Democracy since 1945" in Roger Fletcher (ed.), Bernrf German Social Democraf)', Edward Arnold, London 1987, p.

stein to Brandt. A Short Histo,:y 199·

2. Cited in Jeremy Moon, 'The Responses of British Governments to Unemployment', in Richardson and Henning (eds), Unemployment, p. 24. 3. Cited in Martin Holmes, Political Pressure and Economic PoliC)': British GOIJCrnment 197(}1974, Butterworth, London 1982, p. 46; on p. 47 Holmes himself shows no such emotional concern. 4. Anderson, 'The Figures of Descent', p. 64. 5. Kathleen Burk and Alec Cairncross, tGoodl?),e, Great Britain'. The 1976lMF Crisis, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1992, p. 145 and the whole of chapter 5,'The I:vIovement of Opinion'. This book is the key text on the IMF crisis. 6. James Callaghan, Time and Chance, Collins, London 1987, p. 426. 7. Burk and Cairncross, op. cit., p. 160. 8. Donoughue, Pntne Minis/er, p. 94. 9. On Peter jay's authorship, see Healey, The Tiffle of l\iy Life, p. 443; Donoughue, op. cit., p. 82; and Callaghan'S hint in his own memoirs, op. cit., p. 425. The British public's apparently insatiable appetite for the memoirs of politicians has led to a constant spate of such publications to an extent unequalled in the rest of Europe. Though all are self-serving, it is possible, by judicious cross-referencing, to obtain an impression of perceived constraints. 10. See Labour Party, Labour's Programme 1976, May 1976. II. Holland pointed out that Keynes's macro-economic focus left no room for policies aimed at the level of the large firms, the <meso-economic sector': The Socialisl Challenge, Quartet Books, London 1976, p. 28. 12. Donoughue, op. cit., pp. 82-4. 13· Healey, op. cit., p. 379. 14. Michael Artis and David Cobham (eds), Labour's Economic Policies 1974-1979, :Manchester University Press, :Manchester 1991, p. 21. 15. Healey, op. cit., p. 394. 16. Ibid., pp. 394-5 and Edmund Dell, A Hard Pounding. Politics and Economic Crisis 19741976, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1991, pp. 163-4. 17. Harold Wilson, Final Term. The LaboNr Government 1974-1976, Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, London 1979, p. 115. 18. Healey, op. cit., p. 426. 19. Christopher Allsopp, ':Mactoeconomic Policy: Design and Performance', in Artis and Cobham (eds), op. cit., pp. 3 [-4. 20. Burk and Cairncross, op. cit., p. xiv. 2l. Callaghan, op. cit., p. 436. 22. Healey, op. cit., pp. 380-1. 23· Ibid., p. 4]2· 2.4. Crosland, op. cit., pp. 2.89-90. 25. Crossman) The Diaries rf a Cabinet l\l/inisler, Vol. I, entry for 12 July 1966, p. 568. 26. Crosland, To)'!:)' Crosland, pp. 377-8; corroborated in Tony Benn, Against Ihe Tide. Diaries 1973-76, Hutchinson, London 1989, p. 667. 27· Benn, op. cit., p. 674. 2.8. The outline of this strategy - coded Strategy B - is reproduced in Appendix IV of Benn, op. cit., pp. 725~7.

NOTES TO CHAPTER

18

2.9. Ibid., p. 664. 30. Donoughue~ op. cit.~ p. 90; Del1~ op. cit., p. 2.2.6; Callaghan, op. cit., pp. 436-8. 3 I. S. Crosland, op. cit., p. 381. 32.. Healey~ op. cit., p. 43 I. 33· Ibid., p. 433· 34. Ibid., p. 434. 35. Burk and Cairncross, op. cit., pp. 37, 46. 36. Callaghan, op. cit., pp. 431-2.; Healey, op. cit., p. 430. 37. Lieber, 'Labour in Power: Problems of Political Economy\ pp. 197, 202.. 38. Labour Party, Labour Programme 197}, London 1973, pp. 2.2.-5. 39. Paul Ormerod, 'Incomes Policy', in Artis and Cobham (eds), op. cit., p. 62. 40. This recognition comes from one of the Labour ministers least sympathetic to the unions, Edmund Dell (see his op. cit., p. 159), and is confirmed by all those involved; see also Jack Jones's own recollections in his Union Man. An Autobiograp'-!J, Collins, London 19 86, pp. 196-3°2.. 41. See the TUC pamphlet The Deve/opftlenl oj the Social Contract, London, July 1975. 42.. Bert Ramelson, Social Contracl: Cure~all or Con~/rick?, Communist Party pamphlet, London n.d. (1974), p. 21. 43. See TUC, Economic Revinv 1978, London 1978, pp. 40-1. 44. Healey, op. cit., p. 39 8. 45. Artis and Cobham (eds), 0p. cit., p. 15. 46. Healey, op. cit., p. 467. 47. William Brown, 'Industrial Relations', in Artis and Cobham (eds), op. cit., p. 215. 48. Joel Barnett, Inside the Treasuf)', Andre Deutsch, London 1982., pp. l66-8. 49. Balogh, The Irrelevance oj Co11t'enti01lal Economics, p. 47. 50. On this and the general theme of the new technologies and their impact on labour, see Ian Benson and John Lloyd, New Technology and Industrial Change, Kogan Page, London 1983, especially chapters 3 and 8. 51. Leaman, The Political E(0110111)' oj West German)" 194f-193f, p. 2.41. 52. Josef Esser and Wolfgang Fach, "'Social 11arket" and Modernization Policy: West Germany', in Dyson and \'('ilks (eds), Industrial Crisis, p. 103. 53. Graham Hallett, 'West Germany', in Graham with Seldon (eds), Government and Economies in the Postwar World, pp. 80-1. 54. See the Clearing Banks~ 1982 report~ cited in Wyn Grant and Stephen Wilks, 'British Industrial Policy: Structural Change, Policy Inertia', jotlrtwl oj Public Poliry, VoL 3, no. I, February 1983, p. 19. 55. Esser and Fach, op. cit., p. 10 5. 56. Ibid., p. 1°9. 57. The following paragraphs on the of the steel industry are based on Esser and Fach, op. cit., pp. 111-14 and Kenneth Dyson, 'The Politics of Corporate Crises in West Germany', ff?Cst European Politics, Vol. 7, no. I, January 1984, pp. 34-6. 58. Porter, The Competitive Advtll1tdges of Nations, p. 37 8. 59. ]\t1inkin, The ContentiollJ Alli(trlce, p. 173. 60. See, for instance, Edmund Dell, later Treasul:Y minister and trade secretary, who, in his memoirs, mused that Holland could a lengthy policy paper at the drop of a hat: Dell, op. cit., p. 90. 61. Labour Party, The NatiOfial Enterptise Board. Labour's State Holding Cott/pat!), An Opposition Green Paper, London, n.d. (1973), p. 14. 62. Ibid., p. 21. 63. This is ackowledged by S. A. Walkland, a critic of Stuart Holland's and the Labour

ruc

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

8

Left's proposals, in Andrew Gamble and S. A. Walkland, The British Party ~stetll and Economic Poliry 194J-198;, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1984, pp. 133-40. 64. Labour Party, Labour's Programme 1973, p. 34. 65· Ibid., p. 17. 66. Ibid., p. 18. 67. F. W. S. Craig (ed.), British General Electioll Manifestos 190(}-1974, p. 403. 68. Wilson, op. cit., p. 30. 69' Tom Forester, 'Neutralising the Industrial Strategy', in Ken Coates (ed.), What J.re.nl Wrong, Spokesman, Nottingham 1979, p. 77 and Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, Macmillan, London 1991. 70. Wilson, op. cit., p. 125, 71. Ibid., p. 141. 72. Malcom Sawyer, 'Industrial Policy', in Artis and Cobham (eds), op. cit., p. 160. 73. Healey, op. cit., p. 4 0 7. 74. Sawyer, op. cit., p. 162; Forester, op. cit., p. 86. 75. Stephen Wilks, 'Liberal State and Party Competition: Britain', in Dyson and Wilks (eds), op. cit., p. 145. 76. The episode is examined in David Coates, Labour in Pou)er? A Stuqy of the Labour G01Jernment /974-1979, Longman 1980, pp. J 02-6. 77. Dell, op. cit., p. 90. 78. Sawyer, op. cit., p. 166. 79. Donoughue, op. cit., p. 83, who points out that unemployment was a fate unlikely to befall any of the employees of this august institution. 80. Healey, op. cit., p. 398. 8r. Klaus Hinrich Hennings, 'West Germany', in Boltho (ed.), The European Economy, p.49 6. 82. Leaman, op. cit., pp. 21 7-18. 83. Douglas Webber, 'Social Democracy and the Re-emergence of Mass Unemployment in Western Europe', in Paterson and Thomas (eds), The Future of Socia/ DemocrafJl, 1986, p. 53 n . 84. Leaman, op. cit., p. 2l8. 85. See the analysis of a former of the Bundesbank, Otmar Emminger, in 'West Germany: Europe's Driving Force?', in Ralf Dahrendorf (cd.), Europes Economy in Crisis, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 198J, p. 2.3. 86. Ibid., p. 2.4. 87. Leaman, op. cit., p. 226. 88. Emminger, op. cit., p. 3 I. 89. Helmut Schmidt, The World ensis: BetJveen Recession aud Hope, Foundation for International Relations, n.p. 1984, pp. 18-19; this is the text of a lecture given in Lisbon on 4 November 198;. 90. Hennings, 'West Germany', p. 497. 91. Douglas Webber and Gabriele Nass, 'Employment Policy in West Gcrmany\ in Richardson and Henning (eds), op. cit., pp. 166-7. 9 2 . Ibid., pp. 169-79' 93. Gunther Schmid, 'Labour l'.farket Polic), under the Social-Liberal Coalition', in Klaus von Beyme and Manfred G. Schmidt (cds), Polif)1 and Po/ilia in the Federal Republic of Germa,!y, Gower, Aldershot 1985; p. 11.6. 94. Webber and Nass, op. cit., p. 18395. Giersch, Paque and Schmieding, The Fading lvtiracle, p. 193. 96. David l\1arsh, 'Wunder turns to whimper', Finallcial nmes, 4 November 1987, p. 26.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 18 97. Hallett, op. cit., pp. 94-5.

98. Pimlott, Harold Wi/son, p. ISO. 99. The text of this address is in Helmut Schmidt, Perspectives on Politics, Westview Press,

Boulder CO 1981; the citation is on p. 194. 100. Cited in Horst Heimann, 'Fine del movimento operaio?', in Antonio Missiroli (ed.), Modernizzazione e sistetl/a politico. Ita/ia e Germania federale a confronto, Supplement to Demotrazia e diritto, no. 1-2, January-April 1989; the survey was published in no. 2.1 of Vorwarts, 2l May 1988. 101. Webber, 'Social Democracy and the Re~emergence of lvfass Unemployment in Western Europe" pp. 2.3, 1.7. 101.. Volker R. Berghahn and Detlev Karsten, Industrial Relations in If?est Germalry, Berg, Oxford 19 87, p. 2.46. 10;. Peter Bruce, 'West German unions set might against "demon Kohl"', Financial Times, 3 June 19 86 . 104. Ute Schmidt, 'La Cdu e Ie difficolta della "svolta"', in :Missiroli (ed.), op. cit., p. 131. 1°5. Ronaldo Schmidtz, finance director of BASF, the chemicals company, quoted in David Marsh, 'In the clutch of corporatism', Financial Times, 5 November 1987, p. 27. 106. Kenneth Dyson, 'The Problem of Morality and Power in the Politics of West Germany', Government and Opposition, Vol. 16, no. 1., Spring 1981, p. 1; 1. 107. See Manfred G. Schmidt, 'Learning from Catastrophes: West Germany's Public Policy', in Francis G. Castles (ed.), The Comparative His/ofJ' of Publit' Polif)', Polity Press, Oxford 1989, pp. 56-61. Schmidt points out that in the 1950S Germany's share of social expenditure was higher than in other OECD countries. 108. Marsh, op. cit., p. 2.6. 109. Padgett and Paterson, A HistoO' of Sotial DefHocraC)' in Postwar Europe, pp. 149-5 0 . 110. Miller and Potthoff, A Histo0' of German Sodal DemotraC)', pp. 198-9. I I I. Ardagh, Germany and the Germans, pp. 406-7. I 12. Sebastian Cobler, La~ Order and Politics in ll7est Germany, trans. Francis McDonagh, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1978, pp. 33-4. 113. Victorial Isenberg, 'Le SPD et l'Etat', Nouve/le Revtle Socialiste, April-May 1983, pp. 8,-4· 114. Schmidt, Perspectives on Politics, pp. 187-8. 115. Brandt, l\{J1 Life in Politit:s, pp. 275- 6. 1 16. Enzo Collotti, Esempio Gormaltia. Socialdemot'razia teduca e coalizione socia/~/ibera/e 19691976, Feltrinelli, Milan 1977, p. 97. 117. Braunthal, The West German Sodal Democrats 1969-[932, pp. 144-5. 118. Miller and Potthoff, op. cit., pp. 192-3. 119. John H. Herz, 'Social Democracy versus Democratic Socialism', p. 2. 5 5. IlO. SPD, Okonomisch..politischer Orienticrtlngsrahmetl fur die Jahre 197}-193}, published by the Press and Information of the SPD, p. 8. I 2 I. Ibid., p. II. I l l . Ibid" p. 30. 11.3. Ibid., p. 38. 12 4. Ibid., p. 39. 12.5. Ibid. 126. Braunthal, op. cit., p. 1 5I. 127. Brandt, The State 0/ the Natioll, p. 1 I in English-language text. 128. Herz, op. cit.; pp. 2.65-6. 12.9. See Paul Whiteley, 'The Decline of Labour's Local Party l\lembership and Electoral Base 1945-79', in Dennis Kavanagh (ed.), The Politifs of the Labour Party, Allen and Unwin, London 1982., p. 113.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 8 130 Katz and Mair (eds), Party Organizations, p. 332.. 131. Pontusson, Swedish Social Democraq and British Labour, p. 25. The connection between

social-democratic hegemony and a universalist welfare system is at the centre of G0sta Esping-Andersen, Politics against Markets; see especially pp. 245-6 and see also the same author's The Three Worlds if Welfare Capitalism, pp. 26-33. 132. :Minkin, op. cit., pp. 1 I 5-16; Leo Panitch, Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy. The Labour Party, the Trade Unions and Incomes Policy 194J-1974, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1976, p. 228. 133. S. Holland, op. cit., pp. 139-40. 134. Colin Politics in Britain, Heinemann, London 19 8; p. 7'· I; 5. Child benefits also replaced family allowances payable to the mother, but only for the second and subsequent children, and worth much less than the child benefits; see Nicholas Barr and Fiona Coulter, 'Social Security: Solution or Problem?' in Hills (ed.), The State of Welfare, pp. 279- 80. 1;6. Labour Manifesto 1974, in F. W. S. Craig (ed.), op. cit., p. 4'9. 137. Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries [974-76, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1980, p·7 08 . 1;8. Healey, op. cit., pp. 448-9. 139. Barnett, op. cit., pp. 54-5. 140. Allan Gillie, 'Redistribution', in Artis and Cobham (eds), op. cit., p. 232. 14 I. See figures in William Brown and Keith Sisson, A Positive Incomes PoliO', Fabian Tract no. 442, :May 1976, p. 6. 142. Markovits, The Politics of the J¥-est Germarl Trade Unions, p. 108. 143. Ibid., pp. 117-10. 144. Berghahn and Karsten, op. cit., p. 204. 145. Ibid., pp. 120-2. 146. Ibid., p. 124. 147. Helmut Schmidt, 'The Role of the Trade Unions in the Federal Republic" 14 March 1976, Hannover, in The Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the GoverflnJent of the FRG, Vol. 3, no. 3,6 April 1976, Bonn, p. 2; henceforth: Press Bulletin, PRG. 148. Walter Arendt, 'Speech at the Second and Third Reading of the Co·Determination BiW, 18 March 1976, in Press Bulletin, FRG, 6 April 1976, p. 4. I49. I\farkovits, op. cit., p. 1I 2. 150. Doug l\filler, 'Social Partnership and the Determinants of \X/orkplace In(je~.endeJlce in West Germany', in British Joumal of Industrial Reiatiolls, Vol. 2.0, no. 1, l\farch 1982, pp. 52-3' I 5I. Walther Muller-Jentsch and Hans~Joachim Sperling, 'Economic Development, Labour Conflicts and the Industrial Relations System in West Germany', in Crouch and Pizzorno (eds), The Resurgence of Class Conflict ill U:7esterIJ Europe since 1963, Vol. 1, pp. 288-90. 15 z.. Wolfgang Streeck, 'Organizational Consequences of Neo-Corporatist Co-operation in West German Labour Unions', in Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe C. Schmitter (eds), Patterns of Corporatist Policy,.Making, Sage, Beverly Hills 1981 , pp. 35-6. 153. Ibid., p. 51. 154. Wolfgang Streeck, 'Neo-Corporatist Industrial Relations and the Economic Crisis in West Germany', in John H. Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conflict in Contttl/p0rdO' Capitalism, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1984~ pp. 29 1 -314. I5 5· Ibid., p. 307· 156. Labour Party, Labour Progral)/IJlt [97J, p. 27. 1 57. Labotlr Manifesto [974, in F. W. S. Craig, op. cit., pp. 4 0 3, 458. 158. The standard account of the road to the Bullock Report is John Elliott, Conflict or

NOTES TO CHAPTER

18

Cooperation? The Growth of Industrial Democrat)', Kogan Page, London 1978; the analysis of the actual report is on pp. 1. 34-40. 159. Ibid., p. 145. 160. Coates, op. cit., p. 139; Colin Crouch, The Politics of Industrial Relations, Fontana/Collins, Glasgow 1979, p. 109. 161. Tom Clarke, 'Industrial Democracy: The Institutionalized Suppression of Industrial Conflict?', in Tom Clarke and Laurie Clements (eds), Trade Unions Under Capitalism, Fontana, n.p. 1977, p. 357· 162.. Peregrine Worsthorne, 'Beefing up the bosses" Sundqy Telegraph, 30 January 1977,

p.

18.

163. Rhys David, 'Employee polls back worker directors', Financial Times, 2.6 January 1977,

p.

I.

164. J. Elliott, op. cit., pp. 143-4; see also Benn, op. cit., p. 690' 165. Healey, op. cit., p. 459. 166. See the resolution in rue Report 1978, pp. 561-2. and the speech by Lord Allen of the shopworkers' union, USDAW, who moved the resolution, p. 562..

J.

x67. Jones, op. cit., p. ; 16. 168. W. Brown, 'Industrial Relations', p . .2.19. 169' Kevin Hawkins, Trade Unions, Hutchinson, London 1981, pp. 61-4.

19. The French Experiment 1. Vincent Wright and Howard Machin, 'The French Socialist Party in 1973: Performance and Prospects" in GO/Jemment and Opposition, Vol. 9, no. 2., 1974, pp. 127-8. 2. Hugues Portelli, 'L'integration du Parti socialiste a la Cinquieme Republique\ Revue jranfaise de science politique, Vol. 34, no. 4-5, August-October 1984, p. 82.1. ;. Jenson and Ross, 'The Tragedy of the French Left', p. 1.7. 4. Cited in Socialist International Information, no. 5-6, :May-June 1971. 5. D. S. Bell and Byron Criddle, The French Socialist Parry, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1988,

P·7 0 • 6. An example of this view is in Lazar, Maisons rouges, p. 1;6. 7. I have used the text in the volume published by the PCF - the most easily available - with an introduction by Georges Marchais: Programflle cOfllfllun de gouvernefllent, Editions Sociales, Paris 1971.. 8. Ibid., p. 53. 9. Ibid., pp. 61-4, 68. 10. Ibid., pp. 75, 97. 1 I. Ibid., pp. 95-6. n. Ibid., pp. 105-11.,117' 13. Ibid., pp. 115-16. 14. Ibid., p. 131. 15· Ibid., pp. 143-9' 16. Ibid., pp. 150-4. 17. See Portelli, 'La voie nationale des PC franc;ais et italien', pp. 659-72.. 18. Jean-Pierre Cot, 'Autogestion and Modernity in France" in B. Brown (ed.), Euro-

communism and EurosocialisfII, p. 82.. 19. Ibid., p. 71. zoo Ibid., p. 83. 2.1. See E. Maire, A. Detraz and F. Krumnov, La CFDT et f'Autogestion, Editions de

NOTES TO CHAPTER

19

Cerf, Paris 1973 and E. I\1aire and J. Julliard, La CFDT d'atdourd'hui, Editions du Seuil, Paris 1975 . .11.• George Ross, 'French Trade Unions Face the 19805: The CGT and the CFDT in the Strategic Conflicts and Economic Crisis of Contemporary France', in Esping-Andersen and Friedland, Political Power and Social Theory, Vol. 3, p. 59. 2;. Bell and Criddle, op. cit., p. 88. 24. Cot, op. cit., p. 74, Jenson and Ross, op. cit., p. 30. z ~. Cot, op. cit., pp. 77-8. 26. Hugues Portelli, 'La voie nationale ... " pp. 659-72; see also a succinct summary of /e socialisme autogestionnaire in D. L. Hanley, A. P. Kerr and N. H. Waites, Contemporary France. Politics and Socie!)' sim'c 194J, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1979, p. 156. 27. Pierre Rosanvallon, L1age de Fatlloges/ion, Editions du Seuil, Paris 1976, p. 8. 2.8. Ibid., pp. 16-17. 1.9. Ibid., p. 117. 30. Ibid., p. ll9. 3 I. Ibid., p. 11.0. p.. Byron Criddle, 'The French Socialist Party', in Paterson and Thomas (eds), The Future of Social Demo(,'racy, p. 2. 27. 33. Extracts in Michel Rocarcl, Parler Vrai. Texles po/iliques, Editions du Seuil, Paris 1979,

p.

102..

34. W. Rand Smith, 'Towards AUloges/ion in Socialist France? The Impact of Industrial Relations Reform', West European Polilics, Vol. 10, no. I, January 1987, pp. 57-8. 35. Jacques Julliard, 'Epinay-sur-Seine et retour ou la fin d'un cycle', Intervention, no. 13, July-September I985, p. 6. 36. Lazar, op. cit., p. 136. 37. Mitter.rand, Ma part de verite, p. 110 and his Politique. Textos et distours 1938-1981, Fayard, Paris 1984, p. 33 3· 38. Lazar, op. cit., p. 138 39. See the analysis in Jean Ranger, 'Le declin du Parti communiste franc;ais', Revue jranraise de science polifique, Vol. 36, no. I, February 1986, especially pp. 46-53. 40. Jenson and Ross, op. cit., p. 13. 4 I. Bell and Criddle, op. cit., p. 99. 42. Franc;ois Platone, 'Les communistes au gouvernement: une experience "complexe" et contradictoire', Retltfe politique ef parlementaire, Vol. 87, no. 914, January-February 1985, p. 31. 43. For the constant deterioration of the image of the PCF in French public opinion, see Ranger, op. cit., pp. 53-5. 44. For an examination of the role of communist intellectuals in the 19708 and 1980s, see Sudhir Hazareesingh, Intellectuals and the French Communisf Party. Disillusion and Decline, Clarendon Press, Oxford 199 I. 45. Platone, op. cit., p. 42. 46. Parti socialiste, Pro/el socia/iste. Pour la France des annies 80, Club Socialiste du Livre, Paris 1980; henceforth cited as Pro/et socia/isfe. 47. Among those cited we find: Edgar Morin, Theodor Adorno, David Riesman, Noam Chomsky, Regis Debray, Antonio Gramsci, Dominique Lecourt. 48. Pro/eel socialiste, p. 43. 49. Ibid., pp. 64ff. 50. Ibid., p. 78. 5I. Speech of 21 May 198 I, in I\fitterrand, PO/ifiqlJc, p. 415. p. Pro/eel socia/iste, p. 33. 53. Ibid., p. 32 .

NOTES TO CHAPTER

19

54· Ibid., p. 33· 55. Bell and Criddle, op. cit., p. 2S2. 56. Ibid., p. I I l. 57. Pierre Mauroy, 'La gauche au pouvoir', Revue politique ef parlementaire, Vol. 87, no. 916, May-June 1985, p. 6. 58. Jose Freches, 'V Etat socialiste\ in Michel Massenet et aI., La France socia/iste. Un premier bilan, Hachette, Paris 1983, pp. 401-12, ;86-91 and Anne Stevens, "'L'Alternance" and the Higher Civil Service, in Philip G. Cerny and Martin A. Schain (eds), Socialism, the State and Public Po/icy in France, Frances Pinter, London 1985, p. 157. 59. On the problems of replacing one set of grovellers with another, see the inside view of Thierry Pfister, La vie quotidienne aMatignon au temps de I'union de 10 gauche, Hachette, Paris 1985, p. 1;8; for an implied promise that non-interference in the media was the hallmark of the true democrat, see Fran, originally in Neue Zeit, 19 January 1898; English trans. in H. Tudor and J. M. Tudor (eds), Marxism and Social Democracy. The RetJisionist Debate [S96-J398, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988. - The Preconditions rf Socialism, ed. and trans. Henry Tudor, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994. Berry, Albert, Fran Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 15, no. I, October

w.,

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