On the Relation of Universals and Particulars

Russell B. "On the Relation of Universals and Particulars" PAS, New Series, v. Xll. 1912 pp. 1-24. Reprinted by Gourtesy of the Editor of the Aristotelian 1912 wlnrw.aristotel iansoci ety.org. uk.

Society:

PAPERSRBAD BEFORETHE SOCIETY, 1911-1912_

I.-OI{

THE

RELATIONS

OF UNIVERSALS PARTICULARS.*

AND

3y BonrneNo Russrr,r,. Tnn purpose of the following paper is to consiclerwhether there is a fundamental division of the objects with rvhich metaphysics is concerned into lwo classes, uni'r'ersais and particulars, or rvheiher there is any method ol overcoming bhis dualism. My own opinion is that the dualism is ultimate ; ou the other hand, many men rvith whom, in the rnain, I am in close agreement, hold that ib is not ultimate. I do not feel the grounds in favour of its ultimate nature to be very conclusive,and in what follorvs I should lay stress rather on the distinctions and considerations introduced during the argument than on the conclusion ab which the argumenb arrives. It is impossible to begin our discussionwith sharp definitions of universals and particulars, though we nray hope to reach such definitions in the end. At the beginning, rve can only roughly indicate the kind of facts that we wish to analyze and the kind of distinctions that rve wish to examine. There are several cognate distinctions rvhich produce confusion by intermingling, * The thesis of the present paper is closely similar bo that of lfr. Moore's paper "fdentity," read before this Society iu 1900-1901. Ify chief reasonfor thinking that the questiolrdemandsa fresh discussion is thab the statement of the grounds for bhe thesis appears to require some examination of the nature of sensiblespaceas opposedto physical space. A

2

SERTITAND RUSsELL.

and whicb ib is importanb bo disentangle before advancing into the heart of our problem. The firsr disbinction thab concerns us is the distincriou between percepbsand concepts,i.e.,betrveen ob.jecbs of acts of pelcepbion and ol-,,jects of acts of conception. If there is a rlislirrr,l,i,rrr lrctwccn parbicularsand universals,perceptsrvill be rrnrorrglrilticulars, rvlrile concepts rvill be among universals. ( )l rl r or r r r r lsof r r r ri v o l s a l ss, u c h a s B e rk e l e y a nd H unre, rvi l l rrriirrl,;r.irr I lurt uorrccpLsuro clcrival.rlefronr pelcepts, as fainb l o l r ir s , or ir r s or r rt o tl rrrr rv a y . ()p l ro n e n tso f parti cul arsrvi l l rru rinl. ir .llr ir rr r { .t , lr r rL l l rp i i rrn p i , a rl i c u l i rri b yo f p e rceptsi s i }l usorl -, rLrrrll,lr:rL,tlrouglr flrc ucl of pcrceptioll may differ from the act ol' corrctrlrlirnr, yct ils olrjecls differ only by their greater cornplc.xity, ir.rrtl are really composedof conslituents rvhich arer ol' ruight be, concepts. Bub the clistinction of percepts and coucepts is too psychological for an ultimate rnetaphysical distinction. Percepts ancl conceptsare respectivelyfhe, relata of two different relations, perception and conception, and there is nothing in their definibions to sholv whether', or how, they differ. Moreover, the distinction of perceptsand concepts,in ibself,is incapalile of beirrg extended to eutities rvhich are not objectsof cognilive acbs. llence we require sorne obherdistinction expressingthe intrirrsic clifferencervhich we seenrto feel belrveetrpercelrlsand concepts. A cognate distinction, which effecrlspar:bl,t, lcas[ of rv]nll rve lv ant , is t he d i s ti n c ti o n b e trv e c rrth i u ts rvl ri cl r t.xi sl i rr ti me and bhingsr v l ri c l id o rro t,. Irr r,rrrl eto r tv oi rl i i rry rl rrr,sl ,i ,rrr a ,s to' r v het her t it n e i s rc l a t,i v c o r rrl rs o l u tc\\ , ' r) l u;r,)' si Lyl ,l rrrl i rn c nlit y a " ox is ts i rr ti rrro" 1 ,rr,v i d r:rl .r i s rro l ,i t,scl fl r,l nol rrcnl , rrr pr Llt of t ir ne, r rrtrls < ' rrrcs u c l r p l o l ro s i ti o rrrrs " ,i : i :; l ,r,fl l r, .r/ o r s it r r r r lt ar t eous r v i L h 1 7r-r13' .f5 g 1y " i s trrrc o i' .r' . ( l l , ri rr,' (, t.rrl x t as s r r r t r t 'llt d rl b ,' fo r,'s, i n tu l l a .ttc u tts tu ,tl trf' l r' t.rLl r.trrrrlrr:rl l t tr.rc lr t s iv:e if r ] ra s d u ra ti o n , tl u ry w i l l rr' 1 , l rr, ri ' .) l ' , , r,t,i a per c epb e x i s b s i rl ti rn e , i rr tl rc r;,,1r;r,, l rl ro t'r, \rl rrl ,. i L J)tc io,

ON TIIIi

ttl :,L^'fl oN i i ol r l l N l Vl i l l l )i A I.Il ,\N l r l ' A l { l l t

col l cel l ti d0es troL' w i tl r

the

act, of

seerus i ndi ffcretrb

1'l rtl .l rj rl t'l ' l crcrrl rt,i orr, Lo l l rc

{ )f l x ' l (' trl )l ' l "tt

rv l ri l r'

l ,i l ntr,rf

l ' l tI

i l l ' A l (rr

'l

l :t

"tl t' ttl l ' Il rr' ' rl i l r' l ' .;' ' r' l ' ol r:{ rl l t' r' l rl l l )l l

trottc oi v i tr;i

rLtr,l 1,,, rrl l

l ' i trtrr'

tl i s t' i rrc Tl ns, Ttri trtd l tac'i r:, tvr: l ti Lvo l ttrt' rt 1l l rr trott-1rs l t' l r,rl trf i 11111 l l rrl bl r0 s rurtc (l ol tLruv e rs i es ti on of w hi C h rve w erc i l l scurcl r .

rrtrrlcortcopls. The will break out &s in lhc caso of 1x:t'tlolrLs man who reduces conuepts to perccpts rvili say that nothing is really out of time, and thab the appearance of this in the The man rvho reduces percepts case of concepts is illusory. bo conceplsmay either, like mosb idealists,deny that anything is in bime, or, like some realists, maintain thab concepts can and do exist in time. In addition to bhe above disLincbion as regards time, there is a distinction as regards space which, as we shall find, is very important in connection wibh our preseut question. Put as vaguely as possible, tiiis is a distinction which divides entities into lhree classes: (a) those which are not in any place, (b) those which are in one place at one tine, bub never in more than one, (c) those which ar-e in nrany places at once. To make this threefold division precise, rve should have to discuss what we mean by a place, lvhat we meon by " in," and horv the different kinds of space-visual, tactile, physical -produce different forms of this lhreefoltl tlivisiorr. lir-rr the present I rvill merely illustrato wlrrlb f rnctrt by exirtttpLrs. Relations, obviously, do nof trxisb :rttyrvlreroitr space. Ortr bodies,lve think, cxist irr ottt, plrrrxtrlb ir Littttr,lrrtbttob itr tlttlre olt t lt Q cot t t t r ll ir s t vlr iLt r t t t lss, than otre. (]crtcrl ,l ,1rrrr.l i t,itst's, n r a y b c s l L i t l t , , r l r t : i t t IIl i tl ) y l ,l i t( '( l s l tt, o l l ( i ( ) : w c l D a y s a l ', i r r i t r s e l r s o , t l r l L Lr v l r i L t 'r r c s si s i tr r r vtl t';' l ,l r ttl r l l vl r cr c tl te r e trlry,

is l, rvhile tlrirrg.

'f l r i s r l i v i s i,r r r o l o tr t,i l i tr s l vi l l l ,tr tl i sctr ssctl

l r r t c r ; f , , t ' L l r c 1 r t 'c s t t t t ,I I r r t 'r t , l )' u i sr l rt,o i l r r l i tr :r L tll l r l r l i L r cr l r ti tt:J t 'x r u r r i t r L t , i , i l t . l r r r L , l , l i l , i o r rt , o L l t t l t l t t t v t l 1 ,s1 ','l ttr l o g i t:i il ll ttr l tttct,r tl r l tl 'si tr l tl , l i r ; li r r l l , i o r r s , l , l r r r t r r l l r '( ) l , t t 'o l ,r ;i i r ,r tl r l i st i tr ct.i o tr s l vl r i t'l r t!r ( : r l l r '\ ': r l r l , i n t , l r r l r l 'r ') i {: l l l t, r t r r l t t i tl '.

I r r l l r r : l i tr r l , 1 ,l l tr :c,l l r r :tr : i s A'

I i l,lll' f lir \ N I I

IiUr is I,ll,l,.

ON TH X R E LA TION S OF U N IY E IIS A LIj A N I) I' r\l i ' fl (i l l l ,A l i s .

l l rrr rl i< 1, ; t t , ' , , ior lr cr t ,rv r:c rr l ' o l i rti r)u s a n rl c rrt,i t,i c rvl s i i cl r al e rrof l r:l :rl , i, r r s . ll, lr ; r s lr.rrl t c l rs trl u i u .)'l i )r l rl ri l o s ,l r l rersto i gtrore o r rr,. jc r l,r ' r r lll, ior rsrr,rrrl , s l rr:rl i :rs i f a l l e rrti ti es n' ere t' i tl rcr sttl r,j lr : lr,i, t l, t c t I ic ir t,t,s . l l rrt, t.l ri s C rrs tg rrri S Op t]re tl ecl i rrt, :r.rr,lI : , lr : r ll ils s nlllr ,u ' i t.l ro rrf I' rrl t,l rc irn ' g r.l l n c n t l rat therc url ' r,rrr:l rr r r lil, r c s; r . slr , ltl ,i o n s . J ' l ri l o s o p l ryl ri l s ,s o fi i t. as I l < norv, l r) r'( ' r ilnlor rr r ; r r r ilrI o I rL l l c rrl ,i l i c s rv h i c l r a re rtot rel ati ons.

hatrcd i nto one rvhol e,& nd so on. A lclr r , t iot ris t lisLir r gr r islr r : r l as tlrriil,triple, quadruple, etc., or d1'rxlio,frit'lit:, ilrtrLrdic,olc., accol'(lirrgto the number of terms rvlrich iL rrttibos in the sirnplest couiplexes in rvhich it occurs. Thus in the above exanrple.s, hatred is a dual lelation and belief is a quadruple relation. The capaciby for cornbining terms into a single conrplex is the defining chalacteristic of what I call oarbs. llhe

;\.r..r1 r r r r r ' lr . r r t , i1, i r.s rr,r' r: i rr.l rrrl t:rlrro bo rrl .va l l ti re ti ri rrgs that, rr',rrr lr lr r ; r l, r r r ' : r llyl,c c i L l l o tl l )a rti c u l a rs , b u t i l l so al I the rrrri vr, r ' s r rl,lrlri r r ,lr l,lr il o s o l rl rr:r'asre i n th e h a l ri t o f consi deri ng u 'l rcrr t , lr r , - r ' r lis r r r rs t,lsu : rc l i l ti u rr o f p a rti c u l a l s t o urri versa)s, l'ur urivr:r'sir,lsrrnr gr:rrerallyct_rnceivetl as coutrnon properties of pariiculars, irr l'rrct, as predicates. tr'or our prurposeit is hardly 'ivorth whilr to invent a technicai terru nd hcrc; f sliall

question no\r arises: Are there complexes rvhich ct,rrsistol' o sirigle term and a verb ? " A exists " mighi servc trs rtlr exan)pleof rvhat is possibiy such a cornplex. It is tlrtr 1,ossii(, bility that thero rnay be complexesof this kind rvhich rrtu,litrs irnpossible to decide off-hand bhat verbs are tlte ettttc ils relafious. There may be verbs rvhich are philosopltically ts

lherefole speak uf crrlitics rvhicli are not reiaiions sirnpiy as ttott-rt.IaI'iort s. The secondlogical tlistinctiori *'hich rve requir-eis one rvhich mav or may nob be itlerrbicirlin extension with lhab bebween relabions and non-relatiorrs,but is certainly not identical in irrtensiol. I0 rrral' be cxl.rressctlas the rlistinction betrveen verlis iurrl substanlivcs,()l', rrrot'cool.reclly,behveen the objects tlcnok,rl Ly vcrbs rutl Llrtr olrjucls rlcnoteri by substanlir.es.x (Si rrc c l, lr is r r r or o c o rrc c t r.rx p te s s i oirr s l o rrg a trd cnrrrl rrous,I sl ra l l gt . r r r , r ' r Lll1' rtrs c s l ro rtt' r'l ri rta s eL o n i e i rn i h e sarnetLi l g. l re 'l 'l rrrs,r r lr r , t r I s pt ' r l i o f v e r' l rs I, rn rrL nth e o l rj e c tsderi oted by t l l l ,s , r r r r r l s ir r r ilr r l l y l i rl s u b s t,rrn ti v c s .)' J l l rtrnrrLrrreoi thi s rl i sl ,i r r c l, ior( 'rlllol' l{ (,s fl o rrr tl rrr rr,rrrrl ;' srrI i s c o trrl rl cxes. Irr rrrosb r',,1 1 11r lc xilc sr,r ot ,ir r l rl l , rL c c rL l ri rrrrrrrn b r,l .otli i l l crerrt,t,rrti bi es :u ,, r',r r r l, ir r r , ir r l r t , or r s i rrg l t' r' rrt,i l ,.i , Irrl rt,trs o l rr,r' t' l rLti otr." r\,s l r,\' fr;r.l r r r rIl, r ' 1i, " li, r ' c x i rrrrl ,l c , i s l r c o rrl rl c x i rr rvl ri r' l r l ttrl t.,tl ('{)n rlr ir r ,A : i : r r r r l li irrt,oo trt.rrl ro l r,;" (l ' s I' r,l i t,l1 l r:r1,.\l r:r1r' sl i " ir; rt

r',')rfl l fr'\

x ' l'l ri r l r l i . r v . r ' tt

i tr

rr'l r r llr

i s tl r,r rl i sl i rr,l i,r lr l /,ttt,J,* :u r,l

i f l f l f l o l ) fr:tl f'.

l '[-

ltr ' lir ' /' t' r ttlltilr n;

r ylr i,lr

rt,) ) t' t,l,l,r t l,tr l

I

,,\

rrrrrl

f,r r tr r r r tl- t' r lr i) l\' r

li

( ) f;r s

llr , sr . l.r ,t tr lr r r o lr ) nllr .t l 't1 tr, t1,1,,s,,1 .ll,tth' //i,r 1is, ) ] .lli.

r r tr r l

( ';r r r r l

l l r r .r l i r l i r r ,l i ,,r r l r .r .l r

l ,r

rrr.

well as grammatically intlansitive. Such verbs, if they exist, may be calledpredicates,and the plopositions in rvhich they are attlibubed may be called subject-predicabeploposiiions. If t)rere are no such verbs as those rvhose possibility we havc l..,eenconsidering, i.e., if all verbs are relations, it will foliorv that subject-predicate propositions, if there are any, will express a relotic)1lof subjecb to predicate. Such propositions rvill then be definable as those that involve a ceriain relation calledpred,iccttion.Even if there are subject-predicateproposibions iu rvhich bhe predicate is the ver-b,there rvill sbill be equivalenb proposirionsin rvhich the predicate is lelated to the subject; rhus " A exists," for exarnple, wili be equivalent to " A has existence." Hence the question whether predicates are verbs of not becomesunimporbsnt. The more irnportant question is rvhethel there is a specific lelation of predication,or lYhether rvhat are gramrnaticallv subject-predicate proposibionsare really of nrzurt'cliffercnt liinds, no one of which has the chatacteristics one rriiLurally tssociatcs lvitli sutrject-predicatepropositions. 'I'lrisrlrrcstiorris one to whicli rve shall return ab a later stage. ' l ' l rrl i rl urvrrl ,rgi rl rl rl i sl i trct,ior rlllr s ) t olevit lr bt o ot r r enr lt t ir y i l , i :; rr;rl .rrr' :ll ,,r l I' r' grrrlt lr r ul ilr t lr r , t sr t s r r r r t , it icsr vlr iclr l ,r' r.:rrrrrr. r.i t,tl r)nl y'

llr

r;rtl r1,'r:ts ol '

t,r:t'l rrs of

tr,l rtl i ons ,

rttr,l c l ttttrrl l

llo

6

nERTRAND nussELL.

ON

predicates or relations. A particular. is nabulally conceived as a tJtis or something inbrinsically anaiogousto a tli,s; and such an entity seems incapable of being a predicate or a lelation. A universal, on this view, will be anything that is a predicafe or a relation. But if there is uo specific relation of predicabion,so thab there is no class of entities which can properly be called predicates,then the above method of disbinguishiug particulars and universals fails, The question whethel philosophy must recognise two ultimately distinct kinds of entities, particulars and universals,turns, as we shall see rnore fully later on, on the question whether non-reLations are of two kinds, subjects and predicates,or lather ierms which can only be subjects and terms which may be eiiher subjects or predicates. And this question lurns on tvhether there is an ultimate simple asymmetrical reiation which may be called predication, or whether all apparent subject-predicabe propositions are to be analysed into propositions of o[her forms, which do nob require a radical difference of nature between the apparent subject and the apparent predicate. The decision of the question rvhether there is a simple relation of pleciication ought per.hapsto be possibleby inspectiorr, bub for my part I am unable to come to any decisionin Llrisway. I think, however, thab it can be decided in favour ol' lrlrrrlir:lt,ionlry tlrc analysis of things and by considerations :ts t,o spir,t,io-tcrnlloraldivelsity. TIris arrlr"lysisilrrd these co rrsi rlc r ; r t , iorr rvsill al s o s l ro w tl ru rv rl y i rr rv l ri c l r orrr purei y n lr o rrrrrlu 1 r rv i tl r tl ro o L l re r rl u esl i orrsas to l ,,rl i r:r,l( lll{ ) s t , ir )is s l ri t,l r I rl l i s r,rIl rl ti rc l rr,gi trni rrg of lrrtl ,i r:tt l; r nir t n, l r r r r iv e l s rrl rv l,l ri s1 r:r lr r : r ' . 'l 'l rc r : or r r r r r on- s {!rn i r l ,i o rro f l l ri n g s l rrr,l t.l r,,i rrl rr:rl i l i ,,ri rro i s, I

s t t l'lro l i r ' , I , l r l n o t r r ' , t , o l

t,lr r : ( ' r tr ( ' r .l) l,io tt ll

sr r lr .jr lr,t,:rtrrl l rl l rl i r: rt lrt , t t t t r l t , l r t t r : t s , r t r n' lr y lr r ,r llr r :1 1 1 r is r ;o l;r .r ' g ,,l.ylrtri r.rl .rr l i ri ri trt t t t t : t '1r t , i o t t . is

rt . l, ir u u t u i

l l r r l , I , l r c tlr ir r 1 1 , lili,'

o tlr r l

co tn r r r r ) n r r lnl \r, rrrrl i rrrrr,

l r r r , l l l t r ';r tl,r ' r l tr tcl,lr lr lr l' r iici,

r vlr i,' lr

trl tl ,l rr'1

lt t t rlrt r l t t t , : t t r o t ' 1 1 i v r,r t tt. lr ,r r ;r l,lr : lr .l' li,,l,lr tr ,ilr iu r l .

1'11',11

rr. r, rrl rl .1

THE

R ELAT ION S

OIr

Il N l Vl i l ts ,\

l,:i

A N tr

t'

l i l l ( t rl , i \ l i i i

i

r ,r r r l, n ' {,1, behi nd the datr. A tl ri ng, oI l , lr r , , . 1, 1. 1'1r l; r . \ jr strtuted by a bundl e of srrtrsi l rl rl rrtt r r . lt l, ilr l, r, l, , r r ; '1r rlr; ir r ir r , 'ul senses, but supposedal l to t:o-cxi s l,i11or r cr ''r r r lnlu( r u:lrr{, l, r r(,tl 0f spa,ce. Il ut the col nl rtorrsl r:rrurl vlr ir lr slr or r l, rl : 'r r l, ; lirlr r , r l, lr vi sual and tacti l e qual i l i cs i s rroLl , lr r ,sl, ir crol', r 'il, lr cl visr uilot ' tacti l e percepti on: i t i s a corrshrrcl, cr l" r 'cr r"l syr ; lr , o, lr clicl in rvhich has, I suppose,been gorrcrtlctI lry rrssocirrtiorr.And in crude fact, the visnal and taclilc rluu.liLicsof whicli I lr,nr sensibleare not in a comnrt'rnspircc,lrrrl el,clrirr.ibsown spuce. Hence if the thing is to be irnpartial as Letrveen sight arrtl touch, ib must cease to have the actual clualitiesof wirich we are sensible, and become their commoD causo or origin or \yhatevervaguer rvord can be fourrd. Thus the road is opclre(l to the melaphysical theories of science antl to the rnetaphysical theories of philosophy: the thing may be a number of electric charges in rapid mobion,or an idea ilr the rnind ol God, but it is certainly not v/hat bhe sensesperceive. The argument against things is trite, and I rreednot labour it. I introduce ib here only in order to illustrate a consequence which is sometimes ovellooked. Realists who reject particulars are apb to regard a thing as reducible to a nunrber of qualibiesco-existing in one place. But, aparb frorrr otlrer objections bo tbis view, i! is doubtful whether blre dillcrrrrrl qualities in question ever do co-exisb in one place. lf t,lro qualities are sensible,the place must be in a sensiblcspr\co; but this mahes iL necessarythat Lhe qualities should belorrg tcr only one sense, and it is not clear that genuinely difl'erenb quaiities belonging to one senseever co-exist in a singlc pl:rce irr a yrerceptualslrilce. If, on the other hand, we consider what trlry lrc crrllcrl" rerrl" sl)ru,e,,i.e. Lbe inferred space contaiuing " ol ' j ,' cl srvl ti cl r rre su1)posof o be t hc causesol' t . , ur l ,l rr" ' tr' ;t.l v at is t lr e na, t ur eof t lr t ) l ,l l (' n\\' {f Il () l ,rrrgct' l i ttir rlvlt l r' t(r' l ' l i {} n:1, rl rrrrl rtrr.rr, , ri cl r cxi sl i rr 1, lr i:"; r 'e: ll" slr ace,anr l it is rl rrrl .\' rvl trrrl rrrrrll , r' r.1,1;rl r,l ,l lrr, ,trrrrl l r,ol ' , 1r r r r . lit , ir lr:y. slr , collccLiot tof (,f ,rlut llur l, r 't isl, ir r \\l rrl cvl l rrr;rl l r.r' l t:tvi rr;1 t , :ltscst : icr r co of I,tr.(' (

I]EITTRAND RUSSELL.

ON

T IIE

l tl tl Al 'l 0N l j

Ol ,' l l N l \'l r l l il i r\ l . r;

,\lilr

l,\lillr

| 1 . . \ l r. i

1l

the moment may prescribe. Thus in any case the bundlc of co-existirrg rl.alities in the same place is not an athnissible substitutc for tho thing. tr'or our pruposes, the ,. real " objecb by which scieuce or philosophy replaces the thing is not importanr. \lre lrave rathcr to considerthe relations of sensible objects in a single scrrsiblospace,say that of sight. 'Ilhe theory of sensible qualities which dispenses rvith lxr,rticulars will say, if the same shade of colour is found in

The gerrel i l l l ur,nrc" rvl ri l ,c,"i rr l ,l rir rvi( , \ \ , ,r r rr lr . lr r r , ',1, 1 , 111, , 11, . , , persol l ati i gi vctrl trorrrr,trt,l rl ' tr1r ; r . r . l, r , , r r llr r . 1r ; r rl,lrr r. lr , l lr r , . lr l, ., lr he sees or i ttti tgi trcs;l i rrol ,l rrl 1r: r r , lr :ir lrr r '; r llr , r lr vlr lr , r l il, lr : r ; exact l i kortossi tt col orrr l ,o l ,l rc sllur r llr r . r1r l ; r l, r lr . lr r or ', lr . rt., o avoi rl tnal < i rrgthc coLrrrri l rrrri vcr . st l, r vr : lr r r vol, osr r lr ; r r isrt ,rlr lr L " exacb l i keness" i s a si rrrl ,l u n: lr r t , ion,r r oL ir r r illl, sir lr lrinlo r cotnmuni ty of predi ctl es; rrror eovol',il is t r ot llr r . golr er . al relation of likeness tlrat we rcquirc, brrt itr lrr()ro sltecirtl relation, thab of colour-likeness,sirrce tlvo paLolicstrrighb i-'r-l

bwo different places, that whab exists is the shade of colour itsclf, and that rvhat exists in the one piace is identical rvith rvhat exists in the other. The theory which admits particu).ar.s will say, on the contrary, that two numerically clifferent ,instanccsof the shade of colour exisb in the trvo places : in this vierv, the shade of colour itself is a nniversal and a predicate of both the instances,but tbe universal does not exist in spaceancl time. Of the above trvo viervs,the first, rvhich doesnot iutroduce particulars, dispensesaltogebher rvibh predicirlion as a fundamental relabion: according to tliis vicrv, tvheri \re say " tlris tlring is white," the funcltrrnentalfa,ct is that rvhiteness exists here. Accolding to the ttther vierv, rvlrich adntits particulars, what exists here is somethirrgof which rvhiteness is a preclicate-not, as for common sense,thc lhiug rvith rnany ollier qualities,but an instance of whiteness,a prLrlicular.of which whiteness is the only predicate except shape antl

exactly alike in shapeor size bub different in colour. TIms, in order to nrake the theory of Berkeley and Hunre workal_rle, rve must assurnean ultimate relation of colrut'-likeness, rvlrich holds between trvo patclies lvirich rvoulrl ct,rnruonlyi,tl srr,itlto have lhe sarte colour'. Nolr., prirrtti ./irr,i,',tlris rclrr,Littnof col our-l i l tenessrvi l l i tsel f be i t r r nivr , r 'sr ror l r u , , r lr st r act i dea," and tl .rusw e shal l sti l l l ri r "r 'rI 'ir ilr , ,lo l r r , ioir tl r uivcr sr ls. B ut rve nl av appl y the si nnrrl rrrLl; , sisl, o lolonr . - lilir lllss. Wc

brightness and whabever else is necessalily corrnecled u,ibh whiteness. Of the above trvo theories, one aclnrit,sorrl.y rvlrirt,rvoukl naturally be called universals, while thu .LIrur ltrlrrrits lr.th universals and particulars. Ileforo oxa,rrrirrirrg t,lrcrrr,it, rrrir,r, lre a s we l l t o ex anr ine a n d ti i s rrri s stl ro tl rro r,yu ' l ri r.l rrrrl rrri t,s orrl 1. p a rti c ular s ,ant l dis p e rrs easl to g r:tl ru rrv i l ,l r rrrri v t :r' s:rl s. ' l ' l ri s i s tl tc th eor y adv oc ut cdl ry Il c rk e l c y ,,rrrl I l u rrr. i rr l l r.i r. 1r,l * rrri r: i l g i r,i r r s"t alt s t r ac t id c u s ." W i L l ro rrt,l ,f i rrg o rrrs r,l \' { .s rl ,r\vn to t,l rci r s L: r t c t nc t r tlc s ,t u s s .c ,,v l rn Lr:l rrrl rt. rrrtrl r,,,t l l ri ri Il rr.r,r.r,

may bake a sbandal tlparLi . crrl l L r . clt srol'r : , ol, r ut lili, , r r lss,r Lr r r l sav that anytl ri ng el se i s to l rc clLllcr lir r , , r lr r utlr l\ r , r r r lr r l r l ir r exactl y l i ke our starrdri ,r'oast:. rl I t , is olr vious,lr 'r r r , r 'r , r ',t lr : r l, such a processl eads to arr cl rrllcssr ( jljt . r ss:r vc r xlr l; r . it r Llr , , l i kenessof trvo terms as consi sti ' g ir r t , lr . lili. r r . ss r vlr i, . lrl, lr . i' l i kenessbears to the l i kerressol lr vo ot , lr crt , cnr r s,; r . n,rl , r r lr , :r regressi s pl ai nl y vi ci ous. Li ken ess ab lea, sl,t , lr cr . t : lor rr,r,r r r : il, be admitted as a universal, aud, having adniittctl orrr_lrrrrivcrsll, we have no longer any reason to rcject olhers. 'I'hus Llrt: lvhole comphcated theory, rvhicli hacl no motive exceprt kr avoicl universals, falls bo the ground. Whether or nob thcrc are par'liculars, there must be relations rvhich are universirls irr lhe sensethat (a) they are concepls, not percepbs; (l) tlre,r'do not exist in time; (c) they are verbs, not substantives. Ib i s tl ue that tl re above arg um ent does not pr ove t hat tl rurci l l . rrrri vrrrslrl l rrl rl i l i csas op poscr lt o univer . salr . r lat ior Ls. ()rr tl r. o()l l l ,t.l ' .\'i l,, sl rrrvs t,l r;Ltru r iv. r 'sr r r, llr r lr li( , it tc, s r r r ,s{rf r t r rt:1l ,r,-,i c Il i l t

l i l tr)\!', l rr: t..'l rl l r..orl l rv .,x ttr:1, l i l i r.ttr:s s .s

of

V i tr.i 0rts

10

llltltl' llAN I) IlIlsSIr ll,l,.

Iti rr r lslr c t r v c c npo rti c l l l trs . ' l ' l ri s v i c w l ra s , s o frr as I knorv, rro l, lr ir r gt , o lec on u n e rrrli t l rtry o n di ts Io g i c a l possi bi l i ty. IrrLrt l 'r'o r r Llr r r lur ilr L o f v i c w o f t)rr: p t' o b l e rrrtv l r et,herthere l ue 1 r;r ll, ic r r lir it r s ,has n o l re a ri n { o n th e a rg u rn e nt. It i s rt vi erv rv) r i. lris . r ily pos s i b l ei f l i r.re i l rc [)a rti c ' ]a rs,ancl i t cl ernri rrLl s orrly arr easy re-staternenbof sulrject-prcrlicateprolto-sitiorrs : insteaclof s.rying that an entity has such and suclr a prcrlicate, we shail have to say bhat lhere are entilies to tvlricL it has such and such a specific lil<eness. I shall therefore in future ignore this view, rvhiclr in any case assurnesour tnain thesis, namel)', the existenceof particulars. To the grounds in favour of this thesis we must now return. When we endeavoured to state the trvo theories as to sensible qualities, we had occasion to consider trvo rvhite patches. On the view which denies particulars, whiteness itself exists in both patches : a numerically single entity, whiteness, exists in all places that are white. Nevertheless, we speak of two white patches, and it is obvious tliat, in some sense,the patches are tlo, not one. It is this spabial pturality which makes the difficulty of the theory that deniesparticulars. Withoub atternpting, as yet, bo introduce all the necessary explanations and distinstions,we may state the argument for. particulals roughly as follows. Ii is logically possible for trvo exacbly similar patches of whibe, of the same size and shape, to exist simultaneously in differenb places. Norv, whabever may be the exact meaning of " existing irr dillerent places,"it is seif-evident thal, in such a case, thero rr,r'cbrvo tliflbrenl patches of white. Their diversity mighr, if rvc rrrlolrterltire bheory of absolute position, be r'eganleri as lrr:Lrrrgirrg, nob lo th e whit e it s elf w h i c h e x i s ts i n tl rc trv rr l rl rrt:es,l rrrt,to the co m plex es" wliib c n c s si n l l ri s l rl rr,c"trrrrrrl" wl ri t,t:rrr:ss i rr tl uLt p l ac e. " ' lllt is r v o rrl ,lrl r:r' i v ct,l rr:i rrl i v rrs i t,l 'fl rrr rrl l rt: rl i vrr.si l t,of th is lr lr r c cilr r r lt , l l L t,l rl rrt:e; i trrtls i rrc cl rl i tr:r,s r,: rrrtrrll,,rrsul rl rosctl l ,o r lillir r lLs Lr r r l rrrr,l i l ,i tst,l , ri s rv o rrl rl r.r:,1 rr i rrt,l rrt, Ll rr,l rl rrttrs sl t or t lr l lr r . 1r ; t lt , i ,rrrl rt.r.l r. i l \!{ ,r.r..1 i ,{rrl l trrt, .1ri , ,,l rrtl l )r)}i rl i r)n, ll,

oN TH E R E LA 'I'ION S OF U N I V I:tc i ,\t,l l

A N tr t,.\t{ i l r' rl ,l t,

tl

t t r t l. \ t . , lr r r I 't vp 11111'11111'11 w i l l becomei mp6ssi bl trt,9rl i st, ir r gr r ir rllt r vlt t l, cr r lt t tll{, it . t l unl ess each, i rl g[oatl of l rt' i rr g llt t 't lt t ivr lt r lt r l 1'lr rl,r lvot r liglr L of w l ti tttttess. It trri glr tlr r rl, lr , , r r glrl,l lr r Ll, i ttsto" nce r lr r r r , lit , it r s ol ' ot , lt ct ' ir r Llr r rsr t t t t tl.r r lace by tn(l al )s be di sti ngui shed j tr r lr r ct ras l, lr o ot , lr r lr . Tlr is, tl tc stt , t t t tlr as the one but rrob however, presupposesthat, tlrc trvrr lriLtrllttrstlr,' rLh'eadydisLinguishedas nunterically divr:rsc,sirtrrtroblterrvisewhat is in the sarne place as bhe one Inusb be irr bhe sa,nteplace as the other. Thus the facb that it is logically possible for preciscly sirnilar things to co-exisi in two different places,but that tliings in diffelenb places at the sir.metilt)e cannot be numericully identical,forcesus to admit that it is particulars,i.e.,ittstances of universals,tirat exist in places,and not universals tlietliselves. The above is the outline of our argument. But valious points in it have to be exarnined and expanded before ib can be consideredconclusive. In the firsb place,it is not necessaryto assertthat there ever are two exactly similar existenbs. It is only necessaryto perceive Lhat out jtrdgmcnb thaL this and fhat are two diffelent existents is uot rtccessalilybasetlon ally diffcrence ott tlillirt'clrceof sltilliiLlltosil,iort of qualities,but may be br.Lsed wlt t r llr r r l'{) l' t r r ) 1,ll, r r al one; and that di fl ' et' entto f r lr r r Llil, ics, rrrr r r r clict rl lill, 'r cr r lo,is r r ol,log'ir '1111. 1' al w aysi n fact accomparri es 'r 'nr :u'lr , r r , r 'rI ,' lr r lr , r r r nrr r r r cr i, 'lr, lilli'r l i n otcl eri o i rrsru.rt D eC eS sary l i ,,tr. of sl rati rrl1r,rsi di tl ' erence A g a i u , i L i s l r o t t 'r t s y [ o sttr l ,c t'xr r r .l ,l y r vi r r l l , r to tl , o l ;r ;'r lr tr tl i n l r t r r