No title

KANT-STUDIEN Begründet von Hans Vaihinger; neubegründet von Paul Menzer und Gottfried Martin 89. J A H R G A N G

HEFT 3

1998

Abhandlungen M. Morrison, Toronto: Community and Coexistence: Kant's Third Analogy of Experience

257

F. Glauner, Berlin: Der transzendentale Ort der Rede von Sprachtranszendenz. Zu den Grundlagen einer Metakritik der sprachanalytischen Kantkritik 278 J. Benoist, Paris: L'impense de la representation: De Leibniz a Kant

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P. Trawny, Wuppertal: Über das Verhältnis von Herz und Vernunft im Denken Kants und Hegels. Anmerkungen zu einer Metapher 318 Berichte und Diskussionen K. R. Westphal, Durham/New Hampshire: Buchdahl's "Phenomenological" View of Kant: A Critique

335

H. Herring, Madras: Indische Philosophie? Hinweis und Anregung zu einer Annäherung

353

Buchbesprechungen K. Kawamura: Spontaneität und Willkür. Der Freiheitsbegriff in Kants Antinomienlehre und seine historischen Wurzeln (W. Ertl) 363 L. Honnefeider: Scientia transcendens. Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (N. Fischer) 367 M. Heidegger: La questione della cosa. La dottrina dei kantiana dei principi trascendentali. A cura di Vincenco Vitiello (A. Ferrarin) 370 J. Hintikka: La philosophie des mathematiques chez Kant. La structure de Targumentation transcendantale. Traduit de Tanglais par Corinne Hoogaert (V. Mudroch) 373 J. Wenzel: Anthroponomie. Kants Archäologie der Autonomie (B. Himmelmann) 375

I. Kant: Critica de la razon practica. Traduccion directa del aleman por E. Minana y Villagrasa y Manuel Garcia Morente (M. Caimi) . . . . . . . . 383 Mitteilung 9. Internationaler Kant-Kongreß

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Community and Coexistence: Kant's Third Analogy of Experience by Margaret Morrison, Toronto

1. Introduction In the abundance of writing on Kant's analogies of experience relatively little attention has been paid to the third analogy or principle of coexistence which states: "all substances, in so far äs they can be perceived to coexist in space, are in thoroughgoing reciprocity".1 The issues addressed in the third analogy have a long history dating back to some of Kant's first philosophical writings in 1755. The problem of how to provide a ground for empirically real, coexisting objects brings together questions about the nature of space, objects, temporal relations and the unity of experience; concerns that form the core of Kant's critical programme. It is therefore odd that a problem so fundamental to Kant's philosophy has received so little attention. One reason for this might be that commentators see the third analogy äs less important in establishing the conditions of objective experience than the first two, the principles of permanence of substance and succession in time (causality). Indeed the second analogy is often viewed äs one of the most important parts of the first Critique since it is here that Kant attempts to answer Hume's criticisms of the notion of objective and necessary causal connections.2 The second possibility is that the argument of the third analogy is so obscure and unsuccessful in establishing its conclusion that commentators have chosen to simply set it aside rather than attempt a reconstruction. For example, Melnick [1989, p. 490] and Aquila [1989, p. 190] both argue that Kant's claim about the mutual interaction of coexisting substances is not established in the proof of the analogy.3 1 2

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Here I include Allison [1983], Brittan [1978], Walker [1978] to name a few. In order for Kant to argue his position in the second analogy he needs a well developed concept of substance, which of course is provided by the first analogy. With these two principles firmly in place one might conclude that it is less important to understand how Kant establishes the notion of coexistence in accordance with what he terms "the law of reciprocity or Community" [B257]; especially since the third analogy corresponds to the third relational category and Kant explicitly remarks that the third category results from a combination of the previous two [B110]. Other authors who also question the Status of the third analogy include A. C. Ewing [1924, pp. 104—123] who claims that although Kant thought reciprocity was the minimum amount of determination and interrelation needed to make order in space possible, difficulties immediately arise when one attempts to specify the relation in more detail. W. H. Walsh [1975, pp. 143—147] claims that Kant has not shown why coexistence is possible only if the condi-

Kant-Studien 89. Jahrg., S. 257-277 © Walter de Gruyter 1998 ISSN 0022-8877

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Other writers including Kemp-Smith [1918] and Guyer [1986] acknowledge the importance of the third analogy but do not offer any Substantive Interpretation; instead they suggest that its meaning be ultimately derived from a link with Newtonian science. More recently Michael Friedman [1982] has also argued that the analogies are properly understood only in their connection with Newton's laws of mechanics.4 Such interpretations, however, tend to undermine the independent Status of the analogies äs constraints on all possible knowledge. Moreover, the first and second analogies have been the subject of extensive analyses in the literature characterizing them äs a priori laws distinct from Newtonian science. Thus it would be reasonable to expect that the third analogy can function in a similar way.5 Deriving the meaning of the third analogy from Newton's third law of mechanics or universal gravitation teils us nothing about the content of the analogy äs a law of nature in its own right, a role that Kant specifically ascribed to each of the dynamical principles. My goal here is to highlight the role of the third analogy in Kant's account of the synthetic unity of experience. To do this one needs to explain what Kant means when he claims that all coexisting substances stand in a relation of mutual interaction. The argument turns on several key issues, perhaps the most important being the distinction between the kind of sequential relation that is characteristic of second analogy causality and the reciprocal determination that defines mutual interaction. The sense in which the third analogy embodies a causal relation has been misunderstood in the literature, resulting in some rather curious reconstructions of Kant's argument. What I want to show is how the interaction or reciprocity among coexisting substances involves a determination of the position of objects in a single unified space. These spatial relations, in turn, are intimately connected with the temporal relation of simultaneity expressed in the third analogy, both of which provide the ground for the empirical manifestation of coexistence, namely, reciprocal perceptions.

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tion of mutual interaction is fulfilled and is generally critical of Kant's exposition of interaction. Similarly, Melnick [1973, p. 109) argues that the distinction between causation and interaction cannot be correlated with determining succession and simultaneity respectively. I will not address each of these objections individually in the paper since many of them rest on a misrepresentation of Kant's account of interaction — something I hope to clarify in what follows. Nagel [1983] provides a detailed analysis of the analogy, but like the other authors doesn't really specify anything about the nature of interaction over and above interpreting it äs embodying a causal relation. In addition, however, he takes the notion of Community äs a way of locating consciousness in the empirical order [p. 193] thereby establishing the general interrelation between subjectivity and objectivity. This brings the third analogy in close connection with the argument of the refutation and although I think Nagel is essentially right to link the two, I would suggest that the association is considerable looser than what he claims. For more on the relationship between the analogies and Newtonian science see Michael Friedman's [1992] excellent account.

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2. What is an Analogy? The basic principle of the analogies is that "experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions" [B218]. Each analogy provides an individual principle and proof which, taken together, furnish universal and necessary preconditions for the structuring of objective experience. Kant defines experience äs "empirical knowledge" which determines an object through perceptions, but because the synthesis of perceptions necessary for experience is not provided by experience itself, it must be supplied by the understanding. The story of how this takes place is partly revealed in the transcendental deduction which shows how the transcendental unity of apperception and the transcendental synthesis of Imagination mutually support each other to provide a unified self-consciousness made possible through a unified time. Kant explicitly states that the general principle of the three analogies rests on the necessary unity of apperception which "lies a priori at the foundation of empirical consciousness" [A220]. Apperception enables one to say of the distinct components of experience that they all belong to one consciousness, something that would be impossible if the parts of that experience existed in distinct time sequences. The transcendental synthesis of Imagination unifies separate moments in a single all inclusive time. Although this provides an ordering of experience with respect to past and present it doesn't furnish an ordering of the objects in experience. In other words, it is insufficient to produce a synthetic unity of the manifold of perceptions, which is, ultimately, how empirical objects are connected with time. It is through this connection that objects become part of an objective unified experience distinguishable from mere Intuition and Sensation. Hence, the temporal relations between objects function äs necessary features of objective experience; and, it is these relations that are outlined in the analogies. For example, in apprehension there is no way of distinguishing between the subjective succession and an objective succession or coexistence. There is nothing about our choosing to look at A before B or B before A that allows us to conclude that A and B are coexistent. Experience alone does not reveal any necessary elements in its ordering. Because time itself cannot be perceived, the determination of objects in time is possible only through the ways in which these objects are related to one another. These relations, äs defined by the analogies, involve the three modes of time: duration, succession and coexistence. 3. Coexistence, Community and Causality The third analogy states that all substances stand in a mutual interaction or dynamical Community. This condition of mutual interaction is necessary if we are to have any knowledge of coexistence and, not surprisingly, it is also this notion of mutual interaction that creates many of the interpretive difficulties. Objects are said to be coexistence when "in empirical Intuition the perceptions of them can follow

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upon one another reciprocally" [B257]. That is, it makes no difference, to use Kant's example, whether one first looks at the earth and then at the moon or vice versa, and it is because the order of our perceptions in insignificant we can conclude that these objects coexist. By contrast, in the second analogy where a cause must precede its effect, this kind of reciprocity does not hold. The general problem Kant addresses in the proof of the third analogy is how one can conclude on the basis of reciprocal perceptions that two objects coexist. In addition, however, there is the difficulty of reciprocal perceptions themselves. Because time itself cannot be perceived and apprehension furnishes only successive perceptions, the move from a subjective succession to an objective coexistence requires the category of Community to ensure that the reciprocal sequence is grounded in the object.6 But even this reciprocal sequence is insufficient äs a determination of coexistence since it is because the objects coexist that reciprocity is even possible; and, in order to apply the category of Community to actual objects (in addition to just objects of possible experience), the temporal component provided by the Schema is required. Kant claims that in order for this temporal relation of coexistence to hold at the level of objects the objects themselves must stand in a relation of mutual interaction. So, the question that immediately arises is why mutual interaction is a necessary condition for coexistence.7 If we consider the Critique in its historical context this notion of mutual interaction or reciprocity seems less odd than might first appear. One of Kant's primary motivations in writing the first Critique was to rid science and empirical knowledge in general of the ghosts of Leibnizian metaphysics. In order to introduce a realm of "real" empirical objects into the domain of knowledge these objects must be located/locatable in a space and time. This is exactly the quality that Leibnizian substances lack. Monads exist in Isolation from each other äs non spatio-temporal substances with only the law of pre-established harmony governing their coexistence (so-called) with other monads. Because their coexistence does not involve any physical influence, any appearance of interaction (causal or otherwise) operating at the phenomenal level is simply the result of an imperfect or confused perception. In fact, for Leibniz, all perceivable phenomena are in some sense illusory, the result of our inability to know reality (monads) from our human perspective in the epistemological hierarchy. In this metaphysical picture there is also no need for a realistic or substantial account of space and time.8 Indeed, äs we know from the correspondence with 6

7 8

The category of Community involves the relation of reciprocity between agent and patient. Below I discuss how this category and its accompanying form of judgement (disjunction) figures in the Interpretation of the analogy. In the case of causality what mean is that for all events which stand in a temporal succession, those that follow are determined by some particular event that preceded it äs a cause. Kant, on the other hand does speak of space and time äs empirically real and in addition to classifying them äs "forms of Intuition" he also characterizes them, in certain contexts äs "formal intuitions".

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Clarke, Leibniz views space äs the product of relations that exist between purely phenomenal objects. His primary target is the Newtonian view of absolute space which, according to Leibniz is "something imaginary", the only real thing being the "distance of bodies".9 But, even relations themselves are not real; they are what Leibniz calls enüa rationis — belonging to the realm of ideas. Since only simple substances or monads are real, the empirical world is subordinated to the level of phenomena in the classical sense of the term.10 Hence there is no way of locating substances in space except on the basis of their relationships to other substances; but because these relations are illusory from the point of view of physical causation, there is no ground for a domain of empirically real coexisting objects. However, because Kant does not support an account of space äs a prior and independent substance in the manner of the absolutists, he therefore needs some other way of locating objects in space and determining the spatial relations that hold between them. In addition, Leibnizian metaphysics relies heavily on the notion of pre-established harmony which requires that substances do not interact with each other; each of their successive states emerges from within the nature of the substance itself and is completely immune from the external physical influence of other substances. On this view the world "äs a whole" has no physical reality since the appearance of causally interacting substances is only the result of confused Leibnizian perceptions. Because Kant wants the unified world to be real rather than merely ideal, he needs to explain not only how interaction takes place but why it is a necessary condition for physical reality. Part of that explanation can be traced to the discussion of the principle of coexistence in his 1755 essay Nova Dilucidatio. Here Kant claims that finite substances are involved in interaction only to the "extent that they are maintained by the common principle of their existence, namely, the divine intellect, in a systematic pattern based on mutual relations" [1:413]. But in order to establish the connection between the reality of the physical world and the notion of interaction, we need to first look at what Kant says about the principle of succession. His intention is to show that no change can happen to substances unless they are connected with other substances; in other words, "their reciprocal dependency of each other determines their reciprocal changes of state" [1:410]. Kant's argument turns on the fact that change involves the succession of determinations; this further involves a coming into being of something that was not previously present. Consequently, the substance that undergoes the change must now be determined in a manner that is different from its previous determination. If these determinations were the result of 9 10

See his letter to Böses in summer 1716 in Die Philosophischen Schriften, Vol. 2, p. 575, C. I. Gerhardt (ed.), 7 Vols., Berlin 1857-90. Reprinted by Olms, Hildesheim. This is contrasted with Kant's use of the term "phenomena" which designates the empirically real, that is, the only reality that exists for human cognizers. For a clear and systematic account of Leibniz's view on space, time and general metaphysics see Mates [1986] and for an especially good treatment of how Kant's views were influenced by Leibniz see Butts [1984].

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an internal mechanism rather than an external cause, one would be forced to conclude that the determination responsible for the present state of the substance would also be responsible for producing its opposite. Since this is absurd it must be that any change arises from an external cause or connection with another substance. Having discredited pre-established harmony by exposing what Kant terms the "internal impossibility of Leibnizian substances", he concludes that real bodies do exist, since without a connection among substances external to one another there would be no succession.11 And, without succession, time would also disappear. With these conclusions firmly in hand, Kant turns to an investigation of the nature of this interconnection between substances. The important distinction here is between an individual substance whose existence is independent of other substances and the interaction that must exist between them in order for change to take place. Because finite beings cannot be the cause of other substances and because all things are found to be reciprocally connected, Kant concludes that the common cause, God, must be responsible for these reciprocal relations [1:413]. However, nothing about interconnection follows from existence; hence, it must be the case that the very scheme in God's understanding that establishes existence also establishes that the substances are to exist in a relation of mutual interaction. Kant is emphatic however that the resulting harmony among substances is different from Leibnizian pre-established harmony. In the latter case there is no reciprocal dependency or reliance on efficient causes, whereas on Kant's model these substances act and react producing external states. At this point one is tempted to ask just how it is that these substances are related to one another; does the mention of action and reaction involve a Newtonian model of forces acting between substances? Although Kant does refer to universal gravity, he claims that it is most likely brought about by the same connection of substances that determine space [1:415]. The more informative remark occurs at the beginning of the discussion of the application of the principle of coexistence. Here Kant claims that place, position and space are the ways in which substances relate to one another; and it is in this way that substances are "connected together in an external connection" [1:414]. And, in a restatement in the remark regarding the impossibility of concluding anything about connection from mere existence, Kant claims that "if you posit a number of substances, you do not at the same time and äs a result determine place, position and space ...". The importance of space is further evident in another remark in the Nova Dilucidatio regarding the connection between interacting substances and space. 11

The main thrust of the argument is to show how body and soul can interact in a way that allows the soul to change in response to external influence. It is interesting that in the discussion of the Paralogisms in the Critique [B428] this problem is once again addressed by Kant in the form of a question about how a communion of interacting substances is possible. Here he concludes that the question not only lies outside the field of psychology but also outside the field of all human knowledge.

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... since substances which are distinct from each other reciprocally act on each other (for one substance determines certain things in the other substance), it follows that the concept of space is constituted by the interconnected actions of substances, reaction always being of necessity conjoined with such interconnected actions. [1:415]

Kant goes on to say that all substances, insofar äs they are connected with each other "in the same space, reciprocally interact with each other, and thus they are dependent on each other in respect of their determinations" [Ibid.]. In other words, it looks äs though Kant wants to equate the interconnectedness of substances with being in and, in fact constituting, a single unified space. Viewed from this perspective two things become clear, first, how the problem of the third analogy fits into the framework of the Critique and second, the importance of the third analogy äs a principle distinct from the second. What remains to be done is to provide some analysis of just what Kant means when he say s that substances stand in a relation of mutual interaction. Moreover, I need to show exactly how this interconnection relates to the spatial component of experience. While the analogies are typically characterized äs principles that furnish the temporal features of experience; I claim that space also plays a crucial role in the argument for simultaneity and coexistence. I argue that Kant retains the centrality of space in the argument for the third analogy and that the mutual determination that he speaks of in that context can be understood in terms of the determination of spatial position. Although Newtonian forces play a role in fieshing out the different ways that objects can interact with each other, those kind of explanations are not important for understanding the fundamental content of the third analogy äs expressed in the Critique. The Newtonian explanations can be given only if the reciprocal interactions discussed in the third analogy have already been established. 4. Interpreting Interaction Recall that the third analogy begins with the observation that because perceptions of objects can follow each other reciprocally one can say they coexist. But, because time itself cannot be perceived one cannot infer from things being set in the same time that perceptions of them can follow each other reciprocally. Apprehension reveals only a succession of perceptions, so that when one object, like the moon, is being perceived, there is no accompanying sense that one could have perceived the earth instead, since they exist at the same time.12 Hence, in order for 12

We know that things coexist in one and the same time when the order of apprehension is indifferent between A and B or B and A. If they were related in an objective succession, it would be impossible to perceive B followed by A if we had already perceived A followed by B since A belongs to past time. For instance, if we take the case of the ship moving downstream with A being its position at Tj and B its position at T2 then it is impossible to reverse these perceptions since A preceded B in time and cannot be reproduced. This of course applies to an event that involves changes to a particular object. If we change the example to accommodate cases where we have one substance causing certain changes in another and where both substances endure through time it is also possible to see why the

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us to have an objective relation of coexistence, it is necessary to have a pure concept which facilitates the reciprocal sequence of perceptions and allows us to say that it is grounded in an object. Kant distinguishes the relation of influence, where one substance contains the cause of specific determinations in another, and that of Community of reciprocity where each substance reciprocally contains the ground of determinations in the other. He then concludes: Thus the coexistence of substances in space cannot be known in experience save on the assumption of their reciprocal interaction. This is therefore the condition of the possibility of the things themselves äs objects of experience [B258]. That is to say, reciprocal perceptions alone are not sufficient to judge that objects coexist, there must be reciprocal interaction between substances.13 If each substance in the field of appearance was completely isolated with no interaction with another, then the relation of coexistence would not be an object of possible experience. As Kant remarks in his pre-critical writings, there must be something besides the mere existence of A and B which determines this relationship; something through which A determines for B (and vice-versa) its position in time. Since Kant claims that only a cause can function in this respect, each substance must be said to contain the "causality of certain determinations" [B259/A213] of the other äs well äs the effects of the other. Hence, this causal relation forms the foundation for what Kant terms a dynamical Community or Community of mutual interaction. As I noted earlier, several commentators have tied Kant's notion of dynamical or mutual interaction to his goal of providing foundations for Newtonian science. In the MFNS Kant himself claims that the third law of mechanics (that in all communication of motion action and reaction are always equal) is an application of the category of Community to matter [55l].14 However, it is important to distin-

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time order makes a difference. The example of the lead ball and the cushion [A203/B249] illustrates the point quite nicely. When the ball produces a hollow shape in the cushion, the cause is thought to be simultaneous with its effect. But, the two can be distinguished through what Kant calls the "time relation of their dynamical interaction". If the ball (A) is placed on the cushion resulting in a hollow (B) it is not possible to reverse the order so that the hollow (B) can be perceived before the ball (A). Hence, Kant concludes that the sequence or order of time is the sole empirical criterion of an effect in relation to the causality of the cause that precedes it [A204]. But because all apprehension is a subjective succession the identifying feature of coexistence is whether the order of the succession can be reversed. If so, then it is possible to obtain a relation of objective coexistence. This Statement is slightly ambiguous since there is a sense in which we neuer have a subjective time order reversal in the way that we can have both subjective and objective succession. In order for us to have reciprocal perceptions we must already apply the category of Community or reciprocity, thereby making the perceptual order reversal objective and at the same time guaranteeing that it is in the object, since that is, after all, what Kant means by objective. All references to the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science [MFNS] are to the Ellington translation published by Hackett, 1985 under the title Philosophy of Material Nature.

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guish between a specific application of the category and what Kant sees himself äs establishing at the level of general principles. Although it is tempting to understand the argument of the analogies through a relationship with Newtonian science, to do so is to lose sight of the generality of the objective characteristics of experience that the analogies establish. That is not to say that in providing an overview of the Kantian architectonic one should ignore the connection between the analogies and conclusions of the MFNS, but only that in attempting to understand his account of mutual interaction of substances we cannot simply reduce it to or equate it with the law of action and reaction or universal gravitation. In other words, when we ask ourselves what Kant means in the third analogy when he says that substances stand in a relation of mutual interaction, our answer shouldn't be one that simply appeals to the forces and laws specified by the MFNS. 4.1. Understanding Interaction: A Solution. What we need to know is why mutual interaction is necessary for the possibility of objects in general, and how does this relation function in giving rise to the experience of objects? One way of interpreting this requirement is simply to say that the coexistence of substances is a necessary feature of objects of experience and insofar äs mutual interaction makes coexistence possible it also makes objects possible. But this would be to leave all of the important questions unanswered. The beginning of a solution come at A212/B259 where Kant asks us to assume that in a manifold of substances each one is completely isolated and neither acts on nor receives reciprocal influences from any other. If that were the case then their coexistence would not be an object of possible perception and the "existence of one could not lead by any path of empirical synthesis to the existence of another". This is because the Isolation of each substance implies that they would be separated by a completely empty space. Kant goes on to say [A214] that without Community each "perception of an appearance in space is broken off from every other", hence experience would have to "begin anew with each object" without any spatial or temporal connection to previous representations [B261]. Although Kant does not claim that this is a proof against the existence of empty space, he does take it to show that such a space is not an object of possible experience. In other words, because the objects/substances must be connected with one another in order to coexist it seems reasonable to assume that the spaces or parts of space in which they are located must be similarly connected if we are to have experience. Since the assumption of non-interacting substances prevents us from even perceiving coexistence, it is at least plausible that interaction among substances is what facilitates a unification of the various parts of space into a continuous whole. In fact, a similar kind of argument with respect to time is given in the first analogy. We know that the first analogy provides a unity for the successive parts of time thereby allowing "existence in different parts of the time-sequence a magnitude ... entitled duration" [A183]. If succession were ascribed to a non-unified time, then we would have to think of each successive moment äs part of a different time in

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order to allow for a sequence of events. Consequently existence would flow in parallel streams, since in bare succession existence is always vanishing and commencing. But, with the permanence of substance, which functions äs the expression of time in general, we have an empirical unity of time and the condition of the possibility of the "synthetic unity of perceptions, that is, experience" [B227]. I want to claim that the third analogy operates in a similar way by unifying different parts of space into a single unified whole. Without the reciprocity or mutual interaction of a Community of substances we have no way of ascertaining relations between different spaces; in fact, we have no way of even experiencing this kind of spatial structure. If space was discontinuous such that only empty space existed between isolated substances [B259], we could only determine the existence of particular appearances by perceiving each of them individually. Here each appearance would be disconnected from every other, thereby ruling out the possibility of empirical synthesis, a necessary feature of a unified experience. Because experiences would have to begin anew with every distinct perception, temporal relations would also be impossible for we would have no way of determining or representing an enduring substance, succession and alteration. Although the first and third analogies provide an empirical unity of time and space, the third analogy serves to unite both space and time in a distinctive way. In a section entitled General Note on the System of the Principles Kant discusses the objective reality of the categories, their application to empirically real objects. In order for this to take place we need outer intuitions (of spatial objects). But, in order for us to experience substance, we need to have something permanent in Intuition; that permanence is provided by space [B251]. Although time forms a unified whole it cannot function äs the permanent in Intuition, since it changes from moment to moment. Similarly, in the case of the second analogy, we need a way of representing alteration or change, which can be done only in connection with something permanent. Here Kant takes motion, viewed äs alteration in space, äs his example. We can think of a point that moves to different locations in space äs an example of the kind of change that a specific object undergoes over time. Hence, it is through this notion of alteration that one is able to experience temporal succession. In the third analogy Kant establishes the temporal relation of coexistence, but in order for this relation to even the possible, it requires the additional condition of spatial coordination. That is, two events or substances cannot occur or exist at the same time without being in different places; and, in order for us to judge that these different places are part of the same temporal moment, we need some guarantee that each space belongs to larger unified spatial and temporal framework; structures that are necessary for a unified experience. In that sense the third analogy brings together space and time in a way that the previous two do not. Space enters in the application of the first and second insofar äs one requires an Intuition of matter in space to prove the objective reality of the pure concepts. However, matter äs an empirical concept plays no role in the argument of the third analogy; here Kant's concern is with a synthetic a priori Statement of the principle of

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coexistence and how it relates to space and time. So, although space is a necessary feature for the application of the categories to empirical objects, in the third analogy space is a necessary feature of the temporal relation itself. In other words, without a unified space we cannot conceive of simultaneous events or coexisting substances. The relationship between a unified space and the empirical synthesis necessary for experience involves the two aspects of the analogy, specifically, the role played by the category of Community in achieving a synthesis and the intuitive component which facilitates the perception of objects in space äs Standing in a relation of Community. It is this notion of perception that Kant Stresses in the B edition formulation of the third analogy. In the case of the category, Community is what constitutes a whole out of separate parts. This relation is explained in the metaphysical deduction where Kant discusses the relationship between the category and its corresponding form of judgement; in this case the disjunctive judgement. This form of judgement contains a relation of two or more propositions which stand in logical Opposition insofar äs the "sphere of one excludes the sphere of the other" [B99]. Yet, they also stand in a relation of Community since, taken together, they occupy "the whole sphere of the knowledge in question". Hence, in a disjunctive judgement there is a Community of the known constituents which mutually exclude each other but "determine in their totality the true knowledge" [A74]. The several parts of the whole are thought to be coordinated with, rather than subordinated to, each other and in that sense they determine each other reciprocally äs in an aggregate [B112].15 If we substitute a whole made up of things for a judgement containing propositions the same relation holds. One thing is simultaneously and reciprocally coordinated with another äs both cause and effect of its determination. When the understanding thinks a thing äs divisible, it follows the same procedure äs when it represents the sphere of a divided concept. In the former case it represents the parts of the whole äs existing substances in such a way that while each exists independently of the others they are also combined together in one whole. The independent existence is analogous to the mutual exclusivity of the judgement, with each constituent contributing to the unity achieved by considering, in the disjunctive judgement, all possibilities. Although the category makes this unity possible, a further condition is required in order for us to experience this unity, namely, we must be able to have certain kinds of intuitions that make the perception of coexistent objects possible. The B edition formulation of the third analogy states that "all substances, in so far äs they can be perceived to coexist in space are in thoroughgoing reciprocity". So, the category of Community is necessary if coexisting things or substances are to be objects of possible experience, and like the other categories, of relation and their schema, it yields ways in which objects can exist in space and time. But, in order for us to actually experience these objects we must have intuitions of space and 15

The notion of determine here means that if one of the division is posited the others are excluded and vice-versa.

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time that are somehow determinate. The problem is that neither time itself nor space äs a totality of its parts can be perceived. When Kant introduces the analogies he says that "all appearances are, äs regards their existence, subject a priori to rules determining their relation to one another in one time" [A177]. Since experience is defined äs a knowledge of objects through perception, "the relation involved in the existence of the manifold has to be represented in experience, not äs it comes to be constructed in time but äs it exists objectively in time" [B219]. In other words, we don't construct these relations a priori in Intuition, rather we have a determinate Intuition of objects temporally related to each other in certain ways. Since time, however, cannot itself be perceived, the determination of the existence of objects in time can take place only through their relation in time in general, and therefore only through concepts that connect them a priori [B219]. In order for these concepts to be applicable to objects in time, they must be supplemented by the three ways in which time can be represented. These "modes" of time are duration, succession and coexistence.16 Hence the category and its Schema (or mode of time) form rules which govern the existence of every appearance and determine it with respect to the unity of all time.17 What the third analogy teils us is that there must be a condition whereby A determines for B and B determines for A its position in time. Moreover, only that which is the cause of something eise or of its determinations can function in this respect. And, if mutual causation (äs reciprocity) grounds this relation, then simultaneity follows straightforwardly. To see this we need only consider the following case: if A determines B then B must be simultaneous with or later than A and if B also determines A then A must be later than or simultaneously with B. It is impossible for A to be both later and earlier than ß, therefore they must be simultaneous. In order to understand this in terms of substances and events, we can simply say that if A and B are two substances, they are coexistent if and only if they simultaneously determine certain features of each other. In order to determine the position of two or more coexisting objects in time, it is necessary that such objects exist in different parts of space. It is for this reason that the perception of coexistence is always successive, it being physically impossible for two things to coexist in the same space.18 Coexistence therefore requires a unity of substances that can only be perceived in a unified space; a whole which connects the different parts in which different substances stand. 16

17 18

In the first analogy Kant says that coexistence is not really a mode of time; since none of the parts of time coexist, they are all in succession to one another. This claim doesn't affect my argument since I am concerned here with the way time is represented by objects in space. See A183. The notion of a unified time is the product of the transcendental synthesis of Imagination rather than the analogies. Obviously one can have the perception of two objects existing together at the same time in one's visual field. What Kant is concerned with is the more problematic case where one cannot directly perceive two coexistent objects at the same time.

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We can see then how this picture provides a sketch for understanding what it means for coexisting substances to interact. One substance is thought to be the cause of certain determinations in another and vice-versa insofar äs each is in some sense responsible for the spatial position of the other. It is in that sense that the substances or objects stand in a mutual interaction, since each effects the spatial determination of the others. In other words, each object has the place that it has by virtue of the place of everything eise; hence, places within space are mutually determined. And, it is this spatial position which, in turn, is a condition of temporal position since it is only spatially separated objects that are capable of coexisting. That is to say, we can only have reciprocal perceptions of objects if objects are spatially separated, and it is this possibility of reciprocal perception that functions äs the empirical manifestation of coexistence. This relation of substances excluding others from their spatial positions is similar to the relation Kant describes in the case of disjunctive judgement discussed above. The impossibility of two objects occupying the same spatial position is a manifestation of the logical Opposition of two propositions where the sphere of one excludes the sphere of the other. The constituents of the judgement mutually exclude each other, yet, taken together (äs a Community), they include the entire sphere of knowledge in that particular domain. Likewise, the Community of substances, in order to be an object of experience, must stand in a unified space, a whole that is the product of its various constituents. My claim then, is that mutual interaction means, for Kant, a determination of spatial position. A possible objection to my Interpretation is that while mutual interaction and space are intimately connected, it is only through mutual interaction that spatial relations are defined; hence one needs an independent account of how interaction determines spatial relations, something which at least prima facie would seem to involve the notion of force. The objection is not without merit for indeed there is reason to think that Kant himself may have had force in mind in his reference to the Community of mutually interacting substances äs a dynamical community. This use of the term dynamical is crucial for understanding the proper relation between the dynamical principles established by the analogies and the metaphysical foundations of dynamics discussed in the Metaphysical Poundations of Natural Science. Finally, then, in order to answer this objection let me turn to an analysis of how my account of the third analogy fits with what Kant has to say about interactive forces.

5. General Principles and Empirical Science The most general reference to the term dynamical occurs in the discussion of the dynamical categories — those of relation and modality — in contrast to the mathematical categories of quantity and quality. The latter group is concerned with objects of both pure and empirical Intuition while the former are concerned with the existence of these objects, their relation to each other and to the understand-

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ing.19 At A302 Kant explicitly states that in neither case is he concerned with principles of mathematics or general physical dynamics since it is through the principles of the understanding that the special principles of dynamics, and mathematics become possible. And, he claims to have named the analogies on the basis of their application rather than their content. What Kant means here is that although these principles embody the dynamical relations of composition and consequence (or connection), they make possible the interconnection of experience in a variety of ways, and it is through their application to objects a synthesis is produced. The point is clarified in a footnote added to the B edition of Chapter two, Section three, of the Analytic of Principles where Kant distinguishes two kinds of combination, composition and connection. The latter involves the synthesis of the manifold insofar äs its constituents necessarily belong to one another, äs in the case of substance and accident. Although the synthesis is heterogenous it is represented äs combined a priori. It is this non-arbitrary combination involving "the connection of the existence of the manifold" that Kant labels dynamical [B202]. Consequently, Kant's use of the term "dynamical" has to do primarily with the fact that objects of experience must be and are connected in certain ways; and it is only through this synthesis that we are able to have experience at all. The connection can be further divided into its physical component which connects the appearances with each other and its metaphysical component, i.e. the (a priori) connection in the understanding. Although Kant does not explicitly say so, this latter distinction nicely represents the dual nature of the analogies. In addition to functioning äs conditions for the possibility of experience they also play a role in determining the relations between actual objects. Though the dynamical principles are thought to be regulative äs opposed to constitutive they are nonetheless "constitutive in respect of experience since they render the concepts, without which there can be no experience, possible a priori" [A664/B692]. In other words, the relations that hold between actual objects are experienced partly because of the pure concepts of substance, causality and Community. The interesting issue here concerns the implications of this notion of a dynamical unity for the metaphysical explication of dynamics and mechanics in MFNS. Michael Friedman [1992] has persuasively argued that it is the Metaphysical Foundations that first make clear how the dynamical principles of pure understanding are constitutive with respect to (generate Schemata for) empirical concepts (specifically matter). This is accomplished by showing how the transcendental laws of the understanding together with the empirical concept of matter can yield the meta19

Thus Kant speaks of the mathematical categories äs having no correlates, only the dynamical categories satisfy this condition [B 110]. When the categories are applied to experience, the employment of what Kant terms "their synthesis" is either mathematical or dynamical, concerned either with the Intuition of an appearance in general or with its existence. Because the dynamical principles have a priori necessity only under the "condition of empirical thought in some experience" the necessity is mediate and indirect in contrast to the mathematical principles [B200/A161].

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physical doctrine of body. From this Friedman shows how it is possible to provide an a priori foundation for the empirical law of universal gravitation. He provides a masterful account of how this System fits together and on the basis of this reconstruction concludes that without the Metaphysical Foundations we would have "no conception whatsoever of how the principles of pure understanding are actually constitutive with respect to experience" [p. 259]. He cites Kant's remark in the preface to the MFNS in support of this conclusion: It is indeed very remarkable ... that general metaphysics, in all instances where it requires examples (intuitions) in order to provide meaning for its pure concepts of the understanding, must always derive them from the general doctrine of body — and thus from the form and the principles of outer Intuition; and, if these are not exhibited completely, it gropes uncertainly and hesitantly among mere sense-less concepts .... And so a separated metaphysics of corporeal nature does excellent and indispensable service for general metaphysics, in that the former furnishes examples (instances in concreto) in which to realize the concepts and propositions of the latter (properly, transcendental philosophy), that is, to give to a mere form of thought sense and meaning [4:478.3—20].

Friedman's claim is that the analogies, äs transcendental principles of the first Critique, cannot be understood äs having any content apart from their role in providing a foundation for the more specific laws provided by the MFNS.20 What I want to claim is that the analogies, specifically the third analogy, can and in fact must be understood äs having a content that is distinct from the conclusions of the Metaphysical Foundations; since it is only in virtue of this difference that a relationship can be established between the Critique and the mechanical and dynamical principles of the MFNS. The quote above refers to the role played by the general doctrine of body in providing examples for the pure concepts. This doctrine of body deals with what Kant calls "extended nature". In order for this doctrine to be properly scientific one needs to first provide an analysis of matter. Although matter is an empirical concept, it involves certain aspects which relate only to pure intuitions in space and time [MFNS 4:472]. Hence, äs the quote makes clear, it is the form and principles of outer Intuition that makes possible the derivation of these examples from the general doctrine of body. And, äs we saw above, it is the third analogy that provides the unified account of space, without which there could be no unity of experience. So, although a metaphysics of corporeal nature provides concrete examples for transcendental principles, it can do so only insofar äs the third analogy furnished 20

In a subsequent paper Friedman claims that empirical laws are nested, äs it were, within a sequence of progressively more concrete and empirical instantiations of the transcendental principles. Here he refers to the transcendental principles äs depicting a world with a particular character; and in reference to the third analogy claims that it describes a world whose spatially separated substances are in thoroughgoing interaction with one another. Hence, they always act on one another through external causes. Although this view is slightly different from the one argued in the book, it doesn't explain what interaction consists in and leaves the reader to assume that the external causes are simply Newtonian forces [1992b), p. 185.

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the spatial framework within which these objects (examples) can be located. In that sense the analogy provides content through its ability to structure experience in a determinate way, making possible the application of the categories to experience in the first place. At B291 Kant remarks that in order to demonstrate the objective reality of the category substances "we require an Intuition in space (of matter)". What the third analogy provides is the unified spatial structure that allows us locate matter (substance) in space and to experience motion through a continuous space. Each of the relational categories/principles is concerned with a specific kind of time determination; what makes the third analogy different is that the temporal feature (simultaneity and coexistence) cannot be achieved without the accompanying spatial component. In other words, we cannot conceive of two substances existing at the same time unless they are in different regions of space. Although space is necessary for the application of the analogies to empirical objects, the third analogy shows how space is a necessary feature of the temporal determination of coexistence and simultaneity. Undoubtedly the Metaphysical Foundations provide instantiations of the categories, but before the pure concepts can be applied to objects of experience there is a more fundamental level of application that makes the former possible, namely the application of Schema to categories to form the principles. Here the categories provide synthetic a priori judgements about what nature must be like; to that extent each of the principles has a content that specifies necessary conditions of experience. My point is not to deny that the Newtonian gravitational System is a model of the kind of structure described by the third analogy; moreover, Kant himself says that the three mechanical laws, conservation of matter, inertia and the equality of action and reaction answer exactly to the categories of substance, causality and Community insofar äs they are applied to matter [551]. What we need to understand however is the particular way in which the content of the third analogy functions in this respect. What I want to suggest is that it provides the foundation for a law of action and reaction and universal gravitation through its explication of a unified space. In the chapter on dynamics in the MFNS Kant says that space is required for all forces of matter; indeed he defines matter äs the movable insofar äs it fills space. Space is crucial here because of the way in which Kant relies on it to describe the essential relationship between force and matter. Without both attractive and repulsive forces matter is impossible, for without attractive and repulsive forces to counteract each other matter would extend to infinity or shrink to a mathematical point. Hence, it is only in virtue of these forces that matter fills space. But, in order for the forces to act they require space; äs Kant remarks, "since space contains the conditions of the laws of the diffusion of these forces, it is necessarily presupposed before all matter [535].21 Once this foundation is in place, we can then move on 21

At 4:508 Kant claims that space contains the ground of the fact that with the increase in the volume of matter extending itself, the extensive force becomes weaker in inverse Proportion.

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to tnore complicated Systems involving the communication of motion äs described by the mechanical laws. Thus when Kant says in the third analogy that "we cannot empirically change our position, and perceive the change, unless matter in all parts of space makes perception of our position possible to us", he is claiming that we need the unified space provided by coexisting substances in order to experience change and motion. The reciprocal influence is simly the way in which a Community of substances determines a single space out of spatially distinct points. Each substance contains both the cause and effect of certain determinations of another substance only to the extent that it occupies a particular region of space, thereby excluding other substances from that position. Hence, the interconnection between space and time in the third analogy; two substances cannot exist simultaneously unless they are in different regions of space. Once this framework is applied to matter, äs the empirical realization of substance, we see how the attractive forces of attraction and repulsion determine the filling of space, äs well äs the ways in which forces are communicated between material substances. How then are we to understand Kant's remark at B260 where he claims that without a dynamical Community of substances "local Community (communio spatii) could never be empirically known". It is tempting to Interpret this passage, in fact the entire analogy, äs talking about forces between substances. Undoubtedly the two kinds of causality discussed by the second and third analogies, influence and reciprocity, involve forces. Kant himself is explicit about this at A204 where he says that causality leads to the concept of action, this in turn to the concept of force ... [but] äs my critical scheme, which is concerned solely with the sources of synthetic a priori knowledge, must not be complicated through the introduction of analyses, which aim only at the clarification, not at the extension, of concepts, I leave detailed exposition to a future System of pure reason. Such an analysis has already, indeed, been developed in considerable detail in the existing test-books.

But he is also quite explicit that the notion of force is not part of the framework of the Critique. Not only is it referred to very rarely, but when it is mentioned Kant refers to it äs either a derivative concept [B 108] or äs something we are given in experience. With respect to causality he remarks: How anything can be altered, and how it should be possible that upon one state in a given moment an opposite state may follow in the next moment — of this we have not, a priori, the least conception. For that we require knowledge of actual forces, which can only be given empirically, äs, for instance of the moving forces, or what amounts to the same thing, of certain successive appearances, äs motions, which indicate [the presence of] such forces [A207].

So, the point at which forces enter involves a different level of explanation. The analogies explain what must be necessary in order for experience to be possible; forces, äs described in the Metaphysical Founäations explain how particular kinds of experiences take place. Although dynamical relations do involve forces, the primary dynamical relations are those specified by the Critique, namely, inherence,

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consequence and composition; "the three dynamical relations from which all others spring" [B262]. With respect to the third analogy then the important dynamical relation is composition, from which the equality of action and reaction can be seen äs a special case.22 It seems clear then that if the meaning of mutual interaction involves forces, they must not be specific Newtonian foerces; however, one might still claim that Kant simply has in mind interactive forces in general, the nature of which can only be given in experience. There are two reasons why this line of argument seems unpersuasive. The first has to do with remarks made in the Critique stating explicitly that the concept of force is not pari of the critical programme: ... the categories, äs the true primary concepts of the pure understanding, have also their pure derivative concepts ... I beg permission to entitle these pure but derivative concepts of the understanding the predicables ... — to distinguish them from the predicaments [i. e. the categories]. If we have original and primative concepts, it is easy to add the derivative and subsidiary ... Since at present we are concerned not with the completeness of the System but only with the principles to be followed in its construction, I reserve this supplementary work for another occasion. It can be easily carried out, with the aid of ontological manuals — for instance, by placing under the category of causality the predicables of force, action, passion; under the category of Community the predicables of presence, resistance ... In this treatise I purposely omit the definitions of the categories ... [A82—82/B108].

Although Kant may have had the idea of resistance in the back of his mind when formulating the third analogy, there is nothing in the text that suggests that we must understand the mutual interaction between substances äs a relation that involves force; in fact the text suggests exactly the opposite. Hence, the second reason why the "force Interpretation" seems unreasonable it that it requires us to attribute to Kant a methodology for the critical programme that he overtly rejects. What I have been trying to argue for here is a reading of the text that preserves the integrity of System presented in the Critique while providing an Interpretation of the third analogy that enables us to understand the role of mutual interaction äs the mutual determination of the spatial positions of substances, substances that must stand in a Community if we are to experience a single unified space; or, for that matter if we are to have experience at all. In the concluding passages of the discussion of the principles Kant refers to Leibniz and the inconceivability of a Community of substances arising merely from the fact that they exist. He claims, however, that a Community of substances is possible if we can represent them to ourselves in space, that is, outer Intuition. And, in what I see äs a remark that nicely sums up the relation between space and force in the third analogy, Kant says that space "already contains in itself a priori formal outer relations äs conditions of the possibility of the real relations of action and reaction, and therefore of the

22

I won't go into details here since Friedman has already provided an extensive commentary on these matters. My disagreement with his account is only that it fails to provide an independent analysis of content of the third analogy.

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possibility of Community" [B293]. In other words, Community is not possible without the spatial relations that are fixed by mutual determination. In conclusion, let me go back to the beginning and connect the discussion in the third analogy with the pre-critical writings. In the discussion about Leibnizian substances in Nova Dilucidatio Kant wanted to prove that change could not take place unless there was an accompanying external cause or connection with other substances. His presentation of the principle of succession in time, a precursor to the second analogy, establishes the necessity of this external connection and äs well äs the real existence of bodies. However, when it comes to the principle of coexistence, Kant maintains that finite substances are linked together only insofar äs the divine understanding maintains them in a state of harmony with respect to their reciprocal relations. This doesn't mean that these relations do not have an external nature, but only that without God's intelligence this reciprocity would not exist. Their external state involves each of them acting and reacting [1:414]. Kant does mention that this reciprocal relation involves efficient causality and claims that if the external appearance of universal action and reaction consists in bodies drawing closer together, it is called attraction. Because it is brought about by copresence alone and extends to all distances, it is Newtonian universal gravity [1:415]. Hence, it looks äs though even at this rather early stage Kant wants to connect the principle of co-existence with action and reaction, and particularly Newtonian gravitation. Yet, there are some other remarks that suggest that this is not all Kant has in mind, and that although these forces could be seen äs instances of the law of co-existence, they do not constitute either the meaning of the law of coexistence or its physical Interpretation. My reasons for suggesting this come from a passage at 1:414 where Kant says that place and position in space are relations through which substances, by means of their reciprocal determinations, relate to other substances. In other words, the external connection that exists between substances is a connection that involves spatial determination. My claims is that the third analogy provides the kind of spatial structure and relations among objects of experience that makes possible our experience of force acting across spatial distances. In 1755 Kant has not yet distinguished the proper domain of transcendental philosophy and metaphysics; that comes much later in the critical writings. At this point his concern is to establish the existence of external causes and relations. To that end his task in Nova Dilucidatio is to distinguish between substances that operate through an internal principle of change and the kinds of real substances that he wants to establish; bodies that are affected by external causes. Much later, in the Critique of Judgement, Kant claims that the principle of cognition, which states that bodies äs changeable substances must have a cause, is transcendental; since bodies need only be thought through the pure concepts of the understanding in order for the proposition to be cognized a priori. The same principle is metaphysical when it specifies that the cause must be external, since here the empirical concept of body, äs that which is movable in space, must be introduced in order to

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support the proposition. The same distinction is present in Kant's second law of mechanics where he says that every change of matter has an external cause [4:544]. What implications does this have for the mutual interaction of the third analogy? One might want to say that the third analogy establishes the external causes that Kant sought in 1755, and insofar äs these causes are external they necessarily involve the forces described by the MFNS. Undoubtedly there is a sense in which this is true, for the third analogy allows for the possibility of a metaphysics of forces. But that is only part of the answer. First and foremost, Kant's reciprocal relations are external insofar äs they involve spatial relations that exist outside us and outside the substances themselves. These relations are not external in the metaphysical sense since they in no way involve the empirical concept of body. This enters only at the level of application to particulars, the level at which the MFNS relates pure concepts to empirical objects. The metaphysical notion of an external cause is absent from the third analogy, specifically because the mutual interaction of a community of substances was intended to be understood äs something distinct from and prior to the equality of action and reaction and universal gravitation.23

Bibliography Allison, H. [1983], Kant's Transcendental Idealism, New Haven: Yale University Press. Aquila, R. [1989], Matter in Mind: A Study of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Beck, L. W. [1986], Kant's Latin Writings (Trans., Commentaries and Notes), New York: Peter Lang. Brittan, G. [1978], Kant's Theory of Science, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cassirer, E. [1918], Kant's Life and Though, James Haden (trans.), New Haven: Yale University Press. Friedman, M. [1992], Kant and the Exact Sciences, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [1992b], "Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural Science", The Cambridge Companion to Kant, P. Guyer (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Guyer, P. [1986], Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Kant, I. [1781 & 1787], Critique of Pure Reason, N. K. Smith (trans.), London: Macmillan (1929). [1786], Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, J. Ellington (trans.), reprinted in Philosophy of Material Nature, Indianapolis: 23

An earlier version of this paper was read at the 1994 Pacific APA meeting in Los Angeles. I would like to thank the audience, especially Daniel Dahlstrom, for questions and discussion. I am grateful to Paul Forster and Alan Richardson for many helpful comments and to the SSHRC for financial support.

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Hackett (1985). [1755], "Nova Dilucidatio" or "A New Elucidation on the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition", The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, W. Walford (trans. and ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [1770], Inaugural Dissertation in Ibid. Kemp Smith, N. [1923], A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason', London: Macmillan. Mates, B. [1986], The Philosophy of Leibniz, New York: Oxford Press. Melnick, A. [1989], Space, Time and Thought in Kant, Dordrecht: Kluwer. [1983], Kant's Analogies of Experience, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Nagel, G. [1983], The Structure of Experience, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Walker, R. [1978], Kant: Arguments of the Philosophers, London: Routledge.

Der transzendentale Ort der Rede von Sprachtranszendenz. Zu den Grundlagen einer Metakritik der sprachanalytischen Kantkritik von Friedrich Glauner, Berlin

Die nachfolgende Bestimmung der transzendentalen Funktion der Rede von Sprachtranszendenz steht im Kontext eines umfassenderen Argumentationsprogramms: In der Analyse des unhintergehbaren Setzungscharakters unserer epistemischen Grundbegriffe soll nachgewiesen werden, daß sich die analytisch gegründete Kritik an Kant nicht aus dessen Perspektive befreien kann. Denn — so die These — auch die Analytik greift zur Legitimation epistemischer Geltungsansprüche zuletzt auf inexplikable Setzungen zurück1, d. i. auf Vorstellungen, die bloß in ihrer transzendentalen Funktion, nicht jedoch inhaltlich exponiert werden können.2 ,Tran-

1

2

Das Paradebeispiel solcher inexplikabler Setzungen sind die negativen Verstandesbegriffe. Aus transzendentaler Perspektive müssen sie gesetzt werden, „um die Anmaßung der Sinnlichkeit einzuschränken" (Kant, KdV, A255/B311), ohne daß das mit ihnen Bezeichnete inhaltlich gedacht werden kann. Insofern die negativen Verstandesbegriffe gemäß Kants Beweisprogramm gesetzt werden müssen, sind die Termini ,Noumenon' und ,Ding an sich' transzendental exponible Begriffe. Sie haben die Funktion, mit der Einschränkung der faktischen Erkenntnisurteile zugleich die Vorstellung der urteilstranszendenten Bedingtheit möglicher Erkenntnis zu fundieren. Ausgehend von dieser transzendentalen Deutung des ,exponibeP, sind für Kant nicht nur die negativen Verstandesbegriffe exponibel, sondern auch die inexplikablen Ideen der Vernunft. Auch sie betreffen bloß „die Exposition der Erscheinungen", d. i. „das Unbedingte, was die Vernunft... sucht", nämlich „gleichsam die Vollständigkeit in der Reihe der Prämissen, die zusammen weiter keine andere voraussetzen" (Kant, KdV, A 416/B 443 f.), so daß erst durch die Exposition dieser seitens der Vernunft gesetzten Ideen „die Erscheinungen nach Verstandesgesetzen exponiert werden" können (1. c.). Zumindest vier Ebenen der Rede von ,Setzung' müssen unterschieden werden: Erstens die transzendentale Ebene, wie sie etwa von Kant anhand der transzendentalen Ideen' bzw. von Putnam mit dem „limit-concept of the ideal truth" (Putnam 1981, 216) thematisiert wird. Hiervon zu unterscheiden ist die ,ontologische' Ebene der Rede von Setzungen, wie sie Quine in zahlreichen Schriften im Auge hat. (Cf. etwa Quine 1948, 16-19; 1951, 44 f.; 1955; 1960, 22 f.; 1966—74). Eine dritte Ebene der Rede von Setzung betrifft den eigentümlichen Status der Rede vom Hintergrund selbst — McDowell spricht hier mit explizitem Bezug auf Wittgenstein „of a position which is analogous to a kind of idealism, but with linguistic practice in place of ,ideas'" (McDowell 1981, 248). Viertens schließlich müssen wir gemäß Davidson „words, meanings of words, reference, and satisfaction" (Davidson 1977 b, 222) als Setzungen („posits") begreifen. Wir benötigen sie, um eine Theorie der Wahrheit implementieren zu können, wobei sie diesem Zweck dienen, „without needing independent conformation or empirical basis" (1. c.).

Kant-Studien 89. Jahrg., S. 278-299 © Walter de Gruyter 1998 ISSN 0022-8877

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szendental' besagt hier, daß die Funktion dieser Setzungen ausschließlich darin besteht, das Netzwerk unseres faktischen Selbst- und Weltverständnisses zu verankern und so inhaltliche Vorstellungen, z. B. materiales Urteilen, zu ermöglichen. Im Gegensatz zu den materialen Vorstellungen unseres Selbst- und Weltverständnisses kommt besagten Setzungen also kein Gehalt zu, bilden sie doch allererst den Rahmen, innerhalb dessen wir gerechtfertigt von Inhalten sprechen können. Ausgehend von dieser an Kants ,negativem Beweisprogramm'3 orientierten Setzungsproblematik, lautet die Grundthese sowohl der umfassenderen als auch der hier vorliegenden Fragestellung: Kann nachgewiesen werden, daß der sprach analytische Begründungsdiskurs epistemischer Geltungsansprüche gleichfalls auf inexplikahle Setzungen zurückgreift, dann läßt sich anhand der Exposition dieser Setzungen Kants Idealismusthese auf de-transzendentaler Ebene rekonstruieren. Im Kontext dieser Grundthese repräsentiert die nachfolgede Bestimmung der transzendentalen Funktion der Rede von Sprachtranszendenz den Versuch, mittels der Analyse des irreduzibel Semantischen nachzuweisen, daß die binnenperspektivische Rede unserer sprachlich vermittelten Weisen der Welterzeugung nicht ohne einen kritischen Begriff der Transzendenz4 auskommt. Anhand der Bestimmung der wechselweisen Verwiesenheit der Termini ,Bedeutung' und ,Sprachtranszendenz' werde ich dafür argumentieren, daß die epistemische Funktion dieser ,Setzung' exponiert und als transzendentale Vorstellung qualifiziert werden kann. Ich gehe hierzu in fünf Schritten vor. Einleitend wird anhand der Wittgensteinschen Unterscheidung von ,erklären' und Beschreiben' der hier zugrundeliegende Begriff des Transzendentalen herausgearbeitet. Im zweiten Schritt wird anhand der Kantischen Transzendenzproblematik und ihrer Inversion im Rahmen der analytischen Sprachphilosophie der Grund gelegt, von dem aus drittens der Begriff eines ,Anderen der Sprache' sowie daran anschließend die transzendentale Funktion der Rede von Sprachtranszendenz charakterisiert werden. Abschließend möchte ich die Fluchtlinien kennzeichnen, von denen aus das erweiterte Projekt der Frage nach der Möglichkeit einer Metakritik der sprachanalytischen Kantkritik entfaltet werden kann. 3

4

Wie ich an anderer Stelle zeigte, besteht aus moderner Perspektive Kants ,negatives Beweisprogramm' in der Einsicht, daß der Nachweis der transzendentalen Gesetzmäßigkeit möglicher Erfahrungserkenntnis nur dadurch komplettiert werden kann, daß anhand der Grenzbestimmung der Vernunft einerseits und der Explikation der Rolle und Funktion negativer Verstandesbegriffe, transzendentaler Ideen sowie der regulativen Ideen der Vernunft andererseits das ,quid Juris' möglicher Erfahrung auf die Welt als Erscheinung eingeschränkt wird. Cf. Glauner 1990, 137 ff., 176 ff. sowie 1997, 117 ff. Um schon hier etwaigen Mißverständnissen entgegenzutreten, sei der hier zur Debatte stehende Begriff der Sprachtranszendenz wie folgt definiert: In Abgrenzung zur tradierten Transzendenzvorstellung, d. i. der Vorstellung eines kategorientranszendenten ens realissimum, besagt Sprachtranszendenz nicht, es gäbe so etwas wie eine significatio essentiae, die als der Grund der Bedeutsamkeit des Sprache-Welt-Bezugs jenseits der Sprache aufgesucht werden muß, sondern, daß in und mit der Sprache jenes aufscheint, was als der urteilstranszendente Mehrbestand des Sprache-Welt-Bezugs immer schon in der Sprache miterschlossen ist, ohne daß er sich als solcher jMehrbestand' urteilslogisch eineindeutig identifizieren läßt.

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l. Das Paradigma der Beschreibung als Topos einer nach kantischen Transzendentalphilosophie In seiner Abhandlung ,Zeichen über Zeichen über Zeichen4 schreibt Charles W. Morris: „Aber wir Philosophen gieren nach Worten und sind nicht so klug wie unsere Ermahnungen" (Morris 1948, 159). Von welchen Ermahnungen spricht er? Aus einer an Carnaps Metaphysikkritik orientierten Perspektive könnte man denken, es sei die Ermahnung, den Scheinproblemen der Philosophie zu entsagen. Sie ergeben sich dort, wo mit Begriffen hantiert wird, die keine Bedeutung haben, weil sie weder durch die Ableitungsbeziehungen ihrer Elementarsätze noch durch ihre Wahrheitsbedingungen oder die Methode ihrer Verifikation kriterial eindeutig bestimmt sind. Weniger dogmatisch, jedoch gleichfalls dem Topos der „Verhexung unseres Verstandes durch die Mittel unserer Sprache" (Wittgenstein, PU 109.) folgend, könnte man mit Wittgenstein denken, die Ermahnungen beständen darin, nicht mehr Erklärungen zu suchen, wo nur der Gebrauch von Wörtern beschrieben werden kann. Folgt man dieser Linie, ergibt sich eine dritte Bedeutung der von Morris eingeklagten Klugheit. Sie besteht in der Auffassung, den Wittgensteinschen Beschreibungstopos ernst zu nehmen, also das zu beschreibende Vokabular nicht leichtfertig auf anderes reduzieren zu wollen. Denn kann Philosophie „den tatsächlichen Gebrauch der Sprache ... am Ende nur beschreiben" (Wittgenstein, PU 124.), dann gilt dies für alle Sprachspiele — auch die philosophischen. Und genau dies ist es, was das seitens der Sprachanalytik propagierte Bild der Sprache — genauer gesprochen handelt es sich um die reduktionistischen Bestimmungsversuche der Semantizität5 — nicht unangetastet läßt. Die dritte Bedeutung der Ermahnung zur philosophischen Klugheit liegt deshalb im Hinweis, daß das beschreibende Umkreisen des In-Frage-Stehenden eventuell mehr ausdrückt, als mit einem reduktionistischen Beweis- oder pragmatischen Begründungsprogramm bestimmt werden kann. Derart gelesen, besteht Morris' Ermahnung darin, auf die irreduzible Selbstbezüglichkeit philosophischer Beschreibungspraxis zu verweisen. Sie verdankt sich dem Umstand, daß das zu Beschreibende zuletzt aus sich selbst heraus entfaltet werden muß, ohne daß hierzu weitere Erklärungen angeführt werden können. Was aber hat diese Selbstbezüglichkeit philosophischer Beschreibungspraxis mit Transzendentalreflexion zu tun? Die Antwort finden wir, wenn wir uns Wittgensteins Beschreibungstopos zuwenden.6 Als »grammatische Betrachtung' begriffen, repräsentiert Beschreiben4 „ein »Analysieren4 unserer Ausdrucksformen" (Wittgen5

6

Vier Arten des Reduktionismus sind hier zu unterscheiden: Erstens die referenzlogische Reduktion der Semantizität auf den Weltbezug, wie sie im logischen Positivismus von Carnap (1928) oder Wittgenstein (TLP) und in neuerer Zeit von Kripke (1972) und Putnam (1975) vertreten wird; zweitens und drittens die intentionale bzw. handlungstheoretische Reduktion des Semantischen, wie sie seitens Grice, Austin und Searle propagiert wird. Die vierte Form des Reduktionismus findet sich schließlich in Davidsons wahrheitsfunktionaler Definition des Semantischen. Cf. Wittgenstein, PU 109. mit 124. und 126.

Der transzendentale Ort der Rede von Sprachtranszendenz

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stein, PU 90.), wobei der Vorgang der Analyse „Ähnlichkeit mit einem Zerlegen" hat (1. c.). Dieses ,Zerlegen' richtet sich gemäß Wittgenstein „nicht auf die Erscheinungen, sondern, wie man sagen könnte, auf die ,Möglichkeit' der Erscheinungen" (1. c.). Ausgehend von diesem Möglichkeitsbegriff kann die These vertreten werden, daß Wittgensteins Beschreibungstopos das repräsentiert, was Kant transzendentale Erörterung' nennt. Diese versucht ebenfalls die „Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände der Erfahrung" (Kant, KdV, A 158/B 197) zu bestimmen - also das, was Kant ,die Möglichkeit der Erscheinung' nennt. Dürfen wir aber von dieser Analogie auf die Transzendentalität von Wittgensteins Beschreibungsprogramm schließen? Auf den ersten Blick gesehen, nein. Nein deshalb, weil sich Wittgenstein explizit dadurch von Kant abgrenzt, daß er in der Betonung des Beschreibungscharakters philosophischer Betrachtungen die begründungstheoretische Vorstellung zurückweist, „als gäbe es so etwas wie eine letzte Analyse unserer Sprachformen, also eine vollkommen zerlegte Form des Ausdrucks" (Wittgenstein, PU 91.), die, als die Möglichkeit seiner Erscheinung begriffen, so etwas wie eine letzte Erklärung des So-Seins von Sprache, Selbst und Welt fundiert. Trotz dieser gravierenden Differenz zu Kants Begründungsprogramm basiert jedoch auch Wittgensteins Beschreibungstopos auf einer transzendentalen Reflexionsfigur. Denn die Betonung der bloßen Beschreibbarkeit der Grammatik unseres sprachlich vermittelten Selbst- und Weltverständnisses trägt auf de-transzendentaler Ebene dem auch Kants Transzendentalphilosophie konstituierenden Umstand Rechnung, daß und wie epistemische Begründungen ans Ende kommen müssen. Sie müssen ans Ende kommen, weil das faktische Ordnungsgefüge unseres Selbst- und Weltverständnisses — in Kantischer Terminologie wäre dies das transzendentale Konstitutionssystem — zuletzt nur im Rekurs auf dessen Faktizität begründet werden kann. Aus der begründungstheoretischen Perspektive7 des „ ,So handle ich eben.'" (Wittgenstein, PU 217.) gesehen, antizipiert Wittgensteins Diktum, daß wir mit Begründungen ans Ende kommen müssen, deshalb die schon von Kant betonte Einsicht, daß wir uns „andere Formen der Anschauung ... imgleichen andere Formen des Verstandes, ... ob sie gleich möglich wären, ... doch auf keinerleiweise erdenken und faßlich machen" können, da „der Verstand ... es nur mit der Synthesis dessen zu tun [hat], was gegeben ist" (Kant, KdV, A 230f./B 283). Weshalb aber handelt es sich bei dieser, jeglichen Begründungsdiskurs abbrechenden Rekursion auf die Faktizität unserer ,Weisen der Welterzeugung', um eine transzendentale Reflexionsfigur? Wenden wir uns zur Beantwortung dieser Frage nochmals Wittgensteins Terminus ,Beschreibung' zu. Die Beschreibungsform, die an die Stelle philosophischer Erklärung zu treten hat, nennt Wittgenstein ,grammatische Betrachtung'. Von ihr gilt, daß sie „den tatsächlichen Gebrauch der Sprache in keiner Weise antasten [darf]" (Wittgenstein, PU 124.). Sagt nun die Grammatik, 7

Das „ ,So handle ich eben/ " (Wittgenstein, PU 217.) übernimmt deshalb im weiteren Sinn des Wortes eine begründungstheoretische Funktion, weil im Verweis auf es kenntlich gemacht wird, wie und wo jegliches Begründen ans Ende kommt.

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„welche Art Gegenstand etwas ist" (1. c., 373.), dann liegt die transzendentale Pointe von Wittgensteins Beschreibungstopos darin, daß er mit der bloßen Beschreibbarkeit dieser Grammatik antizipiert, daß die Beschreibung dieser Grammatik nichts anderes repräsentiert als das unmittelbare, nicht nochmals erklärbare Sagen, „was etwas ist". Die Betonung der bloßen Beschreibbarkeit dessen, was Wittgenstein das Wesen nennt, das in der Grammatik ausgesprochen ist8, unterstreicht so auf detranszendentaler Ebene die Kantische Einsicht, daß das, was das faktische So-Sein der Gegenstände — ihre Möglichkeit der Erscheinung — konstituiert, nicht nochmals begründet, sondern bloß in seiner erfahrungskonstitutiven Funktion beschrieben werden kann. Wittgensteins grammatische Betrachtung' übernimmt so die Aufgabe, die Kant der Transzendentalreflexion zuwies: Die Beschreibung jener Begriffe, Elemente, Strukturen und Praxen, die es uns ermöglichen, von Gewißheit, Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit zu sprechen. Ausgehend von dieser am Begriff der Beschreibung orientierten Bestimmung von Transzendentalreflexion, kann die implizite Transzendentalität von Wittgensteins Ansatz wie folgt bestimmt werden: Sie besteht darin, daß aus erkenntniskritischer Perspektive jene ,Tiefengrammatik