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Capital & Class

N John Markakis

Famine and politics in the Horn of Africa

C t M 16

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The attention of the media has in recent years focused on the Horn of Africa as an area blighted by famine . John Markakis attempts to analyse the political responses of the Sudanese and Ethiopian regimes to the famine, the contradictions in their policies and their lack of impact on the underlying problems . He looks particularly at the dilemmas faced by subsistence farmers in the area, as opposed to the urban dwellers who control political power. was reiterating traditional wisdom when he assured his starving subjects in 1973 that famines are `natural disasters beyond human control' . The soldiers who dethroned him a year later proclaimed `drought is natural, famine is man-made', and laid the blame for the calamity on the ancien regime . The newlydiscovered wisdom was forgotten ten years later, when a famine ten times worse devastated Ethiopia and its military rulers pinned the blame on drought . Faced with the same problem, the military regime in the Sudan also blamed nature and consigned its victims to the mercy of Allah . This was just as well . Engaged in des= perate struggles for political survival, no • HAILE SELASSIE

The Politics ofFamine

regime in the Horn could do much about the famine and they left this task to international charity . Neither they nor their numerous opponents allowed themselves to be distracted by the famine, and there was no let up in the many-sided conflict that has ravaged the region for nearly three decades . Unyielding political imperatives proved serious obstacles to famine relief, and the combatants even sought to profit from the situation, thereby adding to the agony of the people they claim to represent . Both the Ethiopian and Sudanese regimes, and nearly all their adversaries claimed to be `Marxist', and socialist opinion abroad was badly divided trying to assess their competing claims . What follows is not intended to resolve this quandary, only to describe the political response to the food crisis in the Horn . To be sure, nature is not blameless . The highlands of northern Ethiopia are skeletal monuments of erosion, an age-old process that enriches the Nile delta in Egypt . The rebellious regimes of Eritrea and Tigrai are the worst affected, and some believe the damage there, and in neighbouring Wollo, is irreparable and justifies the Ethiopian regime's policy of resettling some of the population in the south . With the precious exception of land watered by major rivers, the lowland that surrounds the Ethiopian plateau is arid and supports a sparse population of pastoralists whose life chances depend on the vagaries of a rainfall which is known for its erratic pattern . This pattern turned especially ominous of late, with recurring and severe shortages of precipitation and fateful consequences for the people of the Horn . A collation of recorded incidents for the past one hundred years indicates major drought is likely to occur every ten years, while local folklore upholds the biblical version of the seven-year cycle . Northern Ethiopia has had major drought

and famine in 1947-49, 1958-59, 1972-74, 17 and from 1984 to this day . Population growth has contributed to the problem . The region's population has grown rapidly since the beginning of the colonial era . Less than two million at the turn of the century, Sudan's population now approaches twenty million . Ethiopia's first census, taken in 1984, revealed a staggering 2 .9 per cent rate of growth and a total population of over 42 million ; several millions more than had been estimated . The ratio of people to land on the northern highland of Ethiopia and along the Nile in the northern Sudan is very high, and the peasants on the highlands till miniscule plots of land whose capacity is steadily diminishing due to uninterrupted cultivation without benefit of fertiliser . Most land has been stripped of its natural cover to bring it under cultivation, and once abundant forests were eliminated to provide firewood and construction material . Even greater damage to land has been done by animals, whose numbers expanded even more prodigiously this century, mainly due to the introduction of basic veterinary services . Livestock increase in the Sudan was estimated at sixfold during 1917-1956, and the number of cattle in Ethiopia is thought to have increased from nine million to nineteen million btween 1938 and 1954 . Overstocking led to overgrazing and land degradation, and a critical situation was reported in the Sudan in the early 1940s . It has worsened steadily since then, and the pull of new markets for animals in the Arabian Gulf and Egypt encouraged the inherent tendency of pastoralists to expand their herds . As a result, the Horn now figures prominently in all `desertification' maps . Colonialism transformed the local economy with the introduction of commercial production for export ; cotton in the

Capital & Class

18 Sudan, coffee in Ethiopia, bananas in Somalia . Investment and technological innovation were channelled into this sector to make it the pillar of the economy and the financial mainstay of the state . By contrast, the subsistence sector producing food for domestic consumption was totally neglected . Worse yet, it was weakened by the loss of fertile, irrigated and prime pasture land that was transferred to commercial production, as well as the loss of labour to the latter . Subsistence production therefore stagnated and, given the high rate of population growth, production per capita fell, forcing these countries to become net food importers . The erosion of the subsistence economy was accompanied by the debasement of traditional culture, and the marginalisation and political emasculation of rural society . Peasants and pastoralists were pushed to the margins of a transitional world in which the newly-emergent, westernised urban sector was becoming dominant . In the post-colonial period capital investment continued to flow into commercial production for export in order to earn the foreign exchange needed to provide the urban sector with imported goods . The land area devoted to cotton in the Sudan doubled within a few years after independence . The subsistence sector, which continued to support the bulk of the population, remained outside the focus of development plans . In Ethiopia, agriculture was allotted only 4 .2 per cent of the state's total expenditure for 1963-1973, and little of that reached the ordinary peasant . Not surprisingly, food production in the Horn failed to keep pace with population growth, and the margin of safety for those who lacked access to the resources of the market became thin indeed . Peasants and pastoralists became prey to any interruption in the rhythm of production,

whether caused by drought, flood, locust, animal disease, war or other visitation, and the Horn has had more than a fair share of such calamities in recent times . Drought caused famine in northern Ethiopia several times in the postwar period, the most dramatic instance being the famine of 1972-74 that claimed an estimated 200,000 lives . The imperial regime ignored the disaster and did its best to prevent others from noticing, going as far as to reject offers of aid from abroad . It was only after student demonstrations exposed the tragedy at home, and Jonathan Dimbleby's searing testimonial `The Unknown Famine' was shown abroad, that assistance was allowed to reach the famished region . The radical military regime that succeeded Haile Selassie won early acclaim with the enactment of a sweeping land reform that nationalied land and divided it equally among the tillers . An impressive achievement, it benefitted the mass of tenant cultivators in the south of the country, but had little impact in the north where tenancy was a minor phenomenon and land was already parcelled out in very small plots . Nor did the reform have any impact on production, since neither capital nor technical innovation, or any other production improvements were introduced in the subsistence sector . Shortages of food staples appeared in 1976, and thereafter became a permanent and worsening condition accompanied by rising prices, and the appearance of a black market when price controls were introduced . Initially the regime blamed merchants for hoarding and executed a few, without improving the situation . Later it set up a marketing monopoly to buy agricultural produce from the peasants at fixed prices ; the classic method of squeezing rural surplus through administrative controls . This seems to have proved

The Politics ofFamine

an additional disincentive for the peasants, whose propensity to sell was blunted by the lack of manufactured goods and runaway prices . In 1978, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam denounced the peasant's `individualism' and refusal to bring crops to the market `until prices rise' . Political rhetoric aside, the regime in Addis Ababa paid no more attention to the subsistence sector than had its predecessor . It put emphasis on collectivisation on the Soviet model, but did not get very far in this direction . In the mid-1980s, less than one per cent of peasant households belonged to producer cooperatives, despite state support for them with equipment, fertiliser, credit and cadres to guide their operations . By contrast, nearly all peasants belonged to the associations created in 1975 to manage local affairs, and a large number joined consumer cooperatives to obtain consumer goods . The regime's main effort to spur food production focused on the expansion of state farms, which occupied about four per cent of all cultivated land, but consumed eighty per cent of agricultural credit, eighty-two per cent of fertiliser, over seventy per cent of improved seed, and nearly all other inputs provided by the state . State farm output went to feed the towns and Ethiopia's swollen military establishment, the largest in Africa . The wars, in which its half a million soldiers and militiamen were engaged dislocated production in several provinces and contributed greatly to the overall decline that occurred in the late 1970s . So did the pressing of young peasants into the militia and the flight of others abroad or into the ranks of the half a dozen insurgent movements fighting the regime . Persistent drought took its toll, and production in 1978 and 1979 fell ten per cent below 1977 . In the beginning of the 1980s, a state agency reported the average con-

sumption of grain had fallen below the 19 internationally recognised minimum of four hundred grams per person daily . In other words, Ethiopian peasants were starving in fair weather, before drought unleashed another horrendous famine in 1983 . The Sudan had escaped famine in the early 1970s, partly because drought was not severe there, partly due to the fact that cultivation in the important central region depends on irrigation not precipitation, and partly also because people in the vulnerable regions coped as they always have done by moving to other areas . The country was not as fortunate in the early 1980s, and this was due mainly to the continuing decline of subsistence production, the result of policies promoted by the self-proclaimed `Marxist' regime of General Nimeiry . Inspired with a vision of turning the Sudan into the breadbasket of the Arab world by putting its vast interior under intensive cultivation, vast tracts of land in the western savannah where rainfed cultivation is possible were opened to mechanised farming . Equally vast areas were earmarked for ranching . The operators of these schemes were no ordinary farmers, but Sudanese businessmen and speculators, Arab potentates, multinational companies, and the size of their operations was immense . The Kenana sugar scheme operated by Lonrho was billed as the largest of its kind in the world . Predictably, no investment was made to improve food production in the subsistence sector . Instead, the peasants in the west who practise shifting cultivation suffered loss of land to the commercial sector, as did the pastoralists who found their movements increasingly restricted by the interposition of enormous cultivated areas . The results of this strategy of development were uniformly disappointing . Soil fertility in the savannah was

Capital & Class

20 rapidly exhausted by what was dubbed `strip farming', practised by speculators who sought to get as much as they could out of the land without putting anything back . Overall production increased only marginally, despite the great expansion in the area cultivated . With population increasing more rapidly, output per capita fell, production of food fell short of demand, and expensive imports of cereals became a fixed item in the Sudan's list of imports . Thus, instead of becoming the region's breadbasket, the Sudan lost the capacity to feed itself, and the livelihood of its peasants and pastoralists was placed in jeopardy . When drought struck in the early 1980s, many of them perished . The latest scourge did not strike suddenly . It had a gradual development that began in the late 1970s in the same blighted region of the northern Ethiopian highlands, before the people had a chance to recover from the previous famine . Pastoralists had had no time to rebuild their herds and peasants were short of oxen . Wollo had the first shortfall of rain in 1977, and from there drought spread to Tigrai and other provinces . Millions of people were declared at risk by the Ethiopian Famine Relief and Rehabilitation Commission in 1979 . When the rains failed completely in Tigrai and Wollo in 1981 and 1982, famine claimed the region, starving peasants began trekking to other areas, and the first refugees appeared in the Sudan . Drought and famine soon spread to Eritrea, Harar, Ogaden and parts of southern Ethiopia . By 1984, ten of the country's fourteen provinces were affected, and one third of its population faced starvation . The country's rulers made no attempt to conceal the magnitude of the disaster . On the contrary, the Ethiopian Famine Relief Commission monitored its progress closely and reported to the world in order

to solicit aid . World response was sluggish initially and valuable time was lost . When greater response was stimulated by graphic reportage of infernal scenes in the first refugee camps, foreign aid began to arrive by ship in Assab, whence it proceeded inland with lethal slowness . Available transport was grossly inadequate and quickly proved the main obstacle to relief operations . Relief eventually reached those who had managed to get to the camps set up on the main road . But Ethiopia has precious few roads, and countless others perished unseen and unknown . A macabre debate ensued over the percentage of the population classified as `unreachable' and left to its fate . While clamouring for assistance abroad, the Ethiopian regime itself did little to stem the tide of famine . It did not make famine relief a top domestic priority, and did not declare a national emergency or a mass mobilisation campaign, as it had often done in the past for various reasons . While the world was stunned by continuous illustrated reportage of human agony and death on a massive scale, the drama was handled sotto voce in Ethiopia . There was neither requisitioning nor rationing of food or fuel . When transport was clearly a matter of life and death, the regime neither requisitioned civilian vehicles, as it had done once to send the militia to Eritrea, or offered military transport for relief purposes . Solicitous of urban comfort, it did not restrict imports or assign them lower priority, and a boatful of whisky arrived on time for the celebration of the revolution's tenth anniversary . Several prestige construction projects were also completed on time for this event . After many months of intensive preparations and enormous expense, the regime celebrated the tenth anniversary of the revolution in September 1984, with an extravagence unimagined in the days of

The Politics of Famine Haile Selassie . This event was preceded tions that had no connections with the 21 by the holding of the founding congress of regime in Ethiopia chose this unorthodox the regime's political front, the Party of route . Others that did not, found themthe Working Peoples of Ethiopia, and the selves under attack, particularly in Tigrai hosting of the Organisation of African where the rebels kidnapped foreign relief Unity Heads of State meeting . Indeed, workers and killed Ethiopians working for 1984 was a banner year in the Ethiopian relief organisations . capital . Foreign visitors flocked to Addis With its opponents unwilling to comAbaba to be feted in grand style and to promise political imperatives, the regime applaud the self-praising rhetoric of the in Addis Ababa chose this time to implecountry's rulers . The regime's insouciance ment plans that obviously promoted, if was reflected in other quarters . The Uni- only indirectly, basic political objectives . versity of Addis Ababa hosted an inter- One of these was the resettlement of national conference in November 1984, people from the stricken regions in the foreign dignitatires coming to visit the north to other areas of the country, mainly famished were greeted by slogan-chanting -in the south . Its agents used various means flocks of well-fed urban schoolchildren to to persuade unwilling peasants to abandon prove that not everyone was starving, partheir homes, including the threat to cut off ades and ceremonial dinners were the order relief and other forms of intimidation . of the day, while the Four Horsemen of the Tigrai was the focus of this effort, and the Apocalypse ravaged the countryside . Tigrai Peoples Liberation Front saw it as War remained the regime's top priority . an attempt to depopulate the province and It launched the biggest offensive yet against deprive it of support . Therefore, it felt the Eritrean nationalists in 1982 . This justified to take harsh measures, despite proved another failure and encouraged the the fact that they jeopardised relief operaEritreans to go on the offensive for the tions in its province . Another scheme purfirst time since 1978 . The rebels in neigh- sued by the region was called 'villagisation' bouring Tigrai also strengthened their hold and involved the uprooting of peasants on that province and menaced government and pastoralists from their widely distransport on its way to Eritrea . Both pro- persed homesteads in order to cluster them vinces were hard hit by drought and famine in villages chosen by the authorities . The and the unfortunate inhabitants had to justification given was the impossibility of cross borders and battle-lines to find relief . providing relief and services to the people A major controversy arose over their under existing conditions . The region plight, with the rebels charging that the chosen to implement this scheme was the Ethiopian authorities were unwilling or Ogaden, Arsi and southern Bale, long the unable to help people in areas they conbattleground between Ethiopians, Somali trolled, and the Ethiopians claiming the and Oromo . Understandably, the Western rebels were obstructing relief operations . Somalia Liberation Front and others Many thousands from Eritrea and Tigrai recognised a familiar counter-insurgency crossed into the Sudan to crowd into hastily technique and vowed to obstruct it . The set up camps . Initially they did so with the pastoralists who mainly inhabit this region encouragement of the insurgents, who later have rallied to the various dissident changed their minds and insisted that movements opposing Ethiopian rule and foreign relief organisations deal directly suffered catastrophic losses as a result . The with them inside Ethiopia . Some organisaprocess of destruction was hastened by the

Capital & Class

22 drought that has plagued the lowlands intermittently for more than a decade . Thus, the pastoralist economy was disintegrating when famine came again in the early 1980s, and the lowlands of southeastern Ethiopia were depopulated as people fled across the border to Somalia . The regime and its opponents were fighting over what was becoming virtually a no man's land . The Sudan did not escape the latest visitation . In the middle of 1983, the Governor of Darfur in the west sounded the alarm with a report to Khartoum citing the approach of famine after several seasons of inadequate rainfall . He warned that drought had also affected areas to the south of Darfur, where the Fur moved in times of need . The report was ignored and, when he persisted, the Governor was threatened and forced to flee abroad . The Sudanese economy was in a parlous state, and the Nimeiry regime was tottering after fifteen years of rule distinguished for its political opportunism . The refugee population huddled in the eastern Sudan now reached millions, mainly Eritreans and Tigrai. While world attention focused on their plight, the appearance of similar conditions among the people of Darfur and the Beja in the east went unnoticed . It was not until the end of 1984 when, having trekked from their distant homeland, starving Westerners crowded the outskirts of Omdurman, and the Beja, whose herds had been wiped out, appeared in the camps set up for refugees from Ethiopia that awareness of the disaster dawned . The regime in Khartoum was now distracted by the resurgence of the rebellion in the southern Sudan and the launching of a series of political strikes in the North that were to lead to its downfall . Its reaction to the famine was embarrassment and concern to minimise the political impact . Instead of providing relief to the

faminished Westerners, it ordered them to return to their homeland to await relief there . Given the sorry state of the railway and the absence of roads, this would be a long wait indeed, and they refused to comply . Soldiers were sent then to load them forcibly on lorries which took them to Darfur . Subsequently, the regime did little more than facilitate the work of foreign relief agencies . Following its overthrow in April 1985, its succesor showed scarcely more initiative in this matter, though it did provide Sudanese transport companies with a financial windfall when it agreed with the demand of foreign donors to assign private business the task of transporting relief supplies to the stricken regions . When Ramadan came, the regime did not hesitate to divert transport from famine relief in order to provide the inhabitants of Khartoum with ample supplies of sugar for the occasion . Moreover, the civilian cabinet felt free to announce this initiative to the public . The many-sided political struggle in the Horn of Africa is fought in the name of nationalism overlaid with socialism, but neither of these addresses the most profound contradiction inherent in these societies : namely, the abyss separating the rural world of subsistence producers from the modern sector with its urban core . The depths of this chasm were not plumbed until famine took their measure . No battle is fought along this dividing line . It was lost some time ago when rural society with its traditional economy was left to fend for itself in a situation of expanding population and shrinking resources . The indifference of townspeople and the callousness of rulers during the famine provided a measure of the peasant's social isolation and political impotence . This situation is not an exaggerated form of the peasant predicament



The Politics of Famine everywhere . Peasants elsewhere have some economic leverage because they produce for urban consumption and for export . Subsistence producers in the Horn of Africa can barely feed themselves, and the result of their productive efforts figures only notionally in official economic calculations . This means that the collapse of production in this sector has no direct economic impact elsewhere, and explains

why the regimes in the countries con- 23 cerned do not feel compelled to take drastic measures . Nor do they need worry about political consequences, since their power derives from modern military and administrative resources against which the peasantry has no possible recourse . Even the spectre of a jacquerie does not arise to give the rulers pause, because ethnic divisions fragment peasant ranks .

A new book on the economics of imperialism and its political consequences The book examines the theory of Unequal Exchange, which was put forward by Arghiri Emmanuel in the beginning of the seventies . But not only this the book adds concrete figures to the theory, which estimates that the exploitation, via unequal exchange, yearly transfers value corresponding to hundreds of billions of US dollars. But, first and foremost, the book dares to draw the political conclusions which stem from the imperialism of trade. It shows how the relatively privileged economic position of the working classes In Western Europe and North America has affected their attitude towards the anti-imperialist struggle in the third world. "UNEQUAL EXCHANGE AND THE PROSPECTS OF SOCIALISM represents a very strong presentation of the political implications of the theory of unequal exchange for the left forces in the core/imperialist countries . While I do not share the conclusions in many ways, I believe these are questions which could benefit from fuller discussion. While there are many works already on unequal exchange, its defenders tend to discuss largely its economic functioning, and its detractors its political implications . Your book has the singular virtue of arguing both the economic and political Issues." Immanuel Wallerstein. Please send me copies of Unequal Exchange and the Prospects of Socialism at 10 US$. Allow for post and packaging 3 US$. I enclose a cheque for made payable to MANIFEST PRESS. Payment with order please . MANIFEST PRESS, Landskronagade 2, DK-2100 Copenhagen 0 , Denmark .

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24

Most of the great debates about contemporary Africa take place on the pages of The Review of African Political Economy . Now in its 1 3th year, recent issues have included topics such as Women, Oppression & Liberation, War & Famine, Conflict in the Horn of Africa, Resistance & Resettlement in Southern Africa. Start your Subscription with no . 36, The Health Issue and get 3 back issues FREE (numbers 9 - 26) !

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25

Vincenzo Ruggiero

Turin Today : Premodern society or postindustrial bazaar?

• MANY COMMENTATORS believe that the Turin industrial complex is no longer the `development sector' which for years pulled the Italian economy along behind it . Instead it is seen as a `disaster area' potentially capable of desolating the entire national economy . Local government, trade unions and journalists constantly cite and emphasise the statistics of the crisis in Turin and use them as an argument for the necessity of austerity policies . In recent years, the metropolitan area of Turin has witnessed a radical transformation. Seventy thousand people have been made redundant by local factories . There has been a 27% increase in the number of unemployed who have never had a job . In the whole region of Piedmont there are approximately 25,000 people earning less than 600,000 lire a month (approximately £250) and therefore living below the poverty line .' But very few commentators have assessed this data in the context of information on changes in productivity and the performance of firms in the Turin area . Yet this information suggests strongly that, despite the unprecedented transformation of the labour market, there is no crisis of production or profit standstill in the major factories . 2 It is curious that many official policies ignore the fact that economic recovery is already under way and set up new recovery projects, assuming a natural and automatic connection between economic growth and increasing employment . In view of the existing pattern of economic recovery

At a time when unemployment is a key political issue, but is still generally presented in aggregate quantitative terms (regional or national), it is important to analyse the impact of the crisis in its qualitative and sectoral dimensions - in the workings of the labour market itself. This may be better approached in a comparative perspective . This article looks at the current transformation of the labour market and class composition in a major European industrial centre Turin, the classic industrial city for Gramsci and the centre of industrial growth in Italy throughout the postwar period . What has changed in social terms? What do these changes mean for the notion of a homogeneous `industrial working class'? It is hoped that this type of exploratory study will provoke parallel studies for the UK and elsewhere .

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26

alongside increasing unemployment such projects are actually useless . Yet this is the policy of the Communist Party (Pci) which is the leading political party in Piedmont . The Pci leadership, at its conferences, in its regional economic programmes and in its periodicals lays claim to being the sole party of the Italian working class . They argue that, in view of contemporary changes in the nature of labour and the product (with information technology and robotisation), the defmition of the characteristics of the industrial worker have to be revised . The nature of industrial production is undergoing radical changes, following the example of the automobile sector, and new criteria of efficiency and competition negd to be defined and harnessed . The Pci leadership argues that, as a result, the industrial crisis can only be overcome by the unification of all the `healthy productive energies' of the country within a development pact . This new formula, which seems to owe more to Calvinist austerity than socialism, describes a process that is already underway in society . The Pci appear to be willing to give the process both a new rhetorical dressing and to provide it with an institutional legitimacy . This `social alliance' among producers proceeds in parallel with the decomposition and segmentation of the labour market . The development pact in practice operates by differentiating the workforce, coopting some, pinning down some, converting some and expelling others from the labour market . The overall picture is one of a number of different labour forces inhabiting more and more distant cultural and political domains, without any realistic opportunities to link with, move between or create social relationships with, other segments of the labour market . Therefore we have to examine separately the different sectors of the labour market and avoid the use of all-inclusive categories such as the working class . The complexities of the society do not permit such short cuts .

The `expelled'

In Turin there have been frequent demonstrations and rallies organised by those workers who were `temporarily expelled' by Fiat from the early 1980s . These workers were made redundant, in theory temporarily . Under the legal provisions of the Cassa Integrazione they are entitled to have 90% of their former wages paid to them by the state during their redundancy . In practice, most workers realise that such lay-offs are the first step towards unemployment . In fact, if they refuse alternative job offers often in inaccessible areas of Piedmont - they can be taken off the register and lose the right to any payment at all . One of these rallies was organised by disabled and handi-

Turin today

capped workers who had previously been hired in large numbers by Fiat as a result of specific laws permitting them better access to the labour market . They were the first to be laid-off and during the rally, some of them showed such self-irony as describing themselves as a sort of modern version of the medieval `court of miracles' (a kind of beggars and vagabonds parliament) . The criteria adopted by Fiat in selecting workers for redundancy was to select not only on the basis of political and moral discipline, but also on professional and physical efficiency . A change in the law helped them by enabling them to include in their required quota of disabled workers those workers who had sustained industrial injuries while already working in the factory . Despite the so-called `rotation agreement' which established a nondiscriminatory rota for redundancies, the disabled were deliberately selected for victimisation in the first round of redundancies . Their physical problems are compounded by their weak political organisation and they seem destined to see their place in the labour market wither away and come to a definite end . Among the unemployed and laid-off, each sector has its own different goals and timing for its forms of protest . To each sector of the unemployed its own demonstration! Among physically able redundant workers, the unions have concentrated on several objectives . The most prominent is the demand to scrap new legal regulations which permit fresh hiring, by-passing agreements previously made with local employment exchanges, based on a seniority points system . The new rules enable employers to avoid giving any commitment to newly hired workers in terms of the duration or location of their employment . The union organisers, in their slogans and public statements, call for the unity of laid-off workers with both the employed and the unemployed . But this is rather paradoxical in view of the unions' strong bias towards the sector of skilled workers, and the particular use they make of skills in their industrial negotiations . 90% of the laid-off workers come from the least skilled sectors, and, slogans apart, their material aims have little in common with the skilled workers . There is evidence that the recruitment practices of employers aim at the creation of an `employed hard core' of industrial workers, thus both deskilling other sectors of the working class and weakening them politically . Among the groups which suffer most from this process are those who have little tradition of factory discipline or industrial culture . This is the case with the female workforce which used to be 15 % of the Fiat workforce and is now one-third of the laid-off workers in Turin . It is also the case with the ten thousand youths who were taken on by Fiat during 1978-79 as a result of an unforseen level of demand . Since

27

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this brief episode none of these youths have had the opportunity to establish themselves as career industrial workers . This is hardly surprising if one recalls the circumstances of their first engagement with the industrial world . According to some commentators, the young workers treated the noisy factory like the idyllic alleys of Amsterdam, where they could spend an exciting holiday, smoke dope and discover the joys of sex . They had no notion of hierarchical command and their disaffection materialised in violence against foremen and machines . 3 The new non-industrial firms

These expelled workers - disabled, women and youth - seem destined to constitute a new industrial reserve army . For an indefinite period, their presence may well displace other groups of formerly unemployed still further away from factory work . Those of the previous reserve army who formerly aspired to industrial work at some time in the future now see the prospect of such work receding still further . It is not easy to follow the paths of this `new reserve army' . To do so requires some preliminary remarks on the response of the regional and local institutional structures to laid-off, fired, voluntarily retired and recently unemployed workers . The local authorities have attempted to involve them in so-called `socially useful projects' . These schemes may be seen as artificial attempts to maintain work discipline and productive attitudes . For example, there is one proposal to employ a group of redundant workers on schemes of gardening in public parks-of which there are very few in Turin . In another case, workers laid off by Fiat who used to be employed at the Mirafiori plant were encouraged to build, along with local Catholics, a new church in the Mirafiori district of the town . The authorities are intervening to attempt to avert the withering away of a `productive culture' within the workforce . In recent statistics there has been an unprecedented increase in the numbers of craftsmen and self-employed workers . In the Turin area, 3,000 new small business units have been set up in the field of commercial and service activities . Many former factory workers are now shopkeepers . Many other have joined craft/ artisan production or distribution co-operatives . 4 One of the most well-known of these co-operatives is made up of 400 former Fiat workers making jams and marmalades, and is often cited by official commentators as an example for all the new unemployed . In the words of one journalist, they try `to remove the bitterness left by inactivity by producing and selling sweets' . 5 Very few of the new firms are connected with the mainstream of industrial production in Turin . There are only a few exceptions . One is the small groups which offer consultancy,

Turin today 29

financial and data services . But these activities are based on recently qualified new employees from the so-called `advanced tertiary sector' and do not employ the former industrial workers from the factories . 6 Another exception is the workshops set up by former Fiat employees who agreed to leave the factory enticed by severance payments . These workers got enough money to open up small industrial activities linked to the mother firm . They receive production orders from Fiat, which often also provides them with material aid . These workshops symbolise a sort of ideal continuity of the old industrial characteristics of Turin which many would like to see . They keep alive the old industrial culture of production, yet in order to survive and compete they are forced, for instance, to hire workers `off the books', to pay low wages and to keep one foot in the `black economy' . Only those firms who are most competitive in cutting costs (both in fixed capital outlay and in wages) can maintain any connection with the major industrial circuit of production . Thus the `small entrepreneurial' working class ends up in practice falling into those productive areas defined in Italy as an informal, parallel and underground economy .

There is still a predominant bias among Italian Marxists and development economists that traditional forms of production and the `submerged economy' are obsolete 'pre-modern' relics of the past . If we maintain that new technology will constantly displace traditional labour processes and that the extraction of relative surplus value will progressively erode the extraction of absolute surplus value, then the existence of extremely different modes of production within the same system appears paradoxical . The Turinese case, however, contradicts such assumptions . The complex interrelationship of small units of production with large factories is so extensive that it is fundamental to industrial development as a whole . The big units are more and more dependent on the small, which often operate in conditions of semi-legality . The small firms manufacture components on a subcontract basis with low costs and a high level of efficiency . 7 This structure of production appears to have made a very significant contribution to the recent `Italian economic miracle', and is likely to stand as an example for other industrial countries . But the evolution of the informal economy can also follow another path . It is already the case that many small or middle-sized firms, in search of increased efficiency, helped by large firms and encouraged by the large demand which they make available, become highly competitive and move into independent sectors of the market . In fact, some firms in the submerged economy are

The informal economy

Capital & Class

thus able to weaken the dominance of the bigger firms . 8 The analysis of class composition in Italy has yet to adjust to, these changes . Turin has always been described, in Gramscian terms, as a town with `rational and integrated demographic composition', where each single productive unit flows into the mainstream of the industrial process . 9 Even the distinction between the central cycle and the peripheral cycle of production was never regarded as sufficient to contradict this analysis . It was recognised that much production was decentralised into a widespread network of smaller factories and units, where a number of workers without proper contracts provided sweated labour . This parallel economy was the natural occupational alternative for the industrial workers removed from the central cycle . The parallel economy also offered opportunities of employment to young workers who never had any industrial work experience, or even had any chance to work at all . In the past, young workers could `taste' industrial culture even though only temporarily . This mobility between different sectors of the working class, even if it amounted only to an oscillation between the central and peripheral cycle of industrial production, assured a high degree of cultural homogeneity . One could therefore talk of a Gramscian whollyindustrial proletariat . 10 However, this supposition was often used to avoid coming to terms with a new situation in which the social and productive subjects were becoming increasingly differentiated . The cultural homogeneity attributed to them, although far-fetched, was the only available device to establish a common political programme . If one examines the other tendencies operating in the labour market one has to reject this monolithic supposition .

30

The niche of industrial work

Recent research shows that the majority of workers employed in the parallel economy consist of people already employed in industrial jobs . The industrial activities of the periphery offer a second job for workers in the centre . Having a second job has always been a characteristic of the industrial working class in Turin . 11 It is a deep-rooted tradition for Fiat workers to devote two or three hours per day, in another workplace, to manufacture components linked to Fiat production itself . What seems to be really new in the current scenario is what we can call the growing `enclosure' of the industrial labour market . Far from mobilising new productive forces, this labour market is becoming inaccessible to people who have not been through `cultural training' within it . The centre and periphery of industrial production are both occupied by workers of proved efficiency and discipline, so that the spheres of double-employment and unemployment do not over-

Turin today lap . As a consequence, eliminating double-employment would not abolish unemployment . The double-employed and the unemployed are in competition only in a statistical sense . Those who have been, or still are, in industrial jobs and who have proved their political and professional reliability are likely to be assigned a second industrial job in which they will offer the same guarantees . These selection criteria for the industrial labour force will tend to eliminate the old-style definition of the worker who used to move in and out of the industrial labour market and, occasionally, take non-factory jobs . The resilience of the Turinese working class, much acclaimed in the recent past, has in fact been concerned primarily with the material and political aspects of the industrial workers' existence . Meanwhile, the mobility of individual workers permitted social interchange and a swift circulation of cultural models within the wider working class . Nowadays this process is no longer observable . The current trend is towards the predominance of the industrial career worker, capable of establishing a steady disciplinary relationship with the industrial world and undergoing continuing training. This hard core minority seems destined to consolidate its position in the industrial fortress, leading a separate existence, and to create its own social and cultural niche . About 15% of the double-employed get their second job in middle-sized factories and the remainder in workshops with less than 15 workers . 12 In this way, those who have an industrial job tend to monopolise all the ancillary activities linked with industrial production . Their total work day produces an individualistic behaviour in line with this rigid economic compartmentalisation . There is a tendency to revert to such traditional notions as `free individual bargaining', selling labour power as a pure productive entity, beneft of any social connection and without the historical traditions that give the workforce a collective identity . Recent research conducted by the Istituto Gramsci del Piemonte (the regional research institute of the Pct) revealed the following cultural attitudes among Fiat workers . Of a large sample group interviewed, only the most skilled workers supported the Gramscian principle of `hegemony' and believed in the consequent political programme . Meanwhile 75% of the sample remarked that their main concern was crime and the state's inadequacies in combatting it . The same percentage stressed that terrorism is the leading Italian problem and regarded West Germany as a model of freedom and democracy . West Germany was also taken as an example of successful co-operation among workers and entrepreneurs, who should share the profits . 13 It is safe to assume that the double-employed identify totally

31

Capital & Class

with these sorts of opinions, particularly because of their material pattern of life, alternating work 'and sleep, relieved only by vacant watching of Tv and the odd Sunday afternoon outing. This existence imposes a specific family model - the father as the only bread-winner, the children as private school students (seen as an investment for the future), and the mother apparently unemployed but in fact working to provide the essential services for the family . 14 These career industrial workers are the ideal constituency for the development pact cherished by the Communist Party and regarded by many as the most realistic path for future industrial society . These workers, also including the most highly skilled bracket of the industrial working class, are pushing the trade unions towards forms of co-operative alliance with supervisory and staff grades in the same industry who are currently in the process of unionisation for the first time .' 5 As a result, we can forsee trade unions made up solely of the more professionalised and stably employed blue-collar and white-collar workers . It is interesting to note that the project for an International Labour Agency (SEDOC) which is intended to notify labour vacancies at an EEC level, refers exclusively to the more professional career workers . This too, if implemented, would lead to greater geographical mobility but also to a more rigid separation between sectors of the labour force .

32

The postindustrial bazaar

The failure of the alliance between employed and laid-off or sacked workers is therefore not surprising . The first group seem to have attained a privileged position in the industrial labour market : the second group has become the contemporary reserve army driven into non-industrial occupations . Hence the failure of the so-called `solidarity contracts' suggested by the unions, consisting of work-sharing among those made redundant and an equal distribution of wages among employed and sacked workers . This proposal seems courageous, but is also populistic and out of step with the real situation . It is an attempt at an ideological recomposition of the working class ; yet an effective social recomposition has become almost impossible . This proposal has been rejected by the employed workers who are prepared to defend their existing position in the labour market and who implicitly share the selection criteria of their employers . Industrial disputes involving both the employed and the laid-off seem inconceivable, let alone struggles uniting these groups with the unemployed who have never had industrial experience . The unemployed present a new problem in Turin . The town of `rational demographic composition' has never known such a

Turin today

tense situation among the official non-workers . There are 60,000 registered unemployed and the city job centre has recently been moved from a local cinema to a huge basketball stadium, where each Monday the people on the waiting list are informed of the official vacancies . Many unemployed do not attend these weekly parades and prefer to seek work on the unofficial labour market .' 6 Never before have as many as 6,000 people applied for 60 jobs as street cleaners, ready to submit themselves to theoretical and practical tests . Nor has the town ever witnessed so many demonstrations of unemployed workers accompanied by violent police interventions, and arrests followed by summary trials and sentences . Demands have been put forward for a `guaranteed income' for everybody, something that has never previously been considered by the employed and organised working class ." In a recent meeting of thousands of unemployed it was stated : `The government, in alliance with the trade unions, continues to be interested only in people who work, and even while an increase in child benefits for the official and steady worker is under consideration they reject completely any idea of benefits for the unemployed' .' 8 Work seems to be a sort of credit card that allows people not only to have a salary, but also to get a second salary and finally to have consequent privileges within the sphere of social reproduction . The `easy solution' would be to fit the unemployed into Marx's category of `relative over-population' which `is included in the active work army, but is employed in absolutely irregular activities and lives below the average conditions of the working class' . 19 It might also be instructive to apply the definition of Jeremy Bentham who, with his typical obsession for classification, lists the unemployed as follows : those who have recently lost their jobs because of industrial stagnation ; those victims of periodic stagnation ; those made superfluous by the introduction of new machinery ; and finally the outcasts . 20 In this perspective, this last category might increase in proportion to the other categories reducing their overall importance . In other western cities the divisions in the labour market are similar, mainly characterised by a division between industrial workers (mainly indigenous) and itinerant workers (mainly immigrants) who are employed in the worst jobs . This division is often based on racial discrimination, but in Turin there is a non-racial apartheid, based on generational and social factors . There are about 30,000 unregistered Third World workers in Turin - a figure that is ludicrously small in relation to the proportions present in places like Paris or London - yet these workers have to be added to the other indigenous workers who inhabit the precarious `city bazaar' . Regarded as a paradoxical cic 31-c

33

Capital & Class

survival in an industrial town, this bazaar consists of occasional services, domestic work, extempore artisan activities, street sales, and small-scale production by unofficial and individual firms . This seems to be the only realistic oportunity for people who are excluded from steady jobs . A steady job implies not only a regular income but also provides the social status necessary to find other sources of income . On the other hand, the city bazaar creates a vicious circle of cumulative disadvantages . For example, low wages mean less expenditure on health (which is now considered to be a prohibitively expensive comodity) . Declining health means lower productivity and exclusion from better paid jobs, with the corollary of still smaller wages etc . 21 The inhabitants of the bazaar exchange items and values completely different from those circulating in the official market . The bazaar stimulates individual initiative and competitiveness to generate income : if you do not have a job, create one for yourself. At the same time, the distinction between elementary subsistence and illegal activities is increasingly blurred . There is a visible predominance of `passive' crimes such as male and female prostitution, occasional drug sales, clandestine gambling and any sort of crimes with no victims except their authors . 22

34

Concluding remarks

It is not easy to develop a political strategy to unite all the social sectors which have been described . There may, however, be some optimistic elements to the picture . Turin, with its high immigration rate, is a'Southern' town, where industrial discipline has always met resistance . The preceding discussion has attempted to reply to those left-wing militants whose theory and practice starts from the unquestioning assumption of `the centrality of the working class' . As I have shown, paradoxically, the working class occupies an eccentric position in relation to mainstream industrial production . Nevertheless, the blanket term `working class' continues to be used in official labour ideology as a universal semantic cover-all, embracing very different social subjects and distinct cultures and communities . Highly disparate people, contrary to any materialist analysis of class composition, are lumped together on the basis of a purely ideological definition of unity . This is the approach not only of the militant and independent left, but also of the parliamentary parties . The former is obviously concerned about the segmentation of society that makes a revolutionary unifying strategy very problematic . As for the institutional parties, they fear that such a highly segmented society might sooner or later reject the rules of political representation and instead choose elusive and autonomous paths . In this case, the political system as a whole could act as a `shadow theatre', with

Turin today

the real conflicts being worked out elsewhere, namely in the segmented society itself . This would leave the political system as an empty apparatus with little legitimate existence . 23 Returning to the social situation, the unemployment figures have recently been increasing steadily, from 8% in 1981 to 12% in 1985 . Simultaneously, the percentage of workers employed in small factories of less than 50 workers has increased from 20 to 30% of the industrial labour force, while the overall size of the industrial labour force has decreased by 10% . 24 These official data should of course be considered in the light of the extensive black economy of unofficial employment . The decentralisation of production is far from being accomplished and is bound up with the financial reorganisation of Turin's major firm, Fiat . Fiat has abandoned the rigid hierarchical model, splitting up the decision-making apparatus into twelve divisions, each confined to a specific field of production . Marketing, sales and administration are now independent sectors and the management of the labour force has also been decentralised to local units, making it easier to control . 25 The creation of such sub-units is consistent with the division of the working class which I have described . It is true that Fiat has recently called back to work a few hundred workers who were previously made redundant, but, as recent research shows, these workers were only a tiny minority who had never totally abandoned the industrial labour market . 26 They were never offered early retirement or severance payments and remained within the trade union structure, thereby keeping in touch with the industrial world . These workers were consequently regarded as trustworthy, as if still being part of the union was a guarantee of loyalty . In the current situation, after the turmoil of recent years, the threat of unemployment or underemployment are sufficiently strong deterrents to control those who are taken back again into the factory . Moreover, the increasing number of laid-off workers who apply for psychiatric therapy is an even more weird deterrent and promotes endurance and discipline . 27 Other signifant data concern the growth of employment in non-industrial activities. In 1985, for the first time, they outnumbered the industrial workers : 368,000 compared to 305,000 . Small retailing activities increased by 5% in 1981-85, thus bringing the figure for commercial workers to 21 % of all employment . 28 These data confirm the division of the labour market into segmented niches, but further comment is required on the new social disciplinary model . The previous integrated industrial society was based on a 'panoptic rationality', where social control was enforced by centralised decision-making apparatuses . The new situation is one of a `rationality of dispersion' based on a

35

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36

visible recovery of traditional market elements . This development, at the social level produces de-solidarised behaviour, but at the entrepreneurial level it gives strength to all the primitive forces of accumulation . These forces often break out of their traditional normative bounds, and we find for instance, illegal means of capitalisation that are no longer confined to traditional mafia strongholds, but arelikely to spread wherever the notion of `enterprise freedom' is strongly emphasised . 29 In this framework we can locate the recent episodes of corruption, industrial fraud and corporate crime that had never previously occurred in Turin . On this point, it would be an interesting subject for further work, to verify the hypothesis of Foucault that law is a summary of illegalities that, after periods of transition, take the form of a new legality . 30 At the moment we can only speculate on the sort of industrial legislation that may be enacted . Even among the industrial working class episodes of subtle corruption occur . Those who are employed in industrial work have a good chance of getting a second job in other industrial activities . At first sight this appears to be some sort of social privilege, but more illegal aspects become apparent when we consider that the main sources of information on the availability of work and the main channels of recruitment are the trade unions and the political parties . 31 Trade union and/or political party membership often allows one to bypass the official job centres . In this context, even the struggle for the reduction of the working day could result merely in more spare time for the employed workers to spend on their second job and hence in no way help to resolve the unemployment problem . Sadly enough, the unemployed themselves sometimes participate in this struggle of omnia contra omnia . For example, as the Italian system of social security and unemployment benefit is very limited and arbitrary, it is very hard to find out who is entitled to claim . From this arises the paradoxical situation of people who work in unregistered activities being able to claim as unemployed, whilst others who are not able to hide their minimal income or savings may be disbarred from benefits . Something similar happened recently when the Turin municipality set up paid training courses for so-called 'zero-income' families . Talking to people who attended these courses, one hears everybody saying that their fellow trainees in fact have an income and that the real 'zero-income' people have been excluded . This example points to the following conclusion . Italian relief policies have no de facto economic value, but have a more political function in defusing widespread discontent and acting as sheer political propaganda . In fact is is the hidden and quasilegal side of the economy which in fact provides the lowest strata



Turin today

of the labour market with the basic means of reproduction . And this economic opportunity is linked with a peculiar attitude towards illegality . Political corruption and corporate illegality are widely tolerated even by the lower classes insofar as they themselves feel the need for illegalities in order to survive in their own lives . Although the social and material damage of the two illegalities is absolutely incomparable, the whole illegal pattern is often accepted as an inevitable way to assure income opportunities for everyone . We have in this case homogeneous attitudes despite heterogeneous material conditions . The same could be said in reply to recent contributions that try to reaffirm the centrality of industry in the Turin labour market . 32 The paradox of Turin could be defined as the centrality of production despite the eccentricity of the producers . In other words, industrial production is not central to the material life of the town, but industrial principles are . In practice these principles are widely emulated, and the whole society conforms to them and resembles a global firm . Here we are dealing with the symbolic, but not the material, centrality of industry . Unlike other countries where government policies have been so incautious as to produce uniformity of discontent and homogeneity of hardship, Italy seems to have succeeded by introducing differentiation policies . An unprecedented social stability has been created, despite large inequalities . Many wonder how long it will last .

1. These and other data are taken from the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) and from the local government report Osservatorio Regionale sul Mercato del Lavoro, Regione Piemonte, 1985 . 2. See the supplement devoted to Fiat by the daily newspaper II Manifesto: Fiat: Ombelico d'Italia, December 1986 . 3. On these episodes see Belforte, S . & Ciatti, M . (1982) Il Fondo del Barile, Milano . 4. An interesting article on this matter was published in the fortnightly Turin journal Cittd, 27 November 1986. 5. From the daily newspaper of Turin, owned by Fiat capital, La Stampa, 23 October 1985 . 6. This information is from Lettera de Tecnocity, periodical edited by 'Fondazione Agnelli', Torino . 7. The literature on the parallel economy in Italy is vast . For a good bibliography see Economia Informale . Conflitti Sociali e Futuro delle Societd Industriali, special issue of Inchiesta, January-June 1983 . 8. This is also the opinion of one of the leading sociologists of Turin University, Luciano Gallino, who is also a frequent contributor to La Stampa .

37

Notes



Capital & Class 38

9. Apparently this view is still shared by all trditional left parties and groups, including the PCi and even the Red Brigades . 10 . This was a common assumption during the 1970s, due perhaps to the successful definition given by Antonio Negri : 'operaio sociale' . 11 . Gallino, L . (1985)11 Lavoro a it Suo Doppio, Bologna. 12 . Data from above mentioned ISTAT. 13 . This research was published in the trade union journal Rassegna Sindicale, March 1985 . 14 . Gallino, L ., op . cit . 15 . The workers' pressure is probably due to the strength showed by the middle classes of Turin, which often organised marches and rallies to support their interests . Their objectives, such as a reduction of income taxes, may sometimes appear as objectives of general interest . 16 . On `apparent unemployment' and real underemployment, see Accornero, A . & Carmignani, F. (1986) I Paradossi della Disoccupazione, Bologna . 17 . The objective of a `guaranteed income disconnected from productivity' has been revived in a series of articles published by Il Manifesto. See for instance, Gorz, A . (1986) Chi non lovora mangerd . Separare it reddito dal salario, 10 December. 18 . Also reported in a leaflet produced by the unemployed organisation, Coordinamento Disoccupati di Torino . 19 . Marx, K. (1970)11 Capitale, Roma . 20 . My translation from Italian version of Bentham, J . (1957) Opere, Milano . 21 . On cumulative disadvantages see Sarpellon, G . (1984) Rapporto sulla Povertd in Italia, Milano . 22 . On petty crime as a work activity and `delinquents' as highly exploited workers, see Gallo, E . & Ruggiero, V . (1985) 'Il Crimine Presunto e it Delinquente Lavoratore' in Primo Maggio, Summer . 23 . This concern is often expressed in Mondoperaio, a periodical of the Socialist Party, now in government and the Prime Minister's party . 24 . Unione Italana delle Camere di Commercio, 1985 . 25 . See Bagnasco, A . (1986) Torino . Un Profilo Sociologico, Torino. 26 . In Cittd, op . cit . 27 . On psychiatric problems and even suicides committed by laid-off workers, see 'Cassa Integrazione e Disagio Psichico', Psichiatria/ Informazione, Torino 1984. 28 . ISTAT, Op . Cit . 29 . On this point see Ruggiero, V . (1985) `The encounter between big business and organised crime', in Capital & Class, No . 26, Summer . 30 . This concept is analysed in Deleuze, G . (1986) Foucault, Paris. 31 . Gallino, L ., Il Lavoro a it Suo Doppio, op . cit. 32 . This view has been recently reiterated in the successful book of Bagnasco, A ., Torino . Un Profilo Sociologico, op . cit .

39

Makoto Itoh Skilled Labour in Value Theory

• EVEN THOUGH Marx uncovered the social substance of value relations in general in terms of simple average labour throughout Capital, he was aware that the effect of human labour was determined not merely by technology, but also by different degrees of intensity and skill of the labour . For instance, just after defining values of commodities as crystallised human labour expanded to produce them, Marx states that the quantity of the 'value-forming substance', the labour, must be of an average or a socially necessary labour-time, and he continues as follows : `Socially necessary labour-time is the labour-time required to produce any use-value under the conditions of production normal for a given society and with the average degree of skill and intensity of labour prevalent in that society' (p . 129) . In the context where this is stated in the first section in the first chapter of Capital, Marx seems to consider the conditions of production and the character of labour mainly in relation to the same kind of labour producing the same sort of use-value . In the case of producing the same kind of use-value, it is not difficult to compare and measure the degree of skill and intensity of labour under the same conditions of production . We can easily assume that the labour time of skilful workers is reduced to a certain amount of the socially necessary labour time by comparing the resultant quantity of products . Moreover, the mechanised factory system of capitalist production generally homogenises the efficiency of labour under the same conditions of production, making the instruments of labour the main deter-

This paper reviews various treatments of the skilled labour problem in value theory . It argues that skilled workers' own labour embodies the same amount of labour substance of value as do unskilled workers in a unit of labour time . This is an egalitarian view which impacts on a number of debates . Some of these ramifications are illustrated with discussions of international trade and unequal exchange, socialism and inequality, and the reproduction of labour power under different arrangements for funding the costs of education and training .

Capital & Class

40

minants of productivity . The difference in objective conditions of production, rather than in workers' ability, tends to be the decisive influence on productivity for the same sort of product . The determination of representative technical conditions of production for each kind of commodity can here be left to one side, and analysed separately in the theory of market value or market prices of production as I have discussed elsewhere .' Therefore, let us presently assume representative conditions of production and average intensity and skillfulness for each kind of labour producing the same sort of use-value . However, the problem of the degree of skill and intensity of labour cannot conceptually be confined to the same kind of labour . Marx refers to complex labour in contrast with simple average labour, when he compares different kinds of useful labour . Complex labour can be regarded as expenditure of labourpower of skilled workers better trained or educated than the average unskilled or simple workers . It is certainly difficult, or rather impossible, physically to compare and measure the different degrees of skill and intensity of different kinds of useful labour, since the resultant different use-values are not directly commensurable . So long as Marx discusses the substance of value in a simple commodity exchange, the social mechanism by which capitalism treats the great majority of labour as interchangeable simple labour cannot yet be logically presented . A mere commodity-exchange relation, unlike a capitalist economy, cannot provide the social ground to make simple unskilled labour the common general substance of value relations . Thus, Marx's explication of reducing complex into simple labour in the first chapter of Capital lacks an actual and unambiguous social basis and is really problematic : `More complex labour counts only as intensified, or rather multiplied simple labour, so that a smaller quantity of complex labour is considered equal to a larger quantity of simple labour . Experience shows that this reduction is constantly being made . A commodity may be the outcome of the most complicated labour, but through its value it is posited as equal to the product of simple labour, hence it represents only a specific quantity of simple labour . The various proportions in which different kinds of labour are reduced to simple labour as their unit of measurement are established by a social process that goes on behind the backs of the producers ; these proportions therefore appear to the producers to have been handed down by tradition . In the interests of simplification, we shall henceforth view every form of labour-power directly as simple labour-power ; by

Skilled Labour

this we shall simply be saving ourselves the troubles of making the reduction' (p . 135) . What does `a social process that goes on behind the backs of the producers' mean? The process may well be interpreted in this context as the exchange relations in a market `behind the backs of the producers' . At least, Marx does not show how complex labour-time is socially measured as multiplied simple labourtime, apart from the reduction through commodity value which seems to imply that value in exchange here determines labour values rather than the reverse . From the viewpoint of vulgar economics, which resolves all economic problems into the determination of prices within a market, this point naturally appears a great failure in Marx's labour theory of value . BohmBawerk, the first major critic of Marx's value theory did not miss the point . Marx seems to define the measurement of labour-time here by the exchange-values given in the market, while he initially intended to explain the exchange-values from labour-time embodied in commodities . Does it not make a `circular explanation' j 2 Is there any other possible interpretation of Marx's treatment of complex skilled labour? Against Bohm's type of critique, most Marxian value theorists have attempted to show that complex labour can be reduced to multiplied simple labour by analysing the value of complex labour-power without referring to the role of the market . They usually cite and rely on Marx's statement in the section on `The Valorisation Process' in Chapter 7 of the first volume of Capital as follows : `All labour of a higher, or more complicated, character than average labour is expenditure of labour-power of a more costly kind, labour-power whose production has cost more time and labour than unskilled or simple labour-power, and which therefore has a higher value . This power being of higher value, it expresses itself in labour of a higher sort, and therefore becomes objectified, during an equal amount of time, in proportionally higher values . Whatever difference in skill there may be between the labour of a spinner and that of a jeweller, the portion of his labour by which the jeweller merely replaces the value of his own labour-power does not in any way differ in quality from the additional portion by which he creates surplus-value' (p . 305) . There seems to be little difficulty in accepting Marx's definition of the value of complex labour-power . It is defined as the amount of labour time which is necessary to produce this sort of labour-power, just like the volume of simple labour-power . The

41

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42

real problem lies in the relation between the value of complex labour-power and the value created by the expenditure of this labour-power . The second sentence quoted above, which begins with the phrase `This power being of higher value', can be interpeted variously . (1) If the phrase means `While this power is of higher value', but does not signify causality, the higher value objectified by the expenditure of this labour-power can still be interpreted as being determined by the exchange ratio in a market . Although this interpretation has been exceptional amongst Marxians, the Rubin school's tendency to accept it may coincide with Marx's own suggestion in the preceding quotation from the second section of the first chapter of Capital . However, in opposition to Bohm's type of critique, most Marxians have interpreted the phrase differently, and maintained that the higher value of complex labour-power is causally related with the higher value created by that labour-power . (2) As a formal interpretation of the sentences quoted above, a higher sort of skilled labour can be regarded as being able somehow to create higher values in proportion to its value . For example, E . Bernstein asserted such an interpretation . 3 This view apparently allows the theoretically convenient assumption that the rates of surplus-value (S'i = Si/Vi) are equal across different kinds of complex labour . However, this view contradicts Marx's basic theory, because Marx strongly demonstrated that the use-value of labour-power to be realised in the labour-time expended in a day, and the value substance of labour-power as the necessary labour-time to reproduce labour-power for a day, are determined independently . In view of this basic position, we cannot mechanically assume a direct proportionality between the values and the value products, or an equal rate of surplus-value, as between various kinds of complex and simple labour . Therefore, Hilferding opposed both Bohm's critique and Bernstein's formulation, and suggested a third interpretation as follows . (3) According to Hilferding's interpretation, 4 complex labour mobilises and transfers a series of simple labour which were necessary to produce skilled labour-power . Just as ten batteries combined can generate ten times the electric power of a battery, a series or a combined set of necessary educational -and training labour is potentially stored in the character of the skilled worker and is transferred to the commodity products through his labour . So long as educational or training labour in the past, constitutes part of the value of complex labour-power, it is transferred to the commodity product without varying its amount just like the value of constant capital . Then, for a capitalist who employs skilled workers, surplus-value is to be extracted only from labour

Skilled Labour 43

newly expended by those workers . Therefore, even though skilled workers objectify greater quantities of labour in the commodity products during equal amounts of time, their rate of exploitation must be lower than in the case of simple labourers . This third interpretation seems most consistent with the technological determination of values in terms of labour-time, and has been regarded as a classic solution of the skilled labour problem . However, it could not be a final solution . In recent value controversy the problem has continued to be discussed from various angles .

In Hilferding's solution, the role of educational labour and that of the skilled worker's own labour were not very clearly distinguished. It was also ambiguous as to whether the skilled worker's own labour was to be regarded as simple common labour or not when it was separated from the educational labour stored in his ability . Further, it remained to be clarified how to decompose complex labour in the educational process into simple labour. N. Okishio, 5 and then B . Rowthorn 6 extended Hilferding's approach and gave it a more formal exposition . Let me abridge Rowthorn's exposition here, and begin with assuming n different commodities labelled 1, 2, . . ., n, and m+1 different types of labour labelled 0, 1, 2, . . . , m . Suppose that to produce one unit of commodity j requires l rj units of labour of each type r, and aij units of each commodity i . Then, if one unit of labour expended in an average lifetime of type r is equivalent to Or units unskilled labour, the value of one unit of commodity j is given by, aj = 14)r l rj + Xoiaij r 1

(1)

Since the terms l ri and aij are technically determined, there are n+m+1 unknowns (ai and (~r) in n equations . Let os be the amount of unskilled labour contained in one unit of skill of type s . It is in a sense assumed here, following Hilferding's point of view, that skill in the dead labour-power is producible by certain amount of abstract human labour, and thus accountable by units of unskilled labour. Then one unit of labour in an average lifetime of this type is equivalent to one unit of unskilled labour of the worker concerned plus units of unskilled labour embodied in his skills . Then,

c

4,=1+o

(2)

The recent technological analyses

Capital & Class

44

Suppose further that to produce one unit of skill of type s requires t* units of unskilled labour by the person being trained, plus 1 , units of labour of each type r, plus a*s units of each commodity i . Since each unit of labour of type r is equivalent to Or units of unskilled labour, and each unit of commodity i contains ai units of unskilled labour, o* can be given by, as = t*+

l1iai`s (3) r i From equations (2) and (3) we get, 2:Or's +

(l+ts) + D4)rl'rs + Xoia*s (4) r i We can assume in this economy that labour of type 0 is simple unskilled labour, which means, y~r =

(~o = 1

(5)

Taking (1), (4) and (5) together, we have now n+m+l equations, which under most conditions will be sufficient to determine both the values ai and the reduction coefficient `Yr . Clearly, this form of solution can define the substance of values independently from the wages and avoid the circular inconsistency. If we follow the same line of discussion, we can suppose that workers of type s perform (I+ e,) units of their own labour, as both employees and trainees, and receive a bundle of commodities (b l ,, b 2si . . ., b„,) for each unit of labour through wages . Then, against their own total labour (1+s), their paid labour equals (l+ts)Eoi b is . i The rate of surplus labour e s is calculated as follows : es

=

(l+ts)-(l+t*) Zoibis = 1-Xaibis (1+t*)Eaibis Eaibi s

(6)

Three points are noteworthy in this Okishio-Rowthorn type of formulation . First, skilled workers' own labour is clearly separated from educational labour by others and is treated as unskilled simple labour . This point is not particularly emphasised nor theoretically grounded by Okishio-Rowthorn . However, it is not only a technically key point but may also lead to an interesting insight as to the common character of human labour to which we shall soon come back . Second, skill in workers' ability is treated just like an objective

Skilled Labour

product of educational labour, and embodied labour in skill is regarded as being transferred to the products of skilled workers just as embodied labour in the means of production . This obscures, and may contradict, Marx's fundamental distinction between human labour-power and means of production in the valorisation process . In Marx, the substance of the value of labour-power, which is obtained and consumed by workers in a bundle of commodities to sustain their lives, is not transferred to the value of commodity products but always newly created and embodied in the products by newly expended labour time together with surplus-value, whereas the value of means of production is transferred to the products (cf. pp . 316-17) . This is basically why changes in wages or value of labour-power do not affect the amount of value-product or the substance of values of commodity products . In spite of their intention, Hilferding, Okishio and Rowthorne have somewhat clouded over the basic position of the Marxian theory of value . Third, in their treatment, the rate of surplus-value or that of exploitation must generally differ between simple and skilled workers, or among different kinds of complex workers . According to M . Morishima, as a result of the introduction of heterogeneous labour, this third point conflicts with Marx's law of the equalisation of the rate of exploitation and is not compatible with Marx's view of the polarisation of society into two classes . This anomaly is an important reason for Morishima to recommend `a Marxian economics without the labour theory of value' . 7 Opposing Morishima, S . Bowles and H . Gintis hold that the labour theory of value is perfectly compatible with the heterogeneity of labour . They also oppose the conventional Marxian way of reducing complex labour to simple labour, because they do not believe in the historical tendency of capitalism to homogenise all labour, and also because they want to have the conceptual tools of value theory to encompass the phenomenon of segmentation of workers . In their view, not simplification, but segmentation of workers has become increasingly important especially in the recent development of capitalist labour management . Therefore, Bowles and Gintis build an economic model containing heterogeneous labour or various types of skilled or complex labour, the wage bundles of the various types of wage labour, the matrix of input-output relationships among goods, and the matrix of direct labour inputs involved in their production . In this model, they show that the structure of value relations, including the vectors of rates of exploitation and the organic composition of capital, without being accounted by units of simple labour, can determine the average rate of profit and the

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prices of production . It is also shown that there is normally a strictly inverse relationship between wages and the rate of profit . 8 Reduction of complex or skilled labour is thus regarded as unnecessary . These analyses are to be appreciated as a contribution to the feasibility of Marxian value theory with heterogeneous labour . However, Bowles and Gintis's model and their formal technical exposition may possibly be utilised or extended in two opposite directions . On the one hand, neo-Ricardians may easily utilise the model and the exposition in order to show the redundancy of the concept of abstract labour . Even though Bowles and Gintis maintain that they would not abandon the concept of abstract labour, their treatment of heterogeneous labour can directly be interpreted as a model which deals only with concrete labour without considering the abstract character of labour . In their basic theoretical model, the role of the common abstract character of labour between different kinds of heterogeneous labour is not very clear, and may even seem dispensable . In fact, I . Steedman demonstrates a similar vector-value in his Sraffa-based critique of Marx, and clearly denies any need to reduce different kinds of concrete labour into abstract labour . 9 In the context of Steedman's critique of Marx, the technical possibility of determining the rate of profit and prices without reducing heterogenous skilled labour to simple unskilled labour, is directly regarded as a logical basis for his criticism of the concept of abstract labour and the labour theory of value as being redundant. On the other hand, Bowles and Gintis's model can also be interpreted in an opposite way as being compatible and in a sense mutually complementary with the more traditional treatment of complex labour . For one thing, the determination of the rate of profit and prices of production for an economy with heterogeneous labour in Bowles and Gintis's (B-G) model does not hold even when the ratios of the reduction of heterogeneous to simple labour and the value of skilled labour-power are analysed by the Hilferding-Okishio-Rowthorn (H-o-R) theory. From the view of H-O-R theory, B-G model can be regarded as a useful complement precisely to determine the average rate of profit and prices in an economy with various rates of surplus-value for different kinds of labour . Conversely, the H-o-R approach may be useful to clarify some ambiguous aspects of the B-G model . For instance, although B-G reject the technical determination of values of heterogeneous labour-power, in order to emphasise the role of other social and managerial factors of discrimination, it might still be useful to observe and consider the distinct technical factors such as educational costs in H-o-R even for a more accurate understanding of

Skilled Labour the effects of other factors of segmentation . Besides, B-G, unlike Steedman, maintain the theoretical need of the concept of abstract labour in order clearly to see the fundamental social relations . They add to their numerical example the rates of surplus-value in common labour, in terms of which the amount of labour-time is simply added together and compared without any weight or qualification across different kinds of labour . As B-G point out in their reply to E . McKenna, their common labour is different from the simple labour in H-0-R, and is not reduced from complex labour with a technically determinant weight . 1 ° The economic and social meaning of this concept `common labour' is, however, almost uninvestigated by B-G, so that it may even give an impression of being introduced for technical convenience . Let us recall here that o-R treated the skilled workers' own labour as simple labour, also without giving theoretical foundation . An interesting coincidence, both in the direction of recognition and in the insufficiency of investigation, is thus found here concerning the simple or common character in skilled heterogeneous workers' own labour, in the apparently different models by O-R and B-G . Let us study this point anew from a wider view in a slightly roundabout way .

In retrospect, various difficulties in Marx's value theory often originated in the first section of the first chapter of Capital from his reduction of values to crystals of labour based directly on the exchange relations of commodities . In spite of Marx's great discovery of the forms of value, the exchange-value as a form of value is abstracted from this section to reach the concept of values . As a result, so far as the definition of value in this first section is concerned, Marx's labour theory of value contains a lot of similarities with Ricardo's . Certainly, Marx's Capital as a whole presents us, unlike Ricardo's Principles, with a systematic articulation of the historically specific character of a capitalist economy . In such an articulation, Marx clarified both the transhistorical character of the labour process as the everlasting Natureimposed condition of human existence common to all the social formations (p . 290) and the broad historical character of commodity exchange, money and certain species of capital which existed before and outside of the capitalist mode of production . Only when human labour-power is convened into a commodity on a social scale, can capitalism be established and completely embrace the social labour process within the value-forms of commodity economy . The labour theory of value, which unveils the social relations in labour-time hidden under value-forms, can be shown with a social necessity only by observing this specific

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economic system of capitalism, as we have discussed elsewhere . In contrast, so far as the substance of value as embodied labour is abstracted and observed in a mere commodity exchange relation, we cannot define the social mode of production which has turned out the commodity observed . In a long pre-capitalist history, commodities are especially made by skilled artisans in towns and often exchanged with agricultural surplus products extracted by landlords from various sorts of communal production . In such a pre-capitalist commodity economy, it must be impossible to find a social basis to recognise the homogeneous and common character of human labour as values . This is because social status or ranks, the division of labour, and skilled works are traditionally related and fixed, and personal mobility across them is strictly forbidden . Thus, Marx was correct when he pointed out the historical limitation preventing Aristotle recognising the equality of human labour in his analysis of exchange values (pp . 151-152) . In a capitalist society, the majority of people have become free workers in the double sense (p . 272), and have to alter the concrete forms of labour, say from tailoring to weaving etc ., `in accordance with changes of the demand' (p . 134) for their labourpower as a commodity . The mobility of workers across various kinds of concrete labour is not only formally given in the commodity form of labour-power, but it is also substantially grounded in deskilling of labour by capitalist utilisation of machinery . Marx's analysis of the production of relative surplus-value by means of machinery simultaneously clarifies how capitalism decomposes skills and simplifies labour in a miserable way . In view of such a development, Marx notes that `we must not imagine that so-called "skilled-labour" forms a large part of the whole of the nation's labour . Laing estimates that in England (and Wales) the livelihood of 11,300,000 people [from about 18,000,000 total population - M .I .] depends on unskilled labour' (p . 305) . Marx could have treated simple labour as a dominant form of wage labour on the ground that this was the actual development of capitalism . This was an important reason why Uno insisted on showing the labour theory of value in the context of the production-process of capital, not in that of simple commodity exchanges." In the Uno school, the reduction of complex skilled labour into simple labour has been regarded as being guaranteed by the historical tendency of capitalism to generalise simple labour by means of the mechanised factory system . This view coincides with H . Braverman's position in Labor and Monopoly Capital . Braverman underlines that the strong tendency towards the degradation of labour by the increasing separation of the time-consuming process of design from the majority of workers'

Skilled Labour practice, continues to prevail in the history of us monopoly capitalism . 12 We may thus erase the problem of how to evaluate skilled labour in terms of simple labour, by abstracting the labour theory of value upon the basis of an historical tendency of capitalism in this direction . However, the problem has not yet been completely theoretically solved, in so far as it is simply dismissed from the basic theory contingent upon a factual tendency, which was conspicuous particularly up to Marx's own age . Without giving a more substantial theoretical solution to the problem, we may not be able to offer a sound frame of reference for the analyses of actual segmentation of workers in recent capitalist societies . In fact, more recent studies of the segmentation of labour tend to oppose Braverman and emphasise actual trends to create anew and reproduce various discriminations in workers which are often regarded as relating to actual or possible differences in the degreees of skills or of complexity of works . In my view, however, these actual trends of the segmentation of workers have become more and more dependent upon socially discriminatory factors such as racism, sexism and schooling, and have been utilised and fostered more or less artificially in order to facilitate a managerial 'bureaucratic' control of working people . 1 3 Therefore, the trends towards segmentation do not really relegate, but are rather coupled with, the degradation and the deskilling of labour for the majority of working people, especially for those engaging in the material reproduction process . Thus, if we disregard the artificial managerial segmentation of workers as for wages etc ., capitalist production has powerfully dissolved any fixed traditional skills like in craftsmanship, simplifying labouring operations in most workplaces, especially in industries susceptible to mass production and thus technologically facilitating interchangeability of workers across jobs and industries . However, what enables such mobility of labour-power is not merely the capitalistic achievement of deskilling by means of machinery and equipment . More fundamentally, it is grounded upon the wide range of applicability of human labour-power linked with the mental, such as the linguistic, ability which is specific to human beings in distinction to other animals . Marx's treatment of the labour process clearly implied his recognition of such human labouring ability . Extendible human labour-power, based upon a rich mental as well as physical ability, has enabled workers to perform surplus labour beyond necessary labour time, working for a purpose given by others in class societies, simultaneously offers a most basic ground for the actual mobile interchangeability of workers which is realised under capitalism . Traditionally, the twin problems of how to deal with concrete C/C ~1-D

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and abstract labour and how to reduce skilled to simple labour are regarded as theoretically distinct, and to be handled separately . However, the solution of these problems must now be linked, and mutually cross over to the ground of the basic human ability to work . In treating the skilled labour problem, it is generally assumed that skilled labour is more intensive labour creating more value than simple labour in the same labouring time. In view of the basic ability of human labour-power, we must now understand that even most deskilled and monotonous work is the expenditure of the commonly extensible potential power of human beings . Indeed as Marx suggests, `The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and the way in which it has to be accomplished, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as the free play of his own physical and mental powers, the closer his attention is forced to be' (p . 284), and the more tiring his work must be . In this regard, simple unskilled labour is also expenditure of the complex human ability to work, using in different combinations the various aspects of mental and physical abilities in accord with different forms of concretely useful work . This makes a comprehensive and comparative assessment or measurement of the intensity of labour even in the ordinary unskilled grade of work theoretically hard and rather impossible . This serves also as a hidden basis enabling managerial convenience to introduce artificially fine gradings and segmentations into various works which can basically be performed interchangeably without difficulty . However, we should see that beyond managerial differentiations each sort of work is equally expenditure of a composite human labouring ability in a specific form, and that different concretely useful labour in such a qualification is reducible to abstract human labour, being comparable simply according to the physical hours of labour . From this point of view, complex skilled labour must also be regarded as the expenditure of general human ability to labour in special forms . So far as skilled labour-power needs a certain education or training beforehand, simple labour-power cannot instantly be converted to some sort of skilled work, whereas skilled labour-power can be used in simple work . Hence, grading and categorisation of wages etc . can easily be imposed onto skilled workers . However, if we disregard this aspect of differentiation for the moment, a skilled worker's own labour is basically nothing but the expenditure of the composite human ability to labour just as in the case of simple labour . With this qualification, skilled labour is also reducible to abstract human labour, being commensurable with other types of work simply in terms of physical hours of labour, as a part of the total social human activity of maintaining material reproduction . In comparison

Skilled Labour

with simple labour, which covers in it various forms of expenditure of human ability, skilled labour cannot be regarded as especially intensified labouring activity . Skilled work may often be even less intensive and less tiring, since skilled workers have been given special training or education for their jobs and tend to work under a relatively lesser pressure of competition . Therefore, there is a certain rationality and justification in the way O-R and B-G recognise that skilled workers' own labour can be treated as simple or common labour being measurable simply in terms of physical labour-time just as simple workers' labour. Since Marx tended to analyse the labour substance of value too closely linked with the forms of value from the initial theory of commodities, he was inclined to assume that skilled workers could perform somehow (a little mystically in my view) intensified, more labour than simple workers in the same labourtime, behind the relatively higher exchange values of skilled workers' products in the market including higher wages for them . If we theoretically separate the forms and the substance of value as dimensionally different orders for a more proper, nonmystical understanding of their relations, we need not follow Marx's lead here and must conclude from our re-examination that skilled workers' own labour embodies the same amount of labour substance of value as simple workers do in a unit of labour-time, independently of the relatively higher exchange values in the market given to skilled workers' labour-power and products . Contrastingly, the Rubin school believes that the commensuration of concrete useful labour to abstract labour is inseparable from the form of value or exchange value in the market . In this tradition, S . Himmelweit argues, on the assumption of equal organic composition of capital and an equal rate of profit across industries, that `workers who are paid less or more produce correspondingly less, or more, value . Or equivalently that the value of any labour-power is proportional to its value producing power' . 14 The quantities of abstract labour as the substance of value are qualitatively treated here as a completely subordinate shadow of the equilibrium prices determined in the market, and are not conceived as an objective entity eing independent of market relations . The labour theory of value as a theory to determine prices and to examine their functions from behind the market relations, in terms of objective human labouring activity, must be very much weakened by this way of reasoning . As a result Himmelweit's inference seems to include a circular reasoning between the assumed equal organic composition of capital and the deduced determination of the value of skilled labourpower . The proportional evaluation of the values of products and

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of the labour-power of skilled workers in the market would not hold in a real capitalist economy with differing organic compositions of capital, and it therefore cannot be a solid solution for the skilled labour problem . In our view the values of skilled workers' labour-power must be discussed independently from the labour substance of value of their products . At first sight there is not any problem in defining the value of skilled labour-power. According to Marx, it is the amount of labour time which is necessary to produce and maintain this sort of labour power . It seems just like the definition of the value of ordinary simple labour-power, and has been basically followed by most Marxians, though B-G technically redefined it in the vector value . In Marx's words, `The costs of education vary according to the degree of complexity of the labour-power required . These expenses (exceedingly small in the case of ordinary labour-power) form a part of the total value spent in producing it' (p . 276) . However, labour-power is a special commodity, and is reproduced not in a production process but in a consumption process . Further, since its owner is mortal, `the labour-power withdrawn from the market by wear and tear, and by death, must be continuously replaced by, at the very least, an equal amount of fresh labour-power' (p . 275) . The replacement of workers by their children with the common level of education and civilisation attained by a country must be accounted for in the value of labour-power in the case of workers in general, or simple common workers . Should we then straightforwardly understand that the same is true for the replacement of complex skilled workers? If we should (as suggested in the ordinary analyses of the problem even among Marxians), we must also understand that the reproduction of skilled workers through generations is to be done fixedly within the same grade of skilled workers' families . As a result, the families of skilled workers may functionally become similar to those in a fixed privileged social status or caste in pre-capitalist societies . This seems to be an inevitable consequence of a type of understanding of the law of value in accord with the traditional technological approaches since Hilferding, especially where the embodied labour-time in skill is regarded as being transferred to the commodity products just like the substance of value of constant capital on the one hand, and is regarded also as the value substance to be paid to the sellers of skilled labourpower to secure its reproduction . This logical consequence seems at least partly consonant with the social function of higher wages of complex skilled workers . However, in case Marx's more basic view that the amount of labour-time necessary to reproduce the human ability to work is

Skilled Labour

just consumed in the form of means of consumption and not transferred to the commodity products is true, it should consistently be applied to educational labour-time as well . In addition, if we see that the skilled workers' own labour does not contain any mysteriously intensified labour which creates more substance of value compared with common simple labour, then there is no counterpart in the embodied labour-time of skilled workers products to match the higher value of skilled labour-power . Thus, the law of value does not assure any socially or technologically fixed proportional relation between the amount of labourtime necessary to develop the skill and that embodied in the products of skilled workers . Certainly it must be obvious that a social fund, a certain amount of labour time, is always to be spared for educational materials and labour-power in order to reproduce socially necessary sorts of skilled labour-power . As skilled workers do not expend any specially intensified labour nor transfer any past labour consumed in their life and education, and also as the necessary labour-time to reproduce common labourpower apparently cannot bear such an educational or training fund for skilled labour-power, the fund must generally be regarded as a deduction from total social surplus-labour . The forms to deal with such a fund would vary according to the different social systems . For instance, without a lifelong employment system, a private capitalist firm will not directly bear educational costs of skills, since educated skilled workers may `escape' to other competitive firms in order to sell their labour-power dearer . In a competitive capitalist economy without a public sector, educational costs thus tend to be borne by families, and thus ironically reduce competitive mobility independent of families, each of which are connected with certain different grades of skilled labour . Wages or the form of value of skilled labour-power on this occasion function as a channel of distributing educational funds deducted from social surplus-labour to the families of skilled workers . If wages of a certain type of skilled worker are higher than the costs necessary both to maintain their families and to replace their ability through their children, then other children of the families which can afford such educational costs will come in sooner or later, and vice versa . This is exactly the case, in fact, consonant with the H-O-R model as we have seen . In such a case, wages as the form of value of skilled labour-power are maintained in a market by the inconvertibility of such labour-power just at the level tendentially equivalent to the educational costs plus the ordinary wages for simple labourers, and this enables skilled workers to obtain more substance of value than simple workers . The higher wage costs of technologically necessary skilled workers force

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capitalist firms to set much higher prices for their products in a competitive market, so as to enable these firms to maintain reproduction through price relations with an average rate of profit, as substantially shown by B-G model . So long as the extra portion of the substance of value obtained by the skilled labourer as compared to the common simple labourer remains within the quantity of surplus-labour time in his life, the skilled worker may be conceptually classified as being exploited, nevertheless he must have a more or less petit bourgeois character as well . This is probably what is implied by the degree of `the rate of exploitation in common labour' in B-G model . It must be noted, however, that even when a skilled worker is not exploited and rather exploiting in this context, he may indirectly add to total surplus value by increasing productivity of other workers in various cases . In an opposite case where educational costs of skills are entirely borne by the state or the public entity from taxes on surplus-value, the substance of value acquired personally by skilled workers through the form of value of labour-power or wages need not contain any social funds from surplus-labour, and must theoretically be reduced to the same level as that of the common simple workers . We assume here no shortage of skilled workers, nor special managerial strategies for their segmentation . Our view is substantially the same, with a different interpretation of the case, as analysed in the supplementary part of Rowthorn's essay. A skilled worker in a capitalist sector is assumed there to receive value Vp , just the same as unskilled workers . In Rowthorn's example, even though educational labour (VG+UG) in the state sector is expended for the skilled worker and is transferred to the output of capitalist sector, the total cost in value terms to produce the skilled labour-power (V p+VG+UG) is not totally given to the skilled worker through wages . In Rowthorn's treatment, there seems to be a considerable gap between wages as a form of value and the substantial definition of the value of skilled labour-power . In my interpretation, educational labour (VG+UG) is neither transferred to the output of skilled workers nor to be counted in the value of his labour-power in this case . In an actual capitalist society, these two opposite cases are more or less combined together . Financial institutions from which personal funds for educational costs can be borrowed may also affect the manner in which the reproduction of skilled labour-power is managed between generations . 15 Various types of segmentation of labour are usually linked with different educational costs, but within contemporary capitalist firms they are mostly more in accord with managerial convenience than with the social need to reproduce necessary sorts of skilled labour-

Skilled Labour

power . We can criticise more thoroughly the social function of segmented work in a capitalist economy, with its differentiation of wages and revenues, when we properly recognise the basic common character of skilled and unskilled labour as well as the various possible ways to secure the reproduction of necessary skilled workers . Our alternative solution of the skilled labour problem further relates to two more important issues ; one concerns international trade and the other socialism . Closely linked with his treatment of skilled labour as intensified labour, Marx has this to say concerning international trade : `the law of value is . . . modified in its international application by the fact that, on the world market, national labour which is more productive also counts as more intensive, as long as the more productive nation is not compelled by competition to lower the selling price of its commodities to the level of their value' (p . 702) . Certainly, there may be international differences of labour productivity due to different degrees of intensification of ordinary workers labour. However, actual intensification of labour would rather be strengthened in the less advanced nations with weaker trade unions and stronger competition among workers, as capitalist production extends its domination over workers in such nations . So far as labour productivity in the advanced country is greater for the same industry than in the less advanced country because of better objective conditions of production, such as machinery and equipment, more productive labour in the advanced country should not be regarded as actually more intensive simply for the reason of its productivity. Comparison of labour productivity itself must lose its essential meaning, where products are not homogeneous . Actually, when the advanced and the less advanced countries produce and trade different use-values, as is often the case in the international division of labour, comparison of labour productivity in physical terms cannot have a theoretical sense, because the results of labour in different use-values are not commensurable . Therefore, the commensurability of labour products is conventionally based upon the prices given in the international market . Comparison of labour `productivity' then must depend heavily upon evaluation in the sphere of market or the fluctuation relations between demand and supply . Such treatment, especially when combined with the assumption of more intensive labour behind higher labour productivity, becomes too remote from the basic position of the labour theory of value, where the social relations in the expenditure of labour are theoretically defined independently of the market relations as a fundamental determinant of prices . Our discussion here cannot be a final solution but rather an examina-

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tion of a starting point for the issues on the international value relations or the unequal international exchange . However, it must be clear by now that a position recognising more productive national labour directly as more intensive labour following the Rubin school among others, as well as Marx's own statement cited above, cannot be based on a proper and sound understanding of the skilled labour problem . In a socialist society, a part of total social product necessary for the common satisfaction of needs has to be deducted before the product is divided among the individuals, 16 such as for schools, health services, together with the portions of product for the replacement of the means of production, for the expansion of production, for reserves or insurance funds, for the general costs of administration, and for those unable to work . The educational funds for skilled or complex labour-power should be theoretically dealt with in such a society also not on an individual but on a social communal basis . Then, a skilled worker should not get back from society - after the socially necessary deductions have been made - more than a common simple worker either for what he contributes to society in his own labour-time, or for the costs of maintaining the socially necessary sorts of skilled labour-power . The economic position of such a skilled worker would correspond to that of the skilled worker of a capitalist society in the second theoretical case examined above with an entirely state educational system . In the Critique of the Gotha Programme, however, Marx assumes workers' unequal right to products proportional to the labour they supply in a lower phase of communist society as a `bourgeois right' in principle, since `one man is superior to another physically or mentally and so supplies more labour in the same time . . .' In contrast, `in a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, . . . after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners : from each according to his ability, to each according to his need!'" So long as this `bourgeois right' is based on the concept of skilled or complex labour-power as being able to supply more labour in the same time, we have a theoretical ground to oppose to it . It is related to Marx's ambiguous and problematic treatment of skilled labour, as we have discussed . In a Soviet type of society, this `bourgeois right' in the lower phase of communist society as described in Marx's writing has undoubtedly been fully utilised in order to liegimate the hierarchical and stratified privileges of the state and

Skilled Labour

party bureaucrats in regard to material goods and social services . It tends also to be perpetuated insofar as the higher phase of communist society is regarded as a goal too far away actually to be achieved . Thus in my opinion, the Marxian labour theory of value even on the skilled labour problem, if properly developed, must be able to offer a basis for the fundamentally egalitarian point of view of social relations, which should always be a crucial element of Marxism . From this point of view, the social function and the historical meaning of artificially segmented work in modern capitalist labour management, as well as a justification for hierarchical social orders in `real existing socialist' societies, must be given a deeper and more critical frame of reference for reexamination as we have suggested .

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Acknowledgements I owe special thanks to the editors of Capital & Class for a list of recommendations for revising my manuscript, to Paul Bullock for his editing my expressions, and to Andrew Glyn and Bob Rowthorn for careful reading of the manuscript, suggesting revisions, though I have not necessarily followed all the recommendations and suggestions . This paper is planned to appear as a section in my book, The Basic Theory of Capitalism (London, Macmillan, 1987) .

1. M . Itoh, Value and Crisis, London, Pluto Press; New York, Monthly Review Press, 1980 ; chapter 3 . 2. P . M . Sweezy (ed . ), Karl Marx and the Close of his System by Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk and Bohm-Bawerk's Criticism of Marx by Rudolf Hilferding, New York, M . Kelly, 1949, p . 86 . 3. E . Bernstein, 'Zur Theorie des Arbeitswerts', Die Neue Zeit,

XVIII, (1899-1900), Part I . 4. P . M . Sweezy (ed .), op . cit ., pp. 136-146 . 5. N . Okishio, `A Mathematical Note on Marxian Theories', Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Heft 2, 1963 . 6. B . Rowthorn, Capitalism, Conflict and Inflation, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1980, chapter 8 . In his more recent `Notes on Skilled Labour' (mimeo, 1986), Rowthorn has deepened his theoretical view of this problem, and basically come closer to my position in this section . Therefore, my treatment and criticisms of his argument here cannot be applicable to his recent view, although his previous argument would remain as a typical case for the logical approach to this issue . 7. M . Morishima, Marx's Economics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973, p . 181 .

Notes



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8. S . Bowles & H . Gintis, `The Marxian Theory of Value and Heterogeneous Labour', Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol . 1-2, 1977 . 9. I . Steedman, Marx after Sraffa, London, NLB, 1977, chapter 7 . 10. S . Bowles & H . Gintis, `Labour Heterogeneity and the Labour Theory of Value : A Reply', Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol . 5-3, 1981 . See also E . McKenna, `A Comment on Bowles and Gintis' Marxian Theory of Value', in the same issue . 11 . K . Uno, Principles of Political Economy, translated by T. Sekine, Sussex, Harvester Press ; New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1980, pp . 3334. 12 . H . Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital : The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1974 . 13 . Cf. R . Edwards, `System of Control in the Labour Process', in R . Edwards et al (ed .), The Capitalist System, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1978 . R . Edwards, Contested Terrain, London, Heinemann, 1979 . D . Gordon, R . Edwards, M . Reich, Segmented Work, Divided Workers, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982 . 14 . S . Himmelweit, `Value Relations and Divisions within the Working Class', Science and Society, Fall 1984, p. 334 . Although I disagree with the treatment of the skilled labour problem in this paper, the extension of theoretical implication of the problem to the international exchanges and the female workers problem in the paper is both suggestive and interesting . 15 . The effects of financial arrangement in this regard, however, should not be exaggerated . The value of skilled labour-power cannot substantially be reduced, as the borrowed educational costs must be paid back later from a part of wages for skilled workers . Social mobility over generations would not be very much enhanced by this device, since children of common workers would not have easy access to a loan for expensive educational costs usually requiring guarantees with sufficient earnings and assets among parents or relatives . 16 . K . Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, in D . McLellan (ed .), Karl Marx: Selected Writings, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977, p . 567 . 17 . K . Marx, op . cit ., pp . 568-9 .

Ralph Negrine The New Information Technologies : Is there an 'alternative strategy'?

The Conservative government has adopted a market-led and entertainment-led approach to the development of IT generally . It has privatised BT, established a competitor and has pursued a distinctive market philosophy towards the development of the new media. One of these media, cable systems, has attracted much interest because it contains within it the possibility of the creation of a so-called `national grid', marrying communications and culture, business and entertainment in an intricate and complex way . But because all these developments have taken place in the private sector, the Left has been quick to criticise the government's approach and have pointed out the many consequences : in terms of employment, impact on culture, diminishing the public domain, reducing accountability and so on . However, this article suggests that these critiques are by no means as complete as first appears since they themselves lack any coherent `alternative strategy' that is `realistic', plausible or meaningful. This, the article goes on to argue, will present a future socialist government with a serious problem . What will its own approach be and how much can it learn from these critiques?

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• MANY RECENT discussions of the new communications technologies have been in the form of responses to contemporary developments ; developments which are the direct result of the Thatcher government's policies . Thus, discussions of such technologies as cable and satellites, telephony or data transfers inevitably begin with a consideration of this government's desire to liberalise the rules governing the provision of these technologies and their services as well as its actions in privatising such entities as BT . These policies have been interpreted by Murdock and Golding (1983) as `part of a push to counter the crisis of profitability by restructuring production and consumption around the "golden triangle" of new communications industries - telecommunications, computing and television' . A process with significant industrial and non-industrial (e .g . cultural) consequences . For example, in the cultural sphere `restructuring the communications sytem to the maximum advantage of private business' (Murdock and Golding, p . 32) by de-regulating broadcast technologies will mean `a sharp loss of accountability', it will curtail diversity as commercial pressures intensify, it will restrict entry to the rich and it will also create inequalities between the information rich and the information poor . `As the public sector declines, protection for the poor will be replaced by the dispassionate mechanism of the market' (Murdock and Golding, p . 36) . In the industrial sphere, this convergence of technologies could provide the basis for a, not dissimilar, phase of production and accumulation across a whole set of social relations - not only the labour process but also consumption, for example through deskilling and the rationalisation of administrative and financial sectors and by intensifying consumption through the medium of the television screen and related gadgets (Robins and Webster, 1979 : 288) . Few on the Left would disagree with the general tenor of this critique, for it places the new communication and information technologies in their proper context - in terms of industrial change, in terms of the effects on culture and, lastly, in terms of public access to a whole range of public goods and services . But what has been most apparent, however, is the absence of a real and alternative policy which would unite the diverse views of those who are, broadly speaking, on the Left and which could be held up as part of an `Alternative Strategy' . For an examination of the processes at work - an admirable task does not, of itself, provide us with the tools with which to `reconstruct the left's approach to communications and culture' (Murdock and Golding, p . 36) . It may provide the basis for such an alternative strategy but perhaps no more . That such a policy ought to be developed is clear . Few

Information Technology would dispute the need to combat the basic tenets of Thatcherism in this, as in other, areas . But beyond that it is essential for there to be an alternative policy if the public is to be convinced of the existence of other possibilities and their benefits . In other words, though the need for a policy in this area may seem of parochial interest only, it is worth seeing it as symptomatic of a more general issue : how is the Left to capture the public imagination with its own vision of the future direction of technological change? This paper will focus primarily on contemporary critiques of current government policies before embarking on the wider issues highlighted above . It is worth firstly, and briefly, illustrating some of the more important changes in telecommunications policies which have so galvanised many commentators . Two are worthy of comment : firstly, the privatisation of British Telecom in 1984 and, secondly, the liberalisation of the rules governing the construction of cable systems from 1982 onwards . While the first example does not require a major discussion since its effects have been well documented elsewhere (Levie, 1983 ; Garnham, 1985 ; Woolnough, 1984), the second example does demand some explanation since it deals with future and as yet unknown possibilities . Though I shall deal with some of these matters separately, it is critical to remember that their importance lies in their abilities to inter-connect and so produce a radically different pattern of telecommunications in the future : a communications grid which could be used for all business and private telecommunications activity, including entertainment, telebanking/ shopping, telephony and so on . In 1982, the government liberalised the rules governing the construction and development of cable systems . Such systems whether based on co-axial or fibre optic cables - can connect thousands of homes (and businesses) to a central head-end which can, in turn, supply each individual home (and business) with a range of entertainment, information and interactive (e .g . telebanking) services . Since such systems may come to play a key part in any future local and national communications grid, it follows that their development is of great concern . For many, the development of cable systems provided an ideal opportunity to plan and structure that telecommunications system ; it was an example of the possibilities of social engineering . But by refusing to allow for the public development of such systems and instead permitting the free market to dictate the introduction, growth and development of such systems - both in terms of their physical construction and of the range of services that they are likely to provide - this government has given private entrepreneurs a key role in determining the nature of Britain's future national com-

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munications infrastructure . Though there are certain technical standards that such systems will need to meet, these are seen only as essential in order to ensure the construction of technologically advanced and nationally compatible systems . In all other respects, government policy has been to allow for maximum flexibility particularly with regard to the provision of services on cable systems . One important reason for this approach was the government's belief that the successful exploitation of entertainment services would be a first and necessary step towards the development of more sophisticated technology and a wider range of services . This was the, by now (in)famous, entertainment-led policy . It follows that commercial considerations will be of prime importance in all matters relating to cable : (1) in the construction of cable systems, i .e . if, and where, they are built ; (2) in the types of services provided, e .g. whether entertainment, informational or interactive ; (3) in the range and quality of many of these services ; (4) in the types of services created for business users as opposed to public uses . In the context of other, related, changes in the communications field, it becomes clear that this government has abandoned any pretence to planning the comunications infrastructure of the future though it presumed that some sort of coherence would be achieved through its laissez-faire approach . This is in direct contrast to both the French and German examples where the respective PTTs retain control over telecommunications . Interestingly, these two pole positions - state direction versus market direction - have formed part of the wider debate about the way forward . Clearly, there are problems with both approaches . The former requires massive public funding whilst the latter produces uneven development . This government's approach has certainly had its many drawbacks . Euphoria over the new information technologies in 1982 - remember IT year? - and cable in 1983, soon gave way to depression in subsequent years . In other words, a rather simplistic view of the future rate of development has come face to face with the economic realities of the new communications technologies . Under present (technical) regulations, a cable system is an expensive enterprise whose profitability is a long-term affair . Figures of £30 to £50 million for a 100,000 homes system are not uncommon and the turn to profitability is expected in seven or more years . There are many examples of changed opinions . In his days as Minister for Information Technology, Kenneth Baker frequently advocated the bulding of `the Victorian railway network of the future' . Today,

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however, the cable industry is in difficulties as it faces mounting costs and a rather uncertain future . It was, curiously, most affected by Chancellor Lawson's decision, in the budget of 1984, to phase out all allowances on capital expenditures . Much of this is now of historical interest only . Cable technology (and its more publicised use as cable TV) is here to stay, though few can confidently predict the pace, or the precise nature, of its future development . Uneven and/or very gradual growth is more likely than the images of the futuristic `wired society' so well advertised by the proponents of IT. The costs involved are large and few City investors are at all convinced of cable's future success . This accounts, in part, for the present state of affairs . Paradoxically, it also explains BT'S growing role ; it has taken on a dominant role through its acquisition of ThornEMI's shares and is the only large, wealthy and experienced player in the field . So contrary to the Conservative government's original proposal, BT will play an important part because the other major players have withdrawn and the City considers cable to be too risky a venture . What this illustrates is not the strength of this government's policies towards IT, but their inherent weaknesses . As Johnstone pointed out in The Times (1984) : The truth is that the government has not had a policy on IT . . . and to leave it to the entrepreneurs of tomorrow is not only misguided but uncourageous . . . The government strategy must [be to] direct large sectors of industry . . . towards a particular goal . This criticism has, curiously, its counterpart on the Left . Hughes and McCartney have observed that the government's communications policy is `an abdication of the organising role of the state' (Hughes and McCartney, 1983 : 8) . Such criticisms apart, there appears to be a vacuum where a coherent alternative policy ought to be . The Conservative government has steamrollered through a series of very radical changes in a remarkably short space of time and the Labour Party's participation in the parliamentary discussions - whether in debate or in the scrutiny of the relevant legislation - has had little significant impact . In any case, its work has always had the appearance of a rearguard action: against developments rather than for an imaginative series of alternative changes . Even the 1983 Election Manifesto only made a few references to this whole area . It merely repeated the Labour Party's preference for a publicly constructed and controlled network and to the need to regulate the new technologies no differently to the old (Labour Party, 1983 : 12) .

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One possible reason for the absence of a well thought-out policy could be that, as Murdock and Golding suggest, the Left still discusses `communication in terms of press hostility to Labour, bias in Tv news, and the continued failure of the Press Council . These are important issues, but they do not begin to grapple with [the] scope and scale of current developments' (Murdock and Golding, p . 32) either in industry or communications and culture . These comments, though apt, overlook the weaknesses of many (Left) critiques of the Conservative government's policies ; critiques which would perhaps ordinarily inform Labour Party discussions . In these critiques - and they include Hughes and McCartney's work in Capital & Class (1983), the Working Papers of the GLC/Sheffield Cable Hearings (Economic Policy Group, 1982 ; Sheffield Tv Gruop, 1983 ; Robins, 1983), work on the new information technologies (Robins and Webster, 1983) and the discussion paper for the Labour Party Media Study Group (1983) - one finds a whole range of positions on IT (and cable technology as an immediate example of widespread developments) and suggestions for the future which to many appear to be locked into existing perspectives and structures . Instead of being forward looking, the critiques are very much geared to traditional ways of conceptualising alternative structures for the future . This is nowhere more true than in relation to the issue of increased choice which cable Tv promises . The advocates of the new information technology have successfully traded on the promise of greater choice and individual freedom . But the 'alternative' policies are often forced to foreclose the possible range of choices either because they find them reprehensible or because they see them as part and parcel of an insidious process of cultural decline (or, indeed, both) . Such `alternative' policies have generally been unable to encourage, or allow for, diversity across a whole range of media fare and have instead pushed for restrictions . A coherent strategy on communication and culture (and industry) cannot be satisfied with a mere listing of what is worthwhile but needs to accord with the changing needs and desires expressed by the public over the years . For example, in the public's use of computers and video recorders for home entertainment . Few of the works reviewed here have managed to provide such a forward-looking perspective . There are, I would suggest, at least three reasons for this . Firstly, in pointing out the detrimental effects of current and possible future developments - the internationalisation of culture and industry, restructuring, americanisation of culture, the standardisation of culture, the possible adverse effects on employment - they have retreated, inevitably, into a defensive position . Thus, `our immediate

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response must be to oppose these trends' (Murdock and Golding, p . 36) and `here the name of the game is to slow things down' (Labour Party Media Study Group, 1983 : 1) . Secondly, they set out elaborate structures for encouraging local control, maintaining quality and increasing diversity by framing them within institutions (trade unions, local government, local boards) or philosophies (nationalisation, regulation) which are perceived by many to be both bureaucratic and restrictive . Thirdly, they describe models of accountability which are unwieldy and perhaps even illusory . The Left's dilemma is clear : are the new technologies to be welcomed, and if so, on what terms? This dilemma, itself, rests on a series of other, usually implicit, questions . Firstly, is technology - any technology -'neutral'? Can it be driven to benefit society or does its very development put into motion certain processes which are against the interests of working people? Secondly, should technological development always take place within the public sector or should some degree of privatisation be permitted? Thirdly, can there be a Left alternative within a 'mixed-economy' framework? It is along this axis that opinions divide . The political implications of deregulation and privatisation are central to all the critiques reviewed . Whilst there are some significant differences in overall approaches, methodologies and indeed language, there is a fair degree of unity over the consequences of the new information technologies and their capture by private interests . To quote Robins, whose work is in part a confrontation with non-Marxist versions of the information society as a new democratic order, the reality is that information will not be a freely flowing resource, on tap `in all places at all times' ; it will, rather, be gathered in, collected, appropriated, monopolised, and exploited, in order to maintain the social hegemony of capital . (Robins, 1983 : 60) To call attention to the maintenance, and generation of, inequalities is only one aspect of the attack on the present direction of development . Another is the direct response to these developments . Hence the many formulations of alternative strategies for the construction and development of the new information technologies, and particularly cable . Since cable has come to be seen as an integral part of the national grid and has recently been placed in private hands, it is not surprising that it has moved to the centre of the current debate . Yet it is at the second level - the level of response - that C/C 31-E

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major theoretical (and other) differences begin to shatter the image of a united front against Thatcherism . At the heart of this lack of unity is an unevenly developed critique of technology per se, although one can also detect a lack of clarity with regards to the role of the (future socialist) state in these matters (Frankel, 1983) . There are, broadly speaking, two schools of thought : those who see technology as `neutral' to the extent that its uses are not predetermined by its forms nor unalterable (see Williams, Garnham, Hughes and McCartney, Murdock and Golding) and those who see technological development as a process by which capital is able to retain its hegemony (Robins, Robins and Webster) . But these positions intersect with some others . There are those who express a preference for state-directed change (Hughes and McCartney) or for a large degree of community or local control (Williams, Garnham and Murdock and Golding to an extent) and, finally, there are those who propose piecemeal development and those who reject this in preference for major social and political change (in particular see Robins) . Such divisions run deep and they are well illustrated in Robins' work for the GLC/Sheffield Cable hearings . His work is a perceptive and wide-ranging critique of the new information technologies . It starts with a review of contemporary changes but then quickly turns into a rejection of technological determinism before setting out an alternative interpretation of the current situation . He is clear about the significance of the new information technologies . They provide an area for future economic growth, profitability and massive social change . But he rejects the view that such technologies can ever be put to uses other than those which are related to their development . These technologies are `explicable only in the context of the current crisis of a particular, historical, mode of capital accumulation (Fordism), and the search for new (post- and para-Fordist) coherence of production and accumulation' (Robins, p . 58) . For, as he observed in an earlier work (with Webster), `the (new) phase of accumulation . . . will supersede, yet extend and elaborate, that initiated by Fordism' (Robins and Webster, 1979: 309) . The objective `for capital is to introduce a greater degree of flexibility into the organisation of social production, whilst retaining control and hegemony over the social totality' (Robins, p . 58) . He believes that it is mistaken to think of technology in any other way and, for example, to see it as `a socially neutral force . . . as outside and prior to, the social : as (a) determinant insofar as, at the very least, the social realm must adapt to the logic of the "presocial" and impelling logic of technological growth and

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"progress" .' (Robins, p . 24) A view, he continues, which is articulated by many on the Left including the csE communications group . For these writers, `cable technology is fundamentally neutral, and the central issue is whether policies can be implemented for its democratic (rather than authoritarian) use' (Robins, p . 24) . These criticisms spill over into other areas . According to Robins, the CSE group is caught up `in a kind of binary logic in which the state (rational planning) and capital (the anarchy of the market) are the two poles .' His vehement rejection of the belief in capital's benevolence is matched by his refusal to accept the group's `ultimate belief in the salving capacity of the state' (Robins, p . 9) . This refusal to see 'statism' as a workable alternative to present trends is based on a theoretical reading of the stateeconomy relationship and a different conception of the role and nature of technology . Against its [the CSE group] technicist and instrumental conception, I want to argue that technologies exist only within the context of a particular organisation of production and social life, expressing and mediating the social relations specific to that historical and social configuration . In capitalist societies, technology becomes an expression of the capital relation . . . (Robins, p . 30) In other words, in periods of crisis - and the word appears rather frequently in his works - new technologies are simply ways to neutralise `society's radical potential and subordinate them to the logic of accumulation and the market' . The main objective of the information revolution is `to extend and intensify its hold over the social totality' (Robins, p . 33) . The total denial of any beneficial consequences inherent in technologies is, implicitly, a complete re-appraisal of the role of technologies in capitalist societies . Such an appraisal requires the total rejection of whole groups of technologies because of their common points of origin within capitalist society . Moreover, it hints at, though does not substantiate, the possibility of technologies designed and developed within an alternative (socialist) framework . These propositions are highly problematic but they do highlight the concern over the historical origins of particular technologies and their subsequent uses . Unfortunately, this position leads one, almost inevitably, to consider worthwhile only those proposals for radical change which are able to tackle the new communications technologies and their convergence in their totality . Thus strategies for cable, for videotex and so on are, for

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Robins, insignificant because they do not begin to confront the `ways in which society itself is being annexed, exploited and transformed in the current restructuring of capital' (Robins, p . 63) . There is, in Robins, `no basis for intervention' (Slade, 1983 : 46) . The nature of the task ahead does not escape Robins' attention and he readily admits this . But, he leaves himself open to criticism because he, unlike those he criticises, can make no specific proposals . If his call for `a politics of information' is merely an (academic) afterthought then it is disingenuous for it is -not meant ; if it is a considered remark then it is a teaser . Either way we are no nearer to an alternative . Even his work with Webster only seems to confirm the difficulties with such statements as there is `the need for a social and political refusal of new technologies' (Robins and Webster, 1983) . The reconstruction of a new policy is a difficult task but unless this is done, Thatcher's views will not only appear as coherent and considered but, in Murdock and Golding's word, as `visionary' (Murdock and Golding, p . 32) . Robins' thorough discussion of capital and its present crisis are at such a high theoretical level as not to be easily translatable into practical steps . Whilst accepting that all on the Left are in broad general agreement as to some final objective, it is difficult to see the process by which that goal is to be achieved in Robins' work . Nevertheless, the general criticism he makes of instrumentalism and technicism are well argued and perhaps more pertinent than would at first appear . They can be directed at those who, like Hughes and McCartney, suggest that `an alliance between capital and the labour movement is possible in the development of an expansion of cable systems' (Hughes and McCartney, p . 8) . As I shall argue more fully below, to put forward this view is to overlook the processes which new technologies put into motion and whose effects would not necessarily be lessened or minimised on account of this `alliance' . But by rejecting technicism and instrumentalism, Robins cuts himself off from any suggestions for change which fall short of total world change . In other words, his account can, unfortunately, be readily and easily dismissed as `unrealistic' . Other participants in these debates, e .g . the Labour Party Media Study Group, Hughes and McCartney, do not accept Robins' analysis nor his strategy . Their point of departure, as indicated above, is the quite different view of technological change which they adopt . In the main, they see technologies as being open to alternative, including socialist, uses . A clear exponent of this view is Raymond Williams . His book Television: Technology and Cultural Form (1974) was an early attempt to

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address these issues . Williams argues that technologies are products of particular social systems and so are made to fit into those social systems . Thus cable television and satellite broadcasting and presumably all information technologies will be developed in such a way as to extend the profitability of capitalist enterprises ; they `may have an adverse effect on culture as commercial logic forces them to go for cheap, mass entertainment and they may also have adverse industrial effects through the shedding of labour and so on . Any technology is therefore developed with intent and for uses which are known and central to that technology' (Williams, p . 14) . But such uses are not predetermined nor unalterable . It is important that people identify the real processes behind technological change so as to challenge them and possibly alter them . `There are,' he writes, contradictory factors, in the whole social development, which may make it possible to use some or all of the new technology for purposes quite different from those of the existing social order . . . the choices and uses actually made will in any case be part of a more general process of social development, social growth and social struggle . (Williams, p . 135) Although his concerns are primarily cultural, his analysis can be applied more widely . The point being that unless there is a `social struggle', future developments will be spoken for by existing interests . With hindsight, it is easy to see that this is precisely what has happened . In terms of cable, the government's decisions have denied the public rights of access and have ensured that entertainment produced and marketed by existing multinational media conglomerates, e .g . Murdoch's Sky Channel, dominate the scene . As regards cable's more industrial/ commercial uses, these will be mainly consumer (e .g. teleshopping) or financial (e .g . home-banking) ones : namely, ones that will generate revenue and profit . Educational and similar services are less often proposed or privately supported ; it will be up to public institutions to supply and fund them . One approach that falls well within this perspective is that adopted by Hughes and McCartney and so heavily criticised by Robins . Though they do not specifically explore the issue of the nature and roots of technological change, their position suggests, albeit implicitly, that technologies can be adapted for noncapitalist purposes . After all, their proposals are based on the idea that capital and the labour movement together can deliver the national, cultural and industrial benefits of technological development .

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Their more detailed proposals have what may be considered an even more curious origin . Contrary to Robins' claims, they seem to disfavour state intervention since, for them, state intervention is nothing more than `a classic example of the state "servicing" the needs of capital' ; the Conservative government's actions are therefore an abdication of the state's organising role . This abdication, in conjunction with the financial difficulties of the cable companies, increases the likelihood of `an alliance between capital and the labour movement' . Disaffected private interests would, in other words, welcome and agree to the socially useful plans that the labour movement puts forward . They write ` . . . it is now possible for Labour local authorities to use an alliance with capital to "hive on" the needs and wishes of the labour movement to the private interests which are not being served by the present government's approach' (Hughes and McCartney, pp . 8-9) . These alliances, or consortia, would consist of local authorities and a myriad of local private and public telecommunications interests . Its task would be to plan industrial development in the communications industry rather than concentrate on cable per se . It would firstly explore existing facilities, increase their utilisation and finally plan the upgrading and development of the local telecommunication system . It is unclear, however, what the status of the participants would be . Hughes and McCartney only insist that they would be open to different roles and that consortia would comprise a range of relationships from simple information exchanges to financial/legal links . Since the aim is to achieve flexibility, it is left to others to determine who will link up with whom and in what way . There are, it is clear, many weaknesses in this plan but only three concern us here . Firstly, it is extraordinary that having described (and dismissed?) state intervention, they would readily recommend a similar role for local authorities . Would not such a consortia merely divert public funds for private profit? Would it not work to the advantage of private interests? Secondly, why should private interests join up with local authorities unless there was a monetary inducement? Finally, the idea of 'hiving on' socially useful projects, e .g . interactivity for trade unionists, hardly touches upon the broader potential of information technologies . Taken together one can sympathise with the tenor of Robins' critique concerning the severe limitations of the Hughes and McCartney analysis . Even though they aim to appeal to local authorities with these plans, it is clear that the general nature of their thinking is too loose to allow for direct application in the real world . Too much remains unsaid and unresolved .

Information Technology Hughes and McCartney were correct though in thinking that certain local Labour authorities would be interested in clawing back some of cable's promise for public use . Both the (now defunct) GLC and Sheffield Council decided to initiate a public debate and publish proposals of their own so as to intervene in the development of the new technologies . For these authorities these were real issues and they felt that they could not, and that they ought not, be removed from an area of development which had local and community-wide effects and implications . At the outset, they refused to put forward and adopt either a policy of rejectionism or one that entertained the possibility of reversion to `the status quo ante' (Economic Policy Group, 1982 : 22) . Instead they attempted to formulate a policy which would fully exploit a new technology and so `guide and steer the technology in desirable directions' in order to ensure that it meets `people's real social needs' and allows for `interactivity' (EPG, p . 74) . The central and local states are seen as providing direction and funding for cable developments and as encouraging and supporting moves towards greater access to the means of communication, greater democracy and more representation . The GLC report notes, for example, that `the benefits of local authority representation in a cable consortium would be to bring an element of democratic accountability as well as broadening the basis and aiding the financial stability of the consortium' (EPG, p . 76) . A great many other features of the plan flow from this key proposal . Local authorities would ensure that community interests were represented, that profitable services would subsidise unprofitable ones, that local access and community productions would develop and so on . The role of the local authority is then twofold : it sets real limits to the excesses of free-market behaviour and it facilitates the democratisation process . This second role is critical for it achieves singlehandedly one change that the Left desires . It socialises and democratises the cable system by placing it firmly at the local level and under local jurisdiction . This commitment to localism is part of a much broader reaction to statist positions and a belief in localism as a necessary step towards some form of socialism . As Mattelart and Piemme write : `It is important . . . to clearly distinguish the movement towards decentralisation, when it looms to consolidate a faltering, centralised power, from an idea of decentralisation as a constituent element of popular hegemony' (1984 : 221) . How one is to distinguish between these two movements or achieve the latter within existing social relations are problems that remain unexplored . Shorn of its rhetoric, the GLC report is noteworthy in that it

The process of social struggle

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attempts to present a coherent strategy for the local authorities to adopt . That strategy is made up of several strands . Firstly, a publicly-funded publicly-constructed and owned network for London, for example ; secondly, public and private sector consortia applying for franchises and, thirdly, the cross-subsidisation of `unprofitable access and minority narrow cast programmes by the profitable business, information and entertainment channels' (EPG, p . 77) . Though specific details are missing, this approach has the advantage of setting out a clear view of the private and public divide and it attempts to resolve it by allowing for joint operations though only with regards to the provision of services and programming . This sort of approach does not differ greatly from that proposed by the Labour Party Media Study Group . Briefly, this saw the need for a 'longer-term response' based on the full participation of local authorities at both national and local level . There are a number of interesting features here . The proposed structure sets out prohibitions (a maximum of 13 per cent and a quota on imports), restrictions (no cross ownership) and regulations (10 per cent of channels for non-commercial use ; 40 per cent for use on commercial terms; 20 per cent interactive) . As for funding, a 10 per cent levy on cable operators' gross annual revenue would be needed to fund local, non-profit services (Appendix A) . This particular solution goes beyond structural changes only for it also suggests another aspect which is current in some of the analyses . This is the question of accountability and responsibility . The desire for greater doses of both is by no means new, nor the preserve of the Left . Indeed, the Conservative government has used it as an argument in its plans for abolishing the GLC as well as for privatising BT. But the Left sees these twin concerns as ever-present in attempts to democratise structures . This view runs right through Labour Party thinking . In its 1978 document on the Arts and the People, for example, it stated its prime objective as the creation of `a democratic and decentralised administration for the arts' . This would consist of `effective participation' by consumers, workers in the field, local government and central government (Labour Party, 1978) . There are certain clear parallels here with the Labour Party's paper which proposes the setting up of local boards made up of `representatives of local authorities, members representative of the demographic, cultural and economic composition of the community' (Labour Party Media Study Group, Appendix A : 2) and members nominated by the national cable authority . Similar proposals are made by Murdock and Golding . They suggest that the cable franchising process should be made more open, and

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there should be backing for community and access service and that the regulatory bodies should be strengthened . These ideas are hardly ones which will, in their words, get to `grips with the undemocratic, unrepresentative and paternalistic faces of our present public institutions' (Murdock and Golding, p . 36) . Whilst these structural changes, and their underlying philosophies, are both welcome and commendable, it is difficult to see them as anything other than problematic . There is, for instance, the presumption that local authority participation leads to democratisation and accountability . But is this so for all authorities, of all political shades and across all regions? The lessons of political sociology suggest that the road to a greater degree of participation in society is a more difficult one to travel than the one sketched by the above commentators . Furthermore, there is no reason to think that private capital would be a willing partner in any sort of public/private consortia nor any faith in local authorities' abilities to cope with this new technological field . The experiences of the last few years suggest that private capital would have been rather wary of getting involved in these risky ventures under a Labour administration . Apart from its belief that the primary task is to slow things down and `create the maximum commercial uncertainty' (Labour Party Media Study Group, p . 1), the Labour Party's commitment to nationalisation did have the effect of creating an atmosphere of suspicion and doubt amongst cable operators . It is unlikely that private capital would have risked investing in these enterprises under a Labour administration . Some of the reasons for this are fairly obvious . In addition to the ever-present threat of public takeover of resources, the proposals for regulation, restrictions and imposed limits on profitability were all equally disliked . In general, they reflect the perceived conflict as between the needs of capital and the desires of a socialist government . But it should be noted that this tension is only one form of the tension between the needs of capital and the needs of the state . It has often been argued that the reason for an absence of an industrial strategy in Britain - so desired by many on the Left and on the Right - is that there is no consensus or common agreement as between government and industry . There is little `sensitivity', on the part of government, to industry's needs and little `awareness', on the part of the business community, of the `national interest' (Green, 1981 : 346) . This has even been true of the recent Conservative government's policy on the new information technologies as the changes in capital allowances and the lack of a coherent policy demonstrates . Such dissonance would obviously be compounded by a Labour government . But there is also, however, the point that

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there appears to be an absence of `consensus within government' (Green, 1981 : 347) . This has been true of the 1979-84 period with the Treasury, Department of Trade and Industry and the Home Office vying for supremacy - and would probably be equally true of a Labour government . A GLC/Labour Party type policy may overcome some of the major points of conflict between the needs of capital and the needs of a socialist state, but not all . Since, following Robins and Murdock and Golding, it is generally agreed that the new technologies are part of the process of restructuring with consequent job losses, it is difficult to see how a socialist strategy would overcome this dilemma . How would, for example, the GLC have dealt with `the needs of capital' which are antithetical to its own stated commitment to jobs etc .? It is not possible to ignore these dilemmas since they are central to discussions of future technological change . Certain processes of restructuring are encapsulated within the new technologies . In fact, they are part of the changes that the new technologies put into motion : it is part and parcel of the duality of technological change - that there are `good' and `bad' consequences in all new technologies and these cannot be separated (Ellul, 1962 ; Dizard, 1982) . The longer-term approach proposed by the Labour Party makes these problems rather obvious . It is difficult to see the 40 per cent of channels devoted to commercial use - for example, banking or pay-irv - not having a knock-on effect on existing services and industries . Also, and despite the 13 per cent import quota, it is difficult to see how entertainment channels will not have an impact on the existing broadcasting services . These two examples illustrate how attempts to introduce the new technologies under a sort of `benevolent' management and within a `mixed economy' will do little to minimise the overall effects of technological change . There are other problems with the Labour Party paper . In its attempts to reverse the trends towards media conglomeration, it recommends that there should be little cross-ownership and cross-subsidisation between cable operators and other media interests . The economics of cable make this proposal impossible but more than this it ignores other, equally undesirable, linkages between cable ownership and the ownership of industrial enterprises . In other words, it is too narrow in its vision of cable technology and its industrial developments .

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A way forward . . . ?

The above `Cook's tour' of the Left's recent work on the new technologies raises several key issues which need to be resolved if the public is to be convinced of alternatives . But as I have tried to show, each has weaknesses . These weaknesses are related to the

Information Technology

major questions highlighted in the early part of this paper : namely, should the new technologies be welcomed and on what or whose terms? Other issues flow from these . What appears to be missing in the above accounts is a clear, and workable, vision of how future change ought to be engineered . There are numerous reasons for this . Firstly, technological change has usually come about as a stage of industrial change which breaks down traditional patterns of employment and communality . The Left's reaction has then been, as noted above, a reaction ; that some have had to turn to `the political economy of General Ludd' (Robins and Webster, 1983 : 207) for inspiration illustrates the historical continuity that informs all critiques . But more critical than this reaction is the Left's inability to generally welcome, as well as foresee, industrial change ; for many it seems to appear suddenly and only leaves sufficient room for an 'immediate response' . And this response further limits the range of available options : co-operation leaves one open to the criticism of believing in the progressive nature of technological change whilst non-cooperation entails the belief that `reality can be radically other than what is subordinated to the logic of capital' (Robins and Webster, 1983 : 207) . Strategies of the `middle range' are naive because they assume that the needs of public and private capital can be easily reconciled . As more rapid technological change takes place and establishes itself, it becomes increasingly difficult for the Left to overturn policies . To then advocate a return to public ownership or local authority direction does little either to encourage private investment (in the present or in a future consortium) or to suggest that there are imaginative alternative policies ready to be implemented . These are real problems that will confront a future (socialist) Labour government and are not the sole preserve of academe . My objectives in this paper have not been to denigrate accounts produced by others but to point out some of their inconsistencies . Yet a future socialist government would have to deal with these issues ; it can either confront them or accept that radical social change will not take place and so propose limited reforms . My own preference would be for an approach which sets out clear priorities for the future . This would involve settling the issue of BT and Mercury ; these are national telecommunications enterprises touching all our lives . Whether it needs to get involved in other aspects of IT, such as micro-computer policy, interactive services, cable television or satellite broadcasting is another issue . There has been a readiness to accept uncritically much of the imaginative writing on IT and this has infected otherwise sensible work . Even Locksley writes that `IT offers the prospects for a

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liberated, leisured, egalitarian society' (Locksley, 1986 : 104) without seriously considering the worth of his remarks . More broadly, I would suggest that it is time to rethink whether public ownership (or even the social ownership currently in vogue) of the `national grid' is the way foward ; are attempts to exert control over the communication systems so as to ensure that they meet wider social objectives a plausible alternative? A positive regulatory framework for telecommunications which marries business needs with social objectives sidesteps discussions of ownership and control but reintroduces the themes of ends and objectives . This rejection of some suggestions that governments ought, as of right, to intervene in all aspects of IT is also based on two other factors . Firstly, the well-known point that many of the publicised services on the proposed grid are available today on existing systems, e .g . Prestel . Do we then require a completely new infrastructure for purposes which are unknown and untried and which can be incorporated onto existing networks? Secondly, is the investment that will be required for the construction of the national grid, the best way to spend such large sums? Will it undo all the ills of a society whose welfare services are creaking, whose industries are facing severe international competition and where unemployment is notoriously high? It is not easy to see how the construction of a national grid will alleviate all our social ills . It will not create many jobs (Jefferson, 1984) and will not benefit the public greatly : teleshopping, tele-banking and more television entertainment are hardly the cornerstone of a future socialist society . And yet, it is possible to derive benefit from the national grid (or local grids) if the right policies are chosen . Hughes and McCartney suggested that local authorities could `hive on' socially useful cable services onto the publicly-owned but consortium-directed local networks . This is a welcome idea though it would be preferable if the 'hiving on' could be part of the regulatory structure so that privately-owned cable systems would need to provide access channels, for example . Unfortunately, with the abolition of the metropolitan councils, there is now no base from which such an alternative strategy could derive . The Labour Party paper argued that the Conservative government's policies would produce `egg on its face' as predicted developments failed to take place . This has indeed happened to a limited extent but it has been relatively easy for the government to distance itself from failures and to blame the vagaries of the market place . Moreover, it can also point to the educational value of testing the market to find out what is, and is not, required .

Information Technology Would not an enormously costly GLC-type funded London-wide fibre optic cable system also have risked failing and would not this publicly-funded failure have been even more horrendous? The merit of a private cable system is that one can benefit from its bandwidth without necessarily incurring the full costs . And there is nothing in the Left's suggestions for the future that cannot be incorporated onto a well-regulated cable system . The key feature here then is the control over resources rather than a blind attachment to public ownership as the way forward . One can then start thinking about local access, representative boards and the like as the means to fill up the statutory access, community and other local uses that one would desire . Though this `plan' may appear to avoid many of the central issues raised above it does not in reality do so . Its premise is that technological change will inevitably take place in our societies and that it does need to be challenged and perhaps redirected to different uses . And such struggles can take place at many levels and even when change is not under public direction . It is, however, imperative that the Left does not become mesmerised by the hyped up promise of the new technologies . Certainly, there is a need to highlight the trends and directions of development so as to inform debates and struggles . But such action should be part and parcel of a national (and international) moral and political debate about social change generally . The new technologies, however important, are only a small fraction of the whole and should not occupy an undue importance in our thoughts . For without some general public and popular support for alternative social strategies, the left will not only have lost in the cable debates but the public will have lost their welfare services and public corporations to a government intent on reducing the range of public choices .

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References Dizard W . (1982) The Coming Information Age (Longman) . Economic Policy Group (1982) Cabling in London . Ellul J . (1962) `The Technological Order', Technology and Culture 3 . Frankel B . (1983) Beyond the State . Dominant Theories and Socialist Strategies (Macmillan) . Garnham N . (1985) `Telecommunications Policy in the UK', Media, Culture and Society, Vol . 7, No. 1, January . Green D . (1981) `Promoting the industries of the future : the search for an industrial strategy in Britain and France', Journal of Public Policy, Vol . 1, Part 3, pp . 333-351 . Hughes P. & McCartney N . (1983) `Behind the news : Cable Technology', Capital & Class, No. 19, Spring, pp. 5-14 . Jefferson G . (1984) `The Industrial and Employment Implications of the Cable Revolution', National Economic Development Council, April . Johnstone B . (1984) `A new minister, but does this mean a new policy for IT?', The Times, 18 September . Labour Party (1983) The new hope for Britain . Labour Party Media Study Group (1983) Cable TV (discussion paper). Labour Party (1978) The Arts and the People . Levie H . (1983) `Britain goes to the sales', Marxism Today, April. Locksley G . (1986) `Information Technology', Capital & Class, Winter . Mattelart A . & Piemme J-M . (1984) `Twenty-three guidelines for a political debate on communication in Europe', in Mosco V . & Wasko J . (eds), The Critical Communications Review, Vol . 2, Changing Patterns of Communication Control, pp . 211-223 . Murdock G . & Golding P. (1983) `Privatising Pleasure-the Communications Revolution', Marxism Today, 10, Vol . 27, October, pp. 3236 . Robins, K . (1983) Capital and Cable . Robins K. & Webster F . (1979) `Mass Communications and Information Technology', in Miliband R . & Saville J ., The Socialist Register 1979, pp . 285-316 . Robins K . & Webster F . (1983) `Information Technology, Luddism and the Working Class', in Mosco V . & Wasko J . (eds), The Critical Communications Review, Vol . 1, The Working Class and the Media (Ablex) . Sheffield Tv Group (1983) Cable and Community Programming. Slade, J . (1983) Communication Technologies and Society : Conceptions of Causality and the Politics of Technological Intervention (Ablex). Williams, R . (1984) Television : Technology and Cultural Form (Fontana). Woolnough, R . (1984) `Deregulation : past, present and future', Communications International, September .

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David Goss

Instant Print: Technology and capitalist control

• THE GROWTH of `instant' print can be witnessed in any major shoping street . This article examines the labour process strategies through which small instant print employers exercise control and enforce sweat shop conditions on vulnerable, nonunion labour . In particular, attention is drawn to the differences which distinguish the `new wave' of instant print shops from the `rat houses' which historically have been part of the general printing industry . It is suggested that employer strategies developed in the instant print shops have implications for struggles between capital and labour in the wider printing industry .

The emergence of instant printing Instant print shops are enterprises which specialise in the production of relatively small quantities of printed material where high standards of graphic reproduction are not required . The technology used by instant print shops is not, in itself, particularly revolutionary . Relatively unsophisticated and simple-to-operate small offset lithographic printing presses of the sort used by many offices and colleges for internal duplicating predominate . The main advances have been in the areas of computer composition (typesetting) and plate-making . These formerly timeconsuming, expensive and skilled tasks have, by the application

Instant print has transformed traditional jobbing printing ; technical innovations coupled with a new consumer orientation have served to deskill and `feminise' the work and to take it out of the arena of union control . The paper shows how Msc youth schemes have aided and abetted the casualisation process.

Capital & Class

of micro-electronics, been fully automated and deskilled . Artwork, for example, usually comes as part of computer typesetting software and provides standard designs, layouts, etc ., eliminating the need for the fully skilled graphic artist or compositor . In fact the Prontaprint franchise organisation gives only four weeks' training to make novice franchisees competent in the `art' of instant printing . This type of instant print `package' was first marketed in the UK (to both public and would-be enterpreneurs) by franchise organisations such as Prontaprint and Kallkwik, although many `independent' instant print shops have followed in their wake .' Instant print is aimed specifically at servicing small businesses . As such the bulk of work handled by instant printers involves the printing of business stationery, labels, receipt books, advertising and publicity matter for local small businesses, social clubs and associations . 2 In all cases, however, the emphasis is upon the provision of a fast, customer-friendly and financially competitive service . There is a heavy emphasis upon marketing . The use of prominent high street locations and bright interior and exterior design give the appearance of the more familiar and inviting retail shop rather than the workshop or factory . Behind the glossy facade, however, is the reality of sweat shop conditions for many young, vulnerable workers .

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Small printing firms and new forms of exploitation

The general printing industry has always been dominated by small firms to the extent that 95 per cent of workers are employed in firms with less than 100 employees (Bollard, 1982) . Despite this, the efforts of the craft unions to organise such firms have traditionally been successful, even in the provinces, backed by a variety of `boycotting' or `closing' strategies . 3 The success of such strategies is attributable, on the one hand, to the interdependence between many small printing firms and large enterprises within, or closely connected to the printing industry . Thus, organised workers in the latter have been able to refuse to handle sub-contract work from, or supply materials to, nonunion houses . On the other hand, many employers have been, to a greater or lesser extent, genuinely dependent upon skilled labour, the supply of which has been regulated through union control of the apprenticeship system (Child, 1967 ; Musson, 1954) . A sector of the general printing industry has, however, always proved difficult for the unions to organise . This `rat trade' has a history of exploitation, poor conditions and low wages . The `rat trade' firms tend to be independent of large capital, `operating in niches that consist of small local/specialised markets ignored by large[r] firms' (Schutt & Whittington, 1984) and, hence,

Instant print relatively immune from the type of union strategies described above : In these `rat' houses, small offices in country towns, where boys multiplied, many employers never bothered about indentures . Literally hundreds of instances were reported [to the Typographical Association in 1895] of unbound lads working at the trade . (Musson, 1954) The work produced by such offices has typically been restricted to small-scale jobbing printing, that is, producing small quantities of, frequently one-off, jobs for a variety of small, local customers . Larger printing firms have ignored this area on account of the competitive pricing needed to attract, and keep, small customers, long down-times between jobs, and the cost of constantly changing from one short production run to another. For these reasons this has been the traditional starting ground for the self-employed craft worker or small employer (Goss, 1986 : Ch . 4) . Even in these unfavourable conditions the unions retained some indirect control by encouraging self-employed craft workers to retain honorary membership of the union and insisting on `recognised' labour for any expansion into markets where unionised firms operated (Musson, 1954 ; Goss, 1986 : Ch . 3) . Until the mid-1970s, this market remained relatively stagnant, a function of its localism and dependence upon a traditional and (in printing terms) low level of technology, coupled with union restrictions upon expansion-without-recognition . Unofficially, at least, the policy of the craft unions appears to have been to turn a blind eye to the very small `rat' houses on the basis that their existence would be short and unproblematic . Over the past decade, however, developments in printing technology and the marketing offensives of the franchise companies have opened small-scale jobbing printing to extensive development and exploitation, establishing instant print as the `cutting edge' of an `alternative', non-union, printing industry (Gennard & Dunn, 1983) . For capital, the greatest potential advantage to be gained from the development of instant print lies in its use of unskilled labour : new workers can be quickly and inexpensively trained `on the job' and, as an added bonus, need have no contact with printing trade unionism . This undermines the craft workers' traditional barrier against the uncontested extraction of surplus value . Indeed, the advance of capital in this area has, significantly, kept the labour process fragmented . The separation of `jobbing' from other areas of the printing industry is retained : in particular, through the franchising of instant print shops and the encouragement of franchisees drawn from outside the printing trade . This ensures a'separation' between the traditional (organised) printing industry and instant C/C >1--F

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print .' At the same time, of course, the extreme decentralisation of control which franchising entails fragments labour and militates against union organisation, at both workplace and regional/ national level (Pearson, 1985) . Franchisees can seek out and exploit areas of cheap unskilled labour previously unavailable to capital in the printing industry . However, although the recent development of instant print has been led by the franchise operators, albeit in the guise of a multiplicity of supposedly independent businesses (Labour Research, 1986), the technological developments and heightened demand have also created conditions favourable to independent small enterprises . The sampling frame used in the present research, for example, contained three franchise operators with a total of nine outlets and 26 independent firms calling themselves instant print shops . The data for this paper is taken from a larger study of firms operating in the general printing industry in South East England, conducted during 1983-4 (Goss, 1986) . For present purposes, however, only instant print firms (as characterised above) independently and actively managed by their owner are considered . The six firms falling into this category were all very small, employing less than ten workers . The sample did not include any franchised instant print shops 5 but subsequent contacts with instant print franchisees suggest that, in terms of labour process organisation and techniques of valorisation, there is little practical difference between them and the `independents' . It may therefore be that my results will apply equally to franchised instant print shops, at least at the level of labour process organisations Instant print and The employers in the study clearly recognised the labour market the labour process advantages associated with instant print particularly when compared with what they considered to be the restrictive and `militant' practices of the printing unions in the industry generally . The following quotations were typical of the views expressed : Long periods of training aren't necessary any more in this business, not that they ever were really, they've all been built up by the unions to protect their own interests . Anybody can learn or be taught to do it, in a matter of weeks if they've got any common sense, not years like the unions say . As far as I'm concerned that's a joke . Nobody learns a trade nowadays . If I buy a printing machine the manufacturers run a school you can send an operator to to learn to use that machine, and they can just become a machine operator within a week or a fortnight . They just do what they're told and make the machine

Instant print

function, they learn it parrot-fashion, they just perform that particular function. I haven't looked on the market for skilled printers, the lad that I have now I took on on the YOP [Youth Opportunity Programme] 7 scheme and was very pleased with the way he worked out and so I took him on after that . So long as they've got some basic common sense you can teach them to do things the way you want them done, which is what it's all about . Because these instant print employers were able to bypass union regulation of the labour market they were able to impose extensive controls over labour process organisation . Indeed, they consciously selected workers least able or likely to resist the imposition of sweat-shop conditions : in particular, the young unemployed . Half of those employed in the instant print shops studied were on, or had been recruited through, the Yop scheme, whilst another third had been unemployed immediately before their present job; 60 per cent were under 20 years of age and all were under 30 . Significantly, in an industry where the production process has traditionally been dominated by men, one-third of the instant print process workers were women . 8 However, instant print seems unlikely to be opening up significant new opportunities for women for, as with most deskilled labour processes, employers (who are generally men) see women as an obvious source of cheap, compliant labour : the `nimble fingers and dull brain' thesis . That these were precisely the `qualities' sought in the instant print shop is illustrated in the following quotation ; the gendering of the `typical' miscreant is, of course, significant : You don't want the guy with 10 `O' Levels because he will just be bored to tears after a while and he will break up the shop and be a renegade, or he will just leave and any training you've given him is a waste of time . He might even go and set up in competition with you . You want someone with the ability to sustain hard work, not someone who is brilliant . In general, the employment of young workers (male and female) can have significant economic advantages for employers, particularly at a time of high unemployment . In fact the average wage paid to the workers in the study (those not receiving the MSC-funded £25 YOP allowance) was £42 for a 44-hour week, significantly below the average weekly earnings for the printing and publishing industry as a whole : £155 for a 37 .6-hour week (New Earnings Survey, 1982) . 8 Further evidence of poor conditions has been confirmed by a more recent Low Pay Unit study of instant print shops in London which found that apart from low

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wages and long hours, 3 in 10 firms gave no paid holidays (Labour Research, 1986) . Whilst the utilisation of cheap labour is well established in many industrial sectors (Rainnie, 1984 ; Pearson, 1985) its emergence in the printing trade on a systematic and extensive basis represents a new twist in the struggle for control of the labour process, one which subverts established craft controls and thereby opens new and potentially fruitful areas for the extraction and realisation of absolute surplus value . Indeed, the subordination of labour to capital characteristic of the instant print shops is `direct' and autocratic (Friedman, 1977 ; Edwards, 1979) . Firstly, discipline and the determination of wage levels are the sole prerogative of the employer, who claims the `right' to determine the worth of a particular job, to decide how it should be carried out, and to offer it to a worker on a `take it or leave it' basis . For example : I say [to an employee], `Right, I can afford this much, is that enough?' and he's then got to make the decision : yes it is enough and he will stay ; or no it isn't enough and he will go . A contract of employment is a negotiation between the bloke who's doing the job and a bloke who's paying for it to be done . If he's doing a job that only pays me £1 an hour, then there's no sense in my paying him £2 an hour . You've got to pay people according to what they're worth, you've got to cut your cloth according to your means . And this is what the unions don't understand . They'd come in here and say, `I want this, I want that!' and I'd end up paying a totally unrealistic rate which would ruin me and destroy the business . I'm the one that has taken all the risks and this is what they do not understand, they always want something for nothing . You can't employ people who are going to argue the toss over everything you tell them to do, or who always think they know better than you do . When you give someone a job you are doing them a favour basically, you are giving them a way to earn a livelihood, and you've got a right to be in charge . That's how I see it and that's how it works here . I don't believe in fringe benefits and things like that . You think of the miners and their tons of coal, or the builders with bricks that fall off the back of a lorry or something . I believe that people ought to be paid for the work they do and that's an end to it . Otherwise they come to expect all these types of things and before you know it it's become a part of their wage, but really you're paying them for doing nothing, as a favour almost, and there's no sense in that .

Instant print

Secondly, employers were anxious to restrict the right of workers to join a trade union and to prevent union penetration of their enterprises . This appeared as a conscious anti-union strategy, directed particularly at the printing unions, thus : Well I think the unions have buggered up the printing industry like they've buggered up every other thing they've got their fingers on . Once the unions get control it's selfdestruct automatically built in . A good employee doesn't need a union to fight for him, so long as he's worth it his employer will always hang on to him . From my point of view the printing unions are in the Victorian age . They're totally self-centred and they're trying to hold up progress . They're stopping businessmen from entering the industry, they're going to starve the industry of real business enterprise which is what creates jobs. That's why I won't give them house-room. I'm strongly anti-union to be honest . I think they do the industry no good whatsoever, or any industry come to that . There was a time, 50 or 100 years ago, when they might have done some good, but now times have changed and the unions are way too powerful . To be frank, it would be a condition of employment here that you were not a union member . I would not employ anyone who was . We are not a union house and I hope that situation will continue . I don't really want the union in, I don't think the union these days is doing its job . A few hundred years ago they had their place and they certainly did a lot of good for the working man . But to me, looking at it as the person on the other side, it doesn't seem like they're doing the right things . I'm not interested in the printing unions . I don't think they've got any role to play in a place like this, no role whatsoever, the people who come here come here because they want to, they come here for a job and not to join a union . Finally, genuine training, also, was seen to be a consideration of minimal importance and, like union representation, to be denied workers where possible . The following attitudes were typical : We aren't interested here in training them to be printers in the old sense, that just isn't necessary to turn out the sort of work that we do . The idea of the traditional all-round craftsman is in my view an anachronism .

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There isn't much in the way of training really, it's mostly a case of picking it up as you go along . This is the good thing about being small, because you can teach people to do it how you want it done . If I take someone on I will show them what I want them to do and I will stay with them while they do it . Thus, in terms of the organisation of the labour process, the pervasive presence of the employer and the deskilled technology, meant that control over workers was not only direct but also extensive ; as one employee explained : You've got to play it by ear and be a bit careful what you say . If the boss starts going on about something, even if you don't agree, you've got to keep quiet and pretend to agree, even if you don't. That way you don't get into an argument, you've just got to grin and bear it, humour him almost . You can't want to upset him because you just get picked on, taking the piss and that, until you blow up, and then you're out . There would seem to be little doubt that high levels of unemployment, coupled with the political/legal offensive by the Thatcher government against the working class, particularly the young unemployed and trade unionists have contributed to this process of subordination within the labour process, placing the initiative in the hands of capital . Indeed, the widely publicised `fact' that trade unions and overpaid youth are largely to blame for unemployment has been galvanised in the training `initiatives' of the Msc. In the early 1980s YoP, in particular, played an important role in the instant print shops as a means of recruiting cheap labour and controlling workers . For employers YoP provided `a pool of cheap and vulnerable labour from which they can pick and choose their recruits' (Finn, 1984 : 23) . The following quotations illustrate this view : I get all my staff through the YoP scheme and things like that ; it provides an ideal way of training staff . The government pays the wages for six months while you train them . That has proved ideal because you end up with staff that can at least support their own wages from the moment you start paying them . It [yop] does allow you to train someone up cheaply, which is what I think stops a lot of people taking on staff . And as long as you select them fairly carefully you won't find many that aren't any good . But even if you make a mistake at the interview stage you'll know within three weeks whether they're any good or not, and if they're not then its bye-bye .

Instant print

For workers and trainees alike, however, YoP contained two threats . First it attacked their material security by facilitating easy access for employers to the reserve army of labour . Second, it provided an ideological `backdrop' against which the expectations of young workers were developed, that is, by explaining unemployment as the mis-match between young workers' capacities and the characteristics required by employers, it made the complete subordination of labour to capital a precondition of labour market `success' . Both aspects were reflected in the responses of instant print workers, thus :

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If you've got to stay on and do a bit of extra work or something you can't refuse it because you're helping to do something and you don't want to say `No', because you've got to pull yourself because it's so small . If you want to keep a job then you've got to do your share or the boss might as well give you the sack and get someone else who will do it instead . If I hadn't come here on the YoP thing I'd still be on the dole as like as not, and now I've got a steady job and some training so I think it's quite a good thing really . Bosses don't know what you're like really when they take a person on, so if you've been on the scheme they can find out and you'll probably have a job at the end of it because they'll see you're a good worker and give you a chance . It's better being here than on the dole like I was for a while, and I got fed up with that after a while, and now I think I'd rather be doing something even if the pay isn't that good . At least you're not just hanging around all the time getting bored and pissed off. In one case these threats had a real foundation : the employer claimed that, having been made a director in a small traditional family print firm, he had immediately dissolved the old company, making five craft workers redundant, and started a `new' fi m six weeks later as an instant print shop staffed only by himself and three YoP trainees . The case of instant print raises a number of important issues . The implications of this offensive by capital may, for the printing industry at least, spread beyond the issue of poor wages and `unfair' working conditions . Firstly, it provides a grim reminder that behind the Tory government's rhetoric of `small firm revival' lies a reality of poor wages, long hours, limited training and economic insecurity. The case of instant print, however, must also be seen as part of a more

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general restructuring of capital within the printing industry rather than simply a resurgence of petty bourgeois individualism . This has been most visible and dramatic in the world of newspaper printing but it would seem unlikely that, spurred by the ideological acclaim given to Shah and Murdoch and bolstered by Tory legislation, other sections of printing capital will be slow to push home the advantage. Indeed, the GLC report on printing in London indicates that in general print there is a tendency for units of capital, whilst concentrating ownership, to simultaneously fragment production facilities to enable firms `to avoid having a larger and possibly more militant workforce' . Rainnie (1985 : 162) suggests that the tendency towards fragmentation may also be motivated by a desire to seek out areas of relatively weak union organisation . Even if this is not already the case, instant print is likely to provide capitalists in the wider printing industry with both a model and a material asset in the struggle to reassert control over labour and to correct an `imbalance' recognised by a 1967 Court of Enquiry Report in the following reproachful terms : [Printing employers] have not undertaken with necessary vigour, sufficient forward planning to enable them to prepare to meet difficulties in advance . An important result of this negative approach by employers has been that they have permitted the control of certain matters which are normally within the prerogative of employers to pass into the hands of the unions to a degree which in total is, in our view, possibly without parallel in the country . (HMSO, 1967 : 70) On the one hand is the example that, with new technology, an increasingly wide range of general print work can be produced, to acceptable quality, with semi- and unskilled labour . On the other hand is the existence of a growing pool of young workers, unacquainted with trade unionism (printing or otherwise) conditioned to expect low wages and poor working conditions . The existence of such workers may be used by employers, implicitly or explicitly, as a threat to wring concessions from unionised workforces or to challenge directly their jobs . As the Foc of one of the larger printing firms in the present study explained : There are so many small places that aren't affiliated to the unions, and with a firm of this size it's an attraction for people to come here, you get non-union people trying to come in here by the back-door . . . Because this is what the bosses and the government want, to encourage all these non-union people because they will work for nothing, this is why they're always against the closed shop . (Goss, 1986 : 273ff)

Instant print

Indeed, whilst the extent or success of strategies to use such workers as direct substitutes for craft/unionised labour is unknown, there is little doubt that they are an increasingly realistic and attractive proposition for units of capital outside the instant print field . Doubly so when the level of subordination induced by labour market dynamics, state training policy and technology 'cross-cuts' that determined by gender or ethnicity : in the former case, for example, class and gender systems may coincide as a focus for women's subordination to both capital and men . As the proprietor of a `large' general printing firm remarked when discussing the tendency for instant print to bring women into the traditionally male-dominated world of print production : I wouldn't mind some of these women working here ; women are very conscientious, you know, and they're not looking to go on strike ; not like chaps, women are nowhere near as militant as men, generally they just want to get on and do the job and they would be a very good steadying influence in a print firm . They can't afford to be militant, they've got the kids' new school uniform to buy or something, they would be a very good influence . (Goss, 1986 : 222ff) Instant print provides us with a clear example of how small firms (either independently or as `fragments' of larger units of capital) are able to seek out areas of relatively powerless labour and/or low unionisation and install autocratic sweat-shop conditions within the workplace . However, coupled with new technology, Tory anti-union legislation and capital-oriented training schemes, this represents a threat to the organised section of the printing industry far greater than the uneasy and unstable persistence of traditional `rat houses' . It is essential, therefore, that socialists propose and support strategies to protect workers in small firms and extend union representation into such areas .

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Dick Scase, Irene Bruegel and Capital & Class referees Andy Friedman, Steve Tolliday and Jamie Gough for comment and criticisms on previous drafts of this paper .

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Notes 1. Since 1971 the growth of franchised instant print shops has been rapid . Prontaprint alone, Britain's largest chain, had opened nearly 200 shops by 1982 . 2. This is the type of work that sustained the traditional jobbing printer, and although there are no precise figures available, my research in the South East of England did reveal that many such traditional printers were finding it increasingly difficult to compete with instant print shops . These were felt to be taking the simple, and hence profitable, work and leaving only the difficult and time-consuming jobs with small profit margins . 3. `Boycotting' refers to the refusal by union members to handle any work or materials coming from or going to `unrecognised', i .e . nonunion, sources . `Closing' is the practice whereby a union withdraws members from or refuses to allow them to work in an office which does not recognise union regulation . See Musson, 1956 ; Child, 1967 ; Gennard & Dunn, 1984 . 4. During the course of my research the proprietor of one franchised instant print shop admitted that it was an unofficial, but explicit, policy not to offer a franchise to anyone connected with the established printing trade, precisely to avoid such `contamination' . 5. This was to avoid problems of comparability in the original sample resulting from the ambiguous nature of ownership associated with franchising . 6. This may not apply where the franchisee is a limited company operating more than one outlet . In such cases the greater degree of centralisation may make unionisation easier than in cases of scattered individual enterprises . It was under such conditions that the NGA gained recognition in three Liverpool Prontaprint shops controlled by Linsweld Ltd (Labour Research, 1986) . 7. At the time of the study the Youth Opportunity Programme (the forerunner of the present Youth Training Scheme, YTs) was in operation . YOP was initiated by the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) in 1978 with the intention of providing a six-month industrial training period for the growing number of young unemployed . Most of these placements involved Work Experience on Employer's Premises (WEEP), whereby trainees were placed with an employer for a six-month period financed by MSC . There can be little doubt that, in the hands of the Tory government, the principal function of Yol has been to provide employers with cheap, compliant labour (Finn, 1984 ; Allum & Quigley, 1983) . The same can be said of YOP's successor : of those young people fortunate enough to get a job at the end of their YTS `training' in 1985-6, 82 per cent were paid less than £60 per week ; the average weekly wage of all YTs job-finders being £50 (Department of Employment, 1986) . 8. In 1982 only 121 girls compared with 4,394 boys (2 .7 per cent) were apprenticed to the NGA's skilled crafts (Cockburn, 1982 : 164) . 9. Indeed, at 24 per cent of the average hourly printing rate this is well below the overall differential between young and adult workers of 61 per cent, quoted in Allum & Quigley, 1983 : 9 .

Instant print

References Allum & Quigley (1983) `Another brick in the wall', Capital & Class 21 . Bollard A . (1982) Making an Impression : Small Firms in the Printing Industry (Intermediate Technology Publications) . Child J . (1967) Industrial Relations in the British Printing Industry (George Allen & Unwin) . Cockburn C . (1982) Brothers (Pluto) . Department of Employment (1986) 'YTS Leaving Survey', Employment Gazette, December . Edwards R . (1979) Contested terrain (Heinemann) . Finn D . (1983) `Britain's Misspent Youth', Marxism Today 28 . Friedman A . (1977) Industry and Labour (Macmillan) . Gennard J . & Dunn S . (1983) `The Impact of New Technology on the Structure and Organisation of Craft Unions in the British Printing Industry', British Journal of Industrial Relations, March . Gennard J . & Dunn S . (1984) The Closed Shop (Macmillan) . Goss D . (1986) The Social Structure of the Small Firm (PhD Thesis, University of Kent, Canterbury) . HMSO (1967) Court of Enquiry Report on Technical Change in the Printing Industry (Cmnd 3184) . Labour Research (1986) `Franchising - Who Really Benefits?', Labour Research Journal, August . Musson A . (1954) The Typographical Association (Oxford University Press) . Pearson P . (1985) Twilight Robbery (Pluto) . Rainnie A . (1984) `Combined and Uneven Development in the Clothing Industry', Capital & Class 22 . Rainnie A . (1985) `Small Firms, Big Problems', Capital & Class 25 . Schutt J . & Whittington R . (1984) `Large Firms and the Rise of Small Firms', cited in Rainnie (1985) .

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93

Richard Hyman Trade Unions and the Law. Papering over the cracks?

• IF OPINION polls are given any credence, trade unions are not the most popular institutions in contemporary Britain . Even union members themselves - who despite the recession still amount to roughly half of those at work - apparently assent to many of the criticisms voiced by the political right . Unions seem to have done little of any effect to counteract such familiar assertions as that they inhibit economic performance through strikes and restrictive practices ; oppress individual members through undemocratic practices and unrepresentative leadership, and non-members through closed shop arrangements ; or are above the law and wield power which threatens constitutional government . Such anti-union arguments have bulked large in the ideological campaigns of the ascendant hard-liners among British conservatism . Their efficacy contributed to the electoral victories of Heath in 1970 and Thatcher in 1979 and 1983 . These in turn gave rise to such legislative initiatives as the comprehensive Industrial Relations Act of 1971, and the recent series of more specific measures (the Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982 and the Trade Union Act of 1984) . Both marked a radical shift from the consensus underlying `public policy' on industrial relations during most of the past century : that unions and employers should be free to conduct their negotiations, and from time to time engage in strikes and lock-outs, with the minimum of direct

An anti-union stance has been a prominent feature of Thatcherism ; unions have been labelled as undemocratic institutions blocking change and damaging the performance of the UK economy . This has led to a series of legislative measures to curb union power . Richard Hyman documents these changes in the law, places them in historical context, and examines the unions' responses . Discussing political realignments within the British labour movement during the 1980s, the author concludes that unions need to win back support by developing new modes of collective organisation and action as well as restoring a class content to their political and economic struggles .

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intervention by the state or regulation by law . This traditional detachment between legislation and industrial relations - variously known as `voluntarism', 'abstentionism', and `collective laissez-faire'- owed much to the nature of the legal system within which nineteenth-century unions struggled for the right to exist and function . The archaic principles of common law embody an overriding commitment to the rights of property and the sanctity of individual contracts ; and this bias is reinforced by the trained prejudices of the judges whose powers enable them to act, in effect, as surrogate legislators . In consequence, British law contains a built-in presumption that trade unions, strikes, and all other collective efforts by workers to offset their individual weakness in the face of the employer, are illegal conspiracies `in restraint of trade' . Accordingly, the fight for legality primarily involved an attempt to exclude normal trade union activities from the jurisdiction of the courts . The concept of `immunity' from the taint of common law illegality was established in two vital pieces of mid-Victorian legislation, the Trade Union Act of 1871 and the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of 1875 . These initial protections for union action required extension after the judiciary, at the turn of the century, invented new civil liabilities : most notably defining a tort of `civil conspiracy', and ruling that trade unions as such could be sued for damages . The remedy which the unions pursued, and achieved with the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, made unions exempt from civil claims ; excluded the doctrine of conspiracy from actions `in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute' ; and removed some other restrictions recently imposed by the judges . This simple Act of a mere five clauses remained until 1971 the foundation of industrial relations law . Trade union freedoms to organise, to bargain and to strike received no positive statutory backing (hence employes were equally free legally to victimise unionists, sack strikers and refuse to negotiate) ; they were defined negatively by denying the courts the right to interfere .' In general, trade union officials and activists - understandably sceptical of the type of `justice' they could expect from the legal system were committed to this restricted role of the law in industrial relations ; they preferred to rely on their own collective strength in dealing with employers . Even 'pro-labour' law was often considered dangerous ; as recently as 1966 the Tuc declared that : 2 the essential characteristic of free trade unions is that they are responsible to the workpeople themselves who comprise their membership and cannot be directed by any outside agency . No state, however benevolent, can perform the

Trade unions and the law function of trade unions in enabling workpeople themselves to decide how their interests can best be safeguarded . It is where trade unions are not competent, and recognise that they are not competent, to perform a function, that they welcome the state playing a role in at least enforcing minimum standards, but in Britain this role is recognised as the second best alternative to the development by workpeople themselves of the organisation, the competence, the representative capacity, to bargain and to achieve for themselves satisfactory terms and conditions of employment . In general, therefore, because this competence exists, the state stands aside, its attitude being one of abstention, of formal indifference . Historical experience explains why British unions have so long been wedded to `voluntarism' . The question rarely asked either by unionists or by academic analysts - is why employers and governments also supported a system of minimal labour law . A complex interplay of material and ideological factors must provide the explanation . Laissez-faire as a general doctrine articulated the need for the rising class of industrial capitalists to escape the restrictions of feudal economic legislation . Freedom from legal control and state interference met the interests of an industrial bourgeosie confident of its growing ascendancy in civil society . In an era when the `workshop of the world' dominated international trade (with a little help from the military), governments for their part saw little need to intervene in economic affairs . In the sphere of capital-labour relations, most employers - faced with a relatively weak and acquiescent trade union movement - felt no necessity for direct government support ; and the state was content to leave the routine handling of labour to the bosses themselves . That this detachment was conditional is evident from the major historical exceptions : extensive state regulation during both world wars, intermittent use of `emergency powers' during major disputes . In recent decades, with the state more intimately involved in economic relations, with British capital's international hegemony broken, and with a broader based and at times more assertive trade union movement, the material basis for voluntarism was increasingly eroded . Greater state intervention and more extensive industrial relations legislation were thus predictable . 3 The campaign against the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 may be regarded as a remarkably successful defence of the traditional framework; but inevitably this success was only temporary . `Hands off the Unions!' proved an effective rallying cry against both the 1971 Act and the previous Labour government attempt

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to legislate on industrial relations . A decade later the magic has failed to work . Battered and demoralised, British unions in the 1980s have debated whether a new posture is necessary . Meanwhile an opportunist Labour Party leadership has sought to develop an industrial relations strategy which will win both votes and the goodwill of the unions . The dominant assumption is that far greater legal regulation of industrial relations - including the internal affairs of trade unions themselves - is here to stay . In the time-honoured tradition of the British labour movement, this position has been reached pragmatically ; argument has been as far as possible avoided through paper compromises and behindthe-scenes deals ; fundamental questions of the role of law and the state in contemporary capitalism are, naturally, far from the agenda .

A great deal of mythology surrounds the fate of the 1971 Tory

legislation . The Act itself was an unwieldy measure containing 170 clauses and 9 schedules, drawing heavily on the worst elements of American anti-union laws and in many parts shoddily drafted . It sought a comprehensive transformation of British industrial relations : drastically reducing the scope for legal strike action, outlawing the closed shop, and imposing rigid controls on trade union rules and activities . After some equivocation the TUG resolved to instruct member unions not to co-operate with the institutions of the Act . In the face of union defiance, many of the new law's provisions turned out to be ineffectual, irrelevant or counter-productive ; there were few mourners when it was repealed following the defeat of the Heath government in 1974 . Within the trade union movement the conclusion was widely drawn that united opposition would suffice to defeat any future exercise in anti-union legislation . Such confidence was illfounded . The 1971 Act reflected far more the anti-collectivist ideology of the Tory right (and in particular an influential coterie of Tory lawyers) than the requirements of the dominant sectors of British capital . Most large employers saw trade unions as useful adjuncts to the personnel function, rendering employee relations more predictable and allowing the consensual introduction of changes in work arrangements (most notably through the `productivity bargaining' then in vogue) . The closed shop target of the most virulent right-wing criticism-was accepted by `progressive' managements as a costless sop to union organisers, or even as a valuable device to ensure a disciplined workforce . (Interestingly, subsequent research showed that the number of closed shops - or union membership agreements, as they became generally known among practitioners - increased during the

Trade unions and the law period they were outlawed by the 1971 Act .)4 In other respects the Act's elaborate legalism created administrative problems for employers . Arguably, their lack of enthusiasm was at least as important a reason for its defeat as was the Tuc boycott (which could in any event scarcely have endured had Heath won a second term in 1974) . The Thatcher government learned from this experience, pursuing a piecemeal approach to labour legislation, in many cases through detailed amendments to existing law . The 1980 Act drastically reduced the `right' to strike and to picket through a redefinition of the traditional immunities . New closed shops could be enforced only if supported in a ballot by over 80 per cent of the workers affected, and unions become liable for actions intended to compel employers to introduce a closed shop . 'Uniononly' and 'recognition-only' clauses in contracts were also outlawed . State finance was offered to trade unions which used postal ballots . The 1982 Act went considerably further . The scope for lawful industrial action was narrowed yet again, almost to the point of extinction ; while the ballot requirements were extended to existing closed shops, and individual workers were enabled to obtain substantial damages from unions if dismissed in `illegal' closed shops . (Simultaneously, the limited scope of trade unionists to sue employers if victimised was further restricted .)5 Finally (to date), the 1984 Act obliged unions to hold secret membership ballots in order to elect their executives, call lawful strikes, and undertake political activities . Underlying this latter initiative is a belief that workers voting in their own homes will prove more `moderate' than trade union activists and leaders ; and perhaps more insidiously, that the emphasis on individual decision-making may undermine workers' sense of collective identity and interests on which the strength of unionism ultimately depends . 6 The material context of this new legislative offensive is, of course, very different from a decade ago . In the face of economic crisis, employers are obliged to pursue radical cost-cutting changes in the organisation of production, while workers are less able and willing to resist . Major employers have developed more elaborate personnel management structures and policies, and feel far less dependent on unions as mediators between company and workforce . In addition, attitudes to the law have changed . The Labour government elected in 1974 did not simply repeal the Industrial Relations Act ; a series of new measures was implemented - the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act and the Health and Safety at Work Act in 1974, the Employment Protection Act and the Sex Discrimination Act in 1975, the Race Relations Act in 1976, the Employment Protection (ConsolidaC/C Z1-O

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tion) Act in 1978 . These provided a limited range of rights for individual employees (drastically reduced under Thatcher) together with a statutory procedure for union recognition (soon to prove wholly ineffectual) . Employers became accustomed to this increased legalism, and developed the expertise and resources to cope . Under Thatcher they have proved far more willing to make use of their new rights against trade unions than under the 1971 Act . 7 The unions for their part have found it far more difficult to define a response . Reaction to the 1980 Act was limited, but in April 1982 while the second Employment Bill was still before Parliament the TUC convened a special conference at Wembley . This endorsed an eight-point programme which provided in particular that unions should not take part in closed shop ballots or accept public funds for balloting, and empowered the General Council to assist any union sued under the new laws and to levy affiliates to finance this . The Wembley principles left it unclear whether the TUC itself should defy the law, but at three key moments prudence has triumphed. The first was the 1983 dispute beteen the National Graphical Association (NGA) and the Stockport Messenger newspaper group, the first employer to make use of the 1982 Act . When the NGA refused to obey a series of injunctions the High Court ordered the seizure of all its assets . The TUC expressed sympathy but refrained from jeopardising its own funds by endorsing the NGA's illegality . The mining strike of 1984-5 provided the second test . Here too the courts ordered the sequestration of the funds of the union involved, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) - though in this case the legal action against it was based on laws predating the Acts of 1980 and 1982 . The TUC in September 1984 declared its `total support' for the NUM in its dispute ; but whatever the rhetoric, its leaders took care not to come into conflict with the law . The third episode occurred in January 1986 when News International sacked its Fleet Street workforce and transferred production of such titles as the Times and the Sun to a new plant at Wapping, carefully exploiting the new laws to ensure that any union response would be unlawful . Once more the TUC has offered its services as a mediator but has steered clear of illegality . In other respects the Wembley resolutions have been somewhat hollow . First the electricians' union and subsequently the engineers - both of which, unlike most British trade unions, make extensive use of postal balloting - announced their intention to take the government subsidies . TUC leaders tried desperately (and apparently successfully) at the 1985 Congress to avoid disciplinary measures which could result in the expulsion of two large and powerful affiliates . On the closed shop, meanwhile, despite

Trade unions and the law the official boycott of the prescribed balloting procedure, it appears that a considerable number of such elections have been held, invariably with local trade union co-operation . By the time of the 1984 Act most unions would seem to have accepted that defiance would not succeed . Despite strenuous objections to legislative interference in their internal affairs, they have in the main revised their rules to comply . Ballots before official strikes have become common since November 1984 when Austin Rover sued the unions involved in a dispute at its Cowley plant . As for the requirement to hold political fund ballots, the unions concerned decided to comply and to mount a concerted campaign for a positive vote . To the surprise of many observers, all such ballots have been successful . 8

The chasm between heroic aspiration and depressing reality was evident in the report of the General Council to the 1984 Congress . 9 The TUC itself remains prepared to challenge and test the law in situations where on balance there is a reasonable prospect of success or where there are convincing reasons in the interests of the trade union movement for it to be tested to its fullest extent . The General Council emphasise that they remain fully prepared to respond positively to requests for support and assistance under the Wembley strategy . All requests must be judged on their merits and decisions will be taken in the light of the kind of action being taken, or proposed, by the union, the likely response of other unions and their members to requests from the TUC for supporting action, and the prospects of winning the dispute . The message was clear, even if the prose was tortured : the TUC would not risk its dignity by instructions to member unions which might not be followed, or its organisation and resources by an unsuccessful challenge to the government and the courts . Particularly after Thatcher's re-election in 1983, prudence suggested that a call to action (in effect, a prospective General Strike) would be ignored by most workers ; the outcome would mix tragedy with farce . Such an analysis was in line with the `new realism' which held sway within the General Council, at least from 1983 when constitutional changes ensured the dominance of the centre-right. The majority view, put simply, was that the business of the TUC was to bargain as best it could with the government of the day however unattractive its politics . Some added the constitutionalist argument that industrial power should not be used to challenge an elected government, at least on issues where it could claim a

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(A1 ACADEMIC PRESS CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Managing Editor: Ann Newton Published for the Cambridge Political Society by Academic Press London Cambridge Journal of Economics and the Cambridge Political Economy Society which manages it have the aim of providing a forum for non-neoclassical approaches to economics, following the tradition of Marx, Kalecki and Keynes . The journal publishes theoretical and applied articles on major contemporary issues, with a strong emphasis on the provision and use of empirical evidence and on the formulation of economic policies . In this respect it differs from most other economic journals, which are largely devoted to a sterile body of theory divorced from practical questions . The editors break with conventional practice by including commentaries on current affairs . The journal also includes review articles from time to time, and commissioned articles on important subjects . Research Areas Include : Industrial and trade economics, political economy, labour economics . Publication : Quarterly; Subscription : Volume 11, 1987 £40 .00 (U.K.)/$75 .00 (Overseas) Combined Subscription Rate for Cambridge Journal of Economics and Contributions to Political Economy: All Countries : $91 .00 Recent Contents: S. Solomou: Innovation clusters and kondratieff long waves in economic growth . I. Islam and C . Kirkpatrick : Export-led development, labour-market conditions and the distribution of income - the case of Singapore. M . Brown and P. Philips : The historical origin of job ladders in the U.S . canning industry and their effects on the gender division of labour . B. Strath : Redundancy and solidarity - tripartite politics and the contraction of the west European shipbuilding industry . A. Robinson : The economic problems of the transition from war to peace : 1945 -1949 . R . M. Goodwin : Swinging along the turnpike with von Neumann and Sraffa . G . Hodgson: Behind methodological individualism . S. Deakin : Labour law and the development employment relationship in the U .K. L . Mainwaring : International trade in new and used machines . Notes and Comments. T. Aspromourgos : On the origins of the term `neoclassical' . Commentary. G . Bosch : The dispute over the reduction of the working week in West Germany. D. Fureng : China's price reform . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Coupon : CJE/87/E .28 7th: journals Marketing Department Academic Press, Inc . (London) Ltd 24-28 Oval Road CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS London NWI 7DX Please tick O Please send me a sample copy and subscription details of Cambridge Journal of Economics Name (Capitals) Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Date

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Trade unions and the law clear mandate . Such views were less forcefully expressed when the government demonstrated its own opinion of the TUC by banning union membership at its Cheltenham communications headquarters, and when the coal dispute released such passions within the movement . Nevertheless, the implicit premise of most TUC leaders was that the Wembley strategy had failed ; that whether on grounds of principle or pragmatism, the `law of the land' could not be defied . The only `realistic' solution was to pursue a change in the law - which in turn required the election of a Labour government . As under the Heath government, experience of a hostile Tory administration has strengthened the often uneasy relationship between TUC and Labour Party . The joint Liaison Committee which drafted a number of policy documents on economic and social issues in the 1970s has been reactivated . The search for a new formula for industrial relations law has been conditioned by the Party's own sensitivities . The traditional relationship with the unions has long been widely regarded as an electoral liability ; and under Neil Kinnock's leadership Labour has become particularly concerned with every nuance of the pollsters' findings . These indicate not only broad approval of the government's general programme of restrictive labour law, but also the particular popularity of compulsory secret ballots in trade unions . The party's policy-makers have insisted that public attitudes must be appeased ; and the dominant TUC view - whether by conviction or for the sake of party-union harmony - has endorsed this position . In 1985 the Liaison Committee pamphlet A New Partnership, A New Britain, approved by the conferences of both the TUC and the party in the autumn, announced that `the next Labour Government will repeal the present Government's divisive trade union legislation and replace it with positive legislation . A key feature will be to provide workers with positive rights to information, consultation and representation in company decisions ."° This was followed by a more detailed document from the party's employment policy working group, outlining a `positive industrial relations framework' involving the replacement of the Tory laws by `fresh legislation on workers' rights' ." These would encompass various individual rights - including statutory protection for the low paid - together with collective rights to information and consultation, `bringing democratic accountability into the workplace itself' . Rights to strike and to picket, it was suggested, should rest on a combination of strengthened immunities and a new positive framework . On trade union ballots the statement insisted that unions as voluntary bodies should be free to determine their own methods of internal democracy, and that the 1984 Act should therefore be repealed ; but added that `the movement

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must convince the electorate of the reasons' . 12 Even within the TUC there has been scepticism whether such a task of conviction is feasible . Thus John Edmonds, newly elected secretary of the General Municipal and Boilermakers' Union (GMBU), argued at the end of 1985 that the political argument over statutory ballots had been lost ; the unions should not attempt to eliminate the new legal obligations, but build them into their own broader systems of internal democracy . 13 Other union leaders echoed this argument - which certainly coincided with the views of party strategists terrified at seemingly rejecting members"right to a voice' in their own unions . A cautious approach was outlined in November 1985 by William McCarthy, an academic who is also Labour's spokesperson on employment in the House of Lords . 14 His subtitle Towards the Reform of Tory Employment Laws - avoiding the notion of repeal - is significant . McCarthy insisted that `those who wish to argue convincingly against what is still one of the more popular aspects of Thatcherite dogma should be both clear and united about what they want to put in its place' . 15 An attempt merely to re-establish the traditional `immunities' in the language of positive rights, he argued, would be inadequate; unless the precise nature and limits of these rights (to strike and to picket, for example) were clearly defined the judges would still be able to impose narrow and restrictive interpretations . `For the first time in British history a right to withdraw labour collectively must be clearly established . . . Whatever the legal formula adopted to secure this objective it should be recognised as the fundamental aim of Labour's new legal framework' . 16 The closed shop should be legalised, but `in certain specified circumstances' : allowing exemption for some workers, and most contentiously retaining the Tories' requirement for a ballot (though with only a simple majority needed). 17 Despite the failure of previous legislation, statutory backing for trade union recognition should be provided . On the broader issue of trade union ballots McCarthy declared that `the electorate will expect more from Labour than a simple pledge to repeal' the 1984 Act . 18 The law should be given a dual role, `to improve opportunities for involvement and participation in union decisions' and `to safeguard individual membership rights under existing constitutions and rules' . 19 The former would involve a right for unions to hold meetings and elections at the workplace . To achieve the latter a statutory Code of Practice would specify guidelines for individual voting rights before strikes and in union elections; aggrieved members would be able to complain to a tribunal . The requirement in the 1984 Act for decennial elections to approve political funds would not be re-

Trade unions and the law pealed, but would be supplemented by an obligation on companies to ballot shareholders to endorse their political activities . In January 1986 the TUC General Council issued a consultative document outlining a range of options for legislation . Its starting point was that `the law is in industrial relations and cannot now be excluded - if it ever could' . 20 The TUC advocated an extension of individual employment rights - gravely weakened by the Thatcher government - and invited union reaction to possible statutory support for union recognition . Likewise, views were invited on the desirability of a structure of positive rights to organise and strike, as against traditional immunities . While reiterating the objection to the 1984 Act as `unwarranted state interference in unions' internal affairs', the TUC effectively endorsed the position developed by McCarthy in his paper . 21 His proposal that the requirement for closed shop ballots should be modified rather than abolished was not, however, discussed . The TUC noted without further comment that some unions at local level were co-operating in ballots under the 1982 Act despite the Wembley policy ; and suggested that the movement should'clarify' its views on the acceptance of public funds for ballots and other union activities . Most major unions responded with detailed comments, and a special conference in April revealed sharp divisions . Some unions argued enthusiastically for extensive `positive' law notably the GMBU, which launched a campaign under the slogan `Fair Laws and Rights in Employment' . Others accepted as unavoidable the basic strategy of `reform' to a system of labour far more pervasive than in the past . Yet others reiterated the traditional insistence on `free collective bargaining' and were thus suspicious of the whole notion of positive rights and in particular were hostile to the retention of any elements of the 1984 Act . Out of the discussions a partial consensus was created, expressed in two documents published by the Tuc-Labour Party Liaison Committee in July . Both were endorsed by substantial majorities at the September TUC Congress, and with even less dissension at the party conference a month later . People at Work insists that `there is no question of excluding the law from industrial relations . But it can be given a positive role - with new rights and protection for individual workers and their unions .' 22 Though far from precise on many of the issues on which differences were previously apparent, the policy statement follows the same general approach as McCarthy and the earlier General Council proposals . There is a commitment to strengthened individual rights of job security and equal opportunities ; and also union rights - presented as `a radical extension of industrial

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democracy' to information, consultation and representation . 23 On strike law, it is emphasised that `Labour is committed to enacting clear and comprehensible measures to establish fair boundaries within which effective industrial action can be organised' ; this is to be achieved by `a mixture of rights, immunities and responsibilities' . 24 After criticising the 1984 Act the promise is made of a statutory framework `laying down general principles for inclusion in union rule books based on a right for union members to have a secret ballot on decisions relating to strikes, and for the method of election of union executives to be based on a system of secret ballots' . 25 (Nothing is said about political funds or closed shop ballots .) The proposal embodies the suggestion of an independent tribunal to adjudicate on members' complaints against their unions . The companion policy statement on low pay commits a future Labour government to enacting a statutory minimum wage : a radical innovation for the British labour movement, in which union fears that their own role in pay bargaining might be undermined have traditionally prevailed . Great care is taken to indicate that the minimum would be defined as part of a'national economic assessment' (the vogue concept since the notion of incomes policy has become taboo) in which the unions would participate ; that its `application . . . should be compatible with and encourage collective bargaining' ; and that unions themselves would acquire a major role in its enforcement . 26 Whether a minimum wage would necessarily entail a compression of differentials - a source of anxiety for unions of higher-paid workers - is considered somewhat equivocally . With remarkable speed for so conservative a movement, both industrial and political wings of British labour have substantially revised their conception of the role of the state and the law in industrial relations . Though this change has been neither unanimous nor unambiguous, it symbolises far-reaching moves in the ideology and aspirations of the labour movement as it seeks an escape from the ravages of Thatcherism . These transformations reflect the broader process of realignment within the British labour movement during the 1980s . 27 After the apparent swing to the left at the beginning of the decade (the successful campaign for Labour Party democracy, Benn's challenge to Healey for the deputy leadership, the growth of left-wing local authority activity, the radicalism of the 1983 election manifesto and - somewhat later - the mobilisation around the miners' strike) there has been a lurch to the right . Following Kinnock's election as leader the overriding priorities at national

Trade unions and the law level have been to cultivate the image of a moderate, responsible and united party . Hence the refusal of more than qualified support for the struggle of the miners under Arthur Scargill, and the repudiation of the uncompromising stance of the Militant-led Liverpool council . Of critical importance for this process has been the consolidation of a `soft left' willing to back the Kinnock leadership as the only means of defeating the Tories . The adhesion to this group of many of the left-wing union leaders and municipal politicians has left the `hard left' increasingly marginalised . Benn has been largely isolated, Scargill's influence has waned, and a process of expulsion of Militant members has commenced . The improvement in Labour's ratings in the opinion polls, which has accompanied the rightward shift, has in turn reinforced support for Kinnock within the party . A similar trend in microcosm has occurred within the Communist Party, which given its disastrous record in electoral politics and its dwindling shop-floor influence has long embraced the role of candid friend to the broader labour movement . This orientation has for some years coincided uneasily with the traditional emphasis on industrial struggle and class politics . In the aftermath of the debates and schisms within the communist parties of western Europe, the tension between the two sets of objectives has erupted into bitter factional division . Even before the 1979 election Eric Hobsbawm, guru of the `Eurocommunist' right, urged that the movement should turn from class to populist politics . 28 Labour's two election defeats reinforced such arguments, and the bulk of the party hierarchy embraced continental notions of a `broad democratic alliance' as the only means of resisting the rise of Thatcherism . Many of those who insisted on the primacy of industrial militancy - notably Ken Gill, secretary of the technicians' union TASS - have been expelled ; while the Morning Star, formerly the party's own newspaper, has come out in apparently irreconcilable opposition to the new party line . 29 Accordingly, the cP has shown greater support for Kinnock than for Labour's `hard left' . This is reflected in its attitude to labour law, as outlined in a pamphlet by its industrial organiser, Pete Carter, published in May 1986. The title itself is significant : Trade Unions: the New Reality . Carter attacks as equally damaging the `hard left' ('ill-conceived strategies will assist the Tories') and the `aggressive right' (as typified by the electricians) . `The broad left of British trade unionism,' he insists, `needs to assert itself above these tendencies by creating a shift in the politics of the labour movement which allows a unified approach .'30 Several figures from Labour's `soft left' are singled out for praise in this context . Much of what follows is devoted to the worthy but scarcely novel arguments that unions should avoid narrow sec-

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tionalism and take account of the special interests of women and ethnic minorities, and should also be concerned with community issues . Carter insists in his discussion of the law that `what is now needed is a set of positive rights that take the place of legal immunities . It is totally unrealistic and unhelpful, and counterproductive, to return to the system of immunities and a pre-1979 situation, as is being demanded by some sections of the movement .' While the unions' past objections to the 1984 Act are applauded, policy for the future is unspecific : `it is necessary now for the labour movement to review its position, learn from the strengths and weaknesses of the strategy to date, and consider how to recapture the offensive on the question of democracy' . In short, the cP majority would line up with the TUC and Labour Party mainstream . 31 (Ironically it was Gill, now a leading member of a small grouping of ex-cP `fundamentalists', who presided at the TUC Congress which endorsed the new strategy for the movement .)

For all the ink spilled in the past twelve months, most of the debate has focused on tactics rather than strategies . For this reason, the arguments of both supporters and opponents of the new policies have been inadequate . The anti-legalism of the hard left has a cogent basis . As most advocates of positive rights have conceded, the problems of judicial hostility and the anti-collectivist bias of the legal system cannot be overcome simply by redrawing the framework of industrial relations law . The more `positive' the legislation, the greater the scope for judicial interpretation . A positive right to strike, for example, would not conceivably be unqualified and unconditional ; the judges would retain ample scope to frustrate the intentions of the legislators by extending the exceptions and restrictions . Only by transforming the whole character of the judiciary and the principles which inform its operation could this danger possibly be overcome . Though there has been some discussion of the possibility of creating special labour courts, this problem has received very little attention within the movement . Opponents of a legislative framework of rights for workers and unions argue not only that its efficacy is likely to be restricted and eroded by the courts, but also that union dependence on statutory support can be dangerous . As American experience indicates, once the law assumes a major role in industrial relations its content becomes subject to the vicissitudes of the electoral process . What the law gives it can also take away - perhaps in circumstances where trade unions, having become habituated to the backing of the state, have lost the organisational capacity for

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alternative means of defence . On the two most contentious issues in the recent debates, the `fundamentalists' deploy some persuasive arguments . The principle of individual secret ballots rests uneasily alongside the collective basis of trade union organisation and action . Effective trade unionism requires that members should identify themselves with their fellow workers, subordinating their private interests to the larger, common interest . There can be no doubt that Tory enthusiasm for balloting - and especially postal ballots - reflects an aspiration to displace collectivism by individualism . 32 There is also a plausible rationale for opposition to a statutory minimum wage . Even benignly conceived legal support for the low-paid may prove counter-productive : if the minimum is parsimoniously defined (and current discussions suggests a far from generous level of £80 per week), the state will seemingly legitimise poverty wages . To the extent that the minimum comes to function in low-paid occupations as a maximim, the problem could even be aggravated . And there is clearly reason to assume that, whatever the intentions of its advocates, such a measure will help usher in a comprehensive incomes policy - which in the past has invariably served as a vehicle of restraint . Yet in their insistence on trade union independence from the state, the fundamentalists assert an essentially abstract claim devoid of strategic import . However effective it may have proved in the past, `hands off the unions!' is no longer a serviceable slogan . As was argued earlier, the traditional and virtually unique detachment of state and law from British industrial relations rested on specific historical conditions which no longer apply . Once material and ideological pressures induce the state to abandon its 'abstentionist' posture, the role of trade unions in society is unavoidably politicised . For analogous reasons, the call to defend `free collective bargaining' is no less futile . Not only is the term itself somewhat vacuous : the conduct and outcome of collective bargaining are always conditioned by the balance of social and economic forces, and hence can never be `free' . In addition, when a high proportion of union members are employed directly or indirectly by government, and when unions themselves expect the state to act as overall economic manager, it is fanciful to expect that wage negotiations can remain immune from political influence . But in any event, the insistence on collective bargaining as the indispensable and overriding function of trade unions must be viewed sceptically by socialists . Historically, collective bargaining has followed and reinforced the lines of differentiation and division within the working class : by industry, occupation, employer ; by age, sex, race, education, training . At times a potent method of defence and advance for the relatively strong

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and secure, all too often it has been ineffectual and irrelevant for the weak, vulnerable or marginal . The demand for trade union autonomy with employers all too often reflects the macho complacency of advantaged groups, rather than class politics in any but the most superficial sense . 33 It is difficult, then to contest the premise of the `new realists' that the politicisation and 'juridification' of industrial relations are no longer reversible, and that policy must therefore focus on changes in the content and direction of the law rather than on vain attempts at its exclusion . Likewise they are correct to emphasise that the whole issue is more than a private debate within the left ; it is impossible to ignore the popularity of recent legislation, especially the balloting provisions - even, it would seem, among the most rank-and-file trade unionists . 34 However cogent in the abstract the case against the Tory laws, the unions have failed to convince the public and must come to terms with this failure in the programmes which they now adopt . Whatever their ideal aspirations, unions in their negotiations with employers accept that they will settle for less ; the strategy for labour law must equally recognise the necessity for compromise . Yet the realism of the TUC pragmatists is curiously selective . A measure of the movement's current desperation is that hopes of redemption rest exclusively on the election of a Labour government in 1987 or 1988 . Given the realities of the present 3'h-party system, the odds against a majority Labour administration emerging are high indeed ; but publicly at least, there has been no discussion of other options . And even if the psephologists should indeed be confounded, does the past record of Labour in office inspire confidence that a Kinnock government would enact a major programme of workers' rights in a small and vulnerable economy which is particularly afflicted by world recession? Fairness at Work presents its proposals as a commonsense set of reforms which no party to industrial relations could sensibly resist . Yet even the modest legislation of the 1974-79 Labour government was widely denounced as a `militants' charter', and perceived by many employers and their organisations as an intolerable burden on enterprise and efficiency . If the rhetoric of indusrial democracy which accompanies the Liaison Committee programme is taken even half seriously, it will surely be regarded by the representatives of capital as an outrageous threat to competitiveness and profitability ; while the collapse of `confidence' in international financial circles is likely to precipitate the familiar sterling crisis, putting government policies once more in pawn to the IMF. Faith in the consensual implementation of purportedly radical reform has always been the soft centre of Labour Party

Trade unions and the law pragmatism . Socialism has typically been conceived as a form of social and economic administration so demonstrably rational that its achievement can be classless and non-conflictual . Thus the chasm between promise and performance - the hesitancies, failures and retreats of successive Labour governments - always comes as a surprise, to be explained in terms of remediable contingencies : inner-party divisions, or incompetent or treacherous leaders, or the machinations of civil servants and foreign bankers . Next time will surely be different . . . The central project of socialism without class struggle survives such experiences unshaken . 35 Genuine realism would confront critically the whole tradition of parliamentary reform : the nature and limits of its historical achievements, its victories and defeats ; and would seek explanations for both sides of the balance sheet . Such an analysis would permit an informed assessment of the implications of changed economic and social conditions for the viability of future programmes . The question is not primarily to revive ancient debates on `reform versus revolution' ; at a time when few traditionally revolutionary parties can still be considered revolutionary, and few traditionally reformist parties are any longer seriously and effectively reformist, the old polarities trivialise the issues . Rather, the problem can be posed far more concretely : who will bear the principal burden of capitalist crisis ; how will current gross imbalance of economic and social power be transformed or perpetuated ; what interests are affected in any attempt to subject to conscious collective control a system of production governed by an anarchic competition for profit? All such questions point to the asymmetrical distribution or redistribution of costs and benefits as a central foundation of contemporary political controversy . Whose support can be mobilised for a democratic socialist programme, and how ; whose opposition can be anticipated, and how can it be overcome? Serious, realistic, pragmatic reformism surely cannot fail to address the politics of class! 36 It is in this context that the issue of labour law must be addressed . Most of the recent debate, as has been seen, involves counterposing statutory regulation to autonomous worker action through trade unions . Through this dichotomous definition of the alternatives, both sets of protagonists avoid considering the connection between law and working-class self-activity : in which circumstances they are antagonistic, and in which circumstances complementary . To address questions of this kind it would be necessary to transcend the overbearing parochialism of most British discussion . Overseas experience has been almost totally ignored ; 37 on neither side of the debate is it suggested that the British labour movement might learn from the evidence of the

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Italian workers' statute of 1970 adopted after the upsurge of industrial militancy in the two preceding years, or the more recent attempts by governments of the left in France and Greece to enact major extensions of workers' rights . Two central lessons seem to emerge from such examples . Firstly, radical programmes of labour law are not guaranteed enactment in the intended form by electoral success alone ; also necessary is strong and determined pressure from workers themselves and their industrial organisations . Secondly, the practical effects of such measures as are enacted depend not simply (or even primarily) on judicial and administrative procedures but rather on the balance of forces in society . The law can be a valuable adjunct, but never an adequate substitute, for unity and mobilisation among workers . Mobilisation and unity depend in turn on the dynamics of ideology and consciousness . Communist supporters of the `soft left' typically employ Gramscian notions of a `war of position' in support of their contention that victory in the battle of ideas is a precondition of real social transformation . Other `new realists' present analogous arguments in blander form : unions will achieve their objectives only if they succeed in gaining public support . But which public? The official perspectives of the labour movement tend to eschew the notion of a battle of ideas . In current Labour Party publications, conflict and dissensus typically appear as creations of malign Thatcherite politicians ; Labour's project is to restore harmony and co-operation . The language of partnership, democracy, involvement, freedom and above all fairness abounds . Such slogans have often in the past inspired progressive, popular and even socialist movements ; they have also, perhaps, been so abused by opportunist politicians that their repetition provokes a degree of cynicism . There is no need to study Marx in order to appreciate that these are slippery and ambiguous concepts, whose concrete meaning is inevitably informed by ideological standpoint and material interests . Tories glorify their own versions of freedom, democracy and even fairness ; without raising arguments of class, how can Labour impose its alternative defintions? This is no doubt an indelicate question ; for Labour's whole strategy involves a bid for the political `middle ground', an appeal to the `floating voter' - the deracinated citizen, innocent of social and economic identity . Yet in its passionate efforts to develop an image of classlessness, Labour is afflicted by traditions, organisational forms and a name itself which identify it with the working class . This need only constitute an affliction, however, if Labour fails to challenge the strange presumption that the working class is a minority sectional interest . Here the party is indeed somewhat schizo-

Trade unions and the law phrenic : on the one hand resisting the notion of class, on the other utilising the category of `working people' or `the people who work in our industries and services' . Who is excluded from such classifications? Who might have an interest in perpetuating Tory economic and social policies? Is it simply a coincidence that Thatcher, and several of her cabinet, are millionaires as well as rabid reactionaries? In any event it surely needs emphasising that the free operation of market forces brings riches to some even as it impoverishes so many others . Such material considerations inevitably underlie ideological debates . To make them explicit - highlighting the antagonisms between workers' interests on the one hand, and the priorities of national and international capital on the other would surely aid in unifying and mobilising workers `by hand and brain' (Labour's time-honoured formula) . Attention to the structural foundations of social conflicts is essential if the movement is to succeed in rebuilding an active awareness of collective interests and identity - within the workplace, the company, the broader economy . If unions are to regain the credentials to represent such collective consciousness it is equally essential that they appear convincingly as energetic and responsive agents of workers' aspirations, not as remote, detached, enclosed bureaucracies . British unions have indeed an impressive tradition of active internal democracy ; but increasingly, with changes in the organisation of work and in social and cultural life outside the workplace, this has become the preserve of a cadre of exceptional enthusiasts . 38 If unions are to win the backing of their own present and potential members - the majority of the electorate - for a major reform of labour law and for more general political advance, then the old organic connections must be reconstructed . There is an intimate interdependence between the tasks of re-integrating officials, activists and the broader rank and file ; cultivating anew a commitment to collectivist modes of organisation and action; and restoring a class content to notions of freedom, fairness and democracy . At a time when British unions show signs of new readiness to embrace a campaigning role and address a broader constituency than their separate protected memberships, it would be tragic if both the content and style of their initiatives were neutered by a terror of offending bourgeois susceptibilities .

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Capital & Class 112 Notes

A version of this article appeared in the American socialist journal New Politics, Vol . 1, No . 2, Winter 1987 . 1. Among discussions of the traditional pattern are Kahn-Freund, O . (1954) `Legal Framework' in Flanders, A . & Clegg, H .A ., The System of Industrial Relations in Britain, Oxford : Blackwell ; Wedderburn, K .W . (1971) The Worker and the Law (2nd edn), Harmondsworth : Penguin ; Lewis, R . (1976) `The Historical Development of Labour Law', British Journal of Industrial Relations, 14. 2. TUC (1966) Trade Unionism (written evidence to Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations), London, pp . 68-9 . 3. I have developed this argument in greater detail elsewhere . See, for example, Industrial Relations : a Marxist Introduction, London : Macmillan, 1975 ; `Green Means Danger', Politics and Power Four, 1981 ; `British Industrial Relations : the Limits of Corporatism' in Jacobi, O . et . al . (1986) Economic Crisis, Trade Unions and the State, London : Croom Helm . 4. Weekes, B . et al (1975) Industrial Relations and the Limits of Law, Oxford : Blackwell . 5. Lewis, R . & Simpson, B . (1981) Striking a Balance? Oxford : Martin Robertson ; `Green Means Danger', loc . cit . 6. Undy, R . & Martin, R . (1984) Ballots and Trade Union Democracy, Oxford : Blackwell . 7. For assessments of the impact of the series of Acts see Fosh, P . & Littler, C . (1985) Industrial Relations and the Law in the 1980s, London: Gower ; Lewis, R . (1986) Labour Law in Britain, Oxford : Blackwell . 8. Coates, K. & Topham, T . (1986) Trade Unions and Politics, Oxford: Blackwell . 9 . Report of the 116th Annual Trades Union Congress 1984, p . 31 . 10 . TUC- Labour Party Liaison Committee (1985) A New Partnership, A New Britain, London : Tuc/Labour Party, June, p. 21 . 11 . Prescott, J . (1985) Planning for Full Employment, London : Labour Party, September, p . 29. 12 . Ibid, pp . 27-8 . 13 . Edmonds, J . (1986) `Democracy in Trade Unions', Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations, January . 14 . Freedom at Work : Towards the Reform of Tory Employment Laws, London : Fabian Society, November 1985 . 15 . Ibid, p . 2 . 16 . Ibid, p . 16 . 17 . Ibid, pp . 20-2 . 18 . Ibid, p . 8 . 19 . Ibid, p . 38 . 20 . Industrial Relations Legislation, London : TUC, January 1986, p . 3 . 21 . Ibid, pp . 11-13 . 22 . TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee (1986) People at Work : New Rights, New Responsibilities, London : TuC/Labour Party, July, p . 4 . 23 . Ibid, p . 17 . 24 . Ibid, p . 19 . 25 . Ibid, pp . 20-1 . 26 . TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee (1986) Low Pay : Policies and Priorities, London : TUC/Labour Party, July, p . 13 . 27 . For a range of accounts see Curran, J . (1984) The Future of the Left, Cambridge : Polity .

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28 . Hobsbawm, E . et al (1981) The Forward March of Labour Halted? London : Verso . 29 . For a perceptive discussion see Samuel, R . (1985) `The Lost World of British Communism', New Left Review, 154 . 30 . Carter, P . (1986) Trade Unions : the New Reality, London : Communist Party, May, pp . 15-16 . 31 . Ibid, p . 41 . 32 . For an important critique of the principle of secret ballots in trade unions see Fairbrother, P . (1984) All Those In Favour, London : Pluto . 33 . For an analysis focusing on the virtual exclusion of women from the agenda of collective bargaining see Phillips, A . (1983) Hidden Hands, London : Pluto . 34. For many on the left it has become virtually a declaration of faith that collective decision-making in union branches or mass meetings is intrinsically more democratic than balloting ; and that postal ballots are necessarily anti-working class because unionists' views are swayed by the right-wing press and television . Both are half-truths . The second argument, it might be retorted, insults workers' intelligence . If media manipulation is so powerful, socialists may as well abandon the struggle ; right-wing propaganda is effective only to the extent that it connects, in however partial and distorted a manner, with people's genuine experience . Which leads back to the initial proposition : decisions based on informed discussion among members of the collectivity are indeed (as is argued in the text) the most appropriate pattern for union democracy . But mass meetings are rarely occasions for active participation by the membership ; while union branches are normally the preserve of a small minority of committed members, whose very activism can make them unrepresentative of the broader membership . It is precisely because of the imperfections in the traditional mechanisms of union democracy - and the reluctance of most officials and activists to acknowledge and remedy them - that the Tory attack has been so effective . I consider this point in more detail in `Class Struggle and the Trade Union Movement' in Coates, D . et al (1985) A Socialist Anatomy ofBritain, Cambridge: Polity . 35 . Consider the reported comments of Roy Hattersley on the eve of a visit to the USA : `I will be telling American investors that there is a growing conviction in the UK that common sense and democratic socialism can coincide as far as the British economy is concerned' (Observer, 7 September 1986) . 36 . A variety of assessments of the current predicament of social democracy can be found in Miliband, R . et al (1986) Socialist Register 1985/86, London: Merlin . 37 . The official documents considered above make some reference to German co-determination ; there has also been discussion of Irish proposals for `positive rights' which have not even reached the status of draft legislation . Otherwise foreign experience is a closed book. 38 . I develop this argument in `Class Struggle and the Trade Union Movement', loc . cit .

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Capital & Class Vol . VI No . 1

March 1987

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115

Nikos Martinos

Greek Agriculture : a reply to Vasso Maniatea-Tsapatsaris

Nikos Martinos argues that Maniatea's methodological approach does not permit her to establish an explanatory framework for Greek agriculture, a framework which should accord with the particularities of historical process . Maniatea's methodology prevents her from drawing out the rural economy's social and political context . Her proposed strategy loses its realism in that it fails to encompass politics . Martinos presents an alternative approach which attempts to capture some of Greek agriculture's problems .

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article on the `Crisis in Greek Agriculture' (Capital & Class 27) raises certain questions concerning the diagnosis of the current situation of Greek agriculture as well as the proposed alternative strategy . Irrespective of the disagreement between us, Maniatea's significant work provides a basis for a fruitful dialogue on the crucial problem of the economic and social transformation of agriculture . In this article some of the problems which were examined in her article are discussed from a somewhat different perspective although an enlarged analysis of present-day Greek agriculture is beyond the scope of this article . • MANIATEA'S

Methodology Maniatea's simultaneous treatment of both the structures of production and distribution seems to be in line with the Marxian paradigm . This approximation to economic reality implies the analysis of the articulation of the simple commodity production which characterises agriculture, with the other sectors of the economy dominated by the capitalist mode of production . In order to avoid possibly reducing this problem to a sterile input-output analysis, it is necessary to consider the social relations generated in the process of production and distribution. It is evident that this consideration should take into account the existing ideological mechanisms as well, which are necessary for the reproduction of the `peasant system' . The analysis of the articulation of simple commodity production with capital is necessary not only for reasons of consistency with a certain orthodox Marxist methodology . It makes possible the revelation of the economy's real political and social context . The latter is necessary both for the interpretation of the historical process and for a realistic strategy for economic

and social transformation . The proposed strategy should be specified by concrete agricultural policy measures according to the existing balance of political power . Otherwise, the proposed measures, no matter how `reasonable' they may appear, might not be realised in the existing state of affairs . Maniatea does not seem to be concerned with the articulation of agriculture with the capitalist mode of production .' Contrary to her initial intentions, her approach is one sided : by concentrating on production she somehow neglects exchange . This becomes a handicap both when dealing with the causes of the current crisis and in conceiving of the problem of transformation in relation to the existing political forces and social structure . Although she pays special attention to `technology', she does not proceed to the analysis of those processes which influence its development . Consequently, she bypasses important related issues and fails to provide satisfactory answers to such questions, as for instance : Why have the state and private capital failed to effectively organise the development of science and technology in accordance with the requirements of production? How should we proceed in developing a technology which can organically connect domestic production and consumption? In her view, `the causes of this longterm, structural crisis in agriculture derive from the way the peasant economy has been subjected to Fordist technology and standardisation' (Maniatea, 1986 : 109) . However, in order to consider why simple commodity production is subjected to Fordist technology, it is necessary, firstly, to understand how agricultural production is subjected to commercial, finance and industrial capital, and, secondly, how the agricultural surplus is being appropriated . While we agree that the problem of agri-

Greek agriculture: a reply culture should not be seen simply as an issue of surplus transfer (Maniatea, 1986 : 108), the analysis of transfer mechanisms is necessary not only to fully understand the functioning of market forces, but also to grasp the terms under which class struggle is being waged . We should bear in mind that the external political and economic relations of the complex power structure, established shortly after the war in Greece, played a decisive role in designing the country's growth strategy . 2 Hence, the country's external transactions are of crucial importance in interpreting the long-term changes in the patterns of production and consumption, particularly the relationship between the use of resources in agricultural production and the structure of demand for agricultural commodities . A theoretical formulation and quantification of this relationship for the agricultural sector underpins an analysis of the endogenous factors of development . It is possible, for instance, to see how the imports of agricultural commodities and foreign technology affected the domestic system of production over time and how its dynamism was undermined at higher income levels . The empirical evidence over a 21-year period shows a continuous reduction in the share of resources used in the production of food items for internal consumption as well as a continuous increase in the share of resources used for exports, whereas the country's food balance and terms of trade have deteriorated . The existing divergence between the resource use and the structure of domestic demand leads to the technological undermining of the domestic system of production : competitive food imports are being transformed into complementary imports by displacing the domestic food items from the internal market ; the import content of agricultural exports increases over time. 3

Maniatea has not fully considered these 117 methodological problems . Hence, in her article, the factor of technology becomes autonomous from the field of social relations and the resulting explanatory framework of post-war development in agriculture fails to encompass politics . In my view, the current structure of Greek agriculture should not be seen as the unique possible solution, resulting from the imposition of Fordist technology on a neutral `peasant system' . Rather, the outcome of class struggle has never been certain for the dominant social forces ; nor has the political expression of peasant interests been uniform or predetermined . The absence of a peasant political party and the exclusive management of peasant affairs by bourgeois political forces underlie certain basic features of the Greek social formation (Evelpidis, 1939 ; Dertilis, 1977) which economic analysis cannot disregard .

Diagnosis Maniatea counterposes Fordism in agriculture against the `peasant system' which prevailed up to the late fifties . She invests subsistence agriculture with a number of desirable qualities such as small land holdings, multicultivation and multifragmentation which made it capable of guaranteeing the material conditions for the reproduction of the peasant family (Maniatea, 1986 : 112) . I believe that this description of the past differs substantially from historical reality since the production possibilities of subsistence agriculture were historically limited if both the first big wave of emigration to the United States at the beginning of this century and the extremely low levels of consumption for the largest part of the farm population are taken into account . The peasant's high level of own consumption does not conform with the view of a more or less closed `natural' economy . On

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118 the contrary, Greek agriculture was connected to the international market a long time ago . 4 International exposure did not only make agriculture vulnerable to the fluctuations of external demand, but it also prepared the ground for its complete incorporation into the world market which was realised in full membership of the EEC . In vewing the historical process, it is necessary to see how some major events decisively influenced structural changes in agriculture . If we consider the existing diversity of Greek agriculture up to the fifties, in relation to the composition of output and the geographical distribution of productive activities, we get the picture of a rural economy simultaneously exhibiting high degrees of peasant own consumption as well as early specialisation which is orientated towards exports . Thus, monoculture prevails in many areas in the countryside and a significant portion of the farm units channel almost their whole output to domestic and foreign markets . The negative repercussions on the domestic economy which result from fluctuations of external demand for some key products (tobacco, raisins) fall mainly upon those impoverished monocultivators who initially flooded the urban centres and eventually emigrated to the industrial centres of Western Europe and Australia (the second big wave of emigration of the sixties) . In analysing Greek agriculture one should always take seriously both its early commercialisation and its external exposure, which was reinforced in the post-war period by the rapid growth of fruit and vegetable production . It was on this base that commercial-finance capital initially, and to a lesser degree indigenous industrial capital, created strong linkages with the rural economy and the state apparatus . Industrial capital was activated by the processing of primary commodities (main-

ly the food and textiles industries) and then in the farm input market (fertilisers, farm machinery) under multinational control . Nonetheless, its productive activities are not always easily distinguishable from the commercial activities 5 which have been expanded at the expense of the former, following the gradual harmonisation of the tariff and non-tariff systems of protection with that of the EEC since the late seventies . The mass exodus from the countryside in the sixties generated serious problems in the prevailing conditions of technical organisation in agriculture and farm structure . The general impact on the production process was greater than the implied absolute decrease of the farm labour force because the reduction of available wage labour power was proportionally greater than the reduction of family labour power; seasonal labour shortages emerged as early as the early sixties (Pepelasis-Panayotopoulos, 1962 ; Melas-Delis, 1981) . As the movement out to the countryside continued, the demand for capital-intensive technologies grew larger and the substitution of farm machinery for labour was accelerated . Increases in the organic composition of capital that followed the exodus do not only reveal the capacity of multinationals to penetrate agriculture but also indicate the pressing need of numerous simple commodity producers to survive by disregarding extremely low or even negative rates of return on capital invested, in order to safeguard a minimum level of farm income . Nonetheless, the radical changes in lifestyle of the urban centres did not leave the pattern of consumption unchanged in the countryside . Changed consumption patterns influenced farmers' decisions over the demand for mechanised inputs (tractors in the sixties, small pickup trucks in the seventies) which were also

Greek agriculture: a reply used partially for non-farm transport and recreational purposes . The inability of the secondary sector to absorb the surplus labour force as well as the existing hypertrophy of the tertiary sector was finally to drive a large portion of the surplus population into emigration . Migrants' remittances together with earnings from shipping were to be the main souces of foreign exchange for financing the increasing trade deficits, as well as providing the necessary means for the expansion of the Fordist pattern of consumption ; tourism's net share of foreign exchange earnings increased during the seventies . As domestic industry failed to provide agriculture with the necessary inputs, multinationals captured an increasing share of the farm input market . Thus, agriculture's demand for domestically produced inputs did not correspond to the growth of farm output . Under the normal circumstances which are characteristic of a relatively independent capitalist accumulation process, we would have expected to find that stronger intersectoral linkages would be generated . Yet, the weak linkages which exist have also been the outcome of political power relations6 and lead to certain crucial decisions influencing the country's growth strategy . Decisions favouring the comprador functions of domestic capital have contributed to the retardation of the domestic determinants of development . If we wish to create a satisfactory explanatory framework of the present conjuncture then we must dig into the social and political power relations as they have been enfolded historically . The analysis of these relations will reveal the existing particularities of the articulation of simple commodity production with capital and will show how the Greek state failed to effectively organise the development of science and technology by adapting it to the process of farm production (Martinos, 1984) .

A concluding remark on the alternative 119 strategy In viewing the repercussions of the international division of labour on endogenous determinants of development, we should bear in mind that the high level of peasants' own consumption, as well as the more cohesive social structure which is exhibited by Greek agriculture at lower income levels, do not necessarily imply a `peasant system' which is simply subjected to the penetration of capital . The mechanisms which characterise its mode of articulation are responsible for the reproduction of Greek agriculture ; the introduction and dissemination of Fordist technology is directly related to the mechanisms towards which a transformation strategy should be directed . Maniatea's analysis does not provide a satisfactory answer to the ensuing question : why has Greek agriculture not followed the examples of Japan and Taiwan in efficiently adapting a Fordist technology? Her statement that the Panhellenic Socialist Movement's (PAsoK) strategy for developing cooperatives encounters the resistance of the peasantry (Maniatea, 1986 : 124) adds more confusion than clarification to the problem, since this statement is not founded on an analysis of economic and social rearrangements in the light of the new conflicts and contradictions which are taking place in agricultural production and distribution . In my view, most of the difficulties arise, in building an alternative strategy, because certain important issues about agriculture's articulation under current circumstances generated by Greece's entry into the EEC and PASOK's elevation to power, are not dealt with . By this I do not imply that a political analysis is missing but that Maniatea's analysis is not always successful in revealing the political and social context of the rural economy . For example, some of the issues would be the prospects and obstacles for the independ-

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120 ent development of the cooperative movement in the three post-war periods, the pre-dictatorial (1950-1967), the dictatorship (1967-1974) and the post-dictatorial . Secondly, the changes which occurred in the functional efficiency of state services responsible for the rural sector in relation to the activities of private capital in the same periods, including the organisation of research and development, the role of scientific and technical personnel and the dissemination of know-how . Thirdly, the existing contradictions in PASOK's agricultural policy since 1981, in relation to its political, ideological and organisational character . Finally, the effects on the rural economy, resulting from Greece's entrance into the EEC: the impact on domestic production, the activities of multinationals and on the possibilities of differentiating the national policies within the modalities of the CAP . Bearing in mind the difficulties which emerge from the functioning of the market mechanisms, as well as PASOK's indigenous inefficiency as an agent of collective action, it is necessary to broadly specify the form of state intervention in the rural economy for the purpose of developing the national food system as proposed by Maniatea . It is also necessary to mark out the product development priorities for national and international markets according to the new health standards (Maniatea, 1986 : 126-7) taking into account the constraints which are imposed by CAP's price policies, the increasing deficits in the country's food balance, and the retardation of domestically produced farm inputs . An alternative strategy should be capable of being specified through concrete policy measures and a variety of proposals should be applicable in the short term under the existing regime and should be capable of promoting a favourable balance of power which is necessary for overcoming the structural

rigidities and limitations framed by the dominant productive relations . On the basis of this 'problematique', the first priority for present-day Greece should be the development of animal-dairy production and the food processing industry . This should not be seen simply as an import substitution policy induced by the large amount of imports, now approaching $1 billion per year . Rather it should also be seen as a productive activity which has been the backbone of civilisation in mountainous Greece through the centuries . The reestablishment of viable rural communities might be achieved on the basis of new productive relations starting from the extensive mountain lands which are suitable for livestock production and where private property rights are non-existent or negligible . The application of very simple technologies, some of them already domestically produced, will contribute to the genetic improvement of the animal stock, to the quality of the pastureland, to the higher quality of feedgrain seeds and finally will increase the productivity of labour and farm income . The preceding discussion illustrates that economic analysis may help to reveal and interpret the existing particularities of direct producer participation in the development process and the character of state intervention, as well as the functions of private capital . Thus, the policy contradictions of the party or parties in power will not be seen in isolation from the ongoing class struggle and the proposed transformation strategy will not be separated from political praxis .

*For helpful comments on an earlier draft I thank Leonidas Louloudis .

Greek agriculture: a reply

Notes 1 . Maniatea makes extensive use of the papers presented at the International Economic Conference organised by the Agricultural Bank of Greece in November 1984 . She does not seem, however, to have seriously considered the significant work of A . Dedoussopoulos (1984) `Simple commodity production . Capitalism and commercial capital : a consideration' (in Greek) . 2 . See for instance: Mouzelis N . (1978) `The modern Greek society: Facets of underdevelopment' (Macmillan, London) . Yannitsis A . (1979) `Problems of development in Greece', Economy and Society I (in Greek) . Tsoukalas C . (1981) `Social development and the state' (Themelio, Athens) (in Greek) . 3 . This is based on a comparison of importcoefficients of non-reexported imports with the expenditure on domestic production suitable for the agricultural sector . The long-term movements of these coefficients provide us with useful information concerning the converging or diverging course of the resource use in agriculture in relation to the domestic consumption needs . The `resource use-demand' schema may be also useful in analysing the penetration of foreign capital by means of direct investment as well as showing its disintegrating functions vis-a-vis the domestic system of production . For a detailed discussion see Martinos N . (1984) `The Greek agricultural sector : Development perspectives and social transformation - The divergence of resource use and demand', IVth European Congress of Agricultural Economists : Agricultural Markets and Prices, September, Kiel Germany (F.R .) (in English) . Presented also in International Economic Conference : Economy and Agricultural Sector, November, Athens (in Greek) . 4 . We should note the rapid growth of export production of raisins after the opening of the French market in 1878 . Within a few years the cultivation of raisins surpassed 300,000 stremmata. Nevertheless, soon after the French vineyards were replanted and the French market (which absorbed half of the domestic production) closed, most of the impoverished cultivators were compelled to emigrate to the us . Furthermore, the cultivation of labourintensive oriental tobacco was expanded

tremendously, following the defeat of the 121 Greek army in the Greco-Turkish war in 1922 . The settlement of most of the expatriated 1 1/2 million immigrants from Asia Minor in the countryside necessitated the application of radical legislation in the distribution of land . In the early fifties, over one seventh of the total population were tobacco cultivators and they were directly affected by the downward movement of external demand and the unprecedented fall of international prices . The second wave of emigration followed suit . See Evelpidis C . (1956) `Agricultural Policy' (Papazissis, Athens) pp . 122-31 (in Greek) . 5 . Research on the long-term changes in the activities of commercial and industrial capital is quite limited . On the penetration of foreign capital in agriculture see : Lazanas C . (1981) `Foreign capital in Greek agriculture', Review of Rural Studies 1(Agricultural Bank of Greece) (in Greek) . See also Tassopoulos, T . (1979) Greek industry : Monopolistic development and concentration of production (Tymphi, Athens) (in Greek) . 6 . Even liberal economists have recognised the need for including political equations in the structural equations of econometric models . See for instance, Harry Johnson (1965) `A theoretical model of economic nationalism in new and developing states', Political Science Quarterly, Vol . LXXX . Also in Stephen Hymer's seminal work this point is emphasised . See for example : Hymer S . & Resnich A . (1971) `International trade and uneven development', in Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth, North Holland (Amsterdam-London), pp . 473-494 .

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122 References Dertilis G . (1977) Social transformation and military intervention 1880-1909 (Exandas, Athens) (in Greek) . Evelpidis C . (1939) The economic and social history ofModern Greece (Athens) (in Greek) . Maniatea-Tsapatsaris V . (1986) `Crisis in Greek agriculture : diagnosis and alternative strategy', Capital & Class 27 . Martinos N . (1984) `The agricultural sector and higher agricultural education : The problem of scientific knowledge creation and its technological application', Synchrona Themata, April-June (in Greek). Melas G. & Delis D . (1981) Farm wages and employment in agriculture (Agricultural Bank of Greece) (in Greek) . Pepelassis A . & Panayotopoulos P. (1962) Surplus labour in Greek agriculture 1953-1960 (KOE, Athens) (in Greek) . Wood E .M . (1981) `The separation of the economic and the political in capitalism', New Left Review 127 .

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C . Pierson Marxist Theory and Democratic Politics Cambridge : Polity Press, 1986 £8 .50 (p/b), ISBN 7456 0036 0 Reviewed by Bob Jessop that the crisis of Marxism, allied with parallel crises in traditional social democracy and liberalism, requires a radical rethinking of democratic socialist theory . In this book he focuses on Marxism and democracy . Above all he argues that the crisis of Marxism is rooted in certain long-standing generic weaknesses in historical materialism ; and that these weaknesses have blocked an effective explanation of the political and thereby prevented the development of a radical political strategy for advanced capitalist societies . The generic weaknesses are identified as an historicist belief in inevitable evolution towards socialism ; the derivation of the political from economic forms and their PIERSON ARGUES

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124 functional requirements coupled with the reduction of all political conflicts to class struggles ; an essentialist approach to the state and politics which denies their contingent, historical, and contestable capacities and instead endows them with an inevitable class character ; and its commitment to holistic modes of social explanation . Pierson argues that these theoretical weaknesses are reflected in a failure to develop a radical political strategy which could actually secure a transition to socialism in current economic, political, and social conditions . Thus the development of the Italian `third way', for example, should not be regarded as a simple 'betrayal' of marxism . Instead it should be seen as the adaptation of a mass-based Communist party still committed to the basic Marxist tenets to the realities of politics in modern capitalism . The crisis of Swedish social democracy is also traced to its tendency to reduce politics to the economic class interests of a broadly defined working class and its neglect of new social movements and new political issues . However, against fundamentalist criticisms of reformism and revisionism, Pierson claims that `it is as much what these theorists have retained of "classical" Marxism, as that which they have abandoned, that vitiates their strategies for the transformation of advanced capitalism' (pp . 178-9) . Part One traces the weaknesses in Marx's account of democracy to the generic problems of historical materialism . It then reviews the controversies over social democracy conducted among Bernstein, Kautsky and Luxemburg ; and examines the debates between Lenin, Kautsky and Luxemburg on the Bolshevik Revolution . Notwithstanding their obvious differences, Pierson discerns the same basic, constitutive theoretical weaknesses in these later approaches .

Part Two reviews two different democratic projects : the terza via in Italy, inspired by the Togliattian appropriation of Gramsci ; and the development of Swedish social democracy beyond its initial historic compromise to demands for wageearner funds as a route to democratic socialism . Part Three reviews various current attempts to move beyond Marxist state theory and socialist strategy and finds them largely programmatic and speculative . They are also criticised for failing to integrate Marxist and liberal (or libertarian) principles adequately as well as for importing suspect categories (such as rights) into Marxism . Nonetheless Pierson also finds much of value in post-Marxism . In particular he approves the abandonment of a unitary view of the capitalist stae, the recognition that it is an arena of class struggle, the stress on the historical specificity of each capitalist state, the heightened value attached to civil liberty and social pluralism, and the commitment to institutional guarantees for pluralism and to a political space in which alternative projects can be negotiated . His four main theoretical conclusions are : the need for a state, the necessity of independent institutions within civil society, the role of procedural and institutional elements in democracy, and the importance of political plurality . These conclusions are linked to a defence of the public sphere as the crucial institutional space within which a democratic politics can be conducted . This review of Marxist political theory is well-written and gives an interesting overview of the main theoretical currents . Perhaps the most surprising omissions in this account are any discussion of the postMarxist, discourse-theoretical analysis developed by Laclau and Mouffe or the recent developments in democratic theory emanating from the United States . One

Book Reviews could criticise Pierson in the same terms as his critique of other post-Marxist approaches : for his work is also programmatic and speculative . For his book is too concerned with other theorists to enable him to develop his own approach in detail . Nonetheless he has identified the main gaps in democratic theory and has outlined the theoretical and institutional space on which it must be developed .

Leo Panitch Working Class Politics in Crisis Essays on Labour and the State Verso, 1986, £6 .95 Reviewed by Richard Kuper LEO PANITCH'S Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy, published in 1976, is a superb study of the Labour Party, the unions and incomes policy from 1945 to 1974 . Working Class Politics in Crisis is a collection of nine articles updating the story so to say, as well as bringing together Panitch's reflections on a wider range of issues - social democracy, corporatism, the state under socialism . His central

concern is what determines the limits and 125 possibilities of working-class advance . At the end of the analysis the question always returns to that of constructing a mass socialist party, no less significant a problem today than in the past even if many have backed off in despair. The unifying themes which run through these essays are : class conflict seen not only as a potential revolutionary force but also as a key analytical tool in understanding the nature of capitalist development ; the irreducible importance of political and ideological structures in determining what is possible for the working class at any point in time ; and, in particular, in relation to the British Labour Party, the extent to which its own ideology has contributed to a decline in class politics and identity . The argument is often made by drawing comparisons with social democratic experience elsewhere - Sweden, Austria, Germany, Canada for example which makes for rich and stimulating reading . Panitch's argument against mechanistic Marxism consists essentially of putting the class struggle back in . For instance, against those who would see the post-war growth of state intervention in the economy as an expression of ruling-class needs to recreate conditions in which private capital could renew itself, he shows how it can only be understood as a political response to the growing strength of the working class . Nor did the ability to sustain such gains depend on blind economic forces ; rather, it was and is - the product of a balance of class forces . Here, as elsewhere, Panitch shows a continuing analytical respect for the role of the working class in making its own history . More conretely, `we cannot avoid the conclusion that the working class is itself an underlying factor in the modern British crisis' . In that sense, our impasse derives from the fact that the working

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126 class could help precipitate that crisis but had not generated the political institutions which could resolve it in its favour . Foremost among the institutions here is of course the Labour Party . Panitch is at his most acute in analysing its contradictory role as a working-class party, organically linked to the trade unions, and yet a national party which has acted time and again to restrain the economic demands of its trade-union base . This duality derives, as Panitch puts it, from its 'location as the crucial mediating link' between the working class and the capitalist state . Its suitability for this is in turn derived from its ideological orientation, its rejection of class struggle in favour of social harmony and class collaboration . The latter, as Panitch shows, is rooted in the party's earliest history rather than a response to the need to broaden its social base in the face of post-war affluence and embourgeoisement . The problem with the Labour Party, as Panitch puts it so well, is ,not that it has sought to bring the working class to power by peaceful means . Rather the fact that it has not seen its task as bringing the working class to power has determined the kind of parliamentarianism which it practices .' In short, it is the party's ideology rather than any objective accumulation crisis which determines its actions when in government . The question is how to move on . Much of Panitch's argument is held in common across large swatches of the post-'68 left however much individuals will disagree with some of his analysis ; some still find themselves locked in sectarian isolation building the revolutionary party, others locked in constitutional and political battles within the Labour Party itself, still others in the shadowy space on the `outside left' dreaming of the party to come . Panitch himself is firmly in the third camp, mercilessly dismantling the arguments of those

like Ken Coates who have argued the need for all socialists to join in the fight for the Labour Party's soul or Geoff Hodgson, Gavin Kitching, Paul Hirst and others who believe that support for an incomes policy can be traded for concessions on matters like workers' participation in the enterprise and at national level . His arguments on the latter score are particularly important, since on any scenario other than an outright Thatcherite majority in the next election, we are bound for yet another round of incomes policy . Here, drawing on past history, other European social democratic experiences, and the theoretical problems of curbing the powers of capital in a system where profit-making provides the fundamental dynamic he shows, convincingly, that there just aren't grounds for believing that capital can be enticed into a deal which will be in any long-term working-class interest . And any short-term redistribution of income such as has been achieved by past wage policies has not been a redistribution from capital, but rather what Panitch calls cuttingly, `socialism in one class' . I am entirely in agreement with Panitch on this score . But the argument can only really be counted as won when there is a viable alternative organisation or pole of attraction for socialists in the Labour Party ; yet the chances of creating that alternative seem slender without winning the argument! We are caught in a vicious circle, the illusion always remaining that a really concerted effort could transform the Labour Party . It remains of course because, however illusory, it appears no more impossible than remobilising the working class in a new socialist organisation . It is curious that Panitch provides little real analysis here of the Bennite movement and its potential since in a very real sense it almost accomplished what Panitch says to be impossible! I'm not suggesting that had

Book Reviews

Benn won the deputy leadership the party as we know it would have been won over to the cause of socialism ; if anything the party would have been torn apart, the haemorrhage towards the SDP occurring earlier and more substantially with certain of the right-wing unions decamping as well . In the process, however, a reconstituted party could well have emerged with a substantial trade union base and with it a space opened for socialist politics which quite simply does not exist in a two-party political system . A Bennite triumph in the early 1980s would probably have brought about proportional representation as a response by the other parties to marginalise Labour . But any half-way decent PR system must be a good thing since the only circumstances in which we can hope for a significant socialist presence at the political level is one which restructures and opens out the existing system of representation . It will still be bourgeois democracy, but a little more democratic for all that . In a curious way, the call for PR is perhaps the one genuinely transitional demand we can make at the political level today! All the more peculiar that Panitch doesn't take PR seriously since he is clearly sensitive to the crippling restraint which electoral calculation has always placed on the Labour Party . Given the broad alliances which a first past the post electoral system requires within each major party, a class collaborationalist ideology is well-nigh inevitable . Agreeing with Panitch on the need to `try again' to build a mass socialist party, there are nonetheless some extraordinary lacunae in his writings . On the local government experiences of the first half of the 1980s he is merely silent : one would not know from these essays that, for good or ill, this arena of work had absorbed the energies of countless thousands of socialists during this period, the very people

who among others have to be - and are 127 most likely to be - attracted to any new mass socialist party . It is perhaps not easy to strike a balance sheet yet, but those experiences are likely to be of crucial significance in shaping the planning ideology of the Labour Party - and, even more, of any mass socialist party - in years to come and should not be ignored . On the question of social movements Panitch's position is even more puzzling . `Collective labour' is the closest he comes to giving an account of who the likely supporters of a mass socialist party might be ; the task of socialist politics is `to connect with and help(ing) to broaden and deepen the experience of collective labour out of which working-class identity grows and can be nourished' (p . 51) . This is all extraordinarily abstract . There is, for instance, no account whatsoever of the sex and class debates of the last decade; socialist-feminism seems to have left virtually no trace . The `new social movements' as far as I can see are only mentioned in passing in the context of a critique of the new revisionist strategy . There Panitch seems to be clearly in favour of a strategy of `forging alliances with the new social movement, articulating the demands of women, blacks, and the peace movement to Labour's working-class base in a hegemonic socialist project', his criticism being that in order to maintain the alliance with the parliamentary right of the Labour Party, this project has to be set aside . How much more important such alliances then for the new mass socialist party Panitch is calling for . And how odd, therefore, that Panitch says literally nothing either about the constitution of `collective labour' in Britain after capital has so thoroughly recomposed the old working class, or of how he sees non-class interests articulated in any generalised socialist vision . Without such an account, the appeal of the new

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128 socialist party is likely to be minimal to those very social forces which have, with such astonishing success given the general lack of progress elsewhere, opened out the German political scene .

Ronaldo Munck Marxism and Nationalism : The Difficult Dialogue London : Zed Books, 1986 £6 .95 (p/b), ISBN 0 86232 494 7 Reviewed by Clive Harris IT HAS BECOME a commonplace today to

assert that a theory of nationalism forms a major lacuna in Marxism in the same manner that there is said to be no theory of gender/sexism, no theory of race/racism . In an earlier issue of Capital & Class which gave some space to the subject, Ephraim Nimmi argued that the theory of nationalism has been `Marxism's great historical failure' . The same idea is expressed by John Ehrenreich who declares that `It's time to admit that as Marxists we simply have no adequate understanding of the phenomenon' . Tom Nairn similarly proclaims the theory of nationalism to be `Marxism's great historical failure' . Regis

Debray too states that the concept of nation resists conceptualisation because Marxism has no concept of nature . In Marxism and Nationalism, Ronaldo Munck has followed these illustrous figures by arguing that Marxism has no theory of nationalism . Indeed, he goes one step further and maintains that `nationalism has often been in competition with Marxism', and even that `nationalism is another irreducible phenomenon beyond the grasp of Marxism as we know it' (p . 2) . Such cris de coeur are an integral part of what has become popularised as the `crisis of Marxism' . Though purporting to address this crisis, Munck makes no attempt to analyse its nature . Does it for example represent shortcomings both in the methodological edifice of Capital and the political analyses offered by Marx and Engels themselves? Alternatively, is it a `crisis' of a post-Marx Marxism which has patently failed to comprehend the different levels of abstraction of Marx's writings and has consequently treated Marx's output as a belief system, as a totalising ideology allowing acolytes to quote chapter and verse in support of a particular proposition? Or is it a crisis which has come about because of an inadequate understanding of the classic Marxian concepts of class, state, ideology and so on? These different possibilities are not distinguished in this book . This would be of little concern were the reader confident that the `crisis of Marxism' originated less from the manner in which Marxists have treated concepts such as class, productive forces and relations of production and more from omissions which need to be plugged because chapter and verse cannot be found in Marx's writings which would lend support to the `self-evident', vital importance of nationalism . It is for this reason that the title of the book is somewhat misleading, since it is not about the

Book Reviews former set of concerns but about Marxist debates on nationalism . In a second sense, too, many readers will take issue with the equation between Marxism and nationalism as an equation between two, sometimes competitive, ideologies since this is tantamount to the treatment of Marx's writings as a `doctrine rather than a method' . Despite these preliminary reservations, the book would still be of interest if the debate on nationalism were taken forward significantly . Let us therefore turn our attention to this matter . Most of the book is devoted to a useful guided tour of the numerous Marxist writings on the subject of nationalism starting first of all with Marx and Engels themselves, then moving on to the Second International, Rosa Luxemburg and other fin de siecle leftists, Lenin, the Third International, Third World contributors such as Amilcar Cabral and Che Guevara, and rounding off with an analysis of contemporary debates (e .g . Nairn and Anderson) . All of this condensed into about 150 pages with the remainder of the book devoted to the rethinking proposed by the author . There is the obligatory though still pertinent reference to the discernible shift in Marx's own thinking on the `national question' from the 1860s . If, in the 1840s, Marx and Engels adopted a policy of encouraging Irish workers to make common cause with the Chartists in furtherance of the proletarian struggle in Britain, by 1870 they had come to the conclusion that a nationalist revolution in Ireland was a necessary precondition to the proletarian revolution in England : `The people which oppress another is forging its own chains' . Of interest, too, is the unusual reference to figures such as the Ukranian Zionist, Ber Borochov, who, in The National Question and the Class Struggle of 1905, sought to present a C/C 31-I

materialist account of nationalism by dis- 129 tinguishing between relations of production and `conditions of production' . As in the case of the Irish nationalist, James Connolly, and the Soviet Tartar purged by Stalin, Sultan Galiev, the treatment is far too cursory . The treatment of Otto Bauer should be read in conjunction with Munck's earlier article in Capital & Class . The benefit of this essentially chronological treatment is questionable since Munck's brief attempt at a synthesis towards the end of the book does not even deal with the apparently simple but provocative question : should there be a theory of nationalism within Marxism? To the extent that Marxism is treated as a totalising ideology with certain perceived lacunae which need to be plugged, the answer is obviously `yes' . Marx, though, one feels, would have been appalled by this transformation of his method of analysis into a belief system and would, in typical manner, have declared himself not to be a Marxist . For those who treat Marx's writings as a method rather than a doctrine, however, the issue would be the level of abstraction at which the concept of nationalism can be discussed and not whether there should be a theory of nationalism per se . To be fair, Munck does sidle up to this important question when he quotes Zubaida to the effect that `it is not a problem for Marxist theory to defme "a nation" - it is not a theoretical problem, but one of political practice' (p . 144) . As a suitably radical individual, Munck feels that the answer to the `crisis of Marxism' lies in the realm of political practice/ struggle rather than with definitions or models . In correction, however, it must be said that the issue is not one of definition per se but the level of analysis at which one should attempt to defme . On the erroneous assumption that the problem of definition

Capital & Class 130 is a purely theoretical concern, for which ated accumulation . Neither Marx nor Lenin contemporary Marxists are said to be would have assumed that a theory of realguilty, Munck proceeds to inform us that isation could explain uneven capitalist he will refrain from approaching the development in a concrete social forma`national question' `in the abstract' and tion . On this basis, therefore, Munck's move on towards a discussion of three plea for `historical specificity' is really sketches which figure in contemporary only a partial criticism extending to Third debates : (i) nationalism and develop- Worldism, Marxist or non-Marxist . ment, (ii) nation and state ; (iii) nationalIt is significant - and Munck is quite ism and class . It seems to me that what is aware of this (p . 17) - that when Marx important about these debates is not that from the late 1860s onwards perceives Irish they are contemporary or guilty of an nationalism as critical to the development economic reductionism which collapses of proletarian internationalism in Britain, one polarity into the other but that they he does not simply present an argument are issues which concern the mode of for `self-government' and `independence return to the concrete . from England' but puts forward a proHad Munck utilised this view of Marx's gramme of economic development which writings the brief sketch on nationalism involves agrarian revolution and industrial and development might have moved development via protective tariffs. In other towards an original contribution to the words, the concept of `nation' itself seems `crisis of Marxism' . For example, in deal- to invoke the idea of a `national viability' transcending the simplistic raising up of ing with the supposed connection between nationality to the level of a nation-state via nationalism and uneven development, the author ignores his earlier discussion of the particular political practice of a national historic/non-historic or revolutionary/non- movement, the process that Munck terms revolutionary nations . It is a failure that is nationalism . grounded in his out-of-hand dismissal of A major shortcoming of Marxism and the concept of `national viability' as 'metaNationalism is that it seems unable to physical' and therefore of little signific- transcend the straightjacket which inscribes a formalistic separation of a social ance . For the reader who feels himself/ formation into economic, political and herself to be responding to the same `crisis' as Munck, this dismissal is unhelpful . ideological regions . To my mind, it is this What is required is a much more open very formalism which has contributed mind about the possible connection much to the `crisis of Marxism' since it does not allow us to perceive how, in the between the nation of `national viability' and the more abstract problematic with concrete world, the economic is both which Marx, Lenin and Luxemburg were political and ideological and the ideological concerned in developing schemas of simple and political economic . At best, all that and expanded reproduction, namely, pro- can be argued for is the relative autonomy portionality between a Department proof one or more of these regions . It is thus that Munck rejects the argument that ducing means of production and a Departnationalism has an economic provenance ; ment producing means of consumption . but he only does so by defining `economic' The latter concern centrally invokes issues of division of labour and `realisation' within quite narrowly as productive forces, and a `closed' market, as well as the historically these in turn defined even more narrowly specific movement from primitive to acceleras printing (as in his critique of Benedict

Book Reviews Anderson) . There is even the suggestion (borrowed from Borochov) that when economic class struggle embraces political elements, say, nationalism, that it is 'abnormal' and `unhealthy' (p . 168) . When is there ever in a concrete capitalism a `healthy', `normal' class struggle whose contradictions are purely economic? The purpose of this critique of `economic' interpretations of nationalism is to allow Munck to move on to assert the irreducibility of nationalism, as a specific form of political practice and the importance of the relative autonomy of political practice . Nationalism is described as being neither an ideology of the rising bourgeoisie nor a pathology of a late and declining capitalism . To support his proposition Munck invokes the concepts of Bonapartism and hegemony . Nationalism is said to be akin to Bonapartism because it is 'relatively independent of class struggle' (p . 168) . This reference to Bonapartism is extremely dubious since, despite the obvious passages in Marx's writings on France to which the statement alluded, there is no real sense in which Bonapartism could have been described as `above classes' . It is even more dubious to suggest that nationalism emerges `when there is an equilibrium between the fundamental social classes' . An equilibrium in what sense? The treatment of hegemony as a cultural/ideological phemonemon is meant to underpin the presentation of `politics in command' . Munck is not alone in the denaturing of a concept which Gramsci specifically introduced to bridge the chasm between base and superstructure . To anyone who reads Gramsci closely, especially the section on Fordism, it is clear that hegemony is fundamentally economic, as opposed to economistic, as well as cultural/ideological/political . Fordism was precisely an economic pervaded by the political and ideological .

If nationalism is not reducible to class, 131 to what can it be reduced? Here Munck seems to prevaricate . Reference is made to culture and specifically to Bauer's teleological construction of the nation as a `totality of men bound together through a common destiny' (p . 147) . Aware that this would lend itself to the psychologism for which Lenin criticised Bauer, Munck reins back and informs us that culture/community is a historically specific artefact or, in Benedict Anderson's words, an 'imagined community' . But what does it mean to conceive nationalism historically or as a `historical phenomenon' rather than the product of `models'? Having rejected the idea that its provenance can be found in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, since such an argument would bring him back to those like Anderson whom he criticises for reducing nationalism to the rise of capitalism, Munck offers us an abstract author : the `French revolution' as a specific coalition of all oppressed classes which excluded the feudal nobility . By being the product of this coalition of classes between whom there is an implied equilibrium, rather than presumably being the world view of one class, nationalism is said to break with economism and to become political practice . The essence of this much-vaunted practice is `a general resistance to oppression' (p . 159) . In other words, it is a political practice that is deeply rooted in popular aspirations for socioeconomic, political and cultural liberation (p . 166) . What we appear to have here is a clarion call which presents the struggle for political democracy as a sort of essentialist human drive . In The German Ideology, Marx castigated those who sought to present nationalism as a `fairy kingdom of dream, [as a] kingdom of the "essence of man" .' The concept of democracy now seems to perform this function : Onward, democratic spirits . . .

Capital & Class 132

Nationalism and Marxism, then, is stronger on Marxist debates of nationalism than it is on Marxian concepts of class, productive forces, relations of production and so on . What proves a real stumbling block to an original Marxist treatment of nationalism is the failure to recognise that such concepts need to be concretised in the same way that Munck tries to concretise the concept of nationalism . Nevertheless, the book is not without merit . For the reader or student in search of an introductory summary of the numerous Marxist arguments on the theme of nationalism, Marxism and Nationalism offers a useful guided tour of the multi-faceted debate which has raged for over a century . It has the advantage, too, of going beyond the 1917 limit of Horace Davis's influential tome, Socialism and Nationalism to incorporate many contemporary and Third World contributions . For the reader who is already familia with the subject, or may have encountered Benedict Anderson's novel treatment of the subject of nationalism in Imagined Communities, the author does not make a very original contribution . References Benedict Anderson (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London : New Left Books) . Horace Davis (1967) Socialism and Nationalism : Marxist and Labor Theories of Nationalism

(New York : Monthly Review Press) . Ronaldo Munck (1985) `Otto Bauer : Towards a Marxist theory of nationalism', Capital & Class 25, Spring . Ephraim Nimni (1985) `The great historical failure : Marxist theories of nationalism', Capital & Class 25, Spring.

Richard Sennett The Fall of Public Man London : Faber and Faber, 1986 373pp, £6 .95 (p/b), ISBN 0 571 13968 X Reviewed by Bob Lumley at a time when all that is public is being downgraded, while the private is identified with good quality, fast delivery and personal satisfaction . To many, public ownership spells bureaucracy, public service broadcasting equals paternalism and state education means cultural deprivation . By contrast, private enterprise, whether in education, information or entertainment, has new-found confidence . This dramatic change in the relationship between public and private spheres is often attributed to Thatcherism . However, we need to broaden our horizons . Clearly, the British experience is closely paralleled elsewhere, while in countries like Italy public life has long been regarded with cynicism . Moreover, the current crisis needs to be understood as a historical development . Richard Sennett's Fall ofPublic Man is a valuable study on both counts . Its cultural breadth, intelligence, wit and elegance contrasts with the dull plod of British political debate . The questions he addresses are the classic ones to do with the relationship between individuals and society; in particular he asks what are the WE LIVE

Book Reviews

conditions required for maximising sociability . For him, a society is vital and healthy to the extent to which it is open to strangers . When people fear disclosure and risk-taking, socialising in closed circles, when they mobilise as communities against the wider society, then something is badly wrong. `Incivility', `barbarism' and `retribalisation' accompany the victory of private over public . What is at stake is not the state provision of this or that service but the very language and space of public life itself. The key to analysing and, eventually, revitalising public life is the city, which is the form and symbol of an integrated social relationship . For Sennett, 18th-century London and Paris exemplify a civility by which to measure the subsequent `fall' . As history, it is a dubious enterprise, but the ideal-type provides a vantage-point for showing how `playacting in the form of manners, conventions, and ritual gestures is the very stuff out of which public relations are formed, and from which public relations derive their emotional meaning' . Above all, convention, in life as in the theatre, provides the basis for exchanges between people who do not know one another . Today, according to Sennett, we have lost the art of acting in public because of the widespread belief that the only `meaningful' relationships are in the private domain, far from the world of public `appearances' . But, he argues that it is precisely the human capacity to create rules, conventions, games and masks that make for social expression as an activity in its own right . What then toppled `public man'? Sennett relates the fall to the rise of capitalist social relations, using, however, the department store and Marx's concept of commodity fetishism rather than the factory as his example (he gives an all-toobrief yet fascinating account of the reC/C 33-J

placement of haggling by the passive 133 purchase of fixed-price goods) . However, his argument is largely based on a theory of `personality' that plays a historical role equivalent to that of Protestantism in Weber's analysis of capitalism. According to Sennett, `belief (`a fundamental social condition . . . even as mankind loses a belief in gods') became immanent in society, transforming the way human relations were understood . As the 19th century advanced, the question of personal identity was bound up with notions of truth and authenticity of feeling, so that detection became a part of urban life before it emerged as a profession . Analysis, however, centres on public roles, though the consequences of personality are ultimately related back to the `tyranny of intimacy', which is seen as the condition of private life in post '60s America . The most interesting discussion deals with the parallels between Art and Politics . Sennett shows how the performer, whether musician, orchestra conductor or politician, dominated public interest . The important thing was not the programme but the virtuosity, presence and charisma of the player, the necessary corollary of which was the silent audience . In this context, the public figure of the spectator took shape not only in the theatre but on the streets : `his silence is serving a large purpose ; here he is learning that his codes for interpreting emotional expression are also codes for isolation from others ; here he is learning the fundamental truth of modern culture, that the pursuit of personal awareness and feeling is a defence against the experience of social relations .' Personality is a principle that is also collective ; `in an intimate society, all social phenomena, no matter how impersonal in structure are converted into matters of personality to have meaning' . Thus, politics hinges on the `credibility' of the poli-

Capital & Class

134 tician as a person more than on programmes and actions . Even oppositional political forms operate with the same framework ; for instance, community politics `make local territory morally sacred against the evils of capitalist urbanism', and, in the process, often acquire surveillance and exclusionist functions . Sennett admits that he too once believed that the community was the basic unit for rebuilding society, but he now criticises what he sees as `attempts to make psychological values into social relations', whether the protagonists are ethnic groups or working-class neighbourhoods . He contrasts their attachment to narrow localism with the more extensive use of urban spaces and opportunities made by the bourgeoisie . The city attains importance precisely in so far as it supersedes community and opens up the possibility of a heterogeneous and plural rather than homogeneous society . A lot of criticisms can be levelled at The Fall of Public Man . Sennett says little about women and feminism, though perhaps the `rise of public woman' and the politics of `the personal is political' (and vice versa) might present both a challenge to and/or confirmation of his thesis ; his use of history seems heavily conditioned by his preoccupations with contemporary issues ; the counterposition of the 'impersonal' city to the `organic' community is often stark and abstract . Sometimes one wishes that he had dealt more directly and extensively with contemporary American society rather than slipped in references and allusions . This work does not have the same weight as earlier sociological writings, such as The Hidden Injuries of Class, and is the victim of its ambition . Nonetheless, it has much to say to anyone interested in the regeneration of a crisis-ridden public culture . In particular, he shows how we

have to think about the paradox whereby the urge to create public spaces has often had the opposite effect, leading instead to dead spaces that people desert in favour of their own homes . Boundaries, divisions, secure places, by contrast, can favour social interaction . These are paradoxes that urban planner and radical movements have equally failed to confront so that cardominated redevelopment and community retrenchment have occupied the same ground . The cruellest irony (and a problem that Sennett explores with great intelligence) is the tendency for those opposed to the dominant order to reproduce closed societies, whether through the party or the ghetto .

Jerry White The Worst Street in North London London : RKP, 1986 312pp, £8 .95 (p/b), ISBN 0 7102 0700 X Reviewed by Martin Chalmers than 100 yards from Finsbury Park Station in North London, opposite the former Rainbow, which was once the Finsbury Park Astoria, is the beginning of a street . But it's only a tiny cul-de-sac, cut short by a low railing, behind it some ragged lawn, while the shabby brick side wall of a 'S0s council housing block occupies the former line of the street . This was once Campbell Road, LITTLE MORE

Book Reviews or Bunk, notorious as `one of the worst streets in London' . Islington Council renamed it Whadcoat Street in the late '30s . Ironically, despite the efforts of slum clearance and planners to efface the memory of such disorderly slum streets, the faded words, Campbell Road, can still be made out on the side of the corner house on Seven Sisters Road . The subject of Jerry White's new book (in the early Rothschild Buildings he studied a tenement block in the old East End inhabited by respectable Jewish immigrants) is the history of Campbell Road, a North London slum street . Drawing on extensive oral evidence, he investigates, first, why it came to have the reputation of a disorderly, criminal street ; second, why, once a particular milieu had been established and identified in the late 19th century, it continued to reproduce itself after the First World War - the core of the book; and, third, why that distinctive culture had withered some time before the street's demolition in the 1950s . The implicit theme of his book is the question of how and why the rough plebian street culture of Victorian London disappeared . Campbell Road was built between the 1860s and 1880s, part of London's northward expansion . Its `worst street' tag was fixed, at latest, by Booth's London survey of 1902 . By that time the street had one of the densest concentrations of common lodging house beds in London with an itinerant male population, and most of the houses were divided up into furnished rooms . A large proportion of its inhabitants were either labourers or earned their living in various street trades . Although the number of lodging houses later declined, the image of the street was firmly established : casual employment, perhaps sliding into petty crime, drunkenness, casual violence, overcrowding, an absence of respectable family life, `a source of ridi-

cule, distrust and fear' . Yet, it was also a 135 place of refuge, a family with nowhere else to go, might find room in Campbell Road or one of the other centres of casual street trade in Holloway and beyond . There were therefore two bases to the survival of Campbell Road and its constellation of contradictory values : egalitarianism, collectivism, individualism, libertarianism and chauvinism . One was employment either in traditional costermonger trades or the related demand for casual labour in transport and distribution, or, for women, domestic work and cleaning . A culture was reproduced in Campbell Road, which was quite distinct from those in which the discipline and dependence of apprenticeship, or the discipline of regular factory work or the uniformed working class were normal . Casual employment and an eye for individual opportunity were also quite at odds with unionisation . The links of the 'lumpen economy' to the `petty bourgeoisie' were at least as strong as those to the respectable working classes . The second major element was the flexibility of the housing market in Campbell Road and similar streets . Unlike some writers, White emphasises that this oppositional culture involved considerable costs for those within it; at an everyday, material level, in terms of the imposition of an `outcast' identity, and in the special attention it was subject to by the police and other authorities . Nevertheless, Campbell Road was not only a dangerous place, where the unwary stranger stood to get a licking . Within the wider working-class culture it was also a street with a collective identity in a positive sense, a place `envied as well as despised . The Bunk was an urban subconscious, an abandoned but liberated other self,' where the police and other authority figures were not respected, and where `there was always something going

Capital & Class

136 on,' whether it was street-gaming, or especially rowdy Guy Fawkes parties . The costs - the outside toilets, the smells, the families living in one room, the constant war with landlords, the lack of affection - are made especially graphic in the interview material provided by women who grew up in the road between the wars . Although he by no means neglects either the role of decasualisation in industry and local authorities and the shrinkage of the casual and black economies, nor the `hard edge' of respectabilisation - intevention by state authorities increased during the '30s - White ascribes a major role as agents of change in the road to women . He argues `the young men's lives tended more to accommodation with the traditions of the Bunk', in gambling, drink, street theatre and sport . For women, however, new industries and their demand for female labour opened up opportunities for regular work away from the uncertainties and tyranny of domestic service and cleaning . Only through regular work and a break with the traditions of the street (which frequently seems to have meant violent struggle with parents, especially mothers) was there any chance of reaching out to the new models of femininity and housekeeping promoted by magazines, cinema and radio . The ideal of Romantic Love required money for clothes and make-up, and money to go to the places where they could be displayed, preliminary to marriage - the great escape from Campbell Road . Not all made it, early marriage might easily `reproduce the conditions from which escape was desired' . Altogether, with the rise in real wages, in London, during the '30s, the Campbell Road pole of unrespectable pastimes was becoming an increasingly minoritarian one within the working classes . Also, with the increasing possibility of council housing and even mortgages on the one hand, and

the decline of the street economy on the other, the Campbell Roads of London were increasingly losing their functions . This process was accelerated by the war. It is impossible here to do full justice to the questions raised and thematerial in The Worst Street in North London . Apart from its pleasures as urban and oral history, it is an important contribution to an understanding of the transformation of the working classes in the inter-war period . (One question thrown up from an unfamiliar perspective, is the extent of the similarities with the process of 'respectabilisation' in Nazi Germany .) However, I want to raise some qualifications to White's approach and conclusions . First, although White is at pains to stress the separateness of Campbell Road, largely determined by its housing, from its surrounding streets, perhaps a little bit of the `legend' has rubbed off on him too . Links with other `casual' streets in Holloway and Islington are emphasised, but at the cost of exploring the relationship with the nearer neighbourhood . It comes almost as a surprise, when the reader learns that there are criminal connections in nearby streets, as well as prosititutes and brothels (there were apparently none of the latter in Campbell Road) . To what degree, one wonders, did the police and other authorities, having identified the deviance of the street, amplify its disorderly activities by paying more attention to them than to activities in other streets . Juveniles were more likely to be harrassed in streets already associated with adult crime, for example . White has very thoroughly established the pattern of temporal change in the street and its economy . What he tends to close off, is the fluidity between the respectable and unrespectable extremes, or poles, of the working classes. One would like to know more, for example, about collective actions and riots in the area in

Book Reviews which Bunkites were also involved even if they were not central participants . Second, Worst Street is very effective at bringing together the new inter-war models of femininity with the oral evidence of intervieweees on their own escapes from Campbell Road . However, I suspect that the break between male and female youth is made too sharp . Finally, it's useful to look across the apparent divide of the respectable '50s and '60s at the similarities between the old lumpen and dangerous classes of the metropolis and the even more heterogeneous outcast minorities of the '70s and '80s : blacks, addicts, lumpenintelligentsia and the rest . Even if differences are eyecatching, there are certainly shared features in a rejection by and of certain forms of labour discipline, in the attraction of self-employment and independence as an escape from humiliating forms of casual employment which today are quite likely to take the form of office-work, in the estrangement from organised radicalism, and in an unstable world of furnished rooms and squats . There's also the muchdiscussed rise of a new black economy although it's probably considered less widespread than that in which Campbell Road participated before and after the First World War .

Nicos P . Mouzelis Politics in the Semi-Periphery : Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America London : Macmillan, 1986 £7 .95 (p/b), ISBN 0 333 34934 2 Reviewed by Ronaldo Munck

THEORETICALLY GROUNDED comparisons of politics across different regions are rare . Mouzelis here attempts an ambitious construction of a theory of `politics in the semi-periphery' in a project reminiscent of the approach of the late Nicos Poulantzas . An obvious question to ask is : Why compare the Balkans with the southern cone of Latin America? Mouzelis is probably right in arguing that for certain research purposes it makes more sense to compare Greece (his main area of expertise, and subject of an earlier book) with Chile than say Italy . Nevertheless, there is a somewhat uneasy mix between the Balkans and Latin American historical material and the attempt to theorise on the basis of both . The basic hypothesis advanced by Mouzelis can be summarised quite succinctly : 1 . In the parliamentary semi-periphery (e .g . Argentina, Chile, Greece, which becomes a composite ACG in some chapters), the transition from oligarchic to mass politics occurred under an overdeveloped state and under-developed industrial classes ; 2 . The rise of post-war military bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in these countries, were not random phenomena but have common economic and political structural basis . These assertions are supported with extensive historical accounts interspersed

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with chapters on the `theoretical implications' of same . To the specialist on Greece I suspect Mouzelis' earlier book - Modern Greece: facets of underdevelopment - will find little new in this book . To the specialist of the counterpoint to Greece - the southern cone of Latin America - this book will seem somewhat superficial . It is marred by too many simple mistakes and theoretical over-simplifications . Evita Peron had not `armed the pro-Peron unionised workers' in 1952 (p . 101) . If she had, the military coup of 1955 would not have been such a pushover . On the whole issue of the rise of Peronism, Mouzelis repeats old myths such as `the "new" working classes recently arrived from the countryside [who] were in direct rapport with their charismatic leader' (p. 81). The working class generally is skilfully manipulated, incorporated or otherwise deprived of its autonomy : it is not an active maker of its own destiny . Later in dealing with the 'bureaucraticauthoritarian' regimes of the 1960s, Mouzelis is somewhat cavalier towards Guillermo O'Donnell who originated the term . O'Donnell is wrongly accused of economism (though defended from the charge of functionalism) and with neglecting the distinct political crisis which led to the rise of military regimes . O'Donnell's orginal analysis of the relationship between internationalisation of the economy and the emergence of `new' military regimes in Latin America, is in fact matched by detailed accounts of the politico-military dimension of the crisis, and indeed the key role of working-class insurgency and the threat it posed to capital's continued rule . To most readers of Capital & Class this book will have several attractions . There are extremely useful surveys and discussions on the modes of transition to postoligarchic states and the routes to military

dictatorship in the Balkans and Latin America. Mouzelis, furthermore, reinforces current critiques of economism in Marxist analysis . He rejects the reductionist approach to politics, explained either by ill-defined `projects' of the dominant classes or `requirements' of capital . Instead, Mouzelis argues that the polity too has its proper reproduction requirements, to be studied in their own right . More adventurously, he advances the proposition that the `mode of production' focused on by Marxist theorists should be matched by attention to the `mode of political domination' . Likewise, relations of production have their counterpart in relations of domination . In terms of the old debate on whether economics or politics has primacy or is dominant, Mouzelis does not argue for `primacy of the political' but simply that the economypolity relationship must be studied with `a non-economistic conceptualisation of political institutions and actors' . As Mouzelis explicitly states, what he is ultimately advocating is a rapprochement between Marx's political-economy approach and Weber's political sociology . This is not exactly a new project, but one that must be taken seriously by nondogmatic modern-day Marxists .

Book Reviews Paul Gordon and Francesca Klug New Right/New Racism Nottingham : Searchlight Publications, 1986 £3 .00 (p/b)

occasions it is suggested that policies, 139 particularly education policies, should encourage incorporation and assimilation . From this standpoint anti-racist education is seen as divisive, as underprivileging white citizens, and multiculturalism interReviewed by Jenny Williams preted as an attack on patriotism and nationalism . NEW RIGHT/NEW RACISM highlights the New Right/New Racism is a well written `racial' messages which are an important and very useful account of the variety of part of the economic and political analysis pressure groups and individuals who put forward by the `new right' . Gordon comprise the new right, and of their influand Klug describe a range of new right ence on politics and policies . In particular pressure groups, the writings of their the use of the media to influence popular political and academic leaders and their opinion, to control the framework within links with the popular press . They suggest which debates take place, is well portrayed . that the two contrasting wings of the right, It is important that such a book as this is of free market liberalism and of social available to a wide audience, and that antiauthoritarianism are brought together and racists realise the strength, power and combined in key Thatcherite policies : social logic of the opposition . But the con'Thatcherism has resulted in a "free" centration upon the writings and speeches economy, on the other hand, and a more of national figures means that other facrepressive state, on the other' (p . 5) . tors, which would make their case for Drawing heavily on the analysis devel- seeing racism as a central feature of new oped by Martin Barker in The New Racism right thinking, are ignored . (1982) the authors illustrate the particular For example, many of the economic form of racism which is prevalent among a and social policies instituted since 1979, range of right-wing authors . Racism, it is which stem from social market liberalism argued by Powell, Honeyford, Scruton, or social authoritarianism, do not need Kenny and many others, is inherent in explicitly `racial' dimensions in order to human nature ; that people `naturally' ally have discriminatory consequences . They themselves with their own groups, and contain crucial but hidden `racial' dimenthat black people are `naturally' different sions . The industrial and economic power and outside the British nation . As Gordon given to the Manpower Services Commisand Klug point out, `one of the hallmarks sion, for example, processes school leavers of the new racism is that it takes it as given into a segmented labour market, segthat there are biologically-determined dif- mented by colour and gender, in spite of ferences between groups of people which the anti-racist and anti-sexist policies of are so fundamental as to lead to unbridge- particular schools or local education able gaps in culture and lifestyle' (p . 22) . authorities . The rhetoric of standards, Such racism justifies a particular form of national curricula and parental power, nationalism, which excludes blacks as now being used to justify policies which legitimate citizens . A contradictory form remove power from teachers and LEAS, of reasoning however tends to accompany does not rest on an explicitly racist analysis . social policies aiming to reduce `racial' But the consequences of such policies are conflict and promote harmony . On these likely to be an increase in racial inequalities

Capital & Class

140 and an increase in conflict . Why then is the `race' issue so important to the new right? On page 1 Gordon and King state that the central project of the new right is to preserve the class structure of contemporary capitalism . An analysis of the `racial' dimensions of that class structure, of the ideological and political processes which have resulted in the racialisation of certain class fractions, would have provided the context which explained the power and strength of the new right. This strength is not just because of their access to politicians and the media . It is because of their ability to frame an understanding of `race' issues and a justification of racism which makes sense to the majority of white citizens . Gordon and Klug provide some insights on this question . More work needs to be done .

M . Godelier translated by Rupert Swyer The Making of Great Men . Male domination and power among the New Guinea Baruya Cambridge University Press, 1986 251pp, £30 (h/b), £10 .95 (p/b) Reviewed by Sasha Josephides that his book is about power, primarily the power of men over women, but in reality it touches on almost every major debate within anthropology of the last couple of decades, provides a general ethnography of the Baruya (some of it unnecessarily voyeuristic), includes a technical argument regarding the differences between `big man' and `great man' societies, and concludes with a rather curious exhortation to the reader not to imagine that s/he is less savage than the Baruya . For the purpose of this review I shall concentrate on the central theme of the book which is the claim that male domination does not originate in the emergence of classes but predates them . By looking at structures which existed in Baruya society prior to colonisation Godelier is able to identify mechanisms which subordinate women to men and which clearly belong to a classless society . He recognises that inequalities also exist among men (hence the title of the book which signals that only some men become great) and that particular women can have a higher status than particular men . But men as a group dominate women as a group and the way this manifests itself is through the exclusion of women from control over the means of production, destruction and exchange . The social mechanism which separates men and women into two distinct groups and which both institutes and legitimises female subordination is considered to be male and female initiation . Female initiGODELIER TELLS US

Book Reviews

ation Godelier sees as a way of making women consent to their subordination . The reason why initiation is seen as so crucial appears to be because of the kinds of symbolic statements made regarding the reproductive and nurturing abilities of the two sexes and because of the statuses conferred on the sexes as a result of the rituals . Godelier's material to support this thesis includes data on the Baruya economy and their warfaring traditions, statements on the symbolic meaning and use of bodily fluids, and a corpus of myths regarding a past matriarchy . Neither the data nor the analysis offers anything new to those acquainted with the literature on the Melanesia or even with more general works on gender and anthropology . This is not to devalue the data which is in itself interesting and useful, but in view of the amount of work which has been carried out in this area and the controversies regarding how this kind of material can be interpreted, it is disappointing that Godelier should present both the material and the analysis as a `new discovery' without in any way justifying his particular interpretation nor taking into account any other . Where the book is more promising is in its attempt to relate all forms of inequality and therefore treat the mechanisms which result in the general subordination of women as part of the same process which allows certain men to become `great' . In order to do this Godelier picks out a number of different strands which are relevant to the analysis . However these are not sufficiently developed . In a way the strength of this book is also its weakness : it attempts to bring together a number of different issues which one can agree with Godelier, should be related, but it does not succeed in relating them in a coherent and convincing manner .

141

Barry Munslow (ed .) Africa : Problems in the Transition to Socialism London : Zed Books, 1986 221pp, £18 .95 (h/b), £6 .95 (p/b) Reviewed by Harry Goulbourne THERE ARE SEVERAL reasons for saying forthwith that this collection of essays is a welcome addition to the literature which describes and analyses what is happening in post-colonial Africa . I will mention only three of these . First, the interest in the question of transition is significant, if only because it indicates that the academic community is taking this problematic phase in the development of human society seriously, following the pioneering work of Charles Bettelheim but particularly Clive Thomas, with respect to the Third World . To varying degrees the pieces live up to the expectations engendered by the title of the collection . A great many of the problems involved in the process of transition from the underdeveloped, some would say simply the backward, conditions in which

Capital & Class

142 colonialism left the continent to the sophisticated and humane requirements of socialism are broached . The contributors - Cohern, Turok, Bie Nio Ong, Davidson, Egero, and Bhagavan - and the editor, explore aspects of the origins of a Marxist tradition on the continent and its weaknesses ; the problems of the transition, such as international and regional hostility with respect to Angola and Mozambique, the internal barriers, such as the emergence of an incipient bourgeoisie based on state extraction of surplus from direct producers and the inadequacies of both the structures which have been part of the colonial inheritance as well as those effected in the post-colonial period . The difficulties which exist in the relationship between would-be vanguard parties and the state, efforts to cope with regional and international hostility, the distance between formal and actual state control of national resoruces and the inability of governments to arrest the seepage of cash from the treasury are some of the more important issues raised. Many of these difficulties in a post-revolutionary situation have become commonplace since 1917 . But to shoulder socialist construction in the context of the Third World and especially in Africa, has opened up in a much more dramatic way the apparently fixed gulf between aspiration and reality . These problems of transition are clearly brought out in this collection . Perhaps, then, the single most important thing to be said about this text is its reaffirmation of the conviction that a socialist Africa is still an ongoing project . During the optimistic years of the 1970s when all things seemed possible (if only a leadership was bright enough to recognise the best plans packaged by international experts or was lucky enough to hit upon the correct ideology) there was no end to the praise showered upon seemingly en-

lightened leaders and regimes in Africa . But in the lean years of the present decade, interest in the prospects for socialism in Africa is maintained only by those with no other hope, the dogmatists who know their catechism well and, of course, the courageous . The failure to effect the transition, let alone the realisation of socialism `have swelled the chorus of those who claim that socialism in Africa is nothing but delusion . . .' (p . 1), as Munslow puts it in his quite thoughtful introduction to the collection . In this regard undoubtedly the most revealing statement in the book is that by Bertil Egero in his excellent piece on Mozambique : `In national liberation struggles to date, the strength of popular will and motivation has made possible advances far beyond the mere technological level of the war machinery employed' (p . 137) . The collective energy of people committed to their liberation from colonialism often against great odds (especially in Southern Africa) has not yet successfully transformed itself into the effort necessary for constructing socialism but it is surely idiocy not to recognise the potentiality of what is for many in Africa the first phase in a long struggle toward better societies . A third positive aspect of the collection to my mind is the deliberate emphasis given to the Lusophone countries of Africa - Mozambique, Angola and GuineaBissau . During the struggle for liberation from Portugal, interest in these countries in the English-speaking world was high . With independence and the beginnings of the hard, slow and often disappointing efforts to redirect internal developments, it was perhaps inevitable that interest in these countries would decrease . Indeed, apart from the undeclared war by South Africa on both Mozambique and Angola and the sad and untimely death of Samora Machel, coverage of events in these

Book Reviews

countries has been restricted largely to persons with specialist interest . Nearly all the papers draw substantially on the Lusophone African experiences ; the pieces by Davidson, Egero and Bhagavan on Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola are very informative . It is difficult to fault a collection which displays these virtues . But there are some minor failings which may be mentioned briefly. For example, the book would have been greatly enriched if it had included a bibliography for the non-specialist reader or if the editor had considered helping the reader with the distinction between the background papers (those by Cohen and Turok) and the rest which focus more directly on the more practical postindependence problems . The pieces by Cohen and Turok draw (in parts) on much the same historical experience but they offer radically different interpretations of the Pan-Africanist/early Marxist tradition(s) . Stimulating as Munslow's introduction is, it does little to relate important aspects of much of the arguments contained in the individual pieces . Another disappointment is that the editor was not generous enough to include statements from the active participants themselves (politicians, administrators, academics, advisers, groups, etc .) about the problems they are having to confront during this phase of transition . I wish to make two criticisms of a different order . The first arises largely from what I have just said : although the individual pieces are rich in details of specific situations, there is an insufficient comparative perspective in some of the lengthier ones . Munslow's introduction addresses itself to this but it is interesting to note that nowhere in the text is there an awareness that Africans may have learnt from each other, as opposed to learning from other people's experiences - com-

mendable as this obviously was . A good 143 example of this is the editor's attempt to explain the relative success of Zimbabwe . The experiences of China, Vietnam, Cuba and so forth are mentioned but the lessons learnt by Zimbabwe from Tanzania and Mozambique (which Carol Thompson in her work on the Frontline States has tried to explain) are not explored . I consider it a weakness of the text that one of the most important problems in what they regard as the transition to socialism is largely ignored . This is the important question of democracy . In the reassessment of the last quarter century or so of post-colonial developments in Africa a crucial issue is the question of actual participation by the people themselves in the affairs of their countries . This is a matter separate and apart from the variety of declarations and claims by regimes . By ignoring this question the authors may have, unwittingly, strengthened the erroneous view that socialism in Africa must take on board the anti-democratic aspects of seemingly progressive regimes . Munslow makes mention of the absence of political analysis of the African condition in the 1980s and perhaps this accounts for the lack of any awareness of one of the main issues on the agenda throughout the continent today . But this is not the whole answer . I would suggest that perhaps the time has come to recognise that any broad statement about Africa which does not have space for the voice of Africa's own intellectuals is likely to miss important aspects of what is happening on the continent . Finally, apart from Munslow's opening remarks, there is no attempt in the book to come to grips with the question of whether the transition we are seeing in Africa is towards capitalism or towards socialism . There is much empirical evidence here to

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144 cast doubt on the main assumption of the book as suggested in its title . These limitations are not, however, unique to this book . It should be welcomed as an update on some of the issues raised nearly a decade ago in Palmberg's Problems of Socialist Orientation in Africa and as a useful contribution to the sympathetic monitoring of some major problems in Africa .

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MICHAEL ELDRED: Critique of Competitive Freedom and the Bourgeois-Democratic State. - Outline of a Form-Analytic Extension ofMarx's uncompleted System . pp .liv + 516, paperback. KURASJE, Copenhagen 1984, 3 . impr. 1986 . Price : DKr.360 ; £33 ; $45 Marx did not leave behind a coherent and complete `system' for analyzing the modern world . This book grew out of the attempts of a group of authors, two Australians and two Germans, working in Konstanz, West Germany, to reconstruct Marx's Capital as philisophical critique of social forms, what they term 'formanalysis' . Eldred has hazarded some steps beyond this reconstructed 'capital- analysis' to a concrete thinking through of form-aspects of capitalist competitive life and the state . What comes out of this phenomenological wager is not a `theory' applicable for empirical social research, but an immersion in the `things themselves', to reincorporate Marx's Critique of Political Economy in the body of philosophy (which, if it is still living and breathing, has to risk going beyond the limits) . The book offers valuable contributions to recent debates around Marx's Capital, as well as suggesting paths beyond Marx into areas marxism has traditionally treated in only a cursory, reductive-causal fashion .

* The book can be purchased by mailing the order directly to KURASJE, Krystalgade 16, DK 1172 Kebenhavn K, Denmark, sending the money by cheque or money order to Giro account 716 60 44.