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Articles: CameronShelley Anaximanderand Folk Meteorology Michael Gass Eudaimonism,Theology, and Stoicism Gary Ianziti Leonardo Bruni Paul RichardBlum Francesco Patrizi KathrynGucer The Ranters Beverley C. Southgate Blacklo's Pyrrhonism Jason Gaiger Schiller's Theoryof Landscape Depiction Nancy Sinkoff Jewish Enlightenment Donald R. Kelley JHI 2000
January 2000
Vol. 61, No. 1
ISSN 0022-5037
Journalof the History of Ideas ISSN 0022-5037 Volume 61 Number 1 January2000 Copyright? 2000 by the Journalof the History of Ideas, Inc. All rights reserved. No portion of this joural may be reproducedby any process or technique without formal consent of The Johns Hopkins University Press. Authorizationto photocopy items for internalor personaluse, or the interal or personaluse of specific clients, is grantedby The Johns Hopkins University Press for librariesand other users registeredwith the CopyrightClearanceCenter(CCC) TransactionalReportingService, providedthatthe base fee of $8.00 per articleis paid directlyto CCC, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers,MA 01923. This consent does not extend to otherkinds of copying, such as copying for generaldistribution,for advertisingor promotionalpurposes, for creating new collective works, or for resale. 0022-5037/94 $8.00.
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Number 1
January2000
Volume 61
Table of Contents
Articles
Page
The Influenceof Folk Meteorology in the AnaximanderFragment....................Cameron
Shelley
1
Michael Gass
19
Gary lanziti
39
Paul RichardBlum
59
KathrynGucer
75
Blackloism and Tradition:From Theological Certainty to HistoriographicalDoubt ................ Beverley C. Southgate
97
Jason Gaiger
115
Benjamin Franklinin Jewish EasternEurope:CulturalAppropriation in the Age of the Enlightenment................. Nancy Sinkoff
133
R. Kelley
153
Eudaimonism and Theology in Stoic Accounts of Virtue ................................ A Life in Politics: LeonardoBruni's Cicero .............. FrancescoPatriziin the "Time-Sack":History and RhetoricalPhilosophy ................... "Not heretoforeextant in print": Where the Mad RantersAre .................
Schiller's Theory of LandscapeDepiction. .............
JHI 2000 ....................................Donald Notices ................... Books Received ................
157
............................... .............
.........
Copyright 2000 by Journalof the History of Ideas, Inc.
......
159
Journal of the History of Ideas An InternationalQuarterlyDevoted to IntellectualHistory Board of Editors Executive Editor: Donald R. Kelley, Rutgers University Associate Editor: Robin Ladrach,Rutgers University Hans Aarsleff, Princeton Univ. David Bromwich, Yale Univ. Virginia Brown, Pontifical Institute John F. Callahan,DumbartonOaks Julia Ching, Univ. of Toronto Marcia Colish, Oberlin College David H. Donald, Harvard Univ. Charles C. Gillispie, Princeton Univ. Anthony Grafton,Princeton Univ. Emily Grosholz,Penn State Univ. Knud Haakonssen,Boston Univ. David Hollinger, Univ. of California Bruce Kuklick, Univ. of Pennsylvania Joseph M. Levine, Syracuse Univ. EdwardP. Mahoney,Duke Univ. Allan Megill, Univ. of Virginia John E. Murdoch,Harvard Univ.
Steven Nadler, Univ. of Wisconsin Helen North, SwarthmoreCollege Francis Oakley, WilliamsCollege Anthony Pagden,Johns Hopkins Univ. Claude Palisca, Yale Univ. Peter Paret,Inst.for Advanced Study Eugene F. Rice, Columbia Univ. Dorothy Ross, Johns Hopkins Univ. David HarrisSacks, Reed College J. B. Schneewind,Johns Hopkins Univ. JerroldSeigel, New YorkUniv. Nancy G. Siraisi, Hunter College Quentin Skinner, CambridgeUniv. Gisela Striker,Cambridge Univ. David Summers, Univ. of Virginia John W. Yolton, Rutgers Univ. Perez Zagorin, Univ. of Rochester
ConsultingEditors Sidney Axinn FrederickBeiser GregoryClaeys Stefan Collini Brian P. Copenhaver William J. Courtenay W. R. Elton James Engell Ivan Gaskell Bentley Glass Maurice M. Goldsmith Daniel Gordon Loren Graham
Henry M. Hoenigswald MaryanneC. Horowitz J. Paul Hunter Victoria Kahn George Kateb William R. Keylor Robert M. Kingdon Samuel C. Kinser Norman Kretzmann Elizabeth Lunbeck Rudolf Makkreel Hajime Nakamura
David Fate Norton Steven Ozment Peter Reill PatrickRiley Alan Ryan GordonSchochet Jean Starobinski Nancy S. Struever Brian Tierey Aram Vartanian Brian Vickers Stewart Weaver Donald Winch
Publishedby The Johns Hopkins University Press January2000
Volume 61, Number 1
The
Influence in
the
of
Folk
Meteorology
Anaximander Fragment
CameronShelley Introduction No scholarsdoubtthatthepre-Socraticphilosophers,especiallytheMilesians, were concernedwith meteorology.Theirworks aboundwith accountsof wind, rain,thunder,lightning,meteorites,waterspouts,whirlwinds,andso on. Through examinationof the fragmentsof the pre-Socratics,we can tracethis interestin meteorology from each philosopherto his predecessorsright back to Anaximander.IThalesmight at firstseem to be the most obvious candidateas the man who introducedmeteorologyinto philosophy,but Kirket al. arguepersuasively thatThaleswas moreinterestedin near-easternmythology.2Thus,we musttake Anaximander,Thales'sprotege,to be the philosopherwho mademeteorologya topic of philosophicalinterest. This situationleaves us with an obvious question:where didAnaximander come by his interestand ideas aboutmeteorology if not from Thales?Moder scholarshipunanimouslypoints to the Greekmythologicaltraditionof Anaximander'stime as recordedprimarilyby HomerandHesiod. Gilbertconfidently assertsthatany inquiryintothe originof Greekmeteorologymustbegin with the stories recordedby these poets, and modem scholarsgenerallyecho this opinion.3Kahnnotes that in classical Athens the Milesian-style,non-mythological accountsof meteorologywere treatedas directchallenges to the Olympic reliThanksto ThomasA. Blackson for commentson earlierdraftsof this paper.This research is supportedby the Social Sciences and HumanitiesResearchCouncil of Canada. 1 C. H. Kahn,Anaximanderand the Origins of GreekCosmology (New York, 1960), 98109. 2 G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical with a Selection of Texts(Cambridge,19832),91ff. History 3 Gilbert,Die meteorologischenTheoriendes GriechischenAltertums(Leipzig, 1907), 1718. 1 2000byJournal of theHistoryof Ideas,Inc. Copyright
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gion, as demonstratedby Aristophanesin The Clouds.4But to conclude on this basis thatAnaximanderhimself saw his projectas the constructionof theories by the removalof deities frommyths is to mistakethe resultfor the cause. Kirk et al. simplypointto Kahn'saccountandspeculatethatAnaximanderwas influencedby Greeklegends aboutPhaethonandDeucalion.5None of these scholars consideralternativepossible sourcesofAnaximander'smeteorologicalideas, so thatsupportfor mythologyas the sourcederiveslargelyfromthe lack of a rival. But thereis an alternative,namely,folk meteorology. Folk meteorologymay be describedas the body of folk wisdom concerning the natureandpredictionof weatherpatterns.It typically comes in the form of pithy statementsorjingles such as "Redsky at night,shepherd'sdelight;red sky in morning,shepherd'swarning."6 Folkmeteorologyhasbeen almostcompletely even folklore scholars,so it is not surprisingthatit has escapedthe neglected by attentionof philosophersand classical scholarsas well. However,an examination of folk beliefs aboutmeteorologyreveals significantsimilaritieswith some of the philosophicalbeliefs attributedto Anaximander,most notably,and surprisingly,regardingthe concept of justice (dike) implicit in Anaximander'sfamous fragment. The purposeof this paperis to constructanddefenda case for the influence of folk meteorology on Anaximander,particularlyon the concept of justice in the Anaximanderfragment.The case begins on familiarground,with the fragment itself and argumentsagainstattemptsto traceinfluences on it to non-meteorological sources, and continueswith some evidence of the universalityof folk meteorologyacross culturesand the characterof balance as a folk-meteorologicalconcept,which is thenappliedto the Anaximanderfragmentas a means of explicatingwhatAnaximandermeanttherebyjustice. The suitabilityof balance for this purposeis takenas evidence thatAnaximanderwas influencedby folk meteorology. Thus, this inquiry identifies a plausible origin of one of Anaximander'scentralphilosophicalideas, an originwhich has so farremained completelyunexploredby scholarsof ancientGreekphilosophy. The Fragmentof Anaximander Anaximanderis famous among Greekscholarsfor the centralrole he gave to the conceptofjustice (dike)in his naturalphilosophy.The one fragmentof his writings,quotedby Simpliciusin his Commentaryon Aristotles Physics (24.1821), recordsAnaximander'sview on the effect of justice in the physical world:
4
Kahn, 108-9. 5Kirk, 137-40. 6 P. J. Marriott,Red Sky at Night, Shepherd'sDelight? (Oxford, 1981), 309.
Folk Meteorology
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The things thatareperishinto the things out of which they come to be, accordingto necessity,for they pay penaltyandretributionto each other for their injustice [adikias] in accordancewith the orderingof time [chronou],as [Anaximander]says in ratherpoetical language.7 In this passageAnaximanderclaims thatthe processesby which physicalthings perish or come-to-be tend to balance each other out because such a balance is imposed by time in the interestofjustice. More specifically,Anaximanderappearsto drawa parallelbetween physics and the functioningof a judge:just as a Greekjudge recommendspenalties and retributionsto settle those disputes broughtbefore him,8so time imposes orderon the conflictingprocesses of perishing and coming-to-bewhere one has committedsome injustice against the other.9 A numberof issues arise in clarifyingAnaximander'sexpression.First, is Anaximanderbeing literal? Simpliciuscommentsthathe findsthe expressionto be non-literal,thatis, phrasedin poetical language.Most modem scholarsfollow Simpliciusin this respectandtakeAnaximanderto be speakingmetaphorically. Kirket al., for example, take the parallelbetween physical and legal domains to mean thatAnaximanderis personifyingtime (chronou)as a kind of judge.10Thus,they translatethe finalphraseof the quotationas "theorderingof Time,"whereTimerefersto ajudge who sentencesThingsto penaltiesfor their Crimes committedin perishing and coming-to-be. This interpretationappears compelling at first; certainly,no modem scholar would take the use of legal termssuch as injusticeliterallyin the contextof physicalprocesses.But modem standardsmay be misleadingin this case. English expressionssuch as "thelaw of gravity"might appearto be legal metaphorsby this standard,even though they are merely historicalartifacts.Similarly,Anaximander'suse of a legal expressionmight merely be a historicalartifactof a time when legal andphysical ideaswere not distinguishedas they havebeen since his time."1Thus,it is important to consider any plausible, literal interpretationsof the fragment.Perhaps Anaximanderwas employingthe conceptofjustice in a non-moder way. The second questionbecomes this: if Anaximanderwas employinga literal conceptofjustice, just whatdoes thatconceptmeanto him? Onthe one hand,in the metaphoricalinterpretation, the parallelbetweenphysicalandlegal domains suggeststhatAnaximander'smeaningmustbe soughtin his views on legal matH. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker(Berlin, 19345), translation from R. D. McKirahan,Philosophy Before Socrates: An Introductionwith Textsand Commentary(Indianapolis, 1994), 43. 8 M. Gagarin,Early GreekLaw (Berkeley, 1986). 9 Kirk, 120-21. 7
'1 Ibid., 118.
M McKirahan,45.
CameronShelley
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ters.No scholarhas pursuedthis avenueof inquiryvery far.12On the otherhand, in the literalinterpretation, the avenueof inquiryleadsfurtherintoAnaximander's ideas on physics as such. Thus,we mustlook to Anaximander'snaturalphilosophy for the meaningofjustice.'3 The thirdissue is of coursewhereto look in Anaximander'snaturalphilosophy for his concept of justice. Unfortunately,the fragmentis the only known quotationofAnaximander'sown words,andthe terminjustice(adikias)used in the fragmentis not explainedby any othersource, at least not specifically with referencetoAnaximander.Sincethereis no furtherinformationonAnaximander's concept of justice itself, it is reasonableto turnto the potentialsources of this concept. Threesuch sourceshave been proposed:in his generaloutlook on the world, in his cosmogony,andin his meteorology. The firstpossible sourceis characterizedmost clearlyby Classen,who describesAnaximander'sexpressionas a "typicallyGreekagonisticconception": Perishingand coming-to-be are coupled together and remain interrelated insofaras they-in a typically Greekagonisticconception-persist in mutualconflict which justice balances in favor now of one and then of the other.'4 In otherwords the Greekstendedto see justice in the balance of conflict in all things, and thereforeAnaximandersaw it in the specific instance of physics. While there is undoubtedlysome truthto this claim, it does little more than confirma stereotype. The second possible sourceofAnaximander'sconceptofjustice is his cosmogony. On this readingjustice in physics is understoodas a condition perceived from the mannerin which the cosmos originated.The most immediate groundfor this view is the fact that the fragmentwhich Simplicius quotes follows directlyafterhis discussionof the apeironas the arche or generativeprinciple of the cosmos in Anaximander'snaturalphilosophy.This textualrelationship suggests thatAnaximander'sstatementon justice in conflict and balance follows from the natureof the apeiron as it participatedin the formationof the 12
Holscher,"Anaximanderand the Beginnings of GreekPhilosophy,"Hermes, 81 (1953), 297-300, has gone the furthestin this directionby linking Anaximander'sidea of justice with the Greek idea of moral hubris. He reads Anaximanderas claiming that each basic material element is engaged in tryingto eliminateall othersand thus usurpthe apeiron as the unlimited, immortalelement of the cosmos. But this suggestion rests on the untenableidea that the injustice mentionedby Anaximanderis committedby the elements against the apeiron ratherthan against each other as the text of the fragmentindicates;see Kahn, 37-39, and Kirk, 129-30. 13 Strictly speaking, nothing is known of Anaximander'sviews on legal matters, so the move back to discussion of his ideas of physics is forced on pragmaticgrounds.Here I argue that this move is forced on logical grounds. 14 C. J. Classen, "Anaximandros,"Paulys Realencyclopddieder Classischen Altertumswissenschaft,ed. G. Wissowa, SupplementbandXII (Stuttgart,1970), 57.
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5
cosmos.15Butthis view ignoresthe commentthatSimpliciusmakesimmediately afterhis quotationfromAnaximander:16 It is clearthat,havingobservedthe changeof the fourelementsinto one another,[Anaximander]did not think fit to make any one of these the materialsubstratum,but somethingelse besides these. In otherwords, accordingto Simplicius,Anaximandertook the presentstateof affairsinvolving conflict andbalanceamongthe fourelementsas evidence that none of those elementscould be the arche of the cosmos. It is cosmogony,then, that is inferredfrom observationof the present,ratherthan the presentthat is deduced from speculation about cosmogony.17If Simplicius is correct, then Anaximanderdid not derivehis conceptofjustice fromhis metaphysicalspeculations. This situationdirectsus to the thirdpossible source of Anaximander's conceptofjustice in physics, namely,meteorology. If it is not attributableto his generaloutlookor his cosmogony,thenwe must likely concludethatAnaximandersawjustice as a qualityinherentin everyday meteorology.Thisjustice is evident in a balance imposed on the perishingand coming-to-beof the four elements mentionedby Simplicius, a balance constitutedby penaltiesand retributions.The four elements in questionare probably which implies thatwhatAnaximanderhadin mindwas hot, cold, wet, anddry,18 the balancein the alternationof seasons, fromthe heat of summerto the cold of winterandback,withtheconcomitantalternationof wet rainfallanddrydrought.19 Summer,for instance,occurs in orderto balance out winter,and rainoccurs in orderto balanceoutdrought.Inotherwords,in thefragmentquotedby Simplicius, Anaximanderwas expressinga conceptofjustice derivedfromhis understanding of meteorology. Folk Meteorology If thereis a literalinterpretationof the fragmentin generalandthe concept thenwe mustlook forthemin the sourcesofAnaximander's ofjusticein particular, meteorologicalideas.Theproblemis thatwe do notpossess thosesources. Scholl5 C. J. Classen, "Anaximanderand Anaximenes:The EarliestGreekTheoriesof Change?"
Phronesis, 22 (1977), 92-93. 16 Translationfrom Kahn, 156. 17 W. K. C. Guthrie,A History of Greek Philosophy: The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans(6 vols.; Cambridge,1962), I, 81. 18 Actually, the doctrine of four elements is most likely an anachronismon the part of Simplicius, but hot, cold, wet, and dry are nevertheless representativeof what Anaximander likely had in mind and will be used here without furthercomment. See Kahn, 119-63, Guthrie, 78-83, and Kirk, 119-20. 19See Gilbert, 28-29, Kahn, 184, Guthrie, 80, 101, and Kirk, 119-21, and references therein.
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ars have assumed that Greek myths supplied Anaximanderwith his ideas on meteorology,but this assumptionhas escaped questioningsimply due to a lack of competition.In this section folk meteorology is advanced as a competing source, specifically as the sourceof the concept ofjustice. Folk meteorologyis a poorlydefinedandunderstoodaffair,littleresearched even among those scholars who might be expected to have an interestin the subject.20Thus, any currentdiscussion of it must deal immediatelywith two difficulties.Firstis the problemof specifying what is coveredby folk meteorology. Second is the relatedproblemof the scarcityof criticalsources, ancientor modem, on folk beliefs aboutthe weather. For present purposes, it is enough to say about folk meteorology that its domainis generallythe explanationof large-scale,naturalphenomenasuch as the weather.Widdowsonnotes thatin folk meteorologyweatheris explainedin two ways: as a patternedand self-sufficient set of phenomenalike the cycle of seasons and alterationof day and night ("pseudo-scientific"),and divine interventionslike unheraldedstormsandnaturaldisasters("pseudo-mythological").21 The firstkind of explanationoften seems to reflect sincerelyheld beliefs about how the weatherworks.The secondkindis oftenused to entertainandto frighten children.It is the firstkind thatis examinedhere. Unfortunately,scholarshipon folk meteorology is scarce and singularly nonanalytic.Mostmodemsourceson this subjectconsistof collectionsof weather lore with nothing or next to nothing in the way of analysis or comment.In the English literatureonly Marriottprovides any remarkson the role of balance in Inthe case of ancient weatherlore, andthese commentsareoftenunelaborated.22 Greekliterature,the situationis even more limited-only Theophrastus'swork Concerning WeatherSigns is both available and relevant.To be sure, Homer andHesiod also provideexplanationsof weather,butonly of the literaryvariety. Consider Hesiod's explanationof the origin of strong, baleful winds in the Theogony(869-80), in a passagedescribingthe aftermathof Zeus's banishment of the monsterTyphoeusto Tartarus: And fromTyphoeuscome the fierce, rain-blowingwinds-not Boreas or Notos or brightZephyros,for these come from the gods, and they refreshmankind-but others,reckless gusts, blow on the sea; some fall upon the misty sea andbringcalamityto men; as evil stormsthey rage; each blows in season, scatteringships and killing sailors. Men who meet with them at sea have no defense againsttheirpower.And some20
J. D. A. Widdowson, "Formand Function in TraditionalExplanationsof WeatherPhenomena,"Folklore Studies in Honour of Herbert Halpert: A Festschrift, ed. K. S. Goldstein and N. V. Rosenberg(St. John's, 1980). 21 Ibid., 374. 22
Op. cit.
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times over the vast and blooming earththey blast the lovely fields of earthbor men and fill the landwith dust and dreadfulnoise.23 Gilbertcontends that Hesiod faithfully records folk meteorologicalbeliefs in passages like this one,24but he simply fails to considerthe fact thatHesiod (and Homer)do not displaymuch interestin meteorologybeyondusing it to demonstratethe power and moral nature(good or bad) of mythological beings.25In contrastTheophrastus'swork Concerning WeatherSigns provides a view of non-literaryweatherlore thatis probablyvery similarto thatcommon in sixthcenturyMiletus. Indeed,it is quite similarto weatherlore recordedall over the worldat widely differenttimes. Considerthe following famouspiece of weather lore as it appearsin differentsources, characteristicallyencoded in the form of an aphorismor wise saying: Red sky at night, Shepherd'sdelight; Red sky in morning, Shepherd'swarning.26 (Jesus) answeredthem, "When it is evening, you say, 'It will be fair weather; for the sky is red.' And in the morning, 'It will be stormy today,for the sky is redandthreatening.'Youknow how to interpretthe appearanceof the sky,butyou cannotinterpretthe signs of the times."27 Now the signs of rainappearto be as follows: most unmistakableis that which occurs at dawn when the sky has a reddish appearancebefore sunrise,for this usually indicatesrain within three days, if not on that very day.Othersigns point the same way: thus a red sky at sunset indicates rainwithin three days, if not before, though less certainlythan a red sky at dawn.28 Besides its subjectmatter,weatherlore aroundthe world displaysgreatsimilarity in the underlyingconcepts used. This similarityindicatesthatthe concepts involved in the weatherlore of Anaximander'stime may be exploredthrough 23 24
Translationfrom D. Wender,Hesiod and Theognis(Harmondsworth,1973), 51. Op. cit., 17-18.
25
To be fair, Gilbert, 17, does comment that the Homeric poems primarily reflect the views of an elite, warriorclass; he simply fails to act on this comment. 26 Marriott,309. 27Matthew 16:2-3, RSV.
Theophrastus,10. All translationsfrom this work presentedin this paperare taken from A. Hort, Theophrastus:Enquiry into Plants and Minor Workson Odours and WeatherSigns (London, 1916). 28
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such collections and scholarshipas exist today. Inquiryneed not be limited to ancient sources such as Theophrastus,which has attractedno scholarlyanalysis.
Forpresentpurposesthe most importantconceptcommonin worldweather lore is balance,which describesa compensatoryrelationshipthatholds between two weatherpatternsbased on some significantrelationshipof time andquality. In otherwordsit is widely believedthatnotableweatherpatternsof one kindwill be balancedout at anothertime by weatherpatternsequallynotablebutopposite in kind.29Althoughthe concepthas not been systematicallystudiedin the existing literature,a useful overview of the role of balancein folk meteorologymay be achievedby brieflysurveyingthe kindsof weatherlore in which thatconcept participates.Roughly speaking,balance occurs in weatherlore underthe categories of temporalbalance,qualitativebalance,faunaland floralbalance,and metaphoricalbalance.Each categoryindicatesan attributeof weatherpatterns to which the concept of balanceis applied. Temporalbalanceconcernscompensationof weatheroccurringat one time of year by weatheroccurringat a later,correspondingtime of year. If Februarygives much snow, A fine summerit doth foreshow.30 There are three aspects of this adage to note: it is expressed as a hypothetical statement,i.e., an if-thenconstruction;it relatesweatherpatternsof conventionally oppositetypes, i.e., cold andwarmweather;andit indicatesa directproportion between the magnitudesof cold andwarmweather,where a certainthreshold ("muchsnow")is exceeded. Finally,it establishesthis hypotheticalrelation between two specific periods of time, apparentlyclaiming that the month of Februaryby itself may correspondto the whole summerseason. This adage is similarin these respectsto the well-knownpiece of weatherlore:"Aprilshowers bring forth May flowers."31Of course there are many variationson this basic theme, "As much dew in March, so much fog rises in August."32The most obvious differencebetween this saying andthe last is thatthis one concernsnot opposite conditionssuch as cold and warm,but opposite processes, i.e., water falling (dew) and water rising (fog). As Marriottalso points out, this saying shows the preferencefor selecting correspondingtimes that are alreadysomehow connected.33In this case the times areroughlysix monthsapart,which in a sense makes them as mutuallydistinct as possible from a calendricalpoint of 29Marriott, 1. 30 Marriott, 15. 31 Ibid., 38. 32 Ibid., 30-31. 33Ibid., 31.
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view. Thispreferenceis shown even moreexplicitlyin adagesthatconcernholidays, such as Christmasin snow, Easterin mud. Easterin snow, Christmasin mud.34 Clearly, the reason Christmasand Easter appearhere is due to their mutual religious connection in the Christiancalendar.Some such oppositionbetween calendricaltimes is commonto all weatherlore of this type. Qualitativebalanceconcernscompensationof weatherbasedon its intrinsic nature,ratherthanthe calendardateof its occurrence.Hereis a typicalexample: If the springis cold and wet, then the autumnwill be hot and dry.35 (Cf. If the winter is wet, the springwill be dry;if the winteris dry,the springwill be fair... If the springandsummerarecold, the late summer and autumnwill be stifling hot andwindless.)36 In structureandmeaningthis maxim is much the same as the temporalweather lore discussedabove, exceptthatit identifiescorrespondingtimesby the seasons instead of times as given by the calendar.In other words it is a hypothetical statementthatrelates opposite types of weatherthat are thoughtto correspond across complementaryseasons. Most qualitativeweatherlore follows this pattern,althoughsome adagesidentifyweatherdirectlyby intrinsicquality,such as A warm and serene day, which we say is too fine for the season, betokens a speedy reverse.37 This maximexpressesthe belief thatespeciallygood weatherat any time of year createsa situationin which badweatheris due to follow. It is interestingthatthe antecedentof this adageconcernsgood weatheronly anddoes not implythatbad weathercreatesa situationin which good weatherbecomes due. Thereis a definite tendency in weather lore to take bad weather over good weather as the ultimatecause of weatherpatterns.It may be thatweatherlore shareswith gossip the humantendencyto regardbadnews as moresignificantor attractivethan good news, or it may be thatthe conceptof oppositionitself ("aspeedyreverse") is asymmetricandplaces emphasison the negative side of a reversal("coldand 34 Ibid., 96-97.
35Ibid., 106. 36 Theophrastus,44. 37Marriott, 126.
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turbulent")above the positive side ("warmand serene").Althoughboth factors may well be involved, otheradages of qualitativeweatherlore seem to suggest that the latteroption is true, i.e., that there is an asymmetryin the concept of opposition.Considerthe following maxim: Winterthunder, A summer'swonder.38 Marriottexplainsthat"extractingwinterthunderout of the JuneandJuly summer is supposed to help towards a warm sunny summer or abundantcrop." Note the emphasison thunder,a turbulentformof weather,as the item extracted from one season to the other. In this case at least, warm summerweather is conceived mostly as the absence of thunderstorms.It appears,then, that the conceptof oppositionas it exists in folk meteorologytakesbadweatheras definite entity and good weatherlargelyas its absence. Balancein faunalandfloralweatherlore concernsthe relationshipbetween the weather and various animals and plants. Weatherlore of this kind is rarer than the others and appearsto representthe instantiationin weather lore of a more general concept of an ongoing sympathybetween natureas a whole and certainanimalsandplants in particular.Considerthe following maxim: When the hawthornhas too many haws We shall have many snaws.39 (Cf. Whenthe kermes-oakfruitsexceedinglywell, it generallyindicates a severe winter, and sometimes they say that this sign is followed by droughts.)40
This adagerelatesa high yield of berrieson hawthorntrees in summerto a high numberof snowstormsin the following winter.Marriottexplainsthat"country folk believe natureprovides abundanthaws as food for the hungrybirds in a forthcomingseverewinter."This belief seems to revealsomethingfurtherin the concept of balance in weather lore: not only do opposed weatherpatternsat differenttimes exist in a kind of correspondence,but each patterncontainsas it were the seeds of the other.In this case, for instance,it appearsthatsome of the very fecundity of the summerseason is a manifestationof the severity of the coming winter,exertingan influenceon the presentfromits coming occurrence in the future. In folk meteorology, then, time is a more complex attributeof 38Ibid., 116. 39 Ibid., 303. 40
Theophrastus, 49.
Folk Meteorology
11
naturethanthatwhich establishesthe linearityof events or the correspondence of seasons to one another.Instead, time apparentlyestablishes a balance between positive and negative events by makingthem interpenetrateto some degree, by allowing winter, in the above example, to influence the growth of hawberriesin summerfor the purposeof providingfood for the birds. The finalvarietyof weatherloreto be examinedhereconcernsmetaphorical expressionsthatelaborateon the natureof balancein meteorologicalphenomena. These maximsemploy a numberof differentmetaphorswhose varietysuggests that the folk meteorologicalconcept of balance is not straightforwardly expressedin any one of them. Marriottgives a numberof examples, including: Winteris summer'sheir.41 Whatsummergets, wintereats.42 Winterfinds what summerlays up.43 A fair day in winter is the motherof a storm.44 No one so surelypays his debt As wet to dry and dry to wet.45 Be it dry or be it wet, The weather'll always pay its debt.46 Each of these maxims expresses a balance in weatherpatternsin metaphorical terms. The first three maxims describe meteorologicalevents as materialobjects, which may be set aside by summerbut then inherited,consumed,or uncoveredby winter.Havingacquiredthese metaphoricalarticles,winterno doubt manifeststhem as weather,particularlystorms.Thereis a definite emphasison rigorousweather,namely,winter,in the firstthreeexpressions,while the fourth is concernedwith the predictionof storms,andthe lasttwo describenot a meteorologicalcreditbut a debt.Thus,the emphasison negativeentitiesis also seen in this kind of weatherlore. The fourthadagepresentsa fairday personifiedas a parentgiving birthto a later storm.Marriottadds that 41
Marriott, 112. 42Ibid., 112.
43Ibid., 114. 44Ibid., 115. 45 Ibid., 242. 46
Ibid., 242.
12
CameronShelley An unusually fine day in winter is known as a "borrowed"day, to be repaid with interest later in the season, known also as a "weatherbreeder";and by sailors as a "fox."47
The terms "weather-breeder" and "fox" suggest that fair days are not so much as personified zooified-that is, regardedmetaphoricallyas animalsthatbreed later weatherpatternsas part of a naturalcompulsion ratherthan throughhuman culturalmechanismssuch as inheritanceor obligation.In these cases meteorological events are regardednot as passive materialitems but as animate entities involved in a self-perpetuatingcycle of life anddeath. The concept of a "borrowed"day as well as the concept of debt used in the fifth andsixthmaximsabove clearlypresentsweatherpatternsin termsof financial or moral obligations. Dry and wet weather are given as personifications incurringdebt to one another.However, the way in which the debt is incurred andrepaidis left obscure.In light of the discussion above it is possible thatwet or dry weatherthatoccurs in abundanceor exceeds a certainthresholdof magnitudeis what createsa debt.Presumably,such an abundancethreatensto overturnthe standingbalance of elements and thereforeplaces one element in the wrongto thatextent.Sucha debtmustbe repaidin kindby allowingthe opposite element an abundantmanifestationof equalmagnitude.Theophrastusseems to have this conceptof debt in mind when he says, Whenthereis severeheat,generallythereis compensation[antapodid6si] anda severewinterfollows. If thereis muchrainin spring,it is followed by severe heat in low-lying districts and valleys; so that one should markhow the season begins. If the autumnis exceedingly fine, generally the springis cold: if the springis late andcold, the summergoes on late and the autumnis usually scorchinghot.48 Herethe opposedweatherpatternscompensatingor paying each otherback are severe,exceedinglyfine, or late.Also, tojudge fromMarriott'scorpusof weather lore, such debtscannotbe canceledby meansotherthanrepayment,e.g., remission or the interventionof a thirdparty,unlike debts between humans. Once incited, the compensatingweathermustoccur.In view of these facts, it is clear thatthe conceptof debtas appliedin the meteorologicaldomainappearsto be of a limited and self-correctingsort, ratherthanthe selfsame concept of debt employed in humanaffairs. The conceptof balancein weatherlore,then,comprisesthe following conditions: it is a hypotheticalrelationshipthat predicatesweatherpatternsof con47Ibid., 115. See also R. Inwards, WeatherLore (London, 19504),34. 48 Op. cit., 48.
Folk Meteorology
13
ventionallyoppositekinds in directproportionas some thresholdof abundance is exceeded by the antecedentmeteorologicalevent. This concept of balanceis asymmetricin thatthe adverseweatheris typicallyemphasizedabovethe favorable weather.Some aspects of the concept of balance are capturedby various metaphorsconcerningthe culturaltransmissionof articlesandthe moralobligations of debt and repayment,and also the naturalprocess of breeding.But the diversity and limitationsof these metaphorsalso indicates that none of them entirelycapturesthe relevantconcept of balance.Rather,the hypotheticalrelationshipbetweenweatherpatternsresultsfromthe notionthatthey arenot strictly mutuallyexclusive in time but that each is, as it were, pregnantwith the other. This non-exclusivityis especiallynotablein temporalbalancemaximsin which two otherwisearbitrarytimes of year may be broughtinto correspondence. The FragmentReconsidered The concept of balance in folk meteorology as evidenced in weatherlore closely approachesthe conceptofjustice or equalizationto which Anaximander refers in the fragment.The most immediatesimilarityis in the resemblanceof the fragmentto a maxim of weatherlore, especially bearingin mind thatwhat Anaximanderdescribesas "thethingsthatare"and"thethingsout of which they come to be"mostly likely referto the elementshot, cold, wet, anddry.Indeed,in his comments on this fragment,Heideggerrefers to it as a Spruch,a maxim.49 Comparethe fragment-with the names of the elements substitutedfor Anaximander'sgeneral description-with one of the metaphoricalweathermaxims discussedabove (section 3): Hot, cold, wet, and dry perish into and come to be from one another accordingto necessity,for they pay penaltyandretributionto each other for theirinjusticein accordancewith the orderingof time. Be it dry or be it wet, The weather'll always pay its debt. Despite the simplicity and telegraphicbriefness of the weatherjingle, the two texts areremarkablysimilarin content.Eachspeaksof basic elementsincurring penaltiesagainstthemselveswith respectto the otherelements andthe fact that such debtsarealways repaidin due course.This similaritygoes beyondsuperficialities into the ideas themselves thatarebeing expressedin each. See G. Shapiro, "Debts Due and Overdue: Beginnings of Philosophy in Nietzsche, Heidegger,andAnaximander,"Nietzsche, Genealogy,Morality:Essays on Nietzsches Genealogy of Morals, ed. R. Schacht (Berkeley, 1994), 362. 49
14
CameronShelley
The concept of justice evident in the fragmentmay be systematicallycomparedto the conceptof balancein folk meteorologyas discussedabove (section 3). First, the fragmentis stated in roughly hypotheticalterms with the phrase translatedas "accordingto necessity,"signifying the sort of hypotheticalrelation morecolloquiallyrenderedin Englishas "whenneeded."In otherwordsthe fragmentonly states that if injustice is done, then penalty and retributionare meted out to maintaina balance;the fragmentdoes not state thatthis situation need ever actuallyoccur.Thatissue is addressedin Anaximander'scosmogony. Second, as pointedout in section 2, Anaximander'sfragmentappearsto be primarilyconcernedwith the natureandworkingsof the elementshot, cold, wet, anddryas theyproducethe observablealterationsin seasons,fertility,andweather patterns.In particularthere is a sharedconcern for the relationsbetween the elements consideredto be each other'sopposites.The origin of the tendencyto think of weatherpatternsin terms of opposites in the first place is obscure (if understandable),but it does suggest thatAnaximander'semphasison opposites was not, as Classenproposes, a resultof Greekfondness for conflict but rather a tendencyalreadyfixed in his sourcematerial,as it is fixed in folk meteorology everywhere. Third,Anaximanderseems to imply a directproportionbetweeneach injustice and its matchingpenalty or retribution.Kirk et al. take this proportionto mean an equalityin quantityof the elements,but it is not clearthatthis reading is correct.50For one thing, this reading would mean that the two conflicting elementswould be equalin quantityafterthe penaltyhadbeen imposed,leaving it unclearhow futureimbalancesand meteorologicalcycles would continueto occur.
Kirket al. addthatthe penaltymustreallybe a little morethanequal,which itself constitutesan injusticethatmust eventuallybe redressed.5lHowever,this reading turns the penalty imposed by Time from an example of justice to an example of injustice, thereby obscuringthe distinctionbetween the two concepts. There is no evidence that Anaximandersaw justice and injustice in this self-contradictoryor ambiguousway. Indeed,Heraclitusmay have been disputing Anaximanderon this point when he assertedthat "justice is strife,"thus opposingAnaximanderin conflatingthe two concepts.52In view of the discussion of the conceptof time above it is more likely thatAnaximandersimply had in mind a more fluid notion of time than the modem one. In other words he probablysaw the injusticesandretributionsof the elementsagainstone another as interpenetrating in lineartime andnot thereforeoccurringin strictsuccession. Because accordingto this conceptof time each such event is "pregnant"with its Op. cit., 120. Ibid., 120. 52 Heraclitus,Fr. 80. See Kirk, 193-94. 50 51
Folk Meteorology
15
opposite, the cycle of events would continuewithoutrequiringa contradictory conceptofjustice or a preciseway of measuringequalityor the lack of it among the elements. Of course, the folk meteorologicalconcept of balance does requiresome notion of weathermeasurement.More exactly, it requiresa way of saying that some weatherpatternhas exceeded some threshold.In some cases the threshold might be one of normalcy,as when a droughtor flood ruins harvestsand imposes noticeable,personaldiscomfort.Rarity,such as ragingthunderstormsor blinding blizzards,might also be an appropriatethresholdwhich weatherpatternsmight exceed andthusbringaboutsome meteorologicalretribution.Also, extremedurationor occurrenceduringa significantcalendarday might marka meteorologicalevent as one needingto be balancedout. An abundanceof fertility, such as hawthornberries, might also be deemed suitably significant. Of course,balancein some precise quantityappealsto the moder mindmorethan such a diversecollection of subjectivethresholds,butthereis no reasonto think thatAnaximanderhad anythingmoredefinite in mind.53 Finally,theAnaximanderfragmentdisplaysan asymmetrybetweenthepositive and negative aspects of the processes involved. In weatherlore there is a tendency to conceive of good weather simply as the absence of bad weather, which makes the bad weatherseem more concreteor fundamental.In the fragmentAnaximanderchooses to emphasizethe processof perishingover comingto-be, and he speaks aboutthe injustice of one element against anotherrather than the justice of the resultingjudgment againstthe offender.In otherwords Anaximanderseems to take injusticeas the more concreteidea, the one to mention explicitly in his account, and to takejustice simply as any action taken in responseto injustice. Anaximander'sexpression in the fragmentis similar in essential ways to expressionsof folk meteorology.It is presentedin a similarmannerand, more importantly,presents a concept of balance almost identical to that which pervades weatherlore. The redressingof injusticethrough"theorderingof time"of which Anaximanderspeaksis systematicallycomparableto the concept of balance overtime which is commonlythoughtto conditionpatternsof meteorological events. It appears,therefore,thatthe conceptof balancein folk meteorology may well have influencedAnaximander'sphilosophyas it is recordedfor us by Simplicius.
53 Of course, Anaximanderwas interestedin the propertiesof the apeiron, the indefinite. The meteorological reading of the Anaximanderfragmentsuggests that part of the indefinite quality of the apeiron was the diversity of materialelements and processes to which it gave rise, but an explorationof this reading is outside the scope of this article.
16
CameronShelley Conclusions
The examinationof folk meteorologyundertakenabove presentsus with a plausible source for the concept of justice employed by Anaximanderin the fragment.The conceptof balancein folk meteorologyanswersto the possibility of a literalinterpretationof the fragmentcalled for in section 1. This concept is unlike any such concept studiedby modem scholars,but it may be found informingexpressionsof weatherlore the world over. Balancein folk meteorologyexpressesa conceptthat:(1) statesa hypothetical relationshipthat (2) predicatesmeteorologicalpatternsof conventionally oppositekinds(3) in directproportionas (4) a threshold(possibly subjective)of abundanceis exceeded by an antecedentmeteorological event. The situation describedinAnaximander'sfragmentmeets all of these conditions.The concept of balanceis also asymmetricandemphasizesadverseweatherovergoodweather. Anaximander'sfragmentspeaksaboutinjustice,penalties,andretributions.The distinctionbetween good andbad weatheris not one of mutualexclusivity but ratherone of interpenetration.This interpenetrationof hot, cold, wet, and dry makesbettersense of the conceptofjustice implicitin the fragmentthandoes the contradictory,metaphoricalinterpretationadoptedby Kirket al. It also gives us a differentview of Anaximander'sphilosophicalproject than that posited by KahnandKirket al. Insteadof viewing Anaximanderas constructinghis physical theoryby rationalizingmyths, we may view him as constructinghis theory by extendingnon-mythologicalconcepts containedin the folk meteorologyof his native city. The Greek folk meteorology treatedby Theophrastusis much like that of todayandprobablymuchlike thatknownin the MiletusofAnaximander'stime as well. We have no directproofthatAnaximanderstudiedor thoughtaboutfolk meteorology,but it would be consistentwith his well-known interestin meteorology in general.However,Cicerodoes creditAnaximanderwith predictingan earthquakeduringa stay in Sparta,when he warnedthe Spartansto spend the nightoutsideandthereforesavedmanyof theirlives (DK 12A5a).54The truthof Cicero's story is debated,but if true, it may signify thatAnaximanderapplied his knowledgeof thefolkloreof earthquakes, whichtypicallysuggeststhatgroundanimals leave their lairs before an earthquakebegins.55Comdwelling shortly pare this with the weatherlore concerningthe abundantgrowthof hawberries beforea harshwinter.IfAnaximanderwas familiarwith whatwe mightcall folk seismology, then it is not hardto believe thathe was also familiarwith what we call folk meteorology.The two systems employ very similarconcepts for their explanationsof naturalphenomena. 54See
Kahn, 68, 103-4.
55McKirahan,33.
Folk Meteorology
17
Modemscholarsdo not doubtthatAnaximander,like the otherpre-Socratics, was interestedin meteorology.Whatthey do not know is wherehe came by that interestand how it influencedhis naturalphilosophy as expressed in the fragment. It has always been assumedthatHomerandHesiod would have supplied the materialneeded by Anaximander,but this literarymaterialis not addressed primarilyto meteorology per se and provides explanationsin terms of divine ratherthan self-sufficient action. The above examinationsuggests thatAnaximandermay have been influencedby the concept of balance containedin folk meteorology.It suggeststhat,contraryto commonbelief, Anaximandermay not have used a legal metaphorin the fragmentbutmay well have expressedhimself literally.He may have simply employed a concept of balance which has until now escapedscholarlynotice. Universityof Waterloo.
Eudaimonism and Stoic
Accounts
Theology of
in
Virtue
Michael Gass
The Stoics were unique among the majorschools in the ancientworld for maintainingthatbothvirtueandhappinessconsist solely of"living in agreement with nature"(homologoumenosteiphusei zen). Weknow froma varietyof texts thatboth Cleanthesand Chrysippus,if not also Zeno, characterizedsuch conduct both in essentialist terms, as a matterof living purposively in a manner naturalfor the humanspecies, andin cosmologicalterms,as a matterof living in agreementwith the purposesof natureas a whole, this being regardedas identical to Zeus. This is not to suggest, however,thatcosmo-theologicalspeculation figured prominentlyin the ethical systems of the early Stoics. Judging from extantsummariesanddiscussionsof Stoic ethicaldoctrines,thosedoctrineswere justified in a dialecticalfashion,not by appealto facts aboutthe purposiveorder of naturebut simply froman analysisof ethicalconceptspatternedaftersimilar analysesby earlierphilosophers(mostnotably,Aristotle).It is this kindof learning thatChrysippusapparentlyhadin mindwhenhe maintainedthatethicsshould be studiedpriorto undertakinga systematicinvestigationof nature: [T]hereare threekinds of philosopher'stheorems,logical, ethical and physical.... [W]hatshould be rankedfirst of these are the logical, next the ethical,thirdthe physical;andwhatshouldcome last in the physical theoremsis theology.' On the other hand, as we learn from the testimony of Plutarch(and also fromotherindirecttextualevidenceexaminedrecentlyby JacquesBrunschwig),2
1
Quoted in Plutarch,On Stoic Self-Contradictions,1035A; tr. in A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (2 vols.; Cambridge,1987), I, 159. 2 Jacques Brunschwig, "On a Book-Title by Chrysippus:'On the Fact that the Ancients Admitted Dialectic along with Demonstrations,'" OxfordStudies in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford, 1986), suppl. vol., 81-96.
19 Copyright2000 by Journalof the Historyof Ideas,Inc.
20
Michael Gass
Chrysippusalso believed thatphysics in generalandtheology in particularyield a quite distinct,demonstrativeknowledge of the mattersfirst studiedin ethics. A. A. Long andothershave suggestedthatsuch knowledgewas regardedby the Stoics as encompassingnotjust informationaboutthe ways in which virtuous living is encouragedby, andfits into, the wider aims of natureat largebut also a deeperunderstandingof the very essence of virtue.3Specifically, virtue is revealed to consist in a conscious and deliberateharmonizationof one's actions with the purposesof the divine architect.Thus,underthis interpretationof their ethicalintentions,the Stoics thoughtof the initial, analyticalapproachto ethics as necessarilyincompleteeven in its treatmentof strictlyethicaltopics;the systematicstudyof naturewas thoughtto impartadditionalwisdom regardingethical matters. In her recentstudy of ancientethicaltheories,JuliaAnnas seeks to counter this view of the place of cosmo-theological speculation in early Stoicism by arguingthatsuch a religious characterizationof virtueis incompatiblewith the eudaimonismto which all schools of ancientphilosophy,including Stoicism, were committed.4She concedes thatfirstCleanthesandthenmuch laterthe Roman Stoics did regardvirtuein religiousterms,but in her assessmentthis represents a radicaldeparturefrommainstreamStoic thinkingon this subject(which is identifiedmostly with the views of Chrysippusandhis disciples, all of whom were clearly and consistentlycommittedto the eudaimonisticmodel of ethical inquiry).Annas arguesthatwhereasthe Stoic sage was traditionallydepictedas a personwhose commitmentto morallyappropriateconductstems fromhis own rationalreflectionon his own needs andinterests,a personwho identifiedcompletely with the aims of the divine architectin his purposiveactivity would be someone who surrenderedhis right to decide for himself what his needs and interestsare,andwho thereforecould even be requiredto act in violationof what he mightjudge by himself to be crucialto his happiness. In what follows I demonstratethat this argument,often advanced in the literatureas a reductio ad absurdumof divine commandtheories of morality, falls wide of the markin the presentcase due to the fact thatthose Stoics who characterizedvirtuein religioustermsdid so apparentlybecausethey regardeda completeidentificationwith the purposesof the divine architectas the culmination of an agent-centeredprocess of reflectionon one's needs and interests.On
3 See A. A. Long, "The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 92 (1970-71), 85-104; also "Stoic Eudaimonism,"Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquiumin Ancient Philosophy, 4 (1988), 77-101; Brad Inwood, Ethics and HumanAction in Early Stoicism (Oxford, 1985), 108f; Troels Engberg-Pederson,"Discovering the Good: Oikeiosis and Kathekontain Stoic Ethics," The Norms of Nature, eds. M. Schofield and G. Striker(Cambridge,1986), 145f; and Gisela Striker,"FollowingNature:A Study in Stoic Ethics," OxfordStudies in Ancient Philosophy, 9 (Oxford, 1991), 9f. 4 The Morality of Happiness (New York, 1993).
Eudaimonism,Theology,and Stoicism
21
the basis of their study of naturethe Stoics maintainedthatbecause of our dignified statusas rationalbeings, we are literallya fragmentof the divine architect, and so a decision on ourpartto make its purposesour own representsnot an abandonmentof our effortto lead a good life as we representit to ourselves but rathera revised understandingof who we are, hence of what our needs and interestsare. Diogenes Laertiusrelatesthat "[b]y 'nature'[the Stoics] sometimes mean what sustainsthe world, and sometimes what makes things on the earthgrow: natureis a self-moving tenor,which completes and sustainsits productsin accordancewith seminalprinciplesat determinatetimes, andcontinuesto perform the actionsfromwhich they came to light."5The preciseway in which members of a species are impelledby this force to preserveand develop themselves, and the precise position which they occupy in the naturalorderthat encompasses membersof all species are both a functionof theirspecific constitution.Plants maintainthemselvesandgrow througha rudimentaryformof sense perception, and as a resultthey occupy the lowest rungof life's ladderon earth.The senses of an animalaremorehighly developed;they directit to the thingsit needs for its survivalandgrowthby way of stimulatingdesiresforthose thingsin the animal. A humanpossesses both sense andreason,andas such enjoys dominionover all other species of living things on earth,domesticatingand consumingthem for his or her own purposes. Therefore,the Stoics inferred,naturein general,"the organizingprinciple of [all the specific naturesoperatingin] the whole world,"must "havesense and reason ... to a higher and greaterdegree"than any of the earthly or celestial species which it governs, and thus is "thesupremebeing, worthyof power and dominionover all,"includinghumansandthe celestial deities.Naturecan bring aboutthe "orderlyarrangement"of the planetsand fixed starsin the heavens as well as of the various species of living things on earth if and only if it is an "immortal,rational... being"6who acts purposivelyin creatingand sustaining this order: Finite naturesare born of their own seeds and grow each within the limits of their own form, but the infinite natureof the universe as a whole is the originalsourceof all freedomandall movementandacts in accordancewith its own strivings and desires (which the Greeks call "hormae"),just as we aremoved to actionby ourown mindsandsenses.
5 Diogenes Laertius,Lives of EminentPhilosophers, tr. R. D. Hicks (New York, 1925), VII, 148-49. 6 Lives, VII, 134.
22
Michael Gass Such is the natureof the moving spirit of the universe, so that it may properlybe calledthe divinewisdom orprovidence[pronoia]whichhas formed the world to endureand lack for nothing and to aboundin all grace and beauty.7
The practical consequence of our possessing a rationalnatureis that we resemble the divine architectin living purposively and reasoning about which courses of action are the most beneficial ratherthanby reactingblindly to sensory stimuli.Thus,unlikeplantsandotherspecies of animals,we can live in the beneficial way that natureintendedfor us to live when creatingus only if we endorsethis way of living in ourown practicaldeliberations.Suchis the pointof connectionbetweencosmo-theologicalspeculationandethicaltheorizingin Stoicism.
The Stoics held thatin most circumstancesourpurposiveactivityhas as its properor appropriatefunction(kathekon)ourown survivalanddevelopmentas a rational animal, as is evident from the fact that nature created us with an affinity (oikeiosis) for ourselvesthatmakes us pursuefood, drink,companionship, and otherthings necessaryfor the full and healthyuse of both our bodies andourminds.Basic to Stoic ethics is the propositionthatmoraldevelopmentis a naturaloutgrowthof this activity of preservation.Moderationin mattersrelatedto the body is not an artificialconstrainton what natureintendsfor us, but it is insteadthe outcomethatnatureintendedwhen it endowedus with reasonas well as with impulses for food, drink, sexual activity, and the like. The same holds truefor the othervirtues.For example,we develop a sense ofjustice and benevolence towardsothers and even a courageousdesire to defend others at greatcost to ourselvesas a naturaloutgrowthof ourinstinctto preserveourown offspring.8Thus, it is appropriatefor a person to pursue those things which natureintendshim to pursuealways in a temperate,just, and courageousmanner,never in an intemperate,unjust,or cowardlymanner. Like Aristotle,the Stoics regardedvirtuein generalas involvingnotjust the accomplishmentof variousindividualanduniversalexcellences of bothcharacter and intellectbut a transformationin one's motivationalorientationtowards the very activities of self-preservationandmoraldevelopment.Though"man's firstattractionis towardsthe thingsin accordancewith nature,"the Stoic spokesperson in Cicero'sDe Finibus relates, as soon as he has ... discernedthe orderand so to speak harmonythat governs conduct,he thereuponesteems this harmonyfar more highly thanall the things for which he originallyfelt an affection,andby exer7De Natura Deorum, tr. H. McGregor(London, 1972), II, 57-59. 8 See De Finibus III, 19, 62-63.
Eudaimonism,Theology,and Stoicism
23
cise of intelligence andreasoninfersthe conclusionthathereinresides the chief good of man, the thing that is praiseworthyand desirablefor its own sake....9 The official Stoic positionafter,andprobablyalso during,Zeno's tenureas head of the school is that this order or harmonyto which Cicero here refers is a structuralfeatureboth of our own purposive activity and of the workings of natureas a whole (to which our own activity is but a part). Consistentwith Chrysippus'sadmonitionabouttherelativeorderof ethicsandphysicsin a proper programof philosophical study, popularsummariesand discussions of Stoic ethicaldoctrinesby Cicero,Diogenes Laertius,andothersfocus almostentirely on the former,microcosmicdimensionto this order.Thoughthe Stoics denied thatthe soul has separatepartsor powers, admittingonly the solitaryfacultyof reason,they nonethelessagreedwith the traditionalportrayalof virtueas a harmonious integrationof thought,feeling, and desire in a rationalagent. A virtuous personfeels, desires,andso undertakesonly whathe knows in his wisdom is beneficial for him to feel, desire, and undertake.His is a "consistent,firm and unchangeable"10 power of practicalreasoning. By contrastviciousness is "a tenoror characterwhich is inconsistentin the whole of life andout of harmony with itself.... It is the sourceof disturbanceswhich ... aredisorderlyandagitated movementsof the mind, at variancewith reasonand utterlyhostile to peace of mind and of life.'"11 As this remarksuggests, the defense of virtueoffered in Stoic ethicalwritings not only focuses on the microcosmicdimensionto harmoniousliving but is eudaimonisticin character.The primarypurpose of ethical argumentationin Stoicism as well as in the othermajorschools of ancientphilosophyis a demonstrationof the personaladvantagesof virtueand of the personaldisadvantages of vice. In such theoriesconsiderationby an idealized agent of what is in his or her best interestsserves frequentlyas the startingpoint and always as a litmus test for reflection on the nature of virtue and appropriateconduct. Only the Stoics, however,went so far as to arguethatvirtue(vice) is sufficientfor happiness (unhappiness).Theotherschoolsacknowledgedthe existenceof othergoods besides virtue owing to the commonsensicalobservationthat, however much virtuemay contributeto happiness,a virtuouslife would seem to be desirableon balanceonly if it is also blessed with at least a degreeof health,wealth, andthe like. But the Stoics arguedthatthe harmoniousintegrationof thought,feeling, anddesirewhich constitutesvirtueandwhich (even theiropponentsagreed)is a necessaryingredientin a happylife, is foundonly in personswho desirenothing more thanto act appropriately. 9 Cicero, De Finibus, tr. H. Rackam(Cambridge,Mass., 1914), III, 21. '0Plutarch,On Moral Virtue,441D; tr. in Long and Sedley, I, 377. 1 Cicero, TusculanDisputations, IV, 34; tr. in Long and Sedley, I, 381.
24
Michael Gass
The Stoics arrivedat this conclusionbased on theirconvictionthata person who desires otherthings besides virtue is not just exposed to but is eventually enslavedby longing, hatred,contentiousness,resentment,disappointment,and otherunruly"passions"(pathe) or turbulentemotionalstates. Passions are undesirablenot only becausethey areinducementsto inappropriate conduct,butin and of themselves. A person who desires only to act appropriatelywill not be subject to such disturbances.All appropriateactions (kathekonta;officia) exemplify virtue in general and individualvirtues in particularin their outward aspect,inasmuchas they all involve pursuingthings of value in the fittingmanner specified by nature. But of these, the truly virtuous, or perfect actions (katorthomata)are the ones undertakenin a spirit of indifferencetowardsthe things of value that are the appropriateends of such actions. A trulycontented personpursueswhat he does entirelybecause it is appropriatethathe do so, not because of any independentdesire to achieve it; and his existence will be perfectly satisfactoryeven if he does not actuallyenjoy good health,prosperity,or otherthingsof value.In Stoicterminologythesethingsare"indifferent" as suchare neither so are not nor bad and i.e., they objectsof good regardedindividually "choice"-but are still to be "preferred,"or "selected"when it is possible to do so. Happinessfor a humanbeing consists notjust partlybut entirelyof freedom frompassionin the achievementof moralexcellence, inasmuchas one wouldnot possess this freedomif one felt a need for otherthings as well.'2 Notwithstandingthe considerableemphasisin Stoic ethics on the microcosmic dimensionto the harmoniousnatureof virtuousconduct,Diogenes Laertius relatesthat,in characterizingthe good life for a humanas a "life in accordance with nature,"Zeno and his successorshad in mind a life in accordancewith our humannatureas well as thatof the universe, a life in which we refrainfromevery actionforbiddenby the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervadesall things, and is identicalwith ... Zeus, lordandrulerof all thatis.... [Such is] the virtueof the happyman andthe smoothcurrentof life, when all actions promotethe harmonyof the spiritdwelling in the individualman with the will of him who ordersthe universe.13 This descriptionof the good life as a virtuouslife characterizedby a voluntary andbeneficial subjectionto the rule of the divine reasonis a commonplaceboth 12See Martha
Nussbaum, The Therapyof Desire (Princeton,1994), 359-41; and M. Frede, "The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul," Norms of Nature, 93-110; G. Lesses, "Virtue and the Goods of Fortunein Stoic Moral Theory,"OxfordStudies in AncientPhilosophy, 7 (1989), 95-128. 13 Lives,
VII, 88.
Eudaimonism,Theology,and Stoicism
25
in early and in late Stoicism. The best early example is Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus, which complainsthat "thebad among mortalmen, the wretched,...ever yearnfor thepossession of goods yet neithersee norheargod's universallaw,by obeying which they could lead a good life in partnershipwith intelligence."14 Another,laterexampleof this outlookis Cicero'sfamousdescriptionof truelaw as "rightreasonin agreementwith nature."God, not a senate, is "theauthorof this law, its promulgator,and its enforcingjudge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing fromhimself and denying his humannature,and by reasonof this very fact he will suffer the worse penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly consideredpunishment."15 Severalcommentatorshave describedthis as a "theocratic,"or "divinecommand"theoryof morality.16Suchlanguagecan be misleadingto readersfamiliar only with versions of a divine commandtheory that reflect a Judeo-Christian conceptionof the deity.Theregod sometimesis characterizedas a being whose means(usuallythroughspedirectivesarecommunicatedto us by extraordinary cial revelation or the inner promptingsof conscience) ratherthan simply by observinghow natureoperates;andgod is thoughtto backthese directiveswith a threatof punishmentin a futurelife for disobedience in this life. In classic Stoicism,however,the law of naturewhich expressesthe divinereasonis simply the causal structureof both our own psyche and the world at large;and so our knowledgeof this law is basedon observationof humannatureandof the nature of the restof the universe.As the above-quotedpassagesmakeclear,the punishment that comes from disobeying the divine architectis simply a self-induced misfortunein this life thatcomes from a failureto base our practicalreasoning on knowledge of how natureoperates. Of course,a philosophicalschool may denyto god the roles of moraleducator and of moraljudge without necessarily repudiatingthe view, basic to all religiousmodels of ethicalinquiry,thatmoralvirtueconsists of conscientiously attemptingto do the will of god. Thereis some doubtaboutthe intentionsof the early Stoics, but Epictetus,and otheradherentsof Stoicism in the imperialRoman period maintainedthatthe mindfulnessof and esteem for harmonywhich Cicerodescribedas integralbothto ourvirtueandto ourhappinessinvolves not just a regardfor the internalstructureof our own purposiveactivity but also a consciousanddeliberateprocessof harmonizingourpurposiveactivitywith our perceptionof thewideraimsof natureas a whole.Accordingto DiogenesLaertius, even Chrysippusheld that since "ourown individualnaturesare parts of the natureof the entireuniverse,...living virtuouslyis equivalentto living in accor-
'4 14. Cleanthes, Hymnto Zeus(SVF 1.537);tr.in LongandSedley,I, 327.
15Cicero,De Republica,tr.C. W.Keyes(Cambridge, Mass.,1928),III,22.
16 See, for example,Long in "StoicEudaimonism," 84; Inwoodin Ethicsand Human Actionin EarlyStoicism,160;andAnnasin TheMoralityof Happiness,174n.
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dancewith experienceof the actualcourseof nature.""7 Plutarchcomplainsthat the fact that despite Chrysippusplaced ethics priorto physics in the philosophical curriculumand so apparentlydispensedwith substantiveappealsto cosmological considerationsin his own ethicalwritings,he also maintainedthatphysics in generalandtheology in particulardemonstratethe truthof Stoic doctrines aboutthe natureof goodness more effectively thando the methodsof argumentationnative to ethicalinquiry: Hear what he says aboutthis in the thirdbook on the Gods: "It is not possible to discover any otherbeginningof justice or any source for it other than that from Zeus and from the universal nature, for thence everythingof the kind must have its beginningif we are going to have anythingto say about good and evil." Again in his Physical Propositions he says: "Forthereis no otheror [rather,no more] suitableway of approachingthe theory of good and evil or the virtues or happiness [than]from the universalnatureand from the dispensationof the universe."And furtheron once more:"Forthe theoryof good andevil must be connectedwith these, since good andevil have no betterbeginningor point of referenceand physical speculationis to be undertakenfor no otherpurposethanfor the discriminationof good andevil." According to Chrysippus,then,physical theoryturnsout to be "atonce before and behind"ethics....18 The Stoics regardedthe adoptionof a cosmic perspective as precipitatingan importantshift not so much in one's beliefs aboutwhat one must do outwardly to live virtuouslybut ratherin one's understandingof why such conductis appropriate.Whereasa personwhose practicaldeliberationsareuninformedby a study of natureattendsonly to his own needs and interestsas a rationalanimal (even if, as is inevitablythe case, his needs and interestsoverlapwith those of others),a thoroughacquaintancewith the ways of naturepromptsus "tohave no [strictly]personalinterest,never to think about anythingas though [we] were detached[fromnatureas a whole], but to be like the handor the foot, which, if they had the power of reason and understoodthe orderof nature,would direct every impulseandevery process of the will by referenceto the whole [body]."19 As is illustratedby Diogenes Laertius'sstory of Zeno's suicide, the early Stoics apparentlymaintainedthat, in theory,the only valuableand appropriate objects of pursuitfor a maturehuman are those which natureintends him to
17
18
Lives, VII, 87.
On Stoic Self-Contradictions,1035. 19Epictetus,Discourses, tr. R. Bailey (New York, 1940), II, 10.
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27
obtainand not those which it predisposedhim to pursuefrombirth.20Notwithstandingour naturalimpulse to maintaingood health and other basic things, naturegrantsthese things only to some of us and eventuallydeprivesus all of life itself, the most basic of the things that it programsus to value from birth. Thus, if we were able to know thatour own deathwas imminent,we would be forced rationallyto concludethatour continuedexistence no longer has value; and thus it is an inappropriatething to preserve, our inborn instinct for selfpreservationnotwithstanding.Epictetusquotes with approvalthe saying, presumablyan orthodoxStoic sentiment,that"ifthe good manknew coming events beforehandhe would help on nature,even if it meantworkingwith disease, and deathandmaiming."This is so, he adds,because such a person"wouldrealize thatby the orderingof the universethis task is allottedhim, andthatthe whole is morecommandingthanthepartandthecitythanthecitizen."21 However,Epictetus also endorsesthe sentiment,which he attributesto Chrysippus,that"as long as the consequencesareunknownto me, I alwayshold fastto whatis betteradapted to securewhat is natural,for God himself createdme with the faculty of choosIn practicewe are almost always ignorantaboutnature's ing what is natural."22 futureplans for us, and so we must usually rely instead on our knowledge of which thingsnaturepredisposedus to pursueas well as those thingswhich help us in this pursuit.Oras the Stoic spokespersonin Cicero'sDe Finibusputs it, in the absenceof knowledge as to the time andmannerof our demise, our instinctual regardfor ourselves and our ability to discernfrom naturehow best to act on thatinstinctat each momentof ourlife providesus with "aprobableaccount or reason"for thinkingthatnaturewishes us so to act at thatmoment,even if we cannot achieve certaintyon this score.23Both the virtuous and the less than virtuousact outwardlyas naturewishes in preservingthemselves in a morally appropriatefashion. But the former do this because of their knowledge that naturewishes this of them, not simply because they are inclined so to act by nature. The Stoics apparentlyheld that the adoptionof a cosmic perspective enlarges not just our outlook regardingthe value of our preservationand moral developmentbut also ourunderstandingof why it is thatvirtueis the only good thing. Desiring health, property,and other things of value for their own sake ratherthan because naturewills us to have them is certainly a threatto the 20
"The manner of his [Zeno's] death was as follows. As he was leaving the school he trippedand fell, breakinga toe. Strikingthe ground with his fist, he quoted the line from the Niobe: 'I come, I come, why dost thou call for me?', and died on the spot throughholding his breath"(Lives, VII, 28). According to another version of the story (VII, 31), Zeno died by starving himself. 21 Discourses, 22
II, 10.
Ibid., II, 6. 23 De Finibus, III, 58.
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psychic harmonywith which Stoic ethics is preoccupied;butit also is incompatible with the post-ethicalconsiderationthatvirtue consists of consciously harmonizing ourwill with thatof the universe.A personwho attemptsto obtainor to keep good health,physical comfort, wealth, and other such things only because, and only so long as, he has reason to believe that the divine architect intendsfor him to have these thingswill not be disappointedif he fails to obtain or keep them. For a failure to obtain or keep such things would prove to him that,appearancesnotwithstanding,god did not wish him to obtainor keep them. Such presumablyare the considerationsthat led Chrysippusto proclaim that"thereis no ... moresuitableway of approachingthe theoryof good andevil or the virtuesor happiness[than]fromthe universalnatureandfromthe dispensationof the universe."24 It is entirelyappropriatethatwe shouldmakeuse of the resources god has provided us to preserve and develop ourselves as rational animals.In providingus with such resourcesand also in allowing us to obtain happinessthroughthe exerciseof ourvirtuealone, god demonstrateshisjust and beneficentregardfor us. To desire health,prosperity,or even life as such for its own sake is not only disadvantageousfrom the agent-centeredperspective of Stoic ethics;it is also an injusticefromthe cosmic perspectiveof Stoic physics, inasmuchas it involves appropriatingfor oneself (if only in thought)what is only on temporaryloan to us andbelongs permanentlyto god alone.Justas bad, when god has not seen fit to loan us such things, our desire for them constitutes an ungratefulrejectionof the situationin life which god has assignedus.25Seneca describesthe virtuousman'ssubmissionto his fate as "thesacredobligation by which we [all] are bound....We have been bornundera monarchy;to obey god is freedom."26Such is the understandingof virtuepossessed, if not by the novice studentof Stoic philosophywho has masteredonly ethics, thencertainly by the sage who has drunkdeeply fromthe well of Stoic physics andtheology. We may conclude fromourbrief look at the textualevidence that,although the comprehensivecharacterizationof virtue in Stoicism differs in several importantways from a divine commandtheoryof moralityin the Judeo-Christian mold, it nonetheless shares with theories of that sort a conviction that virtue involves a conscious and deliberateharmonizationof one's own purposiveactivity with thatof a divine being. Whatis the relationshipbetweenthis religious outlook and the understandingof virtue characteristicof Stoic ethics proper, which focuses only on psychic harmony,not also on cosmic harmony?Clearly, the former was thought by its advocates not to supplantbut ratherin some fashionto complementthe latter.One possibility,which JuliaAnnasexploresin
24 25 26
On Stoic Self-Contradictions,1035. See TusculanDisputations, III, 36-37; also Seneca, On Providence, VI, 5. Seneca, On the Happy Life, tr. J. W. Basore (Cambridge,Mass., 1935), XV.7-XVI.3.
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29
her recent study of ancientethical theories, is thatEpictetus,MarcusAurelius, andotherswho clearlychampioneda religiousunderstandingof virtuemay have regardedthe cosmic andeudaimonisticpointsof view as dissimilarbut complementaryperspectives,each yielding a distinct insight into the natureof virtue which, when combined,constitutefull enlightenmenton thatsubject.Annas argues that this way of viewing the relationbetween ethical and post-ethicalreflectionin Stoicismis actuallyunintelligible,since the cosmic andeudaimonistic points of view are not only dissimilarbut also irreconcilableways of understandingour purposiveactivity.In her view Chrysippusand otherearly Stoics would have been mindfulof this fact. Thus,despitetextualevidence to the contrary,she concludes that they would have regardedthe adoptionof a cosmic perspectivetowardsour purposiveactivity as an illegitimateway of achieving knowledge about what virtue involves. Annas concedes that Chrysippuscertainlybelieved thata personwho lives virtuouslyfurthersthe aims of the divine architectin the process. But in her assessmentChrysippus'scommitmentto the eudaimonisticpoint of view preventedhim from positing as an ingredientof virtue a complete identificationwith cosmic purposesin one's own purposive activity: The perspective of cosmic naturedoes not add any ethical theses [in traditionalStoicism], nor does it change or modify those we already know.Whatwe get fromthe widerperspectiveis increasedunderstanding of a subjectwhose contenthas been establishedwithoutthatwider perspective.If cosmic naturewere a first principlewithin ethics, then here, if anywhere,we would have expectedto find directderivationsof particularethicaltheses purelyfromcosmic nature.But this is just what we do not find; by the time we get to appealingto cosmic natureas a first principlefor ethics, the content of ethics is alreadyestablished.... [L]aterStoics differ in just this respect.27 In short,accordingto Annas's interpretation,Chrysippusandotherearly Stoics held that the proposition"Virtueconsists of living in agreementwith the purposes of natureat large"is trueonly as an ethicallyinsignificantclaim aboutan accidentalfeatureof virtueandnot as a controllingdescriptionof how an agent preoccupiedwith leading a good life herself understandsvirtue.Annas asserts correctly,on the basis of the same textual evidence which we have examined, thatthe pious CleanthesandlaterStoics such as EpictetusandMarcusAurelius did thinkof virtueas involvinga consciousandcompleteharmonizationof one's
27 The Moralityof Happiness, 165. Cf. T. H. Irwin,"Stoic andAristotelianConceptionsof Happiness,"TheNorms of Nature,208n; also the remarksby GregoryVlastos, quotedin Long, "Stoic Eudaimonism,"86-87.
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own purposiveactivitywith one's perceptionof nature'saims. But in doing so, she concludes,they were unfaithfulto mainstreamStoic teachingsregardingthe motivationalstructureof virtuousconduct. As evidence thatChrysippusand otherStoics who were plainly committed to eudaimonismregardedvirtue as essentially secular in nature,Annas points out that they sought in their ethical writings to justify the centralethical doctrinesof Stoicismstrictlyin termsof an eudaimonisticpointof view andwithout any referenceto the purposesof natureat large. But as we have seen already, this is only to be expected from Chrysippus'sdistinctionbetween the basic understandingof good andevil attainablewithinethicsproperandthe deeperknowledge of good andevil to be hadfromsubsequentcosmo-theologicalspeculation. In the Stoic curriculumethics precedesphysics andtheology and so limits itself to a study of the microcosmic dimensionof the orderor harmonythat governs conduct.As did Plato before them, the Stoics held thatliving well and living in a psychically harmoniousfashion are one and the same. Judging from what Diogenes Laertius,Cicero, Plutarch,and othersreveal aboutearly Stoic methods of ethical argumentation,Chrysippusand his followers did not believe that cosmo-theologicalconsiderationswere necessaryto establishthe truthof either this or any otherclaims which they madeaboutvirtuein theirethicalwritings.It hardlyfollows, though,thatthey thoughtof the accountof virtue foundwithin ethics properas an account that touches on all essential features of virtuous conduct.The textualevidencesurveyedin the previoussection,modestthoughit may be, at least suggests thatChrysippusprecededEpictetusand othersin believing that a mindfulnessof and reverencefor the macrocosmicdimensionto the harmonythat governs conduct is not only the naturalresult of post-ethical studies in physics but also an importantfeatureof virtuousconductdespite its unavoidableneglect within ethicsproper. As notedpreviously,Annas'sdeterminationto downplaythe significanceof this evidenceandto view the cosmo-theologicalcharacterization of virtueclearly found in the writings of Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and others as a radical departurefrom traditionalStoic eudaimonismreally stems from her belief that such a characterizationof virtueis incompatiblewith the eudaimonisticpoint of view. Since Chrysippusplainlyendorsedthe eudaimonisticpoint of view in ethics and since Annas believes thatthereis no decisive evidence thathe preceded the RomanStoics in positing an all-encompassingdesireto do the will of god as a crucial ingredientof virtuousconduct, she charitablyinterpretshis remarks aboutcosmic natureas addingnothingto the accountof virtue found in ethics proper. Of course this interpretivestrategyis to be commendedonly if a religious characterizationof moral virtue such as we find in the writings of Epictetus really is at odds with the eudaimonisticapproachto ethical inquiry.Annas arrives at this conclusionon the basis of two distinctconsiderations.The firstsuch
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31
considerationhas to do with the psychologicaldemandsof attemptingto harmonize one's actions with nature.In Annas's view the distancingfrom one's own prioritiesand interestsrequiredin orderto adopt a cosmic standpointin one's practicaldeliberationsis such as to insurethat one will relinquishthe concern for one's preservation-together with the ancillaryinterestin health,prosperity, andotherobjectsof value-that is the substanceof virtue,hence of happinessas well, in Stoic eudaimonism.Epictetus,MarcusAurelius, and other Stoics who did appealto cosmic naturein an ethically significantway concludedthatsince I am a partof a greater,cosmic whole ... I shouldthinkof myself as only a partof a largerwhole. I should distance and detachmyself from my own point of view, and see my situationas merely part of a whole in which my point of view is unimportant....The virtuouspersonwill see his task as being primarilythat bringing his own point of view into conformitywith thatof the largerwhole, as partof which he functions. This strategyresults in a recurringfeeling of transienceand impermanence, andalso in a feeling of personalinsignificance;since one is only partof a largerwhole, nothingthatone does really matters.28 The problemwithAnnas'sargumenthereis not herclaim thatthe processof moraldevelopmentdescribedin Stoic ethics proceedsentirelyfromthe agent's "ownpoint of view" (wherethis is understoodnot to involve a considerationof nature'sdemandson him) but ratherher assertionthat the transitionfrom this point of view to a cosmic perspectiveis an abandonmentof the formerin favor of the latter,hence a painfulanddisorientingloss of the moralidentityacquired while operatingfromthe former.WhereasAnnaswould have us believe thatthe responsibilitywhich a virtuousperson assumes for his own preservationand developmentis devaluedonce he takesit uponhimselfto harmonizehis will with thatof the universe,a more plausiblereadingof the textualevidence examined in the previoussection is thatthe Stoics regardedthe virtuousperson'spositive but matureassessmentof the value of his own preservationanddevelopmentas the very resultof his adoptinga cosmic point of view. It is truethata personwho consciously and deliberatelyharmonizeshis purposiveactivitywith thatof the divine architectwill replacehis previousinstinctually-basedregardfor his own preservationanddevelopmentwith an all-encompassingdesireto do only what he perceives to be the will of naturefor his conduct.But accordingto the Stoic teachingssurveyedin the previoussection,the best evidence availablesuggests thatnaturewishes us to maintainourselvesin existenceandto cultivatethe same virtues of characterand intellect to which we were drawn previously. Thus, contraryto Annas's argument,the moralinterestin self-preservationanddevel28The Morality of Happiness, 175.
Michael Gass
32
opmentthatthe Stoics posited as the hallmarkof virtuein theirethicalwritings is subsequentlyanchoredin a desireto comply with the wishes of nature,andso it is hardlyantitheticalto thatdesire. In the passage quoted above Annas chargesthat the adoptionof a cosmic perspective triggers not just "a recurringfeeling of transienceand impermanence, [but]also ... a feeling of personalinsignificance."To supportthis charge she quotesMarcusAureliusto the effect that"[w]henyou get annoyedat [losing or not obtaining]something,you have forgottenthis, that everythinghappens accordingto the natureof the whole, and ... thatnothing is privatepropertyto and anyone-one's child, one's body,one's very soul have come fromyonder"29 will eventuallyreturnthere.Unfortunatelyfor Annas's argument,this passage andothersby the RomanStoics speakonly to the transienceandimpermanence of ourexistence,not to its alleged insignificance,in which case these writerscan hardlybe accused of encouraginga point of view at odds with the traditional Stoic emphasison personalpreservationanddevelopment.A personwho identifies with the aims of natureregardshis point of view not as unimportantor insignificantbut as very importantand significantprecisely because he makes nature'spurposeshis own. Since he believes thatit is by nature'sdesign thathe lives and is able to preservehimself by using the resourcesat his disposal, the Stoic sage values his existence and the resourcesat his disposal. His mindfulness of theirtransienceandimpermanencepreventshim only fromdesiringsuch things for theirown sake, not from desiringthem at all. True, a person who views himself as but a part of natureas a whole, and who thereforeidentifiescompletelywith the aimsof naturein his own purposive activity,is preparedto sacrificehis existence andeverythingelse of value which he possesses if, and simply because, naturerequiredit. This would seem to indicatean indifferencetowardshimself that is not only differentin kind from buteven inconsistentwith the indifferencetowardsthingswhich resultsin Stoic ethics from a self-interestedregardfor the desirabilityof a passionless existence. Such is Annas's second argumentfor the incompatibilityof eudaimonism anda religiousconceptionof virtue.Fromthe eudaimonisticstandpointof traditional Stoic ethics, a person desists from desiring anythingelse besides virtue becausedoing so would haveundesirableconsequences.But virtueas characterized by Epictetus,MarcusAurelius,andotherswould seem to involve notjust a disregardfor whetherheedingthe wishes of cosmic naturehas personallydesirable consequences but in principle a willingness to do even what one would otherwise regardas personallyundesirablewere it not for the fact that nature wishes one to do it. As Annasnotes, "Virtue,on this view, is simply doing what is needed to conformto nature,where thatis takento be cosmic nature,under-
29
MarcusAurelius, Meditations,XII, 26; quoted in The Morality of Happiness, 176.
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stood in ways thatareindependentof humannature."30 Even if nature'srequirements turn out in fact to be identical to the requirementsof an ethical theory groundedin reflectionon the needs andinterestsof humans,a personwho heeds nature'swishes withoutregardto his own interestsis interestedonly in heeding nature'swishes; though his every wish and desire is satisfied in acting as he not atall whatChrysippus does, "thisis anunexpectedlythinkindof happiness,"31 and companyhad in mind,Annas observes,when they pronouncedvirtueto be sufficient for happinessin their ethical theory. She concludes from this that a personwho shifted fromthe eudaimonisticperspectiveof Stoic ethics to a cosmic perspectiveis not clarifyingor expandingupon but insteadsacrificingthe understandingof virtueandhappinessthathe acquiredfromthe eudaimonistic perspective. This line of reasoning,unlike the previous one, would seem effectively to rule out the possibility thatthe adoptionof a cosmic perspectivetowardone's purposiveactivitycouldbe dissimilarto, andyet complement,the eudaimonistic point of view. If a desireto follow the will of natureis the controllingconsiderationin one's decision-makingandif-what Annasassumesto be the case-this desire is not based on a considerationof one's needs and interests,then always actingon such a desireis virtuousif andonly if always actingout of self-interest is vicious, even if the consequencesof acting in one or the otherfashionarethe same. But of coursethe latterkind of behavioris regardedas the very substance of practicalvirtue in a eudaimonisticethical theory.Thus, the religious understandingof virtuerecommendedby the RomanStoics cannotbe dissimilarto the eudaimonisticpoint of view withoutalso contradictingit. Of course, we are requiredby this argumentto acceptAnnas's conclusion thatChrysippusandotherStoicswho wereclearlycommittedto theeudaimonistic point of view would have rejectedthe religious understandingof virtuerecommendedby the RomanStoics only on the suppositionthatthis understandingof virtueis dissimilarto the eudaimonisticpoint of view-i.e., only if a complete identificationwith the aims of naturecould not be basedon an agent'sconsideration of his own needs and interests.But what if not only Cleanthes and the Roman Stoics but also Zeno and Chrysippusregardedthe reflection on virtue foundwithin ethics properas only an initialresult,andthe subsequentadoption of a cosmic perspectivetowardsone's purposiveactivity as the culmination,of examining virtue from a eudaimonisticpoint of view? Annas charges that an "appealto cosmic nature... pulls the agentaway fromthe kind of attachmentto her own concerns which is needed for useful reflection on her final end to be possible."32But this would not be trueif a personalidentificationwith the aims
30 31
The Morality of Happiness, 160.
Ibid., 162. 32 Ibid., 161.
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of cosmic naturewas the final post-ethicalphase in an agent'sreflectionon her final end. After all, the studentof Stoic philosophy who completes the earlier, distinctlyethicalphase of practicalreflectionlearnsthatit is in his best interests not to desire anythingbesides virtue. What if his subsequentstudy of nature clarifiedhis thinkingaboutwhatvirtueinvolves andaboutwhy it is itself desirablenot by pullinghim away frombutby deepeninghis understandingof who he is, hence of what his needs and interests are? More to the point, what if his complete identificationwith the aims of natureas a whole stems, not simply froma recognitionthathe is butpartof natureas a whole but also froma newlyacquiredknowledge aboutwhat kind of parthe is? Accordingto Stoic cosmology,everythingin the universeis composedof an active and a materialprinciple,or ingredient."Thatwhich is acted upon is unqualified substance,i.e. matter;that which acts is the reason [logos] in it, i.e. god." "They [the Stoics] say that god is mixed with matter,pervadingall of it and so shapingit, structuringit, and makingit into the world."33Althoughreason pervadesevery part of matter,therebyaccountingfor whateverdegree of complexityin internalstructureandfunctionthateach materialentitypossesses, the obvious differences in such complexity between various materialentities demonstratethatreason"pervadessome parts[of matter]to a greaterextentand othersto a lesser degree."34 The lowest degreeof rationalactivity at work in the universeis the "tenor,"or "bondingforce"(hexis), which accountsfor the structuralintegrityof all lifeless objects.Morepervasivestill is the "physique"(physis) which informsthe matterof plants,wherebythey are capableof self-contained growthandactivityvia nutrition.The "soul"(psyche)which informsthe matter of all animals,therebyenabling them to functionand develop by affective response to sensory stimuli, is a still higherdegree of materialpervasionby reason. The rationalor intelligentpower (nous) of the humansoul is the most fully realizedmaterialinstantiationof reason on earth,and is the basis for a kinship between god andman. Cleanthesbegins his hymn to Zeus with the observation that "alone of all mortalcreatureswhich are alive and treadthe earthwe [humans] bear a likeness to god"35on account of our rationalnature. Similarly, Senecamaintainsthat"thereis a tie of relationshipanda likeness [betweenGod and man], since, in truth,a good man differs from God in the element of time only; he is God's pupil, his imitator,and true offspring...."36From this fact
33Alexander,On Mixture,225, 1-2 (SVF 2.310, part);tr. in Long and Sedley, 273. 34 Lives, VII, 138-39. 35
36
Cleanthes,Hymn to Zeus (SVF 1.537). Seneca, On Providence, tr. J. W. Basore (Cambridge,Mass., 1935), I, 5.
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Chrysippusdeducedthat"all otherthings were createdfor the sake of men and gods, but ... these exist for theirown mutualfellowship andsociety, so thatmen can make use of beasts for their own purposeswithout injustice."37 This same is point made by the Stoic spokesmanin De NaturaDeorum:"[R]easonis the highest attributeof all. We may thereforewell believe thatthe world andeverything in it has been createdfor the gods and for mankind."38 Since reasonas such is the same everywhereand since god is nothingother than the sum total of reason active in the universe, the early Stoics apparently concluded (if we can trust Diogenes Laertiuson this point) that "our several souls [are]each a fragmentof it" (ie., god).39As MaryanneCline Horowitzhas notedrecently,this is certainlya prominentthemein laterStoicwritings.40 Cicero maintainsthat "the soul of man, deriving as it is from the divine mind, can be As rational comparedwith nothingelse, if it is rightto say so, save God alone."41 beings, Epictetusobserved, we are "a fragmentof god himself; [we] have in [ourselves]a partof him."Plants and otheranimalsalso were createdby God; but they are "not his principalworks" inasmuch as they are not "partof the divine."42 If not for the Stoics in general,thencertainlyfor those writingin the Roman period,the inherentdignityof ourrationalnature,hence ourdignifiedpositionin the purposive orderof nature,is the primarymeasure of what qualifies as an appropriatemeans of preservingourselves. The impulses and inclinationsthat natureprovides us from birth are designed to help us preserve ourselves in a mannerbefittingourdignifiedstatusin the universe.The Stoic spokespersonin Cicero'sDe Legibus statesthat"he who knows himself will realize, in the first place, thathe has a divine element within him, and will think of his own inner natureas a kind of consecratedimage of God; and so he will always act and thinkin a way worthyof so greata gift of the gods."43Epictetusadmonishedhis studentsthatliving in agreementwith natureboils downto respectingthe dignity of one's own humanity:"Youare parted[by the fact of your rationality]from wild beasts,you arepartedfromsheep....Look to it thenthatyou do nothinglike a wild beast [or a sheep], else you destroythe man [hencethe fragmentof divinity] in you and fail to fulfill his promise."44 37De Finibus III, xx, 67. 38 Ibid. II, 132-33.
39Lives VII, 143. In Seeds of Virtueand Knowledge (Princeton, 1998), 21-34. 41 Tusculan Disputations V, 38. 40
42 Discourses
II, 8.
43De Legibus, tr. C. W. Keyes (Cambridge,Mass., 1928), I, 22. 44Discourses II, 8-10. In De Officiis, Cicero describesthis practicalrespect for the dignity of humanityas a "generaldecorumwhich is apparentin every good action,"which consists of acting "in harmonywith the generalqualityof man which distinguisheshim fromthe rest of the animal kingdom"(I, 30, 107).
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Michael Gass
Now if the crucialpiece of self-knowledge gleaned from the cosmo-theological speculationthat comprises Stoic physics is the realizationthatwe each arefragmentsof the divinereasonandso shouldcomportourselvesaccordingly, then Epictetus'sinjunctionalways to act not as though we ourselves were an independententity,butas a partcommittedto furtheringthe aims of the whole is hardlythe abandonmentof the eudaimonisticperspectivethat Annas makes it out to be. Though the divine architectpervadesand animatesall non-rational things, it is distinct from those things. But accordingto the passages that we havejust examined,rationalbeings owe theirexistence as rationalbeings to the fact that they literally are part of the divine architect,just as a hand or a foot owes its existence to the body of which it is a part.If we were self-subsisting entitiesin ourown right,thenit would be appropriateforus to concernourselves with the interestsof the divine architectonly insofaras those interestsintersect with our own separateinterests.However,since we arenot self-subsistingentities but insteada partof the divine architect(who alone is self-subsisting),our interestsbelong to us only insofar as they are a part of the divine architect's interests.In otherwords ourproperaim in life is to accomplishthatshareof the divine architect'sagendathatwe judge to be our assignedportion. Annas'sthesis thatthe religiousaccountof virtuefoundin RomanStoicism is a radical departurefrom traditionalStoic eudaimonismis based upon the considerationthat a person who adopts wholeheartedlya cosmic perspective towardshis purposiveactivity either loses psychic harmonyas a consequence (her first argumentagainstthe possibility of a fully eudaimonisticbut religious understandingof virtue)or else maintainsit only at the expense of surrendering his rightto decide for himself whathis needs andinterestsare (hersecond argumentagainstthispossibility).As notedpreviously,if Epictetus,MarcusAurelius, andothersregardedthe adoptionof a cosmic perspectiveas dissimilarto, hence as possibly requiringa course of action at cross purposeswith, an agent's considerationof his own needs and interests,then Annas's reasoninghere would seem to be compelling. But as we see, this suppositionis wide of the mark;the textual evidence indicates that certainlythe Roman Stoics, and probablythe earlyStoics as well, viewed the adoptionof a cosmic perspectivenot as dissimilarto but ratheras the final expressionof, an agent'sreflectionon his needs and interests.The rationalbeing who wholeheartedlyattemptsto make the aims of the divinearchitecthis own has not left behindthe concernforhis own needs and interests that first led him to virtue in favor of a concern for the needs and interestsof an alienentity;rather,he is now actingon a revisedunderstandingof who he is, hence of what his needs and interestsare. Thoughhe still values the harmoniousintegrationof thought,feeling, and desire in his own person that Stoic ethics representsas the very substanceof both virtue and happiness,this harmonynow obtains in his own person via his identificationwith the cosmic
Eudaimonism,Theology,and Stoicism
37
whole of which he is a dignifiedpart.NeitherofAnnas's two argumentsruleout the possibility of this practicalorientation.Barringthe developmentof some additionalargumentagainstthe possibilityof a fully eudaimonisticbutreligious understandingof virtue,I thinkit necessaryto concludethatcosmo-theological speculationfigured prominentlyin Stoic thinking about virtue from the very beginningof the school's history,notjust at the end.45 GeorgiaCollege and StateUniversity.
45
An earlierversion of this paperwas presentedat VanderbiltUniversity.I wish to thank Michael Hodges, Norm Lillegard,and Jim Fieser for their comments and suggestions.
A
Leonardo
Life
Politics:
in
Cicero
Bruni's
GaryIanziti LeonardoBruni'sLife of Cicero deserves to occupy an importantplace in the annals of early modem history-writing.'Completed in October 1415, the Ciceromarksa turningpoint in Bruni'scareer.It representshis firstmajorforay into the field of historiography,precedingby a few monthshis completionof the first book of the more famousHistory of Florence.2The Cicero containsmany of the features upon which Bruni's reputationas a historianwas later to be based. It is written in concise, elegant Latin;it demonstratesa high degree of sophisticationin its handlingof a wide range of source material;it reveals the workingsof a mature,criticalintelligencecapableof formulatingjudgmentsthat often go againstthe grainof accumulatedtradition.3Nor shouldwe be surprised thatBruni'sbreakthroughinto suchterritorytook place withinthe frameworkof biography.Since the time of Petrarch,life-writinghadbeen practicedby Italian humanists as the preferredform of historical composition.4Bruni's mentor Coluccio Salutatiwas a devotee of the genre, and Brunihimself served his ap1 Bruni's VitaCiceronis is now available in LeonardoBruni, Opereletterarieepolitiche, ed. Paolo Viti (Turin, 1996), 411-99. For the date of completion, 18 October 1415, see Viti's introduction,413. 2 Bruni announcedthe completion of the first book of the Historiarumflorentini populi libri XII in a letter to Poggio Bracciolini, 2 January 1416: Francesco Paolo Luiso, Studi su I'epistolario di LeonardoBruni, ed. Lucia Gualdo Rosa (Rome, 1980), 83. 3 For this view of Bruni the historiansee RiccardoFubini, "La rivendicazionedi Firenze della sovranitastatale e il contributodelle 'Historiae'di LeonardoBruni,"in LeonardoBruni, cancelliere della Repubblicadi Firenze, ed. Paolo Viti (Florence, 1990), 29-62. 4 Petrarch'sDe viris illustribus establishedthe genre: see BenjaminG. Kohl, "Petrarch's Prefaces to the De viris illustribus,"History and Theory, 13 (1974), 132-44; EckhardKessler, Petrarca und die Geschichte(Munich, 1978); and Guido Martellotti,Scrittipetrarcheschi, ed. Michele Feo and Silvia Rizzo (Padua, 1983). Boccaccio's De casibus virorumillustrium,ed. Pier Giorgio Ricci and VittorioZaccaria(Milan, 1983: Tuttele opere di GiovanniBoccaccio, ed. VittoreBranca,IX) is inspiredby Petrarch'sexample. For the advantagesof the term "lifewriting,"see Thomas F. Mayer and D. R. Woolf (eds.), TheRhetorics of Life-Writingin Early ModernEurope (Ann Arbor, 1995), 26.
39 2000byJournal of theHistoryof Ideas,Inc. Copyright
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prenticeshipin history-writingby translatingseven of Plutarch'sLives between 1405 and 1412.5 Bruni'sCicerowas an immediatesuccess in its own day.6It even supplanted its most august rival, Plutarch'sancient biography of Cicero. The latter had begun to circulatein the West as early as 1401 in the Latinversion executedby anotherof Salutati'sproteges, JacopoAngeli da Scarperia.7After the appearance of Bruni's Cicero, however, Plutarch'sCicero came underduress.By the 1430s Bruni'sCicerowas "morewidely diffused"thanPlutarch's.8Bruni'stext soon became standard,to the extent that the editio princeps of the Latinized Parallel Lives (Rome, 1470) printedBruni'sCiceroin preferenceto Plutarch's, setting a precedentfollowed by subsequenteditions down to 1514.9The trend then suddenlyreversed:Plutarch'sbiography(in the 1401 translationofAngeli) stageda remarkablecomeback,returningto occupy its rightfulplace in the Latin editions of the Parallel Lives publishedafterthat date.10Bruni's Cicero meanwhile sank into oblivion. Its primacyhad lastedalmost one hundredyears. 5 For Salutatisee Ronald Witt, "Salutatiand Plutarch,"in Essays Presented to Myron P Gilmore,ed. Sergio Bertelli and Gloria Ramakus(2 vols.; Florence, 1978), I, 335-46. Bruni's first translationfrom Plutarch'sLives was his version of the MarkAntony(VitaMarci Antonii) completed in 1405 and dedicated to Salutati:Leonardo Bruni, Humanistisch-Philosophische Schriften,ed. Hans Baron (Leipzig, 1928), 102-4, 161-63. Otherdates proposedby Baron for Bruni's Plutarchantranslationsinclude: Vita Catonis (1407/1408), Vita Gracchorum(1410), VitaAemilii Pauli (1410), VitaDemosthenis(1412). In the same chronology,Schriften,167-68, Baron originally dated two furthertranslations,the VitaSertorii and the Vita Pyrrhi, in the early 1420s. Later,he redatedboth works to the years between 1408 and 1412: see Hans Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance (2 vols.; Princeton,1955), 614. Subsequentstudies have broughtonly minor modifications:see Gianvito Resta, "LeonardoBruni, Pietro Miani e l'inedita lettera di dedica alla traduzionedella plutarchianaVitaPauli Aemilii," in Scritti in onore di Salvatore Pugliatti (5 vols.; Milan, 1978), V, 883-900; James Hankins,Plato in the Italian Renaissance (Leiden, 19912),367-78. 6 James Hankins, RepertoriumBrunianum:A Critical Guide to the Writingsof Leonardo Bruni (Rome, 1997), 255. 7 Roberto Weiss, "Iacopo Angeli da Scarperia(c. 1360-1410/11)," in his Medieval and Humanistic Greek(Padua, 1977), 255-77. 8 Gianvito Resta, Le epitomi di Plutarco nel Quattrocento(Padua, 1962), 12. 9 Vito R. Giustiniani,"Sulle traduzionilatine delle 'vite' di Plutarconel Quattrocento," Rinascimento,n.s. 1 (1961), 3-62, esp. 38-39, 44-45. 10It did not appear,however, underAngeli's name. Credit for the translationwas given instead to the Bolognese humanistAchille Bocchi (1488-1562), called Phileros, on whom see Giovanni Fantuzzi,Notizie degli scrittori bolognesi (9 vols.; Bologna, 1781-1794), II, 217-32; IX, 61-63; and more recently Antonio Rotond6 in Dizionario biografico degli italiani (Rome, 1969), XI, 67-70; also ElizabethSee Watson,Achille Bocchi and the EmblemBook as Symbolic Form (Cambridge, 1993). Like Eric Cochrane,Historians and Historiographyin the Italian Renaissance (Chicago, 1981), 549, both Rotond6and WatsoncreditBocchi with the translation of Plutarch'sCicero. In fact Bocchi had piratedAngeli's translation,publishingit in Bologna in 1508. By not mentioningthe name of the real translator,Bocchi createdthe impression(without actually saying so) that he himself had translatedPlutarch'swork: see Ludwig Bertalot, "Zur Bibliographie der Ubersetzungendes LeonardusBrunus Aretinus,"in his Studien zum italienischen und deutschenHumanismus,ed. Paul Oskar Kristeller(2 vols.; Rome, 1975), II, 265-303, esp. 288-93.
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The first modem scholar to deal with Bruni's Cicero was Hans Baron. As early as 1928 Baron had found a place for the work within the scheme of"civic humanism," or Biirgerhumanismus as he then called his emerging concept. In his edition of Bruni's selected writings, Baron included a section from the Cicero, that dealing with the Roman statesman's literary output.'1 The decision to publish this extract rather than the whole work was in part dictated by Baron's conviction that most of Bruni's Cicero was a mere reworking of Plutarch and therefore unworthy of furtherattention.12 But the choice of the section on Cicero's literary activity also depended on the fact that it contained statements which appeared to confirm Baron's view of Bruni as a "civic humanist." In particular, Baron emphasized Bruni's presentation of Cicero's literary studies as intimately connected with his political activity. In later years Baron often quoted these same passages in support of his "civic" thesis.'3 This is not the place to discuss the wider implications of Baron's thesis itself. It will be enough to note that with regard to Bruni's Cicero, the "civic" focus was purchased at the expense of the work as a whole. One does not have to look very far into Bruni's Cicero to realize that it can hardly be described as subservient to Plutarch. Moreover, it contains passages in which Bruni shows himself to be much less sanguine than Baron about the supposed healthiness of the connection between letters and political life. For example, when weighing up the import of Cicero's decision (49 BC) to side with Pompey in the incipient civil war, Bruni actually berates his man for having taken sides at all. As events were later to show, Cicero would have done better to stay out of the fray and retire to the peace and quiet of his books. ' For the duty of the good citizen was clearly to abstain from the contest'5 and so on, in a passage which considerably expands on an incident liquidated by Plutarch in one line.16 Later Bruni even indulges in 11Humanistisch-PhilosophischeSchriften, 113-20, correspondingto Viti's edition, 41619 and 468-83, i.e., slightly over 20% of the entire work. 12Ibid., 114. 13 See "Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance," Bulletin of the John RylandsLibrary,22 (1938), 72-97, now revised in Baron's collected essays, In Search of Florentine Civic Humanism(2 vols.; Princeton,1988), I, 94-133. It is worth noting thatthe discussion of Bruni's VitaCiceronistakes up less thantwo pages in each version (90-91 and 121-22, respectively). Baron's real concern lay in tracingthe revival of active citizenship, as reflected in the changing interpretationsof Cicero: see "The Courseof My Studies in FlorentineHumanism,"ibid., II, 182-93, esp. 185, as well as earlier statements,I, 20-21. 14 Bruni, VitaCiceronis,462, carriesCaesar'sletterto Cicero,AdAtticum,X, 8b, in which Caesarurges Ciceroto remainneutral( "... quid viro bono et quieto et bono civi magis convenit quam abesse a civilibus controversiis?").He also alludes, 464, to letters by Caelius Rufus (Ad Familiares, VIII, 16) and Dolabella (AdFamiliares, IX, 9) urgingthe same counsel. ThatBruni regardedneutralityas the best course to follow is clear from his ensuing comment:"... et si ab eventu res iudicandesunt, hec potioraconsilia fuerunt,quod Ciceronisprudentiamnequaquam fallebat." 15Bruni presents Cicero as imprudently giving way to external pressures, "... ut non modo
Cesaris amicitie verum etiam tuto otio bellum periculosumdesperatumquepreferret." 16 Plutarch,Cicero, XXXVIII, 1.
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ironicalcommentaryon Cicero's involvementwhen it comes to relatinghis refusal to acceptthe commandof the armyafterthe defeat at Pharsalus.'7Rather than representing"civic humanism,"remarkssuch as these show Bruni overturningthe positions elaboratedin the 1390s by his masterColuccio Salutati,'8 as well as by his friendPier Paolo Vergerio.'9To some extent, indeed, Bruni's statementseffect a returnto the earlierjudgmentsof Petrarch.20 Baron's assessment failed to account for Bruni's Cicero in its entirety.A detailedexaminationof the work as a whole had to await E. B. Fryde,who in 1980 publishedthe first and still the only extended study of Bruni's Cicero in any language.21 FrydefirmlyrejectedBaron's"civic"reading.22 By considering the portionsof the work neglected by Baron,he proposedthat Bruni's Cicero should be read as the first example of Bruni'scommitmentto "scientific"history.23The work heraldedthe birthof positivist historicalmethodology:Bruni was construedby Frydeas having adheredto a set of rulesthatwould come into prominencewithin the historicalprofessiononly much later.Frydeargued,for example, thatin the CiceroBrunishowed a clearpreferencefor primarydocumentsovernarrativesources.24 Indeed,Frydethoughtthathe coulddiscernBruni using primarysources to "correct"earliernarrativeaccounts.In the case of the Cicero the narrativeaccount was of course that of Plutarch,the "documents" were chiefly the writings of Cicero himself. Thanksto his wide knowledge of these latter,togetherwith his use of Sallust(whose narrativeof the Catilinarian conspiracy Plutarchhad not known), Bruni had been able to devise "an improvedversion of Plutarch'sLife."25 17
Bruni, Vita Ciceronis, 466. Bruni's irony here is all his own: cfr. Plutarch, Cicero, XXXIX, 1-2. 18 For Salutati'sdefense of Cicero's decision to participatein the civil wars, see his letter to Pellegrino Zambeccari,1392-94, in Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati, ed. FrancescoNovati (4 vols.; Rome, 1891-1911), III, 25. 19Epistolario di Pier Paolo Vergerio, ed. Leonardo Smith (Rome, 1934), 439-40, letter dated 1 August 1394, in which Cicero is made to defend himself against Petrarch. 20 Petrarch famously disapprovedof Cicero's participationin the civil wars: Familiarum rerumlibri, XXIV, 3 and 4, in FrancescoPetrarca,Opere (Florence, 1975), I, 1250-55. 21 "The Beginnings of Italian HumanistHistoriography:The 'New Cicero' of Leonardo Bruni,"English Historical Review, 95 (1980), 533-52, also in the same author's Humanism and Renaissance Historiography (London, 1983), 33-53. My page references will be to the second. 22 Ibid., 50-51. 23 See the first chapterof Humanismand Renaissance Historiography,"The Revival of a 'Scientific' and EruditeHistoriographyin the EarlierRenaissance,"3-31. 24 Ibid., 47: "Fairlyconsistently he seems to have preferredprimarydocumentsto narrative sources." 25 Ibid., 42. Fryde's analytical framework,as he himself recognizes, 35-36, derives from Emilio Santini's introduction to Bruni's Historiarumflorentini populi libri XII, in Rerum italicarumscriptores (Citta di Castello, 19142),XIX, 3. Also cited as "the best introductionto Bruni's achievementsas a historian"is B. L. Ullman, "LeonardoBruni and HumanisticHisto-
Leonardo Bruni
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There is much that is valuable in Fryde's study. Yet twenty years on it appears somewhat dated. Recent investigations of Bruni's historiography have overturned the orthodoxies of a generation ago. They have shown that Bruni had recourse to a wide range of strategies, not all of which can be accommodated within a positivistic framework. Thus while he could at times operate with a high degree of critical acumen, Bruni could just as often resort to techniques of a more dubious nature, such as suppression of information, alteration, and deliberate manipulation of data.26The Cicero constitutes no exception. Two examples will suffice. The first, acknowledged by Fryde, concerns Bruni's claim, at the very beginning of the work, that Cicero was descended from royal origins.27Plutarch's account of Cicero's origins is quite different, for he records as equally plausible the story that Cicero's father was born and raised in a fuller's shop.28 But Bruni was unwilling to begin his hero's biography on such a low note. So he opted for the story of the royal origins alone. There was only one problem: where was the evidence to justify the thesis? In the opening lines of the Cicero itself Bruni cites none, and it must be said that this is in keeping with accepted classical practice. However, in his preface, Bruni had made a sweeping claim, namely that the Cicero contained no statement that could not be backed up with proof.29 In regard to Cicero's supposed royal origins Bruni was soon called upon to make good this claim. Within little more than a year after the Cicero's release, an otherwise unidentified vir eruditus challenged Bruni to produce his evidence. Bruni's reply is a sort of footnote hors texte, a learned disquisition aimed at providing the documentation upon which his "royal" thesis is based.30As Fryde himself was forced to recognize, however, Bruni's argument exfontibus is unconvincing. The ultimate source cited for the thesis is Jerome's
riography,"Medievalia et Humanistica,4 (1946), 45-61, reprintedin Ullman's Studies in the Italian Renaissance (Rome, 19732),321-43. Ullman's essay is in fact largely dependenton an earlierstudyby Emilio Santini,"LeonardoBruniAretinoe i suoi 'Historiarumflorentinipopuli libri XII,' " Annali della Scuola Normale Superioredi Pisa, 22 (1910), 3-173. 26 See Anna Maria Cabrini,"Le 'Historiae' del Bruni: Risultati ed ipotesi di una ricerca sulle fonti," in LeonardoBruni, cancelliere, 247-319. 27 Bruni, VitaCiceronis, 418. 28 Plutarch,Cicero, I, 1. A recent commentatoron the text has noted that "... low birthwas a common insult in Roman politics...; as fullers cleaned cloth and clothes in urine they were thoughtto be particularlylow...": see Plutarch,TheLife of Cicero, intro., tr., and commentary by J.L. Moles (Warminster,1988), 147. Plutarch'sincipit would have been especially vivid in Florence, where the cloth trade was omnipresent:cfr. the Plutarchanpassage in the Angeli translationof 1401, as printed in Plutarch, GraecorumRomanorumqueillustrium vitae, ed. HieronymusGemusaeus(Basle, 1542), 319r. 29 Bruni, VitaCiceronis, 418: "Est autem nihil a nobis temere in historiapositum, sed ita ut de singulis rationemreddereet certa probationeassererevaleamus." 30 Bruni, Epistolarumlibri VIII,ed. Lorenzo Mehus (2 vols.; Florence, 1741), I, 115-17 (Ep. IV, 7). Luiso, Studi su I'epistolario, 86, dates the letter in November or December 1416.
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Latinizationof the De temporibusof Eusebius,with a nod at subsequentderivations, including,presumably,even Boccaccio.31Frydedoes his best to deal with this embarassingperformance,even suggesting that "perhapsBrunireally did believe that this patristicauthoritysilenced all doubt."32 Ultimately,however, Frydeis obliged to admitthatBrunithe historiansuffersfromfrequentlapses of his critical judgment: he "could be very prejudicedand obstinately wrongheaded."33 IndeedFrydemustfinallyyield to the recognitionthatBruni'spresentationof Cicero as being of royal descent constitutesa "displayof encomiastic prejudice."34 All of this does not, in Fryde'sview, invalidatehis presentationof Brunias a "scientific"historian;and perhapsit would not, if it were a case of a single slip. But the fact is thatthereare many instancesof this kind in the Cicero,too many, in my view, to make Fryde's overall thesis sustainable.One such is a passage presentedby Frydeas an example of Bruni'scriticalabilities,whereas it shouldratherbe set down to sheerencomiastic.ThepassageconcernsCicero's first criminalcase, which gave rise to the orationPro Sexto Roscio Amerino. The details of the case need not detainus here, otherthan to rememberthat it markedCicero'sdebut:his defense of Sextus Roscius againstthe injusticesperpetratedby the Sullanentouragemade him somethingof an overnightcelebrity in Rome. Plutarchunderstandablyelaboratedon the causes andconsequencesof the trial,in a passagereducedby Brunito a single line.35Bruni'saccountinstead focuses on anotherissue, i.e., on Cicero's age at the time of the defense. In an aside applaudedby Frydefor its supposedcriticalsubtlety,Bruniweighs up the evidence36;he then falls into line behind CorneliusNepos, who had proposed thatCicero was twenty-threeyears old at the time. WhatFrydefailed to notice was that Bruni's source, Aulus Gellius, had presenteda solid case for Cicero being twenty-sevenwhen he defendedSextusRoscius.37The whole point of the chapterby Gellius is indeedto demonstratethatNepos haderredratherbadly on this point.Yet faced with this reasonedargumentbackedup by incontrovertible evidence,Bruniquitedeliberatelysidedwith Nepos on the grounds,says he, that Nepos was Cicero's contemporaryand should thereforebe accepted as more
31 Die Chronikdes Hieronymus,ed. Rudolf Helm (Berlin, 1984), 148; the story is repeated by others, including Boccaccio, De casibus virorumillustrium,534.
32 Fryde, 44. 33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
Cfr. Plutarch,Cicero, III, 2-4; Bruni, VitaCiceronis,420. 36 Bruni, Vita Ciceronis, 420-22, on which see Fryde, 44-45: "Very reasonably, Bruni justifies his preferencefor the authorityof Nepos, a contemporaryand friend of Cicero." 37Noctes atticae, XV, 28. Gellius also notes that Nepos must have deliberatelyalteredthe data "ut M. Cicero orationemflorentemdixisse pro Roscio admodumadulescens videretur." 35
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reliable.38Moretangibleproof of Bruni's"encomiasticprejudice"could hardly be found:the younger Cicero could be made to seem at the time he defended SextusRoscius,themoreextraordinary his genius.Hereonce againBrunishowed himselfquitewilling to manipulatethe evidencein orderto makeit coincidewith the image of Cicero he wished to render.The fact that Bruni could cloak such procedurein the garbof eruditedisquisitionshouldput us on our guard. In realitythe key to Bruni'sCicerolies neitherin its supposedarticulationof the ideals of "civichumanism"norin its precociousexemplificationof a "scientific"approachto history.In whatfollows I wantto offer an alternativeinterpretation of the work. The best startingpoint is Bruni's preface, couched in the form of a letter to his friend Niccolo Niccoli. Despite the patently rhetorical natureof this document,39 it offers a goldmineof information.Brunirelates,for how his example projectoriginatedin his sense of dissatisfactionat readingthe Angeli translationof Plutarch'sbiography.The reasons for this dissatisfaction need careful consideration.As might be expected, the first point Bruni cites concernsAngeli's errorsin translatingfromthe originalGreek.40 A secondpoint, is one which Bruni drives with even force: home however, greater Angeli's Latin is poor,a particularlygraveoffense, given thatthe subjecttreatedhappensto be the prince of Latin letters,the man withoutwhose efforts Latinlettersmay indeed neverhave risento distinctionin the firstplace.41It is to rectifythe stylistic deficiencies of Angeli's translationthat Bruni sets out to retranslatethe Greek text ex novo. As he says in his own words:"AccordinglyI took it on as my duty to try to repairthis shortcomingin the Latinlanguage.I orderedthe Greekvolume right away, and began a new translationfrom scratch."42 Thereis no reasonto doubtthe generalcontoursof these initial statements. Some of the details have certainly been dressed up for the occasion, but the thrustof Bruni'scommentsholds fast with whatwe know to be true.By the end
38
Bruni, VitaCiceronis,422: "Ego Comelio Nepoti, utpote coetaneo et in primis familiari et cum diligentia hominem observanti,magis crediderim." 39 Bruni's alterationof the circumstancesof composition is clear from the very first sentence, Vita Ciceronis, 416: "Otioso mihi nuper ac lectitarealiquid cupienti oblatus est libellus quidamex Plutarchotraductus,in quo Ciceronisvita contineridicebatur."But his concernwith Cicero's biographywas neithercasual nor recent. He alludes to it as early as September1412, in anotherletterto Niccoli: see Bruni,Epistolarumlibri, I, 96-97 (Ep. III, 19), and Luiso, Studi su l'epistolario, 78, 195. 40 For an example of Bruni correctingAngeli's Greek, see G. W. Pigman III, "Barzizza's Studies of Cicero,"Rinascimento,21 (1981), 140. Pigmanpublishes here GasparinoBarzizza's own Vita Ciceronis, showing the extent to which it both differs from and depends on Bruni's. 41 Vita Ciceronis, 416. 42Ibid.: "Huicergo deformitatilatine lingue pro virili mea succurrereaggressus,confestim greco volumine requisitotraductionemex integro incohavi."The translationis that of Gordon Griffiths,in TheHumanismof LeonardoBruni,tr.andintro.by GordonGriffiths,JamesHankins, and David Thompson (Binghamton,N.Y., 1987), 185. Besides the preface, 184-85, Griffiths offers translationsof two brief selections from the body of the work, 185-88.
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of the year 1412 he had completedhis translationof Plutarch'sDemosthenes.43 Whatwas morelogical thanto check-even beforefinishingtheDemosthenesthe translationof the life with which Plutarchhimself hadpairedit, i.e., with the Cicero?Whenhe saw how unworthywas the work carriedout by his old friend andsometimesrival, Brunimadethe decision to retranslate.Therewas nothing unusualin this. Angeli was farfrombeing a distinguishedHellenist,norwas he in the frontlineof earlyFlorentinehumanism.44 He was somewheredown in the rankand file of Salutati'sdisciples. Certainlyhis deathin 1410 or 1411 would have freedBrunifromany lingeringscruples.It was commonpracticefor skilled humaniststo revise or rewritethe Greektranslationsmadeby earlierand lesser men. Salutatihimself had engaged in such activities, and so too did Guarino.45 Wheredoubtsset in aboutthe substanceof Bruni'sstory is in his claim to have beguntranslatingPlutarchex integro.This neithercorrespondsto commonpractice, nor does it squarewith Bruni's finished work as it standstoday. Despite Bruni'sclaims, it is clearthathe beganby rewritingAngeli into a higherregister of Latin.It is this fact thatexplainshow no less an authoritythanRobertoWeiss could insinuatethatBruni'sCicerowas little morethana paraphraseofAngeli's translation.46 But there is no real substanceto such a view. Soon afterthe first Bruni becomes, as faras I can tell, completelyindependentof Angeli. My pages guess is that the early sections of Bruni's Cicero represent-in a somewhat modified form-a residueof the first stage of the work. Bruni's initial project soon moved into a second, definitive stage: that of producingan independentwork of his own on the life of Cicero.As he labored over the translation,he says in the preface,he became awarethatAngeli's halting Latinwas only partof the problem;a deepercause of concernwas Plutarch's narrationitself, which in Bruni'sestimationleft much to be desired.47It was at 43 Luiso, Studi su l'epistolario, 80, on Ep. IV, 1 (Rome, 26 December 1412) to Niccolo Niccoli, where the translationof the Demosthenes is mentionedas completed. 44 For Bruni's early friendshipand then rivalrywith Angeli, as well as for an evaluationof the latter's skills as a Hellenist and humanist,see Weiss, "IacopoAngeli," 255-77. 45For Salutati'srewriting,in 1394, of a late Trecentotranslationof Plutarch'sDe cohibenda ira, see GiuseppeDi Stefano,La decouvertede Plutarqueen occident (Turin, 1968), 40ff, with the relative texts at 91-129 and 132-71. Salutati knew no Greek at all at this stage, and his rewriting should be classified as just that: as an amplificationof an earlier translation.Of a quite different order is Guarino's reworking of Angeli's translationof Plutarch'sBrutus, on which see now MariannePade, "Revisions of Translations,Correctionsand Criticisms:Some Examples fom the fifteenth-centuryLatinTranslationsof Plutarch's'Lives,' " in Methodologie de la traduction: de l'antiquite a la Renaissance, ed. Charles Marie Temes and Monique Mund-Dopchie (Luxembourg, 1994), 177-98, esp. 187-89. While correctingAngeli's Greek, Guarinoleft untouched"the basic sentence structuresof Angeli's work."This did not prevent later editors from crediting Guarinowith the translation. 46 Weiss, "IacopoAngeli," 273. 47 Bruni, VitaCiceronis,416: "Et opus sane ab initio satis luculenterprocederevidebatur: mox vero ut progredior,et ob convertendidiligentiamsingula quequemagis considero,ne ipse quidem Plutarchusdesideriummei animi penitus adimplevit."
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this point that Bruni claims to have set aside both Angeli and Plutarch and to have cast off on his own, starting out once again from scratch.48Words to be taken with a grain of salt. There is every indication that Bruni did not start afresh, but kept his early pages based on Angeli. It was probably at this stage that he introduced some changes to these early portions, including the passages on Cicero's royal origins and the trial of Sextus Roscius, already mentioned. These are tangible signs of Bruni taking command, stamping the text with his own mark. Never, however, does Bruni lose sight of Plutarch, as he ratherrashly claims to have done. The preface also contains important indications concerning the reasons for Bruni's dissatisfaction with Plutarch. One source of this dissatisfaction lies in what Bruni refers to as Plutarch's "omissions," particularly of key details that are required to illustrate the great man's career.49Close examination of the work leads one to wonder whether Bruni's injection of further detail is not driven by the encomiastic imperative we have seen in action before. The desire to praise Cicero is a theme running throughout the whole preface, and Bruni's interventions, whether legitimate or not, appearto be chiefly calculated to enhance Cicero's image. A case in point is Bruni's account of the deliberations in the Senate (5 December 63 BC)as to what was to be done with the Catilinarian conspirators then being held in custody. Plutarch's account of these deliberations (Cicero, XX-XXII) leaves Cicero almost wholly out of the picture; it plays up instead the contributions of Caesar and Cato to the debate. Modem historians tend to agree with this account.50Yet Bruni's version of these events tries to accentuate Cicero's role, making his speech fall into line with the decision eventually taken: capital punishment as recommended by Cato.5' All of which smacks of yet another element brought into play to further Cicero's glory. In fact Bruni's whole narration of the Catilinarian conspiracy appears designed to reclaim for Cicero, on
48
VitaCiceronis, 418: "Nos igitur et Plutarchoet eius interpretationeomissis, ex iis que vel apud nostros vel apud Graecos de Cicerone scripta legeramus, ab alio exorsi principio vitam et mores et res gestas eius maturioredigestione et pleniore notitia, non ut interpretessed pro nostro arbitriovoluntateque,descripsimus." 49 Ibid., 416: "Quippe multis pretermissis, que ad illustrationem summi viri maxime pertinebant...." 50See Ronald Syme, Sallust (Berkeley, 1964), 105ff. 51Bruni, VitaCiceronis, 442, presents a more incisive Cicero who favors the death penalty. This is in line with the FourthCatilinarian,published,however, in 60 BC. Fryde thinksthat Bruni was in good faith, as "he could not know that this representedCicero's later version, rewrittensome three years after the event," 46-47. WhateverCicero's actual behavior on the day, he clearly wanted to be rememberedas having played a key role in bringingthe Senate to decide on capitalpunishment:see Ad Atticum,XII, 21. Brunimay best be describedas respecting Cicero's wishes on this point, thus counteringPlutarch'sacceptanceof traditionsantagonistic towards Cicero.
48
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the basis of his own and otherwritings,the full measureof glory deniedto him not only by Plutarchbut by Sallust as well.52 Omissions, however, are only one aspect of Bruni's dissatisfactionwith Plutarch.Anotheris also hintedat in the preface.It concernsBruni'sperception of Plutarch'sCicero as being conditionedby its pairingwith the Demosthenes. As Bruni says, what Plutarchwrites about Cicero, he narrateswith an eye to comparisonwith Demosthenes,in which the latteris meantto come out superior to his Roman counterpart.53 This is a profoundinsight and shows that Bruni's of of Plutarch had years study yielded theirfruit.We mustalso rememberthathe hadtranslatedPlutarch'sDemosthenesimmediatelypriorto his Cicero.He knew Plutarch'sdeclarationof intent, made in Demosthenes, III, 1, where Plutarch presents the two lives as a dyptych, and also reveals the slant of the coming narration.With regardto Demosthenes and Cicero, Plutarchwrites: "I shall examine their actions and their political careersto see how their naturesand dispositionscomparewith one another."Comparisonthus lies at the very heart of Plutarch'senterprise.As one modem editorhas justly written,"TheLife of Cicero cannot be considered separately from the Life of Demosthenes: the Demosthenes-Ciceropair itself forms a complex unity...."54 BrunirealizedthatPlutarch'scomparativeschemeheavily compromisedhis portraitof Cicero.He perhapsoversimplifiedwhenhe suggestedthatDemosthenes consistentlycame out of the comparisonthe favorite,for Plutarch'spresentation of the pair seems more evenly balancedthan Bruni will admit.55But the key point is that Bruniclearly saw Plutarch'slimitations.Comparisonhad a range of implications.Firmlygroundedin Greekrhetoric,comparisonwas typical of school exercises.56It relied on the evaluationof character,most often measured with referenceto standardizedmoral qualities,or virtues and vices. Plutarch's pairedlives reflected this traditionon a more sophisticatedliterarylevel. The 52 FrydepresentsBrunias using Sallust to correctPlutarch.This is far frombeing the case. Bruni uses Sallust extensively in his narrationof the Catilinarianconspiracy but with other ends in mind. If Sallust was not quite an anti-Ciceronian,his Bellum Catilinae tended to play down Cicero's role and to deny him the statusof hero:see Sallust's accountof the deliberations of 5 December(BellumCatilinae,LI-LII),where the clash of views is presentedas one between Caesarand Cato, and where Cicero's opinion is not even deemed worthy of mention. Bruni's account of the Catilinarianconspiracy,framedby the theme of Cicero as pater patriae (Vita Ciceronis, 430-44), should be seen as an attemptto reestablishCicero's place as the central figure. In this sense the thrustof Bruni'snarrativegoes very much againstthe grainof Sallust's, even while making extensive use of it. 53 Bruni, VitaCiceronis,416-18: "... cetera sic narrat,ut magis ad comparationemsuam, in quaDemosthenempreferrenititur,quamad sincerumnarrandiiudiciumaccommodarivideantur." 54 J. L. Moles in his introductionto Plutarch,The Life of Cicero, 11. 55 Plutarch stresses the venality of Demosthenes as opposed to Cicero's incorruptibility: see the commentaryby J. L. Moles, 157-58, andpassim. 56 See the introductionto Plutarque,Vies, ed. and tr. Robert Flaceliere, Emile Chambry and Marcel Juneaux(Paris, 1964), I, xix-xx.
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whole purpose of Plutarch's Lives was to use comparison as a means of portraying character.7 The pairing of Demosthenes and Cicero is no exception. Bruni had only to read the Comparison itself-which he surely did58 to recognize the extent to which Plutarch was setting Cicero's failures as a man over and against the corresponding virtues of Demosthenes. Bruni's preface constitutes not only an accurate assessment of the nature of Plutarch's enterprise, it also hints at the very different approach that Bruni himself intended to adopt. A major point concerns Bruni's rejection of the pairing scheme. The preface clearly implies the intention of liberating Cicero from the straitjacket of Plutarchan comparison. Here the results speak for themselves: the Cicero of Bruni stands alone.59The narrative is unfettered by any comparative principle. Not only does Bruni not pair his Cicero with the Demosthenes earlier translated but he drops both the Comparison itself and the preface of Plutarch, both essential components of the Greek original.60Bruni's Cicero is a free-standing life and this in itself represents a major novelty not only with respect to Plutarch, but with respect to Bruni's most immediate predecessors as well, most of whom, from Petrarch and Boccaccio down to Vergerio, tended to present biography in series, or collections.61 By abandoning the comparative framework, Bruni was not merely introducing a change in formal presentation. To reject comparison was also to reject its rhetorical function: the illustration of character evaluated according to moral criteria. What was Bruni to put in its place? Here the preface offers only the
57See D. A. Russell, Plutarch (London, 1973). Bruni's admission that Cicero occasionally went so far as to praise his own speaking abilities (Vita Ciceronis, 480: "Dixit aliquid de facultate dicendi...") comes in response to a statementmade by Plutarchin the Comparison,II, 2: "Andat last he praisesnot only his deeds and actions, but also his speeches, both those which he delivered himself and those which he 58
committed to writing ..." (tr. Bemadotte Perrin). 59 Baron, "The Backgroundof the Early FlorentineRenaissance,"first published in 1938, notes that Bruni's Cicero was written at about the same time that Donatello created his St. George: see In Search of Florentine Civic Humanism,I, 21. 60 Plutarch,Demosthenes, I-III, is in fact an introductionto the two paired lives; Bruni's translationof the Demosthenesbegins with Plutarch,Demosthenes, IV: see the incipit as given by Giustiniani,"Sulle traduzionilatine,"38: "DemosthenispaterDemosthenesut Theopompus historicus tradit in primis honestus ac probus vir fuit...." By dropping Plutarch'sfirst three chaptersBruni showed he had no intention of presenting Demosthenes and Cicero as a pair. Fryde, 38, is thus in error when he states that Bruni planned to produce a "translationof Plutarch'sparallel lives of Demosthenes and Cicero." 61 See note 4 above. Bruni'sfriendPier Paolo Vergeriowas the authorof biographiesof the Carraralords of Padua:BenjaminG. Kohl, Padua under the Carrara, 1318-1405 (Baltimore, 1998), xxi, 366, 433. For series and collections of biographiessee Massimo Miglio, "Biografia e raccolte biografiche nel quattrocento italiano," Rendiconti dell'Accademia delle Scienze dell 'Istitutodi Bologna, 63 (1974-75), 166-99. CinquecentopractitionersincludedPaolo Giovio and Vasari:on both see T. C. Price Zimmermann,Paolo Giovio: The Historian and the Crisis of Sixteenth-centuryItaly (Princeton, 1995).
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slightestof hints, at the pointwhereBrunisays he intendsto relatethe "vitamet mores et res gestas" of Cicero.62The inclusion of res gestae here is striking. Plutarchregularlymadethe point thathis own lives were not necessarilymeant to cover res gestae, the greatdeeds of the chosen heroes.63Plutarch'senterprise in fact rancounterto the "greatdeeds"tradition.WhatPlutarchwantedto show abouthis subjectwas, in the words of one modem commentator,"whatsort of man he was."64He wanted,that is, to convey above all the moral fibre of each individual worthy. To do so it was not always necessary to focus on "great deeds";the characterof an individualmightjust as well be illustratedby a small anecdotetakenfromprivatelife. By sayingthathe intendedto relateCicero'sres gestae along with the vita et mores,Bruniwas introducingan entirelydifferent narrativeprinciple as the basis for his own work. The preface maps out two strategiesfor biography:a Plutarchanone and a novel, Brunianone where, as we shall see, res gestae loom large.It is time now to turnto Bruni'sCiceroitself and to test some of the observationsmade so far.The most convenientway of proceedingwill be to continuekeepingPlutarch'soriginalclearlyin view. Let us startwith Plutarch.Nothingwould be moremisleadingthanto regard his Ciceroas "anecdotal,"65 a mere collection of raw materialsused by Brunito a his own. of compose portrait Quite to the contrary,Plutarch'sCicero is a strongtext with a structurethat clearly reflects its author'sgoals and preoccupations.As statedabove, these mainly concernedmoral issues. Cicero, as presented by Plutarch,illustratesa combinationof both virtues and vices, and in this sense one can legitimatelyspeak of a fairlybalancedportrait.But Plutarch also uses the figureof Ciceroto exemplify the dangersof certainmoralfailings. Three major characterflaws are continuallybroughtto our attention,both at strategicpoints in the narrativeandthen againin the concludingsections where Cicero is explicitly comparedto Demosthenes.According to Plutarch,Cicero was 1) boastful,even to the point of praisinghis own eloquence, somethingthe oratorshould never do;662) his speeches showed a disregardfor propriety;he woundedboth friends and opponentswith his bitingjests, thus increasingthe numberof his enemies;673) he was guilty of excessive ambition.68 These arenot merepassing criticismsof Cicero'scharacter.Plutarchmakes them central features of his narrativeby drawing a direct causal connection 62 Vita Ciceronis, 418. 63
The most famous instance occurs in the Alexander, I, where Plutarch declares "... it is
not Histories I am writing, but Lives...." See also, however, Plutarch'sCato minor, XXIV,1, and XXXVII, 5, passages translatedby Bruni in Plutarch,Graecorumromanorumque... vitae, 290, 292'. 64Russell, Plutarch, 102.
D. R. ShackletonBailey, Cicero (London, 1971), xii. Plutarch,Cicero, XXIV, 1-2; Comparison,II, 1-2. 67 Ibid., V, 4; XXV, 1; Comparison,I, 4-6. 68 Ibid., VI, 5; XLV, 1 and 5; Comparison,II, 1-2. 65
66
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between Cicero'sfailuresas a manandthe ups anddowns of his politicalcareer. The Plutarchansystem is one in which moral deficiencies eventuallyresult in political or military disaster:Pyrrhus,for all his skill as a general, is finally broughtdownbecausehe was nevercontentwith whathe hadandalwayswanted Such more; MarkAntony came to grief over his sensuality and debauchery.69 men were towering examples of talent whose fall was due to moral failings. Plutarch'sCicero is no exception. Despite his massive abilities, he is plagued fromthe beginningsof his careerby faultshe will pay dearlyfor.Plutarchmakes this clear early in the story,where Cicero is said to have carriedjesting beyond the accepted limits, and to have thereforeearnedfor himself the reputationof being malicious (V, 4). Later(XXV, 1) this vice will come back to haunthim, increasinghis growingunpopularityandeventuallyleadingto his exile in 58 BC. Self-praiseis partof the samepackage:by praisinghis own actionsin managing the Catilinarianconspiracy,Cicero, accordingto Plutarch(XXIV, 1-2), made himself hateful.But nowhereis the generalpoint more forcefullymade thanin the case of Cicero'soverweeningambition.Ambitionis Cicero'strulyfatalflaw. It is singled out at intervals in the narrative(VI, 5; XXV, 1; XLV, 1), where Cicero is portrayedas literally addictedto this vice. It is because he is obsessively ambitiousthat at the end of the story Cicero allows himself to be persuadedto collaboratewith the young Octavian.Plutarch'sCicerois quiteready to betraythe Republicin exchangeforpositionandauthority(XLV,5; XLVI, 1). How does Brunideal with all of this machineryin his own Cicero?In each of the key passages noted so far, Brunieitherremoves the objection,reformulates it in differentterms, or regroupsit within a special treatmentof Cicero's character.By so doing Brunidoes not necessarilydeny the moral stains on his hero's record. What he does is to suggest that moral categories have no real relevance in relation to matters political. Bruni in other words anticipates Machiavelliby positing no directcausallink betweenmoralconductandpolitical outcomes.The latteroperateaccordingto theirown rules, andarenot influenced by adherenceor non-adherenceto moralstandards. An example comes to hand in the incidentrelatedby Plutarchof Cicero's quaestorshipin Sicily (75 Bc).70By all accounts Cicero acquittedhimself well andwas naively expectingthatsome sortof recognitionwould be forthcoming. On his way back to Rome he chanced to stop off at the fashionableresort of Puteoli,71andtherehe fell in with some Romansfreshlyarrivedfromthe capital. When it became clearthatthey hadnot the slightestinklingof all his fine work,
69
Russell, Plutarch, 105-6, 135.
70Plutarch,Cicero, VI. 71
Plutarch,Cicero,VI, 3, writing for a Greekaudience,mentionsonly a stop in Campania. His source for the incident is Cicero's oration Pro Plancio, 65, where Puteoli (modem-day Pozzuoli) is explicitly named.
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Cicerofelt dejected.Plutarchat thisjuncturebringshome the morallesson in the tale: the incidenttaughtCicerosomethingaboutthe dangersof too much ambition. Unfortunately,he adds,Cicero failed to pay heed. His vanity andthirstfor praisewere to be his undoing.72 Bruni'saccountof the same incidentrepayscarefulattention.Accordingto Bruni,the lesson Cicero learnedat Puteoli was not a moralone. Whatthe incidenttaughtCicerowas how to constructa political careermore effectively.The rulemightbe reducedto a simple formula:remainin the publicgaze. By accepting an appointmentin the provinces Cicero had taken himself off the Roman stage-a bad careermove. What he learnedat Puteoli was the importanceof sticking to the capital, where shining counted. In Bruni's own words Cicero "decidedfromthatday forwardto live beforethe eyes of the Romanpeople, and to shun provincial appointmentsas less efficacious in the pursuitof glory."73 The interventionby Bruniconstitutesa reshapingof the very fundamentalsinitially put into play by Plutarch.Whatwas a moral lesson in Plutarchbecomes useful career advice in Bruni. Where Plutarchsaw the incident as serving to curbCicero'sthirstfor glory,Brunireconstructsthe episode as teachingCicero how more effectively to satisfy it. Not only does Bruni not repeat Plutarch's moral strictures,he clearly approvesof Cicero's ambitionand applaudsthe attainmentof a new level of consciousnesswith regardto tactics. Such a passage places the evaluationof Cicero's careerand characteron an entirelynew footing.74
The question of Cicero's ambitionhad of course exercized minds before Bruni'stime. Petrarchhad condemnedit;75Salutatihad contextualizedit with regardto ancientRomancustoms.76Whatis novel aboutBruni'sapproachis the acceptanceof ambitionas a naturalcomponentof political life. The matterrequires no justification. It is taken for grantedthat ambitiondrives politicians. Thusin every case wherePlutarchlinks Cicero'sambitionto his ultimatefailure in politics, Bruniis carefulto destroythe linkageby removingthe allusion.77 72
Ibid., VI, 4-5.
73 Bruni, VitaCiceronis,426-28: "Ceterumanimadvertenshoc habere
populorumnaturam ut praesentiaquidem acriterintueantur,absentiavero non multumdiscerant, statuitde cetero in oculis populi romani vivere, extemos autem magistratus ut minus efficaces ad gloriam obmittere."Cfr. Cicero, Pro Plancio, 66, where the "lesson" is related without Bruni's cynicism and contemptfor popularopinion. 74 One should rememberthat 1415 was also the year when Bruni returnedto Florence to pursuea careerin politics. As a "homo novus" himself and, like Cicero, a provincialby birth, Bruni understoodsomething about the drive needed to emerge. On Bruni's career as an example of political opportunism,see RiccardoFubini, "La rivendicazione,"31-35. 75 Petrarca,Opere, 1251 (Librifamiliarium rerum, XXIV, 3, 2): "Quis te falsus glorie splendor senem adolescentiumbellis implicuit...?" 76 Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati, III, 50. 77 Cfr. Plutarch, Cicero, XLV, 1 and 5, with the correspondingpassages in Bruni, Jita Ciceronis, 488-92.
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The samepoint can be madeby consideringhow Brunideals with the issue of self-praise.As alreadymentioned,self-praisewas a topic within rhetorical theory:the effective oratorhad to be carefulto appearmodest andthus to avoid speakingof himself. Especially to be condemnedwas the temptationto praise one's own deeds. To praise one's own eloquence was considered to be even worse.78Therewere of course ways to praise oneself discreetlywithoutgiving Onthe whole, offense,andPlutarchhimselfeven wrotean essay on this subject.79 however,self-praisewas a dangerousbusiness requiringimmensetact. Plutarchnot only chastisesCiceroon this point,he also illustrateshow it led directlyto Cicero'sexile fromRome in 58 BC.Thatis, his explanationfor Cicero's troublesafterthe triumphover the Catilinariansis groundedin yet anotherof Cicero's moralflaws (XXIV, 1). In the face of this passage Brunibehaves consistentlywith whatwe have notedso far.He offers a differentexplanationforhis hero's fall: Cicero is the victim of a campaignof hatredunleashedby political enemiesjealous of his success. The contrastbetweenBruniandPlutarchon this key point is perhapsbest broughthome by comparingPlutarch'swords as renderedby JacopoAngeli da Scarperiawith those of Bruni. Angeli (323r): His atque huiuscemodi rebus Cicero permagnamsibi vim comparavit.Sed magnae invidiae patuit, nullo quidem turpi aut indigno suo facto, sed quod laudibuscontinuissese efferens,gloriaque se semperorans, molestus ceteris esset. (Plutarch,Cicero,XXIV, 1) Bruni(444): Cumitaqueex his rebustantumauctoritatiset gratieCiceroni accessisset, ut facile appareret illum etiam post consulatum principemin civitatefuturum,communemaluminvidiaet ambitiomentes quorundamadversuseum incendit. Bruni'sversionof this turningpoint in Cicero'scareerrepaysscrutiny.Whereas Plutarchmakes Cicero the agent of his own downfall, Bruni lays the blame squarelyat the doorstepof those who, alarmedat the extent of his newfound power and influence,begin at thisjunctureto plot againsthim. At firstglance it might appearthatBrunihas simply relocatedvice from Cicero to his enemies, for ambitionis now clearly placed in theircamp. But closer inspectionreveals thatBrunihas framedthe incidentwithina widerunderstandingof the character of political struggle.Cicero is targetedbecause his increasedprestigethreatens to overwhelmall opposition.Once again it becomes clear that Brunihas transcendedPlutarch'sexplanatoryframework.Conflict in politics is seen for what 78 See Quintilian,Institutio oratoria, XI, i, 15ff., where the case of Cicero is extensively discussed. 79Plutarch,On Praising OneselfInoffensively(Moralia, 539-47), where the case of Cicero is mentionedtwice, in more favorableterms than in the life (541-42).
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it is: not the result of moral transgressionbut of a struggle for power which obeys its own rules. Self-praise is also an issue which Bruni faces squarelyin a section of his work which is separatedfrom the narrationof politicsper se.80 By treatingthe issue in this way Bruniisolates it fromthe restof the narrative.Suchmatters,he implies, have nothing to do with questions of Cicero's political successes or failures.They belong to a differentsphere,thatconcerningthe man'spersonality.Whenit comes to dealingwith self-praisein this context,Bruniis quiteready to admitthathis man was guilty.This was probablyCicero's only shortcoming as an otherwisemodel orator:"Onethingalone is saidto have irritatedhis listeners: the fact that he spoke too often of himself and of his consulate."81Bruni neverthelessattemptsto exonerateCicero by pointing to the circumstancesas well as to his frequentandgenerouspraiseof others.Suchelements,Bruniknew, might at times mitigate, if not excuse such behavior.Yet in the end Bruni is forcedto confess thatCiceroexceededthe limits of self-praise,going so faras to congratulatehimself on his own eloquence.82Here Brunicomes to the crux of the whole issue: what does it matterif Cicero transgressed?Perhapsit must be acceptedthatno one-not even Cicero-can be perfect.As Bruniwrites: "We are really too arrogantand exacting;we demandabsoluteperfectionfrom human beings, yet we will not allow them to speak of their own virtues."83The problem,in otherwords, lies not in our selves but in our standards,which are too rigidanduncompromising.WhatBrunisays hereamountsto a relativization of moralstandardsin the light of actualhumanbehavior.It also implies a heavy condemnationof all forms of history-writingthatcan be reducedto an exercise in apportioningmoralcensure.The whole passageconcludeswith a remarkthat can only appearas profoundlyanti-Plutarchan; the taskBrunihas set himself is not to accuse or to defendCicero,but simply to describe:"Ourpurposeis not to plead a case but to describethe man's life and character."84 80 This section covers pages 468 to 486 in the Viti edition, equal to c. 20% of the whole. It is divided into two parts:the first, 468-80, treatsCicero's literaryactivity; the second, 480-86, concernsdomestica,i.e., Cicero'sprivatelife. The highest proportionof Bruni'sVitaCiceronis, c. 80% of the total, relates Cicero's public life in politics (418-68, 486-98). The distributionof materialcan be schematizedas follows: 416-18, prefatoryletterto Niccoli; 418-30, youth;43044, consulate and Catilinarianconspiracy;444-52, fall from grace and exile; 452-68, returnto Rome, civil war; 468-80, literaryworks; 480-86, domestica;486-98, final period and death. 81 Bruni, VitaCiceronis,478: "Unatantumin re audientibus gravem fuisse dicunt,quod de se ac de illo consulatusuo plurimumloquebatur."
82
Ibid., 480.
Ibid.: "Nimis profecto insolentes fastidiosiquesumus:virtutesab hominibusad unguem exigimus; eos de illis ipsis loqui non toleramus." 84 Ibid., "Sed non est propositinostri causam agere, sed vitam moresquedescribere."The words "vita moresque"refer to the specific sub-section of the work in which Bruni concerns himself with private and literarymatters.Most of the Vita Ciceronis is given over to the account of Cicero's res gestae. See note 80 above. 83
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It should be clear at this stage that Bruni's Cicero dismantles the very framework of Plutarchan biography. The question that can be asked is: what, exactly, does Bruni put in its place? To some extent we have hinted at the answer: the compartimentalization of the narrative, for one thing, is more extreme than in Plutarch, and at least one scholar has been tempted to see in Bruni's Cicero a contamination with Suetonian thematic principles of organization.85In my view this may be going too far. Bruni keeps the Plutarchan chronological form for most of the narrative. He makes an exception for the sections on Cicero's writings and on domestic matters, but even Plutarch had done so, admittedly to a lesser extent.86The real difference lies in Bruni's decision to relocate questions of moral weight (self-praise, boasting, etc.) to these two sections, thus taking them out of the narrative itself. As a consequence, the sections on writings and domestica are considerably longer in Bruni.87More importantly, private life is separated from public, or political life. The result is that in Bruni's work most of the space is devoted to narrating Cicero's res gestae quite independently of his private life. This amounts to something of a revolution in biography, since it frees the telling of the career from any surrounding judgments about the moral character of the man himself.88 A political narrative comes into view, in which success or failure is measured solely in relation to the tangible consequences of actions. The whole procedure is thoroughly un-Plutarchan and for that matter
85
Lucia Gualdo Rosa, "LeonardoBruni e le sue 'Vite parallele'di Dante e del Petrarca," Lettere italiane, 47 (1995), 395-96. 86 Plutarch,Cicero, XLII, begins with the statement:"Such then were Cicero's domestic affairs" (trans. Perrin). This concludes a section on domestica, covered in chaptersXL and XLI, where Plutarchdiscusses (very briefly) Cicero's contributionsto literature(XL, 1-3), his divorce from Terentiaand remarriage(XLI, 2-4), and the untimely death of his daughterTullia (XLI, 5). 87 They cover pages 468-86 in the Viti edition (see above, n. 80). The section concludes with the words "Hec domestica,"486, which correspondin functionto the opening remarksof Plutarch'schapterXLII (see previous note). 88 Cfr. Petrarchan biography,as representedby the De viris illustribus,where the declared intentis to provide moral exempla.See the 1351-53 prefaceto the De viris: FrancescoPetrarca, Prose, ed. Guido Martellottiet al. (Milan-Naples, 1955), 222, as well as the final preface of 1371-74: Francesco Petrarca,De viris illustribus, ed. Guido Martellotti(Florence, 1964), 4. Both are translated,with commentary,by BenjaminG. Kohl, "Petrarch'sPrefaces,"132-44. Of special interestis Petrarch'sDe gestis Cesaris, a late compositionwhich grew to monographic proportions,andwhich Petrarchconceived as independentfrom the De viris. In some ways the De gestis Cesaris may be seen as a forerunnerof Bruni's VitaCiceronis:Petrarch,too, wants to restorehis subject'sreputationin the face of ancientblame;he makes use of Caesar'sCommentaries as well as letters carefully chosen from Cicero's Ad Atticum; he adopts a Suetonian organization"perspecies,"thusformallyseparatingres gestae fromprivatelife. See Martellotti, Scritti petrarcheschi, 23-24, 78-79, 81, 84, 484-85, and the extract (chapter XX) published from the De gestis itself in Petrarca,Prose, ed. Martellotti,250-67. The question of an evolution in humanistbiographicalwriting from Petrarchto Bruni is one that requiresfurtherexploration.It shouldbe noted, however,that accordingto Martellotti,Scrittipetrarcheschi,85, 485, Petrarch'sconcerns remainprimarilymoral.
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un-Suetonian.There is indeed no real classical precedentfor what Bruni does with his Cicero. As with the Historiarumflorentini populi libri XII, Bruni's Cicero is a hybridwork, eclectic in its use of classical models, and ultimately quite originalin the form it finally adopts.89 No betterillustrationof this point could be foundthanBruni'snarrationof Cicero'sconductduringthe last years of his life. As we know, Plutarch'snarrative emphasizedthe weight of Cicero'simmoderateambitionas the catalystthat precipitateddisaster,both for Cicero himself and for the Republic.90Bruni offers somethingquite different.Cicero is neitherblindedby ambition,nor is the end of his careeras ingloriousas Plutarchpresentsit. On the contrary,the years 44-43 BCrepresentCicero'sfinest hour,his highest level of achievement.Bruni introducesthis final section with words that leave no room for doubt as to his intentions:"Herenow is Cicero'slast act, like thatof a greatpoet, andcertainly it is in my view the most courageousandthe most beautifulof all."91Wordsthat clearly set the stage for what follows, i.e., a full-scale rehabilitationwhich is meantto challenge Plutarch'sdarkeraccountof Cicero's last years.92As Fryde noted, Bruni turnsto both the Philippics and the letters in orderto develop a morepositive image of Cicero.93But it is not this recourseto new materialthat is most impressive.What is even more remarkableis the way Bruni attainsin these pages a superiorgraspof the forces thatgovernpolitical events. Bruniis fully cognizant,for example, of the fact thatCicerowas placing himself above the law when he decided to encourageDecimus Brutusto oppose Antony at Modena.94And he cites, with slight variations,Cicero's own justification for takingsuch drasticaction:"Willmust take the place of authority,when authorIn other words as the situationspun out of control only the ity is thwarted."95 use of Livy, Thucydides, and other classical models, see Riccardo Fubini, "Osservazionisugli 'Historiarumflorentini populi libri XII' di Leonardo Bruni," in Studi di storia medievale e modernaper Ernesto Sestan (2 vols.; Florence, 1980), I, 403-48. 90Plutarch,Cicero, XLV, 1, cites Cicero's "naturalcraving for honour"(trans.Perrin)as the main factor pushing him into an alliance with the young Octavian.The theme of Cicero's graspingfor more power continues to be Plutarch'sLeitmotiv in XLV,5, and XLVI, 1-2. 91 Bruni, VitaCiceronis,488: "Hic est iam Ciceronisvelut optimi poete extremusactus, et certe meo iudicio omnium fortissimusatque pulcherrimus." 92 See note 90 above. Plutarchreturnsto these criticisms in his Comparison,IV, 3, where he repeats the accusation made by Brutus (Ad Brutum, XVII, 2-5, Brutus to Atticus, June 43 BC),i.e., thatby throwingin his lot with Octavian,Cicero was in fact favoringa new form of tyrannyas a vehicle of self-promotion. 93 Fryde's account, however, 49-50, is highly condensed at this point. Nor does Viti's edition bother to list sources other than Plutarchfor this section, 488-98. Among the main sources (besides Plutarch)are the following: Philippic I (488); Adfamiliares XII, 23 (490) and XI, 7 (490-92); Philippics V VI,and XIV (492). 94See Ronald Syme, The RomanRevolution(Oxford, 1960), 162-63. 95Bruni, Vita Ciceronis, 490-92: "Voluntatemenim pro auctoritatehaberi debere cum auctoritasimpeditur."The phraseis modelled on Cicero's own, Adfamiliares, XI, 7, 2 (Cicero to Decimus Brutus, December 44 BC): "Voluntassenatus pro auctoritatehaberi debet, cum auctoritasimpediturmetu." 89 On Bruni's eclectic
LeonardoBruni
57
action of strong individualscould interveneto save the day. Cicero's actions may have been, strictlyspeaking,illegal;butthey obeyedthe dictatesof a higher law, which says thatwherethe very survivalof the state is at stake,all meansof restoringorderareultimatelysanctionable. Brunithussees Ciceroas behavingbothrationallyandbravelyin the face of neartotal institutionalparalysis.Cicero is drivennot by personalambitionbut by the need to rise to the challengeposed by Antony andthe Caesarians.These men are threateningthe viability of the Roman state. Such a dangermore than justifiesCicero'sdecisionto ally himselfwith Octavian,at leastin Bruni'sview.96 In any case what other option was available?In the limited world of political alternativesthe alliancewith Octavianwas really Cicero's only chanceto muster a credibledeterrentagainstAntony's militarystrengthin the field. The failure of Cicero's grandstrategywas due not to any innateweakness of character but to sheerbad luck. In the greatbattlefought at Modenabetween Antony and the forces of the Senatethe latterwon, butthe two consuls, Cicero'smen Hirtius and Pansa, were both killed. Bruni'sremarkon their demise is eloquent testimony to his ability to identify the key event: "Thiswas a mortalwound to the It was indeedthe deathsof Republic,the seed andoriginof futurecalamities."97 the two consuls that suddenlyrenderedCicero's position untenable.This was the real turningpoint, the moment when Octaviansaw his opportunity.From this point on the die were cast against Cicero;his own and the Republic's end were but a matterof time. All of the featureswe have examinedneed to be seen in relationto Bruni's own century.My argumentis thatwith his CiceroBruniwroughta new sort of biographicalnarrative.The cruxof the novelty lies in the compartimentalization he proposed,wheremattersmoralarerelativizedandin any case relegatedto the sphere of personal idiosyncrasy.The political narrative(res gestae) attains a statusof independence:it operatesas an instrumentfor presenting,justifying, andexplainingthe careerof the individualconcerned.But the explanationdoes not referto doctrineregulatingstandardsof behavior,whethermoral,religious or legal. It insteaddevelops its own logic throughan examinationof the political elementsas they actuallycame intoplay:power struggles,factionalism,treachery,anddeceit arenot condemnedas evil, but areratherseen as so many factors in the politicalequation.Thematerialbasis for the politicalnarrativeis provided by a hodge-podge of writings springingfrom political conflict itself, and thus intensely focused on the events. Indeed often such writings-and Cicero's
96 Bruni, VitaCiceronis,490. A moder proponentof the same view is ShackletonBailey, 246-47. 97 Bruni, Vita Ciceronis, 492: "Hoc fuit pestiferum rei publice vulnus, semen et origo secutarumcalamitatum."Comments ShackletonBailey, 274: "The death of the consuls saved Antony and gave Octavianhis chance."
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Philippics andlettersarean excellent example-were originallymeantas interventionsinto specific conflicts. They arethusrepletewith detail;dripping,so to speak,with self-justificationandbrazenpolemic. Bruni'sreconstructionof the last years of Cicero's careerproceeds from an assemblage of such materials taken from Cicero's writings. In using these Bruni was not simply trying to wrest Cicerofromthe Plutarchanclutches,he was also therebyinventinga new, perhapstypicallyWestern,approachto life-writing,one in which the attemptto grapplewith thepoliticaldimensionsof humanexperiencetook clearprecedence over the illustrationof abstractmoral categories. That such an approachwas bound to be slanted and tendentiousgoes without saying. Yet this should not blind us to the fact thatthe instrumentforged in the service of apologetichad a new edge. Bruni'sbiography,thoughbased on the Plutarchanprecedent,operates on an entirelydifferentplane, one which is best definednot as "scientific" nor as "civic"but as uncompromisinglypolitical. QueenslandUniversityof Technology.
Francesco in
History
and
Patrizi
"Time-Sack":
the
Rhetorical
Philosophy
Paul RichardBlum
Contemporarytheoryof historyis muchconcernedwith the narrativestructureof history,its nature,and its epistemic status.'The problemis not only that sourcespresentevents mostly wrappedin narrativelanguagebut also thattemporality is an inherent feature both of the events told and of storytelling.2 Narrativityandtemporalitytouchuponbasic metaphysicalandanthropological questions, as Paul Ricoeur has pointed out, if narrationis to be understoodas self-explanationof a humanbeing in whom "time"occurs as "being-in-time."3 The following paper cannot claim to contributeto the currentdebate but presents FrancescoPatrizi(1529-97)4as a Renaissancephilosopherwho addressed several of these problems. In discussing his conceptions of history and time, however, it is the aim of this paperonly to locate these within his own philosophy. Versionsof this paperhave been presentedat the SixteenthCenturyStudies Conferencein Toronto(25 October 1998) and at the Early Modem Colloquium at the University of Notre Dame (March 1999). For comments and help thanks to GeraldL. Bruns, Darin Hayton (both Notre Dame, Indiana),and FrancisDavidson (Laxton,UK). E.g., Paul Veyne, WritingHistory. Essay on Epistemology(Middletown, Conn., 1984); HaydenWhite, The Contentof Form: NarrativeDiscourse and Historical Representation(Baltimore, 1987); M. C. Lemon, The Discipline of History and the History of Thought(London, 1995), ch. 2; ChrisLorenz,"CanHistorybe True?Narrativism,Positivism, and the 'Metaphorical Turn,'" History and Theory,37 (1998), 309-29. 2 Cf. Siegfried Kracauer,History: TheLast ThingsBefore the Last (New York, 1969), esp. ch. 6; ArthurC. Danto,Narrationand Knowledge[includingthe integraltext of AnalyticalPhilosophy of History] (New York, 1985), ch. VIII and XV. 3 Paul Ricoeur,"NarrativeTime,"in On Narrative,ed. W. J. T. Mitchell (Chicago and London, 1981), 165-86;cf. H. White,"TheMetaphysicsof Narrativity:TimeandSymbolin Ricoeur's Philosophy of History,"in White, The Contentof Form, 169-84. 4 The form most usual in (among others)Germanand Italianresearchis FrancescoPatrizi, thoughhe called himself FranciscusPatritius,Patricius,FrancescoPatritio.The Croatianformis FranePetric,or Petris.
59 2000byJournal of theHistoryof Ideas,Inc. Copyright
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One of the unresolvedproblemsin the writings of FrancescoPatriziis the differencebetweenhis earliercontributionsto the humanisticcanonandhis late philosophical main treatise,Nova de universis Philosophia. The earlierwritings conform to the usual humanistliterarytopics: the political programof a cittdfelice, the treatiseson honor,the poetic fury,Petrarch(1553), andthen his two dialogues on history(1560) andrhetoric(1562). The two workswhich followed, the Discussiones peripateticae (1571) and the Poetics (1586), show a characteristicdevelopmentof humanistthinking,namely,the differentiationof purelyphilologicalfromessentiallyphilosophicalliterature. Patrizi'sDiscussionesperipateticae5is a polemic againstAristotle,written froma Platonicviewpoint,buthis own philosophyis concealedundera mass of philological material.In an attemptthatseeks to be virtuallydefinitive,he cites passages from Aristotle and the Peripatetictraditionin orderto point out mistakes and contradictions.It was on this account that GiordanoBruno heaped ridiculeon him, calling him "stercodi pedanti."Simply put, he tells us, Patrizi demonstrates"how like he is to an ox or an ass." One cannot say thathe has understoodAristotle eitherwell or ill, but merely that he has read him and rereadhim, cut him up and stitched him together,compared him with a thousandother Greek writers, friends and foes alike, andaltogethergone to an immensedeal of trouble,not only to no purposewhatsoeverbutalso to ourinfinitedisappointment.Anyone who wishes to see intojust whatfolly andself-regardingvanity pedanticdrudgerycan plunge and sink shouldreadthis book.6 This was one contemporaryreactionto Patrizi'sattemptto exploreall the possibilities of a humanisticstyle of literarycriticism,via the comparisonbetween Plato and Aristotle.7 ThePoetics8is essentiallydividedintotwo quitedistincthalves:Dellapoetica la deca istoriale and Della poetica la deca disputata.The first is a lexicon of 5 Francesco
Patrizi,DiscussionumPeripatecitarumTomiIV (Basel, 1581) hereafter,DP. Bruno,De la causa,principio e uno(1584), in GiordanoBruno,Dialoghi italiani, ed. G. Gentile and G. Aquilecchia (Firenze, 1958), 260ff. 7Cf. FrederickPumell, Jr.,"TheThemeof PhilosophicConcordandthe Sourcesof Ficino's Platonism,"MarsilioFicino e il ritornodi Platone, Studie documenti,ed. GianCarloGarfagnini (Firenze, 1986), II, 397-415; also Michael J. Wilmott,Francesco Patrizi da Chersos Humanist Critiqueof Aristotle (Ph. D. Thesis University of London, WarburgInstitute, 1984); Excerpts from this: Michael J. Wilmott, " 'Aristoteles Exotericus,Acroamaticus,Mysticus': Two Interpretationsof the Typological Classificationof the 'CorpusAristotelicum'by FrancescoPatrizi da Cherso,"Nouvelles de la Republiquedes Lettres (1985), 67-95; Mihaela GirardiKarsulin, "Die 'Discussiones peripateticae' zwischen Doxographie und Philosophiegeschichte als philosophischerForm,"Synthesisphilosophica (Zagreb)22, 11 (1988), 371-80. 8 Francesco Patrizi, Della Poetica la Deca Istoriale, Della Poetica La Deca Disputata (Ferrara,1586); andsee LinaBolzoni, L 'universodeipoemipossibili, Studisu Francesco Patrizi 6 Giordano
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the ancientauthors,categories,styles, etc., and the second a series of dissertations on the theory of poetry but these, too, with abundantreferenceto both ancientandcontemporaryliterature. Finally,and entirelydifferentin style, thereis his principalwork, the Nova de universisPhilosophia (1591).9Here the philosophersystematicallydeparts from his accustomed field, ranging from a theory of light (Panaugia), via a discussion on theological principles (Panarchia) and a theory of the soul (Pampsychia)to the Pancosmia, a treatiseon cosmology and physics. Even to this workhe appendsa numberof documentaryexcerpts,andthereis no lack of excursionsinto literaryhistory,but the mainpartof the work is entirelyaxiomatic "methodical"-in approachandargumentativein style. These works of Patrizirepresentthe developmentof philosophicalhumanism in the sixteenthcentury,a developmentaway froma unifiedpresentationof the problemsof the humansciences by the explicit use of the tools of literary rhetoric,and towardsthe researchof philological sources on the one hand and the academictreatmentof systematicquestionson the other.'0Needless to say, Marsilio Ficino's model of "PlatonicTheology" is extensively present in the Nova Philosophia, but still more so is the Aristotelianoutputof the Paduanand otheruniversities,representinga continuationof the latermedieval scholastic tradition.1'
Historically,the workalso belongsto the axiomaticmethodof the Euclidean school. 2Possibly it was the differencein style thatgave rise to the impression thatRenaissancephilosophybegan only with MarsilioFicino, so thata distinction could be drawnbetween humanismon the one side and Renaissancephilosophy on the other.It is also evident that one can scarcely distinguishphilo-
(Roma, 1980). PeterG. Platt,"NotBefore EitherKnown or Dreamtof: FrancescoPatriziandthe Powerof Wonderin RenaissancePoetics,"TheReviewofEnglish Studiesn.s. 43 (1992), 387-94. 9 Francesco Patrizi,Nova de universisphilosophia. In qua Aristotelica methodo non per motum,sedper lucem,et lumina,adprimamcausamascenditurDeindepropriaPatricii methodo; Tota in contemplationemvenit Divinitas: Postremo methodo Platonica,rerum universitas, a conditoreDeo deducitur(Ferrara,1591) hereafter,NUP. '0 Cf. EckhardKeBler,"Vonder Philosophiezur Literatur.Zur Rezeptiondes italienischen Humanismus auBerhalb Italiens: Historischer Befund und einige Thesen iiber dessen Hintergriinde,"Die Renaissance im Blick der Nationen Europas, ed. Georg Kauffmann (Wiesbaden,1991), 227-45. " See Franjo Zenko, "On the Subject Matterand the Method of Panarchiaby Patrizi," Studia historiaephilosophiae Croaticae,2 (Zagreb 1993), 45-55. 12Cf. Hanna-Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz,"'RetoricaPerfetta':FrancescoPatrizisgeometrische in Gerl-Falkovitz, Blick auf die Methodologie des 16. Jahrhunderts," Sprachphilosophie-ein Die zweite Schopfungder Welt:Sprache,Erkenntnis,Anthropologiein der Renaissance (Mainz, 1994), 130-44 (previously in: Rhetorica IV 4 (1988), 329-54); StephanOtto, "Die 'm6gliche Wahrheit'der Geschichte.Die 'Dieci Dialoghi della Historia'des FrancescoPatrizi(1529-1597) in ihrergeistesgeschichtlichenBedeutung,"in Otto,Materialienzur Theorieder Geistesgeschichte (Miinchen, 1979), 134-73.
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sophical fromnon-philosophicalworks on the basis of theirliteraryforms,but ratheraccordingto the themestreatedin them.But fromthe perspectiveof scholastic philosophy the literaryform can sometimes disguise the thematicintention, so that, for example, the De voluptateof Lorenzo Valla can sound more like a scholarlypolemic thathas no rightto be includedin the canonof ethics. It is true, of course, that the literaryform of a philosophicalwork contributesa meansof argumentthatcould not be achievedby meansof systematicargumentation, or at least only in a very differentway; otherwise the authorwould or could have chosen anotherform.The taskof interpretationconsists in recognizing the philosophicalcontent of a given form-in Patrizi'scase the rhetorical form.
With Patrizithe developmenttowardsa purely argumentative,indeed axiomatic,approachcan be seen as the key to the interpretationof his earlyworks. If one comparesthe Nova Philosophia with the Dialogues on rhetoricand history13(andwith the Poetics too) it is apparentthatPatrizihas liberatedhimself fromthe burdenof following the ancientsin the traditionalhumanisticstyle. The purely historicaland philological material-seen from a modem perspective, too-has been banishedto the appendixof his work,to the advantageof the real philosophicaltheme.Onthis view whatthe earlywritingsin factrevealis not the still-unmastereddependencyon humanist-literary rhetoricbutpreciselythe methodicalliberationof Patrizihimselffromthisby meansof explicitthematisation. If one asks oneself why Patriziwished to escape fromhumanistrhetoric,the answercan only be thathe hadrecognizedits functionandregardedit as having now served its purpose. This is perhapsthe reason that in his Dialogues on History Patriziappearsin fact to destroythe humanisttheoryof history.14It is not first and foremost"history"itself thathe destroysbut ratherthe humanistic analysis, and he does this with the literaryweapons of the humaniststhemselves.15This needs to be examinedmoreclosely in the lightof the philosophyof history. The most importantmeansof argumentused by Patriziis thatof sophistical refutation.16 This is essentially a rhetoricaldevice used for playing off compettheories ing againstone anotherand exposing theirinnercontradictions,as opposed to refutingthem througha syllogistic approach.Moreover,it is easy to 13FrancescoPatrizi,Della historiadiece dialoghi (Venice, 1560), reprintin EckhardKeBler, TheoretikerhumanistischerGeschichtsschreibung:NachdruckexemplarischerTexteaus dem 16. Jahrhundert(Munich, 1971) (quotedas Historia with originalpagination).FrancescoPatrizi, Della retoricadieci dialoghi (Venice 1562), reprintwith Croatiantranslation:FranePetric,Deset Dijaloga o retorici (Pula/Rijeka,1983) hereafterRetorica with originalpagination. 14CesareVasoli, Francesco Patrizi da Cherso (Rome, 1989), 39. 15 See Eckhard KeBler,"Geschichte:menschliche Praxis oder kritischeWissenschaft?Zur Theorie der humanistischen Geschichtsschreibung,"in KeBler, Theoretikerhumanistischer Geschichtsschreibung(cf. note 13), with bibliograpy.GirolamoCotroneo,I trattatistidell' 'Ars historica' (Naples, 1971), see 205-67 for Patrizi. 16 Vasoli thus repeatedlyspeaks of a "procedimentoelenchistico"(e.g. 49).
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63
personalizesuch an approach,for instance,havingthe interlocutorpose uncomfortablequestionsandprovokinghis opponent.In the Dialogues on historyand on rhetoricPatrizidoes figureby nameor as "I,"butunlikethe representativeof the authorin GiordanoBruno'sdialogues, he himself is not the spokesmanfor the trueteaching. Rather,he usually promptsothersto make the desiredutterances. For the most part the contributionof the author,Patrizi, is limited to affirmativeinterjectionsor insistentquestions.Moreover,in bothof these works Patrizialso assigns a subjectand a main speakerto each dialogue in such a way thatthe speakerrepresentsthe themeof the dialoguein question(e.g., II Gigante, o vero dell'historia);and so the impressionis createdof a many-sidedenquiry into the subjectconcerned(in rhetoricor history)withouta conclusive or definite didacticmessage. ThusPatrizi'searlydialoguesarecriticalquestionsputto humanisticscience. As to form,it could be shown thatPatriziemploys the techniquesdescribed in his SophisticalRefutations(ch. 15) andthe role of Patrizi'sinterAristotle by locutoris still closer to thatof Socratesin Plato'sdialogues.17As is well known, the maieuticsof Socratesis meantto drawoutthe latentprinciplesof unreflecting speech forms,to renderaccessiblethe underlyingideas of the empiricallyascertained subject matter.Patrizisuspects that the SophisticalRefutationsare not by Aristotleat all, preciselybecauseof the Platoniccharacterof the eristicquestioning, which serves the trueunderstandingof reality.For Plato question and answereffect"generatingin the soulsopinionandknowledgeof all things"(entium omnium,tur opinionem,tur scientiam ingenerarianimis)."8In the Dialogues it can be seen whatPatriziunderstandsby "generatingof opinionandknowledge in souls." The genuinelyhumanisticenquiryinto historyandrhetoricspringsfromthe humane setting of the enquiry into truth.The dialogue sets the scene of the humanistsituation.WithPlato as with many of his followers, the dialogueform also has the functionof veiling the interventionof the authorintothe philosophical text. The specific problemis treated,underthe guise of a real dialogue, as a possible dialogue, as though life itself had thrownup the question.19In such a dialogue the roles are not so constructedthat one person simply holds forth while the otheris merelythereto punctuateand give structureto his lecturebut ratherthe personwho is unmistakablythe principalpartyplays the role mainly of provocateur;and the result is to create much greaterplausibility,precisely becausethe two, who have sometimeshappeneduponeach otherby chance,are 17See Maria
Mucillo, "MarsilioFicino e FrancescoPatrizi,"Marsilio Ficino e il ritornodi Platone, Studi e documenti, ed. Gian Carlo Garfagnini(Firenze, 1986), II, 615-79; Thomas Leinkauf,IINeoplatonismodi Francesco Patrizicomepresuppostodella sua critica adAristotele (Firenze, 1990). 18DP tom. 3,1. 4, p. 316, 28 and 39 sq. 19Cf. K. J. Wilson, IncompleteFictions: TheFormation of English RenaissanceDialogue (Washington,1985).
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real partnersin dialogue. The theoryis drawnfromtheirwords and so is "generated."The very contingencyof the speakersmakes the contentof theirstatementsthe morecertain,providedthatthis contentis universallycomprehensible andcommunicable.Wherethis conditionis absent,the contentof the dialogues then appearsto be aporetic.Despite this the readerknows, or surmises,thatthe author,Patrizihimself, has a thesis to present;and yet in readingboth the Dialogue on historyandthaton rhetoric,it transpiresthatPatrizihas absolutelyno specific dogma to pronouncebut to all appearanceprefers to let the problem remaina problem.To underscorethis let us merelyrecallthatthe third,the fifth, andequallythe tenthandlast dialoguesareeach abruptlybrokenoff by the quite pointless interruptionof thirdparties. At the same time, however, we must point to another,entirely traditional structuralelementin the dialogueson historyandon rhetoric,namely,thatthey follow the traditionalpatternof Aristotelianenquiry,according to which for every topic the questionmustbe asked:"Whetherit is, what it is, how it is." (An sit, quid sit, quomodosit).20 The Historia is divided into "history,""the diversity of history"-both preliminaryconsiderationsof the questionas to whether history exists and in what forms it is to be found-followed by the question "Whatis history?"in the thirddialogue.Thenthe subsequentdialoguesaddress the questionof"quomodo."The Retorica, afterfirst determiningwhat actually constitutesrhetoric,then devotes dialoguestwo to fourto the materialof rhetoric, fromwhichthe appropriatedefinitionis thendrawn.Thenfollow the various attributesof rhetoric,such as beauty,organization,skill, etc. As befitsa literarywork,Patrizi'sdialoguereflectsits subject-matter, namely, the human,contingentsituationof history and rhetoric.This elaboratenessof life and speech is portrayedby the elaboratenessof the dialogue; the reading experiencecorrespondsto the experienceof life itself. But the orderlinessof the discussion of historyor rhetoric,on its uses and characteristics,is occasionally interruptedby the eccentricbehaviorof the principalparty,for Patriziagainand againpresentshimself as the importunateseeker,drivenby fervor,restlessness andin one case-the famousThirdDialogue on history-by a sortof fever that incitesthe imagination.Thispositionalone shouldbe a warningto us not to read the dialogue simply as being much ado aboutnothingand encourageus to seek for a positive theorywhich, for literaryreasons,can be representedor portrayed by the role of the exalted. All the considerationsso faradvancedwith regardto the theoryof literature shouldremindus thatin discussinga literarytext we arestill enteringinto a kind of dependencyon artificialfiction,even when the contenthappensto be philosophy. The literaryform cannot present the solution of the problem at its face value, because the problemto be discussed is in itself a contingentone. But for 20
See Mikl6s Mar6th,Die Araber und die antike Wissenschaftstheorie(Leiden, 1994).
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all this, thereareclearindicationsas to how the realtopic of the two dialoguesis to be found. The forewordto the Dialogues on History presents it as a "not insignificantpatternfor a project on the theory of speech" (eloquenza)that is notintendedto be limitedto rhetoricalonebutratherto embracespeaking(parlare) itself, its understanding,causes, and first principles.21The literaryform at the same time representsthe philosophicaltheme. Thus the Dialogues on history and rhetoricare intendedas elements of a general theoryof speech. From this perspectivehistory is only superficiallythe topic of the TenDialogues; behind it, as its ultimategoal, lies a theoryof speech/speaking. This at once explains why the Historia speaks so much of reading,speaking, and writing-this being in any case the principaltheme in the Retorica. If Patrizirefersextensively not only to the ubiquitousCicerobut also to Lucianus andGiovanniPontano,to his own tutorFrancescoRobortello,andto the literature of the annals,22it is not because he merely wishes to offer a doxography fromwhich his own theoryis derivedbutbecausehe also wishes to show, on the basis of writtenexamplesof the theoryof history,how andwith whattheoretical motives historyis in fact written.The factualrealityof writtenhistoryis for him an object of primaryphilosophicalimportance. This is also why, at the beginning of the second dialogue, Patrizi finds it necessary to make an excursus into philosophy as backgroundto his enquiry into history.This is one of the points where the authorspeaks for himself as a partnerin the dialogue in orderto justify his eristicandmaieuticapproachelsewhere. Even here Patrizidoes not permithimself to speak in personbut rather cites his own spirit (animo), which has declared its readiness "to display all doubts"(di apriruituttique' dubbi)whichpreventhim-the spirit-from knowing what historyis (6r). To speakabouthistoryandto expressdoubtin it arenot possible withoutspeech. Philosophy,the spiritdeclares,has bewitchedhim and madehim sick, so thathe is contentwith nothingwhose reasonhe cannotdiscern (7r, 1-3). Thusphilosophywith "uanapersuasione"has puffed him up with the idea of being a greatSage (7r,8-9). It is true,the urgehas passed, andas a result he has become a rhetoricianand-thank God-a poet (7, 1Off.);but the poison (7r,14) of philosophyhas lingeredin his veins, so thathe mustgo roundwarning worthypeople abouther.Patrizi'ssoul is speakingherenot as a Socrates,for he is not seeking to seduce the young men unto virtue, but, clearly, to persuade them not to allow their virtue to be ruined by philosophy, "questa maga philosophia" (7r, 36). 21 Historia, A lettori(A2r): "Pertantohauereteuoi nelgi ste3i dialoghi non piccol saggio di cio, che dal medesimoPatritio... si poBasperare,in cosi alta sua impresadi tutta1'eloquenza.La quale faranon solamenteper gli oratori,come hannofin qui fattole Retorichedi tantimaestridel dire, ma per tuttiparlatori,et scrittori.Ne piu per uia delleosservanzede i tre soli generi, ma per uia di scienza, et delle cagioni, et de principijprimi del parlare." 22 Historia, I and II.
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The counterpartsof the bewitchedphilosopherarethe rich andmighty,with theirgeneralsoundnessofjudgment,who standout as "judiciousandwise men" (huominigiudiciosi et saui) (7r, 28ff.). Naturehas set an enmitybetween thinking andmoney.23Thus,of its own accord,the thoughtflies into the mouthsof the rich andmighty thatall men will cheaplyyield up to themtheirown thoughts.24 Practicaland social virtuego handin handwith unreflectingactions and above all speech. Needless to say, Patrizi's interlocutorstake all this, above all his warningagainstphilosophyandhis praiseof"prontezza,et acutezza,"as ajoke (7v,5 and 15). But it is a Socraticirony.Patriziwants to learnhistory from the practitionersof history. For the bridgingover of the enmity between thinkingand practiceand the drawingout of philosophicaltruthfrom the unphilosophically-spokenword this is precisely the task of this philosopher.The truthof history-so much is alreadyclear at this point-lies thus not only in factualcorrectnessand equally not in purelymetaphysicalthought,butratherin the fact of actingandspeaking, when "the thought flies straightinto the mouth."The language used and the circumstancesdescribedareno mirrorthroughwhich the philosophermust see, but ratherthey constitutehistoryitself. Now, it is true,the philosophercan and must inquireinto the sense and the reasonof things, but he will discover these only fromhistoricalsources. This is why Patrizi,following Aristotle, has observedthat the goal of the best andtruestphilosopheris to endeavorto perceive,to orderintellectually,and to distinguishthe factsjust as these facts themselves exist, are orderedand subdivided.25This is hardlyan astonishingstatement,for what philosopherwould not aim to identifythingsjust as they are,in all theircomponentparts?But when appliedto history,this means declaringthe very imponderabilityof events and their perceptionas the constitutiveelements of history.For it is in these, precisely, thatthe truthlies. ForPatrizithe writtenword is a means of access to the truth, an access that is overlaid by and-from a hierarchicalperspectivegroundedin otherlevels of being truth.Truthis no simplething,he is saying,but sixfold in the sense thatone level proceedsfrom another. Thefirstandprincipallevel is "thetruthof thingsthemselves"(rerumipsarum veritas),the second thatof perceptionandcognition,the thirdthatof discourse, the fourththe truthof science, the fifth thatof speech, and finally the sixth that of writing.26One cannotoverlook the fact thatthis schema containsa paradox. Historia, 7r,33sq.: "nemistamortaletra'l senno, et l'oro." Historia, 7r, 30sq.: "a coloro, da per se stesso uoli in bocca il senno; et a costoro, per isperanzadi poco prezzo, doni ogni huomo il suo." 25 DP, I, lib. 8, p. 168: "optimosphilosophos ac veros philosophos, vera atque optima ratione apellandosqui res ipsas ita studuoruntpercipere,atque animo componere,ac dividere,ut res ipsae sunt, componunturac dividuntur." 26 DP, I, lib. 8, p. 165: "dicimusitaqueveritatemnon simplicem rem esse, sed sextuplicem, ita per gradusdispositam,ut posteriora priore emanet. Interquas primaac principalissimaest 23
24
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For the lowest level of truthemergesby stages fromthe precedingones, and so it seems to be the weakest. But it proceeds from science, and science from discourse, and what precedes discourse is no intuition,but ratherperceptio and cognitio. Thus the most importanttruthof all, that of things themselves, is not some kind of platonic idea but a "the thing itself" that oscillates directly between ideal truthand empiricalfact. In the middle are discourse and science, which ascertaintruthfrom the res ipsae; yet their outcome-speech and writing-are the lowest gradesof truth. If one relates these stages to the data of natureor assumes them to be a metaphysicalschema, then philosophy becomes a paradox;for in seeking to understandthe highest truthit distances itself ever furtherfrom it, insofar as truthlies eitherin the factualityof thingsor else in the expressionof researchin speech andwriting.If, however,one appliesthis scale to historyandrhetoricto those disciplineswhose truthlies in the writtenand spokenword-the result is a hierarchyof truthwhich ascends from the writtentestimonyvia the act of speaking,knowledge,thinking,cognition,andperceptionto the truthof the thing itself. This thing itself proceeds from the writtentext, and never denies its origins. Historyemergesgenericallyfromthe truthof the thing itself, which finds expressionin the history.ForPatrizi,moreover,the writtenwordis by no means an inappropriatestarting-pointfor philosophizing;for his hierarchyof truthresides within the context of a two-prongedapproachto philosophy,namely,the concernwith the things themselves and the analysis of the doctrineof others.27 What according to the critique of scholastic obedience to authoritymust be avoided,thatis, the mereexaminationof the opinionsof earlierscholars,28is for history its factualbasis, the linguisticportrayalby the historians. The enchantmentof philosophyandthe praiseof promptspeakingarethus the backgroundto a philosophicalcategorizationof historicalspeakingandwriting. Following this introductionandbeforePatriziaddresseshimself to the specific qualitiesof historicalwriting,thethirddialogueon historyacquiresa hermeneutic sense. According to its title, this dialogue poses the question, "Whatis history?"It comprisestwo parts,the feverish imaginationof the sick Patrizispeakingonce againas himselfbutbeneaththe maskof delirium-and the Egyprerumipsarumveritas, a qua reliquaeomnes pronascuntur.Secundavero a primahac nata, est perceptionisac cognitionis veritas. Tertiaa secunda orta, veritas discursionisl6gou rationisac dianoiasdianoeae.Quartaa tertiaenata,veritas scientiae, aliorumquerationishabituum.Quinta veritas sermonis,ab his nata:et sexta scriptorumveritas a quintaitidem progenita." 27 DP, I, lib. 8, p. 163: "sciendumvideturduplicemesse philosophandisummamrationem, alteram,quaead rerumatqueentiumipsorumcognitionemnitamur:alteramad hominis alicuius traditionem,seu opinionemphilosophamur.Eaqueduplici,vel dogmataeius approbando,sectando ... Vel etiam aliorumdogmataconfutando,reijciendo...." 28 On anti-scholasticcriticism, see Antonino Poppi, "FrancescoPatriziet lacopo Zabarella sur 'de optima in Aristotele philosophandiratione,'" Synthesisphilosophica (Zagreb) 22, 11 (1988), 357-69, esp. 360.
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tianmyth of the reversalof time. The most importantstatementmadeby Patrizi, distractedby fever from normal speech, is the thesis that history consists of memory.Appliedto the level of truthconcerned,then,memory,or its content,is itself the stuff of history. Memoryalso includesthe future,not only the past.29This idea is elucidated via the concept of prophecy;for just as history is the discussion of past deeds and events, so prophecy treats of the same things, but in the future. But the essence of the argumentis that history,as memory,suspendstime.30Evidence for this is foundin the Egyptianmyththatspeaksof the dualflow of time, which goes bothforwardandbackwardandthuscancelsoutthe decadenceandprogress of humandevelopment.The knowledge aboutthese time-flows is preservedin (indecipherable) hieroglyphs on columns (7vff). On the face of it, what Patrizi's
informantis saying is that images, columns, and pictogramscan also record historybut thatthis history,here related,is beyond time. The myth in no sense clarifies the question of history for us, least of all any particularpart of the historyof humanity;insteadwe arethrownbackintothe impossibilityof writing historyin time. For the writingof history-and the truerit is the more surely it does so-suspends time. Thus time is only in a provisionalsense a basic signpost of historiography(the seventhandtenthdialoguesdeal with this) but in the last analysiswhat rendersit impossible. Naturally,this idea dependson a particularconceptof time. In the Egyptian myth time is taken as completenessand it is this completenessthatreveals the truesense of history,namely,the never-endingrise andfall of mankind.Time as a whole is not time thatpasses butan enduringreturnin which it is impossibleto meaningfullydetermine"before"and"after."Let us acceptthe myth as a myth, a story aboutsomethingthatcannotbe orderedas an event-sequence;or again, it is a truthrelated,althoughtruthas such is somethingthat simply cannotbe related,since it consists not in contingentactions but ratherin their meaning. Seen thus, Patrizi'smythtells us thatwhile historyconsists of time-conditioned events, its meaninglies in the memoria,which absorbsthe facts withoutabsorbing theirtime-boundcharacter. In orderto do justice to the importanceof this observationby Patrizi,we mustbrieflytravelforwardthreehundredyearsin timeby time-machine,like the Englishgentlemanin H.G.Wells's story,the TimeMachine,publishedin 1895.31 29 Patrizi'streatmentof time, especially relatedto history,seems to be much differentfrom that of other Renaissance authors:see Donald J. Wilcox, The Measure of TimesPast: PreNewtonian Chronologiesand the Rhetoricof Relative Time(Chicago, 1987), ch. 6; Patrizi(not mentionedin this book) does not take into accountthe turnof time measurement"before/after Christ,"and he leaves the chronologicalboundariesbehind, as shown laterin this paper. 30 Cf. Kracauer(note 2), 147 (on JohannGottfried Herder), 149, and (with reference to MarcelProust), 160-63. 31 First published in New Review 1894-1895; as a book: London, 1895. Here cited in the edition:H. G. Wells, Selected Short Stories (Harmondsworth,1959), 7-83.
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Hisjourneyends in a futurethatis almostlifeless anddevoid of humanity,above which all that remainsis an abominabledesolation.32The futureof the living, history-richearthhas become history-less.A previous stop on thejourney into the future,which representsthe greaterpartof the story,had broughtthe timetravelerinto a culturewhere humanitywas split into two classes, the underearthlingsandthe over-earthlings.The class society,the drivingmotorof history in the nineteenthcentury,has now ceasedto move anything.The over-earthlings live in complete social happiness,except for their fear of the under-earthlings. Welfaregoes hand in handwith the end of history,and this is borne out by the later future too, albeit in a form where the end of history is also the end of humanity.Already,by his first stop on thejourney,the time-travelernotes: The greattriumphof HumanityI had dreamedof took a differentshape in my mind.It hadbeen no suchtriumphof moraleducationandgeneral cooperationas I had imagined.Instead,I saw a real aristocracy,armed with a perfectedscience andworkingto a logical conclusion,the industrial system of today. Its triumphhad not been simply a triumphover Nature,but over Natureand the fellow-man.33 Following the triumphof civilization, "thework of amelioratingthe conditions of life," ourtime-travelerfinds "humanityuponthe wane."34The cause, he suspects, is an "energyfor which there was no outlet,"so that, after an epoch of artisticactivity,culturehas now fizzled out in a "contendedinactivity."35 But culturalcriticismis but one side of the story,the time of the cultureis the other. This is above all the conclusion of the story, for the time-traveler disappearsfromthe storyandfromhistorybecausehe goes time-travellingagain.36 The fact thattime andhistoryarethe realthemefor Wells was also notedby Egon Friedell (1878-1938), authorof a culturalhistory of the modernage that competed with Wells's own A Short History of the World(1922). As a result Friedellwrotea sequelto the TimeMachine.37In a lively, narrativestyle Friedell assertsthattime also causes natural,three-dimensionalobjectsto acquirea sort of inertia.Ajourneyintothepastwouldnormallybe impossiblebecauseit would The TimeMachine, ?11, 76. The TimeMachine, ?5, 48. 34 The Time Machine, ?4, 31. 35The TimeMachine, ?4, 33. 36 Note also the unanswered question of the time-travellerat the end of his report:"And takingit as a story,what do you thinkof it?"Thejournalistmerely "fumbledfor his watch."The TimeMachine, ?12, 80. 37 Egon Friedell, Die Reise mit der Zeitmaschine(Munich,1946), cited from the edition, Egon Friedell, Die Riickkehrder Zeitmaschine(Zurich, 1974). Kulturgeschichteder Neuzeit (Munich, 1927-32), tr.as A CulturalHistoryof theModernAge: TheCrisis of the EuropeanSoul from the Black Death to the WorldWar(New York, 1930-32). 32 33
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first have to overcome this inertia of the present time. He illustratesthis by catapultinghis time-travelerfromthe future,acrossthe thresholdof the present, back into history for a few paradoxicalweeks, with the result thatthe English gentlemanmarriesandthe time-journeyends happily.Time stops in the present andrunsin conformitywith the spatialparameters.Assumingtime to be a fourth dimension,ajourneyalongthe dimensionof time would not departfroma given space.38Travellingin time assumes the possibility of isolating a single dimension fromthe otherthree,butthis is just as impossibleas moving along any other dimensiononly. Historythereforedemandsthatwe move alongall dimensionssimultaneously. But in fact this is not practically,only intuitively,comprehensible.Demonstrating this, Friedell'stime-traveleralso experiencesan Egyptianvision, undoubtedly inspiredby the same sourceas thatof Patrizi.The time-travelermeets two Egyptiansin the future.They describeWells's time-machineas the greatanomalyin the events of history,the ... not-belonging,it is the anti-historical.It makesthe courseof historyimpossible,for at any time it can turnit round,reverse it, double it, postpone it, stifle it in absurdity.... Eitherthereis no world historyor thereis no time-machine.39 Behind these alternativeslies the Egyptianview of history through"looking inward"and "intellectualinference."40 Friedell's Egyptiansmove in all the dimensions of historysimultaneously,by looking "sympatheticallyinto the inner being of all living things41-in other words, throughPatrizi'smemoria.They also assertthattime, like space, experiences a curvaturewhen passed through too quickly,andthis then leads into a strangespace.42 In a fictitious letterto H.G. Wells Friedellgives us the clue to his satirical sequel to the TimeMachine: "Why do you hesitate so long to continue this narrative,which afterall dependsonly upon the decision of your will?"43History (as Patrizihad alreadyassumed)can only be attainedas innershow, or else as a deliberatenarrativethatborderson fiction. Indeed,Patrizi'sfifth dialogue concludesregretfullythatnarratedhistoryis no differentfromfama andpoetry: its truthis covered by the outwardmanifestationof language,and as relatedto speakingit is no differentfrom the results of rhetoricand from poems. Thatis why the authorof the Kulturgeschichteder Neuzeitboasts in his letterto Wells
38 Friedell,Die
Reise mit der Zeitmaschine,27ff.
39Ibid., ch. 7, 59. 40Ibid., 59. 41Ibid., 61. 42 Ibid., 63. 43Ibid., 12.
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of being no historian.44Since the theoryof historyaccepts not only the contingency of events but also the contingency and arbitrarinessof their narration, which in turnspringfromthe impossibilityof representingthe totalityof history in time and space, the literaryform-whether science fiction or dialogue-is well suited to a philosophical portrayalof history.45History is a totality that moves in all dimensions at once, whereas its narrationnecessarily isolates the dimensions.
The writing of history is of necessity paradoxical,by virtue of its inner structure,and time especially conceals more than it illuminates. In the ninth dialogue on rhetoricPatrizidiscusses the perfectingof rhetoricand drawsthe conclusion that it consists in constantexercise and adaptationto the relevant objectsof speech,which changeover the courseof history,andin the future,too. In posing his questions about the perfectibilityof rhetoriche aims to "cast a net," throughwhich the partnersin dialogue learn to differentiate.If, on the contrary,one appealsto the mastersof antiquity,one sees nothing.Insteadone is stuck in the "sack of time."46
If in ourculturaldocumentswe stressthe aspectof time, thenwe are isolating one dimension,with the effect, as Wells and Friedell illustratein narrative form, that history standsstill. Thus Patriziincludes time as one of the aspects that must be explored in any "anatomy"of a particularhistory.47The anatomy of time48shows thathistoricaldocuments,while always associatedwith a timeWithindex, arenonethelessset in differentsortsof time, accordingto culture.49 the out recordingof this time, historicaltime itself would cease to exist, says Patrizi'sinterlocutor.50 "Timeitself, as the producerof these events,would swallow themup againaftera few years,just as in ancienttimes Saturndevouredhis own children."5' 44Ibid., 88. 45 This is true, even thoughmathematicaland scientific models are obviously the standards of the theory of space and time. But even science makes use of narrativeelements, e.g. Rudy Rucker,Infinityand the Mind: The Science and Philosophy of the Infinite (London, 1997; first 1982). A present day example for a scientist's narrativeof time and history is Alan Lightman, Einsteins Dreams (New York, 1993). 46 Retorica, 9, 49v: "Ma uoi, uolete altrui prenderein un sacco, si che e' non possa, ne uedere, ne spirare,et ui s'affoghi.... I sacco del tempo, et dell'antichita...." 47Historia, 7, 40v, 22-27: Events are comparedwith an onion, cf. 39r, 26 sq. The metaphor then changes to that of a fishing-rod,with which "la predadell'attore,del tempo, del modo, et degli altritutti are fished."
48Dialogue, 7, 41v, 36. 49Dialogue, 7, 42r. 50Historia, 7, 42r, 30 sq.: "Et che ... s'elli facessero l'historie loro sanza tempo? ... Percioche
oltre, ch'e' si leuerebbea l'attione...." 51 Historia, 7, 42r, 33-35: "Conciosiacosache il tempo stesso producitoredi quelle attioni, dop6 qualch'annole si manicherebbenella guisa, che Satumo al tempo ancitco si tranguggi6i proprijfigliuoli."Cf. SandraPlastina,Gli alunnidi Crono:mito linguaggio e storia in Francesco Patrizi da Cherso (Messina, 1992).
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Later Patrizi will assert against Aristotle that movement precedes time ontologically.52In the Nova Philosophia, too, he destroysthe operabilityof the Aristotelianconcept of time as "numberor measure of movement regarding before or after": 1. Measure and numberare operationsof thought. 2. Time embracesnot only movements(but all things). 3. Immobilityis a cosmological state,complementaryto movement(e.g., earthandheavens). 4. Durationis not measuredby this concept. 5. "motus mensurattempus, potius quam tempus mensuratmotum,"e.g., the movement of the sun marks out time. 6. Time is ratherthe durationcommonto both movementand immobility.53 Distinct from this naturaltime is the aeon, which while semanticallycoincidingwith duration to some extent, is in the strict sense apartfrom all individualthings and thus beyondthe time of movement.54The precedenceof movementover time in cosmology or in naturalphilosophycorrespondsto the aphorismthathistoryseems to occur in time and yet time does not "measure"the acts-that history rather takesplace in all the dimensionsof being, of which temporalityis but one. This theorycan be checked againstPatrizi'sCittdfelice.55Admittedly,this is not a utopia in the sense of Thomas More or TommasoCampanella,since there is no fictional descriptionof the city as a real community.Likewise it is neitherstory nor science fiction. Yet, on accountof its theoreticalapproach,it has this much in common with the RenaissanceUtopias, thatthe dimensionof history is absent (except for the prehistoricfictions about the founding of the city). Justas history standsin a paradoxicalrelationshipto time, because it has to both "fade in" and "fade out" time, so political theory has to "fade out" historyfor the sake of the truthof the theoryitself. Thus time within a particularhistory is realized between two equally unknowableand"un-narratable" ordersof magnitude,namely,the "giantanimal"the totalityof all times, symbolizedby the continuousrotationof the heavensandthe smallest,imperceptiblemomentsof time.56As a totalitytime is a cover-
52
DP, IV, lib. 4, p. 413, 12: "motus naturaest tempore prior."On Patrizi's discussion of Aristotle'sconceptof time see CesareVasoli,"FrancescoPatrizie la critcadel concettoaristotelico dell'etemita del mondo, del tempo e del moto," Sapientiam amemus: Humanismus und Aristotelismusin der Renaisance, ed. P. R. Blum (Munich, 1999), 141-79. 53 NUP, Panarchia,21, p. 43v [correct:45v]a/b. On Patrizi'sphilosophyof time, cf. Mihaela GirardiKarsulin,"PetricevakritikaAristotelovapojnia vremena"(Criticismof the Aristotelian concept of time), Prilozi za istra nivanje hrvatskefilozofskebastine 29-30 (1989), 99-126: She stresses that Patrizi's"geometricphysics" construea "Naturalphilosophywithouttime." 54NUP, Panarchia21, p. 46ra/b. 55 FrancescoPatrizi,La cittafelice (Venice, 1553); reprintwith Croatianand English translation in AndrijaMutnjakovic,Sretan grad (Zagreb, 1993). On the literarygenre see Mislav Kukoc, "Petric's Socio-PhilosophicalThought Between Realism and Utopianism,"Synthesis philosophica (Zagreb)22, 11 (1988), 409-28. 56 Historia, 7, 41v, 30-33: "grandissiomoanimale ... rotondo in guisa quasi del cielo ... continuorotando... leggierissimo, et sidrucciola,ch'huom non se n'avvede."
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In his final dialogue ing sack or a "coat"which covers everythingindistinctly.57 Patrizidrawsthe conclusion from this that time, too, is one of the objects and that the historianhimself must compose. While moments or circumstances58 analysisof the historicalprocessseems to indicatethattime producesthe events, the historianmustnonethelessfree himself fromthe dictatesof time andrelateit in such a way and only to the extent thatit is a necessarynarrativeelement for the understandingof the action.Time as a whole does not belong to the action,59 for each actionhas its own time;60ratherhistoricaltime is the productof the acts notedby the historian.Thusthe preciseobservanceof the time-sequencecannot On the contrary,"the highest producethe stringencyof historicalnarration.61 in time makes exactitude [narration]most obscure"(lo strettissimotempo,la ci rende oscurissima).62 It follows from this that the narratorhimself must supply
time indices for the events he is reporting,and a touchstone for this claim is representedby those simultaneousevents for which the historianmust distinguish the various localities where they occurredand add furtherdetails: "provided we do not wantto narrate[the events] in a confusedway, the orderwhich we give to themis up to ourdecision"(se non confusele uorremnarrare,I 'ordine che lor daremo,sard di nostro arbitrio).63 The truthof history, then, has the characteristicof portrayingthe matter itself, which the historiancomposesanddifferentiatesas the matterdictates;and so historyin its compositionalstructureis not differentfrom"fables"or fiction, as we may conclude,because the historianbringsto the "facts"thatwhich they lose from realitywhen absorbedinto history,namely their spatio-temporalorder.The eccentricbehaviorof the dialogue characterof Patrizishows that the questionof historicaltruthleadsout of historyandthen,in a specific sense, back to it again. Historynow becomes conceivable as a contingentsequenceof happenings and events whose truthremains similarly contingentwhen measured againstmetaphysicalquestions,thoughhere its specific location lies in human actions and words.64The truthof history can only be graspeddialectically,be57Historia, 10, 60v,23-35: "IItempo ... sembraa me essere una certacosa, che il cielo sputa dalla coda, nel modo che l'arangola sua tela, o la seta il baco. Et uolgendo si sempreintomo il si trascinadietro, et se ne auuolge dentro.Tal che egli si e posto nella lunghiBimaantichitadegli anni,un'altiBimomantodi tempo adosso. Il quale, coprendolui, che tuttele cose cuopre,cuopre anco tutte le cose, che sono entro a lui.... Ch'io non so a qual de suoi compagni il tempo uada inanzi, o a qual dopo, correndoegli per tutti eBi." 58 "circostantie," Dialogue 10, 60v, 18. 59Dialogue, 60 Dialogue, 61 Dialogue, 62 Dialogue, 63 Dialogue,
10, 60v, 22sq. 10, 61r, 8sq. 10, 62r, 2-6. 10, 62r, 22. 10, 51 , lOf, cf. 62 - 63r.
64Cf. White (note 1), 173: "historicalevents have alreadybeen 'invented' (in the sense of 'created')by past humanagents, who by their actions, producedlives worthy of having stories told aboutthem.This means thatthe intentionalityinforminghumanactions ... conducesto lives that have the coherencyof emplottedstories."
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tween the "matteritself" and the writtentext in which this truthis preserved. Throughhis dialogues Patrizirejects the purely rhetoricalpraise of history,as was usual with his contemporariesand predecessors, and puts the humanist question concerningthe specifically humancharacterof history in the center. The metaphysicalquestion abouttime and the ontological statusof history is, froma pragmatichumanperspective, closer to deliriumandmyththanto experience. By the end this very questionattributestemporalityto narrativehistory andrelocatesit in the humancontext. PeterPazmanyUniversity,Budapest.
"Not
heretofore Where
extant
Mad
the
in Ranters
print": Are
KathrynGucer In 1654 Ephraim Pagitt published the fifth edition of Heresiography, subtitled"aDescriptionof the Hereticksand Sectariesof these lattertimes."On the title page Pagittpromotedthis latest edition of the catalog by stressingthe "Additions"he had made.Among the new targetsof his anti-sectarianpolemic were the Ranters,whom he introducedin a pithycharactersketchas "anunclean beast much of the make with our Quaker."'But although Pagitt claimed to introducethe sect, Rantershad been aroundin printsince GerrardWinstanley attackedthem in defense of his group,the Diggers, in 1649.2In fact writershad been attacking the sects generally-Anabaptists, Seekers, Brownists, Familists-in brief pamphletslike Winstanley's Vindicationand in tome-like catalogs of sectarian"errours"since the outbreakof the Civil War. The antiRanterpamphletswere thusan incursioninto an ongoingprinteddialogueabout the sects in general. Pagitt himself had been an interlocutorin this dialogue, having publishedfourprevious editions of his list. Why had he not markedthe Rantersin 1649 and 1650 when Winstanleyand othersfirstnoticed them? This essay will answer this question by arguingthat the Rantersarose in dialogue across time, thatthey did not emerge spontaneouslyin Pagitt's 1654 text. When Pagitt introducedthe sect in 1654, he was in fact respondingto a heateddiscussionaboutthe Rantersthathadbeen developingfor fouryears.He thusenteredthe debatea momentafter"Ranters"and"ranting"hadbeen defined by otherpamphleteers.Inthis debateaboutthe Ranterswe can see theprocessby which pamphleteersinvented a linguistic means of talking about religious diversitybefore it was an acceptedfeatureof English society. At the same time thatwriterswere exposing the Ranters'blasphemousexcesses, they were also craftinga political identityfor the groupby attachingcharacteristicwords and 1
EphraimPagitt, Heresiography(16542), Wing P180, 143-44. See GerrardWinstanley,A Vindicationof THOSE... called Diggers (20 March 1649), British LibraryTT E.1365 (1). 2
75 Copyright2000 by Journalof the Historyof Ideas,Inc.
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behaviorsto them in print.The printedcontroversyover the Rantersthus raises interestingquestionsaboutthe relationbetweentextualsignificationandactual politics. Whatwere the processesby which pamphleteersinventednew ways of talkingaboutgroups-sects andparties-in the period?Whatdid labelinghave to do with political identity? In fact the collective dialogue about the Ranterscentered on a label that pamphleteersconsistentlyattachedto the group,their"madness."Althougheach writeridentifiedthe Ranterswith a varietyof creeds andpractices,anti-Ranter pamphleteersall told their readersto view the group as an absence of reason. They claimedthatRanterswere incapableof recognizingandconveying God's truthto theiraudience.Pagitthimself participatedin the cooperativeassaulton Ranter madness. He consistently borrowed this language from his fellow interlocutors,branding the Ranters with terms such as "nonsensicall"and "absurd."Yet I argue that the label itself was largely a red herring.Writers shrewdlyfocusedon Ranterunreasonin orderto persuadetheirreadersnotto use theirown reasonto considerthe sectarianclaims to authority.Moreover,writers shapedandreshapedwhat they meantby Ranterunreasonin orderto modulate its rhetoricaleffect on their readers.Thus it is not surprisingthat the precise constructionof Ranterunreasonshiftedwith the variousresponsesthese writers wantedto elicit fromtheirreaders.3 The explosion of anti-Rantertracts,many of which had sensationaltitles showcasingthe word "Ranters,"indicatedthatthe sect hadparticularrhetorical purchaseon the public in the early 1650s: The RantersReligion (11 October 1650), TheRoutingof the Ranters(19 November 1650), TheRantersBible (9 December 1650), The Ranters RecantationAnd their Sermon (20 December 1650), The Joviall Crew, or the Devill turn'd RANTER(6 January 1651), Rantersof both Sexes, Male and Female (3 June 1651), RANTERSMONSTER (30 March1652).4AlthoughtalkaboutRanterswas neitherconfinedto printnor to pamphlets with the word "Ranters"in the title, anti-Ranterpamphlets competedforthe opinionsof a readershipthatwas uniquelypoliticizedby printed propagandaduringthe Revolution.5
3 In contrastto
Michel Foucaultin Madness and Civilization:A History of Insanity in the tr. Richard Howard(New York, 1988), I view Rantermadness as the creative Reason, Age of constructionof a language for challenging social authority.See Michael MacDonald,Mystical Bedlam: Madness, Anxiety and Healing in Seventeenth-CenturyEngland (Cambridge,1981). 4 Thomasoncollection call numbersfrom first to last: British LibraryTT E.619 (8); British LibraryTT E.616 (9); British LibraryTT E.619 (6); British LibraryTT E.620 (2); British LibraryTT E.620 (10); British LibraryTT E.621 (7); British LibraryTT E.629 (15); British LibraryTT E.658 (6). 5 See Nigel Smith's comment in the debate "Fear, Myth and Furore:Reappraisingthe Ranters," Past and Present, 140 (1993), 171-78; Sharon Achinstein, Milton and the RevolutionaryReader,Literaturein History, ed. David Bromwich,JamesChandler,and Lionel Gossman (Princeton, 1994), and BernardCapp, "PopularLiterature"in Popular Culture in
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Because anti-Ranterpropagandafunctionedin a specific politicalcontext,it is importantthatthe Rantersenteredprinteddiscoursein 1649. I arguethatthe sect's appearanceatthisparticularmomentwas a complexPresbyterianreaction to the political crisis raging over the Engagementoath at the same moment. Although pamphleteerscontinued to talk about the Ranters throughoutthe decade,by themid-1650sthe impetusforthe attackon the grouphadshiftedfrom Engagementrhetoricaboutpolitical critiqueto a concern on the part of other sectarianpamphleteerswith distancing themselves from the Ranters.6AntiRanterrhetoricof the EngagementControversyrevealshow linguisticlabelslike "theRanters"serveparticularpolemicalneeds atparticularhistoricalmoments.7 The Ranters'shiftingpolemical existence is also importantbecause it was the focus of a heatedscholarlydebateover ten yearsago.8In 1986 historianJ.C. Davis challenged earlier accounts of the Ranters by A. L. Morton and ChristopherHill, arguing that the remaining documentaryevidence did not supportthe conclusion thatthe Rantersexisted as "a real religious movement, sect or group."9Hill, among the many scholars who responded to Davis, reassertedandnuancedhis cautiousclaims thatthe Ranterscould not be called "anorganizedmovement,"but at best a looser "milieu"of Ranterindividuals.?1 I wantto shiftthe focus of the debateawayfromthe questionof whichdocuments give us a morereliableaccountof whatthe Ranterswere to a closer examination of how rhetoric about the sect uniquely illuminated the inchoate nature of political groupsin the period,a point raisedby Hill in his responseto Davis.1 I
Seventeenth-CenturyEngland, ed. Barry Reay (New York, 1985), 198-243; and C. John Sommerville, "On the Distributionof Religious and Occult Literature,"The Library,5th ser., 29 (1974), 221-26. 6 On the mid-1650s anti-Ranter pamphletsby Quakersand Baptists see J. C. Davis, Fear, Myth and History: The Ranters and the Historians (Cambridge, 1986), 88-91; see also ChristopherHill, "Abolishingthe Ranters,"A Nation of Change and Novelty: Radical Politics, Religion and Literaturein Seventeenth-centuryEngland (New York, 1990), 157-60. 7 QuentinSkinner,"TheContextof Hobbes's Theoryof Political Obligation,"Hobbes and Rousseau:A Collectionof CriticalEssays, ed. MauriceCranstonand RichardS. Peters(Garden City, N.Y., 1972), 109-42. 8 In Fear, Myth and History, Davis challenged the account of the Rantersgiven by A. L. Morton, The Worldof the Ranters: Religious Radicalism in the English Revolution (London, 1970) and ChristopherHill, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas in the English Revolution (London, 1975) and implicitly the conclusions of the Ranters' first historian, Norman Cohn; see his "The 'Free Spirit' in Cromwell's England: The Ranters and their Literature," The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists in the Middle Ages (New York, 1970), 287-330; in "Fear, Myth and Furore: Reappraisingthe 'Ranters,'" Past and Present, 129 (1990), 79-103; and 140 (August 1993), 155-210. 9 Davis, Fear, Myth and History, x. 10 ChristopherHill, "Abolishing the Ranters,"155. n Ibid., 153.
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argue that the notion of political identity-what Quakers,Ranters, Baptists "were"-was itself takingshape in the collective fashioningof the Ranters.12 It is also importantthat pamphleteersexposed the group in libelous and mocking terms. Anti-Ranterpamphleteersbecame aware of how rhetorical strategieswhich targetedan otherwere particularlywell-suited to the aims of a smearcampaign.They experimentedwith variousmodes of representationsuch as satireandallegory in orderto constructan image of Ranterismas the inverse of right religious thinking and behavior. Thus, the Ranter "madness"that I discussin this essay was a deliberatelycraftedrhetoricalweapon.13Intheirfierce hostilitytowardRantermadness,pamphleteerspositionedthemselves againsta sectarian critique of social authorityat a moment when that authoritywas particularlyvulnerableto attack. Intenselyconcernedwithhow theirrhetoriccouldmosteffectivelysway their readership,pamphleteersexaggeratedimages of the Rantersby castingthem as sensationalcharacters.In theiraccounts,Ranterpreachingwas a blasphemous cursing of the sacredword; Rantercongregationswere grotesquecarnivalsof sexual and gluttonousexcess; Ranterdoctrine,such as the denial of sin, was a ridiculous negation of religion. These writers borrowed strategies from one anotherandthenmeasuredthe effectivenessof theirappropriations by watching how othersmanipulatedthemin print.Theyjockeyed forrhetoricalpreeminence by seeing who could manipulatethe language about Ranterswith the most prowess. Moreover, these pamphleteerseach had an interest in libeling the Ranters.Often competing interestsscapegoatedthe sect in orderto attackone anotherin print.14 In the years between 1649 and 1651, however, the anti-Ranterpamphlets were producedby writerswho felt particularlythreatenedby the explosion of radical religious views that followed Pride's purge and the execution of CharlesI.15Many of these writers were conservative Presbyterianswho had become increasinglyunhappywith the limitedjurisdictionoverthe moralsof the English people thatthe Commonshad given them in 1646. Furthermore,since 12See James
Holstun,"Rantingat the New Historicism,"English LiteraryRenaissance, 19 (1989), 189-225; Thomas Corns, Uncloistered Virtue:English Political Literature,1640-1660 (Oxford, 1992); Phyllis Mack, Visionary Women:Ecstatic Prophecy in Seventeenth-Century England (Berkeley, 1992), esp. chapters 7 and 8; and Nigel Smith, Perfection Proclaimed: Language and Literaturein English Radical Religion, 1640-1660 (Oxford, 1989). 13 Cf. Clement Hawes, Mania and LiteraryStyle: The Rhetoric of Enthusiasmfrom the Ranters to ChristopherSmart (Cambridge,1996). 14 See Peter Lake, "Anti-Popery:The Structureof a Prejudice,"Conflict in Early Stuart England: Studies in Religion and Politics, 1603-1642, ed. Richard Cust and Anne Hughes (Essex, 1989), 72-106; andMarkKishlansky,"TheEmergenceof AdversaryPolitics in the Long Parliament,"Journal of Modern History, 49 (1977), 624. 15 Blair Worden,The RumpParliament,1648-1653 (Cambridge,1974), 123-25; cf. Jerome Friedman, Blasphemy, Immorality, and Anarchy: The Ranters and the English Revolution (Athens, Ohio, 1987), 251-309.
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their mutual alliance had ended in the 1644 schism of the "godly party"in Parliament, the animosity between Presbyterians and Independents had hardened.Both groupshad alignedthemselves with otherwiseunpleasantbedfellows, the Presbyterianswith the Erastianconservativesandthe Independents with the sects, as a means of bolsteringtheir polemical positions against one another.16The campaign against Ranterimmoralitywas thus part of a larger Presbyterianstrategyto associatethe Independentsandthe Commonwealthwith a sectariangodlessness thathad degeneratedinto chaos. But while many of the anti-Ranter pamphleteers were committed Presbyterians,some hadpoliticalallegiancesthatweremorecomplicated.Infact in the collective assault on the Ranterswe also see how formerly disparate interestsmomentarilybondedtogetherto launcha propagandacampaignagainst a perceived common enemy.'7 Two of the most effective anti-Ranter pamphleteers,EphraimPagitt and Samuel Sheppard,were sometime-royalist supportersof the Laudianchurchprogramwho joined the Presbyterians'antisectariandialogueatthemomentwhentheroyalistcausewas weakest.However, this allegianceloosenedas soon as the groupno longerposed a commonlyshared threat.Intheyearsimmediatelyfollowingthe anti-Ranterepisodeprintedattacks on individual sects tended to focus on the Anabaptistsand especially on the Quakers.Thus the Ranters'printedlife gives us insight into the fluidity with which allegiances cohered and dissolved around specific political issues at precisehistoricalmoments. Ultimately, however, the smear tactics of anti-Ranterpropagandawere uniqueto the anti-sectariandebatein the complexclaimtheymadeon thereader's reason. Rhetoricaboutreason surroundingthe EngagementControversygave the Presbyteriansthe immediate stimulus to attack the Rantersin 1649. The Engagementoath was first requiredin October 1649 from all people taking official posts and later,in January1650, of all men over eighteen. Those who took it swore allegiance to the goals of the present government.A vigorous pamphletwar about the oath and by association the government'slegitimacy erupted in the period 1649 to 1651. Pamphleteers who supported the Commonwealthattemptedto persuadetheirreaderswith a varietyof arguments, butone significantstrainin theirrhetoricwas an appealto theirreaders'reason.18 See J. H. Hexter, "The Problem of the PresbyterianIndependents,"in Reappraisals in History (Evanston, 1961), 163-84, and Blair Worden, "Toleration and the Cromwellian Protectorate,"Persecution and Toleration,ed. W. J. Sheils (Oxford, 1984), 206. 17I use the term "Presbyterian" to identifythe anti-Ranterpamphleteersbecause it best fits the group who stood to gain the most from anti-Rantersentimentat this moment. 18 See also Worden, The Rump Parliament, 228-30; Glenn Burgess, "Usurpation, Obligation and Obedience in the Thought of the Engagement Controversy,"The Historical Journal, 29 (1986), 515-36; and QuentinSkinner,"Conquestand Consent:ThomasHobbes and the EngagementControversy,"The Interregnum:The Questfor Settlement,1646-1660, G. E. Aylmer (London, 1972), 84-85. 16
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Pro-Commonwealthpropagandistsanticipatedhow readersmightuse reasonto reject the new government'slegitimacy. They thus encouragedreadersnot to reasontoo incisively on the issue of whetheror not the Rumphada rightto rule. The Engagementcontroversythus became a cruciblein which the issue of reason's ability to judge political authorityhad immediate consequences for those with a stake in the government's legitimacy. In printed propaganda deliberately aimed at the Presbyterian non-engagers, pro-Commonwealth pamphleteersarguedthat a reasoningindividualdid not have the rightto make judgmentsaboutpolitical authority.'9They encouragedtheirreadersto accept without question the Commonwealth'sde facto authority.Although the rhetorical strategiesof these argumentswere complex, they consistentlyaimed to neutralizethe critiqueof a particularkind of reasoningreader.20Such a reader looked for proof of political authorityin a clear accordancebetween principles established in past governments or by mandate of God and the particular governmentof the moment.It was precisely this kind of certaintythatAnthony Ascham,one of the Commonwealth'smost effective apologists,claimedreason was incapableof obtaining: The Spirithaththe greatestproofe for it selfe within, but haththe least Evidenceforit self withoutandthereforeit cannotbe offer'deitheras the Sentenceof a Judge,or as the Reasonof a Doctour;becauseno body can know it ... unlesse it be accompaniedwith Miracleswhichmaybe seen.21 Accordingto Ascham,God's "proofes"andevidencesforhis will were invisible to reason. J. M. Wallace has arguedthat propagandistslike Ascham reacted againstthe demandfor proofby stressingthatparticular"circumstancesaltered cases profoundly, so that two cases which looked alike might admit of very differentsolutions."22 Thusthey suggestedthatreasonwas an imperfecttool in seekingoutthetruthandthatit couldbe misled intoseeing false correspondences between tradition,scripture,and authority. In their printedattackson the Ranters,which exploded into this ongoing dialogueaboutreasonandauthority,Presbyteriansreactedagainstthe reasoning 19 See Richard Tuck, "Power and Authority in Seventeenth-CenturyEngland," The Historical Journal, 17 (1974), 43-61. 20 See Perez Zagorin,A History of Political Thoughtin the English Revolution(London, 1954), 62-70; also QuentinSkinner,"Conquestand Consent"and "Historyand Ideology in the English Revolution,"Historical Journal, 8 (1965), 151-78; and see MargaretA. Judson,From Traditionto Political Reality:A Studyof the Ideas Set Forth in Supportof the Commonwealth Governmentin England, 1649-1653 (Hamden, Conn., 1980). 21 AnthonyAscham, Of the Confusionsand revolutions of Goverments[sic] (16492), Wing A3922, 150. 22 John M. Wallace, "The Spiritsof All That Were Moderate:The Civil War Debates and the Engagement Controversy,"Destiny His Choice: The Loyalism of AndrewMarvell (Cambridge, 1980), 10.
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readerwhompro-Commonwealth pamphleteersimaginedin theirrhetoric.Itwas an precisely authority compatible with precedent and scripture that the conservativePresbyterians,"whoremainedin doubtas to eitherthe godliness or merelythe legalityof takingoathsandpayingallegianceto thenew government," demandedof the Rumpduringthe EngagementControversy.23 But the accounts of a stubbornlyscrupulousreaderin the Engagementrhetoricmadeconservative Presbyteriansrealize that their insistence on an individual's right to make judgments about authoritythreatenedtheir own aim of establishing a single churchgovernmentplainlydemandedby scripture.A reasoningreadermightbe inclinedto inquireinto the sectarianviews with an open mind. In attackingthe Ranters,pamphleteersaimedto suppressa potentialdenial of theirauthorityto prescribea centralizeddoctrineand "godly"discipline. The anti-Rantercampaign was a Presbyterianattemptat damagecontrol. In appealingto theirreadersnotto reason,pro-Commonwealth pamphleteers showed the Presbyterianshow reasoncould be manipulatedeitherto accept or denythe sameargument.Ratherthanleadingthereaderto one truth,reasonitself couldbe persuadedof multipleinterpretations of thetruthby rhetoric,the skillful use of language.24It was precisely reason's weakness to rhetoricthatAscham warned would destroy consensus on political authority:"For in making all perswaders, and thereby equall Judges of Reason, authority is presently dethroned."25 Political writers in both the Engagement and the anti-Ranter debatessaw thatthe reader'sreason,becauseit was an unstablemeansby which to know the truth,had to be controlled.Pro-Commonwealthwritersduringthe Engagementcontroversy straightforwardlytold their readerthat reason was vulnerableto rhetoricandthereforeshe orhe shouldnotuse it to makejudgments aboutwho oughtto rule.Onthe otherhand,the anti-Ranterpamphleteers,on the other hand, sought to defuse reason more subtly by converting it from a consideredcritiqueintoa derisiveuncriticallaughter.Presbyterianpamphleteers constituted the sect members' questioning of established religion and their espousalof dissentingdoctrinesandpracticesas a laughableabsenceof reason. The Engagementrhetoricwas thereforethe most crucial context for the antiRanterdebatebecause it channeleda pre-existingdialogue aboutthe sectarian problemin generalinto a debateaboutone particularludicroussect. On 21 August 1650 GeorgeThomasonacquireda pamphletwhich recorded the processby which the Rantersemergedout of a fusionbetweenanti-sectarian andEngagementrhetoric.The tractdefendeda sect, "themad crew,"so named from their detractors'charges of immoral sexual conduct, blasphemy, and of 23
Skinner,"Conquestand Consent,"82. See Quentin Skinner,Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge, and VictoriaKahn,Rhetoric,Prudence and Skepticismin the Renaissance (Ithaca, 1-16; 1996), 1985). 24
25
Ascham, 151.
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"madness."The anonymousauthorof A Justificationof the Mad Crewdefined "madness"as the inverseof"speak[ing]... rationally"and"depart[ing]not from ... outwardcivilities."26The pamphlettold its readersthat mad people were incapableof orderingtheirthoughtsin publicspeechandrestrainingtheirbodies from gross improperdisplay. Madnesswas thus the absence of reason and, by extension,of the disciplined,courteouspublicbehaviorwhich reasonproduced in its bearers.27 Inwhatmayhavebeen anironicdefenseofthe sectthe authorpraisedthe sect members'loudandnonsensicalpreaching,theirself-consciouscursing,andtheir orgiastic celebrationsof God as signs of the divine presence in them: "It's a common thing for God in the many and several appearancesof himself to be calledof men,mad,a fool, a drunkard,a vainperson."28 HistorianJ.F.McGregor the a Ranter manifesto because its authorespousedthis Justification proclaimed antinomiancreedwhich was latermadeout to be a Rantersignature.29 But it was that that the the word and "Ranter" in the never important pamphlet appeared singleuse of theword"rant"neitherdenotedthe "madcrew"norits practicesand beliefs.30In fact, accordingto the author,"rant[ing]"was something that the sect's enemies did. It was the self-righteous carping of "hypocrites"who condemned the mad crew for sinning while they simultaneously"inwardly" engagedin theverybehaviorwhichthey decried:"Oye hipocrites,you swearand rantit out in my presencedaily, I hearyour inwardblasphemingandcursing."31 Rantingin theJustificationwas identicalwith hypocrisy,the irrationalbehavior of those who say one thing and do another.It was a speech act, not the practice or belief of a particularsect. The word "rant"and a similarword, "rent,"were significantbecause they signaled a discursive context within which the pamphlet was written and a polemical community to which it was speaking.32The author stressed the 26
Anonymous, A Justification of the Mad Crew in their Waies and Principles (1650), British LibraryTT E.609 (18), 4. 27 See Byron Nelson, "TheRantersand the Limits of Language,"Pamphlet Wars:Prose in the English Revolution,ed. James Holstun (London, 1992), 60-75. 28Justification,4; and see Abiezer Coppe, A Fiery Flying Roll (1649), British LibraryTT E.587 (13) and A Second Fiery Flying Roule (1649), British LibraryTT E.587 (14). 29 J. F. McGregor,"Seekers and Ranters,"Radical Religion and the English Revolution (New York, 1986), 129. 30 Similarly the Blasphemy Act, which preceded the Justification by eleven days, mentionedneitherthe group nor the word "Ranters."Historiansof the Rantersfrequentlycited this act as the official Parliamentaryreaction against the group. In it Parliamentdescribed at length the offensive behavior and opinions it sought to prohibit,most of which jibe with those of the "madcrew."But althoughthe act was probablyinspiredby the public excesses of single Ranters,it threatenedunspecified individuals,not groups, with jail sentences and banishment. See the Act against Several Atheistical, Blasphemous and Execrable Opinions (21 August 1650), British LibraryTT E. 1061 (14). 31 Justification, 17. 32 See Nigel Smith, Literatureand Revolution 1640-1600 (New Haven, 1994), 21-92.
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addressees of "O ye hipocrites,"who "rantout" their condemnationsin his presence. They were the other sects who talked and were talked about. He repeatedlyaddressedthemthroughoutthe tract:"Ye Churches,ye Seekers,"and earlier, "Puritanisme,Presbyterianisme,Independensie, Anabaptisme, and SpirituallNotionisme."Thus"ranting"was notmerelythe genericbehaviorof all hypocrites;it was the characteristicmad"talk"of the sectariansfromwhich this authorsoughtto distinguishhis own practices. "Rent,"meaning "sever,"also appearedin connectionwith the sects. The authorof theJustification,fusinghis voice with God's, threatenedthe sectarians with exclusion from the divine kingdom on accountof theirhypocrisy:"from such have I this very day rent the Kingdom."33"Renting"here was a violent separationor tearingaway from God. It was also an explicit statusof the sects, ignobly"rent"fromdivineacceptance,to whichthe authorfrequentlyreferredin his defense of the mad crew. Violent separationand division were also acts characteristicof the sects themselves.The "Churchesand Societies"dividedup mankindby "bring[ing]forth ... a God of the separationof the few that thus worshiphim."34They even divided up the divine itself by "worship[ing]many Gods" insteadof one. Thus ratherthan a Rantercredo, the pamphletseems to have been the discursiverecordof a momentwhen the words "rant"and "rent" were becoming associatedwith pre-existingfearsaboutthe proliferatingsects. In its use of this anti-sectarianlanguage the Justification explicitly appropriatedwords from an ongoing discussion about the sectarianproblem. Pamphletswhich malignedthe sects as the sacrilegiousdivision of God's truth into multiple errorswere rife in the period. The most visible of these were the tome-sized catalogs of sects predominantly written by conservative Presbyterianssuch as Thomas Edwards,EphraimPagitt, and Robert Baillie. Pagitt's Heresiography was published at least seven times in six editions between 1645 and 1662. They produced their lists in a spirit of renewed Presbyterianconservatism,which suffused the City of London's campaignto institute"anauthoritativePresbyterianchurchgovernmentwithoutexemptions, accommodation,or toleration."35 By the time Edwards published Gangraena, his exhaustive catalog of "Errors,""Heresies"and "perniciousPracticesof the Sectaries"in threeparts throughoutthe courseof 1646, he was widely knownfromhis pamphletsandhis preaching as a vocal enemy of the sects.36Gangraena and its fellows were extremelyeffective in creatingthe image of a terrifyingsectarianmonster.They Justification, 13. 34Ibid., 7. 35 MurrayTolmie, The Triumphof the Saints: The Separate Churchesof London, 16161649 (Cambridge,1977), 131. 36 Thomas Edwards, Gangraena (26 February1646), British LibraryTT E.323 (2). See William Haller,Libertyand Reformationin the PuritanRevolution(New York, 1955), 226-29. 33
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instilled in the readerfear and repulsionfor the explicit inverse of the kind of ecclesiastical order grounded in the uniform worship the Presbyterians sanctioned.EphraimPagittmadehis strategyof arguingby contrariesexplicit at the end of the "To the Reader"in the 1645 edition of Heresiography: And if my paines shall do any good in the confirmationof any against seducers,in fore-warningthemto bewareof privateConventicles,andto keepthemclose to thepublikeMinisteryof theWordandCommunionof Saintsin Gods Church,I shall thinkemy labourwell bestowed.37 Pagitt envisioned the victims of sectarianseduction as a chaotic scrambleof madmen enchanted away from such orderly devotional practices as the "SacramentofBaptisme,"receivingthe "holyCommunion,"andrespectingthe "Lords Prayer."38This strategy of arguing by opposites thus achieved two Presbyterianpolemical aims at once: it instilled a fear of the enemy at the same time thatit advocatedthe Presbyterianagenda. In the act of conjuringup a terrifyingother,the Presbyterianpamphleteers also createdan allegoricalsectarianarchetypein which all of the various sects were concentratedintoa singlepowerfulrhetoricalimage-a monstrous,chaotic mass of "errour."Thomas Corns has pointed out that, despite the heresiographers' claim (often set out in the title page) to delineate the sects exhaustively in all their particularforms, they ultimately "denied any major distinctionsof doctrineor social orientationamongthose who [stood]to the left of Presbyterianism."39 Edwardseven said that the work of Gangraenawas to constructsucha massrepresentationof theproliferatingsects:"allthatI do is but to drawthem into one, thatwe may see themas it were at once."40Both Edwards andPagittrepeatedlyinvokedthe imageof masspestilenceanddisease.Thesects were a festering infection eating away at the religious health of society-a gangreneto Edwardsand a "plagueof locusts"to Pagitt.41 An argumentby contrariesalongwithallegorizationof the sects hadsupplied the Presbyterianheresiographerswith two potentrhetoricalweapons up to the momentin March1649 when the Rantersfirst enteredprinteddiscourse.42This strategy pandered to the reader's sense of reason by assembling into one aggregate form the "evidences" and "proof" of the sectarian "errours."43 37
Pagitt (1645), B2v.
Pagitt (1645), A4r. 39 Thomas Corns, "Milton's Quest for Respectability,"Modern Language Review, 77 (1982), 771. 40 Edwards,4. 38
41
Pagitt (1645), A2r.
Winstanley,A Vindication. See ChristopherHill, " 'Reason' and 'reasonableness'in seventeenth-centuryEngland," BritishJournal of Sociology, 20 (1969), 235-52, andKeith L. Sprunger,"JohnYates of Norfolk: The Radical PuritanPreacheras Ramist Philosopher,"JHI, 37 (1976), 697-706; also Perry 42
43
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Edwardsstressedthis ploy in his opening remarksto the tract. Gangraena,he said, would appealto his reader'sreasonin its "methodicall"mode of argument which would "joyn in one things divided and scattered." For Edwards, allegorizing the sects was itself an exercise of reason on the reader's part, requiringan incisive inquiryinto the objectsof its attention.His requestthatthe reader lump all of the sects "in one" demanded a sophisticatedprocess of reasoning:the metaphoricgroupingtogetherof incongruousideasandtermsinto a single allegoricaltype of hereticalbehavior.His readers,he imagined,would not be satisfied with merely "a bare assertion and relation of" the sectarian errors.Ratherthey would expect "othergroundsof satisfactionfor theirbelief," namely, reasoned arguments which Edwards promised to "propound ... as
groundsof proof."44 In demandingthe reader'sincisive examinationof his sectarianstereotypes, Edwardsalso drew froma literarytraditionin popularEnglishpoetryand stage drama which subjected a religious, social, or moral type to microscopic examination.45 Characterwriting in this traditionmade a type recognizableby his exaggerating or her characteristicactions, turnsof speech, and reactionsto everydayoccurrences.ThePuritanwas a commonsubject;he was typicallyoverAn extremelypopularexampleof finicky,hypocritical,stupid,andpretentious.46 suchwritingwas SirThomasOverbury'scollection of Characters,publishedin seventeen editions between 1614 and 1664.47Overburydepicted a variety of social types in brief sketcheswith titles like "A Courtier,""An Hypocrite,""A Souldier,"and"A Puritane."48 Inducingthe reader's"thoughtfullaugh"at such figures, character writing encouraged the reader to classify and to label individualsby recognizingin them the traitsof a type.49 Characterwriting in the pamphletsof the revolutionaryperiod, however, increasinglydiscouragedreadersfromexercisingtheirreasonedjudgment.These charactersadaptedto themorecontroversialenvironmentof the 1640sand 1650s Miller, TheNew EnglandMind: TheSeventeenthCentury(New York, 1939), 111-53; William Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 (New York, 1961); John Morgan, Godly Learning: Puritan Attitudes towards Reason, Learning, and Education, 1560-1640 (Cambridge, 1986); Geoffrey F. Nuttall, The Holy Spirit in Puritan Faith and Experience (Oxford, 1947), 38-41; and James Holstun, A Rational Millenium: Puritan Utopias of Seventeenth-CenturyEngland and America (New York, 1987). 44Edwards,3-5. 45 See William P. Holden,Anti-PuritanSatire, 1572-1642 (New Haven, 1954), ch. 1-2; and Alvin Keman, TheCankeredMuse: Satire of the English Renaissance(New Haven, 1959), 17478. 46 See Holden, 101-45.
47See J. W. Smeed, The Theophrastan "Character":The History of a Literary Genre 1-46. (Oxford, 1985), 48 Sir Thomas Overbury,A Wife,now the Widowof Sir ThomasOverburie... whereuntoare added many witty Characters,and ConceytedNewes (16142), Pollard and Redgrave 18907. 49Holden, 50.
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by soliciting a derisive laughterwhich stifled the reader'sthoughtfulinquiry. Because they could extinguish a reader's considerationof their competitors' claims, these aggressive charactersservedpamphleteerswho wantedto disarm the threat of "types working against Church and state."50This increasingly raucousappealto the reader'slaughterwas evident in JohnTaylorthe royalist "water-poet's"verse attacks on the sects such as A most horrible, terrible, tolerable, termagantSatyre (1639) and SENCEupon NONSENCE(1643).51 We can tracethe articulationof this new polemical tool in the languageof two sequentialanti-Ranterpamphlets.Herepamphleteerscollectively began to craft the "Ranter"as a flexible tool for depoliticizing their readers. Samuel Tilbury'sBloudy Newse from the North recordedan unstablemoment in this articulation,as the Rantersbecame a synonym for the allegorized sectarian other.52Tilburyclaimed to reproducea transcriptof a Rantermeeting in which the sect conducteda formaltrial,a "devilishJudicatore,"in anattemptto identify andpunishthe "misdemeanors"of theirfellow townspeopleof"Lippuck."In a few ways the pamphleteasily subsumedthe characteristicsof Edwards's"rude and undigested chaos" underthe Ranterlabel. The head of this Rantercourt, Judge Williamson, explicitly associated the Ranterjury members with carnivalesqueshameritualsin spelling out theirdutiesto them.He directedthemto ridiculeanymanmarriedforseven yearsbutstill childlessby brandinghis "foreheadwiththe likenessof a Ramshead,"thusaligningthejuryin thereader'smind with the chaotic, and sometimes subversive, suspension of social and ecclesiastical order associated with the Lords of Misrule during the Feast of Fools.53
As a whole, however,the pamphletwas weak propaganda.It didnot replace the heresiographers'strategyof demonizationwith any otherpotent means of execratingthe Ranters.Tilburyminimizedthe fearfactorby makingthe Ranters an extremely ambivalentbugaboo. Anti-sectarianpropagandamanipulatedits readerby creating a fearsome sense of opposition between the sects and the
BenjaminBoyce, The TheophrastanCharacterin England to 1642 (Cambridge,Mass., 1947), 315-17, and ThePolemic Character,1640-1661: A Chapterin English LiteraryHistory (Lincoln, Neb., 1955). 51 See Bernard Capp, The Worldof John Taylorthe "Water-Poet"(Oxford, 1994), 79-97, and Nigel Smith, "RichardOverton's MarpriestTracts:Towardsa History of Leveller Style," TheLiteratureof Controversy,ed. Thomas N. Corns (London, 1987), 38-66. 52 Samuel Tilbury,Bloudy Newse from the North (20 January1650), British LibraryTT E.622 (1). 53 See Peter Stallybrass, "'Wee Feaste in Our Defense': Patrician Carnival in Early Modern England and Robert Herrick's 'Hesperides,'" English Literary Renaissance, 16 (1986), 234-52; MartinIngram,"Ridings,Rough Music and the 'Reformof PopularCulture'in Early ModernEngland,"Past and Present, 105 (1984), 79-113; and E. P. Thompson,"Rough Music," Customsin Common:Studies in TraditionalPopular Culture(New York, 1993), 467548. 50
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standardsof morals and manners it wanted to advocate. Tilbury's pamphlet sacrificedthis tension by fusing the Ranterswith legitimatemodes of judicial conductwithoutrecreatingthe sense of strainbetweenthe two: throughoutmost of the pamphletthe Rantercourt looked suspiciously like the real thing. The pamphlet's anti-Rantercommitmentsonly became clear in a clumsy deus ex machinawhen the town bailiffs suddenlyarrived"witha warrantfor the Judge of the Court."54 At the lastmoment,however,thepamphlet'ssatiricalverse epiloguemadea moredecisive claim aboutthe Ranters.Thepoem's use of satireshowedhow the polemical substitutionof the Rantersfor the sects as a whole involved a subtle shift in the polemical work of anti-sectarianrhetoric.The poem ridiculedthe Rantersbyjuxtaposingtheirorgiasticpracticesof piety againsttheircelebration ofreason: Thus marchingnaked Sister,with a brother, For want of Clothesthey cover one another In some darkGrangethus meet they, where 'tis fit Thatthey the deeds of darknessshouldcommit: The candles areput out, because they say They are enlightnedall, and so they pray.55 The satirehereworkedby fusingpolemicalopposites,bodily excess andreason, into a single ridiculousfigure.The Rantersthoughtthey were "enlightned"even as theycommingled(withheavy sexualinnuendoon "pray")in the darkness.The poem encouragedthe readerto laughat the mad Rantersbecause they were the embodimentof Edwards's"rudeandundigestedChaos,"a massof irreconcilable oppositesclashingagainstone another. Thisstrategydifferedfromthatof theheresiographiesin its invocationof the mentalassociationsthereadermadewith the charactersin chapbooks.Thepoem packagedthe Rantersin a humorousform in orderto make a differentclaim on its reader.It downplayedthe seriousnesswith which the readershouldconsider the Rantersat the sametime thatit successfully condemnedthemas a ridiculous other.The poem thus legitimateda particularkind of satiricaljuxtapositionfor its polemical aims, sexual gluttony set against the operation of reason, by appropriatinga familiargenrewhich the readerwas conditionedto laughat. The satiricalanti-Ranterpoem preemptedanyreasonedlook the readermighttakeat Ranterideasbecauseits satirehadmadethe decisionaboutthe kindof inquirythe Ranterswere worthy of priorto his or her engagementwith them. The satirein this poem thus paradoxically flattered the reader's reasoning faculty by 54Tilbury, 5. 55Tilbury, 6.
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constitutingthe Rantersas a mad otherin the same momentthat it shut off the operationof reasonby makingthe readerlaugh at them.56 Furthermore,the satiricalconstructionof RanterunreasonenabledTilbury to denigratethe rationalityof those royalist pamphleteerswho were simultaneously attachingthe image of the mad Rantersto the new government.57 Tilbury'spamphletprojectedroyalist sympathieson to the Ranters,depicting themas an otherin theirdeclarationof "alldue obedienceand loyaltyto Charles the II."Ranterswho alignedthemselveswith Charles"walkstill in the wayes of Darkness,"temptedinto madnessby the devil's "reason[ing]."Thus, although Ranterunreasonwas born out of the need to downplaya reasonedinquiryinto religious authority,it became a tool flexible enough for use outside of this particularinterestin the service of a Commonwealthdefense against royalist attacks.58 This early association of the Ranterswith royalist sympathies elicited a pointedcounter-attackfromroyalistpropagandists.Almost exactly a year after Tilbury'spamphlet,SamuelSheppardpublisheda pamphlet-playabouta group of proselytizingRanterswhich mirroredthe plot of Tilbury'sRantercourt, The Joviall Crew,or the Devill turn'dRanter. The pamphletpresentedthe Ranters engaging in the business of gatheringtogethera mad flock until the legitimate authorities interceded and incarceratedthem. But where Tilbury made the Rantersroyalists,Sheppardgave the royalistlines to thetown constable,thehero of the play, as he caughtthe sleeping sect membersaftertheirdebauchedorgyworship:"I chargeyou my friendsin the Kings Name ... to indeavourto awake these persons as well by kicking as pinching, and other laudable means, accordingto the Statute."59 Clearlythe Presbyterianpropagandastrucka nerve with Charles's supporters.Sheppard'schoice to mirrorTilbury's plot and to inverthis characters'politicalsympathiessuggestedthathe was directlyreacting againstits rhetoric,reworkingthe Rantercourtforthe oppositepolemicaleffect. But what made Sheppard'spamphletan effective royalist counter-attack was its appropriationof Tilbury'sstrategyin a clever game of one-upmanship. Where Tilbury's pamphlettook an equivocal stand on the Ranters,Sheppard exploited the full rhetoricalpotential of Theophrastansatiricalallegory in an unambiguouscondemnationof the Ranters.He explicitlyfusedthe formof comic drama with what was, by this point in the dialogue about the Ranters, a traditionallanguageof Ranterunreasonin its "Prologue"on the title page: 56 TamsynWilliams, "PolemicalPrintsof the English Revolution,"in RenaissanceBodies: The Human Figure in English Culture, c. 1540-1660, ed. Lucy Gent and Nigel Llewellyn (London, 1990), 96. 57 See JohnTaylor,Rantersof both Sexes, Male and Female (3 June 1651), BritishLibrary TT E.629 (15). 58 Paul Hardacre,TheRoyalistsDuring the Puritan Revolution(The Hague, 1956), 75, 99. 59S[amuel] S[heppard],TheJoviall Crew, or The Devil turn'd Ranter (6 January1651), British LibraryTT E.621 (7), 11.
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Bedlambroke loose? yes, Hell is open'd too: Mad-men,& Fiends, & Harpiesto your view We do present:but who shall cure the Tumor? All the world now is in the RantingHumor. Sheppardsubstituted a dramatic convention associated with the humor of satiricaltheaterfor Tilbury'smilderaddressto a desire for "newse."Dramatic satire here encouragedthe reader to laugh harderat the Rantersbecause it changedherorhis activityfroma considerationof factto a viewing of fiction.An imaginarycaricaturedid not threatenthe reader'ssense of securityas the actual "schismaticks"did. Sheppard'suse of dramaticformwas itselfa calculatedrhetoricalmove. He and otherroyalistjournalistshad skillfully craftedthis new genre, the satirical This to servicetheirpolemicalaimsin previouspamphlets.60 "pamphlet-drama," other and of attention the directed anti-Ranter Tilbury play particular Presbyteriananti-sectarianpolemicists to these previous polemical dramas, cautioningthem to stay away from tried-and-trueroyalist rhetoricalterritory. The Presbyterians,Sheppardwarns,oversteppedrhetoricalboundsin attacking the royalistswith theirown weaponry.Smearingthe Presbyterianswith a more ridiculousanti-Ranterdrama,Sheppardshowed themthatthey were wielding a weapon which was more suitedto royalistpropagandathanto theirown. Sheppard maximized the polemical work of his pamphlet by fully allegorizing the Rantersas a negative Puritanother. He opened the play by associatingthe Rantersin particularwith a traditionalstereotypeof the Puritan as an overly fastidious, finicky zealot, the "Priscian." He then personified commonnegative stereotypesof Puritansin the particularfiguresof the Ranter cast:Apostatus,Mrs.Idlesby,Mrs.All-Prate,Mrs.Crave-Drink,to name a few. The pamphlet-dramageneratedits humorin the tensionbetweenthe derogatory names and the self-righteousbehaviorof the charactersthemselves who were unawareof theirridiculousness.Sheppardthuswon his readerover by allowing him or her access to a privileged knowledge aboutthe characterat whom they both secretly laughed. This full-blown fusion of satire and allegory gave Shepparda rhetoricaledge over Tilbury.He was able to exploit the reader's laughterin a way that Tilbury,in his commitmentto makingthe Ranterslook newsworthy,could not. But Sheppard'smosteffective use of allegoryandsatireputtheEngagement rhetoricof skepticalrationalityinto the mouthof a mad Ranter.In the opening moments of the play the Ranterdruggist, Dose, noted in frustrationthat the people he tried to convert to Ranterismoften refused to question the rules of establishedreligion: 60
Smith, Literatureand Revolution, 70-92.
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Dose. Thatmen shouldbe suchfools, to pinniontheirown arms,tie their own legs, andproposesuch strangenothingsto themselves,on purpose for to keep themselves in awe. When would they but perceive their happiness,boththisworldandthe next is solely theirs;norcanthey lose theirway althoughthey would.61 Dose here equated an uncritical obedience to religion with bodily bondage, implying that a reasonedapproachto divine truthfreed the body to pleasures prohibitedby the stricturesof establishedreligion.62His statementwas a blunt advocation of skeptical rationality. But the context of Dose's remark was satirical and therefore, ratherthan seriously considering his valorization of reason,the readerlaughedat it. Thusby satirizingtheirown rhetoricof skeptical rationalityin the mouthof the Ranterapothecarywhose name,Dose, signified a drug-induced madness, Sheppard took a jab at the pro-Commonwealth propagandists.He threwEngagementrhetoricback in theirfaces by makingthe logic of skepticalrationalitynot the devil in Charles'sclothing, the means by which the Ranterswere temptedinto atheisticanarchy. Strange Newes from Newgate and the Old-Baily, acquiredby Thomason fifteendaysafterTheJoviall Crew,registeredanimmediatepro-Commonwealth reactionto this strainof Royalistpropaganda.63 By the end of the firstparagraph, the anonymousauthorestablishedhis antipathytowardssupportersof CharlesI and towards enemies of "the present Government."More important, the pamphletreactedagainstthe clever propagandaof Sheppard'spamphlet-drama in its directaddressto thereader'sreason.Inanalmostword-for-wordreiteration of heresiographerThomasEdwards'sremarksto the readerin Gangraena,the authorflatteredhis reader'sdesirefor empiricalproofby claimingto offer "[t]he Proofs,Examinations,Declarations,Indictments,Conviction,andconfessions" of the Ranters.The authoralso shifted the context in which it representedthe Rantersaway from satiricalhumorandback to a reasonableassessmentof fact by emphasizingon the title page, in the pamphlet'slargesttype, thatit contained "NEWES."Theprominenceof this wordstoodin directoppositionto the largest word on Sheppard'stitle page-"COMEDIE." The pamphletalso registereda reactionagainstthe powerfulway in which Sheppardusedreasonto his advantagein his rhetoricof Rantertypes. The author emphasizedthatthe factshe representedwereaboutparticularpeople andevents, not stereotypicalfiguresthatmaybe figurativelyextendedbeyondthemselvesto stand for others. The Ranters described had non-allegorical names which recurredconsistently throughoutthe pamphlet.Furthermore,the authorcon61
Sheppard, 1.
Davis, Fear, Myth and History, 83, 106-7. 63 Anon., Strange Newes from Newgate and the Old-Baily (21 January 1651), British LibraryTT E.622 (3). 62
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stitutedthe reader'sexpectationfor empiricalproofas a demandforparticulars: "havingpromised to give you some satisfactionI shall give you some of the perticularsproved."He thusdeterminedwhathis readerexpectedto get fromthe pamphletin the samemomentthathe offeredit. He also definedthewordsspoken by Rantersin the courtas testimony "deliveredupon oath,"thus underscoring thatthe pamphletprovidedthe readerwith empiricaltruth. Butultimatelythepamphletavoidedaskingforthereader'sreasonedinquiry into Ranters.It explicitly opposedthe reader'sperusalof the Ranterfacts to the beneficial activityof policing his or herspiritualandmoralintegrity.Too much attentiongiven to the Ranters,the authorwarned,constituteda "neglect"of the kind of devotional activity conducive to spiritual nourishment.The author accordinglyclaimedto "havepurposelyomittedmanythings"aboutthe Ranters in an effortto preventthe readerfromtoo dangerousan engagementwith them. This pamphletthus avoided either direct interpellationor suppressionof the reader'sreasoningfaculty,paradoxically,by downplayingthe value of reading aboutthe Rantersat all. The pamphlet's rhetoric thus forged a middle path between the heresiographers'call for scrutinyon the one handandthe strenuoussatiricalallegory of Sheppard'sJoviall Crewon the other.In makingthis compromise,the writer avoided using either of two rhetorical extremes, both of which proved counterproductiveto the Presbyterianpolemical agenda.On the one hand,the call for close analysis in the catalogs promoted an inquiry that could easily degenerateinto skepticism;on the other,the combineduse of allegoryandsatire in the pamphlet-dramasuppressedthe operationof the reader'sreason, while invoking a tradition of anti-Puritanallegory which royalists were able to manipulateagainst them.64The pamphleteerthus culled the rhetoricaltactics most suitedto his aims fromthese pamphlets,abandoningthose thathadproved too risky. In the end it was the dilemmathatthe reasoningreaderposed to pre-existing Presbyterianpropagandathatshapedhow rhetoricalstrategiesweremanipulated throughoutthe anti-Ranterdialogue.In its emphasison reason,the anti-sectarian rhetoricof theheresiographerscontaineda flaw whichprovedcounterproductive to the Presbyterianpolemical agenda.Encouragingreadersto fear the sects by solicitingtheirabilityto allegorizebecameproblematiconce the argumentsof the Engagementcontroversyexposed how such a reasoningindividual(or group) might question authority.The anti-Ranterpamphleteersaccommodatedtheir rhetoricalstrategyto the threatthatthis reasoningsubjectposed by substituting mad Rantersfor the sectarianmass and shifting their allegory into a register which engagedthe reader'sdesireto be titillated. 64As in Rachel Weil, "Sometimesa Scepteris Only a Scepter:Pornographyand Politics in Restoration England," in The Invention of Pornography: Obscenity and the Origins of Modernity,1500-1800, ed. Lynn Hunt (New York, 1993), 125-53.
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Given the dubiousutility thatallegory offered the Presbyterians,it should not be surprisingthat John Holland's The Smokeof the BottomlessePit or, A More true and fuller Discovery of the Doctrine of those men which call themselvesRANTERS,which Thomasonacquiredone day afterStrangeNewes, explicitly exposed allegory as a potentially dangerousrhetoricalploy which needed to be restrainedfrom backfiringon the polemicists who exploited it. According to Holland, Rantersdenied the historicalvalidity of Christin their claim that he was a ubiquitousspiritwhich transcendedhistory and existed in everythingand everyone. Holland figuredthis ubiquityas an allegorizationof Christ'sspirit: [O]thersof them say, thatwhat Christdid in his own person,was only a figureor a type of whatshouldbe doneandactedin everyman,andthat every manmustdo andsufferas muchas Christdid, this is the best they say of Christ.65 By transformingChristinto a universalquality,Ranterswere able to "affirm," "maintain,""saith,"and "reason"thatthe externalrules imposed on people by churchdoctrineanddisciplinehadno authority.Inthis emphasison how Ranters tried to convince their audience, Holland clearly felt most threatenedby the rhetoricalmanipulationof allegory againstthe authorityof Christ'swords and actionsrecordedin scripture.He thusdefendedhimselfby makingallegorization itself somethingthatwas done by the Rantersand not by the pamphleteersthat talkedaboutthem. But at the same momentthathe exposed how Ranterreasonwas reallymad allegorization,Hollandalso told his readerhow to read.Ranters,he said, did not read.Ratherthey deniedthatscripturewas anauthoritativesourceof knowledge: "Thebest they say of the Scriptureis; Thatit is a Tale, a History,a Letter,and a dead Letter, and more, the fleshly History; they call it a bundle of contradictions."66 Holland mocked the Ranters who "reason[ed]"that they obtainedknowledge fromthe spiritof Christwhich dwelled within and guided them. By thus execratingRanternon-readingas indwelling and mad, Holland implicitlyvalidatedreadingas anexternalimpositionof knowledgefromthetext onto its reader.Texts, he subtlytold his reader,were as "bindingandinfallible" as the mad Rantershe imagined thought that Paul's words were not.67And reason, as the opposite of the mad Ranters'creative indwelling spirit,was an activitywhich confined its bearerto the rulingorderof the externalword. 65
John Holland, TheSmokeof the BottomlessePit or, A More true andfuller Discovery of the Doctrine of those men which call themselvesRANTERS(22 January1651), BritishLibrary TT E.622 (5), 3. 66
Holland, 3.
67
Ibid., 4.
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Therhetoricalmaneuveringin Holland'stractandthoseof his fellow Ranterhaters, registered the anti-sectarianpamphleteers' realization that religious skepticismmight emergeout of a fearfulscrutinyof sectarianideas. Thusthese pamphleteersexperimentedwith various modes of literaryrepresentationin order to make alternateclaims on their readers' attention.They saw that the heresiographers'appropriationof allegory was a useful tool in the task of concentratingthe reader'sfear on the sects. But this strategyconfrontedthem with the problemof havingto reproducesectarianideas in print,a contextwhich mightinspiretheirreadersto considerthemthoughtfully.Again they turnedto a literarymode, satire, in order to subordinateinquiry to amusement.For the Presbyterians,who were the main source of rhetoric in favor of religious persecutionandforced-conformityatthis moment,literarylanguagedeflecteda reasonedcritiqueof theirauthorityto restrictpeople's abilityto worshipas they pleased. We arenow in a position to returnto EphraimPagitt's 1654 "introduction" of the Ranters. Not surprisingly,Pagitt's account was shaped by what he perceived as a threat to the interests he shared with the Presbyterians-an uncontrolledirrationalrantingindividual.Whereasmost of his accountsof sects usedthe cautioninglanguagefromthepreviouseditionsof 1645and 1647,which calleduponthe readerto scrutinizesectariandoctrineandpractice,his new entry on the Ranters absorbed some of the techniques of his fellow anti-Ranter pamphleteers.Herehe stressedthe ludicrousRanteranticsoverthe intricaciesof theirdoctrinalheresy. Moreover,his entrymadethe Rantera type recognizable in a set of laughablepracticesand ideas. In fact Pagitt reducedall of the sect membersto a single representative"he"who stood for the rest of his kind, an uncommon strategy in the previous editions: "If he was a Christian,he has renouncedhis faith, nor can any desperaterunagado... more blasphemously abuse andprophanethings sacred." A sizeable portionof his entryon the sect reproduceda letterpurportedly writtenby one anonymousRanterto another.Pagittintroducedthe letteras an exampleof Ranterunreason: One of theirlettersrunsin this stile, My own heartblood fromwhom I daily receive life, andbeing, to whom is ascribedall honour& c. Thou art my garment of needlework, my garment of salvation. Eterall plaguesconsumeyou all, rotsinkanddamneyourbodies, andsouls into devouringfire,wherenone butthose who walk uprightlycan enter.The Lord grantthat we may know the worth of Hell, that we may scorne heaven.68
68
Pagitt (1654), 143-44.
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The letter'sjuxtapositionof sacredandprofanelanguagerevealedthe author's awarenessof how scripturecanbe manipulatedto persuadea reader.The Ranter authorfused the style of address in the voice of the psalmist ("Thou art my garmentof needlework,my garmentof salvation")with profanecursing("rot, sink ... damne ...") for sensationalistic effect. Unlike Holland's non-reading
Ranter, this author realized the value of reading scripture. The letter "reproduced"in Pagitt'stractthusmade an otherout of a Ranterpropagandistwho ingestedwordsandideasin printandreworkedthemintorhetoric.Becausea mad Ranter wrote the letter, Pagitt suggested, the text was a topsy-turvy transformationof holy scriptureinto a senseless barrageof curses. But this bad Ranterpropagandisttells us somethingaboutthe threatPagitt perceived in the Ranters.In arguingby inversion Pagitt created a laughable oppositeof the kindof Ranterhe feared:a subtlyreasoningRanterwho skillfully worked scriptureinto an argumentwhich appealedeffectively to the reader's reason.This reasoningRanterpropagandistlurkedmenacinglybehindPagitt's laughablecaricature.Of courserailingagainsta terrifyingsectarianopposite of thebehaviorthe Presbyteriansweretryingto promotewas a commonplacein the catalogsof heresy.But the significanceof Pagitt'sotherhere was precisely that the caricaturedidnotpromoteits impliedopposite,thatis, a Ranterwho readand wrotewell. Rather,it deflectedthe reader'sseriousattentionaway fromsuch an oppositeby provokinghis or her laughter. Pagitt'sappealpreventedthe readerfromconsideringthe Ranterrhetorician who made scripturesupporthis claims without reducing the sacred word to profanity.His rhetoricwas thuspreemptive:it encouragedthe readerto laughat the RanterstereotypebeforethinkingaboutRanterideas. He thereforeprefaced the Ranterletterby addingthatit was writtenin a characteristic"stile,"implying that Rantermadness was recognizable in the stereotypethat he was about to supply.He directedthe readerto approachsectarianideas with his stereotypein mind. Thus Pagitt'spresentationof the Ranterletterrecognizedthe power that printedrepresentationsof the sects had over the reader'sreceptionof sectarian ideas. In fact he skillfully manipulateda distinctionbetween the stereotyped representationof Ranterideas andtheirreality."Onceyou recognize the 'stile' of sectarianideas in these pamphletsaroundyou," he told his reader,"youwill know they arenot worthyof closer consideration." Historianswho arguedoverwhetherlanguageaboutRanterscouldbe saidto provetheirexistencein the mid-1980s missedthe significanceof thisdistinction. To referto "Ranters"in thisperiodwas to single outnot an actualgroupof people but a process of negotiationbetween pamphleteersthatconstructeda language for the articulationof religiousdifference.Those commentingon the sect in this brief period imagined new ways in which people-readers and religious radicals-might use reasonskepticallyto critiquesocial authority.Thusa focus
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on the Ranters'discursivereality opens up a key issue in the configurationof religious and political diversity at this moment. The heated dialogue over the Rantersproduceda tool for talkingaboutgroupsandindividualswho separated themselvesfromthe institutionsof religiousandpolitical authorityat a moment when such behaviorwas almostunspeakable. NorthwesternUniversity.
and
Blackloism From to
Tradition:
Theological Certainty Doubt Historiographical Beverley C. Southgate Introduction
"Pyrrhohimself never advancedany Principleof Scepticismbeyond this," "ruleof faith" complainedJohnTillotsonatthe heightof the seventeenth-century John and and the as Catholic debates;1 champion objectof his charge, Sergeant, must have noted the irony. For Tillotson was not unreasonablein concluding thathis adversary'stheological argumentshad the effect of increasingthe very uncertaintywhich they were designed to combat. Sergeant'sattemptsto overcome scepticismin theologywere actuallydestinedto exacerbatethe problemof scepticismin relationto historiography. JohnSergeant(1623-1707) was an Englishsecularpriestand,more specifically, a memberof thatnotoriousfaction of Catholicsknown as "Blackloists," followers of ThomasWhite (1593-1676), alias Blacklo.2Whiteproducedsome fortyworkson theology,naturalphilosophy,andpoliticaltheory;he was known as an eminentphilosopherin his own day andhas morerecentlybeen restoredto wider interestfollowing the publicationof Hobbes'slengthycritiqueof his cosmological treatiseDe Mundo. Sergeanthas remainedbest known for his advocacy of the Catholic position in the "ruleof faith"debates, but he was also a prolific writeron philosophy and, as a late Aristotelian,took issue with such "moderists"as DescartesandLocke.3Sergeantwas widelyrecognizedas White's I am gratefulto John Henry (University of Edinburgh)and Joseph Levine (SyracuseUniversity) for constructivecomments on the penultimatedraftof this paper. JohnTillotson, TheRule of Faith, or an Answer to the Treatiseof Mr J.S. entituledSure Footing, etc. (London, 1666), 138. 2 On White, see Beverley C. Southgate, "Covetousof Truth": TheLife and Workof Thomas White,1593-1676 (Dordrecht,1993), which includes bibliography. 3 On Sergeant'sphilosophy,see DorotheaKrook,John SergeantandHis Circle,ed. Beverley C. Southgate(Leiden, 1993); N. C. Bradish,"JohnSergeant:a forgottencritic of Descartesand Locke,"Monist, 39 (1929), 571-628; John W. Yolton, "Locke's UnpublishedMarginalReplies
97 of theHistoryof Ideas,Inc. 2000byJournal Copyright
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intellectualdisciple, and it will be convenienthere to considertheirthoughttogether.4Both devoted much of their time and energy (in Sergeant'swords) to "beatingdown scepticism"or, as White had earliercalled it, the "contagionof Pyrrhonism";andbothwould have been horrifiedto thinkthatthey hadactually contributedto any extensionof skepticalphilosophy.5 Blackloist concerns with the refutationof skeptically induceduncertainty had obvious implicationsfor their contributionsto the "ruleof faith"debates and to their attemptedestablishmentof one single and certaingroundof religious belief. During the latterhalf of the seventeenthcenturyProtestantsand Catholicsexpendeda considerableamountof intellectualandemotionalenergy in advocatingtheir respective routes to that level of religious certaintywhich would assuresalvation.While the formerexpressedconfidencein the reliability of the scriptures'literaryrecord,the lattercounter-claimedthat they alone enjoyed a faiththatwas reliablygroundedin an unbrokentraditionderivingfrom Christhimself. ThomasWhitehighlightsthese issues in his additionsto the "correctedand enlarged"1654 editionof WilliamRushworth'sDialogues, in which he laments the fragmentingeffects of the Reformation.White arguesthatbecause they no longer enjoy "onerule amongthem all" Protestantsresortto theirvariousindividualprinciples;andalthoughall appealultimatelyto the authorityof the Bible, they eachhave only theirown "privateconceit"by whichto resolve any ambiguities in the scripturalrecord. The extractionof religious tenets then becomes effectively a matterof mere guesswork;the whole Bible might as well be replacedby the Koran.Somethingfarmore authoritative,White insists, is needed to overcometheologicaluncertainty-"this dangerousCockatrice,Incertitude";6 and it is precisely such firmly based and wholly reliable authoritythat he and Sergeantstroveto provide. to John Sergeant,"JHI, 12 (1951), 528-59; B. Cooney, "JohnSergeant'sCriticismof Locke's Theory of Ideas,"Modern Schoolman, 50 (1973), 143-58; Beverley C. Southgate,"'Beating Down Scepticism':The Solid Philosophyof John Sergeant,1623-1707,"English Philosophy in the Age of John Locke, ed. M. A. Stewart(Oxford, forthcoming). 4 There is much evidence for Sergeant'srole as White's disciple: Bishop RichardRussell, for example, observed that, "with White's demonstrationsadaptedto his own temperament, always on his lips, and White's books in his hands, he gloried in being his disciple." Lisbon College Register, 1628-1813, ed. Michael Sharratt(Catholic Record Society, 1991), 175. See furtherBeverley C. Southgate," 'White's disciple': John Sergeantand Blackloism,"Recusant History, forthcoming. 5 John Sergeant,TheMethod to Science (London, 1696), Preface;Thomas White, An Exclusion of Scepticksfrom all Title to Dispute (London, 1665), Preface. On Blackloist opposition to skepticism,see B. C. Southgate," 'Cauterisingthe Tumourof Pyrrhonism':Blackloism versus Skepticism,"JHI, 53 (1992), 281-94; "The Vanity of Scepticising: The quest for certaintyof ThomasWhite, 1593-1676,"Skepsis,3 (1992), 19-32; " 'To SpeakTruth':Blackloism, Scepticism, and Language,"The SeventeenthCentury,10 (1995), 237-54. 6 Thomas White in William Rushworth,Dialogues (Paris, 1654), Preface. White's enlargementsconsisted of the Preface and a fourthdialogue.
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In this context, however, theology became intimately interrelatedwith historiography. Some of the difficulties attendant on the Protestant recourse to the Bible were no doubt specific to the Bible itself, but others related more generally to the validity of any historical record, and it is some of the wider historiographical implications of theological debate that I shall examine in this paper. By arguing against the skeptics and pragmatic Protestants while simultaneously insisting on their own variety of absolute theological certainty based on reliable historical tradition, the Blackloists actually contributed to the development of that form of historiographical uncertainty which culminated in what, by the end of the century, came to be known as "Historical Pyrrhonism."7 The Scriptures: Linguistic and Literary Problems "For since the original Scripture has been lost, All copies disagreeing, maimed the most...."8 Because Protestants made their appeals solely to the Bible on the issue of faith, it was the unique authority of the Bible which Catholics set out to question and invalidate. Paolo Sarpi's account of the Tridentine debates concerning the validity and authority of the scriptures was published in an English translation in 1620,9 and Thomas White himself had been concerned with such matters long before the development of any specifically "Blackloist" doctrine. While acting as the English Catholic agent in Rome in 1626, he wrote a memorandum concering the scriptures, in which he states his belief that those writings were indeed originally "god allmighties word" but that "original Scripture" had, in Dryden's later words (which I'm now interspersing with those of White), "been lost," had been "maimed" by subsequent human interventions, and "made far more mortall." Translations and copies of the Bible, "all ... disagreeing," had been produced, sometimes by wicked and "sacriligious hands," so that "many errors"had been committed and then "by print multiplied beyond number"; and thus "the purity it once had," had been irretrievably lost.'0 7 The specific term "Historical Pyrrhonism"was used e.g. by Bayle in his Historical and Critical Dictionary, first published in 1697. On the wider context of the relationshipbetween skepticism and theology, see RichardH. Popkin, The History of Scepticismfrom Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley, 1979); "The Religious Backgroundof Seventeenth-CenturyPhilosophy," The CambridgeHistory of Seventeenth-CenturyPhilosophy, ed. Daniel Garberand Michael Ayers (Cambridge,1998); BarbaraShapiro,Probabilityand Certaintyin Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton,1983); H. G. Van Leeuwen, TheProblemof Certaintyin English Thought, 1630-1690 (The Hague, 1963); GerardReedy, TheBible and Reason: Anglicans and Scripture in Late Seventeenth-CenturyEngland (Philadelphia, 1985). 8 JohnDryden,"Religio Laici"(1682), lines 277-79; and see P. Harth,ContextsofDryden s Thought(Chicago, 1968). 9 Paolo Sarpi, The Historie of the Councel of Trent,tr. Nathaniel Brent (London, 1620). 10ThomasWhite, memorandumdated Rome, 7 November 1626; WA StonyhurstAnglia A VIII, no. 33.
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Suchproblemshad long concernedthe Catholicchurch,with the Reformation challenge to traditionalauthorityhaving been facilitated,if not made possible, by the translationsandprintedmultiplicationsreferredto by White." Sir ThomasMorebelieved that"thegreatarch-heretyke"Wycliffe haddeliberately corruptedthe Bible in his Englishtranslation,andthe post-Tridentineauthorization of the Latin Vulgate against its vernacularcompetitorswas designed to allay just such fears.l2But White's own early interest in such linguistic and literarymattersmay well have been fostered at a more personal level by his contact with William Rushworth,a fellow priest at Douai whose critical approachtowardslanguagehad led him, in Galileo's footsteps, to proposemathematicsas the model for precise and accuratecommunication.White describes with evident approvalhow Rushworthhad, even in the context of theological controversies,"affectedthe rigourof Mathematicalldiscourse."Indeed,he had set aboutapplyingthe same rigorto the very questionof biblical authorityand hadcountedat least threeways in which he thoughtthe text hadbeen corrupted. First, there were purposefulamendmentsby Jews or heretics (like Wycliffe, presumably).In these cases distortionswere likely to be few, but since they had been deliberatelychosen, they might prove particularly"importantand material."Secondcamethe non-deliberatemistakeswhich simplyderivedfromtranscribers'naturalnegligence.Thirdwere the textualcorruptionsintrudedby halfwitted scribes,who assumedthatthey neededto addtheirown interpolationsin orderto makesense of whatthey believedwere problematicpassages.Additionally, therewere those inevitableproblemswhich derivedfrom makingtranslations, especially when those translationswere made out of languages"now extinct";for the very natureof language itself is "subjectto continuall change, [andso] mustnecessarilybe very mutableandincertain."In the face of all these difficulties,it is smallwonderthatRushworthreachedthe depressingconclusion that" 'Tis impossible to demonstrateany thing out of barewords."13 The linguisticallybasedargumentconcerningthe deficienciesof the written recordof the scriptureswas then confirmedby Rushworthwith the application of furthermathematicalcomputations.He carefullycalculatedthe possibilityof textual error:taking into account the mistakes liable to be made throughthe centuriesby copyists and again the inevitableproblems of numeroustransla-
a So ThomasWhite:"Whodoes not know, before Printingwas invented,the Bible was not every mans money?" An Apology for Rushworths Dialogues (Paris, 1654), 46. Elizabeth Eisensteinagrees that "The adventof printingwas an importantpreconditionfor the Protestant Reformation,"The Printing Press as an Agent of Change (2 vols.; Cambridge, 1979), I, 310 (my emphasis). 12 See Alistair Fox, ThomasMore: History and Providence (Oxford, 1982), 154. Brian Walton,editorof the LondonPolyglot Bible (1657), claimed in his Prospectusto have freed the Scriptures"fromerror,from the negligence of scribes, the injuryof times, the wilful corruption of sectaries and heretics"(quoted by Eisenstein,Printing Press 11.695,my emphasis). 13 Rushworth,Dialogues, To the Reader;93-94; 105-9.
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tions, Rushworthconcludedthattherewas a likelihood of more thanfifteen or sixteen errorsfor every wordin the Bible; so "itwould be 15 or 16 to one, of any particularplace, that it were not the true Text." Such odds were clearly unacceptable,andit hadto be concededthatnothingwhatevercan be decidedon the basis of the scripturesalone:"Wherenothingbut Scriptureis admittedasjudge, all controversieswould be endedwith a 'Non liquet.' "14 For Rushworth,then,therewere good linguisticandmathematicallycalculatedgroundsfor rejectingthe Bible as the "ruleof faith";andit was essentially those groundsfor rejectionthatwere acceptedandlaterreiteratedby White and of 1659 Whitediscusses Sergeant.So, for example,in his Controversy-Logicke some problemswhich he believes arederivedfromthe very natureof language. With Rushworthhe accepts that languagechanges:the meaning of words in a text is not something that is timelessly fixed; thus simply appealingto some supposedly true "Grammaticalor Dictionary-sense"is insufficient. Rather,it has to be acceptedthatmeaningsfluctuatewith changingfashionsandthat"the downe rightsignificationof a word ... is morewaveringandchangeablethanthe Aspin leafe."An importantcorollaryfollows: argumentsbased upon linguistic points are necessarily insubstantial.They are mere "shuttle-cockearguments, which are easily bandyed from either side," but are ultimatelyindecisive and inconsequential-"a laudableexerciseforboyes, butunworthyof graveMen."15 Protestants,then,arecondemnedto perennialpuerilitybecausetheirdependence on the Bible deprivesthem of any pretensionsto the gravityconveyed by certainfaith.Theologically,the Bible may obviously have an importantpartto play, but only if complemented by independent evidence from elsewhere. "Oftentimesobscureandvery difficultto be discoveredandpenetratedinto,"it cannotafterall "beits own witness thatit selfe is the Mapto chuse the rightway by"; as a free-standingsource, it must always remainan unreliableand uncertain guide. So anyone "who hathno rule for his beliefe, besides the bare letter and words of Scripture,is subject to errour,throughevery passion and prejudice ..."16
"Passionandprejudice,"however,arenot the only, or even the most important,problems.Any historicalaccount,afterall, may be distortedin this manner. But morespecificallythe Bible's authoritysuffersfromits own furtherlinguistic complications,owing to the deliberateattemptsmade to accommodateits message to vulgarunderstanding.It is especially as a resultof this thatit is boundto fall far shortof the mathematicalprecision,which is necessaryif a text is to be accepted as reliable. In this respect it may be contrastedwith the mathematically-modeledphilosophicalworksof PlatoandAristotle:unlikethem,scripture "usesa quitedifferentmethod,deliveringits preceptswithoutconnexionbetwixt 14
Rushworth,Dialogues, 95, 97. Controversy-Logicke(Paris, 1659), 100-101, 108, 142. 16 Controversy-Logicke,50, 62; White in Rushworth,Dialogues, 278. 15 Thomas White,
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one another... [its style being] accommodatedto vulgar capacities."17So, as White explains elsewhere,the scripturesprovidewords effectively enoughbut "withoutpreciselydeterminingthe particularsense."Compared,then,with more philosophically-orientatedliturgiesintendedonly for "theLearned,"the Bible, althoughintrinsically"moresacredand venerable,"has its value curtailedas a resultof being writtenin a languageappropriateto the limited capacitiesof its very wide intendedaudience.18 Anotheraspect of this same problemis that popularizationoften requires the use of metaphorto makeany message morevivid andaccessible.Theremay, for example, be descriptionsof the physical descent of the Holy Ghost to the VirginMaryor of the sitting of Jesus Christat the righthand of his father.But such descriptionsare not to be taken literally:they are intendedsimply to be helpful aids to the understandingof ordinarypeople. Theologians,on the other hand,areintelligentenoughto realizethe physical impossibilityof such things; so that,while addressinghis assumedequals,Whiteexclaims:"Icannotbelieve you think it possible this meaning should be literally true."'9But where "the words of the Scriptureare Metaphorical' in this way, the additionalproblem arisesthatsome externalauthorityis neededto explicatetheirliteralmeaning.20 For Whitethis amountsto saying that"thetruesense"of theologicalmetaphorsneeds to be extractedwith the help of some alternativesource of knowledge, andit is preciselyherethathe thinksthe Catholics'advantagelies. Forthe Protestantlacks any such independentcheck, and is thereforeconsigned to the hell of uncertainty:"buildingall his faith upon the ambiguouswords of Scripture(so loud disputed,andeternallydisputable),[he] mustnecessarily,if he bee a rationallman,live in perpetualdoubt."21 The Catholicon the otherhandhas an independentcheck:he is supportedby his whole traditionandall the learningof the schools, and so can actually know "the sense of the Scripture... independentlyfromthe wordsof the Scripture."Thatenableshim uniquely"toexplicate and declarethe true sense"22and so to enjoy a certain rule of faith. Thatclaim for certaintywas reemphasizedby JohnSergeant.In his capacity as a Catholic-and more specifically Blackloist-champion and spokesmanin the "ruleof faith"debates,Sergeantinevitablybecomes involved first in questioningthe sufficiencyof the scripturalrecord;andlanguageagainemergesas a 17Apologyfor Rushworth,139. 18 Thomas White, Notes on Mr F D's Result of a Dialogue (Paris, 1660), 23-24. 19Thomas White, Religion and Reason (Paris, 1660), 9-10. 20 Thomas White, Devotion and Reason (Paris, 1661), 138; cf. Religion and Reason, 103. Kenelm Digby, A Discourse concerningInfallibilityin Religion (Paris, 1652), 224, makes the same point: "by the knowledge we have of God by naturallsciences ... we come to know, that many wordes and expressions delivered of him in Scripture,are to be understoodas spoken Metaphorically." 21 Controversy-Logicke,87; cf. Religion and Reason, 118. 22 Controversy-Logicke,62; Religion and Reason, To the Reader.
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primaryareaof concern.Presentinghimself as a fashionableempiricistin opposition to reactionaryrhetoricians,Sergeantaccuses his adversaries-including HenryHammond,JohnTillotson,andEdwardStillingfleet-of evadingthe real issues by takingrefugein linguisticquibbles,by resortingdeliberatelyto the use of ambiguities,andby generallyobscuringargumentsin an obfuscatingmaze of verbiage.Justlike the scholasticbuttsof FrancisBacon's earlierreformingzeal, the Protestantswere determined"notto studyThings,but Words;thatis, not to be Scholarsor Knowers, but EmptyTalkers";they were concernedonly with "vapourin wordishlearning,"andwith producingtheirown "giddyInterpretations of Private Fancies." In the absence of any agreed criteriafor choosing betweentheirgiddy interpretations, this led to a veritablydizzy "Bedlamof new Sects."23
But morepositively, Sergeantgoes on to insist thatsuch madnesscould be avoidedby Catholics,inasmuchas they alone could circumventall the difficulties of text-boundliteraryevidence. For they alone enjoy privileged access to anothermore authoritativesource:an unbrokenhistoricaltradition.It is in the elaborationof this conceptof "Tradition"thatthe Blackloistsbecome involved in those explicit considerationsof historiographywith which I am here concered.24
Tradition:Orality,Practice,and Empiricism "Oh,but, says one, Traditionset aside, Wherecan we hope for an unerringguide?"25 The queryof Dryden's spokespersonclearly representsthe Catholic-and more specificallyBlackloist-position by implyingthat"Tradition"constitutes the one "unerringguide."With the literary,scripturalbasis of Protestantfaith invalidated,an alternativefoundationfor belief is required,and is found in an earlierandmorereliablenon-literarytradition.As Drydenwrites elsewhere: "Beforethe word was written,"said the Hind, "OurSaviourpreached his faith to humankind ... Thus faithwas ere the writtenWordappeared, And men believed, not what they read,but heard."26 23 John Sergeant,SureFooting in Christianity(London, 1665), 165, 68, 73, 150; cf. Faith Vindicated(Louvain, 1667), 110; Errournon plust (n.p., 1673), 267. 24 See G. H. Tavard,The Seventeenth-CenturyTradition:A Study in Recusant Thought (Leiden, 1978) and Holy Writor Holy Church:The Crisis of the ProtestantReformation(London, 1959). 25 Dryden, "Religio Laici," lines 276-77. 26 John Dryden, "The Hind and the Panther"(1687), part II, lines 305-6; 322-23 (my emphases).
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Inmoreprosaictermsan admirerof Whitespecificallycitedas anotherBlackloist by John Tillotson, Hugh Cressy had much earlier(in 1647) writtenof an oral tradition-a tradition"moresecurefromerrourandmistakesthenwriting,"being, in words quotedfromEusebius,"notwrittenwith inke andon paper,butby the Spirittin mens heartes."27 Thatoraltraditionbecomes, as HenryHammond the Blackloists' "one inerrableruleof faith(thePope himselfbeing by Mr notes, White solemnly discardedfromhis Infallibility,to makeway for it)."28 Whitehimself distinguishesclearlybetween "Believersof the Wordtaught or delivered orally, and Believers of the word taught or delivered inpaper."29 It
is only the formerwho can claim to "speakauthoritatively"; it is only the Catholic church,with its specifically oraltradition,thatcan claim "to speakefromthe mouthof Christand of his Apostles."30KenelmDigby (anotherBlackloist, and life-long friend of White) similarlynotes that Christ'sdoctrinemight be conveyed throughthe ages by two possible routes:by writing or by oral tradition. But for one seeking religious infallibility,the formeris boundto be unsatisfactory:even when writtenwordsthemselvesarecorrectlytransmitted,they inevitablyremainsubjectto ambiguitiesof meaning.Communicating directlyin speech, on the otherhand,is a morepracticalmatter,andpeople can actuallybe seen to succeed in understandingeach other.So Digby concludes, "Whereasin a truth deliveredby writing,thoughthe wordesbe agreedupon,yet the meaningof them is disputed,"in an oral tradition,"thoughthe wordesbe uncertaine,""thesense is [nonetheless]constant."31 JohnSergeantreiteratesthatsame distinction,when he frequentlycharacterizesliterarytexts as "dead,"in contradistinctionto an oral traditionthat is practicaland living. "No Dead Testimonyor History has any Authority,"he insists, "butby virtue of Living Testimonyor Tradition."32 The life of Catholic traditionis ensuredby its accessibility not only to a moribundacademicelite butto "LearnedandUnlearned"alike. characteristically White himself is clearthatfaithis a democraticmatterin thatit mustbe readily accessible for all-"for learnedand unlearned,for yong and old, for wise and fooles, for Princesandpeasants,RabbiesandIdeotes."Sergeantconfirmsas an
Hugh Cressy,Exomologesis (Paris, 1647), 182, 174; cf. 175. Tillotson's identificationis in his Rule of Faith, 119. 28 Henry Hammond,The Dispatcher dispatch'd (London, 1659), 253. To claim papal infallibility becomes for White the arch-heresy,as subvertingthe unique claim of oral tradition: see TabulaeSuffragiales(London, 1655), 251-56, cited by R. I. Bradley,"Blaclo:An Essay in Counter-reform"(Ph.D. diss., ColumbiaUniversity, 1963), 192. 29 Rushworth,Dialogues, Preface. 27
30
Controversy-Logicke, 46.
Digby, Discourse, 184-85, 215. Cf. White, Apologyfor Rushworth,91-92, "Those who rely on Scriptureare in perpetualquarrelsabout the sense; wheras, to Catholicks,the sense of their Faith is certain,though the words be sometimes in question." 32Method, 338. Sergeantrefers to "anywrittenor dead Testimony"in, e.g., Sure-Footing, 112. 31
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advantageof the Catholic rule of faith, that it is indeed "able to satisfie the acutestDiscoursersand yet [is] understandableby the rudestvulgar."33 Thataccessibilityis in turnensuredthroughbeing derivedfromverypractical procedures:it is "theway of comingto Faithby the openuse of ourSenses." In a continuingoral transmissiondoctrineis not only handeddown personally from fatherto son throughthe generationsbut is also confirmedby relatedactivities. So far from being simply a matter of words, there is "a constant course of frequentand visible Actions conformableto those Words";and it is those "actions"which can actuallybe seen and heardby anyone.As Sergeant clarifies, such "actions"constitute a "living voice and practise visible to the whole World";and "we will trust our Eyes and Experience before your bare Word."Thatis to say, Catholics'traditionis subjectto empiricalinvestigation and confirmation,so theirfaith can claim to be "builton SensibleEvidence."34 The importanceof confirmingactivitieswhich canbe empiricallymonitored is reemphasizedby Sergeantin his Fifth CatholickLetter,where he invites his readersto imaginethe transmissionof anothertradition-that of celebratingthe gun-powderplot: Supposethe Anniversaryof the PowderPlot shouldbe kept on foot, by Ringing of Bells, Bonefires, Squibbs,and spitefull Preachingagainst All Catholicksindifferently...; I wouldknowof himwhethertheMemory of it, tho' kept alive by this PracticalSolemnitybut once a year,would not be perpetuatedfor thousandsof Generations,or how it should ever be forgot? Such annuallyrepeatedandpopularritualsas those commemoratingthe notorious Guy Fawkes areunlikely to fall into abeyanceor ever be forgotten,and for the perpetuationof practicaltraditionsof this kind, even hatredof Catholics must surely be less of a motivatorthan that concern for one's own salvation which lies at the root of Catholictheology.35 With their oral traditionunderpinnedby practicalactivities which can be empiricallymonitored,Catholicsare clearlyjustified in claiming absolutecer33 ThomasWhite,An Answer to the LordFaulklands Discourse
of Infallibilitie(16602), 3; Sergeant,Sure-Footing, 137. 34 Sure-Footing,202, 109, 41, 47, 73; Reason against Raillery (n.p., 1672), Preface;Second CatholickLetter(London, 1687), 79 (my emphases).Cf. John Belson, TradidiVobis(London, 1662), 79 (my emphases):"Traditionwith us signifies apublike delivery to a multitude,so as what was so delivered was setled in their understandingand rooted in their hearts by a constant visible practice." 35 Fifth CatholickLetter (London, 1688), 7. Cf. Method, 337: "It is Impossible that the Martyrdomof King Charlesthe First,or the horridPowderTreasonshould ever be forgotten,if the Anniversaryof them have a Continu'dObligationof celebratingsuch Mattersof Fact but once a Year;much more, were such Practicesoften repeated."
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tainty for their "rule of faith."Empiricismis the key: human beings may be cursedwith defective moralpartsand a rationalitywhich is liable to emotionally-deriveddistortionsbut at least theirsenses are reliable.Accordingto antisceptical Blackloist naturalphilosophy and psychology, our sense-organsreceive nothingless than"directImpressionsof Knowledge"fromnature.Those directimpressionsare referredto by Sergeantas "notions"-these constituting actual particles from external objects, and so being "the very Nature of the Thing"observed.Havingbeen simplyreceivedby us, therecanbe no possibility of any mistake:our straightforward receptionof externalrealityguaranteesthe acquisitionof realandcertainknowledge.Thatknowledgecanthenbe conveyed throughthe generationsin an essentiallymechanicalmanner,as in a chain or a gearingsystem, the originaldataare reliablylinkedto theirchronologicallyremote successors-the links in thatchain, or the interveningcogs, consisting of innumerablewitnesses.36 Now the natureof those witnesses is obviously crucial, and at this point theologybecomes furtherentwinedwith the theoryof historicalstudymoregenerally. Theology andHistoricalStudy " ... the degrees of certitudewhich Historycan affordus."37 WilliamRushworthhadearlierlinkedhis theologicaldiscussionwith wider historiographicalconcerns. Discussing the fallibility of some historicaltraditions, Rushworthconceded that even the reportof Adam and Eve's expulsion from Paradiseshouldbe treatedwith some care:for first it had to be noted that therewere at most only two (human)witnesses to the event-Adam and Eve, who themselveslackedanypreviousrelevantexperience-and second,the story itself appearedto be barely credible even to their audience at the time.38Two importantcriteriaforthe subject'sreliabilitywerethereidentified:first,thenumber of witnesses to an historicalevent and second, the intrinsiccredibilityof their story.These two remainedas crucialbench-marksin subsequentBlackloistdiscussions concerning"thedegrees of certitudewhich Historycan affordus." Those words are quoted from Thomas White's notoriousMiddle State of Souls, where, in a passage examiningthe foundationsof theological doctrines, 36
Sure-Footing,53, 222; Method, 2. Thomas White, TheMiddle State of Souls (London, 1659), 178. 38 Rushworth,Dialogues, 216. See also Cressy, Exomologesis, 299-303, for a discussion of degrees of certaintyin historicalstudy.Note too contemporaryinterestin the archaeologyof early ChristianRome: Catholics hoped and believed that archaeological and antiquarianresearchwould substantiatetheirtraditions;andthe firstclassic study,A. Bosio's Romasotterranea, appearedin 1632. See Amaldo Momigliano, The Classical Foundationsof ModernHistoriography (Berkeley, 1990), 73-74. 37
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he inevitablyfindshimselfembroiledin widerquestionsof historiography,since practitionersin both subjectsclaim to have knowledge which is derived from reportsfrom the past. Those reportsneed to be assessed in orderto determine their respective reliability,and so White outlines criteriafor their "degreesof certitude."Firstcomes absolutecertainty,wherereliabilityderivesfromthe sheer numberof witnesses, the numberof people willing andable to reportwhat they havepersonallyseen or experienced.It is attainedwhen, at a majorevent suchas the Battle of Pharsalia,"thething relatedwas done in the presenceand sight of thousands,confirmedlikewise by numerous,or, as it were, universaltestimonies."The second level of historicalcertaintyis slightlylower,since it lacks that strengthof numbers:it is, rather,"confirmedby few authorities."But its claims to credibilityare still high, as relatingto "a particularfact"which was empirically verifiableat the time andwhich remainsinherentlybelievable.By the third level, there are deficiencies in terms of both of Rushworth'scriteria:there is some obscurityin the storyitself, andthe numberof its attestantsis only small. At this thirdlevel, the concern is with "the delivery of secret transactionsand practices,fromsome wise andfaithfuleye-witness ...";and"here,"Whitenotes, despitethe known integrityof reportersandthe credibilityof theirreports,"the rightwhich Historyclaimsover ourassentsbegins to expire."Thatdegenerative processcontinueswith the last andlowest level of credibility-"the lowest floor that Historicalbelief can reside in." Here we have reportsthat have not been directlywitnessed by many,but "Certainarcanaor secrets [are]communicated from the thirdor fourthhand."39At this lowest level acceptancerequiresthat therestill remainssome link, however tenuous,between reporterandreported, andthatthe reportitself soundsnot entirelyimprobableor incredible. Thatanalysisof reliabilityin historicalstudyhas clearimplicationsfor such theologicalmainstaysas visions andrevelations.In discussingvariousclaims of such experiences,White concludes thatthey must remainhighly questionable. In termsof the criteriapreviouslyspecified by Rushworththese claims not only referto inherentlyunlikelyeventsbutalso almostinevitablylack any supporting witnesses. Claimantsto such experiencesarelikely to be peasantsor women, or simple folk suffering from melancholy or other mental abnormalities,and so they are inherentlyunreliable.Their claims, which by their naturetend to get embellishedanddistorted,areanywayimpossibleto confirmor refuteor even to check. It is hardly surprising,then, that White concludes that theologians are best advised to leave any such reportsof essentially private experiences well alone: theirvalidationcan be delegatedto historians;but unless some publicly observable,outwardeffectshaveresulted,verificationwill inevitablyprovequite 39 Middle State, 178-80. White, Apologyfor Rushworth,126, might be referringhere to the Cabala,which he describes elsewhere as derived from a traditionquite differentfrom that of Catholics: it is "a doctrinpretended,as deliver'd to few, with strict charge to keep it from publicity,"which offers "an opportunityfor jugling and cozenage."
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"impossibleto do."40White'sargumentunderminedthe Protestantclaimthatthe scripturesconsist of nothingless thansimple reportsof God's own revelations. Thishighlightedonce againthe deficienciesof the Protestantposition.Their theological weakness was derivedfrom a more generalhistoriographicalproblem:writtenhistorieswere simplyunreliable.Nor can one purelyliteraryrecord serve to authenticateany other,due to the lack of any criteriafor distinguishing a reliable from an unreliablesource. One could not even distinguishbetween "history"and "romance."A literarydocumentsurviving from the past might have been written as either one or the other, but generationslater no means remainedfor identifyingthe author'soriginalintention.So Sergeantconcludes that we are left "destituteof any Light to make the least difference between them"-between "history"and "romance"or, as we might say, between "fact" and "fiction."41 The unique advantageof the Catholicchurchbecomes clearer.Historyreemerges in its Aristotelianguise as a purely empirical subject: "Historycan testifie nothingbut what men can witness, nor men witness more thanthey can hearor see."42It is preciselythis sortof historyon which Catholicismrelied, for its oraltraditionwas confirmedby witnesses who have heardand seen, its doctrines authenticatedand "testifiedby so great a multitude,to have come from Christ."43 In any purelyliterarytraditionthe numberof witnesses is boundto be small:only a few people can testify as to any book's authorship.Even the scripturalrecordlacks any numericalweight of confirmation.But the practicalmatter of the apostles' actualpreachingwas an altogetherdifferentmatter,for this was witnessed andreportedon by "Multitudes."The very numberofattestants, if unanimous,makesit impossibleto believe eitherthatthey can all be wrongor thatthey all wish to deceive; and so one is broughtto "thatfirmandunalterable Assent we call Absolute Certainty."44Skepticismis once again overcome, and Catholictraditionprovides more certaintyeven thanthose ideal mathematical models, Euclid and Archimedes;"forit is more impossible, thatso greata part of mankindshouldlive in a continuallhypocrisieanddissembling,thanthatthe surestconsequencesGeometrycan make shouldbe false."45
40 Middle State, 168-71, 181; Devotion and Reason, 60-61. White correspondedwith Richard Baxter about the problems of evidence relating to spiritual experiences, and (Baxter Correspondence,MS no. 24, f. 125), wrote of being "very wary,... taking none but from those thatare pious andprudentpersons and of theirowne knowing or some otherway aequivalentto it."
41 42
Method, 338-39.
Devotion and Reason, 6. 43 White, Answer to Lord Faulkland, 22. 44Second CatholickLetter, 43. 37-38. The geometricalanalogy is continuedon p. 128. 45 Controversy-Logicke,
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Historiography "Pyrrhohimself never advancedany Principleof Scepticismbeyondthis." But has the geometrically-styled"absolutecertainty"of Catholictradition beenboughtatthepriceof historicalstudymoregenerally?Havethe Blackloists, in theireffortsto establishtheologicalcertainty,paradoxically,as Tillotsonclaims, furtheredthe cause of historicalpyrrhonism? White's own explicit interestin historiographyis indicatednot least by a numberof referencesto the VenerableBede, whose more extravagantaccounts of miracleshadpreviouslyproducedsome skepticism.Whiteactuallyquotesthe sixteenth-centurySpanishtheologianMelchiorCano,who criticizedthe historianfor having"setdown certainmiraclesvulgarlyreportedandcredited,which the Criticksof our Age will believe to be uncertain."But as White goes on to emphasize,historianscan only recordwhat is reportedto them. The troubleis thattherecan be no guaranteethatreporters,even if telling the truthas they see it, have not been deceivedby othersor arenot sufferingfromself-deception.For example, Bede may well have given an accurateaccountof"what Drithelmus not onley reported,but trulythought";but it was still possible thatDrithelmus himself hadbeen in "someway deluded."46 Suchskepticalquestioningof sourcesbecameincreasinglyfashionablewith the challenges to historical studies that derived from the biblical criticism of suchscholarsas IsaacLa Peyrere,ThomasHobbes,Spinoza,andRichardSimon. These finally demonstratedthat even the previously acceptedrecordof God's dealings with Moses was defective, and this inevitablyserved in turnto undermine the historicalpretensionsof any lesser mortals.The demolitionof scripturalauthoritycould not be achievedwithoutcollateraldamage.47 Sergeanthimself explicitly links his own theological argumentswith such wider historiographicalconcernsand raises, for example, the questionof what we can know about such a famous historical figure as Alexander the Great. Sergeantconcedes that one can have no reliable informationabout his more privatemomentsandquestionswhetherone is evenjustifiedin believingconventional accountsof public events such as his conquestof Asia.48One obviously could not dependon any literaryevidence for such things:Alexander'sscribes 46
Middle State, 163; Devotion and Reason, 57. White notes that Bede writes "as an historian should write" (55). 47 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Part 3, ch. 33. On La Peyrere and Simon, see Popkin, History of Scepticism,esp. ch. xi; Isaac La Peyrere (1596-1676): His Life, Work,and Influence (Leiden, 1987). 48 The choice of Alexander as a historical example may not have been fortuitous: cf. Eisenstein,Printing Press, 1.339: "It was not uncommon for the Old Testamentto be preceded by a life of Alexanderthe Greatin manuscriptBibles."
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were no more reliablethananyone else's. But in Alexander'scase as in that of Christ,one is fortunateto have an alternativebody of evidence derivedfrom a continuingoral andpracticaltradition,and one may feel justified in relying on that traditionbecause "Experiencetells us the memory ... is fresh and lively." Alexander'sconquestswere not everyday events: they paralleledearly Christianity in being somethingquite extraordinary,and they were describedat the time by a veritablemultitudeof eye-witnesses. Those originaltestifierswere so numerousthattherewas no possibility,again, of them all being mistakenor of their all being motivatedto deceive us. Rather,being deeply affectedby what they saw, andwith "theirHeartsandFancies full of it,"they naturally"burstout into Expressionof it,"andtold theirchildren.So the storywas passedon intothe next generation,fromthatto the next, andso on up to the present.Once again,as in the case of Christianity,a practicaltraditionof oral historypresentsus with informationso reliablethatwe can effectively still enjoy "perfectknowledgeof the Thing springing from ... Experimental Perception."49
The sameexampleandargumentis reiteratedby Sergeantin his laterMethod to Science. In the contextof yet anothertypicallyBlackloistrepudiationof skepticism,he againexplicitlytacklesthe subjectof historicalknowledgeandsounds optimisticaboutacquiringa high degree of certaintyaboutthe past. Originally witnessedthroughthe reliablemediumof the senses, the reportedexistence of a historicalentitysuch as JuliusCaesaror HenryVIIIor of a historicalevent such as Alexander's conquest of Asia can be orally transmittedthroughthe ages. Assumingthatthe originalattestantscan reasonablybe expectedto have hadthe experiencethey claimedandgrantingthatthey arerespectablepeople who have no cause to deceive, one may taketheirevidence as reliableeven if farremoved chronologically.One may thenreasonablyexpect to enjoy "Absolutecertainty" with respectto famoushistoricalfiguresandtheirpublicactions.Howeverskeptically we may view reportsaboutthem, We shall still find the Affirmativeof each of them writ in our Breastin such Indelible Characters,and so Solidly Imprintedthereby Nature(I say,by Nature,for thatCertaintywas notAcquir'dby StudyandSpeculation) that we can neverbe able to inventany kindof Reasonthatcan breed in us the least degree of Suspense, as to the Verityof these, and such like Mattersof Fact.50
49 Sure-Footing, 217-20. 50
Method, 341. Sergeantmay think that he has securedhis position by restrictinghistorical study to its essentially Aristotelianagenda of recording empiricallyverifiable particulars, or "mattersof fact,"but he is awarethat on his flank lie universals,which lie beyond the realm of empiricism and so of "UnerrableExperience"and "cannot be the Objects of Witnessing Authorityor Testimony."Method, 330.
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It sounds, then, as if empiricallyorientatedhistorians(then as now) could rest secure in the face of pyrrhonian(or postmodernist)challenges, but I shall concludeby reexaminingJohnTillotson'saccusationthat"Pyrrhohimselfnever advancedany Principleof Scepticism"beyond thatof the Blackloists. Conclusion:TowardsHistoricalPyrrhonism "If writtenwords fromtime are not secured, How can we thinkhave oral soundsendured? Which thus transmitted,if one mouthhas failed, Immortallies on ages are entailed."51 Drydensurelyhas a point:the erosionof trustin literaryhistorymust come to endangerthe securityof history supposedlyderivedfrom oral traditiontoo, for one weak link in the chain of transmissionentails the possibility of endless "lies." Even as Sergeantwas writing his later works, John Locke and Pierre Bayle explicitlynotedthe skepticalimplicationsof his recommended"oraltradition."For Locke the reliabilityof any reportwas boundto decreasewith intervening time: in a thinly veiled referenceto the Catholicrule of faith he insists that with "any testimony,the fartheroff it is from the original truth,the less force and proof it has.... The more handsthe traditionhas successively passed For Bayle, through,the less strengthandevidence does it receive fromthem."52 imwritten similarly,oralhistoryis boundto be even less reliablethanrecords mediatelyat the time of an event. A warypersonmust always ask, "if the Facts relatedwere committedto writingat the time they were fresh;andif it is told him no, butthe Memoryof them is preservedfromFatherto Son by word of Mouth, he knows well, that in such a case a wise Man will be a Sceptic."53 So with theirunderminingof writtenhistory,the Blackloistsarewell on the way to a more generalhistoricalpyrrhonism,and they were recognized at the time as being so by theirProtestantadversaries.JohnTillotsonconcedes thatan orallytransmittedtraditionmighthave claimedsome credibilityin the good old days beforethe Flood, when the populationwas small andwhen men hadbetter memoriesandcustomarilylived for six or seven hundredyears.Buthe considers it unlikelythatmodem men will prove infallible,andemulatingthe mathematically-mindedWilliam Rushworth,he calculates the odds of a message being accuratelyconveyed throughthreemodem generationsas only a million to one. So the corollaryfollows thatBlackloisteffortsto establishtheologicalcertainty
51 Dryden,
"Religio Laici," lines 270-73. Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding(London, 1690), IV, 16, 10. 53PierreBayle, An Historical and CriticalDictionary (originallypublished 1697; English tr., 4 vols; London, 1710-), II, 829. 52 John Locke, An
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have resultedin a yet morepervasivedoubt:"TomaintainInfallibilitie,they are forcedto runto the extremitiesof Scepticism."54 MericCasaubonsimilarlyfinds Sergeant'sassumedconfidencein oralityto be ill-founded:the seeminglycertain,scientificallybasedprinciplesof his newlyfangled oral traditionare in fact "ridiculous,...childish,... senseless," for their outcomeis the reductionof everythingto the statusof the fabulous:they "reduce all Story,all Truth,all Religion, to Esops Fables."The repudiationof any literarytraditionmustresultin the belief thatall books areredundant:apartfromthe oral,"alltestimoniesbecomeuseless";andthose invalidatedtestimoniesreferto "Scriptures,Councils, Fathers,or [significantly]History."55 The threatto historicalstudyis noted,too, by EdwardStillingfleet.It seems obvious to him thatan oraltraditionis no less fallible, andno less open to doubt, thanany literaryrecord: Why may not Men mistakethe Sense of Tradition,as well as the Sense of Scripture?Is Traditionmore Infallible in it self? Is it deliver'd by Persons more Infallible?Doth it make those to whom it is delivered Infallible?Why, then, may not those who deliver it, and those who receive it, both be mistakenaboutit?56 After all, when reportsare not committedto writing, accounts of people and events soon get corruptedand distortedand obscured.That is evidenced, for example,by the fantastictales handeddown aboutKingArthur.But the difficulties of historicaltransmissionare not confined to antiquity;they are revealed even in the very recentpast. For instance,althoughwritingwith the best will in the worldandwith every conceivableadvantage,a supposedlyaccuratereporter fromthe Council of Trent(Paolo Sarpi,no doubt)had alreadybeen accused of partialityandprejudice: Thoughhe had all the advantagesimaginableof knowing all proceedings in it, living at the sametime, conversingwith the personspresentat it, having the memoiresand recordsof the Secretariesthemselves, yet his story is since endeavoured to be blasted ... as fictitious.57 54 Tillotson, Rule of Faith, 83-84. 55Meric Casaubon, To J.S., the author of Sure-Footing ... (London, 1665), 13, 20. Sergeant himself, A Letter of Thanksfrom the Authour of Sure-footing to his Answerer (Paris, 1666), is awareof accusationsthat he is "bringingHistory ... into Incertainty";but he is confident that "the Assuredness of History,"no less than that of faith, is guaranteedby an oral tradition. 56 EdwardStillingfleet,A Discourse concerning the Nature and Groundsof the Certainty of Faith (London, 1688), 42-43. 57 Edward Stillingfleet, A Reply to Mr J. S. (London, 1666), 85. Cf. 83: "Doth not the constantexperience of all times prove that where any history hath not been timely recorded,it hath been soon corruptedby notoriousfalsities, or obscuredby fabulousreports?"
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In the erosion of a distinctionbetween the "factual"and "fictitious,"the Blackloistsinadvertentlyplayedtheirpart.Throughunderminingscripturalauthority,they exposed the potential for errorin any literarytext; and Sergeant more particularlyhad warned that the validity of any surviving text must be highly questionable,since alternativeand possibly contradictory,accounts of the past might well have been lost. The consequence of that theological argument for historiographyis spelt out by Tillotson,when he accuses Sergeantof going even furtheralong the scepticalhigh-roadthanPyrrhohimself. Forif one has to be absolutely certain that no alternativeaccount of an event has ever existed before they can be justified in giving credenceto any historicalrecord, they can never be absolutely sure about anything;and that must apply to accounts fromboth literaryand oral traditions: If this be requisite,to make every Historicalrelationcredible,to know certainlythat it was not contradictedby any of those Books which we do not know what they were, nor what was in them, we can have no certaintyof any ancientFact or History. It is here thatBlackloist skepticismexceeds thatof Pyrrhohimself.58 Whatevertheirintentions,then, the Blackloists' insistenceon an oraltradition to provide and substantiatetheir certain "rule of faith" contributedto a progressive underminingof certaintyin historical study more generally.Not only did they help to expose the many difficultiesassociatedwith the transmission of writtenrecords,but they substitutedan oral traditionwhich could ultimatelyprove of no greatercredibility. In the face of thatskepticalcrisis, a pragmaticway forwardseemed, to men such as Tillotson,Locke, andBayle, to lie in the acceptanceof"moralcertainty" or "common-sense"notions of probabilityboth in theology and in history (as well as in naturalphilosophy):59 Eitherwe mustdestroyall Historicalfaith out of the world,andbelieve nothing(thoughnever so much attested)but what we see ourselves, or else we mustacknowledge,thata moralcertaintyis a sufficientfoundation for an undoubtedassent.60 58
Tillotson, Rule of Faith, 102, 138. Stillingfleet, Discourse, 99, similarly concludes that Sergeant'sposition does "indeedlead to an IncurableScepticism in the Churchof Rome." 59 See also Joseph Glanvill, Letters and Poems in Honour of Margaret Cavendish(London, 1676), 138, on the criteriafor subscribingto belief in witches: "theevidence of the Senses, and Oaths of sober Attestors, and the critical inquiriesof Sagacious, and suspitious Persons." 60 Edward Stillingfleet, Origines Sacrae (London, 1662), 112. As Stillingfleet concludes elsewhere,Letterto a Deist (London, 1677), 27: "All thatI desire is thatyou will give an assent of the same Natureto the Historyof the Gospel, thatyou do to Caesar,or Livy, or Tacitus,or any other ancient Historian."
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The Blackloistswouldneverconcedeto thatproposeddiminutionof"certainty," but their own argumentsultimately helped to make its adoption inevitable. Throughtheir certainty-directedtheology, they contributedto thattraditionof historicalpyrrhonism, whichhasculminatedin ourown millennialpostmoderism.
Universityof Hertfordshire,England.
Schiller's of
Landscape
Theory Depiction Jason Gaiger
This paperoffers a criticaldiscussion of the theoryof landscapedepiction which FriedrichSchillerdeveloped in an importantbut neglected articleon the workof FriedrichMatthisson,publishedin 1794.1The questionof the value and status of landscapepainting and poetry was far from settled at the end of the eighteenthcentury,and Schiller's essay shouldbe seen as makingan important contributionto an ongoing debate.2The second half of the eighteenthcenturyis markedby a profoundambivalencetowardsthe naturalworld. On the one hand there is a remarkable"rediscovery"of nature,evidenced in such diverse but relatedphenomenaas the vogue for Englishgardensandthe appreciationof wild and "untamedplaces," such as the Alps and the Herz mountains.It is also the age of "sentiment," embracinga heightenedsensitivityto all aspectsof thephysical world. And yet when we turn to the visual arts, we find landscape painting rankedfar below history painting and portraiture.Precedence is given to the representationof humanactions and emotions, and the depictionof the human figureremainsthe highest goal of ambitiousart. The modem hierarchyof the genreswas firstestablishedon a firmtheoretical and practicalbasis with the founding of the FrenchRoyal Academy in the seventeenth century.The painter of living animals is rankedhigher than the
1 Friedrich
von Matthisson (1761-1831) was widely read in the eighteenth century but remains little known today. Schiller appearsto have taken his work as representativeof the new genre of "naturepoetry."The most importantfigure here is James Thomson, whose "The Seasons"was enormouslypopularthroughoutEurope. 2 See, for example, Salomon GeBner,"Brief iiber die Landschaftsmahlerey,"in, Johann CasparFifBli,Geschichteder bestenKiinstlerin der Schweiz,III,(Zurich,1770);JohannHeinrich Der TeutscheMerkur,No. 9 (Sept. 1777);JohannGeorg Merck,"Uberdie Landschaftsmalerei," Theorie der sch6nen Kiinste (Leipzig, 1777); Carl Ludwig Sulzer, "Landschaft,"Allgemeine Femow, "Ueberdie Landschaftsmalerei,"in Der neue TeutscheMerkur,I, 11 and 12 (Nov. and Dec. 1803).
115 2000byJouralof theHistoryof Ideas,Inc. Copyright
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painterof inanimatenaturewho depicts "choses mortes et sans mouvement."3 The painterof humansubjects,who imitates"themost perfect work of God," standshigherstill. The highest achievementto which the artistcan aspire,however, is history painting,the depiction of groups of figures in themes derived frombiblicalandmythicalsources.To achievethis, the artistcannotdepictwhat he sees but must employ both knowledge and imagination.The fundamental opposition here is between painting as a merely imitative or mechanical art, which is addressedto the eye alone, and painting as a work of "invention"or which is addressedto the mind.Onlythe latterconstitutesa prop"imagination," erly liberal art, entitling the painterto stand alongside the poet as "un auteur ingenieux et savant"over and above the mere artisanor skilled laborer. The greatpopularityenjoyedby landscapepaintingin the seventeenthand eighteenthcenturieswas not met by any comparableelevation in its statusas a fine art.Addressingstudentsof the Royal Academy in Londonin 1770, Joshua Reynoldscould continueto dismisslandscapeandstill-life as the "meanerwalks of painting"which requireonly "mechanical"expertise.4For Reynoldsthe status of painting as a fine art is established through its treatmentof the great subjects of history painting, that is, the depiction of humanpassions and the intellect.Only in tacklingsuch themes does the artistsucceed in addressingthe imagination,which Reynolds describesas the "greatend of art."5Although of comparativelyrecentorigin,the genre of"landscapepoetry"remainedequally problematicand could not easily be reconciledwith classicist ideals. New categories seemedto be requiredto comprehendthe workof poets suchas Albrecht von HallerandJamesThomson,in which the variedandever-changingaspects of the naturallandscapewere madethe centralprotagonistsof the poetic drama. While traditionalforms such as the bucolic, the Arcadian,and the pastoralallowed the depiction of ruralexistence, the new "descriptivepoetry"sought to celebratethe life of natureindependentlyof man's interveningpresence: it is natureitself ratherthan man's relationto naturewhich is made the poet's primaryconcern. Schiller's review of the third,expandededition of Matthisson'spoetry appearedin two partsin the JenaerAllgemeineLiteratur-Zeitung,11-12 September 1794. While the second half of the review is given over to a detaileddiscussion ofMatthisson'spoetry,the firstpartis reservedfor an extendedtheoretical discussion in which Schilleraddressesthe questionof the possibility and status of landscapedepiction. Schiller concedes that before he can evaluate the particularqualitiesof Matthisson'sverse, he must firstestablishthe significanceof 3 Andre F1libien, "Preface"to Conferencesde I 'Academieroyale de peinture et de sculpture pendant l'annee 1667, in Alain Merot (ed.), Les Conferences de l'Academie royale de peinture et de sculptureau XVIIesiecle (Paris, 1996), 50-51. 4 See, RobertWark(ed.), Sir Joshua Reynolds, Discourses on Art (London, 1997), 51. 5 Ibid., 59.
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the genre to which the poet has devoted his powers. It is this which forms the substanceof the theoreticalfirst section, in which Schiller's declaredgoal is to establish"thefundamentalprinciples[Grundsdtze]throughwhich the value of suchpoetrycan be assessed."6The review belongs to a periodof intensecritical reflection on the arts, promptedboth by Schiller's attemptto understandthe deepermechanicsof his own craftandby a close readingof Kant,above all the CritiqueofJudgment(1790), which he began to readin March1791. The early monthsof 1793 saw Schiller's importantexchange of letterswith K6rner,now known as the Kallias-Briefe,as well as the publicationof his essay "OnGrace and Dignity."It was in this year, too, that he began the series of letters to the Duke ofAugustenburgwhich receivedtheirfinal,publishedformas the Letters on the AestheticEducationof Man in 1795. That Schiller found it necessary to preface his discussion of Matthisson's poetrywith an extendedenquiryinto the very legitimacyof landscapepoetryas a genreor type of poetic expressionreflectsnot only his increasinglytheoretical bent of mind but, as I shall arguehere, an intrinsicincompatibilitybetween the subjectmatterof landscapeandthe classicist frameworkto which he was committed.In the Matthissonreviewwe see Schillerattemptingto reconcilehis own, largelypositive responsesto landscapepoetry andpaintingwith the severe restrictionsplaceduponappropriatesubjectmatterby classicist aesthetics.I show thathis attemptto establishthe statusof landscapedepictionas a formof "beautiful art"drawsuponkey distinctionswhich Kanthaddevelopedin the Critique ofJudgment.The questionis whetherthe objects andevents which makeup the naturalworldpossess "necessity,"thatis, whetherlandscapesubjectsprovidea sufficient basis for securing sharedor intersubjectivelyvalid responses in the spectator.In contrastto laterRomantictheorieswhich emphasizethe value of each individual'sown personalresponsesto the naturalworld, Schillerremains committedto the universalistideals of his age. It is the conflict generatedby these ideals which leads him to develop the theoryof the "musicalstructure"of landscapedepictionwith which we areconcernedhere. Schillerbegins the Matthissonreview with the observationthatin the high period of Greek art scant attentionwas paid to landscapepainting. What has been less remarkedupon, he claims, is that the ancients offer us equally few examplesof landscapepoetryas a distinctgenreor type of poetry.He points out that it is one thing if inanimatenatureis treatedmerely as the "locationfor an action"and quite anotherif natureherself is made the subjectof the depiction, with humanactorsappearingmerely as figureswithin it. AlthoughHomermay FriedrichSchiller,"UberMatthisonsGedichte,"in HerbertMeyer (ed.), Schillers Werke, Nationalausgabe,XXII (Weimar,1958), 266; and see Michael Podro, TheManifold in Perception: Theoriesof Artfrom Kant to Hildebrand(Oxford, 1972). 6
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remainunsurpassedas a "painterof nature"in the truth,individuality,and vividness of his descriptions,it is the "modems"who were the first to consider inanimatenaturea subject worthy of depiction for its own sake. Whereasthe ancientsrestrictedthe domainof artto what was human,or resembledthe human,the modemshaveby contrastsucceededin enrichingthe domainof artwith "anew province."7Schillergoes on to suggest, however,thatthe Greeks'indifferenceto landscapepoetryandpaintingshouldnot be tracedbackto any lack of sensitivityto the delightsof the naturalworld.Rather,it seems moreplausibleto assume that these "connoisseursand passionatelovers of nature"deliberately scornedsuch subjectmatter,findingit "incompatiblewith theirconceptof beautiful art."8Schillerobservesthat"eventoday,rigoristsstill hesitateto acceptthe landscapepainteras a genuine artist."9Thus, althoughlandscapepaintingand poetry representa recognizably moder genre of art, their status remains far fromsecure. Schillerrespondsby declaringthatit is not the subjectmatter(Stoff) butthe mannerof treatment(Behandlungsweise) whichmakesthe artistorpoet:a kitchen as much as a moral treatise can be made the subject of a selfimplementjust subsistentwork of artif carriedthroughin the "appropriateway."However, it soon becomes clear thatnot all types of subjectmatterare in fact amenableto appropriatetreatment.The questionis whetherpaintingsor poems which have as theirsubject"inanimatemasses of nature"can be consideredworksof"beautiful art,"thatis, "worksin which an ideal is possible."10The problemSchiller raisesis whetherthe contingentandunregulatedappearanceof the naturalworld can in factbe raisedto the level of the "ideal."Fromthe perspectiveof classicist aesthetics, the diffuse and ever-variedforms of the naturallandscape appear resistantto the ennobling and orderingvocation of art. The artist should not simply reproducethe particularityand literaltruthof things as encounteredin experience but should seek to representthe idea of their perfection, which is formed in the mind. Consideredin isolation from humangoals and purposes, however, the objects and events of the naturalworld appearto lack any higher animatingidea which could informor give directionto the constructionof such ideal or generaltruths.
7 "Uber MatthisonsGedichte,"
op cit., 265. Schiller includes among the "modems"contemporariesof Pliny the Elder (23-79 AD),therebydating the beginning of the modem period back to the Roman empire. He may well have had in mind Pliny's references to landscape painting in volume XXXV of his Historia Naturalis. Of particularimportancehere is Pliny's descriptionof the work of the painterStudius,who was active in the era of Augustus(Historia Naturalis, XXXV, 116-17). See ErnstGombrich,"The RenaissanceTheory of Art and the Rise of Landscape,"in Norm and Form: Studies in the Art of the Renaissance (London, 1966). 8 "Uber MatthisonsGedichte," op cit., 266. 9 Ibid., 265.
'oIbid.,266.
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Schillerhad declaredhis commitmentto the idealizing vocation of artin a highly criticalanddestructivereview of GottfriedAugust Burger'spoetry,published some threeyears earlierin 1791.1 Lamentingthe divisions manifestboth in humansociety and in the exercise of our mentalpowers, Schillermaintains that it is poetry alone which can restore us to "humanwholeness," reuniting reasonandimaginationin harmoniousco-operation.It is only by attaining"ideal generality"thatthe poet is ableto exercisean "ennoblinginfluenceon his age."12 He declaresin sovereigntones thatthe task of the poet is: to liberatewhat is excellent in his subject ... from coarser,or at least foreignadmixtures,to gatherthe rays of perfectionwhich are scattered in several objects into one, to subordinateto the harmonyof the whole those individual traits which disturbcorrectproportion,and to raise what is local and individualto the level of the universal.13 In Schiller's view Burger'sfailure is to have sought to write "popular"poetry ratherthanraisinghis work to the level of the "ideal."The poet who is initiated into the mysteriesof the beautiful,the noble, andthe trueshouldseek to drawthe people up to this divine originratherthandebasinghis verse throughdescending to the level of theireverydayexistence. We shall miss the real importof Schiller's enquiryinto the status of landscapepaintingandpoetry,however,if we do not attendto the specificallyKantian force which he gives to the phrase"beautifulart."Throughoutthe Matthisson review, Schilleremploys the term"beautifulart"(sch6ne Kunst)not only in its traditionalsense of "fine art"but in oppositionto thatwhich is merely "agreeable"(angenehm).AlthoughSchillerdoes not mentionKantby name,the source of this distinctionis to be locatedin Kant'sCritiqueofJudgment.In the section entitled"OfBeautifulArt,"Kantfirst separatesthe merely "mechanical"artof makingsomethingfromthe "aesthetic"artof producingsomethingwith the intention that it give rise to a feeling of pleasure.He then divides the "aesthetic arts"into those which areto be called "agreeable"(angenehm)andthose which are properlycalled "beautiful"(schon).14 The purposeof an agreeableart is to 1 Schiller's review of Burger's poetry was first published in the Allgemeine LiteraturZeitungon 15 and 17 January1791. Here, too, Schiller used a review of the work of a contemporarypoet as an opportunityto elaboratehis own views on the vocation and requirementsof poetry.The vehemence of Schiller's remarksis at least partiallyto be accountedfor by the fact thatthe Burgerreview is also a form of self-criticism-a declarationof Schiller's conversionto classicist values after the impassioned"Sturmand Drang"of his earlieryears. 12"UberBurgersGedichte,"Schillers Werke,Vol. XXII, op cit., 246. Cf. Schiller's claim (ibid., 253), that "One of the first requirementsof the poet is idealisation,ennoblement,without which he ceases to deserve the name." 13
14
Ibid.
ImmanuelKant, Critiqueof Judgment,?44, Ak. 305 (section numberand paginationof the Akademieausgabe);tr. WernerPluhar(Indianapolis,1987).
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provideus with entertainment.HereKantincludesskills such as the artof telling storiesor of furnishinga tableso thatpeople will enjoy themselves.Beautifulor fine art,by contrast,gives rise to a pleasurethatis not based on mere sensation but is rathera "pleasureof reflection."15 Kant maintainsthat only the pleasuretaken in beautifulart possesses the characterof"universalcommunicability,"therebysuggestingthatit is only the beautifulartswhich can be made the object of a judgmentof taste. Kant's distinctionbetweenthe agreeableandthe beautifulartsthusremainsclosely linked to his earlierdistinctionbetween two differentsortsof aestheticjudgment.The first, a judgmentof "liking,"is the expressionof a merely personalpreference for something.A judgment of this sort is of purely subjectivevalidity, and we experienceno sense of contradictionwhen someoneelse'sjudgmentdiffersfrom ourown. Whenwe makeajudgmentof "taste,"however,we go beyondourown private liking for the object and raise a claim which is extended to all other judging subjects.On Kant'saccount"Ajudgmentof taste requireseveryoneto assent;andwhoeverdeclaressomethingto be beautifulholdsthateveryoneought to give his approvalto the object at handandthathe too shoulddeclareit beautiful."'6In Kant'stechnicalvocabularya judgmentof beautypossesses the modality of necessity. When we make a judgmentof taste we raise a claim to universality;we believe we areentitledto solicit or demandthe agreementof everyone else. For Schiller the oppositionbetween "beautiful"and "agreeable"art takes the full force of Kant'sdistinctionbetween these two differentformsof aesup theticjudgment.While the pleasurewe take in a work of merely agreeableart rests upon sensationalone and is of merely subjectivevalidity,the "reflective" pleasuretakenin a work of beautifulartpossesses the statusof "necessity"and can, in principleat least, be extendedto all otherjudging subjects.The question for Schiller is whetherthe representationof landscapesubjects should be relegated to the subjectivecategoryof the merely agreeableor whetherit can be countedas a formof beautifulart.This problemin turncan only be resolvedby determiningwhetherthe pleasurewe take in the depictionof landscapesubjects possesses the characterof "necessity,"thatis, whetherwe have here to do with a form of pleasure whose basis is not merely private but imputableto other humanbeings. The questionas to whetheran artwhich depictsnon-humansubject mattercanbe termed"beautiful"thusturnsout to mean:Cansuch artplease in a non-contingentway? To anyone familiar with Kant's Critique of Judgmentthis question will come as a source of some surprise.For throughoutthe "Critiqueof Aesthetic
15 16
Ibid., ?44, Ak. 306. Ibid., ?19, Ak. 237.
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Judgment"it is objects of naturalbeauty which form Kant's paradigmaticinstance of purejudgmentsof taste. Indeed,it is naturalobjects such as flowers, birds,and even crustaceans,whose "freebeauty"Kantconsidersideally suited to bringaboutthatunconstrainedplay of the facultiesof imaginationandunderstanding,which lies at the heartof his accountof ourpleasurein the beautiful. Moreover,as concerns the deeper connection which Kant draws between the appreciationof beautyandman's moralvocation, he insists thatwhile an interest in artisticbeauty "providesno proof whatsoeverthat [someone's] way of thinkingis attachedto the morally good, or even inclined towardit," a direct interestin the beauty of nature"is always the markof a good soul" and "indicates at least a mentalattunementwhich is favourableto moralfeeling." Schiller'sprimaryconcernin the Matthissonreview,however,is with a set of problemswhich Kantscarcelytouchesupon in the CritiqueofJudgment.His theoreticalinvestigationsremainclosely connectedwith his own work as a poet and dramatist;at the forefrontof his enquiries lies the relation between the audience'sresponseto a play or poem and the artist'sintentionalrealizationof certaineffects. In contrastKantremainscuriouslyunconcernedwith the linkage betweenthe accountof aestheticresponsepresentedin the firstpartof the "Critiqueof AestheticJudgment"andthe accountof geniusandof the actualproduction of works of artwhich he develops in its final sections. Accordingto Kant, the pleasurewe experiencein apprehendinga beautifulobject arises from the achievementof a harmoniousaccordbetween the higherfacultiesof cognition. The experienceof beautyallows the facultiesto enterinto a stateof free play in which we become conscious merely of the object's"subjectivepurposiveness" for our faculty of cognition in general.The uniquenessof aestheticexperience lies in the fact that it is able to satisfy the understanding'sdemand for unity without subsumingwhat is given in experience under a determinateconcept. The freedomof the imaginationis broughtinto a stateof unconstrainedaccord, or harmony,with the lawfulnessof the understanding. The questionwhich Schillerraises and which Kanthad left unansweredis how it is possible to create a work of art, in which the artistmust necessarily seek to guide or directthe responses of the audience,without at the same time restrictingthe freedom of the imagination,which provides the key to Kant's accountof ourpleasurein the beautiful.Schillerapproachesthis conundrumby means of a definition or "explanation"(Erkldrung)of poetry.This is statedas follows:poetryis "theartof bringingaboutparticularfeelingsoremotionsthrough a freeeffectof ourproductiveimagination." Thisdefinitionis nothis own, Schiller tells us, buttakenup fromamongstthe manyin currentcirculation.Whatmakes it useful, however,is the way in which it revealsthe conflictingdemandswhich the poet faces. Schillerformulatesthese demandsas follows:
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The first requiresthat [the poet] allow our power of imaginationfree play andself-determination,butthe secondrequiresthathe nonetheless be certain of the effect which he producesandbe able to generatespecific feelings or impressions.17 Schiller's proposedresolutionof this contradictionis expressed in a typically compressedand seemingly unworkabledesideratum.He tells us that the poet "mustdictateto our imaginationonly thatpathwhich it would itself pursue,in its full freedomand in accordancewith its own law."'8It is at this point thatthe problemof"necessity"returnsin its full significance,for on Schiller'saccount, it is only wherethe poet follows the "lawof necessity"thathe can be certainthat he has gone beyondwhat is merely subjectiveor arbitraryin his own responses. Only in the domain of "necessity"can the poet be confident that he has succeeded in appealingto what is universallysharedby every readeror memberof the audience. For the poet or painterto fulfil the dual requirementwhich Schiller has established,he mustfirst"submithimself to the law throughwhich the imagination worksin all subjects."19 He mustraisehimselfbeyondanythingwhichmight to his own belong merelyprivateor idiosyncraticreactionsto the objectat hand and succeed in graspingthe "pureobject."Indeed,it is only when the poet responds "not as this or that particularindividual(in which the concept of the species is always limited) but as a humanbeing as such that he can be certain that everyone else will respond in the same way as himself." The task of the poet, then, is to reflect upon the particularassociationsand emotionswhich the object awakensin him so as to distinguishwhat is merely subjectivein his responses fromwhatis genuinelyuniversal.Forit is only by excludingeverything thatbelongs to himself as a uniqueindividualthatthe poet can seek to guide the responsesof othersin a non-impositionalway. The poet's success in transcendinghis own merely subjectiveassociations and responses depends in turn on his being able to identify some "objective connection"betweenappearancesandnecessity.For Schiller,however,no such connectioncan be foundoutside the sphereof humancharacterandaction: In those domainsof naturewhich the landscapepainterand landscape poet make theirown, the determinacyof forms and of combinationsof forms is lost in a curiousway; not only are the shapes here more arbitraryand appeareven more so, but contingency plays a role in their arrangementwhich is highly burdensometo the artist.20 17
"Uber MatthisonsGedichte,"op cit., 267.
18Ibid. 19 20
Ibid., 268. Ibid., 270.
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Views of naturalscenery,it appears,offer no objective rule by which the poet can ensurethatthe pathtakenby his imaginationwill be in accordancewith the imaginationof his audience.Thepoet,accordingly,is confrontedwithtwo equally unhappyalternatives.Eitherhe must arbitrarilyimpose his own orderon the subjectmaterial,therebycontraveningthe firstrequirementthatthe poet should notrestrictthereader'sifreedom of imagination,orhe mustacceptthatthereader's responsesto his workwill not standin any necessaryconnectionwith his artistic intentions.This would contravenethe second requirement,thatthe artistshould awakenspecific feelings or impressions. The upshotof Schiller's reflectionsis the exclusion of naturalscenery as a possible subjectfor works of beautifulart: The realmof determinateformsdoes not extendbeyondanimalbodies and the humanheart;consequentlythese two alone allow of an ideal. Above man (as appearance)thereare no longer any objects for art,but only for science; for here the domain of the imaginationcomes to an end. Below man there are no objects for beautifulart,but only for the agreeable,for here the realmof necessity is closed.21 Schiller'ssearchfor the "fundamentalprinciples"whichunderliethe evaluation of landscapedepictionthus leads him to reendorsethe position from which he startedout:the restrictionby the "wise ancients"of bothpoetryandpaintingto the sphereof humanity.The "necessity"requiredof beautifulart"residesexclusively in humannature."In contrastthe subject matterof landscaperemains At this stage Schillerappearsto have "trappedin a lower gradeof perfection."22 succeededonly in confirmingthe positionwhichhe set outto challenge.The low esteem accordedto landscapepoetryandpaintingis explainedby the contingent characterof its subjectmatter,which does not allow the representationof higher, generaltruths.Since such artdeals with "things"ratherthan ideas, it does not provide a sufficientbasis for sharedor intersubjectivelyvalid responses.Here the "realmof necessity is closed"andwith it the possibilityof producing"beautiful"art.If the "newprovince"acquiredby the modems is to participatein the aims and ambitions of high art, Schiller must find a new frameworkfor the understandingand appreciationof landscapesubjects.
21
Ibid., 269-70.
22
Ibid., 271.
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As I have alreadysuggested, Schiller's experienceof successful works of landscapepaintingand poetry does not allow him to rest with the conclusions statedabove.Thedilemmawhichhe hasidentifiedandindeedexacerbatedthrough his interpretationof Kant'sdistinctionbetween the "beautiful"and the merely "agreeable"demands a more satisfactoryresolution. As Schiller himself observesatthe outsetof the Matthissonreview,"Whoeverstill feels freshandalive within themselves the impressionmade by Claude Lorrain'smagician'sbrush will be difficultto persuadethat it is not a work of beautifulbut only of agreeable artwhich has so delightedhim."23How thenis the significanceof landscape poetryandpaintingto be establishedif the depictionof non-humansubjectmatter is excluded fromthe domainof what can be universallyappreciated? Schiller's ingenious and far-reachingsolution is to arguethat althoughthe "necessity"requiredforbeautifulartcannotbe foundin the indeterminateforms of the naturalworld, the depiction of a landscapecan nonethelessbe made to carrya universalcontentby servingas a "symbol"of humanideas andfeelings. Schiller's argumentis based upon an analogy between the art of music and of landscapedepiction.This argumentrequires,however,thathe focus exclusively upon the formalelements of landscapecomposition.Justas music succeeds in representingnot the contentbutthe formof humanemotion,"accompanyingand makingsensiblethe innermovementsof the soul throughanalogicaloutermovements,"so landscapepaintingandpoetrycan representthe "innermovementsof the human heart."24Every composition, whether painting, poem, or piece of music, contains a "musicalstructure"which remainsdistinctfrom its "logical structure."In so far as landscapepoetry or landscapepaintingare "musicalin their effect" (musicalisch wirkt),they can be seen as a "representationof our Since the inner facultyof feeling, and,as such, an imitationof humannature."25 movements of the soul take place accordingto "strictlaws of necessity" and since this necessity "passesover into the outermovementsthroughwhich it is expressed,"both music and landscapedepiction,when consideredas articulations of humanemotion, can attainthe statusof beautifulart.26The landscape painterwho employsthe contrastandmodulationof colorsto articulatethe form of humanemotions"is no longeran imitatorof commonnaturebuta truepainter of the soul."27 Schiller goes on to argue that landscapepoetry and painting are able to representnot only humanideas and emotionsbut also humanideas, especially the idea of man's moralvocation. Here he drawson the accountof beauty as a
23
Ibid., 266. Ibid., 272. 25 Ibid., 271-72. 24 26
Ibid.
27
Ibid., 272.
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symbol of morality which Kant had developed in the Critiqueof Judgment. Kanthad suggestedthatthe freedomfrom externalconstraintwhich characterizes the relationbetweenthe imaginationandthe understandingin the appreciation of beauty could serve as a symbol of the freedom of the moral will from externaldeterminationby the laws of nature.Similarly,Schiller claims that in the "free play" of the symbolizing imaginationreason recognizes a "sensible image"of its own activities.Whenthis takesplace, he argues,"thedeadletterof naturebecomes the living languageof spiritandthe outerandthe innereye read the same scriptof appearancesin wholly differentways."28The coordinationof color and line in space or of soundsin time representsa "naturalsymbol"of the inneragreementof the soul with itself. Thusit is thatthe "charmingharmonyof forms,tones, andlightwhich delightsouraestheticfeeling now also satisfiesour moralfeeling."29While the composerandthe landscapepainterprovidea symbolic representationof human ideas and human emotions solely throughthe forms of sound and color, the landscapepoet possesses the furtheradvantage that,by means of words,he can providethe symbolismof the imaginationwith a definite content.Schillermaintains,however,thatthereare strictlimits to the extent to which the poet can stipulatethe meaning of his verse, for too greata degreeofdeterminacywill be felt as an "oppressiveburden"anda restrictionof the reader'sfreedomof imagination. In these passages Schiller offers what appearsto be a strikinglymodem defense of the purelyformalqualitiesof landscapepaintingandpoetry.It is the "musicalstructure"of the work of artwhich becomes the vehicle for the articulation of ideas and emotions.The materialconstituentsof the paintingor poem are liberatedfrom any merely mimetic or imitative relation to objects in the world, and features such as line and color, stress, and rhythmare treatedas independentbearersof meaning.Theoriginalityof thisargument,however,should not blind us to the fact that Schiller is still able to value the depiction of landscape only as a site for the projectionof humanemotions and ideas. While he allows landscapesubjectsto acquirethe value andsignificancewhich his experience of works by artists such as Claude Lorrainor Matthisson appearsto demand,the depictionof inanimatenatureis valued only insofaras it standsin for or representshumansubjectmatter.He attributesno independentmeaningor significance to the depiction of naturalforms, and his elevation of landscape poetryandpaintingto the categoryof "beautifulart"is entirelydependentupon allowing naturalformsto participatein humannecessity.His effortsto establish fundamentalprinciples for the evaluation of landscapepoetry do not, as we mighthave expected,leadto any significantreevaluationof the prioritygiven to
28"Uber MatthisonsGedichte," cit., 273. op 29 Ibid.
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the humansphere.Rather,his defense of landscapeas an appropriatesubjectfor "beautifulart"ultimately devolves upon reinscribinglandscapepainting and poetrybackintothe domainof humanideas andemotions.Outsideof this "symbolic" connectionto the humansphereinanimatenatureremainstrappedin that contingency of form and organizationwhich, for Schiller, deprives it of any highersignificance. We may furtherask whetherthe analogy which Schiller seeks to drawbetween music andthe artof landscapedepictiondoes in fact succeed in establishing the qualityof"necessity"which he requiresof a poem orpaintingif it is to be considereda work of beautifulart.Is the analogyto music sufficientlystrongto persuadeus that landscapepoetry and paintingcan become the bearerof "universal"or intersubjectivelyaccessible contentor meaning?Schiller'sargument rests on the following claim: The entireeffect of music (as a beautifulratherthana merely agreeable art) consists thereinthat it accompaniesand makes sensible the inner movementsof the soul throughanalogicaloutermovements.Since every innermovement(as humannature)proceedsaccordingto strictlaws of necessity, this necessity and determinacypasses over to the outer movementsthroughwhich it is expressed.30 Schillermaintainsthatby means of this symbolic act "it becomes comprehensible how commonnaturalphenomenasuch as soundandlight canparticipatein the aesthetic dignity of human nature."31 For this argumentto be successful, he would have to show that the same "necessity and determinacy" however, which he attributesto the innermovementsof the soul does indeed "passover" to the outermovementsthroughwhich ourinnerlife is expressed.Leavingaside the issue of whetherhumanemotionsor feelings do in factproceedaccordingto "strictlaws of necessity,"it remainsopen to questionwhetherhumanemotions can find strictlycorrelativearticulationin purelyformalrelationsof sound,light and color, as Schiller suggests. The analogy which Schillerdrawsbetween the effects of landscapedepiction and the effects of music rests on a prior assumptionabout the natureof music itself. While Schillerdoes not hold music to be a representationalartform in the sense of depictingmaterialor physical objects,he nonethelessmaintains thatit can representhumanfeelings andemotions.This view of music has been subjectedto considerablecriticism.The opposing view was most forcibly expressed in the middle of the succeeding centuryby the Austrianmusic critic EduardHanslick. In his essay On the Beautiful in Music (VomMusikalisch30
Ibid., 272.
31 Ibid.
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Sch6nen),firstpublishedin 1854, Hanslicksets aboutshowing thatmusic cannot coherentlybe seen as a representationof humanfeeling. Althoughhe cites an impressive list of authoritieswho share the view that "music is the art of expressingemotions throughthe medium of sound,"he insists that such argumentsnot only tell us little aboutthe realnatureof music, they also fail to tell us anythingaboutthe actualprocess by which music is supposedto be linked to definite emotions.32He points out thatemotions are dependentupon particular physiologicalandpsychologicalstates;they standin a relationof dependenceto beliefs and judgments which themselves cannot be carriedover into musical compositions.While music clearly stimulatesand gives rise to emotion, it cannot coherentlybe said to "represent"or to "express"emotion. Accordingto Hanslick,"thebeautyof music is specifically musical, i.e., it inheres in the combinationsof musical sounds and is independentof all alien, extramusicalnotions."33For Hanslickmusic is to be interpretednot in termsof some obscurerepresentationalrelationto humanfeelings but in referenceto its own intrinsicallyvaluablesphereof activity.On this view musicpossesses "both meaningandlogical sequence,but in a musical sense; it is a languagewhich we If music can be said to speak and understand,but are unable to translate."34 not requirereferenceto it do then is which "musical ideas" express anything, anythingbeyond themselves in orderto be understood.Hanslick'spositive accountof the "musicallybeautiful"requiresthatwe attributeself-standingvalue andsignificanceto the formalcomponentsof a musicalcomposition.He emphasizes the purelyformalqualitiesof music in abstractionfromany descriptiveor imitative "content,"likening music to an arabesque,"a branchof the art of ornamentation[which]dimlybetokensin whatmannermusic may exhibitforms of beautythoughno definiteemotionbe involved."35 It is interestingthatKanthimself appearsto have remainedundecidedas to whethermusic should be consideredan agreeableor a beautifulart. When he comes to addressthe division of the arts,he places music afterpoetry,claiming that "it speaks throughnothingbut sensationswithoutconcepts, so thatunlike While music is able to "agitate poetryit leaves us nothingto meditateabout."36 the mindmorediverselyandintensely"thanthe otherarts,the "playof thought" which it arousesin us is the effect of merely "mechanical"association.Unlike poetry and the visual arts, music addresses itself to our sensations alone and cannotserve as a vehicle for the expressionof"aesthetic ideas."Forthis reason
This "definition"of music is thatof GottfriedWeber,from his Theorieder Tonsetzkunst, cited by Hanslick in The Beautiful in Music, tr. Gustav Cohen (Indianapolis,1957), 18. 33 Hanslick, op cit., 48. 32
34Ibid., 50.
35Ibid., 48. 36 Critiqueof Judgment,?52 Ak. 328.
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music is "morea matterof enjoymentratherthan of culture... and in reason's Yet earlierin the text judgmentit has less value thanany otherof the fine arts."37 Kant identifies musical "fantasias"and indeed "all music not set to words"as examples of "free beauties"and so as paradigmaticobjects of pure aesthetic judgment.These arethingswhich we like freely andon theirown account;they "representnothing,no objectundera determinateconcept."38It is precisely the absenceof any specific conceptual"content"which accordsinstrumentalmusic its exemplarystatusin this regard.On the one handKantmaintainsthatthe nonrepresentationalcharacterof instrumentalmusic diminishes it, making it unsuitedto serve as a vehicle for the expressionof aestheticideas;but on the other he maintainsthatits very abstractor non-representationalcharacter,its lack of any determinateconceptualcontentwhich might constrainthe free play of the imagination,rendersit a paradigmaticobject of a purejudgmentof taste. It seems then thatmusic cannotstraightforwardlybe understoodas a "representation of our faculty of feeling" as Schiller assumes. Even if-contra Hanslick-one accepts thatthere is some vital connectionbetween music and the expressionof humanemotion,it is difficultto see how Schiller'sfocus on the purely formal elements of musical composition could provide the necessary intersubjectivityof responsewhich his argumentrequires.As Kanthimself recognizes, the associationswhich are broughtaboutin the listenerby a non-conceptuallydeterminedartform such as music cannotbe made to subservesome pregivenconceptualcontent.Unlike the visual arts,which startout with "determinate"ideas and thus are able to "bringabout a productthat serves the concepts of the understandingas an enduringvehicle," music can give rise only to subjective or "indeterminate"ideas.39While Kant describes music as a "language of effects,"he maintainsthatthis languagecannotexpress"concepts"but only "the aesthetic idea of a coherent whole of an unspeakable wealth of thought."40
Theproblemwith Schiller'stheoryof landscapedepictiondoes not residein his bold and original claim that there are purely formal elements in landscape paintingand poetrywhich can affect us in ways analogousto the abstractconstituentsof a musicalcomposition.The difficultiesariseratherfromhis attempt to enlist this idea in supportof the universaland idealizing claims of classicist aesthetics.It is far from clearthatthe formalelements of landscapepoetry and paintingcan bear the weight which Schiller seeks to place upon them. His at-
37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., ?16, Ak. 229-30. Kant explicitly raises the question of music's status as a "beautiful" or "agreeable"art in ?51, Ak. 324-25. 39 Ibid., ?53, Ak. 329-30. Kant claims that "The two kinds of art pursue quite different courses: music proceeds from sensations to indeterminateideas; the visual arts from determinate ideas to sensations." 40 Ibid., ?53, Ak. 329.
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tempt to raise these arts to the level of ideal generalityrequiredby classicist aestheticsovertaxeshis accountof the "musicalstructure"of landscapecomposition. While he is surely right in identifyingthe expressive possibilities containedby such non-representationalfeaturesas color, line, meter,rhythm,and tone, there is good reason to doubt whether interiormoods or states can be articulatedwith the strict"necessity"which his theoryrequires.The "language of effects"is open andimpreciseandcannotbe used to groundthe universalizing ambitionsof classicist arttheory. In contrastto Hanslick,Schilleris not yet preparedto attributeself-standing value or significanceto the purelyformalelements in a composition.While his defense of landscapepaintingandpoetryinvolves the identificationof elements and effects analogous to those operativein a musical composition, he values these elementsandeffects only in so faras they can be understoodas the expression of humanfeelings and ideas. WhatSchillerfails to take into accountis the indeterminateand highly individualizedcharacterof the expressive process. Contraryto his own intentions,perhaps,his theoryopens the way to a view in which the work of art is conceived as the highly subjective expression of the inneremotionalandspirituallife of the creativeartist.Once the artwork is seen in this way,however,it is difficultto see how the universalistclaims of classicist aestheticscanbe upheld.Instead,we arecarriedtowardsa position in which the highest goal or ambitionof art is no longer the representationof "universal" ideas and ideals but the vivid expressionof a particularviewpoint. While Schiller's accountof landscapepoetry and paintingremainsdeeply rootedin eighteenth-century convictionsconcerningboththe absolutepriorityof the humansphereandthe necessity foruniversallycommunicablesubjectmatter or content,it also looks forwardin a numberof importantrespectsto latertheories of landscapepainting. In particularthe analogy which Schiller draws between landscapepainting and music came to play a centralrole in Romantic theories of art. Both art forms were valued for their supposed freedom from directsignificationand for the way in which they could addressthemselves directly to the senses withoutthe mediationof arbitrarycodes, symbols and conventions. Landscapepainting, like music, was seen to allow the spontaneous articulationof emotion,communicatingfeeling throughthe arrangementof basic formsandmasses andthroughthe dispositionof light andcolor.In particular Schiller'sidea of landscapepaintingandpoetryas a projectionof humanmoods onto the landscapesubjectwas takenup anddevelopedby laterRomantictheorists.Forexample,CarlGustavCams, in his letterson landscapepainting(Neun Briefe iiber Landschaftsmalerei),maintainsthat the artist should seek to perceive and representthe landscapeunderan aspect which is congruentwith his "innermood."He formulatesthe "principaltask of landscapepainting"as follows:
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It is the representationof a certainmood in the life of the soul (sense) throughthe imitation of a correspondingmood in the life of nature (truth).41 It is characteristic,however,thatCarusspeaksof a relationof "correspondence" (Entsprechung)ratherthanof"projection"between humanmoods and the domain of inanimatenature.Underlyinghis admirationfor landscapepaintingis a spiritualizedconceptionof the naturalworldwhich remainsforeignto Schiller's thinking.ForCams natureis "therevelationof a single infinitelysublimedivinity, which cannotsimply be reducedto the humanand is indeed inaccessibleto the senses."42Art acquiresthe role of the "mediatorof religion"(Vermittlerin der Religion) in so far as it "teachesus to recognise and brings us into closer proximitywith the originalsoul or power of the world."43Like Schiller,Cams recognizesthatlandscapepaintingis an art"whichproperlybelongs to the modem age alone."44He, too, asks why it is that the Greeks, who producedsuch magnificentexamplesof architecture,sculpture,andpoetry,shouldnot have felt drawntowardsthe depictionof landscapesubjects.ForCarus,however,the late emergenceof landscapepaintingcame aboutbecauseof a changein man'srelation to the naturalworld:humankindhad firstto reacha stage in which it could leave behindthe self-absorptioncharacteristicof the earlyyouth of the species before it could depictnaturein its truesignificance. In contrastSchiller retainsa thoroughgoinganthropocentricstandpointin which priorityis consistentlyaccordedto humanaction and character.For this reasonSchiller'sviews mightbe thoughtto have morein commonwith the position of later "empathy"theoristssuch as FriedrichTheodorVischer.In his remarkableCritiqueof myAesthetics(KritikmeinerAesthetik),publishedin 1866, Vischer draws an analogy between music and landscapestrikinglysimilar to thatput forwardby Schillerover half a centurybefore.Vischerobservesthatthe "beautyof landscape"is "strangelyanalogousandrelatedto the beautyof music. Herelight andcolor effect us throughinorganicforms,andyet they do so in such a way that the landscapeas a whole appearsto us a mirrorimage of our own emotionalstate."45 He does not yet employ the term"empathy"to describe the process throughwhich we projectourfeelings andemotionsinto the objects we perceive, but he speaks insteadof"a profound,dark,certain,inner,yet free
Carl Gustav Cams, Neun Briefe uber Landschaftsmalerei(1831) (Dresden, 1955), 49. Ibid., 96. 43 Ibid., 32. 44 Ibid., 33. 45 Friedrich Theodor Vischer, Kritik meiner Aesthetik (1866), in Robert Vischer (ed.), Kritische Gange (Munich, 19222), IV, 319. Vischer does not make any direct reference to Schiller's essay. It seems likely that he arrivedat similar views by an independentpath. 41
42
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emotionalidentificationof the unityandinterconnectionof imageandcontent."46 Vischermaintainsthatbeautyis locatedin "thecontactbetweenan objectandan apprehendingsubject,"and he declares that "since what is truly active in this contactis the subject,it can be termedan act."47ForVischer,then,beautyis not an objective propertyof things in the world but the result of a largely unconscious processof physiologicalandpsychologicalsymbolismthroughwhich we projectour ideas and feelings on to the externalworld. WhatdistinguishesSchiller'saccountfromthatof Vischer,however,is that whilst the latter seeks to make sense of our actual experience of the natural world, Schilleris exclusively concernedwith theproblemswhich arisefromthe representationof inanimatenature.Schiller is not directly concernedwith the problem of "naturalbeauty"or with developing a theory of our aesthetic responses to natureas such. Rather,he seeks to establishthe value and statusof landscapepoetry and paintingas a particularmode or genre of artisticexpression. As we saw from his criticalreview of Burger'spoetry,Schiller startsout fromthepresuppositionthatthe highestvocationof artcannotbe fulfilledthrough the imitationof whatis given to us directlyin experience.Rather,the artistmust seek to improveupon the contingencyand imperfectionsof the naturalworld. The landscapepainteror poet should not simply hold up a mirrorto naturebut must select, organize,arrange,andmake consonantwith one anotherthose featuresthroughwhich innerand outerexperienceare to be represented.It is this process of orderingand selection which informsSchiller's distinctionbetween the musical andthe logical structureof the work, and indeedthe entireanalogy to music as such. Schillergraspsa successfulworkof landscapepoetryor painting primarilyas a composition,thatis, as an artificialand intentionalorganization of partsinto a meaningfulwhole. Moreover,his concernwith the statusof landscapepoetryandpaintingdevolves upon a complex analysisof the relation betweenworkandaudience,emphasizingthe universalityor "intersubjectivity" of the effects which can be carriedby the strictlyformalelements of the work's compositionalstructure.He seeks to show how, throughthe careful selection andarrangementof the variouselementswhich makeup the workof art,the poet or paintercan bringaboutidenticaleffects in the readeror spectator. It is not untilhis essay "OnNaive and SentimentalPoetry,"publisheda year laterin 1795, that Schillerbegins to addressthe way in which man's relationto naturepermeatesand shapesthe very genreswithinwhich works of artareproduced.In this essay Schillerreturnsto the questionas to why the ancientsplaced so little value on landscapepoetryandpaintingas a separateformor type of art. His answer, like that of Carus,now involves the identificationof a historical shift in man'sattitudetowardsthe naturalworld. Schiller'sattitudetowardsthis
46
Ibid., 320.
47 Ibid., 224
(my emphasis).
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process is farmore ambivalent,however,and is orientatedtowardsuncovering the basis of our "sentimental"interestin nature.He locates the source of our new attachmentto external nature in the gradualloss of a direct relation to naturewithin ourselves. The conflicts and divisions attendantupon modernity have broken that accord with the naturalworld which the Greeks could still enjoy.However,we are awareof the division thathas takenplace, and it is this which drivesus to seek a model of innocenceandharmonyin unspoilednature. The idea of the unity of nature,which Caruswas laterto celebrateas one of the achievementsof moder civilizationandas the animatingimpulsebehindthe art of landscapepainting,is identifiedby Schilleras fulfillinga compensatoryfunction. The new significance accorded to naturein the domain of art, arose in direct proportionas natureitself ceased to be the object of lived experience. Underthe rupturedconditionsof modernity,it is the task of the "sentimental" poet to reveal the distance that pertainsbetween idea and reality.The poetic genres of satire, elegy, and idyll therebytake on a new, critical function. The genres can no longerbe treatedas fixed and immutableforms, whose meaning has remainedconstantfromAntiquityto the presentday.Rather,Schillerseeks to analyze theirhistoricaldevelopmentand to show how theirinnercontentor meaningis transformedby man's changedrelationto innerand outernature. "On Naive and SentimentalPoetry"thus provides a new frameworkfor understandingthe moder concernwith the depictionof landscapesubjects,a frameworkwhich decisively breakswith the classicist assumptionsthatstill remained intact in Schiller's review of Matthisson'spoetry.As I have sought to show, however, the significance of the earlierarticleresides in its very transitionalstatus.Inthe Matthissonreviewwe see Schillerstrugglingto accordmeaning and value to landscapepoetryandpaintingwithin the parametersof classicism itself. This not only bringsto light importantconflicts andtensionswithin classicist aesthetics;it also gives rise to a productiveengagementwith the very principleson which the value of works of artis assessed. It is Schiller's classicist preoccupationwith art's "universal"qualities which leads him to enquire into the sharedor intersubjectivebasis of ourresponsesto landscapepoetryand painting;and it is this, in turn,which encourageshim to addressthe possible significancewhich mightbe borneby the purelyformalelementsof the work of art.Withthis theory,as we have seen, Schillerlooks beyondthe concernsof his age, anticipatinglaterdevelopmentsin the theoryof landscapepainting,while continuingto upholdthe corevalueswhich animatehis enquiry.Ultimately,however, it is Schiller's remarkableability to identify and exacerbatethe conflict betweenhis own responsesandthe conceptsandcategoriesthroughwhich these responsesarecontainedandorganizedthatgives rise to the innovative,if incomplete, theoryof landscapedepictionwhich is essayed in this work. The OpenUniversity.
Benjamin
Franklin
in
Eastern
Cultural
Age
Jewish
Europe:
in the Appropriation of the Enlightenment
Nancy Sinkoff In 1808 an anonymousHebrew chapbookdetailinga behavioristguide to moraleducationand self-improvementappearedin Lemberg,AustrianGalicia. Composedby Mendel Lefin of Satanow,an enlightenedPolish Jew (maskilin the Hebrewterminologyof the period), MoralAccounting(SeferHeshbonhaNefesh) was a crucialweapon in Lefin's lifelong literarywar againstHasidism, the new Jewish pietistic movementwhich had capturedthe heartsand souls of much of eighteenth-centuryPolish Jewry.1The core of MoralAccountingwas a boxed grid, seven lines by thirteen,which correlated,respectively,to the days of the week and to thirteenvirtuesin need of improvement.The grid was to be used daily throughouta thirteen-weekcycle which repeatedfour times during the course of a year. Addressing a traditionally-educatedJewish audience, Mendel Lefin did not disclose the gentile source of the method of moral selfreform,but he did acknowledgethat it was not his innovation:"Severalyears ago a new methodwas revealed,and it is [such] a wonderfulinventionfor this [kind]of [moral]educationthatit seems thatits renownwill spreadas quickly, if God desires it, as thatof the inventionof printingwhich broughtlight to the I would like to thankSteven Kepnes, JeffreyShandler,Olga Litvak, and GershonHundert for their helpful comments on an earlier draftof this essay. Research for this article was supportedby the MemorialFoundationfor Jewish Cultureand the National Foundationfor Jewish Culture.Reproductionof the tableswas enabledby a grantfromThe ResearchCouncil,Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey. ' Hillel Levine, "BetweenHasidism and Haskalah:On a Disguised anti-HasidicPolemic," be-Toldot bimei Perakim ha-Hevrah ha-Yehudit ha-Beinayimuve-Et ha-Hadashah, (Hebrew), eds. I. Etkes and J. Salmon (Jerusalem,1980), 182-91. 2 [Lefin], Sefer Heshbon ha-Nefesh (Lemberg, 1808), par.20. On the view of the printing press as an exceptionaltool for the emancipationof mankindduringthe Enlightenment,see Roy Porter,TheEnlightenment(London, 1990), 40; and JeremyD. Popkin, "PeriodicalPublication
133 of theHistoryof Ideas,Inc. 2000byJournal Copyright
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world."2The creatorof this "wonderfulinvention"was none other than Benjamin Franklin,whose "Rulesof Conduct"first appearedin 1791 in the second partof his EnglishAutobiography.3 Therehas been a noticeable interestrecentlyamong historiansof the Jewish Enlightenment(Haskalah)to map carefully,region by region, the nuances and varieties of the Jewish encounterwith modernity.4Nonetheless, Haskalah scholarshave generallyregardedMendelLefin's use of Franklin'stechniqueas a confirmationof their view that the impetus for the Haskalah among East EuropeanJewry lay in its exposure to the West in general and to the Berlin Haskalah's Westernorientationin particular.5They have viewed Moral Accountingas merely a translationof yet anothertext of the EuropeanandAmerican Enlightenmentsinto Hebrew,and they have paid little attentionto the Polish context and orientationof Lefin's work.6Implicitin this view, too, was the problematicassumptionthat translationof a text is an uncritical,acquiescent act. Mendel Lefin's wholesale adoptionof Franklin's"Rulesof Conduct,"implied, first, a static,unidirectionalinfluence of a Westerntext on an East European and, second, that Franklin'swork itself had a fixed, absolute meaning which Lefin simply appendedto his Hebrew book. Yet the appearanceof the
and the Nature of Knowledge in Eighteenth-CenturyEurope,"The Shapes of Knowledgefrom the Renaissance to the Enlightenment,eds. Donald R. Kelley and RichardH. Popkin (London, 1991), 203-14. 3 In an unpublishedfragmentto a lost philosophicwork, however, Lefin indicatedhis debt to Franklin.See the citationin IsraelWeinlos,"MenachemMendelLefin of Satan6w"(Hebrew), Ha-Olam, 13 (1925), 800. The Hebrewtitle of Lefin's book, SeferHeshbonha-Nefesh,formeda perfect pun on the "accounting"(heshbon) implicit in Franklin'smethod. I would like to thank Elisheva Carlebachfor suggestingMoral Accountingas a more fitting renderingof Lefin's title thanthe oft-usedMoral Stocktaking. Franklinhimself never entitled his four-partmemoirs an Autobiography.See Benjamin Franklin,TheAutobiographyof BenjaminFranklin:A Genetic Text,eds. J. A. Leo Lemay and P. M. Zall (Knoxville, 1981), xix, xlvii, footnote 69. A complete Frenchtranslationof Franklin's work was made in 1791 by Louis GuillaumeLe Veillard,Franklin'sclose friend,but the second section was only publishedin 1798. 4 TowardModernity:TheEuropeanJewish Model, ed. JacobKatz (New Brunswick, 1987). 5 The historiographyin Hebrew,German,and English on the Jewish Enlightenmentin Berlin is voluminous.Classic treatmentsincludeAlexanderAltmann,Moses Mendelssohn(University, Al., 1983), Michael A. Meyer, The Origins of the ModernJew (Detroit, 1979), and Azriel Shohat,Im Hilufei Tekufot(Jerusalem,1960). 6 Hillel Levine pointedout thatmost Hebrew literaryhistorianshaderredin regardingMoral Accountingas a translationof Franklin'sPoor Richards Almanac or of the entireAutobiography. See Hillel Levine, "MenachemMendelLefin:A Case Studyof JudaismandModernization" (Ph.D. diss., HarvardUniversity, 1974), 56, footnote 59; also Eisig Silberschlag,"The English Factorin our New Literature:First Contacts"(Hebrew),Divrei ha-Kongresha-Olamiha-Revi'i le-Mada'i ha-Yahadut(Jerusalem,1969), 71-75.
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"Rules of Conduct" in Hebrew and Lefin's use of other Western and non-Jewish texts were anything but mechanical.7 Not only Lefin's Jewishness but his Polish origins and Polish orientation make the assumption of passivity particularly acute. Effaced from the map of Europe at the end of the eighteenth century, Poland's history has not been integrated into general historical treatments of the Enlightenment.8 Just as studies of the Jewish Enlightenment describe a trajectory from Berlin to Austrian Galician to Russia, so do general interpretations of the European Enlightenment draw a line from Germany and France to Russia, bypassing Poland. For example, in Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich's important book, The Enlightenment in National Context, Poland is nowhere to be found.9 Yet Poland, too, had an Enlightenment (Oswiecenie), beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, which was stimulated by many of the same forces that spurred change in the West: the desire to reform antiquated political systems, to liberate education from religious dogma, and to create a rational state apparatus. In Poland the Enlightenment had its own national coloring; it was sponsored not by a rising bourgeois class but by royal and noble circles (and thus lacked the social critique of the Enlightenmentin the West), in particularby the efforts of the last Polish king, Stanislaw Augustus Poniatowski and his cousin, Prince Adam Kazimierz Czartoryski.10 It is ironic that late eighteenth-century Poles and Jews, dissimilar in so many respects, have both been viewed in the historiography of the European Enlightenment as passive recipients of whatever political and cultural currents befell them. Mendel Lefin's MoralAccounting, a strikingexample of what Roger Chartier has called cultural appropriation, illuminates the fallaciousness of the assumption of Jewish and Polish passivity. Moreover, Lefin's work belies the assumption of a unilateral West to East movement of ideas in several ways.1 7 Anthony Grafton, "Introduction:Notes from Undergroundon CulturalTransmission," The Transmissionof Culturein Early Modern Europe, eds. Anthony Graftonand Ann Blair (Philadelphia,1990), 1-7. 8 PiotrS. Wandycz,"Historiography of the Countriesof EasternEurope:Poland,"American Historical Review, 97 (1992), 1011-25. See LarryWolff, InventingEasternEurope:TheMap of Civilizationon the Mind of the Enlightenment(Stanford,1994). 9 TheEnlightenmentin National Context,eds. Roy Porterand MikulasTeich (Cambridge, 1981); and see RaphaelMahler,Divrei YemeiYisra'el (Rehavia, 1956), 1:4,71-72 and Bernhard Wachstein,Die HebrdischePublizistikin Wien(Vienna, 1930), xvii. 10 BarbaraGrochulska,"The Place of the Enlightenmentin Polish Social History,"A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864, ed. J. K. Fedorowicz (Cambridge,1982), 239-57; Mieczystaw Klimowicz, "PolnischeLiteraturund Kunst im ZeitalterderAufkldrung," Polen undDeutschlandim ZeitalterderAufkldrung,ed. RainerRiemenschneider(Braunschweig, 1981), 97-107; EmanuelRostworowski,"PolensStellungin Europaim ZeitalterderAufkldrung," op cit., 11-21;AndrzejWalicki,TheEnlightenmentand the BirthofModern Nationhood:Polish Political Thoughtfrom Noble Republicanismto TadeuszKosciuszko(Notre Dame, 1989), and his Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland (New York, 1982); Jerzy Dobrzycki, "The Scientific Revolution in Poland,"The ScientificRevolutionin National Context, eds. Roy Porterand MikulasTeich (Cambridge,1992), 150-57. " Roger Chartier,CulturalHistory:BetweenPractice and Representations(Ithaca, 1988).
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First,the text illustratesthe selective (hence, active) opennessto European(and American) ideas on the part of Jewish intelligentsia living east of the Oder River. Second, Moral Accountingreveals the dynamisminherentin any act of translationfor Lefin used Franklin'smoralaccountingsystem for his own, very distinctgoals of reformingPolish-Jewishsociety.Althoughwhat is reproduced textuallyin MoralAccountingis almost a mirrorimage of Franklin's"Rulesof Conduct,"what is producedis not a mirrorimage in meaning.12Third,Moral Accountingunderscoresthe connection between the Jews in Polish lands and theirPolish hosts, an associationrecentlyexploredin the worksofM. J. Rosman and Gershon Hundert.13Benjamin Franklin'smoral philosophy did, indeed, reach the Jews of EasternEuropethroughMendel Lefin's Moral Accounting; but the connective tissue between the American and the East EuropeanJew was the Polish magnaterepublican,PrinceAdam KazimierzCzartoryski. Born in 1749 in Satanow,a large town on the easternbank of the Zbrucz River in Podolia, Ukraine, Mendel Lefin was raised in a traditionalJewish family. Little is known abouthis formativeyears, but later generationsof enlightened Jews described Lefin hagiographicallyas a Talmudicprotege who fortuitouslydiscovered the world beyond traditionalJewish study througha workof seventeenth-century Jewishscience,JosephSolomonDelmedigo'sSefer Elim.14Ostensibly seeking a cure for his near-blindness,Lefin set out for Berlin, the centerof the Jewish Enlightenment,in his early 30s, arrivingsometime in 1780. In the PrussiancapitalLefin met Moses Mendelssohn,SimonVeit,and DavidFriedlinder,andbecameanactiveparticipantin theBerlinHaskalah.These men, known as maskilim,and otherswere actively engaged in a programmatic critiqueof earlymoder AshkenazicJewish culturein an effortto rejuvenateit. They focused on educationalreform,the acquisitionof non-Jewishknowledge, and the revival of the Hebrew languagein an effort to end what they believed
12Ibid., 47. M. J. Rosman, The Lords' Jews: Magnate-JewishRelations in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealthduring the Eighteenth Century(Cambridge,Mass., 1990); Rosman, "Jewish Perceptionsof Insecurityand Powerlessnessin 16th-18thCenturyPoland,"Polin, 4 (1989), 1927; Gershon David Hundert,The Jews in a Polish Private Town:The Case of Opotow in the Eighteenth Century(Baltimore, 1992); Gershon Hundert,"Some Basic Characteristicsof the Jewish Experiencein Poland,"Polin, 1 (1986), 28-34. 14Most of the primarybiographicalmaterialaboutMendel Lefin comes from latergenerations of enlightenedEast EuropeanJews. See, for example,AbrahamBer Gottlober,Zikhronot u-Masa'ot, 2, ed. Reuben Goldberg (Jerusalem, 1976), 197-208 and Samuel Joseph [RaSHi] Fuenn,KiryahNe'emanah (Vilna, 1860), 271-73. Secondaryliteratureon Lefin includesYosef Klausner,Historiyahshel ha-Sifrutha-Ivritha-Hadashah(Jerusalem,1930), I, 201-22; Mahler, Divrei YemeiYisrael,71-72; Israel Weinlos, "Mendel Lefin Satanower:A BiographicalStudy from ManuscriptMaterial"(Yiddish), YIVOBleter, II (1932), 334-57 and "MenachemMendel Lefin of Satan6w"(Hebrew), Ha-Olam, 13 (1925), 778-79, 799-800, 819-20, 839-40; Israel Zinberg,A History of Jewish Literature,6 (New York, 1975), 275. 13
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was the culturalisolationof the Jews.15Lefin only stayedin the Westfor a short period of time. In 1784 he returnedto Podolia and remainedin the region for most of his life, leaving to settle in AustrianGalicia sometime in the second decade of the nineteenthcentury.16Both lifelong proximity to the important centersofPodolian Hasidismandthe experienceof observingthe radicalization of the Jewish Enlightenmentin Berlin indelibly colored Lefin's formulationof the Haskalah,which he definedas the moderatemidpointbetweenthe extremes of Hasidismand atheisticrationalism.'7 When Lefin returnedto Podolia, he settled in Mikolajow, a private town between Miedzyboz and Satanow under the authorityof Prince Czartoryski. Czartoryskiwas not only one of the wealthiest magnates in Poland, owning estates in CentralPoland,Lithuania,Przemysl,andPodolia, andthe Generalof Podolia,buthe was also a leadingsupporterof the Polish Enlightenment,which hadbegunto flourishin 1764underthereignof KingPoniatowski.18Poniatowski and Czartoryskifosteredthe Polish Enlightenmentby creatinginstitutions,the new KnightsSchool, the Polish EducationCommission,andthe didacticmoral weekly, Monitor, which promoted a critique of the Polish nobility's mythic sense of self and ways of life, called Sarmatianism,that subordinatedthe public good to noble self-interest.The Polish nobility had historically regarded itself as descendantsof a race of "heroicSarmatians"who had defeatedRome. Invested in a self-definition that assumed their uniqueness from other European nobilities,the Polish szlachta (nobility)mythologizedtheirliberties,privileges, religion, culture,and economic structure.EnlightenedPoles-known as liberals"becausethe majorityhailedfrom "magnaterepublicans"or "aristocratic the nobleorder-excoriatedtheirnoblecompatriots'excessivepride,stubbornindependence,disdainforurbanandcommercialactivity,andreluctanceto cede any of theirprivileges.'9Czartoryski,eschewingpoliticaloffice, spenthis life actively 15David Sorkin, "FromContext to Comparison:The GermanHaskalahand Reform Ca-
tholicism,"TelAviverJahrbuchfuirdeutsche Geschichte,20 (1991), 23-58, and Shmuel Feiner, "Definingthe Haskalah,"in New Perspectives on the Haskalah, eds. David Sorkinand Shmuel Feiner (The LittmanLibraryof Jewish Civilization, forthcoming). 16 For variousaccounts,see Meir Letteris,Zikaronba-Sefer(Vienna, 1868-69), 38, Mahler, Divrei YemeiYisra'el, 72, andMahler,A HistoryofModernJewry,1780-1815 (New York,1971), 588-89. Documentaryevidence situatesLefin in Mikolaj6w from 1805 to 1808 and in Austrian Galicia, at the Czartoryskipalace in Sieniawa, in 1815. See the Joseph Perl Archive, folder 8, JewishNationalandUniversityLibraryArchives,Jerusalem(henceforth,JNULA);theAbraham SchwadronCollection, Mendel Lefin papers,and the JosephPerl Archive, appendix,JNULA. 17 See Steven Lowenstein, TheBerlinJewish Community: Enlightenment,Family,and Crisis, 1770-1830 (New York, 1994) and ShmuelFeiner,"ThePseudo-Enlightenmentandthe Question of Jewish Modernization,"Jewish Social Studies (new series), 3:1 (Fall 1996), 62-86. 18W. H. Zawadzki,A Man of Honour:Adam[Jerzy] Czartoryskias a Statesmanof Russia and Poland, 1795-1831 (Oxford, 1993), 8 and The CambridgeHistory of Poland, eds. W. F. Reddaway,J. H. Penson, O. Halecki, R. Dyboski (2 vols.; New York, 1971), II, 21. 19JerzyLukowski,Liberty'sFolly: ThePolish-LithuanianCommonwealthin theEighteenth Century,1697-1795 (New York, 1991), 20-22, 77, and 222-23. On the social origins of enlightened Poles, see Grochulska,op cit.
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cultivating all kinds of knowledge both for his own edification and for the advancementof Poland.He was an accomplishedlinguistandwas interestedin literature,history,the arts,naturalsciences, chemistry,political economy, and militarystrategy.Pulawy,the Czartoryskiestate on the Vistulaabout 110 kilometerssouthof Warsaw,became one of eighteenth-centuryPoland'smost vital culturaland intellectualcenters. There, Czartoryskisurroundedhimself with talentedmen, such as J6zef Szymanowski, a poet, lawyer, and official in the governmentTreasuryCommission; Jan Jaworicki, a liberal estate commissioner; Feliks Bematowicz, a novelist and playwright;and Mendel Lefin. All these men were generouslyfinancedby the prince.20Czartoryski'spatronageof MendelLefin,whichbegansoon afterhis settlementin Mikolaj6w,was a crucial influenceuponthe latter'sspecific suggestionsfor reformingthe Jews of Poland andhis practicalabilityto write andpublishworks of the Haskalah.Firsthiring Lefinto tutorhis sons in mathematicsandphilosophy,Czartoryskiprovidedhim with a lifelong stipend,ensuredthathis beneficiaryfoundcomfortablelodgings in which to work,and laterhelpedto publishhis politicaland literaryworks.21 Lefin'sworks,writtenin Hebrew,Yiddish,French,German,andJudeo-German (Germanwrittenin Hebrewcharacters)span the wide rangeof Enlightenment genres:popularessays on naturalscience, translationof a popularSwiss medicaltext, proposalsfor the culturalandeconomicreformof the Jewishcommunity,adaptationof Germantraveloguesinto Hebrew,Yiddishtranslationsof The variScripture,andtranslationof medievalJewishrationalistphilosophy.22 20 JeanFabre,Stanislas-AugustePoniatowskietL 'Europedes Lumieres(Strasbourg,1952), 148. See, too, Zawadzki, 17. 21 Evidence of Lefin's stipendfrom Czartoryskiappearsin MajerBalaban,"MendelLewin i ksiaz AdamCzartoryski,"Chwila,niedziela,7 stycznia 1934, nr.5313, 10 andAdamKazimierz Czartoryskito Adam Jerzy Czartoryski,March 19, 1803, 6285 EW 1046 (copied in the 1880s into 6338 IV, MS EW 1503), the CzartoryskiLibrary,Krak6w. 22 See, for example [MendelLefin], Essai d'unplan dereforme ayantpour objet d'eclairer la Nation Juive en Pologne et de redresserpar Id ses moeurs (Warsaw[1791]), in Materiatydo DziejowSejmuCzteroletniego,6, eds.ArturEisenbach,JerzyMichalski,EmanuelRostworowski, and Janusz Wolinski (Wroclaw/Warszawa/Krak6w,1969), 409-21; Mendel Lefin, "Likkutei Kelalim (Collections of Rules) in N. M. Gelber,"Mendel Lefin-Satanover'sProposals for the Improvementof Jewish CommunityLife Presentedto the GreatPolish Sejm (1788-1792)" (Hebrew), TheAbrahamWeissJubilee Volume(New York, 1964), 287-305; Mendel Lefin, Masa 'ot ha-Yam(Journeysby Sea) (Z6lkiew, 1818; Vilna, 1823; Lemberg, 1859); Mendel Lefin, Moda le-Binah(Insightto Understanding)(Berlin, 1789);MorehNevukhimof Moses Maimonides,tr. Mendel Lefin (Zo6kiew,1829); Mendel Lefin, Sefer Kohelet im Tirgumu-Vi'ur(Ecclesiastes with a [Yiddish]Translationand [Hebrew] Commentary)(Odessa, 1873); [MendelLefin], Sefer Mishlei Shelomo im Perush Kezar ve-Ha 'atakahHadashahBilshonAshkenazle-To'eletAheinu Beit Yisra'el be-ArzotPolin (Proverbswith a Short Commentaryand a New Translationin the Language of Ashkenazfor the Benefit of the House of Israel in the Lands of Poland) (Tamopol, 1814); Sefer Refu'ot ha-Am(The Book of Popular Healing), tr. Mendel Lefin(Z6okiew, 1794; Lwow, 1851);MendelLefin,Elon Moreh(Introductionto the translationof Maimonides'Guide), a supplementto Ha-Meliz (Odessa, 1867). Many of Lefin's works remainedin manuscriptand several, including a treatiseon Kantianphilosophy and two anti-Hasidicsatires,were lost, except for fragments,in the interwaryears.
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ety of languages and genres that comprise Lefin's lifework may be startling but should not obscure their clear didactic purpose. All of Lefin's writings were informed by his battle against the Jewish pietism indigenous to his native Podolia. Mendel Lefin's conception of the Jewish Enlightenment was a form of "religious Enlightenment," reflecting the decisive influence of the LeibnizianWolffian school within the Aufklirung, which proved particularly attractive in Central Europe, Russia, and Poland. This school preserved the traditional dichotomy between metaphysics and physics, thus making possible the pursuit of the new values of tolerance and reason in the service of revealed religion. The theological Wolffians professed a rationalism rooted in faith.23The Wolffian interpretation of natural law, which downplayed the individualism of the British Enlightenment and emphasized obligation and duty as requirements of individual rights, was welcomed by conservative elites in absolutist Russia. Poles educated in German universities were the source of the spread of Wolff's influence as early as the reign of August III.24 Rejecting the implacable hostility of the later skeptical French Enlightenment to religion and clericalism, Lefin saw no inconsistency between the intellectual exploration of Western, non-Jewish ideas and fidelity to traditional rabbinic culture. Lefin was not a practicing scientist, as was an enlightened Galician Jew like Abraham Stem, who invented an adding machine, and the rabbinic figure Barukh Schick, a chemist who translated Euclid into Hebrew25;yet he shared with many eighteenth-century figures the view that "truth[was] revealed not in God's word but in his work[s]."26Lefin supported scientific exploration of the natural world as a means to bolster belief in God's creative power. His earliest publications, such as Insight to Understanding, Letters of Wisdom,and The Book of Popular Healing, all strove to enhance traditional piety through the study of science.27 This effort was consonant with eighteenth-century natural philosophy, which promoted scientific experimentation and its popularization for understanding
David Sorkin, "The Case for Comparison:Moses Mendelssohn and the Religious Enlightenment,"Modern Judaism, 14 (1994), 121-38 and Sorkin, Moses Mendelssohn and the Religious Enlightenment(Berkeley, 1996). 24 Marc Raeff, "TheEnlightenmentin Russia and RussianThoughtin the Enlightenment," TheEighteenthCenturyin Russia, ed. J. G. Garrard(Oxford, 1973), 25-47, and Klimowicz, op. cit. For a recentdiscussionof the ways in which traditionalJews engagedin scientific thinkingin the earlymodem period,see David Ruderman,Jewish Thoughtand ScientificDiscovery in Early ModernEurope (New Haven, 1995). 25 EphraimKupfer, "FromFar and Near," (Hebrew), in Sefer ZikaronMugash le-N. M. Gelber (Tel Aviv, 1963), 218, and David Fishman,"A Polish RabbiMeets the Berlin Haskalah: The Case of R. BarukhSchick,"AJS Review, 12 (1987), 95-121. 26 ErnstCassirer,The Philosophy of the Enlightenment(Boston, 1962), 43. 27MendelLefin,Moda le-Binah,includingselections fromIggerotHokhmah(Berlin, 1789), and Sefer Refu'ot ha-Am,tr.Mendel Lefin (Z6lkiew, 1794). 23
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the ways of Providenceandimprovingsociety.28The "religiousEnlightenment" of Centraland EasternEuropewas compatiblewith the "moderateEnlightenment"of colonial America.29 BenjaminFranklintypifiedthe eighteenth-centurynaturalphilosopher;discoverer of the lightningrod and of the Pennsylvaniafireplace, he believed in the practicalapplicationand moralutility of his experiments,maintainingthat a heightenedsense of God's creativepower could not but resultfrom scientific observation.One of his privatepupils, Polly Stevenson, affirmedthe efficacy of scientific knowledge in underscoringGod's purposewhen she told Franklin, "Ifthe KnowledgeI gain fromyour Instructionsis small, I am certainto receive one Advantage,I shall be taughtto pay a gratefulAdorationto the GreatCreator whose Wisdom and Goodness are so manifest in the Operationsof Nature."30 Lefin'sinterestin suchdisparatetopicsas naturalscience, Germantravelogues, biblical translations,ethical treatises,and transcendentalphilosophy,all of which he regardedas a meansto strengthentraditionalrabbinicreligiousvalnaturalphilosophy,whose ues, fit well intothebroadscope of eighteenth-century included inventors,practicingscientists,literaryfigures,professors, participants and travelers.The eighteenth-centurynaturalphilosopherwas not a specialist, but rather,like Lefin and Franklin,a man with catholicinterestsandpassions.31 While Mendel Lefin may have encounteredBenjaminFranklin'swritings when he was still in Berlin, Czartoryski'sesteem for the AmericannaturalphiThe firstAmericanto be electedto the losopherno doubtsealedLefin'sinterest.32 RussianAcademy of Sciences, Franklinhad a tremendousreputationin all of Europe,includingRussia and Poland.33Czartoryskiknew Franklinpersonally; bothmen were freemasons,belongingto the ParisianLodge,"LesNeuf Soeurs," in 1781. The memwhich, establishedin 1776, elected Franklinas "Venerable" the of interest in educational and reform bership Lodge's Czartoryski'srespect for Franklininfluencedthe former'schoice of the civic catechismfor the new Polish Knights School.34In 1786 Adam Kazimierz described FranklinrevJ. L. Heilbron,"FranklinAs an EnlightenedNaturalPhilosopher,"in ReappraisingBenjamin Franklin:A BicentennialPerspective, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay (London, 1993), 196-220. 29 HenryF. May, TheEnlightenmentin America(Oxford, 1976), introductionand 5-101. 28
30
Cited in Heilbron, 205.
31
Ibid., 196, and Peter Gay, The Enlightenment:An Interpretation(New York, 1966-69),
14. 32
Three volumes of Franklin'sworks were translatedinto Germanas early as 1780; see Silberschlag,72. 33 EufrosinaDvoichenko-Markov,"BenjaminFranklinand Leo Tolstoy,"Proceedings of the AmericanPhilosophical Society, 96:2 (1952), 120. 34Nicholas Hans, "UNESCOof the 18th Century:La Loge des Neuf Soeurs and its Venerable Master,BenjaminFranklin,"ProceedingsoftheAmericanPhilosophicalSociety,97 (1953), 513-24. And see MargaretC. Jacob, Living the Enlightenment:Freemasonry and Politics in Eighteenth-CenturyEurope(Oxford, 1991); on the catechismfor the CadetsSchools, see Fabre, 147, 156.
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erentlyto his son, Adam Jerzy,as "one of a numberof raremen whom inspires pride in oneself for having had the opportunityto meet."35 Lefin employedBenjaminFranklin'smethodof moralself-reformbecause the Americannaturalphilosopherhad likewise come to the conclusion that a practicalprogramof behaviormodificationwas necessary to effect individual change. Writingin 1784 from Passy, France,Franklinexplained: It was aboutthis time that I conceiv'd the bold and arduousprojectof arrivingat moral perfection.I wish'd to live without committingany fault at any time; I would conquer all that either naturalinclination, custom, or companymight lead me into.As I knew, or thoughtI knew, what was rightand wrong, I did not see why I might not always do the one and avoid the other.But I soon found I had undertakena task of more difficulty than I had imagined....I concluded,at length, that the mere speculative conviction that it was our interest to be completely virtuous,was not sufficient to prevent our slipping, and that contrary habitsmustbe broken,and good ones acquiredand established,before we can have any dependence on a steady, uniform rectitudeof conduct.36
Franklinconcluded that self-improvement requireda structuredplan of behavior modification, which, if properly implemented,would result in the inculcation of habituallymoralbehavior.Because he believed thatan individual was best served by short-termconcentrationon one virtue at a time in order to acquirethe "habitude"of all the desiredvirtues,he deviseda personalaccounting systemwhichcorrelatedthirteenvirtues(i.e., temperance,silence,order,resolution, frugality,industry,sincerity,justice, moderation,cleanliness,tranquility, chastityand humility)with thirteenweeks.37Franklin'sbehavioristinnovation lay in his design of a moralaccountingbook, in which each page was devotedto one virtue.Eachday's failingswould be markedin the box correspondingto that week's virtue.At the end of the week Franklinexaminedthe markingsto see how he had progressed,or lapsed, in the cultivationof thatweek's particularvirtue. Franklinorderedhis virtuesin a progressionsuch thattemperancewould make the cultivationof"silence" easier,which in turnwould allow him to "order"his day andmakeit moreproductive,etc. The thirteen-weekcycle of weekly reflec35Adam Kazimierzto Adam JerzyCzartoryski,23 October1776(?). See 6285 II, EW 1046, the CzartoryskiLibrary,Krak6w.The letter,copied in the late nineteenthcenturyfrom the original, is misdated.Adam Jerzyfirstwent abroadwith his mother,IzabelaFleming Czartoryska,in 1786, the year in which the letter,I believe, was written.And see Adam JerzyCzartoryski,Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryskiand his CorrespondencewithAlexanderI, ed. Adam Gielgud (Orono,Maine, 1968), I, 45-49. 36Franklin, 78. My emphasis.
37Ibid., 80.
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tion and accountingrepeatedfour times to roundout the year when, Franklin hoped,the individualwould view a "cleanbook"with "encouragingpleasure."38 Lefin borrowedFranklin'saccountingsystem in its entiretyfor Moral Accounting.He followed Franklin'ssuggestionsthatthe individualselect a "short precept"thatwould encapsulatethe week's virtueandcreatea special accounting book with the aforementionedgrid. Lefin specified thatthe journalshould be nine pages with eighteen sides, that the individualshould use a lead pencil for the daily marks,but write the sums at the end of the week using a pen. He even borrowedmost of Franklin'svirtues;Lefin's original list of thirteenvirtues included calmness (menuhah),patience (savlanut), order (seder), stubbornness(akshanut),cleanliness (nekiyut),humility (anavah),justice (zedek), frugality (kimuz),diligence (zerizut), silence (shetikah), tranquility(nihuta), truth(emet) and asceticism (perishut).Lefin, too, articulatedthe hope thatrepetition would result in a "bookwiped clean of all its spots."39 Lefin not only borrowedFranklin'smethodbut completedthe task thatthe latter had described in his Autobiography:composing a handbook for individual use. Franklinintendedto write an entire book, to be called TheArt of Virtue,devotedto the subjectof individualmoralself-improvement,whichwould have finally providedthe means to put his programof self-reflectioninto practice.40Franklinnever completed the task because he saw it in relation to "a great and extensive project,"the creationof a United Party for Virtuewhich would bringtogethervirtuousmen fromall nationsto oversee the affairsof the world.41While Franklinand Lefin sharedthe belief in the possibility of individual moral self-improvement,theiruse of the "Rulesof Conduct"indicated differentagendas.Franklindirectedhis effortstowarda universalpoliticalprogramwhile Lefin strove to remakethe Polish-Jewishcommunityof his day. Attractedto Franklin'sinstrumentalethics, which divorcedmoralityfrom metaphysics,Lefin clearly sharedwith Franklinthe primarygoal of anchoring moralityin the individualand the consonantability to change behaviorwithin the rationalpower of the self.42Yet while Franklinconceived of his behaviorist 38Franklin,82. 39 [Lefin], par.26. Latereditions of Sefer Heshbon ha-Nefesh substituteharizut(industry) for the fourthvirtue (stubbornness). 40 Franklin,89. 41 Ibid., 91-92; on Junto,the club Franklincreatedin 1726 devoted to discussion of popular morality,see CarlVanDoren,BenjaminFranklin(New York,1938), 74-75. Accordingto Abraham Ber Gottlober,youth groupsformedin Podolia and Galicia which modelled theirbehaviorafter the programin MoralAccounting.See Mahler,Divrei YemeiYisra'el, 77. If this anecdoteis true then Lefin succeeded not only in completing Franklin'sArt of Virtuebut in establishing the voluntary societies that Franklinbelieved would form the core group of the United Party of Virtue. 42 HerbertW. Schneider,"The Significance of Benjamin Franklin'sMoral Philosophy," Studies in the History of Ideas (New York, 1925), II, 298-304.
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technique as an innovative way to improve individual character for the creation of an international political party, Lefin appropriated Franklin's method because he believed it efficacious in his battle against Hasidism.43 Initiated in Podolia in the second quarter of the eighteenth century by Israel ben Eliezer Ba'al Shem Tov, the man later called the Besht, Hasidism, with its emphasis on ecstatic prayer, new rituals, social separatism, and charismatic leadership, threatened to undermine traditional rabbinic authority.44As in his other writings in Jewish languages, Lefin deliberately concealed the anti-Hasidism in Moral Accounting, constructing it to fit into the traditional genre of musar (ethical) literature, texts devoted to instructing a Jew how to live a truly pious life beyond the boundaries set in legal (halakhic) writings.45 Unlike Franklin; who lacked a specific antagonist or religious authority to counter, Lefin had to provide justification within the Jewish tradition for creating a new method of moral reflection and reform. MoralAccounting merited twelve rabbinic approbations upon its initial appearance and was peppered with numerous biblical and rabbinic textual supports, which conveyed an overall impression of fidelity to the classical rabbinic tradition.46 Despite the conservative format of Moral Accounting, however, Lefin explicitly broke with traditional ethical writing, as he tells his readers, because it was inadequate to address the moral dilemmas of the day.47The traditional exhortations to act morally depended upon external rewards and punishments, whose authority,he implied, was no longer as binding as it once had been.48Rousseau's developmental model of education made a noticeable impact on Moral Accounting, in which Lefin took for grantedthe French philosopher's description in Emile of the heightened passions of puberty. Contemporary Jewish adolescents, whom Lefin felt were at a psychologically perilous age, were in need of a new
91-92. 44The classic treatmentof Hasidism'schallenge to traditionalAshkenazicrabbinicculture is Jacob Katz, Traditionand Crisis (New York, 19932); and see Moshe Rosman, Founder of Hasidism:A Questfor the Historical Ba 'al Shem Tov(Berkeley, 1996). 45 On other examples of Lefin's anti-Hasidism,see Chone Shmeruk, "RegardingSeveral of Mehkarim Mendel Lefin's Translation Yidish be-Folin: of Proverbs" Principles (Hebrew),Sifrut ve-IyunimHistoriyim,ed. Chone Shmeruk(Jerusalem,1981), 165-83 andNancy Sinkoff,"Strategy and Ruse in the Haskalahof Mendel Lefin of Satan6w,"New Perspectives on the Haskalah, op cit.; also ImmanuelEtkes, "The Question of the Precursorsof the Haskalahin EasternEurope"(Hebrew),Ha-Dat ve-ha-Hayim:Tenu'at ha-Haskalahha-Yehuditbe-MizrahEiropa, ed. ImmanuelEtkes(Jerusalem,1993),25-44; andJosephDan,Sifrutha-Musarve-ha-Derush(Jerusalem, 1975). 46 See David Roskies, "The Medium and the Message of the Maskilic Chapbook,"Jewish Social Studies, 41 (1979), 275-90 and Chone Shmeruk,"Moses Markusefrom Slonim and the Source of His Book, Ezer Yisroyel(Hebrew),"in Shmeruk,op cit., 184-203. 47[Lefin], pars. 12-14 and 19. 48Ibid., par. 18. See JamesVanHornMelton'sAbsolutismand the Eighteenth-CenturyOrigins of CompulsorySchooling in Prussia and Austria (New York, 1988). 43 Franklin,89,
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way to achieve self-control.49Lackingthe motivationto change theirbehavior on their own, Lefin urged the traditional,non-Hasidicrabbinateto spur their adolescent charges towardthe behavioristmethod of self-reflection and selfcontroldetailedin the book.As Lefin succinctlystated,"ethicswithoutinstruction is not sufficient at all."50He hoped this new method of internalized,individualmoralreformwould prove more attractiveto East Europeanadolescents thanHasidic methods and techniquesfor expiatingsin. The covert anti-Hasidismof Moral Accountingpervadedboth the content and form of the work. The first virtue enumeratedin Lefin's work, menuhah (calmness),permeatesthe entiretext. A sense of innercalm and emotionalbalance-the developmentof moderatetemperament-is necessary for the successful completion of Lefin's program.Calmness was likewise imperativeto renderproperservice to God in accordancewith the idealized rationalistversion of traditional,rabbinicJudaismfavored by Lefin and other enlightened Jews. In Lefin's view moderationwas the remedy for an extremisttendency, and this moderation could best be achieved through the use of Benjamin Franklin'smethod of cultivatingthe virtues slowly, habitually,week by week, over four cycles of the year.Lefin wrote, "Thereis no questionthatthe majorHis ity of cases of [moral]illnesses can only be healed throughmoderation."51 reiterationthroughoutMoral Accounting of words such as metinut(moderation), yishuv ha-da'at (consideration),as well as menuhahand menuhathanefesh, illustratehis belief that the cultivationof these virtues representedan alternativeto the Hasidic emphasison unbridledemotionand ecstaticworship. Alreadywith this virtuewe can see the transformationof Franklin'stext in Lefin's hands.Franklinbegan his chartof self-introspectionwith the virtue of "temperance"and the brief phrasesunderneathexplicating the virtue emphasize the physical, cautioningreadersnot to eat or drinkin excess. The explanatory phrases under "calmness,"the first virtue in Lefin's chart, stressed the realmof the soul, counselingthe audiencenot to let petty events, whetherpositive or negative, distractits calm.52Although Franklinincluded "moderation" as the ninthvirtuein his table, he did not accordit thepreeminentvalueassumed by Lefin. While Lefi's debt to Franklinis clear,in his quest to strengthenthe rationalcomponentof the soul Lefi also borrowedfromthe greatJewishmedi49For Lefin's interestin Rousseau,see the AbrahamSchwadronCollection of JewishAutographsand Portraits,Mendel Lefin papers, and the Joseph Perl Archive, folder 128d, JNULA. For studies on the relationshipof the demographicexplosion in eighteenth-centuryPoland and the rise of Hasidism and Haskalah,see Gershon Hundert,"Approachesto the History of the Jewish Family in EarlyModem Poland-Lithuania,"TheJewish Family: Mythsand Reality, eds. Steven M. Cohen and Paula E. Hyman (New York, 1986), 17-28 and David Biale, "Childhood, Marriageand the Family in the EasternEuropeanJewish Enlightenment,"op cit., 45-62. 50
[Lefin], par. 49. 51 Ibid., par. 70. 52 Franklin, 81 and Figure 1.
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eval philosopher, Moses Maimonides. In Maimonides' Eight Chapters, a discrete treatise on the soul, its constituent faculties, and the appropriate method of healing its imbalance or illness, the philosopher stated his famous harmonization of the Aristotelian "golden mean" with a life lived in observance of Jewish commandments: "Good deeds are such as are equibalanced, maintaining the mean between two equally bad extremes, the too much and the too little. Virtues are psychic conditions and dispositions which are midway between two reprehensible extremes, one of which is characterized by an exaggeration, the other by a deficiency."53 For Lefin as well as for other enlightened Jews, the persona of the medieval master loomed large as the ideal antidote to Hasidism.54 Lefin believed that spread of a Maimonidean perspective among Polish Jewry would revitalize its inner life by turning it away from Hasidism and mysticism toward an idealized rationalist past. To that end Lefin began a translation of Maimonides' The Guidefor the Perplexed into mishnaic Hebrew from the medieval Hebrew translation by Samuel ibn Tibbon in the 1790s.55 Lefin's belief that emotional moderation was the "sine qua non" of a pious life is most explicit in his discussions of prayer.56In a parable at the beginning of MoralAccounting Lefin warned the East European Jewish youths for whom he intended his work against the dangers of mistaking extreme ardor-hitlahavut is the technical term in Hasidic thought-for appropriate forms of devotion.57 The Hasidic claim that ecstasy in prayer was more importantthan habitual prayer at the appointed times was a well-known target of the opponents of Hasidism.58 The risks of extreme enthusiasm were fatal in Lefin's view, and he urged his
53In the fourthchapterof the Eight Chapters,Maimonidesstatedthatonly "frequentrepetition of acts ... practicedduringa long periodof time"can accustomthe individualto finding the propermean. Both citationsarefromIsadoreTwersky,A MaimonidesReader(New York, 1972), 367-68. In The Guidefor the Perplexed, Maimonides'majorphilosophicwork, the philosopher attributed"excess" to be the cause of "all corporealand psychical diseases and ailments."See Moses Maimonides,The Guide of the Perplexed, tr. Shlomo Pines (Chicago, 1963), II, 445. 54JamesLehmann,"Maimonides,Mendelssohn,andMe 'asfim:Philosophyand Biographical Imaginationin the EarlyHaskalah,"Leo Baeck InstituteYearbook(1975), 87-108. 55ShmuelWerses,"Hasidismin the Perspectiveof HaskalahLiterature:Fromthe Polemics of the GalicianHaskalah,"in Werses,Megamotve-Zurotbe-Sifrutha-Haskalah(Jerusalem,1990), 106. 56 Lefin's preoccupationwith emotional moderationas a fundamentalcomponent of enlightenedreligionwas sharedby eighteenth-centurymainstreamProtestantsin both Englandand America. See Michael Heyd, "Be Sober and Reasonable": The Critiqueof Enthusiasmin the Seventeethand EarlyEighteenthCenturies(LeidenandNew York,1995), andDavid S. Lovejoy, Religious Enthusiasmin the New World(Cambridge,Mass., 1985). 57 On hitlahavutin Hasidic prayer,see GershomScholem, "Hasidism:The Latest Phase," Major Trendsin Jewish Mysticism(Jerusalem,1941), 335. On the parable,see Levine, "On a Disguised," 168. 58 Mordecai Wilensky,Hasidim u-Mitnaggedim:Le-Toldotha-Pulmusshe-beineihembaShanim1772-1795 (Jerusalem,1970), I, 38-41, 45, 50, 54, 75; II, 253-338.
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readersinsteadto approachprayerin a moderate,conventionalfashion.In 1823 Meir Reich, an enlightenedcontemporaryof Lefin, warnedhis son, Benjamin, of the dangersraised in Moral Accounting: You should slowly acquirehabit at the beginning of your study,then the end will trulyflourish,not like those who are inflamedwith desire at the beginning of their study and who weary immediatelyof finding the pathto wisdom, thus makingit loathsomein theirmouths.Indeed, the enlightenedones are forbearingand profit doubly in the health of theirbodies andthe delightof theirstudy....Yourprayershouldbe short and [performed]with intention.59 Reich expressed concern, as had Lefin, that Hasidic prayerrepresenteda deviation from the carefully structuredliturgicalformulaeof traditionalrabbinic Judaism,their content as well as their fixed time-bounddaily schedule. Rabbinic Judaismproperlyunderstood,they believed, provided clear guidelines for the moderateacquisitionof good moralhabitsandthe temperatefulfillment of service to God. The method of Moral Accounting was likewise central to Lefin's antiHasidic critique.Lefin turnedto BenjaminFranklin'sindividualisticbehaviorist technique for moral self-improvementbecause of his harsh assessment of the institutionof the zaddik(rebbe),Hasidism'snew model of Jewishleadership whichappearedto offerEastEuropeanJewrya satisfyingway of dealingwith sin andimmorality.The consolidationof the role of the rebbeas a spiritualguide and mediator-a "channel"in the mystical terminologyof the believers-between the superal andmundaneworldsdefinedthe maturationof Hasidismat the end of the eighteenthcentury.Hasidimviewed theirrebbesas havingboth a unique abilityto connectwith the Divine and a special responsibilityto them to effect theirexpiationand spiritualgrowth.60In contrastMendel Lefin arguedthatthe
59 Meir ha-Cohen Reich to Benjamin Reich, Bar, 1823, transcribedin the maskil Jacob Samuel Bik's privatejoural. For the joural, see the Merzbachermanuscriptfound in the mu64, Ms. hebr. fol. 11, 39b. A microfilm of the manunicipal libraryof Frankfurt-on-the-Main, script is held in the Departmentof PhotographedManuscriptsand Archives, JNULA. In 1808, Lefin sent Meir ha-CohenReich a copy of MoralAccountingfor his opinion. See Mendel Lefin to Jacob MeshullamOrenstein,AbrahamSchwadronCollection of JewishAutographsand Portraits,Mendel Lefin papers,JNULA. 60 On the role of the zaddiksee ShimonDubnow, Toratha-Hasidut (TelAviv, 1930); Rachel Elior, TheParadoxical Ascent to God: TheKabbalistic Theosophyof Habad Hasidism, tr. Jeffrey M. Green(Albany, 1993); IsaiahTishbyandJosephDan, "HasidicThoughtandLiterature," in Perakim be-Toratha-Hasidut uve-Toldoteihah,ed. AvrahamRubinstein(Jerusalem,1977), 250-315; Ada Rapoport-Albert,"God and the Zaddikas the Two Focal Points of Hasidic Worship,"in EssentialPapers on Hasidism,ed. GershonDavid Hundert(New York,1991), 299-329.
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institutionof the rebbeunfairlyand deceitfully arrogateda uniquerelationship to God for Hasidism's initiates,excluding average,rabbinicJews.61 Lefinelaboratedon his critiqueof Hasidicexclusivityin MoralAccounting's seventh chapter(justice), consciously playing on the auralconsonanceand orthographic similarity of the Hebrew terms for justice (ZeDek) and rebbe (ZaDDiK). For Lefin, a trulyrighteousman (zaddik)performedGod's will by fulfilling the commandment, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Leviticus 18:19), meaning: respecting his fellow Jews (if not rationalnonJews) anddoing good for all of Creation,particularlyman. Lefin statedthatthe Sages consideredthis commandmentto be "the foundationof the whole Torah."Respecting one's fellow Jews was the essence of authenticJewish faith (emunah)intendedby the prophetHabakuk,when he expressed that "a righteous man (zaddik) shall live by his faith (emunah)"(Habakuk2:4).62Lefin undoubtedlyknew of the Hasidic interpretationof this verse from Habakuk,in which the intransitiveyihyeh (will live) was read as a transitiveverbyehayeh (will vitalize). In the Hasidicreadingthe verse emphasizedthe rebbe'ssingular power to mediatehis followers' spirituallife: "arebbewill vitalize [his followers] throughhis faith."63Reliance on the zaddik'smonopoly on faith was antithetical,wrote Lefin, consciously alludingto his enemies, to the positive commandmentof gemilut hasidim (being charitableto others). Lefin viewed the practiceamong Hasidimto supporttheirrebbeswith donations(pidyonot)as a form of economic exploitationwhich violated "commandmentsbetween man andhis fellow man, such as the prohibitionagainststealing and robbery,injustice and trickery."Lefin, again, well awareof the traditionalJewish exegetical practiceof encodingletterswithnumericalvalue(gematriyah),deliberatelyplaced the commentcomparingthe "true"meaningofzedek (justice)to the false exploitationof thezaddikin his book'sninetiethparagraph; in Hebrewthe number90 is writtensimply with the eighteenthletterof the alphabet,the zaddik/zadi.64 ForLefinthebelief amongHasidimthatthey hadan exceptionalrelationship to the Divine throughtheirrebbesnot only relegatedother,non-HasidicJews to a subordinatespiritualstatus.The inherent,ontologicaldependenceof the Hasidic believers upon their leadershipstruck at the very core of the Enlightenment projectto liberatethe self. Disturbedby the tendencywithin Hasidismto view the rebbe in a quasi-Divinemanner,Mendel Lefin felt it imperativeto find a method of behavior change that would re-anchor morality within the individual.Justas traditionalethicalexhortationwas inadequateto the task of in61
See [Lefin], Essai d'un plan de rdformeayantpour objet d'eclairer la Nation Juive en Pologne et de redresserpar li ses moeurs, sections 22-24 and notes 5 and 6 to those sections, 409-10, sections 14-16 and sections 25-26, 411-12. 62
[Lefin], par. 90.
63Tishy and Dan, 267. 64 [Lefin], par. 90.
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stilling the virtue of self-control, so it could not stem the appeal of Hasidism. Franklin's technique firmly secured the process of controlling one's appetite and perfecting one's morals in the individual. No intercessor or mediator was necessary for the successful practice of the technique in Moral Accounting; all that was required was a self-conscious person with a notebook. Mendel Lefin's seamless appropriation of Benjamin Franklin's "Rules of Conduct" in MoralAccounting challenges the putative borders between Jewish and non-Jewish, Western and Eastern European, internal and external culture in the age of the Enlightenment.65 Lefin consciously employed the ideas of enlightened West European non-Jews in his work and translated non-Jewish texts for East European Jews in an effort to disseminate his conception of a moderate, religious Haskalah. He was of course well aware of the distinct provenance of his sources and knew that not all men who professed Enlightenment ideology were tolerant of the Jews.66 It was Franklin's avowed ecumenicism and reputation as a defender of religious tolerance which made it possible for Lefin-and his disciples later in the nineteenth century-to incorporate the American's technique into MoralAccounting.67 Lefin frequently cited the classical saying of the Rabbinic Sages, " 'Who is wise?' 'The one who learns from every man'68... 'whether from a non-Jew or from Israel or from a slave or from a handmaid, the Holy Spirit rests upon him according to his deeds,' "69 as justification for his cultural borrowing. Incorporating classical Jewish aphorisms not only gave Lefin's work a traditional cast, but expressed his ardent belief that there was nothing incompatible between a rationalized, renewed Judaism and the universal values common to all men. While Lefin acknowledged the distinction between Jewish and non-Jewish texts, in his identity as an enlightened Jew he drew from both kinds of sources. His conception of the moderate, religious Enlightenment was at one and the same time specifically Jewish and universally European. Lefin shared many Enlightenment values with men like Benjamin Franklin, Joachim Heinrich Campe, Helvetius, Immanuel Kant, David Hartley, MontSee Amos Funkenstein,"The Dialectics of Assimilation,"Jewish Social Studies (new series), 1:2 (Winter,1995), 1-14. 66 See the discussion of Lefin's use of Voltaireand Montesquieuin Sinkoff, op cit. 67 See Franklin,76 and 92. NachmanKrochmal,a Jewish philosophersteeped in Hegelian idealism, translateda parableon religious toleranceattributedto Franklinin which the patriarch Abrahamis rebukedby God for being inhospitableto a pagan.JacobSamuelBik praisedLefin's use of Franklin'smethodby citing MishnahShabbat,16:8, "Israelcan makeuse of a light [on the Sabbath]kindledby a gentile."See AlexanderKohut,"Abraham'sLesson in Tolerance,"Jewish Quarterly Review, 15 (1903), 104-11; Joseph Klausner, "'Ethical Fable,' of R. Nachman Krochmal"(Hebrew), Tarbiz,1 (1930), 131-35; Shmuel Werses,"The Original,UnknownVersion of Jacob Samuel Bik's Letterto TobiasFeder"(Hebrew),in Werses,op cit., 350-51. 68 Mishnah Avot, 4:1. 69 TanaDe-Beit ElijahRabbah,parashah 10, chapter1. 65
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esquieu, andJohnLocke-all of whose writingsinformLefin's work-such as the battle against superstitionand ignoranceand the effort to liberatethe human soul from metaphysicaldogma-and yet he was highly selective in how he employedtheirworks.70The contextfor Lefin's projectwas always the spiritual conditionof Polish Jewry;singularto Moral Accountingas an Enlightenment text was Lefin's specific struggle against Hasidism for the souls of East EuropeanJewish youth. For Lefin, Franklin'stechniqueprovideda vehicle by which young men on the brinkof a turnto Hasidismwould remainwithin the traditional fold. Moral Accounting attempted to undermine the appeal of Hasidism while offering an individualizedprogramfor moral self-improvement consonantwith traditionalvalues of devotion to God and to Jewish law. At all times Lefin stroveto balancethe innovationof the Enlightenment'semphasis on the self with the continuity of traditionalrabbinicJudaism. Lefin exhortedhis imaginedreaderthatmasteryof Franklin'smethodof moral selfreformwould free him "to serve God withjoy for the rest of your life until you returnto dust."71Engagedin the culturalfermentof the late eighteenthcentury which had penetratedeast into Polish magnate holdings, Mendel Lefin's appropriationof Franklin'smethodwas neverpassive. Implicitin his selection of ideas from the enlightenedEuropeanculturalrealm was the transformationof Polish Jewry. RutgersUniversity.
70 For Lefin's reference to Leonhard Euler, see his unpublishedjournal, the Joseph Perl Archive, folder 130, JNULA; to Helv6tius, see the AbrahamSchwadronCollection of Jewish Autographsand Portraits,Mendel Lefin papers,documentsb, d and e, JNULA, and the Joseph PerlArchive, folders 6 and 128d, JNULA;to Campe, see Lefin's Masa 'ot ha-Yam;to Kant, see the Joseph Perl Archive, folders 128a, b, c, d, and e, JNULA; to Hartley'stheories of "vibrations" and "the association of ideas," see the AbrahamSchwadronCollection of Jewish AutographsandPortraits,Mendel Lefin papers,documentc, paragraph25, JNULAand [Lefin],paragraph67 with its footnote, and paragraph78; to Montesquieu,see [Lefin], Essai d'un plan de reformeayantpourobjetd 'clairer la NationJuive en Pologne et de redresserparld ses moeurs, op cit.
71
[Lefin], par. 26.
JHI
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Donald R. Kelley It was just sixty years ago that this Journalfirst made its appearance.Two hundredthirty-nineissues laterit continuesin a worldtransformedby war,overpopulation,culturalshocks, scientific and technological transformations,globalization,the avalancheof informationproducedby electronicexchange, and "the accelerationof just about everything."Yet despite these factors and the strainsof postmoderism andculturalalterity,1it has not entirelylost touchwith its intellectualinnocence, faith in humanisticlearning,andrelianceon enlightenedreason.This continuityitself may seem somethingof a novelty in an age of distrustof history and "rageagainst reason,"but for some of us it reflects the critical spirit and intellectualcontext out of which such ostensibly subversive attitudesemerge,andreemerge.To some extent,moreover,the diversityof opinions aboutintellectualtraditionsis the result of specializations,and special interests,which have changedthe climate of opinion since the time of Arthur0. Lovejoy, principalfounderof the JHI. Lovejoy's vision was super-as well as inter-disciplinary;that is, he intendedto include in the agenda of "historyof ideas"particularareas of history of philosophy, literature,art, science, social science, etc., as well as the largerintellectualandculturalareasinto which these disciplinaryhistoriesextend.2These days, however,all these disciplinarytraditions have theirown more specializedjournalsanddo not need to seek a vehicle in publicationsof moregeneralinterest.Whatremainsthen, for the most part,is the interdisciplinary arenain which largerquestionsof humanexperienceshould be posed-and for Lovejoy,as for so manyepigonesandcritics,the main"larger question"is not only one of value but also of specifically historicalinquiry.3 1 Not
to speak of Cold Warassociations:back in the 1960s, apparently,the JHI received, indirectly,$500 from the CIA for its contributionsto the cultureof the free world. Neither our own recordsnor the memoriesof the editorsgo back so far. See FrancesStonorSaunders,Who Paid the Piper? The CIAand the CulturalCold War(London, 1999), 338. 2 Essays in the History of Ideas (New York, 1955), 1-2. 3 Lovejoy, "Historiographyand Evaluation:A Disclaimer,"JHI, 10 (1949), 141; repr.The History of Ideas: Canon and Variations,ed. D. R. Kelley (Rochester, 1990); and see Kelley, "ArthurO. Lovejoy (1873-1962)," Dialektik:EnzyklopddischeZeitschriftfur Philosophie und Wissenschaften,1 (1998), 133-39.
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The first issue of the JHI appearedunderthe editorshipof Lovejoy (with Philip Wiener,who did most of the editorialwork, as "managingeditor"),assistedby a committeethatincludedtwo historians,threephilosophers,fourliteraryscholars,andone politicaltheorist;namely,CraneBrinton,GilbertChinard, MorrisCohen,FrancisCoker,RichardMcKeon,PerryMiller,MarjoryNicolson, J. H. Randall,J. Salwyn Schapiro,and Louis Wright.The firstvolume featured contributionsfrom each of these, includingWiener,except for Miller (vol. 2), Shapiro(vol. 3), McKeon (vol. 8), and Coker.4Duringthe first five years there were also reviews of books by Dilthey (by HoraceL. Friess),Croce (Schapiro), Mannheim(Randall),PerryMiller (HerbertW. Schneider),VanWyck Brooks (Miller) and Alfred Kazin (F. O. Matthiessen).In this period the disciplinary distributionof articles was not markedlydifferent from that of the past five years,norwas the rankingof fields by numberof submissions.5Most important, the originalinterdisciplinarythrustofLovejoy's agenda,if not his attachmentto the spiritualistcurrencyof"unit-ideas,"has survivedgrowing specialization. At firstthe historyof ideas was pursuedlargelyin the shadowof the history of philosophy;for in this field, accordingto Lovejoy, "is to be found the common seed-plot,the locus of initialmanifestationin writing,of the greaternumber of the more fundamentaland pervasive ideas, and especially of the ruling preconceptions,which manifestthemselves in otherregions of intellectualhistory."6Lovejoy's concernwas alwayswith concepts,especially"-isms,"andyet in some ways he anticipatedthe "linguisticturn"of the lateryears of this century, pointing out in particular"the role of semantic shifts, ambiguities, and confusions,in the historyof thoughtandtaste,"for "nearlyall of the greatcatchwords have been equivocal-or rather,multivocal."7If ideas could be given stable definitions, they were nonetheless often, in the context of language, in conflict, even in the mind of a single thinker;for such was the "anomalyof knowledge."8So Lovejoy was at pains to distinguishthe various meanings of
4 In the first decade other contributorsincluded BertrandRussell, Robert Palmer, Hans Kohn, JohnDewey, GeorgeBoas, P. 0. Kristeller,J. W. Beach, EdwardRosen, LynnThomdike, Jacques Barzun, Moses Hadas, Richard Hofstadter,Ernst Cassirer,Monroe Beardsley, Hans Baron, Alexandre Koyre, F. O. Matthiessen, Paul Tillich, Talcott Parsons, Leo Spitzer, Karl Lowith, Donald Lach, BarringtonMoore, JoachimWach, RichardSchlatter,Peter Geyl, Hajo Holbom, Leo Strauss, Rosamond Tuve, Ferand Baldensperger,Charles Singleton, Morton White, WalterKaufmann,Leroy Loemker,HerbertSchneider,and CharlesTrinkaus. 5 Here are the percentages,respectively,for 1940-44 and 1995-99: historiography(15, 7), philosophy (19, 19), political thought (19, 22), literature(19, 26); science (10, 4), social-economic (5, 2); religion (6, 8); art (7, 5). 6 Essays in the History of Ideas (Baltimore, 1948), 8. Lovejoy's first usage of the phrase "historyof ideas" occurredin 1919 (ModernLanguage Notes, 34, 305), according to Gladys Gordon-Boumique,Arthur0. Lovejoy et I'histoiredes idees (Ph. D. diss., Paris, 1974). 7 Essays, xii, xiii. 8 The Thirteen Pragmatisms(Baltimore, 1963), 236.
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catch-wordslike "nature," "romanticism," "progress,"and"prag"perfectibility," matism,"not to mentionmore inflammatoryterms of wartimeideological debate. But the climate of opinion has undergonemany changes in the past three generations.In the early 1940s the Journal'sagendaincludedlargequestionsof nationalism,Marxism,Fascism, Romanticism,andthe Renaissance;in the late 1990s therewere new interestsfocussingon gender,masculinity,memory,practices of reading,the public sphere, and on new faces, including (the revived) Vico, (the "new")Nietzsche, Collingwood, Foucault, Derrida,Gadamer,and Blumenberg-with one old face, thatofAlexandre Koyre,reappearingposthumously.9Some themeshave persisted,and so have the majorfiguresin philosophy and literature,though often with new angles of inquiry-with love, madness, dreams,andthedemonic,forexample,beingfeaturedalongwithDescartes's unencumberedCogito and Kant's pure reason-and some authors, such as Cassirerand Hans Baron,becoming themselves objects of historicalscrutiny. The history of skepticism has flourishedin post-Popkinstudies, and so more recently has the history of Eclectic and "popular"philosophy,long overshadowed by Kantandhis epigones. Scientific subjectsstill figureprominently,but moreoften in the contextualist("externalist,"as we used to say) style of contemporaryhistoryof science, with attentionalso to new areassuch as genetics. In many areasthe "new"(butnow, aftermorethana generation,old) rhetoric andconcernswithrepresentation andmetaphorhavetendedto replace"ideas" andotherconceitsof purethought,especiallyin science andthe humansciences, and theory appearsin studies of literatureEast as well as West. Paradoxically, perhaps,the availabilityof the new technologyhas intensifiedthis literaryturn, as electronicdatabases make word searchesand semanticand citationalanalysis so much easier.'?Also featuredhave been symposia devoted to particular issues, includingthe old questionof objectivityin historyandthe newer one of Renaissance exemplarity, the state of scholarship on Lorenzo Valla, and Machiavelliandreligion. I could offer many more examples of novelties to illustratethe forwardlooking postureof the JHI, but therearemanyties to the past as well. The main reason for this, it seems to me, is that despite the continuinginterdisciplinary orientationof the Journal,the presenceof autonomousdisciplinarytraditionsis still pronounced(despitethe extraordinary proliferationofjourals in fields over-
9 "PresentTrendsof French PhilosophicalThought"(1946), ed. Paola Zambelli, JHI, 59 (1998), 521-48. 10See my review of the data base, Past Masters, in JHI, 56 (1995), 153-59. And the Journal has itself recently gone on line through the "ProjectMuse" of The Johns Hopkins University Press.
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At the end of the millenniumthe JHIEditolappingwith intellectualhistory).11 rialBoardfeaturesthirteenhistorians(rangingwidely in fields andperiods),two historiansof science, six philosophers,fourclassicists, andthreeliteraryscholars, with just one specialist each for art and music. With such an arsenal of expertiseanddiversityof prioritiesandstandards,morehazardousexperiments may sometimes be discouraged;but the high level of scholarshipis protected, andmoreoverthe inputof ourfortyconsultingeditorsandmany otherinformal critics keeps the door open, I hope, to the contributionsof young and more venturesomescholars,who areeven now surpassingtheirelders-a happytranscendence,which I hope thisJournalwill continueto promotein the thirdmillennium, accordingto westernreckoning. RutgersUniversity.
11A rough estimateof English languagepublicationsonly shows 20 journals in the history of science, 8 in philosophy, 9 in political thought, 5 in historiography,6 in literature(surely more), 10 in culturalhistory, and 10 "general."
Notices
Villa I Tatti:The HarvardUniversity Center for Italian Renaissance Studies offers up to fifteen scholarshipsfor independentstudy on any aspect of the ItalianRenaissance for the academic year 2001/2002. The fellowships, which can be stipendiary or non-stipendiary,are for scholarsof any nationality,normallypost-doctoral,and in the earlierstages of their careers.Applicants should send a completed application form, a curriculumvitae and a project descriptionto the Director,Professor Walter Kaiser,Villa I Tatti,via di Vincigliata26, 50135 Florence,Italy (tel.: +39-055-603251) to arrive no later than 15 October 2000, with duplicates to the Villa I Tatti Office, HarvardUniversity,UniversityPlace, 124 Mt. AuburnStreet,Cambridge,MA 021385762, USA (tel.: 617-495-8042). Candidatesshould ask three senior scholarsfamiliar with theirwork to send confidentiallettersof recommendationto the Directorin Italy and to the I Tatti Office in Cambridgeby 15 October.Applications and letters of recommendationsent by fax arenot accepted.Applicationforms can be obtainedfrom Villa I Tattiin Florence, Italy or from the Villa I Tattioffice in Cambridge. Call for papers: "WorldWar II-A 60 Year Perspective,"31 May-1 June 2001. Siena College is sponsoring its sixteenth annual conference on the sixtieth anniversary of WorldWarII with a focus on 1941. Topics will include, but are not limited to, Fascism and Nazism, the War in Asia, Pearl Harbor,and Japanese Expansion and Occupation,Collaborationistregimes,PopularCultureandWomen'sandJewishStudies dealing with the era. Send brief (1-3 pages) outline or abstractof the proposal with some sense of sources, archivalmaterialsconsulted and a recent c.v. or brief current biographicalsketch. Deadline for submissions: 15 November 2000. Replies and inquiries to: Professor Thomas O. Kelley, Departmentof History, Siena College, 515 Loudon Road, Loudonville, NY 12211-1462; tel.: (518) 783-2512; fax: (518) 7865052; e-mail:
[email protected]. Call for papers: "Aquinasas Authority?Seven Centuriesof Problems and Perspectives," 14-16 December2000, the ThomasInstituutat Utrecht.The theme will be the scholarlyreceptionof Thomas Aquinas from 1300 until the present.Deadline for proposals(by mail, e-mail or fax): 1 July 2000. Proposalsmust be writtenin English, French,or German.For more informationcontactthe conference committee:Thomas Instituut,c/o Harm Goris, P.O. Box 80101, NL-3508, TC Utrecht,The Netherlands; website: www.ktu.nl/thomas. Conference:"Nietzsche's Use of Language,"21-23 September2000, Nijmegen University.To markthe centenaryof Nietzsche's death,Paulvan Tongeren'sNietzsche Researchgroup at Nijmegen University is organizingan internationaland interdisciplinaryconferenceon Nietzsche's use of language.For a descriptionof the Nijmegen researchproject see website addresswww.kun.nl/phil/algemeen/nietzsche.html. Topics for discussion include:Nietzsche's vocabulary;his use of metaphor;and the influ157 Copyright2000 by Journalof the Historyof Ideas,Inc.
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ence of Biblical language on Nietzsche's language. The conference will be bilingual (English and German).Provisional list of speakers:Benjamin Biebuyck (Gent, Belgium), Daniel Conway (Pennsylvania, U.S.), Samuel Ijsseling (Leuven, Belgium), Angele Kremer-Marietti(Amiens, France),DuncanLarge(Swansea,U.K.), Wolfgang Miiller-Lauter(Berlin,Germany),GerdSchank(Nijmegen,The Netherlands),Hartmut Schmidt (Mannheim, Germany), Johhanes Schwitalla (Wiirzburg,Germany), Gary Shapiro(Virginia,U.S.), Paulvan Tongeren(Nijmegen). Formore information,please contact:Dr.HesterIjsseling,Departmentof Philosophy,Universityof Nijmegen,Postbus 9103, 6500 HD Nijmegen, The Netherlands; e-mail:
[email protected]; website: www.kun.nl/phil/algemeen/seminar_nietzsche_2000.html. Colin andAilsa TurbayneInternationalBerkeleyEssay PrizeCompetition($2000): for the 2000 competitionsubmittedpapers should addresssome aspect of Berkeley's theory of vision. Essays should be new and unpublished and should be written in English and not exceed 5,000 words in length. All referencesto Berkeley should be to Luce/Jessop,and a MLA or similarcitationstyle shouldbe followed. Submissionsare blind reviewed and will be judged by membersof a review boardselected by the Departmentof Philosophy of the University of Rochester.Deadline for submittingpapers: 1 November 2000. Send submissionsto: Chair,Departmentof Philosophy,University of Rochester,P.O. Box 270078, Lattimore532, Rochester,NY 14627-0078. Errata (no fault of the author):during the productionprocess, two errorswere introducedinto the essay by EdwardP. Mahoney,"PaulOskarKristeller,1905-1999" (JHI, volume 60 [1999], 759). For "Translatonium"read "Translationum";for "Commentarium" read "Commentariorum."
Books
Received
Adams, Marilyn McCord. WhatSort of Human Nature? Medieval Philosophy and theSystematicsofChristology(TheAquinasLecture,1999). Milwaukee:Marquette UP, 1999. 119p., index. Speculationon the details of Incarnation. Albertus Magnus. On Animals: A Medieval Summa Zoologica. Ed. and tr. by Kennth F. Kitchell Jr., and Irven Michael Resnick. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1999. 2 vols.; lxiv, 1827p., bibl., index. Translation,with comprehensivenotes, illustrations,critical apparatus,and forewordby William Wallace. Bacon, Francis.SelectedPhilosophical Works.ed. andintr.by Rose-MarySargent. Indianapolis:HackettPublishingCompany,1999. xxxviii, 290p., bibl., index, $34.95. Abridgementsfrom the majortexts. Bagger,MatthewC. Religious Experience:Justificationand History. Cambridge: CambridgeUP, 1999. ix, 238p., bibl., index. Back to secular considerationsand historical context. Basch, Norma. FramingAmericanDivorce: From the RevolutionaryGeneration to the Victorians.Berkeley: U of CaliforniaP, 1999. xii, 237p., index, $29.95. Legal, social, culturalcontexts-and "stories." Bazerman,Charles. TheLanguages of Edisons Light (Inside Technology Series, W. E. Bijker,W. B. Carlson,and TrevorPinch, gen. eds.). Cambridge:MIT P, 1999. x, 416p., bibl., index, $39.50. Emergenceof electric light as system of meaning and communication. Beem, Christopher.The Necessity of Politics: ReclaimingAmericanPublic Life (Moralityand Society series, ed. Alan Wolfe). Chicago:Chicago UP, 1999. xiv, 311p., index. The idea of civil society and the importanceof good government. Beller, Mara. QuantumDialogue: The Making of a Revolution. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1999. xv, ref., index, 365p. Role of interactionin the creationof scientific "novelty"and consensus. Bevir, Mark. The Logic of the History of Ideas. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999.xii, 337p., bibl., index. Making meaning and culture from hermeneuticsto social theory. Bodino, Juan. Coloquio de los siete sabios sobre arcanos relativos a cuestiones ziltimas(Colloquiumheptaplomeres).Tr. Primitivo Mario, intro. by Jaime de Salas. Madrid:Centrode EstudiosPoliticos y Constitucionales,1998. xxviii, 386p. Translation of Bodin's ColloquiumHaptaplomares. Brandolini,Silva MarzettiDall'Aste, and RobertoScazzieri, eds. La Probabilitd in Keynes: Premesse e influenze(Collana di informazionebibliograficae scientifica, 6, VeraNegri Zamagni,gen. ed.). Bologna: CooperativaLibrariaUniversitariaEditrice Bologna, 1999. 353p., bibl., indices. L44,000. Seven studies with a review by Keynes and bibliography.
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Brenner,William H. Wittgensteins Philosophical Investigations.Albany: State U of New York P, 1999. xv, 184p., bibl., index. $18.95. Introductionto the major themes. Breyfogle, Todd,ed. LiteraryImagination,Ancientand Modern:Essays in Honor of David Grene.Chicago: Chicago UP, 1999. 405p., index. Twenty-twointerdisciplinary essays, from the Greeksto Henry James and Saul Bellow. Bronner,StephenEric. Ideas in Action: Political Traditionin the TwentiethCentury.New York:Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. x, 349p., index. Bums, Kathryn.Colonial Habits: Conventsand the SpiritualEconomyof Cuzco, Peru. Durham:Duke UP, 1999. xi, 307p., bibl., index, $17.95. Nuns to center stage. Cartwright,Nancy. The Dappled World:A Study of the Boundaries of Science. New York: CambridgeUP, 1999. ix, 247p., bibl., index. $54.95. Laws of nature as "patchworknot a pyramid,"in physics and economics. Cooper,LaurenceD. Rousseau, Nature and the Problem of the Good Life. University Park:The PennsylvaniaState UP, 1999. xiv, 223p., bibl., index. Conscienceas "love of order"- as means to "civilized naturalness." Courtois,Stephaneet al. TheBlack Book of Communism:Crimes,Terror,Repression. Cambridge:HarvardUP, 1999. xx, 856p., index. Translationof Le Livre noir du Communisme:Crimes, terreur,repression, with an introductionby MartinMalia. Cox, Christoph.Nietzsche: Naturalismand Interpretation.Berkeley: U of Califoria P, 1999. xvi, 270p., bibl., index, $45. A reading that "saves" Nietzsche from antifoundationalism. Delacampagne,Christian.A History of Philosophy in the TwentiethCentury.Tr. M. B. DeBevoise. Baltimore:Johns Hopkins UP, 1999. xviii, 330p., bibl., index. by $42.50. Translationof Histoire de la philosophie au XXesiecle (1995). Diakonoff, Igor M. The Paths of History. Cambridge:CambridgeUP, 1999. x, 355p., index, $54.95. Expansion of Marxist to revisionist stages of socio-economic evolution, from the Russian (1994). Dooley, Brendan. The Social History of Skepticism:Experience and Doubt in Early Modern Culture.Baltimore:Johns Hopkins UP, 1999. viii, 213p., index. Low journalism in seventeenth-centuryItaly, the degradationof history, and some epistemological consequences. Finch, HenryLeroy.Simone Weilland the Intellectof Grace. Ed. by MartinAndic. New York: Continuum, 1999. xii, 177p., bibl., index, $29.95. Posthumous monograph. Fraser,J. T. Time, Conflict and Human Values.Urbana:U of Illinois P, 1999. 306p., index. Time as essential componentof the determinationof humanvalues. Freedman,Paul. Images of the Medieval Peasant (Figurae: Reading Medieval Cultureseries). Stanford:StanfordUP, 1999. Representingthe myths and reality of the peasant-looked down on, but not alien-and now departed. Galliher,John F., and Keys, David Patrick.Confrontingthe Drug ControlEstablishment:AlfredLindesmithas a Public Intellectual.Albany: State U of New YorkP, 1999. ix, 235p., index, $18.95. Biographyof sociologist. Ghedini, Francesco. II platone di Nietzsche: Genesi e motivi di un simbolo controverso (1864-1879). Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane:Napoli, 1999. 416p., index, $55. Confrontationof Nietzsche with Plato in the Basel lectures. Gienow-Hecht, Jessica C. E. TransmissionImpossible:AmericanJournalism as CulturalDiplomacy in Postwar Germany1945-1955. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
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UP, 1999. xx, 230p., bibl., index. Communicationand culture in US-Germanrelations. Goodwin, Charles Stewart.Precarious Balances: The Middle Ages of the Next Millennium.Lanham:AmericanUP, 1999. xiv, 523p., bibl., index. Comparisonof the Middle Ages and 1990s. Gordon,Lois, and GordonAlan. American Chronicle: Yearby Yearthroughthe TwentiethCentury. Intro. by Roger Rosenblatt. New Haven: Yale UP, 1999. xviii, 998p., index. Gordon, Scott. Controllingthe State: Constitutionalismfrom Ancient Athens to Today.Cambridge:HarvardUP, 1999. x, 395p., bibl., index, $58.95. Generalsurvey of theory and practice. Gracia,Jorge J. E. Hispanic / Latino Identity:A Philosophical Perspective. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000. Who are "we," where do we come from, how do we fit in, philosophically? Gray, Edward G. New WorldBabel: Languages & Nations in Early America. Princeton:PrincetonUP, 1999. xiv, 185p., bibl., index. Critical study of (Colonialwhite/ Amerindian)alterities, linguistic confrontations,problems of translation,and cultural interactions Gregory,Brad S. Salvation at Stake: ChristianMartyrdomin Early ModernEurope. Cambridge:HarvardUP, 1999. 528p., index. Martyrdomin the formation of divergent Christianreligions and identities. Grosholz, Emily, and ElhananYakira.Leibnizs Science of the Rational (Studia Leibnitiana,vol. 26). Stuttgart:FranzSteinerVerlag, 1998. 107p.Mathesisgenerales: theory of predictionand analysis of arithmetic. Guicciardini,Niccolo. Reading the Principia: The Debate on Newtons MathematicalMethodsfor NaturalPhilosophyfrom 1687 to 1736. Cambridge:Cambridge UP, 1999. v, 285p., ref., index, $80. Analysis in terms of scientific and historical questions. Haag, Pamela. Consent:Sexual Rights and the Transformationof AmericanLiberalism. Ithaca:CornellUP, 1999. xx, 232p., index. Heterosexualmodernityand citizenship. Heck, Thomas F., ed. Picturing Performance: The Iconographyof the PerformArts in Conceptand Practice. Rochester,N.Y..: U of RochesterP, 1999. xii, 255p., ing index. bibl., Survey across the arts and nationaltraditions,with contributionsby various scholars. Heilbron,J. L. TheSun in the Church:Cathedralsas Solar Observatories.Cambridge: HarvardUP, 1999. ix, 366p., index. $35. Churchpolitics and the establishment of scientific research. Heilke, Thomas.Eric Voegelin:In Questof Reality(20th CenturyPoliticalThinkers series,KennethL. DeutschandJeanBethkeElshtain,serieseds.). Lanham:Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999. x, 193p., index. Analysis and interpretationbetween political thought and theology. H6sle, Vittorio. Die Philosophie und die Wissenschaften.Miinchen:Beck'sche Reihe, 1999. 236p., bibl. Introductionto the academic disciplines. Janaway,Christopher,ed. The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer.New York: CambridgeUP, 1999. xiv, 478p., bibl., index. $59.95. Thirteen chapters by experts.
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Jefferson,Thomas.Political Writings(CambridgeTexts in the History of Political Thought,Joyce Appleby and TerenceBall, eds.) Cambridge:CambridgeUP, 1999. liii, 623p., bibl., index, $59.95. Selections from various sources, with chronology, biographicalsynopses, critical introduction,etc. Katz, Daniel. Saying I No More: Subjectivityand Consciousness in the Prose of Samuel Beckett (Avant-Gardeand Modernism Studies, MarjoriePerloff and Rainer Rumold,gen. eds). Evanston:NorthwesternUP, 1999. vii, 220p., bibl., index, $17.95. Beckett's refusal of the "I"as mode of expression. Kempshall, M. S. The CommonGood in Late Medieval Political Thought.Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999. viii, 401p., bibl., index, $95. Reconsiderationof Aristotelian origins of theory of the individualand of the state:AlbertusMagnus, Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Henryof Ghent,Godfreyof Fontaines,James of Viterbo,Johnof Paris, and Remigio dei Girolami. Kennedy,Kathleen.Disloyal Mothers and Scurrilous Citizens: Womenand Subversion during WorldWarI. Bloomington:IndianaUP, 1999. xx, 170p., bibl., index. Citizenshipand equal rights, ratherthan materalist demands, from women political activists. Koerer, Lisbet. Linnaeus: Nature and Nation. Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUP, 1999. 298p., bibl., index, $39.95. Scholarly biography of Englightenmentscientist and relationshipbetween science and "economy." Korsmeyer,Carolyn.MakingSense of Taste:Food & Philosophy. Ithaca:Corell UP, 1999. xii, 232p., ill., index. Art, science, philosophy,and "narratives"of eating. Kot, Joanna.Distance Manipulation:The Russian ModernistSearchfor a New Drama (Studies in RussianLiteratureandTheory,CarylEmerson,gen. ed.). Evanston: NorthwesternUP, 1999. 170p.,bibl., index, $54.95. Studyof five Russianplaywrights, including Chekhov. Kreimendahl,Lothar,ed. Philosophen des 17. Jahr-Hunderts:Eine Einfuhrung. Darmstadt:PrimusVerlag, 1999. vi, 267p., index. Twelve essays on major philosophers from Bacon to Thomasius Levine, Joseph M. Between the Ancients and the Moderns: Baroque Culturein RestorationEngland.New Haven:YaleUP, 1999. xiv, 279p., ill., index.Evelyn, Dryden, Saint-Evremond,Wren-en garde. Levine, Joseph M. TheAutonomyof History. Truthand Methodfrom Erasmusto Gibbon. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1999. xviii, 249p., index. Nine previously published essays. Lewis, David. Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy (vol. 3). New York:Cambridge UP, 2000. 255p., index. $54.95. On logic of obligation and permission, the relationshipbetween belief, desire and decision, and subjectivistethics. Lewis, R.W. B., and Nancy Lewis. American Characters: Selections from the National Portrait Gallery,Accompaniedby LiteraryPortraits. New Haven:Yale UP, 1999. xviii, 412p., index. Picturebook with commentary. Lindemann, Mary. Medicine and Society in Early Modern Europe (New Approaches to EuropeanHistory series). Cambridge:CambridgeUP, 1999. xii, 249p., bibl., index. Broad culturaland social history. L6pez Pifiero,Jose M., et al. La ActividadCientifica Valencianade la Ilustracion. Valencia: Diputacion de Valencia, 1998. 574p., ill. Scientific Revolution and after, naturaland human sciences, with extensive Valencianbibliography,with commentary and iconography.
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MacNamara,John. Throughthe RearviewMirror:Historical reflections on Psychology. Cambridge,Mass.: MIT P, 1999. xix, 291p., bibl., index, $37.50. Posthumously published study of psychology from Plato and Aristotle to behaviorismand Gestalt. Mayerfield, Jamie. Sufferingand Moral Responsibility.New York: Oxford UP, 1999. xiii, 237p., bibl., index, $45. Declarationsand prescriptionsfor the meaning, measurement,and moral significance of suffering. Mendes-Flohr,Paul. GermanJews: A Dual identity.New Haven:Yale UP, 1999. xvi, 149p., index. Rosenzweig and fracturednatureof German-Jewishidentity. Monod, Paul Kleber. The Power of Kings: Monarchy and Religion in Europe, 1589-1715. New Haven: Yale UP, 1999. x, 417p., index. Changing conception of monarchicalpower and person. Interdisciplinary-scholarly-popular-survey. Montgomery, Scott L. The Moon and the WesternImagination. Tucson: U of Arizona P, 1999. xiii, 265p., bibl., ill., index. Lunarrepresentationand reality from antiquityto Galileo, Hevelius, and Riccioli. Moorhead,James H. WorldWithoutEnd: MainstreamAmerican Protestant Visions of the Last Things, 1880-1925. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1999. xxii, 241p., index. Apocalyptic religious beliefs and advent of modernity. Murray,Peter Duro. Nietzsches AffirmativeMorality:A RevaluationBased in the Dyonisian World-View. New York:Walterde Gruyter,1999. x, 320p., bibl., index. for the future. Dionysian morality Oakes,Guy,andArthurJ. Vidich. Collaboration,Reputation,and Ethics in American AcademicLife: Hans H. Gerthand C. WrightMills. Urbana,U of Illinois P, 1999. viii, 188p., index, $14.95. Study of these two post-Weberiancollaborators. Oberdeck,KathrtynF. The Evangelist and the Impresario:Religion, Entertainment and CulturalPolitics in America, 1884-1914 (New Studies in American Intellectual and CulturalHistory, series eds. Dorothy Ross and Kenneth Cmiel). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1999. xiii, 429p., bibl., index. "Culture"in religion and politics, via AlexanderIrvine and Sylvester Poli. Oreskes, Naomi. The Rejection of the ContinentalDrift: Theoryand Method in AmericanEarth Science. New York:Oxford UP, 1999. ix, 420p., bibl., index. Transatlanticscientific reception of continentaldrift theory. Panichas,GeorgeA. Growing Wingsto OvercomeGravity:Criticismas the Pursuit of Virtue.Macon: Mercer UP, 1999. xxii, 340p., index. Means of resolving the contemporarycrisis of modernism. Pocock, J. G. A. Barbarism and Religion. VolumeOne: The Enlightenmentsof EdwardGibbon,1737-1764. VolumeTwo:Narrativesof Civil Government.New York: CambridgeUP, 1999. xv, 771p., bibl., index. Gibbon redivivus-contexts, contemporaries, civil and ecclesiastical historiography-and more volumes to come. Pugliese, StanislaoG. Carlo Roselli: Socialist HereticandAntifascistExile. Cambridge: HarvardUP, 1999. xii, 308p., bibl., index. First English-languagescholarly biography. Pyle, Andrew, ed. Key Philosophers in Conversation: The Cogito Interviews. New York: Routledge, 1999. ix, 256p., $20.99. Talking with twenty contemporary English and American philosophers. Rabinow, Paul. French DNA: Troublein Purgatory. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1999. viii, 201p., bibl. Ethics of biotechnology in the context of nationalism.
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Rescher, Nicholas. Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kants Theoryof Rational Systemization.Cambridge:CambridgeUP, 1999. viii, 258p., index, $54.95. Nine previously publishedessays. Rouhi, Leyla. Mediation and Love: A Studyof the Medieval Go-Betweenin Key Romanceand Near-EasternTexts.Leiden: Brill, 1999. ix, 31 p., bibl., index. Role of "thirdparty"in poetics of love. Rousselot, Pierre. Intelligence: Sence of Being, Faculty of God (vol. 1 of the CollectedPhilosophicalWorks).Tr.andintro.by AndrewTallon.Milwaukee:Marquette UP, 1999. xxxv, 236p. bibl., $30. New translationof L'Intellectualismede saint Thomas (1936). Salenius, Maria. The Dean and His God: John Donne s Concept of the Divine (Memoires de la Societe Neophilologique de Helsinki, vol. LIV). Helsinki: Societe Neophilologique, 1998. iii, 208p., bibl. God as light in the sermons. Sallis, John. Chorology:On Beginning in Plato s Timaeus.Bloomington:Indiana UP, 1999. 172p., index. InterpretingPlatonic political themes throughthe chora. Satter,Beryl. Each Mind a Kingdom:American Women,Sexual Purity, and the New ThoughtMovement, 1875-1920. Berkeley: U of CaliforniaP, 1999. xv, 382p., bibl., index. Promotionsof a (pre-"self-help")"women's era"and "genderedsubjectivity" purgedof undesirablemasculine and heterosexualelements. SbarberiFranco.L 'Utopiadella LibertaEguale: II liberalismosociale da Rosselli a Bobbio. Torino:Bollati Boringhiaeri, 1999. 218p., index. Liberal and democratic ideas of four Italianpolitical thinkers. Sokolowski, Robert.Introductionto Phenomenology.Cambridge:CambridgeUP, 2000. xi, 238p., index. Broad overview. Solomon, Robert,and KathleenHiggins. WhatNietzscheReally Said. New York: Shocken Books, 2000. xvi, bibl., 253p., $23. Introductorysurvey. Stein, Roger B., and William H. Truettner,eds. Picturing Old New England: Image and Memory.New Haven:Yale UP / National Museumof AmericanArt, 1999. xv, 239p., bibl., ill., index. Paintings,photos, etc. from the Civil Warto Modernism. Strasser,Susan. Wasteand Want:A Social History of Trash.New York:Metropolitan Books, 1999. 355p., index, $27.50. The nasty side of American mass consumersociety. Sullivan, Jack. New WorldSymphonies:How American CultureChangedEuropean Music. New Haven: Yale UP, 1999. xix, 262p., ill., index. Dvorak, jazz, and popularmusic abroad. Versluis,Arthur.Wisdoms Children:A ChristianEsoteric Tradition.Albany:State U of New YorkP, 1999. xiv, 369p., bibl., index. On ProtestantTheosophicmysticism. Walbridge,John. TheLeaven of the Ancients:Suhraward and the Heritage of the Greeks.Albany: StateU of New YorkP, 2000. xviii, 305p., bibl., index, $26.95. Intellectual history of Persian "Illuminationist"system. Waldmann, Helmut. Petrus und die Kirche (Band II). Tiibingen: Verlag der TiibingerGesellschaft, 1999. xxvi, 249p., DM 14.80. Theological angles on St. Peter, the Church,and the State. Waldron,J. The Dignity of Legislation. Cambridge:CambridgeUP, 1999. xiii, 206p., bibl., index. Introductionto a normativepolitical theory of legislation. Watson, James R., ed. Portraits of American Continental Philosophers. Bloomington: IndianaUP, 1999. ix, 228p. Twenty-two contemporarysketches with bibliographies.
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Wax, Murray L. WesternRationality and the Angel of Dreams: Self, Psyche, Dreaming.Lanham:Rowman& LittelfieldPublishersinc, 1999. ix, bibl., index, $22.95. Interdisciplinarymusings about the social meaning of dreaming. Weidman,Nadine M. ConstructingScientific Psychology: Karl Lashleys MindBrainDebates. Cambridge:CambridgeUP, 1999. xix, 219p., bibl., index. Historicizing neuropsychology. Wilson, Fred. TheLogic and Methodologyof Science in Early Modern Thought. Toronto:U of TorontoP, 1999. xxiv, 607p., bibl., index, ?65. Philosophicalstudies of rationalistand (versus) empiricist methods, mainly in the British tradition. Wilson, Lisa. YeHeart of a Man: The Domestic Life of Men in Colonial New England. New Haven: Yale UP, 1999. xii, 255p., index. Domestic obligation, duty, affection, and patriarchalpower. Wood,Allen, W. Kant'sEthical Thought.New York:CambridgeUP, 1999. xxiv, 436p., index. Kant's distinctive theory of humannatureand history before Hegel. Zook, Melinda S. Radical Whigsand ConspiratorialPolitics in Late StuartEngland. University Park: The Pennsylvania State UP, 1999. xxi, 234p., bibl., index. Bottom-uppolitical activism and disseminationof British liberalism.
A Culture o(
"A Cultureof Fact is a superb realization of a great idea. Erudite, conceptually rich, and thought provoking, it also constitutes an important supplement to several areas of scholarship in early modern English intellectual history." -DONALD R. KELLEY,
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MARX'S ECOLOGY materialism and nature
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