Religion and Nation in Wartime Croatia: Reflections on the Ustaša Policy of Forced Religious Conversions, 1941-1942 Author(s): Mark Biondich Source: The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan., 2005), pp. 71-116 Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4214049 . Accessed: 04/05/2011 06:27 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucl. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
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SEER, Vol.83, No. i,JYanuaty 2005
Religion Croatia: Policy
and
Reflections of
in
Nation
Forced
Conversions,
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Wartime the
Ustasa
Religious I 94I
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MARK BIONDICH Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska, hereafter, NDH), established in April I94i as a result of the Axis partition of Yugoslavia, was an integral component of the Axis new order in South-Eastern Europe. Despite the fact that its regime established a murderous record, the NDH has received relatively scant attention in Western historiography.2The Ustasa organization, led by THE
Mark Biondich is a historian with the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Section of the Department ofJustice, Ottawa. ' The research for this article was made possible by a postdoctoral fellowship in the academic years from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The author wishes to thank Maja Brkljaci, Marko Bulatovic, Mark Mazower, Christian Axboe Nielsen and Andrew Rossos for reading various drafts of this article, for their comments, suggestions and generally for their encouragement. Special thanks go to the four anonymous SEER reviewers for their comments and suggestions. I have tried to incorporate or address as many of their comments as I thought feasible. Of course, the views expressed in the article are solely those of the author. 2 The Western scholarly literature on the Ustasa movement and the NDH is not extensive. See Jozo Tomasevich, Warand Revolutionin rugoslavia,I94I -I945. Occupationand Collaboration,Stanford, CA, 2001, pp. 233-579; M. Broszat and L. Hory, Die kroatische Ustascha-Staat, I94I-I945, Stuttgart, I964 (hereafter, Broszat and Hory); Dimitrije and Ivan Avakumovic, 'Yugoslavia's Djordjevic, 'Fascism in Yugoslavia: I9I8-I94I', Fascist Movements', in P. F. Sugar (ed.), Native Fascism in the SuccessorStates, I9I8-I945, Santa Barbara, CA, i97i; Yeshayahu Jelinek, 'Nationalities and Minorities in the Independent State of Croatia', NationalitiesPapers,8, I984, 2, pp. 195-2I0; Aleksa Djilas, The ContestedCountgy.rugoslav Unity and CommunistRevolution,I9I9-I953, Cambridge, MA, pp. 103-27, 1991, and Holm Sundhaussen, 'Der Ustascha-Staat: Anatomie eines Herrschaftssystem', Osterreichische Osthefte,37, 1995, 2, pp. 497-533. Also useful is Edmund Glaise von Horstenau, Ein Generalim Zwielicht:Die Erinnerungen EdmundGlaisevonHorstenau, comp. Peter Broucek, vol. 3, Vienna, 1998. The literature produced in former Yugoslavia is abundant, although of varying quality. The following works stand out: Bogdan Krizman, Ante Pavelici Ustase, Zagreb, 1978, PavelicizmeduHitlera i Mussolin?ja,Zagreb, I980, Ustasei Trdi Reich, 2 vols, Zagreb, I 982, and Fikreta Jelic-Butic, Ustasei NezavisnaDrzava Hrvatska, Zagreb, 1977 (hereafter, Jelic-Butic, Ustas'ei NDH). A brief clarification of my usage of Croat/Croatian, Serb/Serbian, and Slovene/Slovenian, is in order. Throughout this article, Croat, Serb, and Slovene refer to peoples, regardless of the territory they inhabit, while Croatian, Serbian, and Slovenian refer to land, language, and institutions: e.g., Serbian state, Croatian language, Slovenian history, etc. In a few cases, however, Serbian refers to the Serbs of Serbia, as reflected in the native language's distinction between (i.e., Serbs from Serbia) and Srbi(Serbs, regardless of the territory they inhabit). Srbyjanci I997-99
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Ante Pavelic, emerged in the 1930S as the most extreme group on the Croat political right, and was thrust onto centre stage in the spring of 194I. In an attempt to safeguard Croatia's newly won independence, the Ustasa regime unleashed a brutal campaign to rid the NDH of all 'undesirable' elements. Of those elements, by far the most important and problematical, in the minds of the Ustase, were the Serbs, who comprised nearly one-third of the population. Anti-Serbdom was central to Ustasa ideology; it was 'the quintessence of the Ustasa doctrine, its raisond'etre'.3That the Ustase despised the Serbs seems obvious enough, and can be deduced even from a cursory reading of the pre-war Ustasa press. During the Second World War, hundreds of thousands of Serbs were murdered at the hands of the Ustasa regime.4 This paper will explore only one aspect of Ustasa policy toward the Orthodox Serbs, namely, the policy of forced religious conversion to Catholicism.Jonathan Steinberg has written that one of the 'peculiarities' of the wartime Ustasa crimes is the role of religion. The Ustase, Steinberg writes, 'combined Catholic piety, Croatian nationalism and extreme violence', and their reign of terror 'reminds us of the religious wars of the sixteenth century'. YeshayahuJelinik too has observed that the Ustasa movement was 'devoutly Catholic'. Similarly, Martin Broszat has referred to Ustasism as 'the Croat Catholic brand of fascism', and added that 'Catholic religiosity' could not be divorced from Ustasa ideology.5 In some of the early post-warYugoslavliterature and especially in Serbian nationalist historiography, the Ustase are often seen as Catholic crusaders, whose policies can supposedly be
Eugen Dido Kvaternik, Sjdeanja i zapaz.anja:Prilozi za hrvatskupoviest, comp. Jere Jareb, Zagreb, I 995 (hereafter, Sjecanjai zapazanja),p. 285. 4 Western scholars of Yugoslavia now accept that the official Communist-era Yugoslav estimates of wartime casualties (I .7 million dead) were too high, and that approximately I million persons died in all of Yugoslavia. The approximate breakdown of losses by nationality is: 500,000 Serbs, 200,000 Croats, go,ooo Bosnian Muslims, 6o,ooo Jews, 50,000 Montenegrins and 30,000 Slovenes. Most of these losses were suffered in the NDH. Of the victim groups in the NDH, it is believed that roughly 350,000 Serbs (or i 8 per cent of the Serb population in I941), 30,000 Jews (or 75 per cent of the Jewish population in 1941), and between I5,ooo and 27,000 Roma (or between 53 and 96 per cent of the Roma population in 194 ) were killed. On wartime population losses, see Bogoljub Kocevic, Zrtve
Drugogsvetskog ratau Jugoslav#ji, London, I985, and Vladimir Zerjavic, Gubicistanovni?tva uDrugom ratu,Zagreb, I 989. svjetskom _Jugoslav#e Jonathan Steinberg, 'Types of Genocide? Croatians, Serbs and Jews, I94I-5', in David Cesarani(ed.), TheFinalSolution.OriginsandImplementation, London and New York, 1994,
pp. 176-77; Yeshayahu Jelinek, 'Clergy and Fascism: The Hlinka Party in Slovakia
and the Croatian Ustasha Movement', in Stein Ugelvik Larsenet al. (eds), WhoWerethe Fascists? SocialRootsofEuropean Fascism, Bergen,Oslo and Tromso, I 980, p. 370, and Broszat and Hory, p. 72. This interpretationcan also be found in John Cornwell,Hitler'sPope.7he SecretHistoryof Pius XII, London, I999, and Michael Phayer, 7TheCatholicChurchandthe Holocaust,1930-I965, Bloomington,IN, 2000, both of whom claim that Ustasa genocide was inspiredby religiouszeal.
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understood only through the prism of militant Catholicism.6 The use of religion as a mobilizing ideology by the Ustase does indeed pose a number of disturbing questions, but the choice of forced conversion as one aspect of Ustasa policy toward the Serbs and the collaboration of one segment of the Catholic clergy in Ustasa crimes has tended to obfuscate the real nature of and secular motives underlying Ustasa policy. Students of nationalism in former Yugoslavia and SouthEastern Europe know that the modern Bosnian Muslim, Croat, and Serb nationalities emerged from pre-modern religious communities. Religion's symmetry with national consciousness has led many scholars to conclude that religion has played an important role in shaping the politics of identity and nationalism. What is more, confessional cleavages allegedly contributed, or so many have argued, to the emergence of a national question in former Yugoslavia and fratricidal bloodshed between Bosnian Muslim, Croat and Serb.7 The number of scholars who continue to emphasize the religious moment is not insignificant. This study attempts to get at the heart of Ustasa national ideology by questioning the premises underlying the policy of forced conversion. To what degree was Catholic proselytism an end in itself for the Ustasa authorities? What role if any did religious bigotry play in Ustasa genocide? Determining the true nature of Ustasa national ideology is important not only for an understanding of the Ustasa movement and its wartime regime, but also in order to place Croatian fascism in a proper comparative context and assess its ideological system in relation to similar movements in East Central Europe.
6 All of the works in this category suffer from a pronounced anti-Catholic bias, however. For example, see Psunjski (pseudonym), U ime Hrista: Svetinjeu plamenu,Yugoslavia, I 944; Vladimir Dedijer, The rugoslavAuschwitz and the Vatican. The CroatianMassacre of the Serbs During WorldWarII, Buffalo, WI, 1992; Milan Cubric, Izmedu noz.ai krizfa,Belgrade, I990; Herve Lauriere (pseud. of Branko Miljus), Assassinsau nomdeDieu, Paris, 195 I, and Milorad Lazic, KrstarskiratNezavisneDrz.aveHrvatske,Belgrade, I991 . Among the Western works of this genre I would include the heavily biased and deeply flawed Edmond Paris, Genocidein SatelliteCroatia,I94I -1945. A Recordof Racial andReliggious Persecutions andMassacres,Chicago, IL, I96I. 7 Most recently, for example, one professor of religion observed that the war in BosniaHerzegovina from I992 to 1995 was motivated 'in large part by religious nationalism'. See Michael A. Sells, The BridgeBetrayed:Religion and Genocidein Bosnia, Berkeley, CA, 1996, p. xiii. In a similar vein, see Mart Bax, Medjugoge:Religion,Politics, and Violencein RuralBosnia, Amsterdam, I995. For a general discussion of religion, nationalism and politics in former Yugoslavia, see Thomas Bremer (ed.), Religja, drwvtvoi politika. Kontroverznatumadenjai Bonn, 2002. pribliz'avanja,
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The literatureon forced conversionsin wartimeCroatiais fairly extensive.8One of the majorshortcomingsof this literatureis that it did not take the availablearchivalmaterialof the Ustasa institution thatwasresponsiblefor implementingthe forcedconversioncampaign into account. This material is admittedly incomplete. However, hithertoit hasnot beenutilizedat allby researchersof wartimeCroatia, despitethe fact that it shedsnew and criticallyimportantlight on the origins,implementationand, ultimately,failureof the policy. In the existingliteratureit is arguedwithoutexceptionthat forcedreligious conversionsbeganliterallywithindaysorweeksof theNDH's creation. This interpretationnormallyassertsthe centralityof religionin the Ustasa Weltanschauung. It is belied by the facts, however.A careful readingof the Usta'sapress and archivaldocumentsshows that the regimegave seriousconsiderationto forcedconversionsonlyin the fall of I941, whenpoliticaland militarycircumstancesforcedit to adopta tacticalshifton the Serbquestion. Croat Political RightintheInterwar Era,I9I 8-4 I Before turning to forced conversionsin wartime Croatia, a brief overview of the role of religion in Croat national ideologies and nationalismseemsin order.Croatnationalismhasbeen shapedby two importantfactors.The firstis a state-orientedhistoricismrootedin the ideologyof stateright,accordingto whichthe Croatnationalonewas identified with the Croatian state. Croatia's nineteenth-century nationalideologists,from LjudevitGaj to Ante StarcevicandJosip JurajStrossmayer,operatedwithina frameworkof historicstateright. Accordingto proponentsof the staterightideology,the Croatianstate had never dejurelost its independence,despite the union first with Hungary(I I02) and then the Habsburgs(I527). The bearerof this 8 Much of the literature is polemical, however. A comprehensive, factually correct and dispassionate study of conversions in the NDH has yet to be written. The relevant works on this issue are: Joza Horvat and Zdenko Stambuk (eds), Dokumentio protunarodnom radu i gloc`inimajednog dijela katoli'kog klera, Zagreb, 1946, pp. 54-I 23 (hereafter, Horvat and Stambuk); Viktor Novak, Magnum crimen:Pola vieka klerikalizmau Hrvatskoj,Zagreb, 1948, p. 52 7n; the two works by Sima Simic: Prekr?tavanje Srbaza vremeDrugogsvetskograta,Titograd, I 958, and VatikanprotivJugoslav#e, Titograd, I958; Doko Slijepcevic, IstorijaSrpskepravoslavne crkve,vol. 2, Munich, 1966, pp. 673-8f Ferdo Culinovic, Okupatorska podjela _ugoslavjje, Belgrade, 1970, pp. 348-79 (hereafter, Culinovic); Dugan Lj. Kasic, 'Srpska crkva u tzv. Nezavisnoj Drzavi Hrvatskoj', in R. L. Veselinovic et al. (eds), Srpskapravoslavnacrkva I920-1970, Belgrade, 197I, pp. i83-204; the two books by Veljko D. Duric: Ustasei pravoslavlje:Hrvatskapravoslavnacrkva, 2nd edn., Belgrade, I990 (hereafter, Durid), and PrekrRtavanje Srbau NezavisnojDrz.aviHrvatskoj:Prilozi za istor#uverskoggenocida, Belgrade, I99I (hereafter, PrekrRtavanje); Milan Bulajid, Misia Vatikanau NezavisnojDrz'aviHrvatskoj,2 vols, Belgrade, 1992 (hereafter, Bulajic), and Jure Kristo, KatoliEkacrkva i Nezavisna Drzfava Hrvatska,I94I-I945, 2 vols, Zagreb, I998 (hereafter, KatoliRkacrkva).The most balanced Western studies are Stella Alexander, Churchand State in YugoslaviaSince I945, Cambridge, 1979 (hereafter, Churchand Statein Yugoslavia),and 7he TripleMyth. A Life ofArchbishop Alojzfje Stepinac,Boulder, CO, I987 (hereafter, The TripleMyth).
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state right was originally the Croatian nobility ('politicalnation'), while in the modern era it was the Croat nation. It alone possessed a historic state right that the other peoples of Croatia had to recognize and to which they had to submit. The second factor is Slavic reciprocity, the identification with other (South) Slavs, which was a reflection of Croat numerical inferiority in relation to the politically dominant Magyars and Germans, and stemmed also from the fact that there was a numerically significant Serb minority in Croatia. Religious affiliation did not factor prominently in the thinking of Croat national ideologists, nor did they employ it as a criterion in defining the 'nation'. This was true of Ljudevit Gaj's Illyrianist movement (i 836-48), the first stage of the Croat national awakening. Ante Starcevic and his Party of (Croatian State) Right (I86I-95) adopted a political concept of nation; Croats were the inhabitants of Great Croatia (i.e., Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia), be they Catholic, Muslim, or Orthodox Christian. They did not recognize the existence of 'political' Serbs (or any other nation) in those lands regarded as historicallyCroatian, for there could only be one nation on the territoryof the Croatian state. Thus, Serbs and Bosnian Muslims of the Habsburg lands were regarded as Orthodox and Muslim 'Croats', respectively.9 Even Josip Juraj Strossmayer, whose National Party (I860-74) supported a policy of cultural Yugoslavism and recognized the 'genetic' distinctiveness of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, refused to recognize the existence of a Serb 'political nation' in Croatia. To do so would have meant opening the door to separate Serb rights or even demands for territorialautonomy within Croatia. As in the case of Magyar and Czech leaders, the thinking of Croat elites was conditioned by the legalistic traditions of the Habsburg monarchy; Habsburg rulers acknowledged ancient political entities and treaties, not popular will. Historical state right thus had a powerful hold on the thinking of Croatia's intellectuals.'0 In the twentieth century, Croat national ideologists continued to resist the identificationof religion and nation in favour of other criteria. For example, Stjepan Radic who, together with his brother Antun founded in I 904 the Croat Peasant Party, was anti-clerical by temperament and opposed the identification of religion and nation, just as he repeatedly denounced the role of Catholic and Orthodox clergy in Croatia's political life. His colleagues of the so-called Progressive Youth, who founded the Progressive Party (I 905- o0), rejected religion as arcane and as an impediment to the unity of Croats 9 For studies of Starcevic and the 'state right' ideology, see Mirjana Gross, PoviestpravaCke Zagreb, I 973, recently updated as Izvomopravavtvo,Zagreb, 200 1. ideolog#je, 10 See Mirjana Gross, 'Croatian National-Integrational Ideologies from the End of Illyrism to the Creation of Yugoslavia', AustrianHistogyrearbook,I 5- I 6, 1979-80, pp. 3-33.
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and Serbs.Evenas Ante Starcevic'smovementfracturedafteri 895, all the successorgroups(e.g., the so-calledFrankists,Starcevic'sPartyof Right,theYoungCroats)remainedcommitteduntil I 9 I 8 to the idea of a multi-religious Croatnation.Onlythe Catholicmovementof Croatia which originatedin the late Habsburgera and Bosnia-Herzegovina, (I900-14), tended to conflate religion with nation. But because it operatedin nationallyand religiouslyheterogeneouslands,the Croat Catholic movement remained divided on the question of national ideology. The conservativewing identifiedCatholicismwith Croat nationalityandemphasizedtheprimacyof Catholicreligiousprinciples over Croat national precepts.The moderatewing operatedin the liberal Strossmayeristtraditionand downplayedthe importanceof religionin nationalidentity.11 Afterthe formationof the Kingdomof Serbs,Croats,and Slovenes in DecemberI 9 I 8, Croatianpoliticssplitalongurban-rurallineseven as it united in its oppositionto Serbian centralism.Radic's Croat PeasantPartyrepresentedthe mainstreamand moderatevariantof CroatnationalismafterI 9 I 8. The politicalrightconsistedof the Croat Partyof RightandCroatPeople'sParty.Opposedto Radic'spolitically and socially dominantbut anti-clericalistparty, the People's Party belongedin the I920S to the 'moderate'or 'soft'oppositionto Serbian centralismand followedthe autonomistpoliticalprogrammeof the clericalistSlovene People's Party. It remained on the margins of Croatianpoliticallifewithouta significantfollowing,however.Itsmain areasof supportwere those regionswherereligiousaffiliationwas still more importantthan nationalaffiliation,and where Croat national consciousnesswasstillincomplete,as amongthe Catholicsof Herzegovina, the Dalmatianhinterland,and the CatholicBunjevciof Backa.12 Conversely,the CroatPartyof Right,whosesupportlaywiththe Croat petitebourgeoisieand nationalistintelligentsia,belongedto the 'hard' opposition.It believedthatCroatswereengagedin a struggleagainsta See Pedro Ramet, 'From Strossmayer to Stepinac: Croatian National Ideology and Catholicism', CanadianReviewof Studiesin Nationalism, I 2, 1985, 1. 12 Ivo Banac, TheNational Questionin rugoslavia. Origins,Histoy, Politics, Ithaca, NY, I988, pp. 349, 354. The interwar Catholic movement in Croatia included a number of politicallyoriented groups and organizations, including clergy, Catholic-oriented intellectuals, Catholic student groups and various periodicals. It is difficult to attribute a uniform political agenda to this 'movement', apart from the defence of what they perceived to be Catholic interests. Their many periodicals were in the hands of the laity and expressed a range of political opinions. Some supported the Croat Peasant Party, others were more nationalistic and openly in favour of independence, and almost none of them were under the direct control of the Catholic hierarchy. So organizationally and politically fragmented was this Catholic 'front' in Croatia that Stella Alexander has gone so far as to suggest that there was no such thing as a 'Catholic political movement' at all in interwar Croatia. See Stella Alexander, 'Croatia: The Catholic Church and the Clergy, 1919-1945', in R. J. Wolff and J. K. Hoensch (eds), Catholics,the State, and theEuropeanRadicalRight, I919-I945, Boulder, CO, I 987, pp. 3 I -66 (hereafter, 'Croatia: The Catholic Church and the Clergy').
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Great Serbian policy 'which with unbending consistency is working to destroy Croatdom'.13 The new Yugoslav state was viewed as a modern Serbian empire that aspired to 'the balkanization of the Croat nation'. 14 In short, Croatia had in I9I8 become 'an occupied land'.15 It believed that a new movement, far more radical than the Croat Peasant Party, was needed to serve as 'the bearer of an uncompromising and revolutionary struggle [against Belgrade]'. 16 This new movement turned out to be the Ustasa movement headed, after I929, by Ante Pavelic. The main characteristics of Ustasa ideology were anti-Serbianism, anti-Communism, and its cult of state. Croatian statehood was the objective and was to be achieved at any cost. The Croat Party of Right, and later the Ustase, did not place a pronounced emphasis on religion in their programme and largely conformed to Starcevic's theory of political nationality. For example, as late as I939, Mirko Puk, who would serve during the war as Ustasa Minister ofJustice and Religion, claimed that religion was not a criterion for establishing nationality in Great Croatia; the Croat nation consisted of the Catholic, Muslim and Orthodox populations. 'I Nonetheless, during the interwar period, and especially the I930s, the Croat political right devoted far greater attention to religion and its relationship to nation than ever before. To a certain extent, the views of both the Ustase and Catholic movement overlapped. In their treatment of the national question and identity, the Catholic intelligentsia's views were obviously conditioned by their religious beliefs. Much like the Croat Party of Right (I9I8-29), Catholic intellectuals continued to deny the existence of both Serb and Bosnian Muslim identities in Great Croatia. For the Ustase this denial was rooted mainly in historicist thinking and the ideological legacy of Starcevie.18 In reality, however, Ustasa anti-Serbianism vacillated between exclusionist and assimilationist tendencies with the former tendency, which accepted only the autochthonous Catholic and
Stjepan Sarkotic, Radievo izdajstvo,Vienna, 1925, p. 27. Milan Sufflay, 'Radic, Bethlen i Mussolini', Hrvatskamisao,24 April 1924. 15 Nikola Rusinovic, Moja sje&anja na Hrvatsku,comp. Bozo Rude, Zagreb, I996, p. 287. 16 Kvaternik, Sjdanja i zapaz.anja,p. 27 I. 17 Mirko Puk, 'Ante Star;evic i Muslimani', Hrvatskinarod,9 February 1939, p. 3. 18 'Jogjedan ustaski proglas hrv. narodu!' AezavisnaHrvatskaDrzava, 22 April 1939, p. 8; Mile Starcevic, 'Slava Anti Starcevicu!', Hrvatskinarod,24 February I 939, p. i; Mile Budak, 'I I. i 13. lipnja', Hrvatskinarod,9 June I 939, p. i; Ur., 'Naga prva rijec!', Hrvatskinarod,9 February 1939, p. i; Ivan Orsanic, 'Dr. Ante Stardevic', Hrvatskinarod,I March 1940, p. I . 13 14
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Muslimpopulationsof GreatCroatiaas 'Croat'and excludedOrthodox Serbsentirely,being the strongerof the two.19That is because,as much as some of them were preparedto recognizeSerbsas political 'Croats',manyof themviewedSerbsas foreignto GreatCroatia.Even in this case, however,they were often not regardedas Serbsperse but ratherof Vlachorigin.TheysawSerbidentityas beingderivedthrough the agencyof the SerbianOrthodoxChurch,but theyalsosawSerbsas beingdifferentby blood,a foreignelementdistinctfromthe autochthonous 'Croat' (i.e., Catholic-Muslim)population.A racial or racist undertoneis discerniblebut more often than not impliedratherthan explicit;the Ustaseneverformulateda coherentlyracistideology.20 The Catholicmovementclaimedthatthe Orthodoxof GreatCroatia were not Serbsat all. Rather,they were 'Croats'who had adopteda Serbconsciousnessin the nineteenthcenturybecauseof theirreligious affiliationand the assimilationist,'nationalizing'workof the Serbian Orthodox Church.2' This theory of Serbs as Orthodox 'Croats' originatedin the belief that the Orthodox of Great Croatia were descendedfromthenative,pre-OttomanCatholic(andthussupposedly Croat) population, which had converted under Ottoman rule to Orthodoxy.It was comprehensivelyarticulatedin the worksof Ivo Pilarand especiallyin the numerousstudiesof the Churchhistorian
19 'Ne damo Bosnu!', Nezavisna HrvatskaDr ava, 3 June I9, p 2; 'Opomena vodstvu HSS', Hrvatski narod, 28 July I939, p. i; Luka Grbic, jog o Srbo-Cincaro-Vlasima', NezavisnaHrvatskaDrzava, 4 November I939, p. 4 and 'Hrvatska politika u Bosni', Hrvatski narod,28 July 1939, p. 6. See also, M. O., 'Vlasi a ne Srbi', NezavisnaHrvatskaDrzava, I June 1940, p. 2; Muhamed Hadzijahic, 'Nacionalna obiljezja bosansko-hercegovackih Muslimana', Hrvatskinarod, 24 March 1939, p. 7; I. Z. H., Jog nesto o muslimanima istocne Bosne', Hrvatskinarod,26 May I939, p. i; d., 'Tragedija Hrvatske krajine', Hrvatskinarod,26 May 1939, p. 5, and Petar Preradovic, 'Na proslosti buduenost se snuje', Hrvatskinarod,9 June I 939, p. 5. 20 Many scholars, for example FikretaJelic-Butic, Ivan Jelic and Ferdo Culinovic, among others, have seen a racist component in Ustasa ideology that entailed the biological extermination of Serbs. Pre-war Ustasa rhetoric, especially references to Serbs as 'Vlachs', and their subsequent wartime policies suggest a racist component. They never formulated a coherently racist ideology, however, and to the extent that a racist component existed at all it was more often latent rather than explicit, and competed with an assimilationist tendency. See Jelic-Butic, Ustas'ei NDH, p. 314; Ivan Jelic, Hrvatska u ratu i revolucjf/i I94I-I945, Zagreb, I978, pp. I3, 49, and the relevantsectionsof Culinovic. 21 M. S., 'Srpski apetit', Nezavisna HrvatskaDrz.ava, 24 December 1938, p. 4, and Mirko Puk, 'Ante Starcevic i Muslimani', Hrvatskinarod,9 February I 939, p. 3.
79 and Catholicpriest KrunoslavDraganovic,among others.22For the Catholic intelligentsia,Orthodoxy in the western Balkanswas the agencyof a GreatSerbianideologythat had assimilatedthe Orthodox of GreatCroatiato a Serb identity.The Ustase sharedthis view, but theirworldviewand programmeremainedessentiallysecular.Unlike the pre-igi8 period,when Croatnationalism,in both its Starcevicist forms,had been a relativelyinclusiveideology,in and Strossmayerist theinterwarerait becamea farmoreexclusiveandintolerantideology, at least in the variantespousedby the interwarpoliticalright. The Croat political right continued to deny the existence of Serb and BosnianMuslimpeoplesin GreatCroatia,althoughits attitudetoward the latter remained relatively benign. The Starcevicistlegacy is Ustasanationalideology,buttheydistorted importantin understanding Starcevic'sintegrativeor inclusiveideology,which had never questionedthe place of Orthodoxor Muslimwithinthe ranksof the Croat nationeven as it deniedtheirseparateidentities,increasinglyin favour of an exclusionistprogramme.During the Second WorldWar, the Serbsof GreatCroatiawerefor the mostpartseenas an alienelement, a view that manifesteditselfin the murderouspracticesof the Ustasa MARK
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regime.
When in April I94 I Croatsfinallyachieved'statehood',the NDH was from the beginning really little more than an Italo-German condominium.Thisstateencompassedmostof the historicCroatlands with Srijemand partof Dalmatia)and Bosnia(i.e., Croatia-Slavonia The Ustasa regime, which relied on a core group of Herzegovina. followers probably not exceeding I O,OOO members, lacked broad popularsupport,but was initiallysupportedby a segmentof the Croat PeasantParty'srightwing and a significantsegmentof CroatCatholic clergyand intellectuals,who were elatedat the creationof a Croatian state.The desirefor independencein 1941 was undoubtedlystrong.In the headydaysof April I94I, manyCroatnationalists,even thosewho had little sympathyfor the Ustase,musthave seen Pavelic,as did the Catholicpriest DragutinKamber,as 'the hero of the day' and 'the
22 On Catholic conversions to Orthodoxy in the Ottoman era, see the works of Krunoslav Draganovic, Katolickacrkvau Bosni i Hercegovininekadi danas,Zagreb, I 934, and Masenfibertritte vonKatholikenzur 'Orthodoxie' im kroatischen Sprachgebiet zur Zeit derTiirkenherrschaft, Rome, 1937. Although Ivo Pilar made reference to these conversions in his study, he also emphasized the supposed Vlach origin of most of Great Croatia's Serbs and the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in assimilating them. See Ivo Pilar, J7uznoslavenskopitanje: Prikazcjelokupnog pitanja, trans. Fedor Pucek, 1943, reprint Zagreb, I990 (hereafter, Ju.nos1avenskopitanje), pp. I I 2- I 7 (originally published as L. von Sudland, Die Suidslawische Frageund der Weltkrieg, Vienna, I9I8). See also 'Zivot katolika pod turskim gospodstvom u hrvatskim krajevima', Hrvatskinarod, 7 April I939, p. IO; X., 'Katolicka crkva u Bosni i Hercegovini', Hrvatski narod,5 May 1939, p. 5, and Mladen Lorkovic, Narodi zemljaHrvata,Zagreb, 1940.
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avenger of a martyred past'.23In the event, for the Ustasa movement an opportunity was presented at long last to settle a range of scores under the not-so-benevolent tutelage of the Axis. It enthusiastically exploited the advantage afforded by Nazi conquest to launch a brutal campaign to rid the NDH of all 'undesirable' elements, the most prominent of whom were the Serbs. The Ustase had sworn themselves to independence at all costs, and now they were determined to preserve it by all available methods. They saw the preservationof this attenuated independence as inseparable from a resolution of the Serb Question. In most accounts of the NDH, the Ustase are said to have enjoyed the support of the Catholic hierarchy and a considerable segment of the clergy. This support was not necessarily passive. Many priests and members of the Franciscan order joined the Ustasa organization and occasionally even participated in the implementation of its genocidal policies. The Catholic hierarchy publicly welcomed the Croatian state in April I 94 i although it never actively supported its policies or subsequently distanced itself openly from them.24 All this has led to accusations in Yugoslav historiography of the Catholic Church's hostility toward and its allegedly subversive work against the interwar Yugoslav state. This somewhat simplistic view ignores the fact that, notwithstanding the opposition in I9I8 to the Yugoslav state in some Church circles, most Catholic prelates, like Archbishop Ernest Bauer of Zagreb, Bishop Antun Ak-samovicof Dakovo, and Bishop Antun Mahnic of Krk, openly welcomed the new state. Their support for the new state mirrored and may well have been influenced by the enthusiasm for Yugoslav unification prevalent at that time in Croat intellectual and middle class circles. Their support gradually waned, however. In part this was due to the fact that many Yugoslavist unitarists viewed the Catholic Church as alien and anti-Slavic, and thus a prioriopposed to any Yugoslavia, whereas Serbian Orthodoxy was seen as native and 'national'. Some Yugoslavist unitarists even encouraged a schism with Rome and welcomed the creation, in I923, of the Croatian Old Catholic Church. Long accustomed to state protection in the Dual monarchy, the Church hierarchy was now convinced that its interestswere threatened. It encountered indifference and occasionally hostility from the state authorities. As a result, the Catholic movement abandoned its 'soft' opposition of the 1920S in favour of 'hard' opposition. This trajectory was firmly set during the 23 Dragutin Kamber, Slom NAfDH:Iako sam ga ja prozivio, comp. Bozica Ercegovac Jambrovic, Zagreb, I 993, p. 5. 24 On the clergy and Catholic hierarchy, see Stella Alexander, 'Croatia: The Catholic Church and the Clergy'; Pedro Ramet, 'Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslavia', in Religion and Nationalism in Sovietand East EuropeanPolitics, ed. P. Ramet, Durham, NC, I 989, and chapter 7 of Sabrina Ramet, BalkanBabel, 2nd edn., Boulder, CO, I 996.
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dictatorship of King Aleksandar (I929-34), when Catholic organizations and the Croat People's Party were banned along with all other political parties, and was fuelled by the failure in I 937 of the Yugoslav authorities to ratify the Concordat. The Catholic political movement fragmented after I 929. Its political line, fairly discernable in the I 920S, now became more clouded and complex to unravel even as it joined the 'hard' opposition. The Catholic movement remained organizationally and politically divided. As a generalization, however, it is fair to say that by the late I930S the Catholic political movement in Croatia expressed growing support for Croatian statehood. Some followers, who supported the Croat Peasant Party, were willing to accept broad Croatian autonomy within Yugoslavia. Most, and perhaps a large majority, wanted an independent, Catholic Great Croatian state and were increasingly opposed to Yugoslavia, which they believed to be anti-Catholic and anti-Croat. In practice, they would eventually turn to the Ustaseeven thoughtheyevolved,in the I 930s, autonomously of Pavelic's group.25 This 'marriage' was solidified during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), when the Axis came to be viewed as a bulwark against Communism. Whatever its reservations, the Catholic movement, that is, the Church hierarchy and intelligentsia, preferred a Croatian state to a multi-religiousand polyglot Yugoslavia,which they regarded merely as a Great Serbian state interested in strengthening Orthodoxy to the detriment of Catholicism. The 'marriage' between the Church and Ustasa state was consummated during the Second World War. There is little doubt that the Catholic Church in Croatia responded enthusiastically to the formation of the Croatian state in April 194I. Indeed, on 28 April, Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac issued a circular welcoming the creation of this 'young Croatian state'.26This was the typical sentiment running through Croat nationalist and many Church circles in the aftermathof the proclamation of Croatian 'independence'. Stepinac undoubtedly assumed that the Church would have considerably more freedom in the new Croatian state. His early enthusiasm for the new state quickly dissipated. Tensions set in behind the scenes over the sweeping anti-Serb legislation and the race laws directed at the
25 26
Jelic-Butic, Usta&ei NDH, p. 43. Alexander, The TripleMyth, p. 6o.
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Jewish and Roma populations.27 Perhaps the most serious issue plaguing relations between the Church and Ustasa state was the policy of forced conversion. The Catholic Church undeniably welcomed the prospect of a large number of converts to Catholicism, but its main concern appeared to be that these should be voluntary and strictly under the control of the Church.28 However, it was the Ustasa authorities and not the Church who took the initiative in converting Orthodox Serbs in I94I. The authorities were determined from the outset to set their own rules and standards, thereby resolving which Serbs could convert and which were to be eliminated.
Forced Conversions intheNDH, I94I
-42
The first decree in the NDH pertaining to conversions was issued on 3 May I94I I29 It was remarkablybrief and simply stated that all existing laws relating to conversion, some of which dated back to the Habsburg era, were being suspended until further notice. In order to convert, a person had to register with the state authorities and fulfil all the requirements of the religion to which he wished to convert. The decree is interesting precisely because it says so little. It should not necessarily be viewed as a harbinger of the Ustasa campaign of mass forced conversions, as is done in the literature, but it definitely indicated that the regime was thinking about religion. On 27 May 1941 the Ministry ofJustice and Religion issued the 'Instruction about Conversion from one Faith to Another'.30 Directed at local government officials, the 'Instruction' informed these authorities that they were to issue a document to those persons who registered for conversion, confirming that they had approval to convert. On 14 July 1941 the Ministry of 27 During his 7 June I94I meeting with Hitler, Pavelic mentioned Stepinac and the Catholic Church in passing. According to the German minutes, towards the end of their conversation Pavelic mentioned 'a few personal experiences with the Catholic Church'. He said that many young clerics supported the Ustasa regime, but that 'the Bishop of Croatia [sic; Alojzije Stepinac] had given him the advice that one could rule only if one were as forbearing as possible', and was evidently displeased at that fact that many young priests had openly sided with his movement. Documentson GermanForeignPolicy, 12, Washington, D.C., I962, pp. 977-8i, doc. 603, Memorandum by Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, 9 June 1941. 28 Alexander, 7TheTripleMyth, p. 74. 29 'Zakonska odredba o prielazu s jedne vjere u drugu', Narodnenovine(Zagreb), 5 May 1941, p. i. This paper will focus only on the wartime Croatian state's policy of forced conversion. Although the state authorities obtained the active support of one segment of the Catholic clergy, the policy was initiated and controlled by the secular authorities. In those instances where conversions circumvented state decrees, they were not recognized as legitimate by the Croatian authorities even if the Catholic clergy had sanctioned them. For a discussion of the Catholic Church's wartime policies, especially its views on forced conversion and its own conversion regulations, and the complicity of one segment of the clergy in carrying out Ustasa policies, see the works cited in n. 8, and especially those of Stella Alexander. 30 'Uputa o prielazu sjedne vjere u drugu', Narodnenovine,27 May 1941, p. I.
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Justice and Religion issued additional guidelines in a memorandum to Croatia's Catholic bishops. Two things stand out in the memorandum: for the first time the government made it known that it would not permit Orthodox Serbs to convert to the Greek Catholic (Uniate) rite; and the Catholic bishops were informed that the government would not permit the Serb intelligentsia to convert to Catholicism. Only the Orthodox Serb peasantry would be eligible for conversion. The government would make exceptions only in cases where the Orthodox Serb had a Catholic Croat spouse, and even then permission had to be obtained from the Ministry.31 The last major government acts with respect to conversions of that summer were two related Circulars, issued on 30 July and 2 August I94I by the Ministry ofJustice and Religion and Ministry of Internal Affairs,respectively.The firstand more important Circular32reminded local authorities that the government did not want Serbs converting to the Uniate rite, although it was now prepared to tolerate such conversions in those districtsthat already had Uniate parishes. In order to convert to Catholicism, Serbs were required to show official documentation to local Catholic clergy that they had registered with and been approved by the local authorities (i.e., communal, district or city administration). Only under exceptional circumstances were members of the Serb intelligentsia to be given state approval for conversion, while peasants were in principle to be given approval as quickly as possible. In the case of mixed marriages, Orthodox Serbs could convert if they had a Catholic Croat spouse and their children had been baptized in the Catholic Church. These regulations applied to all counties of the NDH, except for Gora and Krbava-Psatcounties, that is, the Banija region of Croatia and north-western Bosnia, respectively, and where the deportation of Serbs to Serbia and the first wave of Ustasa massacres reached drastic proportions. Finally, if Orthodox Serbs chose to convert to the Lutheranfaith, they would not acquire the rights of the German minority in the NDH, and Jewish converts were to be told that conversion did not alter their racial status, as defined by the NDH's race laws. In a September I 941 circular to all government ministries, the Minister of Justice and Religion, Mirko Puk, noted that the 30July circular provided 'detailed instructions [as to] who may be accepted into the Catholic Church and what
31 Zagreb, Hrvatski Drzavni Arhiv [HDA], f. 2I8, Ministarstvo pravosuda i bogostovija, Odjel za bogostovlje, MPB/OB, kutija 3: Broj 42678 ('Pravoslavni vjerozakonski prelazi'), I4July 32
'94'.
I941.
HDA, Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova, MUP, kutija 25: Broj 48468/1941,
30 July
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documents are needed from the administrative and Ustasa authorities'.33 The second Circular,34 which was forwarded to the Catholic
Church hierarchy in Zagreb, asked the Church to instruct its parish priests that they ask all potential converts to show, prior to conversion, documentation from the local authorities allowing them to convert. The decrees and circulars issued between May and August I941 indicate that some conversions were definitely occurring, and that the government was establishing the guidelines that were to be followed. There is little indication, however, that the Ustasa government was as yet seriously pursuing forced conversion on a massive scale or as a policy in itself. As noted, in Yugoslav historiographythis policy is said to have begun with the NDH's creation, and even Stella Alexander, who has written the most comprehensive Western study of the topic, has argued that conversions were pursued most intensely from May to September I941, and then tailed off.35 In actual fact, the government began pursuing a policy of forced conversion in earnest only in September I94I. If this was the case, then how are the decrees and memoranda of that spring and summer to be explained? Ferdo Culinovic is undoubtedly correct, though unwittingly so, when he writes that conversions began that spring as many Serbs sought to save themselves from Ustasa anti-Serb measures by joining the Catholic Church: 'Asearly as April 194 I, those [Serbs] who joined the Catholic Church, hoping that with its authority they would be protected from Ustasa persecution, were not rare.'36Confronted by frightened and desperate Serbs, he adds, the Church welcomed the new converts, enticed by the prospect of receiving many new followers but seemingly not concerned about the context within which such conversions occurred. For its part, the regime began to see conversion as a way of croatizing or denationalizing the Serbs and, hence, pursued the policy vigorously.37 These early conversions were most definitely coerced, given the extreme anti-Serb rhetoric, legislation and actions of the authorities, but the available data suggest that the Ustasa regime was not yet interested in mass conversions. The real indication that the Ustasa government was seriously prepared to pursue a policy of forced conversion, applied on a massive scale, came on I5 September I 941, when it created the Religious Section (VO, Vjerskiodsjek)within the 'State Directorate for Renewal' HDA, MPB/OB, kutija 9: Broj 2413-B- I 94 I, i o September 1941. Ibid., Broj Pr. 2I378/41 ('Zahtjev potvrde o osobnoj cestitosti za prielaznike na katolicku vjeru'), 2 August I 941. 35 Alexander, Churchand Statein rugoslavia,p. 30. 36 Culinovic, p. 349. I This is where Culinovic errs, however. He incorrectly states that the 'Religious Section' was formed in May I 94 I, when in fact it was formed in September 1941. Ibid., pp. 349-51. 33 34
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(DRP, Drzavno ravnateljstvo za ponovu), a government institution that oversaw the deportation of Serbs to Serbia, the requisitioning of their properties, and the resettlement of Slovenes from Germanoccupied Slovenia to Croatia. The VO, which was headed by the Franciscan friar and Ustasa official Dionizije Juricev,38 was the only governmental institution authorized to coordinate and spearhead the campaign, whether the conversions were to Catholicism, Islam or Lutheranism.Earlier state decrees had given local state authorities and Ustasa party officialsthe power to decide which Orthodox Serbs could convert, except in those instances involving members of the Serb intelligentsia. For example, in June I94I the prefect of Zlatar district near Zagreb forwarded to the Ministry of Justice and Religion the written request of a Serb woman for permission to convert to the Roman Catholic faith. On 2OJune 1941, the Ministry'sDepartment of Religion returned the file with the comment that it 'did not even have to be sent here', since 'religious conversions are to be officiated by the local authorities'.39Similarly, the Ministry informed Nasice district (Slavonia) that it sanctioned the conversion of all local Serbs 'except those who were barred by the districtauthorities'.40As a result, prior to September 194I the conversions that did occur were largely (although not entirely) individual rather than collective (i.e., involving entire villages), and the ultimate decision as to who could convert rested firmly with local state and party officials operating within the general framework established in the Ministry of Justice and Religion's circulars. For example, one of the first and largest mass conversions occurred in the Prijedor region. In late August I941 the communal authorities of Omarska asked the prefect of Prijedor district to grant permission to I5,000 Orthodox peasants to convert to Catholicism. However, the Ustasa party chief of Prijedor and the Grand Prefect of Sana-Luka County, both asked the Ministry ofJustice and Religion for clarification and 'a principled decision': 'As the decree [of 27 May] on 38 In late July 1941 Juricev had been officially transferred from the Ministry of Justice and Religion to the 'State Directorate for Renewal' (DRP, Drzavno ravnateljstvo za ponovu). He is referred to in this document as 'the Poglavnik's [i.e., Ante PaveliC's] private chaplain'. HDA, MPB/OB, Box 3: Broj 48432 ('Fra Dionizije Juricev iz Vodice u Dalmaciji, dodjelba na rad Ravnateljstvu za ponovu'), 29 July 1941. 39 HDA, MPB/OB, kutija i: Broj 1284 I -B- 1 941, 20 June 1941. 40 Ibid., kutija 3: Broj 25453-B- I94I, 23 July I941. In a circular addressing the question of what documents Serbs needed to convert to one of the legally recognized religions in the NDH, the head of the Department of Religion within the Ministry ofJustice and Religion, Branimir Glavas, stated that approval was needed only from local civilian and party officials. In a separate note of September I 94 1, addressed to a Catholic priest who wanted clarification on this question, Glavas remarked that, in individual cases, a person needed to submit a written 'Request' (Molba)stating his or her desire to convert, and a 'Confirmation of Honor' (Potvrdao cestitosti)from the local civilian and party officials confirming their approval. See ibid., kutija io: Broj 2636-B-194I ('Potvrda o cestitosti, izdavanje osobama grtkoistoWnevjere'), n.d.; and kutija i i: Broj 3o62-B-1941, September 194I.
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conversion from one faith to another did not foresee the contingency of collective conversion, a decision is requested as to how to act in this concrete example.' The Ministry instructed the local authoritiessimply to ensure that a collective written request for permission be submitted by the potential converts, and otherwise to act as in individual cases, but that the authority to authorize these conversion lay with the authority of firstinstance.4' The creation of the VO indicated that the government was centralizing decision-making power under one authority. Henceforth, conversion 'requests' were in theory to be forwarded to the VO in Zagreb for final authorization.42According to the government decree forming the VO, 'all affairs,which pertain to the religious conversion of Greek Easterners [Serbs], fall under the purview of this Religious Section'. What is more, the government ordered 'that the decisions of this Religious Section are obligatory for all authorities'.43Although the only institution authorized to conduct the conversion campaign, it appears that the VO lacked its own staff, apart from its central office, and was totally dependent on local officials to carry out its work. The local state and party authorities were expected to prepare the groundwork for conversions, and they employed various coercive methods. Although the literal use of force was not uncommon, many local Croatian officials tried coercing Serbs to convert by promising that the act of conversion would confer citizen status on them, and that they would thereby avoid persecution. Such promises carried an implied threat; by remaining Orthodox, they might face arrest, deportation or much worse. After the VO had approved local requests by Serbs for state permission to convert, the actual conversions were organized, usually in the company of local state officials, either by local clergy or Franciscan 'missionaries'.Croatian civilian and Ustasa party HDA, MPB/OB, kutija 6: Broj I o95-B- I 94 I, 29 August 194 I. According to the VO's and earlier conversion guidelines, Serbs were required, as noted, to seek state permission to convert by submitting a written 'Request'. Local officials tentatively conferred their permission by issuing a 'Confirmation of Honour', and then they submitted lists to the VO for final authorization. This procedure served at least two purposes. On the one hand, it nurtured the fiction of voluntary conversions. Secondly, it enabled the VO in Zagreb to examine regional lists submitted by local officials and, depending on the Serbs involved, to reverse local decisions. The VO's archival records indicate that in some cases involving the Serb intelligentsia (e.g., teachers, members of the free professions, et al.), the VO reversed the permission granted by local officials, and asked them further to investigate the background of the Serbs in question. 43 HDA, Drzavno ravnateljstvo za ponovu, DRP, Vjerski odsjek, VO, kutija I: Broj 603 ('Postupak sa grkoistocnjacima, koji su najavili ili izvriili vjerski prielaz'), I2 December I 94 1. An original copy of the government's 15 September I 94 I order may also be found in: MPB/OB, kutija i i: Broj 3049-B-I ('Okruznica u pogledu postupka kod prelaza sa grckoistocne vjere na druge priznate vjere'), I5 September I94I. Remarkably, none of the authors cited in n.8 provide the correct date for the VO's creation. Many do not cite a date (e.g., Horvat and Stambuk), while others argue that it was formed either in May (Culinovic), June (Bulajic) or October I94I (Duric, Kristo et al.). 41 42
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officials, rather than the Catholic clergy, set the tempo of the policy from the outset. That the creation of the VO truly marked a policy shift for the Ustasa regime with respect to conversion is borne out by an analysis of Ustasa rhetoric. A reading of the Ustasa press between April and August I941 shows virtually no mention of conversion in the general anti-Serb rhetoric, even though the central authorities were at that time issuing memoranda establishingthe guidelines for conversions. In that period, the Ustasa regime was pursuing intensely the deportation of Serbs to Serbia and had initiated the first wave of mass killings of Serbs. In the spring and summer of 194 I, Ustasa rhetoric characterized Serbs virtually in racist terms. They were portrayed as Vlachs and Roma, as an alien element in the Croat lands. In the words of the prominent Ustasa official Mile Budak, the Croatian government would 'force them [Serbs] out [of the NDH]'. At another rally, he described the Catholics and Bosnian Muslims as the only true Croats. The Serbs, on the other hand, 'must leave now, willingly or not'.44 Another important Ustasa official, Milovan Zanic, remarkedthat the Serbs had to leave and that 'there is no method that we Ustase will not employ to make this land truly Croat and to cleanse it of Serbs'.45Such comments were plentiful in the spring and summer of 194I, and there was no suggestion in the rhetoric at that time that the Serbs could be assimilated into the Croat nation through forced catholicization. In September I94I the rhetoric changed abruptly. The reasons for this seem clear enough. The Ustasa authorities were confronted by a growing armed insurrection,Italian occupation of the so-called Second and part of the Third Zone of the NDH, and perhaps most important, the German decision to halt the deportation of Serbs to Germanoccupied Serbia. The Ustasa regime was suddenly forced to modify its earlier exclusionist policy toward the Serbs and to adopt a revised strategy. It turned to forced religious conversion, and this policy was informally announced in September I94I in a series of articles and
4 'Sav je narod uz Poglavnika', Hrvatskinarod,27 May I941, pp. I, 3; and 'Poglavnik je uviek imao pravo', Hrvatski narod, I 6 June I 94 1, p. i 6. 4 'U svim krajevima Hrvatske neogranicena ljubav i odanost prema Poglavniku i NDH', Hrvatski narod, 3 June I94I, p. 2. Like most Croat nationalists since the late nineteenth century, the Ustase argued that the Bosnian Muslims had, in the medieval period, belonged to the Catholic community (which thus supposedly made them Croat) and then the Bogomil religious sect. With the arrival of the Ottoman Turks, these Bogomils converted, so the argument went, to Islam, but conversion did not alter their Croat nationality and character. See Fikreta Jelic-Butic, 'Bosna i Hercegovina u koncepciji stvaranja NDH', and Mile Konjevic, 'O nekim pitanjima politike ustasa prema bosanskohercegovackih Muslimana I 94 I. godine', in Zdravko Antonic (ed.), I94I. U istoriji naroda Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo, I 973 (hereafter, I94I. U istorji naroda Bosne i Hercegovine), pp. 43-49, 263-74.
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statements by the most prominent personalities of the Ustasa leadership, including Ante Pavelic.46As will be seen, however, this policy shift did not mean that the Ustagsakilling spree against the Serb population had ended. Rhetorically, though, the NDH's Serbs were now at once characterized as old Catholics who, in the Ottoman period, had supposedly been forced to convert to Orthodoxy. As supposed former Catholics they had to return to the faith of their ancestors. In the minds of some, though not necessarily all Ustasa leaders, catholicizing the Orthodox Serbs meant croatizing them. The rhetorical shift in the Ustasa press presaged a tactical shift in state policy, and was designed to lend legitimacy to that policy. From September I94I, the policy of forced conversions to Catholicism was initiated on a large scale. It should be noted, however, that Orthodox Roma were excluded from the campaign on 'racial' grounds, and the numerically negligible Orthodox Montenegrin, Russian and Ukrainian communities were exempted altogether.47 The Croatian authorities clearly preferred conversion to Catholicism, but they permitted conversions to other state recognized religions: to the Uniate rite where parishesexisted; to Islam, albeit only in BosniaHerzegovina, since Bosnian Muslims were regarded as 'Croats';and to the Evangelical (Lutheran) Church, whose membership was drawn largely from the Volksdeutsche community.48 The VO's archival material indicates that all but a very few of the registered conversions were to the Roman Catholic faith. This is hardly surprising. In a revealing December 1941 letter to Pavelic, in which he pleaded that conversions to the Uniate church be banned, the VO's chief, Juricev, argued that such conversions were detrimental, in his words 'a fatal matter', to Croatian state interests because over half the Uniate clergy and two-thirdsof its faithfulwere non-Croat. These conversions had to 46 Jelic-Butic,
Ustascei'NDH, pp. 172-73. On g August I94I the DRP issued a Circular (Broj 2446/20-941) to local Croatian authorities (district and communal prefects) informing them that the harsh measures being adopted against Orthodox Serbs were not to apply to Orthodox Romanians, Montenegrins, Macedonians (and Bulgarians) and Russians, unless they had committed anti-Croat and anti-state acts. HDA, MPB/OB, kutija 9: Broj 23oo-B-I94 I. 48 Conversions to a number of Protestant 'sects' were banned, however. For example, on 8 July 1941, the prefect of Modrus County asked the Ministry of Justice and Religion if conversions to the Baptist faith were to be permitted. On 12 July I941 the Ministry's Department of Religion replied that 'in no way are conversions to the Baptist faith to be allowed'. Four days later, the same Department informed the prefect of Mitrovica district 'that no one may freely convert to the Nazarene, Baptist, Adventist, or any other similar religious sect'. Finally, in late August I94I, the Department instructed the prefect of MQdrus County, and presumably the other twenty-one county prefects, to annul all conversions to the Baptist faith since I0 April 1941, the date of the NDH's creation, regardless of the nationality of the convert. HDA, MPB/OB, kutija 2: Broj I 98o6-194 i --B, I2July 194 1, Broj 2253 I-B- 1 941 ('Vjerskiprelaz'), i 6July 194I; and kutija 5: Broj 454--B194 I ('Srbi grcko-istocni, vjerski prijelaz na baptisticku vjeroispovijest'), 25 August 1941. 47
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be banned, Juricev argued, for if they were permitted 'the number of foreign national minorities, who will only eat away at the bones of our national organism, will be multiplied'. The assimilationistintent of the conversion campaign would thus be muted, which is why he forcefully urged that 'either directly or through this Religious Section, you issue totheGreekCatholicritewill not notices according to which thosewhoconvert beprotected bytheState'[emphasis added MB].49Pavelic's reply to this letter, if there was one, is unknown. Conversions to the Uniate church were not banned, but the VO's figures reveal few conversions to that rite, or for that matter to Lutheranism or Islam, and Juricev's letter explains why this was the case. Conversion to Catholicism remained the goal, not for purely religious reasons but, as Juricev's letter demonstrates, because it was seen as the best and really the only way of assimilatingthose Serbs,primarilypeasants, deemed fit for assimilation. The apogee of the new campaign in the Ustasa press was reached in November 1941 . On i 8 November Pavelic received, in what was a well-publicized and carefullyorchestratedpropaganda event, a delegation of catholicized Serbs from eastern Croatia. Pavelic greeted them as 'brothers'and fellow 'Croats'. He emphasized, in what was a serious departurefrom earlier Ustasa rhetoric, that they were native to Croatia. According to Pavelic the Orthodox religion had been used by the Serbian Orthodox Church and Great Serbian propaganda to alienate the Orthodox of Croatia from their native land and Catholic neighbours, with whom they had lived peaceably for centuries. He promised them that the Croatian authorities would do everything in their power to secure for them a peaceful and prosperous life on their land. Pavelic used the occasion also to praise the actions of 'other brothers'elsewhere in Croatia, who had decided recently to convert. No harm would come to any of them, he promised.50 49 HDA, DRP/VO, kutija i: Broj 282/4I ('Teski udarac hrvatskoj nacionalnoj politici u slucaju prelaza grckoistocnjaka na grkokatolicku vjeru'), i i December I 94I. It would appear that Juricev's letter was prompted by the fact that the Catholic Bishops' Conference met from 17 to 20 November at Zagreb, where it adopted the position that conversion to Greek Catholicism was more preferable for Orthodox Serbs than conversion to Catholicism. At this session, the bishops also informed Pavelic that conversions were purely a matter of the Church and not the state. Only the bishops could appoint 'missionaries', who would be responsible to them and not to the secular authorities; conversions were valid only if they had been carried out according to canonical principles and could not be forced. See Alexander, Churchand State in Yugoslavia,p. 34. Juricev's letter was similar in tone to one submitted in July I 94 I by the parish priest of Garesnica, who believed that conversion to the Greek Catholic rite should be banned because that church 'is not capable either in religious or national terms of quickly and surely preparing these Orthodox to be one with us ['da budu jedno s nama']'. HDA, MPB/OB, kutija 3: Broj 334/I941, 22JuIy 194I. ) 'Poglavnik je primio prelaznike s grcko-istocne vjere iz velike zupe Baranja', Hrvatski narod,I 9 November 1941, p. i. The Ustasa regime printed a leaflet about Pavelic's meeting with these Serb converts, which was circulated among Serb villagers to encourage conversion.
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Pavelic's audience with these Serb converts was followed in the Ustasa press by a series of articles on Orthodoxy in Croatia. What Ustasa propagandists repeatedly emphasized was that the Serbian Orthodox Church (always 'Greek Eastern Church', in Ustavsaparlance)51 was, above all, a political organization. Most of Croatia's Orthodox population, it was now claimed, had once supposedly belonged to the Croat nation. Simply put, the Orthodox of the NDH were former Catholics (i.e., Croats) who had converted to Orthodoxy under Ottoman rule. Since the nineteenth century the 'propaganda'of the Serbian Orthodox Church had assimilatedthese former 'Croats' to a Serb identity.52This was the new official line, and it was publicly promoted not only by Ustasa leaders and propagandists, but also by various nationalist and church scholars who lent their support to the policy of forced conversion.53The shift in Ustasa rhetoric, the timing of the VO's creation and the timing of most conversions indicate that forced conversion policy was pursued seriously only from the late
autumnof 1941. In attempting to reconstruct how the policy was implemented, and in order to determine how extensive conversions were in wartime Croatia, the researcher is confronted by a number of empirical limitations. The VO's extant archival material is incomplete. For example, there are no reports from two of the NDH's twenty-two counties.54And of the 142 districtsin the NDH, there are reports only from seventy-three. Even when reports were filed with the central authorities, detailing Serb conversions at the local level, they were often spotty. One reason for the lack of data, especially from BosniaHerzegovina and Dalmatia, may be the neutralization in 194I of local Croatian authorities, either because of armed insurgency or the actions 5' The Ustasa regime's 'Special Commissioner for the Croatian Press', and also the movement's official historian, Mijo Bzik, issued an undated Circular, presumably shortly after the NDH's creation, in which he instructed all newspaper editors, interalia, not to use the word 'Serb' in their articles 'when dealing with the Vlachs in Croatia'. The term 'Greek Easterner' replaced Orthodox Christian. See HDA, f. 2I2, Predsjednistvo vlade NDH, kutija 2: Inv. br. 74 ('Okruznica'), n.d. 52 'Korak uma i srca', Hrvatskinarod,20 November 194 1, p. 2. 53 The historian Rudolf Horvat and especially the Church historian and Catholic priest Krunoslav Draganovic wrote extensively on Catholic conversions to Orthodoxy in the Ottoman period. In addition to the works already cited in n. 22 (above), see Draganovic, Hrvati i Herceg-Bosna:Povodompolemikeo nacionalnojpripadnostiHerceg-Bosne,Sarajevo, 1940; Katalogkatolickihzupa XVII. viekau Bosni i Hercegovini,Zagreb, I 944; co-authored with Josip Butorac, PovijestCrkveu Hrvatskoj.Pregledod najstar#ihvremenado danas, Zagreb, I944; Rudolf Horvat, 'Zasto su Hrvati u i 6. i i 7. stoljecu morali prelaziti na grcko-istocnu vjeru', Hrvatski narod, 27 November 194I, p. 4, and S. M. Stedimlija, 'Pravoslavlje u Hrvatskoj', in Filip Lukas (ed.), Nas'aDomovina,Zagreb, 1943, vol. I, pp. 298-304. 54 Those two counties are Vrhbosna, which was based at Sarajevo and encompassed central and eastern Bosnia, and Cetina, based at the town of Omis and encompassing central Dalmatia. While the latter had a negligible Serb population, the former had a large Serb minority.
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of the Italian military. Be that as it may, the documents enable a reconstruction of the conversion campaign in much of the NDH. On 26 October I 941 Juricev issued one of his first orders as head of the VO, in the form of a circular to all local authorities, the central police and Ustasa party offices. He instructed them on the general guidelines that were to be followed in converting Serbs. The VO preferred mass conversions involving whole families and even entire villages. All communal and district prefects were ordered to report to the VO the number of Orthodox Serbs in their communes, the pace of conversions in their region, the number of conversions and requests for state permission to convert since April 1941, who, if anyone, was providing religious instruction and, finally, to indicate why Orthodox Serbs were not converting, if there were few conversions in their communes and districts.55The replies to the VO's circular filed by communal and district officials, which have hitherto not been analysed, form the best available source for reconstructing the number of conversions and assessingthe success or failure of the policy. The VO's extant archival material confirms that from April 194I to January 1942, at least 30,341 Orthodox, all but a few of whom were Serbs, had converted and another 63,334 had requested approval to convert. Another 943 Serb families, representing between 3,700 and 5,700 people, fall into one of these two categories (see Table i). If it is assumed that those persons who petitioned for permission to convert eventually converted, then at least approximately 97,447 to 99,333 conversions occurred in
1941
-42 .56 Based on the available archival
data, all but 625 individualsand four families converted to Catholicism. The statisticalfigures obtained from the VO collection are incomplete, but they nonetheless allow the researcher to make a number of conclusions. One of the most striking findings arising from the archival data is that regional variations were pronounced and that, as such, the policy of forced conversion could not serve as an adequate solution to the socalled Serb Question in the NDH. The conversion policy appears to have been pursued most vigorously, and was most successful, in 55 A facsimile of this circular (Broj 2608I-I94I, 'Upute za vjerozakonski prelaz grckoistocnjaka', 24 October I941) can be found in Kristo, Katolickacrkva,I, pp. 207-08. See also Duric, Prekrstavanje, pp. 59-6I. In late November I94I, the Department of State Propaganda of the Government Presidency ordered the VO to photograph all mass conversions and to forward the pictures in a timely fashion directly to Pavelic's office. HDA, DRP/VO, kutija I: Broj 6I26, 24 November I941. Many of these photographs can be found in Horvat and Stambuk, pp. 56, 6o, 63, 65, 82, 98, I 23. 56 It is not necessarily safe to assume that all or even most of the 63,334 persons who petitioned for permission to convert actually converted, however. In those counties that were occupied by the Italian military in September I941 (i.e., Bribir-Sidraga, Hum, and parts of Krbava-Psat, Lika-Gacka and Sana-Luka), most of the Serbs who had sought permission to convert probably did not convert.
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TABLE I
Conversions in the NDH, Districts Reporting
No. of Conversions
Baranja Bilogora Bribir-Sidraga
4 of 7 7 of 7 I of 3
5,323
Cetina
oof6
County
2,701
48
Dubrava
I of 7
Gora Hum
6of6 5 of 6
Krbava-Psat Lasva-Glaz Lika-Gacka Livac-Zapolje
2
of 4
I9 239
2
of 5
88
194I-42
Requests, Conversions Pending
i6
209 5,902 c. 3,000
104 0
3
I c. 7,325
No. of Families (No. of Persons Unspecified)
c. 7,i65 C. 2,000 c. I,852
0 222 c. 23
77 0
59
Pliva-Rama
i of 3 of 4 of 5 of
Pokupje
4 of 5
Posavje Prigorje
6 of 6 3 of 7
Sana-Luka
2 of 5
Usora-Soli
i of 8
o
o
o
i of 6
I
O
O
Modrus
Vinodol-Podgorje
Vrhbosna Vuka
Zagorje Zagreb (city) Total
6 8 4 8
o of 7 g of IO 6 of io 73 of 142
6o
c. 3,659 1,437
2,7 I 5
5,206
1,089 i6
280 C. 15,017
2,358
95 unknown C. 30,34I
0
C. 2,500
c. 5,859 2,132 0 272
84 280
46 0 44 0
5,429
935
0
c. 500
47
i8i c. 8,ooo
o unknown
c. 63,334
c. 943
()
Sources: see footnotes 58 to 78. (*) If one assumes four to six persons per family, then 3,772 to 5,658 persons fall into this category.
Slavonia, the Banija region, Zagreb's environs, and part of the Kordun region of Croatia, that is, in those regions more or less firmly under Ustasa control.57 Thus, for example, in Baranja county (north-eastern 57 The percentage figures of conversion cited in this paper are calculated in relation to the 1931 census. One must keep in mind, however, that once mass killings, deportations and other population movements are taken into consideration, the percentage figures would in all likelihood be higher. In a few districts and communes, Ustaga officials appear to have conducted an informal census and provided a figure for the number of Serbs in 1941. In these instances, I have adopted their figures, although I acknowledge that they are imprecise and should be treated with caution. For the 1931 census figures, see Jovan Ilic, 'Broj i razmestaj Srba na teritoriji avnojske Hrvatske', in V. Rudic (ed.), Srbi u Hrvatskoj. brojz teritor4alnirazmeftaj,Belgrade, I993, pp. 7-205; Slobodan D. Milogevid, NJaseljavanje, 'Socioloska i demografska analiza prognanih Srba iz pojedinih srezova Nezavisne Drzave
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Slavonia, see Map i), at least 7.9 per cent of the local Orthodox Serb population converted.58In Bilogora county (western Slavonia), which had one of the highest conversion rates in the NDH, about one-fifth of the Orthodox population converted or sought permission to convert.59 In Gora county (Banijaregion) the figure was iI.8 per cent.60In LivacZapolje county (northwestern Bosnia, western Slavonia) there were pronounced regional variations from district to district, but the county had a relatively high rate of conversion.6' In Zagorje62 and Hrvatske 194 I', in Vlado Strugar et al. (eds), Drugi svjetskirat 5o godinakasnije,Podgorica, 1997, pp. 6i 1-4I, and for Srijem, Sreta Savic, Borbeu Sremu,I94I-I944, Novi Sad, I967, pp. 13, 17. Since the I 93I census listed the population by religion, the number of Orthodox is not necessarily always equal to the number of Serbs, although it most cases it is, because Russians, Bulgarians and some Roma were recorded under 'Orthodox'. 58 For simplicity's sake, the following abbreviations will be employed: OP ('opcinsko poglavarstvo', communal administration); KO ('kotarska oblast', district authority); GP ('gradsko poglavarstvo', city administration), and Vz ('Velika zupa', Grand County). HDA, DRP/VO, kutija i: Broj 3266.-I 94 I (OP Velika Kopanica), 3 Dec. 194 I; Broj Prs. 200/41 (OP Piskorevci), 17 Dec. I941; Broj 2952/941 (OP Vrpolje), 20 Dec. 194I; Broj 5176 ex 194I (OP Koska), i o Nov. I 94 I; Broj 6595/194 I (OP Nasice Vanjske), i i Nov. 194 I; Broj 60.I60-941 (GP Osijek), 17 Dec. 194I; Broj Prs. 1617/1941, Broj Prs. 2133/4I. (V Baranja), 28 Nov. and 27 Dec. 1941; Broj io6i Prs./I94I (KO Virovitica), Io Nov. 1941; Broj 307/194I (OP Cabuna), 27 Nov. 194 . 59 Ibid., kutija i: Broj 536, Prs. Broj 536/4I (KO Bjelovar), 17 Nov. 194I, 8Jan. I942; Broj 14449/194 I (GP Bjelovar), 2 Dec. 1941; Broj II259-194I (OP Trgoviste Cazma),30 Nov. 1941; Broj 10.482 ex I941 (KO Cazma), i6Dec. I941, 2Jan. 1942; Broj 8646-194I (KO Garesnica), i8 Nov. 194I; Broj 8153/1941 (OP Garemnica),28 Nov. 1941; Broj 6002/ 1941 (OP Berek), 12 Dec. I94 ; Broj 8I59/I94 i, Broj I0.979/1941 (KO Durdevac), 17 Nov., 17 and I9 Dec. 1941; Broj 7449/41 (KO Grubisno Polje), I9 Nov. 1941; Broj 103/ 41.-Is. (KO Koprivnica), 13 Nov. I941; Broj io.807 (GP Krizevci), 25 Oct. 1941; Broj 12136/1941, Broj 13230/1941, Broj I3652/I94I, Broj-14I/I942 (KO Kri2evci), 17 Nov., IO and i6 Dec. 1941, 6Jan. 1942; Broj Prs. 74/1941 (OP Sv. Ivan Zabno), I9 Nov. 194I; Broj Prs. 96/194 I (OP Vrbovec), 6 Dec. 194 I . 60 Ibid., Broj 2540/4I, Broj 2540 (OP Dobrljin), 3 Dec. I 941, 3 Jan. 1942; Broj 125 and 126 (VO to KO Dvor), i i Dec. 194 1; Broj 21i8/ 1941 (OP Kraljevcani), 3 I Dec. I94 1; Broj 94 (VO to OP Staza), 12 Nov. I941; Broj 2I67/I94I, Broj 2069/1941 (OP Mecencani), 12 Nov., I and 3I Dec. 194I; Broj 4993 11-I941 (OP Sunja), 28 Oct. I94I; Broj 9127 (KO Petrinja), 17 Nov. 1941; Broj 2540/1941 (OP Blinja, Petrinja), 19 Nov. i941; Broj 96, 97, and 98 (OP Crkveni Bok), Oct. I941; Broj 266i/194I (OP Lekenik), 14 Nov. 1941; Broj 7838/4I (KO Sisak), i6 Nov., I and i6 Dec. 1941; Broj 4527-194I (OP Topolovac), 28 Nov. 1941. 61 Ibid., Broj4o87-H-194 , Broj 4.034 H 194I (OP Daruvar), 4 Nov. 1941, 2 Jan. 1942; Broj 2090 H/I94I (OP DaruvarskiBrestovac),I5 Nov. 194I; Broj I57./Taj. I941 (KO Daruvar),30 Nov. I941; Broj 4087 H. 194I (OP Trgoviste Daruvar), 3 Dec. I94I; Broj 6934-1941, Broj 32 (OP Okucani), I9 Nov., 4 Dec. I94I and 2 Jan. 1942; Broj 2064-1941 (OP Stivica), 25 Nov. I 94 1; Broj 5086/194 I, Broj 5192/194 I, Broj 44/1942 (OP Masii), I and io Dec. 1941, 8 Jan. 1942; Broj 7582/1941 (OP Bektez), 12 Nov. 1941; Broj 12305--I941 (GP Pozega), i8 Nov. 1941; Broj i8o, Broj i6688 (KO Pozega), 23 Nov. and 13 Dec. 1941; Broj I0I83/1941 (OP Pleternica), 29 Nov. 1941; Broj 5587-194I (OP Rusevo), 2 Dec. 1941; Broj 5035/1941 (OP Kutjevo), 3 Dec. 1941; Broj 7235/I941 (OP PozegaVanjska), i6Dec. I941. 62 Ibid., Broj 4454/41 (OP Luka), 2 Nov. I94I; Broj 6007/I941 (OP Klanjec), I9 Nov. 1941; Broj 146/4I Taj. (OP Martijanec), I5 Nov. 194I; Broj i i 6 Taj. 194I (OP Rasinja), 30 Nov. 194I; Broj tajni 129/1941, Broj Taj. 268/41 (OP Ludbreg), 20 Nov. and 2 Dec. 1941; Broj 6230/1941, Broj 406g/I941 (OP Varazdinske Toplice), Io and 15 Nov. 1941; Broj 6995/1941 (KO Novi Marof), 25 Nov. I941; Broj 5856/I941 (OP Radoboj), I4 Nov. 1941;Broj 1II 3/1941 (OP Mali Bukovec),15 Nov. 1941.
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Prigorje63counties, both of which were close to Zagreb, the local Serb population was relatively small but the conversion rates were high. In Pokupje county (Karlovac) there were over i,ooo conversions and requestsby the end of I 941 .64 Apart from these seven counties, which geographically encompassed Slavonia, Zagorje, the Banijaregion, and Zagreb'simmediate environs, the number of conversions was quite low. For example, in Modrus county (Kordun and Gorski kotar regions) of north-western Croatia,65 in Posavje county (part of Slavonia, north-eastern Bosnia),66and in Vuka county (Srijem region)67 there are relatively detailed reports 63 Ibid., Broj 550 Prs./4I (KO Samobor), I Dec. I94I; Broj 59/Prs./I941 (OP Sestine), 4 Dec. I94I; Broj iooi-Prs. (KO Zagreb), 6 and I7 Dec. I94I; Broj 420 Pr. 1941 (KO Kutina), 9 Dec. 194'.
(Poglavarstvoslob. i kr. povelj. trgovista Broj 4682/I941 64 Ibid., Broj 4329-I941, (OP Klinca Selo), I9 Nov. 1941; Jastrebarsko),I2 and 30 Nov. I94I; Broj 5i87-II/I94I (OP Pisarovina), I3 (OP Vrginmost), 24 Nov. I94I; Broj Pr. 131-I941 Broj 5879-I94I (OP Barilovic), 12 Nov. 1941, and MPB/OB, kutija I4: Broj Nov. I94I; Broj 5822/I941 4479-B- I94I (GP Karlovac), io Oct. 194I. (OP Tounj), 5 Nov. I941; Broj 6309-1941 65 HDA, DRP/VO, kutija i: Broj 2425/41 (OP OGtarije), 30 Dec. 194I; Broj 2812-194I (OP Ogulin), 14 Nov. I94I; Broj 2476/4I (OP Broj 5520/I941, Broj6073/1941 (OP DreznikGrad), 7 Nov. 194I; Broj 4708/I94I, (OP Primislje,Slunj), I7 Nov. Cetingrad),I5 Nov., I and 3I Dec. I941; Broj i8 i8/I941 (OP Severin na Kupi, Vrbovsko), 2 and io Nov. 194I; Broj 3720/ I941; Broj 56I5-I94I Broj 8467/4I (OP Bosiljevo), 30 Nov. I94I (OP Moravice), I9 Nov. 1941; Broj 7957/4I, (OP (OP Vrbovsko), 2 Dec. 194I; Broj 4430/I94I and 3I Dec. 194I; Broj 748I/I941 Ravna Gora), 7 Dec. I94I; Broj 64I8/41 (KO Vrbovsko), 12 Dec. 194I. (OP Koraj), I3 Nov. 66 Ibid., Broj 6036/4I (KO Bijeljina), I4 Nov. I94I; Broj i622-4I I941; Broj2371 (OPBijeljinskaSela), 17 Nov. I941; Broj882 (OPBatkovic),17 Nov. 1941; (KO Brcko),3 Dec. Broj 259/41 (IspostavakotaraBrcko), 14 Nov. I94I; Broj I0648/4I (OP Oriovac), 20 Oct. I941; Broj 3091 (OP Gornji Rahic), 7 Jan. 1942; Broj 3358/I94I (OP Svilaj), 29 Nov. 194 I941; Broj 5054 (OP Brod Varos), 17 Nov. I941; Broj 3I59-/94I (OP Bebrina), 29 Nov. 1941; Broj 3874 (OP Andrijevci), 30 Nov. 1941; i; Broj 2092/1941 (OP Podcrkavlje), 3 Dec. (OP Kobas), 2 Dec. I94I; Broj 3453/1941 Broj 2365/941 (OP Klakar), io (OP Sibinje), 5 Dec. I94I; Broj I941/I94I 194I; Broj 4028-II-I941 (OP Osinja), I Dec. Dec. 194I; Broj 65I (VO to KO Brod), 30 Dec. 194I; Broj 2039/41 (KO Derventa), (OP Bosanski Kobas), i8 Dec. 194I; Broj 87 I9/1941 194I; Broj 2562/41 (OP (OP Grada6ac), 27 Nov. 1941; Broj 3.531/194I I and 3I Dec. 194I; Broj 5302/41 Gunja), 28 Nov. I94I; Broj 3497/4 (OP Slavonski Samac), 30 Nov. 194 I; Broj 3449/1941
(OP Gundinci),30 Nov. I94I. (GP 67 Ibid., Broj 732I/41 (GP Mitrovica), i8 Dec. 194I; Broj 5627, 56I6.5544/1941 (GP Karlovci), I5 Nov. Taj. broj 175/I941 Petrovaradin),I3 Nov. 194I; BrojI47/I94I, (KO Ilok), 30 and 5 Dec. 194I; Broj 24I2 (OP Cortanovci), Io Dec. 194I; Broj 7724/41 Nov. I94I and 2 Jan. I942; Broj 2I74 (OP Besenovo), 20 Nov. 1941; Broj I948 (OP (OP Irig), (KO Irig), 30 Nov. I941; Broj 465I/94I Rakovac), 28 Nov. I941; Broj 5009/941 (OP Neradin), 2 Dec. 1941; Broj 13I7 (OP KrusedolBroj I423/I94I 2 Dec. I94I; Prnjavor), 3 Dec. I94I; Broj I937 (OP Maradik), 4 Dec. 1941; Broj Prs. 35 (OP Stara Pazova), 28 Nov. 1941; Broj 73 (OP Stari Slankamen), 12 Dec. I94I; Broj 2831 (OP Novi Broj 67/42 (OP Kukujevci), I9 Broj 4205/I94I, Banovci), 3I Dec. 194I; Broj 3725/I941, (OP Stitar),I9 Nov. 1941; Broj3589/ Nov. and 2 Dec. 194I,2 Jan. 1942; Broj326i/I941 (OP Sid), 4 Dec. I941; Broj 207 Taj 41 (OP Mala Vasica), I9 Nov. I94I; Broj 6592/41 (KO Sid), I9 Dec. I94I; Broj 3624 (OP SidskiBanovci), 30 Nov. and 3 I Dec. I941; Broj (OP Retkovci), 22 Nov. I94I; Broj 3758/41 (OP Strosinci), 3I Dec. 194I; Broj 33i6/4I Broj 3539/41 (OP Lipovac), 8 Nov. I941; Broj 224 (KO Vinkovci), 28 Nov. I94I; (GP Vukovar), I5 Nov., I (OP NoviJankovci), I Dec. 1941; Broj 8833/I941 2413-194I Dec. I941; Broj 383/194I, Broj 375 Taj./4I. (KO Vukovar), I5 and i8 Nov. I94I; Broj i804 (OP Obrez), 20 Nov. I94I.
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which again indicate pronounced regional variations. In general, the rates of conversion were relatively low, approaching, in the case of Vuka county, just over one per cent of its Serb population. The reports from the Dalmatian and Bosnian counties are far more incomplete and indicate low rates of conversion. A case in point is Bribir-Sidraga county (northern Dalmatia). Of the more than 25,000 Orthodox in Knin district, only forty-eight converted to Catholicism by late I94I, although an additional 3,000 permission requests were filed with the local authorities. Of those forty-eight conversions, seventeen involved Croats who had converted in the interwar period to Orthodoxy for marriage purposes, or from the Old Catholic rite to Orthodoxy.68This would mean that thirty-one Serbs converted, or o. per cent of the local population. As will be seen, the Ustasa authorities lost control of most of this county by August I 94 I because of the Serb insurgency and then the occupation of the county by the Italian military. This meant that conversion policy was never truly implemented in Bribir-Sidraga. The same is true of Dubrava (southern Dalmatia, south-western Herzegovina)69 and Vinodol-Podgorje (Croatian Littoral, western Lika) counties, both of which had relatively few Serbs and for which there is only scant information.70There is also spotty informationabout conversions in Lika-Gacka county (Lika region), but it does indicate that at least 3.2 per cent of the local Orthodox Serb population either converted or sought approval to convert.7' In Sana-Luka county (western Bosnia)72the figure was just over 9 per cent while in UsoraSoli county (central Bosnia) the data indicate a far lower rate of conversion.73The same is true of Lasva-Glaz county (central-western
68 Ibid., Broj 2528/1-1941 (Vz Bribir-Sidraga),I2 Nov. 194I; Broj 4642/4I (OP Promina), I 2 Nov. I 94 1; Broj I 5 ('Popis onih koji su presli na katolku vjeru u Kninu 1941 godine'), 28 Nov. 194I . 69 Ibid., Broj 194I/41 (OP Orebic), I I Nov. 1941; Broj 295 8/41 (OP Trpanj), 25 Nov. I 94 I; Broj I 94/4 I (OP Konavle), 26 Nov. 194 I; Broj 1360/4 I (OP Lopud), 27 Nov. I 94 1; Broj 42I8/4I (OP Ston), i Dec. I941; Broj 2222/4I (OP Sipan), 3I Dec. I94I. 70 Ibid., Broj 344I/1941 (OP Jablanac), 20 Nov. I941; Broj 28I5-1941 (OP Novi), i I
Nov. I94I. 71 Ibid., Broj3044/41 (OP LickiOsik), I2 Nov. 1941. 72 Ibid., Broj I327/41 (OPBr. Majdan),I I Nov. 194I; Broj I I.473/41 (KO BanjaLuka), I Dec. I 94 1; Broj I o84/4 I (OP Adolfstal),20 Nov. and 3I Dec. 1941, and HDA, MPB/
OB, kutija 6: Broj I o95-B- I 94 I (OP Omarska), 29 Aug. 1941. 73 DRP, VO, kutija i, Broj 2398/4I (OP Zivinice), i8 Nov. Breske), 24 Nov. 1941.
194I;
Broj 1336/1941
(OP
96
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Bosnia).74 In Pliva-Rama county (south-western Bosnia)75 and Krbava-
Psat county (north-western Bosnia)76the number of conversions was higher, while in Hum county (Herzegovina), from which we have reports from all but one (Posusje)of its six districts, over 2,000 Serbs either converted or sought permission to convert. Once again, regional variations were pronounced.77Finally, in the city of Zagreb approximately 8,ooo Serbs and Jews either converted or were awaiting state permission to convert, as of September 194I.78 As incomplete as these figures may be, they permit a number of conclusions. The enormous regional variations have already been noted. In some regions (e.g., Slavonia, Banija, Zagreb's environs) and counties a high proportion of the Serb population converted to Catholicism. For example, in some Slavonian districts, like Cazma (I9.9 per cent), Garesnica (52.6 per cent), Krizevci (23.8 per cent), and Pozega (40 per cent), and some districts near Zagreb, like Kutina (68 per cent) and Samobor (44 per cent), the rates of conversion were extraordinarily high. In Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Srijem, on the other hand, the proportion of the local Serb population converting to Catholicism was low to negligible. For example, in Bijeljina,Jajce, Livno and Zenica districts(all in Bosnia), in Konjic and Metkovic districts (both in Herzegovina), in Knin district (Dalmatia), and in Ilok, Irig, Karlovci, Mitrovica and Stara Pazova districts (all in Srijem region), the conversion rates were below 2 per cent. Even within those counties with a relatively high rate of conversion, regional variations occasionally differed markedly from district to district, or even from commune to commune. These local variations may also reflect, in addition to the objective factors to be discussed later in this 7 Ibid., Broj 140/4 I (KO Zenica), 14 Nov. 194 I; Broj 1573/4 I (OP Dubostici), i o Dec. '94'. 75 Ibid., Broj 4278/41 (OP Kupres), 4 Nov. 1941; Broj 2736/41 (OP Donji Vakuf), i9 Nov. 194I, and HDA, MPB/OB, kutija I5: Broj 4638-B-I94I ('Grkoistocnjaci, vjerski prielaz', KO Livno), 15 Oct. 1941; kutija i6: Broj 4946-B-I94i and Broj 4947-B-I941 (KO Jajce), 28 Oct. I94I, and Box 20: Broj 62I4-B-i941 (KO Varcar Vakuf), 25 Nov.
1941. 76 DRP, VO, kutija i, Broj 25 10/41 (OP Vrsta), i 6 Nov. I 94 1; Broj 9653 (KO Bihac), 22 Nov. 194 I; Broj 3008- I 94 I (OP Pecigrad), 25 Nov. 194 I. The reports from Bihac pertain to mass conversions only in the villages of Zlopoljac and Kamenica. 7 Ibid., Broj 4904/4I (KO Metkovic), I5 Nov. and 9 Dec. I941; Broj 3283/41 (OP Potoci), I9 Nov. 1941; Broj 3 I83/41, Broj 3382/41 (KO Nevesinje), 20 Nov. and I Dec. 194I; Broj 1700/4I (OP Kocerin), I2 Dec. 1941; Broj 10.410/41 (KO Ljubuski), 3 Dec. 194I and 3 Jan. 1942; Broj 8224/41 (KO Konjic), I, I5 and 3I Dec. 1941; Broj 2744/41 (OP Dreznica), 22 Dec. 194I. In his 3 December report to the VO, the prefect of Ljubuski simply remarked that the local Serbs had all converted, without specifying the number of converts. But on I5 July I94I he had reported to another department of the State Directorate for Renewal that he had given permission to the roughly twenty Serb families in his district to convert to Catholicism. HDA, DRP, Odjel za iseljavanje, kutija 5: Broj 86/ 4I prez. (KO Ljubuski), I I July 1941. 78 HDA, MPB/OB, kutija i i: Min. Broj 315i-B-I94I, September 194I.
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paper, the relative importance of religion in any given region, both at that time and historically as a factor in shaping Croat national identity and Croat-Serb relations. To be sure, Catholicism (like Serbian Orthodoxy) was not of the same type, coloration, and import everywhere in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; for example, it had far less sway over the masses in Hrvatsko Zagorje than it did in Herzegovina or in some other places. Secondly, the majority of conversions that did occur took place relatively late in I 941I In areas that had high conversion rates, for instance, Okucani commune and Vukovar district, the overwhelming majority of the conversions and requests for permission to convert occurred in the last two months of 1941. This is significant in that it would seem to contradict the standard view that conversion policy was launched in April or May I941. This in turn would suggest that the Ustasa regime's commitment to the policy was functional rather than intentional, although the reverse is argued in the literature. One could argue that the conversion campaign intensified only in the fall, and not earlier, because of bureaucratic inertia. However, this argument is belied not only by the rhetoric of the central authorities but also by the fact that they originally conceded control of the policy to local officialdom, rather than maintaining control from the outset. Thirdly, the VO's records should alter our understanding of how the policy was implemented. Although many Serbs likely converted at gunpoint when the Ustasa militia entered their villages as is argued in the existing literature the VO's records show that a range of coercive methods were employed by the authorities and that conversion was in actual fact a protracted, bureaucratic affair often lasting many months. Fourthly, even in areas for which reasonably solid figures exist, the number of Serbs who converted to Catholicism was often relatively small, as a proportion of the total Serb population. To be sure, in some districts the conversion rate exceeded a third or half of the Serb population, and in some communes over three quarters of the Serb population converted. But the overall figures suggest a much lower national rate. In this respect, and when combined with the pronounced regional variations, the forced conversion policy was a failure and could not serve as an adequate global solution to the socalled Serb Question in the NDH. Why were conversions not more widespread and why did not more Serbs convert to Catholicism? The reports of local officials shed important light on these questions, and also raise a number of additional questions. In some parts of wartime Croatia, the conversion policy was never implemented at all, either because of the intervention of the Italian military, which lent protection to Serbs, or because of armed insurrection against the Ustasa regime. In some regions, the two overlapped so that in large parts of wartime Croatia (e.g., Gorski kotar, Lika,
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Dalmatia, western Bosnia, Herzegovina), Croatian authority was neutralized already by September 194I. The Italian occupation, which formally began on 7 September I94 I, prevented the Usta'saauthorities from pursuing conversions in these areas. The arrival of the Italian military effectively neutralized local Ustasa civilian and military authorities. Consequently, the large Serb populations of northern Dalmatia, Lika, western Kordun, Herzegovina and parts of Bosnia were no longer exposed directly to coercive measures by the Croatian authorities.79The failure of the conversion campaign in Bribir-Sidraga, Dubrava, Lika-Gackaand Modrus counties can be attributedprimarily to the Italian military occupation. For example, in October I94I the prefect of Bribir-SidragaCounty, Ante Nikolic, reported to Zagreb that the Italians were opening Orthodox churches and allowing Orthodox priests to conduct religious services. One month later, he reported that the conversion policy was dead.80Another official noted that since early September, following the 7 The Italian occupation, formalized by the Italo-Croatian agreement of 26 August, began on 7 September 194 I, and all Croatian civilian, police and military authorities in the so-called Second Zone (Gorski kotar, western Kordun, Lika, Dalmatia, western Bosnia, Herzegovina) were subordinated to the Italian military. The Italian military gradually extended its occupation to parts of the so-called Third Zone (north-western and southeastern Bosnia), which was the region between the Second Zone and the Italo-German demarcation line in the NDH. The Italian army offered protection not only to the Jewish population, but also to local and displaced Serbs, and in some instances removed and even incarcerated Ustasa officials. On the Italian occupation, see the three articles by Rafael Brcic, 'Okupacioni sistem u Bosni i Hercegovini 1941. godine', Vojnoistorijiski glasnik, 2 I, I: pp. I9-87; 'Reagovanje okupatora i kvislinga na ustanak u Bosni i Hercegovini', I970, pp. 454-65, and 'Njemacki i italijanski planovi u in I94I. U istorii narodaBosnei Hercegovine, Bosni i Hercegovini u svjetlu dokumenata (I 942-1943)', in Dugan Papadopolos et al. (eds), AVNO?/ifrarodnooslobodilaWka borbau Bosni i Hercegovini,I942-I943, Belgrade, I 974 (hereafter, borbau Bosni i Hercegovini), pp. I 3 I -55, and Miso Lekovic, 'Reagovanje Narodnooslobodi1acka Italijana na ustanak u Bosni i Hercegovini (reokupacija demilitarizovane zone)', in I941. u pp. 466-84. istoriji narodaBosnei Hercegovine, 80 HDA, MPB/OB, kutija 14: Broj 4449-B-I94I, 12 October 1941, and DRP/VO, kutija i: Broj 6054/4I (OP Knin), 4 November 194I. Some authors have suggested that the Ustase unsuccessfully attempted, as late as November I94I, to catholicize the Serbs of Dalmatia. Drago Gizdic makes this claim without providing any sources, and even adds that the Ustase received Italian assistance. Fikreta Jelic-Butic uncritically accepts Gizdic's assertion. The archival material and the overall behaviour of the Italian military do not support such a view. See Drago Gizdic, Dalmac'yaI941. Prilozi historijiNarodnooslobodilaWke borbe,Zagreb, 1957, p. 416; and Jelic-Butic, Ustase i NDH, p. 175, n. 14I. Nonetheless, Gizdic's book confirms the thesis of this paper. He makes no reference to conversions prior to the Italian occupation, which again suggests that between April and August 1941 the Ustase, in Dalmatia as in other parts of the NDH, were more interested in 'cleansing' the land of Serbs than in converting them. Generally speaking, local histories of Communist resistance in I941 tend to portray a more accurate picture of the timing of conversion policy than the monographs on that topic. For instance, Branko Sedlar claims that in July 1941 the Ustasa authorities in the Plaski region (Lika), which was later occupied by the Italians, intensified the catholicization campaign, but adds that the campaign 'did not have a serious character'. Apparently neither the local Ustase nor the Serbs took it seriously at the time, since arrests, deportations and killings were more prevalent. The Croatian Serb scholar Duro Zatezalo refers to catholicization in the summer of I94I as a ploy; in many cases, Serbs were invited or ordered to assemble under the pretence of conversion, but were
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arrival of the Italians, 'the interest of the Greek Easterners [Serbs] for conversion to the Roman Catholic faith has been very insignificant, or better said, nonexistent'.81The head of Moravice commune (Gorski kotar) reported that conversions had ceased, 'because the Serbs hope for a complete occupation [by the Italians], based on which their freedom of religion, would be guaranteed'.82 In mid-October 194I an official from Livno (Bosnia) reported that over 400 Orthodox Serbs had announced their intention to convert, but that, with the arrival of Italian troops, 'one can hear talk among the Greek Easterners, that their churches will be opened, that a priest will come from Split, and our Italian allies are encouraging them, with their actions, not to convert'.83Another official reported to Zagreb that 'the entire Italian military authority in Herzegovina is on the side of the Serbs'. The Italians recorded every anti-Serb act, 'presumably so that they can document that we are incapable of governing'.84His colleague from Dreznica commune (Herzegovina) reported in late December I94I that no Serbs had converted to Catholicism in his commune 'because they have no pressure to convert', in all likelihood an implicit reference to the Italian presence.85A report from Bihac noted that Serbs who had fled their homes in fear of the Ustasa militia were now returning in the company of the Italians, who showed no respect toward the local Croatian authorities.86The prefect of Pliva-Rama county in Bosnia reported in late October I941 that the Italian military in the area of Bugojno had prevented the local Croatian authorities from carrying out their most basic governmental operations.87The Italian intervention served not only further to undermine the Ustasa state, but was a deliberate move designed to win the sympathies of local Serbs in order killed instead. Duro Roksandic articulates the same view. Ivo Kovacic claims that the Ustasa authorities in Gorski kotar turned to conversions only in the late summer of 1941, after deportations and killings failed to 'cleanse' the area of Serbs. Franko Mirosevic argues that conversions in the Moslavina region began in September I94I and ended abruptly in January 1942. See Branko Sedlar, 'Ustaski teror u op6ini plaski I94I. godine', in Branko Sedlar (ed.), Plascanska dolina i okolicau NOR-u I94I-I945, Karlovac, 1976, p. 87; Duro Zatezalo, Narodna vlast na Kordunu,Banii i Lici, I941-I945, Karlovac, 1978, p. 33; Duro Roksandic, 'Teror ustasa u glinskom kotaru I941. godine', in Katarina Babic et al., Sisak i Banija u revolucionarnom radnickom pokretui ustanku,Sisak, 1974, p. 842; Ivo Kovacic, 'Gorski kotar u ustanku 1941.', in Ivo Kovacic, Gorskikotaru radnickom pokretui NOB, Rijeka, I974, pp. 203-04, and Franko Mirosevic, 'Narodnooslobodilacki pokret u Moslavini 194 I- I945', Radovi, 13, i 980, p. 99. 81 HDA, DRP/VO, kutija i: Broj 6309- I94 I (OP Ogulin), I4 November 1941. 82 Ibid., Broj 3720/194I (OP Moravice), I9 November 194I; and Broj 64i8/4I (KO Vrbovsko), I 2 December 1941. 83 HDA, MPB/OB, kutija 15: Broj 4760-B- 1 94 I, 17 October 1941. 84 HDA, f. 227, Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova, MVP, Politicki odjel, Odsjek za romanske zemlje, kutija 4: Broj 1.484/41 ('Prilike u Bosni'), 27 October I94I. 85 HDA, DRP/VO, kutija i: Broj 2744/4I (OP Dreznica), 22 December 194I. 86 HDA, f. 227, MVP, Politicki odjel, Odsjek za romanske zemlje, kutija 4: Broj I.55I, 22 October 194 I. 87 Ibid., kutija 5: Broj 1.727/4I, 24 October 194I.
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to have loyal subjects at that time and also in a projected Italian state or zone of influence, one that would be firmly establishedin those areas only after the war. Armed insurrection against the Usta-sa regime also seriously undermined the forced conversion policy. By late I94I the Croatian authoritiescontrolled probably not more than one third of the territory of the NDH, which is also likely why the archival material is not more complete. The head of Dobrljin commune (Bosnia) reported that the continual 'disorders'were preventing the implementation of conversion policy.88 The prefect of Nevesinje district (Herzegovina) also attributed
the low conversion rate to 'the disorders that prevailed in the district, and because hitherto there are some communes that are still not functioning because of the Chetnik-Communist bands'.89 The head of
Masic commune (Slavonia) reported that even the news of disordersin neighbouring Bosnia had a negative effect on conversions;the inference being that local Serbs were waiting for the outcome of the disorders, and possibly the wider war.90The disorders and presence of resistance groups were also cited by officials from Cetingrad, Ostarije, Primi-slje, and Vrbovskocommunes as preventing the implementation of conversion policy.91 Large parts of Bosnia were in open rebellion by the late summer of I941; the insurrection had an exclusively Serb character there and elsewhere. The prefect of Bijeljina district referred to 'irregular conditions' in his district, which had prevented him even from receiving regular reports from and communicating with his communal subordinates.92 Another Bosnian official reported that there would be more conversions if there were fewer incursions into the area by Chetnik and Communist units.93 An official from Tuzla district reported that most of his region had succumbed to disorders and that, until conditions settled down, little could be accomplished.94 Another official from Tuzla district observed that Communist units had of late been operating in local Serb villages, which had prevented conversions: 'hitherto not a single one of them [Serbs] has shown the slightest desire for conversion to the Roman Catholic faith, nor found this to be HDA, DRP/VO, kutijai: Broj2540/41 (OP Dobrljin),3 December 194I. Ibid., Broj 3I83/41 (KO Nevesinje), 20 November I94I. Croatian officials almost always referred in their reports to the Serb royalist Chetniks and the Communist Partisans as a single entity. 90 Ibid., Broj 4712/194 I (OP Masii), 7 November I 94 I. 91 Ibid., Broj 4708/I941 (OP Cetingrad), I5 November I94I; Broj 2476/4I (Gstarije), 30 Dec. 194 I; Broj I 8 I 8/ I 94 I (OP Primislje), i 7 November 194 I; Broj 748 I / I 94 I (OP Vrbovsko), 2 December I94I. 92 Ibid., Broj 6036/41 (KO Bijeljina), 14 November 194I. 93 Ibid., Broj 2039/4 I (OP Osinja), i December 1941. 94 Ibid., Broj 2398/41 (OP Zivinice), I 8 November 1941. 88
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useful.'95 The prefect of Zenica district reported that the conversion campaign 'had to be stopped with the appearance of the Communists on the borders of the district'. If conditions soon returned to normal, 'the conversion campaign [akcija na prijelazu] would move ahead rapidly'. He reported weeks later that disorders still prevailed.96 Even in those areas of Bosnia where the Ustase were able to maintain some semblance of control, their position was too weak to ensure any conversions. In actual fact, it appears that in some areas of Bosnia, the Ustasa authorities never pursued conversions at any point in 1941. Insurrection was but one of the reasons. In eastern Bosnia the Croat element was numerically weak and, relative both to the Bosnian Muslim and Serb populations, insignificant as a proportion of the local population. Although the Ustase did attract some Muslims from the region, their control of eastern Bosnia was tenuous from the outset. In the event, the VO was interested in conversions to Catholicism and could hardly rely on Muslim officials, who staffed the local bureaucracy, where it existed, to implement the policy. Even if extant documentation existed in the VO's records from most of Bosnia, the records would in all likelihood reveal few conversions. One need only look at those areas of Bosnia that were relatively close to Sarajevo, the main centre of power for the Ustase in Bosnia. They too were virtually ungovernable and Croatian authority was quickly neutralized in I 94 1. The prefect of Vrhbosna county, for which there are no extant records in the VO's holdings, reported in late October I94I that three (Rogatica, Srebrenica, and Vlasenica) of his seven subordinate districts were completely in Communist guerrilla hands, and public security in three others (Cajnice, Foca, and Visegrad) was gravely imperilled. Only Sarajevo was safe for the time being. Otherwise administrative authority 'even there where it exists, is neutralized because of the continual imperilment by these Communist bands'.97 In mid-December I94I the regional command of the Croatian Home Guard in eastern Bosnia reported that 'the conversion of the Greek Easterners to the Catholic faith has not even been undertaken on this territory', and concluded that it was unnecessary even to attempt the policy in that region. In fact, it was argued that 'the Serbs consider the action in other regions relating to the conversion of the Greek Easterners to the Catholic faith merely as a sign of our weakness'.98 Ibid., Broj 1336/1941 (OP Breike), 24 November 194I. Ibid., Broj I 40/41 (KO Zenica), I4 November and 9 December 194 I. 97 ZbornikNarodnooslobodilatWkog rata, Tome IV, Book 2: Borbeu Bosni i Hercegovini1941 god., Belgrade, I952, Doc. 124, 368. Soon after this report was filed the regular Croatian army was forced to abandon Foca; in early December I 94I most of Cajnice district, including its principal town Gorazde, fell to the Communist Partisans. 98 Ibid., Doc. I 82, p. 509. 95 96
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But even beyond those areas of Italian control and where insurgency had not undermined Ustasa control, the Croatian authorities often failed to achieve marked successes in implementing the policy. In large part that was because local Ustasa officialdom in some cases refused to implement the policy or simply undermined it in other ways. In many parts of wartime Croatia, continued persecution and even killings of Serbs by the Ustasa militia, even after conversion had occurred, undermined the policy. The prefect of Garesnica district in central Croatia reported in mid-November I 94I that the arrest and deportation to an unspecified concentration camp of some local Serbs, who had already asked for state approval to convert, had a negative impact on the remaining Serb population, which was now refusing to convert. These arrests suggested to the Serbs, this official reported, that even if they converted they would not be sparedfurtherreprisals.99The prefect of Daruvar district (Slavonia) had gone to a local Serb village, where he told the assembled Serbs 'that all those who requested conversion and converted to one of the [legally] recognized religions would enjoy all the rights of a citizen of the Independent State of Croatia, and that nothing could or would happen to these [Serb converts]'. His words appeared to have little effect, however. Even during the meeting he noticed 'marked hostility toward conversion', because an Ustasa military unit had recently deported a number of local Serbs even though they had been willing to convert to Catholicism.100Another official reported that continued arrests and reprisals carried out by Ustasa military and police authorities had decreased, rather than increased, local Serb interest in conversion.10'And yet another official reported that he had invited local Serbs to a meeting where 'the purpose of conversion from the Greek Eastern to the Catholic faith was pointed out to them, but some of them declared, "what is the point of conversion, because they remain who they are" '.102 The head of BijeljinskaSela commune (Bosnia) observed that 'the [Serb] population believes that even with conversion to another faith, they will be unable to alter their position or to avoid eventual legal sanctions, which will be or are being enacted against the Jews'.103 Another official also noted that earlier arrests of Serbs had hampered the local conversion campaign.104 The inference here was that conversion, if undertaken, would not alter their status or hasten the return of the imprisoned Serbs;submittingto conversion was simply an 99 HDA, DRP/VO, kutija i: Broj 8646-194 I (KG Garesnica), i 8 November 194 I. 100 Ibid., Broj I 57/Taj. I 94 I (KG Daruvar), 30 November I 94 I. 101 Ibid., Broj 4034 H 194I (OP Daruvar), 2 January 1942. 102 Ibid., Broj 2090 H/I94I (Daruvarski Brestovac), 15 November 1941. 103 Ibid., Broj 237I (OP Bijeljinska Sela), i7 November 194I. 104 Ibid., Broj 2092/194 I (OP Bebrina), 29 November I 94 I.
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added humiliation. What drove Serbs to convert in the first place was fear of arrest, deportation or being murdered at the hands of the authorities. When many of them began to see that conversion was no guarantee of security, conversion essentially became meaningless. The head of Licki Osik commune (Lika) reported that there were so few conversions in his region because there had been 'unrest and disorder here, in which the Greek Easternerswere killed, that is, both those who converted and sought conversion and those who did not'. All Serbs, converted or not, were treated equally by the Ustasa militia, 'and this made a negative impression on those who intended to convert to the R.[oman] C.[atholic] faith'.105Yet another official reported that many local Serbs feared that 'they too [even if they converted] would eventually all be uprooted and forcefully deported'.106 A similar message was delivered by the prefect of Ludbreg district (Zagorje); many Serbs were openly saying that conversion was pointless because even by converting 'they remain what they are, that is, Serbs'.'07The head of Barilovic commune near Karlovac reported that local Serbs 'are saying that even if they convert, this would do them no good, because the Orthodox in one place announced their intention to convert, came to convert, and were all killed'.'08 A circular issued by JuriZcevin mid-December I 941 to the central Usta'sa party and police offices demonstrates that, at least from the perspective of the VO, continued reprisalsand atrocitieswere extensive and considered to be a major problem. Reminding them of earlier government decrees according to which all Orthodox converts were to be treated as citizens of the NDH,Juricev cited repeated incidents 'in which some local authorities, despite the cited orders of the Government Presidency, are on their own authority committing various crimes, and are even imprisoning individuals and entire families although they have converted to the Roman Catholic faith'. He demanded that such occurrences be halted at once, and repeated that local authoritieswere obliged, in accordance with existing state decrees, not to mistreat converts. What is more, Juricev cited cases of local authoritiesthat 'were hampering the conversion of Greek Easternersto the Roman Catholic faith, and who laugh at and belittle conversion'. He added that this behaviour 'has in some places gone so far, that some of your subordinate organs are publicly saying, why should the Vlachs [in this context, a pejorative reference to Serbs] convert, they should all be killed'. This type of conduct, he concluded, not only contradicted the government's decrees but the spirit of the policy it was pursuing, Ibid., Broj3044/41 (KO Gospic/OP LickiOsik), 12 November 1941. Ibid., Brojtajni 129/194I (OP Ludbreg),20 November 1941. 107 Ibid., BrojTaj. 268/41 (KO Ludbreg),2 December 1941.
105 106 108
Ibid., Broj 5822/
I94I
(OP Barilovic),
12
November
194I .
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and if it persisted he threatened to appeal directly to the Presidency.'09 There is no indication, however, that Juricev's letter had any impact on the treatment of Serbs by the military or gendarmerie. The reasons for this seem obvious enough. Although the central authorities had conferred upon the VO the task of planning and implementing the conversion policy, the Ustasa militia and many Ustasa officials in the provinces continued to regard all Serbs, whether converted or not, as a national security threat and enemies of the Croatian state. To an extent, this was true even of the regular Croatian military, the Home Guard. For example, a late January I942 report filed by the central command of the Croatian Home Guard on conditions in northern Bosnia and eastern Slavonia, noted that although a large number of local Serbs had converted to Catholicism, 'these Greek Easterners, like those who still have not converted, can still be considered unreliable'. In many cases, catholicized Serbs aided the local Communist 'renegades'."10 Likewise, the prefect of Bosanska Gradiska district reported in late December I 94 I that almost the entire Serb population of Orahovo commune had recently 'announced their intention to convert to the Catholic faith. However, when the army and gendarmerie left Orahovo, they [Serbs] were the first to inform the rebels-Partisans of this fact, and welcomed them most sincerely'.'l' Especially in the case of the Usta'sa militia, it was virtually impossible suddenly to view Serbs as potential 'Croats'; in the summer of I941, the militia had been the regime's main instrument in its uncompromising policy of annihilation, through murder and deportation, against Serbs. These Ustase were seemingly never won over to the policy of conversion, and therefore reprisals against converted Serbs continued with impunity well after September 194I. Juricev's December circular was essentially a failed attempt to rein in these elements. While some Ustasa officials continued to persecute Serbs or refused to approve their requests for permission to convert, many Croatian civilian officials simply appeared indifferent to the policy, which also undoubtedly contributed to the low conversion rate in some regions. For example, one civilian official reported that Ustasa party officials in his locality were refusing to provide Serbs with the necessary documents to convert." 2 A local Ustasa party official complained to the central authorities, 'Since I know that Jews and Serbs are converting to the Roman Catholic faith out of fear, and for speculative reasons, I hereby '09 Ibid., Broj 603/41 ('Postupak sa grckoistocnjacima, koji su najavili ili izvrsili vjerski
prielaz'),i 6 December I 941. 110 ZbornikNOR, IV, 3: Borbe u Bosni i HercegoviniI942 god., Belgrade, 1952, Doc. 139, PP. 1 404-05. Ibid., IV, 2,Doc. 194,p. 548.
112
HDA, DRP/VO, kutijai, Broj5054 (OP BrodVaros),i 7 November 194 I.
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ask that, for the time being, you halt these acts [conversions], because they would not be in the interests of the Ustasa movement'."13 This message was repeated by the prefect of Pliva-Rama county in Bosnia, who observed that many local Serbs, 'exploiting, it seems, the fact that they have converted to the Catholic faith, were in the majority of cases spies, which has cost us a great deal'. Under the circumstances, he proposed that 'all conversions of Greek Easterners to the Catholic or Islamic faith be halted, since it [conversion] serves only their goal of masking and concealing [themselves]'."14 And yet other officials appeared indifferent. One reported in late December I 941 that no one in his office had tried converting the local Serbs 'because they are an insignificant minority'."I5 This was echoed by an official from Cortanovci commune (Srijem), who indicated that no Serbs had converted 'because these [Serbs] believe that with their work and behaviour they have shown their loyalty to the State even though they are of the Greek Eastern faith'. He added, however, that in all likelihood conversions would increase 'if a strict order were issued to that effect', which suggests that some officials had not pursued conversions with any deal of intensity or forcefulness."16 His comments were echoed by the prefect of Durdevac, who informed the VO in mid-November I941 that many local Serbs 'will not voluntarily convert to the Roman Catholic faith, until they are forced to do so'."'' The replies, of many local civilian and Ustasa party officials raise some important questions about the politics of the VO's statistics, and the possibility of misreporting or underreporting by local officialdom and party bosses who tried, for a variety of reasons, to resist central policy as laid out by the VO. Another factor that may have hampered the success of the forced conversion policy, particularly in eastern Slavonia, is the competition encountered by the Croatian authorities from Lutheran pastors of the German minority. The German minority and the leadership of the Evangelical (Lutheran) Church in the NDH launched their own conversion campaign, independently of the one pursued by the Croatian authorities, a fact that has hitherto gone unexplored in the literature. In some places, as in Prijedor district (Bosnia), as many as goo Serbs may have converted to the Lutheran faith in I94I, a fact which prompted the leadership of the Evangelical Church to ask the "3 HDA, MPB/OB, kutija Unnumbered letter, dated I5 July 1941. 3: 114 HDA, f. 237, Predsjednistvo vlade NDH, Glavno ravnateljstvo za promicbu, PV/ GRP, kutija i: V.T. 204/42 ('Izvjestaj o politickom, gospodarskom i kulturnom zivotu'), 6
January I942. 115 HDA, DRP/VO, kutija I: BrOj2952/941 (OP Vrpolje),20 December I94I. 116 Ibid., Broj 2412 (OP Cortanovci),I o December I 941. I117 Ibid., Broj8159/1941 (KO Durdevac),i 7 November 1941.
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Croatian authorities for ownership of the local Orthodox church."8 Most of the conversions to Lutheranism likely occurred in eastern Croatia, where much of the Church's membership was based. The prefect of Baranja county, Stjepan Hefer, observed with some displeasure in November I94I that 263 Serbs from three local villages had recently converted to Catholicism, 'although because of the propaganda of prominent members of the Kulturbund, the danger existed that the Greek Easterners of these villages would convert to the Evangelical faith'."9 This was evidently not an isolated incident, as other officials echoed his concern. The prefect of Virovitica district reported of a mass conversion in a local Serb village, and of the simultaneous campaign by local Germans to convert the same Serbs to the Evangelical faith.120 According to one Croatian official, the Lutheran pastor in Osijek and the Germans of Jarmina commune (Vinkovci district, Vuka county) had been active among local Serbs. They were telling Serbs that there was no need to convert to Catholicism, and that they could freely convert to the Lutheranfaith, a fact that had only contributed to the Serbs' 'indecisiveness'.The same official had reported three days earlier that he made a 'determined' intervention with the Lutheran pastor to prevent his continued work among the Serbs.121 In some instances, the Croatian authorities and German minority worked at cross-purposes, almost neutralizing one another. More important, however, was the fact that this competition caused serious tensions between the government and the German minority. Competition for converts was apparently intense and explains why the Bishop's Office of the Evangelical Christian Church issued a series of protest letters to the VO, the Government Presidency, and to the
118 HDA, MPB/OB, kutija 13: Broj 4048-B-1941, October 1941. The figure of goo converts is taken from Bishop Popp's October I941 letter to the Ministry of Justice and Religion, in which he asked for permission to take possession of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Prijedor. He claimed that there were already 200 Lutherans in Prijedor, roughly half of whom were recent Serb converts, and that another 8oo Serbs would soon convert to Lutheranism. With respect to state funding, on I July I94I the Evangelical Church began receiving state financial support in the form of a monthly stipend of 49,296 Dinars (or Reichsmarks 2,464.80). See ibid., kutija 3: Broj I4135-M-B-I94i, 30June 194 . 119 DRP, VO, kutija i: Broj Prs. I617/194 I (Vz Baranja), 28 November 1941. 120 Ibid., Broj io6i Prs./ I94I (KO Virovitica), io November I94I. 121 Ibid., Broj 375 Taj./4I (KO Vukovar), i8 November 1941; Broj 383/1941 (KO Vukovar),15 November I 941.
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central Ustasa party office.'22 According to Bishop Dr Filip Popp's November I 941 letter of protest, his Office was receiving complaints about 'the behaviour of lower state authorities, especially the district prefects and communal officials, and Ustasa commissioners, who belittle and disregard in an insulting manner the Evangelical Church and faith'. Some lower officialswere refusing to allow Serbs to convert to his religion and those who converted were still being harassed. He asked the central authorities to issue strict instructions to local officials reminding them that the Evangelical Church was a legally recognized religion, and that Orthodox Serbs should be allowed freely to convert to his Church if they made that decision.'23Another letter complained of alleged discriminationagainst Lutheran Croats, who were not being accepted into the Ustasa party.'24The Ustasa regime had an obvious vested political interest in nurturing cordial relations with the German minority, and could not disregard such protests. That is why, in early January I942, the Ustasa central party office issued a public statement condemning local acts of discrimination against members of the Evangelical Church. All Ustasa party officials and institutions were indeed reminded that the Evangelical Church was a legally recognized faith, equal in every respect to the Catholic Church and Muslim religious community, and that they should act accordingly.'25In order to smooth over its troubled relations, on 28 February I 942 the Croatian government granted ownership in perpetuityto the Evangelical Church of a I,075 m2 building in central Zagreb, which would henceforth house the Bishop's chancellery.'26 In addition to provoking political problems with the German minority, the government's conversion campaign caused grave tensions 122 The first protest letter was sent on 30 August 1941 (Broj 1304/4I, 'Zalba glede postupka sa evangelicima prelaznicima'), to the Ministry of Justice and Religion, and alleged mistreatment of Serb converts to Lutheranism at the hands of Ustasa officialdom, and specifically that some had been deported to Serbia. On 6 September 194I the head of the Ministry's Department of Religion, Branimir Glavas, forwarded the letter to the DRP with the remark 'that the same has happened with converts to Catholicism, not in a couple of instances but hundreds of times'. On I 7 September I 94I, the head of the DRP, Josip Rozankovic, replied to Bishop Popp, informing him that the DRP 'holds tenaciously and resolutely to the principle of the equality of the Catholic, Evangelical and Muslim faiths'. HDA, MPB/OB, kutija7: Broj 1352-B-i94I, 6 September 1941; kutija i i: Broj 3202-B194 1, I 7 September 1941. 123 HDA, DRP/VO, kutija i: Broj I740/1941 (Biskupski ured Njemacke Evangelickokrscanske crkve a. vj., 'Zalba protiv zapostavljanja i umalovazavanja [sic] Protestantizma u Nezavisnoj Drzavi Hrvatskoj'), I0 November I94I. In this same letter, Popp claimed that approximately 1,500 Serbs had converted to Lutheranism throughout the NDH. This figure cannot be verified in the VO's extant holdings, however. 124 HDA, f. 212, Predsjednistvo vlade NDH, kutija 2: Broj 20374 ('Zalba radi neprimanja Hrvata evang. vjere u Ustasku organizaciju'), I6 November I 94I. 125 'Svaki protestant ima pravo biti ustasa', Hrvatskinarod,i i January 1942, p. 3. 126 HDA, Predsjednistvo vlade NDH, kutija 2: Broj i8I 7/4I. The Croatian government's decision followed a 3 December I94I request by Popp for an official Bishop's Residence and Office in Zagreb.
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between itself and the Bosnian Muslims. The Ustasa regime was cognizant of the need to foster good relations with the Muslims, especially since much of Bosnia-Herzegovina became engulfed in insurrection and Zagreb's hold over those provinces was tenuous. Although the Croatian authorities permitted conversions to Islam in Bosnia, there appear to have been very few.'27 The conversion policy created not only apprehension among the Bosnian Muslims, but beginning in late September 1941 prompted a series of public resolutions in Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka and elsewhere by leading Muslim intellectuals, who condemned the atrocities committed against the Serbs. The resolutions were motivated in part by the shock created by Ustasa policy, and also by fear of reprisal at the hands of the Serb resistance because of the presence of some Muslims in Ustasa ranks. In the event, all the resolutions addressed the 'errors' and 'crimes' perpetrated by the Ustase and demanded, interalia, that all forms of 'religious intolerance' be prevented in future.'28Even those Muslims who remained loyal to the Usta'sa regime called, either implicitly or explicitly, for an abandonment of the conversion policy. For instance, one Muslim Ustasa official, reporting on deteriorating MuslimCatholic relations in Bosnia, noted that among Muslims one could hear rumours that the NDH was a Catholic state, and that 'once the Jews and Serbs were taken care of, the Muslims would be next'. Given the persistence of religious sentiment among the masses, he urged that a more tactful policy be adopted.'29 A similar message can be inferred from a report by the Muslim Ustasa official Ahmed Dumisic, from
127 In late September I941, the Reis-ul-ulema approached the Croatian government 'in the matter of the growing number of conversions to Islam by members of the Greek Eastern and Jewish faiths'. He did not cite any figures, but only asked that these converts be treated fairly by the authorities. The Office of the Government Vice-Presidency, which was based at Banja Luka (Bosnia), asked the Ministry of Justice and Religion to issue a statement clarifying the government's position with respect to the treatment of Serb and Jewish converts to Islam. In an 8 October 194I note to Pavelic's office (Ured Poglavnika),Branimir Glavas of the Ministry of Justice and Religion observed, 'hitherto this Ministry has not been notified of a single Greek Eastern conversion to the Islamic faith', nor was it therefore aware of any persecution of those Serbs who may have converted to Islam. Finally, on 3 November 1941 the Ministry replied to the Government Vice-Presidency and the Reis-ululema that all converts to Islam were to be treated in the same manner as converts to Catholicism, that is, no distinction was to be made in their treatment. HDA, MPB/OB, kutija 14: Broj 4448-B-I94I, 27 September 1941, 3 November 1941; kutija I3: Broj 387o-B- 1 94 I, 8 October I 941. 128 See, for example, ZbornikJNOR,IV, 2, Doc. I 64, pp. 430-33. 129 HDA, Fond Hrvatskog drzavnog sabora NDH, kutija i: Broj 78, Izvjestaj M. A. Catica M. Dosenu, 30 May 1942, no original document number.
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Prijedor. '30 The Command of the Third Home Guard Corps, reporting on political conditions in Bosnia, noted that news of Pavelic's November I94I audience with catholicized Serbs had a negative effect on Muslims. The meeting had received widespread media coverage, and the impression had been created that the highest levels of the Croatian government were actively working for a Catholic state. 1'3 All of these factors in one way or another impeded the progress of the conversion campaign and ultimately brought about its demise. By early I942 it was clear, as the Ustasa police chief later observed, that the regime's Serb policy had 'arrived at a blind alley'.'32 The regime needed urgently to deal not only with the Communist insurrection, which in its early stages relied very heavily for recruits from the persecuted Serb population, but also desperately to establish some kind of order and legitimacy. Pavelic's first step in this direction was calling to session a gerrymandered Croatian State Parliament in late February 1942. When he addressed that institution on 28 February, he incredulously remarked that the government was not persecuting Orthodoxy. What signalled a change, however, was Pavelic's acknowledgment of the existence of Orthodoxy in Croatia. There was now apparently room for Orthodoxy in the NDH, although not for the Serbian Orthodox Church. This speech is normally interpreted as the regime's first step toward creating the so-called Croatian Orthodox Church, as a means of pacifying the remaining Serb population in the NDH.133 Just days earlier, the German General in Croatia, Edmund Glaise von Horstenau, discussed a range of political and military issues with Ustasa officials, one of the more important of which was 'the question of the Orthodox'. He reported to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 'that the [Croatian] Government no longer intends to seek a solution [to the Serb Question] through forced "catholicization", but through the gradual rehabilitation of an Orthodox Church'. This church would necessarily have to be separate and distinct from the Serbian Orthodox Church; it would possess its own patriarch who would be based in Croatia. The project, which now apparently had the genuine support of many Ustasa leaders, would take some time to 130 Ibid., kutija i: Broj 79, 'Politicka situacija u Prijedoru', 23 January 1942. For a discussion of these tensions, the Muslim resolutions of 1941, and the Muslim autonomist movement in the NDH, see Mile Konjevic, 'Neke informacije Hrvatskom drzavnom saboru o prilikama u Bosni 1942. i I943. godine', in Aarodnooslobodiladka borbau Bosni i Hercegovini, pp. I65-75; M. Hadzijahic, 'Muslimanske rezolucije iz I94I. godine', in I94I. U istorij narodaBosne i Hercegovine,pp. 275-82, and Enver Redzic, MuslimanskoautonomaRtvo i I3. SS Bosnei Hercegovine i HitlerovTreliRajh, Sarajevo, I987, pp. I6-20. diviz4a:Autonom#ja 131 ZborniklNOR, IV, 2, Doc. I93, p. 541. 132 Kvaternik, Sjecanja i zapazfanja, p. 285. 133 The text of Pavelics speech can be found in 'Velike smjernice hrvatske drzavne politike', Hrvatskinarod,i March 1942, p. 3. For the standard interpretation that this speech presaged a policy shift for the regime, see Jelic-Butic, UstageiNDH, p. I76.
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realize, however, in light of the few remaining Orthodox priests in Croatia. The legal status of the Orthodox Serb population was quite another matter, however. There was little indication that their legal status would change in the near future.134 The policy of conversion was clearly a deeply resented policy among Serbs and fuelled their resistance to the authorities. In early April I 942, a month after addressinghis parliament, Pavelic ordered the creation of the Croatian Orthodox Church, really a political ploy of a government that was in a desperate political and military position.135 By that point the regime had been forced yet again to adopt a tactical shift in its Serb policy. Indeed, by May 1942, the Croatian authorities, forced by military circumstances and the growth of the Communist resistance, would even sign a series of localized agreements with leaders of the Chetnik movement.'36 Although it appears that some conversions occurred afterApril 1942,137 the policy of forced conversion was essentiallydead. The State Directorate for Renewal, of which the VO was a department, was abolished in late December I94I, and in mid-January I942 the
VO too wasabolished.138 '34 US National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C., Microcopy No. T-50 I: Records of the German Field Commands: Rear Areas, Occupied Territories, and Others. Roll 268, frames 476-9I, Edmund Glaise von Horstenau to OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), 25 February I 942. 135 'Osnutak Hrvatske pravoslavne crkve', Hrvatskinarod,4 April I942, P. 14. Even after the creation of the Croatian Orthodox Church, the regime did not allow catholicized Serbs to revert to Orthodoxy. 136 For the negotiations between the Ustasa government and some Chetnik units, which began in early April I 942, see Jozo Tomasevich, WarandRevolutionin Yugoslavia,I94I -I945. The Chetniks,Stanford, CA, I975, Pp. 226-3I; and Rasim Hurem, 'Prilike u istocnoj Bosni sredinom I 942. godine', in A_VNJViAarodnooslobodila6ka borbau Bosni i Hercegovini, PP. 49-64. 137 Some authors believe conversions were pursued by the regime even after the formation of the Croatian Orthodox Church. For example, see Duric, PrekrAtavanje, pp. I 2 I-23. This proposition is questionable, however, since there is little documentation to demonstrate the point conclusively. Although it appears that some mass conversions occurred as late as May 1942, they likely involved Serbs who had earlier petitioned for state approval and were approved much later by the VO. A reading of the VO's records shows that many, particularly mass petitions, submitted as early as October I 94I, were approved by the VO in late December 1941. Only after receiving instructions from the VO were the relevant local authorities supposed to organize the actual conversions, many of which were probably performed in the first half of I942. Furthermore, since Ustasa forces continued to carry out arrests and massacres against the Serb population after April I942, and right up to the end of the war, many Serbs likely assumed that conversion was the only way to avoid persecution. The VO's own archival material shows, however, that conversion to Catholicism was never a guarantee of security for Serbs. 138 'Zakonska odredba o ukidanju Drzavnog ravnateljstva za ponovu i Drzavnog ravnateljstva za prehranu', 30 December I94I, and 'Naredba o podjeli poslova ukinutog Drzavnog ravnateljstva za ponovu i Drzavnog ravnateljstva za prehranu', I 4 January 1942, in A. Mataic (ed.), Zakoni, zakonskeodredbei naredbe,knj. IO (sv. 9I-IOO), knj. ii (sv. i o i - iIo), Zagreb, n.d., pp. 255-58, 195-97. For his services, Juricev was promoted in late January I942 to officer rank in the Ustasa military. According to the Ustasa press, he was killed in battle against Partisan forces on I6 September I943. See 'O. Dionizije Juricev, ustaski satnik', Hrvatskinarod,24 January I 942, P. 3, and Horvat and Stambuk, p. 231.
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Some Ustasa officials may well have wanted to pursue conversions as soon as the NDH was created, but the extant archival material and the regime's rhetoric suggest that forced conversions were pursued
intenselyonlyfromSeptemberI94I to early I942. The Ustasaregime made a functional commitment to that policy only after deteriorating political and military circumstancesforced it to adopt a tactical shift in its Serb plan. But many of the factors that prompted this policy reversal in September I 94I continued to hamper the conversion campaign, not least of all continued and widespread Ustasa atrocities against the same Serb population it was now attempting to convert. Once launched, the policy failed. In Yugoslav and Western historiographyalike it is argued that 240,000 Orthodox Serbs converted to Catholicism in the NDH.'39 To be sure, this is a significant figure but even if it were accepted as accurate, the policy would still have to be considered a failure, that is, if one assumes that the aim of the central authoritieswas to catholicize the remaining Serb population. Indeed, Yugoslav historiography has drawn attention to the VO's hopes, expressed by Juricev in a 25 October I 94I letter to the Government Presidency, of converting one million Orthodox Serbs.'40 As already noted, the VO's archival material confirms that approximately 97,447 to 99,333 conversions occurred in I94I-42, the vast majority to the Roman Catholic faith. If one adds to this the figures of the Evangelical Church, then perhaps an additional i ,500 Serbs converted to Lutheranismin the same period. The archival material not only explains why the conversion policy failed, far more importantly it reveals the complex and even contradictory nature of Ustasa ideology and policy toward the Serbs while simultaneouslyraising a number of historiographicaland methodological issues. The pronounced regional variations in the NDH indicate, among other things, that the lower echelons of the Ustasa police and officialdom could shape the implementation of policy and, therefore, policy itself. Some local officials,like the prefect of Ljubuski,organized the conversion of the entire local Serb population in July 1941, even before the central authoritieswere seriouslypursuing this policy. Other officials resisted well into late I 941, for they apparently never understood or cared to understand the usefulness or purpose of the policy. For these officials, and certainly for the Serbs who were forced to convert, the act of conversion did not alter who these converts were. The fact that the central authorities were forced repeatedly to order local authorities to comply with central directives suggests that many officials resisted the policy and preferred instead either the complete extermination or expulsion of the Serbs. The historiography has not 139
Durid, Prekrstavanje, pp.
140
See Horvatand Stambuk,pp.
I
27-33. I 15-I8.
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seriously addressed the role of local officialdom in the NDH. Indeed, existing studies of the Ustase and NDH are fairly conventional, in that they adopted a top-down approach and emphasized high politics to the detriment of local conditions. Analysing the role of local officialdom, be it civilian or Usta-sa party, would help fill a historiographical and methodological lacuna. The implementation of forced conversion policy in I 94 I -42 and the essentially uncontrolled activities of regional Ustasa commanders and party functionaries sheds a great deal of light on the true nature of the regime and state machine in the NDH. And yet, the local variations described in this paper were in many ways simply a reflection of contradictions within the central Ustasa leadership and their ideology. After all, while the VO was charged with converting the Serb population, save for the intelligentsia, other central agencies, such as the Ustasa militia and political police, continued ordering the arrest and murder of Serbs, in some cases even those Serbs who had already converted. Within a matter of months in 1941 Ustasa rhetoric had evolved from exclusionist, virtually racist language (Serbs as a supposed alien element, Vlachs, Roma) to assimilationist language (Serbs as supposed old Catholics, and later as Orthodox 'Croats'), albeit the nature of the assimilation in question was the most malignant version possible. This contradictory rhetoric predated the war, as Ustasa ideology continued to vacillate between exclusionist and assimilationist tendencies. One can find numerous references in the interwar Usta'sa press to Serbs either as 'foreigners' (usually of Vlach origin)'14 or as Orthodox 'Croats', who had once, in the pre-Ottoman era, supposedly been Catholic.142 The common element underlying both premises was a denial of Serb identity. How much of this was pure rhetoric, designed merely to devalue or undermine Serb claims to the Ustas'a vision of Great Croatia, and how much was conviction is often difficult to tell. These contradictions were never worked out in a coherent manner, however. As such, forced conversion remained only one part, and certainly not even the worst part, of the Ustas-a regime's perverse programme. In the first months of the NDH's existence Ustasa policy towards Serbs was openly exclusionist. From September 1941 it became supposedly inclusive or assimilationist, first by way of forced conversion (roughly to February I942) and then the promotion of Croatian Orthodoxy. However, the murderous practices of the Ustasa 141 See, for example, Akademicar, 'Dva hrvatska tabora na zagrebackom sveucilistu', Hrvatski narod, I7 February 1939, p. 7; Muhamed Hadzijahic, 'Nacionalna obiljezja bosansko-hercegovackih Muslimana', Hrvatskinarod,24 March 1939, p. 7, and Luka Grbic, jos o Srbo-cincaro-vlasima', VezavisnaHrvatskaDrzava, 4 November 1939, p. 4. 142 See, for example, M. S., 'Srpski apetit', KezavisnaHrvatskaDrzava, 24 December 1938, p. 4; Mirko Puk, 'Ante Starcevic i Muslimani', Hrvatskinarod,9 February 1939, p. 3, and 'Zix7otkatolika pod turskim gospodstvom u hrvatskim krajevima', Hrvatskinarod, 7 April 1939, p. 10.
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regime never abated. The wartime shifting from exclusion to inclusion reflected not only the objective limitations confronting an illegitimate and weak regime, but also the pre-war inconsistencies and unresolved debates within the ranks of the Ustasa group and the Croat political right generally. What can be said with some certainty, however, is that Ustasa motives and policy had little to do with Catholic piety or Catholic proselytism as ends in themselves. Nor did religion influence their genocidal policy in any significant way, the collaboration of one segment of the Catholic clergy and many Catholic-oriented intellectuals with the Usta-sa regime notwithstanding. The Usta-sa regime's forced conversion campaign was not motivated by religious fanaticism or fervour. The policy was a belated attempt at forced assimilation by a brutal Fascist regime that had earlier dedicated itself to exterminating Serbs. For the Ustase, Catholicism was really neither a goal in itself nor even a particularly effective mobilizing ideology in most of Croatia; rather it was an instrument designed to strengthen the nascent Croatian state through the elimination of the Serb Question. In this respect, Croatian Fascism differed from the Hlinka movement in Slovakia, which was genuinely Catholic and led by priests, and the Legion of the Archangel Michael in Romania, which employed religious mysticism and elaborate ritual in its ideology. Ustasa integral nationalism and ideology were closer to Hungarian Fascism. But Usta-sism did share the same social bases as these other regional fascisms; the petite bourgeoisie, nationalist intelligentsia, radical students and even some clergy figured prominently. Their rhetoric was inflammatory, they were anti-Communist, and they adhered to a cult of state in which violent rejuvenation was central. The premises underlying the integral nationalist Ustasa ideology were historicist and eminently secular. Indeed, history was their hubris. Like the other segments of the interwar Croat political right, be it the Catholic clericalists or the small group of Croat Nazis led by Stjepan Buc, the Ustase were committed to Croat state right and its concomitant, one Croat political nation in Great Croatia. One of the cornerstones of Ustasa ideology, one shared by other elements of the political right in Croatia, was anti-Serbianism. Its basic starting point was a denial of Serb identity in Great Croatia but this anti-Serb ideology became progressively more malevolent after i 9 I 8. The Ustasa aversion to Serbian Orthodoxy stemmed from a deeply rooted conviction, shared also by the Catholic political movement in Croatia, that Orthodoxy was the agency of an assimilationist Great Serbian ideology. When in 19i8 Ivo Pilar suggested that 'Serbdom' was an imperialist programme and ideology in which religion and nation were inseparable, he became one of the first writers on the Croat political right to suggest that the 'South Slav Question' was in essence a religious
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question. The 'solution' to this question was not a Catholic crusade against Orthodoxy, but rather the 'neutralization'of Orthodoxy in the western Balkans.143 The Ustase, always attuned to their own, and usually grossly distorted, reading of history, put this premise into practice and used it to legitimize their own crimes. 143
Pilar, Juznoslavensko pitanje,pp.
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