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ISSN 0167-5133

Volume 4, Number 1, 1985

FORIS PUBLICATIONS Dordrecht

JOURNAL OF SEMANTICS AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF THE SEMANTICS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE MANAGING EDITOR:

Peter Bosch

EDITORIAL BOARD:

Simon C. Garrod Leo G.M. Noordman Pieter A.M. Seuren

REVIEW EDITOR:

Rob A. van der Sandt

ASSISTANT EDITOR:

Bart Geurts

CONSULTING EDITORS: J. AJKvood (Univ. Gdteborg), Th. T Ballmer (Ruhr Univ. Bochum),t R. Bartsch (Amsterdam Univ.), J. van Benthem (Groningen Univ.), H.E Brekle (Univ. Regensburg), G. Brown (Univ. of Essex), H.H. Clark (Stanford Univ.), H.-J. Eikmeyer (Univ. Bielefeld), G. Fauconnier (Univ. de Vincennes), P. Gochet (Univ. de Liege), J. Hintikka (Florida State Univ.), St Isard (Sussex Univ.), P.N.Johnson-Laird (MRC Appl. Psych. Unit, Cambridge), E. Keenan (UCLA), S. Kuno (Harvard Univ.), EDITORIAL ADDRESS:

W. Levelt (Max Planck InsL Nijmegen), J. Lyons (Trinity Hall, Cambridge), W. Marslen-Wilson (Max Planck Inst Nijmegen), J. McCawiey (Univ. Chicago), B. Richards (Edinburgh Univ.), R. Rommetveit (Oslo Univ.), H. Schnelle (Ruhr Univ. Bochum), J. Searle (Univ. Cal. Berkeley), A. von Stechow (Univ. Konstanz), M. Steedman (Edinburgh Univ.), G. Sundholm (Nijmegen Univ.), Ch. Travis (Tilburg Univ.), B. van Fraassen (Princeton Univ.), Z. Vendler (UCSD), Y. Wilks (New Mexico State Univ.), D. Wilson (UCL).

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A selection of papers

Language and communicationa] efficiency: the case of Tok Pisin, P MUHLHAUSLER. What has gender got to do with sex? D CAMERON. English as the second language of the deaf, MDEUCHAR&H JAMES. The interfacing of language and music, M Y CHEN. Intonation and meaning in conversation, G MCGREGOR.

Kinetic patterns of individuality in acoustic and graphic productions, G G HAYDU & S FELDMAN. The garden path that historical linguistics went astray on, CH-J N BAILEY. Realism and language change, T PATE MAN. Against effability, M L SCHNITZER. The Shark Bay language and its implications for linguistic theory, J B M GUY. The demarcation of metaphor, P PETTIT. Evaluation of noncontent speech accommodation, R L STREET Jr. The message, the context and the medium, A FURNHAM. The future machine: a study of the span of speakers' anticipations in conversation, D D CLARKE. Language acquisition, data compression and generalization, J G WOLFF. What we might learn from acquired disorders of reading, R B FRIEDMAN. The social context of language acquisition, J BRUNER.

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JOURNAL OF SEMANTICS Volume 4, Number 1

March 1985

CONTENTS

D.S. BREE, The Durative Temporal Subordinating Conjunctions: SINCE and UNTIL

1

BERNARD COMRIE, Reflections on Subject and Object Control. . .

47

THOMAS EDE ZIMMERMAN, A Note on Transparency Postulates .

67

H J . HERINGER, The Verb and its Semantic Power: Association as a Basis for Valence Theory

79

Obituary

100

Journal of Semantics 4 : 1 - 4 6

THE DURATIVE TEMPORAL SUBORDINATING CONJUNCTIONS: SINCE AND UNTIL. * D.S. BREE

ABSTRACT

* The research reported here was carried out at the Max-Planck Institut fiir Psycholinguistik, Nijmegen as part of the project "The Semantics of subordinating conjunctions: an information processing approach", supported by the Nederlandse Stichting voor Psychonomie, with funds made available from the ZWO. Project Nr. 15-30-10. The data on which this report is based was collected by Drs. R.A. Smit from the Brown University corpus of American English available at the Instituut voor Computer Linguistiek, Universiteit van Amsterdam.

Downloaded from jos.oxfordjournals.org by guest on January 1, 2011

The temporal subordinating conjunctions fall into two categories, durative and non-durative, depending on the length of time for which the main proposition is predicated to hold. Formally the two durative subordinating conjunctions in English, temporal since and until, are usually treated as though they were symmetric about the time of reference (henceforth the TOR). I examine this assumption from three points of view: the time relationships between the main and subordinate propositions, the truth conditions of the two propositions, and the causal relationship that may be inferred between the states or events referred to by the main and sub propositions. The analysis is based on samples from the Brown University corpus. In order to distinguish between the temporal and inferential meanings of since four criteria are needed, corresponding to the four different uses to which temporal since may be put. The principal criterion is that the main verb must be in the past aspect, corresponding to the use of since to indicate that the main proposition is true at some moment prior to the TOR. There are also three special uses of since: in a comparative construction, as part of an explicit reference to a time period and as a qualifier in a noun phrase. In all uses the sub-proposition indicates the onset of a time period which ends at the TOR. The main proposition must be true either once, several times or for the whole of this period, depending on the durative aspect of the main verb. The main proposition is also conversationally implied to be false before the onset of the time indicated by the sub-proposition. The sub-proposition is presupposed to be true.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper forms part of an investigation into the semantics of the English subordinating conjunctions (SCs). Here I single out for investigation the two durative temporal SCs: since in its temporal meaning and until. These two SCs are interesting for three reasons. First, they are usually regarded as being symmetric with respect to time, but this is not the case. Second, they are both used in contexts in which there is not only a temporal relationship between their sub and main clause propositions, but a causal one as well. Third, when their main clauses contain a negation they appear to 'lend' a durative aspect to the main verb, but they do so in a different way. These are the main points that will be investigated. In any investigation of the semantics of an SC the basic aspect that is of interest is the truth status of the main and sub-propositions. With temporal SCs, the way that the time of the sub-proposition delimits the time for which the main proposition holds is also important: with since and until, in particular, this includes the durative v. non-durative nature of


Until marks the end of a time period that, by default, begins at the TOR. The main proposition is asserted to hold during this period, except when until is being used in one of the same three special uses as we found for since. The sub-proposition is presupposed to be true when the TOR is in the past and conversationally implied to be true when it is in the present or the future, except in special circumstances. Usually one of four causal connections may be inferred between the sub and main propositions; the sub-proposition is either: 1) the cause of the main proposition ceasing to hold, 2) the cause of the starting of the unnegated form of the main proposition (only with negative main propositions), 3) the goal of the actor in the main proposition or 4) an unintended result of the main proposition. In some respects the properties of temporal since and until are the same, e.g. in marking the boundary of a time period, in having the same three special uses and in hardly ever having a negated sub-clause. They are symmetric with respect to the TOR, as evidenced by the use of the perfect with since and its absence (with one exception) with until. But there are also other nonsymmetric differences: the time of utterance may be in the middle of the time period specified for since; the tense of the subclause is always in the past for since but depends on the time of the TOR with until; until is always durative; for until a negated non-durative main verb is interpreted as durative; since may indicate only the cause of the main proposition, whereas until is not confined to indicating the result of the main proposition, but any one of four different possible causal relations may be inferred.

2. TEMPORAL SINCE

Since, conj. I. From the time that. 1. Denoting a point of time to which the action or event mentioned is subsequent: Thou hast rounded since we met 2. Following upon a statement (or inquiry) as to the duration of the period in question: It is just a fortnight since Mr. Gladstone embarked 3. In sentences implying continuity of action or fact during the period indicated. Also with ever and (rarely) with that: She has lived in England since she was ten years old

(Oxford English Dictionary)


this limitation. Both these points as well as the major issues are considered in this paper, which is in three parts. First there is an investigation of the temporal use of since. This is followed by a similar investigation of the use of until. Finally a comparison is made between temporal since and until to highlight what they have in common, what are their symmetrical properties and in what ways they differ completely. I will concentrate on differences in the semantic and pragmatic aspects, paying little attention to syntax. It is assumed that syntactic differences will be explainable on the basis of semantic differences. The most extensive part of this comparison concerns the differences in the use of negation in the main clause of temporal since and until sentences. Data for the investigation have been taken from the Brown University corpus of American English (Ku&ra & Francis, 1967). Samples of about 150 sentences containing all the SCs were taken from this corpus. I worked with this size sample as a compromise between representativeness and the desirability to pay close attention to the individual sentences. There are too many sentences in the corpus to consider them all; there are over 10,000 tokens of words that can be used as SCs. Of these there are 628 occurrences of since and 461 of until. The samples which I ended up with contained about 130 sentences. In the case of since most had an inferential use, so the sub-sample of temporal since was considerably smaller (34). Thus the percentages of occurrence of different uses of the same SC are only meant as indications; this is not a study that makes anything more than global claims about these frequencies. The purpose of the sample was to provide material for the generation of ideas and examples for their further checking. The codes given to the example sentences refer to the letter of the subcorpus and the number of the sentences within that subcorpus, e.g. P0611 is sentence number 611 from the P subcorpus.

Since is of interest mainly because of the ambiguity between its temporal and inferential meanings; and because of the ambiguity of its temporal meaning between a durative and a non-durative use, i.e. whether or not the main proposition, of which the s/rtce-clause is a satellite, must hold for the whole of the demarcated period or on only one occasion within this period. The truth value of the sub-proposition is of interest as well; it is normally presupposed to be true, which is not strictly correct. Before turning to these three points, I describe, for the purpose of a comparison that will be made with until in Section 4, the period marked out by a since-cteuse.

She has worked hard since it got light ?She works hard since it got light * She 11 work hard since it gets light *She has worked hard since it got light to 6 p.m. The main clause may be embedded in either a speech act or another clause. The one limitation is that the speech act may not be a command: one cannot command a change to take place previous to the TOR. If since is a command, then it has an inferential meaning. Has she worked hard since it got light? He knows that she has worked hard since it got light *Work hard since it got light! Work hard until it gets dark! Since it's light, work hard! b. The main clause must indicate a past aspect Because temporal since marks the beginning of a time period that is previous to the TOR, its sub-clause is always in the past tense and it can only be used when the main clause presents a proposition that holds up to the TOR. There are three ways in which this may occur in English: use of the perfect tense, an explicit reference to time or with a comparative. The perfect tense marker, have+en, is used in English to limit the validity of the proposition to the time previous to the TOR. If temporal since is used as well, then the validity is further limited to the time between the time of the event given by the subclause and the TOR, e.g.


a. Temporal SINCE delimits the beginning of a period A sub-clause introduced by temporal since is used to limit the beginning of the time range of the validity of the proposition in the main clause. The end of the time range must be given by the time of reference (TOR) as indicated by the tense of the main verb.

(P0611) Doc had been under restriction to the ship since the Bustard left Subic (DO 160) Since arriving here, however, I have formed a far different religious picture of present-day England By the time we got to her, she'll have been without food since she left the hostel yesterday

By the time we get to them, they'll have been able to be alone together since they left the hotel, which they'll do in an hour from now. So the past tense indicates that the sub-event occurred before the TOR rather than before the time of utterance. There are ways other than the use of the perfect to refer to a time period previous to the TOR. One way is with an explicit mention of a time period that ends at the TOR and requires a delimiter for the beginning of the period (O.E.D. since 1.2), as in: (Kl 369) It was only hours since I had seen them, . .. ?It was only hours. (E2019) It is a good eight years now since each of us acquired a swimming pool . . . ? It is a good eight years now. The other situation in which a proposition holds for a limited time period ending at the TOR and which is capable of taking a delimiter for the beginning of the period, is when a comparison is being made between what holds in that time period and either with what happened before the period, or with similar objects within the same time period. This is done with a comparative or superlative construction respectively, as in: (LI 305) The shelves looked emptier . . . since the men from the Commissary had called;


Note that the main clause has either past, present or future perfect tense. (There were no instances of the future perfect with since in our subsample). With the future perfect the time period being specified may include the time of utterance, but does not necessarily do so even though the past tense is used in the subclause, e.g.

(C0748) . . . which is about as fine an aggregation as has come along in the jazz business since John Hammond found Count Basie working in a Kansas City trap (A0584) This was the biggest annual outlay since the Communist program for the underdeveloped countries made its modest beginning in 1954

(F1046)

. . . Mr. H., age 27, a diabetic since he was six, stopped using insulin . . .

(A0288) Each ally will have to carry out obligations long since laid down,. . . Note, that the noun phrase itself holds from the time indicated in the since-cteuse up to the TOR, e.g. in (F1046) Mr. H has been a diabetic from six years old up until the TOR. Briefly, temporal since is used to delimit the beginning of the time range in which a proposition must hold. As the event in the sub-clause must occur before the TOR it is always in the past tense (or gerund). The end of the time range is always the TOR so the tense in the main clause must be in the perfect, unless the main clause has an explicit reference to time or the since clause is part of a comparative. c. Distinguishing between inferential and temporal meanings The observations just made on the use of temporal since do not apply to the inferential meaning of since. Two questions arise: is it necessary to distinguish two different meanings of since, and, if so, how does a reader know which meaning is intended? Unlike the different uses of until or;/, it is necessary to distinguish two different meanings of since because the temporal and inferential use do not share any principal semantic characteristic. When since is used with its


In such comparative constructions there is either another object - for comparatives - or set of objects - for superlatives - against which the present object is being evaluated. One way of demarcating this other object or set is with time. Note that the pure comparative is being made to a state before the time indicated by the since clause; whereas the superlative refers to a set of objects occurring within this time period. Besides these three situations, since can also be used within a noun phrase to give the time when the object indicated by the head of the noun phrase came into existence, e.g.

inferential meaning it does not have to have a temporal meaning, and viceversa, e.g. Since you are here, I'll open a bottle of wine, [inferential] She has opened two bottles of wine since she arrived, [temporal]

(BO3O5) Less than half the sum has been spent, since the Interama board pinched pennies during that period of painstaking negotiations (C1494) Race-drivers, on the other hand, are quite often killed on the circuit, and since it was obviously Mr. Remarque's intention to establish automobile racing as life in microcosm, one might reasonably have expected him to demonstrate precise knowledge not only of techniques but of mores and attitudes (L3496) I myself had been up there by seven o'clock, after mushrooms, since there'd been a week of rain which had stopped early that morning and the day was as clear as Sandwich glass So the first criterion is not precise enough; and neither is it pragmatically based, unlike the other three criteria. More appropriate, but vaguer, would be: since is temporal unless there is a possibility of establishing an inference from the s/nce-proposition to the main proposition


So there are two different meanings of since; furthermore a reader must be, and is, able to distinguish them. How is this? The observations made above concerning the way temporal since is used provide a clue. We could expect that since is given a temporal meaning when either: 1. the main verb has a perfect aspect and the s/nce-clause is in the past; or 2. there is an explicit mention of time in the main clause in such a way that the main clause is incomplete without the s/nce-clause; or 3. there is a comparative in the main clause that requires a standard of comparison, which is circumscribed by the s/nce-clause; or 4. the s/nce-clause is a qualifier in a noun phrase. To test this, the sample of 153 since sentences taken from the Brown University corpus of American English (Kucera & Francis, 1967), which had already been divided into those sentences with temporal versus those with an inferential meaning of since on an intuitive basis, was re-examined. All the 34 sentences that had been intuitively classified as temporal, conformed to one of the four above criteria. Of the 119 inferential sincesentences only three conformed to any of the above four criteria, all to the first one:

8 This, however would rule as inferential those sz>ice-sentences that have also a temporal interpretation, e.g. (E0367) Since the concept of high fidelity became important some dozen years ago, the claims of technical improvements have multiplied tenfold Another possibility is to exclude sentences such as (B0305) from Criterion One on the grounds that the since-d&use describes a state and not an event. Changing these sentences so that the sub-clause refers to an event rather than a state (and removing any other references to time in the main clause) does indeed turn them from inferential into temporal s/nce-sentences, e.g.

(C14941) Race-drivers, on the other hand, are quite often killed on the circuit, and since it became obvious that Mr. Remarque's intention was to establish automobile racing as life in microcosm, one might reasonably have expected him to demonstrate precise knowledge not only of techniques but of mores and attitudes (L3496') I myself had been up there, after mushrooms, since the [week of] rain had stopped early that morning But this rule would also exclude the several 'baby' sentences from being temporal, e.g. (P0798) I haven't had any luck since I was a baby unless 'being a baby' is considered an event rather than a state in a person's life. At this moment I can only propose the less than satisfactory revised first criterion for the temporal meaning of since: l'. the s/nce-clause denotes an event before the TOR, i.e. its verb is in the past, and the main proposition is true up to the TOR, i.e. the main verb has a perfect aspect From the subsample of 34 sentences containing a temporal use of since in our sample from the Brown University corpus: 26 had a main verb with perfect aspect,


(B0305') Less than half the sum has been spent, since the Interama board started pinching pennies during that period of painstaking negotiations

5 had an explicit reference to time in the main clause, 6 had a comparative or superlative in the main clause, 2 contained temporally delimited noun phrases. (The total is more than 34 as some sentences exhibited more than one of the required properties.) See Table 2.1 for a detailed division of the 34 subsample sentences. (There is one temporal s/nce-sentence that does not fall into one of these four categories: (LI 500) She could always predict what Stanley was going to do, ever since she first met him

Table 2.1 Numbers of sentences with temporal since by aspect of main verb and time/comparative in main clause Noun Phrase

TOTAL

2 3 1

2

5 6 23

6

2

34

Main clause contains:

Aspect of main verb: none Perfect

Explicit time reference Comparative or superlative Neither

3 3 20

TOTAL

26

d. The main clause determines whether the action is durative The main proposition may hold for not just one (O.E.D. since I.I) but several occasions during the indicated period, or even for the whole of the period (O.E.D. since 1.3). Ever may be used to signal this durative use: (F0598) Ever since I was a child, I have always had a yen to try my hand at writing (N2879) I've noticed the way you've been looking at me ever since we met


There, isn't a perfect tense in (LI 500). One possible account of (LI 500) is that the since clause is an afterthought, another is that it is simply poor English and is more interesting for what it has to tell us about the kinds of errors that can be made. I won't go into this matter here.)

10 Sentences without ever can also have a durative interpretation, which may be seen by attempting to insert an ever in front of the since; if this does not alter the meaning, then the original sentence has a durative interpretation : (P0611') Doc had been under restriction to the ship [ever] since the Bustard left Subic Sometimes it gives an unacceptable sentence, i.e. the sentence must have a non-durative interpretation:

(K1369') *It was only hours ever since I had seen them, . . . (A0584') ?This was the biggest annual outlay ever since the Communist program for the underdeveloped countries made its modest beginning in 1954 Comparatives and superlatives may take ever before the since but the emphasis is different, the ever not being bound to the since. This can be seen as the ever can occur without the s/wce-clause and cannot be moved to the front, e.g. This was the biggest outlay ever (A0584") *Ever since the Communist program for the under-developed countries made its modest beginning in 1954 this was the biggest annual outlay By this classification a half (15/34) of the temporal s/nce-sentences in our subsample have a durative interpretation. What makes a swce-sentence have a durative interpretation, besides the use of ever? It is not adequate to reply that temporal since is ambiguous between the durative and non-durative use, for this still leaves open the question of how this ambiguity is resolved. The occurrence of a negated main verb is one reason for having a durative interpretation, a point which we examine in the section comparing since with until It has been suggested (Heinamaki, 1978) that the durative nature of the main verb is responsible for a durative interpretation.


(D0150') *Ever since arriving here, however, I have formed a far different religious picture of present-day England

11 Table 2.2 Number of sentences by (non-)durative interpretation versus durative aspect of main verb (N=34) Aspect of main verb: Sentence

Durative

Repetitive

Once use: •

interpretation Durative: ever insertable ever present

Special

3 6

1 1

2

cf

time

1*

TOTAL

8 7

1

15

TOTAL

5 9

1 2 10

N.B. ~ Negated main verb.

2 4

6

5

9

5

9 14

19

34

*Noun Phrase, so no verb.

The main verbs of the sentences in the subsample have been classified as durative, repititive, or neither of these. Although this could not be done with complete reliability, the main verb was classified as durative or repetitive if continuously or if several times, respectively, could be added to the verb without altering the meaning of the sentence, e.g. (B1175) Since it was issued in the spring of 1611, the King James Version has [continuously] been . . . considered the most poetic and beautiful of all translations of the Bible -*• Durative (M0754) Her first actual flight, for she and her kind had [many times] made mock flights on dummy panels since she was eight . .. -•Repetitive Verbs that could be classified both as durative and repetitive: (N2879) I've noticed the way you've been looking [continuously/many times] at me ever since we met were put in the durative category. The results are shown in Table 2.2. Durative and repetitive verbs werd used only with sentences that could have a durative interpretation and vice-versa. (The only exception is the durative use when the since clause is part of a noun phrase (F1046)).


Non-durative ever not insertable

12 Sentences that are ambiguous between the durative and non-durative interpretation have main verbs that are ambiguous concerning their durative aspect, e.g. It's rained since Wednesday = It's rained continuously since Wednesday. = It's been raining since Wednesday. = It's rained just once since Wednesday.

[durative] [non-durative]

The verb rain is itself ambiguous in this context since it can be raining for a long time or it can rain several times in a day. In such cases the durative aspect can be brought out by using the progressive, e.g.

Neither of the two special uses of since, i.e. the use to mark the beginning of a time period explicitly mentioned in the main clause, nor the use to mark the beginning of the time range for which a comparative holds, had a durative interpretation on the basis of the insertion of ever test. This despite the use of the verb to be, which is durative, as a main verb; but neither was the main verb in the perfect, so the use to which the since clause is being put here is different. The (non-)durative nature of these two uses will be considered together with the similar use of until (see Section 4). We conclude that there is usually no difficulty for a reader in selecting the durative versus the non-durative interpretation: the default assumptions are that the (non-)durative aspect of the main verb determines the interpretation (unless the since clause is being used in a comparative or explicit time construction, in which case it is non-durative). The durative interpretation can also be made explicit by inserting ever before the since or by using the progressive aspect for the main verb. e. The truth status of the sub-proposition The truth status of a sub-proposition may be presupposed or conversationally implied. (A sub-proposition cannot be asserted as it is only the main clause that can carry a speech act.) If the sub-proposition can be denied by the speaker, then it is a conversational implicature, otherwise it is a presupposition. As the since sub clause uses the reference to an event that usually takes place before the time of utterance, this event must have taken place. So the sub-proposition is presupposed to be true; denying it is not possible, e.g.


It's been raining since Wednesday

13

(B0890) Since moving from a Chicago suburb to Southern California a few months ago, I've been introduced to a new game called Lanesmanship *But I never moved from a Chicago suburb to Southern California a few months ago The one exception is when the TOR is in the future and the sub event is after the TOR. In such cases the sub-proposition is only conversationally implied to be true, e.g. By then, they will have been walking for an hour since they left the hostel, that is assumimg that's what they intend to do

/

The truth status of the main proposition

There is some question about whether the main proposition holds before the beginning of the time period denoted by the since clause. As since is being used to delimit the time period for which the main proposition holds, then it is to be expected that the main proposition is not true before the time indicated by the since clause. However this falsity is most probably a conversational implicature as it can be cancelled (Heinamaki, 1978), e.g. She has worked hard since it got light, and even before dawn she was slogging away The sentences in our sample were examined to determine whether or not the main proposition held before the time indicated by the since clause. In some cases, namely those in which there was a specific reference to time in the main clause, it made no sense to ask this question. For most (86%) of the remaining sentences the main proposition would be false before the onset of the time indicated by the since clause, as expected. See Table 2.3. However there were two sentences in which the truth of the main proposition was open before the time of the subclause: (P0339)

Miss Kizzie had been right snippy ever since they were married, . . .

(P0798)

I haven't had any luck since I was a baby


Thus the sub-proposition is presupposed to be true if it is before the TOR and conversationally implied otherwise.

14 In these cases the truth status of the main proposition before the sincetime is irrelevant to the point that the writer wishes to make. There were even two sentences in which the main proposition would be true before the time of the sub-clause: (K1502) Geneva . . . had in the two years since he had been there continued to be a godless place .. . (NO 167) We haven't slept together since we started

Table 2.3 Numbers of sentences by the truth of main proposition before and after the sub-proposition versus semantic role of sub-clause in the main clause (N=34) Truth of main prop. Before & After sub-proposition:

Semantic role of since-clause Event

comparative

False True unknown True True True •not applicable*

16 2 2

9

TOTAL

20

9

Time

TOTAL

5

25 2 2 5

5

34

g. Summary Temporal since is used to introduce an event which is to mark the beginning of a time period ending at the TOR, so the verb in the since clause must always be in the past tense. Also it can only be used with a main clause indicating that the main proposition is true at some moment(s) before the TOR. This may be done in one of three ways: the main verb has a perfect aspect, there is a comparison between something at the TOR and a previous object or set of objects, there is an explicit time reference in the main clause. The event or state described in the main clause must


What is interesting here is that either the context is such that the main proposition is highly unlikely to be true before the since-time, in which case it is being used to emphasize the truth of the main proposition, as in (NO 167); or the writer needs to cancel any conversational implicature that the main proposition is false before the since-time, e.g. with the use of 'continued' as in (Kl 502). Thus the falsity of the main proposition before the since-time is a conversational implicature.

15

3. UNTIL

Until, B. conj. see till B. Till, B. conj. (orig. the prep, governing the demonstrative pron. that, in apposition with the following clause.) Cf. Until, similarly used, l.a. To the time that; up to (the point) when; until (Denoting the continuance of the action or state expressed by the principal clause up to the time expressed by the dependent clause, and usually implying that at the time such action or state ceases and a different or opposite one begins.) E.g. Silence, till I be silent too


occur within this time period. The s/nce-clause can also be used to modify a noun phrase; it then denotes the time when the object indicated by the noun phrase came into existence. There are two meanings, rather than simply two uses, of since, because the temporal meaning does not necessarily include any inferential connection, and vice-versa. The temporal meaning may be distinguished from the inferential by four criteria corresponding to the four temporal uses of since mentioned in the previous paragraph. If the smce-clause occurs as part of a comparative construction, as part of an explicit reference to a time period or as a qualifier in a noun phrase, it has a temporal meaning. Otherwise it has a temporal meaning only if the main verb has a perfect aspect, the sub-verb is in the past and the sub-clause refers to an event rather than a state. The main proposition may hold for the whole of the period; this durative interpretation occurs if there is an ever before the since (unless this ever occurs as part of a comparative and so does not qualify the since) or if the main verb is durative or repetitive. Main verbs that have either a durative or non-durative aspect, in the context in which they occur, will lead to ambiguous s/nce-sentences, but the writer can avoid this by using the progressive (or ever). The proposition indicated by the since clause is presupposed to be true. There is a conversational implicature that the main proposition is false before the time indicated by the s/rcce-proposition. If this is not the case there would normally not be any point in the writer using since. Consequently if the writer does use since when the main proposition is true before the time of the siwce-proposition then (s)he must cancel the implicature, unless the context is such that the main proposition is highly unlikely to be true before the since time, in which case the since clause is being used to emphasize the truth of the main proposition for all the time up to the TOR.

16 b. With negative (expressed or implied) in the principal clause, and the dependent clause with till denoting the continuance of the negative condition up to the specified time, and usually (as in 1) implying its cessation or reversal (Le. the commencement of the opposite or positive condition) at that time, e.g. 'Never imagine', said a wise prelate, 'that you will root Popery out of England till you destroy Oxford' c. Formerly, and still diaL and in U.S., used after a negative principal clause, where before (or when) is now substituted in Standard English, e.g. I was not long set till Margaret came to see me

So at first she seemed, and it was long till we doubted her perfection e. Indicating the ultimate result or outcome of a continued action expressed by the principal clause: So long or so far that; so that at length, e.g. Bessie ran till she was out of breath

(Oxford English Dictionary) Until is interesting in that there is not only a temporal relation between the sub and the main events/states, but almost always a causal one as well. This relationship can be from the main to the sub-proposition or viceversa or both. The truth status of the main proposition is partially determined by the direction of this causal relationship! This raises the question of whether there is more than one meaning of until. The truth status of the sub-proposition, on the other hand, depends upon the time of reference (TOR) in a straightforward way. Before discussing these points I will first specify the time period indicated by until; this always ends at the until-e\ent and it usually, but not always, begins with the TOR. So, contrary to expectations, the main verb can have a perfect aspect as we shall see. a. UNTIL delimits the end of a time period When a sentence includes an unr//-clause the time for which the main proposition is guaranteed to hold is limited. In general this limit extends from the TOR to the time specified by the w«ft/-clause. Usually this time


d. Depending on a principal clause containing an expression of long duration of time or delay before the act or state expressed by the dependent clause begins to take effect Now dial. e.g.

17 is given indirectly by describing an event that bears some causal relation to the event or state described by the main proposition. E.g. She worked hard until sunset She worked hard until she finished her thesis She is working hard until she finishes her thesis She'll work hard until she finishes her thesis The time span can be further restricted to begin at a time after the TOR (although there were no examples in our sample) but not to before the TOR, e.g.

Most (96%) of the 130 sentences sampled from the Brown University corpus had both main and subclause verbs in the past (59%) or the present tense (29%) or the main in the future and the sub-clause in the present (8%). (If the until clause fell within a phrase, i.e. a noun phrase, a gerund or an infinitive, then the tense of the main clause in which this phrase occurred has been taken.) See Table 3.1 for details. Of the five sentences which appeared not to maintain tense concordance four contained a present tense in the sub-clause with a modal - should, could, or would - in the past tense in the main clause. (E0091) You should also begin this exercise with a very light barbell until you become accustomed to it balance-wise (HI 291) A 10-gallon can . .. could be used to keep the wastes until it is safe to leave the shelter A 10-gallon can would be used to keep the wastes until it is safe to leave the shelter These past tense modals do not indicate past time but another world: should to indicate an obligatory world; could to indicate a possible but improbable world; would an imaginary world. The one remaining exception to tense concordance: (H2O73) And his genius moved his readers to seek solutions of those evils for all Western men / until today, in the industrialized West, these social evils substantially do not exist


She worked hard from the time she matriculated until she'd finished her thesis She'll work hard from tomorrow until she finishes her thesis *She worked hard from the day before until she finished her thesis *She'll work hard from yesterday until she finishes her thesis

18 indicates this by inserting today after until Note that here until is not being used (primarily) as a time delimiter but to introduce a result of the action in the main clause. If the time specification has already been restricted to before the TOR, i.e. through the use of the perfect, then one would not expect to be able to use until. However this is possible, e.g. (K2051) The colony had been small until the Spanish Inquisition of 1492 drove many Jews into Rome

(E0111) . . . he had harrowed in compost until it [the soil] was loose, spongy and black In these examples the beginning of the time period, which ends at the until-event/state, is not the TOR but some unspecified time before the u«ft/-event/state, which itself is before the TOR. For the present perfect, on the other hand, the acceptability is dubious. If it is acceptable then it is in the context of the use of the dramatic present to recount the unfolding of an ongoing event, e.g. (E0111') ?He has harrowed in compost until the soil is loose, spongy and black Of the 130 unrt/-sentences in the sample only four had the main verb in the past perfect and one in the present perfect, e.g. (C0570) Mr. Foy is a joy, having learned his dancing by practising it until he is practically perfect


In a story that is already marked as being in the past, the writer may want to describe the state of something previous, not only to the TOR, but also previous to an action that caused the state to change. The standard way of indicating the previous state is with the past perfect tense, with until indicating the action that caused the change of state (see O.E.D. le). The past perfect is also used to indicate that an action was continued at least up to the point when a certain result was achieved, and this achievement has already taken place before the TOR, e.g.

19 Table 3.1 Numbers of sentences by tenses in the main and sub-clauses (N=130) Tense of until clause Past Main clause tense

simple

Past: simple in Future with Geiund with Infinitive perfect

47 4 4 4 4

perf.

8 3

Present +Future

simple

perfect

5

TOTAL

60 8 4 4 4

1

27 2 2 1 3 2

2

1

29 2 2 1 3 2 1 40

Future: simple TOTAL

63

11

1

8

2

50

5

75

55

10

130

While there were no such sentences in the sample, it is possible to use unr//-clauses when there is an explicit reference to time or a comparative in the main clause and when the unr/7-clause is part of a noun phrase, just as with smce-clauses, e.g. for time: (K1369') It'll only be 5 hours until we meet again (E2019') It'll be a good 8 years until each of us acquires a swimming pool in comparatives: The Peanut switch their The Peanut switch their

will be a better buy than the Sinclair until IBM policy will be as good a buy as the Sinclair until IBM policy


80 Present: simple progressive with Gerund with Infinitive Imperative in Noun Phrase not shown

20

The Peanut will be the best buy in micros until someone makes a plug-compatible as a part of a noun phrase: (F1056') . . . Mr. H., age 27, a diabetic until he died, stopped using insulin .. . The strike, a public nuisance until it's resolved, is costing the government not a penny

b. UNTIL delimits the end of a duration The main clause of an MMftV-sentence is usually considered to have a durative interpretation (e.g. by Heinamaki, 1978: 89, 111). This was tested by attempting to insert "for all the time" in front of until. This was possible in most (87%) sentences, the main verb either having a durative aspect (60% - tested for by the possibility of inserting 'continuously') or being negated (26%), e.g. (F0992) When she said that she didn't have the money, he said that she could come in for treatment with his office [for all the time] until she was ready to buy one (HI568) We cannot test public opinion until the President and the leaders of the country have gone to the public to explain what is required and have asked them for support (Sentences with the modals should or could were considered to have a durative interpretation on the grounds that the obligation or possibility


As we are about to see, until always has a durative interpretation. (When since is used in these constructions the main clause does not have a durative interpretation, see section 4.f)We have seen that: 1. until marks the end of a time period that begins at the TOR, unless: a. there is an explicit statement to the contrary, using from tl until t2; b. the main verb is in the (past) perfect, when the beginning of the period is left open and the until-event occurs before the TOR; 2. there is always tense concordance between the main and sub verbs. If the main verb is marked for the future aspect, then the sub verb is in the simple present.

21

was durative.) See Table 3.2 for details. Why negated main verbs have a durative interpretation is discussed below (see section 4.h). Contrary to the generally accepted meaning of until (O.E.D.) there were also sentences which did not have a durative interpretation. The usual exception (11%) occurred when the main verb indicated an action that could be repeated. This was detected either because there was a phrase indicating repetition, e.g. "day after day", already in the main clause; or because 'several/many times' could be inserted without altering the meaning of the sentence, e.g.

(F0663) . . . friends and relations repeat the story [many times] until the general population may get an entirely false notion of how often the hymen is a serious problem to newly-weds (J1719)

Toss a die [several times] until an ace appears

There were only two cases in which the main verb was neither durative nor repetitive. In these cases it described an action that could not be performed continuously: (G2183) When the proprietor dies, the establishment should become a corporation until it is either acquired by another proprietor or the government decides to drop it (P0788) He started out as a stickman, then became a pit boss until the Club found him crossroading Here the reader is left to infer that "become X until Y" entails "become X and then remain X until Y". So we do not need to postulate a special meaning of until here. Thus until marks the end of a duration - rather than simply a period that generally begins with the TOR. There are four cases, depending on the nature of the main verb: 1. The main verb describes a state or action that lasts for the whole of the period. 2. The main verb describes an action that is repeated during the entire period. 3. The main verb is negated. 4. The main verb is neither durative, repetitive nor negated. The reader is


(HI094) The authority for the program was renewed several times until the vocational rehabilitation program was made permanent under Title 5 of the Social Securities Act in 1935

22

left to infer a consequence of the main verb that is durative, e.g. from "become X" to infer "and remain X". c. The semantic relationship between the propositions

(B1454) It will simply delay the debates until the qualifications are closed next Spring, .. . (El 367) I stayed on the car for a few minutes until, turning right, it entered a huge square . .. C - Cause (59%): (E0201) This cooling .. . just delays the natural softening of the fruit until a grovelike temperature is restored (E0617) By this scheme, pulling one signal to clear locks all the other switch and signal levers in safe position until the first signal is again restored to normal R - Result (18%): (A2326) And from that the stock moved right on up until it was trading Thursday morning at aroung 22 a share (N0591) And it's goin' to go on like this year after year until the white people take over this land


Until is seldom used simply to delimit the end of the duration for which the main proposition holds; usually there is a causal relationship between the main and sub-propositions. This wellknown fact (see O.E.D.) has not been captured by formal semanticists (e.g. Rohrer, 1977). There are four possibilities for the causal relationship: E there is no causal relationship between the main and sub-propositions, only a temporal one (O.E.D. la/b); C the sub-proposition is the cause of the ending of the time period for which the main proposition holds (O.E.D. la/b); R the sub-proposition describes a result of the activity given by the main proposition (O.E.D. le); G The sub-proposition describes the goal for which an actor is carrying out the activity described in the main proposition. All four possibilities are found in our sample: E - time of Event only (11%):

23

G - Goal (11%): (EOO85) Extend your feet forward and backward until you are in a deep leg split (L0208) I made a big circle until I located the car parked at the curb in front of an apartment house The two uses of until that are considered dialectal by the O.E.D. (lc and Id) did not occur in the sample. Table 3.2 Numbers of sentences by (non-)durative versus semantic role of subclause in the main clause (N=130) Semantic

durative aspect:

Event

Durative Repetitive act Negated verb None of these* Unknown TOTAL

5 9

14

role

the t• He was asleep for all the time up to noon

[implicature] [assertion]

one denies either the main assertion or the conversational implicature. This works for until, with the denial of the implicature providing the AT ALL denial, and the denial of the main assertion providing the FOR ALL denial. E.g. He was awake (=not asleep) all the time up to noon [not assertion & not FOR ALL] He slept (=didn't awake) at noon [not implicature & not AT ALL] However it does not work for since as the denial of the implicature does not give the AT ALL denial, e.g. It hasn't rained all the time from off Wedsneday [not assertion & not FOR ALL] It was raining on Tuesday [not implicature] ~ -• It hasn't rained at all ever since Wednesday [not AT ALL] A metalevel explanation. It is possible to save this explanation by postulating a higher order one, namely that the ambiguity of the negated versions is due to denial of different aspects of the sentence. Since is ambiguous between a durative and non-durative interpretation, so a negated s/nce-sentence is ambiguous between these two interpretations. Until is not ambiguous about what it asserts, so the denial can be of either its assertion or of its conversational implicature. We have just seen that this difference can explain the ambiguity of until denials. With since, the denial of the durative interpretation implies that the activity did not occur FOR ALL of the duration; the denial of the non-durative inter-


It has rained ever since Wednesday -*• It wasn't raining on Tuesday -»• It rained all the time from off Wednesday

44

pretation implies that it did not accur AT ALL during the period. Thus we have an explanation of the ambiguity for both until- and smce-negated sentences. This explanation can be tested by applying it to the main verbs that give unambiguous denials. With since, the denial of a non-durative verb should be unambiguous because the durative interpretation of since is not possible. This is the case, for, as we have seen above, there is no difference between the AT ALL and the FOR ALL denials, e.g. *She hasn't left ever since I last wrote

For until with non-durative verbs (not yet negated) no main assertion is possible, so only the implicature can be denied and one only gets an AT ALL denial. This is indeed the case as we have seen, e.g. She didn't leave until midnight ->• She (did not leave) until midnight [not AT ALL] ~ -»• It's not the case that (she left until midnight) [not FOR ALL] On the other hand an unfzV-sentence having a purely durative verb can have both an assertion and an implicature, so both can be denied, which leads to ambiguity. We have seen that this is the case, e.g. He didn't know the result until noon -* He knew the result only after noon [not AT ALL - contrary] -*• It's not the case that he knew the result until noon [not FOR ALL - contradictory] For since the negated sentence should be unambiguous as the main verb can only be interpreted duratively, i.e. the negation should only give a FOR ALL denial. While the negation of a durative with since is unambiguous, it does not get a FOR ALL denial but an AT ALL denial, e.g. He hasn't known his name ever since his accident -»• He knew his name only before the accident [not AT ALL] ~ ->• It's not the case that he has known his name for all the time after his accident [not FOR ALL]


She hasn't left since I last wrote ->• Since I last wrote, (she has not left) [not AT ALL] -*• It isn't the case that (she has left since I last wrote) [not FOR ALL]

45

i. Summary We have seen that since and until have certain properties in common, that they are symmetrical with respect to others, but that they are also different in certain respects. They have in common that they both mark the end of a time period within which their main proposition holds. The other end of this time period is the TOR (for until the TOR is a default). Not only is there a time relationship between the sub-event and the main state/event, there is usually also a causal relationship. Both can also be used in three other constructions marking a bound of a time period: comparatives, time periods explicitly mentioned in the main clause and as qualifiers within noun phrases. The sub-proposition is presupposed to be true if it occurs before the time of utterance and conversationally implied to be going to be true if it occurs after this time (but there are some exceptions for until: when the main clause is itself embedded in a verb of saying, deciding, etc.; the relationship between the events is lawlike; the present is being used for dramatic effect). Moreover negated sub-clauses are hardly ever used, not because they are unacceptable but because there are easier ways of saying the same thing, e.g. using "since stopping X-ing" for "since not X-ing" and "while X" for "untfl not X". Since and until are symmetric with regard to the TOR: since being


So even this hybrid explanation falls on its final hurdle. We have seen that four possible explanations of the inherent ambiguity to be found in most negated since- and unr/7-sentences each fafl to explain all the data. The small v. large scope of negation explanation fails unless we are prepared to accept the auxilary hypothesis that negated nonduratives are durative with until but non-durative with since. The durative v. non-durative interpretation of the main verb fails as an explanation because the negation of verbs that have only a durative interpretation should be a FOR ALL denial whereas it is an AT ALL denial. The denial of the assertion v. the conversational implicature does not work for since. The fourth, hybrid, explanation is that the denial of since is ambiguous because of the durative v. non-durative openness of since and that the denial of until, not having this openness, is ambiguous at a 'deeper' level, namely on the possibility of denying either the assertion or the conversational implicature; this hybrid explanation fails because the negation of duratives in smce-sentences should give a FOR ALL denial but in fact gives an AT ALL denial. In conclusion, therefore, I have failed to find a clean explanation of the data on the ambiguity (or the lack thereof), when durative and non-durative verbs are negated in since- and untilsentences.

46

Rotterdam School of Management Erasmus University P.O. Box 1738 3000 DR Rotterdam

REFERENCES Bennett, D.C., 1975: Spatial and Temporal Uses of English Prepositions. Longman, London. HeinainaTd, 0., 1978: Semantics of English Temporal Connectives. Reproduced by Indiana University Linguistics Club. Ku&ra, H. & W.N. Francis, 1967: Computational Analysis of Present-Day American English. Brown University Press, Providence. Miller, G.A. & P.N. Johnson-Laird, 1976: Language and Perception. Cambridge University PTess, Cambridge. Rohrer, C, 1977: How to define temporal conjunctions. Linguistische Berichte, 1977,51: 1-11.


before and until usually after the TOR. This is reflected in the tense in the main clause: it must be perfect with since and is not perfect with until, with one exception (see 4.b). There are several non-symmetrical differences between since and until. The time of utterance may be in the middle of the period being specified with since, but not with until; in the latter case the TOR is moved up to the time of utterance. The tense in the temporal clause is always in the past with since but it is not always in the future with until; rather it is in the past when the TOR is in the past and otherwise in the present, even though it may occur after the time of utterance. Until is durative and must have a durative verb in its main clause, whereas since may or may not indicate a durative, depending on the durative aspect of the main verb. Both can have a negated main verb, but with until a negated non-durative is interpreted as durative wheieas for since it is not. Whereas since may indicate the cause of the main state/event, until is not confined to indicating the result of the main state. It may also indicate the goal of the actor performing the main event; it may, and often does, indicate the cause of the stopping of the main state.

Journal of Semantics 4: 47 - 65

REFLECTIONS ON SUBJECT AND OBJECT CONTROL

BERNARD COMRIE

ABSTRACT

0. INTRODUCTION

For many years, linguists have been puzzled by the contrast between sentences like (1) and those like (2): (1)

Arthur persuaded Beryl to leave.

(2)

Arthur promised Beryl to leave.

The surface syntactic structures of the two sentences seem to be identical, and indeed are treated as identical in mainstream generative grammar. Arthur is subject of the main clause verb, and Beryl is its object; the infinitival clause has no overt subject of its own. Semantically, however, the sentences receive quite different interpretations. In (1), the understood subject of the infinitive is Beryl, whereas in (2) it is Arthur, i.e. (1) and (2) can be closely paraphrased by (3) and (4) respectively:


A recurrent problem in linguistic theory has been trying to provide a principled basis for the distinction between subject control and object control verbs, where by 'subject control verb' is understood a main clause verb that requires coreference between its subject and the understood subject of a dependent infinitive (e.g. I tried to leave, I promised you to leave), and by 'object control verb' a main clause verb that requires coreference between its object and the understood subject of a dependent infinitive (e.g. / persuaded you to leave). A number of possible solutions are examined, in particular a purely formal principle (the Minimal Distance Principle) and a pragmatic principle rooted in Searle's theory of speech acts. It is concluded that any explanatory account of the subject/object control distinction must be grounded in the pragmatics of speech acts, although in at least some languages, including English, these pragmatic principles have become grammaticalized.

48 (3)

Arthur persuaded Beryl that she (Beryl) should leave.

(4)

Arthur promised Beryl that he (Arthur) would leave.

(5)

The kindergarten teacher asked little Colin to leave the room.

(6)

Little Colin asked the kindergarten teacher to leave the room.

(7)

The kindergarten teacher requested that little Colin leave the room.

(8)

Little Colin asked the kindergarten teacher for permission for him (little Colin) to leave the room.

Thus, (5) is an instance of object control, while (6) is an instance of subject control. In principle, both (5) and (6) are ambiguous with respect to the subject/object control distinction, and preferences for one interpretation rather than the other depend in large part on the power relationship between the participants. One way of handling examples like (5)(6) would be to say that English has two homophonous verb? ask, the one meaning 'request an action by addressee', the other meaning 'request permission from the addressee for an action by the speaker'. The approach outlined below will obviate the lack of economy of this analysis.


In other words, in (1) the reference of the understood subject of the infinitive is controlled by the main clause object, i.e. we may speak of 'object control', while in (2) the reference of the understood subject of the infinitive is controlled by the main clause subject, and we may speak of 'subject control'. The aim of this article is to examine what principled basis there is for this distinction between subject and object control, and in particular to see to what extent such a principled basis should be expressed as a formal principle of syntax or as a pragmatic property, relating to the meaning of the items involved and their use in constructions of this kind.1 It is generally acknowledged that the main factor distinguishing subject-control from object-control constructions is the verb of the main clause. In general, a given verb occurring in surface structures like (1) and (2) allows either only subject control or only object control (although some significant exceptions to this generalization are discussed below). Occasionally, a verb will be found in both structures, such as the English verb ask in (5) and (6), at least for many speakers, which receive (7) and (8) as their most natural interpretations, respectively:

49 1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Before continuing, it will be useful to delineate somewhat more accurately the range of constructions that are to be treated here. For the most part, examples will be taken from English, although where relevant occasional examples from other languages are also included. The first restriction is that only those sentences are considered where the noun phrases that occur as surface structure arguments of the main clause are also interpreted semantically as arguments of the main verb (i.e. Equi constructions). We thus include instances of subject control as in (9), where the main verb has no noun phrase object: Deirdre tried to leave.

We do not, however, include those structures that have traditionally been analyzed as Raising structures, such as (10) and (11): (10)

Edward expected Fiona to leave.

(11)

George seems to have left.

In (10), Fiona is indeed interpreted as subject of the infinitive, and the linear analysis of (10) might seem identical to that of (1), but crucially Fiona in (10) is not interpreted semantically as object of the main clause verb, and indeed with Raising verbs like expect one can even have nonreferential noun phrases that are not available for semantic interpretation, as in (12): (12)

Harriet expected it to rain.

(13)

Ignatius expected there to be snow.

Similarly, in (11), although George is interpreted semantically as subject of the infinitive, it is not interpreted semantically as an argument of the main verb seem, as can be seen in the case of nonreferential subjects: (14)

It seems to be raining.

(15)

There seems to be snow.

The distinction of Equi and Raising verbs is often tricky, and near-synonyms within a language or apparent translation equivalents across languages sometimes behave differently. In English, for instance, the verb


(9)

50 order is a raising verb, whereas tell, when used to report a command, is an Equi verb, as can be seen clearly from the behaviour of nonreferential noun phrases (see further Comrie 1974): (16)

The general ordered there to be no more fraternizing with the local people.

(17) *The general told there to be no more fraternizing with the local people.

(18)

Jennifer advocated relocating the kennel.

In (18), the subject of relocating is not necessarily Jennifer, but rather is unspecified, i.e. (18) can be paraphrased as: (19)

Jennifer advocated that the kennel should be relocated.

Indeed, quite generally, in English the gerundive is available as a means of indicating the nonapplicability of the restrictions on control possibilities that hold with the infinitive (Thompson 1973).3 This is, incidentally, a difference between English and many other European languages, which allow the infinitive with an understood unspecified subject where this subject is interpreted as preferential with an unspecified object of the main clause verb, as in the German sentence (20): (20)

Die Mutter bat, das Geschirr abzutragen.

The literal translation of (20) is 'Mother asked to carry away the dishes'. The German sentence is ambiguous and on one interpretation, subject control, is synonymous with the English sentence given as its literal translation, i.e. 'Mother asked for permission that she (Mother) be allowed to take away the dishes'. However, the German sentence has an interpretation not available to its literal English translation, namely 'Mother requested of someone unspecified that that unspecified person carry away the dishes', i.e. 'Mother asked for the dishes to be carried away'. In English, only a handful of verbs permit this construction, for instance the verb say as in (21):


For the purposes of this article, it will be assumed that the distinction between Raising and Equi verbs has been drawn, and that only Equi verbs are under consideration.2 The second restriction is that we will consider only examples where the dependent verb is in its infinitive form, and not, for instance, dependent gerundives, as in (18):

51 (21)

Kevin says to clear the table.

(22)

Lucy would like to meet on Thursday.

(23) *Lucy will meet on Thursday. Whether the strangeness of (23) is to be handled as syntactic or pragmatic (clearly, the problem is that the subject of intransitive meet must refer to more than one entity), there is no such anomaly about (22), where the understood subject of the infinitive is simply understood as a group including Lucy. There are as yet poorly understood constraints on this extended coreference - witness the ungrammaticality of (24) with explicit each other - but for present purposes it is sufficient to note that such examples as (22) will be treated as well-formed examples of subject control. (24) *Lucy wants to meet with each other on Thursday. After these preliminary remarks defining the scope of our discussion, it will be useful to turn to attempts to predict the distinction between subject and object control.

2.

ARBITRARY SPECIFICATION OF CONTROL

Since a major factor is clearly the identity of the verb in the main clause, one possibility would be simply to specify arbitrarily, for each verb that enters into a control structure, whether it takes subject control or object


I will assume that such sentences are to be accounted for in terms of coreference between the understood subject of the infinitive and an unspecified object of the main clause, i.e. that these are instances of object control. Although the precise details of what is meant by saying that two noun phrases are coreferential are not relevant to our present concerns, one interesting feature of the interpretation of coreference for control purposes should be clarified, to avoid possible misunderstandings. In at least certain instances - and the precise delimitation of these instances is a task for future research - the understood subject of the infinitive is interpreted as a set properly containing the controlling noun phrase, rather than as being strictly coreferential with the controlling noun phrase. This can be seen in sentence (22), where a literal coreference interpretation would involve the ungrammatical (or at least nonsensical) (23):

52

(25)

Martin drohte (seinem Sohn), ihn alleine zu lassen.

(26)

Martin threatened (*his son) to leave him alone.

However, one does not find a given verb being subject control in one language but its translation equivalent being object control in another, or vice versa. This is not to say that there is no difference among languages of subject versus object control — a problem to which I return below but the degree of systematicity of cross-language correspondences is such that they cannot be the chance result of convergence of arbitrary distinctions.


control. Thus persuade would be marked, as part of its lexical representation, as taking object control, and promise would be marked as taking subject control. For main clause verbs that do not take an object noun phrase, such as try (cf. (9)), presumably subject control would be assigned redundantly, given that in the absence of an object there is no possibility of object control. But for main verbs that do take a noun phrase object, the specification of subject versus object control would be arbitrary, with no attempt at prediction. There are a number of problems with this approach. First, it is of course uneconomical, and in general an approach that denies systematicity will only be accepted in the absence of any more systematic alternative; below, we will see that there are a number of more systematic alternatives. Second, this approach forces us to say that, in the case of English ask, there are two homophonous verbs, one specified lexically as taking object control and the other specified lexically as taking subject control; again, this analysis splitting one lexical item in two should be accepted only in the absence of a viable alternative. Third, when one compares control verbs across languages, it is usually the same verbs (i.e. translation equivalents) that fall into each of the two classes of subject and object control. Thus, English promise is a subject control verb, and so are French promettre, German versprechen, Russian obei'dat' ; English persuade is an object control verb, and so are French persuader, German iiberreden, Russian ugovorit' . This is all the more remarkable when one considers that the detailed syntax of infinitive constructions is one area where there are considerable differences among these languages (of the type illustrated by (20) above). Some of the differences between the languages result from the fact that a given verb in one language is a control verb while its equivalent in another language is not, as in (25)-(26), where German drohen 'threaten' is a (subject) control verb even in the presence of a main verb object, while English threaten is a control verb only in the absence of a main clause object:

53

(27)

Nora was promised to be allowed to leave.

The noun phrase Nora is non-agent in bloth clauses, so the thematic identity condition is satisfied. By contrast, (28) is claimed to be ungrammatical, since Oswald is non-agent in the main clause but agent in the second clause: (28) *Oswald was promised to leave. RfiZicTca's analysis predicts that (29) will receive the interpretation whereby her son is interpreted as subject of the passive infinitive, since this noun phrase is recipient of both clauses: (29)

Penelope promised her son to be allowed to leave.

For English, my own judgement does not agree with RuZicica's prediction for this sentence. In particular, for me the interpretation Tenelope promised her son that she (Penelope) would be allowed to leave' is available, and is in fact preferred to the interpretation Tenelope promised her son that he (her son) would be allowed to leave', which is at best highly marginal. Of course, on the preferred interpretation it is necessary to assume that Penelope has some influence over whether or not she is given permission to leave (e.g. perhaps that she would be able to persuade her boss to let her leave work early in order to take her son to the cinema).


A more interesting variant of the arbitrary distinction hypothesis has recently been proposed by RuZiCka (1983), who divides control verbs into those requiring 'thematic identity' and those requiring 'thematic distinctness'. Whether a verb belongs to one class or the other is, apparently, arbitrary, although since the distinction does refer to semantic (thematic) roles, it is conceivable that it could be linked to the pragmatic account developed below (as is suggested by RuZiclca). For 'thematic identity' verbs, the two coreferential noun phrases must share the same semantic role; promise is an example of a thematic identity verb, since the promiser is an agent and so is the subject of the infinitive. For 'thematic distinctness' verbs, the two coreferential noun phrases must have different semantic roles; persuade is an example of a thematic distinctness verb, since the two coreferential noun phrases are, respectively, non-agent and agent. This distinction allows RuZicTca to account for what is otherwise a puzzling piece of data, namely the fact that the verb promise, in a control structure, can be passivized, but only if the infinitive verb is also passivized, in which case the subject of the infinitive is interpreted as coreferential with the subject of the main clause, as in (27):

54 For a number of other examples, for the most part from German and Russian, RuZiCka predicts ungrammaticality because of violation of the thematic distinctness condition. On his analysis, the following would all be ungrammatical: (30) ?Quintus versuchte, bestraft zu werden. 'Quintus tried to be punished.' (31) ?Ramona uberredete Stefan, vom Arzt untersucht zu werden. 'Ramona persuaded Stefan to be examined by the doctor.'

(32)

Theresa versuchte zu malen. Theresa tried to paint.'

In (31), Stefan is non-agent of both the main clause and the infinitive, and since uberreden 'persuade' is a thematic distinctness verb the possibility of the two coreferential noun phrases being of the same semantic role is ruled out. However, whatever the status of examples like (30) and (31) in German, their literal translations into English are fully acceptable, even if the situations described, especially in the case of (30), are rather bizarre. The reactions of German speakers to the German versions are also rather varied, making it doubtful whether such sentences can simply be marked as ungrammatical, a point to which I return below. Thus RuZicTca's approach has two drawbacks: the fit with the data is not so close as might at first sight seem to be the case, and the distinction between thematic identity and thematic distinctness verb classes remains an idiosyncratic lexical specification.

3.

A FORMAL APPROACH: THE MINIMAL DISTANCE PRINCIPLE

In early work on transformational syntax of English, a formal syntactic solution was attempted for the problem of distinguishing subject and object control verbs, in terms of the distance between noun phrases; the best known version of this is the Minimal Distance Principle (Erasure Principle) suggested by Rosenbaum (1967). This approach claims that the understood subject of the infinitive is that the noun phrase of the main clause which is closest to the subject of the infinitive, distance being measured, for instance, in terms of the number of nodes separating noun phrases from


In (30), Quintus is agent of the main clause but non-agent of the infinitive; versuchen 'to try', however, is a thematic identity verb, as can be seen from (32), where Theresa is agent of the main clause and of the infinitive:

55

(33)

Ulrich tried to leave.

(34)

Veronica persuaded Walter to leave.

The Minimal Distance Principle makes incorrect predictions, however, for verbs like promise, where the main clause verb has a noun phrase object, since here the data present subject control rather than object control: (35)

Xantippe promised Yves to leave.

On this analysis, then, verbs like promise, i.e. verbs that have a main clause object but nonetheless show subject control, would have to be treated as arbitrary exceptions. This analysis is superior to the approach whereby all specification of control is done by arbitrary lexical specification, since the Minimal Distance Principle does define a general principle covering the vast majority of verbs. However, a small set of irregularities remains, a set which is moreover, as already noted, remarkably consistent across languages. Before writing off the treatment of these irregularities within this approach, however, it should be noted that there is independent evidence pointing to the unusual nature of verbs that have a main clause object and subject control. Although most speakers of English readily accept sentences like (35), there is a minority for whom such sentences are either completely ungrammatical (and must be replaced by paraphrases with a that-cfause) or for whom the interpretation predicted by object control is the only available or the preferred interpretation (i.e. 'Xantippe promised Yves that he (Yves) would leave'). Moreover, work done on the acquisition of control properties by children suggests that children in general go through a stage where control is assigned on the basis of the Minimal


one another in a phrase-marker. While the precise statement of the Minimal Distance Principle is not of immediate importance, what is essential is that this principle be stated in such a way that the object of a main verb is closer to the subject of the infinitive than the subject of a main verb is. This then predicts that, if the main verb has no object noun phrase, it will take subject control (there is only one possible controller, which is therefore necessarily the closest noun phrase of the main clause). If the main verb does have an object noun phrase, then this object noun phrase will be closer to the subject of the infinitive than the main clause subject is, so object control will be predicted. In essence, this predicts object control in the presence of a main clause object noun phrase, subject control otherwise, thus giving the correct predictions for sentences like (33)(34):

56

(36)

Zoe persuaded Albert to leave.

(37)

Albert was persuaded by Zoe to leave.

On this interpretation, being an object control verb means that the lexically specified object controls the reference of the understood subject of the infinitive, and in both (36) and (37) the lexically specified object of persuade is Albert, even though this noun phrase happens to be surface structure subject of (37). This clearly makes the right predictions for object control verbs. For subject control verbs like promise - whose passive is in any event rather unusual in terms of control properties, as noted above - the Minimal Distance Principle interpreted in this way makes an incorrect prediction, since in the grammatical passive sentence (38) the controller is different from that in the active sentence (39): (38)

Bernice was promised by Cecil to be allowed to leave.

(39)

Cecil promised Bernice to leave.

In (38), it is the underlying object that controls the reference of the understood subject of the infinitive ('. . . that Bernice would be allowed to leave'), whereas in (39) it is the underlying (and surface) subject ('. . . that Cecil would leave'). One might try to avoid this problem by stating the Minima] Distance Principle as a constraint on surface structures, rather


Distance Principle (and therefore misassigned, at least relative to the majority adult judgement, in sentences like (35)), with subject control in sentences like (35) taking over at a later age (Chomsky 1969). Thus the Minima] Distance Principle probably does have some role to play in an overall account of the grammar of control, in that it does seem to have some psychological reality. Before leaving the Minimal Distance Principle, we should examine its predictions with respect to passive sentences, in particular those where the main clause is passivized. (With respect to the infinitive construction, the Minimal Distance Principle refers invariably to the subject, which in the case of a passive will be the derived subject, whatever its underlying grammatical relation.) Rosenbaum's account was framed on the assumption that control is assigned as part of the cycle, and in particular on the assumption that control is assigned on the basis of the underlying grammatical relations in the main clause. Thus, passivization of the main clause should have no effect on which noun phrase controls the reference of the understood subject of the infinitive, and this is indeed borne out for object control verbs, as in (36)-(37):

57 than as part of the cycle. It would then be necessary to ensure that passive agents are not objects of the passive verb (a position which can probably be argued for independently), so that the sentence would behave as one where the main verb has no object, i.e. subject control is predicted by the Minimal Distance Principle, thus giving correct interpretations for both (37) and (38), bearing in mind that what is now relevant is the surface structure subject of the main clause. These same interpretations would, of course, be obtained for agentless passives: (40)

Diane was persuaded to leave.

(41)

Edgar was promised to be allowed to leave.

4.

A PRAGMATIC APPROACH

So far, none of the approaches considered has seriously considered the meanings of the verbs involved in specifying control, nor the way in which the meanings of these verbs are used in actual linguistic interaction. In this section, I will sketch an approach that crucially does take these factors into account. In particular, it relates the distinction between object and subject control, for verbs that have a noun phrase object, to their speech act value, within the general framework of Searle's approach to speech acts (Searle 1969). For illustrative purposes, I will concentrate on persuade and promise. The verb persuade belongs to a speech class called directives by Searle. One of the main characteristics of a directive is that the reported speaker, in felicitously uttering a directive, presupposes that the addressee has the ability to bring about the action required by the directive. Linguistically, the addressee is expressed as the (lexically specified) object of the main verb, while the action is expressed by the infinitive construction, as in (42), where Graham is the addressee and (for Graham) to leave is the action:


I will not pursue this possibility further, although it is deserving of further attention, because one soon enters an area of unclear judgements on which it is difficult to build any firm theory. I conclude that there is good evidence that the Minimal Distance Principle (or some similar formal principle) has an established place in the description of control facts, although it clearly fails in accounting for the cross-linguistically recurrent pattern of subject control with verbs like promise, when these verbs have an expressed noun phrase object.

58 (42)

Fenella persuaded Graham to leave.


Most frequently, the entity which has the greatest ability to bring about an action is expressed linguistically as subject of the clause that expresses that action (at least if it is in the active voice), and indeed in this example Graham has, or is presupposed by Fenella to have, the ability to leave. Thus, for this to make any sense as a directive it is essential that the addressee be also the entity with the ability to bring about the action, and this finds its linguistic expression in coreference between the addressee and the subject of the infinitive construction. Essentially all that happens in languages like English, where the infinitive may occur without an overt subject, is that the pragmatically most natural situation is expressed by means of a more economical linguistic expression; it is only necessary to express overtly the subject of the infinitive in a directive if this subject is not coreferential with the addressee, expressed by the object of the main clause. Turning now to promise, this belongs to Searle's class of commissives, one of whose main characteristics is that the reported speaker, in uttering a commissive, presupposes that the speaker has the ability to bring about the action required by the commissive. Linguistically, the speaker appears as subject of promise, and the action is expressed by the infinitive construction. By the same reasoning as was used above for directives, the subject of the infinitive is the participant in that action most likely to have the ability to bring about the action. By the definition of commissives as a speech act, the expectation of the normal case is thus with coreference between speaker, i.e. subject of promise, and understood subject of the infinitive construction. This account based on speech acts therefore makes the correct prediction precisely in those cases where other approaches either make incorrect specifications or require idiosyncratic assignment of control properties. Moreover, since this account is not based on idiosyncratic properties of English, it generalizes naturally to translation equivalents in other languages. In fact, the predictive power of this analysis is even greater. The 'exceptional' behaviour of promise is now grounded firmly in the behaviour of commissives as speech acts, and we would therefore expect to find similar behaviour on the part of other verbs whose speech act value would lead to an expectation of greater naturalness of coreference between main clause subject and understood subject of infinitive, rather than between main clause object and understood subject of infinitive. This set of verbs includes, in the first instance, near-synonyms of promise, such as vow, swear, as in (43):

59 (43)

Heidi vowed/swore to Inigo never to do such things again.

(44)

Johanna drohte ihrem Sohn, ihn alleine zu lassen. 'Johanna threatened her son that she would (lit. to) leave him alone.'

We can also provide a more meaningful account of the behaviour of English ask, which takes either object or subject control in the presence of an expressed main clause object, at least for many speakers (see (5)-(6)). When ask is interpreted as a request for action, then the most natural interpretation pragmatically is that the speaker is presupposing that the addressee has the ability to carry out the action, thus giving object control, as for persuade. Where, however, the interpretation is one of request for permission to carry out a certain course of action, it is unlikely that the speaker would ask the addressee for permission for the addressee to carry out some action, and highly likely that the speaker would ask for permission for the speaker to carry out some action; on this interpretation, then, we would expect subject control. In general, especially when examples are presented in isolation, the request for action interpretation is dominant, so this interpretation is likely to mask the alternative in (45), which is more likely to be interpreted as TCeith requested of Linda that she leave': (45)

Keith asked Linda to leave.

Where, however, the infinitive construction contains explicit reference to the granting of permission, then the interpretation with subject control


The sense here is clearly that Heidi vowed or swore that she (Heidi) would never do such things again. Above, we noted that the German verb drohen 'threaten' takes subject control, even when the matrix object is expressed (see (25)). (English is irrelevant here, since the verb threaten in English does not allow both an expressed object noun phrase and an infinitive.) Would we expect drohen to take subject or object control? For a felicitous threat, it has to be the case that the treatener, i.e. the participant expressed as the lexical subject of the verb of threatening, has the ability (or at least claims the ability) to bring about the action referred to by the infinitive construction. This is therefore parallel to the behaviour of promise, indeed the main difference between a promise and a threat is whether the speaker believes the outcome to be to the advantage or to the disadvantage of the addressee. We therefore predict that verbs of threatening, if they allow infinitive constructions, will take subject control, as is borne out by (44):

60 is more salient, as in (46), where probably the most coherent interpretation is 'Malcolm asked Naomi for permission that he (Malcolm) be allowed leave': (46)

Malcolm asked Naomi to be allowed to leave.

Note that in this account of ask I have referred merely to the interpretation of the main clause verb, without taking any stand on whether there is one or two verbs ask; this approach is entirely consistent with one where ask, in all its interpretations, is analyzed as a single lexical item, conceivably with a single meaning, but with different interpretations arising through the interaction of meaning and context.

Does the pragmatic account presented in section 4 supersede the need for a formal syntactic account of control? While the pragmatic account does provide a principled account for a range of data that are not handled by formal principles proposed to date, I think the answer to my question is nonetheless negative, i.e. overall both formal principles and pragmatic principles will be required. One reason for this, as noted in section 3, is the psycholinguistic evidence in favour of the Minimal Distance Principle. But in this section, I wish rather to examine judgements of grammaticality and interpretation that suggest that both formal and pragmatic principles interact in the overall description of control. If the pragmatic principles were overriding, then we would expect that control would be determined entirely by semantic (thematic) roles, irrespective of how these are encoded by means of grammatical relations, since the pragmatic account refers only to semantic roles (such as speaker and addressee of verbs of linguistic communication, and agent of the infinitive construction). If, however, the agent of the infinitive construction is expressed by means of a passive agent, in other words if the infinitive is passivized but retains the same noun phrase as agent, the resulting sentence is wildly ungrammatical in English (and likewise at least in German and Russian), whether or not the agent is expressed overtly: (47)

Otto persuaded Pamela to kiss Quincy.

(48) *Otto persuaded Pamela (for) Quincy to be kissed (by her). There is therefore a syntactic constraint that in control constructions the coreferential noun phrase in the infinitive construction must be the subject. This applies equally in cases of subject control:


5. THE INTERACTION OF FORMAL AND PRAGMATIC PRINCIPLES

61 (49)

Rowena promised Saul to recommend Tanya.

(50) *Rowena promised Saul (for) Tanya to be recommended (by her).

(51)

Umberto persuaded Vera to be examined by the doctor.

In this sentence, the syntax of object control predicts that Vera will be interpreted as understood subject of the infinitive, even though this noun phrase is not agent of the infinitive construction. This prediction is correct, as the sentence is grammatical with this assignment of anaphoric relations. This would seem to be in direct violation of the pragmatic account. But it is necessary to consider more carefully the precise interpretation that is given to (51). The only coherent interpretation is that Vera has some influence over whether or not she is examined by the doctor - if this were not so, there would be no sense in which Umberto could persuade her to submit to this examination. Thus, although Vera is perhaps not, in the strict sense, agent of the infinitive construction, this noun phrase does have some degree of agentivity, and it is only with this interpretation that the sentence is judged to be acceptable. A similar account is applicable to subject control examples like (52) and (53): (52)

William tried to be elected.

(53)

Yvonne promised to be elected.


The most obvious way of reconciling the formal and pragmatic principles, and the one I will advocate here, is that the formal principles are grammaticalizations of pragmatic principles. In other words, the reason why, for instance, promise has exceptional syntax (subject control even in the presence of a main clause object) is because of pragmatics; but the syntax now exists independently of the pragmatics. The outcome of this is that two sets of criteria have to be met for a control sentence to be acceptable: it must satisfy the syntactic requirements in order to be judged grammatical, and it must also satisfy pragmatic requirements in order to be judged coherent. While (48) and (50) satisfy the pragmatic requirements, they violate the formal requirements, and are therefore unacceptable. But what of sentences that satisfy the formal requirements but fail to satisfy the pragmatic requirements? The kinds of sentences we are looking for are those where the subject of the infinitive construction is not an agent: as a subject, it satisfies the syntactic requirement; as a non-agent, it fails to satisfy the pragmatic requirement. We need therefore to look for infinitive constructions with a non-agentive subject, for instance passive infinitives, as in (51):

62 In order to get coherent interpretations, it has to be assumed that William and Yvonne have some influence over whether or not they are elected. Such sentences often sound more natural if there is some explicit indication of this degree of influence, which can be achieved in English by using the get (oneself) passive or the have oneself passive rather than the be passive in sentences like (51)-(53): (54)

Zeno persuaded Amanda to have herself examined by the doctor.

(55)

Basil tried to get himself elected.

(56)

Cynthia promised to get herself elected.

(57)

Donald asked Elvira to be allowed to leave.

The inclusion of be allowed to also fosters the appropriate interpretation of passivized promise sentences, such as (58): (58)

Frank was promised to be allowed to leave.

At least for English, then, we can say that (i) control properties have their basis in pragmatics, since only in this way can one account, for instance, for the apparently exceptional behaviour of promise - this point may well hold language universally; (ii) the pragmatic principles have, however, become grammaticalized, so that English has syntactic rules of control which do not necessarily match the predictions made by pragmatics; (iii) where syntax predicts grammaticality in conflict with the most obvious pragmatic correspondent of that syntactic construction, the sentence will normally be accepted and an appropriate pragmatic interpretation filled in, for instance by assigning some degree of agentivity to noun phrases that are otherwise not necessarily agentive; other overt linguistic elements may assist in bridging the gap between the literal meaning of the construction and its interpretation, but they are not necessary. To what extent are these generalizations, in particular (ii) and (iii), universal? One could well imagine possible languages where more importance would be attached to the pragmatics, so that syntactically wellformed constructions would be rejected out of hand if they do not match


However, such extra cues are not required in English, but merely assist in communicating an interpretation which is not the most obvious correspondent of the syntactic construction. We have already seen that such explicit indication of pragmatics assists in fostering the subject control interpretation with ask, as in (57):

63 the most obvious pragmatic correspondents, and syntactically illformed constructions would be accepted if they do match the most obvious pragmatic correspondents. On these points, there seems to be an overall difference between the reactions of English-speakers and German-speakers to translation equivalents. English-speakers almost invariably go by the syntax, and therefore assign the indicated interpretations to the sentences below, even though this involves some pragmatic contortion: Gladys promised Hubert to experience victory once again.

(60)

Gladys promised Hubert that she (Gladys) would experience victory once again.

(61)

Scipio persuaded the Senate to have a free hand.

(62)

Scipio persuaded the Senate that it (the Senate) should have a free hand.

(The departure from alphabetical ordering of names in (61X62) is, of course, to enable the reader to bring to bear his real-world knowledge of Roman politics). The most coherent interpretation of (59) pragmatically, given that a promise is to be to the benefit of the addressee, would be that Gladys is promising Hubert that he, Hubert, will experience victory in the future, but English syntax excludes this interpretation. In (61), real-world knowledge of Scipio's relations with the Senate make the only plausible interpretation that Scipio persuaded the Senate to allow him, Scipio, to have a free hand, but once again English syntax disallows this interpretation. Abraham (1983: 221, 234) cites German equivalents of (59) and (62) as fully grammatical and acceptable in the pragmatically coherent interpretation: (63)

Use versprach Joseph, noch einmal einen Sieg zu erleben.

(64)

Scipio iiberredete den Senat, frei handeln zu diirfen.

Conversely, English-speakers accept without hesitation sentences like (65)-(66) in the interpretation dictated by syntax: (65)

Karen tried to be elected.

(66)

Lou persuaded Marcia to be examined by the doctor.

For German, RuZicTca (1983) unequivocally predicts that (67) and (68) are ungrammatical:


(59)

64 (67) *Nathan versuchte, gewahlt zu werden. "Nathan tried to be elected.' (68) *01ga uberredete Peter, vom Arzt untersucht zu werden. 'Olga persuaded Peter to be examined by the doctor.'

6. CONCLUSIONS

In this article, I have tried to show that the control phenomenon, in particular the distinction of subject and object control, involves both formal syntactic and pragmatic factors. In a sense, one could now reformulate the problem area as 'control between syntax and pragmatics', since the remaining problem seems to be to identify under what circumstances in each language syntax or pragmatics takes precedence. But what is clear is that any complete account of control, i.e. any account that attempts both to describe and to explain the facts, must take due account of both syntax and pragmatics. Department of Linguistics University of Southern California Los Angeles CA 90089-1693 USA NOTES 1. The discussion in this article continues that in Comrie (forthcoming 1984). I have presented some of the material contained in this article at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Symposium on Markedness, the Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society, NIAS (Wassenaai, The Netherlands), and the University of Sussex (England). I am grateful to all participants in the ensuing discussions for theii comments. 2. The question of the surface syntactic analysis of Raising verbs — in particular whether (10) should be analyzed as [Edward expected Fiona [to leavej] or as [Edward expected [Fiona to leave]] is not relevant to the present argument and will


Not all speakers of German are so unequivocal in their rejection of such sentences, but there is nonetheless a difference in the reaction of Englishspeakers and of German-speakers to such sentences: for English-speakers, they are unequivocally acceptable, while for German-speakers at least the question of their possible ungrammaticality can arise. Coupled with the differences in grammatically judgements for sentences (59), (61), (63), and (64), these point to a difference in degree between English as a more syntactic language and German as a more pragmatic language - though I would emphasize that this is a difference in degree only!

65 not be discussed further, although my personal commitment to the former analysis remains unshaken. 3. In passing, it should however be noted that in some cases gerundives axe subject to the same control restrictions as infinitives, for instance the gerundive with the preposition from after such verbs as dissuade, e.g. he dissuaded us from going, an instance of object control. There is even an Equi/Raising contrast, a fact which seems to have been largely neglected in analyses of Raising, as can be seen in he prevented/ 'dissuaded there from being a fire.

REFERENCES Downloaded from jos.oxfordjournals.org by guest on January 1, 2011

Abraham, Werner, 1983: The control relation in German. In: Werner Abraham (ed.), On the Formal Syntax of the Westgermania, pp. 217-242. Benjamins, Amsterdam. Chomsky, Carol, 1969: The Acquisition of Syntax in Children from 5 to 10. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. Comrie, Bernard. 1974: Order and tell in a transformational grammar of English. Studia Anglica Posnaniensia 5: 3-8. Comrie, Bernard, 1984: Subject and object control: syntax, semantics, pragmatics. Berkeley Linguistics Society 10: 450-464. Comrie, Bernard, Forthcoming: Maikedness, grammar, people, and the world. In: Fred Eckman, Edith Moravcsik, & Jessica Wirth (eds.), Proceedings of the UWM Symposium on Markedness. Plenum, New York. Rosenbaum, Peter S., 1967: The Grammar of English Predicate Complement Constructions. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. RuSclca, Rudolf, 1983: Remarks on control. Linguistic Inquiry 14: 309-324. Seaile, John R., 1969: Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Thompson, Sandra A., 1973: Subjectless gerunds in English. Foundations of Language 9: 374-383.

Journal of Semantics 4: 67 - 77

A NOTE ON TRANSPARENCY POSTULATES

THOMAS EDE ZIMMERMANN

ABSTRACT

0.

INTRODUCTION

In spite of all the merits Richard Montague's (1970) semiotic theory certainly possesses, its great generality has proved to be one of its weaker points. The fact that the theory can be applied to describe the syntax of both many artificial languages of symbolic logic as well as at least some fragments of natural languages makes it an unlikely candidate for a general theory of possible human languages, i.e. for a 'universal grammar' in a more linguistic sense of the term. Attempts have thus been made to cure the theory from this disease of over-generality. The most common strategy of approaching a more restrictive version of Montague Grammar is the search for constraints (Partee (1976)) on its various components. The present article is intended to make a small and, for the most part, negative contribution to this aim. It will be shown that at least one attractive and, at first glance, plausible constraint on the role of meaning postulates (i.e. the rules that describe logical features of lexical items) is not general enough to cover all cases that have been discussed in the literature. The constraint to be formulated further below essentially says that postulates must not make use of any logical apparatus which exceeds the expressive


This paper deals with the role of meaning postulates in Montague's theory of indirect interpretation. More specifically, it is concerned with the problem of finding suitable constraints on systems of postulates. One plausible candidate for such a constraint is discussed in some detail. It is a principle to the effect that the logical complexity of any meaning postulate must not exceed the expressive power of the natural language under description. It is argued that such a constraint would be too powerful because it rules out transparency (first-order reducibility) postulates because they are essentially second-order statements. A weaker alternative to the original constraint is then formulated. It is argued that this new constraint should not be the only restriction on the structure of meaning postulates.

68

1. BACKGROUND

One way of filling the gap between lexical and logical semantics is the use of meaning postulates. During the past decade this method has been used by quite a few semanticists working in the tradition of Montague Grammar. It has not only proved very successful but also extremely powerful. One of the reasons why postulates can be so powerful is that they need not be expressed nor even expressible in the object language but are usually given as formulae of some higher-order logic (in most cases Montague's IL). The latter also plays the role of the target language for a translation device which defines the interpretation of the object language. The general framework of all this is Montague's theory of translation or, as some prefer to call it, his theory of indirect interpretation. In order to facilitate future reference, let me briefly enumerate the main ingredients of an indirect interpretation device according to Montague's theory: (i)

(ii)

(iii)

a (syntactically defined) language Lj together with some direct and compositional interpretation procedure; i.e. L. is associated with a class t^Cj of models each specifying the extensions of all Ljexpressions and each inducing a compositional meaning assignment (based on a so-called 'Fregean' interpretation); a translation procedure T from another (syntactically defined) language Ln into L, such that every model m e viCj induces a model 7Xm) for Ln based on some Fregean interpretation; the class of all 7(m) will be referred to as *M>^', a restriction C on ^C. which carries over to *MJ^ and is meant to single out the class of intended models for L n ; so C narrows


power of the (natural) language to be interpreted. Montague's transparency postulates (the ones that guarantee the translatability of large portions of English into first-order predicate logic), however, turn out to violate this constraint. The intuitive reason for this failure is that transparency is a higher-order property whereas Montague's fragments of English only involve first-order quantification (or something very close to it). Having established this negative result, I will then briefly discuss a considerably weaker version of the constraint just mentioned, one that does not conflict with transparency anymore. It will, however, be argued that this new constraint should not be taken to be the only restriction on the role of meaning postulates in Montague Grammar. Different and differently motivated constraints will have to be found in order to arrive at a more powerful theory of the logical behaviour of lexical items: the search must go on.

69 down JL^ to some JL^ which - by the translation procedure T - induces the class *^C^

of intended Ln-models. n

'MJ™ making II' come out true coincides with the class ^J^'T of all Ln-models induced by some L,-model that verifies FI. One might object that it would be more adequate to restrict oneself to logical languages that are not essentially stronger than the natural languages to be interpreted by them (where strength refers to both ontological presuppositions and expressive power). The situation just described has, however, occurred too often to be left out of consideration or be banned by puristic methodology. In fact, some of the most important meaning postulates that have been introduced in descriptive Montague Grammar cannot be reduced to direct ones. The transparency postulates of PTQ1 may serve as an illustration here. As will be shown in the next section (and as is probably obvious anyhow), none of them can be expressed in the PTQ-fragment of English. If one allowed for arbitrary restrictions on the class ^ > n , one would obviously get all sorts of weird interpretations. Even model classes that are not closed under isomorphisms could be introduced that way although L, and even Ln might be closed under isomorphic images. But once we restrict our attention to restrictions C that carry over from v4Cj to


I will not attempt to give a precise definition of the above notion of 'intended model'. Nor do I want to suggest or presuppose any criteria for deciding whether a given class of L, -models can play the part of the intended models in (iii). A minimal condition would, of course, be that the Lj -consequence notion induced by such a class of models must allow for the intuitively valid inferences of the natural language fragment under description. There are, however, possibly more data that one might want a semantic theory to agree with. Moreover some external criteria like simplicity, elegance, ontological parsimony, and generalizability will certainly play a role in choosing one semantic theory rather than another. In what follows, I will simply ignore these matters and pretend that some class of L,-models has been picked out - no matter how this has been done. The details of (i) and (ii) can be found in Montague (1970). (iii is only alluded to in that text and has to my knowledge never been developed in detail. In practice, however, (iii) is the place where meaning postulates enter the scene: JiJ^ is usually defined as the class of models in which (each member of) a certain set FI of L,-sentences is true. Intuitively, n gives a description of the logical behaviour of the non-logical (and in most cases: lexical) expressions of L as well as of the logical connections between them. As noted earlier, FI need not be expressible in L n , i.e. there need not be a set FI ' of Ln-sentences such that the class

70

JL>T via T, this kind of situation can no longer occur. Still, I claim, strange things might happen. One might, for instance, have a purely extensional language Ln which is interpreted by translation into some intensional L, and then impose some L,-expressible restrictions on the set of possible worlds. These restrictions could thus even be formulated by way of a set of indirect meaning postulates. In view of L n 's extensionality they would, however, be absolutely pointless. More complicated cases of weird (systems of) postulates can be invented but I will not go into them here.

2. THE TROUBLE WITH TRANSPARENCY

(EP)

If m and m ' are in «X>j, and 7(m) and T(m ') are Ln-equivalent, then: m t=II iffm ' |=n,

where L -equivalence is the 'relation' that holds between two models just in case they make the same Ln-sentences come out true. The original motivation behind EP was to exclude systems of postulates that concern 'parts' (and in particular, parameters) of L, that do not play any role in the process of interpreting L n . There is, however, at least one counterexample to this constraint, i.e. a system of postulates which is generally held to be quite innocent but nonetheless fails to satisfy (EP). The system in question is the set of Montague's PTQ-postulates. It suffices to concentrate on one transparency postulate, e.g. transparency of find: (T)

V S A x A ^ D

[find1 (x, f)*-+

f {y

S{Vx,

V

y}}]

As Montague (1973: 236f.) has pointed out, (T) essentially says that find ' can be reduced to a first-order two-place relation among individuals; i.e. (T) is equivalent to: (T')

AxA

f D

[find'

(x, f

)

^ f{y

find',(Vx,

V

y)}]


In an earlier paper2 I discussed some artificial examples of arbitrary systems n of meaning postulates and arrived at the conclusion that purely structural constraints on possible FIs can be given which would rule out certain undesired cases as not 'in accord with' the procedures (i) and (ii). In particular, I proposed the following condition that arbitrary FI should meet in order not to interfere with the direct interpretation JL l of Lj and the translation T from Ln to L,:

71 where find ' * abbreviates: Xv Xufmd 1 ( A u , A X P P { A v } ) , for some (distinct) individual variables u and v.

(a) (b) (c) (d)

m h llfind ' llfind1 r(m)

n• Vf Mind ' I ; •!*= Kind1,!3; =h T(m'), n

where " = T " denotes L

- equivalence and m and m ' are based on3J

and 3V , respectively. Now let m (= > > ) be an infinite model of the PTQ-postulates, i.e. a model based on an ontology with an infinite domain E of individuals (or 'entities') and an infinite domain W of indices (or 'possible worlds' 4 ); for definiteness I will assume that both domains are denumerable, i.e. of cardinality N Q . So (a) holds by stipulation (and the trivial fact that FI possesses infinite models). In order to find a suitable m ' that fits (b) - (d), one first has to pick some term phrase denotation (\Q which is not definable in (any model based on) 7( J J ): (e)

qQ + I a D sion a.

' ^ > (i , j), for any point and any Ln-expres-

The idea is to let m ' differ from m only in the value that the extension of find' assigns to q^. Since q^ is not definable in L n , this shouldn't have any effect on what is true or false in the T-induced models. For cardinality reasons, there are q^ satisfying (e). To see this, consider the equivalence relation = < s > e > on contexts (i.e. IL-variable assignments) of $ which is defined by: (f)

j =

-

j • iff j(x) = j ' (x), for all IL-variables x of type <s,e>. '


I claim that there are Ln-equivalent models m and m ' for the PTQ-fragment L n of English such that m satisfies the PTQ-postulates II whereas m ' does not. I will now sketch a proof of my claim. First observe that for any IL-models3 m = < 35 , < i j > > and m ' = < & ' , < i ' ,j ' » both satisfying (T) the identity of Sfind '*D and Mind 1 *!!*' implies that Hfmd1 II = Hfind'H*' (where || • | | a is the meaning assignment induced by ). So it suffices to prove the existence of some m and m ' such that (a) - (d) hold:

72

denotations (in $ 's and 71($ )'s ontology) is 2 2 . So there are many cu which satisfy (e). One can now use such q~ in order to define a function F (with the same domain as Kind ' II ) by letting F(i jXQXO be the opposite truth value of Kind ' II (ijXQXQ whenever Q(i) = q 0 ; otherwise, F has to coincide with II find ' l a . Obviously, F(ij) = F(ij ' ) for any points and e > equivalence classes. Hence the number of 7X 55 )-definable possible term phrase denotations does not exceed KQ 0 « 0 0 (N 0 *0) N 0, i.e. 2K0 (by basic cardinal arithmetic). But the number of possible term phrase

73 (h)

8 f i n d l r ( a ) ( i , j ) (Dc^ D

for all points . ( ||a 2 ll^*-* is o^'s intension.) By the inductive hypothesis and the definition of 3b ' , (h) is the same as: (h1)

U f i n d l l 7 ' ( a ) ( i , j ) (Dc^ O

(STF)

DA :P[seek' ( x , f)

«+ try-to ' ( x /[find ' ( f )])]

If one adds to the above construction the condition (+), then it is easy to show that m ' (and, indeed, every model based on $ ' ) fails to satisfy (STF):


Suppose some point didn't satisfy (h ' ). By the definition of F, II 0f2 I 7'( a ) (jj) would then have to be q^. But this contradicts (e). Thus (g) holds, and hence: m =i m ' . This finishes the proof of the fact n that the PTQ-postulates do not satisfy (EP). Something must be wrong about this principle. It should perhaps be mentioned that the above proof contains two inessential complications due to the fact that I have chosen PTQ as my frame of reference. The argument would have been smoother had I applied it to a postulate concerning the subject position of some intransitive verb (rather than the objects of find); even more simplicity could have been gained by adopting individuals (rather than individual concepts) as the basic units of reference. This would, however, have presupposed a deviation from the PTQ type-assignment. It is also worth noting that the use of non-denumerable standard models in the above argument does not imply that denumerable nonstandard (= general) models behave any better. For if m and m ' areas construed above and m and m ' are denumerable general models of Th(m) and Th(m ' ), respectively5, then T(m) and TXm ' ) are obviously L n equivalent although they are still separated by (T). So (EP) is even in conflict with non-standard semantics of IL. Before discussing a revision of (EP), let me mention that a slight variation on the theme of the above proof reveals that (EP) also gets into trouble with another PTQ-postulate, viz. the definition of seek in terms of try and find according to Montague (1973: 235):

74 (+)

Itry 1 ( A f m d ' (f))P (i,j[^/Q0]) * Dtry" ( f t { ?}) la (i,j[^/Q0][Jl for some point < i , j > of JJ .

/F(j)]),

( 3{. is a variable of the type corresponding to TV-senses.) (EP) thus not only rules out certain type reductions like (T) but even some purely 'relational' postulates describing logical connections between lexical items.

3. A REVISION

(ENP) If m and m ' are models for L, and T(m) and T(m ' ) are ^-identical, then: m 1= n iff m ' \= II , where two models are Ln-identical if they agree in assigning denotations to arbitrary Ln-expressions. Note that (ENP) still implies that II accepts strong T-equivalence in the sense of Zimmermann (1983:23): m t FI iff m ' •= II whenever m and m ' are strongly T-equivalent, i.e. whenever 7Xm) = T (m ' ). Postulates that (partially) concern L, -expressions which do not play any role in the translation procedure Twill thus be ruled out by (ENP). I think that this is as it should be. The difference between (EP) and (ENP) is, of course, that the latter does not imply that FI accepts Inequivalence but only that it accepts the much finer 'relation' of Lnidentity.6 Still, the examples used in Zimmermann (1983) in order to motivate (EP) via acceptance of Ln-equivalence are not affected by this revision: postulates expressing intensional conditions on the indirect interpretation of extensional languages not only violate Ln-equivalence but also Ln-identity and thus do not satisfy (ENP). It should be mentioned that the general properties of (EP) which were discussed in Zimmermann (1983) carry over to (ENP). In particular, one can show that the restriction imposed by (ENP) does not collapse into (direct) expressibility in L n ; an example has already been discussed in the foregoing section. Moreover, (ENP) remains non-trivial even for systems FI of postulates accepting L -equivalence but 'essentially violating' (ENP), i.e. where FI is not equivalent to any system satisfying (ENP).


As can be seen directly from the above proof, there is an easy way to overcome the difficulty that (T) causes for (EP): simply redefine Inequivalence as sameness of denotation of all Ln-expressions (and not just the sentences). Then the proof does not go through anymore, since I find ' I r ( m ) =# 0 find ' I T ( m ' } . Indeed, the PTQ-postulates turn out to be oJc. according to this new version of (EP):

75

4.

POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS

(ENP) might, in fact, appear too weak to be of any interest: probably nobody, i.e. no 'working semanticist', would ever introduce a set FI of postulates violating (ENP). I am inclined to agree. But if this is correct, then any general study of the relation between logical and lexical semantics based on meaning postulates need not and must not involve too broad a notion of postulates. The above principle, then, helps to make this concept a little narrower than it appeared in Montague's original theory. Other constraints on meaning postulates are conceivable and have been proposed. As an example one can take the principles of compositionality and local applicability that were discussed by Kurt Engesser and myself.7 Like (ENP), these principles define structural constraints on the logical form of meaning postulates. More substantial constraints can presumably be obtained by translating (part of) the investigations carried out in 'possible words semantics' into a more logically inspired framework.8 It should then turn out that restrictions on the set of possible word meanings correspond to constraints on meaning postulates. One might, moreover, find some constraints which are only applicable to certain types of postulates so that, e.g., type shifting postulates like (T) are subject to another class of constraints than relational postulates like (STF). Such an approach would presumably involve some global classification of meaning postulates in purely semantic terms. All this is, however, far beyond the scope of the present paper. Another objection to (ENP) and the entire semantic approach under-


The (artificial) example discussed in Section 5 of Zimmermann (1983) also works for (ENP) in place of (EP). What was wrong with (EP)? I guess one could say that the original principle was too 'logic-oriented' in that it was based on the assumption that the evaluation of sentences (i.e. the truth-value assignment) is the only semanticaJly relevant aspect of models. However, as the case of (T) shows it is sometimes desirable to constrain the interpretation of expressions of other categories in a way that does not correspond to any constraint on truth-value assignments. Another way of looking at the intuitive difference between (EP) and (ENP) is suggested by saying that (EP) did not allow for non-standard effects, i.e. models which are declared unintended even though they are (on a sentence level) equivalent to some intended model. With (ENP) one can have such 'non-standard' models as long as the borderline between intended and unintended models does not cut through the partition induced by L -identity and strong T-equivalence. But this condition is obviously very weak.

76

Sonderforschungsbereich 99 Universitat Konstanz Postfach 5560 D- 7750 Konstanz FRG

NOTES

1. Montague (1973), 235, (4). 2. Zimmermann (1983). 3. 1 follow Montague (1970), rather than Montague (1973), in my general semantic terminology and notation. 4. More precisely, W is the cartesian product of two sets W. and W\ which can be thought of as the sets of worlds and times, respectively. In the terminology of PTQ, the elements of W are also called 'points of reference'. As I have pointed out in the preceding note however, I do not follow this terminology but rather assume that a point of reference is a pair < i, j > , where i e W and j is an IL-variable assignment. 5. Th(m) is the set of sentences true in m. The kind of general semantics I have in mind here has been developed in Gallin (1975:17f). The fact that such m and m ' exist then follows from Gallin's lemma 3.3.1. Cf. Gallin (1975:30).


lying that principle might be that meaning postulates are an inadequate tool for linking lexical and logical semantics. In particular, certain generalizations on the semantic behaviour of expressions of the same syntactic category seem to resist a straightforward treatment by meaning postulates.9 Moreover, one might follow Keenan (1983) and argue that postulates imposing restrictions on the possible denotations of lexical items should be replaced by sub-type conditions so that one wouldn't even need transparency postulates any more. But one would still want to have some semantic coherence within the lexicon. However, the only way to achieve this goal is, to my knowledge, the use of 'relational' postulates. A third objection is this: (ENP) allows for distinctions (between classes of models) which are not definable in terms of the usual semantic primitives such as analyticity, entailment etc. I am not quite sure what to reply to this kind of argument, except that higher-order techniques have frequently been applied in the logical analysis of natural language and that it is as least doubtful whether any serious alternatives exist. But even if it should turn out that there are deductively complete systems of logic matching some large portion of ordinary language, analyses based on these systems would not necessarily be ruled out by (ENP). The principle is just liberal enough as to also allow for purely semantic approaches to meaning, as opposed to syntactically motivated, i.e. deductive, ones.10

77

REFERENCES Carter, Richard J., 1976: Some constraints on possible words. Semantikos 1,2: 27-66. Dowty, David R. 1979: Word Meaning and Montague Grammar. Reidel, Dordrecht. Dowty, David R., Robert E. Wall, and Stanley Peters, 1981: Introduction to Montague Semantics. Reidel, Dordrecht. Engesser, Kurt, 1980: Untersuchungen zur Montaguegrammatik. Dissertation, Universitat Konstanz. Gallin, Daniel, 1975: Intensional and Higher-Order Modal Logic. North-Holland, Amsterdam. Keenan, Edward L., 1983: Facing the Truth: Some Advantages of Direct Interpretation. Linguistics and Philosophy 6: 335-371. Lakoff, George, 1970: Linguistics and Natural Logic. Synthese 22: 151-271. Montague, Richard, 1970: Universal Grammar. Theoria 36: 373-398. Montague, Richard, 1973: The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English. In: Hintikka, Jaakko, Julius Moravcsik and Patrick Suppes (eds.): Approaches to Natural Language. Reidel, Dordrecht, 221-242. Partee, Barbara, 1976: Semantics and syntax: The search for constraints. In: Rameh, Clea (ed.): Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics 1976. Washington, D.C.; 99-110. Partee, Barbara and Mats Rooth, 1983: Generalized Conjunction and Type Ambiguity. In: Bauerle, Rainer, Christoph Schwarze and Arnim von Stechow (eds.): Meaning, Use, and Interpretation of Language. W. de Gruyter, Berlin & New York; 361-383. Zimmermann, Thomas, 1983: Bedeutungspostulate in der Montague-Grammatik. Conceptus XVII, 4(M1: 19-28. Zimmermann, Thomas (forthcoming): Transparent Adverbs and Scopeless Quantifiers. In: Groenendijk, Jeroen, Dick de Jongh and Martin Stokhof (eds.): Information, Interpretation, and Inference. Foris, Dordrecht.


6. D accepts L -equivalence if for any L -equivalent models m and m ' in JC n 7" n i the following holds: m eJL ' iff m eJC ' ; this definition has been adopted from Zimmermann (1983:23). Acceptance of L -identity can be defined in an analogous fashion. 7. See Engesser (1980:310 and Zimmermann (forthcoming), Section 6. 8. See e.g. Lakoff (1970, Section VII), Carter (1976), and Dowty (1979, Section 2.4) for three different approaches to possible word meanings. Dowty (1979, Section 3.1) also gives some arguments against constraints proposed by generative semanticists. 9. This has been observed by Partee and Rooth (1983:377f, Note 16). It is the only real-life example illustrating the weakness of postulates that I know of. Artificial restrictions that cannot be captured by postulates are much more easily found: see, e.g., Dowty, Wall & Peters (1981:268). 10. The present paper is an elaboration of the first part of my talk at the 5th Amsterdam Colloquium on Formal Semantics, August 1984. The other parts are included in Zimmermann (forthcoming). — I am indebted to Jim Fearns and Ron Feemster for checking my English and to Wolfgang Sternefeld and an anonymous referee of the Journal of Semantics for various critical remarks on an earlier version of this paper.


Journal of Semantic* 4: 79 - 99

THE VERB AND ITS SEMANTIC POWER: ASSOCIATION AS A BASIS FOR VALENCE THEORY HJ. HERINGER

...the verb (the soul of the sentence)... W.C. Whitney, Language and the Study of Language, London 1967: 228

Valence theory has been syntactically oriented; the fundamental distinction between complements and supplements has remained without justification. It is shown in this paper that (i) valence theory can be founded semantically and (ii) that the distinction between complements and supplements is a semantic, relational, and gradual distinction. These are conclusions from an association experiment we are reporting which gives the distance of question words from verbs by considering frequency, latency, and rank of mention.

1.

Whitney's beautiful metaphor sounds like a topos to the linguist's ear. The question is: how does this soul breathe life into the body of the sentence? In concrete and banal terms the verb does this by organizing the sentence. The verb is the core of the sentence. Hunting for historical precedence we find our topos - like just about anything in the intellectual history of the West - with Aristotle. Temporarily hidden from view it comes back to light in Scholasticism: connoting words evoke something else; e.g. albus (white) would presuppose something of which it is an attribute. Our topos reappears with the Scholastic Petrus Helias, who made a distinction between syntactic aspects (voce) and semantic ones (sensu); on both levels the verb governs other parts of speech (Seidel 1982: 271). In the 12th century our topos subsided to the bottom of the vernacular grammars: "Li verbes gouverne et n'est pas gouverne"s" (Heinimann 1963: 33). Repressed by the Latin tradition of Donatus, and resurrected by Meiners in 1781: "Das Pradikat ist der vornehmste Theil des Satzes; denn aus ihm entwickelt sich der ganze Satz. Es gleichet einer vollen Friihlingsknospe. Wie diese bey ihrer Entwickelung aus sich einen


ABSTRACT

80


ganzen Zweig sammt Nebenzweigen und Blattern hervor treibet; also liegen auch in dem einzigen Pradikat nicht nur alle Haupttheile, sondern auch Nebentheile des Satzes verschlossen, die sich daraus herleiten lassen. Wie dieses zugehe, das mussen wir itzo zeigen" (Meiner 1781: 127). Finally, it is Humboldt who recognizes its importance. He reveals "the verb as the most important part of speech, and the central point of every language" (Humboldt 1885: 332). Its importance is reflected in its ability to mould the other parts of speech into a complete sentence. But topoi are masters of mimicry. They change their shape and colour, mislead by their tempting appearance and tend to conceal their true nature. An attempt to lay a theoretical foundation for the above topos is valence theory, as formulated by Tesniere. Tesniere bases his theory on a semantic design of the sentence, describing it as a miniature drama (Tesnie*re 1959: 102), with the verb in a leading role, referring to a process, and, in addition, the participants (actants) and the circumstances (circonstants). But the treatment of the verb remains purely syntactic. While nouns are relatively neutral in their syntactic function, the verb imposes a structuring pattern on its environment, determining the function of the phrases and thus forming a syntactic whole. And this is the main idea which has been pursued by the syntactic theory of valence. The power of the verb is represented by syntactic categorization of the verbs, and of the NPs into complements and supplements. Complements are those NPs that are obligatory whereas supplements are those that are facultative. This was the leading idea. It led to widespread ramifications, was revised several times, and subjected to operational tests (cf. Helbig 1981: 27-40). In fact all this was an attempt to take into account the semantic phenomenon that complements and supplements stand in different relations to the verb; complements are arguments of the verb, and supplements are additional predications, added to the propositional core, which is formed by the verb with its complements. More often than not linguists got trapped in a kind of category mistake and conceived of complements and supplements as syntactic categories instead of as relational concepts. Eventually, valence theory has not succeeded in justifying syntactically the difference between complements and supplements; it has not succeeded in explaining why verbal valence is effective in different syntactical positions. It has ignored the fact that the verb has its structuring power not only as a predicate within the elaborated form of the sentence but also in minimal syntactifications, such as verbal compounds, where it organizes the meaning without the support of any syntactic structure.

81 2.


Because of all this it seems all the more attractive to change the point of view radically and to look at the syntactic phenomena through semantic glasses. The different forms of syntactic realization derive from one uniform semantic power of the verb. The distinction between complements and supplements is then (i) a semantic distinction; syntactically they are both NPs; (ii) a relational distinction, since an NP is only a complement or a supplement in relation to a certain verb; (iii) a gradual distinction, since semantic boundaries are not sharp but fuzzy boundaries. The question is now, how the semantic power of the verb can be approached theoretically. By introspection, by analysis of usage, or by investigating the textual or sentential distribution? All these methods may be legitimate, but here I want to follow a different empirical method which relies on the following theoretical assumptions on the nature of meaning: (i) The meaning of a word is not homogeneous in the sense of being invariable from speaker to speaker. The notion that a word should have just one unique and intersubjective meaning is a myth, albeit a myth necessary for communication. Without it there would be no hope for understanding. We have empirical corroboration of this plausible assumption from Labov (1973) and Coleman/Kay (1981). (ii) Individual knowledge of intersubjective meaning, which is of course subjective, has a different status and different extension from intersubjective meaning. Intersubjective is only what in fact lies within common knowledge (in the sense of Schiffer 1972). Intersubjective meaning is more of an abstraction, or an average, constructed from the many subjective meanings. (iii) Subjective meaning is a cognitive complex of semantic relations which have been acquired in the course of previous communication and experience. These relations manifest themselves in how the word in question is used in communication. And they also form the basis for associations, which are rather extracommunicative and emanate from a subjective associative network. The conception of meaning as essentially associative is not new in linguistics. The dark space of the unconscious in the soul from which all speech actions flow is, as H. Paul put it, "ein Produkt aus alledem, was friiher einmal durch Horen anderer, durch eigenes Sprechen und durch Denken in den Formen der Sprache in das Bewusstsein getreten ist" (Paul 1920: 26). This product has an associative structure, and in this sense associations form the basis of all speech action. F. de Saussure even took all paradigmatic relations between expressions to be associative relations, and he spoke of associative fields:

82 "Les rapports et les differences entre termes linguistiques se deroulent dans deux spheres distinctes ... (Engler 1964: 276a). D*unepart... des rapports fondes sur le caractere lineaire de la langue ... (I.e. 277a). C'est la sphere des rapports syntagmatiques (I.e. 279b). D'autre part, en dehors du discours, les mots offrant quelque chose de commun s'associent dans la memoire, et il se forme ainsi des groupes, au sein desquels regnent des rapports tres divers (I.e. 280a) ... Nous les appellerons rapports associatifs" (I.e. 281a).

Unfortunately these insights have had little or no effect on the everyday practise of linguistics.

They did, however, become operative in many psychological association experiments, some of which have been concerned with associative meaning (Deese 1962, Marx 1978). Associations are frequently seen as simply 'given' in cognition, but occasionally they are also taken as determined by the meaning of the respective stimulus word (Clark 1970). Unfortunately this experimental work was not accompanied by a high level of reflection as regards linguistic theory, and it was not made clear that it relied upon theoretical assumptions that are in contrast with the usual notions in linguistic semantics that meaning is language specific, that meanings are distinct, stand in systematic relations, etc. Experimental psychologists simply tried to avoid the dispute by postulating a new type of meaning, i.e. associative, or psychological, meaning seen as a pure reflex of thought where no linguistic expression intervenes (Szalay/Deese 1978: 2,16).1 Psychological association experiments have dealt almost exclusively with paradigmatic associations, presumably a consequence of the fact that subjects mostly associated in paradigmatic dimensions; but perhaps also a consequence of Saussurean conceptualization. Even with grammatical phenomena only the paradigmatic aspect has been considered (distribution and category, Deese 1965: 97, an exception is Kielhofer 1981). And it is only in some recent experiments that syntagmatic or predicative structures underlying the paradigmatic associations are considered. Engelkamp (1973), for instance, found that the probability of reproducing certain nouns varies with different verbs as a stimulus word, i.e. that there are varying affinities between nouns and verbs. The semantic power of the verb, in the sense here intended, consists in its power of requiring or evoking certain nominal complements. The communicative background for this is that certain questions impose themselves upon the speakers, given a particular verb. The very use of the verb requires that these questions, which are concerned with the slots opened


3.

83

by the verb, are answered. In actual sentences the meaning of the verb presupposes that these slots are filled (cf. Heringer 1984a). The degree of probability with which these questions arise reflects the degree of necessity of the complements. Although the questions are formally determined by the grammatical form of sentences in which the verb in question occurs in finite form, one may expect that they also characterize the grammatical potential of the verb in other syntactic environments.

4.

I shall now present the results of an association experiment that deals with syntagmatic associative relations between verbs and questions.2 The aim of the experiment was to determine the specific proximity of verbs and question words. The test was conducted with 100 subjects. In a pretest, 20 stimulus verbs were selected according to the following criteria: (i) They should present different valence types of German. (ii) Some of them should come from sets of semantically related verbs. (These are the verbs from the buying (kaufen) scene and from the legal context.) (iii) They should, at least in the majority of cases, not be polyvalential. There are, however, some polyvalential verbs to provide a contrast. The following 20 verbs were selected: lachen (to laugh), denken (to think), gehorchen (to obey), gehoren (to belong), befehlen (to order), appellieren (to appeal), spekuUeren (to speculate), kaufen (to buy), verkaufen (to sell), bezahlen (to pay), schulden (to owe), anklagen (to accuse), beschuldigen (to accuse), verurteilen (to condemn), freisprechen (to acquit), fragen (to ask), degradieren (to degrade), folgern (to infer), rechtfertigen (to justify), heifien (to be called/to order). All verbs were presented to every subject in one session.3 They were presented in the infinitive form and the subjects were asked to produce all


Presuming that semantic proximity between Vs and Ns is reflected in associations of questions to stimulus verbs we put forward the following hypotheses to be checked by an association experiment: (i) First order nominal syntagms show differences in semantic proximity to the V. (ii) Semantic proximity of nominals with identical syntactic category varies from V to V according to verb meaning, i.e. they are more or less verb specific. (iii) Traditional V-complements are nearer to the V then traditional supplements. (iv) Transition from complements to supplements is gradual.

84


questions (question words) that occurred to them in connection with each verb. The responses were tape recorded and were ranked according to (i) order, (ii) frequency, and (iii) latency. The pretest had shown that it was necessary to pool the responses in niches. E.g. the responses warum?, weshalb?, weswegen?, aus welchem Grund?, wegen was? (why, for what reason, because of what?) were pooled under the lead warum? The idea is that these questions aim at the same kind of answer. In addition, the question words had to be pooled for each verb separately. E.g. wem? and an wen? with the verb bezahlen are questions aiming at the seller, whereas the question an wen? with the verb denken must be pooled with woran? and an was? With the verb gehdren the question wem? may arise but not the question an wen? In some cases (e.g. was? as nominative and accusative) the question words are ambiguous in a way that could not be resolved in this test format. An example: suppose a subject associates with the verb hchen successively: 1. wer? 2. woruber? 3. warum? 4. wie? 5. wie lange? 6. wann? The order gives the subjective ranking of the subject in question. From the subjective ranks we computed the rank R of the question word as a mean (cf. Table 1). Moreover, suppose our subject was timed to utter wer? after 1.8 sec, woruber? after 2.0 sec, warum? after 2.4 sec, wie? after 2.9 sec, wie lange? after 3.9 sec and wann? after 5.3 sec. From these subjective latencies we computed the mean latency L for each question word (cf. Table 1). Finally, the frequency F of particular responses was considered, because isolated responses could reach very high figures for mean rank and for mean latency. For this reason it would not be adequate to present the results in the order of their mean rank; less frequent question words would then be overrated (cf. Table 1). A neglect of frequency would be especially distorting in cases of short latency, and in particular where short latency co-occurs with high rank. Thus, the question word womit shows an exceptional value of latency with the verb lachen (cf. Table 1). Obviously, there was one subject who had made up his mind to respond with womit even before the stimulus was given (similarly, another subject's response: warum nicht). So we computed the ratio F/L, which is used as a limit for reasonable results; if the logarithm of F/L is negative the corresponding question word is not taken up in the final representation. Long latency may mislead as well as very short latency. If a participant thinks too long (and in fact does not associate) he will reach the most ridiculous responses. Thus, the response durch was with a rank of 2.00 for the verb lachen is surely amazing. But a glance on latency reveals the real resason for this high ranking. All such in fact marginal responses are filtered through frequency and the corresponding limitation to LN (F/L)

WARUM WER WORUEBER WIE WANN WIE LANGE WO MITWEM WIE OFT WIESO WEM WAS AN WEN WIE STARK WODURCH WIE VIEL WEN DURCH WAS FUER WEN ZUWEM WOHIN WONACH WIE GERN WIELAUT WOMIT WARUM NICHT AUFGRUND WELCHER URSACHE

VERB: IACHEN

TABLE 1

601 101 312 501 401 403 301 213 404 701 104 102 202 505 512 521 103 206 209 222 304 306 507 510 511 611 656

answer no. 76 63 52 33 19 9 7 6 5 5 4 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

frequency

F R

2.08 1.60 2.02 2.61 3.05 3.33 3.86 2.33 3.60 4.80 2.75 2.50 5.50 2.50 3.50 4.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 1.00 1.00 3.00

rank 1.00350 0.94254 1.19624 1.39058 1.22355 0.70711 1.57359 0.81650 0.89443 1.48324 1.50000 2.12132 0.70711 0.70711 2.12132 2.82843 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000

std.dev.

oaded from jos.oxfordjournals.org by guest on January 1, 2011

L

4.96 3.44 4.31 7.21 7.42 7.89 7.14 8.33 8.20 10.40 10.00 12.00 10.00 4.50 15.50 5.50 9.00 15.00 5.00 9.00 10.00 18.00 6.00 6.00 2.00 4.00 10.00

latency LN (F/L) 2.729 2.906 2.491 1.521 0.940 0.132 -0.020 -0.329 -0.495 -0.732 -0.916 -1.792 -1.609 -0.811 -2.048 -1.012 -2.197 -2.708 -1.609 -2.197 -2.303 -2.890 -1.792 -1.792 -0.693 -1.386 -2.303

F/L

15.321 18.290 12.071 4.576 2.560 1.141 0.980 0.720 0.610 0.481 0.400 0.167 0.200 0.444 0.129 0.364 0.111 0.067 0.200 0.111 0.100 0.056 0.167 0.167 0.500 0.250 0.100

std.dev. 3.58307 2.07736 3.37545 6.46991 3.96254 4.28498 2.73426 5.42832 5.84807 6.98570 9.38083 8.48528 4.24264 0.70711 17.67766 3.53553 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000

oo

86

5.

The aim of our experiments was to create a diagrammatic representation of the semantic power of the verb as it shows up in syntagmatic qualities. The following systems can be seen as prototypes for verb valence. They are based on the ratio — - — and display the semantic distance of the questions to the verb. Figure 1 shows that the essential questions with verkaufen are wer?was? wem? They aim at just the slots that are traditionally postulated in valence theory. In addition, our satellite system shows a jump between complements and supplements, i.e. wer? was? wem? on the one hand and the remaining questions on the other. This jump, or gap, is more or less wide


It may seem remarkable that the question wer? often, and even in its mean value, comes out lower than perhaps expected (cf. Table 2). This is easily explained, however, by the fact that the infinitive's function is just to mention the verb without any subject. And it is indeed impossible to mention the subject (contrary to other complements or supplements) together with the infinitive: *Das Buch Paul gehdren vs. Paul gehdren (*The book to belong to Paul, vs. to belong to Paul). From this point of view it seems rather remarkable that wer? comes out as high as it does, surely an indication for the paramount importance of the subject. Although wer? is relatively less frequent than other question words it comes out very well in rank (cf. lachen Table 1). More significant is the case of gehorchen with verb-specific wem? But even here, in spite of longer latency wer? predeces wem? in rank. Without any claim to a final explanation of these facts, the conjecture seems permitted that unmarked or normal word order and the fact that there are more and less usual successions for the mention of question words play their part here. It should be noted that selectional properties of verbs with regard to question words are a relevant factor. There are selectional differences for the series wer? - wen? - wem? (for human or animate) in contrast to was? (for inanimate). Comparing gehdren and gehorchen (Tables 2 and 3) we notice wem? at the top in frequency and not bad in rank either. (With gehorchen the question wem? is exceeded by wer?) But wer? is more frequent with gehorchen than with gehdren, a consequence of selection, since gehdren also admits was? as a question asking for the subject. Likewise, and even more clearly, was? occurs rarely with gehorchen, but with gehdren it occupies the second place. The fact that selected wer? also reaches an overall better rank than selected was? with gehorchen could perhaps reflect a certain anthropocentrism of language (cf. Zubin 1979: 195).

WEM WARUM WER WIE WANN WOZU WO WAS IN WIEFERN IN WELCHER SITUATION WIE LANGE WIESO WORIN WIE OFT WIE SEHR IN WELCHEM ZUSAMMENHANG UNTER WELCHEN BEDINGUNGEN A UF WAS WOGEGEN WANNNICHT WIE WEIT WODURCH

VERB:GEHORCHEN

TABLE 2

104 601 101 501 401 802 301 102 531 558 403 701 311 404 504 560 564 203 305 407 508 512

answer no. 93 77 60 20 12 10 6 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1

frequency

F

std.dev. 0.54357 0.73181 0.58488 1.03999 1.00000 0.84984 0.51640 0.57735 1.29099 0.95743 0.57735 2.08167 1.41421 1.41421 0.00000 1.41421 2.12132 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000

rank 1.47 2.58 1.38 3.15 3.50 3.50 4.67 1.50 3.50 3.75 3.67 3.67 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.50 6.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00

R

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L

2.97 5.64 3.00 8.50 7.17 9.80 7.33 3.25 14.25 11.75 9.00 8.33 12.00 12.50 9.00 7.00 12.50 23.00 14.00 10.00 9.00 10.00

latency 1.72230 2.76208 1.97441 6.45225 2.88675 5.75036 2.06559 1.25831 19.24187 3.86221 1.73205 1.15470 1.41421 0.70711 2.82843 4.24264 4.94975 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000

std.dev.

LN (F/L) 3.445 2.615 2.996 0.856 0.515 0.020 -0.201 0.208 -1.270 -1.078 -1.099 -1.022 -1.792 -1.833 -1.504 -1.253 -1.833 -3.135 -2.639 -2.303 -2.197 -2.303

F/L

31.337 13.661 20.000 2.353 1.674 1.020 0.818 1.231 0.281 0.340 0.333 0.360 0.167 0.160 0.222 0.286 0.160 0.043 0.071 0.100 0.111 0.100

WARUM NICHT

WO

SEIT WANN WIESO WOFUER

WEN

WARUM WER WIE LANGE WOHIN WIE WIEVIEL WOZU WANN

WAS

WEM

VERB: GEHOEREN

TABLE 3

403 304 501 521 802 401 103 402 701 801 301 611

101

104 102 601

answer no.

9 6 6 5 4 4 3 3 1 1

10

92 73 30 28 12

F frequency 1.45 1.71 3.33 2.11 4.08 2.40 3.44 3.33 3.33 3.80 1.50 3.50 4.00 4.33 3.00 5.00

R rank 0.56186 0.67658 1.02833 0.99403 1.31137 1.26491 1.01379 0.81650 1.03279 0.83666 0.57735 1.29099 2.00000 1.15470 0.00000 0.00000

std.dev.

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3.02 3.92 8.13 4.71 10.25 6.20 9.78 9.83 7.67 9.60 3.75 12.25 10.67 9.33 6.00 7.00

L latency 1.48973 3.02192 4.75418 2.87849 7.79423 3.99444 2.81859 8.28049 2.50333 2.60768 1.50000 6.39661 5.03322 3.05505 0.00000 0.00000

std.dev.

30.446 18.633 3.689 5.939 1.171 1.613 0.920 0.610 0.783 0.521 1.067 0.327 0.281 0.321 0.167 0.143

F/L

3.416 2.925 1.305 1.782 0.158 0.478 -0.083 -0.494 -0.245 -0.652 0.065 -1.119 -1.269 -1.135 -1.792 -1.946

LN(F/L)

00 00

89

verkaufen IOXL

T

question was wer an wen wen wo wie wleviel warm wann wofuer wonin wen wozu

Figure 1. for different verbs and does not justify two different syntactic categories, because that would presuppose an absolute distinction where we find a transition, as has been expected within the theory of associative meaning. The results for the second verb of the buyingscene are very similar (cf. Fig. 2).

y«eshalb

wleviel

kaufen

Figure 2.

IOxL 1

question

.7 1.3 4.1 4.4 6.5 7.0 7.1 7.7 15.3 15.8 20.0

was wer warum wo wann won wozu wievie! wle worn I t weshalb


. 5 1.2 1 .6 2 .3 4 .8 7 .3 7 .4 8 .5 9..4 10.8 13..9 15..0 15. 2

90

fur wievlV

\weshalb

schulden IOXL

"T .9 1.1 1.6 2 .S 4 .2 14 .4 20 .0

figure 3.

question weo wer was wieviel waruo weslulb fuer wieviel


The gap between the complements wer? and was? on the one hand, and the supplements on the other reappears, but transition is smoother. The reason is that wo? is not purely a question for a supplement, but may also ask for the seller. Verbs of the buyingscene are characterized by four semantic roles: buyer, seller, goods, and payment. Whereas the seller role plays the most prominent part with verkaufen it is more in the background with kaufen. All the same, the question concerning the seller arises here, evoked by the knowledge of the commercial script. But, as is not foreseen by valence or selection, it appears in the disguised form of wo? The embanassing fact that the question von wem? does not appear in the evaluated range is explained by this kind of suppletion. It is a consequence of semantic valence and perspective with verkaufen - where the seller is in the foreground - that the question concerning the seller (wer?) here comes out so much better. The fact that wo? scores so much less with verkaufen is explained by the fact that with the latter the question word for the seller is wer? Another type of suppletion is shown in Figures 3 and 4. The questions was? and wieviel? in connection with schulden aim at the same slot, so do the questions woruber? and warum? in connection with lachen. They could have been put into one niche and would then have been much nearer to the verb in the respective satellite systems (3) and (4). There is a difference, however, between the two cases, since wieviel? in the case of schulden is a potential specification of was? whereas woruber? and warum? in connection with lachen are partially competing questions. Very similar is the behaviour of the selectional variants wer? and was?

91

in the case of gehdren (cf. Fig. 5). Both aim at the same participant (was? as a question for an accusative complement is out of place here) so that the subject would reach a higher value than appears at first glance. It is also an interesting question why with lachen and schulden there are very few question words that reach the limit of LN (F/L) > O, in comparison with kaufen and verkaufen. The latter verbs evoke many more questions. One explanation for this could be that communicative

gehoeren IOXL

~F .6 1.1 4.3 5.6 12.5 14.0 15.6 15.6

Figures.

question wem was wer wansi zu woa wle lange wofcin HOZU


Figure 4.

92 relevance plays an important part here. Frequent verbs, which are of great communicative relevance, tend to have a more diffuse meaning and, therefore, may evoke more questions. Verb satellite systems containing double valences are potentially misleading. Our representation does not show that e.g. with gehoren the question wem? and wohin? are alternatives which do not co-occur and are connected to different uses of the verb. The same holds for was? and wonach? with/hz^en 4 (cf. Fig. 6).

~F 1.0 1.0 1.2 2 .4 6 .3 7.2 12..2 13..6 15..6 20. 0

question

wen wer was warun

wie wann wonach wozu

wo wodurch

Figure 6.

hefssen IOXL

T 1.0 1.1 4 .2 6 .9 8 ,t 15..0

Figure 7.

question

wer wle wen warua

was wann


igen IOXL

93

In Fig. 9 warum? is very close whereas the complement question wessen? is much further away. The reason for this seems very simple: it is a matter of suppletion. The adverbal genitive becomes more and more unusual in German. The consequence is that the corresponding slot of the verb is marked by the question warum? Unusualness of the adverbal genitive has

eshalb

folflern IOXL

~T 1.5 1.7 2.2 4.8 14.5 20.0

Figure 8.

question

was wer woraus warun weshalb wozu


In those cases questions specific to one use of the verb score lower results than non-specific ones, a consequence of the fact that in the association experiment the different uses of the verb cannot be kept apart. A similar amalgamation has taken place with heifien (wer? wie?) and heifien {wer? wen? was?) (cf. Fig. 7). The verb heifien is especially interesting because it is the only one where wie? aims at a complement and therefore - different from all other verbs - can score very good results. This also applies to the question woraus? in connection with folgern (cf. Fig. 8). These examples should have demonstrated sufficiently that the questions are verb-specific in the sense that their affinity to the verb results from the verb meaning. The following three verbs, beschuldigen, appeUieren, spekulieren, are significantly less frequent than the verbs we have discussed so far. Lacking familiarity to the subjects of our experiment is reflected in the associations (cf. Figures 9, 10, and 11).

94

beschuldlgen tOxL "7 question wen wer warua weshalb wann weswegen wosit WdS wofuer wessen

figure 9. also the effect that womit? is relatively close to the verb, a question which is otherwise very unusual in fully syntactified constructions. The high scoring womit? aims at the same slot and suppletes the genitive. The decline of the adverbal genitive can be seen as a reason, but also as a consequence of those suppletions. So we could speculate and try to make a prediction as to the future syntactic realization suppleting the genitive, not only in the form of a question, but also as an answer: Man beschuldigt

appellieren IOXL

question

I figure 10.

.8 1.3 4.2 5.3 8.1 8.3 8.5 12.0 14.8 16.9 20.0 20.0

an wen wer warum

wen art was

was wle westialb warm wodurch wozu WOJIit


.6 1.3 2.0 5.4 7.4 8.0 11.2 12.2 13.3 17.6

95

spekulieren IOXL

Figure 11.

ihn, weil er gestohkn hat. An analogous development we may expect for anklagen with wessen? vs warum? Another type of variation appears with appeUieren and spekulieren, where abstruse questions have high scores. The question wen? with appellieren can only be explained by the fact that subjects did not know the meaning of the verb well or perhaps that they replaced it by an equivalent like anrufen where the question wen? does make sense. Surprising is also the question was? with spekulieren, possibly induced by daft -phrases with correlate, like Ich spekuliere (darauf), daft er kommt. It is not unlikely that also other types of hesitation interfere in these cases, since all these verbs are loan words, and their use is restricted to certain styles and universes of discourse.

6.

The leading idea of our experiment was that the different questions aim at different, semantically defined, slots of the verb. The verb-specific questions are sensitive to valence, the unspecific questions concern supplements. This hypothesis should have the effect that on the one hand there are niches with high scores for some verbs and low scores for others, and, on the other hand, that there are niches with constant scores with respect to different verbs. Whereas questions for complements should vary considerably, questions for supplements should show more constant values. An exception to this hypothesis would certainly be the question wer? which occurs with all verbs.


T question 1.3 wer 1.8 worauf 4.4 warum 5.9 worueber 6.3 vomit 9.7 w 11.6 auf was 11.6 sit was 15.9 wie 16.8 wann 20.0 wodurch

96 If we take a look at our niches from this point of view, the first relevant result is that they vary considerably with respect to their occurrence with different verbs (cf. Table 4).

TABLE 4 question word WORAN WORAUS WO VON WORAUF WESSEN WOHIN WONACH WIE VIEL WOFUER WORUEBER WOZU WOMIT WEM WEN WODURCH WO WARUM WER WIE WANN WAS

occurs with n verbs 2 2 3 4 5 6 6 10 10 12 14 14 16 16 18 19 20 20 20 20 20


We clearly seem to have verb-specific questions on the one hand, which can be considered as typical complement questions. On the other hand, we have unspecific questions, some of which are traditionally considered as complement questions (wer? was?), and some as supplement questions iyvann?, wie?, warum?). They can only be shown to aim at either complements or supplements of the individual verb by means of semantic distance. There is, however, a tendency for particular question words to have an affinity either with complements or supplements. This tendency is corroborated when the standard deviation is considered. There is a gradual order from supplement questions to complement questions (cf. Fig. 12). High standard deviation reflects verb-specificity, hence affinity with complements. The only exception is wer?, which occurs with all verbs. Relatively constant questions, which have only minor variation in standard deviation, show their affinity with supplements. Certainly, we do not expect a categorial distinction, but this is a clear criterion of degree for the different semantic functions of complements

97 [standard deviation

and supplements in sentences. Hence valence theory has not been chasing a chimera, but represents an adequate intuition with respect to linguistic facts. To the extent that the meaning of a word is reflected in the associations of the speaker-hearer, it has been shown that verb valence is in fact a semantic phenomenon which is reflected in frequency, rank, and latency of associated question words. The closer the question is to the verb the more it can be seen as relating to a complement of the verb. Certainly, there is no clear line between complements and supplements, but a continuum in semantic affinity between questions and verbs. The verb determines the form of utterances in which it occurs in the sense that already its meaning evokes certain questions which the text or sentence may answer. The answers to the nearest questions may be grammaticalized in the form of grammatical case and prepositions as proposed in syntactic valence theory. But the semantic power of the verb not only works in its predicate function but also in other syntactic functions, e.g. in nominal compounds (cf. Heringer 1984b). Universitdt Augsburg Universitdtsstrallc 10 8900 Augsburg - FRG

NOTES 1. Szalay/Deese even deny a problem of translation in cross-cultural investigations (Szalay/Deese 1978: 27). Obviously psychological meaning is meant to be independent of linguistic expressions.


Figure 12.

98 2. The experiment was planned and carried out in a project at the University of Augsburg, whose financial support I gratefully acknowledge. I wish to thank also F. Keller-Bauer, who was responsible for the analysis of the data. 3. To avoid effects of clustering (which actually occurs) the verbs were given in reverse order to one half of the subjects; as for clustering cf. Deese 1962: 36. 4. The distribution is very complex with bezahlen where we have the following correspondences: bezahlen wer wem was/wieviel wer wen worn it wer wen wo fur

REFERENCES


Clark, HH., 1970: Word associations and linguistic theory. In: J. Lyons (ed.), New horizons in linguistics, Penguin Books, London; 271-286. Coleman, P. & Kay, P., 1981: Prototype Semantics. Language 57: 26-44. Deese, J., 1962: On the Structure of Associative Meaning. In: Psychological Review 69: 151-175. Deese, J., 1965: The structure of Associations in Language and Thought. John Hopkins Press, Baltimore. Engelkamp, J., 1973: Semantische Struktur und die Verarbeitung von Sdtzen. H. Huber, Stuttgart. Engler, R., 1968: F. de Saussure Cows de linguistique gtnerale, tome 1; Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden. Heinimann, S., 1963: Zur Geschichte der grammatischen Terminologie im Mittelalter. In: Zeitschrift fur Romanische Philologie 79: IZ-ll. Helbig, G., 1982: Valenz, Satzglieder, semantische Kasus, Satzmodelle. Verlag Enzyklopa'die, Leipzig. Heringer, H j . , 1984a: Neues von der Verbszene. In: Sprache der Gegenwart (Jahrbuch 1983 des Instituts fur deutsche Sprache), Band LX; 34-64. Heringer, HJ., 1984b: Wortbildung: Sinn aus dem Chaos. In: Deutsche Sprache 1; 1-13. Humboldt, W. von, 1885: On the Verb in American Languages. In: Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 22: 332-354. Kielhofer, G., 1981: Strukturen der assoziativen Bedeutung. In: Kotschi, Th. (ed.), Beitrdge zur Linguistik des Franzdsischen (= Tubinger Beitrage zur Linguistik) 754:50-79. Labov, W., 1973: The boundaries of words and their meanings. In: J. Baily & R. Shuy (eds.), New ways of analyzing variation in English. Georgetown University PTess, Washington, 340-373. Marx, W., 1978: Die Messung der assoziativen Bedeutung von Satzen. In: Zeitschrift fur experimentelle und angewandte Psychologie 25: 113-119. Meiner, J.W., 1781: Versuch einer an der menschlichen Sprache abgebildeten Vernunftlehre oder philosophische und allgemeine Sprachlehre, Leipzig (Nachdruck: Frommann, Stuttgart 1971). Paul, H., 1920: Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte. Niemeyer, Tubingen. Schiffer, S., 1972: Meaning. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Szalay, L.B. & Deese, J., 1978: Subjective meaning and culture: An assessment through word associations. Erlbaum, Hillsdale. Seidel, K.O., 1982: Quid sit dictionem regere dictionem. Aspekte der Verbvalenz in Grammatiken des 12. bis 17. Jahrhunderts. In: Greule, A. (ed.), Valenztheorie

99 und historische Sprachwissenschaft. Beitrage zur sprachgeschichtlichen Beschreibung des Deutschen, 271-289. Tesni&re, L., 1969: Elements de syntaxe structurale. KBncksieck, Paris. Zubin, DJV., 1979: Discourse Function of Morphology: The Focus System in German. In: T. Givon (ed.), Discourse and Syntax (= Syntax and Semantics 12); 469504.


100 OBITUARY

Thomas T. Ballmer, Professor of Linguistics at the Ruhr Universitat Bochum and consulting editor of this Journal, put an end to his life on 2nd December, 1984. His death concluded an extended period of acrimonious legal dispute concerning his employment.

We shall miss him as a colleague and as a friend. His work has influenced many of us and he got many ideas under way that are now being developed further by others. The editors


Thomas Ballmer's scientific achievement was considerable. In the ten years after he had received his Dr. phil. from the Technische Universitat Berlin he wrote some seventy articles and four books, concerned with most areas of theoretical linguistics. His approach to all the problems he attended to was genuinely creative, characterized by a high degree of explicitness, clarity, and theoretical reflection.

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