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E V (R) (w)
In terms of this model, we can now redefme the thought (the subjective meaning, not the proposition or the objective meaning} expressed by a sentence S in a development from K1 to K2 as:
{w E W: 3f w, f p K2 \ K� } The definition is again the subjective notion of information we had initially for our DRSs. But we are now in a position where we can also defme objective propositions. The set of ontological alternatives nee ( a) of the actual world a in a model M is our starting point for defining classical propositions. These ontological alternatives represent ways the world a could have been given the way out world is organised. In particular, the alternatives are the same as the actual world up to a certain point in the past after which they diverge. The following definition gives a defmition of the classical proposition expressed by a sentence leading to a development from K1 to K2 •
{w E nec (a) : 3/ M, w, f, a p K2 \ K1 } We can strengthen this by noting that functions J satisfying this condition are ·uniquely determined by the intensional anchors of the DRS. Let !anchor
be the function that satisfies the intensional anchors of K2 then reformulate the defmition of classical proposition as:
{w E nee( a) : M, w, ]mchon a F K2 \ Kl }
\ K1 •
We can
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, x, iff < f(x1 } (v} , . . . ,J(x, } (v) M, w, J, v I= Rx1 , K) iffJ I= deJ(x, K) 2. M, w, J, v l= def(x, 3· M, w, J, v I= x = y iffJ(x) (v) = f(y) (v) 4· M, w, J, v I= Oc.p iff 'Vu E nec(w)M, u,J, v I= c.p S· M, w, J, v I= Bxc.p iff 'Vu E bel (f (x) (v))M, u , J, u I= c.p 6. M, w, J, v I= Lc.p iff 'Vu E W M, u, J, u f: c.p I.
302 Demonstratives
in
Discourse
This completes my reconstruction of Kaplan's notion of proposition within DRT.
Excursus This excursus presents a possible way of adding negation and quantification to our new DRT. (41) denies that we can satify
(41)
Mary does not have a boyfriend
the DRS
(42). Mary's boyfriend(x) )
exist(x) We can introduce a notion 'is false on' {=j) between models and (new-style) DRSs. The intuition is that we can form the discourse marker for Mary's boyfriend without any problem, but that we will run foul of the other condition in the DRS. In negation, the intensional anchors can be formed but they do not give us objects that extensionally satisfy the other conditions.
M, w, J, v =9 K iff M, w, J, v f= deJ (x, K1 ) for all conditions def(x, K1 ) E K and M, w, J , v =9 A for some other condition of K. M , w, J, v =9 A has to be spelled separately for each condition. This same idea also allows a treatment of universal quantification. We extend first of all the definition of def(x, K) to allow plural objects (sets), indicated by capital letters.
M , J f= def(X , K) iff 'v'w E Wf(X, w) = {a E U: M, w, J;•v , w f= K} This assigns to the discourse marker the concept of a set that denotes in a world w the set of the K-satisfters. We further need a predicate nonempty(X) that tests whether the extension is empty. We can then represent (43)
(43)
Every man is happy.
as we would
(44)
(44),
not(some men are not poor)
I.e. as the negation of
( 45 )
(45).
def(X , [man(X ) , -. poor(X )] ) nonempty(X )
The full definition of =9 is straightforward.
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def(x,
Henk Zeevat 303
6
I NTE N T I O NAL ANAPHORA
def(K, intend(y, e1 , x, K) } def(x, K) and the net effect is that x is bound to K and K is how the speaker intended x. The problem is however that the value of K will vary with the world in which it is evaluated: the speaker may intend x differently in different possible worlds. The way out is presumably to make the reference to a speaker's concept K a presupposition rather than an intensional anchor. If (46)
(46} intend(y, el l x, K) is presupposed and resolved to a concept K, we have solved the problem after adding a new intensional anchor def(x, K) using the K found by presupposition resolution. If one starts considering the possibility of accommodating the postulated K, a new complication arises. An accom modated presupposition-we must rule now-has an intermediate status between old and new material. It is new, but it is not taken on board when we determine the propositional content of sentences. This is not impossible and it is in line with the presupposition literature. Without it, we would land in exactly the same situation we had before. The statement that the speaker intends x under the intention K would be a constituent of the content. It is also good to notice that per force the accommodation about the speaker is global. The only inconsistency at the global level that could arise is that it is somehow known that the speaker does not intend x under any concept. But that is guaranteed to be false given that the speaker intends x under the concept associated with the referential device she has selected for x.
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It will become clear that we need speaker's reference for dealing with intentional anaphora. It is related to a test, like the one of Haas-Spohn (1995) for epistemic alternatives. We put the speaker in an alternative world and allow her the possibilities of unlimited investigation. The task is to identify the object she intended with her utterance of a referential expression. Clearly, the results of the test depend on what the speaker assumes about the referent, i.e. on the way the speaker intends the referent. In our theory, such a way of intending an object is represented by a condition def(x, K) and the way the interpreter can connect it to the utterance ex of a referring expression is by another condition: intend(y, ex , x, K) (speaker y intends x with ex under K). Assuming variables for DRSs we can have two conditions:
304 Demonstratives in Discourse
The following is an example where we might need accommodating speaker's reference. There is a tramp sitting by the side of the road and the speaker says:
=
(48) Hob believes that a witch killed poisoned his cow.
his
pig and Nob believes that she
We are considering the case where the witch does not exist and where Hob and Nob never talk and Nob does not accept that his witch killed Hob's pig. The first two clauses rule out giving a wider scope to a witch. The last clause rules out an Evans interpretation (based on the complement of the first conjunct), as that would make the second conjunct equivalent to (49). (49) Nob believes that the witch that killed Hob's pig poisoned his cow. So the remaining interpretation can only be based on speaker reference. Who would the speaker pick out as the referent in a world w?
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(47) You see that fellow? Bill thinks he used to be a millionaire. Here the context associates the referent with the common ground perception of the fellow. Since Bill is not present, he has no part in the perception. So perforce, the pronoun in the second sentence must be associated with a referential concept of the speaker, which can also carry Bill's belie£ E.g. the speaker may falsely assume with Bill that the man is Mr. So-and-so, the once well-known millionaire. I am assuming that new markers are represented by two discourse markers x and y tied to conditions def(x, K) and def(y, K1 ) with an assumed extensional identity x y, where one of K and K1 represents the speaker's intention. The interpreter may decide that K and K1 are in fact the same. In addition to the problems we face in this section there are two other arguments for setting up things in this way. The first is the ambiguity problem. We noted that names may have many bearers, and anaphora can often be resolved in different ways. A double representation offers a simple way of expressing the idea that the name or pronoun must refer to who the speaker intended. In addition, the double representation makes it possible to deal with Donnellan's and Kripke's examples of speaker's referents that are distinct from the literal referents of the expressions, and that we as charitable interpreters-as a repair strategy-interpret by ignoring. the literal mearung. The theory of intensional anchors has to meet a crucial test: intentional anaphora. The classical case is the Geach sentence about Hob and Nob. Edelberg (1992) has noted that many of the accounts of the Geach-sentence fail on the asymmetric examples he discusses. . Let us start with (a simplified version of) the Hob-Nob example.
Henk Zeevat 305
(so) Arsky believes somebody killed Jones and Barsky believes he left town. Intuition has it that (so) is not true in the circumstances described. It is of the murderer of Smith that Barsky believes that he left town and not of the murderer of Jones. So we have to answer the question: why cannot the speaker intend the referent of somebody as the mu rderer of Smith? (Free accommodation of speaker intentions would seem to allow this.) Obviously Arsky believes of the murderer of Smith that he killed Jones and Barsky believes that the murderer of Smith left town. We can bring out the problem also in the following way. Example (s I ) is obviously true, ·
(s I ) Arsky believes that the murderer of Smith murdered Jones and Barsky believes that he left town. ·
and the problematic example seems to follow from it by a simple application of existential generalization under the belief operator, a totally innocent inference. How do we explain this? My explanation is based on the assumptions we make about the speaker. Suppose it is somebody who-like Arsky-assumes that there is a single murderer of Smith and Jones. Then the person is sincere and reporting the facts, when she reports as in example (so).
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It is necessary that in Hob's belief alternatives the intensional object intended by the speaker exists and that that same intensional object also exists in Nob's belief alternatives. Some examples of successful possible intentions of the speaker are: the witch of the rumour going around in the village, the witch from the newspaper etc. They are successful because we find these suggestions in the literature as glosses for what the sentence could mean and are convinced by them. The interpretation we are describing is one where the speaker has an intention that does not denote in the actual world, but denotes across the belief alternatives of both Hob and Nob. The relationship between the discourse marker of the pronoun and those of its antecedents is that one of the discourse markers of the antecedent is intensionally identical to the other. In one of the Edelberg examples, we find the opposite situation. Arsky and Barsky are two detectives investigating the alleged murders of Smith and Jones. Arsky believes the murderer of Smith is the guy who killed Jones, but Barsky does not and, moreover, Barsky believes the murderer of Smith has left town. Smith and Jones were both victims of an accident and not murdered. The problem is the sentence (so).
3 o6
Demonstratives in Discourse
(52) Harry thinks that somebody crashed that car into a tree and Muriel thinks he is wounded.
def(x, person x crashed that car)
Muriel.
binds
x
to a concept that also works for
The Edelberg papers and intentional identity are important because they offer strong constraints on the kind of concept which can serve as an explanation of intentional identity, especially in the case of speaker reference: a concept under which the speaker intends the object in question. The Evans description in the other case also gives the only solution that explains the other two examples. Speaker's reference is not only a possibility for the interpretation of indefinites. ( s 3 ) can be a statement about a misrecognized Muriel.
( s 3) Harry is having a good time.
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But if we do not agree with Arsky-by not believing that any murders took place or by being like Barsky in assuming that the murderers may well be different persons-we cannot understand what the speaker says as a true report. Understanding seems to require that the murderer ofJones is given to us as the murderer of Smith. But this cannot be satisfied if we do not accept Arsky's identification of the two murderers. If the speaker has the information we have (we are asked to check the correctness of the report, given the dau) there is no basis for making the assumption that the speaker can intend the murderer of Jones as the murderer of Smith. The speaker has no more information about the murderer of Jones than we do. Her intention therefore forcibly coincides with the Evans description. And under the Evans description, the sentence is obviously false. On the view I have been defending it is not the case that the second conjunct means the same if we replace one antecedent by the other. It is either the speaker's referent (how the speaker would identify the 'someone') or the Evans description that is available. The speaker's referent is not identical with the m u rderer of Smith. The Evans description is the murderer of Jones. So we meet with an interesting case of contextuality, comparable to Quine's Giorgone was so-called beca use of his size where so-called refers to the name Giorgone. This is also what blocks the seemingly innocent existential generalization under the belief operator in the first conjunct. Another example of Edelberg is also unproblematic using the Evans description. Here somebody has staged a car accident by putting a car against a tree, smashing the windshield and throwing ketchup on the surrounding grass. Harry and Muriel are two independent passers-by who witnessed the resulting scene.
Henk Zeevat 307 The concept under which the speaker intends the discourse marker can be used when the speaker uses a definite to pick out objects in the immediate environment. A charitable hearer infers the statement that the speaker wanted to make, noting the mistake (the speaker believes that she sees Harry). Moving to the speaker's concept is a repair strategy, not a different interpretation.
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The following eight theses try to give an overview of where we have landed at this point in the paper. I. Demonstratives and indexicals are interpreted by resolving a pre supposition that refers to the representation of the utterance in which the demonstrative or indexical occurs. The content of the presupposition can be equated with the descriptive meaning of the demonstrative or indexical as given in Kaplan's theory of demonstratives, but the role it plays in determining the referent is different. In Kaplan, the descriptive meaning fixes the referent with respect to the context of utterance, the first parameter in a bi-dimensional truth-conditional account of natural language. Contexts of utterance have more structure than the values of the second parameter, the circumstance of evaluation. In our theory, the context of utterance is just a part of the hearer's representation of the common ground information that serves as the background against which interpretation of utterances takes place. By means of presupposition resolution, the descriptive meaning of demonstratives and indexicals identifies material that is already available to the interpreter as part of the common ground. 2. The objects that are found by presupposition resolution in the common ground are anchored by an intensional anchor. These objects come equipped with a criterion of identification that determines whether they have a counterpart in another possible world and which object it is. The criterion of-identification is determined by the way the object enters into the common ground, as a perceived object or as the reference of something that somebody said. In this way, the identifying concept depends on the way of introduction. So, although demonstratives, indexicals, names and certain uses of definite descriptions find their referent by presupposi tion resolution and do not contribute descriptive meaning, that does not mean the individual concept corresponding to the referent is a rigid one. With respect to the alternatives relevant for the attitudes, rigidity is not a possibility.
308 Demonstratives in Discourse
This allows us to have the following view on attributive uses of definite
(S4) {w E W: f M, w, fanclwn w F K }. The individual realizations of thoughts are limitations of this intension to the set of belief alternatives of the individual belief subjects. They give the information that the sentence supplies to the particular subject. But the individual realization cannot be equated with the thought itsel£ Individuals can entertain thoughts they do not or cannot accept and they must do so in order to make sense of the thoughts of others and in order to engage in counterfactual reasoning. So the thought must be equated with the intension itsel£ The intension is determined by anchors on the one hand and by representational content on the other hand. Thoughts so conceived are almost as fme-grained as the property theoretic reconstructions of propositions like the ones in e.g. Bealer (1982). DRT reconstructs thoughts, as it should, since thoughts rather than propositions are the basis of accounts of communication. But it is not impossible to reinterpret DRSs as also denoting propositions. S· Aboutness is a relation between objects in reality and thoughts. Thoughts here are conceived as intersubjective entities that have subjective realizations. A thought P is about an object u iff P depends on an anchored discourse marker x such that x denotes u in a under any f that satisfies the anchor.
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descriptions. It is possible to have attributive uses pick up a criterion of identification from the common ground that does not have more information than the definite description has itsel£ An attributive use does not differ from a referential use in picking up a discourse marker tied to a criterion of identification, but in the nature of the criterion picked up. 3· Rigidity makes sense only over a limited class of alternative possible worlds, the ontological variants of a given possible world. The objects in these variants can be tracked by means of spatio-temporal continuity under a sortal concept, i.e. the way we re-identify objects through time. 'Ways the world could have been' are also ways our objects could have been. Of the · modalities that quantify over these alternatives-ontological and causal necessity-we require that the reference of markers is ftxed by the their intensional anchor in the world over whose alternatives we quantify. This allows a reconstruction of classical propositions as { w E nee(a ) : M, a, fancho, a f= K} if K is the difference DRS representing S to which sufficently many anchors are added. 4· The thought expressed by a sentence S is a diagonal over the set of all alternative worlds. If we represent its content as a difference DRS K with sufficient intensional anchors, it is (54).
Henk Zeevat 309
P depends on a marker x iff P is only defined on those worlds on which x lS.
6. .Kripke's puzzle asks us to explain why the two sentences in are both true, even though the thoughts Pierre entertains-one for believing it, the other for disbelieving it-are both about London.
(ss)
Pierre believes that London is ugly. Pierre does not believe that Londres is ugly.
That is achieved by our notion of aboumess. Pierre has two concepts of London: the city I now live in and the city praised by the travel brochure.
failed to realise that the two Paderewskis are one and the same man who is both a politician and a pianist. There are two resolutions available in the belief state of the person for the presupposition name(x, Paderewski) though both concepts (the politician Paderewski, the pianist Paderewski) are about one and the same man. Kripke's puzzle is a paradox if one equates thoughts and classical propositions, but it largely disappears if one thinks of propositions and thoughts as different semantic objects. 7· It is essential in interpretation to take the speaker's point of view. The hearer tries to make sense of what the speaker says. That is the essence of the hearer's task. That is also where speaker's reference comes in. The speaker gives an indication in her words but may be wrong in different ways or may lack the means to characterise the concept adequately to the hearer. Identity between the new discourse marker and the concept of the speaker is the condition that expresses the success of the enterprise of establishing what the speaker is talking about. 8. The theory is compatible with Frege's clarifications of his distinction of sense and reference for proper names. Frege makes an analogy between introducing a proper name in a proof by a line: a = the so and so. In natural languages this concept is not so clear. 0'J!e can misinterpret .Kripke's account of proper names as supplying a standard sense of proper names.) A pragmatic reconstruction, however, is much more in line with the proof theoretic account of Frege. The Fregean sense of a proper name is then not something that is grasped by every competent user of the name, but something which is fixed over and over again for every common ground into which the name enters. The
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The one concept is identified in Pierre's beliefs because it is the one that Pierre associates with the name London, the other because it associates in Pierre's beliefs with the name Londres. The Paderewski problem is slightly different because it avoids trans lation. Here a person believes that Paderewski is highly musical and at the same time believes that Paderewski is not musical at all. The person has
3 IO
Demonstratives in Discourse
sense plays a role in attributions ofknowledge and belief, not in attributions of necessity.
8 ACTIONS AND THOUGHTS account of natural language communication should primarily provide an explanation of how thoughts can arise in another person because of verbal communication. The notion of classical proposition is beside the point when it comes to predicting the behaviour of speaker and hearer in producing and interpreting verbal utterances. This changes dramatically if we look at their actions. In the notion of action, we fmd an attribution not just of behaviour but also of thoughts and purposes that led to that behaviour or made it possible. Let us have a look at a small example: John is eating a boiled egg. In eating it, John must have a concept of the particular egg which is about the egg in the actual world. He must have various beliefs about the egg which link into his desire of eating something. He must have formed the goal of eating the egg and started to carry out various actions to prepare for his eating. These involve various beliefs about causal necessities. If you uncap the egg, you can take the soft part out, you can take the soft bits out successfully with a spoon, etc. Now if the action is successful (which we assume it is) the causal beliefs must be true, the concept must denote the actual egg and the beliefs John has about it must be sufficiently close to the actual properties of the egg. The fact that a causal belief is true involves the truth of the causal necessity of the proposition corresponding to the belie£ There must be a good deal of correspondence between John's beliefs about the egg and what is the case with the egg. In particular, John's causal beliefs must correspond to causal necessities, John's concept of the egg must correspond with the egg he is eating and his beliefs about the egg . must correspond with true propositions. The success of the behaviour depends on the truth of certain causal and ontological necessities. If eggs could suddenly tum out to be consisting of rubber, or if John would unaccountably ftnd himself back in bed again instead of at the breakfast table, the action would fail. My claim here is that if we want to account for the success of actions we need both thinking and causal necessity. The planning and monitoring by the subject of his action requires that the subject uses causal necessities in his reasoning. If we want to account for success, part of the explanation is the truth of the causal assumptions of the agent. But without thoughts, the reasoning and plan formation required by the action is not possible. An
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Henk Zeevat 3 I I
In my formal system, the concept of necessity cannot be applied to thoughts. A thought is true or false, but there is not a set of alternatives in which the thought should be true for it to be necessary. The thought expressed by a sentence is necessary because in the actual world, the sentence expresses a necessary proposition. The thought itself does not know to which proposition it corresponds. It is not possible to define thoughts in terms of propositions either, so both notions are necessary for a complete account of action.
The perceptual anchors on which the interpretation of demonstratives and indexicals depends do not give us a special relationship with the actual world. Perception is just a way in which the object may be given, it does not give the object itsel£ Information must be effective for it to help us with our intended actions. The information that Tom is the thief suffices for grabbing the man in front of you, if you are aware of the essential necessity that they are the same. Otherwise it does you no good at all. If communication is to help in determining action, it must not just be truthful, but also effective for the action in question. The objects involved in the possible action must be recognizable as the denotation of the intensional anchors of the discourse markers in the way required by the action. (We need a name if we want to enter somebody on a list of students, we need a face if we want to shake hands, etc.) It is not enough that anchors are about objects, they must anchor the objects in relevant ways. Demonstratives and indexicals are special because they supply us with anchors for which the mapping is particularly easy and reliable, because they recover perceptions of the immediate environment and thereby do not rely on various kinds of memory (memory of names, of facts, of the earlier ·discourse, etc.). They are means of referring effectively to the objects that are at hand and in sight and so guarantee that they can be directly causally influenced by the agents. Our theory of indexicals and demonstratives makes their interpretation (normally) dependent on prior and continuing perception of these objects. To the extent that prior perception provides us with the basis for keeping track of an object or for recognising it again, demonstrative and indexical reference (normally) guarantees the effective ness of the thoughts (at least with respect to the referents of these expressions) expressed by sentences in which they occilr. This would be the explanation of the thought experiment of Bar-Hillel
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9 D E M O N STRATIVES A ND INDEXI CALS
3 I 2 Demonstratives in Discourse
Acknowledgements I wish to thank Anna Pilatova and two anonymous reviewers of the Journal ofSemantics for their many useful comments and suggestions. Without their help, the paper would be considerably more obscure than it-unfortunately-still is.
HENK ZEEVAT ILLC & Computational Linguistics University of Amsterdam Spuistraat 134 1012 VB Amsterdam The Netherlands email: [email protected]
Final
Received: 29. I 1.99 version received: I4.6.oo
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Asher, N . & Lascarides, A (1998), 'Bridging', Journal of Semantics, I 5, 8 31 14Bar HilleL Y. (1954), 'Indexical Expressions', Mind, 63, 3 5 9-79·
Bealer, G. (198.2.), Quality and Concept, Oxford. Beaver, D. (1995), Presupposition and Assertion in Dynamic Semantics, PhD Thesis, Edinburgh University, Centre for Cognitive Science.
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(1 954) about the (non-) eliminability of indexicals from discourse. He finds himself unable to explain to his wife that he would like her to bring him a boiled egg in bed, on one Sunday morning, without recourse to indexicals. The non-indexical expressions that could be used to refer to the place or the moment of utterance all require information that we do not have naturally available: the precise time needs a correct clock, the date a calendar and the precise geographical position measurements that we have normally not carried out. It seems that it is precisely this relation to the actions we can carry out immediately on the objects we have at hand (eat them, pick them up, kiss them, etc.) that makes demonstratives and indexicals special. The way in which the interpretation of other referential devices takes place is much the same: presuppositions are evaluated over the common ground to find common ground objects. But the knowledge that these other devices employ is much more varied and much less directly related to basic actions. Names are great if you have to look up telephone numbers, knowing that the referent is the dean helps if you want to sort out certain legal issues, but it insufficient if you want to recognise the person at the railway station. At the same time, these other devices have a far wider range and are necessary for referring to all those objects that are not at hand and in sight.
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Kripke, SA (I979), 'A puzzle about belief', in A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use, Dordrecht, p. 239-283. Kripke, SA ( I979), 'Speaker reference and semantic reference', P. A. French, T. E. Uehling & H. K. Wettstein (eds), Con
Journal ojSnnantia 16: 3 15-3 80
© Oxford University Press 2000
The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling JAVIER GUTIERREZ -REXACH The
Ohio State University
Abstract
r
INTRo'D U CTION
Clitic doubling constructions have received a great deal of attention in the syntactic literature since the early 1 970s. Nevertheless, no uniform attempt to analyze the formal semantics of these constructions has been made so far. In this paper, I present an analysis of third person argument weak pronouns or clitics1 in so-called 'clitic doubling' ·constructions that attempts to characterize the semantic restrictions on the occurrence of noun phrases in this type of sentences in Spanish. The Spanish dialect represented in this paper is a non-'leista' central Castilian variety, concretely a spoken dialect of Madrid. There are areas of substantial agreement in the judgments described here and those characteristic of other well-known dialects, such as other dialects of the Iberian peninsula, River Plate Spanish (Jaeggli 1 982), and especially Porteiio Spanish {Suiier 1988, 1 991).2 The proposed analysis ' The distinction between weak and strong pronouns has to be understood in a strictly prosodic/ morphological sense and is not related to the use of these tetrns to characterize semantic distinctions. See Halpern ( 1 995) and Cardinalerti & Starke (1 99�) for recent accounts of the morphological and prosodic aspeCts of cliricization. Cardinalerti & Starke develop a three-way distinction between strong, weak and clitic pronouns. Here I will ignore this latter distinction and use the standard two way (weak vs. strong) classification. � There are also significant differences with other well known dialects, such as standard written nonnative Spanish, Basque Spanish. Quiteiio, and Andean Spanish. The dialect described here also differs from 'leista' and 'laista' varieties of the Iberian Peninsula. A 'leista' variety generalizes the use of le for (animate) direct objeets and a 'laista' variety generalizes the use of Ia for feminine indirect objects. See Fem:indez-Ordoiiez (1993, 1999) and Klein-Andreu ( 1 981) for details on the geographical and sociological distribution of these varieties. In the course of the paper, I will indicate where these dialectal differences are of significance to my account.
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This article presents a study ofthe semantics ofclitic pronouns and clitic doubling in Spanish and related languages. Its main hypothesis is that the co-occurrence restrictions that are observed between the clitic element and its quantifier associate can be properly characterized within Generalized Quantifiers Theory. Clitics are treated as generalized quantifier functions which are restricted to a context set. In clitic doubling constructions, the context set is retrieved from the doubled NP-quantifier. Three main constraints are formulated that restrict this mechanism: the Principal Filter Constraint, the Presuppositionality Constraint, and the Context Dependence Constraint. The resulting interactions are studied in a variety of configurations with respect to generalized quantifiers of different properties, namely clitic doubling of existential, universal, negative quantifiers and doubling in questions.
3 I6
The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
will
be extended to account for clitic doubling phenomena in other languages (Romanian, Greek and Northern Italian dialects). An instance of a clitic doubling construction is a sentence in which a pronominal clitic is associated with a noun phrase which seems to be saturating the same argument as the pronominal element. In this sense, the clitic 'doubles' the associated noun phrase, as illustrated in the following example from Spanish: dio el libro a Pedro (I) Juan le Juan to- him gave the book to Pedro juan gave the book to Pedro'
(2) a. A student came in. He sat down. b. Two students came in. They sat down. Within the standard analysis of the pronouns he and they in Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp & Reyle I993), these proforms are analyzed as respectively introducing singular and plural discourse referents in a Discourse Representation Structure. These discourse referents are respect ively linked to the singular and plural discourse referents previously introduced in the Discourse Representation Structure when a student and two students in the first sentences of the discourses in (2) were processed. The analysis in Generalized Quantifiers Theory treats definite pronouns such as they as generalized quantifiers (functions from sets to truth values) restricted to a context set argument. Thus, given a context set C, the pronoun they denotes the following function: ·
(3) THEY(C)(A) = I iff c � A & I C l ;::: 2 This latter line of analysis can be viewed as a descendant of the E-type analysis of pronouns as definite descriptions (Evans I 980; Neale 1 990; Heim I990; Chierchia I995; van der Does I995). Using capital letters to represent denotations, in sentence (2b) above the pronoun they denotes the function THEY mapping the context set C � STUDENT such that IC n CA.ME_INI = I c I = 2 to a generalized quantifier function that would map the set SA,T_DOWN to I (True) iff C � SAT_DOWN.l 3 In other words, the context set supporting the resolution process for the interpretation of they has to be the minimal wimess (Szabolcsi 1 997) of the generalized quantifier TWO STUDENTS.
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Clitics will be treated here as denoting the same type of quantifier functions as strong pronouns. These are determiner functions inherently restricted to context sets, along the lines proposed by Westerscihl (I985a, I 989), van Deemter (I991) and van der Does (I995) for pronouns in general. Consider the following sentences:
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach 3 17
(4)
Let (i)
a
be a pronominal . clitic expression. Then,
if a is [+nom.], it denotes a function Fnom E [P (E) -+ [P(E) -+ 2]] (ii) if a is [ + ace.], it denotes a function Face E [P(E) -+ [P (E2 ) -+ P(E)]] (iii) if a is [ + dat.], it denotes a function Faat E [P(E) -+ [P (E3 ) -+ P(E2 ) ] ]
The above definition is a standardized version and fixes the order of application of the functions (datives precede accusatives which, in turn, precede nominatives). A generalized definition, taking into account arbitrary case extensions of a pronominal clitic function and without any pre-determined order of application, would be as follows. Let a be. a elitic expression, F its denotation, and AR ( - I ) the set of unary arity reducing functions. For I � i � n, and • The definition is restricted to indirect object datives. It ignores thoses cases in which the dative element docs not correspond to the third element of a relation, for instance 'quirky' dative subjects such as (i): ·
(i) A Juan le falta un libro to Juan to-him lacks a book )uan is missing a book' In order to account for (i� the function space corresponding to the function FJ,u in (4) has to be extended as follows: FJ,u e [P(E) -+ [ [P(El ) -+ P(E')] U [P(E) -+ z] J J. The modified FJ,u now includes dative indirect objects and dative subjects.
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Generalized quantifiers can be treated as arity reducing functions: functions in the set AR( -k), for I < k < n, mapping a n + k-ary relation to an n-ary relation (Ben Shalom I 993 b; Keenan & Westerscl.hl I 997). Thus, a pronominal clitic is a prosodically weak expression denoting a function mapping a set (the context set argument) to an arity reducer. Using Keenan's (I989) terminology for generalized quantifiers based in his semantic case theory and applying it to pronominal clitics, we can say that cases act as extensions of a basic pronominal clitic function. Initially, we can take a nominative clitic to denote this basic function mapping a context set to a function from sets to truth values. An accusative clitic denotes, in the terms of semantic case theory, the accusative extension of a pronominal clitic function: a function mapping a context set to a function from binary relations to properties. Finally, a dative clitic denotes the dative extension of a pronominal clitic function: a function mapping a context set to a function from ternary relations to binary relations.4 The following definition states these ideas formally, writing E to represent a universe of individuals, P (E i) for the power set o f E i (I � i � n) , and [A -+ B] for the set o f functions from A to B:
3I8
The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
E Dom(AR ( - I ) ) a k-ary relation. the denotation of the i�th case of a is the i-th extension of F, a function F; E [P (E) - AR(-I)] such that a,. ) E R} ) = I } . F; ( C) (R) = { ( xy . . . x; - I l xi+l · · · xk ) I F( C) ( {x; j ( a 1 In the remainder of the paper, we will only need the simpler definition in (4). Consider now the following examples:S R
•
•
•
(s) Pedro la vio
There is an important difference between the constructions in which the weak pronominal element is not doubled and those in which it is doubled by a full NP. In (s), Ia may refer to a contextually salient inanimate or animate entity in a model and may have a deictic or an anaphoric reading, where the pronoun is dependent on previous discourse. In (6}, the choice of the entity referred to by the clitic is not necessarily dependent on previous discourse. The reference of the clitic is determined by the doubled NP. In this case, Ia denotes the same entity or individual denoted by Mana. Any account of the semantic of eli tics has to explain this difference in a coherent way. On the other hand, (s) and (6) are similar in that the entity to which the clitic refers must be contextually salient in both cases. This salience is pragmatic in nature and might be related to a topicality condition (see Bolinger I974; Silva-Corvalan I98o/8 I; and Bentivoglio I983).6 What is of interest to us is that the set of possible clitic referents in doubling constructions is a subset of the possible clitic referents . in non-doubling constructions. In this paper, it will be claimed that a semantic analysis sheds new light on areas of the semantic of clitic pronouns in doubling structures that have not received a satisfactory explanation so far, such as the following one�. What are the common properties of the generalized quantifiers that can be 'doubled' by a pronoun? Do these properties exclude other classes of 5 The occurrence of the pr�position a preceding the direct object Maria is an instance of the so called 'personal a'. This marker should be distinguished from the directional preposition a 'to', which precedes indirect objects and some locatives. In general, human/animate direct objects require the presence of this preposition, which can be considered an animacy marker and, in some environments, a specificity marker. See Pensado (1 995) and Bruge & Brugger ( 1996} for more details on a variety of factors conditioning the occurrence of this marker. In what follows, we will gloss this marker with an A. " A minor additional difference between non-clitic doubled and clitic doubled srrucrures is related to emphasis. Assuming that the individual referred to by In in (;) and Maria in {6} is the same, sentences (;) and {6) are truth-conditionally equivalent. Nevertheless, they are not equivalent at a pragmatic level In some dialects. sentence {6} has a distinctive emphatic character.
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Pedro her saw 'Pedro saw her' (6) Pedro la vio a Maria Pedro her saw A Maria 'Pedro saw Maria'
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach
3 19
quantifiers uniformly? What are the differences among clitic pronouns depending on their case? What is the role of the context set? etc. Treating pronouns as definite descriptions restricted to context sets is also fully compatible with a dynamic perspective, once an appropriate characteriza tion of the dynamics of context and context sets is provided (Groenendijk, Stokhof & Veltman 1 995).'
2 THE DENOTATION OF SPANISH ACCUSATIVE AND DATIVE CLITICS Accusative clitics
As explained in the previous section, the clitic proform la 'her' denotes the
accusative extension of a pronominal generalized quantifier function, mapping a contextually determined set C to an arity reducer in ['P (E 2 ) � P(E)], where FEMININE is the set denoted by the feature [+feminine] encoded in the lexical elements morphologically specified as feminine.
(7)
Let R � E2, LA(C)(R) =
C � E, a, b E E. Then, {ai C � {bl (a, b} E R & b E FEM1NlNE} & I C I= I }
Notice that I am treating the number morphology of the clitic as imposing a condition on the context set C. If the clitic is singular, the context set C has to be a singleton. If the clitic carries plural morphology (las 'them-fem'.), then the context set is of cardinality greater or equal to two and induces a different pattern of anaphora support.
(8) Let R � E2, C � E, a, b E E. Then, LAS(C)(R) =
{aiC � {bl (a, ·b) E R & b E FEMININE} & I C l � 2}.
Following definition
(7),
the denotation of the verb phrase (9)
is (10):
(9) la vio her saw 'saw her' � As these authors point out, ·context sets are not subject to choice, but are constrUcted (and deconsaucted) in a deterministic fashion through the interpretation procedures o o o the fact that information states come with context sets can be 1ot5ed to interpret anaphoric terms as contexrually restricted quantifiers.' Alternatively, the dynamics of contexts and context sets can be represented in Discourse Representation Theory via the linking relations that are established between discourse referents introduced in a Discourse Representation Saucture by the processing of a quantifier expression or accommodated by a pragmatic inferential process.
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2.1
po The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
{10) Let C � E, a , b E E. Then, LA(C){SAW) =
{ai C � {bl (a, b) E SAW & b E FBMININE} & I C I = I }
Applying the denotation of the subject ofsentence (n)8 to (Io) yiel� (12). { I I} Pedro la vio Pedro her saw ( I 2) lp(LA)(C){SAW) = I iff
Ip({a iC � { b l (a, b) E SAW & b E FEMININE & I C I = I }} = I iff p E {aiC s; {bl (a, b) E SAW & b E FEMINlNE} & I C I = I }
{ I J) Una mujer estaba andando. Pedro la vio a woman was walking. Pedro her saw 'A woman was walking. Pedro saw her'. The context set for the interpretation of Ia in (I 3) is the intersection of WOMAN and WALK. This set is a singleton and satisfies the cardinality condition on the context set imposed by Ia. When the context set does not satisfy this requirement, the discourse becomes anomalous: vio {I4) Dos mujeres estaban andando. Pedro *la/las two women were walking. Pedro her/them-fem. saw 'Two women were walking. Pedro saw *her/them'. Sometimes, the determination of the relevant context set is restricted by standard constraints on pronominal anaphora resolution, such as salience, linear precedence in a text, focal stress assignment or those belonging to common sense reasoning. For instance, the context set for Ia in (I sa) -is the individual Luisa, as determined by pragmatic and world-knowledge reasons. The pragmatics of the connective pero 'but' determines that the content of the following proposition is contrary to the speaker's expecta tions (Schwenter I 999) In (I 5 b), focus stress makes the proper name the preferred contextual antecedent. .
{I s)
a.
Maria dijo que Luisa estaba enferma, pero Pedro la vio esta Maria said that Luisa was sick, but Pedro her saw this maiiana
morning 'Maria said that Luisa waS sick, but Pedro saw her this morning' 8 The denotation of Pedro is the individual generated by p (Keenan 1996): the function I, such that I, (A) = 1 iff p E A.
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Consider now the following discourse:
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach
32.1
9 We have to assume enriched models where events and propositions are also part of the basic ontology (for instance, £ � E. for £ the set of entities of the event sort). The anaphoric capability of lo goes beyond these two cases (NPs or sentences). This form may also behave as a pro-adjective or a pro-adverb in copular constructions, in the sense that it can be semantically resolved as anaphoric to the denotation of an adjective or an adverb:
(i)
a.
Juan esti contento. Pedro tambien lo esti Juan is happy. Pedro too It IS Juan is happy. Pedro is happy too' b. Juan es idiota. Pedro tambien lo es Juan is idiot Pedro too 1t IS Juan is an idiot Pedro is an idiot too' c. Juan esti bien. Pedro tambien lo esti Juan is well. Pedro too 1t IS Juan is well. Pedro is well too'
10 The capability of the plural form los to refer to events/propositions is more reduced, but not impossible. Consider, for instance, the following example:
(i) Hubo dos eventos importantes el pasado Junes y los presencie ambos por there-were two events important the last monday and them watched-1 both by television 1V
'There were two important events last Monday and 1 watched them both on 1V'
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b. Pedro dijo que Maria y [Foe Juana] estaban enfermas, pero Pedro said that Maria and [Foe Juana] were sick, but Pedro Ia vio esta maii.ana Pedro her saw this morning 'Pedro said that Maria and [Foe Juana] were sick, but Pedro saw her (Juana) this morning' As observed above, elitic doubling eliminates any potential ambiguity. For instance, (I s b) would be ambiguous without focus stress on Maria orLuisa but, as shown in { 16), the presence ofa doubled element disambiguates the sentence: (I 6) Pedro dijo que Maria y Luisa estaban enfermas, pero Pedro la Pedro said that Maria and Luisa were sick, but Pedro her vio a Maria esta manana saw A Maria this morning 'Pedro said that Maria and Luisa were sick, but Pedro saw her (Maria) this morning' The accusative clitics lo 'him/it' and los 'them' differ from la and las in the condition that b E -F E MININ E. They also denote functions from context sets to arity reducers mapping binary relations to sets. These two pronominal clitic forms may also be used to establish anaphoric reference to events and propositions. Sentence (17a) is ambiguous depending on whether lo is interpreted as anaphorically linked to juan or to the event of Juan's playing.9•10 Similarly, in (17b) the context set of lo is a singleton set containing the proposition that Kennedy is still alive.
322
(I7)
The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling Juan estaba jugando. Pedro lo vio Juan was playing. Pedro him/it saw 1uan was playing. Pedro saw him/it' que Kennedy sigue vivo pero Pedro no lo b. Juan cree Juan believes that Kennedy continues alive but Pedro not it cree believes a.
1uan believes that Kennedy is still alive, but Pedro does not believe it' 2.2
Dative clitics
(I8)
a.
b.
Let R � E3, C � E, a, b, c E E. Then, LE(C)(R) = { (a, b) I C � {cl (a, b , c) E R} & I C I = I } Let R � E 3 , C � E, a, b, c E E. Then, LES(C)(R) = { (a, b) I C � {cl (a, b, c) E R} & I C l � 2}
The stepwise interpretation of sentence
( I 9) is shown in (2o)
:
(I 9) Juan les
(2 o)
dio algunos libros Juan them gave some-pl. books 1uan gave them some books'
1.
Let C � E. Then, LES(C)(GAVE) = { (a, b) I C � {cl (a, b, c) E GAVE} & I C I � 2} 2. (LES(C)(GAVE))(SOMEpl BOOK)aa = SOMEpl BOOK({ (a, b) I C � {cl (a, b, c) E GAVE} & I C I � 2}) = {ai iBOOK n {b I c � {c l (a, b, c) E GAVE} & I C I � 2}} I � 2} 3· JUAN ((LES(C)(GAVE))(SOMEpl BOOK)ac,) = I iff Ij({a II BOOK n {b I C � {c l (a, b, c) E GAVE} & I C I > 2}}l � 2}) = 1 iff
j E {a II BOOK n { b I C � { c I (a, b, c) E GA VB} & I C I � 2}} I � 2} 11
We are ignoring here 'laismo' and 'loismo' phenomena by which Ia and lo and their plural forms are substituted for le, les depending on the gender of the referent. In sentence (i), the clitic Ia does not denote the the accusative extension of the pronominal clitic function LA. as defined in (7), but rather its dative extension. Thus. in 'laista' and 'loista' dialects there is a mismatch between morphological and semantic case. (i) Juan Ia dio el libro a Maria Juan her gave the book to Maria 1uan gave the book to Maria'
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The dative indirect obj ect clitics le and les denote functions in the set in definition (4, iii). There is no gender difference morphologically encoded in these elitics. n They only differ along the number dimension.
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach 323
3
T HE SEMANT I C S OF CLITIC D O UBLING
As observed above, in non-doubling examples the context set is determined by standard discourse principles for pronominal anaphora resolution, whereas in clitic doubling constructions the relevant context set is retrieved from the denotation of the doubled expression. Consider the following discourses: ·
(2 1 )
'
( ) 22
Sentence (2 1 ) is a straightforward case, where the context set of lo is the singleton set MAN n CAME_IN. On the other hand, in the discourse in (22), the context set of lo is not MAN n CAME_IN but rather JUAN. 12 Thus, we need to establish a denotation for doubling clitics in which the context set is related to the doubled generalized quantifier. Initially, we are going to characterize this relation as membership. The denotation of a clitic doubling expression in which the clitic is an accusative proform is determined as follows:
(23} Let O:ace
be an accusative pronominal clitic expression, O:Jfacc its doubling counterpart, and Face the function denoted by O:ace· Then, for all context sets C � E; R � E 2 ; Q E AR( - r); the function denoted by O:Jjace is:
FJface ( C) (R) ( Q,u}
=
Face(C}(R} & C E Q
1 2 This does not entail incompatibility with previously established context sets, as in the case of identical proper names. Also, when the doubled expression is a strong pronoun or a demonstrative, the context set of the clitic may be linked to the context set of these context-dependent expressions: (i)
'a.
Una chica enrr6 y Pedro le dio un regalo a girl came-in and Pedro to-her gave a present 'A girl came in and Pedro gave her a present' b. Una chica enrr6 y Pedro le dio un regalo a girl came-in and Pedro to-her gave a present 'A girl came in and Pedro gave a present to this girl'
a ella to her a esta chica to this girl
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en ese momento Pedro Un hombre entr6 en el restaurante y a man came in the restaurant and in that moment Pedro lo vio him saw 'A man came into the restaurant and at that moment Pedro saw him en ese momento Pedro Un hombre entr6 en el restaurante y a man came in the restaurant and in that moment Pedro lo vio a Juan him saw to Juan 'A man came into the restaurant and at that moment Pedro saw Juan'
324
The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
(24)
For I < i < n, let o:; be a pronominal clitic expression of case i, O:Jfi its doubling counterpart, and F; the function denoted by o:;. Then. for all context sets C n, where n is a
number considered to be normal or average in a certain context (Wester stahl 198 5b). Consequently, a context set containing many students and other individuals who are non-students is also an element of the quantifier and may serve as a context set for les in (26a). For instance, in a situation in which the students that count as many are so or more, given two context sets, one with 6o students and So non-students and another with 6o students and no non-students, both of them would be elements of the quantifier MANY STUDENTS �ecause the cardinality of their intersection
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R c; E3 , A, G c; E, a, b, c e E. Following definition (24), LES{C){GAVE) = { (a, b) I G c; {c I (a, b, c) E GIVE} & I G l � 2}. The interpretation of the non-doubled les ha dado algunos regalos, would require the application of the accusative arity reducer (SOMEpi PRESENTS)aa to the binary relation LES{C)(GAVE). Then, (LES(C){GAVE))(SOMEp1 PRESENTS)acc is the following set: {a IIPRESENT n {biG c; {c l (a, b, c) E GAVE} & I C I > 2] } l � 2}.
326 The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
(2 8} WITNESS(D(A)) =
{B lD (A) (B)
= I
& B s; A}
Consequently, the definition i n (24) has to undergo a minor modification: (29) For I < i < n, let o:; be a pronominal clitic expression of case i, O:Jfi its doubling counterpart, and F; the function denoted by o:;. Then, for all context sets C � E; R � E"; Q, Q; E AR ( - r ) , where Q is the basic function corresponding to Q;; the function denoted by O:Jfi is defmed as follows:
(Q;)-.(Qn) = F;(C){R)(Qz) Fa;;(C)(R)(Qz) C E WITNESS ( Q ) ·
·
·
·
·
·
(Q;-x ), (Q;+x )
·
·
·
(Qn) &
The above definition predicts that the interaction between the doubling clitic and the associated quantifier is always identical, independently of case. Nevertheless, this is not the case in Spanish. In general, a dative clitic may double the dative extension of any generalized quantifier. Contrastingly, not all generalized quantifiers can be doubled by an accusative clitk The associated quantifier in an accusative clitic doubling construction satisfies the following denotational requirement.
(3o)
The Principal Filter Constraint: The generalized quantifier associated with an accusative clitic has to be ·
a principal ft.lter. The definition of a principal filter
(3 I )
••
is as
follows:
A generalized quantifier Q over E is a principal filter iff there is a not necessarily empty set A � E, such that for all B s; E, Q(B) = I iff A � B. The set A is called the generator of Q (A = GEN(Q)) A generalized quantifier Q lives on a set A iff for any set B, Q(B)
= I
iff Q(A n B)
= I.
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with STUDENTS is greater than so. Thus, these two sets would be possible context sets for les in (26a). This is not correct because (26a) does not make any assertion about non-students. Since the set C being an element of the quantifier is not restrictive enough, an alternative would be to claim that C has to be a witness of the quantifier, in Barwise & Cooper's (I9 8 r) terminology (see also Szabolcsi I 997): an element of the quantifier that is a subset of the smallest live-on set. 14 This set is normally, the first argument of the determiner heading the quantifier, ie. the restrictive part or noun denotation. For any generalized quantifier function Q , determiner function D and A � E, if Q = D(A) and assuming that A is also the smallest live-on set of Q, we define the set of witnesses of this quantifier, WITNESS(D(A)), as follows:
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach 327
In accusative doubling constructions,
the context set of the pronominal clitic function is the generator of the associated quantifier:
(32)
Let a= be an accusative pronominal clitic expression, OJf= its doubling counterpart, and F= the function denoted by a=. Then, for all C � E; R � E2; Q E AR( - r }; the function denoted by OJ!= is:
FJ/=(C)(R)(Q=) = F=(C)(R) & C = GEN( Q)
(3 3)
(34)
Los engaiiaron a esos estudiantes A those students them fooled 'They fooled these students' b. Los vi a mis primos them saw-1 A my cousins 'I saw my cousins' c. Lo comieron todo it ate-they all-sg. 'They ate everything/it all' d. Los vieron a todos . them saw-they A all-pl. 'They saw all of them' e. La(s) encontraron a cada una de las runas her/them-fem. found-they A each one of the girls desaparecidas disappeared 'They found each one of the disappeared girls' a. *Los engaiiaron a una mayoria de los estudiantes A a majority of the students them fooled 'They fooled most students' b. *Las encontraron a varias niiias desaparecidas them-fem. found-they A several girls disappeared 'They found several disappeared girls' a.
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The examples in (33) are well formed, whereas those in (34) are anomalous. This is due to the fact that the noun phrases esos estudiantes 'those students', mis primos 'my cousins', todo 'everything', todos 'all' and cada una de las ninas desaparecidas 'each one of the disappeared girls' denote principal filters. For instance, esos estudiantes is the principal filter generated by a contextually determined group of students; cada una de las nitias desaparecidas is the filter generated by the set of disappeared girls. On the other hand, una mayoria de los estudiantes 'a majority of the students/most students', varias ninas desaparecidas 'several disappeared girls' and the bare plural alcaldes 'mayors' do not denote principal filters. The anomaly of the examples in {34) follows directly from the Principal Filter Constraint.
p8 The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
c. *Los eligieron a alcaldes them elected A mayors 'They elected mayors' Intensional or vague quantifiers, such as muchos 'many', pocos 'few', aproximadamente n 'approximately n' (Keenan, & Stavi 1 986), and quantifiers of excess (Bosque 1 996), such as demasiados 'too many', do not denote
principal fllters and cannot be accusatively doubled. (3 5)
*Las
The only exception to this claim is when the principal fllter reading is forced, namely when the speaker is referring to a particular group. This interpretation is somewhat marginal, probably because vagueness prevents the identification of a group. Consider now (36): (36)
??Las vi a pocas runas them saw-1 A few girls 'I saw few girls' b. Las vi a unas pocas niiias them saw-I A a-pl. few girls 'I saw a few of the girls' a.
Sentence (36a) is anomalous because the generalized quantifier denoted by the noun phrase pocas ninas 'few girls' is not a principal fllter. The sentence only improves in situations in which the Sentence is construed in a way such that the decreasing quantifier denotes a group. The only acceptable reading of (36a) would be 'I saw a group consisting of few girls'. This interpretation is better rendered in Spanish as (36b), where the noun phrase unas pocas ninas 'a-pl. few girls' forces the group interpretation. The contrast is similar to the one observed in . English between the determiners few and a few. Comparative quantifiers (Beghelli 1992) cannot be accusatively doubled either because they are not principal filters: (37) *Los salude a mas congresistas que senadores them greeted-! A more congressmen than senators 'I greeted more congressmen than sep.ators'
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quiero a muchas mujeres/pocas them-fem. love-1 A many women/few mujeres/aproximadamente tres mujeres women/approximately three women 'I love many/few/approximately three women' b. *Las quiero a demasiadas mujeres them-fem. love-1 A too-many women 'I love too many women' a.
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach
329
In the case of the neuter clitic, the principal 6.lter effect resurfaces again
when it doubles a propositional expression. Consider the following contrast:
(38)
Lo se que te sientes mal it know-! that you feel bad 'I know that you feel bad' b. *Se lo pregunt6 si te sentias mal REFL it wonder if you felt bad 'He wondered whether you felt bad' a.
(3 9)
The Presuppositionality Constraint The generator of the generalized quantifier associated with an accusative clitic is a presupposed set. The existence of the individuals in this set is presupposed.
The Principal Filter Constraint and the Presuppositionality Constraint are both necessary and independent. In other words, one cannot be derived from the other. It could be possible to have generators that are discourse novel, so the first constraint alone would not suffice. On the other hind, if only a presuppositionality condition is posited, as done by Franco & Mejias Bikandi (1997, 1999), it is entailed that doubling of presuppositional quantifiers which are not principal filters is possible. In the next section, I will argue that this situation does not obtain. �5 These authors follow Diesing (1992) in the identification of presuppositionality, specificity and strength. These properties would all be associated with raising of the relevant quantifier at LF to the IP level (restriction) of the clause. •• The emphatic character of some doubling constructions might be related to a Salience Constraint on the presupposed set. The generator of the doubled generalized quantifier is high in a conteXtUally determined scale ordering the presupposed context sets in a given discourse by their salience.
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The difference between saber 'know' and preguntarse 'wonder' is that the first verb selects a proposition whereas the latter selects a question (a set of propositions, in the terms of Karttunen's 1977 theory). Doubling is possible with verbs of the first type because the complement is trivially generated by the singleton containing the relevant proposition. This not so with verbs of the preguntarse 'wonder' type. A second constraint satisfied by accusative clitic doubling belongs to the semantics/pragmatics interface and has been discussed under different guises by several authors. The idea that doubled elements are topical/ presupposed can be traced back to Givon (1976). Recently, Suiier (1992, 1999), and Franco & Mejias-Bikandi (1997, 1999) have observed that accusatively doubled objects have to be presupposed.15 In the terms of our theory, we can formulate the following constraint:16
330
The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
Assuming the standard focus/background informational partition, pre supposed elements can be taken to belong to the background {Partee 1991, 1 995; Diesing 1992). In consequence, from the Presuppositionality Con straint it follows that focused noun phrases cannot be doubled. This predicts a fact observed by Jaeggli ( 198 2), following a suggestion by Esther Torrego: doubling of focused noun phrases is not possible in practically all varieties of Spanish (examples (40 a,b) are from Jaeggli 1982: 4 8 ). (4o)
*vo lo vi a [Foe Juan] him saw A [Foe Juan] I 'I saw [Foe Juan]' b. *yo Ia encontre a [Foe Maria] I her found A [Foe Maria] 'I found [Foe Maria]' c. *La salude a [Foe su madre] her greeted-I A [Foe his mother] 'I greeted [Foe his mother]' a.
(41)
(*Lo) vi a Juan (.'A quien viste? him saw A Juan A who saw-you es a Juan b. A quien (*lo) vi A who him saw-1 is A Juan 'Who(ever) I saw is Juan' c. Es a Juan a quien (*lo) vi is A Juan A who him saw-I 'It is Juan who I saw' d. (*Lo) vi solo a Juan him saw-I only A Juan 'I saw only Juan' a.
.
There are some pertinent observations that have to be made with respect to dialectal variation. First, doubling of certain principal ftlter denoting elements is not possible in some dialects. In standard written and normative
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As expected, doubled noun phrases cannot appear in syntactic positions that are intrinsically focused. It is not possible either to answer a wh question with a doubled object (41a), or to accusative double an object in a pseudo-cleft or a cleft construction (41 b,c). Finally, noun phrases headed by a focus operator such as solo 'only' cannot be accusatively doubled either (4 1 d).
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach
33 I
Spanish, accusative doubling of direct objects is claimed to be marginal (Fernandez-Soriano 1999: 1249).17 Nevertheless, in spoken and coll6quial Castilian Spanish, as well as in Southern Cone Spanish it is quite regular. In some of these varieties, there is an animacy restriction. Doubling of expressions denoting inanimate entities is not possible, even if they denote quantifiers that are principal filters. This is the case in River Plate Spanish (Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and some areas of Chile).18 On the other hand, Silva-Corvalan (1981) and Suiier (1988) provide data from the Spanish dialect of Buenos Aires (Porteiio Spanish) in which the animacy restriction does not hold systematically: Me la prepare la prueba objetiva to-me it prepared the objective test 'I prepared the objective test' antes de subir b. Yo lo voy a comprar el diario the newspaper before of going-up I it am-going to buy 'I'll buy the newspaper before going up home' a.
My own field work in spoken Madridian Spanish confirms this point. Speakers tend to double inanimate objects less frequently, but the 11
There are very significant exceptions to this generalization. Although the occurrence of doubled proper names and expressions denoting inanimate entities in written literary texts is rare, doubling of quantified noun phrases seetns to be common, as long as they satisfy the constraints that we have formulated. Poston (I9B) states that doubling is rare in the normative variety except when the objecr is todo(s) all a propositional complement (as in (38a) above) or a stressed pronominaL Fernandez-Soriano (I999) gives as grammatical examples with pronouns and the quantifiers los cuatro 'the four'; todos 'all', etc. Garcia-Miguel (I 99 I) provides the following example from ElJarama, a novel by Rafael S:inchez-Ferlosio that attempts to capture a colloquial spoken variety: '
',
(i) La ayudo a mi madre her help-1 A my mother 'I help my mother' Significantly, Llorente & Mondejar (1 974= 37 ) state that objecr doubling 'does not follow the normative standard, which does not mean that it does not happen.' Llorente & Mondejar (I972.) give examples from twentieth-century authors from Spain and Latin America: 'Le vimos a Carrancido 'lit. it saw-we A Carrancido' (Carlos Peralta}. me ha costado despertarlo a don Lorenzo 'lit to-me has been-an effort wake-up-him A don Lorenzo' (A. Buero); usted ha de verlo a Lucas 'lit. you have to see-him A Lucas' (R J. Sender). See also Marcos Marin (I978� 18 The following contrast is taken from Jaeggli (1982.: 14, I9): (i)
a.
"La vimos Ia casa de Mafalda it-fern. saw-we the house of Mafalda 'We saw Mafalda's house' b. Lo vimos a Guille then saw-we A Guille 'We saw Guille' c. Los vimos a los chicos then saw-we A the kids 'We saw the kids'
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(42)
332
The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
difference disappears in emphatic contexts and when the object is clearly presupposed. In the varieties in which the animacy restriction holds, it amounts to a specialization of the Principal Filter Constraint. The general ized quantifier associated with an accusative clitic has to be a principal fllter and live on the set ANIMATE.19 (43) The Animacy Constraint: If Q is a generalized quantifier associated with an accusative clitic, then for any set B, Q(B) = I iff Q(B n ANIMATE) = I
(44)
Le vimos a Juan to-him saw-we A Juan 'We saw Juan' b. Les vimos a los marineros to-them saw-we A the sailors 'We saw the sailors' c. *Les elegimos a alcaldes to-them elected-we A mayors 'We elected mayors' d. *Les vimos a varios marineros to-them saw-we A several sailors 'We saw several sailors' a.
19 In all Spanish varieties, doubling of strong personal pronouns obeys the Animacy Constraint. Consider (i): (i)
Pedro la vio a ella Pedro her saw A her 'Pedro saw her'
In (i), Ia must refer to a female human entity, so the sentence cannot be uttered when what Pedro has seen is a chair or a cow. Additionally, and unlike other noun phrases, strong pronouns require doubling obligatorily: (ii) *Fedro vio a ella/elias Pedro saw A her/them-fem.pl 'Pedro saw her/them' 20 The same happens in Quiteiio Spanish (Ecuador), a generalized 'leista' dialect for inanimate/ animate masculine/feminine direct objects (Suiier & Yepez 1988).
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Finally, let us consider the case of Basque Spanish (Landa I995). As a 'leista' variety, it systematically subsitutes le for lo in accusative doubling. Nevertheless, the Principal Filter Constraint, the Presuppositionality Con straint and, to some extent, the Animacy Constraint are satisfied, as the following contrasts illustrate.20
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach 3 3 3 e.
quien (*le) vi es a Juan to who him saw-1 is A Juan 'It is Juan who I saw' £ ??Le compre el coche to-him bought-1 the car 'I bought the car'
A
(45)
Lideres, no los ha habido en este pais por mucho leaders, not them have had in this country by much tiempo time 'There have not been leaders in this country for a long time' b. Jugadores como Maradona, ya no los veremos m:is players like Maradona, already not them will-see-we more 'We will not see soccer players like Maradona anymore' pondre nunca, una corbata con flares c. No me la not me it-fern will-put-1 never, a tie with flowers 'I will never wear a tie with flowers' a.
Clitic right/left dislocated elements are not necessarily subject to a presuppositionality constraint. In (46a,b), the noun phrase associated with the clitic is contrastively focused. In (46c), the dislocated element is in the. scope of the focus operator solo 'only'. (46)
21
a.
Claro que lo han saludado, [Foe a Pedro); no a Juan clear that him have-they greeted, [Foe A Pedro); not A Juan 'Of course, they have greeted Pedro and not Juan
See Roca (1996) for a semantic
analysis of the srrucrures
exemplified
in
(45).
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I t is important to observe that the examples we are considering are instances of clitic doubling and not of clitic right dislocation. Clitic right dislocation can be clearly distinguished from clitic doubling prosodically. In clitic right dislocation constructions, there is a pause or intonational break separating the reduplicated noun phase or quantifier associate from the rest of the sentence. There is not such a pause in clitic doubling constructions. In addition, right dislocation obeys constraints similar in nature to left dislocation (Cinque 1990; Vallduvi 1990; Roca 1996; Escobar 1995; Casielles 2000) and that are not necessarily equivalent to those satisfied by clitic doubling. For instance, bare singulars and plurals can be clitic left/right dislocated (4sa.b) and the same happens with other quantifiers that are clearly not principal filters (4sc).21 The comma indicates intonational break.
334
The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling b.
[roc A Pedro], lo
saludado; no a Juan have-they greeted; not A Juan [Foe A Pedro], 'They have greeted P�dro, not Juan' c. Solo a Juan lo han saludado only A Juan him have-they greeted 'They greeted only Juan'
him
han
4 P R I N C IPAL FILTERH O O D IN DOUBLED E X I S TE NTIAL Q UANT I F IERS
(47)
Las he visto a tres monjas/tres de las monjas them-fem have-1 seen A three nuns/three of the nuns 'I have seen three (specific) nuns' a algunos profesores enOJO b. Los them-pl. annoyed A some-pl. professors 'He annoyed some (specific) teachers' a.
The specificity of the indefinite may be epistemic, as in (48a) or related to discourse anaphora, as in (48b) .
(4 8)
a.
que estoy a algunos profesores en los Los enOJO them-pl. annoyed-he A some-pl. professors in them that am-I pensando thinking 'He annoyed some teachers I am thinking about'
22 A determiner D is intersective iff for all sets A, B, A', B' � E, if A n B = A' n B' then D(A) (B) = D (A' ) (B'). A determiner D is co-intersective iff for all sets A, B,A', B' � E, if A - B = A' - B' then D(A ) (B) = D(A' ) (B'). 2J For some speakers, the specific reading can be obtained both with a bare existential determiner, such as tres 'three,' algunos 'some-pl.' and a complex partitive existential determiner, such as tres d� los 'three of the,' algunos d� los 'some of the .' For others, especially in some varieties (Porteiio Spanish), the reading only arises �th the overt partitive varianL In section seven, this potential contrast is
explained as
a
by-product of an additional context dependence constrainL
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Noun phrases headed by determiners comprised in the class of intersective/ generalized existential determiners by Keenan ( 1987; 1996) and Keenan & Westersclhl (1 997)22 may receive a specific or a non-specific interpretation {Fodor & Sag 1 982; En� 1991; Diesing 1992; etc.). As noticed by Suiier {1 9 8 8), Sportiche ( 1 996) and Uriagereka ( 1995 ), among others, when a noun phrase of this type is doubled by an accusative clitic, only the specific interpretation is possible:23
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach 3 3 5
b. Los enOJO a algunos profesores que ha mencionado them-pl. annoyed-he A some-pl. professors that has mentioned Juan Juan 'He annoyed some teachers mentioned by Juan' In what follows, I will argue that principal filterhood, and not specificity, the relevant feature in doubling constructions in generaL This includes those cases in which the doubled element is an indefinite quantifier. The· property of specificity overlaps with, but is not equivalent to, the property of being a principal filter. The principal filter property characterizes generalized quantifiers or noun phrase denotations. Thus, it holds at the denotational or truth-conditional level There are quantified noun phrases that inherently denote principal filters (universals, definites and proper names) because they always have a generator. These are grouped by the co-intersectivity property of the determiner heading the generalized quantifier (Keenan 1996). Other quantified noun phrases may denote principal filters in certain situations (models), namely those noun phrases headed by intersective/existential determiners, such as so-called indefinites, cardinal determiners and to a lesser extent 'vague' determiners such as many and Jew. Doubling is optional for generalized quantifiers headed either by co-intersective or by intersective determiners. The difference resides in that the interpretation does not change when the doubled element is a quantifier that always denotes a principal filter, whereas the presence of an accusative doubling clitic is associated with the principal filter reading of generalized quantifiers headed by intersective/existential determiners. When a generalized quantifier headed by an intersective determiner is not accusatively doubled, the principal filter reading is impossible, under normal conditions of stress and intonation. Ben Shalom (1993a), following the empirical findings in Liu (1990), claims that existential quantifiers may take wide scope when they occur in the object position of a sentence only if they are principal filters. The sentences in (49) are ambiguous. is
Three stUdents read two books b. Every poet bought a book
a.
In the preferred reading of the above examples, the subject scopes over the object and books vary with respect to students and poets respectively. In the object wide scope reading of (49a), there is a group of two books such that three students read those books. Therefore, the quantifier TWO B ( OOKS) in (49a) is generated by the set corresponding to that group. Similarly, when A (BOOK) in (49h) is a principal fllter, the singleton that
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(49)
3 36
The Formal Semanti� of Clitic Doubling
generates it is the unique same book that every poet bought. In the Spanish correlates of (49a), the object may receive a wide scope interpretation by two means: focusing or accusative doubling. Thus, (soa) has only the reading in which DOS (LffiROS) has narrow scope; (sob) may have a reading in which DOS (LIBROS) has wide scope; and, finally, (soc) has only the object wide scope reading. The existence of two different strategies for deriving obj ect wide scope readings is not surprising, given that the Presuppositionality Constraint forces the doubled object in (soc) to be a non-focal expressioiL (so)
estudiantes leyeron dos libros students read two books estudiantes leyeron [Foe dos libros] students read [Foe two books] leyeron dos libros estudiantes los students them read two books
In the dialects in which (soc) is possible, DOS (LIBROS) is the principal filter generated by the set of two books such that three students read them. The generalized quantifier DOS (LIBROSt is a principal filter if and only if there is a set A (the generator) such that for every property B such that DOS(LIBROS)(B) = I , A s;::; B. The idea that existential noun phrases can be systematically associated with more than one denotation can also be implemented in a type shifting framework. For instance, De Swart ( 1 999) proposes that there are three classes of indefinites and labels their respective characterizing properties as weakness, qualitative predication and referenti ality. The latter class involves a type shifting map from type ( (e, t) , t), the type of generalized quantifiers, to type e, the type of individuals. She also points out .that 'this mapping is dependent on the partition of individuals salient in the context'. This would be the type transition that would be triggered by accusative clitic doubling. As a matter of fact, some of the properties that she associates with this class of indefinites (ability to license discourse anaphora and scopelessness) are also characteristic of accusatively doubled existential noun phrases in Spanish. Thus, De Swart's class of referential indefmites would be equivalent to our principal filter denoting class. Let us now consider how speciftcity and principal filterhood are related. The speciftcity property is a priori more complex. It seems to involve purely semantic properties and others that belong to pragmatics, so there is no agreement on how it should be understood semantically or on how it
2• For all
B�
E,
DOS{LIBROSXB) = 1
iff
I LffiROS n B I
= 2..
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Tres three b. Tres three c. Tres three a.
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach 3 3 7
�·' As pointed out by En� (1991), historically, specificity has been related to a cognitive property. An NP is specific when the speaker has an individual in mind as its referent (Ioup 1 977). It has also
(1966) distinction between the referential and the attributive use of (1981) relates it to the d� r�/d� dicto distinction and Fodor & Sag
been related to Donellan's Saarinen definites (Partee
1972).
(1982) to the wide/narrow scope contrast More recently, talcing into account the ideas developed by Winter (1997), Kratzer (199M) and Reinhart (1997). specific interpretations may be related to the action of a contexrually dependent choice function.
(1982)
(1984) version of the theory.
"' Her account is compatible both with Heirn's and Kamp's A determiner function D is definite iffD is non-trivial and for all A�
�7
1 996).
E. D(A) = o or D(A) is the
filter generated by some non-empty set B � A (Keenan '" Peter Bosch points out that there are exceptions to this generalization, namely when the pronoun is in the consequent of an !flunlcss construction and quantifier or a negative polarity itenL
(i)
a.
Nobody passes unless he finishes the exam in time
b. If anybody tries to get in here. just hit him over the head
has
as its antecedent a negative
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·
should b e implemented in the grammar.25 An influential theory proposed by En� (1991) states the specific/non-specific distinction in the terms of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT).26 Specificity implies a linking of the newly introduced discourse referent to a discourse referent already present in discourse. Non-specificity implies that there is not such a linking. Therefore, indefinites and numerals are specific if and only if the construction rule associated with them introduces a new discourse referent and a linking condition relating this discourse referent to another discourse referent already present in the Discourse Representation Structure (DRS). There are three possible types of linking conditions, depending on the nature of the linking relation: (i) the identity relation, by which the condition is of the form a = {3, for a , {3 discourse referents; (ii) the subset or inclusion relation, by which the condition is of the form a � {3; and ftnally (iii) the proper subset relation, which is related to a condition of the form a C {3. The difference between principal fllterhood and specificity can also be cast in terms of DRT. Definite noun phrases denote principal fllters27 and establish a link of type (i) above. Specific noun phrases establish a link of type (ii) or (iii). Since the identity relation entails the subset relation, definiteness would entail specificity but not the other way around. In the ftrst section, it was pointed out that pronouns can be treated as deftnite determiners having a context set as their first argument. They can also be considered defmites when we understand this term as related to the dynamics of discourse interpretation because the construction rule asso ciated with pronouns links the newly introduced discourse referent to a discourse referent already present or accomm.odated (Lewis 1979) in discourse by an identity condition.28 By being definites, pronouns are also speciftc. Thus, in principle, pronouns could match with specific and deftnite noun phrases. Nevertheless, imposing an identity condition on discourse
3 3 8 The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling referents renders very different interpretations from those triggered by an inclusion-type linking. A clear case of this are specific indefinites, in En�'s (1991) terms. These are noun phrases that have a so-called partitive interpretation (overt or covert partitives). For instance, in the discourse in (5 1), the noun phrase three congressmen may behave as a covert partitive and be interpreted as 'three of the democratic congressmen'. (5 1) The Democrats are in town. I have j ust seen three congressmen in a limo.
In the process ofDRS construction corresponding to the above discourse,
(52) Los dem6cratas estill en la ciudad. the Democrats are in the town congresistas en una limusina congressmen in a limo ( 5 3 ) Los dem6cratas estill en la ciudad. the Democrats are in the town congresistaS en una limusina congressmen in a limo
Acabo de ver a tres fmished-1 of see A three
Los acabo de ver a tres them fmished-1 of see A three
Sentence (52) is semantically equivalent to (5 1). The noun phrase tres 'three congressmen' is interpreted as a partitive existential quantifier and the associated linking type would be inclusion, as in the English case. Sentence (5 3) is not equivalent to (5 1). The presence of the clitic forces the associated existential quantifier to behave as a definite. The speaker is referring to a unique group of individuals which is already presupposed. Prior to the processing of the second sentence in (5 3), there are two discourse referents in the corresponding DRS, one corresponding to los dem6cratas 'the Democrats', and other corresponding to a group of Demo cratic congressmen. Thus, the discourse referent contributed by the existential quantifier tres congresistas 'three congressmen' is linked by an identity condition to the presupposed discourse referent and, consequently,
congresistas
20'
See van Geenhoven ( 1 998)
for the
DRT semantics of partitive existentials.
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the discourse referent {3 introduced in the DRS by the construction rule associated with three congressmen is linked to the discourse referent a contributed by the Democrats. The linking type between {3 and a is inclusion, so three congressmen counts as a specific existential quantifier but not as a definite existential.29 The type of linking required in clitic doubling constructions is stronger than the linking needed for the interpretation of partitive existentials. Mere inclusion does not suffice. Thus, what would be needed is definiteness, in En�'s terms, not just specificity. Consider the two possible translations of sentence (5 1), without and with a clitic pronoun:
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach 3 39
(54}
Los he visto a mas de cuatro/cuatro 0 mas estudiantes or more students them have-1 seen A more of four/four 'I have seen a group of more than four/four or more students'
Notice also that characterizing the doubled quantifiers by the property of being a 'strong' indefinite (Diesing 1992; De Hoop 1 992) would not give a correct result either. This is because the specific, partitive and pre suppositional readings of indefinites (the readings usually covered under
this label) do not necessarily entail principal 6lterhood of the quantifier. Anagnostopoulou & Giannakidou ( I 99 s } claim that partitivity is the essential requirement for doubling in Spanish. Nevertheless, this is not the correct generalization because partitive noun phrases can be doubled only when they denote principal 6lters. As explained above, partitivity requires linking to a previous discourse referent (En� 1991) or, in different terms, that the quantifier following the partitive marker (the prepsition de 'of') is presupposed (Diesing 1992). Satisfaction of this requirement is compatible with the quantifier not being a principal 6lter. Consider the following sentence:
(s s)
varios de los libros Quiero que me traigas want-1 that me bring-you several of the books 'I want you to bring me several of the books'
Sentence (s s) has two readings. In the reading where varios de los libros 'several of the books' does not denote a principal 6lter, the sentence would be true in situations in which the speaker wants the addressee to bring him a subset of a presupposed group of books, and the only requkement is that this subset contains several books. Thus, there is more than one of these -'" A determiner function D is positive iff for all A. the quantifier function D(A} always maps the empty set to o.
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the existential quantifier is behaving like a definite. Truth-conditionally, the quantifier TRES (CONGRESISTAS} 'THREE (CONGRESSMEN}' is obligatorily a principal 6lter in (5 3) and has a generator set. This generator provides the context set for the pronominal clitic function LOS. In sum. the presence of a doubling accusative clitic forces the associated existential quantifier to be a principal 6lter. Increasing and decreasing cardinal determiners that are positive (Keenan 1996; Keenan & Westersclhl 1 997f0 are accusatively doubled only when they are interpreted as principal 6lters. In this case, they are non monotonic. The following example 1s interpretable only if the speaker has a concrete group in mind containing more than four students that he has seen.
3 40
The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
subsets that could satisfy the speaker's requirement In the second reading, which normally requires focusing the object, the speaker wants the addressee to bring him a particular subset of books so not any subset containing several books qualifies. The quantifier denoted by varios de los libros 'several of the books' is a principal filter and is generated by the subset of books in question. In the doubled variant of (5 5), where the object is presupposed, only the principal filter reading is possible. varios de los libros (56) Quiero que me los traigas want-1 that me them bring-you several of the books 'I want you to bring me a group of several of the books'
(57) Tres profesores los engafiaron a muchos de los estudiantes A many three professors them fooled of the students 'Three professors fooled a group consisting of many of the students' encontraron a varias de las nifias (58) Dos polidas las two policemen them-fern. found-they A several of the girls desaparecidas disappeared 'Two policemen found a group of several of the disappeared girls' Partitives do not necessarily support plural anaphora. When the partitive quantifier is in the scope of a modal verb, plural anaphora is impossible, as' (59a) shows. By contrast, when the partitive is doubled, as in (59b), it takes wide scope with respect to the modal verb, making plural anaphora possible. (59) a. Puede que .coma tres de las manzanas. *Las he elegido yo may that eat-1 three of the apples them have chosen I 'It may be the case that I eat three of the apples. *I have chosen them' b. Puede que las coma tres de las manzanas. Las he them have may that them eat-1 three of the apples elegido yo chosen I 'It may be the case that I eat a group of three of the apples. I have chosen them' The scope data in (57-59) follow immediately from the fact that principal filters are scopeless (Zimmermann 1987, 1 993), so they cannot
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It follows that (57) and (58) do not exhibit a scope ambiguity. Only the wide scope/scope independent reading of the overt partitive quantifier is possible. The interpretation in which the students vary with the professors and the girls with the policemen is not possible. This latter interpretation is readily available when the object is not doubled.
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach
341
have an interpretation in which they are dependent on other quantifiers in the clause or on embedding modal verbs.31 As is well known (Montague 1969), existential quantifiers trigger an ambiguity when they occur as objects of intensional verbs such as look for, want, etc.: (6o)
I am looking for a unicorn b. I need two secretaries a.
(61)
a un unicornio urucorn 'I am looking for a unicorn' necesito a dos secretarias b. (Las) them-fern need-1 A two secretaries 'I need two secretaries' a.
(Lo) busco
him look-for-I A a
The above contrast is also derived without further assumptions from the Principal Filter Constraint. When an existential quantifter is modified by a relative clause, the mood of the verb in the relative clause determines the principal fllter or the non-principal fllter interpretation of the quantifier (Rivero 1977). In sentence (62), the noun phrase dos secretarias 'two secretaries' can be only construed as a principal fllter. There is a group of two secretaries who speak French and the speaker is looking for them. The generalized quantifier function denoted by dos secretarias maps a unique set · of two individuals to True in a concrete situation, namely the above mentioned group. Indicative mood forces principal fllterhood of the generalized quantifier. In (63), subjunctive mood makes the principal Hlter interpretation of the existential quantifter impossible. The quantifier cannot be true of a unique set of individuals. frances (62) Busco a dos secretarias que saben look-for-I A two secretaries that know-IND.-they French 'I am looking for two secretaries who speak (indicative) French' frances (63) Busco a dos secretarias que sepan look-for-I A two secretaries that know-SUBJ.-they French 'I am looking for two secretaries who speak (subjunctive) French' 31 In the sentences in (57.:.. 5 9), the scope independent reading is equivalent to the wide scope reading. Also, the claim with respect to embedding modal verbs cannot be generalized to modal/ aspectual operators in general, as will be argued in section six.
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The existential quantifiers in (6o) can be construed as being principal fllters or as not being principal fllters. In Spanish, the presence of an accusative clitic forces the doubled NP to denote a principal Hlter. By contrast, the variants without clitic doubling in (61) display the same ambiguity as (6o).
342
The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
As expected, an existential generalized quantifier expression modified by a relative clause can be doubled by an accusative elitic only when the verbal mood is the indicative:
(64)
Las
Spanish bare plurals cannot trigger a principal filter reading (McNally The bare plurals in the following examples can only receive an existential narrow scope reading.
1 995).
(65)
Juan ha comprado libros Juan has bought books Juan has bought books' b. La casa fue construida por obreros the house was built by construction-workers 'The house was built by construction workers' a.
The prediction that follows from this property of bare plurals and the characterization of clitic doubling developed so far is that accusative clitic doubling of bare plurals is impossible, as observed by Suiier (1988).32 The partitive bare plural alcaldes de las ciudades costeras 'mayors of the coastal cities' in (66) cannot be doubled by an accusative clitic.
(66)
*Los eligieron a alcaldes de las ciudades costeras them elected A mayors of the cities coastal 'They elected mayors of the coastal cities'
Dative clitit doubling is not subject either to the Principal Filter Constraint or to the Presuppositionality Constraint. Both filter denoting and non-filter denoting noun phrases are allowed in doubling constructions with le, les. Consequently, the examples in (67) and (68) are well formed. Recall that what contrasts these two sets of sentences is that the generalized quantifiers in (67) are principal filters whereas those in (68) are not. J2 Bare �oun expressions in Spanish never denote principal filters. Thus, in Spanish the type transition from (t, t ) to t is not possible. In other languages, where bare plurals may refer to kinds, this transition is possible (Chierchia 1998�
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busco a dos secretarias que saben . them-fem. look-for-I A two secretaries that know-IND.-they Frances French 'I am looking for two secretaries who speak (indicative) French' b. *Las busco a dos secretarias que sepan Frances them look-for-I A two secretaries that know-SUBJ.-they French 'I am looking for two secretaries who speak (subjunctive) French' a.
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach
(67)
Les dieron un libro a esos estudiantes to-them gave a book to those students 'They gave a book to those students' b. Le pusieron objeciones a todo to-it put objections to all 'They raised objections to everything' dieron regalos a cada una de las runas c. Le/les to-her/to-them gave presents to each one of the girls desaparecidas disappeared 'They gave presents to each one of the disappeared girls' a. Les dieron regalos a muchos estudiantes students to-them gave-they presents to many 'They gave presents to many students' b. Les dieron algunos libros a varias runas gave-they some-pl. books to several girls to-them desaparecidas disappeared 'They gave some books to several disappeared girls' c. Les hicieron promesas a algunos alcaldes to-them made promises to some-pl. mayors 'They made promises to some mayors' leche a familias de pocos d. Les ofrecieron queso y to-them offered-they cheese and milk to family of few medios resources 'They offered cheese and milk to low-income families' a.
The behavior of intersective determiners under dative clitic doubling follows the expected pattern. The principal filter and the standard (non principal filter) interpretation are possible and the sentences in (69) are ambiguous.
(69)
Les he dado una carta a tres monjas letter to three nuns to-them have-I given a 'I have given a letter to three nuns� b. Les envi6 saludos a algunos profesores to.,.them sent greetings to some-pl. teachers 'He sent greetings some teachers' a.
Further evidence in favor of the denotational difference between accusative and dative clitics is the following contrast in scope noticed by Sufier (1988, 1991):
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(68)
343
344 The Formal Semantics of Cliric Doubling
(70)
Todos los all the candidates candidates b. Todos los all the electores voters a.
electores los eligieron a algunos de los voters them voted to some of the-pl. candidates les han dicho la verdad a algunos candidates to-them have said the truth to some-pl.
J.l
In some instances, dative clitics have become just
invariance in number. The singular form
case
markers and show morphological
le may double singular and plural
noun phrases:
(i) No le tiene miedo a las balas not CL-dat-sg. has-he fear to the bullets 'He does not fear the bullets' Marcos Marin {I 978), Rini {I 989) and
Roca {I996) also argue in favor of this hypothesis. This phenomenon has been observed by Silva-Corvahin ( I 98 I ) for Chilean Spanish; Bentivoglio (I 978) for the Venezuelan variery of Caracas; and Swier {I988) for Porteiio. Company (2.ooo) obserVes that there is an increase in the obligatory co-ocurrence of dative clitics with the noun phrase from a diachronic point of view. In sixteenth-cenrury texts, only ?% of the occurrences of dative NPs had a dubling pronoun; in the eighteenth-century, the percentage increases to 40%; fmally, in twentieth enrury texts, the obligatory co-occurrence has increased to So%. Js The only exception in this respect is Andean Spanish (the Andean areas of PerU, Bolivia and Nonhwestem Argentina), a dialect in which there is generalized accusative doubling of direct objects with the accusative clitic lo (Escobar 1978; Klee I989; among others). In this dialect, doubled objeets do not have to be either principal filters or presuppositional, as illustrated in {i), from Lujan {1 987). ·"
{i) Se lo llevo una caja CL-dat CL-acc took-he a box 'He took a box'
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Suiier observes that in sentence (7oa) only the object wide scope reading is allowed, whereas in sentence (7ob) the object may take wide or narrow scope. Sentence (7oa) is construed as 'there is a group of candidates such that all the voters voted them'. Sentence (7ob) is ambiguous between this reading and the object narrow scope reading: 'every candidate has told the truth to some electors'. In sum, it seems clear that accusative doubling marks two semantic properties of the quantifier associate (principal filterhood and presupposi tionality), whereas dative clitic doubling is not associated with any semantic restriction. In this respect, dative clitics can be taken as mere morpho syntactic agreement markers of number and dative case (Suiier 1988; Lyons 1990; Franco 1993).33 This might explain why the use of dative clitics in indirect object constructions is increasing across dialects, to the point that in some varieties it has become obligatory.34 On the other hand, from our line of reasoning, it follows that a similar trend in accusative doubling is not foreseeable, because accusative clitic marking has semantic import.35 In
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach 345 sum, the reason why we see such a contrast in doubling possibilities is explained by the hypothesis that accusative doubling amounts to semantic marking whereas dative doubling is essentially syntactic marking (case agreement) and is semantically inert.36
s A C C U SATIVE D O U B L I N G I N RO MANIAN A N D G REEK
The clitic seems to be just a mark of accusative case in this dialect, hence the gender and number invariability. This is normally explained as a phenomenon characteristic of bilingual speakers of areas in which Spanish is in contact with Quechua and Aimara. .II> It is also expected that some particular uses of dative doubling might grammaticalize as semantic markers. This is the case with so-called 'intensive' le in Mexican Spanish (Torres-Cacoullos 2.000), where the clitic does not saturate an argument position and refers to a presupposed entity, as illustrated in (i):
(i} 10ralel now-CL.dat. 'Hurty up!' 37 lu an anonimous reviewer points out, the Animacy Constraint is also operative. Whereas non doubled pronouns may refer to animate or inanimate entities, as in (i), ditic doubled expressions may only refer to animate/human entities (ii): (i) a. L-am vazut CL-have-I seen 'I have seen it/him' vazut b. *Am
have-I seen 'I have seen it/him' (ii} a. *L-am vazut filmul film-the CL-have-I seen 'I have seen the film' b. Am vazut filmul film-the have-I seen 'I have seen the film'
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Clitic doubling constructions in Romanian are similar to their Spanish correlates in many respects. In Spanish, accusative doubling is optional, and its presence marks principal filterhood and presuppositionality. In Roma nian, if a noun phrase denotes a principal filter, it is doubled obligatorily. Otherwise, it must not be doubled. Thus, the proper name Popescu in (71); the pronoun ea 'her' in (72); the universal quantifiers to[i 'all' and to[i copii 'all the children' in (73) and (74); the demonstrative acest profesor 'this professor' and the definite quantifter profesorul de fisica 'the physics professor' in (75) are all principal filters and trigger doubling obligatorily. The data in (71, 72) are from Steriade (1980) and the data in (73, 74) from Dobrovie-Sorin (1 994)-37
346 The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
vazut pe Popescu L-am PE Popescu · him have(!) seen 'I have seen Popescu' b. *Am vazut pe Popescu have(I) seen PE Popescu 'I have seen Popescu' a. Am vazut-o pe ea have-I seen-her PE her 'I have seen her' b. *Am vazut pe ea have-I seen PE her 'I have seen her' (73) a. l-am vazut pe toti them-have(I) seen PE all 'I have seen all' b. *Am vazut pe to�i have(I) seen PE all 'I have seen all' vazut pe to�i copii (74) a. l-am them-have(I) seen PE all children-the 'I have seen all the children' b. *Am vazut pe to�i copii have(I) seen PE all children-the 'I have seen all the children' (7 s) a. 11 vad pe acest profesor him saw-we PE this teacher We saw this teacher' b. 11 vad pe profesorul de fisica him saw-we PE teacher-the of physics 'We saw the teacher of physics' Generalized quantifiers headed by intersective determiners have to be doubled only when they denote principal filters. (examples from Dobrovie Sorin 1 994).38 Comparative quantifiers cannot be doubled. dus pe doua fran�ozaice la gari (76) a. l-am them-have-1 taken PE two French-women to-the station 'I have taken a group of two French women to the station' -
..,. As observed above, intensional quantifiers such as mauy andJew cannot be as easily doubled in Spanish.
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This shows that in Romanian it is also the case that the generator of the principal filter denoted by the doubled expression has to live on the set ANIMATE. The presence of the preposition pe, whose distribution is in part similar to Spanish a, is also obligatory. See Farkas (1 978), among others, for more details on the distribution of pe.
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach
347
picalit pe multi copii b. l-am them-have-! fooled PE many children 'I have fooled a group of many children' pe fati de la noi din-sat (77) 0 caut her am-I-looking-for PE girl from the our village 'I am looking for a girl from our village' (78) *l-am examinat pe mai multi baieti decit fete them-have-! examined PE more many boys than girls 'I have examined more boys than girls'
(79)
Caut un elev care sa-�tie engleze�te look-for-I a student which speak-SUB]. English 'I am looking for a student who would speak English' b. *11 caut pe un elev care sa-�tie engleze�te him look-for-I PE a student which speak-SUB]. English a.
The Presuppositionality Constraint is also satisfied in Romanian.39 Consequently, noun phrases in the post-copular focus position of cleft and pseudocleft constructions cannot be accusatively doubled (!sac 2000): (8o)
*E
pe Ion ca l-am vazut it-is PE John that him-have-! seen 'It is John who I have seen' b. *Fe cine l-am vazut era Ion PE who him-have-! seen was John 'Who I have seen is John' a.
The most significant difference with Spanish is that Romanian dative clitic doubling is also subject to the Principal Filter Constraint. Dative clitic doubling is obligatory if the associated expression has a principal filter reading. In (8 1), from Popescu (1999), doubling marks that the existential quantifier expression unor boli incurabile denotes a principal fllter, as pointed· out by a reviewer: (8 1) Le caucl leac unor boli incurabile CL-dat.pl search-he remedy some illness incurable 'He searches remedies for incurable diseases' ''' Steriade (r 98o: 283) states that 'the identity of the referent (of the doubled expression) is either known to the speaker or else uniquely determined by the referential expression itsel£' See also Farkas (1978) and Farkas & Kazazis (1 980�
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Clitic doubling, again in parallel with Spanish, is incompatible with subjunctive mood in a modifying relative clause.
348 The Forinal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
Thus, whereas dative clitic doubling in Spanish is a syntactic case/ agreement marker, in Romanian both accusative and dative doubling are seniantically conditioned. In Greek, the class of quantifiers that can be doubled is more restricted. Only phrases that always denote principal filters may be optionally doubled by an accusative clitic. Therefore, proper names, definite descriptions, universal quantifiers and demonstratives occur in accusative doubling constructions (examples (82, 83) from Schneider-Zioga (I994)).
Anagnostopoulou & Giannakidou (I995) claim that existential quanti fiers cannot participate in (accusative) clitic doubling constructions, as shown in (84a,b). Bare plurals cannot be doubled either (84c).40 (84)
*Tin psaxno mia/kapja grammatea her look-for-I one/a secretary 'I look for one/a secretary' b. *Tous eksetase merikous apo tous asthenis them examined-he several of the patients 'He examined several of the patients' c. *Ta-tro fruta sixna CL-pl-eat-I fruit frequently 'I eat fruit frequently' a.
Iatridou (I 99 I ), in her discussion of the differences between clitic doubling and clitic left dislocation, points out that cardinal quantifiers such as three can be clitic left dislocated, as illustrated in (8sa), but cannot be clitic doubled (Ssb). In (86), we see that an indefinite expression may "" Antonia Androtsopoulou (p.c.) suggests that there is dialectal variation with respect to this property. In her own dialect, quantifier expressions headed by generalized existential/intersective determiners may be optionally doubled, but bare plurals may not. Kalluli {1999) presents data from another Greek dialect in which doubling of existential quantifiers is possible: {i) Akoma ke i Anna katafere na {to) ekdosi ena vivlio prin na pethanin still and the Anna managed to it publish a book before to die 'Even Anna managed to publish a book before she died' In the dialects in which doubling of existential noun phrases is possible, the Principal Filter Constraint is satisfied. When the existential .noun phrase is doubled, it denotes a principal filter.
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(82} Tin-idha tin Maria her-saw-I the Maria 'I saw Maria' (83) Tin-idha tin kopella her-saw-I the girl 'I saw the girl'
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach
349
be right dislocated but not clitic doubled. See also Anagnostopoulou (1 994).'u
(85)
(86)
Tria provlimata, mono o Kostas ta-elise three problems only the Costas them-solved 'Three problems are such that only Kostas solved them' b. *Mono o Kostas ta-elise tria provlimata only the Costas them-solved three problems a. To idha na pemai prin apo dio meres, ena Egleziko it saw SUBJ. PASS. before from two days an English karavi ship 'I saw it go by a couple of days ago, an English ship' b. *To idha ena Egleziko karavi na pemai prin apo dio it saw an English ship SUBJ. PASS. before from two meres days 'I saw an English ship go by a couple of days ago' a.
(87)
*Tous idha tous perisoterous fitites them saw-I them most students 'I saw most students'
Schneider-Zioga (1 994) agrees with the above picture, and claims that the only quantifier phrases that can be doubled in Greek are those headed by the following determiners: this/that, whatever, every, the and proper names. These are determiners that cannot occur in existential-there constructions in Greek: afto/ekino 'this/that' afto to luludhi 'this the flower' opiadhipote luludhia 'whatever flowers' kathe ghata 'every cat' to kathe ghata 'the every cat' ke I dhio ghates ' the two cats' tin Maria 'the Maria' ·
(88)
*Exi
'there is
stin avli
in the courtyard'
'' For the speakers of the dialects mentioned in the previous foomote, examples (S sb) and {86b) are acceptable. My field work confirms the existence of a dialect split. About a third of my seventeen infomunts find the examples (Ssb; 86b) acceptable, when the associated quantifier is a principal filter.
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Proportional determiners such as perisoterous 'most' cannot participate in clitic doubling constructions either:
3 so
The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
In
(89)
0 Jannis diavase [j ena vivlio jia ton [; Arthur Miller]], enthusias tike, ke thelise na gnorisi [k ton sigrafoa] apo konta John read [j a book about [; Arthur Miller]], he got very enthusiastic, and he wanted to get to know [k the author] \ex 0 b. Jannis diavase G ena vivlio jia ton [; Arthur Miller]], enthusiastike, ke thelise na ton gnorisi [k ton sigrafoa] apo konta John read [j a book about [; Arthur Miller]], he got very enthusiastic, and he wanted to get to CL know [k the author] a.
In (89a), the non-doubled ton sigrafoa 'the author' is ambiguous. It may either refer to Arthur Miller (k = i) or to the (accommodated) author of the book that John read (k = j). The second option is not available under clitic doubling. Ton sigrafoa in (89b) can only be understood as referring to Arthur Miller (k = i). Anagnostopoulou & Giannakidou conclude that elitic •2 The definition of universals such as all and �err consists only of that inclusion condition. Determiners such as tl1� tm can be treated as having an additional cardinality condition and are restricted to a context set. •J In the dialect represented in previous foomotes, no specialization of the Principal Filter Constraint would be needed. In this dialect, Greek would behave like Spanish and Romanian with respect to this constraint.
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sum, what these data indicate is that the property that determines which clitics can be doubled in Greek is also semantic. It is related to, but not identical with, the property satisfied by clitic doubled quantifiers in Spanish and Romanian. In the dialect of Greek represented in the text, only a subset of the quantifiers that can denote principal fllters is doubled, namely those quantifiers headed by co-intersective determiners. Determi ners such as every, all, the, the ten, all but John, all but the ten, etc. are co intersective. All of them have an inclusion condition of the form A � B as part of their definition.42 Determiners such as most, more than half of the, ten percent ofthe, etc. are proportional-neither intersective nor co-intersective and cannot be doubled by an accusative clitic in Greek. Neither co intersective nor proportional determiners can occur in existential-there constructions. This construction isolates intersective determiners cross linguistically because only quantifiers headed by determiners satisfying this property can participate in existential sentences (Keenan 1987). The importance of accusative clitic doubling in Greek is that it shows that the property of co-intersectivity is also liriguistically relevant in a different domain.43 Anagnostopoulou & Giannakidou (1995) also observe that not all defmites may be doubled. There is an additional condition that a co intersective noun phrase has to satisfy, a Prominence Condition in the sense of Heim (1982). Consider the following contrast:
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach 3 5 r
doubling in Greek requires that the entity referred to by the noun phrase has been explicidy introduced in the discourse and formulate this constraint in terms of the Heimian notion of prominence.44 Since what is asserted cannot be presupposed, this condition requires the opposite of the Presuppositionality Constraint on Spanish accusative clitic doubling, by which it is preferred that the entity referred by the doubled noun phrase is presupposed. As expected, the translation of (89b) into Spanish gives the opposite results. When el autor 'the author' is doubled, as in (9o), it refers to the presupposed and accommodated author of the book (k = j), not to Arthur Miller. The non-doubled version is ambiguous, as in Greek.
In Greek, doubling of accommodative definites (91a), weak definites {Poesio 1 994) (91b), novel proper names/definites (those mentioned for the first time) (91c) is not possible. In Spanish, definites belonging to all these types may be doubled (92). (91)
*I Maria mou estile glika; tis efaga tis sokolates the Mary to-me sent sweets; them ate-1 the chocolates amesos immediately 'Mary sent me sweets; I immediately ate the chocolates b. *Xtes ton gnorisa ton fititi enos diasimou glossologou yesterday him met-1 the student of-a famous linguist ' I met the student of a famous linguist yesterday' c. *Xtes onirevtika oti ton gnorisa ton Clinton s'ena party the Clinton in-a party yesterday dreamt-! that him met 'Last night I dreamt that I met Clinton at a party' a.
... An anonymous reviewer points out that in her dialect doubling of distributive universals, such as each or every is not acceptable. My Greek informants, when tested on this issue, tended to fmd the examples ungrammatical in 'out of the blue' contexts, but acceptable in those in which the generator of the noun phrase headed by the distributive universal is prominent. Thus, potential variability in the acceptability of doubling of other noun phrases headed by co intersective detenniners might indicate constraint conflict with the Prominence Condition. If an expression satisfies the Co-intersectivity Constraint but its referent is not prominent, in the dialects in which the Prominence Condition is ranked higher, clitic doubling the expression would give an ungrammatical result. A formal implementation of these ideas would probably require the use of an optimality theoretic system (Prince & Smolensky 1 993) applied to the constraints that we are analyzing.
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(9o) Juan ley6 [j un libro sobre [; Arthur Miller] ], se entusiasm6, y quiso conocerlo [k al autor] John read [j a book about [; Arthur Miller] ], he got very enthusiastic, and he wanted to get to CL know [k the author]
3 52.
(92)
The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling a.
Maria me envi6 dukes; me los comi los chocolates Mary to-me sent sweets; CL-dat them ate-1 the chocolates
The contrast follows from the difference between the Prominence Constraint and the Presuppositionality Constraint, because in these examples the doubled element refers to a presupposed entity (in our terms, the generator of the associated principal fllter is presupposed, not prominent.) The examples in (92) are felicitous only if in the corresponding discourses it is presupposed that there is a group of chocolates in the sweet box; that there is a concrete student of a famous linguist; and the existence of Clinton is known by speaker and addressee. In the next section, we will see some further consequences of this fact in Spanish.
6
INTERA C T I O NS BETWEEN C L I T I C D O UB L I N G AND ASPE C TUAL / M O D AL O PERATORS}
Franco ( 1 99 3 : 86, 1 999) argues that the following sentences are examples of non-specific quantifiers doubled by an accusative clitic:45 (93)
luego se olvidaba a uno y Juan lo invitaba Juan him invited-IMPERF. A one and later SE forgot-imper£ ' Juan used to invite somebody and then forget all about it' b. En este departamento, lo admiten a cualquiera him admit A whichever in this department, 'In this department, they admit anyone' a.
•s The variants of the sentences in (93) with the plural forms of uno and cualquiera are ungrammatical for different reasons. Unos exhibits a clearly differential behavior from its singular counterpart and can never be accusatively doubled (see section 7.1). Cualesquiera is an archaic form.
(i}
a.
juan los invitaba a unos y luego se olvidaba Juan them invited-IMPERF. A one-pl and later SE forgot-imper£ b. *En este departamento, los admiten a cualesquiera in this department, them admit-they A which-pl.-ever
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inmediatamente immediately 'Mary sent nie sweets; I immediately ate the chocolates b. Ayer lo conoci al estudiante de un famoso linguista of a famous linguist yesterday him met-1 A-the student ' I met the student of a famous linguist yesterday' que lo conoci a Clinton en una sone c. Fijate, ayer look, yesterday dreamt-! that him met A Clinton in a fieSta party 'Look, yesterday I dreamt that I met Clinton at a party'
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach
353
What I will be arguing with respect to these examples is that, when their semantics is examined in detail, they turn out to be indirect evidence in favor of the account presented in this paper. The common property of the above sentences and others that will be considered in this section is that the clitic is dependent on some aspectual operator. It is this property which creates the illusion of non principal filterhood. (94) OP .
. .
cl
. . .
QP
"' Franco (1 993) actually tranSlates the q=tifier uno as peoplt. This misses important aspects of the meaning of uno. first, that it is semantically and syntactically a singular quantifier. Hence, the
tranSlation by somebody is more adequate. Second, it is also the case that in some of the situations quantified over, the speaker is included. A more precise paraphrase would be: 'In general, when John
invited somebody he would forget about the invitation.' The sentence would entail that in at least one of the situations, the speaker has been the person invited by Juan. ., In a framework which uses variables at the syntactic level of representation of Logical form, the
quantifier cualquiera 'whichever' would be tranSlated as a free variable, whose denotation is fixed by a pair (c,g) where c is a context and g an assignment. Heim (1 987) considers variables to be definite, so this idea would be in consonance with the possibility of accusative doubling.
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Franco argues that uno 'lit. one (somebody)' is a non-specific generic quantifier. Nevertheless, the quantificational force of uno is not generic. The generic force of the sentence does not come from the quantifier uno but rather from the imperfec� aspect of the verb invitaba 'invite-past-imper£'.46 In a situation s, uno denotes the principal filter generated by an individual x, sometimes the speaker. Therefore, uno can be considered extensionally as denoting a principal filter and it meets the selectional requirements of the accusative clitic. The illusion of non principal filterhood emerges because the individuals may vary with respect to the situations considered, but in each situation a unique individual is considered. When the relevant individual is the speaker, it is indeed the same individual in all situations. Sentence (93b) is very similar in its quantificational force to (93a). The quantifier cualquiera 'whichever' has two components: an intensional component induced by the incorporated propositional attitude. verb q uiera 'want', and the relative quantifier cual 'which'.'" The doubled· cualquiera denotes in each situation a contextually relevant unique indi vidual. It is important to note that the Presuppositionality Constraint is also active in the modal/generic contexts under consideration. The above sentences are acceptable only when the potential individuals referred to in the different situations are presupposed, i.e. known by speaker and addressee. In (95), the non-doubled correlate of (93a), uno works as a mere cardinality quantifier (the Principal Filter Constraint does not hold), and there is no presupposition that the speaker or the memb�rs of a particular group of people are those who were invited.
3 54
(95)
The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling a uno y luego se olvidaba Juan invitaba Juan invited-IMPERF. A one and later SE forgot-IMPERF. juan used to invite one person and then forget all about it'
The habitual present and the imperfect past are the only verbal forms that create the proper dependence and the illusion of non-filterhood because they introduce generic quantifiers over events or situations.
(96) (97)
a uno y luego se olvid6 Juan lo invtto Juan him invited-PERF. A one and later SE forgot-per£ juan invited somebody and then forgot about it' Juan lo invitara a uno y luego se olvidara Juan him will-invite A one and later SE will-forget juan will invite somebody and then he will forget about it'
The quantifier cualq uiera 'whichever' is incompatible, when doubled, with verbs describing punctual or non-durative events. The perfect past obligatorily describes an event that took place in a period of time preceding the speech time, so (98a) is not well-formed. Sentence (98b) has only an . activity interpretation. In other words, whenever somebody will apply for admission to the department, he will be admitted It lacks a unique-event interpretation such as 'somebody will apply to this department in the future and he will be admitted'. This incompatibility between cualquiera and episodicity is due to the fact that cualquiera is a non-veridical polarity item (Bosque 1 999) and requires the presence of a generic/aspectual operator.
(98)
*En este departamento, lo admitieron a in this department, him admitted-PERF.-they A cualquiera which-sg.-ever 'In this department, they admitted anyone-pi' b. En este departamento, lo admitiran a cualquiera in this department, him will-admit-they A which-sg.-ever 'In this department, they will admit anyone- pl' a.
..., Another difference betweeen generic and episodic contexts is that the speaker does not have to the entity presupposed in an episodic context such as (96� Nevertheless, the generator of the quantifier is still presupposed.
be
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When the perfect past and the future · are substituted for the imperfect past form of the verb, as in (96, 97), the illusion of non-fllterhood does not arise because only one situation is considered and a unique individual in that situation.48
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach
355
different variety o f sentences in which a similar illusion o f non principal filterhood arises are the following ones:
A
(99)
a.
Ahora m.ismo me lo tomaria
un vrmto
tan
ricamente
In the above sentences, the optative/desiderative mood interacts with doubling in the same fashion as we have been considering so far. The function denoted by the clitic expression becomes dependent on the modal operator. The context determines that in each situation the glass of wine to be drunk (99) or the money to be spent ( 1 oot9 is ftxed by the desires of the speaker in that situation. In sum, it is the property of denoting a contextually dependent function that allows the pronominal clitic to be dependent on the mood parameter. The explanation of the phenomena considered in this section, and also of the examples in (92) at the end of the previous section, is also related to a well-known property of the definites that are associative anaphors (Clark 1 977; Hawkins 1978; Heim 1982).5° Consider (1 02): (1 o2) Whenever I go to a wedding, the bride looks wonderful. The noun phrase the bride seems to be not denoting a principal ftlter in (1 02) because there may be more than one individual satisfying the description the bride. The individual referred to by the definite descrip tion-the generator of the principal filter THE{BRIDE)-varies with respect to situations in which there is a wedding y such that the speaker goes to y. In addition, the individual denoted by the definite description has to be •., Lexicalized expressions such as mil pestt4s ' a thousand pesetas' denote a unit of measure that can be conceived as an homogeneous or integrated whole (Simons 1987; Moltmann 1 997).
50 Clark (1977) calls this class of definites bridging defmites, and Hawkins (i 978) calls them associative definites. See also Poesio ( 1 994), who analyzes the properties of a subclass of anaphoric defmites that he calls weak definites.
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now EMPH me it would-take-! a wine-DIM so richly 'Right now, I would easily drink a glass of wine' mil pesetas? (1 oo) -� En que te gastarias in what you would-spend-you thousand pesetas 'What would you spend a thousand pesetas on?' pesetas en bombones -Yo me las gastaba mil I me them spend thousand pesetas on chocolates 'I would spend them on chocolates' (1o1) Ahora m.ismo me las tomaba dos botellas de vino en un now EMPH me them would-take-! two bottles of wine in a santiamen saint-amen 'Right now, I would drink two bottles of ·wine in a second'
356 The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling connected to the situation by a pragmatically relevant relation, so that the proper 'bridging' or accommodation inference takes place (see also Partee 1989; Barker 1 991; Asher & Lascarides 1996; etc.) The definite description the dog would not be felicitous in (103), because dogs are not normally linked to wedding scenarios, whereas brides are.
(103)
#Whenever I go to a wedding. the dog looks wonderful.
(1o4)
C =
{xl l {yly E WEDDiNG &(I, y)
E
GO_TO &(x,y)
E
1r} l =/= 0}
The function THE(BRIDE) i n (102) is stilL a principal filter whose I . The deftnite generator is the set BRIDE n C such that !BRIDE n C1 quantifter is in the scope of the quantifier over situations whenever and in each situation the bride would denote a principal filter even though the generators need not be the same in all situations. It is this property which creates the illusion of non principal filterhood. The analysis also requires lifting the to the type of an intensional determiner function, a function from worlds or (or world..:time pairs) to determiner functions. Applying this explanation of the variation of deftnites in modal contexts to clitic doubling allows us to maintain the relationship between doubling and principal ftlterhood. Although clitics are definite quantifiers, when they occur in the scope of a temporal, aspectUal or modal operator they become dependent on it. Therefore, in each world-time under considera tion, the context set of the clitic function is provided by the generator of the doubled quantifier at that given index. The intension of a clitic is a function mapping indices (world-time pairs) to its extension, a function from context sets to arity reducers. The illusion of non-principal ftlterhood is explained away by the straightforward observation that the intension of a clitic is not a principal filter but its extension is. As was pointed out at the end of the previous section, the emergence of associative anaphors via clitic doubling critically depends on the Pre suppositionality Constraint. If the generator of the associated quantifier had to be prominent, as in Greek, or focused, doubling would be impossible. In Spanish, since the generator has to be presupposed, it is possible to recover it from the background. Thus, ( 105) is felicitous with and without a clitic. ==
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Clearly, the property of definites of having an additional context set argument or parameter is the element that triggers the associated bridging property. Given that context sets are presupposed, and following the standard assumption that bridging involves accommodation, the context set of the function THE would be C in (104) where 1r denotes a contextually relevant relation between weddings y and individuals x:
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach
3 57
(105) Cuando voy a una boda suelo saludar-Qa) a la novia when go-I to a wedding use-to-I greet-(her) A the bride primero first 'Whenever I attend a wedding, I use to greet the bride first' Let us consider one more instance of the kind of dependence that we are analyzing in this section. In the following example, the noun phrase mas de cuarenta ingenieros de software 'more than forty software engineers' denotes an increasing quantifier despite the fact that it is doubled by an accusative elitic.
The most likely interpretation of the sentence is that Bill Gates would indeed be able to hire more than forty engineers for his company in a month because he is incredibly wealthy, powerful, etc. Any group of more than forty engineers makes the sentence true, so it appears to be obvious that the quantifier is not a principal filter. The apparent exception follows naturally from the distinction between the intension and the extension of a pronominal clitic function and the claim that the property of principal ftlterhood applies only to extensions. In the above sentence, in each of the situations under consideration in which Bill Gates hires engineers, he hires a unique group with more than forty. The Principal Filter Constraint is satisfied at each index, but the group selected at each index does not have to be the same. .
7 D O UBLING AND THE C O NTEXT D E PE NDE N CE PARAMETER
In this section, it will be shown that in some circumstances the constraints considered so far are not sufficient to account for all cases of accusative doubling. More concretely, when there are two quantifiers belonging to the same class (existential/intersective, universal/co intersective, proportional or negative quantifiers) which may satisfy the Principal Filter Constraint, only the context dependent quantifier may be doubled.
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(1 o6) Bill Gates los contrataria a mas de cuarenta ingenieros de Bill Gates them would-hire A more of forty engineers of software en un mes software in a month 'Bill Gates would indeed be able to hire more than forty software engineers in a month'
3 58 The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling 7. 1
Universal, existential and proportional quantifiers
Schmitt (1994, 1998) presents another potential counterexample for an account of clitic doubling based on specificity. Her evidence comes from the behavior of universal determiners in accusative doubling constructions. Quantifiers headed by the complex determiner todos los 'all the'51 may be doubled whereas those headed by the universal determiner todo may not.52 (107)
Los vi a todos los hombres them saw-1 A all-masc.pl. the men 'I saw all the men' b. *Lo vi a todo hombre him saw-I A every man 'I saw every man' a.
(108)
a.
Todos los hombres aman a una mujer all-masc.pl. the men love A a woman 'All the men love a woman'
51 I follow Keenan & Stavi (1986) in treating these sequences of determiners as forming a complex determiner. 52 Schmitt (1994) presents (ro7) as characteristic of COrdoba (Andalusian) Spanish. My field work shows that the contrast is attested much more widely, particularly in most dialects of Peninsular Spanish.
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Schmitt (1994) observes that the above contrast is unexpected under the specificity hypothesis because 'universal quantifiers are taken to be specific, since there is always a presupposed set in the discourse to which they refer' (p. 1 8 3). Recall that here we are defending the claim that principal ftlterhood plus presuppositionality and not specificity are the critical factors in accusative clitic doubling, so the question becomes how to interpret the contrast within our theory. First, it has to be observed that there is only one presupposition that the universal determiners todos los and todo share, namely a Strawsonian one: the restriction set or first argument of the determiner function is presupposed to be non-empty. Beyond this point, their behavior is quite different. Todos los 'all the' is a contextually dependent universal. In this respect, its morphological composition as a complex determiner mirrors its semantic content. The definite part los 'the-pl'. introduces the context set/presupposed set and the quantifier part todos 'all' indicates the quantificational force of the expression. Todo 'every' differs from todos los in lacking a definite part. Consequently, the function denoted by this expression lacks a context set and it does not presuppose any property of individuals. Compare the following sentences:
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach
359
b. Todo hombre ama a una mujer every man loves A a woman 'Every man loves a woman'
(ro9)
Vinieron doce estudiantes. Todos los europeos sonreian came-they twelve students. All the Europeans were-smiling 'Twelve students came in. All the European ones were smiling' b. Vinieron doce estudiantes. *Todo europeo sonreia came-they twelve students. Every European was-smiling 'Twelve students came in. Every European was smiling' a.
In (ro9a), todos los can accommodate a context set C of twelve students who came, whereas this is not possible in the case of todo. This fact is what blocks accusative doubling, since accusative doubling requires linking between the clitic pronoun and the quantifier associate.53 53 In the terms ofDRT, the discourse referent contributed by the doubled quantifier to a DRS has to be linked to the discourse referent introduced by the clitic pronoun. Thus, in the case of todo, the discourse configuration needed for doubling does not obtain. As a reviewer observes, the distinction is not absolute and when enough restrictive material is provided, todo can be coerced to denote a contextually restricted function and can be linked to an accommodated discourse referent, as the contrast in (i) shows:
(i)
a.
El
afio pasado visite Ia Universidad de Madrid. *Queria ver a todo alumno de the last year visited-! the University of Madrid. Wanted-! see A evety srudent of lingiiistica. linguistics 'Last year I visited the University of Madrid. I wanted to see evety srudent' b. El afio pasado visite Ia Universidad de Madrid. Queria ver a todo alumno de the last year visited-! the University of Madrid. Wanted-! see A every srudent of lingiiistica que hubiese leido sobre sintaxis rninimista. linguistics that had-subj.he read about syntax minimalist 'Last year I visited the University of Madrid. I wanted to see every srudent who had read about minimalist syntax'
Doubling is impossible in (ia). In (ib), it would be marginally possible.
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Sentence (roSa) may be understood as a universal statement about a contextually determined group of men or as a universal statement about men in general In the latter case, the context set does not bring about any proper restriction into the denotation of the noun hombres 'men'. Sentence (ro8b) lacks the first interpretation. It can only be understood as a universal or generic statement about men in general. This is related to the property of the quantifier todo of not being restricted to a context set. Todo can be considered a universal determiner but, in DRT terms, it cannot be linked to any previously introduced discourse referent. On the other hand, todos los can be linked to a previous discourse referent, as the following contrast illustrates.
360
The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
There are two distributive universals in Spanish. the simple determiner cada
'each' and the complex cada uno de los 'each one of the'. The second one denotes an inherently context dependent function, whereas the first one
does not. In some dialects of Spanish, such as Porteiio, only quantifiers headed by the complex context dependent determiner can be doubled, as observed by Suner (I988): (I I o)
*Lo entrevistaron a cada candidato por media hora him interviewed-they A each candidate by half hour 'They interviewed each candidate for half an hour' b. El medico lo/los examin6 a cada uno de los pacientes the doctor him/them examined A each one of the patients 'The doctor examined each one of the patients' a.
(I I I )
Vinieron doce estudiantes. Algunos europeos sonreian came-they twelve students. some-pl. europeans were-smiling 'Twelve students came in. Some of the European ones were smiling' b. Vinieron doce estudiantes. *Unos europeos sonreian came-they twelve students. a-pl. European were-smiling a.
Parallel to the contrasting universal determiners, a quantifier phrase headed by a lgunos may be accusatively doubled but one headed by unos may not. The determiner algunos has a complex variant, algunos de los 'some of the', which can also participate in accusative doubling. {I 1 2)
a.
Los
vi
them saw-I 'I saw some b. *Los vi them saw-I 'I saw some
a algunos/algunos
de los estudiantes A some-masc.pl./some-masc.pl. of the students students' . a unos estudiantes A a-pl. students students'
In some Southern Cone dialects, the difference extends to quantifiers headed by cardinal determiners. Accusative doubling of simple cardinal determiners, such as tres 'three' in (I I 3 ), is not possible, whereas it is possible to double the complex contextually restricted variant
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The same type of contrast can also be observed in existential determiners. The Spanish plural existential determiners unos 'a-pl'. and algunos 'some' differ in several properties (Laca I 996; Laca & Tasmovski I996; Gutierrez Rexach I 999a, I 999b). One of the most important differences is that unos is context independent whereas a lgunos is context dependent, as the following contrast shows:
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach 361 (I I 3)
Los vi a *tres/tres de los estudiantes them saw-1 A three/three of the students 'I saw three/three of the students'
Finally, there are two different proportioruil determiners in Spanish: una mayoria de los 'a majority of the' and Ia mayora de los 'the majority of. Only the second one denotes a contextually restricted function, as shown in ( I I 4), and as expected only this determiner can participate in accusative doubling constrUctions (I I s ) .
(u s)
Vinieron doce estudiantes. *Una/la mayoria de .los europeos came-they twelve students. a/the majority of the europeans sonreian were-smiling 'Twelve students came in. Most of the European ones were smiling' Los vi a *una/la mayoria de los estudiantes them saw-I A a/the majority of the students 'I saw most/most of the students'
In sum, the data in this section prove that, in some cases, the licensing of accusative clitic doubling requires an additional restriction on the quanti fier associate besides the denotational property of principal filterhood. Universal, existential and proportional quantifiers that, in principle, satisfy the denotational constraint of principal ftlterhood may fail to satisfy the necessary linking condition because they lack a context set Thus, we can formulate the following additional semantic constraint on accusative doubling: (u6) The Context Dependence Constraint:
Let Q;, � be two quantifiers satisfying the Principal Filter Constraint and such that they would yield an equivalent interpretation in a clitic doubling constrUction.54 Then, if one is a contextually restricted function and the other is not, only the contextually restricted . quantifier can be doubled. The following sections on the behavior of negative and interrogative quantifiers corroborate the importance of the above constraint in doubling constrUctions. " This guarantees that the
unos; tres de los vs. tres; etc.
relevant pairs arc considered. In Spanish, todos los vs. todo; algutWs vs.
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(1 14)
362 The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling 7.2 Doubling and negative quantifiers
Doubling of noun phrases headed by the determiner ningun 'no' and ninguno de los 'none of the' also present some interesting peculiarities. First, in an indirect object doubling construction, if the determiner ningun 'no' .heads the quantifier phrase, it cannot denote a principal filter.
(u7) No le
he dado regalos a ningtin politico not to-him have-! given presents to no politician 'I have not given presents to any politician'
(u 8) No le
he dado regalos a ninguno de los politicos not to-him have-I given presents to no of the politicians 'I gave presents to none of the politicians'
Let us now consider the behavior of ningun 'no' and ninguno de los 'none of the' in accusative doubling constructions. The simple negative determi ner ningun 'no' cannot occur in accusative doubling constructions but the complex determiner ninguno de los 'none of the' can, as illustrated in the contrast between (I I 9) and (120):
{I I9) ( 120)
*No lo he visto a ningtin politico not him have-1 seen A no politician 'I have not seen any politician' No lo he visto a ninguno de los politicos of the politician not him have-1 seen A none 'I have not seen any of the politicians'
In this case, the difference cannot be related to the property of principal filterhood since neither the quantifiers headed by ningun nor those headed by ninguno de los de�ote a principal filter. The only difference between the determiners NINGUN and NINGUNO DE LOS is that the latter is restricted to a context set C:
B, C � E. Then, NINGUN(A)(B) = I iff A n B = 0 NINGUNO DE LOS(C)(A)(B) = I iff {C n A) n B = 0 The quantifiers NINGUN(A) 'NO{A)' and NINGUNO DE LOS(C)(A) 'NONE OF THE(C)(A)' denote principal ideals, defined as follows:
{I2I)
Let A,
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The sentence above cannot be interpreted as 'there is a group of politicians such that I did not give presents to any of them'. This is precisely the interpretation of the following example, where the doubled constituent is headed by the complex partitive determiner ninguno de los 'none of the':
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach 363
( I 22) A generalized quantifier Q over E is a principal ideal iff there is a non empty set A � E, such that for all B � E Q(B) = I iff B � A. The set A is called the generator of Q
(123)
No le he dado regalos a ninguno not to-him have-I given presents to none 'I have not given presents to anybody' a. No le he dado regalos a nadie not to-him have-I given presents to noone 'I have not given presents to anybody' (124) a. No lo he visto a ninguno not him have-I seen A none 'I have not seen anybody' b. ??No lo he visto a nadie not him have-I seen A noone 'I have not seen anybody' 55 A reviewer observes that this line of explanation can also be invoked to explain another phenomenon, the so-called COMP-set anaphora, observed with negative and downward entailing quantifien (Moxey & Sanford 1 99.z):
(i) Few of the students came to the lecture. They (= the ones that didn't come) preferred to go to the beach instead. 56 In some 'leista' varieties, the difference practically does not exist, and doubling of the context independent variant ruulie is possible (Camacho 1993; Roca 1996).
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The principal ideals NINGUN(A) 'NO(A)' and NINGUNO DE LOS(C)(A) 'NONE OF THE(C)(A)' are generated by the set -, A. Thus, it is still possible to retrieve the set A (the complement of ..., A), although not as the generator of a principal filter, but rather as the complement of the generator of the principal ideal. If the generator were retrieved by direct semantic inference from the denotation of the quantifiers, doubling of principal ideals would be possible without further restrictions. The above contrast shows that the retrieval of the complement set of the generator of the principal ideal is only possible when the set is already presupposed (the Presuppositionality Constraint is satisfied) and when the function denoted by the determiner expression is restricted to a context set (the Context Dependence Constraint is also satisfied.)55 This is the case of NINGUNO DE LOS(C)(A) 'NONE OF THE (A)' where the presence of the definite determiner the forces the partitive or presuppositional reading. Consider now the quantifiers nadie 'no one' and ninguno 'nobody'. In contrast with ningun N, these two quantifiers can occur in dative and accusative doubling constructions. Nevertheless, in accusative doubling constructions, nadie is marginal (Suiier I99I, I992).56
364 The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
(125)
*No hay ninguno en el jardin not are-there nobody in the garden 'There is nobody in the garden' b. No hay nadie en el jardin not is-there nobody in the garden a.
A similar contrast obtains in Romanian, between the non-context dependent quantifier nimeni 'nobody' and the context dependent niciunul 'no one, none'. The former cannot be clitic doubled whereas the latter has to be clitic doubled {Dobrovie-Sorin 1994): ( 1 26)
a.
vazut pe nimeni Nu (*1)-am not him-have-I seen PE nobody 'I haven't seen anybody'
b.
In �coala asta sint IO profesori de englezi, dar din picate nu-*(1) apreciez pe niciunul 'In this school there are 10 teachers ofEnglish, but unfortunately I do not-(him) appreciate none'
In sum, if we take into consideration the facts about positive and 57 A
reviewer observes that sentence (usa) becomes OK in the order (PP VP negQ], as
in
(i}.
(i) En d jardin no hay nadie/ninguno in the jarden not there-is nobody Constructions such as (i) are not instances of existential/presentational haber 'there is'. Rather, they are locational constructions, where what is asserted is not existence but the location of an entity or entities. Thus, strong and presuppositional quantifiers may occur in this type of constructions.
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Ninguno 'none', in contrast with nadie 'no one', is dependent on the availability of a context set for its interpretation. Therefore, when uttering (124a) the speaker is presupposing the existence of a context set, so that the quantifier ninguno is equivalent to the partitive ninguno de los C 'none of the' where C is a context set. Thus, the Presuppositionality Constraint and the Context Dependence Constraint are satisfied. The Principal Filter/Ideal Constraint is also satisfied indirectly because the presence of the context set triggers an inferential step of the sort described above that makes the retrieval of the complement of the generator of a principal ideal possible. The quantifier nadie is less flexible in allowing this inferential step and it exhibits resistance to becoming a pure contextually dependent and presuppositional quantifier. Consequently, it is always a weak quantifier. This is illustrated by the contrast in (125), where it can be observed that the quantifier ninguno 'nobody' cannot occur in existential constructions, but nadie 'nobody' can.57
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach 365 negative quantifiers, accusative doubling is sensitive to the property of having a generator. This generator provides the context set and restricts the function denoted by the pronominal clitic.
7·3 Nominative clitic doubling in Northern Italian dialects
(1 27)
Tutto gl' e successo di notte {Fiorentino) Everything CL.-nom. happened in the night b. Tut l'e capita de not (Trentino) Everything CL-nom. happened in the night a.
She also o.bserves a 'somewhat mysterious instance of fully agreeing morphology' (1992: 666), from Rizzi (1986), by which the equivalents of nobody in Trentino and Fiorentino have to be doubled by the agreeing variant of the clitic. (128)
Nessuno gl' ha detto nulla {Fiorentino) Nobody CL-nom. said anything b. Nissun l' ha dit niente (Trentino) Nobody CL-nom. said anything a.
The above example is problematic for her syntactic 'Matching Hypo thesis', which correlates agreeing clitics and strong or specific determiners, because negative quantifiers do 'not appear to be presuppositional or specific' {Suiier 1992). The examples are not problematic for a semantic account within Generalized Quantifiers Theory. Obviously, the property of being specific or presuppositional is not enough to link all the positive quantifiers considered before with the negative quantifiers nessuno and
nis.sun. Tutto 'all' is just a plain universal quantifier, probably without any salient ingredient of context dependence (a property that we are associating with restriction to a context set). According to Suiier {1 992), in Trentino S8
This class includes universal determiners, definitcs, demonstratives, pronouns, and the specific
or strong reading of many and
some.
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. Nominative clitic doubling in the Northern Italian dialects Trentino and Fiorentino is also sensitive to the semantic property of having a generator. Trentino and Fiorentino have two types of subjects clitics: a neuter clitic and an agreeing clitic. The syntactic properties of these clitics have been studied by Rizzi (1986), Brandi & Cordin (1989) and Suiier (1992). Suiier (1992) observes that when the doubled subject is headed by a strong determiner, in Milsark's (1977) sense,58 only the agreeing nominative clitic may double the quantifier phrase.
366 The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
when the doubled quantifier phrase is an overt partitive, only doubling by the agreeing clitic is possible (129). Yet with nissun/a, there is alternation between the agreeing and the non-agreeing null clitic (130).59 Doubling by the agreeing clitic forces presuppositionality and context dependence, whereas doubling by the non-agreeing clitic is associated with non context dependence.
(r29) Nisuna/neanca una dele putele 1' e scampada l'altra not ( r 3 o)
none/not one of the girls CL-nom. ran away the other night no 1' ha telefona nissuna not SCL telephoned nobody (context dependent) b. no 0 ha telefona nissuna not SCL telephoned nobody a.
(I 3 I)
Everybody but John came to the party. No student but John came to the party._ b. *Some students but John came to the party. *Most students but John came to the party. a.
The exception phrase substracts a set of individuals from the generator of the generalized quantifier. The denotation of a quantifier phrase modified by an exception phrase is no longer its generator, although there is still a set 59 Here we are following Suiier's assumption that the non-agreeing clitic in Trentino is a phonologically null clitic. Alternatively, one could assume that in Trentino context dependence is associated with a clitic and non context dependence is not marked at all '"' Satisfying the condition of having a generator is not sufficient. It is also required that the set substracted from the generator can be effectively separated from the remaining individuals in the generator. Sentence (i) would be a contradiction. (i) john and
Mary except John went
to the party.
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We see that the parallelism with Spanish is almost complete. In Trentino and Fiorentino, an agreeing nominative clitic may double a subject, if and only if the subject denotes either a principal filter or a principal ideal. In the case of principal ideals, there is an additional constraint. The quantifier has to be restricted to a context set and satisfy the Context Dependence Constraint. Clitic doubling is not the only phenomenon sensitive to the semantic property of being a principal filter or a principal ideal. Modification by exception phrases is possible only for quantifiers denoting principal filters or principal ideals (Hoeksema 1996; von Fintel I993; Moltm.ann 1995; Lappin I 996). The examples in (I 3 r ) and (I 32) illustrate this point. Everybody denotes a principal filter and no student denotes a principal ideal, whereas some students and most students do not denote a principal filter or ideal.60
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach 367
that can be uniquely recovered from the generator. This is probably the reason why quantifier phrases modified by exception phrases can still be doubled by accusative clitics in Spanish:6 1 (1 33)
Los vi a todos los estudiantes excepto a Pedro them saw-1 A all the students except A Pedro 'I saw all the students but Pedro' ha leido todas las novelas de Gald6s excepto b. Pedro las Pedro them-fem. has read all the novels of Gald6s except a.
Miau Miau
We can conclude that the results in this section seem to confirm the validity of the Context Dependence Constraint on clitic doubling, which separates quantifiers satisfying the Principal Filter/Principal Ideal Con straint in two classes: those that are contextually restricted functions and those that are not. Only the quantifiers in the first class may be accusatively doubled in Spanish and Romanian, or nominatively doubled in Northern Italian dialects. In the next section, we will see how the Context Dependence Constraint is also relevant for interrogative quantifiers.
8 CLITIC D OUBLING IN QUESTIONS The interaction between clitic doubling and interrogative quantifiers in questions confirms some of the claims that have been made so far. Jaeggli (1982, 1 986), Hurtado {1984) and Suiier (1988), among others, observed that accusative and dative clitics contrast in the following manner: accusative clitics cannot double a wh-word whereas dative clitics can. In ( I 3 S ), only the non-doubled variants are well-formed, whereas in {136) all the variants are well-formed. ''' for some speakers, when the quantifier phrase denotes a principal ideal, accusative doubling becomes more acceptable when the exception phrase is preposed and topicalized:
{i)
?Excepto a Clinton, no lo he visto a ninguno de los politicos of the politicians except A Clinton, not him have-I seen A none 'Except Clinton, I have not seen any of the politicians'
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'Pedro has read all the novels written by Gald6s but Miau (1 34) No lo he visto a ninguno de los politicos excepto a not him have-1 seen A none of the politicians except A Clinton Clinton 'I have not seen any of the politicians but Clinton'
368 The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling (1 3 5)
lA quien (*lo) viste? A who him saw-you 'Who did you see?' b. l'Que (*lo) compraste? what it bought-you What did you buy?' diste un libro? (1 3 6) a. l'A quien Qe) to who to-him gave-you a book 'To whom did you give a book?' b. l'A quien Qe) molestan estos ruidos? to who to-him bothers these noises a.
Notice that the above sentences also contrast with the ones below. This contrast reveals a difference between the Spanish wh-words quien 'who' and cual 'which one'. The former cannot be doubled by an accusative clitic 62 whereas the latter can.
( 1 3 7)
lA cual de ellos Qo) viste? A which of them him saw-you 'Which one of them did you see?' b. lA cual Qo) han matado? A which him have-they killed 'Which one did they kill?'
a.
The contrast between (1 3 5) and (1 37) is triggered by a semantic difference between the interrogative quantifiers quien 'who' and cual 'which one'. The interrogative quantifier q uien 'who' is not a discourse linked or 'D-linked' quantifier, in Pesetsky's (1 987) terms. On the other hand, the interrogative quantifier cual is discourse linked. The difference becomes apparent in the following example:
(I 3 8 )
que entraron tres Ya se already know-1 that came-in three llevaba la pistola carried the gun 'I already know that three criminals gun?' que entraron tres b. Ya se already know-1 that came-in three llevaba la pistola carried the gun a.
delincuentes, pero quien criminals, but who
came in. But, who carried the delincuentes, pero cual criminals, but which
''2 In the Porteiio variety reported by Suiier {1988), only the overt partitive ( 1 3 7a) can be doubled, whereas ( I 3 7b) cannot be doubled.
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'Who is being bothered by these noises?'
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach 369 already know that three criminals cime in. But, which one carried the gun?'
'I
·
( I 39) ( 140)
Let A, X � E. Then, QUIEN E ['P (E) � LP(E) -+ 2]}.and QUrEN(A) (X) = I iff PERSON n A = X Let A, C, X � E. Then. CUAL E('P (E) -+ ('P (E) -+ rAP (E) � X and cuAL( c) (A) (X) = I iff c n PERSON n A =
2]]]
Consider the sentences in (I41): (14I)
lQuien vino a la fiesta? who came to the party? b. lCual vino a la fiesta? which-one came to the party? a.
The wh-expression quien in (141a) denotes a function mapping the set of individuals who came to the party to the 'answer set' or complete true answer of the question (the set of individuals who came to the party in that situation), as follows: (142) Let
X � E. Then.
QUrEN(CAME TO THE PARTY)(X) =
THE PARTY = X
I iff PERSON
n CAME TO
The difference between QUIEN WHO' and cuAL 'WHICH ONE' is that the latter, but not the former, is restricted to a context set. · The presence of this context set is what brings about the discourse-linking effect observed in (I 3 8 b). 64 •J Among the propositional theories of questions, the most prominent are the ones developed by Karttunen (1977) and Groenendijk & Stokhof(1 984� See Krifk.a (1 998) for recent arguments in favor of a categorial approach. My conception of interrogative quantification is in the spirit of Higginbotham & May's (1981) approach. ''"' In DRT tenns, the discourse referent contributed by cutil has to be linked to a discourse referent already present in discourse, whereas quiin introduces a novel discourse referent in a DRS. In ( 1 3 8b)
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In (1 3 8b), the requested information is which one of the criminals carried the gun. Thus, an interpretation in which what is asked is which person. but not which criminal carried the gun is not possible. By contrast, in ( 1 3 8a) the preferred interpretation is one in which those who are supposed to be carrying guns are not criminals. In Gutierrez-Rexach (1997), it is proposed that the quantificational expressions quien and eutil are interrogative generalized quantifiers, functions from sets of individuals to questions. A question is extensionally a function identifying a unique set.63 The question function maps a unique set to true. The set of questions, written [ P (E) � 2]], is a subset of [P (E) � 2]]}. The wh-fonns q uien and cual 9 denote the following functions:
370 The
Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
(143) Let C, X s; E. Then, CUAL{C)(CAME TO THE PARTY)(X) = PERSON n C n CAME TO THE PARTY X
I
iff
=
As the dialogue in ( 144) illustrates, under certain discourse conditions, q uiin may occur in a felicitous reply to the statement of speaker A:. (144)
he vista a Juan en tu casa B: A quien lo have-1 seen A Juan in your house B: A who him has vista en mi casa? have-you seen in my house 'A:. I've seen Juan in your house B: You saw who in my house?' A:. Lo A:. him
( 145) En este departamento, lo admiten a cualquiera in this department, him admit A whichever 'In this department, they admit anyone' (146) *En este departamento, lo admiten a quienquiera in this department, him admit A who-ever 'In that department, they admit anyone' above, the discourse referent x introduced by cutil would be linked to the plural discourse referent Y introduced by tres ddincuentes 'three criminals' by a condition of the form x E Y. 65 In a generalized 'leista' dialect such as Basque Spanish. doubling ofquien by le is possible (Franco
1993), and the interrogative quantifier is interpreted in these constructions as a context dependent function:
·
(i) e.A quiin le viste? A who CL-dat. saw-you 'Which one (of them) did you see'
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The interrogative sentence uttered by speaker B is pragmatically a surprise question. Surprise questions force discourse linking of the discourse referent introduced by a wh-phrase for rhetorical purposes, in this case to stress B's surprise at the fact that speaker A saw Juan. The presence of the clitic is related to the 'echo' character of surprise questions. The fact that q uiin may have a reading in which it is dependent on a previously introduced discourse referent and that a surprise/echo question forces that reading also serves to clarify the point that QUIEN is optionally context dependent.65 Following the hypothesis that context sets are presupposed, it can be claimed that context dependence is the relevant factor in doubling structures with interrogative quantifiers. The same difference arises in free relatives. The morphologically complex quantifier cualquiera 'whichever' can be conceived of as denoting a function from possible worlds to contextually determined sets (see also Jacobson (1995) and Dayal (1997) on the semantics of this class of quantifiers.) The free relative pronoun cualq uiera 'whichever' may be doubled, as the example (93b) repeated below illustrates, but q uienq uiera 'whoever' may not.
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach 371 Thus, the difference between accusative and dative clitics emerges again. Dative clitics may double any argument interrogative quantifier, whereas accusative clitics impose a stronger condition on the doubled quantifier. The quantifier has to be restricted to a context set argument. In sum, there is an asymmetry between doubling structures involving declarative and interrogative/relative quantifiers. When an accusative clitic doubles a declarative quantifier, the Principal Filter Constraint, the Presupposition ality Condition on the generator of the quantifier and, in certain cases, the Context Dependence Constraint have to be satisfied. On the other hand,
{147)
a.
Pe cine {*1)-ai
vazut? PE who (*him}-have-you seen 'Who did you see?'
'"' Interrogative generalized quantifiers are intersective (Gutierrez-Rexach 1997), so in principle they could also denote principal filters, as their declarative counterparts do. It is the discourse dynamics of dialogue what prevents this. The only exception are so-called rhetorical and echo questions, where either the answer is known by the speaker or it is already available in previous discourse.
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when the doubled element is an interrogative quantifier, the most important constraint at stake is the Context Dependence Constraint. Only interrogative quantifiers restricted to context sets may be doubled by an accusative clitic. The Presuppositionality Constraint requires, in this case, that the context. set of the interrogative quantifier is presupposed. Evidently, the difference is related to the semantic nature of declarative and interrogative quantifiers and ultimately to the difference between a declarative statement and a question. The Principal Filter and Pre suppositionality Constraints require that the clitic uniquely recovers a presupposed set from the generalized quantifier. In the multi-speaker exchange characteristic of discourses involving questions and answers, the . speaker, when posing a question of the who/which sort, does not normally have a particular individual or group of individuals in mind but rather is asking for the pertinent identification of a group. Therefore, context dependence becomes the relevant property. The speaker may be asking for the identification of a set of individuals from a previous superset that he has already identified (the context set), so the Presuppositionality Constraint is related to this superset. The context set of the clitic is equated with the context set of the quantifier.66 Dobrovie-Sorin ( 198s, 1990, 1994) observes a related contrast in Romanian. Doubling of the accusative interrogative quantifiers cine 'who' and ce 'what' or of an interrogative quantifier headed by ce 'what' is not possible. Doubling of the accusative interrogative quantifier care 'which one' or of the interrogative quantifier headed by the interrogative determiner care 'which' is obligatory.
372
The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling
ottt Ce (roman) (*1)-ai what (novel) (*it)-have-you read 'What (novel) did you read?' vazut? (I48) a. Pe care 1-ai PE which him-have-you seen 'Which one did you see?' vazut? b. Pe care baiat 1-ai PE which boy him-have-you seen 'Which boy did you see?' c. *Fe care ai vazut? PE which have-you seen 'Which did you see?' d. *Fe care baiat ai vazut? PE which boy have-you seen 'Which boy did you see?' b.
(I49) Cui (i)-ai trimis bani? whom-dat (to-him)-have-you sent money 'Whom did you send money?' (I so) a. Caruia 1-a1 trimis bani? to-which to-him-have-you sent money 'To which one did you send money?' b. *Caruia ai trimis bani? to-which have-you sent money 'To which one did you send money?' trimis bani? (I s I) a. Carui baiat i-ai to-which boy to-him-have-you sent money 'To which boy did you send money?' trimis bani? b. *Carui baiat ai to-which boy have-you sent money 'To which boy did you send money?' To summarize, in Romanian there is also a contrast between accusative and dative doubling and the relevant factor is also the nature of the doubled interrogative quantifier; non context dependent (cine, ce, cui) versus context dependent (care, ciiruia, ciiruz}. The difference between Romanian and Spanish is that in Romanian context dependent interrogative quantifiers trigger accusative clitic doubling obligatorily, whereas non
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Doubling of the dative interrogative quantifier cui 'to whom' is optionaL By contrast, doubling of the dative interrogative quantifier ciiruia 'to which one' or of the interrogative quantifier headed by the dative determiner ciirui 'to which' is obligatory.
Javier Gutierrez-Rexach 373
context dependent interrogative quantifiers block it. In Spanish, non context dependent quantifiers block accusative doubling and doubling is optional with context dependent ones. Dative clitic doubling is optional in Spanish questions, independently of the nature of the doubled interrogative quantifier. In Romanian, doubling is sensitive to the context dependence of the interrogative quantifier. It is optional with non context dependent quantifiers and still obligatory with the context dependent ones.67 9
CONCLUSIONS
67 In Southern Italian dialects, interrogative quantifien may be doubled by a wh clitic. Cecilia Poletto (p.c.) observes that there is no semantic restriction on the associated quantifier, so wh doubling can be taken as a syntaCtic agreement phenomenon. Consider, for instance, the following examples from Monncse (Poletto 1 999):
(i)
Ch e-1 chi che maja le patate? wh is-he who that eats the potatoes 'Who is eating the potatoes?' b. Che fe-t maji que? what do-you eat what 'What do you eat?' a.
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The nature of the dependence between a pronominal clitic and its quantifier associate has been shown to be semantic and to obey very precise restrictions that can be accurately formulated in Generalized Quantifiers Theory. The analysis of clitics as contextually restricted functions and of clitic doubling as the retrieval of a context set argument from a generalized quantifier lends itself to a treatment of this fundamental dependence as a family of related constraints on context set retrieval. The first one of them, the Principal Filter Constraint, determines that the context set of an accusative doubling clitic is the generator of its quantifler associate in Spanish. The constraint has been argued to hold also in the domain of existential quantifiers, rather than the less restrictive properties of specifi city, strength or partitivity. Modal subordination and aspectual dependence are also treated and their interplay with this constraint has been discussed. Accusative and dative doubling in Romanian can also be characterized by this constraint. Accusative doubling in Greek satisfies a stronger require ment, since only co-intersective quantifiers can be doubled. The second constraint is the Presuppositionality Constraint, which requires that the generator of the associated principal filter is presupposed. This constraint is shown to hold in Spanish and Romanian, but not in Greek, where the generator has to be prominent in discourse. Some quantifiers contrast along the dimension of contextual dependence. For instance, in Spanish there are pairs of intersective, co-intersective,
374 The Formal Semantics of Clitic Doubling negative and interrogative quantifiers which contrast in that one member of the pair is a contextually restricted generalized quantifier function and the other is not. In all these cases, only the contextually restricted function may be doubled. Again, this constraint seems to have cross-linguistic validity since it can be argued that it also holds in Romanian and Northern Italian dialects.
Acknowledgements
Received: 08.04-99 Final version received: 27.05.00
Department of Spanish and Dept. of Linguistics Ohio State University 266 Cunz Hall, 1841 Millikin Road Columbus, OH 43210-1229 USA e-mail: gutierrez-rexach. 1 @osu.edu
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