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Journal of Semantics 22: 231–280 doi:10.1093/jos/ffh025 Advance Access publication May 3, 2005 Conditional Truth and Fu...

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Journal of Semantics 22: 231–280 doi:10.1093/jos/ffh025 Advance Access publication May 3, 2005

Conditional Truth and Future Reference STEFAN KAUFMANN Northwestern University

Abstract

1 INTRODUCTION Two topics in the study of semantics which have recently received much renewed attention are conditionals and expressions of modality on the one hand, and tense and temporal reference, on the other. Each of them has its own history of increasingly sophisticated formal theories. Curiously, however, despite the wide currency of early accounts of the interaction between modal and temporal elements in the semantics of certain expressions (e.g., Dowty 1977, 1979), most subsequent work in these areas addressed only one at the exclusion of the other. The standard approaches to conditionals and modality in the 1980s and 1990s dealt with sets of worlds and quantification over them, often paying little attention to the temporal and aspectual properties of the sentences involved. Likewise, theories of tense and aspect typically dealt with one world at a time, abstracting away from the modal nuances arising with differences between, for instance, past and future reference. While there are doubtless advantages to such a modular approach, there is also no question that the ultimate goal of developing a comprehensive semantic treatment of modality and temporality will The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

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This paper proposes a compositional model-theoretic account of the way the interpretation of indicative conditionals is determined and constrained by the temporal and modal expressions in their constituents. The main claim is that the tenses in both the antecedent and the consequent of an indicative conditional are interpreted in the same way as in isolation. This is controversial for the antecedents of predictive conditionals like ‘If he arrives tomorrow, she will leave’, whose Present tense is often claimed to differ semantically from that in their stand-alone counterparts, such as ‘He arrives tomorrow’. Under the unified analysis developed in this paper, the differences observed in pairs like these are explained by interactions between the temporal and modal dimensions of interpretation. This perspective also sheds new light on the relationship between ‘non-predictive’ and ‘epistemic’ readings of indicative conditionals.

232 Conditional Truth and Future Reference

(1) a. b.

If he submits his paper to a journal, we won’t include it in our book. If he submitted his paper to a journal, we won’t include it in our book.

Two questions are of central importance in this debate. First, assuming that conditionals are built up compositionally from the connective ‘if ’ and the two constituents, what are the expressions that form the input to this operation, especially the one that becomes the antecedent of the conditional, and how does the composition proceed? Second, how should the semantic difference between conditionals like (1a,b) be characterized? Regarding the first question, I will argue in this paper that the antecedents of (1a) and (1b) are literally (2a) and (2b), respectively.1 (2) a. He submits his paper to a journal. b. He submitted his paper to a journal. This claim, trivial though it may seem, has often been denied on the grounds that the antecedent of a (1a), unlike that of (1b), does not appear to have the same interpretation in the conditional as it does in isolation: (2a) is only felicitous under a special reading which includes 1

Some speakers, including an anonymous reviewer, find that (2a) requires the presence of a temporal adverbial like ‘tomorrow’. Others believe that the future reference time may be supplied contextually (Steedman 2002).


require more than putting together one theory of each. Recent work on the ways in which they interact and constrain each other has brought back into focus the importance of keeping each in view when analyzing the other (Condoravdi 2002; Fernando 2003; Ippolito 2003; Kaufmann 2005, among others). The present paper contributes to this line of research. I propose an analysis of the temporal and modal properties of simple sentences and indicative conditionals, which accounts for the variety of readings observed in the latter in terms of the interplay between these dimensions. I will only be concerned with indicative conditionals, ignoring the separate problem of the morphological makeup of counterfactuals. In the remainder of this introduction, I will take a first look at the relevant data. The class of conditionals that is often treated uniformly as ‘‘indicatives’’ is not as homogeneous as the label would suggest. Pairs like (1a,b) illustrate a distinction that has been the subject of a longstanding controversy.

Stefan Kaufmann 233

(3)

a. He will submit his paper to a journal. b. ?If he will submit his paper to a journal, we won’t include it in the book.

This latter position is often accompanied by the claim that ‘will’ in the antecedent, as in (3b), results in ill-formedness unless it has a volitional reading, paraphraseable in this case as ‘If he is willing to submit his paper. . .’ (Palmer 1974; Wekker 1976; Dowty 1979; Declerck and Reed 2001). I will show that none of the above assumptions are required for an adequate semantic account. Instead, I propose an analysis that is strictly compositional, in the sense that the antecedents of all indicative conditionals receive exactly the same interpretation as they do in isolation. This proposal is uncontroversial for (1b), but the argument for extending it to (1a) requires a detailed analysis of the temporal and modal makeup of such sentences, as well as an answer to the second question, the one about the semantic difference between (1a) and (1b). Regarding this question, I will argue that there is no significant difference between these sentences. This claim, too, is at odds with much of the literature, as it appears to fly in the face of rather solid intuitions to the contrary. While indicative conditionals are generally used under uncertainty about the truth value of the antecedent, the source and nature of this uncertainty is not the same in the two cases. Funk (1985: 375–376) stated the difference lucidly: In the case of [1a] the uncertainty is largely due to the fact that the state-of-affairs described and predicated does not yet exist, i.e., is


an element of ‘certainty’ or ‘scheduling’ (Zandvoort 1965; Lakoff 1971; Vetter 1973; Goodman 1973; Wekker 1976; Dowty 1979; Quirk et al. 1985; Comrie 1985). This connotation is absent in the antecedent of (1a). I will refer to it as the Certainty Condition (CC), leaving open until further discussion the question of its source and theoretical status. For now, what is important is that no similar contrast is felt between (1b) and (2b). Some authors argue on the basis of such observations that the antecedent of (1a), unlike that of (1b), is not really a tensed clause (Dudman 1984, 1989; Crouch 1993). Others assume that the antecedent of (1a) is (3a) at some underlying level, and that the auxiliary ‘will’ is removed by a mechanism triggered by the ‘if ’construction (McCawley 1971; Comrie 1985; Dancygier 1998).

234 Conditional Truth and Future Reference still subject to manifestation (so that it cannot be affirmed or denied—it is unverifiable) at the moment of the sentence being uttered. In [1b], however, the state-of-affairs does exist at the time of speaking (either in the positive or negative sense—it is ‘manifested’ and could thus be verified), but the speaker has not got enough information (or is otherwise not disposed) to be sure about it and hence to affirm or deny it. Accordingly, the meaning of the conditioning frame can be said to vary from ‘if it happens that. . .’ to ‘if it is true that. . .’ (emphasis in the original)

(4) a. b.

[We’ll check what was decided about these manuscripts at yesterday’s meeting.] If he submits his paper to a journal, we won’t include it in our book. [We’ll contact potential contributors next month to see which of these manuscripts are still available then.] If he submitted his paper to a journal, we won’t include it in our book.

Now, the existence of such readings is in itself not an argument against the use of Funk’s criterion in classifying conditional sentences. We could say that (1a) and (4a) are distinct, homonymous conditionals, similarly for (1b) and (4b), and accordingly classify (1a) and (4b) together on one side, and (1b) and (4a) on the other. But we would then be dealing with


Many authors have made similar remarks to the effect that in (1b), but not in (1a), the truth value of the antecedent is either known to someone other than the speaker, or knowable in principle, or in any case somehow ‘out there’ (Close 1980; Dancygier 1998; Declerck and Reed 2001; Garrett 2001). This distinction is real, and it constitutes an important part of the motivation for my proposal. However, I do not consider it a criterion for distinguishing between conditional sentences. Rather, it is readings of such sentences that fall in one class or the other. Consider the ‘scheduling’ reading on which (2a) is felicitous. Notice that the antecedent of (1a) can have this reading (‘If he is (now) scheduled to submit his paper. . .’), and that (1a) under this interpretation shares the property of ‘verifiability’ of a state of affairs with (1b). Similarly, the antecedent of (1b), its Past tense notwithstanding, can refer to future states of affairs that are not yet ‘verifiable’ at speech time (‘If (it turns out in the future that) he submitted his paper. . .’). Under this ‘past-in-the-future’ interpretation, the criterion would group it together with (1a). Natural contexts in which these readings become salient are given in (4a,b).

Stefan Kaufmann 235

2 PRELIMINARIES The account is based on the standard analysis of conditionals, spelled out formally in terms of quantification over possible worlds. A sentence ‘if A then C’ asserts of a set of worlds K that C is true at all, most or few worlds in K at which A is true (depending on the modal involved). Authors differ in their assumptions as to whether K represents the speaker’s knowledge (Ramsey 1929) or beliefs (Stalnaker 1968), the common ground (Stalnaker 1975) or some other conversational background (Kratzer 1979, 1991). I will focus on two kinds of conversational backgrounds: objective and doxastic (or subjective) ones. This distinction has traditionally proven useful in the analysis of conditionals and has a central place in related areas as well; cf.


four sentences instead of two, and there had better be good arguments for postulating such a cross-cutting taxonomy. I will show that on the contrary, there are good arguments against such a move, not the least of them being that a simpler analysis is possible, as I will demonstrate. Moreover, within this analysis, the intuitive difference alluded to by Funk and others falls out as a consequence of a semantic variation whose statement makes no reference to tenses or other structural properties of the sentences involved, nor to extralinguistic notions such as the status of states of affairs. Instead, the difference involves the relation between the speech time and the time at which the constituent clauses are evaluated. The semantic effects observed by Funk and others follow as a consequence of this difference, together with certain assumptions about the interaction of time and modality that are built into the model. The details of this account have to wait until some formal preliminaries are in place. Throughout this paper, I will distinguish between predictive and non-predictive readings of conditionals. The former differ from the latter in that the antecedent (i) carries the CC when used in isolation, but not in the conditional, and (ii) refers to a state of affairs that is not yet ‘manifest’ or ‘verifiable’ at speech time. I take (i) and (ii) to be reflections of the same semantic property. Sections 2 and 3 set up the model-theoretic background and the framework of the compositional analysis. Sections 4, 5 and 6 are respectively devoted to the bare tenses, the modal ‘will’, and the conditional. Section 7 surveys the motivations and predictions of the proposed theory with regard to a variety of additional data. Section 8 raises some questions for future work.

236 Conditional Truth and Future Reference Condoravdi’s (2002) metaphysical/epistemic distinction in the treatment of modals in time. In addition to this quantificational semantic core, the account draws on the interaction of the two modalities with each other and with time. Time plays a central role inasmuch as many of the observations can be traced to the well-known asymmetry between a ‘fixed’ past and present and an ‘open’ future, discussed since Aristotle and incorporated in many tense logics, including the one I am going to use as a point of departure.

2.1 Models

Definition 1 (T 3 W-frame—Thomason 1984) A T 3 W-frame is a structure ÆW, T, B; RÞ ¼ fÆu; væ 2 R : ½½A>BR;v ¼ Æ1; +æ and if ½½A ^ BR;u ¼ Æ1; +æ; then ½½A ^ BR;v ¼ Æ1; +æg With the help of this update rule we can account for (8b) and (8c) as well. The reason is that according to this rule, all accessible worlds make the conditional true, and worlds in which both the antecedent and consequent are true only ‘see’ other such worlds. But this means that a later modal or conditional statement that presupposes what is entailed by the antecedent and/or consequent, as do the second sentences of (8b) and (8c), can now also be interpreted appropriately.

According to Karttunen (1974), Stalnaker (1988), Heim (1992) and Zeevat (1992), a belief attribution like (9a) presupposes (9b):21 (9) a. John believes that Mary stopped smoking. b. John believes that Mary used to smoke. How can we account for this in our two-dimensional approach? We have assumed that what is presupposed can be represented by a primitive accessibility relation in the model. Suppose that our model contains the accessibility relation Bj which represents what John believes as well. If R(w) represents what is presupposed in w, then Rj(w) ¼ [fBj(v) : v 2 R(w)g represents what is presupposed in w about what John believes. This suggests the following definition of an indexed accessibility relation: Rwj ¼ fÆu; væ 2 W 2 j dx 2 RðwÞ : v 2 Bj ðxÞg: This definition has the effect that for all worlds v, Rwj ðvÞ ¼ Rj ðwÞ: Notice that Rwj is introspective: "v"u 2 Rwj ðvÞ : Rwj ðuÞ ¼ Rwj ðvÞ: Using this indexed accessibility relation, we can adopt the following combined truth and appropriateness conditions: w

½½Belðj; AÞR;w ¼ Æ1; +æ iff "v 2 Bj ðwÞ : ½½ARjw;v ¼ Æ1; +æ iff dv 2 Bj ðwÞ : ½½ARj ;v ¼ Æ0; +æ ¼ Æ; æ otherwise This immediately accounts for the non-presuppositional reading of the sequence (9b)–(9a). In particular—and similarly as for Stalnaker (1988)—we don’t have to introduce a new update function for belief attributions: any update of R automatically updates Rwj as well.

21

For disagreement, see Geurts (1998).


4.3 Belief and desire

Robert van Rooij 297

According to Heim (1992), desire attributions should be interpreted with respect to what is (presupposed to be) believed as well. The following discourse seems perfectly acceptable: (10) a. John believes that Mary used to smoke, b. but he hopes that she stopped doing so. But as noted by Asher (1987), Heim (1992), and later by Geurts (1998), desire attributions can be conditionally dependent on other desire attributions as well: (11) a. John wants Mary to come, b. and he wants Bill to know that Mary will come.

½½Desðj; AR;w ¼ Æ; æ iff ½½)ARj ;w ¼ Æ; æ ¼ Æ1; +æ iff ½½)ARj ;w ¼ Æ1; +æ and fv 2 Bj ðwÞ : ½½ARj ;v ¼ Æ1; +æg > fu 2 Bj ðwÞ : ½½ARj ;u ¼ Æ0; +æg ¼ Æ0; +æ otherwise

UpdðDesðj; AÞ; RÞ ¼ fÆu; væ 2 R j ½½Desðj; AR;v ¼ Æ1; +æg

UpdðDesðj; AÞ; Rj Þ ¼ fÆu; væ 2 Rj j if ½½ARj ;u ¼ Æ1; +æ; then ½½ARj ;v ¼ Æ1; +æg

The truth condition basically says that the embedded sentence should be interpreted with respect to all worlds in Bj(w) in which this sentence can be interpreted appropriately. It also demands that if A 22

For a discussion of some alternative analyses of desire attributions, see Van Rooy (1999).


Intuitively, this suggests that desire attributions can introduce subordinated contexts and can be interpreted with respect to such contexts as well. How can we account for this? Just as we earlier took R to be a primitive accessibility relation that cannot be reduced to what the participants of the conversation know or believe, I think that now we have to assume the existence of a primitive accessibility relation Rj that represents what has been explicitly established about what John believes. Thus, in the beginning of the conversation Rj ¼ W 3 W and UpdðBelðj; AÞ; Rj Þ ¼ fÆu; væ 2 Rj : ½½ARj ;v ¼ Æ1; +æg: I will assume for simplicity the following analysis of desire attributions: Des(j, A) is true in w iff all the A-worlds in Bj(w) are preferred to the :A-worlds in Bj(w).22 Taking presupposition satisfaction into account as well, we define the interpretation rule as follows (where X > Y iff "x 2 X: "y 2 Y: x > y):

298 A Modal Analysis of Presupposition and Modal Subordination presupposes P, the desire attribution is predicted to be appropriate if either P is presupposed to be believed by the agent, or P is presupposed to be desired. The update rules are similar to what we have discussed above: the first one just demands that the desire attribution has to be true, while the second turns the A-worlds in Rj(w) into the preferred ones.

4.4 Subjunctive mood and negative sentences

(3a) A thief might break into the house. He would take the silver. But now consider the following example: (12) I don’t smoke. I wouldn’t be able to stop. This example is more problematic than (3a) because now there is no modal operator in the first sentence of the sequence that has a non-global effect on the accessibility relation. To account for this example one might propose, again, to accommodate the presupposition locally within the scope of the subjunctive modal. I would like to suggest, however, that, once we represent what is presupposed by an accessibility relation, no need for local presupposition accommodation arises. The first idea that comes to mind to account for examples like (12) is to propose that negative sentences have an effect similar to that of modals. But it is not straightforward to work out this suggestion, because the worlds that verify the negated clause are not accessible anymore after the interpretation of the first sentence. In this section I would like to suggest tentatively two alternative solutions for such examples. A first proposal would be to assume that the modal in the second sentence is interpreted with respect to an accessibility relation that is obtained by subtracting from the original accessibility relation (in which the whole of (12) is interpreted) the relation resulting from the interpretation of the first sentence of the sequence. Let t be the moment in time at which the second sentence should be interpreted. Then we can define Rt as fÆu, væ 2 Rt1ju,v;Range(Rt)g. Thus, Rt consists of the arrows between worlds in the previous information state,


In section 3 we saw already that certain examples of modal subordination involving subjunctives are unproblematic for our account. Our analysis of possibility operators and their duals in section 3.2 immediately gives the desired reading for a sequence such as (3a):


Rt1, that were eliminated by the last assertion. In terms of this accessibility relation, we can analyze the subjunctive mood as follows:

t

t

½½Would AR ;w ¼ Æ1; +æ iff dv 2 Rt ðwÞ : ½½AR ;v ¼ Æ; +æ and t " v 2 Rt ðwÞ : if ½½AR ;v ¼ Æ; +æ; t then ½½AR ;v ¼ Æ1; +æ

23 So, with Kaufmann (2000) I agree that we need to keep previous contexts ‘in memory’. Accepting this—according to one reviewer—we give up the assumption that we can account for modal subordination in terms of a single accessibility relation. But I don’t agree, for we still might think of R as a single accessibility relation for each time point. In systems that add to possible worlds a temporal dimension it is very normal to assume perfect memory: at each point in time you recall what you knew, believed, or presupposed before. To implement this assumption, we don’t have to add to the model some extra accessibility relations, although the accessibility relation now has to represent more information. I won’t go into the details of such a system here.


Notice that according to this interpretation rule of a subjunctive modal, the second conjunct of a formula like :A ^ Would (@A ^ B) is predicted to be true with respect to accessibility relation R if all accessible Aworlds are B-worlds as well. In particular, we can now account for the sequence (12) without making use of local accommodation. Still, I don’t think this proposal is unproblematic. The most problematic aspect, I believe, is the fact that the suggested analysis can’t explain the contrast between positive and negative sentences: why can subjunctive modals only ‘pick up’ negated sentences? As discussed by Horn (1989), among others, there exists a crucial distinction between the contexts in which positive and in which negative sentences can be used appropriately: in contrast to their positive counterparts, negative sentences require a context in which the truth of the positive sentence is expected, or at least very salient. One way of being salient is to be the topic of conversation: a question to be addressed. Geurts (1995) suggested tentatively that this might be the reason why sequences like (12) are appropriate. I think that this is indeed a good suggestion. We have seen in section 4.1 what the dynamic effect of a (positive polar) question is: the worlds in which the positive sentence is true come to be preferred to worlds where it is false. A subsequently used modal expression can then be interpreted with respect to these most preferred worlds. This can’t be the whole story, of course, because after the first sentence of (12) these most preferred worlds are eliminated. So, if t is the moment in time at which the second sentence should be interpreted, the relevant accessibility relation should not be Rt, but rather Rt1, i.e. the context of interpretation for the first sentence of (12).23 I think that this suggestion is a natural one, especially given the fact that would is a past-tense modal. If this first sentence presupposes that the

300 A Modal Analysis of Presupposition and Modal Subordination topic of conversation is whether I smoke, the most preferred worlds in Rt1(w) are all worlds where I smoke, and the second sentence of (12) can be interpreted appropriately. 5 INDEFINITES AND PRONOUNS

Updðdxr A; ÆR; aæÞ ¼ ÆfÆi; jæ 2 R½x=r : ½½AR½x=jðrÞ;j ¼ Æ1; +æg; a½x=aðrÞæ Thus, in the actual possibility, the speaker’s reference of the indefinite is introduced (although this need not be an individual that


Although we have discussed Karttunen & Peters’ (1979) binding problem already with respect to possibility statements, the most famous problematic example involves indefinites: their false prediction that the individual that satisfies the presupposition of a sentence like Someone managed to succeed George V on the throne of England need not be the one who actually succeeded George V. In this section I will show that this problem will not arise in our framework if we extend it to the predicate-logical case. However, the main goal of this section is to indicate how we can account for modal subordination phenomena that involve anaphoric dependencies across the sentential boundary. To take indefinites and pronouns into account, we have to make our accessibility relation one between more fine-grained possibilities. In contrast to standard dynamic semantics, I assume that pronouns are (normally) used referentially, referring back to the speaker’s reference of its antecedent indefinite. Such a speaker’s reference of (an occurrence of ) an indefinite depends on the referential intentions the speaker has. This kind of information should be represented already in a possibility (actual or non-actual). But this means that these possibilities have to contain more information than the world-assignment pairs standardly assumed in dynamic semantics. A clause with an occurrence of an indefinite is represented by dxrA, where r is a reference function. Let us assume that the set of possibilities I is a set of functions from (i) n-ary predicates to their interpretations; (ii) variables to individuals; and (iii) reference functions to individuals. If dxrA is interpreted in possibility i, then i(r) is the speaker’s reference of the occurrence of the indefinite in i, and the dynamic effect will be that from now on x will be assigned to i(r) in i, i.e. i(x) ¼ i(r). Let us define R[x/r] as fÆi[x/i(r)], j[x/j(r)]æ : Æi, jæ 2 Rg, and R[x/d] as fÆi[x/d], j[x/d]æ : Æi, jæ 2 Rg. Now we define the update of ÆR, aæ with dxrA as follows (where a is the actual possibility):


makes the sentence true). Also in each possibility that is compatible with what is presupposed, the speaker’s reference of the indefinite in that possibility is introduced, although this introduced individual has to verify the sentence in that possibility. The (rigid) truth and presupposition satisfaction conditions of the new clauses are given below (where ~ x is an n-ary sequence)):

½½P~ xR;i ¼ Æ1=ð0Þ; +æ iff

½½dxr AR;i ¼ Æ1; +æ iff

ið~ xÞ 2 iðPÞ ðor ið~ xÞ;iðPÞÞ and ið~ xÞ is defined x x ½½AR½ =iðrÞ ;i½ =iðrÞ ¼ Æ1; +æ

R; a~+ A

iff

da# a : ½½AR;a# ¼ Æ1; +æ x

x

Now it follows that R; a~+ dxr Px iff dd 2 D : ½½PxR½ =d ;a½ =d ¼ Æ1; +æ: But this means that the sentence is true in a just in case there is an individual that has property P in this world, just as expected. In van Rooy (2001), I argued that the notion of speaker’s referent is important for at least two reasons. First, to account for the phenomenon of pronominal contradiction: although speaker’s reference has no truth conditional effect on the interpretation of indefinites, it does for the interpretation of pronouns. Second, to understand what a discourse referent used in dynamic semantics really represents: a discourse referent represents what is presupposed about the actual speaker’s referent. I will not discuss these arguments any further here. However, in one sense the present implementation of the second intuition is much more appealing than the one I have given in van


Notice that the above rules say that dxrP(x) is rigidly true in ÆR, aæ if and only if the speaker’s referent of the indefinite in a has property P in this world/possibility. Existential sentences, however, don’t seem to have such strong truth conditions. As argued for in van Rooy (2001), although speaker’s reference is crucial for the analysis of pronouns, it doesn’t seem to influence the truth or falsity of the clause in which the indefinite occurs. To account for this, I will follow the same procedure as I proposed in van Rooy (2001), and define the semantic notion of truth as an abstraction of the more pragmatic notion of rigid truth where speaker’s reference is crucial for the interpretation of indefinites. Let us say that j i iff j is a possibility just like i, except that j might assign different individuals to reference functions than i does. Now I define the notion of truth (and presuppositional appropriateness) of sentence A in possibility ÆR, aæ in terms of this notion as follows:

302 A Modal Analysis of Presupposition and Modal Subordination

(13) a. A wolf may come in. It would eat you first. b. )dxr[Wx ^ Cx] ^ hEx Notice that [[)dxr[Wx ^ Cx] ^ h Ex]]R,a ¼ Æ1, +æ iff [[)dxr[Wx ^ Cx]]]R,a ¼ Æ1, +æ and [[h Ex]]R#,a# ¼ Æ1, +æ, where ÆR#, a#æ ¼ Upd()dxr[Wx ^ Cx], ÆR, aæ). The first conjunct is true iff di 2 R(a) : i(r) 2 i(W) \ i(C). The update of ÆR, aæ with the first conjunct results in fÆj, iæ 2 R[x/r] : i(r) 2 i(W) \ i(C)g [ fÆj, iæ 2 R : :dd 2 D : d 2 i(W) \ i(C)g.24 If we then only look at possibilities i 2 R#(a) where i(x) is defined, the second conjunct is predicted to be true iff "i 2 R(a): "d 2 D : if d 2 i(W) \ i(C), then d 2 i(E). Thus the second conjunct says that in every possibility where there is a wolf who comes in, it eats you first. I believe that this is the correct reading for the second sentence of (13a). In section 4.1 we followed Landman’s modal splitting analysis of disjunctive sentences. Intuitively, such an analysis must be able to predict that (14a) really means (14b). (14) a. Call this number. The phone will be answered by either a doctor or a secretary. The doctor can tell you right away what’s a matter with you, or the secretary can make an appointment for you.

24

x

Based on the assumption that [[dxrA]]R,i ¼ Æ0, +æ only if :dj i : ½½AR½

=iðrÞ ;j½x =jðrÞ

¼ Æ1; +æ.


Rooy (2001): it’s accounted for now in terms of standard set theory making use of a standard way to model propositional attitudes, i.e. an accessibility relation. The binding problem of Karttunen & Peters’ (1979), involving indefinites, was due to the fact that they represented presupposition and assertion separately. Our analysis, instead, only interprets them at different dimensions. We represent their problematic sentence abstractly as follows: dxr [@Px ^ Qx]. An easy calculation shows that this formula is predicted to be true and appropriate in ÆR, aæ, R, xa ~x+ dxr [@Px ^ Qx], just in case dd 2 D : " i 2 RðaÞ : ½½PxR½ =d ;i½ =d ¼ Æ1; +æ & x x ½½QxR½ =d ;a½ =d ¼ Æ1; +æ: Thus, it is required that the same individual has to satisfy both the presuppositional part and the assertive part: the binding problem does not occur. This prediction is independent of our assumption that indefinites come with speaker#s referents. How does our analysis of indefinites and pronouns account for anaphoric dependencies across modal statements? Consider the following classical sequence:


b. Either a doctor will answer and he can tell you what is wrong, or a secretary will answer and she can make an appointment. Let us assume that Upd(A _ B, ÆR, aæ ) ¼ Upd(A, ÆR, aæ) kUpd(B, ÆR, aæ), where ÆR, aæ k ÆR#, a#æ ¼ ÆR [ R#, a [ a#æ.25 If we now represent (14a) as something like (dxrA _ dysB) ^ (Px _ Qy), this is indeed what we predict. The new possibility will be ÆUpd(A, R[x/r]) [ Upd(B, R[y/s]), a[x/a(r), y/a(s)]. Because of the definedness condition, we correctly predict that the first disjunct of the second disjunction will be regarded as a continuation of the first disjunct of the first disjunction, and similarly for the second disjuncts.

In this paper I have proposed a modal two-dimensional analysis of presupposition and modal subordination. For the analysis of presupposition I combined the strong points of the standard dynamic analysis and the two-dimensional one: what is presupposed by a sentence follows from the interpretation rules, and presupposition satisfaction is determined (almost) independently from truth. For the analysis of modal subordination I proposed that the embedded clauses of modal statements should be interpreted with respect to possibilities that verify what is presupposed. Roberts (1989, 1996) discusses many more phenomena under the heading of ‘modal subordination’ than I do in this paper. Some of her additional examples, e.g. bathroom sentences, I would definitely interpret in terms of descriptive pronouns instead of as involving modal subordination (cf. van Rooy, 2001). Other examples, however, in particular those where the interpretation of one quantified phrase depends on that of another, are closer to the ones discussed in this paper. It remains to be seen whether, and if so how, we should extend our analysis to cover these examples as well. Acknowledgements The research for this paper has been made possible by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), which is gratefully acknowledged. I am grateful to Cleo Condoravdi and Stefan Kaufmann for inviting me to submit a paper to the special issue. I would like to thank an anonymous referee, 25 Notice that because we think of worlds as a combined function from (i) propositional variables to truth values; (ii) discourse referents to individuals; and (iii) variables to individuals, the union of two worlds is well-defined. Notice also that after the update of a world with new information, this can have an effect only on the individuals it assigns to variables.


6 CONCLUSION

304 A Modal Analysis of Presupposition and Modal Subordination Frank Veltman, Henk Zeevat, and the editors of this special issue for valuable comments and discussion.

ROBERT VAN ROOIJ Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam Nieuwe Doelenstraat 15 1012 CP Amsterdam The Netherlands. e-mail: [email protected]

Received: 15.03.03 Final version received: 30.03.04 Advance Access publication: 03.05.05

Asher, N. (1987) ‘A typology of attitude verbs and their anaphoric properties’. Linguistics and Philosophy 10:127–189. Beaver, D. (1995) Presupposition and Assertion in Dynamic Semantics. Ph.D. dissertation. CCS, Edinburgh. Fernando, T. (1995) ‘Are context change potentials functions?’ In H. Kamp and B. Partee (eds), Contexts in the Analysis of Linguistic Meaning. Palgrave MacMillan, Stuttgart/Prague. Frank, A. (1997) Context Dependence in Modal Constructions. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Stuttgart. Gazdar, G. (1979) Pragmatics. Academic Press. London. Gerbrandy, J. (1999) Bisimulations on Planet Kripke. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Amsterdam. Geurts, B. (1995) Presupposing. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Stuttgart. Geurts, B. (1998) ‘Presuppositions and anaphors in attitude contexts’. Linguistics and Philosophy 21:545–601. Groenendijk, J. and M. Stokhof (1991) ‘Dynamic predicate logic’. Linguistics and Philosophy 14:39–100. Heim, I. (1982) The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Heim, I. (1983) ‘On the projection problem for presuppositions’. In M. Barlow et al. (eds), West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics. Stanford University, 114–123. Heim, I. (1992) ‘Presupposition projection and the semantics of attitude verbs’. Journal of Semantics 9:183–221. Herzberger, H. (1973) ‘Dimensions of truth’. Journal of Philosophical Logic. 2:535–556. Horn, L. (1989) A Natural History of Negation. University of Chicago Press. Chicago. Kamp, H. (1981) ‘A theory of truth and semantic representation’. In J. Groenendijk et al. (eds), Formal Methods in the Study of Language. Mathematical Center, Amsterdam, 277–322. Karttunen, L. (1974) ‘Presuppositions and linguistic context’. Theoretical Linguistics. 1:181–194. Karttunen, L. and S. Peters (1979) ‘Conventional implicature’. In C.-K. Oh & D. Dinneen (eds), Syntax and Semantics, Presupposition. Vol. 11. Academic Press. New York, 1–56. Kaufmann, S. (1997) ‘What’s at stack in discourse’. In P. Dekker et al. (eds), Proceedings of the the 11th Amsterdam


REFERENCES

Robert van Rooij 305 Tilburg University Press. Tilburg, 534–548. Rooy, R. van (2001) ‘Exhaustivity in dynamic semantics; Referential and Descriptive Pronouns’. Linguistics and Philosophy 24:621–657. Sandt, R. van der (1988) Context and Presupposition. Croom Helm. London. Sandt, R. van der (1992) ‘Presupposition projection as anaphora resolution’. Journal of Semantics 9:223–267. Soames, S. (1979) ‘A projection problem for speaker presupposition’. Linguistic Inquiry 10:623–666. Soames, S. (1989) ‘Presupposition’. In D. Gabbay & F. Guenthner (eds), Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Volume IV, 553–616. D. Reidel. Dordrecht. Stalnaker, R. (1974) ‘Pragmatic presupposition’. In Munitz & Unger (eds), Semantics and Philosophy. NYP, 197– 213. Stalnaker, R. (1976) ‘Indicative conditionals’. In A. Kasher (ed.), Language in Focus. Reidel. Dordrecht, 179–196. Stalnaker, R. (1988) ‘Belief attribution and context’. In R. Grimm & D. Merrill (eds), Contents of Thought. Tuscon. University of Arizona Press, 140–156. Stalnaker, R. (2002) ‘Common ground’. Linguistics and Philosophy 25:701–721. Veltman, F. (1996) ‘Defaults in Update semantics’. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25:221–261. Zeevat, H. (1992) ‘Presupposition and accommodation in update semantics’. Journal of Semantics 9:379–412.


Colloquium. ILLC. Amsterdam, 187– 192. Kaufmann, S. (2000) ‘Dynamic discourse management’. In M. Faller et al. (eds), Formalizing the Dynamics of Information. CSLI Publications. Stanford, 171–188. Kibble, R. (1994) ‘Dynamics of epistemic modality and anaphora’. In H. Bunt et al. (eds), International Workshop on Computational Semantics, ITK, Tilburg, 121–130. Kratzer, A. (1981) ‘The notional category of modality’, In J. Eikmeyer & H. Rieser (eds), Words, Worlds, and Contexts. W. de Gruyter, Berlin, 38– 74. Landman, A. (1986a) Towards a Theory of Information. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Amsterdam. Landman, A. (1986b) ‘Conflicting presuppositions and modal subordination’. In Papers from the 22nd Regional Meeting, Chicago Linguistic Society, Chicago, 195–207. Roberts, C. (1989) ‘Modal subordination and pronominal anaphora in discourse’ Linguistics and Philosophy 12:683–721. Roberts, C. (1996) ‘Anaphora in intensional contexts’. In S. Lappin (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Semantics. Blackwell, Oxford, 215–246. Rooy, R. van (1998) ‘Modal subordination in questions’. In J. Hulstijn & A. Nijholt (eds), Twendial #98, 237– 248. Rooy, R. van (1999) ‘Some analyses of pro-attitudes’. In H. de Swart (ed.), Logic, Game Theory and Social choice.

Journal of Semantics 22: 307–337 doi:10.1093/jos/ffh021 Advance Access publication June 20, 2005

Causality and Tense—Two Temporal Structure Builders LEONOOR OVERSTEEGEN Universiteit van Tilburg

Abstract

1 BACKGROUND Models for temporal representation generally focus on expository or narrative texts. Numerous linguists describe what tense tells us about the location of an eventuality in relation to the moment of speech, or about the relation between eventualities in successive sentences (for example, Reichenbach 1947; Kamp & Rohrer 1983; Hinrichs 1986; Moens & Steedman 1988; Webber 1988; Lascarides & Asher 1993). The relative ordering of eventualities expressed in successive sentences is especially complex—I simplify it here to suit my purpose. In general, the ordering between the eventualities expressed by two sentences in the simple past depends on the types of eventuality.1 Usually, two states overlap whereas two events are interpreted as successive. For two successive 1

Ever since Vendler (1957), classifications of types of events have been proposed, e.g. by Bach (1986) and Moens & Steedman (1988). In this paper, the basic distinction between states and events is respected but more refined distinctions are left aside. The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.


By force of causes precede effects, causality contributes to the temporal meaning of discourse. In case of semantic causal relations, this contribution is straightforward, but in case of epistemic causal relations, it is not. In order to gain insight into the semantics of epistemic causal relations, paradoxical cases are analyzed of text fragments in which temporal and causal meaning seem to be irreconcilable. A solution is proposed consisting of several parts: First, an analysis of epistemic causal coherence relations, in which the effect sentence is argued to be a (covert) belief sentence. Secondly, a method for deriving (epistemic) causal coherence relations. And thirdly, a format for representing temporal meaning in which contributions of tense and causality can be reconciled. Finally, it is argued that understanding epistemically causally connected sequences (or: argumentation) is not equal to being persuaded to believing them. The difference is shown to be expressible in the representation format proposed.

308 Causality and Tense—Two Temporal Structure Builders

(1) Causes precede effects h causeðe1 ; e2 Þ / :e2 <e1 The law in (1) can be phrased as follows: it is necessarily the case that an eventuality e1 which causes another eventuality e2 is not preceded by that eventuality e2. In an interval semantics approach, one could also use the positive variant of (1), requiring that the initial point of the interval representing e1 has to precede the initial point of the interval representing e2. This requirement would result in different relations between the intervals, depending on the event types expressed (cf. Hinrichs 1986; Moens & Steedman 1988; Webber 1988).3 These two sources should not supply conflicting temporal information. ‘A text is temporally incoherent if the natural interpretation of text is such that there are no inferrable relations between the events. A text is temporally misleading, or as we shall say, unreliable if the natural interpretation of the text is such that the inferred relations between the events differ from their actual relations in the world.’ (Lascarides and Oberlander, 1993: 6). In most (temporally) coherent

2

This default, a consequence of the anaphoric property of tense, can be overruled by several (context-)factors as in: (The party went on all night.) But John had left early because his ex-girlfriend showed up (anonymous reviewer). The complex nature of the pluperfect is the main topic of Oversteegen & Bekker (2002). 3 If one wants to allow for causal relations between eventualities starting simultaneously, the relation between the initial points of the corresponding intervals should be < instead of Explanation (a,b) where me(a) stands for ‘main eventuality described in a’.


In all of these cases, both the tense combination of the two sentences and the causal relation inferrable between the eventualities expressed in them put the eventuality in the latter sentence before the eventuality in the former sentence. If causality implies temporal precedence, we should expect to find mutual restrictions between tense and causality. Inter-sentential causal relations, or causal coherence relations, should occur only between sentences with certain tense combinations, and not with others. In other words, the combination of tenses in two sequential clauses would restrict the set of options of possible coherence relations expressed. Indeed, we find a rule in Lascarides and Asher (1993) which narrows down the set of possible (causal) coherence relations between a specific combination of tensed sentences. A (somewhat simplified) description of the rule is given in (3).

310 Causality and Tense—Two Temporal Structure Builders 2 A PROBLEM WITH EPISTEMIC CAUSAL RELATIONS

(4a) John came back because he loved her. (4b) John loved her, because he came back. In (4a), real-world causality connects the two clauses. Let us call this a semantic causal relation. With respect to (4b), Sweetser claims that the speaker’s knowledge of John’s return causes the conclusion that John loved her. Whereas the causal relation in (4a) indeed connects two eventualities ‘in the world’, the causal relation in (4b) concerns a realworld eventuality and a conclusion or a claim or a belief about a real world eventuality. Examples like (4b) are labeled epistemic causals.5

5 Knott & Mellish (1996) attempt to understand what happens with regard to causal relations in argumentation as well. However, they understand the epistemic causal relation as being symmetrical. See Knott and Mellish, 1996: 154 (15):

(15) The footprints are deep. It follows that/so the thief was a heavy man. They define an epistemic relation as a relation between the intended effect of each individual utterance. Why would this be undesirable? Argumentation is not based on symmetrical relations between data and conclusions. It is exactly because the speaker supposes that his data are easily adopted—or even belong to the shared knowledge—that he hopes to make the hearer believe his conclusion or beliefs. Therefore, I adopt Sweetser’s view that an epistemic causal relation defines a relation between an eventuality and a belief about another eventuality.


It is clear how the two sources of temporal information may collaborate. A causal relation may be lexicalized, e.g. by a causal connective, or inferred, with the help of real-world knowledge. In both cases, we use the indefeasible law in (1), causes precede effects, to determine the sequence of eventualities. This sequence usually parallels the sequence dictated by the combination of tenses. Causal relations between sentences are not interesting for their temporal property only; the discourse theoretical literature focuses on other aspects of causal coherence relations. For the entire set of coherence relations, of which causal relations are a subset, a dichotomy is recognized. This dichotomy has been described as semantic versus pragmatic (Van Dijk 1979; Sanders et al. 1992); subject matter versus presentational (Mann & Thompson 1987); ideational versus rhetorical (Redeker 1990); and ideational versus interpersonal (Systemic Functional Grammar in general). In order to explain the nature of the dichotomy, I shall use Sweetser (1990). Sweetser (1990) distinguishes different types of domains of interpretation: coherence relations can be interpreted in each of them. The following causal examples are taken from Sweetser (1990: 77):

Leonoor Oversteegen 311

Eve’s husband (presumably) had hit her (e1) because she immediately came out again (e2). (6) Zeker een derde deel van de kamer werd door het zwarte instrument in beslag genomen (e1). Gek was ze geweest, gek dat ze zoveel geld had uitgegeven voor dat ding, dat apparaat, dat monster (e2). (At least one third of the room was occupied by the black instrument. She had been crazy, crazy to have spent so much money on that thing, that machine, that monster.) (5)

In example (5), a connective is present, defining a ‘backward’ causal relation with the eventuality in the second sentence causing the first one. In example (6), a ‘forward’ causal relation will be intended: the attribution of craziness to ‘her’ is the consequence of the negative evaluation of the presence of the big, black instrument, a grand piano. In Table 1, an overview is given of the temporal relations in (5) and (6) as implied by different sources. The columns 2 and 4 of Table 1 contain paradoxical conclusions. The temporal relations derived from different sources form a contradiction for both (5) and (6).


One might expect that epistemic causals are not subject to the Causal Law in the way that semantic causals are. An epistemic causal relation ‘reflects the process of reasoning from simple perceptions in order to assess the probability of a state of affairs from the speaker’s point of view’ ( Jaszczolt 2003). It does not relate two eventualities and, at first glance, does not need to reflect iconicity. Indeed, we find examples of epistemic causals in which the cause appears to follow the effect, as in He presumably finished his paper, because I see him leave. Does this imply that ‘in epistemic temporal relations the overt temporal marking is irrelevant, whereas for semantic causals it must cohere with the Causal Law’ (anonymous reviewer)? That would be a sad conclusion for a linguist believing in compositional semantics, and one, I will argue, we need not draw. By analysing some more cases in which epistemic causality and tense seem to contradict each other, I will explain how tense and causality can maintain their generally accepted interpretation. Their contribution to the semantic representation structure is not a different one in the epistemic cases. The representation structure appears to be more complex but it is in line with general ideas about epistemic modality. Below are two examples of such paradoxical cases, the one constructed, the other coming from a corpus of literary texts:

312 Causality and Tense—Two Temporal Structure Builders Table 1

(5) (6)

Tense combination

Temporal relation

Causal relation

Temporal relation

PPf – sP sP – PPf

e1 < e 2 e2 < e1

Cause (e2, e1) Cause (e1, e2)

e2 < e1 e1 < e2

3 COMPONENTS OF A SOLUTION

A model for temporal representation that reflects the information provided by tense. A correct, formally supported analysis of causal relations. A description of the contribution of causal relations to the model.

I describe these three components in sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, respectively. Furthermore, in order to explain the paradoxical clashes between causality and tense as in (5) and (6), the specific nature of epistemic meaning has to be addressed and it has to be incorporated in the representation model. This is done in section 4.

3.1 The TTT framework—the temporal part of the story To represent temporal information, I make use of the two track model (TTT) advocated in several publications (Oversteegen 1988, 1989, 1993; Oversteegen & Bekker 2002). It is not claimed that only TTT is suitable for the purpose. Other representation formats can do the job just as well, if they are characterized by two properties: 1. For all temporal categories, independent contributions to the representation structure are defined.


It is not difficult to see which error is made in the analysis in Table 1: The causal relations in (5) and (6) do not hold immediately between the eventualities e1 and e2. What is caused in both cases is not the eventuality expressed, but a mental state: a belief held by the speaker about the eventuality. In other words, the first sentence in (5) and the second sentence in (6) are not simply assertions. Claims following from an argument are not supposed (by the speaker) to be purely informative: in my opinion, they should be analysed as (covert) belief sentences. What we need for the analysis of sequences like (5) and (6) is:


2. A certain amount of vagueness in the relations between semantic entities in the representation structure is allowed.


The motivation for choosing the type of representations used in TTT comes from McTaggart (1927), who argues that time can be thought of as something dynamic, and constantly advancing, and that it can also be considered from a God-like perspective, covering the history of all eventualities. Oversteegen (1989) proposes a linear, twotrack representation of temporal meaning in which each of these conceptualizations of time can be expressed. For each sentence, in this representation, called TTS for two track structure, both the dynamic and the static temporal meaning aspects can be reflected. In the former view, an eventuality is seen from a particular point in time and the predicates PAST, PRESENT, and FUTURE are relevant. Some expressions of time have a deictic nature, and the truth of a tensed statement depends on the temporal point of view taken. Natural language elements expressing this dynamic and deictic temporal meaning are represented on the S-track. Here, S stands for ‘speaker’or ‘point of speech’. The S-track has a point structure and harbours points of speech and points of evaluation. Points of temporal perspective in general (including points of reference) are represented on the S-track. McTaggart referred to this type of temporal ordering as the ‘A-series’. The static conceptualization of time is independent of a point of view. Eventualities are temporally ordered by the precedence relation but not with respect to the point of speech or with deixis. McTaggart referred to this type of temporal ordering as the ‘B-series’. It is referred to as static because, once an eventuality e1 is ordered before some other eventuality e2, this ordering is permanent and will not change over time. In TTT, natural language elements establishing this static and non-deictic temporal ordering are represented on the E-track, where E stands for ‘eventuality’. By means of a TTS contribution, temporal expressions are represented according to both these views, and the representation contributions are allowed to interact. Since tense is a deictic category characterised by the predicates PAST, PRESENT, and FUTURE, it is primarily represented on the S-track. Tense also establishes a relation between an eventuality on the E-track and evaluation points on the S-track; we refer to this as a ‘bridge’ between the two tracks. This point on the S-track may be S itself but it may also be an S#-point, depending on the tense used, since S# only plays a part in past tenses; the present relevance quality of present tenses is reflected by the fact that S itself functions as the relevant evaluation point.


(7) present

(8) past

In TTT, the perfect is not treated as an autonomous tense but as a temporal component which combines with a basic tense form to result in a ‘full’ tense such as the present perfect. For example, the value of the relevant evaluation point will be S if the perfect is combined with a present tense, and it will be S# if the perfect is combined with a past tense.6 When the perfect combines with one of the basic tense forms, its contribution to the final representation is the constraint that the eventuality must precede the E-track element that corresponds to the relevant evaluation point. The evaluation points for the eventuality are provided by the basic tense form. Combining the perfect with the present and the past results in the derived forms shown in (9) and (10) below. (9) present perfect

(10)

past perfect

6 Something similar holds for the future. However, the future is not solely a temporal category and I will return to it in the section on modality (4.1).


Event type is associated primarily with the E-track because it is independent of temporal location with respect to the point of speech; a process located in the future will be just as much a process when it is located in the present or the past. The perfect is not dependent on the point of speech either: it can combine with past, present, or future and it is, therefore, primarily considered an E-track notion. Temporal adverbials can be deictic (cf. yesterday) and, consequently, defined on the S-track, or can express relative position (cf. an hour earlier) and, consequently, be defined on the E-track. For each clause, the linguistic categories expressing temporal meaning contribute independently to a TTS. Sequences of clauses (or larger portions of discourse) can be represented by means of a (complex) TTS. The contributions of the present tense (7) and the past tense (8) to the TTS of the entire sentence are given in the following configurations:


3.2 Deriving causal coherence relations It has been noted in the linguistic literature, at least since the seventies (Lakoff 1971), that the semantics of causal coherence relations is richer than the semantics of additive coherence relations. Apart from stating the truth of the propositions expressed in both clauses, there is a ‘relational proposition’ connecting them. There is no consensus about the status of this relational proposition: some have referred to it as a topos (Moeschler 1990), as an inference (Kehler 1994), as a conventional implicature (Noordman & Vonk 1992), or as a background assumption (Sidiropoulou 1992). I think it is uncontroversial, however, to state that the examples in (11a–c), containing semantic causal relations, make sense only if the speaker holds true the regularities in (12a) to (12c) and expects the hearer to do the same: (11a) The car stopped because the engine broke down. (q because p) (11b) The car stopped because it was out of petrol. (11c) The girl looked radiant because she was in love. (12a) If the engine of a car breaks down, the car will stop. (p / q) (12b) If a car is out of petrol, the car will stop. (12c) If a girl is in love, she will look radiant. 7 For definitions of temporal categories in this TTS model, I refer to Oversteegen 1986, 1989, 1993, and Oversteegen & Bekker 2002. 8 At least, this is the way in which assertions are treated. This treatment conforms to Stalnaker’s treatment of assertive propositions as functions from possible worlds to truth values.


In sum, the components of a TTS relevant to our purpose are e (the interval representing the eventuality), S (point of speech and evaluation point), and S# (imaginary point of speech and evaluation point). A TTS is built up in a compositional way: each tense, event type, temporal adverbial, and temporal connective has its own characteristic contribution.7 For an individual sentence or set of sentences, the sum of these independent contributions plus the interactions between them results in the TTS of the complete temporal meaning of a (set of ) sentence(s). The tense of a sentence contributes to its TTS in terms of the order of points on the S-track, and both tense and event type may contribute to specifying which eventualities correspond to which points on the S-track. In order for an assertive sentence to be true in a world w, these ordering and correspondence relations must be compatible with the temporal ordering of eventualities and times in w, and the eventualities must have occurred at the times indicated by the correspondences shown in the TTS, i.e., the eventualities must be ‘evaluated’ at these time points.8


(11aa) The car stopped. The engine broke down. (11bb) The car stopped. It was out of petrol. (11cc) The girl looked radiant. She was in love. Suppose that causal coherence relations, like the marked one in (11b), or the unmarked one in (11b), carry a presupposition, like the one in (12b): (11b) The car stopped because it was out of petrol. (12b) If a car is out of petrol, the car will stop.

(q because p) ( p / q)

For the speaker, this means ‘to take it for granted, or at least to act as if one takes it for granted, as background information—as common ground among the participants in the conversation’ (Stalnaker 2002: 701). Therefore, if the speaker did not suppose that (12b) is an appropriate regularity, he would not utter (11b). However, whether (12b) is an appropriate regularity, depends at least partly on the context. According to Stalnaker ‘what the context provides is the domain of possible worlds that propositions distinguish between . . . context is not just information that mediates between utterance and proposition; it is the material out of which propositions are constructed.’ (Stalnaker 1999: 156). Suppose mention is made in the context of a car which has both a petrol tank and a gas tank. In such a context (12b) is not an appropriate regularity—and (11b) is not acceptable either. Therefore, taking (12b) to be the presupposition for (11b) is a false simplification. We can only phrase the appropriate presupposition if we consider the context of the utterance. Mackie (1965) introduces a notion that gives us the required context dependence for the conditional relations underlying causal


Lagerwerf & Oversteegen (1994) argue that the regularities in (12) behave as presuppositions for the sentences in (11). The reason for preferring this option to other options, like treating the regularities as inferences or implicatures, is that they function as prerequisites for the causally connected clauses. If one does not believe in a relation like the one expressed in (12a), one will not accept (11a) either. On the other hand, if one does not have the knowledge expressed in (12a), one can still accept (11a), but only if (12a) is accommodated, or added to one’s knowledge base. This strongly resembles the way presuppositions behave. Usually, presuppositions are ascribed to a certain lexical item or a certain construction. It is interesting to note that it is not the causal connective, however, that triggers the presupposition, but the causal coherence relation. The same presuppositions as in (11) should be attributed to the juxtaposed sentences below:


coherence relations. In Mackie’s view, for every causal relation, there is a corresponding underlying conditional relation. The cause in the causal relation then corresponds to a so-called INUS condition (with IN for INsufficient and US for UnneceSsary): (13)

A is an INUS condition of a result P if and only if, for some X and for some Y, (AX or Y) is a necessary and sufficient condition of P, but A is not a sufficient condition of P and X is not a sufficient condition of P.

(12b*)

If a car runs on petrol and on gas (Z) and it is out of petrol (A), the car will stop (P). (12b#) If a car runs on petrol only (X) and it is out of petrol (A), the car will stop (P). Now, suppose we have the additional information X that the car can only take one type of fuel. We have to interpret AX and P in Mackie’s definition for (12b) as in (12b#). If the context supplies us with the information X (the car runs on petrol only), the regularity in (12b) applies. If the context supplies us with the information Z (the car runs on petrol and on gas), it does not. Henceforth, I will refer to a conditional like (12b#) in relation to a causal relation like (11b), as ‘realization of the INUS scheme’. The utility of the INUS condition consists in its being an insufficient condition: only given certain additional information do we accept the regularity of which it is a part. This additional information comes with the context and with the speech situation. Consequently, the regularity may be acceptable in one situation or 9

In the remaining part of the paper, I will refer to the complete conditional (AX _ Y / P) as the INUS scheme. I will systematically neglect the disjunct Y: it is of no importance here to find the ‘entire’ set of causes in the causal relations (cf. Mackie 1965).


The antecedent A in definition (13) is made unnecessary by force of the disjunct ‘or Y’. The disjunct is added to ‘AX’ in order to make it clear that there may be alternative causes; AX is not considered to be a complete cause. Mackie defines the antecedent A as insufficient. That is to say, in combination with some additional information X, the antecedent may be sufficient, but in combination with alternative additional information, for example Z, it may not be sufficient, or even false.9 Applying definition (13) to the conditional in (12b), we can get the following situations. Z may be: the car has both a petrol tank and a gas tank. Therefore, if it is out of petrol, it can still switch to gas. The additional information makes the conclusion in (12b) invalid for such a car (cf. (12b*)).

318 Causality and Tense—Two Temporal Structure Builders context, but unacceptable in another situation or context.10 This implies that we do not need to assume an unlimited set of ‘causal laws’ (as in Lascarides and Asher, 1992, 1993). The conditionals underlying the causal relations may be formed ad hoc, incorporating occasional information about context and situation.11 I adopt Mackie’s view that an (underlying) INUS condition, as a part of an INUS scheme, is the essence of a causal relation. A complete realization of the INUS scheme is presupposed by a causal coherence relation, be it semantic or epistemic (as I shall argue in section 4.2).

The examples in (11), contain two occurrences of the simple past (see (8)) and a causal relation between two eventualities resulting, by force of the Causal Law in (1), in a temporal relation. In general, the precise temporal relation between two eventualities in simple past depends on the types of eventuality involved. If both eventualities are terminative (the real events), then the intervals representing them are ordered by precedence. If one or both are states (including Vendler’s activities), the intervals representing them may overlap. For details of the underlying mechanism determining the sequence of events and states, I refer to Hinrichs (1986), Webber (1988) and Oversteegen (1993). (14a) (15a)

Carl patted Joy on the head. Joy kissed Carl. Carl was in love with Joy. She was in love with him.

The anaphoric nature of tense warrants a default interpretation for (14a) and (15a): In (14a) the default is that Joy responded to Carl’s tender gesture with a kiss. But Webber (1988) argues that this default can easily be overruled. If the first clause had been Carl pushed Joy away, it would have been more natural to interpret a reversed sequence of events (cf. Lascarides & Asher 1991, 1993). In (15a), the default is that being in love was mutual, or at least coincided at a certain period. 10

Therefore, the relation between A and P in (12b) should be represented by the symbol > for defeasible implication (Lascarides & Asher, 1991, 1993, and Lascarides & Oberlander, 1993). The symbol indicates that the conditional relation functions in a non-monotonous logic (Asher & Morreau 1991). Henceforth, this symbol will be used. 11 In argumentation theory we find a concept strikingly similar to the INUS scheme. Gerritsen & Snoeck Henkemans (1990), working within the framework of Pragma-dialectic argumentation theory developed by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1982), describe a procedure for the reconstruction of the intended link between arguments and claims, as the pragmatic optimum. Both the INUS scheme and the pragmatic optimum have the form of a conditional, and both have to be reconstructed from two causally connected text parts amplified with textual and situational context information.


3.3 The contribution of semantic causal relations to the representation structure


Given the anaphoric potential of tense, what contribution does an explicit causal relation make to the temporal structure? Compare the following sentences: (14a) Carl patted Joy on the head. Joy kissed Carl. (14b) Joy kissed Carl because Carl patted her on the head. (15a) Carl was in love with Joy. She was in love with him. (15b) Joy was in love with Carl because he was in love with her.

(11a) The car stopped because the engine broke down. (11#a)

(11b) The car stopped because it was out of petrol. (11#b)

(11c) The girl looked radiant because she was in love. (11#c)

The representations should be read as: (11#a): e2 < e1; (11#b): e1 e2, and e2 starts before e1; (11#c): e1 s e2, and e2 starts before e1. 12 This difference is due to the ‘indivisibility’ of events, as it has often been called in the aspectual literature. Consequently, in case of an event causing a state, I will assume that the event entirely precedes the state. However, assuming that only the start of the event precedes the start of the state, and, consequently, allowing the event and the state to overlap, would not change the analysis presented in the paper in any significant way.


The presence of because appears to exclude certain interpretations. In (14b) Joy’s kiss can only be seen as a response to Carls’ gesture. And in (15b), there is no question anymore who fell in love first. In other words: the start of the eventuality expressed in the main clause necessarily follows the start of the eventuality expressed in the becauseclause, in line with the Causal Law. In case of two events, as in (14b) and (11a), this generally results in two separate events immediately following each other, whereas two eventualities of which at least one is a state, as in (15b), (11b), and (11c), still have the possibility to overlap.12


4 EPISTEMIC CAUSAL RELATIONS The paradoxical examples (5) and (6) are nothing more, of course, than instruments for refining our understanding of epistemic causal relation. They force us to distinguish the interacting meaning aspects. In this section, the components of a solution proposed in the sections on semantic causal relations (3.2 and 3.3) will be re-evaluated and adapted for epistemic causals (in 4.2 and 4.3). But previous to this, an extension of TTT for the representation of epistemic meaning is required. Section 4.1 presents this extension.

4.1 Epistemic modality in the representation structure Epistemic modality in general is described as speaker-oriented modality. It reflects the speaker’s ‘degree of commitment to the expressed proposition or the likelihood of a state of affairs’ (Nuyts 2001). For example, the future tense may express epistemic modality. The certainty of the claim that an eventuality takes place at some point on the E-track is relativized by the use of the future tense. The E-track reflects the type and order of eventualities asserted by the speaker. If the speaker feels obliged to relativize the truth-status of the eventuality, it would be incorrect to represent such an eventuality on the E-track without representing the reservation. The solution for epistemically modified expressions in TTT is adopted from Van Fraassen (1969). He introduces supervaluations to account for the expressed measure of certainty for a certain eventuality to take place. In TTT this idea is realized by a branching of the E-track. From the point in time at which the speaker sees two (or more) possible extensions of the E-track, or futures, it branches and,


At this point, the three components claimed in section 3 to be the prerequisites for the representation of epistemic causal relations have been described. As a model for the representation of temporal information, TTT was introduced. An analysis of causal relations, making use of Mackie’s INUS condition, was provided. And, in conclusion, the meaning contribution of the semantic causal relation was defined. It appeared to consist of two different aspects. One aspect of the contribution is the determination of the precedence relation between the (starting points of) e-intervals in the TTS (this section). The other aspect is of a propositional nature: It concerns the accommodation of a presupposition reflecting a general regularity (section 3.2).


consequently, makes it possible for the speaker to express a lesser degree of certainty (Oversteegen 1989). (16)

present future

(17)

past future

4.2 Deriving epistemic causal coherence relations The epistemic causal relations can be treated in parallel to the semantic causals (Lagerwerf & Oversteegen 1994). A sentence like (4b) carries a presupposition as well, but in this case, the presupposition does not hold immediately between the two propositions connected. For (4b), it would be if a boy comes back for a girl, there is reason to believe that he loves her. More examples of epistemic causals, counterparts of the examples of semantic causal relations in (11), are given in (18). The INUS conditions associated with them are given in (19). (18a) (18b) (18c) (19a) (19b) (19c)

The engine (presumably) broke down, because the car stopped. (q because p) The car (presumably) was out of petrol, because it stopped. The girl (presumably) was in love, because she looked radiant. If a car stops, there is reason to believe that its engine has broken down. ( p > Bq) If a car stops, there is reason to believe that it is out of petrol. If a girl looks radiant, there is reason to believe that she is in love.

As was the case for semantic causal coherence relations, context plays an important role in ‘licensing’ the derivation of epistemic causal coherence relations. The conditions required to derive them are similar to those for semantic causals: we should be able to reconstruct a (contextually inspired) realization of the INUS scheme, since such a realization functions as a presupposition to the epistemic causal


The TTSs do not distinguish between the E-track extensions: the speaker conveys the belief that the course of events from the evaluation point S (in the present) or S# (in the past) on, may well contain the relevant eventuality. Likewise, adverbials like perhaps or presumably indicate a belief held by the speaker instead of a simple assertion. Similarly, they cause a branching of the E-track.


4.3 The contribution of epistemic causal relations to the representation structure I can now turn to the concrete proposal for representing temporal aspects of epistemic causal relations. It follows directly if we combine the TTS for a semantic causal relation, like (11#a), and our knowledge of the presupposition for epistemic causal relations, as in (20). (11a) The car stopped (e1) because the engine broke down (e2). (11#a)

(20)

If a car stops, there is reason to believe that its engine has broken down (p > Bq)

The modification of (11#a), required for an epistemic causal relation, can be read from the presupposition: it is not the eventuality e1 which stands in a causal relation to e2, but the belief state that e1 occurs 13 An epistemic causal does not necessarily reflect a reasoning from result to cause. An epistemiccausally connected sequence of sentences like: There must be puddles on the streets. It has been raining for hours, expresses a reasoning from a cause to an (uncertain) result (cf. Noordman & De Blijzer 2000).


relation. The difference between semantic and epistemic causals consists in the status of the consequence in the INUS scheme. In case of a semantic causal relation, it is an assertive proposition, whereas it is a belief in case of an epistemic causal relation. Section 5.2 gives examples of the derivation of epistemic causals. It would be convenient if epistemic causal relations could easily be recognized. That is, if the belief clauses were marked as such, for example, by the use of a verb expressing a cognitive state. Sweetser argues that epistemically connected pairs in written English can be recognized by the use of a comma—in Dutch, even this signal is not necessarily present. The cases I am concerned with here can be recognized by reconstructing the conditional regularity underlying the causal relation. In the case of an epistemically connected pair of clauses, the causal relation is generally a reasoning from result to cause, or, in other words, an abduction (Hobbs et al. 1993; Lagerwerf & Oversteegen 1994).13 However, in section 3.2 it was argued that semantic causal relations need not be linguistically marked either, and, consequently, must often be derived.


(at some time). Consequently: e2 < Be1 (but see note 12). This belief state Be1 is reported in the simple past and it is this belief state, not the eventuality which it refers to, that is evaluated at the S# introduced by the simple past. This is reflected in (20#a). (20a)

The engine (presumably) broke down (e1), because the car stopped (e2).

(20#a)

14

Introducing a separate realm for representing attitudinal or perspectivized meaning has been proposed in other frameworks as well, for example, in DRT as ‘articulated DRSs’ (Kamp 1990), in SDRT (Asher, 1993), and in Mental Space theory (Fauconnier, 1994; Fauconnier & Sweetser, 1996).


The epistemic causal relation tells us that e2 precedes Be1. What does (20a) tell us about the relation between e2 and e1? Tense does not give us further indications about the location of e1: both clauses are in the simple past tense. However, if we infer, on the grounds of real-world knowledge, a causal relation between the engine breaking down and the car coming to a halt, we do have information about the temporal relation between those two eventualities. It is well known from the literature that evidence relations reason from effect to cause, and, consequently, it is uncontroversial to apply the Causal Law to e1 and e2 (cf. Hobbs 1993). Given that the Causal Law says that e1 should be located before e2, where should e1 be located? Not on the E-track side by side with the eventualities the speaker claims to occur at some time. In the epistemic case, the speaker believes that e1 occurred—he does not assert it. Kamp (1990: 46) says the following about beliefs like these: ‘Its identity as a belief, i.e. as an attitude with that particular mode, is given as an inseparable aspect of the attitude itself.’ Therefore, the content of the belief, in this case, the occurrence of an eventuality, should be represented separately. In section 4.1 it was argued how this can be done in TTT.14 Therefore, in a TTS, the eventualities claimed (by the speaker) to belong to the real world are represented in a different realm than the eventualities occurring in his beliefs. A TTS contains several branches if and when the speaker conveys less certainty about the factual state of an eventuality. An eventuality he believes to occur or have occurred is located on a different branch than the asserted events are. In such a TTS, the branching E-tracks share the same time structure. Separate

324 Causality and Tense—Two Temporal Structure Builders parts of a discourse representation ‘may share the same discourse referents’ (Kamp, 1990: 46). Points in time are such discourse referents. In (20#) all individual contributions to the TTS of (20a) are presented at once—I will illustrate the way such a TTS comes about step by step in section 5. The TTS should be interpreted as telling us: 1. That all eventualities are located in the past, 2. That the full stop of the car (e2) precedes the belief that the engine broke down (Be1), 3. The engine breaking down (e1) is believed to be the cause of the full stop of the car (e2), and as such precedes this stop (e1 < e2).

(20#)

At this point, the specific nature of an epistemic causal relation has been described in terms of TTT. The contribution to the TTS made by tense, by the causal relation between an eventuality and a belief about another eventuality, and by the relation between the two eventualities, have been specified. In short, the temporal/causal aspects of an epistemic causal coherence relation are representable in TTT.15 Returning to the problem which arises when tense and causality seem to provide paradoxical information in epistemic causal sequences, we are now in the position to put the analysis to the test: does it provide a way out of the paradox? 15

Temporal information in causal coherence relations is implicit. Freksa & Barkowski (1999) argue that a spatial representation, which a TTS is, is especially suitable when: 1. The knowledge to be represented consists of a large number of interrelated relations and many of these relations can be captured simultaneously by the arrangement of a comparatively small number of objects (p. 202); 2. Implicit knowledge is represented (p. 205); and 3. It is not necessary to make all the knowledge represented explicit: inferences can be made (p. 205).


This last piece of information forces the E-track to start branching before e2. Whereas it may be clear that e1 cannot be located on the same Ebranch as e2 and Be1, one might argue that e2 and Be1 could be represented at both branches: assertions (of beliefs) may be argued to express beliefs as well. I have no strong opinion on this matter. Several counterexamples to the claim that every assertion expresses a belief have been given in the literature (Siebel 2003).


5 SOLVING THE PARADOXES The components of my explanation of the clashes of tense and causality in an argumentative piece of discourse have been discussed separately. Now, I bring them together in an explanation of the paradoxical cases (5) and (6). First, I demonstrate how the concept of INUS conditions guides (or ‘licences’) the derivation of the epistemic causal relation between the juxtaposed sentences in (5) and (6). Then, I give the TTS representation of these sentences in such a way, that both tense and causal coherence relation have their independent contributions to the TTS without causing incompatibility.

As may be expected, the analysis of causal relations by means of INUS conditions shows that it is not the presumed hitting itself that is caused in (5), repeated below for convenience. If we take the A in (13), the INUS condition, it symbolizes she immediately came out again. The speaker would not want us to accommodate a presupposition to the effect that ‘if she leaves a building at a certain speed or within a certain time, she will be hit’ (5)

Eve’s husband (presumably) had hit her (e1) because she immediately came out again (e2)

Realizing an INUS scheme for (5) implies demonstrating that a complement X for the INUS condition A can be constructed in such a way that the conclusion P is a reasonable consequence of the INUS condition and the complement together. Let us ignore other possible causes represented by Y, and focus on the sufficient condition AX. What contextually determined X implies, in conjunction with A, that the belief that Eve’s husband had hit her is justified? The situation may be that a marital fight has taken place and that one of the partners, the wife, has walked out. If the speaker needs no more evidence for his conclusion, then probably the husband has been violent before and this fact belongs to the common ground which the speaker is assuming. However, it is also possible that a sudden sound is mentioned in the context that is interpreted as a blow by the speaker, at the moment he sees the wife coming out quickly. In conclusion, as a complement X for the INUS condition A in (5), either (5b) or (5c) would be possible. The point is that a legitimate choice for one of them, or yet another possibility, can be made in context only. (5b)

A: Eve immediately came out again X: Eve’s husband was mad at Eve & Eve’s husband is a violent man


5.1 Licensing epistemic causal relations in the examples

326 Causality and Tense—Two Temporal Structure Builders (5c) A: Eve immediately came out again X: Eve’s husband was mad at Eve & a sudden, loud sound had just been heard

(6) Zeker een derde deel van de kamer werd door het zwarte instrument in beslag genomen (e1). Gek was ze geweest, gek dat ze zoveel geld had uitgegeven voor dat ding, dat apparaat, dat monster (e2). At least one third of the room was occupied by the black instrument. She had been crazy, crazy to have spent so much money on that thing, that machine, that monster. Again, we ignore other possible causes and focus on AX. What could X be? Again, the unknown X represents contextually supplied information which, together with A, should lead to P, the conclusion that it had been a mistake to spend so much money on the grand piano. The context does give us the relevant information: it appears that the subject used to play professionally but that she stopped playing altogether at some time before the period of time referred to in (6). After a few dramatic events, the subject has not been able to play the piano anymore. This contextual information makes it possible to construct an acceptable complement X for the INUS condition: (6) A: at least one third of the room was occupied by the black instrument X: she does not play the piano anymore and the instrument is a constant reminder of a broken career In this case, we do not have to construct the complement X out of the blue. The context provides us with the information required to complete the realization of the INUS scheme. Consequently, the context dependence Stalnaker (1999) refers to (see section 3.3 of this paper) is realized in the approach to epistemic causal relations presented. We accept this type of argumentative relations only if we are able to construct an


In terms of TTT, we now have established the relation between e1 (¼ A) and Be2 (¼ P). We need to do the same for (6), repeated below for convenience, by demonstrating that a complement X for the INUS condition A, in this case at least one third of the room was occupied by the black instrument, can be constructed in such a way that the conclusion P is a reasonable consequence of A and X together. Again, licensing a semantic causal relation would not work: the speaker of (6) would not expect us to have or to accommodate the presupposition that big black instruments make one crazy.


appropriate conditional relation, a realization of the INUS scheme, based on an INUS condition and completed by contextual, linguistic or extralinguistic, information. And, again, in terms of TTT, we have argued for the relation between e2 (¼ A) and Be1 (¼ P).

5.2 The temporal paradox

(5)

Eve’s husband (presumably) had hit her because she immediately came out again (5a) contribution of PPF (5b) contribution of sP to TTS (clause 1): to TTS (clause 2):

In section 1 and section 3.3, the anaphoric nature of tense was mentioned. It results, as a default, in the location of an eventuality in the pluperfect before the location of an eventuality in the past (see table 1). This result was first obtained by Reichenbach’s principle: the permanence of the reference point. In terms of TTT, it means that combining the TTS contributions of the simple past in (5a) and the pluperfect in (5b), the evaluation points S#1 are mapped onto each other. The resulting TTS contribution of the combination of tenses is given in (5c). (5c)

The contribution of the epistemic causal relation to a TTS is complex, as was argued in section 4.3. It introduces a belief state Be1, which is interpreted as being caused by the eventuality e2. Consequently, the e2 must precede Be1 (see also (20#)). This part of its contribution is given in (5d). Furthermore, it tells us that the eventuality e1, the content of


For the paradoxical cases (5) and (6), the temporal representation follows the lines of the epistemic causals discussed in section 4.2. In these cases, however, the temporal relation between e1 and e2 is explicitly defined by the tenses used. The paradox is caused by the seemingly controversial information contributed by the tenses and by the causal coherence relation. In (5a) and (5b), the TTS contributions of the tenses of both sentences are given.

328 Causality and Tense—Two Temporal Structure Builders the belief state Be1, is not asserted by the speaker but believed to be true. Therefore, e1 can not be located on the same branch of the E-track as e2. Note that the relation between e1 and e2 is not defined by the epistemic causal relation. The contribution in (5e) should be interpreted as leaving the temporal relation between e1 and e2 undetermined. (5d)

contribution 1 of epistemic (5e) causal relation to TTS:

contribution 2 of epistemic causal relation to TTS:

(5#)

total TTS:

There are several independent observations confirming the adequacy of (5#) as a representation for (5). First, the interpretation of the belief state at the imaginary speech point S#1 should be: at S#1, the speaker could have said truthfully I believe that Eve’s husband has hit her. Note that, indeed, the S#1e1 configuration can be mapped to the contribution of a present perfect to a TTS (see (9)). Secondly, substituting the pluperfect in the first clause of (5) by a simple past should result in ambiguity. Since the relative position of e1 and e2 is due to the contribution of the tense combination, it would be unclear, in case of two simple past tenses, what sequence of events is intended. (21)

Eve’s husband (presumably) hit her because she immediately came out again.

Indeed, there are two interpretations for (21): the first one is similar to the interpretation of (5). The second one presents the eventuality in the first clause as a result (or reaction) of the eventuality in the second


We obtain the final TTS for (5) by combining (5c), (5d) and (5e)—and this synthesis is not paradoxical anymore (as were the columns 2 and 4 in Table 1). Besides, the vagueness in the relation between e1 and e2 disappears as a result of the contribution of (5c): A precedence relation is defined


(6)

Zeker een derde deel van de kamer werd door het zwarte instrument in beslag genomen. Gek was ze geweest, gek dat ze zoveel geld had uitgegeven voor dat ding, dat apparaat, dat monster.

At least one third of the room was occupied by the black instrument. She had been crazy, crazy to have spent so much money on that thing, that machine, that monster. (6a) contribution of sP to TTS (6b) contribution of PPF to TTS (clause 1): (clause 2):

As in (5c), the combination of simple past and pluperfect determines (by default) the temporal relation between e1 and e2 (see (6c)). (6c)

Naturally, the contribution of the epistemic causal coherence relation in (6) is similar to the one in (5). The only difference consists in the 16

The relation between Be1 and e1 remains the same.


clause. In other words, it implies the inversed precedence relation between e1 and e2.16 Thirdly, as was argued in section 4.2, epistemic causal relations usually reason from result to cause. This implies that an inversed semantic causal relation can be found ‘backing up’ the epistemic causal relation (cf. the inversion of the clauses of the semantic causal relations in (11) in the epistemic causal relations in (18)). For (5), this semantic causal relation would be: Eve immediately came out again because her husband (had) hit her. This semantic causal unambiguously places the hitting (e1) before the coming out (e2). Consequently, the relation of logical compatibility between the two causal sequences is reflected in the TTS for (5), the epistemic counterpart. The sequential relation between the eventualities as defined by the semantic counterpart is a subpart of (5#), the TTS for (5). The second paradoxical case can be treated in a similar way, as will be demonstrated now.

330 Causality and Tense—Two Temporal Structure Builders relation between e1 and Be2. In this case, e1 is a state as well, and states may overlap (see (11#c)). And for (6), this should be the case: the belief that she had been crazy to spend money on the piano does not put an end to the instrument crowding the room. Again, the two parts of the contribution are presented separately (see (6d) and (6e)). And again, in (6e), the temporal relation between e1 and e2 is unspecified. contribution 1 of epistemic (6e) causal relation to TTS:

(6#)

total TTs:

contribution 2 of epistemic causal relation to TTS:

The TTSs (5#) and (6#) represent the paradoxical information reconstructed in Table 1 in a coherent way. These TTSs do justice to our intuition about the type of causal relation employed in the sentences (5) and (6), but they also incorporate the ‘hard’ semantic temporal information supplied by tense and the Causal Law stating that causes precede effects.17 6 THE INTENTION OF THE SPEAKER AND UNDERSTANDING VERSUS ADOPTING In the logic-semantic literature, overt belief sentences have been investigated extensively (e.g. by Kamp1990, Singh & Asher 1993, Stalnaker 1999). There are similarities between overt belief sentences and the type of sentences discussed here. In both cases, the commitment of a subject to a propositional content is expressed and, in both cases, there is no expectation that the content of the proposition is considered to be uncontroversial. However, only in the ‘covert’ belief sentences discussed here, is the believer necessarily identical to the speaker. This makes the intention of the speaker interesting. In uttering the sentence, 17 The rule CCT, presented here as (3) in section 1, tells us that the second clause of (6) must function as an explanation for the first clause. Being crazy when she bought the piano would be presented as an explanation for her creating the undesirable situation in the room described in the first clause.


(6d)


To accept a proposition is to treat it as true for some reason. One ignores, at least temporarily, and perhaps in a limited context, the possibility that it is false. Belief is the most basic acceptance concept: the simplest reason to treat a proposition as true is to believe that it is true. But there may be various reasons to ignore the possible situations in which some proposition is false even when one realizes that one of those possible situations may be the actual one (. . .), one may grant something for the purpose of an argument. In cases where communication is facilitated by accepting propositions that one or the other of the participants don’t believe, we need a notion of common ground based on a notion of acceptance that may diverge from belief. (Stalnaker 2002: 716) This notion is described as the belief about what is accepted. Thus a presupposition still reflects the speaker’s belief about the common ground—but not necessarily his belief about common belief. The branching TTS form enables us to distinguish between understanding an epistemic causal relation (or argumentation) and


the speaker conveys a belief which is the conclusion of an argument. The argument is supposed by the speaker to be common ground because one part is explicitly present in the discourse and the other part is presupposed. Presuppositions are considered to be speakers’ beliefs about the common ground (Stalnaker 2002). However, the belief sentence presenting the conclusion of the argument is not phrased as a personal attitude. As a consequence, an epistemic causal relation is often interpreted as an attempt to make the hearer adopt the conclusion. In other words, the speaker has the intention of turning his personal belief into common belief, shared with the hearer. The hearer will be prepared to share this belief only if he can reconstruct the missing argument: the presupposition built from the INUS condition, its (contextually determined) complement(s), and the conclusion. However, reconstruction of the presupposition is not a sufficient condition for sharing the belief of the speaker. Understanding an argument is not equal to believing it to be true. Stalnaker (2002) makes the same distinction. Treating presuppositions as speakers’ beliefs about common ground, he argues that common ground equals common beliefs in many cases. However, it is also possible that a speaker treats a proposition as common ground, i.e. as a presupposition, whereas he does not believe the proposition to be believed by the recipient(s). In these cases, common ground is not identical to common beliefs.


(5$)

(6$)

The collapsing of tracks can be interpreted as a transfer of eventualities from one domain (of expressed beliefs) to another one (of assertions). This change of state becomes more plausible if one considers chain arguments. An example of a chain argument is given in (22). (22)

It is going to rain (1). Everybody is carrying an umbrella (2). We should postpone the match (3).

The speaker starts with a belief (1) and supports it with an assertion (2). The final claim or belief (3) is based, in turn, on the belief (1), which may be accepted by the reader as a fact because of the support in (2). This is a minimal example of a chain argument: a clause that is


adopting it (or being persuaded). If we merely understand the relation between event and belief state in an epistemic causal relation, we are able to reconstruct the presupposition, but we do not add it to our knowledge base, or accommodate it. The branching TTS structure remains intact. The representation structures (5#) and (6#) model this situation. Adopting the epistemic causal relation, however, implies either believing already or accommodating the regularity expressed in the presupposition. In that case, the branching of the E-track can be collapsed into a non-branching TTS. The results of (5) and (6) are given in (5$) and (6$), respectively. The eventualities Be1 (in (5#)) and Be2 (in (6#)) have disappeared in (5$) and (6$). The presence of e1 and e2 at an earlier time makes them redundant and strange. As a result of the procedure, the causal link between e2 and believing e1 (in ((5)) or between e1 and believing e2 (in (6)) is present in the accommodated presupposition only.


originally presented as a conclusion functions as an argument for another conclusion. We get the relations presented in (22a). (22a)

e2 causes Be1 so e2 < Be1 e1 causes Be3 so e1 < Be3

7 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION In this paper, I argued that we can gain insight into the temporal aspects of argumentative parts of discourse. On the one hand, this is done by analysing the properties of epistemic causal relations in comparison with semantic causal relations and, on the other hand, by recognizing the specific nature of the related eventualities in epistemic causal relations. The analysis consists of distinguishing ‘hard’ semantic aspects of these causal relations (i.e. the precedence relation between cause and result, the existence of a presupposition) and ‘soft’, defeasible aspects of these relations (e.g., the precise content of the INUS scheme), and explaining their relation. Moreover, these aspects of causality are combined in a straightforward way with the ‘hard’ temporal information contributed by the tenses used in the causally connected sentences. Originally, TTS representations were meant to model assertive sentences. The extended TTS appears to be capable of representing a combination of interacting properties: causal, temporal, and epistemic properties. The status and function of presupposition in the analysis presented may seem problematic. The presupposition, in the form of a conditional relation (the INUS scheme), is also assumed necessary for obtaining the correct (epistemic) causal relation in the absence of a presupposition trigger (like because)! However, it is argued that bridging, the resolution


A TTS for this text would contain branching E-tracks: e2 is on the same branch as Be1, but e1 would be on another branch. Similarly, e1 would be on the same branch as Be3, but e3 would be on another branch again. This increasing branching may seem artificial, but it reflects the growing ‘instability’ of the claims: the more ‘deeply-branched’ eventualities are represented, the further they are from the asserted facts. When is it possible to use such chain arguments with a reasonable chance of success? According to the approach advocated in this paper, the epistemic causal relation is accepted if an adequate realization of the INUS scheme, functioning as a presupposition, is accommodated. If this happens and the belief state concerning an event is adopted by the hearer, the ‘e-claim’-branch can be collapsed onto the E-track. The difference in status, fact or claim, disappears for the hearer.


18 Asher & Lascarides (1998) argue that ‘Full understanding takes the full [discourse representation] structure and integrates it with the beliefs of the interpreter, and as such comes after discourse interpretation’ (Asher & Lascaridis 1998: 85). In fact, this order is suggested by the analysis presented in this paper as well.


of anaphora, and the interpretation of presuppositions are ‘a byproduct of computing the discourse structure of a discourse, which we view as a necessary precondition for discourse interpretation . . .’ (Asher & Lascarides 1998: 85). If presuppositions can be envisaged as a byproduct of computing the discourse structure, which is, in turn, the precondition for discourse interpretation, then why would we need a trigger for them apart from the general demand that the discourse must be coherent, and, consequently, coherence relations, as constituents of discourse structure, must be computable? Taking the INUS scheme to be an inference instead of a presupposition for a causal relation, would be neglecting its essential role in causality (see section 3.2). The paper also addressed different effects of epistemic causal coherence relations on hearers. Whereas the effect in the epistemic causal relation, the conclusion of the argument, is not supposed by the speaker to be common ground already, he does treat the presupposition for the epistemic causal relation as common ground. In the words of Stalnaker (2002: 716), the speaker believes that it is common belief that the content of the presupposition is accepted. If it really is, the hearer may adopt the epistemic causal relation. In this case, we may say that he adopts the belief expressed. Alternatively, he may simply understand what the speaker means, without adopting his belief. Focusing on the hearer, I argued that we must have two different representation structures available: one for the hearer who has properly understood the epistemic causal relation (or the argument), and the other for the hearer who believes the causal link to hold and is convinced by the argument. The question whether they both represent the meaning of the sentence pairs should probably be answered in the negative.18 Even if it is the intention of the speaker to convince the hearer of the truth of the conclusion, should this intended effect be seen as part of the meaning or is it a consequence of the linguistic meaning of the sentences, i.e. its perlocution? Leaving the answer to this question open to further research, I may have provided a little more transparency in the relations between epistemic causal relations, temporal meaning and information status. And as a profitable consequence, a general difference between the use of causality in narrative texts and in persuasive texts.


Acknowledgements This paper is dedicated to Henk Verkuyl, my first tutor in semantics. The comments made by an anonymous reviewer were of great benefit to the paper. LEONOOR OVERSTEEGEN

Received: 27.11.02 Final version received: 23.12.04 Advance Access publication: 20.06.05

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