No title

HYPATI A

SUMMER 1988

A Journalof FeministPhilosophy

A HYPATI

VOL.3, NO. 2 SUMMER 1988

A Journalof FeministPhilosophy

Hypatia

Hypatia (Hy-pay-sha)was an Egyptianwoman philosopher,mathematician, and astronomerwho lived in Alexandriafrom her birth in about 370 A.D. until her death in 415. She was the leaderof the NeoplatonicSchool in Alexandria and was famous as an eloquent and inspiring teacher. The journal Hypatiais namedin honorof this foresister.Her nameremindsus that although many of us are the first women philosophersin our schools, we are not, after all, the first in history. Hypatiahas its roots in the Society for Women in Philosophy,manyof whose membershave for yearsenvisioned a regularpublicationdevoted to feminist philosophy.Hypatiais the realizationof that vision;it is intendedto encourage and communicate many differentkinds of feminist philosophy.

Hypatia(ISSN 0887-5367) is owned by Hypatia, Inc., a tax exempt corporation, and publishedby IndianaUniversityPress,which assumeno responsibility for statements expressedby authors. Hypatiais publishedthree times a year. Subscriptionrates for 1988-89 are: Institutions$40/year; Individuals, $20/year.Foreignorderadd postage:$5/yearto Canada,Mexico, and overseas surface;$10/yearto oversearsairmail.Single copies are$20 (institutions) and $10 (individuals). A 40 percent discount is availableon bulk orderfor classroom use or bookstore sales. Life-time subscriptionsare available to donor subscribersfor $400. and businesscorrespondence to the JournalsManager, Addressall subscriptions IndianaUniversity Press, 10th and MortonStreets, Bloomington, IN 47405. Notice of nonreceiptof an issue must be sent within four weeks after receipt of subsequentissue. Pleasenotify the Pressof any change in address;the Post Office does not forwardthird class mail. Manuscriptsand other editorial correspondenceshould be addressedto: Editor, Hypatia, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville,Edwardsville,IL 62026-1437. Copyright ? 1988 by Hypatia, Inc. All rights reserved. Hypatiawas published in 1983, 1984, and 1985 as special annual issues of Forum. Women'sStudiesInternational

Hypatia

EDITOR MargaretA. Simons, SouthernIllinoisUniversityat Edwardsville ASSISTANT EDITOR MaryEllen Blackston Huey-li Li COPY EDITOR Lisa Langstraat EDITORIALASSISTANT Alice Snyder BOOK REVIEWEDITOR JeffnerAllen, State Universityof New York,Binghamton FORUM EDITOR MariaLugones, CarletonCollege ASSOCIATE EDITORS Azizah al-Hibri (Editor 1982-84), New York SandraBartky, Universityof Illinois,Chicago Ann Garry,CaliforniaState University,Los Angeles SandraHarding, Universityof Delaware Helen Longino, MillsCollege Donna Semiak-Catudal,Randolph-Macon College Joyce Trebilcot, WashingtonUniversity,St. Louis ADVISORY BOARD ElizabethBeardsley,TempleUniversity GertrudeEzorsky,BrooklynCollegeof City Universityof New York ElizabethFlower, Universityof Pennsylvania Virginia Held, GraduateCenterof City Universityof New York Graciella Hierro, Mexico Instituteof Technology JudithJarvisThompson, Massachusetts Barnard Mothersill, Mary College MerrileeSalmon, Universityof Pittsburgh Anita Silvers, San FranciscoState University EDITORIALBOARD KathrynPyne Addelson, SmithCollege JacquelineAnderson, Olive HarveyCollege,Chicago Asoka Bandarage,BrandeisUniversity

Hypatia

Sharon Bishop, CaliforniaState University,Los Angeles LorraineCode, YorkUniversity Blanche Curry, ShawCollege ElizabethEames, SouthernIllinoisUniversityat Carbondale Susan Feathers, Universityof Pennsylvania Ann Ferguson,Universityof Massachusetts,Amherst Jane Flax, HowardUniversity Nancy Fraser,NorthwesternUniversity Carol Gould, Steven'sInstituteof Technology Susan Griffin, Berkeley,California Donna Haraway,Universityof California,SantaCruz Nancy Hartsock, Universityof Washington Hilda Hein, Collegeof the Holy Cross Sarah Lucia Hoagland, NortheasternIllinoisUniversity Alison Jaggar,Universityof Cincinnati ElizabethJaneway,New York Evelyn Fox Keller, NortheasternUniversity Rhoda Kotzin, MichiganState University LyndaLange, Universityof Alberta Linda LopezMcAlister, Universityof SouthFlorida PatriciaMann, City Collegeof New York KathrynMorgan, Universityof Toronto Janice Moulton, SmithCollege Andree Nichola-McLaughlin,MedgarEvarsCollege Linda Nicholson, State Universityof New York,Albany Susan Ray Peterson, New York Connie Crank Price, TuskegeeInstitute Sara Ruddick, New Schoolof SocialResearch Betty Safford,CaliforniaState University,Fullerton Naomi Scheman, Universityof Minnesota Ruth Schwarz, Universityof Pennsylvania ElizabethV. Spelman, SmithCollege JacquelineM. Thomason, Los Angeles Nancy Tuana, Universityof Texas at Dallas Caroline Whitbeck, Massachusetts Instituteof Technology Iris Young, WorcesterPolytechnicInstitute JacquelineZita, Universityof Minnesota

Contents

vii Preface 1 Joyce Trebilcot Dyke Methods 15 Lisa Heldke Recipesfor TheoryMaking 31 Uma Narayan WorkingTogetherAcrossDifference:SomeConsiderations on Emotionsand PoliticalPractice 49 LauraM. Purdy Does Women'sLiberationImplyChildren'sLiberation 63 Eva FederKittay Womanas Metaphor 87 Gail Stenstad AnarchicThinking 101 Uma Narayan Poems 107 JeffnerAllen PoeticPolitics:How theAmazonsTook theAcropolis Review Symposium 123 Claudia Card FemaleFriendship: Separationsand Continua 131 MarilynFriedman WithoutIndividualism: Reviewof Individuality JaniceRaymond'sA Passionfor Friends 139 Janice G. Raymond Response

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Forum 145 MarilynFriedman WelfareCuts and theAscendanceof MarketPatriarchy Comment/Reply 151 Bruce M. Landesman On Nancy Fraser's"Women,Welfareand the Politics of Need Interpretation 163 Linda Timmel Duchamp DesperatelySeekingApproval:The Importance of BetweenApprovaland Recognition Distinguishing 165 Victoria Davion Competition,Recognition,and Approval-Seeking Book Reviews 167 KathrynS. Russell Genderand History:The Limitsof SocialTheoryin the Age of the Familyby Linda Nicholson 170 Jane Duran Philosophyand FeministThinkingby Jean Grimshaw 172 EleanorH. Kuykendall LesbianPhilosophy:Explorations by JeffnerAllen Sexeset parentesby Luce Irigaray 174 Melinda Vadas Intercourseby Andrea Dworkin 177 Monica Holland Women'sWays of Knowing:The Developmentof Self, Voice, and Mind by MaryField Belenky, Blythe McVickerClinchy, Nancy Rule Goldberger,and Jill MattuckTarule 181 Notes on Contributors 185 Announcements 191 SubmissisionGuidelines

Preface

How can we, as women, translate our experience into knowledge, and challenge ouroppressions,without at the sametime constructinga theoryoppressiveto others?This epistemologicalconcern, and its related issues, are centralto manyof the articlesin this issueof Hypatia.JoyceTrebilcot'sinterest, in "DykeMethods,"is in finding a "methodfor using language"within a "wimmin'sspace"where "differencesare cherished."Her goal is not a "universal"understandingof the worldarrivedat by an individual,"objective"obin the world,that locatestheorywithin collective server,but a "withstanding" feministaction: "I am standingwith wimmin"and "withstandingpatriarchy." Her methodoffersthree principles,emphasizingthe non-persuasiveuse of languagegroundedin wimmin'sexperience, including:"Ispeakonly for myself." In "RecipesforTheoryMaking,"LisaHeldkeusesthe processof creatingand sharing recipes, traditionalwomen's activities seldom discussedby philosophers,as a modelfor feministinquirythat is anti-essentialist,self-reflectiveand both theoreticaland practical.Workingwithin the epistemologicaltraditionof John Dewey's "CoresponsibleOption," Heldke argues, in part, that people come up with theories,as well as recipesfor variousreasons.So it's important "to assessthe motives of the recipe giver," and to "askthe giver about the conditionsthat promptedthe developmentof a particulartheory." Uma Narayan, in "WorkingTogether Across Difference,"also recognizes the importanceof the context in evaluatingtheories. But in her model, access to theorybuildingis not freelyshared,but limitedby "historicallyconstituted attitudes and assumptionsof privilege and power." Her interest is in overcomingproblemsof dialoguewithin heterogeneousgroups,where membersare variously"insiders"to one formof oppression,be it "class,race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual preference,"and "outsiders"to another. Narayanprovidesa critical analysisof the concept of the "epistemicprivilege of the oppressed,"and emphasizesthe epistemic role of emotion in her analysis. An "outsider"to an experience of oppression requiresextensive studyto gain even a limited awarenessof the experienceof oppressionthat an "insider"may feel immediately. But this "epistemicprivilege,"which gives insiders a more subtle and complex understandingof the ways oppression operates, also bringsgreatervulnerability.To avoid unintentionallyhurting "insiders,"trusted "outsiders,"who often have privilegedaccess to theorybuilding, must practice a "methodological humility" and "caution," and allow insidersto "speakfor themselves."These concepts have much in common with Trebilcot'sprinciples,althoughNarayanwouldarguefor the added necessityfor women to learn about those experiencesof oppressionto which they are "outsiders."

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Like Heldke, LauraM. Purdy, in her article, "Does Women's Liberation Imply Children'sLiberation?"focuses on an area of women's activities that has not often been the subject of philosophical concern, in this case child care. Although Purdydoes not addressepistemologicalissuesat length, she is concerned with both developing an alternativeto "extremescepticism,"and recognizing differences and cultural/historical context in doing feminist theory. PurdycriticizesShulamithFirestone'scall for equal rightsfor children as well as women. Purdysees Firestone'sliberationmodel of childrearingas inappropriate,since it does not take into account differencesbetween the situationsof women and children, or recognize"the natureof the environment into which children are to be liberated." Eva FederKittay, in "Women and Metaphor,"returnsthe focus of attention to language,in this case the place of women in men's culturalschemes. Drawingon workby Simone de Beauvoirand Nancy Chodorow,Kittayquestions "the prominence of women's activities and relations to men" as "persistent metaphors for man's projects." She argues that "the structure of metaphorand the structureof the relationbetween men and mother/Woman as Other contribute to the conceptual importanceof the metaphorizationof Woman." In "Anarchic Thinking," Gail Stenstad also drawsconnections with the workof Europeanphilosophers,in her case, MartinHeideggerand Luce Irigaray,as well as the American, SusanGriffin. In contrastto Purdy'sfocus on control and Heldke's interest in theory-building,Stenstad calls for "wild," "unruled,"and "atheoretical thinking." Stenstad's "earthymovement" in thinking would be "a sheltering, clearingmovement where things find their place, disclosing themselves," "opening up spaces for non-divisive otherness, for difference, for multiplicityof voices." Her desire to "avoidthe trap of replacingpatriarchaltruth and realitywith some unitarytruth or realityof our own," a trap that "attemptsto impose one's views on others," seems to share a concern with Narayan, and with Trebilcot whose "motivatingdesire is . . . that others not control me." It mayhave been the appealof Stenstad's"wildthinking"that encouragedus to publishpoetrywrittenby a philosopher,for the firsttime. But we were encouragedas well by JeffnerAllen's call for "syntacticand semanticinnovation" in her paper on lesbian and feminist writing, "Poetic Politics." Here Allen proposesan alternativeformof "textualaction"to the "politicsof difference," that have been criticizedby Helene Cixous and MoniqueWittig for "maintainingthe ruleof the Same."Allen is sympatheticto Wittig'sradicalrejection of the "ideologyof difference"in Cixous' concept of "femininedifference(s). But while Wittig would reject"anycategoryof difference(s),includingthe difof historicallyconference identifiedas 'woman,'Allen remains"appreciative stituteddifferences."Her alternativeis an "amazonintertextuality,"rooted in the women'smovementand "constitutedby texts of femalefreedom." The concernswith women'scommunityand individuality,institutionsand "wildness"are reflected in the review essays by Claudia Card and Marilyn

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Friedman,and the responseby Janice Raymond,on her work, A Passionfor Friends.Cardis interestedin Raymond'sdiscussionof "institutionsthat foster female friendship," and the issue of "how we can have discipline without being tamed," since the "wildness"of "nondomesticated"women can be a sourceof "passionateconnections amongwomen."Card'scriticism,and Raymond'sresponsefocuseson what Cardsees as the "unnecessary""rejectionof feminist separatismand the 'lesbian continuum.' " In Raymond'sreply she clarifiesher distinction between female separationand dissociationfrom the world. In her discussion,FriedmancontrastsRaymond'sconcept of the self in relation, with liberalindividualism.The exchange between Friedmanand Raymond focuseson issuesraisedby the sado-masochismdebates.FriedmancriticizesRaymondfor not considering"the fundamentalsignificanceof women's own assertionsof need and desire, preferenceand choice," and for not developing "the moral epistemologyby which we might discriminatelegitimate and importantcritiquesof women's practicesfrom those critiqueswhich are unfounded."Raymond'sresponseis to locate Friedman'scritiquewithin the "shiftfrom feminist radicalismto feminist liberalism,"which "is both cause and effect of the feminist liberationcompaignfor sexual liberation." The special sections in this issue of Hypatiainclude MarilynFriedman's Forumpaperanalyzing"class-basedmarketpatriarchy,"a comment by Bruce Landesmanon a paperby Nancy Fraser,a comment by LindaDuchampwith a reply from Victoria Davion, and a greatly expanded section of Book Reviews, edited by JeffnerAllen. We are deeply indebtedto our editors, manuscriptreaders,contributors,and publishersfor the journal'ssuccess, recently evidenced by Hypatia'sfirst place awardin a competition held by Chicago Women in Publishing. Two of the three issues covered by the awardwere edited by a guest editor, Nancy Tuana, on Feminismand Science. If you would like to review a book on feminist philosophy, write a comment on an article, contributea paperto the special issue on FeministAesthetics, or suggest ideas for future issues, please write us at the Southern Illinois University at Edwardsvilleeditorialoffice. Lettersfrom readerswere instrumentalin shapingthe contents of this issue. We are alwaysinterested in yourideasfor improvingthe journaland our serviceto you. Send all correspondenceconcerningthe content of the journal,as well as papersfor general submissions, to the SIUE editorial office. All correspondenceconcerning subscriptionsshouldbe addressedto the journalsmanagerat IndianaUniversity Press. A final note of apology and gratitudeto our trustycomputerexpert, Alexandra Babione, for mispellingher name in an earlierissue. M.A.S.

Methods Dyke or Principlesfor the Discovery/Creation of the Withstanding* JOYCETREBILCOT

ideaof truth,the author Alarmedby the dominationinherentin thepatriarchal sketchesprinciplesthat allow her to developaccounts of reality-to "do thesettingsupory"-without implyingthatothersshouldagree.This epistemological in differentunderstandings portsdifferences of the amongwimminthatareexpressed world;it also supportsagreement.

Firstprinciple:I speak only for myself. Secondprinciple:I do not try to get other wimminto accept my beliefs in place of their own. Thirdprinciple:There is no "given." INTRODUCTION

The methods I discussin this essayare, most narrowlyconceived, methods for using language. They are, therefore, methods for a great deal else as well-experiencing, thinking, acting. But my focus is on language,on verbal language,on English;my focus is on how, as a dyke-a conscious, committed, political lesbian-I can use wordsin thinking, speaking,and writing to contributeto the discovery/creationof consciouslylesbianrealities.BecauseI am most aware of my words in writing, this essay is, in the first instance, about writing-in particular,about writing "feministphilosophy"or "feminist theory." I intend what I say here, however, to apply to other uses of wordsas well. Of the many wimmin whose work and presence inspiresand supportsme, I am especially awareof valuable contributionsto the content of this essay from Claudia Card, JacquelynN. Zita, Jannekevan der Ros, JeanetteSilveira,JeffnerAllen, JuliaPenelope, MariaLugones,Marilyn Frye,and SarahLuciaHoagland.Also, the writingof LizStanleyand Sue Wise in their book andFeministResearch(London:Routledgeand KeganPaul, BreakingOut: FeministConsciousness 1983) has given me both content and courage. After I presentedthis materialat a sessionof the Society for Women in Philosophyin the fall of 1986, Sarah Hoagland sent me a copy of an earlieressay by Sally Miller Gearhartin which Gearhartdevelopsan idea closely relatedto partof what I say here. Gearhart'sthesis is that "any intent to persuadeis an act of violence." Her essayis "TheWomanizationof Rhetoric,"Women's StudiesInternational Quarterly,1979, Vol. 2, pp. 195-201. Hypatia vol. 3, no. 2 (Summer 1988) ? by Joyce Trebilcot

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The center of this essay is the statement of three principles. (I dislike the hierarchicalconcept of a principle, but I have not yet found a satisfactoryalternative.) As will become clear, the principlesare not rules everyone is to follow but, rather, articulationsof values I want my own work to embody. They are guidelines,or remindersor, even, idealsthat expresssome of what I currently need in my work. They are not exhaustive-there are certainly other significantvalues guidingmy work-and they may not be permanent. But for now these principlesand the anti-heteropatriarchal practicesthey imply engage my attention. My procedurein this essayis, first,to indicatesomeof the sourcesof the principlesand the contexts in which they apply;then, I explicateeach of them;after that, I addresssome of the questionsand objectionsthe principlesinspire. Sourcesof theprinciplesin my experience.The principlescome mainly from anger, from anger about being controlled. This control is exercisedby men and male-identifiedwomen over women/ wimmin and girls in a varietyof ways, of which-as I have learnedthrough feminism-two of the most effective are erasureand falsenaming. In erasure, men make us invisible either by claiming that we are includedwhen we are not (as in termssuch as "mankind")or by simplyignoringus; in falsenaming, they define us and then enforce their definitionsupon us (as in their concept of woman). Another manifestationof control by men is that women/wimmin adopt the very means of oppressionthat the dominatorsuse and apply those techniques against ourselvesand one another. For example, I have been in the audience of sessionsof the Society for Women in Philosophyand of the National Women's Studies Association when lesbian feminist speakershave made claims about wimmin, about dykes, about "we," that erase or misdescribe me. In such cases, if I maintainmy sense of who I am, I am excluded;if I feel myselfa partof the "we"being discussed,I distortwho I am. This difficulty is not only mine; I have heardother wimminsay that the misuseof "we" in lesbian and feminist settings is hurtfulfor them as well. But long beforefeminism,I was angrybecauseof attempts-often successful -to control me. My earliestexperience of being controlled was as the only child of a mother and father who, with vigorousdedication, attempted to make me what they wanted me to be-a traditionaland docile daughter. I have also been controlled by other people and institutions-the Catholic Church, school, heterosexuality,and so on. In connection with the work of this essay, it is importantto understand that these and similar institutions participate in the truth industryheteropatriarchalscience, religion, scholarship, education, media-that is used by men as a meansof exercisingpower. In dominantculture"truths"are presentedas claims that people are requiredto accept as basesfor their thinking and action and hence identities, regardlessof how they feel about the

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"truths"and regardlessof their relevantexperiences.By meansof the apparatuses of "truth,""knowledge,""science,""revelation,""faith,"etc. (it matters little whether the methodology is scientific or religious), men are able not only to projecttheir personalitiesas reality,but also to requirethat other peopleparticipatein those realitiesand acceptthem as theirown. Recipientsof the "truth"(i.e., all those not certifiedto create it) are expected to long for truth, to respect it, to bow down to it, and, especially, to honor-and obey-those who are authoritieson it. The system is thoroughlycorrupt;it hurtsme, angersme, and, when I have my wits aboutme, strikesme as silly. How ridiculous,for example,for a crew of male scientiststo go on an archeologicaldig and reportthat what they have foundis what is there, when I would come back with quite a differentstorywere I to dig, and other wimminwould come backwith yet other stories.Justas I am committedto writingphilosophy withoutexcludingor distortingany wimmin,so I am also committedto finding ways of workingwithout imposingmy "truths"-the descriptions,definitions, explanations,ideals,that are meaningfulto me-on other wimmin.The three principlesI explicatehere are guidesdesignedto help me in this project. Wheretheprinciples apply.My life is like a muddylake with some clearpools and rivulets-wimmin's spaces-but many areasthick, in one degreeor another, with the silt and poisonsof patriarchy.The principlesI articulatehere belong to the clear waters. The principlesare not intended to be used in situationsthat are predominantly patriarchal,that is, when getting somethingfrom men is at stake, as when one is workingin the patriarchyfor money, doingbusinesswith men and male-identifiedwomen, etc. In these contextsI find that it is usuallymosteffective to operateaccordingto patriarchalideasof knowledgeand truth. When both patriarchaland feminist elements have a significantpart in a situation, the principlesdo apply, although in ways limited by patriarchal power. Women's studies classes sometimes have this character;sometimes, for example, for a class to work, both in relationto the institution and in relation to the students in it, the teacher must operatepartlywith patriarchal principlesand partlyas a discoverer/creatorof wimmin'sspaces. In situationsthat are predominantlywimmin-identified,in contrast, I attempt to throw off mainstreamhabits and values in favorof the more direct and diverse patternsof wimmin. I should add that, for me, patriarchyis always present: there is no "pure"wimmin's space. (As if in compensation, when wimmin are presentthere is no purepatriarchy-we are alwaysviolating and sabotagingit.) THE PRINCIPLES

Firstprinciple:I speakonlyfor myself.I speak "only for myself"not in the sense that only I am my intended audiencebut, rather, in the sense that an

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account I give reportsonly my understandingof the world or, more accurately, only my withstandingin the world. (I use "withstanding"to mean both that I am standingwith wimminand that I am withstandingpatriarchy.)I expect both that some wimminwill find that what I say is truefor them and use it in their own thinking and that some wimmin will find that what I say is false, distorted, or irrelevant.The latter case may hurt because I often want what I say to be liked, to be acceptedby wimmin I respectand love. But it is more importantto me to leave plenty of spacesfor differences. Let me give an exampleof how the idea that I speakonly for myselfworks. Suppose I am inclined to write "We all need love." BecauseI wish to speak only for myself and thereby to acknowledge the likelihood that there are wimmin who do not believe that they need love, I refrainfrom the plural "we." There are several alternatives.First, instead of "We all need love," I may write "I need love and some other wimmin reportthat they also need love." This social science sort of approachpresupposesdata-written or verbal avowalsfromother wimmin. In what I would take to be the best scholarship, the wimminwho are reportedon have themselvesauthorizedthe use of their wordsin the context in question;they themselvesparticipate,as it were as co-authors,in the work. With this approachto fulfillingthe principlethat I write only for myself, feminist scholarshipmoves in the directionof becoming collective scholarship,a not surprisingoutcome. A second way of reactingto the inclination to write "We all need love" in a way consistent with speakingonly for oneself is to write insteadsomething like "I need love and it seems to me that some other wimminalso need love"; or, perhapsbetter, "Myimageof wimmin is that we all need love." In formulations like these I remind myself and my audience that I am talking about only my own beliefs, concepts, definitions, imagings-and that I respectfully leave space for the accounts of the wimmin I am describing,whether or not those accounts are significantlydifferentfrommine. With this approachI remind the readerthat when I am writingaboutother wimmin, the distinction between my opinion and their own is (even when the opinions themselves are identical) methodologicallysignificant. The third and perhapsbest alternative is that, in place of "We all need love," I write simply, "I need love." If I choose this approach,I clearlyspeak only for myself, and so attach my theorizings-that is, whateverexplications, explanations, predictions,or exhortationsI may connect to the claim that I need love-clearly and closely to my self, in accordancewith the feministbelief that the personal is essentially involved in both knowledge (and hence theorizing) and liberation. Secondprinciple:I do not tryto get otherwimminto acceptmy beliefsin placeof theirown. The first principle, that I speak only for myself, suggeststhe second, that in talking about my beliefs I reject the purposeof tryingto bring it about that other wimmin substitutemy beliefsfor their own. I sometimescall

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this the principle of nonpersuasion.In this context, the term "persuasion" must be construedbroadlyso as to include not only argumentand discussion but also other formsof deliberatelyinfluencingpeople'sbeliefs, such as various kinds of rewardand punishment (e.g., bribery,blackmail), the inducement of conversion experiences, and so on. Of course the principle of nonpersuasion does not preclude my telling other wimmin what my beliefs and values are, and I may certainlygive them information, whether of a particularand perhapstrivial sort (e.g., "I'll be there at ten-thirty") or, for example, informationI might relate to a class aboutherstoryor feministtheory. The principleof nonpersuasionholds that I should not try to mold wimmin'sminds, not that I should not give them informationand ideasthat they can use, if they choose, in makingup their own minds, in making up their own realities. Not tryingto get other wimmin to accept my ideas in place of their own is a principleprimarilyabout intention ratherthan about behavior. Whether a particularkind of behaviorcounts as persuasionvariesfromsituationto situation and among cultures, so there is no kind of behavior that is alwaysprecludedby the principle. Indeed, I find that applyingthe principledoes not require much change in how I act-I can still set out my convictions and my reasonsfor them (as I do, for example, here). But my attitudechanges-it no longer includes the intention to perusade,an intention to which I became habituated in heteropatriarchy. Despite my renunciationof persuasion,wimmin may, of course, be influenced by me to adopt as their own certain of my beliefs, even though those beliefs are not authentic for them; this is especially likely in situations in which I am perceived as having higher rank or status. The principle of nonpersuasioncan not and does not requirethat I in fact do not cause other wimmin to believe in certain ways, but only that I refrainfrom trying to do so.

This principle, then, takes seriouslythe cliche that everyone should think for herself. In heteropatriarchalscholarship,this notion is likely to be presented against a backgroundimage of "a marketplaceof ideas"where many producerspresent their wares, hawking them with arguments, competing with one anotherfor attention and allegiance;and consumersbuy some ideas but not others. The principlethat in makinga statement I do not try to get others to accept it suggestsnot an image of a marketplacebut one of a potluck:we each contributesomethingand therebycreatea whole meal. It is understoodthat our contributionsmay be diverseand may seem, on some standards,not to go well together, but we are not botheredby that. We each eat from our own and other dishes. The dish I bring is something I like myself, but also I want to share it-I hope that at least some others will like it too. In writing dyke philosophy it is essential to me that someone else thinks that at least some of my workis worthwhile.But I want my workto be usedby

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other wimmin becausethey find it helpful in termsof their own experiences, not becauseI have persuadedthem, howevergently, that what I say is true. I wish to learnto presentmy worknot as ideasfor sale in a competitivemarketplace but as fruit to be sharedwith those who are so inclined. Thirdprinciple:Thereis no "given."This principle, like the second, is suggested by the first. Not only do I speakonly for myselfbut, ultimatelyand in principle, only I speakfor myself. That is, the task of discovering/creatingreality requires in the long run the exploration of every facet of existence throughmy feminist lesbianconsciousness.In principle, I need to rewritethe entire world for myself. In practice, a finite lifetime and the call of other amusements make doing so impossible. Further, other wimmin with dyke consciousnessesaredoing some of the work, and in manycases I can integrate their analysesinto my own. Still, the principlethat there is no "given"reminds me that at every step I need to considerhow patriarchalassumptionsmay be distortingwho I am and what I think, leadingme backinto the serviceof men. Consider how controlling and pervasivethose heteropatriarchal"givens" are. For example, in writingabout wimmin'slives, partof the backgroundof my discussionis the manyassumptionssharedby me and my readersaboutthe necessaryconditions of human life-that, for example, humans and hence wimmin must have food and waterand air to survive;that our lives generally last less than a hundredyears;that we are subjectto pain; and so on. When these topics are not themselvesthe subjectsof my discourse,I am likely, as a matter of habit and convenience, to accept such assumptionsnot merely as truebut as "givens"in the sense that I take them to be immutable,to be written into the natureof things. And, indeed, they are written into the nature of things-but not by me, nor, yet, by any womon. So they are "givens"only on sufferance:temporarilyand, even then, suspect. The idea that there is no given meansnot just that every "given"needs to be reexamined in dyke consciousnesses,but also that dyke consciousnesses may define reality in such a way that there are no givens at all, that is, no "nature," (or deity) no immutable facts of nature (or metaphysics) that wimmin are forcedto accept and build upon. In developing ideas in one area it may be helpfulor even necessaryto assumea fixed backgroundof as-it-were immutableconditions, but these may be understoodas assumptionsfor the sake of discussionand furthercreation/discoveryratherthan as facts of nature. The principle that there is no "given"not only calls attention to the need to question the assumptionsand presuppositionsof a particularfocus, it also is a reminderthat conceptualschemesthat require"givens"are designed by privilegedmen in their own interests. QUERIESAND REPLIES

In this section I addresswhat seem to me to be the most importantob-

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jections and puzzlesinspiredby the three principles.These are organizedas three queries:the queryabout persuasion,the queryabout community, and the queryabout pie-in-the-sky. Queryaboutpersuasion.Joyce (I say to myself), probablythe most serious worryI have aboutwhat I have written so farhas to do with the second principle, which is that I do not try to get other wimmin to accept my beliefs as their own. I have two concerns about this claim. First, it is not true:I sometimes do try to persuade others. Second, and more important, I wonder whether it ought to be true:surelythere aresituationsin which I shouldtry to get others to agree with me. Replyto thefirstpart.Yes, I often do try to persuadeothers to accept what I say as their own. Sometimes I do this for the fun of arguingand sometimesI do it out of moraland political conviction. In some of the situationswhen I try to persuadeothers to adopt my views, resistingthe temptationto attempt to persuadewould be appropriate,but ratherthan resistI act out of old habits. All three of the principlesare ideals, and I do not alwayslive up to them. On other occasions, however, the principleof nonpersuasiondoes not apply because the situation is heteropatriarchal;these principles,as I have already said, are designedfor wimmin'sspaces. But partof what constituteswimmin'sspace is the exerciseof these principles. That is, wimmin'sspace is definedpartlyby wayswimmin treat one another; the absenceof conceptual/intellectualhegemonyor, more broadly,seriousrespectfor differencesamongwimmin, which is the point of the principle of nonpersuasion,is one of the characteristicsof wimmin'sspace. Thus, there is an intimate relationshipbetween acting in accordancewith the second principle(and, indeed, with all three of the principlesI have articulated here, as well as others) and the natureof the spaceone is in. I define whether a space or situation is wimmin'spartlyin termsof whetherthe principlesI am discussinghere apply;conversely, whether the principlesapply depends on whether the space is wimmin's. Considera case in which I am a teacherin a women'sstudiesclassroomin a mainstreamuniversity.If the classroomsituationis veryheteropatriarchal-a largebeginning class of 50 or 60 students, say, with few feminist students-I am likely to define my taskas largelyone of recruitmentand so to find persuasion-for example, persuadingstudents that women are oppressed-an essential tool. I do not follow the principleagainstpersuasion,which does not apply here. In contrast, in a smallerand more advanced class, I may enter into the explorationof the views of a studentwhere these views are inconsistent with my own, not with the prospectof her beliefs changingbut, rather, with the intention of participatingin the articulationof those beliefs as an empoweringsystem for her. By acting in accordancewith the principle of nonpersuasion,I contributeto the creation of wimmin'sspace in this classroom.

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Replyto thesecondpart.The second partof the queryaboutpersuasionurges that in wimmin'sspaces there sometimesare situationsin which I shouldtry to persuadeothers to accept my beliefs as their own. In reply, I notice firstthat I, like other wimmin, often observewimminengaging in self-destructiveor other-destructivebehavior and refrainfrom interfering,and find such restraintappropriate.It is, of course, within the parametersset by the principlesto tell wimmin what I think about what they are doing, where the telling is a reportof my feelings ratherthan a lecture about moralityor their own good. My merely telling other wimmin what I think of their beliefs or behaviorwithout thereby intending to interferemay in fact-because of patriarchalhang-over-function as a sanction, influencing them to change their beliefs. On the other hand, wimmin may consider what I say on its own merits, without regardto their relationshipto me, and decide, in the light of what they have heard, whether or not they want to change. In the formercase, I persuadedespitemy intention not to; in the latter, there is agreementnot because wimmin have been persuaded,but because we have chosen the same or similarbeliefs. Of course there are situations-heteropatriarchal situations-in which it is appropriatefor me to attempt to change what others believe. Persuasionis appropriatewhen it is the best means for getting resourcesfor wimmin (including myself) from people with patriarchalpower-for example, in the context of a job or of political workthat confrontspatriarchalinstitutions. In ambiguoussituations, situationson the continuumbetween heteropatriarchy and wimmin'sspaces, there are choices to make:which way do I move here, towardpatriarchyand persuasion,or towardwimmin? In wimmin'sspaces, wimmincan respectand value our differences,including our disagreements.Indeed, accordingto my concept of wimmin'sspaces, these spacesare essentially-that is, by definition-places where differences are cherished;whatever makes this cherishingimpossiblecomes from somewhere else. Queryaboutcommunity.In a voice of challenge I say to myself that feminism, especiallylesbianfeminism, is essentiallybasedon "we,"on communities of wimmin consciousof ourselvesas wimmin. But in my emphasison difference, I obliterate community;in my emphasison the many (to use terms from patriarchalphilosophyas a reminderof the source of the objection), I lose sight of the one. Another way of formulatingthis issue is to ask whether there must not be something or other that all feminists, or all dykes, agreeon, wherebywe are all entitled to be called "feminist"or "dyke." Surely being a dyke, while partlya matterof action and style, is also partlya matterof having certainbeliefs. And, indeed, it might be argued, it is essential for wimmin to have shared beliefs as a basis for solidarity, so that we may stand together in strengthagainstheteropatriarchy.The querythat emergesfromthese consid-

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erations, then, is whether the principlesarticulatedhere protect differences among wimmin but sacrificeour being together as wimmin. Reply. Communities of wimmin are wimmin acting, singing, speaking, thinking, feeling, not necessarily the same but in concert, together. The three principles imply that I will not try to bring this about by persuading wimmin to accept some set of beliefs, but they do not prevent my participating in and encouragingcommunity. The principlesprecludemy imposinga "we"on others, but they do not mean that wimmin cannot sharevalues and beliefs and self-definitions;they do not mean that wimmin cannot move together, thus creating a "we." More explicitly, while being a dyke is in part to have certain beliefs-for example, belief in the creative power of wimmin-it is dykiest, I think, to come to these beliefs oneself, not to internalizethem in reaction to someone else's intention that one do so. Of course, wimmin generallylearn dyke and feminist beliefs partlyfrom one another-indeed, communityconsists partly in this interaction. But learningfromone anotherdoes not requirethe intention to persuade.Nor does sharingbeliefs presupposepersuasion.Dyke communities, where wimminsharemanybeliefsand values, may come into being without perusasion,throughwimmindefiningand redefiningourselvesin interaction with one another. I want to add that although I try to refrainfrom acting so as to get other wimmin to adopt the principlesI articulatehere, I would likeother wimmin to adopt them. I like to be with wimminwhere no one is imposingher views and there is no competition about who has the truth. When wimmin who sharemy anti-hierarchical,anti-competitivevaluesget together, we tend not to argueor to try to persuade,but to tell our stories-past, present, and future, actual and fantastical-and to make plans. In these situationsit seems that the stories are understoodand enjoyed and the plans carriedout just as well or better than when some womon is tryingto convince us to accept her ideas. Sometimes an idea for an action or project for us all to participatein together elicits disagreementand is thereforeallowed to drop. But in other cases, we agree, and we act jointly. Becauseof these experiences, I do not think that abandoningthe purposeof getting others to adopt one's own beliefs lessens community;on the contrary, it seems to me that such restraint can strengthenwimmin'ssense of sharedconvictions and commitments. Finally, I shouldnote that as I use these principlesof dyke method, they do not imply that other wimmin should not act as leadersand persuadewimmin to accept theirbeliefs and values. I do not universalizethe principles.My purpose is to announce my own (perhapstemporary)adoption of them, not to try to persuadeothers to accept them. Query aboutpie-in-the-sky.Assuming a somewhat scolding and definitely pragmaticvoice, I say to myself:Joyce, there you go off again, all by yourself, to some imaginarydyke heaven where each womon speaksonly for herself,

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we love one another'sdifferences,and not even naturelimits us. I understand that this tendency comes fromyourseparatistheart, but you are wastingyour energies. Pure wimmin'sspaces can't exist-we are interlardedeverywhere with heteropatriarchy-and, anyway, we need to be dealing with heteropatriarchalreality now, for they are truly out to get us. Reply. First, a semantic point: pure wimmin's spaces can't exist in that when they do, the word"wimmin"itself will not be partof them, for despite the spelling, that wordrefersbackto patriarchy;in purewimmin'sspaces, patriarchyis inconceivable. (It does not follow, however, that "purewimmin's spaces"(with the quotation marks)cannot exist.) As to the central concern of the query, the need to confront heteropatriarchy:the angerfromwhich the theorizingin this essaycomes is like a twoheaded snake, one head attacking patriarchydirectly (and often in its own terms), the other slitheringits way throughpatriarchy,makingits own spaces, pushing aside men and their products,eliminating patriarchyfrom its path. Thus, the principles for discovering/creatingwimmin's spaces do not preclude attacking heteropatriarchyin its own arena. Indeed, commitment to wimmin'sspacesis in fact often conjoined with a commitmentto defend and supportwimmin/womenwho are being harmedby patriarchy.In particular, some separatistsare regularorganizersof and participantsin actions that involve dealing with men both in confrontationand in coalition. Moreover, the developmentof wimmin'sspacesmay itself lead wimmin to decide on direct political action, as, for instance, in the case of an academic, fired because her researchis aboutseparatism,who then chooses to confront the universitydirectlyin a campaignto get her job back. The centralresponseI want to make to this queryhere, however, is that it is a mistaketo supposethat devotion to wimmin'sspacesmeansthat a womon can not or does not engage in political actions involving confrontationswith men. CONCLUSION

I wrote earlierin this essay about the sourcesof these principlesin my experience, about the structuresunderlyingmy anger. I want to referagain to those sourceshere, construingthem as reasonsand motives for adheringto the principlesrather than as sources. The first reason has to do with techniques men use to oppresswimmin/women:erasure(makingus invisible) and false naming (imposing their definitions on us). Because of my conviction that I mustnot use these techniquesagainstother wimmin, I have formulated the principles. A second reasonI have for developingthe principleshas to do with the hegemony of heteropatriarchalinstitutions of knowledge/science/truth/reality whereby men as a group and, especially, a groupof privilegedwhite men, project their personalitiesinto what they define as a reality we must all ac-

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cept. Becauseof my conviction that I mustnot participatein analogous"feminist" institutions, I have formulatedthe principles. Connected with the sourcesof these principlesand the reasonsfor them are motives:why am I attractedto the epistemologysketchedhere?As what I have alreadysaid indicates, the motivating desire (as far as I know) is one that has alwaysbeen at the center of my life: that others not control me. My logic here is in part like that of the pacifist who respondsto violent treatmentwith a refusalto be violent in return.I respondto dominationwith a commitment to discover/createspaces in which domination cannot exist. But unlike the pacifist, who renouncesall violence, I do not renounceall attempts to persuade:rather, I use the master'smethods within the master's house for the sake of wimmin/women;in wimmin'sspaces, however, I abjure those methods. The principlesdiscussedhere may seem an unacceptablerenunciation of power to some wimmin. For me, however, the principlesfeel empowering;they embody my deepest values.

ADDENDUMI: THE ZITACOMMENTARY

When I presentedthe materialin this essay to a meeting of Midwestern SWIP (Society for Women in Philosophy)at Madison,Wisconsin in the fall of 1986, JacquelynN. Zita was the commentator.We talked for some time about these ideas and, in addition, I have the benefit of her written remarks ("Dyke Methods and Dyke Talk: A Response,"unpublished;quotationsbelow are fromthis work). Here I comment on her three majorresponsesto my discussionof the principles. Caring.Jacquelyn says that she experiences persuasion-whether she is persuadingor being persuaded-as an act of caring;she emphasizesalso that wimmin can choose not to be persuadedby those whose intention is to change them. She writes: "I understand[persuasion]as an act of caring between equals in which I want to change another womon's beliefs, perceptions, and behaviorsfor reasonsI can sharewith her in waysthat do not violate her agency, responsibilityor autonomy." Unlike Jacquelyn, I often experience attempts to persuadeas attempts to invade or control and, rarely, if at all, as constitutive of caring or love. So Jacquelynand I differin this regard.This differencewill of course inspireus to give differentplaces to persuasionin our value systemsand so in the dyke spaces we participatein creating. It need not prevent us from caring about one another or from being close. Loss.Jacquelynsays"Idespairat losing the languageof 'rightor wrong'and 'trueor false,"'and, in anotherplace, she sayswith regretthat the principle that there is no given makes it "verydifficult to distinguishbetween actual and fantasticalaccounts."

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The principlethat there is no (single) given meansthat ratherthan simply being given the foundationsupon which my thought is built, I in parttake or define them for myself (I might speak here of ideas as "given/taken"-by analogy with "discover/create"-rather than as merely given). To thus change the concept of the given implieschangesin other concepts in the network of ideas having to do with knowledge and belief, including those that Jacquelynmentions. So, when I speak accordingto the principles, the notions of true and false, right and wrong, and realityand fantasydo not have for me the absoluteand universalmeaningsthat they usuallyhave in patriarchy. It does not follow that they have no meanings at all, that I must lose them. I can, if I want, discriminateand select among alternative accounts and label those that I prefer "true" or "right" or "real." But for me, in wimmin'sspaces, thinking I know the trueand the right and the realdoes not give me the right to imposemy versionof what is the case on others, or even to try to persuadeothers to accept my version as their own. Denying that we are all given some facts upon which we mustbase our understandingof reality does not mean that I lose the ability to distinguishamongalternativewaysof formulatingwhat is going on, but only that I lose authorityover others. But it seems to me that this authorityhas value only in heteropatriarchy,and I intend not to lose it there. So, unlike Jacquelyn,I do not feel a sense of loss. The dykeconnection."Whyshouldwe call this method DYKEMETHOD?" Jacquelynasks. "The principlesas they stand could be used by anyone." The principlesare dyke principlesbecausethey are lesbianseparatistprinciples, that is, they partiallyconstitute separationfromthe essentiallymasculine-heterosexual-patriarchalmethods of dominant cultures. Perhaps the principlesof this essay can be adoptedby anyone; in any case, whoever does adoptthem is to that extent participatingin an aspectof dyke consciousness.

ADDENDUMII

I discusshere furtherquestions that may be of interest to some readers. philosophy.These principlesbear imporQuery aboutlinkswithpatriarchal tant similaritiesto work done by men in variousmale-centeredintellectual traditions-e.g., old-fashioned idealism, phenomenology, ethnomethodology, deconstruction.Wouldn't it be useful to discussthese connections? Reply.I think that the dangerof furtherabsorptionof male waysof thought outweighsany benefits that might be gained by choosing to study ideas that are similarto these but are developedoutside of dyke consciousness.I understand the concern that if we do not use concepts that men have developed, we mayhave to reinvent the wheel. My idea, however, is that of necessitywe do use male-createdwheels, engines, and a good deal more, for the time being; that in moving out of patriarchy,we must give our energiesnot to what

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men produce,but to discoveringand creatingfromwimmin'sown, different, resources;that in doing so, wimmin will not reinvent the wheel but, rather, find and makewhat is now inconceivable;and that this processis essentialto liberation. Queryaboutcriticism.What'sreallygoing on here is that you are setting up a situation in which no one can criticizeyou. You label everythingyou say as only your own opinion, so you can say whatever you want. Reply.Well, of courseI can saywhateverI want, but I am neverthelesssubject to criticism. My beliefs and values, while spoken as only mine, may certainly be criticizedas false, misguided,immoral,and so on; and, in response to such criticism, I may modifymy accounts. But I will not change my stories in responseto criticismthat I am not speakingfrom a "universal"or "objective" view. (BecauseI do not take seriouslythis sort of criticism, I sometimes feel guilty, as though I am "getting away with something." Scholars in heteropatriarchy,when speakingin scholarlycontexts, are not supposedto speak only for themselves.) Queryaboutbeingself-ish.These principlesmean that in writing philosophy, for example, you are talking only about yourself,about yourown opinions. In most places where one would ordinarilywrite "we"-as in "we must do this or that" or "we know that such and such"-you must write merely "I." What makes you think that anyone wants to hear so much about you? Writing alwaysabout yourselfas you do seems excessively self-centered. Reply.This queryis based in parton a mistake;on these principlesI speak for myself, but I may speak aboutanything at all. Of course some wimmin/ women may find that what I have to say is of little value for them, but others are sure to be interestedin comparingour stories, in the similaritiesand differencesbetween us and our ideas. Writing "I"so often insteadof "we"does sometimesfeel strange-it violates what I was taughtas a child-but this is a small and not unpleasantstrangenesscomparedto others I have been through and others yet to come.

Recipes for Theory Making LISA HELDKE

Thisis a paperaboutphilosophical inquiryandcooking.In it, I suggestthatthinkour can illuminate about of otherformsof inquiry.Speunderstanding cooking ing it us with one to circumvent thedilemmaof absolutI think way provides cifically, ism and relativism. The paperis dividedinto two sections.In the first, I sketchthe background againstwhichmyprojectis situated.In thesecond,I developan accountof cooking as inquiry,by exploringfive aspectsof recipecreationand use.

Could it ever make sense to think of cooking as a form of inquiry?Could thinking about cooking ever illuminateour thinking about philosophy?This paperis my attemptto show why "yes"is the appropriateanswerto both these questions. Through an explorationof cooking-an explorationthat focuses on the natureof recipesand recipeuse-I'll develop my claim that cooking is a formof inquirythat is anti-essentialist,that successfullymergesthe theoretical and the practical, and that promotes a self-reflective and interactive model of an inquiryrelationship. My account of cooking growsout of a particularepistemologicaltradition, a traditionI label the CoresponsibleOption. Membersof this traditionare attempting to develop epistemologicalframeworksor attitudes that avoid the dichotomiesof realism/antirealismand foundationalism/relativism.I content that these dichotomiesare not exhaustive, and that it is in fact importantfor feminists to find ways around them-to construct alternative attitudes in which to engage in epistemology.BeforeI turn to my account of cooking, I'll sketch out this epistemologicaltradition. I. WHY SHOULDFEMINISTS WORRYABOUT AND RELATIVISM? FOUNDATIONALISM

Philosophersworkingin a varietyof traditionsare trying to develop positions that avoid the sharp, pointy rocks of absolutism,realism and foundationalism, without falling into the murkyswampsof relativism.Theoristsengaged in these sorts of projects attempt (implicitly or explicitly) to undermine, dismantle, begin before, or otherwise avoid the metaphysicalquestions, "Isthere somethingOut There that exists, unchangingand independHypatiavol. 3, no. 2 (Summer1988) ? by LisaHeldke

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ent of us, or are we the creatorsof all that there is?"and the relatedepistemological question, "How can we groundour knowledgeof the world-or can we?" Sandra Harding, one importantfigure in the movement I'm describing/ constructing, asks, "do we-should we-still believe that our representations can in principlereflectone uniquelyaccurateimageof a worldwhich is ready-madeand out there for the reflecting?Should we reallythink a feminist philosophyor science can be the mirrorof natureany morethan non-feminist ones can?"(1985, 16). Philosophicalclaims are not ". . . 'approximationsto the truth' which can be woven into a seamlessweb of representationof the world 'out there,' but permanentlypartial instigatorsof rupture.. ." (1985, 17-18). Philosophyis valuablenot because it can uncoverThe Real, but because it can create alternativewaysto think aboutwhateverrealityit is we've inherited/discovered/created. RichardBernstein, a theorist engagedin a relatedproject, calls his an attempt to move "beyond objectivism and relativism." He suggeststhat we have to stop treatingthe epistemologicalterrainas necessarilybifurcated-as if there were a fundamentalopposition between ". .. the basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent,ahistoricalmatrixor frameworkto which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness,or rightness,"and the view ". . . that all such conceptions (taken to be fundamental)mustbe understoodas relativeto a specific conceptual scheme, theoreticalframework,paradigm,form of life, society, or culture"(1983, 8). This opposition-accompanied, as it is, by the assumption that its two alternatives constitute our only available options-rests upon what Bernsteincalls the "CartesianAnxiety," (1983, 16) the conviction that either there is a firmfoundationfor our knowledge,or we arecondemnedto swirlendlesslyin the morassof intellectualand moralindecision. The assumptionthat our epistemologicaloptions are limited to two is unwarranted. Furthermore, neither option-foundationalism nor relativism-is particularlyuseful or desirable in its own right. My assessmentof these options arisesout of certain feminist concerns and aspirations;it is my contention that the epistemological"attitudes"that are foundationalismand relativismhobble effortsto inquireinto, and theorizeabout, our experiences. In orderto be able to do the kinds of inquiryI want to do, I feel the need to be free of the constraintsthese two attitudesplace upon me. Let me explain. I am interestedin developingways to do feminist inquiry that are respectfuland illuminatingof the differencesin women'slives-that embodya respectfor difference.At the same time, I do not want to interpret respectfor differenceas a blanketsanction of all and any differences.Specifically, I do not translate"respectfor difference"into a demandthat we respect or accept mysogynist,racist, classistor otherwiseoppressiveviews, simplybe-

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cause they are different from ours, or a demand that we always "resistthe temptation"to try to convince others of our views. I think foundationalism and relativismare inadequateframeworksfor doing this kind of inquiry. Foundationalismtreatsdifferenceas a "stage"or "phase"we pass through on our way to constructingadequatetheory. Difference,for the foundationalist, reflects an inadequacy,a failureor incompletenessin our theorizing;if we had developed an adequate set of theories about subject X, the need for-and perhaps the possibility of-different approacheswould be eliminated. On the other hand, relativismallows for and even encouragesdifference, but disablesus from criticizingthe theories of others for being incomplete, uninclusiveor otherwiseinadequate.The relativistis left to say "different is different;it's neither better nor worse." In contrast, I would like to constructepistemologiesthat are respectfuland representativeof the differencesin women'sexperiences,without being glib, unreflectiveor uncriticalabout those differences-that is, without defining all differencesas necessarilygood and desirable,or declaringa moratoriumon convincing and persuading.In orderto carryout this project, I find it necessaryto develop attitudestowardinquirythat will allow such epistemologiesto exist. That is, I want to develop epistemological options that are neither absolutistnor relativist. My own approachto/avoidance of absolutismand relativism I label the "CoresponsibleOption." The term "coresponsible"embodiesthe atmosphere of cooperation and interaction which characterizes inquiry activity. l Whether we acknowledgeit or not, we enter into relationshipswhen we engage in inquiry;relationshipwith other inquirers,and also with the things into which we inquire-the things labelled "objects"on a traditional account. The model of inquiryI'msuggestingrejectsthe strictsubject/objectdichotomy, with its emphasison hierarchyand separation.In its place, I suggest we think of inquiryas a communalactivity,that we emphasizethe relationships that obtain between inquirersand inquired.In the wordsof John Dewey, inof two people [orthings]who 'correspond' in quiryis ". .. the correspondence orderto modifyone's own ideas, intents and acts. .. ." (1958, 283). I label my approachan "option"to suggestthat what I offerhere is simply one way to think about the worldand about inquiry,not theway. This is not simplya modest claim about the fallibilityof my thought;it is an assertionof my view of the statusof theories in general.They are tools we may choose to use, outlooks we may elect to assume. Some are more useful than others; none are universallyreliable. II. WHY SHOULDPHILOSOPHERS WORRYABOUT COOKING?

I situate my examination of cooking within this context-a context in which the issue is not "Do we cast our lots with absolutismor with relativ-

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ism?"but rather"Howcan we avoid both of these headaches?"I want to ask a questionaboutinquiryand theorizing:If I do choose to resistthe temptationto enter the absolutism/relativism debates,in what spiritmight I set out to inquire and to developtheories?And how might I explainand justifydoing theory? (An aside. I speakhere only partlyfacetiouslyof the "temptation"to enter these debates, for I have found them extremelyseductive, for reasonsI can't quite diagnose. Choosing to throwthem over has provendifficultpsychologically-and perseveringin avoiding them is sometimeseven more so. Part of the difficultyfor me stems from the fact that I just don't have good ways to talk that are both nonfoundationalistand nonrelativist. Furthermore,even when I find the ways, I don't alwayswant to use them. There'ssomethingextremely comforting about believing that my alternativesare cut-and-dried, limited to two. This paperis my attemptto develop some usefuland attractive ways to think about inquiryand theorizing,that breakthe seductive hold of this dichotomy.) I'mmotivatedto askquestionsaboutthe "spirit"in which to inquireand to develop and promote theories, becausedoing theory is an activity whose legitimacy cannot be regardedas unimpeachable,once I reject the absolutist/ relativist dichotomy. As I see it, I can no longer justify my theory-production-and-saleon "objectivist"grounds-that is, by assertingthat "our"task as theory makersis to formulatetrue, faithful-to-Realitytheories, which we then pressupon "the public,"on the assumptionthat they will of coursewant to adopt these truest-to-datetheories (because true theories are epistemologicallyand morallysuperiorto less trueones). By the same token, I cannot be satisfied with a relativist shrug of the shoulders, and the assertion that, of coursewe don't reallyhave any "independent"reasonsto promoteor defend one theory over another, although, given our tradition,we'll of courseprefer one over the other, and will be motivated to share that theory with others, the way we share a favorite story. If I am going to do philosophy,I want to do it, think about it, and describe it in ways that are neither foundationalistnor relativist. This paperexplores one possible way, a way entered throughthe kitchen. Cooking is an activity that is somewhatforeignto the westernepistemological tradition, especiallyin the 20th century, in which discussionsof theory have come to be framedalmost exclusively in termsof scientific models. I'm not a scientist, but I am a cook, and my familiaritywith cooking methodsand languageallows me to speak with more knowledgeand flexibility about this activity than about science. That's one reason I've chosen to talk about cooking. Another reason is this: the activities that fall underthe categoryof "cooking"manifestqualities that I want manifestedin my philosophizing. Simplyput, I think cooking is a kind of inquiry.I take my cue in partfrom John Dewey, who defines inquiryas "the controlled or directed transforma-

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tion of an indeterminatesituation into one that is so determinatein its constituent distinctions and relationsas to convert the elements of the original situation into a unifiedwhole" (1938, 104-5). Such a definition certainlyencompassescooking. Furthermore,I follow Dewey in eschewing the strict dichotomy between theory-the "knowledge gaining" activity-and practice-the "gettingthings-done"activity. These are not two separatedomainsof human life, but two interrelated,interdependentdomains. The differenceis one of degree, not kind: "One is the pushing, slam-bang act-first-and-think-afterwards mode, to which events may yield as they give way to any strong force. The other mode is wary, observant, sensitive to slight hints and intimations" (1958, 314). For Dewey, the paradigmexample of a discipline that had "completelysurrenderedthe separationof knowing and doing" was science (1980, 79). 1don't think this claim can still be madeaboutthe sciences, if indeed it ever could. For, whatever it may be that scientists do, the way in which most philosopherstalk about science rendersit a most abstractand theoretical activity, one in which "practice"is assigneda decidedly inferior role. Cooking doesn't sufferfrom this problem-at least certain kinds of cooking don't. 2 In it, the theoreticaland the practicalworktogether in an activity that genuinely does justice to Dewey's definition of inquiry. I want to speakin praiseof the practical.Cooking is a vehicle that allows me to do so. I muststresshere that I'mnot usingcookingand recipessimplyas analogies to, or metaphorsfor, philosophicalor scientific inquiryand theory. Certainly my account of recipes can be regardedas a metaphor. But it is something more and other than that. It is a philosophicalinvestigationof the natureof cooking-cooking being an activity that has yet to be so investigated. I am consideringcooking qua inquiry, if you will. This suggests yet another reason I've chosen to discuss cooking. It has never really been the subject of philosophicalconsideration(Plato's discussion of pastrycooking notwithstanding).This is at least partlydue to the fact that cooking is a "woman'sactivity," like child rearing.Traditionally,western philosophershave regardedsuch women'sactivities to be philosophically irrelevant;they have definedthem out of existence, renderedthem invisible, describedthem throughtheir silence. They have done so by constructingcategories that considerand account for only (certain) men's activities. Activities like cooking and child rearingturn out to look trivialon traditionalphilosophical accounts, because they don't fit into any philosophicalcategories. In exploringcooking, I want to begin to removethis curseof irrelevanceunder which it has lain, and to begin to illuminate its philosophical significance. Even as my account is a philosophicalinvestigationof cooking, it is also my intention that it enhance and expandthe waysin which we do philosoph-

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ical theory. To be succinct: I am using the tools and languageof philosophy to investigatea particularset of humanpractices.In turn, I intend for my investigation of those practicesto have an impact upon philosophy. My explorationof cooking tends to focus the constructionand use of recipes. I'll look at five aspectsof recipesand recipe-cookrelationships,and shall show how each aspect can illuminateour thinking about theorizing.First, I briefly explore some of the ways cooks create recipes. I then consider the formsor systemsunderwhich people collect them. Next, I turn to the focus of my account: an explanation of how cooking, becauseof the relationships that obtain between cook, recipe and ingredients,escapes both absolutism and relativism. In relation to this, I considerthe issue of flexibility:how do I-the-cook determinehow flexible a recipe is? I conclude with a discussionof flops in the kitchen. IN THEKITCHEN: CREATINGRECIPES A. ANTI-ESSENTIALISM

Cooks create new recipes and experiment with old familiarones for all sorts of reasons-to enter contests, to use up a bit of leftover something, to experimentwith tastes, to securetheir job, to play. It's important,I think, to recognizethat there is no one reasonpeople experimentin the kitchen. I may be faced with economic necessity-I have only cormeal and a little driedup cheese in the house, and no money for groceries.I may be feeling playful-I have an afternoonfree, a full cupboardand the urgeto make somethinggorgeous and delicious. Or I may have a set of job demandsto meet-I have 60 people to serve on a limited budget, and am requiredto meet certain stipulated dietary requirements.3 Furthermore, any two people respond to a particulardemandin differentways;a fun, exciting challenge to you maybe a tedious exercise in battling miserlinessto me. Perhapsyou might argue that although I might be motivated-or compelled-to come up with a new recipefor a varietyof context-dependentreasons, this does not deny that there is still a general, overarching,aim in experimentingin the kitchen; namely, to producesomefood. But in fact this is not alwaysthe case. Sometimesfood is a sort of accidentalbyproductof the experiment, second in importanceto some other aim. Sometimes, for example, the experimenterherself may never actually make the food for which she's created a recipe; I've heardof cases in which people won contests with recipesthey've never tried. And even in the manycases wherecreatingsome food is the aim, a varietyof not-necessarily-relatedthings maycount as fulfilling that aim. Makinga special surprisedish for someone'sbirthdayis quite a differentthing frommakinga filling food that can be preparedin ten minutes and will serve 100. I stressthe fact that cooks create recipesfor a varietyof reasons,because I think this observation is helpful for thinking about epistemologicalinquiry

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and theorizing. It seems to me that there isn't one central reason, or type of reason, people come up with new theories, or modifyexisting ones. My sense is that theories, like recipes, are most usefullyregardedas tools we use to do things. The rangeof things that we may do with them is at least as broadas the range of things one may do with recipes. I may develop a theory to help myselftolerate a situation in which I find myself, or to explain to myselfand others a set of experiencesI've had. I may take up and modifya theory in order to help me develop a relationshipwith anotherpersonor persons. I may create a theory in order to have something to write about in a paper for a class. Grantingmy claim that people createtheoriesfor manyreasons,you might still want to ask me, is a theory like a recipe in that, when it is implemented, a "product"results?In thinking abouttheoriesin relationto recipes, I was initially quite troubledby this question. I couldn'tseem to come up with something that was the theoryequivalentof food-that all theoriesproducedwhen they were implemented. I toyed with the suggestionthat all theory aims at improvingour ability to get on in the world, or at establishingrelationships in the world. But this seemed obviouslyfalse. It may be regardedas a good "product"of theory, but surelynot the only good product,and definitelynot the only product. But then I flipped the problemover; I realizedthat what I had taken to be an obvious general fact about the creation of recipes-namely that their creatorsare all ultimatelyinterestedin makingfood, in some unambiguouslyessentialsense of the word-is simplynot a fact, and that, as I said above, food doesn't alwayseven resultwhen someone createsa recipe. My conclusionfromall of this is that perhapswe might want to say that the "product"of theorizingis some sort of relationshipor practice in the world, but that such a claim has no morevalue as an essentialistclaim abouttheorizing than the claim that the "product"of creating a recipe is food. 4 Some people "never use a recipe," by which they mean that they never look at a cookbook, and perhapsnever do the same thing twice, while other people religiouslyfollow a recipeno matterwhat they'recooking and how often they've made it. The way you treat written recipesoften reflectsyourdegree of skill and confidence as a cook, yourspiritof adventure,yourknackfor imaginingwhat foods might taste good together. Blendingflavorsin creative and artfulways requiresyou to be sensitive to those flavors, to know which ones "like"each other and which ones don't. It also requiresa spiritof adventure, the derring-doto mix together two ingredients that normally aren't thought to go together. And it requiresthe expertiseto know when enough is enough: when a rule cannot be brokenor bent, or when adding another ingredient will upset the balance of flavorsyou've constructed. The level of cooking at which dramatic-and-daring experimentationgoes on is a level perhapsfew of us reach. In orderto be good at it, you must un-

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derstandthe foods with which you'reexperimenting;you need to know what temperaturesthey can withstand,how they reactwith other foods, how much of them is needed to producea particularresult. This kind of knowledge is difficultand time consumingto obtain. It'salso extremelyrewardingand useful, for it allows you to create wonderfulfoods, and it enablesyou to be flexible in the face of a nearly-emptyrefrigerator. So it is with theorizing. It's relatively easy to take up a theory, wholecloth, and use it. But to do so is to run the heavy risk of being irrelevant, harmful,or destructive.To do usefultheory, I think it is necessaryto explore and experiment, to know extremelywell the things with which you'reinquiring. It's necessary in inquiry in a way that it may not be in cooking, for whereas in cooking a failureto experimentleaves you with a boring diet, it theorizing, it makes you into an arrogantunperceptiveinquirer. COLLECTIONS GUIDETO RECIPE B. A BROWSER'S

Recipes get collected into all sortsof books and files, organizedundermyriad systemsand anti-systems,by people with any numberof motives for collecting them, profit or personaluse. Go to any large best-sellerbookstore, and you'll find at least three rowsof cookbooks.There are generalcookbooks that will instructyou in the rudimentsof preparinganything from a boiled egg to a roastedarmadillo(Joyof Cooking,516). Then there are cookbooks devoted to recipes for a single kind of food or for food of a single ethnicity. Others featurerecipesfor special diets-low sodium, gluten free, sugar-free, vegetarian.There arecookbooksput out by civic organizationsand churches, containing their members'favorite recipes. And then there are the recipe files, recipe drawers,recipe boxes of individualcooks. These, if they are organized,are done so on the basisof the particularidiosyncraciesof that cook, and the eatersfor whom they normallycook. (My mom has separatebundles of recipes, housed in plastic strawberryboxes, for recipes containing either rhubarbor dried apricots, two of my family'sfavoritefoods.) Most recipe collectorshave stacksof recipes-in cookbooks,copied out of magazines,clipped out of newspapers-that they've never tried. Collecting and exchanging recipes, and imaginingwhat they might be like if I made them, is an activity that takes up as much of my time as actual cooking does. I think of philosophical theorizingas collecting, trading, developing, using, adapting and discardingrecipes/theories. I collect ideas from various sources. Some of them I try-and some of these I keep and modify for use again. Others I talk and think about, the way I talk aboutwhat a recipemight taste like and how long it might take to prepare.They don't become a partof my theoretical/practicallife, but hover in the wings, waitingfor a situationin which they might be useful.

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Sometimes, when I'm thinking about theorizing, I see myself as trying to write an epistemologicalcookbook-not theepistemologicalcookbook, mind you, but a largishvolume that attemptsto providewaysto think about a wide variety of issues. In developingand passingout epistemologicalcookbooks,I includerecipes on which I'dstake my reputation-I'm not going to abdicateresponsibilityin the event of their failure,but will try to discoverwhy it might have occurred, and to think of ways to fix it. Nonetheless, some of them might fail. I connect the recipesin my cookbookin a systematicway, but I don't pretend that they are the only sortsof recipesone would ever need, or that this system is the only systemunderwhich they could be organized.There are at least as manyvarietiesof philosophicalsystemsas there arecookbookorganizing schemes. And, as with cookbooks, it would be misguidedto believe that one systemonly is sufficientor usefulor reliable;that only one systemcould or should be used to organizetheories. You could use my epistemological cookbook exclusively-many cooks swearthat all they need is a copy of JuliaChild-but I would advise against such exclusivity. Better that my recipesbe used as partof a largercollection, or that certain of them be selected and modifiedfor use in your cookbook. They are my recipes, filled with the idiosyncraciesof my life. I cannot imagine that they would prove universallyuseful to anyone else. (They aren't even that for me.) C. OUT OFTHEFRYINGPANAND THEFIRE:AVOIDINGABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM

A recipe is a descriptionor explanationof how to do something-specifically, how to preparea particularkind of food. As such, it does not present itself as theway to make that food-the opinion of some cooks notwithstanding-nor does it suggestthat this food is thefood to eat-the opinion of some eatersnotwithstanding.Considertheorizingin this light: imaginedeveloping and exchanging theories the way you create a recipe and share it with a friend. What would such theorizingbe like? On the "recipe plan" of theory/recipe development and exchange I, as theorizer,do not (generally)assertthat the projectI take up mustbe taken up by others. On a "recipeplan" I-the-theoristdon't set an absolutistagendaof things that you-the-other-theoristmustworkon. Rather, I presentissuesthat I find important,and suggestreasonsthat you may also. Likewise, I cannot assertthat anyone who does choose to take up this project must approachit using the same methods I use. All I can do is offer my approach,explaining why I found it useful. I think of pieces of philosophicaltheory created on the recipe plan as if/ then statements. If you find this projectcompelling, then you might find this

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approachuseful. "Do you like asparagus?It's really inexpensive right now. You might like to try the recipe I have for asparagussoup." This way of thinking about theorizing,and about how to offer theories to others, is not absolutist. But, while it avoids absolutism,doesn't it send me sliding into relativism?Nothing I've saidso farseemsto preventit. After all, if anyone is free to select problems"at random,"and if no one must proceed in any particularway using any particularstrategy, then haven't I simply asserted (in the now-famouswordsof an infamousphilosopherof science) that anything goes? I think this is not the case. Let me explain why. Recipes allow cooks to varytheir preparationtechniquesand to fiddlewith the ingredientlist. Some recipespermitconsiderablymorefiddlingthan others, but virtuallyall of them have their breakingpoint. I can make equally wonderfulchocolate chip cookies either by dumpingall the ingredientsin a bowl at the same time and stirringthem together, or by first mixing butter and sugar together, and then adding eggs one at a time. Chocolate chip cookie dough is extremelyresilient;when I mix the ingredientsfor it, almost anythingcan go and they'll still turn out. If I attemptedthe same sort of radical variation in technique when I was makingpuff pastry, I'd probablyproduce all sorts of interestingfood products,but only some of them would resemble puff pastry. Similarly, some recipes allow me to substitute, to add or delete items, while others "demand"rigid adherenceto their ingredientlist. You can toss in anything from nuts to cheese to herbs when makingbread, but if you're making Scotch shortbread,you dare not change a single ingredient. (If you add raisinsto shortbread,one cookbookwarns,you may make somethingdelicious. But it won't be shortbread.)I should point out here that many kinds of reasons may fuel a demand for adherence to a recipe. The example I've given is of a case in which the "historicalintegrity"of the productrests on the integrity of the ingredient list. In other cases, changing an ingredient might not only destroythe integrity, it might actuallyrenderthe productinedible. Here, then, is the basisfor my assertionthat the recipe plan is not relativist: once you decide to make a certainfood-take on a certainphilosophical problem-some methods of proceedingwill be closed to you, becauseof the nature of the project. The numberand nature of those limitations will vary according to the project you've chosen, but most any project will have its limits. Similarly,the ingredients(aspectsof the world) you select will be restricted because of the project you've chosen-again, in degrees that vary with the project. In other words,while it may be true that there is no cherry pie that is more cherrypie than any other, it is also true that certain things just aren't cherrypies; recipes are not infinitely flexible. I'd also suggestthat the recipeplan avoidsrelativismat an earlierstage:my initial choiceof recipes is not simply the result of personalwhim combined

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with tradition. Certainlythese factorscome into play; I choose to make certain foods because I grew up eating them, and I'm very fond of them. But other concerns influence my choice as well; health/nutrition and environmental concerns restrict the range of foods I prepare.These concerns may well transcendthe narrowlimits of gastronomy,and enter the realmof morality; my decision about the foods I eat is shapedby my concern for the environment, and my concern about the labor and investment practicesof the companiesthat producemy food. None of these concernsbinds me, but once I choose (or am enjoined) to pay attention to them, my subsequentfood choices are affected. If I decide to become a vegetarian,I will have to give up the chicken I now eat. In describingrecipesas non-relativist,I've been drawinga pictureof nested concerns-and-suggestions;I've suggested that selecting a particularmoral stance might restrict the recipes I use, while selecting a particularrecipe might restrict the ingredientsand methods I use to execute it. At no level have I labelled something as "imperative,"because in the strongestsense of that word, nothingis imperative.There are some rulesthat we might call absolute-such as the rule that you boil all water that comes from an untested source, or the rule that you not pourboiling wateron yeast-but if you look back a step, you find that even these imperativesrest upon choices, choices so universallymade in favorof one alternativeratherthan anotherthat we almost stop thinking of them as choices. The demand that you boil water assumesthat you are interestedin preservingyour life-that you don't want to get parasitesor any other illness. And the demandthat you not pour boiling water on yeast assumes that you want the yeast to live-that the reason you'reusing yeast in the first place is that you want your breadto rise. D. MEAND MYRECIPE: UNDERSTANDING THERELATIONSHIP

I've described recipes as flexible to varying degrees. One question that arisesfromthis kind of descriptionis, when facedwith a new recipe, how do I go about determininghow flexible it is? How do I determinewhat I can and can't do to it? Learningthe limits on a recipe is part of what is involved in learning to be a cook. It's a self-reflective process, because in orderfor me to determine the spirit in which I should receive a set of instructions, I must know what kind of an operatorI am-how I tend to work with ingredients and so on. Ultimately, I must determine how I-and-the-recipe work together-how I am to interpretthe instructionsgiven by the writerof the recipe. Let me be more specific. In assessingthe flexibility of a recipe/theory, it's often importantto considerits source-the personor institutionfromwhom I receivedthe recipe. Why has s/he given the instructionsthe way s/he has?Is it really necessarythat I do step B before proceedingto step C? If my mom

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gave me a recipe, she's no doubt strippedthe instructionsto the bare minimum, even leaving out steps she knows I'll know to do. On the other hand, if I use a recipe fromthe 4-H cookbookthat I got when I was nine, I know that I can eliminate about half the steps immediately("Ask your mother if you can use the oven"). On a relatednote, the tone in which a rule is issuedneed not be the tone in which you receive it. Sometimes the recipe writertells you it's absolutely necessaryto use this particularingredientor method. The experiencedcook will realizethat this is the preferenceof the authorspeaking,or a marketing ploy being used by the Kraftcorporationto get you to use Parkaymargarine. The more I know about the recipegiver, the moreable I'll be to assessthe relevance of their instructionsfor me. Pie crustmakersarenotoriousfor issuingcommandswhen they give out recipes: they insist that only shorteningX will producea light, flaky piecrust. Sometimes shortening X is lard, sometimes it's Crisco, and sometimes it's Another Vegetable Shortening. Having made a lot of piecrustsin the last 10 years, I can say quite confidently that it doesn't matter one whit what you use. Unless you'remotivatedby additionaldietaryconcerns, lardand vegetable shortening work equally well. But recognizingthis fact-and recognizing that what looked like imperativeswere actually personal preferences-was something I was able to do only when I had enough experience to formulate my own judgment. This propensityto command that you often find in recipe givers suggests that it's importantto lear how to assessthe motives of the recipe giver. In my Kraftexample, it's obvious that the giver has somethingto gain by issuing a rule as if it werea command;they'll sell moreParkaymargarine.In other instances, it may not be so obvious why someone tells you to do something a specific way-but it's importantto try to figure out. (There's an old joke abouta familyin which two generationsof women cut the end off their roasts beforeroastingthem "becauseMom did it that way."And why did the original Mom do it that way? Becauseher roastingpan was too small.) In general, when I receive a recipe, the more I know about the recipe giver, the better the position I'll be in to assessthe relevancefor me of their instructions.And, when I'm in the position of giving out recipes, the more I take into account my recipient, the more I attemptto give informationthat is sensitive to their level of experience, the better off my recipient will be. Let me reiteratethis point specificallyin termsof theories. In interpreting the theories of others, it is vitally importantthat I understandthe motives drivingthose "others."How is it that they have come to pay attention to this issue?What do they stand to gain from issuing that rule as an absolute demand?Why do they leave out entirelyany discussionof that concern in their theory?Developing such an understandingis important,and it can be very difficult. Sometimes it may well be that the person who created the theory

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wishes to conceal certain ulteriormotives from me-the-recipient. Examples of this phenomenon include political theories throughwhich those in positions of power mystifythose whom they oppress,in orderto ensure the continuance of their power. In cases where such willful concealment is being employed, no easy access to the theorist'smotives is available.But, althoughthat theoristmaynot volunteer informationabout their motives, it may be possible to get that information throughother means. In such a situation, I would suggestthat it is of particularimportanceto investigatethe other's motives, for it is preciselyin such situations where ignorancecan leave you disempowered.5 E. WHENRECIPES FAIL(ORWHENWEDO)

Recipes are usually tested by someone-your grandmotheror the Betty Crockertest kitchen worker-and the testeroften offerssome sortof promise that the recipewill workfor you. (This promisevariesconsiderablyin formality-and effusiveness-depending upon its source.) Despite this promise,the recipe may not work, for all sortsof reasons.Perhapsthe food turnsout just as the recipe "intended"it to, but you find out that in fact you don't like tripe. Or perhapsyou live in a place whereclimatic or other conditionscausedifferent dietaryconcerns to come into play, and this food doesn'tfill the requirements. On the other hand, maybethe recipe really doesn't turn out as it was intended to, because you haven't establisheda workingrelationshipwith the recipe;as I've suggested,learninghow to reada recipe involves learningwhat kind of relationshipobtains between you-the-cook and this recipe (and its author). In instances where the recipe doesn't work, perhaps you've used techniques or ingredients, or are working under conditions (like high altitude) that differfromthose used by the recipecreatorin waysthat this recipe can't tolerate. So, the recipe/cook team fails. Or it succeedsin a totally unexpected way. (Lousypopovers, but great edible tennis balls.) This kind of failuremaybe overcomeby thoughtful practice;by followingthe recipe more literally, perhapsand introducingvariationsonly when you've achieved the resultsyou desire;by asking the recipe creatorfor a more detailed explanationof how to do whateverit is they'retelling you to do; or by asking someone else for suggestionsabout how they would proceed. The recipe-cookteam might also fail becauseof a poorlytested recipe, or a recipe that leaves out an ingredientor instruction. In such cases, fixing the problem might be extremely difficult, especially if you cannot consult the person who wrote the recipe, but are left to unravel the problem on your own. And again, the recipe creatormight intentionallyleave somethingout, or might deliberatelyobscurethe instructions,in orderto guaranteeyourfailure, and ensure the "superiority"of their cooking skills.

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To describethese recipefailuresin theoryterms, I'dsuggestthat it won't do to treat theorizingas an activity in which I, the disinterested,semi-omniscient theory creatorunveil a set of universally-applicable laws about a bunch of mute, lifelessStuffof the Universe. Nor is it usefulto think that I, the theory recipient, can simplytake up someone else's theoryas is, follow its unambiguous, universally-applicableinstructions, and unproblematicallyapply it to the "same"phenomena they were exploring. With respect to the formerassertion, that theorizingis not the one-sided activity of a detached subject, think about making bread. The dough respondsto yourwarmhands'kneadingaction, and you learn to respondto it, to know when you've kneaded it long enough, and when to add more flour. It's an activity that depends upon a connection between bread maker and breaddough. This relationshiptakestime to develop;the firsttime you make bread, it may well turn out dry or holey becauseyou haven't yet figuredout how to readthe messagesthe dough is giving. Reciprocalresponsescharacterize things that exist in relation to each other, that can affect and be affected by each other. When I use a recipe, I enter into a kind of relation with the ingredients. I do not assume complete separatenessfrom them, nor total power over them. I think the same claim can be made, to some degree, about any kind of inquiry-activity.It'smost obviouslytrueof theorizingwith ("about")other people. And, although it is yet to be shown, I'm willing to believe the same will be true of even the hardestof "hardsciences."6 With respect to the latter assertionabout the way to approachsomeone else's theory, I'm suggestingthat it is usefulto ask the giver about the conditions that promptedthe development of a particulartheory. Trying to see how their experiencesrelate to mine, how they challenge and conflict with mine, and how their theoryfits with or contraststo mine enablesme to create useful, successful,helpfultheories. At the center of this activity standsalways a relationbetween me and the other theorizer.The moredevelopedthis relation, the better equippedam I to modify and implement their theory. What I've given in this paper is, I suggest, a little methodologicalcookbook. In it, I've offereda collection of some ways to go about doing philosophical theory. I offer them as tested products,and as partsof an integrated system. Furthertests mayprove them wrongor unhelpfulor misleading,and I may have to throwout some recipes. But I issue them in good, provisionallyfoundationalfaith.

NOTES 1. I say that this atmospheredoes characterizeinquiry, though sometimes it might be more appropriateto say that I wish it characterizedinquiry. But I do wish to say that, whatever the

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attitude that prevailsbetween inquirers,there is a sense in which their activity is at least interactive. What I mean is that, despite the storiesthat inquirersmay tell themselvesabout being disinterestedsubjects, they are in fact in relations, both with the things into which they inquire, and with other inquirers. 2. I'm sure the sorts of cooking that go on in multi-starrestaurantsdo or could manifest an element of abstractedtheoreticity that would rival that of the sciences. 3. Thanks to Susan Heineman for this example. 4. There still may seem to be a troublingdisparitybetween cooking and theorizing,however, becauseit seems that cooking producesfood a lot moreoften than theoriesproductpracticalconsequences in ones life in the world. Precisely. I think there is. And I think this is a failureof theorizing. I am willing to say that it would be very usefulto try to make theories that matterto people in our lives, just as it's useful to create recipesthat go on to get used. But again, I don't want to translatethis into an essentialistassertion. 5. It is a brutalfact that this relationshipof mystificationis farmorecommon than a cooperative one. In some respects, then, the recipe model is an idealistic one; it worksbest when the participantsin inquiryare willing participants,anxious to reveal motives and strategies. 6. Evelyn Fox Keller has alreadygiven us an example, in BarbaraMcClintock, of a biologist who thinks of her researchas a loving communication with her corn plants. And the workof some theoreticalphysicists,who utilize the notion of a "participatoryuniverse,"also point towardthis way of thinking about inquiry.

REFERENCES

Berstein, Richard. 1983. Beyondobjectivismand relativism:Science,hermeneuticsand praxis.Philadelphia:University of PennsylvaniaPress. Dewey, John. 1938. Logic:the theoryof inquiry.New York:Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. .1958. Experienceand nature.2nd ed. New York:Dover. .1929. The questfor certainty.New York:Perigree. Harding, Sandra. December, 1985. Feministjustificatorystrategiesand the epistemology of science. Unpublished paper, delivered to meeting of EasternDivision, American PhilosophicalAssociation. Rombauer,Irmaand MarionRombauerBecker. 1977. Joy of cooking.Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Working Together Across Difference: Some Considerationson Emotions and Political Practice UMA NARAYAN

Uma Narayan attemptsto clarifywhat the feministnotion of the 'epistemic privilegeof the oppressed'does and does not imply.She arguesthat thefact that oppressed'insiders'have epistemicprivilegeregardingtheir oppressioncreates politicsinvolving'outsiders'whodo not problemsin dialoguewithand coalitionary sharetheoppression,sincethelatterfail to cometo termswiththeepistemicprivilege of the insiders.She concretelyanalyzesdifferentways in whichthe emotionsof hurt by outsidersand suggestsways in whichsuch insiderscan be inadvertantly problemscan be minimized.

TAKING EMOTIONS SERIOUSLY

Dialoguebetween membersof a groupthat has a heterogenouscomposition in terms of factorslike class, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual preferenceetc., and in coalitions of such heterogenousgroups, is often hard to sustain, despite the presence of common interests and political goals. My concern in this paper is, therefore, a practicalone, despite my touching on theoretical considerations. I think it would be a helpful practice for groups with heterogenouscomponentsto talk aboutwaysin which dialoguebetween people who share and people who do not share the experience of a certain form of oppressioncan be damagedbecausethe emotions, and hence the sense of violated by self, of the membersof the oppressedgroup are unintentionally non-membersof the oppressedgroupwho participatein the dialogue. I have tried to analysea numberof waysin which this can happen. I think the cases I have consideredare common enough to be easily recognised,and hope they will provide a startingpoint for people to talk together about and work through problemsin dialogue they may have had or may fear having. The cases I have consideredare by no means exhaustive, and I am sure that I wish to thank MartinEisenberg,MaryGibson and HowardMcGaryfor the manystimulating discussionsout of which this papercame to be written. I wish to thank Alison Jaggar,Iris MarionYoungand KarenWarrenfor the many helpfulcommentsthey providedon the issuesas well as for the tremendousencouragementthey have provided.

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any groupthat sincerelyfocuseson these problemswill discovermanymore. I for one do not think that such a collective self-examinationof the problems of communicating across our differences is a form of collective self-indulgence. Rather, it seems to be a pre-requisitefor any groupthat sincerely intends to keep workingtogether across, and despite, differences. Though I shall focus on problemsin dialoguebetween heterogenousmembersof politicalgroups,it is also the case that such problemsoccur in communication betweenfriendsof heterogenousbackgrounds.Workingacrossdifferences is a morallyand politicallyimportantenterprisein either context. Both in political contexts and in the context of friendship,such differencesin elements of backgroundand identity can be enriching resources,epistemologically, politically and personally.Learningto understandand respect these differencescan make more complex our understandingof our selves and our societies, can broadenthe rangeof our politics and enrich the varietyof connections we have as persons.But such effortsarenot without costs, and these costs are what I shall focus on. Of course, these problems in dialogue have different implications when they occur in the domain of politics than they do when they occur between friends. Often, the intimacy that characterizesfriendshipsmay permit such problemseasier articulation.They may also arouseless hostility because insidersmay be more willing to make allowancesfor outsiderswho are friends. Outsidersmay be more concerned about having caused offense to insiders who are friendsand hence, more willing to try and understandthe nature of the problemsthat arise. It is only becauseI regardworkingacrossdifferences as an unavoidable and valuable project, personally and politically, that I think understandingthe costs and trying to minimizethem is something we must work towards. In focusing on the role of the emotions in these problemsof communication, I am following the injunction of severalstrandsof feminist theory that insist that the emotions must be taken seriouslyand not regardedas mere epiphenomenalbaggage(Baier1986, 235). Thus, althoughI shall be addressing problemsthat have to do with communicatingacrossall sorts of differences, not gender differencesalone, my project is still primarilyinspiredby the feminist commitment to take emotions seriously. A lot of feminist theory'sprojectsto take emotionsseriouslyhas focusedon the positive contributionsthat emotions make to knowledgeand communication. This is both understandableand appropriate,since feminist theory is trying to oppose perspectivesin which the emotions have been regardedas totally opposed to reason and as alwaysimpedimentsto knowledge. One of the most attractivefeaturesof feminist thinking is its commitment to contextualisingits claims. It would tend to be skepticalof claims that regardedemotions as alwaysa hinderanceto knowledgeas well as to claimsthat emotions alwaysmake a positive contributionto knowledge. It would prefer

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to examine the specific roles emotions could play in particularcontexts and criticallyexamine their contributionsin such concrete contexts. In keeping with this commitment, feminist theory, in opposing perspectivesthat are contemptousand/or dismissiveof emotions, would fail to live up to its own standardsif it countered with another absolutist perspective on the emotions-one that said that emotions always had a positive contribution to make in the domain of knowledgeand communication. Therefore,I shall not apologizeif at least some of my focuson the emotions is 'negative', in that I see them as capableof creatingproblemsfor communication acrossdifferences.However, even where my focus is thus negative, I am still committed to taking emotions seriouslyand to understandingtheir validity in the contexts in which they arise. THE POLITICSOF DIFFERENCE AND WORKINGTOGETHER ACROSSDIFFERENCE

IrisYoung, in her paper'Impartialityand the Civic Public:Some Implications of FeministCritiquesof Moral and Political Theory' (1986, 381-401), arguespowerfullyfor both a political theory and a political practicethat not only recognizes,but values, the differentcultures, experiencesand interests of differentgroups. She, like many others, wants to rethink the liberaldemocraticpromiseof equalityand fraternitybecause the promisehas not materialised.Liberaldemocracy'sideas of a 'civic public', and of a public realm of the state that somehow expresses"the impartialand universalpoint of view of normative reason"(1986, 382) seem to her to serve to cover up the racismand sexism that are endemic to modem politics. I have no quarrelwith, and much sympathyfor Young'sprescriptionfor the institutionalised representationof differences as a political goal. I would, rather, like to focus on another level, and look at another nest of problems that come out of differences.If we are going to strive for a coalitionarypolitics, as Young suggests,we still have to work togethercontinouslyacrossour differences. Such coalitions can break down for internal reasons if 1) people do not learn to trust one another acrossdivisive social differences,and if 2) people do not learn how to sustain workingrelationshipsin contexts of sometimes powerfuldistrustand disagreement.It would seem that even when people are working together for powerfullybinding and common social and political goals, a progressiveorganizationor movement cannot be sustainedunless the prejudicesand problemswhich arisebetween membersareexaminedand programmaticallyaddressed. There is yet another reason why such differencesmust be addressedand workedthrough. Even within the specificgroupsthat make up the coalition,

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that is, within the autonomous organizations of the sort that Young recommends, supposedlyrepresentativeof a common interest and experience, members are necessarily going to be heterogenous in some respects. Such groupsare then necessarilygoing to be confrontedwith questionsof difference. Any autonomousgroup that is going to representthe interests of, say, women is going to both consist of and representwomen from different classes and ethnic backgrounds,with differentsexual preferences,cultures, experiences, etc. It seems well nigh impossibleto have groupswhose members will have no significant differences among themselves, despite the commonalities of their oppressionand of the interests that bind them together. So, 'working together continously across our differences'seems to be a project we cannot avoid or get away from. We are condemned to either ignoring and annhilating differences,or to workingtenuously acrossthem to form alwaysriskybonds of understanding. AND THEPOLITICSOF DIFFERENCE PRIVILEGE EPISTEMIC

My startingpremiseaboutwhat it takes to worktogetheracrossdifferences is that 'good-willis not enough'. What I mean is that a simple resolutionon the part of individualsor groupsthat they will try to understandthe experiences of moredisadvantagedpersonsor groups,whose oppressionthey do not share, and a resolve to try and empathizewith their interests,althougha useful thing to have, is not going to solve or resolve the thousandsof problems that are going to crop up in discussionand communication.Too often, even the most resolutepossessorsof good-will will find themselvesbaffledand angered by failuresof communication. The possessionof such resolute goodwill on the part of membersof more advantagedgroups (men, white people, straightfolk, westerners,etc.) towardsmembersof more disadvantagedgroups(women, people of colour, gay people, membersof Third World cultures,etc.) maybe an importantfoundation for the beginning of trust-buildingexperiencesbetween them. But the advantagedwould be wrong to expect this to be sufficient to cause strong, historicallyconstitutednetworksof distrustto simplyevaporateinto thin air. If anything, such good-will must help sustaincommunicationthroughsituations, issues and discussionswhich inevitably cause resurgencesof mistrust. Annette Baier, in her paper "Trustand Antitrust', says: One leaves others an opportunity to harm one when one trusts,and also shows one's confidence that they will not take it. Reasonabletrust will requiregood groundsfor such confidence in another'sgood-will, or at least the absence of good groundsfor expecting their ill-will or indifference.Trustthen,

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on this first approximation, is accepted vulnerabilityto another'spossiblebut not expected ill will (or lack of good will) towardone (1986, 235). The situationsI am concernedwith differin significantwaysfrom the sort of situation of trust that Baier seems to have in mind, since they are characterizedby the presence of historicallyconstituted relations of power, privilege and lack of understandingon the part of membersof advantaged groups,and reasonablegroundsfor mistruston the partof membersof disadvantaged groups. Membersof disadvantagedgroups may be willing to set aside their mistrustof membersof advantagedgroupsthey workwith in political groups,to the extent of acceptinggood will on the partof the advantaged. But they cannot fail to be awareof the fact that presenceof good will on the partof the membersof advantagedgroupsis not enough to overcomeassumptions and attitudesborn out of centuriesof power and privilege. The disadvantagedcannot fail to realizethat being hurtby the insensitivity of membersof the advantagedgroupsthey endeavourto workwith and care about, is often moredifficultto deal with emotionallythan being hurt by the deliberatemalice of membersof advantagedgroupsthey expect no better of. Here, membersof disadvantagedgroupsrenderthemselves more vulnerable becausethey accept the existence of good will on the partof membersof oppressedgroups, and they have good reason to expect that they will, often enough, be hurt, good will not withstanding. I shall try to examine where some of the difficulties in communicating acrossdifferencesmay lie. I shall startby examiningthe claim that members of oppressedgroupsmay have 'epistemicprivilege'1(Harding1982; Hartsock 1983; Jaggar1985). The claim of 'epistemicprivilege'amounts to claiming that membersof an oppressedgrouphave a more immediate,subtle and critical knowledgeabout the natureof their oppressionthan people who are nonmembersof the oppressedgroup. I shall, for the sake of convenience, use the term 'insider'to refer to a memberof an oppressedgroupand the term 'outsider'to referto non-members. These termshave a disadvantagein that they lack an explicit sense of hierarchy,but have the advantageof reversingconventional ideasof what is central and what is marginal.People are 'insiders'or 'outsiders'only with respect to specific formsof oppressivesocial structures-racism, sexism, compulsoryheterosexuality,etc. An individualwho is an 'insider'with respectto one formof oppression(say, by being a woman) may be an 'outsider'with respect to another form oppression(say, by being white). I shall try to flesh out what I understandby the notion of the 'epistemic privilegeof the oppressed'while simultaneouslytryingto state what, at least in my understandingof it, this claim does not imply. Firstly, the claim of epistemic privilegefor the oppressedneed not imply that the oppressedhave a cleareror better knowledgeof the causesof their

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oppression.Since oppressionis often partlyconstitutedby the oppressedbeing denied access to educationand hence to the meansof theory production, (which would include detailed knowledgeof the historyof their oppression, conceptual tools with which to analyzeits mechanismsetc.), the oppressed analysisof how their specificformof maynot have a detailedcausal/structural oppressionoriginated, how it has been maintained and of all the systemic purposesit serves. Explanatorytheories and conceptual tools (like 'classstructure'and 'patriarchy') that help us understandthe specificitiesof a certain form of oppression and its links with other formsare often developedby people who are not membersof the oppressedgroupand whose relative privilege in that regard has given them greateraccess to the means of theoreticalreflection and production. So, what is it about the natureof their oppressionthat the oppressedcan be said to have epistemic privilegeabout?I think they have epistemic privilege when it comes to immediateknowledge of everydaylife under oppression-all the details of the ways in which their oppressionis experienced, seen to be inflicted, and of the waysin which the oppressionaffectsthe major and minor details of their social and psychic lives. They know first-handthe detailed and concrete ways in which oppressiondefines the spaces in which they live and how it affectstheir lives. I think that the emotions play an importantrole in the knowledgethat is partof the epistemicprivilegeof the oppressed. I shall returnto this shortly. I do not wish to suggesta rigiddistinction between description(which the oppresseddo better) and explanation (which the dominatorsmay do better), between questions(which the dominatedmay raise) and answers(that dominators may have theoretical tools to provide). No explanation of a form of oppressionthat totally fails to account for the way it is experiencedand describedby the oppressedcan be adequate;questionsthat the oppressedraise have assumptionsand are theory-laden,and may serve to shatter the neat, explanatoryparadigmsof outsiders. Secondly, the claim to epistemic privilege for the oppressed does not mean, as far as I am concerned, that people who are not membersof the oppressedgroupcan nevercome to understandthe experiencesof the oppressed or share in their insights or knowledge. Such a claim would have very undesirablepolitical consequences. It could be taken as a license to excuse all those who are not membersof any oppressedgroupfrom any concern with that oppression.After all, if they can never understandmany or most significant aspects of that oppression, how could they meaningfullytake an interest in it or help fight againstit? Taken this way, the claim to epistemic privilege would make communicationbetween memberof an oppressedgroup and sympatheticnon-memberspretty close to useless.

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Besides, such an "unconveyabilityof insights"thesis simplyseems untrue. Many of us would claim to know, say, a few men who are sympatheticto and understanda good deal about feminist concerns, or white people who are concerned with and understanda good deal about issuesof race. But I think that the claim to the epistemic privilegeof the oppresseddoes imply that people who are not membersof the oppressedgroupwill have to make a great deal of effort to come to gripswith the details of lived oppression. Having membersof the oppressedgroupas friends,sharingin aspectsof their life-style,fightingalongsidethem on issuesthat concer them, sustaining a continousdialoguewith them, etc. can all help non-membersdevelopa more of what a formof oppressioninvolves. But 'outsidsophisticatedunderstanding ers'who do none of the above, who simplyhave an abstractsortof goodwilltowardsmembersof the oppressedgroup,are unlikelyto have much of a clearor detailedawarenessof the formsin which that oppressionis experienced. Outsiders should not yield to the temptation to use the thesis of the epistemicprivilegeof the insideras an excuse for the view that they can learn nothing about a form of oppressionunless 'educated'about it by insiders. If insidershave epistemicprivilegeabout their oppression,outsiderscannot educate themselvesaboutthe situationof insidersexcept by listeningto or reading about their experience of their situation. But concerned outsidersmust recognize that their concern carrieswith it a responsibilityto actively seek out and acquiresuch knowledge,ratherthan see it as the insider'sresponsibility to bring such knowledgeto their attention becausethe oppressionis 'the insider'sproblem'.This attitude on the part of outsiderswould merely add a pedagogicburden to all the other burdensthe insider suffersfrom. Sympathetic outsidersmust recognizethat their concern for a form of oppression mustbe reflectedin their willingnessto actively educatethemselvesabout it. Thirdly, the claim that the oppressedhave epistemic privilege does not amount, as far as I am concerned, to a claim that the knowledge that they have of their oppressionis in any way 'incorrigible'.Membersof an oppressed group, like human subjectsin general, can alwaysbe mistakenabout the nature of their experience. Other membersof the very same groupmay differin the way they perceive or interpretcertain incidents or even certain general types of incidents. It may well be the case that not all of them can be right, and at times, it may even be that all of them are wrong. The operations of ideology may sometimes convince the oppressedthat their experiences are other than they are, and an 'outsider'may be able to more clearlysee and articulatewhat is going on. It is certainlynot my intention to rule out such possibilitiesa priori. But the thesis that the oppressedhave epistemic privilegedoes have some implicationsfor 'outsiders'who want to arguethat the understandingof an 'insider'is wrong.The 'outsider'mustundertakethe attemptwith what I shall call 'methodologicalhumility' and 'methodologicalcaution'.

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By the requirementof 'methodologicalhumility'I mean that the 'outsider' must always sincerly conduct herself under the assumptionthat, as an outsider, she may be missing something, and that what appearsto her to be a 'mistake'on the part of the insidermay make more sense if she had a fuller understandingof the context. By the requirementof 'methodologicalcaution', I mean that the outsider should sincerelyattempt to carryout her attemptedcriticismof the insider's perceptionsin such a way that it does not amountto, or even seem to amount to, an attempt to denigrate or dismiss entirely the validity of the insider's point of view. Fourthly,the claim to epistemic privilegefor the oppressedshould not be identifiedwith the claim that the oppressedshould speak for themselves and representtheir own ilnterests.That the oppressedshouldspeakfor themselves may be a thesis to which we may have a moral and political commitment quite regardlessof the view that the oppressedhave epistemic privilege. Even if the oppressedhad no epistemicprivilegewhatsoever,there areseveral other good and importantreasonswhy they should speakfor themselves. Historically,those in power have alwaysspoken in ways that have suggested that their point of view is universaland representsthe values, interestsand experiencesof everyone. Today, many critiquesof political, moraland social theory are directed at showing how these allegedlyuniversalpoints of view are partialand skewedand representthe view points of the powerfuland the privileged. The oppressedwill, therefore,be quite warrantedin being sceptical about the possibilityof 'outsiders'adequatelyspeakingfor them. Besides, the right and power to speakfor oneself is closely tied to the oppressedgroup'ssense of autonomy, identity and self-respect.That it will foster and safeguardthis sense of autonomy and self-respectis a good enough reason to say that the oppressedshould speak for themselves, questions of epistemic privilege apart. However, if the thesis of the epistemic privilege of the oppressedcan be substantiated,it would provideyet anotherreasonfor arguingthat oppressed groupsshould speakfor themselves. If the oppresseddo have epistemic privilege, they can understandtheir problemsand representtheir own interests better than 'outsiders'could. AND THEEMOTIONS PRIVILEGE EPISTEMIC

I would like to arguethat a very importantcomponent of what constitutes the epistemic privilege of the oppressedhas to do with knowledgethat is at least partly constituted by and conferredby the emotional responsesof the oppressedto their oppression.Unlike concerned'outsiders'whose knowledge of the experienceof oppressionis alwaysmoreor less abstractand theoretical,

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the knowledgeof 'insiders'is enriched by the emotional reactions/responses that the lived experience of oppressionconfers. In what ways does an insider'semotional responsesto lived oppressionenrich her knowledgeof the nature of that oppressionin ways that are much more difficult for an outsiderto achieve? I can think of at least three ways; there are probablymore. I shall discuss these three under titles that make clear what the outsidermisses that the insidergrasps. 1) Minimizing the emotional costs of oppression:Sympathetic outsiders can and do react not only intellectually, but emotionallyto incidents of racism, sexism, etc., even though they are not and may never be the targetsof such oppression.But, often, the outsidermay fail to realizethat the insiders' emotional responsesto the oppressionmay be much more complex than his own. Such failuremay lead his understandingof the emotional costs of the oppressionto be much more sketchy than that of the insider. An outsider,when told aboutor presentat an incidentthat is racist,sexist, and sympathywith the victim. etc. most often doesfeel angerat the perpetrator The victim, however,mayfeel a complexand jumbledarrayof emotions:anger at the perpetrator,a deep sense of humiliation,a sense of being 'soiled'by the incident, momentaryhatredfor the whole groupof which the perpetratoris a part, rage at the sort of historythat has producedand sustainssuch attitudes, angerand shame at one's powerlessnessto retaliate,a strongsense of solidarity with those who face the same problems,and maybeeven pity for the stupidity of the perpetrator.The outsider,not having been at the receivingend of the oppression,mayfail to whollygraspits effectson its victimsand his understanding may, therefore,fail to do justiceto the costs of that experience. of oppression:An outsiderwho has not 2) Missingthe subtlermanifestations an first-hand and has learnedaboutit second-hand,is experienced oppression more likely to understandthe general and commonplaceways in which the oppressionis manifested.Forinstance, if a professorusesopenly racistor sexist examplesor is openly hostile to minorityor female students, sympathetic white male studentsmay be able to spot his attitudesquite as well as the victims of the attitudes. But if his attitudesareexpressedmorecovertly, through dismissingtheir queries,not takingtheir contributionsseriously,under-valuing their work, lack of cordiality,etc., outsidersmay fail to see what is going on. An insiderwho is sensitizedto such prejudicedattitudeswill often pick up cues rangingfrom facial expressionsto body languagethat an outsidermay simplyfail to spot and will often also be alertedby her own feelings of unease about the personor situation. As a consequence, the insideris farmore likely than the outsiderto know the extent to which a formof oppressionpermeates a society and affects the lives of its victims and of the very subtle forms in which it can operate. 3) Not making connections or failing to see oppressionin new contexts: The outsider usuallyknows about the more widesspreadand commonplace

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contexts in which the oppressionis manifestedand may fail to carryover what he knows about one context when he sees the same sort of phenomena in new or unusualcontexts. Or, he mayfail to make the connection between what he knows in theory and what is actuallytaking place in a given situation. Forinstance, men who have been sensitizedto the 'silencing'of women in public or professionalforumsmay fail to see the phenomenon takingplace in informalgatheringsor between friends. Insidersare more likely to make these connections and to carryover what they have learnedto new contexts because they become more vigilant in their attitudes the more they are exposed to the oppression. EMOTIONAL COSTSOFWORKINGACROSSDIFFERENCES

Although being an insider to a form of oppressionmay confer epistemic privilege, it certainly constitutes a burden. The insider lives with all the formsthe oppressiontakes, from everydayand trivial manifestationsto violent and life-threateningones. The insiderpaysa heavy social and psychological price that no outsiderpays. Forinsidersto worktogetherwith outsidersis a projectthat is often fraughtwith difficulty,for, in any communication,the two groupsdo not function as equally vulnerable. In their paper, "Have We Got a Theory For You!," MariaLugonesand ElizabethSpelman explain the nature of this unequal vulnerabiltythus: And yet, we have had to be in yourworld and learn its ways. We have to participatein it, make a living in it, live in it, be mistreatedin it, be ignoredin it, and rarely,be appreciatedin it. In learningto do these things or in learningto sufferthem or in learningto enjoy what is to be enjoyed or in learningto understandyour conception of us, we have had to learn your cultureand thus yourlanguageand self-conceptions.But there is nothing that necessitatesthat you understandour world;understand,that is, not as an observerunderstandsthings, but as a participant,as someone who has a stake in them understands them. So yourbeing ill at ease in our world lacks the features of our being ill at ease in yourspreciselybecauseyou can leave and you can alwaystell yourselvesthat you will soon be out of there and because the wholeness of your selves is never touched by us, we have no tendency to remakeyou in our image (1983, 576). It is the insiderwho paysthe priceof oppressionand even sympatheticoutsiders, since they are prone to blind-spotsand clumsiness, can offend and hurt the insidermore often than they imagine. The insidercan neither simply walk away from the issues, as the outsideralwayscan, nor can she ever

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inadvertantlyhurt the outsiderin quite the same way. Thus, since the brunt of possiblehurt is most often on the insider, the burdenof takingcare not to cause offense can fairly be laid on the outsider. Outsiders often assume, wrongly,that good will on their part is a guaranteeagainstcausingoffense to insiders;and when insidersareoffendedand expresstheir anger, the outsiders often react with honest bafflementand anger since they cannot understand how someone sympatheticto a formof oppressioncould conceivablybe seen as having offensive views or attitudes. I shall try to list and analyzea numberof ways in which outsidersmay reveal lack of understandingand cause affrontand grief to insiders.The list is in no way exhaustive. Understandingthese ways in which communicating across differencesmay falter and go wrong may help outsidersavoid these problemsand may help insidersto try and understandwhy the outsideris going wrong. What all these failuresI will list have in common is the inabilityof the outsider to fully understandand respect the emotional responsesof the insider. In some cases, the responseof the outsiderviolates the insider'ssense of selfidentity, self-worthor self-respect.In other cases, the responseof the outsider violates the insider'ssense of identity and solidaritywith and respectfor her group. CASE1: OVERTDENIALOFTHEVALIDITY OFTHE UNDERSTANDING INSIDER'S AND/ORRESPONSE

Given the way differenceworks, it is hardly surprisingthat insidersand outsidersmay often have very differentunderstandingsof what is involved in a situation or issue. For instance, men and women often have very different understandingsfrom men concerning what was involved and who was responsiblein casesof sexualharassment.Men often think women areresponsible for attractingunwantedattention becauseof the way they dress, conduct themselves, etc. Women often see this sort of view as a self-exculpatingexplanation that absolves men of their real responsibility. When, for instance, men totally blame women for the sexual harassment and sexual terrorismfromwhich they suffer,they wholly deny the validityof the insiders' understandingof such harassmentas something inflicted on them. The insider will most often respondemotionally to such attempts to negate her understanding-with anger, tears, etc. The issue, to the insiders, is not a purelytheoreticalone, and their angerand pain at what they have to endurebecome exacerbatedby the seeminginabilityof even well-intentioned outsidersto see their point of view. The situation is complicated by the fact that most outsidersand insiders have been socializeddifferentlyand understandand displayemotions in very differentways. For instance, public (or even private) displaysof emotion by

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women, which areexperiencedas naturaland authenticby the women, often seem excessive and artificialto men. The outsideroften reacts to the insider'semotional responseover a disagreement in one (or both!) of two ways:a) the outsider(say, the man) may 'dismiss'the emotional responseas just one of those silly and irrationalresponses that insiders(say, women) are prone to; and/orb) the outsidermay accuse the insiderof 'using'the emotional responseas a manipulativemeasure. The insidermay be told that since she could not musterargumentsthat were cogent enough to convince the outsider, she is now resortingto 'emotional tactics' to win the argument. If the outsider takes both tacks (and they often do), the insider is in a strangedouble-bindover her emotions. If her responseis authentic and natural, it is also pathetic and a symptomof her weakness,irrationalityand lack of self-control. If her responseis not a symptomof weaknessand irrationality,it is a calculated, manipulativeand inauthenticstrategicmove on her part. To an insider, who alreadyfeels that she has renderedherselfvulnerableby displayingher emotions, such dismissalsor accusationsof manipulationadd insult to injury.The outsidermust realizethat such denial of the validityof the insider'sresponseswill almostcertainlycausea seriousbreachin the dialogue, since they deeply violate the insider'sself-respect. CASE2: ACCUSATIONSOF 'PARANOIA'

Outsidersoften considerthe reactionsof insidersto be 'paranoid'and accuse them of 'paranoia'. They mean that they think that the insidersare imagining the existence of racist or sexist attitudes, say, in too many cases where the outsiderfails to see it and where he thereforeconsidersthese attitudes to be absent. (This is another way in which the outsidercan deny the validity of the insider'sresponse, but I think it is common and important enough to treat separately). I have alreadyexamined reasonswhy even sympatheticoutsidersmay fail to pick up on subtle formsof prejudiceand discrimination.An accusationof paranoia is a particularlydangerous reaction from an outsider, especially since, in many cases, the insideris never totally surethat her judgementsare accurate.Often, subtle instancesof racismor sexismare such as to be open to interpretation;insidersare often awareof this and are often anxious and uncertain about their own perceptions. They are often extremely ambivalent aboutwhetherto makean issueof it, especiallysince the incident/remarkcan be 'explainedaway';and once such explaining awayoccurs, the person who raised the issue ends up being made to feel nasty and suspiciousfor having raisedthe issue in the first place. But if my experience and the experiencesof people I know is any indication, the insideris moreoften correctthan mistakenin her suspicions.Some-

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times less subtle manifestationsfollow that give the show away, or else, the insidermeets other insiderswho have the samefeelingsof uneaseand suspect similarprejudiceson the part of the same person. For instance, women students and studentsof colour seem to reportan amazingdegreeof agreement in their individualjudgementsas to which of their professorsaresexist or racist, often in the subtlestof ways. Outsidersshould refrainas far as possiblefrom such accusations,since the outsider is more likely than not to be wrong, and because such accusations underminethe insider'strustin her own perceptions.This mayreduceher capacityfor vigilance, somethingthat those who areon the receivingend of oppressioncan ill afford. CASE3: INSENSITIVE REACTIONS TO AN INSIDER'S RESPONSE

Outsiderscan be offensivelyinsensitiveto the reactionsof insiderswithout necessarilyovertly dismissingthem as irrational,manipulativeor paranoid.I shall illustratethis sort of insensitivitywith an incident. A groupof people who were interestedin varioussortsof oppressionwere discussingthe question of whether it was importantthat women (ratherthan men) taughtcoursesin feministtheory,and whetherit was importantthat blackprofessors(ratherthan white ones) taughtcoursesin black literature,philosophy,history,etc. A black male participanttalked about an awfulpedagogicexperiencewith a white teacherwho taughtRichardWrightwith little sensitivityto the context of black cultureand experience, and who constantlydismissedwhat his black studentshad to say. He was, presumably,arguingthat there was a point in black writings being taught by black professors.A white participantresponded to this by saying that it was better that such worksgot includedon syllabuses, regardlessof who taught them, rather than their not being includedbecausethere were no teachersfromappropriatebackgroundsto teach them. This reactionwas experiencedas an insensitiveone becausea) the insider's account of his unhappypedagogicexperience was brushedaside and not addressed;and b) becausethe same basic point could have been made very differently. For instance, the outsidercould have said, "I can understandwhat you are talking about. Such experiencesmust be awful. But don't you think that, perhaps,it maybe a good thing to pushfor blackwritingsto be included on syllabuses,regardlessof who is there to teach them?" In this case, the 'outsider'who was white was also a woman and a feminist. Then, this becomes not only a case of an insensitive response,but a case of an insensitive failureto analogize.If a woman had talked about how awful it was to do VirginiaWoolf with a sexist male teacher, and if a man, whatever his race, had dismissedit similarly,any feminist would have perceivedit as a sexist response.

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If 'workingtogether acrossdifference'is to at all be possible, we must all learnto analogizefromsituationsof oppressionin which we have been 'insiders' to those in which we are 'outsiders.It is sad, but seems unfortunately true, that experience and understandingof one form of oppressiondoes not necessarilysensitize one to other forms. But if we make the effort to analogize, it may give us some clues as to how to avoid insensitiveresponsesin areas in which we are outsiders. CASE 4: FAILUREBY OUTSIDERSTO AVOID CRUDE AND 'STEREOTYPIC'GENERALIZATIONSABOUT INSIDERS

Sometimes, even the best intentioned outsiderscannot seem to get away from cliches and stereotypicgeneralizationsabout insiders.I am not talking about cliches at the level of 'All blacksare lazy'or 'All women are irrational', which are evidently offensive, but much more insidiousand difficult to see cliches and generalizations. Once again, let me try to illustrate what I mean with example. I have heardmore than once fromwhite feministsthe following account of the differencesbetween westernand non-westernfeminist agendas.The gist of it is that non-westernwomen are concerned with life and death issueslike food, drinkingwater, etc. and have no time to be concernedwith issueslike that of sexual autonomythat are of concern to westernfeminists.Concer with sexual autonomy, it seems implied, has nothing to do with life and death, and it seems to be a 'luxuryissue' to be engaged in by western feminists, who, it would seem, have solved their problemsof economic survival. Firstly, this opinion is wrong. Lack of sexual autonomy leads Indian women to be marriedoff to men who are only interestedin the money and goodsshe bringswith her as her 'dowry'and leadsthem to be frequentlyburnt to death by husbandsand their families who would like another dowryand who passthese murdersoff as kitchen accidents. Secondly, this sort of view is insultingin its implicationthat concernover sexualautonomyis the privilege of western feminists. Outsidersshould carefullyscrutinizetheir explanations and attitudes for such cliches that are insulting to insiders. CASE 5: FAILURETO SEE WHY SOMETHINGTHAT IS NOT EXPLICITLY INSULTING TO A PERSON OR GROUP MAY BE IMPLICITLYSO

Outsidersare often taken abackby the sharpreactionsof insidersto statements that the outsidercannot see as having anythingto do with the insider, let alone be insulting to her. For instance, women in a group may react sharply to a man's statements that are frequently insulting to particular women, who may not be present or even be membersof the group. The

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women may suspect, with perhapssome jusitfication, that the man's statements reflect the man's attitudes to women in general. If the outsideris to avoid that sort of reaction, he must be very carefulto specifywhat his criticism of a particularinsideris and try to show why it is not an expressionof a general negative attitude to insidersin general. Outsidersoften fail to understandwhy, for instance, an Indian may react negativelyto implicitlyderogatoryremarksaboutsay Chinese or African cultures. Outsidersfail to see that the insidermayquite legitimatelysuspectsimilar derogatoryattitudes on the outsider'spart towardsher own culture, because she suspectsthe derogatoryattitudesstem froma negative view of nonwesternculturesin general. It maybe verydifficult,but outsiderswill have to try and focus on the more general implicationsthat statements they make may have for insiders,or else they are likely to insult them unintentionally. ABOUTWHATINSIDERS CASE6: INAPPROPRIATE JUDGEMENTS OUGHTTO DO OR FEEL

Outsidersoften think that their commitmentto a causeor issuewhich does not directly affect them warrantstheir makingjudgementsabout what insiders ought to do or feel. These judgements,almost inevitably, turn out to be insulting to the insider. For instance, women philosophersand philosophersof colour I know, who are interestedin areaslike mathematicallogic, are offendedby implications that 'someone like them' should be devoting themselvesto political philosophy and/or feminist theory. Outsiderswho imply this fail to see why, for 'someone like them', it may be a matter of pride to excel in an unconventional (for people like them) and difficult field like mathematicallogic. Similarly, many westernfeminists imply that they find some non-western feministstoo harshand criticalabout their own cultures.They mayfail to see how women who have fought againstsome of the most oppressiveaspectsof those cultures cannot affordthe more rose-tinted view of it that outsiders can. By and large, it would probably be good advice to outsiders that they should try and learnfromthe perceptionsof insiders,ratherthan tell insiders what they ought to do or feel, especiallyabout contexts and issuesthat they ought to suspect they know less about than insiders. There are, no doubt, several other ways in which communicatingacross difference can create problemsfor the participants.For instance, outsiders may fail to understandwhy their desire for praise or acknowledgementfor their interest in an issue that does not directlyaffect them could be met with resentmenton the partof insiders.Or, outsidersmay fail to understandwhy, at moments of crisis, even insiderswhom they are close to may preferto sort their feelings out with and discusstheir problemswith other insiders.

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I think these problemsof communicatingacrossdifferencewill be easierto handle if both insidersand outsiderstake the idea of the epistemicprivilegeof the oppressedseriously.Outsidersmust try to understandthat good will on their part is not sufficientto guaranteethat their perceptionsand comments are inoffensiveto insiders.They mustsensitizethemselvesto the fact that insidersmay have more subtleand complex understandingof the waysin which opressionoperatesand is experienced.They mustrealizethat insidersarespecially vulnerableto insensitivitiesfrom outsiderswhose good will they have accepted and who they have begun to trust. Awarenessof these featuresthat impinge on dialogue with insiderswould convince outsidersthat they have good reasonto proceedwith what I have called 'methodologicalhumility'and 'methodologicalcaution' and focus more careful attention on the implications of what they say. Outsidersmay, .rightly,feel that the exercise of methodologicalhumility and methodologicalcaution maycrampthe spontaneityof their reactionsand the ease with which they communicate.However, this loss of ease and spontaneity seems a necessaryand small price to pay to avoid causing offense to insidersand causingseriousbreachesin dialogue. If it is not only possiblethat insidershave epistemic privilege, but if it is also true that insidersare specially vulnerableto insensitivitiesfromoutsidersthey trustand workwith, it seems both unavoidableand only fair that outsidersbear the burdenof exercizing caution and of taking care not to offend. Is there anything insiderscan do to help in workingacrossdifference?Perhaps taking the idea of the epistemic privilege of the oppressedcan make a differenceto insidersas well. Realizingthat outsidersdo not have the subtle understandingof oppressionthat insidershave mayhelp insidersdeal with insensitive perceptions/commentsby outsiderswith greatercharity. Firstly, it may help insidersrealizethat such insensitivitiesare not necessarilya symptom of lack of good will on the partof outsiders.Secondly, realizingthe difficulties outsidersmay have in understandingthe subtletiesof oppression, insiders may see their insensitivities as less culpable. This is not to say that such insensitivitiesmustbe simplyoverlookedor forgiven insteadof being confrontedor dealt with. But the mannerin which the confrontationtakes place may be different. For instance, instead of reacting with understandableanger that inevitablymakes the outsiderdefensive, the insider could try instead to point out why the outsider'sremarksor perceptions were experienced as hurtfulor offensive. I shall not pretendthat this is an easy thing to do, or that this is askingno moreof insidersthan exercisingmethodologicalhumilityand methodological caution asksof outsiders.It is very hardfor insidersnot to react with angerto such insensitivities, for each such insensitivityevokes memoriesof countless others. Besides, anger is a necessaryemotion for those who must constantly exercise vigilance and retain their self-respectin the face of systematicsocial

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prejudiceand discrimination.Insensitivitiesfrom outsidersone trustsmake insidersespeciallybitter and pessimisticabouthopes for change, and angeris often an inevitable corollary. Besides, revealing one's anger makes one less vulnerablethan revealing one's hurt. In revealing one's anger, one seems to react from a position of strength, while revealingone's hurt lacks this quality and seems to open up possibilitiesof the outsiderreactingwith either pity or guilt, neither of which the insidercan find very palatable. Moreover, insidersare often fed up with the burdenof constantly having to explain themselvesand their perceptions to outsiders,and bitter about the fact that, while they must unavoidablylive and function in the outsider'sworld, the outsiderhas no such imperativeto understandtheir worldand their experience. However, perhapsinsidersmust try, whenever possible, to raise issues of insensitivity from outsiders, with some rein on their anger.And outsiders,in their turn, musttry to understand the nature and sourcesof the insider'sanger. I am sure that seriousdiscusionof the problemsof communicatingacross differencesby groups that are dealing with the problem will reveal several other kindsof problems.What is importantis that such groupsdo addressthis questionprogrammaticallyand not just act on the hope that goodwillon the part of its memberswill take care of all such problems.2 NOTES 1. Alison Jaggarusedthe notion of 'epistemicprivilege'in her workfor her seminaron Feminist Epistemology,when she held the LaurieChair in Women'sStudiesat RutgersUniversityin 1985. REFERENCES

Baier, Annette. 1986. Trust and antitrust. Ethics96: 231-260. Harding,Sandraand MerrillHintikka, eds. 1983. Discovering reality:Feminist perspectiveson epistemology,methodology,and philosophyof science.New York:Dordrechtand Reidel. Hartsock,Nancy. 1983. The feminist standpoint:A specificallyfeministhistorical materialism.In Discoveringreality,eds. S. Hardingand M. Hintikka, 283-310. New York:Dordrechtand Reidel. Lugones, MariaC. and ElizabethV. Spelman. 1983. Have we got a theory for you! Feminist theory, cultural imperialism and the demand for 'woman'svoice.' Hypatia (1), published as a special issue of Women's StudiesInternational Forum.6: 573-581. Young, Iris Marion. 1986. Impartialityand the civic public: Some implications of feminist critiquesof moral and political theory. PraxisInternational.5:382-401.

Does Women's Liberation Imply Children'sLiberation? LAURA M. PURDY

ShulamithFirestonearguesthatfor womento embraceequalrightswithoutrecconognizingthemfor childrenis unjust.Protectionof childrenis merelyrepressive trol:theyare infantilizedby our treatmentof them.I maintainthatmanychildren no longerget muchprotection,butneitherare theybeingprovidedwithan environmentconduciveto learningprudenceor morality.Recognizing equalrightsfor children is likelyto worsenthissituation,not makeit better. We must include the oppressionof childrenin any programfor feminist revolutionor we will be subjectto the same failing of which we have so often accusedmen: of not having gone deep enough in our analysis,of having missedan importantsubstratum of oppressionmerelybecauseit didn'tdirectlyconcern us. Shulamith Firestone, The Dialecticsof Sex (1970) Are women who embraceequal rightsfor themselvesbeing inconsistent if they deny them for children?Are they thus guilty, as Firestonecharged, of stopping short of justice when they have "gotten theirs?" Twenty years ago Firestone argued that the oppression of women and children is paralleland intertwined.Forchildren, as for women, a merephysical differencehas been culturallymagnified,by meansof dress,activity, and education, so as to producewhat "appearsto be a differentkind of animal with its own peculiarset of laws and behavior"(Firestone 1970, 89). And "differentanimals" require rights and duties differentfrom those of white men-that paradigmaticmeasureof humanity. In her opinion, in neither case is this differenttreatmentjustifiable;for both it constitutes oppression. Propertreatment, accordingto her, entails recognizinga large measureof individualchoice aboutrelationshipsand activities, togetherwith the respect appropriatefor such an autonomous being. For women and children, this right is violated by legal and social strictureson their actions, enforced by economic sanctions. Firestone believes that such practices with respect to women and children are reprehensible(1970, ch. 4). Not only do women and children sufferthe same kind of oppression,but their oppressionsreinforceeach other. Just as the imageof the happyhouseHypatiavol. 3, no. 2 (Summer 1988) ? by LauraM. Purdy

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wife needs a house and children to complete it, the image of the carefree child requiresa full-time caretaker(1970, 86, 91). Firestone'sunderlyingthesis, then, is that artificialdifferenceshave been constructedbetween humanswho are essentiallysimilar.These are then held to be morallyrelevant differencesthat justifyhierarchicalrelationships.For the sakeof argument,let us assumethat this claim is truefor women. What is thereforein question is its relevance to children. CHILDREN'S OPPRESSION

Firestonedescribesas "repression"any control of children. "Control"includes both demandsfor certain behaviorsand limits on action. It presupposes a rangeof sanctionsbackingsuch demandsand limits. Since "control" is a uniquelyusefulword, it shall be usedhere, but in a neutralway in orderto avoid assumingwhat is to be proven. In other words, it is used here descriptively, not normatively, so that argumentis requiredfor judging it good or bad. The thesis that we should not attempt to control children may take three forms. First, it may be arguedthat it is wrongto control children, regardless of the consequences. Second, it may be arguedthat we would more likely achieve our aims for children without such control and it is therefore counterproductive.Third, it maybe arguedthat we wronglycontrol children because we thus deflect them from aims better than those we envision for them. Before going on, let us note how attractive is the thesis supportedby all three formsof argument.It is clear, simpleto apply, and extends the trendtowardrecognizingindividualequalityand autonomy. Its theoretical appeal is enhanced by the fact that it liberateswomen and society at largefrom onerous childrearingduties. Firestone'semphatic equationof control and repressionmight suggestthat she is a proponent of the first and most radicalform of the thesis, although some of her argumentsare more suggestiveof the second or third. Formone is, in any case, untenable. If we have any concern for consequences, it, like all other deontological argumentsof this kind, is vulnerableto evidence (or thought-experiments)that laissez-fairechildrearingleads to miserablechildren and/or disintegrationof importantadult values. Let us thereforeconcentrateon the consequentialistargumentscontained in formstwo and three. Firestone'smain argumentis basedon Aries'scontention that childhood is a recent invention (1970, 76ff). She describes at length his argumentfor the view that the concept did not exist in the Middle Ages. For a variety of reasonsyoung people came to be increasinglysegregated fromadult life; as this occurredthey took on the unformedcharacteristics we associatewith children today. This developmentexplainshow child-

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ren could formerlymingle with adultssuccessfully,whereasit now seems obvious to us that they are incapableof doing so. Detailed informationabout the childhood of LouisXIII is cited to show how children were both treated and behavedmuch more like adults;child prodigies,althoughcommon in the past, are becoming rarerand rarer. Although Firestonefails to differentiatebetween contemporarysociety and the ideal free society here, one might well infer from what she says that she thinks childrenwill be liberatedif we now starttreatingthem like adults. She simply does not addresspractical issues raised by the transition, especially within a less-than-idealsociety. Considerationsabout such issues are surely relevant to judgmentsabout our duties towardchildren. Nevertheless, her points aboutcontemporarychild-rearingareprovocative and demand investigation. She elaborateson this theme by arguingthat our currentchild-tending arrangementsare detrimental: . . modernschooling retardsdevelopment ratherthan escalating it. By sequestering children away from the adult world-adults are, after all, simply larger children with worldlyexperience-and by artificiallysubjectingthem to an adult/child ratio of one to twenty-plus,how could the final effect be other than a leveling of the groupto a median (mediocre) intelligence? (1970, 85). The processof segregationbegun at the end of the medievalperiodwas acceleratedafter the eighteenth century, as childrenwere placed in gradeson the basisof age: "Such a rigidgradationincreasedthe levels necessaryfor the initiation into adulthoodand made it hardfor a child to directhis own pace. His learning motivation became outer-directedand approval-conscious,a sure killer of originality"(1970, 86). Now Firestone's assessment of children's segregation is well-taken. Whether this historicalaccount is accurateor not, there are enough anthropological studiesof less-segregatedchildhood experienceto persuadeus of its possibility.And, that our own contemporarywesternsegregationof children from adult life is undesirablenow seems beyond questions. SEPARATEWORLD

Why is the segregationof children from adultsundesirable?I believe that Firestoneis right in attributingmuch of the children'sdifficultyin adapting to adultstandardsof behaviorto this practice.Furthermore,in the yearssince she wrote, the situation has, in general, changed for the worse. The post-medievalsegregatedworldof childrenthat Firestoneis criticizing protected middle- and upper-classchildren from a difficult and frightening adultworld, at the cost of delayingadultfreedom.The ultimatedesirabilityof

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this trade-offremainsto be argued.I think, although there is reason to suppose that it was taken to extremes in some cases. What childrenin "advanced" westernculturesnow face is a separate,unprotectedworld.It is separatein that it is quite isolatedfromrespectedadultauthority; it is unprotectedin that childrenmustnow managemanyadultfreedomson their own. 1 The centralfeatureof this new worldis the dearthof good adult models.Their absenceleavesinexperiencedyoungpeople at the eye of a storm of powerful,confusingpressures.The change from protectedto unprotected segregationis illustratedby the followingstatistics:as recentlyas the sixties, parentsand teacherswere the chief influenceon teenagers;by 1980 parents rankedsecond (behindpeers)and teachersfourth(behindthe media) (Welsh, 1986). Yet it is parentsand teacherswho representthe responsibleadultworld to teens. The resultingvacuumaltersthe contoursof their worldappreciably. Insteadof modeling themselveson these responsibleadults, it is tempting for youngstersto adopt the less demandingidealsconveyed by peersand popularculture:they are "morefun." But childrenwho succumbto these temptahave lower self-esteemand generallybehave worse tions ("peer-orientation") (Condryand Siman 1974, 543-54). They are moreprone to lie or skip school (Bronfenbrenner1972, 660), get caught up in heavy drinking or drug use 1972, 662). (Packard1983, 72) or delinquencyand violence (Bronfenbrenner In short, they adoptthe valuesof the rebelliousyouthculture(Coleman1961). Now, rebellion per se, is not necessarilya bad thing, as Firestonepoints out. Our social arrangementsoften underminewelfareunnecessarily,and rebellion of one sort or another is requiredto improvethem. But some formsof rebellionare self-destructiveor erodebeneficialsocial institutions.Forexample, developing critical thinking ability usuallytakes self-discipline;refusing to applyoneself in this mannerharmsboth studentsand those they come into contact with. Those who workonly to accrueunemploymentbenefitsdeplete the social resourcesavailablefor those who are genuinelyunableto find work. The values children are picking up from these alternativesourcestend to be conducive to destructive,not constructiverebellion. After all, the media are independent businesses, often with a product to sell, not purveyorsof sound values. And peers, as Firestoneso brilliantlyperceives, are not models of maturityfrom which children can learn. Whatever the merits of the old segregatedworld, the new is clearly undesirable. CHILDRENAND ADULTSTOGETHER

It could be arguedthat if children are not handling their newly-won freedoms verywell, the problemis not with their having more adultfreedom,but with other aspects of the equation. Firestoneemphasizesthe oppressiveaspects of youth, not all of which have been eradicatedin the twenty yearsof social change since she wrote. Other might emphasizethe incompletenature

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of the revolution in children'slife. This revolutionhas conferredupon them previously unimagined freedom, without the correspondingresponsibility that teaches them its limits. I think that both these emphasescan be viewed as facets of the sameproblem,lack of confidence in children'sabilityto function in a maturemanner. Still anotherdimensionof the problemis the fragmented, pluralistic, technologically-advancednature of the society youth must cope with. There is, I think, considerabletruth in all these contentions. Lackof condescension toward children is surely a condition of their maturation, as is holding them responsible(insofaras is possible)for the consequencesof their decisions. And if we, as a society, fail to organizeinstitutions to facilitate their passageto adulthood,it is we, not they, who areto blamefor their retardation. There is reason to believe that, for reasons beyond their control, many children are having a harder time than ever making this transition (Coleman, 1961). For the poor, dead-end, low paying jobs await them, if they are lucky, after yearsof apparentlyirrelevantschooling. For those who are better off, schooling seems ever more extended yet often fails, nonetheless, to preparethem for the practice of whatevervocation they choose. There is, however, reasonto believe that anotherfactorplaysan important role in the crisisof youth. And it is one that bearscentrallyon Firestone'sassertion that all control of children is undesirablerepression. Two separateissuesare involved in this assertion.One is whether the contention that all control is repressionis justifiable;the other is whether the same control patterns(whateverthey may be) are justifiablefor children and adults. The generalthesis that no control is ever justifiableis, on the face of it, indefensible. Political theorists of every stripe, except anarchists,realize that we must attemptto control behaviorthat threatensharmto others. While we may have to choose between radicallydifferinginterpretationsof "threaten" and "harm,"the fact remainsthat there is agreementabout the necessity for protectingcertain basic rights, like the rightto life. 2 Surelythis principleapplies to children, too. Debate now centers on the libertarianprinciplethat we have no business attemptingto control self-regardingactions. However, even if, for the sake of argument,we concede its force for adults, its applicationto childrendoes not necessarilyfollow. At issue is whether there are morallyrelevant differences between the two categories:are children just inexperienced, "shortadults," who will acquirethat experience best by being treated like adults? ARE CHILDREN JUST "SHORTADULTS?"

I doubt that anyone who has spent appreciabletime with children would arguein favorof this claim. Children, lovable though they maybe, do not es-

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pecially at early ages now exhibit the kinds of behavioressential to a decent society. They do not appearon earth equippedwith the kinds of prudential characteristics(self-discipline, desire for hard work, knowledge about the world, rationality) essential for many kinds of satisfyingactivities. Nor do they immediatelydemonstratethe kind of concern for others upon which decent communitiesmustbe based.This is not to say that there is anythingfundamentallybad or sinful about them, but ratherthat these desirablecharacteristics appear to be learned over time. Furthermore,it is not clear that treatingchildren like fully autonomousbeings is conducive to such learning. Is maturebehavior learned ratherthan innate?There is longstandingdebate about the extent to which development can be attributedto environmental pressuresor an internalprogram.Few child psychologistsnow adhere to either the extremeLockeanview that nurturedeterminesbehavior, or the extreme view attributedto Rousseauthat behavioris merelythe unfoldingof inner potential. Positionsnot farfrom the latter still appearto be popularin other circles, however. Consider Firestone'splea: "The best way to raise a child is to LAY OFF"(1970, 91). One might well supposethat she believes that children emerge, creativity and intelligence intact, self-disciplinedand caring,if relievedof the smotheringand inappropriate expectationsof the adult world.Her equationof controland repression,as well as her commentson the happyfreedomof lowerclasskids (1970, 100) furtherbolsterthis supposition. Firestone'sblanketrecommendationto "layoff" does not appearto depend on the kind of worldin which we arelayingoff. But, on the face of it, such an unqualifiedrecommendationis implausable.It seems obvious that children would be better off if relieved of inane demandsthat they be "popular,"or that they excel at pursuits(such as football) for which they are not suited. It is much less obvious that anybodywill benefit if they are relieved of demands that they develop their minds in certain ways or that they demonstratecare for others. Firestone'sromantic assessmentof lower class children'sfreedom from both kinds of demandsnot only ignoresthe differencesbetween them, but furtherbuttressesthe view that she wants liberationnow (despitepossibly unfavorableconditions), not when conditions might be riper. Perhapsher lack of interest in the nature of the environment into which children are to be liberatedstems from an implicit model of human development that owes more to Rousseau than to Locke. 3 Rousseau generally emphasizedchildren's internal "program,"arguingthat it flowers best with minimal interferenceby us, whereasLocke'stabularosaunderscoredthe critical importanceof environmentalpressures. Is SUCH A VISIONTENABLE?

Both historical evidence and contemporaryresearchare enlightening. In her book on the history of childrearingadvice, Christina Hardyment de-

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scribessome late eighteenth-centuryattemptsto raise children accordingto what people perceived as Rousseau'sprecepts. Central tenets of this view were that children were to do as they liked from the ages of two to twelve; they were to have natural surroundings,no academic training, and, "All their actions had to spring from necessity rather than obedience" (Hardyment 1983, 19). What happened?Hardymentwrites: Unfortunately, parents and educatorsrapidlybecame disillusioned by their experimentswith nobly savagechildren. Richard Lovell Edgeworth'sboy became so unmanageablethat he was sent away to boardingschool. David Williams described one little child of nature who, aged 13, slept on the floor, spoke a jargonhe had formedout of the severaldialectsof the family, could neither read nor write, and was "a little emaciated figure, his countenancebetrayingmarksof prematuredecay, or depravedpassions;his teeth discolored,his hearingalmost gone." (1983, 19) It would be interestingto know what happenedto these children in the end, as well as to have moredetailsabouttheir upbringing.But these hints bode ill for the idea that the least childrearingis the best. More organizedexperimentsalong these lines occurredin the earlypartof this century. In the 1920s and 30s, so-called"psychoanalyticpedagogy"was a powerfulforce in continental thinking. The basis of this movement was the Freudianstricturethat repressionis the majorcauseof neurosis;preventionof neurosiswas its goal (Cohen 1979). Repressionwas to be avoidedby granting childrena maximumof freedom.This idea was embodiedin a seriesof experimental schools; among them were Siegfried Bernfeld's Kinderheim Hausder Kinder,Anna Freudand DoroBaumgarten,Lili Roubiczek-Peller's thy Burlingham'sschool, and Vera Schmidt'sMoscowChildren'sHome and PsychologicalLaboratory(Cohen 1979, 197-201). Most were short-livedand appearto have been regardedeven by their supportersas unsuccessful.There was a "growingweight of evidence that between principleand practicethere was a huge lacuna, throughwhich many a theory, and many a child, could fall" (Cohen 1979, 203). Sexual liberation should have circumventedthe bad effects posited for repressionand freed children's inner forces to direct them through Freud'spsychosexualstages. The result should have been an ebulliently original school-child. But the normal sublimationof drives into constructiveactivity failed to materialize.The children'sbehaviorturnedout to remain distressinglyinfantile. Many early proponentsof psychoanalytic pedagogylateremigratedto the United States, where they producedcritiques of permissivechildrearing. The experiencesof a freshgenerationof idealistsin the sixties is recounted by Marie Winn:

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By the time the children were old enough to understand words, we began spelling out their freedomto them, the fact that they didn't haveto do what we say just becausewe'rebigger and stronger,that they were entitled to their own opinions and desires.But it reallyworkeddisastrously.. . . We realized pretty soon that giving them absolute freedom was not enough, that you had to make them understandthat people's rights can infringeon each other. And we soon realizedthat such an understandingwas much too complicatedfor them. They just weren'told enough to be able to restrainthemselves on their own (Winn, 1983, 196). Experienceforced these libertariansto modify their theoretical views about moral childrearing:the conclusions that children need the securityof some authorityseemed inescapable. Recent childrearingresearchsupportsthis view. The picturethat emerges associatesimpulsiveness,irresponsibility,disorganization,aggression,and intellectual and behavioralimmaturitywith early laissez-fairepermissiveness.4 Conversely, these same studies imply that some kinds of high control, coupled with rationalexplanationand warmtharerelatedto the oppositetraits.5 Although these resultsare subjectto the usualcaveatsabouthumanresearch, they are, nonetheless, highly suggestive. It would be foolish to believe that they are the last word, but it wouldbe still morefoolish to ignorethem: what empiricalevidence we have points firmlyagainstlaissez-fairepermissivenessif we value certaintraits.6 Therefore,the burdenof proofis upon those who argue for this kind of permissivenessto show either that the evidence is flawed or that the traits are undesirable. OFLEARNING THE IMPORTANCE

The foregoingsuggeststhat the totally inner-directedmodel of human development is inadequate.Rejecting it does not precluderecognitionof some internalelement; it does requireacknowledgingthat the environmentplaysa largerrole than Rousseaumight have envisioned. EleanorMaccobypresents us with a coherent and persuasivealternative. She concedes that children have certain innate tendencies, such as the one favoring social learning (Maccoby 1980, 407-8). She asserts,however, that: Children probablyacquireempathicemotions throughsimple classical conditioning. They lear adaptive social behaviors partlyby experiencingthe consequencesof their own actions and partlyby observingthe sequencesof interactionengaged in by other people. Some aspectsof social behaviorare simply a matterof acquiringhabits (saying"please"and "thankyou,"

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smiling and shaking hands upon being introduced). But as children grow older, their social behavior increasingly becomes a matter of planned sequences, organizedin pursuitof long-termor short-termgoals (1980, 409). She arguesthat children need both knowledgeof acceptablesocial behavior and genuine social consciousness in order to integrate their actions with those of others in this way. Parentscan encouragesuch developmentby various means, includingprovidingstructure,and consistentlyenforcedreasonable demands (1980, 409-10). Furthermore,parentaldemands, learningand self-esteem interact in a mutually-reinforcingway (Maccoby 1980, 272; Coopersmith1968, 96-106). Learningcontrol and skills increasesself-esteem and makes further satisfying experiences and interactions more probable. Failureto learndecreasesself-esteemand makesfurtherbad experiencesmore probable.Learningis more likely to occur if parents(or other adultsclose to the child) pay close attention to him or her, and systematicallyattempt to teach control and skills. This view conceives of children as unfinishedbeings who need a periodof development and teaching to become mature human beings. It requiresa clear conception of traits we find admirable;it concedes that they are unlikely to develop if not explicitly taught. I think that there is good reasonto adopt this vision. Experimentswith permissivenesssuggestnot only that it is an ineffective childrearingmethod, but also the inadequacyof its underlying model of human development. It is true we do not yet know the limits of developmental flexibility. If Piagetian theories are confirmed,for example, our notions of how children can respondat differentages to environmentalstimuliwill become more circumscribed.If anthropologistsshow us societies where children have equal liberty,yet thrive in desirableways, our thinking will have to alter. Fornow, however, we have good historical and psychologicalevidence that "laying off" children in societies like oursis inefficient:it does not help them develop in desirableways. It wouldthereforebe irresponsibleto now recommendsuch practice. Consonant with our recent recognition of the extent of socially constructedbehavior, however, it would make sense to continue researchon alternativeapproachesto childrearing.We have, afterall, been all too prone to interprettrends in our own society as universalimperatives-skepticism defeated only by solid empirical evidence would be a refreshingantidote. Such researchcan help us avoid repeatingpast mistakesas well as illuminate possible futurepaths. The foregoinghas assumedthat we know what the desirabletraitsare, and can thus be seen as an attempt to reply to the second thesis about childrearing-that control is ineffective-described at the beginning of this paper. Skepticism about our value judgments is implicit in the third the-

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sis-that if left to their own devices, children would develop "bravenew traits," ushering in a new age. Although such skepticism is fashionable, I have yet to see a coherent and persuasivetreatmentof this possibility. Although I would surelynot wish to be interpretedas setting out a definitive list, I believe that extreme skepticism is unwarrantedhere. Can we really imagine a better worldwhere imagination,critical thinking and concern for the welfareof others have no prominentplace? CONCLUSION

If the most convincing model of human development is a moderate Lockeanone (that developmentis largelybut not entirelydeterminedby the environment), how do we explain certainfacts cited by Firestone?In particular, what are we to make of the evidence that children have in the past participated much more fully (and successfully)in adult society than they now do in western cultures?How too, can we interpretcross-culturaltestimony from non-westernculturesabout such currentparticipation? I think that we need to be carefulabout how we interpretsuch historical and cross-culturalevidence. For example, it does not follow that because a given society did not recognizeadolescence, that the stagedoes not exist. Individualsof a given age may have had needs that were ignored. Historically, there is evidence that the casualtreatmentaccordedthe young was not uniformlygood for them (deMause 1974). Two furtherpoints need to be made here. One is that a shrunkenconception of youth is by no means universalin human history. It appearsthat notions aboutit have variedtremendouslyover time (Elkind1984, 18). Thus our own practicesmay be much less distinctivethan writerslike Firestoneimply. A second issue is that social conditions create differentattitudesand practices about human development. One set of characteristicsmay be required by society A, anotherby B. This is likely to affectassumptions,practices,and values differentlyin the two societies. Thus, for instance, a feudal agriculturaland artisansociety needs very differentpeople from a complex technological one. Customs appropriatefor the first may fail miserablyfor the second. We thereforecannot assumethat becausechildrencouldfunctionacceptably in differentsocietiesthat they could do so in contemporarywesternculture. In our society, the unemploymentproblem,by itself, createsan insuperable barrierto moreindependentchildren.As it appearsto be a structuralfeature of capitalism,there is much resistanceto its resolution.Even though eradicating unemploymentis essentialto humanwell-being,dumpingnew workerson the labormarketwouldat presentmerelyexacerbatecurrentproblems. Firestone'sother good argumentis that certainpracticesretardratherthan accelerate mature behavior. There is good evidence for this position. The American fascination with brilliance, at the expense of emphasizinghard

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work, providesa readyexcuse for poor achievement. Rigid age-gradingand segregationfrom adults furtheraffects learning. Benjamin S. Bloom, in his recent book DevelopingTalentin YoungPeople,writes that afterforty yearsof researchon schooling, his majorconclusion is that "whatany person in the worldcan learn, almostall personscan lear if providedwith appropriateprior and currentconditions of learning"(Bloom 1985, 4). Our way of life clearly does not provide these conditions. Still more telling is his claim that randomly chosen studentsperformbetterwhen individuallytutoredthan ninetyeight percent of all students taught in groups(1985, 4). What this shows, however, is not that children should be relieved of demands on their time or energy, but that we need to change the kinds of demandswe make on them. We must re-emphasizethe value of hardwork and provide them with much expandedopportunitiesfor interactingon an individual basis with adults.7 If children were no longer so separatedfrom adult society, we cannot predictwhat they would be like. It is plausibleto believe that they would, in general, behave more maturelyand be happierto boot. I think that we have leared enough about child development to expect this resultonly if they arefor some time subjectto specialprotectionand control. We have no reasonto supposethat differentcircumstanceswill enable them to handle full adult responsibilityand freedom in a complex society at an early age; however, definitive judgmentsabout these mattersmust await empiricalevidence. 8 Furtherobservationand experiencearethereforenecessary to determineoptimal levels of responsibilityand freedomfor differentsocieties. The currentlymost plausiblemodel of childhood requiressubstantialadult supervisionand care:it will not, by itself, liberateus fromchildrearingduties. But the systematic draftingof women for this job, and hence their childlinked oppression,can be ended. Sharedparenting,good daycare-even perhaps communal childrearing-can lift the longstanding responsibilityfor children from their backs. Women's and children's oppression have been connected, as Firestone rightlyargues.The firststeps towardswomen'sliberationcan be taken by accordingthem rightsmen have taken for granted.9 There arefew morallyrelevant differencesbetween women and men, and none that would justifywithholding equal rights from women. But there is good reason to believe that there are morallyrelevantdifferencesbetween children and adults. Children appearto need time and practiceto develop the capacitiesfor handling freedom in waysconsonant with their own long-termself-interestand the needs of society. We do not yet know the optimal balance of freedomand control for all children and all circumstances,but we do have groundsfor judging that control is sometimesappropriatefor children where it would not be for adults. Therefore,failing to recognizeequal rightsfor children is not wrong; differenttreatmentmay in fact be morallyrequired.Thus we do not discrimi-

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nate againstchildrenby recognizingequalrightsfor women but not for children: Firestone'sthesis is wrong.

NOTES 1. There are manyconvergingreasonsfor this social trend. Among them are women'sparticipation in the workplace,society'sunwillingnessto provideadequatechildcare,ignoranceand insecurityabout childrearingtechniquesand values on the partof parents,and a new tendency to apply libertarianvalues to the family. 2. This is not to deny that there are areasof disagreementabout even central issueslike the right to life, such as those surroundingabortion, euthanasia,capital punishment, and killing in war. 3. Although there would be considerabletension between any such model and many of her other contentions. ... It also needs to be said that the popularunderstandingof Rousseaudoes not alwayscorrespondvery preciselywith what he actually wrote. 4. The pictureis somewhatcomplicatedhere by the severaldifferentmeaningsassignedto the word. It is importantto differentiatebetween at least two broadtypesof permissiveness,"demo"Democratic"style childrearingconsistsof actively involving children cratic"and "laissez-faire." in decision-makingand providingthem with reasonsfor rules. Differingopinions are aired and evaluated. Children'sviews are treatedwith respect, and when judgedsound, prevail. "Laissezfaire"style contrastsstronglywith this. Diana Baumrind,a noted child researcherin child psychology, describesthe laissez-fairepermissiveparent: She attemptsto behave in a nonevaluative,acceptantand affirmativemanner towardthe child's impulses,desiresand actions. She consultswith him about policy decisions and gives explanationsfor family rules. She makesa few demandsfor householdresponsibilityand orderlybehavior. She presentsherself to the child as a resourcefor him to use as he wishes, not as an ideal for him to emulate, nor as an active agent responsiblefor shapingor alteringhis ongoing or futurebehavior. She allows the child to regulatehis own activities as much as possible, avoids the exerciseof control, and does not insist that he obey externallydefined standards.She attemptsto use reasonand manipulation,but not overt power, to accomplishher ends (402). These two styles have in common the practicesof consultingabout importantdecisions, and explaining rules. However, they differradicallyin other respects.The democraticstyle, unlike the laissez-fairemodel, is not inconsistent with high demands, control of the child's impulses, and modeling on the part of the parent. 5. See for example, D. M. Levy, "The Deprivedand the IndulgedFormsof PsychopathicBeVol. 21, (250-54), 1951, cited in Daniel G. Freedhavior,"AmericanJournalof Orthopsychiatry, man, "The Origins of Social Behavior,"Influenceson HumanDevelopment,ed. Urie Bronfenbrenner, (Hinsdale, Illinois:The DrydenPress,Inc., 1972); Wesley C. Becker, "Consequences of DifferentKindsof ParentalDiscipline,"Reviewsof ChildDevelopmentResearch,ed. MartinL. Growthand the Parent-Child RelaHoffmanand Lois Maccoby, SocialDevelopment:Psychological tionship,(San Diego: HarcourtBraceJovanovich, Publishers,1980); Diana Baumrind,"Child care practicesanteceding three patternsof preschoolbehavior,"GeneticPsychology Monographs, vol. 75, (43-88), 1967; Baumrind,"CurrentPatternsof ParentalAuthority,"Developmental PsyDeterminantsof PerchologyMonograph,vol. 4, (1, Pt. 2), 1971; Diana Baumrind,Socialization sonalAgency, paperpresentedbiennial meetings of the Society for Researchin Child Development, New Orleans, 1977, (cited in Maccoby,p. 377); N. Kent and D. R. Davis, "Disciplinein the Home and IntellectualDevelopment,"BritishJournalof MedicalPsychology,Vol. 30 (27-34), 1957; reprintedin Bronfenbrenner,Influences. 6. The picture is somewhatcomplicatedby the fact that children seem to need differentapproachesat differentstagesof life. It looks as if the optimummight be early firmness,high de-

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mands and warmth;these lead to internalizationof control, which in turn permits increasing freedomduring the teenage years. 7. Incidently, Firestone'spoint, which is most well taken, really underminesher own Rousseau-basedmodel of human development. 8. The practical applicationof these ideas would be far from easy. First of all, we face the problemof how to deal with already-existingchildren who may not be preparedfor such treatment. Second, if childrearingcontinues to remainthe privatepreserveof parents, many future childrenwill have troubleadaptingto new freedomand responsibility.Third, society must make radicalchanges in orderto accommodatethese children;they are, as I have asserted,desirablein themselves, but we have not been able to make them. If they are not made, currentsocial problems may well become unmanageable. 9. This is not to say that a bettersocietywouldnot recognizeadditionalrightsunknowntoday! REFERENCES

Baumrind,Diana. 1967. Child care practices anteceding three patterns of preschool behavior. GeneticPsychologyMonographs75: 43-88. . 1971. Currentpatternsof parentalauthority.Developmental Pyschology Monograph4(1, pt. 2). -- . 1972. Some thoughtsabout childrearing.In Influenceson humandevelopment,ed. Urie Bronfenbrenner.Hinsdale, Illinois:The DrydenPress, Inc. . 1977. Socializationdeterminants of personalagency.paper presented at the biennial meetingsof the Society for Researchin Child Development. New Orleans. Becker, Wesley. 1964. Consequences of different kinds of parental disciresearch,ed. MartinL. Hoffmanand pline. In Reviewof childdevelopment Lois Wladis Hoffman, vol. 1. Russell Sage Foundation. Bloom, Benjamin. 1985. Developingtalentin youngpeople.New York:Ballantine Books. Bronfenbrenner,Urie. 1972. The roots of alienation. In Influenceson human development.Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, Inc. Cohen, Sol. 1979. In the name of the preventionof neurosis:the searchfor a psychoanalyticpedagogyin Europe1905-1938. In Regulatedchildren,liberated children:educationin psychoanalyticalperspective,ed. Barbara Finkelstein. New York:PsychohistoryPress. Coleman, James S. 1961. The adolescentsociety:the sociallife of the teenager and its impacton education.New York:The Free Pressof Glencoe. Condry, John and Michael L. Siman. Characteristicsof peer-orientedand adult-orientedchildren.Journalof MarriageandtheFamily36(3): 543-54. Coopersmith,S. 1968. Studies in self-esteem.ScientificAmerican218(2): 96106. DeMause, Lloyd. 1974. The historyof childhood.New York:The Psychohistory Press. Elkind, David. 1984. All grownup andno placetogo. Reading,Massachusetts: Addison Wesley PublishingCo.

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Firestone,Shulamith. 1970. The Dialecticof Sex. New York:BantamBooks. Hardyment, Christina. 1983. Dreambabies:threecenturiesof goodadviceon childcare. New York:Harperand Row. Kent, N. and D. R. Davis. 1957. Discipline in the home and intellectualenvironment. In Influenceson humanbehavior,ed. Urie Bronfenbrenner. Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, Inc. Levy, D. M. 1951. The deprivedand indulgedformsof psychopathicbehav21: 250-54. ior. AmericanJournalof Orthopsychiatry Locke, John. 1689. An essay concerninghumanunderstanding.Ed. A. C. Fraser.Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1894. psychological growthand theparMaccoby, Eleanor. 1980. Socialdevelopment: San Diego: Harcourt,BraceJovanovich, Publishers. ent-childrelationship. Packard,Vance. 1983. Our endangeredchildren.Boston: Little, Brown and Co. Rousseau,Jean-Jacques.1762. Emile.Trans. Allen Bloom. New York:Basic Books, 1979. Welsh, Patrick. 1986. Tales out of school.New York:Viking Press. Winn, Marie. 1983. Childrenwithoutchildhood.New York:Pantheon.

Woman as Metaphor1 EVA FEDERKITTAY

Women'sactivitiesand relationsto men are persistentmetaphorsfor man's where of theseandthelackof equivalentmetaphors projects.I querytheprominence vehiclefor womenandwomen'sactivities.Women'sroleas menare themetaphoric metaphorresultsfromherothernessand herrelationaland mediational importance in men'slives.Otherness,mediation,andrelationcharacterize theroleof metaphor in languageandthought.Thiscongruence betweenmetaphor andwomenmakesthe in woman man's metaphorof especiallypotent conceptualeconomy.

Women's activities and women's relation to man persistentlyare used as metaphors for man's activities and projects. In these metaphors, man mediates his engagement with the world through a representationof it as Woman and metaphoricallytransposeshis relation to Woman on to his relation to the world. Many of the metaphorsare transculturaland transhistorical. Man speaksof conqueringthe mountainas he would woman, of raping the land, of his plow penetratinga female earth in orderthat he may sow his seed therein. He symbolicallymimicsa woman'sbirthgivingin initiation rites when man gives birth to man, concretizingmetaphorsinto ritualisticenactments.2 And he uses exclusively female activities as metaphorsto help him structurehis own relations to his exclusively male enterprises. Plato uses the midwifeand the female domain of procreationas metaphor for intellectual activity which, within the setting of fifth centuryAthens, is virtuallyan exclusivelymale domain.3 Rilke speaksof "The thought of being creator, of procreating,of making," as "nothing without the thousandfold concordance of things and animals-and enjoyment of it so indescribably beautifuland rich only becauseit is full of inheritedmemoriesof the conceiving and the bearingof millions"(Rilke 1934). Nietzsche, situated-however problematically-in the male domain of philosophy,opens BeyondGoodand Evil with the invitation to suppose that truth is woman. Conrariwise (or perhapsgiven Nietzsche's ironical stance, contrapuntally)the arts of deception are spoken of as Woman. Locke, eloquentlyderidingeloquence, writes: "Eloquence,like the fair sex, has too prevailingbeauties in it to sufferitself ever to be spoken against. And it is vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving wherein men find pleasureto be deceived." (Locke 1689). Imagesof sexual conquest, particularlysince the seventeenth century, are regularlyused to describethe relationof the male scientist who investigatesa Hypatiavol. 3, no. 2 (Summer1988)? by EvaFederKittay

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female Nature, Mother Nature, penetratingher, and forcingher to yield up her secrets. Or man speaksgently of the earthas his motherand Nature as his nurse: Earthfills her lap with pleasuresof her own; Yearningsshe hath in her own naturalkind, And, even with something of a Mother'smind, And no unworthyaim, The homely nurse doth all she can To make her Foster-child,her Inmate Man, Forgetthe glories he hath known, And that imperialpalace whence he came. Wordsworth(From"Ode, Intimations of Immortalityfrom Recollections of EarlyChildhood.") Man identifies that which he wants and desires, or has acquiredor fearsacquiring,as Woman. The earth, the sea, the hurricane,Truth, Freedom,Liberty, Sexuality are all called Woman, as is Death itself. These examplesdirect us to consider the importanceof woman'smetaphorizationin the conceptual organizationof man's experience. The use of the vehicle of Woman to form men's conceptualizationof the world and their relation to it is pervasive and goes unquestioned because Woman, both as Other and as Mother, occupiesa position in men'slives that both reflects the structureof metaphoricalthought and mirrorsthe role of metaphorin languageand thought. To the extent that the structuringof our conceptualizationsdependson the use of metaphor(see Lakoffand Johnson 1980 and Kittay 1987) to that extent we can expect that the articulationof men's experiences, in largemeasure,will be modeledon their relationshipto women. Let me suggest how there is a congruence between man's relation to women and the structureof metaphoricallanguage.Simone de Beauvoirargues convincingly that woman is Other for man: man regardshimself as the norm againstwhich woman is postulatedas Other. Alterity is itself a crucial requirementfor metaphor. A minimal, but essential requirementfor metaphor is that its topic and its vehicle come from two distinct conceptual domains, that is, the vehicle must be Other with regardto the topic. Consider, for example, the difficultyof using "knife"metaphoricallyfor "fork"when both are used as they come from the one domain of eating utensils; or considerusing "apple"for "pear"where both come fromthe domain of common fruit. Women and metaphorsalike are at once mediationaland relational. As Other, woman serves to mediate between man and man, man and Nature, man and Spirit. In metaphorthe domain of the vehicle mediates between

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that which is not well known, or that about which we want to learn more, and what is familiaror readyto hand. That is, metaphorsmediatebetween an assimilated (or rather relatively assimilated)conceptual domain and a distinct and separatedomain which needs to be newly assimilatedor reconceptualized.My claim, then, is that as women are the Other, mediatingfor men between one stage of life and the next, between the familiarand the new, so Woman serves symbolically,throughmetaphor,to mediate man'sconceptualizationsbetween himself and those alteritieshe must encounter. Woman has served not only as Other and as Mediator.Woman has been the fulcrumof relations,of those associationsinto which men enter -the life of a womanhas traditionallybeen dominatedby relationsborn to others. It is this role as the locus of humanrelationsthat makespossiblewoman'scapacity as mediator.While women are the loci of sets of humanrelations,metaphors acquiremeaning by exploiting semantic relations. Metaphors accomplish their mediational cognitive function, the mediation between distinctive domains through a transference of semanticrelations & if we reLehrer are best understood 1981; Kittay 1987). Metaphors (Kittay gardthe metaphoricaltransferof meaning to be a transferof the relationsof contrastand affinitywhich pertain to the vehicle term on to the domain of the topic. Forexample, if I say of a tennis playerthat she is "hot"this game, "hot" is the vehicle, and its semantic field is the field of temperatureterms; the domainof the topic is athletics. "Hot"and "cold"aregradedantonymsin the temperaturefield;when transferredto athletics, a "hot"playeris one who plays well and scores while a "cold"playerdoes not. The antonymy of the pairis preserved.Moreover,if a playerscoresonly moderatelywell mid-game, we can say "she was luke-warmin the thirdquarter."Since "hot"and "cold" are not absolute but gradedantonyms, we can captureall sorts of performances in between, and even on the outerextremes,e.g. "Herperformanceon the court today is sizzling."In this way metaphorcan, through a relational transposition,structurean as yet unstructuredconceptual domain, thereby altering, sometimestransiently,sometimespermanently,our ways of regarding our world. To the extent that man uses Woman as metaphorhe has a conceptualdomain availablethat is alreadyschematizedby proximateand familiarrelations that can be transferredto make intelligiblemore distant and obscureconceptual and experientialdomains. Woman providesmen with a set of richly articulateddomainsby which he can conceptualizeeven his earliestmediations between himself and his self, his fellows, and his world. The congruence of the structuralfeaturesof metaphorand the structural featuresof man'srelationsto womanmakesthe metaphoricaluse of Woman a central feature in man's conceptualizationof his cosmos-so central, that were men's relationsto women to change, men will need to abandonconceptualizationseven of partsof their experiencewhich appearto have little to do

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with their relationswith women. The studyof the persistentuse of woman's domain as the vehicle, where the domainof man is the topic, is then a philosophical investigation, spurredby feminist theorizing, into the nature and source of some of our most significantconceptions. I. THE 'OTHER'AND GENDERTHEORY WOMANAS 'OTHER'

If the structureof metaphor is such that the vehicle and the topic must come from two distinct domains, then Simone de Beauvoir'sunderstanding of woman'ssecondarystatus alreadyprovidesmotivation for the metaphoric use of woman. For Beauvoir contended that woman's inferior status was rooted in man'sconception of womanas Other.4 If woman is Other, then she is always available as the vehicle for the self-conception and activities of man, the subject, the topic. Following a Hegelian metaphysics,Beauvoirclaimed that "Other"was a basic categoryof human thought. As the subjectsets itself up as the essential one, it does so in oppositionto an other: "The subjectcan be posed, only in being opposed."(Beauvoir1952, xvii). But if othernessis a fundamentalcategory of human thought, necessaryto the very formationof self-consciousness, women too should set themselvesup as the essential Subject in opposition to another self which they posit as Other. Women's positing men as Other would then generatemetaphorsin which men were the vehicles for the self-conceptionsand activities of women. Indeed, within the Hegelian dialectic the claim of the other consciousnesscannot long be ignored, and one must acknowledgethe reciprocalclaim on the part of the other. When that consciousnesswhich has been posedas Other sets itself up as the One, it then poses the firstconsciousnessas the Other.5 And yet man'srelationto woman differsfrom his relationsto the other self-consciousbeings, i. e. men, in that this othemess is not reciprocal.Women have not similarlyassertedtheir own essentialityand posited the othernessof man. And the dearth of metaphors where men servesas the vehicle for the topic, woman, attests to this lack of reciprocity. Beauvoir was herself unable to explain the lack of reciprocity. As she noted, other groups,notablyminoritiesor colonizedpeoples, have lackedthe full reciprocityof Othernessfor extended periods, but have in time asserted their subjectivityand posited their oppressorsas other. Only in the case of women has the lack of reciprocityseemed so naturaland so inexorable.Neither the apparentlack of historicalcontingency in the case of the Otherness of women, nor the apparent"primordialMitsein"of the sexes explains this lack of reciprocity."In truth," she writes, "the nature of things is no more immutablygiven, once for all, than historicalreality. If woman seems to be

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the inessential which never becomes the essential, it is because she herself fails to bringabout this change"(Beauvoir1952, xviii). This suggeststhat in the end we are forced to attributewoman'scontinued otherness to her own complicitywith her oppressors.It is a complicity, which Beauvoiranalyzesas arising from woman's exclusion from production and her historic enslavement to reproduction-a condition over which she has had little control-as well as men's resistanceto her assumptionof the statusof subject.6 But it is also a complicitythat comes froma "temptationto foregolibertyand become a thing," a temptation which coexists in the person along with the "ethical urge"towardtranscendence. But if this is so, how did women come to assumethe position of dependency, of otherness in the first place? Why should women have permitted themselvesto be excludedfromproduction?And why shouldwomen'srole in reproductionhave doomedher to othernessand subordinationratherthan ascendancyand power?Why, in the final analysis,shouldwomen and not men have yieldedto "the temptationto foregoliberty?"Without retreatingto that essentialism, be it biological or metaphysical,that Beauvoirso significantly repudiatedwhen she declaredthat womanwas not bornbut made, we are left without a fully satisfactoryanswer to the question Beauvoirposes: Why is otherness not reciprocallyposited by woman? I suggestthat with the arrivalof currentgendertheorywe have an explanation that can help resolveour perplexity.Gender theoryhas provideda justification for claiming that the categoryof Othernessis not as essential to the self of a womanas it is for a man. Once we understandthe sourceof the asymmetry of otherness, we will also understandwhy woman serves as metaphor for men, and why man does not performa similarservicefor women. Furthermore, this justificationexplainswhy woman, in particular,has functioned as a mediation and predictsthe sort of relationswe can expect when we examine metaphors in which woman is the vehicle. We shall see exactly how Nancy Chodorow's(1978) psychologicaltale of the formationof the self illumines Beauvoir's question and consequently frames the investigation of Woman as Metaphor. CHODOROW AND GENDERTHEORY

Perhapswe first need to considerwhether an empiricallybasedstudysuch as Chodorow'scan have a bearingon the philosophicalconcept of the Other. I adoptthe position that the most metaphysicalconcepts, apparentspinnings of ethereal webs ex nihilo, are, if only through metaphoric transpositions, groundedin experientialreality. Such experiencein turnpresentsitself, in its particularity,throughthe articulationof concepts. In fact, the very thrustof this paper is to show, more or less specifically,how an entire series of such conceptualizationsare groundedin men's experienceof women as nurturers,

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an experience which itself reflectsculturallydefined conditions shaping the lives of both men and women. Primaryamong the importantpsychologicalconsequencesof asymmetrical gender-differentiated relations between mother and child, consequences which result from the productionof gender, is the fact that men establish their identity, their sense of self, in opposition to the mother, while daughters establish their sense of self through a continuing identity with the mother. If this thesis is correct, it explains why otherness is essential to the self-formationof men but not of women. For men the categoryof Other is crucial because men establish their relation both to themselves and to their worldthroughan oppositionto one whose othernessis markednot only by the limits of one's skin, but by the saliency of sexual and gender differences. Woman, in contradiction,does not establishherselfin oppositionto one who is so fundamentallydifferentiatedfrom herself.7 Chodorow arguesthat the young boy must represshis primaryidentification with his mother in orderto develop his propersexual identity, that is, more precisely, his gender. Foremostamong the salient sexual differences which the young boy comes to perceive are the procreativeones. Therefore the boy comes to understandthat becausehe is male,and his mother is female, he cannot reproducein his experience the birthgivingwhich broughthim into existence and which justifies the remarkablepower that the mother holds over him (Kittay 1983). Certainly, the young girl learns, as does the young boy, to distinguishherself from her mother, that the limits of her skin are not coincident with that of the woman who cares for her and has powerover her. But as Chodorow's use of "object-relations"psychoanalytictheory allows her to demonstrate, the differentiation, the separation is never complete in the girl. And to Chodorow'sanalysiswe can add that the younggirlcan maintainthe identification in the knowledgethat she can one day bear the same relationshipto her childrenthat the motherbearsto her:her dependencyon her motherand the powershe thus grantsher mother is the very powerthat she can look forwardto having when she herselfbecomes a mother. Forwomen the category of Othernessnever has the fundamentalstatusand pervasivecharacterit has for men because women's own understandingof themselves and their affliations is mediatedthrough one who, insofaras she has a same gender identity, is not fundamentallyOther. In recasting Chodorow'sobject-relationspsychoanalytictheory into the philosophicalconcept of alterity, we can say that for the boy and girl alike, the mother, as the first importantOther, serves as the first mediation between the child and the child's sense of who s/he is-one's consciousnessof oneself as a separateconsciousbeing in a worldwith other separateconscious beings. She is simultaneouslythe mediatorbetween the child and the child's needs, desires,etc. and between the child and the world. But for the boy, his

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relations to himself, his relations to other persons and his relations to the and abworldabouthim areall firstmediatedby the Mother, asfundamentally in her sexual differenti(and perhapsparticularlyprocreative) solutelyOther, ation from the boy. The significanceof the biological sexual difference attains its particularsaliencyby virtueof the culturalsignificanceof gender (itself a cultural,not a biologicalconcept) to identity itself. In orderto establish his appropriategender identity, he must establish himself both as separate and as distinct from her. Beforemoving on, then, to applythese feminist analysesto metaphor,we see how Chodorow, in effect, explains why women have never reciprocally constitutedmen as Other. Forwomen, Othernessneed not have the oppositional and absolutecharacterit has for men. Forbetter and for worse, the self that women develop may well be more accommodatingto otherness. If gender theory is correct, then the key to women's liberationmay not lie in the reciprocityof Otheress. Insteadwomen will be liberatedby creatingnew social conditions that will forgealternativesto men's currentconception of the relationbetween self and other. It maynow be the historicalmomentfor philosophersto rewriteHegel'smaster-slavedialectic fromthe standpointof the maternalconsciousness,the consciousnesswhich has been formedto accommodate the othernessof the child and which in turn develops that same accommodatingotherness in the female child. This is a dialectic in which the self and other aresuch that the self comprehendsitselfnot throughan opposition, but througha connectedness, an empatheticbond with an other. This still to be developeddialectic, togetherwith other feministefforts,maythrow light both on the familiarlimitation of women'sdependencyand lack of autonomy that emerge from the relative lack of separationand differentiation from the mother;but it will also illuminatethe excessive valuationof autonomy and the undervaluation of mutuality which feminists have begun to identify. These remarksare meant as a contributionto the effortsof feministsto see how far gender theory can take us in understandingthe gender-basednature of our theoretical constructs.The utilizationof this perspectiveto the question of Woman as metaphor is part of the exploration of the new terrain opened up by examining the consequencesof woman'smothering.8 II. MOTHER/OTHER-WOMAN/METAPHOR

It is the initial positing of Motheras Other which makeswoman a particularlysuitablevehicle to mediatelater (re)definitionsof oneself and one's connections to the world. Becauseman'sfirstand most significantattemptto define himself and to establishhis relationshipsarisesout of his experiencewith a woman, women serve metaphoricallyto representthose activities and domains in which man will redefinehimself and establishnew associationsin a

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world which expandsfor him as he maturesand gains knowledge. This conceptual move is facilitatedby the structureof metaphoritself. Becauseit is in the very structureof metaphorto exploit such relationships,woman'ssituation as Other is solidifiedthroughthe metaphorizationof these earlyexperiences and their metaphoricaltranspositionon to man's later life. Woman performingher role as Mother/Mediatoris propitiouslysituated in man's life to become the metaphor which mediates between assimilated and as yet unassimilatedexperience in later life. Furthermorethe very relationsthe Woman as Mother bearsto her young son obtains the potential-through their saliency in the boy'smental representationsof himselfand his position in the world-to serve as the model for the variouspossiblerelationshe will later need to establishbetween himself and his world. On manyaccountsof metaphor,modelsareelaboratedand extended metaphorswhich have the possibilityof greaterconceptual stability than most metaphors.As such, the modelsof the relationsof the man to his early mother figurebecome the sourceof many possiblemetaphorsin which those relations are transferredto the domainsoccupied by man and his various projects. They will be relationswhich reflect the metaphorictranspositions of the waysin which the child views his relationto his mothergiven the genderdifferential,combined, we must add, with devaluationof the female gender. They will be relations which reversethe power the mother has over the child, yielding metaphorsof conquest and forcedsubmission.Others will reflect the fact of man having been born of woman. These are the metaphorsof man giving birth to himself, to his products, to other men (in initiation rites). They are metaphorsof man giving life (Pygmalion), saving life, or, though a metaphoricreversalof death for life where woman is death or the victim to receive death, taking life. Still others will reflect man's dependency, with all the ambivalencesuch dependencyevokes. These give us the ambivalenceof metaphorsof the good and nurturingMother Earthand the "EarthMother [who] engulfs the bones of her children" (Beauvoir 1952, 166), the glorificationof woman'ssensual body and the devaluation of the bodily (Fleshas Woman), the life-givingyet fearsomepowersof a femaleSea, the welcoming and enveloping or suffocatingand confining armsof the city as Woman. And they will reflect the mediation of the mother with the greaterand morepowerfulforcesof the Father(the VirginMary), the female incarnation of Justice, Liberty,Truth, Death; her mediationbetween the young boy and his futureself, the female Museswhich mediatebetween the poet and his art (men's brainchildren, born of the male creator mating with the female Muse); and her mediation with the social world, woman as keeper of the hearth, the feminine as the compassionate,empathetic, moralizingelement, and woman herself as a metaphorictransactionbinding together groupsof

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men in the rites of marriage. (See Levi-Strauss 1949). These latter mediationsalso have a negative side, as when the womanis thought to bridge man not with the higher, but with the lower powers, aligning man with the forcesof Evil:the witch copulatingwith the Devil is the symbolicincarnation of this metaphoricmediation. Imagesof woman "on top," of woman taking over have metaphoricallyrepresentedanarchy, the overturningof properly constituted power, as in Bruegel'spainting of Mad Megg.9 The metaphoricalimageof woman has been used to representman'semotional and irrationalelements, his (sic) "darkerside." Here woman mediates negatively between man and himself so that he can displace unto woman those components of his nature with which he wants to disassociatehimself - just as he utilized the psychologicalmechanismof "splitting"his mother into a 'goodmother'and a 'badmother' (see Klein 1957), so he splits himself into a good self and an evil self and uses the "badmother"as the one unto whom he can projecthis evil self, producingthe metaphorof Woman as Evil, Irrational,Witch. The darkside of womanas mediatorbetween man and other men, between man and his social world has its representationin metaphorsof Woman as Artifice, Woman as Deception, and its mythic representation of Helen, whose "mediation"between men was that of war and destruction,although ambivalentfigurethat she is, she was also the sourceof unity amongGreeks: womanas she who bindsmen togetheris the positive mediationwhile woman as she who causesdiscordamongmen is its negative side. The metaphoricuse of women who belong to social groupsthought to be Other is pertinenthere. The Other Other has perhapsa unique role in mediatingbetween men and women of his own social group-especially in the context of sexualrelations. The iconographyof the black female servant in paintingswith strong erotic content, e.g. Manet'sOlympiaor Daniel Rossetti'spaintingThe Beloved,can be analyzed as an intensification of the erotic-itself paradigmatically Other-achieved by the sexualizationof the woman who is doublyother. 10 In regardto both its relationaland mediationalaspects,metaphoris the instrument,par excellence,for such relationaltransfersacrossdistinct domains, where the metaphor mediates between such distinct domains. Man's metaphorizationof his relationsto women is therebyused to orderman'ssubsequent relations to others and that which is Other. The work of Evelyn Fox Keller (1984), SandraHarding(1986), Carolyn Merchant (1980) and others strongly suggeststhat scientific developments are associatedin some systematicway (the directionalityof a causal link, if any, remainsunclear) with the changing metaphorsregarding"genderpolitics," and the manyformsand shifts in this politics of gender. Harding(1986, 115), speakingof the Renaissanceand Elizabethanperiods, writes: Thinkersof the periodconsistentlyperceivedunruly,wild nature as rising up against man's attempts to control his fate.

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Machiavelli appealedto sexual metaphorsin his proposition that the potential violence of fate could be mastered:"Fortune is a woman and it is necessaryif you wish to masterher to conquer her by force; and it can be seen that she lets herself be overcome by the bold rather than by those who proceed coldly, and thereforelike a woman, she is alwaysa friend to the young becausethey are less cautious,fierce and masterher with greateraudacity." The violent imagesrecur in Bacon ([1623] 1870, 296): You have but to follow and as it were hound nature in her wanderings,and you will be able, when you like, to lead and drive her afterwardto the sameplace again . .. Neither ought a man to make scrupleof entering and penetratinginto those holes and comers, when the inquisitionof truth is his whole object. Harding (1986) maintainsthat the canons of science retain the structure,if not the content, of the metaphorsbecause the contentful metaphorshave l proven so fruitfulin empiricalresearch. MEDIATIONS/METAPHORS

A child emerginginto personhoodengagesin many mediationswhich utilize Mother/Other. These become the source of future metaphoric mediations. Such a flow of mediation/metaphorhas at least three distinctive tributaries.And in looking at the vast assortmentof metaphorsit may be helpful to have a typology to guide us. The developing child must mediate between its presentself and its evolving self, between itself and its world (as object), and between itself and other subjects(its social world). In a worldwhere the subjectis thought of as male, these three mediations are reflected in three metaphor-types:(male)self/ (male)self, (male)self/objectworld, (male)self/(male) social world. The typology provides, at once, three ways in which women or women's activities are used to form metaphorical identifications based on women's role in a man's early life and which are the sourcesof potent metaphoricalconceptualizations. We have said that the motherfirst mediates (MALE)SELF/(MALE)SELF: between the young child and his sense of self. Attaining that sense of self comes through an increase in his activities and his growth. According to earlychild theorists, the child's earlyattainmentof his sense of self proceeds throughactivities in which he identifieswith his mother. In the self/selfmetaphors, we have man's later replicationof preciselythis relationshipto his mother-again he mediatesbetween a currentself and a developing self by

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identifyingwith the active woman and througha mimetic relation, an imitation not of the actualactivity but of the structureof that activity, man incorporatesthese activities into a newly articulatedself-definition. Here Woman is vehicle in the sense that some exclusive male activity is modeled on her activities, as in, for example, the midwife metaphor.12 In this type of metaphor,man vis-a-vishis domain locates himself in a position homologous to that of the woman vis-a-vis her domain.13 This results in a of the man with a woman:Socratesin the domain of metaphoricidentification a midwife. Notice that in the Theatetusmetaphor, Socrates is philosophy which to he takesto be critical, namely, that his job as points one disanalogy a philosopher-teacheris far more importantthan the midwife'ssince he, unlike the midwife, must be able to discern true from false births. Where man metaphoricallyidentifieshimself with woman, we can almost alwaysfind an accompanyingstatement in which the man, at once, dissociates himself from the devaluationof the literal female activity by supervaluating his metaphoricallyidentifiedmale activity. When men of New Guinea structuretheir male initiation rites on the model of women's birthgiving, they make clear to all that their birthgivingis far superiorto the birthgiving of women. And Rilke (1903) writes in the "Book of Hours:" Bestow on us man's real motherhood (not of the kind of woman's labor), install the he-man in his right as he who giveth birth;birth to Death-Messiah: fulfill his longings, for they are greaterthan the dreamof the virgin giving birth to God.

14

It is woman'sagencywithin her own domainthat is modeledby man when he seeks a representationfor his own activity. But man'smetaphoricidentification with woman is combinedwith a supervaluationof man'sactivities and a metaphoricappropriation of the relevant relationswhich pertain in the female domain via a transpositionof these relationson to an exclusively male domain. (MALE)SELF/OBJECTWORLD: This metaphor-typedoes not require the topic of the metaphorto be a domainof man'sactivitiesperse. It only requiresthe topic to be a domain which is Other for man. Here the relationof man to some alterity is mediated through a chosen relation (or set of relations) to Woman:not man but the alterity(which is the topic) is metaphorically identified with woman, and it is man who is the uttererof the metaphor. The alterityis just that othernesswhich man wants in some way to engage. Or else, it is the alterityhe wants to mediatebetween himselfas utterer and a force greaterthan himself. When an alterity is metaphoricallyidentified as woman, and man relatesto it as he would to a woman, the ensuingrelation is generallymodelledon the motherguidingher child in the child's interactionswith the externalworld. The confidence, security,anger, and fear

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- all the ambivalencesevoked by the move awayfrom the dependencyon the mother-is reflectedin the metaphorsin which anotheralterityis metaphorically named Woman. His attitudes and behavior toward the Other mimic his relations (or rather some chosen subset of possible relations) to women. In a telling passagefrom the Prelude,Wordsworth,deriding "that false secondarypower/ By which we multiplydistinctions,"praisesthat association of the babe to its mother which instills in us a yearningto regainthe wholeness of Being, the unity of ourselvesand the world of Nature. The effort to reestablishunity is the creative urgeof the poet. The babe, in his experience of oneness with his mother is "the first/ Poetic spiritof our human life" (Prelude, bk 2, lines 216-17, 260-61). The ambivalenceof the closenessand dependencythat the youngchild experiences in regardto its mother becomes reflected in the contraryand contradictorynatureof the imagesof those alteritiesidentifiedas woman. Biblical images of the cities of Jerusalemand Babylon, for instance, exemplify both sides of the ambivalence.St. Paul in the Epistleto the Galatiansspeaks of that "Jerusalemwhich now is, and is in bondagewith her children,"and of that "Jerusalemwhich is above which is free, which is the mother of us all" (Gal. 4: 25). The city of Babylon is simply "the great whore." (MALE)SELF/(MALE)SOCIAL WORLD: In this metaphor-type, the woman herself, not a mere representation,linguistic or otherwise, becomes the metaphoric vehicle. The metaphoricidentification is between woman and that value which womansignifiesbut which manpossesses.Possessionof such value places him in an interactiverelation with other men. This metaphor is based on the mediative role of the mother to the child as she integratesthe child into the social order,which underpatriarchyis the world of the Father. To a large extent, the value the mother takes on is both value that the child attaches to her and that which other, grownmen (the father) attach to her. It is the shift in her value fromprotector,nurturer,omnipotent figure to her value as erotic object. Once she loses her omnipotence (becomesviewed as a castratein Freudian idiom) and is seen to be valued by others for her erotic qualities, she can be exchanged for another erotic object. It is an exchange which binds men together. The Oedipal complex can itself be viewed as such a metaphoricexchange. The boy gives up the Motheras a love object-gives her over to the Father-in exchangefor the father'ssocial identity in and throughthe superego. This is also how to understandLevi-Strauss'explanationof the primordial and universalcharacterof the incest taboo:that "in humansociety a man must obtain a woman from another man who gives him a daughteror a sister." (Levi-Strauss1967, 44). Throughthe exchange of women, men establish circlesof social interactionwith men not fromthe samematernalline. In this exchange, actual women function as signifierswhose value comes from their mediating role in the interactionbetween men.

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Within social structureswherekinshipplaysa less criticalrole in establishing social relations, woman is still the metaphoricvehicle for the value controlledby a man, value throughwhich he establisheshis position in the social order.Thus the "possession"of a BeautifulWoman takes on the metaphoric role of signifyingthe greatervirility (or money or power)of the man "possessing"her. Similarsignificationis given to a woman'sclothing, jewels, leisure, or today, perhaps, to her professionalachievement. We have alreadycited the destructive(althoughambivalent)characterof such mediation in the figure of Helen. To this we need to add the rapeof women in wartime,which is as much a symbolicact as an actualassault.Woman as the metaphor,the mediation between one social groupof men and another, is preciselythe vehicle for expressionof the dominationof one groupover the other. If the sexualexchange of women marksthe bond between men, the victor'ssexual "expropriation"solidifies a conquest.15 Within patriarchy,those men who possessvalue do not signifyvalue. Men who do not possessvalue but are productive,e.g. slaves and laborers,do signify value; however, the signification is literal, not metaphorical.In social and economic orderswhere woman are actively engaged in "productive"labor, they too signify literal ratherthan symbolicor metaphoricvalue-that is, they exemplifythe value they producefor others. But it is that which neither possessvalue of itself, nor is engaged in "productive"labor (laborproductive of value), which is best suited as the metaphoricalvehicle for value. It is reasonableto conjecturethat the less she is engagedin utility and needed productivelabor, the moregearedto leisureand luxury,the moreshe is capable of being metaphoricallyidentifiedwith the value which belongs to man. Yet women who are productivewill still take on a metaphoricimport, but it is not the positive value accordedto the womanof leisure;it is rathernegative value accordedto the Witch, the Whore, the Temptress.It is not only productivewomen that acquirea negative valence, but, especiallyin hierarchical and racist societies, those women who are the Other Other. The Other Other is a woman who, like the mother, is female, but, unlike the mother, comes from some groupalreadymarkedby salient differences-differences conceptualized as threatening or desirable, as imbuing its bearers with power or renderingthem vulnerableprey. Sexual transgressionsalong the lines of class and race invite danger, excitement, even disaster,but also allow men who are regardedas Other to deny their alterity (e.g. the sailorin SweptAway (see n. 15); also see Cleaver 1967), and allow men who are the One to affirmtheir masteryor assertthe sexuality-especially where upper class males are conceptualizedas effete or as lacking a robustsexuality (e.g. the CaryGrantfigurein I'mNo Angel(see n. 16). The Other Other, the dark woman, the Jewess,the workingclass woman is sexualized-she is conceptualized as unusuallyvoluptuousor yielding, or as perverselyor exaggeratedly sexual.

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The Other Other may be regardedas mediatingbetween man and other men of his own class and race, but also between himself and his sexual relations with women of his own groupor between himself and his ambivalence towardhis own sexuality. The ambivalencetowardsexualityin Western cultures is mirroredin the contradictoryimages of the diseasedor perverseor bestial sexualityof the Negress, the Hottentot, the Jewess, or the prostitute and the sexually stimulating, the desirable, the irresistibleNegress, Jewess, prostitute, or the sexually accommodating, pliant, self-effacing Asian woman. (See Gilman 1985).16 Gilman (1985, 122-3) writes, "All the world is the womb, accordingto Lawrence, Miller and Durrell, but the black womb is quite different"and cites a remarkablepassagefromDurrellin TheBlackBook(1973, 123), which featuresa black Englishstudent, Miss Smith: The creedsand moresof a continent, clothed in an iridescent tunic of oil. I turn alwaysto those riversrunningbetween the black thighs for ever and for ever. A catharticZambesiwhich never freezes over, fighting its way through, but flowing as chastelyas if it wereclothed in an iridescenttunic of oil. I turn always to those exquisite horrors,the mutilationsand deformations, which cobble the historyof the darkcontinent in little ulcers of madness. Strangestreakshere and there you will find: hair triggerinsanities barelyshowing, like flaws in ice, but running in a steady, heavy river, the endless tributaryof sex... All this lives in the wool of MissSmith, plainlyvisible, but dying. As a mediatorbetween a man and his own social class, the Other Other is generallydestructiveof the social order. In the same novel, Durrellspeaksof the black woman:"The strangestreamof sex which beats in the heavy arteries, fasterand faster, until the worldis shaken to pieces aboutone's ears, and you are left with an indeterminatevision of the warmAfricanfissure,opened ... to swallowall the white racesand their enervatecreeds, their arks,their olive branches." The witch, generallya peasantwoman, is thought to derive her powersby her intercoursewith the Devil. In this she mediatesbetween men and the Devil-the figurewho would destroythe orderamongstmen given by God, the Father. The Whore, the workingclass woman who sells herself rather than her labor, is the communalrepositoryof men'slust, that is of those men who can pay for her. Within the hypocritical morality of those societies which supportprostitutionwhile condemning it, the Whore is at once destructiveof the social orderof marriageand supportiveof an orderin which the upperclass women, desexualized,are kept "pure"of all utility, including the renderingof sexual services.17

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The Temptress,againgenerallya womanof the "lowerclasses"( the Siren, the Golddigger,the Actress), both distractsmen fromobligationswithin the social order and tempts them to take a woman from outside his appropriate class. Given the view that marriageis a social and economic bond between men who exchange their daughtersand sisters, if the temptresssucceeds in marryingthe man and thus displacinga woman from the appropriategroup, she disruptsthe prevailingexchange of value amongstmen and divertswealth awayfromthe class of men with whom "hercatch"has a bond, and amongst whose heirs the wealth is supposedto be distributed.In the film I'm No Angel, Mae West, the irresistibleseductive showgirl, triumphsover the blueblooded family of heir, Cary Grant, who inadvertentlyhas fallen under her spell. As she winningly counterstheir assaultson her chastity and morality, love and Mae West win the day;thus playingout the scenarioin accordance with Hollywood'sversion of romance, virtue and democraticopportunity. In a counterpart to this Hollywood fantasy, the negative value of the Temptressis converted to positive currencywhen the man of wealth turns the temptress into his mistress (or turns a former prostitute into a kept woman, e.g. Camille). In supportingher in addition to his legitimate wife, he obtains still another sign of his worth. OTHERNESS FORTHEWOMANAS SUBJECT

The categoryof Otheress is not without significancefor woman as well. She too must establish her sense of separatenessfrom her mother and from the world in which she exists. But, women do not posit men as Other in establishingtheir own sense of identity. Forwomen, the firstOther is not a sexual opposite in a worldwhere, as we have said, sexualdifferenceis fundamental to identity. Of the three kinds of metaphor,we see that the self/selfmetaphor has some limited applicabilityto the female subject. She can posit the mother'sdomain of activity for activities which are literally non-motherly. After all, she too develops a sense of self in relation, if not in fundamental opposition to the mother. She can speakof "givingbirth to herself,"for example. But what we do not seem to find is a similargenre of metaphorsin which domainsof exclusivelymale activities are utilizedas vehicles for exclusively female activities. Women can also posit some alterityas Woman (the self/objectworldmetaphor)-the Earthis Motherto women as much as it is to men. However, the opposition, the alterityis not so fundamental.It involves at once an identification between the speakerand the metaphoricvehicle, resultingin a metaphor with a very differentconfigurationthan the same metaphorutteredby man. Foragain, in the case of the younggirl, as in the case of the youngboy, it is the motherwho mediatesbetween the girl and the worldshe encounters. The father, to some smallextent, mayplay a mediatingrole in relationto the

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exterior world in such a way that his relation can be metaphoricallyexploited. We have the use of the male vehicle of the Shepherdas Protector, the SpiritualGuide, etc. for men and women alike. 18 But such male vehicles for activities and alterities which women engage in (usually along with, rather than instead of, men) do not predominate. It is difficult to ascertainthe extent to which women use actual women (the self/social world metaphor) to mediate metaphoricallybetween themselves and their social sphere. If Chodorowand object theorists are correct, women never fully renounce the mother as a love object. Instead, the father is simply added as another love object. In their erotic attachmentsto men, there is often an affective relation to another woman. Does this "other woman"performa metaphoricfunction comparableto the metaphoricfunction women performfor men? Or does the man have a metaphoricvalue in the associationof the two women?Howeverwe describethe psychologicalreality, there appearto be few resonances,comparableto the mediationwomen providefor men in either actualor symbolicsocial structures.An anthropologist, for example, would be hardpressedto reinterpretincest taboos and kinship structuresso that marriagescould be viewed as an exchange among women of men: in our own culture, it is the fatherwho gives the brideaway, not the mother who gives away the groom. Women who mother mediate literally for infant male and females alike. But while women become metaphoricmediatorsfor adult men, men rarely play this metaphoricrole for women. Instead,for the adult woman, her place in the world, even her identity is literallymediatedby her relationshipto a man. Women will speakmetaphoricallyof their "battlescars"using the male domain of war for the actual scars left from childbirthor the psychological (and metaphorical)scars left by life's hardships.When puerperalfever took the lives of so many women, one might have said that the lying-in chambers of the hospital were women's"gorybattlefields."But while we speakof men giving birth to new ideas, to worksof art, etc. childrearingin not spokenof as "inseminating"the child with the values of society. Metaphors in which woman'sactivities arethe topic and men'sactivities, the vehicle, or in which man is the Other, or in which actual men metaphoricallyare identifiedwith the power or value which inheres in the woman and throughwhich woman relatesto the social worldof women are all less frequentand less likely-and certainly constitute an insignificant number of the standard metaphors within our language. The metaphorof Woman is, nonetheless, both accessibleand understandable to women-and yet problematic.For in orderto comprehendthe metaphor a woman mustsee herselfat once as the Other -in the vehicle-and as the One, occupyingman'sposition in the topic of the metaphor.Woman, in so far as she sharesman'srelationto the Mother/Other,is capableof comprehending the metaphorfromthe position of the topic (man'sworld), but in so

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far as she identifies with Mother/Womanshe finds herself as the Other and the vehicle ratherthan the subjectwho can utter the metaphor. In so faras metaphor,on my account, requiresthat the domainrepresented by the vehicle be distinct from the one representedby the topic, the use of Woman as Metaphorfor the activitieswhich aregenerallyregardedas limited to man solidifiesas well as reflectsthe alterityof woman. And the shifts in relations man establishesto variousalteritiesecho back to those he experienced with women. This leads to the following hypothesis:where woman and her domains are employed as a metaphorfor some other human enterprise,the latter is viewed as belonging exclusively to man. Where she is thought to be an equal citizen in the latter domain, she would cease to serve as a meta-

phor. 19

To pursuethis admittedlyspeculativeline, considerthe Socratic midwife metaphoronce more. The metaphorplays on the relation between creation and procreationand the field to which these notions belong. The conceptual fields generatedresultin the identificationof female creationas corporaland male creation as mental or spiritual-an identification which makes of womanthe vehicle for intellectualcreativity,and at once excludesher as participantof that cerebralcreativity. The transferencein this metaphoris one from the field of the physical, palpablerealityof corporealbirth-as accomplished by women-to the field of mental activity, and by a simultaneous transferenceof the antonymousrelationof male and female to the malesphere of intellectual activity. Since one thing is alwaysa metaphorfor something other than itself, a woman'spro-creativitywould only be a metaphorfor a man's creativity. Unfortunately, woman has served, in our intellectual his/ story, as a symbolof or as a metaphorfor, but not as an actor in the life of the mental and spiritual.Once she becomes a full participant,will she still serve as a metaphor? As woman becomes a participant,and if the progresstowardthat end proceeds without significantregressions,she will slowly cease to serve as metaphor. Though once her entire participation is secure, the metaphor of woman's procreativityfor intellectual creativity may reenter the language, but with a differentresonance.Forwoman'sintellectualcreativity,which she would now sharewith men, would be recognizedas distinct fromher unique role in birthgiving.When these two capacitiesare no longer in dangerof being conflatedand her role as the creatorof ideas, poems, paintings,etc, is not in dangerof being abrogated,then the one function can again be metaphor for the other. This speculationis basedon the observationthat in a periodof transition, when old roles and assumptionsare questionedand new ones are still unformulated, but in which the directionof the new orderis set forth, metaphoris often too threateningto the establishmentof the new order. Either it incorporatesregressiveassumptions(as in the case of woman as metaphoronly) or

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becauseit is too radicalin alreadyusingassumptionsof the new orderas a basis for buildingnew incongruities.Metaphors,curiously,while cruciallyimportantconceptual tools for bringingabout conceptualchange, need a stable orderfor their meaningfulformationas metaphor. A final observationwith regardto the birthmetaphor.As womanare more fully engaged in intellectual life, while still fulfilling their procreativefunction, we mayfind moremetaphorsin which formerexclusivelymale activities are the vehicles for childbirth. A woman who is a musicianmay speakof the "symphonicclimax of the head emerging,"or the female philosophermay ponderthe metaphysicalperplexitiesof embodyingtwo separatebeings while having only a single consciousness, employing figures from philosophy to help her illumine the situation of pregnancy. CONCLUSION

If the claims put forwardhere are valid and the speculative hypotheses prove true, there would be profoundconsequencesfor man's conceptual organizationwere women to cease functioningas man's"doubleand mediator" (Beauvoir 1952, 687). This condition, if the claims of gender theorists are correct, will come about only if women no longerserve as the sole nurturers of young children. Add to this the claims of Lakoffand Johnson (1980) and others that our conceptual system is substantiallymetaphoric, structuring (and being structuredby) our language, our experience, and our actions. Then we see how an investigation of Woman as metaphorand its dependence on the earlymother-childrelation (in which the motheris Other for the boy) will reveal that much of the conceptualand experientialorganizationof men's lives dependson retainingthe Othernessof Woman-i. e. her potential as Metaphor. Little has been done to analyzehow a generalimagesuch as Woman contributesto and operatesin the conceptualizationsarticulatedby a culture.20 Indeed, generallymetaphoris far too context-boundto yield interestingresults on such a scale. LakoffandJohnsondeal broadlywith a numberof metaphors which they take to be key metaphorswithin the conceptual systemof contemporaryWestern man, e.g. "time is money," "up is good," etc. but they do not considerthe metaphorsutilizingwomansuch as "nature(or earth or body or the irrational)is a woman," intellectual creativity (or artistic activity) is giving birth," "becominga man (or gaining knowledge-coming into the light) is emergingfrom the womb (or being bor anew)," etc. Certainly literarystudiesand some anthropologicalworkhave dealt more specifically with the use of woman as some particularvehicle in particularmetaphors. We need more generalstudiesof the underlyingmetaphorsemploying woman as vehicle. And we need studiesdirectedat culturaldifferencesin the symbolicuse of Woman, as well as differencesin the metaphorsgeneratedby

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the use of women from varioussocial classes or racial groups. Here I have been less concerned with the specific content of the metaphorsof Woman than in claiming that the structureof metaphorand the structureof relations between men and Mother/Womanas Other contributeto the conceptual importance of the metaphorizationof Woman. NOTES This paperwas readat the City Universityof New YorkWomen in PhilosophyColoquium at the GraduateSchool of the City of New Yorkand at the World Congressof Philosophy, Montreal, August, 1983. I want to thank the members of both audiences for their useful comments. I also want to thank the graduatestudents of Society for Women in Philosophy, Stony Brook, State University of New York, especiallyJanice McLane, for their remarksand suggestions.The paperhas furtherprofitedfrom the commentsof Diana Meyers,EdwardCasey, Elfie Raymond, MargaretSimons, and the two anonymousreviewersfor this journal. 1. There is an ambiguityin the title due to a featureof metaphorfirstbroughtto light by I. A. Richards(1936). There are metaphorsin which women are metaphoricallydescribedand there are metaphorsin which women are used to metaphoricallydescribe something else. Richards introducedthe view that the meaningof metaphoremergesfroman interactionof the subject,or topicof the metaphor,that which is representedby the metaphor,and the vehicle,the representation used to speak of the subject. When a woman'sbeauty is representedas a flower, fruit, or some other delight of Nature, then, we say Woman is the topic and Nature the metaphor's vehicle.While the vehicle offersa perspectivethroughwhich we view and understandthe topic, the choice of the vehicle can itself reveal much about the way in which the topic is conceived. Simone de Beauvoir'ssuperb chapters from The SecondSex, "Dreams,Fears, and Idols" and "Myth and Reality," display the numerousand contraryvehicles that metaphoricallyspeak of woman. Beauvoirconcludes that woman is a cipher, an Other unto which man can project all his "dreams,fears, and idols." Woman is thus metaphoricallyrepresentedby whatever alterity man seeks to engage, and so becomes myth rather than subject. On the other side of the ambiguity we find that she can also be used to representthe alterity. Beauvoir'sfocus is on metaphoricand mythic representationsof women, although she also points to many examples where womanservesas a metaphorfor some other alterity. It is in this lattersense that I want to look at woman as metaphor. 2. See Mead (1949), Bettelheim (1954), Kittay (1983). 3. Plato, at the same time, was among the few men within philosophy to challenge that exclusivity, though interestingly enough, not in the same dialogues in which he utilizes the vehicle of woman. In these dialogues, especially in the Theatetusand the Symposium,the presumptionis that the intellectual and creative sphere are the province of males-and this despite the fact that the wisdomconcerninglove is learnedfroma woman, Diotima. The ascent to the absolute form of Beauty is describedfor men only. 4. My reading of Beauvoirdoes not depend on an understandingof woman'sOtherness as being the primary,that is primordialsource, of woman'soppression.Othernessis fundamentally a representational,not a causal notion and can well co-exist with a more materiallygrounded notion of the ultimate sourcesof women'soppression.Nonetheless the representationof a class or caste as Other servesto encapsulatefor the oppressed,and in turnjustifyfor the oppressor,the behaviorsthat constitute the oppression.As such the concept has not only representational,but also causal force. 5. Ironically,within the Hegelian dialectic, self-consciousnessis ultimatelythe achievement of the slave, one made possible by the slave's relation to his labor. 6. I thank MargaretSimons for remindingme of this aspect of Beauvoir'sanalysis. 7. Some feminists, e.g. Young (1984) challenge the universality of Chodorow's thesis, suggestingthat becauseit relieson an analysisof genderformationwithin the nuclearfamily, the thesis cannot be generalized to situations where familial structuresare different. And some feminists resist all attempts to fashion universalistictheories about women.

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I hold on to the view that the varieties of women's situation, of her oppressions,and her symbolizationare not disjoint but can be encompassedin a theorythat has within it the possibility of accountingfor differences;a theory that sees, for example, differentformsof oppressionas transformationsof one anotherthat take their specificformin virtueof constrainingand shaping conditions unique to each culture, race and class. I take the theory that Chodorow gives us, especially when we consider the Reproduction of Motheringtogether with Chodorow'sarticles, e.g. "Mothering,Male Dominance and Capitalism"(1979) to be such a theory. The universalityof Chodorow'sthesis lies not in its specificaccountof genderformationin the nuclearfamily, but in two theses: the universalityof women'snurturanceof very young children and the universalityof women'ssubordinationto men. Only if one seriouslyquestionsthese must one question the possibilityof an appropriatevariationof a Chodorow-likeaccount to accommodate differencesin family structure. While few have contested the universalityof women's mothering, some have posed serious challenges to the thesis of universalmale domination, e.g. Allen (1986). It is still not clear how we shouldreceive accountsof genuine gynocentricsocieties. On the one hand, they evince data, apparentlyignoredby male, white anthropologists,of institutionsgrantingwomen considerable power, even an egalitarianstatus. On the other hand, the claim is made that these egalitarian featureswere destroyedin largemeasureby colonialismand imperialism.The societies studiedby anthropologists,significantlyadulteratedand infected with the patriarchalismof the colonial powers,lack the strongand alive egalitarianismof formertimes. Those who speakof their native culturesas thus contaminatedby white man'spatriarchy,speakof the powerof the native women still present in an attenuatedform. But harkeningback to a time and place when women were powerfulin an unattenuatedform, to a genuinelysexuallyegalitariansociety, when the existence of such structuresare basedon artifacts,myths, folktalesand variousoral traditionsis not nearly as satisfactoryas the direct evidence of an healthy, vigorous, and extantsexually egalitarian society. For instance, in readingan account such as that of PaulaGunn Allen, one is genuinely impressed by her evidence and arguments that the women of the Laguna Pueblo exercised considerable power. But given that matters of war and peace and the external affairsof the society were in the hands of men, one wants to ask if the external and internal affairswere equallyvalued, or did the men hand over the internalaffairsto women so that they would be left free to occupy themselveswith what they mayhave taken as the more importantexternalaffairs? That is to say, before concluding that this was genuinely an egalitariansociety, one wants to know much more. Evidence may be mounting for a reversalof the thesis of universalmale domination. To the extent that there is evidence for genuine, though historicalinstancesof gynocentricsocieties, to that extent feminist theoristswill have to reconsidertheories basedon universalmale domination and will have reasonto glean visions of what a gynocentricsociety of the futuremight look like and what the preconditionsfor patriarchyare. Perhapsfor now, both the thesis of universal male domination and its negation are conjectures;still, we have surerreasonsfor adopting the thesis. At the very least, we can say that the thesis, if not universal,is a truegeneralization.And a theory such as Chodorow'sis generalizableto the extent that the generalizationis true. 8. As Carol Gilligan's provocative book, In a DifferentVoice (1981) suggests, a self which regardsitself as a self-in-relationratherthan as autonomous,developsdistinctive waysof dealing with moral problems. According to Freud, boys' oedipal complex is resolved by the castration complex, which is, in turn, completed by incorporatingthe father'sauthoritativemoralityinto their own self. As this feat is not possiblefor women-their castrationcomplex precedestheir oedipal stage-Freud claimed that women are incapable of forming a fully authoritative superego.With Chodorowand Gilligan, Freud'sclaim is turnedon its head. We have here not a failing of women, but an excess on the partof men to compensatethemselvesfor the repression of a formeridentificationwith their mothers. These views, though new and in need of further researchand argument,are, for many, tantalizingand intuitively convincing. (See Kittay and Meyers1987). If this line of researchis as productiveas it now seems, we will have at hand a set of tools by which to begin a profoundreexaminationof our representationand study of human nature and enterprises. 9. I owe this observationto LindaNochlin in a personalcommunication. 10. I recommend the discussion in Gilman (1985), especially part I, in which he not only drawsour attention to the sexual iconographyof the black female servantin Europeanpainting,

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but discusses the sexualizationof women who belong to non-white, non-Christian, or lower socio-economic groups. 11. See Harding(1986), especiallychapters5 and 9 for a fuller discussion. 12. It is interestingto note that Socrates'mother was herself a midwife. 13. Today not only it is the case that the professionof philosopheris occasionallyoccupiedby women, but the role of midwifehas been largelyusurpedby male physicians.When we understand the metaphor,we bracketthose conemporaryfacts which we know to be at odds with the sexual differentiationof the two domainspresupposedby the metaphor.Our comprehensionis facilitatedby the scarcityof women philosophersand the embeddedfeminine wordin "midwife." 14. Note that one cannot understand "man" in the generic sense, since it becomes the anaphoricreferentof "he-man." 15. I use the term "expropriation"ratherthan "theft"becausewartimerape, ratherthan rape which occurs under the normalizedcircumstancesof peace, often has an almost semi-official status. Men are rarely brought to trial for wartime rape, much less actually convicted and punished for such activities. It is often assumedto be the normal bootie one is entitled to as victor. But as the sailorin Lina Wertmuller'smovie SweptAway discoversto his dismay,the rapeand conquest of a woman of the social class that constitute his oppressorsdoes not in and of itself a revolutionmake. When the sailorand the wife of his employeraresweptoff to a desertisland, he lordsover her as she had once lordedoverhim-and goes farbeyondthat in his sexual masteryof the womanwho becomeshis willing sexualslave. Forthe sailorthe possessionof his master'swife signifies that he is at least as much of a man, if not more, than his formeremployerand all the men of his ilk-men of the upperbourgeoisie.But this significationgets lost as soon as the couple leave their islandand returnto their formersurrounding.The husbandreclaimshis wife, she her privileged existence as an upper bourgeoiswoman, and the sailor is again just another hired hand. 16. This sexualizingof the Other Other, has a corollaryin the sexualizedand feminizedimages of the black man and the Jew in racist and anti-Semitic societies. The African man, pictured with a pendulousabdomen, was likened to the pregnantEuropeanwoman. As such, his physiology was believed to be of a lower orderthan that of the Europeanman. The Jewishmale was characterizedas having effeminate featuresand as possessingfeminine personalitytraits and, once again, placed loweron the scale of humandevelopmentthan the Europeanmale (Gilman, 1985). One can understandthe feminizationof the maleother as yet anotheruse of woman (here the feminizedtraits) as an effortof the males belongingto the dominantgroupsto mediate their own relation to men who are distinctlyOther. By imbuingthem with feminine traitsand identifying them with a feminizedOther, the privileged men legitimize excluding other men from sexual access to women from the dominant social group. 17. We see here again how the Other Other mediatesnot only between a man and other men, but also between a man and the women of his class. This is perhapsparadigmaticof the way in which workingclass women and women of color and, in the context of anti-Semitism,Jewish women have been used by the men of the dominant groupto exclude the women of their own class fromproductivelabor,fromsexualfulfillment,and fromforminggenuine connections to all women. And it is also paradigmaticof the way in which women of the dominantclass have been pitted against other women-so the formersee the latter as more sexually available, desirable, usefuland so forth, while the latter see themselvesas excluded from a womanhoodexemplified by the former.The woman who is the Other Other bearsthe social cost that makespossiblethe rarifiedfemininityof women of the upperclasses.The metaphorizationof the Other Other is one more obstacle to an inclusive feminist movement. 18. RosemundRosenbergcalled these to my attention. 19. This hypothesisis formulatedfor societies that are patriarchiesand may be moving toward a more sexuallyegalitariansociety. If there are, or have been genuine gynocentricsocieties that have never moved throughan androcentricperiod, this hypothesiswould not necessarilyhold. For in a trulygynocentricsociety the relation to the mother, for both male and female must be importantlydifferent, since the mother would not be a devaluedOther. Pariarchiesdepend on the expropriationof the power of women-of her sexual and procreativepowers (see Kittay 1983), a condition which, by definition, wouldnot hold for a gynocracy.Gender identityformation for both men and women takes place in the context of this expropriationand concomitant

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devaluationof women. The discussionwhich follows and which has predominatedin this paper presumes, with Chodorow, that gender identity formation and women's subordination are intimately entwined, and that woman's mothering is the linchpin in the complex. As IrisYoung (1983) has pointed out, it is perfectlypossiblethat gender identity formationis not necessarilytied to woman'ssubordinationand that a society in which motheringis the work of women can also be a society in which women are not subordinated.Allen (1986) who argues that the Laguna Pueblos have, or rather have had such a gynocracy (see n. 7), claims that American Indianculturegenerallyis gynocentric. It is thereforeworth examining the imagesof American Indian cultures and seeing whether we find the same metaphoricuse of woman. A detailed study is beyond the confines of this paper. But two points are noteworthy. First, the image of woman and Mother seems to be an especially salient one even in such a presumablyegalitariansociety. Allen writes: There is a spirit that pervades, that is capable of powerfulsong and radiant movement, and that moves in and out of the mind . . . Old SpiderWoman is one name for this quintessentialspirit, and Serpent Woman is another, Corn Woman is one aspect of her, and EarthWoman is another, what they together have made is called Creation, Earth, creatures,plants, and light. She cites a portion of the Thought Woman story: In the beginning Tse che nako, Thought Woman finished everything, thought, and the names of all things. She finished everything, thoughts, and the names of all things. She finished also all the languages.And then our mothers, Uretsete and Naotsete said they would make names and they would make thoughts. Thus they said. Thus they did. Furthermore,the Mother/Womanimage is importantlymediational.Forexample, in speakingof the Corn Mother, Allen says that without her presence, "no ceremonycan producethe power it is designed to create or release. The story of Abanaki, the FirstWoman, is even more clearly mediational. During a great famine she has her husbandkill her so that her corpse should be transformedinto a fertile field which would providefood for her children and their descendants (Allen 1986, 13, 13, 17, 23). But the second point to note is that nature of the symbolism in the context of Native American culture is importantlydifferent from Western societies. Allen emphasizesthat the symbolsare statements of a perceived reality, not metaphorswhich stand for something else. Thereforeit is not that the Earth,for example, is metaphoricallyconceptualizedas woman, but it is a woman, froma certain point of view, just as Allen says"The color red, as used by the Lakota, doesn't stand for sacredor earth, but it is the qualityof being, the color of it, when perceived'in a sacredmanner'or from the point of view of the earth itself' (1986). If this is how we are to understandthe imagesof Woman in Native American cultures,then, perhapsWoman is neither Other, nor metaphor, in spite of her evident importance in the symbolic fabric of Native American life. In that case, the thesis of this paper-that it is by virtue of her Otherness that woman is a central metaphorin our conceptualization-is not challenged by the role of Woman in the symbolicstructureof gynocentricsocieties. And the importanceof woman'smediational role, which I have claimed derives from her position as mother, is evident in both modes of symbolization. 20. There is of course the notable exception of Beauvoir'stwo chapterscited above from The SecondSex. Also see Griffin (1978), Merchant (1980), Harding (1987), and Keller (1984) for useful analysesof scientific metaphors, and Gilman's (1985) analysisof the images of women from groupsthought to be Other. REFERENCES

Allen, Paula Gunn. 1987. The sacredhoop. Boston: Beacon Press. Bacon, Francis. [1623]. De dignatate et augmentis scientiarum. vol. 4. Longman'sGreen. 1870. Cited by Merchant 1980, 168; and Harding 1986, 116.

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Beauvoir, Simone de. 1952. The secondsex. Trans. H.M. Parshley, New York:Alfred Knopf. Bettleheim, Bruno. 1954. Symbolicwounds.New York:MacmillanPress. Chodorow,Nancy. 1978. The reproduction of mothering.Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress. Chodorow, Nancy. 1979. Mothering, male dominance and capitalism. In Zillah Eisenstein, ed. Capitalist patriarchyand the case for socialist feminism.New York:Monthly Review Press, 83-106. Cleaver, Eldridge. 1967. Soul on ice. New York:McGrawHill. Dinnerstein, Dorothy. 1976. The mermaidand the minotaur:sexualarrangementsand the humanmalaise.New York:Harperand Row. Durrell, Lawrence. 1973. The blackbook. London:Farberand Farber.Cited in Gilman 1985, 123. Gilligan, Carol. 1981. In a differentvoice. Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press. Gilman, Sander. 1985. Differenceand pathology:stereotypesof sexuality,race and madness.Ithaca:Comell University Press. Griffin, Susan. 1978. Womanand nature:the roaringinsideher. New York: Harperand Row. Harding,Sandra. 1986. Thesciencequestioninfeminism.Ithaca:Cornell University Press. Hegel, G. W. [1807]. The phenomenology of mind. Trans. by J. B. Baillie, New York:Harperand Row. 1967. Kittay, Eva Feder. 1983. Womb envy as an explanatoryconcept. In Joyce Trebilcot, ed. Mothering:essaysin feministtheory.New Jersey:Littlefield and Adams, 94-129. , 1987. Metaphor:Its cognitiveforce and linguisticstructure.Oxford:Oxford University Press. Kittay, E. F., and A. Lehrer.1981. Semanticfieldsand the structureof metaphor, Studiesin Language5, 31-64. Kittay, E. F. and Diana T. Meyers. 1987. Womenand moraltheory.Totowa, New Jersey:Rowman and Littlefield. Klein, Melanie. [1957]. Envy and gratitude. Envy and gratitudeand other works:1946-1963. New York:Delacorte. 1975. Lakoff,G. and Johnson, M. 1980. Metaphorswe liveby. Chicago:University of Chicago Press. de la parente,Paris. Levi-Strauss,Claude. 1949. Les structureelementaires . [1963]. Structuralanthropology,New York: Anchor Books, 1967. bk. 3, ch. 10. Locke, John. 1689. An essayon the humanunderstanding, Machiavelli, Niccolo. [1531]. Theprinceand thediscourses.ch. 13, p. 64; ch. 25, pp. 91, 94. Moder Library.1950. Cited by Merchant 1980, 130.

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Mead, Margaret. 1949. Male and female, New York:William Morrowand Company. Merchant, Carolyn. 1980. The dominationof nature,San Francisco:Harper and Row. Plato. 1968. The Theaetetus.The dialoguesof Plato. Trans. Jowett. London: Oxford University Press Richards, I. A. 1936. The philosophyof rhetoric.London:Oxford University Press. Rilke, Rainer Maria. 1903. The book of hours. Cited and translated by Simenauer 1954, 242. . 1934. Letterof the 16th of July, 1903. In Lettersto a youngpoet. Trans. M. D. Herder, 36-38. New York:Norton. Cited by Simenauer 1954, 239. Simenauer,Erich, 1954. 'Pregnancyenvy' in RainerMariaRilke, TheAmerican Imago11. 235-48.

Anarchic Thinking GAIL STENSTAD

This paper exploresa possibilityof atheoreticalfeminist thinking.Anarchic thinkingis a way of thinkingwhichis neitherbasedon nor yieldsone accountof truthor reality.Itsparticularvalueto feministsis its affirmation of multiplevoices, ways of beingand possibilities for action.

Wildmeans ... "not tamed or domesticated....growing or producingwithout the aid and care of man . . . not subjected to restraint or regulation . . . exceeding normal or conventional bounds in thought, design, conception or execution . . .deviating froma naturalor expected course,goal, or practice; acting, appearing,or being manifestedin an unexpected, undesired,or unpredictablemanner. . . not accountedfor by any known theories. (Daly 1978, 343-4). I want to begin by taking seriously the suggestion that thinking which would be both subversive(of patriarchaltheory and practice) and creative would be wild thinking: thinking which goes beyond conventional boundaries, deviates from expected goals and methods, and is not accounted for or predictedby any theory. This thinking will be, in a word, un-ruledor anarchic. Anarchic thinking may be negatively characterizedas atheoreticalthinking, that is, as thinking which does not work from, posit or yield objective distance, transhistoricaltruths,hierarchicalorderingsor a unitaryreality.1 It is thinking which has "renounced the claim to a binding doctrine." (Heidegger 1971b, 185) Thus, it is open to both ambiguityand possibility, open to a multiplicity of meanings, interpretationsand styles. The importance of this openness to ambiguityand differencecan hardlybe overemphasized. Heidegger has pointed out that the continued dominance of technocraticthinking (thinking which sees all things as resourcesto be technically manipulated)demandsunivocity, a dominanceof one voice which is all the moredangerousto us in that it seductivelyparadesas "an all-sidedness which in turn is maskedso as to look harmlessand natural,"swallowingup all resistanceor differenceunder the rubricof objective reality. (1968, 26, 34, 71) To the extent that theory, even feministtheory, claimssuch objective reality, it riskssilencing many women in a demandfor univocity. Hypatiavol. 3, no. 2 (Summer 1988) ? by Gail Stenstad

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Irigarayhas brought to our attention the way in which the manner of thinking demanded by patriarchy is a specularizingthinking, a thinking which demandsnot only one voice, but sameness, throughand through. . . . the result [is] that all divergencieswill finally be proportions, functions, relations that can be referredback to sameness. . . . License to operate is grantedto the (so-called) play of those differencesthat aremeasuredin termsof sameness... [All developments]are dictated by a processof images, reflections, reduplicationswhich are rated in terms of their conformity, equivalence and appropriatenessto the true . . . (1985a, 247, 261-2) To breakthe strangleholdof specularization,of repetition, of sameness,of univocity, we need to do more than confrontpatriarchalthinking in its own terms (though that strategyhas its place). We also need to think in ways which breakthe rules, wayswhich deny to patriarchythe right to set a standardfor feminist thinking. Why should we, in our resistanceto patriarchyand our attempt to create something differentfrom it, continue to echo some of its most fundamentalpresuppositions?I will suggestthat one of the most subversive things feministscan do is to think anarchicallyand then to speakand act from out of this thinking. How can we think anarchically?How do we distinguish it from merely sloppyor chaotic thinking?What sets anarchicthinking in motion, and what keeps it moving?What are some of the importantelements of the actualpractice of anarchic thinking?These are the questions I need to addressnext. First,how is anarchicthinkingdistinguishedfrommerelysloppyor chaotic thinking?While it is rule-less, anarchicthinking is neverthelessprecise and careful.Anarchic thinking must be alert to fine nuances of language,to historical and linguistic contexts, and to all the possibilitiesand implications which may arise. Anarchic thinking is not sloppy thinking. What sets anarchic thinking in motion? There are no limiting rules for what is worthyof thought. Anything which deeplyconcernsus, touches us in mind and heart, provokesthinking . (Heidegger1971a, 91, 73-4)2 It might be something as particularas one sentence heard or read, or as general as specularization in the Western philosophical tradition. It might be the bruiseson the face of a batteredwoman, or the nearlyincomprehensibleprospect of nuclearannihilation. It could be some oppressivesituationcalling for action, or the success of an act of resistanceto oppression.It might be the touch of a hand or the sound of a voice. Then what? Once we get underwayin anarchic thinking, what moves it along?One of the main things which keeps thinking (of any kind) moving is unresolvedtension. The importantelements or moments of anarchic thinking serve to deliberatelymaintain such tension and, thus, to keep anarchic

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thinking fluid, alwaysin motion, alwayson the way. Persistencein questioning, workingand playingwith ambiguities,being alertfor the presenceof the strangewithin the familiar,and allowingfor concealment or unclarityin the midst of disclosureare four elements of anarchicthinking which stand out as particularlysignificant in this respect. Persistencein questioningkeeps anarchicthinking moving. As feminists, we are questioning the authorityof patriarchalstructures,institutions and practices.The tidiest and most comprehensivetheories, the most self-evident presuppositions,solid truthsand hardfacts have become questionable.Hairline cracksopen up into which we can insertour questions. These questions and our thoughtful responsesengender furtherquestions. Since we are not looking for a theoretical resolution of this question-and-responsetension, thinking remains in motion. At this point, it is importantto remind ourselves why preservingthese tensions which keep thinking moving is crucial. It is not a matterof motion for the sake of motion. To deliberatelymaintain fluidityin thinking is to resistthe tendency to settle for one explanation, one voice. It keeps us listening for the voices of our sisters,no matterhow different their experiences and ways of expressionare from ours. We might ask ourselves:how do we view the languagewe think about and with? Can we hear Heidegger'ssuggestion? Words are not terms, and thus are not like buckets and kegs from which we can scoop a content that is there. Words are wellspringsthat arefoundanddugup in the telling (1968, 130). Anarchic thinkingwelcomesthe ambiguities,the multiplicityof meanings,of the wordswe encounterand use. It is open to the deep wellsof differingexperiences from which such multiplicityarises.Anarchicthinkingembracesmultiof texts. The tensionswhich arisefromsuch ambiguityand ple interpretations to serve keep thinkingmovingand open to manifoldpossibilities. multiplicity Another of the tensions which keeps anarchicthinking moving and opens up new possibilitiesis the tension between the familiarand the strangeor uncanny. One of the things that theory-buildingseeks to do is to make the strangefamiliar,to tame it and place it in its properslot in the totality. Anarchic thinking, on the other hand, takes note of the previouslyunnoticed or unheeded strangenessin what is familiar. Feministsare alreadyacquainted with this making-strangein the works of, for example, Mary Daly, Luce Irigarayand SusanGriffin. We all know how Daly has madesome of the most familiar,taken-for-grantedpresuppositionsand activitiesof patriarchyappear to us as something strange or even bizarre. (Daly is a radical theorist; however, her way of making-strangeis very suggestivefor anarchicthinkers.) I will discussGriffin and Irigarayin more detail below. The effect of this making-strangeis to decenter the familiar,the taken-forgranted,the true, the real, etc. The boundariesset for our thinking by famili-

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arityare transgressed.The previouslyunthinkablebecomes thinkable. Anarchic thinking is boundarythinking, pushing at the very boundariesof the thinkable, stretching them, rearrangingthem, breakingthem. The practice of thinking at the boundarytransformsour thinking; it transformsus. The transformativeexperienceof anarchicthinking is perhapsone of its most subversive effects. It is a powerfulway to clear out lingering internalizationsof patriarchalpresuppositions.This clearsthe way, as well, for us to think creatively. Susan Griffin's Womanand Nature serves as a powerfulexample of this transformativeboundary-thinking.Womanand Nature is not a theoretical work. Some of the key movements in the text, the movement from dismemberingto re-memberingand the closely intertwinedmovement from silence to speech, serve as a powerfuldemonstrationof the practiceof anarchic thinking and the transformativeexperience which accompaniesit. The book beginsby quotingor paraphrasingthe voices of the philosophers, the theologians, the scientists, the engineers, the technicians. These voices (the voices of patriarchy,echoing and re-echoing each other) are all very, very familiar. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Bacon, Descartes, Kant and Schopenhauer.Copericus, Kepler,Newton, Boyle and Bohr. The MalleusMalleficarum.Pavlov and Freud.The foresters,dairymenand doctors. All speaking from an ever-increasingobjective distance, analyzing,ordering,establishing hierarchies(in which we again and again find ourselvesat the bottom), proclaiming the truth, defining reality, dividing the real into useful layersand manageablebits. Listen to Griffin: Separation. The clean from the unclean . .. The changing from the sacred. Death from the city. Wilderness from the city. The cemetery. The Garden. The Zoological Garden. The ghetto. The ghetto of Jews. The ghetto of moors. The quarterof prostitutes. The ghetto of blacks. The neighborhood of lesbians. The prison. The witchhouse. The underworld. The underground. The sewer. Space divided. The inch. The foot. The mile. The boundary.The skin of the sea otter . . . fromthe sea otter . .. the tusk of the elephant . .. from the elephant . . . the pelt of the fox . . . from the fox . . . the weed from the flower, the metal fromthe mountains, uraniumfrom the metal, plutoniumfrom uranium,the electron from the atom . . . energy splitting, the chromosome split, spiritburnedfromflesh, desiredevastatedfromthe earth (1978, 95-8). As we experiencethe violence of the traditionwith which we are familiar,as we experience the numbing into fearful silence of women's voices down through time, the familiar becomes very, very strange. "We open our

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mouths. We try to speak. We try to remember,"(44). We questionand question and question. We notice ambiguities.We ponder alternate interpretations of the familiarwords. We begin to speak with each other. . . .what is buried emerges . . . What is unearthed is stunning, the one we were seeking ... is ourselves(160). We are flesh, we breathe ... .We speak (46). The time of our silence is over . . . we do not deny our voices (174-5). The transformativeexperience of readingand thinking along with Susan Griffin does not yield some one thought or way of thinking or voice but rather, as she said, voices,many voices, all of our voices, however similaror differentthey may be. Since this thinking is atheoretical, it will not fall into the trap of replacingpatriarchaltruth and realitywith some unitarytruth or realityof our own. I say "trap"becauseclaims to possessunitarytruth and reality and claims to correctnessall too often go hand in hand with attemptsto impose one's views on others. We have all been on the receiving end of this processoften enough to know how destructiveit is. We have begun also to take seriouslythe voices of Third World women and women of color, when they have pointed out that feministtheoriesand argumentshave all too often ignoredtheir experiencesand concerns, as if all women were white, well-fed and well-educated.Anarchic thinking, on the contrary,affirmsthat there are genuine differencesin our experienceof being women and also yields and welcomes differencesin thinking and speaking.Anarchic thinking empowersa multiplicityof strongfeminist voices. The speaking(or writing)which is empoweredby anarchic thinking gives voice to the movement of the thinking and to the new possibilitieswhich arisealong the way. Our own transformative experience in reading(or hearing) and thinking along with such a voice provokesus to continue the movement of thinking in our own ways, and to give voice to the new possibilitieswe encounter and create. Thus far I have characterizedthe practice of anarchic thinking as calling for persistencein questioning,opennessto ambiguityand multipleinterpretations, and attentivenessto the strange-within-the-familiar. As exemplifiedin Griffin'swork, such thinking decenters the familiar, the taken-forgranted, the "true"and the "real."It stretches, rearrangesand breaksthe boundaries of the thinkable-the thinkable as delimited by the kinds of thinking to which patriarchalinstitutionsgive their seal of approval.In so doing, it clears the way for the possibilityof creative thinking, of thinking something genuinely different. Those who attempt to think differently, creatively, and to communicatethis thinking to others, however, encounteranother boundary or barrier:our relationshipto and expectationsof languageitself. We expect language to disclose something clearly. When we encounter language (whetherour own or another's)which seemsunclear,which seems to conceal as much as it discloses,we tend to resistor even reject it. The waysin which I

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have describedanarchicthinking so farwill serveto dislodgethis resistanceif the unclarityis due to ambiguityor strangeness.But where the opacity is due to more than ambiguityor strangeness(as it is in the workof Irigaray,which I will discussbelow) an additionalmovement in anarchicthinking is called for. I will call this move "earthymovement."That name, unfortunately,carriesa and "commonsense"which is not my emphaconnotationof "down-to-earth" sis, but it neverthelessdoes seem to best name what I am going to describe. I will begin by consideringthe imageryof the word"earth"One of the first things that becomes apparentis that, in spite of its solidity (soil, land, the planet), "earth"conveys a great deal of movement. There are two faces to this earthy movement. The Greek word physisserves to name one of those faces (the physisof Heraclitus,not of Aristotle'sMetaphysics,book 4). Physis: what, of itself, emergesand rises, and the very movement of arising. The Greeks early called this emergingand rising in itself and all things physis.It clears and illuminates. . . that on which [we]base our dwelling. We call this . . . the earth (Heidegger 1971b, 42). Earth as physis:imageryfor a movement and a space/placein which something emerges;a clearingwhere things arebroughtto light and disclosed, and in the midst of which we too find ourselves. For the other side of earthy movement, consider the word "earth"as a verb. All of the verbal meanings of "earth," without exception, have the sense of hiding or concealing. To bury. To plunge or hide in the earth. In gardening:to heap the earth over. Of foxes and other animals:to run to her earth, her den, her sheltering-place.Though now we speak of "grounding" power or electricity, the word first used was "earthing."Notice how most of these senses of the verb "earth"also carrya connotation of sheltering.In the old days, one earthedthe familytreasuresto shelter them frombanditsor invaders.The gardenerheaps earthover her rosesto shelterthem fromthe ravages of alternatefreezingand thawing. The fox runsto earth for shelter. The hiding or concealing which is the meaning of "to earth"is a concealing for the sake of sheltering (see the OED, under "earth"). This might seem to work against the arisingand disclosing of physis,but that is not so. "Physis,"said Heraclitus,"loves to conceal itself' (FragmentB 123: physiskryptesthai philei).The arisingwhich physisnames is fond of selfTo disclosing belongs concealing. Why? hiding. Earth is that whence the arising[i.e., physis]bringsback and shelterseverythingthat ariseswithout violation. In the things that arise, earth is present as the sheltering . . . (Heidegger 1971b, 42). Sheltering yields the space within which disclosing can take place, as Heideggersays, "without violation." I am not doing metaphysicshere, but

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drawingon this imageryto uncover a possibilityof a certain movement in thinking, a thinking "withoutviolation." This is a sheltering,clearingmovement where things find their place, disclosing themselves; in the same sheltering movement, they hold back, concealing something from penetration and analysis. To the questioning and the openness to ambiguityand multiple interpretations by which I have already characterizedanarchic thinking, this earthymovement addsan allowancefor that which conceals at the same time as it discloses. I keep saying: things arise and disclose themselves within this earthy, shelteringmovement. What things?Again, this is not metaphysics;I am not referringto the objects of metaphysics.I am speakingof those things which both provoke and are yielded in thinking, especially in thinking which attempts to think differently,creatively, in thinking which goes againstor beyond rather than with or within traditionalmodes of thinking, in thinking which is not only atheoretical,but which also breakswith patriarchallylegitimated rule-boundanalysis(as well as its son, instrumentalrationality). The thinking which occurs within an earthy movement is illegitimate thinking, patriarchallyspeaking. Analysis wants to divide, define, clarify and master its material. Instrumental rationality takes this further, using such analysisfor the purposeof control, of power-over. In genuinely creative feminist thinking, this traditional, rule-boundthinking runsup againstsomethingwhich is opaqueto it, something resistant to its penetration, something incalculableand elusive. As an example, consider the work of some of the Frenchfeminists, such as Irigarayand Cixous, who are exploringthe possibilityof what they call, variously, a "femininevoice" in writing, or "speakingas (a) woman"or "writing woman'sbody." The/a "femininevoice," especiallyas its possibilityis exploredin the work of Irigaray,is deliberately opaque to traditionalthinking. To claim that the feminine can be expressedin the form of a concept is to allow oneself to be caughtup again in a systemof "masculine"representations,in which women are trappedin a system of meaning which serves the auto-affection of the In a woman('s) language, the con(masculine) subject .... cept as such would have no place (1985b, 122-3). Irigarayis calling into question somethingwhich we usuallytake for granted in our thinking: conceptualization.The limiting which the concept accomplishes and the grasping(for purposesof control) which it permits, she suggests, lead us back into the arena of violation. To put this in terms of the earthy movement outlined above, traditionalanalysisonly sees half of the movement, if that much. It sees what arisesand disclosesitself. . . but only as materialfor conceptual analysis.If it sees the other side of the movement,

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i.e., the reticence, the opacity-to-analysiswhich shelterssomethingfrom violation so that it can continue to grow, it sees it either as (1) something irrational, to be rejectedout of hand, or as (2) an obstacle to be overcome, to be forciblypenetratedand made clear and mastered.It cannot see the reticence and intransparencyas something intrinsic to an attempt to bring something else to language,in an otherlanguage.Thus an attempt to think such matters by way of traditionalanalysisis skewedat the outset. Eitherviolation or outright rejection (without ever having understoodwhat is being rejected) is the outcome. I would question the appropriatenessof dismissingthe creative thinking of feminists through the application of the sort of "standards"that have ben used (and still are used, all too often) to dismissthe workof feminist thinkers as a whole. These attempts to think something in a way very differentfrom that validatedby traditionalthinking deserve to be taken seriouslyon their own terms. The question is: how? To think the issues raised by French feminists such as Irigaraywould seem to requirea kind of thinking which I have describedusing the imageryof the earthymovement. It requiresthinking which can move with the self-concealing and sheltering aspect of the earthy movement, rather than to ignore it or attempt to overcome it (through forcing it into some conceptual grid). One thing which the selfconcealing qualityof such feministdiscoursescreatesis a shelterfrompatriarchal and/or instrumentaland/oranalyticviolation. But this somewhatdefensive move is only one (and perhapsa lesser)thing which occurs. The other is the way in which its elusivenessactuallymakesa place for, and makesway for the opening up of creative possibilities. To see how anarchic thinking, and especiallythe earthy movement it allows within thinking, can help us think these creativepossibilities,let us take a closer (though necessarilyvery brief) look at what Irigarayis trying to accomplish. [Whateverwe attemptto say], in orderto be interpreted,[has] to pass through the masterdiscourse:the one that prescribes . . [i.e.,] the discourseon discourses,philosophicaldiscourse . . . But this philosophicalmastery. .. cannot simplybe approachedhead-on, nor simply within the realm of the philosophical. Thus it was necessaryto deploy other languages. . . so that something of the feminine as the limit of the philosophical might be heard (1985b, 149-150). We cannot simply use the logical and analyticaltools of philosophyto break the limits of philosophicaldiscourse,the masterdiscourse.So Irigarayhas deployed two other strategies.The first, which placesus at the limit, is transformative mimesis, a repetitionof the masterdiscoursewhich evokes the oppressiveness of what is said (and has been said, over and over and over); the fa-

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miliardiscoursebecomes strange,alienating, and perhapsoptional. We have alreadyencountereda similartransformativemove in Griffin. To attempt to go beyond the limit, Irigarayexplores the possibility of "speaking as (a) woman."This is her second strategy,which I want to discussin more detail. The first question that arises in this attempt is: what is this (word) "woman"?We know what "woman"has been in the masterdiscourseand we know as well how far it is fromwhat we might sayof ourselves.But what shall " (fill in the blank) is to acwe say of ourselves?To say "womanis of the master discourse.This syntax and the to syntax presuppositions quiesce allows us to fill in the blank with: a being, entity, subject, object, proper name, concept, formal identity, or intelligible ideality, i.e., something formulated, formed, fixed, finished, complete. In the master discourse, if "woman"is none of these things, then "she"is simply ... .a blank, a nothing. We know we are not simply nothing. Yet we cannot, according to Irigaray,"fill in the blank"in the masterdiscourse. One woman+ one woman+ one woman will never add up to some generic entity: woman (1985a, 230). Neither blank, nor definite and finished, "woman"is multiple, ambiguous, indefinite, unfinished, somethingnot fixablewithin the mastergrid. (1985b, 156; 1985a, 229-230). To think "woman"is to move with the self-concealing side of the earthymovement, which shelters"woman"from the violation of the masterdiscourse. When we then go on to explore the creative possibilityof "speakingas (a) woman,"we are alreadyspeakingfrom a place of multiplicityand indefiniteness. Therefore, says Irigaray, . . . there is simplyno way I can give an account of "speaking (as) woman";it is spoken, but not in metalanguage(1985b, 134). No metalanguage, no rules of syntax: no propermeanings, propernames, properattribution,etc. Yet, it is spoken. We have all heardit, if only seldom, in the words of some of our poets (Piercy, Rich, Shange and others). But most of us are not poets; Irigarayis not a poet; she is a thinkerwho attempts to "speakas (a) woman."We ask, as thinkers,can a speakingfor which there is no metalanguagebe thinkable?I wouldsuggestthat to hear,in this context, is to think.It is to hear/thinkwithin an earthy movement. [These wordsare] inaudiblefor whoever listens to them with ready-madegrids, with a fully elaboratedcode in hand . .. One would have to listen with another ear, as if hearing another meaning alwaysin the processof weaving itself, of embracingitself with words,but also getting rid of wordsin order

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not to become fixed, congealed in them. For if "she" says something, it is not, it is alreadyno longeridenticalwith what she means. What she says is no longer identical with anything, moreover; rather, it is contiguous. It touches (upon) (1985b, 29). As the wordsarewoven together, arisingto disclosesomething, they are also, at once, withdrawing.There is no self-identity, no pure disclosure.The demandfor a puredisclosureis a demandof the masterdiscourse.To hear/think woman-speech,earthyspeech, requiresallowingfor the reticence, the elusiveness, the withdrawingand self-concealingthat belongsto earthydisclosing. Heeding an earthymovement allows us to hear/thinkwordswhich are not identical with but are, rather, contiguous with their meaning, words that touch (upon) their meaning, fluidly. In this context, "I hear"is not "I see" but "I am touched." I hear wordswhich drawnear and slip away, intimately, yielding only intimations.These intimationssparkmy desireto drawnearer, to listen ... to listen not only to the reticence of what is held back, but also for what might arisefromwithin the shelteredplace of the earthymovement of thinking. I listen for the words of she who attempts to "speak as (a) woman," whoever she may be .... At this point, I want to summarizethe descriptionof anarchic thinking, and emphasizethe importanceof addingit to the rangeof options availableto feminist thinkers. Anarchic thinking is atheoretical,rule-lessthinking, i.e., thinking which is neither bound to some ideal of truth or realitynor tied to a guidingfirst principleor an ultimatereferent.Anarchic thinking can also be characterizedby persistencein questioning,opennessto ambiguityand multiple interpretations,attentiveness to the strange-within-the-familiar,and allowancefor and attentivenessto languagewhich conceals as it reveals(earthy movement in languageand thinking). Decentering the familiar, the takenfor-granted,the "true"and the "real,"anarchicthinking wouldstretch, rearrangeand breakthe boundariesof the thinkable. Anarchic thinking thus can both subvertsuch intellectual and institutionalstructures,and clear a space for creative feminist thinking. In so doing, anarchic thinking breaksthe hold of patriarchalunivocity, specularizationand sameness.It empowersa multiplicityof feministvoices. If we hold ourselvesopen to the possibilitieswhich sound in these voices, we will find ourselveswith a multiplicityof strategiesand possibilitiesfor action as well. These possibilitiesare furthermultiplied in that anarchic thinking adds to but does not abolish other modes of thinking. Forexample, if I were to say that no one should"dotheory,"I wouldbe, in effect, setting up anarchyas an archeor rule. That wouldbe an absurdmove. It would also operatewithin a rigid either/orframeworkwhich is counter to what I have said about the way in which anarchicthinking affirmsmultiplic-

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ity. The insights attained throughtheoreticalanalysishave been very valuable. However, as an anarchic thinker, I do not hold to the results of such thinking as capital-T Theory (as Truth, Reality, as establishingan archeor speakinguniversally).I view the workof the theoristsas clarifyingparticular areas of thinking and experience, as situational analysesapplicablewithin clearly demarcatedlimits. There are other either/ordichotomieswhich I want to explicitly reject at this point: anarchicthinking or analysis,anarchicthinking or conceptualization. Anarchic thinking certainlymay makeuse of analysisand concepts (we are not all going to be able to-or even want to, except occasionally-write like Irigaray!).The concepts arrivedat are not taken as ends in themselves, but as ways of thinking about and expressingour experiences, concerns and purposes.Yes, I also reject the dichotomy of anarchic thinking or purpose. Anarchy need not be utter chaos, and anarchicthinking is not utterly purposeless. "No arche"does indeed mean "no telos";there is no one absolute end. However, that does not imply utter purposelessness. The question of the relation of anarchicthinking to purposeleads to two closely relatedquestions.What is the relationof anarchicthinking to normativity, and what is the relation of anarchic thinking to feminist politics? These are very difficultquestionsto think through. I am going to sketch out the beginning of a response,or at least of a way in which a responsemay be approached. Is anarchic thinking a case of "anythinggoes"-utter relativism?I would have to respondto that question with a "no," otherwise I could hardlycall myselfa feminist (I wouldhave to say that the oppressionof women is acceptable). Reflection on this point suggeststo me that I am a feminist because I feel outragewhen I am oppressedor when I see or reador hear about the oppressionof other women. This is not a theoreticalarche.One does not require a theoretical base to be a feminist (to take the normativeposition that the oppressionof women is wrong). Furtherreflection suggeststhat oppressioncontinues to function through an odd mix of requiring(an impossible-to-achieve)uniformityin the thinking and behaviorand appearanceof women, while at the same time keeping us divided and isolatedfromone another. The oppressedlearn to be afraidof and to despise difference:differencefrom men (which has continually been used to justifythe oppressionof women) and our differencesfromeach other (especiallydifferencesin color, class and sexualpreference,differenceswhich are used to oppressthe out-groups,often with the supportof women who belong to the in-group).This stronglysuggeststhat acceptingand affirmingall of these differencesis crucialto overcomingoppression.This is preciselywhat anarchic thinking does. Now comes a reallystickyquestion:what happenswhen we differfromone another with respect to value-questions(and the political moves that may

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arise from the taking of certain positions on value-questions)?For example, middle-classAmerican feministsmay, perceivingthat continuous pregancies are oppressiveto Third World women, supportstrongbirth control programs abroad.Then they are surprisedwhen the Third Worldwomen perceive such progamsas genocidal. The applicationof anarchicthinking would be helpful in this case. Differentexperiencesof oppression,differentfelt needs and values, need to be respectedand affirmed.This is not to say that changes will not occur (on both sides of the question) but for one group to assumethat they "knowbetter"and shouldthus be able to decide for the other is arrogant and destructive.Another exampleof a differenceamongfeministson a valuequestion pressesthe issue a bit harder.This is the currentand acrimonious debate over whether pornographyshould be outlawedor legalized.One side points out that pornographyis violently degradingto women, and encourages actualphysicalviolence as well, and should thereforebe outlawed.The other points out the importance of freedom to choose, and warns that if laws againstpornography(a difficultmatterto define in any case) are enacted and enforced, this reinforcesthe dangerousnotion that the governmentcan and should legislateregardingprivatesexual matters.Anarchic thinking does not providea basisfor deciding between these two arguments(and their underlying values). The questionwhich needs to be addressed,then, is: is this a reason to reject anarchic thinking? I do not think that it is. The fact that anarchicthinking does not providea normativebasisfor deciding particularvalue-questionswithina generally feminist context (i.e., within a groupof people who are outragedby the oppressionof women and want to work towardchange) would be a reason to reject anarchicthinking only if we assumethat feministsmust take a uniformpolitical stance. I think that is a very questionableassumption,for reasonsverysimilarto those raised by Emma Goldmann many decades ago when she warned the suffragists againstpinning all their feminist hopes and pouringall of their women'senergy into gaining the vote. The right to vote, or equal civil rights, may be good demands, but true emancipation begins neither at the polls nor in courts. It begins in [a] woman'ssoul ... .Never can a new idea move within the law. It mattersnot whetherthe idea pertains to political and social change or to any other domain of human thought and expression. . . . How can it be otherwise? [Even though individual laws change, t]he law is stationary, fixed, a "chariotwheel" which grindsall alike without regard to time, place and condition. .. (Goldmann1972, 142, 322). The vote, affirmativeaction laws, Title IX, etc. are all "gooddemands."So, perhaps, are laws in other areas. But I agree with Goldmann that the law is not where deep change occurs. It occurswithin us as individualsand among

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us as women beginning to see ourselves as a community working for deep change. As Goldmannpointed out many times, anarchyand communityare not in conflict; as I have suggested,anarchicthinking allowsthe kind of affirmation of differencewhich strengthenscommunity:differenceneed not be divisive. It is this opening up of a space for non-divisive other-ness, for difference, for a multiplicityof voices, which makesanarchicthinking cruciallyimportant to feminist thinking. We need a thinking and praxiswhich will genuinely differfrom that allowed for and legitimatedby patriarchy.But we also need (and perhapsas a prerequisite)a way of thinking which allows us to differ, each womanfromthe other, and still be a communityof feministsjoining together to do the work that needs to be done. We are, in fact different:in age, color, ethnic background,class and personalhistory. Such differences have affectedthe ways in which we experience the oppressivenessof patriarchal structures,and in what we would like to see changedin orderto end that oppression. Such differencesare also bound to affect the ways in which we think. If we can set aside the trainingwhich makesus demandthe objective, the true, the real, in a word, the theory, these differenceswill not appearas problemsto be somehowovercome (with the accompanyingriskof silencing or invalidatingthe experienceof manyof us). A multiplicityof voices and of possibilitiesfor thought and action can be a genuine strength, and it is this multiplicitythat anarchic thinking yields and affirms. I realizethat this does not answerthe questionsthat can (and need to be) askedregardingthe relationshipbetween anarchicthinking and normativity, and between anarchicthinking and feminist politics. It merelysketches out the initial directionof a response.I have laid the firstfew threadsof the warp of a fabricwhich I hope others will add to, both warp and weft, creating a multicolored,multitexturedfabricof thinking and practice. Some unraveling and reweavingwill no doubt occur, and I welcome it. There are Women everywherewith fragments gather fragments weave and mend .... we will know what we need to know to learn how to come together to learn how to weave and mend (Cameron 1981, 149) NOTES 1. LaDelleMcWhorterhas convincinglyargued(in McWhorter1987) that theoryis boundto such notions of truth, reality and objectivity. 2. Although I find Heidegger'sworkvery helpful to this project, it would not be appropriate to referto what I am discussingas "Heideggerian"feminism. Heideggernever characterizedhis thinking as either anarchicor feminist.

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REFERENCES

Cameron, Anne. 1981. Daughtersof copperwoman.Vancouver:PressGang Publishers. Daly, Mary. 1978. Gyn/ecology.Boston: Beacon Press. Goldmann, Emma. 1972. RedEmmaspeaks.Ed. Alix Kates Shulman. New York:Vintage. Griffin, Susan. 1978. Womanand nature:the roaringinsideher. New York: Harperand Row. Heidegger,Martin. 197la. On theway to language.trans. PeterD. Hertz. San Francisco:Harperand Row. -- . 1971b. Poetry,language,thought.trans. Albert Hofstadter.New York:HarperColophon Books. trans.J. Glenn Gray. New York:Harper -. 1968. Whatis calledthinking? Books. Colophon Irigaray,Luce. 1985a. Speculumof the otherwoman. trans. Gillian C. Gill. Ithaca: Corell University Press. . 1985b. Thissex whichis not one. trans. Catherine Porter. Ithaca:Cornell University Press. McWhorter, LaDelle. 1987. Thinking throughthe metaphysicsof the real. Unpublishedpaper.

UMA NARAYAN NOTTO SPEAK IT IS So OFTENEASIER It is so often easier not to speak. The whisperedracial obscenity Strikes like an unexpected blow Each time. The fact of repetition Does not immunizeus to its force. The sour anger rises in the throat But fear knots it into a hard silence. And meeting you soon after, Dear friend though you might be, You too are white; and we Talk of other things, Although the body still Trembleswith the shock And the mind cannot shift From its brooding. It is only days later that We can tell in collected tones Of what took place, And bear to see the dismayin your eyes And endure the consolation of your anger. It is so often easier not to speak. Especiallywhen the casual insults take place in your midst, And when public remarksoffend In perhapsunintended implications. We have learned to guardour tongues In the interest of civility. We are gaggedby the fear That almost anything we say Will only strike you as Shrillness, bad-mannersand bad-taste. It is so often easier not to speak. We drawbehind the protective wall Of silence, to regain our poise. To show our pain to you Seems a second humiliation. And there is alwaysthe dread Hypatiavol. 3, no. 2 (Summer 1988) ? by Uma Narayan

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Of seeing incomprehensioninvade your eyes Or of hearing you attempt comfort With unbearableremarks About how we are over-reacting And would be better off If we did not let these incidents affect us To such a great extent. It is so often easier not to speak. You too benefit from the silence. Our pleasant daily intercourse Is breachedby such issues. It is hard for you to look With equanimityupon our anger. You no doubt feel as helpless In your way, as we do in ours. And, however unintended, Our anger arousesin you A faint aromaof guilt. It is so often easier not to speak. Speech between us is fraught With tensions; every sentence mined With risk. But silence between us May be more dangerous. What friendshipcould survive Its rifts?Its deep undercurrents Can make us drift apartlike continents With no possibilityof bridges. May we both have the strength To handle with grace The strangeperils of our speech. COLONIALFICTION- I

With what ease you use Our history and geography As raw materialsfor Your imaginations. With facility your fiction harbours Imaginarycountries in South America

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Where cruel tinpot dictators Are subvertedby white men Committed to Democracy And all higher civic virtues. Strange kingdomsand strangerpeoples In the African 'darkness' Provideyou exotic settings Where brave white explorers Have to set things right: Unite warringtribal peoples, that somehow alwaysinvolve Saving beautifulnative women Who end up suitablygrateful And quickly acquirethe habits Of Christian modest And romantic love. With what facility you mix up Our names, institutions, customs: Exotic African fauna romp Unembarassedthrough Indian landscapes. Strange cannibalisticrites Are thwartedin regions Where anthropologistshave failed To document them. And whereverthese lands lie They casuallyoverflow With gold and silver and strangegems That the natives gladly bestow On the white man for all His intercessionson their behalf. I dream retaliation, of writing Stories about strangewhite kingdoms In darkestCalifornia Or of a lost Englishpeople Whose affairsare put in order By sophisticatedChinese explorers, Or who are civilized by Upright Hindu missionaries Who teach them to wear clothes And refrainfrom eating their enemies.

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But it would not work. One needs an authentic blindness To write that sort of fiction. Mine would be too contrived Too make-believe, And anyway, useless. One joke could not subvert An entire genre. I content myself With writing this poem.

II Let me not excuse you Too quickly. Your blindness Was no doubt real. But the contempt that fed it Was no less substantial. The fiction you wrote Was no less powerful For its stupidity. Generationsof schoolboys Fed on your fare Set out as adults With Bibles and guns And cheap merchandise And, not to forget, The stiff upperlip, To fulfill the calling Of the white man's burden. Yourfiction proclaimed How much there was to do And who alone could do it. Voltaire may have talked Of cultivating one's own garden, But you knew how lucrative it was To pillage other fields. Tales of lost diamond mines, Of cities of gold and silver, And preciousgems that were

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The eyes of pagan idols Luredyou with promiseof riches. Stories of barbariccruelties, Of vile native usages And blind worshipof gods Patently false and far more Ferociousthan your one Lamb, Beckoned with the guarantee Of Paradisehereafter For all your good works. So you came and conquered: Tore out the eyes of our gods, Stole our preciousmetals, Killed local rulerswho Mistrustedyour treaties, Killed unco-operativesectors Of whole populations. You then patted yourself On your now-tanned back For fulfilling so well Yourworld-historicmission. What we find most strange Is that your mission Never seems to end. Even today you bear the burden Of care-takingthe world. You still must lend supportto Dictatorialgeneralissimos For the sake of internationalpeace And the good of their peoples. You still must sit at tables Where terms are to be discussed Or treaties drawnup by us. If any of our people riot, You rush to restoreorder. If we resent your interference We must be communistagitators. If we oppose what you propose We must be terrorists Fundedby Khaddafi.

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Do you not think it time To re-readyour Voltaire? For you to mind your own Gardensfor a change? Not everything there is blooming Or smells good. Do you not think it time To start writing other stories And to leave us in peace To write our own?

Poetic Politics: How the AmazonsTook the Acropolis JEFFNERALLEN

Thispaperexploresthepoeticpoliticsof lesbianandfeministwriting,the textual violencethatwritingexercisesandtheamazonintertextit creates.In thisparticular thewritingof HeleneCixousand essay,JeffnerAllentakesas herpointof departure MoniqueWittig.

Lesbian and feminist writing makes actual-logically and materiallyworlds in which females choose freely the course of our lives. The startling repercussionsof these textual worldstake by surprise,and devastate, patriarchal institutionswhich wouldcontrol the distributionof meaning, value, and physical goods against the self-definedinterestsof each woman. By lesbian and feministwritingI include, as a partiallist: the use of words, dialects, and mannersof speakingwhich strikea liberatingresonanceamong groupsof women; diaries;deliberatemistakesin the addition of a bill, when women do not have enough money to purchase basic necessities; the exchange of notes to make known the depths of friendshipand passion;lesbian and feministphilosophy.The randomappearanceof this list belies rigidseparationof texts into "practical"and "theoretical"categories.Common to each instanceof lesbianand feministwritingcited is a commitmentto a textual action I will call: poetic politics. I. FOURTHESESON POETICPOLITICS

Poetic politics is defined uniquelyby each instance of lesbian and feminist writing, and by their shifting interconnections. Some instances of lesbian and feminist writing may be so bold that they transformentirely the field of textual action, at least for some readers.Majorclaimsof poetic politics can be articulated,nevertheless, while keeping in mind the inevitablyperspectival characterof any such description. THESIS1

Poetic politics speaksthe fortunesof a people in such a way that that fortune might be real. Hypatiavol. 3, no. 2 (Summer 1988) ? by JeffnerAllen

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THESIS2

Poetic politics sets forth, by retrievaland by invention, elements vital to the productionof meaning: language,culture, and corporealself. A poetic politics posits connections between women'scontrol of the productionof meaning and women's shaping of our sexualitiesand our bodily powers. THESIS 3, the entanglement of freedom In poetic politics there speaks not one for all, but each for herself. How I speakmyselfas lesbianor feminist, or as both, is specific to how I experience myselves, is multiple in meaning, resistsnormativeclassification.To the extent that how I speakmyselfis alive, a qualitymorereadilyfelt than thought, it interactswith the creationof meaningby each woman, with the fortunesof all women. THESIS4

The aesthetics, ethics, and ideologies at work in poetic politics give rise to textual worldswhich differ, and which may conflict. This study of poetic politics will focus on the distinctive configurationof these theses in the worksof Helene Cixous and MoniqueWittig, writerssituated frequently in the heterogeneous movement called the new French feminisms. To be sure, Cixous and Wittig are vigorousin their pronouncements of non-relatednessto one another, and with good reason. There is an insurmountableopposition between the "feminine textual breakthrough" proposedby Cixous, which utilizes"a writingsaid to be feminine"and seeks the recovery of a feminine symbolics, and the "political semiology"developed by Wittig, which aims at ending the categoriesof sex and gender by study of language and ideology (Cixous and Conley 1984, 51, 60; Wittig 1980, 103). My choice of Cixous and Wittig as majorpoints of referencein poetic politics is basedprimarilyon their perspicuousunderstandingsof the textual production of meaningand its effectsand, not incidentally,on a readerlydelight in some of their texts. An uncompromisingaffirmationof female control of the creation of meaning is fundamentalto the writingsof both Cixous and Wittig, as is the affirmationof female language,embodiment,and experience as sites where meaning is created. Both writersofferthe additionaladvantage of a steady productionof book-length publicationsthrough which issues in poetic politics can be traced, Wittig beginning with The Opoponoxin 1964, and Cixous with Dedans, 1969.1

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These two accomplices in poetic politics will be found, however, in the companyof a third. My own approachto their texts is neither literarycriticism, which has been done excellently by others, nor a historyof recent conflicts in the French lesbian/feministmovements.2 I propose,instead,a philosophicalreflectionon poeticpoliticsand theprocessof meaningconstitution.Such a proposal may seem to run against the grain of claims by both Cixous and Wittig that philosophy is antithetical to empowering female thought. Cixous, in one of her many critical remarkson the solidarityof philosophical inquiry with logocentrism and phallocentrism, writes, "The philosophical constructs itself starting with the abasement of women." Wittig contends that the categoriesof sex, which enforce the social dominance of women by men, are "those two great axes of categorizationfor philosophy" (Cixous 1980B, 92; Wittig 1978). Although in agreementwith what I take to be the spirit of these statements, I claim that lesbian and feminist writing can rewrite any field of inquiry,and that it alreadyhas accomplishedsuch a rewrit3 ing of philosophy. Like much of the new Frenchfeminisms, my philosophicalapproachwill shape itself not by writing about texts, but by engagementin textual invention. Referenceto texts by Cixous and Wittig will be groundedin what I take to be some of the strongest,boldest elements of their respectivepoetic politics, a selectionthat shiftsthe contoursof the new Frenchfeminismsby situating them in a context that is moreAmericanthan European,and morefeminist than postmodem.In the case of Cixous, manywritingspriorto her statement, "the enigmaof heterosexuality.. . it is behindme" (Cixousand Conley 1984, to some, they alsogive 66), will be abandoned.4 If suchchoicesappeararbitrary to find how one constitutes itself. opportunity poetic politics II. TEXTUALVIOLENCE

The textual action of lesbianand feminist writingtakes the right to determine what a poetryand a politics might be. It nullifies mandatoryseparation between that which has been designatedthe "poetic"and the "political."No longer can a text be classifiedthe productof either a statesmanor a poet, a philosopheror a feminist, a writeror a political activist. The wedge that has constructed the "poetic" and the "political"as discrete categories and dictated the laws that govern their combination is removedby the textual violence of this writing. The practice of a textual violence at once poetic and political is affirmeddecisively by Cixous: Poetry is/and (the) Political Sorties: Out and Out Attacks/WaysOut/Forays(Cixous and Clement 1986, 63) The political powerof a literaryworkwith a new formis, Wittig argues,like a

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Trojan Horse. It operatesas a warmachine, becauseits design and its goal is to pulverizethe old formsand formalconventions. . . Eventually it is adopted, and even if slowly, it will work like a mine. (Wittig 1984, 49) THEWEDGE

The Athenian illusion that poetry and politics ought to be separatehas maskedfor too long, in Western cultures, the subtext from which that illusion arose:the claim of a single poetic politics to makereal the fortunesof all. The Acropolis, Athens' "higher-city,"has protectedthis subtext, legislating that those who are not at its origin may be poets or statesmen,but not both. Or that one might be both if in possessionof a poetic politic that is mimetic and dulcet-imitative, soothing, agreeable-a servile imitationof its own. In contest for admission to the city, many a poet has exhausted herself and never been said to win. The Athenian laws of textual productionjustify their rule of poetry and politics by claiming a privilegedepistemic access to knowledgeof the truth. The Athenian Citizen in Plato'sLawsdeclares, "Ourwhole polity has been constructedas a dramatizationof a noble and perfect life. . . one which indeed can be producedonly by a code of true law."Socratesoffersin supportof his expulsionof poetryfromthe Republic,"Itwouldbe impiousto betraywhat we believe to be the truth." (Plato 1961, VII 817b, IV 719c). This tenuous justificationtakes on verisimilitudewhen Socratesfabricatesthe historyof a long-standingquarrelbetween poetryand philosophy, a traditionthat would perpetuatethe banishmentof poetry and prevent the exercise of poetry and politics by hands other than his own. The textual violence of lesbian and feminist writing blocks the wedge by affirmingthat which Socratictraditionwoulddisinherit:poetry, her bold and unsettlingcharacter.Against Socrates,whose views of poetryand "herspell" in a "well-governedcity" lead him to testify, "we really had good grounds then for dismissingher from our city since such was her character"(Plato 1968, X 607b)-poetry is freed to become a furiouscomplex of characters which turn the Athenian city into an illusion and poetry'sfictions into reality. Today a new form of the wedge, assimilationistclaims and expectations, would conceal the textual violence of lesbian and feminist writing. This wedge would separatelesbianand feministwriting, includingthe new French feminisms, from their history as a distinctive textual movement. By obfuscation of their historic exercise of violence, it would reinstatethe Same: the Athenian laws of textual production.In the wake of assimilation,women are

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writtenaboutwithoutany referenceto actualtexts by femaleauthors,as is the case with continentalphilosopherssuch as Derridaand Foucault.Or the new Frenchfeminismsarementioned,but only by couplingfemalewriterswith male counterparts.Much as Simone de Beauvoirhas been readagainsta background of Sartreanphilosophicalpresupposition,missingthe importof her concerns, new Frenchfeministwritersare readas accessorieswhose task is to respondto, correct,deviatefrom, and enhance, male-definedtheoreticalprojects.5 Assimilationistclaims arguein supportthat writingsby Cixous and Wittig reflect a traditionalacademictraining:Cixous referencesFreudand Lacanian psychoanalysis,Genet, Heidegger,and Derrida,and Wittig cites influenceby Barthes,Brecht, Proust,and Russianformalism.Both Cixous and Wittig cite the importance of works by Marx. 6 Assimilationist readings of the new French feminismsfail to note that texts such as those by Cixous and Wittig mention the classic male traditionin orderto dismissit by rigorouscritique, or to turn it inside out until it is beyond recognition. THELACUNAE

Suppressionof the textual violence of the new Frenchfeminismsfails, for the lacunaryoriginsof these and other lesbian and feminist writingsresistall attempts to institute the Athenian laws of textual production. Both Cixous and Wittig claim a strongrapportwith female authors:Cixous writes of her bondswith Clarice Lispectorand MargueriteDuras,and Wittig indicatesher connections with Sappho, Djuna Barnes,Natalie Sarraute,and membersof the group, questionsfeministes.Yet the question of textual situation is more than a matter of influence, for the violence of the new French feminisms emerges in spaces where patriarchalstructuresare absent-spaces which would expand and which are alreadyfemale languages, cultures, histories. Cixous tells of those "spacescontaining a certainamountof usefuland necessaryknowledgein orderto carryout anothertype of workwhich would be on the side of femininity"(Cixous and Conley, 1984, 63). Wittig writes of the "intervalsthat yourmastershave not been able to fill with their wordsof proprietorsand possessors... the gaps,. . . all that is not a continuationof their discourse"(Wittig 1973, 113, 114). Les Guerilleres,Wittig's book of female writer-warriors,concludes, TO WRITE VIOLENCE OUTSIDE THE TEXT IN ANOTHER WRITING THREATENING MENACING MARGINS SPACES INTERVALS WITHOUT PAUSE ACTION OVERTHROW (Wittig 1973, 143)

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The powerof the lacunaederivesnot from an essentialistseparationof female and male traditions,but fromthe historicfact of the linguisticand other activities which take place in such sites. For Cixous, the institutions of phallocentriclanguageare firmlydisplacedby a lacunaryfeminine language: For as soon as we exist, we are bor into languageand language speaks (to) us, dictates its law, a law of death: it lays down its familiar model, lays down its conjugal model. . . (Cixous 1981, 45) A metaphoriclanguageopens up a life space for Cixous, "Up high, I lived in writing. I read in orderto live. . . there was little place for metaphorin my existence, a very restrictedspace, which I often annuled"(Cixous 1977, 29). createsharedlinForWittig, it is becausethe femalewarriorsof lesGuerilleres guisticspacesthat they can name, and in so doing end, phallic control of languageThey [Elles]say, the languageyou speak poisons your glottis tongue palate lips. They say, the languageyou speak is made up of words that are killing you. They say, the languageyou speak is made up of signs that rightlyspeakingdesignatewhat men have appropriated(Wittig 1973, 114). They say, I refusehenceforwardto speakthis language,I refuse to mumble after them the words lack of penis lack of money lack of insignia lack of name. (Wittig 1973, 107). Recognitionof male appropriationof languageis accompaniedby the decision of each female to determinethe language,or languages,she will speak, a choice which is made, for both Cixous and Wittig, in a specificallyfemale context. ForCixous, the context is that of a feminine writing that disperses the space of death: It was mortallycold, the truthhad set, I took the last book before death, and behold, it was Clarice, the writing. . . . The writingcame up to me, she addressedme, in seven languages, one after the other, she read herself to me, through my absence up to my presence (Cixous 1979, 48). ForWittig, the context is a lesbianwritingwhose power imbuesa subjectivity, j/e, the lesbian "I."J/e is not one, nor is j/e split. As Wittig indicates in The LesbianBody,j/e, with the powerof/, the bar, overturnsall expectations of heterosexualdiscourse: Yourwhole body is in fragmentshere. . . I Uj/e] speakto you, I all of a sudden that such marvelous with for strength yearn you the pieces fall together (Wittig 1976, 112).

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In the space of a female bestowed life, Cixous affirmspoetry: its phonic and oral dimensions, its bodily materilizationof language,and its sourcesin female desire. Such a poetizinggrantsan open space that bringseach woman to writing: "Woman must put herself into the text-as into the world and into history-by her own movement"(Cixous and Conley 1984, 63). Wittig claimspoetryas a catalystfor transformationin women'slives. In Crossingthe Acheron,Wittig showsthat Virgilfailed to attain paradisenot becausehe was pagan, but because, without desireor hope, he lost passionfor an actualparadise here and now and wanted to destroyhis works. Wittig, a poet of desire and hope, reworksfemale syntax and semanticsto write that which has been without words:the space of freedomthreatenedwith extinction, "the music of the spheresand the voice of the angels"(Benegas 1985, 97; Wittig 1985C, 110). Just as languageis not a static frameworkto which new contexts are attached as clothes are hung on a line, the female languagesdeterminedby Cixous and Wittig are not ethnographicdetails addedon to language,but a shift in what is language.It wouldbe a misunderstanding to conceivethe textual violenceof Cixousand Wittig'swritingas an externaltool thatmanipulateslanguage,ratherthanas a creationof meaningthatmakesrealtheclaimthatlanguage, or moreaccurately,languages,are informedby ethnographic limits.To be forbidden language,to be poisonedby a languagenot one's own, arenot psychological, or individualdilemmas.Experiencethat the language,or languages,one exercises are distinct from that language which would impose itself is not "merely"an autobiographicalconfession, but a dispersalof philosophical, literary, and political discoursesabout "languageitself." As Jewish, Algerian, lower middle-classwhen young, and a woman, Cixous states she had to deal with the fact that language, the materialfrom which writing is drawn, was lackingfor her. "'Youcan read, adore, be assailed,"'she was told, "'Butwriting is not grantedto you'. . . Writing was reservedfor the elect" (Cixous 1977, 20). A battle for a languageof one's own begins early, also, for the young female studentsof Wittig's Opoponox.Fran?oisePommier,alreadyalienated fromthe vitality of language,"makesround, fine letterswith her pen that stay right between the two lines without sticking out" (Wittig, 1966, 31). CatherineLegrand,heroine of the Opoponox,resiststhe rule of the dominant languageand refusesto hold a pen correctlyduringwritingclass (Wittig 1966, 32). A pulverizationof "languageproper"is effectedby the interactionand singularityof female languageswhich destabilizelaws of gender markedsyntax and semantics.The impactof Cixous'sobservationthat there is not one feminine discourse, but thousandsof differentkinds of feminine words, and of Wittig and Zeig'sDictionaryof LesbianPeoples(1979), is to demonstratethat thepluralityof femalelanguagesis textualviolence(Cixous and Clement 1986,

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137). The violence of these languagesis not the centralizedand seemingly monolithic force of the wedge, but a startingon all sides at once, the character, Cixous maintains, that makesa feminine writing, or a fracturingand extension into space that is like Pascal'scircle, whose center is everywhereand whose circumferenceis nowhere, a character,Wittig states, of lesbianwriting (Cixous 1981, 53; Wittig 1979, 65). These feminine languagesannounce themselves in Cixous' texts: "a languagethat resonatesin each national language";"the languageof my mother";"the languagethat speaks/isspoken by women when no one is listening to them to correct them"; the languageof Promethea,she who speaksburingly, she who has not cut the cord that connects speech to her body and who does not know how to speak otherwise (Cixous 1977, 28, 1983, 184). Each of these languagesis, Cixous insists, a political act of resistance: For a long time it has been in body that women have responded to persecution, to the familial-conjugalenterpriseof domestication, to the repeated attempts at castratingthem. Those who have turned their tongues 10,000 times seven times before not speakingare either dead from it or more familiar with their tongues and their mouths than anyone else (Cixous 1976, 886, 887). The lesbian languagesin Wittig's texts are animated by "the original language of 'letters and numbers'" which the ancient Amazons did not relinquish ... a languagewhich, accordingto the legend, "wascapableof creating life or of 'striking' death" (Wittig and Zeig 1979, 94). "OLULU, OLULU," modulatedaccordingto differentrhythms, speeds, volumes, the famous cry of triumph of the Tritonians, conqueressesand amazonsfrom Libya, disempowerslanguageswhose rigid, rigorous,repressiveconstruction would effect a permanent representationof female oppression (Wittig and Zeig 1979, 119). The longer one moves in the lacunae, the more readily the textual violence of lesbian and feminist writingdefines itself as the creation of meaning that is exercised by each female language. Femalecontrol of the production of meaningconstructsa pandemicpoetic politics that makesreal not one history, but many. It aims not to establisha correct line of female inheritance, but to make a claim of non-inheritance, basedon the female experience that knowledgecannot be possessed.The languagesthat are createdand freed in the works of Cixous and Wittig pass on textual worlds without dictating a right over them, a freedomwithout legislation, in rivalryto excel in the rejection of servile ideologyand in invention. As the sites of a poetic politics in which female fortunesare rememberedand invented by each in the company of those whom she chooses, the lacunae effect cataclysmicupheavalsin textual history and producetheir own textual worlds.

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III. THEREIS NO "POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE"

Lesbian and feminist poetic politics challenge the currentdesignation of women'swriting, and in particular,of the new Frenchfeminisms,as "the politics of difference.""The politics of difference,"a term that has achieved prominence among contemporarycontinental and feminist theorists, is a misnomer. "A writingsaid to be feminine," the political strategyof Cixous, claims to drawupon the lacunaeof femalewriting, each with its languagesand politics, and therebyto affirma politics of differences.Femininewritingdissolvesthe logic of difference organized according to a hierarchy of opposition and, Cixous declares, makes of difference "a bunch of new differences." For Cixous, the affirmationof differences,one of which is "woman,"formsa politics of female survivalthat dislodgesthe rule of the Same. A claimingof differencesstops racismand misogyny,"two waysof not letting the other exist, of cancelling, of excluding, or of occulting the other," and bringsto an end that history in which differences are at no moment tolerated or possible (Cixous and Clement 1986, 67, 70, 71, 83; Cixous 1980A). The "politicalsemiology"of Wittig, in contrast,claimsthe lacunaein their and "difference."Any differencethat individualityby abolishing"differences" constitutesconcepts of oppositionbetween categoriesof individualsis, Wittig maintains,the productof an oppressiveideology.This includesthe difference identifiedas "woman,"for as Wittig argueswith admirableconsistency: what makesa woman is a specificsocial relationto a man,. . . a relation which implies personal and physical obligation as well as economic obligation (Wittig 1981, 53, 1982, 64, 1979, 115). Apartfromthe ruleof identity, both "differences"and "difference"areempty concepts. One is not bor a woman or a man, and just as there are no slaves without masters, there are no women without men. There can be, moreover,no "politics"of difference.When posited as "difference," the "margin,"the "other," the new French feminisms are represented as a reactive movement, mesmerizedby the mechanismsof powerthat enforce the Same. Femalecontrol of the creationof meaning is depicted as a single voice which, for unexplainedreasonsof birth, destiny, or mere happenstance, is stationed permanentlyon the outskirtsof the Acropolis and barredfrom entrance. Without the dignity of their self-chosen names-"a writing said to be feminine," "politicalsemiology,"etc.-the pluralitythat constitutesthe political powerof the new Frenchfeminismsis not addressed. The new Frenchfeminismsconstitute themselvesby refusing"the politics of difference," by rejecting that ideology whose fixity and universality of

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claim woulderasethe indigeneousaspectsand the particularityof female languagesand experience. This refusalis textual violence, an act in which being spokenfor is displacedby a fluid speakingof self with selves. As a valuationof self, it is a deliberateoffense which is one, althoughnot the only, historical condition for the possibilityof female survival. The rejection of "the politics of difference"opens a space, moreover, for the formulationof issuesstill to be resolved.Cixous affirmsa politics of differences, but in such a way that her writing tends towardan ideologyof difference. Wittig rejects all ideologiesof difference,but underestimatesthe relevance of some differencesthat are historicallyconstituted. That differencewhich is feminine, Cixous argues,exceeds the ruleof signification and is, therefore, beyond ideology. "Feminine"and "masculine," "man"and "woman,"designatethat which cannot be classifiedinside a signifier except by force. The feminine, and moreprecisely,the feminine libidinal economy which Cixous characterizesas "neither identifiableby a man nor referableto the masculineeconomy," is abundant,endless. The feminine escapes the signifier as a living structure: a biological difference based on driveswhich are radicallydifferentfor women than for men, and a productof history and culture (Cixous and Conley 1984, 51, 56, 57; Cixous 1976, 28; Cixous and Clement 1986, 81-83). movementof a transforCixous'saffirmationof femininityas "theprecursory makesfemininity,writtenoutsideanmationof social and culturalstructures," ticipation, into a messianictext of the future. "Women-poems,"the "poems like open palms,"are to organizeand carefor the regenerationand vitalization of other (Cixous 1981, 50, 53, 1976, 879, 1980A). Messianismand materity of the intertwinein Cixous'stexts, which resistthe patriarchaldisparagement of motherhood the risk but at of making prescriptivefor pleasures pregnancy, females.Messianism,matemity,and heterosexualityare mandated: I do not believe in that [artificialinsemination]at all. .... I do not sing the praise of the union of women, because it is wrong. . . . but as one knows, a child is made together. It takes two, a man and a woman. Besides this child precisely needs two (Cixous and Conley 1984, 66). As Wittig succinctly remarks,this is "An anti-homosexualracism, whose function is to poeticize the obligatorycharacterof the 'you-will-be-straightor-you-will-not-be' " (Wittig 1980, 107). Even in Le Livrede Promethea, Cixous' recent work in which she explicitly rejectsbisexualityand writesthe love of women with women, H. describesherself, "I am born mother, like all the girls," and Prometheais named, "a woman, a child, a mother"(Cixous 1983, 150, 1976, 890, 891). The ideology of difference is more successfully brought to an end by Wittig, whose texts make real her maxim, "Neithergods nor goddesses,nei-

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ther mastersnor mistresses"(Wittig 1985A, 35). Her theoryof writingtends, however, to a formalismthat does not take into account the relevanceof diverse female languagesand experience. Wittig's claim that ideology is displaced when a literarytext reduceslanguageto be "as meaninglessas possible" and turns language into a "raw," "neutral," material to be worked (Wittig 1984, 47-49), does not admit those non-formal elements which might account, in part, for how languageis workedin some waysratherthan others, for instance, as lesbianwritingratherthan as heterosexualdiscourse. This omission is unexpected, for the formalismthat pervadesWittig's theory of writingis not predominantin that writingitself. The materialbase that informsher theory of writingbreaksthroughformalismand enables theoretical articulationof women's concrete situations. Paris-La-Politique, Wittig's new text, calls in that city, a city in name only, where one is like the wolves that howl from freedom and famine, their flanks exposed to the wind while the others with the mark of the collar have a full stomach and a shining fur (Wittig 1985A, 41), for food, drink, and shelter, the firstnecessitiesfor a space in which one can breathe more freely. Amidst the conflicts in Cixous and Wittig's assessmentsof the relation of ideology to female languagesand experience, "the politics of difference"is dismantled from all sides at once. At their best, the texts of Cixous and Wittig displacethe ideologyof differenceby the practiceof new formsof textual violence: the uprootingof their own narratives,especiallyinsofaras they preservethe imprintof ideology;the creationof meaningthat is unrecoverable by ideology, and which is, therefore,dangerousto the rule of the Same. While the practiceof textual violence is dangerousto itself, dangeris an element in which lesbian and feminist writing thrives. IV. AN AMAZONINTERTEXTUALITY

Poetic politics transformstextual reality not by a single strategy,but by a combination of strategicshifts. A turnaboutof realitiesoccurs when lesbian and feminist writing, by placing more and more female defined signs in relation to each other, makes vanish patriarchalsignifiers and signification. Piece by piece, syntacticand semantic innovationspile up and, by the power of their presence, reconfigurefiction and reality. Luci Maure,of Wittig's Les Guerilleres,gives one instance of how multiplemethodsof meaningconstitution magnifytheir effects when she cries, . . . to the double echo the phrase of Phenarete, I say that that which is is, I say that that which is not also is. When she

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repeatsthe phraseseveraltimes the double, then triple, voice endlessly superimposesthat which is and that which is not (Wittig 1973, 14). An initial judgmentthat the effectsof Luci Maure'scry are more imagined than "real,"may be followed by an awarenessof their surprisingreality. Objections that the new Frenchfeminismsdo not engage a narrativestyle that portrays"reality"accordingto a representationalconcept of truth and do not offer step by step proposalsfor action miss the possibilitythat there may be numerouspolitically efficaciousstyles of lesbian and feminist writing. A related chargeof elitism has tended to accept the biasesof literatureof engagement, for which languageis but a tool for liberation. The frequentassumption of this criticism, that there is a single, linear language common to women, ignores the pluralityof female languagesand the strength of their non-conformity.7 Indeed, as femalesexperimentourselvesin wordson paper, our texts become an outpost of lesbian and feminist cultures. Common to the strategies of lesbian and feminist writing, and defined uniquelyby each, is a field of textual action that might aptlybe termed:amazon. If an amazontext is a text of female freedom, then the texts of lesbian and feminist writingconstitute an amazonintertextuality.Such texts may be consideredby and about amazons,whether Cixous' Le Livrede Promethea,in which "H." calls Promethea,bearerof female languagesand life, "my amazon," or Wittig and Zeig's Dictionaryof LesbianPeoples,in which "all the companion lovers called themselves amazons.Living together, loving, celebratingone another" (Cixous 1983, 89; Wittig and Zeig 1979, 5). Feminine writing, Cixous claims, is an action of strategicvalue, for it expresseswhat has been silenced. The poetic is political in the most efficient and ensnaringsense because it takes place in language(Cixous and Conley 1984, 65; Cixous 1981, 53, 1976, 879, 1980A). Wittig affirmsthat writing and action are inseparable, I am a woman who writes of women and for the liberationof women. It is the sameact: I cannot disassociatethe two terms. It engages my body, my desire, my dreams, and my hope (Wittig 1974, 12).8 She shows, in CrossingtheAcheron,that the text is an excellent site for a female offense, so often is the enemy an ideology that inducesservitudewithout exercisinga direct, physicalpresence (Wittig 1985C, 81). While admitting that some militant actions advance women's liberation more immediately than does feminine writing, Cixous insists, And to live, I need to do what I am doing. So, do I have the right to do it?. . . I justifymyself.. . I believe it is useful, and

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I think that it can be usefulonly on condition that there be a women's movement (Cixous and Conley 1984, 59, 60). So primaryis the women's movement to the productionof texts in rupture with masculineculturethat, Wittig states, "if the women'smovement dies, I die. My personwould lose all reality, all sense"(Wittig 1974, 12, 1976, ix).9 Once banishedby patriarchy,the ensemble of amazontexts articulatesits histories, from the warriors of Dahomey, Patagonia, the Caucasus, to Sakundeva, rebel queen in Cixous' The Schoolat Madhubai,and Panzaand Quixote, heroines of Wittig's The LongestJourney(Wittig 1985B; Cixous 1986). The record of Aeschylus in the Eumenides,and of those who have held the power to write and to preservethat recordhas perpetuatedthe history of amazondefeat and Athenian victory at the Acropolis. Yet the record of a loss so overwhelmingas to constitute the end of amazonendeavor is far fromuniversal.An amazonintertexthas been suppressed,not for lack of records by which it might speakits fortunes,but becausehow the amazonstook the Acropolis might displace male, Western, philosophicalculture. In the recordsof this writer, the Acropolis has been taken not just once, but over and over again. The amazonshave gone to Athens to avenge the wrongsdone an amazonqueen, to recapturea hill still markedby tracesof an ancient amazoncity, to engage in a textual productionof meaningthat befits these and related events. On the Acropolis, that symbolicsite fromwhich male-definedinstitutions have attemptedto rule, the amazonspitched their camp after they mastered the surroundingcountry and approachedthe city with impunity (Plutarch 1914, XXXVI.4-XXVII.2;Aeschylus 1959, lines 684-690; Cleidemus 1973, 103-104). On Ares' Hill they set up their camp and fortifiedthat place with walls and towers as a new fortress-town.The Athenians were routed and drivenback by the women as faras the shrineof the Eumenides.The fact that the Amazonsencampedalmost in the heart of the city is attestedboth by the names of the localities there and by the gravesof those who fell in battle. The Acropolishas been taken, as well, by an Athena whose verdictbefore the Athenian judgeswas not that recordedby Aeschylus. Athena's supposed defense of the lawsof Apollo, "mytask it is to renderthe last verdict/ And I cast this stone for Orestes" (Aeschylus 1959, lines 662-720), is thereby recast.10Insteadof the illusoryAthena, "motherlessdaughterof Zeus'head," there speaksan Athena, ancient Libyanamazon,founderof that city which was given her name and from which she, like poetry, was expelled. In the contest of languagesand life, Athena, amazon, dismissedby tragedianand philosopherfor reasonsof character,history,and her friends,casts a final verdict-for freedommake by each woman'swordsand hands.

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NOTES 1. As a chronologicalpoint of reference,Wittig's Opoponox,1964, is the earliestof the new Frenchfeminist texts. Cixous'Le Prenomde Dieu, 1967, and L'ExiledeJamesJoyce, 1968, do not take up gender issues, which she first considersin Dedans,1969. The first majorbook by Luce Irigaraythat is genderrelated,Speculumde l'autrefemme,waspublishedin 1973. The widelyheld belief that Julia Kristeva"is also, among the major theoreticianswriting in France, the only woman-and that makes her contributioneven the more noteworthyas she challenges a long Western traditionof male-dominatedthought," is given voice in Leon S. Roudiez's"Introduction" to his translation of Revolutionin Poetic Languageand is a serious misrepresentation. Kristeva'sRecherches pourune semanalyse,which does not deal directly with gender issues, appeared in 1969, and her La Revolutiondu langagepoetique,in 1974. 2. Texts of particularusefulnesseither for study of literarycriticism of Cixous and Wittig's writing, or for historicalanalysisof recent events in the Frenchlesbian/feministmovements include: Verena Andermatt (1979), Noni Benegas (1986); Diane Griffin Crowder (1983) and (1985); Christiane Makward(1978); Michele Richman (1980); Marthe Rosenfeld (forthcoming), and (1984); NamascarShaktini (1982); Helene Vivienne Wenzel (1981). 3. In addition to the numerousand diverse instances of lesbian and feminist writing to be found in books, anthologies, and journalssuch as Hypatia:A Journalof FeministPhilosophy,see ed. MaryEllen Waithe, a fourvolumeseriesforthcoming also The Historyof WomenPhilosophers, with MartinusNijhoff. 4. While Cixousneverrelinquishesentirelythe ideologythat motherhoodis a necessaryelement andLa Batailede Arcachon, of any symbolics,her most recent texts, such as Le Livrede Promethea rejectbisexualityand heterosexualityas normativeand establishother directionsof inquiry. 5. Simons(1986) developsa readingof Beauvoirthat is independentof Sartreanpresuppositions. 6. A direct criticism of French, male, post-structuralistthought is developed by Wittig (1980), "The Straight Mind." 7. Feministtheoristsin the U.S.A. have expressedreservationsat attemptsto importFrench feminismsinto lesbian and feminist writing in the U.S.A. A charge of "exoticism"has developed which, for this writer,is well addressedto the publishingindustryand the academicinstitutions which have supportedthe worksof Frenchfemale writersto a fargreaterextent than similarly experimental, theoretical work by American authors.Nevertheless, the new Frenchfeminisms' concern with language is not exclusively academic. Outside the U.S.A., groups of women who live apart from academia, for instance, the French Canadian VisibiliteLesbienne, conduct experimentsin female syntax and semanticswhich, in addition to their own concerns, share much in common with the new Frenchfeminisms. 8. See also, Rosenfeld (1984, 241). 9. See also, Makward(1976, 13). Cixous and Wittig recognizethe need for a pluralityof political actions, including those outside the texts of writing. The written text is limited, Cixous claims, becausea partof the worldcannot writeand becausetrulyunlivableevents do not have a writing. ForWittig, the exerciseof a new languagerequiresa parallelaction in social history, or, as she demonstratesin Les Guerileres,that females seize all weapons. 10. Athena, accordingto Aeschylus, votes for Orestes, who has killed his mother, Clytemnestra, to avenge the death of his father, Agamemnon.Athena votes againstClytemnestra,who has killed Agamemnonto avenge his murderof her daughter,Iphegenia.(See Aeschylus[1959, lines 662-720]). Forreferenceto Athena the amazon,and the historyof Athens as an amazoncity, see W.K.C. Gutherie(1955, 107); Wittig and Zeig (1979, 11, 12); Herodotus(1973, 103, 104). REFERENCES

Aeschylus. 1959. The Eumenides. In The Orestiantrilogy.Trans. Philip Vellacott. New York:Penguin Books. Andermatt, Verena. 1979. Helene Cixous and the uncoveryof a feminine language.Womenand Literature7.1: 38-48.

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Benegas, Noni. 1986. Virgile,non. Vlasta4: 96-98. Cixous, Helene. 1976. The laughof medusa.Trans. Keith Cohen and Paula Cohen. Signs 1.4: 875-894. . 1977. La Venue a l'ecriture. In La Venue a l'ecriture,eds. Helene Cixous, Madeleine Gagnon, Annie Leclerc. Paris:Editions 10/18. . 1980A. Poetry is/and . 1979. Vivre l'orange.Paris:des femmes. (the) political, Breadand roses2.1: 16-18. . 1980B. Sorties. Trans. Ann Liddle. In New Frenchfeminisms,eds. Elaine Marksand Isabellede Courtivron.Amherst:Universityof Massachusetts Press. . 1981. Castrationor decapitation?Trans. Annette Kuhn. Signs7.1: 4155. .1983. Le livrede Promethea.Paris:Gallimard. . 1986. La prisede l'ecolede Madhubai.In Theatre.Paris:des femmes. and Clement, Catherine. 1986. The newly bornwoman.Trans. Betsy Wing. Minnesota:University of Minnesota Press. and Conley, Verena Andermatt. 1984. Voice I. ... Boundary2 12.2: 51-66. Cleidemus. 1973. Oration. In Helen Diner, Mothersand amazons:the first femininehistoryof culture.New York:Doubleday. Crowder,Diane Griffin. 1983. Amazonsand mothers?Monique Wittig and Helene Cixous and theoriesof women'swriting. Contemporary Literature 24.2: 117-144. . 1985. Une armee d'amantes: l'image de l'amazondans l'oeuvre de Monique Wittig. Vlasta4: 79-87. Gutherie, W.K.C. 1955. The Greeksand theirgods. Boston: Beacon Press. Herodotus. 1973. In Diner, Mothersand amazons:thefirstfemininehistoryof culture.New York:Doubleday. Makward,Christiane. 1976. Interviewwith Helene Cixous. Sub-Stance13: 19-37. . 1978. Structuresdu silence/du delire. Poetique35: 314-324. Plato. 1961. Laws. In Collecteddialogues,eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairs. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Plato, 1968. Republic.Trans. Allan Bloom. New York:Basic Books. Plutarch. 1914. Plutarch'slives:vol. i TheseusandRomulus.Trans. Beradotte Perrin. Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press. Michele Richman. 1980. Sex and signs: The languageof French feminist criticism. Languageand style:An international journal,13 : 62-80; Rosenfeld, Marthe. 1984. The linguistic aspect of sexual conflict: Monique Wittig's Le Corpslesbien.Mosaic 17.2:235-241. . 1989. Splits in the French lesbian/feministmovement. In For lesbians only, eds. Sarah Hoagland and Julia Penelope. London: Onlywoman. Forthcoming.

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Shaktini, Namascar. 1982. Displacing the phallic subject: Wittig's lesbian writing. Signs8.1: 29-44. Simons, Margaret. 1986. Beauvoirand Sartre:The philosophical relationship. YaleFrenchStudies72: 165-181. Wenzel, Helene Vivienne. 1981. The text as body/politics:An appreciation of Monique Wittig's writingsin context. FeministStudies7.2: 264-287. Monique Wittig. 1966. The opoponax.Trans. Helen Weaver. Plainfield: Daughters,Inc. - . 1973. Les guerilleres.Trans. David LeVay. New York:Avon. - . 1974. Monique Wittig et les lesbiennes barbues.Actuel 38: 12. . 1976. The lesbianbody.Trans. David LeVay. New York:Avon. FeministIssues4: 63-70. . 1978. The point of view:universalor particular? and Frenchliterature,eds. George . 1979. Paradigm.In Homosexualities Stambolian and Elaine Marks. Ithaca:Corell University Press. . 1980. The straightmind. FeministIssues1.1: 103-112. 1981. One is not born a woman. FeministIssues 1.2: 47-54. .1982. The categoryof sex. FeministIssues2.2: 63-68. . 1983. The point of view: Universal or particular?FeministIssues3.2: 63-70. -- . 1984. The Trojan horse. FeministIssues4.2: 45-50. . 1985A. Paris-la-politique.VLASTA 4. . 1985B. Le Voyage sans fin. VLASTA 4: supplement. -- . 1985C. Virgile,non: un roman.Paris:Les Editions de Minuit. Forthcoming in English as CrossingtheAcheron. and Zeig, Sande. 1979. Lesbianpeoples:materialfor a dictionary.New York:Avon.

REVIEW

SYMPOSIUM

FemaleFriendship:Separationsand Continua CLAUDIA CARD

to Thisreviewessayon JaniceRaymond'sA Passionfor Friends,sympathetic contextsof femalefriendship,criticizesas theauthor'sinquiryinto theinstitutional andof the "lesbiancontinuum"and its rejectionof feministseparatism unnecessary formulatesa possibleconnectionof its accountof sourcesof passionatefriendship amongwomento the new researchon womenand violence.

Three of the issuesthat capturedmy attention in A Passionfor Friendsare separatism,the "lesbiancontinuum,"and the sourcesof passionatefriendship amongwomen. I will explorethese issuesin the context of an overviewof the book, sayingwhy I find it an importantbook and what questionsit raisesfor me. Feministliteratureon female friendshiphas focussedupon exceptional individual relationships,from Ruth and Naomi to Toklas and Stein. By contrast, Jan Raymond'swork deals with institutionsthat are supportedby and that nurtureempoweringconnections among women-connections including, but not restrictedto, lover relationships.Writing partlyout of her 12 yearsas a nun, she notes that institutionsreduceneeds for individualinitiative-taking in building friendships. In patriarchy,they create contexts in which passionateattachmentsamong men develop readily. Institutionscan likewise foster natural development of passionate connections among women. The convent did it so effectivelythat the Churchfound it necessary to forbid"particularfriendships"among nuns. 1 While Jan Raymondstresses the need for friendshipas a basisfor feministpolitical change, her genealogy also suggeststhat without institutionalsupport,passionatefemale friendships in a misogynistenvironment are likely to remain exceptional. Thus, this book challenges, at least implicitly, the rejectionof rules, institutions, and disciplines as oppressive,a challenge with which I sympathize. We can understandourselvesto include positive capacitiesfor organization and discipline, ratherthan as only hinderedor restrainedby disciplinesand ordersexternallyimposed.The interestingquestionsthen arise:what kindsof institutionsfoster the developmentof female friendships,and to what kinds of institutions do empoweringfemale friendshipsgive rise? Hypatiavol. 3, no. 2 (Summer1988)? by ClaudiaCard

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To answersuch questions, Jan Raymonduses a method, which, like Nietzsche and Foucault,she calls "genealogical."2She searchesfor ancestorsin institutions created by women whose primaryattachmentswere to women, and in institutions that fostered women's development, on the hypothesis that where women'sgeneraldevelopmentis supported,women will naturally be attractedto each other. Her centralchaptersare two case studies, the medieval Europeanconvent, especially prior to the thirteenth century rule of enclosure, and the nineteenth and early twentieth. Chinese vegetarian houses and spinsters'houses createdby women who refusedmarriage,women to whom she refersas "marriageresisters,"citing as ground-breakingthe research of MarjorieTopley's Ph.D. dissertation, University of London in 1958. Informativeand utterly absorbingreading, especially the materialon the Beguines, these chaptersare welcome antidotes to a focus on women as victims. Like success stories of resistanceto assault, they remind us of our agency. But they do not sufficientlyanswerthe questions,what kindsof institutions fosterpassionateconnections amongwomen and to what kinds of institutionsdo such connections give rise?Forthat we need an account of what it was about these institutions that supportedor was supportedby female friendship. Here the book'saccount becomesextremelyabstract:Jan Raymondelaborates the ideas that for empowering connections among women we need thoughtfulness, passion, and worldliness, and that institutions fostering women'spassionsfor women providethe context forfemalehappiness.In discussing wordliness,she rejects separatism.I will returnto that shortly. The lesbiancontinuumissuecomes up obliquelyin the Introduction'sdefinition of the book's subject matter:whichpassionsfor friends are at issue? Here Jan Raymondintroduces"Gyn/affection,"the third of three new tech"the nical terms.The firstis "hetero-reality"(her substitutefor "patriarchy"): situation created by hetero-relations." The second is "hetero-relations," which cover "the wide rangeof affective, social, political, and economic relations that are ordainedbetween men and women by men" (her substitutefor "heterosexuality,"as ordinarilyunderstood)."Gyn/affection"is her term for the bonding agency of passionatefemalefriendship,with affectionencompassing "influencing, acting upon, moving, and impressing,and of being influenced, acted upon, moved, and impressed."Gyn/affectionis also presented as a replacementfor the concept for which she tells us (26n, 244) she earlier coined the term, "Lesbian continuum," a term now well-known from Adrienne Rich's essay "CompulsoryHeterosexualityand LesbianExistence." The lesbian continuum was intended to include passionate connections amongwomen who maynot have been loversand maynever have thought of aspectsof their lives as lesbian. I will arguethat the continuumof Gyn/affection should not be regardedas an improvementover the lesbian continuum. It doesn't do the same work.

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The sourcesof Gyn/affectionare the subjectof chapterone. This chapter nicely exposesNancy Chodorow'saccount of women'sdesireto motheras really the socially enforced substitutefor the Gynlaffectiverelationships that would otherwisehave reproducedmother-daughteraffective bonds. In criticizing Nancy Chodorow'sproposalof co-parenting,Jan Raymondobserves that "If the original woman who experiences primarylove for her mother (women) were not confrontedwith the mother (women) as heterorelational and patterned into these relations herself by the mother, but were instead confrontedwith the mother as a female friend who puts women first in her life, then Gyn/affection would become prevailing reality" (53). She then looks at the social constructionof the so-called"naturalwoman,""everready to satisfythe naturalman," and proposesthe antithesisof this creatureas another source of female friendship-the woman who is "wild," not "manmade,"not domesticated.Sourcesof passionateconnections amongwomen, then, include the experience of having been mothered and an absence of-perhaps an undoing of?-female domestication. What are the implications of the evident conflict between these two sourcesof passionateconnections among women? The book does not quite pose this question but sets the stage for it. Our wildnessleads us to reject our domesticatedmothersand leads them to reject us. Their domesticationis an obstacleto preservingour wildness.Where the mother-bondgroundsour passions for women, domesticated motherhood may be a major threat to the quality(not just the survival)of passionatefemale attachments.Furtherwork on female friendship might explore this idea in connection with the new workon intrafemaleviolence. Also, wildnessas a sourceof passionatefemale friendshipdoes not obviouslyfit well with the idea that we need institutionsto fosterpassionateconnections amongus. At the least, I want to ask how institutions might preserveour wildness, or undo our domestication,how we can have discipline without being tamed. Wild women, Jan Raymond reminds us, tend to be invisible in heteroreality, since men stamp us with images of heterorelations.They represent "loose" women-women not bound to men-as prostitutes (by heterorealogic, available to all men since none own them) and as other heterodefectives, or perverts.They have representedSappho'shetaeraeas both, ancient temple virginsas temple "prostitutes,"and nuns as promiscuous.Accordingly, chaptertwo treats"the nun as loose woman,"and chapterthree, Chinese marriageresistersas "moreloose women." The final two chapters,on obstaclesto female friendshipand the futureof female friendship,are as close as we get to an abstractaccount of what kinds of institutions foster and are fostered by passionate connections among women. Here, the focus on institutions is no longer as clear as it was in the beginning. "Obstacles"are presentedsimply as "obstaclesto female friendship." Jan Raymondcriticizesthree stances: "dissociationfrom the world,"

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"assimilationto hetero-reality,"and "victimismin the world."Under "dissociation fromthe world"she takesup separatism,along with "therapism,"and "relationism." Frommy decadeof experimentingwith separatism,I wouldnot have put it into the same bag of tricks with "therapism"and "relationism."Separatism has been integral to my experience in building female friendships.But Jan Raymond'sexperience with separatismantedatesthe currentfeminist movement, reachingback to her yearsas a nun. Reflectingupon the historyof the convent, she concludes that the rule of enclosure, segregatingnuns fromthe surroundingworld, destroyedmuch that was valuable in convent life. Jan Raymonddoes not define "separatism"but contrastsit with "worldliness," and she contrasts"worldliness"not with "unworldliness"(or, spirituality) but with Hannah Arendt'sconcept, "worldlessness."FollowingHannah Arendt, she meansby "the world""the publicrealm,"what lies between people. 3 Her objection (really to worldlessness)is that in denying us access to the worldand to knowledgeof it, separatismmakesus more vulnerableto attack. However, the obstacletofemalefriendship presentedby separatismis not actually spelled out. She might have arguedthat separatisminterfereswith our development in denying us access to resourcesand thereby interferesalso with the qualityof our passionaterelationships.But she doesn't. She simply cites our vulnerabilitythrough ignorance. Separatism actually remediesclassic obstacles to female friendship. It combatsour vulnerabilityto male extortion and bribes,which have been major obstaclesto femalefriendshipin "the world"(or in heteroreality?)because of what SusanGriffinhas called "the male protectionracket"(1971, 320). It also forces us to test our perceptionsagainsteach other, therebyenabling us to correct hostile systematicmale-servingmisperceptionsof each other. In her widely circulated 1978 essay, MarilynFryepresentedseparationas an alternativeto assimilation,distinguishingit fromsegregationby whose initiative is involved and whose interestsserved, and focussingon the aim of control of others' access to us. Like MariaLugones,Jan Raymondseems to want a differentkind of alternative to assimilation, although it is not clear that Jan Raymond'salternativeis not actuallyseparatistin MarilynFrye'suse of that term. Maria Lugones formulatedher alternative to assimilationfor beneficiariesof oppression,and she calls it "playfulworld-travelling"(1987, 3). Jan Raymond formulates hers for survivorsof oppression, and calls it "worldliness." Let's look at separationas "worldlessness."By "worldlessness,"Jan Raymond means, with Hannah Arendt, a lack of access to "the public realm," more specifically, the world of human artifacts, culture and politics. Still, "the world"is not an entirely clear concept. It seems to contain a hidden assumption of unity. Does "the world"encompassone continuous public in-

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cluding all the spacesbetween people?Does it referthe totality of many discontinuouspublics?Does it referactuallyto privilegedworldsof powerfulminoritieswho control marketsand governments?How is "the world"relatedto "heteroreality?"Is it not possible to separatefrom "heteroreality"without separatingfrom "the world?"I will review one way in which this is possible. If "the world"refersto a totality of discontinuouspublics, it is misleading to contrastseparatistspacewith it, for such space is partof it and is itself a repositoryof resources.If "the world"refersto the worldsof powerfulminorities, we neverhavehadmuch access to them. What is importantin Hannah Arendt's view, is that we understandour places in "the world"or our relationships to it, because it contains forces dangerousto us. Hannah Arendt has arguedthat separatismkept EuropeanJewsunnecessarilyignorantof forces in the worldand of Jewishpositionsin those forces,with disastrousconsequences. Jan Raymond'sreferencesto Hannah Arendt's argumentssuggests that something analogouscould happen to us as women, although she is less specificabout it than HannahArendt in not detailingwhat the dangerousignorance might be. The fuller analogyis that we might fail to appreciateour powerpositionsin "the world"(economic powerpositions, for example) or in relation to it, and therebyfail to anticipatehostile responsesof others to us. We might become vulnerableto hostility that we lacked the perspectiveto appreciate. This is an interestingargument.For more detail, I recommendArendt's TheJew as Pariah,to which Jan refers.But it is not an argumentthat separatism interfereswithfemalefriendship.So far the argumentseems compatible with the conclusion that a price of female bonding is the riskof vulnerability to hostility from outside. How vulnerabledoes separatismmake us? Isolationismdoes carrythe danger of ignorance.However, separatismneed not be isolationist.The relevant separationis a severingof certainbondsto men and to male-servingpractices. As MarilynFryeput it in her essayon separatism,the idea is to deny men access to us, excepton our termsand at ourinitiative.This usuallymeansa retreat from affectiveto formalrelationshipswith men, from intimacy to something more distant. "Distance"here is a spatialmetaphor;it does not stand in any easy correlationwith real spatialdistance. Retreatingfromaffectiveto formal relations might count as separatingfrom heteroreality without separating from "the world."Formalitydoes not precludecommunicationbut structures it. Putting relationshipswith men on a formal, ratherthan affective, basis, puts us in a betterposition to insist upon accessto resources.It puts us in a position to insist upon access to resources.It puts us in a position to appealto rights,respectfor which lies at the core of much moder masculine identity. A significant cost of intimacy is a foregoingof the appeal to rights.4 Some.separationsdo involve the dangersof isolation. To protect ourselves against subliminaladvertisingand from bombardmentby misogynistimages

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while we are healing ourselves, we may ignore establishmentmedia. In this technological age, however, the dangerof our doing that successfullyall at once seems remote. To what extent is the issueover "separatism" merelyverbal?The answeris not clear. Jan Raymondcomparesher own ideal with Virginia Woolf's "inside outsider"of ThreeGuineas, and with Hannah Arendt's "consciouspariah."But, are they not separatists?She complainsof an eco-feminismpreoccupied with the worldof Natureto the neglect of the worldof public artifacts and human institutions, citing as a model to emulate Rachel Carsonand arguing that the worldcan be what we make of it. Was Rachel Carsonseparatist?We need to demandourplaces,Jan Raymondsays, in theman-madeworld as women whose affinitiesare with women, to meet the worldon its own turf but not on its own terms. But what is the "turf"when what is at stake is whether to work "within the system"or outside and against it? ForJan Raymond's concerns the languageof separatismmay not be particularlyuseful, but it also seems unnecessaryto pose those concerns againstseparatism. In seeming contrast with its rejection of separatismas short-sighted,the book rejectsthe lesbiancontinuumas presumptuousor patronizingto women who do not identify as lesbian and short-changingthose who do by not acknowledgingthe latter'ssocial risks.The term she adoptsas neutralbetween lesbianand nonlesbianfemalefriendshipsis "passionate," leavingopen which are involved. "Passionate" seems to be other the side of the "affecpassions It seemsalso an alternativeto LillianFaderman's tive" coin in "gyn/affection." "romanticfriendship,"which many have found trivializingor euphemistic when appliedto women in love with women. I like the term "passionate" for the purposesof this book. But, just as it is unnecessaryto rejectseparatismin ordersupportworldliness,it is also unnecessaryto rejectthe lesbiancontinuum in presentingthe passionsof Gyn/affection.Instead,these conceptsneed to be distinguishedfromeach other and the differentworkof each madeclear. The criticismsJan Raymondcites of the "lesbiancontinuum"have annoyed me for years,and so I welcomethe opportunityto addressthem. It is important in certaincontexts to distinguishbetweenlesbianand nonlesbianattachments, but for differentreasons, for reasons that have to do with undermining homophobia.The objectionsJan Raymondcites-patronage of some and selling othersshort-indicate not that the lesbiancontinuumis misconceivedbut that we have neededgreaterclarityabout(and perhapsa new vocabularyto express)what lies on it than we find in Adrienne Rich's essay, for example, of 1980. What lie on it arenot simplypassionateconnectionsbut somethingmore specific.Neither is it a specificallysexualcontinuum.If we can grantthat it is an eroticcontinuum,it is truethat therewill be lots of experiencesand relationshipson it that are not popularlycalled "lesbian,"or not so-calledby their key participants.There is room for perfectlyrespectfuldisagreementhere about what does and does not belong.

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So understood,the idea of a lesbian continuumneed be neither presumptuousnor patronizingto women who do not recognizeor embracethose erotic elements of their lives nor short-changingto those who do. It need not be presumptuousor patronizingto disagreewith othersabouttruthsapplicableto their lives nor about the significanceand value of such truths. It is offensive to call people by propernames that they explicitly reject. That is disrespectful. However, "lesbian"does not function as a propername in the expression "lesbiancontinuum."Jan Raymond(unlike Adrienne Rich) capitalized"Lesbian" in "lesbiancontinuum,"and that may have encourageda confusion of its ordinaryadjectival use with its very different use as a political identity term. When "lesbian"is not used as a political identity term, the riskstaken by those to whose experience the term is appliedare irrelevantto the term's applicability.On the contrary, an answerto the question whether one has had lesbian experiences or relationshipsis presupposedin arguingthat one ought to embraceones lesbian relationshipsand take the consequent risks. Ann Ferguson,criticizingthe idea of the lesbian continuum, treated"lesbian" in that expressionas a political identity term (1981). So understood, "Lesbian"eitheris or comes close to being a propername, like "Republican" or "Democrat,"referringto identificationwith an amorphousbut historical entity. Accordingly, Ann Fergusoncomplainedthat the lesbian continuum was "ahistorical,"since "Lesbian"as a political identity has a shorterhistory than is referredto by the continuum. But the lesbiancontinuumdoes not attribute to women a political identity.The point it enables us to make is not that manywomen areunawareof their identitiesbut that lesbianconnections are very ordinary,normal featuresof most of our lives, a point we need to make continually to dispel homophobia. The subject of Jan Raymond'sbook is passionatefemale friendships,not just lesbianones. Forthis, the lesbiancontinuummaybe inessential. But neither is "Gyn/affection"a replacementfor it. To dispel homophobiaby recognizing the ordinarinessof lesbianexperience, we need to identifyand distinguish such experience. "Gyn/affection,"of course, does not do that. The lesbian continuumcan. To identifylesbianexperience, we do not need to identify womenas lesbians,using "Lesbian"as a propername or even as a noun. Forour lives to crossthe lesbiancontinuum, we need only experience lesbian feelings, desires,fantasies,relationships,or interactions.The idea of the lesbian continuum allows us to addresswhat SinisterWisdomused to call "the lesbian imaginationin all women."6 The claim that most women belong on that continuum impliesneither that we are all lesbiansnor even that all our passionsfor female friendsare lesbian passions. NOTES 1. For more on this, see Lesbiannuns: Breakingsilence,eds. R. and N. Manahan (1985), including a piece by Jan Raymondand PatriciaHynes.

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2. See Nietzsche (1966). 3. This clarificationshould be moved from the footnote, p. 152, into the main text. In the footnote, Jan Raymondcites Hannah Arendt, "The world lies between people," from "On humanity,"Men in darktimes(1968). 4. Forelaborationof this idea, see my "Gratitudeand Obligation"(1988), in which I analyze the sense of obligation involved in the appeal to rights as a formalone and contrast it with a sense of obligation appropriateto friendship. 5. Perhaps,for a similarreason, it would be better not to capitalize"Gyn/affection."I have done so only becauseJan Raymonddoes so in introducingit. 6. SinisterWisdom,a feminist periodicalissuedsince 1976, foundedby CatherineNicholson and Harriet Desmoines, bore the caption from 1977 until the summerof 1981: A Journalof Words and Picturesfor the LesbianImaginationin All Women.

REFERENCES

Arendt, Hannah. 1968. Men in darktimes.New York:Harcourt. -- . 1978. TheJew as pariah:Jewishidentityandpoliticsin themodernage. Ed. Ron Feldman. New York:Grove Press. Card, Claudia. 1988. Gratitude and obligation. The AmericanPhilosophical Quarterly25:2. and the Chodorow,Nancy. 1978. The reproduction Psychoanalysis of mothering: Press. of California sociologyof gender.Berkeley:University Curb, Rosemary& Nancy Manahan, eds. 1985. Lesbiannuns: Breakingsilence. Tallahassee:Naiad Press. Ferguson,Ann, JacquelynN. Zita, and KathrynPyne Addelson. 1981. On compulsoryheterosexualityand lesbian existence: Defining the issues. Signs:Journalof Womenin Cultureand Society7 (1): 158-199. Frye,Marilyn. 1983. Reflectionson separatismand powerin Thepoliticsof reality:Essaysinfeministtheory.Trumansburg,NY: The CrossingPress.Reprinted from SinisterWisdom6:30-39. Griffin, Susan. 1971. Rape:the all-Americancrime. Ramparts.(September). Reprintedin MaryVetterling-Bragginet al. eds. 1977. Feminismandphilosophy.Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, & Co. Lugones,Maria. 1987. Playfulness,'world'-travellingand loving perception. Hypatia:A Journalof FeministPhilosophy2(2):3-19. Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1966. On the genealogy of morals. tr. Walter Kaufmannand Robert Hollingdale in Basic writingsof Nietzsche,ed & trans. Walter Kaufmann.New York:Random House. of femaleafRaymond,Janice. 1986. A passionforfriends:Towarda philosophy fection. Boston: Beacon. Rich, Adrienne. 1980. Compulsoryheterosexualityand lesbian existence. Signs:Journalof Womenin Cultureand Society5(4):631-660. Woolf, Virginia. 1938. Threeguineas.New York:Harcourt,Brace& World.

REVIEW

SYMPOSIUM

IndividualityWithout Individualism: Review of Janice Raymond's A Passionfor Friends MARILYNFRIEDMAN

This reviewof JaniceRaymond'sA Passionfor Friendsfocuseson her strong senseof theindividual andof individuality. However,andthisis thecentralcontentionof mypaper,herperspective is quitedistinctfromliberalindividualism. It is also a complexvariationon thefeministconcernwithselvesin relationships.

One of the many themes which runs throughJanice Raymond'sA Passion for Friends1is a strong notion of individuality.This theme threads its way throughall facets of Raymond'sconception of the Self, with its uniquecognitive emphasisand perfectionistnorms, and it appearsas well in her moderated version of relational and collectivist values. Even the typeface reveals Raymond'sconcern for individuality.Her text presentsus visually with the "capitalizedSelf;" the word 'self' is capitalized every time it appears.Remarkably,the word 'other' is nevercapitalized,although 'Gyn/affection'is. This might be causefor some initial concern. Theorizingof this sort runsthe riskof backslidinginto a kind of revisionistliberal feminism. I wondered, at first, whether the capitalizedSelf is a thin disguise for the capitalistSelf. Is it the abstracted,self-interested,mutuallydisinterested, utility-maximizing,game theoretic, rational agent of modem liberal thought?The answeris a clear "no." Raymondoffersus the cautiouspromise of a feministrenewal of individuality. Her conception might well be called "individualitywithoutindividualism." Raymond'sinsistence on the importanceof individualityis alwaysrelated to contexts of female friendshipand women'scommunities.It is the individual woman in relationships who occupies Raymond'sattention. This emphasis is quite explicit in her discussionof the value of women'sreligiouscommunities. Convent life "at its best"featureswhat Raymondconsidersan "instrucHypatiavol. 3, no. 2 (Summer 1988) ? by MarilynFriedman

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"personalachievement"are balancedwith "communitypurpose"and "cooperative well-being."In the convent, she tells us, individualwomen each had a "separateexistence" in the context of an establishedbasis for "a powerful spiritof sisterhood."Privacyof thoughts, emotions, and their manifestations was preserved"in the midst of an intense and deep communityspirit."And women were "helped ... to be clear about their responsibilitiesas individuals." With the convent example in mind, Raymond endorses a type of women'scommunitywhich is a "conjunctionof individualsratherthan a substitute for individuality.... " (110). Thus, her notion of individualityemphasizes:individualgrowth;personalachievement;separateexistence; cognitive, emotional, and expressiveprivacy;and a sense of individualresponsibility. However, if Raymondhad gone no fartherthan these notions, she would not have radicallydepartedfrom popularconventions about individuality. Fortunately,she has gone much farther. Raymond'snotion of individualityis characterizedby what might be called a cognitive emphasis,but it is distinctlynot a conventional liberalnotion of rationality. Raymondwarns against allowing the feminist rejection of "abstract and meaninglessmale rationalism"(216) to lead to a misguidedflight from theory and into anti-intellectualism.Thinkingis central to her conception of female Selfhood. Borrowingheavily from Hannah Arendt (1978), Raymonddifferentiatesthinking frommere "intellectualactivity," (221) the latter a search for a body of truths, the formera more profoundsearch for their meaning. Thinking and friendship"go hand in hand," Raymondurges;their crucial union she calls "intercoursewith oneself." It is worth quoting Raymondat length here, drawingupon a passagewhich revealsmuch of her notion of the Self, her modifiedview of ideal rationality,and the importanceof the Self's regardfor itself: Thinking is where I keep myself company, where I find my It is the solitude, as opposed to lonelioriginal friend .... ness, where I am alone with, but not lonely in, the companionship of myself. . . . This is one of the majorreasonswhy women have lost their Selves-because they have stopped thinking. By not thinking, an individual loses her original friendshipwith her Self. Throughthinking, a persondiscovers that she can be her real Self. In discoveringthis, she also realizes that the conversation that took place in the duality of thinking activity-that is, the dualityof "myselfwith myself," the "two-in-one,"or "the one who asks and the one who answers"-enables conversationwith others. When I discover, through thinking, that I can converse with my real Self, I have to realizethat such a conversationis possiblewith others.

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This is the awakeningof femalefriendshipin which the search for others like my Self begins. . . Aristotle maintainedthat "the friend is another self." However, until the Self is another friend, it is often difficult for women to have confidence in their power of making and sustainingfriends. . . . The movement, I believe, is dialectical. A woman mustbe at the sametime a friendto her original Self and to others. Which comes first is hard to determine. What is clear is that thinking and friendshipgo hand in hand2 (222). *

In Raymond'sview, friendship,especiallyGyn/affection, requiresthe capacity to be with an otherin affectionatedialogue.And this capacitymust be realizedwithinone woman'sSelf at least as soon as she is able to realizeit with otherSelves. Affectionate Self-regardis necessaryfor female friendshipwith others. Raymond does not assert the priorityof the Self's inner dialectical processoverthe social dialectic between Selves, but equally, she does not assert the priorityof the socialprocesseither. At this point, Raymond'saccount narrowlyavoids a primarytenet of abstractindividualism;she resiststhe view that dialogue withinthe individual Self can or must precedeall relations of friendshipwith others. Raymond similarlyevades a hackneyed cognitivism in her insistence on the importance of thinking to female friendship. She advocates "Self-directed thinking" (220) for women, thinking with thoughtfulnessrestoredto it. Thinking must be "thoughtful"for it to contributeto the flourishingof female friendship.And "thoughtfulness"involves "a thinking considerateness and a considerate thinking" (221). It enriches thinking with an attentiveness, considerateness,and respectfor other women and their needs (22021). Raymondnotes that, "Thinkingis materializedin the thoughtfulnessof female friendship"(223). Raymondavoidsan abstractedcognitivismbecause she does not divorce reasoningcapacityfromfeeling, caring, or materialembodiment. Another cognitive dimensionwhich playsan importantpart in Raymond's conception of the Self is what she calls the "rigorsof discernment,"borrowing this expressionfromAlice Walker. In regardto friendship,one is to discern who is a "truefriend"and who is not (164). Discernmentovercomesa sentimentalizingattitude towardfriendshipamong women-the attitude of supposingthat feminismmakesall women friends(173). In addition, for Raymond, discernment is an important means of Self regard. She states that "Discernmenthelps us to regain perspective about our Selves and others. Without this habit of reflection, we lose the feel of our own Be-ing, the sense of integritythat makesus who we are (164). Similarly,"The habit of discernment teaches us to be loyal to our Selves, to have faith in our own insights,

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and to claim these as a power of scrutiny in our interactions with others (173). Thus, discernment in the context of friendshipis reflection on Self and other, scrutinyof interactionswith others, and a sourceof both faith in one's insights and loyalty to Self. Discernmentalso enablesone to resistwhat Raymondcalls the "tyrannyof tolerance." Raymond has found many women who refrainfrom expressing their vague feelings about what they regardas wrong practices by other women. Lesbian sado-masochism,and, by implication, heterosexual sadomasochismare Raymond'sprime examplesof women'spracticeswhich have arousedcriticismby some feministswho, nevertheless,often feel reluctantto articulatetheir concerns. On sado-masochismin particular,it is clear where Raymondstands;she quotes approvinglyfrom Hilde Hein, who has written that, "We cannot capitulateto the liberaldogmawhich treatsas normaland neutral the volitional debasementand humiliation of one human being by another (171). 3 In general, Raymond distances herself from the "tyrannyof tolerance," which might also be called a "liberaldogma."This is the view that there are no generalmoralstandardsby which to decide amongcompetinghumanends becauseof the incommensurabilityof their underlyingvalues. It is this tenet which groundsthe liberalcall for a politics and a governmentalsystemwhich do not take sides among competing ends or life-plans. 4 By contrast, Raymondentreatsus to differentiate among competing values and to see that the radical so is to retain spirit of the women's movement. necessary doing "Toleranceis essentiallya passiveposition,"she warns;it uncriticallysustains an existing social orderin a misplacedeffortto be "sensitiveto and respectful of others (171)." As an aside, it is worth noting that Raymondneglects to develop the moral epistemology by which we might discriminate legitimateand importantcritiques of women's practicesfrom those critiqueswhich are unfounded. She advocates discernmentbut providesno groundingby which to orient a disceming attitude. In the context of the sado-masochismdebates, Raymond also omits to consider the fundamentalsignificance of women's own assertions of need and desire, preferenceand choice. This controversyhas pitted deeply importantfeminist values againsteach other. On the one hand, there is the feminist sense of outrage against all humiliation and debasement of women, coupled with a deep suspicionthat any woman'sseemingconsent to such practices is really either a patriarchalfalsehoodor a female strategyfor survivalundercoercive conditions. On the other hand, by contrast, there is the equallyprofoundfeministdistrustof any moraldoctrinewhich purportsto tell a woman "what'sgood for her" and which ignoresher own expressionof need, desire, and choice. Thus, in illustratingthe rigorsof her own discernment, Raymondmakes clear her criticalstance towardsado-masochismbut, regrettably,she does not

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develop any generaltheoreticalorientationor standpointfor sortingthrough the conflictof feminist values raisedby this issue or for groundinga feminist critiqueof any woman'sseeminglyvoluntarypractices.Ironically,in light of her strong notion of individuality,one might initially have expected Raymond to take the other side, and to presenta philosophymore supportiveof women's expressedchoices to participatein any sexual practice. But Raymond'sinsistenceon discernmentleadsher quite the other way;she does not endorse women's undiscemingexpressionof our individuality. In this respect, she reveals another importantdimension of her notion of individuality:one might call it a perfectionism,although Raymond herself does not use this term. According to Raymond,ones discernmentshould be rigorous,one should not participateeven in mutuallyvoluntarydebasement or humiliation, and, as a force for social change, one should not refrainfrom expressingfeelings about the perceived wrongnessof other women's practices. The discerningself is one who strivesfor the good without succumbing to the tyrannyof tolerance. In tandemwith this emphasison the individual,Raymondalso tempersthe feminist concern with relationships and collectives. She warns us against what she calls the "tyrannyof relations"and "relationism."Relationism is "the reduction of friendshipto relationshipsthat get constantly 'examined' and 'dealt with' . . . ." The overemphasison having relationshipsturns it into a "technical enterprise(161), and is an "obstacleto female friendship becauseit drawsa woman'senergyawayfromher Self, her originalfriend, alwaysto others."It is Raymond'scontention that, "No genuine Gyn/affection can be createdwhich does not come froma strongSelf. Relationismpromotes a surrenderof Self and of a positive and necessarySelf-centeredness(162). In a similar vein, Raymond decries a tendency which she has noticed among some feminists to treat the slogan, "the personalis political" as if it meant "the personalis public knowledge."Too often, she suggests,women have felt obliged to disclose the natureof their close relationshipsto a wider women'scommunity, "subjectto the public and collective judgment"of that community. In Raymond'sview, the insight that the "personalis political" revealed the "bastionsof patriarchalpower and . . . prime centers of sexual politics"in such areasas that of familyand sexuality;but it did not call for the publicizingof intimate relationships(162-63). Finally, Raymondworries,as have manyothers, aboutthe nonhierarchical structuresof many women'sgroups.Under this banner, Raymondwarns, unstructured,coverthierarchies may emerge, which are more rigidly resistant than overt structuresto open intervention or influence (195-96). Similarly, valueswhich so manyfemiRaymondnarrowsthe scope of the noncompetitive nist communities have endorsed. Against these stances, she counterposes what seem almost like cliches about individualachievement. Her views are best summarizedin remarkswhich she quotes approvinglyfrom co-authors

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SherryMcCoy and MaureenHicks: "Ourpowerstructuresneed to be judged by whether or not they enhance individuals'ability to achieve their own potential, not on whetherat a given momentsome women aregiven greaterauthority." And another quote from McCoy and Hicks: "Real differencesin competence, responsibility,and commitmentdemandacknowledgment,and this may take the form of delegatinggreaterauthorityto those membersof a groupwho are preparedto accept it (196)." These varied ideasdrawnfromA Passionfor Friendsmake it clear, I think, that despite some cliches about personal achievement and privacy which seem borrowedfrom liberalcapitalistculture, Raymond'sconception of individuality, in its normativedimension, divergesimportantlyfrom liberalindividualism.Forone thing, selves are alwaysunderstoodin the context of relationships with particularothers who, all together, comprisecommunities. In addition, discernmentand thinking arenot pale versionsof purereason. As an aside, I suggestedearlier that Raymondwould do well to elaboratea substantiveorientation or standpointto underwritethe capacityfor discernment. But at least this notion does not devolve into conventional individualistic rational choice. Raymond'sdiscernmentimpartsqualityand selectivity to ones particularfriendships,and enspiritsthe women'smovementwith radical potential. Discernment is part of thinking and thinking contributesto friendshiponly if it is "thoughtful,"that is, infusedwith consideratenessand respectfor the other, and only if it can also achieve this dialectic in affectionate Self-regard. of liberalindividualismis clearlyabsent from Finally, the self-interestedness The rightsortof Self-regardis important of renewal individuality. Raymond's for transformingus into individualscapableof Gyn/affectionand genuine female friendship.Raymond even praises convent life for setting particular friendshipsin the context of a searchfor transcendentmeaning (113). Thus, Raymond'sSelf has affectionate, considerate, respectful,discerningSelf-regardas well as a similarregardfor others,and is capableof contextualizingSelf and other amidst values and purposeswhich transcendbothSelf and other. In one's Self mustbe one's friendin orderto have any friendsat all, then "a passionfor friends"is also a passionfor one's Self, and a woman'saffectionate Self-regardis, at the same time, the realizationof Gyn/affection.The capacity for internal dialogue opens the Self up to the enlargingworld of Gyn/affection and frees one's imaginationto be stirredand moved by women. 6 NOTES 1. The full title is A Passionfor Friends:Towarda Philosophy of FemaleAffection. 2. The quotesand paraphrasesin this passagewhich RaymondtakesfromHannahArendt are from The Lifeof the Mind (1978, 188-191). 3. Quoted from: Hilde Hein, "Sadomasochismand the LiberalTradition," in Robin Ruth Linden (1982, 88).

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4. This liberal view has been widely expounded. One recent version of it comes from Joel Feinbergwho defendsthis principle,but not radicalindividualism,as a central liberaltenet. Cf. "Liberalism,Community, and Tradition,"unpublishedmanuscriptdrawnfromhis HarmlessImmoralities,Vol. IV of The MoralLimitsof theCriminalLaw (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press, in press). 5. Quoted from: SherryMcCoy and MaureenHicks, (1979, 68). 6. This paperwas presentedas partof a panel discussionof A Passionfor Friendsat the Society for Women in Philosophy, MidwestDivision, Bloomington, Indiana, November 14, 1987.

REFERENCES

Arendt, Hannah. 1978. The life of the mind.New York:Harcourt. East Palo Alto, Linden, Robin Ruth et al, eds. 1982. Againstsadomasochism. Cal.: Frog in the Well. McCoy, Sherryand MaureenHicks. 1979. A psychologicalretrospectiveof power in the contemporary lesbian-feministcommunity. Frontiers:A Journalof Women'sStudies4:3, pp. 65-69. Raymond,Janice. 1986. A passionforfriends:Towarda philosophy of femaleaffection. Boston: Beacon Press.

REVIEW

SYMPOSIUM

Response JANICE G. RAYMOND

This essayis a responseto thecommentsand critique,includedin thisissue, of ClaudiaCardand MarilynFriedmanto my book,A Passionfor Friends.In this betweenfemaleseparation anddissociaresponse,I emphasizethecrucialdistinction tionfromtheworld,so as to registerthedifferencebetweenthepositiveandnegative in whichwomenareengaged.I alsoexpandthediscussionof individualseparations The latterhas arisenwithinthe contextof a feministliberal ity and individualism. sexual liberation whichdefends,amongotherthings,sadomasochism, campaignfor and prostitution,pornography, surrogacy.

I am glad to have this opportunityof responseto ClaudiaCardand Marilyn Friedmansince both raiseissuesaboutmy workthat provokefurtherclarification. Since I cannot reply to all points in the space allotted, I will concentrate on selected areasthat seem to loom largestin each respectivepaper. A preponderantand puzzlingpartof ClaudiaCard'scritiquerelatesto my philosophy of separatism.Cardstates:"In discussingworldliness,she rejects separatism." No so. I reject dissociation. Several partsof the book are bent on addressingthe complexityof this issue. My remarkson separationand dissociation are quite explicit, and thereforeI can only think that Card'scomments call for a re-statementand elaborationof this subject. . . . somefeminist separatists,have made dissociationfrom the world a political ideal and reality (154). Let it be understoodthat I am not identifyingdissociation with the necessity for women to live 'on the boundary'of hetero-relational society . . . However, there is a worldless dissociation from patriarchyand a worldly dissociation. The dissociation that I criticize is not that of women coming together separatelyto then affect the 'real'world. Rather, it is a dissociationthat proclaimswithdrawalfromthat world (153). These comments are located in what is the more analytical part of the book. Yet they arepreceded,at the end of chapter3, by concrete and specific Hypatiavol. 3, no. 2 (Summer1988)? byJaniceG. Raymond

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guidelinesintended as a yardstickfor measuringa worldlyseparationusing the marriageresistersas a case study. This section is, in part, a rebuttalto those who dismissthe marriageresistersas apoliticaland escapist,becausethey separatedthemselves from marriageand marriagereformunder the communist revolution (143-45). These comments are offeredin the historicaland more concrete part of the book because it was importantto locate them within a groupof women who lived out a worldlyseparationfrom hetero-realityand who were predictablycriticizedfor having done so-unfortunately by heterorelationalfeminist scholarship. Here I stated that, "The bias againstseparationrunsdeep in feministwritings," becauseseparation(women separatedfromthe structuresof hetero-reality by their own choice) is not distinguishedfromsegregation(women separated from the structuresof power at the will of men); and separation"is simplisticallyequatedwith a separatismwhich is uncriticallydefined as an escapist and apolitical dissociationfrom the world." I furthercontended that critics always look at separationfrom the perspective of mere "separation from"ratherthan fromthe viewpointof a powerand integritygained (144). I also talked about how other groupshave attained ratherthan lost power by establishingseparatespheres."The separationthat women'sgroupshave chosen must be granted the same political weight and worth of other separate sphereswhen they can be trulyshown to change the qualityof women'slives, to conferpoweron women, and to assistwomen in makingtheir markon the world"(145). I intended this section to be an affirmation of a worldly separation of women from hetero-reality-not to be equated with a worldlessseparation which I consciously termed dissociation,so as to registerthe difference between the positive and negative separationsin which women are engaged. The marriageresistersprovided an excellent example of women separated from the hetero-realityof their existence who turnedthat separationto their powerfuladvantageand made their markon their worldand on history. This discussionof the political worth and weight of women's separations,at the end of chapter3, relatesvery much to the discussionof dissociationin chapter 4 and, I thought, put it in context. I did not put separation"into the same bag of tricks as 'therapism'and 'relationism.'" What I put there was dissociation.Dissociationis a majorobstacle to female friendship,not merely because it makes women vulnerable throughignoranceof the world, but because"it deprivesGyn/affectionof its political powerand makesof it a personalmatteronly." BecauseA Passionfor Friendsis concerned with restoring the power and the politics to female friendship,"Women'sfriendshipscannot be reconstitutedin a vacuumof dissociation from the wider world"(155). I have not chosen to use the word, separatism,however, becauseeven in the best of analyses, it does not accent and sustaina feminist vision of exist-

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out of its traence in the world. And I find it difficultto wrench"separatism" ditional worldless interpretation. MarilynFrye'sgroundbreakingarticle on separatismis both original and clarifyingbut, from my perspective, not focused enough on the necessity for worldliness, and on the distinction between a worldlyseparatismand a worldlessdissociation. Where ClaudiaCardtalks aboutmy use of the term "world,"I cannot help but think that we are talkingabout the same reality. A largepartof my book did maintain the necessity to separatefromhetero-realitywithout separating from the world. The examplesgiven on 231-37 review severalways in which this is possible. "The world is what women make of it. This point is crucial-we must make somethingof it." The idea that a woman can live "as a woman, among women, among men," was meant to convey this notion. Also, the term "insider outsider." Further, I gave concrete examples of women working in the world who articulatethe connections, for example, between militarism,nuclearismand male bonding. Obviously, women have worked in these movements without makingexplicit those connections. Card'spoint which expandsthe consequencesof women'signoranceof forces in the world is well taken. She says:"The fulleranalogyis that we might fail to appreciateourpowerpositionsin 'the world'(economic powerpositions, for example) or in relation to it, and thereby fail to anticipate hostile responses of others to us. We might become vulnerableto hostility that we lackedthe perspectiveto appreciate."This indeed is a fulleranalogyraisedby the necessity for worldliness. I also agree that the change from affective to formalrelationshipswith men puts women in a better position to insist upon access to resources.Cardis also right in suggestingthat VirginiaWoolf, Hannah Arendt, and Rachel Carsoncould be called separatistin an expandeduse of that term. However, I do not find the term especiallyuseful in explaining the content of their worldly existences. Finally, worldliness is not pitted againstseparatism,as Cardsuggests.It is posed in oppositionto dissociation. * **

in my work, an emMarilynFriedmanaccents the centralityof individuality that is intrinsic to of female phasis certainly my development friendship.The gist of her review is that A Passionfor Friendsis successfulat avoidinga liberal individualism by placing the female Self in relationships. This makes for some interestingdiscussionthat is not specificallyan articulatedpart of the book. Considerable confusion has been introduced into feminist theory by typologiesof liberalismappliedto women'sactivismfor change. When measured by Marxistcriteria, the work of many women often appearsas liberal, because of the ways in which women have had to focus on individualassertions or individualrights, a focus that is not seen as challengingthe capitalist

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state. But when thrown into historicalrelief, these so-called individualassertions and rights are not so easily equatablewith a bourgeoisliberalism,because within a bourgeoisculture, women'sclaims to individualityhave been pervertedby a biological or ontological essentialismthat consigns women to the realmof nature. Paradoxically,the first task of any essentializedgroupis to assert its individuality. The difficultyariseswhen women's individualneeds, desires, or rights are assertedin opposition to or apartfrom the class of women. Within the last decadeof this wave of feminism,we have seen a shift fromfeministradicalism to feminist liberalism,based, I think, on the above tension. This feminist liberalism, not to be identified with what has been typed liberal feminism, is both cause and effect of the feminist libertariancampaignfor sexual liberation. Feministsexual liberalismgained ascendancy,particularlyas it opposed itself to the feminist anti-pornographymovement and broadenedits parameters to affirma sadomasochismsexuality,so-called"noncoerciveintergenerational sex"-what some old-fashionedfeminists still insist on calling incest and man/boy love-and prostitution. The sexual liberalismthat came to be definedas feminism,we arenow witnessing again in the reproductiverealm. And once more, this liberalismhas opposed itself to the feminist resistence against the new reproductivetechnologies, in particularsurrogacy.Like its sexual counterpart,reproductive liberalismhas broadenedits parametersto affirmsurrogacy,in vitro fertilization and the gamutof the new reproductivetechnologieswhich have been popularizedas medicalmiraclesfor women who desireor need these technologies. Friedmancommented that, "In the context of the sado-masochismdebates, Raymond also omits to consider the fundamental significance of women'sown assertionsof need and desire, preferenceand choice." It is only within a liberal context, however, that need, desire, preferenceand choice become the dominant standards.Can an individualwoman'sneed, desire, preferenceand choice be abstractedfromthe social context in which women lead their lives?The languageof need, desire,preferenceand choice has been especiallyamenableto those who woulddismissmale dominanceand its relation to the sexuality that gets defended as women's choice. Isn't it significantthat need, desire, preferenceand choice get materialized in an affirmationof pornography,sadomasochism,and surrogacy,for example? Isn't it significant that female sexual dynamism,vitality, and vigor become circumscribedin old formsof sexualobjectification,subordination,and violence, this time initiated by women and done with women'sconsent, and thus proclaimedto be different?The sexual liberalsoffera supposedsexuality strippednaked of feminine taboo, but only able to dress itself in masculine garb. It is a male-constructedsexuality in drag. There is the arrogantand patronizingassumptionin the sexual liberals'argumentsthat those who make problematicthe concept of sexual pleasureare

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themselves deprivedof its more vital and vigorousdelights. Sexual wimps! Problematizingthe concept of sexual pleasuremeans talking about need, desire, preferenceand choice in the context of male power. But the sexual liberals hardly talk about male power anymore-at least not when sexuality is the subject-that's simplistic and grim. And as the FACT brief so facilely phrasedit, that only portraysmen as vicious "attackdogs"and women as victims. Feministsexual liberalismstrivesfor a symmetrythat defies the culturalinequalityof male subjectand female object. The sexual actors, and the modes of sexuality acted out, get firmlyseparatedfrom anything they might represent in the world, separated, that is, from reality, in a sphere of their own-the realmof fantasy. In sado-masochism,for example, the whips, the chains, the swastikas,the militaryparaphernalia,the handcuffs,the dog collars, the masters,the slaves have no dimension in the real world. The master or slave roles, for example, are treatedin a worldapart, in a sanctuaryof sexual need, desire, preference, and choice. The game is played accordingto other rules, valid in that fantasyworld. The liberalfinds shelter behind her culturedbrother, the artist. Like the claim of the artist to a sphereof reality all his own called the aesthetic, the liberal makes her sexual activities become independentof reality, independentof critique. The sexual sphereexists in a rarefiedatmosphereof fantasyand a bedroomsub-culture.The victim shall no longer be called victim if she learns how to use the tools of the master. MarilynFriedmanstates that I did not provideany "generaltheoreticalorientation or standpointfor sortingthroughthe conflictof feministvaluesraised by this issue [sado-masochism]or for groundinga feminist critique of any woman'sseeminglyvoluntarypractices."I hope the above remarksbegin to do that. I have much more to say about all this, but suffice it to state that Friedmanhas noted alreadywhat one standpoint is for sorting through this conflict. I will use her words to state that standpoint here: "the cautious promiseof a feministrenewalof individuality;""the individualwoman in rela"individualgrowth . .. balancedwith . .. communitypurpose;" tionships;" and finally, "Selves are always understood in the context of relationships with particularothers who, all together, comprisecommunities."She, nor I, madethis standpointexplicit in discussingsexual liberation.But this is only a beginning, and Friedmanis quite right that the subject calls out for more. More is forthcoming.

FORUM

WelfareCuts and the Ascendanceof MarketPatriarchy MARILYNFRIEDMAN

controlof women'sdomesRecentwelfarecutshaverevealedthatthepatriarchal tic laborhas beensignificantly relocatedfrom the homeand thegovernmental buto the the sale labor, Through reaucracy marketplace. of domesticandreproductive manylow incomewomenhavecometo occupya classpositionin relationto middle and upperincomefamilieswhichparallelsthe positionoccupiedby the traditional wife in relationto her husband.

Recent welfarecuts have broughtinto focus a trendwhich has been developing in the United States at least since the nineteenth century:the rise of a form of patriarchalcontrol over women's lives which is distinct both from traditionalfamilialpatriarchyand fromstate patriarchyas well. It is a formof control which is basedon economic, ratherthat state, powerand which presupposessome of the socio-economic privilegesof middle and upperincome families. I call it "class-basedmarketpatriarchy." The welfarecuts are, in one sense, a puzzlingdevelopment in American history, which, over the courseof the past two centuries,has shown a steady evolution toward increasedstate control over domestic and family life, (cf. Boris & Bardaglio1983, 70-93). Power over wives and children, as well as regulationof reproduction,have been removed to a significantextent from the hands of male heads of familiesand vested in the state. This trend began in the nineteenth centurywith marriedwomen'spropertyacts, divorce and adoption law reform, and criminal abortion statutes, and reached its peak with the twentieth centurydominanceof the welfarestate. Called "statepatriarchy"by some authors,2 this developmentresultedin the relocation and transformation, but not the demise, of patriarchalcontrol over women's lives. Recent welfare cuts and other efforts to withdrawgovernmentalwelfare and income supportfrom low-income and unemployedpeople have reversed this long-standingtrend. Cuts in federalwelfarespendingunder the Reagan administrationalone have been awesome and relentless. No majorprogram Hypatiavol. 3, no. 2 (Summer 1988) ? by MarilynFriedman

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of welfare and income supporthas remained untouched; the cuts have affected Aid to Familieswith Dependent Children (AFDC), subsidizedhousing, school lunches, legal services, and the ComprehensiveEmploymentand TrainingAct, to name a few (cf. Stallardet al 1983, 46-7). And still, some welfare opponents are not satisfied, demanding even further reductions.3 Since they comprisethe greatmajorityof welfarerecipients,women and their dependent children are the primaryvictims of any such draconianmeasures. In their book, The New ClassWar (1982), FrancesFox Piven and Richard A. Cloward argue that the Reagan welfarecuts have economicaims. Piven and Clowardpredict that the largenumbersof personseliminated from welfare rolls will enlarge the pool of surpluslaborand thereby increasethe economic insecurityof both the unemployedand the workingpoor (32-3). An enlargedpool of surpluslaborwill make it more difficult for workersto bargain for betterworkingarrangementsor even to retainthe cohesion necessary for any collective action whatsoever. The Piven/Cloward explanation plausibly interpretssome of the significance of welfarecuts for women's lives. Forwomen, in particular,being deprivedof governmentalwelfaresupportis likely to mean having to seek employment in the ever-growingservicesectorof the economy. The service sector increasedits share of the labor marketby 31% between 1970 and 1980. The enormousprofitabilityof this sector is sustainedby low laborcosts, more specifically:low wages, few fringe benefits, little job security, poor working conditions, and a transient and unorganizedworkforce.4 However, the Piven/Clowardexplanationomits the specificpatriarchal significance of welfarecuts, a dimension of welfarecuts which requirescareful analysis. Some of the political coalitions which call for an end to state welfare, such as the fundamentalistNew Right, are well-known for their commitment to the traditionalpatriarchalfamily.5 Their questfor an end to state welfareand statepatriarchydoes not signal an interest in the end of patriarchy itself. Yet welfarecuts do not contributeto a resurgentfamilialpatriarchy. Women who are eliminated from welfare rolls do not simply find men to marry, locking themselves and their dependent children into traditional patriarchalfamily units. Inadequatewelfare benefits more readily draw low-income women into (marginal)paid employmentthan into traditionalpatriarchalmarriages.This resultis hardlynew. The very low benefitspaidto welfarerecipientsin southern states priorto the 1960s, coupled with employmentavailabilityrequirements in those states, even for mothersof veryyoungchildren, had the effect of forcingmany otherwiseeligible impoverishedmothersoff welfarerolls and into desperate searches for paid employment. In the south, jobs were frequently found in low-paid, seasonalagriculturallabor (cf. Piven & Cloward 1971, 134-5). Today, women who are forcedoff welfarerolls often find work in the serv-

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ice sector of the economy. Many of these women are "in service"to families. Traditionalfamilial patriarchywas groundedimportantlyon the economic dependenceof wives on their husbands.Under currenteconomic conditions, many familiesneed two incomes to maintaintheir desiredstandardof living. The mythologized"traditional"family, centered arounda heterosexualcouple subsistingon the income only of its adult male, is rapidlydiminishing in extent, even for middle and upper income groups. Many traditional, single income patriarchalfamilieshave evolved into, or been supplantedby, "patriarchal two-paycheck"families.6 And patriarchyis accommodatingitself to this economic evolution. Low-incomewomen in the domestic service sector are bearingan increasing shareof the domesticworkwhich maintainsfamilylife for middleand upper income families. Even the patriarchalfamily is, in many cases, no longer a nuclear self-contained domestic unit. It is surviving through the deprivatizationof some of its domesticity. The patriarchalfamily has "gone public." As a result of this development, many low income women now occupy a classposition in relation to middle and upperincome familieswhich parallels the position which the traditionalwife occupied in relationto her husband.7 Like the traditionalwife, domestic service workerscarryout the "reproduction" of laborin virtueof their nurturanceof currentand futurelaborers.Like the traditionalwife who has little or no resourcesof her own and no bargaining advantages,and who, therefore,depends on the financial largessof her husband, unorganizeddomestic laborersalso have no bargainingadvantages as a groupand depend ultimatelyon the willingnessof consumerfamilies to pay for their services. Like the traditionalwife, paid domesticworkersare engaged largelyin the low-statuscare of bodily needs while those caredfor become freed of these chores to engage in activities of higher culturalstatus. Both the paid and the unpaiddomesticworkerare hemmed in by meagerresources, little prospect for "advancement,"highly circumscribeddecisionmakingauthority,and a low, subordinatestatusbasedpartlyon the absence of a significant educational or training prerequisite.Nowhere is this trend moreblatantlyevident than in the latest innovation in paidfemalelabor, the misnamedpractice of "surrogatemothering,"which is the marketingof real fertilityand childbearingserviceby some women to middleand upperincome families. Domesticwork, whetherpaid or unpaid,is laborintensive work, consisting of operations which have proved difficult to mechanize (Scott 1984, 62). The low productivityof laborintensive workrequireslow laborcosts in order to be profitable. Women are channeled into lower-payingjobs outside the home (and unpaid as wives/mothersinside the home) at a far greaterrate than men, becausewomen continue to be regardedas "essentially"wives and mothers, that is, as domestic servers,and not primarilyas wage-earners.

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Thus, the degree of state control over (low-income) family life, which is ceded by the state as the role of welfareagencies declines, does not, in the main, return to private family patriarchs.Instead, it reappearswithin the socio-economic relationshipsbetween low-incomewomen who enter domestic service work and the families which ultimately they serve. Class-based market patriarchy is a systemic phenomenon in which certain socio-economic classes, via their familialunits, acquirea portion of that control over (low-income) female domestic labor which has historicallybeen usurpedby male "heads of households" and, more recently, by the state. Class-based marketpatriarchsare, in the first instance, service sector employers,and, in the final analysis, the consumersof domestic services. Class-basedmarketpatriarchyis not new. There have long been women who earned meagerwages in domestic labor. But recent trendshave accelerated the build-upof this sector, and it is emergingnow as partof a significant relocationof the patriarchalcontrol of women'sdomestic laborfrom the family hearth and the governmentalbureaucracyto the class-structuredmarketplace. 8

NOTES 1. Patriarchyis the hierarchicalorganizationof genderroles and relations, and the concomitant male control of women's reproductivity,sexuality, and other formsof labor and leisure. 2. Boris& Bardaglio,p. 72 and elsewhere. It is also referredto as "publicpatriarchy"in, for example, Nancy Fraser,"Women, Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation,"Hypatia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter 1987), p. 104 and elsewhere.However, this termwouldbe misleadingfor my purposes.Both governmentaland class-basedmarketpatriarchyare "public"in the sense that they are not domestic/intrafamilial.Yet they are importantlydifferentfromeach other. In view of that difference, I use the term "state patriarchy"for the governmentallyexercisedform and "class-basedmarketpatriarchy"for the formwhich is exercisedby middleand upperincome families in virtue of their economic power and class privilege. 3. Charles Murray,LosingGround(New York: Basic Books, 1984), has recommendedthe elimination of "the entirefederal welfare and income-supportstructurefor working-agedpersons," with the sole exception of UnemploymentInsurance.In "The Week in Review"section of TheNew YorkTimes,November 18, 1984, Murray'sbook was referredto as the Reaganadministration's"new Bible." 4. Cf.: Joan Smith, "The Paradoxof Women's Poverty:Wage-EarningWomen and Economic Transformation,"Signs, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Winter 1984), p. 302 for the statistic, and passim,pp. 291-310, for a general discussionof the service sector. 5. See especiallyZillah Eisenstein'sdiscussionsof this point in "The PatriarchalRelations of the ReaganState," Signs,Vol. 10, No. 2 (Winter 1984), pp. 329-337. Also by ZillahEisenstein on the same topic, cf.: Feminismand Sexual Equality:Crisis in LiberalAmerica(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984); "The Sexual Politics of the New Right:Understandingthe 'Crisis of Liberalism,'"Signs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Spring 1982), pp. 567-588; and The RadicalFutureof LiberalFeminism(New York:Longman, 1981). My analysisof the patriarchalsignificanceof welfare cuts differsmarkedlyfrom Eisenstein's. 6. I owe this expressionto Vicki Patraka. 7. The de-privatizationof women'sdomesticlaboris a consequenceof manycontemporaryalterationsto family life, both to patriarchallyorganizedand non-patriarchallyorganizedfamilies. Not only traditionalpatriarchalfamilies, but all familiesin which all adult membersspend their

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time earningincome outside the home, whetherpatriarchalor not, are likely to purchaseat least some domestic services in the marketplace. However, the significance of the impact of deprivatizeddomestic laboris to reproducecertain aspectsof familialpatriarchywithin the market economy. Thus, many people who would never structuretheir own privatizeddomesticityalong patriarchallines are neverthelessunwittinglycontributingto a patriarchalizationof women'slabor in the public economy. 8. I am gratefulto MariaLugonesand LarryMay for helpful commentson earlierversionsof this paper.

REFERENCES

Boris, Eileen and Peter Bardaglio.1983. The transformationof patriarchy: The historic role of the state, in Families,politicsandpublicpolicy.Irene Diamond, ed. New York:Longman. Eisenstein, Zillah. 1984. The patriarchalrelationsof the Reaganstate. Signs 10 (2): 329-337. - . 1984. Feminismandsexualequality:Crisisin liberalAmerica.New York: Monthly Review Press. -. 1982. The sexualpolitics of the new right:Understandingthe 'crisisof liberalism.'Signs7 (3):567-588. -- . 1981. The radicalfutureof liberalfeminism.New York:Longman. Fraser,Nancy. 1987. Women, welfare and the politics of need interpretation. Hypatia.2 (1):103-121. Murray,Charles. 1984. Losingground.New York:Basic Books. Piven, FrancesFox and RichardA. Cloward. 1982. The new classwar. New York:Pantheon Books. . 1971. Regulatingthe poor: The functionsof publicwelfare.New York: Vintage Books. Scott, Hilda. 1984. Workingyourway to the bottom:The feminizationof poverty. London: Pandora. Smith, Joan, 1984. The paradoxof women'spoverty:Wage-earningwomen and economic transformation.Signs 10 (2):291-310. Stallard, Karin, BarbaraEhrenreich,and Holly Sklare. 1983. Povertyin the Americandream:Women& childrenfirst. Institutefor New Communications: South End Press.

COMMENT/REPLY

On Nancy Fraser's"Women,Welfareand the Politicsof Need Interpretation" BRUCE M. LANDESMAN

In "Women,Welfareand the Politicsof Need Interpretation," Nancy Fraser to illuminate the intended a genderbiasof the inquiry pursues "meaning-oriented" Americanwelfaresystemin orderto aidfeministsand theiralliesin thecontinuing politicalstrugglesover the welfaresystem.For Fraserthefundamentalissuesare I arguethataloverjudgmentsaboutwhat womenneed-"need interpretation." and it is the is vivid her provocative, inadequateas a conthough analysisof system to or a searchfor tributioneither politicaltheory practicalstrategy.Frasersubstitutes and defenseof politicalvalues.She patternsand meaningsfor carefulclarification leavesneedswithoutfoundationand does not explorethe capacitiesfor changein moder liberalstates.The meaningssherevealsprovideus neitherwitha soundbasis for judgmentson politicalvaluesnor witha strategyfor improvement.

In "Women, Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation,"1Nancy Fraseranalyzesthe American welfaresystem. According to Fraser,two featuresof the systemshouldtroublefeministsand their allies. One is structural: the systembenefitspoorwomen but at the sametime reinforcestheir poverty. The second is ideological:the system defines women's needs for them and does not let them define their needs for themselves. To shed light on both these problems,Fraserpursuesa "meaning-oriented"(105) inquiryintended to "makeexplicitly the social meanings"(105) and "tacitnormsand assumptions" (105) embeddedwithin welfare programs.In showing how "welfare practicesconstructwomen'sneeds accordingto specificand in principlecontestable interpretations"(105), her inquiryis meant to enable feminists and their allies to contributeto "the politics of need interpretation"(105) in the continuing political disputesabout the welfaresystem. An inquirylike Fraser'smight be evaluatedin two ways. One might look at it as a contributionto political theory. Importanthere is the clarificationand defense of particularpolitical values, and an account of what sort of political and economic institutions can best achieve the preferredvalues. A second way to look at Fraser'sinquiryis as a contributionto politicalpractice, the deHypatiavol. 3, no. 2 (Summer1988)? by BruceM. Landesman

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velopment and defense of a strategyfor use in the political arena to achieve political values either assumedor arguedfor. Fraserseems to want to do both these things-to make a theoreticalcontributionwhich will be usefulas well for political practice. I am skeptical,however, about the value of her analysis as a contributionto either theory or practice. Although her essay gives us a vivid and provocativedepiction of the Americanwelfaresystem, crucialconcepts are not clarified, values are not argued for, questionable empirical claims are asserted,and practicalalternativesare left undeveloped.My guess is that there is probablylittle disagreementbetween Fraserand me in our basic political values. But I find the method she uses unhelpful. It is an attempt to unearthmeaningsand patterns, to reveal underlyingstructuresand institutions. But, in doing this, clarification and rational argumentation about fundamentalissues are avoided, and the empiricalfacts are manipulated to fit the underlyinganalysis.For these reasonsI do not think much is illuminated. Or so I shall argue. I hope our disagreementswill be useful for othersas a wayof contrastingdifferentwaysor methodsof engagingin or "doing" political philosophy, feminist or otherwise. In the firstsection of this paperI give a briefaccountof Fraser'sanalysis.In sections II through IV I develop my criticisms. II discussesneeds; III deals with the "gendersub-text"of the welfaresystem;"IV considersFraser'sview state apparatus. of the welfaresystemas a juridical-administrative-therapeutic I. In the first partsof her paper, Fraserarguesthat the welfaresystem is divided into two parts, one primarilyfor men-unemployment insurance, social security, medicare-the other primarily for women-AFDC, food stamps,medicaid, etc. The firstparttreatspeople as individuals,rights-holders, purchasingconsumers,and membersof the workforce,and is meant to help victims of marketfailures.These programsare thought of as formsof social insurancein which people receive backwhat they have contributed.The beneficiariesare neither stigmatized,nor subjectedto surveillance.The second part of the system-the women's part-takes its beneficiaries to be housewivesand mothers, and treatsthem not as rights-bearersbut as dependent clients, who often receive in-kind aid ratherthan cash. These are not insurance programsbut matters of public charity, whose subjects are often treated in a demeaning way and subjectedto surveillance.This part of the system is meant to help membersof defective families. Frasersays that this division of the system-this "gendersubtext"-rests on the norm that the familydoes and shouldcontain a male breadwinnerand a female mother and housewife, who occupy separateand unequal spheres, outside workfor men, the home for women. Women are thus "constructed" exclusively as mothers, their needs interpretedas maternalneeds, and their

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spheresof activity confined to 'the family.'Fraser'sconclusion is that the system, structuredto meet needs impliedby these "increasinglycounterfactual" norms, does not adequatelydefine or meet the realneeds of women and men, nor does it allow people to define their needs for themselves. In the final sections of her paper,Fraserproposesthat we regardthe welfare (JAT) (113) state apparasystem as a "juridical-administrative-therapeutic" is to translate of which function main the political questionsabout peotus, and/or administrative into needs therapeuticmatters"(113). In "legal, ple's its juridicalaspect the system either accordsor denies people variousrights. The administrativeaspect requiresaid claimantsto show that they meet administrativelydefined criteria of need or entitlement, and to do this they must "translatetheir experiencedsituationsand life-problemsinto administrable needs" (114), which are then "redefinedas correlatesof bureaucratically administeredsatisfactions"(114). In its third aspect, the therapeutic, the JAT encouragespeople to see their problemsas essentiallypersonalproblems and deficiencies, and offersthem variousformsof instructionand therapy. Thus unwed pregnantwomen are offeredcounseling sessionswith psychiatric social workers, intended to get them to acknowledge"their true, deep, latent, emotional problems"(115) and so avoid futurepregnancies. Fraserconcludesthat seeing the welfaresystemas a juridical-administrativetherapeuticstate apparatusenablesus to see "bothsub-systemsmore critically" (115). Her conclusionis that the system"positionsits subjectsin wayswhich do not empowerthem" (115). It treatsthem as "possessiveindividualists"-either as "passiveclients or consumerrecipientsand not as active co-participantsinvolved in shapingtheir life-conditions"(115). The state "preemptsthe power to define and satisfypeople'sneeds"and imposes"monological,administrative definitionsof situationand need and so preemptsdialogicallyachievedself-definition and self-determination" (115). In response,Fraserproposesfour"analytbut distinct, ically practicallyintermingled"aims feministsshould seek: 1) to make women'sneeds a politicalratherthan a personalmatter;2) to challenge traditionalviews aboutwomen'sneeds;3) to empowerwomento interprettheir own needs;and 4) to gain supportforpolicies"basedon feministinterpretations of women'sneeds"(118). The focus, she says,shouldbe "asmuch on need interpretationas on need satisfaction"(118). II. When all is said and done, Fraserseems to me to be assertingthe following three claims: 1) the welfaresystemdiscriminatesagainstwomen because it is based on sexist norms; 2) the modem (liberal)state involves an impersonal,paternalisticbureaucracy whose operationdisempowerspeople; and

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3) the fundamentalnorm of liberal societies is a possessive individualist model of the person. Fraserobviouslyfinds these featuresof the system undesirable.This critique of liberalsociety, however, is hardlya new idea. My problemis not that I disagreewith Fraser'scritiquebut that I think it needs amplificationand defense of the sort she does not give. She makesvery clear that a consequenceof the way the systemoperatesis that it does not meet people'sgenuine needs. To back this claim, however, it is importantto say somethingabout what needs are, what needs people have, and how this is determined. Fraser,however, says very little about this, as I will try to make clear by a brief discussionof needs. The first thing to note about needs is that there are narrowand broad senses in which that concept maybe used. In the narrowsense, needs are distinguishedfrom wants;in the broadsense, they include wants as well. In the narrow(and more useful) sense, we need things which are essential for our survivalor for meetingour fundamentalinterests.Other things we would like to have are desiredbut not needed. Using this notion of need, most people would agree that people have basicneedsfor food, clothing and shelter;companionshipand affection;the developmentof their basicabilities;carefor illness; and respectand self-respect.We can argueabouthis list and the criteria used to formulateit, but the intuitive idea of basic needs is clear enough. We can distinguishpeople'sbasicneeds fromthe things they requireto fulfill their basic needs, e.g. education to develop their abilities, successful achievements to develop their self-respect, a doctor to cure their injuries, etc. I doubt Fraserthinks that the systemis wrongaboutpeople'sbasic needs, as I have explained them. My guess is that she thinks it is mistaken about what they need to fulfill their basicneeds, what we might call their instrumental needs. What an unwed teenage mother needs to fulfill her basic needs is not food stampsto wardoff starvationbut a seriouschange in the structureof her opportunities.Note, however, that this view of the woman'sinstrumental needs presupposesthat she has a basicneed for self-respectand the development of abilities, which meagerwelfareprovisionsoverlook. Note, further, that food stampsdo meet some of the mother'sbasic needs though perhaps not in the maximalway. So Fraser'sclaim shouldbe not that the systemfails to meet needs but that 1) it does not meet basicneeds in the best way, and 2) it does not meet people's genuine instrumentalneeds. The claim that the system does not adequatelymeet people's basic or instrumentalneeds requiresgrounding.It requiressome view about what people's basic and instrumentalneeds are and some defense of that view. This must rest, I think, on a theoryof the good, a view as to what sortsof lives are good lives for human beings to live. There are, crudely, two general types of theories of the good life. 2 Subjective theories understandthe good life in termsof person'sown values or desires.A good life for an individualis a life

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he thinks is good or a life in which he satisfieshis desires.Subjectivetheories do not permit "exteral observers"to evaluate an agent'sdesires. If an agent has a desire, its satisfactionis an element of the good life for that agent. Hedonistic theories of the good are prime examplesof a subjective theory. Objective theories, on the other hand, involve some ideal of the good life which it is thought desirablefor people to live up to, whetherthey want to or not, or whetherthey think that life good. Objective theoristsare thus willing to criticizepeople'sdesiresand hold that while a person'sdesiresare fulfilled, he may still not lead a good life, for he desiresthe wrongthings. When John StuartMill said that it is better to be Socratesdissatisfiedthan a satisfiedpig, he was expressingan objective view of the good life (though he hid this from himself). Similarly,our objection to the society representedin Aldous Huxley'sBraveNew Worldmustrest on some objective account of the good, since people's desiresthere are fully satisfied. Fraser,I think, presupposessome objective account of the good life. She says that people's true instrumentalneeds, as I have called them, are those they would define for themselves if they were free to do so. The system, however, defines people'sneeds for them and thus gets them wrong (perhaps becausethose who define them benefit fromso doing). Fraser,however, does not say much about what people's genuine instrumentalneeds would be if they werefree to define them. She does makeclear, however, that she rejects the norm in accordwith which the systemdefinesmen-possessive individualists and consumerrecipients. She clearly rejects the individualistview of the good life prevalentin liberalcapitalistsocieties-the life of the possessive consumer and the rational maximizerof capitalist economics. Presumably, she has a different view in mind, which is hinted at when she speaks of "dialogic"and "participatory" processesof need interpretationas opposedto administrative "monological processes"(115-6). But what is this alternative view? It needs clarificationand defense, becauseviews aboutthe good life are highly contestable. There is much more agreementamong sensitive people on basic interpersonalmoralclaims than on any conception of the good life. And liberalpluralisticsocieties have dealt with this by being very waryabout attempts to enforce any conception of the good life. So an adequatediscussion of what people reallyneed requiresmoredevelopmentof a conception of the good life. Frasermay respondthat she does not need to give a theory of the good because her view is that the good is what people would endorseif they were really free to judge for themselves;or more weakly, they would, if free, reject the conception of the possessiveindividualist.I, too, would like to believe this, but without some strongargumentation,it remainsa ratherspeculative psychologicalclaim or a pious hope. In sum, Fraser'sviews aboutwhat women need rest on a conception of the good which she does little to clarifyor defend, or on speculative empirical/

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psychologicalclaims about what people would want in certain conditions. The claim that the systemdoes not meet people'srealneeds thus hangs in the air, requiringa more fulsomeaccount of needs to be a seriouscontributionto a political theoryof humanneeds. But perhapsthat is not her point. Her aim might be to get people to think harderabouttheir needs and be criticalabout conventional interpretationsof their needs. This is certainlya salutaryaim. But I doubt that this can be achieved without developing some account of what people need which directly challenges their own ideas. These criticalremarkshave so farbeen basedon construingneeds in a narrow way, as basic needs or needs instrumentalto meeting basic needs. If "needs"are understoodmore broadlyto include wants-which I think Fraser assumes-the same problems will arise. Claims about what women really want will certainlydepend on contestable views of the good life, i.e., about what people should want, or on speculativepsychologicalhypotheses. Thus on this construalof needs, too, the foundationsare missing. III. I now turn to the more empiricalclaims that Frasermakesin regardto the "gendersub-text"of the welfaresystem (108). I shall try to show that these ideas, insightful as they are, are somewhat overstated, need more defense, and that their practicalimplicationsare unclearwithout a theoryof needs or an account of the capacitiesfor change in the liberalcapitalistpolitical system. Frasersays that the system is structuredon the basis of underlyingnorms which lead to differenttreatmentfor men and women. Consequentlyit fails to meet women's needs. Suppose that Fraseris correct in her view that the system treats men and women differentlyin accord with culturalnorms. It does not follow immediatelyfrom this that the system fails to meet their needs. Poor men and women may in fact have differentneeds which are best met by differentprogram;and their having differentneeds may result from underlyingnormswhich areso widelyacceptedthat people end up having the needs attributedto them. If so, the welfaresystemwill meet genuine needs. Thus I'm sure Fraserwould agree that providingfood stampsto unmarried, poor teen-age mothersis helping them meet genuine needs. As I said earlier, it is not the best way to meet their full arrayof needs, but it still meets some needs. The problemthen is overstatedif it is said that the system does not women'sneeds. It meets some of them. It fails in that it meets so few needs and so meagerly. Many people respond to this by thinking that the system should be extended. I assumeFraseris not opposedto extending the system, but she sees this as problematicbecauseit maintainsthe construalof women'sneeds as familial, maternalneeds and so maintainsthe "feminizationof poverty"(103).

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In my terms extending would help with certain needs, but it does not effect the morebasicproblemof restructuringpeople'sfundamentalopportunities.I agreewith Fraser,then, that extendingthe systemis not enough. But it is just false to say that the system does not meet some genuine needs. Nor can we have a good idea as to what changes are desirableunless we have the fuller sort of theory of people'sneeds which I think is lacking. And lastly there is the question of how to get the system to change for the better, assumingwe have an idea of what is better. On this question liberal reformerswill have differentviews than more radicalcritics, and their disagreementswill center aroundthe capacityof the liberalcapitalistsystemto meet these needs. The spirit of her argumentsuggeststhat Fraseris not a liberalreformer,but as I will explain below, she is not entirely clear on this. The importantpoint is that a practicalstrategyrequiressome view of the system'scapacityor incapacity for change, but Fraserdoes not give us this. I turn now to the empiricalquestion of whether the system does in fact treat men and women differently,and, if so, whether it does this becauseof embeddedgendernorms. I do not feel fully adequateto evaluatethese claims which involve a largeempiricalcomponent. But I see some problems.I am not surethat the differencesin welfareprogramsarecompletelydue to gender norms nor that are they obviously irrationaland/or unjust, as Fraserclearly thinks. Thus Frasersays that the male-orientedsubsystemstend to provide cash and treat people as consumers.But this is not true of medicarewhich providescertainkindsof in-kind aid, though it is supposedlypartof the maleoriented system. The same is true of job-trainingprograms.On the other hand, AFDC familiesdo receive welfarechecks, as well as food stamps, and food stampsare somewherebetween in-kind aid and cash. The division on this matter is not clear-cut. Furtherthe rationale for the distinction between some of these programs mayhave little to do with gendernorms. In-kindaid maybe justifiedas a way of insuringthat funds are spent as society intends them to be spent and not divertedto less importantuses. It may thus be reasonablefor the state to subsidize a very sick person'smedical bills ratherthan give her a sum of cash, which she might use for other purposes.Perhapsthis latterreasonfor in-kind aid is a rationalization.Perhapsit is based on unjustifiedpaternalismand a demeaning attitude towardswomen. But this needs argument. There is another rationale which might be given for the division of the welfare system. Social security, medicare and parts of medicaid are often thought of as supplementsto private insuranceand pension programsmeant to help everyone or almost everyone-a use of the state to provide people with public goods almost all desire, but which the marketdoes not provide. AFDC, unemploymentcompensation,food stamps,and other partsof medicaid, on the other hand, can be seen as "relief"programsmeant to help people in various ways "needy."The insurancevs. general fund paymentsfor

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these programsmay largelybe a myth, but the publicgood vs. reliefrationales for these programsare possiblegroundsfor the distinction. Seeing the differences this way helps explain why the "publicgoods"programshave so much supportwhile the "relief"programsare so inadequate. The first benefits a largemiddle class who are politically active; the second helps the poor "who don't vote." On this rationalethe division of the systemrestson a classrather than a gender subtext. These quibbles suggest that the differencesbetween the two systems are neither as clear-cut as Frasercontends nor so obviously based on gender grounds.It wouldseem to be importantfor her argumentthat Frasereither refute these other rationalesor admit that they play a role. But perhapsFraser thinks that such rationalesare rationalizationsand need not be taken seriously. I will develop this suspicionin the next section. In any case, the practical impact of Fraser'sanalysisseems to me to depend on whether class or gendergroundsthe system;on whether the liberalstate can be reformed;and on whether the argumentsfor some of the currentpracticescan be shown to be inadequate.Fraserdoes none of this. IV. In the final partsof her paperFraserdiscusseswhat she calls the juridicaladministrative-therapeuticstate apparatus(JAT), and this concept is supposed to providefurtherilluminationof the welfaresystem. But I do not find it helpful. Concerningthe juridicalaspect, Frasersaysthat the welfaresystem accordsrights to the beneficiariesof the male part of the system but not to those of the female part. This seemsplainly incorrect.AFDC claimantshave rights to receive aid, or in the currentjargon"entitlements,"just as much as medicarerecipients, if they meet the qualifyingconditions. Perhapsthe qualifying conditions are weakerand less subject to administrativediscretion in the so-called male sub-systemthan in the female, but this is a differentpoint. Further,it hardlyseemsan undesirableelement of a welfaresystemthat it operate by accordingpeople rights to variousformsof aid, ratherthan making the receipt of aid a matter of administrativebenevolence. In its administrativeaspect, Frasersaysthat the systemrequiresindividuals to construe their needs in accord with administrativecriteria, "to translate their experienced situations and life-problems into adminstrable needs" (114). Fraserfinds this undesirable,a kind of falsification, because there is likely to be a gap between people's actual needs and administrativecriteria. But what is the alternative?Everylargemoder state requiresa bureaucracy to translategeneralpolicy and legislativegoals into specific actions. In order to conform to requirementsof consistencyand formaljustice-and simplyas a matter of practicality-a state must develop criteriawhich will inevitably fail to take into account importantfeaturesof particularcases. The best sys-

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tems will reduce this gap and provide for redressand exceptions for special cases;the worsewill be rigidand corrupt.(The veryworst, like the Circumlocution Office, Dickens' model bureaucracyin LittleDorritt,will be expert in "how not to do it," i.e. doing nothing (1979). PerhapsFraserthinks that no administrativeapparatuscan do a good job this way in meeting people'sreal needs. If so, her ultimate targetfor criticalattack is the modem state, or perhaps, the modem capitaliststate; but then we need some clue as to what alternative will work better. In its third aspect, the therapeutic,the JAT gets people to see their problems as personalproblemsand offers them therapyand instruction. Fraser's point, presumably,is that their problemsare not reallypersonalbut socially induced, and thereforesuch therapyis an instance of "blamingthe victim." But Fraser'sapparentassumptionthat a problemis either personalor social but not both is obviouslymistaken. Without doubt unwed, pregnant,black, ghetto teenagershave a problemwhose causesincludepovertyand the effects of past and continuing discrimination.But they also have a personalproblem, and it is difficultto see that it is a terriblething for the state in such case to offer them "pre-natalcare, motheringinstructions,tutoring"(114-5) and pyschiatriccounseling. In doing so the state meets genuine needs and, in fact, one problemis that it does so little of this. PerhapsFraser'spoint is that this is just a band-aid,not a cure for the real problem. I agree. As I said earlier, it meets some needs but does not provide the fundamental changes which would enable people to meet their full arrayof needs. But it does meet some real needs. That the state and the welfaresystemhave legal, administrativeand therapeutic aspectsis obvious. But I fail to see the point of reifyingthis into somestate apparathing as impressiveas "the juridical-administrative-therapeutic tus" (113). Clearly, the modem liberalstate is a welfarestate with a bureaucracy, and such systemshave strengthsand weaknesses.Pointing these out and recommendingstrategiesfor improvementis useful. But merely giving the bureaucracya 'heavy'name does not help much. Fraseris clearly a radicalcritic of the modem or modem capitalist state. Her view seems to be that it disempowerspeople and frustratestheir abilityto satisfy their genuine needs. It treats them as possessive individuals. It is faulted for imposingmonological and administrativeconceptions instead of encouraging "dialogicallyachieved self-definition and self-determination" (115). It prevents people from being "active co-participants involved in shapingtheir life-conditions"(115). I have nothing againstthis rhetoric, but it is just rhetoric. It is a substitutefor argumentsfor and againstthe valuesfostered by the liberalstate and for the hardworkof thinking up better alternatives. This bringsme to my majorconcern. As I have said, there is very little argument about values in Fraser'spaper.We are offeredpatternsand structures

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and apparatuses,but the rationalesand argumentsofferedfor currentpractices are not discussed-not clarified, not refuted. This leads me to wonder whether Frasertakes the modem capitaliststate to be a systemof oppressive dominationsuch that the political argumentswhich go on in it simplyrationalize variousinterestsand thus do not need to be taken seriouslyas rational attempts to deal with difficult problems.Although Fraseris eager that people's real needs be met and that dialoguebe engagedin, she never engagesin this dialogueor makesany suggestionsaboutwhat women and people in general reallyneed. The modem state is said to be "monologic"but so is Fraser's perspective. Dialogue surely(and originally-think of Socrates) includes argument about good and bad, but we get little of that. Finally, is the modem state so "monologic?"Much argumentoccursabout what people's needs are, how to meet them, how to deal with scarcity. Consider, for example, the following debates about health care: how to define health care needs, distinguishneeds from wants, keep costs reasonable without detractingfromthe qualityof care, what to do aboutexpensive therapies such as organ transplants,what the respectiveroles of the private and public sectors should be, etc. Or consider debates about surrogatemotherhood and other reproductiveissues, and whether these should be allowed, and if so, how they might be regulatedto make them work to the greatest benefit. These are debates about needs and preferencesand how to meet them in complex situationscharacterizedby the fact that meeting some preferences inevitably means not meeting others. People debate these issues, searchfor the most reasonableand just solutions. Of course, in a democracy, ultimate policy decisions do not reflect pure reason but inequities of power and political compromise,but it is not implausibleto think that reasonplays some role. Fraserseems reluctant to enter these debates. That's why I take her to think they deserve no respect. But if so, this needs some arguing. My view that Fraserthinks these argumentsworthlessis challengedby the final pagesof her essay. There she saysthat the JAT is only one agent in the modem state. Debate goes on about people's needs, and we find, she says, three types of contestants: experts and professionals,such as social workers and welfareadministrators;oppositionalmovements, such as feminists, lesbians and gays, welfareclients, and "peopleof color;"and reactionarieswho want to reprivatizeissues of need. The JAT does not dominate but is one agent in strugglesbetween these groups. The JAT is thus "not undisputed masterof the terrainof the social" (117). Other groups,includingfeminists, can thus affect policy. This seems to be saying, however, that change for the better can come through democraticpolitics, and that rational argumentation plays some role in this quest. But then the idea of the JAT is shown again to be not veryhelpful, for it is not an oppressive,all-powerfulstructure that can only be overthrown,but just the rigid, sexist bureaucracy,which can be defeated through political struggle. And, more importantly, if political

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struggleis possibleand might be effective, then argumentabout values has a big role to play. Fraser'smain concern is that feministsand progressivesshould concentrate not only on the extension of need satisfactionbut also on need interpretation. I agree. But for this we requiresome good clear thinking about what people need, about how currentpolitical structuressatisfyor frustrateneeds, and a view of the political system which can groundstrategiesfor change. Fraser'smeanings, patterns, structures and "apparatuses"are interesting enough but leave these more importanttasks undone.

NOTES 1. This commentaryis a revisedversion of remarkson "Women, Welfareand the Politics of Need Interpretation"deliveredat the Pacific Division convention of the American Philosophical Association in March, 1987. I would like to thank Kai Nielsen for helpful discussionof my comments. 2. An importantdiscussionof these types of theories is T. M. Scanlon's "Preferenceand Urgency."

REFERENCES

Dickens, Charles. 1979. LittleDorritt.Oxford:Oxford University Press. Fraser,Nancy. 1987. Women, welfare and the politics of need interpretation. Hypatia:A Journalof FeministPhilosophy.2(1):103-121. Scanlon, T. M. 1975. Preference and urgency. Journal of Philosophy LXXII:19:655-669.

COMMENT/REPLY

DesperatelySeekingApproval: The Importanceof Distinguishing BetweenApprovaland Recognition LINDA TIMMELDUCHAMP

VictoriaDavionconfusesseekingapprovalwiththedesirefor recognitionof and respectfor one'sdifference.Ironically,whensheassertsthatthedesireto pleaseothersprovidesan incentiveto do well(andthusconstitutesa positiveaspectof competition)Davionunderminesherargumentthatcompetitionenhancesone's senseof self. Ratherthanenhancingone'ssenseof self, strivingto win approvalfromothers sabotagesone'sabilityto relyon herownjudgmentandtakemoralresponsibility for herself.

Victoria Davion's failureto distinguishbetween approvaland recognition ironicallyunderminesthe very ends she arguescompetition can serve. "The incentive to do well is often linked to tryingto please someone in order to gain recognition,"she writesin "Do Good FeministsCompete?"But tryingto we mean acplease someone can nevergain one recognition (if by recognition knowledgementand affirmation).Seeking another'sapprovalonly reinforces one's general dependency upon authority in its various various guises and forms.Seeking another'sapprovalthus weakensone's sense of self ratherthan strengthensit. Consider by way of example the following situations: 1) a woman with a talent for design, an eye for color and a feel for texturefindsthat she is unable to weave unless she is producinga piece specificallyto please another person-to the point that any exercise of her talent and creativitydependsentirelyupon the approvalof others;2) a graduatestudentwho has excelled and flourishedunderthe nurturingapprovalof her teachersbegins to develop her own ideas and direction-until she learnsthat doing so will mean the loss of that approval, and thus in order to continue winning approvalfrom her teachers and mentors she consequently fails to develop her burgeoning orginalityand intellectualindependence;3) a "modelsecretaryalwayshaving servedher superiorwell and faithfullyand in turnbaskedin that superior'sapHypatiavol. 3, no. 2 (Summer 1988) ? by LindaTimmel Duchamp

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proval respondswith her usualdiscretion, helpfulnessand efficiency to that superior'sorderseven in the service of unlawfulor unethical acts, solely for the unquestionedsake of that approval. In the first situation the weaver'sutter dependence upon approvalmeans that she cannot create without it. In what way does striving for others' approvalhelp develop her sense of self?In the second situationthe graduatestudent'sneed for approvaleffectivelykeepsher in line by teachingher to censor herself and by preventingher from developingher own ideas, her autonomy as a thinker. In her case seeking approvalwill prevent her from developing and displayingthose "differences"Davion refersto when she defines "recognition." In the third situation the importanceto a subordinateof her superior'sapprovalcan lead to terrible,even fatal consequencesfor other people. I was onlyfollowingorders:surely,we have learnedby now that unquestioning submissionto authorityoften harmsothers, and can kill. I don't see how rewardedsubmissionto authority("Even a smile tells another that they have done well") enhances one's sense of self-or leads others to recognizeone's "differences."Within the context of friendshipbetween women, seeking approvalratherthan recognitionfromone's friendnegates reciprocityand mutuality, for she who seeks approvalfrom another constitutesthat other as an authorityfigure. A well-developedsense of self requiresone to be her own judge, to have internalizedauthorityfor herself. I'm not certain whether the desire for approvalis an essential element of competition. But if competition requiresthe renderingand valuingof a judgment by some externallyconstitutedauthority,then I would arguethat competition is more likely to sabotageone's sense of self than strengthenit. Life, unlike a game of tennis, does not abideby rules. And where there are no absolute rulesand playerscommittedto obeyingthem, judgmentmustalwaysbe politicallydetermined. As any feminist working in the academymust know throughexperience, one woman'sbrillianceis often judgedby the old boys to be lunacy or piffle.

REFERENCES

Davion, Victoria. 1987. Do good feminists compete? Hypatia:A Journalof FeministPhilosophy2(2):55-64.

COMMENT/REPLY

Competition,Recognition,andApproval-Seeking VICTORIA DAVION

HereI supportmy positionin "Do GoodFeminists Compete?" againstthesuggeswithothersweakensratherthanstrengthens one'ssenseof self. tionthatcompeting In "Do Good FeministsCompete?"(1987, 55-63) I claim that at the root of many feminist objections against competition is a fear that competition fostersa strongsense of self. This is seen as a bad thing becausea strongsense of self leads to a sense of differencefrom, ratherthan connection with, others, and in much feminist literaturea strongsense of differencefromothers is linked with a war-likementality, while a strongsense of connection is linked to a peacefulone. I then explorethe idea that what is needed is a healthy balance between these two and the possibility that women under patriarchies may have too little sense of self ratherthan too much, which would imply that perhapsa little competition could be a healthy thing for many women. In her response to this, Duchamp basicallyclaims that approval-seeking does not help foster a strong sense of self, but, rather,causesone to become dependent upon the judgmentof others, weakeningone's sense of self rather than strengtheningit. Hence, if the motivation to compete is simplya motivation to please, this will not help fostera strongsense of self. She saysthis in response to my stating that a motive for competing might be the desire to gain recognition throughpleasing others. I have severalpoints to make in responseto this. First, if Duchampis correct, then many feminist objections againstcompetition are misguided,but for differentreasonsthan those I discussed.I pointed out that the fearof too stronga sense of self may be inappropriateat this time for manywomen, and that, rather, fear of an underdevelopedone may be in order. However, if competitiondoes not help fostera strongsense of self, feministsworriedabout this do not have to worryaboutcompetition.Instead,those of us worriedabout the possibilityof too little sense of self shouldbewareof competition. Acceptance of Duchamp'sclaim about competition rests upon accepting the claim that competition is merelyan approval-seekingactivity. Duchamp presentsthis idea becauseI statedthat the incentive to do well is often due to wanting to please someone in order to gain recognition. Duchamp reduces this claim to the claim that the incentive to do well is motivatedby the desire to gain approval. And as her examples show, approval-seekingcan often weaken ratherthan strengthenone's sense of self. Duchampstates that "tryHypatiavol. 3, no. 2 (Summer 1988) ? by Victoria Davion

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ing to please someone can nevergain one recognition (if by recognition we mean acknowledgmentand affirmation)." The claim that one can never gain recognition by attempting to please someone is implausible.To recognize someone is to acknowledgethem as having done something important.Attempting to pleaseothers can be a motive for doing somethingthey see as important,and if one is successfulat this, one may well gain their recognition. However, if in seeking recognitionone is merely wanting another person to like what one does and agree with it, then one is actuallyseekingapprovalwhich is not basedupon recognition. In addition, one can recognizesomeone as having achieved somethingmomentous without approving of what it is they do. I am not sure, therefore,that any affirmationneed be involved. People can be recognizedas having been the world'snastiest villians, and this wouldn't imply approval. A distinction, therefore,needs to be made between approvalbasedupon recognition, based upon acknowledgementof an importantachievement, and approvalwhich is simplyliking someone. This suggestsa distinction betweendifferentwaysone can please someone. A teacher can be pleased that a student is doing well, and this can be based upon the recognition of achievement. However, the same teacher may dislike the student and or disagreewith the work she has done. In an important sense, however, if the teacher recognizesachievement, she may be pleased although she does not approvein the sense of either liking or agreeing. I thereforedisagreewith the claim that attemptingto please is simplyapproval-seeking.One personmaybe attemptingto do something that another will respect even if the latter, in some very important senses, does not approveof it. Attempting to gain this kind of recognition fromthose one respectsdoes not seem a bad thing. Nor is it identicalwith approval-seeking. I don't think it would be healthy for someone to value her achievements only if others do. However, especiallyat the learningstage, feedbackcan be helpful. And, I believe that this can help strengthenone's sense of self in facilitating a recognition of one's strengthsand weaknesses.Being overly dependent upon the recognitionof others for a sense of self-worthis not good. But paying attention to feedback can help one form a sense of what one knowsshe has yet to lear. This, I believe, can contributeto a strongsense of self. Too much of anything is not good. Yet a little maybe quite important.I thereforehaven't changedmy view on this matter. I do, however, think some clarificationwas needed, and I thank Linda Timmel Duchampfor bringing this to my attention. REFERENCES

Davion, Victoria. 1987. "Do good feminists compete?"Hypatia2(2):55-63.

Book Reviews

Gender and History: The Limits of Social Theory in the Age of the Family. By LINDA NICHOLSON. New York:ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1986. S. Russell Kathryn LindaNicholson's GenderandHistoryclearlydemonstratesthat philosophy has a valuablecontributionto make to feminist theory. Her central theme is that the tendency to be ahistoricalmustbe correctedif we are to have an adequate theory of genderand female devaluation,or an analysisof the connections among the family, the economy and the state that avoids reifyingpresent forms. To be historical, for Nicholson, is to recognizethat currentpractices have emerged from a complex series of social organizationsand that these have undergoneconstant changes (91 or 103). Patternsof historical emergenceneed to be identifiedto show how old conventions can function in new sets of social relationsto perpetuatemale dominance. Nicholson describes historical work as "telling a tale whose beginnings may be markedly different from its end" (90). Her narrativehermeneutic approachmakes a searchfor originslegitimateif we rememberthat similaritiesbetween past and present are "family resemblances,"not identities or universal truths. The early reasonsfor women'soppressionmay be differentfrom currentones but still operate within new combinationsand permutations. She arguesthat we can captureboth the pervasivenessof female devaluation and avoid relativismwithout a cross-cultural,"totalizing"(207) theory. There is neither one set of activities nor one way of perceivingwomen'sbiology that wouldallow us to explicate thecauseof women'soppression.The existence of women and children in all societies, for example, does not entail that motheringis the centralorganizingfeatureof gender. We falselyuniversalize if we claim that women'ssubordinationis due to their domesticactivity as Rosaldo, Ortner and Chodorowhave done. Nicholson providesan interesting account contrastingGayle Rubin'shistoryof women'soppressionand that of Engels'. But if Nancy Hartsock is correct, and Rubin fails to apply Marx'stheory of surplusvalue properlyat the level of productionbecauseshe does not move beyond the level of exchange, then Engelsand Rubin'sanalyses are much more incompatiblethan Nicholson recognizes. Nicholson claims to be following the methodology of Hegel, Dilthey, "critical theory" and the Frankfortschool in her abandonmentof a reductionist approachto causalitywherebyan implicit similarcause/similareffect dogma binds us to determinism.This "prohistorical,anti-scientific model" Permissionto reprinta book review from this selection may be obtained only from the author.

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(105) is presentedas a way to do interpretive,narrativehistoryand avoid the pitfalls of positivistic social science. She seems to equate a commitment to scientific explanationwith positivism, however, in a way that fails to do justice to the critiqueof that method and the attempt to move beyond it in social science and philosophy. Part I of Genderand Historyis an enjoyablecomplementto Alison Jaggar's FeministPoliticsand HumanNature. It presentsthe differencesbetween liberal, radicaland socialistfeminismin a way that wouldbe usefulfor the classroom and gives a very readableoverview of the women's movement during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.Nicholson has an insightfulmaterialist approach,so she is able to balance technical philosophicalexposition with an account of why certain ideasor strategiesbecome viable. Her analysis of the changing relationsbetween privateand public spheresnot only makes sense of the slogan "the personalis political,"but also showswhy feministsin the nineteenth centurydid not, for the most part, reject motherhood.Nicholson does mention race and the workof severalblack writers.Nevertheless, had she paid greaterattention to black feminismand the organizedactivities of women of color againstsexual abuseand lynching, for example, she might have illuminated importanthistorical links between sexuality, class control and racism. The most interesting part of the book is Nicholson's claim that today's family is the outcome of a historicalprocesswhich broughttogether kinship and domesticity. Combining genealogical relation and cohabitation, the "family" includes a normative feature indicating "who 'ought' to live together" and emphasizes the relation between mother and child (81-83). Without falling into a dual-systemsapproach,Nicholson shows how private life and developingfamilyformshave been influentialthroughouthistory. As a differentiatedpolitical sphere and the modem economy emerge together out of a society dominatedby kinship, they retain elements of that kinship system. The tension between new political forms and traditionallife illustrates how the state enhances patriarchyto insure its rule. Nicholson arguesthat since the 1800s familylife has been increasinglyindividualizedand separatedfrom external society. Many of its functions have been taken over by the state or by commodityexchange. Indeed, an increasing individualizationof life defines crucialhistoricalpatternssince the breakdown of feudalism and the dissolution of kinship. Today, this process is markedby a growth in the political significanceof the independent human individual (one person= one vote) and by a move away from an analysisof society that is based on household units headed by a man. Genderand Historyis also an importantbook for political theory in general because of its insistence that changing relationsbetween private and public life give rise to formsof thought that tend to reifyaspectsof the time in which they are written. Thus, Locke'sindividualismand his view of the declining

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political significanceof the familyreflect the historicalseparationof kinship and state during the seventeenth century, whereasMarx'semphasison the importanceof productionexpressesthe nineteenth centuryseparationof the capitalist economy from the state and family. Nicholson's analysis of the Filmer/Lockecontroversy is a genuine contribution to recent scholarship, particularlyher critiqueof the former'sconflation of patriarchy,kingshipand fatherhood. Her claim that Locke obfuscateshis devaluationof history with his "dualvision" of personalfreedomand familialobligation is especiallyinteresting. Although Nicholson realizesthat Marx, unlike Locke, knew what he was doing, and though she agreesthat undercapitalism"the economic" is dominant, she faults him for economic determinism.She criticizesMarxfor having a cross-cultural"idolizationof labor"and for assumingthat humans will compete over surplusbecauseof their "acquisitiveness"(184). Claiming that Marxistsoveremphasizethe productionand consumptionof food and objects, she arguesthat this focus cannot account of the significance of "activities such as childrearingor nursing"(173). For Nicholson, there is an ambiguity in the Marxist term 'production,' which can mean either any action necessaryfor survivalor the creation of commodities under capitalism (174-179). She says this leaves Marx with a theory that is trivial, tautologousor historicallyinaccurate.Narrowingthe scope of the theoryto capitalismand focusingon Marx'sown historicalworks would be insufficientbecauseit wouldfail to show that gender, too, is a relation of class division since it involves struggleover the productionand use of food and objects (195). Though this last point is challenging,Nicholson's analysisof Marxwill not be adequatefor those who use internalrelationistmodelsof dialecticsand try to explain historical process in a non-positivistway that incorporatesa notion of contradiction. Her summaryof Marxrelies too heavily on a determinist readingof early Marxistslike Engels, Plekhanovand Lenin and on later humanistor "instrumentalist" versionsof Marxismexemplifiedby writerslike Shlomo Avineri (169-175). Her understandingof the term 'commodity'as centering around food and material objects fails to make sense of Marx's claim that a commodityis a contradictoryunity of use value and value, where the latter is taken as abstract labor (Marx 1967, chap. 1). As Harry Bravermanhas shown, commoditiescan also be services. Her accusationthat Marxidolizesworkcannot be madewithout confrontinghis theoryof abstract labor. The central issuehere is understandingwhat it was that Marxwas trying to do and whether or not his methodologyof abstractionin both inquiry and exposition makes it legitimatefor him to use languagethe way he does. Marx'sanalysisof the labor processtakes place at variouslevels of abstraction-sometimes at the level of the capitalistfirm, sometimesat the level of society in general. A charitable interpretationof his work requiresa more

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subtle rendering of his theoretical moves than that offered by Nicholson. Since theoretical understanding is advanced through critical debate, however, Nicholson's significant work, Genderand History,will provide an opportunityfor Marxiststo identify some of the main difficultiesfeminists have with their ideas and for liberalsto question the dismissalof history. REFERENCES

Braverman,Harry. 1974. Laborandmonopolycapitalism.New York:Monthly Review Press. Harstock, Nancy. 1983. Money, sex and power. Boston: NortheasternUniversity Press. Marx, Karl. 1967. CapitalI. New York:InternationalPublishers. Philosophy and Feminist Thinking. By JEAN GRIMSHAW. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. JaneDuran and FeministThinkinginThe jacket blurbfor Jean Grimshaw'sPhilosophy formsus that it is a workwhich "... focuseson someof the centralproblemsin feministthinkingand their relationshipboth to feministpracticeand to philosophicaltheoriesand traditions."As such, it wouldseem to be a worthycontribution to effortsin the contemporaryintersectionof philosophyand feminism, and a workwhich shouldbe reviewedin this space. But some workshave more to offerthan others, and the Grimshawbook fallsshortof fulfillingits goals in many respects.Makingclear the respectsin which it does fall short helps to shed light on some currenteffortsin feministtheory, particularlythose efforts which see androcentrismas operatingat a profoundlevel ratherthan a level synonymouswith exclusionarypracticesin the workplaceor the professions. The work is divided into eight chapters,each one of which is titled according to some recurringproblemin feminist academic literatureand its relationship to philosophy, e.g., "The Maleness'of Philosophy,""Women and Autonomy." The organizationis commendable,but the analysisof issuesoffered in each chapter does not make a contributionto the currentfeminist/ philosophicalliteraturewhich risesabove the level of analysisalreadyavailable. The approachis thorough and doughty. Repeatedly, however, alleged problemsin feminist theory are presented in such a way that it is not clear that the problemhas been genuinely understoodor that the analysisis at all helpful in elucidating the complexities of the problem, even if it aims in a generallycorrect direction. An example of the overall tone of the work is the chapteron "The 'Maleness' of Philosophy."Here it might seem that Grimshawis at somewhatof a

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disadvantage,since the publicationof Evelyn Fox Keller'sReflectionson Genderand Science(1985) and SandraHarding'sThe ScienceQuestionin Feminism (1986) (both longerworkswhich focus in depth on the problemof androcentrism) precededher work by only a few months. The contrast, however, is striking.Grimshawbegins the chapterin some apparentperplexityover what could be meant by the "maleness"of philosophy. Seeming to ignoremuch of the work which has been done on the notion that certain sorts of theorizing are androcentric-some of Keller's work had been published well before Grimshaw'spiece-Grimshaw spendsquite a bit of time on the examination of the exclusion of women from certain portions of Aristotle's polity and Lockean theory. The analysishere is not of the precise and penetratingsort found, for example, in some of the pieces in the Hintikka and Hardinganthology DiscoveringReality. A second difficultyof the work-at leastfromthe standpointof the American reader-is that it attempts a synthesis of recent British and American commentary, but relies much more heavily on British work. Given the author's location, this is quite understandable,but it creates a certain unevenness, since the bulk of the English-languagepublishing done on the stated topics has been in the United States. The book thus has a somewhat limited focus. As noted, majorAmerican theoristsare rarelycited; more frequent citations are to RadcliffeRichards,Oakley and Rowbotham. The problemof the lack of citation of majorwork in the field of feminist philosophical theory is combined with (and reinforces)the somewhatnaive quality of the analysis, an illustrationof which is the chapteron 'Maleness' just discussed.The readeris left uncertainas to what it is that the authoractually intends. There is more than one way in which Grimshaw'sview of what is constitutive of the 'Maleness'of philosophymight be interpreted:the readermight think that Grimshaw'sconception of what constitutes "maleness" is simplyone interpretationthat might be given, or that it is in fact the standardinterpretationof what constitutes"maleness"in philosophy,or that it is the best gloss on what constitutes maleness-even if others might not agree-or that it is simplythe case that the authorherselfis unawareof what is meant by the phrase"The 'Maleness'of Philosophy."What remainsparticularly unclear is whether Grimshawherself genuinely believes that most of the concern about the "maleness"of philosophyhas focusedon the fact that, in terms of sheer numbers,most philosophersare male, or whether the concern has aimed at a deeper level-masculinist or androcentricthoughtstyles and/orconceptualframeworks.If it is in fact the case that "maleness"has alreadybeen perceivedas something more than a mere head count of philosopherscited and philosophicalexamplesconstructed,then Grimshaw'sanalysis of the problemof "maleness"is essentiallya strawmanargument,and one which does not clearlyserve the reader'sor student'spurposes.If it is generally agreedthat the problemof androcentrismhas its most interestingramifi-

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cations at deep theoreticallevels, then to focus on exclusion in termsof mere numbersis somehow to miss the point. Only briefreferencecan be madeto Harding'sTheScienceQuestionin Feminism, but it is worth mentioning in this context because, while examining the same generalareaof the intersectionof philosophicaltheoryand feminist concerns, it has the virtues of Grimshaw'sdefects. Harding'sanalysis is sophisticated and thorough;she cites almost all of the relevant contemporary workin feministphilosophyand contemporaryfeministtheory. The originality of the book lies in its attemptto utilize the strandsof post-modernistcritical theory (that is, contemporaryliterarytheory) to analyzeand assesswork in philosophyof science and the sciences in general.The difficultyhere, theoretically, is that the assessmentthat philosophyand philosophyof science in particularare on all fourswith any other literaryendeavoris one which may requiremore argumentthan Hardingis preparedto give. Hardingcites Rorty frequentlywith apparentapproval;the Rortianline that philosophyought to be "deconstructed"and strippedfree of its pretensionsto a preeminentplace among academic disciplines is part and parcel of Harding'sargumentabout science. But Rorty himself offersmore in the way of argument(in Philosophy and theMirrorof Nature,for example) than Hardingdoes. It is not clear that science is a "text"to be readlike any other text, and to state this flatly or assume it as a given begs a question. Nevertheless, of the two worksmentioned here, Harding'sis by far the more valuable. Original, clearly written and comfortablewith a wide rangeof materialon philosophyand feminism, it is a worthy contribution. It might be thought to be Grimshaw'smisfortunethat these two workswere publishedmore or less simultaneously. REFERENCES

Harding,Sandra. 1986. The sciencequestionin feminism.Ithaca:Corell University Press. reality.Dordrecht: Harding,Sandraand Hintikka, Merrill. 1983. Discovering Reidel. Keller, Evelyn Fox. 1985. Reflectionson genderandscience.New Haven: Yale University Press. and theMirrorof Nature. Princeton:PrinceRorty, Richard. 1979. Philosophy ton University Press. Lesbian Philosophy: Explorations. By JEFFNERALLEN. Palo Alto, CA: Institute of LesbianStudies, 1986. Sexes et parentes.By LUCEIRIGARAY.Paris:Les Editionsde Minuit, 1987. EleanorH. Kuykendall These are both passionate works. Both explore the limits of their languages;both radicallyevaluate the gender distinctions their respective lan-

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guagesand culturescommonly offer, and both courageouslyproposealternatives for woman-identifiedfeminists.Allen and Irigaraypresentcollections of papers,some previouslypublishedand other publishedhere for the firsttime. Their writing is as poetic as it is acutely philosophical. Both Allen and Irigaraydrawupon rich and eclectic sourcesin Continental philosophy,feminist theory, and, in Irigaray'scase, linguistics,to create their originaland independent, yet complementaryproposalsfor a feminist ethics, epistemology, and ontology. Allen's book opens with "Remembering:A Time I Will Be My Own Beginning"and with an articlepreviouslypublishedin Trivia,"Lookingat Our Blood: A Lesbian Response to Men's Terrorizationof Women." A third chapter, "Motherhood: the Annihilation of Women," appearedin Joyce Trebilcot's anthology, Mothering,published by Rowman and Allanheld in 1984. These essays pursue to the utmost the personal consequences of a woman's oppression and the radical possibilities of a feminist answer. At times they shock, as in Allen's enragedrecountingof a rapeand in her rejection of motherhoodas a markof male violence. At its most radical, Allen's LesbianPhilosophyconcludes with "Naming and Difference:Truth and Female Friendship."This chapter is a critique both of masculinist ontology since Plato'sSymposiumand of androgyny,which, Allen argues,co-opts and erasesfeminine identification. It is also, and finally, a radicaland lyricalproposal for an ethic of feminine bonding, feminine boundarilessness,feminine rhythm. Allen offersher ontology as specificallylesbian, and her writing is direct, idiomatic, and very personal, drawingthe readerinto its substantialphilosophical argumentwithout an appearanceof erudition, though the erudition is impressively evident in the notes. By contrast, Luce Irigaray'sSexes et like earlierworks, is an intimidatingliterary parentes(SexesandRelationships), adventure. It is not political in the way that Allen's book is avowedlypolitical. Not yet translated,Irigaray'sworkaboundsin eruditereferencesand unexpected syntactic puns, so that it is hardly accessible to the nonacademic reader.But Irigaray'swritingis no less revolutionarythan Allen's, though it is own descriptionof it, in ". . . double style: a written, accordingto Irigaray's of amorous a relations, style of thought, exposition,writing... ." (191). style Sexeset parentesdoes not appearat the outset to be a revolutionarywork. It begins with an academic paper, "La Croyance meme" ("The Very Belief') which may usefullybe read together with the sections on Freud'sBeyondthe PleasurePrinciplein Derrida'sPostCard, publishedin translationby the Universityof Chicago Pressin 1987, to which Irigarayis replying.Irigaray'sbook continues with an interview previously published with Les Editions de la Pleine Lune, a small feminist press in Montreal, "Le corps-a-corpsavec la mere"("Body-to-Bodywith the Mother").This mayusefullybe readwith her "And the one doesn't stir without the other," translatedby Helene Vivienne

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Wenzel in Signs, 1981; and AmanteMarine([Feminine]Loverfrom the Sea), published by Les Editions de Minuit in 1980, which are examples of "l'ecriturefeminine"or "femininewriting"that she was explaining in plainer language to sympathetic interviewers. Irigarayshares Allen's concern with the violence done mothers, physicallyand psychically, but is very far from Allen's rejection of motherhood. However, several of the other essays in Sexeset parentes,all talksoriginallyaddressedto feministacademicsin various Western European universities, present a radical critique of masculinist ontology and propose a woman-identifiedontology as a radicalalternative. Some of them, such as "Femmesdivines"("Holy women")and "Lescouleurs de la chair" ("The colors of flesh") present more accessible explanationsof earlier works. Others, such as "Les femmes, le sacre, l'argent," ("Women, the Sacred, and Money") and "L'universalcomme mediation," ("The Universal as Mediation") continue argumentsbegun in Speculumof the Other Womanand ThisSex WhichIs Not One, both publishedin translationby Cornell University Press in 1985. Two essays in particular,"Le genre feminin" ("The feminine gender")and "Lestrois genres"("The three genders"),propose a woman-identifiedontology without characterizingits erotic direction as specificallylesbian. Both Irigarayand Allen challenge the courageousreader;both dareher to think, to speak, to live, in the feminine. Neither for Irigaraynor for Allen is this challenge a matterof a diffidentexercise in analysis,though the analysis itself, in Irigaray,can be as captivatingas a logical puzzle.Both Irigarayand Allen take departurefrom the constitution of cultureaccordingto male conventions of exchange, which violate women, above all, in separatingus from one another. Both Irigaray'sand Allen's original challenge is to dare the imaginativeleaps-personal and logical, ethical and ontological-that might bring us together. Allen's particulargift, in LesbianPhilosophy,is to find an authenticallyAmerican voice for that discovery. Intercourse. By ANDREA DWORKIN. New York:Free Press, 1987. MelindaVadas In Intercourse,Andrea Dworkinconstructsa pictureof the sexual act of intercoursel as that act has been describedby severalwell-known male fiction writers2and as that act is and has been controlled and shaped by male law. She goes on to ask some pertinentand uncomfortablequestionsabout the political details of this picture-questions, that is, about the relationshipbetween sex and sexism. Dworkin'scentral argumentis this: In the social worlddelimited by intercourse,3 any sex act can have a violative and subordinatingmeaningbecause intercourse-which is socially recognizedas the paradigmaticsex act-has a

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violative and subordinatingmeaning. This fairlywell-hiddenmeaning of intercourseis conceptuallymost directlygeneratedby the existence of the act and the coherence of the concept of rape(and its nearrelative, prostitution). "Rapeand prostitutionnegate self-determinationand choice for women; and anyone who wants intercourseto be freedomand to mean freedomhad better find a way to get rid of them" (143). The institutionalizedsex acts of rape and prostitution, acts which subordinate women, give meaning to their method or means of subordination, standardlythat of intercourse. The means of rape/prostitutionacquire the meaningof rape/prostitution.The means, intercourse,and the meaning, subordination, fuse into a functional and conceptual unity. Rape/prostitution and intercourse are joined at this level of meaning, as well as materially 4 joined throughtheir necessarypreludeof sexualobjectification, this objectification being both a causal and conceptual antecedent of these acts. (In other words, in orderto be fucked, women must be made fuckable.) In order for intercourseto have a differentmeaning, to "meanfreedom,"the institutionalizedsex acts of rapeand prostitutionmustboth cease to occurand cease to be even comprehensible,for their mere comprehensibilityrestson the social realityof women'sstatusas sex objects and thus, ultimately,on women's 5 metaphysical inferiority, of which the act of sexual objectification is the lived social reflection. In short, the relationshipbetween women'smetaphysicalinferiority,intercourse, and rape/prostitutionis that of a vicious circle: Rape/prostitutionis a determined social response to women's metaphysicalinferiority(that is, to our 'natural'fuckability), a responsewhich also serves to expressand maintain that inferiority/fuckability,and thus also a responsewhich subordinates women; the subordinatingnatureof rape/prostitutioncreatesthe subordinating meaning of its method: intercourse;this method, intercourseitself, both this inexpressesand maintainswomen'smetaphysicalinferiority/fuckability; feriority/fuckabilitythen determinesthe social responseof rape/prostitution . . .and so on, aroundthe circle. Intercourse,with its actual meaning and function hidden by desire (if not mutualdesire) and social approval,is perhaps the most vicious memberof this vicious circle, the main stumblingblock to women'sequality.Therefore, in the social worlddelimitedby intercourse, intercoursesubordinateswomen. Intercourseis the linchpin of women's inequality, not only because of its inextricable relationship to rape/prostitutionand to the categorizationof women as inferior/fuckable,and not only because its meaning infects the meaningof other sex acts, makingsex "anyviolation of a woman'sbody,"but also becausethe meaningand function of intercoursetend to be hidden from our social view by men's-and women's-normative approvalof and pleasure in the act itself. Intercoursesubordinateswomen, but, instead of resisting, women construct their lives around meeting its demands and its meaning.

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They seek to become, and finally do become, "the objects who need to be fucked." "It is the best system of colonializationon earth; she takes on the burden, the responsibility,of her own submission,her own objectification . . When those who dominateyou get you to take the initiative in yourown human destruction, you have lost more than any oppressedpeople yet has ever gotten back (142-43). Dworkin'sanalysisof intercoursewill-and has-angered nearlyeveryone. ("If the questionsmake the holy penis unhappy,who could survivewhat the answersmight do?" (134).) The variouspoints of contention that have been raised are beyond the scope of this review. However, in my view, there is nothing incoherent, contradictory,or anti-intuitive about Dworkin'sanalysis. She arguesher case lucidlyand with force. Though her conclusionsmight seem unpalatableand extreme to some, no theoretically unprejudicedevidence points to their falsity. That is, without begging the question and assuming that 'sex itself' is either basicallygood or basicallyneutral, nothing Dworkin suggests regardingintercoursecan be shown to be false. No evidence-e.g., women's reportson how much physicalpleasurethey get from intercourse-disconfirmsDworkin'shypothesisthat intercoursesubordinates women unless a sex-positive or sex-neutralassumptionis made prior to the examination of such evidence. But it is just Dworkin'spoint to arguethat a sex-positiveor sex-neutralashuman sumptioncannot be validlymade. Lived (and differentially-gendered) intercourse and women's and seems created there has history inequalityboth, to be a relationship between these two manufacts: ". .. intercourseand women's inequalityare like Siamese twins, alwaysin the same place at the same time, pissinginto the same pot" (128). The unrelentingco-presenceof intercourse and women's inequality should tell us something-especially when we considerthis co-presenceagainstthe backgroundof improvements in women'ssocial/economiclot conjoined with a lackof change in our metaphysical status. Through history and history'sprogress,women remain forever fuckable. What Dworkinconfrontsus with in Intercourseis not, in my view, an analysisthat suggeststhat she is crazy,6 but ratherone that reminds us that we mayhave overlookedthe obvious. Dworkinis directingour gazeto a large, ugly chunk of women'sinequalitythat has restedundisturbedon the mantelpieceof humansocial life for centuries,gatheringthe dust of convention, its real natureobscured.Her analysisalso remindsus that this ugly collectible is in fact a movableobject, that it is there by our choice, and that we could just possiblythrow it out. NOTES 1. I believe that, for Dworkin, the defining instance or paradigmcase of intercourseis the standardone: penetrationof the erect penis into the vagina, followedby thrustingto male ejaculation. However, she extends the concept of intercourseto cover any penetrationof a woman's

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(or man's)body, the definitionalemphasisbeing on the penetrationof that body:"Havinga line at the point of entry into yourbody that cannot be crossedis differentfromnot having any such line; and being occupied in yourbody is differentfromnot being occupied in yourbody"(133). 2. Included among these writersare James Baldwin, Tennessee Williams, Kobo Abe, Isaac Singer, and Leo Tolstoy. Dworkinalso devotes a chapterto examiningthe meaning-and subsequent misinterpretation-of Joan of Arc's actual (i.e., not fictive) resistanceto intercourse. Dworkinnotes that, in the social worldde3. In the chapter, "Occupation/Collaboration," limited by intercourse,the problematicmeaningof intercoursecan and does extend to other sex acts that can be "anyviolation of a woman'sbody."Whether or not there is a social worldoutside that delimited by intercourseis an open question which, as far as I can see, Dworkindoes not seek to close. 4. Necessary,that is, to intercourseas we know it. When Dworkinasks, "Can intercourseexist without objectification?Would intercoursebe a differentphenomenon if it could, if it did?" (140), I believe that she is suggestingthat intercoursewithout objectificationwould literallynot be the same act. (In which case, calling the act by the same name would seem to me to be problematic.) 5. Dworkin'suse of the term "metaphysical"to describewomen's inferiorityis perhapsnot one analytic philosopherswould regardas standard.As she uses the term, it clearlydoes not entail that such inferiorityis unalterable. I believe that, for Dworkin, the term "metaphysical" properlyrefersto or modifies whatever social constructionswe tag and perceive as non-social non-constructions-and which constructionsare thereforenot amenableto conceptual change by way of individualfiat. I think Dworkin'sapplicationof this term is illuminating,corresponding, as it does to the social perceptionof the sort of inferiority(our 'natural'fuckability)said to afflict women. 6. Dworkin'sanalysisof intercoursehas been called crazyby those who have the political power to make that label stick. See the New YorkTimesBookReview,May 3, 1987.

Women's Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice, and Mind. By MARY FIELDBELENKY,BLYTHEMcVICKERCLINCHY, NANCY RULE GOLDBERGER,and JILLMATTUCK TARULE. New York:Basic Books, 1986. MonicaHolland The authors of Women'sWays of Knowinghave written a multi-faceted book which includesa rich theory about the positions in which women, as a group, tend to be as knowers. Their theory is based on interviews with women from a variety of backgroundsand with differentamountsof formal schooling. Their researchwas motivated in part by William Perry (1970), who developed a theory of intellectual and moral development by charting the progressof a nearly all-male groupof Harvardundergraduates.The authors provide both complementationand counterpointto Perry'stheory by focusing on women, and by extending the scope of their study beyond Harvard'sgates. Also motivating their researchwas their desireto articulatethe reasonswhy women so often doubttheir intellectualabilitiesand feel isolated in and alienated by formallearningsituations. The authorsexplore the followingpositionsof women as knowers:(1) the pathological case in which the woman is incapableof communicatingwith others becauseshe is incapableof carryingon the internaldialoguenecessary

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for the most rudimentaryknowledge;(2) the position of the woman who receives all her knowledgefromauthoritative,and often authoritarian,others; (3) the position characterizedby the woman who rebelliously rejects all knowledgethat does not arisefromor conformto her "gutfeelings;"(4) the position typical of the woman student who squelches the voice of personal experience in order to practice the objective, detached sort of thinking she perceives her professorsto be demanding of her; and (5) the position in which the woman integratesthe knowledgearisingfromher personalexperiences with the evaluativeknowledgeusedby women in the previousposition. The authorsdescribethe environmentswhich producethese epistemic situations. Women in the firstposition growup in non-communicatingand often violent familieswhere the dialoguenecessaryfor the child'sdevelopment as a knower is missing. (The discussionof what is lacking in the childhood environmentof the women in the firstposition is interestinglyreminiscentof G. H. Mead'stheoryof the vocal gesture.)Women in the second position are usuallyraisedin authoritarianfamilies in which communicationis one-way. Women in the thirdposition are typicallythe productof the same sort of environment as the women in the second position. These rebelliouswomen, however, have rejectedthe voice of externalauthorityand accept as authoritative only the internalvoice. Women in the fourthand fifth positionsgenerally come fromfamilysituationsin which communicationis two-way, and in which reasoningand decision-makingare cultivated. We also find in Women'sWaysof Knowingdescriptionsand explanationsof the everydayevents that act as catharsesin the lives of women, especiallyin our lives as knowers. Certain events tend to propel women into healthier, more integratedepistemic situations. For example, women in the first position who seek health care for their newbors often have their firstexperience with constructive communication, and as a result come to think of themselves for the first time as capable of receiving and acting upon knowledge. Since the authorsstressthat women often move throughdifferentstages as knowersover the periodof a lifetime, it is clearthat the environmentsthe authors describeas giving rise to what might be called 'basepositions'or 'starting points'do not determinethe possibilitiesfor women as knowers.Forevents external to the original home situation can act as catharsesin the lives of women. Not having access to the corpusof the interview data, I cannot evaluate the theory inasmuchas it is constructedfrom that data. I can say, however, that there is a good bit in Women'sWaysof Knowingthat ringstrue. The appeal of the book is in largepartdue to the authors'often persuasiveuse of interview excerptsto illustratethe theory. They use the interviewsnot only to support their contentions but to bring the theory to life for the readerby building bridgesacross the often accessablerealities of the women to their theory about those realities.

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Women'sWaysof Knowingought to providegristfor the mills of psychologists, feminists, people of all disciplinesinterestedin the practicalaspectsof teaching, and philosophers-especially epistemologists. The discussion of epistemic justificationrisks deterioratinginto an empty exercise if it is not groundedin the broaderdiscussionof the natureof knowledgeand the nature of knowers.The discussionmust deal with all ways of knowing, not just the ones that provideinterestingpuzzles,and it mustbe attentive to the workbeing done on knowledgein other disciplinesso as to avoid evolving into a position of isolation. I might add that the book develops, in all sortsof interesting ways, a shift in metaphorfrom the knower as seer to the knower as listener. This aspectof the book warrantsthe seriousattention of philosophers. I have only two furthercomments. First, I thought some of the interview quotationswere open to interpretationsat variancewith those of the authors. In these cases the quotes were often gratuitous,and cutting them would not have weakenedthe point. Second, this book by rightsought to go a long way towardsopening up the largercommunityof philosophersto feminist issues. Consequently,had I written it, I wouldhave chosen a title that could not expose it to the thoughtlessremarksthat "Women'sWays of Knowing"seems bound to expose it. Somethinglike "Womenas Knowers"woulddescribethe projectjust as well without conjuringup the negative imagesassociatedwith that sexist, mythicalfaculty"women'sintuition." It's unfortunatethat many of the people who will be makingthoughtlesscommentswould probablyfind the book very stimulatingif they could get past the title. REFERENCES

in the college Perry, W. G. 1970. Formsof intellectualand moraldevelopment years.New York:Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

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WOMEN'S STUDIES INTERNATIONAL FORUM WOMEN'SSTUDIES Special issues for Volume 11, 1988 INTERNATIONAL FORUM is a bi-monthlyjournal (suppliedto subscribers designed to aid the of WSIFas partof their distributionand exchange PERGA^IM Sydy T.ky. trno regularsubscriptionand of Women's Studies also availableto research from many non-subscribers): disciplines and from around the world. The is to a of the establish feminist policy journal * Feminism in Ireland, edited by forumfor discussion and debate and to AilbheSmythe account for and value culturaland political * 'In a Great Company of Women': differences. The journalseeks to critiqueand Nonviolent Direct Action, edited by reconceptualize existing knowledge, and to Berenice A. Carrolland Jane E. Mohraz examine, and re-evaluatethe manner in which knowledge is produced and distributed,and the implicationsthis has for SUBSCRIPTIONINFORMATION women's position, Volume11, 1988 ISSN:0277-5395 Published six issues per annum Subscribers to WSIFalso receive Feminist Annual Rate (1988) US$115.00 Forum, a news and views supplement which appears in each issue with information Two-yearRate (1988/89) US$218.50 on forthcomingand recent conferences, Personal Rate (1988) US$ 40.00 Student Rate (1988) currentresearch, new Women's Studies US$ 20.00 A special rate is availableto NWSAmembers. publicationsand Women's Studies centers. New Yo.*

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Notes on Contributors

JEFFNERALLEN is an associateprofessorof philosophyat State University of New Yorkat Binghamton.She is co-editorof The ThinkingMuse:Feminism and RecentFrenchThought,IndianaUniversity Press,forthcoming1988; ediand Cultures,SUNY Pressforthcoming1989, and tor of LesbianPhilosophies authorof LesbianPhilosophy: Explorations,1986. She has publishednumerous articles in contemporaryEuropeanphilosophyand in feminist philosophy. CLAUDIA CARD is a revolting hag in the philosophydepartmentwith a courtesyhome in women'sstudiesat the Universityof Wisconsin- Madison. She writes and teaches ethics, feminist theory, and lesbian culture. VICTORIA DAVION is a lecturerin the philosophydepartment,University of Wisconsin - Madison, an instructorof Chimera self-defensefor women, and is a volunteer at the MadisonRape Crisis Center. LINDA TIMMEL DUCHAMP, an ABD in European history, lives in Seattle where, as a foundingmemberof CD Artworkers,she recently helped organizethe four day multi-mediaevent High IntensityLaboratory: Exposing the War in El Salvador.She has completed eight books of fiction (including BloodIn The Fruitand The General'sDaughter);currentlyshe is workingon The ThirdAlternative,a book of feminist speculativefiction. JANE DURAN receivedher Ph.D. in philosophyfromRutgersin 1982. She is the authorof numerouspublicationsin epistemologyand philosophyof science. She is currentlyworkingon the naturalization of epistemicjustificationtheory. MARILYNFRIEDMANis assistantprofessorof philosophy and directorof women'sstudiesat BowlingGreen State University. She publishesin the areas of ethics, social philosophy, and feminist theory. She has been awarded an NEH Fellowshipto complete her book-length manuscriptentitled, What Are FriendsFor?Reflectionson Friendship, Justice,and Gender. LISA HELDKEis currently a visiting assistant professorof philosophy at Carleton College. She received her Ph.D. from NorthwesternUniversity; her dissertationis entitled "CoresponsibleInquiry:Objectivity from Dewey to FeministEpistemology."She reallydoes like to cook, and everythingshe says about her mother is true.

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MONICA HOLLAND is doing doctoralwork in philosophyat IndianaUniversity, Bloomington. She is interestedin issuesin epistemology,philosophy of mind and feminist theory, and is workingon a dissertationproposalon a feminist alternative to the traditionalcriteriaof personal identity. She has workedas the editorialassistantof Nous, and is currentlythe editorialassistant of the Journalof Philosophical Logic. EVA FEDERKITTAYis associateprofessorat State Universityof New York at Stony Brook. She has authoredarticles in feminist theory, philosophyof language,and normativeethics. She wrote Metaphor:Its CognitiveForceand Its LinguisticStructure,with ClarendonPress, Oxford UP, 1987, and edited with Diana T. Meyers, Womanand Moral TheoryRowman & Littlefield, 1987. She is currentlyworkingon the issue of sexual equality. ELEANORH. KUYKENDALLis chair of the departmentof philosophyand coordinatorof the linguisticsprogramat the State University of New York, College at New Paltz. She has publishedarticleson feminist linguistics, on Irigaray,and on Sartre.She is the authorof forthcomingarticleson Beauvoir and Kristevaas well as of articleson genderand subjectivityin Frenchfeminist theory. Her translationof Irigaray's"SorcererLove" is forthcoming in the Frenchfeminist philosophy issue of Hypatia. BRUCEM. LANDSMAN is an associateprofessorof philosophyat the University of Utah. His major interestsare political philosophy, ethics and applied ethics, and he has published several papersin those areas, including in the CanadianJournalof Philosophy,1983. "Egalitarianism" UMA NARAYAN is currentlya graduatestudent in philosophyat Rutgers University, workingon her dissertationin the philosophyof law. Her undergraduatedegree is from the Universityof Bombay,where she lived until four yearsago. Narayan'sareasof interest include ethics, social and political philosophy and feminist issues. As a teaching assistant,she teaches undergraduate courses in philosophy and, recently in women'sstudies. LAURA M. PURDY received her Ph.D. from StanfordUniversity. She is currently associate professor of philosophy at Wells College, where she teaches a wide rangeof courses.Her researchis mainly in appliedethics and feminism, and she is currentlycompletinga book on equal rightsfor children tentatively entitled LiberatedChildren,LostChildren? JANICE RAYMOND is professorof women's studies and medical ethics at the University of Massachusettsin Amherst. She is the authorof The TranssexualEmpire:theMakingof theShe-Maleand A Passionfor Friends:A Philoso-

Notes on Contributors

183

phyof FemaleAffection.At presentshe is workingon a book on surrogacyand the new reproductivetechnologies. KATHRYN RUSSELLis an associateprofessorof philosophyat State University of New Yorkat Cortland. She is coordinatorof the women's studies committee there and active on the minorityand women'sstudies. GAIL STENSTAD teaches philosophyat VanderbiltUniversity. She is also developing the curriculumfor a new programin women'sstudiesto be offered by the InternationalInstitute for Advanced Studies. JOYCETREBILCOTis a long-time memberof the MidwesternDivision of the Society for Women in Philosophyand coordinatorof a women's studies program.A book of her writings, In Process:RadicalLesbianEssays,will appear in 1989. MELINDAVADAS is a feministphilosopherliving in Oak Ridge, N.C. She is currentlywritinga book on pornography,sexuality, and justice. Her most recent article, "A First Look At The Pornography/CivilRights Ordinance: Could PornographyBe The SubordinationOf Women?" appearedin the September, 1987 issue of TheJournalof Philosophy.

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THE JOU&NALOF 'THE BIiTITISH SOCIETY FORJPHEINOMENOLOgY An International Review of Philosophy and the Human Sciences EDITOR: WOLFE MAYS

Volume 19, No. 3, October 1988 CONTINUING HUSSERL'S THOUGHT Articles Husserl and the Philosophy of Science, by Elisabeth Stroker Phenomenology of Logic and the Problem of Modalizing, by Thomas M. Seebohm How to Study Consciousness Phenomenologically or Quite a Lot Comes to Mind: by Eduard Marbach Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy: The Concept of Rationality, by J. M. Mohanty The Structure of Consciousness According to Xuanzang, by Iso Kern Husserl as a Tutor in Philosophy, by Robert Sokolowski Reviews and Notes The JBSP publishes papers on phenomenology and existential philosophy as well as contributions from other fields of philosophy. Papers from workers in the Humanities and human sciences interested in the philosophy of their subject will be welcome. All papers and books for review to be sent to the Editor: Dr. Wolfe Mays, Department of Philosophy, University of Manchester, Manchester M 13 9PL, England. Subscription and advertisement enquiries to be sent to the publishers: Haigh and Hochland Ltd., The Precinct Centre, Oxford Road, Manchester 13. England.

Announcements Newsletteris Newsletter.The FeminismandPhilosophy Feminismand Philosophy sponsoredby the APA Committee on informationaboutthe statusof women in philosophy and to make more widely available the resourcesof feminist philosophy. The Newsletterwill contain discussionsof recent developments in feminist philosophy and related work in other disciplines. It will include liter-ature overviews and book reviews, suggestionsfor eliminating gender bias in the traditional philosophy curriculum,and reflections on feminist pedagogy. It will also keep the professioninformedabout the work of the Committee on the Status of Women in Philosophy.The Newsletterwill provide a forumfor queriesand informaldiscussionsof topics relevantto feminist philosophy and also to the status of women in the profession.The editor Guidelines:All submissions invites contributionsto the Newsletter.Submission must be limited to ten manuscriptpagesand mustfollow the APA guidelines for genderneutrallanguage(APA Proceeding).Essaysshouldbe submittedin duplicate with the author'sname on the title page only for the anonymous reviewing process. Manuscriptsmust be typed double-spacedand references must follow ChicagoManual style. Please send articles, comments, suggestions, and all other communicationsand inquiriesto: Nancy Tuana, Arts and Humanities, JO 3.1, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX 75083-0688. Call for papersfor theMay, 1989 issue:The May, 1989 issue of the Feminism and PhilosophyNewsletteredited by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone and Nancy Tuana will focus on Feminism,Sexuality,and the Body. The issue will be devoted to investigationsof the relationshipof feminismto the clinical body, feminism to the visual body, feminismto the social body (the body as social subject/socialobject), feminismto the felt body, feminismto the reproductive body, and so on. The focus will be on the concrete flesh and bone body, but in differentguises, settings, and/orwith specific emphases.Forthis issue the Newsletteris seeking: (1) Essays(no more than 10 pages); (2) Book reviews of relatedworks;(3) Relevant bibliographiesof philosophicalinterest; (4) Curriculardiscussionsand suggestionsregardingthe use of materialson feminism, sexuality, and the body in philosophycourses. All submissionsmust be limited to ten manuscriptpages. Essaysshould be submitted in duplicate with the author'sname on the title page only. The deadline for submissions is January 1, 1989. Send manuscriptsto Nancy Tuana, Arts and Humanities,JO 3.1, Universityof Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX 75083-0688.

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Nemesisis seeking written work and photographsfrom Separatists,Lesbians, and RadicalFeministswhich tell our tales of heteropatriarchaldisruptionand womyn-positive reality building. For more information send a SASE to Nemesis, c/o Amber L. Katherine, P.O. Box 417042, Chicago, IL 606417042. Deadline for submissions:Dec. 1, 1988. Callfor Papers:A Special Issueof Psychologyof WomenQuarterly:Theoryand Methodin FeministPsychology.Readersare invited to submit original manuscriptsfor a special issue of Psychologyof WomenQuarterlyon the subjectof theory and method in feministpsychology.Topics of interestinclude, but are not limited to, the following: * links between feminist theorizingin such disciplines as philosophy, political science, and literarystudies and theorizingin feminist psychology; * the postmodernistchallenge to empiricalpsychologyand its relevance to the study of women and gender; * explication of the meta-theoreticalassumptionsthat underlie the productionof knowledge in the psychologyof women; * the inter-relationof scholarshipand action, including examination of the ways that the sociopolitical milieu has shaped the feminist researchagenda, as well as critical analysesof the extent to which our scholarshiphas succeededor failed as a guide for feminist activism. Papers based on either conceptual analyses or empirical analyses are welcome. Innovative approaches to scholarship are especially encouraged. Articles should conform to APA guidelinesfor style and length. The deadline for submission is January15, 1989. Send all submissionsto the issue editor: Dr. Jeanne Marecek, Departmentof Psychology, SwarthmoreCollege, Swarthmore,PA 19081. Sage:A ScholarlyJournalon BlackWomen.The editorsof Sageare collecting manuscriptsfor a special issue on BlackWomen'sStudies(SubmissionDeadline: January15, 1989). For the BlackWomen'sStudiesIssue (which is supported in part by the FordFoundation), the editors encourage: * essayswhich describeteaching strategies,theory, and methodology in Black Women's Studies * articles which describeBlack Women's Studies curriculain various settings, e.g., in the university,outside the academy, in high schools, and the Caribbean * personalnarratives,interviews, and retrospectiveanalysesfrom scholars, programdirectors,and students * representativesample syllabifrom teachersfrom any given time period

Announcements

187

The editors welcome manuscriptswhich focus on the lives and cultures of Black Women whereverthey reside. For submissionguidelines, contact the editor. Sage: A ScholarlyJournalon Black Women, P.O. Box 42721, GA 30311-0741. A student issueof Sage:A Scholarly Journalon BlackWomenwhich includes work from young scholarsaroundthe countrywill be publishedthis spring. This issue is supported in part by the Fund for Improvement of PostSecondaryEducationof the U.S. Departmentof Education. Journalon Single issuesare $5. Individualsubscriptionsto Sage:A Scholarly BlackWomenare $15/year;institutionalsubscriptionsare $25/year. Formore information contact Dr. Beverly Guy-Sheftall, Co-Editor, Box 42741, Atlanta, GA 30311-0741 (404-681-3643 ext. 362). in FeministEthics:TheoryandPractice":to be held Conferenceon "Explorations October 7-8, 1988, at University of Minnesota, Duluth. Keynote speakers are Charlotte Bunch and Sara Ruddick. Recent work in feminist ethics has been rich, exciting, and diverse. This conferencewill addresssuch questions as: What is feminist ethics? Is there a relation between sex/genderand morality?How do traditionalmoraltheories contributeto or contradictfeminist ethics? Do feminist ethics endorsea restrictiveview of women'splace?What resultsfromfeminist ethics can we expect in the social, political, economic, and academicarenas?Scholarsin all disciplines,and feministpractitionersin all areas, are encouraged to submit papers. Contact Eve Browning Cole, Dept. of Philosophy & Humanities, University of Minnesota-Duluth, Duluth, MN 55803 or SusanCoultrap-McQuin,Head, Instituteof Women's Studies, University of Minnesota-Duluth, MN 55803. 11th Annual Conferenceof the CanadianSocietyfor Womenin Philosophy(CSWIP). Women in Particular:Feminist Social and Political Philosophy. September 16-18, 1988, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta. For furtherinformation,call LyndaLange (403) 432-2055, 432-4999, or Debra Shogan (403) 432-2018. Societyfor Womenin Philosophy.For informationon membershipin regional divisions which include programannouncementsand a subscriptionto the national SWIP Newsletter, as well as a subscriptionto Hypatia, contact: PacificSWIP:ExecutiveSecretaryRiataManning, UC San Jose State, San Jose, CA 95192. TreasurerRuth Doell, San Francisco State University, Dept. of BiologicalScience, 1600 HallowayAve., San Francisco,CA 94132. MidwestSWIP: Executive SecretaryJean Rumsey, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Steven's Point, Steven's Point, WI 54481. TreasurerCarol Van Kirk, 1401 N. 58th St. Omaha, NE 68106. EasternSWIP: Executive Secretary Libby Potter, Dept. of Philosophy,

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Haverford College, Haverford, PA 19041. Co-Executive Secretary Joan Ringelheim, Apt. la, 150 W. 74th St., New York, NY 10023. Treasurer JanaSawicki, Dept. of Philosophy,Univ. of Maine, Orono, ME 04469. The Directoryof Women in Philosophyis availablefromthe Executive Secretary in each division. Cost is $2.00. Matrices:A Lesbian-Feminist ResearchNewsletter.A Networking Newsletter for Lesbian Researchers. Includes networking notes and queries, lists of books, articles, and periodicalsof interestto Lesbianresearch,book reviews, calls for papers,conferences, bibliographies,etc. Subscriptions:U.S. $5.00, Foreign$7.00, Libraries$9.00. Mail to: JacquelynN. Zita, ManagingEditor, Women's Studies, Ford Hall 492. University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455. The Social Philosophy and Policy Center will hold a conference on The Foundations of MoralandPoliticalPhilosophy, September22-24, 1988, at Bowling Green State University. ParticipantsincludeJean Hampton (Philosophy, Pittsburgh);JudithJarvisThomson (Philosophy,MIT); Terence Irwin(Philosophy, Cornell); Russell Hardin (Philosophy and Political Science, Chicago); Holly Smith (Philosophy,Arizona);EricMack (Philosophy,Tulane); Peter Railton (Philosophy, Michigan); Allan Gibbard(Philosophy, Michigan); and Stephen Darwall(Philosophy,Michigan). Forfurtherinformation, contact KoryTilgner, Social Philosophyand Policy Center, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403, (419) 372-2536. Callfor Papers.The next conferSocietyfor the Studyof WomenPhilosophers. ence of the Society for the Studyof Women Philosopherswill be held in conjunction with the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, EasternDivision, in Decemberof 1988. We are interested in receiving the following: * paperson any aspect of the thought of a woman philosopher(where "philosopher"is traditionallydefined) * paperson other women thinkers (e.g., poets, novelists, diarists, mystics) * paperswhich reflect on the nature of philosophyspecificallyin light of women's contributionto the history of thought Papersshouldbe no longerthan 15 pages,doublespaced.Since they will read under blind review, please attach two cover sheets. On the first, put your title, name, addressand social securitynumber.On the second, put yourtitle and social security number only. Send seven copies of the paper to: Veda Cobb-Stevens, Philosophy Department, University of Lowell, Lowell, MA 01854. Deadline: Sept. 1, 1988.

Announcements

189

A majornew additionto the RayaDunayevskayaCollection at the Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, is now available on microfilm. Entitled "Supplementto the Raya DunayevskayaCollection," this one-reel additioncontains "RayaDunayevskaya'sLastWriting, 1986-87: Towardthe Dialectics of Organizationand Philosophy."Dunayevskaya,the founderof the philosophyof Marxist-Humanism,died in Chicago on June 9, 1987. Dunayevskaya'snotes for the unfinishedbook she had tentativelytitled "Dialecticsof Organizationand Philosophy:'the party'and formsof organization born out of spontaneity"are included in this addition, along with her journalismon world events. Of special significanceis Dunayevskaya'sextensive correspondencewith "non-MarxistsHegel scholars"George Armstrong Kelly, LouisDupre, and A. V. Miller. Copies of this one-reel additionto the Raya DunayevskayaCollection may be obtained from Wayne State University Archives of Laborand Urban Affairsfor $20. The full, 12,000-pagecollection is availableon six microfilmreels for $120. For furtherinformation and orderforms,pleasecontact Philip P. Mason, Director,Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, 48202. SinisterWisdom.Call for Submissions Lesbians. for Issue 38: Italian-American Guest editor: Rose Romano. Deadline: February15, 1989. Please markenvelope - ATT: Rose Romano. Alt work should be submittedin duplicate. SASE mustbe enclosed. Issue37: open (no theme-deadline:Oct. 15, 1988). Issue 39: on disability (deadline: June 15, 1989). Current editor: Elana Dykewomon, P.O. Box 3252, Berkeley,CA 94703. Publishedthree or foura year. Subscription$17/year, $6 for sample (current) issue. Call for Papers. A special topics issue of Gender & Societywill focus on physical and psychological violence against women and children. We are particularlyinterestedin papersshowingthe systemicinterrelationshipof the variousformsof violence, the impactof institutionalviolence, and the threat of violence as a means of social control over women and children. We welcome interdisciplinarysubmissions and are especially looking for articles dealing with women and children of color or from working-class backgrounds.The submissionsshould have some relationshipto the real world in which real women and real children live. Pieces analyzingor critiquingsocial policies and programsdesigned to ameliorateviolence against women and childrenwouldbe appropriatesubmissions.Reportsof researchgroundedin a structuralanalysisof violence againstwomen and children are welcome, but this issue will not be limited to articles written in standardacademic style. Experientialdata, poetry, drawingsand photographs,used as illustrativematerial in analytic pieces or as separatesubmissionsare also welcome, but we cannot accept fiction. Guest editors for this issue of Gender& Societyare Pauline B. Bart, Departmentof Psychiatry,University of Illinois, Chicago;

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PatriciaY. Miller, Departmentof Sociology and Anthropology, Smith College; Eileen Moran, Executive Director, WestchesterNY Children'sAssociation, and ElizabethStanko, Departmentof Sociology, ClarkUniversity and London. Deadline for submissions:April 1, 1989. Expecteddate of publication: Decmember 1990. All submissionsshould be sent to: Judith Lorber, Editor, Gender& Society,Dept. of Sociology, CUNY GraduateCenter, 33 West 42 Street, New York, NY 10036. Please send five copies and a $10 submissionfee and follow Gender& Societyguidelinesfor submission.

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March, 1988

Vol. 11/1

"WhoAre WetoJudge" BringingStudentsOutof the Cave TeachingWomenPhilosophy Whatis PersonalEthics,and ShouldWebe TeachingMoreof It? James Garson HeuristicsforProofFindingin FormalLogic KevinO'Neill in Introductory UndergraduateApprentices Philosophy SophisticalSam'sSad Condition,A Fable PhillipCummins Reviews New Publications 1988Subscriptions(4 issues):$18.50 individuals;$42 others.Add $4 for postage outsidethe USA.Send ordersto the PhilosophyDocumentation Center,BowlingGreenStateUniversity, BowlingGreen,OH43403-0189. Edited by Arnold Wilson, Universityof Cincinnati,Cincinnati,OH 45221-0206.

SubmissionGuidelines Hypatiasolicits paperson all topics in feministphilosophy.We regularlypublish generalissuesas well as special issueson a single topic, or comprisingthe proceedingsof a conference in feminist philosophy. All papersshould conform to Hypatiastyle using the Author/Date systemof citing references(see the ChicagoManualof Style). Papersshould be submittedin duplicate with the author'sname on the title pageonly for the anonymousreviewingprocess. The Forum,edited by MariaLugones,publishesshortpapers(2-3 pages) on a designated topic, in order to further dialogue within feminist philosophy. Suggestions for topics and papers on past topics should be sent to: Maria Lugones,PhilosophyDepartment,CarletonCollege, Northfield, MN 55057. The BookReviewsection will publishreviewsof publicationsin feminist philosophy. To proposepublicationfor review, or to contributebook reviews, query the Book Review Editor:Jeffner Allen, Department of Philosophy, SUNY Binghamton, Binghamton,NY 13901. SPECIALISSUES

Feminismand PhilosophicalAesthetics.Feminist philosophical perspectives have been developedin most of the recognizedareasof philosophyof science. Aesthetics and philosophy of art have lagged behind this development, in spite of the rich work being done in relatedfields such as literatureand art, literarytheory and art criticism. The special issue of Hypatiawill begin to remedythat situation. Submissionsare invited on all topics of philosophical aesthetics. The following are suggestionsthat might be developed. 1. Developmentswithin feminist philosophyor feminist art and their extension into feminist aesthetic theory. 2. The compatibilityor incompatibilityof feminist art and feminist theory with familiartreatmentsof the concept of art and of traditionalaesthetic concepts such as aesthetic perception, creation, and evaluation. 3. Challenges posed by feminism to the stance of gender neutrality or "universality"in aesthetic theory. 4. Feministperspectiveson the workof majorcontemporaryphilosophers of art presentlyexerting influence on the field of aesthetics. 5. Feminist politics and the role of art in society. Papersshouldbe submittedin duplicateto either of the guest editors:Hilde Hein, Departmentof Philosophy,College of the Holy Cross,Worcester,Massachusetts,01610, (617) 793-2468;CarolynKorsmeyer,Departmentof Philosophy, BaldyHall, SUNY at Buffalo,Buffalo,NY 14260, (716) 636-2444. (Please put your name and addresson a detachabletitle page only. If you wish returnof manuscripts,include a self-addressed,stampedenvelope with your submission,) Deadline: Dec. 1, 1988.

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Volume 1, Number 1, Spring 1986 Antigone's Dilemma: A Problem in Political Membership, by ValerieA Hartouni, Women Philosophers in the Ancient Greek World; Donning the Mantle, by KathleenWider, How Many Feminists Does It Take to Make a Joke?: Sexist Humor and What's Wrong with It, by Merrie Bergmann, The Politics of Self-Respect: A Feminist Perspective, by Diana T. Meyers, PreparingThe Way for a Feminist Praxis, by Andrea Nye, Romantic Love, Altruism, and Self-Respect, by KathrynPauly Morgan, Oppression and Resistance; Fry'sPolitics and Reality, by Claudia Card, Comment/Reply, by Laura M. Purdy and Nancy Tuana Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 1986 Motherhood and Sexuality, edited by Ann Ferguson, Motherhood and Sexuality: Some Feminist Questions, by Ann Ferguson,Foucault and Feminism: Towards a Politics of Difference, by Jana Sawicki, Female Friendship:Contra Chodorow and Dinnerstein, by Janice Raymond, Woman: Revealed or Reveiled?, by Cynthia A. Freeland,The Feminist Sexuality Debate: Ethics and Politics, by Cheryl H. Cohen, Feminism and Motherhood: O'Brien vs. Beauvoir, by Reyes Lazaro, Possessive Power, by Janet Farrell-Smith,The Future of Mothering: Reproductive Technology and Feminist Theory, by Ann Donchin, Should a Feminist Choose a Marriage-LikeRelationship?, by MarjorieWeinzweig Volume 2, Number 1, Winter 1987 Connections and Guilt, by SharonBishop,Wrong Rights, by ElizabethWolgast, Through a Glass Darkly: Paradigmsof Equality and the Search for a Woman's Jurisprudence,by Linda J. Krieger, Is Equality Enough?, by Gale S. Baker, The Logic of Special Rights, by Paul Green, Pregnancy LEave, Comparable Worth, and Concepts of Equality, by Marjorie Weinzweig, Women, Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation, by Nancy Fraser, The Feminist Standpoint: A Matter of Language, by Terry Winant, Bodies and Souls/Sex, Sin and the Senses in Patriarchy:A Study in Applied Dualism, by SheilaRuth, Improper Behavior: Imperative for Civilization, by ElizabethJaneway, The New Men's Studies: From Feminist Theory to Gender Scholarship, by Harry Brod Volume 2, Number 2, Summer, 1987 Playfulness, "World"-Travelling, and Loving Perception, by Maria Lugones, Sex-Role Stereotypes in Medicine, by Mary B. Mahowald, Pornography and Degradation, by Judith M. Hill, Do Good Feminists Compete?, by VictoriaDavion, A (Qualified) Defense of Liberalism, by Susan Wendell, The Unit of Language, by AndreaNye, The Look in Sartre and Rich, by Julien S. Murphy, How Bad is Rape?, by H. E. Baber, On Conflicts and Differences Among Women, by Luisa Muraro, The Politics of Women's Studies and Men's Studies, by Mary Libertin,Does Manning Men's Studies Emasculate Women's Studies?, by Harry Brod, Celibacy and Its Implications for Autonomy, by Candace Watson Volume 2, Number 3, Fall, 1987 Feminist Scholarship in the Sciences: Where Are We Now and When Can We Expect a Theoretical Breakthrough?, by Sue V. Rosser, The Method Question, by SandraHarding,

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The Gender/ScienceSystem:or is Sex to Genderas Natureis to Science?,by EvelynFox Keller,Can ThereBe a FeministScience?,by HelenE. Longino,Le sujetde la scienceest-il sexue?/Isthe Subjectof Science Sexed?by LuceIrigaray,translatedby CarolMastrangelo Bove,UncoveringGynocentricScience, by RuthGinzberg, JustifyingFeministSocial SciTraence, by LindaAlcoff,John Deweyand EvelynFox Keller:A SharedEpistemological dition, by LisaHeldke Volume3, Number1, Spring, 1988 Introduction,by Nancy Tuana,Science, Facts,and Feminism,by RuthHubbard,ModelPotter,The WeakerSeed:The Sexist Bias ing the GenderPoliticsin Science, by Elizabeth of ReproductiveTheory,by NancyTuana,The Importanceof FeministCritiquefor ContemporaryCell Biology,by The BiologyandGenderStudyGroup,The Premenstrual SynN. Zita,Womenand the Mismeasure of drome:Dis-easingthe FemaleCycle, byJacquelyn Thought,by JudithGenova,Dreamingthe Future,by HilaryRose,FeministPerspectives on Science, by BarbaraImberandNancyTuana,ReviewEssay/ACriticalAnalysisof SanN. Zita draHarding'sThe ScienceQuestionin Feminism,by Jacquelyn Back issueseach: $10/indiv. and $20/insti. JournalsManager,IndianaUniversityPress, 10th and MortonStreets, Bloomington,IN 47405.

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