No title

JOURNAL OF SEMANTICS AN INTERNATIONAL JouRNAL FOR THE INTERDISCIPLINARY Sruov OF SE MANTICS OF NATIJRAL THE LANGUAGE...

Author: Oxford University Press

8 downloads 327 Views 27MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

JOURNAL OF SEMANTICS

AN INTERNATIONAL JouRNAL FOR THE INTERDISCIPLINARY Sruov OF SE MANTICS OF NATIJRAL

THE

LANGUAGE

MANAGING EDITOR. PI!TER BoscH (IBM Saennfic Ccnrre, Hetdelbcrg and Umvermy of Osrubriick) ASSOCIATE EDITORS MANFIIED K Rmu. (Umvermy ofTeX2� Ausnn) R o B VAN DER SANDT (Umvernry ofN':)mcgen) REVIEW EDITOR TtBOR Ktss (IBM Saennfic Centre, Hetdclbcrg) ASSISTANT EDITOR BIANL\ BUSCH BECK-W o tP (IBM Setennfic Ccnrre, Hctdclbcrg) EDITORIAL B OARD. N AsHER (Umvemry ofTexas, Ausnn) R. BARTSCH (Uruverstry ofAmsrcrdam) M. BtERWI!CH (MPG and Humboldt Umvemry Be rim) B BocURAEV (Apple Computer Inc) M. BoRJuo (Uruvemry ofToulouse) K BROWN (Umvemry of�x) G CHtERCHtA (Uruvemry ofMtlan) 0 DAHL (Uruvemry ofSrockholm) S C GARROD (Uruverstry of Glasgow) B. GEURTS (Umverstry of Osrubriick) M HERWEG (IBM Saenofic Ccnrre, Hetdelberg) L R. HORN (Yale Uruvernry) J JACOB! (Uruvemry ofWuppeml) P N JoHNSON-LAtao (Pnnceron Uruverstry) H KAJ..p (Umver51ry ofSrurrg:m) EDITORIAL ADDRESS

S LEVINSON (MPI Ntjmegen) S UIBNER (Uruvernry ofDusseldorf) StR JoHN LYONS (Umverstry ofCambndge) A. MANASTER-!V.MER (Wayne Scare Uruvemry) J McCAWLEY (Umvemry ofClucago) M MoENS (Umvemry ofEdmburgh) F J PELLtmER (Umvemry of Alberta) M PtNKAL (Umvemry ofSaarbriicken) T SANFORD (Uruvemry ofGlasgow) R. ScHA (Uruverstry of Arnsrerdam) A VON STECHOW (Umverstry ofTiibmgen) M STE EDMAN (Umvemry ofPenruylvama) W W AHLSTER (DFKJ, Saarbriicken) B WEBBER (Umverstry ofPennsylvama) H ZEBVAT (Uruvemry of Amncr Buclr wrtd" zuriick�kam. If nght, thiS means that the Accusanve postnon m (6-8) IS not a full DP postnon.

(6-1 0) Ich habe inzw�schen wieder jedes Buch/die meisten Bucher zuriick I am not sure about this. It seems to me that the sentences

bekommen I have meanwhile again every book/most books backgot

can have the restitutive reading.t

7

WIEDER I N P R E D I C A T I V E A N D A T T R I B U T I V E P A R T I C I P I AL P H R A S E S

The point I want to make in this section IS that the readings observed with wieder in participial phrases suggest that attributive partiap1al phrases of unergative verbs may have pass1ve voice, whereas there IS no passive in predicative participial phrases. The voice projection is responsible for the repetitive/restitutive ambiguity.

Downloaded from jos.oxfordjournals.org by guest on January 1, 2011

(6-9) a. Anna das Haus WIEDER verlieB b. 3e(again(PAST(e))A.e[agent(Anna)(e) &

Anum von Srechow I I 3

(7- I ) a. Der Raupenschlepper ist wieder repariert (restitutive/repetitive?) the power carrier is again repaired b. ?Der Raupenschlepper ist wiederum/erneut/noch einmal! the power carrier is again..e/again..e!once more/ ein weiteres Mal repariert (only repetitive) one more nme repaired c. Der Raupenschlepper ist wiederum/erneut/noch einrnaJJ the power carrier is again,.e/again..e!one more/ ein weiteres Mal repanert worden (only repennve) one more time repaired been The data to be analysed are:

(7-2)

a.

Der Raupenschlepper ist wieder heil the power carrier is again intact b. ??Der Raupenschlepper ist wiederum/erneut/noch einmaV The power carrier is again..e!again..e!once more ein weiteres Mal heil time intact one more

Perhaps we can explain this distribution if we require that the repetitive adverbs mentioned require the presence of a voice phrase}6 Let us therefore tentatively risk the following generalization: (7-3) wiederum, erneut, noch einmal, ein weiteres Mal, . . . arrach to VoiceP and possibly to higher projections). The examples suggest, then, that 'statal passives' do not contain a voice phrase and are therefore not passives, a claim defended for independent reasons in Kratzer {1 994). The examples in (7-1 b) are not totally unacceptable, but there is a clear conrrast between them and the (7- 1c)-examples, which are instances of the verbal passive ('Vorgangspassiv'). My guess is that we reinterpret the (7- 1 b) sentence as verbal passives if we accept them. The situation is different with attributive participial phrases; here the repetitive adverbs can be inserted without any problem: (7-4)

a.

der wieder reparierte Raupenschlepper (repetitive/restitutive) the again repaired power carrier


The predicate in these sentences 1s what German grammanans call a Zustands passiv 'statal passive'. A term more familiar in Generative Grammar 1S adjectival passive. Here wieder seems to have only the restitutive reading. An anonymous referee has pointed out to me that certain German adverbs have only the repetitive reading: erneut, noch einmal, and ein weiteres Mal, among others. These adverbs combine poorly Wlth the statal passive. The contrast 1s observed even more sharply 1f we mod1fy an underived adjective:

1 14

The Different Readtngs of Witdn- 'Agam'

b. der emeut/ein weiteres Mal!noch einmal!dreim.al repariene Rupenschlepper I tentanvely conclude that attributive participial phrases may have a voice projection. This conclusion is not in agreement with Kratzer ( 1 994), who claims that attributive pamcipial phrases (her verbal participial phrases) are purely verbal. I say something about her motivation at the end of this section. Let me present the analysis first. Concerrung predicative pamcipial phrases, we follow Kratzer ( I 99+ 39) with slight changes which are due to our decompositional approach. The LF of the predicative partictptal phrase in (7- r a) is this:

In other words, the head of the phrase is the adjective morpheme PERF, the perfecnvuer, which min- and max-selects V and VP, respectively. Kratzer's semantics for PERF is this:17 (7-6) PERF is a symbol of type ((s, t), (s, t)). fERI1J(P)(s) - I iff3e [P(e) - 1 & s - ftarget(e)] , where P ts any property of events with a target state and s lS a state. PR01 is interpreted as �; hence, this symbol has to be brought to an operator position at LF.18 �� is a function which assigns relic events their target states. The notion of target state is moovated in Kratzer ( 1 994: 32 f£) and in Klein ( I 994). Given these assumpnons, the LF translates mto the following formula: (7-7) � [PERF(BECOME(again(intact(xj)))(s)] Given an appropriate semantics for the 'control copula', which lS the identical mapping,19 we can predicate this of the subject and obtain the wanted restitu tive reading, namely that the power carrier is in the target state of a repatring after having been broken. What happens ifwe attach wieder to VP or to A'? We would obtain formulae expressing 'intermediate readings' (c£ Section 3� i.e. the power carrier has been repaired before but not necessarily by the same people.


(7-5)

Arru m von Stechow

I Is

(7-8) a. �[PERF{again(BECOME{intact(xJXs)) b. �[again{PERF{BECOME{intact(xJXs))

(7-9)

e

V ceP

-------

again

A.e:VolceP

p�Wce

�Voice -�

n l.j

Intact

BECOME

agenl(x)(e)

And here is the semantics of STATE

(7-1 0) STATE is a symbol of type ((s, t), (s, t)). f:STATEIJ{P) - [PERF1(P), ifp is a property of relic events. 1STATEIJ{P) - P otherwise.


Predicate (a) applies to the power carrier if it is in target state of a repairing and if it had been repaired before; (b) applies to the power carrier if it IS in the target state of a repairing and if it had been in the target state of repairing before. Both predicates are equivalent and express repetitions. I find these readings hard to get, but see no obvious way to block them in my account. Let me turn to attributive participle phrases next. I speculate that they may contain a voice phrase. Furthermore, these participles have adjectival inflection. This suggests that the sequence of morphemes IS Verb + Voice + A + INFL. Thus a possible LF for the participal phrase in (7-�) could be (7-9). As we said before, [Spec, A) licenses PRO. We could leave it there, but given that we have a [Spec, I) position, we use the latter as the operator posmon. Similarly, we have to say that the morpheme STATE-the semanncs will be given in a moment selects Voice. And Voice has to license proacc. See also Rapp (1995), where a rather similar analysis is proposed.

1 1 6 The

Different Readings of Wmla 'Ag:un'

This somewhat ugly disjunctive definition takes account of the fact that �ERF1] is not defined for properties of non-relic events. We will cite an example of Kratzer's in a moment. First, let us consider the translation of the LF mto a formula. After some !-conversions we obtain: (7- I I) �3s(STATE(again(t..e [BECOME(intact(xJ)(e) & age nt(proXe)] ))(s))

(7- 1 2) a. E in von zwei Rappen gezogen-er Wagen (Kratzer I 994: (6)) a by two black horses drawn-agr cart b. *Der Wagen ist von zwe1 Rappen gezogen (Kratzer I 994: (ro)) the cart is by two black horses drawn (7- I 3) a. Die heute morgen gemalt-en Stilleben (Kratzer (1994: (7)) the today morning painted-agr still lives b. *Das Stilleben war heute morgen gemalt (Kratzer 1 994: ( 1 1 )) the still life was today morning painted She says (Kratzer ( 1 994: 49) that the ungrammaticality of the (b)-examples show that reduced relatives, i.e. attributive parocipial phrases, have verbal and not adjectival participles. She also mentions an observation by W1lmanns and Paul 'that the aspect of reduced relatives formed from verbal particrples matches the Aktionsart of the verb from which the participle is formed. She concludes: 'This shows that the verbal parnciple affix is not an aspectual operator (or it would have to be a triVial one). In particular, it is not a perfectivizer.' I was not able to appreciate these remarks fully because the manuscript I have doesn't contain a detailed analysis of reduced relatives. I have no problems with process verbs. Kratzer's analysis of the verb ziehen 'to pull' would be (c£ Kratzer (1994: 39): (7-1 4) zieh-*

hle(pull(x)(e)) 'e is a pulling of x'

(The asterisk indicates the translation into the logical language.) Neglecting the adverbial von zwei Rappen , the parncipial phrase in (7- I 2a) is perhaps translated as something like: (7. 1 3) We[pull(xXe)) We can intersect this with cart and obtain (7-I 4) We[pull(x)(e) & cart(x)]


The formula expresses the property true of an individual a iff there is a state which is the target state of someone's (- pro's) action of repairing a, where a has performed such an action before. Clearly, this is the intended result. Kratzer ( I 994) argues against an analysis which regards attributive participial phrases as passivized. Here are some relevant examples (Kratzer I 994= 48):

Armm von

Stechow

I I7

This is the property rrue of individuals which are carts and are in the process of being pulled. Let us look at the result verbs next. I don't want to consider

Kratzer's example {7-1 3 a) because verbs of creation like

malen

'to paint' raise

further complications. Let us consider a simplified version of our original example instead: (7-I s ) der reparierte Raupenschlepper the repaired power carrier Kratzer would analyse ( 7- 1 6) repaner-•

reparieren 'to repair' as something like this:

Applying the same method as before, we could obtain something like the following translanon for the modified noun: (7- 1 7) We [repaired(x)(�t(e))

& power carrier(x)]

This is an attractive analysis. The reason for not taking 1t over 1s that I believe that Kratzer's decomposition of telic verbs is not general enough. See appendix 2. My analysis is more complicated. Stated in Kratzer's terms, the complex noun is translated as: (7- 1 8) J..x3s3 e [repaired(x)(s)

carrier(x)J

& s - �t(e) & agent(pro)(e) & power

This result is achieved by the perfectivizingjob of the STATE-operator, which licenses a 'passive' vo1ce head. A remark on the ungrammaticality of the examples (7- 1 2b) and (7- 1 3 b) is in order. Presumably, the von-phrase in (7- 1 2b) has to bind a pro at LF, although the details have to be worked out. In any case, the presence of such adverbials is a classical diagnostic for passivization, and predicanve participles are not passivized, although I am not sure how reliable the diagnostic is. As for (7-1 3 b),

this example contains the frame setter arguably has a position outside the VP.

heute morgtn

'this morning', which

Finally, let me stress that I do not claim that attribunve participial phrases are obligatorily passivized. Unaccusative verbs cannot be embedded under Voice, as we know. Take the following example: (7- 1 9) der wieder abgestiirzte Raupenschlepper the again crashed power carrier


A.xA.e[repaired(xX�t(e))J 'e is an event at whose end x is repaued'

1 1 8 The

Different Readings of Wrrda 'Agam'

Everything is as before, except that the voice phrase is missing; i.e. the repetitive reading of the participial phrase has roughly the following analysis: (7-20) [a.PR01(M, tj' (VP again (VP(XP tj down) BECOME]) STATE) INFL) If we have two possibilities of analysing attributive participle phrases, which one should we choose? Kratzer (199+ 4) points out the criterion of possible coreference between (implicit) subject and object, which might help: (7-2 1 )

Das Kind war gelcimmt (Kratzer 199+ (7a)) The child was combed (stative) b. Das Kind wurde gekammt (Kratzer 1 994= (7-b)) the child got combed (eventive) a.

(7-22) Das sorgfaltig gelcimmte Kind the carefully combed child If the pro-subject of a passive construction were coreferennal With the PRO moved to an operator position, a violation of principle C would arise. This would predict that the comber couldn't be the duld, contrary to the facts. On the other hand, the Case theory outlined in section 4 entails that we should have a voice projection if we have a structural dative in the participial phrase.20 (7-23)

Die ihrn gegebene Macht war gewaltig the lumdat given power was enormous b. Er trocknete die ihm gesalbten Fiiik he dried the hi�t rubbed with ointment feet a.

It seems to me that the dative pronoun cannot be coreferential with the implicit subject of the participial phrase. Thus, clus seems to be the correct prediction. If it were true that the repetitive adverbs mentioned did require a voice projection, one would expect passivization in the attributive participial phrase: (7-24) Das noch einmal sorgfaltig gekammte Kind wurde sehr bewundert the agaiDnp carefully combed child was very admired The presence of a voice projection would predict that the child could not have combed hersel£ This is the prevailing reading, but I am not sure that self combing is totally excluded. All this is very subtle, and more is to be said about it. I will leave the matter at this stage. It seems to me that nothing in this section contradicts the general thesis of this paper that the different readings encountered with wi�der should be analysed in terms of syntactic scope. The


She comments: '7(a) is compatible with the child having combed herself, 7(b) is not.' The non-coreference in (b) follows from the Binding Theory for the analysis of the passive she assumes. It follows that the attributive participial phrase in (7-22) should not be analyzed as passivized:

Arrum von Stechow 1 1 9 problem of this section is not that we do not have enough structural distinc

tions. There might be too many.

8

WIEDER

A N D S L O P P I NE S S

(

Terms become sloppy i fone o f the parameters which determine their reference

is bound by an operator. In this section we will derive Fabricius-Hansen's I 98 3) observation that sentence (8- I a) exhibits a sloppy reading with respect to the

term den Namen ihres Mannes 'the name of her husband', which is not present in

sentence (8- I b):

sloppy)

(because) Anna again the name of her husband takes

b. Anna den Namen ihres Mannes wieder annahm (only strict)

Anna the name of her husband again takes

It is plausible that the availability of the sloppiness has to do with whether 'the

name of her husband' is in the scope of wieder.

Wieder mvolves two different

events, and the husband might have changed in between. The explanation of the data will be that if the term 'Anna's husband' is in the scope of wieder, it will

have sloppy interpretation if its event variable 1s bound by

wieder. If the event

vanable remains free, we will have a strict interpretation. If'Anna's husband' is

not in the scope of wieder, the event variable Will not be bound by the term will have a strict interpretation with respect to

wieder, and

wieder.

Let us comment on the different readings of the sentence first. Sentence

(8- 1 a) may describe a situation in which Anna was first married to Otto and had

taken his family name. Then they got a divorce anq Anna top� her maiden

name again. Mter a while, she again took Otto'� family name, ei�er by

marrying him again or by some other legal act. This is the strict reading for 'the name of her husband'.11 The sloppy reading suggests two marriages to two

separate men, with a divorce in between, and m each case Anna took the family name of her husband.

The explanation of the data is that the term 'the name of her husband' has an

event (or temporal) parameter which can be bound by the A.-operator associated with

again. When this is the case, we have a sloppy reading. Binding requires

that the binder c-command the bound material. This is the case in example

(8- � a) but not in {8- 1 b). Note that

annehmen

'to take on' is a

holder + object result verb and

(8- ra) can therefore have a restitutive reading although position.

that

wieder is in a pre-object

Let us derive the sloppy/strict ambiguity of sentence (8- I a). In order to


(8- 1 ) a. (weil) Anna wieder den Namen ihres Mannes annahm (strict!

1 20

The

Dlfferent Readmgs of W1�a 'Agam'

simphfy the formulae, we represent the term 'the name of x's husband' by the symbol t:(x), whose meaning is defined as follows: (8-2) £:(x): - the name of the person who happens to be x's husband at the time of e. Even if x is kept constant, the value of fe(x) may be different for different e's. Suppose first that the object is in the accusative position embedded under hol der. The formula representing the sloppy reading of clns configuration is the following (after several /,.-conversions):

holder(Anna)(s)])(e))){PAST(e))]

The formula expresses a repetition: Anna married agam and took the name of the new husband. Suppose next that the direct object is in the accusative position above VoiceP. The sloppy reading created by this representation is given by the following formula: (8-4) 3e [again(Ae[l..x [ag.(Anna)(e ) & BEC.(As [poss.(xXs) & hold .(Anna)(s))Xe)](£:(Anna))])(PAST(e ))] - 3e [again(l..e[ag.(Anna)(e) & BEC.(As [poss.(£:(Anna)Xs) & hold. (Anna )(s)])(e)])(PAST(e))]

The difference between the two readings is very subtle. In (8- 3 ) the name of Anna's husband is determined only after the completion of the action, whereas in (8-4) the name of the husband is not affected by the action. The first scenario is very unplausible. Thus, for pragmatic reasons, both readings amount to the same 'sloppy' repetition. Let us turn to the restitutive sloppy readings of(8-Ia) next. In principle, there could be three of them, because again could mod1fy the possess phrase, the possess + holder phrase, or the BECOME phrase. In fact, the poss1bilines are reduced to two because the direct object is in the accusative position, which embeds the possess phrase. After performing several /,.-conversions, we are left with the following two formulae: (8-s)

3e(ag .(Anna)(e) & BEC.[aga in (A.s[poss.(£:(AnnaXs)) & hold.(AnnaXs)])](PAST(e ))) b. 3 e(ag.(Anna )(e) & aga in(BEC. A.s [poss.(£:(Anna))(s) & hold.(Anna)(s)])](PAST(e )))

a.

In (8-sa) Anna did some clung which caused her to have the name of her current husband, and she had the name of a husband of hers before, either the same one or another. If he is the same person, the interpretation coincides wuh the


(8- 3 ) 3 e[ag a in(Ae[agen t (AnnaXe ) & BECOME{M[possess (£:(Anna)Xs) &

Armm

von Stechow 1 2. 1

restitutive strict reading, which we will discuss in a moment If it is another husb;nd, then the reading coincides with the repetitive sloppy reading for pragmatic reasons. {8-sb) is the 'intermediate' reading. I won't comment on it, since it presupposes a rather peculiar scenario. Strict readings are obtained by leaving the event variable of £:(x) free in the scope of again. We can also achieve this effecet by QR-ing the direct· object at LF. Let us choose the former option; i.e. we can leave the event variable simply free in the scope of again. The reader may check for himself that we are left with three strict interpretations for (8-Ia) : {8-6)

3 e [again{Ae ' [ag.(Anna)(e ') & BEC.{As [poss.(({Anna))(s) & hold.(Anna)(s)])(e ')])(PAST(e))] b. 3e(ag.(Anna)(e) & BEC.[again {As [poss.(((Anna))(s) & hold.(AnnaXs)])] (PAST(e))) c. 3e(ag.(Anna)(e) & again [BEC. (As[poss.(((Anna))(s) & hold.(Anna)(s)])](PAST(e)))

a.

(8-7) a. The sloppy configuranon off.,(x) with respect to again: e is bound in the scope of again : again(A.e[. . . £:(x) . . .])(e) b. The strict configuration of £:(x) with respect to again: e is free free in the scope of again: again{A.e' [. . . f.,(x) . . .] )(e' ) Strict readings require the event variable of£:(x) to be free in the scope of again . A typical case is an LF where the term is moved to a Case position lugher than again: (8-8)

A typical strict reading configuration occurring with again fe( x)(l..y [ agai n(A.e [ ... y ... ] )(e)])

i

.j,

Movement to [Spec, AgrO]

If movement to [Spec, AgrO] did always go in tandem with a strict intepreta tion, this would mean that we could not reconstruct this type of movement at LE The matter deserves more scrutiny, however. It is not clear to me that the following example excludes a sloppy interpretation:


The most natural strict reading is represented by {8-6a) . This is the repetition in which Anna twice took the name of the same man. This is the restitutive reading for the same husband. (8-6c) is the 'intermediate' reading. Let us resume the sloppy/strict configurations. For a term to be sloppy, the event variable must be bound by the A.-operator following again:

1 22

The Different Readmgs of Witdtr 'Agam'

(8-9)

Wladimir hat seinen Computer

wieder rumiert

Wladimir has his computer again rumed If a sloppy reading is possible here, we have to reconstruct the direct object in a position at LF where we can bind the event variable of the description.

9

C O U N TE R D I RE C T I O N A L

WIEDER ?

One of the central semantic ideas u nderlying the explanations given in this article 1s to reduce the apparent ambiguity of 'again' to one basic reading,

repttition)

as such

is

repetition .

restitution , and the ( restitution/

The terminology

rrrelevant. What really matters i s whether 'again' has

narrow or wide scope with respect to the relevant 'aspectual' operators, espe

(

cially to BECOME. I take 1t that the spirit behind the methodology of this

e nterprise follows Dowty I 979)

in the essential respects. In this section I want

to defend this 'classical' approach against possible objections arising from a recent proposal by Fabricius-Hausen. Fabricius-Hansen22 points out on several occas10ns that a scope solution for

the ambiguity has to face empirical difficulties to do with verb pairs like to

rise,

which may be called

counterdirectional

tofall!

antonyms.23 Consider the

following pair of sentences: (9- 1) a. das Barometer WIEDER fiel (repetition) the barometer again fell b. das Barometer wieder FIEL (restitution?) Clearly, (9- r a) has a repetitive sense: the barometer fell after having fallen before. But what about the restitutive reading? Such a thing does not seem to exist. On the other hand, we have a very clear intuition about what (9- 1 b) means: the barometer fell after a rising. This reading is called

by Fabricius-Hausen. The terminology

counterdirectional is well motivated because the sentence

does not seem to express the restitution of a state but rather the continuation of motion or transition in 'reversed direction'. In recent

talks,u

Fabricius-Hansen generalizes the concept of counter

directionality by defining a relation CONTRA between properties. Her idea is

that the old notion of restitution is a special case of the new, more general concept. Fabricius-Hausen assumes rwo operators,

RES and PRE, which assign

the target state property and the pre-state property to a temporal property. For lnStance, (9-2) a. PRE(fall(x)) b. RES(fall(x))

- higher(x) - lower(x)


namely the repetinve one: the repetition of a state is called a repetition of a becoming is called a

Arnim von Stechow

123

(Cf Fabricius-Hansen 1994b: Fig. 1a.) The relation CONTRA holds of two properties iff they have reversed pre-state and target state properties: {9-3) CONTRA(T, T') ifiRES(T) - PRE{Tj & RES{T*) - PRE{T) (Fabricius-Hansen 1994b: de£ 12a)

T and T' are properties expressing transitions. It follows that 'fall' and 'rise' stand in the relation CONTRA. The final concepts we need in order to understand Fabricius-Hansen's new theory are the descriptions Prer(e) and R�r{ e), which denote the pre-state and the result state of the transition e, where e has property T:

J,.. assigns to any event 1ts pre-state. !target is Kratzer's target state function. Fabricius-Hansen's (1 994b: de£ I JC) meaning rule for 'counterd1rectional resntunon' 1s the following:

{9- 5) againc{T)(e) 1ff T(e) & 3e* IT*(CONTRA(T, T') & T*(e*) & TIME(ej < TIME(e) & ResMAX(T")(e*) - PreMAX{T)(e)] , where T and T' are properties expressing transitions.

(I am using the mdex 'c' for counterdirectional again in order to avoid confusion with my own defirution.) TIME is a function that assigns every event its running time. (It seems to me that the formulation of this meaning rule is unnecessarily strong. As far as I can see, the last conjunct could be replaced by the simpler condition �Xej, and thus the descriptions in (9-4) would be dispensable for the theory.)23 The 'counterdirectional-restitutive' reading, which is expressed by (9-rb), is now formalized as (9-6):

(9-6) 3e[againc(fall(the barometer)){PAST(e))]

The formula expresses correctly that the falling occurs (immediately) after a nsmg. At this point the question arises as to how the repetitive reading, i.e. sentence

(9-1a) , is represented. I am not quite sure what Fabricius-Hansen's position actually is. In her (199�) she simply assumes a lexical ambiguity. Let us denote this meaning by � · In other words, (9-1 a) is represented as (9-7) : p (9-7) 3e[�p(fall(the barometer)){PRES(e))] The meaning of � is the same as that described in rule (9-20) below. It means that the property in question is instantiated at the evaluation time and had been instantiated at an earlier time. The necessity of introducing a lexical ambiguity is a disadvantage of this proposal S techow (199 5) raises this criticism against Dowty's (1979) attempt to assume a lexical ambiguity for again.


{9-4) a. Prer(e) :- LS. �(e) - s & T(e). b. ResT(e) :- LS. Lr t(e) - s & T(e).

1 2-4

The Dlfferent Readmgs of Wiedrr 'Again'

Another point, which is more troubling, is that there ts no way to explain the

loss of the resntutive-counterdirectional reading if wieder precedes the subject at surface structure. One of the crucial

aims

of the theory defended in this

article is precisely that of offering a structural explanation in terms of scope for this fact.

An attractive feature of Fabricius-Hansen's proposal is that 1t applies to 'relic transitions' as well as, for instance, to the verb pair einschlafen! aufwachen 'to fall asleep/to wake up'. The properties expressed by these verbs stand in the CONTRA-relation. Hence, the meaning rule (9-5 ) applies to them.26 For instance, we can formalize the meaning of (9-8 a) as (9-8b):

because Otto again up woke

b.

3e (againc(wake-up(Otto)){PAST(e)))

The formula correctly expresses that Otto first fell asleep, then Otto slept for a whtle, and finally woke up. A sentence with repetitive

�P' of course. Again. we

wieder is formalized with

would like to have an explanation for the fact

that we have only the repetinve reading if wieder precedes the subject Next, consider a pair of transitive CONTRA-verbs, i.e.

Ojfnen/schliefien

open/to close'. In Fabricius-Hausen ( 1 994b) we find the entry x y

'to

ofiD.en 'x

open y' for 'to open'. Carried over into a Davidsonian approach, tlus means that the verb has to be formalized as

open(y)(x)(e).

Therefore the restitutive

counterdtrectional reading is represented as (9-9b): (9-9) a. Ali Baba Sesam wieder offnete

c

Ali Baba Sesame again opened

b. 3(again (open(SesameXAli)(PAST(e ))))

Let us assume that

PRE(openv(SesameXx)) - closedA(Sesame) - RES(closev(Sesame)(y)) and

PRE(closev(SesameXy)) - openA(Sesame) - RES(openv(SesameXx)) where

x and y are arbitrarily chosen subjects. It follows that the transitional open(SesameXx) and close(Sesame)(y) stand in the CONTRA

properties

relation. Therefore formula (9-9b) says that Ali opened Sesame after Sesame

had been closed by someone else or had closed by itsel£ These truth conditions conform to our intuitions.

Again. it would be nice to be able to explain why the sentence

(9-1 0) weil Ali wieder

Sesam offnete


(9-8) a. weil Otto wieder AUFwachte

Armm von Stechow 1 2 5

has only a repetitive reading. Why does it have exactly the same logical form (9-9b), with the only difference being that we have to choose agaiDnp Instead of againc? I have no idea how Fabricius-Hansen's new theory would answer this question. Let us take up the question of how 'counterdirectional' readings are treated in our approach. Ignoring tense, the main idea for an analysis of (9- I b) is resumed in the following paraphrase:

(9- I I ) e 1s an event at whose end the barometer is again in a lower state.

This is the restitution of a state of the needle. Ignoring tense, the formahzanon is this: Here beg(e) is the beginning of the event e, i.e. its left boundary. In this formula, MORE 1s the (abstract) comparative morpheme. For my purposes, the comparative semantics of Seuren ( I 97 3) will do: (9- I 3) IMOREII(P, Q) iff3d [P(d) & -.Q(d)) , where P and Q are properties of degrees.

Together with Seuren, I assume that properties of degrees are downward entailing in the sense that if a degree has some property, then any lower degree has that property as welL d.:.low.(x) means that the 'lowness' degree of x at state s is d. Increasing lowness means decreasing height, of course. For a construction of degrees of lowness, smallness and so on, see Stechow ( I 984b).27 Thus the formula (9-12) means that at the end of e, the barometer is down to a level which is lower than its level at the beginning of e, and the presupposition is that at some earlier time it has been down to a level lower than its level at the beginning of e at some earlier time. At this point, it becomes obvious that the terminology resitutitive versus rtpetitive is not always appropriate. (9- 1 2) does not express the restirution of a particular state of the barometer because the fall of the barometer might be longer than its previous rise; 1.e. the final state of the falling might be lower than the state at the beginning of the rising. So we might speak of the resnrution of a lower degree: the comparative MORE contains an existential quantifier and this one is in the scope of again. I would not call such repetition a restirution. The terminology is simply out of place. An anonymous referee comments on this analysis as follows: There 15 one situation in which this aru.lysu seems implausible, and this is the one actually mentioned . . . Assume times to. t1, t2 � where to is the first time under consideration. Assume the following barometer values: • •

to:

Soo, t1: Sso, t2: 9()0, t3: 850, t4: Soo, �: 750, t,s: 700, r8: 650


(9- 12) the barometer{Ax.BECOME [again(As [MORE [Ad.d-low.(x), Ad.d-lowbeg(e)(x)]]))(e))

1 26

The Different Readings of W1td!r 'Agam'

I thmk we on say that for all points between t1 and rs. da5 Baromtttrfollt WJtti!T. But nonce that for the mterval, say, (�. �]. there IS no barometer value m the past that was lower than the barometer value at t5, 750. The present analysiS would say that only the mtervals (t1, t3], (t3, r.J make the sentence true.

(9-14) the barometer(Ax.again [BECOME(N;(MORE(Ad.d-low.(x), Ad.d-lowbeg{e)(x)]])](e)) In other words everything is as before. What about counterd1recnonality? In the classical approach. this term has no theoretical significance. Regardless of whether we have a repetitive or a 'counterdirectional' reading of our sentence, there must be a last preceding rising. The repentive reading entails that there was a previous falling as well. The 'counterdirectional' sense does not require this, but does not exclude 1t either. It could be the case that we have in mind the last ns1ng when we express the 'counterdirectional' meaning. If there were a prevwus falling, we should have uttered a sentence expressing the repentive reading according to the Gricean maxim of informativeness. It is therefore plausible that we have in mind a previous falling when we utter a sentence expressing the repetitive sense. All this is pragmancs and psychology, not semantics, one might argue. Returning to our analysis of'to fall', I have to add that the decomposition is the same which Dowty (1 979: 88 ff.) seems to have in mind for what he calls 'degree-achievements'. Typical examples are these: (9- 1 5)

a. The soup cooled for ten mmutes b. The soup became cooler for ten minutes c. *The soup became cool for ten minutes

If 'the soup cooled' is analysed as 'the soup became cooler', the expression denotes a process and can be modified by the durative adverbial 'for ten minutes' (perhaps combined with the invisible quantification 'for each relevant subinterval of', as Dowty (1979) assumes for that adverbial). (9-1 5c), on the other hand, expresses a genuine achievement and cannot be combined with that adverbial (There is a reading in which the sentence is acceptable, namely


Yes and no. If we understand das Barometerfollt in the perfective aspect, i.e. the event time coincides exactly with the reference time, then I would agree. But in German we have no grammaticalized aspects. If we evaluate the sentence with respect to the interval (t5, �]. we silently switch to the imperfective aspect. That is, we consider the interval as part of a larger interval, say, (t2, �]. which can make the sentence true. In other words, we evaluate the 'progressive' meaning 'the barometer is falling again' with respect to the interval (t5, �]. For convenience, we will keep Fabricius-Hansen's repetinve/restitutive distinction. The meaning of(9-1 a), a repentive read1ng, is then represented by

Armm von Stechow 1 27

when the adverbial qualifies the result state.) It 1s the inherent comparativeness which makes 'degree-achievements' processes. Telic trarlSltions are achieve ments or accomplishments and therefore cannot be combined with adverbials of the said kind. The decompositional approach gives a uniform explanation of these apparently unrelated facts. In order to describe the restitution of stative properties, Fabncius-Hansen (1 994b) introduces a further meaning rule (her rule 1 4):

(9- 1 6) again_te(ZXs) iff Z(s) & 3e3T(Z - RES(T) & TIME(e) I< TIME(e) & againc(e)(T)] , where Z is a stative and T is a transition.

(9- 1 7) Anna wieder gesund ist Anna again healthy is would be formalized as: (9-1 8 ) again_te(healthy(AnnaXs) Some comments are in order. Fabricius-Hansen's semantics for this case is more complicated than that for transitions, because rule (9- 1 6) uses the rule for transitions in the definiens. In fact, the formula says that Anna's being healthy 1s the result of an immediately preceding becoming healthy for which there is a counterdirectional becoming sick. Since the latter requires Anna's being healthy to be a pre-state, Anrla must have been sick before. This analysis strikes me as somewhat tortuous. In any case, the treatment runs counter to the tradition. according to which the modification of statives is always the primitive case. In our more traditional approach, the formalization is exactly the same, but the semantics is very simple. The formula says that Anna's being healthy is later than a previous maximal state of her being healthy. Hence her health is restituted. Furthermore, it follows without stipulation that there is no 'restitutive/repetitive' ambiguity because the BECOME-functor is missing.28 The situation changes as soon as we have the auxiliary werden 'to become'.

Anrla wieder gesund wird (ambiguous) Anrla again healthy becomes b. wieder Anrla gesund wird (only repetitive)

(9- 1 9) a.


(The index 'state' is my own addition. I use it to keep this symbol apart from the other symbols for 'again'. !< means 'precedes immediately'.) It is not necessary to regard this rule as a further reflex of a lexical ambtguity of wieder 'again': the different meaning rules may rather be regarded as the qualification of different cases which the definition of the function expressed by the word has to distinguish. States are different entitles than transttions. Therefore, the function can assign them values m a dtfferent way. A sentence like

1 28 The Dtfferent Readmgs of Witdn- '�in'

The data are predicted by our theory. Fabricius-Hansen distinguishes a further class of properties, which she calls X These comprise achievements/ accomplishments which are not transitions of the kind mentioned. She illustrates this 'rest class' with examples such as the following ones: x auf lachen 'to burst out laughing', x winken 'to wave', x zwei Bier trinken 'to drink two beers', x zwei Kilo abnehmen 'to lose two kilos in weight', x 1 00 Meter fallen 'to fall r oo meters', etc. Whenever 'again' applies to such a prop erty, we have to apply the following rule (Fabricms-Hansen 1 994b: rule I 5c): (9-20) againe�.e(e)(X) 1 ff X(e) & 3e '[X(e ') & TIME(e ') < TIME(e)]

(9-21)

a.

Erst nahm Anna 5 Ktlo zu. Dann nahm s1e wieder zwe1 Kilo ab. First put Anna 5 kilos weight on. Then lost she again two kilos. b. Erst stieg der Ballon 200 Meter. Dahn fiel er wieder roo Meter. First rose the balloon 200 meters. Then fell it agam roo meters.

Clearly, the second sentences do not express the repetition oflosing a particular amount of weight or the repetition of falling a certain distance. Rather, they express the partial resntunon of an earher state: Anna regained the state in wluch she we1ghed two kilos less and the balloon regained a height it had earlier. FabriClus-Hansen can deal with these examples if she classifies the two properties as transitions. The counterdirectional property of losing two kilograms would then be the property of gaining two kilos. And the counter directional property of falling 100 meters is that of rising r oo meters. Thus the second sentence of the first diSCourse would mean that Anna lost two hlos and that this was after she had gained two kilos m werght. This would be true even if she had gained five kilos in weight. The repetitive sense is obtamed by the repetitive 'again'. The examples are interesting as such. So let us discuss the1r analysis in a decompositional approach.29 The restitutive sense of the second sentence in (9-2 1a) IS represented as (9-22): (9-22) BECOME(again(As(DIFF(2 kg}(MORE) (A 3y(cathe.y 1\ ds.(Q.y).O.x) 1\ Vz(cathe.z ville.av (av idennfying constant of Anvers)

1\ ds.(Q.z).O.x) => z - y)))

Mter having skolerruzed with the function c and having applied one ponms, we wtll have in the base

(KB

)

at

I

modus

:��{

c�v)

ds.(Q.(c�v)).O�v) -.cathe.z V --.ds.(Q.z) .O�v) V z - (c.av)

When we were working with a

relational noun, i t was the presence of the first

argument of the noun (usually bound to a noun complement) that enabled us to retrieve the specifications from the base. Here, with a

unary noun

(or sortal

noun, i.e. with only one argument), we must mttoduce a localization predicate

that will be used to anchor the cathedral in a place. The umqueness hypothesis will be 'il existe une seule cathedrale se ttouvant dans un lieu (there is one single cathedral m a place)'

UNJ - 3x(cathe.x 1\ 3y(ds.(Q.x).O.y)

1\ Vz(cathe.z 1\ ds.(Q.z).O.y) => z - x)))

Now all that remains for us to do is to make the proof by refutation ofKBtxt 1-

UNJ to abram the substitution x - �v. y - av. Rule (L4) then gives us the speci ficanons we looked for:

/.. � cathe.(c�v) 1\ ds.(Q.(c�v)).O�v) 1\

.9�Q �Q.(c�v)))

Consequently, 'la cathedrale' is 'la cathedrale d'Anvers'.


a cathedral)'

Fr:mCIS Renaud 169

{ I 9) J'ai emmene rna voiture au garage. Le coffre ferme mal. [I took my car to the garage. The boot shuts badly) Ifwe have available in memory the fact that 'cars have only one boot', the search algonthm will have no trouble in returning the right spectfication. Let us say in passmg that since we are searching through logtcal representations we could also succeed with an indefinite antecedent (2o) J'ai emmene une voiture au garage. Le coffre ferme mal. [I took a car to the garage. The boot shuts badly) whereas a surface analysts that tried to restore the noun complement would give 'le coffre d'une votture (the boot of � car)' and thus would mtroduce another car into the universe. Fradin (I 984) was one of the first to observe insightfully that the knowledge used in this kind of process was stereo typic knowledge. Kleiber (I 99 3 b) found a lot of arguments to support this view. So the textual stratum is composed of the representation of the previous text and of the associated stereotypic information. This information isgeneral knowledge, shared by most ofthe speakers, and which gives the necessa ry, prototypical or scenic (coming from a scenario) properties of objects. {As a rule, we will represent it by the Retter's default rules, Sombe 1 989)). LOhner (198 5) laid great emphasis upon the role of functionality: 'the crucial condition is that the head noun in these uses provides a general two-place functional concept'. At first sight thts seems to be right, since the algorithm Test-Srch-info-UM will succeed m its quest for uniqueness if it finds a functional axiom in the KB . But Kleiber {I 993b) clearly shows that this condition on the noun is not sufficient in itself It must necessarily be of stereot ypic nature. We can rapidly illustrate this particular status of knowledge by this famous example adapted from Kleiber {I993b):


If the previous text now mentions the town of Brussels, we again come up agatnst a problem such as that of choosing between Aries and Marseilles which we met in (I 6). In that case, we have to analyse the sequence of actions: 'A go to X', 'A see Y' with the help of some general principles: 'If an mdividual A has gone to the place X, afterwards he is in X', 'if an individual A located in X sees Y, then Y is in X'. We must also take into account the sentence under analysts 'Vincent saw a cathedral' 3y cathe.y /1. voirE.(Q.v).(Q.y). With the help of these items of information. which are all highly likely in the situation under consideration. It becomes possible to make the refutanon which will giVe us Antwerp rather than Brussels. Let us also point out the central part played by the part/whole relanon in the associative anaphora.

1 70

The Definite Article: Code

and Context

(z r ) Nous entrames dans un petit village. L'eghse dominatt les matsons. [We came into a small village. The church towered above the houses.] (22) Nous entrames dans un petit village. ??La super�tte etait fermee. [We came into a small village. ??The superette was closed]

J.J.2.J Cognitive restrictions Until now we have coruidered the process of retrieving information stored in more or less long-term memory. The preceding analysis of deictic and anaphoric restrictions made use of information originating from the sensory store (real-time perceptions of the objects in the speech situation) or textual shon-term information (immediate anterior text). On the contrary, the


The prototypical relation between 'small village' and 'church' is enough to interpret 'l'eglise' as 'l'eglise du village'. But substituting 'l'eglise romane (the romanesque church)' for 'l'eglise (the church)' lS enough to make the sentence look very strange. As for sentence (22), it seems very odd in French. although everyone knows a lot of small villages with a superette. The functionality of the head noun, which of course guarantees the uniqueness condition in rule (L4), seems to be vahd for the associative anaphor only if Test-Srch-info-UNI is done upon stereotypic informatiotL Rule (L4), contrary to Heim's accommodanon, 1 5 when working in recogmtion, makes it possible to account for all these effects. We thus experience a pleasant surprise when we realize that the same algorithm allows us to carry out direct and indirect specifications: direct and associative anaphora (sections J.J.2.2a and b), as well as what we have called direct and indirect deictic identification (sectioru J.p.ra and b). This result can be understood as a consequence of the fact that in the direct case the uniqueness hypothesis contains only one existential variable to instantiate, whereas in the mdtrect case it contairu two: one vanable instantiating the referent and the other, non referential, irutantiating a noun-complement relatioiL 1 6 Moreover, when one works in generation, the availability of stereocypic mformanon is not even enough to guarantee that associative anaphora with 'le' will be possible. A5 a matter of fact the anaphoric link can be established by the definite article as well as with the clitic 'en' or the possessive 'son/sa/ses'. Fradin (1 984) and Kleiber (r993a. b) have made detailed studies of this problem, while working mostly on the syntactic surface and from the standpoint of generation rather than recognitiotL By definition, we limit associative anaphora to those cases where the search for a double instantiation (of referential and non referential arguments) through the textual stratum succeeds. Although. very often, the specification can be brought by a noun complement, we prefer to avoid any syntactic delimtion.

Francis Renaud

I7I

activation of lexical memory carried out during the analysis of monoreferent is a matter of long-term memory.

We are now going to see ocher cases of recourse to this long-term memory: 24) and general knowledge of the world (2 5). Let us look

episodic memory (23,

at the following examples:

(23)

(Le Monde) L'accord de libre-&hange nord-americain doit etre examine par Ia Chambre des Representants mercredi prochain.

[(Le Monde) The North-American free-trade agreement will be examined

(24)

by the House of Representatives next Wednesday]

Un accord de libre-&hange entre l'Indonesie et la Malaisie est en cours de [A free-trade agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia is under discus-

sion]

It seems to us that If the Le Monde JOUrnalist believes he is allowed to introduce

an 'accord' by means of definite article in the first sentence ofhis article, he will also believe that his readers already know of the existence of this agreement. On the other hand, brand new information, as in

indefinite article.

The definite article

in (2 3)

(24), must be

introduced by an

seems to function here in the same manner as

with direct anaphora, but Instead of searching through the cotext the algorithm

Srch-info-UNI searches the long-term memory Iffix.T· If it finds an identifying

constant c1, 1t bnngs it back to the sentence under analysis. But if it finds no

speofying information, 1t mtroduces a new constant by means of the existential

quantifier, exactly as the indefinite article does in

(24).

In this case, then, the

'familiarity' effect of the definite article comes from the activanon of long-term

memory.

As a matter of fact,

regardless of whether the activated information comes

from the speech situation, from a previous text or from older knowledge the

analysis process will work, in every case, in the same manner. It looks as though

there were

only one phenomenon , with subcases whose boundaries are indeter

minate, as in the following example:

(25)

II faut que j'emmene rna voiture �/dans un) garage. [I have to take my car to the/a garage]

The speaker will only use the indefinite article when he has an occasional garage in mind (on holiday for example), and he will use the definite article in

the other cases. But from the listener's point of view, the analysis of 'le garage'

will resort to: (a) deictic restrictions, if he shares some very specific knowledge with the speaker, enabling him to uniquely identify the garage; (b) anaphoric restrictions, if a garage has been introduced in the previous text; (c) general


discussion.

1 72 The Defirute Amcle: Code and Context knowledge, telling him 'every car owner usually takes his car to the same

garage, near his home'.

Any occurrence ofthe definite article thus triggers a search procedure through the base. The search strategy we have sketched consists in reviewing the pragmatic, textual, or general strata oft� base (also taking stereotypic knowledge into account) until the time when the right stratum isfound. Ifall the search processesJail and ifno specifications are given by noun modifiers, there remains only the existential valuepossibly associated with a stylistic effect (as we shall see later in section J.J.J.I) or the principle ofconservation of unity oftime and place {by a principle ofdiscursive coherence which requires that, in the absence ofcontrary information, spatio-temporal referring points are retainedftom one sentence to the next}. All the processes of search for information have failed

In section J . J . I we saw that the uniqueness hypothesiS may be guaranteed by

the lexicon, and m section 3 -3 .2 we saw that it can be obtained by searching

through short-term or long-term memory. We snll have to look at the case when all these methods fail. We will distinguish two possible situanons:

(ti)

(i) we have a stylistic effect; the specifying information 1s given by a modifier (noun complement, relative clause).

J.J.J. I

Stylistic device and the construction of a mental model

Let us consider, for example, the following sentence that began an article in the

Ccumer International: (26) Six heures, k reveil sonne dans � chambre de Peggy Schnetder. Elle se leve, prepare k cafe, pose k pain, k rniel et � con£ture sur � table de � cuisine.

[At six o'clock, the alarm clock rings in the bedroom of Peggy Schneider. She gets up, makes coffee, puts the bread, the honey and the jam on the kitchen table] The article goes on by making us attend to the morning activities ofPeggy. The author uses the direct style generally used in television reports. He thus invites the reader to build a

mental image of the scene for himself One can assume that

this image works as a sequence of TV pictures containing an alarm clock ringing, a woman making coffee, etc., accompanied by a commentary that we shall interpret accordtng to the principles of deictic restrictions seen in section J .J.2 . I a.

This styllSnc device, which does not date only from the period of television, is also abundantly used by novelists, as in the narrative:


3·3·3

Franos Re112ud 1 7 3

(27) Max posa la mai}l sur le genou de Sophie. [Max put his hand on Sophie's knee]

Although. Max has two hands, a s well as Sophie's two knees, by using this direct report style the author makes us see one single hand laid on one single knee. It remains necessary to define a new test in rule (L4) to direct this case towards the existential value (since (L4) would lead us to ask the question: which hand, which knee?). Might it be that (27) could be represented by the less natural sentence:

(28) Max posa une-main sur un genou de Sophie. [Max la1d � hand on � knee of Sophie.]

3·3·3·2 Specifying noun modifier Since giving a general analysis of noun complements and of relatives is too complex to be taken up here, we shall content ourselves with semng out some simple cases.

(a) Modification by an attributive complement

Examples of attributive complements are: 'L'ile de Krakatau', 'le port de Mombassa', 'la dynastie des Tang' (Krakatoa island, etc.). These kinds of definite noun phrases can be used without difficulty at first mention , even with a hearer supposed to know nothing about them. These complements are sometimes labelled 'attributive complements' since they can be associated With structures such as 'Krakatau est une ile (K. is an island)'. Let us again take the representation of'l'ile de Krakatau' given in section 3: /.. .9 3x(ile.x 1\ name.(Q.x).'Krakatau' 1\ .9.(Q.(Q.x))) We shall start by represennng17 the phrase: 'ile de Krakatau' by A.x(ile.x 1\ name.(Q.x).'Krakatau') then by applying (L4). In general, the uniqueness hypothesis 31x(ile.x 1\ name�Q.x).'Krakatau') will return nothing and thus will lead to the existential value 'l'ile de Krakatau' - A..93x(ile.x 1\ name�Q.x).'Krakatau' 1\ .9�Q�Q.x))).


Since for us semantic representations are used to control all possible mferences, we do not see from this point of view what could distinguish (27) from (28). In any case, if we had to take account of this stylistic effect, it would be better to save this kind of information m a special register.

1 74 The Definite Article: Code and Context We could seek to guarantee uniqueness by a default rule which would say that, exceptions aside, all entities With the same name are identical: VX"i/YVA{.nameXA 1\ name.YA ::> X - Y) But we can verify that Srch-info-UM still Jails in this case, since

this rule does

not guarantee the existence of an island with the name of Krakatoa.

(b) Modification of an extractable noun complement

(29)

La porte de man bureau ne ferme pas [The door of my office does not lock]

a de.

La porte ne ferme pas a de.

whereas

(30)

[The door does not lock]

(3 I )

requires a specifying context. Or consider:

a 3 s m sous l'eau.

(Cosquer a decouvert une grotte dans les Calanques) L'entree de la grotte se trouve

[(Cosquer has discovered a cave in the Calanques) The entrance to the cave is

3S

m below sea level]

The phrase 'la grotte (the cave)' can be analysed by anaphora according to the method seen in section

] .].2.2. Let us suppose that Srch-info-UM brings back

the constant c33 that has been introduced by the skolernization of 'une grotte'. In this case, if entrEe

(entrance) is considered as a relational noun, the set of all entries of the cave will be A.x entrEe. ( Q.cJJ).x. If the uniqueness hypothesis is not able to bring anything back, the phrase '}'entree de la grotte (the entrance of the cave)' will be represented by the existential value: A. � (grotte.c33 1\ entree.(Q.c33).x 1\ !JJ .(Q�Q.x))) It is because a cave can have one or several entrances and because we do not have any data on that subject

(Srch-info-NU.(entree. (QW.c11))

consequently

fails) that the noun specification will pass through the assertion of the uniqueness hypothesis of the noun head:


'Le fils de Sophie (the son of Sophie)', from which we started, but which we still have not classified, is an example of an extractable18 noun complement. As we have seen, to be identifying, a noun without a modifier, such as the noun in 'la porte (the door)', needs an anaphoric or a deictic context (the door about which we have spoken or the door here present in situation). On the other hand, m 'la porte de mon bureau [the door of my office)', the presence of a modifier will translate the task of finding a specification to the complement. For mstance, the following sentence can be uttered out of the blue:

Francis Renaud

175

31x(grotte.c33 A entree�Q.c33).x).

So we see that the definite character of'l'entree de la grotte' does not come here &om the Identifying value of (L4) but &om its existential value!

In this case, the two checks of rule (L4) guarantee that we can add the uniqueness condition to the KB without ending up in inconsistency (noted

by

o)

KB v 3 1 x{grotte.cn A entree.(Q.c33).x) 1-/- o On the contrary, with a functional noun such as 'pere', which by definition is

constrained by the property 'tout individu n'a qu'un seul pere (every person has

will return an identifying value as seen in section J . J.2. I a. But then it is this kind of uniqueness specificity which makes 'pere de Sophie' incompatible with the indefinite article 'un'. one single father)', the algorithm

Srch-info-UNI will

succeed every time and

We thus see that what is sometimes called

complete definite description

can be

obtained by the idennfyng as well as the existential value of (L4). The analysis of 'le roi de France (the king of France)' cannot be reduced to one of these cases, since 'roi' is a functional noun, 1 9 albeit one with a temporal dimens10n. In the sentence 'le roi de France est malade (the king of France is ill)', the algorithm

Test-Srch-info-UNI

in rule (L4) would activate the knowledge

that France is now a repubhc with no king. Then

Test-Srch-info-NU

succeeds (card N

-

Test-Srch-info. UNI fails and

o), so (L4) rejects the sentence by

replying 'which king of France?' Modification by a relative clause gives the same type of restrictions as

We have seen in this long section that (L4) is very useful for unifying a lot of

modification by a noun complement. We shall not consider it here.

data into a single formula which were scattered until now. This rule points out

tries to identifi a refermt in the knowledgt base. It does not transmit an assemon taken in the lexicon, but runs an

that the article 'le' in all its specific uses firstly

algorithm that searches among items of pragmatic knowledge on speech situations ('ferme la porte, le gouvernement accorde une aide' . . .), contextual, general, or episodic shared knowledge (respectively, anaphora, 'le pere de Sophie', 'le boulanger) to return an identifying constant (and more generally a ground term). The uniqueness hypothesis that guides the processing of information works well in so far as it applies to a well-delimited stratum of the knowledge base.

When the search succeeds, one gets a 'familiarity' effect, an effect which has been known for a long time by traditional grammar. But when the search fails, the hearer is forced to introduce a new referent, while possibly adding the


(*un!le)(pere de Sophie/nez de Sophie/n!gne de Koubilai! . . .)

1 76 The Definite Article: Code and Context

Rece:�ved: 25.07.94 ReVISed verswn recetved: 1 5.03.95

FRANCIS RENAUD CRLAO EHESS 54, Bd. Raspail

75170 Pans Odo: o6 Frana t"-Ttulil rma ud@ (hmfr

APPE N D I X A

first approxtmanon of the rules ts:

(RG1)

(RG2)

(RG�)

I I I

N2 - Det N U 1 ::acdU2:acc 1\ Uo:U 1 So :- S1 .S2

(RG5)

Vz - Vt Nz Uo:UI SO : A. 9tS2.[i.. � 'IY( � .Y :::) 3E3X( XX 1\ S1.EX.Y)) /1. VX( XX :::) 3E3Y( � .Y /1. S1.E.X.Y)))

(RG6)

N2 V2 SP :- !{ U I :{acc:nb:pl n cln.�grp) /1. U 2:clv:coll then S I .(A.:!t:.Y ,. X /1. plur. 9t} tfU2:chr.disrr then S I .{). :!t:.Y ,. X /1. diStr. X" else S 1 .S2

N2 - NPR UO:U 1 SO :- A..9(.9'N.(Q.S I )))

V2 - Vi Uo:U1 SO :- A. XVX( XX :::) 3E(S 1 .E.X))

-

PH -

In

the second line of the rules, we introduce feature terms (or attribute/value lists) which enable us to make rests and to mrunut


additional information given by the uniqueness hypothesis, which in such a case behaves as a specifying assertion. Furthermore, we notice With pleasure that our analysis does not stop here. We observe that when the algorithm is run With a uniqueness hypothesis containing several existential variables, it is able to extract indtrect specification (deictic indirect Identification and associative anaphora) from the siruational or contexrual stratum of the base, possibly complemented with some stereotyptc knowledge. Finally, we have noted that the traditional opposition between the deictic and anaphoric interpretations has been relativized a little since in both cases we have the same kind of processing of memonzed information. This unitary approach is moreover empirically corroborated by the fact that m French no linguistic expression IS specialized in the anaphoric function and that all the anaphoric expressions can also have deictic uses (Kleiber 1 991). Rule (L4) allows us to give a unitary presentation ofanaphoric as well as deictic values with direct as well as indirect referential identification. It sheds light on the first-mention use as well as on anaphonc recall.

Franru Renaud I 77 information over long distances (Ui repre sents the fearure term at category 1 of the rule, startmg from the left). Thus in (RGI), U I :acciU2:acc tells us that the term UI of the Det and U2 of the N will unify for the agreement fearure ace (this is the notation of Smolka I 992 but It IS not essennal for the rest). The lextcal enmes are: LEX:

le, Det, acc:(nb:sg A gr:masc),

AN/..9' 3ix(N.x) A 3x(N.x A .9'N.(Q.x)))

AN/...9 3 ix(N.x A .9 N�Q.x))) une, Det, acc(nb:sg A gr:fem).

AN/..9' 3 i x(N.x A troiS,

.9 N.Q.x)))

Det, acc:nb:pl, AN/...9 351 3X(X c N A cardX - 3 A X - u.51 A .9.51 ) Ia plupart des, Det, accnb:pl, AN/...9 3.5t' 3X(X c N A card.X > II 2card.N A X - u.51 A .9 .51 ) max, NPR, acc(nb:sg A gr:masc), m Soplue, NPR, acc:(nb:sg A gr.fem), s eleve, N, acc:nb:sg, Cleve These rules only apply to count nouns wtth therr sp«rfic ��alue. On a trial basiS, let us see how our rules parse the example Us ll� se sont riunis (Tk students met). With (RGI), we have les Cleves - A..9 351 (eleve - u5l A .9.51 ) And With (RG4), we get (in the first step, we disregard the auxiliary): se sont reUUIS - )... stVX( XX ::::> 3E sereunrr.E.X) A5

the leXIcal entry of� riunir has the fearure clv-.coll and as the subJect is plural (accnb:pl) and has no group fearure, rule (RG6) Will add the plunliry constraint to the cover 3.91 (eleve

- u.51 A plur.51 A VX(51X ::::> 3E se-reunir.E.X)

We thus get the formula we were looking for.

parsed by these rules m a Simple manner. 351 3 (X c Cleve A card.X > I 12 card.Cieve A X - u.51 A VY(51 Y ::::> 3Ese reurur.E.Y)) In conclusion, let us point out the formal relanonsh1p between /e and Ia. At first sight, therr representanons seem utterly different. Nevertheless we shall show that they are closely related. They only differ in thm presuppositions: 'le N' presupposes that N IS composed of only one mdlVldual, whereas 'les N' presupposes that N IS composed of several md1viduals. Let us start &om the folloWing representations: le - AN/..9' card.N -

I

A

A

351 (N - u.51

{L I ) .9' 51 ) les - Am9' card.N > I A 351 (N - u.51 {L2) A .9 .51 )

The condition card N - I amounts to sayrng that N IS a singleton 3x(N - Q.x), so {L I ) is ).N).g> 3x351 (N -

Q.x A u.51

but we know that the cover of[x}

A

.9 .51 )

IS

[{x}}

(Q.x - u.51 ) - (51 - Q.(Q.x)) thus

).N).g> 3x351 {N A

.9 .51 )

- Q.x A 5I - (QN.x))

and by subsnrunon

A.NA..9 3x(N - Q.x A .9 .(QN.x))) moreover one can demonstrate that f-

{N - Q.x) ::::> N.x

so )M.9' 3x(N.x A

.9 N�Q.x)))

and if the uniqueness condition IS re established, one finds the previous defirunon of /e given m the lexicon LEX.


Ia, Det, acc:(nb:sg A gr.fem), 3x(N.x A .9�QN.x))) les, Det, acc:(nb:pl). AN/...9 card.N > I A 3.91 (N - u.51 A .9.51 ) un, Det, acc:(nb:sg A gr:masc), AN/..9' 3 i x(N.x) A

Fmally, the sentence LA plupart da il� se sont riunis (Most students met), winch presents so many problems for Kamp & Reyle { I 993) (as they acknowledge in section 4-4-6), IS

I 78 The Definite Article: Code and Context NOTES

7

• • •

8

9

10 II

I2

I3 I4

descnption {I) from (2) and (3}. Tradmon would claim that in (5.I) the NP Ia portiere de rna v01rure presupposes ma 1101turt a unt stUit portiht (my car has only one door) and although I feel this presup position false, I don't feel clearly (5.I) truth-valueless. So I prefer to deal with It, fts,and un m thesarne manne rand say, like Caffi (I 994). that the difference between presupposition and irnphcarure '15 more a rnarter ofdegree than a dichotomy'. This operator can be defined by A.p L{A.n N.n 1\ n.p) With N the set of narural numbers and L the iota operator (c£ Andrews I986: 203, where the narural number n IS defined as the class of equipollent sets with n elements). But we assume that this formula, in theu view, is only a first sketch. Kadmon {I990) has given a DRT analysis of uniqueness whose formaliSm IS not quite clear to me. Opaaty effectS also obtain between two proper names (such as I=lort Ducasst and Lautriamont or Khanbalik and Nltm) or between a proper name and a mono refemng phrase (Lauis XIV and It Roi Solti0. For the method of refutation by resolu non 10 logtcs, c£ Chang & Lee (I 973); 10 type theory, cf. Wolfram (I993). Contrary to the process of 'accommoda non' 10 He1m (I988: p. 370) which, more over, does not explam the d1fference between (4.I) and (5. I). Of course, one can restrict the sJruanon even more by supposing that before pumng two of Sophie's sweaters (one blue and one pirlk) to dry, someone has said 'I fear the pink sweater will shrink.'. In this case, ( n ) becomes poss1ble again, 'le pull' refemng to the pink sweater, by an anaphoric process which we shall see later. and thus depending on the speech sirua non through the speaker-hearer link. Let us recall that our system of construe-


I For their help m Jevelopmg the present paper, I would like to thank Irene Tamba and an anonymous reviewer. 2 For Kamp & Reyle, the semannc construction can only begin after the syntacnc analysis has been completed. 3 The appeal to the nonon of fixed-point, as made by nonmonotonic logtc, seems to reflect properly this dependency of the parts on the whole. We have med to do Without this nonon m this amcle, but we are convmced that With regard to the plural definite article we cannot diSpense With it. 4 All the quannfiers are put before the Q.,x,F. Suppose Q.. IS an formula Q1x1 ex!Stennal quannfier. If no universal quannfier appears before Q.. we choose a new constant c and replace x,. by c. If Q.1, . . Q.., are all the uruversal quantifiers appeanng before Q.. we choose a new n-place funcoon f and replace x,. by f\x.1, . . . x.J. 5 In our Vlew, the argument of the predicate � riunir IS taken in the powerset of t'IM wh1ch is a Boolean algebra, hence a serrulamce. We agree With the cnncism of Lmk gtven by Landman (I989). Moreover, Kamp & Reyle {I 993) establiSh that each complete, atomic, free upper semilamce with zero is ISOmorphic tO the powerset of a set B: 'Theorem 3 shows that the choice between a lattice theorenc and a set-theorenc approach towards the model theory of srngular and plural count nouns IS not cruaal from a smctly formal po10t of view: models based on the one approach can be readily converted into equivalent models based on the other' (p. 405}. 6 As one referee points out to us, 'the failure of the condinons' 10 (4.2) does not result m a clear lack of truth-value. Would It not be berter to speak of 'conversational �mplicarure'? Perhaps. but tfwe do I don't see why we should take apart the definite

Francis Renaud 1 79 16 We should tmprove (Ls) to perform the double tnstantianon. 17 The rule system must make use of encyclopedic informanon if 1t IS to diS anguiSh between anribuove comple ments ('Ia VIlle de Bordeaux') and possessive ones ('Ia gare de Bordeaux'): the hearer can only make the diSnncnon tfhe knows that Bordeaux rs a town and that towns hallf! stations. I 8 The noun wtthtn the complement can be relanvized, rumed into a quesnon and chnCIZed. I9 'every kmgdom has one and only one king'.

RE FE R E N C E S

Andrews, P B . ( I986), An Introduction to Mathmuwcal Logic and T}'P( Tkory· To Truth Through Proof, Academic Press, New York. Barker, C. ( 1992), 'Group terms m EngliSh: represenong groups as atoms', journal of &mantics, 9, 69-93· Caffi, C. ( 1 994), 'Presu pposttion, pragmancs', in R E. Asher (ed.), Tk Encydoptdia of Lmgua� and Linguutics, Pergamon Press. Carpenter, B. (I 992), Tk Logtc of T� Ftaturt Structuu, Cambridge Uruverstty Press, Cambndge. Chang, C. & Lee, R (I 97 3� SymboilcLogic and Mtehanical 'Ikory Proving, Academic Press, New York. Christopherson, P. (I 939), Tk Art1clts: A Study of thrir 'Ikory and Uu in English, Munsgaard. Corblin, F. (I 987), Indifini, diflni tt dimon stratif, Droz. Davies, M. ( 1 989� ' TUJO txaminm marlml six scripts: interpretations of numerically quantified sentences', Linguistics and Philo sophy. u, 3, 293-323. Damourene & Pichon (I 950� Essai tk gram mairtfrat!ft!rst: dts mots a Ia �. d'Arrrey. Does,]. M. van der ( 1993� 'Sums and quann fiers', Lmguistics and Philosophy, 16, 5 , 509so.

DOlling, J. (1990), 'Plurals and collecnve nouns: an outlook on semanncs of group expressiOns', m IUlnUn & Polos (eds.), Papas from tk &cond Symposium on Log1c and LAnguagt, Akademiat Kudo, Budapest. EnJalbert, P. (I 989), 'Notes prelinunaires :i une theone operationnelle du sens', Intd kcllca , 8, I 09-59 Enplbert, P. & Vtctom, B. (1994), 'Du langage au modele', La./. {Traittmmt automatiqut dts /angUts), 35, I, 3 7-

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

Recommend Documents