JOURNAL OF SEMANTICS
AN INTERNATIONAL j OURNAL FOR THE INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF THE SEMANTICS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE
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JOURNAL OF SEMANTICS
AN INTERNATIONAL j OURNAL FOR THE INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF THE SEMANTICS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE
MANAGING EDITOR: PETER BoscH (IBM Germany) REVIEW EDITOR: BART GEURTS (IBM Germany)
EDITORIAL BOARD: PETER BosCH (IBM Germany)
SIMON C. GARROD (Univ. of Glasgow)
BART GEURTS (IBM Germany) PAUL HoPPER (Carnegie Mellon Univ. , Pittsburgh)
LAURENCE R HoRN \'iale University) STEPHEN lsARo (Univ. of Edinburgh) HANs KAMP (Univ. of Stuttgart)
LEo G. M. NoORDMANN (Univ. of Tilburg)
R oB A. VANDER SANDT (Univ. ofNijmegen) PIETER A. M. SEUREN (Univ. ofNijmegen)
CONSULTING EDITORS: R. BARTSCH (Univ. of Amsterdam)
SIR jOHN LYONS (Univ. of Cambridge)
J. VAN BENTHEM (Univ. of Amsterdam)
W. MARstEN-WILSON (MRC, Cambridge)
D. S. BailE (Univ. of Manchester) H. E. BREKLE (Univ. of Regensburg) G. BROWN (Univ. of Cambridge)
]. D. McCAWLEY (Univ. of Chicago)
H. REICHGELT (Univ. of Nottingham)
B. RICHARDS (Imperial College, London)
H. H. CLARK (Stanford University}
A.J. SANFORD (Univ. of Glasgow)
H.-J. EIKMEYER (Univ. of Bielefeld)
A. VON STECHOW (Univ. ofKonstanz)
]. HoBBS {SRI, Menlo Park)
D. IsRAEL (SRI, Menlo Park)
D. VANDERVEKEN (Univ. of Quebec) Z. VENDLER (Univ. of California, San Diego)
E. L. KEENAN (Univ. of California,
Y. WILKS (New Mexico State Univ.,
0. DAHL (Univ. of Stockholm)
H. ScHNELLE (Ruhr Univ., Bochum)
G. FAucoNNIBR (Univ. of California, San Diego)
P. N.JOHNSON-LAIRD (MRC, Cambridge) Los Angeles)
M. STEEDMAN (Univ. ofPennsylvania)
B. L. WEBBER (Univ. ofPennyslvania) Las Cruces)
D. WILSON (Univ. College, London).
E. LANG (Univ. or Wuppertal)
EDITORIAL ADDRESS: Journal ofSemantics, IBM Germany Scientific Centre, IWBS
7000-75, Postfach 8oo88o, D-7000 Stuttgart 8o, Germany. Phone: (49-71 1-) 6695-559. Telefax: (49-71 I ) 6695-500.
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New Subscribers to the Journal of Semantics should apply to the Journals Subscription Department, Oxford University Press, Pinkhill House, Southfield Road, Eynsham, OX8 1]. For further information see the inside back cover.
Volumes J--(} are available from Foris Publications Holland, PO Box 509, 3300 Am Dordrecht,
The Netherlands.
Published by Oxford University Press
Copyright by NIS Foundation
ISSN 0167-513 3
JOURNAL Of· SEMANTICS Volume 8
Numbers
1
&
2.
SPECIAL ISSUE: FO CUS IN PHONETICS, SYNTAX, SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS Guest Editors: Jakob Hoepelman, Rudolf Schnitzer
CO NTENTS JOACHIM jACOBS Focus ambiguities PETR SGALL Focus and the levels of language system
37
JACK HoEKSEMA and FRANs ZwARTS Some remarks on focus adverbs
51
ULRICH F. G. KLEIN Focus: an idea in motion
71
S]AAK DEMBY 'Only' as a determiner and as a generalized quantifier
91
RoB T. P. WieHE External and verb phrase negations in actual dialogues
107
JAY DAVID ATLAS Topic/comment, presupposition, logical form and focus stress implicatures: the case of focal particles only and also PETBR I. BLOK Focus and presupposition
127 149
U\1] @)�(U] [{'@) � lse of preposition stranding is not included in the NSR
G. Klein
90 Focus:
an idea in motion
Essen , 0.
-
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von (1956), Grundzuge der hoch Lenerz, J. & U. F. G. Klein (1988), 'Fokus deutschen Satzintonation , Henn, Ratingen. Glasnost', S&P-Arbeitsberichte, 9: I 6-3 5· Heidolph, K. E., W. Fliimig & W. Motsch Lieb, H. H. (1980), 'Intonation als Mittel (1981) (eds), GrundzUge einer deutschen verbaler Kommunikarion', Linguistische Grammatik , Akademie-Verlag, Berlin. Berichte, 68: 34-47. Hohle, T. N. (1982), 'Explikationen fur Paul, H. (r 88o), Prinzipien derSprachgeschichte "nonnale Betonung� und "normale Wort (8. Aufl. 1 970), Niemeyer, Tiibingen. stellung�·. in W. Abraham (1982) (ed.), Posner, R (1979), 'Bedeutung und Gebrauch Stazglieder im Deutschen , Nart, Tiibingen, der Satzverkniipfer in den natiirlichen 75-153· Sprachen', in G. Grewendorf (1979) (ed.), Hohle, T. N. (r988), 'VERUM-Fokus', S&P Sprechakttheorie und Semantik , Suhrkamp, Arbeitsberichte, S: I -7. Frankfurt-on-Main, 345-85. Jacobs, J. (1984), 'Funktionale Satzperspek Reis, M E. (1980), 'Grundbegriffe der tive und lllokutionssemanrik', Linguistische Semanrik', MS, Cologne. Berichte . 91: 25-58. Rochemont, M S. (1986), Focus in Generative Jacobs, J. ( 1988a), 'Fokus-Hintergrund Grammar (Studies in Generative Linguistic Gliederung und Grammatik', in H. Alt Analysis 4 ) , John Benjamins, Amsterdam/ mann (ed.), 89-134· Philadelphia. Jacobs, J. (r988b), 'Akzenruierung', MS, Uhmann, S. (1987), Fokussierung und Intona Wuppertal. tion: Eine Untersuchung zum Deutschen an Kiparsky, P. (1966), 'Ober den deutschen Frage/Antwort-Sequenzen in experimentellen Akzent' in Untersuchungen uber Akzent und Dialogen , Diss., Konstanz, appeared as Intonation im Deutschen ( studiagrammatica Fokus-Phonologie (1991), Niemeyer, VII) (3. Aufl. 1973), Akademie-Verlag, Tiibingen. Berlin: 69-98. Vennemann, T. (1986), Neuere Entwicklungen Klein, U. F. G. (1 990), 'Fokus und Akzent', in der Phonologie , Mouton de Gruyter, Cologne (Kolner Linguistische Arbeiten: Berlin/NewYork/Amsterdam. Germanistik 19 ). Wiese, R (1988), Silbische und lexikalische Klein, W. (r98o), 'Der Stand der Intonations Phonologie: Studien . zum Chinesischen und forschung', Linguistische Berichte, 68: 3-3 3· Dtutschen (Linguistische Arbeiten 2 1 1 ), Krifka, M. (1983) Zur semantischen und prag Niemeyer, Tiibingen. matischen Motivation sntoktischer Regular Wunderlich, D. (1988), 'Der Ton macht die iliiten , Fink, Miinchen. Melodie: Zur Phonologic der Intonation Lenerz, J. (1977). 'Zur Abfolge nominaler des Deutschen', in H. Altmann (ed.), 1-40. Satzglieder im Deutschen' (Studien zur dtutschen Grammatik 5 ), Nart, Tiibingen.
© NJ.S. Foundation (1991)
Journal of&rtuJntics 8: 91-1 o6
'Only' as a Determiner and as a Generalized Quantifier
SJAAK DE MEY University ofGroningen Abstract
1 'O NLY' I S N O T C O N SERVATIVE It has been observed in the literature on GQs (compare e.g. van Benthem 1986: 8) that ONLY, the denotation of'only' in an arbitrary model, lacks the property of Conservativity. We define ONLY in the following way.1 ONLY (A, B) iffB � A A relation R is called conservative iff R (A, B) iff R (A, A n B) Now we have that ONLY (A, B) .... ONLY (A, A n B) that is, (B � A) .... (A n B � A) is logically true, since its consequence is. However, (A n B � B) .... (B � A) is not logically true, in spite of the fact that its antecedent is. Hence, ONLY so defmed is not a conservative relatiotL The denotation assigned to an expression is meant to be a correct model of the meaning of that expressioiL So, in order to check whether our model of the meaning of an expression e is correct we should check our intuitions about the meanings of the sentences where e
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Two types of linguistic theories have been particularly concerned with the analysis of 'only': pragmatics, in particular focus theory and presupposition theory, and generalized quantifier (GQ) theory, the latter in the negative sense that it has been eager to show that 'only' is not a GQ.Judging from such analyses, then, it would appear that the analysis of'only' is not at home in the grammar of narural language. The main negative point of the present article is to dispute this. The main positive point is the observation that there are strong relationships between 'all', 'the' and 'only'. We propose a way to account for them.
92
'Only' as a detenniner and generalized quantifier
occurs. If a correct model of the meaning of 'only' would be conservative then the sentences { 1) Only willows weep and (2) Only willows are willows that weep
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should, according to the defmition of Conservativity, have the same meaning, which, obviously, is not the case. The modelling of the meaning of'only' by the non-conservative relation ONLY seems .to be correct then, at least in this aspect. Conservativity is generally believed to be a defining property of determiner denotations. Compare Keenan & Stavi (1986), van Benthem (1986). Moreover, determiner denotations are taken to be the primary examples of quantifiers relevant for natural language (NL) quantifiers. Hence, the conclusion seems straightforward: ONLY is not conservative because 'only' is not a determiner. Without further background, the issue may seem to be of little importance. In order to give the matter more substance we may look at it in the following way. It is the aim of formal semantics to characterize the meanings of NL expressions in formal terms, e.g. in terms of GQs. From a formal point of view, GQs are just higher-order predicates, that is, predicates or relations taking sets as arguments. Obviously, there are, for a given domain, far more GQs than there are NL expressions whose denotations can be modelled by GQs. However, when it is essential, and not just a question of incidence, that the meanings ofNL expressions can be neatly described in formal terms, then what we may expect is that there is a very proper subset of the set of GQs, the NL quantifiers, which, moreover, admit of a neat axiomatization. One of the primary tasks of formal semantics in this view, then, is to axiomatize the set of NL quantifiers. Conservativity seems to be an appropriate axiom. ONLY fails this axiom, and hence is outside the set of NL quantifiers. However, we should realize two points. Clearly, whether the set of NL quantifiers is axiomatizable crucially depends on the way we establish which NL expressions are NL quantifiers. In particular, the issue hinges on whether 'only' is a determiner and on how important it is to be a determiner. Moreover, even if one accepts, as we do, that such an axiomatization is indeed among the primary tasks of formal semantics, one should realize that it is not apriori certain that the set of NL quantifiers is axiomatizable. Maybe only a subset of the set ofNL quantifiers is. So the fact that ONLY does not seem to be in the axiomatizable part of a subset of NL quantifiers need not be taken to be decisive. There may be other subsets of the set of NL quantifiers that do include ONLY and that are axiomatizable. What is at stake, then, is the appropriateness of Conservativity as an axiom, and, in the long run, the
Sjaak de Mey
93
2
B O OLEAN Q UANTI FIERS
Algebras are sets closed under one or more operations. Put differently, an algebra is a set of entities a subset of which are compound or structured. The structure inherent in the compound members can be described in terms of the operations of the algebra. As languages have many compound expessions, algebras are suitable models for pieces of language and their grammars. A lattice is a more highly structured type of algebra. A lattice is a set which is closed under two operations, commonly called the meet (o ) and the join {V) operation and over which a partial order (�) is defmed. A binary reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric relation is called a partial order.3 Moreover, the order in a lattice is defined in such a way that each pair of elements a and b has both a greatest lower bound (glb) and a least upper bound Qub). For each pair of elements a and b, the meet of a and b is the glb of a and b, whereas the join of a and b is the lub of a and b: (o -GLB) (V-LUB)
X �a & X � b - X � (a 0 b) a � x & b � x - {a V b) � x
A Boolean algebra is a commutative, distributive, complemented lattice. Accordingly, the meet and join operations in a Boolean algebra are com mutative and distributive. Moreover, a complementation relation is defined assigning to each member a unique complement. Characteristic of Boolean algebras is the fact that, for an arbi� element a, (a o -.a) is an absolute
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relation between determinerhood and being an NL quantifier. These tWo points determine the course of the discussion in the next two sections. In Sections 2-3 we create a context in which we can evaluate the appropriateness of Conservativity as an axiom. Our proposal is to pay due respect to the Boolean character of 'only'. In Section 4 we discuss what it is for an NL expression to be a determiner. Sections s-6 deal with the relations between 'only', 'all' and 'the'. There is, then, in this paper heavy emphasis on Boolean structure.2 Boolean structure is very prominent in the ways we reason. Consequently, it may be demanded of a grammar of a natural language that it properly describe the Boolean nature of natural language. We reason with meanings in a way com parable to the way in which we calculate with numbers. Boolean semantics is to formal semantics what the theory of integers is to number theory. And although the algebra of integers is not a Boolean algebra (e.g. addition and multiplication of integers are not idempotent operations whereas union and intersection of sets are), there are striking resemblances between the algebra of integers and the Boolean grammar of meanings.
94
'Only' as a determiner and generalized quantifier
minimum for the partial order, whereas
(a V -.a) is an absolute maximum for
the partial order. That is: (IRRELEVANCE1 ) (IRRELEVANCE2)
(a o -.a) � b b � (a V -.a)
'
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It follows, from Antisymmetry, that, for all elements a and b, (a o -.a) = (b o ...., b), and also that (a V -.a) = (b V -.b). Therefore, for all a, (a o -.a) is written as o whereas (a V -.a) is written as 1 . It has been proved that the logic of Boolean algebras is representable in set theory as each power set of a given set D is a Boolean algebra. That is, the logic of Boolean algebras is, at the same time, the logic of power sets: it is part of intuitive set theory. In particular, the meet operation is representable as inter section (n) of sets; the join operation is representable as union (v) of sets; complementation is representable as set theoretic complementation ( ); whereas the partial order is representable as the subset relation (s;;;); . o is representable as the empty set, whereas 1 is representable as D. Note that in this representation, (IRRELEVANCE1 ) says that o is a subset of any subset of a given set D. What we are particularly interested in are quantifiers for a given set D (the domain) because such quantifiers are suitable models either of the meanings of certain NL expressions or of properties of such meanings. We define a quantifier in a very general way: any m-ary operation taking n1-adic, . . . , n, adic relations over D as arguments and mapping them to a �-adic relation over D is a quantifier for D. Moreover, we extend the notion of a quantifier by sti pulating that any set of quantifiers for D or any relation among quantifiers for D be a quantifier for D. In this way, properties of quantifiers are themselves quantifiers. As, quite generally, GQs are operations taking relations as arguments and having relations as values, we systematically distinguish between the Latin terms 'unary' , 'binary' , etc., and the Greek terms 'monadic', 'dyadic' , etc. We use the Latin terms for the 'arity' of quantifiers and the Greek terms for the ; 'adicity' of the arguments or values of quantifiers. If the value of a quantifier Q for a given n-tuple is a ttuth value (ttuth values are monadic relations as they are subsets of 1 , the set having just the empty set as its sole member), then we say that Q itself is a relation rather than an operation. If all the arguments of a m-ary quantifier Q have the same adicity n, we can characterize Q as an m-ary n-adic operation or relation.
Sjaak de Mey 2.1
95
The Boolean operations and the Boolean order as Boolean quantifiers
2.2
Internal negation and duality
In order to represent the meanings of yet other connectives and determiners we introduce also, alongside Boolean complementation or external negation (EN), a family of operations of Boolean internal negation (IN) and Boolean duality (DU). The operations of internal negation and duality are defmable in any Boolean algebra that has sets as members. If Q is any set of subsets of a given set D then
0
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As the power set of a given set D is a Boolean algebra, and both the three Boolean operations (i.e. intersection, union and complementation) and the Boolean order (i.e. the subset relation) are clearly quantifiers, we have with each set D a set ofBoolean quantifiers for D. Many NL expressions tum out to have a Boolean meaning. Propositional connectives, and a number of determiners and determined NPs take their denotations from among the Boolean quantifiers. They are moreover the NL quantifiers par excellence .4 We distinguish between Boolean algebras according to the type of their members. The following Boolean algebras are specifically relevant for NLs: the truth value algebra (propositional calculus), and the property algebra, the determiner algebra and the NP-algebra for a given domain D. These algebras are sets of truth values, properties ( = subsets of D, hence, monadic relations over D), determiner denotations and NP-denotations, respectively. They provide models of the Boolean meanings of words such as 'and' , 'or', 'not' , connecting sentences, nouns or intransitive verbs, determiners and determined NPs, respectively, and of the words 'if' and 'all', denoting relations between truth values and properties, respectively. In spite of the fact that the GQs modelling aspects of the meaning of any of these words are formally different in that they take arguments of differing categories and, hence, belong to different Boolean algebras, they are really the same relations, that is, they are insensitive to the precise character of their arguments. Their Boolean nature guarantees uniform semantic behaviour. Of course, this should not be taken as implying that such words cannot have other than Boolean meanings as well. In what follows we restrict attention to quantifiers that are relations,5 although everything we say on them can be readily generalized to cover also the case of quantifier operations. Hence, although the operations of intersection, union, complementation, and their Boolean compositions are Boolean quantifiers as well, they are of less relevance for our purposes. For a more general treatment we refer to de Mey (forthcoming).
96
'Only' as a determiner and generalized quantifier
EN(Q) IN(Q) DU(Q)
= = =
POW(D) - Q {X � D I (D X) E Q} EN(IN(Q) ) = IN(EN(Q) ) -
If R is a binary relation over POW(D) then, of course, EN(R) is the com plement with respect to POW(D) x POW(D). As to internal negation, we should distinguish between left internal negation (L-IN), right internal negation (R-IN) and left and right internal negation (L&R-IN): L-IN(R) R-IN L&R-IN
= = =
{(X, Y) E POW(D) = POW(D) I (X Y) E R} {(X, Y) E POW(D) X POW(D) I (X, Y ' ) E R} {(X, Y) E POW(D) X POW(D) I (X' ' Y ' ) E R} I '
DU{Q) = IN(EN{Q) ) EN{IN{Q) ), IN(Q) ) = L-IN(EN(Q) ) L-DU(Q) = EN(L= R-IN(EN(Q) ) EN(R-IN(Q) ) R-DU(Q) L&R-DU(Q) = EN(L&R-IN(Q) ) = L&R(IN(EN(Q) ) In what follows we use the signs 'IN' and 'DU' also as dummies for arbitrary members of the families of internal negations and duals. Looking upon POW(D) as a Boolean algebra, then, the subset relation and all the Boolean compositions by intersection, union, external negation, internal negation and duality are (instances of) Boolean quantifiers for D as the following definition says:6 =
=
·
1. The subset relation over POW(D) is a Boolean quantifier for D 2. If Q1 and Q2 are Boolean quantifiers for D, so are EN(Q), IN(Q), DU(Q), (Q1 1'""\ Q2) and (Q1 u Q2) J. If Q 1 , . . . , Qn are Boolean quantifiers for D, and ifR is a n-ary Boolean relation defined for Q I , . . . , Qn, then R is also a Boolean quantifier for D Note, furthermore, that the truth value algebra has a fixed domain: 2, which is the set of truth values, the power set of 1. A property algebra and, hence, a quantifier algebra depend on a given domain D, however. In order to reach a more general definition we should be able to drop the reference to a given set D. We accomplish this by introducing the following two axioms of Extension and Quantity*, and requiring that all Boolean quantifiers obey these axioms: If A, B � D � D* then R0(A, B) iff R0.(A, B) (EXT) (QUANT) If D � D* and f is a I- I function mapping D into D* then Ro(A, B) iff �l(f(A), f(B) ) So, if a quantifier is a Boolean quantifier for D it is also a Boolean quantifier for any D* which is either a superset ofD or the permutation product of a superset of D under a permutation of D.
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We can furthermore defme the operations DU of duality:
Sjaak. de Mey
97
From these two principles, a more common principle of Quantity is derivable: (QUANT) If 1t is a permutation of D then Ro (A, B) iff R0 (1t (A), 1t (B) ) A quantifier obeying (QUANT) is called logical. All Boolean quantifiers are logical, then. Given these axioms, we can also look upon connectives and Boolean deter miner denotations as denoting essentially the same relations. That is, if we write the denotation of if as IF, and the denotation of 'all' as ALL, IF is the same relation as ALL, disregarding the character of the entities these relations are defined over. Moreover, we also have the following correspondences: '
R-IN
L-IN
L&R-IN L-DU
R-DU
AND ONLY-IF NOT-OR IF NOT-IF NOT-AND OR ALL NOT-ALL NO ONLY..NOT ONLY NOT-ONLY..NOT SOME
What is especially nice about the approach we have taken here is that we can calculate the properties of the other Boolean determiners if we take the properties of the order as a starting point and look at how they are transformed under the operations yielding compound Boolean quantifiers. Here is an example. ALL is a partial order and, hence, it is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. ALL has also some other properties, e.g. it is monotonic on both sides. More in particular: ALL is L-decreasing and R-increasing.7 Note that this follows from the fact that ALL is transitive. Hence, the logic of monotonicity of Boolean quantifiers is part of the logic of Boolean algebras, more in particular it is derivable from the transitivity of the subset relation. It is an easy exercise now to establish which properties are preserved under EN, IN or DU. For example, NO is non-reflexive. As NO is the right internal negation of ALL we have that for all X � D: NO (X, X) iff ALL (X, X'). There is only one case in which a set X � D is a subset of its own complement: that is so if X is empty. This is in accordance with (IRRELEVANCEI ).
3
C O N SERVAT I V I TY A N D RELATED PROPERTIES
Let us go back now to Conservativity. Actually, for two-place relations we should distinguish between L-Conservativity, R-Conservativity and L&R Conservativity. What is generally called Conservativity is R-Conservativity. A quantifier is
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EN
'
98 'Only' as a determiner and generalized quantifier
L-Conservative iff R (A, B) iff R {A "' B, B) R-Conservative iff E.(A, B) iff R {A, A "' B) L&R-Conservative iff R (A, B) iff R {A "' B, A "' B) ALL is R-conservative. This follows from some general lattice properties of the meet {intersection) operation and the order (the subset relation): 1.
2.
A � {B "' C) - {A � B) & {A � C) {A � B) & {A � C) - A � {B "' C)
[Transitivity ('"'-GLB
and taking C A.8 Hence R-Conservativity is certainly a Boolean property of ALL. ALL is neither L-conservative nor L&R-conservative, however. Yet, ALL has another interesting left-hand property instead: it is L-progressive. We define ==
Again, that ALL is L-Progressive follows from some general lattice properties of the union operation and the subset relation: 1. 2.
(B u C) � A - {B � A) & {C � A) (B � A) & (C � A) - (B u C) � A
[Transitivity [u-LUB
and taking A C.9 The following schema shows the distribution of Conservativity and Progressivity over the connectives and Boolean determiners: =
L-CONS
AND
L-PROGR
R-CONS
R-PROGR
SOME
IF
ALL
IF
ALL
ONLY-IF
N-AND
NO
N-IF
N-ALL
N-IF
N-ALL
N-ONLY-IF N-ONLY
ONLY-IF
ONLY
AND
SOME
OR
ONLY..NOT
N-ONLY-IF N-ONLY
N-AND NO
N-OR N-ONLY..NOT
ONLY
OR
ONLY..NOT
N-OR
N-ONLY.NOT
From this schema it might appear that L-CONS and L-PROGR are preserved under L-IN, whereas R-CONS and R-PROGR are preserved under R-IN. Also, it would appear that L-CONS and L-PROGR are reversed under R-IN whereas R-CONS and R-PROGR are reversed under L-IN. Yet, this would not be an appropriate thing to say. Let us notice Hrst that ALL has two further properties that we will call 'L complemented Conservativity' {L-C-CONS) and 'R-complemented Progres sivity' (R-C-PROGR). We defme R is L-C-Conservative iff R {A, B) iff R (A "' B ' , B) R is L-C-Progressive iff R {A, B) iff R {A u B ' , B)
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R is L-Progressive iff R {A, B) iff R (A u B, B) R is R-Progressive iff R (A, B) iff R (A, A u B) R is L&R-Progressive iff R {A, B) iff R (A u B, A u B)
Sjaak de Mey
99
R is R-C-Conservacive iff R (A, B) iff R (A, A ' r� B)
R is L-C-Progressive
iff R {A, B) iff R (A, A ' u B)
ALL is L-C-Conservacive: 1 0 I.
{A r'l B
I
) � A & A � B .... A
2. A r� B � B J. A r'l B = (A r'l B 4· A � B I
I
I
)
r'l
r'l
B �B I
B=0
[Transitivity [Hyp [see note I O
[3 [2,
S· A r'l B � B - A � B I
ALL is R-C-Progressive:
s
[Hyp
3· A = (A r� A ' ) u (A r� B) 4· A = A r� B
[2, Distribucivity
[2, note I O [3, Contraction [4
[3 [4, note IO
[Hyp
S· A � B
[I , note I O
[ I , note I O
The proof can be read in both directions. Furthermore, L-PROGR and L-CONS are transformed into L-C-CONS and L-C-PROGR, respectively, under L-IN, and vice versa, whereas R-PROG and R-CONS are transformed into R-C-CONS and R-C-PROGR, respectively, under R-IN, and vice versa. Furthermore, L-PROGR and L-CONS are transformed into L-C-PROGR and L-C-CONS, respectively, under R-IN, and vice versa, whereas R-PROGR and R-CONS are transformed into R-C-PROGR and R-C-CONS, respectively under L-IN, and vice versa. To give just one example: suppose R is R-CONS. Then R (A, B ' ) iff R (A, A r� B ' ). Then R-IN(R) (A, B) iff R-IN(R) (A, (A r� B ' ) ' ) = (A, A ' u B). The conclusion may be clear. It is not the case that L-CONS (R-CONS) and L-PROGR (R-PROGR) are preserved under L-IN (R-IN), nor is it correct to say that L-CONS (R-CONS) and L-PROGR {R-PROGR) are reversed under L-IN (R-IN). The fact that, for example, NO, which is the R-IN of ALL, is R-conservacive just as ALL, follows from the fact that ALL is also R-C-PROGR and R-C-PROGR is transformed by R-IN into R-CONS. Given this framework we are now in a better posicion to evaluate the claim that the den9tacions of all determiners are R-Conservacive. In this framework
we derive the properties that determiner denotations have from some more basic facts, in particular the properties of Boolean algebras. Any grammar of
account for the Boolean character of NLs. In a Boolean algebra, however, there is no privileged posicion for R-Conservacivity.11 Note that if non-conservative determiner denotations are not NL quan tifiers, the corresponding connectives are not NL quantifiers either, because
NL should
they are essentially the same relations. So, AND would then be a NL quantifier,
but OR would not. This result is very implausible indeed.
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1. A � A' u B 2. A = A r� (A ' u B)
100
'Only' as a determiner and generalized quantifier
As for 'only', ONLY is the L&R-IN of ALL, or, equivalendy, ONLY is the converse of ALL,the superset relation. As we have shown, ONLY has respect able Boolean properties. Hence, ALL is an NL quantifier iff ONLY is. Some thing similar holds of the connectives 'IF . . . THEN' and 'ONLY IF', which are the subset relation and the superset relation among truth values, respectively.
4 T HE A U T O N O M Y O F SYNTAX
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Having said this, it may still be relevant to check whether the claim that 'only' is not a determiner is tenable, and, if it is, to discuss the question of how important it is to not be a determiner. So let us first look at the reasons why 'only' is said not to be a determiner. These have to do with the fact that 'only' can combine with proper names ('only John'), definite descriptions ('only the pilot who shot at it') and numerical NPs ('only three pilots who shot at it'). So, 'only' combines with NPs whereas genuine determiners should combine with Ns only. Therefore, 'only' is said to be an adverbial. Now, in fact, we should ignore deflnite descriptions and numerical NPs, otherwise the case is immediately lost: also 'all' combines with them ('all the pilots', 'all three pilots'). What should be shown, then, is that in 'only pilots' 'only' is not a determiner. No argument to support this claim has been put forward, as far as I know. It is of interest to note that we do not have '"'no the pilots', '"'some the pilots' or '"'each the pilot', although we do have 'all the pilots'. So, taking the argument seriously, we should conclude that 'all' is not a determiner either. Clearly, the whole quest becomes dubious. There is another consideration. It is well known that many determiner words may occupy two different positions in the sentence, an NP-internal position as in 'All the boys were dancing', and a 'floated' position as in 'The boys all danced'. Clearly, the two occurrences of 'all' do not essentially differ in meaning and we should apply a GQ analysis to both occurrences of this word. So, even if we had to conclude that 'only' is not a determiner because it does not occur in NP-internal position, nothing seems to follow. There are many quantifier words occurring only in one of the two positions discussed. This may also be a language-specific matter in the sense that there may be languages in which what apparendy correspond to English NP-internal quantifler words may appear in floated position only. So what we would have to prove is not only .that 'only' is not NP-internal (in English, that is) but that it is neither a floated quantifler. Now the second issue. How important is it to be a determiner? Clearly, this is an issue that demands much more discussion than we can give it here. We merely emphasize the following theoretical consideration. If we take deter-
Sjaak de Mey
101
minerhood to be important we may do so because we are inclined to believe that syntax dictates to us the relevant distinctions. In this context I woud like to cite a passage from Montague's paper 'English as a Formal Language' (1974: 2 10).
There are two reasons to pay special attention to this passage. First, the last
sentence can be taken to be a formulation of the principle of Compositionality,
which says that the meaning of a compound expression is composed from the
meanings of the compounding expressions. Second, it also says that syntax and semantics should go hand in hand, but that syntax cannot be the guide. If this is
the right track we clearly have to get rid of the idea that syntax is autonomous, that is, that syntax dictates the correct distinctions.
Strangely enough, there are many people working in the tradition of Montague grammar who nevertheless defend a much narrower version of the principle of Compositionality. According to such narrow versions, syntax does lead semantics. Therefore it is important to emphasize that this is not what Montague himself defended. Moreover, the spirit in which we approached the
analysis of 'only' in the previous section is in complete agreement with the
passage cited above. 'All' and 'only' are closely related from a semantic point of view, and whatever differences there may be in syntactic behaviour, they are accidental rather than essential. Syntax cannot dictate the proper analysis of 'only'.
In the remaining two sections of this paper I shall elaborate on some similar ities between 'all', 'the' and 'only'.
5 EXI STE NCE CLAI M S The relation ONLY as defined above is the denotation o f the word 'only' as we fmd it with bare nouns such as in 'only pilots'. An interesting question now is
whether there is an existence claim on the second argument of 'only'. That is to say, a sentence such as
(3) Only pilots who shot at it escaped the Mig that chased them
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Some linguists roughly sharing the main goal of the present paper, that is, to define the notion of a true sentence of English (or English sentence true with respect to a given interpretation), have proposed that syntax-that is, the analysis of the notion of a (correctly formed) sentence-be attacked first, and that only after the completion of a syntactic theory considera tion be given to semantics, which would then be developed on the basis of that theory. Such a program has almost no prospect of success. There will often be many ways of syntactically generating a given set of sentences, but only a few of them will have semantic relevance; and these will sometimes be less simple, and hence less superficially appealing, than certain of the semantically uninteresting modes of generation. Thus the construction of syntax and semantics must proceed hand to hand.
102
'Only' as a determiner and generalized quantifier
states that any pilot who escaped the Mig that chased him was a pilot who shot at the Mig that chased him The question is, does it also imply that there were pilots who shot at the Mig that chased them? As ONLY is the superset relation, that is, the converse of the subset relation, it does not enforce this. This analysis of 'only' is in keeping with the one Geach gave. I refer for a short survey of the various analyses of 'only' to Atlas (this volume). This is, moreover, precisely what we should expect given the fact that ONLY is the converse of ALL. Yet 'all' is often understood with an existence implicature on its first argument rather than an existence claim. 'All students read books' does not necessarily imply that there are students, although it may suggest it. So, we could argue that in the case of 'only' it is also an implicature rather than an implication that there are pilots who escaped the Mig that chased them. An argument to support this can be derived from sentences such as .
If this is a grammatical and non-contradictory sentence then we should conclude that the definition we gave of ONLY is a correct model of the meaning of 'only'. I would say that (4) is, indeed, grammatical and non-con tradictory. With an eye on what follows, it might be wise to emphasize once more that with 'only' in the sense we analysed here the existence implicature clearly rests on the second argument. To be sure, in models where there are no students, (4) can only be true if there is no one who reads books. Yet even in models where there are students, (4) can be true although there is no one who reads a book.
6 OTHER F O R M S O F ' O NLY' Let us now tum to other collocations of 'only': the 'proper name-only' (as in 'only John'), the 'definite description-only' (as in 'only the pilot'), and the 'numeral-only' (as in 'only three pilots')P We start with the definite description-only as we find it in
( s) Only the pilot slept Let us first point to a technical difficulty that arises from the type of frame work we use. Perhaps it would be natural to analyse ( s ) as expressing that the set of sleepers is a subset of the set denoted by 'the pilot'. However, this would be a category mistake as 'the pilot' is an NP, and, hence, not the kind of set which SLEEP can be a subset of. This may seem to suppon the point of view of those who have denied 'only' the status of a generalized quantifier. I do not accept this. In reaction I would point to the case of 'all the'. With the latter, the solu-
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(4) Only students, if anybody at all, read books
Sjaak de Mey 103
cion is to defme a quantifier ALL-THE. So let us try and work out this solution for 'only' as well: ·
ONLY-TlfE.s (A, B) iff iBI = I & B � A Note that this quantifier ONLY-THE is the converse ofTHE,g: THEsg (A, B) iff IAI = I & A � B
ONLY-THE,s (A, B) iff !AI = 1 & B � A Note that this definition leaves the contribution of THE untouched. Yet it would be completely parallel to the case of 'all the' if we look upon ALL-THE as the composition of ALL and THE,g where the latter is defined as follows: THE,s (A, B) iff !AI - I & A � B Whether this account of 'only the' is correct depends on whether sentences such as
(6) Only the pilot, if anybody at all, was asleep are grammatical and non-contradictory. I would say that (6) is an acceptable sentence. We should extend the analysis to proper names now. Proper name denota tions are entities, members of D, not generalized quantifiers. However, proper names can be raised to generalized quantifier level. JOHN, then, is the set of John's properties: JOHN = {X � DljE X} We now defme a generalized quantifier for each proper name a ONLY-PN. = {X � DI X = {a} and defme further ONLY-PN. (A,B) iff A - {a} & B � A ONLY-PN., basically, is the set of singleton properties that a has. Still , the second argument may be empty. Again we have to check our intuitions about sentences such as (7) Only John, if anybody at all, slept
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Note further that the quantifier THE,g is closely related to ALL: the difference is in the cardinality claim on the first argument with THE that is lacking with ALL. Yet there is something unsatisfactory about this solution: the definition of ONLY-THE does not require that the first argument be a singleton set as well. Another natural definition is
I04 'Only' as a determiner and generalized quantifier
Still a different case is the 'numeral-only' as we find it in sentences such as (8) Only three pilots are sleeping Again we introduce a quantifier ONLY-THREE (A, B) iff iAJ = 3 & B = A This definition runs parallel to the definition of ONLY-THE. Again, the crucial question is whether sentences such as (9) Only three pilots, if anybody at all, slept
(ro)
As
few as three pilots slept
in the sense of: three pilots slept and that number is smaller than we may have expected. Here the set of pilots is a subset of the set of sleepers, and not vice versa. Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to hold that we find this kind of 'only' only with numerals. In the other three cases we discussed, the bare plural 'only', the proper name 'only', and the definite description 'only', there was no numeral. We cannot replace 'only the pilot' in (3 ) and 'only John' in (6) by 'as few as the pilot' and 'as few as John'. SJAAK DE MEY Institute for General Linguistics Oude Kijk in 't Jat Straat 26 97 I 2 EK Groningen Netherlands
N O TES I We use the sign 'b' for the subset relation. Later on (Section 3 ) we will also use this sign for the partial order in a lattice. No confusions should arise from this systematic ambiguity. 2 The Boolean character of NL has been extensively demonstrated in the literature. Compare Keenan & Faltz (I984), Zwarts (I986}. We trust that the
3
reader is familiar with the concepts of lattices in general and Boolean algebras in particular and, hence, we will not discuss the structure of such types of sets in detail A relation R is reflexive iff for all X � D: R (X, X). A relation R is antisymmetric iff for all X, Y � D: R (X, Y} & R (Y, X) - X Y. A relation R is transitive iff for all X, =
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are accceptable. I must admit that my intuitions here are not as certain as in the other cases. My feeling is that (9) is a possible, but not very prominent reading of (8). But then, we should certainly not exclude the possibility that there are more senses of 'only', senses in which it is not the converse of 'all'. Note that instead of (8) we could also say
Sjaak de Mey I05
R
Here is a proof. From left to right: 1. A � B (HYP A � B & A � A (� is reflexive, PC 3· A � B & A � A - A � A n B (nGLB 4- A � A n B (MP 2,3 5· A n B � A (('\..LB 6. A e A n B [� is anti-symmetric, 4,5 2.
From right to left: 1. A '= A n B (HYP 2. A !; A [� is reflexive 3· A !; A n B [I ,2, substitution 4· A � A n B - A � A & A !; B (('\..GLB 5· A � B IFF A !; A & A � B (PC 6. A � A n B - A � B (4,5 7· A !; B (MP 3 ,6 8. A e A n B - A � B (I ,7 I I We already noted that the often discussed monotonicity properries of determiner denotations are also derivable (and, hence, should be derived) from the transitive character of the order in a Boolean algebra. I2 To be sure, there are more collocations than we discuss here, e.g. we also have 'only' as a VP-modifier as in ' We can only pray'. We cenainly do not claim that in all cases where 'only' can be used only one analysis of 'only' can be given. Nor do we claim that one and the same analysis should hold for all possible occurrences of 'only'. The only sense of 'only' we are concerned with here is the Boolean ONLY which is the converse of ALL. Note that in 'we can only pray' 'only' also seems to be the converse of 'all'; compare 'all we can do is pray'. That is,
ALL ( WE-CAN-DO, PRAY) = ONLY (PRAY, WE-CAN-DO)
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R (B, C) - R (A, C). is non-reflexive if not for all X � D: (X, X) e R, and irreflexive iff for no X � D: (X , X) e R Similarly for the other properties. 4 Determined NPs denote the image set of the denotation of their Detenniner for their head noun denotation: � frn.Det N) � = (X � Dl DET(N , X) ) and, hence, are in a sense derivable from determiner denotations. Put differently, the logic of detennined NPs is a proper pan of the logic of detenniners. Subject detenniners have quantifier relations as denotations whereas object determiners are quantifier operations. 6 Compare what was said at the end of Section 2.1. Note funhermore that in this definition EN, IN, DU, n and u are operations defined over quantifiers, not properties. They are operations of Boolean quantifier algebras, not propeny algebras. Due to the Boolean character, however, they are really the same operations as the corresponding operations of propeny algebras. 7 A relation R is L-decreasing iff for all X, Y, Z � D: R (X, Y) & Z � X - R (Z, Y) and R-incteasing iff R (X, Y) & Y !; Z R (X, Z). These properries themselves are sets of relations, hence quantifiers. 8 More fully written out we have in the first line that A � (B n C) & (B n C) !; B - A � B. and A � (B n C) & (B n C) !; C - A � C. 9 That is, B � (B v C) & (B v C) £:; A - B £:; A, and C � (B v C) & (B v C) !; A - C f:; A I O Use is being made of the theorem saying that A � B iff A = A n B Y, Z � D: R (A, B) &
1o6 O nly '
'
as
a determiner and generalized quantifier
RE FERE N CE S determiners', Linguistics and Philosophy, 9, 3 = 2 5 3 -)26.
Mey, S. de (1990), Determiner Logic, or the Grammar of the NP. PhD. diss, University of Groningen. Montague, R (1974), 'English as a Formal Language', in: R Thomason (ed): Formal Philosophy, Selected Papers of Richard Mon tague , Yale University Press, New Haven and London. Zwarts, F. (1986), 'Categoriale grammatica en Algebrai:sche Semantiek', Ph.D. diss., University of Groningen.
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Atlas, J. (1989), 'Topic/comment, presup position, logical form, and focal stress implicatures', article read at the Focus Workship at the Fraunhofer Institut fiir Arbeitswirtschaft und Organisation, 2830 June 1989. Benthem, J. van (1986), Essays in Logical Semantics, Reidel, Dordrecht. Keenan, E. & L. M Faltz (1984), Boolean Semantics for Natural Language , Reidel, Dordrecht. Keenan, E. & J. Stavi (1 986), 'A semantic characterization of natural language
© Nl.S. Foundation (1991)
journal ofSmtantics 8: 107-us
External and Verb Phrase Negations in Actual Dialogues R OB T. P. WI C H E University ofLeiden Absuact
1 EVENT L O G I C In this section I will say a few words about event logic. My version of event logic
is heavily inspired by a paper of Parsons (198 ;) and, to a lesser degree, by some papers by Marrin (198 1a,b). Martin says that the explicit need for linguistic purposes for variables for
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Negations play an important role in actual dialogues. If one participant of a dialogue is negating an utterance of the other participant (or is uttering a sentence that entails a negation of an utterance of the other participant), there occurs a verbal conflict between the parti cipants} This conflict is resolved as soon as a participant is forced (only by verbal means, of course) to give up a sentence so that there is no longer a conflict. In recent theories about.negation a distinction is rather often made between two different kinds of negation.2 Gabbay & Moravcsik (1978) and Hoepelman (1979) make a distinction between (sentence) negation and denial. Gabbay and Moravcsik motivate their distinction as follows: 'That the negation of a true proposition takes us to a false one, is one of the early . lessons in elementary logic. Sentence negation is important for logic, for it gives us general ways of characterizing contradictoriness, and thus helps us formulating such basic laws as the law of non contradiction. In everyday discourse however, negative sentences are used to formulate denials of various sorts. In fact, even the notion of a denial is too narrow; denial, objection, criticism, etc. are all everyday activities the point of which is to say: "No, it is not like this; rather, it is like that." '3 Jacobs (1982) distinguishes between 'kontrastierende Negation' and 'nicht kontrastierende Negation', and Hom (1985, 1989) between Truth functional (descriptive, logical) negation and Metalinguistic (non-descriptive, non-logical) negation. Barrh & Wiehe (1986) distinguish between three kinds of negation: Exclusion negation, Choice negation and Discrepancy negation. I will try to combine all these approaches. In the style ofJacobs I will make a distinction between Contrasting Negation (Cneg) and Non-Contrasting Negation (NCneg). Cneg has to be divided in Choice negation and Metalinguistic negation. NCneg has to be divided in Exclusion negation and Verb Phrase negation. Verb Phrase negation corresponds roughly with the Discrepancy negation from Barth & Wiehe. NCneg is characterized formally by the negation operator '-' from classical, two-valued logic, Cneg by the metalingnistic operator '-KORR'. 'KORR' is Jacobs's correcmess operator. Event logic will be used as a valuable instrument for characterizing formally the difference between the different types of negation that are discussed in this paper.
108 External and verb phrase negations in acrual dialogues
events was first noted by C. S. Peirce.• Parsons states that the .idea that many sentences can be assigned logical fonns that make reference to, or quantify over, events, states and processes was first proposed by Hans Reichenbach, and was worked out in some detail by Donald Davidson.5 'One phenomenon that Davidson's account handles in a nice way has to do with certain adverbial modifiers (certain adverbs together with certain prepositiotial phrases functioning adverbially). Davidson's idea was that these modillers appear in logical fonns as predicates of events.'6 One advantage of event logic is that it accounts in an easy way for the fact that each of the following sentences
is generated by7 (4) Mary walks slowly in the back yard If we treat (4) as an untensed sentence, its logical form is {Ee}[(walk0Xe) & Agent(Mary0,e) & slowly0(e} & in°((the back yard)0, e) ]
(s)
The logical fonns of (1), (2) and (3) are the same as the logical form associated with (4) with one or more conjuncts dropped out. With the given method of symbolization, the inferences are valid in the ordinary predicate calculus. The brackets '(' and ')' around 'walk' are not used by Parons. I borrow them from Martin and use them to indicate that in ( s ) only '(walk0)(e)' represents an event; the event of walking. If we would not use these brackets, 'slowly0(e)' could be interpreted as 'e is an event ofslowly'. The variable 'e' in ( s ) ranges over events. 'Agent(Mary0, e)' means that Mary is the agent of the walking event, 'in 0((the back yard)0, e)' means that the location of the walking event is in the back yard. 2
C O O PERATIVE AND C O MPETITIVE DIALOGUES
Carlson (1984} makes a distinction between cooperative (agreement-seeking} and competitive (truth-seeking} games. The aim of the players in a cooperative game is 'to make their private lists match each other.'8 The aim of the players in the competitive game is 'optimally satisfied if the opponent is forced to unilaterally give up his conflicting assumptions and accept the other's view'.9 There is, however, one thing that both kind of dialogues have in common:
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( 1} Mary walks slowly Mary walks in the back yard (3) Mary walks
(2)
Rob T. P. Wiehe
109
Def. I p{p ') is forced with verbal means by p ' (p) to give up a sentence S in a dialogue D := p '{p) shows {proves) in D in a correct way that S is false or that the state ment S is not correct, or a person q of which the authority with respect to the truth value ofS is acknowledged by both p and p ' , claims that S is false. We all know that it is often not possible (for practical or theoretical reasons) to end a competitive phase of a discussion by forcing an opponent to give up a sentence. In that case the participants can decide to disregard their conflict for the moment and to continue the dialogue. In that situation there is a transition, too, from a competitive to a cooperative phase.
3
EXTERNAL NE GAT I O N {Extneg)
If there is an explicit verbal conflict between a statement 'S' of a participant p and a statement 'Not S' of the other participant p ' , and 'S' is uttered in the dialogue before 'Not S', we call the statement 'Not S' an external negation (Exmeg). If the only function is the conveying of new information, we call it a
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'Whether by cooperative information sharing or by competitive debate, the players attempt to make their sets of assumptions coincide.'10 The basic distinction I prefer to make is not between cooperative and competitive dialogues, but between cooperative and competitive puts of dialogues. Competitive parts are parts in which there is a 'conflict of avowed opinion'.1 1 Cooperative parts are parts in which there is no such explicit verbal conflict. Unless the participants decide that their dialogue will be a competitive one from the start, it seems a good working hypothesis to me that dialogues start as cooperative dialogues. As soon as there is a conflict of avowed opinions, the dialogue becomes competitive. If there is no longer such a conflict, the dialogue becomes cooperative again. The verbal conflict is resolved as soon as a participant gives up a sentence so that the conflict disappears. There are two possibilities here: ( I ) a participant is forced with verbal means to give up a sentence; (2) a participant voluntarily gives up a sentence. Negation plays an important role in all this. If one participant negates an utterance of the other participant (or utters a sentence that entails a negation of an utterance of the other participant), there is definitely a conflict of avowed opinions. This conflict is resolved as soon as a participant is forced with verbal means to give up a sentence so that the conflict disappears.
1 10
External and verb phrase negations in actual dialogues
Verb Phrase negation (Section 4). In this case there is no disagreement between the participants at all. There are three types of Extneg: Exclusion negation (Section 3-1 ), Choice negation (Section J.2), and Metalinguistic negation (Section J.J). 3.1
Exclusion negation ( Excluneg)
Kohl doesn't negotiate (7)
Kohl negotiates (6}
According to Mannoury, Exclusion negation is the oldest 1 3 function of negations. If we choose the following symbolization for (6): (8) negotiate*(Kohl*) the symbolization of (7) is (9) - negotiate*(Kohl*) The negation operator in (9) is as usual placed in front of rest of the sentence. The conjunction of (6} and (7) is, according to their symbolizations, an explicit contradiction. R1 A negative statement 'Not F' of a participant p (p ' ) in a dialogue D is an Excluneg, with symbolization '- F' if and only if I . 'Not F' is a reaction of p (p ) upon an earlier statement 'F' in the same dialogue D of p ' (p). 2. p (p ) does not suggest or present an alternative for F. '
'
Sometimes a person explains why he or she makes a certain (negative) state ment. Consider, for example, the following dialogue: p p' The king of Romania is rich ( 1 o) The king of Romania is not rich (ua), for Romania does not have a king ( I I b)
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Gerrit Mannoury (1 867-19S6}, Dutch philosopher and intellectual leader of the Signifies Movement in the Netherlands, was the Hrst to make an explicit distinction between Exclusion negation (from now on: Excluneg} and Choice negation (Choiceneg). An Excluneg rejects something without putting an alternative in its place. The attention is concentrated entirely on the possibility which is excluded.12 We see an example of an Excluneg in the following dialogue: p' p
Rob T. P. Wiehe
I II
an interpretation of ( u ) , and other sentences of this type, I choose (with '- R' and '- K' as abbreviations for 'The present king of Romania is not rich' and 'Romania does not have a king'). 14
As
(12) - R BECAUSE!FOR - K My symbolization of (12) is 15
{I 3) - K & (- K - - R) 3 .2
Choice negation ( Choiceneg)
Kohl negotiates (6) Kohl doesn't negotiate (7) Kohl bargains (I 4) The utterances of (7) and (I4) together form an example of Choiceneg. In this paper I will not choose (9) as an interpretation of (7). Instead I will choose another way to symbolize (7) and (I 4) which is borrowed from event logic. 17 The symbolizations are
(I s ) - (Ee)[During(e, now0) & (negotiate0Xe) & Agent(Kohl0, e) ] (I6) (Ee)[During(e, now0) & (bargain°Xe) & Agent(Kohl0, e) ] In the classical, two-valued, logic, we may replace (I s) by
(I7) (Ve)[- During(e, now0) v - (bargain°Xe) v - Agent(Kohl0, e) ] The following sentence (IS} follows logically from (I S) and (I6) (Ee)[During(e, now0) & -(negotiate0Xe) & (bargain°Xe) & Agent(Kohl0, e) ] There is a great advantage in this way of symbolizing sentences. We translate (7) as an external negation and can deduct from the symbolizations {I S) and {I6) another sentence in which the negation operator does not have the maximum scope, and that can be seen as a translation of (7) and (I 4) together, or as a trans lation of the sentence
{I9) Kohl doesn't negotiate, but bargain
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A Choiceneg presupposes the distinction of two alternatives. By rejecting one of these alternatives, one simultaneously afHrms the other. The attention of speaker and hearer is divided over both alternatives.16 The following dialogue offers an example of a Choiceneg. Metalinguistic negations are treated in the following section. p' p
I 12
External and verb phrase negations in actual dialogues
If a participant of a dialogue can choose between Excluneg and Choiceneg, the Choiceneg is the most cooperative choice.
R2 A negative statement 'Not F, (but} G' of a participant p in a dialogue D is a Choiceneg, with symbolization '- F & G', if and only if r . 'Not F, (but} G' is a reaction of p upon an earlier statement 'F' of the
2. 3·
other participant p', and The interpretation '- F & G' doesp't lead to a contradiction and is not counterintuitive. The interpreter of the statement 'Not F, (but) G' believes that the speaker presents 'G' as an epistemic alternative for 'F'.
Metalinguistic negation (Mlneg)
Not all negations of the type 'Not-F, (but} G' are examples of Choiceneg. Consider, for instance, the following sentences
(20) It is not possible, it is necessary that Havel is right (2 1 } Gorbachev did not solve some problems, he solved all of them (22) Ceaucescu did not pass away, he was killed Van der Sandt's comment18 on sentences of this type is:
On the standard translation all these sentences amount to plain contradiction. And since the implicarures denied do uncontroversially not contribute to the semantic content and thus cannot be sensitive to logical operators, it is difficult to see how the prediction of contra dictoriness can be avoided. The problem is of course that none of the above sentences is con tradictory. They are all easily interpretable as a refusal to accept a previous utterance because of the implicarures invoked.19 Hom calls these negations 'metalinguistic negations' (from now on: Mlneg). This kind of negation is 'not reducible to a truth functional one place connective with the familiar truth table for negation, nor is it definable as a separate logical operator; it represents, rather, a metalinguistic device for registering objection to a previous utterance (not proposition} on any grounds whatever, including the way it was pronounced'.20 Jacobs knows this type of sentences, too.21 Choiceneg and Mlneg are in his terminology both contrasting negations (KN). Jacobs uses the operators KORR (for 'korrekt'} and AD (for 'adaquat'} in his characterization of KN. All these negations have as their general formula22
(23) - KORRa & E1 �1 .E1 �n KORRallt...lln •
•
The operator 'KORR' (an abbreviation of 'korrekt'} is defined as follows:
(24) KORR a = [ a & AD a ) .
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3·3
Rob T. P. Wiehe
1 13
'ADa' is true 'genau dann . . . , wenn a im angedeutenden (und dann nariirlich zu explizierenden) Sinn inhaltlich adaquat ist'. The first conjunct of (23) is true if .{\!)a is true, but also if - a is t;r!le.23 jacobs admits that the left parts of sentences like (20) , (21), (22) can be represented by '- ADa', but he adds 'Damit ergibt sich allerdings noch keine allgemeine logische Repriisencation fiir KN, denn diese Negationsart kann ja durchaus auch wahrheitsfimktional gebraucht werden, wie z.B in (4.54d)'.24
Nicht Lulse bewunden Peter, sondern Gerda
(25)
- CORR{I-F) & G
Instead ofJacobs (24), I suggest (24 ) CORR(I-F) = F & AD(I-F) '
Sometimes, as in (2o) and (21), it is known that the following sentence is also true
From (25) and (25 '), the next sentence follows in classical two-valued logic: (25 ) (F & G) & - AD(I-F) '
So not only (25) but al�o (25 •') holds for (20) and (2 1).
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For this reason, Jacobs takes (23) as the general formula for KN. l am not sure that there is such a general logical representation of KN as Jacobs suggests. In my opinion (4.54d) is not about correctness at all, but about truth. If we disregard the internal structure of (4.54d), this sentence is of the type '- F & G'. Horn says that Dummett 'is on the right track in characterizing this use of negation (Mlneg, RW) as "a means of expressing an unwillingness to assen 'A', without necessarily constituting a willingness to deny 'A'. But 'Dum men's neo-Fregean representations, utilizing scope distinctions to account for the difference between the two ways in which negation can be understood, may not be sufficiently general or generalisable. While "(1-(not A)" may be unobjectionable for descriptive (propositional) negation, it is not dear that a representation like "not (1-A)" can be interpreted coherently for all cases in this chapter'.25 Pragmatical adequacy and (pragmatical) correctness are not predicates of sentences, but predicates of statements. For this reason, I prefer 'ADI-F' above 'AD F' and 'KORRI-F' above 'KORR F'. As a formula for (20), (21) or (22) ), I suggest, combining ideas ofJacobs and Dummett ('CORR' corresponds with Jacobs' 'KORR'· operator):
1 14 External and verb phrase negations in actual dialogues As a rule for Mlneg, I
suggest:
R3 A negative statement 'Not F, (but) G' of a participant p (p ) in a dialogue D is a Mlneg, with the symbolization '- (CORR(rF} & G' if and only if 1 . The statement is a reaction of p (p ) upon an earlier statement 'P of the other participant p (p ); and 2. The s�tement is not a Choiceneg. 1
1
1
The symbolization of (2o) is (disregarding tense)26 (26) - CORRrPoss (Ee) [(righteo) (e) & Agent(Haveleo, e) ] & Nee (Ee) [(righteo)(e) & Agent(Haveleo, e) )
( I I a) The king of Romania is not rich
The external Russelian symbolization of ( I I a) is, as everybody knows
( I 1 a ) - (Ex) (Kx & ( 'Vy) (Ky - y=x) & Bx) 1
The ordinary symbolization of (ub) Romania does not have a king lS
(ub i ) - (Ex) (Kx) It is a well-known fact that in a classical, two-valued logic ( I 1 a ) follows from ( I I b ) So it is not true in this case that 'the descriptive reading self-destructs'. Consequently, there is no need to call (ua) a metalinguistic negation. In my opinion, (na) is an Excluneg (see Section 3.I). 1
1
.
4 VE RB PHRASE NEGAT I O N (VP neg) Consider the following start of a dialogue p
I
p Kohl doesn't negotiate
(7)
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Horn makes a distinction between Truth functional (descriptive, logical) and Metalinguistic (non-descriptive, non-logical) negation. About the relation between these two kinds of negation, he makes the following true remark: 'there is a procedural sense in which the descriptive use of negation is primary: the nonlogical metalinguistic understanding is typically available only on the "second pass", when the descriptive reading self-destructs.'27 Because of this remark, I fmd it a bit surprising that Horn considers sentences of the following type Metalinguistic negations.28
Rob T. P. Wiehe
II5
The only function of (7) in this case is the conveying ofnew information. As the interpretation of (7) in this situation I choose the following formulation. (27) (Ee) [- {During(e . now>��<Xe) } & Agent(Kohl>�< , e) ] This symbolization expresses the fact that (7) gives new negative information about Kohl. In (27) only the (linguistic) predicate is negated. Therefore (27) is called verb phrase negation (VPneg). A disadvantage of these symbolizations of (7) is that (z8) does not follow directly from (27) and (16). To make sure that (18) follows from (27) and (16), I introduce the next meaning postulate for VPneg.
MPI states that an Excluneg is materially implicated by a VPneg. The opposite does not hold. My rule for VPneg is: R4 A negative statement '1t>�< doesn't (didn't do, shall not do) ()>��< ,e ) ] - (Ee) [P(e, t) & (d>�------ VPneg
(Ee) [- [ During (e, now•) & <Walk"> (el & Agent (Kohl•, e))
}
- (Eel [During (e, now•) & <walk•> (e) & Agent (Kohl•, e))
yes
Choiceneg For example, in:
Kohl doesn't walk. but run
- (Ee) [During (e, now•) & <Walk•> (e) & Agent (Kohl•, e)) (Ee) [During(e , now•) & (e ) & Agent (Kohl•, e)) or: (Eel [During (e, now•) & - <walk•> (e) & (e) & Agent (Kohl•, e))
no
MLneg For example, in:
Kohl doesn't walk. but talk
- CORR (Ee) [During (e, now•) & <walk•> (e) & Agent (Kohl•, e)) & lEe) [During Ie. now•) & le ) & Agent IKohi•.• e )J
Figure 2
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no
>------ Excluneg
122 External and verb phrase negations in actual dialogues
From these examples we see that quantificated sentences, too, can be translated in the symbolic language of event logic.
7 C O NCLUS I O NS The flowchart depicted in Figure 1 can be helpful in discovering which kind of negation a certain sentence/statement is, while Figure 3 gives a fairly complete classification of the different kinds of negation. NEGATIONS
- sentences with
� �
Extneg
NPI - sentences with morphologically incorporated negations. - sentences that do
VPneg
Only non-atomic
Atomic and non
sentences
atomic sentences
1---..
Choice Neg
Mlneg
not have their literal meaning ('Jan is geen Iicht').
I
Excluneg
Figure 3
The main differences between the Mlneg, Choiceneg, Excluneg and VPneg are listed in Figure 4· From the examples we saw the Mlneg always consists from at least two atomic sentences. The same holds for Choiceneg. Only Exduneg and VPneg can be atomic sentences. VPneg is not a correction of a previous utterance, and a fortiori not a sentence that is contradicting a previous utterance. Mlneg is a correction, but not a contradiction, of a previous utterance. I can hardly imagine that (20) (21 ) or (22) are used as opening sentences of a dialogue. Choiceneg and Excluneg are contradicting a previous utterance, and are a fortiori corrections of a previous utterance. The only negation that does not give or suggest new information is Exduneg. VPneg is the only negation in which the negation operator may not be placed in front. In Choiceneg we may place the negation operator in front. ,
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sentences in which the analysis depends only on the form of the sentence.
Sentences in which the analysis depends on form of the sentence and on the context of the uttering of the sentence
Rob T. P. Wiehe 123
'\�
an atomic sentence
E X
t n e
g
Ml neg
Choice neg Excluneg
VP-
Contradicts previous )Jtterance
Gives or suggests new information
Negation operator has to be placed in front
no
yes
no
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes/no
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
no
no
yes
no
Figure 4
However, we can deduct from a Choiceneg another sentence that can be considered also as a Choiceneg and that does not have a negation sign in front The negation operator has to be placed in front in an Exduneg and in an Mlneg. There is a formal difference between Excluneg and VPneg. A VPneg is of the type (Ee)[ - {P(e, t) & (d*)(e)) & Agen�7t0, e) ] , an Exduneg of the type - (Ee)[P(e, t) & (d*)(e) & Agen�7t0, e )]. According to the meaning postulate (MP,), Excluneg follows from VPneg. The opposite does not hold. The formal difference between Exduneg and VPneg has to be analysed as a difference of scope of the negation operator. The most negative sentences (excluding the negations in Section s ) are ambiguous, and can be interpreted as an Exmeg or as a VPneg. If the function of the corresponding statement is that of correcting another sentence, it is an Extneg; otherwise it is a VPneg. ROB T. P. WICHE J. S. Bachstraat 20 3 5 3 3 XC Utrecht Netherlands
N O TES 1
Compare the following short dialogue: p: Mitterand walks p ' : And he doesn't have his shoes on p ' gives new information about Mitre rand and his utterance doesn't contradict or correct p's utterance.
2 And not only in recent theories. See Hom (1989: 140, 141). 3 Gabbay & Moavcsik. (1978: 251). 4 Martin (1981a: 2). 5 Parsons (1985: 23 5). 6 ibid.: 236. 7 See Parsons, l.c.
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neg
Corrects a previous utterance
I24 External and verb phrase negations in actual dialogues
....
·
I9 Van der Sandt (1988). My examples are based on those of Van der Sandt 20 Hom (I98 5 : I21). 2I Jacobs (I982: 309). 22 ibid.: 3 I 3. 23 ibid.: 3 I 3· 24 ibid.: 3 I 3 , 301. 25 Hom (I989: 42I). 26 'Poss' and 'Nee' are short for 'possible' and 'necessary'. 27 Hom (I989: 443 , 444). 28 ibid.: 444- Hom's own example is (what else should one expect?): The king of France is not bald. As an example of descriptive negation, he ofers: The queen of England is not bald. 29 Carlson (I984: 308). 30 I.e. 3 I Carlson: 309. 32 Carlson: 321. 3 3 I.e. 34 I.e. 35 I.e. 36 Seuren (I98 5: 230). 37 Seuren: 235. 38 Seuren: 232.
RE FE RE N C E S and pragmatic ambiguity', Language, 61: Barth, E. M & E. C. W. Krabbe (I982), From 12I-74· Axiom to Dialogue, de Gruyter, Berlin. Barth, E. M & R T. P. Wiehe (I986), Hom, L. R (I989), A Natural History of Negation , Chicago UP, Chicago. Problems, Functions and Semantic Roles, de Jacobs, J. (I982), Syntax und Semantik der Gruyter, Berlin. Negation im Deutschen , Fink, Munich. Carlson, L. (I984), 'Focus and dialogue games', in L. Vaina and J. Hintikka (eds), Krabbe, E. C. W. (I985), 'Argumentatie in formele discussies', in W. K.. B. Koning Cognitive Constraints on Communication , Reidel, Dordrecht (ed.), Taalbeheersing in theorie en praktijk , Foris, Dordrecht, I 2o-8. Gabbay, D. M & J. M Moravcsik (I978), 'Negation and denial', in F. Guenthner & Mannoury, G. (I934). 'Die signifi.schen Grundlagen der Mathematik', Erkenntnis C. Rohrer (eds), Studies in formal semantics, North-Holland, Amsterdam. 4: 288, 309 and 3 I 7-45· Hoepelman, J. Ph. (I979), 'Negation and Mannoury, G. (I943), 'La question vitale: "A denial in Montague grammar', Theoretical ou B" ', Nieuw Archief Wiskunde, a i : Linguistics , 6: I9I-209. 16o-7. Hom, L. R (1985). 'Metalinguistic negation Martin, R M (I98u), 'On Logico linguistics:
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8 Carlson (1984: 301). According to Carl son, a dialogue is represented by a 'two column list of sentences, each side listing sentences successively uttered or written down by one of the dialogue participants'. In addition, each player has a private list, not seen by the other player. In this list 'again on one side, are entered the player's own assumptions at each stage of the game. On the opposite side, the player enters assumptions that he takes the other player to make or have made in this game' (3oo). 9 ibid.: 301. IO Carlson, I.e. 1 1 See Barth & Krabbe (1982: 32). The notion 'conflict of avowed opinions' is important in this book. I2 ibid.: 171. 1 3 Mannoury (I943: 3 3 3). I4 See Krabbe (1985: 1 24) and Wiehe (I988: I89)· I 5 See the previous note. The operator ' ' has to be read as 'If . . . , then'. I6 Barth & Wiehe (I986: I74). I7 See Section 1. I8 Jacobs (I982: 308) makes a similar com ment
Rob T. P. Wiehe 125 structure and transformation', Logico Linguistic Papers, Foris, Dordrecht, I-I 9· Martin, R M (198Ib), 'On the analysis of action sentences', Logico Linguistic Papers, Foris, Dordrecht, 1 55-69. Parsons, T. (1985), 'Underlying events in the logical analysis of English', in E. Le Pore & B. P. McLaughlin (eds), Actions and Events, Blackwell, Oxford, 23 5-67. Seuren , P. A. M (1985), Discourse Semantics , Blackwell, Oxford.
Van der Sandt, R A. (1988), 'Discourse systems and echo quotation', Nijmegen (internal report), I-33Wiche, R T. P. (1988), 'Over het onderscheid russen argumentatieve en formele discussies', Tijdschrift voor taalbeheersing, 10: lli- 3 I .
Zwarts, F. (1986), 'Categoriale Grammatica en Algebraische Sexnantiek', Ph.D. thesis, University of Groningen.
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Journal oj&mantics 8: 127-147
© N.l.S. Foundation (1991)
Topic/Comment, Presupposition, Logical Form and Focus Stress Implicatures: Tl?-e Case of Focal Particles only and also JAY DAVID ATLAS Pomona College, Claremont and The Institutefor Advanced Studies, Princeton Abstract
PETE R GEA C H ' S EXC L U S I O N A N ALYS I S A N D I T S DEFECTS Sherwood's semantic intuition was straightforward. The statement Only Socrates is running [R (ONLY s)] seems to assert Socrates is running and no one other than Socrates is running [R(s) & ..., (� )(x�s & Rx) ]. Thus Only Socrates is running
E
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In Chapter I 2 of the thirteenth-century Oxford logician William of Sherwood's Treatise on Syncategorematic Words ( Syncategoremata) , Sherwood discusses the word only ( tantum) , which in the example Only Socrates is running indicates, according to Sherwood, 'how much of the subject is under the predicate-viz. that the subject Socrates and no more is under it. In that case it is an exclusive word' (Sherwood 1968: 8 I ). In Chapter 7 of the twentieth-century English logician Peter Geach's (I 9621! 980) Reference and Generality , Geach discusses the words only and alone , remarking that medieval logicians 'were gready interested in exclusive proposi tions, but their treatment of them was on the whole superficial. This comes out in their having generally accepted the idea that exclusive propositions were exponible as conjunctions �socrates alone is wise", say, as �socrates is wise and nobody besides (other than) Socrates is wise" . . . If the force of che exclusive proposition is to exclude everything other than what is named in or by the subject-term from �sharing in the predicate", that is no reason for reading in an implication that something named by the subject-term does "share in the predicate" ' (Geach I9621I98o: 208-9). This dispute between English logicians across seven centuries has been echoed in recent and influential work by the Anglo-American philosopher H Paul Grice and by linguists, notably Laurence Hom in his (I 969) 'A Presuppositional Analysis of ONLY and EVEN', in his (I989) treatise A Natural History ofNegation , Lauri Kamunen and Stanley Peters in their (I 979) 'Conventional Implicature', and Josef Taglicht in his (I 984) book Message and Emphasis: On Focus and Scope in English . In this paper I shall argue that neither Sherwood, with his conjunction analysis of Onlyx is F, nor Geach, with his non-conjunctive analysis, nor Hom, with his presuppositional analysis, nor Taglicht, with his conjunction analysis of only and his conventional implicature analysis of also and even , have accounted for the semantic and pragmatic facts, for their analyses have failed to integrate linguistic facts about topic and focus, about entailments, and about Gricean (I975, 1989) 'implicatures'. By reconsidering their views I hope to show how a more coherent account can be achieved. In the course of this paper I will offer my own analysis, building on what I have learned from theirs and, 1 hope, improving on them.
128 The case of focal particles only and also
entails Socrates is running [R (ONLY s) II- R( s) ]. And on the usual, classical assumptions about individual constants, and the usual expectation about proper names, Socrates is running will entail Someone is running [ R( s) 11(l:x) ( Rx) ]. So, by transitivity Only Socrates is running entails Someone is running. It is to this claim that Peter Geach objects (Geach 1962!1980: 208): It is formally much more convenient to treat the exclusive proposition as having precisely the exclusive force of its supposed second component, and not to read 'F(only 8)' as implying 'F(some 8)' (i.e. in the degenerate case where 'El' is taken to be a single proper name, as implying 'F(El)') . . . 'F(only 8)' will thus be true when 'F( )' is true of nothing at all; for 'F(x) ' will then not be true for any interpretation of 'x' as a proper name, let alone its being true for some interpretation in which 'x' names something not named in or by '8'.
names something that is named in or by 'El'.
This means that 'F(only a)' is true iff ....., (l:x) (x;Fa & Fx), i.e. nothing other than a is F. So if nothing is an F, nothing other than a is F, and 'F(only a)' is true. Suppose that our domain of quantification D is finite, e.g. D = {a , b , c , . . . z} , and let us suppose that No one is running is true. Now consider the statement Only a, b, c, . . ., z are running. According to Geach's analysis, that statement is true iff no one other than a , b , c , . . . , z is running [....., (l:x) ( x;Fa & x;Fb . . . x;Fz & Rx) ]. Of course, if no one is running, Only a, b, c, . . ., z are running will be true, even though a , b , . . . , z are everyone, each of whom is not running! And that is surely an absurd assignment of truth-value to Only a, b, c, . . ., z are running. The problem does not arise for Sherwood, because on his analysis, Only a, b, c, . . ., z are running is true iff a , b , c , . . . , z are running and no one other than they is running. When not one of a , b , c , . . . , z is running, the first conjunct is false, and so Only a, b, c, . . ., z are running is false. The problem that Geach and Sherwood fail to note is one independent of the size or character of the domain of quantification. It is a linguistic fact. Consider the sentence *Only everyone is running. This is an ungrammatical sentence of English. If one states Only a, b, c, . . . are running, one 'implies' that not everyone is running, i.e. that someone is not running. One 'implies' that 'a , b , c , . . .' does not list everyone. Likewise the sentences, *Not only everyone is running, *It is not the case that only everyone is running, are ungrammatical English sentences, and likewise if one states It is not the case that only a, b, c, . . . are running, Not only a, b, c, . . . are running , one 'implies' that 'a , b , c , . . .' does not list everyone. To simplify, what is GRAMMATICALLY PRESUPPOSED by Only a is F is a is not everyone [ (l:x) ( x;Fa) ] , that, on the assumption that 'a' is non vacuous, there are at least two things in the domain of quantification D. We may put the PRESUPPOSITION this way: There is someone other than a. So far, we have:
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Geach's (1962!1980: 207) truth-condition was simply: F(only 8)' is true iff no interpretation of 'x' as a proper name makes 'F(x) ' true unless 'x'
Jay David Atlas 1 29
Only a is F GRAMMATICAL PRESUPPOSillON: There is someone other than a. ASSERTION: (i) No one other than a is F (ii) a is F (?)
2
WHAT I S ' a is F '?
A Horn� defense ofthe presupposition analysis Hom (I¢9) has provided a paradigmatic example of a presuppositional analysis. His view is this: {HORN)
Only a is F PRESUPPOSITION: a is F [Fa ] ASSERTION: No one other than a is F [....., (l:x) ( x:la & Fx) ]
He has one claim and one argument in favor of this view. The first is a claim about two negative sentences, (I) and (2) below: (I) It's not true that only Muriel votedfor Hubert. (2) Not only Muriel votedfor Hubert. These sentences, Hom (I¢9: 99) claims, are mutual paraphrases. Hom then argues that the following continuations of {I)/(2) are acceptable or unaccept able as marked: (3)
a.
. . . Lyndon did too. b. . . . Somebody else did as well, but Iforget who. c. . . . �she didn't. d. . . � The election never took place. .
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Geach and Sherwood have disagreed whether (ii) a is F belongs in the assertion, but they are agreed that (i) No one other than a is F does belong. I havejust argued that on the standard logical interpretation of the truth-conditions for (i), as given by Geach, absurd consequences can follow. It is not possible for the truth-conditions of Only a is F to be specified by (i) alone. Something else is required, contrary to Geach's view. The question is, what is it? Is it a is F ? If it is, is the proposition asserted, as Sherwood and Taglicht (I984: 87-8) believe, or 'presupposed', as Hom {I969: 99) believes, 'conventionally implicated' as Kart tunen and Peters {I979) believe, or none of these, as I believe?
I 30
The case of focal particles only and also
B
Problems with the presupposition analysis
Consider the statement Only Socrates is Socrates, a logical, but not very interesting thing to say. On Horn's analysis, we would have:
Only Socrates is Socrates. ASSERTION: No one other than Socrates is Socrates (-. (l:x) (x�s & x=s) ] PRESUPPOSITION: Socrates is Socrates [s=s]
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Now, I admit that there is something very odd about ?? Not only Muriel votedfor Hubert. The election never took place. And the explanation is that the Hrst statement presupposes that there was an election, which the second statement then denies. There is also something odd about ?Not only Muriel votedfor Hubert. She didn't. Horn believes that the explanation of the oddity is the same: the Hrst presupposes that Muriel voted for Hubert, which the second then denies. Since one may naturally infer Muriel votedforHubert from Only Muriel voiedfor Hubert as well, Horn takes Muriel votedfor Hubert to be 'presupposed' by the affirmative and negative sentences. One might Hrst consider whether the data will be as convincing for the other negative sentence: It's not true that only Muriel votedfor Hubert. The election never took place. I confess that I Hnd this much more linguistically acceptable than the 'Not only . . .' sentence. How about It's not true that only Muriel votedfor Hubert. She didn't. ? I don't Hnd that linguistically unacceptable at all. Horn explains the linguistic oddity of (3c) as a case of presupposition violation as in (3d). But the mere oddity of (3c), even in the case of the 'Not only' sentence, does not prove that it is a case of presupposition violation. There might be another explanation of the oddity of (3c). (In fact, there is, and I shall give it later in this paper.) I draw two conclusions. First, (1) and (2) are probably not mutual para phrases, contrary to Horn's intuitive claim. Second, no argument has been provided that the only explanation for the oddity of (3c) is a presupposition violation. The data simply show it to be a possibility. Nevertheless, on the basis of that claim and those data, Horn suggests his presuppositional analysis of Only a is F. Since the ASSERTORIC component alone is held by Horn (1969: 105) to determine entailment relations and truth conditions (which determine the truth-value T or lF when the presupposition is T), his suggestion for the ASSERTION in Only a is F faces the difficulty that I raised against Peter Geach. It would be absurd to take the statement Only a, b, c, . . . are running to be true in the case that I described in Section I . But the view that Only a is F has the presupposition a is F also leads to difficulties.
Jay David Atlas
I3 I
(i) I described myself truly;
(ii) what I said must be false (since I didn't regret that it was); (iii) what I said must be neither true nor false (since by (i) its presupposition is false).
From (i)-(iii) one can infer either that one cannot accept both the presupposi tional analysis of regret and the semantic concept of presupposition or that one cannot accept both the presuppositional analysis of regret and saying truly 'I don't regret that the statement I am now making is false'. If one is a presuppositionalist about verbs like regret, e.g. Hans Kamp, one
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This analysis makes the assertion of Only Socrates is Socrates into the assertion of a Hrst-order logical truth. Likewise, the assertion of Not only Socrates is Socrates would be the assertion of a Hrst-order logical falsehood Someone who is other than Socrates is Socrates [ (l:x) (x�s & x=s)J, and its presupposition would also be Socrates is Socrates [s=sV Whatever is being asserted in Not only Socrates is Socrates, it is linguistically absurd to identify the assertion with the logical contradiction Someone is identical to Socrates and not identical to Socrates , or with the equivalent Socrates is not Socrates , it being presupposed that Socrates is Socrates. When I assert Not only Socrates is Socrates , I am not asserting Socrates is not Socrates , or asserting Something is both identical and not identical to Socrates , even if what I do assert entails that Socrates is not Socrates. Furthermore, Hom's analysis implies that Not only Socrates is Socrates would possess mutually contradictory assertoric and presuppositional components, as would, on a similar analysis, the statement The king ofFrance does not exist. That statement might be thought to presuppose The king ofFrance exists , which on Strawson's (1 950) original view would make the negative existence statement true only if not true, and so necessarily not true (rather than, as it is in fact, contingently true). So statements whose assertoric and presuppositional parts contradict each other, particularly ones that presuppose their own untruth, are very peculiar statements. Whatever the peculiarity of Not only Socrates is Socrates , its peculiarity does not seem to be one of asserting a logical contradiction while simultaneously presupposing a trivial truth that is the direct denial of what is being asserted. Another interesting case of this kind is The Paradox of the Regretter: I don't regret that the statement I am now making isfalse. That assertion would presuppose that what I am stating in the assertion is false, so it would presuppose that I do regret that the statement I was making, when I made the statement, was false. On the semantic concept of presupposition and on the presuppositional analysis of regret, if in saying 'I don't regret that the statement I am now making is false' I didn't regret that the statement I was making was false, the�:
I 32
The case offocal particles only and also
will
C The essential issue Hom's presuppositional analysis leads us to make false predictions of linguistic anomaly in sentences; the anomalies fail to materialize. We were led to consider the consequences of Only Socrates. is Socrates presupposing Socrates is Socrates because we wished to examine the question whether Only Socrates is running presupposes Socrates is running. The conclusion I draw from my discussion is that Socrates is Socrates is not presupposed by Not only Socrates is Socrates or by Only Socrates is Socrates. Likewise, I doubt that the truth of a is F is presupposed by the statement Only a is F or by Not only a is F. But if it is not presupposed, what is its status? By contrast with Hom's analysis,
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want to maintain both the presuppositional analysis of the meaning of regret, namely that the regret statement presupposes that what is regretted is true, and the semantic conception of presuppositioiL But these are maintained at the cost of being committed to the claim that some mental descriptions are impossible to apply truly. The statement is paradoxical, i.e. contradictory, if and only if one accepts the presuppositional analysis of the meaning of regret sentences. Depending on one'sjudgement of the statement's contradictoriness, one would have linguistic evidence in favor of, or against, the presuppositional account of regret. Or one might decide just to give up the analysis in order to get rid of the paradox, an appealing solution. The puzzle of the presupposition of The king of France does not exist is a theoretical puzzle; the statement is not intuitively puzzling. The solution is to correct the theory (see Atlas 1 988). The thought that Not only Socrates is Socrates asserts a contradictory of its presupposition is also puzzling. Yet obviously nothing other than Socrates is Socrates-that is not puzzling, and obviously Socrates is Socrates-that is not puzzling. So the falsity of Not only Socrates is Socrates is not puzzling. But if it really asserts a contradictory of what it pre supposes , it should be a linguistically odd statement, e.g. ?The king ofFrance does not exist and he is bald. Yet it is not odd in that way. It just seems unoddly and logically false. On Hom's analysis Only Socrates is Socrates and Not only Socrates is Socrates both presuppose Socrates is Socrates. The former asserts the logical truth No one other than Socrates is Socrates ; the latter asserts the contradiction Something is Socrates and not Socrates. Hom's analysis predicts a linguistic anomaly in Not only Socrates is Socrates that fails to materialize: asserting a logical equivalent of Socrates is not Socrates and presupposing Socrates is Socrates. Whatever is peculiar about Not only Socrates is Socrates , that is not it.
Jay David Atlas
{HORN)
133
Only a is F PRESUPPOSITION: a is F ASSERTION: No one other than a is F.
with Geach's analysis, {GEACH)
Only a is F ASSERTION: No one other than a is F.
with Taglicht's and William of Sherwood's analysis, {TAGLICHT/ SHERWOOD)
my analysis, so far, is {ATLAS)
Only a is F GRAMMATICAL PRESUPPOSITION: There is someone other than a . ASSERTION: (i) No one other than a is F QQ ????????????????????
The fundamental issue facing the analysis at this point is the status of a is F. It is a significant feature of the analyses of Geach and Hom that Only a is F does not semantically entail a is F, while it is a feature of Sherwood's and Taglicht's analyses that Only a is F does entail a is F. In a recent reconsideration of the problem, Hom (1989: 248) takes the 'essential issue' to be this: 'Is only a negative in meaning and positive only by presupposition or implicature, or does it abbreviate a conjunction (only a = " a and nothing (other/more} than a )?' The intuition behind Hom's question is, as we have seen, that in, e.g. Only Muriel votedfor Hubert , the presupposition is the positive Muriel votedfor Hubert , while the assertion is the negative No one other than Muriel votedfor Hubert. On my view the first mistake was the claim that the presupposition is Muriel votedfor Hubert. Hom's arguments do not demonstrate that it is. The second mistake has been in the understanding of the logical form for No one other than Muriel votedfor Hubert. Geach's and Hom's logical form for No oneotherthan Muriel votedforHubert is ....., ('l:.x) (x¥m & V(x ,h) ) . This logical form is logically equivalent to {Ilx) ( V(x ,h) - x=m J ) . This means that at most Muriel voted for Hubert. If no one voted for Hubert, it is still true that at most Muriel voted for Hubert. The logical form is vacuously true, by reason of the truth of --o('l:.x) ( V (x ,h) ) , and so the ASSERTION part of OnlyMuriel votedfor Hubert would be true even if no one voted for Hubert. What would be false would be Hom's proposed presupposition that Muriel voted for Hubert. {How can the presupposition be false and yet the assertion true ? Hom {1¢9) would "
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Only a is F ASSERTION: a is F & no one other than a is F.
1 34
The case
of focal particles only and also
have to give up his logical analysis of the ASSERTION or give up the semantic concept of presupposition.)
3
THE PROBLEM O F ASSERT I O N AND LOGI C AL FORM: T O P I C AND F O C U S
-
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It seems to me that when one asserts 'Only Muriel voted for Hubert', or its negatives 'It's not true that only Muriel voted for Hubert' I 'Not only Muriel voted for Hubert', one is not presupposing, in the proper sense of that word, that Muriel voted for Hubert. Thus it is that Taglicht (1984: 88) noticed that the example below is 'hard to reconcile with the claim that the positive proposition in only sentences is not part of the assertion'. From this observation Taglicht infers that what is asserted may be represented by the conjunction of Hom's presupposition and assertion. Taglicht observes that asserting Each ofthem stuck to one drink; Bill drank only whiskey and Harry drank only beer would be to 'assert' that Bill drank whiskey as well as that Bill drank nothing but whiskey. Surely there is something correct about Taglicht's observation. His example strongly suggests that Bill drank whiskey is not just presupposed. Whether he is right to say that Bill drank whiskey is 'asserted' is another question, one to which I shall return. There is acrually a fundamental theoretical puzzle raised by Hom's claim that a is F is presupposed by the statement Not only a is F. When we state The queen ofEngland raises the best race horses , we state something different from There is a unique queen ofEngland and she raises the best race horses. Strawson (1950) led us to think that we do not assert the existence of the English queen when we state The queen ofEngland raises the best race horses. In fact, we rarely feel the need to assert sentences like 'There is a queen of England and she raises the best race horses'. The purposes served by direct assertion are better served without it presupposition is adequate. But we do find people saying things like :Jane, and only Jane, got to the party on time'. Yet on Horn's analysis of OnlyJanegot to the party on time , whose presupposition is allegedly Jane got to the party on time, it should be just as unusual to find people stating Jane, and onlyJane, got to theparty on time as it is to find them saying There is a unique queen ofEngland and she raises the best race horses. But that is just an incorrect linguistic prediction. Statements likeJane, and onlyJane, got to the party on time are not unusual. The conclusion of this argument is, once again, that Only a is F does not presuppose a is F. But does it, in the sense of'assert' currently under discussion, assert that a is F as Taglicht (1984) claims? This is, as Hom (1989: 248) remarks, 'an essential question'. But how, in the face of so many conflicting linguistic intuitions and theoretical claims, shall we go about finding a satisfactory answer?
Jay David Atlas
135
(Focal NP Limitation) Focal Noun Phrases in natural language statements cannot be translated by singular terms that are logical subjects in the Semantic Representation of their truth conditions (e.g. Russell-Tarski logical forms). Since only is a focus marker, and the focus NP in Only a is F is 'a', the Focus Limitation Principle has an interesting consequence. William of Sherwood and Josef Taglicht (1984), among others, have taken the logical form of Only a is F to be a is F and no one other than a is F (Fa & {Ilx) [Fx - x = a] ) , in which 'a ' is a logical subject in the first conjunct. But according to my principle, Only a is F cannot have a logical form in which 'a ' is a logical subject Thus the cor� unc tion above is not the logical form of Only a is F ! (I) The Focal Noun Phrase Limitation Principle entails that the conjunction a is F & no one other than a is F is not the logical form of Only a is F.
Since 'a' is a Focal NP in Only a is F, it is not a Topical NP in the statement, as we shall see below. Does that fact about Topic have any consequences for our analysis of Only a isF? In my recent discussions {Atlas 1988, 1 989) of the Topics
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Some years ago, following the lead o f Scott, Davidson, and Harman, and reacting to discussions with Gerald Gazdar and Stephen C. Levinson, I asked myself what the logical form of a cleft sentence (in English) was. Gazdar (1979: 124-5) had proposed one. For It is Sam who wants Fido he had suggested A.x( Wants( x ,Fido) ) (Sam) . Since the 'focus' of the cleft is Sam , and the 'pre supposition' is Someone wants Fido , in Gazdar's logical form the 'focus' corres ponded to the logical subject, the 'presupposition' to the logical predicate. He took his view of clefts with two-place relation symbols because he assumed that in clefts with one-place relation symbols, e.g. It wasJohn who went , the logical structure was similar to the simple subject-predicate John went. He then assumed that the logical structure of It is Sam who wants Fido was similar to that of Sam wants Fido. To a philosophical logician concerned with semantics, and not so much swayed by syntax, this assumption seemed very odd: the pre supposition of the cleft was Someone wants Fido , which was not a presupposition of Sam wants Fido ; it was instead a presupposition of the contrastively stressed SAM wants Fido (compare SAM doesn't want Fido , or Does SAM want Fido?). So I argued that It wasJohn who went paired with the contrastively stressed JOHN went , not with John went, just as I had argued, as had Halvorsen {1978) independently, that It was himselfthatJohn wanted Mary to describe pairs withJohn wanted Mary to describe HIMSELF , not with john wanted Mary to describe himself. So I concluded that Gazdar's identification of logical subject and 'focus' in It is Sam who wants Fido was profoundly mistaken. This was my first formulation of my Focal Noun Phrase Limitation Principle:
I 36
The case of focal particles only and also
of negative existence statements, e.g. Pegasus does not exist, I appealed to work by Gundel (1977) in making the following observations, where 'NP' is a meta variable ranging over proper names and simplex deHnite descriptions (not e.g. 'the F of the G'):
By these criteria the focal NP 'a • in Only a is F is not a topical NP, so that, on the basis of the Linguistic Aboutness Principle: {ABOUT) A statement is about a only if'a' is a Topical Noun Phrase in the statement. the statement Only a is F is not about a. (II) The statement Only a is F is not about a. For the conjunction Fa & cJ> , it is intuitive to say that the conjunction is about a and about the topic(s) of 4>, since the individual conjuncts are about a and about the topic(s) of cJ> respectively. So if the logical form of Only a isF were a is F and no one other than a is F [Fa & (IIx) ( Fx -+ x - a)] , what would it be about? A reasonable answer would be: it is about a and those who F. But by {II), Only a is F is not about a . So, on the basis of the Linguistic Aboutness Principle and of my Criteria for Noun Phrase Topicality, we see, again, that the logical form of Only a is F cannot be Sherwood's and Taglicht's conjunction. {III) The Linguistic Aboutness Principle and the Criteria for Noun Phrase Topicality entail that a is F & no one other than a is F is not the logical form of Only a is F.
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(CRITERIA) Criteria for Noun Phrase Topicality ( x ) Topical NPs are not abnormally stressed. (2) Leftmost NPs (in surface forms) are not necessarily topical NPs. (3) If an NP is a topical NP in' a statement (not sentence), the statement is a linguistically acceptable answer to the question What about NP? (4) If an NP is a topical NP in a statement, the asfor NP trans form of the statement is linguistically acceptable (in the same contexts) and makes the same statement. (For example, johnny deceived thegirl '* Asforjohnny, he deceived thegirl.) ( s ) The Grice-Strawson (1954, 1¢4) Condition Statements carry presuppositions of the existence of NP designations only ifthe NPs are topical. (For example, a statementJohnny deceived thegirl carries a presupposition that the designation of johnny exists, but a statement of It wasjohnny who deceived the girl does not.)
Jay David Atlas
i 37
Moreover, the Grice-Strawson Condition shows that Hom's pre suppositional analysis of Only a is F cannot be correct. That analysis calls for Only a is F to presuppose a is F. According to the Grice-Strawson Condition, since 'a' is not a Topical NP in Only a is F, Only a is F cannot presuppose that a exists. And how could the statement presuppose a is F and not presuppose a exists? It could not; so, the statement does not presuppose that a is F, a conclu sion that I also argued for in Section 2 C.
{N} The Grice-Strawson Condition entails that Only a is F does not presuppose a is F.
{l:x) (Brian knew that Mary kissed x) , which entails (under the usual rationality assumptions) Brian knew {l:x} (Mary kissed x) , which in turn entails {l:x) (Mary kissed x) . Thus the cleft statement does not presuppose Mary kissedjohn after all! At most it presupposes Mary kissed someone , and there is no conflict with the reasoning that we have sketched.)
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(There are some subtleties in the argument just given that deserve mention in passing. The intuition to which I appealed in my question 'And how could the statement presuppose a is F and not presuppose a exists ?' is as fundamental a semantic intuition as one can appeal to, but like Bertrand Russell in similar circumstances, I feel the need to try to explain it by more theoretical notions, even if the explanation turns out to be more complicated than what is being explained. I want to hold something like this: Since a is F 'directly entails' a exists , in the sense that it is an entailment of (roughly speaking) a subformula [(l:x} (x=a & Fx) 11- {l:x) {x=a) ) , and presuppositions are preserved under 'direct entailment', since those 'direct entailments' represent part of the information being presupposed, if a exists is not presupposed, neither is a is F. Cleft sentences present an interesting test case. In the statement Brian knew that Mary kissedjohn , Mary kissedJohn is presupposed. And so is John exists. On the reasoning just sketched, ifJohn exists were not presupposed, neither would Mary kissedjohn be presupposed. But in the cleft It wasJohn that Brian knew that Mary kissed , sinceJohn is not a Topical Noun Phrase (it is a focus), by the Grice Strawson Condition john exists is not presupposed by the deft statement. By the reasoning just sketched, that would mean that Mary kissedjohn would not be presupposed in the cleft statement It wasJohn that Brian knew that Mary kissed. Can that be right? Let us consider the question using only the basic properties of deft statements. The 'presupposition' of this deft is:
138
The case offocal particles only and also
4 LEXI CAL M E A N I N G , L O G I CAL F O R M A N D P R A G M AT I C I N FE R E N C E : S O LV I NG T H E P R O B L E M S
A Meaning At this point in our argument, we have eliminated as analyses of Only a is F the proposals of (GEACH), (SHERWOODtrAGLICHT), and (HORN). Never theless we still have to account for two pieces of linguistic data, the intuitive inferences:
When we left off considering my analysis, we were at this stage: (ATLAS) Only a is F GRAMMATICAL PRESUPPOSITION: There is someone other
than a. ASSERTION: (i) No one other than a is F. (ii) ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ???? ? ? ??????? I think that there has been omitted from consideration o f the sentence some features of lexical meaning, since the attention in philosophy of language and in formal semantics is always on truth-conditions, as the core of sentence mean ing. We know something about the meaning of 'Only a is F ' that we have so far neglected, namely that it is an analytic entailment of 'Only a is F' that exactly one person is F ! But this proposition is not just a conjunct to be conjoined with No one other than a is F. It is an analytic entailment by virtue of the lexical mean ing of only, a syncategorematic term in the sentence. This proposition is a syncategoll'ematic proposition, and it cannot be simplistically conjoined with No one other than a is F by '&' to yield a logical form for the sentence of the type lJI & . Still, we do want to combine Exactly one person is F with No one other than a is F somehow. The way to do it, thanks to the brilliant invention of multiple quantification by Gotdob Frege (ca. 1 879) and Charles Sanders Peirce (ca. r 883), is the following: (LOGICAL The logical form of Only a is F = FORM) (�x) (ITy) [ (x=y = ry) & (ry - y=a) ] (Now I do not want to be misleading or tricky about this. This logical form is logically equivalent to one that just is the conjunction by '&' of Exactly one person is F (Russell's The F exists) and No one other than a is F, viz.
(�) (ITy) (x=y = ry) & (nx) (Fx - x=a ) .
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(Datum r ) Only a is F. Therefore a is F. (Datum 2) Not only a is F. Therefore, a is F.
Jay David Atlas 1 3 9
(ATLAS) Only a is F GRAMMATICAL PRESUPPOSITION: There is someone other than a. [(�x) (x�a ) ] ASSERTION: Exactly one individual, and no one other than a, is F. (�x) (ITy ) [ (x=y = Fy) & ( Fy - y =a ) ] It's not the case that only a is F GRAMMATICAL PRESUPPOSITION: There is someone other than a . ASSERTION: It's not the case that exactly one individual, and no one other than a, is F. G
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Their equivalence is a theorem of ftrst-order Quantification Theory with Identity, but they are not the same logical form. They are conceptually distinct, and important logical conceptions are involved in the proof of their equi valence, both syntactic conceptions and semantic conceptions.) From the point of view of a theory of speech-acts, in asserting Only a is F, we do not thereby assert a is F, the way we would if the statement were to consist of a conjunction a is F & tP. Rather, what we do assert entails a is F, but it does not 'say' it This feamre of my analysis preserves Aquinas's and Geach's intuition that an 'excluder' like only excludes everything other than what is named by the subject-term 'a' from 'sharing in the predicate' 'F' and need not go on to say that something named by the subject-term does 'share in the predicate' (Geach 1 > Not only a is F "Not only a is F" --> > a also is F "Only a is F" --> > Not also a is F, "Not also a is F" --> > Only a is F.
From observation (3) it is clear that a Levinson Scale will not predict the reinforced implicature: not ALSO a, ONLY a (e.g. John did not ALSO win the Nobel Prize in Physics; ONLY he won it). This Focal Stress implicature must be given another explanation. There are a number of contrasting expressions of this kind in English:
(FOCAL STRESS) not SOME, (but) ALL not ONE, (but) MANY not ALSO, (but) ONLY (e.g. } did not ALSO l . . m . Phystcs . ; f wm the NobeI prrze o hn ALSO did not
I
{
he
I���
ONLY he
1 1·
won it.)
On Hom's (1985) view the Focal Stress inference would allegedly be explained as follows: the first clause of a is not ALSO F; [he ONLY] is F would be a
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The Levinson Scale (only, also) yields:
142 The case of focal particles only and also
a is not ALSO F; [he ONLY] is F. I I
v v
[a ONLY] is F Unlike Hom, Taglicht takes the logical form of [ a also] is F to be the conjunction of the ASSERTION and the CONVENTIONAL IMPLICATUM. In light of the anomaly in non-sarcastic statements of ..It's not true [everyone also] is F and ..[Everyone also] is F, I believe that there is a Grammatical Presupposi tion There is someone other than a in [a also] is F. I also believe that the truth conditions of [a also] is F are given by At least two individuals, one ofwhom is a, is F. Thus I propose: (ATLAS ' ) (a also] is F GRAMMATICAL PRESUPPOSITION: There is someone other than a [ ( l:x) ( x� a) J ASSERTION: At least two individuals, one ofwhom is a, are F. [ ( l:x) ( l:y) ( x=a & y �a & Fx & Fy) ] My ASSERTION, of course, is logically equivalent to Taglicht's a is F and someone other than a is F. I prefer my logical form, again, because of my lFocal NoWl l?hlrase Limitation l?rinciple . Taglicht's logical form makes [a also] is F about a and about those who F. On my view [a also] is F, where 'a' is a Focal NP, is not about a. So I reject Taglicht's logical form. For the same reason I reject Hom's (1969: 105-6) claim that the ASSERTION of [ a also] is F is Fa ,
·
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'metalinguistic' denial of the presupposition of [a also] is F, viz. the denial of Someone other than a is F, which would be equivalent to No one other than a is F. That proposition is what Hom (1969) takes to be ASSERTED by Only a is F. Thus, on Hom's view, asserting a is not ALSO F; [he ONLY] is F amounts to asserting No one other than a is F; no one other than a is F. I myself do not think that such redundancy is a correct prediction of the linguistic facts involved in the assertion of a is not ALSO F; [he ONLY] is F. Hom (1969) and Hom (1985) cannot both be right. I prefer another analysis, one that Hom himself could well have given on another occasion, in which asserting a is not ALSO F 'metalinguistically' denies a also is F, and so negates the (Levinson Scale) implicatum of also , i.e. negates not only, and therefore entails only (e.g. Was there also sugar in the coffee? NO-ONLY sugar in it). rhis inference is then reinforced by the continuation of the asser tion . . . [he ONLY] is F. This is a different redundancy from the one just considered; it is not the repetition of an asserted content. It is the explicit asser tion of the negation of the implicatum of what was just denied, namely of AL50 [also --> > notonly; DENIAL[ALSO) = DENIAL[not ONLY] = ONLY].
Jay David Atlas 143
C A solution To summarize: (1) Only a is F GRAMMATICAL PRESUPPOSITION: There is someone other than a [ (l:x) (x:Fa) ] ASSERTION: Exactly one individual, and no one other than a, is F. ( (l:x) ( Tiy) [ (x = y = Fy ) & (Fy - y = a)] TOPIC: Those who F (2) It is not the case that only a is F GRAMMATICAL PRESUPPOSITION: There is someone other than a ASSERTION: It is not the case that exactly one individual, and no one other than a, is F. (3) [a also) is F GRAMMATICAL PRESUPPOSITION: There is someone other than a [ (l:x) (x:Fa) ] ASSERTION: At least two individuals, one ofwhom is a, are F. [ (&) (l:y) (x=a & y�a & Fx & Fy) ) TOPIC: Those who F (4) Hom's (1969) alleged presuppositional inference: Only a is F. Therefore, a is F. is an ENTAILMENT. ·
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which is about a. On my account [a also] is F does not assert Fa , but the statement entails Fa . We are now in a position to explain Datum 2, Hom's alleged presupposi tional inference from Not only a is F to a is F. The inference is two-staged. First, asserting Not only a is F (Levinson Scale) IMPLICATES [a also) is F. Second, [a also] is F 'DIRECTLY' ENTAIT..S Fa (see (Section 3) above). Thus the intuitive inference is explained. Finally, the independently motivated logical forms for Only a is F and a also is F conftrm, by the Popperian (Existential Quantifter) criteria for Informative ness discussed in Atlas & Levinson (198 1 : 4 1 , n. 1 3 , 42, 48), that the logical form of Only a is F is more informative than the logical form of a also is F , as would be expected on the evidence of the generalized conversational implicatures. Thus our semantic account and our pragmatic account of only and also are congruent, and our total account satisfies the desideratum of a unified account of semantic and pragmatic properties that was discussed in Atlas & Levinson (198 1 ). Only is more informative than also in Popper's logico-semantic sense, and it is more informative in Levinson's implicatural-pragmatic sense.
1 44
The case of focal particles only and also
(s ) {LEVINSON SCALE}
5
C O NCLUS I O N
These results are the product of an unusual combination of elements: (i) truth conditional semantics, (ii) Gricean implicatures, and (iii) TOPIC constraints on the structure of Semantic Representations/logical forms. Only all three elements, working coherently together, manage to give an accurate and adequate logico-linguistic explanation of the contribution FOCUS PAR TICLES like only and also make to the truth-conditions, entailments, and pragmatic implications of sentences in which they occur-a better explanation, I suggest than the previous explanations by medieval logicians, contemporary logicians, and some contemporary theoretical linguists. I hope that this case study demonstrates the merit of that unusual combination of philosophical, logical, and linguistic ideas.
Acknowledgements I am indebted to discussion with Dr Stephen C. Levinson and to comments by Dr J. de Mey, Prof. Dr Jacobs, Dr P. Bosch, and Prof. Dr F. Zwarts. I am also indebted to Dr J. Hoepelman and to J. Machate for their invirarion to address the MAFID Focus Workshop, 28-30 June 1989, Fraunhofer-Instimt fiir Arbeitswirtschaft und Organisation, Smngart, Germany. I am
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There exists a Levinson Scale (only, also) of lexical items also and only that permits First Maxim of Quantity generalized conversational implic atures from the assertion of verbal frames A( ) in which they occur: { I } "A (also)" -> > A(not only ) (2) "A(not only )" -> > A (also) {6} The FOCAL STRESS implicature: "A(notALSO}" -> > A{ ONLY} is explained by Horn's {I98S} 'metalinguistic' denial and the Levinson Scale (only, also). {7) Horn's {I969} alleged presuppositional inference: [ [Not only] a] is F. Therefore, a is F is a two-staged inference, a scalar, generalized conversational implic' ature and a 'direct' entailment: {I} "Nor cnly a is F" ->> [a also] is F (2) [a also] is F I� a is F (8) Only is more informative than also in both Popper's logico-semantic sense and Levinson's implicatural-pragniatic sense. (Thus I have a unified account of the semantic and pragmatic properties.)
Jay David Atlas I 4 5 grateful t o my student Creighton Rosenral for assistance publication.
m
preparing this paper for
JAY DAVID ATLAS Department of Philosophy Pomona College Claremont, California 9 I 7 I I
U.SA
N OTE I To be precise about Horn's comrnirmenr to logical syntax, I would have to rreat 'is
for
=
S', and add
not
as an axiom:
Only Socrates is Socrates , and so I have bothered
with
this
syntactical
complication.
1- (Ilx) (S x = x - s).
RE FERE N C E S Atlas, J. D . ( I 988), ' What are negative exist ence statements ahour?', Linguistics and
Philosophy,
II:
3 7 1 -93.
Atlas, J. D. ( 1 989),
Philosophy without Am biguity, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Atlas,J. D. & S. C. Levinson ( I 98 1 ), 'It-clefts ,
Horn, L. ( 1 969), 'A presuppositional analysis of
ONLY
of logical operators in English', Ph.D. Angeles.
Pragmatics: Implicature, Pre supposition, and Logical Form , Academic Press, New York.
Geach, P. ( 1 9621 I 98o),
ity, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. Grice, H. Paul (I 97S). 'Logic and conversa
tion', in P. Cole & J. L. Morgan (eds),
Syntax and Semantics J: Speech Acts , Acad
emic Press, New York, 41-58. Grice, H. Paul ( 1 989),
Studies in the Way of
Words , Harvard University Press, Cam bridge.
of
California,
Los
Horn, L. ( 1 98 5 ) . 'Metalinguistic negation and pragmatic ambiguity', 74·
,
Longuage , 6 1 : 1 2 1 -
A Natural History '![Negation ,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Karttunen, L. & S. Peters ( 1 979). 'Conven tional implicature', in C.-K. Oh and D. A. Dinneen (eds),
Syntax and Semantics: Pre supposition , Academic Press, New York, 1 56. Levinson, S. C. (1983), Pragmatics , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Sherwood , W. ( 1 986),
Gundel, J. ( 1 977)
Linguistic
University
Hom, L. ( 1 989 )
Reference and General
Chi. Ling. Soc. ,
Horn, L. ( 1 972), 'On the semantic properties
P. Cole (ed.),
Press, New York, 1 -6 1 .
Papers from the
guistic Society, Chicago,
Diss.,
Gazdar, G . ( 1 979),
EVEN',
98- 1 07.
informativeness , and logical form: radical pragmatics (revised standard version)', in
Radical Pragmatics , Academic
and
Fifth Regional Meeting, Chicago Lin
Role ofTopic and Comment in Theory , Indiana University ,
Linguistics Club, Bloomington. Halvorsen, Per-Kristian ( 1 978), 'The syntax and semantics of cleft constructions', Texas Linguistics Forum, 1 1 , Dept. of Linguistics, University of Texas, Austin.
Treatise on Syncategore matic Words rrans. by N. Kretzman ,
University o f Minnesota Press, Minnea polis. Srrawson, P. F. ( 1 9 54) . 'A Reply to Mr Sellars',
Philosophical Review, 63: 2 1 6- 3 1 .
Srrawson, P . F . ( 1 964), 'Identifying Reference and Truth-values',
Theoria 30: 96- 1 1 8.
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'x
accept the logical forms that I have given
'S', for
Socrates' as a predicate symbol 'Socratizes', rather than as
But I have no doubt that Horn would
146
The case of focal particles only and also
Appendix 1
OnlyA is_.E
ATLAS
GEACH
HORN
SHERWOOD
ASSERTION
One individual, k no one other than Lis f.
No one other than a is £
No one other than il is f.
A is £ k no one other than A is f.
GRAM. PRFSUPP.
!is f.
! is f. Someone is E
There is someone other than.A
IMPLICAT: CONVENT.
IMPLICAT: CONYERS.
LEVINSON SCALE !!. .
"not only" ->> also. � also is_.E
11-
PRFSUPP.
il is .El
TOPIC: Those who f
,! is £ [Not only ,il iS f » il is fl
a is E k no one
other than A is £
! is E
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ENTAILMENT
TAGLICHT
Jay David Atlas
1 47
Appendix 2
�also is_E
ASSERTION
ATLAS
At least two
GEACH
HORN
SHERWOOD
TAGUCHT
� is f.
� is E.
� is f.
� is E.
individuals, one of whom is� are_E.
� is .E.
Someone other than
� is f.
GRAM.
There is
PRESUPP.
someone other than.l!,
Someone
IMPLICAT:
other
CONVENT.
than� is f.
IMPLICAT:
LEVINSON
CONYERS.
SCALE . "'also" ->> not only. FOCAL IMPLIC. "not ALSO"" -» ONLY.
PRESUPP.
TOPIC:
Someone
Those whof
other than � is E
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ENTAILMENT
jounuJ/ of&mantics 8: 149-165
© N.l.S. Foundation (1991)
Focus and Presupp osition PETER I . BLOK University ofGroningen Ahsuact
I I NT R O D U C T I O N In Linguistics and Philosophy of November I988, Jay David Atlas published an article in which he claims to give a conclusive analysis of sentences like (I):
(I) The present king of France does not exist
()
As, for example, Hintikka has point�d out, 1 I is highly problematic for those
who propose a Strawson-style account of(2) (2) The present king of France is bald
With this approach, (2) has a truth-value gap under the present circumstances in which there is no king of France. But then, it is argued, the same must hold for (I), and so its own truth deprives the sentence of any truth-value whatsoever. Atlas draws our attention to the undeniable fact that (3 ) is simply false in our world:
(3) It is the present king of France who is bald This is e�plained by observing that (3) has the presupposition that there is somebody who is bald, and the sentence states that this somebody is the present king of France. Since the King of France does not exist, the sentence has to be false. This well-known phenomenon was accounted for by Strawson (I¢4), when he claimed that definite descriptions only have existential presupposi tions in sentences which are 'about' this constituent Strawson gives a 'recipe' for aboumess, which is something like 'being able to form a description of the utterance of the form (4)
(4) He (i.e. the speaker) was saying (describing, etc.) who (what, how, which, etc)
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In this paper traditional approaches to the notion 'presupposition' are criticized. The relation between the concepts 'topic'; and 'presupposition' is discussed in a game-theoretical frame work. It is shown that the concept presupposition has to be defined pragmatically with respect to its dialogical functions.
1 so Focus and presupposition
((4) is Janet Fodor's (1979) paraphrase of Sttawson's argument}. Hence, ( s ) and (6} get the paraphrases (7) and (8} respectively:
( s ) The King of France visited the exhibition today
(6) The exhibition was visited by the King of France today {7) The speaker was saying what has been visited by the King of France today {8} The speaker was saying who the exhibition has been visited by today
(9) Pegasus does not exist
( 1 0) ?It is nothing that is Pegasus ( 1 1) It is not Pegasus who exists Since (ro) is supposed to be an incorrect paraphrase of(9), and { I I) is a correct one, it may be concluded, according to Atlas, that in (9) Pegasus is not and what exists is in topic-position. Here, these positions are determined by the so-called 'cleft-test'. So it is Atlas's ultimate claim that existential propositions have 'all that exists' or 'the existing' in topic-position, and what is claimed to be there in a non-topical position. It is, I think, an appealing theory. But it has, I am afraid, some less convincing aspects, especially the way topicality is defined and topics are recovered. The criteria by which the decision on the separation of a
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The NPs in (7) and {8} which occur in subject position in ( s ) and (6} respectively are supposed to have existing referents; ifthey do not, then their originals lack a cruth-value. This is, as a matter of fact, exactly the line of argument Atlas proposes: the cleft in (3) is a well-known way to place a constituent in focus-position and Atlas wants to claim that only definite descriptions in topic-position have existential presuppositions. It should be noted that this presupposes that focused constituents like clefts are never in topic position. I will comment on this in the next section. The whole idea is, as I already mentioned, not totally new; if we look at Sttawson's examples ( s ) and {6), in the light of the 'recipe' (4), we can see that his claim is approximately the same: taking for granted that in unmarked constrUc tions subjects are in topic-position, it is obvious that in ( s ) the King of France and in {6) the exhibition are topics. Sttawson's 'aboutness-test' is nothing but an embedded question-test for non-focusedness, to which we will tum. our attention in Section 3· To summarize, the point Atlas wants to make is the following: in (2) the King of France is topic, and hence his existence presupposed; in (3) he is in non-topic position and hence his existence is not presupposed, and so what has to be proved is that in ( r ) the King of France is not in topic-position either, by which the apparent contradiction would disappear. To provide proof for this last claim, Atlas presents, among others, the following examples:
Peter I. Blok
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sentence in a topical and a non-topical part should be made, are exhaustively deale with by Atlas, and will be discussed in the next section. In Section 3 ic will be pointed out chat every test for aboumess in relation co semantic presupposition which makes use ofnon-focusedness, like the so called question-test, begs the question indeed. Finally, I will present alternative, pragmatic, concepts of topicality and presupposition and show chat it is because (I) can only be uttered in contexts which are in face about 'the King of France' chat the sentence cannot be accused of presupposition denying. TOPIC AND FOCUS
In chis section we will cake a closer look at the concepts 'aboumess', 'topic' and 'focus'. Although these concepts are used in many different ways in the literature, we will confine ourselves co the sense in which Atlas uses them. In Section 4 ofhis article, he states: In a normally stressed statement of Johnny deceived the girl', Johnny is a topic-designating Noun Phrase (NP), Johnny himself is the topic, and the comment about the topic is that he deceived the girl. In 'It was Johnny who deceived the girl', Johnny is not a topic-designating NP, so Johnny is not the topic, by which I mean, intuitively, that the statement is not about him.2 The simple subject predicate statement that corresponds to the cleft statement i� the contrastively stressed statement JOHNNY deceived the girl', which is not about Johnny. These data illustrate several generalizations about statements (not sentences, please note): (i) Topical NPs are unstressed; they receive primary nor contrastive stress. (ii) Leftmost NPs (in surface forms) are not necessarily topical NPs. (iii) NPs carry presuppositions of the existence of their designations only if they are topical NPs. (For example, the use ofJohnny in a statement of Johnny deceived the girl' carries a presupposition that its designation exists, but the use ofJohnny in a statement of 'It was Johnny who deceived the girl' does not.) (Atlas I 988: 383-4)
It should be noted that the reference to the concept 'comment' in the first sentence of the quotation above is slightly misleading: the sentence mentioned has nothing to do with topic-comment constructions or their interpretacion (c£ Li & Thompson I 976). The generalization (i) already states chis, because topics in topic-comment constructions like as-for sentences receive contrastive stress (c£jacobs I984; Chafe I976). Generalization (ii) tells us chat topic in Atlas's sense should not be confused with theme in the sense ofHalliday (I 967). There it is assumed chat the theme is always the initial constituent of the sentence (p. 2 I 2), and moreover, chat the sentence is 'about' this theme. Non-standard word-order does not change the posicion of the theme, but it is a way to change themes. Therefore, Atlas's concept of topicality has nothing to do with Halliday's concept of aboumess or theme.
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2
I 52 Focus and presupposition
{a) As forJohnny, he deceived the girl (a') As for the girl, Johnny deceived her (b) ?As for Johnny, HE deceived the girl (b) As for the girl, JOHNNY deceived her {c) ?As for Johnny, it was he who deceived the girl (c') As for the girl, it was Johnny who deceived her {Atlas 1988: 385) These examples have the following significance: In (a}Johnny is in a structural topic position {topic in relation to comment} and it is claimed that it is 'about' Johnny, and not 'about' the girl. In (a') it isjust the other way round. (b) and (c) sho\0 that elements which appeared in structural topics can hardly be focused afterwards. But this does not mean that structural topics are always the, and the only, topic (as opposed to focus) of the sentence! As Chafe (1 976} pointed out, topic-comment sentences are, in western languages like English and Dutch, mostly used to express contrastivity of some sort. If (a) is placed in a context like (a'): (a") As for Johnny, he deceived the girl, and as for Benny, he married her both conjuncts are, in my opinion. also 'about' the girl. Moreover, (b) and {c) get much better in a contrastive context: (c") (About Johnny and Benny, which of them deceived the girl and which of them married her?) As for Johnny, it was he who deceived the girl, and as for Benny, HE married her.5 Hence, the topic-comment division has nothing to do with the difference between focus and non-focus (called topic by us). It is a function of the topic comment construction. though, to make a statement explicitly 'about' the constituent in structural topic position. But it is certainly not the most
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Since topical NPs are never stressed (generalization (i)), they cannot be in focus.3 But it seems, at least from the examples given by Atlas, that the converse holds, too: every NP not in a focus position is topical. This can be illustrated by the main argument Atlas gives himself to locate topics: 'If an expression N is a topical noun phrase in a statement, the statement is a linguistically acceptable answer to the question "What about N?" ' {Atlas 1988: 38 5-6}. But everything which is not explicitly in focus (is stressed, is an answer to a Wh-question. is in a cleft construction) obeys this rule. Therefore, I would conclude by saying that what Atlas calls topical NPs are NPs which are not in focus. We will call the part of the sentence which is not in focus topic. It has to be stressed again that this notion of topic has nothing to do with so called topic-comment constructions. However, many of the examples Atlas gives makes use of as-for constructions and left-dislocation. which are typical topic-comment constructions:
Peter I. Blok 1 5 3
important one (c£ Chafe I 976). In the next section we will have a closer look at the way in which the difference between focus and topic is made and, more importantly, is recovered. For if one knows the topic of a sentence, one knows its topical NPs, what it is about and then what is presupposed.
3 QUESTI O N S I N F O C U S
In order to give the topic-focus partition of a sentence, several tests can be applied. We came across some ofthem in the previous section, and Atlas applies them in the following way to existential sentences like (12):
(12) is supposed to be an answer to the questions (I 3 ) and (I4}; (I s) should be a correct and (I6} an incorrect paraphrase of (12). Most readers may feel a little uncomfortable judging these examples. Atlas gives in a note some other possibilities like 'as for existing, John does' and 'As for the existing, John is one', but I do not think these are improvements at all. Compared to (10), I do not see very much difference. As a matter of fact, the native speakers of American English who were confronted with these sentences either rejected (I s) and its paraphrases or preferred (I 6} as the topic-comment version of ( 12). So let us concentrate on the questions and initially on the question-test itsel£ Observe the simple sentence (I7}, (r7) JOHN comes (again, capitals indicate stress). It is hardly controversial to state thatJOHN is in focus-position and comes in topic. Moreover, most theories assume that the existential closure of the topic is a presupposition of a sentence like (r7); hence, (r7) states something like: 'Given that someone comes, it is John who comes.' The question to which (r7) is an answer can be (r8} but also (I9): ( r 8} Who comes? (I9) WHO comes? In Hajicova (r984) it is shown that questions like (r8) and (19) do not have the same presuppositions. This may be illustrated by the fact that (2o) is a correct answer to (r 8), but as an answer to (r9) it seems rather odd:
(20) Nobody comes
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(12) John exists (I 3 ) Who/what exists (I4} What about what exists ( I S} As for what exists,John does (I6} As for John, he exists
1 54
Focus and presupposition
(21}-(23) are some convincing examples given by Hajicova: (21) What did you buy for him for a Chrisonas PRESENT? (22) WHAT did you buy for him for a Chrisonas present? (23) You bought him something for a Chrisonas present
(24) John has given A BOOK to a girl (25) What did John give to a girl? I think that in the question (25) the existence of girls is presupposed and hence, in this context, (24) also presupposes this. To resume: the following can be observed: if one identifies the presupposi tions of a sentence as the existential closure ofits topic, with the question-test as a criterion for topicality, one inevitably begs the question because one has only access to the relevant question if one knows the presuppositions of the declarative. If one tries to avoid this problem by not identifying the presupposi-
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(23) is a presupposition of(22), but not of(21); (2 1) can be answered by 'nothing', which is not a normal answer to (22). We may conclude that if we want to say something about the presupposi tions of questions we have to know their topic-focus structure. How does one explore the topic-focus structure of questions? By means of their possible answers, of course! So ifwe want to know the presuppositions of a sentence like (17) using the question-test we have two possibilities: either that 'someone comes' is a presupposition, or that it is not. We will never know which one to choose. Therefore, I accuse the question-test for presuppositions of circularity. There seems to be a way out for Atlas, his argument being the following: I want to know the presuppositions of a declarative sentence-therefore I need to know the topic-focus structure-therefore I need to know to which question it is an answer-! have two possibilities with different presuppositions, but with one and the same topic-focus structure-! take the existential closure of this unique topic as the presupposition of my declarative sentence. To summarize: questions do not always have the existential closure of their topics as a presupposition but declaratives do. This argument, though, is immediately refuted by (2o), Nobody comes. If the argument had been correct, the sentence would have had the existential closure of the topic of its questions, 'who comes', as a presupposition. But obviously, it is not a presupposition here that 'to come' has any extension. Hence, the existential closure of the topic found with the question-test is not a presupposition here at all. It may be, then, that the argument only holds for definite descriptions: it is only true of definite descriptions that their existence is presupposed in declaratives ifthey occur in the topic of all questions to which the declarative is an answer. This, however, is obviously false, because it is true of almost every NP. Look at (24) and (25):
Peter I. Blok
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4
THE P RAGMAT I C S O F P RES UPPO S ITI O N
In the previous section it has been made clear that although the intuition that only sentences which are about a certain definite description have existential presuppositions with respect to it seems correct, this aboutness cannot be defined more precisely in terms of topicality without begging the question. This is because the notions of topic, as the counterpart of focus, and pre supposition are so closely connected that hardly anything about the one can be explained in tenns of the other without circularity. Therefore, everybody who entertains a semantic concept of presupposition, by which I mean pre supposition as precondition, in tenns of the meaning of some of the content of the sentence, on the possible models with respect to which the sentence can be evaluated, will have problems with sentences like (r8) and (2o) (and of course ( 1 )) . The alternative seeins to be that the existential closure of the topic is not presupposed automatically, but then there is no way to recover the presupposi tions either. In an extremely lucid article, Karttunen (1973) has already pointed out that a purely semantical approach to presuppositions has to fail. In the analysis of filter conditions on the projection of presuppositions in compound sentences, it turns out to be the case that the contextual environment is of conclusive importance; hence, the mutual knowledge of speaker and listener should be
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tions of question and answer, one gets the truism that NPs must have some sort of referent to be able to say something about them, which does not hold for definite descriptions alone. The central problem here is, of course, that in the semantic concept of presupposition, like Atlas's, a notion of topicality is inherent already. This can be seen if one takes into account that the semantic presupposition concept is usually expressed in terms of the shared consequence of a proposi tion and its negation; and naturally, the scope of the negation is determined by the topic-focus division.6 Therefore, looking for the presuppositions and the topic-focus division is exacdy the same thing. This is made manifest in the paraphrases (7) and (8) of the Strawson examples ( s ) and (6). Whether something is presupposed or not, though, and to what degree, is a context-sensitive matter. This can be illustrated by the examples (2 1 ) and (22). The presupposition of (22) is a result of the context to which the sentence belongs (note that it is hardly ever the initial sentence of a discourse!). Hence, if we want to say something conclusive about this matter, we should not just flirt with some specially chosen small pieces of context, but have a rigorously pragmatic view of it This holds afortiori for the topic-focus distinction.
1 56 Focus and presupposition
taken into account for any successful treatment of the matter. A more pragmatic view is necessary, for which there are a number of quite similar proposals, e.g. Jackendoff: 'presupposition is the information in the sentence that is assumed by the speaker to be shared by him and the hearer', or Sgall: 'Knowledge, or other items, stored in the memory of the speaker, and supposed by him or her to be also present in the hearer's memory'.7 One should be extremely careful when trying to reinterpret the notion of topic in connection with a pragmaticized notion of presupposition, because if one identifies the one with the other again, one inevitably identifies the topic focus partition with the old-new distinction, which is rather dubious, I think. Examples (26)-{27), which are from Reinhan (198 1), may illustrate this point:
HimseDfin (27) is obviously in focus position, but its reference is not new in the context of (26). As Danes (1 986) states, it is not the topic which is 'old information' and the focus which is 'new', but the connection between the two is new. So, in the sentence :John swims', in whatever intonation, :JOHN swims', :John SWIMS', or neutral, the new informative aspect is not :John', or 'to swim' respectively, but the fact that the predicate holds for its argument. So, if the topic-focus partition is �ot the distinction between what is semantically presupposed and what is not, nor the distinction between 'old' and 'new' information in a ·more pragmatic sense, what kind of function does it have? I think it should be stated in terms of search-strategies rather than in terms of informational content. The databases of my conversational panner and me are conceivably rather big; if I state something, there are two possibilities: either I assume that my partner does not have any opinion on the matter, or I assume that he or she has one opposed to mine. In the latter case, I will help my panner to find this opinion opposed to my utterance in his or her database by means of intonation, sentential construction, or in general by means of the topic-focus articulation. This view implies that one can only talk meaningfully about a topic-focus distinction within a context In the past, this has only been stated implicitly; something like the question-test is, of course, doing nothing but creating a suitable context. But what assures us that every sentence can occur in the context of a wh-question? Let us have another look at the problematic sentence ( 1) 'The present king of France does not exist'. One utters a sentence like that only if one assumes that one's partner in discourse has something to do with the present king of France, his concept or imaginary being. Hence, there is always some connection between a context, shared by you and your partner, and the sentence, which says something like: skip everything on the king of France, i.e. every file you
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(26) Whom does John love? (27) John loves HIMSELF
Peter I. Blok 1 5 7
have on him. These are the files with his name (description) on it, where he is in
topic-position.
��
a
b Whoj