Iranian
Studies
Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
Volume VI (1973)
Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jerome W. Clinton,...
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Iranian
Studies
Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
Volume VI (1973)
Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jerome W. Clinton, Associate Editor A. Reza Sheikholeslami, Associate Editor
Published by The Society for IranianStudies, P. 0. Box 89, Village Station, New York, New York 10014, U. S. A. Printed at the Boston College Press US ISSN 0021-0862
The Society for Iranian Studies COUNCIL ErvandAbrahamian Amin Banani Ali Banuazizi James A. Bill JeromeW. Clinton Paul W. English Gene R. Garthwaite FarhadKazemi, Executive Secretary KennethA. Luther Ann Schulz, ex officio, Treasurer
Address all communications concerning the Journalto the Editor, IranianStudies, Box K- 154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167, U.S.A.
IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Contents:
Volume VI (1973)
ARTICLES
Daftary,
Farhad.
Development Planning in Iran:
A Historical Enayat,
Hamid.
Survey.
The Politics
Farrokhzad, Forough. Massud Farzan)
. . . . . . . . . . . of Iranology
176-228
. . . .
2-20
Two Poems (translated by . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
52-57
Hooglund, Eric J. The Khwushnishin Population of Iran. . . . . . . . . . a . . a .
229-245
Keddie, Nikki R. An Assessment of American, British, and French Works since 1940 on Modern Iranian
L6ffler,
History.
Reinhold. The National of Boir Ahmad ..............
. . . . . . . .
152-165
Integration .
127-135
.
66-109
Nowshirvani , Vahid F., and Bildner, Robert. Direct Foreign Investment in the NonOil. Sectors
of the
Iranian
Economy .
.
.
Pakdaman, Homa, and Royce, William. cAbbas Mirza's Will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ricks, Thomas M. Towards a Social History
of Eighteenth-Century
iii
136-151
and Economic Iran
.
.
.
.
110-126
Sheikholeslami,
A. Reza, and Wilson Dunning. .
21-51
Russell D. Patrick J. Hurley and (reviewed by American Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . Justus D. Doenecke).
172-174
The Memoirs of Haydar Khan CAmuUghla
.
BOOKREVIEWS Buhite,
Connell,
Semnan: Persian City John (Ed.). and Region (reviewed by John Gulick)
. . .
63-64
The Changing Balance of Monroe, Elizabeth. Power in the Persian Gulf (reviewed by Ann Schulz) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
166-172
Keddie,
Nikki R. Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "alBiography Afghdni," A Political (reviewed by Hamid Enayat) .246-255
Iran's Ramazani, Rouhollah K. The Persian Gulf: Role (reviewed by Ann Schulz) .166-172 (translated [Mukatibat] Rashid ad-Din. Perepiska (reviewed by Thomas T. by A. I. Falina) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Allsen).
Yar-Shater,
Ehsan.
Dialects
58-63
A Grammarof Southern Tati
(reviewed
by MohammadAli
Jazayery) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
iv
255-259
IranianStudies
Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
Minter 1973
VolumeVI
Number1
The Society for Iranian Studies Council Ervand Abrahamian, Baruch College, City University of New York Amin Banani, University of California, Los Angeles Ali Banuazizi, Boston College James A. Bill, University of Texas at Austin Jerome W. Clinton, American Institute of Iranian Studies Paul W. English, University of Texas at Austin Gene R. Garthwaite, Dartmouth College Farhad Kazemi, New York University Kenneth A. Luther, University of Michigan Ann Schulz, ex offico, Clark University
Executive Committee Farhad Kazemi, Executive Secretary Ann Schulz, Treasurer Ali Banuazizi, Editor
IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jerome W. Clinton, Associate Editor A. Reza Sheikholeslami, Associate Editor
Copyright, 1974, The Society for Iranian Studies Printed at the Boston College Press Published in the U.S.A. US ISSN 0021-0862 Address all communications to IRANIAN STUDIES, Box E-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167, U. S. A.
Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Volume VI
Winter
Number 1
1973
ARTICLES
2
THE POLITICS OF IRANOLOGY
Hamid Enayat
21
THE MEMOIRSOF HAYDARKHAN CAMUJ UGHL0
A. Reza Sheikholeslami and Dunning Wilson
52
0 BEJEWELED LAND! I FEEL SAD FOR THE GARDEN --Two Poems by Forough Farrokhzad
Trans.
by Massud Farzan
BOOKREVIEWS
58
RASHID AD-DIN: Perepiska (Trans. by [Mukatibat] A. I. Falina
63
Semnan: JOHN CONNELL(Ed.): Persian City and Region
Thomas T. Allsen
John Gulick
THEPOLITICSOF IRANOLOGY
HAMIDENAYAT It may at first seem strange to speak of the politics of Iranology since until recently Iranology was so much confined within the limits of archaeology, linguistics,
bibliography
and other
"micro" studies
that
any sug-
gestion about its possible implications smacked of too Yet if one sets an outlook of history. conspiratorial question of deliberate or aside the often unverifiable motives, there remains little political non-deliberate doubt that Iranology has always been involved with polito prove in the tics. This statement is not difficult case of the present phase of Iranology, when an increasing in number of Iranian scholars are taking the initiative the field, and a growing number of issues relating to the life of Iranians have become contemporary sociopolitical Hamid Enayat is Professor and Chairman in the Department Science, University of Tehran. of Political This article is an extended version of a talk given by the author at the Third Congress of Iranology held in Tehran (September, 1972). The author wishes to thank Jerome W. part of the talk into Clinton for his help in translating Thanks are also due to John Gurney and Roger English. Oxford, and to Anne Enayat, Owen, of St. Antony's College, draft of this pafor their useful comments on an earlier for the content is, however, entirely Responsibility per.
the author's. IRANIAN STUDIES
2
to political The difficulty susceptible interpretation. arises with regard to the formative period of Iranology of European Orientalism when it was a preserve and whose great pioneers were long thought to be inspired by nothing less than a pure love of knowledge. It is with this formative period of Iranology that the present paper purports to deal. In any critical examination of Iranology one has to the background of Orientalism in general view it against which today has acquired a post facto political significonsciousness. cance for the new phase of Asian national This is a phase which is characterized by an intense desire to overcome all forms of alienation from traditional culture in the drive for national self-assertion. Since Orientalism, in the sense of a systematic body of scholarly knowledge about the civilizations and cultures of the East, was originally established by the Europeans, one widely-held is that it opinion about its raison d'etre was simply one of the many colonialist stratagems for subjugating the East. It is thus maintained that just as colonialist governments needed military and diplomatic so also did they reexperts to devise their expansion, conversant with the language, culture and quire scholars
character
of the people under their
rule to facilitate
As Orientalism the execution of colonialist policies. has thus been conceived in political "sin," it cannot be trusted to give an authentic account of the essence of Eastern cultures and civilizations. This may be a rather of Orientalism, naive conception of the genesis but it is
a view which cannot be easily refuted. The witnessed the emergence of some branches of alism, and the remarkable growth of others, era of colonialist expansion. Although the
period which modern Orientwas also the relations be-
tween the various branches of Orientalism and the immediate goals of colonialism the may not be readily apparent,
undeniable fact is that Orientalism was largely stimulated by, and in a sense nurtured in the bosom of,colonialism. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, events such as Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 and the later 3
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French conquests in North Africa, the increasing importance of the "Eastern Question," the Indian Mutiny of 1857, and of the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran, the intensification all combined to give a certain urgency to Oriental studies. Further stimulation was provided by the expansion of commercial relations and missionary activities, both suspected to be the disguised tools of political domination. When one adds to this politico-religio-commercial background the fact that some of the prominent Orientalists had themselves been colonial administrators before turning to academic careers, and that a number of their students were also trained for the express purpose of colonial service, one would become very skeptical of the claims about the purely scholarly motives of Orientalism. The official account of the establishment of London University's School of Oriental and African Studies, one of the largest and most authoritative institutes of Oriental studies in the West, to mention but one example, bears witness to the fact that the original consideration in creating such institutes was "the urgent need for suitable teaching... for those about to take up administrative and commercial posts in Asia and Africa."1 Even when questions of the political determinants of Orientalism are put aside, there still remain some "tangible" grounds for linking Orientalism with colonialism in the minds of politically-minded Asians, for instance, the fact that most of the Orientalists came, and still come, from those Western countries that have had long political involvement, colonialist or otherwise, in the Orient, and that the greatest institutes of Oriental studies and the most valuable collections of Oriental manuscripts and relics and documents are located in their metropolitan centers. Ever since the Second World War, condemnation of Orientalism as a handmaid of colonialism has found wide acceptance among the intelligentsia of Asian and African and has occasionally countries, given rise to controversy As early as 1956, in an apparent among Western scholars. response to such condemnation, some eighty Western and Asian historians gathered at the School of Oriental and IRANIANSTUDIES
4
African Studies to examine the state of historiography on Asia and Africa. One of the major themes broached at the was the necessity of making the participants conference of their predecessors aware of the nationalistic prejudices A more important outcome of the disand of themselves. cussions was the realization that the at the conference was historians attitude of "Asia-centred" nationalistic and even conmerely a reaction against the "patronizing of the many of the older Western oritemptuous attitude entalists.t'w2 These debates
in a series
continued
of study
con-
ferences at the School of Oriental and African Studies until 1958, and the papers submitted to the conference appeared in Historians of the Middle East, edited by Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (1962). Meanwhile, the growth of the freedom movements in Asia and Africa, and the upsurge of in the late fifties added fresh the "Third World" ideology political dimensions to such debates. Some of these political dimensions are taken up by the French scholar Vinof cent Monteil in his paper entitled "The Decolonization the Writing of History," in 1962. Here Monteil published of what some of the gave a more sympathetic explanation had termed as "the participants at the SOAS conferences Asian nationalistic response to Orientalism." "Because
of prejudices of every sort," stated Monteil, "because of a persistent fondness for the exotic...and because of the of colonialism, internal contradictions has not the history of colonial peoples been falsified, and does it not remain falsified, mutilated and consequently almost unusable?" Monteil then went on to analyze some of the typical alternative methods of historiography devised by Indian, Turkish and African historians to replace the "colonialist" method. He discerned two main schools of historiography among the new Asian and African historians, one nationalist and the other Marxist. After criticizing some of the inconsistencies and anomalies in the works of the representatives of these two schools, Monteil pinned his hopes on an emerging third school which, according to him, is "purely and simply scientific," and manifested itself in the Fourth International African Seminar in Dacca in 1961.3 5
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While such critical analyses of Orientalism have been discussed in various Asian, African and Western academic or intellectual the subjecthas received scant circles, attention in Iran. The reasons for this neglect are so complex and diverse that they perhaps deserve a separate A whole set of psychological study. reasons ranging from our oft-vaunted tendency to welcome and tolerate alien intellectual trends, to our equally oft-deprecated infatuation with Western cultural trappings, come to one's mind in explanation of this phenomenon. But one particular historio-political explanation which should be of interest to us here is the fact that, contrary to most Asian and African countries, Iran never suffered colonization at the hands of Western powers. What anti-Westernism was generated in Iran in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the work of the Shi'ite ulama who regarded Western encroachments as a grave threat to Islam. When, in subsequent efforts both by Iranian officialdom and intellithe Shilite ulama were gentsia to diagnose Iran's ills, accused of being a major stumbling block to national salvation, all that the Shi'ite ulama stood for, including antiWesternism, was discarded in the formation of the new "progressive" outlook. This further weakened our ability for critical thinking with regard to the West, perhaps on a much larger scale than in any other Muslim country. Conwriters sequently, with hardly anyone among the influential of the era of the Constitutional Revolution taking the trouble to examine the impact of the West in other than a most superficial political fashion, the cultural and conceptual aspects of this impact went largely unscrutinized. On the contrary, there were many intellectuals among the era who identileaders of the post-Revolutionary political fied the desire for reform with slavish imitation of the West, and saw such imitation as the sole hope of reforming Iran.4 The events of the First World War and, more importantly, the Allied occupation of Iran during the Second World War and the beginning of a new stage of national consciousness altered this situation to some extent. Gradually political opposition to the West took on a cultural IRANIANSTUDIES
6
aspect, although even in this phase, our political and economic dependence on the West has made us at times hesitant and circumspect in our judgments about it. When Iranian scholars in the last two decades or so gradually came to take over some initiative in Iranian studies, their greatest shortcoming was, therefore, the absence of any background of criticism and evaluation of Western Orientalism. They had no Panikkar (author of Asia and Western Dominance, London, 1953) who would revise the conventional accounts of modern Iranian history, or no Bahl (author of Al fikr al-islam; al-badith wa salatuhui bi'l isticmar al-gharb1, Cairo, 1957) who would examine the impact of the West on religious thought. AhmadKasravi's Ayin (Tehran, 1932), Sayid Fakhrud-din Shadmdn's Taskhlr-i tamaddun-i farangl (Tehran, 1946), and Jalal A1 Ahmad's Gharbzadig were far too polemical or ethico-political in their approach to impress the scholarly community which would dismiss any argument not accompanied by detailed documentation and textual citation. Iranian scholars therefore often accepted as gospel truth those same judgments which had led Orientalism into a clash with rising Asian nationalism. Evidence of this uncritical attitude can be found in the scores of books which have appeared in Iran since the war on Iranian history and culture, mostly heavily relying on the Orientalists' works. After a long period of voluntary or forced silence, Western Iranology has now come under criticism in Iran. The quality of this criticism varies from the philosophical to the pedestrian.5 But apart from its belated occurrence, this criticism seems to suffer from two main weaknesses: one is its excessive preoccupation with the personal motives of Western Iranologists, and the other is the crude polemical language employed by some of the critics. Altercations as to whether or not this or that Western Iranologist was motivated in his lifetime of scholarship by colonialist designs is not a meaningful way of assessing the products of Western Iranology. It would seem to be unwise to lump together all Western 7
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in Iranologists, and for that matter all Orientalists, terms of their motives or their feelings towards Iranians. of Western governments and Some of them were officials some, perhaps most, through the good fortune of aristocratic birth and inherited wealth, acquired first the opporand tunity of studying in the best Western universities, then of travelling widely in the East. There were also some who had neither private means, nor received government support. Some, like Welhausen, viewed Islam with contempt;6 others, like Le Bon waxed eloquent about the A few like McDonald glories of Islamic civilization.7 considered Iranians as "born liars,"8 or like No'ldke confessed that they did not particularly like Iranians,9 while others like Grousset and Corbin used the most colorful lanYet all of them were guage in praise of Iranian culture. or magreatly helped in their work, whether spiritually obterially, by the circumstances created by colonialism, for the study of Iranitaining in its shadow the faculties an and other Oriental cultures. Regarding the crude polemics, they are the inevitable result of the exuberance that their authors feel in a new spell of officially-tolerated opportunity utilizing for the censure of the West in both political and cultural terms. Until a decade ago, such censure was often associated in the official eyes with left-wing radicalism, and It is, of course, poswas therefore severely restricted. atmosphere of culsible that the new politically-charged tural nationalism will affect adversely the scholarly but this is quality of the works of Iranian historians, unavoidable as a transient phase of national self-consciousness. This point has often been ignored even by like Monteil who, for all their awareness of the critics Afro-Asian optique, are taken aback by the absence of oristandards in most ginal research and the poor intellectual of the products of Afro-Asian nationalistic historiography. But how can one in all fairness expect, for instance, the historians of the peoples only recently emancipated from colonialism to judge the records of their former masters and stoic equanimity? with scientific objectivity
IRANIANSTUDIES
8
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing remarks is not that because Iranology was born of the exigencies of colonialism, one should discard in the rewriting of Iranian history the fruits of decades of labor by European and American scholars. The proper course would rather be for us to try to examine critically both the content and methods of the Orientalists' works in an effort to place our own studies on a sound basis. In the remaining portion of this paper I should like to examine briefly some of the general deficiencies of Western Iranology with a a few critical view to identifying in the methodoissues and political logy of Iranian social history. The most glaring
defect
of Western
Iranology
is
its
non-Iranian perspective. This need not be a defect, especially if by non-Iranian viewpoint is meant a scientific and universalistic approach, relieved from all manner of and racial prejudices. national, confessional Alternatively, a non-Iranian viewpoint, even when it is colored by such prejudices, may have obvious advantages for objective scholarship insofar as a scholar who is scrutinizing a foreign culture is able to judge its merits and demerits better than those located within that culture. But none of these qualifications seem to be present in the conventional methods of Western Iranology for two main reasons. Firstly, because Iranology developed along other Oriental
studies within the context of a colonialist mentality, it was tainted with European national arrogance bolstered by a belief in the unquestionable, eternal superiority of the West over the East. Secondly, outside the colonialist context, Orientalism in general was affected by the prevalent notions of history in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These notions, whether they belonged to Macauley and Grote in England, Michelet and Guizot in France, or Treitschke and Meinecke in Germany, were all, in the words of Isiah Berlin, merely "national philosophies of history," informed with a sense of moral and political whether they dealt with "their own times or with direction, Even Hegelian, Marxian remote cultures and situations."110
and Weberian schools of historiography, with all their claims to universality, objectivity and "value-detachment," 9
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could not escape cumstances.
the
impact
of specifically
European cir-
The European-centred method of historiography may not be discernible in the meticulously-researched works of Western Iranologists on particular details of Iranian archeology, philology, numismatics, etc. But it is certainfailure of Western Iranology to ly evident in the palpable assess Iranian contribution to the development of human culture, and in its obsession with the incidental, the bizarre and the exotic of Iranin the more general studies ian history and civilization. these flaws were Ironically, of Western philosocommunicated back to the meditations phers of history and other thinkers who trusted in the data vouchsafed to them by the Orientalists. For example, of the many books written on political thought in the West, of Zoroasonly that by George Catlin notes the influence trianism on ancient Greek Political philosophy, especially on the views of Plato.11 Fortunately, Fatlhallah Mujtab-a'i of Tehran University has conducted original research on this question, the publication of which we hope will help to make good this deficiency.12 Yet if the basic and implicit assumption of Orientalism was that Western civilization was innately and eternally superior to Eastern civilization, our own Iranology ought not to commit the opposite error, and assume that everything pertaining to Iranian culture is a paradigm of It ought not to be forgotten perfection. that fanaticism begets fanaticism, and the excesses of some of our scholars in demonstrating the excellence of Iranian culture have stimulated among some Persian-speaking people undesirable cultural reactions which have sometimes taken on a political character. Iranology has to some extent been free of one of the political which have vitiated faults other branches of Orientalism. Most Orientalists, in emphasizing the linguistic, and ethnic pluralism of the various religious, Asian and African peoples, have, wittingly or unwittingly, prepared the ground for a variety of tribal conflicts,
IRANIAN STUDIES
10
wars within these nations. movements, and civil separatist the strife beof the Indian subcontinent, The partition in the Sudan and Nigeria, and tween Muslims and Christians between the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus, the hostility impact of coloniare just a few examples of the divisive has made no Orientalism alism to whose intensification But the works of Western Iranologists, mean contribution. moveon a few minority religious except for some studies have had few such results. century, ments in the nineteenth by Western Iranologists of many eleInstead, the discovery has been responheritage cultural ments of our pre-Islamic urge for sible for the growth in Iran of a nationalistic This, incicivilization. of pre-Islamic the exaltation dentally, holds true for a number of other Muslim countries, withl Pharaonic enthralment Egypt where a similar especially has sometimes been noted in the development civilization thus Taha Husain once asserted of national consciousness; from Arab that Egyptian culture was in essence different from pursue a course separate culture, and should therefore if it were to overcome its that of other Muslim countries for glorifying the prebackwardness.13 Predilections Islamic past sometimes place a heavy strain on Islamic and exert an adverse efof these countries, affiliations not to fect of their individual cultural integration, implicainternal and external speak of their political tions. 14 Another flaw of Western Iranology is that its prewith the minutiae preoccupation excessive viously-noted, of military and of philology, and the history archaeology from the has diverted its attention religious conflicts I do not of Iranian history and culture. broader features of these value and necessity mean to deny the scholarly but rather want to emphasize that the Iranodisciplines, has in most of these fields concern with details logists' of the more general tiends their vision often obfuscated and deveiopments. In this regard it is not surprising that although Islam has been studied in the West for a to the course time, most points relative very considerable of Iranian thought remain unknown.. "Many points," says of philosophy in Iran S. H. Nasr, "relative to the history
11
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have remained cloaked in obscurity, in particular the hiswhich by reason of the tory of the last seven centuries, absence of any link with European civilization and the disappearance in the Arab world of independent philosophical schools, has not been studied by Western scholars." 15 This deficiency in Western Iranology has given rise to the belief that Iranians have throughout their history lacked the capacity for critical, serious thought, and have adhered to no principle--save blind obedience to their masters, a belief that has often been accepted uncritically by large sections of our Westernized intellectuals. This notion has sometimes found a fascinating cynical expression in our contemporary literature such as in the later works of Sadiq Hidayat, although Hedayat's cynicism was more of a spirited response to exaggerated official glorification of ancient Iranian culture. It is evident that a people who believe themselves to be incapable of critical thinking will tend to be servile and submissive to tyranny. Even worse, since they see themselves as incapable of criticism or assiduous application, they will allow themselves to be torn in the crosscurrents of contemporary intellectual developments. of studying political One of the difficulties thought in Iran is that political ideas are always incorporated in ethical, theological, metaphysical, or historical works. While in the West from the time of Plato onwards, it has been a tradition among thinkers to write books and treatises specifically on politics and government, in both pre-Islamic and post-Islamic Iran discussions of society and government have always been subsumed under more general observations on religion and the world. As a consequence, a thorough knowledge of Iranian or Islamic political thought would require a careful study of very nearly every work which in some way reveals Iranian or Islamic attitudes toward the life of the individual and society, from the andarznamah's to works on theology, history, ethics and philosophy. glish
So far no more than two books have appeared in Enby Western scholars on the specific subject of Is-
IRANIANSTUDIES
12
One of these, by Erwin Rosenlamic political philosophy. thal, contains no discussion of Shi'ite political thought.16 and the other by W. Mont omery Watt summarizes it in little over a dozen pages.1' Whatever the justifications for this neglect, its connection with political considerations can hardly be denied: because Sunni Islam is embraced by the vast majority of Muslims, and because Westerners historically have had more substantial relations with them, Orientalism has regarded the study of Sunnism to be of far more urgent necessity than that of Shi'ism. Apart from its historical importance, a critical study of Shilite political ideas is particularly essential for us in evaluations of the place of Shi'ism in our nation's cultural heritage. Such an evaluation will enable us to decide a more important issue in Iran's social history, that is to say, whether some of the negative traits in our national character, such as fatalism, love of superstition, submissiveness in the face of oppression, and dissimulation, are, as has sometimes been claimed, the outcome of Shilite indoctrination,18 or whether they have been simply the by-products of sociopolitical circumstances. In fact when one carefully etudies the beliefs and practices of the Shilites throughout history, one cannot help forming the impression that Shi'ism, with its emphasis on justice as an absolutely essential of the ruler, and prerequisite its insistence on the Muslims' obligation to fight oppression, has often inspired political militancy among its adherents. Indeed, in most of the unorthodox and revolutionary movements in the history of Islam, from the Mu ctazilah to the anti-despotic movements of the 12th century A.H., the Shi'ites have either actually taken a leading part or been accused of doing so. Finally, one general lesson to be learned from the low esteem in which Orientalism is held in Asian nationalistic circles today is that scientific research in general, and research relating to social sciences in particular, cannot maintain their integrity unless they avoid dependence on governments, and subordination to transient social demands and "moods." This is particularly important since recent growing interest in history in Iran, as in most other Asian countries,
13
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by, grandiose has coincided with, and sometimes initiated of the past. Here again official schemes of glorification individual scholars may not be directly connected with goBut vernments, or consciously serving their interests. the overall orientation of their research plans, notably with regard to the choice of topics, may be determined by official expectations. Thus far, I have spoken of Western Iranology as a coherent whole, but of course there is a separate school of Iranology which, despite its reliance on Western sources and methodology, subscribes to a completely separate and But beindependent school, namely, the Soviet Iranology. the point Iranology, of Soviet a discussion fore turning to the momentous ought to be made that since the early fifties developments in Asia and Africa and the changing pattern of their relations with the West have occasioned important The great changes in the character of Western Orientalism. of the West have accommodated themselves to universities The travel and immigration of a conthese new conditions. siderable number of students and scholars from Asian countries to the West and their employment in the universities of Europe and America have resulted in a substantial number of lecturing and research positions in the departments of Oriental studies being occupied by "Orientals" themIn addition, a growing number of Orientalists selves. have now turned their attention from past history to the present situation in Asia. And, as the bases of independence of the countries of the Third World grow stronger, and the signs of weakness and strain in Western civilization become more manifest, there has been a diminution in the thinly concealed pride and arrogance that characterized Great efforts are now the older school of Orientalism. being made by some Western scholars to combine their studies on Iran and Islam with sympathy or empathy through adopting such approaches as phenomenology, or by trying to analyze Islam from the "faith perspective" of its believers. However, in contrast to a few of my colleagues, I am not convinced that this change has come about because the light of Eastern wisdom has fallen on their perplexed I believe, rather, that here again the Western hearts. IRANIANSTUDIES
14
exigencies of governmental interests continue to determine the orientation and content of much of current Oriental studies. As regards Soviet Iranology, one must say that insofar as the social history of Iran is concerned, it has to some extent been free of most of the serious flaws of its Western counterpart. In contrast to their Western colleagues, Soviet Iranologists have given proper attention to the social and economic causes of historical developments, and have grasped some of the broader issues relating to Iranian culture. In particular, they have tried to discover as much of the conditions, hopes and agonies of ordinary people as can be inferred from available literary and historical sources. More interestingly, they have paid attention to some of the unorthodox ideas and beliefs which have either gone largely unrecorded or been handed down to us in a distorted version. Pigulevskaya's study on Iranian cities,19 Dyakonov's thesis on Gaumata,20 and Petrushevsky's research on the Sarbiddrid movement of Khurasan,21 are only a few examples of the Soviet method of historiography on Iran. Whether or not we agree with the judgments of Soviet scholars on these subjects, their work has yielded one unquestionable benefit: by providing us with an interpretation of a great many events in our history different from the conventional accounts, they have helped to arouse controversy among our scholars and students, and thereby provoked them to search out the truth. It is only through such controversy that history, as an academic discipline, can change from an assemblage of crude and disjointed data into a lively intellectual exercise. But since the conceptual framework of Soviet Iranology is provided by Marxism-Leninism,22 it still suffers from that fundamental flaw of Western Iranology, namely, its non-Iranian viewpoint. Moreover, there is much in the Marxist method of historical and sociological analysis which is today the subject of dispute even among the Marxists themselves. As was indicated previously, since World War II a number of Asian and African scholars and writers 15
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have, by reason of their resentment of Western Orientalism, turned to Marxism in order to base the histories of their own countries on the writings of Soviet Orientalists and to employ the criteria of dialectical materialism in their evaluations and analyses. But owing to the impossibility of free discussion and debate, the Marxism which was accepted by a few intellectuals in these countries was of the rigid and official type known as Stalinist Marxism. One of the fundamental bases of Stalinist Marxism is the conof their viction that all human societies, irrespective national, religious, regional, cultural and other differences, have from the beginning of history down to the present moment passed through the same five stages, namely, primitive communism, serfdom, feudalism, capitalism, and chasocialism, and that the economic, social and political racteristics of each society have all been precisely the same at each of these stages. According to the advocates of this theory, it is this very uniformity in the characof human societies which makes possible the uniteristics versal application of Marxist theories to all spheres of human life, and which elevates Marxism to the status of a new science, the science of man. conFrom the time of the twentieth and twenty-first gresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, this style of historiography has been criticized by a number of Marxists. In keeping with the general drive for de-Stalinization, theories denoting the uniform development of all human societies throughout history have been rejected or largely modified by Soviet scientists and their followers. In the preface to his book, Sur le mode de production asiatique, the French Marxist writer Jean Chesneaux stresses the fact that the return to the spirit of free inquiry has meant that Marxist scholars will now study non-European societies in a manner which is both more exact and free of rigid preconceptions, and will consequently better compreAs is abundantly hend their variety and individuality.23 clear, the bulk of the work of Soviet Iranologists belongs to the rigid school of the older Soviet Orientalism in that their writers have laboriously attempted to fit each period of Iranian history into the mould of one of the five IRANIANSTUDIES
16
stages of historical severely criticized his assertion that
The late M.CA. Khunj; development. Dyakonov's History of Media, refuting the Median period of Iranian history
corresponds perfectly with the serfdom period of European history.24 Such analyses of the works of Soviet Iranologists can be most useful in understanding the essential features of Iranian society in the past. And at the same time we may look forward to the publication of new studies by Soviet scholars written from a freer point of view. This anticipation
does not, of course,
Iranian scholars from their obligation better understanding of the distinctive
and modern Iranian sociopolitical Iranology
may succeed
taking the rigorous
in this
excuse young
to work toward a features of ancient
structure. undertaking,
In order that it
must,
while
methodology of European scholarship
as
its model, avoid both the excessive concern with the deas shown by Western Iranology, tails, and the dogmatism of
its Soviet counterpart. But, it is the view of this writer that another condition is even more essential to the success of Iranian scholarship, and that is a true scholarly environment. It was the existence of such an environment which ultimately enabled Europeans to discover the methodo-
logy of scientific
research.
The most essential
indicator
of an environment proper to scientific inquiry is freedom of thought and conscience, and the possibility of criticizing whatever is accepted and taken for granted. This is an asset which is won, not merely by convening academic
congresses, strated,
but as the experience
by long struggle
of Europeans has demon-
and sacrifice. NOTES
1.
School of Oriental (London, 1970-71),
2.
Dwight Macdonald, "In Search of Asian History," Encounter, Vol. VII , No. 3 (September, 1956), pp. 16-17.
and African Studies, p. 71.
17
Calender
WINTER1973
3.
Vincent Monteil, "The Decolonization of the Writing of History," in I. Wallerstein, ed., Social Change: The Colonial Situation (New York, 1966), pp. 592-605.
4.
See an account of S. H. Taqi-zadeh's notorious remarks about the necessity of complete Westernization of Iranians in Yaby5 Aryan-Pur, Az baba ta Nlma, Vol. II (Tehran, 1350), p. 232.
5.
For some samples of recent Iranian views on Iranology, see Abulhasan Jalili, va jahan-i "Sharq-shinasi imrfiz," Vol. I, No. 2 (1347); Dariush AshuCUluim-i Ijtimacl, ri, "IIran-shinasi chist," Bar-resi-i Kitab (Tehran, 1350); Abul-Qasim Injavi Shlrazl, "cIllat-i vujidi-i istishraq va mustashriq," Negin, Vol. 8, No. 85 (Khurdad, 1351).
6.
J. W. Fiuck, "Islam as an Hiistorical Problem in European Historiography since 1800,".in Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt., eds.., Historians of the Middle East (London, 1962), p. 309.
7.
See his
8.
Duncan B. Macdonald, Development Jurisprudence and Constitutional reprint), p. 39.
9.
Fiuck,
op.
La Civilization
cit.,
p.
des Arabes
(Paris,
1884).
of Muslim Theology, Theory (Lahore, 1960;
309.
10.
Forward to F. Meinecke, Historism, Anderson (London, 1972).
11.
A History of the Political George Catlin, (London, 1950), pp. 74-75.
12.
Fathallah Mujtaba'i, "Aflatan va nizam-i tabaqati-i Hind va Irin," Sukhan, Vol. 21, No. 11, pp. 1OS3-65.
13.
Cf. Taha Husain, (Cairo, 1947).
IRANIAN STUDIES
Mustagbal
18
translated
by J. E.
Philosophers
ath thagqafah fl Miar
14.
For an example of some of the Iranian Muslim criticisms of the modern nationalist tendency to exalt preIslamic Iran, see S. H. Nasr, et al., Muhammad, Khatam-i payghambaran, the Husaynlyah Irshad publicaNo. 1 (Tehran, no date), tions, pp. 86-87.
15.
S. H. Nasr, "Barkh;1 masa'il marbut bih tarikh-i falsafah dar Iran," Rahnamaye Ketab, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Sharlvar., 1345), p . 234.
16.
Erwin J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam (Cambridge, 1958). The author justifies this omission in the following terms: "Shi'ite doctrine is mixed with a number of extra-Islamic ideas and notions and is too complicated to be treated in this first of political conspectus thought without further research along the lines of R. Strathman's work" (p.5).
17.
W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh, 1968), pp. 110-114; there are also other sketand doctrinal chy accounts of historical aspects of Shilism in pp. 42-45 and 82-89.
18.
For an extreme Ahmad Kasravi,
19.
N. V. Pigulevskaya, Les villes de l'etat iranien epoques parthe et sassanide (Paris, 1963).
20.
I. M. Dyakonov, Thrikh-i mad, translated by Karim Keshavarz (Tehran, 1965).
21.
I. P. Petrushevsky, Nahzat-i sarbidaran dar Khurasan, into Persian by Karim Keshavarz, in Fartranslated hang-i Iran-Zamin (Tehran, 1340).
22.
USSR Academy of Sciences, "Fifty Years of Soviet Oriental Studies," History of Iranian Studies (Moscow, 1967), p. 4.
version of this critical attitude Shicigarl (Tehran, 1322).
19
into
see
aux
Persian
WINTER1973
23.
Jean Chesneaux, (Paris, 1969).
24.
M.CA. Khunji, "Bahs va tabqlq dar tarlkh-i Rahnamaye Ketab, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Shahrivar, supplement.
IRANIAN STUDIES
Sur le mode de production
20
asiatigue
mad," 1346),
THE MEMOIRSOF HA YDARKHAN ?A4MU UGHLU A. REZA SHEIKHOLESLAMI and DUNNINGWILSON In 1946 a short autobiographical account of Haydar Khan CAmuUghiu, the Caucasian revolutionary who participated in the Iranian Constitutional movement, 1905-19O9,l appeared in the Persian monthly journal, Yadig r.2 The article, which was accompanied by an introduction as well as by some concluding remarks, was unsigned. The editorial policies of the journal, however, indicate that un- 3 signed articles were written by CAbbas Iqbal, the editor. Iqbal does not attempt to establish the authenticity of this account, nor do other historians who have used it in their research. While in the absence of the document its authenticity cannot be established, it is possible to make some comments concerning the probability that this may be authentic and that the events mentioned in the autobiography took place, the role Haydar Khan played in these of these events for the Iraevents, and the significance nian political structure. Iqbal, in his introduction, writes that Haydar Khi had dictated to MLrza Ibrahim Khan Munthis autobiography shizadah.4 Munshtzadah shared many characteristics with
The introduction and notes are by A. Reza Sheikholeslami. He is a doctoral candidate in Islamic Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. The translation of the text is by A. Reza Sheikholeslami and Dunning Wilson. Mr. Wilson is the Persian Bibliographer at the University of California, Los Angeles. 21
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Haydar Khan: He hiad come to Iran from Russia; he resented to that of the Russian of his position the inferiority in the Persian army, as Uaydar Khan probCossack officers ably had with regard to Russians in Russian Azerbaijan; probable that It is therefore and he was a revolutionary. he would have known Haydar Khan and that Haydar Khan would The text of the autohave told him about his activities. nor is it in a comin good Persian, biography is neither for Haydar It is however too elaborate style. plicated It is therePersian.5 knew little Khan, who admittedly assertion, fore safe to assume that, contrary to Iqbal's by Ilaydar Khan to Munthis is not a text simply dictated or someone else must have but that the latter shlzadah, at least its style. changed liberally source of doubt about the authenticity One possible of the story of memoir is Uaydar Khdn's narration
of this
his bomb-throwing at cAla' al-Dawlah's house in order to fri-ghten the Anjuman-i Khidmat (The Society for Service), of which CAla' al-Dawlah was an important member. The date Iaydar Khan gives for this event is July 25, 1907. The Anjuman-i Khidmat, also known as the Anjuman-i Akabir (The Society of Elders) or the Anjuman-i Ashraf (The Socity of Nobles), was formed following the murder of Atabak, which took place on August 31, 1907. It is of course possible that Haydar Khan might have made an error in the What is odd, however, is that he date of the incident. should have made a mistake in recording the sequence of the account of the Anjuman-i the events as well---presenting Khidmat in a way which suggests that it had existed before Atabak's later
death.
of the Anjuman, as will Haydar Khan's description It will also be shown that be shown, is correct.
this particular
act agrees with Haydar Khan's general be-
havioral pattern and that he might very well have done it. the account given corroborate Independent sources actually here, i.e., that Uaydar Khan was involved in throwing a bomb at cAla' al-Dawlah's house.6 of the account can be The date of the composition The key to it is Haydar Khan's calculated rather narrowly. IRANIAN STUDIES
22
to SaniC al-Dawlah as the late UanlC al-Dawlah. reference on February 6, 1911. Haydar SaniC al-Dawlah was killed Khan himself was forced to leave Iran in late March or The memoirs must have been dictated early April, 1911.9 1911, since to Munshlzadah between February and April, in 1917 before Haydar Khdn's fatal Munsh!zRdah was killed that return to Iran in 1921, and there is no indication MIunshlzddah took any trip outside of Iran at any time afis of course tenable only on ter 1911.10 This hypothesis the assumption that persons other than HIaydar Khan did not insert
the
word "late."
Haydar Khan as presents Iqbal, in his introduction, party because he was a Muslim zealot who formed a political of the unjust treatment of his co-religionists resentful Many other Iranian writers, at the hands of the Russians.'1 Howfollowing lqbal, have come to the same conclusion. ever, neither Haydar Khan's Islamic zeal, nor his oftstand the test of closer sense of nationalism, proclaimed The error with regard to Haydar. Khan's religious scrutiny. zeal probably stems from the fact that, in Russian Azerdiffered from the exestablishment the exploiting baijan, and masses not only in class but also in religion ploited to the Russian Haydar Khdn's opposition nationality.12 be assumed to have its source establishment could therefore As far as elements. in any of the three aforementioned claim with regard to the formation of a Muslim poIqbal's there were in party by Haydar Khan is concerned, litical formed in the Caucasus parties fact two Muslim political the Himmat and the century, in the twentieth very earl of the Russian off-shoots These were basically Musavat.1 Haydar Khan, however, not only Social Democratic Party. maintained his membership as a Social Democrat (according to the memoirs),14 but he was in Iran when the two Muslim parties were formed and thus could not have been among Nor was Haydar Khan (as some Persian authors the founders. He remained a Russian suba nationalist. have suggested) he was rather disdainand, as his memoirs indicate, ject, Witness his experiful of the backwardness of Persians. lack of ence in Mashhad and his complaint of.people's maturity. 15
23
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In fact, the sole ideological criterion that we can usefully apply to Haydar Khan is Marxism as interpreted by the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party and by its left wing at the time of the split. It is only then that we gain insight into his cooperation with the "bourgeois nationalists" in the course of the Constitutional Movement, and his later avowed Bolshevism. The development of Haydar Khdn's course of action closely resembles the doctrinal change that the Communists underwent after the October Revolution of 1917. While Marx had predicted a socialist take-over first in the western countries, a school of Asian communists pressed for immediate socialist revolution in the East following the October Revolution. Finally, it was agreed that those countries that had experienced bourgeois nationalism for ten or more years were ready for the socialist stage.16 Iran was then such a country. From then on Uaydar Khan worked for the socialist take-over rather than a bourgeois-nationalist government. Vaydar Khdn's memoirs begin from the time of his recruitment in Baku during Muzaffar al-Din Shah's first trip to Europe in 1900 and end with the murder of Atabak, the Iranian premier, in 1907. This covers part of the first phase of Haydar Khan's political activities, namely Folhis co-operation with the "bourgeois nationalists." lowing the murder of Atabak, he is supposed to have partiterror of major sigcipated in two more acts of political nificance. These are not covered by the memoirs, but since we are concentrating on the first phase of Haydar Khdn's political life, namely his cooperation with the national we will deal with them. bourgeoisie, On August 31, 1907, the very day that the AngloRussian Agreement dividing Iran into spheres of influence was signed in St. Petersburg, Atabak was shot in front of His alleged assassin is the Majlis (Parliament) building. said to have committed suicide soon after shooting Atabak. On his body a note was found which read "'cAbb&sAqa, money changer, of Azerbaijan, member of the Anjuman, a nationalist devotee, No. 41."'17 It is an indication of the political confusion of the time that every political group was
IRANIANSTUDIES
24
for Ataeither accused of or boasted of being responsible on the subject, however, can The literature bak's murder. The friends of be broadly divided into two categories. accuse Mulammad CAlU Shah (January, 1907Atabak generally to show that Atabak July, 1909) and his court in an effort Thus, had become a true friend of the constitutionalists. of who held the portfolio Hidayat, Mukhbir al-Saltanah, under Atabak, claims that the murthe Minister of Sciences der was ordered by the Shah and carried out by the AdamlAtabak's political including Other sources, yat group.l8 by the constituthat Atabak was killed enemies, insist sources agree that it was Most reliable tionalists.19 some alleging gaydar Khan who planned the assassination, Azerbaijani that Taqlzadah, at the time a young radical was also involved.20 member of Parliament, was not a simple act of poAtabak's assassination were felt long after Its repercussions violence. litical with Parliament The Shah's relationship Atabak's death. that Atabak had beworsened, as the era of conciliation On the very day of his gun drew to an end with his death. an oath from MubammadcAll Shah death, Atabak had extracted that he would cooperate with Parliament and that he would Enjoying the highhis power to the ministers.21 delegate in the country, Atabak was the only est political stature a constitutional man who might have been able to establish Not only could he stand up against monarchy in the land. the unreasonable demands of the Shah, but he could also he had the support muster enough support in Parliament, of the merchants, of the top clergy, the representatives the Speaker as well as such moderates as Sanic al-Dawlah, of the House.22 Atabak could count on the wealth of Amin clergywhile the influential al-Zarb and Mucin al-Tujjar, man, Sayyid CAbd Allah, kept the populace under control mainly composed for him. The opposition in Parliament, of Azerbaijani was outnumbered.23 representatives, quickly The murder of Atabak changed the picture that the coalition The working majority, and completely. immediately disappeared. Atabak had formed in Parliament, joined his previous Sayyid cAbd Allah, his arch-supporter, 25
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enemies, namely Taqlzadah and his radical group.24 The fear instilled by "devotee No. 41" was so great that Atabak was not even given a public funeral. The moderates and the absolutists feared for their own lives. 25 The small radical minority in Parliament had received an important boost indeed. On the traditional fortieth-day commemoration of CAbbas Aqa's death, when the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 had also been made public, the population of Tehran turned out as for a holiday. Thousandf6 gathered at his tomb, swearing to follow in his path. It would seem that this single act of violence, while altering the power coalitions at the top, brought the common urban people together into one unified body. They became more hopeful about their futures, more aware of their existence as a nation, and less tolerant toward absolutism. In fact, it would seem that a new element appeared in the life of the Persians, namely patriotism. With the disappearance of Atabak from the scene, the lines of conflict became more clearly drawn. The Shah and Parliament could not agree on cabinets, and in the absence of a figure like Atabak interceding between the constitutionalists and the Shah, the two sides stood face to face against each other. The level of conflict rose, each side getting ready for the final round of the confrontation. Those who thought cooperation with the Shah was possible lost their standing among the constitutionalists, and thus the movement was radicalized and became more revolutionary. The Shah's camp also became more warlike. Fearful of the radicals, and yet keenly aware of the change in the style of politics, a group of notables united in an anjuman, which became known as the Khidmat.
According to Dawlatabad; 's account, Saltanah,
the new Speaker
group together.27
it was Ihtisham al-
of the House,
who brought
this
Prominent among the members of this
an-
Ihtisham juman was cAla'al-Dawlah, al-Saltanah's brother. The members of this anjuman went to Parliament on September 27, 1907, and declared their loyalty to the Constitution.28 The account that is ascribed to Haydar Khan is correct insofar as it recognizes the corrupt nature of
IRANIAN STUDIES
26
Mirza Ahmad Khan cAla' al-Dawlah himself was this group. who had survived official an example of an unscrupulous and had master-minded many more, and who many intrigues of the nature of the changing 2 atterns was very conscious He around him.2 relationships of the political-power like many other late top Qajar funcstarted his career, servant to Nasir al-Din Shah (1848as a personal tionaries, and ruthlesshis father's title Later, he inherited 1896). It was he who, as the governor of ly worked his way up.30 and thus so provoked some merchants, Tehran, bastinadoed Shah, other merchants that they took refuge in the Masjid-i where, joined by Sayyid CAbd Allah and Sayyid Muhammad, they began the movSTent which developed into the Constitusucceeded, Yet, when the Revolution Revolution. tional when the constitutionalists In fact, he tried to join it. as governor of Fars, to forced his resignation effectively get their support he went to the Court as a member of a demanding that the Shah cease opposing the Condelegation stitution.32 of pecple The Anjuman-i Khidmat was a conglomeration rather than changing alliances new political establishing It was a major threat to constitutionalism their politics. Haydar Khan, in harmed it most. and the one that finally to make the movement more radical, struggle his continuous of the Khidmat group. must have been aware and resentful in one of two act could only have resulted His terroristic would have Khidmat either the group reactions: possible in which and turned to the absolutists, been antagonized case the movement would have been purged of the elements with the connections with strong emotional and social or the Khidmat ancien regime and thus more radicalized; into further and more group would have been frightened In either with the constitutionalists. cooperation radical In the case, Haydar Khan would have welcomed the result. it was the second which at least, case of cAla' al-Dawlah, took place. Six months after Atabak's murder, on the last day of February, 1908, a bomb was thrown at the Shah's motor The Shah himself happened to be in a following vehicle. Some members of the royal and escaped injury. carriage 27
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entourage, however, were not as lucky. The plice investigation resulted in the arrest of Haydar Khan, among others, and the accused were taken to the Shah's residence for further investigations. The fact that the police had apparently not sought a legal warrant for their arrest or for the search of their residences, and the transfer of the accused to the Shah's palace, resulted in a protest in the Majlis and among the constitutionalists outside of the Majlis. Under popular pressure not only were all of the accused released, but the chief of police and the governor of Tehran were brought in front of the courts for their handling of the case.3 At least Haydar Khan, of those arrested, was deeply involved in the plot. He in fact confessed later that he was the one who threw the bomb;34 and according to another source, he was in the habit of boasting of it. Other contemporary sources, some of them friends of Haydar Khan, agree that he was the master-mind behind the plot.36 The insistence of the constitutionalist leaders that the accused should be released must have convinced the Shah that they were also involved in, or at least in agreement with, the plan to have him assassinated. The constitutionalists showed no interest in seeking those responsible for the episode, nor did they agree that those already accused could be brought before proper tribunals. In fact, once again an open act of violence had changed the moods and orientations of the leadership of the Majlis and the "Court party." The very Majlis that was now in the forefront of the struggle for the release of the accused plotters had previously been buying royal support eagerly, and rather expensively. The bomb was thrown at a time when the relationship between the Shah and the Majlis was once again amicable. Taqlzadah, who at the time was one of the most radical members of Parliament, finds it possible to say that "the relationship between the Shah and the people was continuously growing warmer and firmer until the incident of the bomb thrown at the Shah's retinue. That single event," he says, "changed the picture. The Shah 7 disillusioned with the Majlis, resolved to destroy it." The Constitutional Revolution had so far evolved rather the constitutionalists peacefully: employed such tradiIRANIANSTUDIES
28
tional means of registering as taking sanctuary opposition or the ulama leaving the capital (bast), in self-imposed exile. The attack on the Shah's motor vehicle and the subsequent closure of the Majlis intensified the conflict to such a degree that the usual channels for expressing opposition were no longer adequate. The Shah and the constitutionalists confronted each other, armed. And for the first time in the Middle East a monarch was deposed in the name of the nation. Following the closing of the Majlis, Haydar Khan went to the Caucasus, where he aided in the supply of men and ammunition to Iran to fight the absolutists.38 Later in the course of the Revolution, he returned to Tabriz. This period of his activities is mainly marked by the bomb concealed in a parcel that he sent to Shujac Nizam, an absolutist officer stationed in the city of Marand. Shujac Nizam, upon opening the parcel, was killed by the ensuing The Shah sent another high-ranking explosion. to officer replace him, and the military situation did not change materially. But the abundant and detailed availinformation able about this incident in the contemporary sources may be an indication of the boost in morale that it gave to the constitutionalists at a difficult moment.39 When Tehran finally fell to the constitutionalists in 1909, two groups emerged, known as Dimukratlyfin-i cAmmlyian (Popular Democrats) and Ijtimaclyuin-i IctiddllyUn (Social Moderates). The Democrats were influenced by the Caucasian Social Revolutionaries of 1905.40 It was naturally with the Democrats that Haydar Khan cooperated. He was very active in setting up the branches of the Democratic Party in the provinces.41 His rare combination of charisma and his patience in establishing orgrass-root ganizations would have left an effect had his career not been cut short by the controversy over Bihbihani's death. On January 25, 1910, Sayyid cAbd Allah Bihbihnii, a powerful leader of the Moderates, was killed in his The murderer or murderers were never arrested. house. Most sources contend that Haydar Khan had master-minded the plan. MahmuidMahmiid, in whose house Haydar Khan sought 29
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refuge after Bihbih&ni's death, observes briefly in his42 notes that Bihbihani was killed by Haydar Khdn's group. Kasravi presents a rather complicated plot, the central theme of which was that "foreigners" set up the Democratic Party and that Haydar Khan became an unwitting agent for the Party and for Taqlzadah, one of its leaders. Whenthe ulama in Najaf declared Taqlzadah excommunicated and sent the excommunication document to Bihbihani to read in the Majlis, Taqlzadah, hoping to avoid this, instructed Haydar Khan to assassinate Bihbihani.43 Taqlzadah, just before his death, denied the allegation that he or Haydar Khan were involved. He held that copies of the excommunication document were sent many people other than Bihbihdnl.44 Whatever the facts may be, the popular opinion must have been more in line with the account that Kasravi presents, since soon after Bihbihanl's death Taqlzadah had to leave Iran. Haydar Khan was arrested, but, under pressure from the Democrats, he was released. He even participated in the disarming of Sattar Kh&an'sand Baqir Khan's bands, which formed the Moderates' armed support. However, with the supporters of Bihbihani after him,45 he spent most of his time in hiding, and his effectiveness was severely reduced. Thus, when Sipahdar became prime minister on March 11, 1911, he was able to expel Haydar Khan from the counThis marked the end of Haydar Khan's cooperation with try. the "nationalist bourgeoisie" in Iran. The following memoir is a case study of the efficacy of terror in polities marked by a low degree of instituis dominated by actors rathtionalization. Where politics er than by roles, the removal or coercing of certain individual actors can result in new patterns of political beof a figure havior. In such a setting an assassination like Atabak can be of a revolutionary magnitude, since, with his removal, the change is not limited to that of the in the patpremier, but extends to significant alterations and counter-alliances. tern of alliances In this milieu the public also identifies all its hopes and despairs with
certain selves violent Atabak,
actors. political They therefore express themin utopian revolutionary jargon, following each act. Such was the case following the death of when the populace felt that the last obstacle to
IRANIANSTUDIES
30
progress and democracy was removed. Haydar Khdn's terrorism not only helped to eradicate a sense of powerlessness felt by the majority of the people, a particular characof traditional teristic polities, but, by rendering the conservative elements insecure, made them accept a measure of political change which they would not have otherwise accepted. Text of Memoirs In Baku, I knew several Iranians. Muzaffar al-Din Shah4 was then on his first trip to Europe, accompanied by Mirza CAli Asghar Khan Atabak. He was seeking a Muslim engineer to set up an electric light factory in Mashhad. At that time, there were few Muslim electrical engineers and those that were in Baku introduced me. After purchasI set out for ing parts and equipment for 400 lights, Khurasan. Although the purchases were arranged by Hakim al-Mulk,47 I accepted this procedure. Prince Nayyir al-Dawlah48 was governor of Mashhad. I saw in that city acts of cruelty which offended the human conscience. I had been involved since the age of 12 in political activities in Russia, and I had never been able to tolerate economic exploitation. How could I witness such acts in Iran and remain silent? What surprised and affected me even more was seeing the governor moving through the streets and markets. A large number of servants and retainers, about 400 people, surrounded him. People sitting down along the path followed by the governor were raised up by force and ordered to kneel in homag I had never seen this kind of thing. The Mutivalli Bash of the Holy Shrine also practised this. He once called I me to his house to make some inquiries about my job. was taken to a room by one of his servants. The Mutivalli B&shl himself was seated above the crowd on one side of a heater. Hajl Vazir was seated on the other side. There was one chair near them. I purposely sat down on that chair although the rest of the people were sitting on their knees upon the ground.
31
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The Mutivalli manners are?" explain
Bashi asked me, "Do you know what
I answered, "Yes, I do. If you like, them in more detail for you."
He replied, manners are.1"
"Very well,
speak up.
I am ready to
Let me see what
I answered, "Manners require that a person's behavior be such that people not call him crazy. It also involves an element of morality. Not telling lies nor thieving nor defrauding are considered parts of manners. Everyone who adheres to these four conditions is said to be,a person of good manners." He said, "Correct, but there are customs requiring one to respect one's elders and superiors, aren't there? You should respect notables, shouldn't you"? I said, "Yes, we do, but not the ones of which you are thinking. A person is notable if he possesses knowledge and wisdom." I did not know Persian well, so all of our conversation was exchanged by means of an interpreter. The Mutivalli
Bashi was very offended
by such a remark,
and his
anger became apparent. Because I had sat on the chair without his permission, our conversation had shifted from one about routine matters to a personal feud. He considered my behavior an affront to his rank. I got up and, saying good-bye, went out. Being very angry, he did not answer. This gave me satisfaction that he would not want to see me again. At that time, Saham al-Mulk, who had replaced
the Mutivalli Nasir al-Mulk
Bashi was Shlrazl.
Since the electric light was something new people often came to the factory to look around. way, I became acquainted with practically all the dents in the Khurasan area, from the lowly to the
IRANIANSTUDIES
32
to Iran, In this resinotables.
My own purpose in affronting the Mutivalli Bdsh1 was to demonstrate to the people of Khurasan who lacked culture and understanding in some matters that the Mutivalli Bashi was also a man and not descended from the sky; that it was possible to behave in the same way towards him that they behaved toward other classes of people; that he had been elevated to this rank because of wealth, bribes, or other such arrangements; and that it was possible that he in no way deserved it. One evening, a man arrived at the entrance of the factory and said that His Excellency, the Mutivalli Bashi, was coming to look around and that it would be good to send on a light ahead. I paid no attention to the man's remarks. I even ordered that they shut the doors of the factory. After he had arrived and had waited a half-hour outside the gate, I agreed through one of the employees to his visit and gave permission to open the door. Once he had entered the factory, I paid no attention to him. After walking around, he left. My main intention in behim was to make the men grasp the meaning and littling value of human dignity. At the beginning of my stay in Khurasan, I witnessed a dreadful spectacle which prompted the people to admire and praise the new governor. They believed that he would be a good and cruel governor who would be able to establish law and order. However, my nature was repelled by the following sight, which I considered an act of sheer cruelty, and contrary to conscience and humanity. A body was split in two; one half hung on one side of the gate I could not erase and the other hald on the other side. this barbaric image from my mind. After a short time, another inhuman event occurred. The new, blood-thirsty governor united with the landowners to store and hoard grain in order to raise its price. They sold it in such a way that people could acquire bread only The price of with difficulty and at exorbitant rates. bread increased so much that the poor and weak were unable to purchase it. 33
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Since I was acquainted with most of the inhabitants, I used the high price of bread to incite the people against I urged them to unite and to rethe tyrannical governor. volt for the dismissal of the governor. Gradually, a great wave of turmoil began to make itself felt amongst the people until suddenly thronging together, they demanded the removal of the governor. In the midst of the excitement, several houses were sacked, one of them being the home of Na'ib al-Tawllyah. Twenty casks of wine were brought out of his residence. Na'ib was one of the chief guardians of the Shrine and had a yearly income of 40,000 tfimdns from village endowments to the Shrine. He was one of the five guards who took their turn lighting the lamps of the Shrine. It was charged also that Naqlb al-Sadat, one of the foremost landowners in Khurasan, was associated with the governor in hoarding grain and with that in mind, the people sacked his two-hundred-year-old house. Two casks of wine were placed in the entrance to the Shrine. Passers-by were told that this wine was from the house of Naqlb, a guard of the Shrine, who on the surface displayed such piety. In the turmoil, the young son of Naqib was killed and buried in the guard-house, but Naqlb himself took refuge in the I did not favor those events and did not want any Shrine. looting to take place. Since no one had informed me about the operation of government in Iran and because I did not know that all Iranian system of government was always conducted in the same manner, I imagined that after the removal of this brutal governor, his replacement would be forewarned about the previous governor and would not take part in unlawful activities. Unfortunately, the reverse was true; the next governor followed the same sort of policy, absolutely unchanged. I then understood that the government of Iran acted only on the followed no law and that its authorities principles of force and personal despotism. Whatever rulers wished to do with regard to the inhabitants, they could with complete impunity.
IRANIANSTUDIES
34
The commotion lasted about 13 days. The mob grew so great that movement in the entrance to the Shrine was Nayyir al-Dawlah was deposed and Rukn alimpossible. Dawlah50 was appointed governor and moved to Khurasan. After the arrival of Rukn al-Dawlah, no further changes took place in people's feelings and thoughts. had not got appeared. When I The idea of a constitution I was spoke to them on the subject of a constitution, broaching a totally extraordinary topic, the implications They said of which they failed completely to understand. that people could not speak with the Shah, that a person's order tongue was tied because the ruler could arbitrarily them beheaded. group in Ordered from Russia to form a political struggled for 11 months to esKhurasan, I unsuccessfully tablish one. Their minds were not ready and my endeavor They did not understand the meaning of my was fruitless. words. During that time, I found one Mashhadi with whom His name I was able to discuss the topic of the party. was Ibrahim Milni and he had imported a cigarette factory there. Since I realized that my efforts in Khurasan were I set out for Tehran on October 8, 1903. Ten useless, days later I reached N;shapiur. The deposed governor, land around Nishapiir. Nayyir al-Dawlah, owned substantial was his fief and its government under his The city itself control. After returning from Khurasan, I saw that he had ordered a person hanged. Several months after my arrival in Tehran, I took a job in a machine-shop. This way, I came to know all the My purpose was to get to know many mechanics in the city. So I resigned from the machine-shop and types of people. took employment in the Russo-Iranian Transport Company. In this job, I met most of the merchants and foreigners. After one year, I resigned and became employed in the electric light business of Haji lHusayn Aqa Amin al-Zarb. Electrical section was completely under my authority. 35
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In those three companies where I worked I made the I considered some of acquaintance of very many people. them capable and discussed certain things with them. For example, I said that government must be based on law and that the people elected by the nation must interpret that I also asserted of the country. law in the best interests and governors should possess that the ruler, ministers, limited power and that they should not be free to do as they wished. At this time, I found a way to some of the ulama. The people of Tehran obtained a photograph of M. Naus,51 the head of Customs, in the clothes of an Islamic preacher The situation graduand began calling for his expulsion. ally became more entangled and then the people began demanding justice and a house of justice. After the events at Jumcah Mosque and the trip to Qum,52
the first
people
to take refuge
in the British
Em-
bassy were the students of the Sipah Salar Mosque school. I sent them there after giving 5,000 dinars to each. Previously, when the Sipah Salar Mosque was being wired for I had gone along to supervise. At that time, electricity, I had had a chance to talk with the students and I was successful with them. Later, a large group gathered within the British Muzaffar al-Din Shah was comEmbassy from every class. The pelled to comply with the requests of the nation. One was a decree of a conpeople proposed several items. Another was the opening of the national assemstitution. Another demand was the return of the ulama from Qum bly. and also the removal of CAyn al-Dawlah53 from his position as the chief minister. After the ulama returned from Qum, Mu;affar al-Din However, it Shah issued a decree granting a constitution. Those who agreed with us did not achad certain defects. cept that decree and prevented the people from leaving the Embassy. Eventually the Shah conformed to the wishes of the nation, that is, those people assembled at the Embassy IRANIANSTUDIES
36
and signed the decree for the Constitution. Since those who took refuge in the Embassy had abwas or what solutely no concept as to what a constitution it required, a special group kept them informed and inI was among that group and stilled in them its own ideas. can say that, most of the fundamental ideas came from the house of the late Sanic al-Dawlah.54 The time for electing representatives arrived. We had a struggle to get knowledgable people elected, and at first we managed only to form a disorganized group of people from the bazar. They were brought together and conWe attempted to organize sulted on important occasions. them and succeeded. We also formed a Secret Committee consisting of seven people, as well as a Public Committee of which a great many of the bazar people were members. The representatives were elected and gradually formed into cliques. Our committees regressed into disorganization. Each representative became a member in a society or clique. This dispersed our Public Committee. Eventually only I remained and the seven people in the Secret Committee. We had connections with the Russian Social Democratic Party. The Russian Social Democratic Party was informed that its branch had been established in Tehran. They wrote to me personally that the necessary orders had been given to the party branch in the Caucasus and that I, having formed an offshoot of that branch, should work together with them. Several representatives who had connections with the Social Democratic Party in the Caucasus worked with me. At one meeting, after much deliberation, a decision was made to frighten the absolutists who at that time had formed a group called the Anjuman-i Khidmat, and had secret connections with Muhammad CAli Mlrz& [Shah] and were working to destroy the Constitution, by throwing a bomb at the home of the Vazir-i Makhsuls.55 37
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Several fedaeens from Baku were in Tehran and were ordered to do this. However, they did not do a good job. They left the bomb unexploded in the doorway of the house and ran away. The absolutists did not appreciate the warning, and corruption and evil practices continued. It was decided to throw a bomb at the house of CAla' al-Dawlah. The sound of this would reach the people. The intention was only to scare the absolutists. The eve of July 25, 1907, I set out alone about seven hours after sunset to I had a large bomb with me and I let carry out this task. it explode at the door of his house. Then I moved away in Two the direction of the zoo. It was a very dark night. soldiers in front of the post office came after me. Two others were in front of me. While I was on the sidewalk I intended to the four of them got together on my trail. go from Mirza CAli Akbar Khan Nazim al-Atibba' Street to the northern wall of the factory yard. There was a tall, solid pole in the yard, on top of which was some electric wiring. Beforehand, I had tied a thick rope to this pole and thrown the end of the rope over the wall to the street side. When I returned from the job, I could take the rope and swing to the top of the wall, which was about four meters high, and from there, I could swing into the yard. When I approached Mirza CAll Akbar Khan Street, I fired several shots at my pursuers to make them turn back. They ran away and I continued on. At the near end of Lukhtlha Street, an old policeman stuck his head out of his bedroll and said, "Whoare you? What's going on?" I answered, "Shut up and go to sleep." The policeman said, "Right," put his head under his ragged quilt and went back to sleep. I turned into Mirza cAll Akbar Khan Street but there were many dogs about me, barking and preventing my movement. I drove them away by all possible means and moved on. Several Cossacks were now coming after me, Since it was a very dark night, they could not shooting. see me, but they kept shooting in the direction of the The backyard of the factory was next to the back barking. of the house a Cossack officer whose name was Muhammad BaIt was from qir Khan Mirpanj and who is now a colonel. IRANIANSTUDIES
38
there
that
the Cossacks
came.
Close to Mirza CAll Akbar Khan's house there was a narrow street on the left. I needed to turn there in order to reach the rope. But because of the dogs and their I missed the street barking, and went beyond it by mistake. After turning around, I found the street. Meanwhile, bullets from the Cossack rifles were showering down around me. I finally reached the rope, according to plan, grabbed it, and jumped. Just as I did so, a dog bit my leg I drove him away with a kick but he took a from behind. piece of my trousers. There was no harm done to my leg. I quickly, reached the top of the wall and using the lamp post, immediately entered the backyard. Everyone was asleep. The offices were closed and locked. The only place I could stay unnoticed till morning was the iron-works. The floor there was very damp because it never got any sun. I went inside but could not find a dry spot in which to sit. Therefore I stood on my feet until morning and caught rheumatism in my legs from the dampness in the ground. My imagination played tricks on me. I heard the sound of footsteps on the roof and thought that the pursuers had guessed my plans and come after me. Gripping my revolver, I came out to defend myself. Meanwhile, the on the roof sounded more rapid and fleeting. footsteps I could not find even a large shadow worth worOutside, rying about. Then I realized that it was the sound of a
cat running and leaping on the roof. fidence and went back inside.
I regained my con-
About dawn, I heard the porter coming and I called out, "Open the door." He was greatly shocked and terrified at finding me there, since all the doors were closed and locked. He asked me, "How and when did you get in I answered, "I came because I had work in here. here?" I pounded on the door but you didn't wake up, so I was forced to come over this wall. Now hurry up and open the I want to get out of here." door. The porter opened the 39
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door and I left. I went directly to the residence of Mudir al-Sanayic to sleep. Just as I was ready to sleep, I suddenly heard pounding on the door. Again I thought that they were coming after me. I took my revolver and
prepared to defend myself.
It was unusual for anyone to
come there. Opening the door I saw two Jewish traders who wanted to buy used objects. I shut the door firmly and, stretching out flat on the bed, went to sleep. On July 25, 1907, there was a meeting of religious students and people at Sadr Madrasah,56 which it was necessary for me to attend. I That afternoon, therefore, went to the school. Hajl Khan Khayyat was also there and saw me. In front of the group and without any hesitation, he said, "What game were you playing last night at CAla' I laughed at his remark but pressed al-Dawlah's house?" his hand to signal him to be quiet. When the meeting broke up, I went with him to Laof the events. lahzar Street to see the effects They had had an extraordinary effect on the people. Moreover, the Europeans living in Tehran felt it. They were saying that it was a new Iran and no longer the old Iran, and that the which they people had now become aware of their rights, from the rulers. wanted to protect its effects About a month after this explosion, on The abthe minds of the people had totally disappeared. solutists were deeper than ever in their corrupt practices. Meanwhile, Mirza CAll Asghar Khan Atabak, whom Muhammad cAll Mirza brought back from Europe to undermine the Constitution, had secured the votes of seventy members of
Parliament, by means of bribes and promises. With this majority he was able to pass whatever he desired. His previous treasons having gone unpunished, Atabak once again embarked on an incessant series of intrigues to destroy the Constitution. For example, he bribed Shaykh Fazl Allah Mujtahid and a group of his followers to go to57
Haz.rat-i Shah CAbdal-Azim where they provoked an incident
IRANIANSTUDIES
40
The Secret Committee of Social Democrats in Tehran, in which the late Hajl Malik al-Mutikallimin and Aqa Sayyid Vaciz58 were both members, decided to do away with Atabak and sent the order to the Executive Committee. This Committee then forwarded the order to the Committee of Terror which, under my leadership, consisted of twelve people divided into three groups of four members each. A special commission was set up to decide whether the weapon should be a bomb or some other type of weapon. After much deliberation, the majority opinion deemed the bomb unwise, and it was agreed that the job should be done with a revolver. Amongthe terrorist group, lots were drawn, and the name of cAbbas Aqa was selected, along with two others as his I was with them on several occasions when assistants. they went to Atabak's summer residence in Shimiran but it was never possible to carry out the assassination. It was announced that on August 8, Atabak would come to Parliament. On Friday, the 7th cAbbas Aqa, Mirza CAll Akbar, Hasan Aqa, cAbbas' brother, and I went to the bathhouse. The next day, we went to Parliament to get a ticket for cAbbas so that he would have entree to the spectators' gallery.59 We went to the Assembly Building courtyard and gate. Several hours after dark, Atabak came out with Sayyid CAbdAllah Mujtahid. They were conversing and heading in the direction of the gate. About six feet from the gate, a sayyid interrupted Sayyid CAbdAllah to present a petition. Atabak, however, came on ahead behind the torchbearers. As soon as two and a half feet.... NOTES 1.
Haydar Khan was born in the family of Tariverdiov in Alexsandropol, currently known as Leninakan, in Armenia. His birthdate is not clearly known, but considering that he had just graduated from college when he came to Iran in 1901, he was probably born in the late 1870s. His stay in Iran coincided with a revolutionary period in Iranian history in which he participated eagerly. Following his departure from Iran 41
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in 1911, he continued his technical education in in During the First World War, he enlisted Paris. tock the Ottoman Army. When the Russian Revolution He helped in the organihe went to Russia. place, Iranian Communist Party. zation of CAdalat, the first In In 1921 he joined the Soviet Republic of Giln. by the more October of the same year, he was killed who resented the of the Republic, moderate faction Russian influence. 2.
The in two installments. The account was published first part, cAbb&s Iqbal, "Haydar Khan cAmujUghlii," Yadigar, Vol. 3, No. 5 (1946), pp. 61-80, covered Uaydar Khdn's life from the time of his departure for Iran until Atabak's return to Iran and his preThe second part of the account, which inmiership. cluded Atabak's assassination, appeared in Yadigar, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1946), pp. 50-51.
3.
See Yadigar, "Unsigned articles," (1948), the back cover.
4.
Ibrahim Munshlzadah came to Iran from Eriwan with his father in 1889, where both became Persian citizens. in the Cossack brigade, of Russian officers Resentful he resigned his commission in 1907 and thereupon In 1915 he formed the joined the constitutionalists. Iranian Committee, through which several Retribution During Vus5q's governstatesmen were assassinated. ment, Munshizadah was to be banished from Tehran, but was murdered en route by his gendarme guards in 1917. For his biography see Mahdi Bamdad, Shar4-i hal-i (BioIran dar garn-i 12, 13, va 14 hijri rijal-i graphies of Iranian statesmen of the 12th, 13th, and A.H.), Vol. 1 (Tehran, 1347), pp. 2914th centuries Farrukh (Farslyasi-i 31; Mahdi Farrukh, Khatirat-i rukh's political pp. 10-12; memoirs) (Tehran, n.d.), (Memoirs) (no place of CAbdAllah Bahrami, Khatirat n.d.), pp. 487-525. publication,
5.
See the translation
IRANIAN STUDIES
of the account
42
Vol.
5, Nos.
above.
1-2
Vasan ICzam Quds1, KitAb-i of my memoirs), Vol. 1 (Tehsee also MahmuidMahmuid, Fikr-i azadi (The idea of p. 334.
6.
p. 469; Bamdad, 2p. cit., man (The Book khatirat-i ran, 1963), pp. 162-163; "Memoirs" in F. Adamlyat, freedom) (Tehran, 1961),
7.
See the translated
8.
muCasirin" (Recent deaths), "Vafayat-i Mu1ammadQazvini, Yadigar, Vol. S, Nos. 4-5 (November, 1948-January, 1949), pp. 84-85.
9.
"Haydar cAmuiUghlu va Muhammad CAbd al-Husayn Nava'l, Amin Rasiulzadah," Yadigar, Vol. S, Nos. 1-2 (Septem1948), p. 56. ber-October, 4
text,
p. 32 above.
above.
10.
See footnote
11.
Iqbal,
12.
for Transcaucasia, 1917F. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle this problem 1921 (New York, 1951), p. 12, discusses The same can be said concernin regard to Georgia. ing Azerbaij'an.
13.
Ibid.,
14.
above. See also S. Jav1d, See the translation,pp.35-37 Iran va naqsh-i azadl khahan-i Nahzat-i mashritiyat-i movement and the Jahan (The Iranian constitutional (no place of freedom-lovers) role of international 1968), p. 59. publication,
15.
See the translation,
16.
Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berke1966); Walter E. Laqueur, The ley and Los Angeles, Soviet Union and the Middle East (New York, 1959), p. 18.
2p.
pp.
cit.,
p. 62.
19-22.
p. 35 above.
43
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17.
A. Kasravi, Tarikh-i mashritlyat-i Iran (History of Iranian constitutionalism), 7th Ed. (Tehran, 1967), p. 447.
18.
Mahdi Qul; Hidayat, Khatirat va khatarat (Remembrances and perils), 2nd Ed. (Tehran, 1965), pp. 157-158. See the rebuttal of the thesis of the Adamlyat involvement in the murder in F. Adamlyat, 2.* cit., pp. 256-275. In fact, on the advice of Sanic al-Dawlah, the Speaker of the House and Hidayat's brother, the governor of Tehran arrested the head of the Adamiyat group, charging him with the murder of Atabak. He was released in two days. See Adamlyat, ibid., pp. 271-273. The Adamlyat Society was a Freemasonic group. For the history of freemasonry in Iran, see Hamid Algar, "An introduction to the history of Freemasonry in Iran," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (October, 1970), pp. 276-296; F. Adamlyat, a. cit., particularly pp. 199-338. According to the memoirs of cAwn al-Mamalik, one of the founders of the Adamlyat Society, Atabak appeared before a committee of the and swore to be faithful to the Constitution. Society According to the same source, Atabak was trying to reconciliate the Shah and Parliament. See Adamiyat, op. cit., pp. 260-268. Some sources, like Khan Malik Sasani, Sijasatgardn-i dawrah-i Qajariyah (Statesmen of the Qajar period), Vol. 2 (Tehran, n.d.), pp. 309321, claim that they are in possession of "documents" proving the Shah's participation in Atabak's murder.
However, no documents have been produced so far. Sasanl claims that the Russians, finding out about Atabak's good will towards Parliament and the British, planned his assassination. Kasravi, however, seems to think that the British had previous the assassination. Kasravi, 2p. cit., 19.
knowledge of pp. 449-450.
Yahya Dawlatdabaddi,Hay4t-i Yahya (Yahya's life), Vol. 2 (Tehran, n.d.), pp. 136-145; Edward G. Browne,
IRANIAN STUDIES
44
The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (Cambridge, 1910), pp. 150-154. 20.
21.
Kasravi, op. cit., pp. 449-450, thinks that Taqizadah was the master mind behind the plot. Taqlzadah himself vehemently denies this. See Uasan Taq1zadah, "Akhirin difac-i Taqizadah" (Taqizddah's final defense), Rahnama-Yi Kitab, Vol. 13, Nos. 3, 4 (MayJune, 1970), pp. 223. This is an answer to accusations raised by Ibrahim Safa'l, Rahbaran-i mashriitah (Leaders of the constitutional movement) (Tehran, 1965). The rebuttal was published posthumously. While the antipathy of Kasravi, as well as of ,af'll, for Taqizadah is well known, a more impartial writer, Javad Shaykh al-Isl5ml, also insists that Taqizddah was an important member of the terroristic organization which Haydar Khan refers to (see the translation p. 21 above). See Javad Shaykh al-Isl&ml, "Ravish-i Taiqlq darbarah-yi asnad-i marbiit bi tarikh-i mashriitiyat-i Iran va shivah-i arzyabi-i daqlq-i anha" (The Methodology for the study of Iranian constitutional documents and their careful evaluation), Sukhan, Vol. 15, No. 7 (July, 1965), pp. 718-732. Taqlzadah claims that he has no knowledge of any terroristic organizations and he regards as completely baseless Haydar Khan's assertion that there was a "Secret Committee" which ordered the "Execution Committee" to have Atabak done away with (see the translation, p. 41 above). He asserts that Haydar Khan alone is responsible for Atabak's death. (See Sukhan, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1966), pp. 45-48.) In regard to Atabak's death, see also the memoirs of Sharaf al-Dawlah, who was elected to the first Majlis from Tabriz. Yahya Zaka', "Khatirat-i Sharaf al-Dawlah va jarayani qatl-i Atabak" (Sharaf al-Dawlah's memoirs and the incident of AtRbak's murder), Sukhan, Vol. 16, No. 4 (April, 1966), pp. 383-388. Dawlatabad;, o.P cit., pp. 139-140; see also the texts of Atabak's letter to the Shah demanding that he should be a constitutional monarch and the latter's 45
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acceptance in F.0. 416/33, Sir Spring-Rice to Sir EdSeptember 13, 1907, No. 200, Inward Gray (secret), closures 1 and 2. pp. 125-126.
22.
Dawlatabadi, 2k. cit.,
23.
Mahd1 Malikzadah, Tarikh-i inqilab-i mashrfitlyat (The Vol. 3 revolution), history of the Constitutional (Tehran, n.d.), p. 45.
24.
Dawlatabadi,
25.
Malikzadah,
26.
Ibid.,
27.
Dawlatabadi, op. cit.,
28.
and Persian reAnn K. S. Lambton, "Secret societies volution of 1905-6," in A. Hourani, ed., Middle EastNo. 1, St. Anthony's papers, No. 4 ern Affairs, (London, 1958), pp. 49-51.
29.
Riiznamah-i Mutammad Uasan Khan, Ictimad al-Saltanah, (Ictimdd al-Saltanah's Ictimad al-Saltanah khatirat-i ed. I. Afshar (Tehran, 1967), pp. 934-935, diary), 986.
30.
Ibid.,
31.
Browne, op.
cit.,
32.
Dawlatabadi, p. 162.
2p.
33.
Kasravi,
cit.,
34.
cAll Jamalzadah, "Taqlzadah," RahSayyid Muhammad nama-i kitab, Vol. 13, Nos. 3 and 4 (May-June, 1970), p. 167.
2p. 2p.
pp. 49-51;
pp.
221,
op.
IRANIAN STUDIES
cit.,
pp.
cit.,
180-181,
pp.
Browne,
52-53,
68.
cit.,
o.
191-194.
pp.
150-154.
pp. 148-149.
688.
pp. 112-113. cit.,
pp.
pp.
163-165;
Browne, 2p.
cit.,
548-551.
46
35.
Georges Ducroq, "La politique due gouvernment des Soviets en Perse," Revue du monde musulman, Vol. 52 (December, 1922), p. 145.
36.
Hidayat, 2p. cit., p. 151; Malikzadah, Vol. 3, pp. 213-214.
37.
va mashHasan Taqlzadah, Tarlkh-i ava'il-i ingilab of the beginnings of the rutlyat-i Iran (The history revolution and the Iranian constitution) (Tehran, 1958), pp. 58-59.
38.
CAbd al-Husayn
39.
Ibid., pp. 50-51; Kasravi, 2p. cit., pp. 800-804; Ismall Amir Khizl, Qlyam-i Azerbaijan va Sattar Khan (The Uprising in Azerbaijan and the role of Sattar Khan) (Tabriz, 1960), pp. 219-224, 233-234.
40.
A. Banani, "Hizb, Section 111, Persia," of Islam, New Ed., Vol. 3 (1971), fasc. 49-5- 1967; Adamiyat, 2o. cit., p. 324.
41.
Malik al-Shucara' Bahar, Thrikh-i mukhta?ar-i ahzab-i of polislyasl, inqirraz-i Qajarlyah (A Short history the demise of the Qajars), Vol. 1 tical parties, (1944), p. v; Navaci, 2p. cit., p. 53 .
42.
Malmiid Matmiid, "Memoirs," in Adamlyat, Mp. cit., pp. 334-335. says that MuhammadQazvlni categorically in the hands of 4aydar Khan. Bihbihanl was killed See MuhammadQazvlni, "Vafayat mucasirin" (Recent deaths), Yadigar, Vol. 5, Nos. 8-9 (March-April, 1949), p. 71.
43.
hijdah Salah-i Azerbaijan Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-i (Eighteen years in Azerbaijan history),(Tehran, 1954), 523-524. pp. 127-131,
44.
Taqizidah
Nava' , op. cit.,
"Akhirin
difac, " 2p.
47
op. cit.,
p. 48.
cit.,
Encyclopedia 49-50, pp.
pp. 221-223.
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45.
Malikzadah,
46.
Muzaffar al-Din Shah was born in 1853, acceded to the throne on June 8, 1896, and died on January 14, 1907, soon after he granted the Constitution. His reign was marked by various loans from Russia and an oil concession to the British. See Nikki R. Keddie, "Iranian politics 1900-1905: background to revolution," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 5 (1969), No. 1, pp. 3-31, and No. 2, pp. 151-167.
47.
Also known as Mirza MatmiidKhan Buriijirdi, Mu;affar al-Din Shah's personal physician. Muzaffar
9p.
al-Din
cit.,
Vol. 6, p. 219.
he was When
Shah was crowned Hakim al-Mulk
came
to Tehran with him. Upon his arrival in Tehran like the rest of the party who came to Tehran with Mu;affar al-Din Shah, he accumulated wealth and power and constituted a dangerous rival for Atabak. The latter, however, managed to send him to Gilln as the governor, where he was found dead shortly after his arrival on August 14, 1903. For his biography, see Bamdad, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 35-38; Hidayat, op. cit., p. 136;
for the conflict between Hakim al-Mulk and Atabak, see A. Mustawfl, Sharh-i zindigani-i man_ya tarikh-i ijtimaci va idari-i dawrah-i Qajdr1yah (The story of my life or the social and administrative history of the Qajars), Vol. 2 (Tehran, n.d.)., pp. 53-54. 48.
Also known as Sultan Husayn Mirza, he was the grand son of Fath cAll Shah (1797-1834). Like many other statesmen of the late nineteenth century, he started his career as a personal servant to Ndair al-Din Shah (1848-1896). Upon the death of his father in 1888, he inherited his father's title and some of his official governmental positions. This practice had genin the second half of Nasir erally become universal al-Din Shah's reign. In 1900, when Mutammad Taqi Mirza Rukn al-Dawlah, Nasir al-Din Shah's brother and governor of Khurasan, died; Nayyir al-Dawlah became
the governor. (Most governorates used to be held by members of the Qajar royal family.) He was dismissed IRANIAN STUDIES
48
in 1903 following the incident that Haydar Khan mentions in his account. See Ictimad al-Saltanah, 2p. cit.,
49.
p. 643; Bamdad, 2p.
cit.,
Vol.
2, pp. 86-91.
Chief administrator or the shrine endowments of Mashhad has been with the ruling monarch, as the mutivalli. He delegates his authority to a nii'b al-taw1_1ya, who is either governor-general of Khurasan or equal to him in rank. The day-to-day administration of the endowments was left in the hands of a functionary, usually referred to as the mutivalli bashl. For a general description of the administration of the Holy Shrine endowments just prior to lIaydar Khan's arrival, see Mustawfi's account of the trip he took to Mashhad in 1898.
See Mustawfl,
op. cit.,
Vol.
2,
pp. 38-42. 50.
CAll Naqi Mirza, the eldest son of Mu4ammad Taq1 Mirza Rukn al-Dawlah inherited his father's title in 1900 upon the latter's death. In 1903 he-became the governor of Khurasan, a position his father had held up to the time of his death in 1900. He was governor of Khurasan until 1904. See the editor's notes in A1mad CAll Khan Vaziri Kirmani, Tarikh-i Kirman (A History of Kirmdn), ed. Bastani Parizi (Tehran, 1961), pp. 440-442.
51.
In M. Joseph Naus was a Belgian financial expert. December, 1903, he was appointed Director of the Customs. In 1904, he became the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs as well. Finally, he became the High His arbitrary manner of handling the afTreasurer. fairs of the state had created much resentment. When it became known that he had himself photographed in the dress of the Muslim clergy, the resentment against him received the emotional spark which it needed to Grievances against him were a factor in explode. the movement that developed into the Constitutional Revolution. See Browne, 2p. cit., pp. 109-112, 136138.
49
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52.
The demands for the removal of Naus, the formation of a house of justice, as well as other demands, resulted in a riot in which 18 people were killed, two of them sayyids (believed to be descendants of the ProA large crowd took sanctuary in the Masjid-i phet). Jumcah (Friday Mosque), whence they left for the Holy Shrine at Qum. Around the same time, 5,000 people took sanctuary in the British Embassy. The demands at this point became more substantial: namely, a and a representative constitution national assembly. On August 5, 1906, the Shah acceded to the people's demands. Browne, p. cit., pp. 112-124.
53.
Sultan CAbdal-Majid Mirza, known as cAyn al-Dawlah, was Fatt CAll Shah's grand son. He was the chief minister when the Constitutional Revolution began; and his reactionary and harsh personality may indeed have accelerated the Revolution. as demanded by the constitutionalists
1906. tional 54.
55.
Yet he twice became premier in the constituperiod in 1914 and again in 1917.
Uanlc al-Dawlah and two of his brothers, Mukhbir alSaltanah and Mukhbir al-Mulk, all educated in Europe, were prominent in the Constitutional Movement. Sanic al-Dawlah helped draft the electroal law and became the first Speaker of the House. Upon the murder of Atabak, he resigned his Speakership, despairing of any meaningful reform. He was finally killed by a Georgian on February 6, 1911. See Muhammad Qazvlnl, "Vafayat-i muCairln,"' Yadigar, Vol. 5, Nos. 4-5 (November, 1948-January, 1949), pp. 84-85; Browne, 2p. cit., pp. 129, 137, 140. Ghulam Husayn Khan Ghaffarl, minister
of the court.
Vol. 2, pp. 114-115, 56.
He was dismissed, on July 24,
governor of Tehran and cit., 2.
See Dawlatabad'i,
120.
A mosque school in the southern part of Tehran, which was one of the centers of political gatherings during the Constitutional Movements.
IRANIAN STUDIES
50
57.
clergymen, led by Shaykh Fazl About 500 absolutist Allah, took bast (sanctuary) in the shrine of Shah CAbdal-Azim, whence they waged propaganda warfare The ostensible reason against constitutionalism. for their bast was that the Majlis should not interThey took fere with Islamic religious principles. bast just before Atabak became premier and upon his death they returned to Tehran. Haydar Khan's claim that Shaykh Faz,l Allah worked for Atabak is questionSayyid CAbdAllah was the main pillar among able. The enmity bethe clergy upon whomAtabak relied. tween the Sayyid and the Shaykh was so intense that they could not be in the same camp. For this very and reason the Shaykh left the constitutionalists themwas willing to rejoin them if they dissociated selves
from the Sayyid.
Vol. 3, pp. 59-62, 64-65,
See Dawlatdbddl , op. cit.,
88-91.
58.
Malik al-Mutikallimin and Sayyid Jamal Vaciz were When two radical members of the first Parliament. CAll Shah staged a coup against the constiMuhammad For dein 1908, he had them executed. tutionalists tails on the two, see the study by Malik al-Mutikallimin's son: Mahdi Malikzadah, 2B. cit.
59.
Haydar Khan seems to have made a mistake in recording the date. Atabak was murdered on August 31st.
51
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TWO POEMSBY FOROUGHFARROKHZAD
Translatedby MASSUDFARZAN
0
Bejeweled Land!
Finally I made it. I registered myself and confirmed my existence with a name and a number. Therefore, long live number 678 from the 5th Arrondisement, Tehran. Now I am all set The bosom of Motherland The lullaby of old civilization and nipple of history and the rat-rat-rattle of law's rattlebox-it is all mine I am all provided for.
Massud Farzan is Professor
of English at Pahlavi University,
Shiraz.
IRANIAN STUDIES
52
I stand by the window and inhale In ecstasy, 678 lungfuls of air, scented with dung, urine and rubbish I sign my name on 678 bills and on 678 application blanks: Forugh Farrokh-Zad. In the land of the Rose'n Nightingale a privilege it's to be merely living, is finally your existence confirmed,
let alone when with a name and a number. I can simply peep--legally Henceforth at last!--through the curtains and see 678 poet-charlatans in search of rhymes and rhythms amidst garbage cans I have but taken my first legal stroll, whereupon a flock of 678 mysterious as black nightingales, disguised crows flap their weary wings toward daylight I have only to inhale my first legal share of air and smell the odor of 678 roses: Courtesy of the great Plastico Inc. Manufacturers, Ah, yes. It is a privilege to live in the homeland of Mr. Crooner Junkie Clownson and Maestro Torchsongster film stars--opulent not to mention flocks of fleshy legs, buttocks, breasts & covergirl-cum-art & what-not; and philosophers of "to hell with it, it ain't mine" and quiz shows and--Ah, you have only to touch any soundbox or picturebox and out jumps to sing a new genius of juvenalia.... So, now that I have finally made it I'll celebrate I'll buy--and charge it--678 candles which I'll light; then I'll jump onto the shelf to deliver a few words, Ladies and Gents, on the advantages of living legally whose ground I'll break, amidst overwhelming with a shovel, with an axe or a bodkin.... 53
applause,
WINTER1973
Henceforth I can join artists' gangs but first I should inhale, in the backroom of Khachick's corner store, several grams of pure stuff and drink several cups of not-so-pure Pepsi Cola and publish several pieces of blah-blah, tam-tam-tamara Then I join the assembly of "artists" and write the outline of the project of my first great novel on the back of 678 packets of grade A native Winstons whereupon I should have become self-confident enough to extend a self-invitation to the assembly of eulogy & flattery & financial security because, Gentlemen, every month I read from cover to cover the Magazine of Art & Science & Acquiescence. Moreover, I am not too bad in "the art of good rhetoric and poetics." Oh yes, finally I made it therefore, long live number 678 from the 5th Arrondisement, Tehran who, with her will power, hard work and positive thinking has obtained such a lofty position, namely 678 meters from where she stands at the window to the ground on the sidewalk and is proud and privileged to be able to throw herself directly from the window--rather than indirectly via the staircase-onto the bosom of the motherland. Let it be her final wish and will that in return for 678 coins the great poet & official laureate Maestro AbrahamSahba compose a eulogy in her behalf in therhyme-pattern of blah.
IRANIANSTUDIES
54
I Feel Sad For The Garden Nobody is thinking about f lowers nobody is thinking about the goldfish nobody wants to believe that the flower garden is dying that the garden's heart has swollen under the sun that the garden's mind is being emptied of the memory of green that the garden's feeling is huddling in a corner, slowly rotting. The yard of our house is lonely our yard is yawning in anticipation of a rain from some unknown cloud and the pond in our yard is empty. The small inexperienced stars are falling off the treetops and from the house of the goldfish, there come, at night, our yard is lonely.
through their
faded windows
the sound of coughing.
Father says: "It is too late for me I did my work I carried my load." He sits in his room from morning till sundown reading native epics and histories. Father says to Mother: "To hell with any birds or fish what difference does it make after my death whether there is a garden or not my retirement pension will suffice."
55
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All
her life
Mother has been standing before her prayer-spread of the fear of hell. at the threshold At the bottom of everything of sin Mother looks for the footsteps and thinks that it is the consequence of a plant's that has spread over the garden. Everyday she says prayers and breathes them to all the flowers to all the goldfish to herself Mother is waiting for a second coming which is to descend. and the blessing the My brother calls my brother laughs at and takes statistics under the perishing my brother is hooked he thinks the garden
by the destruction he gets
sin
garden a cemetery of plants the confusion of the fish sick skin of the water on philosophy will be saved
of the garden
drunk
and punches the walls and windows so hard to say and tries that he is much pained, and talks of his ennui he takes his despair with himself wherever he goes lighter and ballalong with his ID card, pocket calendar, point pen. His despair is so little that it gets lost in the comings and goings of the beer joint. who used to be the flowers' And my sister and whenever Mother beat her She shared the secret of her heart of geraniums with the quiet gathering
bes.t friend
and sometimes she even invited the family of the goldfish for a party of the sun and candies-now she lives
on the other
and in her artificial IRANIAN STUDIES
side
house 56
of town
goldfish along with her artificial husband beside her artificial songs she sings artificial and makes natural babies whenever she comes to see us and the hems of her dress touch the poverty of the garden she takes a cologne bath every time she comes to see us she is pregnant. The yard of our house is lonely the yard of our house is lonely everyday, behind the door, there comes the sound of people being killed and the sound of explosions our neighbors are planting in place of flowers shells and grenades.... children have filled the little bombs. with little their briefcase The yard of our house is lost. *
*
*
I am afraid of the times when I have lost my heart I am afraid of thinking of so many hands about the futility of so many faces. the alienness
student who loves madly Like a little his geometry assignment I am alone
thinking that it is possible to the hospital
to take the garden
thinking thinking and the garden's heart has swollen under the sun the garden's mind is emptied slowly, and slowly, of the memory of green.
57
WINTER1973
BOOK REVIEWS
Perepiska [Mukatibat]. By Rashid ad-Din. Translated and edited by A. I. Falina (Pamiatniki Pis'mennosti Vostoka, XVII). Moscow, 1971. 498 pp. THOMAST. ALLSEN With the important exception of occasional official acts embedded in the historical and geographical narratives of JuvayniL, Rashid al-Din, Qazvlni, etc., very few original documents from the Il-Khan period have reached us. Because of the paucity of such documents, the Mukatibat of Rashid al-Din, written while he was Vazir under Ghazan (1295-1304) and Oljeitu (1304-1316), acquires a special prominence among the sources illuminating the history of Iran during the period of Mongol domination. The range of information contained in these letters is as varied and extensive as were the interests and concerns of the great scholar and statesman who produced them. We owe, however, the preservation and transmission of these letters not to their contents, important as they may be, but to the elegance of Rashid al-Din's language, which subsequent generations deemed an excellent example of the Persian epistolary style. which first Indeed, the letters,
Thomas T. Allsen is a Ph.D. candidate in Comparative Asian History at the University of Minnesota.
IRANIANSTUDIES
58
appear in book form shortly after the death of Rashid alDin, were in all likelihood gathered together on the initiative of his surviving sons in the hope of securing and perpetuating the memory of their father as a man of great eloquence and wisdom. The original introduction to the Mukatibat, prepared by Muhammad Abarqiihl, who had previously served as Rashid al-Din's secretary, makes the didactic nature of this enterprise abundantly clear. The use of this ornate prose, however, is normally confined to the opening salutations and is seldom maintained throughout, except in a few letters of condolence sent to bereaved friends. On the whole, the style of the correspondence is direct and unaffected, particularly in the "open letters"
intended for the edification of the inhabitants fic town or region (28, 33).1
of a speci-
Of the fifty-three letters included in the Mukatib&t, twenty-one were addressed to Rashid al-Din's sons, all of whom served as government officials within the Il-Khan realm, seventeen to other officials and dignitaries, and twelve to various theologians. Three of them were written to Rashid al Din by his associates. The subject matter of the letters extends from botany, pharmacology and agronomy to Islamic theology, Sifism and the qualities of a Muslim gentleman, a theme which Rashid al-Din treated at length in several communications to his sons (20, 21, 23). There
is also some information on the external relations of the Il-Khans with their nominal sovereign, the Grand Khan, i.e., the Emperor of the Yuan Dynasty of China (34, 49), and with their near neighbor, the Delhi Sultanate (29, 36). It is, however, the abundance of data on economic and social conditions which accords the Mukatibat its enormous value as an historical source. In almost every letter there is precise, often systematically presented information on a variety of subjects of interest to the economic historian: pensions for distinguished officials and scholars (19); regional tax tables and corvee obligations (23); improvements in the irrigation systems, including Rashid al-Din's own sketches illustrating his plans for new canal construction in Iraq (38, 39), and lists of textile products
59
WINTER1973
own estate, comprising a Rashid al-Din's by region (34). and charicommercial interests vast network of properties, touched upon in the Mukatibat and is is frequently ties, written in the form in a letter, in great detail described to a close friend (36).2 of a will, of concerns which Despite the apparent diversity of subjects and the variety letters prompted individual a consistent theme emerges from the discussed therein, This theme finds it clearest as a whole. correspondence directrepeated admonitions, in Rashid al-Din's expression and the local officials leaders, ed to his sons, religious between the gopopulace at large, that the relationship and interdependent, vernment and the governed is reciprocal and every and that it is the basic duty of every official dilitheir respective obligations citizen to discharge Rashid al-Din clearly believed gently and harmoniously. had been undermined by a corrupt that this relationship the Mongol and particularly officialdom, and tyrannical their tribal and military who had retained Turkic nobility that as a result of and he further believed traditions, often accompanied by widespread their endless exactions, and stability the internal and loss of life, destruction of the state had been severely comproexternal security as the power of the state depended upon Therefore, mised. of those who paid the taxes and the economic well-being and peasantry performed the required state services--the al-Din tirelessly argued that an efthe townsmen--Rashld system which guaranand even-handed administrative ficient of the masses also security teed the economic and personal of the ruling class. There is little served the interests doubt that it is these very concepts which supplied the for the well-known reforms initheoretical underpinnings tiated in the reign of Ghazan.3 of Rashid al-Din's Mukatibat, The present translation is based on the oldest the first one in a Western language, and most complete text available, i.e., century) (fourteenth It has been by MuhammadShafi in 1947.4 that published version dating from the sevencompared with an unpublished in the Leningrad Branch teenth century which is preserved
IRANIAN STUDIES
60
Several other manuof Oriental Studies.5 of the Institute not script and published versions of individual letters, in the preparation available to Shafi, were also utilized of this translation. Important variants are noted in the appended commenand geographitary, which also contains a full historical Obscure or unusual words are cal explanation of the text. In addition given in the footnotes in the Arabic script. apparatus, there is a lengthy introduction to the critical which outlines the life of written by the translator, Rashid al-Din, the history and transmission of the text and concludes with a close analysis of the letters as a historical source. of the Mukatibat Falina's remarks on the utilization She shows by European scholars are of special interest. that although the work had been known in the West since the early part of the nineteenth century, its research potential remained generally unrecognized until Soviet invesI. P. Petrushevskii and A. A. Alitigators, particularly zade, began exploiting its untapped riches in the 1940s. demonstrated the which conclusively These early efforts, source, were, howimportance of this work as an historical ever, only part of a wider Soviet interest in the writings of Rashid al-Din6 and in the economic and social history of Iran.7 Unfortunately, Western scholars have not exhibited the same degree of interest in the Mukdtibdt.8 This is audue, in part, to the suspicions cast on the letters' thenticity by Reuben Levy.9 His objections to the work, turned aside by Petrushevhowever, have been skillfully to this source skii,10 and continued Western indifference can no longer be justified on grounds of questionable auA better explanation for this neglect, I susthenticity. of many Western historians of pect, is the inclination Iran to pursue lines of inquiry emphasizing philological and cultural problems, an approach which frequently pays attention to the economic and social aspects insufficient of Persian history. 61
WINTER1973
Hopefully, a growing awareness of Soviet work in Iranian economic and institutional history will help stimulate Western interest in such studies. Falina's excellent edition testifies both to the high quality of Soviet scholarship in the field and demonstrates once again the importance of the Mukatibat as a source for the history of medieval Iranian society. NOTES letters
in Falina's
1.
These numbers refer to individual translation.
2.
On the basis of this data, I. P. Petrushevskii has published a valuable study on Rashid al-Din's personal wealth, "Feodal'noe khoziaistvo Rashid ad-Dina," 4, 1951, pp. 86-104. Voprosy Istorii,
3.
These reforms are studied in great detail by A. I. "Reformy Gazan-khana," Uchenye Falina in her article, Zapiski Instituta Vostokovedeniia Akademii Nauk, 17, 1959, pp. 51-76.
4.
Mukatibat-i
5.
from this manuscript Photoreproductions of selections are given in the appendices, pp. 443-461.
6.
See A. K. Arends, "The Study of Rashid ad-Din's Jami u't-Tawarikh in the Soviet Union," Central Asiatic Journal, 14, 1970, pp. 40-61.
7.
"Izuchenie feodal'nogo obshSee I. P. Petrushevskii, chestva Irana v Rossii i v SSSR (1917-1970)," in k 2500 Iranskogo Gosudarstva i Kul'tury: Istorii letiiu iranskogo gosudarstva, Moskva, 1971, pp. 71-82.
8.
Michel M. Mazzaoui's recent study, The Origins of the Si'ism, Siufism and the GulAt (Freiburger aafawids: Islamstudien, III), Wiesbaden, 1972, does make some
IRANIAN STUDIES
Rashid1, Lahore, 1947.
62
use of the Mukatibat-i 9.
10.
Rashidi.
See pp. 23, 27, 53.
"The Letters of Rashid al-Din Fadl-Allah," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1946, Pts. 1 and 2, pp. 7478. "K voprosy o podlinnosti perepiska Rashid ad-Dina," Vestnik Leningradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, 9, 1948, pp. 124-130.
Semnan: Persian City and Region. Edited by John Connell. University College London Expedition to Iran, 1969. 105 pp., photographs, maps. No price indicated. JOHNGULICK This is a solid geographical study of Semnan, a town of 31,000 people, about 200 km. east of Tehran on the Tehran-Mashhad road. The report consists of five chapters (Physical Environment, Semnan City, the Bazar Economy, Water Use and Urban Agriculture, and a chapter on two villages in the environs of the town). Connell wrote the last chapter himself and is coauthor of the Semnan City chapter. This is evidently the report of a field team, and team research has much to recommend it in urban studies, although its results can be expressed in somewhat disjointed and inconclusive fashion, as is to some extent true of this study. Semnan grew only slightly between 1956 and 1966; it lacks the relatively large "Westernized" middle class of larger cities; its bazar economy continues to function but
John Gulick is Professor of Anthropology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
63
WINTER1973
is responding to various changes in the region and nation; living on the peripheries of the adaptations of villagers Semnan can better be understood in terms of responses to nation-wide phenomena than in terms of preconceived ruralThese are some points that impressed me as urban notions. being important ones, but I am not sure if they are the most important points as far as the editor and other authors are concerned. Geographers at the University of Durham, England, have also been producing informative and inexpensive reports on various Iranian cities during the past decade. This is a development to be welcomed and encouraged. One hopes that before too long the several studies will be synso as to yield some major hypotheses, if not conthesized, urban developments concerning twentieth-century clusions, in Iran. A practical note: no publisher of Semnan is indiI obtained my copy by ordering it directly from cated. of Development StuJohn Connell, who is at the Institute dies, University of Sussex, Brighton, England BNl 9RE. The cost was $2.00, which is a bargain.
IRANIAN STUDIES
64
Note on the English Transliteration System The system of transliteration used by IRANIAN STUDIES is based on the Persian Romanization System approved by the American Library Association, the Canadian Library Association, and the Library of Congress. Copies of the transliteration table may be obtained by writing to the Editor
Iranian Studies is published quarterly by The Society for Iranian Studies. It is distributed to members of the Society as part of their membership. The annual subscription rate for non-members is $7.00; the price of single copies is $1.75 per issue. For institutions the subscription rate is $10.00 per annum. The opinions expressed by the contributors are of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the Society or the editors of Iranian Studies. Articles for publication and all other communications should be sent to the Editor, Iranian Studies, Box E-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167, U.S.A. Communications concerning the affairs of the Society should be addressed to the Secretary, The Society for Iranian Studies, P.O. Box 89, Village Station, New York 10014, U.S.A. The exclusive distributing agent for IRANIAN STUDIES in Iran is: Kharazmie Publishing & Distribution Co., 229 Daneshgah Street, Shah Avenue (P. 0. Box 14-1486), Tehran, Iran.
COVER: Silver Plate with Shapur II Lion Hunting Hermitage, Leningrad Sasanian. 309-379 A.D.
Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
I-
Spr .IngSume
_~~~1
-L
_-. ..
-
....*It
I
1973
Voum
VI
Nubr
2i
The Society for Iranian Studies Council Ervand Abrahamian, Baruch College, City University of New York Amin Banani, University of California, Los Angeles Ali Banuazizi, Boston College James A. Bill, University of Texas at Austin Jerome W. Clinton, American Institute of Iranian Studies Paul W. English, University of Texas at Austin Gene R. Garthwaite, Dartmouth College Farhad Kazemi, New York University Kenneth A. Luther, University of Michigan Ann Schulz, ex offico, Clark University
Executive Committee Farhad Kazemi, Executive Secretary Ann Schulz, Treasurer
Ali Banuazizi, Editor
IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jerome W. Clinton, Associate Editor A. Reza Sheikholeslami, Associate Editor
Copyright, 1974, The Society for Iranian Studies Printed at the Boston College Press Published in the U.S.A. US ISSN 0021-0862 Address all communications to IRANIAN STUDIES, Box E-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167, U. S. A.
Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Volume VI
Spring-Summer 1973
Numbers 2-3
ARTICLES 66
110
DIRECTFOREIGNINVESTMENT IN THENON-OILSECTORS OF THE IRANIANECONOMY
Vahid F. Nowshirvani and Robert Bildner
A SOCIALANDECONOMIC TOWARDS HISTORYOF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
Thomas M. Ricks
IRAN
127
THENATIONAL OF INTEGRATION BOIRAHMAD
136
CABBfSMIRZAISWILL
OF AMERICAN, 152 AN ASSESSMENT BRITISH, ANDFRENCH WORKS SINCE 1940 ON MODERN IRANIANHISTORY
Reinhold L8ffler HomaPakdaman and William Royce Nikki R. Keddie
BOOKREVIEWS K. RAMAZANI:The 166 ROUHOLLAH Persian Gulf: Iran's Role
Ann Schulz
MONROE:The Changing ELIZABETH Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf 172 RUSSELLD. BUHITE: Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy
Justus D. Doenecke
DIRECTFOREIGNJNVESIMENT IN THENON-OILSECTORS OF TE IRANIANECONOMY VAHIDF. NOWSHIRVANIand ROBERTBILDNER Introduction The world-wide expansion of multinational corporations and the concomitant rise in direct foreign investment have recently received considerable attention from econoA continuing controversy has existed over the mists.' costs and benefits of foreign investment to both the capiThe conflict between and the host countries. tal-exporting of foreign capital and the "national" inthe interests noticeable in the underdeveloped terest is particularly countries. While many of these countries have opted for the "free enterprise" path to economic growth, they lack as well as the technical and administrative expertise, to the foreign political will, to explore alternatives investment as an instrument for gaining access to the inknow-how and markets. dustrial countries' technological that the At the same time there is a gradual realization alleged benefits of foreign investment are not automatic In order to improve and that the costs may be substantial. the terms for obtaining foreign capital to their own advantage, a number of underdeveloped countries have recently
Vahid F. Nowshirvani is Associate Professor of Economics Robert Bildner graduated from Yale in at Yale University. 1973; he spent his senior year in Iran and Yugoslavia studying foreign investment in these countries. IRANIANSTUDIES
66
attempted to more closely monitor and regulate the operacorporations within their bortions of the multinational ders. The extent to which they have been and will be an open quessuccessful in achieving this aim is still tion.2 In the following pages, we shall describe the experience of one such underdeveloped country, Iran, with Our objectives are: (1) to examine foreign investment. the development of the Iranian government's policies towards foreign investment; (2) to analyze the pattern in the periof foreign investment in Iran, particularly od after 1334 (1955) when the Law for Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment was enacted; and (3) to offer some suggestions about the possible impact of foreign capital on the Iranian economy. We shall be concerned only with equity capital held by foreigners or what is known Other capital movements such as as direct investment. foreign aid, intergovernmental credit arrangements or bond As the title of the paper issues will not be considered.3 we shall exclude from our discussion the oil inindicates, position in the Iradustry which, because of its critical nian economy, would require a special study of its own.4 A Brief History direct foreign there was little Until quite recently, Nineteenthinvestment in Iran outside the oil sector. place to foreign encentury Iran was hardly an attractive The country did not have abundant agricultural trepreneurs. of the instability or mineral resources, and the political country in the previous century had ruined much of the network was inThe transportation trade and the industry. adequate, but no pressing need was felt to improve it until was generally thought the last quarter of the century--it that the expected increase in commerce would be too small to justify the high costs of road or railway construction. in trading Although foreign merchants engaged extensively within Iran, they seldom tried to set up proactivities Early in the century the British and duction facilities.5 in obtaining preRussian governments were more interested 67
1973 SPRING-SUMMER
ferential treatment for their merchants and imposing a policy of "free trade" than in acquiring special privileges for their investors. As the nineteenth century wore on, and with the growth of internal trade and its increasing integration into the international economy, the Iranian economy became more commercialized.6 At the same time European capitalists were beginning to look further afield for investment opportunities. Concession hunters saw lucrative possibilities in Iran--at least for short-term speculative ventures if not long-term investments. Nltir al-Din Shih, who ruled for most of the second half of the century, and his entourage were favorably disposed towards grants of concessions, the former for fiscal and political reasons and the latter for the opportunities they saw of obtaining bribes. These early attempts to obtain concessions in Iran were mostly for the construction of railways-, often together with the right to exploit mineral resources along the route. The only investors who could hope to obtain significant concessions were British and Russian subjects who had the active support or at least the tacit approval of their government. Unfortunately for them, the Anglo-Russian rivalry, which was both economically and politically motivated, frustrated most of their efforts. Thanks to that rivalry, Niair al-Din Sh&h and Mu;affar al-Din Shah and their courtiers were able to obtain better terms from England and Russia and to maintain Iran's precarious "independence."7 It also enabled the emerging merchant class, siding with various court factions and religious leaders, to block the penetration of foreign capital where its interests were threatened. The role of the merchants in forcing the canof the 1891 tobacco concession is too well docucellation mented to be repeated here.8 The lack of clear hegemony by either Russia or Britain is probably the most significant factor in explaining the relatively small amount of foreign capital in Iran at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth Had the 1907 Russo-British agreement to divide century. Iran into spheres of influence come sooner, we might have IRANIANSTUDIES
68
seen more British and Russian enterprises established in Iran. The political turmoil in the years immediately preceding and following the agreement precluded a major expansion of European investment in Iran. Clearly, the constitutional revolution, the Russian Revolution, and the First World War were major disruptive elements. Thus, on the eve of the Great War, there was little foreign investment of significance apart from the oil company, the Imperial Bank of Persia, the Russian Loan and Discount Bank, and perhaps the northern fisheries and the various telegraph lines. Although by that time the potential value of the D'Arcy concession was becoming apparent, the two banking operations were still the most visible sigisof foreign penetration because of their effective control of finances both private and public. Aside from these concerns, there were a number of minor foreign enterprises, primarily engaged in operating various toll roads and short stretches of railways. In certain instances mining rights were also included in the road concessions.9 As for foreign manufacturing enterprises, they were practically non-existent. The few attempts to set up modern industry failed because of competition from imports. This was to be expected given the primitive state of the Iranian economy, the absence of tariff protection, and the declining production and transportation costs in Europe.10 With the exception of certain changes in the Russian investments after the Russian Revolution, the position of foreign enterprises in Iran remained basically the same until the 1921 coup d'etat. A new era in Iran's economic life began with the coming to power of Reza Shah in 1921. The new Shah embarked on a series of programs of reform aimed at modernizing the economy. The basic elements of these programs were: (1) the establishment of a strong government; (2) legal and administrative reforms; (3) massive investment in infrastructure to improve the transportation and the communications system; and (4) the introduction of largescale modern manufacturing industry. The state took a very active role, and the policies pursued were intensely nationalistic. Although foreigners were brought in to assist in the construction and operation of many projects, 69
SPRING-SUMER1973
they came as individuals or as contractors for the government. The general economic depression in the industrial easy to recruit a nations in the 1930s made it relatively exception, no minor one With large body of technicians. In fact, most of the connew concessions were granted. cessions previously awarded were either cancelled or subcurtailed (e.g., the right of the Imperial Bank stantially The government even of Persia to issue notes was revoked). tried to change the terms of the oil concession, but the new agreement reached in 1933 was not as favorable to Iran as had been hoped. One should bear in mind that in the in the economic policies 1930s the pursuit of nationalistic regions of the world was facilitated non-industrialized economy and that by the breakdown in the international capital movethere was a sharp decline in international ment. The allied occupation of Iran during the Second and economic changes. World War produced major political Reza Shah was forced to abdicate and the power of the cenreduced. This loss of autral government was drastically thority together with material shortages caused by the war and the occupation put a virtual halt to the industrialization programs. The destruction of the monolithic politactivity and an structure led to increased political ical factions. political various intense power struggle among In Iran, as elsewhere in the Third World, the nationalist groups gained much strength during and in the years immediately following the Second World War. Since the attainment of formal independence was not an issue in Iran, the on the nationmovement focused its activities nationalist alization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which had become This goal the symbol of foreign domination in the country. takethe full of and March 1951 in achieved eventually was over of the Companytook place a few months later when Mussadiq formed his cabinet.11 Being one of the first expropriations of Western assets in an underdeveloped country, the nationalization of the oil industry met with stiff resistance from the maoil companies and the British and the jor international and economic means was U.S. governments. Every political IRANIANSTUDIES
70
employed to force a settlement on Iran. After resisting for over two years the Iranian government succumbed to the pressures and the oil industry once again came under foreign control. While these events were occurring in the oil industry, there was naturally no foreign investments in the rest of the economy. In fact, during this period the British banking concession was cancelled, and the Northern Fisheries' agreement with the Russians was not renewed when its term expired. But once foreign control was reestablished in the oil sector, the rest of the economy was also opened up to foreign capital. The 1955 Law for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment Mussadiq was removed from power in August 1953, and soon after that the oil dispute was settled through an agreement with a consortium of international oil companies. These developments put Iran firmly in the Western camp. The oil agreement was ratified by the Iranian Parliament in October, 1954, and a year later in November, 1955,the Law for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment (hereafter referred to as the 1955 Law) was enacted. From the general nature of the Law it is clear that there had been no extensive deliberation and planning prior to its pasThe main provisions of the 1955 Law are as follows: sage. 1. to set up a board to examine proposals by foreign investors which reports its decisions to the Council of Ministers; 2. to give legal protection accord it equal status with private
to imported capital domestic capital;
and
3. to guarantee repatriation of profits and the principal and in the case of nationalization to provide for compensation. 12 previous
It is interesting to note how the history or Iran's experience with foreign capital (notably with the
71
SPRING-SUMMER 1973
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) is reflected in the 1955 Law. It is stipulated that foreign firms cannot "transfer their share, profits and rights" to foreign governments and that all disputes are to be settled through Iranian courts. In the original law the spheres of activity for foreign capital were left rather vague. It simply stated (Article 1) that the law applied to all foreign investment "for development, rehabilitation and productive activity in industry, mining, agriculture, and transport." Attempts to be more specific were made in the Regulations for Implementing the Law which were approved nearly a year after passage of the original bill. In the Regulations, development and productive activities were defined as those "activities which help raise the production level and income of the country, directly or indirectly earn foreign exchange, or effect an economy in its expenditures" (Regulations, Article 1, Note 2). The supply of credit to Iranian firms, investment in banking and in activities subsidiary to "productive investment" (presumably trading), were also to enjoy the privileges of the Law. The bulk of the provisions of the Regulations were, however, concerned with financial matters concerning the importation of capital into Iran and repatriation of profits and of the original capital from Iran. Two limitations specified by the Regulations merit special attention. One was that the investment projects were to be in fields open to local private firms. The other stipulated that the investment did not involve any monopoly rights or special privileges. Presumably investments which did not satisfy these two conditions would reas is the case for projects in quire special legislation, the oil industry. In practice, neither of these limitaThe first provision was tions has been strictly enforced. violated when the Shell Oil Companyinvested, as a partner Since such in a joint venture, in a lubricating oil plant. an operation was at that time considered a part of the oil industry, it was not presumably open to local investors. to The National Iranian Oil Companytried unsuccessfully The second limitation is more freblock the investment.13 firms quently violated. Many Iranian and joint-venture have obtained special privileges, mainly in the context of of the government. Because the import-substitution policies IRANIANSTUDIES
72
of the high tariffs or outright bans on imports, there are many firms which have complete or near complete monopoly power. To the extent that the provisions of the Law and the Regulations reflect the goverrunent's attitude toward foreign investment, the following conclusions may be drawn. First, it is clear that the policy-makers considered the movement of funds to be the most important aspect of foreign investment.14 At a time when both foreign exchange and investible funds were scarce, it was believed that foreign private capital, in addition to intergovernmental aid, was the obvious source to tap. This preoccupation with the financial side of foreign investment is reflected not only in the various articles of the Law and the Regulations, but also in the administrative apparatus set up within the Bank Markazi Iran to deal with all matters connected with foreign investment. It was only recently, in 1971, that the Centre for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment was transferred from the Bank Markazi to the Ministry of Economy. Second, at the time that the Law was enacted, there was little awareness of the potential contributions of foreign firms to technology transfer and export expansion. In this respect, as we shall see, the government's position has recently undergone considerable change. And, third, the then recent experience of the nationalization of the oil industry made it essential that liberal guarantees be provided to dispel the fears of foreign investors. Although the provisions of the 1955 Law reflect a very permissive attitude towards foreign investment, the actual situation was more complex. In fact, there was still a good deal of suspicion and fear of foreign capital both on the part of the government and on the part of the emerging industrial bourgeoisie. For example, ever since the passage of the 1955 Law there has been an unwritten working rule that foreigners should not hold more than 50 percent of the shares in joint ventures.15 Moreover, there have always been enough bureaucratic hurdles so that the government could deny a license to any project which it considered undesirable--usually because it would threaten 73
SPRING-SUMMER 1973
existing
large-scale
domestic producers.16
Foreign Investment in Iran After the 1955 Law Table 1 presents the gross inflow of foreign capital into Iran for the period 1335 to 1350 (1956 to 1972). The figures provide only a rough approximation to the book value of foreign investment because repatriation of original capital is not accounted for (see note to Table 1) and because data coverage is incomplete. They should, however, give a reasonably accurate picture of the pattern of growth of foreign investment in Iran. At the end of 1350 (March 1972), there was also an investment of about $18.5 million in the banking sector which is not included in Table 1.17 The Ministry of Economy reports that, as of January 1973, there were 134 concerns, besides banks, operating in Iran that had some foreign participation. This figure includes only the foreign investors who obtained approval through the Centre for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment, which makes them eligible for the privileges of the Law. In addition to these firms, there are some foreign investors who have not registered with the Centre and are therefore not included in the reported statistics. Since there is no major reason (besides some red tape and the desire to remain less visible) for not seeking the approval of the Centre, onlT a handful of companies operate in Iran without a permit. 8 Of the 134 registered firms, 108 are in manufacturing industries, 10 in mining, 7 in agriculture and 9 in various services. In addition, there are 10 banks with foreign partners, one of which is a wholly-owned Russian bank, engaged primarily in foreign trade transactions. Table 2 shows the number of foreign investors by nationality and date of permit. It is clear from these two tables that in the years immediately following the passage of the Law there was no rush to invest in Iran. The total inflow for the six years up to the end of 1341 (March 1962) is of the same order of magnitude as the investments in the year 1344 (1965/66). Only after 1343 (1964/65) is there a noticeable increase IRANIANSTUDIES
74
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SPRING-u.-sER17
IN IRANAS OF OF FOREIGNINVESTORS NUMBER 1973 JANUARY (By country of origin and date of decree) (Excludes banking and oil sectors)
TABLE2.
British
American
German
French
Japanese
Other
Total
1956
0
0
0
1
0
0
l
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
1 1 2 0 1 1 2 3 2 5 5 0 6 9 0 6
0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 4 1 1
0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 4 2 3 1 1 3 3 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 4 4
0 1 0 3 2 4 0 6 3 0 1 4 3 4 3 11
2 2 3 7 3 6 3 9 10 11 12 7 16 26 12 24
44
16
21
11
17
45
154
Totals Source:
Ministry of Economy, Centre for the Attraction and Protection of Forin Iran--November Identification eign Investment, Foreign Investors' 1956-January 1973. Tehran, 1973 (mimeo.).
Note:
The total
number of
foreign
investors
in Iran
exceeds
the number of
because in a number of joint firms with foreign equity participation In cases where ventures there are more than one foreign partner. several firms in a project are closely associated with a parent company, we have treated them as one company. An example will illustrate The foreign partners of S. S. Nacet Iran are (1) The Gilette Co., this. Capital Corp., (3) The Gilette Co. Re(2) The Gilette International and (4) Gilette (Japan), Inc. We report these as search Institute, one company. When a company has invested in Iran through a foreign of the parent company. we have recorded the nationality subsidiary, of the foreign shareholders of S. S. For example, the nationality Kablsazi IKO Iran is recorded as American since the Swedish partner in this venture is in fact a subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph.
IRANIAN STUDIES
76
both in the number of foreign firms investing in Iran and in the average size of each investment. There is of course an upward trend in capital inflows for the entire period. The difference between the two subperiods may be explained partly by events in the international arena and partly by conditions in Iran. The spread of multinational corporations from the industrial countries into the und;rdeveloped countries was generally slower in the 1950s than in the in the manufacturing sector. 1960s, especially Hence, it is not surprising to see a more rapid expansion in Iran Until 1343 (1964/65), when the during the latter period. Iranian economy began to rebound from its recession, neither the economic nor the political situation in Iran was particularly attractive to foreign investors. In 1341 (1962/63), per capita GNPin Iran was about $180. With about 65 percent of the population living in rural areas and an inadequate transportation network, there were no large concentrated markets to attract multinational corporations. The liberal import policies made access to the Iranian market relatively simple, and the uncertain politi c a 1 situation further inhibited foreign enterprises from owning large amounts of fixed assets in Iran. The majority of foreign firms operating in Iran during this period were consultants or contractors for various infrastructure projects such as dams, roads, and port facilities, which were proposed under the government's development plans.19 It is true that in the second half of the 1330s (1951-61) there was a boom in industrial investment which was prompted by an easy credit policy rather than high protective tariffs. Investment expanded primarily in food other light consumer products, and processing, textiles, construction materials. Since multinational corporations were not dominant in these industries, it is not surprising that they played a minor role in Iran in this period. These industries were not new to Iran and did not require sophisticated technologies. The industrial entrepreneurs-who at this time came mainly from the traditional merchant class--could acquire the necessary technology from foreign machinery suppliers and saw little advantage in forming joint ventures with foreign capital.
77
1973 SPRING-SUMMER
Two developments in the late 1330s (1951-61) should be noted. One is the foreign investment in commercial banking; the other is the establishment of the Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran (IMDBI). The growing monetization of Iran's economy and the rapid rise in foreign trade offered attractive opportunities for investment in the banking sector. Between 1334 and 1339 (March 1956 to March 1961) the money supply grew from 24.95 billion rials to 41.64 billion rials. During the same period, the value of merchandise imports rose from 10.9 billion rials to 49.8 billion rials. In the short span of time between 1337 and 1339 (1958-1960), 12 new commercial banks were founded, eight of which had foreign partners (since 1339 [1960] one more has found an American partner). Another private bank which had been established The previously also set up a joint venture in this period. main activity of these banks, until quite recently, centered on foreign trade transactions. They are now beginning to expand their network of local branches in order to increase their share of the domestic credit market. Since there is a tendency for foreign companies to use the services of banks that have foreign shareholders, these banks are likely to gain an increasing share of the domestic marfirms become more prominent in the ket as international economy. The formation of the IMDBIis an important landmark in the growing cooperation between Iranian and foreign The Bank was founded in 1338 (1959), with a subcapital. stantial government subsidy, in order to provide longand mining projects. term credit for industrial Though the Bank is a privately-owned joint-stock company, it has in the formulation of industrial been very influential of the government and should really be considered policies a semi-public institution. Forty percent of the original shareholders' equity of 400 million rials was owned by This percentage foreign institutions, mainly financial. has since been reduced to 16 percent on a capital of 1,500 million rials. In the first few years, the managing direcand foreign shareholders tor of the Bank was a foreigner, had a majority vote on its board of directors. As Table 3 IRANIANSTUDIES
78
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SPRING-SUMER 1973
in IMDBIinclude some of the shows, foreign participants largest financial and manufacturing corporations in the world.20 Since the individual blocks of shares are small-ranging from fifty to several hundred thousand dollars--it is hard to imagine that such large corporations were primarily motivated by the direct monetary returns in deciding to invest in the IMDBI. Rather, they probably considered it the cheapest way to obtain, on a continuing basis, detailed information on investment opportunities and As for the possible local partners for their clients. Iranian backers of the project, they wanted foreign partiFirst, it gave a certain cipation for several reasons. Second, it provided a channel prestige to the project. for establishing contact with Western capital markets and it assured that the Bank would investors. And, finally, remain reasonably independent of the government. The foreign investment boom in banking notwithstanding, a substantial flow of private capital into manufacturThe expaning sector did not begin until 1343 (1964/65). of the government in the late 1330s (1951sionary policies and balance of payments problens. 1961) had led to inflation The adoption of some rather severe stabilization measures led to a recession in the early 1340s (1961-71).21 Since, mirelatively at that time, foreign investment was still nor, the economic slowdown simply retarded its growth rather than significantly Beginning lowering its level. with the economic recovery in 1343 (1964/65), the pace of The increased interest of foreign investment quickened. multinational corporations since then has been prompted by stathe rapid growth of the Iranian economy, its political favorable to foreign inand by government policies bility, vestment. Fueled by a steady rise in oil revenues which expanded from $466.5 million in 1343 (1964/65) to just under $2 billion in 1350 (1971/72), the economy grew in real terms at an average annual rate of over 10 percent By 1350 (1971/72), Bank Markazi Iran during this period.22 was claiming a per capita gross national product of over $420. Because much of this growth was concentrated in urban areas and in higher income groups, substantial markets consumer developed for a number of products, especially durables and some intermediate goods. Although growing IRANIANSTUDIES
80
markets were certainly important, foreign capital was attracted to Iran less by the booming economy than by the of the government. In the past industrialization policies decade, the government has tried to encourage investment in manufacturing by providing easy credit, tax incentives, restricted competition in the domestic markets, and high trade barriers. Protection from imports has probably been the most potent policy instrument used to promote importsubstituting A recent study by the World Bank industries. found that on the average customs duties in 1349 (1970) were 4.8 times their level in 1339 (1960). In addition, a whole host of import restrictions and quotas were imposed during this period. By 1349 (1970), about 70 percent (in terms of value) of the goods produced in Iran were protected by quantitative restrictions which often meant outright prohibition of imports.23 Faced with the loss of markets, or hoping to gain a share of a growing and protected market, many foreigners responded to these policies by setting up production facilities in Iran. Foreign investors found Iran particularly attractive because it did not suffer from the ills usually associated with the importsubstitution strategy for industrial growth, i.e., stagnant domestic market and balance of payment crises. The growing oil revenues provided plentiful supplies of foreign exchange and, through government expenditures, an exogenously expanding market for manufactured goods. The industrial composition of the capital inflow is shown in Table 1. As of the end of 1350 (March 1972), in terms of total value of foreign investment, the leading industries were rubber, petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals. Over time the pattern of inflow has shifted in response to changes in the structure of demand and in government policies, as in the case of agriculture (see below). As demand grew for a particular product because of rising incomes, or because the industries that use the product were established, its imports increased. Once the existence of a "reasonable" size market was recognized, steps were taken, usually initiated by the IMDBI, to set up production facilities in Iran. Since, in most cases, no domestic production existed previously and the technologies tended to be
81
SPRING-SUMMER 1973
for intermediate goods, especially somewhat sophisticated, foreign firms were brought in, often as partners in joint This has naturally led to ventures, to establish plants. in the fastest growinvestment of foreign a concentration Table 4, using a different classification ing industries. provides further evidence of this shifting of industries, It is clear that foreign firms are increasingly pattern. investing in intermediate goods, durable consumer products, and capital goods. The nondurable consumer goods manufacsector, by far the largest industrial ture, which is still had the greatest number of investments in the early subperiod, but subsequently its share of foreign investment These developments reflect has declined substantially. the changing structure of Iran's manufacturing sector. During the decade of the 1340s (1961-71) intermediate duindustries grew at an rable consumer- and capital-goods annual rate of 18 percent, against 13 percent for the light In the latter group were many consumer-goods industries.24 firms that could take advantage of domestic established growth opportunities without fear of foreign competition by the government through its because entry was restricted licensing system. agriculture Outside the manufacturing industries, and services appear as new sectors of interest in the latest has subperiod. Mining, which is primarily export-oriented, had fewer foreign investments, though they tend to be larger in average size and more evenly spread over the entire period. The national origin of the foreign capital inflow is shown in Table S. U.S. companies have by far the largest share, followed by German, British and French corporations. The dominant position of American firms has eroded over time while European and Japanese firms have increased their The same basic picture emerges, perhaps more share.25 if we examine the number of foreign investors clearly, rather than the value of assets (see Table 2). Since 1344 (1965/66), the three major European countries mentioned above have been investing more in Iran, while Japan has joined the rank of leading investors only in the last IRANIANSTUDIES
82
NUMBEROF FIRMS WITH FOREIGNPARTICIPATION ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY
TABLE 4.
63-67
68-72
Total
7
10
10
27
3
7
9
19
4
15
24
43
1
4
13
18
Agriculture
-
1
6
7
Services
2
1
6
9
Mining
2
3
3
8
58-62 Nondurable Goods Durable
Consumer
Consumer Goods
Intermediate Capital
Source:
Goods
Products
Ministry of Economy, Centre for the Attraction of Foreign Investment, Foreign and Protection in Iran, November 1956Identification Investor's January 1973.
83
SPRING-SUMMER 1973
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AUTUMN1973
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targets were specified in the Third Plan frame. The planned rate of 4.1 percent for agriculture, however, was not realized, as the actual rate of growth of total agricultural production fell short of 3 percent.39 The failure to attain the agricultural growth target was essentially due to the fact that the government's agricultural policy changed drastically at the very beginning of the plan period. More specifically, land reform became the primary concern, thus deemphasizing the Third Plan frame's policies for increasing production and productivity in agriculture. In terms of major industrial classifications, agriculture indeed had the lowest growth rate during the plan period. On the other hand, petroleum and industry had the highest rates; they were followed by the services sector, especially government services. The construction sector also expanded rapidly during the period under consideration. As a result of these developments, some structural transformation took place in the economy. The outstanding feature of this change was the decline in the relative position of agriculture rather than any appreciable increase in the relative importance of industry. This development occurred because the decline in the position of agriculture was largely offset by the rise in the relative position of the oil sector, while services maintained their relative share in aggregate output. it is not Concerning the employment situation, possible to make comparisons between the actual and planned developments, because of both the lack of data on actual developments as well as the Third Plan's vague employment targets. There is general agreement, however, that the employment-generation effects of the Third Plan were Total employment increased by about 500 rather limited.40 thousand from 1962 to 1967; the bulk of this increase occurred after 1964, following the termination of recessionary conditions in the economy. The actual expansion of employment, though its extent is subject to much uncertainty, compares rather unfavorably with the Plan's target of roughly one million new jobs.
IRANIANSTUDIES
198
The overall level of prices remained relatively stable during the Third Plan period. The first two years of the plan period were years of recession. Subsequently, with economic recovery and increases in development outlays, the domestic supply of goods also increased significantly during the latter part of the period, not to mention the rapid rise of imports. A significant portion of the increased domestic output resulted from the utilization of idle capacity as well as the fact that some of the capital-intensive projects of the Second Plan began to give some results in terms of output. In addition, during the last two years of the plan period, the government actively pursued a price stabilization policy by directly importing those products for which significant shortages had occurred in the domestic markets.41 Finally, the government also pursued a more cautious monetary policy as compared to the late 1950s. The combination of all these factors helped to prevent the appearance of any general excess demand situation and overall pressures on prices. *As indicated already, no fixed target had been specified in connection with the balance of payments, but relative external balance was mentioned as one of the secondary objectives. In terms of actual developments in the balance of payments, the Third Plan period can be divided into two subperiods, viz., 1962-63 and 1964-67. During the former period, as a result of the recessionary conditions prevailing in the economy and the implementation of the stabilization program of the early 1960s, the balance of payments was favorable. This condition was essentially due to reducing imports, especially in the private sector. Following economic recovery, especially after 1965, both investments and imports increased very rapidly. As a result, despite increased foreign exchange earnings of the oil sector, the balance of current payments showed increasing deficits, from $58 million in 1964 to $212 million in 1967. During these years, the net inflow of foreign loans, although substantial, was not sufficient to cover the growing deficits. As a result, foreign exchange reserves declined. Cumulative balance of payments deficits on current account amounted to $421 million during 199
AUTUMN 1973
1962-67, out of which $274 million by foreign loans.
(65 percent)
was covered
In the remainder of this section we shall make comparisons between the actual and planned development of investments, in terms of the totals and then by extending the analysis to the developments by sectors. As we have seen, according to the plan frame, total fixed investments for the entire plan period were set at 290 billion rials (at 1960 prices), out of which the shares of the public and private sectors were set at 158 billion (54.5 percent) and 132 billion rials (45.5 percent), respectively. In addition to fixed investments, certain recurrent development outlays were also allowed for in the Plan, as a result of which targets for the so-called development expenditures of the public and private sectors were raised to 190 billion and 158 billion rials, respectively. Subsequently, the investment target for the public sector was revised several times, while nothing was said regarding the private sector. Implicitly, at least, the total fixed investment target for the private sector continued to be 132 billion rials as specified originally. This, then, is the figure which has to be compared with the actual development of total investments in the private sector. The investment target for the public sector was fixed at 230 billion rials (at current prices), according to the final revision of the Plan. This target referred to development outlays without giving a breakdown in terms of fixed investment and recurrent development outlays. In view of the fact that in the original calculations contained in the plan frame the recurrent development outlays were estimated at 20 percent of fixed investments, it is safe to assume that about 38 billion rials. of the 230 billion program were for recurrent development purposes. On this basis, the fixed investment target for the public sector would amount to 192 billion rials (at current prices). IRANIANSTUDIES
200
At current prices, total public fixed investments amounted to 16S.5 billion rials during the whole plan period, as against the final target of 192 billion rials.42 These figures imply a shortfall of 26 billion rials. In other words, about 86 percent of the revised public investment program was actually fulfilled. In real terms, total public fixed investments added up to 165.2 billion rials, which would imply that the original target (158 billion rials) was only slightly exceeded, despite the fact that oil revenues turned out to be much larger than projected in the plan frame.43 The same picture is conveyed by making comparisons between the actual and planned public development outlays (including both fixed investments and recurrent development outlays). At current prices, the actual development outlays amounted to 204.6 billion rials, as against the final target of 230 billion, implying an 89 percent plan fulfillment. On the other hand, actual private investments turned-out to be significantly in excess of the planned magnitude--namely, 248.6 billion rials (at constant prices) as against 132 billion rials for the entire five-and-one-half years of the Third Plan. In other words, the private sector invested almost twice as much as originally expected. Taking investments of both sectors into account, total fixed investments at fixed prices amounted to 413.8 billion rials, compared to the original target of 290 billion. The over-fulfillment of the original target was almost exclusively due to developments in the p*rivate sector. Actual investments by both sectors also exceeded the final target; in this case, too, the over-fulfillment of the Plan was related to the performance of the private sector. The private sector actually accounted for about 60 percent of total fixed investments, as compared to about 45 percent envisaged in the Plan. We shall now make comparisons between the planned and actual developments in the public sector in more specific terms. Table 2 shows the actual and planned sectoral outlays for the whole plan period. Comparisons between the actual outlays and outlays planned under the final revised.
201
AUTUMN 1973
form of the Third Plan imply a high degree of fulfillment of the sectoral investment targets. The largest shortfall (41 percent) occurred in the case of the industrial sector. In terms of the sectoral distribution of development outlays, once again with the exception of a relatively large deviation in the case of the industry proper, the actual and planned distributions were in close agreement. It is not possible to make comparisons between the originally planned and actual outlays, since the former are at 1960 prices and the latter at current prices. In this can be compared. case, only the sectoral distributions Here, too, the largest deviation was related to the industrial sector. Industry proper absorbed 8.2 percent of total public development outlays, as against the originally planned share of 18.1 percent. On the other hand, the irrigation program absorbed a much larger share (46 percent) of the actual expenditures on agriculture and irrigation, as compared to the original intentions (28 percent). Transport and services absorbed almost the same shares as envisaged under the plan frame. We shall now take a closer look at the actual intrasectoral allocations (for the major sectors) and see to what extent they were in line with the original intentions. In agriculture, actual developments departed significantly from the situation in the plan frame. envisaged In the main, aside from the implementation of a major land reform program which had not been foreseen by the planners when the plan frame was being prepared, the deviations resulted from the type of irrigation projects actually implemented.44 These developments in effect a major shift in represented the agricultural As indicated, policy of the government. the irrigation program absorbed a much higher share (46 percent) of investments in agriculture and irrigation than the share (28 percent) in the plan frame. envisaged This situation was mainly due to the type of irrigation improjects plemented during the plan period. The Third Plan had emphasized small-scale irrigation projects (deep wells, qanat and small dams), as compared to the largeimprovements, scale multi-purpose stressed in the Second Plan. projects IRANIAN STUDIES
202
In practice, however, the emphasis was once again given to big capital-intensive As a result, projects. the construction of six new major dams began during the period under review. In addition, the completion of the unfinished dams of the Second Plan absorbed a much higher share of outlays on irrigation than originally expected. As a result of these developments, 80 percent of the actual investments in irrigation were absorbed by the large-scale systems. On the other hand, only about 4 percent of this sub-sector's investments were used for deep wells, qanats, and small dams. In sum, there was little connection between the actual and planned developments in agriculture and irrigation. Out of the actual development expenditures of 47.3 billion rials on agriculture and irrigation projects, almost 50 percent w a s absorbed by a drastically different type of irrigation program, while another 30 percent was related to the land reform programs.45 In industry, too, actual developments represented some major departures from the industrial policy of the Third Plan. The deviations occurred largely in the public sector, but due to the high level of investment activity in the private a relatively sector, high rate of growth was achieved in the industrial sector as a whole. The industrial policy of the Third Plan aimed at minimizing direct public investment in industry, while providing for every possible kind of assistance to the private sector. In addition, the industrial program of the Third Plan stressed the development of small- and medium-scale industries rather than heavy industries. These guidelines were based to a great extent on comparative advantage considerations.4 As a result, the public program for industry essentially of credit provisions consisted for the private sector. The private sector did, in fact, receive assistance, in various forms, from the government and responded favorably. However, contrary to the situation in envisaged the Plan, credit extension to the private sector did not constitute the main component of the public sector's industrial program. Out of total public development expend-
203
AUTUMN1973
to private itures of 17.1 billion rials, long-term credits absorbed 4.4 biland equity share participation investors while another 733 million or only 26 percent, lion rials, with technical was used in connection (4.2 percent) rials Furthermore, sector.47 given to the private assistance a establishing in 1965, the government started beginning and complex innumber of new, highly capital-intensive making, aluminum, machine-tool dustries, such as steel, These indusand petrochemicals. manufacturing, tractor made to the account for the bulk of the allocations tries sector in the Fourth Plan, and they also absorbindustrial outindustrial ed the major share of the public sector's the Third rials (or 56 percent),during lays, 9.6 billion Plan period.
In the transport sector the discrepancies between unlike those actual performance and original intentions, in agriculture and industry, were not related to drastic The basic reasons policy changes during the plan period. similar to those which occurred (espewere essentially with of costs) in connection the underestimation cially The problems were, once again, largely the Second Plan.48 absorbed Road construction to the road program. related secof the transport a much greater share (67 percent) origthan the share (48 percent) tor's total investments of despite the intentions In addition, intended. inally the plan frame, main roads, rather than feeder roads,
clearly
received
the major emphasis.49
In the field of education and manpower training, improvethe Third Plan, basically emphasized qualitative system, while the quaneducational ments in the country's titative expansion was supposed to take place only at the expanhowever, quantitative In practice, primary level. once again dominated the actual develsion at all levels The expansion of primary education absorbed 64 opments. as compared percent of total public outlays on education,
As a result,
with a planned share of 48 percent.50 respondingly
less
was spent
(in both absolute
terms) on secondary and tertiary crucial
manpower training
IRANIAN STUDIES
program. 204
levels
cor-
and relative
as well as on the
The target
for primary
education was to increase the number of pupils attending these schools by 681 thousand. The target was surpassed as the enrollment at the primary level increased by 1,181 thousand, of which 816 thousand were enrolled in regular primary schools while the remaining 365 thousand attended the so-called Education Corps classes.51 The Education Corps program essentially consists of sending high school graduates, who have been drafted for military service, to rural areas to spread literacy among children and adults. This program, which is an important component of the White Revolution, has been one of the most beneficial programs adopted by the government.52 At the secondary level, contrary to the development envisaged in the plan frame, once again quantitative expansion was stressed at the expense of qualitative improvements. Enrollment in the secondary schools reached 658 thousand, compared to the more modest target of 400 thousand. With respect to higher education, almost no quantitative expansion had been foreseen in the Third Plan. However, several new universities were established during the plan period. In conclusion, it remains to add thataside from the reasons cited above, to some significant extent the deviations between the actual and planned developments in most sectors were due to the new manner in which the Third Plan was implemented. Unlike its predecessors, the Third Plan was implemented by the regular ministries and government agencies. The results, of course, varied significantly, depending on the previous experience of the ministries.53
The Fourth Development Plan, 1968-1972 The Fourth Plan, covering the period March 1968 to March 1973, was Iran's second comprehensive development plan. In this concluding section we shall briefly describe and appraise the Fourth Plan.
205
AUTUMN 1973
Main Objectives overall
of the Fourth Plan
The Fourth Plan was formulated in terms of several These were (1) an increase in the objectives.54
the relaincreasing rate of economic growth by gradually of raising the productivity tive importance of industry, (2) of production; and using advanced techniques capital, of income; (3) a decrease in distribution a more equitable
the dependence on foreign countries and the diversification serof exports; and (4) improvements in administrative vices by the introduction of basic changes in the adminisof advanced managerial trative system and the extension orand public and private to all ministries techniques ganizations. the speaking, and quantitatively More specifically growth rate target. Fourth Plan was based on an overall real GNP at an average The target chosen was to increase of 57 or a total increase annual rate of about 9 percent, This target, plan period. during the five-year percent, implied a growth rate of 2.6 percent, with a population
per capita
GNPgrowth rate target
of about 6.4 percent per
annum.
The Fourth Plan also specified a number of secondary balobjectives regarding employment, income distribution, The ance of payments, and the general level of prices. objective of the Fourth Plan regarding employment was "the employment for the of maximum full-time productive creation will purpose of (1) absorbing those seeking employment...who unproconverting enter the labor market, and (2) gradually jobs into stable and productive ductive or low-productive
employment. "55
speaking,
Quantitatively
total
employment
was to rise from 6,932 thousand in 1967 to 7,898 thousand On the other hand, of 966 thousand. in 1972, or an increase to only 61 thouopen unemployment was expected to decline This implied a quasi sand by the end of the plan period.56 since as planned the rate of open policy, full-employment to about one percent of the unemployment would decline labor force.
IRANIANSTUDIES
206
In terms of the country's balance of payments, the Plan envisaged an overall cumulative surplus for the entire plan period. More specifically, the net current account would show a total deficit of about $880 million, while the capital account would have a total surplus of around $1,524 As a result, million. Iran's foreign exchange reserves were planned to increase by about $600 million over the five-year period of the Plan.57 The objective of relative price stability was treated rather inadequately. The Plan essentially stated that "by following sound financial, monetary and foreign exchange policies and controlling the supply of essential agricultural commodities...it is expected that relative price stability will be preserved."58 Finally, it can only be added that the objective of improved income distribution was also handled rather inadequately. For all intents and purposes, the "distribution" aspects of the Fourth Plan were overshadowed by the "growth" considerations. Size of the Fourth Plan The total size of the Fourth Plan was originally fixed at 810 billion rials. Of this total, 743 billion rials (92 percent) were to be financed domestically,while the remaining 67 billion rials (8 percent) would be financed by the net utilization of foreign resources.59 It is not exactly clear how the magnitude of the total fixed investment requirements of the Fourth Plan were estimated. The planners, however, felt that about 810 billion rials would be required to achieve the Plan's growth rate target. The total size of the Plan implied an incremental capital-output ratio of about 2.7:1. In order to realize the planned investments, the Fourth Plan specified that the average annual rate of increase of consumption expenditures by the public and private sectors should not exceed 10 percent and 7 percent, respectively, during the plan period. The size of the public sector program was fixed at 480 billion rials,60 or about 59 percent of total develop207
AUTUMN 1973
ment outlays, while the share of the private sector amounted to the remaining 330 billion rials (41 percent). The size of the public sector program was increased several times. Finally it was fixed at 555 billion rials, while nothing was said about the size of the private sector program. In this respect, the Fourth Plan, like its predecessor, proved to be rather "open-ended."
The Investment
Program
The public investment program was the main policy program specified in the Fourth Plan. Some details regarding private investments, especially in industry, were also specified. However, the Plan was by and large open-ended in terms of private investments and the policies required for calling forth the planned private responses. This, indeed, can be regarded as one of the main defects of devel-
opment planning in Iran.
Unlike the Third Plan, however,
the Fourth Plan did contain some statements regarding monetary, fiscal and other general economic policies of the government.61 As in the case of the Third Plan, the od of formulating the Fourth Plan was one of ror. The task of planning, which was broken number of stages, was undertaken entirely by of the Plan Organization. The process started
ing total
investment
requirements
essential methand ertrial down into a the economists by estimat-
on the basis
of the
overall growth rate target.62 The sectoral investment allocations were fixed on the basis of sectoral production targets. Five broad sectors of planning: agriculture, and services. electricity,
were distinguished for the purpose oil and gas, water and industry, Sectoral production targets
were fixed prior to determining
the sectoral
investment al-
locations. An attempt was also made to fill the sectoral investments with key investment programs; but the planners still faced the difficulty created by the shortage of an All in adequate number of concrete investment projects. IRANIAN STUDIES
208
all, for the same reasons mentioned in connection with the Third Plan, a high degree of optimality and internal consistency cannot be attributed to the Fourth Plan. The broad sectoral allocations of the Fourth Plan are shown in Table 3 and a more detailed picture of the public investment program is given in Table 4. The outof these tables is the high priority standing feature given to services, especially transport and communications, while agriculture received a very low emphasis in comparison with industry. Thus, unlike the Third Plan the sectoral allocations of the Fourth Plan implied an unbalanced growth strategy. In particular, the Plan emphasized investments in social overhead capital as against directly productive activities. Plan Implementation The implementation of the Fourth Plan was completed in March, 1973. In this section we shall appraise the Plan's results in terms of its overall objectives and then its investment program. The primary objective of the already, was an annual real rate of percent. The actual rate of growth cent, indicating an overfulfillment about 2 percentage units.
Fourth Plan, as noted growth in GNPof 9.4 amounted to 11.6 perof the target rate by
The planned and actual sectoral growth rates are shown in Table 5. With the exception of agriculture and construction, all the sectoral value added targets were either attained or surpassed. In terms of major industrial classifications, agriculture, with 3.9 percent per annum, had the lowest growth rate during the plan period. Oil and services had the highest rates. Indeed, the actual growth rate of the services sector was almost twice the planned rate; this was mainly contributed by government services. Industry proper grew at an average annual rate of almost 14 percent.
209
AUTUMN 1973
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In terms of the country's balance of foreign exchange, the Fourth Plan's forecasts were not realized. Although Iran's oil revenues increased much more rapidly than expected, especially in 1971 and 1972, nevertheless the cumulative surplus on the balance of foreign exchange for the entire five-year period was less than planned, about $277 million compared to $633 million. This was mainly because current payments increased more rapidly than envisaged, amounting to a cumulative total of $12,759 million as against $10,328 million, while $600 million in exports of petrochemicals
was not realized.65 In this final section we shall briefly discuss the of the investment fulfillment program embodied in the Fourth Plan. As noted already, total fixed investments were originally set at 810 billion rials (at 1965 prices), out of which the shares of the public and private sectors were to be 443.5 billion and 366.5 billion rials, respectively. Subsequently, the investment target for the public sector was raised, while nothing was said regarding the private sector. The target for the public sector was finally set at 554.5 billion rials (at current prices). Data on actual investments are given in Table 6. Total fixed investments amounted to about 789 billion rials (at 1959 prices) during the plan period as against the original target of 810 billion rials,implying a shortfall of 21 billion rials. The shortfall was entirely due to developments in the private sector. The public sector actually accounted for about 58 percent of total fixed investments as compared to 55 percent originally envisaged in the Fourth Plan. Table 7 gives more information on the planned and actual developments in the public sector. Comparisons between the actual and planned development outlays show a high degree of the total (91.4 percent) as well as the sectoral investment The largest targets. shortfall was related to agriculture. In terms of the sectoral distribution of development outlays, once again the actual and planned distributions agreed rather closely. 215
AUTUMN1973
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since the mid 1960s, Iran has been very successful, a high rate of economic growth. and sustaining in initiating Iran's development and planning problems are, therefore, from those faced by most developing different significantly other oil producing nations of the countries, including Iran has now reached the important trade-off Middle East. choices have to be made between the phase where delicate of of growth, on the one hand, and the quality quantity on the other; not to mention the ineconomic development, with the high growth of the flationary problems associated in are recognized Fortunately, the choices recent years. Iran's Fifth Development Plan, which has assigned high important programs yet vitally priorities to less tangible It is, health and agriculture. in areas such as education, benethat the socioeconomic indeed, through these fields fits of economic growth will come to be more equitably total population. shared by the bulk of the country's a high rate Whether or not Iran can succeed in maintaining price stability of growth while attaining also relative of national and improving the distribution income, however, remains to be seen.
NOTES 1.
United Nations, Public Finance Information Papers: Iran (New York: United Nations, 1951), pp. 7 and 21.
2.
Plan Organization, Review of the Second Seven Year Plan Program of Iran (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1960), p. 55.
3.
George B. Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 12.
4.
Ibid., p. 106; and National Bank of Iran, The ThirtyYear History of the National Bank of Iran, 1307-37 (1928-58) (in Persian; Bank of Iran, Tehran: National 1959), p. 200.
5.
Between
1936 and 1939,
the cost
217
of living
index
rose
AUTUMN1973
by 43 percent. National Bank of Iran, Bulletin, Vol. 24, No. 172 (1956-57), p. 346. The major factors responsible for the inflationary pressures were the stagnation of agricultural production, restriction of consumer good imports, and the overall high level of public investments, particularly in transport and construction projects, which were partly financed through borrowing from the domestic banking system. Between 1941 and 1944, wholesale prices increased by more than 200 percent, and the cost of living index rose by about 300 percent. National Bank of Iran, The Thirty-Year History of the National Bank of Iran, p. 219.- The main fuel for the wartime inflation was provided by the military expenditures of the Allied forces in Iran. of all types At the same time, the unavailability of imported commodities as well as serious food shortages limited the aggregate supply of goods. Aside from successive crop failures during this period, the main reason for food shortages was the fact that not much was left after the requirements of the Allied forces were satisfied. Furthermore, the limited available supplies of food and other commodities could not be distributed within the country, since Iran's transport facilities were also monopolized for For a brief review military purposes by the Allies. of the main economic events of this period, see E. M. H. Lloyd, Food and Inflation in the Middle East, 194045 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956), pp. 157-69; and H. Pirnia, A Short Survey of the Economic Conditions in Iran (Tehran: Economic Information Bureau, 1945), pp. 25-30. 6.
Including the Morrison-Knudsen International and the Overseas Consultants Incorporated.
7.
For more details on the limited results of the First Plan, see Plan Organization, Review of the Second Seven Year Plan, p. 5; and H. Motamen, "Development Planning in Iran," Middle East Economic Papers, Vol. 3 (1956), pp. 100-108.
.RANIANSTUDIES
218
Company
8.
Lessons See Albert Waterston, Development Planning: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), of Experience (Baltimore: pp. 61ff; and Bent Hansen, "Planning and Economic Growth in the UAR (Egypt), 1960-65, " in P. J. Vatikiotis, ed., Egypt Since the Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 20.
9.
Henry J. Brutton, "Notes on Development in Iran," Economic Development
(July,
and Cultural
Change,
Vol.
9
1961), p. 633.
10.
Review of the Second Seven Year Plan Organization, Plan, pp. 3 and 14-15, and idem, Progress Report on Plan Tehran: the Second Seven Year Plan (in Persian; Organization, 1964), p. 10.
11.
P. Bjorn Olsen and P. N. Rasmussen, "An Attempt at State: Iran," in Everett E. Planning in a Traditional Hagen, ed., Planning Economic Development (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), p. 226.
12.
For a brief discussion see of some of these conflicts, H. Myint, The Economics of the Developing Countries (New York: Hutchinson and Co., 1964), pp. 167-68.
13.
There are different,
but essentially
equivalent,
methods of specifying the relative importance of the See Stephen A. Marglin, Public various objectives. Investment Criteria (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967), pp. 23-26. 14.
Law of the Second Seven Year Development Plan of Iran (Tehran: Government of Iran, 1956), Article 1.
15.
On these important distinctions, see Jan Tinbergen and Hendricus C. Bos, Mathematical Models of Economic Growth (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 113-14.
16.
Law of the Second Seven Year Development Plan, Articles 1 and 2. 219
AUTUMN1973
Review of the Second Seven Year
17.
Plan Organization, Plan, pp. 6-7
18.
adopt a deAlthough the planners did not consciously the planned pattern of investments velopment strategy, via emimplied an unbalanced development strategy, This implied overhead capital. phasis on social in common with the however, had very little strategy,
in the sense-of
unbalanced growth strategy
Hirschman.
of, is based on the recognition strategy The latter of technoand the emphasis given to, the existence between linkages) (vertical logical complementarities As a stages of production. at different industries it favors a development policy that concenresult, where the linkon particular sectors strategic trates where the network of viz., are strongest, age effects The kind of deis thickest. relations input-output imbalance proposed by Hirschman is one that liberate by linkage effects, aims at maximizing the total It alinvestment projects. choosing the appropriate a sequence of expansion that so aims at determining making in the economy. will maximize induced decision from any consideration These issues did not receive the Iranian planners. In any event, it is interesting to note that, due to weak backward and forward Hirschman of the transport sector, linkage effects
himself
does not favor the strategy
of unbalanced
in transport faciligrowth via emphasis on investment of EconoSee Albert 0. Hirschman, The Strategy ties. Press, mic Development (New Haven: Yale University 1958), pp. 76-119. 19.
See Waterston,
20.
The Second Plan,
2o.
cit.,
pp.
as originally
61-63. intended,
been entirely
financed domestically
oil
no foreign
revenues;
borrowing
was to have
by the country's A
was envisaged.
scheme was formulated for dividing the oil revenues among the Plan Organization, the Ministry of Finance, and the National
this
Iranian
Oil Company.
arrangement, Plan Organization
IRANIAN STUDIES
220
According
to
would have received
rials from the a total of 88 billion ($1.2 billion) total oil revenues during the whole sevencountry's This compared rather favorably year period. with the rials 70 billion original cost estimate, ($933 million), of the investment program. But the actual development turned out to be quite different from the original intentions. As a result of rises in the ordinary of the government, the original expenditures scheme for the al'location of oil revenues was changed drason two occasions, both at the expense of the tically share going to the Plan Organization. In 1958, the Plan Organization's share was reduced from 80 to 60 percent for the remainder of the plan period. This lowered total oil revenues of the Plan Organization, for the whole seven-year period, to about 76.5 billion In March 19S9, the government once again rerials. duced the Plan's share, limiting it to 10 billion rials ($130 million) for 1338 (1959-60) and 55 percent of total oil revenues for the remaining two and onehalf years of the plan period. These two successive reductions meant that the Plan Organization's refrom oil revenues, for the seven-year ceipts period, would not exceed some 65.8 billion rials ($860 million); thus necessitating foreign borrowing by about 18 billion rials ($240 million) to finance the 84 rials program. billion However, the actual amount of foreign loans utilized by the Plan Organization during the entire seven-year period amounted to 25 rials billion (about $330 million). In sum, approximately one-third of the investments were foreign financed. Had the Plan Organization received 88 rials from oil revenues, billion as originally planned, no long-term foreign borrowing would have been required. But, during the plan period only about 50 instead of the originally percent, specified 70-80 of the oil revenues were used for financing percent, the Plan. On the other hand, about 40 percent of the country's total oil revenues during the plan period were used in financing the ordinary expenditures of the government--substantially more than the share, about 15 percent, originally intended for the Ministry of Finance. See Law of the Second Seven-Year Develop221
AUTUMN1973
Review of the 8, Plan Organization, ment Plan, Article Second Seven-Year Plan, annex 2; idem, Economic Report, 1962), p. 6; and Plan Organization, 1961 (Tehran: National Iranian Oil Company, Role of the Oil Industry Iranian Oil ComNational in Iran's Economy (Tehran: pany, 1967), Tables 2 and 6. 21.
Review of the Second Seven-year Plan Organization, Plan, pp. 34, 41-42, and annex I-3; idem, Progress RePlan, pp. 29-33 and port on the Second Seven-year Table 14; and idem, Third Plan Frame: Transport and 1961), Plan Organization, Communications (Tehran: p. 23.
22.
pp. 226-31; and See Olsen and Rasmussen, 2o. cit., J. Amuzegar "Iran's Economic Planning Once Again," Middle East Economic Papers, Vol. 4 (1957), pp. 1-11.
23.
and of these developments, discussion For a detailed see Farhad Daftary, "The causes, their underlying and the Problem of InflaBalance of Payments Deficit Vol. 5 Iranian Studies, tion in Iran, 1955-1962," (Winter 1972), pp. 2-24.
24.
Plan Organization, Plan, pp. 15-18.
25.
"Legal Decree on the Third Plan, passed by the Council of Ministers on September 6, 1962," Central Bank of Vol. 1 (November-December,1962). Iran, Bulletin,
26.
Plan Organization, Plan Organization,
27.
Olsen
28.
Outline of the Third Plan, pp. 37Plan Organization, 39; and N. Islam, "Methodology of Development PlanA Case Study of Iran," Pakistan Economic Journing: p. 2. nal, Vol. 12 (December,1962),
and Rasmussen,
IRANIAN STUDIES
Review of the Second Seven-year
Outline of the Third Plan 1961), pp. 35 and 40. op.
cit.,
222
(Tehran:
p. 237.
29.
George B. Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran, p. 169.
30.
The role of these objectives, as guides to resource was stated by the planners as follows: allocation, "Where a choice must be made between two projects whose contributions to national income are approximately equal, the choice runs in favor of the one that offers more employment or a better pattern of income distribution." See Plan Organization, Outline of the Third Plan, p. 41.
31.
Ibid.,
pp. 40-41.
32.
Ibid.,
p. 45.
33.
In addition
to fixed
investment
expenditures,
the
supplementary Plan also made allowance for certain expenditures, and the sum of the two was defined as expenditures development outlays. The supplementary were allowed for at the rate of 20 percent of total fixed investments planned for each of the two sectors. Thus, the overall magnitude of the development ex-
penditures was raised 34.
originally envisaged under the Third Plan to 348 billion rials.
Jan Tinbergen has expounded his original stage method of planning in many places; for example, see his Vol. "Planning in Stages," Statsokonomist Tiddskrift, 76 (March, 1962), pp. 1-20; and idem, "Simple Devices for Development Planning," in E. A. G. Robinson, ed., Problems in Economic Development (New York: St. Martin's This model is sumPress, 1965), pp. 373-83. marized and appraised in Bent Hansen, Lectures in Part II, the Theory of Economic Economic Theory: 1967), Policy and Planning (Lund: Student Litteratur, pp. 106-9.
35.
See J. Tinbergen, Development Planning (New York: B. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), p. 75; and Hollis in Chenery, "Approaches to Development Planning,"
223
AUTIJMN 1973
E. A. G. Robinson, ed., ment, p. 391.
Problems in Economic Develop-
36.
For more details, see Farhad Daftary, Economic Development and Planning in Iran, 1955-1967 (Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley, 1971), University of California, pp. 433ff.
37.
the expenditures of the On the basis of reclassifying revised Second Plan, the "core" programs of the latter would account for only about 18 percent of the total. Plan Organization, Outline of the Third Plan, p. 66.
38.
allocations, For a discussion of the intra-sectoral see Daftary, Economic Development and Planning in Iran, pp. 441-55.
39.
The target rate of 4.1 percent was quite realistic, since the actual rate attained during 1950-59 had See Plan Organization, Outbeen about 3.3 percent. line of the Third Plan, p. 113.
40.
See, for example, William H. Bartsch, Problems of Employment Creation in Iran (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1970), pp. 29-30 and 56-57.
41.
pronounced for agriculShortages were particularly The imports of tural products of animal origin. these products increased from 974 million rials in 1963 to 1,883 million rials in 1967. Imports of grains also rose rapidly during the same period of time. See Plan Organization, Fourth National Development Plan, 1968-72 (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1968), p. 19; and Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report as at March 20, 1968, pp. 104-105.
42.
Actual investment figures are the estimates of the Central Bank of Iran as published in National Income of Iran, 1962-67 (in Persian; Tehran: Central Bank of Iran, 1969).
IRANIAN STUDIES
224
43.
44.
Actual developments proved to be quite different from the situation envisaged in the plan frame in that both revenues and current expenditures of the public sector increased at much higher rates. Such was particularly the case for the oil revenues, which during 1963-67 increased at an average rate of 18 percent as compared to 5 percent assumed in the plan frame. As a result, during the plan period oil revenues accounted for almost 50 percent of total public revenues, as against the forecast of 38 percent contained in the plan frame. Therefore, although non-development expenditures had also increased at a much higher rate (12 percent) than assumed initially (5 percent), actual public savings were larger than the relevant forecasts of the plan frame. It was due to these developments that the size of the public sector program was raised. During the Third Plan period about 67 percent of the country's oil revenues, amounting to 145 billion rials, were used in financing the public development program. Abstracting from the Plan Organization's non-development outlays, these oil revenues actually financed about 70 percent of the public development outlays. Thus, one-third of the country's oil revenues (not to mention almost all of the oil bonuses) was used in meeting the rising current expenditures of the government. See Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report as at March 20, 1967, pp. 55-56, and 67; idem, Annual Report as at March 20, 1968, pp. 219-27; Plan Organization, Outline of the Third Plan, pp. 50-51 and 54-57; and idem, Progress Report on the Third National Development Plan (in Persian; Tehran: The Majlis Press, 1968), p. 22. See Plan Organization, Third Plan Frame: Agriculture (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1961); J. Price Gittinger,
Planning for Agricultural Development: The Experience of Iran (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1965); and idem, "Planning and Agricultural Policy in Iran - Program Effects and Indirect Effects," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 16 (October,1967), pp. 107-17.
225
AUTUMN1973
45.
Plan Organization, Progress Report on the Third National Development Plan, pp. 37 and 59-63; and Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report as at March 20, 1968, p. 112.
46.
See D. Avramovic, "Industrialization of Iran: The Records, the Problems and the Prospects," Tahqiqat-e Egtesadi, Vol. 7 (Spring,,1970), pp. 14-46; and Plan Organization, Third Plan Frame: Industries and Mines (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1961).
47.
Plan Organization, Progress Report on the Third National Development Plan, p. 82.
48.
See Herman G. Van Der Tak and Jan de Weille, Reapof a Road Project in Iran (Washington, D.C.: praisal International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1969).
49.
All in all, some 3,800 kilometers of main roads were constructed or improved, including the completion of work on some 1,250 kilometers of the Second Plan's road program. This represented a 75 percent fulfillment of the Third Plan's target of 5,054 kilometers. Plan Organization, Progress Report on the Third National Development Plan, pp. 135-42 and 154-63.
50.
Plan Organization, Third Plan Frame: Education (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1961), p. 34; and idem,
Progress Report on the Third.National Plan, p. 187.
Development
51.
Plan Organization, Progress Report on the Third National Development Plan, p. 188.
52.
For further details, see Richard Blandy and Mahyar Neshat, "The Education Corps in Iran: A Survey of its Social and Economic Aspects," International Labor Review, Vol. 93 (May,1966), pp. 521-29.
53.
It should
also
IRANIAN STUDIES
be mentioned 226
here that
perhaps
the most
important development since 1955 in Iran's public finances (aside from the unprecedented importance acquired by the oil revenues) has been related to a major change in 1964, in the budgeting system of the country. In 1973, additional steps were taken towards improving Iran's budgetary system. For details, see Farhad Daftary,"Development Planning and Budgeting in Iran," in CENTOSeminar on Budget Administration (Ankara: Central Treaty Organization, 1973), pp. 221-32. 54.
Plan Organization, p. 39.
55.
Ibid.,
p. 48.
56.
Ibid.,
pp. 68-69.
57.
Ibid.,
pp. 53-59.
58.
Ibid.,
pp. 55-56.
59.
Ibid..,
p. 41.
60.
More specifically, the total planned public development outlays consisted of (1) 380.2 billion rials in fixed investments, (2) 64.9 billion rials in recurrent development outlays, and (3) 34.9 billion rials in the form of financial assistance, out of the Plan Organization's funds, for fixed investments by the private sector. On this basis, total planned fixed investments of the private sector would amount to about 366 billion rials. Ibid., pp. 60 and 63; and The Law of the Fourth National Development Plan (in Persian; Tehran: Imperial Government of Iran, 1968), pp. 3 and 17-18.
61.
Plan Organization, pp. 53-60.
62.
Initially
Fourth National
Fourth National
three different 227
Development Plan,
Development Plan,
growth targets
were conAUTUM 1973
sidered. See Julian Bharier, Economic Development Iran, 1900-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 99. 63.
Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report as at March 20, 1973, pp. 12-13 and 93-94.
64.
Ibid.,
65.
For further
p. 55.
Organization,
66.
in
details,
see ibid.,
Fourth National
pp. 168-70; and Plan Development
Plan,
p. 57.
On the basis of the estimates by the Central Bank of Iran, whereas in 1971-72 Iran's GNPgrew at the average annual rate of about 14 percent with 6 percent annual rise
in prices,in
1973 the real
growth rate
to almost 34 percent with a 13 percent rise general level of prices.
IRANIAN STUDIES
228
amounted
in the
THE KHWUSHNISHIN POPULATION OF IRAN ERIC J. HOOGLUND
social
Iranian villages generally contain two distinct classes: (1) peasants who cultivate land they own
and/or rent, and (2) landless who engage non-farmers in various commercial, service, and labor activities appropriate to an agricultural economy. Peasants generally employ one term to designate all landless villagers; the most widely used is "khwushnishin."l Although for peasants this term is useful, it poses some difficulty for the so-
cial scientist since khwushnishins do not comprise a homogeneous class,but rather are a collectivity of diverse occupational groups sharing in commononly a landless status. Included among the khwushnishins are as well est, as some of the poorest,
some of the wealthiof all villagers.
In
Eric Hooglund is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins University and is employed by the Middle East Commission of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. An earlier version of this paper was presented in the SIS Population Panel of the MESAConvention in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in November, 1973. The author wishes. to express his appreciation to John Anthony, Ali Banuazizi, Mary Hooglund, Thomas Ricks, and Dennis Williams for reading preliminary drafts of the paper and offering helpful suggestions for its revision. 229
AUTUMN1973
terms fy at paper their
of economic and social stratification, one can identiIn this least three separate groups of khwushnishins. I propose to describe these three groups and analyze unique roles in the villages.
fact about the khwushnishins is The most significant a significant proportion of total vilthat they constitute Although no complete occupational census lage population. of rural Iran has yet been undertaken, reliable surveys indicate that 40 to 50 percent of all inhabitants in villages In many of of under 5,000 population are khwushnishins.2 the larger villages (pop. over 1,000) the khwushnishin element tends to predominate, while in the smallest villages (pop. under 200) there may be few or no khwushnishins. and shopkeepers clerics, Blacksmiths, carpenters, religious are some of the typical khwushnishins; the overwhelming majority, however, are laborers who must depend upon seasonal jobs in agriculture in order to earn a living. A thorough study dealing with the composition, function, and position of the various groups of khwushnishin considerable has yet to appear.3 Nevertheless; villagers knowledge about the landless has been acquired during the past decade through the publication of several excellent These studies have revealed the wide invillage studies.4 of income and status existing among the khwushequalities nishins, and thus have demonstrated a need to subdivide However, no them into more socially meaningful strata. consensus appears to exist regarding a classification scheme. Currently, the tendency is to subdivide the khwushnishins into either two or three separate groups. Khusrou Khusrovi, an anthropologist who has done divides the extensive research in Iranian rural sociology, khwushnishins into two groups.5 The first group is the "rural bou'rgeoisie" and includes moneylenders, peddlers, and shopkeepers.6 The second group is the "rural proletariat" which comprises the majority of khwushnishins earning cash or kind remuneration for specific work and for anaThese terms clearly have some utility services. for One can identify, lyzing khwushnishin stratification. IRANIANSTUDIES
230
a group "rural bourgeoisie," i.e., example, a distinct and lending are buying, selling, whose primary activities Also, since the non-bourgeois elements of the for profit. landless population do not farm, are comprised of various preand live in relatively kinds of workers and artisans, carious economic circumstances, they may appropriately be However, lumping all the called a "rural proletariat." latter together tends to obscure some very significant among occupational groups social and economic differences included in the rural proletariat. among the In order to account for the differences non-bourgeois khwushnishins, it is necessary to classify them into at least two separate groups. This is exactly what Javad Safinejad, another leading scholar of rural system for classification Iran, does in his tripartite first group is the "murSafinejad's landless villagers.7 those "living in easy circumliterally, rafah al-hal," stances," and it corresponds to Khusrovi's rural bourgeoiHis second group consists of all the "indirect sharers sie. of the harvest," i.e., people who provide peasants with regular services for which payment is rendered,by mutual agreearound harvest time. The ment, at fixed intervals--usually third group is made up of wage earners, who are mostly seasonal agricultural laborers working for daily wages. In the course of my own field research, I found that as belongall khwushnishins can be conveniently classified I have relabeled three groups. ing to one of Safinejad's (2) (1) the rural bourgeoisie, these groups as follows: workers, and (3) the agricultural the non-agricultural I believe permits one to study laborers. This division, Howin Iran somewhat more easily. village stratification ever, it should be pointed out that neither peasants nor recognize the validity of this, khwushnishins necessarily or any other, classification system.8 The Rural Bourgeoisie About six percent of all khwushnishins are village In this category are itinerant peddlers, entrepreneurs.9 231
AUTUMN 1973
shopkeepers, merchants, wholesale dealers, moneylenders, grist mill owners, and rentiers of specialized services such as work oxen and agricultural machinery. As a group they control a major portion of rural capital and credit, and thus have an influence upon the whole production system. The largest number and greatest variety of these khwushnishins are found in those villages which serve as area market centers. In general, any village of at least fifty families contains one small store whose proprietor is also a primary creditor. A majority of the rural bourgeoisie are shopkeepers who operate the tiny one-room stores. Although their inventories include a wide variety of goods, the most important items are such essential commodities as tea, sugar, rice, and cotton cloth, none of which are locally produced in most villages. Near the towns trade is generally on a cash basis, but in more isolated areas shopkeepers still accept grain and other produce in exchange for their wares. Typically, goods are sold on credit; interest rates generally average 5 to 7 percent per month in villages of the Central Plateau, Azerbaijan, and Khurasan. Since most credit is extended for a nine-month period, the effective interest rate can be as high as 63 percent. Although such the general paucity of more reacharges are exorbitant, sonable credit sources and their own poverty compel villagers to accept these unfavorable terms. Shopkeepers, especially those in the larger villages, the also engage in the profitable business of salaf-kharl, advance purchase of unharvested crops.10 Negotiations usually take place in late winter when peasants have consumed To peasants who cannot all their food supplies. virtually obtain credit because of an already heavy debt burden, salaf-khars offer immediate cash in return for the promise of receiving a fixed measure of the crop when it is harAdvance crop sales average from 30 to 60 percent vested. less than the prices which normally prevail during the regular harvest season. benefit
of the rural bourgeoisie also Other representatives from their economic transactions with the peasants.
IRANIANSTUDIES
232
Most notable are those khwushnishins who monopolize the ownership of cattle, grist mills, and agricultural machinery. Since oxen, flour mills, and more recently tractors have important functions in the production process, men who are in a position to rent any of these services to the peasants usually earn considerable income from the fees charged. In larger villages these capitalists make good profits which are sometimes invested in short-term, high-interest loans to the peasants. These are primarily productive loans which the peasants must contract in order to finance the annually recurring costs of cultivation. The credit practices described above amount to an undeniable economic exploitation of the peasants. There are two main reasons why this situation exists. The first reason is the general poverty of the peasantry. Some 70 percent of all peasants farm less than five hectares (12.35 acres) of land annually.11 Except in those areas of the North where rainfall is abundant, five hectares is not sufficient to provide a peasant family with more than the barest subsistence livelihood in a country as arid as Iran. Thus, most peasants must obtain loans to meet their consumption deficits and to finance future production. Repayment, then, reduces the amount of the harvest available for personal consumption, forcing more borrowing to pay for basic necessities; indebtedness keeps accumulating, ensnaring peasants in a cycle that often lasts until death. The second reason is the near monopolistic control the rural bourgeoisie have over rural credit sources. Although the government has been encouraging the growth of rural cooperative societies, the lending capabilities of these associations are not yet sufficiently developed to offer any serious competition to traditional village creditors.12 As long as shopkeepers, moneylenders, and similar individuals realize that peasants have no alternative loan sources, they will continue to maximize their profits through high-interest, short-term credit policies.
233
AUTUMN 1973
The Non-Agricultural
Workers
all villages of fifty or more families In virtually at least one individual earns a livelihood from essentialwork. The occupations found in rural ly non-agricultural bathareas are quite varied; commonexamples include: house attendant (hammami), barber (salmanl), blacksmith and (ahangar), coppersmith (mesgar), shoemaker (kaffash), The largest number and most representcarpenter (najjar). workers generally reof non-agricultural ative varieties side in those villages which serve as local market centers. According to a recent study, a maximumof seven percent of jobs.13 adult males are employed in non-agricultural workers fall into two categories: Non-agricultural (1) those who provide personal services to the peasants, which peasants and (2) those who produce various artifacts Individuals who render services to use in everyday life. are generally considered to rank low in other villagers Their low status jobs provide only the barest status.14 opportunity of subsistence-level incomes and offer little for mobility. As a consequence, younger men in these lines of work prefer to migrate into urban areas where opportunities are more promising. Unlike barbers and bath-house attendants, the khwushnishins who manufacture various goods do not suffer any social stigma because of their work. Indeed, individual craftsmen who have acquired a reputation for skill often Traditionally, village artisans enjoy local prestige. all the non-food products utilized by the made virtually earthenware, shoes, clothing, copper utensils, peasants: tools. However, cutlery, wooden furniture, and agricultural of inexpensive, factorysince World War II the varieties made goods available in the villages have increased conThese products not only compete with, but ofsiderably. This developten undersell, their hand-made counterparts. ment has adversely affected rural craftsmen throughout Iran. The fate of the village blacksmiths is illustrative of what is happening to most rural artisans. Traditionally
IRANIANSTUDIES
234
blacksmiths made the iron shoes for horses and work oxen as well as all metal implements utilized in agriculture. Mechanization, which has been gradually extending into the is eliminating countryside, the need for all his services. The bicycle, which represents a relatively ininexpensive vestment and is economical to maintain, has largely replaced the horse as a dominant mode of intraand intervillage travel in many villages. The use of oxen for plowing, however, is still relatively widespread since the cost of tractors and other machines is often prohibitive for the average peasant. Thus, blacksmiths continue to provide oxen shoes, plowshares, and the metal parts used to yoke the animals into teams. But, in some cases, men village are investing in tractors, plows, and combines, and renting out their machines at fees which are competitive with animal and human power. Thus, the use of oxen for agricultural labor is gradually declining, and likewise the need for blacksmiths to make them work-worthy. Blacksmiths are also losing their function as manufacturers of various metal agricultural implements. Many of the tools used in farming are now mass-produced in towns and sold in the local bazaars; often they cost less than the price of unfinished iron out of which a blacksmith fashions similar tools. It is above all this inability to compete with cheap factory-made goods which blacksmiths share with all other rural craftsmen. Shoemakers, coppersmiths, even carpenters find it increasingly difficult to earn a livelihood from their trades. The artisans most seriously affected are those working in villages located in relatively close proximity to large towns and cities. In more isolated villages the traditional craftsmen tend to be somewhat insulated from many of the technical changes in the country as a whole. occurring However, examples of urban consumer goods are found even in the most remote villages. When it is no longer possible to earn a satisfactory in a particular living village, craftsmen, those especially who are young and have families to support, migrate to the towns. Since they have some skills, craftsmen have an
235
AUTUMN1973
easier time finding work than does the typical villager. Carpenters and shoemakers are sometimes fortunate enough Blacksmiths, on to obtain jobs suiting their own skills. the other hand, are even less needed in the cities than some find work in construction they are in the villages; or factories. The Agricultural
Laborers
workers and the rural bourgeoiThe non-agricultural sie discussed above are similar in the sense that both The groups have definite occupations within villages. overwhelming majority (more than 80 percent) of khwushnishins, however, do not have any regular work. These are With their families they number laborers. the agricultural more than six million, or fully one-third of Iran's total Since they do not own land, do not have rural population. fixed jobs, and must earn their living through seasonal work, these laborers barely exist at a subagricultural the poorest of all villagers. sistence level and constitute laborers must depend upon whatever seaAgricultural sonal and/or casual jobs are made available by peasants and landowners. The peak work season extends non-cultivating from about mid-May through mid-September in most of the During this period there are numerous and varied country. which require intensive tasks associated with cultivation For example, peasant families who farm at labor inputs. least two hectares (5.9 acres) need help with the weeding Those few prosperous peasants and harvesting of crops. who cultivate at least eight hectares (19.8 acres) not only need to employ additional help, but also often consider to pay laborers to do most, or even all, of it prestigious their field work. Despite the division and redistribution non-farming absentee owners still of many large estates, control considerable tracts of land and customarily hire laborers on daily or monthly bases to cultiagricultural vate under the supervision of salaried bailiffs. Within any given area work conditions and wage rates regardless whether a laborer is employed by a vary little IRANIANSTUDIES
236
Working small peasant owner or a large absentee landlord. hours are usually long, lasting from dawn to sunset with a two-hour lunch and rest break at noontime. For such a day an experienced man earns between 60 to 90 rials ($.80 to $1.18); women and children receive from one-half to twoit is also custothirds this amount.15 In some villages mary for employers to provide lunch for their workers. A laborer who is able to work every day during the season can earn between $80 and four-month agricultural $120. If he is married and his wife and children also work, another $50 to $100 can be added to the family income. need for khwushnishin workSince there is generally little ers in the other months of the year, $150 to $220 represents the total annual wages of most khwushnishin families. Taking the average family size as five (according to the 1966 National Census), this amounts to a per capita income of $30 to $45. When one considers that the 1973 per capita income for the country as a whole was about $500, the poverty of this rural group becomes more striking. laborers often exist below what would Agricultural They sustain normally be considered subsistence levels. themselves through charity, casual jobs, and work outside of northern Iran where rural In villages the villages. living conditions are generally superior to the rest of the country, many khwushnishins own one or two sheep, providing a net income of about $10 to $15 per animal in adMen dition to the milk products consumed by the family. near towns or road construction sites who live in villages generally apply for whatever temporary, unskilled jobs become available from time to time. Although the main source of employment remains to for khwushnishin work, actual opportunities be agricultural laborers have been declining since the Land Reform Program which began in 1962. Two factors have contributed to this (1) the small size of peasant holdings, and development: Although seven hectares (2) the increasing mechanization. (17.3 acres) is considered the minimumamount of land a peasant family must farm in order to maintain an adequate
237
1973 AUTUMN
living standard, 70 percent actually obtained less than five hectares of annually cultivated land as a result of Peasants subsist off such small areas redistribution.16 by limiting production costs and finding additional sources of income. Thus, they not only have to work hard in order laborers, but they also comto avoid hiring agricultural pete with the khwushnishins for the work which is available undistributed estates that employ villagers. on the still However, these jobs are diminishing as more and more large It is significant landowners mechanize their production. that land worked by tractors and combines requires less than one-half the manpower needed prior to the introduction of machines.17 The competition between peasants and agricultural Allaborers has at times led to rivalry and hostility.18 is basically economic, it of interests though the conflict For example, dimensions. is acquiring social and political laborers from memberpeasants usually exclude agricultural ship on the elected village councils and rural tribunals. between peasants social relationships In larger villages, and laborers are discouraged; marriages between peasant daughters and the sons of landless khwushnishins, for exAgricultural laborers ample, are very rare occurrences. They resent their inferior position in village society. feel their only hope for improving their lot lies in the of land. In numerous interviews in different acquisition areas of the country many said that they were waiting for the break-up and rethe completion of Land Reform, i.e., distribution to the khwushnishins of the several hundred large estates on which most of them presently find work.19 Since there is currently no policy to expand the Land Rethe hopes form Program to include the landless villagers, of the agricultural laborers do not seem to be realistic. Since land reform has brought no expansion of econoworkers, agricultural for the traditional mic opportunities many khwushnishins seek to improve their lot through seaDuring the past ten years, sonal or permanent migration. to more khwushnishins have migrated in two directions: Rural migraprosperous rural areas, and to urban centers. IRANIANSTUDIES
238
common. Typically, unemtion has always been relatively ployed khwushnishins travel around the countryside at harvest time in search of work in those villages with insufficient manpower. Although this migration is seasonal, agricultural laborers do undertake permanent moves. The most dramatic examples occurred during the 1960s, when several thousands of khwushnishins left their villages in Baluchistan, Sistan, and southern Khurasan to settle in the more fertile plains of the Dasht-i Gurgan.20 In some districts villages lost up to one-half of their total popula-. tion through emigration.21 Migration of agricultural laborers from one village to another still seems to be more prevalent than their migration to urban areas.22 On possible reason is the familiarity, and perhaps even preference, for village life and agricultural work. However, a far more important reason must be the lack of employment opportunities in the towns which serve as the primary market centers for the majority A typical example is Marand, a small town of of villages. 2S,000 which serves as the primary commercial and administrative center for a district of nearly 200 villages to the northwest of Tabriz in East Azerbaijan. With the exception of a few small-scale artisans' workshops, there is no industry in the town. Villagers who migrate to Marand can only find temporary jobs, often as unskilled construction workers. Since possibilities are so limited, most agricultural laborers do not consider migration to Marand (and similar towns) to be a promising way of improving their circumstances. 23 Khwushnishin laborers would usually migrate to towns where they believe there is chance for finding work. The experience of the few towns in which factories have been established in recent years illustrates the attraction of employment opportunities. For example, Mianduab in West Azerbaijan and Turbat-i Jam in Khurasan are both relatively small towns (15,000 to 20,000) which have grown considerably since sugar beet processing mills began operations. Landless villagers have migrated to these towns, lured by the hope of permanent work in the factories or in the 239
AUTUMN 1973
rapidly expanding service sector. However, in both towns the number of khwushnishin immigrants far exceeds the numA majority reber of jobs which are presently available. main without steady work, while the presence of a large unemployed and underemployed labor force serves to keep wages low for those who do find jobs.24 If the few towns with factories draw khwushnishin all job seekers, the ten largest cities in which virtually Iranian industrialization is concentrated are even more alluring to villagers frustrated by the lack of opportuniIn this respect, Tehran more than any ties in rural areas. other place acts as a magnet attracting all those who dream of escaping poverty. Immigration rates are very high (around three percent per year), resulting in heavy competition for every available job. Unlike village artisans, the typical agricultural laborer brings no useful skills to the city; also, he is usually illiterate. Thus, if he is able to find steady, unskilled work he is extremely fortunate. The majority of khwushnishins are not lucky and must eke out a day-to-day existence from temporary jobs in construction or from casual labor service. A majority of former agricultural workers not only fail to find adequate employment in Tehran, but they often live in worse conditions than those prevailing in the villages. Thousands of rural immigrants are crowded into squatter settlements in the southern and eastern sections of the city. Living quarters frequently consist of small, one-room mud huts which may be shared by more than one family. Sanitary conditions are far below even the most minimal standards; usual urban services such as piped water, At garbage collection, and electricity are non-existent. any given time many lack even these squalid dwellings for a home and must sleep on the sidewalks or in the city's Khwushnishin laborers encounter similar problems parks.25 in Isfahan, Mashhed, Tabriz, and smaller cities, although perhaps on a smaller scale.
IRANIANSTUDIES
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Conclusion Our discussion
has attempted to demonstrate that the
is not really a homogenous social khwushnishin population groups. but composed of three distinct or economic class, the condition of the rural bourgeoisie, With the exception seems to have worsened since the Land of the khwushnishins The overwhelming majoriReform Program of the early 1960s. The ty live in poverty or confront economic insecurity. of rural Iran does structure present economic and social The to improve their lives. not offer them an opportunity and the landless between the peasants existing disparities into class differences. are being consolidated khwushnishins and how real progress to foresee it is difficult Presently without some program in the villages is possible prosperity of of the condition which would encourage the amelioration
the majority
Migration to the cities
of khwushnishins.
is
are not sufficientsince the cities solution not a feasible to close to offer employment opportunities ly industrialized stricken khwushnishins. to six million
NOTES 1.
means "he who The term khwushnishin, which literally sits comfortably" is commonthroughout the Central Plateau. Different terms are used to designate landless villagers in other areas; for example, aftabnishin in much of Khurasan, karaneshin in parts of Kurdistan, and gharibah in some Azerbaijan districts. For the sake of consistency khwushnishin has become the generally accepted term in scholarly research and publications.
2.
A 1960 government survey of some 1800 villages in all parts of the country found that khwushnishins comprised an average 45 percent of all inhabitants. Since 1960 subsequent government surveys and several University of Tehran sponsored research projects have found similar patterns in a sample of several hundred villages. See Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Census of
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1339; Sample Survey of 14 Areas (Tehran, 1340/1961-62); Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Barrisiha-yi Masa'il-i Nirui-yi Insani, Vol. III (Tehran, 1344/196566), pp. 2343-2438; and Plan Organization, Mushkilat dar Rustaha-yi Iran (Tehran, 1350/1971-72). 3.
This situation should be remedied soon. The Iranian government has become concerned about the condition of landless.villagers and in 1973 extended to the University of Tehran's School of Social Sciences a research grant for an intensive study project on the This project is being conkhwushnishin population. ducted by the Rural Studies Group, a research department whose previous publications have made significant to knowledge about social and economic contributions aspects of Iranian villages.
4.
Two excellent monographs which discuss the khwushnishin problem are: Javad 5afinezhad, Talib&bad (Tehran, University of Tehran Press, 1345/1966-67); and Ismacil CAjami and Muhammad Muhajer-Yazdani, Bihabad (Tehran, University of Tehran Press, 1346/1967-68).
5.
See, for example, his article "La stratification social rurale en Iran," in Etudes rurales, No. 22-23-24 (Juli-dec., 1966), pp. 243-247; and his recent book, Jamicah-shinasi Riista'i Iran (Tehran, University of Tehran Press, 1351/1972-73), pp. 130-136.
6.
In Jamicah-shin&si, Khusrovi uses the term "Sudagaran" (the profit workers) instead of the "rural bourgeoisie" which he has used consistently in his articles in French and Persian scholarly journals.
7.
is implicit in his recent Safinezhad's classification study of the organization of production in village society, Bunih (Tehran, University of Tehran, 1351/ 1972-73). He outlined his views more fully in several discussions in Tehran during 1972. I am very grateful for a complete exposition of the three khwushnishin groups provided in a personal communication of February 12, 1974.
IRANIAN STUDIES
242
8.
Peasants, of course, consider all khwushnishins as one group separate from themselves. However, whenever I asked peasants how many kinds of khwushnishins there were, the inevitable response would be "two": the rich ones and the poor ones. In conversations in which I would inquire about the appropriateness of dividing the poor khwushnishins into two categories of agricultural and non-agricultural workers, about one-third of all peasants interviewed would agree that this was valid; one-fifth would be stimulated to subdivide this group into three or more types; and roughly one-half would insist there was no reason to divide them. Interestingly, the khwushnishins, themselves, do not identify with a broad landless group. Indeed, there is an intense dislike of being in any way equated with those considered to be inferiors; shopkeepers, for example, generally feel superior to all others, while carpenters tend to look down upon barbers and laborers. Virtually all khwushnishins whom I have interviewed identify themselves along occupational lines and would divide non-farming villagers according to their jobs.
9.
This is the estimate of the Rural Studies Group researchers based upon preliminary data obtained during a 1973 survey. See Note 3 above.
10.
For a detailed discussion of salaf-khars and the practice of salaf-kharT, see Khusrou Khusrovi, "La reform agrarire et l'apparition d'une nouvelle classe en Iran," Etudes rurales, 34 (1969), pp. 122-126.
11.
Plan Organization, Mushkilat dar Rustaha-yi (Tehran, 1350/1971-72), p. 5.
12.
For information on the problems of the rural cooperatives, see University of Tehran, Shirkath_-yi Tacavuni Rustd'f dar Shish Manja_ah (Tehran, n.d.), pp. 95-100; 140-148; 189-191; 202-204.
13.
See Note 9 above.
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Iran
AUTUMN1973
14.
For a discussion of peasant judgments regarding social status see, R. C. Alberts, Social Structure and Cultural Change in an Iranian Village (Madison: University of Wisconsin Ph.D. Dissertation, 1963), pp. 727797.
15.
These were the prevailing wages when I conducted field research in 1971-72; generally, the lowest wages were found in the south and southeast and the highest ones in the north and northwest. The pre-1973 exchange rate of 76.25 rials to one $US is used in this paper; the rial has been revalued by about 9 percent since 1973.
16.
For a fuller discussion see Chapter III, "The Transfer of Tenure," in my Ph.D. dissertation, The Social and Economic Consequences of Land Reform in Iran (Washington: Johns Hopkins University, 1974).
17.
Interviews with large landowners in the Varamin area of Tehran, Summer, 1972.
18.
of Iran See further James A. Bill, The Politics (Columbus: Charles Merril, 1972), p. 46
19.
In interviews which I conducted in 1971-72,khwushnishin laborers gave two consistent responses when queried about their own evaluation of their future: either (1) they would find some work in a nearby town, Tehran or some other city; or (2) they would obtain land through government aid.
20.
See Shoko Okazaki, The Development of Large-scale Farming in Iran: The Case of the Province of Gurgan of Asian Economic Affairs, (Tokyo: The Institute 1968), pp. 18-21.
21.
Arzi Narraghi, ed., Barrisi-yi Natayij-i I?la,ht-i dar Shish Mantagah (Tehran: University of Tehran, n.d.), pp. 19-24.
IRANIAN STUDIES
244
22.
Ibid.
23.
See Further, "A Study of the Rural Economic Problems of East and West Azerbaijan," Ta_bqlhat-e Eqtesadi, Vol. 5 (January, 1968), pp. 165-180.
24.
On Mianduab see ibid., pp. 181-195 passim; on Turbat-i Jam see Andre Singer, "Social Organization Among the Timuri of Khurasan." Paper presented at the British of Persian Studies, Tehran, 12 June,1972. Institute
25.
Although the University of Tehran has been doing research in the slums and squatter settlements of the capital since 1972, no scholarly publications can ever capture the essence of life in these areas the way it has been recorded in the realistic sociological stories of the late Samad Behrangi; especially recommended is his novella about the life and dreams of a young khwushnishin boy, Bist-u-chahar Sacat dar Khwab-u Bidari (Tabriz, 1348/1969-70).
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BOOK REVIEWS Biography. Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani," A Political University By Nikki R. Keddie. Berkeley and Los Angeles: of California Press, 1972. 496pp. $20.00 HAMID ENAYAT
Professor Keddie's new book on the life and works of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din is undoubtedly the most comprehensive study that has so far been carried out on this outstanding figure of the Muslim world in the nineteenth in various languages The amount of literature century. on the Sayyid's biography now surpasses, perhaps, that on leader of contemand religious any other Muslim political And yet a good deal of the mystery surporary history. stubbornly refuses to be still rounding his personality Professor Keddie's book, by furnishing us with unravelled. ample data about Jamal ad-Din's life throws its more obscure aspects into greater relief. placchronological, The author's method is strictly ing the main stress on the sequence and details of events, and doctrinal with only occasional reference to ideological analysis of their background. issues, or to sociological
Hamid Enayat is Professor and Chairman of the Department Science, University of Tehran. of Political
IRANIANSTUDIES
246
With unrelenting care and patience, she traces Jamal adfrom their recondite beginnings in Iran Din's activities (1838-1866), through his adventures in Afghanistan (186668), Instanbul (1869-71), Egypt (1871-79), India (1879-82), Paris (1883-84), London (1885-86), Iran, Russia and again Iran (1886-92), to his final years in Baghdad, Basra, London and Istanbul (1892-97). However indispensable this method of study may be for meeting the demands of straightforward, chronological history, for thoseinterested in the study of ideas, it is less helpful inasmuch as it often ignores the dialectics of the process of thought, and imposes upon it a structure necessitated by chronological seriality. Its greatest disadvantage in a biographical study is its failure to offer a comprehensive account of the mental life of the individual under study. Thus there is abundant data about Jamal ad-Din's intellectual development scattered throughout Professor Keddie's book, but it often remains unintegrated. This results, occasionally, in repetitiveness, but rarely in an overall critical assessment. For instance, we are told on numerous pages that Jamal ad-Din's conception of religion was instrumental, and, always subordinated to political considerations (pp. 95, 112, 126, 140, 180, 195, etc.). This naturally raises the question of Jamal adDin's religious sincerity (a question that Professor Elie Kedourie has discussed in his controversial study, Afghani and Abduh: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Islam, London, 1966). It also brings us up against the problem of the relationship between Jamal ad-Din's ideas and Islamic modernism in general. Given the structure of the book, the only section in which the reader would expect such problems to be discussed at length is the Conclusion, but this is disappointingly short (pp. 42123) and fails to synthesize the author's scattered remarks. There are, of course, sections in the book which partially discuss these issues, such as those on the "Refutation of the Materialists" (pp. 171-81), and the "Answer to Renan" (pp. 189-99), the former justifying the Sayyid's atypical, traditionalist criticism of the modernists in India, and the latter justifying his modernist criticism of the tra-
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AUTUMN 1973
in Paris. But these give the impression ditionalists of being related to isolated cases. It would have been better to integrate the essential arguments of such sections into a separate, final chapter on the presumed or real inconin Jamal ad-DIn's religious ideas. sistencies However, as has been mentioned before, Professor Keddie is less concerned with the genesis and development of Jamal ad-Din's thought than with the biographical facts about him. The most notable among these is the problem of Jamal ad-Din's nationality. Besides devoting Chapter Two
(pp. 10-36) and Appendix 1 (pp. 428-33) to an elaboration of the proofs of the Iranian origin of the Sayyid, the author uses every opportunity in the book to emphasize these proofs. In fact, the whole book may be said to be in a way a vindication of the claim about the Sayyid's Iranian origin. It can now be said that with the publication of this book, which rounds up the impressive array of evidence previously produced by the Documents inedits concernant Seyyed Jamal al-Din AfghAni (Tehran, 1963), and Homa Pakdaman's Djamal ed-Din Assad Abadi dit Afgh_ni (Paris, 1969), the case for the Sayyid's Iranian origin has become almost unassailable. In Professor Keddie's presentation, evidence for the birth and early education of Jamal ad-Din in Iran can be divided roughly into two accounts and correspondence categories: first, personal
whether by Jamal ad-Din himself
or his relatives
and ac-
in Iran quaintances, attesting to his birth and activities from 1833 until 1866 when he presumably made his first apcarpearance in Afghanistan. Second, the investigations to ried out by Western diplomats, especially the British, ascertain his nationality. As regards the opposite claim of an Afghan origin, the evidence produced so far by its of Jamal ad-Din's own proexponents consists exclusively nouncements which have served as the basis of the 'standard' biographies by Jurjl Zaidan and MuhammadCAbduh. Professor Keddie dismisses these pronouncements as 'untruths' (p. 8) motivated by Jamal ad-Din's "desire to present himself to the Muslim world as a Sunni rather than a Shici, as the Sunnis formed the majority of Muslims outside Iran" (p. 428). IRANIAN STUDIES
248
All this sounds plausible, but there is at least one episode in Jamal ad-Din's life which cannot be explained if one assumes him to be an Iranian. This is his sudden involvement in Afghan politics after his alleged immediately first appearance in Afghanistan in 1866. How was it possible for a young man in his early twenties, with no prior in politics, to achieve immediate prominence in experience the highest political circles of an alien country? Professor Keddie's answer to this question somewhat taxes her readers' credulity. According to her, the available documents indicate that "the British at that time were concerned about the sudden appearance in the high counsels of the then Amir of Afghanistan, Aczam Khan, of a foreign Sayyid, who was advising the Amir to follow an anti-British course" (p. 40). Jamal ad-Din appears in these documents "as a purely political agent possibly having ties to Russia or
at least carrying papers from someone outside Afghanistan. Presumably it was these papers and/or arguments by Jamal ad-Din which convinced the Amir to take this young foreign almost immediately into his highest counsels..." (p. 47). But perhaps realizing that these explanations are not enough, Professor Keddie introduces another argument further on: "His sudden influence with Aczam Khan may be explained by the papers he is reported to have brought with him, and/or by the extraordinary personal magnetism and mental ability that continued throughout his life to gain him access to men of power and intelligence" [emphasis added] (p. 52). Once Jamal ad-Din's personal magnetism is invoked, the solution of many riddles in his life becomes, of course, considerably easier. But this style of riddle-solving is at variance with Professor Keddie's otherwise vigorous method of sifting data, and admitting only the most concrete and well-documented facts as the basis of her judgments. Taken in itself, the controversy about Jamal adDin's nationality sounds at times to be trivial, especially when it becomes embroiled in the prejudices of Iranian or Afghan nationalism (during a visit to Afghanistan two years ago I was surprised to find that resentment at the claim about Jamal ad-Din's Iranian origin is a recurrent theme
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AUTUMN1973
in the complaints Iranians).
of even socialist-minded
Afghans against
But Professor Keddie tries to diminish the impression of triviality by reminding us that the controversy is important because the nationality question is tied to the question of Jamal ad-Din's orthodoxy. Throughout his life there were incidents which were interpreted to be an indieven of his cation-of his unorthodoxy, and occasionally irreligion, "which his Muslim followers have been at pains to explain away" (p. 2). If it were proved that Jamal adDin was born and educated in Iran, this would, in the author's view, account for his religious unorthodoxy. That is why, in addition to biographical evidence referred to before, Professor Keddie also draws our attention to a number.of features in Jamal ad-Din's religious outlook which reflect traditional Iranian and Shi'ite influence, such as his philosophical frame of mind, his considerable knowledge of Sufism, his advocacy of ijtihad, his practice of taqiyyah, and his interest in Shaykhism and Babism (pp. 18-22, 86, 163, 393). Two points must be made here: first, if by Jamal ad-Din's unorthodoxy is meant his non-Sunni views, Professor Keddie's explanation is valid. But since some instances of his unorthodoxy have been interpreted as sheer irreligion (such as his Answer to Renan), the question of his nationality becomes irrelevant to the nature of his religious thought. Any Muslim from any nationality is of becoming a heretic or an atheist, equally susceptible unless it is assumed that Iran is a more fertile breeding ground than any other Muslim country for heresy and atheism. This assumption seems to be indeed held by the author, as can be inferred from some of her remarks in the book, the following reminiscence being one of them: "The late Sayyid Hassan Taqizadeh told me in 1960, perhaps ironically, that he sometimes doubted Jamal adDin was an Iranian because he [Jamal ad-Din] was apparently a believing Muslim, and he [Taqizadeh] had never known an Iranian with modernized ideas who was a real believer IRANIANSTUDIES
250
in Islam." She then adds: "Afghani's actual religious beliefs tend to argue for rather than against an Iranian origin" (Footnote 7, p. 428). (See also pp. 18-22 which lead to the conclusion on p. 22 that the Sayyid's early education in Iran meant that he grew up in an environment where doctrinal innovations were more in the air in the religious circles than they were in most of the Sunni world.) Assuming this to be true, the question then arises as to why in nineteenth-century Iran there were so few people adhering to a religio-political outlook similar to that of Jamal ad-Din? Was Jamal ad-Din's unorthodoxy due to his upbringing in Iran, or to the impact of Western culture as filtered through his own mental characteristics? Secondly, just as there are elements in Jamal adDin's thought which reflect shi'ite influences, one could also point to elements which denote Sunni indoctrination. Chief among these are his catholic and irenic conception of Islam, which at least in the nineteenth century was more likely to develop within a Sunni rather than Shi'ite environment, his salafi tendencies which have endeared him to such fundamentalist groups as the Muslim Brothers (p. 2), and were perhaps responsible for causing him to be once accused of Wahhabism (p. 53), and his republicanism (p. 108) which is more adjustable to the Sunni political theory and institution of baycah and cahd than to the Shi'ite notion of a divinely-designated imamah. It is perhaps in deference to such considerations that Professor Keddie, after summarizing her arguments in support of the Sayyid's Iranian origin, admits that "none of this indicates that Afghani as an adult regarded himself as a Shi'i" (p. 433). But her reasoning would have been more convincing to the skeptic had she answered more fully and explicitly the case against her thesis. All this brings us to a more general question about Jamal ad-Din: what was it in his character and conduct that gained him such almost unparalleled influence among the Muslim elite? Professor Keddie answers this question in the second chapter of her book which concerns the most
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fruitful period of the Sayyid's life, that is, his stay in Egypt from 1871 to 1879. She recognizes four reasons for First is his already-mentioned Jamal ad-Din's popularity. magnetism and charisma which, as the author points out, more content of his teachings, assured him than the intellectual (p. 85). of an extraordinary influence among his disciples Second was his attachment to the ideas and methods of the which enabled him to "point a path Islamic philosophers, of Islam-science and fresh interpretation to rationalism, a path indigenous to the Islamic world and not involving a wholehearted acceptance of the superiority of the aggressive and threatening foreigner" (p. 86). Third was his British encroachments hatred for Western and particularly in Muslim lands "which coincided with a growing mood in the Fourth was his lively and original diMiddle East"(p. 87). dactic methods which consisted in replacing "rote repetition of the texts, and and memorization" with new interpretation encouraging his students to do the same. Coupled with this was his belief in the existence of different levels of meanwhich enabled him to talk in difing and interpretation ferent terms to different audiences (p. 91). Thus it was that his disciples included such divergent figures as the Islamic reformist cAbduh, the Jewish Sanuca, the Christian Ishaq, and the atheist Shumayyil. Of these qualities, Jamal ad-Din's charisma and antiimperialism might be considered to be the ever-present reaBut sons for his popularity in almost all Muslim lands. his philosophical and scientific leanings proved on several occasions to be a severe drawback, as was shown in his clash with the traditionalists in Turkey, and in his Indian posture experience when he had to adopt an anti-scientific to combat the pro-British influence of Sir Sayyid Akmad in the later Khan. In Iran his preoccupation with politics periods of his life did not leave him much opportunity to as a modernizing teacher. display "his excellences" In addition to these acknowledged, positive qualities of Jamal ad-Din as a religious leader, there and political are also highly unfavorable accounts about his personality. quotes Professor Keddie as an honest biographer dutifully IRANIANSTUDIES
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these but does not care to comment upon them. The most damaging one is the claim about his superficiality. At least three statements are cited in the book to this effect: one by the correspondent of the London Times in Cairo indicating that "there was certainly no originality in his views...his views were crude and general," but adding that he had certain well-defined ideas and "knew how to express them with force" (p. 117). Second is a report by Sayyid Husain Bilgram-1, a liberal shi'ite from Delhi, stating that "I found him to be a well-informed man for a Herati...though rather shallow in his acquirements" (p. 144). Third is Amin ad-Dawlah's remark in his memoirs that "Jamal ad-Din's knowledge was based mainly on a powerful memory of popular sources like newspapers and speeches rather than on profundity, but that in an ignorant country like Iran he seemed a fountain of knowledge" (p. 281). How is one to reconcile these judgments with the repeated accounts, either by Professor Keddie or others, of the Sayyid's intellectual abilities? It would be unfair to dismiss such unfavorable judgments as stemming from illwill, and to accept the favorable ones as authentic accounts of the Sayyid's personality. The Sayyid's own available tracts and articles do not offer a solution either, since none of them appear to be infused by an outstanding or exceptional intelligence. While the truth about the Sayyid's intellectual stature may perhaps never be known, one must not forget that, as Professor Keddie points out (p. 422), his reputation and influence have been largely posthumous, and his enthusiastic followers among the later generations of Muslim writers and politicians have sometimes attributed to him qualities that he may not have really possessed. But the best way to avoid inconsistency in judging Jamal ad-Din is to refrain from exaggerated praise, and to rest content with acknowledging him not as an heir of Avicenna, but, in Professor Keddie's phrase, as "a pioneering political writer, speaker and activist" (p. 423). We are on firmer ground when assessing Jamal ad-Din's political ideas. Professor Keddie consistently adheres to the position that all that appears devious and contradic-
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in the light tory in Jamal ad-Din's life can be justified of his ideals of independence and military strength of Islamic states and the unity of Muslims. If he engaged in in Egypt, it was not for selfdubious Masonic activity If the change (p. 12). advancement, but to plot political his other religious contradicts Refutation of Materialists an expedistatements, the reason is that it is primarily express the ent political tract which does not necessarily real opinion of its author, but is meant to foster the uniIf (pp. 180-81). ty of all Indians against the British it is because in "Answer to Renan" smacks of atheism, Western Paris, Jamal ad-Din wanted to impress "an elite view of history audience" with his advanced, evolutionary of the (p. 195), and thus presumably enhance the prestige Muslims. vividly show the main weakness These explanations of Islamic modernism--its excessive concern with politics in the at the expense of facing some fundamental issues This was relationship between Islam and the modern world. imrequirement of the fight against perhaps an inevitable in the nineteenth But what proved later century. perialism to be more harmful was some of the modernists' special
style
of politicking.
Since the Muslim masses at that
time were much more ignorant
literate their
and enlightened struggle
than they
are today,
and the
who had the capacity
elite
was tiny
for independence
to lead
and powerless,
some modernists, and most notably Jamal ad-Din, often saw their best chance of achieving their progressive ideals in rulers. When this did not work, appealing to traditional (Jamal ad-Din is politics they resorted to conspiratorial reported to have expressed his belated regret that instead of such maneuvers with the Sultans and Amirs, he had not directly appealed to the people themselves, p. 419). Subsequent
generations
of modernists
inherited
all
renThus intellectual these weaknesses from the pioneers. activism, and clique to political aissance was sacrificed education of the intrigues took the place of the political masses.
IRANIANSTUDIES
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has not written her book Keddie obviously Professor But about Jamal ad-Din. to answer all these questions her book is an indispenthanks to its rich documentation, of modern Islamic History for sable source for students about Jamal ad-Din, and the right questions formulating whole. a as Islamic modernism
A Grammar of Southern Tati The Hague: Mouton, 1969.
Dialects. By Ehsan Yar-Shater. 277pp; two maps. MOHAMMAI) ALI JAZAYERY
This book contains a phonological and morphological of nine Iranian dialects description spoken in an area to the south and southwest of Qazvin. The dialects are called Chali, Danesfani, Ebrahim-abadi, Esfarvarini, Eshtehardi, Sagz-abadi, Takestani, Xiaraji, and Xoznini, together making up the Southern Tati, which, with Northern Tati, comprises a branch of Northwestern Iranian. Professor YarShater has been working on these dialects at least since the mid-1950s, articles and writhaving published several ten a doctoral dissertation of London), (1960, University before publishing the work under review. He has continued his work since the publication of this work, and, it is to be hoped, will publish other major statements on the other Tati dialects, as well as improved revisions of this book. The book opens with a "Preface" (pp. 7-8), detailed "Contents" (pp. 9-14), "List of Abbreviations," followed by "Conventions" (pp. 15-16), and two maps. These prefatory materials are followed by "Introduction" (pp. 17-28), whose
MohammadAli Jazayery is Languages and Literatures Austin.
Professor of Oriental and African at the University of Texas at
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AUTUMN1973
major section headings, after some introductory remarks, are: "Villages and Villagers," "General Features of the Dialects, " "Dialect Variations," "Dialect Materials," "Problems of Phonemization," and "Method and Scope." Next comes the grammatical description, in two parts: "Phonology" and "Morphology." The book ends with a "List of the Main Informants" (pp. 276-6), and a very short "Bibliography" (p. 277). Syntax is not included, except to the extent that some materials in the section on morphology are relevant to syntax. The section on phonology is quite sketchy (less than 30 pages), while morphology takes up the bulk of the space (210 pages). The description Danesfani, Esfaravini,
of Chali is most detailed, and Xoznini the least.
those of
Among the good features of the book is the abundance of examples, with very infrequent exceptions--no doubt inI have advertent (here and there a gloss is missing). noticed only one typographical error (p. 49, line 13, where s should be corrected to s), though there may be a few more. I miss an index, though there seems to be fairly extensive cross-referencing. Some texts, however short, would have been welcome. These shortcomings will hopefully be remedied in a later volume of texts promised by the author (p. 25). The inclusion of a vocabulary in that volume, or yet in a third volume will be most welcome. The grammatical sketch presented represents primarily an analysis of the speech of 29 informants interviewed in the area between 1955 and 1963. The informants' speech was in some cases transcribed directly and in others from tape recordings made by the author. The list of informants gives the name, age, education and occupation for each. Acall but two of the informants range cording to this list, in age from 25 to 67, each decade represented by three, five or seven informants; one informant was seventy, and another The various ages, or decades, are not evenly diseighty. but such distribution would tributed among the dialects, IRANIANSTUDIES
256
to achieve. Four dialects quite likely have been difficult are represented by two informants each, two by three each, With one excepone by four, one by five, and one by six. tion, all informants were male. Eight are listed as illiterate. In addition to the informants, some written and published materials were used. The treatment of phonology (pp. 31-61), especially is quite brief. The author himfor some of the dialects, self is aware of this (pp. 26-27), but even so, some of the "In cases statements are not clear enough. An example is: of doubt I have allowed for variations of pronunciation in rather than deciding my otherwise phonemic transcription, grounds" (p. 27). Variaon a phoneme without sufficient affect the phonetion in pronunciation does not necessarily mic status of a phone. His examples (p. 27, footnote 36) are buma/boma "he came," mi-/me- (the imperfective morpheme), and 9L/qul "ram" which may occur in the same diBut why is this a problem? The situation is no alect. different from the variation seen in such Persian words as , rh/rah, or for that matruft/roft, firuz/p fars/pa, we have be-/bo-/ Similarly, ter, baradar/beradar, yek/yak. bu-/bi- (the imperative morpheme), and na-/ne- (the negative morpheme) in Persian. None of these groups of morphemes represents problems in the phonemic analysis; they variation (with various degrees of freesimply illustrate dom). The author states that h disappears in Persian loan(p. 34). The words in final and preconsonated positions fact is that, in spoken Persian, h rarely occurs in these except in the most deliberate or affected speech; positions, thus, gons, sa:r, a:ya, etc. (to cite some of the author's Since borrowings examples) are quite normal in Persian. in these dialects must have been made primarily from informal spoken Persian, there is a great likelihood that the words were borrowed without h. The compensatory lengthening replacing h is a very commonPersian phenomenon. At one point, [e:] is considered an allophone of e (p. 37, footnote 10). The term "allophone" relates to in-
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1973 AUTUMN
dividual What is meant here, apparently, phonemes. is that [:] is an allophone of y. Even this interpretation would since [:] and [y] are themselves be objectionable, two separate phonemes--at least y is--by virtue of occurring elsewhere in the language independently. Another tion or change Takestani, [6] (p. 40), while phoneme in its
example of confusion of pronunciation variawith allophonic is seen when, in variation is listed as a more central allophone of e on the same page it is also listed as a own right.
The section on morphology (pp. 65-274) is the most comprehensive. Rather than discuss this section in detail, I shall point out a few morphological features which are of interest to Persianists because they represent phenomena not found in Persian. These include grammatical gender (in nouns and verbs, and less predominantly in adjectives), case distinctions, frequent use of postpositions (and the corresponding rareness of prepositions, all of them appearing in affected speech influenced by Persian), the use of the Persian adjectival suffix -tar for the superlative as well as the comparative, the existence of proximate and remote demonstrative pronouns, number agreement between a noun and the related predicative and the presence of pasadjective, sive verb stems (based on active stems). The morphological description covers nouns, postand pre-positions, adjectives, pronouns, verbs, conjuncand suffixes. The last two categories tions, are treated the section on the verb is the most comprehensive. briefly; Most sections (e.g., "Nouns," etc.) and subsections (e.g., "Case," etc.) begin with "General Remarks," followed by on individual statements dialects. Syntax, as already indicated, has been left out (exTo some cept for more or less incidental observations). these days--at least in the United States--linlinguists is almost nothing but syntax. guistics This, of course, is an objectionable view, and I am glad the author of the book being reviewed does not subscribe to it. However, I IRANIAN STUDIES
258
hope that he will a separate work.
cover syntax in the next edition,
or in
Similarly, there is no statement on word formation, with the exception of brief mentions of some derivational suffixes and a scattering of other phenomena (pp. 138-9, 142-4, 266-7, 274). One aspect of word formation--"Verbal Nouns" (pp. 250-55)--is discussed under "Verbs." Though this is in keeping with accepted tradition, a more appropriate place for them (in the absence of a separate section on word formation) would be under "Nouns." Throughout the.work, one notices a great many similarities between Southern Tati and Persian. Nor is this surprising since they are related genetically and close Some of the similarities geographically. are due to borrowing, both in vocabulary and in grammar. An instance of grammatical borrowing is the ezafa construction, which, however, is 'found only occasionally (p. 74). Another is the suffix -tar, which is used for comparative as well as superlative (p. 140). Still another is the ordinal numeral suffixes -om and -om-in (p. 145). The similarity is greatest in the vocabulary, and that is precisely the area where it is very difficult, in the case of linguistically related geographically close dialects, to distinguish between borrowings and cognates. This work is the result of painstaking research by a scholar with a first-rate record of scholarship. Although some areas, as pointed out, need improvement, he is aware of that fact. His major purpose was apparently a description of the morphology, and here he has done an excellent job. Omissions, generally speaking, were by design. To make too much of them would be to show ingratitude where gratitude and encouragement are clearly called for. For although a number of studies of Iranian dialects spoken in Iran exist in print, practically none--even, or especially, among those by native Iranians--would meet the required standards of methodology, exactness and reliability. Here, in Professor Yar-Shater's meticulous work, we have an example to be held up for others to see and emulate. I look forward to other studies by him on the "Median" dialects. 259 AUTUMN 1973
IRAJ BASHIRI
HEDAYAT'S Structuiral IVORY Anialysisof TOWER The BliindOwl
Since its publication in 1937 THE BLIND OWL has remained an The structural analysis enigma in Persian and world literature. presented in Hedayat's Ivory Tower is an attempt to * prove that the dream-world
of the Owl is not the result of narcotic hallucinations. * shed light on the life of Hedayat, find a place for THE BLIND OWL in Persian fiction and bring Hedayat studies into focus. * evaluate Hedayat's synthetic approach to Eastern and Western literatures. Such insights plus the step by step reconstruction of the writing of the book have been possible only through the use of the Persian version of THE BLIND OWL- a new translation of which is included in the Tower.
1974 xvii 221 pp. $6. 00
Libraryof Congress Catalog Card Order Number: 73-620244 *
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COVER: Silk With Rooster VaticanLibrary,Rome Sasanian. VI-VII Cent.A.D.