Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
Volume III (1970)
Ali Banuazizi,Editor Jacqueline W. Mintz,...
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Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
Volume III (1970)
Ali Banuazizi,Editor Jacqueline W. Mintz, Associate Editor
Published by The Society for Iranian Studies, P. 0. Box 89, Village Station, New York, New York 10014, U.S.A.
The Society for Iranian Studies COUNCIL Amin Banani Ali Banuazizi James A. Bill Richard W. Cottam Manoucher Parvin Roger M. Savory Majid Tehranian, Secretary-Treasurer
IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Contents: Volume IlI (1970)
ARTICLES
Cottam, Richard W. The United States, Iran and the Cold War .... . . . . . . . . . . .
2-22
Oil and Cold Doenecke, Justus D. Revisionists, War Diplomacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
23-33
Hedayat, Sadeq. Three Drops of Blood (translated . . . . . . . . by Thomas M. Ricks ....
104-114
Genesis of Party in Iran: A Razi, G. Hossein. Case Study of the Interaction Between the . .
58-90
Ann T. An Expanded Role for the Majles Committee ................ .
35-45
Mark. Persian Folksong Texts from Afghan Badakhshan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
91-103
Political
Schulz, Slobin,
System and Political
Abdol-Hosein. Zarrinkoob, torical Perspective Banani) .................
Parties
Persian Sufism (with foreword
iii
in Hisby Amin .
137-220
BOOKREVIEWS English,
Paul W. City and Village in Iran (reviewed by William Irons). . . . . . . . . . 115-125
The Huretwitz, J. C. Middle Eastern Politics: Majid (reviewed by Military Dimension Tehranian). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
46-50
Lambton, Ann K. S. The Persian Land Reform, 19621966 (reviewed by AhmadAshraf) .50-54 Leiden, Carl. The Conflict of Traditionalism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East (reviewed by Philip C. Salzman).
125-128
MISCELLANEOUS Letters
to the Editor.
Note from the Editor Publications
Received.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129-131 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
iv
55-56,
136 132-133
J~dTC4~eV, s rne Soc
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COUNCIL Amin Banani of California University at Los Angeles Ali Banuazizi University of Southern California James A. Bill of Texas at Austin University Richard W. Cottam of Pittsburgh University Manoucher Parvin Hunter College Roger M. Savory of Toronto University Majid Tehranian, Secretary-Treasurer New College Iranian
Studies
Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jacqueline W. Mintz, Associate
Editor
for by the Society Iranian Studies is published quarterly to members of the SoIranian Studies. It is distributed The annual subscripciety as a part of their membership. tion rate for non-members is $5.00; the price of single the subscripcopies is $1.25 per issue. For institutions tion rate is $8.00 per annum. The opinions expressed by the contributors authors and are those of the individual of not necessarily or the editors those of the Society and all other Iranian Studies. Articles for publication should be sent communications concerning Iranian Studies to the Editor, P.O. Box 24766, Los Angeles, Iranian Studies, the 90024, U.S.A. concerning California Communications to the Secreaffairs of the Society should be addressed of Sotary, The Society for Iranian Studies, c/o Division cial Sciences, Florida 33578, U.S.A. New College, Sarasota, Cover:
Heavy Bronze Mortar Mashhad. Seljuq. 12th C. Archaelogical Museum, Tehran
SLdv
UJYttUl
Volume
III
Winter
1970
Number
1
ARTICLES 2
THE UNITED STATES, THE COLD WAR
IRAN AND
Richard
W. Cottam
23
REVISIONISTS, OIL AND COLD WAR DIPLOMACY
Justus
D. Doenecke
34
AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR THE MAJLES COMMITTEE
Ann T.
Schulz
BOOK REVIEWS 46
HUREWITZ:
Middle Eastern Politics: The Military Dimension
Majid
50
LAMBTON
The Persian Land 1962-1966 form,
Ahmad Ashraf
55
PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED
Re-
Tehranian
THE UNITED STATES, IRAN AND THE COLD WAR*
RICHARD W. COTTAM
the Cold War over It would be premature to declare continues The Cold War rhetoric in the sumner of 1969. in the debates over Vietto abound in the United States confrontation nam and the ABM; dangers of Soviet-American and Soviet behaconflict; in the Arab-Israeli are serious But, as is of the Cold War mold. vior in Czechoslovakia speech at the by Richard Nixon's acceptance symbolized agreethere is widespread Convention, Republican National and that an era of negotiation ment among American leaders The Union has been entered. rapprochment with the Soviet are already strong that for Iran this portends indications will not inconflict an era in which the Soviet-American affairs. internal Iran's very significantly fluence As this
new era begins,
there
are already
signs
the Soviet-Ameriincluding that the Cold War world view, reis about to be drastically in Iran, can confrontation of the Cold War. of students by a new generation vised Policy, Weapons and Foreign in his Nuclear Henry Kissinger interan image of monolithic constructed in 1957, written goals. principal in its single-minded communism, national In 1969 this praised. His book at the time was widely Kissinger's wing diehards. view is held only by right of the the intensity one given was a natural construct That it communists. from revolutionary threat perceived is even for the mid-1950's, exaggeration was a serious But, as a new generation today. to be questioned hardly memory of the Cold War, or no real with little emerges of an infact the vital that danger is a seriuous there however threat from communism, perceived tensely
Richard W. Cottam is Professor of Pittsburgh. University
of Political
Science
at the
on the "Strucat the Conference *This paper was delivered by the Socico-sponsored Iran,' ture of Power in Islamic and the Near Eastern Center of the ety- for Iranian Studies The Conference at Los Angeles. of California University of Califwas held on June 26-27, 1969, at the University Los Angeles. ornia, IRANIAN STUDIES
2
If this is done there is will be forgotten. unrealistic, for that new myths will be substituted every likelihood fear or exaggeraeliminate Since the new analyses old. of American as a major determinant ted threat perception some vigorous at times included Cold War behavior--which substiin local Cold War arenas--some acts of imperialism Already the notion that will be sought. tute explanation of American behavior was the need the prime determinant comthe demands of a huge industrial-military to satisfy acceptance. is advanced and is gaining widespread plex, No more than a handful of Americans comprehend the in Iran's hisextent of American influence extraordinary American Yet, without question, tory in the Cold War era. trends so fundaIranian historical altered intervention for generations. that the impact may well be felt mentally and for Iranians The American role was highly visible in the United others in the Third World but unnoticed of Amerisection That even the highly attentive States. American government can public did not observe blatant blindness the perceptual acts in Iran, simply illustrates of those engaged in what they see as fundamental conflict. has no such problem, however, and there The new generation in is no reason to doubt that American Cold War policy scrutiny. Iran will come under the closest reason to doubt that AmAlso there is very little in Iran will be placed snuggly within the erican policy areas are so peculiarly Few policy new myth construct. exschool is actively Since the revisionist susceptible. American ploring that assumption
in the Cold War with the motives economic the case of Iran is were primary, these
a concern with oil was the determinsimple: deductively here is that this deductive The contention ing force. Evidence to support inductively. case cannot be supported were a significant that American oil interests the belief is prior to 1954, if it exists, in American policy factor in Iran were Actual American investments well concealed. this fact is of Admittedly minimal prior to that year. to those who see western behavior as significance little However, it trusts. by international determined largely studies is important to note that one of the few careful that of Bernard Cohen1, group behavior, of economic interest is to of such interests that the mode of behavior suggests and with very directly, objectives, seek very specific paris not closely The case he studies high visibility. to the Iranian case, but there have been studies allel relations. made of the role of oil in Iranian foreign of determinant2 as a primary see oil which Even in those advanced no evidence is virtually there interest foreign or as independently acting interests, oil that American in deterwere significant trust, part of an international
major detail mining either in Iran. can policy
or the general
3
color
of Ameri-
WINTER1970
Of course there is no difficulty at all in documenfactor ting a case that Iran's oil was seen as a vital in in demonEuropean recovery. Nor is there any difficulty and in Europe strating the belief in the United States that a major communist objective was a denial of Iranian oil to the West. was viewed as the European recovery of inprime,essential prerequisite for the containment ternational communism and the Soviets, it was assumed, were as interested in preventing this objective as the United States was in achieving American it. Official statements concerning Iran in this period rarely neglected to mention the vital European need for Iran's oil. The rhythm of American policy in Iran supports a different proposition regarding American motivations. Prior to World War II American involvement in Iran was slight. Individual Americans such as Morgan Shuster, Arthur Millspaugh and several did American missionaries have an impact on Iran and in sum left Iranians with a very favorable of the United States. impression Millsin Iran, during. World War II, paugh's second assiqnment had a closer official connection. But as Millspaugh makes clear in his book3, he received greater support from the British than from his own government. A minor effort was made on behalf of Standard Oil and of Sinclair in gaining some share of the oil consession in Iran, but in neither case was there success.4 Intense American interest in Iran did not even occur when American forces were present in Iran during World War II. Then there was a general deference to the British.5 in Iran American interest really begins in 1946 with the American acceptance of the new role as the first power in the anticommunist bloc. Iran has the distinction along with Greece and Eastern Europe of being part of the first arena of the Cold War. The Soviet-American confrontation over Iran in the United Nations was, in fact, part of the inaugural of the Cold War. The assumptional base concerning motivations in this essay, therefore, is that American interest in Iran was overwhelmingly defensive. In American eyes Soviet in Azerbaijan policy made clear beyond question, the conclusion that the Soviet Union wished in Iran a commuthe Soviet lead. nist regime which would follow closely If this objective could not be achieved fairly cheaply, the Soviet Union appeared to be willing to settle for a friendly regime in Tehran, tolerant of an autonomous communist Azerbaijan and willing to grant the Soviet Union a slight advantage in a Soviet-Iranian Company for exploiting Iran's northern oil. Evidence for these views is substantial and to this writer convincing.6 But this is not the place to explore such evidence. What is necessary to point to here is simply the official American perception IRANIAN STUDIES
4
aggressive of a highly that perception this
It in Iran. policy Soviet policy gave form to American
was in Iran.
support verbal was to grant response The American ambasits and through Nations to Iran both in the United in strength But American in Iran. George Allen, sador, as a deterto have served the area was much too slight or to a in Azerbaijan presence Soviet to continued rent What the of Iran. to gain control effort Soviet serious leaders to Soviet did do was to indicate stand American in Iran would lead to troops of Soviet the retention that and to substantial in relations deterioration serious or for reareason for this Whether rearmament. American Union did withdraw the Soviet sons not yet apparent, reAzerbaijan the communist and did permit troops Soviet army. by the Iranian gime to be ousted reappraisal. the most careful deserves This episode which led to policy of Soviet one aspect It was clearly in Union which was implicit of the Soviet the perception Affairs.7 in Foreign "Mr. X" article George Kennan's tells of the article of the premise acceptance Widespread The day. of that consensus perceptual much of American with Niazi Gerparallel Union was seen as closely Soviet the But in retrospect, intent. aggressive many in its with such minor pressure is that point startling really Such beUnion did depart. the Soviet it, against applied if Soviet Indeed, of Hitler. that parallels hardly havior few epiare to be understood in the period motivations But the importfor reappraisal. are more important sodes perAmerican here is the resultant to establish ant point comdictatorship Soviet aggressive a highly ception: opposiAmerican of vigorous in the face to retreat pelled tion. Because
its
oil,
of
its
so important
strategic
to Europe's
and because
locations
economy,
of
Iran was cer-
Furof the Cold War struggle. point tain to be a focal Union as the Cold War took form and the Soviet thermore, the potential, nuclear weapons significant developed Cold War battles the central was that probability confrontation military would not be in the form of direct of both East and West. of obliteration with the risk would be in the third of the conflict the center Rather was expectation The American states. world of developing would be in the form of subverting aggression that Soviet moving them and thereby states of these the governments regimes by communist to dominance toward and ultimately was sufevidence Supporting the Moscow lead. following
ficient nist
the American
to maintain military
net
in
Iran,
perception.
discovered
almost
The commu-
accidentally
Over four hunin 1954, is an example of such evidence. in the organization were involved dred Iranian officers 5
WINTER 1970
even though some of them mai not have been the role they were playing.
fullv
aware of
For states such as Iran, the American containment policy objective can be simply stated: to help establish and to strengthen stable non-communist, regimes capable of resisting and fully subversion aware of the dangers of communist aggression. In order to accomplish this objective, the entire spectrum of the American foreign policy would have to be mobilized. Military aid would be given as much to provide internal as to advance the security direct military contairnment policy. Economic aid was seen as essential for real stability. Information agency policies were for the purpose of constructing favorable images of the western allies and non-communist third world regimes, and unfavorable images of communist regimes or regimes seen either as under communist influence or insufficiently aware of the communist danger. both Diplomacy, overt and covert, would support internal forces working for non-communist stability and oppose those undermining that position. That this adds up to a picture of political engineering is beyond question, although few of those participating would have so described The policy was it. not articulated explicitly but the pattern soon became so distinct that it clearly reflected the basic compulsions behind the policy. However, these patterns amounted to nothing more than the stylistic content of policy. A characteristic feature of the entire third world was one of flux. Increasingly insistent counter elites were appearing everywhere. They not only demanded power but called for fundamentally different political, social and economic policies. Since a prevailing attitude of many of these counter elites was one of distrust of and anger at the imperialist policies of America's closest allies, policies of hostility to the West were very likely should those elites come to power. Yet they seemed to represent strong and virtually irreversible trends. Opposing them therefore could at best result in only temporary stability. Simply by stating the objective of non-communist stability, therefore, very little of the substance of is indicated. strategy Is stability best achieved and communism most successfully resisted if traditional elites are maintained in power or if some element of the counter elites replaces them? If the latter, which element of the counter elites is most likely to be in harmony with American objectives? The alternatives can be framed in terms of the control scheme the various elites would be likely to incorporate. The analytical device employed below9 the control system incorporated will consist IRANIAN STUDIES
6
assumes that of three
Normaand coercive. utilitarian, normative, elements: genof norms which appeal to the employment refers tive This of the population. elements or to specific erally favored which represent to symbols appeals includes by offering to people is the appeal Utilitarian norms. reCoercive or power needs. to material satisfaction or the of force the threat to the use of force, fers or sections individuals to control of deprivation threat of the population. very were of three strategies For Iran control would be to supstrategy The first varieties. different even elites of the counter section port the dominant of the distrustful would be deeply elite that though from the Sodanger of the compelling unconvinced West, forces in the security represented and poorly Union, viet per the eighty control who by and large and among those The or tribesmen. who are peasants cent of Iranians normagroup would be primarily of this method of control themselves to describe would be able Its leaders tive. and a nation Iranian independent a truly as representing and the econboth the society to transform determination with the eduprimarily would be strong This appeal omy. Its utilitarian people. and professional youth, cated class and lower middle to middle would be mainly appeal elite of the traditional who see in the ousting elements For advancement. and status for a career opportunities of land offer would be the distant there the peasantry the against would have to be applied Coercion reform. of coercion, the instruments but since elite traditional of the were under the influence the army and police, device the coercive elite, and the traditional court model an ideal This is hardly mob. would be the popular situa basically revolutionary But given for stability. alternabe made for this could argument a strong ation, At least potential. long-term the best tive as offering in the face of would not be standing States the United trends. historical and progressive strong the tradiwould be to support strategy The second here. advantages There would be clear elite. tional including experience with governmental This is the elite with the impericooperation profitable long and mutually it In self-interest Great Britain. particularly al West, of The method of control anti-communist. was naturally the counSince coercive. this group would be primarily intent their revolutionary had demonstrated ter-elites among the artiof their appeal the receptivity and also would be little there of the population, element culate of this but the control for the time being alternative was wellelite The traditional group by repression. easily and thus could forces in the security represented the instruments. Hlowever, the coercive mobilize 7
WINTER 1970
efficiency of the coercive instruments, events had indicated, would have to be improved; and for an oligarchic More centralizaserious elite this represented dangers. tion and placing power in fewer hands was called for, and this could be disruptive of harmony within the oligarchy. in the area Utilitarian devices would be employed largely and educaof infra-structure development, communications tion in particular. This would meet some of the demands but would be rather slow of the anti-traditional elements in producing even an accommodationist The apattitude. peal to norms would be narrowly restricted among the poelement could be litically aware. Only the traditional reached. The very basis of the revolutionary potential was the rejection of traditional norms. But among the peasantry this elite could be expected to operate along traditionally
accepted
normative
patterns.
Again
this
is
far from being an ideal control model for producing stability. Its primary vulnerability lies in the probability that the rising demand for new norms would far outrace the gains made through infra-structure development. A third model would stand as a compromise between these two extremes. In this model one section of the traditional elite would retain power but would move rapidly to coopt important elements while of the counter elite simultaneously dropping elements of the traditional elite. The method of control here would be, of necessity, at first primarily coercive but would turn as rapidly as possible to a primary emphasis on utilitarian. Given the in Iran in the early years of the revolutionary spirit Cold War, only the leading elements of the revolutionary elite could rule without a primary recourse to coercion. In this model, the section in of the traditional elite include at first those in critipower would of necessity cal positions in the security force. But no effort would be made even in the initial stage to maintain the power position of the traditional oligarchy. Instead the process would be one of attracting, through appeals to salmen in the counter ary and position, highly qualified elite, both into the bureaucracy generally and into the security forces themselves. At a rate harmonious with the success of the utilitarian appeal to the counter elite, there would be an alteration of norms and concomitant
symbol
manipulation.
At
first
traditional
norms
must prevail since some reliance on the traditional elite would be essential at this stage. But as important elements of the counter elite were coopted and the prevailing mood of the counter elite could be described as accommodationist, the support of the traditional elite would become less vital. At this point the leaders could turn more to norms acceptable to the counter elites and the beginnings of a stable utilitarian-normative scheme would Likewise as reliance appear. on the traditional elite as IRANIAN STUDIES
8
the primary base of support becomes unnecessary, it would be possible to inaugurate new programs, such as land reform which would have great utilitarian and normative appeal to the peasantry. The problem for this model would be the very great instability and uncertainty of the transitional period. But it offers some very significant long-term stability prospects. As some readers will have recognized, the above three "models" are in fact abstractions of the central strategies utilized by the regimes led by Mossadeq, Zahedi, and the Shah respectively. This is not to argue that the alternative strategies were articulated and the relative merits of each debated by those involved in the American decision making process concerning Iran. On the contrary, the various choices made depended heavily on the accident of personality of leading decision makers and on the opportunities perceived by very different men at different times. Although it has been observed above that few Americans comprehend the terribly important role played by the United States in modern Iranian history, most Iranians do. In fact they tend to exaggerate that role. Because of the vital importance of Iran to American security as perceived by American leaders, American interference did reach proportions that can be described as political be noted engineering. But it should that this more than political engineering amounted to little to grant In one extraordinary support to that elite. case this did amount to a major effort one to overturn But when the Mossadeqist, and substitute another. elite, Zahedi was replaced by a royal American dictatorship, support constant. of the government in power remained in Iranian Really extensive American interference the Mossadeq did not begin until era. internal affairs With the freedoms But then it was probably inevitable. a vigorous under Mossadeq, and subthe press permitted Demonstrations of stantial communist press appeared. were frequent and a Yankee Go Home camTudeh supporters within the bureauCommunist paign was launched. presence the infiltraand as mentioned was suspected cracy above, in the armed forces was much greater tion then than even feared. anti-communists Actual the more alarmist-minded was probably indicated communist accustrength fairly in the Tehran elections in 1952 which were remarkrately Then the communist candidates ably free. about polled of the vote. one-fifth the premiership, Even before Mossadeq accepted and a bitter oil was nationalized with Iran's dispute Iranian nationalists followed. were conGreat Britain that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had been a cenvinced tral instrument in an indirect and nonformal but very real 9
WINTER 1970
therecontrol of Iran. imperialist They were determined fore to stop the flow of Iran's oil rather than to permit to finresources the greatest of Iran's natural actually of the country. control Iranian-British ance the imperial which came in relations moved toward the breaking point, 1952. within which the first This, then, was the setting in Iran's American involvement major decision concerning The regime was non-communist. In affairs would be made. fact during this brief period Iran was very close to havBut it was doctrinaire ing a liberal-democratic system. in its non-aligned status, and since such freedom as desthe regime was subject cribed was granted its communists, to a charge very familiar to Americans in 1951, that of being "soft on communism." Purthermore this was a period Beneath the surface there was the staof surface chaos. bility of a regime which had attracted the enthusiastic of the public--and support of one section a most important section. But certainly there was the appearance of instability. From a control system perspective, probably few more completely on regimes in modern history have relied normative control. The symbols most successfully manipulated were those relating to Iranian nationalism. Mossbecame a symbol of new found dignity for adeq personally the ancient Other symbols, of economic and sonation. cial progress, were seen as subsequent intito, although mately connected with, the achievement of real indepenThe belief held that British dence. was solidly imperialism was the primary obstacle alterto any fundamental and must first be eliminated. ing of Iranian society Symbols of freedom and humanism, likewise, were utilized effectively. But there was very real material discomfort in Iran under Mossadeq. Foreign trade fell off and only partly as a result of a British economic blockade. The bureaucracy was always several months in arrears with its salary. Merchants felt a sharp decline in sales. What is remarkable is that with the utilitarian appeal so very weak the regime lasted as long as it did. There was coercion under Mossadeq. A strict censorship was passed and law frequently martial imposed. But judging from the violence and often obscenity of the personal attacks on Mossadeq in the opposition press, it would be hard to argue that there was a controlled press. Real coercion did exist, however, in that anyone opposing the regime was automatically charged with being in British pay. Furthermore the charge was in many cases believed. Physical intimidation was not unknown. But much of the security forces were never firmly under Mossadeq' s control. HIence IRANIAN STUDIES
10
the coercive instruments relied upon were more likely be urban mobs or the force of mass opinion.
to
Could the United States support such a regime? The answer of Ambassador Grady before his retirement in 1952 was a qualified "yes." His argument was made publicly his retirement in articles and in public aftT speeches. Central to his case for support of Mossadeq was the contention that Mossadeq represented a most powerful manifestation of Iranian national history. He symbolized the search for national dignity for many of his countrymen. But Grady argued as well that, because of his absorption in a past in which Iran was so frequently a victim, Mossadeq did not perceive the sincerity of the British search for compromise. Grady saw intransigence on both sides as tragically capable of pushing Iran into the Cold War center stage. "Support" in this case meant to grant the Mossadeq regime economic, technical and military assistance. But the Tudeh press in describing this as American interference on behalf of the Mossadeq regimell had a point. American assistance did improve the Mossadeq regime's control capability. The kind of support Mossadeq wanted, however, and in fact demanded only a few weeks before his overthrow was diplomatic support against British efforts to strangle the regime economically and to conspire it politically against within the right opposition camp.12 In making this demand, Mossadeq spelled the out clearly American dilemma: it must give diplomatic as well as material support to a regime which is non-aligned externalin a ly, "soft on communism" internally, uncompromising bankdispute with America's closest and virtually ally, The implied threat in Mossadeq's derupt economically. mand was that lacking this support, Iran would likely go communist. In a way what was surprising was that America in the early 1950's, with a fear of internal comtransfixed that its own security munist subversion and convinced non-communist regimes rested on the existence of stable, in strategic parts of the third world, should have given That it did so was any support to the Mossadeq regime. of a general policy probably more the result application But than to any special concern for the Iranian regime. the primary argument for Ambassador Grady did articulate that it was the American support of the Mossadeq regime: of an important historical manifestation trend, a trend which could be resisted only at the risk of turning Irantoward communism. ian nationalism servative
Successor to the liberal Hienry Grady was the conBefore too many months had Loy IIenderson. 11
WINTER1970
Mr. Henmodel was about to be tested. passed the second as did Mr. has not revealed his thinking publicly derson But if Hassan Arsenjani's 30 Tir can be relied Grady. to the ambassador was most receptive on, the new American elite that he traditional entreaties of members of Iran's bestow America's Since the perfavors on them. should of the and world views philosophies sonalities, political to have been important ambassadors appear two American be it should in Iran, policy determinants of American the Truman adminisduring noted that both were appointed a purposeto indicate and that is nothing there tration that It is of course possible in direction. ful change
Grady would have become so frustrated
with
Iranian
na-
he too would that and intransigence tionalist suspicion to overturn have turned ear to those seeking a willing Iranian nationalism conviction that Mossadeq. But Grady's in Iran, if profor long-term stability could be a force A major American held. perly treated, was very deeply Amin the overthrow role of Mossadeq had Grady remained of accident the role Such*is bassador was thus unlikely. in major historical events. involvement to Arsenjani, the Henderson According of Mossadeq replacement was substantial in the short-lived for so act1952. If so, the case by Ahmad Qavam in July and Qavam was a subtle ing is fairly easy to construct. to narrow docnot at all given sophisticated statesman, in the art of He and his class were experienced trine. with the street unsentimentally politics and would deal Brutal coercion would behind Mossadeq. mobs which stood be unnecessary. welcome a reThe public would in fact storation of calm and order. to the appointment But the four days of Qavam's have cast doubt on the aspermanent premiership should could provide that Iran's traditional oligarchy sumption of a style not seen in Iran since stability. Coercion the days of Reza Shah would clearly if Qavam be necessary and MossThis was not forthcoming were to stay in power. almost literally back to the premiership adeq was brought on the shoulders The first Americanof an adoring crowd. change in Iran to engineer major political backed effort had failed. 1952 until From July 19, 1953 when Mossadeq August real concealment of was finally there was little toppled, Nor was the identito Mossadeq. Anglo-American hostility General Fazlollah probable successor, ty of Mossadeq's would be no This time there Zahedi, in much doubt.13 as the primary conto make full use of coercion failure a Zahedi else would distinguish trol device. But little on the tradifrom a Qavam leadership. Both would rely hardly less support. Zahedi tional elite for primary IRANIAN STUDIES
12
of controlling with the problem than Qavam would be faced and with an oligarchic, elites counter assertive highly inauguFurthermore, system. control inefficient, hence to which would be attractive the kind of programs rating class laboring class, of the middle interest the material with the vestclash certainly would almost and peasantry any refinally, Then, oligarchy. of that ed interests imperial of western on the support gime which was founded appeal a normative utilizing would have difficulty powers It is a measregime. the ousted who had favored to those to the States in the United perceived ure of the danger in the Mossimplicit world of the non-communist security to such would have been recourse there that adeq regime, alternative. a questionable to partiwas the decision But even more audacious on It rested of Mossadeq.14 ouster in the actual cipate and resources understanding that American the assumption of a governthe replacement to engineer were sufficient That assumption following. and devoted ment with a large in 1957 as it would in Syria just to be incorrect, proved
and again
in Cuba in 1961.
But ironically
the communist
from States the United part saved in large Tudeh Party The coup was failure. the price of disastrous paying government 16, 1953 but the Mossadeq for August planned Genit. foiled of the plan and easily had been informed the country. and the Shah fled hiding Zahedi went into eral Attacks on relihand. its But then the Tudeh overplayed and much of the poputook place leaders and mosques gious was a real a red dictatorship that was convinced lation from the poor sections The mob that marched possibility. in part paid was doubtless of south Tehran to the north of sponwas an element but there money, for by American the overthrow of Mossadeq In any event, as well. taneity Agency 19 and the Central Intelligence on August occurred success by many, or blame for this full credit was given aware Iranians. politically most, probably set himself Zahedi General the coup d'etat, After a restored that the assumption to the task of disproving He control a stable system. re-establish could oligarchy corepressive what was for Iran a severely did exercise utiliBut he made no progress through control. ercive means of attracting support positive or normative tarian corelite. Rumors of official of the traditional outside belevel and were widely were on the sensational ruption the Shah very quickly began manifesting liowever, lieved. the trato manipulate that his ability indications clear as it was as artistic and to move beyond system ditional of the center of months In a matter was inept. Zahedi's to from the premiership had been transferred authority as premier Zahedi was dropped When, later, the Court. of opposition. a ripple was hardly there 13
WINTER 1970
In retrospect it is clear that from the first weeks of the royal dictatorship, there would be movement toward a new and ultimately control remarkably stable system. Certainly nothing of this was perceived by concerned Americans who were granting the Shah as much support as could be extracted from a sympathetic Cold War congress. But the Shah understood very well both the direction in which he must move and the extent of his freedom of action in doing so. The oligarchy had little reason to be pleased with the royal dictatorship. The Pahlevi family was neuveau in the eyes of Iran's great families, many of whom had blood ties with the Qajar dynasty ousted by the Shah's father, Reza Shah. In addition, many of the oligarchic families had suffered the loss of land and all had lost power during the old Shah's regime. A royal dictatorship by definition would again reduce the power of the oligarchy. Furthermore, the young Shah had on several occasions indicated his attraction to a program of land reform, and this was anathema to Iran's great landowners. The very delicate task the Shah had to perform was to attract the support of sections of the counter elites through utilitarian appeals without suffering too serious a loss of support from members of the oligarchy as their power and influence were reduced. His primary reliance in this period had of necessity to be on coercion. But members of the traditional elite were well placed in the security forces, the instruments of coercion; in any case, these organizations were inefficient and generally of low capability in dealing with internal security problems. The Shah set about immediately improving the security force capability, the office especially of Military Governor of Tehran and later the security organization, SAVAK. But in the meantime he had to rely on his own skill in the political manipulating process to keep his many opponents apart. It was in this period that American support was most vital. The contention can be well supported, in that until 1963 the regime was dependent for its fact, continued existence on the virtually unqualified and generous support from the United States. Virtually all elements of the American government's foreign policy community were involved in Iran. Military support including technical, and training; material economic and technical aid assistance; propaganda support; and diplomatic supWhereas this support helped improve the efficiency port. of the security forces and the government's ability to satisfy some of the material aspirations of the people, the primary value lay elsewhere. As described here, the overthrow of Mossadeq was the result of an Americanbacked coup effort which, although failing, sparked a Tudeh response which in turn produced the essential IRANIAN STUDIES
14
public reaction in Iran for a second coup effort to be successful. A basic assumption of this description is that no such minor effort could have been successful had the Mossadeq control system been stronger. But this picture was far from universally accepted among Iranians. As stated above, many, including many Nationalists, placed the primary responsibility for Mossadeq's overthrow with the United States. The response of followers of Mossadeq to this perception was one of anger but an anger mitigated by a feeling of helplessness. If a man of Mossadeq's broad popularity could be overturned by American intervention then clearly American capability was so great as to make futile any direct effort to reverse the situation. Iranians were unhappily familiar with foreign
intervention,
primarily
British
and Russian,
and
to them the phenomenon was sufficiently common to be thought of as an integral part of the political process domestically. As such, a major, and quite possibly the major, tactic adopted by the Mossadeqists was to persuade the Americans that a new Nationalist regime was most in their interests. In effect they argued the validity of the Grady model: real stability and invulnerability to Soviet subversion could only be achieved by a regime which had nationalist legitimacy. This tactic was well represented by the Iran Party Manifesto of 1957 which went so far as to embrace the Eisenhower Doctrine in a vain effort to attract American support. Consequently, in the period unof greatest of the royal dictatorship, vulnerability wavering American support for the regime was an essential aspect of the control system because of the perceived American capability to invoke overwhelming force and thus make futile any move without American backing. Late 1960 was the beginning of the period of Two years greatest optimism among Iranian Mossadeqists. whose control earlier Nuri as-Said, system in Iraq closely resembled that of the Shah in Iran, had been overhad been thrown and his American and British protectors Then in 1960 the Mento reverse the situation. powerless deres regime in Turkey, which had been very close to the In Iran, the was ousted by a coup d'etat. Americans, free election Shah's effort to conduct a seemingly had and the regime had been placed been exposed as fraudulent But possibly most important, on the defensive. the a new and dynamic president United States had elected who, of popit could be hoped, had a far deeper comprehension For the next two in the Third World. ular aspirations became increasingly National Front activity years, open in early 1963 of a new in the open election culminating committee. central This was indeed a critical His security forces, especially 15
period for the Shah. SAVAK, had been fashioned WINTER1970
a truly into effective coercive instrument. He was therefore able to move openly toward a disengagement with the traditional upper class which had been his chief, if reluctant, base of support. He did so by inaugurating programs of land, and economic social reform which should satisfy some of the demands of lower and middle class elements. His policy of attracting technically competent
and politically accelerated. tween
the
at least
loss
withdrawn men into the bureaucracy But there was an inevitable time-lag of
willingness
support
from
traditional
to accommodate
elements
to the regime
was beand
from
middle class elements. His discomfiture was manifest. He was compelled to allow his faithful premier, Manuchehr Eqbal, to be made a scapegoat: and he ultimately felt compelled to turn to the non-subservient aristocrat, Ali Amini, as premier. In a real sense the royal dictatorship was in temporary abeyance. In retrospect it appears that this was the last moment of possible success for the aging Mossadeq leadership. Amini was a member of the more progressive section of aristocratic politicians and had some support there. Furthermore, he was believed to be respected by and supported by Americans. But he needed a much broader base of support if anything a countervailing approaching force to the Shah with his coercive capability was to be created. This could really only have come from the Mossadeqists. But no alliance was affected. Apparently the Mossadeqists did not believe it necessary to ally with the man who had turned against and had negotiaMossadeq ted the Oil Agreement which had restored effective western control, although not ownership, of Iran's oil production. Given their increasing freedom of activity, it is not difficult to comprehend their optimism. However, since Amini had not developed a real base of support, his dismissal was easily accomplished when the economic situation improved. Then shortly after the National Front had held its elections and proclaimed the certainty of a National Front victory, the Shah struck. Virtually the entire top leadership of the National Front was jailed. A referendum was held regarding the Shah's reforms and the over 99 per cent approval was a clear manifestation of a near absolute coercive control system. This was further demonstrated a few weeks later when the security forces put down with a considerable loss of life a religious led anti-regime demonstration. Obviously American behavior conformed very little with the optimistic expectations of the Mossadeqists. Support for the Shah and his premiers was unfaltering. Reductions in aid which were taking place simply reflec-
ted Iran's recovery and the fact of an immense oil income, much of which was being used for developmental IRANIAN STUDIES
16
to is not difficult for this The explanation purposes. very much Cold were still The Kennedy years discover. only weeks occurred crisis The Cuban missile War years. Front. crack down on the National the Shah's before renon-communist for a stable, the desire Consequently There was goal. the determining gime in Iran remained ability when the Shah's in the Amini period uneasiness but with seemed to be faltering; goal this to achieve of alternatives any consideration of control his recovery to the extent Moreover, to have been dropped. appears in the Kennedy administration's was a shift there that of the Shah. it was even more supportive Iran policy, of Mossain the impression There was some justification of the Eisenanti-communism the romantic, that deqists But what was not comprehower era would come to an end. If place. which would take its hended was the doctrine and for Iranians of the Kennedys attraction the magnetic sensing world was due to their in the non-western others feelwith their to empathize of the Kennedys an ability a transto suggest is little there and aspirations, ings enin John Kennedy's to others ability of this ference seems to have been almost there On the contrary, tourage. actook into that emerged that in the doctrine nothing any or, even more broadly, aspirations nationalist count aspirations. identity poto imply here that American There is no intent from a formulated in Iran was at any time sharply licy of threat The perception base. theoretical developed well communism did lead to a Union and world from the Soviet and mainIran establish held goal of helping consistently But this is simply regime. non-communist a stable, tain an intenIt did reflect of policy. outline the skeletal in its stage for an Iran which at this of concern sity revoluand political was on the edge of a social history as described However, unstable. inherently and hence tion this goal emto achieve designed strategy American above, manifesting regimes Iranian three sequentially braced The and ideologies. systems control very different three apof these systems one or another to embrace decision of personality of accident to have been the result pears and the perception decision makers, of leading and values as the just aid programs, The economic of opportunity. formuwere ad hoc, poorly support, of political programs one by JehanTwo recent studies, and inconsistent. lated make this and the other by George Baldwin,15 gir Amuzegar most persuasively. point to was a thrust Yet there from the overall flowed naturally control had an inadequate regime on normative lied far too heavily symbols. of national manipulation 17
which American policy The Mossadeq type aim. it rein that system the especially control, of other The careers WINTER 1970
leaders, and Nkrumah, who made brilliant such as Sukarno use of nationalist the limited symbols, suggest utility of this control device. The greater longevity of a Nehru or a Nasser in part by their can be explained supplementwith efforts in the utilitarian ing normative appeals diBut reliance on positive from tradirection. support tional elements of counter with coercive control elites, was equally tenuous. which was the Zahedi model, The was paralearly of the royal control system dictatorship lel to that of Zahedi but, out of as explained above, necessity rather American than the wish of the Shah. programs tended the Shah's fairly to reinforce consistently own inclination to seek to broaden his support by utilitarian appeals to the peasantry, labor and lower middle class disaffecelements even though this would produce tion from the traditional element. In other words, given the basically conservative the United objectives, States was uncomfortable with regimes such as that of Mossadeq which involved rapid elite and normative alteration. Much preferred were regimes, such as that of the Shah in the 1960's, which would alter elites and norms more but yet would move rapidly slowly in the direction enough of social and economic to attract the necessary change popular satisfaction. This thrust was highly congruent with an era in which American intellectuals were proclaiming the end of ideology. There was little room for sentiment or for liberal doctrine among the Kennedy intellectuals. For example, Thomas Schelling, one of the intellectuals close to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, chose to speak of Dr. Mossadeq in each of his books dealing with bargaining strategies. In the first, the extraordinarily complex, subtle-minded was compared with a misbeMossadeq small having In the second,he child.16 is compared with a puppy uncontrollably wetting the floor.17 The reduc-
tionism
implicit
in advocating
child
psychology
as a mo-
del for dealing with the symbol of Iranian nationalism or in assuming that infantile irrationality characterized and gave him excellent Mossadeq bargaining is strength, only more extreme slightly than that found in other Kennedy theorists. Developmental patterns in Iran of the 1960's, for example, conformed well to the simplistic model in Rostow's Stages of Economic Growth; and the connot unlikely is surely clusion Rostow's inthat, given in the administration, fluence this was a determining factor in the pro-Shah policy. But possibly the best, although post hoc, statement of the new doctrine for developing countries can be found in Samuel Huntington's article, "Political Development and Political Decay."18 In that article Huntington glorifies the middle path of rational development. Too rapid elite or normative alterations for him can be as much a manifestation of decay IRANIAN STUDIES
18
Since the terms "developas would be no change at all. this value judgmental, ment" and "decay" are admittedly with American That it coincides doctrine. is clearly states in Iran and other client practice policy foreign of the Cold War era is probably not accidental. Development and economic tenns. system seen as the then the case could royal dictatorship problem for serious in
terms
of
can writers primary
sense
need not be thought of only in social political democratic Were a liberal for example, goal of "development," be made that in Iran the period of But a far more has been one of decay. regime is "development" the present
of
describe
identity
focus,
community
the
i.e.,
In what
identity.
society,
as traditional
largest
Ameri-
terminal, political
com-
is generalmunity to which one grants a primary loyalty, a manifest proceeds, But as development ly parochial. tendency is to focus on the nation as the object of terThe Mossadeq phenomenon was in minal, primary loyalty. Dr. Mossadeq aspect of development. this sense a vital the nation of Iran, for many Iranians came to symbolize These same and dignity. for true independence searching his having been overthrown by foreign perceived Iranians and their impotence in the face of that conintervention that It is hardly to be expected intervention. tinuing from that interthey would grant the regime benefiting legitimacy. ference nationalist terms, the problem this poses for Seen in control he has made Without question one. the Shah is a serious direction. in the utilitarian progress very significant have substanof Mossadeq, once supporters Many Iranians, Their areas. power in technical and great tial salaries In the to the regime. accommodation suggests behavior manipulate can legitimately the regime area, normative
with economic the symbols associated since But nearly a generation ment.
developand social the overturn of
especially progress the Shah has made little Mossadeq, nationalist in gaining and intellectuals among students of the articulate majority For the less legitimacy. to have he appears and urban labor, country, peasants serious economic adjustalthough been more successful, midwith the intellectual But his failure ments remain. on coercion reliance a continued necessitates dle class a American objectives, considering ironically and hence, few Seen in this perspective, instability. sub-surface for the Shah than the be more opportune could events al-Arab Shatt dispute.
in Iran, there is On the surface in the sense of the word as development Iran can stand as almost In fact, ton. in a American foreign policy successful try in the Cold War era. 19
and stability used by Huntingof the prototype coundeveloping WINTER1970
from the point of view of the archUnfortunately, in Iran, there are clear signs itects of American policy of American historians will that the next generation to this in the introduction judge them badly. As stated of the American is beginning essay, a general revision the Soviet American confrontation Cold War role including role in plays such an extraordinary in Iran. Perception can be made that the prediction foreign policy analysis that the architects of American Cold with some confidence War perspective. War policy will be judged in a post-Cold that preserved the American atThe perceptual blindness tentive public from viewing the full extent of American But is likely to pass. interference in Iran's affairs in its place there may well appear for many a view that America By now, of course, oil imperialism was the key. Given in Iran. oil interest does have a very substantial of the regime and the generally the surface stability there attitude of that regime, satisfactory cooperative to has been little reason for the American oil industry The Shah is a place demands on the State Department. the State Departhard bargainer, and in all probability ment has helped argue the oil company case with his govof any major ernment. But there is no public evidence demands from the oil industry. political policy and here is that the intensity The contention the in Iran has reflected direction of American policy implicit in perception of threat to the United States is behind the What basically Soviet ambitions in Iran. as President transformation of such formerly hard liners since 1962 and is the steady decline Nixon to negotiators of perceptions of that threat. the Cuban missile crises group pressure Since there is no ethnic or ideological are reaconcern with Iran, and since economic interests demands on situation, sonably happy with the existing Both AmeriIran are minimal. American policy concerning can and Iranian policy Not only is Sovietreflect this. but Iran is and increasing, Iranian trade substantial supplies from the Soviet Union and purchasing military thus becoming somewhat dependent for spare parts on the very government that presumably was the primary target of its earlier is the revealed Now fully armament programs. control. internal coercive central purpose of armament: and dam aid in the form of factory Also Iran is receiving with the in contrast construction. Even more startlingly little concern previous era, the United States manifests state relationThe client with these Iranian policies. ship is clearly over. for Iran, that Presumably the Cold War objective it have a stable priregime is of declining non-communist the intensity of American-Iranian ority. Consequently to the point that interference relations should decline IRANIAN STUDIES
20
beyond that of normal diplomatic American disinterest in Iran is
relations will cease. unlikely to reach the
pre-World
long
War II
And so
level.
as
the
Arab-Israeli
and the Iraqi-Kurdish crises persist American withdrawal from the area will be slow. But, having helped significantly alter the course of Iranian history, the United States appears likely now to move back toward the role of benevolent observer.
NOTES 1.
and Foreign Process The Political C. Cohen, Bernard Settlement Peace The Makin-g- of the Japanese Policy: 1957). (Princeton,
2.
L. P. Ellwell-Sutton, See (London, Politics Power
Oil
Fatemi,
A Study in Oil: Persian Saifpour and Nas-r-oah 1955);
in
Powderkeg
Diplomacy:
(New York,
Iran
1954). 3.
bein Iran Diplomacy of American account For a good UniYeselson, Abraham see period Shah the Reza fore 1883-1921J Relations, Diplomatic ted States-Persian quesoil On the 1956). New Jersey, (New Brunswick,
tion 4. 5.
6. 7.
Russia
Cottam, See "The Sources
op. of
1947,
York, 11. 12.
13. 14.
Americans
cit., So-vet
the
in
Iran
in
Persia
op.
Millspaugh,
and
Fatemi,
cit.,
Natonalism
West
124-29. pp. Conduct,"
(Washington, and
cit.,
Iran
in
cit.,
op.
(Pittsburgh,
George
New
(Ithaca,
Foreign
Affairs,
566-582.
pp.
Cottam, c1t., op. For a deveiopment
A Comparative 10.
op.
Elwell-Sutton,
Lenczowski, 1949). York, July 8. 9.
see
Cottam, and Richard 202-3. pp. 1964), C. Millspaugh, Arthur 1946). D. C., see On this subject
p. of
Analysis
237. this
scheme
of
Complex
see
Etzioni,
Amitai
Organizations
(New
1961).
and News U.S. of Grady, an interview example for See 13-17. pp. 1951, 19, Oct. Report, World p. 212. cit., op. iottam, this expressing letter of Mossadeq's text For the of The De artment see Eisenhower to President point 7 77o pp. 1953, 20, July Bulletin, State 211-221. cit., pp. op. Cottam, in print of this episode account The most complete Harkness, and Gladys the article by Richard remains Evenin The Saturday of CIA," Doings "The Mysterious an unpHowee 66-68: pp. 1954, 6, November Post, is far more complete Love by Kennett account lished witness. Love was an eye and accurate.
21
WINTER 1970
15.
16. 17.
George B. Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore, 1967); Jahangir Amuzegar, Technical Assistance in Theory and Practice: The Case of Iran (New York, 1966). Thomas C. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 13. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, 1966),
18.
p.
38.
Samuel P. Huntington, "Political litical Decay," World Politics, 430.
IRANIAN STUDIES
22
Development and PoApril 1965, pp. 386-
REVISIONISTS,OIL AND COLD WAR DIPLOMACY
JUSTUS D. DOENECKE conrecent if the be surprising indeed It would War Cold and the scholarship revisionist over troversy most two decades, the last For to Iran. not extend did inStates United that have asserted historians American to Soviet a response fundamentally was in Iran volvement Russia War II when during World made manifest penetration, Accordin Azerbaijan. regime a puppet to establish tried War scholarship, of Cold school "orthodox" to the ing in 1946. in Persia interest an overt took first America
to Stalin, the "blunt message" Truman sent his President Naand the United sharply, protested Department State The withdrawal. for Russian asked Council Security tions discussions, Nations the United boycotting Soviets, after
left
the
America,
territory.
suddenly awaken rescue.1 the
to
her
power,
a disinterested
and
responsibilities
world
had
come
to
has this tradiyears with the past several Only by a new 'revisionchallenged been interpretation tional who find that American policy of historians, school ist" own its and possessed its own dynamic from resulted often to the revisionAccording intervention. for mainspring cenof the the turn since diplomacy American school, ist thrust for marforward as a continued must be seen tury of both possession Defending and raw materials. kets and prosperity, security to national key as the elements been have McKinley of William the time her from diplomats an Open Door policy to secure effort in a constant engaged nineteenth century of the for diplomat As one her trade. In and no favor." field sought "a fair it, America put D. Rooseof Franklin war-time diplomacy this the context, to seof many steps in a history one becomes simply velt as a her takes and Iran place world, an Open Door cure almost can discover States the United where area major control. This for commercial essay opportunities unique works: Gardrevisionist Lloyd two major deal with will and of New Deal Aspects ner's Economic Diplomacy,2
D. Doenecke Justus in the New College
is Assistant Professor Florida. Sarasota, 23
of
History
at
WINTER 1970
Gabriel States
Kolko, Foreign
The Politics of War: 1943-1945.43 Policy,
The World
and United
American interest in Middle oil Eastern preceded World War II, when the State in conDepartment--working junction an accommodation with American companies--forced with the British and French extensive to permit American entry.4 For example, and the Britin 1928, the American ish, long rivals over Middle the soEastern oil, signed called 24 per cent of Red Line agreement which granted the output of the former Ottoman empire to American interests. Saudi Arabia and Iran, did not come however, under the terms of the agreement and were left open. Yet, testifying to the primacy a State of oil in his diplomacy, Department trade analyst claimed that "...a review of diplomatic history of the past 35 years show that will petroleum has historically played a larger part in the external relations of the United States than any other commodity."5 When in August, and Russia 1941, Britain occupied Iran to secure control of their supply lines, Wallace Murray, Chief of the Near Eastern Division of the American State Department, advocated the resumption of trade negotiations with Iran "for reasons of political expediency and in order to safeguard American trade interests in Iran during the post-war period." Murray told leaders of the American oil industry interested in Iran that he did not want to repeat the pattern of the past two decades, when America had been obliged to force her way into the Middle East. On January 13, 1942, less than a month after Pearl Harbor, America was indeed insisting that Anglo and Soviet pipelines, constructed with her lend-lease aid be made available to her own companies after the war. It is in this context that the financial mission of Arthur C. Millspaugh to Iran in late 1942 must be viewed, as well as the visit of Patrick Hurley to the Middle East in the middle of 1943. Kolko claims that Millspaugh, "who years earlier had worked for the Iranians," was "the most powerful man in Iranian economic affairs"--that is, until he was forced out by Iranian
nationalists torney for ternational
in February, 1945. several American oil operations.
Hurley had been an atcompanies which had in-
Upon return to the United States, Hurley told President Roosevelt that America "had to put forth a much greater and exert much more leadership effort if Iran were
to
remain
independent."
Hence
it
was
Hurley
who
secured agreement from the Big Three at Teheran pledging respect from Iranian independence, it was he who called for shifting the control of lend-lease in Iran from the British to the Americans, and who offered plans for IRANIAN STUDIES
24
building
an Iranian
democracy,
based
in
his
words
upon
a
went even furMillspaugh "system of free enterprise." program of American aid to a twenty-year ther, projecting backand stabilizing as he put it, for "developing serve, declaring, was indeed impressed, Roosevelt ward areas." with the idea of using Iran as an "I was rather thrilled American policy." example of what we could do by unselfish that he was too old for Yet Roosevelh did admit privately such a task. of Hurley and Millsdismissal Despite Roosevelt's was soon stepped American activity paugh's grand designs, recommendaIn the spring of 1944, Hurley's up in Iran. into an be transformed tion that the American legation that out, as well as his suggestion Embassy was carried When the be taken over by American agencies. lend-lease in late 1944, mission was strengthened American military that such a of War Henry L. Stimson declared Secretary and advancement of "for the protection move was necessary Admiral William D. Leahy, a top advisor our interests." in seeing that the Chief pleasure expressed to Roosevelt, toward Briwas taking "a very strong attitude Executive in Iraq, Saudi tain" concerning 5uture oil concessions Arabia,
and
Iran.
It is at this point that American oil aims can be Kolko is Professor best put into a wider perspective. In a general discuscogent on this point. particularly during the war, he relations sion of British-American notes: was one analysis The issue in the final The power. critical strategic of Britain's had a powerful oil inAmericans in contrast excessive restricted dustry that successfully the Middle East As an oil reserve imports. Middle Eastto be reliable. was too distant repern oil to the United States ultimately to Europe and a source of exports resented to conan instrument and potentially profit, In the controversy trol European industry. were that ensued after 1943 the British for their very economic and stratebattling the Americans for profits. gic independence, both initiated Both sides were aggressive, Middle Eastthe entire until new struggles, integrated became a single, ern question illusNo other issue more vividly problem. the theory and practice trated to the British of the new world econowy the Americans said they wished to create.?U
25
WINTER 1970
Triggering
the
oil
Iranian-American
interpower
were
dispute
negotiations,
possibly
secret
not even
1943. An overture late known to Washington until between Vacuum conan Iranian and Standard commercial attache in Baluchiscerned the possibility of an oil concession discovered tan. As soon as the British this, they rapidthere to ly sent their own representatives to Teheran, The Russians the area for themselves. secure followed Alwith the demand to seek oil in all of Azerbaijan. of State the American though minister warned Secretary Cordell Hull that such American overtures "would cause toward British and Soviets to suspect that our attitude Iran is not entirely disinterested and thus weaken our Vacuum that general position here." Hull told Standard "because of the importance of petroleum, both from the
long-range looks with sources dard to
viewpoint and for war purposes, the Department favor upon the development of all possible
of petroleum." The rush to Teheran.11
State
Department
urged
Stan-
of the Soon the rivalry reached the leadership Great Powers. At the end of February, Churchill 1944, wired FDR: "There is apprehension in some quarters here that the United States has a desire to deprive us of our in the Middle East on which among other assets oil things, the whole supply of our navy depends." Roosevelt replied that he in turn was concerned the about "the rumor that British wish to horn in on the Saudi Arabian oil reserves," at which point he feared that Churchill retorted "a wide difference opening between the British and United States Governments on such a subject at this Kolko adds, time."
"The matter had become grave, for on their oil despite the alliance suf fering. "I1 1
the Americans insisted and common wartime
At the very time Roosevelt and Churchill were communicating, the State Department was alerting her embassies that "we are actively engaged in developing a firm post-war theme:
foreign
oil
policy."
The United
States
Kolko
elaborates
demanded
equal
on this rights
with other foreign nations to explore and develop foreign oil. Given United States power such a position implied America would demand control over the future development of foreign oil. time the State DeBy this partment's policy completely identified the national interest with that of American oil firms operating abroad..." Or,
told
as
Under
the embassies,
IRANIAN STUDIES
Secretary
of
"You should 26
State
render
Edward
all
Stettinius
appropriate
to the representatives assistance petroleum nies who may be seeking
of
American
oil
compa-
concessions."L3
was firm in seeking States the United Yet while she was not quite the Open Door for her own concessions, On April to others. to grant such privileges so willing "Petroleum entitled, a document was released 11, 1944, repeated The declaration States." Policy of the United access" and equal American demands for "equal familiar in exploration," enterprise for American opportunity of Western of "conservation the element while introducing of This conservation, petroleum reserves." Hemisphere of as practical, insofar implied "curtailment, course, Hemifrom Western and its products the flow of petroleum Kolko canmarkets." Hemisphere to Eastern sphere sources "Given United his own comment: from adding not restrain Hemiof Western of the vast majority States consumption mona United States output, this meant in effect spheric at that the known world reserves one-half opoly of nearly the former called for terminating The policy also time." of Middle the apportionment concerning Western agreements Further, and far more importantly, Eastern Oil reserves. of 'a by Washington guarantees it called for governmental of holding diversified and geographically substantial nationStates in the hands of United foreign petroleum to demand for would continue America als." Yet, while none she would surrender concessions from others, further "This would of her own. The report continued clearly: presentposition of the absolute the preservation involve of existprotection and therefore vigilant ly obtaining, with inStates hands coupled in United ing concessions of equal opportunupon the Open Door principle sistence in new areas." Again, companies States ity for United reresist his own interpretative Kolko cannot Professor marks: Given the already position predominant of the United States in the world oil economy, terms meant near Amerthe Open Door in these natural over the most critical ican monopoly in the world--precisely what the resource Hull for And although suspected. British trade and bilateral against inveighed years the instrument for ateconomic agreements, unwould be a "bilateral this taining policy with the United Kingdom" which derstanding to other nations for they then might present Such is the stuff agreement. multimaterial words are made.14 from which noble arrived in When the British the such talks, they told for just must provide States United proposal 27
that month Washington Americans that any for British industrial, WINTER 1970
commercial and military welfare. The Americans refused, claiming that would "conflict such assurances with our established commercial and forcing policy," through an innocuous final statement the Atlantic endorsing Charter.15 Yet Millspaugh was becoming more and more of a nuisance, despite his strong for American support oil aims. of an Iranian His unilateral revision treaty with Russia shocked the generally Mohammed Saed, pro-American who by February, 1944, was calling for his removal. Millspaugh's execution of American howaims continued, ever: he arranged for Hlerbert Hoover, Jr. and A. A. Curtis, both American oil consultants--in Kolko's words--to "define Iran's in talks interests with Anglo-Iranian Oil, Standard Vacuum, and Sinclair Oil." Finally, Millspaugh became the main subject of Iranian politics, for his oil activities and personal seemed even to American arrogance embassy officials to encourage the extreme nationalists. By the end of June, Saed was frightened of the rising strength of the nationalist leader Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, profiteers, and the Tudeh party, and stripped Millspaugh of his powers. Both Hull and Hiurley had been aware of Millspaugh's deficiencies as a diplomat, and his loss of power by no means indicated any shift in the American thrust to secure oil concessions. As Stettinius noted, America wanted "a strong and independent Iran," which would include "the possibility of sharing more fully in Iran' s commerce and the development of its resources." To guarantee these aims, America needed continuation of the advisor program, air bases, and "close interest in the present negotiations (with Hoover and Curtis) for a petroleum concession in Iran."16 It was in September, 1944, that the Russians entered the scene, a move which according to Kolko turned "what originally had been an Anglo-American conflict [into]a three-way crisis among the major Allies." At this time Sergei I. Kavtaradze, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, arrived in Teheran to secure a five-year oil concession for those areas in northern Iran then under Russian occupation. Partially under American urging, Saed announced on October 9 that he would defer all concessions negotiations until the end of the war.17 As Herbert Feis, Economic Adviser to the State Department, later noted, "Any gesture intended to assist the USSR to secure control over the oil resources of Northern Iran would have been resented in Britain and reas betrayal garded by the ruling element of Iran. Besides, who knew with certainty what use the USSR would make of the concessions?" Russian funds were used in an attempt to overthrow the Saed government, and when on December 2, the Majlis took over, Mossadegh pushed through IRANIAN STUDIES
28
oil concesto discuss foreign a law making it illegal While the Russians were furisions without its consent. Leland Burnette Morris, led ambassador, ous, America's the postaccepting in willingly the American delegation told Joseph Grew, Acting Iranian diplomats ponement. to be able to that they were relieved of State, Secretary avoid the Soviet request and hoped that American compaa prominent role" Gardner's words--"play nies would--in KolYet Professor Iran's oil resources.1 in developing the whole Russian affair. ko is quite terse concerning He writes: over oil the struggle It was primarily over of American control and the extension that caused the Russians to Iranian affairs but to establish not only for oil, intervene along their borthat affairs the principle ders could no longer be determined without and security.19 regard to Soviet interests with that of George F. coincides Such a statement to the State Department embasKennan, American counselor sy in Moscow, who warned that "the basic motive of recent in northern Iran is probably not the need Soviet action peneforeign of potential but apprehension for oil itself to its Yet, without referring in that area..." tration State any clash with the Soviets,the own role in creating that to Roosevelt 1945, reported in January, Department, cooperation.20 ground for Allied Iran was a real testing for the U.S. In late 1944, John A. Loftus wrote an article in In"Petroleum entitled, Bulletin of State Department Relations," ternational over the ican hegemony said: Loftus
which world's
Kolko most
Ameroutlining sees resource. critical
by American of control The desirability is abroad properties over petroleum nationals the (a) that based on two considerations: for disoil industry talent of the American demonis historically and development covery equal, being other things (b) that strated... is nationals States by United oil controlled to the more accessible to be a little likely of in times uses for commercial States United in time of purposes and for strategic peace war.21
Hence it
is
hardly
surprising
and Britain urged the from withdrawals troop
States United for the date
that
at Yalta
for August, 1941, and Stalin fixed by Churchill had ended. By May the months after hostilities too
joined
in
such
while
requests,
29
the
to advance Russians originally Iran, Churchill
six Iranians
thought
that
WINTER1970
some British military presence might be needed.22 The United States, all the while, maintained her advisory commissions in Iran until September, 1945, and willingly responded to Iranian requests for aid in securing withdrawal of the other two great powers. To both Gabriel Kolko and Lloyd Gardner, the Azarbaijan crisis of 1946-when the United Nations Security Council secured the withdrawal of Russian forces--was the triumph of really American oil policy. Kolko says: ...From 1945 on the United States consistently urged that foreign troops withdraw far more quickly than either the Russian or British governments desired. The United States could therefore represent itself as the disinterested advocate of Iranian national
interests,
a position
(retained)
...during
the sustained crisis that recurred repeatedly after the war. In this position the United States championed Iranian rights over British and Russian imperialism, and ultimately obtained a major share in the output of the Iranian oil industry.23 Gardner comments in a similar
vein,
writing:
Although the United Nations was finally brought into the controversy, American-led Iranian soldiers replaced Soviet occupation forces in Northern Iran, and American influence probably was the determining force in the granting blocking of a Soviet oil concession in 1947. Gone were the impressive dreams of reIran. building Great Britain and Russia had withdrawn their troops, but the country's basic ills remained. Foreign ownership of oil resources led to the nationalization crisis of 1951 and 1952, at the conclusion of which the United States finally got a share of Iranian oil as part of an international consortium set up to run the fields. The continuing burden of absentee land ownership plagued the country, and the rising tide of Middle Eastern nationalism made the area unstable.24 Efforts thus far made to answer the revisionists have neither been very extensive nor very successful. Perhaps it is partly because American scholars for so long have not looked at American policy in terms of any inner dynamics, any direction of its own. Too often it IRANIAN STUDIES
30
has merely been pictured in terms of a "response" to aggression, or restoring the "balance of power." Even those who talk in terms of "awakening to world responsibilities" fail to modify the American picture of the disinterested world policeman. The revisionists, relying upon such evidence as the wartime in Iran, diplomacy fail to be satisfied with such explanations for American conduct. In the words of Professor Robert Freeman Smith, "Their works reject the view of a somewhat befuddled, defensive United States facing a world of predatory aggressors, and instead present the United States as a rather imperial-minded power with ambitions and goals which on the whole are rather similar to those of most other modern powers."25 It is only when defenders of American policy are willing to re-examine the domestic origins of their diplomacy that they can genuinely contribute to the debate.
NOTES 1.
2. 3.
Such an interpretation is repeated by Professor Richard Cottam in a paper primarily dealing with post-war Iran. In his introductory remarks, Cottam claims that before the year 1954 American diplomacy in Iran was never fundamentally motivated by a concern for oil reserves. lie denies that "American oil interests, acting independently or as part of an international trust, were significant in determining either major detail or the general color of American policy in Iran." He further asserts that even prior to World War II, American involvement in Iran was "slight," that such diplomats as Arthur Millspaugh--director of a wartime financial mission from the United States to Iran--"left Iranians with a very favorable impression of the United States," and that efforts to obtain concessions for Standard Oil and Sinclair were "minor," conspicuously lacking in success. Intense American interest in Iran, "did not notes Cottam, even occur when American in Iran forces were present during World War," when there was "a general deferin 1946. ence to the British, and only became active At that time American was "overwhelmingly depolicy the removal of Soviet fensive," involving troops from northern AzerIran and the ousting of the communist baijan regime See Richard by the Iranian army. Cottam, "The United and the Cold War," (paper States, Iran, delivered at the Conference on the'Structure of Power in Islamic Iran,' June 26-28, 1969), pp. 3-5. Madison, Wisconsin: of Wisconsin University Press, 1964. New York: Random House, 1968. 31
WINTER 1970
4. 5. 6. 7.
8.
9.
10. 12.
13. 15. 17. 19. 20.
For a full see John A. De Novo, American description, Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1919 (Minneapolis: of Minnesota University Press, 1963.) Cited in Kolko, p. 294. Gardner, p. 227. Kolko, p. 299. According to Kolko, in fact, Millspaugh "was there to open Iranian riches to the United States" and led the American government's effort to direct much of Iranian affairs. Kolko does note that the Iranians, themselves, were "delighted" with continued American protection, then a useful counterforce to Russian and British inroads. Gardner, p. 228. Kolko elaborates Hurley's posture, noting Hurley's fear of British mono"imperialism, poly, and exploitation" and his appeal that Roosevelt work for "liberty and Democracy" in Iran by obtaining important oil concessions, maintaining a mission concerned with domestic life in Iran, and breaking the economic hold of the British. See p. 308. Gardner, p. 229. Gardner further comments, "Apparently without informing either Russia or Great Britain, the United States had moved to obtain an oil concession in Iran. Never before had American interest had a clear shot in this but now proscountry, pects were especially good." Kolko, p. 295. 11. Kolko, p. 300 Kolko, p. 301. Churchill said to Roosevelt on March 4, 1944, that "My position in this, as in all matters, is that Great Britain seeks no advantage, territorial or
otherwise, as result of the war. On the other hand she will not be deprived of anything which rightly belongs to her after having given her best services to the good cause--at least not so long as your humble servant is entrusted with the conduct of affairs." Ibid. Ibid., p. 302. 14. Ibid., p. 303. Ibid., pp. 303-4. 16. Ibid., p. 229. Gardner, p. 229. 18. Gardner, pp. 229-230. Kolko, p. 310. Ibid., p. 311. One revisionist historian, D. F. Flemsees ing, oil as an extremely strong factor in Russian demands. "For decades," he writes, "the British had been taking great quantities of oil from South Iran.
The Russians desired to exploit North Iran, partly because they feared that their own fields might be drained by wells south of the border. It was sometimes said that Russia did not need oil, but this was not true in view of the fuel needs of any large expanding economy and of the recent war damage in her own oil fields. She also naturally desired to share in Middle East oil takings, since the West had fabulous holdings in Iran, Arabia, and Iraq." See The Cold War and Its Origins, Volume I (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday
, 1961),
IRANIAN STUDIES
p.
340. 32
21. 22.
23. 25.
495. on February 6, when 496. Gardner notes that favored met, Eden and Stettinius Ministers Ete Foreign the withdrawal for Iran after concession oil a Soviet that KoIko suspects See p. 230. troops. of foreign did not just troops to maintain desire Churchill's for "but most probably from Russia any threat concern would deal only with the United the Iranians fear that P. 496. to do so." if permitted States p. 231. Gardner, 24. p. 496. Kolko, Relations, "American Foreign Freeman Smith, Robert Toward a New ed., J. Bernstein, in Barton 1920-1942," in American (New York: Past: Essays History Dissenting p. 237. 1968), Pantheon, Ibid.,
p.
SIBTl, p.
33
WINTER 1970
AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR THE MAJLESCOMMITTEE
ANN T.
SCHULZ
Seven years ago, a political report published by Echo of Iran raised the issue of the difficulty with which the Iranian politic l elite between distinguishes criticism and subversion. There is still only a hazy boundary separating treason from the lesser Just evil. one example of this level of debate was the suggestion by the "opposition" Mardom Party Newspaper that to attribute administrative misdemeanors to either ministers or to the Imperial was to commit treason.2 Inspectorate One of the distressing effects of the failure to make this distinction in contemporary Iran is that a generation may appear which is loyal to the monarchy but which holds attitudes counter-productive to the espoused long-run political goals of the Shah.3 The attitudes to which I refer include the rejection of policy-oriented political activity and a flexible bargaining stance in the resolution of social problems. This writer met a number of young people in Iran who saw general disorder as the only alternative to the tight rein with which the Shah attempts to guide political activity. If, in fact, there is, as the Shah maintains, growing support for the general goals of the Shah-People Revolution, the time has come to examine consciously the development of areas in which a broader segment of the can participate population in shaping public policy without raising the loyalty This observation is not, issue. in itself, a new one. Almost a decade ago, T. Cuyler Young spoke to the problem of developing a corps of young political leaders.4 By asking that leadership development be given explicit consideration, Professor Young was recognizing the existence of several problems (in addition to that mentioned above) which confront all polities and especially "developing' ones.
Ann T. Schulz is Assistant Professor at the University of New Hampshire. IRANIAN STUDIES
34
of Political
Science
of of these problems is the achievement The first goals-as developmental be described what may generally development. or socio-economic be they 'nation-building' has in policy-making The need for expanding participation on politerature in the burgeoning been amply discussed The justificadevelopment.5 and administrative litical for broadened participation tion advanced most frequently scrutiny to additional will be subjected is that policies for elites to enforce programs and that it will be easier once adopted. reason for involvcrucial, and equally A second, is ing a large number of people in policy determination The stake in the regime. the participants' to increase and treason on the part of power of criticism confusion that potenmakes it more likely almost certainly holders fashion. will respond in a similar tial counter-elites what happened prior to and immediThat was essentially There Revolution. the Constitutional ately following at issue which need of policy questions were substantive of the monarchy, but not have endangered the continuation partly because MohammadAli Shah chose to remain inflexisupport for his refinancial ble on the issue of foreign gime, he forced the issue of curbing the Shah's power by the newly established closing Majles.6 in Iran appears criticism of political The pattern Rather than consideration. somewhat unusual upon first with criticism opposition countering finding the elite is an extremethe Shah himself arguments in its defense, as well as the minisof policy execution ly vocal critic of the servants and the civil ters of their departments at persons of little directed Thus, criticism public. aulevelled at those with greater power is acceptable; unless its object is exit is less acceptable thority, between the Shah and The distinction tremely vague. The Shah is is even more profound. other politicians of the manner in his criticism to direct most likely the iniis executed because he is nominally which policy no this crucial role, Yet despite of all policy. tiator If this of the Shah is permissible. public criticism which derives maximum as a tactic is described pattern to competitors) relative prestige (increasing advantage action compa(by negative with a minimum of independent it no longer can be seen as unique to Iran, but risons), in which the stakes of found in situations is frequently are high. Thus, Iranian political activity political are immune to neither critical stance s nor to cynelites to both.' And, in susceptible icism but particularly of system, the difinition Iran, as in any other political behavior treasonous system-challenging")" (or 'negative leaders is pragmatic and most often defined by political themselves. 35
WINTER1970
The possibility of increasing a regime's legitimacy should enchant the power elite in any polity. In fact, Manfred Halpern has recognized the dual benefits of broadened participation of the Shah's in his criticism avoidance of the new middle class on the ground both of formulating good policy and of curbing alienation.9 The late Dr. Hasan Arsanjani pinpointed the sources of alienation suc 4nctly in a recent article on "The Youth Revolution." He held "society" for the responsible directions through which youth vented its abundant energies. Youth share an inherent drive to express themselves. If this drive is stymied, the youthful energies will find destructive outlets. One Azarbaijani newspaper writer indicates that there may have been some increase in participation: "In the short time that the intelligentsia has been given a chance and a better deal..."ll But whatever improvement has been made, the article concludes (as do the observers cited above) on the pessimistic note that "it is not becoming of this age of mental maturity that the people should be given childish games and expect them to accept them as so-called political exigencies." Much of the pressure for changing the "standards of admission" to decision-making circles has apparently come from the "technocrats" and the bureaucratic middle class who are anxious to see "objective achievement criteria" govern leadership recruitment.12 There are other critics of centralized decision-making who emphasize the breadth of participation rather than the use or failure to use achievement criteria. One of these critics, a writer for Neda-ye-Luristan, demanded that the Interior Ministry confront the problem of local council elections honestly. The rationale for stopping the elections "midstream" was that "unsatisfactory" representatives had been chosen in several instances. Despite the Government's justification, the writer cited felt that the elections were the pertinent end, rather than the composition of the Councils.13 (The law providing for municipal
elections
was
passed
by the
Majles
in
1955.)
In many contemporary Communist regimes today (to cite but one example) there is apparently a conflict similar to that found by Professor Bill in Iran between technocrats and planners, on the one hand, and an elite which coopts its new members on the basis of loyalty (both to persons and to "the regime") alone.14 This conflict is exacerbated because the doctrinal commitment of the elite is to universalistic recruitment criteria, thus its contradicting actual behavior. This commitment
arouses unfulfilled expectations. The Shah has made such an ideological commitment and the existence of this IRANIAN STUDIES
36
contradiction in Iran is almost certainly one reason why there is extensive cynicism among the elites and "counterelites."15 The tensions created by such contradictions (between espoused ideology and practice) ofttimes affect the prescriptive conclusions of outside observers, be they scholars or more casual onlookers. It is by no means certain that achievement criteria for leadership recruitment are untarnished gems to be coveted at any historical juncture. There is much logic in the argument that charismatic leadership, for example, might provide the kind of security and motivation needed to meet successfully the wrenching dislocations inherent in development. The more realistic question that must be asked is: Is there any middle ground which might be an acceptable compromise between open and controlled participation for all concerned? Dr. Arsanjani, in the article cited above, called for a balance between expression and control. The balance continues to hang on the side of control. There are some trends in Iranian politics which do evidence potential for stimulating political activity and we youth with leadership capabilities. Unfortunately know little about the impact of their experiences in the Literacy, Rural Development and Health Corps. Do these 'in the field" less young people emerge from their stints and more committed to activity in cynical about politics the area of public policy? If they do, other experiments in institution-building might be encouraged. Concomitant with youth involvement, however, must come the expansion of the possibility of meaningful poliIn this tical activity during extended adult careers. have direction, efforts to regularize economic decisions Yet associations. led to the formation of new business associations in such private the Government's involvement than they otherwise renders them less valuable might be in stimulating policy-oriented activity.16 institutions the existing ofSimilarly, political centers of policy discusfer little hope as alternative of the powerThe recognition sion as now constituted. lessness of the Majles and the political parties by reduces even furIranians within and without the elite to prospective in giving direction ther their usefulness or policy makers. politicians Occasionally attempts are of these institutions the legitimacy but made to increase undertaken in a quiet or even the moves are generally This approach undercuts the possibiclandestine manner. as sincere and that the measures will be interpreted lity of the elite's be due to the partiality may, in fact, foci for political alternative commitment to supporting 37
WINTER 1970
as Secretary loyalties. Ata-ollah Khosravani was removed the same time General of the Iran Novin Party at roughly of his use of criticisms that newspapers were voicing the very sito quell debate. However, pressure tactics their such moves deadens impact. lence which surrounds like Political strategies, There is planned and deliberate. for regarding political development an unmanageable variable. dependent constructs might include potential debate on policy issues while not
restrictions
on political
any others, may be no justifiable reason as a natural process-Thus, developmental to broaden strategies eliminating completely
activity.17
depolicy One such arena in which "constructive" is, I would like to bate might successfully be encouraged inCertainly, suggest, that of the Majles committee. creasing their participation in policy making will not automatically improve the regard with which the Majles is is also a held. Opening the selection of legislators commitnecessary means to that end. However, increased of tee activity might at least change the perspectives the Majles members themselves--and with 200 plus representatives and approximately a 50 per cent turnover every effect. that would have more than a little four years, proportion of The Majles itself includes an increasing as the "educated what may very generally be described as a fomiddle class," which should bolster its utility cal point for development. that the
well
One is Such a strategy entails many problems. there has never been a broad consensus concerning correct
procedures
as on their
role
for
deliberations
committee
in policy-making.
as
As one deputy
the power of active the Mossadegh during period observed, a committee policy depended, and its ability to influence even then, chairman.18 upon the power of the individual In other words, the committee has little life of its own. the lifeblood of a To carry the metaphor further, in large measure upon the parliamentary committee depends resources committee has no at its disposal. The Majles
technical or physical resources. research In fact, assistants. themselves handle the recording deliberations. legislature
Another is
potential its ability
or It has no clerical representatives individual in the committee involved
source of to draw
committee upon the
in analyzing non-legislators policy. U.S. Congress, for example, regularly have no formal ties to the Government scholarly or economic interest in the IRANIAN STUDIES
38
power in expertise
any of
Committees in the use witnesses who and who have either subject under
of however, the patterns In the Majles, consideration. of the bureauthe preponderance reinforce consultation The Majles committee comdetermination. cracy in policy and of govmonly hears only the views of other deputies between priThe actual consultation ernment witnesses. takes issues and the Government on policy vate interests For example, the Majles place within the ministries. hearing on the Fourth Plan Bill conPlanning Committee's of Plan of the Director of the testimony primarily sisted had been submitted to the Before this bill Organization. the however, meetings between the architectsl?f Majles, had taken place. industrialists Plan and private lack of constructive legislators' The contemporary then should not have mystiin policy-making participation did) in Hoveida (as it apparently fied Prime Minister under which the committees operlight of the constraints Nor is Iran exempt from the logic which has reate.20 to the overall activity in legislative lated the decline monand the simultaneous activity growth in governmental by resources and intellectual of financial opolization tasks are further And, the committees' administrators.21 encumbered by the current emphasis on gaining the "approbefore it val" of the Iran Novin Party on legislation goes to the Majles as a whole, and by the desire of the through the Majles as to push legislation Administration as possible. rapidly commita confusing problem exemplifies The latter both a strong ment on the part of the Shah to developing party and at the same time to pre"revolutionary" single within the competition a semblance of partisan serving party apparAlthough the commitment to a single Majles. such measures as the appointment ently has not dictated only, legisand deputy ministers of Iran Novin ministers is brought before party caucuses before it reaches lation into stimulate in an apparent effort the Majles floor, (December, The recent in the Party organization. terest in funds for the Fourth Plan was "expected 1969) increase as it has already been to pass the House unscathed group of the ruling Iranapproved by thl parliamentary does not guarantee This kind of activity Novin Party."2 role in developing greater to the party a substantially between but it does place one more obstacle legislation, Majles deliberation. the Government and active There are many examples of the second encumbrance cogent one is A particularly to committee deliberation. passed in the Majles the Defense Loans Bill which recently According to the Conafter only two weeks of discussion. the Majles is the focal point of budgetary powstitution The Defense Bill should have aroused exceptional er. because funds for the armed forces are, to interest 39
WINTER1970
indulge in the ultimate siderable contention.23 weeks.
a matter of conunderstatement, But passage took a scant two
indications In addition to these direct of the imthere are as constituted, potence of Majles committees means of assessing indirect the importance of committee in processing activity one of these is to legislation. examine the characteristics of the legislators who are in the committees recruited to leadership positions themA comparison of the social selves. background characteristics of Majles representatives with the Iranian population as a whole shows that particular segments of the were strongly in the legislapopulation overrepresented ture--the secularly-educated, landowners, professionals, and currently civil servants. If the committees were active in policy-making these characteristics should appear even more strongly in sought-after leadership positions.24 We studied the characteristics of committee chairmen and members of the Executive Committee in the first twenty-one sessions to determine if this funneling did The initial occur. selection criteria but were repeated only to a very slight degree. Educated deputies made up a larger percentage of the office-holders than did the non-educated.25 Among those deputies with high office holding scores, however, the advantage enjoyed by the educated deputies in obtaining chairs declined. The same held for occupation. relationship For example, in the Majles as a whole, deputies with salaried occupations overrepresented their corresponding numbers in the population to a far greater extent than they themselves wer e overrepresented within the Majles committee leadership. 6 In contrast to Frey's study of the occupants of various leadership posts within the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Cabinet, the lack of differentiation between the Majles membership and the leaders is one further indication of the lack of power attributed to the committees.27
The variation in leaders' backgrounds during the four "Constitutional periods" also speaks to the lack of independence and thus prestige enjoyed by Majles committees. Committee chairmen were more likely to be educated in the traditional Islamic schools during Reza Shah's reign and during the post-Mossadegh era than they were during either the Constitutional period or the post-World War II years. There were occupational differences as In the periods of strong monarchical well. rule, officeholding was monopolized by deputies with land-holding and government service backgrounds to the detriment of deputies in what has been termed the "persuasive" occupations IRANIAN STUDIES
40
relidefinition) writer's and (by this teaching --legal, about why One might draw a number of conclusions gious. I The only point took place. shifts particular these They indicate they did take place. wish to make is that a determs, in these is, leadership parliamentary that bethe boundaries words, or in other variable, pendent have been politics and external tween the committees vague. are
If there relatively
committees that are so many indications enterit is not then a futile powerless,
Perthem for new tasks? prise to recommend refurbishing of these same data other aspects haps not, for several about the committee's conclusions point to some positive were regarded as reand expertise Experience position. Senior depufor committee chairmen. levant attributes positions to leadership elected ties were most frequently than the averolder were slightly chairmen and committee for leadership some qualifications Thus, age deputy. was And there to be important. thought were apparently specioccupying deputies in terms of specific continuity electthe committees on the average Although fic posts. held many deputies over the session, ed one new chairman In other more than one session. during the same chair
to a particbe elected words, a deputy would frequently ular chair for one or two but not all of the organizationover a span of several in each session (jalese) al periods but is less obvious, This kind of continuity sessions. for the an opportunity providing very real, nonetheless growth of expertise. that a seat in the Rajles In arguing his thesis in policyright to participate the possessor's legitimizes that "members of the Majlis making, Leonard Binder writes to see and opportunity and senate have an unparalleled before they become law. in committee, bills discuss selfand senate members can and do insert .Majlis does not have When the bill amendments. protective they may also delay it for varying staunch royal support, The Majles Planning Committee appears to be periods."2 According to one in these terms. active particularly work, it receives newspaper account of the Committee's in projects development for specific numerous proposals by the recommending deputies.29 represented the districts this kind of actiWhether or not one wishes to disparage it is part and parcel of vity as "pork barreln politics, Morein more powerful legislatures. committee activity decision-making the independent to control over, attempts have come through the Planpower of the Plan Organization to conthat the stimulus It is doubtful ning Commission. in the Committee, but trol the planning body originated did not erode the Commitcertainly itself the exercise tee's power. 41
WINTER1970
Members of the Petitions Committee have also indicated an interest in assuming an active role in its "ombudsman" capacity. that Kayhan reported 58,000 complaints were received by the Committee the twentyduring first session of the Majles.30 Most of these complaints were not processed because of technical resource constraints and the lack of contact between Ministries and the representatives themselves. The probability that greater committee activity would be enthusiastically greeted by the representatives is high. Committee chairmen are consistently the major source of opinion in floor debate on any particular issue. In the same vein, within at least the four-man Mashhad delegation, the deputies make a conscious to diattempt vide legislation and constituent demands by subject matter on the basis of their own occupational specializations and committee assignments. The crucial missing ingredient,then, is administrative support for their expanded roles. It would be worthwhile experimenting with improved technical support (in the form of financial, staff and witness resources) in the absence of a deeper political commitment to the committees. Technical resources are just one area of stress in institution-building; however, its relatively noncontroversial character may recommend its selection as a point of departure. The renewed emphasis upon institution-building in studies of political change follows on the heels of the earlier recognition of the importance of informal negotiations and decision-making processes. While institutions may be only the visible portion of the iceberg, their characteristics are not unrelated either in shape, origin or fate to the submerged form. Most inquiry follows such a dialectic path. One student disposed toward the behavioral approach for understanding legislatures is now contemplating the possibility that such institutions themselves possess independent influence over the behavior of their members.3 Thus, although institutions with nominative similarity may exhibit marked normative differences, they are not completely formless conduits and may conceivably be shaped to elicit specific desired behavior. And, given the state of our knowledge about political development, experimentation is doubtless as efficient and reliable as theory-building. For example, the Iranian Army, a bulwark of tradition in one sense has been given an innovative role in social development.32 Data from such cases on the reciprocal influence of role, member and institution would provide an opportunity to sift through the available hypotheses.
IRANIAN
STUDIES
42
NOTES 388 (Echo of Iran,
1963).
1.
Political
2.
Mehre
3.
Throughout Mission For My Country (New York: McGrawHill, 1961), the Shah discusses the "political immadifficult. turity" which makes policy discussion 2 "Iran in Continuing Crisis," Foreign Affairs,40, (1961), p. 290. countries do not reAll prescriptions for developing as an unmiticircles gard more open decision-making seriously the gated blessing, but most consider problems presented by a narrow basis for policy devis usually elopment. In fact, political development in defined as including expanded participation decision-making. J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner, Development (PrincePolitical Parties and Political ton: Pye Princeton University 1966),MLucian Press, and S. Verba, Political DevelCulture and Political 1969), Milton Princeton U. Press, opment (Princeton: of Development Administration,' Esman,i "The Politics in Wm. Siffen and J. D. Montgomery, eds., Approaches to Development Politics, and Change Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), and Lucian W. Pye, (Boston: Little, Aspects of Political Development Brown and Company, 1966). to compromise with The revolutionaries' willingness but the throne is seen not only in the Constitution also in such behavior as asking the Shah's consent before seeking bast. E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-TW90 (London: F. Cass, 1966), p. 118. Marvin Zonis, "Iran: The Politics of Insecurity" (UnPh.D. dissertation, M.I.T., 1968), pp. 531published 535. Iran: Political Development in a Leonard Binder, of California University (Berkeley: Changing Society Press , 1962), p. 288. "The Character and Scope of the SoManfred Halpern, in the Middle East," in William R. cial Revolution North Revolution: Polk, ed., The Developmental the Middle East and South Asia (Washington, Africa,, The Middle East Institute, 1963), p. 15. D. C.: It should be noted, however, Donya Almanac, 1968. in politithat the lack of meaningful participation cal life is only one cause of alienation among Iranof Student "The Politics ian youth. James A. Bill, The Case of Iran," Iranian Studies, Alienation: II, 1 (1969). Asre Novin, "Victory Should Not Be Election Goal," in Echo of Iran, XVI, 106 (1968). translated "The Iranian Intelligentsia: Class and James Bill, Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton Change" (Unpublished University, 1968).
4. 5.
6.
7. 8. 9.
10.
11. 12.
Reports, Iran,
May
22,
1968.
43
WINTER 1970
13. 14.
15. 16.
17.
18.
19. 20. 21.
22. 23. 24. 25.
Neda-ye-Luristan, January 17, 1968. and Group Conflict H. Gordon Skilling, "Leadership in Czechoslovakia," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Political in Eastern Leadership and the Soviet Euroee Union, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970). Marvin Zonis, "Iran: The Politics of Insecurity" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, M.I.T., 1968). The new Export-Import rules announced by UnderSecretary of Economy Rokneddin call for the Tehrani of an exporters' formation association which business men would be required to join. Because it was stimulated by the government's in coordiinterest nating export activities, the prospective association could hardly be described as a private, voluntary organization that with all that designation implies. One example of such directed is Presidevelopment dent Nasser's deliberate expansion of the U.A.R. legislators' activity and prerogatives. R. H. Dekmejian, "The U.A.R. National A Pioneering Assembly: Experiment," Middle Eastern Studies, IV, 4 (1968), pp. 361-375. Permanence or "institutionalization" implies, by definition, no personal dependence. The concept of "institutionalization" is operationalized in Nelson Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, 1 (1968), LXII, 144-168. Kayhan, September 21, 1967. "I want to find inspiration from you, advice from you. Your criticisms should be on a much higher level." March 8, 1969. Kayhan International, Samuel H. Beer, 'The British Legislature and the Problem of Mobilizing Consent" in Elke Frank, ed., Lawmakers in a Changing World (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966). Kayhan International, December 6, 1969. It is noteworthy that such caucuses take place after Cabinet action rather than before. Mlanoucher Parvin, "Military Expenditure in Iran: A Forgotten Question," Iranian Studies I, 4 (1968), pp. 149-154. Frederick Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 224. The findings reported here are presented in detail in this author's "Recruitment and Behavior of Iranian Legislators: The Influence of Social Background" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1969). The category "educated" includes all those deputies with college and Islamic schoolThe remainder ing. are termed "non-educated." This discussion is arbitrary in the sense that it reflects no judgment about the exact chronological point at which one can claim to have received an
IRANIAN STUDIES
44
26. 27.
28. 29. 30. 31. 32.
was overrepreThe educated population education. ; the educasented in the Majles by an index of The "index of overrepreby only 1.3. ted deputies of any characis simply the percentage sentation" to its relative found in a sub-population teristic Donald R. population. in the total distribution and Their World (Chapel Matthews, U.S. Senators 1960), of North Carolina Press, University Hill: p. 273. (government and Using the same index, the salaried in the was overrepresented population professional) by 1.2. Majles by 5.4 and in the leadership bore party membership, where relevant, Political of a committee to the attainment relationship little however, can be attriThis finding, chairmanship. to parties of political buted to the irrelevancy as well as to that of the comconsiderations policy mittees. Development in a Political Leonard Binder, Iran: of CaliforUniversity (Berkeley: qinq Society, nia Press, 1962), p. 240. Kayhan, May 15, 1967. November 22, 1967. Kaan, in The Durable Partner," "Congress, Huitt, RlhK. Studies on ConSidney Wise and Richard F. Schier, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1969). (new York: gress Bernard Gruf, "Le Role Social de L'Armee en Trau," VI (1962), pp. 49-53. Orient,
45
WINTER 1970
BOOK REVIEWS
C.
Dimension. By J. The Military Middle Eastern Politics: 1969. Frederick- A. Praeger, New York: Hurewitz. $11.50. pp. xvii+553
MAJID TEHRANIAN of military on the role literature The expanding on focused has generally countries in the underdeveloped Cold War place, In the first phenomena. post-war three deal to dump a great have led the Great Powers rivalries states. Secondly, client in their hardware of military have led of development strains and political the social and to take direct to remove the civilians the military over taken has often the military And finally, charge. The connecand slogans. banners under "revolutionary" has often however, three phenomena, these between tion or rationalized underestimated been ignored, away. Professor
Hurewitz's
study
of
the
military
in
Mid-
While it is a good case in point. dle Eastern politics data about and quantitative massive historical provides to show the connecting all three phenomena, it fails links among them. some in debunking put forth usually countries. developed
however, successful, is quite Hurewitz rationalizations of the more ingenious in the underrule of military on behalf
to include by Hurewitz defined East, The Middle to Morocco, from Pakistan stretching states the eighteen major arsenals become one of the world's has increasinqly acdecades, In the two post-war of military hardware. $11 about the area has absorbed to his estimates, cording to anoAs compared equipment. worth of military billion the regions, major arms importing ther of the world's is a staggering this America, of Latin states nineteen of area and a population over-all with a larger figure: is Associate Majid Tehranian in ence at the New College
IRANIAN STUDIES
Professor Sarasota,
46
of Political Florida.
Sci-
to the Middle East's 300 million, 250 million as compared Cuba) imported in the same periLatin America (excluding worth of weaponry. od only about $1.5 billion phenomenon is not hard to The explanation for this requirements of what is find. In addition to the normal 'internal security" or "pacificaeuphemistically called on coercion tion" by governments that depend more heavily East is also plagued with bitter than consent, the Middle endintense and seemingly regional conflicts harvesting less the Israelis, the arms races: The Arabs against the monarchies against Pakistanis against the Indians, those of the West against the republics, and the clients in some of the countries of the Soviet Union. Because and the oil exporting states) the region (notably Israel exchange earnings, have the means to pay in hard foreign for provided an enticing market the Middle East has also "the merchants of death." approach to the Hurewitz takes a comprehensive as the rewith the national as well problem. He deals aspects of the power struggles gional and international historical, in the Middle East. His method is basically to charclassification but he also provides a five-fold the Middle political systems: republics acterize Eastern and Sudan), reSyria, Iraq, under military rule (Egypt, coalitions (Pakistan, publics under military-civilian monarchies (Libyal, Algeria and Turkey), traditional modernizing monarchies Saudi Arabia and Yemen), (Iran, and non-miliand Kuwait), Morocco, Afghanistan, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia). tary republics (Israel, is more descriptive however, Hurewitz's typology, us wh the military It does not tell than analytical. no generIt estlishes roles. have played such diverse between variables any number of possible al correlations and their of the military in the social character polititendencies. howHurewitz, cal behavior and ideological the simplistic debunks notion--propaever, effectively on the subject literature gated by some of the comforting countries in the underdeveloped usually act --that armies of modernization. as vanguards to claims that armies have acted as the Contrary he provides substanof nationalist integration, vanguard and conscript armto show how both career tial evidence in the Middle East have actually reflected the ethies of domination in their or regional patterns nic, religious The Pakistani consists of societies. chiefly army still are still officers Moroccan Bermostly West Pakistanis; excluded from Arabs were until Palestinian recently ber; Similar in the Jordanian dissensitive army. positions characterizes In conscript armies as well. crimination 47
WINTER 1970
Iraq and Egypt, the top officers are invariably Sunni Arabs; in Turkey, they are Sunni Turks; in Israel, nonJews are excluded. Hurewitz concedes, Nevertheless, Middle Eastern conscript armies have served to some extent as instruments of national and middle class integration political aspirations. Valid as these observations are, they provide no alternative theoretical framework for understanding the meaning of Middle Eastern military in pointerventionism litics. Following Max Weber, most American social scientists have treated armies as models of rational-legal bureaucracies acting on behalf of "modern" as opposed to "traditional" values. as Hurewitz rightly Consequently, charges, they have too uncritically portrayed armies as the vanguard of nationalist integration and reform.2 The theory has also served--possibly ideolinadvertently--the ogical function of rationalizing Western aid toward the militarization of the client regimes in the underdeveloped countries. By contrast to such theorists, Hurewitz maintains that "the only generalizations that stand up against the evidence are subregional." But this is in part due to the great diversity of military in the Midorganizations dle East. Tribal, professional, conscript and guerilla armies could not be expected to act uniformly in the process of change. What is certain, however, is that the military have moved in quite a number of instances into a leadership vacuum. Having failed to lead the transition from an agrarian to an industrial the traditional society, civilian leadership has either abdicated or given in to the military. The military, in turn, has often come to power on nationalist and modernist slogans. But because of its social composition, often biased in favor of the dominant ethnic, religious or social groups, and its political disunity, inexperience and insensitivity, it has often turned away from the radical measures necessary for social and economic transformation. Instead, the military has often tried--and in some instances it has partially succeeded--to exercise reform from above. Mohammad Ali, Ataturk and Reza Shah were the earliest examples of this in the Middle East; Nasser, Boumedienne and the Libyan officers are the latest efforts; the military in Syria and Iraq represent the weaknesses and failures. In the chapter on Iran, of special interest to the readers of Iranian Studies, Hurewitz is in league with those social scientists who have shown insensitivity to the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people. "Whatever else Mussaddiq had exemplified in the early 1950's,n he writes, "political freedom was neither an achieved
IRANIAN STUDIES
48
of his two objective nor an avowed practical reality If we assume freedom of the (p. 294). governments" to be signs of political parties press and political Throughwrong. remarks are patently freedom, Hurewitz's Mosaddeq allowed even the opposiout his term of office, the Tudeh Party) to operate relation groups (including groups all real opposition By contrast, freely. tively It is true since the coup of 1953. have been suppressed to such extra-parliamentary that Mosaddeq resorted martial law and rule by decree to methods as referendums, get his way, but this was mainly because he was fighting the Shah, the Communists, the on too many fronts--against signalled His failure the and the Americans. British, It also demonstrated democracy. of parliamentary failure the conditions social reforms, that without fundamental freedom could not be sustained. for greater political With respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Hlureand propro-Israeli has a distinctly analysis witz's as simple nor as is neither The situation American bias. commentary by the autypical as the following one-sided thor suggests: were designed The Soviet arms policies the Arab to polarize to stir up tensions, and Israel, and to promote a settlestates ment favorable to the Arabs, in order to discredit the United States as the principal The United guardian of peace in the zone. however, tried to dampen the tensions, States, and to to prevent Arab-Israel polarization, settlement. (p. 493) urge an equitable a the book provides its shortcomings, Despite in the account of military politics and detailed lively to both the layman and the specialMiddle East, useful character of the study has its The encyclopedic ist. It provides a massive amount of data to show merits. in the area have conflicts and internal how the external the political systems in the Midcombined to militarize The data capacities. dle East well beyond their internal to claims by some social also suggests contrary that, in the Middle East has on the the military scientists, and economic developwhole slowed the process of social resources away from those channels and ment by diverting military regimes that are politically by consolidating and insensitive. insecure
NOTES 1.
As is often the case, Middle Eastern events moved After the presses. than the Western printing faster 49
WINTER 1970
2.
be recent military take-over, Libya can no longer monarchy. classified as a traditional Halas Manfred "The more the army was modernized," argued, "the more its pern has typically composition, concapabilities, and purpose organization, spirit, criticism of the existinq stituted a radical politiwas the army, modern technology cal system. Within usefulness and power appreeagerly welcomed and its showed the political system ciated. By contrast, and greed greater inertia, inefficiency, skepticism, Within of modern science. in utilizing the products In civilian polirewarded. the army, merit was often larger. nepotism, and bribery loomed tics, corruption, tranof national mission Within the army, a sense regional, or economic scending parochial, interest, deto be much more clearly or kinship ties seemed Halelse in society."--Manfred fined than anywhere The Politics of Social Change in the Middle pern, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton East and North Africa 1963). University Press,
The Persian Oxford:
Land
Reform,
Clarendon
Press,
By Ann K.S.
1962-1966. 1969.
xiii+386
pp.
Lambton. $11.75.
AHMAD ASHRAF With various system published in dard work, Landlord
ton the
essays on Iran the past three and Peasant in
has established herself as agrarian problems of Iran.
and insight, her mastery of the field observations in the 1940s combine to produce the uniqueness this area.
and its decades, Persia,
land tenure and a stanProfessor Lamb-
the foremost Her historical
authority on knowledge
Persian language, and later in the of her scholarship
and 1960s
her in
In the present work Professor Lambton's main objective is to describe in great detail the course of events of the first and second stages of the land reform of the 1960s. To enable herself to fulfill this objective, she travelled widely in Iran during the implementation of the in the reform years She visited 1962-1968. over 300 villages, inquired into the actual methods of the reform's execution, investigated the attitudes of the
Ahmad
for
Ashraf is Lecturer in Sociology Social Research, University of
IRANIAN STUDIES
50
at Tehran.
the
Institute
to their comments and complaints, by listening peasants (in some cases the land reform officials and interviewed She to villages). accompanying them on their missions and has carestatistics has also made use of the official fully examined the land reform laws and regulations. and a postchapters of seventeen The book consists contain a summary of the two chapters The first script. of the situation background and a portrayal historical Chapter three is prior to the land reform of the 1960s. of the Land Reform Law examination and detailed a careful Chapters four and five deal with the 1962. of January, of opposition, of the law, the suppression implementation and the extension of the reform to the whole country. of cover the implementation The next three chapters province of Khorasan, stage in the northeastern the first The ninth chapand the west. the south, the southeast, the second stage, governing ter deals with the regulations of the the execution detail two chapters and the following deal with the Chapters twelve and thirteen second stage. and problems of of disputes and solution investigation irrigation.
length
The cooperative
in three
chapters,
is concerned last chapter in the Finally, Trends.'
provides stage.
us with
an account
societies
fourteen
are
through
discussed
at
sixteen.
The
"Achievements, with Professor postscript,
of the programs
and Problems Lambton
of the third
of this work is its rich The primary contribution of the events in over 300 villages. and lucid description in each vilThe author summarizes the state of affairs the reader with providing lage in one or two paragraphs, of the Persian land reform in action. a lively portrait monograph as a descriptive The work may be characterized This lack of a framework. conceptual without an explicit Lambton's refrom Professor approach derives theoretical methods, and modes of anathe theory, fusal to consider instruas useful heuristic science of modern social lysis social pheand explaining analyzing ments in describing, draw his own concluThe reader must, therefore, nomena. quessions with regard to a number of major theoretical such as 'Why was the land reform launched at this tions, "What was the moment in Iranian history?", particular politiand "What are the social, nature of the reform?", A brief of the reform?" cal, and economic consequences in order to seems necessary comment on these questions in this work. some of the problems inherent clarify With regard to the background of the reform, Promade an attempt to go beyond Lambton has clearly fessor the of formal events and to relate the narrow perimeter ideological land reform movement of the 1960s to certain 51
WINTER1970
and social, developments and political circumeconomic, stances. However, she seems to have paid insufficient within attention to some of the structural changes the Iranian social system--as well as changes on the international scene and external pressures--that undoubtedly of those who drew the thinking and decisions influenced up and implemented the Land Reform Law of 1962. Lambton points In her historical works, Professor of the land tenure out the historical specificities system in Persia, the domination of the arbitrary power of and the patrimonial rulers over the land-owning class, sociin this resulting precariousness of land ownership ety. Surprisingly, however, Professor Lambton does not relate her historical insights land into the Persian in the past of land reform tenure system to the politics decade. Thus, the chain of meaningful connections just cited is not given sufficient prominence in the author's account of "The Political, Social, and Economic Background" of the reform in chapter two, which is the main explanatory part of the work. The resumption of and rapid growth in oil revenues and the "dollar in the mid- and late-fifties shower" produced rapid growth in entrepreneurial activities and greatly strengthened the civilian bureauand military cracies. These interlocking factors have brought about basic structural changes in the Persian social system as a whole. The proportion in of agricultural production the GNP constantly decreased as the oil and enindustry trepreneurial activities replaced the functional importance of agricultural production in the basic economic structure of the society. the growing Furthermore, strength of the military and security forces and the bureaucracy decreased the dependence of political authority on the land-owning class and provided a solid ground for the revival of the total power of patrimonial authority. Ideologically, the conflicts between patrimonial nationalism, middle-class "nationalitarianism," and intelligentsia-working-class communism has been of utmost significance in influencing the decisions relevant to the land In this reform. situation, both the resistance of the declining land-owning class and their defeat were inevitthe proponents able. Therefore, of the emerging patrimonial nationalism, who were equipped with the traditional institutions of arbitrary total power and supported by the modernizinq forces of the military and civilian bureaucracies and the dependent bourgeoisie and pressured by external forces, decided to champion a land reform, both to defeat the opportunism of the land-owning class and to forestall the rise of the middle-class "nationalitarianism" and the working-class-intelligentsia communism. In summary, long-range structural developments and the IRANIAN STUDIES
52
due to the and the bureaucracy, rise of the bourgeoisie the had already diminished rapid growth in oil revenues, class and power of the land-owning economic and political housethe dependency of the patrimonial thus decreased and the enterprise agricultural hold on the traditional the land of these developments, As a result landowner. The only questions episode. reform was an inevitable of the reform. were the type and the effector context of the immediate situational The analysis economic and that the social, of the land reform reveals in the early 1960s created a situation crisis political type of land reform could be in which this particular authorof the patrimonial under the leadership realized, of the reputed "architect ity and Dr. Hasan Arsanjani, of the movement the main objective Clearly land reform." revolution was to forestall situation in this concrete development of from below and to postpone the political of the logic of objective The application the society. would reveal that without the long-range possibility and the more immediate pressures, developments structural to be set in movement was not likely even this particular leadership. motion by the patrimonial accounts of the land Turning to the descriptive suffers Lambton, the portrait reform provided by Professor In the majority of approach. from the lack of an analytical with only vague and inconclusive cases we are furnished about the improvements in housing conditions, statements of the area under the expansion the rise in productivity, the accomof fertilizers, the utilization cultivation, in the decrease of the rural cooperatives, plishments of the peaand the indebtedness practices fore-selling The reader is often left without a clear noetc. sants, of the and shortcomings the achievements tion regarding reform. of the land reform with the consequences Finally, of and economic structure political regard to the social, considcommunities have not been adequately the village of class and class conFor example, the questions ered. The ignored. are largely in these communities flict of the Iranian land reform has widstrategy" "original between those who had the ened the class differentiation at the time of the reform right of cultivation (nasaq-dlr) While the proletariat and the village MTkosh-neshin). of the land reform, former class was the sole beneficiary over 40 per cent of the populathe latter (constituting excluded from was systematically tion of the villages) the development of Furthermore, the reform measures. in and agricultural capitalism activities entrepreneurial of the land consequence as a significant Iranian villages, areas of consideration. reform, is among the neglected 53
WINTER1970
monograph reliable of this value The enormous Those who criticisms. by these not be obscured should the land and after during villages Persian have studied work is, Lambton's Professor that would testify reform of and informative description an objective in general, It and mid-sixties. in the earlyof events the course theoretical, for further ground us with a solid provides and on the causes studies and empirical interpretive, view that land reform--a of the Persian consequences share with us. Professor Lambton herself might
IRANIAN STUDIES
54
PUBLICATIONSRECEIVED
ARMAJANI, YAHYA. wood Cliffs, pp. xiv+432 BAYNE, E.A. American
Middle N.J.:
Past East: Prentice-Hall,
in Kingship Persian Field Universities
BIBLIOTHEQUE ROYALE ALBERT Ier. Ier Albert Royale liothe5jue 130 pp. 1969. Bruxelles,
Engleand Present. Inc., 1970.
Transition. Staff, InFc., Inauguration par S.M. le
New York: 288 1968. de la Roi.
pp.
Bib-
Commercial Russo-Persian Relations, ENTNER, MARVIN L. SoMonographs, of Florida (University 1828-1914. G;ainesville, 1965). No. 28, Fall Sciences, cial v+80 pp. Press. of Florida University Florida: (Paperback) indicated. No price Edition). (Revised Persia FRYE, RICHARD N. 128 pp. $4.50. 1968. Schocken Books,
New York:
INSTITUTO ITALIANO PER IL MEDIO ED ESTREMO ORIENTE (ISMEO). 19, Nos. 1-2 (MarchVol. New Series, East and West,
June 19697) .KAMSHAD, H. England: $7.50.
Prose Modern Persian University Cambridge
KAMSHAD, H. England: viii+249
Prose A Modern Persian University Cambridge $9.50. pp.
Literature. Press,
Political (Editor). KARPAT, KEMAL If. East. Middle in the Contemporary 19 8. xiii+297 ick A. Praeger,
Reader. Press,
1966.
Cambridge, xv+226
pp.
Cambridge, 1968.
and Social New York: $10.00. pp.
Thought Freder-
to Imperialism: An IslamiC KEDDIE, NIKKI R. Response Jamai adof Sayyid and Religious Writings Political Univand Los AngeleS: Berkeley Din "al-A Mani."' $7.50. xii+212 1968. pp. Press, of California ersity 55
WINTER 1970
LEIDEN, CARL (Editor). The Conflict of Traditionalism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East. Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1969. 160 pp. $4.95. PINCUS, JOHN. and Development: Trade, Aid, Poor Nations. New York: McGraw-Hill xv+400 pp. $10.00.
The Rich and Book Co., 1967.
RICKS, THOMAS, GOUTTIERRE, THOMAS, AND EGAN, DENIS. sian Studies: A Selected of Works Bibliography
En lish Indiana
Perin
Bloomington, Indiana: (mimeographed). University, 1969. viii+266 pp.
SANGHVI, RAMESH. The Shah of Iran. Day Publishers, 1969. xxvii+390
New York: Stein pp. $10.00.
and
STAVRIANOS, LEFTON S. Middle East: A Culture Area and Bacon, Boston: Allyn 1968. Perspective. No price i-ndicated. (Paperback)
in 72 pp.
STEWARD-ROBINSON, J. East. Englewood I83Ipp. $1.95.
1966.
(Editor). The Traditional Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, (Paperback)
WILBER, DONALDN. Iran: Past and Present Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University ix+312 pp. $6.00.
IRANIAN STUDIES
56
Near
(6th Ed.). Press, 1967.
JAHAN-E NAU A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STUDIES, ARTS, & LITERATURE (IN PERSIAN) Iranian of JAHAN-E NAU is to provide objective The chief of their for the expression with a vehicle intellectuals contriThe journal's works. and creative views critical and artists, poets, of writers, primarily consist butors generation. of the younger critics social A sampling
of
articles
from
the
recent
issues
include:
in the Third World of Education The Crisis of Modernism Ideology Century Marxism in the Second Half of the Twentieth of Iran Rural Problems Era in Islamic System Social The Iranian Mode of Production The Asiatic of Rostam and Sohrab The Tragedy from Sadeq Hedayat Four Letters Ale Ahmad's Autobiography Writers Iranian by Contemporary Stories Short Azadeh, I. Khoei, Poems by M. Omid, M. Sereshk, et al. Kianoush, and other Manuscripts be should correspondence to Dr. Amin Alimard, sent Editor-in-Chief.
rate subscription The annual Subscription is $5.00. be addressed orders should Publisher Hejazi, to Hosein and Editor.
JAHAN-E NAU House Ferdowsi Printing Atabak St. Ferdowsi Ave., Iran Tehran, 57
WINTER 1970
A Journal of the Social Sciences
February 1970
Vol. I.
No. 3.
E. Naraghi The Aim and Method of Social Research in Iran Characteristics, Belicfs, and Occupational Aspirations of Peasants E. Ajami Kh. K/worovi Irrigation and Rural Community in Iran A Research on Television Audiences in Iran Population Growth and Manpower Proble Relation Between Education and Occupation among Polythecnic Graduates First Census of Tehran Emigration of University Professors and R e Third World Countrie Stereotypes Memorial Speech for Karl Jaspes Three Basic Concepts of K. G. Jung&' Psychology
Editor: Daryoosh Ashoori
Institute for Social Research, Tehran University Tehran, Iran
STUDIES
58
4. Heamvaziri M. Amani
from
4 Translations
IRANIAN
M. Kotobi F. Amirzadeh
E. Niaraghi B. Sarookhani .4. Jaiii J. SaUari
TriesoZctfor
Jrani4z*t SUdZis
ARTICLES FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIETY PERTINENT TO OBJECTIVES AND MEMBERSHIP
ARTICLE II:
OBJECTIVES
be the It shall 1. the study of Iranian encourage language, the history, cluding problems and political nomic, will mit
to Society of this purpose inand society, culture ecosocial, literature, of Iran.
as such is non-partisan. The Society 2. or candidates parties political not support policy. of public members on questions its
safeguard members
work however, shall, The Society 3. and expression of inquiry of freedom fields. in these scholars and other
nor for for
It com-
the its
ARTICLE III:
MEMBERSHIP
1. tives of this sciences social the Executive to the Society's of ten payment annual paying
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Fsgf9740onet
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Z7 &octt*forJwf COUNCIL Amin Banani University
of California
All Banuazizi University
of Southern California
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of Texas at Austin
at Los Angeles
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of the City University
of New York
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Matid Tehraniant
Secretary-Treasurer
New College IRANIANSTUDIES Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jacqueline W. Hintz. Associate
Editor
Iranian Studies is published quarterly by the Society for Iranian to members of the Society as part of Studies. It is distributed rate for non-members is The annual subscription their membership. For insti$5.00; the price of single copies is $1.25 per issue. rate' is $8.00 per annum. The opinions extutions the subscription authors and are those of the individual pressed by the contributors those of the Society or the editors of Iranian not necessarily for publication and all other comnmunications Articles Studies. P.O. Box 24766, Los should be sent to the Editor, Iranian Studies, Commiunications concerning the 90024, U.S.A. Angeles) California The of the Society should be addressed to the Secretary, affairs New Society for Iranian Studies c/o Division of Social Sciences. Sarasota, Florida 33578. U.S.A. College, Cover: Bronze incense burner in the shape of a bird. Late 11th century. Archaeological Museum, Tehran.
Volume III
Spring
1970
Number 2
ARTICLES 58
GENESIS OF PARTY IN IRAN: A CASE STUDY OF THE INTERACTIONBETWEEN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND POLITICAL PARTIES
91
PERSIAN FOLKSONGTEXTS FROMAFGHAN BADAKHSHAN
104
THREEDROPS OF BLOOD Translated
G. Hossein
Razi
Mark Slobin
Sadeq Redayat by Thomas M. Ricks
BOOKREVIEWS 115
ENGLISH: City
125
LEIDEN: The Conflict of Traditionalism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East
129
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
132
PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED
and Village
in
Iran
William Philip
Irons
C. Salzman
GENESISOF PARTYIN IRAN:A CASESTUDY OF THEINTERACTION BETWEENTIE POLITICAL SYSTEMANDPOLITICAL PARTIES
G. HOSSEIN RAZI Identification and analysls of environmental conditions associated with the emergence and developin general, ment of political parties and different in particular, types of parties are important to an of the problems and prospects of repreunderstanding sentative in emerging nations. government This paper a study of the genesis presents and development of political parties, their possible and prototypes, their functional in Iran. substitutes
Razi is Associate G. Hossein Professor at the University of Houston, Science
of Political Texas.
An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Annual Meeting of The American Political Sixty-sixth Association, California, Science Los Angeles, September 8-12, 1970.
IRANIAN STUDIES
58
is studied Party development in terms of the characteristics of the general political system or the of opportunities."l "structure Since the analysis of the internal institutional developments is not in itself sufficient in the case of a political system such as exists in Iran, consideration will also be given to It is important to relevant influences. cross-polity with this deals that institutions emphasize paper only in their operational sense and not with the important In fact, area of attitudes. it proposes to demonstrate of the that the general institutional characteristics to the political system have been of major significance and development of political parties party types.2 Furthermore, presuming that political parties also influence the political system, t-he paper attempts to describe the functions which Iranian have parties Our reference performed. to party functions is intuitive and haphazard. This is in part due to the limin a preliminary itations of data inherent study of this nature. But it is also due to the theoretical problems involved in party salience and the fact that there are few tested of party functions hypotheses in of the availability of impressive spite inventories.3 Although our primary concern is with Iranian parties, an attempt is also made to gain further insight into the subject by comparing them with earlier parties of Europe and other developed systems. The term "party" as used here is general and refers to a myriad of groups and organizations which or nominal appeal to an electorate through actual attempt to acquire some control of the political decision-making process. This control is excercised in order to accommodate the demands of the group's leadits members, or both. It includes ership, minor parties as well as revolutionary but organizations, excludes institutional interest groups, such as the army and the bureaucracy, that are part of the formal
59
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A cursory look at the structure of the government. parties in various parts of development of political between the older the world reveals a clear difference and parties of the nineteenth century and the factions and by institutionalized present parties characterized The important question is structures. mass-oriented local, how parliamentary, personal) and doctrinal parties.4 groups develop into modern political The Political
Environment and Party Prototypes
system in Iran was feudal and The old political basis was provided by ideological Its patrimonial. of the old modif'ication The and tradition. religion system was to a great extent the product of cultural contact with Europe. This contact resulted in changes influenced the politics and indirectly which directly of the country. and modern polThe line between traditional cannot always be easily drawn institutions itical since both have gone through a process of adaptation. the it is clear that the constitution, Nevertheless, modern process are the and the electoral parliament, of legitimacy because they have no meaninstitutions The monsystem. ingful precedent in the traditional tradipredominantly a is archy, on the other hand, even though it has adopted some of tional institution goals, such as reform, modernthe modern nationalist and added new authoriization and industrialization, The tarian techniques to the old ways of absolutism. this in be studies development of Iranian parties will institutions. paper in terms of these major political The first challenge to absolutism and autocracy of the sh'lhanshTh (king of kings) began with the Tomovement The consitutional bacco Revolts of 1891-92. and the civil war in the early years of this century of mashrutiyat (constitutionalbetween the followers ism and the parliament) and those of estebdad (absothe basic legitimacy lutism of the shahs) reflect IRANIANSTUDIES
60
conflict of the Iranian The Fundapolitical system. mental Law of 1906 and the Supplementary Fundamental Law of 1907 still of govconstitute the formal basis ernmental and are the oldest authority of existing In practices Middle Eastern constitutions. however, there have been substantial changes in the operation of the systems with the basic conflict between the of the parliament followers and the followers of the courts still remaining. The recent of Iran can be political history divided into four periods, of using the predominance or authoritarian either democratic institutions as the criterion. These periods are: the genesis First, of representative government (1905-1925); second, Reza Shah's dictatorship third, the re-emer(1925-1941); gence of representative government and, (1941-53); fourth, the development of Mohammad Reza Shah's dictatorship (1953-present). These classifications are obviously general, as each period has had its own variations. However, on the whole they are valid and a comparative provide context for the study of party development. The following Persian terms, with the exception of the first, refer to possible prototypes of the political party: parti, band, dowreh, anjoman, and frTaksion. The term pWrti, borrowed from French, simply means "pull" or "influence" and parti bizi (using one s pull) implies a process by which pressure is brought to bear by individuals in order to get a favfrom the bureaucracy3 orable decision the military2 or security It refers organizations.5 basically to the lobbying process and is used to secure employment, receive contracts, expedite decisions, circumvent reguor insure the application lations, of legitimate regulations. Such practice is likely to continue regardless of the emergence of political parties. Pirti has not been, and is unlikely to become, a basis for the formation of political parties, although it may conto their development. tribute In this connection, it
61
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considto note that M.I. Ostrogorskii is interesting confactors as one of the possible ered corruption and English of the earlier to the formation tributing American parties .6 into a small number of prominent BWnd refers process who help each other in the political dividuals It is the but have no open or formal organization. to by It is commonly referred of a clique. equivalent members or families the name of one of its leading BTnd has played a role in the bWnd-e Masludihi). (e.g. and more personal formation of some of the smaller however, As a rule, in Iran. or friksions parties into an-jomans, which have bands have tended to develop of parties. in the formation been instrumental to and refers means a circle, Dowreh literally Its memberor both. relatives, a group of friends, take place Its meetings fifteen. ship seldom exceeds in homes of members or at some weekly or biweekly may belong to Individuals place. other designated sysa social It is primarily more than one dowreh. for providing tem of the upper and middle classes, and mutual support communication political informal geared to periods It is especially and cooperation. organizations of dictatorship when formal political Dowrehs, too, have tended to develop are repressed. into an_omans or small parties. or socmeans an association Anjoman literally It has a larger membership and more complex iety. disthan any of the groups previously organization has been a factor character Its organized cussed. transin the recurring phenomenon of its structural The anioman is into the political party. formation esof the political party, prototype the most likely in periods of representative government. pecially a term borrowed from German, is used Fraksion, Its defactions. to parliamentary in Iran to refer to the Western European parties is similar velopment
IRANIAN STUDIES
62
that grew out of parliamentary Frzksions groups. have varied in cohesiveness and stability of their memberMost have been no more than temporary factions ship. in one Majles session. Others have been of longer A few have been interlocked duration. with political parties outside the parliament. of Only the origins the National Front's are traceable to the leadership parliamentary group of nationalists formed around Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq in the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Majles. Representative
Government:
The anjomans against absolutism. Brown is illustrative:
Phase I,
played a major The following
1906-1925 role in the struggle from E.G. passage
The Anjomans were the cause of the victory, they had drawn the people together and united them in one common cause, and had organized their strength to such an extent that in the day of trial tyranny a united found, to i s surprise, front against it. Although there were some peasant uprisings in the North, and some support from the tribal Khans in other areas, the center of the constitutional movement was in the cities where An jomanha-ye Enghelibi (Revolutionary Associations) were formed by the merchants, traders, artisans and some urban workers under the leadership of the intellectuals and the clergy. The British Legation report, dated February 27, 1907, that in Tabriz: states The landed proprietors, too, find their interest directly menaced by the action of the "Enjumen" in causing the prices of grain and meat to be reduced and the mercantile and lower classes can alone be considered as whole-hearted supporters of the Committee... 63
SPRING 1970
Alui Shah and the IranIn June 1908, Mohaammad ian Cossack Brigade, directed by the Tsarist Russian A the Majles. bombarded and dissolved officers, civil war subsequently began between the royalists which lasted until the autumn and constitutionalists in the victory of the constiof 1909. It resulted MohammadAli was desposed, his minor tutionalists. son, Ahmad, was appointed kings and a pro-democratic regent was selected. parties began During the war various political Some survived through the Second Majles, to emerge. which was inaugurated on November 15, 1909. The two leading parties were the Popular Democrats and the The Alliance and Progress Moderates (EltedIlis). The Democrats a third minor party. Party constituted Tabriz the mainly by were led aniomans, comprised supported by antwere but Turks, Iranian mostly of in Tehran and Qazvin. especially mans in other cities, esThey were also helped by the Moja4hedin (fighters), those who came mainly from the Baku oilfield pecially in Russia and played a major role in defeating the The Moderates were composed of the Bakhroyalists.9 tiari khgns and tribesmen, who had supported the conduring the war, and the more conservstitutionalists ative elements among the clergy and landed gentry. The Regent, Waser al-Molk, who had studied in ins tituBritain and was familiar with representative in organizing the Majles on the tions, also assisted However, he was mainly basis of party affiliation. in insuring the minority status of the Popinterested formed a govIn 1909 he successfully ular Democrats. ernment from members of the majority party, the Moderates, which the Democrats found acceptable. Iran seemed to be well on its way to developing parties. monarchy based on political a constitutional In function. Its parties had performed the electoral elections the fact, the first committee to supervise to the Majles was formed by Tabriz aniomans immediately
IRANIANSTUDIES
64
after the news of the granting of the constitution was communicated by the telegraph office. They had also proven their ability to aggregate disparate linguistic groupss such as the Turks, the Persians, the Armenians, and the Bakhtiaris, as well as different social groups, such as the clergy, the intellectuals, the commercial class, and the tribes. Furthermore, they had demonin integrating strated some capability these groups for the purpose of formulating social goals and optimizing efforts for their achievement. Finally, they seemed to have contributed to the development and maintenance of a representative form of government. Despite this propitious beginning these parties failed to survive. The main reason was the influence of foreign powers. In most emerging nations the development of representative government and political parties has coincided with the end of colonialism. In the case of Iran the reverse process took place. This is not to deny the importance of internal cleavages which the parties had to face. But the disintegrative effect of such cleavages was exacerbated by foreign intervention. Russia had opposed the constitutional movement in Iran from the beginning. Britain had initially supported the constitutionalists because of Russia's extensive influence over the Iranian court. But in view of the rising power of Germany in Europe, Russia and Britain initiated an era of cooperation. One of the instruments of this cooperation was the Convention of August 1907 which divided Iran into zones of 0 The northern zone, which included the influence. centers of the constitutional movement, became the sphere of Russian influence; the southern zone was assigned to the British; and the central zone was to be opened to the influence of both governments. During the civil war, Russia's support of the court was not sufficient to defeat the constitutionalists. But the Russian government increased its power by dispatching military forces to Iran, and suppressing and executing some of the nationalist leaders. 65
SPRING 1970
In December 1911. Russia sent an ultimatum to of Morthe Iranian government demanding the dismissal gan W. Shuster, an American advisor, who had been commissioned by the Majles, and was implementing plans structure, of Iran's financial for the reorganization The ulpolice. and provincial customs administration, timatum was supported by the British government and the movement of Russian troops toward Tehran. The British urged the cabinet to accept the Russian demands. But Women's aniomans apthe Majles decided to resist. peared before the Majles urging the deputies to vote Besides the Democrats and the against the ultimatum. Moderates there were three minor parties in the parlithe Unionist , the Progressive, ament at this time: All were and the dashnHktsutiun Armenian parties. On Decto the ultimatum. united in their opposition ember 24, the cabinet of Sams?m was legally dissolved because the Majles had turned down its request for comBut the cabipliance with the Russian ultimatum.11 the Majles with net executed a coup dletat dissolving the deputies with execution if troops and threatening On 25, Shuster was disDecember they reassembled. missed. a major setback for These events constituted on based competitive-aggregovernment representative gative parties as well as national unity and finanfor the It was a defeat especially cial solvency. had proved more Democrats as some of the Moderates with powers0 foreign themselves to reconcile willing the not had fled who A number of liberal leaders Others country before tried to leave at this time. The Majles remained susgradually went underground. pended for three years. With the coronation of Ahmad Shah and the momof Russia with its European fronentary preoccupation life was resumed when the Third tiers, parliamentary 1914. British and Ruson November Majles convened and had the elections sian agents had influenced independents. helped the Moderates and cooperative IRANIANSTUDIES
66
But they soon The Democrats were in the minority. were able to regain their leading role because of their nationalist British-Russian rivalry, orientation and the lack of any unifying program among the majority of the members. In November of 1915, when an attempt was made to set up a pro-German government in Qum, the Majles was dissolved. The fourth Majles was not to meet until nearly six years later, in June 1921. During this period the cabinets were accused to Russia or Britain. of subordination The liberals and nationalists who had a reputation for honesty did not participate in the government. The British opposed the Democrats as irresponsible and dangerous extremists. This was understandable since the Democrats regarded Britain and Russia as Iran's treacherous enemies. The Democrats, sometimes with the help of the German and Turkish officers, engaged in an intermittent, small-scale war against Russia, Britain and the Iranian government.'2 More importantly, the Democrats and the Moderates, who could easily cooperate in the First and Second Majles, had become alienated from each other by the time the Third Majles ended because the Moderates, responding to the new structure of opportunities in the political system, had begun cooperating with the foreigners. They were accused of being a group of traitors who served the fore'ign powers and had betrayed the real nationalists to gain -control of the central Iranian government. The first communist parties in Iran emerged from two nationalist-separatist movements which were primarily a response to foreign domination of the central government. The first was the movement of the Jangalis (Woodsmen) under the leadership of a local patriot-reformer called Kuchik Khan in the wooded areas of Gilan, a province on the shores of the Casplan Sea. They fought the British forces on several occasions, asserted the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and used "Persia for the Persian" as 67
SPRING 1970
The forces of the Jangalis were mainly their slogan. and composed of the middle- and lower-middle classes The movement began in 1915 when Kuchik Khan peasants. and EhsWnullah Khan met with a number of other patriots commitIn 1917 they formed a revolutionary in Tehran. tee and by early 1918 they were in control of Gilan and The second and more parts of the nearby provinces. movement occurred in Azerbaijan which was short-lived called AzTdistin (Land of the Free). These movements reveal not only the persistence ideas but also the adoption of the constitutionalist by the Irorientation Soviet-Marxist of an exogenous and comnationalists the between The division anians. arrested was while a for which munists in this period, by Reza Shah, seems to be a preview of the later division between the National Front and the Tudeh (Masses) occurred be(Among the Jangalis this division Party. communist Kuchik Khan and-the tween the nationalist in Azerbaijan Ehsanullah Khan and Jalfar Pishevari; it occurred between MohammadKahiabani and Pishevari.13 Reza Kh2an, the commander of the Iranian Cossack an Anglophile journTabataba'i, Corpss and Sayyid.Zia staged a coup dletat in 1921 which in time realist, and changed the sulted in Reza Shah' s dictatorship It is important to system. nature of the political note that in the Fourth Majles, elected mostly under and the Fifth Majiles, elected durVosuqls influence, ing Reza Kh?an's control of the government, the largest parliamentary fraksion was the Renovation (Tajadto Hosdod), which supported Reza Khan and, accoying The other sein Makki, had more than forty deputies. and United Socialists were the Socialists friksions Furthermore, which had sixteen to seventeen deputies. Minorlty in the Fifth Majles there was a so-called FrIaksion, headed by MohammadModarres, which opposed Reza KhaInand had fourteen deputies. Democrats and Moderates conHad the original tinued to operate) Iran might have developed a twosystem with two major party system, or a multi-party IRANIANSTUDIES
68
parties. The Democrats were not too different from the earlier Liberal parties in Europe or even Latin America, especially Uruguay, where the property franchise gave rise to two-party In these cases the systems. and the clergy aristocracy the Conservatives, supported while the traders, manufacturers, intellectuals and middle classes of towns and cities the Libsupported erals. This is very similar to the socio-economic basis of Moderates and Democrats in Iran. There is also some ideological with the Conservasimilarity tive-Liberal division in Europe, where the Conservatives emphasized and authority tradition and the Liberals emphasized individualism, rationalism, liberty, and other ideological equality, components of the American and French Revolutions.15 AMother point of possible interest is the relationship between electoral laws and political parties. The original law, issued on September Iranian 6, 1906, provided for a system of representation in which the middle classes and urban areas were favored. Elections were direct in Tehran and on a two-stage in the provinces. basis A property qualification of 1,000 tomans (200 pounds) in cases of peasants and land proprietors eliminated most of the population. Nomads were excluded due to a six-month residence qualification.16 In 1914, however, a new electoral law removed the property qualification and established universal male suffrage and direct, secret ballot. Although this was a democratic victory in appearance, it greatly increased the power of the landowners and tribal leaders who controlled the majority of the population. It was done in order to increase Moderate representation. There is little doubt that the new electoral laws influenced the nature of the parliament and the parties. The voters of the former electoral system were articulate and not easily manipulated by foreign powers of the central government. The and tribes, peasants on the other hand, were unaware of the significance of their votes. Although the simultaneous assertion of Russo-British, colonialism,
69
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process, and suppression manipulation of the electoral the to isolate make it difficult of the nationalists seem changes the change; does impact of the electoral to a decline in the quality of the to have contributed gradualism Consequently, parliament and the parties. which seems to have in the extension of the franchise, in some of the Western countries, made a difference might have helped the survival of competitive-aggregagovernment in Iran. tive parties and representative On the whole, the Iranian case tends to support the system is one of the signifview that the electoral icant factors in the development of party systems. Dictatorship:
Phase I,
1925-1941
Reza Shah developed a charismatic dictatorship based mainly on the bureaucracy, the army, and the modernization took Economic and technological police. In spite of the society. in of some sectors place the regime was with partiess political some tinkering them as conand soon regarded them unable to tolerate were that functions To the extent party spiracies. institutional the at all, done by were they performed groups. interest It should be noted that the Shah did feel a for political parties or need, at least initially, were alfour groups In 19273 similar organizations. and bureauinto parties, to political lowed organize direct and to were ordered officers promote cratic them. These were: Irin-e No (New Iran), Iran-e JavWn and Tajaddod (Re(Young Iran), Taraqqi (Progress)., The motto of the Itrin-e No Party was novation). This to the Shah and devotion to progress". "loyalty that perhaps the Shah was influenced motto indicates by the example of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey and planned party to iupport his to form a majority political the without and within Majles. 7 All of these program Shah did not seem to Reza soon disappeared. parties of authinstitutions to able tolerate competing any be individual of the even some for eliminated he ority, notables who had helped in his rise to power. IRANIANSTUDIES
70
the Majles convened with Throughout his rule, scrupulous and voted for all the recommendregularity of the executive. ations The deputies were chosen by the Shah personally from a list of individuals nomlocal inated separately by governors, administrators, and secret Each proposal three times contained spies. the number of deputies to which the area was entitled. After the Shah had made his selection, the names were sent to the governors and local administrators who filled the ballot boxes, opened them at the end of the election and reported counted the votes, period, the results. As late as 1932 in an address before the deputies, the Shah stated that the absence of political in the Majles was a shortcoming parties and the formation of patriotic would be helpful. parties But nothing further came of this statement. In January 1939 the Organization for Development of Thought (Sizmian-e Parvaresh-e Afkir) was formed at the Shah's order to inform the people about government programs, to direct public opinion along approved channels, and to promote national pride. This may very well have been what Reza Shah had in mind when he spoke of political parand had now finally ties found his model in the Nazi and Fascist propaganda apparatus. The absence of political parties and a meaningful electoral process seemed to have created a vacuum which was evident by the end of Shah Reza's rule. The functional of the institutional performance interest groups was not adequate to promote the legitimacy and effectiveness of the system. There was an hiatus in upward and downward political communication. Suppression and illegal practices were taking their toll, and had become endemic at all levels corruption of the bureaucracy, the army, and the police. Democracy:
dom of
Phase
II,
1941-53
With the fall of the dictatorship speech, the press, and assembly
71
in 1941, returned.
free-
SPRING 1970
and groups which had been suppressed beIndividuals attack against the police state and gan a large-scale of land in the name of purthe Shah' s confiscation The public trial of his chief of polchase or gift. ice revealed a great deal of corruption and injustices The cenincluding murders of the regime's opponents. shifted from the Shah to the ter of decision-making Majles, where cabinets were appointed and dismissed, The new and programs were discussed. and policies of the Majles although he Shah followed the verdicts through a number of loyal tried to exert his influence With respect to the Majles it is important deputies. to remember that the Twelfth Majles did not end until after the fall of Reza Shah and that the deputies to the Thirteenth had already been chosen by him before to the Futhermore, the elections his resignation. Ahmad Premier by Majles were manipulated Fifteenth electfree relatively only the Qavim. Consequently those were Mosaddeq Mohammad ions before the rise of Sixteenth, of the those and in part of the Fourteenth, the governwhen after the discovery of irregularities At any election. Tehran in the ment did not intervene the new in conducted were campaigns rate, no electoral environment until 1944. parties emerged after Reza A host of political a rule, they adopted patriotic As Shah's abdication. mostly irown newspapers, names and published their number A circulation. good and with small regularly or small groupst individuals were formed by prominent based on a bind or dowreh, disappearing without much A few had a lasting system. effect upon the political organeffect both in terms of ideology and political The purpose of this section is not to di sization. cuss
them in deigils
in other works. of these parties
as this
information
is
available
We shall give a brief description beginning with the Tudeh.
The core of the Tudeh leadership
was composed
who were intellectuals of forty-nine of the survivors been by Reza and had Erini imprisoned led by Dr. Taqi
IRANIAN STUDIES
72
Shah in 1937 on charges of communist activities. On January 302 1942, they created the first modern party of Iran. The official program of the party was neither nor communist. It was of a liberal revolutionary and moderate tone, but addressed primarily to the industrial workers, peasants, and intellectuals. It called for legalization of trade unions, progressive labor legislation, equality of minorities, bureaucratic reform, free health and educational and friendly relations services, with all of Iran's neighbors. It was not until later when the rift between the Allies became clear that the party began to openly advocate Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology and to attack the Western powers. The Tudeh has been the only mass party of Iran. (With the possible exception of the Third Force, all others have been basically cadre parties.) The party members paid fees, were issued cards, and were organized into cells (hozehs) and organs for different occupational, age) and sex groups. It also translated and published books and owned an impressive number of "front" newspapers. By 1944 the party had recruited a comparatively large number of members and controlled the majority of organized labor through its affiliated unions. The backbone of the party's leadership, however, remained the intellectuals of middle-class background. In the Fourteenth Majles it had a friksion of eight members, at that time the only organized party with constituting support in and out of the Majles. In the first cabinet of QavUl, the 'Tudeh had three members. It was made illegal by the government for the first time in 1949, but it continued its operation until the fall of Mosaddeq in 1953. During the Mosaddeq period it constituted the only popularly-based and organized group outside the National Front. In the free elections of the Seventeenth Majles it received one-third of the votes in Tehran but no seats. It engaged in a bitter fight with Mosaddeqls supporters before the latter's fall. Subsequently it went underground due to repression by the new government and its open activities have since been conducted in foreign countries. It is essential to 73
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point out that in many ways the Tudeh Party set the pata number of In fact, in Iran. tern for other parties the ?ganito a response as them were formed initially the Tudeh. of influence and ideological zational Another party on the left was the separatist It was formed in 1944 by PisheAzerbai jan. Demokrat-e and whose from Azerbaijan who had been elected vari, vote in the Fourwere rejected by a single credentials doubt that this party There is little teenth Majles. and occuauthorities with the help of Soviet succeeded however, had The people of Azerbaijan, troops. pation of to the tyranny and maladministration been subjected grounds for popular providing the Tehran government, in this proThe Tudeh Party branches dissatisfaction. into the Demokrit and incorporated vince were dissolved governto set up a leftist After the attempts Party. a prothe Demokrats inaugurated ment in Tehran failed, Democracy was to be the principle vincial part of Iran. was allowed. opposition of government, but no organized but the state inviolable, was declared property Private lands and the lands of those who had fled to Tehran were Before _the Iranian and redistributed. confiscated the Demokrats had constructed the area, troops reoccupied of which founded a university--both a radio station, The Demokrit-e in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan were the first to the Tudeh and may be Party was in many ways similar howIts leaders, as the latter's tributary. regarded members of the prehard-line ever, were mostly older, last efReza Shah communist movements, who made their of before forts way to the younger generation giving Tudeh leaders. end of the political spectrum emerged On the right was that of conservathe first three types of parties: and the second and third notables, and pro-British tives and reof extreme nationalistic parties were ideological of has been None great importance orientation. ligious for becoming sufficiently agor has shown any capability In 1943, as a cadre or as a mass party. either gregative the Halgeh called later Party, the Vatan (Fatherland)
IRANIAN STUDIES
74
and still later (Circle), called the ErTdeh-ye Melli (National Will) Party was created by Sayyid ZiT, who had been the prime minister of the coup d'etat 58gime of 1921 and had been later exiled by Reza Shah. This party was at the opposite end of the political spectrum from the Tudeh and was supported by the British. It tried to equal the Tudeh Party' s attacks on the West by attacking the Soviet Union and accusing the Tudeh of being a tool of the Soviet It was too government. with the British closely and the court, associated too in ideology, conservative and too traditional in makeup to be able to sufficiently and adapt. innovate It could not become aggregative even though Sayyid ZiaT was elected to the Fourteenth Majles from the British zone and had the support of a number of deputies in the Majles. It was dissolved by Qavam in 1945. A number of its members, however, adopted other labels and continued to support the court. The extreme nationalist parties included the PanIrain, Sumka, the Aria, and the National2jalvation group of the Revolutionary Nationalism Party. As the Tudeh was heir to the an joman of Dr. Erini, the extreme nattionalists were heirs to the anioman of Dr. JahEnsuz, who was also arrested by Reza Shah. These parties showed an ideological affinity toward Fascism and had irredentist and atavistic tendencies. Their hallmark was anticommunism. Some tried to form their own small militia from among secondary school students. From time to time, they cooperated with the court, and at least one group supported the National Front for a while. On the whole, they were not successful and remained quite small since neither the international nor the Iranian environment was conducive to their development. The two active religious groups of this period were the Fed' yan-e Islam and the Mojiahedin-e Islmn. The first group was small and conducted its meetings It came to be known for its religious secretly. zeal, strong nationalistic outlook, and the belief that Shi'ite
75
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It beruler. lands should be governed by a religious such Iranof assassinating as a result came well-known as Ali RazmWara, Abdol Hossein f igures ian political had formed who, incidentally, and Ahmad Kasravi, Hajir, The group to purify Shi'ism. rellgious his own little with Sayyid Abol-Qasem KashMojahedin group cooperated that the problems of Iran could be resolvaxni, and felt Neiauthorities. of religious ed only by the leadership a large number of members although ther group acquired they helped Kashani becomne an important religio-political initially KrshTni and his merchant followers figure. off from the split with Mosaddeq but later cooperated Front. National between the right and the left were a Situated may be The following parties. number of other political PeikTr (Patriots), Mihan Parastin in passing: mentioned Melli Mardan-e KWr (Men of Work), Ettehid-e (Battle), IrTn-e Unity), Irtn (Iran's Vahdat-e Unity), (National The only middleParty. Mi (Our Iran), and the Socialist were the of significance or quasi-parties parties class the component units, Front and its important National the Mardom-e and possibly Parties, and Toilers I_n with these Before dealing IrEn and the Third Force. must be made to the Demreference groups individually) from different IrWn Party, which was completely okrit-e them. Irnn Party, which was more rapid The Demokrat-e was formed by QavTm in than in its rise, in its decline to 1945 in order to provide him with a base of support, Melli Party of Sayyid Zii and to break up the Erideh-ye Creparties. rival the Tudeh and Demrnokrat-e Azerbaijan of a ated from above, this was a temporary aggregate because of who cooperated large number of individuals the separatist movements in the North, threat, the Soviet a seat in the Majles or a of receiving and the prospect to the Soviets To persuade in the government. position bea coalition withdraw from Iran, Qavam established and tween his party and the Tudeh, Iran, Socialist, to He also made a number of promises Iran-e Ma parties.
IRANIAN STUDIES
76
the Soviet
Union and to the Demokriat-e Azerbain.
In the elections of the Fifteenth Majles, Qavim and the army were in control. Most "elected" deputies either belonged to the Demoktat-e IrKn Party or were pro-Shah. Mosaddeq and his parliamentary associates of the Fourteenth Majles who had led the opposition to Soviet demands and had received the largest popular majorities before, were defeated through electoral manipulation. After the rejection of the Soviet oil concession, Qavam lost his premiership and power, although 85 of the 136 deputies were nominally from his party. The subsequent disappearance of the Demokrat-e IrIn suggests that parties of this nature are not likely to become durable
or acquire
a mass base
of support.
The National Front emerged during the elections of the Fifteenth Majles when Mosaddeq and a number of popular leaders and supporters gathered before the Shah's palace requesting that the election be nullified. This request was to no avail. This was the beginning of the rift between the Front and the court. In the elections of the Sixteenth Majles, which were free in Tehran and a few other urban areas, Mosaddeq and his supporters were again elected by large majorities. The Irnn Party, formed in 1944, began as an association of engineers in 1942. Its membership was later expanded to other professionals, mostly lawyers and professors. It continued to attract members from other groups until the height of its power during Mosaddeqls government (1951-53). It constituted the core of the National Front and remained with it until parties were repressed by the new dictatorship. The Ir,an Party was a genuine middle-class party with some aggregative capacity. Its ideology was based on socialism and liberalnationalism. Its programs called for land distribution, economic development, and the maintenance and strengthening of a democratic form of government. A wing of the Inan Party,
77
which also began as
SPRING 1970
was the Mardoman anjoman during the democratic period, in oriand Islamic It was more socialist e Iran Party. disand organization previous Because of its entation. of the leadership the it managed to capture cipline a convention Iran Party in Tehran, and it was not until that the old leaderwas called delegates of provincial of The later withdrawal the new group. ship defeated the Mardom-e Iran weakened the Irnn Party. formed by Dr. Mozaffar Baghil i, Party, The Toilers to a cadre from a personal a transformation represented complete with a origin, middle-class party of national, of his polAt the beginning group. Socialist splinter career Baghi' i was a member of the small Ettehaditical to win a e Melli Party which was formed by his father In This was to no avail. Kerman seat in the Majles. IrWn and formed a the Demokrit-e 1945 Baghil'i joined Qavam rewarded him with a seat party branch in Kerman. He soon broke off with QavAm Majles. in the Fifteenth himself to build a popular image by attaching and tried in the Majles and Front through speeches to the National of his associaAs a result of a newspaper. publication from Tehran Front, he was elected tion with the National began attacking to the Sixteenth Majles and immediately and the After Razm7ari's assassination Premier Razmari. Baghil'i formed the of the Mosaddeq cabinet, formation bazaar groups of students, Party from various Toilers This party had a program, women and KermWnis. merchants, to and traditional but Baghi'gi was too opportunistic after opgain a mass base of support for it, especially the to Mosaddeq. Although Mosaddeq accepted position he was from the beginning Party in the Front, Toilers and his mercurial of Baghi'l 'Is opportunism suspicious soon began to criticize Mosaddeq and character. Baghili fav28) he was already on the ninth of Esfand (February due Mosaddeq, however, was victorious oring the court. of of his chief to popular support and the vigilence It was at this point that General Afshartus. police, with him,and the Third Force, composed split the Toilers was formed and women's organizations, mainly of students Aside from the of Khalil Maleki. under the leadership
IRANIAN STUDIES
78
followers of BaghW i also Third Force, the religious shifted their support to the National Front. These events and the split within the Tudeh Party, when it decided to oppose Mosaddeq, demonstrate the meaningful of the National aggregative-adaptive capabilities Front. the relationship Subsequent to the split, between Baghal i and Mosaddeq became strained and a number of his militant supporters were arrested. Baghaili was in close collaboration with the court and was implicated with General F. ZThedi in the murder of General He was f5ed from prison after ZThedi beAfshartus. came prime minister. Maleki, who had once been arrested by Reza Shah as a communist, broke with the Tudeh Party and established the Socialist Association, which he later dissolved. His opposition to the Tudeh ideology was on theoretical grounds similar to those of the Titoists and West European Socialists of anti-communist orientation. Because of his knowledge and writings he became well-known as a major anti-communist theoretician. Under his leadership the Third Force showed some tendency towards becoming a mass party. Its organization was similar to the Tudehs as it had cells, action groups, and managed a number of publications. Membership cards were issued and fees collected. Financial assistance was also received from some prominent bazaar merchants with a traditional outlook. After the fall of Mosaddeq, the government dissolved the Third Force but Maleki was allowed to retain government employment and resume his anti-communist literary work. Dictatorship:
Phase II,
1953-
The fall of Mosaddeq and the return of the Shah put an end to freedom of expression and assembly. Even parties friendly to the court were not allowed to operate. Military rule was established and, for the first time since the constitution, military courts openly replaced civilian courts, trying the opponents on military 79
SPRING 1970
and political the cabinets
charges. of General
continued This situation Zihedi and Hossein Al-.
during
In 1957, at the order of Mohammad Reza Shah, two "from above" to overcome the were created loyal parties and in order which were faced in elections difficulties of freedom and legala semblance to give the elections Party was placed under (Nationalist) The Melliun ity. the prime minister, Eqbal, Manucher Dr. of leadership the Party was headed by AssadullTh and the Mardom (People) of the Shah and a later prime friend Al lam, a close and the Mardom were to The Melliun (1962-63). minister parties, minority and majority the of roles play the prime his mlnister and Shah the With respectively. approved can"free" and "clean" elections, promising and two of the parties other joined one or the didates predetermined, with the outcomes each other, ran against canto the respective communicated but not necessarily these all of In spite the elections. before didates the game which the two courthowever, arrangements, were supposed to play could not be conparties created and electionbribery, Charges of corruption, trolled. and were were publicly aired by the candidates rigging and other Front opposiadded to those of the National drawn-out and the long tion groups that were boycotting to the Twentieth Majles deputies Nevertheless, election. In from the ranks of these loyal parties. were elected Before were elected. a few "independents" addition, were these deputies however, this Majles could convene, Apordered by the Shah to hand in their resignations. that some of the army the Shah was apprehensive parently among the deputies. had too many friends generals the Shah and were who had supported (These generals, tried, later dismissed, were positions, now in important "clean" a The Shah again promised and/or imprisoned.) But the new elections process. and "free" electoral Majand the Twentieth different were not substantially les was soon dissolved.
formed
of Dr. Ali Amini was By 1960, when the cabinet was temporarily of relaxation measure and some
IRANIAN STUDIES
80
introduced, the Melliun disappeared and the Mardom became insignificant) a situation which has since continued in spite of the fact that the Mardom's leader became a prime minister in 1962.23 After the dismal experience with these parties, the regime kept the Majles suspended for nearly two and a half years in spite of the fact that Article 48 of the Consitution unequivocally requires that new elections be held no later than a month after a dissolution. During the period of suspension, the government resorted to a "popular"? referendum on a six-point program termed the Shah' s "Great" or "White" Revolution. On January 24, 1963, while preparations for the referendum were in progress, the press reported without denial a foreign news service item regarding the arrest of a new group of over 200 important leaders of the Front, university and clergy. students, On the same date, the newspapers reported that during the referendum the government would not interfere with the people's In fact, in Etteli'Tt vote. both of these items were headlined on the first page. On January 26, the referendum was held throughout Iran and on the next day the results had already been tabulated and were announced by the tss-media. The following are the official returns: Number Qualified
Per Cent
Voters
6,098,277
100.0
Enumerated Votes
5,593,826
91.7
Yes Votes
5,589,711
99.9
No Votes TOTAL
4,115 5,593,826
0.1 100.0
To arrive at the above estimate of the total number of eligible voters, the government took the total enumerated male population 18 years of age and above of
81
SPRING 1970
the 1956 census and increased it by 17.5% to account for population growth. The result of this referendum is especially significant since participation by as much as one-third of the eligible voters in Iran would have then been regarded as phenomenal, the completion of elections in Tehran alone usually had taken over a month, and the National Front and university students had recommended the referendum's boycott. Soon after this referendum there was a maj or uprising against the government in which an estimated 1,500 persons were killed. In 1963, references to parties rapidly disappeared from the mass-media and the government formed a "congress of the delegates of the peasants, workers, women, intelligentsia, and other classes of people", to nominate a single slate for the electionsO The following statement from EttelW'it before the formation published of this congress to East Eurindicates some similarity with its single opean "democratic centralisml party system. of this session The elections (21st Majles) will be conducted on the basis of a oneAnd this party, which has party system. a clear and defined program for the future parliament, is "the party of nation"' (hezbe mellat). This is the party which entered the arena and deposited its uniform votes in the "national box (the referapproval" In the past, when the country did endum). not have any program, the elections and the parliaments were the arena of confrontation of the votes and ideas of the left and right, the fast and the slow, and the and the moderates. extremists Consequentthat the ellikelihood ly, there was less which require the free expression ections, of ideas, would take place in a healthy, As his and tranquil environment.... safe, of the process Exalted Majesty has implied, is a l"national approval" (the referendum) elections.25 model for the future
IRANIAN STUDIES
82
But Iran has not since developed a mass-based party, not even a single para-military one comparable to the Nazi, Fascist, or Conmunist parties. This is to a great extent due to the aversion of the Shah and institutional interest the security groups) especially to the development of other organized and pubforces, licly based centers of authority. A single nominal party has existed for some time and is currently dominant. This is the Irln-e Novin Party which emerged with the blessing of the Shah from a number of highechelon in 1964. bureaucrats But it has not shown any to become unified tendency or popularly based in spite of the fact that most cabinet members and deputies have since been its nominal members. In fact, the lack of such attempt may well have been a factor contributing to the political survival of its leaders. On March 8, 1964 a few deputies in the Majles were also allowed to declare "the existence of the Mardom Party". Also, the I?n-IrTn Party which had from time to time been associated with the court was also recently assigned a few deputies in the Majles. None of these parties, however, have so far shown potential for developing into a mass-based political party. As the conduct of the referendum indicates, most party functions that are performed are again done by the institutional A new institutional interest groups. interest group, established after the fall of Mosaddeq, is the SAVAK, or the Sizmin-e Amniyat va Etteli'it-e Keshvar (the National Security and Information Agency).
This semi-clandestine intelligence agency is presently one of the most important functional units of the regime. Conclusions We have tried to demonstrate that the configu-ration of the political for system has been significant the development of political parties. The Iranian case suggests the existence of a possible relationship between a genuine electoral process, no matter how limited
83
SPRING 1970
the electorate, and the emergence of competitiveaggregative parties. It also indicates that in their initial stages such formations are highly unstructured and fluid, resembling the situation in Western Europe, where various political clubs, groups around notables, and cliques within or outside the legislature found it necessary to convert their loose structures into parties in order to appeal to the expanding electorate. As expected, periods of dictatorship in Iran have impeded the development of parties. This is the case whether we refer to the competitive-aggregative parties of the Western type, the dominant-oligarchic parties of the Mexican type, or even the para-military single parties comparable to those of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and the USSR. Even in periods of party repression, however, the need for them has been periodically expressed and attempts at creating comparable organizaThis tions have been made, albeit without much success. suggests that although political parties are not a refor the political quisite system, a need for them may It may be worthwhile be inherent in modern polities. to note in this connection that similar systems, such as Mustafa Kemal's Turkey and Franco's Spain, have sucIt ceeded in develop'ing subservient single parties. is true that these parties3 the National Republican and to minor roles vis-a-vis the Phalanges, were relegated But the Iranian the bureaucracy and security forces. monarchy has not even produced parties such as these.26 of the difficulty is in part a reflection This inability dictators to institutionalize other cencharismatic of But it may also be a reflecters of public authority. tion of the nature of monarchy as an ultimate ruling in a system based nominally on representainstitution Presidential dictators tive government. may feel a more a procompelling need than kings for political parties, that seems to be suported by the Jordanian and position Ethiopian political systems. however,
In the periods of representative governments a number of party functions appear to have been
IRANIANSTUDIES
84
performed. Aggregation, integration, socialization, contribution to the development and maintenance of the representative of the monarchial system) limitation powers) and even governings were done to varying extents by different In the periods of dictatparties. orship, party functions have been relegated mainly to institutional interest groups, although attempts at utilizing subservient parties have also been made. However, in the absence of a meaningful electoral system or similarity of political the gathering of ideology, a few political around a dominant decisionopportunists maker has not resulted in a functioning political party, at least not in the short run. In the area of functions, innovation has mainly come from the parties and groups outside the goverrnment. The Popular Democrats, the Tudeh, the Iran, the Toilers, and the National Front have been the source of political innovation. They have also inspired technological, economic and administrative modernization. Many of Reza Shah's reforms were proposed by the parties before he became dominant, just as the six-point program of the present regime's "White Revolution" were proposed by the parties before. The Iranian case seems to corroborate Theodore LowiIs findings that innovatign has mainly come from the minority or the g2ut-party and Duverger's
"catagion
from the
left."
y
n
Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner have proposed that once political parties have emerged in a system, their suppression is not likely to automatically terminate their activities, and that this suppression usually results in clandestine and conspiratorial character for the repressed parties.29 This proposition, which is supported by the history of the Bolsheviks in Russia and the F.L.N. in Algeria, seems to find further support in the Iranian case. The suppression of the Popular Democrats resulted in guerrilla warfare, clandestine and support for radical activities, separatist movements. The suppression of Erini and Jahansuz groups resulted in the later formation of pro-Communist and Fascist
85
SPRING 1970
parties. tributed factions, adoption models.
of the Tudeh has conthe suppression Finallys Communist of pro-Chinese to the development in the seems to result repression In short, and inf luences exogenous of the more radical
that suscepticase also indicates The Iranian is not necideology communist or leftist the bility to socio-econand lower with poverty associated essarily number of active the largest In fact, omic status. members of the Tudeh have come from the urban middleworkers and proincome groups such as the white collar and even military officers. students, fessionals, laws of the electoral of the effects A comparison in Western of franchise of 1906 and 1914 with a history that gradualism suggests Europe and the United States, might have been helpful of franchise in the extension and parties of competitive-aggregative to the success Furin emerging areas.30 institutions representative the more power within by keeping political thermore, such gradof the system; and modern sectors articulate of dictatthe justification ualism might have obviated reas the means for economic and technological orship forms. in powers' policies of the foreign The effects But in general they from time to time. Iran have varied of the competto the development have been detrimental and representative instituparties itive-aggregative in the of colonialism The abnormal appearance tions. period of Iran tended to deepen early constitutional of early parand make the operation societal cleavages that insularThis suggests ty system more difficult. intervention might have been a major ity from foreign of Britain, parties the early native enabling factor and Western Europe to overcome the the United States, In the case of the United States difficulties. initial it should be noted that the history, with a colonial of a factor to leave the system) Tories were encouraged emphasized. which has not been adequately importance
IRANIAN STUDIES
86
it has often been suggested that to Finally, achieve representative government in emerging nations to it is necessary first expand educational facilities, improve technology and raise the standard of living. Some have gone so far as to argue that it does not matter how such requisite of democracy are conditions achieved and that dictatorship may be the fastest method of bringing them about and thus enhancing the prospects for a successful representative democracy in the future. The case of Iran does not substantiate this proposition. Educational, economic, and technological developments did characterize both periods of dictatorship. They did not, however, contribute to the development of representative institutions. In fact, the reverse appears to have been the case. The lessons of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and the USSR are not different. Expanded literacys economic development, high rate of employment, and improved standard of living in these polities did not make their people or leaders more democratic. Rather, they became stauncher supporters of their respective authoritarian systems.
NOTES 1.
Joseph A. Schlesinger and Harry Eckstein, "Parties, Political,t Inter-National Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968 ed., vol. II, p. 430.
2.
For the influence of various environmental factors upon political parties see: George E. Lavau, "Partis politiques et realites sociales: Contribution a une etude realiste des partis politiques,TM Cahiers de la Fondation des Sciences Nationale Politigues, no. 38 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1953); Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Acin the Modern State, tivity trans. Barbara and Robert North (London: Methuen; New York: Wiley, 1955); Moisei I. Ostrogorskii, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, trans. Frederick Clarke
87
SPRING 1970
3.
4. 5.
6. 7. 8.
9.
(London and New York: Macmillan, 1908), 2 vols.; Ferdinand A. Hermens, Democracy or Anarchy? A Study of Proportional Representation (South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press , 1941); Theodore Lowi, "rToward Functionalism in Political Science: The Case of Innovation in Party Systems,' The American Political Science Review, vol.57 (1963), pp. 570-583; Schlesinger and Eckstein, pp. cit., pp. 447-450; Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Praeger, 1967); Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, and Stein 1956); and Seymour M. Lipset Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1967). Lowi, op. cit., pp. 572-573; Schlesinger and Eckstein, op. cit., pp. 432-435; 451-452; and Valdimer 0. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (5th ed., New York: Crowell, 1964), ch. 8. Duverger, op. cit., pp. xiii-xxxvii; and Schlesop. cit. inger and Eckstein, pp. 450-451. An extensive discussion of pirti is available in Leonard Binder, Iran: Political in a Development Changing Society and Los Angeles: (Berkeley Univof California ersity Press, 1964). and Duverger, Ibid., p. xxvi. op. cit., The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1910), pp. 167-168. Great Britain, Correspondence the Affairs Respecting of Persia, December 1906 to November 1908 (Cmd. 4581) and Papers, vol. Accounts 105, (London: H.M.S.O., 1909), p. 28. Peter Avery, Modern Iran (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 139-162. This work contains the best account in English available of the earlier party movements. See also Mehdi Malekzgdeh, Tarikh-e EnrelTab-e Mashof the Constitutional Iran (The History rutiyat-e Revolution in Iran), in Persian (Tehran: Soqrat and Ibn Sina, 1949-1954),7 vols.
IRANIAN STUDIES
88
10. 11. 12. 13.
14.
15. 16.
Roger P. Churchill, Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: Torch, 1939). Morgan W. Shuster, The Strangling of Persia (New York: The Century, 1912), pp. 157-167. Avery, op. cit., pp. 185-188, and Malekzideh, 2j. cit., vol. 4. For a comprehensive account of these movements see: George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948: A Study in Big-Power Rivalry (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1949); Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966); Avery, op. cit., pp. 212-220; and Manucher Dowlat-e Showravi dar Iran (The Gorgani, Siasat-e Policy of the Soviet Government in Iran), in Persian (Tehran: Mazaher, 1947). Ta?rikh-e Encelib-e Mashrutiyat-e Irnn (The History of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran), in Persian (Tehran: Mazaher, 1945-1946); vol. 2, pp. 337339; vol. 3, pp. 4-10. Duverger, op.cit., pp. 212. According to this electoral law, the membership of the Majles was set at 150 (with the maximum constitutional limit of 200), of which sixty members were allocated to Tehran and the rest to the provinces. The electors were divided into six classes: (1) Princes and the Qajir tribe, (2) doctors of divinity and students, (3) nobles and notables, (4) merchants, (5) land proprietors and peasants, and (6) trade guilds. Each class voted for its representatives separately to the Majles. Elections in Tehran were direct and in the provinces through the college of electors. The actual division of votes reflected the triumph of the middle and upper-middle classes, especially the business class. The following was the distribution for the 60 representatives allocated to Tehran: Princes and members of the QaIjir family, 4; doctors of divinity and students, 4; merchants, 10; landowners and peasants, 10; trade guilds, 32 in all. The third of the above six categories was
89
SPRING 1970
17. 18.
19. 20. 21. 22.
23.
24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.
not defined or represented. Donald Wilber, Contemporary Iran (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 68, 77. accounts of the various For the best available L.P. Ellwell-Sutton, parties in this period see: The Middle Parties in Iran: 1941-1948,' "Political East Journal, vol. 3 (1949), pp. 45-61; Richard UnivW. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: ersity of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), and "Political Party Development in Iran,' Iranian Studies, vol. 1 Lenczowski, (1968), pp. 82-94; Binder, op. cit.,; Op.. Cst W.; Avery, op_. cit.; Wilber., op. cit.; and Zabih, op. cit. and Zabih, op. cit. Lenczowski, op. cit.; op. cit. Elwell-Sutton, pp. 216-221; Cottams Nationalism Binder, op. cit., in Iran, pp. 267-281. For the best account of the Toilers and the Third pp. 212-215; Cottam, Force see: Binder, op. cit., Party Development in Iran," pp. 89-91, "Political and Nationalism in Iran, pp. 264-265, 293-294; and pp. 93, 148. Wilber, op. cit., Institutions See G.H. Razi, "The Press and Political and KtyA Content Analysis of Ettela'at of Iran: han", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 22 (1968), pp. 471-474. EttelUlIt, January 30, 1963. Ibid., July 30, 1963. Order in Cf., Samuel P. Huntington, Political (New Haven: Yale University Changing Societies Press, 1968), pp. 417-419. Ibid. p. xxvii . Op. cit., Political Parties and Political Development (PrincePress, 1966), pp. 22-24. ton: Princeton University The importance of the electoral process for politby ical parties was first expounded extensively See also Duverger, oR. cit., Hermens, op. cit. and Eckstein, op. cit., pp. 216-228; and Schlesinger pp. 438-439.
IRANIAN STUDIES
90
PERSIANFOLKSONGTEXTSFROMAFGHAN BADAKHSHAN MARKSWOBIN This study is based on fieldwork undertaken in Badakhshan province of Afghanistan in 1968 for the purA sunmary of the pose of collecting musical data. basic musical styles and instruments current in the area can be found in the author's Instrumental Music in Northern Afghanistan. The focus of the present article is the type of Persian verse set to music by the folk singers of Badakhshian. Principally) this includes a description of the texts of the most comnon folksong form of the region, the felak, drawn from singers of the Faizibid Darwaz (northern), (central), Shughnan (northeastern),
Mark Slobin completed fieldwork in 1967-69 in Afghanistan and Soviet Central Asia under a Foreign Area Research for the present article Fellowship. was undertaken under a Wenner-Gren Foundation post-doctoral Dr. Slobin is currently Vislting grant. Assistant Professor at School of Music, University of Michigan, Professor of Music at Wesleyan and will be Assistant University beginning Fall, 1971.
91
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and Keshm (western) regions of BadakhWakhin (eastern) Reference will be made to current Pershian province. sian and Uzbek folksong texts of other areas of northern Afghanistan and the Tajik SSR. The task of linking the contemporary quatrains of Afghan (and Soviet) Badof fourtradition akhshan to the Iranian historical line folksong texts lies in the province of a specialist in Persian poetry; the present author, whose main concern is the music of the rubVli, is content to bring the existence specialists of literary to the attention folksemi-improvised of a still vigorous tradition o5 song texts in BadakhshXn today. Badakhshan is a mountainous zone, lying at the point of the Hindu Kush, at the headnortheasternmost waters of the Oxus. It is linked to the rest of Afand is road and air traffic, ghanistan by unreliable thus often cut off due to poor road and weather conof the region isolation Hence the traditional ditions. Badchange. technological maintained despite has been an old Iranian by populated akhshan is principally termed Mountain Tajiks in the litpopulation generally At the Soviet-Afghan border along the Panj erature. a number of secluded Iranian peoples known live river as Pamir Tajiks, speaking archaic Iranian collectively to the Persianwhich are unintelligible languages and Pamir TajBoth Mountain Mountain Tajiks. speaking SSR (Tajin the live Tajik of the same extraction iks border across the of movement populations ikistan); stopped in ca. 1940. charbaiti) play an imporSongs (bait, ruba'i, of Mountain life They may in the Tajiks. tant role a of si'at-tiri means ("time-passing,' serve as 1) workers, for shepherds and itinerant "diversion") and in towns, 3) to dance villages 2) accompaniment of the urban center in the province, entertainment times, e.g. the anat festival FaizfbWd, especially (Jeshn) held late in August. nual Independence Festival
IRANIANSTUDIES
92
differs the
The most common type of up-country songs which from the standard urban style, considerably is
felak
(lit.
"fate,'
luniverse"r).
Felaks
form an
important component of the repertoire of purely instrumental music in Badakhshan when performed without words; few other modifications are made beyond the mere absence of text. When sung) fel?aka may be performed solo or with the accompaniment of three indigenous Badakhshani musical instruments: the dambura (a two-stringed fretless lute), the gfichak (a two-stringed spike and the tulI (a type of recorder).3 fiddle) Felaks are sung to melodies of extremely limited melodic compass with the musical structure depending on the verse form, e.g. important lines (usually the last) are marked off by caesuras, etc. The songs are set for the most parts with rarely more than syllabically two notes allotted to a syllable. Final syllables are invariably lenghthened, with vowels or consonants transformed into long vowels like E or i that may be prolonged for several measures. Bearing this background in mind, let us turn to analysis of the songs themselves. Ten representative felaks have been chosen for discussion, with a total of forty-four verses, yielding an average of 4.4 verses per song. Of these, thirty-eight verses are in quatrain form, leaving only six anomalous verses; three three-line stanzas and one each of two, five and seven lines. We are dealing, then, with a repertoire that falls into the old Iranian tradition of quatrain folksong
texts.
Aside from this high degree of uniformity in one feature, other traits of the felaks under study display a remarkable heterogeneity of structure in terms of type of rhyme scheme, number of syllables per line and shared vocabulary of stock words or phrases, features to be discussed below.
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SPRING 1970
percentIn regard to rhyme scheme, a significant age of the felak verses in quatrain form deviate fro the AABApattern considered standard for the rubiYi. follow twenty-five quatrain verses, Of the thirty-eight six variant representing this norm, but thirteen, These rhyme-schemes, deviate from the AABApattern. Five verses break down into the following patterns: with AAAArhyme scheme, three with AABB, two with AABC Among and one each with AAAB, ABCAand ABCDpatterns. those with three lines the six non-quatrain verses, is the two-liner follow either an AAAor AMBpattern, an AABBBand the single sevenan AB, the five-liner line verse (of which more below) contains no apparent These findings do not tally with JilYi rhyme scheme. Cejpek's statement regarding Persian quatrains for "So-called singing quatrains (rubT-i tarfolksongs: ana with rhyme pattern aaaa) do not occur very often, but the rhyme formula aabb appears fairly frequently."15 However, Cejpek's remarks as to the metric structure of folksong quatrains bears quite closely on the Badakhshani case: Among the various genres of rhythmigenucal poetry the quatrain (rubali) inely has its roots among the people, Each verse is usually made up of eleven sylone finds though occasionally lables, Not until later was twelve or fourteen. imthe metric system of polite literature (most composed upon the folk-quatrains mon is the incomplete eleven-syllable hazai. in though not a specialist The present writer, to agree with Cejpek in is inclined Persian metrics, his view that folksong quatrains are only loosely with the classical aruz system of Persian associated verse, and can more properly be analyzed according to awkward It is certainly per line. number of syllables to scan most of the felak texts under study the way IRANIAN STUDIES
94
one would scan a verse
of polite
literature.
Cejpek's estimate of eleven and twelve-syllable predominance is borne out by the Badakhshani material, although fourteen-syllable lines are not as common as he indicates. Singers clearly prefer eleven- and twelve-syllable lines; next come lines of ten and thirteen syllables. structures, Fourteen-syllable however, are definitely less favored in Badakhshan. Less homogeneous than the overall distribution of syllable-number is the patterning of lines within a given verse. Only four of the forty-four quatrains are isosyllabic, and overall there are thiry-one different combinations of syllable-numbers in the sample, only three of which occur more than once. Lopsided quatrains such as one with the pattern 11,11,11,6 syllables are common. The heterogeneity of patterning in rhyme scheme, number of syllables per line and combination of syllable-number in lines of a given verse delineated above bespeaks the semi-improvisatory nature of felak songtexts as well as a generally nonchalant attitude towards fixed form among folk singers. Looking over the entire body of texts, one finds a continuum of precision in verse structure which can be roughly correlated in certain cases with the degree of professionalism and/or cosmopolitanism of the singer. At one end, an amateur backwoods singer may prefer a style which is in approach, frequently with autoalmost narrative biographical content, while at the other extreme of the poetic range a much-traveled professional singer may employ subject-matter and verse structures reminiscent of polite literature. We will examine these features of the BadakhshTni song texts as we look at sample poems. Our first example is of the extreme amateur variety cited above. This is a felak sung by GhulTm Husayn of the Shughnian region, where Mountain and Pamir Tajiks 95
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live side by side; Ghulam Husayn is of the former group. His song illustrates a blend of tightly and looselystructured verses. The verses accordare transcribed ing to Badakhshani pronunciation from the recorded performance. The author was assisted in the translation of song texts by Mr. E. Yaftali a (Kabul University), native of Badakhshan. Passages considered obscure by the present writer and/or Mr. Yaftali in are enclosed parentheses. Example
1:
Ghuain Husayn's
Felak
Verse
1:
Az xaneie padar, ei mardom, digar raftam Ba sad alam du didei geryan raftam. Yaran o baradara?n salamat ba?shid. Shughn7an be shoma, man dar badaxshan megardum.
Verse
2:
Xa-be didam, az in xab elahi didam dust. Xud ma wa tura xubtar be bolin didam. Az xibe labe dar shodam wa xabe didam. Dar dashte bad or margi namad z pase rum Man kiyam, man begiram be xane resam. Be xane resam ke madaram darra? w?az sazad. Girad labe dandan barayad nafasam.
Verse
3:
Nozuk badane (mushqe xotan) miyaye. Az rThe ghariba watan miyaye. Yaqub pesare gum shodara (ki shenid) Ku yusufi nazanin be watan miya?ye.
Verse
4:
Be mulqake shughnan fitadam gharib. Bimar shodam ba? sar nay?af tam tabib. Ku xohar ku madar ku ya-ram aziz Girad xabare ma.
Verse
1:
I left my father's house, o people. With a hundred sorrows and two tearful eyes. and brothers, be well! Friends in Shughnan is for you; I'm going to travel Badakhshan.
IRANIAN STUDIES
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Verse 2:
I had a dream, oh God, and saw my friend. I saw you and myself better in sleep I slept near the door and dreamed. Anyone who goes to the desert of Evil and Death doesn't return. Who am I , that I can reach home So that when I reach my home my mother will open the door So that she kisses me and my soul escapes.
Verse 3:
body (with musk of Khotan) is The delicate coming. He is coming home f rom af ar. Jacobs who lost his son (who has heard of him) is coming home. Yusuf the beautiful
Verse 4:
1 live poorly in the land of Shughnrn. I became ill but didn't find a doctor. my mother, my friend Where is my sister, To f'ind out how I am.
Readily apparent is the variety of verse-types Verse 2 stands out, in its in Ghulim Husayn's felak. stanzas. rambling form, from the other, four-line Verses 1 and 3 offer examples of the more standard, AABA-rhymed quatrain of Badakhshin, while Verse 4 The thread running throughtakes a middle ground. account of wanout the song is the autobiographical many dering and longing for home, which characterizes It is interesting to note that Shughnin is felaks. country than Badakhshrn treated as being a different nature of sub-regions proper, emphasizing the isolated of Badakhshan. Even Ghulia Husayn's felak is not free from a cliches: note the certain number of quasi-literary in Verse 3 and the possible phrase Biblical references l"mushqe xotan" ("musk of Khotan"). elaksa are partly or an by the singer's solidified memorized verses) and partly improvised to suit audience's approbation, 97
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Verse 3 is probably one of Ghuthe mood or occasion. lTm Husayn's fixed quatrains that he fits into many felaks; Verse 2, on the other hand, bears an improvisatory mark, and was strung together without a break in the sung performance. Some of GhulWmHusayn's cliches are those found though there are remarkably few such in numerous felaks, One which Badakhshani folksongs. in phrases recurring o barT"YSrSn appears in Verse 1 is quite popular: adbeing parties as and brothers") darTn" ("lovers stereotyped of use the than More coimnon dressed. phrases and similes in fgLlaks is the recurrence of a work, etc. In to agricultural allusions given locale, to short, singers rely on homespun material relating musician. the daily life of the non-professional At the other end of the creative continuum stands the work of performers such as Baiz Gul Badakhmusician who has made a regional shi, a professional across the North and has even been broadreputation for a a rare distinction cast by Radio Afghanistan, Baz Gul hails from the Keshm Badakhshani singer. area of (western) region, which is the least isolated Here is one of his well-known songs: the province. Example 2:
Baz Gul Badakhshils
Felak
Verse 1:
Seibarga beguft dar zamin sabza manam. Benafsha beguft jawTni azTda manam. Sadbarga beguft lafi behuda nazan; Yak daste guli jawWni pur maza manam.
Verse 2:
Ashuq shodara tegh be sar bayad xord. Gar zahr bedish mesle shakar bayad xord. Ruze be gonihi isheqi koshte shawam. Darya darya xune jigar bayad xord.
IRANIANSTUDIES
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Verse 1:
I am the only greenery on Clover said: earth. Violet said: I am the perfect youth. don't boast The centifolious rose said: in vain; I am a wreath of young joyous flowers.
Verse 2:
The lover must be ready a blade. If you give him poison, like sugar. Someday I may be killed love. He should drink rivers
to be pierced
with
he must eat it for the sin of of liver's
blood.
Here we have two tightly structured, unrelated verses which stand in sharp contrast to Ghulam Husayn's rambling but thematically connected stanzas. Baiz Guls quatrains follow the standard AABApattern, down to recurrence of as long a closing phrase as "bWyad xord". Further, both stanzas have a central theme carried out In the first, strictly. the "beguft" motive and allegorical use of flowers clearly bespeaks a close connection to the cliches of polite Persian verse, while in the second the dangers of love are stated in the traditional style. Bfz Gul's quatrains Significantly, also seem metrically related to standard rubali meters of classical Persian verse, though a fair amount of metric "compensation" is required to make the lines fit the patterns. The meters are:2._vuuF.u l-a..vu for Verse I and for Verse 2, based necessarily on a classical Persian reading of the text. This is the extent of metric formalization in Badakhshani folksong texts, though one cannot precisely say that other quatrains do not admit to metric scansion. As Masse has noted, "No Persian metre admits to so many variants as the rubai.,"8 Between the extremes
of Ghulim Husayn's 99
and Baz
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Gulls style lies the large middle ground of felak feature of this Perhaps the most interesting verse. body of material is the insight it affords extensive to the into Badakhshani life through the references and the continuing probdaily round of activities and love encountered by Mountain lems of subsistence Here, for example, are two verses of a felak Tajiks. by Baba Naim, a Badakhshani musician who has become a Radio Afghanistan performer of non-Badakhshani music recalls many of the tunes of in Kabul, but who still The tight structure of the his native province. verses may be a result of Baba Naim's professional stature and his wide travel and residence in various areas of Afghanistan. Example 3:
Baba Naim's Felak
Verse 1:
Charxe felak mara be charx aiwordi. Kulab budim mara dar baix awordi Janam dar KulTabbudim u mixurdim ibe shirin Az Xbe shirin bar 7abe talx awordi.
Verse 2:
Dar kotile ruberu bastam shudgar GowhXye hartmnzda nemikard noxshar Sange bezadim o beshekast yugh or separ GowhXbe cherar raft, ma didane yar.
Verse 1:
0 wheel of fortune, I was in Kulib, you Dear, I drank sweet You brought me from
Verse 2:
down the passo I was plowing straight The damn cows weren't chewing their cuds. I threw a stone and broke the yoke and plow. The cows fled and I ran to my lover.
you spun me around. brought me to Balx. water in Kulib; sweet water to bitter.
the common reference to "felak" Verse I displays or "icharkh-i felak" in Badakhshini songs, and explains IRANIANSTUDIES
100
how the term felak was given to the entire genre of songs. Here the singer describes the plight of refugees from Soviet Tajikistan the Kul(specifically ab region) to the Afghan side, probably during the Basmachi uprisings of the 1920's and 1930's. Balx, in Afghan Turkestan, is here made to stand for the whole of northern Afghanistan. Verse 2, on the other hand, is a rather bitter rustic scene with some elements of pastoral Both verses comedy. of Baba Naim's felak typify the concerns of felak singers. The of a given locale, stressing as in Verse 1, is found in four of the ten songs under discussion, and specific to agricultural reference or pastoral occupations appear in five of the felaks. The third motive mentioned earlier, Biblical references, occurs in five texts, and the fourth common topic, travel and separation, comes out in three of the sample songs. Among other folk poetry genres of Afghanistan, the felak of Badakhshan is most like the Uzbek quatrain of Afghan Turkes tan, Though the language (and language family) obviously differ, the semi-improvised functional nature of the Uzbek songs is quite close to the Tajik quatrain.9 The Uzbek songs are generally heard among professional in teamusicians houses across the North, and have the same immediacy of content and lack of formal metric structure that characterize many felak texts. Folksong in Pertexts sian heard in the same teahouse context tend to follow the ghazal, rather than rub'ali, form, and are usually composed by semi-professional urban poets who produce texts specifically for musicians, to be set to stock melodies. In these verses, the cliches and concerns of polite Persian literature predominate, down to mere parody of classic poetic style. Rarely, however, are classic poems themselves (e.g. works of Saladi and Hafez) used as song texts. Classically-oriented town ghazals are also composed in Uzbek in certain towns of Afghan Turkestan, notably Andkhoi, and are analogous to Persian verses of the same urban variety.
101
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of the Badakhshani felak relatives The closest are to be found across the border in southern Tajikistan, where the other half of the Mountain Tajik popIn Dansker's valuable study of the ulation lives. music culture of the Tajiks of the Karategin and Darwiz regions (adjacent to Afghan Badakhshlan) one finds the word gharibi ("poor"t songs) used much the way Afghan as a generic term for i.e., Badakhshanis uig felak, These songs, both in terms of their types of song. manner of performance, accompanying instrufunction, to the ments and melody typess correspond closely The most confelak described in the present study. between these vincing proof of the "blood-relationship" motives is the appearance of identical two repertoires and lines in the texts of songs in Soviet and Afghan Below is a Soviet Tajik quatrain quoted Badakhshan by Dansker ; the Afghan versian can be found as Verse 4 of GhulTm Husayn's felak (Example 1). KulTAbgharib o Bimar shodam o Ku madar or ku O bigonfi hamin
mulke Kulib gharib. be sar nayoftam tabib. padar biyarand tabib? guft o kuj-K mord gharib.
KulTab is poor and the land of Kulab is poor. I fell ill and couldn't find a doctor. Where are my mother and father, to bring a doctor? 0 thus spoke the unfortunate one and where did the poor fellow die. of lines is not accithe coincidence Clearly, of dental, and demonstrates the continued closeness among the Mountain Tajiks despite the repertoire border over the last closing of the Afghan-Soviet The term fellak, though not cited years. thirty-odd as in use in Tajikistan, in Dansker's study, is still the present author was informed by Nizam Nurdianov, of the Tajik Academy of in Tajik folklore speclalist in Dushanbe. Sciences, IRANIANSTUDIES
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In summary, while Browne has so aptly stated proth? oldest that the rubi' i is "almost certainly genius of Persia, 12 the present duct of the poetical that this does not mean to indicate study has attempted it is on the contrary, that the rubil'i has vanished; areas of the Iranian world. in the eastern flourishing
NOTES 1,
2.
3. 4.
5. 6. 7.
8. 9.
10.
11. 12.
Slobin, M., Instrumental Music in Northern AfghanPh.D. dissertation istan, (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1969). For a recent regional folk study of the Persian quatrain, see Mardom-i KhorasTn by Ibrahim Shukurz5de (Tehran: Nihad-i Farhang, Pashto 1967). folk poetry has its classic in presentation Darmsteter's Chants Populaires des Afghans (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1888-90); one important Pashto genre, the lundali has recently been described by a Pashtoon poet, Saduddin Shpoon ("Paxto and the Landey,"in Folklore Afghanistan XX, No.4 1968, 40-49). in Slobin, Illustrations 1969. Cejpek, Jiri, "Iranian in J. Folk-Literature,' Rypka, ed., History of Iranian Ljterature (Dordrecht: Reiden, 1968), 607-710. 695. Ibid., Ibid., 694. I am indebted to Prof. G. Windfuhr, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Literatures, University of Michigan, for the metric analysis of Biz Gull s felak. Masse , H., "Rubaill in The Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1936), 1167. Slobin, M. a Notes from the record album "Afghanistan Vol. I: Music of the Uzbeks,0 Anthology of the World's Music Series, 1969. Dansker, O., "Muzykal'naia kulltura tadzikov Karai Darvazal" in Iskusstvo tegina tadXikskogo naroda Vol. 3 (Dushanbe: Donish, 1965, 236. Ibid. Quoted in Masse, 1936, 1167. 103
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THREEDROPS OF BLOOD
SADEQ HEDAYAT Translated
by Thomas M. Ricks
they changed my room. Yesterdays Am I completely cured now? Will I be free to leave next week as the superintendent promised? Have I been sick at all? For one years they wouldn' t give me a pen and paper which I wanted more than anything else. I always thought about the many things I would write once they gave me a pen and paper. without Yesterday) asking, they brought me paper and a pen...something I longed I waited for so long. for so much...something But what's I have been able to the use? Since yesterday, write nothings no matter how hard I try. It's as someone were me back, as though my arm though holding Now, as I read over the garbled were paralysed. which are etched into the paper, the only words lines I can make out are ... "three drops of blood." *
Thomas H. Ricks ment of History
IRANIAN STUDIES
*
*
is a doctoral candidate at Indiana University.
104
in the Depart-
The sky is azure, the garden green, the flowers and a soft gentle blooming on the distant knoll, breeze carries their to this very spot. fragrance And for what? I'm no longer able to enjoy such things; things meant for poets, and second childchildren, hoods. It's one year since I came here. Night and day, I have been kept awake by the crying of a cat; these terrifying these grating cries, sounds bring my heart to my mouth. In the morning, my eyes are hardly open when the damned injection...! How long the days have been and how weary the hours... herded together underground during the summertime, or decked out in our yellow and pants while seated shirts alongside the garden during the winter to enjoy the For one year, I've lived among these sunshine. strange and peculiar people. We have nothing in common; I'm as different from them as the earth is from the sky. Still, the groans, the stillness, the curses, the tears, and laughter of these human beings continue to fill my sleep with nightmares. *
*
*
In another hour, we eat ... the same old food ... yogurt, pudding, rice, bread, and cheese...enough to live on, or rather enough not to die. Hassan has but one desire and that is to eat a bowl of rich soup and four flat loaves of fresh bread. When he leaves this place, they'll bring him a bowl instead of a pen and paper! He's one of the happier people here. Short in stature, he has a foolish laugh, thick nieck, bald head, and rough, arthritic hands, deformed from hod-carrying cell ..every of his body and his stupid look prove he was born for carrying hod. If MIohammadAli didn't stand there at lunch and dinner, Hassan would have taken all of us right up to God but Mohammad Ali is also a citizen of this world. They say whatever they want in this place but this is another world, beyond the world of ordinary men. We have a doctor who doesn't understand anything about the power of God. If I were in his place, I'd pour poison in all their food some evening and give it to them to eat. Then, 105
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the next mornings I'd stand off in the corner of the garden with my hands on my hips and count the dead as when they brought At first, they were brought out. of them poisonfear overpowering this had I me here, Mountil lunch or dinner my touch I didn't ing me. I Terrified, ate. I it...then hammad Ali tasted they were going to thinking stayed awake at nightst are very far away) matters these of all me. Now, kill the same food, same the .always time.. faded by people) halfway up coming blue darker a room, the same blue the wall. Two months ago, they threw a mad man into that He tore open his at the end of the courtyard. prison and began marble jagged of own stomach with a piece They say same that tool. with opening his intestines stomachs. out tearing to accustomed he was a butcher, Then, there was another one who popped out his own had to tie his hands eye with his fingernails...they The blood from He was screaming. behind his back. I know that all these dried up. his eye had already people are under the head supervisor. Not all of these people here are like these if cured and Many of them would be miserable two. Sughra Sulthere's For instance, to leave. allowed she Two or three times, tan in the women's section. but She's old They caught her. wanted to escape. and uses the smears her face with plaster-of-paris She also thinks of hergeranium flower for rouge. .if she were cured and as a fourteen-year-old.. self But then she'd have a stroke. looked into a mirror, there is good old Taqi who wants to turn the world that women are the reason He believes upside-down. for man's misery and to save the world, every woman He's become the lover of Sughra must be killed. Sultan. All of these people are under our head superall the hands of the insane behind He ties visor. he always and beady-eyeds Large-nosed their backs. under the pine tree at the far end of the strolls IRANIAN STUDIES
106
he bends over to examine the foot garden. Sometimes, of the tree. Anyone seeing him might wonder how such man fell into the grip of a a harmless, helpless But I know him. I also know group of raving idiots. that under the tree are three drops of blood. There's The cage is a cages hanging in front of his window. To take his a cat devoured the canary. empty because revenge, he left the cage there to attract greedy them. cats in order to execute Just as the he spied a tabby cat. Yesterday) beast reached the top of the pine tree directly in front of his window, he ordered the guard to shoot. These three drops of blood belong to that cat. But, he claims they belong to the Bird when questioned, of Truth. and neighbor... of all is my friend Strangest Abbas. About two weeks ago, they brought him here. He warmed up to me immediately. He thinks he's a prophet and poet. He believes that everything, particularly prophecy, depends on good luck and chance. Everyone needs foresight. If he's a dunce, he shall If he's the wisest succeed. man in the world and doesn't have foresight, he'll fall on bad days. Abbas also thinks of himself as a tar expert. He a wire across streched a piece of wood and thought he had a tar. He also composed a poem which he recites eight times a day to me. One might say they brought him here because of this poem... the poem, the peculiar ditty which he composed... Alas, once more, night comes Upon all the world, blackness comes Upon all creatures, stillness comes Except on me, pain and grief will no joy in a world like mine There's The remedy is not sorrow, but death is Now in that corner beneath the pine There, in the dirt, three drops 107
flood.
mine of blood.
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Abbas rewe walked in the park. Yesterdays this very same poem when a woman, a man, and cited Till now, they have a young girl came to see him. them. I now know them and recognize come five times. She The young girl brought a bouquet of flowers. she loved me. From the laughed at me. Certainly, to me. Abbas' pock-marked she was attracted beginning But, as the woman spoke face wasn't goodlooking. I saw Abbas take the girl aside and with the girl, kiss her. *
*
*
Until now, no one came to see me and no one The last been one year. It's brought me flowers. time, Siavush came to see me. Siavush was my best Every days we went to We were neighbors. friend. talktogethers and returned together the university During the recess) together. ing about our lessons Rokhsara, Siavush's tar lessons. I gave Siavush used to take part in our sescousin and my fiancee, thought about marrying Siavush seriously sions. one month before but, suddenly, sister Rokhsarals she broke off the engagement and Siathe wedding, I went to inTwo or three times, sick. vush fell forbut they said the doctors quire about his health Every time I came, bade anyone to speak with him. gave up. I finally they gave me the same answer. it was close to examinations. I now remember.. home and dumped to dusk, I returned One day, close on the table. my pile of books and school note-pads shot a pistol As I was about to change my clothes, it made me jump, esThe shot was so close rang out. when I remembered the moat behind our house pecially I in our neighborhood. and the rumors of a thief from the table drawer and went into the took a pistol Then, closely. I stood there listening courtyard. As see a thing. I climbed up on our roof but didn't courtdown, I glanced over into Siavush's I started There, in the middle of the yard, stood Siayard. I called and underpants. Surprised, vush in his shirt is that you?" "Siavush, out to him:
IRANIAN STUDIES
108
one else
He saw me and yelled is here."
back:
"Come on over,
no
"'Did you hear the shot?" I asked. He put his to his lips and motioned for me to come with a finger nod of his head. I quickly climbed down and went to the front door and knocked. He opened the door himself. His head was down and he stared at the ground. "Why didn't you comne to see me?"
they
"I came two or three times said the doctor forbade it,"
"They think he mumbled.
I'm not well
"Did you hear
the
pistol
to visit you but I answered. but
they're
wrong,"
shot?"
Without answering, he took my hand and led me to the foot of the pine tree. He pointed to something. Bending over, I saw ...three drops of fresh blood on the ground. Then, he took me to his room and closed the door. I sat down in a chiar while he lit the lamp. He then came over to me and pulled up a chair in front of me next to the table. His room was simple; blue in color, a darker blue coming halfway up the wall. There was a tar on one side of the room. A pile of books and school note-pads were scattered across the table. Then, opening the table drawer, Siavush took out a pistol and showed it to me. It was one of those antiques pearl-handled pistols. He stuffed it into his pocket and said: "I used to have a female cat, named Nazee. Maybe you saw her around. She was one of those common tabby cats with two big eyes.. .larger than usual as if she wore eye-liner. The color and shapes on her back were very even as if poured on like water onto a paper blotter and then folded neatly in the middle. Every day, when I returned from school,
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Nazee ran out to me, purring and meowing as she rubbed When I sat down, she climbed over my against my leg. head and down my back, poking her nose into my face and licking my forehead with her rough tongue; begOne could see that a female cat was ging for a kiss. than a male more crafty, more kind, and more sensitive Besides me, Nazee was on the best of terms with cat. But she the cook since she got her food from her. kept her distance with the old housemaid who was most and who said her prayers and disliked conscientious Nazee believed that human beings cat hair. Certainly, were more clever than cats since they hoarded all the tasty food and kept the warm, cozy places for themCats, therefore, had to resort to flattery selves. in order to get along with them. and cajolery were most noticeable "Nazee's animal instincts when a bloody head of a rooster fell into her grasp. Her She was then transformed into a vicious beast. and out, and her claws came gleamed, large eyes grew Then, as if she snarled at anyone who came near her. it was only a toy, she began frolicking realizing Puthead to be allve. about imagining the rooster's ting her paw under it, she stroked it and then hid nearby, lying in ambush. Twice she attacked, herself leaping and capering with all the strength and agilattacks and quick retreats. ity of her kind, feinting Soon, she would tire of sporting with the head and For someappetite. would devour it with a ferocious time, she would prowl around looking for the rest of her sweet disposition the rooster to kills forgetting for the next one or two hours; not coming near anyone, not parading
around,
not even
attempting
flattery.
"Nazee was good at expressing her likes and She was both wild and reserved, not divulgdislikes. She knew full well ing her secrets or views on life. If a strange cat happened that our house was hers. by our gates she would snarl and hiss and her cries if it had would linger on for some time, particularly been a female cat. IRANIANSTUDIES
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"Nazee' s cries for food were quite distinct from her other wooing sounds. Her cries of hunger, rages or passion were all quite different. The tone of her vo'ice would change gradually. First, the cry rasped from her lungs, then it was a cry of revenge and angers followed by a pained sound which rose from a primeval urge which finally drove her running to her mate. Moreover, Nazee's looks were more significant than anything else. Often, she almost showed human feelings so much so that people asked themthat fuzzy head and behind those mys'Inside selves, terious green eyes, what thoughts and feelings must be welling up?' "'Last springs a terrible thing happened. As you know, this is the season when all animals swoon and make love. It is as if the spring breeze injected into all moving beings a bit of insanity. Our Nazee was no exception. The first wave of love went to her head and she trembled so much her whole body shook and her cries became more prolonged. Tomcats, hearing her calls, happily went off in her direction. After the squabbles and fighting, Nazee chose the one who was the strongest and the noisiest to be her mate. When animals make love, smell is most important to them, particularly among tame and clean cats who face other females like themselves. This is not so for the cats on the walls, the alley cats, the thins thieving; lazy emaciated cats who give off their own natural small so attractive among their kind. All day and particularly at night, Nazee and her lover sang out together. Nazee's soft body contracted while her mate's arched like a bow and together they purred in joy. Into the early hours of dawn, they continued their labors. Then, ruffled, tired, bruised but content, Nazee made her way back into the room. "Nazee's nocturnal lovemaking kept me awake. At last, I lost my patience. One day, I was working in front of this very window and spotted the Lover and Beloved strutting abou t the garden. I took this pistol which you see, went three steps, and took aim.
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The gun fired and a bullet tore into Nazee's mate. You might say he was torn in two. He took one jump a sound, darted for the gate, and, without uttering in front of the garden's clay wall and collapsed died. "The drops of blood trickled off in a straight Nazee searched for him for some time until she line. She smelled his blood and went found his prints. for his dead body. For two days and two straight she kept watch over her dead one. Often, she nights, nudged him with her paw as if to say, 'Wake up, it's Why are you sleeping at a time for Spring. still lovemaking? Why don't you budge? Get up! Get up! Nazee didn't understand death and didn't realize her lover was dead. "The following day, both Nazee and her mate I asked everyI searched everywhere. disappeared. Was Nazee that angry It was no use. one about her. with me? Have people and lovemaking ceased to have meaning for her? When one mate dies, what becomes of the other? "Then, one night, I heard the wailing of that The next He cried until daylight. very same tomcat. night was the same except he stopped his cries at dawn. On the third night, I again took the pistol of the pine tree in front and fired in the direction of my window. The flash of his eyes in the dark was and then stopped. the cries faded gradually, clear, Since that nights he comes and begins his wailing in The others sleep well and the same way as before. don't hear him. Whenever I tell them, they laugh at me but I know. ..I'm sure it's the voice of that Since that night until now I haven't cat I murdered. been about to sleep a wink. I move around, sleeping screams in every room. All night long, the terrible of this cat ring out, calling his mate. "Todays when the house was empty, I went out to the place where the cat sits every night and cries. IRANIANSTUDIES
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I took aim at the spot where the flash of his eyes in the dark. was clear The bullet was fired in the direction where I heard the cat's and, then, cries three drops of blood splashed down from above. You saw them with your own eyes. Aren't you my witness?" At that moment, the door of the and Rokhsara and her mother came in.
room opened
Rokhsara was carrying a bouquet of flowers in her hand. I stood up to greet them but Siavush laughingly said: "Of course, you know Mr. Mirza Ahmad Than better than I. No introduction is necessary. He gave me his word that he saw the three drops of blood with his own eyes at the foot of the pine tree." "'Yes, I saw them," I quickly added. Then Siavush came towards me, chuckling. He reached into my pockets took out my pistol, and put it on the table. "You know Mirza Ahmad Khan is not only good at playing the tar and reciting poetry, he's also an expert hunter....his aim is very good." Then he nodded I too got up and said: towards me. "Yes, this afternoon I came to get my school notebooks from Siavush. To pass the time, we were aiming at the pine tree.. .but those three drops of blood don' t belong to the cat, they belong to the Bird of Truth. You know that the owl who eats three grains of wheat belonging to a child must scream every night until three drops of blood trickle out of his throat. Perhaps a cat has devoured the neighbor' s canary and they have shot it and it happened here. Now I'm going to recite a new lyric poem which I've brought with me." I picked up the tar, tuned it, and then recited this poem: Alas, once more, night comes Upon all the world, blackness
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comes
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comes stillness Upon all creatures, Except over me, pain and grief flood.
will
There's no joy in a world like mine The remedy is not sorrow but death is mine Now in that corner beneath the pine There, in the dirt, three drops of blood. At that point of the poem, Rokhsarals mother stormed Rokhsarals eyebrows went out of the room in a huff. up and she said, "This one' s mad." She then took Siavushl s hand and they both burst out laughing. They left the room, slamming the door behind them. In the courtyards they stopped under my lamp below the window panes I saw them put their arms around each other and kiss.
IRANIANSTUDIES
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B O
OK
RE
V IEW
S
and Economy in in Iran: Settlement City and Village Madison, Wisc.: the Kirman Basin. By Paul W. English. 1966. 204 pp. Press, The University of Wisconsin .75. $6
WILLIAM IRONS an excelThis study by a geographer provides and of the influence of environment lent description on settlement economy, and social pattern) technology in one of the more arid regions of the Iranstructure ian Plateau. research conducted It is based on field in 1961-62 over a period of eleven months in Kirman, and preceded by seven months of library research and preparatory work in London, Tehran, Yazd and Isfahan. of the study is unique in that the The perspective of investigation is not a single community subject an urban center and a but rather a region including and rural area of small urban subcenters surrounding
Professor William Irons is Assistant of Social Relations at Johns Hopkins
115
in the Department University.
SPRING 1970
is focused on the relationAttention communities. ship between these communities rather than on the inof a single community. The ternal organization author is convinced that such an approach can yield new insight which cannot be gained by investigations of his focused on a single community, and the results study presented in this book bear out this conviction. Extension of this regional approach to certain other parts of Iran, such as Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, or the of the Caspian Sea will probably southern littoral in defining regional involve greater difficulties borders than were encountered in this study of the however, will probSuch difficulties, Kirman Basin. ably prove only to be minor problems, and undoubtedly there will be a number of future studies in Iran which will apply such a regional approach with conprofit. siderable of his study English begins the presentation of the physical environment of the with a description Kirman Basin pointing out that because of a number of extreme temperatures) ruggedfactors such as aridity, and poor soil the region presents ness of terrain, Hie then to human habitation. very serious obstacles reviews the history of human occupation of the basin, showing that because of its marginal character as an and its remoteness from area for human habitation in early Irancenters of commerce and administration ian history (Achaemenian and Parthian periods) the area was not permanently settled until early Sassanas a ian times, when Kirman City was established By this time qanat technology was outpost. frontier of Kirman well developed in Iran and the settlement The vagwas based on this means of supplying water. economic, and demographic political, aries of shifting of the Kirman Basin from on the inhabitants conditions to the present are then settlement the time of first reviewed brief ly.
IRANIANSTUDIES
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this is a description Following of settlement and land use, and an examination pattern of the facof Kirmani society. tors shaping these aspects Until of deep wells, introduction the only rethe recent and human conliable source of water for cultivation sumption in the Kirman Basin was the qanat, and this fact has been of overriding in determining importance settlement and the means of land utilization. pattern influThe way in which reliance on qanats strongly and internal ences the location, size, structure of settlements and the pattern of land use in the irrigated fields surrounding each settlement is made clear in this very interesting of the book. section The author's examination of these matters leads very natto an analysis of the impact of settlement urally and on the local land use patterns economy and social It is from this analysis structure. that English's most important a conclusion conclusion arises, which he feels can be generalized to the rest of Iran: "The villager of Iran, whether sharecropper, weaver, or herder, is inextricably in an urbaninvolved dominated, regional economic organization and probably was so in the past" (p. 88). The high cost of qanat construction and maintenance results in a conof the ownership centration of water resources and of arable land as well in the hands of a small wealthy upper stratum of the regional urban center, Kirman City. Share-cropping arrangements cause surpluses of rural produce beyond what is necessary for a very modest subsistence of the rural population to flow into the hands of this urban elite, and, thus, capital for investment in other activities, such as the extensive carpet weaving industry of Kirman, and livestock and wood production are also concentrated in urban hands. Closely associated with this situation is a concentration of mercantile and administrative activities in the regional urban center. To a very limited extent smaller regional subcenters such as Mahan and Jupar share in the conduct of these administrative and mercantile affairs. This condition in
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which a small urban elite monopolizes control of the economic activities of the entire and in which region, administration and trade are concentrated in the regional urban center, is characterized by the author as urban dominance. This is a condition which English feels can be generalized not only to the rest of Iran, but also to the entire Middle East (pp. 111-114). While English's demonstration that urban dominance is a salient feature of Kirmani society is a very substantial achievement, his suggestion that urban dominance is a characteristic general to the Middle East, both past and present, could be misleading if it is assumed to imply that conditions throughout the Middle East closely parallel those of Kirman. It is certainly true that there is no community in the modern Middle East, even the most isolated of nomad camps or the most inaccessible of mountain vilin some lages, whose population does not interact At a very significant way with some urban center. minimum such interaction consists of some form of trade with urban markets and recognition of the auof government officials based in urban centhority in various ters to collect taxes and to intervene ways However, the extent of urban conin local affairs. trol of rural economic resources described by English for Kirman is by no means universal. Agricultural in which local cultivators own all or most communities of the land they farm are not unknown in Iran, or In the majority of other parts of the Middle East. the local herders own all or pastoral communities, for which they care. most of the livestock Recogninow universal tion of government authority although Until very recently, has not been so in the past. tribal there have been various groups which have only In the tenuously accepted government authority. the tribal of such cases, majority people have recognized the urban-centered government as having only a to make demands on them, such as very limited right with a small body of militia to be supplied the right
IRANIAN STUDIES
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or to collect a light tax while leaving in tribal often the hands considerable authority including of the right to make war and peace independently numerous instances records in government. History resisted which such groups successfully by military its means attempts by the government to increase The extent to which tribal control over them. groups of urbanhave acted as political entites independent based governments has frequently gone even farther A fairly of the dynasties than this. large portion arose in Middle Eastern history recorded originally as a result of tribal conquests of urban centers. Are such tribal groups to be described as urbandominated? The condition of urban dominance which English has very ably demonstrated as characteristic of the Kirman Basin can be generalized to the rest of Iran and to other parts of the Middle East only with certain It is certainly limitations. true that for several millenia all rural communities in the Middle East have had important economic and political relations with urban centers. However, the extent to which the urban population has been the dominating group in these relations has varied considerably. The in the degree of urban dominance observed by English Kirman Basln in 1961-62 while not unusual is not universal. There is another feature of English's discussion of urban dominance in Kirman which deserves brief mention. This is his continual criticism of the "traview that Middle Eastern ditional" society is divided into isolated and self-contained communities. At the of the study, very beginning he states: It is customary for writers to divide Middle Eastern society into three sectors--city, village, and tribe--each
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enviphysical a different exploiting such authors preInvariably, rornent. by warning face their discussions that one must not view these readers economic realms, segments as discrete the mutto illustrate examples and cite city of each sphere: ual interdependence crops; depend on village-grown dwellers such basic commodities, receive villagers from the city; as salt, sugar) and cloth, supply wool and mi lk products tribesmen Havin return for grain. to marketplaces these writers this warning, ing delivered each segment as a proceed to discuss are viewed cities system: self-contained in a barren land, linked by as islands and networks of roads and caravan trails, who and processors by traders occupied as opposed to 'folk' share in 'urban' selfare isolated3, villages cultures; peasant comsufficient, inward-looking relations; with few external munities groups political and/or are ethnic tribes in prescribed periodically who migrate (p. xvii). patterns a number of monographs which use The author cites of or a tribe as a unit a village, a city) either misleadthis of influence the for as evidence study Yet the stuview on scholarship. ing "traditional" to a uniform adherence dies cited by no means present cited do exaggerate Some of the studies such a view. and nomad camps from urban of villages the isolation for example Fredof those cited, but others centers, deal very explicNomads of South Persia, rik Barth's of the with the relationship and insightfully itly environsocial group under study to its external urban cenamong other things, ments which includess or tribe but which focus on a village Studies ters. of of the relationship cognizance which take full
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the group under study to other groups including urban centers are not as rare as many of English's comments on the "traditional" view imply. Following his discussion of urban dominance, the author devotes his final substantive to chapter in Kirman. modernization In view of the condition of urban dominance described in the book, it earlier is not surprising in this section of the to discover study that modernization of the local economy--the of such things introduction and deep wells as tractors and the consequent change in settlement and pattern economic organization--is a matter almost entirely in the hands of the upper stratum of Kirman' s urban population. The urban elite introduces such innovations only when they are advantageous in terms of their own interests. As a result suchJinnovations tend not to alter the most basic feature of the regional economic organization, namely the concentration of wealth and control of economic activities in the hands of the urban elite. There are a number of other interesting conclusions presented in this section of the book which are given only brief and which are definitely attention worthy of investigation in future studies. (This comment is intended as a matter-of-fact observation rather than a stricture; there is nothing wrong with an author's being brief on topics that are peripheral to his focus of interest.) One such conclusion is that in the area of modernization Kirman is Tehrandominated: Numerous forces of modernization are challenging traditional patterns of Kirman's life, but few changes have been generated in the city or towns of Kirman. internally Modern concepts and materials spead from Tehran .... The urban elite and the middle class mimic the tastes and decisions of their counterparts in Tehran; there is little creative energy in this provincial city (p.
121
98).
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with Iran to all those familiar obvious It is surely such as modernization, of life, that in some spheres as Tehran-domiIran is not so much urban-dominated with its many this condition and certainly nated, inis as worthy of systematic ramifications social as is urban-dominance. vestigation briefly that is discussed Another proposition has changed more drastically structure is that social than economic organization: of nineteenth-century The twin pillars exthe patrilocal life, Kirman's social clergy, tended family and the Islamic in the face resilience have shown little Surprisinglys of change. of modern forces has wrought scant the magic of technology of the heart the economy.... change in (p. 99 ). but one that is suggestion, This is a very interesting of the on the basis (or reject) to accept difficult The author gives no in the study. offered evidence realistifrom which to evaluate evidence substantial Most of of social change in Kirman. the extent cally change sound more like comments on social English's emfrom careful derived than like statements cliches for example this Consider investigation. pirical statement: of the Among all but the lowest classes and economic a desire for social city, the intense advancement has superseded and practice faith concern with Islamic the preceding cenwhich characterized (p. 101 ). tury that there was no concern for socclear Is it really century in nineteenth advandement and economic ial for reconcern that clear it and is really Persia, in nature? was not often perfunctory matters ligious
IRANIAN STUDIES
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If current conditions among the more conservative ments of Iran's population provide any indication social conditions in the nineteenth the century, swer to these questions would have to be negative.
eleof an-
In a number of other areas, English's statements about social change appear not to be the result of thorough, For example, systematic investigation. English states that social mobility was "virtually nonexistent" in nineteenth century Persia. (p. 99 ) However, the literature on Iran in the last available century indicates that movement in and out of the privileged upper stratum of landowners and government administrators was extensive. In general) the author's about socstatements ial change appear not to be based on a careful investigation of social in the last century, conditions and without such an investigation it is difficult to know to what extent current conditions represent change and to what extent they represent continuity with the In the area of economic change the author's past. investigations appear to be more thorough. Perhaps it is unfair to be too critical of comments that are peripheral to the author's main focus of attention, settlement pattern and economy. Nevertheless, if the author's comments on social change were offered on the assumption that peripheral impressions are worth recording, as they often are, then he might have prefaced his comments on these matters with a warning to the effect that they were not based on extensive investigation. Brief mention should also be made of the appendices. There are six appendices which present data which could not be presented in detail in the main body of the text but which are, nevertheless, important both because of their intrinsic interest and because they substantiate some of the more basic
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These appendices in the study. presented propositions animal carpet weaving) data on agriculture, present and the occupaland ownership, qanats, husbandry, in Kirman. of settlements structure tional noted above to the minor strictures In addition that small criticisms there are three especially use of the word English's First, should be made. as is certainly Kirman's society "tfeudal" to describe since it implies, as to enlighten to mislead likely ruwith a substantial a society among other things, urban-domithan a thoroughly rather ral aristocracy the author refers in places, Second, nated society. marriage, for "cross-cousin preference to a traditional Among many Islamic or simply "cousin marriage." some groups in Iran, there is an exincluding peoples cousirs, for patrilateral parallel preference plicit partas marriage children, brother's that is father's studying anthropologists and in a few instances ners, a high statistical groups have demonstrated Islamic of marriage partchoices of such preferred frequency much of Iran the preference ners. However, throughout and paral(cross of any variety is simply for cousins So far as I know there is as marriage partners. lel) in Iran which class or social group, tribe, no ethnic Third, as marriage partners. cross cousins prefers at the in a separate section the footnotes placing The book some inconvenience. end of the book causes and bibliography is well documented and the footnotes but the value to scholars, will be of considerable if they could have been used more easily footnotes had been placed at the bottom of each page. above are not criticisms offered The various is other than anything meant to imply that the study to Iranand contribution substantial a very valuable of the The author's tracing ian studies. insightful on of reliance ramifications qanat irrimany social of the and environment arid in the difficult gation in itachievement a very significant Kirman Basin is of the predominating His demonstration self.
IRANIAN STUDIES
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of Kirman City in the economic and social influence life of the entire region of the Kirman Basin is and his suganother very important accomplishment gestion that such urban dominance may be characteristic of much of the Middle East will provide a valuable stimulus to future research. The concept will undoubtedly stand of a regional study) however, as the author's most valuable contribution, and probably will inspire a number of future studies employing a similar perspective.
The Conflict of Traditionalism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East. Edited with an Introduction by Austin: Carl Leiden. The University of Texas, 1966. 160 pp. $4.95.
PHILIP C. SALZMAN The papers brought together in this volume were originally in 1965 at a conference presented sponsored by the Middle East Center of the University of Texas. They can be conveniently grouped for purposes of exposition into those presenting the past and current thought of Middle Easterners, as conin theological, tained and social legal statements, and those examining Middle Eastern phenomena, including historical movements, and cultural institutions, orientations, from the outside, with the perspective of the unbiased analyst. Papers presenting Middle Eastern thought: AlNowaihi describes "The Battle of the New Poetry" in Egypt and defends the new literary trends as breaking through clicheed and creatively forms expressing
Philip pology
C. Salzman is Assistant Professor at McGill University, Montreal.
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of Anthro-
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and resnew forces the national within tradition, Nawaz and subversive. than being alien rather ponses, of Islamic for "a sociological calls interpretatlon meaning of the precise Law... in order to determine the ledelimit the norms of the Koran" and "properly Makdisi discusses gal norms of the Koran and Sunna." and conflict the historical between Traditionalism arguing that traditionalism in Islam, Rationalism if not matters in practical pragmaticll was "tbasically in matters of theoin theory. "Rigid and inflexible of law... in matters and adaptable it is flexible logy, of that since "law is the vehicle Makdisi concludes Traditionalism theological in Islam," development Amin sees the impede progress. does not necessarily indeand ijtihad, imitation, battle between taglid, one in the history as a continuing pendent thought, the true as representing of Islam, with the latter of "1inward consisting of Islam and currently spirit pracOther "spurious values." religious idealistic and "mater ialist and irreligious t'ices and beliefs" al-jabr, fatalism, were introincluding doctrines,' He conpurposes. for malicious duced from outside in the Middle East is a matter that progress cludes than rather to its true place, of restoring iitihad a Rosenthal presents European "modernism.* applying of "Muslim Definicatalogue researched meticulously literature. tions of Knowledge" from the traditional trends in Islamic Von Grunebaum summar'izes recent of Fyzee and the formulations and presents thought, Lahbabi as examples of modern reconstructions. Middle Eastern phenomena: Papers examining of Muslim armies, and points the role discusses Glubb the armies that gave to out the traditional support authboth and secular who were religious the rulers as of were Soldiers thought customarily orities. to in contrast of religion and morality, upholders and welcomed by the West, and were thus prestigious of Westin general. The inapplicability the populace from difin the Middle East "arise ern institutions traditions, between our national characters, ferences
IRANIAN STUDIES
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climate"; and problems which arise in the Middle East of adherence "are not the result of 'backwardness,' or of conflict with 'modernism"' but to tradition, of the rather "result from the racial characteristics English presents data from his Muslim peoples." field study of Kirman to demonstrate the change in and the reculture, economy, and ethnic relations, class structure. Lenof the traditional silience the development of national regimes. czowski outlines conThe democratic model developed out of a colonial text, and threw off the "reformist-authoritarian,' deviand "confessional" "authoritarian-oligarchial" ations. Failures in attempts to apply the democratic model led to the current "radical-revolutionary" He concludes that the phase with pan-Arab aspects. deal with disArabs, trying to develop an identity, of immal poverty, and "survive in an encirclement placable enemies,' will continue for some time in Pfaff argues that phase. the "radical-revolutionary" and modern of Islamic traditionalism the dialectic "technicism" has led to a "nationalist synthesis.' of technicism as a means toward a politiconsisting in which the nation has taken the cized salvation place of God and immortality is seen as the nation's march through
history.
"Progress
becomes
synonymous
with national fulfillment--and the fruits of techniStodof that progress." cism become the milestones dard gives an account of the Turkish Teskilat-e Mkaha&Eawhich seems to be an early attempt at an based on a Western model. intelligence organization Capsule evaluations the variance
in the
quality
are of limited of
these
essays
use,
but
requires
comment. The papers of Von Grunebaum, Glubb, Lenczowski and Pfaff attempt synthetic overall views. Von Grunebaum's masterly paper succeeds through balthe classificaancing the general and the specific) More, it provides a creative tory and the synthetic. synthesis, giving new insights by asking questions perspecdifferent and quite fruitful from a slightly tive. The Lenczowski and Pfaff papers provide usewith the former erring ful if not original overviews,
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on the and the latter on the side of classification can provide adequate Neither side of generality. Glubb's disspace. i.n the allotted substantiation is points, descriptive with some useful cussion, in the area of causality) poorly argued1 especially to climate references and is marred by inappropriate Nawaz, Amin and The papers of Al-Nowaihi, and race. by perhaps Makdisi can best be viewed as responses insofar by informants rather than reports subjects a social meant to propogate as they are primarily Alaccount. view rather than to give a scholarly plea with no schopaper is a well-written Nowaihils Those of Nawaz and Amin do have pretensions. larly badly in achieving but fail scholarly pretensions, of propoganda intent the Whatever canons. scholarly a out and sets argued well it is Makdisi'ls paper, data. of the historical interpretation provocative are Stoddard and Rosenthal The papers of English3 useful a presents case studies. English specific backed by hard data and convincaccount of one city; material is little Rosenthal's ing interpretation. with no literature from the culled more than a list to comit difficult which is about interpretation, specific sketchy, link his Stoddard does not ment. In sum, to any broader problem or issue. material followed by is excellent, the Von Grunebaum article The and Makdisi. Pfaff Lenczowski, those of English, value. are of very limited others Part of book. This is, then, a disappoint'ing articles, of the the shortness stems from the trouble notes and ref erfourteen pages including averaging no attempt article, There is no introductory ences. there is Furthermore, together. to draw the material identities of the uninitiated) the (for no indication of the authors beyond their names, or of their backAnd there are more than a few typographical grounds. from this the proceedings To say the least, errors. As hand. a editorial far heavier needed conference of a current to use the result phrase is, it stands, non-book a and not non-book, a very good reviewers, at that.
IRANIAN STUDIES
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LETTERSTO THE EDITOR
A statment in Professor Parvin's review of my of the Middle East needs correctings Economic History "not even one (essay) to discuss viz. the attempts from the Marxist point of view.' question Actually, I translated, from the Russian, three long essays by Soviet authors--but for all I know Soviet scholars Marxist. are no longer considered One more point--I did not intend to certainly aid to Middle Eastern countries deny that Soviet and Chinese) would (like American, British, Japanese promote their economic growth. I merely suggested that, again like other aid, it would increase the donor's political I do not think the evinfluence. ents of the last ten years have proved that particular forecast wrong. As for the more general question raised by Professor Parvin, of course I do not imagine that I have satisfactorily explained the causes of the economic decline of the Islamic Middle East. I am not sure such an "explanation" will ever be found--think of the numerous and contradictory theories that have been advanced, during the last three hundred years, to account for the decline of Rome. In the present
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state of knowledge on the Middle East, the most one and the can hope for is some tentative suggestions gathering of material that can stimulate further research. This is all I aimed at in my book. CHARIESISSAWI (Charles Issawi is Professor of Economics at Columbia University. His Economic History of the Middle East was reviewed in the Fall 1969 issue of Iranian Studies.) THE REVIEWER REPLIES: This is in response to a letter written by Professor Charles Issawi concerning my review of his book, Economic History of the Middle East. I have no quarrel with Professor Issawi on the I have acknowfirst point he makes in his letter. which his book conledged the Russian translations tains; however, what is Marxist is a moot question. The second point raised by Professor Issawi is most important and thus the main reason for this reply. It is true that political influence generally follows But aid. (or even precedes) economic and/or military it is the nature and the extent, and thus the impliof the political influence exercised which cations, are of importance, not its mere existence. Surely the influence exerted by the United States in political Western Europe through the Marshall Plan cannot be are concerned, compared, as far as its implications in American aid to the dependent milto that implicit itary regimes of Latin America through the Alliance for Progress and other means. the book due I have neither meant to criticize of a of the economic to the absence convincing theory decline of the Middle East nor can this be read into I agree with Professor Issawi that this the review. IRANIANSTUDIES
130
is what is stated in my review--that after this book the phenomenon of economic decline remains one of the mysteries of the mysterious Middle East. MANOICHER PARVIN
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PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED
AFSHAR, IRAJ. Vol. I.
Y-dgI?rha-ye Yazd (The Monuments of Yazd), Tehran: Anjoman-e Melli, 1348 (1970).
754 pp. ALGAR, HAMID. Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906: The Role of Ulami in the Q jar period. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California + 286 pp. Press, 1969. xviii $9.50. ARMAJANI, YAHYA. Middle East: Past and Present. glewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
En1970.
BANK MARKAZIIRAN LIBRARY. Fehrest-e Mozu' i Magfl1t-e of Articles Egtesadi, 1345-1346 (Bibliography in Persian on Economics, 1345-1346/March 1966March 1968). Tehran: Bank Markazi Iran Library, xxvii + 261 pp. 1348/1969. Commercial Relations, Russo-Persian ENTNER, MARVINL. of Florida 1828-1914. (University Monographs2 No. 28, Fall 1965). GainesSocial Sciences, Florida: of Florida Press. ville, University No price indicated. v + 80 pp. (Paperback) FRYE, RICHARDN. Persia (Revised Edition). 128 pp. $4.50. Schocken Books, 1968.
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New York:
KAMSHAD, H. Modern Persian Prose Literature. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1966. xv + 226 pp. $7.50. H. A Modern Persian Prose Reader. KAMSHAD2 England: Cambridge University Press, + 249 pp. $9.50.
Cambridge, 1968. viii
KARPAT,KEMALH. (Editor). Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. xiii + 297 pp. $10.00. KEDDIE, NIKKI R. An Islamic Response to Imperialism: and Religious Writings of Savyid Jamal Political ad-Din llal-Afyghani"l. Berkeley and Los Angeles: of California University Press, 1968. xii + 212 pp. $7.50. SANGHVI,RAMESH. The Shah of Iran. New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1969. xxvii + 390 pp. $10. STAVRIANOS,LEFTONS, Middle East: A Culture Area in Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1969. Pers2ective. 72 pp. No price indicated. (Paperback) STEWART-ROBINSON, J. (Editor). The Traditional Near East. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. 183 pp. $1.95. (Paperback) SWEET,LOUISE. (Editor). Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East. 2 vols. Garden City, N.Y.: The American Museum of Natural History, The Natural History Press, 1970. Vol. I: Depth and Diversity, xv + 437 pp. $3.95; Vol. II: Life in the Cities, Towns, and Countryside, xv + 438 pp. $3.95. (Paperbacks) WILBER,DONALDN. Iran: Past and Present (6th Ed.). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967. ix+312 pp. $6.00 133
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CENTRE(IRANDOC) IRANIANDOCUMENTATION ANDSCIENTIFIC PLANNING INSTITUTEFOREDUCATIONAL AND RESEARCH MINISTRYOF SCIENCEANDHIGHEREDUCATION P. 0. Box 11-1387,
Tehran
The Ministry of Science and Higher Education has established the Iranian Documentation Centre to bring modern to phyinformation and reference services and extensive chemists, agriculturalists, sicians, engineers) lawyers, Irandoc provides and social scientists. scientists, loans, inter-library photocopies, searches, literature circuroom and book reading open-shelf translations, stateof information, dissemination lation, selective in person, and reference service, studies, of-the-art telephone calls. by mail or by long-distance is being developed A large book and serial collection In materials. and Western Asian, Iranian, to include and docucooperating closely with Iranian libraries Irandoc supplements their collect'ions mentation centres, is provided in several Representation and services. and information organizationss scientific international is brought to bear on national and and staff expertise problems. international Irandoc is publishing material useful to Iranian researAlready it has manuand librarians. chers, professors, bookstores, of Iranian libraries, for directories scripts and is compiling and periodicalss newspapers publishers, a union list of Iranian social science and science serials. will be published: An abstract bulletin Also, two serials covering Iranian science and social science periodicals, service reproducing the contents pages of and an alerting Iranian science and social science journals. significant Irandoc's Director is Ali Sinai and its Technical Director is John F. Harvey.
IRANIANSTUDIES
134
Qwrtrly Jouna of
ECONOMICRESEARCH
eglesidi Iabgigitme Vol.
CONTENTS
Nos. 19 & 20
VII
HOSSEIN PIRNIA
Thought
The Nature of Scientific
MANSUR FR1OZAN,et al.
The Development of the Gas Industry in Iran
AJID TEHRANIN
of Entry Strategies Iran: Alternative Petroleum into the International Industry The Comparative Evaluation Contracts, Concessions, Joint Ventures
STAUFFER THKOMAS
of Oil and
of Oil Agreements
A Comparative Analysis
ESMA'IL ERFANI P. MINA
A Comment on Mr. Stauffer ERAP-Type vs. Fifty-Fifty A Further Comment
MANSUR FRDOZAN
Agreement--
The Burden of the Public Debt and Long-Run Growth Cooperation between the USSR and the Developing Countries in the Promotion Exports of Industrial
Assistance
Bibliography
in Theory and Practice
of Economic Publications
Published University
ROV G. PROTHO
RESEARCH GIR)UP
A Survey of the Rural Economic Problem of Baluchestan and Sistan Technical
AHMED KOORO)S
on Iran
FERYDOON FIRDOZI HOSSEINAZIMI
in English by the Faculty of Economics, of Tehrans P.O. Box 14-13229 Tehran. $5.00 Annual Subscription
J->ffSvua2c
1 97
S<mnr~,f.t,1970
6t
VoCul-o X
fltLAs
3ankAf
riw,& soct1for
s 2t-aru*n $tudii
COUNCIL
Amin Banani University Ali
of California
at Los Angeles
Banuazizi Boston College
James A. Bill University
of Texas
at Austin
Jerome W. Clinton of Minnesota University Richard W. Cottam of Pittsburgh University Farhad Kazemi, Executive New York Univeristy
Secretary
Kenneth A. Luther of Michigan University W. Mintz Jacqueline New Haven, Connecticut Ann T. Schulz, University
Treasurer ex officio, of New Hampshire
Majid Tehranian Tehran, Iran
IRANIAN STUDIES
Editor Ali Banuazizi, Editor Associate Jerome W. Clinton, Editor W. Mintz, Associate Jacqueline Assistant Editorial Sharon Stilo,
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