Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
Volume V (1972)
Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jerome W. Clinton, As...
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Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
Volume V (1972)
Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jerome W. Clinton, Associate Editor A. Reza Sheikholeslami, Associate Editor
Published by The Society for Iranian Studies, P. 0. Box 89, Village Station, New York, New York 10014, U. S. A. Printed at the Boston College Press US ISSN 0021-0862
The Society for Iranian Studies COUNCIL Amin Banani Ali Banuazizi James A. Bill Jerome W. Clinton Gene R. Garthwaite Farhad Kazemi, Executive Secretary Kenneth A. Luther Jacqueline W. Mintz Ann Schulz, ex officio, Treasurer Majid Tehranian
IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
Contents: Volume V (1972) ATICLES Farhad.
Daftary,
The Balance of Payments Deficit
and the Problem of Inflation
Doenecke, Justus D. visionism .. Keddie, Nikki R. 1800-1914, Overview.
Iran's
in Iran
.
.
Role in Cold War Rea * @
.
.
2-24
96-111
The Economic History of Iran, and Its Political Impact: An 8-78
Lieberman, Samuel S. Family Planning in Iran: Results of a Survey and a Mass Media .149-179 Camip Loraine, Michael B. Bahir in the Context of Revolution. Persian Constitutional
79-87
Nilsen,
Don L. F. Syntactic and Semantic Categories of Echo Words in Persian .88-95
Rotblat,
Howard J. Structural Impediments to Change in the Qazvin Bazaar.
130-148
Touba, Jacquiline Rudolph. The Relationship Between Urbanization and the Changing Status of Womenin Iran, 1956-1966
25-36
iii
BOOKREVIEWS Armajani, Yahya. Middle East: Past and Present (reviewed by Robert A. McDaniel) . . . . . . Dashti,
53-55
Ali. In Search of Khayyam (trans. by L. P. Elwell-Sutton) (reviewed by D. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112-119 Shojai).
De Fouch6cour, C.-H. La description de la nature dans la poesie lyrigue persane du xie inventaire et analyse des themes cik'cle: (reviewed
by William
L. Hanaway, Jr.).
. . .
49-52
Gregorian, Vartan. The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and (reviewed by Modernization,_1880-1946 Firuz Kazemzadeh). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120-123 Radjabi Tabrizi, (1752-1779)
Parwis.
Iran unter Karim bain
(reviewed
by J.
R. Perry
. . . . 184-188
Roschanzamir, Mehdi. Die Zand-Dynastie . . . . . . (reviewed by J. R. Perry .184-188 The Successors of Genghis Tabib, Rashid al-Din. Khan (trans. by John Andrew Boyle) (reviewed by Romeyn Taylor) . . . . . . . . . . 189-192 Tikku, G. L. Persian Poetry in Kashmir,_ 13391846: An Introduction (reviewed by Michael B. Loraine). . 0 . . . . . . . . . . 180-184 Elite of Iran Zonis, Marvin. The Political (reviewed by T. Cuyler Young). . . . . . . .
37-49
MISCELLANEOUS A Directory of Teachers of Persian in the United States and Canada (compiled by M. A. . 193-199
Jazayery) .................
Letters
to the Editor
. . . . . . . . . .
iv
. . .
124-127
Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
Winter 1972
Volume Vb
Winter 1972
Volume
V
Number
I
The Society for Iranian Studies COUNCIL Amin Banani Los Angeles of California, University Ali Banuazizi Boston College James A. Bill of Texas at Austin University Jerome W. Clinton Tehran, Iran Richard W. Cottam of Pittsburgh University Farhad Kazemi, Executive Secretary New York University Kenneth A. Luther of Michigan University Jacqueline W. Mintz Yale University Ann Schulz, ex officio, Treasurer University of New Hampshire Majid Tehranian Tehran, Iran IRANIAN STUDIES Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jerome W. Clinton, Associate Editor A. Reza Sheikholeslami, Associate Editor Copyright, 1972, The Society for Iranian Studies Printed at the Boston College Press Published in the U. S. A.
Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Volume V
Winter 1972
Number 1
ARTICLES 2
2S
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT ANDTHEPROBLEM OF INFLATIONIN IRAN, 1955-1962
Farhad Daftary
THERELATIONSHIP BETWEEN Jacquiline ANDTHE URBANIZATION CHANGING STATUSOF WOMEN IN IRAN, 1956-1966
Rudolph Touba
BOOKREVIEWS 37
MARVIN ZONIS: The Political Elite of Iran
49
C.-H. De FOUCHECOUR: La description de la nature dans la poEsie lyrique persane du xie ci8cle: inventaire et analyse des themes
53
YAHYA ARMAJANI:Middle East: Past and Present
T. Cuyler Young William L. Haraway, Jr.
Robert A. McDaniel
THE BALANCEOF PAYMENTDEFICIT AND THEPROBLEMOF INFLATION IN IRAN, 1955-1962 FARHAD DAFTARY
It is a commonly held view that development policies together with balance of paylead to domestic inflation mechanisms which in many underlying The ments problems. developing countries have made this view come true are Increased investment outlays lead to rather well-known. increased purchasing power and imports; prices rise, and, to the extent that aggregate output and real income actuwill further contribute to ally increase, this in itself in the country's balance of payments. the deterioration The time will soon come when the International Monetary Fund, as a precondition for extending short-term loans to support the country's depleted reserves of foreign exmeasures in order to change, will ask for deflationary Development will restore order to the country's finances. slow down, and if the balance of payments has deteriorated After a devaluation will be required. significantly,
Farhad Daftary is a Senior Economist at the Plan Organization, Tehran. The author would like to express his deep appreciation to Professor Bent Hansen of the University of California, Berkeley, for having read and made helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. IRANIANSTUDIES
2
the country can embark on the next suitable interval, round of economic development and difficulties. The developments in the Iranian Economy during the Second Plan period (1955-1962) make it plausible to conclude that Iran provides yet another example for confirming the truth of the above-mentioned view. Undoubtedly, to some extent Iran's problems, during the period under conof the same so-called were the manifestations sideration, But the Iranian situ"'orthodox ailments of development." features which require special ation has some distinctive in light of substantial In particular, consideration. foreign exchange earnings of the oil sector, a severe foreign exchange crisis cannot be regarded as the "normal" Indeed, or "'unavoidable" result of development activities. as we shall discuss below, the development activities during the period under consideration could have been which actually pursued without many of the difficulties occurred. can, of course, occur with the adopDifficulties tion of a naive expansionist policy and lack of fiscal a country's no matter how plentiful responsibility, what This, as we shall see, is essentially resources. In addition, the problems were subhappened in Iran. stantially aggravated by an overwhelming lack of coordinaof the governtion between the various economic policies In with each other. ment, which were often inconsistent other words, the government did not attempt to use the various policy instruments at its disposal to achieve any including a target particular set of policy targets,1 rate of growth and a target for the balance of payments. Iran's First Development Plan, which had really never gained any momentum, collapsed almost completely with the loss of the country's oil revenues following the of Iran's Oil Industry in 1951. The ennationalization which lasted for more and economic crisis, suing political than three years, seriously disrupted the Iranian economy.. The disruptions had been so great that, when the oil crisis was finally settled in 1954, the government decided to make a fresh start on the basis of a new plan as soon as 3
WINTER1972
a plan which would also be more in line with the possible, country's increased oil revenues under the Oil Consortium Agreement of 1954. Consequently, the formulation of the Second Plan (September 1955 - September 1962) was completed in less than one year. of oil revenues After 1954, the renewed availability on a large and rapidly growing scale provided the main fuel for the expansion of the Iranian economy. Oil revenues, amounts of domestic and foreign together with substantial borrowing, permitted a rapid increase in public expendiand aided by extremely liberal Thus stimulated, tures. investment activities foreign trade and credit policies, an unprecedented experienced also sector in the private As a result, after more than boom after the mid-1950s. three years of stagnation the expansionary forces in the economy rapidly gained momentum. As already noted, however, the development of the Iranian economy did not take place in any smooth or susDifficulties tained manner during the Second Plan period. of inflaform occurred almost immediately, first in the of balance the in and soon afterwards tionary pressures large of in spite By 1960, as well. payments problems foreign exchange earnings from oil, the country's foreign exchange reserves were almost completely depleted, and the economy was plagued by both internal and external imbalthe Confronted with a foreign exchange crisis, ances. Iranian government was finally forced to implement a program in order to rectify the imbalances. stabilization measures succeeded in solving the difThe stabilization only at the high cost of plunging the economy ficulties which lasted until 1964. The into a severe recession, purpose of this paper is to review these developments and their major underlying causes. II The oil revenues in Iran provide a major source of easily controlled and mobilized revenue for the government. As a result, public expenditures can be financed to a IRANIANSTUDIES
4
increases in taxation and large extent without significant At the same time, the other domestic sources of revenue. oil revenues provide a supply of foreign exchange which permits a rapid rise in imports, while the non-oil exports In short, the oil revenues remain relatively stagnant. high rate of capital formation make possible a relatively and substantial imports. These advantages are far in excess of what could be expected in a country with Iran's production capacity and level of per capita income. The essential point in this context is that the oil revenues do, in principle, permit a rapid rise in aggregate expenditures and purchasing power, which, of course, need not be matched by proportional increases in the domestic supply of goods. Between 1955 and 1960 aggregate expenditures and purchasing power did indeed increase substantially. Furthermore, as we shall see, the increases were far in of the excess of the amounts warranted by the utilization oil revenues alone. From 1955 to 1960, the Plan Organization, while and implementing the Second Plan, succeeded in initiating sustaining a high level of investment expenditures financed by oil revenues as well as foreign borrowing. At the same time, the rest of the government also embarked on a high level of investment activity outside of the Second Plan.2 The public investments which took place beyond the scope of the Plan, accounting for about one-half of total public foreign financed. investments, were almost exclusively The foreign borrowings of the different ministries and government agencies, however, were done individually, This manner of foreign without any overall coordination. borrowing by itself created serious repayment problems when "it became clear that much of the uncontrolled borrowing consisted of medium-term suppliers' credits that would require heavily bunched debt repayments over These two sources of public investthe next few years."3 to increased ment expenditures contributed significantly purchasing power in the economy. But they did not result in proportionate increases in domestic production, since public investments were overwhelmingly concentrated in social overhead capital and public construction projects.4 S
WINTER1972
In addition to rapidly rising investment outlays, the ordinary expenditures of the government also increased without matching increases in taxes or substantially, Current expenditures increased other ordinary revenues. from 16 billion rials in 1956 to 37 billion in 1960. As a result, the ordinary budget of the government incurred which could not be fully covered deficits substantial amounts of oil revenues even after diverting significant from the Plan Organization's budget to the government's The government financed the remaining ordinary budget. of the ordinary budget by borrowing from the deficits Central Bank. It should perhaps be mentioned that much of the increase in the ordinary expenditures during this period was for military purposes, including the construction of military installations. tendencies In spite of the fact that inflationary after were becoming apparent in the economy (especially financing 1957), the government continued with its deficit In and its easy credit policy for the private sector. used not were policies monetary and fiscal words, other On the contrary, policy instruments. as counter-cyclical the expansionary measures were maintained while inflationary pressures were becoming even more accentuated.6 In sum, overall public expenditures increased oil revenues (which rapidly, and, in spite of substantial increased from 92 million dollars in 1955 to 288 million by deficit-financed in 1960),7 they were increasingly borrowing from the domestic banking system (especially the Central Bank) as well as from abroad. At the same time, as already noted, these expenditures contributed to increases in the domestic rather insignificantly supply of goods. Turning next to developments in the private sector, we noted that after the mid-1950s there occurred an unprecedented upsurge in private investment activities, The major factors mainly in industry and urban housing. responsible for the boom in private investment included high government spending, an extremely liberal credit policy, and easy access to breign exchange for all types IRANIANSTUDIES
6
of imports.8 Total private investment expenditures increased from about 10 billion rials in 1957 to almost 31 billion in 1959. The period 1957-1960 marked an unprecedented expansion of credits to the private sector. As the data in Table 1 show, the net claims of the banking systems on the private sector increased more than three-fold, from 8.2 billion rials in 1957 to almost 29 billion in 1960; during the same period the money supply increased by 60 percent. One of the principal sources of credit extension to the private sector was the so-called Revaluation Loan Fund (RLF), which made available, in a manner similar to printing new money, 7.1 billion rials ($95 million).9 The outstanding features of this particular loan program were its big size and the unusually easy terms under which credits were extended.10 Credit expansion was also stimulated by the growth of the banking system. Between 1956 and 1960, fifteen new banks were including the important Industrial and Mining established, Development Bank of Iran. The ready availability of loanable funds coupled with the alarmingly liberal monetary policy of the government, including the liberal lending policy of the National Bank (then the Central Bank) to other banks, gave rise to an unprecedented expansion of money and credit in the Iranian economy, an expansion that was bound to exert serious pressures on domestic prices and on the country's balance of payments. These, then, were the major forces stimulating private investment.11 Table 1 shows the net credit movements through the banking system (including the Central Bank and all commercial banks); it also shows the factors responsible for the expansion of the money supply (covering currency in The sectors considered circulation plus demand deposits). are the government (including the Treasury General, Plan Organization, and other government agencies) and the private sector, as well as foreign assets. Net borrowing by the government from the Central Bank increased steadily from 1954 to 1960, with the 7
WINTER1972
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exception of a small decline in 1959. This borrowing, for had an expansionary effect financing the budget deficits, on the money supply, since it was not offset by other transactions. However, as the data show, government borfactor than private rowing was a much less significant to the expansion of borrowing in terms of contributions the money supply. From 19S4 to 1960, out of a total net the private sector credit expansion of 35.7 billion rials, received 24.2 billion as against 11.5 billion going to the government. The net claims of the banking system on the rapidly between 1956 private sector increased particularly and 1960. Net lending to the private sector was indeed the major factor underlying the rapid increase of the money Regarding the supply during the years under consideration. causes underlying the developments in the country's net foreign assets, suffice it to note that until 1958 the extent of the net inflow of foreign capital was such that in the balance of current payments not only the deficits could be covered, but it also permitted some increase in the reserves of foreign exchange (which had become deThis crisis). pleted during the oil nationalization in 1959 situation, however, changed rather drastically and 1960, and the country's reserves began to decline rather rapidly. in As a result of these developments (particularly the money the net credit position of the private sector), supply increased by 88 percent from 1956 to 1960, or at On the other an average annual rate of 17.1 percent. hand, the real annual rate of growth of GNPdid not exceed 6 percent durlng the same period of time. Confronted with such developments in the money supply and aggregate production, one does not have to be a fanatical believer in the primitive "quantity theory of money" to realize that the government lacked financial soundness and that there would be mounting pressures on the general level of prices. In short, the economy was rapidly experiencing an internal with repercussions for the country's exdisequilibrium, We shall consider the developments in ternal balance. Iran's balance of payments below. Here, it is interesting to note that while the difficulties were becoming increasingly clear, the government did absolutely nothing 9
WINTER1972
to rectify
the internal
and external
imbalances.
As we have seen, imports rose very rapidly after domestic production of machinery 1954. With very little and equipment in Iran, the marginal propensity to import than in consumpis much larger in investment activities the case when the This is particularly tion activities. sector absorbs the bulk of the investments. industrial tends Consequently, an expansion of investment in itself to increase imports even if the level of aggregate expenditure remains unchanged. Imports increase more rapidly, of course, when the level of aggregate demand, Between 1955 and 1959, imports increased too, is rising. at the unprecedented average annual rate of almost 17 It should be mentioned, however, that although percent. capital goods accounted for the bulk of the increase, luxury items) also imports of consumer goods (especially As the non-oil exports continued increased significantly. stagnant, the merchandise trade defito remain relatively cit in the non-oil sector rose from about $200 million in 1955 to $410 million in 1959. The rapidly rising oil to cover these trade deficits, revenues were not sufficient in and the situation was worsened by the growing deficits the balance of invisibles. As a result of these developments, the outstanding feature of Iran's balance of foreign payments during these in both the expansionary years was the rising deficits of current the balance payments. Unand of trade balance were financed by foreign borrowing. til 1957, the deficits In fact, as already noted, the extent of the net inflow of foreign capital (during 1954-1957) was such that it also permitted the expansion of Iran's foreign exchange reThese reserves, however, have never been subserves. stantial. Consequently, when the inflow of foreign capital declined after 1957 (partly because of the rising repayments of the outstanding debts), the unfavorable impact on the country's foreign exchange reserves was drastic. tionary
It was precisely during the years of severe inflapressures and ever rising investment expenditures--
IRANIANSTUDIES
10
namely, 1958-1960--that the deficits in the balance of current payments were covered by drawings on the country's relatively small reserves of foreign assets. But once again, the government did not recognize the danger signs of the approaching crisis. Consequently, the reserves were rapidly depleted, and by mid-1960, for all practical purposes, Iran was almost completely out of foreign exchange reserves. Only then did the government realize the need for taking some corrective measures in order to rectify the internal and external disequilibria. However, even at that late hour the initiative had come from abroad. The International Monetary Fund, as a precondition for giving a short-term loan to support Iran's depleted foreign exchange reserves, made its standard policy recommendation of asking the Iranian government to institute a stabilization program. As already indicated, the rapidly growing public expenditures (increasingly deficit-financed by borrowing through the banking system and from abroad) as well as the unprecedented expansion of private investments (financed largely by borrowing from the banking system), resulted in a rapid increase in the stock of money and the general purchasing power in the economy. All in all, aggregate demand expanded much more rapidly than the domestic supply of goods and services. The net result of all this, as we have seen, was a persistent and growing deficit in the balance of current payments together with internal inflationary pressures. Indeed, the external imbalance was further aggravated by rises in domestic prices relative to foreign prices, while the rate of exchange remained unaltered. The "open-door" import policy, which permitted substantial increases in imports, undoubtedly had some effect on checking the domestic price rises. However, this by itself could not rectify both the internal and external imbalances while the excessively expansionary monetary and fiscal policies were maintained. The import policy merely slowed down domestic price rises at the in the balance of payexpense of still greater deficits ments. It is precisely under such circumstances that the 11
WINTER1972
use of a number of policy instruments (at least as many as the number of policy targets) is necessary in order to This, however, simultaneously. attain several objectives the eventual dewas not done. In a sense, therefore, pletion of the country's reserves of foreign exchange represented the "logical conclusion" to the course of events which was allowed to develop unchecked. As the data in Table 2 show, prices began to rise rather rapidly after 1957. The internal imbalance of the due to the excess demand for late 1950s was essentially The internal excess demand was goods and services.12 due to the excess demand for goods and seressentially pronounced in The imbalances were particularly vices.13 the markets for domestically produced consumer goods and Shortages of food products were particufood products. larly severe in 1959, a very bad year for agriculture due to abnormally sparse rainfall. In order to have a better understanding of the underlying causes of the domestic price rises in Iran, one would have to go beyond the consideration of the overall size of the excess demand, or the so-called gap." The composition of the excess demand "inflationary also played an important part in generating pressures on in The increased demand, originating domestic prices. for domestically the increased wage bill, was essentially The upward produced consumer goods and food items. pressure on domestic prices resulting from this source could not be relieved by imports because at the existing rate of exchange the import prices of these commodities were too high for the consumers in question, including The domestic production of the the civil servants.14 to fully satisfy same products was clearly insufficient the demand for them. As a result, the imbalance between the demand and supply in these commodity markets persisted and, indeed, grew with the rising expenditures of the public and private sectors. On the other hand, increases in the purchasing power of the upper income groups led to increased demand for consumer durables and non-durables of higher quality, IRANIANSTUDIES
12
TABLE2 PRICESANDTHECOSTOF LIVING, 1955-62 INDICESOF WHOLESALE (YEARBEGINS21 MARCH;1959=100)
WHOLESALE PRICES Home ProGeneral duced & Consumed Goods Index
COSTOF LIVING Food
General Index
Food
Rent
1955
94.0
79.6
90.0
77.1
80.8
72.0
1956
101.3
85.3
97.4
83.9
86.2
82.4
1957
99.4
88.9
93.5
87.6
87.9
88.9
1958
98.2
93.6
95.9
88.5
86.0
94.0
1959
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
1960
102.0
103.1
102.6
107.9
110.2
105.5
1961
102.2
102.7
104.3
109.6
112.4
109.6
1962
103.6
104.3
106.8
110.6
114.2
108.7
Source:
Central Bank of Iran, Bulletin, Vol. 8 (JanuaryFebruary, 1970), pp. 672-73 and 692-93.
and luxury items, most of which such as foreign textiles are imported. The rapid growth of imports largely reflected the rising purchasing power of the upper income and investing groups and their increased demand for both capital goods and certain types of consumer goods. Consequently, the prices of capital goods remained relatively 13
WINTER1972
stable, while the prices of consumer durables increased only moderately. However, due to the above-mentioned reason, the excess demand for domestically produced consumer goods and food products could not be satisfied by imports, and consequently the prices of these products continued to rise rather rapidly. The differential effects on prices of the increased demands for different types of consumer goods as well as for capital goods are clearly reflected in the lag of the wholesale price index behind the cost of living index. As the data in Table 2 show, between 1955 and 1960, cost of living increased by 40 percent, while the general index of wholesale prices rose by only 9 percent. The difference is baslcally attributable to the fact that the latter index is heavily weighted with imported goods, the prices of which actually declined by 15 percent. On the other hand, the wholesale price index of home produced and consumer goods, which is more comparable to the cost of living index, increased by almost 30 percent over the same period of time. It may be unnecessary to point out that irrespective of the existence or nonexistence of internal inflationary demand pressures, the total demand for commodities and services would exceed their total domestic supply by the amount of the deficit in the country's balance of current investments are also payments. Under such circumstances, in excess of domestic savings (both in an ex-ante sense) in the by the same amount. Whether or not the deficits balance of current payments should be regarded as manifestdemand pressures depends ations of internal inflationary on the particular set of circumstances. 5 If there is no need for corrective policy measure and the country has sufficient foreign financing available for covering the there is no cause for alarm. The Iranian deficits, government might not have been able to check the domestic price rises completely, but it could have kept them within more acceptable bounds. But this is another issue. The balance of payments problem that developed in the the late 1950s should be judged on its own terms, i.e., of funds for covering the deficits. In this availability IRANIANSTUDIES
14
sense, the Iranian government's failure to take any corrective measures when the country's reserves of foreign exchange were rapidly falling to extremely low levels cannot be justified. The government took no measures to influence the level and composition of aggregate demand. Neither the domestic price rises nor the rapidly falling foreign exchange reserves created any cause for alarm. Both types of imbalance were permitted to proceed unchecked, and the country, as was to be expected, ultimately ran out of rising foreign exchange reserves while prices were still point that emerThe essential high rates. at relatively g e s from our discussion is the government's overwhelming lack of understanding with respect to economic policy the government showed More particularly, in general. little understanding of the effects of expansionary and their repercussions in terms of domestic policies the country's balance of foreign payments. Indeed, the government seems to have been rather confused in terms As a result, the various of its economic objectives. policy means were not coordinated in order to attain any clearly specified set of economic ends. Therefore, it is safe to state that to a large extent the economic experienced during the Second Plan period difficulties were due to the government's poor performance in the general area of economic policy, both long- and shortterm. III In this concluding section we shall briefly discuss the stabilization program and the problem of recession that plagued the Iranian economy in the early Iran experienced a severe foreign 1960s. As indicated, exchange crisis in 1960. In September, 1960, the government requested a $35 million stand-by loan for a period of one year from the International Monetary Fund. In October, 1960, the loan request was approved, but it was made conditional on the implementation by the Iranian program for government of a financial stabilization 15
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rectifying the internal and external imbalances. After considerable opposition from various government circles, especially the Ministry of Finance, the government eventually decided to institute the recommended stabilization program, which was to be effective until March, 1962. The stabilization program included a number of monetary and fiscal measures.16 The liberal import policy of the preceding years was to be continued only with respect to capital goods. On the other hand, imports of non-essential and luxury items were to be discouraged through the imposition of higher import duties; no import quotas were envisaged. At first, the stabilization program was not closely observed, and as a result the pressures on domestic prices and on the balance of payments continued. By March, 1961, net credit expansion had exceeded the stipulated limits. Deficit-financing continued, and the net indebtedness of the Treasury General to the newly established Central Bank actually increased significantly, instead of declining by 2 billion rials as envisaged in the stabilization program. Indeed, the Central Bank, in the absence of overall governmental support, could exert very little influence over the expenditures of the ministries. The Iranian economy was approaching a serious crisis when the cabinet changed in May, 1961. At the same time, additional U.S. financial assistance for budgetary support was made available, and, in order to prevent further depletion of the country's foreign exchange reserves, imports of a large number of commodities were In July, 1961, an extension of the 1960 IMF prohibited. stand-by agreement was arranged, subject to the implementation of a revised stabilization program. The implementation of the revised stabilization The financial position program met with more success. of the public sector improved more than what was envisaged, while severe import restrictions on some 214 commodities contributed to the building up of the country's IRANIANSTUDIES
16
foreign exchange reserves in 1961. At the same time, these reserves received an indirect boost from the overall in the country. decline in investment activities Consequently, the program was once again revised in December, 1961, to allow for more relaxed credit extension to the private sector. Having finally succeeded in curbing the inflationary pressures and improving Iran's balance of payments, the stabilization program came to an end in March, 1962. The deflationary measures of the stabilization program, however, had an adverse effect on investments, current production, and the rate of growth in the economy. Consequently recessionary conditions appeared in 1961 and were accentuated in 1962 as credit and import restrictions were imposed on an economy accustomed to easy money and imports for almost any purpose. The reduction of investment activities was particularly pronounced in the private sector. Many of the private industrial and construction undertakings, which had started during the investment boom of the late 1950s had to be abandoned or, if already completed, found themselves short of working capital. The speculative boom in real estate transactions also collapsed, and unemployment rapidly became an alarming problem in the urban areas, in Tehran. To some extent these problems were especially the results of the excesses and the unsoundly based expansion of the late 1950s. Stockpiling of inventories, consumer indebtedness, hasty investments in construction, exacted their poorly planned and over-ambitious factories toll in terms of slackening of trade and depression of Indeed, the year 1341 (1962-63) business confidence.17 has been characterized as the year of "crisis of confidence."118 Some attempts were made to revive the conditions in the private sector through monetary policy.19 However, investors remained unresponsive, and demands for industAll in all, rial loans and permits continued to decline. to increase net the efforts of the monetary authorities lending to the private sector did not meet with much success, as the private sector showed a strong preference and expanded its savings and time deposits. for liquidity 17
WINTER1972
Meanwhile, the operations of the government further and contributed to the depressed investment activities, Public investstagnant conditions in the private sector. declined by the ministries, especially ment expenditures, implementation the in 1962. In addition, significantly of the Third Plan (September 1962-March 1968) got off to a slow start, and during the first two years of the Plan period actual investment expenditures fell significantly Once again, public inshort of what had been planned. vestments were being curtailed because current outlays continued to increase substantially. Signs of economic recovery did not appear until had proved to be mid-1964. Monetary policy by itself the recession of the in rectifying rather ineffective fiearly 1960s and had to be supplemented with deficit as well as expenditures, development nancing and rising The private sector finally a more liberal import policy. of responded favorably, and, with the reestablishment optimism and confidence in the sector, private investments began to increase. By 1965, having gone through four years of expansicn the Iranifollowed by an equally long period of recession, Since path. an expansionary on an economy was once again capital of foreign net inflows and revenues then, oil By 1350 (1971-72), indeed. have been very substantial for example, Iran's oil revenues had passed the high mark of $2 billion dollars per annum, while the net of foreign long-term credits exceeded $400 utilization But since 1967, Iran's net current account of million. the balance of payments has shown increasing deficits and the country's foreign exchange reserves have also tendenIn addition, inflationary had a downward trend.20 cies have also started to gain momentumduring the last It remains to be seen whether or not couple of years.21 in Iran will face another round of economic difficulties the Judging from the developments of the near future. last few years, as well as the current trends, this seems to be a very likely possibility.
IRANIANSTUDIES
18
NOTES 1.
For the underlying
concepts
and theories
of this modem
approach to formulating economic policy, which is primarily the work of Jan Tinbergen and his school of thought, see Jan Tinbergen, O the Theo of Economic Policy (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing and DecentraliCompany, 1952) and idem, Centralization zation in Economic Policy (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1954). See also Bent Hansen, The Economic Theory of Fiscal Policy (London: George Allen G Unwin Ltd., 1958), especially Chap. 1. 2.
The Second Plan, like its predecessor was not a comprehensive plan. The partial nature of the Second Plan was not merely due to the exclusion of the private sector, regarding which nothing was said, but also because it did not cover all of the activities of of a the public sector. It consisted exclusively public investment program covering merely that portion of public investments which was to be controlled by the Plan Organization, a portion which in actuality accounted for only about 50 percent of total public
investments. The line of demarcation was determined on the basis of a rather arbitrary essentially arrangement for dividing the country's total oil revenues among the Plan Organization, the Ministry of Finance and the National Iranian Oil Company. 3.
George B. Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 42.
4.
At this
juncture
it is helpful
to make a few remarks
some broad aspects of the investment concerning program embodied in the Second Plan. Generally speaking, the basic methodological shortcoming of the Second but the Plan was not its lack of comprehensiveness,
fact that the planning problem was approached in such a manner that it simply could not lead to optimal results. There is no evidence suggesting that the 19
WINTER1972
planners adopted any clearly defined planning methodology, including a method of ensuring internal consistency in the Plan. The investment decisions were made largely in an arbitrary fashion, and the of the investment projects embodied in the selection Plan did not follow from the application of any speAt the time, the overcific investment criterion. riding concern of the government was to launch an investment program of some sort as soon as possible. It was the size, rather than the composition, of the investment program which received the highest official Be that as it may, the proposed consideration. pattern of investments under the Second Plan was heavily biased towards investments in infrastructure Furthermore, the speciand social overhead capital. fic investments were dominated by a few highly capisuch as the and "monumental" projects, tal-intensive In contrast, multipurpose dams and the highways. in both agriculture directly productive activities, The large and industry, received low priorities. projects, degree of concentration on capital-intensive of course, prevented aggregate domestic output from Output increasing in proportion to investments. intended, increases were even less than originally although the original intentions were rather modest to begin with. This is revealed by the fact that roads and big dams absorbed almost 50 percent of actual investments, while according to original intentions the same programs were not supposed to absorb more than 20 percent of total planned investments. For further details see Farhad Daftary, t and Planning in Iran, 955-1967 Economic Develo University of California, (Ph.D. Asertation, Berkeley, 1971), pp. 345-392. S.
Until 1964, the preparation of the government's annual general budget, which is sometimes also called the "ordinary" or "current" budget, was the responsiOn the other hand, bility of the Ministry of Finance. the so-called development budget, covering the transactions of the Plan Organization was prepared separately by the latter body. The budget of the Plan
IRANIAN STUDIES
20
Organization was not a part of the government's general budget, but there was some overlap between the two. The general budget included some capital expenditures as well as some recurrent development outlays, while the budget of the Plan Organization covered some current expenditures. There was not a single capital, or development, budget as distinct from the ordinary budget in the country. Since 1964, the entire task of budgeting, in respect to both current and capital budgets, has been transferred to a special bureau, the Central Budget Bureau, in the Plan Organization. It should be noted, however, that still no close working relationship exists between planning and budgeting in general, and the preparation of the ordinary and capital budgets in particular. In other words, there still does not exist a unified and coordinated budget accounting for all of the government's revenues and expenditures. For further comments, see Farhad Daftary, "Development Planning and Budgeting in Iran,'" in CENTOSeminar on Budget Administration (Ankara: Central Treaty Organization, forthcoming). 6.
The government was basically unwilling to check its ordinary expenditures and planned for budgetary deficits, and deficit-financing, with respect to every single year during the Plan period. Actual deficits came to be even larger than the amounts anticipated by the government. See Plan Organization, Progress Report on the Second Seven Year Plan (in Persian, Tehran: Plan Organization, 1964), Tables 11-12.
7.
Excluding foreign exchange sold by the foreign oil companies operating in Iran to the Iranian government for rial expenditures in Iran.
8.
See Baldwin, op. cit., p. 99; and Richard E. Benedick, Industrial Finance in Iran (Boston: Graduate School Harvard University, of Business Administration, 1964), pp. 19-20.
21
WINTER1972
9.
The par value of rial, since
1946,
was devalued
which had remained unchanged in March 1956,
from 32.25
However, the price to 75.75 rials per U.S. dollar. of gold, which is used as 40 percent currency cover (with the remaining 60 percent mainly backed by the Crown Jewels), was not changed; the gold content "official" implied the pre-devaluation rate still In order to remedy the situation, exchange rate. the rial was revalued in terms of gold, according to the Note Reserve (Amendment) Act of May, 1957. The price of gold, held as note cover, was raised from 36.2901 to 85.2396 rials per gram. This revaluation did not affect the foreign trade sector. It only permitted the release of 7.1 billion rials, representing the difference between the old and the new value of the gold held as note cover, from the Issue Department to the Banking Department of the National Bank of Iran (then the Central Bank). The government decided to use the "windfall" revaluation fund as a loan program for the private sector. National Bank of Iran, Annual Report as of March 20 , 1958 (Tehran: National Bank of Iran, 1958), p. 5; and Henry J. Brutton, "Notes on Development in Iran," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 9 (July, 1961), p. 629. 10.
The basic rate of interest charged was 6 percent. This compares rather favorably with the customary rates of at least 12 percent in the commercial banking system and rates of 18-36 percent charged by the lenders in the Bazaar, which is an important finanand a major supplier of loanable cial institution funds in Iran. For more details of the RLF, see pp. 102-118. Benedick, 2p. cit.,
11.
Private investment received a further impetus from of income in favor of a change in the distribution the upper-income groups, with higher propensities See Plan Organization, Outline to save and invest. of the Third Plan (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1961), p. 11.
IRANIAN STUDIES
22
12.
For the relevant concepts and theories, see Bent Hansen, A Study in the Theory of Inflation (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1951), especially Chaps. 1,3,7 and 9; idem, A Survey of General Equilibrium Systems (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1970), Chaps. 9-10; and idem, Long- and Short-Term Planning in Underdeveloped Countries (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1967), pp. 41ff.
13.
During the same period, the supply of labor increased rather significantly, with the result that money wages and wage costs were in general kept down. This tendency was further reinforced in the absence of effective labor unions and the generally weak bargaining position of labor vis-a-vis management in Iran. Therefore, one cannot speak in terms of a with respect to the general cost-push inflation domestic price rises of the period under consideration. Plan,
See Plan Organization, p. 12.
Outline
of the Third
14.
See also P. Norregaard Brutton, p. 632. Mp. cit., Rasmussen, "On the Interrelationships between Growth of Income," in Jean Marchal and and the Distribution Bernard Ducros, eds., The Distribution of National Income (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), pp. 522-29.
15.
For example, see Bent Hansen and Girgis A. Marzouk, Development and Economic Policy in the UAR (Egypt) (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 196S), pp. 231-32.
16.
First, total credit expansion by the banking system for the years 1339 (1960-61) was to be cut sharply; and 1340 (1961-62), to 3 billion it was to be limited rials per annum. The minimum new credit requirements for the two years in question, of the private sector, at 10.S billion had meanwhile been estimated rials, or 4.5 billion in excess of the total amount rials in the stabilization specified program. Therefore, in order to observe the credit ceilings, the net 23
WINTER1972
indebtedness of the public sector to the Central Bank was to be reduced by 2 billion rials in 1960-61 and 2.5 billion rials in 1961-62. These declines increases in the governwould require significant ment's ordinary revenues and, more importantly, Secondly, in reductions in ordinary expenditures. addition to the above-mentioned change in its fiscal operations so as to achieve budgetary surpluses, the Ministry of Finance was also to transfer 1.9 billion rials (during the years in question) to the Plan The purpose of this transfer was to Organization. prevent further declines in the scope of the Second Plan. The full implementation of these measures would bring about surpluses in the ordinary budget, amounting to 2.75 billion rials in 1960-61 and 3.25 The full texts of the billion rials in 1961-62. program and its two subsequently restabilization vised versions are given in Central Bank of Iran, See 1963), pp. 24-33. Bulletin, Vol. 1 (Jan.-Feb., also idem, Annual Report as of March 20- 1962 (in Persian, Tehran: Central Bank of Iran, 1962), pp. 10-17. pj. cit.,
p. 15.
17.
Benedick,
18.
Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report as of March 20, 1963 (Tehran: Central Bank of Iran, 1963), p. 9.
19.
For example, in 1962, the Central Bank reduced the ratio imposed on commercial banks in order liquidity and in 1963, to enhance their lending potentiality, to 4 percent. 6 from reduced was rate the rediscount
20.
See Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report as of March 20, 1971 (Tehran: Central Bank of Iran, 1971), pp. 132-134.
21.
price indices, as calcuAccording to the official the general index of Bank, the Central lated by wholesale prices rose by 7 percent during 1350 (1971-1972).
IRANIAN STUDIES
24
THE REL4TIONSSHIP BETWEENURBANIZATION AND THE CHANGINGSTATUS OF WOMEN IN IRAN, 1956-1966 JACQUILINERUDOLPH TOUBA Rapid developments of the twentieth century have forced attention upon the changing status and role of women in all societies. As they have acquired a longer life expectancy, are having healthier children, and with the advancing technology, mass production and distribution contributing to their lessening housekeeping chores, women have acquired more and more leisure time. While the industrialized societies have been mostly concerned with the problem of leisure time for these women, and making optimum use of all human resources, both male and female, the developing countries have been facing the basic problem of illiteracy, and particularly illiteracy of their female population. There has always been a small
Jacquiline Rudolph Touba is Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology, College of Social Sciences, University of Tehran, and Head of the Group on Family Research, Institute for Social Studies and Research, University of Tehran. An earlier version of this article was presented at the "Tenth International Seminar on Family Research," sponsored by the International Association and Sociological the Institute for Social Studies and Research, Tehran, March 5-12, 1968. 25
WINTER1972
segment of the female population in developing countries with as much, if not more, leisure time than those of the industrialized nations. However, they have been and often still are bound by a culture which has defined their position to be in the home, to be honored and respected but not to be heard publicly and often not seen publicly. Some developing nations have recognized the wasted labor potential for economic development of half their population. In addition some have recognized the injustice of keeping persons illiterate or not allowing development of intellectual talents because the ascribed status of female has traditionally required a subservient role in the society. Iran is one interesting example of a developing country that has recognized the aforementioned factors and is attempting to analyze the problem. Historical
Background of the Status of Womenin Iran
Iran has had a long tradition of equal rights for women dating back to the period of Zoroastrianism some 2,500 years ago. Even with the coming of Islam, the position of women in Iranian society was strengthened,l although this is not always visible in all present day Islamic societies. of Islam, which reThe principles spected women's status and granted rights still not granted to women in some Western nations, were appreciated in Iran. Some of these rights were equality in matters of commerce, mortgage of real estate, gifts of property, partnership and investment, religious endowments, leases, guarantees, deposits and The exercise entry into commercial practices. of woman's right to ownership or possession of property was made independent of the approval, control or guardianship of anyone, including her husband.2 The destructive changes in the position of women followed this early Islamic era and have been attributed to the The status of women Mongol invasion of the 13th century. IRANIANSTUDIES
26
in the period following was altered considerably and in some cases to almost that of a servant to her male masters. During the 19th century, Iran was again invaded, although more subtly than previously, as she came into the orbit of European politics and infiltration. A few of the more progressive families, who began to travel and study in the West, added to the new ideas that were disturbing to the traditional practices. The turn of the century witnessed the advent of the Constitutional Movement which gave women a chance to make a plea for a change in their position in the society. The irony of this movement, which was supposed to insure rights to all citizens of the country, was that it served to legally stifle woman's further participation in political For example, the Electoral Law, Article 10, affalrs. specifically stated, Those deprived of the right to vote shall consist of all females, minors and those under guardians; fraudulent bankrupts, beggars, and those who earn their living in a disreputable way; murderers, thieves, and other criminals punished under Islamic law. Thus women were put in the same category with beggars and criminals despite their level of education and family background. However, it must be remembered that this was not the only factor keeping her in a relatively unchanging Of equal importance were her imprisonment position. through illiteracy, the traditional practices of wellto-do families which did not allow her entrance into the labor market, and the non-acceptance of her into the more of the labor market even if she did prestigiousp.ositions gain entrance and was well qualified. Despite this, as more families sent their children abroad, and began moving the status away from strict adherence to older traditions, and role of women in some segments of the Iranian population gradually changed. As schools were built and 27
WINTER1972
were established, campaigns against illiteracy became more available, employment opportunities economically, began making themselves visible, and intellectually.
and as some women politically,
at home and Womenbegan studying at universities abroad, and could be found moving into the professions of sciences, medicine, and agricultural physical, biological religion and teaching, law, economics and statistics, Numerous and entertainment.3 welfare, art, literature types of women's organizations developed ranging from or political, those that were based on professional, midand spinsters for to those concerns philanthropic rights were given to In 1963, equal electoral wives. women by a decree of the Shah as part of his "White Revolution," and this same year marked the election of six women to the Majlis, of whomtwo were appointed to the Senate. In addition, women have become civil servants, members have been active in national sports of the armed services, competitions and have recently joined the traffic police force in the capital city. View of the Chang4ng_Status of A More Realistic Women: Urban-Rural Differences remains as to which segments of The question still the population have really been affected by changing of sertechnology, the improvements in and availability and new electoral vices, increased employment opportunities laws. Thus far reference has only been made to a few examples of women being able to join in the mainstream of Therefore, the remainder of this paper will Iranian life. attempt to take a broader view of the changing status of between urbanization women and examine the relationship and the changing status of women in Iran and five major urban centers from 1956 to 1966. Iran of many developing countries, A characteristic included, is the rapid growth of one major cultural center, often the capltal city, with growing but smaller urban The complexes in various sections of the country. IRANIANSTUDIES
28
remainder of the country usually includes a vast rural area hardly affected by the more modern practices and A corollary to this is the relatively attitudes. unchanging position of women in the rural areas. A. Literaci in Urban and Rural Iran.4 When the data for the country as a whole are examined, the change in the illiteracy of women can be estimated to be 11 percent from 1956 to 1966, the percentage of illiterate females being 91 percent in the former year. However, when the urban and rural areas are compared, there is an estimated 20 percent decrease in urban Iran from the 1956 illiteracy figure of 77 percent, while the illiteracy rate among women in rural areas has changed by only three percent, thus encompassing an estimated 95 percent of the total rural female population of 10 years and over by the 1966 census. B. Employment and Occutpational Status in Iran. A comparison of the employment status of Iranian women from 1956 to 1966 demonstrates a greater increase in the proportion of women in the labor force in the rural areas than in the urban areas. Of those women employed in the rural areas, the change has been estimated to be shifting toward greater employment in production, crafts and related fields, while decreasing in all other occupational groups. Meanwhile, the greatest changes in women's employment status in the urban areas were found to have There occurred in the professional and related fields. is only a slight increase in production work, a relatively high degree of change in the white-collar occupations since 1956 and a decrease in agriculture and service occupations. However, the assumption that the improvements are uniform for all urban areas may not be warranted. The Relationship Between City Size and Changing Status of Womenin Iran In the developing countries, improvements in the quality of population and increased availability of services are often assumed to occur in the capital city or 29
WINTER1972
It is preat least the largest cities of the country. sumed that as the concentration of population increases, roads, housing and schools will the need for hospitals, also increase, and the provision of these facilities will in turn attract just that type of population which Thus, one might expect will demand even more services. to see changes in the social environment of the city to vary directly with its increasing size. of the changing the relationship Investigating interesting, status of women to city size is particularly practices must change if the woman for many traditional Whether urbaniis to acquire a new role in the society. zation will contribute to changes in these traditional remains to be seen. A preliminary modes of orientation was done for analysis of the aforementioned relationship Tehran, 1966 population-five major Iranian cities: Tabriz, 1966 2,719,730; Esfahan, 1966 population--424,045; Abadan, 1966 population--272,962; population--403,413; Shiraz, 1966 population--269,865.5 A. Changes in the Literacy and Educational Status. In 1956, Tehran had the highest percentage of literacy among the female population ten years and over (35%). While Shiraz was second with (30%), Esfahan and Abadan female populacould boast of only a 17 percent literate In 1966, in was illiteracy. highest tion and Tabriz the findings demonstrated that the largest degree of existed in Tehran (52%) with Shiraz still literacy still second (50%). However, Abadan, with 42 percent of its made the greatest per1966 female population literate, Although centage change over its previous 1956 level. literacy among females in Esfahan and Tabriz increased from 1956 to 1966, the former demonstrated extensively among its female population nearly two-thirds illiteracy of the female had nearly three-fourths and Tabriz still (see Table 1). population illiterate the After a more detailed examination of literacy, same pattern occurred for the female population with some elementary education (1 to 6 years), those with some high school, those with some college and college graduates. IRANIANSTUDIES
30
For the female population with some elementary education, Shiraz had a higher percentage than Tehran, and Abadan again had the highest percent change over the 1956 figures. The percentage of the female population with some high school education in Shiraz also came very close to Tehran in 1966, and the percent change from 1956 was much higher than for Tehran. Abadan more than doubled its 1956 female Both Esfahan population with some high school education. and Tabriz had a high percent change since 1956 but the proportion of females with high school education twelve years ago was so low that the proportion in 1966 was less than half of that for Tehran and Shiraz. In 1966, Shiraz also exhibited nearly the same proportion of its female population with a college degree and increased about the same amount as Tehran. Despite the fact that Abadan was the only city with no university, a slightly larger percentage of its female population than that of Esfahan or Tabriz had attained a college degree or higher. Nevertheless, all of the cities had increased their college educated female population to only less than one percent of the total female population ten years and over (see Table 1). It is inB. Changes in the Occupational Status. teresting to note that the percentage of employed females ten years and over in Tehran actually decreased from 1956 to 1966, and the proportion in Abadan remained the same, although at a level much lower than that of the other cities. Tabriz had the largest proportion of employed women in 1966, and both Tabriz and Esfahan had a larger proportion of employed females than Tehran (see Table 2). When the specific occupational groups are examined, it is significant that more than half of the employed women in Esfahan and two-thirds of those employed in Tabriz were in production, crafts or related industries. from 1956 to 1966. These proportions increased extensively During the same period the proportion of females in prostable in duction, crafts, etc., remained relatively Tehran, Shiraz, and Abadan. All cities demonstrated a large decrease in the proportion of service workers in 31
WINTER1972
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1972 AUTIJ4N
The Design of the Presurvey Beginning in May, 1970, the presurvey of 1000 married individuals was carried out in Isfahan City and Ostan. In general, the pattern of responses for the men (419) and the The presurvey inquired into perwomen (581) was similar. knowledge, attitudes and practice of sonal characteristics, family planning, media behavior, community participation, The questionnaire was long (231 motives. and fertility but important questions were repeated several questions), Eight Health Corpswomen times using different wordings. They were supervised by the were trained as interviewers. Deputy Director of the Isfahan Health Department and the Population Council resident adviser. Respondents were chosen randomly from a universe of of Isfahan Ostan like one million (autonomous districts Yazd were not covered), and grouped into urban and rural Some 424 interviews were made in Isfahan City segments. among towns and viland the remaining 576 were distributed lages in proportion to the total number of people living in Within these population groupcommunities of various sizes. drawn according to social and economic criings, clusters, teria, were chosen at random. Within each cluster the husband or wife from each household was interviewed. Apart from checks built into the survey (see below) of the sample was evaluated by comparing the distributions respondents by age, occupation, and education with similar data obtained from 1966 census data and clinical profiles Only one important discrepancy was noted. on acceptors. of male respondents was weighted disThe age distribution For this reason, in favor of older cohorts. proportionately involving age data were made for fethe cross-tabulations male respondents alone (see Table 4). The effect of this between age and age bias was minimal. The relationships the family size, KAP, and other variables shown for women in Table 4 were similar to those of the male respondents, and they follow a pattern discovered in KAPstudies done elsewhere.
IRANIANSTUDIES
156
Characteristics
of Respondents
For male and female respondents history. Fertility the mean and median number of living children was 4.0. For female respondents and the wives of males respondents the mean number of pregnancies was 5.6. Fifty six percent of the women covered in the survey had been pregnant in the last two years, 70 percent in the previous three; 14 percent were pregnant at the time of interview. Sixty five percent of the respondents desired their or their spouse's last pregnancy, but for those with one or more living children this proportion declined with number of living children (Table 5). Two-thirds of those interviewed believed they were still fertile. Twenty-eight percent of the women covered had had a miscarriage or a stillbirth.5 Over half had experienced the death of at least one child, one-fifth two or more. For all couples the number of living children varied directly with the number of child deaths experienced (Table 6). TABLE5. PERCENT WITHSPECIFIEDCHARACTERISTICS BY NUMBER OF LIVINGCHILDREN,ISFAHANOSTAN, MAY1970 PRESURVEY Number of living children Characteristica Expecting old age support from children Desired last pregnancy Would pledge to have no more children Would have taken the pill on the spot Use of contraceptives Ever used Currently using e
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
84 62
96 95
96 77
93 69
98 69
98 54
96 45
95 42
100 38
100 37
92 65
22
8
22
31
42
40
66
46
52
47
35
16
16
24
23
27
35
24
33
21
42
26
32 19
31 26
45 39
44 38
45 36
34 29
46 37
40 27
41 38
32 37
41 33
9 Total
For female respondentor wife of male respondent.
FamilZ size norm. On the average, men desired 3.8 children, women 3.7; 17 percent left family size to the will of God. As shown in Table 6, the norm fell with succeeding
157
AUTUMN 1972
TABLE 6. AVERAGENUMBEROF LIVING CHILDREN AND AVERAGEIDEAL FAMILYSIZE BY NUMBEROF CHILD DEATHS, ISFAHANOSTAN, MAY1970 PRESURVEY Number of Child Deaths
Average Living
Number of Children
Ideal
Family Size
0 1 2 3 4+
3.3 3.9 4.6 4.8 4.9
3.5 3.8 4.2 4.1 4.2
Total
4.0
3.7
Number of Respondents
483 202 147 76 92 1,000
by a single defining characterisWhen classified cohorts. tic the following groups had lower norms: professionals, army and government employees (Table 7), urban residents (Table 8), and families with few child deaths (Table 6). Over half of those Awareness of population trends. interviewed thought that the rate of population growth was excessive (Table 7), but perception of mortality trends Fifty seven percent felt that more, and varied widely. 40 percent that fewer, children were surviving than in the Two-thirds feared some of their own offspring would past. Acute awareness of declining mortality was not assodie. ciated with any groups whether defined by age, education, or occupation.
lagers
However,
had perceived
compared with
a decline
city
dwellers,
vil-
in child mortality.
Some questions framed in an motivation. Fertility ferfashion attempted to elicit experimental and tentative and true-false, of Yes-no, respondents. motives tility open-ended questions, as well as rank-order techniques were attitudes employed. The results suggested that fertility were related closely to perceived demands of the environment. Thus nearly all respondents expected their children's help as laborers and as sources of support in old age. Yet most respondents readily associated the notion IRANIANSTUDIES
158
WITHSPECIFIEDCHARACTERISTICS TABLE7. PERCENT OF WOMEN; BY OCCUPATION FORMENANDHUSBANDS ISFAHANOSTAN,MAY1970 PRESURVEY
Clharacteristic
GovernSpecialment ists/docem- Army, Teach- Shop- tors/biisiWork- Farmployees police ers keepers nessmen Total ers ers
84 Number of respondents 317 265 Family size attitudes Ever discussed 88 family size 77 60 Ideal number of children 3 Left to God 13 32 3.3 Number (average) 3.8 4.3 Wants work force sup99 85 96 port from children Expects old age sup84 92 96 port from children Thought population 27 70 growth excessive 59 Family planning attitudes and knowledge Had heard of the family 23 13 46 planning program Approves of family 83 69 98 planning 94 Knew methods 83 65 Practice of family planning 42 17 71 Ever used 12 61 Used currently 35 10 Used pill currentlya 8 16 Used withdrawal 47 29 9 currently
23
35
215
16
960
70
74
78
88
74
13 2.7
14 3.6
14 3.6
87
94
97
75
96
78
80
93
62
92
83
60
58
56
52
61
60
21
62
62
87 91
94 97
89 85
100 100
83 80
70 65 13
74 54 3
45 39 9
81 75 62
41 33 10
57
54
31
81
28
0 3.0
17 3.7
?Or, whose spouse used the pill currently.
of declining fertility on their part with improvements in For example, 69 percent of farmers and 57 their situation. percent of workers interviewed stated a preference for more mechanical aids rather than children to assist them in their work. Fifty-seven percent of respondents agreed with a statement linking the two-to-three child family to government provided old age support. Nearly all expressed the belief that large families ought to pay higher taxes, while 80 percent approved of a hypothetical plan in which child allowances declined with number of living children. Nearly all agreed that small families should be rewarded; 52 percent mentioned education and 25 percent cash as suitable rewards. 159
AUTUMN 1972
TABLE 8. PERCENTWITH SPECIFIED CHARACTERISTICS BY PLACE OF RESIDENCEAND SEX: ISFAHANOSTAN, MAY 1970 PRESURVEY 1sfahan City
Other cities
Villages
Women
Men
Women
255 Number of respondents Family size attitudes Ideal number of children Left to God 5 3.5 Number (average) Wanted old age support from children 88 Wanted work aid support from children 93 47 Perceived mortalitydecline Thought population growth excessive 65 Family planning attitudes and knowledge Approved of family planning 95 Thought Islam approved 87 Would pledge to have 2 or 3 children 45 Would have taken pill on the spot 24 Had heard of the family planning program 72
160
50
60
10 3.3
18 3.7
24 4.8
88
90
89
94 42
98 62
92 51
58
76
90 78 37
item
Contraceptive knowledge Knew Pill IUD Withdrawal Sterilization Condom Contraceptive use Ever used contraceptives Currently used contraceptives Ever used pill Currently using pill Ever used withdrawal
7 3.4
Men Women 251
Men
Total
213
989
30 4.4
17 3.7
94
97
92
98 68
100 72
96 57
67
41
36
52
98 84
89 80
72 57
69 47
83 70
38
25
32
26
35
26
18
15
29
25
26
70
80
69
53
47
62
97 81 48 42 82
91 67 48 42 80
92 82 56 42 84
80 72 39 54 77
84 46 30 24 51
46 29 23 22 51
84 49 51 27 60
69 62 30 12 53
63 54 23 12 46
48 30 22 8 34
44 32 20 5 34
18 11 12 8 8
15 12 10 7 5
41 33 19 10 22
Note: Place of residence was illegible on 11 questionnaires;they were not used in this table.
With respect to the probKAPof contraception. lem of realizing their fertility aims, 80 percent of the conrespondents knew at least one method of fertility trol; by method, women were more aware than men (Table 9). Knowledge varied slightly by age (Table 4), but significant differences by occupation were found (Table 7)--farmers had
IRANIANSTUDIES
160
the least awareness. Of those who had heard of the pill, 40 percent had heard "bad" reports. Nearly 80 percent expressed the desire to obtain more information. TABLE9.
OF EACHCONTRACEPTIVE KNOWLEDGE METHOD, OF THOSEWHOKNEW A METHOD Percent
Method Pill IUD Withdrawal Sterilization Condom
Men
Women
All Respondents
77 39 48 27 55
89 56 53 27 64
84 49 51 27 60
Respondents registered high approval of the use of contraceptives. However, 93 percent stated that the approval of their spouse was a prerequisite to practice. Although most had discussed family size with their mate, only 52 percent believed that their spouse's approval would be forthcoming. Seventy percent thought that Islam approved of contraception. Significantly, fewer rural (53 percent) than urban (82 percent) respondents held such a view. Forty-one percent of the respondents had previously practiced contraception (44 percent of the women). Of all respondents, 19 percent had used the pill and 22 percent had practiced withdrawal. Half of those interviewed had friends or relatives who had attempted to limit their family sizes at some time. Yet, of those who stated that they did not want their (or their spouse's) last pregnancy, only 46 percent were currently using a method of control. There were disparities in the contraceptive practice of groups defined in various and often overlapping ways. Villagers (Table lOB) and especially peasants (Tables lOA 161
AUTUMN 1972
AND FAMILYPLANNINGCHARACTERISTICS TABLE 10. DEMOGRAPHIC AGED 35 (A) BY OCCUPATIONFOR MENOR HUSBANDSOF WOMEN OR OVERAND (B) BY RESIDENCEAND SEX FOR THOSE AGED 35 OR OVER, ISFAHAN OSTAN, MAY 1970 A. By occupation
Characteristic Number of respondents
Farmer
Worker 124
Government employee
102
35
Tradesman 77
Average Number of living children Number of pregnancies
4.7 7.2
4.5 6.2
-Percent
--
With more than 7 children Ever used contraceptives Currently usingb IUD Pill Sterilization Condom Withdrawal
4.8 8.1
5.1 6.7
25 18 12 0 8 1 1 5
26 68 56 3 21 0 15 29
Female
Maleb
Female
62
95
20 39 34 0 10 1 6 20
23 40 36 0 12 0 9 14
B. By residence and sex Rural Characteristic Number of respondents Number of living children Number of pregnancies With more than 7 children Ever used contraceptives Currently usingo IUD Pill Sterilization Condom Withdrawal
Urban
5.5 8.0
5.6 8.6
33 17 13 0 10 0 1 4
23 19 11 3 6 3 0 2
o
36 Average 6.1 8.3 Percent 39 58 47 0 17 0 25 22
Maleb 102 5.6 7.5 24 61 53 3 13 0 5 36
Breakdownsof users by method do not sum to 100 because of use of methods not specified here and because of inconsistentresponses. b For males aged 40 or over.
IRANIAN STUDIES
162
and 7), and those who had received no formal education were unlikely to have used any methods. The differences by edumethods cation were due mainly to greater use of traditional since the IUD and the pill were used by respondents with no and three or more years of education to about the same exincreased with suc"Current use" of contraceptives tent. ceeding cohorts, while "ever-use" showed an irregular pattern. difIt is remarkable that in spite of substantial ferences in their use of contraceptive methods, urban, rural, and occupational groups still arrived at similar average completed family sizes and average numbers of pregnancies experienced (Table 10A). Until comparable data are available for other regions of Iran, these results must be conOne possible explanation sidered to be highly tentative. of this lack of significant fertility differentials-is the reliance on traditional methods and an inability to use these methods effectively by those attempting to limit their family sizes.6 Exposure to mass media. Information on media behavior was essential, of course, in designing a complete publicity campaign. Radio. Seventy-five percent of the respondents lisand 65 percent owned a set. tened at least occasionally, Most listened at home, on Fridays, and to Radio Iran (originating in Tehran). The news (44 percent), dramas (40 percent), music (23 percent) and educational offerings (15 percent) were the programs most preferred. Twenty seven percent had heard family planning information on the radio before the campaign began. Mail. Fifty-nine percent received mail at least monthly (but only 6 percent daily) and 58 percent had home delivery. Television. Thirty-six percent watched occasionally, and 12 percent owned a set. "Peyton Place" and "Sarkar Ostovar" (a comedy about a police sergeant) were program followed by news, films, and musical programs. favorites, 163
AUTUt 1972
Newspapers. Thirty-three percent of the respondents were able to read newspapers, and 73 percent of these actually did; 36 percent of the latter group read daily and 24 Of the items read frequently the news and percent weekly. accidents were most often mentioned. the coverage of traffic In all, 14 percent had read something on family planning in the newspapers. Of Magazines. Twenty-six percent read magazines. these, 56 percent read Zan-i Ruz (Today's Woman)and 20 perHaftegi (Weekly Etella'at). cent Etella'at-i Contact with these communications channels varied with the age, education, and place of residence of respond(Tables 11 and 12). ents, although not always systematically As expected, inhabitants of Isfahan City were by far the most exposed to the mass media and were also more likely to have heard of family planning through these channels (Table 12). BY MEDIAEXPOSURE WITHSELECTED TABLE11. PERCENT ANDSEX, ISFAHANOSTAN,MAY1970 EDUCATION PRESURVEY 3 or more years education Media exposure
Men
Number of respondents Listened to radio Read newspapers Saw films Spouse saw films
157 90 65 53 40
Women 166 93 62 59 61
No formal educations Men
Women
216 60 10 14 6
339 67 2 2 16
Totalb 75 25 28 28
Respondentsmay have attended literacy classes. Total includes those with intermediateeducation and those with education unknown, not shown separately. a
IRANIANSTUDIES
164
BY WITHMEDIAEXPOSURE TABLE12. PERCENT ANDSEX, ISFAHANOSTAN, PLACEOF RESIDENCE MAY1970 PRESURVEY 1sfahan City
Media exposure Number of respondents Listened to radio Owned a radio Heard of family planning on the radio Able to read newspaper Read newspapers Had read of family planning in newspaper Read magazines
Women Men
Other cities
Women Men
Villages
Women Men
Total
255 89 87
160 85 76
50 68 60
60 67 56
251 59 45
213 66 50
989 75 65
40 59 38
39 51 39
20 14 10
18 51 39
13 7 5
15 28 22
27 33 25
24 37
13 33
6 13
8 28
4 4
2 14
14 21
and contraceptive Western consumption, fertility, The income data obtained in the presurvey were practice. To get a rough idea of the incomplete and unsatisfactory. between the material worth and the fertility relationship and contraceptive practice of couples the level of ownership of Western consumer goods was adopted as an index. Furthermore, it was recognized that "modern" consumption might also be an indicator of modernity in attitudes and to adopt mobehavior of couples and of a predisposition dern family planning methods. Ownership of consumer durables was associated with A higher proportion of curcurrent use of contraceptives. rent contraceptors owned each of ten different consumer (Table 13), durables than did current non-contraceptors and, conversely, a higher proportion of owners of each of than the ten durables were currently using contraceptives were nonowners. In addition, 56 percent of savers used as opposed to 30 percent of non-savers (not contraceptives shown in tables). The ownership of particular goods varies, of course, In order to conwith the wealth and tastes of households. jointly trol for these factors respondents were classified 165
1972 AUTUMN
DURABLESBY PERCENTOWNINGCONSUMER TABLE 13. BY USE, USING CONTRACEPTIVES CONTRACEPTIVE BY OWNING,AND SAVING BY OWNING,FOR SPECIFIED DURABLES, ISFAHANOSTAN, MAY1970 PRESURVEY
Consumer durable BicyElectric cle Radio Fan
Characteristic
RefrigSewing Machine erator
Owning each consumer durable All respondents Current contraceptors " noncontraceptors
38 44 35
65 89 57
36 62 24
42 69 29
23 45 12
Using contraception currently Owners of durable Nonowners of durable
38 27
43 17
57 20
54 18
65 24
Saving Owners of durable Nonowners of durable
23 13
21 8
32 8
30 7
41 10
by age (under 35 and 35 and older), place of residence (village and city) and number of consumer durables owned For these groups the average values for (0-3, 4-6, 7-9). certain demographic and family planning characteristics (Table 14). Briefly, for young city women were calculated norms existed between their fertility no strong relationship and the number of durable goods and reproductive histories, for young was found (inversely) owned. Such a relationship village women. Among older women the number of goods owned was related directly for village women, and in a U-shaped fashion for city women, to number of pregnancies and number of living
inversely
children.
related
IRANIANSTUDIES
In general,
ideal
family
size
was
to number of durable goods owned, but no
166
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