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EDITORIAL 1 EDITORIAL Creative Strategies for Change Innovation Models and Methods Creative Strategies for Change T ...

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EDITORIAL

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EDITORIAL Creative Strategies for Change Innovation Models and Methods

Creative Strategies for Change

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It has to be concluded that innovation, while difficult can not, perhaps must not, be left to chance. To do so would be to rely far too much on being in the right place at the right time, hoping for something to turn up. The need is for a strategic approach that matches the environmental features of the 21st century landscape. In shorthand, the strategies have to articulate goals in ways that preserve flexibility of operating, and even in redefining some of the lower order goals. If creativity is a kind of set to break set, a creative strategy may be seen as a strategy to break out of unhelpful strategies. The articles in this issue all provide food for thought into the nature and achievement of creative strategies.

he prize is still to be won. Even the most successful of our global organizations know enough about innovation to realize how much more is to be discovered. Consequently there is an enthusiasm for looking over the fence to see what is growing in the next garden. In the vocabulary of management consultants, organisations would dearly like to benchmark themselves against others. Almost synonymous with benchmarking comes the term best practice. A little digression. In November 1999, scientists announced the complete resolution of the genetic code (information content) of a human chromosome. There seems no impediment to the completion of the human genome project aimed at mapping the entire genetic coding of a human being. In innovation terms, we are a long way from a complete innovation map. The process of benchmarking seems akin to teasing away at fragments of code so that sense can be made of the instructions that control innovative practices within organizations. The analogy with the human genome project does not stop there. Once we have a complete map of genetic information ± what then? Can we replicate the code outside its original cellular cage? (Maybe, one day, say the geneticists). In other words, the scientists are aware of the gulf between the knowledge they are mining, and the desired (or feared applications). To return to innovation, we have to recognize that `best practice' is as embedded in time and space as is the genetic code within individual human beings. Why bother? Because there are other, very good, reasons for studying organizational variations. The process alerts us to alternative possibilities. It may help us avoid overgeneralizing regarding causal relationships. We become less vulnerable to the promises of sure-fire solutions to organizational dilemmas. When the process involves the organizations, it is one that may facilitate the conversion of general or codified knowledge into knowledge specific to the firm's own interests and capabilities. # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000. 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

Contents In our lead article, Zoe Radnor and Judith Robinson provide a framework for benchmarking innovation practices from a UK perspective. They offer supportive evidence for some well-established propositions on innovation supports, such as importance of top management support, cross functional teams, innovation champions, reward systems, and creative (positive) climate for idea development. They suggest that in `best practice' companies sampled, a stage-gate model of innovation tended to be followed, either explicitly, or implicitly. Hernan Riquelme has conducted a study of the influence of creativity-supporting interventions on strtegic planning. In the experiment, the impact seems to be most effective if the team had a more `close-minded' orientation at the outset. Zhongqi Jin reports an analysis of empirical data of organisational innovation processes. He shows evidence for factors associated with the lack of linearity of innovation processes. In everyday terms, the process has a greater need to test and learn within it, according to features such as novelty of the overall innovation experience.

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CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT

Malcolm Goodman uses the metaphor of detection to great effect to explore corporate innovativeness, or lack of it. (`Sherlock never ceased to be amazed at the number of top managers who were on the lookout for an instant solution to pressing problems'). His analysis is the more interesting as recent events in the marketplace seem to support his `deductions' for one of his selected companies, Marks & Spencer). Min Basadur has developed a wealth of experience of techniques for supporting innovation strategies in action. With his co-workers he shows the need for processes that favour `win-win' outcomes. They provide a case of union/management bargaining in which a creative approach found ways of èxpanding the pie' . Success, however, vanishes when trust is lost. The dynamics seem to be the inevitable tensions between distributive (zero sum) and integrative (non zero-sum) modes. A creative support system offers more hope for sustaining win-win, non zero-sum outcomes.

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The author of the book of the quarter, Umberto Eco, has gained international fame for his fictional, post-modern, and linguistic works. Kant and the platypus is hard to pin down into a category. It is perhaps best seen as a series of essays on consciousness and reality. Somewhere in these pages are notions of deepest relevance to progress in understanding creativity. Finally, a word on the millennium bug. What happened and what can we learn from what happened? First impressions are that the bug was rather more like a cultural virus or what has become known as a meme. (see Susan Blakemore, The Meme machine, Oxford University Press, 1999 for a recent examination of this concept). If I understand the metaphor, memes propagate ideas, whose main characteristic is that of ease of propagation. The idea of a millenium bug successfully propagated, with considerable help from the internet, governments, software interests and so on. The phenomenon can be understood primarily within a world of virtuality.

# Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000

BENCHMARKING INNOVATION

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Benchmarking Innovation: A Short Report Zoe Radnor and Judith Robinson A project is reported that benchmarked `best practice' mature organisations, with a base in the United Kingdom, on the processes and practices that they perceive underpinned successful innovation projects. The majority of organisations had director level personnel involved in the innovation process but only three had active involvement of the top management. However, the majority saw the greatest level of innovation being obtained through the use of cross-functional teams. Five key innovation supports were identified during the benchmarking exercise. These were top management support for, and involvement in the process; the appointment of an innovation champion or sponsor; rewards for innovative behaviours and ideas; and finally a positive attitude to building on creative ideas, irrespective of their source. It is suggested that benchmarking can play a role in identifying best-practice innovation structures and procedures.

Summary

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nnovation is central to the development and maintenance of new products, new ways of working and new processes within any organisation. A project was established to benchmark `best practice' mature organisations, with a base in the United Kingdom, on the processes and practices that they perceive underpinned successful innovation projects. This paper will aim to present some of the initial findings from the project. They highlight important issues in connection with the context, culture and process of innovation. The project methodology began when a period of desk-based research was undertaken to identify potential partner organisations. This was then followed by a series of visits to benchmark partners to collect and share information about innovation. Primary data were collected through the use of interviews and questionnaires to understand the current position and organisational context. Eight organisations were visited during this pilot project and data collected through a mini-case study approach supplemented with the use of an inventory. In all organisations, at least one contact was at director level, or similar, and this facilitated an overview of the entire process from idea generation to launch. In addition, most organisations enabled access to other employees who played a role # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000. 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

in the innovation process. The data derived from these visits led to a series of tables which described the context, culture and process used during successful innovations. These data reveal some key themes and practices which are currently leading to successful innovation within the United Kingdom.

Introduction The comparison of operations within one organisation with those in other organisations is known as benchmarking. Slack and coauthors (1995) note that Xerox used `competitive benchmarking' in 1979 to describe the process in which the manufacturing division revitalised itself by comparing the features of its assemblies and processes with those of competitors. Benchmarking is subject to a variety of definitions: it has been defined as a continuous search for and application of significantly better practices that lead to superior competitive performance. Others note that benchmarking is the process by which organisations learn modelled on the human learning performance. In essence, all of these definitions may be paraphrased as benchmarking is in effect a tool which may be used to measure and improve performance. Several texts note that the use of benchmarking enables the organisation to develop an

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Linear innovation model

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understanding of how exceptional performance is obtained. Any benchmarking exercise should therefore result in two types of outputs: the benchmark comparative data and a set of enablers that represent the practices that underlie the performance. Finally, Watson (1993) cites a speech given by Deming to Hewlett Packard in which it is noted that users of benchmark data should Àdapt, don't adopt.' This indicates that the context in which the benchmark companies operate will influence the process enablers. Since companies differ in culture and business environment it is probable that direct transfer of practices would prove unsuccessful. It has been argued that there are a number of different types of benchmarking including internal, external, non-competitive, competitive, performance and best-practice benchmarking (Boxwell, 1996; Codling, 1992; Holloway, 1997 and Zairi, 1993). Indeed, it has been suggested that use of competitive benchmarking can foster innovation, and enhance product and service quality. This study effectively falls into the broad category of performance benchmarking. It combined elements of measurement e.g. quality, number of successful innovations launched per year, and process benchmarking (an attempt was made to understand the culture and context within each organisation). Benchmarking goes beyond a study of business processes in that it has four essential steps according to the method described by W. Edward Deming: plan, do, check and act. The last stage provides the process with a bias towards action. Such benchmarking can lead to business process re-engineering (Hammer & Champy 1995). The four stages are often represented as a wheel or cycle to highlight the repetitive nature of the process. The first stage involves the identification of the processes or practices to be compared, and an evaluation of the current performance of the business. The second step requires secondary research to identify potential benchmarks, the development of questionnaires and research questions. Once the benchmarkers have completed secondary research, site visits should be arranged to share information and collect primary data. The third step requires the data to be analysed in two dimensions. First, to determine the perceived performance gap and second, to identify the so-called process enablers. Finally, the information derived from analysis should be used to develop a process suited for the company. This requires recommendations for change within the organisation aimed at improving performance.

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Innovation is important to the economy as a whole. A recent Economist article (Anon 1999). notes that governments, businesses and other organisations have been united by a thirst for innovation. Innovation is often described in terms of the production of better products or services. We should also recognize the innovation inherent in manufacturing process changes, new ways of marketing, distributing or supporting these services (Urban 1980). Innovation is a manageable process often reduced to three broadly identifiable stages: The invention stage where ideas are conceived, collected and entered into the process. The implementation phase during which exploration and/or development lead to the realisation of the idea within the organisation, and finally The market penetration phase in which the benefits to the organisation of the innovation are exploited (Weyrich 1998). Others (Doyle 1994; Anon 1999) define the innovation process in five steps: (1) Imagining, to derive the initial insight (2) Incubating, or nurturing the concept to gauge if it has commercial valu (3) Developing prototypes, coupled with market research (4) Promoting and marketing, and (5) Sustaining the innovation by extending the life-cycle. Whilst there are always exceptions to rules, most innovations result from a conscious, purposeful search for opportunities (Mohrle & Pannenbacker 1997). According to the CBI, there are four styles of innovation: exploitation of novel technology, process innovation, supply chain integration and broad innovation strategy with the best companies demonstrating elements of all four styles (CBI Innovation trends survey 1999). Within the new product development literature, innovation and new product development is often described in terms of linear processes (see for example Price & Bass 1969). This impression of a linear process is confirmed when case studies relating to innovation are consulted. The linear model implies that innovation proceeds as an orderly process, starting with the discovery of new knowledge, moving through development to launch. It is generally agreed, however, that this approach is overly simplistic. A number of authors have attempted to model the innovation process in more detail (Calantone 1988; Ettlie 1980; Josty 1990; King 1992; and Kline 1985). These papers all suggest that innovation is a complex process, which despite its importance is poorly understood.



Thus, although these stage models have high face-validity, Rickards (1996) points out that the innovating system remains open to information throughout. Ideas, generally of a more incremental kind, may be regarded as thoroughly inter-mingled with implementation activities. Furthermore, the cyclic representation of the models indicates that implementation is always `sandwiched' between planning-type stages. In other words, we must treat stage models as useful guides to a more complex reality that is always open to contextual surprises. This is why benchmarking can suggest possibilities, but cannot provide a total a priori plan for a specific future innovation. (Mintzberg 1994).

Methods A benchmarking exercise was undertaken to facilitate learning about innovation from a number of organisations. The key research questions were: Did the benchmark partners have a defined process for innovation? What clues could be obtained about the context and culture of these organisations? How does the organisational culture support innovation? In line with the benchmarking literature, this study has been undertaken using the plan, do, check act cycle as outlined in Table 1, which outlines the key research steps undertaken during each phase of the research.

Initial Selection of Benchmark Partners This stage involved the use of data sources including articles, professional bodies, Internet

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searches and the use of appropriate databases (Mintel, Extel cards, and The creative organisation database, Rickards 1998). The intention was to gather data and identify potential benchmarking partners. A systematic search for information was undertaken on companies based in both the FTSE Top 100 and Dow Jones Top 100.

Criteria for Admission Included Large organisations with turnover similar to, or greater than that of the sponsoring organisations' Business Units. Separate innovation units associated with large organisations were also included, provided their parent organisation matched both the turnover requirement and operated within the science-based or FMCG areas.

Target Organisation Perceived as Being Innovative Within its Own Industry Sector Target organisation had launched at least one innovative product per year for three years. New product launches were successful in terms of increased shareholder value. Two additional categories of organisation that also could be highly innovative were added to the initial targets or prospective benchmark companies. These were (1) university and not-for-profit research organisations and (2) SMEs which have to be innovative to survive. Hart (1996) has summarised the techniques required to collect the required process data. The approach used here follows the targets set in Hart's review: interviewing people who understand and know the process well, obtaining a balance in the level of detail between the process maps obtained for each

Table 1: Benchmarking innovation process stages Benchmarking Stage Plan Do

Activities Undertaken Initial selection of target benchmark partners

. Secondary source research to identify potential targets

Collection of data from benchmark companies

. Benchmark visits to 8 organisations . Triangulation of information obtained using secondary sources

Check

Analysis of benchmark company processes with respect to their operational context and environment

Act

Development of a framework: people, process and culture for the analysis of innovation in other organisations


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organisation and, finally focussing on breadth, not depth, in the collection of data. Once the principle of benchmarking was agreed, the researcher visited the organisation. A semi-structured questionnaire was used to guide these discussions, to ensure that comparative data was collected from each organisation. The organisation of each such visit was left, in part, with the partner organisation. Some offered one-to-one meetings with key staff, whilst others met with the researcher in small groups of three to five members. One meeting was conducted by telephone because of the limited regional availability of the Marketing Director. The data collected during the benchmarking exercise comprised three distinct categories:

Quantitative, qualitative and process maps. Miles and Huberman (1984) have written a guide for the analysis of and display of qualitative data. In brief, they encourage the use of tables to display key information.

Results Eight organisations were included within this benchmarking exercise (Table 2), all of which had a base in the United Kingdom or Ireland. Five of the companies were global blue-chip corporates. The purpose of the study was to gain some understanding on innovation activity, the main inhibiting/facilitating factors, and also to assess non-specific strengths and weaknesses in innovation work. The main

Table 2. Profile of Participant Companies

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Trade description

Name

Innovation features

Supermarket retailer

Retailco

Top management involvement fmcg environment Major retailer

Pharmaceutical company

Pharmaco

Pharma company. Commercial R&D

Healthcare company with retailing and manufacturing businesses

Healthco

Retailer of healthcare goods In-group manufacturing Breakout strategic growth Globalisation of their brand Strategic planner reputation

IT company hardware

Computaco

Consumer goods Phenomenally successful Excellent internet strategy Strong marketing

Flavourists

Familyco

SME Entrepreneurial culture

Research commercialisation from a major UK University

Uniresorg

Commercialisation of University activities Strong R&D and knowledge base

Biotechnology research and associated biotechnology spin-outs

Biotechco

R&D commercialisation Links with University Strong R&D

Consumer goods company

Consumerco

fmcg company IT system designed to facilitate innovation process Central innovation groupings (product related) Local centres which modify innovations to meet local needs and tastes.

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research objective was to gain an understanding of the innovation process and the organisational design features that maximise stepchange innovation. The sample were drawn from a diverse range of industries and sectors as the researchers recognise that best practice can be shared across industry boundaries provided the context is understood. The results of the survey are discussed in the following sections. It should be noted that the exercise was to study `best-practice' companies. However, benchmarking is a continual improvement process and as such, `best-practice' is an elusive goal. As a consequence, companies were selected as they were recognised as offering good practice in certain areas aligned to innovation. Furthermore, companies were selected so that a range of both good practice, and business environments, were surveyed to enable learning from diverse practices. Table 2 summarises the main reasons why each company was selected for inclusion in this study. The use of a mixed qualitative and quantitative interview approach has enabled an understanding to be developed, of the context in which each organisation operates. For example, when asked about their definitions of innovation, most noted that innovation was customer focussed (data not shown), the exception being Biotechco who indicated that innovation was technological. Clearly, there is wide agreement that any innovation process has to have a customerfocussed approach. A member of the Retailco Board noted that Àll organisations, and parts of organisations could be described as retailers ± some just don't realise it! Every one has a customer be it internal or external'. This again reinforces the importance of an out-

ward-looking focus for innovation process. Furthermore, it demonstrates the importance of creating a culture which fosters and encourages excellent intra company communication to share knowledge. The information gleaned from each set of benchmark interviews has been summarised into a series of key features associated with the following topics: people; processes and organisational culture. In this report, the following definitions were used. People (see Table 3) essentially summarised who are the key players within the innovation process. It links into the human side of the innovation process. This includes the role of top management; and the nature of the leaders of the innovation programme on a day-to-day basis, from where ideas are sourced. Process (see Table 4) is linked to the underlying operational aspects which help the organisation develop innovations. Culture (see Table 5) indicates the types of tools that the organisations have used to embed positive behaviours such as idea sharing, entrepreneurial attitudes and a positive attitude to innovation and associated cross-functional working within the organisation. By using two-dimensional tables or matrices, the direct analysis and comparison of organisations becomes possible. Innovation is associated with flows of information across organisational boundaries as it is in effect a boundary spanning process. Table 3 attempts to summarise how the organisations encourage innovative activity through the use of human resource. Five key features were identified during the benchmarking exercise. These included top management support for, and involvement in the

Customer-focussed approach

Table 3. People Aspects of the Innovation Process Retailco

Pharmco

Top management

Yes

No

Director level

Yes

Yes

Innovation rewards

Yes

Yes

Cross functional team working

Yes

Yes

Ideas from:

Everyone Design team Traders Suppliers

R&D Creativity and Innovation group


Healthco

Computaco

Familyco

Biotechco

UniResorg

Consumero

Yes

Yes

No

N/A

N/A

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Anyone

Anyone SWORD Suppliers Customers Competitors

R&D staff Literature Conferences

Academics

Marketing R&D Local mkts Customer needs

Category managers Innovation managers

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Table 4. Culture Aspects of the Innovation Process Retailco

Pharmco

Healthco

Computaco

Familyco

Biotechco

Uniresorg

Consumerco

Clear agenda for innovation

Yes

Somewhat

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Hierarchical organisation

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Entrepreneurial culture

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Innovation rewards

Yes

Yes

Part of appraisal scheme

Yes

?

Yes

Yes

?

What types of reward?

Token reward

Bonuses Meals out Leave

?

Yes

Company grows

Options

Shares Consultant contracts

?

Functional silos

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Some

No

Yes

Yes

Table 5. Process Aspects of the Innovation Process Retailco

Pharmaco

Healthco

Computaco

Familyco

Biotechco

Uniresco

Consumerco

Internal processes emphasised

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Process for sharing ideas across functions

Yes

Yes

?

No

Yes

Yes

Yes (seminars)

Yes

Ideas database

Yes

Yes Several

?

No

No

No

No

Yes

IT/IS to facilitate process

Yes

Yes

?

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Stage gate model

Yes

Yes

Yes

Somewhat

Somewhat

Yes

Yes

Yes

Gatekeepers

Variable

Variable

Variable

Line manager

Business unit manager

Yes

Academic Admin

Board members

Dedicated resource

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Financial appraisal

NPV/IRR

Not shared

NPV/IRR

Uplift in sales

No formal analysis

Portfolio analysis

No

Portfolio analysis

process; the appointment of an Innovation champion or sponsor (who may have a different title); whether the organisation offered special rewards for innovative behaviours and ideas; and finally a positive attitude to building on creative ideas irrespective of source. The latter was supported by the wide variety of sources cited when innovation team members were questioned on the point or origin of ideas.

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As discussed above, innovation can be described in terms of a process and as such can be subjected to managerial controls. The data shown in Table 4 illustrates the types of managerial control processes which have been utilised by organisations to manage this process. Key features include the widespread use of stage-gate systems and associated gatekeepers coupled with a reliance on IT/IS systems to assist in knowledge sharing and



progress monitoring across functional boundaries. When considering innovation, it is difficult to avoid an examination of the organisational culture (Table 5). A number of representative

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quotations from each of the partner companies about their organisations' attitudes towards innovation, provide some support for issues highlighted in the previous tables (see Table 6).

Table 6. Representative Comments from Each Organisation and Its Innovation Procedures Organisation

Representative quotes

Retailco

``The involvement of top management is responsible for the success of our process'' `Òur suggestion scheme generates 1000 ideas a month'' ``Since instigating our innovation process we have increased our project pipeline and cut our budget by a factor of four'' `À two tier structure enables us to work on risky and less risky projects'' `Èveryone can be involved in innovation''

Pharmaco

``We want to be recognised for innovation and leadership in the therapeutic areas in which we compete.'' ``We have established ourselves as a group of internal consultants ± that's truly innovative for a bunch of statisticians. We can, however, utilise our statistical expertise to help other parts of the business examine their processes and we can suggest changes which may make substantial cost savings. Statistics is all about processes'' `òur discovery process is probably very similar to that of other pharma companies, but we also encourage innovation in other areas, working, process modifications and to our culture''

Healthco

`èach business has an innovation champion, but they may be at different levels'' ``category managers have innovation as part of their appraisal procedure'' ``we are hugely advantaged by having access to in-house manufacturing in terms of R&D costs and development time'' ``. . . tend to over analyse leading to both a slow response to competitors and to a protracted decision making process''

Familyco

``there is a formal process for new product development, matching a flavour etc, other innovations are processed more informally through the business units to the M.D.'' ``we have no process for innovation ± it's against our culture'' ``[we are] a metrics driven organisation'' ``we have a very flat organisational structure, and are very entrepreneurial''

Computaco

Uniresorg

``The Academic brings their idea to us we then help in the process of commercialisation'' ``The metrics used for benchmarking research vary depending on the organisation''

Biotechco

``Research scientists and group leaders must be both creative, and innovative in order to be successful in their research programmes'' ``Researchers have changed ± they are becoming more commercially aware'' ``we try to recognise everyone when arranging rewards for commercialisationnot just those named on the patent ± this is important''

Consumerco

``we use a stage gate system for innovation'' `ìnnovation is about adapting existing products to new markets'' `òur cross-cultural and functional teams are a key part of our success''


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It should be noted, that all companies visited recognised that most innovations do not pass smoothly along their process from idea to launch. Within each stage, many iterations and modifications may have to be incorporated. Retailco and Healthco in particular recognise that innovations may move forward along the process crossing certain barriers only to return to the previous stage following consumer testing. Benchmark companies were asked to rank a number of potential blocks to the innovation process within their companies. The participant companies were provided with a list of factors and asked to rank them in order of decreasing impact on the innovation process in their organisation. For example, if lack of activity co-ordination is the most important

factor blocking innovation it should be ranked as number one. The results of this ranking is given in Table 7 which indicate that overall lack of resource availability; poor activity co-ordination, and low participation in the innovation process are the most important blocks to innovation as reported by the benchmark partners. A similar approach was then taken to explore the role of external factors impinging upon the innovation process (see Table 8). As Table 8 indicates the organisations saw the first factor as the need to satisfy the changing requirements of customers. Second, the requirement to meet profit targets whilst maintaining profit margins and third advances in technology and the need to develop strong relationships with customers. Therefore, from

Table 7. Internal Blocks to Innovation Internal blocks to innovation Senior mgt commitment to the innovation process Resource availability for sustaining innovation Strong R&D base People's skills- creativity, knowledge, and skills Strong marketing department Sophisticated technical systems Strong manufacturing base Level of involvement and participation in innovation activities Effectiveness of communication systems Activity co-ordination/integration for innovation

Score

Overall Ranking

5 18 4 8 11 5 3 13 12 15

1 5 3 4 2

Table 8. Ranking of External Factors Impinging Upon the Innovation Process External factor

Advancements in the level of technological sophistication Intensity of overseas competition Developments in the levels of awareness/concern for environmental issues Customer care ± need to build strong relationships Supplier management issues ± strong supply chain Single European Market Government incentives towards innovation Need to offer competitive mix Reduction in product life cycles ± need to introduce innovations quickly Need to meet tighter profit margins Competitor activity Need to satisfy the ever-changing requirements of customers

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Score

Overall Ranking

11 0 3 11 5 4 3 4 10 12 5 21

3= 3=

5 2 1



this analysis it could be concluded that the benchmark partners reported that they were most concerned to develop strong relationships with their customers often voiced in terms of `relationship marketing' and customer service. Finally, within the benchmarking literature there is a substantial body of data relating to the use of specific performance measures when documenting innovation. As such it was of interest to collect some data relating to the performance measures reported to be applied within the organisations (Table 9). These data indicate that each organisation appears to select those measures that are most appropriate to their organisation, with the results being spread across a wide range of measures.

Discussion This paper has sketched out the findings from our recent work into benchmarking innovation amongst eight organisations. The results were presented in terms of three main tables, based on people, culture and process. These can be summarised as: The majority of organisations had director level personnel involved in the innovation process but only three had active top involvement of the management. However, the majority saw the greatest level

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of innovation being obtained through the use of cross-functional teams. All but one company felt the culture of the organisation reflected a clear agenda for innovation. Six companies stated they had a hierarchical organisation, and five stated they had an entrepreneurial company ± some stating they had both. A variety of rewards were given for innovation, such as tokens, bonuses, meals out, and special options. The process for innovation varied across all the benchmark partners. Half of them emphasising the internal processes, and the others not. However, the majority had a process for sharing ideas and used the stage gate model as a tool for monitoring the actual process. The use of IT varied amongst the companies, as did the gatekeepers for the stages of innovation. Finally just over half had a dedicated resource for the innovation, with variations in financial appraisal methods deployed. These findings, together with some of the qualitative data and the other tables presented can highlight some key issues in relation to innovation. These key issues, and questions that can be raised include:

People, culture and process

(1) It is possible to benchmark the innovation process, provided a clear understanding of the organisational context is developed?

Table 9. Performance Measures Used in Innovation Performance measure

Company

Product flow ± definition and measurement Profitability analysis Performance ± cost/ratio New products as Percentage of turnover Average development time Idea to concept time Concept development time Product development time Percentage of sales value by products launched in the last three years Speed Commercial success volume from new products Percentage of new product sales from innovations Time to market Brand share/category Fit with global strategy In-house measures Not applicable

Retailco, Pharmaco Familyco Pharmco, Familyco Retailco, Pharmaco, Healthco Retailco Retailco Retailco Retailco Healthco


Retailco Healthco, Familyco Healthco Retailco, Healthco, Computaco Retailco Consumerco Biotechco

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(2) Can entrepreneurial activities survive within a hierarchical structure? Innovation is complex and multi-dimensional in its approach, and therefore contextual issues will always have to be taken into account for any innovation Lack of resource availability is generally regarded as a major block to the innovation process A wide range of performance measures are reported as being used amongst the reporting organisations ± further analysis needs to take place into which are the strategic and valueadded metrics relevant to the success of an innovation process. Innovation aims to meet customer requirements and also profit targets. Therefore, a question arises whether these tangible goals favour incremental , relatively easily measurable, innovation over pure `blue sky' research? To draw together the selected findings in response to the research questions outlined, some initial points would be: Did the benchmark partners have a defined process for innovation? Although not all of the organisations had an explicit written process for innovation, it was apparent that all employees interviewed had, at least, a tacit understanding of the innovation process. Furthermore, this understanding could almost always be related to the stagegate system of innovation management discussed by Cooper (1990) and by Clark and Fujimoto (1991). What clues could be obtained about the context and culture of these organisations? That innovation is important for all contexts and sectors and organisations. That the product or service you provide seems to make little difference to the type of innovation process you put in place. This also goes across the people and culture aspects of the companies. In organisations such as Computaco, you would expect a director involved in innovation (due to the nature of the market) but this was not so. Also there appears to be little relation between the organisational structure, and the level of entrepreneurial activity. Furthermore, innovation activities are closely linked to the company structure, management support for and interest in innovation and the external environment (Vedin 1980) We conclude that this benchmarking exercise has provided some insights into the innovation process amongst a variety of organisations with operating bases in the

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UK. It has been argued that successful innovation is central to the development of future competitive strategies of organisations (for example, see Porter 1985). Critical success factors such as quality, delivery, flexibility and cost are integral parts which an organisation requires to operate to survive. In addition, successful innovation may become the factor that allows the company to grow. By benchmarking the practices and processes of innovation with other organisations, companies may be able not only ` to adapt' but also àdvance' in an ever-more competitive marketplace.

References Anon (1999) Innovation in industry. Survey. The Economist, February 20th. Boxwell, R.J. (1996) Benchmarking for Competitive Advantage. McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York. Calantone, R.J. di Benedetto, A. and Meloche, M.S. (1988) Strategies of product and process innovation: A loglinear analysis. R&D Management, 18, 13±21. CBI (1999) Innovation trends survey. http:// www.cbi.co.uk Clark, K.B. and Fujimoto, T. (1991) Product development performance. Strategy, organisation and management in the world Automotive Industry. Harvard Business School Press, Cambridge, MA. Codling, S. (1992) Best practice benchmarking. A management guide. Gower Publishing Ltd., Aldershot. Cooper, R.G. (1990) Stage-gate systems: a new tool for managing new products. Business Horizons, May±June, 33, 44±55. Doyle, P. (1994) Marketing management and strategy. Prentice-Hall Europe, Hemel Hempstead. Ettlie, J.E. (1980) Manpower flows and the innovation process. Management Science, 26, 1086±1095. Hammer, M. and Champy, J. (1995) Reengineering the corporation. A manifesto for business revolution. Nicholas Brearley Publishing, London. Hart, V. D. (1996) Process mapping: how to engineer your business processes. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester. Holloway, J., Hinton, M., Mayle, D. and Francis, G. (1997) Why benchmark? Understanding the processes of best-practice benchmarking. Performance Management Research Unit, Open University Business School, Working Paper Series 97/8. Josty, P.L. (1990) A tentative model of the innovation process. R&D Management, 20, 35±45. King, N. (1992) Modelling the innovation process: an empirical comparison of approaches. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 65, 89±101. Kline, S.J. (1985) Innovation is not a linear process. Research Management, 28, 36±45. Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. (1984) Qualitative data analysis: a sourcebook of new methods. Sage. London. Mintzberg, H. (1994) The rise and fall of strategic planning. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall International Editions.



Porter, M.E. (1980) Competitive strategy: techniques for analysing industries and competitors. Boston, The Free Press. Price, W.J. and Bass, L.W. (1969) `Scientific research and the innovative process'. Science, 164, 802±806. Rickards, T., (1996) `The management of innovation: recasting the role of creativity', The European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology. Special Innovation Issue, 5, 1, 13±27. Rickards, T. (1998) Àssessing organisational creativity: An innovative benchmarking approach'. International Journal of Innovation Management, 2, 367±382. Rock, A. (1987) Strategy vs tactics from a venture capitalist. Harvard Business Review, Nov±Dec, 65, 63. Slack, N., Chambers, S., Harland, C., Harrison, A. and Johnston, R. (1995) Operations Management. Pitman Publishing, London. Urban, G.L. and Hauser, J.R. (1980) Design and marketing of new products. Prentice-Hall International, Inc., London.


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Vedin, B.A. (1980) Innovation organisation. From practice to theory and back. Institute for Management of Innovation and Technology, ChartwellBratt Ltd, Bromley. Watson, G.H. (1993) Strategic Benchmarking: How to rate your Company's performance against the world's best. John Wiley & Sons Inc. New York. Weyrich, C. (1998) The meaning of innovation. Electronic News (1991), 44, 8±10. Zairi, M. (1992) Competitive benchmarking: An executive guide. TQM Practitioner Series, Technical Communications (Publishing) Ltd., Letchworth.

Zoe Radnor is a Lecturer in Operations Management at Bradford Management Centre. Judith Robinson is a member of the MBA programme at Manchester Business School and Lecturer in Medicine at the University of Manchester.

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How to Develop More Creative Strategic Plans: Results from an Empirical Study Hernan Riquelme What factors help and hinder creativity within the strategic planning process? An exploratory study examined the strategic plans of groups of graduates for their own business school. The students were assessed for rigidity of cognitive orientation, and divided into open-minded groups, and two other groups of more rigid orientation. Strategic plans were rated for originality and relevance. An open minded orientation affected the production of a strategic plan in a positive way. The productivity (quantity) of the more closed-mind type of group was enhanced in the elaboration of a strategic plan through interventions introducing creativity. The quality of production was only marginally enhanced. We conclude that creativity-enhancing techniques had a marginal direct effect on efforts to deal with illdefined problems such as a strategic plan. Additional indirect effects (by influencing rigid cognitive orientation) may be occurring.

Strategic planning imperative

Objectives of the Study

T

he research reported here was directed towards greater understanding of how creativity-enhancing techniques affect the creativity of strategic planners and the plans they produce. It also explores the relationship of cognitive style with the use of creativity techniques and the relationship between cognitive style and the strategic planning output. The study reports a semi-controlled experiment that seeks to shed light on the following propositions: (1) an open and curious mind promotes and strengthens the level of imagination and creativity in the strategic planning process, and hence its output (the strategic plan) (2) creativity-enhancing techniques will help individuals and teams in the creation of a more strategic/creative plan (3) creativity techniques will exert a positive influence on participants with identified rigidities of cognitive framing and functioning.

Research Basis for the Study Strategic planning has become an important instrument in many companies and almost an

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imperative for others. Strategic plans have been criticized because they are developed as if in a surprise-free future; are far from being innovative or revolutionary; and are usually an extrapolation of the past (Hamel 1996). The strategic planning process has become a methodical and routine procedure in almost every company. It has been argued for some time that whenever planning becomes programmable, the plans are in danger of becoming useless (Porter 1996; Simpson 1998). Strategic plans, rather than including different ways of performing activities from the rivals or similar activities in different ways, are in their most parts reflection of a `more-of-the-same' strategy or of incremental improvements. Although `business as usual' may sometimes be a viable strategy, it represents only a part of the range of options available. As environments become more hostile and competitive, more innovative strategies are likely to be required (Lord & Maher 1993). This indicates a research opportunity. What might be the conditions that support managerial behaviours leading to creative plans, and visionary strategies (Channon 1982; Nanus 1990)? In order for the strategic planning process to be more effective, people in charge of such # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000. 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

CREATIVE STRATEGIC PLANS

plans must generate more creative/radical alternatives, based on futuristic scenarios. A strategic plan is unlikely to succeed when the people who prepare and implement it do not have the ability to see opportunities that remain invisible to others. For this, efforts are required that help the planners to break away from conventions, and envision the future (Calloway 1985; Costello 1999; Dimma 1981; Hamel 1996). Given the nature of the problem as defined above, it is intuitively appealing to conclude that people with well-developed creative skills (for example, as supported by creativityenhancing training) can contribute to a great extent to the strategic planning process and its outcome. These people can help in the generation and selection of alternative products/services, the identification of new markets, the creation of images of the future, the search for alternative resources, the vision of a new era in an industry (Gilliam 1993, Wheatley et al. 1991). Creativity techniques have been reported to be applied to SWOT analysis. (Rickards 1999a) The techniques have helped users to find unexpected ways of turning weaknesses into strengths and threats into opportunities. It has also been indicated that there is scarcity of managers who can view their businesses creatively and strategically (Davidson & Reiman 1986; Hamel 1996; Michalko 1994). Thus, creativity can be considered to lie at the heart of the strategic planning process. Several procedures and creativity-enhancing techniques have been proposed and used to measure the creative output of well-structured and independent problems. In these environments, it is widely believed that people can enhance their creative outputs by the utilization of creative techniques (Amabile 1996; De Bono 1992; Gordon 1981; Isaksen 1988; Osborn 1963; Thomson 1992). In an attempt to evaluate the creative process in an open-ended design, Vergara-Cabrera (1981) conducted an experiment in which participants received treatments intended to stimulate creativity. The participants, MBA students, were asked to `design elements such that their combination represents ``What a Wharton graduate should look like in ten years.''' Some groups were instructed in idealization procedure (Ackoff 1974) and others in àugmented' idealization, that is, idealized design accompanied by other techniques, for example, brainstorming, dialectics, synectics. The research report indicated that the use of the idealized design increased creativity, and that no improvement in creativity was observed in the control groups or the ones that used augmented idealized design.


15

The study reported an ad hoc methodology to assess the creative process. Overall, the author looked at the evidence that students removed their self-imposed constraints. However, the evaluation criteria have to rely on external assessors, an approach that has been described as an inter-subjective one (Amabile 1996). There are several complications. For example, the shift in perception for an organization may be highly novel in the experience of the organization, while almost trivial to the rest of the world. To cite an example, a company may have a strategy to train leaders for the business environment. A shift to a strategy of training leaders for all environments is substantial, and perhaps even shocking to the organizational executives. This view would be supported by the research assessors who would evaluate the shift as creative. We would consider that using other criteria (e.g. `new to the world') it is hard to see evidence of the creative element in the proposed plan. An additional way to improve the creativity of strategic plans is by the selection and training of people with particular personality traits or cognitive styles such as the following: internal locus of control, extraverted, intuitive feeling, open-minded and integrative, with a greater degree of vividness of imagery (Wheatley et al. 1991). Cognitive styles and personality traits that have been reported to influence imagination and creativity in a wide variety of fields include: a non-aggressive, sensitive, openminded personality. Creative people are also reported to possess a good opinion of themselves, they are intellectually curious and interested in accuracy of communication, they feel comfortable disagreeing with others, they are determined, perseverant, intrinsically motivated, and extravert. These are people who predominantly process with the right brain. (Amabile 1998; Feist 1999; Goertzel & Goertzel 1978; Mackinnon 1978; Milne 1989; Tardiff & Sternberg 1988). It is also claimed that some cognitive styles are more creatively productive than others (Hyde 1998). Although the personality characteristics mentioned above have been related to the creative person, it is not necessarily true that all creative individuals possess all of these attributes. Creative personalities are composed of various personality traits, some of which may be present in one creative individual, but not in others (McWhinney 1993; Tardiff & Sternberg 1988). Given that the willingness to modify constraints is critical in the process of creativity, and some research studies have found correlation between open-mindedness and

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creativity, we also set out to test experimentally this, through examination of cognitive style.

Procedure Subjects in the experiment were chosen out of 60 graduate students in the MBA program. The students must develop a strategic marketing plan as a major requirement to pass the component of the course. A part of the module contains a three-hour session on precepts towards a creative way of thinking and creating strategy. During this session, subjects are informed about the criticism towards strategic plans (e.g. lack of futuristic vision, lack of original activities/ strategies, lack of challenges to the industry's conventions) and the need for more creative, innovative outcomes of the strategic planning process. The session does not introduce material on creativity-enhancing techniques. All 60 participants received the 2-1 item Gough-Sanford rigidity scale (Rokeach 1960). Scores were computed, and experimental groups were formed with high and low scores on the rigidity scale. Eight groups of six students became the subjects of the experiment that allowed for replications in each group. Experimental groups: ± One group was composed of students with self-reported non-rigidity in mind (open minded). ± Two groups were represented by students with characteristics of a rigid mind. Two groups constituted the control; one composed of a rigid mind and another with non-rigidity in mind. Therefore they were not submitted to the treatment (i.e. creativityenhancing techniques). The creativity-enhancing techniques were: brainstorming, attribute listing, and morphological analysis. The creativity techniques in use followed the observations and methodology provided in Allen (1962); Goldner (1962); Higgins (1994); Osborn (1963); Noller et al. (1976) and Rickards (1990). The subjects, after receiving information abut the markets, the company (in this case the Graduate School of Management), the industry and competition, were charged with devising a strategic marketing plan for the School. The information about each of the topics required as input for the strategic plan (market, industry, competition, etc) comprised documents of ten pages on average.

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All groups were provided with the same material. The subjects had four weeks to study the material in order to prepare the strategic plan for the Graduate School of Management, after which time they had two weeks to complete the assignment. After this the groups were given the reports back and asked to resubmit. This served the purpose of a before treatment trial. The assignment carried an important weight in the final mark. This was done to make the exercise serious, and motivating. In addition, groups were informed that the School was considering strategic changes in the programs, and that their strategic plans would be a major contribution. Kaufmann (1988) reviews the literature of creativity and problem-solving, concluding that studies of artificial problems were inappropriate for inferences of real-life problems. Thus our context is consistent with these views, and also with Amabile's model (Amabile 1996) that places high salience on intrinsic motivation in the achievement of sustained creative efforts.

Measure of Creativity in the Strategic Plans In order to compare the effect of the creativityenhancing techniques on the creativity of the groups with respect to their strategic marketing plans, an ad hoc procedure was developed. The criteria used in the evaluation were related to the criticisms raised against strategic plans, and also followed the traditional three forms to measure creativity namely: fluidity of ideas, originality, and diversity (Guilford 1967, Torrance 1965). The criteria used in judging the creativity of the marketing plans were the following: (1) The presence or absence of a vision of the future. (2) If there is a futuristic vision, then the number of different events pointing at examples of visions of the future. (3) The presence or absence of concepts, or activities in the strategic plan that were surprising. This criterion stood for efforts that were rated original, innovative, and an activity that does not follow an extrapolation of previous activities in the industry. (4) In the presence of surprising (original) activities in the strategic plan, then the number of such activities was recorded.



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(5) The presence or absence of challenges to industry's conventions. As in the previous criteria, the number of events that challenged the industry's conventions. (6) The lack of practicality of the ideas, activities in the strategic plan. The number of events that exemplify lack of practicality of the idea.

Notwithstanding this last decision rule, the projects have been scored for their individual contributions in terms of the criteria examined. A creative strategic plan was deemed to be the one with the highest overall creativity score. The overall creativity scored was arrived at counting the number of elements considered to meet the criteria as outlined. Five independent judges evaluated the strategic plans. These people did not know about the treatment provided to one of the groups, nor that the groups had been classified according to the rigidity of mind.

Overall, for a strategic marketing plan to be considered creative it had to contain elements that challenged ideas and assumptions, activities and concepts that were original, and based on a futuristic vision. Each of these criteria had an equal weight except for the last one that overrules the others. In other words, a plan can have evidence of a challenging of conventions, or an original concept, or a fantastic futuristic vision without any indication that it might be possible to implement it.

Analysis of the Data The two tables summarize the collected ratings for each of the groups, and allow us to elaborate on the following aspects:

Table 1. Score Report of Strategic Plans for Different Experimental Groups (Before Treatment) Rigid/no treatment

Rigid/treatment

Non-Rigid/no treat

Criteria

I

II

III

IV

I

II

III

IV

I

II

III

IV

Judge 1 Judge 2 Judge 3 Judge 4 Judge 5 Overall Score

0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 1 1

0 1 1 0 0

0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0

0 0 1 0 0

1 1 1 1 1

0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0

1 1 1 0 1

2 1 0 1 1

0 0 0 0 0

4

6

10

Explanation: Criterion 1: number of data evidence on futuristic vision Criterion II: number of original activities/ideas Criterion III: number of data evidence that challenged industry's conventions Criterion IV: practicality of the idea Cells contain the number of data evidence judged as meeting the criteria.

Table 2. Score Report of Strategic Plans for Different Experimental Groups (After Treatment) Rigid/no treatment

Rigid/treatment

Non-Rigid/no treat

Criteria

I

II

III

IV

I

II

III

IV

I

II

III

IV

Judge 1 Judge 2 Judge 3 Judge 4 Judge 5 Overall Score

0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 1 1

1 1 1 0 0

0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0

1 2 2 1 1

2 2 3 2 1

0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0

1 1 1 1 1

2 2 1 1 1

0 0 0 0 0


5

17

13

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Inter judge agreement In general terms there was agreement in most of the cases among the judges. The tables represent the original scores provided by the judges. There was no intention by the researchers to bring consensus among the judges, but rather to clarify why a particular criterion might not be considered as meeting an activity or idea. Of the five judges, four agreed in ranking the strategic plan with more evidence of creativity in the after treatment experiment. In the before treatment experiment three Judges agreed in their ranking of the strategic plans. The discrepancy among the various judges indicates difficulties with the concepts of originality, and challenges to the industry's conventions. Example where judges disagreed include activities in the strategic plans such as: . Ìncorporate subjects that are totally un-

.

. .

.

. .

related to the business programs like science, engineering, art, . . .' (challenge to industry's convention) `Telemarketing for promoting the School products' (considered original by some judges) (challenge to industry's convention) À free curriculum where the students asks for his her own subjects and contents' (considered original by some judges) Ìntegration of politics (how to stay alive within a company and climb the organizational ladder) as one of the main subjects' (challenge to industry's convention) À program that attracts top executives without making them work in the traditional MBA delivery' (challenge to industry's convention) Èliminates lecturers' (considered original by some judges) Ènroll celebrities and give them awards such as Honorary MBA' (challenge to industry's convention)

Criteria analysis Evidence ± as interpreted by the judges ± that supports the different criteria has been mentioned in the previous analysis. The criteria that scored the most number of evidence were originality (II) and challenges to industry's conventions (III). Caution must be exercised in interpreting the score per criterion as the sum does not mean that there are 10 ideas/activities challenging the industry's conventions. (For example, in the Rigidity/treatment cell of Table 2.) In fact, the challenges were counted as

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four, whereas the original ideas/activities were only counted as two. Only one strategic plan was deemed to be based on the future, rated by only one judge. The future was defined as three year period. It indicated the objectives achieved in this period in terms of number of students, income generated, number of alliances, market scope and prestige. The School was also conceptualized as independent from the University. There were no reports from the judges of any evidence of lack of practicality in the strategic plans.

Group analysis Control groups vs experimental group: The groups that applied the creativity-enhancing techniques generated a great number of ideas, however many of these remained undeveloped. According to the groups they were judged as impractical or unproductive in the sense of difficult to implement. Examples of such ideas were `to guarantee MBA graduates with work after a period', `study less play more', `more cultural events', `classes run not on a time basis'. When we compare the scores before/after the treatment we do not find evidence for a significant number of activities, ideas or concepts that are deemed creative in the strategic plans. It is true that there is more evidence of challenging ideas, but on the whole the increment is from a basis of one to a maximum of four challenging concepts. The sample size used in the research does not allow us to perform serious statistical analysis. High-score rigidity experimental group vs high-score rigidity control group: On a judgmental basis, the data do provide evidence supporting the difference between the groups that scored high in rigidity of mind and the control groups. After the treatment (that is after sessions of creativityenhancing techniques), the group with high score in rigidity or closeness of mind produced a large number of ideas out of which a few were considered challenging by the judges. The control group with more rigid mind orientations did not change their strategic plan a great deal. The control group with high scores in mental rigidity stuck to the traditional way of delivery except for incorporating teaching via internet. The future was considered two years, with no changes in the environment. The strategic plan concentrated on improving present weaknesses; the marketing program



activities were the same as the ones performed by the School at the moment or by other Schools in the `business education industry'. Examples are: . Directly contacting individual consumers

through catalogues.

. Direct mail. . Promotional activities through open house,

information day and seminars in large companies. . Newspaper advertising, internet advertisement, radio advertisement. . A product (e.g. MBA) with specialization and wide range of electives.

Conclusions Although previous research studies have shown that creativity-enhancing techniques do help in the generation of creative outputs or products, little has been done in relation to the application of creativity techniques to the ill-defined problems of strategic planning. The production of a truly strategic plan presents such a problem for business people. We speculated that for a strategic plan to be more effective certain cognitive styles would be more effective. This research study has explored the effect of an open (non-rigid) mind in the production of a strategic plan and its interaction with creativity-enhancing techniques. A creative strategic plan ± as judged in this research ± implies a concern with a vision of the future, generation of radical scenarios and challenging concepts. Our experiment study shows that: (1) Creativity-enhancing techniques had a marginal direct effect on efforts to deal with ill-defined problems such as a strategic plan. Training in techniques such as brainstorming, morphological analysis and attribute listing will increase the number of ideas in the development of a strategic marketing plan. Having said that, creativity is more than generation of ideas, these have to be developed into practical action plans if of any use. Many of the ideas were not explored further. (2) An open minded orientation seems to affect the production of a strategic plan in a positive way. This may, however be a justification for creativity training, in that it has been claimed to enhance the openness of a team's environment (De Cock & Rickards 1996). (3) A closed-mind type of cognitive style can be trained to become more productive in the elaboration of a strategic plan. This is particularly encouraging, as an individual


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may find that the development of creative strategies to be hindered by an inappropriate cognitive style. (4) Future research should seek to assess the relationships between different cognitive styles and creativity-training treatments as variables impacting on the development of imaginative yet practical strategic organisational plans. As in any empirical study, the work has its limitations. Would open-minded individuals be more receptive to protocols designed to enhance creativity? Would a mix of cognitive styles be preferred for such tasks over more homogeneous groups by cognitive style as indicated by Kirton (1994)? Would the effectiveness be influenced by `cocktails' of techniques deliberately designed to optimise creative outputs (as suggested by Rickards 1999b)? We recognize that such questions would provide even further research opportunities. However, we trust that our study has made some progress along the road to enhancing the effectiveness and creativity of the strategic planning process.

References Ackoff, R.L. (1978) The Art of Problem Solving. Wiley, New York. Allen, M.S. (1962) The Allen Morphologizer. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Amabile, T. (1998) How to kill creativity. Harvard Business Review, 76, 76±88. Amabile, T. (1996) Creativity in Context. Westview, New York. Calloway, D.W. (1985) The straw that stirs the drink: Leadership at PepsiCo. Planning Review, 13, 8±14. Channon, J. (1982) Visions of the future. Forscum 1990. OE Communique, 2, 14±22. Costello, B. (1999). Make Money by Thinking the Unthinkable. The Futurist, 33, 30±36. Davidson, M. and Reiman, B. (1986). Point/ counterpoint: Doers as Planners. Planning Review, 14, 4±9. De Bono, E. (1992) Serious Creativity. HarperCollins, London. De Cock, C. and Rickards, T. (1996) Thinking about organizational change; towards two kinds of process intervention. International Journal of Organizational Analysis, 4, 233±251. Dimma, W. (1981) A perspective on presidents and planning. Ivey Business Quarterly, 46, 47±56. Feist, G. (1999) The influence of personality on artistic and scientific creativity. In R. Sternberg (Ed.) Handbook of Creativity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. Freedman, D. (1987) Cultivating IS creativity. Infosystems, 34, 24±28. Gilliam, T. (1993) Managing the Power of Creativity. Bank Marketing, 25, 14±18.

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Goertzel, M.G., Goertzel, V. and Goertzel, T.G. (1978) 300 Eminent Personalities. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Goldner, B.B. (1962) The Strategy of Creative Thinking. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Gordon, W. (1981) The New Art of the Possible: The Basic Course in Synectics. Porpoise Books, Cambridge, MA. Guilford, J.P. (1967) The Nature of Human Intelligence. McGraw-Hill, NY. Hamel, G. (1996) Strategy as revolution. Harvard Business Review, Jul±Aug., 74, 69±82. Higgins, J.M. (1994) 101 Creative Problem-Solving Techniques. New Management Pub. Co., Winter Park, Florida. Hyde, T. (1998) Are Some Cognitive Styles More Creatively Productive than Others? Journal of Creative Behavior, 32, 77±91. Isaksen, S.G. (1988) Educational implications of creativity research: An updated rationale for creativity learning. In K. Gronhaug and G. Kaufmann (Eds) Innovation: A Cross-disciplinary Perspective. Norwegian Uni. Press, Oslo. Kaufmann, G. (1988) Problem-solving and reasoning. In K. Gronhaug and G. Kaufmann (eds) Innovation: A Cross-disciplinary Perspective. Norwegian Uni. Press, Oslo/Bergen. Kirton, M.J. (1994) Adaptors and Innovators: Styles of Creativity and Innovation. Routledge, London. Lord, R.G. and Maher, K.J. (1993) Leadership and information processing: linking perceptions and performance. Routledge, London. McWhinney, W. (1993) All creative people are not alike. Creativity and Innovation Management, 2, 23±31. Michalko, M. (1994) Twenty-four ways to kill creativity in business. Manager, 46, 22±25. Milne, T. (1989) Left hand, right brain, wrong career? Personnel Management, 21, 40±44. Nanus, B. (1990) Futures-Creative Leadership. The Futurist, May±Jun, 24, 13±18. Noller, R.B., Parnes, S.J. and Biondi, H.M. (1976) Creative Actionbook. Scribner's, NY. Osborn, A.F. (1963) Applied Imagination. Scribner's, NY.

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Porter, M. (1996) What is strategy? Harvard Business Review, Nov.±Dec., 61±78. Rickards, T. (1999a) Creativity and the Management of Change. Blackwell Publishers Inc., Oxford. Rickards, T. (1999b) Brainstorming. In M. Runco and S. Priktzer (eds) Encyclopedia of Creativity. Academic Press, San Diego. Rickards, T. (1990) Creativity and Problem-Solving at Work. Gower, Fardborough, England. Rickards, T. and Puccio, G. (1991) Problem-finding, idea-finding, and implementation: An exploratory model for investigating small-group problem solving. In P. Barrar and C. Cooper (Eds.) Managing Organisations in 1992: Strategic Responses. Routledge, London. Rokeach, M. (1960) The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations into the nature of beliefs systems and personality systems. Basic Books, Inc., NY. Simpson, D. (1998) Why most strategic planning is a waste of time and what you can do about it. Long Range Planning, 31, 476±480. Tardiff, T.Z. and Sternberg, R.J. (1988) What do we know about creativity? In R.J. Sternberg (Ed) The Nature of Creativity. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge. Thomson, K. (1992) A conversation with Robert Galvin. Organizational Dynamics, 20, 56±66. Torrance, P. (1965) Rewarding Creative Behavior. Prentice Hall, Englewood-Cliffs, NJ. Vergara-Cabrera, E. (1981) Creativity in strategic planning. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. University of Pennsylvania. Wheatley, W., Anthony, W., and Maddox, N. (1991) Selecting and training strategic planners with imagination and creativity. Journal of Creative Behavior, 25, 52±60.

Hernan Riquelme is a Lecturer at the Graduate School of Management, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, Australia.


`LEARNING AND PROBING'

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How Product Newness Influences `Learning and Probing' and the Linearity of its Development Process Zhongqi Jin In this paper, the relationship between product newness and non-linearity of new product development processes has been examined in the context of the UK's information and communications technology industry. The results showed that new product development and implementation are contingent on the product's newness. New product development managers should be aware of such differences in order to avoid costly iterations when they are not necessary, and accept them when they are. Such knowledge may encourage managers to consider the scope for deliberately introducing feedback/iteration processes when they lead to more effective new product development.

Summary

N

umerous new products appear in the market place each year, and the newness of these products varies. This study attacks an unresolved issue in the literature: how product newness influences `learning and probing' and the linearity of its development process. It explores whether different new product development approaches (linear vs. nonlinear) should be used to develop different types of new products (radical vs. incremental) in order to achieve better performance. The conceptual framework of this study links both organisational-oriented innovation literature and economics-oriented innovation literature. The contentious definitional problem of product newness is reviewed and three continuous dimensions of product newness are used: newness to market, newness to company, and newness to technology. The importance of the linkage between product newness and linearity of new product development processes is also reviewed by examining three essential streams of research in the literature: the universal approach, the continuos changing approach, and the experimental approach, which indicates an increased trend of product newness whereas a decreased trend of the linearity of new product development processes. The method used in this research is mainly quantitative but combined with substantial # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000. 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

components in qualitative analysis. The sample was drawn from the British Information and Communications Technology industry via a stratified random sampling procedure. Having refined the sampling frame with telephone survey work, the data were collected via a postal survey (response rate=34%). Using data relating to 170 products, a set of hypotheses was tested and explored via multiple regression techniques. Semi-structured interviews were carried out with managers in seven companies. The results of interviews together with survey findings explained the influence of multi-dimensionality of product newness on new product development, especially regarding new product development as a process of probing and learning. This study has revealed that the influence of product newness depends on what kind of product newness we are dealing with. Among the three dimensions of newness, product-newness-to-market contributes directly to the non-linearity of new product development processes. The results also indicated that the role of non-linearity of the new product development process is doubleedged. On the one hand, higher non-linearity means higher cost and higher risks in the sense that the project might not be commercially viable. On the other hand, higher non-linearity facilitates a learning procedure. Thus design iterations and modifications of the original design are inevitable.

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The implication of the research is straightforward. It suggests that a new product development process is basically a learning and probing process. This indicates that the newer the product to the market, the more possible the modification of specified market objectives. Thus, managers must be prepared to modify or change their initial market objectives while carrying out new product development. Product newness can serve as an indicator of the likelihood that initial market plans may need to be changed. It also suggests that the learning mechanism differs in new product development if different dimensions of product newness was applied. The finding is therefore important for further research as a basis for understanding how to utilise learning in new product development in order to get a better performance.

Introduction

Three views of new products

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For most organisations, new products are the lifeblood of survival and success (Booz Allen & Hamilton 1982 ; Little 1991). The recognition has prompted many studies aimed at revealing secrets of success and failure of firms in developing new products (Craig & Hart 1992; Hopkins 1981; Johne & Snelson 1988; Lilien & Yoon 1990; Montoya-Weiss & Calantone 1994;). Various best practices or `silver bullets' have proliferated in the past two decades (Calantone et al. 1995). Research in the subject is becoming multi-disciplinary, embracing marketing, organisational behaviour, human resource management, operational research, psychology, and economics. In the academic literature, there are three distinctive views on how new products can be developed successfully. The universal approach addresses the importance of organising the product development, emphasising developing the right product in the right time using the right process (Calantone et al. 1995). It tends to seek the universal truth or principles of developing winning products and avoiding failure. Indeed, this approach provides tool kits or general principles for new product development. Product managers have to select the right tools and combine them correctly according to different situations encountered (Bessant & Francis 1996; Crawford 1994). The organic and experimental approach (Burns & Stalker 1961; Lynn et al. 1996) addresses the unpredictability of the environment and the innovativeness of the product. New product development in this approach is anything but a fixed practice. New product development teams have to face the inevit-

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ability of experimenting and probing. Contrary to the universal approach, the experimental and probing nature of the process calls for repeated trials and errors before a winning product is achieved. The third approach is one that recognises continuous change. It addresses the semistructured nature of new product development in rapid relentless, high velocity settings (Brown & Eisendhardt 1997). The unpredictable change of the environment stimulates unanticipated probing procedures. Although fundamentally differing, these three approaches share two basic characteristics. The first is acceptance of a non-linearity of new product development processes. This refers to the extent to which changes and iterations happen during these processes (Jin et al. 1997). The universal approach, for example, stresses the utilisation of perfect new product development processes or best practices that tend to reduce design iterations and possible errors. That is, it favours to some extent a linear process whenever possible. Whereas admitting that trials and errors are inevitable, the experimental approach claims a deliberate non-linear process. In asserting that changes are continuous but not completely unpredictable, the continuous changes approach lies between these two extremes. The second concept that distinguishes these three different approaches is the perceived nature of new product development, or product newness (Ali 1994). The experimental approach, for example tends to aim for `really new', pioneering, or so-called radical products. The universal approach was criticised as being concentrated more or less on incremental products. In contrast, the continuous approach is appropriate while the product is neither radically new nor is it merely incremental. Indeed, although new products are developed each year, newness of the products differs. A difficulty arises when one tries to differentiate really new products from others (Kleinschmidt & Cooper 1991). Given the evidence of the existing literature (Kleinschmidt & Cooper 1991; Lynn et al; 1996; Nord & Tucker 1987; Zaltman et al. 1973), there is a necessity to explore the relationships between product newness and characteristics of new product development processes. This study investigates whether non-linearity of new product development processes depends on product newness. In other words, should different approaches (linear vs. nonlinear) be used to develop different types of new products (radical vs. incremental) to achieve better performance? Furthermore, as non-linearity of new product development



processes links directly to trial and error types of learning behaviour, the above question can be expressed as ìn what ways do learning mechanisms in new product development differ?'

Literature Review and Conceptual Framework The innovation literature has two traditionally separated approaches: the economic and the organisation oriented traditions (Adler 1989; Ali et al. 1995, Rickards 1999). The former emphasises the association of innovations with macro economic factors, the uncontrollable, external variables to firms. It provides a broad picture of innovations mainly from the industry and/or organisational level (Dosi 1988). The latter addresses how individual products are created, emphasising the controllable, internal variables (Cooper 1986; Wind et al. 1988). It focuses on the organisational level of innovations and the development of individual products addressing more on the tactical issues. The conceptual framework in this study accommodates both approaches, although its focus, the empirical work, belongs largely to the latter. The conceptual framework consists of four elements: the environment, the nature of new

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product development or product newness, the characteristics of new product development processes, and new product development performance. As is shown in Figure 1, on the one hand, the environment new product development is engaged in, (the uncontrollable external factors), influences the nature of product development. On the other hand, it has impact on the characteristics of new product development processes. This leads to the argument that in order to cope with the demand of the changing environment there exists a match between the nature of new product development and the characteristics of new product development processes. A proper combination of the two would lead to improved performance outcomes. The influence of context on new product development is twofold. On the one hand, it influences the selection of new products by the organisation (Adler 1989). Evidence in the literature shows that firms select different types of products (Pioneering or modifications) in relation to the market, the competitor, the industry practices, and size of firms (Ali 1994). For example, the development and introduction of pioneering products are suggested more likely to increase with firm size to a point. Furthermore, industries with rapid technological change shorten the product life cycle and stimulate the development of a stream of pioneering products (Birou et al.

The influence of context

Figure 1. The Conceptual Framework # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000

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1998). On the other hand, it influences the way the new product is developed (Adler 1989; Miller & Blais 1993). Different industries have different new product development practices. Competition and market characteristics have a strong impact on how the product will be developed. For example, when time to market is important, a crash programme instead of a step by step process should be used (Krubasik 1988). Miller and Blais (1993) found that there are stable patterns of new product development which organisations adapt to and transform their environment to gain competitive advantage. For example, the science based product innovation mode is often found in the pharmaceutical industry. Firms tend to get technology leadership mainly through internal R&D. The organisation structure is flexible and the firm tended to be of moderate size. The entrepreneurial fast-track experimentation mode is often seen in the computer industry. It is characterised by a high degree of experimentation to develop a continuous flow of improved products. The influence of environmental factors on the internal development of new products is further summarised in Shrisvastva & Souder (1987) in a contingency model, in which three distinct processes: (stage dominant, process dominant, and task dominant processes) were related to different settings of environment uncertainty, intensity of competition. Contrary to the traditional approach of finding commonalties in 'best practices', Jin et al. (1997) identified six distinct approaches from best practices of 30 well-known companies across a broad variety of industries. These research findings suggest the necessity of exploring the potential relationship between product newness and characteristics of new product development processes. For example, Souder et al. (1998) examined the moderating role of technical and market uncertainties on R&D/marketing integration. Olson et al. (1995) examined the moderating role of product newness on new product performance. The nature of new product development or the strategy of developing a new product (Ali 1994) remains the core concern of new product development literature (Droge & Calantone 1996). At the heart of the classification of new products is the definition of newness. Baker (1979) asked `What constitutes a new product? There can be no hardand-fast answer, for newness is essentially a subjective concept that depends upon one's state of knowledge or, in the case of a firm, its current range of activity.' A key contribution to this field was reported in Booz Allen & Hamilton (1982).

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Derived from Ansoff's (1957) original product/ market matrix, a landmark definition of new products was offered in which product newness was related to the company or to the market dimension. On the basis of this definition, six different classes of new products can be identified which are shown in a two dimensional map (see left side of Figure 2). The six categories are: . New to the world products (first of their

kind, creating an entire market)

. New product lines (established products

that are new to the company)

. Additions to existing product lines (estab-

lished products new to the firm that fit into the firm's existing product lines) . Improvements and revisions to existing products . Repositioning . New applications for existing products (i.e. existing products retargeted to a new market segment) This definition of newness and classification has been widely accepted and repeatedly used in product development research (Cooper 1988). To explore it further, the classification of new products may be traced back to Robertson (1967), and Johnson and Jones (1957). Considering the disrupting influence the introduction of the product had on established consumption patterns, Robertson proposed a continuum that contains three categories: . Continuous innovations ± least disrupting

influence on established consumption patterns. Alteration of a product is involved, rather than the establishment of a new product (e.g. annual automobile changes, fashion style changes). . Dynamically continuous innovations ± some influence on consumption patterns but not enough to alter the established patterns (e.g. electric carving knife). . Discontinuous innovations ± require new consumption patterns and the creation of previously unknown products (e.g. television, computers). This classification was based on the point of view that innovation was a process to meet consumer needs. Robertson (1967) reckoned that much innovation was `programmed' whether it was for industrial goods or consumer goods. This classification is similar to one found in Kleinschmidt and Cooper's study (1991). The distinctive perspective of the classification was that it linked innovation classification with established patterns, (which was not reflected explicitly in Booz Allen and Hamilton's categorisation).



Apart from Robertson's classification, Johnson and Jones's (1957) category may be the first in this field, and it is still relevant today (Hisrich & Peters 1984; Veryzer 1998). In this work, newness has two dimensions: new to the market (which was reflected in Booz Allen & Hamilton 1982 ) and new to the technology. With these two dimensions, eight variations were identified. A comparison between these classifications is shown in Figure 2. Despite different vocabulary, the similarities are evident. Booz Allen and Hamilton's (1982) definition placed emphasis on the market and the company, whilst Johnson's definition stressed the market and the technology. Even though there is a shared emphasis on the market, they approached the market concept differently. For example, they failed to distinguish between the target market and the rest of the market. A product, for example, which is new to the company and to the target market, is not necessarily new to the world. And this product lies in no categories of success in Booz Allen and Hamilton's view of new products. This may be called incompleteness of classification. Another difficulty arising from Booz Allen and Hamilton's definition is that the degree of newness in a category may vary greatly. Some are really new products, for example, while others may be just `small modifications'. The difference of newness may be so great within a new product line, that a re-classification is required (Kleinschmidt & Cooper 1991). Johnson's definition ignores the existence of the individual company which may cause

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difficulties in the context of new product development as it has already been noticed that the process is closely related to a firm's current range of activity (Baker 1979). A possible alternative to the definition of newness is a combination of Booz Allen and Hamilton's definition, and Johnson and Jones' definition. In other words, newness in the technology dimension could be added to the former's newness definition of new products. This is particularly important because the technology content is a very important dimension in information and communication technology products. A pentium chip, for example, might not be new to the market or the company, but it is new in technology. The categorisation of three dimensions of product newness is also supported in the new product learning model of Maidique and Zirger (1988). In summary, although product newness is a subjective concept, a number of common points emerge in the literature. First, product newness is a multi-dimensional concept. It can be measured along at least in three dimensions: newness to market, newness to technology, and newness to company. Secondly, although there are various classifications of new products according to newness available, none of them include all of the three dimensions. And finally, categorical classification of new products according to newness may cause problems in that the degree of newness varies even in the same group. The linearity of new product development processes refers to the extent to which the

Figure 2. Categories of New Products: A Comparison (Booz Allen & Hamilton 1982 with Johnson & Jones 1957) # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000

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process can be classified as linear, that is, a process with few activities reiterated and almost no feedback. On the other hand, nonlinearity of a new product development process refers to the other extreme of the new product development process (Jin et al. 1997). The importance of the concept has attracted attention recently from various authors (Hart and Baker 1994; Lynn et al. 1996). Lynn et al. (1996) looked at the new product development process via analysing a diverse set of successful cases. They uncovered a process of probing and learning or so called learning derived strategy. Firms developed their products through successive approximations, which was an iteration and feedback procedure beyond project phase development, that is, a family of products instead of one product were developed. The development of previous products, which may not be a success at all, provided experience and opportunity for the development of later products. It was in this sense the procedure iterated. The importance of this concept was also stated in Hart and Baker (1994) as one of the main reasons to build a revised new product development model ± the multi-convergent new product development model. In this sense, a non-linear new product development process is a necessity, for gaining a winning product/market combination. As already indicated, there are three different approaches to effective new product development. First, the universal approach (Brown & Eisenhardt 1995) addresses the rational nature of new product development. Doing everything right can certainly enhance the chance of success but no guarantee of winning. Doing one thing wrong may jeopardise the whole project (Cooper 1986). This leads to the seeking of the high-quality new product development processes (Cooper & Kleinschmidt 1995) or so-called perfect new product development processes (Jin et al. 1997). Although a wide variety of models have been proposed and used to some extent, the universal approach followed basically a linear approach. Examples of such models range from the phased review technique to stage-gate systems. However, the universal new product development approach may have negative impact on innovativeness of the product, which in turn would lower the competitive advantage of the organisation in the long run. Therefore the searching of effective new product development approaches falls in a vicious cycle, which was criticised as concentrating mainly on the development of incremental products (Lynn et al. 1996).

Learning

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The organic, experimental approach recognises that the development of radical products is unpredictable, turbulent, and accidental (Burns & Stalker 1961; Zaltman et al. 1973). Learning and probing is the main theme of this approach. As suggested by Lynn et al. (1996) A careful reading of recent industrial history leads to the conclusion that in a competitive, technology-intensive global markets, advantage is built and renewed through the more discontinuous form of innovation-through the creation of entirely new families of products and businesses. Continuous, incremental product line extensions and improvements are essential for maintaining leadership, but only after it has first been established through the more discontinuous form of innovation. (p. 10) They suggested that new product development is, under the context of discontinuous innovations, in its first instance, a learning and probing process. Reckoning that new product development is a learning and probing process means that the aim of knowledge seeking in new product development should be maximising learning instead of looking for the `perfect' new product development process. Errors and redesigns can be tolerant whereas the ultimate aim is to have a successful product or in more general, a successful business in the long run. This learning and probing process is so different that even the term used to describe it should be different (Lynn et al. 1996). Furthermore, Tidd (1997) argued that this learning and probing process is very complicated that should not be regarded as simply as an imitation of human learning. Indeed, Maidique and Zirger (1988) found an evolution pattern of new product success. By believing that repeating past `best' practices would reproduce past successes, many firms have turned success into failure. This approach or paradigm changed the traditional view that iteration is time-consuming and cost increasing, recognizing that iterations are not only inevitable but helpful to facilitate synergy between product characteristics and market conditions. The continuous change approach (Brown & Eisenhardt 1997) addresses the semi-structured nature of new product development in relentless, higher velocity settings. The structure of firms in this approach is neither mechanist nor organic. New product development is neither rigidly planned nor chaotically reacted. It is challenging of staying poised on an edge between existing structure. This was echoed in Kleinschmidt and Cooper (1991). They revealed that innovativeness of



new products had a U-shaped relationship with performance. They contended that moderately innovative products have in general a lower success rate than the other two extremes. Therefore they suggested the necessity of different treatments in the context of faster product life cycle or to be accurate the product replacement cycles and high market uncertainty. To sum up, universal, continuous change, and experimental probing shows decreasing linearity of new product development processes, but an increasing trend of product newness. The relationship between product newness and non-linearity is also supported by Zaltman and co-workers: It can be hypothesized that the more solution radical the innovation, the more likely problems will emerge in the process of implementation. Accordingly, the more solution radical the innovation, the more important it is to create feedback mechanisms that can identify and deal effectively with these emerging problems (Zaltman et al. 1973: 78). They inferred that the more radical an innovation, the more learning and unlearning take place, and therefore the more modification must be made in existing structures and processes. Thus, more radical innovations may need more feedback and iterations during the New product development processes. More iterations are needed for newer products because major innovations are generally unpredictable and accidental in nature, whereas incremental innovations can be programmed or planned for in some way (Myres & Marquis 1969). These arguments suggested that: H1: product newness is negatively related to the linearity of the new product development process, that is, the newer the product the less linear the new product development process or converse. The lower the product newness, (the more incremental the product) the more rational or predictable the development of the new product (Lynn et al. 1996). Wherever predictable paths exist, it is important to know whether the product is right for the market. Pre-development work may reduce unnecessary iterations and unpredicted design changes, and therefore reduce the cost of development and increase the success rate of the product (Cooper 1986). When product newness is high, it is less certain that the products can be right first time. They may need to be tried out in the market (Lynn et al.


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1996). Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995) suggested that when predicable paths do not exist, increasing the number of design iterations improves the odds of success, and thus accelerates the process. Thus one would expect H2: The higher the interaction between non-linearity in new product development processes and product newness, the better the performance of the product will be. In other words, the positive effect of the non-linearity of new product development processes on the performance of the product will be stronger if at the same time newness of the product is higher. While on the other hand, more design iterations mean more delay and increased cost of new product development. When the opportunity cost of new product development is high, unpredictable delay is especially harmful to the performance of new products (Krubasik 1988). Time to market is identified as one of the most important factors in successful New product development (Abler et al. 1991; Cooper 1986). The delayed launch means loss of market and potential profitability. More directly, increased cost of new product development certainly adds no competitive advantage to the product. The worst case was that not enough pre-development activities were done before the development. Then in the final stage it was realised that something was wrong in the design, and a late re-design had to be undertaken which inevitably increased the development cost. So in this case, sufficient pre-development studies would reduce the necessity of design iterations and which in turn would increase the odds of success. In formal terms, H3: Other things being equal, reducing the number of design iterations or increasing the linearity of new product development processes yields a better performance.

Method The study adopted a survey and post survey interview approach which combined the qualitative and quantitative analysis (Bryman 1992). The purpose of the survey was to examine and to explore further the three hypotheses proposed. Due to the multidimensionality of product newness, the study has an explorative nature. Semi-structured interviews were conducted to corroborate research findings obtained from the survey.

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The hypotheses were examined against a sample of the information and communications technology products developed in the UK. We narrowed our interests to one country and one industry due to following considerations. First, a lot of research suggests that new product development processes are influenced by environmental factors such as industrial characteristics (Ali 1994; Miller & Blais 1993). Different patterns of new product development across industries have been identified. New product development managers in a high tech sector like ICT will not be convinced, for example, by research evidence derived from food industry. Limiting the range of research within one industry is certainly helpful to reduce the influence of these environmental factors. Therefore a number of authors called for research of innovation within one industry (Barczak 1994; Cooper & Kleischmidt 1993b). Secondly, information and communications technology industry is fast growing and technologically intensive. The fast growing and technologically-intensive nature of the industry means more innovations, so that the degree of `newness' of the product varies, which is essential for the purpose of this research. UK's ICT sector has been European's market driver in recent years (Eurobit 1996), which provided a good basis for research into new product development. Thirdly, a number of research showed that national culture would have significant impact on R&D and new product development (Kedia et al. 1992; Souder et al, 1997). To minimise the influence of national culture, the study has limited itself to one country and possible confounding factors due to the exists of multi-nationals were controlled. Furthermore, even if the context of this study is limited to the information and communications industry, types of products vary sharply, ranging from hardware, software, to network products that combines hardware and software together. These differences within the ICT industry sectors were also considered in this research. Hence it is easy to extend the design of this research to the case of cross industries. The ICT industry in the UK. In similar fashion to that found in previous studies (Barczak 1994; McDougall & Robinson 1990;), the ICT sector here refers to companies classified by the US-SIC codes (SIC 3571, SIC 3572, SIC 3575, SIC 3577, SIC 3578, SIC 3579, SIC 3661, SIC 3663, SIC 3669, SIC 3613, SIC 3552, SIC 3555). Instead of concentrating on large firms, as found in Barczak's study (1994) on the US telecommunications industry, in which she

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limited the company size to sales turnover larger than $25 million, it was decided to include smaller companies in this study as well. The SME sector is an important force of new product development in the industry. A limit was set to companies with sales turnover larger than £1million. A comprehensive retrieval of the on-line CD-ROM database FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) yielded 4542 companies. Information such as company addresses, latest annual sales turn over, trade description, telephone number of each company were downloaded from the CD-ROM. By examining the trade description of these companies provided by FAME and by eliminating redundancies (for example, one company may have different names) reduces the number of potentially qualified companies to 1853. A preliminary analysis found that the first 170 large companies (annual sales turnover greater than £50 millions) counted for 80% of the sales turnover of the industry. The 440 medium sized companies (annual sales turnover between £10 to 50 millions) counted for 10% of the total sales turnover. The remaining 10% belongs to the 1243 small companies (annual turnover less than £10 million pounds). Three sectors. Intuitively, the ICT sector can be divided into two sub-sectors: computer industry and telecommunications industry. However, with the integration of computer technology and telecommunication technology, more and more firms manufacture products which belong to both industries. Yet there are still distinctions between these two industries. In reflecting the common points as well as distinctions of both sectors, companies in ICT sector were classified into three sub-sectors: . Sector A: computer and office equipment

sector but not the communications equipment, US SIC Code 3555 3571 3575 3578 3579 3652. . Sector B: the communications equipment but not computer and office equipment, US SIC code 3661 3663 3669 3613. . Sector C: doing both the communications equipment and computer and office equipment. Table 1 shows the population distribution according to firm size and sector classification. The figures at the last column of show the number of firms in each category according to the firm size and the percentage of firms in that category occupied in the whole population. For example the number in the first cell in the last column indicate that the number of



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Table 1. Population Distribution Number of companies in the sampling frame Large firms (Sales turnover greater than £50 m)

Sector A

85 (50%)

Sector B

Sector C

Total

42 (24.71%)

43 (25.29%)

170 (9.17%)

Medium firms (£10 to 50 m)

232 (52.73%)

87 (19.77%)

121 (27.5%)

440 (23.75%)

Small firms (5=£10m)

650 (52.29%)

263 (21.16%)

330 (26.55%)

1243 (67.08%)

Total

967 (52.19%)

392 (21.15%)

494 (26.66%)

1853

large firms is 170 which accounts for 9.17% of the total population of 1853. Similarly, the last row of the shows the total number of firms according to industrial sectors and the percentage it accounts in the total population. Companies. The population of this research is UK-based ICT companies with sales turnover greater than £1 million which have made at least one new product available for sale from 1992 to 1997. Because in this industry the first 170 companies counted for 80% of the total sales turn-over, it might be right to grasp the `vital few', given such a concentration rate. Another factor, which should be taken into consideration, is that the new product development process for the computer industry and for the communications industry might be different. This also leads to favour the choice of stratified sampling. Of the stratified sampling, there were three methods to choose, that is, the uniform sampling method,

the proportionate method and the optimum allocation method. According to Cochran (1977) and the formula provided by Kish (1965, 4.6b), optimum allocation was chosen due to larger gains of precision than the other two methods. The sampling distribution by optimum allocation method was shown in Table 2, given a sample size of 768 (Calculation of sample size follows Cochran (1977), the procedure is omitted here due to space limitation). Telephone survey work was carried out to find out whether firms in the sample were really qualified for the survey, and to look for the person who had a general familiarity with new product development activities in the firm. Understandably, people who have in-depth knowledge and experience of new product development activities would not be a majority in the firm and they are usually highly occupied. 501 companies were identified as suitable for this research and personalised

Table 2. Sampling Distribution: The Optimum Allocation Method (n=768) Estimation of sample size Large firms (Sales turnover greater than £50 m)

Sector A

85

Sector B

Sector C

Total

42

43

170 (22.13%)

Medium firms (£10 to 50 m)

183 (52.73%)

69 (19.77%)

96 (27.5%)

348 (45.31%)

Small firms (5=£10m)

131 (52.29%)

53 (21.16%)

66 (26.55%)

250 (32.55%)

Total

399 (51.95%)

164 (21.36%)

205 (26.69%)


768

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addresses were obtained. The over-all response rate of the telephone survey work was 65.22% and there is no specific stratum with response rate lower than 50%. Respondents. Mail survey was used in the data collection, which followed a modified TDM survey procedure from Dillman (1978). In the first instance, 501 questionnaires together with a personalised cover letter and an unstamped envelope with address label were sent out via second class mail. A database was built to monitor the response and non-response. the first follow-up started two weeks later. Formal, personalised follow up letters were sent to those non-response via first class mail. A month later after the survey started, the remaining non-response were contacted via telephone. Corresponding follow up letters were mailed according to the response stimulated by the telephone support. Of the 501 companies to which questionnaires were sent and contacted, 257 replies were received, which means either they sent the completed questionnaire back or gave a definite reason why they could not complete the questionnaire. The response rate therefore is 51%. Among them 170 questionnaires were identified as valid for further data analysis. This yielded a response rate of 34%. The statistics for the position of the respondents is exhibited in Table 3. It is easy to see that of the respondents' background, both marketing and R&D/technical occupied significant proportions. It can be seen from the bottom of Table 3 that 22% of the respondents are marketing and sales managers/marketing directors, whilst technical managers (10%), engineering managers (11%) and R&D managers (2%) accounted for 23% of the final sample. Therefore there was a significant proportion of respondents in the sample which represented either marketing or R&D. The respondents were asked in the questionnaire to describe briefly their role in the project. Most of the respondents in the survey reported that they had been the head of the project or major designers. That is, the respondents were either the top person or the other person as it was specified in Langrish et al. (1972). Some of them claimed that they played the role of the `product champion' in the development process of the new product they nominated. This verified that the strategy used in telephone survey work in finding the best person in the organization for new product development was successful. It was believed that finding the right persons for the questionnaire would certainly improve the validity of the data collected. In a word, the quality of respon-

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dents is a fundamental guarantee in assessing the validity of the survey. This survey depended upon a pool of highly qualified new product development professionals to fill out the questionnaire. Response and non-response. To determine possible non-response bias, four kinds of analysis were carried out. First, a test of mean difference between final response and nonresponse group was done. An independent sample t-test was carried out for the response group (n=170) versus the non-response group (n=501-170=331). Levene's test did not reject the equal variance assumption (F=1.065, P=0.303). No significant mean difference was found between the final response group and the non-response group for sales turnover, on which the stratified sampling was based. A comparison was also made between the first wave response (response received before the first follow up letters were sent out) and the second wave response (response received afterwards). No significant differences were found between the two samples. Therefore it was reasonable to assume that the sample obtained was a proper representative of the whole population (Armstrong and Overton 1977). The response (n=170) was also compared to the original sampling frame (N=1853). It was found that the principal assumptions of optimum allocation method were held. Finally a detailed analysis of reasons of non-response was carried out. It is concluded that the final sample can be regarded as representative. Post survey interviews were carried out in four steps, on an evolutionary basis. First, respondents were contacted to see if they were willing to be interviewed. 501 respondents were contacted and 68 of them agreed to be interviewed. This was done along with the postal survey. Secondly, a brief report of the initial research findings was sent to the respondents interested. Thirdly, a telephone contact was made to set up the interview date and time. Fourthly, a semi-structured interview was conducted. The interview process was evolutionary in the sense that the procedure was repeated several times. Each time two respondents were contacted. The interview questions changed each time on the basis of previous interviews. Because there was a relatively large pool of respondents who agreed to be interviewed, it was therefore possible to choose those cases which were with or against the theme which emerged in data analyses of the postal survey. In total, managers from seven companies were interviewed. The length of interviews lasted from one hour to two and a half hours.



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Table 3. Respondent Sample Details (n=170) Characteristics

% of respondents

Industry sector A. Computer and office equipment sector but not the communications equipment B. The communications equipment sector but not the computer and office equipment C. Doing both communications equipment and computer and office equipment

44% 25% 31%

Size of the company A. Large firms (Last year sales turnover greater than £50m.) B. Medium sized firms (Last year sales turnover between £10m to £50m) C. Small firms (Last year sales turnover between £1m to £10m)

17% 53% 30%

Type of company A. Wholly UK owned B. International with UK headquarter C. UK subsidary of a multi-national D. Others

46% 16% 35% 3%

Type of products nominated A. Communications equipment B. Computer products C. Electronics D. Others

24% 23% 28% 25%

Product newness A. New to the world product: a product new to both the organization and the world. B. New product line: a product new to the organization which allows the organization to enter markets in which it has no previous experience C. Product line extension: a product that is new to the organization but ``fits'' with the existing product lines D. Improved product: a development of an existing product Respondents position in the company A. Marketing & Sales Manager/Director B. NPD Director/Manager C. Product Manager/Production Director/Specialist D. Product Engineer/Designer/Design Engineer E. Engineering Manager F. Technical Manager/Director G. Manager Director/General Manager/Business Manager H. R&D Manager I. Others

The interview process was semi-structured in the sense that all the questions asked during the interview process were open ended. All of these questions were asked around two themes. One of the two themes was to compare the new product development pro-


11% 23% 42% 24% 22% 15% 13% 13% 11% 10% 8% 2% 6%

cess of a particular product the respondent had developed to the results of the data analysis. The other theme was to explore the respondent's perceptions of the research findings and potential managerial implications of this research.

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Variables and Measurements The theoretical framework of the study necessitates the measurement of four blocks of variables: product newness variables, the linearity of new product development process variable, context variables, and the performance variable. The measurement building procedure outlined by Churchill (1979) was carefully followed. In the first instance, literature was searched to identify scales and items that might be used for this research. It was found that measurements for most constructs required in this study existed in the literature. Only the measurement for the linearity of New product development processes required to be developed. For the precision and parsimony of the questions and integrity of the questionnaire, the scales used for multi-item constructs were limited to the 5 point Likert scale and the 7 point semantic differential, although it has been suggested that a positive relationship exists between the number of scales points over the normal range and the reliability of the measure (Churchill & Peter 1984). The performance variable. Measuring the success and failure of new products has been a contentious topic (Griffin & Page 1993). At the heart of the problem is the multi-dimensional nature of product development performances (Cooper & Kleinschmidt 1995; Hart 1993). More than 75 distinctive measures of success have been used by firms and academics with little or no consensus across either group (Griffin & Page 1993). Along with Barczak (1995), for the purpose of this study, we measure success and failure of new products in the sense of financial performance using items suggested by Griffin & Page (1996). The coefficient alpha was 0.83. Product newness was measured by a five category scheme (based on Booz, Allen, & Hamilton's model); and 5 point Likert scales that capture three aspects of product newness: newness to market, newness to company, and newness to technology. New to market, and new to company measures were developed on the basis of Kleinschmidt and Cooper (1991) and Olson et al. (1995). The new to technology measure was developed on the basis of the conceptual model in Afuah and Baham (1995). Qualitative evidence regarding the most distinctive feature that makes the product new was obtained. Linearity of new product development processes. The measures for the linearity of new product development processes were developed during this research. It mainly measures five

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kinds of design iterations: 1) the design iteration from idea to concept 2) the design iteration from concept to prototype 3) the redesign after prototype stage 4) redesign after product in trial 5) the overall design changes during the whole New product development processes. The linearity of new product development processes was measured by 5 seven point semantic differential items. The coefficient alpha for linearity scale was 0.68. A confirmatory factor analysis produced only one factor. Other variables. Apart from above constructs which were the primary concern in this research, several open ended questions were designed to understand the ènvironmental' part of the new product development process. All of the environmental variables included were single item and qualitative orientated. These variables were: . Types of products: the respondent was

asked to describe what the product was and what distinct features made this product `new' than the existing products. . Strategic considerations of the firm in new product development: the respondent was asked to enumerate three factors which he/she thought critical for his/her firm in developing a new product. . Types of organisations: the respondent was asked to identify what kind organisation he/she worked for. . Location of new product development: the respondent was asked to state in which country the new product development process happened. A summary of the reliability analysis of scales is shown in Table 4. Measurement items for individual scales are listed in Appendix I. As it is shown in Table 4, most of the constructs were measured by at least three items except the construct new to technology. The coefficient alphas of constructs are all greater than 0.60, which are sufficient for the purpose of this study (Nunnally 1967). It should be pointed out that the performance scale has five missing values. Because of the small percentage of missing values, the alternative of dropping subjects as indicated in Cohen and Cohen (1983) was used when the reliability analysis was conducted.

The Data Analysis and Results of the Postal Survey The data analysis was carried out following multi-regression procedure detailed in Cohen and Cohen (1983). In case multi-colinearity



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Table 4. Reliability Analysis of Scales Scales

New to company New to market New to technology Linearity Financial performance

Items

Alpha

Factors

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Standard Deviation

3 4 2 5 3

0.69 0.69 0.82 0.68 0.83

1 1 1 1 1

1.00 1.00 1.00 1.20 1.00

5.00 5.00 5.00 7.00 5.00

3.45 2.38 3.30 4.27 3.43

0.95 0.86 0.93 1.19 0.80

problem occurs, the adjusted procedure recommended by Aiken and West (1991) was used. The testing of the three hypotheses was shown in Figure 3. An advantage of using regression techniques is that they can be used in investigating both the nature and strength of relationships between two or more variables (Meidan & Moutinho 1994). Given that the hypotheses did not specify to the level of different aspects of product newness and that the relationships to be tested are largely nonlinear from previous studies (Kleinschmidt & Cooper 1991, for example), the data analysis has an exploratory nature. Regression would

therefore serve the purpose of analysing the relationships between product newness and New product development processes both in terms of testing the hypotheses proposed and in exploring further the potential relationships. Indeed, the data analysis can be divided into two parts. The first part tested the hypotheses via linear or non-linear regressions and the second part explored potential non-linear relationship between variables, especially when multi-dimensionality of product newness was considered. Hypothesis H1 was tested using simple regression model with one of the product

Figure 3. Three Aspects in Data Analysis. # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000

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newness variables (newness to company, newness to market, and newness to technology) as the independent variable and the linearity of new product development processes as the dependent variable. For newness to market, the regression equation used was as follows: (1)

Linearity=a+b*mnew+e1

Where Linearity: linearity of New product development processes mnew: product newness to market The estimated equation was: Linearity=74.8911947.247103mnew+e1 t=

(2)

(72.376)

r=70.17886 N=170 F=5.552 p=0.019650.05 The relationship between newness to market of the product and the linearity of new product development processes was found to be statistically significant (p50.05). That is, the higher the newness to market of the product, the lower the linearity of new product development processes. The result showed that new to the market new product development process had design iterations and modifications with associated learning and probing. Similarly, the relationships between the linearity of new product development processes and the other two kinds of product newness were estimated. No significant relationships between the other two newness variables and the linearity of new product development processes were found. The correlation coefficient between product newness to company and linearity of New product development processes was 70.06. The correlation coefficient between product newness to technology and linearity of new product development processes was 7.09. Although a negative trend was shown, the relationships were not statistically significant. H2 was tested only for the interaction of product newness to market and the linearity of new product development processes. That is, H2 is rewritten as: the higher the interaction between non-linearity of new product development processes and product newness to market, the better the performance of the product. This is because there was no evidence to support the existence of the relationship between the linearity of new product development processes and the other two kinds of product newness variables. In this complex and unnecessary analyses have been avoided.

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Because the negative relationship between linearity of new product development processes and product newness to market, the interaction item used was nonlinearity by mnew (product newness to market), where non-linearity is the complementary of the linearity index. Previous studies show that the relationship between product newness and new product development performance is non-linear (Kleinschmidt & Cooper 1991). Two non-linear models were tried in finding a better fit between the interaction item: nonlinearity*mnew and financial performance of the product. These two nonlinear models were the inverse model and the S-model. The S model yielded a better fit than the inverse model. The results showed that that about 10% (R2=0.10) of variances of the financial performance can be interpreted by a S-curve of the interaction item between the non-linearity of new product development processes and the market newness of the product. This result confirmed hypothesis H2 that the higher the interaction, the better the performance. It suggested, however, that there was a limit beyond which the increasing of interaction would not improve the financial performance of the product. The result of the regression for financial performance is shown in Appendix II. The process of testing hypothesis H2 used above was also useful in carrying out in testing hypothesis H3. Recall that H3 was stated as: other thing being equal, reducing the number of design iterations yields better performance. Considering the interaction effect between product newness to market and linearity of new product development processes on financial performance may have a non-linear relationship, the following equation was formed FPERFORM=b0+b1*LINEARIA+b2* MNEW+b3*LINMNEWI

(3)

Where LINEARIA: Non-linearity, defined as 8-LINEARITY MNEW: Newness to market of the product LINMNEWI=1/ (NONLINEARITY*MNEW) The estimation results for equation (3) are shown in Table 5. From Table 5, following formula was obtained: F=5.2677.25M7.17L73.9/ML

(4)

Where L: non-linearity M: market newness of the product F: financial performance of the product



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Table 5. Newness, Linearity and Their Interaction on the Financial Performance of the Product Dependent variable: FPERFORM

Unstandardized Coefficient B

Std. Error

Constant MNEW LINEARIA LINMNEWI

5.267 7.245 7.170 73.909

.539 .096 .072 .885

Standardized Coefficients Beta

t

Sig.

7.264 7.250 7.591

9.779 72.543 72.352 74.416

0.000 0.012 0.020 0.000

Collinearity Statistics Tolerance

VIF

.515 .492 .309

1.940 2.034 3.234

R2=0.10 F(3,161)=5.958 Sig. F=0.001

The L by M curve was shown in Fig. 4, given M=1, 2, 3, 4, 5. A simple calculation yields the maximum point for F when M is fixed: p Maximum L = 4.78/ M While M=1, 2, 3, 4, 5 L=4.78, 3.37, 2.75, 2.39, 2.14 correspondingly.

Figure 4. The Interaction Effect. The result showed that while M (product newness to market) was large, reducing nonlinearity of the New product development process yielded a better performance. While M was lower, increasing non-linearity of the New product development process yielded a better performance. Further explorations on how product newness variables influence the linearity of new


product development processes were carried out using multivariate analysis. The statistical details are shown in Appendix III. The results confirmed again that product newness to market is negatively related to linearity of new product development processes. The results also showed that given same level of product newness to market, there exist a U-shaped relationship between product newness to company and the linearity of new product development process (p50.05). That is both higher value and lower value of product newness to company associated with higher linearity of new product development processes. When product newness to company was near its mean value, its contribution to the linearity of New product development processes reached the lowest point. Furthermore using the testing procedure recommended in Aiken and West (1991), the interaction effect of product newness to market and product newness to company on the linearity of new product development processes was statistically significant (p50.01). The result showed that if a product was new to a company, the new product development in that company was most likely to adopt a linear, step by step process. The effect was strengthened if while at the same time the product was new to the technology. In summary, hypothesis H1 was supported in the sense that the newer the product to market, the more non-linear the New product development process will be. Hypothesis H2 was also supported: it was concluded that the higher the interaction of product newness to market and the linearity of New product development processes, the better the financial performance of the product. Hypothesis H3 was only partly supported, while a product was new to the market, increasing the linearity of the New product development

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process will improve financial performance of the product. To explain the research findings, semi-structured interviews were carried out with managers in seven companies. The results of interviews together with survey findings explained the influence of multidimensionality of product newness on new product development, especially regarding new product development as a process of probing and learning.

Discussion and Validation from Post Survey Interviews The research findings enhanced the understanding of the impact of product newness upon the linearity of new product development processes from two perspectives: (1) the impacts vary upon different kinds of product newness (2) the impact can be related to the financial performance of the product.

More trial and error

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This study has revealed the influence of product newness depends on what kind of product newness we are dealing with. Among the three dimensions of newness, product newness to market contributes directly to the nonlinearity of new product development processes. A possible explanation is that learning and probing happens in the new product development process, and that product newness to market facilitates this. Understandably, if a product is new to the market, new product developers have to learn more about market requirements in order to develop the new product successfully. The process therefore stimulates some kinds of iterations. This is consistent with Hart and Baker's (1994) multi-convergent model. At a first glance, it might be surprising to see that the findings did not support that the newer the product to company, the more iterations happened during the new product development process. We may speculate that the newer the product to the company, the less experience the company has, therefore more learning would be needed (Olson et al. 1995). That means more trials and errors and hence more iterations. A further probing of these conclusions through the post survey interviews found that companies in the ICT industry may not necessarily go through this ìterative' learning process when they develop a new to the company product. Instead, as was the case of the `low product newness to company' product, the high newness to company product can also be developed by a highly linear new product development process. An explanation of this

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result is as follows. The experience (which did not exist in the company in the case of a highly new to company product), may have existed somewhere in the industry already if the product is not a new to market product. The company can get experience in some way instead of learning and probing again. The way of gaining this experience can be through a joint venture, strategic alliance, licensing, and recruiting experienced staff from competitors. It was found that the last method was frequently used in the computer industry. As one of the product managers explained: If you design something that is new to the company, probably you can get experience in the design of that product from another company, and that's what happens here. This product was developed in Austin, Texas. Why do our facility in Austin, Texas develop Unix systems? Because IBM, MOTOROLA and other companies have their design facilities in Austin, Texas. So we can recruit experienced Unix people. Our main headquarters is in California. Why is that? Because that is where a lot of computer expertise is. So if somebody wants to develop something new to them that is already established in the market place, they just recruit people who have experience. For a medium new to company product, there was no immediate way of `copying', or it may not have been worth copying directly, and therefore trials and errors would be inevitable during the new product development process. In this sense, learning and probing processes occurred, within a nonlinear new product development process. Successful new product development was a trade-off between the benefit and the cost in probing and learning. This study has also revealed that the influence of product newness on the linearity of the new product development process has an impact on the financial performance of the product. This result is not surprising because design iterations are related directly to development costs. If during the new product development process, one can manage to limit design iterations within individual stages, (maximum design iterations using CAD design, for example), the cost of development will not be increased significantly. If at the trial production stage, an error or flaw was detected, a re-design was required, then the cost would be higher. Furthermore, the relationship between financial performance of the product and the interaction between product newness to market and the linearity of the new product



development process was not linear. This complicated relationship was highlighted further in the post survey interviews. Firm F is a medium sized company in England. Its key product LG001 has been the market leader for many years. At the time Firm F was visited, the environment in which it was competing was experiencing a dramatic change. The company was developing a new product due to the change in deregulation of the public utility market. A technical manager with nine years of new product development experience in firm F expressed his perception on iteration: I believe if you have to iterate, you have failed to do this study (pre-development) properly. You should never have to iterate. You should put all of your efforts into getting the specification correct, then you go to design and development. . . . This should happen even in new markets, emerging market like this. You only need to iterate virtually minor points like we did to secure that, something we could not predict from the computer. We have done lots of market research into what the customers want over the last two or three years. So we are tempted into get it right here first time. If you don't, especially if you are a small or medium size enterprise like ourselves, if we get it wrong, it costs 750,000 pounds [sterling] to put it into production. That is just for the product. If we look at the other, the actual element (the chip) development, it costs another half a million. If we got that wrong, we could have been bankrupt. However, it is not always easy to reduce the number of design iterations. Sometime it is an exercise that firms must go through, and as a price of learning, for a brand-new product. A marketing manager in firm G, a large firm with established new product development processes, described this inevitable process: First he described the initiation of the idea, In the computer industry, what we are trying to do ..[is to]differentiate through the actual product capabilities. So this machine itself is a differentiated product. There is only one or two other machines like that in the market. That machine is very interesting. I joined the company six or seven years ago. A week after I joined, I said we needed a more powerful Unix system than the [earlier] fault-tolerant system we launched [before] and that was an innovative machine. I said


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we needed something more powerful, and a lot of other people said exactly the same thing. That machine is actually the third design. People at our development facility came up with a design and they said this is going to be wonderful. When we [looked at it] they were quite a long way down the design process.' Then he described lessons from its first design, They went all the way through the design process checks, they got the points when they looked at what the manufacturing cost would be. One said realistically it was sort of sizeable. So they'd written the first document of the market requirement. Now they were going to the later stage and they found that it was impossible to build at the cost that was being assumed in the original market requirement document. So they then stopped, because it was not going to meet market requirements. In the second design, new problems appeared: In a recent design, we tried a completely different approach. Without going into technical details, instead of building a system where you have lots of processes that all plug in the same machine, we wanted to build a system of clustered Unix machines We established a standard for clustered systems. When the moment came to re-evaluate it, we found that, no, that would not actually work. So that was why we actually came to the third design and this was four years ago. Again we got quite a long way down the road. The third design was much better, but new problems were still on the way: And they realised that there is a problem, that we've been on our own. We've been virtually the only company with the software architecture. and we would find it very difficult to find software port to the machine. To be successful in the Unix market place, you must have lots of software on that. So one of the criteria was that we should get lots of software on that. In order to solve the problem, the company built a strategic alliance with another big computer company. Eventually the product was a great success. The example showed that learning and probing is a process that the company has to go through when developing a new to the market product. This held, even for a company whose new product development process may be well-established.

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It is possible that the `lucky innovator' may exist (Jin et al. 1997). Aforementioned firm F provided evidence to support this argument. As a market leader for many years, Firm F is used to developing incremental products in a stable market. It adopts a linear new product development process and views iteration as necessary but not beneficial. However, when environmental changes and a moderately new product is required to be developed, adopting a purely linear process is anything but unpractical. Avoiding minor iterations would cause not only delays but also larger iterations in the future. As a result, Firm F delayed its launch of the new product and lagged behind its competitors for more than six months to enter the new market. These kinds of experiences indicated further that the role of non-linearity of the new product development process is doubleedged. On the one hand, higher non-linearity means higher cost and higher risks in the sense that the project might not be commercially viable. On the other hand, higher nonlinearity facilitates a learning procedure. Thus design iterations and modifications of the original design are inevitable. Using design iterations properly can speed up the process (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi 1995). A simple logic behind this is that when one goes over the process again, one speeds up, and gets a better result (Arrow 1962). Putting these two points together can explain the results: other things being equal, a lower degree of nonlinearity in the case of new to the market product can yield a better financial performance. While in the case of `not new to market' product, an increase the level of non-linearity can yield a better financial performance. The premise before this rationale is, of course, to keep a positive trade-off between the benefit and cost of non-linear new product development processes. Lynn et al (1996) observed that

The `lucky innovator'

Probing and learning is an iterative process. The firms enter an initial market with an early version of the product, learn from experience, modify the product and marketing based on what they learned, and then try again. Development of a discontinuous innovation becomes a process of successive approximation, probing and learning again and again, each time striving to take a step closer to a winning combination of product and market. This research extended their observation by confirming that the probing and learning happened within the new product development process for new to the market products.

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Product newness to market was identified in this study as a key determinant in the iteration of the process. In contrast to their optimistic attitude toward probing and learning, it was suggested here that one has to pay for it. While the cases described in Lynn et al. (1996) are all giant enterprises, this study suggested small and medium enterprises (SME) may not be able to afford such a luxury in probing and learning. A manager in a medium sized electronic firm admitted frankly that if the product they were working on failed, they could be bankrupt before they got the èxperience' to learn again. Lack of funding in R&D in SME is another factor to deter this probing and learning process, which in turn deters the development of really new to the world products. Kleinschmidt and Cooper (1991) suggested that innovativeness is both a negative factor and a positive factor to the success of new product development. This research extended their study by revealing how product newness may influence new product development processes. According to these workers, low innovative and highly innovative products have higher success rates than moderately innovative products. Therefore they contended that managers should treat moderately innovative products with more caution. This study confirmed that more iteration happened in moderately new to company products than in products of high or low newness to company products. In this way our study supports the findings in Kleinschmidt and Cooper (1991). Zaltman et al. (1973) suggested that the more radical an innovation, the more learning and unlearning must take place, and therefore the greater modification must be made in existing structure and processes. This study confirmed their argument and further pointed out that the learning and unlearning process happened when developing a new to the market product. Although this study was a cross sectional study, it can illustrate in some perspective the learning and unlearning process when firms develop a family of products. The reason behind this is that product newness for each individual product was measured in this study, which provided a continuum from highly new products to merely modifications of existing products that can be regarded as equivalent as considering a family of continuous new products. For example, Burgelman and Maidique (1988) proposed a model of new product success and failure in which successes and failures alternate with an irregular rhythm. They suggested:



In the model, a sequence of success is followed by either a major organizational change, changes in organizational design, technology, or market direction that prompt an economic failure, which in turn spurs a new learning pattern. (p. 334) An important phenomenon described in their model was that firms often turned success into failure by believing that repeating past practices would reproduce past successes. The findings in this study suggested that with a brand new product firms may get success. But when they make greater modifications to an existing product (a medium new product to the firm), more learning and unlearning was required than the development of previous one. But that is a point many firms often ignored and refused to give more attention because this time they were developing a `medium new to the company' product instead of `highly new to company' product of previous time. It is easy to be complacent and more optimistic due to the success of the first product. Hence it is not a surprise to understand a failure waiting ahead. Just as Burgelman and Maidique (1988) commented, Success can breed failure for firms that continue to view the future through the prism of present victory, especially in the dynamic industry environment. This study finds that it is this `newness trap' which turned successful firms to failures. Limitations related to findings. It must be pointed out that the findings of this study are limited by the way the linearity of new product development processes was measured. It measured explicitly modifications and iteration activities across four stages in the new product development process: idea, concept, prototype, and product in trial. The advantages of using this scale were obvious such as easy to understand, measurement items easy to follow, easy to replicate etc. On the other hand, one disadvantage of this measurement is that it can not measure activities within each individual stage. For example, during the concept stage, many alternatives may be tried again and again without returning back to the idea stage or forward to make a prototype. In other circumstances, the development of the product concept might be very simple or straightforward. The linearity scale did not measure explicitly these differences. A further consideration specifically relevant to the research into the linearity of new product development processes was that the


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over-all study was set at the level of individual new product development projects. A new to the world product may be developed through the effort of several generations of evolution in the sense of manufacturing process, marketing, and technology. The iteration may happen across different product generations. These non-linear new product development processes were ignored in the design of this research. For example, a new product development process might be completely linear, while its product failed to market, therefore another new product development process was embarked upon and the procedure iterated to a larger extent until final success of the product or sadly, the trial and error procedure stopped somewhere. This common design limitation of surveys may call for more complicated research designs which, instead of using individual projects as the research unit, should use the family of product evolution as the research unit, that is, a combination of historical analyses and cross sectional survey design.

Conclusions It was concluded that the impact of product newness on New product development processes can not be ignored. The study found that product newness to market was associated positively with the non-linearity of the new product development process. To put it further, the more non-linear the new product development processes, the more frequent design iterations and feedback and modifications, therefore the more intensive the probing and learning will be. On the one hand, this probing and learning process was inevitable. It can facilitate the product development in the direction of producing a product which can meet, or be expected to meet, customer requirements. For example, the use of customer test or Computer Aided Design (CAD) or Beta site may all trigger iterations and modifications which aim at a better version of the product. On the other hand, it takes risks and costs to carry out such a probing and learning process although the costs and risks for different learning activities (e.g. customer test and CAD) may vary. On the basis of the research findings, it was concluded that for a `not new to market' product, merely increasing the non-linearity of New product development processes could yield a better product performance. While to a `highly new to market' product, reducing the degree of non-linearity of New product development processes would yield a better product performance. The result suggested

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that in developing a `not new to market' product firms seem to be paying less attention to the feedback signal during New product development processes, albeit such information in fact is very important in reducing the cost or adding values on the product. The above findings are helpful in highlighting the puzzlement from observations of Langrish et al. (1972) some twenty seven years ago: Market information undoubtedly played a valuable part in directing R&D into useful channels. Some reservations must, however, now be entered. One such reservation concerns the value of formal market research carried out by independent organisations. We have encountered some cynicism about this. A major limitation of the idea that innovation should be planned in advance to meet clearly specified market objectives is the observed fact that the successful innovation often emerges from activities whose principle objectives at an earlier stage were not those that in the end met. (pp. 52±53)

Modify or change market objectives

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The study suggested that a New product development process is basically a learning and probing process which indicates the newer the product to the market, the more possible the `clear specified market objectives' be modified because the ultimate objective is getting success other than meeting planned market objectives. Thus, managers must be prepared to modify or change their initial market objectives while new product development is carried out. Product newness can be served as one of the indicators in relation to the extent the initial market plans need to be changed. About 10% of products surveyed in this study were claimed as `new to the world' products. By linking product newness to attributes of new product development processes, this study provided a bridge of research into continuous and discontinuous innovations. Its revelation of the learning mechanism complemented and extended Lynn et al.'s (1996) theory of probing and learning which was built from the observation of so called `discontinuous innovations'. On the basis of the research findings, this study suggested that the learning mechanism differs in new product development if different dimensions of product newness was applied. The finding is therefore important for further research as a basis in understanding how to utilise the learning mechanism in new product development to get a better performance. An interesting topic derived from the research findings of this study is the necessity

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of understanding further the learning mechanism in New product development processes, especially the distinction of different kinds of learnings and their impact on the development process. Probing and learning is an inevitable process while developing a `new to market' product. It is desirable to know what can be learned and probed in advance and what must be learned during the new product development process. This includes, for example, identifying different feedback signals in new product development processes. There is no denying that pre-development study can reduce the risk of new product development. However, the predevelopment studies are only the first step in identifying feedback signals. For a `new to market' product, pre-development studies are not enough because the marketing plan may keep changing during the development process. New product development is a continuous probing and learning process which reduces the uncertainty of the development and the risks involved. Identifying feedback signals earlier is certainly helpful to reduce the development risks. An important direction for future study is therefore to gain a better understanding of feedback signals in new product development. For example, how should those feedback signals be used to develop new products effectively. By so doing it can certainly maximise the effect of learning and minimise the cost. It is believed that once the problem of learning in new product development is solved, one can say that the `black box' of new product development processes can be more thoroughly unpacked.

Acknowledgement Helpful comments and suggestions from David Targett, David Birks, Paul Bottomley, Martyn Pitt, Tudor Rickards, and an anonymous reviewer at Creativity and Innovation Management are gratefully acknowledged. The author thanks generous support for the project from NSFC (Natural Science Foundation of China), British Council, and Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications.

References Abler, R., Albert, S., & Barry, M. (1991) Time-based Product Development. Design Management, 15(9). Adler, P. (1989) Technology: A Guide to the Literatures, In Rosenbloom, R. and R. Burgelman (Eds.), Research on Technological Innovation, and Policy, 4: 25±151. JAI Press, Greenwich, CT.



Afuah, A. N., & Bahram, N. (1995) The hypercube of innovation. Research Policy, 24, 51±76. Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991) Multiple Regression: Testing and Interpreting Interactions. Sage Publications, Newbury Park, CA. Ali, A. (1994) Pioneering versus incremental innovation: review and research propositions. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 11(1), 46-61. Ali, A., Krapfel, R. Jr., & LaBahn, D. (1995) Product innovativeness and entry strategy: impact on cycle time and break-even time. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 12, 54±69. Ansoff, H. I. (1957) Strategies for diversification. Harvard Business Review, 35(September±October), 113±142. Armstrong, J. S., & Overton, T. (1977) Estimating non response bias in mail surveys. Journal of Marketing Research, 51(July), 71±86. Arrow, K. J. (1962) The economic implications of learning by doing. Review of Economic Studies, 29(June), 155±173. Baker, M. J. (1979) Marketing: An Introductory text. 3rd ed. Macmillan, London. Barczak, G. (1995) New product strategy, structure, process, and performance in the telecommunications Industry. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 12, 224±234. Barczak, G. (1994) Gaining superior performance of new products in the telecommunications industry. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 9(4), 19±32. Bayus, B. L., Griffin, A. & Lehmann, D. (1998) From the Special Issue, The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 15, 108±110. Bessant, J., & Francis, D. (1996) Implementing the new product development process. Proceedings of the 3rd International Product Development Conference. INSEAD, France. Birou, L. M., Fawcett, S. E., & Magnan, G. M. (1998) The product life cycle: a tool for functional strategic alignment. International Journal of Purchasing and Management, 34(2), 37±52. Booz Allen & Hamilton (1982) New product management for the 1980s. New York. Brown, S. L., & Eisendhardt, K. M. (1997) The art of continuous change: Linking complexity theory and time-paced evolution in relentlessly shifting organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42, 1±34. Brown, S. L., & Eisenhardt, K. M. (1995) Product development: Past research, present findings, and future directions. Academy of Management Review, 20(2), 343±378. Bryman, A. (1992) Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Research. Ashgate Publishing Limited, Avebury. Burgelman, R. A., & Maidique, M. A. (1988) Strategic Management of Technology and Innovation. Irwin Inc, Illinois. Burns, T., & Stalker, G. M. (1961) The Management of Innovations. Tavistock, London. Calantone, R. J., Di Benedetto, C. A., & Haggblom, T. (1995) Principles of new product management. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 12, 235±247.


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Calantone, R. J., Vickery, S. K., & Droge, C. (1995) Business performance and strategic new product development activities: An empirical investigation. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 12, 214±223. Churchill, G. A. Jr. (1979) A paradigm for developing better measure of marketing constructs. Journal of Marketing Research, 16(Feb.), 64±73. Churchill, G. A. Jr., & Peter, P. J. (1984) Research design effects on the reliability of rating scales: A meta-analysis. Journal of Marketing Research, 21, 365±366. Cochran, W. G. (1977) Sampling Techniques. 3rd ed. John Wiley & Sons, New York. Cohen, J., & Cohen, P. (1983) Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Science. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ. Cooper, R. G. (1988) Pre-development activities determine new product success. Industrial Marketing Management, 17, 237-47. Cooper, R. G. (1986) Winning at New Products. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc, New York. Cooper, R. G., & Kleinschimidt, E. J. (1995) Benchmarking firm's critical success factors in new product development. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 12(5), 374±391. Cooper, R. G., & Kleinschmidt, E. J. (1993a) Stagegate systems for new product success. Marketing Management, 1(4), 20±9. Cooper, R. G., & Kleinschimidt, E. J. (1993b) Major new projects: What separate the winners in the chemical industry? The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 10, 90±111. Craig, A., & Hart, S. (1992) Where to now in new product development research? European Journal of Marketing, 26(11), 1±49. Crawford, M. C. (1994) New Product Management. 4th. Ed. Irwin, Homewood, IL. Dillman, D. A. (1978) Mail and Telephone Surveys: The Total Design Method. Wiley-Interscience, New York. Dosi, G. (1988) Sources, procedures, and microeconomic effects of innovation. Journal of Economic Literature, 26, 1120±1171. Droge, C., & Calantone, R. (1996) New Product Strategy, Structure, and Performance in Two Environments, Industrial Marketing Management, 25, 555±566. Eisenhardt, K. M., & Tabrizi, B. (1995) Accelerating adaptive processes: Product innovation in the global computer industry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(March), 84±109. Eurobit (1996) European Information Technology Observatory. Griffin, A., & Page, A. L. (1996) PDMA success measurement project: Recommended measures for product development success and failure. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 13(6), 478±496. Griffin, A., & Page, A. L. (1993) An interim report on measuring product development success and failure. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 10, 291±308.

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Hart, S. (1993) Dimensions of success in new product development: An exploratory investigation. Journal of Marketing Management, 9, 23±41. Hart, S. J., & Baker, M. J. (1994) The multiple convergent processing model of new product development. International Marketing Review, 11(1), 77±92. Hisrich, R. D., & Peters, M. P. (1984) Marketing New and Mature Products: Planning, Development, and Control. Merrill, Columbus; London. Hopkins, D. S. (1981) New product winners and losers. Research Management, 12(May), 12±17. Jin, Z., Birks, D., & Targett, D. (1997) The context and process of effective NPD: A typology. International Journal of Innovation Management, 1(3): 275±298. Johne, F. A., & Snelson, P. A. (1988) Success factors in product innovation: A selective review of the literature. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 3, 134±144 Johnson, S. C., & Jones, C. (1957) How to organize for new products. Harvard Business Review, 35(May±June), 49±62. Kedia, B. L., Keller, R. T., & Julian, S. D. (1992) Dimensions of National Culture and the Productivity of R&D Units, The Journal of High Technology Management Research, 3(1), 1±18. Kish, L. (1965) Survey Sampling. New York: Wiley. Kleinschmidt, E. J., & Cooper, R. G. (1991) The impact of product innovativeness on performance. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 8(4), 240±251. Krubasik, E. G. (1988) Customize your product development: How to decide between a crash program and a perfect product. Harvard Business Review, 66(November±December), 46±52. Langrish, J., Gibbons, M., Evans, W. G., & Jevons, F. R. (1972) Wealth From Knowledge. Macmillan, London. Lilien, G. L., & Yoon, E. (1990) Timing of competitive market entry. Management Science, 36(5), 568±585. Little, A. D. (1991) Survey of the Product Innovation Process. Arthur D. Little Inc, Cambridge, MA. Lynn, G. S., Morone, J. G., & Paulson, A. S. (1996) Marketing and discontinuous innovation: The probe and learn process. California Management Review, 38(3), 8±37. Maidique, M. A., and Zirger, B. J. (1988) The new product learning cycle. In Burgelman, R. A., & Maidique, M. A. ed. Strategic Management of Technology and Innovation. 1988 Irwin Inc, Illinois. McDougall, P., & Robinson, R. (1990) New venture strategies: An empirical identification of eight archetypes of competitive strategies for entry. Strategic Management Journal, 11, 447±467. Meidan, A., & Moutinho, L. (1994) Quantitative Methods in Marketing. In The Marketing Book, ed. M. J. Baker, 3rd edition, pp. 268±302. Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd, Bath, Avon.

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Miller, R., & Blais, R. A. (1993) Modes of innovation in six industrial sectors. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 40(3), 264±273. Montoya-Weiss, M. M., & Calantone, R. (1994) Determinants of new product performance: A review and meta-analysis. Journal Product Innovation management, 11(5), 397±417. Myres, S., & Marquis, D. (1969) Successful industrial innovations: A study of factors underlying innovation in selected firms. National Science Foundation Report No. NSF 6917, May, Institute of Public Administration, Washington D. C. Nord, W. R., & Tucker, S. (1987) Implementing Routine and Radical Innovations. Lexington Books, Massachussetts. Normann, R. (1971) Organizational innovativeness: Product variability and reorientation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 16, 203±15. Nunnally, J. C. (1967) Psychometric Theory. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York. Olson, E. M., Walker, O. C. Jr., & Ruekert, R. W. (1995) Organizing for effective new product development: The moderating role of product innovativeness. Journal of Marketing, 59(1), 48±62. Rickards, T. (1999) Creativity and the Management of Change, Blackwells, Oxford. Robertson, T. S. (1967) The process of innovation and the diffusion of innovation. Journal of Marketing, 31, 14±19. Shrivastava, P., & Souder, W. E. (1987) The strategic management of technological innovations: A review and a model. Journal of Management Studies, 24(1), 25±41. Souder, W. E., Buisson, D. H., & Garrett, T. C. (1997) Success through customer-driven new product development. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 14, 459±472. Souder, W. E., Sherman, D. J., & Davies-Cooper, R. (1998) Environmental uncertainty, organizational integration, and new product development effectiveness: A test of contingency theory, The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 15, 520±533. Tidd, J. (1997) Complexity, networks & learning: Integrative themes for research into innovation management. International Journal of Innovation Management, 1(1), 1±21. Veryzer, Robert W. Jr. (1998) Discontinuous innovation and the new product development process. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 15, 304±321. Wind, Y. J., & Mahajan, V. P. (1988) New product development process: A perspective for reexamination. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 5, 304±310. Zaltman, G., Duncan, R., & Holbek, J. (1973) Innovations and Organizations. John Wiley and Sons, New York.



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Appendix I: Measurement items Newness to company (Alpha=0.69). This scale was composed of 3 five point Likert items. Five point Likert scales were used with the following points: 5=strongly disagree, 4=disagree, 3=neutral, 2=agree, 1=strongly agree. The belief statements that operationalised newness to company were: `The technology was already embodied in our organisation before product development', `This product needed little modification of existing engineering/design work', `There was almost no modification on existing manufacturing processes'. Newness to market. This scale was composed of 4 five point Likert items (Alpha=0.69). The belief statements for newness to market were: `The new product was mainly purchased by old customers of the organisation', `There was no new sale force organised particularly for this product',

`Completely different media types of advertising/promotion programme were used for this product' (in adverse order), `New methods were used for market research in its development' (in adverse order). Newness to technology. This scale was composed of two five point Likert items (Alpha =0.82). The belief statements were: `The key ideas that make this product have significantly advanced over existing knowledge of the current technology capability' (in adverse order, 1 strongly disagree, 5 strongly agree), `The linkage between the key ideas of the product have significantly advanced over existing knowledge of the current technology capability' ( in adverse order). The linearity scale. This scale was composed of 5 seven points semantic scaled items. These items are :

We re-defined the product concept a lot of times

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

The concept stage and the prototype stage were interwoven with each other After the prototype test, a new concept definition was formed for the product No change has been made since trial production

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

The product design changed a lot of times during the development process (e. g. at least 5 times)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

The coefficient alpha for this scale was 0.68 (0.69 in standardised item alpha). A confirmatory factor analysis extracted only one significant factor. The performance scale. This scale was composed of 3 five point Likert scaled items (Alpha=0.83):


The product concept remained unchanged (e.g. at least 5 times) since the first definition There were no concept definition activities after the first prototype was tested No change was made after the prototype test At least 10 percent of the product design has been changed since trial production There were no design iterations, we followed an exact step by step approach.

The product has met the profit goals (1 strongly disagree, 5 strongly agree) The product has met margin goals (as above) The current estimate of ROI on the project has met original criteria (as above)

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Appendix II The interaction effect of the product newness to market and linearity of the New product development processes Dependent variable: performance of product Method.. S-curve Multiple R R Square Adjusted R Square Standard Error

.31238 .09758 .09204 .26988

Analysis of Variance: DF Regression Residuals F=

Sum of Squares 1 163

17.62532

Mean Square

1.283781 11.872482

1.2837812 .0728373

Signif F = .0000

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Variables in the Equation - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Variable Nonlinearity* newness to market (Constant)

B

SE B

Beta

7.714184 1.315988

.170114 .034060

7.312377

Appendix III. Multivariate approaches on the joint influence of product newness variables An exploratory analysis was conducted, using two equations: (1) Joint influence with-

T

Sig T

74.198 38.637

.0000 .0000

out interaction: putting all product newness variables and their higher order items together but without adding interaction of these variables (2) Joint influence by adding interaction items.

Table 6. Linearity and Newness: Further Explorations Variables

Newness to market Newness to company Newness to technology (Newness to market)2 (Newness to company)2 (Newness to technology)2 (Newness to market)3 (Newness to company)3 (Newness to technology)3 R2 F

Not adjusted for context variables

Adjusted for context variables

Coefficient

SE

Partial correlation

Coefficient

SE

Partial correlation

72.487** 7.114 7.015 74.649** 7.109 7.076 15.578 0.041 0.011

.940 .188 .192 3.700 .098 .087 9.232 .072 .066

7.21 7.05 7.01 7.10 7.09 7.07 .132 .04 .01

7.1974** 7.020 0.002 74.605* 7.120 7.076 12.958 .018 2.328

1.003 .196 .204 4.017 .105 .090 9.729 .074 .071

7.16 7.01 .00 7.09 7.09 7.07 .11 .02 .00

0.11 2.141**

0.16 1.98*

** P50.05, * P50.1

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(1) Joint influence without interaction. The result showed that the joint influence of product newness variables can explain 11% of the total variance in linearity of new product development processes. It confirmed again that product newness to market was negatively related to the linearity of the new product development processes. While product newness to market was under control, a quadratic relationship between the linearity of the new product development processes and product newness to company was found (p=0.034). It indicated that both higher value and lower value of product newness to company associated with higher linearity of the new product development processes. When product newness to company was near its mean value, its contribution to the linearity of the new product development processes reached the lowest point. In other words, given the same level of product newness to market, a U-shaped relationship was detected between product newness to company and the linearity of the new product development processes. The nearer the product newness

45

to its mean, the less linear the new product development process was. (2) The interaction between product newness to company and product newness to technology. Using the testing procedure recommended in Aiken and West (1991), the interaction effect of product newness to market and product newness to company on the linearity of new product development processes was statistically significant (p50.01). The comparison of two models (with and without the interaction item) is shown in Table 7. The result showed that if a product was new to a company, the new product development in that company was most likely to adopt a linear, step by step process. The effect was strengthened when the product was new to the technology.

Zhonqui Jin is a Lecturer in Marketing, Middlesex University Business School.

Table 7. Product Newness and Linearity (N=170) Independent variables Product newness to company

Model 1

Model 2

0.000

0.007

Product newness to market

70.232**

70.267**

Product newness to technology

70.066

70.035

The interaction of product newness to technology and product newness to company R2

** P50.05

70.314***

0.04

F

Model 1 vs. Model 2

0.11 11.72**

*** P50,01


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The Frustration of Talent: A Study in Scarlet* Malcolm R.V. Goodman Many organisations are under pressure as they face strong buyers' markets. This paper presents the findings of a research project designed to discover why talent is so often frustrated by mediocre management and what might be done about it. ICI and Marks & Spencer were selected as the setting, as both are well-respected corporations and are facing stiff business challenges. The paper explores the locking hold that cultures can exert on operational management. It opens with a profile of each organisation before passing the consultancy brief to an imaginary business detective, Sherlock Holmes. By means of various devices the famous detective applies his powers to the case and the paper closes with a summary of his findings.

Introduction

T

his paper, takes an experimental approach in the tradition of the new paradigm writers (Clegg, Frost and Thomas, 1999) and features two home based companies that have been seen as model organisations for several years. Both were considered `Blue Chip' firms. The management training provided by ICI and Marks & Spencer was highly regarded. Now both organisations are floundering and profits tumbled by almost 50 percent in last complete trading year. What has gone wrong? What practical lessons are there to be learnt from their predicament? To discover answers to these and other pertinent questions five top managers, ten middle managers and ten `front-line' staff were interviewed in each company. To protect the interests of employees strict confidentiality was requested and honoured.

Troublesome Times Rough Water at Millbank For a company formed in 1926, from the merger of four large UK chemical companies, and one that recently promoted itself as a `world class' organisation, the plight of ICI,

* In the spirit of Conan-Doyle, A Study in Scarlet

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the chemicals and industrial giant, must concern its London (Millbank) headquarters. The first quarter results for 1999 indicated that turnover had slipped from £2.16bn compared to £2.29bn in the previous year and that profit had fallen by nearly 50 percent. In 1997 ICI purchased Unilever's food flavourings and fragrance business for £4.5bn ($8bn) in a bid to reshape its trading portfolio. Efforts to sell its bulk chemicals business took longer than anticipated and left the company with immense debts ($4.5bn) and poor profits. In the global environment of the 1990s, the mass production of basic commodities, such as industrial chemicals, does not deliver the same profits as high-margin value-added products made by modern manufacturers. The economic crisis afflicting emerging markets, and the resulting drag on the Western industrialised economies, has weakened demand for basic chemical commodities. The World Bank warned that commodity prices may never return to their former levels. The first half profits for 1999 exceeded expectations but were 16 percent down at £166m. Net debt fell to £3.2bn from £4.2bn largely as a result of the sale of unwanted industrial assets. A further 600 job cuts were announced, mainly from the company's London head office.

Baker Street Crisis At the same time, Marks & Spencer, the UK's biggest clothing retailer, has also lost its # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000. 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

THE FRUSTRATION OF TALENT

spark. In May 1999, the company reported that there had been a sharp decline in current trading and that store sales had slipped by ten percent in the first month of the trading year. Despite assurances from their Chief Executive Peter Salsbury that `we have bottomed out. We have taken the first steps to work a future growth' the company's plight worsened and in July the Board announced that `like-for-like sales' had slipped ten percent in the first quarter. General merchandising (clothing and housewares) dropped by 12.9 percent. Food and drink sales were down 3.4 percent and overseas operations were performing badly. In the last three trading years return on capital fell from 22 percent to 9 percent. Shareholders were angry. Both companies were struggling and bleeding cash. Both had sought to recruit top management talent and had employed the services of consultants and gurus. Let's imagine that both turned to the celebrated detective Sherlock Holmes for help.

A Case for Sherlock Holmes Sherlock mulled over the details of the two companies. Outside, the London fog was forming again. He strained his neck and peered out of his sitting room window. To his left he could just make out the outline of the Marks & Spencer headquarters. A few hours earlier the sun had been shining in London. Strange how the weather changes suddenly. As the view from his window faded, he could empathise with the Marks & Spencer management across the road, and the puzzled ICI board in their Millbank headquarters. Hansom cabs could drive through fog, so why could not companies? Believing that most problems needed careful thought, he settled down in his favourite chair and studied his brief. After a short while he drifted into a deep sleep. He was awakened by a knock on the door. It was his landlady delivering the evening paper. Responding to a sudden insight, he crossed the room to his desk in search of his favourite notebook. Several years of experience had convinced him of the benefit of recording his waking thoughts. Frequently they provided vital clues to his cases. On waking he was aware of how often virtual reality seemed to be more attractive than reality. His room was light and secure. Outside it was foggy and dark. Clearly both ICI and Marks & Spencer had misread their reality. They had been dreaming. On waking they had sought to restructure their business operations. Clearly some of this activity was


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both professional and sensible. However, much of their effort, Sherlock mused, was probably driven more by panic and the temptation to seek a `quick fix'. After all, ICI and Marks & Spencer were famous brands. Perhaps the market would soon come to its senses and business would improve.

Pursuing Inquiries Sherlock decided to explore two lines of inquiry. Both organisations were attempting to manage change. Clearly they believed that they were once great and would be great again. This greatness they put down to the talent of their cultures. The opposite ploy was to examine the arguments for changing their management practices, and would be necessary if the external environmental developments (collapsing world markets for bulk chemicals and sharp competition for High Street and Shopping Centre clothes sales) continued their present course. As market conditions had favoured both organisations for some years then it was, perhaps, no surprise that their respective management styles and cultures had become set. Further inquiry would require interviews with top, middle and `front-line' staff.

Mulling Over the Evidence. . . Sharpening Perspectives In past cases Sherlock had found it useful to classify evidence into `functional' and `holistic' categories. The former included professional formulistic skills. e.g. top management, middle management and the `frontline' staff'. The latter referred to the skills that enabled individual, group and organisational operators to respond proactively and in a co-ordinated and consistent manner to the challenges presented by their working environment. Whereas functional skills typically assumed an internal focus, holistic skills had more to do sensing the air. He suspected that his clients had placed too much emphasis on their functional skills.

Functional and holistic categories

ICI Regroups Top ICI management concluded that they could not reverse the decline in the fortunes of their traditional portfolio of bulk chemical business. So they resolved to change it by adding businesses with a better profit potential (e.g. Unilever's food flavourings and fragrance business) and off-loading their traditional chemical commodity operations.

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(e.g. industrial chemicals to the Huntsman corporation; polyester business to DuPont etc.). Difficulties in securing acceptable prices in falling global markets, and complications resulting from the Competition Authorities in overseas countries (namely the United States) had made this a slow and cumbersome business leaving the company heavily in debt. Apart from the thirty-year investment programme to build the pharmaceutical business (Zeneca), few of the company's major ìn house'new product and new business developments were doing very well. As the restructuring progressed many external commentators regarded the company's top management as ponderous. Their vision and business options seemed vague and ill defined. This charge seemed to prick the retiring Company Chairman (Sir Ronald Hampel) who complained that the company were the victim of unfair news coverage.

Marks & Spencer ± Drastic Measures Marks & Spencer were suffering from falling sales resulting from supply difficulties in the winter of 1998 and in the spring of 1999. The move to acquire better buying prices had led them to place orders overseas. This resulted in the late delivery of goods. Thus stores have been under-supplied during the crucial winter and spring trading periods. City analysts did not expect sales to recover before 2002. In the meantime. a rash of new store openings had left the company overextended. However, like ICI, the top management had lost their way and recent expansions were based on over-optimistic assumptions. The company was reviewing its smaller European stores and promised to manage its UK portfolio more aggressively. Disposals were likely. After the Boardroom battle over the succession, the new chief executive had thinned out the management ranks. Three directors resigned and 290 middle managers left the company employ. Following the announcement of reduced profits in July a further 400 office jobs were scrapped. In an attempt to get closer to their customers an additional 2000 sales staff (largely part time) were recruited. The graduate-training programme was shelved and the company offered details of graduates they had selected to rival retail organisations!

New Visions Needed

Poor business judgement

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The evidence accused both clients of poor business judgement. The global market place in which they were operating had changed dramatically and caught them by surprise.

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Both needed to manage their affairs professionally rather than drift towards rectifying the mistakes of the past by `quick fix' cost cutting activity and the hasty buying and selling of businesses. This required a new vision. To probe the holistic picture Sherlock sought the views of company employees. Both organisations were nervous about this at first, but did agree to his proposal to interview their staff. Sherlock was keen to explore how they were managing at three levels; top management; middle management and `front-line' operators. In both companies he was keen to establish whether there was a clear definition of what management interventions entailed.

Gaining Insight Facing up to Reality ± Questioning Mind Sets The interviews provided a good opportunity for interactivity and revealed that both companies were guilty of unco-ordinated management practices. The candour with which the interviewees answered his questions, and made known their specific views, provided a fascinating insight into their affairs. Whilst absorbed by the intricacy of his findings, Sherlock was determined not to be deflected by intriguing parts of the case. He sought a focused holistic view. It was important not to jump to conclusions before he had assembled all the evidence and examined all the implications. The first thing that struck him was the silence of his room. Too many important corporate decisions were taken when there was too much noise about to fully think through the consequences. Experience had convinced him that adrenaline and testosterone surges did not often promote incisive thought. Slowly he applied his mind to the evidence gleaned from the employees. He was struck by the tribal nature of the two organisations. Top dogs and lesser dogs. But were the dogs hunting together? Strange, how the mind so often wandered into metaphoric mode when searching for inspiration. His eye focused on a small triangular screen. It was tastefully decorated with a hunting scene that was secured by stretch banding at each side.

Three-way Stretch ICI and Marks & Spencer appeared to be like his three cornered screen. (see Figure 1) It reminded him of the three segmentations he



had adopted for his interviewing. He placed the top managers at the apex of the triangle; the middle managers at the bottom left hand corner and the `front-line' operators at the right hand corner. He imagined the marketplace to be to the right of the triangle. When market conditions were favourable the companies prospered. Sherlock had long been of the opinion that really good detectives were the ones who solved their difficult cases after giving due consideration to all the relevant data they could muster. So this should be true of top managers in industry and commercial life. It was, in his view unprofessional, that that so many seemed to blame the marketplace or sunspots for their failures! Who does the managing? Clearly individuals, groups of

Figure 1. The Three-Cornered Screen individuals and the organisational officers. Sherlock superimposed these on the triangular screen, gazed at the emerging picture, and puffed contentedly on his pipe, as his mind was drawn to the three sides of the triangular screen. As he pictured three squares on the sides of the triangular screen, it struck him that this was what management was all about. The dynamic leadership of the interfaces between individuals and the organisa-

49

tion; the organisation and groups and groups and individuals. In prosperous times just being busy seemed to disguise any serious interface problems. However, when the operating environment became less advantageous problems started to appear in the interfaces. Instead of acting together (well or badly) the actors at the three corners in the triangular picture were moving apart. Trust levels were falling; morale was fading; people were becoming cynical and negative in their thinking and responses. Top management, alarmed by the sudden turn of events, reacted by trying to ride out the storm. Surely finer conditions would prevail tomorrow? Or the day after? Or next month? Or next year? As they tried to get a grip on the business most of their actions were functional. Cut costs to the bone. Reduce the headcount. Lengthen payment periods. Seek accommodation at the bank. Meanwhile the middle management were between a rock and a hard place. The `front-line' operators were pulling them to the right as they attempted to interface successfully with the marketplace. But they were restrained by the top management who were reluctant to move, and who tended to prefer the attractions of gurus and theorists. The `front-line' operators were frustrated by the middle managers who were afraid to move for fear of incurring the displeasure of their directors. If management was to succeed, then attention needed to be given to the interfaces between top management (the organisation), groups and individuals. Or the level of externally generated work had to disguise the strains in the management system. When the level of sales suddenly declined, the `management triangle' split into three (see Figure 2) and the interface adjustments trebled in number, causing considerable management stress fractures. (Goodman, 1995).

Figure 2. Operational Organisational Structures Under Pressure # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000

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Playing in tune

The 'Quick Fix'

Sherlock enjoyed playing his violin. A recent trip to a concert had made a deep impression on him. He was fascinated by the individual and concerted skill of the musicians. The ability of a company to respond effectively to external stimuli depended on the nature of the stimuli and its corporate teamwork. In his previous observations of organisations Sherlock had identified six basic operational models. (Morgan 1993) Model 1 was typically to be found where a company enjoyed a strong sellers', market and typically favoured an extremely functional approach to business. Model 6 tended to be associated with companies that faced strong competition, had an urgent need to consistently manage a differential, and had a clear realisation of this task. Such a company was likely to perform as a holistic organisation. Sherlock deduced that ICI was a Model 1 organisation that was trying to function as a Model 3 organisation. Many organisations like this exhibited the `Three-way Stretch' syndrome. In the good times ICI had tended to take its customers for granted and had concentrated on improving its supply-side efficiencies and associated systems. Marks & Spencer, once close to its customers, had developed in the good years into a Model 1 organisation. Decision-making power was concentrated at corporate headquarters in Baker Street. The new chief executive had begun to dismantle this edifice and declared a massive number of middle manager redundancies. However, he had also frozen the graduate recruitment and training scheme.

Pleased with the usefulness of the violin and orchestra metaphors, Sherlock recalled the position of the poorly performing player, who tried to `magic' everything right in a single brief discussion with his conductor. Sherlock never ceased to be amazed at the number of top managers who were on the lookout for an instant solution to pressing problems. They spent fortunes on consultants, gurus and Business School graduates. If the problem went away then management took the credit. If the problem did not it must have been because the consultant had failed. Either way the commissioning managers were in the clear. Inquiries revealed that both companies had attempted `quick fixes' only to remain disappointed at their lack of success. Discussion with senior management showed that they had wanted success in these troubled times but had not wanted to change their cultures. Teamwork, quality, empowerment, activity based costing, business process reengineering, accelerated problem solving had all been tried. Sherlock mused over a long-held truth. When it comes to it you have to do your own thinking. Did his clients know how to think as he did.? What may have been elementary for Dr Watson seemed unfamiliar to many managers in the two companies. `Trophy hunting' or `quick fixing' may have satisfied the five W interrogatives of the English language (What, Why, Who, When, Where) but did not tackle the critical How question. The translation of cognitive education into company based application and instruction lay at the heart of the matter. It was the difference between diagnosis and cure.

Figure 3. Six Operational Models (after Morgan 1993)

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Light in the Darkness Analysis of the employees' interview enabled Sherlock to formulate a detailed diagnosis of the two organisations' respective ills. (See Table 1) Despite operating in different markets, they had much in common. Top managers from the companies were expected to arrive at any moment full of expectancy that the famous detective had been able to throw some light on their troubles. Pacing around his sitting room Sherlock assembled his thoughts.

Understanding the Business Environment Means Facing Reality The sudden appearance of the fog on the day he accepted the brief, and the rapid fading of the light, as darkness fell over London, provided Sherlock with a beginning to his diagnosis. Both organisations had lost their way. It was time to get back to the basics of Table 1. Part I

ICI/Marks & Spencer Sample

human behaviour. Social scientists were continuously emphasising the importance of environment or context when evaluating the quality of human interventions. (Kolb, 1984) Experience showed that it could be dangerous to take environmental conditions for granted. This had been a basic mistake of the top management in both organisations. Not only was this dangerous, but the temptation to believe that major manifestations of the environment could regularly be commanded and controlled had looked questionable since the day King Canute attempted to hold back the tide. The middle managers had a better understanding of real market conditions. In both cases the `front-line' staff fully were close to their customers. A least-cost philosophy had undoubted merits, but its relentless pursuit irrespective of market conditions was misconceived. ICI's customers wanted unique formulations, keen prices, earlier delivery, and regular updates on where their orders were in the system. Similarly, Marks & Spencer should have

Marketing and Responses Market perspective

Market action

Aware

Unaware

Self-righting

Response righting

ICI Top managers Middle managers Front-line operators

5 10 10

1 6 8

4 4 2

4 6 3

1 4 7

Marks & Spencer Top managers Middle managers Front-line operators

5 10 10

1 6 8

4 4 2

5 6 3

0 4 7

Part II

Light in the darkness

Response Issues Sample

Teamwork

Culture

Sound

Weak

Retain

Change

ICI Top managers Middle managers Front-line operators

5 10 10

5 6 3

0 4 7

4 6 2

1 4 8

Marks & Spencer Top managers Middle managers Front-line operators

5 10 10

5 6 2

0 4 8

5 5 1

0 5 9


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Myopic management

secured their supply lines, before becoming critically reliant on overseas manufacturers. Empty clothes racks; especially in the important winter season, simply advertised to the market that the company had lost its way. Sherlock's second key finding threw an interesting light on how the three levels of management saw the dynamics of the business. In both companies the top managers felt that their markets would recover by themselves. The middle managers were split 60/40 in favour of a `natural' return to better times. Forty percent, however, thought that their companies needed to reposition their businesses. The `front-line' staff clearly saw the need for a rethink of basic business strategy.

Management Responses Holmes's evidence was compelling. His clients were, in reality, but their top managers were living in the past and believed that business would right itself. The middle managers found themselves leaning in both directions and the `front-line' staff were frustrated. Sherlock turned to the internal management responses (see Table 1). Influenced by the orchestra metaphor, he had made a point of probing the state of the teamwork in both organisations. In each case, the top management thought that it was sound. However, only 40 percent of the middle managers (perhaps conscious of their positions) said that it was fine. Most of the `front-line' operators (90 percent) found it unsatisfactory. Turning to the issue of corporate culture, Sherlock found that both his clients' top management thought that this were standing up well and did not need to be changed. The middle managers were split on the issue but in both companies the `front-line' staff (ICI 80 percent; Marks & Spencer 90 percent) saw this as a pressing need.

Summing Up Sherlock offered three basic options. His clients could: I. Manage a disaster (MAD1) II. Manage a differential (MAD2) III. Manage a difference (MAD3) Changing times dictated the need for changing ways and attention to holistic skills i.e. more emphasis on internal real team working and external attention to market developments. The severe contextual pressures mounting on the two organisations provided a stark choice. Either the environment had to be managed or their respective management

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styles and cultures had to change. In the face of rigorous discontinuous change the latter was the only real option. Failure to basically change the modus operandi of the boardroom was managing a disaster. (MAD1) ± myopic management. However, changing the basic operational management style and organisational culture was no easy task after several steady years. This was Sherlock's regular criticism of Inspector Lestrade, who often `reappeared upon the scene, rubbing his hands in a pompous and self satisfied manner'(Conan-Doyle, 1888). If more managers could free themselves from their mind sets and the paradigms of their organisations they would be better placed to face their challenges. This case was particular interesting, as the technique of managing a differential (MAD2) advantage was far from obvious. The solution lay in the act of management itself. It was largely a matter of orchestrating the critical management interfaces (Figure 1) However, it was necessary first to address the matter of thinking. To the celebrated detective this was essentially a matter of perception. Incisive thinking was a practised blend of functional skills and holism Ì ought to know by this time that when a fact appears to be opposed to a long train of deductions, it invariably proves to be capable of bearing some other interpretation' (remark attributed to Conan-Doyle). He needed to convince his clients that it was sometimes logical to contemplate the unfamiliar and illogical. The term manager referred to all his client's employees. They were instrumental players and to make a difference the corporate orchestra needed them all. A breakthrough in thinking was required. Both organisations needed to release their natural talent and to cease frustrating it. He commented that that their `mediocracy knew nothing higher than itself' (remark attributed to Conan-Doyle). Their managers needed to escape from organisational paradigms and to orchestrate the thinking of their employees. Then managerial `talent would instantly recognise genius'. Thinking in this way requires a release from old ways, a determination to keep an open mind and to give a little time and effort to relearn some basic, yet powerful, creative thinking skills. Sherlock saw poor corporate management skills as a business crime. Certainly one of omission and perhaps one of ignorance too. Perhaps a large reason for this was the power of mind sets. The trouble with myopic thinking was that it creeps up on and surprises so many. In turbulent and competitive times making a difference (MAD3) required a firm understanding of context



(reality), a willingness to escape management mind sets and a willingness to learn how to generate ideas to release the genius of innovation. As Tom Peters later declared `crazy times call for crazy organizations'. (Peters, 1994). If such management is deemed to be crazy and mad then it is MAD2 and MAD3. Conventional management is often MAD1. Business management is not primarily about short-term measures, such as excessive cost cutting and the opportunistic selling and buying of businesses. It is about developing a well-tuned team that act in a concerted manner. It is a vision. As Dr Watson wrote in his journal ìt seemed to me that the mists in my own mind were gradually clearing away, and I began to have a dim, vague perception of the truth' (Conan-Doyle, 1888). Uncluttered, clear and perceptive thinking is better than driving in fog. If all this seems strange to you, it is because you have failed at the beginning of the inquiry to grasp the importance of the single real clue which was presented to you. I had the good fortune to seize upon that, and everything which has occurred since then has served to confirm my original supposition, and indeed, was the logical sequence of it Hence things which have perplexed you and made the case more obscure have served to enlightened me and to strengthen my conclusions. (Conan-Doyle, 1991, 1888)

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(and women) to take initiative, to give them a chance to show what they can do, and a scope within which to grow. (Message circulated to McDonnell Douglas staff in 1946!) The evidence in this case supports the assertion that realistic managers (all corporate employees) should learn to practise a style of managing that is context specific, holistic in style and creative. This contrasts with the closed system where place, time and practice are so often taken as given. The great detective looked out of his window. He exhorted his clients to take notice of the traffic in their world. They should be on the outside looking in to their business operations and not predominantly concerned with their internal company affairs. His own cases were seldom solved by himself. He implored them not to frustrate their managing talent. Strange, how obvious the solution is once it has been found. Dr Watson noticed that the myopia of Holmes's clients was largely due to the fact that they had become too remote from their markets, their staff and their publics. Also, they should have listened to and involved their staff in the formulation of their visions After all `detection is about unravelling the complexities of the case issues, evaluating the facts and waiting for the solution to become evident however strange it may turn out to be' What was needed was less management and more managing. Let Sherlock have the last word. `Gentlemen, it is a mistake to confound strangeness with mystery.' (Conan-Doyle, 1991, 1888)

From Management to Managing

References

This case has been a study in scarlet. The picture of two commercial organisations bleeding sales, profits and carrying large liabilities is a vivid metaphor. The way forward is clear . Managers need to accept a commission. Their prime task, whether at the individual, group or organisational level, is to shape and co-ordinate behaviour to achieve, real, predetermined, wealth-creation goals. This involves a 'people oriented visionary approach similar to that proposed by Matsushita, the founder of the Japanese Matsushita Electrical group. It is the art of managing rather than management.

Clegg, S. et al. (1999) Studying organization: Theory and Method. Sage, London. Conan-Doyle, Sir A., (1991, 1888), A Study in Scarlet, Facsimile Edition, Wordsworth Editions. Story first published in Strand Magazine in 1888 Ware, Hertfordshire, 11±37. Goodman, M.R.V. (1995) Creative Management. Prentice Hall, Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire, 212±214. Kolb, D. (1984) Experiential Learning. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA. Morgan, G (1997) Imaginization. Sage, Thousand Oaks, California, USA. Conan-Doyle, (1888) Strand Magazine, À Study in Scarlet', London. Heading from Chapter VII Peters, T. (1994) The Tom Peters Seminar. MacMillan, London.

For us, the core of management is the art of mobilising the thinking resources of all employees in the service of the firm. Any institution has to be organised so as to bring out the talent and the capabilities within the organisation; to encourage men


A study in scarlet

Malcolm Goodman is a Lecturer in Marketing, Durham University Business School.

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Collaborative Problem Solving Through Creativity in Problem Definition: Expanding the Pie Min Basadur, Pam Pringle, Gwen Speranzini and Marie Bacot The classic models of two party problem solving in situations of potential conflict are reviewed and the growing impetus for a process that would encourage collaborative win-win solutions is summarized. In is demonstrated that in-win collaboration requires innovative thinking, and that a four stage process of deliberate creativity with a track record of success is described. The process, called Simplex, emphasizes òut of the box' thinking in problem defining (before solving) as the key to making a perceived `fixed pie' larger, moving beyond the shackles of zero-sum, win-lose, compromise thinking. If a problem can be conceptualized from a new angle in such a way that each party believes its resolution would provide a high level of satisfaction, then the parties will be more likely to work together collaboratively. This process uses four specific creative thinking skills. A case study is described in which the Simplex process was used in union management bargaining. In the case study, when the creative process was deliberately applied, success was achieved in building trust and developing expanded pies and new solutions. However, when the process was abandoned, the trust was lost, no creative solutions were developed, and a sub-optimal lose-lose situation resulted. A two-dimensional diagnostic model which shows the relationship between skill level in the process and motivation to use it is provided. This model defines four modes of pure and mixed distributive and integrative bargaining.

Introduction

H

Problem definition Volume 9

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andling joint problem solving between two parties in situations with potential for conflict is an important topic. Given various names such as dispute resolution, conflict management, conflict resolution, union management bargaining, alternative dispute resolution and negotiating in general, it crosses the boundaries of many diverse fields including industrial and organizational (I/O) psychology; industrial relations; human resource management; and social psychology. In this paper, we will first review classic models of conflict management and the growing impetus for a process that would encourage collaboration. We will demonstrate that the Simplex process provides a viable method for collaborative win-win problem solving through the deliberate use of creativity. A key in this process is creativity in problem definition. This process focuses on

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developing a joint creative problem definition which opens up room for new `win-win' solutions. This new conceptualization of the issue makes the so called `pie' to be split larger. The Simplex process makes the collaborative behavior orientation in Figure 1 (below) possible. Collaborative behavior is the preferred choice but requires a new process of thinking. In this case, new means different and superior to the traditional zerosum movement up and down the bargaining line or sub- optimizing movement down into the lose-lose area below the bargaining line (see Figure 2 below). The new process of thinking is learnable and can be deliberately applied even in the most difficult of situations. The more difficult the situation, the higher the necessary skill in applying the process. We will focus particularly on union management bargaining, a specific form of conflict management, and how the Simplex process can be applied to it. We will demon# Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000. 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

CREATIVITY IN PROBLEM DEFINITION

strate the adaptation of the process to this forum, the training provided in advance, the procedural checks used during the training and the application of the process and the outcomes. A case study is described in which real world participants learned to use such a process. The fundamental purpose of our paper is to show how this expansion can be achieved using creativity deliberately in problem definition or conceptualization. This deliberate creative work in problem definition must not to be confused with attempting to be creative in developing solutions to a narrowly defined, preconceived problem. The process of creativity applied in this paper, called Simplex, has four sequential stages: problem generation, problem conceptualization, solution optimization, and solution implementation. This is one of the reasons Simplex is called a complete process of creativity. Most people think of creativity only in terms of the third stage. They tend to think of creativity as brainstorming solutions for solving a problem, not realizing that the previous two stages even exist and are even more critical to the creative process. The conceptualization stage is the key to making the pie bigger. By and large,

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people in North America do not know how to deliberately apply a complete creative process to conflict management situations. The creative process that will be introduced in this paper simultaneously builds trust and provides a pathway to collaborative, creative, work in a way that is honest, above-board and makes sense to any manager, union member or government person through its simplicity and logical common sense. Skillful application of this process produces a climate of trust and collaboration. A simple problem solving language is employed to enable the opening of minds in a non-threatening way. An example of how this process worked successfully in a confrontational franchisee-franchisor situation in a consumer goods company in North America is provided elsewhere in this paper. Although the basis for the conflict resolution models of Figures 1 and 2 is well known, the application of a creative process emphasizing creativity in problem conceptualization as a practical, deliberate method for expanding the total satisfaction available (the size of the pie) and achieving super-optimization (as modeled in Figure 2) is new and unique and is the basis of our paper. In the case study presented in this paper, when the creative process was

Figure 1. Orientations Toward Conflict Resolution # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000

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Figure 2. Beyond the Bargaining Line: Expansion and Contraction of the Pie deliberately applied, success was achieved in building trust and developing creative solutions for implementation. However, when the creative process was deliberately abandoned in that case study, the trust was lost and no creative solutions were developed and a suboptimal lose-lose situation resulted. We will conclude with recommended future steps both in terms of research and practical application of this process to conflict management situations. We strongly believe, and the research clearly indicates, that this process, and the training necessary for using the process skillfully, is neither industry nor culture bound. This process is currently being used across a wide variety of organizations in many countries and in several different languages. Because of its unique focus on discovering and building upon the possibilities in any given situation, it is ideally suited to the arena of conflict management.

model (Figure 1) of five different basic orientations toward conflict resolution involving two parties. In Figure 1, the vertical axis measures one party's concern for its own satisfaction on a scale from low to high while the horizontal axis measures its concern for the other party's satisfaction. Within the framework, high concern for one's own satisfaction coupled with low concern for the other's satisfaction indicates Competitive behavior while the opposite is Accommodating behavior. Compromise behavior occurs midway and represents some, but incomplete, satisfaction for both parties. Avoidance behavior occurs when there is low concern for both self and other's satisfaction while Collaborative behavior occurs when a party experiences high concern for both its own satisfaction and also for the other party's satisfaction.

Fixed Pie Assumption ± Optimizing

The Classic Model of Conflict Management Thomas (1976) adapted the work of Blake and Mouton (1964) and Hall (1969) to provide a

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The straight line joining the Competitive, Compromise and Accommodating behavior orientations is called the Zero-Sum, WinLose, Bargaining Line. When problem solving orientations are confined to positions along



this line, the assumption is implicit that a fixed amount of satisfaction (the pie) is available to be split. Every gain made by one party results in an identical loss by the other party. The goal becomes to find an optimal solution in which the entire fixed pie is split in a way that each party can agree to. Optimizing thinking assumes that the problem to be solved has already been defined (i.e. how to split a fixed amount of satisfaction between the two groups in such a way that both can agree). This is optimized Zero-Sum or Fixed Pie thinking and is sometimes referred to as distributive bargaining (Walton & McKersie, 1965). An example of the use of the bargaining line is the traditional and relatively adversarial labor-management bargaining process in North America. Positions are taken by either side and defended with selective information. Often negotiators become more committed to their position than to finding solutions to the problems. There is often a great lack of trust in the opposite side as each party seeks to increase its power in order to gain greater advantage over the other side. Conflict is often endemic to such situations (Craig & Solomon, 1996). Both parties assume that there is a fixed amount of satisfaction available. The management side goes into the bargaining process determined to limit the union to the minimum possible share of what it perceives as the fixed amount of money and benefits it can afford. Meanwhile the labor side goes in determined to gain the maximum share possible of what it perceives as the fixed amount of money and benefits the company can afford. Because these are directly opposing goals (problem definition) little collaborative problem solving is possible. Unless some process could be devised and applied which would create a common agreed goal to pursue or problem definition to solve, the management-labor team is doomed to sliding up and down the Bargaining Line until exhaustion, government intervention or public outcry brings a final compromise position somewhere on the line. This solution will indicate how much each side won/lost in the distribution of the whole pie.

Throwing Away Some of the Pie (Sub-optimizing) Continuing to use the example of union management bargaining, sometimes no compromise is reached and some of the fixed pie actually gets thrown away. The bargainers get off the bargaining line into the lose-lose area which is to the lower left in Figure 2. This area demonstrates various degrees of sub-


57

optimized thinking. While the kind of thinking employed is still zero-sum in nature, the size of the pie shrinks sometimes to zero. According to Godard (1994) the collective bargaining process can become a forum for threats and innuendoes, thus escalating and accentuating the level of disagreement. He goes on to indicate that this process is one in which each side attempts to disguise its `Bottom Line'. Initial positions may bear little resemblance to what it is that the parties will ultimately be prepared to accept (Stevens, 1963) This type of traditional negotiation can involve considerable bluffing, adversariness, and outright deception, as each side attempts to convince the other that it is unable or unwilling to make more than minimal concessions (Walton & McKersie, 1991). In the lose-lose area each side is determined to reduce the amount of satisfaction experienced by the other party even if it has to give up some of its own satisfaction to do so. In other words, each party is willing to contract the amount of satisfaction available. A piece of the pie gets thrown away. Often this is manifested in the form of costly strikes which reduce employee incomes and company revenues as well as good will with the public for both the union and management. During work stoppages, neither the company nor its workforce makes money. Both sides end up in the `lose-lose' area. In the worst possible scenario, all the pie is thrown away: the company is dissolved and the Avoidance behavior orientation in the lower left-hand corner of Figure 1 has been adopted (We both lose). This may occur through bull-headedness on either side. It may also result from an ulterior motive on either side such as the company wanting to open up a replacement plant in another geographic area or employees secretly wanting to buy the company out of bankruptcy and run it themselves. Thus, the bargaining process as described to this point (above) is some sort of a win lose contest. At best, what one side wins, the other automatically loses and none of the fixed pie is thrown away. This represents an optimization of sorts. At worst, when negotiations get really heated and both sides fail to compromise anywhere along the bargaining line, some of the assumed fixed pie is actually thrown away. This is called sub-optimization.

Making the Pie Bigger (Super-optimizing) The area above and to the right of the WinLose Bargaining Line in Figure 2 is the WinWin area. In this area, both parties' concerns are considered valid and relevant. Both parties achieve a higher level of satisfaction

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than they believed possible and sometimes the full satisfaction desired. The solution is not on the bargaining line but rather, is somewhere in the area above it. The collaborative behavior orientation in the upper right-hand corner of Figure 1 (we all win) is required to achieve this solution. To the extent that each party wants more than partial satisfaction for itself and more than partial satisfaction for the other party, collaboration is necessary. Full collaboration is necessary for both parties to achieve 100% satisfaction. This can be referred to as integrative bargaining or mutual gains bargaining. This system emphasizes (1) the need to focus on common interests between parties rather than on positions; (2) the need to put oneself in the position of the other party and see things from the other party's point of view; (3) the need to create options that will enhance the mutual gains of the parties; (4) the need to develop and use objective rather than selective criteria for evaluation of outcomes (Craig & Solomon, 1996). Each side goes into the bargaining process with the same goal: How to achieve full satisfaction for ourselves and at the same time ensure that the other party also achieves full satisfaction? In other words: How to ensure both parties experience full satisfaction? In this collaborative approach the amount of total satisfaction expands and makes the pie bigger than it was.

Integrative bargaining

Collaboration as the Preferred Approach Intuitively the collaborative approach seems the best way to go. However, many researchers go beyond an intuitive argument to back up the need for the collaborative approach and the need for a process to allow it to happen. Adams, (1995), Pfeffer, (1994), Craig and Solomon (1996), Kochan and Osterman (1994), Godard (1994), Kochan and Piore (1984) and Kochan, Katz and McKersie (1986) have written extensively on the need for a more collaborative process for collective bargaining. According to Adams (1995), adversarialism is not in the economic interests of any society and confrontational industrial relations systems are a drag on economic performance. Thus, it is in the interests of any nation to pursue policies designed to elicit consensus. He suggests that articulated cooperation produces an economic synergy that is absent in confrontational societies. Adams strongly believes that American legislation, rather than stimulating labor-management cooperation, further embedded adversarialism. Unions came to be considered not as social partners, as they were defined in Europe, but instead as a kind of punishment

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for managerial sins. North American industrial relations are exceptional in the degree to which they are confrontational and exclusionist, and that exceptionalism is to our economic and political disadvantage. Godard (1994) believes that labor-management cooperation is being held back by adversarial traditions and a high degree of distrust between parties. The cooperative and collaborative approach in many European countries is in stark contrast to the situation in North America. From the early 1970s Scandinavian unions have been leaders in cooperating with management in order to reorganize work to make it simultaneously more satisfying and rewarding to the workers and more productive (Berggren, 1992). In Germany unions are also participating cooperatively in work reorganization schemes (Jacobi, Keller & Muller-Jentsch, 1992). The tradition in many European countries is the tripartite process whereby management, government, and employee representatives are willing to work together for the common good and approach the bargaining process with a cooperative, collaborative mindset. Often the union initiates problem solving with government and management. For example, in Germany when east and west were unified into one country and a great deal of unemployment and other financial malaise occurred, the union, instead of simply demanding solutions, took the initiative to work with government and management to achieve ways to increase employment. In these countries, there is a common approach that is based on trust among the three parties to solving problems collaboratively. Adams (1995) believes that a move away from confrontation is possible in North America despite the long history of confrontation. He stresses that the Swedes, during the early 1900s were among the most quarrelsome of peoples, but by the 1970s the world was acclaiming their propensity to find mutually acceptable solutions to difficult socioeconomic problems. In short, attitudes and behaviors embraced for decades or even centuries can be changed. Magma Copper, fourth largest copper mining company in the United States has been able to bring about such a change. The details of how Magna achieved an end to the company's ùs versus them' adversarial relationship is documented in Pfeffer (1998). Magma's vice-president of human resources, saw old hostilities and resentments preventing both sides from discussing future possibilities without a dramatic breakthrough. A group of seventeen high ranking union and management personnel



was formed to develop, oversee and implement a process of cooperative labor relations. The management and union jointly hired an outside consultant to facilitate such a process involving both sides. The process began with all group members venting emotions for a full day followed by a second day which was used to develop an implementation plan to achieve cooperative labor relations. This plan was `jointly owned' by union and management. The new working relationship that developed at Magma, inspired the company and union to reconsider the contract they had signed earlier. Both parties voluntarily agreed to sign a new contract eight months prior to the old one's expiration in 1992. They approached designing and negotiating a contract the same way they approached all other work place issues: jointly, collaboratively, and cooperatively. Magma `believes it enjoys a substantial competitive advantage in the mining industry due to its innovative highinvolvement human resource processes'. Pfeffer (1998) wrote that many of the changes made at Magma entailed a sharing of power with employees that organizational leaders are often not willing to undertake, regardless of the economic benefits from doing so.

Easier Said than Done In North America the collaborative approach often fails when tried. This may be because most North American organizations have never learned how to innovate new management processes that work permanently. North America is famous for the `Fad of the Month' approach to learning how to manage better. New `programs' such as TQM, quality circles, and suggestion systems, make a lot of sense conceptually but they often fail because the implementation is poorly understood and skills in making change are lacking (Basadur & Robinson, 1993). For these new programs to become permanently established, the way people think and behave needs to change. This is very difficult and takes much time and effort. North American managers tend to look for the `quick fix'; they do not usually take the time to learn the necessary creative skills of change making. Thus such programs come and go and are often derisively referred to as the latest `flavor of the month'. The problem is that the `what' is understood, but there is a lack of knowledge of the `how', the new, different behaviors and thinking skills to put the theory into practice. According to Pfeffer (1998) `smart people and organizations do dumb things' because a profound gulf exists between knowing what to do and knowing


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how to do it and between knowing how to do things more effectively and actually doing things more effectively. Knowing `what' to do is necessary but on its own it is clearly insufficient. What is required to close the gap is a clear cut implementable process for organizational creative or innovative thinking, that is, skill in deliberately changing for the better how we do things. Basadur (1995) suggested that, in order to achieve highquality, innovative, creative results, an individual or a group requires not only the appropriate content (i.e., the knowledge or the what) but a creative, innovative process (the how) for working on that content, as well as sufficient skills in applying the innovative process. These three components provide the `quality results equation': Quality Results = Content + Process + Process Skills An important objective of this paper is to introduce such a process and process skills and demonstrate how they can be learned and applied.

Trust as an Outcome of Collaboration Pfeffer (1998) suggests that all workplace practices and changes should be evaluated by a simple criterion: to what extent do they convey and create trust and respect among people. The collaborative approach requires a serious commitment to doing things differently. According to Adams (1995) collaboration is based on mutual recognition and acceptance of the validity of the interests of each party. In Germany and Japan for instance, the key ingredient seems to be that the parties are consulted about issues critical to their interests and there is a concerted attempt to achieve consensus before any action is taken. As experience is acquired, that their interests are not treated cavalierly, labor and management become more willing to commit themselves to positions that in confrontational circumstances both would automatically oppose. This suggests that union-management cooperation over a broad range of issues helps to engender the trust necessary to produce employees highly committed to continuous improvements in quality and productivity (Adams, 1995). For many North American companies, this atmosphere of trust is considered highly desirable, but there is no method or pathway to achieving it. It seems to be assumed that because such an atmosphere of trust does not already exist, therefore, collaboration is impossible, that is, trust leads to collaborating. In this paper we propose that works the other way around,

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that is, collaborating leads to trust. More specifically, we propose that the deliberate application of the special creative process and process skills described in this paper leads to an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect.

Simplex as a Tool for Conflict Management ± Collaborative Win-win Solutions Through The Deliberate Use of Creativity Creativity Moving beyond the bargaining line into the `win-win' area of Figure 2 requires òut of the box thinking', that is, `creativity'. However, the key is that creativity is needed most in problem defining, not so much in problem solving. What is needed is a process that permits both sides to use their creativity in defining problems in new ways. Attempts to categorize the study of creativity (e.g. Murdock & Puccio, 1993) frequently emphasize the four `Ps': product, person, press (environment) and process. Most research focuses on one category. O'Quin and Besemer (1989) and Jackson and Messick (1964), for example, focused on understanding and assessing the product of creative efforts. Meanwhile, one aspect of the `person' approach has been identification: the development of cognitive and personality tests capable of identifying more or less creative people. Dunnette (1976), Gough (1976), Roe (1976) and Torrance (1974) provide comprehensive reviews of this identification movement. Guilford's work (1968) is among the best-known in the cognitive realm and MacKinnon's (1962, 1977) in the personality realm. Kirton (1976) and Myers (1962) addressed the relationship between personality and creative behavior, and Guilford (1968) addressed the cognitive aptitudes and abilities associated with various kinds of (potentially creative) thinking. The study of environmental `presses' has been pursued by Amabile and Gryskiewicz (1989), Andrews and Farris (1972), and Baker, Winkofsky, Langmeyer and Sweeney (1976), among others.

The Process Approach to Creativity The focus on the fourth P is apparent in research that models creativity as a process. For example, Basadur (1979, 1982, 1992) portrayed individual, team and organizational creativity as a dynamic, circular four stage process (Figure 3) of continuously finding good problems, (generating), defining them

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(conceptualizing), solving them (optimizing), and putting good solutions into practice (implementing). Generating means continuously and deliberately discovering and surfacing new and useful problems to be solved. In organizations, this includes generating new products or services by anticipating new customer needs, by discovering ways to improve existing products, services, procedures and processes, or by identifying opportunities to improve the satisfaction and well-being of organizational members and pertinent groups outside the organization. Conceptualizing means keeping an open mind and defining such new problems and opportunities (regarding them as `fuzzy situations') accurately and creatively to clearly visualize the big picture and to identify more specific challenges and insights and relate them to one another. Optimizing means developing new, useful, imaginative solutions to these challenges. Implementing means successfully putting such new solutions into action. Each implemented solution leads to new, useful problems to be discovered ± hence the circular process. Research shows that effective organizations do what it takes to mainstream such a process (make it an everyday habit among its members) for continuous innovation and for intrinsic motivation (Basadur, 1993, 1997). Research also shows that skills in such a process can be deliberately developed (Basadur, 1979, 1994). To make the process work, skills in sequential diverging and converging thinking (defined below) are necessary within and between the stages. In practice, the process is represented as eight diverging-converging steps within the four stages as follows: . Generating: problem finding and fact find-

ing

. Conceptualizing: problem definition and

idea finding

. Optimizing: idea evaluation and action

planning

. Implementing: gaining acceptance and im-

plementation

These eight steps make up the complete circular Simplex innovative thinking process shown in Figure 4. Building upon the work of Parnes, Noller and Biondi (1977), Basadur, Graen and Green (1982) identified a two-step mini-process called ideation-evaluation in which diverging and converging thinking occur sequentially (see Figure 5). Ideation-evaluation occurs within each of the eight steps of the Simplex process. Ideation, or active divergence, is the generation of options without evaluation



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Figure 3. The Four Stages of the Innovation Process (deferring judgment). Evaluation, or active convergence, is the application of judgment to the generated options to select the most significant options. Separating active divergence from active convergence is a vital aspect of this mini-process and must be executed skillfully within each step of the eight step process. The skill required to separate active divergence from active convergence is called deferral of judgment. As depicted in Figure 6, deferral of judgment skill balances active divergence and active convergence by separating them. Both active divergence and active convergence are essential to creativity but must not be done at the same time. Instead, they are used sequentially.


A fourth skill, the vertical deferral of judgment is also vital. It operates between the steps or stages of the process to prevent unconscious leapfrogging and short circuiting the process. This skill is described in more detail below. The four necessary process skills of the Simplex process can be summarized as follows: . Active divergence B the ability to asser-

tively generate a variety of options.

. Active convergence B the ability to evalu-

ate and choose from among options and advance the process. . Deferral of judgment B the ability to separate active divergence from active convergence.

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Figure 4. How the Four Stages Correspond to the Eight Steps of the Simplex Innovation Process . Vertical deferral of judgment B the ability

to avoid unconsciously leapfrogging past steps or stages of the process.

Why Problem Definition is So Important

Problem definition

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Asked what he would do with only one hour to save the world, Albert Einstein said, Ì would spend 55 minutes defining the problem and then five minutes solving it'. He believed that the best problem solvers were those who could define problems in new ways. The same belief has been expressed by many famous problem solvers such as Polaroid inventor Edwin Land who said Ìf a problem can be defined, it can be solved' and the famous educational psychologist John Dewey who wrote À problem well stated is half solved'. Getzels (1975) conducted a field experiment linking problem definition emphasis to creative performance. Tables 1, 2 and 3 list the specific skills required for good diverging and converging thinking and for the separation of the two

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especially in the conceptualization stage of the creative process. The conceptualization stage emphasizes creativity in problem defining.

Vertical Deferral of Judgment Not only does deferring judgment mean delaying and separating evaluative, converging thinking and behavior from non-evaluative diverging thinking and behavior within each stage, it also means delaying moving to the next stage of the process until each previous stage is complete. The fourth skill, vertical deferral of judgment, must be exercised from stage to stage. Skipping in and out of different stages at random must be avoided. This skill means avoiding the urge to leapfrog over different stages of the process. For example, many people lack the patience to fact find, preferring to jump straight to a solution before the problem is well defined. Others jump even further and want to plan for or even take action immediately. A



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Figure 5. The Ideation-Evaluation Process

Figure 6. Balancing the Process Skills of Active Divergence and Active Convergence Using the Process Skill of Deferral of Judgment # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000

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Table 1: Specific Skills for Deferring Judgment Especially in Conceptualization . Avoid making premature, negative judgments of fledgling thoughts (both when working

alone and with others)

. Visibly value, appreciate, and welcome other points of view as opportunities to strengthen

thinking, rather than as a threat to one's ego

. Patiently maintain an awareness that some facts are more difficult to perceive (more invisible)

than others

. Question assumptions for validity and search out hidden, unconscious assumptions which

may be unwarranted

. Tackle problems with an optimistic `can do' attitude rather than prematurely concluding that

it `cannot be done' because Ì can't see how'

. Tend not to jump prematurely to a conclusion as to what the `real problem is' in a situation . Avoid attaching negative connotations to problems; such prejudgment may bias fact finding

efforts

. Visibly stay open-minded to others' versions of the facts . Often pause deliberately to try an unusual approach to define a problem instead of

automatically relying on an old approach

. React positively to new radical thoughts as opportunities to build fresh new thinking

Table 2: Specific Skills for Active Divergence Especially in Conceptualization . Search out many different facts and points of view before attempting to define a problem . Define problems in multiple and novel ways to get a variety of insights . Clarify problems by breaking them down into smaller, more specific subproblems and also

by opening them up into broader, less limiting challenges

. Deliberately extend effort to create additional unusual, thought provoking potential ways of

defining a problem

. Give credit for divergent thinking by others; praise others for alternative viewpoints and try

to build upon and strengthen such alternatives to increase variety of choice

. Turn premature, negative evaluations of ideas into positive challenges to keep the creative

process flowing; that is, change negative `We can't because. . .' thoughts into positive `How might we. . .?' thoughts . Share information and ideas freely with other people and departments hoping to build understanding of problems . Get teams to formulate problems in ways which transcend individual and departmental considerations.

problem solving group must ensure that its members are moving through the process one step at a time and diverging and converging together within each step. Skill in vertical deferral of judgment is essential to allow a group to work through the Simplex process together and to knowingly adapt the flow as circumstances suggest. A process facilitator should be used to synchronize a group in its flow of sequential diverging thinking and converging thinking. The facilitator models these thinking skills (and the supporting attitudes and behaviors) and builds the

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group's own capability to use the process. Group members are encouraged to remain open to and seek out fresh points of view while diverging, and to apply objectivity and good judgment while converging.

Importance of Deferring Judgment Obviously, crucial to the success of Simplex is this thinking skill of `deferring judgment'. The ability to defer judgment in the two ways described above is the gateway to the creative, collaborative development of multiple



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Table 3: Specific Skills for Active Convergence Especially in Conceptualization . Take the time to select, clarify and focus upon the most significant facts available prior to

attempting to define a problem

. Recognize and accept the critical few best problem definition options in terms of `broadness'

vs `narrowness' of focus and insight provided

. Open-mindedly develop and use multiple, unbiased criteria for selecting from among

problem formulation options, rather than letting preconceptions or hidden motives sway decisions . Take the risk of failing or being criticized for being different for selecting novel problem definitions . Be willing to accept and participate in consensus decisions about problem formulation and move on decisively in the problem solving process . Do not wait for the `perfect' option to emerge; instead take reasonable risks to finish the problem formulation stage

points of view and new and different perspectives. If analysis and evaluation of fledgling thoughts and different points of view are deferred skillfully, multi constituency participation and problem defining and solving is made safer. Under such conditions, team members are less fearful advancing fledgling points of view and less likely to feel they must be constantly òn guard' to protect parochial interests. Breakthroughs are more likely to occur under this process which encourages different points of view and relaxed supportiveness. Skill in deferring judgment permits extreme emphasis to be placed upon the first two stages of the Simplex process. The essence of the generating stage is to surface new problems and information as positive opportunities for improvement and innovation. In the union-management context this would be equivalent to looking forward to the next bargaining session as an opportunity to improve the quality of work life and company performance. In Japan, this is commonly called `looking for the golden eggs' (Basadur, 1992). This orientation permits safe, openminded, fact finding to occur. The essence of the conceptualization stage is to raise insightful challenges that are sparked by the key facts discovered in the generation phase and create a common and fresh understanding of the problem as a whole. Creativity in problem defining often provides the road to a breakthrough. . . looking at the problem from a new angle. Too often we rush into developing solutions without determining a good problem statement. Many unwarranted assumptions are made. For example we assume the problem definition is clear to all parties involved and that it is the same as our own perception. An important aspect of problem


definition in the Simplex process is that problem definitions are always forced into an optimistic format beginning with the words `How might we. . .?' People tend to dislike negative problems, but they are quite positive toward opportunities and challenges. The `How might we. . .?' is a vital and powerful phrase. The `How might we. . .?' question replaces the negative `We can't because. . .' statement which is frequently heard in organizations.

Skills, Behaviors And Attitudes Are Needed to Make The Process Work Basadur and Finkbeiner (1985) identified specific attitudes that enhance the process skills described above. They suggested that, unless the ideation-evaluation process is accepted attitudinally, then the process will not likely occur. Thus, the process skills have both attitudinal and behavioral components. Basadur, Graen and Green (1982) reported a field experiment which tested the effects of training the complete Simplex process in an applied setting. They expected that the training would improve creative performance on the job only if a positive change in attitudes and behaviors occurred. That is, the training had to motivate participants to accept the value of separating diverging and converging thinking and to deliberately apply the ideation-evaluation process if innovative performance were to be improved. This belief was based on Basadur's (1979, 1994) analysis of previous laboratory and field experiments on the value of providing creativity training of any kind. In virtually all of this research, the extent to which the participants were actually skilled in the creativity techniques that they were asked to use

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in the experiment was never measured. For example, although `brainstorming' is a creative thinking technique based on deferral of judgment and active divergence, none of the brainstorming research ever attempted to measure to what extent the subjects accepted the value of and employed the skills of deferral of judgment and active divergence in the experiment (or more importantly, back in the real-world setting). In other words, many earlier research studies provided no more training than `giving brainstorming instructions' (as if this were sufficient to effect sudden changes in brainstorming attitudes and skills). In contrast, Basadur, Wakabayashi, and Graen (1990) stressed the importance of building significant skills through at least two days of hands-on practice on real-world problems. Basadur and his colleagues also suggested that compared to simple brainstorming, a complete process such as Simplex is likely to be perceived as more useful and more credible among participants from realworld business and other organizations and less subject to the skepticism that often plagues attempts to `train creativity' (Basadur et al, 1982; Basadur, Graen, & Scandura, 1986). Basadur, Runco and Vega (in press) modeled how real improvements in the acceptance of ideation-evaluation related to improvements in its skillful application. One reason why so many new management techniques earn the ironic label of `flavor of the month' is that managers are unaware that fundamental new thinking attitudes and skills must be learned and applied to make using the new techniques permanent. Basadur and Robinson, (1993) and Basadur (1997) provide complete analyses of what it takes to make permanent changes in how organizations think and how perpetuation of this `fad' approach to management can be avoided.

Out of the box thinking

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Measuring the Needed Skills, Attitudes and Behaviors Basadur et al (1982) systematically measured for the first time the impact of training in a complete process of creativity on individuals both immediately after training and after their return to work. They expected that performance would be improved only if significant gains in the acceptance and practice of the ideation-evaluation process were achieved. These expectations are consistent with Kraut's (1976) traditional industrial/organizational psychology training model: Training must go beyond understanding to change attitudes and to change behaviors in order to achieve superior results. Basadur et al stressed that essentially none of the previous research

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in creativity training had addressed the intermediate steps in Kraut's model. Their research attempted to measure and understand to what extent changes in acceptance of (attitude) and practice of (behavior) ideationevaluation might actually result from training and accompany changes in performance (results). As described above, this link between training and changes in acceptance and practice of the fundamental ideation-evaluation process had simply been assumed to occur in previous research. Basadur and Finkbeiner (1985) established a questionnaire to measure two specific attitudes that make up acceptance of ideationevaluation: the preference for ideation (active divergence) and the tendency to (not) evaluate prematurely (preference for deferral of judgment). They suggested that these two attitudes enhance and encourage the practice of the two related behavioral skills. Encouraging active divergence leads to generation of more options and deliberate development of many points of view. Encouraging avoidance of premature convergence reduces the urge to prematurely judge or analyze a fledgling thought. Basadur and Finkbeiner also suggested that a low tendency toward premature convergence would trigger a high preference for active divergence. That is, the former, more passive attitude is a prerequisite trigger for the latter, more active attitude. When people become skilled in reducing premature convergence and increasing active divergence, they create more, higher-quality options. These two measures of the acceptance attitudes are used in the research reported in this paper as explained later. Measures of the behavioral skill (practice of the ideationevaluation process) are also described later.

'Out of the Box' Thinking Is Critical in All Four Stages For many people, òut of the box' thinking is much more difficult in the earlier stages of the creative process, especially conceptualization, which involves discovering good questions and challenges prior to creating good answers and solutions. Applying Simplex helps people uncover specific challenges that they face, relate strategic and tactical challenges to one another, and understand a situation both from a big picture (forest) and a specific (trees) standpoint. The Simplex process is designed to facilitate an individual, group or whole organization to discover, think through, clarify and define complex, ambiguous, or strategic issues by placing maximum emphasis on the skills of problem generation and conceptualization prior to solutions and



implementation. This special skill is not taught in school. On the contrary, students become totally immersed in learning various solutions for presented and structured problems and when they begin their jobs find that these solutions often do not match the ill-structured problems that they either encounter or must seek out for themselves (Livingston, 1971; Leavitt, 1975; Levitt, 1963). The most important skill they need seems to be finding the right problems to work on, and this includes increasing the size of what at first glance seems to be a `fixed pie'.

Formulating Creative Challenges to Make the Pie Bigger The first three steps in the Simplex process of Figure 5 are concerned with creativity in terms of problems not solutions. Once a problem or opportunity has been sensed (Step 1), participants in a Simplex creative problem solving application session deliberately view it as a `fuzzy situation' requiring clarification. Fact finding follows (Step 2). Participants share perspectives and stretch their thinking to generate information about what they know or think they know, what they don't know but wish they knew, what they may be needlessly assuming, what would be different if the situation were resolved, and what they have already thought of or tried. Participants then choose key facts to create specific challenges they need to confront. Formulating these challenges in an imaginative way is called problem definition (Step 3). The key facts are used for divergent generation of concrete, specific, simply worded challenges each beginning with the words, `How might we. . .?'. Participants defer judgment and avoid prematurely assuming what can and cannot be done. Each `How might we. . .?' represents a unique challenge. By discussion and consensus, the group then chooses a small number of challenge statements they consider as the more important ones. Next, using the selected challenges as starting points, the group creates a Challenge Map, with broader (bigger picture) challenges placed higher and more specific (tactical)

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challenges placed lower. When moving down the map from the top, the questions `What's stopping us?' and `What else is stopping us?' are used to elicit specific impediments and create additional previously undiscovered challenges. Conversely, when moving up the map, the questions `Why?' and `Why else?' are asked to identify previously undiscovered goals and broader challenges. Because this mapping process relates all of the challenges created by the team to one another both strategically and tactically, when completed it represents many ways in which the pie can be enlarged. Judgment and analysis are deferred while the map is being built, permitting new and sometimes hidden or unexpected challenges to be discovered in both directions. The simple three-step questioning process in Table 4 is used to create and place each new challenge. The group then selects the challenges from the map that are believed especially critical and merit solutions and action plans or further fact finding and more detailed exploration. If further fact finding and exploration is decided, for each of the selected challenges the major impediments preventing its solution are identified by asking the questions repeatedly: `What's stopping us?' and `What else is stopping us?'. This results in additional challenges to add to the challenge map. The top challenges are then selected from the final map to enlarge the pie. A more extensive description of the challenge mapping and problem formulation methods above are provided in Basadur, Ellspermann and Evans (1994).

Examples of the Power of Problem Definition Irish Spring A research team at Procter and Gamble was given the directive to develop a bath soap which could compete in a superior way against the newly launched competitor product Ìrish Spring'. The team had prematurely defined the problem in the following way: `How might we produce a better green striped bar of soap?' After several months of

Table 4: The Simplex `Why What's Stopping?' Creative Analysis Step 1. Ask the complete question: `Why. . .?' or `What's Stopping. . .?' of the selected challenge. (Also, ask `Why else. . .?' and `What else is stopping. . .?'). Step 2. Answer in a complete simple sentence. Step 3. Transform the answer into a new challenge.


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solution generation they were unable to design a green striped bar of soap which tested superior to Irish Spring. They had rushed into solving a poorly defined problem. By asking some good fact finding questions, creating a divergent list of `How might we. . .?' challenge statements and deliberately applying the `Why-What's stopping?' analysis, a new, broader and more creative problem definition was developed. This powerful statement of the problem was `How might we produce a more refreshing bar?' One team member immediately pictured freshness in the form of fluffy clouds in a blue sky while another member said freshness made him think of the sea coast. In a very short time frame a new and very successful product was conceived: Coast bath soap. The key to the team's success was a less restrictive, broader problem definition. The `pie' was made bigger: better green stripes was only one way of achieving better refreshment. The refreshment pie was bigger than the green-striped pie. Lay the Bags Flat

Transference of skills

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Another example of broadening the problem, increasing the pie and increasing the amount of total satisfaction available is a Frito-Lay packaging dilemma. An interfunctional team had been formed to reduce costs and was bogged down solving the challenge `How might we reduce packaging department costs?' The team's manufacturing members had identified a new packaging system which saved enormous amounts of time and money. The individual bags of potato chips were being packaged standing upright in larger boxes for delivery to customers. The new idea involved laying the bags on their sides in the boxes. The sales department team members were not at all satisfied with this solution because on delivery, customers open each box and count the bags before signing the receiving documents. Thus the new idea would result in extra time and frustration for the customer and slow down the salesperson who would make fewer sales calls per day. Obviously, an important challenge for sales was `How might we continue to make our required quota of sales calls per day?' By working together with the attitude of achieving full satisfaction for both sides, and by following the discipline of the Simplex creative process, a new problem definition was identified. `How might we lay the bags flat yet still allow the customer to quickly know how many bags are inside the box?' Several solutions immediately became evident, including providing each customer with a weigh scale so that opening the box and counting

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was unnecessary. Rather than argue and disagree over solutions which appear to conflict because they address two different challenges, the creative process resulted in a new expanded challenge that encompassed both original challenges. In the union-management bargaining context this would be an example of making the pie bigger, where many more and more creative solutions could be generated to the expanded problem definition. Some of these solutions would be capable of providing complete satisfaction to both parties.

The Necessary Creative Process and Facilitation Skills Can Be Acquired Learning the creative process and skills involves participation in a workshop setting followed by the completion of a program of activities in the work setting. The intent is to acquire the skills, attitudes and behaviors necessary for achieving successful creative outcomes each day in day to day working and living. Simplex training workshops are intensive and practice oriented. Learning experiences include a series of diverse tasks that encourage participants to discover concepts not considered before such as the value of deferring judgment and of divergence in thinking. For example, participants define problems then compare definitions with other participants, discovering that the same problem can be viewed in many different, yet fruitful ways. Importantly, the emerging skills are applied to real-world problems as part of the learning experience. This promotes transference of creativity skills and concepts to personal frames of reference. A supportive climate is developed and participants are encouraged and rewarded for displaying the necessary attitudes, skills and behaviors. Participants are provided many opportunities for discovery that such attitudinal and cognitive skills do work.

Results of Training the Necessary Creative Skills Research and experience strongly indicate that the Simplex skills for innovative thinking can be learned, nurtured, and managed within organizations through experiential and practice-oriented training (Basadur, 1994, 1995; Basadur, Wakabayashi, & Takai, 1992). Basadur et al (1982) demonstrated that such training among participants from an industrial research organization yielded several improvements including:



. more likely to pause to try new, unusual . . . . . . .

approaches; more open-mindedness to new ideas; deferral of premature critical judgment; less time spent in negative evaluation during idea generation; increased quantity and quality of problems found; and more different problem definitions developed; less likely to jump to conclusions about the nature of a problem; better skilled in evaluating ideas.

Basadur, Graen, and Scandura (1986) found that training effects on manufacturing engineers persisted back on the job, particularly when they were trained in teams. Other organizational field research demonstrating the results of training in specific thinking skills, attitudes, and behaviors for both individuals and teams is summarized by Basadur (1987, 1993). Top management can also be trained to apply these skills in their work as individuals and as members of executive teams. Furthermore, they can be taught how to model and encourage the use of these new skills throughout the organization. Top managers must lead by learning and visibly using the creativity skills and changemaking process. They must also develop specific strategies to maintain the use of the process and the thinking skills (Basadur, 1993, 1994) on an everyday basis.

Union Management Bargaining: A Special Subfield A special and very important category within the field of conflict management is unionmanagement bargaining. An effective method for achieving collaboration and integrativeness would be very valuable to this category because much acrimony is still associated with it. One tends to think of agonizing, prolonged strikes causing loss of worker income and company profits, and nerve-wracking brinkmanship in highly confrontational meetings between union leaders and company bargainers sitting on opposite sides of a long narrow table. The meetings last all night and all day for weeks on end with news blackouts and adversarial posturing by both sides. Stagner and Rosen (1965) describe the bargaining process as beginning when one side attempts to communicate to the other its perception of the work situation and to induce a change in the situation. They go on to say that bargaining is necessary because the situation as seen by management does not


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coincide with that seen by workers and union officers. Conflict occurs when one party does not achieve its desired satisfaction level in relation to the other party. Bargaining is an important kind of conflict management. It has become part of life in the work environment. It also can obviously lend itself to improvement. The case study below used the Simplex four-stage, eight-step creative process as a deliberate tool to implement collaboration in a real-world labor-management collective bargaining session. A genuine need provided an opportunity in a real life setting for some research and also an opportunity to develop a practical method for application to a wider range of situations. The results were used to develop theory integrating creativity, the bargaining process and conflict resolution and explaining why successful application would be situational.

Case Study Application In this North American corporation, the historic relationship between management and the union can be characterized as definitely confrontational. Four times in the past 11 years, resolution of the collective agreement had involved work stoppages. This time both parties thought that it was timely to explore a more collaborative approach to bargaining a new agreement. During the past decade there had been a slump in the industry and revenues were decreasing. Neither the company nor the union relished the acrimony and non-productive effort that appeared to be inseparable from their traditional bargaining, especially in these difficult times. It was agreed to try to apply the Simplex creative problem solving methodology to the bargaining process to try to achieve more of an integrative win/win solution.

Training to Build Attitudes and Skills How the training works is modeled in Figure 7 (as discussed earlier with respect to Kraut, 1976, etc). For training to be effective in achieving improved creative performance it must first achieve a change in attitude, that is, an acceptance of the four process skills (active divergence, active convergence, deferral of judgment, and vertical deferral of judgment). This then, must lead to the application of these four process skills to real world work which in turn should result in improved creative performance in terms of finding and defining good problems and creating and implementing good solutions.

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Figure 7. How Simplex Training Works: Attitudes to Behaviors to Results

A special 12 day training session was devised for the 14 member negotiating team to build the attitudinal and cognitive skills described above. The team was comprised of seven members from each side. The level of such skill can be expected to be proportional to the amount of training provided (Basadur 1994). The impact of training in this case was a compromise between the level of skill needed, time available, and risk. (As will be discussed later, this level of skill was not sufficient to handle all the articles to be bargained. The monetary article was considered too difficult to risk the new approach.) A procedural check was made to ensure a training `take' had been achieved. The questionnaire measuring the two attitudes connected with deferral of judgment and active divergence skills described above (Basadur & Finkbeiner, 1985) was administered before and after the training. The results were compared to a control group (n=99) comprised of members who had undergone the same training previously in

the same company but for different purposes. According to Table 5, the training was likely successful in achieving a `take'. The bargaining team and the control group both made significant improvements on both attitudes. The magnitude of the changes is consistent with previous research. After training, the two groups improved on both attitudes and also both attitudes scored very similarly (17.8 vs 18.3 for premature convergence and 23.8 vs 22.2 on active divergence). While the magnitude of improvement on premature convergence was even higher (6.3) for the control group than for the bargaining team (3.3), this was probably due to a lower starting point (21.1 vs 24.7) before training and was not considered an important difference. This indicates that the training was successful in at least influencing attitudes toward innovative thinking in the correct direction and to a similar degree as other training groups. Furthermore, the same analysis was conducted for the two sub teams (union and

Table 5: Attitudes Associated with Creative Thinking Skills Before and After Training Preference for Active Divergence

Tendency toward Premature Convergence

Before Training

After Training

Change

Before Training

After Training

Change

Union-Management Bargaining Team (n=14)

20.5 (3.4)

23.8 (3.4)

3.3* (3.3)

21.1 (5.5)

17.8 (4.0)

73.3* (3.2)

Control Group (n=99)

19.3 (4.0)

22.2 (3.9)

2.9** (4.3)

24.7 (5.8)

18.3 (5.7)

76.3** (6.1)

* p5.01 ** p5.001 Standard deviations are provided in parentheses ( ).

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management (n=7) each) and scores for the sub groups were similar to each other and similar to the team as a whole.

Action Plan for Ensuring Application of the New Attitudes and Skills At the end of the training, the team created an action plan to ensure that the four process skills in Figure 7 were applied and practiced in the upcoming application of the Simplex process. The plan comprised of specific implementable actions to help the team deliberately use their new skills and avoid falling back into old habits. For example, a bell would be purchased to be rung every time premature judgment was used by anyone to squelch a fledgling thought. Nominal fines would be imposed for interruptions and poor listening behaviors. Also included in the action plan were a bias board and some techniques for avoiding bogging down. Bias board To capitalize on the Simplex process's emphasis on creativity in fact finding and problem definition, the team created a `Bias Board'. The purpose was to help push fact finding way beyond superficial and obvious information. Each side's biases were to be `dug out', identified and recognized as legitimate starting points rather than remaining hidden. The fact finding that followed the training used the `Bias Board' to permit both parties to deliberately and openly share their key biases as simple facts to be started with, not to be hidden, ignored or used later to `kill' new approaches. Such sharing of preconceived notions was rewarded with positive feedback and recognition by other members. Avoiding bogging down Whenever the group would lapse into old adversarial tactics, however unintended or disguised, it learned to employ a technique called `debriefing' (Basadur, 1994). In debriefing, a group pauses to self-correct by examining its behaviors and processes and intercepting any slippage. Furthermore, when the team found itself ìn a loop' where no new ground was being broken, they would entertain what they called a `free wheeling' period. By permitting each person to talk in a very unstructured way about anything that might in any way be related to the issue, the team developed new insights that permitted it to evolve new words and approaches to bridge differences.


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Implementation and Results on All 25 NonMonetary Articles During a three month period, the process was applied to all 25 non-monetary articles. An outside facilitator was not used; and the team facilitated itself. Each contract article in turn was considered a fuzzy situation (step 1). Each party read its opening position concerning the article, then expanded and elaborated on their view of the fuzzy situation to its heart's content while the other party relaxed and listened non-judgmentally (to the best of its ability). Second came an actively divergent fact finding period (step 2). Any kind of fact finding question without limits was entertained. In addition, special questions to probe for deeper facts were also deliberately employed. For example, `What do we know or think we know about this fuzzy situation?' `What don't we know but wish we knew about this fuzzy situation?' Ì wish I knew. . .?' Ì think I know. . .' and Ì firmly believe that. . .'. The teams interacted freely with each other and, as people thought up fact finding questions or answers, these were written up without judgment or argument onto large pieces of newsprint posted on the wall. Many, many such pieces were posted. Consensus was then reached on the most relevant facts through active convergence. The team worked hard to evolve expressions of these facts in ways that were satisfactory to both sides. For example, opinions were stated as àll of us are of the opinion that. . .' or `some of us are of the opinion that. . ..' This way beliefs, opinions and feelings could be identified as such and expressed as statements of fact. (E.g. `The union believes that supervisory skills are inadequate but management feels most supervisors have skills above the industry average.') Using these key facts as the base, the group used active divergence to generate many, many thought provoking `How might we. . .?' challenges. Why ± what's stopping? questioning was used to further improve and clarify these challenges. The group then converged on those challenges with the most promise for making the pie bigger (step 3). For each selected challenge (problem definition) for each article, the two step mini process of ideation evaluation was used in steps 4, 5 and 6 to create and select ideas, criteria for evaluation, and action plans for article revision. Actions taken included providing instructions to the language committee for changing the contract and in some cases specific workplace changes were implemented. These changes were assigned to members of the team with a specific timetable

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for completion. Where members felt they needed help in gaining acceptance (step 7) for the changes from either constituency, the members of the team created ideas to help. In either case, individuals who were assigned tasks of implementing the changes (step 8) would report back to the group on their success at the next meeting.

Monetary Article Bargaining

Monetary and nonmonetary issues

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Senior management had been planning to increase organization wide application of the Simplex process to improve the company's operations in general in addition to union management bargaining. It wanted to expand this application slowly and deliberately. They feared risking failure so were hesitant to employ the process directly on the monetary article until further skill and experience was achieved. Unfortunately, they did not advise the members of the team of this decision until it was too late. Instead, as soon as work on the twenty fifth article was complete, an awkward attempt was made to apply the process indirectly. The senior management of the company advised that ìt wished to table its monetary package in full'. This was a surprise to the entire fourteen member team. A management communique stated: Àt this point discussions have just begun on the monetary items. In a manner consistent with our approach to these negotiations, we have tabled our full mandate.' Apparently, this represented a conscious belief by senior management that to put out all of their predetermined monetary package (facts) as a whole and not emit it in `dribs and drabs' as in the past was a move forward toward open and honest sharing of information in the spirit of the creative process. In retrospect, it seems that the atmosphere of trust and collaboration that had been built so far had lulled senior management into a false sense of security that this indirect approach would be understood by the union in the way that it had been intended. However, a union communiqueÂ the next day indicated that the union had not perceived the company's move of putting its full mandate on the table as an open disclosure of the facts. On the contrary, instead it was perceived as a return to the old adversarial bargaining approach. This communiqueÂ stated `. . .the company finally tabled its offer' and `. . .it is a pity that the company has reverted to the standard method of bargaining and so forces the union to do the same'. Thus bargaining on this single monetary article began without application of the newly adapted Simplex creative process.

March 2000

Discussion of Results and Future Steps Simplex Successful with Non-Monetary Items From the results above, it appears that Simplex Creative Problem Solving skills were successfully applied to resolving all the nonmonetary issues. Subsequent interviews with members of both teams indicated a lot of optimism for the new approach. Importantly, the process allowed the team to get to the underlying causes instead of recurrent symptoms. There was a feeling that a great deal of progress had been made on learning a new process that is useful in the bargaining context. There was also a feeling that the next time around it may very well be time to try to increase skill in the process to the point that it could be experimented with on the monetary article as well. The Simplex process was successfully applied to develop a much more harmonious and co-operative constructive atmosphere around all of the bargaining process until the monetary issue hit. It was firmly believed by both sides that the atmosphere was very productive and well worth repeating in the future. The rest of this section will deal with some explanations of the apparent differential ease of application to monetary and non-monetary issues and suggest future research.

Concerns Precluding Application to Monetary Article The subsequent interviews with both sides indicated that on the monetary article there were three concerns that tended to preclude the effective use of the Simplex process by the company at this stage. The monetary article was perceived to (1) be more complex (2) be more emotional and (3) involve higher personal risk. The first two can be grouped as a skill issue and the latter can be classified as an organizational climate/motivational issue. These two issues are interrelated and suggest two integrated explanations. The monetary article was considerably more complex from a content point of view and also evoked much more emotion than the non-monetary articles. The monetary issues would require much more trust about very intimate motivations that neither party would be willing to open up about at this stage. For example, what if all the real facts were portrayed fully and resulted in the team deciding that the union should agree to a 10% pay cut? How would this sit with the membership? Conversely, what if the bargaining team concluded that



senior management should double their offer based on the `real' facts and yet the budget had already been approved by the Board? The inner motivations of both sides on the team would certainly be at odds with such potential results with severe implications for members of both sides. Clearly with the backdrop of past mistrust and adversity prior to these negotiations, such a trust level was not yet present. For each non-monetary issue, emphasis on creating an expanded problem definition which incorporated high concern for satisfaction for both parties led to creative, integrative solutions. However, on the monetary issue, there was no effort devoted to creative problem definition. The team reverted to zero-sum thinking and there was no opportunity to create a bigger pie. The likely relationship between the amount of emphasis placed on problem definition and the degree of creativity of the solutions and the degree of integrative bargaining is shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Relationship of Emphasis on Problem Definition to Creative, Integrative Solutions

Skill Levels Required to Use Simplex: Non-Monetary vs Monetary Articles It is probable that the skill level of the company as a whole in applying the creative process was sufficient to handle problems only to the level of difficulty demanded by the non-monetary issues. As problems get more difficult (emotional and complex), more skill is needed (see Figure 9). With inadequate skill, quite possibly the team would have become more and more engrossed in the content and forgetful of the process in tackling the more difficult monetary article even if it had the opportunity to apply the creative process. Such higher skill in Simplex can be achieved through more extensive training or by employing a highly trained facilitator who can manipulate the team into


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using the process and detach it from content as needed.

Figure 9. Relationship of Problem Difficulty to Level of Creative Process Skill Required to Achieved Creative, Integrative Solutions

Motivation to Use Simplex: Non-Monetary vs Monetary Articles In this case, the perceived risk of using the Simplex process caused the company to succumb to the old habits and negative reactions to change that had been built up in the organization over the years. In the well known equation, P = M H A, (performance equals ability times motivation), performance is zero if either the skill or the motivation to use the skill is zero. Thus, in the more general case, if traditions are more secrecy than openness, more adversarial than co-operative, more withholding than sharing, then no matter what the skill level, on certain articles of discussion a team may still not be able to perform well even if given the chance, due to a low motivation level. Such a low motivation level might occur, for example, if team members are thinking Ì don't think we should use this process because I'm not sure it will lead to success in the eyes of my members (or my hierarchy)'.

Bringing the Two Explanations Together The two potential explanations above provide the basis for a two-dimensional model of Distributive-Integrative Bargaining. The level of motivation of a bargaining team to use the Simplex creative process can be plotted on one axis and the skill level of the bargaining team in the process on the other as shown in Figure 10. In area 1, the team is low in both creative process skills and in motivation to apply them. Thus, it resorts to purely distributive, uncreative, adversarial bargaining on all articles. In area 2, the team believes strongly

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Figure 10. Skill ± Motivation Model for Applying the Simplex Creative Process to Bargaining that the Simplex process is important and wants to apply it but is somewhat frustrated because it does not have sufficient skill to use it well on all articles. On the less difficult articles they use it to achieve integrative bargaining. In area 3, the skill is high but the motivation to apply creativity to the articles is low. Thus, for articles which are perceived as relatively non-threatening and non-risky in the organization context, the Simplex process is applied and they are handled integratively. However, for articles which are perceived as risky, the team either just `goes through the motions' or does not even try to use the technology. Instead, it handles these articles quite adversarially in a manner that has been expected by their constituencies in the past. In area 4, the team is both highly skilled in the creative process and has a high motivation to use it. Every article, regardless of complexity, emotionalism or riskiness is handled creatively. There is a trust that the respective constituencies will understand new creative, unusual solutions in a spirit of co-operation and experimentation. Thus, very integrative bargaining on all articles results.

Future Steps This paper has endeavored to explain how the Simplex creative process can help achieve collaborative win-win solutions through the deliberate use of a creative process emphasizing problem definition. Three factors were

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identified that mediate the application of the process to union-management bargaining: complexity of the issue, emotionality of the issue, and motivation to apply to the issue given the organizational climate. It would be worthwhile to get additional organizations to attempt to use the Simplex creative process in their bargaining on monetary and other more complex, emotional issues and conduct research to understand better what it takes to get a very integrative mode (area 4 in Figure 10) in force in such organizations. In the future, the model of Figure 10 could be used at the beginning of any experiment with using the Simplex process to improve bargaining between two parties. During a pre-consultation, both sides could assess themselves to what extent the organization's atmosphere/climate would permit creative problem solving technology to be used. They would also be able to make a good decision as to what skill level they would need. This would be tied into what extent they would desire to attempt distributive bargaining. For example, would there be certain articles on which they felt the motivation would be high? What skill level did they think was necessary to achieve on which articles? Which articles would they feel it would not be fruitful to attempt such a process either to the skill level needed or consistent with the organizational climate prevalent? The organization could also make decisions about long range plans to improve organiz-



ational climate to move from a very distributive to a very integrative mode (area 1 to area 4 in Figure 10), such as how gradually, or how quickly, as the case might be. The model in Figure 10 could be used for a company to plan carefully, over a period of time, an approach that would suit it specifically. Research should be done to uncover as many other factors as may be operating in organizations that would either aid or preclude organizations moving toward the very integrative (area 4) mode. Further research could then be done as to how such factors might be managed.

References Adams, R.J. (1995) Industrial relations under liberal democracy. University of South Carolina. Amabile, T.M. & Gryskiewicz, N.D. (1989) The creative environment scales: Work environment inventory. Creativity Research Journal, 2, 231±253. Andrews, F.M. & Farris, G.F. (1972) Time pressure and performance of scientists and engineers: A five year panel study. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 8, 185±200. Baker, N.R., Winkofsky, E., Langmeyer, L., & Sweeney, D.J. (1976) Idea Generation: A Procrustean Bed of Variables, Hypotheses and Implications. College of Business Administration, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati. Basadur, M.S. (1997) Organizational development interventions for enhancing creativity in the workplace. Journal of Creative Behavior, 31 (1), 59±72. Basadur, M.S. (1995) The power of innovation. Pitman Professional Publishing, London, UK. Basadur, M.S. (1994) Managing the creative process in organizations. In M.A. Runco (Ed.), Problem Finding, Problem Solving, and Creativity. Chapter 12. Ablex, Norwood, NJ. Basadur, M.S. (1993) Impacts and outcomes of creativity in organizational settings. In S.G. Isaksen, M.C. Murdock, R.L. Firestein, and D.J. Treffinger (Eds.), Nurturing and Developing Creativity: The Emergence of a Discipline (pp. 278±313). Ablex, Norwood, NJ. Basadur, M.S. (1992) Managing Creativity: A Japanese model. Academy of Management Executive, 6 (2), 29±42. Basadur, M.S. (1987) Needed research in creativity for business and industrial applications. In S.G. Isaksen (Ed.), Frontiers of Creativity Research: Beyond the Basics (Chap. 18, pp. 390±416). Bearly, Buffalo, NY. Basadur, M.S. (1982) Research in creative problem solving training in business and industry. Proceedings of Creativity Week 4. Greensboro, N.C. Center for Creative Leadership. Basadur, M.S. (1979) Training in Creative Problem Solving: Effects on Deferred Judgment and Problem Finding and Solving in an Industrial Research Organization. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, December.


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Basadur, M.S., Ellspermann, S.J., & Evans, G.W. (1994) A new methodology for formulating illstructured problems. OMEGA: The International Journal of Management Science, 22 (6), 627±645. Basadur, M.S. & Finkbeiner, C.T. (1985) Measuring preference for ideation in creative problem solving training. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 21 (1), 37±49. Basadur, M.S., Graen, G.B. & Green, S.G. (1982) Training in creative problem solving: Effects on ideation and problem finding in an applied research organization. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 30, 41±70. Basadur, M.S., Graen, G.B. & Scandura, T.A. (1986) Training effects on attitudes toward divergent thinking among manufacturing engineers. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 21 (1), 37±49. Basadur, M.S. & Robinson, S.J. (1993) The new creative thinking skills needed for total quality management to become fact not just philosophy. American Behavioral Scientist, 37 (1), 121±138. Basadur, M.S., Runco, M.A. & Vega, L.A. (in press) Understanding how creative thinking skills, attitudes and behaviors work together: A causal process model. Journal of Creative Behavior. Basadur, M.S., Wakabayashi, M., & Graen, G.B. (1990) Individual problem solving styles and attitudes toward divergent thinking before and after training. Creativity Research Journal, 3 (1), 22±32. Basadur, M.S., Wakabayashi, M., Takai, J. (1992) Training effects on the divergent thinking attitudes of Japanese managers. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 16 (3), 329±345. Berggren, C. (1992) Alternatives to Lean Production. ILR Press, Ithaca. Blake, R.R. & Mouton, J.S. (1964) The Managerial Grid. Gulf Publishing, Houston. Craig, A.W.J. & Solomon, N.A. (1996) The System of Industrial Relations in Canada, 5th edition. Prentice-Hall Canada Inc, Ontario. Dunnette, M.D. (1976) Aptitudes, abilities, and skills. In M.D. Dunnette (Ed.), Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology (pp. 571±607). Rand McNally, Chicago, IL. Getzels, J.W. (1975) Problem finding and the inventiveness of solutions. Journal of Creative Behavior, 9, 12±18. Godard, J. (1994). Industrial Relations: The Economy and Society. McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Toronto. Gough, H. (1976) Personality and personality assessment. In M.D. Dunnette (Ed.), Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology (pp. 571±607). Rand McNally, Chicago, IL. Guilford, J.P. (1968) Creativity, Intelligence and their Educational Implications. EDITS, San Diego. Hall, J. (1969) Conflict Management Survey: A Survey of One's Characteristic Reaction To and Handling Of Conflicts between Himself and Others. Teleometrics, Inc, Houston. Jackson, P.W. & Messick, S. (1964) The Person, the Product and the Response: Conceptual Problems in the Assessment of Creativity. Educational Testing Service, Princeton, NJ. Jacobi, O., Keller, B. & Muller-Jentsch, W. (1992) Germany, codetermining the future? In A. Ferner and R. Hyman (Eds), Industrial Relations in the New Europe. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

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Kirton, M.J. (1976) Adaptors and innovators: A description and measure. Journal of Applied Psychology, 61, 622±629. Kochan, T.A., Katz, H. & McKersie, R. (1986) The transformation of American industrial relations. Basic Books, New York. Kochan, T.A. & Piore, M. (1984) Will the new industrial relations last? Implications for the American labor movement. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 473, 177±189. Kochan, T.A. & Osterman, P. (1994) The mutual gains enterprise. Harvard Business School Press, Boston. Kraut, A.I. (1976) Developing managerial skills via modeling techniques: Some positive research findings ± a symposium. Personnel Psychology, 29, 325±328. Leavitt, H.J. (1975) Beyond the analytic manager. California Management Review, 17 (3), 5±12. Levitt, T. (1963) Creativity is not enough. Harvard Business Review, 41, 72±83. Livingston, I.S. (1971) Myth of the well-educated manager. Harvard Business Review, Jan±Feb, 79±89. MacKinnon, D.W. (1977) Foreword. In S. Parnes, A. Noller, & A. Biondi (Eds.), Guide to creative action (p. xiii). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. MacKinnon, D.W. (1962) The nature and nurture of the creative talent. American Psychologist, 17, 484±495. Murdock, M.C. & Puccio, G.J. (1993) A contextual organizer for conducting creativity research. In S.G. Isaksen, M.C. Murdock, R.L. Firestein, and D.J. Treffinger (Eds.), Nurturing and Developing Creativity: The Emergence of a Discipline (pp. 249± 280). Ablex, Norwood, NJ. Myers, I.B. (1962) Myers-Briggs Type Indicator manual. Educational Testing Service, Princeton, NJ. O'Quin, K. & Besemer, S.P. (1989) The development, reliability and validity of the Revised Creative Product Semantic Scale. Creativity Research Journal, 2, 268±279.

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Parnes, S.J., Noller, R.B., & Biondi, A.M. (1977) Guide to Creative Action. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, NY. Pfeffer, J. (1998) The Human Equation. Harvard Business School Press, Boston. Pfeffer, J. (1994) Competitive Advantage Through People: Unleashing the Power of the Work Force. Harvard Business School Press, Boston. Roe, A. (1976) Psychological approaches to creativity in science. In A. Rothenberg and C.R. Hausman (Eds.), The Creativity Question. Duke University, Durham, NC. Stagner, R. & Rosen, H. (1965) Psychology of UnionManagement Relations. pp. 108±109. Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc, Belmont, CA. Stevens, C. (1963) Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiations. McGraw-Hill, New York. Thomas, K. (1976) Conflict and conflict management. In M.D. Dunnette (Ed.), The Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology. Rand McNally, Chicago, IL. Torrance, E.P. (1974) The Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking. Personnel Press, Bensenville. Walton, R.E. & McKersie, R.B. (1991) [1965] A behavioral theory of labor negotiations. ILR Press, Ithaca, NY.

Min Basadur is Professor of Organizational Psychology and Innovation at the Michael G DeGroote School of Business, McMaster University, Ontario, Canada. Pam Pringle is a Lecturer at the Michael G DeGroote School of Business, McMaster University, Ontario, Canada. Gwen Speranzini is a doctoral researcher at the School of Management, University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology, United Kingdom. Marie Bacot works with the Centre for Research in Applied Creativity, Ontario, Canada.


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Book of the Quarter Eco's Mirrors and Consciousness Reviewed by Tudor Rickards Umberto Eco (1999), Kant and the platypus: Essays on language and cognition, ISBN 0 436, 41057 5, 464pp, hardback, endnotes and general index, London: Secker & Warberg. [A translation by A McEwen, of Kant e l'ornitorinco, Bompiani R.C.S. Libri, Milano, 1997.]

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tackled the new work by Umberto Eco for various reasons. In the preceding months, a few books on knowledge management had claimed my attention. However, they did not strike me as having a great deal of credibility, lacking as they did any credible conceptual underpinnings. I had vague suspicions that an author with something to say on philosophy and criticism might provide a few starting concepts that would strengthen informed practice in the management of knowledge. Less hopefully, I wondered if such an author would have something new to say about the essential aspects of knowledge production, particularly creativity. Eco's latest book to be translated in English seemed a suitable candidate. I was attracted first by the cover, which has a magnificent design, with wellbalanced text, under-stated colours, and a juxtaposition of two drawings, one of a platypus and one of the great German philosopher Kant. (Whoever said we should never judge a book by its cover, never added that a book's cover is a pretty good initial indicator of the values of its author and publisher). What preconceptions did I bring to my reading of Eco's Kant and the platypus? My bookshelves no longer contain a copy of his most famous work, The name of the rose, which I read several times with enjoyment and then lost with insufficient regrets for me to buy another copy. I have also watched the film version several times, again with enjoyment. I have never managed to see the final scenes. That is partly because of the enthusiasm of TV schedulers for running the film well into the small hours of the morning. Nevertheless, I enjoyed that part of the film I've seen, and the experiences subsequently encouraged me to try Foucault's pendulum, a work which # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000. 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

offers enough space for readers to develop their own ideas on literary criticism and postmodernism. More recently, I acquired a copy of The Island of the day before which kept sending me to sleep, even before the small hours of the morning. These encounters illustrate my various reactions to Eco's work. The writing has a dangerous richness that can be described as multi-textual, and I survive when I can find a coherent narrative to cling on to. Otherwise I let go and abandon the project. In the introduction to Kant and the platypus, Eco writes of his intentions to deal with an important problem. He notes that èven Kant (as we shall see) not only failed to solve [the problem] but didn't even manage to express [it] in satisfactory terms' (p1). The problem concerns the nature of generalities and of specifics, and the relationships between the two sorts of `thing' (or, indeed, if we should accept the existence of the two sorts of `thing'). Generalities are categories such as machines or humans. Specifics are individuals such as `my computer' on which I am working (serial number 68013728); or `Mr. Michael Jackson', whose figure I had noticed mowing the lawn outside, when I began making these electronic keystrokes a few minutes ago. The philosophical difficulties begin when we try to understand how knowledge of machines connects with knowledge of `this particular machine'. (There are other difficulties, for example, to do with the legitimacy of accepting the permanence or otherwise of the alleged figure of Mr. Jackson, over time). Having noted the difficulties that Kant experienced in expressing this problem in satisfactory terms, Eco added: `So you can imagine how much chance I've got.' This

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playful remark serves as a decision-point. What are we to make of the author's intentions? Is he playfully setting the scene so that readers can join in, free from concerns that the author claims any major philosophic ambition? Later in the introduction he retains this position for the essays, claiming they were `written therefore in a spirit of indecision, and beset by numerous doubts'. On balance, I'd say the Professor is up to one of his intellectual games when engaged in such protestations of modesty. Later in the introduction, he notes that he owes thanks to colleagues and companions who awoke him from some of his dogmatic slumbers. This is an echo (an Eco?) of Kant's famous remark on the impetus to his philosophic work he received on reading Hume. The impetus led Kant to his enormously influential attempt to deal with the relationship between the empirical and the conceptual (`categorical'), that is to say the central issue within this new book. These implications, of which Eco is clearly aware, are hardly consistent with someone troubled with a sense of the inadequacy of his work. Is Eco deliberately or accidentally revealing some rather ambitious aspirations? The subsequent text did not reveal to me many further indications of the author's self-doubt, and I'm inclined to treat the sentiments in the introduction as a form of philosophic or pedantic license. The author permits himself the possibility for an approach that is rather free stylistically. He chooses to interweave stories with his theoretical discussions, using the interesting argument that stories help us understand `how common-sense works. In this way we discover that normality is narratively surprising' (pp5±6). This frees him to indulge his natural exuberance and love of paradox. `Kant knew nothing about the platypus, and that should not worry us, but if the platypus is to solve its own identify crisis, it ought to know something about Kant (p7). A little earlier in similar vein we find: Ì insinuate that it [the platypus] was not made from the pieces of other animals, but that other animals were made from pieces of the platypus (p6).' Hearing these remarks, we may chose to hear a post-modern jester protecting himself from accusations of not making any sense, by providing a space for creative sense making. That is why we are not able to remark of the authorial voice `the poor chap can't be serious, can he?', and expect a serious answer from anyone. Perhaps for such structural decisions, Eco sometimes leaves the reader unclear as to his intentions. When he chooses to clarify the concept of a schema he refers to the modern

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computer flow-chart. We are left unclear as to whether he feels that we are today better able to refine Kant's ideas, or whether he is building up to denouncing the idea of some cognitive structure that has characteristics akin to a flow-chart. Before going any further, I have to acknowledge that the book has had an effect on my writing in this review. I would prefer there to be a greater degree of clarity, compactness and focus in the earlier paragraphs, just as I would liked more of such features in the book. But Eco has wriggled out of any such responsibilities, and somehow triggered some hapless mimicry of his style in myself, that is a bit of a platypus of a style. I will make a conscious effort to regain a voice of my own. I think this book is àbout' Eco updating his contribution to the theory of semiotics. He is seeking to secure his position in that paradigmatic space. He intends to honour a debt that had been incurred when A theory of semiotics, his major text, was published, some years ago (1976). Readers encounter his views on reference, iconism, truth, signification, and perception, mostly modifying or reaffirming his earlier work. However, the repaying of the dept has little consequence to those of us who were unaware of the contract in the first place. Put baldly, this book can only be approached in these terms by students of semiotics already versed in his earlier text. Which leads to a puzzle. What then, is the significance (if I dare use the term) of the beautiful cover, and the introduction written in a way that I `read' as an invitation to an intelligent but non-specialized audience? In these terms I feel quite at home. One plausible explanation runs as follows. Highly gifted but unworldly scholar falls among publishers who persuade him of the merits of reaching a wide audience for his work. Empirically determinable outcome: lots of books bought and quickly shelved unread. (Ì never did get time to read that latest Eco I received as a Christmas present'.) Yet the text is not completely unreadable (in the old-fashioned sense of the term) even for those uninitiated into the mysteries of semiotic theory. The stories can be fun, although you would hardly buy this book for its amusing illustrative narratives. It provides adequate evidence that the àdvances' of semiotics in dealing with the problems of universals and specificity are creating their own theoretical difficulties. For me, the introduction of a vocabulary of cognitive types, nuclear content, and molar content, does not dissolve the eternal philosophic difficulties of universals and singula-


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rities. While I may not follow Wittgenstein's arguments in detail, (he suggested at one time that virtually no one ever would understand him), his broad position is now well-known, and at least has it to be addressed by others intent on clearing up the ancient philosophic conundrums. Here, only the merest of traces of Wittgenstein are allowed to intrude into the discourse. The style of writing at times delighted and at times frustrated me. I found much that entertained and delighted in the discursive accounts of attempts to classify the platypus, of the role of poets in helping demarcate the limits of possibility, (poets have not won, the philosophers have surrendered, p56). The frustration kicked in with the realization that the illustrative examples mostly stood alone ± for me they did not illustrate, so much as kept me going. The big frustration came from the sense of so dazzling an intellect engaged in a project that seems to seal itself off from an acknowledgement of its own limits. By the time I read (p124) that `Given the erratic character I should like these reflections to have, I shall


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not always try to identify positions, theories, research or the schools of thought within contemporary cognitivism', I am of the mind that we have here more of that philosophic license mentioned above. Why should there be merit in such an erratic character? Might it be rather more fun to `honour the debt' to one's own writing, than to the debt that might be owed to the writings of other people? Yet I could not leave the book alone. I reread it. I found a few more elements I admired, such as his examination of mirrors, mirror images and TV images. I spent more time re-examining his thoughts on being (`being always manifests itself in the positive', p55). And on his preference for the rational over the poetic as a route to understanding (a view shared by earlier philosophers, I seem to recall). After that, I closed the book. I'm still not sure how to deal with its echoes, mirrors, and analysis of consciousness. On balance, I think I'll leave the cognitive mainland of semiotics and search for further insights into such matters in other territories. Perhaps I'll write some poetry.

Volume 9

Number 1

March 2000

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