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JOURNAL OF SEMANTICS AN INTERNATIONAL JoURNAL FOR

THE INTERDISCIPUNARY Sroov OF THE

SEMANTICS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE

MANAGING EDITOR . PETER BosCH (mM Scienufic Centre, Heidelberg and Uruversity of Osnabnlck) ASSOCIATE EDITORS. NICHOLAS AsHER (Uruvemty of Texas, Austin) RoB VAN Dmt SAmrr (Uruvemty of NJJmegen) REVIEW EDITOR: AND Uloi!LING (Uruvemty of Stuttgan) ASSISTANT EDITOR AND! UloELING (Uruvemty of Stuttgan) EDITORIAL BOARD· MANFRED BIEIIWISCH (MPG and Humboldt Uruvernty Berlm) BRANIMJR BoGUIL\EV (mMWatson Research Center) Mum BmuLLO (Uruvemty of Toulouse) Kmn! BROWN (Uruvcmty of Essex) GENNAIIO CHIBII.CHIA (Uruvemty of Milan) ANN CoPP.STilll (Stanford Uruvernty 6s-rnN DAHL (Uruvemty of Stockho ) PAUL DFxxa (Uruvemty of !uruterdam) CLAIIlE GAII.DB.NT (Uruvemty of Surbrucken) BAliT GEUim (Uruvemty of Osnabrock) M!CHA£1. Hl!i.WEG (mM Saenufic Centre, Heidelberg) LAUill!NCB R HollN (Yale Uruvemty) JOACHIM JAcoBs (Uruvcmty of Wuppertal) PHIUP N joHNsoN-LAIIlD ( Pnnceton Uruvemty) MBGUMI K.uu!YAMA (SRI lnternanonal Stanford)

L

HANs !CAMP (Uruvemty of Stuttgut) SEBASTIAN UIBNEII (Uruvemty ofDUsseldorf) Sill joHN LYON S (Univemty of Cambndge) jAMES D. McCAWLEY (Uruvemty of Chicago) MAlle MoBNs (Uruvemty of Edmbnrgh) fuN CIS J. Pn1.l.1!111!1l (Uruvemty of Alberta) MANFlll!D Pmv.L (Uruvemty of Saarbnicken) ANToNY S ANPOII.D (Uruvemty of Glasgow) AilrNIM VON STECHOW (Uruvemty ofTubmgen) MAn STEEDMAN (Uruvemty of PenruylvanLa) ANATOU STRJGIN (MD: Planck Gesellschaft, Berlm) HBmmrrm DB SwAliT (Uruvernty of Utrecht) BoNNIE WBBBmt (Uruvemty of Penruylvarua) Hilla Zlmvt.T (Uruvemty of Anuterdam) THoMAS E. ZIMMI!IlMANN (Uruvemty of Stuttgan)

EDITORIAL ADDRESS Journal of Semanncs, c/o Dr P Bosch, ffiM Germany Saennfic Centre, Vangerowstr. 18, D-61rMl ofSmttuwa LS dLStnbured by MAIL Arneru:a, �J.l3 Randolph Avenue, Avenel, New Jersey 07001, USA. PenodLC11 postage pa>d at R.thway, New Jersey, USA and at additional entry pomu. US POSfMASIER: send address correctioru

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JOURNAL OF SEMANTICS Volume IS Number

I

CONTENTS Special issue on Underspecification and Interpretation Guest Editors: Reinhard Blutner and Rob van der Sandt REINHARD BLUTNER AND RoB VAN DER SANDT Editorial Preface KEES VAN DEEMTBR

s

Ambiguity and Idiosyncratic Interpretation MARcus EGG Wh-questions NICHOLAS Bridging

in Underspecified Minimal Recursion Semantics

AsHER AND

ALEx

37

LASCARIDES 83

(to be continued in Volume IS Number 2)

The contents page published in the journal of &mantus, Volume IS Number I: February 1998 w as in error. We apologise for this mistake and request that you please insert this sheet instead of the faulted page. Please visit the journal's world wide web site at http://www.oup.eo.uk/sema.nt

JOURNAL OF SEMANTICS Volume 15 Number 3

CONTENTS STEVEN FiussoN, DoMINIEK SANDRA, FRANK BRISARD, GBRT VAN RILLAER AND HUBERT CUYCKENS Flexible Semantic Processing of Spatial Preposinons IOANNIS VBLOUDIS 'Quantifying' Superlatives and

Homo Sap1ens

NICHOLAS AsHER AND ALEx LAsCARIDBS The Semantics and Pragmatics of Presupposition

215

239

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(0 Oxford Umvenity Press

1998

Flexible Semantic Processing of Spatial Prepositions STEVEN FRISSON, DOMINIEK SANDRA, FRANK BRISARD, GERT VAN RILLAER AND HUBERT CUYCKENS

University of An�

Abstract users spontaneously apply semantic extenston pnnciples to novel usages, or whether they treat word meanings as discrete, ngidly defined entities. In Experiment 1, readers made a timed deci51on on the correctness of a sentence. Rejecting a cognitively plausible yet unattested extension of a preposition (*Pmr IS standmg by tk county) took longer and lead to more errors than rejectmg a pLamly incorrect usage of that preposition (*Pmr is standing by tk subtJtk� ThU result was obtained for two novel extensions of two different preposinoru. Experiment 2 mcluded a preceding context in order to fix the referent of the target word and to exclude singular mterpretanoru. The results were consutent With those of Experiment 1, although the overall number of errors dropped considerably. Taken together, these experiments indicate that, even in a wk dJSCOuragtng the use of flexible processing, subjects are not able to suppress the apphcanon of extension principles. We conclude that interpreting the mearungs of words in a flexible way is an mherent property of a semantic processing system.

This article presents two experiments investiganng whether language

INTRODUCTION

Word meanings have rwo characteristics. First of all, they have an element of conVffl tionality, such that they behave as relatively stable linguistic units. This conventional aspect makes it possible for children and foreign language learners to learn how to use words in the way adult native speakers of the language do, thereby conforming to the norms that members of the language community have implicitly agreed upon. For the same reason, lexicographers can describe those meanings in their dictionaries. In short, the notion of lexical meaning entails the existence of conventional usage norms, which one has to respect in order to engage in successful communication. At the same time, however, word meanings are characterized by a degree of jkxibility. This property makes it possible to extend the range of applicability of words to situations in which they are not conventionally used. This potential of meaning extension is the driving force behind the historical evolution of a word's meaning, ie. the process by which novel

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1

192

Flexible Semantic Processing of Spattal Preposinons


usage possibilities are added to the usage potential of a word. For instance, the word wing was certainly not used in expressions like t� wing of an airpla� before the emergence of flying techniques, but the original meanmg of the word made it possible to extend its usage to such a new context. Examples like this can be found in abundance in the diachronic evolution of many words in any language. This readiness of language users to extend word meanings also explains the high frequency of different forms of figurative language, like metaphor and metonymy (which, incidentally, are often the processes behind diachronic semantic evolution, as in the example above), irony, etc. This also manifests itself in the realm of grammatical or so-called function words, in so far as the same principle is responsible for the emergence of new, related usage types. Prepositions, the class of grammatical items we will focus upon in the present paper, get extended semantically by virtue of unusual combinations with other lingmstic items, in particular with the types of objects that follow them. Accordingly, wing acquires another meaning either through combination with an explicit linguistic item belonging to the semantic domain of, say, 'airplanes', or at least through the realization that an intended referent of which wing is attributed as a part is not, in any literal sense, a bird. Of course, for prepositions the combination with unusual referents and/or linguistic expressions will tend to have a bearing on the whole of a proposition, since the function of such grammatical items is exactly to establish a coherent scene in which all participants are given a specific role. The fact that meaning extension is so pervasive in language indicates that language usm are very good at it Speakers apparently have no problems using words in a novel way Oanguage production) and listeners do not seem to encounter problems of interpretation Oanguage comprehension). This is an interesting observation from a psycholinguistic point of view. It suggests that the flexibility of word meanings actually reflects a property of the language user's processing system. That system must be designed in such a way that adapting word usages to the communicative needs of the moment is a very natural and effortless process. In the present paper, we will investigate one aspect of this 'naturalness'. We will test the hypothesis that, despite the highly conventionalized nature of lexical meaning, language users are unable to deal with word meanings as conventional linguistic entities only. Rather than treating their stored semantic knowledge in a rigid, inflexible way, they will spontaneously and automatically extend it to novel usage contexts. In order to test this hypothesis, we designed an experimental technique which explicitly invited language users to reject non-existing but possible semantic extensions of word usages. Indeed, the best way to demonstrate the automatic nature of the process of semantic extension is to show that it cannot be brought under

Steven

Frisson,

Dominiek Sandra, Frank Brisard, Gert V:m Rillacr, Hubert Cuych:ns

193

2 EXPERIMENT 1 The hypothesis that language users automatically extend word usages beyond the set of existing ones was tested in a speeded decision task with the Dutch spatial prepositions aan 'by, near, at' and naast 'next to'. Dutch-speaking subjects were asked to decide whether they thought sentences containing these prepositions could be used in Dutch or not.

2.1 Method 2. I. 1 Materials and design For the purpose of this experiment, only those instances of aan and naas t were used that express the spatial relational component 'proximity'. This semantic overlap enabled us to test similar extensions in two different prepositions. The results for aan and naas t will be presented separately. The use of aan and naas t expressing a spatial proximity relation imposes restrictions on the size of their landmarks (LM) relative to their trajectors (TR).' This allows us to create extensions in which the difference in size of LM with respect to TR is manipulated. Extension principles, such as metaphorical and metonymic mappings, end-point focus, etc., are frequently based on some manipulation of an original or prototypical semantic configuration. in which, at least in the case of prepositions, the relation between TR and LM is considered crucial Out of all the possible


subjects' conscious control, even in a situation where attending to extensions is irrelevant for the task at hand and actually interferes with task performance. The basic technique was to present sentences in which a word-always a preposition-was used incorrectly, but where this usage was a cognitively plausible (though unattested) extension of the actual word meaning. Subjects were expected to classify such sentences as incorrect sentences in the language. If the process of semantic extension is indeed automatic, subjects will be unable to inhibit processing of the extension and, accordingly, will find it relatively difficult to reject these sentences. This will be reflected in longer reaction times and possibly higher error rates relative to the data for plainly incorrect sentences. The technique used here is sitrular to the one that Glucksberg and his colleagues have successfully used in their research on metaphor processing (e.g. Glucksberg, Gildea & Bookin 1982).

194

Flexible Semantic Processing of Spatial Preposttiom


criteria that can be changed (properties of TR, of LM. or of the type of relationship linking the two), only one, i.e. the relative size of LM, was selected for this particular experiment, in order to make sure that no interference from other semantic variables was measured. If flexibility in the processing of lexical-semantic configurations is as pervasive as the experimental hypothesis purports it to be, it should manifest itself when the manipulation of this criterion leads to incorrect, yet quite conceivable, usages of a preposition. In a relation of spatial proximity as lexicalized by aan or naast, LM is usually larger than TR (e.g. Ptter [=TR] stond aan het bruggetje [=IM], 'Peter was standing by the bridge), but LM can also be allowed to be somewhat smaller than TR (e.g. Hij stond naast htt barluukje, 'He was standing next to the bar stool). The important point is that the difference in size between LM and TR should not exceed a certain limit. This limit is not absolute but is to be defined in terms of LM's relative size with respect to TR A small TR, for instance, puts a much stricter limit on the size of the LM it is spatially related to than a large TR does. Consider, in this respect, Marokko ligt naast de Salutra 'Morocco is located next to the Sahara Desert' vs. De speld ltgt naast htt huis The pin is lying next to the house'. The former sentence is more acceptable than the latter, even though the landmark in the former sentence is much larger than that in the latter. The restriction on TR's and LM's relative size has (cognitive) advantages for the hearer, in that it allows her to identify TR's precise location with respect to LM In this sense, it is true that the magnitudinal constraint present in these prepositions' m eanings constitutes an instantiation of a more general, functionally inspired criterion, which states that reference points (i.e. LMs) need to be salient enough-where salience is a relative, not an absolute notion-to serve as the reference point or anchor of a spatial identification process (see also Vandeloise 1991 ). If LM is too large with respect to TR (e.g. Gtrt bMndt zich aan htt graafsclutp, 'Gert is located by/near the county}, TR's location cannot be sufficiently identified, simply because the perimeter of the landmark in question is too extensive to warrant any precise localization of the trajector, i.e. the hearer has too many options from which to select the actual location of the target at hand. Conversely, if LM is too small with respect to TR (e.g. Dt stoel staat aan dt spdd, The chair is standing by/near the pin'), LM is not salient enough within the scene described, which also impedes easy localization ofTR It is exactly this sort of manipulation of LM with respect to TR that we have performed in order to create the extensions used in the following experiment. It is true that the normative size of TR and LM is due to pragmatic requirements, but this does not invalidate its being seen as part of the

Steven frisson, Dominie� Sandra, Frank Brisard, Gert Van Rillaer, Hubert Cuycken.s 195

semantic characterization of the prepositions concerned. For one thing, similar restrictions on size do not seem to hold for that subset of locative prepositions which defines a relatively specific spatial relation between TR and LM, such as 'support' (for on) or 'inclusion' (for in), such that the principle referred to above is by no means a general one that can be indiscrim.inately applied to all instances of localization through the use of spatial prepositions., The materials consisted of three categories of word usages:3

Examples of sentences for each of the three categories and the two prepositions are given in Table 1. The stimuli used in each of the three categories were attested by means of a pre-test, resulting in a categorization not dependent on experimenters' intuitions. In this pre-test, four different sets of So sentences expressing an aan/naast-relation between TR and LM were presented to 100 subjects (all of them first-year business undergraduates), each randomized set being presented to 25 subjects.


(i) Corr�d usages (COR}: the preposition's usage falls within the range of existing usages, i.e. it indicates an acceptable and lexicalized spatial relation between TR and LM (e.g. Het kind bevond zich aan d� roltrap, 'The child was located at the escalator'). The size of LM relative to TR is neither too small nor too large, i.e. it does not exceed an implicitly agreed upon and conventionalized limit. The required response to sentences containing these usages is yes. (ii) Plainly incorrect usages (INC}: the preposition's usage falls outside the range of existing usages, in that it indicates an unacceptable spatial relation, either because the relation is impossible in the physical world (e.g. H�i bevindt zich naast tk hoofdletter, 'Heidi is located next to the capital letter') or because it indicates a spatial relation with an abstract NP (e.g. De man staat naast het verbruik, 'The man is standing next to the consumption'). The required response to sentences containing these usages is no. (iit} Exwuied usages (EXT): the preposition's usage falls outside the range of established usages, yet it can be perceived as a possible usage, i.e. it indicates a spatial relation between TR and LM which is physically possible, but which happens not to be lexicalized in the language (e.g. Gm bmndt zich aan het graafschap, 'Gert is located by the county'; Els bevindt zich naast het zakmes, 'Els is located next to the pocketknife'). Two subcategories are distinguished, one in which LM is too small (EXT1) and another in which it is too large (EXT2) with respect to an implicitly agreed on limit. The required response type to sentences containing extended usages is still no.

I

96 Flexible Semantic Processing of Spatial Preposltloru

Table

I

Example sentences for the different condittons used in Expenment

Category

Example

COR

Htt

I

fond btvond zuh aan dt roltrap 'The cluld w.u located at the escalator'

Anntmit staat naast dt bromfltts

EXT EXT!

'Annemie is standing next to the motorbike'

110

Ptttr sto nd aan

110

htt scllttmlts

EXT2

Anntmlt bmndt zuh naast dt oostltust

'Annemie

u

located next to the

HI} staat aan dt ondtrt�UI

INC

east

coast'

'He is standing by the subtitle' wrbruik 'The man IS standmg next to the consumption'

Dt man staat naast htt

To make the task as natural as possible, subjects were informed that some of the sentences were produced by learners of Dutch as a foreign language while others were deliberate mistakes made up by the experimenters themselves. Since learners of a foreign language often produce mistaken though plausible word usages and language users recognize such errors, the subjects were offered a natural criterion to discriminate between possible extensions and impossible ones. (The fact that learners of Dutch would not actually produce such sentences because the relations expressed are not sanctioned in any language is rather immaterial to the argument, since our perception of non-native speakers in the course of learning a language is such that we expect them to make plausible mistakes that just 'sound funny'. It is this feeling of a plausible strangeness which we wanted to create so that subjects would provide the type of reaction needed for the test, without prompting them to inquire into the actual possibility of such mistakes occurring.) Subjects were then asked to indicate, for each sentence, whether the sentence was

correct

(i.e. 'whether a native speaker of Dutch

would use that sentence') or whether it was incorrect. For each sentence classified as incorrect, subjects had to state (i) whether they thought this

sentence could have been produced by a learner of Dutch as a foreign language, i.e. whether they thought it liluly that the learner of Dutch could

this particular sentence, or (ii) whether they thought this unlikely, i.e. whether they suspected that the sentence had been made up

have come up with

by the experimenters.


'Peter was standmg by the razor' Hans btvond zich naast dt sptld 'Hans was located next to the pin' Gtrt btvindt zuh aan htt graafichap 'Gen is located by the county'

Steven

Fri.sson,

Dominiek Sandra, Frank Brisard, Gert Van Rillaer, Hubert Cuyckens

197

The stimuli used in the experiment were selected from the sentences in the pre-test on the following basis: (i) sentences predominantly classified as correct in the pretest made up the COR-category in the experiment (So sentences, 40 for aan and 40 for naast); (ii) sentences predominantly classified as incorrect and as unlikely mistakes made up the INC-category in the experiment (40 sentences, 20 for aan and 20 for naas t); (iii) sentences predominantly classified as incorrect but as likely mistakes made up the EXT-category in the experiment (40 sentences, 20 for aan and 20 for naas t, equally divided between EXTI and EXT2).

categories had to be matched on word length and frequency. As far as word length is concerned, the matching had to involve the category of COR items as well, in order to make sure that subjects could not use word length as a cue for making the distinction between positive and negative response types. The means are shown in Table 2. A one-way ANOVA, in which category (COR, EXT,. INC) was treated as the independent variable and word length as the dependent one, was non-significant (F < I). A separate


The sentences in the INC and EXT categories were clearly perceived as incorrect, both for aan (mean number of mcorrect-responses: INC: I94 (out of 20), EXT: 17.6) and for naas t (INC: I9.4, EXT: I6.J). The pattern observed for the EXT items pertained to each extension type (for aan: EXTI = 94 (out of 10), EXT2 = 8.2; for naas t: EXTI = 7.8, EXT2 = S.s ). For both prepositions, the number of [,July-responses differed significantly between the INC and EXT categories, as assessed in an analysis of variance (ANOVA), where category was treated as the independent variable and the number of likely-responses as the dependent one: F[I, 24) = I40.88, p < o.ooi for aan (INC: 3.6, EXT: I 1.2) and F[I, 24) = I4J·Is. p < o.ooi for naast (INC: 2.7, EXT: I 1.3). Items in the INC category were pre dominantly considered to be unlikely usages, whereas those in the EXT category were predominantly considered to be likely ones. For both prepositions, this contrast was also significant when the two extensions were analysed separately (aan: INC vs. EXTr: F[I, 24] = 30.42, p < o.oi, INC vs. EXT2: F[ 1, 24] = 2J.I7, p < o.oooi; naast: INC vs. EXTI: F[I, 24] = I0.2S, p < O.OI, INC vs. EXT2: F[I, 24] = 64-00, p o.ro, naast:F[r, 38] = 1.54, p > o.Io. When the two extension types were treated as separate levels in the ANOVA (EXT r,

EXT2, INC}, the result remained non-significant: F[2, 37] = 2.67, p > o.os for aan, F < 1 for naast. Items in the COR category were drawn from the

same frequency region as those in the EXT and INC categories. All sentences in the experiment (i) showed the same grammatical

hutsdtur, 'Luk is standing by the door';johan stand naast de bureaustoel johan was standing next to the desk chair'). To avoid having to establish a limit on TR's and LM's difference in size for each TR-LM configuration, the TR and the verb used in the sentences were kept as constant as possible. This means that (1) TRs all referred to entities of the same size, i.e. persons (tk student 'the student', d� jongen 'the boy', personal pronouns, proper nouns), and (ii) the verb expressed a static spatial relation Qexicalized by staan 'to stand' or zich bevinden 'to be located', both used in the simple present and simple past the same number of times over the various conditions). To force subjects to read the whole sentence, they had to answer yes/no-questions about their contents at regular intervals. The experimental list was divided over

8

blocks of

20

sentences. An

additional block, containing 20 filler items, was added at the beginning of the experiment to familiarize subjects with the experimental procedure; its results were not analysed. In each block, there was an equal number of

aan-

and naast-sentences. Each block consisted of

incorrect ones, and s extensions, i.e. there were

10

correct sentences, s

10 yes and 10

no

Table � Mean word length (WL) and frequency (Freq) for each condition AAN

NAAST

Category

WL

Freq

WL

Freq

COR EXT EXT I EXT2 INC

8.2 7·9 8.] 7·6 8 .]

77 95 8] 107 So

7·8 7·7 7·6 7·8 84

95 99 97 100 87

responses.


structure: NP-V-PP, and (ii) expressed the spatial relation 'proximity' lexicalized by aan or naast-between TR and LM (e.g. Luk staat aan de

Steven Frisson, Dominiek Sandra, Frank Brisard, Gen Van Rillaer, Hubert Cuyckens

199

The experimental blocks were presented in two different orders. In each version, the order of the blocks was fixed, but within each block, the order of the sentences was randomized. Between blocks, there was a pause of maximum ro seconds. Subjects pressed a key

if they

wished to continue

with the experiment before the end of the pause or the computer proceeded with the program when the 10 seconds had elapsed.

2.1.2 Procedure Before the experiment started, subjects were instructed-both orally and in writing-about the relevant aspects of the experimental procedure. In

they thought native speakers could use the sentence in Dutch or not. If they thought the sentence was possible in Dutch, they were invited to strike the� key; if they thought the sentence was not possible, they had to strike the no key. They used their preferred hand for� responses. Subjects were told to

decide as quickly as possible while making as few mistakes as possible. Finally, they were informed that, at regular intervals, a question about the previous sentence would be asked, which they had to answer by using the ylS or no key.4 During the experiment, subjects were sitting in front of a computer screen in a darkened room. Before the first block of sentences was presented, a summary of the instructions appeared on the monitor. For each sentence, subjects had to proceed as follows: after seeing the first part of the sentence (presented in lowercase letters) up and until the preposition tUtn

or

naast, they had to push a key in between the two response keys on the

button box to make this part of the sentence disappear. Mter an interval of

250 ms, a fixation point (+) appeared in the middle of the screen for 250 ms, which was in turn followed (again after an interval of 250 ms) by an NP (presented in uppercase). Subjects had to strike the � or no key, depending on whether they thought the whole sentence could be used in Dutch or not. Reaction times were measured from the onset of the NP up to the subject's response. Mter making their decision, either the message 'Next sentence' appeared on the screen, in which case subjects could strike the }'6 or the no key, or a question appeared, which they had to answer with the )'fi or no key. The next trial was then initiated.

2.1 .3 Subjects Thirty first-year undergraduate language students volunteered for this experiment (each order of blocks was presented to 15 subjects). Their native language was Dutch. None of the subjects had participated

in the pre-tests.


particular, they were asked to decide, for each of a number of sentences, whether the sentence could be considered as correct Dutch, that is whether

200

flexible Semantic Processing of Spatial Prepositions

2.2 Results The results will be presented separately for aan and naast. Since only the results for the INC and the EXT categories are relevant to our hypothesis, the data for the COR category will not be discussed.

2.2.1 AAN

Table 3 Mean reaction times (R'Ij, standard devtatlom {SD) and error percentages for a:ms

Category

RT

SD

Errors

COR EXT EXT I EXT� INC

Il S 3 1729 1479 1886 126o

286 468 3 77 S l7 25 0

7 26 21 30

(nu)

(%)


Table 3 presents the mean RTs and error percentages for the different categories of aan. ANOVfu; were performed on both the RT data and the error data. Reaction ti� analyses. Response times above 4000 ms were excluded from the analysis (s%). In the analysis of the RT data, responses which did not correspond to the expected response type were also excluded (13% ). A one-way ANOVA {EXT vs. INC} was performed on the mean subject and item reaction times. The higher RT that was found in the EXT category (difference: 469 ms) differed significantly from the RT in the INC category {Fs[1,29] = 34-27, p < o.ooi; F,[ 1, 38] = 49.10, p < 0.001). When the two extension types were kept separate in the analysis, the outcome of the ANOVA remained significant {INC vs. EXT 1 vs. EXT2; Fs(2, 52] = 28.83, p < o.oo1; F,[2, 37) = 56.46, p < o.oo1).6 In order to study the effect of the two extensions separately, pair-wise comparisons of the means were performed. These were all significant: EXT1 vs. INC: Fs(1,52] = 9.61, p

Vx "' R (x)

(c£ (xb) above� That is to say, �arion reverses implication: if R (x . ) => R(x� ) , then "' R(x� ) => rvR(x . ).


M

+

2. 1 8 'Quantifying' Superlatives :and Homo Sapiem This 'scale reversing' is the key notion in Fauconnier's account. Compare the examples in (1) with those in ( r ' ) below: (r')

a.

John cannot solve the most difficult problem. ( - john cannot solve any problem') b. John can solve the simplest problem. (- john can solve any problem')

etc.

(2' )

a.

b.

I don't think John can solve the most difficult problem. (- 'I don't think John can solve any problem') I'll be surprised if John can solve the most difficult problem. {- 'I'll be surprised if John can solve any problem')

etc. We can conclude the presentation of the main points of this analysis by quoting the following clarification with respect to reversing implication:

negation plays no speoal role in explaining these phenomexu: it i! simply one of the nuny scale reversing environments (perhaps a statistically dominant one) [fn. omitted]. (Fauconnier 1979= 2.9 5) 0

0

0

In my view, Fauconnier's papers raise at least which he does not address:

three serious questions,

Question (i) It can easily be seen that environments like those in ( 1 ) and (2) above constitute a necessary but not sufficient condition for the occurrence of the 'quantificational' readings; sentence ( 1 a), for example, can have a second,


It is obvious that in (� a-b), for example, both the lower and the upper end of the relevant scale can give rise to (pragmatic) implications; the environment of negation simply reverses their flow: it can change a sterile end (c£ 'the simplest problem' in (1'b) ) into a fertile one (c£ (rb) }; and, conversely, it can change a fertile end (c£ 'the most difficult problem' in (1a) ) into a sterile one (c£ {I'a)). If we now add (a) that a number of (quite varied) environments (c£ the cases in (2) } share with negation this property of 'scale reversing', i.e. can give rise to 'quantificational' readings for superlatives when such readings are absent in the simple declarative counterparts, and (b) that these environments are 'the very same which reverse standard (grammatical) polarity' (Fauconnier 1 979: 292), then Fauconnier's account spreads over the whole of our data so far, and the facts in (2) and ( 3 ) above, as well as in (2') below, become naturally predictable:

Ioannis

Veloudis

2 19

non-'quantificational', reading as well: john can solve the most difficult of the (specific) problems he has in front of him' (c£ the 'literal' readings of the superlatives in ( 3) ) Is there any sufficient condition for the any- like aspect of superlatives, or should we simply be content with the observation that in some (syntactic, see note I) environments sentences with superlatives become ambiguous between a 'literal' and a 'quantificational' reading? Fauconnier's papers presumably say 'yes' to the second of these questions, considering the ambiguity between a literal and a 'quantificational' reading simply as an instance of ambiguity resolved in context. I will argue below that the answer to the first question, 'is there any sufficient condition for the any- like aspect of superlatives?', can (non-trivially) be 'yes'. .

We have seen that in their 'quantificational' reading superlatives belong to the same end of a pragiDatic scale as, and become paraphrasable by, the gramiDatical quantifier any. What does this mean as far as their semantics is concerned? Can we really assume that the expression tlu simpkst in {I b), for instance, is (pragmatically?) 'synonymous' with any? In any case, what is it with any that IDakes it pattern here differently from other universal quantifiers, e.g. �? ' Fauconnier's answer is that any is not a quantifier but rather indicates the extremity of a scale' (I 979: 297). (Actually, it may indicate either end point of a scale, being thus 'synonymous' with superlative expressions like tlu simplest or tlu most difficult.) I will argue below that this quasi-synonymity between any and the 'quantificational' aspect of superlatives can be accounted for in logical terms. In particular, I will argue that any and the corresponding 'extremity of a scale' are real alternatives in either of the key premises A and not B of two well-known logical schemes, namely, modus ponendo ponms and modus tollendo tollens, respectively; and that in being real alternatives in either of these premises they logically guarantee the truth of the same conclusion.

Question (iii) The 'quantificational' readings under discussion are welcome only in environments like those in {I) and (2). What are the grounds for this restriction? To say simply that the 'scale reversing' environments, i.e. negation (c£ {Ilrd)), comparison, if-clauses, etc. (c£ (2a-h) ), are, or are among. the environments that license negative polarity items (NPI's) would hardly be a satisfactory answer. As Haspelmath points out in his


Question (ii)

220

'Quantifying' Superlatives and Homo Sapiens

illuminating typological study of indefinites, 'one must of course ask further what it is about j ust these contexts that gives them their scale reversing property' (I993: 1 1 2, fn. I 9).

This is not the only problem here, though: we must ask further what it is

about all these environments and that in (�a) that makes them 'licensers' of the any- like aspect of superlatives. Is it simply a matter of coincidence that they share this property? of imperative.

This

Any, for instance, is welcome in the environment

environment, though, cannot function as a 'licenser' of

that any- like aspect of superlatives. What can this be due to? Obviously, to

answer, one should of course ask further what it is about imperatives that precludes them from contexts of pragmatic scalarity.

In what follows I will try to provide an explanation for the phenomena examined by Fauconnier, 3 modifying his pragmatic account so that it can meet questions (i)-(iii) above. In the first part of the discussion I will restrict myself to the data in (I). 2 A HYP O T HE S I S I n my opinion. the 'quantificational' readings of (I a-d) are explicable o n the basis of the hypothesis that the propositions expressed by the 'quantifying' superlative- versions of examples like (I a-d) above directly correspond to the minor premises of modus to premise

(ponmdo) ponms and modus (tollendo) tollms, i.e.

A (c£ (� a)),

If A. then B4

A Therefore, B or to premise

not B (c£ (I b-d) ),

If A. then B

not B

Therefore, not A functioning thus as symbolic, or, better, metonymic, representatives of �e whole modus. (Note that in a sense A and ponens and modus tollens, respectively.)

not B are the key premises of modus


say that imperatives, i.e. instances of ordering someone to do x, do not quantify over scales, because ordering someone to do x just doesn't contain the order to also do x'(if x and x'are on some scale), would hardly explain anything; the original problem still remains, to the extent that the content of that 'because-' clause simply paraphrases the restriction it is supposed to account for. If one wants to avoid such a, more or less, question-begging

Ioannis

Veloudis

.2.21

This hypothesis seems to be encouraged by two facts: (i) the major premise, ifA1 then B, in both modi is easily recoverable, as it is pan of the assumed common ground between speaker and hearer (c£ Fauconnier's 'pragmatic scalarity); and (ii) what the speaker wants to communicate to his/her hearer in the case of a 'quantificational' reading corresponds in fact to the conclusion of either modus. Suppose that speaker S , cannot solve a particular mathematical problem, say problem a, and discusses with her hearer, S�, candidates for solving it: How about John? John cannot solve the simplest problem.

S2's (unambiguously 'quantificati�nal') contribution in this context probably imphes that john cannot solve problem a'. This implication (not A}, however, is exactly what S, would logtcally conclude on the grounds of what S2 has said, i.e. john cannot solve the simplest problem' (not B), taken together with the pragmatic implication 'If John can solve problem a, he can solve the simplest problem' (ifA1 thm B). And the sources of the latter implication are obvious: S:;r.'s utterance, as far as the apodosis B is concerned, the context of S�'s utterance, as far as the protasis A is concerned, their common knowledge, as far as the (pragmatic) connection if A1 thm B is concerned. Suppose now that S:;r."s answer in the context above is as follows: S,: S:;r.:

How about John? John can solve the most difficult problem.

S:;r.'s (unambiguously 'quantificational') contribution this time probably implies that john can solve problem a'. This implication (B), however, is exactly what S, would logically conclude on the grounds of what S:;r. has said, i.e. john can solve the most difficult problem' (A), taken together with the pragmatic implication 'if John can solve the most difficult problem, he can solve problem a' (if A1 thm B). And the sources of the latter implication are again obvious: S./s very utterance, as far as the protasis A is concerned, the context of S:;r.'s utterance, as far as the apodosis is concerned, their common knowledge, as far as the (pragmatic) connection if A1 thm B is concerned. s What can this hypothesis predict concerning our data in (1)? Probably, it can predict that (1a) has a 'quantificational' reading simply because/when it is underscmdable as the second premise of the logical sequence (modus ponen.s}:


S,: S�:

222

'Quantifying' Superlatives and Homo Sapiens If John

can solve {the most difficult/any}6 problem, then he problem(s} a (, b, etc.}.

can

solve

John can solve the (most dijfteult/any} problmr. Therefore, John can solve problem(s} a (, b, etc.). (where John can solve the most difficult/any problem' = A , John can solve problem(s) a (, b, etc.)' = B, and 'problern(s) a (, b, etc.)' is (are) somehow present in the universe of discourse� Similarly, our hypothesis predicts that (1b) has a 'quantificational' reading simply because/when it is understandable as the second premise of the logical sequence (modus to/lens): solve problern(s} a (, b, etc.), then he can solve {the simplest/ some} problem. John cannot solve {the simpkst/anyy problem. Therefore, John cannot solve problem(s} a ( b, etc.) ,

(where John can solve problem(s} a (, b, etc.)' = A, John can solve the simplest/some problem' = B, and 'problem(s) a (, b, etc.}' is (are) somehow present in the universe of discourse). In the same manner, our hypothesis predicts that (1c) has a 'quantifica tional' reading because/when it is understandable as a second premise of the logical sequence (modus to/lens): If a (, b, etc.) could solve this problem, {Einstein/somebody} could solve it. {Einstrin couldn't/Nobody could} solve this problem.

Therefore, a (,b, etc.) couldn't solve this problem. (where 'a (, b, etc.) could solve this problem' = A, 'Einstein/somebody could solve this problem' = B, and 'person(s) a, (b, etc.)' is (are) somehow present in the universe of discourse�

3

E XPLANATO RY VALUE

Let me examine to what extent these predictions answer questions (i}-(iii) above: Answer

We

(i)

now say that the 'quantificational' reading of (�a), of (1b), etc., is allowed on condition that (1a), (1b), etc., can be understood as the second can


IfJohn can

loannis

Veloudis 2.2.3

IfJohn can solve problem(s) a (, b, etc.), then he can solve {the simplest/ some/*every} problem.8 John cannot solvt {tk simpkst/any/*every} probkm. John cannot solve problem(s) a (, b, etc.). It is worth pointing out in this connection that the fact that the superlative


premise of either modus, as they have been presented above; if this is not possible, i.e. if the proposition expressed cannot be understood as the second premiss of either modus, simply for logico-conversational reasons, the 'quantificational' reading is precluded. Suppose, for example, that John, an intelligent schoolboy, is in a puzzle about the easiest problem of his homework, although he has quite easily solved the other, more difficult ones. Referring to this rather unexpected situation his father can naturally utter something like ( 1 b): John cannot solve tht simpkst probmn; probably what he is 'saying' in this case has no place in the sequence of modus tollms (and, of course, it has no place in the sequence of modus potwtS, either); and, predictably, what he is 'saying' in this case can by no means have a 'quantificational' reading. More specifically, what the father is saying in this context is acceptable only as a description of the (unexpected) situation; that is, his utterance of (1b) can by no means be understood as a premise, namely not B, of modus tollms, for conversational, as well as logical reasons: obviously, what the father 'knows' in this case, i.e. (i) his (pragmatic) knowledge of the fact that 'ifJohn cannot solve the easiest problem, he cannot solve any problem', on the one hand, and of the fact that 'ifJohn can solve the most difficult problem, he can solve any problem', on the other hand, and (ii) his experience of the (unexpected) fact that john cannot solve the easiest problem', on the one hand, and john can solve the most difficult problem', on the other hand, would logically (by modus ponens) lead him simultaneously to two contradictory conclusions. The environment of imperative (see above) also creates an analogous situation: Don't solvt the simpkst probkm, John!, for example, can by no means be understood as the minor premise, not B, of modus to/lens; and, predictably, it can by no means have a 'quantificational' reading. An imperative, that is to say, cannot quantify over scales, simply because the utterance in which it occurs does not qualify as the second premise, not B, of modus tollms. (In fact it does not qualify as a premise at all.) What is more important, however, is that we can now readily explain the asymmetry between the any- and the evtry- versions of quantification in cases where, according to the hypothesis defended here, modus tollens is involved. Evtry patterns differently, we can now say, simply because it has no place in the relevant logical sequence. C£ the anomaly in, e.g.,

224

'Quantifying' Superlatives and Homo Sapiens

simpkst corresponds to a negated existential (not universal} any (c£ Fauconnier I97Sa and references therein) becomes now readily predictable, and is naturally explicable: due to the particular version of Qogical) implication, A --+ B (: 'if John can solve problem(s} a (, b, etc.}, then he can solve some problem'), that fills in the first premise slot in the sequence above, for example, any in the second premise, not B (: john cannot solve any problem'), invariably corresponds to the existential quantifier so� it can thus be understood only as an existential any. In addition, we can now readily explain another asymmetry, pointed out in Fauconnier ( I 97sa: 3 7 I}: 'Superlatives, but not the quantifier any, can occur in subject position of a negated sentence.' C£ the following examples (his (1 5 7) and ( I s 8), respectively):

the

It is obvious that only the second of these two sentences (Fauconnier's (I s 8 ) ) can b e uttered, and understood, as the second premise, not B, of modus

toliens: If girl(s) a (, b, etc.) could seduce John, then the most beautiful girl could seduce John. The most btautiful girl could not seduce John. Therefore, girl(s} a (, b, etc.} could not seduce John. It is, predictably, then acceptable. On the other hand, the first sentence (Fauconnier's (I s 7) ) cannot be uttered, and understood, as the second premise, not B, of this logical sequence: If girl(s) a (, b, etc.) could seduce John, then some girl could seduce John.

*Any girl could not seduce John. ??? It is, predictably, then anomalous, since what it 'says' differs considerably from 'it is not the case that some girl could seduce John', i.e. from not B. We can legitimately maintain, therefore, that in terms of the hypothesis argued for here a common characteristic is uniformly ascribable to the contexts in which the 'quantificational' reading of a superlative is welcome: these contexts constitute a subset of the set of contexts in which modus potwtS and modus tolkns are involved,9 being metonymically represented by their key premises, A and not B, respectively. (Needless to say, in terms of Fauconnier's account the ambiguity between the literal and the 'quantifi cational' readings of a superlative is considered as no different from any other kind of ambiguity resolved in context.}


*Any girl could not seduce John. The most beautiful girl could not seduce John.

Ioannis Vdoudis Answer

225

(ii)

We can now characterize the semantic relationship between the super lative- and the corresponding any- versions of our data: what makes them look 'synonymous' is the fact that they share the same premise slot in modus ponens or modus tollms. In particular, if a superlative occurs in the A- slot of

·10

�

respectively). That is, the 'quantificational' versions of the examples

in (I) cannot be differentiated from their any- counterparts, as far as their contributions to the logical sequence of either modus are concerned: this is

what their alleged 'synonymity' rests with, and is confined to. We can conclude, therefore, that the hypothesis presented above

allows us to naturally explain the similarity in function between superlatives and any in cases involving pragmatic scalarity, avoiding the (otherwise unwarranted) assumption that 'any is not a quantifier but rather indicates the extremity of a scale' (see question

(ii) in the preceding

section).

Answer

(iii)

We can now explain the so-called 'scale reversing' property of negation, i.e., why the presence of negation can give rise to a 'quanrificational' reading in some cases (c£ (I b-d) ) and obliterate it in other cases (c£ (I 1a) ), on the one hand; and why the absence of negation can give rise to a 'quanrificational' reading in some cases

(c£

(�a) ) and obliterate it in other

cases (c£ (I 'b)), on the other. In particular, the second premise of

tollens

modus

This obviously means that a sentence with a not, conforming thus to not B, if what it 'says' is

is negative in form.

superlative must contain

expected, according to the logical flow of the sequence, to occur in that premise slot; otherwise, my hypothesis predicts, the 'quantificational' reading of that sentence will be cancelled. C£ (I'b): it cannot possibly

be

incorporated in

modus tolkns:


modus ponens, then there is no logical harm in substituting this premise by A' , provided that A' differs from A only in that it contains the any counterpart of the superlative (c£ (�a): John can solve the most difficult problem can naturally be substituted by John can solve any probkm); and if a superlative occurs in the not B- slot of modus tollens, then there is no logical harm in substituting this premise by not H, provided that H differs from B only in that it contains the any- counterpart of the superlative (c£ ( Ib-d}: John cannot solvt the simpkrt problem, Eins�n couldn't solvt this probkm, and Onassis couldn't alford her oprnses can naturally be substituted byJohn cannot solve any probkm, Nobody could solvt this probkm, and Nobody could alford her

2.2.6 'Quantifying' Superlatives and Homo Sapiens IfJohn can solve problem(s) a (, b, etc.), then he can solve {the simplest/ some} problem. John can solve {the simplest/some} problem. m (the logical sequence breaks down, since the form of distorted:

modus tolkns

1S

If A, then B

B

???);

If John can solve {the most difficult/any} problem, he can solve problem(s) a (, b, etc.). John cannot solve {the most diffu:ult/any} problem.

??? (the logical sequence breaks down, since the form of modus potm!S is distorted: If A, then B not A

???); the non-'quantificational'reading is, then, the only one left for (11a). We can conclude, therefore, that the hypothesis defended here accounts for the 'quantificational' reading of superlatives on the grounds of logical necessity, in particular of logical necessity dependent on the idiosyncrasies of material implication (: A -+ B is false if (and only if) A is true and B is false� In Fauconnier's proposal, on the other hand, this reading is accounted for in terms of 'pragmatic scalarity' and the logical/semantic propenies of the expressions involved. This difference will be made more evident if we pass to the second part of our discussion. It is obvious that the preceding paragraphs meet our questions (i)-{iii) in part only: in fact the mosaic of environments in (2) has hardly been touched


the non-'quantificational' reading is, then, the only one left for (1 'b). Similarly, the second premise of modus ponens is affirmative. This obviously means that a sentence with a superlative must not contain not, conforming thus to A, if what it 'says' is expected, according to the logical flow of the sequence, to occur in that premise slot; otherwise, my hypothesis predicts, ' the 'quantificational' reading of that sentence will be cancelled. C£ ( I a): it cannot possibly be incorporated in modus ponms:

Joannis Veloudis

1.27

(2a) I don't think John can solve {the simplest/any} problem.1 1 as expressing a subjectively modified paraphrasis of the 'quantificational' reading of ( 1 b) (rb) John cannot solve {the simplest/any} problem. i.e. as a (moderate) manifestation of the key premise not B of modus tolkns. Similarly, will bt surprised if and is too stupid to can be taken as analogous, though less moderate, variants of not; thus the 'quantificational' readings of (2b) and (2e), respectively, (2b)

111

be surprised if John can solve {the simplest/any} problem.

(2e) John is too stupid to solve {the simplest/any} problem.

can intuitively be understood as expressing manifestations of not B.14 On the other hand, the 'quantificational' reading of (2d) (2d) It is harder to solve the NPI's puzzle than (it is) to solve {the most difficult/any} mathematical problem. does not seem to be readily reducible to not B. How can this be accounted for? Should we say that modus ponms, instead of modus tolkns, is involved here? (2d) could of course be said to directly correspond to the minor


on so far. What is it that makes them 1icensers' of the 'quantificational' reading of superlatives? And what is their relationship, if any, with the 1icensers' of the 'quantificational' readings already discussed (c£ (�a-d))? Moreover, how can the hypothesis presented above be extended so that it can be applicable to our data as a whole? I will argue below that the 'quantificational' readings in (2) are more or less directly reducible to the second premise, not B, of modus tollens, that the environments in (2) function as 'licensers' for the same reason as the environments in (rb-d);1 1 and that our data on 'quanrificational' super latives are in general explicable in terms of their association with modus potm�S and modus tollens, the only requirement for this being that my hypothesis above be slightly modified: The propositions expressed by the 'quantifying' superlative versions of (�a-d) and (2a-h) (as well as by their any- counterparts, it can now be added) more or less directly correspond to the minor premises of modus ponms and modus tollens, i.e. to A (c£ (�a) ), or to not B (c£ (rb-d) and (2a-h) ), functioning thus as metonymic representatives of, or in some sense reflecting, the whole modus. Let me in tum discuss (2a-h) in the light of this modification. Considering not think as a moderate variant of not/"' we can intuitively understand (2a)

2.2.8 'Quantifying' Superlatives and Homo Sapiens

premise A of modus ponms. This would be of no following sequence:

use,

though. Consider the

If it is harder to solve the NPI's puzzle than it is to solve {the most difficult/any} mathematical problem, then it is harder to solve the NPI's puzzle than it is to solve problem(s) a (, b, etc.). It is harder to solvt tht NPfs puzzlt than it is . . . (=ul)

Therefore, it is harder to solve the NPI's puzzle than it is to solve problem(s) a (, b, etc.) Is this

S 1 : I'm going to solve the NPI's puzzle. S�: It is harder to solve the NPI's puzzle than it is . . . (=2d) It is obvious that (2d) in this context is intuitively understood as strongly implying 'you cannot solve the NPI's puzzle', 'forget itl', 'you can't be serious!', and so on. These implications, however, have nothing to do with the conclusion 'it is harder to solve the NPI's puzzle than to solve problem(s) a (, b, etc.)' in the sequence above. How then can this conversational contribution of (2d) to the contexts of its use be accounted for? People working on grammaticalization have emphasized the role of speakers and hearers negotiating meaning in communicative situations. It has been maintained, in particular (c£ Hopper & Traugott 1993: 86-7), that expressivity may motivate metonymic inferencing, more specifically, that 'the search for ways to regulate communication and negotiate speaker and hearer interaction' underlies metonymic processes such as 'specifying one meaning in terms of another that is present, even if covertly, in the context' (1993: 87), or better, 'indexing or pointing to meanings that might otherwise be only covert, but are a natural part of conversational practice' (1993: 86-7). In my opinion (ul), as well as the whole of our examples here, under their 'quantificational' readings, constitute instances of such a metonynic 'pointing to meanings'. In this light, the peculiarity of (ul) can be said to be simply due to the fact that what (ul) 'says' in a sense comments on a (moderate) variant of, rather than, more or less, directly corresponds to, the key premise not B of modus tolltns. Consider (4) below: (4) It is hard

to

solve {the most difficult/any} mathematical problem

the content of which is comparable to the key premise of a (moderate) variant of modus tolltns:


sequence involved in the contexts in which the 'quantificational' reading of (2d) is welcome? Suppose that S 1 has decided to deal with the NPI's puzzle and that she wants to discuss her decision with S�:

loannis Veloudis

2.2.9

If one can solve the NPI's puzzle, one can solve {the most difficult/any} mathematical problem. o� can hardly solvt {the most difficult/any) mathematical probkm. Therefore, one can hardly solve the NPI's puzzle.

(2e)

Anybody who can solve {the simplest/any} problem is fit for

this job.

The 'quantificational' reading here involves the sequence If somebody can solve some specific problem(s) a (, b, etc.), then somebody can solve the simplest problem.

Nobody can solvt t� simplest problem. Therefore, nobody can solve some specific problem(s) a (, b, etc.) in a very interesting way. What (2e) communicates is something like 'everybody is fit for this job'. What is it then that makes this reading possible? Intuitively, (2e) defines a very low standard ofjudgement; and this definition is made on the basis of the following (minimal) exception: if there is somebody who falsifies 'nobody can solve the simplest problem'; i.e. it is made on the basis of the falsification of the key premise above. If this is the case, however, the 'exceptional' cases implied here are directly dependent on the key premise of modus tollms.


If we take (2d) as expressing a comment on the grade denoted by (4) (= 'the degree of difficulty denoted by (4) is the starting point of the gradation of the difficulty of NPI's'), we can intuitively understand what it is that makes the 'quanti£cational' reading of (ul) imply a much stronger variant of the conclusion 'one can hardly solve the NPI's puzzle' above. By asserting that the difficulty of NPI's is of a higher grade than the difficulty of the most stubborn mathematical problems, (2d) not only anticipates the truth of the conclusion 'one can hardly solve the NPI's puzzle' above, but also makes it comparable to the truth of the key premise 'one can hardly solve the most difficult/any mathematical problems' of our variant of modus tollms. Considering now this comment on the key premise as a reinforced variant of that key premiss, we expect our modified sequence of modus tollms to lead to a much stronger conclusion, i.e. to 'the NPI's puzzle can by no means be solved', more or less; this is, however, exactly what our (2d) implies. The 'quantificational' reading of (ul), therefore, is after all somehow reducible to the key premise of modus to/lens. A second instance of indirect reducibility to not B, and another characteristic piece of meaning negotiation, is exemplified by (2e):

�30 'Quantifying' Superlatives and Homo Sapiens An analogous exception involving 'quantificational' reading of (2f):

not B

is

implied

in the

(2f) John was the only one to make {the faintest/any} attempt to solve the problem. John is described here as the only person that falsifies the key premise, and consequently the necessity of the conclusion, of the sequence If one

made attempt(s) a (, b, etc.) to solve the problem, one made {the faintest/some} attempt to solve the problem.

No otU nuuk tM faintest/any attmtpt to solve the problem. That is, the 'quantificational' reading of (2f} is characteristically dependent on modus tolkns. In the same vein, the 'quantificational' reading of (2g) (2g) John solved the most difficult problem before his audience could show {the faintest/any} sign of fatigue.

expresses a comment on the validity of the sequence If somebody solved the most difficult problem before his audience could show sign(s} a (, b, etc.} of fatigue, then somebody solved the most difficult problem before his audience could show {the faintest/any} sign of fatigue.

Nobody sol�d the most difficult problmt btfore his audience could show the fointfit/any sign offatigue. Therefore, nobody solved the most difficult problem before his audience could show sign(s} a (, b, etc.) of fatigue. '

'

Intuitively, this reading of (2g) says that the modus is inapplicable as far as John is concerned. What is it that makes John exceptional? John is said to be the only person that falsified the key premise Nobody solved tk most difficult

problm� befor� his audienu could show {the faintest/any) sign of fotig�. The relationship between not B and the 'quantificational' reading is again obvious. The question in (2h), finally, (2h) Can John solve {the simplest/any} problem? can be said to point to this relationship in a very interesting way. Questions with 'quantifying'superlatives are normally given a rhetorical interpretation.' � Needless to say, this peculiarity can hardly be a matter of


Therefore, no one made attempt(s) a (, b, etc.) to solve the problem.

loannu Vdoudis

3J I

4

EVIDENCE

The intuitive predictions, as well as the linguistic generalizations, in the preceding section can only show the explanatory value and the 'attractive ness', if any, of the hypothesis I have been arguing for. They can hardly be considered as constituting direct evidence for the involvement of modus ponens and modus tollms in the 'quantificational' readings. In what follows I will attempt to provide some pieces of this evidence by distinguishing three semantic characteristics of our data that have been passed over in the relevant literature, to the best of my knowledge. First, I have been arguing that the 'quantificational' readings of the negative examples in ( 1) directly correspond to the key premise not B of modus tolkns. However, not in this premise unexceptionally exemplifies the contradictory aspect of negation (: 'it is not the case that . . .'). The implications this restriction has for my hypothesis are obvious: if the 'quantificational' readings of ( 1 b-d) are actually related to not B, their negative particles must necessarily have a contradictory interpretation only.


coincidence. Has it anything to do with the hypothesis that the 'quantificational' reading of (2h) is reducible to the key premise of modus tolkns? We can intuitively understand (2h) as an emphatic alternative to its probable answer. More clearly, (2h) can be considered as an emphatic assertion of the proposition that the answerJohn cannot solve {the simpkst/any} problem (c£ (1b)) normally expresses: the speaker feels confident that the truth of the latter is self-evident, well-known, etc.; and to show this confidence (s)he &eely takes the 'risk' of the corresponding question, implying thus that the difference between 'questioning' and 'answering' is neutralized in this case: the question can safely be used to denote this particular answer, since any other answer is (considered to be) precluded! (The same intuition, of course, extends to rhetorical questions in general.) If we take this point of view, the presence of (2h) among the data involving modus tollens is no more curious: if its 'quantillcational' reading is in fact an alternative, and emphatic, way of saying john cannot solve the simplest/any problem', it is simply an alternative, and emphatic, way of saying not B (c£ my discussion of (1b) above). We can, therefore, conclude that our data in (2), as well, are explicable in terms of the (modified) hypothesis presented above: the 'quantificational' readings of (2a-h) echo, in a more or less indirect way, modus tolkns, 'presupposing' in a sense, rather than posing (c£ (1b-d)), the key premise of this logical sequence; hence their metalinguistic, so to speak, flavour.

232 'Quantifying' Superlaoves and Homo Sapiens

(4)

a John can solve problem(s) a·(, b, etc.). b. John cannot solve problem(s) a ( b, etc.). ,

I can equally well cooperate, however, by responding with either of the indirect answers in (s) (c£ also (�a-b) above): (s)

a John can solve {the most difficult/any} problem. b. John cannot solve {the easiest/any} problem.

According to the hypothesis I have been defending, this is probably due to the tautological character of the two logical modi, modus ponens and modus tollens, symbolically represented here by their key premises A, i.e. (sa) (c£ also (�a)) and not B, i.e. (sb) (c£ also {Ib) ), respectively. This being the case, the hypothesis that modus ponnu and modus tolkns are involved in the 'quantificational' readings is in accordance with the conversational characteristics of the latter. To restrict myself to (4) and (s) above, (�) and (4b), the conversational variants of (sa) and (sb), respectively, are exactly the conclusions that the relevant logical sequences (modus ponms


We can easily see that this is in fact the case: the 'quantifi.cational' versions of (I b-d) can be associated with the contradictory interpretation ('it is not the case that . . . can/could solve/afford . . .'), and by no means with a contrary interpretation ('it is the case that . . . cannot/could not solve/ afford . . .') of not; under its 'quantifi.cational' interpretation (Ib), for instance, can never be associated with a paraphrasis like 'it is the case that John leaves the simplest (: any) problem unsolved'. Their corresponding literal versions, on the other hand, do not have this restriction; in the context described in the preceding section (Answer (i) ), for example, what the father says in uttering {Ib) is indeed paraphrasable as 'it is the case that John leaves the simplest problem unsolved'. Second, it has been pointed out that rhetorical questions are usually asked if the speaker considers it obvious that the relevant answer is negative (see note I S; see also Haspelrnath I 993: 48, and references cited there). I consider this remark as a piece of (independent) evidence for the treatment of (2h) above: the fact that rhetorical questions like Who wants any b�ans? (from Lakoff I 969: 609) are normally understood as anticipating a negative answer is in accordance with, if it is not explicable in terms of. my suggestion that these rhetorical questions are in a �ogico-conversational) way associated with the key premise not B. Third, surprisingly it has not been stressed in the relevant literature that the 'quantificational' readings we have been discussing are indirect ways of 'saying' something. Suppose, for example, that I am asked whether John can solve (specific) problem(s) a (, b, etc.). I can cooperate by responding with either of the 'literal' answers in (4):

Ioann.is

VeloudiJ

233

and modus tollens, respectively) lead to. That is, the hypothesis I have been arguing for gains additional support &om the fact that the uses of sentences it (independently) brings together; i.e. the key premises and the conclusions in the analyses of the logical sequences presented above, are exactly uses of sentences which are conversationally very close to each other. Needless to say, this conversational interchangeability will simply be considered as a matter of coincidence by any account in which modus ponms and modus tollens play no role.

The hypothesis defended above, if correct, has some obvious theoretical implications. It would seem interesting, for instance, to those interested in grarnmaticalization phenomena to examine to what extent modus tollens has been conversationally exploited as a mechanism for the reinforcement of negative constructions. It is not probably a matter of coincidence that not ( < na wiht 'no thing') in English. (�) . . . pas ( < � va pas) in French, (ov)S€v) (< otiS€ lv 'not even one {thing)') in Greek, nemo (< � hemo [homo < hmw] 'nobody') in Latin. etc., historically come &om expressions meaning 'minimal quantities','6 i.e. &om 'quantificational' expressions like those dealt with in Fauconnier's papers. More generally, the preceding analysis of 'quantificational' readings as involving logical modi can be naturally accommodated in any theory that proposes a systematic analysis of language as rooted in general human cognitive abilities. Such a proposal is argued for in Sweetser (1 990), for example. She maintains in particular that a cognitively based theory is 'the right way to tackle the issues of multiple form-to-function mappings' (1990: 12� Considering our data as a particular instance of such 'multiple form-to-function mappings', we can hardly be surprised from the following correspondences. Sweetser ( 1 990: 64- s) argues:

Any sentence can be viewed under two :upects: :u a description of a real-world situation or event, and :u a self-contained part of our belief system (e.g. a conclwion or a premise� & descriptions, sentences describe real-world events and the causal forces leading up to those events; :u conclusums they are themselves undentood :u bemg the result of the episternic forces which cause the tram of reasoning leading to a concluston.

This general statement is in a sense exemplified by the data we have been

analysing: the non-'quantificational' and the 'quantificational' readings in (r)-(2) can be said to correspond to the real world aspect and the episternic world aspect, respectively. In addition. what is more important, the 'quantificational' readings can be understood as premises {or better: as


5 THE O RE T I CAL CO N S I D E RAT I O N S

234 'Quantifying' Superlatives and Homo Sapiens

.

.

Now what we mean by a mathematical symbol is a set of mathemancal equations and relanonships. We are able, therefore, in mathematical tenru, to find the optimum solution. (S.6.!c.26) can

would not be rmpossible implications of actuality.

m

these examples, but � abk to is preferred because of the

Rather curiously, if the present positive form can is used there may be indication of actuality, but in the future rather than the present . . . That is to say, while IS abk to says 'can and does', can says 'can and wiU. do'. (Palmer 1979: 77) If this is the case, i.e. ifcan in fact means that 'there is ability now which may be actualized in the future' (Palmer 1 979: Ss ), then can is distantly related to the actual world, to say the least; and this is probably in harmony with the epistemic atmosphere of our 'quantifying' superlative noun phrases.

6

E P I L O GUE

Obviously, the analysis I have been arguing for, if acceptable, has considerable consequences for a number of relevant questions. It would be interesting to examine, for instance, to what extent the alleged 'genericity' of 'free-choice' any in sentences like Any owl hunts mice (from


key premisses-substitutes for conclusions) of modus potmtS and modus to/lens, i.e. of two well-known examples of 'epistemic forces which cause the train of reasoning leading to a conclusion'. Besides these remarkable (descriptive) correspondences, we have, I think, good reasons for arguing that our data belong to the (speaker's) epistemic world. First, as it has been pointed out independently, in their 'quantifica tional' interpretation superlative noun phrases 'need not have any reference or even any possible reference: their function is [ . . . ] not referential' (Fauconnier 1 980: 6o).'7 That is, the simplest problem, t� most difficult problem, etc. in (1}-2) do not refer to, or even entail the existence of, a particular problem which is such-and-such; the latter has no place in the real world: it probably belongs to the speaker's episternic world. Second, the various verbal modifications of the infinitival pattern (to) solve x in (1}-(2), i.e. can, cannot, I do not think . . . , it is harder . . . , etc. are of a particular character: they imply, if they do not denote, the speaker's beliefs, judgements, calculations, etc. as far as the truth of the infinitival achievement is concerned. That is, can, cannot, I don't think . , etc. introduce us to the speaker's episternic world, rather than describe real-world situations. Third, it is interesting to note the special character of can in the 'quantificational' readings we have been discussing. It has been pointed out in particular that can implies non-actuality:

Joannis Velou
{I) If baldness is hereditary, then Jack's son is bald (z) If Jack has a son, then Jack's son is bald. The challenge for a formal semantic theory of presuppositions is to capture contextual effects such as these in an adequate manner. In particular, such a theory must account for why the presupposition in (1) projects &om an embedded context, while the presupposition in (2) does not. This is a special case of the Projection Problem: If a compound sentence S is made up of


In

240 The Semantics and Pragmancs of Presupposition

constituent sentences sl ' . . . ' Sn , each with presuppositions P I . . . ' Pn . then what are the presuppositions of S? Many recent accounts of presupposition that offer solutions to the Projection Problem have exploited the dynamics in dynamic semantics (e.g. Beaver 1 996; Geurts 1 996; Heim 1982; van der Sandt 1 992). In these frameworks, assertional meaning is a relation between an input context (or information state) and an output context. Presuppositions impose tests on the input context, which researchers have analysed in two ways: either the context must satisfy the presuppositions of the clause being interpreted (e.g. Beaver 1996; Heim 1982) or the presuppositions are anaphoric (e.g. van der Sandt 1 992) and so must be bound to elements in the context. But clauses carrying presuppositions can be felicitous even when the context fails these tests (e.g. ( 1 )). A special purpose procedure known as accommodation is used to account for this (c£ Lewis 1 979): if the context fails the presupposition test, then the presupposition is accommodated or addtd to it, provided vanous constraints are met (e.g. the result must be satisfiable). Tills combination of test and accommodation determines the projection of a presupposition. For example, in ( 1 ), the antecedent produces a context which fails the test imposed by the presupposition in the consequent (either satisfaction or binding). So it is accommodated. Since it can be added to the context outside the scope of the conditional, it can project out from its embedding. In contrast, the antecedent in (2) ensures that the input context passes the presupposition test. So the presupposition is not accommodated, the input context is not changed, and the presupposition is not projected out from the conditional. Despite these successes, this approach has trouble with some simple pred1ctions. Compare the following two dialogues (3abc) and (3abd): '

a.

A: Did you hear about John?

b. B: No, what? c. A: He had an accident. A car hit him. d A: He had an accident. ??The car hit rum. The classic approach we just outlined would predict no difference between these two discourses and would find them both acceptable. But (3 abd) is unacceptable. As it stands it lacks discourse coherence, while (3abc) does not; the presupposition of t� car cannot be accommodated in (3abd). We will argue that the proper treatment of presuppositions in discourse, like a proper treatment of assertions, requires a notion of discourse coherence and must take into account the rhetorical function of both presupposed and asserted information. We will provide a formal account of presuppositions, which integrates constraints from compositional semantics and pragmatics in the required manner.


(3)

Nicholas Asher and Alex Lascarides

24 1

show that presupposed information is sensitive to rhetorical function and that the notion of accommodation should be replaced with a more constrained notion of discourse update. The third consequence concerns the compositional treatment of presupposition. Our approach affords that one could call a compositional treatment of presuppositions. The discourse semantics of soRT is


We will start by examining van der Sandt's theory of presupposition satisfaction, since he offers the most detailed proposal concerning accommodation. We will highlight some difficulties, and offer a new proposal which attempts to overcome them. We will adopt van der Sandt's view that presuppositions are anaphoric, but give it some new twists. First, like other anaphoric expressions (e.g. anaphoric pronouns), presuppositions have an underspuified semantic content. Interpreting them in context involves resolving the underspecification. The second distinctive feature is the way we resolve underspecification. We assume a formal model of discourse semantics known as soRT (e.g. Asher 1993; !..ascarides & Asher 1993), where semantic underspecification in a proposition is resolved by reasoning about the way that proposition rhetorically connects to the discourse context. Thus, interpreting presuppositions becomes a part of discourse update in SORT. This has three important consequences. The first concerns pragmatics. soRT provides an expliat formal account of how semantic and pragmatic information interact when computing a rhetorical link between a proposi tion and its discourse context. This interaction will define the interpretation of presuppositions, and thus provide a richer source of constraints on presuppositions than standard accounts. This account of presuppositions will exploit pragmatic information over and above the clausal irnplicatures of the kind used in Gazdar's (1979} theory of presuppositions. We'll argue in section 2 that going beyond these implicatures is necessary to account for some of the data. The second consequence of interpreting presuppositions is SORT concerns accommodation. In all prevtous dynamic theories of presupposi tion, accommodation amounts to adding, but not relating, the presupposed content to some accessible part of the context. This mechanism is peculiar to presuppositions; it does not feature in accounts of any other phenomena, including other anaphoric phenomena. In contrast, we model presupposi tions entirely in terms of the soRT discourse update procedure. We replace the notion that presuppositions are added to the discourse context with the notion that they are rhetorically linked to it. Given that the theory of rhetorical structure in soRT is used to model a wide range of linguistic phenomena when applied to assertions, it would be odd if presupposed information were to be entirely insensitive to rhetorical function. We will

242 The Semantics and Pragmatics of �upposttion compositional upon discourse structure: the meaning of a discourse is a function of the meaning of its parts and how they are related to each other. In soRT presuppositions, like assertions, generate underspecified but interpretable logical forms. The procedure for constructing the semantic representation of discourse takes these underspecified logical forms, resolves some of the underspecifications and relates them together by means of discourse relations representing their rhetorical function in the discourse.

So

presuppositions have a content that contributes to the content of the discourse as a whole. Indeed, presuppositions have no less a compositional

treatment than assertions. Our discourse-based approach affords a wider perspective on presuppo

amounts to an important special case, which applies to single sentence

discourses, of the more general 'discourse' problem: how do presuppositions triggered by elements of a multi-sentence discourse affect its structure and content? We aim to tackle this question here. And we claim that a rich

notion of discourse structure, which utilizes rhetorical relations, is needed. While we believe that our discourse based theory of presupposition is novel, we hasten to add that many authors on presupposition like Beaver (1996) and van der Sandt (1992) would agree with us that the treatment of presupposition must be integrated with a richer notion of discourse structure and discourse update than is available in standard dynamic semantics (e.g. K.amp & Reyle's DRT, Dynamic Predicate Logic or Update Semantics), because they believe that pragmatic information constrains the interpretation of presuppositions. We wish to extend their theories with this requisite notion of discourse structure.

2

VAN DER SANDT'S DYNAMIC A C C OUNT AND ITS PROBLEMS

Van der Sandt

(1992)

views presuppositions as anaphors with semantic

content. He develops this view within the framework of DRT (K.amp & Reyle

1993),

in order to exploit its constraints on anaphoric antecedents.

A presupposition can bind to an antecedent only if there is the same content in either an accessible part of the DRS which represents the discourse context, or an accessible part of the DRS which represents the current clause (i.e. the clause that introduced the presupposition trigger� In

(2),

for example, the antecedent of the conditional is accessible to the

consequent, and it contains the same content as the presupposition that's triggered there.


sitions. Present dynamic accounts of presupposition have concentrated on phenomena like the Projection Problem. For us the Projection Problem

Nicholas Asher and Alex Lascarides 243

(I)

(2)

If baldness is hereditary, then Jack's son is bald. If Jack has a son, then Jack's son is bald.

So this

presupposition binds to it.

which can be paraphrased as

IfJack

intuitions.

This

provides a representation of (z)

has a son, then he is bald,

which matches

In contrast, the presupposition in (I) cannot be bound, because the context lacks the required content. Following Karttunen (I974) and Hetm

(I982),

(I992) resorts to accommodation: he context (c£ Stalnaker I974; Lewis I979).

van der Sandt

presupposition to the

adds the

Van der Sandt provides an algorithm which specifies how binding and supposed material is separated from the asserted material in the DRS which represents the current sentence (which may be complex in that it contains several clauses), in order to allow them to be processed differently. One handles the presupposed material first. If it can be bound in the manner specified above, then it is. Otherwise, it is added to an accessible site. One then adds the DRS which represents the asserted material of the current sentence to the DRS representing the previous sentences in the discourse, or some subDRS of it, via DRT's notion of update (note that one of these DRSS may have been modified with the addition of the presupposition). Essentially, DRT's notion of update is set union on both the discourse referents and the DRS conditions. When the contexts are structurally complex (i.e. contain subDRSS and complex conditions), different possibilities for accommodation arise. Van der Sandt distinguishes between global accommodation (as in (Ia)), in�diate accommodation (as in (Ib)) and local accommodation (as in (Ic)).

j,x ( a)

son(x)

b

has( j, x)

lm-tditary(b)

{ Ib )

=>

I �Li(x) l

b,j,x has( j, x) lm-tditary( b) son(x)

=?

I �Li(x) l


accommodation jointly model presupposition satisfaction. First, the pre

2« The Semanria and Pngtnatia of Prerupposition

( 1c)

b hn-tditary( b)

=>

x, j son(x) has( j, x) bald(x)

(4) Either John didn't solve the problem or else Mary realizes that the problem has been solved. The second disjunct presupposes that the problem has been solved. There's no suitable accessible antecedent, and so this information has to be accommodated. (4) is reminiscent of one discussed by van der Sandt (1992}.'

( s ) Either John has no donkey or his donkey is eating quietly in the stable.


These capture the different possible inferences that presuppositions can give rise to. (1a) means: Jack has a son, and if baldness is hereditary, then Jack's son is bald. (1b) means: if baldness is hereditary and Jack has a son, then Jack's son is bald. (1c) means: if baldness is hereditary, then Jack has a son and he is bald. Only (1a) reflects the case where the presupposition projects from the embedding. Accommodation is subject to certain constraints: the result of the addition should be logically consistent and should not render any part of the asserted content uninformative. Furthermore, van der Sandt argues that if these constraints yield a choice as to where to accommodate the presupposition, then one prefers to add it to the most superordinate or highest DRS context in which the constraints are satisfied. So in ( 1 ), global accommodation (i.e. (�a)) is predicted. Van der Sandt's account of presupposition is compelling, because he offers a precise solution to the Projection Problem. A presupposition projects from an embedded context only if the above algorithm predicts that it is accommodated at a superordinate site in the DRS (e.g. (�a)). There are, however, a number of difficulties with the theory's predictions, some of which are particular to van der Sandt's formulation of accommodation, others of which are endemic to the semantic notion of accommodation itself-which we will take henceforth to mean the addition of presupposed information to the context. The first problem, which is particular to van der Sandt's account, is that local accommodation isn't predicted in certain cases when it should be. Consider (4) (modified from Beaver 1 997):

Nicholas Asher and Alex Lascarides .2.4 5

(6)

a.

A:.

The Problem Solving Group is given a problem each day, and the group leader Mary has to assign it to someone in her group. John is the best problem solver. But when he solves a problem, he always boasts about it. This annoys Mary, and so if she thinks that the day's problem is an unsolved one, she gives it to him, to test him. Otherwise, she gives it to someone else. b. B: John's being very quiet just now. Did she give him today's problem?


The presupposition in ( s ) that John has a donkey cannot be accommodated globally in his theory, because this would render the first disjunct of ( s ) uninformative: assuming ¢ is the proposition that John has a donkey, then accommodating globally would produce a semantic representation of the form ¢ A (..., ¢ V 1/J), which is equivalent to ¢ A 1/J. So by appealing to the info�tiveness constraint we mentioned above, van der Sandt predicts that global accommodation is not possible for (s):• We cannot block global accommodation in (4) with the informative ness constraint, however. Adding the presupposition that someone solved the problem does not render the first disjunct, that john did not solve the problem. uninformative. Since this global accommodation also results in a consistent discourse, van der Sandt's representation of (4) amounts to: the problem has been solved, and either John did not solve it or Mary realizes that it has been solved. As Beaver points out, this is contrary to intuitions, which favor local accommodation: either John did not solve the problem. or it has been solved and Mary realizes it has been solved. To capture the intuitive semantics of sentence (1), Van der Sandt relies on the preference for global accommodation. But in (4) this preference causes problems, because local accommodation should be preferred, and yet the constraints on accommodation are satisfied at the superordinate site. We shall see in the course of this section that this puzzle arises because of a general observation about presuppositions that DRT alone cannot capture: the preferred site for accommodation depends on a variety of pragmatic factors (c£ Beaver 1996) that are not represented in DRSS. Nevertheless, (4) is in fact a bit odd unless it is uttered in a particular context; we need to know which problem is being talked about. Van der Sandt's theory fails to capture this as well, because it predicts that the presupposition that there is a problem, which is triggered by tk problem, can be globally accommodated. But discourse contexts which improve the acceptability of (4) strongly suggest that the way presuppositions are satisfied depends on the rhetorical structure of the discourse as a whole. Dialogue (6) illustrates this:

246 The Semantics and Pragmatics of Presuppos1tion

(6)

c.

A:

Well I'm not sure she did. Either John didn't solve the problem or else Mary realized that the problem's been solved.


B's question identifies the problem being talked about, and this improves the acceptability of (4). In addition, the rhetorical links between the (6a), (6b) and (6c) help one interpret the presupposition that the problem has been solved. But our more basic problem remains: to explain the local accommoda tion of the presupposition of realize in (6c). We could with Geurts (1995) integrate in Van der Sandt's theory further constraints on accommodation such as those in Gazdar's theory, which are based on Grice's notion of conversational implicature. Gazdar's theory predicts local accommodation in any context where by uttering the sentence, the speaker implicates that the presupposition is not taken for granted (i.e. the speaker implicates that he believes that it is possible that the presupposition is false). Would such a constraint block global accommodation in (6)? B's question about John's behavior in (6b) serves as an elaboration to the generalization about who gets problems in (6a), and so the answer to the question hangs on whether Mary believes that the problem is solved or not. A implies by his utterance (6c) that he doesn't know whether Mary gave John the problem. But what implicatures does this raise? Given what A said in (6a), A and B would know the answer to the question as to whether John got today's problem, if they knew if Mary believed it was solved. So this context implicates that A and B don't know if Mary believes the problems been solved. However, the context does not implicate that A and B themselves believe the presupposi tion-that the problem has been solved-is in doubt; the context is mute on this issue. So Gazdar's constraints do not predict local accommodation in this case. Something more is needed to explain why local accommodation occurs here. To predict local accommodation in (6), we analyze presuppositions in terms of the rhetorical structure of the discourse context. Rhetorical structure is something about which DRT has little to say. We claim that rhetorical structure explains why local accommodation is preferred in some cases where global accommodation would be informative and consistent, and furthermore would meet Gazdar's constraints on how Gricean-style conversational implicatures determine global vs. local accommodation. The place where presuppositions get accommodated depends on the rhetorical links between propositions in discourse as well as their content. In �cular, presuppositions are interpreted so that the rhetorical links are as strong as possible. We will return to the detailed analysis of (4) in section 5·3 and demonstrate that the Contrast relation between the disjuncts in (4) is at its strongest in (6) if the presupposition is accommodated locally.

Nicholas Asher and Alex Uscarides

247

The difference in acceptability between (Je-d) also demonstrates that the constraints of informativeness and consistency are too weak: (3)

a. A: b. B: c. A: d. A:

Did you hear about John? No, what? He had an accident. A car hit him. He had an accident. ??The car hit him.

(7) ?? I don't know whether the Pope has measles. But every Catholic realizes the Pope has measles. (8) I don't know whether the Pope has measles. But for every person, if he's a Catholic and the Pope has measles, then he realizes the Pope has measles. Van der Sandt's theory predicts that presupposition that the Pope has measles is globally accommodated in (8). But intuitively, global accommo dation shouldn't be possible, because a statement akin to Moore's paradox ( 1 9 1 2) would be asserted ('Ik Pope has measks but I don't know that tk P� has measks). Van der Sandt's constraints on accommodation do not block this. But even if they did, the resulting account would still allow intermediate accommodation. But this incorrectly predicts that (7) is felicitous. In contrast, the presupposition in (8) is bound to this intermediate position. But the difference in acceptability between (7) and (8) demon strates that an explicit linguistic antecedent is required, and accommo dation at the same site as this antecedent is odd. Van der Sandt fails to capture this. There are certain presupposition triggers, such as too, which are like (7) in that their presuppositions require a linguistic antecedent They pose similar challenges. Consider (9}: (9) John lived in New York too. Various people have supposed that (9) presupposes that there is someone other than John who lived in New York. This content is already common knowledge to most speakers. However, (9) is odd in a context where the


While (3c) is perfectly felicitous, (3d) is not Most theories would predict that the presupposition in (3d) is accommodated globally (i.e. added to the main context), because the result is informative and consistent. So these constraints predict coherence where there is none. These constraints on accommodation also cause difficulties for examples where the presupposition seems to require an explicit linguistic antecedent to be felicitous. Consider, for instance, the contrast between (7) and (8), taken from Beaver (1997):

248 The Semantics and Pngmatics of Presupposition

presupposition or something simibr isn't already explicitly introduced into the discourse context. In fact, we think that the received wisdom about the presuppositional content of too is wrong: (9) is perfectly felicitous if uttered in a context in which other places John has lived have already been mentioned. The presupposition of too is rather that it requires that there be some proposition in the context that hears the rhetorical relation Parallel to the content of the sentence in which too occurs.3 In any case the presupposition triggered by too must be introduced explicitly into the discourse context, and cannot be accommodated. Another difficulty for this theory is that it on occasion fails to specify the appropriate content of the presupposition itsel£ Beaver (I997) argues that the following minimal pairs show that the content of the presupposition cannot depend simply on constraints like consistency and informativity: ·

If David wrote the article, then the knowledge that no good logician was involved will confound the editors. (I I) If David wrote the article, then the knowledge that David IS a computer program running on a PC will confound the editors.

The presupposition of (10) is (12), whereas for ( u ) it is (I J): ( 12) If David wrote the article, then no good logician was involved. (I J) David is a computer program running on a PC. The factive nominal knowledge triggers the presupposition in both (10) and (I I ). But whether conditional presuppositions arise or not cannot be a structural matter, since the same structure gives rise to a conditional presupposition in (10) but not in ( u ). So the standard theory of accommodation cannot account for the intuitions about these examples; it does not explain the presence of conditional presuppositions in some cases but not in others. Beaver (I997) argues that presupposition satisfaction must also depend on some world knowledge dependent notion of plausibility, but he too does not give an explicit or detailed account that would make the correct predictions in ( 10) and ( 1 1 ). Van der Sandt's conjecture that presuppositions are anaphors is a compelling idea. But it has shortcomings because accommodation is not constrained enough. Background knowledge such as information about the domain can block accommodation (Lewis I 979). and the rhetorical function of the utterance in the text can influence the projection of its presupposi tions, as shown with (6). Though Van der Sandt and Beaver would both acknowledge that pragmatic constraints on accommodation are important, these constraints have not been integrated into the formal theory of presuppositions or made sufficiently precise to have any predictive force. For instance, Van der Sandt's (I992) explicit theory ignores them.


(Io)

N1cholas Asher and Alex Uscarides 249 Consequently, presuppositions are sometimes accommodated in the wrong to produce the wrong readings, or they are accommodated when they should not be. We will approach these problems by tackling presupposi DRS

tions in a framework of discourse representation that formalizes the semantics pragmatics interface.

3 T H E B A S I C P I CT U RE Our framework of discourse interpretation, soRT, extends DRT in two fundamental ways. First, discourse contexts are represented as recursive,

representing the rhetorical functions of these discourse constituents in the context. Second, these discourse relations can affect the content of the clauses they relate, and hence of the discourse in general. To build such representations of contexts, SORT proceeds incrementally, interpreting each bit of new information as yielding a change in the discourse context. Like other dynamic theories of interpretation (e.g. and Groenendijk & Stokhof's 1 99 1

)

DPL ,

SORT

DRT

must specify how new

information can change an existing discourse context-i.e. it must give an account of the context change potential (ccP) of an utterance.

SORT

does so

as follows. First, one uses the grammar to build up compositionally the oRSs for each clause (c£ Muskens 1 995; Fernando 1 994; Asher 1993 ). The soRS is

then built from these oass dynamically. In the simple cases examined here and in Lascarides & Asher ( 1 99 3), we update clause by clause.• When updating the SDRS built so far with a new DRS, one uses the glue logic to decide where to attach

this DRS and to infer one or more rhetorical relations

to attach it. This last function of the glue logic was spelled out in Lascarides

& Asher ( 1993 ) and elsewhere in what we have called DICE (Discourse in Commonsense Entailment), but there the glue logic was restricted to this

task. Hence in this paper we will speak more generically and more generally

of a glue logic. The rhetorical relations may trigger modifications to the

DRSS

that were

produced by the grammar. For example, in ( 1 4), the glue logic determines

that Narration connects the clauses. Spatia-temporal constraints on Narration

are then used to add to the representation of ( 1 4) that the boxcar is in Dansville:

( 1 4)

a.

John took an engine from Avon to Dansville.

b. He picked up a boxcar, c.

and took it to Broxburn.


relational structures (soass), involving oass representing the contents of clauses, and discourse relations like Parallel, Narration and Background

250

The Semantics and Pragmatia of Presupposition

{ I s) The King of France is bald. We take a different view. {I S) means: that there is a King of France is Background to his being bald. Much of this paper focuses on spelling out this idea in detail Our 'rhetorical' approach to presuppositions has at least three advantages. First, as we mentioned in section I, loosening binding in this way eliminates the need for semantic accommodation altogether, where by semantic accommodation we mean that the presupposition is added to the context, but not related to any element of it Alternatively, accommodation can be viewed as constrained by much more than informativeness and consistency in this picture, because it is licensed only when the presupposition can be bound to the context with a rhetorical relation (c£ Lascarides & Oberlander I99J).s Either way, the accommodation mechanism where information is simply added to the context is removed. This is a very desirable feature of the theory, since this 'addition' mechanism is only used to account for presuppositions. We are replacing it with a general procedure of inter pretation. which works for assertions too and which is used to model a wide range of linguistic phenomena, particularly semantic ambiguity resolution. The second advantage of this approach is that it records the influence of pragmatic information on presupposition satisfaction. Pragmatic constraints on computing rhetorical relations, which are provided by the glue logic


The rhetorical relations, their semantic effects and the new information are now integrated together with the given SDRS representing the context to form a new soRS. Thus, SDRS construction proceeds dynamically, and each given SDRS and piece of new information produces a new SDRS, which can serve as a representation of a new discourse context Suppose one were to analyse presuppositions from the perspective of this kind of discourse semantics. Then standard binding and accommodation both seem unsatisfactory. First, standard binding is too restrictive: there are many rhetorical relations that bind propositions together-not just identity, but also relations like Paralld and Background. Binding presuppositions only with identity wouldn't reflect these alternatives. Second, accommodation where it is viewed as addition alone-is unsatisfactory, because in soRT the representation of discourse is well defined or coherent only if each DRS is related to another with a rhetorical relation. There is no scope for just adding a proposition to the context; it has to be related to it as well. This perspective leads us to loosen van der Sandt's notion of binding. Instead of a presupposition binding with identity to an accessible site in the context, it will bind with a rhetorical relation. For example, in {I s), van der Sandt would accommodate the presupposition that there is a King of France, because binding isn't possible.

Nicholas Asher

and Alex I...ascandes 25 1

(Lascarides & Asher 1 993), provide a much more constrained mechanism for dealing with presupposition than informativeness and consistency alone. As a result this theory will overcome some of the problems discussed in section 2. Third, it maintains a close relationship between presupposition satisfaction and discourse coherence. The presupposition failure in (3a, b, d) will be predicted by the fact that the presupposition that there is a car cannot be rhetorically bound to the propositions in the context. This is roughly analogous to the discourses given in (x 6a-c) being incoherent; we cannot attach the presupposition anywhere in the context and get a coherent discourse.

(3 )

a.

car.

.

Our account of presupposition will buttress and develop van der Sandt's view that presupposition satisfaction and discourse coherence are closely related, and we will exploit soRT's rich notion of discourse coherence to do

this. In

soRT, assertions are linked to the context by computing a rhetorical relation. We claim that presuppositions are handled this way too. But many linguists have argued that assertions and presuppositions are different. Presuppositions project from embeddings and assertions don't. And Clark ( 1977) has intuitively described presupposed information as givtn, and asserted information as �.6 We need to account for this intuitive difference. We capture the difference between presuppositions and assertions in three ways. First, the rules for updating discourse ensure that the rhetorical role of presuppositions is in general different &om that for asse rted information. To capture the intuition that by and large, presuppositions are given, the rules for computing rhetorical relations ensure that pre suppositions in general bind with Background (i.e. the presupposition provides background or sets the stage for the main story line). For example,

the representation of ( 1 s ) will include: (a) the proposition a that x is bald, (b) the proposition {3 that there is a King of France and that is x/ and (c) the condition Background(a , /3) (so the presupposition provides background to the main point, which is that x is bald� Presuppositions may also bind with Dtf-Co�qucut in some cases. This relation means that the presupposition is a defeasible consequence of the


A:. Did you hear about John? b. B: No, what? d. A:. He had an accident. ?'?The car hit him. (16) a. A:. Did you hear about John? ??There was a b. B: No, what? A:. ??There was a car. c. A:. John had an accident. ??There was a car

252 The Semantics and Pragmatics of Presupposition proposition it attaches to. If the consequence relation is idempotent (a standard assumption), then binding in van der Sandt's sense turns out to be a species of Def-Consequena. So binding in van der Sandt's sense will in general correspond in this theory to a

case

where the presupposition is

Def-Co�qumu (because it is defeasibly entailed by the attaches to) and Background (because in our theory pre

related by both proposition it

suppositions usually bind this way). Presuppositions can be attached with relations other than Background and Def-Consequence, but in general tlus arises because the presupposition trigger itself specifies some other rhetorical relation. For example, the presupposition trigger too entails Parallel, and because entails Explanation. In contrast to presuppositions,

Background-e.g. Narration, Result, because. Further Def-Consequenu, unless it is explicitly

Explanation-even in the absence of words like too and

more, assertions do not attach with signalled by a discourse particle. A second difference between presuppositions and asserted information is that there is an important distinction between their compositional semantics. The grammar produces a representation of presupposed infor mation which is always incomplete or umkrspecified. This is the technical way of ensuring that presuppositions are always anaphoric, and must be

bound. Because of this, asserted information and presupposed information behave differently at the start of a discourse. Asserted information is simply introduced into the null context. But this is not possible for presupposed information. It is

always

bound to some antecedent with a rhetorical

relation, even if that antecedent is the asserted information in the clause

which introduced the presupposition-as in e.g. (I 5).

Finally, there will be differenC:es in the preferences for which part of the

discourse structure presuppositions vs. assertions attach to. Presuppositions are freer in their attachment possibilities than assertions; those clausal

constituents of the assertion that are combined with logical operators have their attachment sites determined by the grammar, whereas presuppositions

are always free in principle to attach outside the SDRS constituent in which they were generated. The preferences for attachment predict that pre suppositions

can

project from embeddings in a way that assertions cannot.

The underspecification in presuppositions is used to record the influence of pragmatics on presupposition satisfaction. A distinguishing feature of SDRT

is that computing a rhetorical connection between propositions in the

glue logic can result in those propositions receiving additional content. Update in SDRT is defined so that if this additional content can resolve underspecified conditions that arose in the grammar, then it does.

This

captures the intuition that when processing discourse, people are expected


asserted information may be attached to the discourse context with a variety of rhetorical relations other than

Ntcholas &her and Alex Lascarides 2 5 3

4

PRESU PP O S I T I O NS I N M O RE DETAIL

Having given the basic picture, we will now turn to the details of the theory. First, we will give an overview of the soRT compositional semantics of presupposition triggers. Processing the presupposition relative to the context amounts to resolving its underspecified elements, and this is handled via the soRT update function. We will illustrate how this works, by analysing some simple sentences (i.e. sentences that do not contain logical operators such as if or not). We will then examine the interpretation of presuppositions in more complex sentences (e.g. (1o) and ( u )), and compare our treatment to that of other dynamic accounts, such as Beaver's (1996) and van der Sandt's (1992). Using SDRT makes comparisons and reformulations of van der Sandt's DRT-based theory of presuppositions relatively straightforward. We will demonstrate that at least some of the


to and often do fill in gaps in what's been made lmguistically explicit. This feature of soRT provides a formal model for how pragmatics (wluch influences the rhetorical relation) affects semantics (i.e. the resolution of underspecification). We will use tlus feature to record the influence of pragmatics on the semantics of presuppositions. The grammar typically introduces at least two underspecified elements in a presupposition: one is the rhetorical relation used to bind the presupposed mformation, and the other is the other term of this relation, which is known as the attachment point. The latter underspecificatton ensures that the structural position in the discourse context in wluch the presupposed information is entered is not determined by the syntactic position of the presupposition trigger that generates it, because the attachment point that is pan of the representation of the discourse context could be a proposition that was introduced by an earlier sentence (this 1s explained in more detail in section 4-2). This captures the intuition that that presuppositions may project from the embedded contexts m which they are introduced. Underspecification for presuppositions actually comes in a vanety of types, which depend on the presupposition trigger. We wtll examine some of these in section 4-1. In all cases, however, in processing a presupposition one must resolve the underspecified elements with respect to the discourse context. So presupposition projection, binding and accommodation all occur as a byproduct of the SDRT update procedure. They occur by computing how the presupposition rhetorically connects to the context. Since tlus update procedure is determined by the pragmatic mformation spectfied in the glue logic, presuppositions are mfluenced by pragmatics as well as compositional semantics.8

254

The Semantics

and Pragmattcs of Presupposition

problems concerning conditional presuppositions can be overcome, because of the role of pragmatics in soRT. Finally, we will examine presuppositions in multi-sentence discourse, and then return to some cases that one might think are difficult to handle in a proposal where semantic accommodation is excluded. 4. 1

Semantics of clauses

( I 7)

I:, K,l

Updating the discourse with information such as that in (17) will involve computing a rhetorical relation R between 1f' and some accessible speech act discourse referent 1f' 1 in the discourse context Computing this rhetorical relation may include resolving underspecified conditions that are in K1r, as we shall see in section 4-2. Note that R's arguments are the labels, and not the DRSs themselves. We explain why in section 4-2. A presupposition that is introduced by a clause can receive different scope &om the assertioiL For example, in (I), the presupposed information has wider scope than the conditional, but the asserted information does not9 In section 2, we showed that the relative scopes of the asserted and presupposed content of the clause is not syntactically determined; and so, in line with the general strategy for representing ambiguity, the grammar


We first examine some important aspects of the compositional semantics of the clauses. Following Reyle (1993) and Asher & Fernando (1997), the grammar utilizes underspecification to represent semantic ambiguity. The grammar produces a set of labelled pieces of information and a set of constraints about how these labels can combme. Semantic ambiguity occurs when the constraints underdetennine the combination of these labels. Since the combination of labels is underspecified, so is the representation of the meaning of the clause. Resolving the relative scopes of the labels is then done by updating the discourse context with this (underspecified) meaning. Discourse update in SORT is specifically designed to resolve underspecified elements when it calL To avoid clutter in notation, semantic information that must be grouped together according to syntax receives just one label. Moreover, as in HPSG (Pollard & Sag 1 994), these labels may appear in conditions. A special case of this labelling procedure is the following: if the grammar produces the DRS Kn for some clause, then the SDRS for the discourse will include (17) where the label 1f' is a discourse referent, which we call a 'speech act discourse referent' since it labels a DRS (we will always assume a notational convention that 1f' labels Kn):

Nicholas

Asher and Alex Lascandes 2 5 5

groups asserted information under one label, and the presupposed informa tion under another. Consequently, the grammar produces an SDRS like that in ( 1 7) for the asserted content of a clause, and it will produce another SDRS ' ' with speech act discourse referent rr , and condition rr : K1r' for the presupposed content of this clause, where K1r' will be the DRS discourse

constituent that represents the presupposttion (e.g.Jack has a son for { I )). The grammar does not determine the scope of 7r and 71" 1• Rather, all of these

soRSs must be attached to the representation of the discourse achieved so far through the soRT discourse update procedure: that is, they must be attached to the context with a rhetorical relation. Rhetorical relations produce ' hierarchical structures for the labels 1r, rr etc, since some rhetorical relations

way and providing them with different labels, the grammar distinguishes between presuppositions and asserttons in one other important respect. Presuppositions are exphcitly encoded as anaphoric, since the grammar invokes for each presupposition an underspecified attachment point and underspeetfied rhetorical relation. These are gtven respectively by and

R = ? in the , 7r , U

(r8)

7r

u

=

?

canorucal representation of presuppositions, given m (I 8):

' . K' •

R(u,

7r

rr

'

)

R=? u=? This distinguishes this treatment of presuppositions from van der Sandt's, because this underspecification means that the presuppositions must be rhetorically bound to the context, rather than added.

always

The Projection Problem is challenging, because the scope of presupposed information is contextually rather than grammatically determined. Our semantic representation of presuppositions allows for this through the use is determined by resolving u

=

=

u ?. The scope of a presupposition ?. Sine� this is done via the discourse update

of the underspecified attachment site

procedure, and hence via the glue logic, pragmatics will influence the scope of presuppositions. Moreover, for presupposition triggers that are intro duced in an embedded context such as a conditional, soRT allows the presupposition to access attachment points that are outside the scope of the embedding. If discourse update resolves the antecedent attachment point

u

to one of these, then the presupposition has essentially projected out from


are subordinating and some are coordinating. So this discourse structure will resolve the relative scope of the asserted and presupposed content. As well as separatmg asserted content and presupposed content in this

256 The

Semantics and Pragmatics of Presupposltlon

its embedded context. This contrasts with the assertions in the conditional, which cannot project in this way. To illustrate the ideas, let us examine the compositional semanttcs of some example clauses that contain presupposition triggers. Presuppositions of abstract type-i.e. propositional or factual presuppositions-are triggered by

stop/start verbs, rtgret, realiZe, and

expressions such as wh-questions, focus, comparatives,

mana� and

succeed

verbs, factive verbs like know,

presuppos1tional adverbs like

regret. containing regret

agam.

Let us consider, for instance, a factive

verb like

structures, and therefore act as guides for putting the SDRS together; they will disappear after SDRS update. This will involve binding

11', 11' 1

etc to available

referents with rhetorical relations. Note also that the DRS representingjohn is

sick forms part of the representation of the asserted content, and also part of the representation of the presupposition. We use the DRS in a rather than the label because the intensional operator works over a DRS and not a term.

11' 1 , R, u 11' 11' :

11'

s regret(s,

p:

'

:

[2]

R(u, 11' 1 ) R=?

[ I ] , 11 [2] )

u=? (2o) John regretted that he was sick. 11'

11' 1 , R u j, s", t"

j, s, t, n I

11':

regret s, ),· II

sick(s', j ) -
- PL ( f3) means a is more plausible than {3.'7 Let us now look a t conditional contexts in more detail. Given an attachment of 8( C ) to B in the context A > B, where > is some standard conditional operator, we would expect A > (B 1\ 8( C)) to be equivalent to A > B and A > 8( C). This equivalence holds in many conditional logics (for instance, Stalnaker's conditional logic, Lewis's ( 1 973) counterfactual logics, or the normality conditional of Asher & Morreau I 99 1 which underlies DICE). One consequence of this is that the attachment of the presupposition 8( C) to the consequent B of a conditional whose antecedent is A, is equivalent to attaching A > 8( C) to the constituent in which the conditional A > B occurs. So local attachments in this case are equivalent to conditional presuppositions. But since these conditional presuppositions seem to be preferred in at least some cases, this would go against the van der Sandt proposal of accommodating presuppositions globally whenever possible. Our approach to these conditional presuppositions will be to treat them as cases of binding with Dif-ConMquffl££. If we assume that > is the operator version of the relation Def-Co�qunue, then such attachments in conditional contexts amount to attaching the presupposed information with


(I o) If David wrote the article, then the knowledge that no good logician was involved will confound the editors. ( I I ) If DaVid wrote the article, then the knowledge that David is a computer program running on a PC will confound the editors.

Nicholas Asher and Alex Lasc:uides

277

Dif-Constqumce. We will stqumct relation can be

suppose in addition that this Dtftasible Con demonstrated by a deduction, and that the information at the attachment point plays an essential role in the derivation of the presupposed information, in the sense that one could not make the derivation without it. In some cases, it is clear that commonly supposed background knowledge is enough to link presupposition with an appropriate premise via Deftasible Constqumce. For example, consider the pair (37) (due to M K.rifka, p.c.): (37)

a. If David b. If David

is is

going diving, he11 bring going diving, he'll bring

his wetsuit. his dog.

(3 8) If David goes diving, then he has a wetsuit. On the other hand (3 7b) does not. It generates the simple presupposition: (39) David has a dog. In (3 7a), general world knowledge allows us to derive defeasibly the fact that David has a wetsuit from the fact that David goes diving. But from the fact that David goes diving we can't derive that he has a dog. Given a preference for binding with Def-Constquena, we will predict this binding for (37a) but not for (3 7b). Conditional presuppositions need not be generated only from the consequents of conditionals, however. We can attach presuppositions generated in the antecedent of a conditional to that antecedent with Dif Constqumu as well, as in (4oa) due to Beaver (p.c.): (4o)

a.

If David is a shepherd and has a good rapport with his dog, he'll get a job on the farm. b. David is a shepherd and he has a good rapport with his dog.

Once again it appears plausible that we can already defeasibly derive David's having a dog from the fact that he is a shepherd. Note, howeve�, that it is the conditional that licenses this conditional presupposition. The conditional presupposition vanishes when there is no conditional in context as in (4ob). Further, the presupposition changes depending on the modal context. For example in (41) we only get the counterfactual presupposition that were David a shepherd, he would have a dog: (4 1) If David were a shepherd and had a good rapport with would get a job on the farm.

his

dog, he

We claim that conditional or counterfactual presuppositions surface only in conditional or counterfactual contexts. In (4oa) the presupposition is


(37a) generates the conditional presupposition:

278

The Semantics and Pragmatics of Presupposition

attached with Dq-Consequmce, but because the premises are taken to be asserted as true the defeasible consequence is itself drawn and assumed to hold in the context. In cases where the attachment point (and essential premise) falls under a modal or conditional context, the defeasible context cannot be drawn, and the presupposition that is bound by Defeasible Consequence inherits the modal force of its attachment point. This inheritance is predicted if we think of the discourse function of these antecedents of conditionals as conditional or counterfactual assumptions and we take these conditionals to be closed under the consequence relation'8 •

Let's turn now to the analysis ( 1 0) and (u). While ( 1 0) generates a conditional presupposition, it is not plausible to claim that general world knowledge and the discourse context make available the relevant premises for deriving the presupposition from the antecedent. Such a conclusion would follow if the context supported particular facts about David, like the fact that he's not a good logician. But the interesting and puzzling fact is that the conditional presupposition seems present even when the context doesn't support such facts. We claim that people add these distinct facts 1/J as implicatures in order to bind the presupposition with Dtftasible Co�quence, as long as the assumption of tf; is more plausible than the original presupposition. We'll say that one update of r with {3 is strictly preferred to another when of the pair it is r, {3-maximal, which was defined in § 4-2. •

Preference for Binding:

Suppose

Update(r, a, 8(/3) ) links a and 8({3) with Dif-Co�uence, assuming some extra information tf; distinct from Ka(/3) that is attached to r via Background and 2. Updak(r, a, , 8(f3)) links a, and 8(/3) with Background but not 1.

Dif-Consequence

Then:

1

Updak( r, a, 8(/3)) is strictly preferred to Update( r, a , 8(/3)) {normally if) and only if PL(J.L(KI/J) (x)) is greater than PL(J.L(Kacf3))(x))) Note of course that tf; could simply be a tautology, in which case the update with Def-Consequmce will be strictly preferred to the update with Background without restriction. This statement on preference of updates will play an important role in


Closure of Conditionals under Consequence: Suppose DefCons( a, /3) and Ka. => K-y hold, where => represents either a normal or counterfactual conditional Then: Ka. => K13.

Nicholas Asher and Alex Lascarides

279

detennining whether the presupposition should be locally or globally bound in conditional sentences such as ( I), (2), ( 1 0) and (I I). Note that the above axiom on its own does not guarantee that a unique attachment site is chosen, even for conditional sentences. Heirn ( I 98 3 , I 992) and van der Sandt ( I 992) note that presuppositions have a conventional property: they project out from embeddings to have the widest scope possible. In fact, in certain cases, this tendency to project actually seems to win over what's plausible. Consider sentence ( I I), for example. According to common sense, it is more plausible that sentence (42) is true than (43):

(42)

(42)

is the reading one gets of ( I I ) if the presupposition attaches in the intermediate position. (43) is the result of global attachment, and corres ponds to the intuitive interpretation of ( u ) (since it entails David is a computer program). So global attachment seems to be favoured here, even though the result is the less plausible scenario. These examples show that, in contrast to Beaver (I 996), a preference for attaching presuppositions that is based solely on plausibility cannot be right. It is important to stress that (42) being dispreferred is not a counter example to the Preference f or Binding constraint. That axiom together with Maximize Discourse Coherence only rules out a conditional attach ment, unless it is most plausible. But the presupposition in (42) is not attached with a conditional or Dif-Co�qumce, and so the constraint does not apply. There seems to be some tension between deriving a plausible reading, and the conventional property of presuppositions that they project to the widest scope. The constraint Preference for Binding and the axioms of Maximize Discourse Coherence and Prefer Global Attachment reflect this tension. Prefer Global Attachment will determine that global attachment occurs in (I) and ( u ). But Preference for Binding with Maximize Discourse Coherence will override this default to produce local attachment in ( 1 0). With these constraints on conditional attachments in place, let us analyse (I) and (2). Let (I)'s antecedent that baldness is hereditary be represented by (so Krr, supplies the information that baldness is hereditary):

a (a ) � �


If David wrote the article and he's a computer program, then the knowledge that David is a computer program will confound the editors. (43) David is a computer program, and if he wrote the article, then the . knowledge that David is a computer program running on a PC will confound the editors.

280 The Semantics

and Pragmatics of Presupposition

The consequent (that Jack's son is bald), contains a presupposition, and so it is represented by two constituents b4 and bp given below (as before, we have

glossed over the presupposition triggered by the proper name jack, by making the simplifying assumption that Jack is represented by the

constant j}.

7T� t, t 7T�:

7T3 x, j 7T3 :

son(x) of(x , J )

The soRS after updating with the first clause is simply a itsel£ Moreover, because of the cue word if, the grammar produces a Condition relation between the speech act discourse referent 1r 1 in a and another discourse referent, which must be equal to or include within its scope the asse rted information b4 of the consequent. We will label the result-which includes the

Condition

relation, a and b4-with the speech act discourse referent

1r4•

Now SDRS Update must be used to attach the rest of the discourse information, namely bp, which is labeled 1r3• Condition is a subordinating relation, and so there are three available attachment sites for

1r3• Condition is

a subordinating relation, and so there are three available attachment sites

for 1r3 : either (a) 1r3 binds 'globally', to the speech act discourse referent 1r4; or (b) 1r3 binds in the 'intermediate' position, to 7r 1 ; or (c) 1r3 attaches in the 'local' position, to 1r �· One must check which of these choices produces a

coherent result, and then choose among these coherent alternatives, using the axioms we specified earlier.

Attaching 1r3 Background(1r1 , 1T3 )

to

7r1

is

not

possible:.

Background

applies,

but

cannot be inferred, because a decent topic cannot be

constructed; there is no thematic link between background and foreground, just as there is no thematic link in the incoherent (44).

(44)

Baldness is hereditary. Jack has a son.


bald(t, x) lwlds(t, t) t�n

Nicholas Asher and Alex Lascarides 28 1

7r. , 7rl 7r[ ) 7r1. 7r. :

7r 1 : K1r, , 1r1. : K1r, Condition ( 1r 1 , 7r ) 1.

7rl : K1f1 Background(1r. , 1r3 ) Now consider the analysis of (2). As before, the grammar produces a constituent a which contains the information in the antecedent clause, which we label 7r1 again. And it induces a Condition relation between this and (at least) the asserted information in the consequent So just as with ( I ), there are three available attachment points for binding 1r3 in the presupposed information bp : 1r•, 1r" and 7r:�.· In ( I ), 1r3 could not attach to 7r1 with a rhetorical relation. But now the situation is different, because the content of 1r 1 is different As we suggested in section J, if the content of the new information is a defeasible consequence of the content of the proposition to which it is to be attached, then normally, the rhetorical relation Dej-Cons�quenu is inferred. This is encapsulated in Defeas ible Consequence: •

Defeasible Consequence:

(( r, a, {J) 1\ ((J1(Kr) (r) I\ J1(Ka) (a)) > J1(Kf3 ) (f3))) > Dif-Co�quenu(a, fJ) The constraints on Dif-Cons�quma are compatible with those on Background, and so it is possible for both Def -consequence and Background


Neither can we infer Dif-Cons�quenu(7r " 1r3), for the auxilliary information needed to make the derivation is surely less plausible than the presupposi tion 1tsel£ Thus, Prifernru for Binding does not apply. 1r3 can attach to 1r• or 1r1. coherently, both with Background (since Background applies in each case). We claimed earlier that the local attachment corresponds to the reading: If baldness is hereditary, then Jack has a son and he is bald. We can now explain why. The Condition relation holds between 7r1 and the topic that's introduced by the Background relation between 7r2 and 7rp and this topic contains a 'repeat' of the content given in bd and br Thus part of the meaning of this SDRS is that if baldness is hereditary, then Jack has a son. However, the default Prefer Global Attachment applies and so by Defeasible Modus Ponens, global binding is chosen in this case. The final ' analysis is given in ( I ) below (in simplified form, since we have not included the FBP structure that's introduced by Background):

282 The Semantics and Pragmatics of Presupposttion to

fire,

yielding

Background( a:, {3)

the

result

that

hold. Note also that

both

4J > 4J

Dif-Constqunta( a, {3)

4J. So Defeasible Consequence will apply whenever one

attempts to attach

a presupposition to a constituent of the same content. So

Binding

and

is valid for any proposition

Prefuence for

holds without restriction, since no extra information is needed to

establish it. Our constraints Priferrnce for

way van der Sandt's principle that binding is preferred over accommoda tion. And for (2), these axioms predict, correctly, that the presupposition does not project out &om the conditional. In general, whether a presupposition projects from an embedding or not depends on several things. First, it depends on pragmatic and semantic content of the prior discourse and the presupposition, because this is used to reason about which available attachment sites the presupposition can coherently bind to, and which rhetorical relation to use. Second, the projection depends on the relative plausibility of the various choices of attachment (that are coherent� Third, it depends on the relative strength of the rhetorical connections provided by various choices of attachment. Finally, it depends on the default which favours attaching presuppositions high up in the soas structUre. Some general results concerning projection follow from this. Some of these are given below (for single sentences in the null context):

I . Projection does not occur in a sentence of the fonn. IfA tkn B, when the presupposition triggered by B is a default consequence of A. 2. Projection does occur in a sentence of the form. If A tkn B, when the presupposition triggered by B is logically independent of that given by A and plausibilities reflect logical independence in the way that probabilities do (note that it can always attach coherently with

Background

to the global site, because

B

will contain sufficient content

that's similar to its presuppositions so that the topic required by

Background can be constructed). 3· In a sentence of the form A and not B, the presuppositions triggered by B will project from the embedding so long as they can coherently attach to A with a rhetorical relation. To say more in general is tricky,

because

projection is determined by a

complex interaction between semantic and pragmatic knowledge resources.


Binding and HaximJ.Ze Discourse Coherence force us in the analysis of (2) to bind 1r3 to 11"1 (i.e. to bind the presupposition to the antecedent of the conditional) with Dif-Constqutn«. We therefore infer a binding to the (intermediate) attachment site with Background and Dif-Constqutnce, even though the presupposition could coherently bind at the global level with Background. Thus Maximize Discourse Coherence and Prtjuma for Binding capture in a more general

Nicholas Asher and Alex Lascarides .2.83

(7) ?? I don't know whether the Pope realizes the Pope has measles.

has

measles. But every Catholic

We now examine these examples in more detail First, note that intermediate accommodation isn't always blocked:


Furthermore, we view these solutions to the Projection Problem as a side issue; we are more concerned with addressing the problem of interpreting presuppositions in multi-sentence discourse. We now consider the analyses of (zo) and (1 1� Van der Sandt's analysis was inadequate, because it failed to distinguish their presupposed contents. In our theory, the constraint Priferencefor Binding accounts for this variation. Consider (10) first. The pre-supposition trigger knowledge that ¢ generates a propositional presupposition ¢ that must be attached to the context. We will defeasibly infer ¢ if we assume that David is not a good logician. But this assumption about one individual seems more plausible than the general assertion that no good logician was involved.'9 So local binding (to the asserted information in the consequent) is inferred for (10) via Prejtrt:na for Binding and Maximize Discourse Coherence in the now familiar way. In contrast, the information needed to establish an inference &om the fact that David wrote the article to the fact that he's a computer program is no more plausible than David's being a computer program tout court. So the truth functional 'only if' part of Conditional Presupposit �ons forces one to eschew the conditional attachment and to bind the presupposition in (I I) non-locally (Le. as Background to the antecedent, or to the whole conditional statement). Prefer Global Attachment leads us to infer global attachment, because of the default preference for it. Note that global attachment occurs even though the intermediate attachment describes a more plausible scenario, as we explained earlier. Our theory predicts this, because plaustbility is a deciding factor only in quite specific circumstances. Thus the axioms which constrain the update of discourse with presuppositions predict the difference between ( 1 o} and (I I). It is interesting to compare this approach to conditional presuppositions to that offered by satisfaction theorists (e.g. Beaver 1997). Satisfaction accounts always generate conditional presuppositions in contexts such as (1o). But such conditional presuppositions do not always occur (c£ (n )). So they have tried to provide accounts for how the unconditional presupposi tions arise &om the conditional ones. Geurts (1996) argues convincingly that these attempts are flawed. This approach is different: the conditional presuppositions occur only when Dif-Consequence can be inferred. In section 2, we observed examples where intermediate accommodation is predicted in standard theories of presupposition (e.g. van der Sandt I992), even though intuitively it should be blocked:

284 The Semantics and Pragmatics of Presupposition

(45) Nobody regrets leaving school . (46) Everybody takes their children to school (47) Most people in the neighbourhood take their children to school cases apparently all involve information in the presupposition that to resolve the underspecified elements like the B relation of section 4- 1 (example 24) generated by the treatment of the generalized quantifiers. Further, it is just these resolutions that will allow us to infer an appropriate rhetorical link between the presupposition generated in the nuclear scope of the quantification and the restrictor. This predicts that intermediate attachment is allowed in (45-47). The presupposed material in these cases describe a property of the 'quantified' discourse referent. For instance in {46), the presupposed material is that x has children. where x is the discourse referent introduced by �uybody. So we can se t B to the 'has' relation, and so relate x to y where y is a discourse referent representing a child of x, and at the same time establish the relevant thematic link between presupposed information arising &om the nuclear scope and asse rted information in the restrictor so as to establish a coherent Background relation (and FBP which we omit below for simplicity). So the representation of {46) is {46'):

These serves

u, 11'3 x, y, B, �, t person(x)

7r l :

B(e, x, z) holds(�, t) B = has z=y

Background ( 1r, u) u = 11'3 y 11' : 3

child(y) has(x, y)

7rl =>

7rl :

I

I

I take-ttrschool(x, y) I


7rl '

Nicholas Asher and Alex Lasca.rides 285 In the cases where intermediate accommodation is blocked, the presup

posed information is not of the right type to be identified with the contextually specified element in the restrictor of the quantifier. More specifically, it is not a property of the discourse referent that's being

So it doesn't give rise to an appropriate instantiation for the B, and thus doesn't provide the appropriate thematic Background. So some and perhaps all of the underspecified

quantified over.

bridging relation continuity for

conditions in the restrictor fail to receive a resolution. Consider for instance

(7). The presupposed material that the Pope has measles is not a property of every Catholic. More precisely, it does not involve the variable introduced by every Catholic. So the presupposed information cannot help resolve the

we explained in section 2, the presupposition should not bind globally because of Moore's paradox. Assuming that the constraints on rhetorical relations capture this constraint on assertability, global attachment will

be

blocked in SORT. In fact, local attachment will also be blocked in this way; note that (48), which is the reading given by local attachment, is also unassertable: (48) I don't know whether the Pope has measles. But for every person, if he's a Catholic, then the Pope has measles and he realizes the Pope has measles.

So

SORT

predicts that

(7)

is odd.

5·3

Multi-sentence discourse

In this section, we examine presuppositions in multi-sentence discourse. Consider (49): (49) a. John failed at school years ago. b. He now regrets that. The pronoun that in (49b) introduces a propositional anaphoric discourse referent One must resolve this to an available discourse referent of the same type.

So,

This

the pronoun

gives only one choice: the proposition expressed by (49a�

that

is identified with the content of (49a), regardless of

how the constituents attach together with rhetorical relations. Therefore,

the representation of (49a) is a, and the representation (49b) is bd for the as.Serted content and b1 for the presupposed content (in slightly simplified form):


bridging relation B or its other term. And we cannot get a thematic link so as to validate a Background relation between the presupposition and the restrictor; so the presupposition fails to bind to the intermediate position. As


11"1 j, x

(a)

Jail(j , x)

1T I:

school(x) 11"� j

' 'T'

(

j , ' ja1IU, x) school(x)

)

We now attempt to update a with

b,.

1r3 , R, v ;, x (b,)

11"3 :

fail( j, x) school(x)

R=? v=?

R(v, 1rJ Defeasible Consequence applies to

1r 1 and 1r3 • And the temporal and topical constraints on Background are met, smce 1r 1 and 1r 3 specify the same content So, Updateson yields

Background( 1r 1 , 1r3 ) and Def- Constqumu( 1r 1 , 1r3 ) via DICE, and the condi tion R = ? and v = ? in bp are replaced with R = Background 1\ Def Constqutttce and v = 1r . . Furthermore, a topic 1r is built on top of this soas rr' which contains a, b, and the Background relation. The content in the topic 1r is a repeat of the content o: and ba, which is just a. And FBP( 1r, 1r 1 ) holds. This topic structUre

is important in this case, because it means that the asserted content ba can attach to the content of a, which is 'repeated' in 1r-for note that a itself is blocked from attachment by the Background relation with the presupposi tion. Intuitively, we want the asserted content of (49b) to be connected to the content (49a), because there is a causal relation between the action of failing in school and regretting it. The topic 1r lets us do this. In fact, since the presupposed content in this case is exactly that of (4�). attaching 7r1 to


;, x

11"� :

Nicholal Asher and Alex Lascarides 287 the presupposition 1r3 would have been adequate. But this would not be the case in the slightly modified example, given in ( s o):

(so)

a.

John failed at school years ago.

b. He now regrets that awful mistake.

(49)

a. John failed in school. b. He now regrets that. ,

7r , 7r , 7rl j, s

j, x 7r :

•do well(}, x) school(x)

7rl :

FBP( 1r, 1r1)

j, x

regre{, J,'

fail(}, x) school(x)

)

Result(1r, 7r1)

7r, ' 7r3 7r' :

j, x 7r, :

fail(}, x) school(x)

j, x 7r3 :

fail(j, x) school(x)

Background( 7r1 , 1r3) Dif-Co�quena(7r1 1 1r3 )

(49) this

to van der Sandt's binding of presupposed content. In the presupposed information is a defeasible consequence of

is analogous case

the constituent it attaches to, and it attaches with

Background

and


Suppose Background did not produce a topic that 'repeated' the content of ( soa) and the presupposition (that there is an awful mistake). Then the regret would have to attach to the awful mistake with a rhetorical relation. So the regret would be caused by the awful mistake, rather than the action of failing in school and the fact that this was a mistake. By repeating all the content in the topic, new elements can attach to both the foreground and background information as required. In (49), therefore, in order to capture this intuition that the regret is caused by the action described in (49a), we attach 1r1 to the topic 1r with R�lt. Therefore, the final representation of (49) is (49' ):

288 The Semantics and Pragmatics of J>re,upposition

Dej-Cons�quenu.

In contrast,

(s I}

is an example where the presupposition

would traditionally be accommodated:

(S I }

a.

The US bombing of Baghdad during the Gulf War was much more indiscriminate and brutal than the American public was led to believe.

b. But

military

commanders

will

not

acknowledge

that their

campaign resulted in massive civilian casualttes.

(s I b)-which ledgt,

we label 7rb-contains the presupposition trigger

which introduces the presupposition

a( 1rb)

acknow

that their campaign

but

indicates that

the asserted content (that the military commanders will not acknow ledge a( 7rb}) must attach with Contrast to the discourse context (5 I a) which we label 1!"0• This Contrast imposes coherence constraints: the two propositions 1!"0 and 7rb must have contrasting thetnfi (Asher I993). In parncular, the truth of one should lead to an expectation of the negation of the other. We must check this is the case. We must also compute

a

rhetorical

attachment

between

a( 1rb) and an available a( rrb} to rra (i.e., attach

attachment site. Suppose we attempt to attach 'globally'). Then given that world

knowledge supports a defeasible

consequence relation between 1!"0 and a( 7rb) , they are connected with and Difeasible Conseq uence via Defeasible Modus Ponens on

Backgrou nd

the rules Background and Defeasible Consequence. If a( 7rb ) attaches

this

way, then the coherence constraints on Contrast between 1rb and the (modified) discourse context-which contains 1ra, a( 1rb) and a Background between them-are verified: there is a contrasting theme between a( 1rb) (which is in the discourse context} and alternattve to itsel£ But

this

this

not acknowkdg� that

a( 1rb). The

is to attach a ( 1rb) 'locally' instead of 'globally': i.e. to 1!"6

will not produce as strong a contrasting theme. Therefore,

the default preference for global attachment wins out by Maximize Discourse Coherence, and ensures that a( 1rb) attaches to 1ra rather than 1rb, because this produces the better discourse. Consider now an example which involves bridging as well as presupposition satisfaction: (28)

a.

John took an engine from Avon co Dansville.

b. He picked up the boxcar c.

and took it to Broxburn.

(28a) is represented as a, while the asserted and presupposed components of (28b) are

ba

and

bp :


resulted in massive civilian casualties. The cue phrase

Nicholas Asher and Alex Lascarides 289 11'

j, EI , a, d, t, t, n (a)

1TJ :

John( } ) tngmt(EI) A110n(a) DaiiSVllk(d)

tJJ /u(t, ) , EI) from(t1 , a) to(t. ' d) holds(t. ' '· )

'· -< "

'IT]. e]. , t]., n pick-up (e]. , j, y) holds(e]., t1.) t]. -< n

7r3 , v, R B , u , e3 , t3 , y 'IT] :

B=? u=?

B(e3 , y, u) holsd(e3 , t3 )

boxcar( y) R(v, 7r3 ) R=? v=? According to Upda�soan we should check whether there is sufficient information in 'IT 1 , 'IT1. and 'IT3 that we can attach them together with rhetorical relations, which lead to the underspecified elements in 'IT3 being resolved. Suppose we were to try and attach 'IT 3 to 'IT 1 (or 'IT 1.) first: 'IT 3 cannot attach to 'IT 1 (or 'IT1.) with any relation-in particular Narration or Backgrou nd because there is insufficient information in 1r3 to trigger the relevant DICE axioms. So let us ignore 'IT 3 for now, and try to attach 'IT1. to 'IT 1 , to see if this produces possible resolutions ofunderspecified elements in 'IT3 .:w And indeed, it does. 'IT 1 and 'ITJ. both describe events, and so Defeasible Modus Ponens on the axiom Narra tion yields Narration(1r1 , 1r1.). We must then accommodate content arising &om Narration's coherence constraints. First, trr. occurs before t1r. : that is, the taking of the engine &om Avon to Dansville occurs before y (which is the boxcar according to Krr) is picked up. Second, by modus -


'IT]. :

290 The Senunncs and Pragmatics of Presupposttion pnens on Spat ial Consequence on Narration, the actorJohn is in the same place at the end of taking the engine to Dansville as when he starts to pick up y. By the prepositional phrase in (28a), this is Dansville. And by the lexical semantic content of the phrase picking up, this event starts in the same location as it finishes, and the object y that's picked up is also at this

11', 11'1 , 11''

11'1 :

j, EI , a , d, t 1 , t1 , n

y, t1. , � , t3 , t3 , n

John ( j) tngint(EI ) Avon (a ) Dansville(d ) t, -< n

puk-up (t1. , j, y) holds (t l , t, )

talu(t, j , EI ) .from(t. , a ) to (t, d ) holds( t. , t, )

1!':

boxcar (y) in (t3 , y, d ) ovtrlap (t1. , tl )

Narration (11'. , 1r) 1!'1.1 1!'3 , v, R

11'':

pick-up (tJ. , j, y) holds (t, t, )

R(v, 11'1 ) R = Badeground V = 1!'1

-
m a context C of a sentence ,P mwt not make ,P in C logically equivalent to x. such that X I= if> but it's not the cue that ¢J I= X· 3 For more on too and Paralkl, 5ee Asher {I993) or Asher, Hardt & Busqueu

( I 997).

4 In

more complex examples, we may fonn local soJt.Ss that are then atuched

5

together. The idea of handling presupposition

5atis&ction through computing haw it

u rhetorically connected to the dis course context was used in Lascarides & Oberlander {I993) to process the content of wlwl -, b4Qr?- and a.Jtn clauses. This approach is similar m spirit, but more general We have replaced therr procedural approach with a declarative one; we have integrated sernannc and presupposi tiona! information into the constructton of an soilS in a compositional way by wing underspecification; and finally, we cover a wider variety of presupposition triggers. Furthermore, Lascarides and Oberlander ignored the way computing a rhetorical relation can lead to further inferences about semantic content, and so they did not model the w.1y the


NICHOLAS ASHER Dq1artmnll of Philosophy Umvmity of Taas at Austin Austin, To:as 787Il USA �-mail: naslm@bm�.la.ut=s.edu


Narration because, as we have noted elsewhere (Asher t.c Lascarides I995� it does not apply for all discourse rela noru. FOr example Contrast and Paralkl have different spatial comtramts, as given in Asher t.c Lascarides (I995, in press� I 2 For sirnphcity, we have written this rule m words, although it can be encoded wing the modal connective > . I 3 This kernel ensures that only the rela tiom m the context change, and not the structure.

I 4 Note that this definition holds only for DRSS without cond!noru of the form :x = ? . We gloss over the complications that occur when we countenance such condinoru. They are not relevant for our purposes, since we resolve condl noru such as these in different ways &om those in on. 1 5 This is a slightly simplistic analysiS. For example, we have ignored the presup positional content of proper names such as Frana, and we have also �gnored any urnqueness conditions that might form part of the content of 1k Kmg ofFrana. 16 Of course Russell's an.alysis of (15) IS different from ours and van der Sandt's because ofh.IS uniqueness condition, but we won't go into that here. I 7 There are many ways one could develop this notion. For instance, one could tentatively identify the plausibility of a conditional plausibility of the conse quent upon the antecedent. If so, we'll also want to assume that propositions can have a relative or conditional degree of plausibility PL(IJ I a) , JUSt as they can have conditional probabilities (in fact plausibility could be interpreted as subjective probability, though we will remain agnostic on this wue� On the other hand, one might explore a modal approach to comparative plausibility; PL(a) >- PL(IJ) iff there are some a worlds that are closer to the expected worlds (given the content of the dis course so far) than any f3 worlds are. But


content of the presupposition iaelf is determined by context (e.g. (Io) vs (I I}). 6 One could take an even more extreme posinon, and suggest that presuppo sitiom are extra inferred knowledge, which strictly spe2king doesn't comprise part of the semantic content of the text at all. & Gazdar (I979) and Mercer (I985) have argued, they are irnpli catures of some kmd. We reject thiS extreme position. Treating presuppoSI tiom as part of the semannc content allows one to record how it affects the mterpretation of other expressions in the text, such as pronouns (van der Sandt I992). 7 We ignore here and below the con troverSial wue as to whether definites introduce a uniqueness requirement (c£ Russell I905)· 8 Indeed, the prinapal advantage of usmg son for mvestigatmg presupposinon over other theones ofdiscourse structure (Hobbs tt al. I993 ; Grosz & S1dner I986; Polanyi I985; and others) is that son has already explored extensively the mter action between compositional semantic mforrnation extracted from the grammar and p�tic inforrnanon. 9 Since our main concern is modelling presuppositions, we will ignore pro blems of quannfier scope and concen trate only on the different possible 'scopes' of presupposed and asserted information. IO Asher & Lascarides (in press), however, ignored spatio-temporal conditions on when the bridging relation holds. We recnfy this here by subsuming the bridging within our general treatment of presupposinoru. We demonstrate that resolving the rhetorical connection between the presupposed content and the discourse context introduces spano temporal constraints on that content, which in turn impose the spatio temporal conditions on the bridging relation B in the required way. I I This spatial constraint applies only to

298 The Semantics and Pragmatics of Presupposition agam to pursue this discussion would

lead us too far afield. I 8 In general we would like to thank David Beaver for the examples that led w to thmk about conditional presuppositions generated from the antecedents of conditionals. I 9 Given this :urumption, there is a logical dependence between the statements David wrote 1M arti& and no good Wglcian wrote 1M article. And so the general rules we've stated about projection, which

arise from Update..,... and the plau siliility axionu, predtcts that the pre supposition doesn't project from the embedding. 20 Note that clauses (2e-d) and (3c-d) in Update� allow content rp, that is inferred by attaching 1r2 to 1r, , to affect the resolution of undenpecifi cation in 1r3 to occur, because 1r3 will attach to 11'2 or 1r. . 2 I For some details as to h ow this story should go, see Asher (I995�

Asher, N. (I993 � &jtrtna To Abstract Thtory (SALT VII� Stanford, CA, March Objtcts in Ducou�. Kluwer Academic I997 . PublUhen, Dordrecht. Asher, N. & Lascarides, A. {I994� Asher, N. (I995), 'From discourse micro 'lntenttoru and information in dis structure to macro-structure and back course', Procttdmgs of tk JZM Annual again: the interpretation of focus', in Mutmg of 1M A.!soaabon of Computational Lmguistics, NM U5 Cruces, June I994. H Kamp & B. Partee (eds.� Ccnfmnus on &mantics and CcnUxt, Prague and 34-4 1. Bad Teinach, SFB Report, University of Asher, N. & Lascarides, A. {I995� 'Lexical Stuttgart, I995· disamlnguation in a discourse context', Asher, N. {I996� 'Mathematical treat journal of &manbcr, u, I, 69-- I08. ments of discourse contexts', in P. Asher, N. & Uscarides, A. {I998� Dekker & M Stokhof (eck� Procffding.s 'Questions in dialogue', Linguistics and of tht Ttnth Amsterdam Colloquium on Philosophy, 21, 23 7-309. Formal &mantus, IUC Publications, Asher, N. & Lascandes, A. {I 998� 'Bridging', Uruversity of Amsterdam, 2I-40. journal of&mantics, I S , 83-1 1 3 . Asher, N. (forthcoming), The logical foun Asher, N. & Morreau, M (1991� 'Common danoru of discourse interpretation', in sense entailment a modal theory of J. M Larrazabal {ed.), Logic Colloquium non-monotonic reasoning', Procffdmg.s 19¢, Springer Verlag. Berlin. to 1M uth International joint Ccnftmta Asher, N� Aurnague, M, Bras, M & on Artifiaal Intelligtna, Sydney, Australia, Vieu, L {I996), 'De l'espace-ternps August 1991. daru !'analyse du discoun', &mwtiqut: Beaver, D. {19¢� 'Presupposition', in J. Numiro Sp«Ud: 11tio,us simantiq� tt van Bentham & A. ter Meulen (eels.� modaliSIUUm , 9Handbook of Logic and Linguistics. .Asher, N. & Fernando, T. (I997� 'Effective Beaver, D. (1997), 'Presupposition in DRT', labeling for disambiguation', Procffding.s SALT VII, Stanford, CA. of 1M &cond lnttrnotionol Workshop in Chierchia, G. (1995� Dynamics of Mtaning: Computational Linguistics, TJlburg, The Anaphora, Presupposition, and 1M 'Ikory of Netherlands. Grammar, University of Chicago Press, Asher, N., Hardt, D. & Bwquets, J. (I997� Chicago. 'Discourse parallelism, scope and ellip Clark. H (1977� 'Bridging', in P. N. sis', Proatdings ofStmantics and linguistic Johmon-Laird & P. C. Wason (eels.�


RE F E R E N C E S



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