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Articles: Taneli Kukkonen Medieval Arabic Metaphysics Rebecca Boone Claude de Seyssel Don Bates WilliamHarvey Ian Hunter Christian Thomasius David Armitage EdmundBurke David Bates Louis-Claudede Saint-Martin CyrusMasroori Hume in Nineteenth-CenturyIran CatherineKemp Hume's Treatise EmmanuelC. Eze Hume, Race, and HumanNature
October 2000
Vol. 61, No. 4
ISSN 0022-5037
Journalof the History of Ideas ISSN 0022-5037 Volume 61 Number4 October2000 Copyright? 2000 by the Journalof the History of Ideas, Inc. All rightsreserved.No portionof thisjournalmay be reproducedby anyprocessortechnique withoutformalconsentof The JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.Authorizationto photocopyitems for internalor personaluse, or the internalor personaluse of specific clients, is grantedby The Johns Hopkins University Press for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright ClearanceCenter(CCC)TransactionalReportingService,providedthatthe base fee of $8.00 per articleis paid directlyto CCC,222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers,MA 01923. This consent does not extend to other kinds of copying, such as copying for general distribution,for advertisingor promotionalpurposes,for creatingnew collective works, or for resale. 0022-5037/94 $8.00.
The purposesfor which theJournalof theHistoryofIdeas was foundedare:to fosterstudies which will examinethe evolution of ideas in the developmentand interrelationsof several fields of historicalstudy-the historyof philosophy,of literatureandthe arts,of the naturaland social sciences, of religion, and of political and social movements-to afford a medium for the publicationof researcheswhich are likely to be of common interestto studentsin differentfields; to bring togetherperiodicallyor make available otherwise such studies, and to promotegreater collaborationamong scholarsin all the provinces of culturaland intellectualhistory.
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Volume 61
Number 4
October 2000
Table of Contents
Articles
Page
Plenitude,Possibility, and the Limits of Reason: A Medieval Arabic TaneliKukkonen Debate on the Metaphysicsof Nature ............
539
Claude de Seyssel's Translations of Ancient Historians Rebecca Boone ......................................
561
Machina Ex Deo: William Harvey and the Meaning of Instrument Bates ..............................................Don
577
ChristianThomasius and the Desacralizationof Philosophy .. Ian Hunter ..... ...................................
595
.David Armitage
617
David Bates
635
EuropeanThought in Nineteenth-CenturyIran:David Hume and Others ...................................... Cyrus Masroori
657
Two Meanings of the Term "Idea":Acts and Contentsin CatherineKemp Hume's Treatise ............................
675
EdmundBurke and Reason of State ................ The Mystery of Truth:Louis-Claudede Saint-Martin's EnlightenedMysticism ..........................
Note Hume, Race, and HumanNature ..................
EmmanuelC. Eze
691
Notices ...................................................
699
Books Received .............................................
703
Contentsof Volume 61 ........................................
713
Index to Volume 61 ..........................................
715
Copyright 2000 by Journal of the History of Ideas, Inc.
Journal of the History of Ideas An International Quarterly Devoted to Intellectual History Board of Editors Executive Editor: Donald R. Kelley, Rutgers University Associate Editor: Robin Ladrach,Rutgers University Hans Aarsleff, Princeton Univ. John E. Murdoch,Harvard Univ. David Bromwich, Yale Univ. Steven Nadler, Univ. of Wisconsin Helen North, SwarthmoreCollege Virginia Brown, Pontifical Institute John F. Callahan,DumbartonOaks Francis Oakley, WilliamsCollege Julia Ching, Univ. of Toronto Anthony Pagden,Johns Hopkins Univ. Marcia Colish, Oberlin College Claude Palisca, Yale Univ. David H. Donald, Harvard Univ. Peter Paret,Inst.for AdvancedStudy Charles C. Gillispie, Princeton Univ. Eugene F. Rice, Columbia Univ. Daniel Gordon, Univ. of Massachusetts Dorothy Ross, Johns Hopkins Univ. David HarrisSacks, Reed College Anthony Grafton,Princeton Univ. J. B. Schneewind,Johns Hopkins Univ. Emily Grosholz,Penn State Univ. Knud Haakonssen,Boston Univ. JerroldSeigel, New YorkUniv. David Hollinger, Univ. of California Nancy G. Siraisi, Hunter College MaryanneC. Horowitz, Occidental Coll. Quentin Skinner, Cambridge Univ. Bruce Kuklick, Univ. of Pennsylvania Gisela Striker,Harvard Univ. Joseph M. Levine, Syracuse University David Summers, Univ. of Virginia EdwardP. Mahoney, Duke Univ. John W. Yolton, Rutgers Univ. Allan Megill, Univ. of Virginia Perez Zagorin, Univ. of Rochester
Consulting Editors Sidney Axinn FrederickBeiser GregoryClaeys Stefan Collini Brian P. Copenhaver William J. Courtenay t W. R. Elton James Engell Ivan Gaskell Bentley Glass Maurice M. Goldsmith Loren Graham
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DavidM. Rabban
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Plenitude, Possibility, and Limits A
Medieval
Arabic
of
Debate
Metaphysics of
the
Reason:
on
the
Nature
TaneliKukkonen
In a recentarticleSimo Knuuttilahas examinedthe argumentativepatterns of moder cosmology,especially the searchin fundamentalphysics for an "ultimate explanation,"a unified "Theoryof Everything"that would subsume all more local theoriesunderits aegis. Knuuttilagoes on to comparecontemporary modes of explanationwith previous ways of conceiving of the metaphysicsof understanding.As it turnsout, on the cosmological borderlinewhere physics shadesinto metaphysicsdesires similarat hearthave fueled the effortsof thinkers throughoutthe historyof westernthought.Whenwhat is at stakeis the final intelligibilityof the world,sharedideals of necessity,transparency,andsimplicity come to the fore. More often thannot, theological concernsandpreconceptions accompanythese notions. One can reactto this finding in one of two ways, eitherby retortingthatthe modems have not gotten very far or by pointing out thatearlierdiscussions on the topic were often quitephilosophicallysophisticated.In this articleI propose to investigate how some of the issues raised by Knuuttilafigure in a specific historicalcontext.This is the debateon the pre-eterity of the worldinitiatedby the celebratedMuslim theologian AbiuHamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111) in his polemic arguingfor TheIncoherenceof the Philosophers (Tahdfutal-faldsifa, 1095) and laterpicked up by the AndalusianphilosopherAverroes(1126-98) in
1 S. Knuuttila,"Plenitude,Reason and Value:Old and New in the Metaphysicsof Nature," Nature and Lifeworld: Theoreticaland Practical Metaphysics, ed. C. Bengt-Pedersenand N. Thomassen(Odense, 1998), 139-51. On Theoriesof Everything,see J. D. Barrow'swork of that name (Oxford, 1991).
539 Copyright2000 by Journalof the Historyof Ideas,Inc.
540
TaneliKukkonen
his reply, TheIncoherenceof the Incoherence(Tahdfutal-tahdfut,1180).2The exceptionallyrich cosmological materialscould be taken in any numberof directions,but I will focus on threemain issues: the discussants'constructionof the domainof possibilities (i.e. the relationof the possible to the actual),their understandingof the reasonabilityof creation,and the question of its finitude and infinity.The study is undertakenpartlyto illustratethe sophisticationwith which the topics were handledin medieval Islamicphilosophy,but in each case I will also drawparallelswith certainmodem conceptions,and I submitthatin each case al-Ghazali'sandAverroes'sdebatethrowslight on the contemporary discussion.In the final section I will develop this contentionfurtherby pointing to a connectionbetween finitudeandpossibilitieswhich I believe has bothheuristic and existentialvalue. PlenitudeandPossibility Among historiansof philosophy it is now acknowledgedthatin late medieval discussionscertainmodaltheoreticalinnovationswereinstrumentalin bringing about profoundchange in the western worldview.A conceptual shift occurredwhere,roughlyspeaking,a single intelligibleuniversewas exchangedfor several possible worlds. In Knuuttila'sestimationthis change in worldviews was in some ways more fundamentalthan anythingmodem science has produced since.3This claim deserves considerationbut I would like firstto outline what the change was about,for in al-Ghazali'sandAverroes'sdebatethis shift in modalparadigmsis clearly discernible. Representativeof the philosophers'point of view, Averroesholds onto the receivedArabicAristotelianinterpretationof settingpossibilitiesin a statistical temporal-frequencyframework.According to this account, what is truly possible must at some time be realized-this is a technical interpretationof what has afterLovejoy commonlybecome knownas the principleof plenitude.4As a Al-Ghazali's work is available in The Incoherence of the Philosophers: A Parallel English-Arabic Text,ed. and tr. M. E. Marmura(Provo, Utah, 1997; henceforthTF). The standard edition for the Tahdfutal-tahdfutis by M. Bouyges (Beirut, 1930; henceforthTT).Translations for al-Ghazali are from Marmuraand for Averroes,from Averroes'Tahdfutal-Tahdfut,tr. and annot. S. Van Den Bergh (2 vols., with paginationto the Arabic indicated;London, 1954). 3 Knuuttila,"Plenitude,"144-47; see S. Knuuttila,Modalitiesin MedievalPhilosophy(London, 1993). Although the expression is a distinctly modem one and refers to the so-called possible-worlds semantics employed in modem modal theory,I use the term here in a ratherconcrete fashion.The loose definitionof"possible worlds"as causally independentuniverses fairly accuratelydescribesthe sense in which the term is used in the two Tahdfutworks: it also corresponds to the way the idea is handled in contemporarycosmological discussions (Knuuttila, "Plenitude,"144). 4 About the backgroundto this temporalinterpretationin Aristotle, see J. Hintikka,Time andNecessity:StudiesinAristotles TheoryofModality(Oxford,1973),93-113. See also Knuuttila, Modalities, 1-38 with referencesto recent scholarship. 2
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corollary,whatalways is is necessarily.The cosmologicalconsequencesof these assumptionscanbe outlinedas follows. First,lest God's creativepossibilitiesbe limited,it mustbe admittedthatthe worldcould havebeen createdhoweverlong ago in the past. By extension God must have been able to create the world an infinitetime ago. But if it is a genuinepossibility thatthe world is eternallyold, then accordingto the principle of plenitude, this possibility is an actual fact. Once it is concededthatthe world is eternal,recognitionthatit could neverhave been anything else is but a short step away: because there is no space in the whole of infinitetime for an eternalthing'sopposite(here,its destruction),then, following fromplenitude,therecould not in truthhave existed any genuinepossibility for such an occurrenceat all. The eterality of the world thus becomes logically necessary.5The trainof thoughtis developedby Averroesin the course of his explanationof the so-called "thirdproof of the philosophersfor the eternity of the world." As a furtherrelatedpoint Averroesin the "fourthproof " recalls the common interpretationof possibility as potentialityandposits an elaboratedefense of the "nothingcomes from nothing"principle. Because nothing can be conceived of as coming into being from absolute nonexistence, there has always been somethingto set in motion any individualchange, in short,any genesis or transformation:any actualizationof a possibility.6All truepossibilities are potentialities,preexistentand inherentin somethingand coming forth in a rationally predictableand explicable fashion. In moder termstheremust be a lawgovernedprocess fromwhose viewpointchangecanbe explainedforthereto be any talk of any given changetakingplace. This is thoughtsufficientin precluding the possibility of an absolutecreationex nihilo.7 The temporal-frequency model of modalitiespropoundedbyAverroestreats all genuine possibilities as realized within one and the same universalhistory. ThusAverroes,when confrontingandrejectingthe ideaof otherpossibleworlds, straighforwardlyinterpretsthese as being actuallyspreadout in a series: "The manwho affirms... thatbeforethe world therewas an infinitenumberof possibilities of worlds,has certainlyto admitthatbeforethis worldtherewas another world and before this second world a third,and so on ad infinitum."8But for these to be recognized as "worlds"means that they have to be partof a larger 5 Cf.
TT,97.14-98.5. Averroes'sargumentis taken fromAristotle'sDe Caelo, 1.12. In Aristotelianterms, matter,form, and privationmust all have been pre-existentfor any given change to take place: cf. TT, 100-102, 104-7 (for Aristotle, Physics 1.7-9). Similarly by definitionthere can be no beginning to eithermotion or time (Aristotle,Physics VIII.1; TT,6465, 74-80). 7 On the proofs and theirmodal contentsee the author's"PossibleWorldsin the TahdfutalAverroes on PlenitudeandPossibility,"Journalof theHistoryofPhilosophy,38/3 (2000); tahdfut: see also H. A. Davidson, Proofsfor Eternity,Creationand the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy (Oxford, 1987). 6
8
TT, 98.14-99.2.
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World,whichthenis itself eternal,even if its constituentpartsarenot.Averroes's modeof reasoningclosely resemblesthatemployedin moder many-worldstheories and so allows us a glimpse into their shared assumptions.Many-worlds theoriesseek a (non-theist)explanationto the apparentlyimprobablecontingent factthatan inhabiteduniversehas evolved out of initialchaoticconditions.They proposeto explain this by postulatinga larger,"capital-U"Universe, in which all possible universes are realized.9The explanationonly works if the various universes arereal in a way reminiscentofAverroes.They have to be trueparallel or successive universes.10The way the questionitself is understoodis revealing froma methodicalviewpoint.Contingencyis explainedby showinghow it is not contingencyat all. ForAverroesall questionssuch as a possible beginningof the universeare resolveable by recourseto "natural"reasoning.An absolutebeginning can be ruled out on the groundsthat this is not the sort of thing that happens in the naturalworld andwithinthe system of naturallaws. No events andno possibilities fall outsidethe over-archingsempiteral frameworksof rationalityandmodality.Muslimtheologiansfoundpreciselythis autonomousstandingof an eternal Aristotelianuniverse,which in the Tahdfutal-tahdfutis so ably reproduced by Averroes,to be incompatiblewith some deep-seatedreligious beliefs. What estrangedmany from philosophicaldoctrinewas not so much eternalismitself as its ambitiousunderpinnings,the philosophers'desireto see the worldexplain itself and therebyin effect justify its own existence. If things cannot be other thanwhatthey are,theologiansasked,whatpowerdoes God have, afterall, over their existence? In what way can God be said to be the cause of an absolutely necessary universe?1 Moreover,does not belief in the penetrationof human insight into all mattersand all possibilities exhibit an insufferablehubris, one which the pious would do well to avoid? Both in the Latinwest and in Islamic thoughttheologicalconcernsprovidedincentivefor conceivingof new modelsof modalities.12
For his part al-Ghazaliin the Tahdfutal-faldsifa hones to a fine point the critique of a plenitudinal-statisticalmodel of modality.As regardsthe "third proof" the possibility of God's creatingone world or anothermost certainly knows no temporallimits. However, infinitely extendablepossibility does not translateinto possible infinity but insteadinto a single limited actualizationin 9 There are several ways to do this. See G. Gale, "Cosmological Fecundity:Theories of MultipleUniverses,"Physical Cosmologyand Philosophy,ed. J. Leslie (London,1990);J. Leslie, Universes(London, 1989), 66-103. 10See Leslie, Universes, 10ff. The theory has thereforebeen said to grossly violate the principleof "Ockham'sRazor." n See TF,82.14-83.12 (TT 277-78); TF,125.2-12 (TT,414); and TE 57ff(TT 147ff.). 12For materialson the Islamic discussions see E. L. Ormsby,Theodicyin Islamic Thought (Princeton,1984); for the Christianbackground,Knuuttila,Modalities, 62-98.
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time, since an actual and traversed infinite is impossible even on Aristotelian premises (cf. ?3 below). Thus the "beginnings of existence are not specified with respect to priority and posteriority, but the principle of its having a temporal generation is specified. For it is the possible, nothing else."'3 Possibilities in general are to be viewed as alternative states of affairs, as indexes of mighthave-beens, rather than a temporally ordered series of inevitable happenings. One world's coming to be at the expense of another is exactly what is meant by its possibility; in other words possibility is contingency. There are clearly countless facts in the world on which God can arbitrate besides its age and size.14 This opening up to seemingly infinite possibilities is, however, only half the story. Though unrealized possibilities remain possibilities for God, all alternative possible worlds collapse into the actualization of this one just as soon as God chooses this world history in preference to all its alternatives. Al-Ghazali's full position emerges as that of Islamic occasionalism, a worldview with a radically dualistic conception of possibility and necessity. On the occasionalist view there are no "natural" laws; God creates all existents from nothing at each discrete instant of time by conjoining any combination of substances (atoms) and accidents (properties). Thus while everything is possible to God, everything becomes necessary through God. '5 There are important limits to al-Ghazali's possibilism. Modal judgments are "judgments of the mind" meant for weighing whether a given cluster of statements is logically coherent or not. Realizing logical contradictories, al-Ghazali is happy to admit, "does not lie within God's power." This means that the possibles are possibles independently of God's power. As for what constitutes an impossibility, al-Ghazali contends that "the impossible consists in affirming a thing conjointly with denying it, affirming the more specific while denying the more general, or affirming two things while negating one."'6 All of this is important because the medieval conception of logic centered around the theory of predication, a theory which itself provided the basis for Aristotelian demonstrative science. By admitting logical relations of"the specific and the general" al-Ghazali
13 TF, 40.14-15, with minor alterationsto Marmura'stranslation(TT,98; Van Den Bergh translatesthe passage altogetherdifferently).For the point thatit is the actualinfinity of the past which precludesits pre-etemity,TF,47.10-48.3 (TT, 119). 14 Cf TF 40.9-14 (TT,98). Marmuracorrectlypoints out that al-Ghazali'sviews regarding the contingencyof the earth'stwo poles' positions (cf. ?2 of this article) suffices to bringabout Journalof theAmerian infinityof unrealizedpossibilia("GhazalianCausesandIntermediaries," can OrientalSociety, 115/1 [1995], 89-100, at 99). To these can be added infinities upon infinities of unrealizedcombinationsof atoms and accidents. 5Al-Ghazali'sfull occasionalistrefutationof the workingsof secondarycausalityandnatural necessity can be found in the famous SeventeenthDiscussion, or the first "On the NaturalSciences":cf. e.g., the graphicexamples given in TF 173.17-174.14 (TT,529-30). 16 TE 42.2-5 (TT, 102-3); TF 44.8-14 (TT, 109-10); TF, 178.10-11 (TT,535); 179.5-6 (TT, 536).
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in effect embracesapodeictic scientific method.17The suggested revisions are nonethelesssignificant.Whatal-Ghazalisuggests is that,properlyspeaking,we shouldtakeone "possibleworld"to be the stateof the world as it is at any single instantof descriptionand thatthere are no necessaryties between consecutive states.18Creationout of nothing (la min shayy') then becomes no more or less possible thanany otherstate of affairswhich comes afteranotherone: it can be perfectlywell statedthatat one momentthe world was not andthatthen it was. When this happensis a matterof God's discretion.19More importantstill is the simple recognitionof severalpossible ordersas opposed to only one. This will become apparentfrom an examinationofAverroes's opposite view. WisdomandWill God is the SufficientReason for the world to be, thepraeponderansof late medieval scholasticismor the Murajjihas he was knownin Arabic:the Arbitrator.20How are we to understandthis principle, and what implicationsdoes it have for ourview of God'swisdom?An extendeddiscussionon a single pointin the courseof the "firstproof " providesa useful focal pointhere.The questionis whetherGod could have createdanotherkind of world or, to put it anotherway, whetherthere are some such distinctive featuresin the presentworld as could tell us if it could have been somethingotherthanit is. Al-Ghazali and Averroestake what seem at first glance unexpectedpositions, with the theologian defendingthe possibility of the presentworld being arbitraryor even irrationalandthe philosopherconverselyarguingfor its necessaryoptimality.The discussioncentersaroundtwo examplesfromthe empirical world which al-Ghazalipresents as proof to his argument.He claims that no rationalecan be foundfor the generaleastwarddirectionin the rotationalmovement of the outermostcelestial sphere.Thereis also no reasonwhy the poles of the Earthcould not have been fixed otherwise.Because these two featuresexhibit randomness,they stand in need of a free will to arbitratebetween them. Readersfamiliarwith modem so-called "selector"metaphysicswill see a conSee M. E. Marmura,"Ghazali and DemonstrativeScience," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 3 (1965), 183-204; by the same author,"Ghazali'sAttitudeto the SecularSciences and Logic," Essays in Islamic Philosophy and Science, ed. G. F. Hourani(Albany,N.Y., 1975), 100-111. 18 See the author's"PossibleWorldsin the Tahdfut al-faldsifa:Al-Ghazalion Creationand Contingency,"Journalof theHistoryof Philosophy,38 (2001); andOrmsby,TheodicyandR. M. Frank,Creationand the Cosmic System:Avicennaand al-Ghazdli(Heidelberg, 1992). 19 The claim of the philosophers'"first proof' for the eternity of the world was that an immutableGod cannothave limitedactions(cf. TF,13.7-14.16; TT,4): however,accordingto alGhazali, God's eternalwill can perfectly well take temporalobjects without this implying any temporalityor change in the willer (TF, 15.1-5 and 17.5-15; TT,7 and 13). 20See W. L. Craig,TheCosmologicalArgumentfromPlato to Leibniz(London, 1980), 54ff. 17
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nectionhere,albeitthatthe relationis one of inversion.Wherecurrent"selector" argumentssearch for special featuresin the universe which could be taken as internallyjustifying its existence over otherpossibilities, al-Ghazalilooks for altogethertrivial alternativesthatwould requirea free Will outside the worldsystem for theirarbitrationand implementation.21 If this is al-Ghazali's position, then it might be suspected that Averroes would take somethingcloser to the moder "selector"approach.This is indeed the case. Averroes claims that "many things which by demonstrationcan be foundto be necessaryseem at first sight merely possible," i.e., contingent.The astronomicalorderis one such case: Indeed,if a single one of these movementsshould cease, the orderand proportionof the universe would disappear,for it is clear ... that the numberof these movementsis as it is, eitherthroughits necessityfor the existence of this sublunaryworld, or because it is the best. Do not ask here for a proof for all this, but if you are interestedin science, look for its proof, where you can find it.22 The same goes naturallyfor the positions of the poles. Averroes'sclaims are never substantiated:in his "scientific"works, the commentarieson Aristotle, Averroeshas to admit that the details of celestial mechanics are not yet sufficiently well known.23This leaves his argumentratherweak, since the assumption that everythingon the cosmic scale is "necessaryor for the best" must be acceptedon faith.We would nowadaysbe in a betterposition to assertthatthe exact placing of the poles and the relativepositioning of our planet in the universe, indeed even the setting of minuscule fractionsof certaincosmological constants,have been necessary for the emergence of an inhabitableuniverse with us as observers.Even then the argumentis hardlyconclusive. For the socalled "anthropicprinciple"to be credibleit has to weakenedto the pointwhere it no longer functionsas an explanationfor why the universeis as it is. Without precise criteriaof verificationand falsificationthe idea is not likely to go anywhere.24
More interestingthanthe questionaboutwhethereitherthinker'sargument is soundis whatthe thinkersintendby them.Argumentsfromdesign would not
21 TF,25-27 (TT,41, curtailed;VanDen Bergh supplementsthe full text); and see D. Parfit, "ThePuzzle of Reality,"TimesLiterarySupplement,3 July 1992. 22 TT,44.13-14 and 47.3-9 (cf TT,129.3-12 and 491.12-492.5). 23 Cf. e.g., Averroes'sLong Commentaryon the Metaphysics. Tafsirmd baCdal-tabiCa,ed. M. Bouyges (4 vols.; Beirut, 1938-52), III, 1658ff. 24 See J. D. Barrowand F. J. Tipler,TheAnthropicCosmologicalPrinciple (Oxford, 1986); TheAnthropicPrinciple, ed. F. Bertola and U. Curi (Cambridge, 1989). On fine-tuning arguments cf. Leslie, Universes, 1-65.
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havebeen lost on al-Ghazali;in his depictionof divineprovidencethey arequite central. Nevertheless al-Ghazali's approach is quite different from that of Averroes.WhereAverroesemployscosmic examples,al-Ghazali'spreferenceis for microcosmicdetails of the humanbody.Al-Ghazalifurtheremphasizesthat all the featureshe has mentioned could have been set otherwise, had God so wished.25This is a "metaphysicsof contingency"madeto serve a "metaphysics of grace,"to use two of LennGoodman'sphrases.Preciselybecausethis blessed and congenial world is so wildly improbablewe should give praiseto God for havingrealizedit andhave fearfor His might, as He could have chosen not to.26 A modem theist spin on this has been to claim thatthe likelihood of an inhabitable universeevolving out of the chaotic initialconditionsof the firstthreeseconds is so low thatit belies the existence of a Designer.It is importantto notice thatfor eitherargumentto work,all prospectivenatural(innerworldly)explanations for the currentuniverse'scoming to exist mustbe shown non-effective. Averroesrecognizes that this understandingof the principle of sufficient reasonis very differentfromthatof the philosophers: [F]orthe Ashcaritesunderstandby "differentiation"the distinguishing of one thing eitherfrom a similarone or from an opposite one without this being determinedby any wisdom in the thing itself which makes it necessaryto differentiateone of the two opposite things. The philosophers, on the other hand, understandhere by the differentiatingprinciple only thatwhich is determinedby the wisdom in the productitself, namely the final cause, for accordingto them there is no quantityor qualityin any being thathas not an end based on wisdom....27 For the philosopherthere is nothing that is ruled by chance. Averroesrejects AshCariteoccasionalismon the same grounds.The standardoccasionalistexplanation for perceptiblelawlikeness in naturewas that God habituallyrecreates things in stable and steady patterns.God also implants in the human mind a correspondingcertaintyof this continuedlyhappeningin accordancewith His promisethatwe shall find "nochangein God's custom"(sunna,Cada).Averroes If occasionalism adoptsthe phrasebut finds the interpretationunacceptable.28
See the explanationsof the divine names al-Hakdm(theArbitrator),al-CAdl(the Just)and al-Latif (the Benevolent), in al-Ghazali,Al-maqsad al-asnd 'fi sharh macini asmd'Alldh alhusnd, ed. F. A. Shehadi(Beirut, 1986), 98-111. 26 Cf. Ormsby,Theodicy;by the same author,"Creationin Time in Islamic Thoughtwith to Al-Ghazali,"God and Creation,ed. D. B. Burrelland B. McGinn (Notre Reference Special Dame, Ind., 1990), 246-64. 27 TT, 412.2-7. 28 TT,542.6. For al-Ghazali'sAshCariteaccount of knowledge cf. TF, 174.16-175.11 (TT, 324). 25
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were true,therewould despite lawlikeness be no actuallaws (no "wisdom")to be discernedin the workingsof nature.Hence any and all humanstrivingafter true knowledge would be equally in vain. Averroesrepeatedlyassertsthat accepting the terms of AshCaritereasoningwould be contraryto "the natureof man insofar as he is man,"by which he means that the humaninclinationtowards rationalitywould be frustratedin a world where all things were equally possible.29The humanmindmustbe able to graspandto delineatethe truelimits of possibility, otherwise "thejudgment of the mind that things are possible or impossiblewould be of as muchvalue as no judgmentat all, andtherewould be no differencebetweenreasonandillusion."30 For the philosopherinnerworldlyreasonabilityis both derivablefrom the divine essence and evident in the way natureworks. As regardsthe extent to which the divinewisdom is determined,it is revealingthatAverroesin his search for Qur'anicpassages to corroboratehis view of creationresortsto "Thereis no changingthe words of God"(10:64/65) and"Thereis no alteringthe creationof God" (30:29/30).31Whatthe context requiresis confirmationthat the world is the best and most beneficially ordered;yet instead of the wealth of material suited to traditionalargumentsfrom design, Averroeschooses to cite passages thatsuggest thatthe instantiationandpreservationof the currentworld orderis necessary.This is typicalof Platonicallyinfluencedtheorieswherethe good, the beautiful,andthetruecoincide.JohnLesliehasexplainedhow in these"axiarchic" theoriesof world-makingcertainevaluativejudgmentsbecome "creativelyeffective": if something is for the best then this necessitates its existence and if somethingis necessary,this testifiesto its optimalpositioningin the worldorder. Whatdoes this mean?The implicationsrundeep if one is willing to follow them through.From an examinationof his logical works EdwardBooth has concluded that for Averroes,"throughthe concord of mind with reality,logic was ontologizable."32 Now for this kind of notion to be made to work therecan be only one orderof logic-if therewere several, one could always ask which one is instantiatedin our world and why. But if what Booth proposes is true, thenthe relationgoes the otherway aroundas well: the manifestworld displays the only way for the world to be. By takingone last necessary step, by trusting thatthere is some fundamentalconcordof mind with reality,one can then presume to infer the fundamentallaws of reality from the way things defacto appear.And this, as we have seen, is just whatAverroesproposes. Like Plato and Aristotle,it seems, Averroesbelieved thatthereexists 29
E.g., TT,417.4 (cp. TT,479.2 and Tafsirmd bacd al-tabica, II, 1126, 1135).
30TT,113.7-9.This aspectofAverroes'sphilosophyis magisteriallyhandledin B.
S. Kogan's
Averroesand the Metaphysicsof Causation(Albany,N.Y., 1985). 31TT, 50.9.
Cf. E. Booth, AristotelianAporetic Ontology in Islamic and Christian Thinkers(Cambridge, 1983), 131ff. 32
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TaneliKukkonen an eternaland invariantformal level of being which makes particular things what they are and which can make a human soul a conscious copy of the formalbasic structureof reality.This doublefunctionof the formal level as the shaper of being and intellect made Plato's and Aristotle'sepistemologyextremelyrealisticandgave the [sic] philosophy the high distinctionof makingthe soul directlyacquaintedwith the ultimatebasis of reality... when the intellectcomes to know the formal structureof reality,it ... has then an inside view into the ultimatefoundationsof being and sees the visible world as its imitationor explication.33
These arelofty aspirations;but it is good to notice they have not gone anywhere. One need only point to Einstein's and Hawking's wish to "know the mind of God."The kind of strongcorrespondencetheoryAverroesadheresto also finds counterpartin modernspeculationsregardingthe relationshipof mathematics and reality.Some authorshave purportedto explain the strikingaccuracywith which the humanmind applies its reasoning faculties (most notably in mathematics)to the outside world by suggestingthatthis indicatesan extraordinary and thereforesomehow special similitudebetween mind and the world.34It is often difficultto get clearaboutwhatis meanthereby:is it thatthe mathematical capabilitiesof the mind entail the universe's also being structuredmathematically or, more likely, vice versa? The whole line of thoughtmay well be confused. At any rate, in the context of a prospective"Theoryof Everything"the desired conclusion seems to be that(a) there is a single mathematicalformula, one that (b) the humanmind can come to comprehend,and which (c) can then give all the othertheorems,ie. all laws of nature.As for the conviction thatthe universalorderin the final analysisturnsout to be logically necessary,Einstein's famousretortthat"Goddoes not play dice"might seem a throwawaycomment, but it is in fact something else entirely.Einstein truly believed that it was not enoughfor his "unifiedfield theory"to encompassall actualfacts of the world: it had also to show itself to be necessary.Why? I cannotimaginea unified andreasonabletheorywhich explicitly contains a numberwhich the whim of the Creatormightjust as well have chosen differently,whereby a qualitativelydifferentlawfulness of the world would have resulted....A theorywhich in its fundamentalequations explicitly containsa constant[of Nature]would have to be some-
33Knuuttila,"Plenitude,"147. 34 On the topic see J. D. Barrow,Pi in the Sky: Counting, Thinking,and Being (Oxford, 1992).
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how constructedfrombits andpieces whicharelogically independentof each other;but I am confidentthatthis world is not such thatso ugly a constructionis needed for its theoreticalcomprehension.35 The way Einsteindismisses the notion of the Creatorhaving "whims"mirrors Averroes'spolemics against the Ashcaritevoluntarists.An ideal Creatorproduces an ideal creation,which, it turnsout, is also the only possible one. The viabilityof the idea is boughtwith the assumptionthatall logic in the end reverts to a single figure,with no independent"bitsandpieces." To conditions(a), (b), and(c) we mayaddthat(d) theunifiedtheoryenvisionedby EinsteinandAverroes leaves no loose ends, i.e., no real variablesdangling. Practicalobstaclesaside (JohnBarrowdrilyremarksthat"asyet thereis no inkling"how all cosmological constantsmightbe reducedto zero), criticshave suggestedthatthe whole notionis confusedon a semanticallevel. Forthereto be a theorywhichtrulyexplainseverythingandleaves nothingcontingentthetheory wouldhaveto explainitself.Wouldthisnotbe a case of pullingthe Miinchhausen trick?From a logical point of view the idea seems to be that we do not really need any semantics:the world is the only model, the only interpretationthereis (or everymodelwould look the same),andthe truthvalue of anypropositioncan be checkedagainstthe formalsystemprovidedby thetheoryof everything(whose practicalvalue now becomes apparent).This has been said flatly to contradict Godel'sincompletenesstheorem,which statesthatany consistentformalsystem rich enoughto containarithmeticis necessarilyincomplete,i.e., thatnot all true propositionsexpressiblein it can be proved from its axioms. If the theoremis right (and it is) and the world needs for its expression a system of at least the strengthof arithmetic(which seems likely), then the world contains features (actualor possible, it makesno difference)not deduciblefromthe system. This is certainlyremarkable,althoughone is not sure how much can be made of it.36 Averroesof courseknew nothingof G6del's incompletenesstheorem.Most likely he would have found it hardto accept. But he has several things to say about finitudeand infinity.Consideringearlierviews on the topic may help us formulatenew approachesto the possibility of a "completedknowledge."
35 Quoted from Barrow,Theoriesof Everything,89.
R. Hofstadter,Godel, Escher,Bach: An Eternal GoldenBraid (New York, 1980); R. Rucker,Infinityand the Mind (Boston, 1982); also J. D. Barrow,Impossibility.TheLimitsof Science and the Science of Limits(Oxford, 1998), 218ff and H. Kirjavainen,"Cosmology,Theology, andthe Questionof UltimateExplanation,"Infinity,Causality,and Determinism:Cosmological Enterprisesand theirPreconditions,ed. E. Martikainen(Dordrecht,forthcoming). 36 See D.
550
TaneliKukkonen Finite and InfiniteCauses
In the philosophyof religionthe obvious contextfor notionsof finitudeand infinity is the religious one: God is infinite, while the creature(the world) is finite. The dialectic is conceptuallyricherthanhas often been recognized. The basic structureof the cosmological proof is to arguefromthe impossibility of an infiniteregressof causes to a single FirstCause.Despite this apparent uniformity,differentformulationsof the argumenthave reflectedwidely divergentconceptionsof what the proof is about and what it entails. Therehave been creationistvariantsof the proof, eteralist understandings,conservation andclockworkmodels, andall of these may have includedany numberof suppositions about what is meant by some thing's being a cause.37The Christian MonophysiteJohnPhiloponus(c. 490-574 AD)is now usually creditedwith the initiationof the creationistapproachto the proof. Philoponusmolded the argument into rigorousAristotelianshape by claiming that the Aristotelianban on the actualandtraversedinfiniteprecludesthe world'sbeing eternal.38 The Muslim theologianswould add to this by bringingout more forcefullythe implication thatthis entails the existence of a transcendentCreator.This has led William Lane Craigto label the approachthe kaldmcosmological argument.39 The known the that theoretical in lies the proof's significance implicit suggestion naturallaws are merely local in scope. God has set the world in motion a finite time ago, and His agency transcendsconventionalmodes of causation.40This impliesthatconceivablestatesof affairssurpasswhatwe observeon the level of everydayexperience,as indeed was al-Ghazali'sunderstandingof the proof's implications. Averroes,too, recognizes the Islamic approach,but accordingto him, the disagreementis really betweenAristotleand Plato. When Plato in the Timaeus suggested that nothing comes to be without a cause, theologians took this to entailthatthe worldin its entiretyhas come to be.41Averroesbelieves the literal interpretationof Plato to be correct in its exegesis but a misinterpretationof 37 On differentapplicationsof
the argumentsee Craig, TheCosmologicalArgument. Philoponus'smost clear formulationof this is in a fragmentpreservedby Simplicius:cf. In AristotelisPhysicorumlibros quattuorposteriorescommentaria,ed. H. Diels (Berlin, 1895), 1178.9-35. See Davidson, Proofs, 86ff and R. Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of AristotelianScience (London, 1987). 39 Cf. W. L. Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument(London, 1979); also Craig, The CosmologicalArgument,48ff. Craig'sproof has last been discussed in Religious Studiesin 1996 through1998. 40Cf. Philoponus,AgainstAristotle,as quotedby Simplicius,In Phys., 1141.11-30; 1150.2225; for furtherapplications,Davidson, Proofs, 30-33. 41 Cf. TT,171-72 andAverroes'Questionsin Physics, ed. andtr.H. T. Goldstein(Dordrecht, 1991), 8-9; for Plato, Timaeus28a. On the evolution of the doctrineof creatio ex nihilo and on Plato's see G. May, Schopfungaus dem Nichts (Berlin, 1978). 38
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philosophicalprinciples. Aristotle in the beginning of Physics 8 had demonstratedthat every change is preceded temporallyby a prior change, i.e., that thereis no first change. Coupledwith the recognitionthatan infiniteregressof causes is impossible,this shouldlead us to recognizethattemporallyantecedent changes are not primarycauses at all.42In Averroes'sterminology,preceding causes aremerelyaccidental.The essentialcausalchain is the synchronicchain of movers continuouslyextending from the First Mover (God) down to earth; "thereforeAristotlesays thata man andthe sun togetherengendera man, andit is clear thatthe sun leads upwardsto its mover and its mover to the FirstPrinciple." Averroespresentsthe famous analogy of the craftsmanand the instrument which was to serve for centuriesas the standardexample illustratingthe conservatiointerpretationof divine causation(as opposed to the creatio one): Similarly [to the generationof man out of man], when an artisanproduces successively a series of productsof craftsmanshipwith different instruments,and producesthese instrumentsthroughinstrumentsand the latteragainthroughotherinstruments,the becomingof these instruments one from anotheris somethingaccidental,and none of these instrumentsis a condition for the existence of the productof craftsmanship except the first instrumentwhich is in immediatecontactwith the workproduced.43 In contrastto the accidentalseries the essentialcausalchainis necessarilyfinite, as the Aristotelianprinciplesthatthe world is necessarilyfinite in size and that thereis no "changeof change"make clear.44But it is also eternallyunchanging, following from the eternallyimmutablenatureand activity of the First Mover andAgent. This meansboththatthe world is always andthatit is always essentially the same. Both notions are important.Theirjoint roots lie in a Platonic idea which is known as "processand return." The fundamentalquestion of Platonismwas how to derive the many from the One or,to put it the otherway around,how the worldof fleeting appearances could be tracedback to the immutablerealmof truebeing. ArthurO. Lovejoy's greatinsightwas to show how fromthe very beginningthe solutionto this question was put in ethical terms. Though(the one) true impassive Being need not take heed of anythingbesides itself, it would be "less"if it did not give out and 42 Cf. Averro6s,Long Commentaryon the Physics, VIII, comm. 1, in Aristotelisopera cum AverroisCordubensisin eius commentaria(9 vols.; Venice, 1562;repr.Frankfurtam Main, 1962; hereafterAOACC),IV, fol. 338F-339F. 43 TT,268.12-13 and 269.1-5; cf. also Long Commentaryon the Physics, VIII, comm. 47 (AOACC,IV, fol. 388Fff.). 44Cf. TT,56-60; for Aristotle, Physics III.5, V.2 and Averroes's explanationsin the Long Commentaryon the Physics, VIII, comm. 15 (AOACC,IV, fol. 349Eff.; the idea is present already in Simplicius,In Phys., 843-49). For criticalremarkscf. Davidson, Proofs, 130-33.
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bringforthexistence to the greatestpossible extentof its powers. This formsthe kernel of the idea Lovejoy dubbed"the principle of Plenitude":a benevolent Creatorby virtue of necessity, by virtue of His essential goodness realizes all thatHe can. Plato's Timaeus,the originatorof this line of thought,postulateson the basis of this a maximalityof forms and the procession of the temporaland the transitoryfrom the eternal.45 Aristotletook a ratherdifferentapproachto the problematic.Accordingto him there are no unrealizedpossibilities in eternalbeings and species; this is true,butthe principleis groundedin logic ratherthanin theology,andits consequencesimply primarilya beginninglessandendless cosmic cycle ratherthana vertical"chainof being."It was up to the Neoplatoniststo bringthese divergent strandstogether.The harmonizationis visible alreadyin Plotinus,who suggests that the Forms form the fully roundedmind of God (they comprise all that is thinkable)and that the perfection of the corporealworld is to temporallyand discursively imitate this whole.46Proclus expands on this and presents in his Commentaryon the Timaeusan impressive systematicaledifice based on the Platonicdivisionbetweensoul-time-opinionandreason-eterity-knowledge.As sempiternaltime representsin discursiveformthe timeless whole of the ideas,47 so the world-soul by comprehendingone thingata timegainsits return[tothe One]through the whole of time, which comprises the whole period of that which is divinely generated.With regardto the former[feature]it is inferiorto the supercosmicsoul; while with regardto the latterit is superiorto the intracosmic.Forall of these have [their]returnin some partof the whole of time, whereasthis, as if runningaroundit, completesits periodin the whole of time by intellectingthe intelligiblesof the one intelligibleuniverse. For as it is the cosmic soul, of necessity it will circumscribethe whole intelligibleuniverse;andthroughthis it will effect the intellectual returnof the cosmic period,in accordancewith the perfectnumberand by way of producingthe whole corporealperiod.48 In a novel applicationof Aristotle's so-called infinitepower argument,Proclus additionallyarguedfor the view that an infinitely temporallyextended world
45A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge,Mass., 1936), 45ff. 46 See V. Boland, Ideas in God According to St. ThomasAquinas: Sources and Synthesis (Leiden, 1996), 49-65; and Enneads 3.7.4-5, 5.2.1-2. 47 Proclus Diadochus, In Platonis TimaeumCommentaria,ed. E. Diehl (3 vols.; Leipzig, 1903-6), III, 92.5-28. 48 Op. cit., II, 290.6-17.
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constantlydependson its Creatorfor its existence.49Not only does this give the conservatioidea concreteexplication,but the Aristotelianeverlastinguniverse and the Platonic plenitudeof forms are tied togetherin quasi-logical fashion. The sum total of the world's intelligiblecomponentsremainsfixed anddefinite andever the same (thusin principleintelligible),while the whole of infinitetime is needed for the corporealworld to completely represent(hence "turnback," returnto) the contentsof what is on the higherlevel.50The dialecticof the finite andthe infinitehas a moregeneralfunctionas well. It accompaniesall the differentiationsthatarise within Proclus'scomplex ontology.At each level of being finitude and infinity are both present;in each case, finitude is privileged over infinity,as actualitypresidesover potentialityandunityover multiplicity.God's greatestblessing is to give "limitto the infinites:forthis assimilatesthingsto the good,"thatformprovidesmatterwith actualityand intelligibility.51 The reasonI have dwelt on Proclus'speculiarcosmological metaphysicsis becausethe model he elaboratedon has provenenormouslyinfluentialthroughout the history of western speculativethought.Averroes'sdistinctionbetween accidentalandessential series puts acrossbasicallythe same idea, only in more technicalform.The chainof explanationis the verticalone: this has the effect of pushing temporalcausation and change to the background.The focus is laid mainly on the abiding self-structuringfeatures of the universe. In Aristotle's classification these correspondto the formal and final causes: thus the most fundamentalquestions to ask about the world are why it takes the form that it does and what the purposeof each part in the whole is. Averroestakes this to confirmhis views on the necessity of everythingin the largerscheme of things. He also takes it as testifying to the fact thatthereis one final reasonunderlying the entire shape of nature.As everythingderives from the first principle,so is everythingalreadypresentwithinhim.Thenotionrevealsthe extentofAverroes's debtto Neoplatonism.52 In modem science andespecially in the more speculativereachesof fundamentalphysics the notion of"process andreturn"has transformedinto an ideal of"algorithmiccompressibility."This meansroughlythatan explanationis consideredthe morepowerful,the morephenomenaandlocal laws it can cover and 49 Op. cit., I, 266-68; trans.in R. Sorabji,Matter,Space and Motion: Theoriesin Antiquity and their Sequel (London, 1988), at 250-53. For materialssee op. cit., 249-85, and my "Infinite Power and Plenitude:Two Traditionson the Necessity of the Eternal,"in MedievalPhilosophy and the Classical Traditionin Islam, Judaismand Christianity,ed. J. Inglis (Richmond,2001). 50Proclus,In Tim.,I, 436-38 and II, 130-31. 51 Cf. In Tim.,II, 66.1-14; also II, 102-3; cf. L. Siorvanes,Proclus: NeoplatonicPhilosophy and Science (Edinburgh,1996), 175-79; and also my "Proclus on Plenitude,"Dionysius, 18 (2000). 52Cf. TT 184-94,226-34. Cf F. Rosenthal,"Ash-Shaykhal-Yfnani andtheArabicPlotinus Source,"OrientaliaNew Series, 22 (1953), 370-400, at 397-400; reprintedin GreekPhilosophy and the Arab World(Brookfield,Vt., 1990).
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the more economically it can be described.Closely relatedto this notion is the notion of symmetry,by whose means all variancescan be convertedto corresponding invariances.Perhaps,then, the whole cosmic chain of events could ultimatelybe reducedto a single numberand formula?This is the stuff out of which theories of everythingare made.53It is good to take note of the roots of these ideals in Platonismand the sharedroots of both in Pythagoreannumerology. It is also illuminatingto note how this somewhatmystical way of viewing the world was originallythrowninto chaos with the inventionof the irrational number,the indefinite.54 Why shouldthis notionbotherthe strongrationalistso? InfinitePossibilities:Saying and Showing The tale of the "infinitizationof the world"in the sixteenthandseventeenth centuriesis by now a familiarone, with its attendantconnotationsof a broadened perspective in scientific outlook and enquiry.55ElizabethBrient has recentlyputforwardthe suggestionthatthe intensivedimensionof thisinfinitization shouldreceive as much attentionas has been given the extensive one: Nature,in the modem age, is thoughtof not only as infinitelyextended in space, but also as exhibiting an infinite richness in all of its parts. Each particular,each individualbeing is graspedas utterlyunique, as infinitelyrich andconsequentlyas conceptuallyinexponable.Thusthe infinitizationof the real leads to an infinitizationof the knowable-the radical shift in ontology grounds a correspondingshift in epistemology... 56
Brientdoes not really go into the subject,butwhat lies at the heartof this development is the late medieval nominalistturn.57Once the metaphysicalties between logic andontology aresevered,thereis no moreguaranteethatthe names
53Cf. e.g., Barrow,Theoriesof Everything,18-23. 54 See K. R. Popper, Conjecturesand Refutations. The Growthof Scientific Knowledge (London,1963), 75-93; furtherA. Szab6,Anfdngeder GriechischenMathematik(Munich,1969), translatedby A. M. Ungar as The Beginnings of GreekMathematics(Dordrecht, 1978); D. J. O'Meara,Pythagoras Revived:Mathematicsand Philosophy in Late Antiquity(Oxford, 1989); L. J. Zhmud'," 'All is number'?'Basic Doctrine'of Pythagoreanismreconsidered,"Phronesis, 34 (1989), 270-92. 55See A. Koyr6,From the Closed Worldto the Infinite Universe(Baltimore, 1957); and see E. Grant,Planets, Stars, and Orbs. TheMedieval Cosmos, 1200-1687 (Cambridge,1994). See now also W. G. L. Randles, The Unmakingof the Medieval ChristianCosmos 1500-1760. From Solid Heavens to BoundlessAether(Aldershot, 1999). 56E. Brient,"Transitionsto a Modem Cosmology:MeisterEckhartandNicholas of Cusaon the Intensive Infinite,"Journal of the History of Philosophy, 37 (1999), 575-600. 57Cf., however,p. 595 and esp. n. 67.
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with which we denotethings completelydisclose theiressences. This leads to a separationof logical andnomic necessities andopens up new lanes of investigation and, in the final analysis, the viability of an inductivescientific methodology. In contemporaryscholarshipthe traditionallydrawnborderlinebetween latemedievalandearlymodem thoughthas been called into questionon account of the fact that these and other seeds of modernitywere sown already in the fourteenthcentury.More andmore, this is also takeninto accountwhen writing the historyof westernthought. If we now look at al-Ghazali'sview of the relationshipof knowledge and realitywe find strikingaffinities.For al-Ghazali,realityitself does not guarantee its own intelligibility.Only revelationgrantscertitude,and this is by theological precepts.58Otherwisean open mind is best kept with regardto the way natureworks: our view of the potentialitiesinherentin things may not correspondto the realityof things,and God's freedomis so wide as to seem limitless in our eyes. If, then,the principlesof dispositionsarebeyondenumeration,the depth of their naturebeyond our ken, there being no way for us to ascertain them,how can we know thatit is impossiblefor a dispositionto occurin some bodies that allows for their transformationin phase of development in the shortesttime...? The denialof this is only due to our lack of capacity to understand,[our lack of] familiaritywith exalted beings, andourunawarenessof the secretsGod, praisedbe He, [hasinstilled]in creation and nature.Whoever studies inductively the wonders of the sciences will not deem remote from the power of God, in any manner whatsoever,what has been relatedof the miraclesof the prophets.59 In heraccountof analogousideas in the (muchlater)writingsofCusanus,Brient makesnote of the fact thatnot everyonewould regardthis approachas constructive at all. Averroesfor his part is led to remarkthat the theological theory of possibilities leads to an annulmentof"both religious and rationalwisdom and, in short, reason itself."60From the vantage point of history the opposite will have shown itself to be the case. As Brientrightlyobserves, this notion of our inabilityto know anythingexhaustivelymay seem to be a negativeresult,butit does not have the samekindof negativestatus as a purely skepticalposition. In fact it is not a skeptical argumentat all. Rather,it forms the basis for an understandingof the project of 58Cf. e.g. TF, 47.10-48.5 (TT, 119). 59 TF,
178.2-8 (TT, 535).
60TT,476.6-7 (cf. TT,519-25).
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knowledge acquisitionas itself unbounded.And it opens up the possibility for a new methodologyfor acquiringknowledge aboutthe world via conjenctures,via model building.61 The amountof allusionsis staggering.Forwhile conjecturesandmodelbuilding areconduciveto regularscientificpracticein the modem era,they also formthe basis of every semanticalapproachto logic. They provide the key to viewing possibilities in a frameworkof "possible worlds."In light of this it seems not entirelycoincidentalthatMuslim theologianstypically preferredpropositional logic over (Aristotelian)predicatelogic. For while the lattercan be understood as describing the only and necessary way the world is built (in the form of descendingtreesof essentialpredications),the formerproceedsby hypothetical reasoning pertainingto semantically "empty"states of affairs: if A, then B. Here, God in creatingis boundonly by what he has createdbefore.62 I would thereforeproposeto revise Brient'spictureby effecting one simple change. An infinitizationof the real is not needed, only an infinitizationof the possible. (Brientmight of course agree with me on this.) It has been remarked elsewherethatthe idea of severalpossible worldsproduceschangesin scientific practicebecause,e.g., afterits introduction,one can no longerregardthe laws of natureas logically necessary.We shouldthennot be surprisedto find al-Ghazali suggesting that an inductive approachis the correct one in investigating the mysteriesof God. In fact, aside from the final commentaboutthe "miraclesof the prophets,"the above passage would fit into any early modem textbook on scientificmethodology.But thenit seems thatwe may creditan eleventh-century BaghdadianMuslim with having graspedsome of the most pertinentpoints of what we call a modem western outlook! If nothing else, perhapsthis should persuadeus to check ourpictureof "modernity"andourconceptionof wherethe lines are drawn. The interpretationI have given finds some supportin A. W. Moore'sanalysis of Kantianandpost-Kantiannotions of the infinite.Moore suggests thatthe moder problematic arises from a perceived discrepancy between a finite "lifeworld"andthe infinities apparentlyopening up in all directionstherefrom (bothin- andoutwards).While Kant'sown solutionwas ultimatelyconservative (Kantwas led to postulateuniversalandunassailablecategoriesof understanding), his remarksaboutthe peculiarlogic of the infiniteareinspiringandprovide anotherway of conceptualizingthe limits of our world and the limits of the possible. To talkaboutthe "infiniteframework"in which thingsarereceived,for example,is, in effect, to say, "Proceedas ifthere were an infinitereality 61Brient,"Transitions,"599. 62See L. E. Goodman,Avicenna(New York, 1992), 184-211.
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out there."And this providesa continualspurto realizethe possibilities inherentin things. It provides a continualspurto furtherreception.It leads, ultimately,to an increasein knowledge andunderstanding.63 The word "realize"clearly accepts of two interpretationshere. I would like to believe the equivocationis intentional. What, then, of the personal intuitionsunderlyingthe cosmological enterprise? In approachingthis questionI would like to comparethe Tahdfutdebate with a parallel contemporarydiscussion. A prominentpiece of recent philosophicalcosmology,WilliamLaneCraigandQuentinSmith's Theism,Atheism and Big Bang Cosmologyis staged as a debatebetween theist and atheistinterpretationsof currentcosmology. Craig maintainsthat the finitude of creation testifies to its Creator,while Smithtakes a uniqueposition amongmodem cosmological thinkersin thathe defendsthe notionthatthe universe'soriginationis simply a brutefact, one withoutany cause or explanationwhatsoever. Smith concludes the work on an optimisticnote regardingthe hopes of an eventualconsensus.Accordingto Smith,thereis a largedegreeof unanimityand muchcommongroundbetween cosmological thinkersalready.The overallevidence weighs sufficiently heavily in favor of Big Bang cosmology for the old debate aboutthe eternityand the originatednessof the world to be laid to rest. The world has come to be fromnothingin a finite time in the past. Furthermore, althoughthe philosophicalatheistneed not acknowledgeany ultimatecause for the world's existence, he can still sharewith the theist a certainsense of wonder in the face of the fact that there should be something in existence ratherthan nothing at all. All cosmological theories also try to make this world and its originationintelligible.As Smithsees it, the only questionleft unsettledis whether the acknowledgedlywondrous actuality of existence is of causal or a causal origin.64
Our examinationof the historicaldialogue above, however, seems to subvert Smith's appealto harmonyin reverence.Both Islamic correspondentsexpress their wondermentand reverenceover the existence of the world and its marvellousandbeneficientordering.Overandabove Smith'srequirements,alGhazaliandAverroesagreeon this order'sbeing established-even necessarily established-by a transcendentcause.But they arriveat whatSmithwouldprobably considersubstantiallythe same view fromsuch differentconsiderationsas to make it appearthatthe questionsthey addressare fundamentallydifferent.If this is true,then it reducesthe significance of any concordreachedin the mere appreciationof existence. 63 A.
W. Moore, TheInfinite(New York, 1990), 223. 64In W. L. Craigand Q. Smith, Theism,Atheism,and Big Bang Cosmology(Oxford, 1993),
337.
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Let us look at Craigand Smith from the point of view of their approaches ratherthantheirsolutions.Craigis a self-proclaimedchampionof the venerable kaldmargumentthat arguesfrom finite creationto first cause. Despite of this, andmoreinterestingly,Craig'sreasoningfromcreationto God otherwisehas all the flavorings of a modem "selector"theory.The world exhibits remarkable features,foremostof which is its amenabilityto life, andthis is the reasonfor its having been chosen. The goodness of God is posited as an explanationfor the birthof life as it is not in, say, Derek Parfit'sSelectormetaphysics;still, Craig as much as all searchersafteran ultimateexplanationproposesto "see the mind of God"in the sense thathis argumentis meantas groundsfor the factwhy there should be somethingratherthannothing.Craig'sapproachthus drawscloser to theAverroesof the Tahdfutal-tahdfutthanto the al-Ghazaliof thatwork. Comparethis with QuentinSmith'saccountof the ultimatelyuncausednatureof the universe. In what is evidently a favoritepassage (it is quoted from a previous book) Smithdescribes,presumablyin autobiographicalfashion,a certain"metaphysics of feeling."This feeling for the ultimaterealityof the real is deliveredin what areunmistakablyreverentialtones: [This world] exists nonnecessarily,improbably,and causelessly. It exists for absolutely no reason at all. It is inexplicablyand stunningly actual.... The impact of this captivatedrealizationupon me is overwhelming.I am completelystunned.I takea few dazedsteps in the dark meadow, and fall among the flowers. I lie stupefied,whirling without comprehensionin this worldthroughnumberlessworldsotherthanthis one.65
"Inthis world throughnumberlessworlds otherthanthis one":in the contextof a felt infinity of possible worlds, the actual reality of this world conspires to produce in Smith a fundamentalsense of awe. Oddly enough, on the level of attitudethis is pure al-Ghazali,where Craigwas al-Ghazali'sdisciple in argumentation.The idea of an incomprehensibleinfinity of possibilities becoming somehow disclosed in revelatoryexperience mirrorsal-Ghazali'sattitudetowardshumanscomingto knowdivineliberalityand"theoptimum."Al-Ghazali's feeling for the "perfectrightnessof the actual,"as EricOrmsbyputs the idea, is well nigh identicalto Smith'srapturebefore the existence of this world and no other. If this is correct,thenit seems the featuresofcosmological thinkingwe have at handdo not fall neatlywithinthe categorieswhich often formthe main focus of discussion.The debate,especially in popularliterature,is continuouslybeing cast as one of theism vs. atheism.The distinctiondoes not appearto be particularly fruitfulhere. Self-professedtheists and atheistshave both approachedthe 65 Q.
Smith, in Theism,Atheism,217, quotedas reproducedhere.
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questionof a final explanationfrombothof the directionssketchedouthere.The two types of"ultimateexplanation"seem to have theirbasis in differentways of approachingthe problemof the world, ratherthanof God (in questionsof cosmology, of course,the two dimensionscannotalways be neatly differentiated), andthey seem to take theircue fromdifferentways of tacklingfinitude. The moreprevalentattitudehas fuelledbothancientphilosophyandcurrent venturesinto fundamentalphysics:it attemptsto abstractfromthe world'smany particularssome moregeneralfeatures.Founduniversalswould allow the world The to be understoodin morecompressedformandthusmore"fundamentally." possibility of working "fromthe top down,"from first principlesdown to particulars,representsthe tantalizingbut elusive universalcalculus thatwould allow us to see in every instancethe workings of a hierarchicallyorderedset of laws, all ultimatelysubservientto one (or the One, as the case may be). Knuuttila has put it thatin the quest for an ultimateexplanationexplanationmerges with understanding,and understandingin turnis seen as a kind of unificationof the mind with the universalcode.66Scientific pursuitwhen viewed in this fashion begins to show resemblanceto the mystic's quest to become assimilatedto the divine Reason. In moder cosmology, then, one shouldperhapsnot be too surprised to find physicists adopting what are recognizably reverentialtones in discussing the ramificationsof a unified cosmological theory,and theologians animatedlydiscussingthe same theories. There is anotherkind of mysticism. This mysticism dreamsof the beatific vision as well, but insteadof settingits hopes on humanascentit relies on divine descent; insteadof deducingthe form of the world from its immanentlogic, it awaits for a disclosure of the divine will. Insteadof trying to say, it is content with being shown: as Moore has contended,Wittgenstein'sdistinctionis pertinent in the context of infinity and possibility.Towardsthe end of the Tractatus Wittgensteinremarksthat"Goddoes not revealhimself in the world."Thenhow does thishappen?"Toview theworldsubspecie aeterniis to view it as a wholea limited whole." But if the world is truly infinite and languagenecessarilyfiA nite, then "Feelingthe world as a limitedwhole-it is this thatis mystical."67 in divinevision of the world,sub specie aeterni,is inexpressible anyinnerworldly language, for Wittgensteinis of the opinion-as was Kant-that logic is transcendental.68This kind of vision can then only come from outside the system entirely(if it is not to be merehallucination,a partdelusionallyrepresentingfor the whole). This idea conjoins such diverse thinkersas al-Ghazali,Kant, and Wittgenstein. 66
Knuuttila,"Plenitude,"147-49. Citations from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: The German Text of Ludwig Wittgensteinss Logisch-PhilosophischeAbhandlungwith a new Translation,tr. D. F. Pearsand B. F. McGuinness(London, 1961), 6.432 and 6.45. 68 Cf. Tractatus6.13; for Moore's comments, TheInfinite, 186-200 and ff. 67
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It has been pointed out that there are two ways of understandingthe transcendentalist position. In one interpretationthe givenness of logic (as in Wittgenstein'sTractatus)andthe categoriesof perception(as in Kant)leave us only the option of accepting these as givens. On this view we could at most wonderwhy thereshouldbe somethingratherthannothing.But all questionsof the how arereducedto mere tautologiesas soon as we recognize the finite perceived world as a closed whole, where every featureof the system can be explainedby referenceto some otherfeature.69This would seem to be a variation on the "only one logic" theme, this time with an anthropocentrictwist. A more optimistictakeon the transcendentalist problematicwould be to view logic as an open-endedcalculusthatcanbe refinedandredefinedwithoutlimitfromwithin. By this accountone always replaces one element with anotherand then works out the implications.Not only is this more congenial with the overall approach of semantical inquiry,but it correspondsbetter with the way human inquiry usually proceeds.70It also leaves us free to trustthat the wonders of God and naturewill never cease. Al-Ghazali in fact voices the same kinds of concerns we have expressed regardingthe expressibilityof the mysticalexperience.Kantandal-Ghazaliagree in that the mystical cannot be expressed in conventional language or logical form.According to al-Ghazali,the case much resembles that of the drunkard who cannotscientificallydescribehis state.A soberdoctorcan do this, buthe is in turnshutoff fromthe sheerfeeling of intoxication.71 It is at least amusingthat when criticizingthose who claim to convey special esotericknowledgeto their followers,al-Ghazaliremarksthat"thisknowledge,as they describeit, amounts to some triflingdetailsof the philosophyof Pythagoras."72 Al-Ghazali,it would was not his seem, overly impressedby contemporaries'attemptsat algorithmic compression.
Universityof Helsinki.
69 Cp. Tractatus6.44: "It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists." 70See Knuuttila,"Plenitude,"149-50 and Kirjavainen,"Cosmology";cf. furtherM. Kusch, Language as Calculus vs. Language as UniversalMedium.A Studyin Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer(Dordrecht,1989). 71 Al-Ghazali, Al-munqidhmin al-daldl, ed. G. Saliba and K. CAyyad(Beirut, s.a.), 132; English translationin TheFaith and Practice ofAl-Ghazili, tr.W. M. Watt(Oxford, 1994), 57; similarlyMunqidh,141 (Watttr., 64). 72 Munqidh,128 (Watttr., 55).
Claude
de
Seyssel's of
Ancient
Translations Historians
Rebecca Boone
Throughhis seven translationsof ancienthistoryClaudede Seyssel played a majorrole in transmittingknowledge about antiquityto the French.Despite this facthe has receivedlittle attentionfromscholarsof the FrenchRenaissance. Perhapsthe problemis thatSeyssel does not seem to fit neatlyinto any category. He was neitherFrenchnorItalianbuta Savoyard,not trulynoble butthe illegitimate son of a noble family, not truly a historianbut a writerof history-based propagandaanda translatorof histories.He beganhis careeras a jurist,became a royal councillor,then a bishop, andin the end died as theArchbishopof Turin. Before his deathSeyssel left numerousworks,his most famousbeing a political treatiseentitledLa Monarchie de France, a work contemporaneouswith The Prince by Machiavelli, with whom he shared a similar view of the political world.1
Much like Seyssel himself the genre of history translationhas been rather neglectedby scholars.A notableexceptionis a recentarticleby A.C. Dionisotti, which also examines the translationsof Seyssel. The article's intention is to continue a projectproposedby Amaldo Momigliano, to collect evidence that "wouldhelp us to understandwhere andon what occasions andby whatpeople books of history were writtenand read."2This essay attemptsto continue this projectby askingthe following questions:Why did Seyssel undertakethe translations?For whom were they intended?How did Seyssel conceive his task as translator?Finally,what can be inferredfrom his techniqueof translation? The most importantbiographyof Seyssel is Alberto Caviglia, Claudio di Seyssel (14501520): La vita nella storia di suoi tempi ("Miscellaneadi Storia Italiana,"LIV, Turin, 1928); also the introductionof Jacques Poujol's critical edition of La Monarchie de France et deux autresfragmentspolitiques (Paris, 1961) and Donald Kelley's introductionto TheMonarchyof France, tr. J. H. Hexter and ed. D. R. Kelley (New Haven, 1981). 2 A. C. Dionisotti, "Claudede Seyssel" in AncientHistory and the Antiquarian.Essays in MemoryofArnaldo Momigliano,ed. M. H. Crawfordand C. R. Ligota (London, 1995), 73-89; and in general see E. B. Fryde, Humanismand Renaissance Historiography(London, 1983).
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First,the translationsmustbe put in the contextof Seyssel's life. The translationswere a sideline in his busy careeras royalcouncillor.One of many itinerant scholar-diplomatshired by the states of Europe at that time, Seyssel had been teachinglaw at the Universityof Turinwhen he was called into the service of Franceby the newly crownedLouis XII in 1498. Seyssel was of value to the court because of his reputationas a jurist as well as his connections with the court of Savoy, the state which held the mountainpasses leading to Italy.This was especially importantbecause the conquest of Milan was the main goal of Louis XII throughouthis reign.Seyssel playedan activerole in the Frenchoccupationalgovernmentin severalItaliancities. AlthoughSeyssel spentmuchof his time in Italy, he often followed the king aroundFrance or was in transiton diplomaticmissions to England,to Flanders,and to the Swiss cantons. It is amazingthatSeyssel even foundthe time to write,butby the end of his life, he had left an astoundingvariety of written works: legal commentaries, translations,works of propagandafor the Frenchmonarchy,a political treatise, and at the end of his life severalreligious tracts.Despite the copiousness of his written works, however, Seyssel remainedoutside the circle of writers at the French court. He had no connections either with Bude or with the Grands Rhetoriqueurs,such as Jean Lemairede Belges, nor did he leave any friendly andeloquentcorrespondenceto otherhumanists.If Seyssel lived duringthe buddingyears of the Frenchrenaissance,he showed few signs of appreciatingit. As a Savoyardeducatedin Italyhe probablythoughtof the Frenchin the same way as did many Italians of his age: they were militarily powerful but culturally backward.3 Undoubtedly,Seyssel believed the translationswould serve his own interests at court.They were a way to cultivatepatronageandto enhancehis prestige by buildingup a reputationas an importantscholar.But evidence suggests that theirmainpurposewas to prove to the king, to whom all but one of his translations were dedicated,his utility as a councillor.This was the argumentof Paul
3 This is the idea espoused in Baldesar Castiglione's II libro del Cortegiano, ed. Walter Barberis (Turin, 1998), 89-90, as well as in many of the sixteenth-centuryrelazioni of the Venetiandiplomatsto France. Seyssel, writing for France, is much more circumspect,but his opinion is implied in several places. For example, in his tract about France's victory over Venice at Agnadello, L'Excellence & la Felicite de la Victoire,que eut le TrechrestienRoy de France LouysXII de ce nom, diet Pere dupeuple, contre les Venitiens,au lieu appelle Aignadel, l'an 1509, le 14 iour de May, Seyssel borrows the frameworkof Thucydides'account of the PeloponnesianWar by characterizingVenice as Athens and France as Sparta,both culturally and militarily.In addition, in Les Louanges de Bon Roy Lovys XII, de ce nom dict Pere du peuple et de lafelicite de son Regne, 36, Seyssel states "IIest tout notoire,que pour l'ignorance du temps present, la science est communementdesprisee, Non pas tant seulement des Roys, mais de toute la Noblesse en France.Et pleust a Dieu, que le temps qu'ils perdenten ieunesses, banquets, & choses inutiles, ils 1'employassenta apprendretelles sciences." Both works are reprintedin Histoire de Louis XII, ed. TheodoreGodefroy (Paris, 1615).
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Chavy in his study of Seyssel's translations.4 The question, however, is how exactly Seyssel's translations could accomplish this. In what ways were the translations useful? There are at least two dimensions to this question: first, the act of translating itself and, second, the use of the histories which translation made accessible. In one way the act of translation might be seen as part of a literary project which would, as Seyssel put it in a preface to his translation of Justin, presented to the king in 1509, "enrichir, magnifier et publier" the French language.5 By this he meant that the rather crude French language might be enriched with elements of the more perfect Latin by imitating Latin style and adopting vocabulary, just as Latin had been enriched by adopting elements of Greek. The other side to his endeavor was the extension of the French vernacular. In the interior of the country adopting the vernacular would allow those who did not know Latin access to knowledge of the Scriptures, moral philosophy, medicine, and history.6 The vernacular was significant in terms of the exterior of the country as well. As Lorenzo Valla noted in his famous preface to the Elegantiae, language and political domination go hand in hand.7 Seyssel put this concept in the context of the French invasion of Italy, stating that "There is no region now in it [Italy] where the French language is not understood by the majority of the people: such that there where Italians once considered the French barbarians as much in customs as in language, at present they converse without translators and the Italians adapt themselves, those under your subjection as well as many others to the dress and lifestyle of France." In this way he conceived of the act of translation itself as a contribution to the king's effort at Italian conquest. Thus, his "literary"project was essentially political.8 The question arises, however, as to where Seyssel's own translation fits into this apparent project to "publicize" the French language, for this work was not published in his lifetime. Most likely, Seyssel intended as his audience not 4 See Paul Chavy, "Les TraductionsHumanistesde Claude de Seyssel" in L'humanisme francais au debut de la Renaissance: Colloque International de Tours (XIVeStage), ed. A. Stegman and M. Francois (Paris, 1973), 361-76. 5 FerdinandBrunot,"Un projetd'enrichir,magnifieret publierla langue franqaisen 1509" Revue d'histoire litteraire de la France, 1 (1894), 27-37; and see the introductionto Brunot, Histoire de la languefrancaise des origines a nosjours (Paris, 1967), II. 6 Claude de Seyssel, Exorde de Justin printedin La Monarchiede France, ed. Poujol, 67: "Ceux qui n'ont aucunenotice de la langue latine peuvent entendreplusieurschoses bonnes et hautes, soit en la Sainte Ecriture, en philosophie morale, en m6decine ou en histoire, dont n'auraientaucune connaissance sans cela." 7 LorenzoValla,TheElegances of the LatinLanguage,in ThePortableRenaissanceReader, ed. and tr. J. B. Ross and M. M. McLaughlin(New York, 1953), 131-35. 8 It is interesting to compare the political nature of Seyssel's preface to Justin with a contemporarywork,JeanLemairede Belges's La Concordedes Deux Langages,ed. JeanFrappier (Paris, 1947), which was a poetic appeal to unite French and Tuscan, illustratingan alliance between Florence and France.
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the "public"butratherthe nobilityof France,who were notoriousfor theirignoranceof Latinin Seyssel's time.9 Why did Seyssel choose exclusively works of historyto translate?Seyssel was working at least twenty years before the proliferationof translationsof histories in France.'0PerhapsSeyssel's choice was due to the interestsof the king himself. Unlike his queen,Anne of Brittany,who was a substantialpatron of literaryactivity,Louis XII limited his interestto history.The poets at court drew on the genre of history,and propagandapieces were writtenas histories andvice-versa in orderto sway public opinion." Seyssel himself did this sortof thing, writinga panegyricto Louis XII in the form of a historyof Franceand a to be a historyof thegloriousvictoryof theKingatAgnadello pamphletpurporting againstthe Venetians.Both of these were publishedimmediatelyfor wide circulation.12
If his contemporaryhistory served as propaganda,what purposes did his translationsof ancienthistoryserve?Werethey also intendedto serve as propaganda?This is not likely, given thatnone of themwere madepublic by Seyssel. Since he activelysoughtpublicationfor manyof his otherworks,why did he not do the same for his translations?Evidence suggests that Seyssel wantedto restrictthe audienceof his ancienthistoriesto the king and his courtand that he believedthe informationcontainedin themto be not only primarilyof advantage to this small group but also elements of the histories to be unsuitablefor the populace. How exactlywere the historiesmeantto be usedby theirintendedaudience? Seyssel sharedwith many of his humanistcontemporariesa similar vision of history.They did not see the ancient past as a unified and continuingprocess eventuallyleadingto the present.Rather,historywas seen as a huntingground for examples to teach moral philosophy.13Seyssel assumed, like the ancients, de l'humanismeen 9 See JacquesMonfrin,"La connaissancede l'antiquiteet le probl&me langue vulgaire dans la France du Xve siecle" in The Late Middle Ages and the Dawn of HumanismOutsideItaly, ed. M. Verbekeand J. Ijsewijn (Leuven, 1972), 158-59. 10PierreVilley, XVIemesiecle. Les sources des idees. Texteschoisis et commentes(Paris, 1912), 39. l See Michael Sherman, The Selling of Louis XII: Propaganda and Popular Culture in RenaissanceFrance, 1498-1515 (Ph.D diss., Universityof Chicago, 1974), 310-17; also Frederic Baumgartner,Louis XII (New York, 1994). 12 Les Louanges de Bon Roy Lovys XII, de ce nom dict Pere du peuple et de la felicite de son Regne and L'Excellence& la Felicite de la Victoire,que eut le TrechrestienRoy de France Louys XII de ce nom, dict Pere du peuple, contre les Venitiens,au lieu appelle Aignadel, I 'an 1509, le 14 iour de May, both in Histoire de Louis XII, ed. TheodoreGodefroy (Paris, 1615). 13 Felix Gilbert,"The Renaissance Interestin History"in Art, Science and History in the Renaissance (Baltimore, 1967), 373-87; Myron Gilmore, "The RenaissanceConceptionof the Lessons of History" in Humanists and Jurists: Six Studies in the Renaissance (Cambridge, 1963), and Timothy Hampton, Writingfrom History: The Rhetoric of Exemplarityin Renaissance Literature(Ithaca, 1990). See also John D. Lyons, Exemplum:TheRhetoricof Example in Early Modern France and Italy (Princeton, 1989).
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that the past repeateditself in a cycle, so the factorsdeterminingactions then would be the same atworkin the present.14In his use of history,however,he was less like Bude and Erasmus,who soughtout historicalfigureswho would illustrate moral precepts, than like Guicciardiniand Machiavelli, who looked for lessons of politicalconduct.Althoughhe focusedon successfulgenerals,Seyssel also understoodthat customs, laws, and virtues of states could also serve as models. For Seyssel history was a source of political knowledge intendedto informpolicy-making;his interestwas not in the past but in the present.'5 A descriptionof the historiesthatSeyssel translatedwill help to illuminate the sortof knowledgehe actively sought.His firsthistory,translatedin 1504-5, was Xenophon'sAnabasis, a storyof the retreatof 10,000 Greeksoldiersout of the ruggedterrainof Asia Minorin the years beforeAlexander.After thatcame the translationof Appian of Alexandria's Warsof the Romans, including an account of the Roman Civil Wars,to which Seyssel added Plutarch'sLife of MarkAntony,executedaround1507.16Thethirdtranslationwas Justin'sEpitome ofHistory, fromaround1509, which was an abridgementfromthe laterRoman Empireof the lost work of the earlierhistorianTrogusPompeius. This was a universalhistorywhich began with the ancientNear East and Greece, and coveredMacedonandthe Hellenistickingdomsto theirfall beforeRome. In 1511he translatedthree books of Diodorus Siculus, which covered the successors of Alexanderthe Great.To this work Seyssel addedPlutarch'sLife ofDemetrius. In 1514 Seyssel dedicated The Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius to Anne of Brittany.This was his only non-secularhistory.In the same year he also completed his translationof Thucydides,which includedall eight books recounting thePeloponnesianWars.Accordingto Seyssel'sprefaceto thishistory,Thucydides was to be his last translation,but in fact Seyssel translatedone more, that of Appian's account of the Hannibalicwars, the manuscriptof which was only recentlydiscoveredby A C. Dionisottiin the BritishLibrary.Althoughintended for Louis XII, it was dedicatedto the new king FrancisI in 1515. In fact all of his historiesexcept Eusebiuswere dedicatedto the Frenchking.17 So with the exceptionof Eusebius,what generalizationscan be made about these histories? First of all, the translationsare overwhelmingly Greek. One reasonfor this mightbe the influenceof his collaborator.Seyssel himself did not know Greek,and for most of his translationshe collaboratedwith a Byzantine 14
Gilbert, "The Renaissance Interestin History,"377. Kelley (ed.), Versionsof Historyfrom Antiquityto the Enlightenment(New Haven, 1991). 16 Decembrio's Italianversion of Appian's civil wars from 1472 also adds Plutarch'sLife Mark See A. C. Dionisotti, "Claudede Seyssel," 87. of Antony. 17 translation of Xenophon's Anabasis is also an exception, in that Seyssel preSeyssel's sented copies of it not only to Louis XII but also to king Henry VII of England(shortly after a successful diplomaticmission to him in 1506) and to CharlesII of Savoy, to whom he remained a perpetualcouncillor throughouthis service to France. 15Donald R.
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refugeenamedJanusLascaris,who firsttranslatedthese historiesfromGreekto Latin, from which Seyssel translatedthe works into French.Lascarisseems to have been Seyssel's main connectionto humanism.He andSeyssel hadmuch in common;they both servedas diplomatsfor Louis XII, had an experiencedview of politics, andwere partof a special breedof Renaissancescholars-uprooted noblemenpracticingpolitics for a foreign government,always traveling,finding, translating,and transportingmanuscripts.Lascaris also shared Seyssel's love of politics. When he taughtGreekin Florence,he was uniquein his selection of texts which tendedto emphasizeGreekmilitarystrengthratherthanphilosophy or literature.'8 PerhapsSeyssel chose Greek history as a subtle appeal to Frenchpatriotism, forby focusingon Greece,Francecoulddistanceitself fromAncientRome, whose heritagethe Italiancity states claimed for their own. But I think these sentiments,which would develop fully only later on in the century,were not primaryin Seyssel's decision. Of course Seyssel might have chosen Greektexts in particularsimply because they had not been translatedpreviously into French, and their novelty would have made them more marketableat court.Marketableas what, though, andto whom, is an importantquestion.A. C. DionisottisuggestedthatSeyssel's translationswere a sort of substitutefor the medieval romances,directedat the same audience:the princes and the nobles who at this time preferredto hear storiesread in vernacularprose.19CertainlyXenophonwould have quencheda thirst for adventureliterature,and Diodorus's account of the successors of Alexanderthe Greatwould serve as a sequel to the stories of thatmost famous conqueror.Dionisotti noted that in all of his histories Seyssel includedchapter divisions and tables of contents, which were also a standardfeatureof prose romancesas well as of medievalhistoriography.In addition,Seyssel's presentation copies were sumptuouslycrafted,with many illuminations.Evidentlythey servedas presents,finely producedfor use at court.20This use explains,according to Dionisotti, why Seyssel never had his translationsprinted.Their rarity and exclusiveness were partof theirvalue.21
See B6rje Kn6s, Un ambassadeurde Hellenisme-Janus Lascaris-et la traditiongrecobyzantinedans l'humanismfrancais (Paris, 1945); Anna Pontani,"Perla biographia,le lettere, i codici, le versioni di Giano Lascaris"in Dotti bizantinie libri greci nell 'Italiadel secolo XV, ed. M. Cortesi, E.V. Maltese (Naples, 1992), 363-433; and Anna Meschini, "La prolusione fiorentini di Giano Laskaris"in Miscellanea di studi in onore di VittoreBranca (Florence, 1983), III, 69-113. 19A. C. Dionisotti, "Claudede Seyssel," 73-89. 20 See Natalie Zemon Davis, "Beyond the Market:Books as Gifts in Sixteenth-Century France"in Transactionsof the Royal Historical Society (1982), 69-88. 21 Seyssel's translationswere published after his death by order of Francis I himself directed by his lecteur Jacques Colin. The principal editions are Thucydides (Paris, 1527); 18
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While I agree that Seyssel might have desired to keep them exclusive to increase their value, I think he might have had another motive, which was to keep the powerful information contained within them safely among the nobility of the court and away from the public. Seyssel himself hints at this in the preface to Xenophon dedicated to Charles II duke of Savoy, where he discusses Louis XII's attitude toward the promulgation of the text. Seyssel states, "Because of the singularity of the book, it seemed to him [Louis XII] that it ought not to be made public [divulgue], rather as a rare thing it ought to belong to princes and important persons only."22 What was this information which needed to be kept away from the public? First of all, military information. It is important to realize that in general ancient history revolved around war. In the details of battle after battle one could find information about equipment, troop formations, and strategy which would still have been relevant in Seyssel's own time.23Perhaps Seyssel chose histories focusing on Macedonian and Hellenistic-era history because they featured battles in which pike phalanxes played an important role. This would have had special importance because in the early sixteenth century the Swiss infantry was defeating the French cavalry with such pike formations.24The Hellenistic era is also significant because during this time kingdoms besieged and conquered the independent city-states of Greece in a way that parallels the French kingdom's attempt to conquer the Italian city-states. Evidence that Seyssel took information on war gathered from ancient histories very seriously is the fact that such a large portion of La Monarchie de France is dedicated to the art of war and based on the examples found in these histories.25 Another reason why Seyssel might have wanted these histories kept in limited circulation was the fact that they inevitably relate the strengths and advantages of democratic, or "popular" governments. Even historians who were antidemocratic had to concede the strength of Athens at its height as well as that of
Xenophon (Paris, 1529); Diodorus Siculus (Paris, 1530); Eusebius (Paris, 1532); Appian of Alexandria, Wars(Lyon, 1544); Justin (Paris, 1559). Seyssel's last translation,the Hannibalic Warsof Appian, was never printedand perhapsnever even presented. 22 Claudede Seyssel, prefaceto the translationof Xenophon'sAnabasispresentedto Charles II of Savoy. Paris, BibliothequeNational, Ms. Fr. 701: "Et tellement que pour la singularitedu livre luy a semble quil ne debuoit point estre divulgue ains comme chouse tresrereestre communique a prinpces et grans personnaiges tant seullement." The same statement appears in Seyssel's preface to Anabasis presentedto HenryVII of England,included by A.C. Dionisotti in the appendixto her article, "Claudede Seyssel," 91-95. 23 See A. Grafton and L. Jardine,"'Studied for Action': How Gabriel Harvey read his Livy,"Past and Present, 129 (1990), 30-78. 24 David Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-CenturyEurope (New York, 1995), 43-75. 25 Claude de Seyssel, preface to the translationof Appian, Warsof the Romans,printedin Claude de Seyssel, La Monarchiede France, ed. Poujol, 85.
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theRomanRepublic.Seyssel,a monarchist,carefullychose historianswho shared his distrustof populargovernment,and who particularlyfocused on the civil disorderhe believed inherentin democracies.The only historywhich focuses on Rome is that of Appian, because, accordingto Seyssel, of all the Greek and Romanwritershe is the one who has given the fullest accountof their"dissensions, seditions and intestine or civil wars."26Thucydidesis of course also an example of a historianwho shows the dangersof civil war and how the democraticgovernmentof Athens contributedto it. Seyssel's apparentobsession with civic disorderand the threatof popular France, governmentseemsratherunusualin the contextof earlysixteenth-century to later well as as a statewhich appearedunifiedandpeacefulto contemporaries historians.Nevertheless, Seyssel saw two threatshere:first,thatsocial disorder within Francemight cause the downfall of the monarchyand, second, that the monarchymight have to fight more powerful democraticforces from without. Seyssel's attitudeprobablyhad to do less with his observationsof Francethan with his own experienceas a diplomatexperiencingat firsthandthe civil disorder of the Italiancity-states, and from there he projectedthe social dynamics onto the kingdom of France. Seyssel might also have been influenced by his experienceof the innerworkingsof the Swiss democracies,whichwere, incidentally, the site of his most notablediplomaticfailures. Seyssel also seems to have feared the power of the populargovernments surroundingFrance.In the preface to his last history,Appian's account of the Second Punic War,dedicated to Francis I, Seyssel stated that this particular history was significantbecause it concernedtwo popularempires, Rome and Carthage.He relatedhow Rome's neighborswatched it grow until they were helpless againstit, a narrativewhich he considered"goodteachingandexample for all great kings and princes to be admonishedto think and have regardfor popularstatesthatthey see aroundthem grow in authority,in force, in territory, in wealth,in ambitionandcupidity."Seyssel also used the examplesof Carthage andAthens,who were even moredangerousthanRome due to theirlack of good laws andbalancedconstitution.Of this kind of popularempire Seyssel states, It is not possible to take assurancein the promises and treatiesof such states who are subject to the pure and absolute will of a rude, uncivil and willful people who by their natureare the enemy of princes, of 26 Claude de Seyssel, preface to the translationof Appian's Iberica and Hannibalica published in A. C. Dionisotti, "Claude de Seyssel," 99: "Si n'est possible prendre seurete es promesses et traictezde telz estatz qui sont subgetz a la pure et absolue volunte d'ung peuple rude, incivil et voluntaire,qui de sa natureest ennemy des prinpces, des nobles, des riches et de tous ceulx qui ont sens et auctorit6;et au surplusn'est plus souvent capable de verite et de raison, ains est enclin a toute violence, vilennie et convoitise, ainsi que l'on peut appercevoir par la presente histoire de l'estat des Cartaginois,et par aultresde celuy des Atheniens."
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nobles, of rich people and all those who have sense and authority,and moreoverwho are not often capable of truthor reason, but ratherare inclinedtowardevery violence, villany andgreed.27 He also adds, the wise andinformedprinceswho see such statesrise aroundthemand cannotbe secured from them by good and whole friendship,ought to strive to be secured from them by other means, as once did Philip of Macedon...,who took such meanstowardsthemthathe putthemunder subjectionto him.28 Seyssel concludedthat it is betterto assail one's enemy in his own land as did Hannibaland Scipio, a statementclearly applicableto the king's intentionsof foreignconquest.29 An examinationof Seyssel's techniqueof translationlends supportto the argumentthat these translationswere meant foremostto serve as militaryand political instructionfor the king and his councillors. I use his translationof Thucydidesas an example not only because Seyssel consideredit his masterpiece in the artof translationbut also because Seyssel had been drawnparticularly to this historianas one who shared his political perspective.30Another In A .C. Dionisotti, "Claudede Seyssel," 95-103. Claude de Seyssel, preface to Appian's Iberica and Hannibalica, 98-99: "Qui est ung bel enseignementet exemple a tous gransroys et prinpcespourestre advertizde penser et avoir regardaux estats populairesqu'ilz voient croistreautourd'eulx, d'auctorite,de force, de pais, de richesses, d'ambition et de convoitise.... Considerantlesquelles choses, les prinpces sages et avis&zqui voient telz estatz trop elever autourd'eulx asseurerpar aultresmoiens, ainsi que fit jadis le roy Philippe de Macedoine. Lequel, voiant l'estat populaire de plusieurs citez de Grece venir a telle grandeuret puissance, depuis la victoire qu'ilz eurent contre les Persiens, que si on ne les rabaissoit,luy et les aultresprinpces leurs voisins viendroientdu tout en leur subjectionm,et seroientpar eulx oppressezet malmenez,comme desja estoient, tint telz moiens envers eulx qu'il les remit presque a sa subiection." 29 An interestingcomparison might be made between Seyssel's approachto Thucydides and that of ThomasHobbes, who was also attractedto this historianbecause he was "The most politic historiographerthat ever writ"and taughthim that "democracywas absurdand that one man is wiser thanthe multitude."RichardSchlatter(ed.), Hobbess Thucydides(New Brunswick, 1975), xviii-xxi. Quentin Skinnerdiscusses Hobbes's approachto Thucydides'rhetoricalstyle and its moral implications in "Thomas Hobbes: Rhetoric and the Constructionof Morality," Dawes Hicks Lectureon Philosophy(London, 1990). See also Skinner,Reason and Rhetoricin the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge,1996). Thucydidesand Hobbes sharednot only a similar skepticism but also a strong anti-rhetoricalsentiment. 30 For most of his Greek histories Seyssel relied on manuscripttranslationsof Lascaris, which are lost. Exceptions are his translationof Justin, which was originally written in Latin, and Appian's Warsof the Romans,which he translatedfrom Pier CandidoDecembrio. Seyssel claimed that the lattertranslationwas so inaccuratethat he was forced to rely on Lascarisfor most of it. In fact E. B. Fryde, in Humanismand Renaissance Historiography,27, regardedit as one of the "disasters"of Nicolas V's project of translation. 27 28
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reason to focus on this translation is that it is one of the few for which we have the manuscript from which he translated. For the translation of Thucydides, Seyssel worked from the Latin translation made by Lorenzo Valla.31Because Seyssel found Valla's Latin very difficult, he relied on Lascaris to help him with the most difficult passages. The extent ofLascaris's influence is unknown, but it is nevertheless interesting to compare the divergence in both context and style apparent in the translations of Seyssel and Valla. Requested by Pope Nicholas V, Lorenzo Valla's translation of Thucydides was part of the Pope's project to advance the church by making it a leader of culture.32Although the translation of Greek works into Latin was related to a political agenda, that is, the spread of language as a tool of empire, Valla nevertheless does not seem to have chosen Thucydides out of the same sort of political concerns as those which clearly motivated Seyssel. It may be argued that for Valla the translation of Thucydides was largely a literary enterprise, while for Seyssel, it was political. This is demonstrated in an examination of how each translates a certain portion of Thucydides, namely, his Melian Dialogue.33 The Melian Dialogue captures in many ways the essence of Thucydidean history. Perhaps the most ruthless example of political realism to be found anywhere in his work is a dialogue between Athenian ambassadors and the magistrates of the little island of Melos. The Athenians try to convince the Melians to surrender without a battle to Athens. The Athenians make it clear that questions ofjustice should play no part the discussion, maintaining thatjustice can only be discussed between equals, not between a weak island like Melos and a strong empire like Athens. The dialogue contains a lucid illustration of a philosophical principle, that force is the basis of human relationships.34 The extraordinary character of what is said has its counterpart in the rhetorical strategy in which it is clothed. Thucydides' style in general has been noted by the ancients in the following terms. Quintillian said it was "condensed, abbreviated and highly pressurized" while Cicero noted that Thucydides is so compressed that "almost every word contains a full statement." 31 Seyssel translatedThucydideswhile in Rome as ambassadorto Pope Leo X. He probably used the presentationcopy of 1452 dedicatedto Nicholas V. Heavily marginated,the copy contains correctionsfrom Valla himself and his handwrittenapprovalof the scribe's work. The manuscriptexists in the VaticanLibrary,Ms. Lat. 1801. Judgingthe value of Valla'stranslation is complicatedby the fact that the Greek codex or codices from which he worked have never been found; see G. B. Alberti, "Thucydidenella traduzionelatinaLorenzoValla,"Studi italiani difilogia classica, 29 (1957), 222-49. In addition,numerouserrorswere added in subsequent copies, especially in numerousprinted editions. R. I. Wilfred Westgate, "The Text of Valla's Translationof Thucydides,"Transactionsand Proceedings of the AmericanPhilological Association, 67 (1936), 240-49. 32 OxfordDictionary of Popes, s.v. "Nicholas V." 33 Because the Greek copy from which Valla worked has been lost, for this paper I will assume that significant deviations from both Valla's version and the Greek text considered most accuratetoday reflect a conscious choice on the partof Seyssel. 34 Jacquelinede Romilly, Thucydidesand AthenianImperialism(New York, 1963), 298.
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Dionysius of Halicamassus identified four major instruments:poetic vocabulary,variety of figures, harshnessof sound combination,and brevity.He also stated that the authorhad a "brevitythat lacks clarity."35The dialogue containsseveralof Thucydides'favoriterhetoricaldevices, one of which is antithesis:for example,justice / expediency,present/ future,and especially word / deed. The questionhere is to what extent Seyssel was able to capturethe essence of the dialogue both its substance and rhetoricalstructure.In terms of simply renderingthe informationSeyssel capturedthe main points, but he did not seem to notice how the literarystyle of the authorgave meaningto the dialogue. Comparethe following passages fromV.87.36 C. F. Smith translation: Well, if you have met to argue from suspicions about what may happen in the future,or for any other purpose than to consult for the safety of your city in the light of what is presentand before your eyes, we may as well stop.37 Seyssel: Si vous est ici assemblez pour debattredes choses qui pourroient advenir/ ou pour aultrematiere,que pour pouveoir au salut de vostre cite en lestat que les choses sont: il nest besoin que nous parlonsplus avant.38
Valla: Enim vero si ad suspictiones futurorumcaptandas/ aut ad aliud quippiamconvenistis / quamut ex rebuspresentibus/ & quas cemitis saluti civitatis consulatis,sileamus.39 Seyssel's translationmisses two main elements of Thucydides'structuringof the dialogue and his style of history-writingin general.Thucydides'use of antithesispervadesthe dialogue, andthe precedingpassage illustratesthe tension between the futureand the present.The Atheniansinsist on concentratingonly on the present,while the Melians want to discuss the future.This is ironic because throughoutthe history,foresight is emphasizedas the quality of a good A. J. Woodman,Rhetoric in Classical Historiography(Portland, 1988), 45. I have decided not to include the Greek partly because the codex from which Valla worked is unknownand partlyto emphasizethe differencesbetween the translationsof Seyssel and Valla. 37 Thucydides,History of the Peloponnesian War,tr. Charles Forster Smith (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 3.157. 38Claude de Seyssel, Thucydides.Paris, BibliothequeNationale, Ms. Fr., fol. 178 39 Lorenzo Valla, Thucydides.VaticanLibrary,Ms. Lat. 1801, fol 116. 35
36
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statesman.The Atheniansclaim to have a more realistic view of the political situation,butthis is underminedby theirapparentblindnessto the thingswhich might happento them, and in fact do happento them in the next episode, the disastrousSicilian expedition.40Seyssel's opposition:"thingswhich could happen / the state in which things are"lacks the same power as Valla's"suspicions of the future/ thingswhich arepresentandwhich you can see clearly,"which is muchmorein keepingwith Thucydides.In fact Seyssel simplyomitsthe cernitis, when a referenceto sight plays a significantrole not only in the dialoguebut in the whole of the history.The "occular"perspectiveandThucydides'use of it to substantiatethetruthof his claimsis somethingwhichapparentlyescapedSeyssel. Anotherexample of how Seyssel fails to captureThucydides'penchantfor antithesisoccurs in the following passage from V. 95. C. F. Smith: Foryourhostilitydoes not injureus so muchas your friendship;for in the eyes of oursubjectsthatwouldbe a proofof ourweakness,whereas your hatredis a proof of our power.4' Seyssel: de nostreimbecillite et impotence/ dont les aultresausquelznous dominons nous esti II seroit plus nostre damaige de vous avoir pour amys, ce seroitung grandargumentmerontmoins.42 Valla: Nam amicitia vestra imbecillitatis odium potentie nostre qui presumusargumentumest.43 The differencebetween Valla'sconcision and Seyssel's lengthy explanationis striking.Clearly,Seyssel's version lacks the potency ofValla's phrase.By sharing the main verb and omitting the second personal pronounValla is able to juxtapose"yourfriendship/ weakness"with"[your]hatred/ ourpower."Granted, given the syntax of the French language, this tension would have been more difficultto expressgrammatically,butthis is only one exampleof manyin which Seyssel drawsout the narrative,underminingthe brevityandhence much of the force of the original.
40
Jacqueline de Romilly, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism, 273-310 and C. W. Macleod, "Form and Meaning in the Melian Dialogue" in Colin Macleod, Collected Essays (Oxford, 1983), 52-68. 41 C. F. Smith, Thucydides,161 42 Claude de Seyssel, Thucydides,fol. 179 43Lorenzo Valla, Thucydides,fol. 116
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What about one of the most famous elements in Thucydides'history:the antithesisof words and the realitythey supposedlydescribe?Not surprisingly, Seyssel's prose tends to underminethis dialectic. FromV. 111: C. F. Smith: Formanymen, thoughthey can still clearlyforeseethe dangersinto which they aredrifting,areluredon by the powerof a seductivewordthe thingcalled disgrace-until, the victims of a phrase,they areindeed plunged,of theirown act, into irretrievablecalamities,andthus incurin additiona disgrace that is more disgraceful,because associated with folly ratherthanmisfortune.44 Seyssel: Carcelle a souuentestrecause de gransinconueniensa ceulx qui sy sont arrestezen gransdangiers.Et plusieursse sont trouvez/ lesquelz consideransles chose a quoy leurfailloit parvenirsilz se rendoient/ ont abhorryle nom de servitude,quilz reputentdeshonneste/ et ont mieulx ayme endurerle nom destre veincuz quilz ont reputeplus honnorable dont ils sont aprezen effect parvenuzpar leur trop scauoira calamitez incurables.Et si ont eu plus granthonteparleursimplesse et follie quilz neussenteu par la fortune/ silz leussent voulu endurer.45 Valla: Nam sic nequaquamvos ad verecundiamque hominibusinsedis & apertispericulis extitit plerunqueperniciosa/ convertetis : cum enim permultaconspiciamusad huc adquetendatur/ id quodturpeappellatur vi nominis inducente/ tamen ipsa vi nominis excussa / eligiturpotius quam sponte in cladem in emandabilemincidatur/ & turpiusdedecus accipiaturper insipientiamquamper fortumam.46 Seyssel managesto capturethe emphasison the word"name,"butthe function this word plays in his passage differs sharplyfrom that in Valla's.Firstof all, Seyssel's "nom"is an object.The subject(manypeople) "loathethe nameof servitude"andprefer"thenameof being conquered."One mightsay they simply do not want thatname attachedto themselves. In Valla'spassage, however,the name, or more correctly,the "force of the name" is the agent of the action. Valla'ssubjectis acteduponby the seductive"forceof a name,"andviolence is not chosen voluntarily,ratherby the same "force of a name."Valla's version 44C. F. Smith, Thucydides,173. 45Claude de Seyssel, Thucydides,fol. 181 46 Lorenzo Valla, Thucydides,fol. 118
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indicatesanunderstandingof Thucydides'skepticismaboutthe relationof words to reality.After all, Valla himself was a philosopher of language.47Seyssel, however,did not seem to graspthe issue. Seyssel understooda tensionbetween realityandphilosophicalspeculation,andthis is surelypresentin Thucydidesas well, but it is doubtfulthat Seyssel consideredthe ambiguityof languageto be an element in Thucydides'historyimportantenoughto renderfaithfully.48 Indeed,whetherSeyssel understoodthe complexities of languageis doubtful. Nowhere in his works does he provide a theoreticaldiscussion of his technique of translation.Moreover,in his works he evinced an ambivalentattitude towardrhetoric.Certainlyhe realizedthepotentialof languageto motivatetroops in war, and he emphasizedthe utility of eloquent haranguesin the prefaces to Xenophonand Thucydides.Seyssel appealedto a revival of this practicein La Monarchiede France.49In this way effective rhetoricwas to him a powerful tool. In otherplaces, however,Seyssel impliedthateloquencehadlittle place in the narrationof history. In the preface to Appian's Hannibalic WarsSeyssel discussedthe meritsof epitomes,or abridgements,overoriginalworks.He stated that even thoughthe wars of Hannibaland Scipio Africanushad been covered by Livy in beautifulstyle and had alreadybeen translated,his own version of Appian, covering the same material,was useful thoughnot as elegant, since it would give the readereasier access to the "substance"of the history.50 In transmittingthe mainpoint of the MelianDialogue, Seyssel was successful. He did not capturethe artor subtletyof eitherthe authoror his Latintranslator,butgiven Seyssel's own limitationsas well as those of the Frenchlanguage of his day,this might not have been possible. My suspicion is thatthis mattered little to him. What Seyssel wanted to give the king and his court was a book makingaccessible knowledge of politics and militarystrategy.He saw the text as a tool to lead to some other action, not just as a famous ancient text to be savoredfor its style and for what it could say aboutantiquity.Valla'sapproach was different.Having undertakento translatethe text to build up the cultural capital of the papacy, his translationwas meant to serve a differentpurpose fromthe outset.He looked at the text fromthe standpointof a philologist. RepFrancoGaeta,Lorenzo Valla:Filologia et storia nell'umanismoitaliano (Naples, 1960). On the discrepancybetween reality and philosophical speculation,see Seyssel's proem to La Monarchiede France, 95. 49 Claude de Seyssel, La Monarchiede France, 3:8. 50 Claude de Seyssel, preface to Iberica and Hannibalica, 97: "lesdits deux livres tout ainsi abregezcomme sont, contiennentneantmoingsles deux partiesprincipalespour lesquelles l'histoire a este premierement trouvee, assavoir la cognoissance des choses passees et l'enseignementpour celles qui sont advenir.Car la tierce partie,que est l'elegance du stille et l'agencementdu lengaige, conceme plus l'art oratoireque l'histoire. Pourraisonde quoy ceulx qui desirentavoir cognoissance de plusieurs choses, et qui appliquentplus leur entendementa la substance de l'escripture que a la lettre ne au lengaige, ayment trop mieulx l'abrege des histoires." 47
48
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resenting a certain moment in time, it was an artifact.For the humanistthe translationwas a work of literature;for Seyssel it was closer to a technical manual. What does this mean for the study of history in the Renaissance?I believe it makesnecessarya reevaluationof the complexity of the genre of history translationand its position in the studyof Renaissancehumanism.Historians need to considersuch texts not simply as objectsor as evidence of humanist activity, but instead they should think about them in the way their translators andreadersunderstoodthem, as advice to acquireand exercise power. In his history translationsSeyssel providedcounsel intendedto influence policy decisions. The task of historytranslationwas to provideknowledgebeneficial to the state in a way that mirrorsa diplomat's acquisition of foreign intelligence. In both of these situationsthe substanceof the knowledge was secret, or at least intendedfor a limitedaudience.The rhetoricalgoal was clarity; literaryartificewould have been at best irrelevant,and at worst an obstacle to the deliveryof essentialinformation. Universityof SouthAlabama. Bibliography of Seyssel's Translations Manuscripts: Xenophon,Anabasis.Paris,BibliothequeNationale,MS. Fr.702-701 (1505). Appian of Alexandria, Warsof the Romans and Plutarch,Life of Mark Antony.Paris, BibliothequeNationale, MS Fr. 713-714 (1507?). Anotherpresentationcopy dedicatedto LouisXII exists in the BibliotecaNazionaledi Torino (L.III.1). This copy was severely damagedby a fire in 1904. Justin,Epitome.Paris,BibliothequeNationale, MS Fr. 715 (1509). DiodorusSiculus, books XVIII,XIX, XX of BibliothecaandPlutarch,Life ofDemetrius. Paris, BibliothequeNationale, Ms. Fr. 712 (1511). Eusebius,Ecclesiastical History (1514). The manuscriptof this has been lost. Thucydides,ThePelopponesian Wars.Paris,BibliothequeNationale, Ms. Fr. 17211-17212 (1514). Appian,TheSpanishand Hannibalic Wars.London,BritishLibrary,Harley MS, 4939 (1514).
Machina
and
Ex
the
William
Deo:
Meaning
of
Harvey Instrument
Don Bates
Introduction Since our clocks do consistently disclose each hour of the day and nightdo they not seem to partake of another body (beyond the elements), and that more divine? But if, under the dominion and management of [our human] Art, such splendid things are daily achieved beyond the powers of the objects themselves,... And if, in serving men they carry out such things as are to be marvelled at, what I ask, may we expect from them when they be instruments in the hand of God? These words come near the end of William Harvey's De generatione animalium.' As he does often in this work, he is arguing that it is possible for a material object to behave supra vires elementorum, i.e., in a manner that exceeds what can be explained merely from the qualities of the elements from which it is made. In fact, just before this, he argues that human craftsmanship enables the elements of air and water to make ships sail in opposite directions, fire to do one sort of thing in the kitchen, another in the shops of metal-workers, including the production of iron, which in its turn peacefully tills the soil or besieges the town in war. So if even human Art is capable of making something as wonderful as a clock out of the elements, how much more might God be able to do with them? Thanks to my colleague Faith Wallis, Geoffrey Lloyd, Elisabeth Hsu, Catherine Wilson, Christopher Cook, and Andrew Wear, though none of them would necessarily agree with everything I say here. ' Exercitationes de generatione animalium. Quibus accedunt quaedam de partu, de membranis ac humoribus uteri, et de conceptione (London, 1651), 249 (Ex. 71), emphasis added; hereafter cited as DGA. In this edition, all exercises after no. 4 are incorrectly numbered, so, throughout this paper, the correct number, rather than the one which appears in his
book, will be cited instead. Unless otherwise stated, all translationsfrom Latin are my own.
577 Copyright2000 by Journal of the History of Ideas, Inc.
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Not only is it entirelyconceivablethatthe (divinely) artfulmanipulationof these same elementscan accountfor the wondersof God's nature-such as the generationof a chick out of an egg-there is also no need to inferthe existence of additionalentities such as faculties, qualities,agents, and the like. All thatis needed is the concept of "instrument."Today such things as his appeal to a clock, his referenceto "art,"andthe word"instrument" itself, areliableto arouse in our minds a fairly mechanicalsort of image. Therefore,we need to put this idea in its intellectualcontext, by looking at where Harvey's notion of instrument is coming from. First,ourmuch more mechanicalworld view was just coming into being as Harvey(1578-1657) wrotethese words.Althoughthe philosophyof his younger contemporary,Rene Descartes(1596-1650) was not yet in full bloom (he died a year before Harvey's book appeared),Cartesianismwas certainly on the explanatoryhorizon,2as was the work of anothercontemporaryandcontributorto the "new philosophy,"PierreGassendi (1592-1655).3And, of course, Harvey had certainlyknown FrancisBacon (1561-1626).4Nevertheless,Harveywas a devoutAristotelianwho was adamantlyopposed to the effortsof these contemporariesto replaceAristotle.5Moreover,it was from the Aristoteliantradition, not fromthe new mechanics,thatHarveyhadderivedthe conceptof instrument. If, broadlyspeaking,the "new philosophy"was about a universethat was built like a clock, then the "old"naturalphilosophies, whether dominatedby Platonism,Aristotelianism,Christiantheology,or some combination,were about a universe thatwas socially constructed.6Not only was man at the center,to a large extent the workings of the universe were envisioned in terms of social experience.The regularity,predictability,harmony,andwonderof naturalphenomenaseemedbest explainedin the languageof reason,moralvalues,motives, responsibilities,hierarchies,laws (in the social sense), andthe like, explanatory resourcesthat,in the late ancientand medieval intellectualculturesof Europe, far outweighedeitherthose thatappealedto the passively materialand the mechanical,or to the randomand the chance. But very centralto that social model of naturewas the concept of instrument,which gave to it somethingof a mechanicaltwist. To see how this was so, we need to go backtemporarilyto the worksof Aristotle,the influenceof which launchedthe notion of instrumentinto the western intellectualtraditionin the firstplace. His Discourse had appearedanonymously in 1637; the Meditationsin 1641; Principles of Philosophy, 1644; and Passions of the Soul, 1649. 3 Ranging from 1624 to the 1640s. 4 DGA 75 (Ex. 25). 5 See StephenMenn, "The IntellectualSetting,"in The CambridgeHistory of Seventeenth CenturyPhilosophy, ed. D. Garberand M. Ayers (Cambridge,1998), 33-88, esp. 38-47. 6 Or, perhaps,psycho-socially constructed. 2
William Harvey
579 Aristotle's Instrumentalism
From predecessors like Empedocles but more particularly from his own teacher Plato, Aristotle inherited an explanatory model for understanding how nature works which had a profound influence on his natural philosophy. This was the idea of nature as a craftsman:7"Thus, if a house were a natural product, the process would pass through the same stages that it in fact passes through when it is produced by art."8Art imitates nature, and nature imitates art. Moreover, just like a craftsman, nature uses instruments, particularly in the production and management of living things.9 From the very beginning of the western intellectual tradition, then, there was a conscious and explicit link, by analogy, between the way that nature acts and the way that humans use instruments.'? But just exactly how were human art and the productions of nature analogous? For example: "it is probable that Nature makes the majority of her productions by means ofpneuma used as an instrument. Pneuma serves many uses in the things constructed by Nature, just as certain objects do in the arts and crafts, e.g., the hammer and anvil of the smith."' Now, although pneuma was material (though invisible and extremely rarefied),'2 it certainly did not have a relevant shape in the way that an anvil or a hammer does. So, in this instance at least, Aristotle could not have been likening pneuma to an instrument on the basis of its structure. In fact, the term he uses here (and quite commonly) for "instrument" is organon, and it is clear not only from his usage but also from that of many successors that it was often little more than a label for whatever mediated between the doer and the deed, a label intended not so much to draw attention to the characteristics of that mediation as to make the existential point that it was "that with which one works."'3 7 In the way that, for example, a housebuilderor physician is a craftsman(P.A. 639b 1519). See FriedrichSolmsen, "Natureas Craftsmanin Greek Thought,"JHI, 24 (1963), 473-96, 477. "Fora philosopherwho condemnedall metaphoras obscure,Aristotle is ... extraordinarily free with implicit and explicit comparisonsof every kind between the role of physis and the
technai"(G. E. R. Lloyd,TheRevolutionsof Wisdom: Studiesin the ClaimsandPracticeof
Ancient GreekScience [Berkeley, 1987], 188). 8 Physics 199a 15seqq.;see also 199b 28seqq. Unless otherwise specified, all Aristotelian quotationsare from translationsin the Loeb Classical Libraryeditions. See Solmsen, "Nature as Craftsman,"487f. 9 "One may regard the structureof the organ [i.e., lung] as very like that of both the bellows of a forge; for heart and lung conform closely to this shape" (On respiration 480a 20seqq.). 10 Two millennia after Aristotle, Harvey will write that "there is no part [of the living which in is not some body] way arrangedinstrumentally(organice)" (AnatomicalLectures, Prelectiones anatomie universalis. De musculis, ed. and tr. Gweneth Whitteridge[Edinburgh, 1964], 2r). l G.A. 789b 6-13. 12 And sometimes roughly translatedas "breath." 13 OxfordEnglish Dictionary, where, in the introductionto the entry for "organ,"it is explaining its original Greek meaning.
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Moreover,Aristotle is not calling on materialnecessity here. In fact right afterthe above passage he goes on to say: "Butto allege thatthe causes are of the necessary type is on a parwith supposingthatwhen waterhas been drawn off from a dropsicalpatientthe reason for which it has been done is the lancet, andnot the patient'shealth,forthesake of whichthe lancetmadethe incision."14 Not only does an instrumentnot always introducematerialnecessity into the process, more to Aristotle's point it is used for a purpose.'5This is entirely in keeping with the fact thatfundamentalto his whole naturalphilosophywas the idea that final cause or purpose, not materialnecessity, must be the basis for understandinghow natureworks. In the use of the model of instrument,then, Aristotlefocuses farmore than we would on its purposefulnessandmuch less on its materialsand structure.At the same time it was centralto the notionof instrumentthatit was not the author of its purpose.For that, one has to turnfrom the tool to its user. In Aristotle's hands, however, the conceptualizationof the user is again somewhat at odds with ourpresent-dayintuitions.Here again is Aristotle: If artificialprocesses are purposeful,so are naturalprocesses too; for the relation of the antecedentto consequent is identical in art and in Nature. This principle comes out most clearly when we consider the otheranimals.Fortheirdoings arenot the outcomeof art(design) or of previous researchor deliberation;... Hence, if it is by natureand also for a purposethatthe swallow makes hernest andthe spiderhis web,... it is clear that causality of the kind we have described [i.e., the final cause which is purpose]is at work in things thatcome aboutor exist in the course of Nature.'6 Again his centralpoint here is thatpurposeis at work in naturejust as in art.But supportingthat argumentis an underlyingassumptionwhich Aristotle simply takes for granted.Since the swallow and spiderare not actively intelligent,and since their purposefulactivities are not the outcome of "previousresearchor 7 deliberation,"therecan be purposefulactioneven withoutthinking. In fact, he goes on to say that "Art ... does not deliberate either...."
In otherwords,while anything(artor nature)thatproceedslike a craftsman does notproceedsimplyby the materialnecessityof its instruments,neitherdoes G.A. 789b 12-15; emphasis in the Loeb translation. "... each of the parts of the body, like every other instrument,is for the sake of some purpose."Moreover,"for the sake of those functions ... they are naturallyadapted"(P.A. 645b 15seq.). 16 Physics 199a 20-30. Quotationfrom Solmsen, "Natureas Craftsman,"488. 17 Though,just because their behavior is so purposeful"some raise the question whether 14
15
the works of spiders and ants ... should be attributed to intelligence ..." (Aristotle, ibid.).
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the usernecessarilydo so by wit. Thereis somethingautomatic,somethingroutine or habitual,somethingthatis unreasoning,inherent,sometimesinstinctive, or in man, intuitive.18Nature operates like a craftsmanin that it uses skills, techniques,and tools, but in a routinemannerto achieve standardends, more thanarbitrarilyandcontingentlyon the basis of on-going reasoningor intellect. She does not play a role so much as she serves a purpose.She is not a planner,a philosopher,or a god; she is a doer, an artisan,a craftsman.As a matterof fact even in a "well-governedcity-state,"the social behaviorof people is also habitual.Once orderhas been established"thereis no need of a special rulerwith arbitrarypowersto be presentat every activity,buteach individualperformshis own task as he is ordered,and one act succeeds anotherbecause of custom."19 In short, while it cannot be said from today's perspective thatAristotle's notion of instrumentwas far out at the mechanicalend of the spectrum,neither was his user of the instrumentout at the strictlypsycho-social end. In fact, as has long been understood,explanationsof the world in the thinkingof the ancientGreeksin generalwerenot couchedin dualistictermsthatmadethepsychosocial and the mechanicalmutuallyexclusive. Rather,they thoughtin termsof whatmightbe characterizedas a spectrumof explanationsfor the thingsbothof society and of nature,explanationsthatrangedfromthe autonomousto the automatic,or fromthe actively self-governingto the merely self-moving. Nevertheless,spreadacrossthe middleof thatspectrumwas the realmof the "technical,"a conceptualspacewhich we, today,can readilyimagine,at least in termsof"technique"and "technology."20 Here we too acknowledgea close interactionbetween mind andmatter,runningfromthe automatedmachineat the mechanicalend of the scale to the paintbrushin the handof the "creative"artist, at the other.But thatvery sense of familiaritycould lead us astray. Forexample,takethe fact thata groupof Aristoteliantreatisesdealingwith the techniquesof logic andsoundreasoninglaterbecameknownas the organon andthat,throughoutthe westernintellectualtraditionuntilmoder times, it was generally believed that these sorts of tools for regulatingthe reasoningof the mind also furnishedthe best model for explaining how naturewould proceed regularlyand reliablyfrom intentto effect. In otherwords the place to look for exemplarsof the consistent,the regular,the predictable,or,as we would say, the mechanical,was in the realmof the mentalandnot the material.This, however, tendsto be obscuredby the fact that,since any suchmentalregularitieshadto be initiatedby intent,explanationsof consistency of outcome also had to include somethingaboutvalues, morals,judgmentsandwill which would guaranteethat
18
199a 24 and translator'sfootnote. 19Motu animalium,703a 30-34; see also 701a 30seqq. 20 From the Greek techne, meaning "art."
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those mechanicalprocessesof the mindwould startdown the rightpathof intention in the firstplace.21 Meanwhile,mere materialinteractionswere seen as unreliable,unpredictable, accidentalor the productsof chance. In fact it was precisely that kind of materialisticexplanationof how theworldworksproposedby the ancientatomists which some of the writingsof PlatoandAristotlewere aimingto discreditandto replace,writingsthatwere laterreinforcedby the monotheisticreligionsandthat completelyeclipsedsuchmechanicalviews almostentirelyuntilthe Renaissance. It should be clear by now that the notion of tool cannotbe separatedfrom the notion of its user.The behaviorof the hammercannotbe explainedwithout saying somethingaboutthe artisanwho holds it. Since Aristotle'snotion of the user is perhapssomewhatcounter-intuitiveand since his way of thinkingabout the user will be a focus of Harvey'swork in the seventeenthcentury,we need to considerAristotle'sideas aboutthe user before returningto the instrument. As was said earlier,the regularitiesof the craftsman'sbehaviorwhich are intendedto assureregularitiesof outcomes are the mentalregularitiesof habit, custom,instinct,andintuition.Moreover,as such a craftsman,natureuses skill, instruments,and routineprocedures,partlybecause the desired outcomes are well known in advancebut also because naturemust bringmaterialnecessities undercontrolanddirectthemto those ends.22Yetthe basic conceptstill inclines towardswhat for us would be the mechanicalend of the spectrumin that,given those ends, regularoutcomesarethe resultof regularprocesses. In otherwords, once the intentis established,nature'sbehavioris mechanicalto the extentthat it is the result of a plan.23 Not that Aristotle himself was trying to emphasizethat the craftsmanbehaves "mechanically."He would undoubtedlysay "technically"and mean that Thecraftsin the senseof"goal-directed,result-oriented, professionalexpertise."24 man analogyis alwaysjust that,an analogy.Moreover,Aristotlespecifies, as in the example of spidersand swallows, thatconscious, active intellect is not necessarilyinvolved.Finally,even in the case of somethingas complexas reproduction in the living he does not call on a creatoror author(beyondthe parentsand 21 In fact, it must surely be this ancient conceptual legacy that accounts for the muddled languageof our present-daymechanicaldiscourse, as when we speak about somethingobeying the second law of thermodynamics. 22 ArthurL. Peck, "The ConnatePneuma:An Essential Factor in Aristotle's Solutions to the Problemsof Reproductionand Sensation,"in Science Medicineand History,ed. E. Ashworth Underwood (Oxford, 1953), 111-21, 112. 23 As Geoffrey Lloyd says of Aristotle's cosmology, "in the doctrine of the prime mover ideas fromphysics, frompsychology andfromtheology arewelded into a single complex whole" (Aristotle: The Growthand Structureof His Thought[Cambridge,1968], 154). 24 Heinrichvon Staden, "Teleology and Mechanism:AristotelianBiology and EarlyHellenistic Medicine,"in AristotelischeBiologie: Intentionen,Methoden,Ergebnisse, ed. Wolfgang Kullmannand Sabine F6llinger (Stuttgart,1997), 183-208, 207, where he comparesAristotle's use of techne with mechane.
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the ancestorswhose species reachbacketernally)25; andso it seems likely thathe was tryingto replacethe idea of an active, conscious, contingentlyintervening intellect or volition in nature'sworks with a more fixed notion of an aim or end which, in and of itself, is a cause-the final cause. "Naturecannotgo through the phase of intellectualanalysis. Aristotle has not endowed it with a mind or consciousness,nordoes he ever in his biological treatisespresentphysis as performinga reasoningprocess comparableto those of the PlatonicDemiurge."26 Fromits very beginnings,then,the conceptof"instrument"conjuredup the conceptualspace of the humanarts;it focussed on the explanatorydomainbetween purposeandeffects; and,as promotedby Aristotleat least, it often leaned in the directionof automaticityandregularity,ratherthanautonomyandcontingency, andalso as if those technicalcharacteristicscame morefromthe domain of the craftsman'sbehaviorthan from the materialconsequencesof his instruments. Or,in today's language,insofaras they did not involve any active, intellectual decision-making,such regularitiesin the mind of the plannerand doer were inclinedtowardsthe "algorithmic"or "programmatic."27 This featurebecomes particularlyimportantwhen we turn to Aristotle's conceptof"form"(psyche)in living things,which is manifestin the processing of the potential into the actual for the sake of previously establishedends. In sexualreproduction,for example,once the male seed has imparted"form"to the female menstrualblood, "one thing follows on afteranotherwithout interrupIn otherwords, an tion,just as it does in the 'miraculous'automaticpuppets."28 Aristotelian"form"is, in effect, a naturalprocessworkingaccordingto a planin a craftsman-likeway.29 In fact an evolutionarybiologist has recently likened (albeit implicitly) Aristotle'sconceptof"form"to a (computer)"program."30 Thoughsuch a term is obviously anachronistic,it does have the virtueof pointingout, first,thatthe 25 G.A.
731b 30seqq.; De anima 415b 1-9. Craftsman,"495. 27 It must not be forgotten,however,thatAristotledid not always speak in clearly technical terms. To the passage just quoted above, Solmsen adds that, for Aristotle, nature"operatesin ways so ingenious and ... so intelligentand pursuesits 'ends' so consistentlythatwe often find it difficult to see the difference between its procedureand those of a conscious agent. These difficulties inherentin Aristotle's teleology are well known," and Solmsen illustratesthis by quoting Aristotle to the effect that "'Nature, like a sensible human being, always assigns an organ to an animal that can use it ... she always does the best she can in the circumstances' (which accountsfor the fact that man is endowed with hands)," 16f. The Aristotelianquotation is from P. A. 68alOseqq. 28 G.A. 741b 8. At 734b 10 Aristotle uses the same analogy and elaborateson it. 29 And, significantly,Aristotle often refers to that plan, or "defining formula"part of his form as its "logos." See G.A. 734b 34-735a 2. and A. L. Peck, in the introductionto the Loeb Classical Libraryedition, xliv. 30 ErnstMayr,"TheIdea of Teleology,"JHI, 53 (1992), 117-35, 121 and 123; see also 12630. 26 Solmsen, "Natureas
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form thatAristotle is talking about is inherentin matter,and, second, that its "knowing"is a largelyunconscious,automaticprocess.3'The vegetative aspect of this form for instance,quiteunconsciously"runs"(we might say) the instruments32of nutritionandbasic bodily maintenance.In otherwords,the Aristotelian"form"in living thingswas quitemechanistic,with thepossible exceptionof pneuma, and with the definite exception of the rationalmode of the psyche in manwhich clearlywas volitional.33So in his naturalphilosophy,ifAristotlewas trying to avoid the radicalmaterialismof the atomists and the spiritualismof Plato,his teleology was meantto supplantmaterialnecessity not with a deus ex machina but with a machina ex natura, where nature in the form of psyche behaves like an unthinkingcraftsmanwho uses tools. However,as is well known,in the subsequenthistoryof westernthoughtthis mechanicaldimensionof Aristotle'steleology was not prominent,certainlynot as any sortof metaphysicalprinciple.Indeed,for the most part,it simply did not exist.34Nor could it have needed a lot of imaginationfor explanationsof nature to slip frometernal,inherent,unauthorized,machine-likepurposefulprocedures into some type of more actively volitional agents, particularlyin a conceptual world that dependedso heavily on the model of humansociety to explain the workings of nature.In the hands of Galen, for instance,Aristotle's notion of instrumentswas still widely employed, but the user of those instrumentswas morea Platonicsoul thanan Aristotelianprogrammaticform.In otherwordsthe userwas muchmorevolitional,while the moreroutinizedprocessesgoing on in living bodies were explained by certain qualities or "faculties"possessed by those instruments,such as attraction,retention,rejection,etc. Active intelligenceor "agency"was particularlycalled upon to explainthe morecomplexnaturalphenomenaof generation,growth,nutrition,andthe maintenanceof life amongthe living, phenomenawhich Aristotle'sown remarkable studies had made so salient and so much in need of explanationby the natural Since "psyche"was also used by Plato to mean something much more intellectually active, and since something more akin to his notion of the word (and its Latin equivalent "anima")then spreadinto later ancient philosophies and Christianity,it has long been conventional to use "soul"to translateAristotle'sversion of psyche, as well. But, in his case, "soul"is probablyat least as inappropriateas "program"is, if not more so. and "organum" 32 Or organs.Right up until Harvey'stime, the Latinterms"instrumentum" were treatedsynonymously as translationsof the Greek term organon. 33 At G.A. 736b 28seq., for example. With respect to the mechanistic element, Marjorie Grenehas arguedthat, in Aristotelianteleology, there is "absolutelyno questionof any kind of 'purpose'here," (MarjorieGrene, "Aristotleand Modem Biology," JHI, 33 [1972], 395-424, 398). I would be more inclined to say that any perceived purposefulnesshad been programmed into the matter,while at the same time conceding thatAristotle did not conceive of any author for that program.Its purposefulnesshad alreadyexisted from eternity. 34The most notable exception being Erasistratusand his followers. For a very relevant discussion of both Erasistrateanand Aristotelian mechanism, their relationshipto teleology, and much else in this paper,see von Staden, "Teleology and Mechanism." 31
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philosophers and physicians who followed him. In addition, Plato had already given a high profile to an explanatory strategy that depended on intellectually active agents, a strategy picked up first by his devotees (like Herophilus and Galen) and then by a monotheism that could quite credibly introduce a host of deorum in machinas.35 Finally, given this intellectual climate before, during, and after Aristotle, his own focus on teleology lent itself to, more than it resisted such explanatory practices. But if the more mechanical aspect ofAristotle's views was not very influential at the conceptual level, it certainly was in practice. After all, the most influential way in which Aristotle used the notion of nature working as a craftsman with instruments was in anatomy, in the study of those visible, material parts of (many different) living things that might tell us about the ends for which they were made.36 Not, of course, that he saw the body as a machine. Indeed, he thought that the "constitution of an animal must be regarded as resembling that of a well-governed city-state."37Nevertheless, the end result was nothing less than the beginning of a uniquely western tradition,38based on the idea that body parts are instruments, or "organs." So, however Aristotle's teleology was used conceptually, in practice, the body's organs became material clues as to Craftsman Nature's intentions, at least insofar as intentions could be inferred from the materials, shapes, or actions of her instruments. Or to put it another way, when instruments are themselves material, to varying degrees they will also "materialize" the purpose they have been designed to serve.39 In the case, say, of a hammer, such materialization is minimal and the effects that a hammer produces are closely tied to the actively engaged intentions of the hand that holds it.40Nevertheless, with more sophisticated mechanical contriv-
35For a comparisonof Aristotle's and Galen's teleology, and the explorationof several of the ideas being discussedhere, see R. J. Hankinson,"Galenandthe Best of All Possible Worlds," Classical Quarterly,39 (1989), 206-27. 36 And, as is well known, Aristotle's interest in anatomy was dominatedby his desire to shed some light on the natureof the "psyche."See G. E. R. Lloyd, AristotelianExplorations (Cambridge,1996), ch. 2, "The relationshipof psychology to zoology," 38-66. 37 Quotation from Motu animalium, 703a 30seqq. Moreover,his view is holistic in that "constituentmaterial parts cannot be said to have the characteristicsthey do ... outside the composite whole" (Lloyd, ibid., 62, emphasis in original). 38 G. E. R. Lloyd, "Alcmaeon and the Early History of Dissection," SudhoffsArchiv, 59 (1975), 113-47. See also idem, Magic, Reason and Experience:Studies in the Origin and Developmentof GreekScience (Cambridge, 1979), 163f, and Shigehisa Kuriyama,"Varietiesof Haptic Experience:A ComparativeStudy of Greekand Chinese Pulse Diagnosis"(Ph.D. diss., Harvard,1986), ch. 6, "The Rise of GreekAnatomy,"177-209. 39See above, note 15.
See P.A. 687a 20. Long before Harvey's time it had become a clich&that "the hand is called the instrumentof instruments"(organumorganorum,DGA 252 [Ex. 72]; also, Harvey, Anatomical Lectures, 7). 40
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ances, purposecan be increasinglymaterialized,by routinizingor regularizing some of the stepsthatneed to be takenbetweenthe intentionandthe deed. Thus, from a mere instrument(as in the case of a quill used by an author),41 through machinesthat,once triggered,allow for a regularizedsequenceof events (such as a "war machine"like a trebuchet),42 we move on to the engine which can functionfor a period of time on its own (like a pump).43 Thus, insofaras instrumentsmaterializepurpose,they can distancethe visible effects from the sources of thatpurposeto varyingdegrees. Nevertheless, instrumentsdo not shove agency completely beyond the explanatoryhorizon. On the contrary,the more complex such mediatingcontrivancesare, and the more sophisticated(even if routinized)theirresponsesto variouscontingencies, the moreplausibleit is to explaintheir"behavior"by throwingsome wit into the works. Even thatmodem icon of the mechanicaldevice, the automobile,is far fromself-moving,let alone self-makingor self-designing.In summary,whatwe mightcall Aristotelianinstrumentalismcombinesmechanismwith teleology; it occupies a zone where mind andmattermeet.44 Overthe succeedingcenturies,then,this instrumentalismhad an impacton thinkingabouthow the worldworks,andparticularlyon how living thingsfunction, which moved explanationsin two directions.On the one hand,because of the teleology involved45andbecause an "instrument"needs a useror agent,this conceptcould easily incline explanatorypracticestowardsthe volitionalcausation end of the spectrum(especially amonghis successors).46Onthe otherhand, 41
See the quotation from Boyle's "Essay Containing a requisite Digression concerning those, that would exclude the Diety from intermeddling with Matter" (1663), in Timothy Shanahan,"God and Nature in the Thought of Robert Boyle," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 26 (1988), 547-69, 564. 42 "Aristotle... shares with his Hellenistic counterpartsa keen awarenessof the precision ... of missiles and siege engines" (von Staden,"Teleology and Mechanism,"207). 43 See von Staden's detailed account of the parallels between Erasistratus'smodel of the heart and the water pump invented by Ctesibius (ibid., 202f). See also idem, "Body and Machine: InteractionsBetween Medicine, Mechanics, and Philosophy in Early Alexandria,"in Alexandria and Alexandrianism(Malibu, 1996), 85-106. 44 The word "determined"still reflects this convergence because, at the same time that it connotes "deterministic"in our mechanicalsense, it also implies that, furtherback in the causal chain, there was a determiningagent. 45As Lloyd has shown, the flow even of Aristotle'sreasoningwas frequentlyin the, for us, counter-intuitivedirection of inferring structurefrom function ("The Empirical Basis of the Physiology of the Parva Naturalia,"in Aristotleon Mindand the Senses, ed. G. E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L. Owen [Cambridge,1975], 215-39, and his own commentaryon thatpaper,"The Empirical Basis of the Physiology of the Parva Naturalia," ch. 10 in Methods and Problems in GreekScience [Cambridge,1991], 224-29, esp. 224-26, as well as idem, AristotelianExplorations, 50.) 46 The significant exception of Erasistratus(whose followers were still prominentat the time of Galen) has alreadybeen mentioned.Nowhere did Erasistratusdisplay a more mechanical approachthan in his explanationsconcerningthe structureand actions of the heart and its valves (C. R. S. Harris,TheHeart and the VascularSystemin Ancient GreekMedicine [Oxford,
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this instrumental or "organic" concept of living body parts also gave rise to a material inquiry into the body, founded on the belief that its visible structures have something to do with its hidden workings, that matter, shape, and purpose are all causally interconnected.47Nor is this technical or mechanical twist to the reasoning and explanations of the western anatomical tradition insignificant when one compares them with, say, butchery as a motive for cutting up a body, or consulting the heavens as a way of trying to understand it.48 Moreover, when we come to sixteenth-century anatomy, the materiality of the anatomical tradition was greatly reinforced, stimulated by a renaissance of Galen's dissecting practices and by a new and more critical study of his texts. The common denominator was the material body, and so, revising Galen (and eventually, revising one's fellow anatomists) was first and foremost a matter of revising his accounts of its physical structure on the strength of new empirical evidence-a materializing of the Scholastic commentary, so to speak.49Nor was teleology any impediment to this reform. In fact, far from being merely a way to second-guess the creator's mind, teleology was used to dress up these new empirical findings in sacred robes. When, for example, Vesalius noted the way in which movements of the wrist and shoulderjoints "complement the fingerjoints in providing for the movements of the hand," his "explanation was couched in terms of mechanics rather than the purposes of the soul," but he nevertheless attributes this to " 'the singular industry of Nature, so solicitously taking thought for the strength of the parts.' "50 For Vesalius, in fact, not only had God become an "engineer,"51but accurate accounts of structure had become a moral obligation if we are to appreciate the ingenuity of nature, and also not to misrepresent her. 1973], 196-98, 226). For Erasistratus'sdescriptionof actual experimentsto demonstratethat these valves prevent a backwardflow, see Heinrichvon Staden, "Experimentand Experience in Hellenistic Medicine,"Bulletin of the Instituteof Classical Studies, 22 (1975), 178-99, 184. 47 "The criticalrole played by teleology in the rise of Greekanatomyis one which has not been sufficiently appreciated"(Kuriyama,"Varietiesof Haptic Experience," 192). 48 See Ackerknecht's argumentthat even the practices of autopsy and dissection in many societies did not lead to "anatomicalknowledge,"at least of the kind developed in the western tradition(Erwin H. Ackerknecht,"PrimitiveAutopsies and the History of Anatomy,"Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 13 [1943], 334-39). Nor, apparently,did the practiceof divination throughthe inspectionof entrailsin ancientGreece contributeto anatomicalknowledge (Lloyd, "Alcmaeonand the Early History of Dissection," 131, n. 71). And see D. C. Epler,Jr.,"Bloodletting in Early Chinese Medicine and Its Relationto The Origin of Acupuncture"(Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 54 [1980], 337-67), esp. 361f. 49 For a general description and analysis of sixteenth-century anatomy, see Andrew Cunningham,The Anatomical Renaissance (Aldershot, 1997). See also Vivian Nutton, "The Anatomyof the Soul in EarlyRenaissanceMedicine,"in TheHumanEmbryo:Aristotleand the Arabic and European Traditions,ed. G. R. Dunstan (Exeter, 1990), 136-57. 50 Nancy G. Siraisi, "Vesaliusand the Reading of Galen's Teleology,"Renaissance Quarterly, 50 (1997), 1-37, 10 and 12. I wish to thankSachiko Kusukawafor drawingthis articleto my attention. 51 "divinemachinata est," ibid., 16. Also see 19, 30 and 32.
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WilliamHarvey'sInstrumentalism Despite the impressionthatsometimesarises fromhis discovery of the circulationof blood, Harvey'sintuitionsand motives were those of a naturalphilosopher,not a modem scientist.As such, he was strivingfor a comprehensive, coherent,epistemologicallydefensibleworldview thatwould ultimatelyanswer such fundamentalquestionsas how man relatesto creation.As an Aristotelian, this meant addressingsome of the most puzzling and wondrousof all the phenomenaof nature-fertilization, embryologicaldevelopment,and even simple growth. In fact, it was that largerpicture(ratherthanthe motion of the blood) which was Harvey'slife-long passion, the resultof possibly thirty-fiveyears of in a remarkablerangeof animalsfrominsectsto marine empiricalinvestigations,52 to and even the deer in the Royal forest, as well as the equally life, dogs, cattle, carefulstudyof the embryologyof otherauthors-Aristotle, Galen,andhis own teacherFabricius-and an extensive acquaintancewith the largertrendsin Renaissancenaturalphilosophy.53 Centralto all this was the phenomenonof conception.54Whatdo the male and female respectivelycontribute?Why does the offspringbelong to the same species, have the same generalcharacteristicsand, even more mysteriously,resemble now one parent and now the other? How does the male transmithis contributionto the female, particularlysince, accordingto Harvey'sresearch, the male seed never comes into directphysical contactwith the female egg?55 How are those instrumentsthat are needed to develop the foetus themselves developed?56 Finally,how do we accountaltogetherfor foresightandpurposeful development,not just in the beginning but all along the way until the foetus is bornand then until the infantbecomes an adult?57
See William Harvey,Disputations Touchingthe Generation of Animals, tr. with intro. and notes by Gweneth Whitteridge(Oxford, 1981), xxii-iv. 53 "He mentions 128 types of animal life" (F. J. Cole, "Harvey'sAnimals,"Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 12 [1957], 106). See also idem, A History of Comparative Anatomy(1944; New York, 1975), 129f. Regardingthe royal deer, see DGA 217-44 (Exx. 64-70). Regardinghis naturalphilosophy in general, see C. J. Cook, "Textand Context: The Philosophical Structureof the Writings of William Harvey Illuminatedby Disputes in RenaissancePhilosophy"(Ph.D. diss., CambridgeUniversity, 1995), 247-52; also WalterPagel, WilliamHarvey'sBiological Ideas (New York, 1967). 54DGA 293-301 (De conceptione); see also, 112 (Ex. 41) and 132f. (Ex. 47). 55Such issues permeate the whole of De generatione animalium, but see in particular DGA 139 (Ex. 49); see also Cook, "Textand Context,"225-40. 56 Harvey marvels at the fact that the blood comes into being and is moved before the organsfor makingand moving it; and that there is sensationand movement in the foetus before it has a brain (DGA 189f. and passim in Ex. 57). 57 "For,(as Seneca says) 'in the seed the whole plan (ratio) of the futureman is contained. And the infant,still unborn,possesses the conditions(legem) for a beardand grey hair' " (DGA 175 [Ex. 55]). 52
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With the exception of the "phenomenon"of fertilizationwithoutphysical contact, none of these issues was new to Harvey.Indeedthey all went back at least to Aristotle. Moreover,several of The Philosopher'sviews had long been controversial.Therefore,the story of Harvey's investigationsand response to these mattersis long andcomplicated,but an excellent treatmentof thatsubject by ChristopherCook will allow us to move on to the conclusions that Harvey arguedfor on the basis of his findings.58 First, on what he felt to be strictly his own empiricalfindings, he simply could not accept Aristotle's concept of the automaton,the inherent,programmatic form in the male seed, as more thana partialexplanation.59 [In] the skilful makingof the chick, the first efficient [i.e., the primary doer of the deed] uses providence,wisdom too, goodness and understanding,farbeyond the comprehensionof ourrationalsoul, inasmuch as it is in that [efficient] wherein exists the plan [ratio] of the future work,andthatwhich acts towardsan intendedend, distributesandcompletes everything,fashionsthe partsof the chick, even the tiniest,for the sake of whateveruse and action;andnot only takes care of the work of fabrication,butalso of the chick'shealth,ornamentanddefence.Yetthe male or his seed, eitherin coitus or afterwards,is not of a kind such that art,understandingandprovidencecan be attributedto it.60 From this Harvey concludes "thatthe male is not the first [cause], but only an instrumentalcause." Something more is needed, and that something, Harvey concluded,must be God.61 Harvey's reason for this conclusion is that, on the one hand, any resortto corpuscularianaccountsandmaterialnecessities of the subsensibleworldof the new mechanismwas simplyto indulgein speculation.62 Besides, how could such and account for the intelligenceone finds in genexplanationspossibly foresight eration?63 Onthe otherhand,Scholasticappealsto invisible,intelligentagents58
See Cook, "Textand Context,"225-40, 165-76 and 211-19. 59DGA 139 (Ex. 49). 6 DGA 144 (Ex. 50).
Ibid. For Aristotle, only the rationalsoul of man came from without and was transcendently divine (G.A. 736b 27 and 737a 10). 62 For his doubts about atoms and elements, DGA 28f. (Ex. 11); 254 (Ex. 72). Altogether, calling upon the words of Aristotle,Harveyrejectedthe possibility of any methodthatreasoned from a priori premises, since everything starts from sense (DGA B4rf. [Praefatio]). See also CatherineWilson, "VisualSurfaceand Visual Symbol:The Microscopeand the Occult in Early Modem Science," JHI, 49 (1988), 85-108. 63 For some of the difficulties that generationcreatedfor mechanists,see A. J. Pyle, "Animal Generationand the Mechanical Philosophy: Some Light on the Role of Biology in the Scientific Revolution,"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 9 (1987), 225-54. 61
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ontologically distinct pneuma or spirits, and the like-were equally speculative,64particularlywhen those agents were endowedby theirhumanadvocates with the same kind of "sagacity"(prudentia),"skill," and "intellect"that we mere mortalshave.65So neitheratoms nor agents will do. In fact the observablesuperiorityof the ways of natureover those of man was the cornerstonefor Harvey's own explanations.Since "in the structureof the chick, art and foresight are no less in evidence than in the creationof man and of the whole world, we must of necessity acknowledgethat,in the generation of man,thereis an efficient cause superiorto, andmore excellent thanman himself."Orto put it anotherway, "thevegetativefaculty,or thatpartof the soul which constructsandpreservesa man, is farmoreexcellent andmoredivine and moreresemblesthe likenessof God"thaneven the rationalpartof oursoul does. And since we mistakenlythinkthatourrationalsoul exceeds all otherfaculties in natureand thatthey are subservientto it, we are also wrong to thinkthatwe can directly(i.e., withoutinvestigatingnatureitself) applyourmentalfaculties and our practices in the arts to the understandingof nature,"as if the active principlesof natureproducedtheireffects by ... advice and instruction,derived from an intellect or mind."66 So we must neitherrationalize,use our mental practices analogically nor rely solely on any otherkind of analogyas a way of understandingandexplaining nature. But rathernature,the startingpoint [principium]of motion and rest in all those things in which she exists, and the vegetative soul, the first efficient cause of any generation,move not by any acquiredfaculty(as with us), such as we call upon by the name of eitherartor wisdom, but as if by decree, or some mandate,operatingaccordingto laws, namely by a similar force and means whereby light things are borne up and heavy thingsdown.67 In other words, even though the processes of generationexhibit "sapience,"68 they arenot the resultof any intellectualactivitythathas been acquiredthrough educationor training,which, when manifestin ourselves, we regardas "art"or
64Exercitatioanatomicade circulationesanguinis (Cambridge,1649), 64; also 61. "There is no need ... to call gods upon the scene," and, "to multiply entities is superfluous"(DGA 244 [Ex. 71]). 65 DGA 145f (Ex. 50); 249 (Ex. 71). See also Exercitatioanatomica de circulationesanguinis, 62f. 66DGA 145f(Ex. 50). 67 Ibid., 146, emphasis added. 68 Cook, "Textand Context,"205.
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"wisdom";but ratherthey are following the laws of natureevery bit as much as do the forces of gravity.69Harveycontinues, Thatis to say, the vegetative faculty of the parentsgenerates,and then the seed proceedsto the form of the foetus, in the same way in which a spiderweaves its web, birdsbuild nests, broodover andthereinprotect their eggs, bees and ants preparetheir little nests, and stow food for futureuse. In otherwords, they act naturally,and by an inherentinclination, but not by any providence, instruction,or advice [i.e., not by any active intellectualinput].Forthatwhich in us is the startingpointof artificialoperations,in those naturalworksis nature(who is self-taught, andeducatedby no one), andwhat in us is acquired,is in theminherent and fromwithin.70 What accounts for regularand orderlychanges in the world, then, are not randomlyenergeticatomsor educatedagentsbutthe law-abidinginstrumentsof God.71In fact "all naturalbodies are both the productsand the instrumentsof the highestdivinity."72 Harveyhas kepttheAristotelianmodel of craftsman,and instrumentsor forms, except thatwhen it comes to processes, such as conception and developmentduringgeneration,the temporalregularitiesinherentin thoseprocessescannothavebeenpassedon mechanicallyfromancestorsthrough eternity,as Aristotle's forms were, but, because of theirwondrouscomplexity, must be continuouslymanagedby the wisdom and foresight of God, who artfully makes his creationsalso serve as instruments.73 In orderto achieve this, however, Harvey has to explain how instruments can be connecteddirectlyto this divine, intellectualforce withoutconjuringup intermediateintelligentagents. To do this he first drawsattentionto Aristotle's distinctionbetween instrumentsthatare "factive"and those thatare "active."74 Of the first kind, for instance, are the hand, feet or genitals, which function 69 During the development of the foetus, "many actions of the formative faculty are observed following each other in order (just as we see in automata,or self-moving machines, where one wheel moves the next wheel)" (DGA 181 [Ex. 56]). See Aristotle, G.A. 741b 6-9. 70DGA 146 (Ex. 50), emphasis added. 71 For Nature finally just is God (DGA 145 [Ex. 50]).
72
Ibid., 147.
73 See
also, DGA 42 (Ex. 14); 76 (Ex. 26); and 86 (Ex. 28) and Harvey,AnatomicalLec-
tures, 47v.
DGA 143 (Ex. 50). As a contemporaryEnglish translationput it, some are 'factiva, Making, and some, activa, Doing" (AnatomicalExercitations Concerning the Generation of Living Creatures[London, 1653], 262). From the twelfth century onward, this distinctionthough not with quite the meaning that Harvey is going to give to it-was a hallmarkof the Aristoteliandivision of the arts in medieval Europe(ElspethWhitney,Paradise Restored: The MechanicalArtsfrom AntiquityThroughthe ThirteenthCentury,Transactionsof the American Philosophical Society, vol. 80 [Philadelphia,1990], passim). 74
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becausethey aredirectlyconnectedto the animalwho uses them. Of the second are the seed or egg which act on their own, having become separatefrom any motivatingforce or "firstefficient."Now those thatbehave separatelydo so not becausethey are,or have in themintelligentagents,butbecausecertainfaculties or propertiesare inherentwithin them upon which theiractions depend,just as the powers of herbsand medicines are called upon by a doctorto attainhealth. In such cases naturehas previouslywritteninto them (praescribit)the standard or pattern(normam)for theiroperations.75 Up to a point, Harvey's notion of instrumentis at least as mechanical as Aristotle's.However, in his naturalphilosophy,accountingfor orderlinessand regularityis only one, andpossibly the lesser, of Harvey'sgoals. He also wants to explainnature'swondrousdiversityandcomplexity,which mustbe the result of the obvious, ongoing presence of divine intellect. So, to his factive versus active distinction,Harveyadds a second feature,a featurethatbrings even the independentlybehavinginstrumentback in touchwith God-its capacityto act beyond the powers of its own matter,supra vires elementorum.Thus, the primordiumwhich is formedfrom the conception or the vis plastica in the blood manifestspowerswhich arenot only beyondthose of the elementsbutmustbe in touch with the divine.76Yet like the programmatic,vegetative soul of Aristotle, suchpowers can be passedon frominstrumentto instrument,in orderto accomplish the incrediblycomplex developmentof the foetus andthe maintenanceof the adult, in the same way that spiderscan weave theirwebs, birds build their nests, etc.77
An importantmethodologicalconsequence of this subtle tension between the intellectualandmechanisticfeaturesof these causes is thatHarveydoes not wantus to jump too quicklyto any conclusions aboutnature'soperationson the basis of mechanicalanalogies. True,many of her complex activities are accessible empirically(ratherthan by reasoning),78just because they can be interpretedin technicalandcraft-liketerms-but only as long as we understandthat it really is art that imitates nature, not the other way around,79and that our 75 DGA 143 (Ex. 50). Furtheron, he contrasts an instrumentconjoined to the first efficient-the hand of the craftsmanfor instance-with one that is separatedfrom it, such as an arrowloosed from the bow (ibid., 144). 76 The phrase supra vires is used repeatedlyin Ex. 71, especially in connection with the blood. 77 Speaking of the male's contributionto conception, "throughso many mediatorsor instrumentsis this power, this artisanof fecundity transferredor handed on ..." (DGA 139 [Ex. 49]). 78 Insofaras they are accessible at all. The process at work in a fertilizedegg, for example, seems to be the result of an arte inimitabili,modoque incomprehensibili(DGA 78 [Ex. 26]). 79 When his teacherFabriciuscomparedthe developing embryo to buildinga ship, he was not contemplating"what is done by naturein the order of generation,but ratherwhat, to his mind,ought to happenaccordingto nature... by a resemblanceto an artificialbuilding, as if, in fact, naturewould imitate art, and not ratherart nature"(DGA 172 [Ex. 54], emphasis added). See also 146 (Ex. 50).
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empirical findings must therefore always preempt any analogies we might otherwise draw from art.80 In short, Harvey blends a fairly materialistic, technical, and at times even mechanical account of the regularities of nature, with an ultimate input of intelligence from a God who is a crafty Architect,8' a God who, incidentally, is everywhere.82Moreover, this explanatory scheme enabled Harvey to account also for more general regularities, like seasonal changes in growth and decay, and the overall harmony and good order of the universe.83 Under the basic inspiration of Aristotle, then,84Harvey's natural philosophy depends heavily on the concept of instruments or organs even while he is clearly an opponent of the new atomistic mechanism that is just beginning during his lifetime. But his instrumentalism cries out in turn for an ultimate user, and for this he relies, not upon Aristotelian ideas, nor upon gods who are called out of the world's machinery, but on a world of instruments and machines that come out of God. Machina ex deo; God works in mechanical ways.85 McGill University. 80 "[L]et all reason fall silent where experience opposes"(ibid., 32 [Ex. 11]). Since Fabricius said he had done daily sketches of the developing embryo, it would have been "in keeping with so much diligence to make us more certain about what went on in the egg through the testimony of his senses, before, duringand after,but not to offer an opinion or personalconjecture, accordingto the example of a house or ship."By doing this, he was takingrefuge "in petty reasoningfrommechanicswhich ill-becomesa distinguishedanatomist"(ibid. [C]2', [Praefatio]). Also, see Cook, "Textand Context," 142-45. 81 And who, on occasion, does seem to be able to make some instrumentsbehave on an intelligentlycontingentand adaptivebasis (see, for example, Harvey,Exercitatioanatomicade circulationesanguinis, 80). For God as "architect,"see DGA 29 (Ex. 11). As to His craftiness, see, for example, De motu locali animalium, 1627, ed. and tr. Gweneth Whitteridge(Cambridge, 1959), 114",a Section entitledHarmoniaet Rithmus,and DGA 182 (Ex. 56) about God as a potterratherthan a carpenter(as discussed and cited by Cook, "Textand Context,"245, n. 467; and 249, n. 496). 82 "[F]orall things are filled with the Deity (Jovis enimplena, fiunt omnia) and the God of Nature displayethhimself in all things"(Harvey,AnatomicalExercitations,499, original Latin at DGA 271 [De partu]). Harvey also likens the ChristianGod to an anima mundi (DGA 145 [Ex. 50]), but elsewhere makes clear that this is merely literaryand allusive (DGA 170 [Ex. 54]). Also see the title page of Harvey,Anatomical Lectures, and Cook, "Text and Context," 249-51, regardingthis phrase, Harvey's connection with Stoic thought, and the care that must be taken in interpretingHarvey's use of such expressions, generally. 83 See above, note 81. See also DGA 248 (Ex. 71); his Exercitatio anatomica de motu cordis et sanguinis in animalibus (Frankfurt,1628), 30; and E. V. Ferrario,F. N. L. Poynter, and K. J. Franklin,"WilliamHarvey's Debate with CasparHofmannon the Circulationof the Blood," Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 15 (1960), 16. 84 Along with Skepticism, Stoicism, Christianity,the PaduanAristotelians, and his own empiricalresearch,for all of which see Cook, "Textand Context,"passim. 85 See Cook re Harvey's "theory of change," "Text and Context,"241-52; and also 93f, 126, 137, 143f. Ultimately, Harvey wants to reconcile the wondrous complexity of change in nature with the harmony and good order of the universe. To accomplish this, he combines divine intelligence with Aristotelian instrumentation.
Christian
Thomasius
and
the
of Philosophy Desacralization Ian Hunter
Introduction Despitehis significancein earlymodemGermany,wherehe was well-known as a political and moral philosopher,jurist, lay-theologian,social and educationalreformer,ChristianThomasius(1655-1728) is littleknownin the worldof Anglophone scholarship. Unlike those of his mentor,SamuelPufendorf,none of Thomasius'sworkswas translatedinto English,when, at the end of the seventeenthcentury,Englishthinkerswere searchingfor a final settlementto the religious question.None has been translatedsince. Moreover,while Thomasiushas been subjectto increasingscholarlyattentionin Germanysince the 1970s,where he has been treatedlargely as a representativeof the "early Enlightenment," there is very little secondaryliteratureon him in English.2Things are however beginning to change in this regard,with recent researchalreadygiving rise to importantnew Anglophone books and essays.3 Knud Haakonssen'sarticle on 1 This paper draws on a recently completed larger study, Ian Hunter,Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany(Cambridge,2001). I should like to thank David Saunders for his helpful comments. Unless cited otherwise, all translationsfrom Germantexts are my own. 2 See Frank Grunert,"Bibliographieder Thomasius-Literatur1945-1988," in Christian Thomasius 1655-1728: Interpretationenzu Werkund Wirkungmit einer Bibliographie der neueren Thomasius-Literatur, ed. Werner Schneiders (Hamburg, 1989), 335-55; and "Bibliographieder Thomasius-Literatur1989-1995," in Christian Thomasius(1655-1728), ed. FriedrichVollhardt(Ttibingen, 1996), 481-96; WernerSchneiders,Naturrechtund Liebesethik. Zur GeschichtederpraktischenPhilosophie im Hinblickauf ChristianThomasius(Hildesheim, 1971); Frederik.M. Barnard,"ChristianThomasius:Enlightenmentand Bureaucracy,"American Political Science Review, 59 (1965), 430-38, and "Rightful Decorum and Rational Accountability:A ForgottenTheoryof Civil Life," in Schneiders(ed.), ChristianThomasius,18796; Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 247-56. 3 See T. J. Hochstrasser,Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment(Cambridge, 2000); Thomas Ahnert, "ChristianThomasius' Theory of Natural Law in its Religious and Natural Philosophical Context"(PhD diss., CambridgeUniversity, 1999), to be published by
595 2000 byJournal of theHistoryof Ideas,Inc. Copyright
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Thomasiusfor the new RoutledgeEncyclopediaof Philosophy might well be a strawin the wind.4 Nonetheless, if we compareThomasiusto the "greatline"of Germanmetaphysicians-Leibniz, Wolff, Kant, Hegel-we are struckby the depth of the obscurityinto which he has been cast by today's alignmentof the philosophical planets. There are several deep-seatedreasons for this state of affairs.Among these the most importantis the continuingdominanceof post-Kantianphilosophicalhistoriography,which is constitutionallyinimicalto the type of"civil" philosophyrepresentedby Thomasiusandhis mentorPufendorf.Thepost-Kantian historyof moralphilosophytreatsearlymodem practicalphilosophyas a series of attemptsto reconciletwo opposedyet inescapableprinciples:the moralnorms issued by a powerless reasonandthe coercive commandsissued by a powerful will. This antinomyis supposed to find its resolution in Kant's conception of self-commandingrationalbeing.5In the historieswrittenfrom this standpoint, Thomasiusappearsas one of the manyphilosopherswho fall shortof the necessary reconciliation.The most common claim made against Thomasiusin this regardis thathis conceptionof law-as sovereigncommandsissued for the end of social peace-cannot be given a suitablyrational-moralgrounding. In the largerwork on which the presentpaperdraws,I offer detailedarguments regardingwhy this historiographicalstandpointis unsuitedto an historical understandingof Thomasius'scentraldoctrinesand objectives. For present purposes we can propose that Thomasius did not fail to achieve the Kantian reconciliationof unmovingreason and irrationalcommandbecause he did not attemptit. Such a reconciliation,we may suggest, is pertinentonly within the discipline of metaphysics.Here it appearsas a variantof the traditionalmetaphysical problemof how immaterialrationalbeing can have effects in a world governedby the materialends and inclinationsof embodiedbeings.6Far from failing to rise to this level of philosophicalconcern,Thomasiuslooked askance at it from anotherstandpointaltogether,viewing the metaphysicalpursuitof the Max Niemeyer Verlag; Peter Schroder, "Thomas Hobbes, ChristianThomasius and the SeventeenthCenturyDebate on the Churchand State,"History of EuropeanIdeas, 23 (1997), 59-79; also J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy:A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, 1998), 159-66. 4 Knud Haakonssen,"ChristianThomasius,"in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Craig (London, 1997), IX, 376b-370b. 5See WernerSchneiders,Naturrechtund Liebesethik;Werer Schneiders,Hoffnung auf Vernunft.Aufkldrungsphilosophie in Deutschland (Hamburg, 1990); Wilhelm SchmidtBiggemann, Theodizee und Tatsachen:das philosophische Profil der deutschen AuJkldrung (Frankfurta. M., 1988). The anglophoneworks organizedby this historiographyinclude Beck, Early German Philosophy; J. B. Schneewind, Invention of Autonomy, and Christine M. Korsgaard,The Sources of Normativity(Cambridge, 1996). 6 See, for example, the helpful discussion in Heinz Heimsoeth, The Six Great Themesof WesternMetaphysicsand the End of the Middle Ages, tr. Ramon J. Betanzos (Detroit, 1994), 69-79, 128-38, 214-16.
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rationalself-governanceas both morally self-deludingand a threatto the civil polity. Thomasius'sposition may be characterizedin termsof his elaborationof a detranscendentalized anddesacralizedphilosophy.In this regardhe belongs to a loose coalition of early moder "civil philosophers,"that includes Montaigne, Hobbes,Bayle, Pufendorf,andBarbeyrac.All of these writerssoughtto deprive metaphysicalphilosophyof the quasi-sacralauthorityit claimedthroughinsight into the divine "intelligibles"underpinningthe materialworld. Sacral insight into the intelligibles-the substantialforms, perfections,pure ideas-was the centraltenet of scholasticmetaphysics,allowing it to build the greatsystems in which the (Greek)philosophicalconceptionof the divine mind's intellectionof the essences could be reconciledwith the (Christian)theologicaldoctrineof the world's ex-nihilo creationby God.7Despite all talk of a "rational"Enlightenment,this centraldoctrinepasseddirectlyintoenlightenmentmetaphysics.8Here it was manifestin Leibniz'sconceptionof the divine mind'scontinuousintellection of the perfections,9Wolff's derivativedoctrineof a philosopher-God'screative intuitionof thepossibilia underlyingmaterialthings,0?andKant'sconception of the rationalbeing who governs its will by thinkingthe pure idea of the moral law.11In rejectingthe metaphysicsof intelligible being-in repudiating the theology of the divine mind, the cosmology of an immaterialuniverse, and the anthropologyof man as a rationalbeing (a being of reason)-the civil philosopherswerethusnotjust engagedin anti-scholasticcombat.Theywerebreaking away from the whole line of university metaphysics, stretchingfrom the scholastics throughLeibniz and Wolff to Kant and beyond, proposing instead the developmentof a desacralizedphilosophicalcurriculum. To write the historyof Thomasius'scivil philosophyfroma Kantianstandpoint is thus something more significant and less innocent than an academic mistake.In tying Thomasiusto a philosophicalhistoryof rationalbeing's recovery of its capacityfor self-determination,Kantianhistoriographyforces him to submit to a philosophical-historicalperspective to which he was vehemently opposed,therebycontinuingby othermeans the metaphysicalwar againstcivil "Metaphysics,"in The CambridgeHistory of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt (Cambridge, 1988), 537-636. 8 Ludger Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens: Die formale Bestimmungder Seiendheit und Realitdt in der Metaphysikdes Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus-Sucrez-WolffKant-Peirce) (Hamburg,1990). 9 Bogumil Jasinowski, "Leibniz und der Ubergang der mittelalterlichenin die moderne Philosophie,"Studia Leibnitiana, 4 (1972), 251-63. 10WernerSchneiders, "Deus est philosophus absolute summus: Uber ChristianWolffs Philosophie und Philosophiebegriff,"in Christian Wolff1679-1754. Interpretationenzu seiner Philosophie und deren Wirkung,mit einer Bibliographie der Wolff-Literatur,ed. Werner Schneiders(Hamburg,1986), 9-30. " Josef Schmucker,Die Ursprungeder EthikKants in seinen vorkritischenSchriftenund Reflektionen(Meisenheim, 1961). 7 CharlesH. Lohr,
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philosophy.TakingThomasiusas ourcase study,we will groundthe earlymodem detranscendentalizingof philosophyin a quitedifferentset of historicalcircumstances:those associatedwith attemptsto desacralizepolitics andsociety in the aftermathof the protractedseries of religious conflicts known as the Thirty YearsWar(1618-48). We can find pointersto these circumstancesand to the depthand scope of he issued Thomasius'attackon universitymetaphysicsin a program-statement to prospectivelaw studentsat the Universityof Halle in 1699. In the Summary Outline of the Basic Doctrines Necessary for a Student of Law to Know and
Learnin the Universitieshe warnshis studentsagainstthe centraltenetsof both scholasticandrationalistmetaphysics,or "sectarianphilosophy": Regardingthe firstprinciplesof all ormostsectarianphilosophy:(1) That God and matterwere two co-equal principles. (2) That God's nature consists in thinking.(3) Thatman'snatureconsists in thinkingandthat the welfare andhappinessof the whole humanracedependson the correct arrangementof thought.(4) Thatman is a single species and that what is good for one [person]is good for another.(5) That the will is improvedthroughthe understanding.(6) Thatit is withinhumancapacity to live virtuouslyandhappily.'2 In thus itemizing for eliminationthe intellectualisttheology, anthropologyand ethics of universitymetaphysics,Thomasiusstakes a claim for a differentkind of philosophicalculture.This is one groundedin an "Epicurean"anthropology of man as a creaturewhose intellectknows nothingof God's, whose destructive passions faroutstriphis feeble reasonandwho is thereforesubjectto civil governanceratherthanthe "holy"law of his own rationalwill. Thomasius's opposition to the intellectualist anthropologyof university metaphysicsarose fromhis remarkablehistoricalself-consciousnessregarding the role of philosophicalanthropologiesin the formationof intellectualcomportments. He regardedthe sacralizinganthropologyof men governingthemselves throughquasi-divineinsightinto pureideas as wholly unsuitedto the formation ofjurists and statesmenchargedwith the governanceof desacralizedstates, for these were states which had put an end to religious civil war by excluding the quest for transcendentvalues and the pursuitof moralrenovationfrom the political domain.Such stateswould be best governedby officials who could confine theirmoralaspirationsto the privatedomain,wherethey would do no social harm,and who could restrictpolitics to the worldly imperativeof social peace, which citizenswould have to obey regardlessof theirreligiousfaithor transcendent aspirations.Thomasius'sprogramfor the desacralizationof metaphysical 12 ChristianThomasius,SummarischerEntwurfder Grundlehren,die einem Studioso Juris zu wissen und auf Universitdtenzu lernen n6tig sind (Halle, 1699), 47-48.
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civil philosophy-is thus philosophy his elaborationof a detranscendentalized symptomaticof somethingfar more consequentialthana disputeon the terrain of philosophy as theory. It is indicative of a conflict between rival academic cultures,each attemptingto shape the moralcomportmentof intellectualelites in accordancewith its own (sacralizingor desacralizing)agenda. ProtestantScholasticism Duringthe final thirdof the seventeenthcenturythe political and religious intelligentsiaof severalGermanstateswere centrallypreoccupiedwith the problem of the relationbetweenreligiousandcivil governance,the so-calledchurchstate relation,much as was the case in Englandduringthe same period. In the Germansettingthis problemhadbeen compoundedby the emergenceof a number of confessionally distinct,mutuallyhostile states duringthe sixteenthcenUniversitiesandotherHochschiilenmultipliedin keepingwith the growth tury.13 of states,as rulersfoundededucationalinstitutionsin orderto supplythe clergy andofficials neededto governtheirterritoriesanddisciplinetheirpopulations.14 During the sixteenthcentury,when the aims of the clerical and political elites were closely aligned, most Germanuniversitiespossessed a distinctlyconfessional form.This meantthatthe genericgoal of cultivatinga "wise andeloquent piety"took its specific characterfromCatholic,Lutheranor Calvinistdoctrine.'5 In orthodoxuniversitiesthe philosophy and theology faculties took the lead in determiningdoctrinalorthodoxy,and in trainingthe clergy for theirrole in the religious discipliningof the population.'6The early moder expansionof German universities,which was destined to play a centralrole in producinga lay 13 See Heinz Schilling, "Konfessionalisierungund Formierungeines intemationalenSystems wahrendder friihen Neuzeit," in The Reformationin Germanyand Europe. Interpretations and Issues (Special Volume,Archivefor ReformationHistory/Archivfur Reformationsgeschichte), ed. Hans R. Guggisbergand GottfriedG. Krodel (Giitersloh, 1993), 591-614; and, "Confessional Europe," in Handbook of European History 1400-1600: Latin Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation.VolumeII: Vsions, Programs and Outcomes,ed. ThomasA. Jr. Brady,Heiko A. Oberman,and James D. Tracy (Leiden, 1995), 641-82. 14 Peter Baumgart and Notker Hammerstein (eds.), Beitrdge zu Problemen deutscher Universitdtsgriindungender friihen Neuzeit (Nendeln, 1978); Notker Hammerstein,"Universititen-Territorialstaaten-Gelehrte Rite," in Die Rolle der Juristen bei der Enstehung des modernenStaates, ed. Roman Schnur(Berlin, 1986). 687-735. 15 Notker Hammerstein, "Relations with Authority,"in A History of the University in Europe: VolumeII, Universities in Early Modern Europe (1500-1800), ed. Hilde De RidderSymoens (Cambridge,1996), 114-22. 16JiirgenBucking,"Reformversuche an den deutschenUniversitatenin derfruhenNeuzeit," in FestgabefuirErnst WalterZeeden, ed. Horst Rabe, HansgeorgMolitor,and Hans-Christoph Rublack (Munster, 1976), 355-69; Thomas Kaufmann, Universitit und lutherische Konfessionalisierung.Die RostockerTheologieprofessorenundihrBeitragzur theologischenBildung und kirchlichenGestaltungim HerzogtumMecklenburgzwischen 1550 und 1675, Quellen und Forschungen zur Reformationsgeschichte(Giitersloh, 1997).
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audiencefor the coming generationof enlightenmentthinkers,was thus the directresultof theconvergenceof two centralhistoricalforces,"confessionalization" andterritorialstate-building.17 As a consequenceof this convergenceGermanacademicphilosophy itself acquireda distinctly confessional character,due in no small partto the close alignmentof the philosophyandtheology facultiesduringthe sixteenthcentury andbeyond.18 HorstDreitzelhascharacterized thisconfessionalSchulphilosophie in this way: Toreligiousconfessionalismtherecorrespondeda type of philosophical confessionalismin thehighereducationalandscientificinstitutions.[This was] especially pronouncedin the restorationof scholasticismfollowing the counter-Reformationmonopolizationof philosophicaltraining via the Jesuits at Catholicuniversitiesand gymnasiums.The sciences and "arts"were demoted, homogenized, their disciplines polemically repelled or syncretisticallyassimilated-a procedurethatwas the less maintainedthe morestronglythe scientificdisciplines,anchoredin lifepractice,developed a life of theirown and put into question academic philosophy's claim to a total interpretationof things.'9 The Lutheranversionof this "secondscholasticism"sustainedits totalizing interpretationof the worldby tetheringpotentiallyautonomousnaturalandcivil sciences to a Christianphilosophy.Anchoredinitiallyin Melanchthon'sbiblicist commentarieson Aristotleand then in a full-bloodedAristotelianmetaphysics indebtedto Suarez,Lutheranscholasticismdominatedthe archipelagoof orthodox universities-Wittenberg, Rostock, Leipzig, GieBen,Tiibingen-until the middle of the seventeenthcentury.20 By this time, however,Protestantscholasticism was under sustainedattack. This campaign was fueled in part by scholasticism's perceived complicity with religious intolerance,and in partby the 17Anton
Schindling,"Schulenund Universitatenim 16. und 17. Jahrhundert.Zehn Thesen zu Bildungsexpansion,Laienbildungund Konfessionalisierungnach Reformation,"in Ecclesia Militans. Studia zur Konzilien- und Reformationsgeschichte Remigius Bdumer zum 70. Geburtstag gewidmet, ed. Walter Brandmiiller, Herbert Immenkotter, and Erwin Iserloh (Paderbom, 1988), 561-70; Notker Hammerstein, "Universitaten des Heiligen Romischen Reiches deutscherNation als Ort der Philosophie des Barock,"Studia Leibnitiana, 13 (1981), 242-66. 18 Sachiko Kusukawa,"Law and Gospel: The Importanceof Philosophy at Reformation Wittenberg,"History of Universities, 11 (1992), 33-58; Michael H. Shank, "Unless you believe, you shall not understand": Logic, University and Society in Late Medieval Vienna (Princeton, 1988). 19Horst Dreitzel, "Zur Entwicklung und Eigenart der 'Eklektischen Philosophie,'" Zeitschriftfur Historische Forschung, 18 (1991), 302. 20 Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transformationof Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Melanchthon(Cambridge, 1995); Lohr, "Metaphysics,"627-29.
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relateddrive of emergentcivil sciences-law, political science, politicaljurisprudence(Staatsrecht)-to freetheirintellectualobjectsfromall dependencyon metaphysicalconcepts and doctrines.Dreitzel comments that "[i]n Protestant Germany ... it was not the natural sciences that dealt the death-blow to Aristotelianismand philosophicalconfessionalism,butjurisprudencetogether with the doctrineof naturallaw, underthe influence of Pufendorf."21 As one of the leadingthinkersunderPufendorf'sinfluence,Thomasiusplayed a centralrole in the attackon the philosophicaland religious underpinningsof Lutheranneoscholasticism,despitethe fact thatbothhe andPufendorfremained Lutheransthroughouttheir lives. The prime targetof Thomasius'sintellectual attack was Lutheranuniversity metaphysics (Schulmetaphysik).22 Despite its from sixteenth Lutheran the universities centuryand its banishing during early absence from Melanchthon'smodel curriculum,the discipline of metaphysics began to resumeits powerfulrole acrossthe theology andartsfacultiestowards the end of the century.As WalterSparnhas shown, this returnwas drivenin part by longstandingconflicts between Aristotelianphilosophy and Christiandoctrinein such areasas the trinity,Christ'stwo naturesand one person,the mode of his presencein the host, whose reconciliationwas the raisond'etreof university metaphysics.But it was also drivenby intenseconfessionalrivalryover the rightmetaphysicalsynthesisof philosophyandtheology requiredto solve these problems.23 Universitymetaphysicsclaimeda capacityto handlesuchproblems on the basis of its status as the science of "being as being," that is, being as divinelyintelligized,throughwhich it purportedto harmonizethe differentkinds of being (divine andhuman,immaterialandmaterial)andtheirsciences (theology andphilosophy).Given, however,thatthe science of being andthe manner of man's rationalaccess to it were construedin accordancewith rival theological, Christologicaland epistemologicaldoctrines,universitymetaphysicswas itself confessionallydivided andpartisan.24 For Thomasius, coming to maturityin the aftermathof the ThirtyYears War,universitymetaphysicswas boththe foundationandepitomeof Protestant neoscholasticism.25Accordingto Thomasius,in mixing philosophy and theology-natural andrevealedknowledge-metaphysics hadinflictedprofounddamage on both religion and the state. Not only had this discipline transformedthe Bible's simple revealed truthsinto enforceable esoteric doctrines, a form of used in the clericaldominationof the laity,it had also played a key "priestcraft" 21 Dreitzel, "Entwicklung,"302. 22
See Max Wundt,Die Deutsche Schulmetaphysikdes 17. Jahrhunderts(Tiibingen, 1939). WalterSpam, Wiederkehrder Metaphysik:Die ontologische Frage in der lutherischen Theologie des friihen 17. Jahrhunderts(Stuttgart,1976). 24 Spam, Wiederkehr,6-18. 25 See the helpful comments on this issue in Detlef D6ring, "Sakularisierung und Moraltheologiebei Samuel von Pufendorf,"ZeitschriftfudrTheologie und Kirche, 90 (1993), 164-66. 23
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role in mobilizingthe stateas the enforcerof credalreligion, therebybecoming complicitin religiouspersecutionandreligiouscivil war.26Moreover,Thomasius argued,in claimingto know "beingas being"andto be the "scienceof sciences," metaphysicswas the instrumentthroughwhich the otherwiseautonomousdisciplines of law andpolitics were subordinatedto theology andphilosophy,depriving the stateof the civil sciences requiredto steerit throughthe shoalsof confessional division. If, then, Thomasius focused his intellectual program in the desacralizingseparationof philosophy from theology, therebydestroyinguniversity metaphysics,this was because he regardedthe merging of naturaland revealedknowledge in this discipline as instrumentalin the disastrousmerging of civil andreligious authorityin the confessional state. Philosophyfor the Court The earliestoutlineof Thomasius'sdetranscendentalized philosophyis given in his Introductioadphilosophiam aulicam of 1688, translatedinto Germanas Einleitung zur Hof-Philosophie (Introductionto Court Philosophy) in 1710, which is the editionused in this paper.Despite its title the Hof-Philosophieis not a conductmanualfor courtiersbut a handbookoutlininga philosophyforjurists andpolitici chargedwith the governanceof a desacralizedstate. Given the role of the earlymoder Germancourtsas epicentersof powerfulcivil and military to Civil Philosophy."27 bureaucracies,its title could be renderedas "Introduction In fact this work representsThomasius's first attemptto detranscendentalize academicphilosophy by separatingit from theology, historicizing its origins, and treatingit as an instrumentserving the ends of man's flourishingin civil society. Ratherthan anticipatingnineteenth-centuryempiricism or utilitarianism, however, the Hof-Philosophie representsthe fusion of two distinctively early moder intellectualcurrents.First,it drawson the historicalapproachto scholastic metaphysics developed by Thomasius's "blessed father,"Jacob, in his Schediasmahistoricumof 1665. An adherentof the classic Lutherandualismof revealed and naturalknowledge, Jacob Thomasius objected to the rationalist collapsing of this division in (Scotist) Aristotelianmetaphysicalontology; for this led to God being treatedas a sub-species in a hierarchyof being open to the humanintellectratherthanas the "highestanalogum"for a realitythis intellect could not know directly.We learn from Giovanni Santinello that Thomasius
26 Cf. Mark Goldie, "Priestcraftand the Birth of Whiggism," in Political Discourse in Early ModernBritain, ed. Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner(Cambridge,1993), 20931. 27 See Otto Hintze, Staat und Verfassung,ed. GerhardOestreich (Gottingen, 19703),32158, 471-502.
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senior sought to rectify this errorby providinga historyof it.28Tracingits origins to the early-Greekdualisms of God and matter,good and evil, Jacob regardedthe philosophical"sects"-Aristotelian, Platonic,Stoic, Epicurean-as attemptsto reconcilethe dualisms,treatingneoscholasticmetaphysicalontology as the most recent such attempt. At the same time, the Hof-Philosophieis also informedby the kind of antimetaphysicalcivilisphilosophia thatwe find in such Renaissancehumanistsas MarioNizolio. This currentof civil philosophycombinesa nominalistrejection of metaphysicalabstractionand universalswith an "empiricist"epistemology, framingboth strategieswithin a rhetoricalconceptionof logic and languageas instrumentsof civil communication.29 In fusing his father'santi-sectarianhisof neoscholastic humanistic "civil-nominalist"critiqueof and the tory ontology metaphysics,Thomasius'sHof-Philosophie emerges as a powerful anti-metaphysical tract.By focusing on its sectarianmergingof theology andphilosophy, Thomasius was able to diagnose university metaphysics as a danger to both privatepiety andpublic tranquillity. Thomasius begins the Hof-Philosophie with a history of philosophy.As TimothyHochstrasserhas shown, this historybelongs to the genreof"histories of morality"whose rolewas to providea genealogyforthe contemporarystruggle between neoscholasticphilosophia Christianaandthe "eclectic"civil philosoThomasius'shistoryof philosophy is phy ofHobbes, Grotius,and Pufendorf.30 thusnot so mucha historyof ideas as a genealogy of philosophicalsectarianism as a particularkindof intellectualcomportment.Originatingwith the platonizing churchfathers,andtransmittedinto earlymodernityvia Aristotelianmetaphysics and moral philosophy, this philosophical zealotry arises when mattersof faithareespousedin the formof philosophicallydemonstrabledoctrines,requiring adherenceto the truthof a particularmasteror sect: "Experienceandhistory bothteachthatthis sectarianphilosophy... has providedinnumerableoccasions for greatdisturbancein the churchandthe state."3'It was againstthis intolerant confessionalphilosophythatthe excellent Hobbesenteredthe field in England; but it is Grotiusand Pufendorf,those "two heroic men,"who have led the renewal of moralphilosophy.In groundingnaturallaw in man'sneed for sociality ratherthanin his supposedinsightinto divine ideas they have pavedthe way for
28
Giovanni Santinello, "JakobThomasius(1622-1684)," in Models of the History of Phi-
" ed. Francesco losophy:FromIts Originsin theRenaissanceto the "HistoriaPhilosophica, Bottin, et al. (Dordrecht,1993), 409-42. 29
MariusNizolius,VierBiicheriiberdie wahrenPrinzipienunddie warhrephilosophische
Methode Gegen die Pseudophilosophen,tr. Klaus Thieme (Munich, 1980); and see Dreitzel, "Entwicklung." 30 Hochstrasser,Natural Law Theories, 125-28. 31 Christian Thomasius,Einleitungzur Hof-Philosophie,in AusgewdhlteWerkeed. Werner Schneiders(Hildesheim, 1994), II, 51.
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a restrainedandnon-sectarianeclectic philosophy.32 Eclectic or civil philosophy is thus advocatedprincipallyas a mode of intellectualconduct,ratherthanas a doctrineor theory.This scholarlydeportmentis groundedin a confession of the limits of humanintellect,which preventsus fromtreatingany philosophyas the absolutetruth.It manifestsitself above all as the exercise of a pluralisticchoice among variousphilosophies in accordancewith the benefits they bringto man andthe commonwealth.33 Havingconstructedthehistoryof philosophyas a historyof sects, Thomasius proceedsto historicizethe conceptof philosophyitself.34In observingthe diversity of meaningsgiven to the termas embracingall wisdom, as limitedto natural knowledge alone, as equivalentto the liberalarts,or (most harmfully)as identical to metaphysics, Thomasius argues for its operationalconstructionas the discipline taughtunderthis name in "ouracademies."He therebydefines it in oppositionto law, medicine,andtheology andtreatsit as inclusive of the liberal arts.35He thenproceedsto configurethis empiricallydefinedfield via a series of theoreticalandmethodologicaldistinctions.Theology is distinguishedfromthe otheracademicsciences bothby its end, eternalfelicity as opposedto civil welfare, and by its mode of cognition, revelation as distinct from naturalknowledge. Philosophyis also distinguishedfromthe other"rational"sciencesof medicine and (natural)jurisprudence;for they have autonomousends, the healthof the body and the soul, whereasphilosophy is contributoryto these ends and is hence an instrumentalscience.36This allows Thomasiusto characterizephilosophy as: "thatintellectual and instrumentaldisposition [habitus intellectualis und instrumentalis]which considers God, his creatures,and the naturaland moralconductof men in the light of reason,andwhich investigatesthe causes of theirconductfor the benefit of the humanrace."37 If his historyof philosophyis intendedto show the temporaloriginsof scholastic sectarianism,then Thomasius'smethodologicaldemarcationof philosophy is meantto reveal the intellectualgroundsof this undesirabledeportment. As we have noted,Thomasiuslocates these groundsin the mixing of two fundamentallydistinctprinciplesof cognition,revealedandnaturalknowledge,which is reflectedin the alliancebetween the theology andphilosophyfaculties in the confessional university.This mixing takes two forms, "When argumentsfor thingswhose knowledgedependson the light of naturearederivedinsteadfrom the principleof revelation,"and "Whenargumentsfor the secrets of faith are
32
Thomasius,Hof-Philosophie, 46-47.
33 Thomasius, Hof-Philosophie, 51-55. 34 Thomasius,Hof-Philosophie, 67-68. 35Thomasius,Hof-Philosophie, 69. 36 Thomasius, Hof-Philosophie, 70. 37 Thomasius,Hof-Philosophie, 71.
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drawnfromthe principlesof reason."38 Scholastictheology mustbearthe blame for the latterconfusion,whichhas been the cause of"the manyreligioustroubles whichhavecontinuedfromthe beginningof scholastictheologyuntilourtime."39 Universitymetaphysics,however,musttakeresponsibilityforthe former,which, althoughnot as dangerousto civil peace, remainsthe source of harmfulteachings. Frommetaphysicshas arisenthe monstrosityof a "Christianphilosophy," characterizedprecisely by the attemptto derive philosophical doctrines from revealed truthsor to elucidate the latterusing philosophicalmeans. These attemptshave producedsuch hybridsas the metaphysicaldistinctionbetween essence and existence-the notion that dogness exists independentlyof dogs"which does not come from the Holy Ghost." Further,they have led to such monstrositiesas a "Christianphysics"and a "Christianethics,"the formerpurporting to explain the common creation of matter,the latteroriginal sin. Yet these are mattersof faith which philosophershave no competence to discuss when actingin theirprofessional-civilcapacities.40 Having shown the historicalconsequences of the sectarianmixing of philosophy andtheology and arguedthe need to confine philosophyto the ends of man's worldly happiness,Thomasiusnotes the broadcontoursof his delimitation of the philosophicaldomain: With the descriptionof philosophy I have signaled that its end is the flourishingof the humanrace:thatis, temporalhappiness.Throughthis description,first,philosophywill againbe separatedfromtheology and, second, it will be denied thatthe final end of theoreticalphilosophy is aimed at a pure contemplation.Because [theoreticalphilosophy]must also be renderedsubordinateto those activities thatreach [only] to the flourishingof the humanrace, which Seneca had alreadyrecognizedin his time.41 Despite his commentthatthe princes themselves have decreedthe separation of philosophyandtheology,Thomasiusdoes notproposethatthe stateshould enforce this demarcationin the interestsof social calm; for he arguesthat academic work should be free of political control, to the extent that it does not jeopardizecivil peace. Thomasius'saim was to reducephilosophyto the status of a preparatorytrainingin the liberalarts,therebyallowing politics andjurisprudenceto standas independenthistorically-baseddisciplines.To this end, the Hof-Philosophie seeks to replace the PlatonizedAristotelianismof rationalist metaphysicswith a naturalisticanthropologyof the passionsandan eclectic mix 38Thomasius,Hof-Philosophie, 71. 39Thomasius, Hof-Philosophie, 73. 40 Thomasius,Hof-Philosophie, 75-76. 41 Thomasius, Hof-Philosophie, 81-82.
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of humanist("civil-nominalist")logic and Stoic ("empiricist")epistemology. Withoutthis radicaldetranscendentalizing of philosophy,Thomasiusargues,the desacralizationof political authoritywould remaininsecure.For the state's futurejurists andstatesmenwould be corruptedby a disciplinethattemptedthem to orienttheirdutiesanddecisions to an horizonthatlies beyondcivil happiness and, in doing so, denied them the restrainedand pragmaticcomportmentrequiredby theircivil office. If this desacralizingof philosophywere to succeed, therefore,universitystudentswould have to be providedwith an alternativeto the intellectualistpaideiathatsuturedthemto the neoscholasticcurriculumand thusto confessionalsociety.Thomasiusoutlinedhis alternativepaideiaandcurriculumin a seriesof essayswrittenaroundthe sametime as theHof-Philosophie. Dismantlingthe ScholasticCurriculum The lecturesandessays producedby Thomasiusbetween 1685 and 1690, in which he threwdown the gauntletto Leipzig neoscholasticismandsketchedhis new curriculum,are programmaticratherthan systematicscholarlyworks, by turns far-sighted and combative, satirical and mordant.At their center lies Thomasius's acute sense of a relationshipthat those of us coming after Kant have the greatestdifficultyin comprehending:the relationbetweenthe elaboration and transmissionof particularphilosophies and sciences on the one hand, and the formationof particularkinds of intellectualdeportmentin and through this elaborationandtransmissionon the other.42 The primefocus of Thomasius's concernin this regardwas the neoscholasticphilosophicalpreparationstudents underwentbefore enteringthe threehigherfaculties,for he regardedthis preparationas wholly unsuitedto the formationof futurejurists and statesmen. ThecharacterofThomasius'sconcernwithhis students'philosophicalpreparationis signaledin the essay How a YoungMan is to be Educated,whose subtitle runs:"ChristianThomasmakes a proposalto universitystudentsin which he sets out how, within a three-yearperiod,he intendsto educatea young man, who has decidedto uprightlyserve God andthe world in civil life andto live as an honest and gallant man, in philosophy and the particularpartsof jurisprudence."Observingthatthe universityconsists of the faculties of law, medicine, andtheology, "underwhich philosophyis an instrumentof the higherfaculties, or at least shouldbe," Thomasiusindicatesthe philosophicaldispositionsuited to futurejurists:"ThereforeI also demandas my auditorssuch individualsas do not take the mere shell of philosophy as their final goal-and following the erroneouspagan doctrineseek their highest good in speculation-but such as
42 See, in general, Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Wayof Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford, 1995).
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strive to turntheirphilosophy to the real benefit of the humanrace."43Before consideringthe best means of forming this disposition, Thomasiuspauses to reflectthathe has long foundthe philosophicalpreparationgiven to his students unsuitedto their futurecalling, and thatas a result for severalyears I have reflectedon how I mightprovidethatnecessary instrument,philosophy,in a form that one could use in jurisprudence, and [I have] requiredas the type of my futureauditorssuch individuals who have resolved to cultivate philosophy to the degree that it is capable of establishingparticularbenefits in civil life and especially in jurisprudence.This is so that throughthe propositionsof philosophy [Welt-Weisheit]they will be enabledto honestlyapplytheirunderstanding andwill to the needs of humanity,to supportthe generalpeace, and to skillfully serve the commonwealthin whateverpoliticaloffices it determines.44 In fact Thomasiushadpublishedsome of the fruitsof this reflectionthe year before in his essay On the Deficiencies ofAristotelianEthics. Herehe provides an acerbicanalysis of the limits of neoscholasticmoralphilosophyas a formative regimen,at the same time outliningthe new arrangementof disciplinesthat he was assembling as a desacralized philosophical propaedeuticfor jurists. Thomasiusbegins by arguingthat for young men to acquirethe mannersand knowledge requiredfor prudentparticipationin the affairsof life and the state, threeconditionsmustbe met: it is necessaryfirstthata young man seek a certaingroundfor exploring the truth;next thathe learnto conformhis moralsto the laws of virtue; and finally he must apply himself to understandingthe state of human affairsand the republicin which he finds himself. Because in so far as men live in the world,they live boundto each otherin an orderlyfashion in a civil society, andhave to observe in this conditionnotjust the duty that binds them to the whole human race, but also their duty to the commonwealthin which they live. They are incapableof doing both obedientlythoughunless they have alreadycleansed theirunderstanding of the commonerrorsandareknowledgeableof the society in which they dwell....45
43 ChristianThomasius, "Wie ein junger Mensch zu informierensei" (1689) in Kleine TeutscheSchriften,Ausgewdhlte Werke,Schneiders(ed.), XXII, 240. 44Thomasius, "Mensch,"241-42. 45 ChristianThomasius, "Von den Mangeln der aristotelischen Ethik" (1688) in Kleine TeutscheSchriften, Werke,XXII, 75.
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Aristotelianpracticalphilosophy serves none of these purposes,according to Thomasius.In the first place it is incapableof making young men virtuous and for this reason does not deserve the name of practicalphilosophy.A discipline worthyof the title habituspractici(practicalcompetence)shouldactually form the capacity for moral action.46Academic moral philosophy,taught via commentarieson the NichomacheanEthics, is quiteincapableof functioningin this way. On the one handAristotelianmoralphilosophy-bogged down in disputes over the summumbonum,taught to youth in the form of metaphysical exercises,proceedingfroma cataloguingof the eleven virtuesto a classification of the species of justice-is reduced to a set of technical terms and axioms lackingall edifyingpower:"Ihope thereforethatI do no injusticeto Aristotelian ethics when I say that it is as incapableof leading a young man to the path of On virtue as a gouty foot is incapableof carryinga lame man across a river."47 the otherhand,throughits mixing of theologyandphilosophy,Aristotelianmetaphysics can lead its adherentsto claim a quasi-sacralauthority.This threatens the political order,giving birthto such dangeroushybridsas "Christianlogic," "which has no other use than to show ill-manneredindividualshow they can oppose the territorialsovereignunderthe cover of a hypocriticalreligiosity."48 As a result,says Thomasius,displayinga characteristicmix of self-promotion, intellectualaudacityand political bravado,he will redressthe defects of Aristotelianmoralphilosophyby developing an alternativeethics in a series of lectures to be held at eleven in the morning duringthe Michaelmassterm of 1688.A detaileddiscussionof Thomasius'sethicaldiscipline,as outlinedin his Practice ofEthics, is offeredin the largerworkon which this paperis based.For ourpresentpurposeswe mustcontentourselveswith observingthatunlikeAristotelianmoralphilosophy,which sought to groundethics in the reflective selfgovernanceof a "rationaland social being,"Thomasius'sethics took shapeas a diagnostic for the passions and a set of exercises for keeping them within the boundsof civil order.49 He proclaimsthe centralcharacteristicof this discipline with the statement,"[t]hatethics is nothingotherthana teachingandinstruction in how a man should govern his affects, in orderto renderthem incapableof In short,Thomasius impellinghim to somethingthatwould be againstthe law."50 was proposingto remedythe practicalincapacityof Aristotelianmoralphilosophy with an ethicaltherapeutics.This was designedto relegatethe intellectualist anthropologyandquasi-religiousdisciplineof metaphysicalethics in favorof an anthropologyof the passions (Affektenlehre)gearedto a practiceof privateself46 Thomasius, "Mangeln,"80-81. Thomasius, "Mangeln," 86. 48 Thomasius, "Mangeln," 92.
47
Schneiders,NaturrechtundLiebesethik;and Dorothee Kimmich,"Lobder 'ruhigen in Vollhardt(ed.), ChristianThomasius, Belusting':Zu Thomasius'kritischerEpikur-Rezeption," 379-94. 49 See
50
Thomasius, "Mangeln," 94.
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restraintandsupplementedby legal coercion.In the event the elaborationof this detranscendentalizedethics was interruptedwhen, at the instigation of the Leipzig's leadingmetaphysicaltheologians,the SaxoncourtbannedThomasius from lecturingon religious andmoraltopics, forcinghim to decampto the University of Halle in neighboringBrandenburgin 1690.51Such was the natureof the conflict between civil andmetaphysicalphilosophy. In the second place, Thomasiusargues,Aristotelianpracticalphilosophyis no less inappropriateas a means of informingstudentsas to the natureof the state they live in and the duties they owe to it. Here, the importantthing is that futurejuristsand statesmenbe instructedon the present,post-Westphaliancondition of the Holy RomanGermanEmpire,particularlywith regardto its relation to the emergentterritorialstatesandtheirsovereigns.In using Romannatural law categoriesandAristotle'stypology of state-formsto construethe Empire as a type of state, a res publica mixta, neoscholastic political theory is completely unsuitedto this task.52To compensatefor this failureuniversitieswould have to groundthe teaching of law and politics in the study of positive public law or Staatsrecht.Exemplifyingthe new historicalform ofjurisprudencethat he sought to introduce into the university, Thomasius argues that German Staatsrechtderivesnot fromtheo-rationalconceptsofjustice knownto the metaphysician,but froma quitedifferentorderof reality:the historyof the Reformation, the religiouswarsof the sixteenthcentury,andespecially the ThirtyYears' War.It was in this context of Imperialjus publicum, from the religious peace treatiesof Augsburg(1555) andWestphalia(1648) in particular,thatnew basic laws emergedfor the Germanstates. These were needed to provide statesmen with a desacralizedjuridical framework,capable of containing the fractious doctrinesand passions of the warringconfessional estates.53Emergingas the instrumentof this statistdeconfessionalizationof society,the new politicaljurisprudencewas constitutionallydisposedtowardsthe realityof the systemof independentsovereignstatesestablishedby the Treatyof Westphalia.If they were to understandthe desacralizednatureof the states in which they lived, the rising generation of jurists and statesmen would thus have to be taught German Staatsrecht.
51See, RolfLieberwirth,"ChristianThomasius'LeipzigerStreitigkeiten,"Wissenschaftliche Zeitschriftder Martin-Luther-Universitdt Halle-Wittenberg(Gesellschafts- und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe), 3 (1953), 155-59; and Frank Grunert, "Zur aufgeklarten Kritik am theokratishcen Absolutismus. Der Streit zwischen Hector Gottfried Masius und Christian ThomasiusfiberUrsprungund Begriindungder summa potestas,"in Vollhardt(ed.), Christian Thomasius,51-78. 52 See Donald R. Kelley, "Law,"in The CambridgeHistory of Political Thought 14501700, ed. J. H. Bums and MarkGoldie (Cambridge,1991), 66-94. 53Thomasius, "Mangeln,"103-5.
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Thomasius'shistorical approachto the study and teaching of Staatsrecht was representativeof a moregeneralalliancebetweenthe disciplinesof law and history which was displacingthe deductive frameworkof Aristotelianismand Roman law.54This transformationplayed an importantrole in his attempted overthrowof Aristotelianpracticalphilosophy.In factThomasiusproposedthat philosophy or arts faculties should continueteaching ethics, politics, and economics,butin a quitenew way.Ratherthanapproachingthesedisciplinesthrough theportalsof metaphysics,which led to thembeing regardedas appliedbranches of moralphilosophy,studentswould be introducedto them via the discipline of history,which allowed the disciplines an eclectic independence.Situatedin the curriculumin this way, the civil sciences were no longerto be seen as devolved branchesof the theoryof being, in eitherthe neoscholasticor rationalistmanner. They were to be taught instead in the eclectic way, as autonomoushistorical undertakings,each with its own empiricalobject and practicalend.55Politics, for example, should be taught not as a branchof ethics, nor in terms of the prince's role in executing God's will or of the state's role in realizing man's moralnature,but as a discipline for managingthe state as an empirical-historical entity.In a mannerreminiscentofArnisaeusandConring,Thomasiusargues thatpolitical science should focus on how states are maintainedand what it is that destroys them; the role of differentforms of governmentin realizing the sovereigninterestsof the state,the benefitsandharmsof good andbad clergy to the state, the contributionof manufactureand trade,and so on.56 The primecasualtyof this reconstructionof the artscurriculumis of course the disciplineof metaphysics.As the linchpinof philosophicalconfessionalism and the confessional university,academicmetaphysicswas doubly inimical to Thomasius's desacralizingprogram.For metaphysics both demoted the civil sciences to the lower (sensory-discursive)levels of the ladderof being, and allowed Lutheranuniversitystudentsto imaginethatthey mightbecome wise beyond measure by ascending to the upper (intellectual-intuitional) levels. Thomasius's curricularand pedagogical reforms were thus intendedto completely dismemberuniversity metaphysics,reassigning its ontological role to history,relegatingits ethics in favor of his Affektenlehre,denying it any role in politics, and expelling it from theology, leaving only its carcass to be picked over by logicians in searchof useful categories.Nothing less thanthis complete destructionwould do, if futurejuristswere to be trainedin an ethics permitting them to governthemselves, and a politics permittingthem to governthe state. Jus undHistorie: Ein Beitragzur Geschichtedes historischen 54 See Notker Hammerstein, Denkens an deutschen Universitdtenim spdten 17. und im 18. Jahrhundert(G6ttingen, 1972); and Hammerstein,"Jurisprudenzund Historie in Halle," in Zentrender Aufklirung I. Halle: Aufklirung und Pietismus, ed. NorbertHinske (Heidelberg, 1989), 239-53. 55 See Dreitzel, "Entwicklung";and Michael Albrecht, Eklektik.Eine Begriffsgeschichte mitHinweisenauf die Philosophie-und Wissenschaftsgeschichte (Stuttgart-BadCannstatt,1994). 56 Thomasius, "Mensch,"251-54.
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Nonetheless, Thomasius'sreformof the artscurriculumwas not governed by a simple substitutionof social utility for metaphysicaltruth.By treatingit in this way some commentatorshave soughtto explainThomasius'sstatismas the productof yet anotherphilosophicalerror:his sacrificeof transcendentalnorms capable of judging the state to an all embracing political utilitarianism.57 Thomasius'sprimephilosophicalconcernhowever was not the substitutionof utilityfor truth.Rather,he was concernedwith the questionof the utility-in the broadsense of contributingto "humanflourishing"-of differentmodes of acceding to truth,in termsof the intellectualdeportmentsto which they gave rise. In groomingthemselves for participationin a quasi-divineintellectionof pure concepts, universitymetaphysiciansimagined themselves acceding to a truth thattranscendedthe horizonof civil happinessandits guarantorthe civil sovereign, therebyopeninga speculativeconduitthroughwhich zealotryandintolerance could flow into civil society. In thusapproachingacademicphilosophyvia a historicaldescriptionof the intellectualdeportmentsit formed,Thomasiuswas playing the trump card in his reconstruction of the arts curriculum: the historicizationof metaphysicsitself. We can concludeourdiscussionby turning to a remarkable text in which Thomasius outlines the terms for such an historicization. SecretTheology andPhilosophicalPriestcraft In 1707, late in his career,Thomasiuswrote the Forewordto the first German edition of Grotius'sDejure belli ac pacis, which also belongs to the "histories of morality"discussed by Hochstrasser.58 Takingthe form of a brief history of naturallaw, this text offers us a striking insight into the culturaland politicaldamageThomasiusbelieved hadbeen inflictedby Protestantscholasticism in general and its metaphysicsin particular.Nothing could be clearer,he begins, thanthe differencebetweenrevealedandnaturaltruths,the formercoming throughfaith and revelationand leadingman to eternalbeatitude,the latter arisingin man'sunderstandingandguidinghim to civil happiness:"Hereinlies the simple and clear distinctionbetween theology and philosophy or between theology and the three other faculties:theology is concernedwith the light of graceandteachesin accordancewith it;jurisprudence,medicineandphilosophy teachin accordancewith the naturallight."59 Yet,he continues,nothinghas been moreresponsiblefor derailingman'snaturalpursuitof a long andhappyearthly life thanthe mixing and confusion of these two kinds of truth;for fromthis has See, for example, Schmidt-Biggemann,Theodizee,41-45. Hochstrasser,Natural Law Theories, section 4.5. 59 ChristianThomasius, "Vorrede"(to the first Germanedition of Grotius's Law of War and Peace), in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (Drei Biicher vom Recht des Krieges und des Friedens), ed. WalterSchatzel (Tiibingen, 1950), 2. 57
58
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arisenshamefulexercises of priestcraftwith all the attendantmiseryof religious tyrannyand conflict. It is the "scholars"who have been most responsiblefor this grievousconfusion, Thomasiusargues,and particularlythose who inheritedthe paganphilosophical conception of natureand mixed it with the Christiandoctrineof creation,thatis, the metaphysicians.Enthusedby "Platonicfables,"the metaphysicians not only produceda bastardphilosophical-theologicalconceptionof a creationdividedinto visible andinvisible thingsbutthey also used theirputatively pure insight into invisible things as the basis for doctrine-mongeringand religious persecution:"Onewas not contentto presentChristianswith errorsthat contradictedthe soundreasonandsenses of normalmen. Throughheresy-hunting and coercion of conscience one forced these errorson the people as necessary articles of faith."60Above all it was the incorporationof Aristotelianand Platonicmetaphysicsin the developmentof scholasticphilosophythatformalized this corruptingmixtureof philosophyandtheology, leadingto the progressive ruin of ethics, naturallaw,jurisprudence,and statecraft. In a strikinginstanceof his analysis of the corruptingeffects of metaphysical doctrines,Thomasiusdivides their proponentsinto two kinds, the "orthodox" (Rechtmeinenden)and the "esoterics"(Geheimen).The formerexercise power throughthe public imposition of articles of faith, the latter througha clandestinepracticeof mysticalspiritualdirection.Inpurportingto know divine thingsthroughnaturalphilosophicalmeans,each of the two formsof metaphysics, orthodoxSchulmetaphysikand the esoteric pursuitof mystical enlightenment, amountsto a "secrettheology": Both thereforemisuse the naturallight:The orthodoxdo so in thatthey overstepthe limitsof reason,seekingthroughits powersto explainthings thatGod has held it not necessaryto reveal, overly neglecting however the will and its improvement.The esoterics do so in thatthey make the powers of the will greaterthanthey are, and, on the otherhand,diminish the light of the understandingtoo much. Both complain about the pagans and paganphilosophy,and yet both are descendedfrompagan wisdom and its disciples. The orthodoxin fact [descend]fromrefining Platonic disputationsregardingthe divine being, the esoterics though from the Platonic doctrineregardingthe end of true wisdom: namely, union with God throughthe way of purificationand enlightenment.61 Further,orthodoxand esotericmetaphysiciansboth use theirsecrettheology to engage in "priestcraft,"the illicit exercise of authoritybased in "higher"spiritual insight, to the ruinof trueChristianity: 60Thomasius, "Vorrede," 8. 61 Thomasius, "Vorrede," 12.
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So everythingleadseitherto idle speculationor enthusiasmand,thereby, simple active Christianityis forgotten.Both of them impressupon the laity that giving is more blessed than taking, although for them this means thattakingis more blessed thangiving. Both seek to strengthen the pretensesof theirdoctrinesthroughholy fraud,throughthe fabrication of many evidently false histories, and throughfalse miracles ... Finally,we can add thatboth classes rob their listenersof the rightuse their God-given reason. The orthodox [do so] by binding listeners to their formulas,the esoterics by binding them to inner inspirations.So they spreadthe two most grievousprejudicesof the humanunderstanding, the former [the orthodox]that of humanauthority,the latter [the esoterics]thatof untimelyrashness.62 Thomasius is particularlyconcerned with the effects of university metaphysics on the civil sciences of ethics, politics, and naturallaw, regardingit as the sourceof theirconfessional corruptionand assimilationto scholasticmoral philosophy: It is certainthatthe [teachingof] ethics by the first philosophersin the universitiesfoundedby the Pope was so badthat,so to speak,one could not entice a dog behind an oven with it. The profession of statesman first arose long afterthat. In his account of the papal monarchy,Herr Pufendorfhas remarkedthat it belongs to the secrets of papist states eithernot to treatpolitics in the universitiesor to do so only in accordancewith the interestsof the clergy.Because of this, even the name of politics itself has been made suspectand a taintof shameattachedto it. More shouldbe said aboutthis elsewhere,because politics and natural law or ethics [Moral]-which are in fact markedlydifferent-were often confused.63
Severalbraveandwise men hadattemptedto redressthis situation,amongthem Pierre Bayle, HermannConring, Jean Barbeyrac,and most notably, Samuel Pufendorf,attackingthe scholastic anthropologiesand cosmologies and pointing the way towardsa new conceptionof politics and naturallaw. Theirefforts,however,have been hamperedby the scholasticdominationof the universities.In the law faculties the dominanceofjus civile has been a retardingfactor,for this has meantthat the glossators have been unable to separate naturallaw from Roman law, and thereby provide it with the new form requiredby the emergenceof desacralizedterritorialstates. FranqoisHotman and Jean Bodin representhonorableexceptions, however, as they are among 62
Thomasius, "Vorrede,"12-13.
63
Thomasius, "Vorrede," 17.
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"thelegists who are everywherebeginning to defend the rights of worldly authorityagainstthe tyrannyof the clergy."64 Things are even worse in the theology facultieshowever;for here naturallaw has been ensnaredby the full metaphysical confusionof theology andphilosophy,being in effect transformedinto a branch of moral theology and losing its civil vocation altogether. While ThomasiusblamesJesuitmetaphysicsforthis confusion,he also castigatesProtestantuniversitiesforpermittingthis "secrettheology"to creepbackin, thereby allowingProtestanttheologiansandphilosophersto follow the Jesuitsin assimilatingnaturallaw to metaphysicsandmoraltheology:"As a result,at the beginning of the seventeenthcentury,the doctrineof virtueand vice, or of the difference between good and evil, of the naturallaw and such like, was in a wretched and deathlycondition,amongboth the Catholicsandthe Protestants."65 Returningat last to the subject of his Foreword,Thomasiuswrites that it was Grotius'stask and honorto begin to clean out the Augean stables of scholastic metaphysicsandnaturallaw. He characterizesGrotiusas a man who had himself held political office andhad experiencedfirst-handthe monsterof religious authority.In his treatmentof "thelaw of warandpeace"Grotiushadbeen the firstto show thatconflictsbetweenprincescould not be decidedon the basis of Justinianor Canonlaw, but only througha naturallaw groundedin worldly sociality. In doing so he separateddivine, universal,mosaic, and humanlaws fromeach other:"Ina word, Grotiuswas the instrumentthatservedGod's wisdom in lifting the long-lasting confusion of naturaland supernaturallight by making a beginning."66Perhapskeeping in mind the fundamentalcorrections that Pufendorfhad made to Grotius'sconstructionof naturallaw, Thomasius concludeshis Forewordby observingthatGrotiusrepresentsonly the dawning of truthfrom the long night of scholastic error. Thomasius'sForewordto Grotiusthus provides us with an epitome of his programto desacralizeearlymoder academicphilosophy.Above all, it demonstratesthe extraordinary historicalself-consciousnessof his attackon university metaphysics.In approachingthe core metaphysicaldoctrines,those articulating rationalbeing's intellectionof the pureforms,fromthe viewpointof the undesirable civil andreligiousdeportmentto which they gave rise, Thomasiuswas able to treatmetaphysicsas inimicalto a desacralizedcivil order.Metaphysicsformed intellectualswho soughttheirethicalduties in laws prescribedby a reasonpure enoughto be sharedwith God, andwho presumedto offer rationalphilosophies of religion ("naturaltheologies") in orderto provide civil authoritywith transcendentfoundationsandobjectives.Like his mentorPufendorf,Thomasiusrealized thatthe deconfessionalizedstates emergingin the post-Westphalianperiodrequireda very differentkind of intellectualto staff the institutionsof civil 64Thomasius, "Vorrede," 18. 65 66
Thomasius, "Vorrede,"24. Thomasius, "Vorrede,"26.
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and religious governance.These would be intellectualswho would find their civil duties in a hierarchyof offices subordinateto the territorialsovereign and who would treatreligion as a matterof private faith beyond all philosophical formulationandcivil enforcement.It was to the formationof this civil intelligentsia that Thomasiusdedicatedhis detranscendentalizedethics, his positive politicaljurisprudence,andhis curriculumof historicizedcivil sciences. Conclusion Thomasius'sseparationof the civil sciences fromtheology indicatesnot his philosophicalfailure,butthe failureof earlymodem universityphilosophy,that is, its failure to comprehendthe desacralizingseparationof civil governance fromreligiousworshipthathadtakenplace in the centurybetweenthe Treatyof Augsburg(1555) andthe Treatyof Westphalia( 1648).67The comprehensionof this transformationwas to be the task of the civil philosophy developed by PufendorfandThomasius,in particularof theirrefashionednaturallaw. In fulfilling this task the civil philosopherselaborateda naturallaw characterizedby two fundamentaland interdependentstrategies.On the one handthey declared that securitywas the sole end for which states are formed and governed. This necessitatesthe state'sradicalindifferenceto the truth-claimsof its constituent moralcommunities,just as had been requiredby the greatreligiouspeace treaties. As a resultthe statemay not be judged on the basis of such claims, normay it attemptto enforce some particularset of them. On the otherhand,Pufendorf andThomasiusinsistedthatwhile ecclesiological religioncould be regulatedby salvific religionlay the civil sovereignin the interestsof security,"spiritualistic" beyondthe state,in the domainof free privatefaith,so long as it posed no threat to civil tranquillity.68 Ratherthan signaling their failureto become metaphysicians, the fact thattheirnaturallaw containsa statistconceptionof politics and law, alongsidean unreconciledfideist or "spiritualist"theology,thuspointsto a quite differenthistoricalreality.It indicatesthe mannerin which Pufendorfand Thomasiussoughtto destroymetaphysicsso thatthey could transformpractical philosophyin accordancewith the political-juridicaldesacralizationof civil authoritythathad alreadytakenplace. 67 See MartinHeckel, GesammelteSchriften:Staat, Kirche,Rechte, Geschichte,ed. Klaus Schlaich (4 vols., Tiibingen, 1989-97); and J. G. A. Pocock, "Religious Freedom and the Desacralisationof Politics: From the English Civil Wars to the Virginia Statute,"in The Virginia Statutefor Religious Freedom: Its Evolution and Consequences in American History, eds. Merrill D. Peterson and RobertC. Vaughan(Cambridge, 1988), 43-73. 68 See Samuel Pufendorf,Of the Natureand Qualificationof Religion in Referenceto Civil Society (London, 1698); and ChristianThomasiusand Enno RudolphBrenneysen,"VomRecht evangelischer Fiirsten in Mitteldingen oder Kirchenzeremonien"(De jure principis circa adiaphora, 1695), in Auserlesene deutsche Schriften Erster Teil, Ausgewdhlte Werke,ed. Schneiders,XXIII, 76-209.
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University metaphysics of course was not destroyed, at least not in Germany.In Englandthe incorporationof moderatePuritansin theAnglican settlement of the 1680s led to the marginalizationof metaphysicsfor its clericalism and enthusiasm.69 In the Germanstates,however,a sharperseparationbetween politics and religion had the paradoxicaleffect of creatinga space ("civil society")in which metaphysicscould regainits strengthandplot its revengeagainst the state fromwhich it had been excluded.70Nothing more sharplyfocuses the returnof Germanmetaphysicsto its full academicstrengththanKant'sconception of moralityas the capacity of rationalbeings to conform their will to the morallaw merelyby thinkingits idea. Kant'svehementinsistencethatonly the rationallypurifiedwill shoulddeterminemoralworth-his rejectionof all such "material"ends as "power,riches, honor, even health"and all such virtues as "moderationin affectsandpassions,self-control,andtranquilreflection"-shows how radicallya rebornmetaphysicsturnedaway from the kind of desacralized civil philosophyelaboratedby Thomasius.71 Ouronly concernwith Kantianmetaphysicshere is to note how inappropriate it is as a viewpoint for understandinga style of philosophy thatremainsin effect its swornenemy.To the degree thatit continuesto view him froma postKantianstandpoint,thatis, to the degree that it asks him to reconcile an unmotivatedrationalintellect andan irrationalpolitical will in the figureof self-governingrationalbeing, thenthe moder historiographyof philosophywill remain incapableof understandingan early moder civil philosopherlike Thomasius. For Thomasiuswas concernedwith a quite differentproblem:how to replacea philosophicalpaideia dedicated to the spiritualgrooming of self-sacralizing metaphysicalintellectualswith one capableof formingthe "juristiccivic consciousness"andprivatizedpiety of those chargedwith governinga desacralized state.72To the extentthatThomasiusentertainedthe "Kantian"problem,thenhe unhesitatinglydismissedit as an instanceof the metaphysician'ssecrettheology andphilosophicalpriestcraft. GriffithUniversity.
See, Goldie, "Priestcraft." As arguedby ReinhartKoselleck, Critiqueand Crisis: Enlightenmentand the Pathogenesis of Modern Society (Oxford, 1988). 71 Immanuel Kant, Groundworkof the Metaphysicsof Morals, AkademieAusgabe (Berlin, 1903-), IV, 393-94; and ImmanuelKant, Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor, The CambridgeEdition of the Worksof ImmanuelKant (Cambridge,1996), 49-50. 72 See Stephen Lestition, "The Teaching and Practice of Jurisprudencein 18th Century East Prussia:K6nigsberg'sFirst Chancellor,R. F. von Sahme (1682-1753)," lus Commune,16 (1989), 30. 69 70
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David Armitage EdmundBurkehas been one of the few political thinkersto be treatedseriously by internationaltheorists. Accordingto MartinWight,one of the founders of the so-called "EnglishSchool"of internationaltheory,Burkewas "[t]heonly political philosopherwho has turnedwholly from political theory to international theory."2The resurgenceof interestin Burkeas an internationaltheorist has not, however, generatedany consensus about how he might be classified within the traditionsof internationaltheory.Wight variously divided thinkers into trichotomousschools of Realists, Rationalists,and Revolutionaries,Machiavellians, Grotians,and Kantians,or theoristsof internationalanarchy,habitualintercourse,or moralsolidarity;3morerecentinternationaltheoristshave refined or supplementedthese categories to constructsimilartrinitariantraditions of Realism,Liberalism,and Socialism,andof EmpiricalRealism,Universal MoralOrder,and HistoricalReason.4Burke'splace within any of these traditionsremainsuncertain.Debate over whetherhe was a realistor an idealist, a My thanks to Jack Censer, Istvan Hont, Susan Marks, Damn McMahon,Julia Rudolph, and especially JeremyWaldronfor their comments on earlierversions of this essay. ' See David P. Fidler and Jennifer M. Welsh (eds.), Empire and Community:Edmund Burkes Writingsand Speeches on InternationalRelations (Boulder, 1999). 2 Martin Wight, "Why is There No InternationalTheory?"Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theoryof InternationalPolitics, ed. HerbertButterfieldand MartinWight (London, 1966), 20; on whom see Tim Dunne, InventingInternationalSociety: A History of the English School (Houndmills, 1998), 47-63. 3 MartinWight,InternationalTheory:The ThreeTraditions,ed. GabrieleWight and Brian Porter (London, 1991); Wight, "An Anatomy of InternationalThought,"Review of International Studies, 13 (1987), 221-27; Hedley Bull, "MartinWight and the Theory of International Relations,"British Journal of InternationalStudies, 2 (1976), 101-16 (repr.Wight, International Theory,ed. GabrieleWight and Porter,ix-xxiii); Brian Porter,"Patternsof Thoughtand Practice: MartinWight's 'InternationalTheory,'" The Reason of States: A Study in International Political Theory,ed. Michael Donelan (London, 1978), 64-74. 4 Michael W. Doyle, Waysof Warand Peace. Realism, Liberalism,and Socialism (New York, 1997), 18-20, andpassim; David Boucher,Political Theoriesof InternationalRelations: From Thucydidesto the Present (Oxford, 1998), 28-43, andpassim.
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Rationalistor a Revolutionist,has concludedvariouslythathe was a "conservative crusader"or an "historicalempiricist,"a belated dualistor a Cold Warrior beforethe fact, or,most egregiously,"aproto-Marxist,or moreprecisely protoGramscian"theoristof hegemony.5The factthatBurkeso obviouslyeludesdefinition may put in doubtthe analyticalutility of closely-defined "traditions"of internationaltheory.6 Burke'srelationshipto conceptionsof reasonof stateprovidesa more precise exampleof the confusionwithin such taxonomies.Accordingto one recent historianof internationaltheory,Burke"laidthe foundations"of the "conservative approachto InternationalRelationsinformedby the two moder notionsof stateinterestandnecessity,by raison d 'etat";however,in the words of another, "Burke... was vehemently opposed to the idea of Reason of Stateand did not subscribeto the view thatnationalinterestsoverridemorallaws."7The assumptions on which each of thesejudgmentsrestsareclearlyincompatible:on the one hand that a "conservativeapproach"in the realm of foreign affairs implies an espousal of reason of state defined as the primacyof "stateinterestand necessity,"thatBurkedid indeedacknowledge;on the otherhandthatreasonof state is definedmoreexactly as "theview thatnationalinterestsoverridemorallaws" andthatBurkedid not hold such a view, so could not be definedas a reason-ofstate theorist.It might of course be possible that Burke held various views on such mattersat variouspoints in his long literaryandpolitical careeror thathe arguedfor differingconceptionsof reasonof state in differingcontexts.To test such a hypothesis demandsa historical accountof Burke's relationshipto the theoriesof reasonof stateheld by his contemporariesandpredecessors.
5
R. J. Vincent, "EdmundBurke and the Theory of InternationalRelations,"Review of International Studies, 10 (1984), 205-18; David Boucher, "The Characterof the History of Philosophyof InternationalRelationsand the Case of EdmundBurke,"Review ofInternational Studies, 17 (1991), 127-48; Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations, 308-29; Vilho Harle,"Burkethe InternationalTheorist-or the Warof the Sons of Lightand the Sons of Darkness,"European Values in InternationalRelations, ed. Vilho Harle (London, 1990), 59, 72; KennethW. Thompson,Fathers of InternationalThought:The Legacy of Political Theory (Baton Rouge, 1994), 100; Fred Halliday,RethinkingInternationalRelations (London, 1994), 108-13. (Thanksto Anders Stephansonfor this last reference.) 6 Jennifer M. Welsh, EdmundBurke and International Relations (London, 1995), 6-9, 172-80; Welsh, "EdmundBurke and the Commonwealth of Europe: The CulturalBases of InternationalOrder,"Classical Theories of InternationalRelations, eds. Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann (Houndmills, 1996), 173-77, 183-86; Empireand Community,ed. Fidler and Welsh, 38-39, 51-56; and see Traditionsof InternationalEthics, eds. TerryNardinand David R. Mapel (Cambridge,1992); Timothy Dunne, "Mythologyor Methodology?Traditionsin International Theory,"Review of InternationalStudies, 19 (1993), 305-18; Ian Clark,"Traditionsof Thought and Classical Theories of InternationalRelations," Classical Theories of InternationalRelations, eds. Clark and Neumann, 1-19. 7 Torbj6m L. Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory: An Introduction (Manchester,1992), 141, 143; Boucher, Political Theories of InternationalRelations, 14.
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Toplace Burkewithintraditionsof reasonof statemightseem to be a simple category error.After all, he famously scorned "dashingMachiavellianpoliticians," deplored"the odious maxims of a Machiavellianpolicy," condemned "thedreadfulmaxim of Machiavelthatin greataffairsmen arenot to be wicked by halves,"and identifiedthe Discorsi as the inflammatorytextbookof French republicanism.8His strictureson Machiavelli and Machiavellianismaffirmed avantla lettrethe classic moder accountof reasonof stateofferedby Friedrich Meinecke, which counterposed"raisond'etat on the one hand,and ethics and law on the other"and tracedthe emergence of this separationto the heathen Florentinewho hadgiven the traditionits familiarnickname.9Such accountsof reasonof stateandof Machiavellireinforcedthe long-standinginterpretationof Burke as the last of the medieval theoristsof naturallaw, for whom no merely humancalculationsof advantageor interestcould overridethe dictatesof divine reason.If reasonof staterepresentedthe doctrinethatpoliticalexpediencyshould supersedemoral law, then Burkecould only have been its (and Machiavelli's) enemy: his "politics ... were groundedon recognitionof the universal law of reasonandjustice ordainedby God as the foundationof a good community.In thisrecognitionthe Machiavellianschismbetweenpoliticsandmoralityis closed, and it is exactly in this respectthatBurkestandsapartfromthe moder positivists and pragmatistswho in claiming him have diminishedhim."'0To accept otherwisewouldhave allowedhim to fall backintothe handsof those exponents of expediency,the utilitariansand the secularists. These accounts of reason of state and of naturallaw arguablydepended upon a misapprehensionof the moder naturallaw theoryto which Burkewas heir. Thattheory,revived initially by Hugo Grotiusand elaboratedby his successors, took its foundationalprincipleof self-preservationfromthe Stoics. To determinethe limitsof self-preservationas a practicalprinciplealwaysdemanded 8
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), in The Writingsand Speeches of EdmundBurke, ed. L. G. Mitchell, VIII, The French Revolution 1790-1794 (Oxford, 1989), 60, 132; Burke,FourthLetter on a Regicide Peace (1795-96), in R. B. McDowell (ed.), The Writingsand Speeches of EdmundBurke,ed. R. B. McDowell, IX, I: TheRevolutionary War1794-1797; II: Ireland (Oxford, 1991), 69 (alluding to Machiavelli, Discorsi, I. 27); Burke, Second Letter on a Regicide Peace (1796), Writingsand Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX, 282. 9 Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern History, tr. Douglas Scott, intro. WernerStark (New Brunswick, 1998), 28, 29. In Cosmopolitanismand the Nation State, tr. RobertB. Kimber(Princeton, 1970), 101, Meinecke had arguedthat Burke "struckthe first decisive blow against conceptions of the state that the eighteenthcenturyhad formed on the basis of naturallaw" and assimilatedhim to Machiavelli and later advocates of Realpolitik who had also recognized the importanceof "the irrational componentsof the life of the state, for the power of traditions,customs, instinct,and impulsive feelings." 10Burkes Politics. Selected Writingsand Speeches of EdmundBurkeon Reform,Revolution, and War,Ross J. Hoffman and Paul Levack (New York, 1949), xv.
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calculationsof competing goods accordingto consequentialistcriteria."This was true no less for bodies politic and their rulersthan it was for privatepersons. In the political realmthe fundamentaldeterminingfactor in any calculation of outcomeswould be necessity. In the case of the respublica necessity, as a principleof political action, could only be justified by an appealto thatsalus populi which was the supremalex, in Cicero's famous words (De Legibus, III, 3). Cicero placed severe constraintsupon such calculations in the municipal sphere,andrestrictedthemto the ends of self-defense,security,or the protection of liberty;any actionstakenin pursuitof such ends hadalso to avoid infamyand to be in accordancewith the republicanconstitution.'2In their laterrecensions -shorn of the specifically Roman and republicanlegal context within which Cicero wrote-such theoriescould reconcile the principlesof naturallaw with strictly limited appealsto necessity in the interestsof the common good; they could also be extendedbeyondthe municipalto the internationalrealm.13 This "moder" traditionof naturaljurisprudence,which rested upon the argumentsof Stoic ethics, was utilitarianto the extentthatit dependeduponthe calibrationof competinggoods in relationto specific ends.Toplace Burkewithin the theoryof reasonof statederivedfromthis traditionimplies no inconsistency in his thought.The opponentof "Machiavellian"expediencycould equallywell be the proponentof Ciceronian"necessity":the differencebetween the two dependedupon the criteriadeployed,the circumstancesthatcould be appealedto, andthe consequencesthatwere desiredor imagined.To situateBurkewithinthis strainof earlymodem reasonof statetheoryalso makesit possible to appreciate just "how much weight [he] attachesto considerationsbased on expediency, treatedsimply as a practicalregardfor consequences."'4 Moreover,since reason of state within this traditionwas consequentialist precisely because it was groundedin a neo-Stoic conceptionof naturallaw, to see Burkeas a reason-ofstatetheoristin this contextneatly avoids the steriledisputeaboutthe truecharacter of his political thoughtas eitherutilitarianor naturaljurisprudential.'5It could be describedas both, so long as the traditionof naturaljurisprudencein questionwas the "moder" one initiatedby Grotiusand so long as the utilitari1 Richard Tuck, "The 'Modem'
Theory of Natural Law," The Languages of Political Theoryin Early-ModernEurope, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge,1987), 99-119; Tuck, Philosophy and Government,1572-1651 (Cambridge, 1993), 172-76. 12 Norberto de Sousa, "Cicero on the Themes of Necessity and Public Utility," unpublished paperpresentedto the Seminar,"The Politics of Necessity and the Languageof Reason of State,"King's College, Cambridge,22 January1993. 13 RichardTuck, The Rights of Warand Peace: Political Thoughtand the International Orderfrom Grotiusto Kant (Oxford, 1999), 18-23, 29-31. 14 Donald Winch, Riches and Poverty: An Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain, 1750-1834 (Cambridge, 1996), 196. 15 John Dinwiddy, "Utility and Natural Law in Burke's Thought: A Reconsideration," Studies in Burke and His Time, 16 (1974), 107, 123-25.
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anismin questionwas of this consequentialistkind.The assertionthat"thenatural-lawtraditionandconsequentialismareopposedat a very deep level"is therefore not trueof all formsof naturaljurisprudenceor even of consequentialism;16 nor is it necessaryto choose between them to characterizeBurke'spolitical or internationalthought. Burke'sreason-of-statetheorycould be appliedequallyto the internalconstitution and the external relations of a state. In this way its scope extended beyond the internalpolitical determinationslaid down by Ciceroto the international realmtreatedby the "moder" theoristsof naturallaw like Grotius.Reason of state was thus Janus-facedlike its conceptual near-neighborsin early moder political thought,sovereignty,and the balance of power.7 Like them, reason of state crossed the boundarybetween political theory, defined as the theoryof legitimacyanddistributionof powerwithinthe state,andinternational theory.In both spheresreasonof stateacknowledgedthe compulsionsof necessity; its particulartheoreticalconcern was thereforewith the contingent, the extraordinary,and the unforeseeable."A high degree of causal necessity,"argued Meinecke,"whichthe agenthimself is accustomedto conceive as absolute and inescapable,and to feel most profoundly,is partof the very essence of all actionpromptedby raison d 'etat."'8Since necessity has no law (necessitas non habet legem), reasonof statecould not be codified or legislated.Reasonof state alone could not determinewhich circumstanceswere trulycases of extremenecessity andhencewhichpreciseoccasionscouldpermitthe overridingof custom and law. It could only lay down norms from which such exceptions could be derived,andmoregenerallyit provideda consequentialistmeansof applyingthe norms of naturallaw. In these regardsreason of state was close to resistance theorywhich also dealtwith extremityandoverwhelmingnecessity.Resistance theorydid, however,lay down stringentconditionsunderwhich rebellionmight be justified, even if only in retrospect,and offered a wider range of agents the possibility of makingjudgments of necessity, even to the point of democratic agency. The compulsion of necessity demandedin reason of state theory was assumedto be universallyrecognizablebutonly underparticularcircumstances by specific, usuallysovereign,agents.The conditionswhich would makenecessity both evident and compelling could never be defined with any precision;it thereforedemandedprincely or consiliar discretion for its application.These requirementsplaced it firmly among the arcana imperiiand left it open to the
16 Pace Joseph Boyle, "NaturalLaw and InternationalEthics," in Traditionsof International Ethics, eds. Nardin and Mapel, 119; compare Carl Friedrich,ConstitutionalReason of State: The Survival of the ConstitutionalOrder(Providence, R.I., 1957), 31-32. 17 F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty(Cambridge, 19862),chs. 4-5; M. S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919 (London, 1993), 150-54. 18
Meinecke, Machiavellism, 6
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charge(especiallyfromthosewho wereexcludedfromjudging)thatit was merely subjective,arbitrary,and unconstrainable. Because reason of state, whethermunicipal or international,was morally ambivalent,two types might legitimatelybe inferred,one naturalandhencejusThe EnglishWhig tifiable,the othermerelyputativeandhence reprehensible.19 traditionwhich precededBurkeanduponwhich he drewcontainedexamplesof these two strainsof reasonof state.Forexample,the Marquisof Halifaxargued in 1684 that "thereis a naturalreason of State, an undefinablething grounded uponthe Commongood of mankind,which is immortall,andin all changesand Revolutionsstill preservethits Originallrightof saving a Nation,when the Letter of the Law perhapswould destroyit."20"ReallNecessity,"he lateraffirmed, Since "is not to bee resisted,andpretendednecessity is not to bee alleadged."21 politicians still alleged necessity nonetheless, it would be distrustedas simply one of the "ArcanaImperii,"complainedJohnTolandin 1701, "whenin reality Reasonof Stateis nothingelse butthe rightreasonof managingthe affairsof the Stateat home andabroad,accordingto the Constitutionof the Government,and with regardto the Interestor Power of otherNations."22The difficulty of judging whetherreason of state was naturaland directedlegitimately towardsthe interestof the community,or contrivedfor the benefit of the rulersalone, made it both contestableand open to apparentlyopposing constructions,even within the thoughtof a single theorist.As Burkehimself noted in his ThirdLetteron a Regicide Peace (1796-97), "Necessity,as it has no law, so it has no shame;but moralnecessity is not like metaphysical,or even physical. In thatcategory,it is a word of loose signification,andconveys differentideas to differentminds."23 Burke'sengagementwith the languageof reasonof state ranfrom his first publishedpolitical work, the Vindicationof NaturalSociety (1756), to the last, the ThirdLetteron a Regicide Peace. In this he remarkedin passing that"reason of state and common-sense are two things";24thirty years earlier,in the Vindication,he had satirizedcontemporaryconsequentialismalong the same lines:
19MaurizioViroli, From Politics to Reason of State: TheAcquisitionand Transformation of the Language of Politics 1250-1600 (Cambridge, 1992), 273-74. 20 George Savile, Marquisof Halifax, The Characterof a Trimmer(1684), in The Worksof George Savile Marquis of Halifax, ed. MarkN. Brown (3 vols.; Oxford, 1989), I, 191. 21 Halifax, "Prerogative"(1685-88?), in Worksof George Savile Marquis of Halifax, ed. Brown, II, 41. 22 [JohnToland,] TheArt of Governingby Partys (London, 1701), 93-94. 23 Burke, ThirdLetter on a Regicide Peace (1796-97), in Writingsand Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX, 344. 24 Burke, ThirdLetter on a Regicide Peace, in Writingsand Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX, 300.
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All Writerson the Science of Policy are agreed, and they agree with Experience,thatall Governmentsmust frequentlyinfringethe Rules of Justiceto supportthemselves;thatTruthmust give way to Dissimulation;Honestyto Convenience;andHumanityitself to the reigningInterest. The Whole of this Mysteryof Iniquityis called the Reasonof State. It is a Reason, which I own I cannotpenetrate.What Sort of a Protection is this of the general Right, that is maintainedby infringingthe Rights of Particulars?Whatsort of Justiceis this, which is inforcedby Breaches of its own Laws? ... For my part, I say what a plain Man
would say on such an Occasion.I can neverbelieve, thatany Institution agreeableto Nature,andproperfor Mankind,could find it necessary,or even expedientin any Case whatsoeverto do, whatthe best andworthiest Instinctsof Mankindwarnus to avoid.25 The publicationof Bolingbroke's deistic writings in 1754 and of Rousseau's secondDiscourse in 1755 providedthe immediatetargetsfor the Vindication's ironic attemptto undermineargumentsin favor of naturalreligion by reducing However,Burke'starequivalentargumentsfor naturalsociety ad absurdum.26 get in this passage of the Vindicationwas neitherBolingbrokenorRousseaubut Hume. In the Treatiseof HumanNature (1739-40) Hume had arguedthat the laws of nations did not supersedethe laws of nature.Both persons and bodies politic were bound by the same duties to upholdpropertyand promises;however,the obligationis weakerfor princesthanfor privatepersons:"themorality of princes has the same extent, yet it has not the sameforce as that of private persons,"in proportionto the advantagesto be gained by nations ratherthan individualsfromsecurityof property,the administrationofjustice, andthe adjudication of equity, he argued.27When Hume returnedto this question in the EnquiryConcerningthePrinciples ofMorals (1751), he restatedthe distinction in the languageof reasonof stateandprovidedthe immediateoccasionforBurke's satirein the Vindication:
[Burke,] A Vindicationof Natural Society (1756), in The Writingsand Speeches of EdmundBurke, ed. T. O. McLoughlin and James T. Boulton, I, The Early Writings(Oxford, 1997), 154. Cf. Rousseau's almost exactly contemporaneousremarksin "The State of War"(c. 1755-56), in Rousseau: The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings,ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge, 1997), 163: "accordingto the ideas of princes about their absolute independence,force alone, speakingto citizens in the guise of law and foreignersin the guise of reason of state, deprives the latter of the power and the former of the will to resist, so that everywherethe vain name of justice only serves as a shield for violence." 26 J. C. Weston, Jr., "The Ironic Purpose of Burke's VindicationVindicated,"JHI, 19 (1958), 435-41; Burke: Pre-RevolutionaryWritings,ed. Ian Harris(Cambridge,1993), 4-6. 27 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, 19782),567-68 (III. ii. 11, "Of the laws of nations"). 25
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David Armitage The observanceofjustice, thoughusefulamong[nations],is not guarded by so stronga necessity as it is among individuals;and the moral obligation holds proportionwith the usefulness.All politicianswill allow, and most philosophers,that REASON OF STATEmay, in particular emergencies,dispensewith the rulesofjustice, andinvalidateany treaty or alliance, where the strictobservanceof it would be prejudicial,in a considerabledegree, to either of the contractingparties. But nothing less than the most extreme necessity, it is confessed, can justify individuals in a breachof promise, or an invasion of the propertiesof others.28
Burke's ironic recension of Hume left the theoreticalfoundationsof this argument for actingin accordancewith reasonof stateunscathed.Only if civil society itself were illegitimatewould such reasonof statebe unconscionable.If, as Burkelaterarguedin the Reflections,governmentwas a necessary"contrivance of humanwisdom to provide for humanwants"and if "men have a right that thesewantsshouldbe providedforby this wisdom,"it followed thatgovernment was empoweredto provide for those wants by any necessary means: the individual membersof civil society had alreadyresigned to the governmenttheir "rightof self-defense,the firstlaw of nature,"andhadthereforeceded adjudications of necessity to theirgovernors.29 Even within the municipal sphere, Burke argued, any law might be suspended,thoughonly underthe compulsionof extremenecessity andin the interest of the preservationof the political community.Conor Cruise O'Brien has taken such an admissionto be "one of those distressingmatters,aboundingin the Burkeanuniverse,forwhich some arrangementof veils was normallyapproHowever,the principleseems to have caused Burkelittle distressand priate."30 would hardlyhave been a revelationto him. As he told the House of Commons in 1780, the greatpatentoffices in the Exchequercould not be swept away in the nameof EconomicalReformbecause,as offices held for life, they were a species of propertyandonly necessity could overridethe principleof legitimatepossession. "Thereareoccasions ofpublick necessity,so vast, so clear,so evident,"he neverthelessadmitted,"thatthey supersedeall laws. Law being made only for the benefit of the community,no law can set itself up against the cause and
David Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), ed. Tom L. Beauchamp(Oxford, 1998), 100 (Section IV, "Of Political Society"). 29 Burke,Reflectionson the Revolutionin France, in Writingsand Speeches, ed. Mitchell, VIII, 110; and see lain Hampsher-Monk,"Burkeand the Religious Sources of Skeptical Conservatism,"in The Skeptical TraditionAround 1800. Skepticismin Philosophy, Science, and Society, ed. JohanVan der Zande and RichardH. Popkin (Dordrecht,1998), 235-59. 30Conor Cruise O'Brien, The Suspecting Glance (London, 1972), 34-35. 28
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reason of all law."31Only such overmastering compulsion, defined in accordance with public necessity (the Ciceronian utilitas publica or utilitas rei publicce), could justify an appeal to reason of state. On the same grounds, he charged that the Protestant Association's opposition to Catholic relief, which they "dignified by the name of reason of state, and security for constitutions and commonwealths" was a mere "receipt of policy, made up of a detestable compound of malice, cowardice, and sloth," and hence not a legitimate invocation of the principle.32Because the appeal to necessity was only justifiable for the benefit of the whole community and ultimately the preservation of society itself, the occasions on which it could legitimately be invoked had to be extraordinary and overmastering: as Burke argued consistently during the impeachment of Warren Hastings, it could therefore not be raised into a regular principle of government.33 Burke argued that only the Glorious Revolution fulfilled these exacting conditions in recent English history and hence provided a reliable standard against which to judge later claims of public necessity. Richard Price's assertion that 1688 had made cashiering kings a regular principle of the British constitution forced Burke to refine this theory of state necessity. Against Price, Burke argued that the Revolution had been "an act of necessity, in the strictest moral sense in which necessity can be taken," and that it could not therefore be erected into a constitutional precedent. The extremity of the situation showed that it was possible "to reconcile the use of both a fixed rule and an occasional deviation" and that this was the only way to remedy such an emergency without a complete dissolution of government.34This argument resuscitated a Tory means to defend the Whig doctrine of the ancient constitution in the aftermath of 1688; by adopting it Burke was also following the lead of the nervous Whig prosecutors of Henry Sacheverell in 1712.35This particular argument from necessity had first been employed as a justification of the Revolution by Tories such as Edmund EdmundBurke, "Speech on Presentingto the House of Commons, a Plan for the Better Securityof the Independenceof Parliament,and the (EconomicalReformationof the Civil and OtherEstablishments"(1780), in The Worksof the Right HonourableEdmundBurke(16 vols.; London, 1803-27), III, 308-9. 32 EdmundBurke, "Speechat the Guildhallin Bristol, Previousto the Late Election in that Certain Points Relative to his ParliamentaryConduct"(1780), in Worksof Edmund City, Upon Burke,III, 418. 33 Carl B. Cone, EdmundBurkeand the Natureof Politics (2 vols.; Lexington, Ky., 195764), II, 205-7; W. H. Greenleaf, "Burkeand State Necessity: The Case of WarrenHastings," Staatsrdson.Studienzur Geschichteeinespolitischen Begriff,ed. RomanSchnur(Berlin, 1975), 549-67; FrederickG. Whelan,EdmundBurke and India: Political Moralityand Empire(Pittsburgh, 1996), 188-93, 199-202. 34 Richard Price, A Discourse on the Love of our Country(London, 17893),34; Burke, Reflectionson the Revolutionin France, in Mitchell (ed.), Writingsand Speeches, VIII, 68, 72. 35 MarkGoldie, "ToryPolitical Thought, 1689-1714" (PhD diss., Cambridge,1978), 328; J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitutionand the Feudal Law: A Reissue with Retrospect (Cambridge, 1987), 381. 31
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Bohun and ThomasLong, as well as by the Whig CharlesBlount, who had all relied upon Grotiusto justify a limitedrightof resistance,as had defacto theoIn Book I of De rists like AnthonyAscham earlierin the seventeenthcentury.36 lure Belli ac Pacis (1625) Grotiusadmittedthat even some of the laws of God carrieda tacit exception in cases of extreme and imminentperil, though in no case would this be defensible if considerationof the common good were to be abandoned.On such minimalistgroundsresistancewould be justified againsta rulerwho hadrenouncedhis governmentalauthority,alienatedhis kingdom,or otherwisemadehimselfanenemyto thepeople.37Strippedof its explicitlyGrotian roots, though maintainingthe appeal to self-preservation,this argumentprovided the Whig managersof Sacheverell'simpeachmentwith just the weapon they neededto combatthe doctrineof non-resistancewithoutraisingthe specter of a generalandunrestrictedrightof rebellion.38Burkequotedthe transcriptof the Sacheverell trial at length in the Appealfrom the New to the Old Whigs (1791) to show (in Robert Walpole's words) that only "the utmost necessity ought ... to engage a nation, in its own defense,for the preservation of the whole."39
Duringthe debateon the FrenchRevolution,reasonof state in the Grotian traditionprovidedBurkewith an argumentto show thatthe events of 1688 (in England) and 1789 (in France)were similar in that each presenteda case of imminentdangerthatjustified armedinterventionandhence fulfilledthe conditions of"necessity."This argumentfromnecessity therebysuppliedBurkewith a weaponagainstthose EnglishJacobinswho assimilatedthe FrenchRevolution to the GloriousRevolution, and it helped him to show that 1789 was indefensible forjust the same reasonsthat 1688 had beenjustifiable. Burkecould then arguethat the FrenchRevolution was uniquely threatening,because it jeopardized the true interests of the states of Europe which were the basis of their naturalreasonsof state.On these grounds,a crusadeagainstthe FrenchRevolu-
36 MarkGoldie, "EdmundBohun and Jus Gentiumin the Revolution Debate, 1689-1693," TheHistoricalJournal, 20 (1977), 569-86; JohnM. Wallace,Destiny His Choice. TheLoyalism of AndrewMarvell (Cambridge,1968), 32-35. AnthonyAscham, A Discourse: Whereinis Examined What is Particularly Lawful during the Confusions and Revolutions of Government (London, 1648) was republishedas A Seasonable Discourse..., in 1689. 37 Hugo Grotius,De lure Belli ac Pacis (1625), I. 4. 7-14, cited for example by [Charles Blount,] TheProceedings of the Present ParliamentJustified by the Opinionof the Most Judicious and Learned Hugo Grotius (London, 1689); [Thomas Long,] The Historian Unmask'd (London, 1689), 22, 35. 38 Geoffrey Holmes, The Trial of Dr Sacheverell (London, 1973), 139; Peter N. Miller, Defining the CommonGood: Empire,Religion and Philosophy in Eighteenth-CenturyBritain (Cambridge, 1994), 79-87. 39 Burke, An Appealfrom the New to the Old Whigs (1791), in Daniel E. Ritchie (ed.), EdmundBurke,FurtherReflectionson the Revolutionin France (Indianapolis,1992), 131; for Burke's use of the trial see ibid., 124-44.
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tion would be "the most clearlyjust and necessary war, that this or any other nationever carriedon,"40in accordancewith the principlesof the law of nations laid down by the Swiss jurist Emerichde Vattel. For Burkethe crucialdistinction was that Englandbefore 1688 was like Franceafter and not before 1789. Thoughthe EnglishJacobinswantedto see the Frenchrepublicansas the equivalent of the Whigs, for Burkethey were not only the equivalentof the Jacobites but were in fact more like Louis XIV in theirdesire for universalmonarchy. Burke'sappealto necessity revealedthe conceptualdifferencebetween the GloriousRevolutionand the FrenchRevolution.The formerhad been limited, strategic,andconstrainedpreciselyby the principleofsaluspopuli; the latterset fairto unleashillimitableconsequencesas a resultof its unprincipledandunrestrictedreasonsof state thatwould endangerthe integrityof all states. This, at least, was the directionof Burke'sargumentin the years following the publication of the Reflections and markeda shift in his conception of reason of state between 1790 and 1793. However,the fundamentalargument,derivedfromnecessity andbased upon vestiges of the Romanandneo-Romantheoryof reason of state,was containedin the Reflectionsitself. The GloriousRevolutionandthe FrenchRevolutioncouldbe distinguishedaccordingto the trueandfalse appeals to necessity each had inspired.Withinthe terms of the ius gentiumEnglandin 1688 andFranceafter 1793 became conceptuallyequivalentbecause each state was internallydivided, each was threatenedby or itself threatenedan imminent danger,and hence each could justifiably necessitate armed intervention.The distinctionlay in the fact thatFranceafter 1793 (underthe militant,oppressive and outwardlyaggressiveDirectory)was equatedwith Englandin 1688 (under the rule of the tyrannicalJamesII). As Burkeput it in a startlingpassage of the Reflections, thick with classical allusions and founded upon an argumentfor conquestthatwas originallyTory,not Whig: Laws are commandedto hold theirtongues againstarms;andtribunals fall to the groundwith the peace they are no longerable to uphold.The Revolution of 1688 was obtained by a just war, in the only case in which any war, and much more a civil war, can be just. "Justabella quibus necessaria."41
Burkehere alludedto two of the most frequently-citedclassical mottosjustifying force over law -Cicero's maxim silent leges inter armas (Pro Milone, IV. 11) andthe speechof Pontiusthe Samnitein which he arguedthatthe Roman
40
Burke,A Letter to a Noble Lord (1796), in Writingsand Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX,
168. 41 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, Writingsand Speeches, ed. Mitchell, VIII, 80.
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rejectionof the Samnites'conciliatoryoverturesafterthe battleof the Caudine Forksjustified them in going to war on groundsof necessity: iustumest bellum, Samnites,quibus necessarium(Livy, Histories, IX. 1. 10). In De lure Belli ac Pacis Grotiushad similarlyarguedthatonly the municipallaws of a particular communityare"silent ... in the midst of arms"while the naturallaw remainsin force. Grotiusfurtherarguedthat anyone who has given anotherjust cause for war cannot claim to be acting defensively when they are attacked;just so the Samniteswerejustified in attackingthe Romansafterthe battleof the Caudine Forks.42When Roman implacabilitydemandedextrememeasuresin response, warbecamea necessity,andarmsbecamelawful for thosewho were deprivedof all other hope. In just such terms, Burke concluded that the intransigenceof JamesII had been a similar"case of war, and not of constitution,""anextraordinaryquestionof state, andwholly out of law."43 Externalintervention,in this case by the ProtestantPrinceof Orangeandhis army,had beenjustified in England'sinternalaffairs,as a civil war outside the bounds of municipallaw became a public war between two princes underthe principles of the ius gentium. In such a contest victory generateda legitimate appealto conquest.On these groundsit was possible to see William'sintervention in 1688 as an example of a just war and his victory over Jamesas a legitimate act of conquest.44It is possible thatBurkehere was thinkingprimarilyas an Irishman:the WilliamiteWarof 1689-91 that markedthe Irishphase of the Glorious Revolution was indeed a war of conquest, as the bloodless standoff HowbetweenJamesII andthe futureWilliamIIIhadhardlybeen in England.45 Le Droit des In ever, more easily documentedis Burke's debt here to Vattel. Gens (1758) Vattel arguedthat every foreign power had a right to aid an oppressed people if insupportabletyrannyhad driven them to rebellion,just as "[t]heEnglishjustly complainedof James II" in 1688. "Whenevermattersare carriedso far as to produce a civil war, foreign powers may assist that party which appearsto them to have justice on its side," moreover,"every foreign powerhas a rightto succouran oppressedpeople who imploretheirassistance." On these groundsWilliam of Orangehad justly intervenedon the side of the injuredparties,the people of England.46 42 Grotius,De lure Belli ac Pacis, "Prolegomena"26; II. 1. 18; and see David J. Bederman, "Receptionof the Classical Traditionin InternationalLaw: Grotius'sDe Jure Belli ac Pacis," Grotiana, 16/17 (1995/96), 32. 43 Burke,Reflectionson the Revolutionin France, in Writingsand Speeches, ed. Mitchell, VIII, 80. 44 MartynP. Thompson,"TheIdea of Conquestin the Controversiesover the 1688 Revolution," JHI, 38 (1977), 33-46; Mark Goldie, "CharlesBlount's Intentionin WritingKing William and Queen Mary Conquerors(1693)," Notes and Queries, 223 (1978), 527-32. 45 The argumentthat Burke'sdivided Irishnessinflected the whole course of this political is the burdenof ConorCruiseO'Brien, The GreatMelody:A ThematicBiographyand thinking CommentedAnthologyof EdmundBurke (London, 1992). 46 Emerichde Vattel,Le Droit des Gens (Neuchatel, 1758), II. 4. 56; III. 18. 296.
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Vattel's use of the Glorious Revolution to justify intervention by foreign powers and Burke's argument that the Revolution presented a case of just war were in fact the same argument, each with the conclusion that 1688 had been a just war precisely because intervention from outside had been justified according to Vattel's criteria. Burke used just this argument, with direct support from Vattel, in Thoughts on French Affairs (1791) to show that "[i]n this state of things (that is in the case of a divided kingdom) by the law of nations, Great Britain, like every other Power, is free to take any part she pleases." "For this," he had earlier counselled his son, "consult a very republican writer Vattell."47 This appeal to Vattel harked back to an earlier debate on the morality of war, when -in the case of British capture of the Dutch island of St Eustatius in 1781 during the American War- Burke had invoked "Vattel as being the latest and best [exponent of natural law], and whose testimony he preferred; because, being a modem writer, he expresses the sense of the day in which we live."48In the case of the French Revolution, however, the question ofjustice was more vexed and controvertible. According to Vattel, it was "a very celebrated question, and of the highest importance" whether the aggrandisement of a neighboring power could be a sufficient and just reason for war.49Although Grotius and later Wolff had specifically argued that it could never be a just grounds for war "to take up arms in order to weaken a growing power" simply because it might become a source of danger,50Vattel disagreed, and provided Burke with just the reason-ofstate argument he needed to justify a holy war against the Directory. Vattel argued that the safety of a state could be so threatened by a looming neighbor that it would be just to anticipate aggression in the interests of the liberty and order of the whole of Europe, as had been the case during the War of the Spanish Succession.5' He argued further that modem Europe was now a kind of republic in which all of the formerly separate nations were bound together by the ties of common interest. The balance of power was the safeguard of those common interests and provided the means of guaranteeing liberty for Europe. A purely utilitarian cal47 Edmund Burke, Thoughtson French Affairs (1791), in Ritchie (ed.), Further Reflections on the Revolution in France, 207; Burke to RichardBurke, Jr., 5 August 1791, in The Correspondenceof EdmundBurke: VIJuly 1789-December 1791, ed. Alfred Cobbanand Robert A. Smith (Cambridge,1967), 317. 48 Edmund Burke, "Speech on the Seizure and Confiscation of Private Property in St Eustatius,"14 May 1781, in TheParliamentaryHistory of Englandfrom the Earliest Timesto 1803 (36 vols.; London, 1806-20), XXII, col. 231; and see RonaldHurst,The GoldenRock. An Episode of the American Warof Independence:1775-1783 (London, 1996). 49 Vattel,Droit des Gens, III. 3. 42. 50 Grotius,De lure Belli ac Pacis, II. 1. 17; II. 22. 5; ChristianWolff,Jus GentiumMethodo Scientifica Pertractatum(1749), ?? 640, 651-52; Alfred Vagts and Detlev F. Vagts, "The Balance of Power in InternationalLaw: A History of an Idea,"AmericanJournal of International Law, 73 (1979), 562; Tuck, Rights of Warand Peace, 189-90. 51 Vattel,Droit des Gens, III. 3. 42-44.
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culationwould not be enough to justify preventiveaggression,and only a preemptiveresponseto a threatenedinjurycould be sufficientjustificationfor war. Confederaciesmightbe the best meansof defendingagainstsuch injuries,but if they failed, an evidentlyaggressivepowerwhich threatenedthe libertiesof Europe should be opposed and weakened in the interestsof the great commonwealth and in accordancewith justice and probity.52 Michael Walzerhas taken Burketo be the opponentandVattelthe proponentof interventionto upholdthe balanceof powerthatmaintainedthe stabilityof the European"republic";however, whateverBurke'sviews may have been in 1760, by 1793 he had come to agreewith Vattelthatsuch interventionin defense of the balanceof power was justifiable.53 Vattel'skey historicalexampleof suchjustifiableprecautionwas the Warof the Spanish Succession. In that war, as Whigs had argued at the time and as Vattelagreedhalf a centurylater,Louis XIV had presenteda dire threatto the Because Burke whole Europeanorderby his designs for universalmonarchy.54 War saw 1789 in the the of he againstthe Directory similarly light 1688, judged to be conceptuallyequivalentto the Warof the SpanishSuccession. The Treaty of Utrechtthathad endedthatwar enshrinedthe balanceof power as the central regulatingprincipleof the internationalorderin oppositionto the threatof universal monarchyfrom a power such as Louis XIV's France. Reason of state after 1713 thereforemade preventive aggressionjustifiable in defense of the balanceagainstaspiringuniversalmonarchs.The Whiggish idiom of universal monarchyand the memory of the wars that had spawnedit clearly lay behind Burke's warningin the Letters on a Regicide Peace that "France,on her new system, means to form a universal empire, by producinga universal revolution."55This was the logical successor to Burke's argumentin the Reflections thatthe FrenchRevolutionand its aftermathshouldbe seen in light of the Glorious Revolution.The analogywas useful precisely because the commonmaxims of Europeancivilizationandsecurityso menacinglythreatenedby the "new 52 Vattel,Droit des
Gens, III. 3. 44, 47-49. Michael Walzer,Just and Unjust Wars(New York, 19922),76-80, quoting Burke'sAnnual Register,3 (1760), 2; and see GaetanoL. Vincitorio,"EdmundBurke and the First Partition of Poland: Britain and the Crisis of 1772 in the 'Great Republic,"' Crisis in the "Great Republic": Essays Presented to Ross J. Hoffman,ed. GaetanoL. Vincitorio(New York, 1969), 33-42. 54 John Robertson,"UniversalMonarchyand the Libertiesof Europe:David Hume's Critique of an English Whig Doctrine,"Political Discourse in Early ModernBritain, ed. Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner(Cambridge, 1993), 356-68. 55 Edmund Burke, ThirdLetter on a Regicide Peace, in McDowell (ed.), Writingsand Speeches, IX, 340. Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrensdorf,Justice AmongNations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace (Lawrence,Kan., 1999), 184, arguethat "it is in his loathing of universalempirethatBurkestands furthest,in his conceptionof internationalrelations,from his otherwise favorite authority,the Roman patriot Cicero," though this fails to distinguish between differing conceptions of "universalempire"(on which see, for example, Cicero, De Officiis, II. 27). 53
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system"of the Frenchand upheldby Vattel.56Vattel'sargumentwas partlythe productof the openingphase of the Seven Years'War,andin it he assumed-as Bolingbroke, Hume, Robertson,and Gibbon also did57- that the balance of power as enshrinedin the Treatyof Utrechtwas the basis of the international order.Burkereturnedto the same originto arguethat,"[i]fto preventLouis the XIVth from imposing his religion was just, a war to preventthe murderersof Louis XVIth from imposingtheirirreligionupon us is just."58 The RevolutionaryWarswould in due course shatterthe Europeanbalance of power and, as Paul Schroederhas argued, thereby irreversiblytransform Europeanpolitics.59Burkewas the prophetof the transformation,and he foresaw it with the help of Vattel,in accordancewith post-Utrechtreasonof state.In the Remarkson the Policy of the Allies (1793) he cited Vattelto show that the rightto intervenebecamea dutyin certaincircumstances,accordingto "whether it be a bona fide charity to a party,and a prudentprecautionwith regardto yourself."As Burkeshowed with an appendixof extractsfromVattel,intervention against France would be a "prudentprecaution"for all Europeanstates preciselybecausethe Frenchrepublicpresentedanunprecedentedthreatto their naturalreasonsof state-their interests,theirsecurity,andabove all theirshared political maxims as partnersin the commonwealthof Europe.60Proximity,vicinity,andlegitimateapprehensionof dangerthereforejustified intervention:as Burkecrisply summarizedthis position in 1796, "I shouldcertainlydreadmore from a wild cat in my bed-chamber,than from all the lions that roar in the desertsbeyondAlgiers."61 See J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarismand Religion, I: The Enlightenmentsof EdwardGibbon, 1737-1764 (Cambridge,1999), 109-13, 133-34, 138-39, and Barbarismand Religion, II: Narratives of Civil Government(Cambridge, 1999), 170, 219, 275-77. 57Bolingbrokes Defence of the Treatyof Utrecht,ed. G. M. Trevelyan(Cambridge,1932); David Hume, "Of the Balance of Power" (1752), in Eugene F. Miller (ed.), Hume, Essays: Moral, Political and Literary(Indianapolis,1987), 338-41; FrederickG. Whelan, "Robertson, Hume, and the Balance of Power,"Hume Studies, 21 (1995), 315-32; Jeremy Black, "Gibbon and InternationalRelations," Edward Gibbon and Empire, ed. Rosamond McKitterickand Roland Quinault(Cambridge, 1997), 225-28. 58 EdmundBurke, First Letter on a Regicide Peace (1796), in Writingsand Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX, 238; compareBurke,A Letterto a Memberof the National Assembly(1791), in Writingsand Speeches, ed. Mitchell, VIII, 306: "Theprinces of Europe,in the beginningof this century,did well not to sufferthe monarchyof Franceto swallow up the others.They ought not now, in my opinion, to suffer all the monarchiesand commonwealthsto be swallowed up in the gulph of this polluted anarchy." 59 Paul W. Schroeder,TheTransformationof EuropeanPolitics, 1763-1848 (Oxford, 1994). 60 Edmund Burke, Remarkson the Policy of the Allies (1793), in Writingsand Speeches, ed. Mitchell, VIII, 474; the "Appendix"of extracts from Vattel is inexplicably omitted from this edition. For a fragmentof Burke's working notes on Vattel see Sheffield City Libraries WentworthWoodhouse Muniments, 10/27, (passage transcribedfrom Vattel,Droit des Gens, II. 12. 196-97, printedin Burke,Remarkson the Policy of the Allies [London, 1793], 207-9). 61 Burke, First Letter on a Regicide Peace in Writingsand Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX, 259 (arguingagainstCharlesJames Fox's claim thatthe Frenchrepublicshould be toleratedon the same groundsthatjustified keeping a consul in Algiers). 56
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Burke arguedin the Thoughtson FrenchAffairs (1791) that,though there hadbeen manyinternalrevolutionswithinthe governmentsof Europe,none (not even the GloriousRevolution)had effects beyond theirown limitedterritories. However,he added: The presentRevolutionin Franceseems to me to be quite of another characterand description;and to bear little resemblanceor analogy to any of those which have been broughtaboutin Europe,uponprinciples merelypolitical.It is a Revolutionof doctrineand theoretickdogma. It has a muchgreaterresemblanceto those changeswhichhavebeen made uponreligiousgrounds,in which a spiritof proselytismmakesan essential part. The last Revolution of doctrine and theory which has happenedin Europe,is the Reformation... [the] effect [of which] was to introduce other interests into all countries, than those which arose from their locality and natural circumstances.62 To introducealien interests,as the Reformationhad done andas the Revolution threatenedto do, and in particularto introducealien interestswhich claimed universalapplicability,such as justificationby faith or the rights of man, dissolved the necessaryconnectionbetween a state's naturalsituationand the idiomaticinterestsit generated.Thereby,"if they did not absolutelydestroy,[they] and with it the at least weakened and distractedthe locality of patriotism"63 determinative,organicreasonsof state. Throughoutthe 1790s andparticularlyduringthe opening years of the war againstthe DirectoryBurkemaintainedthatBritainand its allies were engaged againstFrancein a "religiouswar,""amoralwar"againstthe "armeddoctrine" of "a sect aiming at universalempire."64 Of course he was not alone in arguing thatthe war againstthe Directorywas a war of religion;such argumentswere a staple of Anglican polemic during the early years of the war. This "new and unheard-ofscheme of conquestand aggrandizement... the total subversionof every lawful government,of all order,of all property,and of all established religion"could only be resistedby a "justand necessary war,"arguedWalker King at Gray's Inn in 1793. "The nation with whom we are at war,"Charles
62 Burke, Thoughtson FrenchAffairs, in FurtherReflectionson the Revolutionin France, ed. Ritchie, 208 (Burke's emphases). 63 Burke, Thoughtson FrenchAffairs, in FurtherReflectionson the Revolutionin France, ed. Ritchie, 209. 64Burke,Remarkson the Policy of theAllies (1793), in Writingsand Speeches, ed. Mitchell, VIII,485; FourthLetteron a RegicidePeace (1795-96), in Writingsand Speeches,ed. McDowell, IX, 70; First Letter on a Regicide Peace (1796), in Writingsand Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX, 199; Second Letter on a Regicide Peace, in Writingsand Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX, 267.
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MannersSuttontold the membersof the House of Lordsin the following year, "is professedly a heathen nation; and unless it shall please God to spare his people, our laws, and liberty, and religion, are inevitably lost." Such "a war againstall Religion, carriedon in the very centerof Christendom,by a people hithertonumberedamongthe most enlightenedof nations,"GeorgeGordoninformed his audience in Exeter on the same day, "is a novelty in history";to opposeit woulddemand"awarof ster necessity,andconsequentlyof the strictest justice."65However, Burke'schargeof universalempirehintedthatthe French republicwas as great a threatto the common maxims of the great republicof Europe as Louis XIV had been almost a century earlier.In his international theory as in his political theory Burkeremainedtrueto the ideological inheritance of EnglishWhiggismnot least becausehe drewso heavily on Vattel,whose anglophiliawas decidedlyWhig in complexion66andwhose doctrinesof the law of nationswere directedto the same end as Burke's,thatis, to the defense of the Europeanbalanceof power andthe new internationalreasonsof stateoriginally guaranteedby the Treatyof Utrecht. Burkewas morethanjust a conspiracytheoristof the Revolution(thoughhe did sympathizewith those, like the Abbe Barruel,who saw free-thinkers,Freehe was also more masons, andJews behindthe events of 1789 andthereafter);67 thansimplythe most franticandprominentapologistfor Anglicanismin the face of Frenchrevolutionaryatheism(thoughthereis truthin thatview, too). He was in fact a classic early modem theoristof reason of state within the natural-law traditionrevived by Grotius and revised by Vattel. Reason of state made the internaland externalrealms of state policy mutually intelligible for Burke; it providedhim with an argumentto ensuresecurityin extremitywithoutdestroying security,property,or law; andit providedthe mostpersuasiveanalysisof the collapse of the Europeanstate system, the failureof the balance of power, and the desperateneed for self-preservationcompelledby the FrenchRevolution.68 This strainwithin Burke'spolitical thoughtshowed thatreasonof state had not
65 Walker King, TwoSermons,Preached at Grays-Inn Chapel; On Friday,April 19, 1793 (London, 1793), 12, 10-11; Charles Manners Sutton, A Sermon Preached Before the Lords on Friday, February28, Spiritualand Temporalin the Abbey Churchof St. Peter, Westminster, 1794 (London, 1794), 14; George Gordon,A Sermon,Preached in the CathedralChurchof St. Peter, Exeter,On Friday, February 28, 1794 (Exeter, 1794), 10, 26. 66 See Vattel,Droit des Gens, I. 2. 24; I. 4. 39; I. 6. 76; I. 8. 85, 87, etc. 67 J. M. Roberts, "The Origins of a Mythology: Freemasons,Protestantsand the French Revolution,"Bulletin of the Instituteof Historical Research,44 (1971), 78-97; Amos Hofman, "The Origins of the Theory of the Philosophe Conspiracy,"French History, 2 (1988), 152-72; and DarrinM. McMahon,Enemies of the Enlightenment:The French Counter-Enlightenment the Origins of the EuropeanRight, 1778-1830 (Oxford, forthcoming). 68 Peter Onuf and Nicholas Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World:The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolutions, 1776-1814 (Madison, 1993), 8-9, 188-89.
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lost its rational basis long before 1789 (pace Reinhard Koselleck);69 it also demonstrated that it was not a necessary consequence of reason-of-state theory that it should separate a state's domestic maxims from its foreign policies (pace Meinecke);70 and it proved, to Burke's satisfaction (as it no doubt would have been to Vattel's, too), that reason of state was not by definition the enemy of "law or innate moral principles" (pace almost everybody).71 However, Vattel and Burke stood at the end of this tradition of reason of state. After all, it was in the context of the same late eighteenth-century wars that Kant and Bentham produced their respective plans for perpetual peace, each of whom attempted to conceive cooperative, transparentinternationalnorms and institutions that would render such reason of state inoperable and obsolete.72 Both also questioned the Whiggishly self-congratulatory account of the Glorious Revolution on whose historical foundations Burke's theory rested, Kant because it exemplified both a "monstrous" appeal to "a right of necessity" (ius in casu necessitatis) and a tacit, standing right to rebellion without restriction, Bentham because he could not see it as beneficial for the interest of the nation (rather than to the "particular interest of the aristocratical leaders in the revolution").73The Kantian categorical imperative and Bentham's greatest happiness principle provided competing but equally fatal alternatives to this tradition of reason of state; their anathematization of it opened up that gulf between morality and politics out of which Meinecke's instrumentalistaccount-and, consequently, almost everyone else's-emerged. To place Burke on one side or the other of this argument has always risked distorting historical accounts of his thought, whether in the political sphere or the international realm; it has also sharpened the distinction between these two arenas in ways which neither early moder theorists of reason of state nor Burke himself would have recognized. Burke's place in the history of international thought should therefore be assimilated more closely to his position in the traditions of political thought, as a standing reproach to procrustean taxonomies and overhasty appropriations. Columbia University. 69 Reinhard Koselleck, Critiqueand Crisis: Enlightenmentand the Pathogenesis of Modern Society, Eng. tr. (Cambridge,Mass., 1988), 17, 39. 70Meinecke, Machiavellism, 13. 71 In this case, Boucher,"TheCharacterof the Historyof Philosophyof InternationalRelations and the Case of EdmundBurke," 135. 72 Immanuel Kant, "PerpetualPeace: A Philosophical Sketch"(1795), in Kant: Political Writings,ed. HansReiss (Cambridge,19912),93-130; JeremyBentham,"PacificationandEmancipation" (1786-89), Bentham MSS XXV, University College London, printed (in a heavily edited version) as "A Plan for an Universal and PerpetualPeace;" in The Worksof Jeremy Bentham,ed. John Bowring (11 vols., London, 1843), II, 546-60; Stephen Conway, "Bentham versus Pitt: Jeremy Bentham and British Foreign Policy 1789," The Historical Journal, 30 (1987), 803-9. 73ImmanuelKant,"Onthe CommonSaying: 'This May be Truein Theory,But it Does Not Apply in Practice"'(1793), in Kant: Political Writings,ed. Reiss, 81, 83-84; JeremyBentham, "The Book of Fallacies"(1818), in Bowring (ed.), Worksof JeremyBentham,II, 447-48.
The
of
Mystery
Louis-Claude de
Truth:
Saint-Martin's
Enlightened Mysticism David Bates
"... what truth! and what error!" -Goethe on Saint-Martin' It is hardly surprising that Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin (1743-1803), the philosophe inconnu of late Enlightenment Europe, remains almost completely unknown outside of the marginalized and exotic disciplines ofesoterism, theosophy, and mysticism. Although influential in certain circles, Saint-Martin failed to penetrate the mainstream of Enlightenment thought, and what influence he did have in philosophy was largely felt outside of this period altogether, revealing itself in figures such as Maistre,2 Lamartine,3and German Romantics like Franz von Baader.4 In his own lifetime Saint-Martin was met with incredulity by the forces of rationalism. Voltaire was given a copy of Saint-Martin's 1775 text Des erreurs et de la verite by a friend ofd'Alembert. Voltaire later commented to the mathematician, "I don't believe anyone has ever printed anything more absurd, I would like to thankthejournal'sreadersfor theirsuggestionsandcorrections;also Harvey Mitchell, Michael Geyer, Jan Goldstein, and Steven Wolfe. 1 In a letterto Lavateron 9 April 1781, Goethe wrote: "Indem Buche des Erreurset de la verite, das ich angefangen habe, welche Wahrheit!und welche Irrthum!"Quoted in Bertram Barnes, Goethes Knowledge of French Literature(Oxford, 1937), 84. 2 Emile Dermenghem,Joseph de Maistre mystique(Paris, 1923). 3 Christian Croisille, "L'Influence de l'illuminisme dans la formation de la pensee Le Preromantisme.Hypothequeou hypothese?Colloque romantique:Lamartineet Saint-Martin," organise a Clermont-Ferrand...ed. PaulViallanieux(Paris, 1975), 450-67; and C. M. Lombard, "The influence of Saint-Martinon Lamartine,"Modern Language Notes, 70 (1955), 42-44. 4 Elme-Marie Caro, Du mysticisme au XVIIIesiecle: essai sur la vie et la doctrine de Saint-Martinlephilosophe inconnu(1852) (Geneva, 1975); ErnstBenz, Les sources mystiques de la philosophie romantiqueallemande (Paris, 1968), esp. 69-114.
635 Copyright2000 by Journalof the Historyof Ideas,Inc.
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more obscure,more crazy,and more stupid."5In the Tableaude Paris, Mercier described Saint-Martinand his martinistfollowers as a sect which turnedits backon the pathsopenedup by soundphysics, chemistry,andall naturalhistory in order"to run headlong into an invisible world only they perceived."SaintMartintaughtthatthe objectswe see aroundus areonly "fantasticanddeceptive images" and that the truthlies precisely where we cannot see it, Mercier explained."Physicalexperiences,"the cornerstoneof the dominantsensationalist doctrine,were for the martinistsonly "errors,"an "eternalsource of folly and deception,"wroteMercier.6One review of Saint-Martin'sworksdescribedtheir effect as analogousto thatof a "pyramidcovered in hieroglyphs,erectedby an unknownman in a public square,"in otherwords, completelymystifying.7The revolutionaryBarnavewould link martinismwith all the other "metaphysical follies,"which were, he believed, the resultof an overly speculativetendencyin eighteenth-century thought.8 Forhis partSaint-Martinrejectedwhathe consideredto be the anti-spiritual tendency of Enlightenmentthought. Responding (as a maturestudent)to the professorGarat,one of the ideologuefollowersof Condillac,atthe Ecole normale in 1795, Saint-Martinwrote: I alwaysadmirehow you protectyouself frommaterialismby endorsing ... the teachings of Condillac. Although I read little, I have just gone through (very quickly, it is true) his Essai sur les origines des connaissances humainesandhis Traitedes sensations. WhetherI have poorly graspedit, or I haven'tyour secret,I have come acrossalmostno passages which do not repel me; and, I can say, have not encountered one which attractsme. His statue,for example ... seems to be a mockery of nature...For me, each of the author'sideas appearsto be an attack againstman, a veritablehomicide.9 Mystic thought,it seems, must oppose Enlightenment.At best, mysticism or as the duringthe period of Enlightenmentwill be seen as its "underside"10 5 See Voltaire to d'Alembert, 22 October 1776, letter D20361, The Complete Worksof ed. Theodore Besterman(135 vols.; Banbury,Oxfordshire,1968), CXXVII, 346. Cf. Voltaire, Voltaireto Louis Fran9oisArmandDu Plessis, duc de Richelieu, 15 October1776, letterD20347, ibid., 334. 6 Louis-SebastianMercier, Tableaude Paris, new ed. (1782-88) (8 vols.; Geneva, 1979), VI, 233-34. 7 AntoinetteL. G. La M., "Compterendu,"Bibliothequefrancaise, 6 (an IX [1800]), 99102. 8 Joseph Barave, Oeuvres, ed. Berenger de la Dr6me (4 vols.; Paris, 1843), IV, 101-3. 9 Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin, Controverse avec Garat, precedee d'autres ecrits philosophiques, ed. RobertAmadou (Paris, 1990), 387. 10 See, e. g., the referencesto Saint-Martinin RobertDamton, Mesmerismand the End of Enlightenmentin France (Cambridge,Mass., 1968), esp. 68-69.
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preparationfor coming anti-EnlightenmentRomanticdoctrines." Indeed, the end of the Enlightenmentin Francesaw a markedinterestin esotericthoughtand a mystic sensibility.12However,the attemptto linkmysticismandEnlightenment has almostalways been a criticalattemptto discoverthe "superstitious"core of eighteenth-centuryrationalistthought.In this perspectivethe study of mystic thought in its own terms can only have antiquarianvalue, for the mystic approachto truthis, it is claimed, always in the form of a secret, revealedknowledge thatcan never withstanddisciplinedanalysis. Saint-Martinfinds his way into history as eithera footnote in largebooks on Romanticthinking,or as the protaganistin largelyincomprehensibleones examiningesotericthought.'3 Here, I do not want to claim that Saint-Martinshould be "included"in the Enlightenment,but a sympatheticreadingof this complex and commonly misunderstoodthinkercan, I think, help broadenour understandingof late eighteenth-centuryEuropeanphilosophy, particularlyits important(though often neglected)transcendentalandtheologicaldimensions.It is of courseonly within the "rationalist"readingsof Enlightenmentthoughtthatthe idea of an irrational or speculativedarkside can be elaborated.It may be possible here to redefine the relationbetween the "mystery"at the heartof mysticism and the pursuitof truththat markedall Enlightenmentthought;it was not simply a matterof the sensationalistsrejectingmetaphysicsas errorandthemysticsrejectingthephysical world as deception.The boundarywas never wholly effaced, and attentionto errorand illusion can help elucidate eighteenth-centuryconceptualizationsof this borderzone in which humanitywanders.Errorwas understoodto be bothan obstacleanda pathto a hiddenandelusive truth.Saint-Martin'svery metaphors of wanderingand errancywill help connecthis Enlightenedmysticismwith the mainstreamof epistemologicalinquiryin late eighteenth-centuryFrance. It is importantto recognize thatfor Saint-Martinthe revelationof truthwas never simply a matterof secretritualandinitiation.His earliestinfluenceswere in fact philosophical. Saint-Martintells us that his own path began with the seventeenth-centurythinkerJacquesAbbadie and thathe read,while a student of law, the works of Voltaireand Rousseau.14 He did, it is true, have an early 1 See, e.
g., Anne-MarieAmiot, " 'L'Hommede parole'martiniste,prefigurationdu poete romantique, ou: du messianisme illuministe au messianisme poetique," Le Preromantisme, 380-97; and Annie Becque, "Aux Sources occultes de l'esthetique romantique:l'imagination selon Saint-Martin,"ibid., 414-24. 12 See Auguste Viatte, Les Sources occultes du romantisme(2 vols.; Paris, 19652). 13 For example, Arthur Edward Waite, The UnknownPhilosopher. The Life of LouisClaude de Saint-Martinand the Substance of his TranscendentalDoctrine (Blauvelt, N.Y., 1970). 14 See Saint-Martin's apologetic Portrait historiqueet philosophiquede M. de Saint-Martin,faitpar lui-meme,Oeuvresposthumes(2 vols.; Paris, 1807);forhis relationshipwithAbbadie, see I, 58; on Rousseau see Nicole Chaquin, "Louis-Claudede Saint-Martinet Jean-Jacques Rousseau,"Dix-HuitiemeSiecle, 3 (1971), 195ff.
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association with the mystic circle associated with Martinesde Pasqually,the shadowy SpanishCatholicwho came to Franceand establisheda secretsociety called the orderof the "Elus-Cohens."Saint-Martinhadabandonedthe studyof law for an armycommission in Bordeaux,where he encounteredthe orderand was admittedin the fall of 1768. Leavingthe armyto become Pasqually'ssecretary in 1771, Saint-Martinwas fully immersedin the martinist'5reworkingof Judeo-Christian thought,encapsulatedin Pasqually'sone survivingtext,the Traite de la reintegrationdes etres (1771).16 Yet, as he developed his own thinking, especially afterthe deathof Pasquallyin 1774 duringan extendedstay in SaintDomingue, Saint-Martinmoved away from the cultist traditionsand became interestedin themorephilosophical,reflectiveapproachesto mysticalquestions.l7 Fromthinkerssuch as Swedenborghe learnedof the intensityof the inner,intellectual mystic experience. Saint-Martin'sencounterwith JakobBoehme after 1788 was especially importantin this regard.Not only did Saint-Martinincorporatesome of Boehme's ideas intohis own work,he also translatedthe German shunned philosopher'sbooksintoFrenchtowardthe endof his life.'8Saint-Martin the ritualisticaspect of the mystic cults, especially laterin his life, and triedto reachout to all mankindthroughhis many writings.19 In his philosophicalstudies Saint-Martinaimed to penetratethe very relationshipbetweenhumanerrancyandtruth,the conditionsthatmediatedthe world of appearances,andthe unifying totalitythatboth encompassedandescaped it. Farfromrejectingthe "physical"in favorof wild and groundlessmetaphysical speculation,Saint-Martinexploredthe tension-filledrelationshipsof experience of the manifest expressionsof a "universaltotality"within a corporalizedand temporalizedworld. Saint-Martin'sfirst majorwork was Des Erreurs et de la verite, and the title alreadyreveals this basic idea: that truthis always a unity and errorthe 15 While technicallythe term martinistereferredto the followers of Martinesde Pasqually, it was also appliedto the circle aroundSaint-Martin,especially after Pasqually'sdeath in 1774 in Saint-Domingue,though distinction between the philosophies was not great for the larger intellectual community. 16 Circulatedin manuscriptform in the eighteenthcentury,this text was published for the first time in Paris in 1899. See Gerardvan Rijnberk,Martines de Pasqually (Paris, 1935), and Viatte, Les Sources occultes, I, 45ff. 17 As M. Ferraz wrote, in his Histoire de la philosophie pendant la Revolutionfrancaise (1789-1804) (Paris, 1889), 133, "of all the celebratedmystics, [Saint-Martin]is no doubt the most reasonable ... he constantly rejects the theurgicalpractices by means of which the Jew Martines[de Pasqually]pretendedto put himself in contact with invisible powers." 18 See Jacob Bohme, L 'Aurorenaissante, ou la racine de la philosophie, de 'astrologieet de la theologie (2 vols.; Paris, an IX-1800), and idem, Des trois principes de 'essence divine, ou de l'Eternel engendrementsans origine (2 vols.; Paris, an X-1802). 19 See Benz, Les Sources mystiques,69-70. Caro, in Du mysticismeau XVIIIesiecle, 34, writes that Saint-Martinhints in his first few works about some secret knowledge, but as his philosophy developed, his writings "carriedthe mark of a more personal inspiration,and of a more liberatedmethod."
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essential characteristic of the varied realm of the multiple. The philosophy of Saint-Martin is not simply a retreat into mysticism; it confronts the human desire to flee from the mystery which is at the heart of his existence. He pictured man arriving at the threshold of truth, unable to cross but nonetheless drawn to the infinite.20 "In this pitiful degradation, no longer seeing the fixed and simple qualities of unity, [man] is reduced to wandering [errer]around the temple which conceals them, and to which he is denied access."21Alone among worldly beings we felt the need to account for the "phenomenon of the existence of things" and to search for the solution to the "great problem" of our own existence. Humanity senses that there must be some kind of relation between itself and the beyond, between itself and this source which our instinct naturally engages.22 The starting point of Enlightenment epistemology was the idea that the human mind was separated from the truth. Philosophy was in fact the method which would guide us toward this elusive goal. However, the very condition of error made this journey dangerous. As d'Alembert wrote in his Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia: Between these two limits [of human knowledge] there is an immense distance where the Supreme Intelligence seems to have wanted to deceive human curiosity, as much by the innumerable clouds it has spread there as by some flashes of light that seem to burst out at intervals to attract us. One might compare the universe to certain works of a sublime obscurity whose authors occasionally bend down within reach of those who read them, seeking to persuade him that he understands nearly all. We are indeed fortunate if we enter this labyrinth and do not leave the true road! Otherwise, the flashes of light intended to lead us there would often serve only to lead us further from it.23 Although for many Enlightenment thinkers reason might keep us on a straight path, the connection to this sublime truthwas very complex and in the end relied on a sometimes mysterious affinity between our own sensibility and the essence of truth itself.24
20 Maximes et pensees, ed. RobertAmadou (Paris, 1963), 131: "Nothingis easier than to arrive at the door of truth.Nothing is more rareand difficult than to enter there...." 21 Tableau naturel des rapports qui existent entre Dieu, I'homme et l'univers (2 vols.; Edinburgh[Lyon], 1782), 1,125. 22"Reflexionsd'un observateursur la question:Quelles sont les institutionsles plus propre a fonder la morale d'un peuple?"(1797), Controverseavec Garat, 136-37. 23 Jean le Rond d'Alembert, Discours preliminaire de I'Encyclopedie(Paris, 1965), 3637. 24 See my "TheEpistemologyof Errorin Late EnlightenmentFrance,"Eighteenth-Century Studies, 29 (1996), 307-27, and "Idols and Insight:An EnlightenmentTopographyof Knowledge," Representations(forthcoming,2000).
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Like so many mainstreamphilosophersof the EnlightenmentSaint-Martin describedhumanity'sseparationfromtruthin spatialterms.Whatdistinguishes his own work is the way he conceptualizedthe relationshipbetween the errant humanmind and the divine truthof the universe. Yet like d'Alembert, SaintMartinbelieved thatthe foundationof any truephilosophywas the recognition of essential limitation.Man, he wrote, "throwshimself onto these dangerous pathswhich diverthim foreverfromhis trueroad."25 Separatedfromthe "light," how can we alone light the torchwhich must guide us along the paths?Clearly, truthanderrorwere not, in Saint-Martin'smystic philosophy,simply definedin termsof access to "divinesecrets."Accordingto Saint-Martin,errorwas caught up with the variedand changingmodes of a concreterealityexpressedin space and time, a world that concealed the essential unity of all things. For SaintMartin,though,andfor most eighteenth-century philosophers,appearancesmust be the path to this other reality. He does not, then, advocate the rejection of "mereappearances"(an escapistmysticism),buthe does underlinethe dangerof remainingcaughtin this realmof these appearances,whereeverythingis visible and control seems possible. The task was to work throughthe errorstowarda largertruth.One of the most disconcertingsituationsfor a travelleris to encounter two opposite roadswithoutknowing which one leads in the rightdirection. Saint-Martindoes not counsel inaction,nor does he advocatewaiting for a divine sign. The travellermustchoose;he mustnot refusehis "innerconviction."26 In manyways Saint-Martin'songoing taskwas the elucidationof this problematic, internalrelationshipwith truth. In Des Erreurset de la verite Saint-Marinbegins with the observationthat man does not seem to acknowledgethe obstacles between his own perceptions and"science"(knowledge),as if he neverconsidersthe shadowscreatedby any enlighteninggaze.27The materialformsof the sensibleworldcannotbe mistaken fortheprincipleswhichunderliethem;thedifferencesconcealwhatneverchanges: it is a truthat once profoundand humiliatingfor us, that here below differencesarethe only sourceof our knowledge [nos connaissances]; since if it is from here that the relationsand distinctionsof beings derive, these samedifferencesconcealthe knowledge[la connaissance]of Unity andpreventus from approachingit.28 The variedforms of natureare linkedby the unchangingprincipleswhich govern their appearance.29Science, for Saint-Martin,is the penetrationof these 25Des erreurs et de la verite, ou les hommes rappelles au principe universel de la sci-
ence... (2 vols.; Edinburgh[Lyon], 17822[1775]), I, 3. 26
Ibid., I, 45. I, 1. 28 Tableau naturel, 11,143. 29Erreurs, I, 74-85. 27 Ibid.,
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forms and the revelation of the principle, revelation in its most fundamental aspectas themanifestationof somethinghidden,not "directcommunicationfrom the divine."30 The forms of natureare not discrete, independentpartsthat can be added together to create an increasingly accuratepicture of nature.Each particular form, Saint-Martinsays, evoking Leibniz, exists in the world as "theextractin miniatureof the universal,"and must be "the image of this universal."Nature, writes Saint-Martinin an echo of Plotinus,is only "the inferiorand alteredimthe very limitat which God'svoice "diesout."32In Saint-Martin's age of unity,"31 view this is the foundationof humanerrancy:we are immersedin the world of formswhich presentto us only the distortedfiguresof universalBeing. Knowledge, then, can only be accomplishedthrougha surpassingof the visible world into the world of principles.And yet how would this be possible when we can perceive only the deceptive productsof these principles?Saint-Martinwarns: "we can only ever know here collections [assemblages], and not the principles which assemble [assemblent]."33 With some images of"distillation"or precipitationSaint-Martinopens up the possibility of insight in the midst of deception and separation.The violent clash of formscan, he implies, occasionallydisentanglethe heterogeneouselementswhich confuse anddistortthe directmanifestationof the principle,which If man, for example, always "accommodates"itself to specific circumstances.34 is it manifests a of continually variety characteristics, possible to separatefrom him those "heterogenouselements with which he is mixed"andrecognize "the integralprincipleof his being, like the perfectmetals found in the midst of the most compoundedamalgams."35 Often a "shock"is requiredto "fairesortirla verite."If truthis compoundedwith the materialwhich concretelyexpresses it, it is sometimes possible to manipulatethese materialsso thatthey interact,allowing the truth"toprecipitate"or "separateitself' fromits materialconstraints. But this will, Saint-Martinimplies, always be a momentaryand unpredictable insight. Ordinarily,we cannottranslatefrom the form to the principle.We cannottravelfromthe "curvedlines"which constituteand legislatethe corporal
30 Controverseavec
Garat, 392. Traitedesformes, ed. RobertAmadou (Paris, 1985), 22. To my knowledge, this edition never appeared,but the proofs may be consulted at the Bibliothequenationale in Paris. 32 Maximes etpensees, 136. 33 Pensees sur les sciences naturelles, published with notes and introductionby Robert Amadou (Paris, 1982), 55. 34Erreurs, ,,45. 35 "Discourssur la questionsuivanteproposeepar l'Acad6mie royale des sciences et belles lettres de Prusse: Quelle est la meilleure maniere de rappeler a la raison les nations, tant sauvages que polic6es qui sont livr6es a l'erreuret aux superstitionsde tout genre?"(hereafter "Berlin Discourse"), Controverseavec Garat, 14. 31
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world to the perfect "straightlines" of the superiororder.36 The errantpaths of the curveddimensionscannotbe tracedandmappedas the pathsto knowledge.37 The ratherunusualdoctrineof straightand curved lines leads us to one of the key aspects of Saint-Martin'sphilosophy,the fallen conditionof humanity. Saint-Martin'sversion of the fall is not the fable of the Gardenof Eden but a philosophical fall from the spiritualinto the concrete. "The true serpent,"he wrote, "is the spirit which deviates [s'e'carter]from the straightline." Sin is essentiallythe firsterror.Man'soriginaldwelling spacewas the square,the only pure form (Saint-Martinrathercrypticallyclaims) composed of straightlines. The circularis the beginning and end of all form, a state of confusion, and the prison of l'esprit.38The images of errancylink the first crime of man with the strayingnatureof all form;this allows Saint-Martinto describethe conditionof humanityas an in-betweenstate "above"the endless variationof the temporal andthe materialandyet "below"the perfectionof unityandregularity.Manhas strayedfrom the path and by the very natureof the "curve"he cannot merely retracehis steps and emergefromhis predicament.More accurately,in orderto retracethese steps the line from which he divertedmust be found and recognized.39 The doctrineof the fall is for Saint-Martinless "moralistic"thanit is a way of describingthe essentialparadoxof humanity.While it is obviousthatmanhas an intense desire for truthand knowledge, unlike the beasts or other entities which remainwithintheirself-enclosedworlds,this knowledgealways seems to elude him. Saint-Martinsuggests that it is as if he has lost somethingwhich he seeks to find again.If it is truethat"[w]e arebornin the infinite,we cannotform any idea of ournative country,"althoughthe desire is still within us, linkingus to a higherdimension.40 Saint-Martinexplainsthis paradoxas the resultof man's spiritualexistencebecomingconfoundedwith a materialone, two statesof being thatare"diametricallyopposed"to one another;he is at once mortalandimmortal, greatandsmall, free in his intellect,butboundto the worldby laws independentof himself.41 Man, it might be said, has "sublime"needs, yet is foreverincapableof satisfying them, evidence of some "fataltransposition,"as the mystic "Lodoik"
"Instructionssur la sagesse," Presence de Louis-Claudede Saint-Martin,textes inedites suivis des actes du colloque sur L.-C. de Saint-Martintenus a I 'Universitede Tours,ed. Robert Amadou (Tours, 1987), 98. 37Erreurs, II, 109, 115; "Instructionssur la sagesse," 96-97; Pensees sur les sciences naturelles, 56. 38 "Instructionssur la sagesse," 97. 39Erreurs,II,163-64. 40 Traitedes formes, 5, 10-11. 36
41
Erreurs, I, 50.
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(the Comte de Divonne) once wrote.42 Unlike the plants and animals, which manifest their principle to a greater or lesser degree over the course of their life, man finds himself"in opposition with his principle," which puts him in "disharmony" with the world, which leads him to illusion and lies. Spiritually without limits yet imprisoned in a perishable, transient body, humanity is in "exile" in the world, wandering in the face of appearances.43Another mystic in this same circle wrote that fallen man has been cut off from the direct light of divine knowledge and sees now only "an indirect reflection, an inferior substitute for the pure and holy light of which his crime has deprived him."44Sensations arrive without will and they constantly vary, providing no real continuity, Saint-Martin observes.45 The body is only an "obscure veil which hides the true light"; it is the source of illusion and the instrument of crime.46It is wrong to confuse the "corporal envelope," then, with the thinking being trapped within. Sensation and thought are radically different, and cannot be explained in terms of each other.47 Nor can we reach for the source of our purest being through the deformed instrument of our body. Man is a "fugitive from himself."48 Breaking through the opposition of"innate ideas" and the tabula rasa, SaintMartin puts forward the idea that man is what may be called a "table rasee." For Saint-Martin the mind is where the traces of a more perfect life still exist despite their being mixed with the accumulated (sensual) impressions of our long passage in the corporal world. The right conditions must be sought in order that these roots might spring up and flourish.49 Specifically, Saint-Martin describes how errancy can lead to insight, which he sees as access to the universal. The possibility of "inner conviction" in the face of deception and appearance arises because man is already connected to this universal in some way; the pursuit of truth is the search for reunification, an effort at traversing the distance Lodoik [Comte de Divonne], La voie de la science divine ... en trois dialogues traduits librementde l'Anglois de W.Law,precedes de la voix qui crie dans le desert (Paris, an XIII1805), 7. This text was heavily influenced by Saint-Martin'swork, and it was addressedto the "hommesde d6sirs"(a referenceto Saint-Martin'sL'hommede desir [Lyon, 1790]). Divonne helped to spread the ideas associated with Saint-Martinand his circle, as one of Mme. de Stael's visitors at Coppet. See Nicole Chaquinand Stephane Michaud, "Saint-Martindans le Groupede Coppet et le cercle de Fr6edricSchlegel,"Le groupe de Coppet.Actes et documents du deuxiemecolloquede Coppet,10-13juillet 1974, ed. SimoneBalaye andJean-DanielCandaux (Paris, 1977), 113-34. 43 [Divonne], La voie de la science divine, 4-5. La philosophie divine, appliqueesaux lumieres 44 Keleph Ben Nathan [Dutoit-Mambrini], et divine... (3 vols.; Paris, 1793), I, 29. Divonne celeste naturelle,magique,astrale, surnaturelle, was instrumentalin publishing this work. 42
45 Erreurs, I, 45-46. 46 199.
Ibid., I,
47 Controverseavec Garat, passim. 48 Keleph Ben Nathan,La philosophie divine, III,122. 49 "Essai sur les signes et sur les id6es relativementa la question de l'Institut:Determiner l'influence des signes sur la formationdes idees" (1799), Controverseavec Garat, 173-74.
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that separatesman from the divine. This distance is only recognized as a gap because in a way it still connects him by drawinghim into this open space with the promiseof some fulfillmentof thejourney. The theological dimensionof this relationshipbetween truthanderrancyis one way of describingthe uneasydisjuncturebetweenthe humandesireforwhat lies beyondthe immediateandthe visible andthe failureto penetratethe barriers thatconstantlyblock this desire. Whatis desire, as Condillachad alreadysaid, but the recognitionof a lack.50As Saint-Martinwrites, Desire resultsonly fromthe separationor the distinctionof two analogous substances...;and when the aphorists[gens a maximes]say that we cannotdesirewhatwe do not know,they give us the proof thatif we desire something, it is absolutely necessary that there be a portionof this thing which we desire in ourselves, and which thus cannotbe seen as being entirelyunknownto us.51 Our desire for knowledge of the universalmeans we share that knowledge in some fragmentedstate,Saint-Martinsuggests.The axiomatictruthsof the exact sciences, for example,do not "express"a truthwhich reasoninfers;therearises an accord (convenance)between the intrinsicjustice of these axioms and the "sparkof truthwhich shines in ourconception."Insightandnot logical orderis the methodthat leads us to truth.With insights into the natureof the world we begin to gain some understanding,or at least feeling, for the universalsourceof all things, the "unknownbeing that we call God" as Saint-Martinputs it. The human soul elevates itself throughthese insights: "in the discovery of partial axioms it looks to give itself up to this total truthwhich dominatesit...."52 But if humanacts are the manifestationof the divine, the individualityof these acts in the concrete world tends to obscure their divine origin. Human reason might be describedas "a kind of debris and degradationof this divine light...."53Thereforeif we reveal the universal in our moral activities, we are also in a sense removed from this totality by the very natureof our activities. Humanityoperateswithin space and time, and action is in essence the particuof the larizationof the infinite, as the forms of the world are "corporalizations" immaterial,"temporalizations"of eternity.54The works of men "are nothing morethantranspositions... limitingthemselvesto giving thingsanotherplace."55 50 Condillac, Traite des animaux, Oeuvresphilosophiques, ed. Georges LeRoy (3 vols.; Paris, 1948), I, 372b. 51Ministere de l'homme-esprit,351. 52Ecce Homo (Paris, 1792), 3-6; idem,"Cahierde metaphysique,"Controverseavec Garat, 243-44. 53Keleph Ben Nathan,La philosophie divine, I, 83. 54 "Cahierde m6taphysique,"254, and Traitedes formes, 12. 55Erreurs,II, 241.
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Thus for Saint-Martin man is in a sense a "diminished God" (un Dieu devetu),56 who draws from the unity of the divine in his moral acts yet never attains this exalted position.57 This is the central idea of Saint-Martin's work: error is the condition of our being as it seeks to expiate the original crime, which is a deviation from the (straight) path of truth. As the great martinist scholar Robert Amadou comments, for Saint-Martin, "[e]very error is only transposed truth ... a perverted truth."58It is this critical relationship that informs Saint-Martin's discussion of the concrete forms of human existence: the nature of language, society, and politics which he turned to in his later writings. In his first major book Saint-Martin denied that human languages could be simply the product of habit and convention. The diversity of these languages was no proof of their arbitrary nature. These differences, he wrote, were only "an accidental flaw, and not in its nature."59For Saint-Martin, the many languages of the present were all deviations from the pure first language of man, the pure communication with the divine intelligence, a "secret" and "interior" language.60 The origin of convention in language, he went on to argue in his next book, is the lapse into the corporal world, where communication is no longer perfect but conducted through external signs and expressions, which can only be distorted versions of the primitive signs that constituted this originary communication.61With Rousseau, Saint-Martinrejected much of the Enlightenment speculation on the origin of language. He thought it impossible the language could be invented before the medium of language itself, that human beings could somehow create among themselves a system constructed purely through convention.62 During the French Revolution, however, Saint-Martin developed a more thorough theory of language. Proscribed from the capital because of his noble status, Saint-Martin had returned to his birthplace, the town of Amboise. After the Terrorhe was chosen by the residents to represent them as a student (though 56 Lettre a un ami, ou considerations politiques, philosophiques et religieuses sur la Revolutionfrancaise (1795), Controverse avec Garat, 56. More crudely, man as a limited being "could be called an excrementof the infinite." Keleph Ben Nathan, La philosophie divine, I, 352. 57"Cahierde metaphysique,"254: "And these moral works, which seem the most natural to man, is to draw from the unity; it is, as it were, to extract the sap from his marvellous[acts]; finally to make, in the eyes of our fellows and of all the beings, a little God...." 58 RobertAmadou, introductionto Saint-Martin,Oeuvres majeures,Des Erreurs et de la verite (Hildesheim, 1975), 17. 59Erreurs,II, 230. 60Ibid., II, 194-271.
61 Tableau naturel, I, 64. 62
Jean-JacquesRousseau,Discours sur l 'origineet lesfondemens de I 'inegaliteparmi les hommes,Oeuvrescompletes,ed. BernardGagnebinand MarcelRaymond(5 vols.; Paris, 196495), III, 151; cf. Saint-Martin,"Berlin discourse," 19.
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he was now in his fifties) at the newly opened Ecole normale.Back in Paris, Saint-Martinattendedthe lectures given by the Ideologue Garaton language and the natureof mind. On 9 vent6se, an III, Saint-Martinrose to challenge Garat's"sensualist"doctrine,derivedfrom Condillac.Theirdebatewas subsequentlypublished.63Saint-Martinarguedherethatthe conceptualdifficultysurroundingthe origin of languageprovedthat man had within him some kind of social andmoralnature,expressedin language,an idea which he would develop furtherin variouswritingsof this period. Saint-Martin'sconfrontationwith ideologie produceddetailed reflections on the natureof the sign and the relationshipof language and human intelligence. He studied De Gerando'smassive work on signs and ideas,64and he worked on responses to a series of prize questions sponsoredby the Class of Moral and Political Sciences, a branchof the new FrenchNational Instituteof Sciences andArts, which hadbeen createdin 1795 to replacethe old Academie In 1799 Saint-Martinworkedon a questionthatasked:"Determiner FranCaise.65 l'influence des signes sur la formationdes idees." Drawing on earlierreflections, Saint-Martintranslatedhis own mystic philosophy into the language of ideologue linguisticpsychology. Saint-Martinbeganhis 1799 essay on signs by establishingthe relationship of sign and signified. The sign is in general"therepresentationor indicationof somethingseparatedor hiddenfor us."The sign marksan entirely"newregion" for mankind,one where materialsensation and spiritualthoughtbecome one, enclosed underthe same seal. The sign in effect operatesfor somethingthatcan no longer make its own appearance,the inner ideas of the spiritualbeing enclosed in a physical envelope. The idea has become detached from its native country,the "regionof ideas,"andmusttravelnow throughsubsidiarymeansto reachits destination.Forthis reasonSaint-Martinattributesdesireas the radical originof the sign:the idea lacks its own meansof expression,it has lost the pure continuityof spiritualidentityandmustfind a way throughthe sensibleworldto this higherdestination.If the idea is "sovereign,"the sign is its "minister,"without which its power could not be effected, Saint-Martinexplains.66Yet entering into the world of forms, the ministersof our ideas do not always find theirway throughto the "luminousregion"thatmarkstheirtruegoal, for this intermediate zone is like a "mass of vapours"obscuringthe pathways.The problemis that signs, being necessarily linked to the region of the sensible, have an inherent 63 Their exchange was revised for publicationand appearedin the thirdDebats volume of the Seances des Ecoles normales (Paris, an IX [1801]). 64 Joseph-MarieDeg6rando,Des Signes, et de l 'art de penser considerer dans leurs rapports mutuels (4 vols.; Paris, an VIII-1800). 65 See Martin Staum, Minervas Message: Stabilizing the French Revolution (Montreal, 1996). 66 "Essai sur les signes," 176-85.
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tendencyto deviationandimperfection,an inevitableinclinationtowarderrancy.67 This errancyhas taken us so far from the pure realm of ideas, Saint-Martin claims, thatwe almost cease to believe this region even exists.68 The solutionto this predicamentfor Saint-Martinlies not in the perfection of these signs, the goal of the analyticphilosophers.Such a task is impossible; there is an ever-presentdisjuncturebetween the sign and the idea precisely because the sign navigatesthe "mixedorder"andthe idea can live only in the free and simple orderof truth.Ourmistakeis to follow the twists andturnslanguage takesin thisprocess insteadof maintaininga distancebetweenoursigns andour ideas. In the spiritof Rousseau'sessay on language,Saint-Martinsays that"the more our languageshave rushedinto the torrent,andhave become inventivein artificialornaments,the more they have had the means to develop errorsand vices in men,withoutproviding much in the way of real sustenance for our We must try to breakthroughthe everydayneed for externalsigns, thought."69 returningto the inner light of the higher orderthat informs our thoughts.The sentimentof this superiorregion can be recognized only in brief intervalsof elevation, or revelation,as our ideas move us across this space of separation. The light of this region "burstsforthand occasions an affectionhigherthanthe idea itself," which is a "tableaumixte" of light and shadow.This intervention into the sublime is the truegoal of our ideas; the idea is in fact only the sign of this infinitedesire, andthusparticipatesin the inevitablefailuresthatmarkany sign.70
In an earliertext, a responseto a prize competitionof the Prussianacademy on the problem of releasing people from errorand superstition,Saint-Martin describedthe activity of "truepoetry"as one way of enteringthis sublime region, which is "complete,calm, luminous,which gives repose to all the faculties." The poetic voice transcendsthe specificity of concrete objects and their signs and allows the "reallanguage"to be felt once again, the truevoice of our spirituallife to re-emerge. Originarypoetry (poesie primitive), Saint-Martin wrote, was worthy of its name, capable of communicatinglight to men and dissipatingthe errorswhich plague him, only by paintingthe tableaux which were of anotherorder,whose models were not at [thepoets] command,that is to say, only by retracingthese sublime objects which are
67 "Controverseavec Garat,"413, writing that the institutionof speech is the "transmission of the germ of speech,"which can be followed in its development,"save for the varieties that this developmentcan offer in the non-thinkingregion where it must operate." 68"Essai sur les signes," 218-19.
69
Ibid., 231.
70 Ibid., 232-34.
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almostcompletelylost to us, only by initiatingmen into the knowledge of the laws of the supremedirector....71 Thepoetryof tradition,then,is the continuinghistoryof these divine announcements, these importantthreads,which are given to man to "guide him in the labyrinthof terrestriallife,"wherehe always seems to matchevery step forward with as many falls back again.72This idea reemergesin his 1799 essay on signs. Descendingintohis corporalexistence(theIdeologueproject,accordingto SaintMartin),man will, it is true, learnto controlthe naturalsigns, but it is only by ascendingalongthe progressionof signs (which for Saint-Martinincludesideas, the "signs"of spiritualdesire)thathe "will findthe sublimeregionof the mother impression,or of theprimordialdesire,with the languagethatis properto him."73 The progressionof languagemoves towardreintegrationwith the source of all reality. From his first majortext on errorand truthSaint-Martinwas interestedin applyinghis own mystic thoughtto concretesocial andpoliticalproblems.This interestonly intensifiedduringthe periodof the Revolution.In turninghis attention to the problemof humanassociation, Saint-Martinrejectedthe dominant explanations:thatsocial orderwas createdthroughthe violent actionof oppressors or was simply the result of a volontaryaccord of some sort. As with language, Saint-Martinsaw a conceptual impossibility in the idea that society is purely "natural"(relationsof physical need and force) or simply a productof volontaryhumanformation.The theoryof pureforce as the foundationof order amonghumanbeings is an "atrocity,"accordingto Saint-Martin,while the idea thatdiscreteindividualscame togetherto form society spontaneouslyis a "chimera,"a logical impossibility,as he explained.74 In the aftermathof Revolution, civil war, and Terror,Saint-Martinwould laterconcludethatif we cannotfind within ourselvesthe elementswhich could producethis "sublimepact"that is society, it is probablethat the materialsfor this "vast edifice" came from beyond the "simple and reducedhumanorder." Therefore,for Saint-Martin,the goal of all humanassociation can only be the very point fromwhich it has descended,as the resultof some "alteration."The very disordersand irregularitiesthat continually plague human society offer evidence of a higher order."Infact, one could say that in the very disordersof his thought, man is a being who searches to regain the point from where he
71 "Berlin discourse," 23-24.
72 Ibid., 25. 73 "Essai sur les signes," 235. 74Erreurs, II, 3-11; "BerlinDiscourse," 7.
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fell."75If humanitywas simplyplayingout its naturalinclinations,this feeling of imperfection(notto mentionthe imperfectionitself) would neverarise.The very violence of man'sprogressionin the world implies thathe is not wherehe ought to be: it is only by violent and convulsive efforts that men go towardthis elevated goal [haut terme], and they only climb laboriouslytowardthis first stage of the level, an irresistibledemonstrationthatproves they are fallen; because if they were at theirnaturalpoint, we would see everything proceed smoothly and regularly....76
It is the disjuncturebetween the desire for orderand the inabilityto achieve it thatmarksboth the separationfrom andthe connectionwith the divine totality. The goal of associationis thus the task of rehabilitation,an expiationaimed at reintegration.And for this reason,Saint-Martinwrites, it mustbe inspiredfrom above. The individualbeing, Saint-Martinconcludes, is not the startingpoint of social orderbut rathera productof this order.By looking at humanbeings as discreteentities(whichthey admittedlyarefroma materialpointof view) we are inevitably led to the paradoxof association:individualseither give up liberty (independence)or have it forcibly taken away. The paradoxdisappearsif, as Rousseau implied in the Second Discourse, we begin with the fact of social communion,understoodas a divine gift.77 As Saint-Martinsees it, the "generalwill" is the startingpoint for social organization,understoodas the voice of this communityidentity.WithRousseau, he agreesthatthe generalwill "is not at all formedfromthe will of all."Identity is anteriorto difference,andis what allows these differencesto ariseanddefine themselves. [N]ever will the general will form itself from particularwills; on the contrary,it is the particularwills that must form themselves from the generalwill, that is, ...the particularwills must conformto this general will which surely exists before the particularwills, since, accordingto the principleswhich direct this work, the general will can only be the uniquesourceof the universaland divine thought....78 75 Eclair sur l'association humaine(Paris, 1797 [an V]), 14-22. This book was published the Cercle Social, originally a Girondin political club and press that in 1792 published by Saint-Martin'sEcce Homo, alongside works by figures such as Condorcet.The links between Saint-Martinand the Cercle Social are sketchy, but see Gary Kates, The "CercleSocial, " the
Girondins,and theFrenchRevolution(Princeton,1985). 76 Ibid.,25. 77 Rousseau, Discourssur l'originede l'inegalite,Oeuvrescompletes, III, 207. 78Eclairsur l'associationhumaine,52-53.
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Interests,then, are the inevitableconsequenceof our materialneeds; yet these interests,no matterhow common to variousindividuals,will never found a social order,since they are by definition transitoryand unstable.They can only ever be the basis of "partialagglomerations."This kind of harmonyis only a harmonyamongobjects,constructedthroughcontingentrelations,andthuscannot "linkitself' with that"grandeharmonie"thatwould providea real stability. Integrationgives way to reintegration:"Yes,the truesocial contractis only the adhesion of all the members of the political body to this ancient general will which is before him...."79
The generalwill, then, is the voice thatspeaks to all men despite the variations anddeviationsthatconditionevery specific social community.This is why the astoundingvarietyof humansocieties throughoutthe world cannotbe taken as evidence that no common foundationfor orderexists. The very ubiquityof social formationpoints to a fundamentalorigin of order.No matterhow degradedthe unity of any one community,it seems as if the "eternalgeneralwill" pierces the clouds with the rays of its "inalterableclarity."80 This has importantconsequences, Saint-Martinbelieves, for the theory of practice in human communities. The goal of human association must be the recoveryof a higherunity,andthereforeits guidingforce cannotbe drawnfrom the myriadof conflictingdesiresthatexist in any communityof fallen individuals. Elections, writes Saint-Martin,cannotbe tolerated.They are illusory "because they encroach on regions of which man no longer has neither key nor map."Insteadof leadingto a restorationof social orderto itshigherlevel, these capriciousactionscan only lead to its devastation.The universalwisdom, source of the "eternalgeneralwill," alone chooses its ministersandprovidesthemwith the means to carryout theirtasks. Humanelections areuseful only for "domestic management."Thus for Saint-Martinall politicalthoughtis really in the end religiousthought,andall governmentis theocracy,an idea thathe would explore in greaterdetail in his reflectionson the FrenchRevolution.81 Unlike many other religious thinkersof the era, Saint-Martinwas able to interpretthe FrenchRevolutionwithin theological categories,while living and working at the very heart of the revolutionarytorrent,even though he was of noble birth and suffered many hardshipsin this period. Though he became a targetof suspicionduringthe Terror,partlybecause of his unorthodoxwritings, and partlybecause of his personalassociations with the Duchess of Bourbon, the sisterof PhilippeEfgalite,Saint-Martingave moneyto the armyto buy equipment, andthis helped him to avoid prisonandthe guillotine.He was, like other 79 Ibid., 55. 80
Ibid., 66.
81Ibid., 70-72, 91. See Karl Epting, "Die politische Theologie Louis-Claude de SaintMartin's,"Epirrhosis: Festgabe fr Carl Schmitt(Berlin, 1968), 161-84.
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nobles, strippedof certainpolitical and financialprivileges, and was forced to leave Parisin 1794. However,it seems thathe was spurredto addressthe political challengeof the Revolutionby morepositive developments,specifically,his election in Amboise to the electoralassemblyandhis move to Paristo attendthe Ecole normale. In a shortbook published in 1796, his Lettrea un ami ou Considerations politiques, philosophiques et religieuses sur la Revolutionfrancaise, SaintMartinelaboratedon the political ideas outlinedin some of his previous work. For Saint-Martinthe Revolution was not, despite its disruptiveand violently destructivecharacter,and its anti-religiousideology, something to be fought. Writingbefore Joseph de Maistre'sbetter-knownConsiderationson France, Saint-Martinsaw the uprisingprecisely as the manifestationof divine power. The Revolutionwas the appearanceof a new form of humanorganizationthat hadbrokenthroughtheossifiedhierarchiesandemptystructuresofAncien Regime Europe.The Revolution, for Saint-Martin,was an "abbreviatedimage"of the Last Judgment,a "magicaloperation"to restoreorder.82 In his attemptto understandthis radicalturnSaint-Martinlooks first to the effects of revolutionarypower and concludes thatbecause it struckmost forcefully the clergy and the monarchy,these classes must have had the most sins to expiate.The ministersof the divine intelligence in the humanworld had closed theireyes to the truth,andabusedtheirposition. ThusFrancebecomes, through the operationof revolutionaryaction,the exampleof Europe.The king of France was in essence the king of Europe, the leader of the strongest nation in this community of nations. The Revolution that would break down the old order appearedin Franceprecisely because Francewas the only nationable to defend itself against the concertedforces of Europe,Saint-Martinbelieved.83He saw the Revolution as a recovery of sorts; the oppressedhad regained rights that were usurpedover the courseof the precedingerasby the variousrulingclasses, The Revolutionin France,then,was all with the aid of a "supernatural power."84 not accomplished throughthe actions and ideals of individuals or groups; it actedthroughthe humanagents thatwere the (chosen) people of France. This structureis crucial for Saint-Martin'sunderstandingof this period in Europeanhistory,for he criticizes the individualleaders in the political realm while maintainingthe significance of the Revolution's regenerativepower. In essence the actors of the Revolution were completely insignificantor were at best conduitsof revolutionaryforce. The enemies of revolutionaryFrancecould not see thatthe attackson its leaderswere not only ineffective but also advanta-
82Lettresur la Revolutionfrancaise, 58. 83 Ibid., 63.
84Ibid., 58. See Nicole Chaquin,"Le Citoyen Louis-Claudede Saint-Martin,theosophe revolutionnaire,"Dix-huitiemesiecle, 6 (1974), 209-24.
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geous to France.The Revolution could not be defeated "fromabove"because the eliminationof any one leadermeantonly that a new one was thrownup to take his place. Individualswere not guiding revolutionarypolicy; they were "agents employed in this great work." Europewas in the midst of a crisis, a "convulsionof expiring humanpowers, strugglingagainst a new, naturaland living power"thatthese old powers refusedto recognize, to theirdetriment.85 Saint-Martinsaw this disruptiveforce as the occasion for regeneration.The lesson to be learnedfrom this divine interventionwas thathumanbeings were unable to structuretheir own society solely throughtheir own efforts. Man's power,writes Saint-Martin,is everywherelimitedto "industryand administration,"whereassociety can only ever be a productof its own "self-formation."In otherwordsthe foundationalact of social organizationis necessarilyoutsidethe realmof individualcreation;the bodies of a people andgovernmentsformthemselvesfromthemselves, and are the naturalresultsof time and circumstanceswhich man occasions or allows to be born;and it is for this reasonthatthe mode of this formationmustso oftenescapeourcalculations[refuserainos calculs].86 The foundationallaws of society must, Saint-Martinsays, have a consecrated airin orderto be legitimate,andmancan hardlyfulfil this task alone, something Maistre would repeat in the coming years. The crisis of the Revolution had, Saint-Martinbelieved,provedexactlythis by destroyingthe old ordersandforcing the creationof a whole new social framework. The crisis, writes Saint-Martin,awakens the traces of original virtue that lay dormantin every individual.The resistancesbroughtforthby revolutionary excesses andthe chaos of political disorderoccasion the manifestationof those hiddenbuteternalprinciplesthatwere alwayswithinus. Providence,like a skilled surgeon,had "eradicatedthe foreignbody"and the people of Francewere now If it was clearthathuman experiencingthe usual effects of a painfuloperation.87 of had not society instantlyregainedthe "purepeace" harmonyin society, this hardlymeantthatthe task of organizationwas simply the problemof ordering individualsandcoordinatinginterests.Unlike the beasts,whose affectionswere only ever directedtowardspecific objectsat a specific time andwhose organization was only contingent,humanbeings lived outsideof theirspecific individual relations,they "embracedin theiraffections ... all species, and lived in the generalityof all beings, whateverthe intervalof times and spaces."88
85
Lettresur la Revolutionfranqaise, 63. Ibid., 66. 87Ibid., 117. 86
88
Ibid., 68.
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Order,then, was not somethingto be constructedout of the specific relations among individualmen but rathersomethingto be found at a level higher thanthem all. Thus,for Saint-Martin,the firststep in foundingthis orderwas to searchfor the pathsthathadbecome overrunafteryears of neglect: "if the truth can be obscuredby man's negligence, it can never be lost completely for him, since he always has the means to distinguishit and recognize it."89The goal of post-revolutionaryaction was not the total recreationof society but ratherthe preservationof its guidingprinciples,the residueof truththatexistedat the heart of any social order,even amidstthe forces of disintegration.The sovereigntyof the people, freed by the "surgicaloperation"of the Revolution,was not to be invented.Sovereigntyhad to be reexpressed,rediscovered.As Saint-Martinargues, the sovereignties of individualnations were in fact the "organs"of that "supremesovereigntywhich sends down its sanctionin them."90 For Saint-Martin,then,the claim of political leadersto speakfor the people could only ever be a claim to announcethe divine (general) will. The people could find itself only by finding the Truth.The organsof social orderwere not mere representativesof the common good. They had to be the "reflectionof a power superiorto them."9'Humanitydid not create its own law; individuals could only administerand execute law.92The legislator in a sense discovered preexistinglaws.93The true"monarch"was the divinity:"Menwho find themselves at the headof Nations or of administrationscould only be his representatives or, if you like, his commissaires."94 Saint-Martin'sreferencehere to the delegates of revolutionaryauthoritywho were sent to the provincesto enforce revolutionarylaw and establish order in the midst of resistance sharpensthe image of political action he puts forwardin this work. Authoritymust come from somewhere, even if it is not always visible and cannot appearunproblematicallyto legitimatethe actions of its organs.The structureof revolutionary orderwas not fundamentallydifferentfrom a theological political structure.95 The problemwas locatingthe sourceof authorityandrecognizingthe trueorgan of this power. Whatexactly could be done in this revolutionarycrisis, accordingto SaintMartin?Writingin 1797, Saint-Martinused the occasion of a prizecontestsponsored by the Class of Moral and Political Sciences to discuss this problem, respondingto the following question:"Whatare the most appropriateinstitu89
Ibid.
90Ibid., 112 91Ibid., 93.
Ministdrede l'homme-esprit,293. 93"Etincelles politiques,"L'Initiation,4 (1965), 218. 94Lettresur la Revolutionfrancaise, 104. 95See CarlSchmitt,Die Diktatur:VondenAnfdngendes modernenSouverdnitatsgedankens bis zumproletarischenKlassenkampf(Munich, 19282),chs. 4 and 5. 92
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tions to found la morale of a people?"In contrastto many contemporarytheories, he writes that institutionscannot serve to create a people and its morale. They arenot meremeans,but insteadact as the tangiblemediatorsof an already existing publicvirtue.Institutionsarethe "envelope,sign, or bulwark"of social doctrine.The problem, of course, is how to returnto this originarycode and regenerateourinstitutions,which were obliteratedby the Revolution.The world is filled, Saint-Martinobserves,with a bewilderingarrayof contradictoryviews. The legislatorwould seem to be caughtwithin an "inextricablelabyrinth."The legislator,then, must seek to divine the morale of a people, the unifying force, before establishingconcreteinstitutions.96 The paradox,one alreadyelaboratedby Rousseauin the Social Contract,is thatthe legislatormustdiscernexactly what is not obvious: Saint-Martinasked, "how could the legislator himself reach this point of sublimity?"The "active classes"who wield power in society often succumbto the temptationsof abuse; they resist regenerationas much as the "passiveclass" is open to it. Saint-Martin sees this as a "restrictedcircle"which seems impossibleto escape;the legislatormust "communicateto his nationthe spiritof life" andthis meanshe must "himselfbe impregnated" with this spirit,he mustsense withinhimselfthe "force anddesireto penetrateto the sourceswherethis fireresides."This requiresmore thanmereinsight.ForSaint-Martinthe legislator,in orderto "receivethis spark," mustpurifyhimselfof allthe"extraneouselements[substancesetrangeres]which, even if [this spark]might arise,would stop it fromcatchingfire."Only the pure legislatorcould thus "communicate"this warmthto all the institutions.Institutions devoid of this anteriorspiritcould never have any positive effect.97 The desire for this sacredflame explains in partthe passion thatmen have for the "elevatedposts,"where it is commonlyheld to reside. But Saint-Martin is carefulto say thatthis flame, like the sun, can transmitits light to all beings and never allows itself to be usurpedby any one individual or intermediary body. Saint-Martindoes not imply thatthe divine will can speakonly out of the mouth of one chosen monarch.As a result Saint-Martin'sconclusion to the Institute'squestion is less in the form of a concrete "solution"that might be implementedin any one nation,thana pointingof the way, "showingthe paths" thatmight directus to a solutionthatmust in a sense be seen as coming toward us. The specific forms of legislation and governmentSaint-Martinleaves to "otherwriters"with the warningto these "newPygmalions"thathowevercomplex the "statue"so created,it is never a simple task to "seize the flame that could alone bringtheirstatueto life."98
96 "Reflexions d'un 97 Ibid., 162-64.
98Ibid., 165.
observateur,"141-45.
Louis-Claudede Saint-Martin
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Saint-Martin'swritingswere all effortsto show humanitythatits truepath lay outsidethe visible forms of his materialexistence. The mystic elementwas not a retreatinto intellectualrepose and inaction,however.The role of the philosopher,he thought,was to point the way out of this region, to spur man to recognize his superiornature.Through"negligenceor bad faith"man has misunderstoodthe principleof orderandpeace, andthusdwells in disorder.He then takes this disorderas evidence of the arbitraryand conventionalnatureof his existence.99This disorderis, however, simply a result of our separationfrom Truth,our refusal to exercise the faculties we have; we remain, then, in the world of "lies anderror."'00 Yetthe very recognitionof disorder,of error,reveals ourconnectionto a higherreality.The driveto knowledge is predicatedon both the absenceof truthandthe awarenessof its absence.Here, Saint-Martinoffers a variationon the eighteenth-centuryconcept of curiosity: limitation is what drives us towardthe truth. In this context Saint-Martin'sreflectionson truthand its essential mystery are, I would suggest, linked to the Enlightenmentconcept of progress,which itself relies on this dualrecognitionof errorandof truth.Saint-Martin'senlightened mysticism, like contemporaryEnlightenmentthought,denied any direct access to truth,and advocated instead working througherrorto create a path toward truth,a truthunderstoodto be linked in some way to our innermost being. Readinga transcendentalmysticphilosopherin conjunctionwith (instead of in oppositionto) Enlightenmentsuggeststhatdespitethe factthatthe methods of the rationalEnlightenmentwere at times at odds with the moremysticaldoctrines,we havetoo oftenoverlookedtheirsimilarities.Truthwas notunproblematic for Enlightenmentphilosophersand scientists;the methodsof observationand calculationwere not seen as easy roads to knowledge. The unity of Truthwas not takenfor granted,even by theEncyclopedie-only God could ever know the secretprinciplesunderlyingthe orderof the "vastmachine"thatis the universe.?01 If we can take seriously the philosophical significance of mystic thought,as I have tried to do here, perhapswe can also begin to take more seriously the mystical dimensionof "mainstream" philosophyof the period. Universityof California,Berkeley.
99Erreurs,I, 201-2. '00 Tableaunaturel, I, 140. 101 Encyclopedie,ou dictionnaireraisonne des arts, des sciences, et des metiers, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert (Paris, 1751-65), s.v. "ordre."
in
European Thought Iran: Nineteenth-Century David
Hume
and
Others
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Europeanideas have played a crucial part in the shaping of the modem Iranianintellectualclimate, since Iranianintellectualshave been, one way or another,engaged with these ideas for at least a hundredand fifty years. This engagementhas also influencedIraniansociety in variousways, as the conceptual foundationsof the two Iranianrevolutionsof the twentiethcenturypresent the best evidence. Consideringthis impact,the study of the receptionof European ideas in nineteenth-centuryIranbecomes important.This articleexplores neglected questions concerningthe receptionof ideas: did practicalconsiderationsof the Iranianintellectualsplay a significantpartin the receptionof these ideas?And if they did, whatwas theirimpact?The examinationpresentedhere helps us to furtherour understandingof the receptionand disseminationof political ideas in differentculturesand to appreciatethe varietyof interpretations which they can receive. The article is organized in three parts. The first part provides a brief descriptionof the historicalcontext in which the nineteenth-centuryIranianintellectualswere situated.The second partreviews severalexamplesof the interaction between the practicalconcerns of Iranianintellectualsand their selection, interpretation,and utilizationof Europeanideas. This part intends to provide evidence for the overallsuggestionthatpracticalconcernswere the determining factor in the patternof the engagementof Iranianintellectualswith European ideas. The thirdpartof the articleconcentrateson the same factorin some of the writingsof a leadingIranianintellectualof thetime,MirzaFath'aliAkhundzadeh, includinghis purported"Letterfrom David Hume to the Muslim Clergy of India,"writtenaround1860.
657 Copyright2000 by Journalof the Historyof Ideas,Inc.
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CyrusMasroori HistoricalBackground
Throughoutthe nineteenthcentury Iran suffered from a significant crisis which affectedvariousaspectsof life, differentsocial strata,andthe rulingQajar regime.The crisishadthreeinterrelatedcauses:the expansionistpolicies of Iran's powerful neighbors,Russia and British India;an economic decline and fiscal difficulties which were in part due to the institutionalarrangements,and; the Qajars'inherentlyweak legitimacy.Between 1800 and 1830, Iranianswere involved with disastrouswars against Russians,which clearly demonstratedthe weakness of the Iranianstate in protectingits territoriesandpopulationagainst its northernneighbor. Defeats in these wars pointedto the need for reformin Iran.The state initiatedlimitedinstitutionalreforms,firstby the CrownPrinceAbbasMirza(181Os and 1820s) andlaterby PrimeMinistersMirzaAbulqasimQa'imMaqam(1835) andMirzaTaqiKhanAmirKabir(1848-51). These reforminitiatives,however, provedto be unsuccessful,and the continuedweakness of the statewas further indicatedby defeatsby Britishforces (1856-57). One of the main obstacles to reformin Iranwas the oppositionby many of the courtiersandthe majorityof the Shi'i clergymen(ulama).The latter'sopposition, particularlyto any reformbased on Europeanideas, was importantbecause the ulamaenjoyed significantinfluenceover the people. Althoughon occasions the Shahand some of his ministerssupportedcertainreformsbased on Europeaninstitutionalmodels, the anti-reformcoalition of the ulama and conservative courtierswas almost always successful in stopping such attempts. Meanwhile,it mustbe rememberedthateven when the Shahsupportedreform, he remainedan autocratwith very littletolerancefor any ideaswhich questioned his absolutepolitical authority.Thus, althoughdebateregardingmodernization was at times toleratedby the state,demandsfor democratizationwere repressed by both the state and the ulama.1 Against the above background,the nineteenthcenturyIranianintellectuals who adheredto the principles of liberalismcan be divided into three groups: institutionalliberals,who believed thatIrancould overcomeits "underdevelopment"by importingEuropeanpolitical and economic institutionswithout cultural changes or the liberal educationof the people as a prerequisite;Islamic liberalswho believed that demonstratingthe compatibilitybetween Islam and liberalprinciplessuch as the rule of law andgovernmentby consentwould be a prerequisiteto establishingliberalinstitutions;Enlightenmentliberalswho argued thatthe first step towardsreformin Iranwould be to awakenand educate the Iranianpeople and free them from ignoranceand superstition. 1 In general see: Abbas Amanat,Pivot of the Universe:Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831-1896 (Berkeley, 1997); Shaul Bakhash, Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars, 1858-1896 (London, 1978); Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution:An InterpretiveHistory of ModernIran (New Haven, 1981), ch. 2 and 3.
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Interactions between Practical Concerns and the Reception of European Ideas During the second half of the nineteenth century most Persian political texts point to, describe, defend, or refute European ideas and cultures. In various writings by the leading Iranian intellectuals of this period we find references to many European thinkers, occasionally accompanied by brief descriptions of their ideas. The list of such names includes Francis Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes, Bossuet, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Mirabeau, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Bentham, and John Stuart Mill.2 During the same period a number of European books, including texts in philosophy and history as well as writings containing implicit or explicit political arguments, were translated into Persian. These translations included Discours sur la methode by Descartes,3 Les aventures de Telemaque by Francois de Salignac de la Mothe Fenelon, Le Siecle de Louis XIV and Charles XII by Voltaire,4 and parts of Nouveaux principes d 'economie politique by J.C.L. Sismondi. Some of Moliere's plays, including Le Medecin malgre lui, Le Misanthrope, and L 'Ane, and a number of novels such as Les Amours du Chevalier de Faublas by Jean-Baptiste de Couvray, Aventures de Mosquetaires and El Conde de Monte-Cristo, by Alexandre Dumas, and The Bronze Statue; or the Virgin s Kiss by George W. M. Reynolds were also translated into Persian during the second half of the nineteenth century.5 In reviewing these translations we find that the Iranians were not simply passive recipients of western literature and ideas;6 nor did they adopt them after careful study and thorough analysis. When various schools of European thought 2
In addition, in Hoquq-e Asasi ya Usul-e Mashrutiyat,a work by Mirza Mustafa Khan Mansur al-Saltanehwritten around 1909, the ideas of the following Europeanthinkers were briefly mentioned:John of Salisbury,Marsilius of Padua, Francisco Suarez, Jean Bodin, and Fran9oisHotman. See FraydunAdamyyat, Ideoluzhy-eNihzat-e Mashrutiyat-eIran (Tehran, 1976), I, 215-22. 3 ArthurGobineau claimed that he "translatedDescartes's Discours sur la methode into Persian, with the assistance of a knowledgeable rabbi, Mollah LalazarHamadani,which the king Nasereddin Shah agreed to have published."See ArthurComte de Gobineau,"Les Religions et les Philosophies dans l'Asie centrale,"in Gobineau Oeuvres (Dijon, 1983), II, 476. Accordingto FraydunAdamyyat,the Persiantitle given to this translationwas Hekmat-eNaseri (Naser s Wisdom)in dedicationto Naseral-Din Shah.Adamyyatpointsout thatone of Descartes's works had apparentlybeen translatedto Persian and consequentlyburneda few years earlier: Adamyyat,Andishehhay-eMirzaAqa KhanKirmani(Paris, 1985), 73; andAdamyyat,Andishehyeh Taraqqiva Hokumat-eQanun (Tehran,1972), 17-18. 4 These works by Voltairewere apparentlytranslatedbefore 1850. See EdwardG. Browne, The Press and Poetry of ModernPersia (Los Angeles, 1983), 159. 5 For othertitles translatedto Persiansee Browne, 159-64. In addition,a numberof European books on biology, militarysciences, medical sciences, and geometry were translatedand taught at Dar al-Fonun, the first European-stylecollege in Iran. For lists of some of these books, see Browne, 157-58; and YahyaArinpour,Az Saba TaNima (Tehran,1993), I, 259. 6 Hence Gobineau, Oeuvres, II, 1113, wrote in a letter to Prokesch-Ostenin 1862: "[the philosophersof Teheran]ask me to translateDescartes'sDiscours sur la methode,not thatthey want to copy the Europeanphilosophy, but because they say it must also contain something [valuable], and they want to know what it is."
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came to the attentionof Iranianintellectualsduringthe nineteenthcentury,very few of them were interestedin studying Europeanideas solely for the sake of scholarlycuriosity.Instead,practicalconsiderationsandpoliticalmotivesplayed an essentialpartin the receptionof westernthoughtin Iran.7 One importantpracticalconsiderationwas a resultof the marketfor books in Iranduringthis period. One must rememberthat at the time less than five percent of Iranianswere literate,8printinghouses were few and tightly controlled by the government,and the clergy in general was highly hostile to the spreadof Europeanideas. Finally, mainly because paperwas imported,books were so expensive thatonly a few people could affordto buy them.9One consequenceof these conditionswas thatthe translatorsandauthorscould not expect much monetarycompensationfrom selling their books. Rather,most of them hoped that translatingand publishing works from Europeanlanguages would bringthemto the attentionof the Court,andfacilitatea governmentappointment or promotion. A numberof Europeannovels were translatedin this period, and it was hopedthatthey would not promotethe suspicionandhostilityof the secularand The translatorsoften addedintroductionsto these novels religious authorities.1? This in turncould lead to the spreadof highly distortedimages of Europeanthinkersand their ideas among the generalpopulation,of which Gobineaugives an interestingexample. He writes: "The Voltairewhom a Persian knows is an absolutely different person from the 18th centuryfigure who was called with devotion 'Patriarchede Ferey.' An extremeaccountof this Asian Voltairewas once given to me by a lively and very cheerful fellow, who told his story with such assurancethat one could swear that he knew and visited [this Asian Voltaire] frequently: 'Valater[sic.],' he told me seriously, 'was a Frenchwriter.What a man!A true rascal! He walked in the bazaar with his hat on his ears and his shirt unbuttoned,one hand on his straightponiard,one fist on his hip. He spent his days with Armeniansdrinking,and his nights elsewhere. He especially hatedthe mullahs (clergymen),and gave them a hardtime. Oh! There was not an agony which he did not bring to them. So, they did not like him, and always complained against him to the chief of police. But he was alert, and easily escaped from [the policemen] who came afterhim. When he was in a good mood he made lots of songs which are still read. [Some of them] are about the poor mullahs, in which he attacks and smashes them into pieces. Others are about the Armenians' wine and the charm of the women whom he attended.He was a brilliantbum!' " Gobineau, Oeuvres,II, 489. 8 The first official index of literacyis fromthe 1956 census, which indicatesthatonly 15% of the population older than 10 years were literate; see Charles Issawi (ed.), The Economic History of Iran 1800-1914 (Chicago, 1971), 24. 9 Books were so expensive that the averageprice of a book was equal to the price of meat purchasedby a family of four over a period of six months to one year. See MuhammadIsmail Rezvani, "Ta'sir-eRuznamehayehAhd-e Naser-i," in Haftad Maqaleh (eds.) Afshar, Iraj and Yahya Mahdavi (n.p., 1990), 184. 10Even in the case of fiction, the probablepolitical intentionsof some translatorsand the critical content of their translationswere noticed by the state. E'temal al-Saltaneh,ministerof publicationbetween 1882 and 1896, was not himself immune from censorship. His modified translationof Memoiresd'un dne was recalled (1889), but most of the copies had alreadybeen distributed.In 1894, his translationof Memoires de Mademoiselle de Montpensierwas also banned(Adamyyat,Ideoluzhy-e,I, 53, 66). Sayyed Husain Khan Shirazi, the translatorof The 7
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"in which they wrote about the need to elevate science, culture and art; and admired the Shah's good will and attention toward these praiseworthy goals.""' In many of these translations, as well as in the translations of Moliere's plays, the translators felt free to omit parts of the original text, change the names of characters or places, and add to the original text, especially in the form of Persian poems.'2 This was probably done to make the story or play more attractive to the reader or observer, a consideration which made precision in translation a matter of little concern to the typical Iranian intellectual of the time.13 Translation of European novels was not always for the sake of possible monetary rewards or securing a job or a promotion. Some looked at translation of European literature as a practical means to achieve political goals. For example, Ali Bakhsh Mirza Qajar translated Amours de Chevalier de Faubalas by Jean-Baptiste de Couvray to defend Islamic tradition by providing evidence of the immoral sexual relationships between men and women in Europe.'4 E'temad al-Saltaneh, the minister of publication, also claimed that he had translated historical novels in order to inform people and the Shah of the social and political situation in Europe.15 One of the books translated from French by E'temadal-Saltaneh (or under his supervision) was Memoires d 'undne by Sophie, comtesse de Segur, which was a story written for children and which had been translated into English as well.'6 However, E'temad al-Saltaneh's translation of 1888-89 included a number of political statements about the nature of social life and the individual's rights as well as metaphoric criticism of the prime minister, Amin al-Sultan, which obviously were not included in the original text.'7 There were also occasions when the Iranian authors only borrowed general ideas from the European thinkers. Safineh-yeh Talebiya Ketab-eAhmad, a book by Abdolrahim Talebov Tabrizi, is an example of such a work. Ketab-e Ahmad (as it is usually referred to) was written with the intention to facilitate the education of Iranian children in the "introductory stages of modem sciences and technologies."'8 Almost the entire book is concerned with introducing modem scien-
BronzeStatue, or the Virgins Kiss, tried to secure its publicationaround 1890 by modifying the translationof passages that could provoke the authorities'suspicion. The book was allowed to be published only after the ConstitutionalRevolution of 1905. n Arinpour,I, 260. 12 See EdwardG. Browne, A LiteraryHistory of Persia (London, 1969), IV, 458-62; and Arinpour,I, 337-42. 13
Arinpour, I, 260, 337-42.
14Ali
Bakhsh Mirza Qajar,Mizan al-Melal (Tehran,1945), 87.
15MuhammadHasan Khan E'temad al-Saltaneh,Ruznameh-yehKhaterat(Tehran,1966),
411, 570, 595, 796, 1175, 1189. 16 The English translationappearedin 1880 as TheAdventuresof a Donkey (Philadelphia, n.p.). 17 See Adamyyat,Ideoluzhy-e,I, 65-76. 18 AbdolrahimTalebov Tabrizi, Safineh-yeh Talebiya Ketab-eAhmad (Istanbul, 1896), 3.
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tific innovationsanddiscoveriessuch as the telephone,photography,the microscope, modem medicine, and electricity,in a languageunderstandableby children.Talebovpoints out thathe has borrowedthe idea of writing a book about children'seducationfrom Rousseau'sEmile.'9 It is evident that eitherTalebov was not aware of Emile's basic premises regardingthe proper education of children,or foundthose premises irrelevantto conditionsin Iran.20 Therewere also occasions of translatingandusing Europeantexts for one's political goals withoutcreditingthe originalauthoralthoughthis shouldnot be necessarily regardedas a sign of intellectual dishonesty.An illuminatingexample in supportof this suggestion is the case of MirzaAqa KhanKirmaniand his Haftad va Dow Mellat. MirzaAqa Khanwas one of the best-educatedand brightestmembersof the Iranianintelligentsiawho opposed the absolutismof the Qajardynasty and the dogmatismof the Muslim clergy.As a result of his opposition to the government,he was first forced to leave his hometown and laterto live in exile in the OttomanEmpire.MirzaAqa Khan'slife in exile was often accompaniedby poverty,and he was eventuallyextraditedand executed because of his political beliefs and activities. There is little doubtthat MirzaAqa Khanwrote his book, Haftad va Dow Mellat, underthe influenceof a shortessay, La chaumiereindienne,by Jacques HenriBerardin de SaintPierre(1737-1814),who was a followerof Jean-Jacques Rousseau.AlthoughAqa Khandoes not mention Berardin's name, the beginning paragraphof Aqa Khan's book is a translationof the first paragraphof Bemardin'sbook, and the main theme and most of the charactersof the two books are the same; but Haftad va Dow Millat is much lengthier than La chaumiereindienne,and includes several originalarguments.21 Why did MirzaAqa Khannot mention Berardin's name? One might call this a simple case of plagiarism,particularlysince Berardin was not widely known in Iran.22But plagiarismis usually committedin hopes of financialreward and fame and MirzaAqa Khan'sprofile does not give us the pictureof a manreadyto cheatin orderto securesuch gains. MirzaAqa Khanwroteanother book, Seh Maktub,which is an imitationand in partsa copy of MirzaFath'ali Akhundzadeh'sMaktubat.Unlike Berardin, Akhundzadehwas a well known 19 Talebov Tabrizi, 72.
In Safineh-yehTalebiya Ketab-eAhmadthe authorof Emile is referredto as "theFrench authorLuis Biar (?)" This, however, could be a printingmistake, and such scholarsas Fraydun Adamyyat(Andishehhay-eTalibovTabrizi[Tehran,1984], 5), and MuhammadBaqerMu'meni (Ketab-eAhmad [Tehran,1967], 5) have suggested that the reference is to Rousseau's Emile. 21 Haftad va Dow Millat and a Persian translationof La chaumiere indienne were published together by Mirza MuhammadKhan Bahadur(Berlin, 1924/25). See also Adamyyat, Andishehhay-eMirza Aqa Khan, 62. 22 As Browne (The Press and Poetry, 164), andArinpour(I, 260) point out, Bemardin'sLa chaumiere indienne was translatedinto Persian by MuhammadHusain Khan Zaka' al-Mulk. However, it is not clear whetherthis translationappearedbefore or afterHaftadva Dow Millat. 20
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figureamongIranianintellectuals,andmany individualsin Iranandoutsidehad readhis Maktubat.It is almost impossible to assume thatMirzaAqa Khanwas hopingno one wouldnoticethe similaritiesbetweenhis workandAkhund7adeh's. Finally,it is well knownthatMirzaAqa Khanwas generallyreluctantto put his name on the books he wrote. Consequently,there are a numberof anonymous writingsbelieved to have been writtenby him. Even in HashtBehisht,which he coauthoredwith his close friendMirzaAhmadRuhi,Aqa Khaninsistedthatthe main ideas in the book belonged to his teacher,Haj Sayyed Javad Karbalai. Thereis no reasonto believe thatHaj Sayyed Javadwas familiarwith the western ideas presentedin the book.23 One can concludethatAqa Khandid not mentionBerardin's name simply because he believed that doing so could have a negative effect on the practical purposeof writingHaftadva Dow Millat. The subjectof Haftadva Dow Millat was religion,andapparentlyAqa Khanwrotethe book when he was advocating Islamic unity,a projectin which he was involved in collaborationwith Sayyed Jamalal-DinAfghaniandShaykhal-Ra'isQajar.Consequently,Aqa Khancould have thoughtthatmentioningthe name of a Christianas the originalauthorof the workwould foil his political intentions. As mentionedearlier,the absence of an independentmarketfor books and the tight censorshipimposed by the secular and religious authoritiesdiscouraged the translationof moder Europeanwritings in philosophy and political theory.Oppositionto philosophy by the religious authoritiesin Irancould be tracedback to the Middle Ages, and the burningof a translationof a work by Descartesaround1853 indicatesthe strengthof thatoppositionin the mid-nineteenthcentury.24 At the sametime the secularauthoritywould not have tolerated the publicationof many of the texts of moder westernpolitical theory,mainly becausethey criticizedabsolutismandadvocatedsuch conceptsas popularsovereignty and the rule of law. Consequently,references to works by European political theoristswere scattered,brief, andsometimesinaccurate.No one criticized the inaccuracyin the transmissionof Europeanideas, eitherbecause the readerswere unawareof it or because emphasis on accuracyhad little or no utility for theirpracticalconcerns. Anotherconsequence of contextualcircumstancesand practicalconcerns was the weaknessof ideologicalcommitmentsamongIranianintellectualsof the time. Fromtime to time they would give differentand even opposing accounts and interpretationsof the Europeanideas and their authors.In Hasht Behisht, MirzaAqa Khanadoptedan overallunfavorableapproachto Europeanintellectuals, ideas, and civilization. For example, he arguedthat:
23 24
See Adamyyat,Andishehhay-eMirza Aqa Khan, 64. See note two.
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The Frenchwere once a mightyandrichpeople, andall Europeancountries learnedscience, industry,and progressfrom the French....But as civilization progressed,from within the Frenchnation appeareda few people such as Voltaireand Jean-JacquesRousseauwho claimed to be intellectualsandenemies of superstition.[These intellectuals]andsuch groups as Nihilists, Freemasons,Socialists, Radicals, and Anarchists corruptedthe moralvalues of the noble Frenchnation,causingrevolution and anarchyin that country.And althoughNapoleon (I) tried to reform that nation's morals through Christianity,the French did not recover.25
A few years later,however,he referredto Voltaireas a "greatman of knowledge and [a] very honorablephilosopher."26 MirzaAqa Khanknew Voltaireprimarily in connectionwith whathe thoughtwas his radicalatheism,27andquotedhim as follows: Peoplesurpriseme sincethey use intelligenceandsoundmind,andcarefully analyzeevery issue butreligion, in dealingwith which they forget rationalityandbecome foolish andinsane. [Aboutreligion,people] listen to andbelieve whatno ignorantkid would, andsay whatno madman would say.28 How can we explainthis changeof heartaboutFrenchphilosophersin general and Voltairein particular?One such explanationcan be made based on changesin MirzaAqaKhan'sview of religionandits sociopoliticalutility.When writingHasht Behisht MirzaAqa Khanbelieved thatreligion could contribute to sociopoliticalreformin Iran.A few years laterhe lost hope of such a contributionandinsteadbelieved religionwas an obstacleto reform.His treatmentof Voltaire,therefore,closely correlateswith his assessmentof religion'spragmatic values.
25
Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmaniand Mirza Ahmad Ruhi, Hasht Behisht (Tehran, 1960 [?]),
150. 26 Mirza Aqa KhanKirmani,Seh Maktub(Paris, 1991), 139. EitherE'timadal-Saltanehor Mirza MuhammadHusain KhanZak'a al-Mulk, the head of the state translationagency, translated a biographyof Voltairelate in the nineteenthcentury.It was not, however, published;see Adamyyat,Ideoluzhy-e,I, 52-53. 27 Kirmani, Seh Maktub, 148.
28
Ibid., 147.
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Akhundzadeh'sWritings A prime example of how practicalconsiderationsinfluenceda leading Iranian intellectualof the nineteenthcenturyin his interpretationof moder European ideas is the case of Mirza Fath'aliAkhundzadeh'suse of David Hume's Dialogues ConcerningNatural Religion. Akhundzadehwas born in 1812 in Nukha,a small town in a partof Azerbaijanwhich was annexedto the Russian Empireafterthe second Perso-Russianwar in 1828. By around1834 he moved to Tbilisi andresidedin thatcity untilhis deathin 1878. AlthoughAkhundzadeh lived most of his life in Russian Caucasiaand served the Russian administration, he always consideredhimself to be a Persian.29 Akhundzadeh'swritings include six plays, a novel titled Hekayat-e Usef Shah Sarraj, and a critique of Iraniansociety and its political and religious institutionscalled Seh Maktub-eShahzadeh-yehHendi Kamal al Dowleh beh Shahzadeh-yehIrani Jalal al-Dowleh va Javab-e In beh An.30In addition, Akhundzadehwrote a numberof shortessays andnotes, andhis lettersto other Iranianintellectualsalso containmany interestingcommentsregardingIranian cultureand politics.31Several of Akhundzadeh'swritingshave been translated into Russian,French,German,and English;and he has been referredto as "the orientalMoliere."32 Akhundzadeh'sknowledgeof Persian,Arabic,AzariTurkish(Azerbaijani), and Russian provided him with employment as an interpreterof eastern languages in the Russiangovernment,andallowed him to become acquaintedwith variousRussianandEuropeanliteraturesandschools of thought.He was familiarwith works of a numberof Frenchand Britishintellectualsof the eighteenth andnineteenthcenturies.Among such figureshe namesVoltaire,Montesquieu, David Hume,Jean-JacquesRousseau,JohnStuartMill, HenryThomasBuckle, Ernest Renan, and J.C.L. Sismondi in his writings. Of Russian intellectuals Akhundzadehwas familiarwith worksby Pushkin,Lermontov,andMarlinsky,
29 See the autobiographyof Akhundzadeh,in Fath'ali Akhundzadeh,Maqalat, ed. Baqer M'umini (Tehran,1972), 8-17; Akhundzadeh,Maktubat,ed. M. Subhdam(Paris, 1985), introduction;Adamyyat,Andishehhay-eMirzaFath 'aliAkhundzadeh(Tehran,1970);MangolBayat, Mysticismand Dissent, Socioreligious Thoughtin QajarIran (Syracuse, 1982), 136-37; Hamid Algar, "MalkumKhan,Akhundzadaand the ProposedReformof the ArabicAlphabet,"Middle Eastern Studies, 5 (1969), 116-30; MehrdadKia, "MirzaFathAli Akhundzadeand the call for modernizationof the Islamic world,"Middle Eastern Studies, 30 (1995), 422-48; MaryamB. Sanjabi,"Readingthe Enlightenment:AkhundzadaandHis Voltaire,"IranianStudies,28 (1995), 39-60; Mirza Fath'ali Akhundzadeh,Maqalat-e Farsi, ed. Hamid Muhammadzadeh(Tehran, 1977), introduction. 30 This work has also been referredto as Seh Maktuband Maktubatin various writings. 31 For brief descriptions of Akhundzadeh'smajor works see Adamyyat Andishehhay-e Mirza Fath 'ali, ch. 1; and Arinpour,I, 345-58. 32 H. A. R. Gibb et al. (eds.), The Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden, 1956), I, 332.
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andeven translatedNikolay GavrilovichCheryshevsky's Whatis to be Done? into Azari Turkish.33 Because Akhundzadehdid not know eitherFrenchor English,he could not have studied the works of the French and British authorsin their native languages.34His knowledge of these works could have come from three sources. Some workswere availablein Russiantranslation;Akhundzadeh'sson, Rashid, knew French and translatedsome works in that language for his father;and Akhundzadehwas in contactwith a numberof Iranianintellectualssuchas Mirza MalkumKhanand MirzaUsef KhanMustesharal-Dowleh, who knew various EuropeanlanguagesandespeciallyFrench.It is possible thatthey informedhim aboutsome of the above-mentionedEuropeanwritings.DavidHume'sDialogues ConcerningNaturalReligionhadbeen translatedinto Frenchas earlyas 1779.35 Akhundzadehis the most significantrepresentativeof the IranianEnlightenmentliberals.InMaktubatAkhundzadehwritesthatIraniansmustliberatethemselves from their "absurdbeliefs and the repressionof" despotism. This end could only be achievedvia knowledge (elm),36and knowledge could not be acquired unless throughprogress,andprogresscould not be achieved unless by being liberal, and being liberal is not possible without getting rid of [religious]beliefs. Alas thatyourreligionandyourbeliefs areobstacles to your conversionto a liberal.37 In the introductionto the same book, Akhundzadehdefines the "liberal": [o]ne who is an absolutefree-thinker,is not subjectto religious terror, and does not believe in what is beyond reason and outside the law of nature,even if the majorityof the peoples of the world believe in that and [historicalaccounts]and books presentit as truth...38 To achieve enlightenmentpeople not only must be literate,but they also "mustacceptEuropeanideas. In the Iranians'minds Europeanideas must have 33 See Sanjabi,"Readingthe Enlightenment,"M. Subhdam'sintroductionto Akhundzadeh, Maktubat;Muhammadzadeh'sintroductionto Akhundzadeh,Maqalat-e Farsi, and Adamyyat, Andishehhay-eMirza Fath 'ali. 34 Vanessa Martin's suggestion that Akhundzadeh"translatedworks from English and French"is obviously not correct(Islam and Modernism:TheIranian Revolutionof 1906 [London, 1989], 5). 35See T. E. Jessop,A Bibliographyof David Humeand of ScottishPhilosophyfromFrancis Hutcheson to Lord Balfour (London, 1966), 41. 36Elm could mean science as well, and it is knowledge acquiredthroughmodem scientific investigationwhich Akhundzadehis pointing to here. 37 Akhundzadeh,Maktubat,56; also Akhundzadeh, Maqalat, 112-13. 38 Akhundzadeh,Maktubat, 12.
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Akhundzadehfinds priorityover Europeancommerce and manufacturing."39 two obstacles to this end. First, the great majorityof the Iranianpeople at his time were illiterateandcould not studyEuropeanideas, and, second, Islamwas preventingpeople from liberatingthemselves from the yoke of ignoranceand superstition.Akhundzadeh'sintellectualactivitiesrevolvedaroundovercoming these obstacles. These activities includedattemptsto reformthe alphabetso it could be learnedfaster and easier, promotingnationalismas an alternativeto Islam, criticizingIslam and especially the Shi'i dogma, and promotingcritical thinking among the Iranianintelligentsia.40It was in performingthe last two activities that Akhundzadehfound certainschools of Europeanthoughtto be particularlyhelpful. Akhundzadeh'shostility towards Islam had several grounds.First, it was the Muslims' invasion which had put an end to ancient Persian civilization, which he admired.41Second, Akhundzadehfound Islam to be an obstacle to liberty: Complete freedomhas two elements:moral freedom and bodily freedom. The guardiansof Islamhave takenourmoralfreedomaway,making us ... subjectto theirown will in moral issues.... The nationsof the East,because of the adventof the Arabs'religion and theirdomination over Asia, have lost [their]completefreedomat once, and aredeprived of thejoy of equalityand the blessing of humanrights.42 Thirdly,Akhundzadehfinds Islamto be an obstacleto materialprogressin both personalandsocial scales. The prayersdemandedby Islamhave "nobenefitbut wastingone's time, andstoppinghim fromobtainingthe meansnecessaryforhis life and thatof his family."43 Finally,like any otherreligion, Islam is "vainand and Akhundzadehattacksits ontologicalbasis. fictitious," It must be pointedout thatAkhundzadehwas an atheistand did not follow Hume'sskepticism.Akhundzadeh'sepistemologywas close to thatof JohnStuart Mill. Like Mill, Akhundzadehbelieved that the way to the discovery of truths was to allow for andpromotethe clash of ideas. Not only opinion mustbe free, but to "criticize"is the primaryresponsibilityof intellectuals.Truthis indepen39AkhundzadehMaqalat, 110. In a letter Akhundzadehwrites; "The railroadis necessary [for Iran],but reformingthe alphabet is more necessary. The telegraph is necessary, but reforming the alphabet is more necessary. [Enacting a] secular legal code is necessary, but reforming the alphabet is more necessary.I am not againstmaking secular laws, but give priorityto the reformof the alphabet because without educating the people laws will have no benefit" (Adamyyat,Andishehhay-e Mirza Fath'ali, 104). 41 Akhundzadeh,Maktubat, 15-16. 40
42Ibid., 56. 43Ibid., 134.
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dent of customs and traditions,and in fact truthscan be discovered if through criticismmankindis saved fromthe tyrannyof dogma andtradition. The similaritybetween John StuartMill's andAkhundzadeh'sviews was not entirelyby accident.Akhundzadehknew aboutMill's OnLiberty,andwrote a briefessay on the mainideasof the book.44Inthis essay Akhundzadehpresents argumentsaboutthe necessity of freedomof ideas andexpressionfor discovery of truthsand the effect of adheringto customs and traditionsin preventinghumanprogress.AkhundzadehpresentsMill's argumentthateven if one is in error he shouldnot be forcedto acceptan alternativeidea, since such forcefulconversion is more harmfulthanhaving false beliefs. However,Akhundzadeh,who is primarilyconcernedwith religious dogma, spendsalmostone thirdof his essay attackingthe Catholic Church,a subject only briefly mentionedin Mill's On Liberty. A critical approachto beliefs and ideas and allowing for clashes among themwere the mainprinciplesofAkhundzadeh'sthought.The best evidence of this is Maktubat.Judging from his other writings, there is little doubt that AkhundzadehwroteMaktubatto criticize Shi'i dogma.Nevertheless,the book has two characters:Kamal al-Dowleh, who attacksreligious dogma, and Jalal al-Dowleh, who defends it and tries to refute Kamal al-Dowleh's attacks. In developingJalaal-Dowleh'sdefenseAkhundzadehtriedhardto providethe strongest arguments,althoughhe opposedJalalal-Dowleh's position. Another work Akhundzadehpresentedas a letter by David Hume to the Muslim clergy (ulama) in India.45Fromthe above evidence it is apparentthat Akhundzadehdid not shareHume's skepticismandwas insteada firmadherent of nineteenth-centurypositivism; however, he was evidently awareof and admiredHume'shostilitytowardsreligiousdogma.Theepistemologicaldifference between them may even have been unknownto Akhundzadeh.But if he was awareof it, it would not necessarilyhave made him overly concerned,since he was following the generalpragmaticapproachof Iranianintellectualsto the use of the ideas of theirEuropeancounterparts. Thereis no evidence thatin fact Hume wrote this letter.Meanwhile,in the appendixto Maktubatwe find an argumentalmostidentical,both in contentand language,to the alleged letter,which is not presentedas a letterto the ulama of 44For the Persian text of this short essay, which takes up about 370 Persian words, see Akhundzadeh,Maqalat, 93-95. Handwrittencopies of this essay along with Akhundzadeh's translationof a part of one of Mirabeau'sspeeches were apparentlycirculatingunderthe title GuftarDar Azadi by the early 1880s. See Ali Pursafar,Ketabshinasi-eInqelab-e Mashrutiyate Iran (Tehran,1994), 224. 45 There is no evidence thatthis letterwas publishedin the nineteenthcentury,but it could have been circulatedby the authoramong his friends, as was the case with his famous book, Maktubat.For the Persian text of the letter, see Mirza Fath'ali Akhundzadeh,Mirza Fath 'ali Akhundzadeh:Asarlari,ed. HamidMuhammadzadeh(Baku, 1961), 297-301; andAkhundzadeh, Maqalat, 121-24.
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Indiaanddoes not mentionHume'sname.This partof Maktubatwas apparently writtenaround1864-65, but it is not clear whetherAkhundzadehwrote the alleged letterbefore or afterMaktubat.There remaintwo questionsto be asked here. First,is the alleged letterinfluencedby Hume's writingon religion at all? And second,whatwereAkhundzadeh'spossible motivesin "forging"this letter? In the first sentence Akhundzadehspecifically names David Hume as the authorof the letter.The claim that the argumentsagainst the First Cause presentedin the letterareby an "Englishphilosopher"would have servedtwo purposes. First, it would divert some of the hostility from the Muslim clergy and evenperhapsfromthe Christianclergy,a tacticusedbyAkhundzadehinMaktubat as well. But if thatwas all, Akhundzadehwould not have had to specify thatthe letterwas by Hume,as he could have followed the frequentlypracticedtradition of presentinghis statementin the nameof"Europeanphilosophers"in general.46 One might assume that by mentioningHume by name Akhundzadehwas trying to promote the importanceof the letter and its argument.But Englishspeakingphilosophers,unlikemanyof theirFrench-speakingcounterparts,were little known amongthe Iranianintellectualsof the time. If in fact Akhundzadeh wantedto simplypromotethe argument,he probablycouldhaveachievedgreater success by attributingit to a philosophermore famous among Iranians.That Akhundzadehmentions Hume by name suggests thathe had some knowledge aboutHume's argumentsagainstreligious dogma. Thereis some evidencethatthe argumentin the allegedletterwas influenced by Hume's Dialogues ConcerningNatural Religion. Like the Dialogues, the letter is writtenin the form of a dialogue. The Dialogues involves three main characters:the skepticPhilo,thephilosopherCleanthes,andthe orthodoxthinker Demea.Akhundzadeh'sletterincludesonly two views, thatof the "philosophers" versusthatof the "clergymen,"anddoes not presentthe skepticalposition.This could be becauseAkhundzadehor the personwho informedhim aboutthe Dialogues understoodit simply in terms of a debatebetween theologians and philosophers.Or,Akhundzadehcould have concludedthatby reducingthe number of characters,the atheistargumentin the Dialogues could become sharperand easier for Iranianreadersto understand. In comparingthe content of the letter to that of the Dialogues we find a similarphenomenon.TheDialogues examinesseveralargumentsfor God's existence. In the letterwe find only two of these arguments:the "vegetationand generation"argumentand the "FirstCause"argument.Thereare some considerablesimilaritiesbetween how these argumentsarepresentedin the two texts. Hence, in the Dialogues the "FirstCause"argumentis presentedas:
46In factAkhundzadehmadeuse of thattraditionin otherworks(see Akhundzadeh,Maqalat, 37).
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Nothing exists withouta cause; and the originalcause of this universe we call God.47 In the letterwe read: ... each being musthave a cause,becausenothingcould come intobeing by itself. Thus, the universethatexists, needs a cause for its being, and that cause is its creator. Again, in the Dialogues we read: We must, therefore,have recourseto a necessarilyexistent Being who carriesthe reason of his existence in himself....48 And in the letter: ... necessary-to-be ... is the essence of God, and this being requires no
cause. In the Dialogues Cleanthesmakesthe following objectionto the conceptof God as the "necessaryexistence": But further,why may not the materialuniversebe the necessarilyexistent Being...?49 In the letterwe readthatthe philosophersask: Why should not we accept thatthe being which needs no cause is this visible andsensible universeitself...? Finally, in the Dialogues Hume examines the vegetation/generationargument: The worldplainly resemblesan animalor a vegetablemorethanit does a watch or a knitting-loom.Its cause, therefore,it is more probable, resemblesthe cause of the former.The cause of the formeris generation or vegetation. The cause, therefore,of the world we may infer to be somethingsimilaror analogousto generationor vegetation.50 47 David Hume, Dialogues ConcerningNatural Religion and the PosthumousEssays, ed. RichardH. Popkin (Indianapolis,1998), 14. 48
Hume, 55.
49 50
Ibid., 56. Ibid., 44-45.
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The letterpresentsa manipulatedversion of the above argument: ... the being of a spermrequiresa father(man), and the being of a seed requiresthe being of a tree. Therefore,the universewhich is the collection of all things requiresa cause. The alleged letterby Hume to the Muslim clergymenof Indiais aboutonetwentieththe length of the Dialogues ConcerningNaturalReligion. Therefore, the letterobviously could not include many of the argumentsin the Dialogues. In writingthe letterAkhundzadehwas not concernedwith the epistemological dimensionof the Dialogues. The purposewas to promotecriticalthinkingabout Islam and its doctrines,a goal thatAkhundzadehpursuedthroughouthis intellectuallife. Conclusion As suggested earlier,the typical Iranianintellectualof the nineteenthcenturyprimarilyand often exclusively understood,interpreted,andpresentedthe schools of Europeanthought in terms of pragmaticpolitical objectives. This priorityof practicalconsiderationsover theoreticalaccuracyled to a varietyof broad interpretationsof Europeanschools of thought in Iran.Because of this and the fact that very few Iraniansat the time had any knowledge of moder Europeanthought,brief accounts and summaryinterpretationsof the writings of Europeanphilosopherswere not uncommonat the time.Akhundzadeh'spragmatic accountof Hume'sDialogues is an example of the above attitude. Utilizing this approach,Iranianintellectualswere able to use Europeanconcepts and argumentsin innovative ways to expand the boundariesof political vocabularyand discoursein Iran.An importantexample of this expansionwas the evolution of differentpolitical languages which shareda numberof basic principlesfrommoder Europeanthought,butpresentedthem in fundamentally new interpretations.These political languages were pregnantwith words and concepts thatwere new to the Iranianpolitical discoursein the mid-nineteenth century,andwere furtherreinterpretedby futuregenerationsandimpactedtheir politicalactions.This demonstrateshow the disseminationof ideascould follow practicaldemandsand contingencies instead of pure intellectualconcern and curiosity. Universityof California,Riverside.
I would like to thank John ChristianLaursenfor his advice concerningthis article.
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Appendix The following is a translationof the essay by Akhundzadehwhich purports to be a letterby David Hume:51 In the year 1768, an English52philosopher53 called Humepresenteda problem to the ulama of Islam in Indiaand Bombay,asking them to give an answer to it. So far, a decisive answer which brings about satisfactionhas not been given. The problemis this:
The religiousscholarsof each nationconfrontthe philosophersin proving the divinity [God] by arguingthat each being must have a cause, becausenothingcould come into being by itself. Thus,the existing universe needs a cause for its being, and thatcause is its creator. Philosophersrefutethe above opinionby saying, "Ifthe above is valid, the cause, because itself is a being, needs its own cause, and so would its cause, and so on. And this is againstreason,because reasondictates thatthe chain of causes must stop at a point, otherwisetherewill be an endless regress.Therefore,reasonrefutesthe argumentof the religious scholarsthat cause could be proven based on being. In fact the weakness of these scholarsin the case of provinga cause for being is clearer thanthe sun." Philosopherstell the religious scholars:"eitherthe chain of causes mustcontinuewithoutan end, or you must stop at a point andacknowledge that one being among beings needs no cause. In the formercase, there will be an endless chain [of causes], when in the lattercase the necessity of cause is removedand it is demonstratedthattherecould be being without[requiring]a cause. So why shouldnot we acceptthatthe being which needs no cause is this visible and sensible universe itself andnot the imaginaryand suspiciousbeing known as the creator?And on what basis would you, the religious scholars,arguethatthe being of the universenecessitates having a cause? We both agree thatthe chain of causes must stop at a point; then does not reason prescribethat we should stop at the being of the universe?" 51 The translationhere is from the Persian text of this letter in Akhundzadeh,Maqalat, 121-24. 52 Akhundzadeheither did not know that Hume was Scottish, or introducedhim as English, perhapsbecause Iranianreadersof the text would have attributedmore authorityto an "English"philosopherthan to a "Scottish"one. 53 Akhundzadehuses the word hakim,which has a numberof meanings in Persianincludmedical doctor, sage, wise man, and philosopher. ing
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The religious scholarsare unableto refutethe above objection [by the philosophers],andare compelled to say; "Wedivide being into two kinds. One is possible-to-be (mumkenal-vojud),which is the universe, andthis being needs a cause. The second kind of being is necessary-tobe (vajebal-vojud),which is the essence of God, andthis being requires no cause. Obviously,due to the problemthat the endless causal chain could be present,we must stop at a point. [However],we do not stop at the universe,which is possible-to-be,because it needs a cause. Instead we stop at necessary-to-be,which is God, andthe cause of the possibleto-be,butitself does not need a cause. In this way, thereis no problemin provingdivinity andthe Creator." But [the above argument]could be valid [only] if the division of being into possible and necessary is valid. Let us see on what basis the religious scholars divide being into possible and necessary.The religious scholarssay: "Wesee objectsneed causes. Forexample,the being of the embryorequiresa father(man), and the being of a seed requires the being of a tree.Therefore,the universe,which is the collection of all things,requiresa cause. In this case the universebecomes a possible-tobe, and to end [the chain of causes] at it becomes impossible. Consequently,we arguethattheremustbe a being which needs no cause, and thatis the necessary-to-be.This means that [the necessary-to-be]does not requireanotherbeing as the cause of its own being, but ratheritself is the cause of the possible-to-bewhich is this universe.We stop at this necessarybeing and recognize it as the cause of all otherthings." The philosophersrefute the above argument[by telling] the religious scholars,"Thingsin theirvarietyandconvertibilityfromone form to anotherand one conditionto another,requirecause, but not in their [material]essence andsubstance.Hence,embryoandseed in the variety of the conditionsandtheirchange fromone formto anotherrequirethe being of fatherand tree, [but] not in their essence and substance.Our disagreementis not basedon varietyandchange.By being we meanthe essence of things.And this essence is on accountof being in opposition to absolutenon-being,andon the whole [beingis] complete,single, and bounded,which means the exhaustivematter.Differentthings only in theirvarietiesandchangesneed each other.Thus,the essence of things is the necessary-to-be,andthe essence of the universewhich is the collectionof [all]things,needs no otheressence andrequiresno cause. The universe,in its essence, could not be consideredthe possible-to-beand in need of a cause, otherwisean endless chain of causes becomes evident.And the essence of thingswhich is the single andnecessarybeing, has neithercome afternothingnessnor ends with nothingness.The essence of things neitherhas a beginning nor will it have an end. But its
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Two
of
Meanings
Term
the
Contents
and
Acts
"Idea":
Hume's
in
Treatise
CatherineKemp From the Treatiseof HumanNature (completed in 1736) to the Appendix (to Book III,publishedin 1740) andto the EnquiryConcerningHumanUnderstanding( 1748) Humeappearsto vacillatebetween two ways of accountingfor the formationof belief. The doctrinein the Treatiseis explicitly amendedin the Appendix and then reversed again in the Enquiry.Hume is at pains to insist, first,thatbelief is no morethanmereconceptionwhich is attendedby a particularsentimentor feeling (read:impression),ratherthanby some idea of the existence per se of objects.' Then he correctshimself in the Appendix, saying that conceptionis "modified"as belief butis not attendedby any distinctimpression (T 627). In the Abstractof the Treatisepublishedthe same year (1740) Hume refers to belief as "a differentMANNER of conceiving" (T 653). Later,in the Enquiry,he revertsto his initialformulation:"thedifferencebetweenfictionand belief lies in some sentimentor feeling, which is annexed to the latter,not the former."2
This vacillation is a series of attemptsto answer the question of how conception,if it is in itself indifferentto its object,canbecome lively, thatis, become a belief in the existenceof thatobject.3The fact thatHumeappearstornbetween
'David Hume, A Treatiseof Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 19782;rev. P.H. Nidditch), 97 (cited as "T"). 2 David Hume, Enquiries ConcerningHuman Understandingand Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 19753;rev. P.H. Nidditch), 48 (cited as "E"). Last italics mine. 3 This inquiry into the natureof belief proceeds under the understanding,sharedby several commentatorsin recent years, that neither a specific content nor referenceto a particular object determineswhetheror not conceptions (or ideas) are beliefs. See, for example, John P. Wright,"Hume'sRejectionof the Theoryof Ideas,"History of Philosophy Quarterly,8 (1991), 150, and Michael Gorman,"Hume'sTheory of Belief," Hume Studies, 19 (1993), 95.
675 2000byJournal of theHistoryof Ideas,Inc. Copyright
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these two ways of explainingbelief andthathe was comfortablerestingwith the attendantmodel in the laterexpressionof the theoryin the Enquiryindicates,I believe, that both models are legitimate descriptionsof the genesis of belief, consideredfromdifferentpointsof view.4The attendantmodel he finds serviceable in the Enquiryis perfectly sound from the vantageof the science of moral humannature:a sensible dimensionto belief is centralto Hume'spositionhere, a point to which I will returnbelow.5The question of the differentmannerof conceptionis bettersuitedto a discussionof the epistemologicalnotionof belief, becauseit takesaccountof differencesbetweenacts beyondthose differencesin the way they feel to the mind.These two versionsof the theoryof belief, I argue, suggest thatthereare two distinctmeaningsfor the term"idea":(a) understood as the act of conception, and (b) understoodas the content of that act. I begin withthis suggestion,takingup firstthe attendantandthenthemodificationmodel. I then show thatthis distinctionintroducesclarityintothreetraditionallycontroversial aspects of Hume'sposition.
ALL the perceptionsof the humanmind resolve themselves into two distinctkinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONSand IDEAS. (T 1) Given this menu at the opening of the Treatise,we must ask whetherthe sentimentwhich attendsthe enlivenedconceptionis annexedto an impressionor to an idea. The attendantitself is an impressionand therebythe source of the liveliness of the believing conception.By itself, we are told, conceptionhas no force andvivacity.Throughoutthe TreatiseHumeranges"mereconception"on the side of thinking,in the easily perceivabledivisionbetweenfeeling andthinking (T 2), and fromthis we can conclude at least provisionallythatthis conception is itself an idea, which is joined to an impressionto produceour assent. In this light the conception and the idea are simply two names for the "partsand composition"(compare T 94-95, 628) of belief, or what I will call here the content of an act of the mind, by which I mean those elements of such an act which indicatethe directionof the mind to an object.6It is this content which 4
Gorman attempts a reconciliation of these two versions of the theory of belief via an identificationof the "mannerof conception" of an idea with the "feeling to the mind" of an idea. This identification is possible, however, only after Gormanresolves the ambiguity between idea as object of belief and idea as that belief itself in favor of the second meaning. "Mannerof conception"and"feeling to the mind"become aspectsof "thebelief-idea."Gorman, 94-95. I argue here that Hume's theory is clearer if we preserve and clarify, ratherthan collapse, these distinctions. 5 See also Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments(Cambridge,1991), 69-70, 158-59. 6 This notion of contentwas readily availableto Hume from the late-scholastictraditionin Scotland:"All notions representto a cognitive faculty. It is now plain that that representative function consists of an intentionalact of the cognitive faculty by which the mind is directed towardsa given object. But as well as an object such an act must have a content for otherwise
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does not changein the transformation frommereconceptionto belief. The direction to a particularobjectpersists.If belief is no more thanconceptionwhich is annexedto or attendedby a particularfeeling or sentiment,we understandthis conceptionas an idea which is the contentof a particularact of the mind. Here, when Humerefersto our idea of an object,he refersto the content,to the direction of the mind (or ratherits act) to a particularobject.We will see in a moment thatanothertermHume employs for this idea-cum-contentis "image." The fact that this act of the mind also goes underthe name "conception," and sometimes, althoughnot as often, underthe name "idea"points us to the implicationsof the secondmodel of belief. Consideredas a certainmodification of conception,as Humeeverywhereremarks,belief "impliesa conception,and yet is somethingmore; and since it adds no new idea to the conception;it follows, thatit is a differentMANNER of conceiving an object;somethingwhich is distinguishableto the feeling, and dependsnot upon our will" (T 653). This differencein manner,which is the subjectof the modificationor modulationof mere conceptioninto belief, is a qualityof acts ratherthan of contents. Sometimes Hume will refer to belief as a differentmannerof conceiving an idea, instead of an object, but this is a case in which the term "idea"refers to the content of the act of conceiving, as above. Hume's remarkson the peculiar mannerof conceptionare addressedto the act-in relationto its object-as the locus of the transformation.Neitherobjects nor anythingwe could construeas contentshave "manners"in Hume'sdiscussion;rather,thatwhich is modifiedor alteredin its manneris the act directedat an object, where this directionconstitutes the content.7If belief, then, is a peculiarmannerof conception, which is merely "differentto the feeling," conceptionis here understoodas an act of the mind, sometimes referredto as an idea and usually only in conjunctionwith objects. The phrase"ideaof an object,"like the termidea itself, has two meanings: the first,presentedabove, refersto the content(or directionto an object)of an act of the mind;the second is synonymouswith "conceptionof an object,"or "conceiving an object," and refers to the act whose direction to a particular object constitutes its content. Here then lies the second meaning of the term
there is no way of explaininghow the act can have any direction,even less how it has precisely the direction it does have." Alexander Broadie, "MedievalNotions and the Theory of Ideas," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 87 (1986-87), 165. The scholastics of John Mair's circle, Broadie notes, proceeded to identify the content with "an intelligible species formally identical with the form of the object." Hume is attempting to work out his notion of idea without such a commitmentto the natureof the content. Whetheror not Hume retainsa notion of object in additionto his impressionsand ideas is the subjectof a greatdeal of controversy.In this essay I side with those commentatorswho argue that he does. See Norman Kemp Smith, ThePhilosophy of David Hume (London, 1949), 218; see also Wright, 157. 7 "[B]elief ... is a name merely for the manner in which certain ideas come to be apprehended."Kemp Smith, 377. "Ideas"here are contents.
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"idea"for Hume: as act, in additionto the sense of idea as content for such an act. This distinction,I think, is of enormousassistance in elucidatingthe employment of the term "idea"in the Treatise:in some places we are given to understandthat we have conceptionsof ideas, in otherplaces we read that we have conceptionsof objects, and in still othersit appearsthatwe have ideas of objects. Takentogether,these expressionspresenta considerablebarrierto understandingHume on a numberof importanttopics, for example, his theoryof ideas, of belief, and of the imagination.In orderto explore the ramificationsof this claim and to provide it with a broaderfoundationin Hume's exposition, I turnnow to the examinationof threeissues in his workwhich have most consistentlyengagedthe attentionof his readers:the "exactresemblance"of the simple impressionsand ideas, also referredto as "thecopy thesis,"the vexed question of the natureof the qualities"force"and "vivacity,"8and finally the natureand role of impressions,especially in relationto "ideas." Ideas as Contents:Ideas as Images of PrecedentImpressions The designationof one sense of the term "idea"as the contentof an act of the mind gives rise to the possibility of a new way of readingHume'sclaim that ideas are images, or copies, of precedingimpressions.This claim takes several forms.The firstuse of the termimage occurs on the firstpage of the Treatise(T 1), closely followed by the "greatresemblance"between impressionsandideas (T 2) and the "reflexion"of the one by the other, so that all the perceptionsof the mind are double, and appearboth as impressionsand ideas. When I shutmy eyes andthinkof my chamber, the ideas I form are exact representationsof the impressionsI felt; nor is there any circumstanceof the one, which is not to be found in the other.In runningover my otherperceptions,I find still the same resemblance andrepresentation.Ideasandimpressionsappearalwaysto correspondto each other.9 Of this impression,there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains afterthe impressionceases, andthis we call an idea. (T 8, my emphasis)
8 Although ratherneglected in recent discussions. For an exception, see Wayne Waxman, "Impressionsand Ideas: Vivacity as Verisimilitude,"in Hume Studies, 19 (1993), 75-88. 9 Treatise,2-3, my emphases. Hume goes on, of course, to point out that some complex and some impressions complex ideas do not participatein this exact resemblance, although "the rule here holds without exception,"that is, for our simple perceptions.
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Our ideas are copy 'd from our impressions,and representthem in all their parts. When you wou'd any way vary the idea of a particular object, you can only encreaseor diminishits force and vivacity.1 If you would make any otherchange on it, it representsa differentobject or impression.(T 96, my emphasis) If we readthese passages with the understandingthatthe termidea in each refers to what I have called the content, we are able to discern a particular constructionof the terms"copy,""resemble,""correspond,"and"represent."It is this:to copy an impression(or anotheridea),to resembleit or correspondto it, and even to representit (althoughthis is a most difficult notion) is simply to repeat it, or, more precisely, to repeata certainaspect of it. Whatis an impression for Hume?Provisionally,at least, we can say it is comprisedof its sensational character,expressedin its qualitiesof strength,steadiness,force, etc. (T 1), its adventitiouscharacter,wherebyit formsourfirstexperienceof a particular sensationalevent (T 1), its temporalcharacter,in which it occurs and then fades fromthe mind(T 253), and,finally,its what,the elementhavingto do with its being an impressionof something in particular.This last element I deduce fromthe stipulationHume makes thatimpressionsare things which are copied in our ideas. Those ideas which are copies of impressionsdo not reproduceor reflect or repeatthe sensationalcharacterof impressions,to the contrary,they essentiallylackit, as ideasper se. Nor do they copy the adventitiousor temporal aspects,since they areby definitionprecededby impressions,andformthe destinies of those precedentimpressions,usually afterthe latterhave deteriorated. Of what, then, are they copies? When Hume asks with regardto a particular idea, "fromwhat impressionscou'd this idea be deriv'd?"(T 251), he is inquiring, e.g., into what impressionof his chamberis the idea of his chamberderived (or copied) from. This what is the content, and it is the unalterablythe same, barringany deteriorationdue to the faultof our faculties,or the passageof time. Considerthe language of "partsor composition"and "the nature,or the orderits parts"Hume employs to describewhat is unchangedin the modulation of mere conception into belief: these parts,their natureand composition, and their orderare elements and aspects of"the idea" (T 95), which, I submit, are copies of the analogous parts, composition, etc., of the correspondingimpression(s). The content, as it first appearsin the guise or by the means of the impression,is repeatedin the idea, where idea here is understoodin its sense as content.The idea is itself this repetition.If we bearin mindthe understandingof content as a direction of an act of the mind to an object, it is much easier to recognize that Hume is merely pointing out that the directionof the mind to a 10A
claim Hume retracts,not very specifically, in the Appendix (T 636).
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particularobject remainsconstanteitherwhen we switch acts from an impression to an idea (construedhere as synonymouswith the act of conception) or when we modify an act and alterits "manner,"as in the case of a mere conception of, say, the event describedto me by a friend,which is transformedinto the lively conceptioncalled belief, when I finally recollect the event andbelieve in its (past)existence (T 627-28). The actualelementsof the anecdote,or memoryto-be, are "double,"or are "reflexions"of each other insofar as they resemble each othereven as they are partsof very differentacts. When we inspect or, as Hume says, review ourthoughts,we find the two appearancesof the past event, one in the formof the mereconceptionof the situationas conveyed to me by my friend,who expects me to rememberit, and the second in the memory,or the lively idea, of it as an actualpast event for which I was present. Understoodin this way, the questionof the meaningof the claim thatall our ideas are, ultimately,copies of impressionscarriescertainimplicationsfor the issue of representation.Throughoutthe TreatiseHume refers to ideas as images, usually faint ones, of the originallyvivid impressions.When he uses the he is generallyunderstoodto referto the repexpression"exactrepresentation," resentationof the impressionby the idea, where the representativeis construed as a pictureor an image. In accordancewith this view Hume's insistence that "perceptions"are our only objects appearsto make sense insofar as it means thatfor us thereis, on the one hand,a world of objects (impressionsand ideas) (T 67-68) and, on the other,a set of images or representationsof these objects; here there is a clear distinctionbetween representativeand representedor, as some prefer,between sign and thing signified. Any notion of a real world of objects dropsout, and Hume pursuesthe traditionalepistemologicalquestions along a divide of his own designation,namely,thatbetweenourperceptionsand the representationsof these in ourthoughts.This is Humethe skepticpar excellence, and in my view it is entirelya productof a misreadingof his work, albeit one which is not easily evaded. JohnYoltonis one readerof Humewho has, I believe, grappledsuccessfully with this series of termsin Hume'stexts, althoughin the end I do not completely agree with his conclusions. In his PerceptualAcquaintancefrom Descartes to Reid Yolton carefully combs the history of optics and texts in the eighteenthcenturytheory of ideas traditionfor insights into the employmentof the term image." In his readingof Hume Yolton distinguishesbetween images as picturesof things, and images as thoughtsaboutthose things: Herewe areoften temptedto say I imagemy room,the objectsin it, and theirposition. I may well do that, althoughI do not think it clear what such images are. But I can also thinkabout my room, even the objects 1 John Yolton, PerceptualAcquaintancefrom Descartes to Reid (Minneapolis, 1984).
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in it, withoutany attemptat imaging:I knowthatthereis a typewriter,a desk, a black and white floor, and so on. My recalling each of the objects in my room, includingtheirrelativeposition, is whatHumewould say is an "exactrepresentationof the impressions"I have with my eyes open. "Exactrepresentation"need not be "image"or "picture."An exact representationin thoughtgets it right,is the knowledgethatthe room is made up of these objects and these relations.12 This distinction,which I believe is not one which is inappropriatelyattributedto Hume, clears the way for Yolton's own interpretationof the terms "idea"and "object"in Hume'stext. He identifiesideas as the contentsof conception,much as I have done here,13and says that "Hume takes ideas to be the medium of conception.His logic is one of acts andcontents."14 By "mediumof conception" Yoltonmeans an intermediarybetween conceptionandpresentsensible experience. Conceptionis a mentalact, andin Yolton'saccountwe find a morecareful enumerationof these actsthanin most of Hume'sreaders:he recognizesHume's employmentof consideration,contemplation,regarding,reviewing,andreflecting,15andlists "simpleconception"as well. All of these acts areaccompaniedby contents,which Yoltonarguesis the sole referencefor the termidea:"ideasare mentalcontents."16 On the otherhand, objects for Hume are ideas or perceptionsconceived of andbelieved to be numericallyandspecifically differentfromthe perceptionswe actually experience.17 AlthoughYoltongrantsthatHume does not deny the existence of real, external objects,he acceptsthis distinctiononly on the lines of Hume'sremarkconcerning the numericalversus the specific difference between perceptionsand objects.'8Ideas,as the mediumof conception,may or may not be pictorialimages, accordingto Yolton,but they are certainlythe bearersof meaning,and are representativein thatrespect.Hume,in Yolton'seyes, himself subscribesin the end to the "double-existence"view, in which, however,the objects(as opposedto the ideas) arejust barelyin the picture,andideas standin, as it were, for the objects they represent.The notion of representationYolton attributesto Hume is one
12Yolton, 186.
exhausts the meaning of the term for Yolton, whereas in my view it is ambiguously employed for both content and act of conception. 4Yolton, 182. 13 This sense
15 Ibid., 192-93. 16 195.
Ibid.,
7 Ibid., 163. 18 See Treatise I.ii.6.
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which is not necessarilypictorial,but certainlythe idea must containinformation which corresponds,howeverdistantly,to some object.ForYoltonthe informationis gleanedfromsensible experience,andthe idea in which this information is containedrepresentsthese perceptual"objects." AlthoughYoltoncertainlyavoidsthe now commontrapof labellingHumea skeptic on the groundsthat ideas for Hume completely precludeour access to, and thereforethe existence of, a world of non-mentalobjects, he nevertheless accepts Hume's account of the vulgar and the philosophicalprejudicesabout ideas and objects vis-a-vis the double existence hypothesis as an account of Hume's own theory.19WhatI mean by this is thatYoltonreadsthe dilemmaof the sole existence of ideas on the one handand the "double"existence of ideas and objects on the other, as a question of whether or not ideas for Hume are representations(or signs, or reifications)of objects. If we recall,however,what Hume has meantby the "doubleexistence" of ideas in sections priorto I.iv.2, namely, that ideas are simply copies or repetitions(ultimately)of certainimpressions (or complexes thereof), it is clear that the question of"double existence" for Hume's theoryis very differentfromthe problemas it is posed by the vulgar and the philosophical views on the perceptionof objects. There is no questionthatwe have access both to impressionsand to ideas. What is unusual, I think, about representationin the Treatiseis that the sense in which one is a representativeof anotheris entirelyreciprocal:there is not any strongsense to the distinctionbetween representedand representative per se, because the only prioritywhich would ordinarilyappertainto the represented is for Hume solely temporaland causal, in Hume's sense of that term. Since there is nothing in temporalor causalprioritywhich requiresthe second term to be a representativeof the first and since there is no other difference relevantto the issue of representationbetweenimpressionsandideas,thereis no point,I believe, in distinguishingbetween impressionsas representedandideas as representatives.Hume speaks as though the representationalrelationwere mutual:these "perceptions"are "exact representations"of each other. This is the "doubleexistence hypothesis"to which Hume subscribes.Any questionof the relationof ideas or impressionsto a world of actualobjectscomes up only in the contextof a discussionof vulgarandphilosophicalprejudicesaboutperception, and althoughHume is stronglymoved by his own argumentsand conclusions here, in the end his own theoryis capableof answeringthe skeptic'squestions, at least so far as they pertainto our belief. Hume's statementsthroughoutthe Treatiseconcerningthe relationof the mindto an externalworldare,as is properfor a good philosophicalskeptic,very humbleandwise:
19Yolton, Perceptual Acquaintance,215.
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As to those impressions,which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason,and 'twill always be impossibleto decide with certainty,whetherthey arise immediatelyfrom the object, or are produc'dby the creativepower of the mind, or a deriv'd from the authorof our being. (T 84) This kind of uncertaintywould never tolerate claims that the sources of our impressionswere represented,or formed one of two existences presentto the mind. I do not think that Hume ever forgets or ignores this uncertainty.Our various commitmentsto the particularnatureof the objects we experience are affairsof the relationbetween impressionsand ideas, and of the activity of the imagination,as the sectionentitled"Skepticismwithregardto thesenses " (I.iv.2) demonstrates.It is also the case thatHumeonly raisesthe questionof representationin consideringthis relationbetweenimpressionsandideas,which is to say between differentinstancesof a particularcontent. Fromthe readingI have proposedof representationin the Treatisewe can elicit a correspondingview of Hume's use of the term "image."Ideas are certainly images of impressions,as Hume makes clear in the first few sections, while impressionsarenot so clearly images of ideas. Hume'snotionof image is tied more closely to the temporaland causal relationshipbetween impressions andideas, so thatan image (idea) can only succeed its original(the impression), and the (partial)cause of an image (or idea) is a precedentimpression(other causes of images, insofaras they are faintor inaccuratecopies of theiroriginals, are defects of the faculties, and generaldeteriorationover time). Nevertheless, the sense in which an idea is an image of a precedentimpressionis confined, I believe, simply to the fact thatthe one, the idea, is a repetition(of varyingquality), or perhapsa kindof echo, of the other.The termis limitedto the temporally determinedaspects of the originalityof the impressionand the derivativecharacterof the idea andso is not mutualor reciprocalin the way thatrepresentation is, but it does no more thanexpressjust half of thatreciprocalrelationship.It is importantto bear in mind that in this discussion the term idea appearsin its sense as content,not act. This becomes clearerwhen we ask why it is thatthis contentis repeated,or why we find our"perceptions"doubled:put very simply, the repetitionsserve as the contentsfor differentacts. Hume sees his chamber, he remembersit, he imagines that it is suspendedin air,he believes thatit continues to exist even when he is not looking at it. Differencein Degree versusDifferentto the Feeling: ForceandVivacityReconsidered [A]ll simple ideas ... aresuch exact copies or replicasof the corresponding impressionsthatmerely by an increasein the degree of their force
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CatherineKemp and liveliness they come to operateon the mind in a mannerequivalent to, andhardly,if at all, distinguishablefrom,thatof theirimpressions.20
Once we have recognized the role of ideas in thoughtas contents,another difficult issue in the Treatise,namely, Hume's claim that the only difference between impressionsand ideas consists in their differentdegrees of force and vivacity,becomes rathermore negotiable.If we bearin mind thatthe contentis repeated,or whatis the same thing,thatthe contentdoes not change,we areable to look to the differences in acts for an understandingof Hume's claim about force and vivacity. Kemp Smith'sparaphraseof Hume on the subjectis a very precise expressionof the combinedeffect of a contentwhich does not alterand an act which does. By this I meanthatsince whatI have identifiedas the content is "exactlyrepresented,"or at least resembling,in two acts which differin their relative degrees of force and vivacity, the differencein degree, and that which changesin the shift fromimpressionto its "faintimage,"the idea, lie on the side of the act. The difference in acts between, e.g., a "reverieof the imagination" and a belief in a matterof fact is a difference,at least in part,in the qualitiesof those acts, that is, in their force and vivacity. The second error [is] that two ideas of the same object can only be differentby theirdifferentdegreesof force andvivacity. I believe there are other differences among ideas, which cannotproperlybe comprehendedunderthese terms.Had I said, thattwo ideas of the same object can only be differentby theirdifferentfeeling,I shou'dhave been nearer the truth.(T 636) This is Hume's correction,in the Appendix to the Treatise,of the claim aboutthe differencebetween impressionsand ideas, and between lively ideas and faint ones, which appearsfairly consistently in the body of the Treatise itself, as well as in the Enquiry. In the opening sections of the earlier work, Hume assertsthatimpressionsandtheircorrespondentideas "differonly in degree, not in nature"(T 3); and later,in the exposition of his notion of belief, he repeats this claim and adds that "belief ... can only bestow on our ideas an additionalforce and vivacity"(T 96). The correctionin the Appendix,which is directedat this very passage, begins with Hume's initialuneasinessand subsequentretraction(T 625) of the notionof a particularsentimentwhich attendsthe conception we call belief.21Finally, in the passage cited in full above, Hume proposes that in the place of the (sole) difference between various degrees of Kemp Smith, 111. A version of the theoryof belief to which, as I have pointedout elsewhere, Hume returns in the Enquiry(E 48). 20 21
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force andvivacitywe observethe "differentfeeling"of mereconceptionin comparisonwith the lively conceptionwhich he calls belief. Althoughthis notion is not much explicatedby Hume, the distinctionI have proposedbetween the two senses of the term idea, as act and as content, sheds some light, I believe, on what he means by this "differenceto the feeling." In this section we shift our focus from idea as contentto idea as act. In the context of the largerprojectof the Treatise,namely, the "attemptto "thedifintroducethe experimentalmethodof reasoninginto moralsubjects,"22 ferencebetwixt feeling andthinking"(T 2) has a meaningbeyond the narrowly epistemological differencesbetween conviction and mere conception.We can observethe importanceof the distinctionin the investigationof moralsubjectsin an earlyprogrammaticdecision: And as the impressionsof reflexion, viz. passions, desires, and emotions, whichprincipally deserve our attention,arisemostly fromideas, 'twill be necessary ... in orderto explainthe natureandprinciplesof the humanmind, [to] give a particularaccountof ideas, before we proceed to impressions.(T 8, my emphasis) The special statusaccordedall impressions,includingthose of sensation,for the moralquestionis due to the fact that,as Hume says, "Impressionsalways actuate the soul, and thatin the highest degree"(T 118). So one way to construethe difference between feeling and thinking,between impressionsand ideas, and between lively and unenlivened ideas is as a difference between those things which influence the will, and those which do not (cf. T 119). This view makes it possible to reinterpretthe differencein degrees of force and vivacity. From the point of view of the will, impressions and ideas, for example,may well have differentdegreesof force andvivacity, for theirdifference is felt; and what is available to the feeling by way of difference, Hume implies, is variationin intensities. Although Hume states in the Treatisethat impressionsand ideas do not differ in naturebut only in degree (T 3), I believe that we may infer from his retractionof the stipulationthat they differ only in their degrees of force and vivacity thatthey do in fact differ in nature;but this differencein theirnatureis not availableto the feeling. Only certaineffects of this nature,viz. varyingdegrees of certainqualities,are felt. Feeling andthinking do not differessentiallyin termsof degreesof force andvivacity,butit is this differencewhich primarilycharacterizestheirdifference"tothe feeling." Further,we mustnot fail to notice the specialnatureof this difference:when Hume implies thatbetween impressionsand ideas or between conception and belief, the differenceis simply a "matterof degree,"it is only in unusualcircum22
This is the subtitle of the Treatise.
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stances that this phrasecarrieswhat is for us its conventionalmeaning. Typically, when we say thatthe differencebetween two things is a matterof degree, we meanthattherearejust a few shadesbetweenthem,so thatthey areonlyjust distinguishable.We acknowledgethe distinctionbut do not place much weight upon it. This sense of the phrase holds in the examples Hume cites where it becomes difficult to distinguish feeling from thinking, as in sleep, fevers, or madness(T 2), but it does not hold with referenceto feeling andthinkingproperly so called. Mere conceptionand fully fledged belief differ,to the feeling, in termsof degrees;thatis, theirdifferencecan be mediatedby the severaldegrees lying between them, but assertingthat their difference is a matterof degree is similarto saying that the differencebetween the temperatureof my room and thatof liquid nitrogenis a matterof degree:degrees separatethem indeed, but measuringthe disparityin degrees is almostmeaningless. Hume's argumentthatwhat makes one idea "differentto the feeling"when comparedwith othersis the mannerof conceptionpeculiarto it, pointsus to the locationof the qualitiesof force andvivacity."[B]elief consists not in the peculiar natureor orderof ideas, but in the mannerof theirconception,and in their feeling to the mind"(E 49; cf. T 629). As we have alreadyseen, the mannerof conception refers to an alterationin the act which is directed at a particular object. If the differencein the "feeling to the mind"consists in or relies upon a differencein the mannerof conception,thencertainlyit is the case thatthe varying degreesof force andvivacity affectthe act of the mind,not its content.When a faintidea is enlivenedby an associationwith some presentimpression,the act of conception,or the idea as act, assumesa greaterdegreeof force andliveliness for the feeling than it did previously.Of course it is the case thatthe contentof the act is therebyattendedwith a feeling of greaterforce and vivacity, which it lacked as the contentof mere conception,but here we have only returnedto the two versionsof Hume'stheoryof belief. Mereconceptionwhich is modifiedinto belief I have designated"idea"as act, while the contentof such a conception,in its affiliationwith a sentimentwhich transformsit into belief, is "idea"as content.Whetherwe say, ultimately,thateitherthe act or the contentis forcefuland lively is irrelevantunless we want to specify the origin, or the location,of these qualities.The content is possessed of force and vivacity only derivatively,and relies for the distinctionupon the modificationof its act. This modificationin act,moreover,is the explanationfor the fact thatwe observeacts which differin nature,not simply in degree.Forthe mindto be relatedto its objects in different mannersis for it to be thus related in different acts. To see, to remember,to imagine,andto believe in the existence of, say, Hume'schamber,is to be related to the same object,by meansof the sameunchanging(althoughperhapsdeteriorating)content, in four differentmanners,which are very differentin their natures.
Humes Treatise
687 The Role of ImpressionsReconsidered
The interpretationsI have proposedfor two featuresof Hume'stheoryconcerninghis claim aboutthe resemblancebetween impressionsandideas andthe location of the qualitiesof force and vivacity have importantramificationsfor the way we understandthe natureandrole of impressionsin his theory.Consideredin theircomparisonwith ideas, in termsof priority,causation,resemblance, and force andvivacity, and as the notion which, with ideas,jointly exhauststhe class of things Hume calls perceptions(T 1), impressionsmustbe reconsidered in light of the constructionI have put upon ideas as employed in two senses, as acts andas contents.In this section I will firstinvestigatethe relationof impressions to ideas as acts, in orderto continuethe discussion of force and vivacity and then inquireinto their relation to ideas as contents, which will requirea returnto the question of the resemblanceof ideas and impressions.Finally, I turnto the questionof whetherimpressionsthemselvescan be construedas acts with contents,and what it would mean should it appearthey can. In relationto ideas in the sense of acts, impressionsare,I contend,the source of any feeling thatattendsor affects the qualityof those acts. This is clear,e.g., in Hume'saccountof the role of impressionsin the transformationof mereconception(or ideas as acts) intobelief (enlivenedideas).Correlatively,the absence of an impression assures that an idea will remain faint and languid (T 624). Hume'sseconddefinitionof a "cause"(T 170) pointsup this distinction:only an impressiondeterminesthemindto forma lively ideaof therelatedobject,whereas an idea is only able to invoke anotheridea. I wou'd willingly establishit as a generalmaxim in the science of human nature,that when any impressionbecomes present to us, it not only transportsthe mindto such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicatesto thema share of itsforce and vivacity. (T 98) Ideasor conceptionswhich arefaintandlanguidor which carryno commitment to the existence of theirobjectsonly become enlivenedthroughsome relationto a presentimpression,which dispersesa measureof its own forcefulnessover the related ideas, in this case to the acts of conception. If the transformationis sufficiently drastic,the associationwith an impressioncan alterthe quality of the related acts, as in the case of the modulationof fictions into beliefs. For example: Here then we have a propensityto feign the continu'dexistence of all sensible objects;andas this propensityarises fromsome lively impressions of the memory,it bestows a vivacity on thatfiction; or in other words, makes us believe the continu'd existence of body. (T 209, my emphasis)
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Just as coming into relationwith an impressionenlivens an idea, so losing such a relationreversesthe effect, for example,the "perceptions"of the memory, which Hume sometimesrefersto as impressions,sometimesas ideas andwhich he says are "somewhatintermediatebetwixt an impressionand an idea" (T 8) are in the process of losing their relationto the initial impression,and thereby theirdegreeof force andliveliness. One way to construememoryunderthis new view of impressionsandideasis, as Humeimplies,as a kindof"half-wayhouse" for act-contentcomplexes which are between the two clear states. Impressions strikeus primarilywith the feeling of theiracts, while ideas strikeus with contents. In memorythese act-contentcomplexes areon theirway to being striking in theircontents,andyet they arestill somewhatcompellingin theirfeeling. The more narrowsenses of these terms(impressionsas feelings, ideas as contents), plausible in Hume's theory,focus on this distinctionbetween feeling and content. My argumenthere is that there is more to both than simply what distinguishesthem.Nevertheless,it is this "supplyof feeling"which is one roleplayed by impressionsin relationto the act-contentcomplex implicit in Hume's term "idea."Specifically,impressionsserve as the sourceof the feeling which accompanies, or perhapsprecipitates,the quality and the modulationof these acts. This is not to say that the felt change is the only alterationto which the act is subject, since there are other differences between types of act, but that to a certainextent,for Hume,for an act to feel differentlyis tantamountto its becoming an entirely differentact. Let us turnnow to the relationof impressionsto ideas as contents. Impressions,very simply, are the originals of which ideas as contents are copies, or "exactrepresentations."Ideasare"faintimages"(T 1) of impressions "in thinking and reasoning,"and impressions,as the "first appearancein the soul" are in effect the first instanceof contentswhich may and very likely will serve subsequentlyas contentsfor several differentacts, includingremembering, conceiving, dreaming,etc. [T]he belief or assent, which always attendsthe memoryand senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptionsthey present;( ... ) this alone distinguishesthemfromthe imagination.Tobelieve is in this case to feel an immediateimpressionof the senses, or a repetitionof that impressionin the memory.(T 86, second italics mine) Impressionsarecopied, resembled,repeated,doubled,andrepresentedin order to producethe contents for other acts of the mind. From a certainperspective, we may say thatimpressionsandideas as contentsreferto muchthe same thing, i.e., the directionof the mind to a particularobject, except thatimpressionsare always the firstinstance,or perhapssimply the presentappearanceof a particu-
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lar instance,of the directionof the mind to this object, while ideas are always derivativein some respect.Impressions,then,arethose thingsof which ideasare copies: they provide contentsto every subsequentact of mind which is not an impression.This, I believe, is the true significance of Hume's insistence that every idea musthave its origin in impressions,for every copy, every repetition, requiresan originalof some sort or another,and this is precisely the featureof impressionsHumechooses to emphasize. The two roles I have identifiedfor impressionsin relationto ideas imply a third,which is not only a compoundingof the first two but is implied by the doublemeaningof the termidea, as act andas content.The thirdrole consists in this: as I mentioned briefly in the discussion of memory above, impressions themselves are acts with contents.23As acts, impressionsare the first intentions of particularobjects, and as such possess contents,which directthe acts to the objects.Impressionsareessentiallybelieving acts, amongthe most forcefuland vivacious in the mind,andtheircontentis correspondinglythe most vividly and steadily maintained.Eitherin relationto the ideas of the imagination,or upon comingintoa new relationwith anotherideathroughsome principleof the imagination,an impressiondoes two things:the act conveys its qualitiesof force and vivacity to the other,relatedacts, andthe contentis copied over, or represented in or into, the contentof otheracts. In this analysiswe discoverthatthe sensible aspect of impressions,theirfeeling, is distinctfrom theirmeaningfulaspect as pointersto particularobjects, and thatthese two aspectscan coexist in a mental event called an impression.The perplexitiesinvolved in unravellinga notionof impressionsas sensations in the narrowsense, that is, as feelings simpliciter which mustbe amenableto representationin ideas,which lack feeling, no longer troubleus. Forthe samereasonReid'scriticismof Humeon thesegroundsproves unfounded.Reid, purportingto take issue with Hume on the stipulationthat "ideas are faint copies of preceeding impressions,"24 argues instead there is a "totaldissimilitude"between"oursensationsandsensiblethings."25 Apartfrom of resemblance of the the fact thatthis refutationdoes not addressthe question impressionsand ideas, partof Reid's mistake here, I believe, is in identifying Hume'simpressionswith sensations:
Ronald J. Butler remarksthat "withinevery perceptionthere is a distinction ... between thinkingand feeling ... [these] are differentaspects of perceptions.Two perceptionsmay convey the same thoughtwhile differingin feeling." See RonaldJ. Butler,"DistinctionesRationis, or the Cheshire Cat Which Left Its Smile Behind It," Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety, 76 (1975-76), 170. Cf. Kemp Smith, 381. 24 Thomas Reid, "An Abstract of the Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principle of CommonSense," cited in David Fate Norton, "Reid's Abstractof the Inquiryinto the Human Mind"in ThomasReid: CriticalInterpretations,ed. StephenF. Barkerand Tom L. Beauchamp, (Philadelphia, 1976), 129. 25 Ibid. 23
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CatherineKemp I can attendto what I feel, andthe sensationis nothingelse, norhas any otherqualitiesthanwhat I feel it to have. Its esse is sentire,andnothing can be in it that is not felt.26
The evidence in Hume's text againstthis readingof the termimpressionlies in the fact that copying impressionscould never give us ideas of actual objects, where such copies only picked up sensationalinformation,without any other content. Distinguishingtwo meanings in Hume's employmentof the term idea not only reconciles the two versions of his theoryof belief but also renderscertain featuresof that theory more coherentthan they appearunder readingswhich retaina single meaning.Certainlythe looseness with which Humeuses the notionhas contributedsubstantiallyto confusionanddisagreementamonghis commentators,but that looseness need not be read as non-technical.Carefulattention to the whole set of expressionshe uses to describebelief yields clarityeven to so ambiguousa notion. Universityof Coloradoat Denver.
26
Ibid.
Hume, and
Human
Race, Nature
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Introduction JohnImmerwahrrecentlywrotein theJournalof theHistoryofldeas, "While Hume is generallyknown as an enemy of prejudiceand intolerance,he is also infamousas a proponentof philosophicalracism."'I am intriguedby this suggestionthatHume'sis a "philosophicalracism";one wonders:how manybrands of racisms are there?Whatdoes "philosophical"racismmean?Assuming that philosophicalracismis somethingwhich we wish to takenotice of, whatpartof Hume's philosophy sustains it? How much of Hume's philosophy may be affected by this, andhow profound? On the surfaceit seems not to makesense to ask, for example,how profound Hume's "philosophicalracism"is or how deeply racisthis philosophicalworks may be. The question appearscontrivedbecause, currently,every referencein the literatureseem to point to only a footnote: I am aptto suspectthe Negroes and in generalall otherspecies of men (for thereare four or five differentkinds) to be naturallyinferiorto the whites. Thereneverwas a civilized nationof anyothercomplexionthan white, nor even any individualeminenteitherin action or speculation. No ingeniousmanufacturersamongstthem,no arts,no sciences. On the otherhand,the most rudeand barbarousof the whites, such as the ancient GERMANS,the presentTARTARS,have still somethingeminent aboutthem, in theirvalour,formof government,or some otherparticular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countriesandages, if naturehadnot made an originaldistinction betwixt these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are NEGROEslaves dispersedall over EUROPE,of which none ever dis'John Immerwahr,"Hume'sRevised Racism,"JHI, 53 (1992), 1-23.
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covered any symptoms of ingenuity;tho' low people, without education, will startup amongstus, and distinguishthemselves in every profession. In JAMAICA,indeed,they talkof one negroeas a manof parts and learning;but 'tis likely he is admiredfor very slenderaccomplishments, like a parrot,who speaks a few words plainly.2 This was added, between 1753 and 1754, to the essay "Of National Characters."It was also revised in the final edition of the Essays. Moral, Political and Literary,which Humehadpreparedshortlybeforehe died in 1777.3Meanwhile, the originalversion of "Of National Characters"was writtenin 1748. An equallyreasonablepointof view on the matter,however,is to show that, far from being philosophicallyunimportantor an after-thought,the footnote, both its additionseveralyears afterthe originalessay was writtenand its maintenancein the subsequentrevisionsby Hume, suggests thatthe ideas expressed thereinwere importantto the authorand, significantly,to the argumentsof"Of National Characters."It is known that by 1770 James Beattie, in An Essay on the Nature and Immutabilityof Truth,in Oppositionto Sophistryand Skepticism, had extensively criticized"Of National Character,"specifically the note underconsideration.Humewas awareof this andothercriticismsandresponded or commentedon them in lettersto friends,amongotherplaces. In a letterto his friend and publisher,William Straham,later published in London Chronicle (12-14 June 1777), Humediscusseddismissively criticismsfromThomasReid and James Beattie, referringto the latteras "a bigoted silly fellow."4The fact thatit survivedHume's multiplerevisions and remainedpartof the Essays and was publicly defended from criticisms invites one not to dismiss this lengthy additionas marginalto Hume's thoughtbut ratherto determinewhy he might have felt it neededto be addedin the firstplace, revised, andcriticallydefended in whatis now its definitiveversion.Relevantspecific questionswould be: why, of all otherpossible places (I have in mind, for example, a comparableessay "Of the populousnessof ancientnations"),was the footnote addedhere? How does the opinionin this note relateto the mainargumentsof "OfNationalCharacters"?Do the contents of this essay, especially in their implicit and explicit philosophicalcommitments,havea relationshipto Hume'smostimportantworks, such as the Treatiseof HumanNature? 2
David Hume, ThePhilosophical Works,ed. T. H. Greenand T. H. Grose (London, 1882), III,253. 3 Furtherreferencesare to the revised edition, which containsthe following modifications to the original (quoted above): "I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturallyinferiorto the whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even individual eminent in action or speculation...."The rest remainedunchanged.It is very probablethat the modification was promptedby James Beattie's criticisms. Relevant excerpts of this critique, and furtherdiscussion of the historicalcontexts of Hume's "racism"may be found in E. C. Eze (ed.), Race and the Enlightenment(Oxford, 1997). 4 See Letter of David Hume, II, 1766-76, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (Oxford, 1932), 299-302.
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My purposeis to show that, far from being marginalto his body of philosophical work, Hume's "remark"about the races, the Negro in particular,is groundedin Hume'stheoryof humannatureor,as he often called it, "scienceof man."WhenHume says, for example,thatNegroes have "noarts,no sciences," he is drawingconclusionsfromhis highly sophisticatedtheoryof mind,a theory within and fromwhich it can be shown thathe believed thatthe Negro does not possess specific mentalabilitiesneededto producescience andculture. Hume'sNegro Mind As is well known, for Hume "themind"is not a thing or an object existing independentof perception:perceptionis "themind."To perceiveis to feel andto have ideas and, from them, to think and to judge, etc. Hume succinctly states: "whatwe call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of differentperceptions, unitedtogetherby certainrelations."5 We must drawattentionto this idea thatthereare "certainrelations"which keep perception"unitedtogether"as a "heapor collection."This notionof"certainrelations,"capableof imposingrelativeunityuponperception,is important because it is in andthroughthe organizingactivity thata personcan claim to be more or less a "unity,"a "self,"andtherefore"human."It is also on the relative andvaryingdegrees of"certainty"providedor guaranteedby these "relations" thatHume would find, or locate, varyingdegrees of certaintyfor knowledge in the artsandthe sciences. Finally,the "certainrelations"at the highesttheoretical anthropologicalandepistemologicallevels underwritethe distinction"inkind" that Hume established in the Essays between the "white"race and the "nonwhite" races. Simply put if the Negro race is inherentlyand by "nature"incapable of"arts andsciences,"it is becausenaturehadnot endowedthis racewith the "certainrelations"of the mindon the basis of which culture,science, andthe arts are possible. The Negro "species of men," understandably,would also be ontologically "inferior"to other humansbecause for Hume these are also the "certainrelations"thatmakepossible the relativeunity of self in which we cultivate forces againstdispersion,psychological andmetaphysical. The fact thatHumebelieved the supposedlyinferiorpsychologicalandcognitive state of the Negro to be on the one handpermanent and on the other racially based and thereforeindividuallyor collectively unremediablecan be deducedfromthe following:while "themost rudeandbarbarousof the whites ... have still somethingeminentaboutthem, in theirvalor,formof government,or some otherparticular,"he explains that"thereareNEGRO slaves dispersedall over EUROPE,of which none ever discoveredany symptomsof ingenuity;tho' low [white]people, withouteducation,will startup amongstus, anddistinguish 5 David Hume, Treatise HumanNature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1978), 207. of
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themselves in every profession."Hume thereforeconcluded, "Sucha uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if naturehadnot made an originaldistinctionbetwixt these breedsof men." To graspthe philosophicalsignificance and (racialized)depthof this view of the Negro andhumannature,one could approachHume'stheoryof the mind from anotherperspective-the perspectiveof the distinctionhe drawsbetween "passive"and "active"(functionsof) reasoning.This perspectiveenables one to see just how complexis Hume'stheoryof perceptionandhow deeplyencoded in this theory is the racial idea. Since it is on the basis of the assumptionthat thereexist seven kinds (one wonders,why not five, eight, or twenty?)of"philosophicalrelations"thatHume codified the mentalfunctionsthatmakepossible relativepsychological "unity"of the self and the certaintyof scientific reasoning, the suggestion would be, accordingly,that in orderto understandthe process throughwhich "theNegro" for Hume may be humanbut an only inferior kind, we ought to examine his notion of "passive"and "active"reasoning, a notion complementaryto, but differentfrom, the functions establishedfor the philosophicalrelations. ForHumephilosophicor scientificthinking,"reasoning"proper,consists in the exercise he calls "combination"or comparisonof ideas. "Reasoning"in this sense is opposedto mereimpressionas the active to the passive. The firstquality of active reasoningis the ability to renderexplicit and clear ideas which are by theirpropernatureimplicit and faint. An idea is by its very natureweak and fainterthan an impression;but being in every otherrespectthe same, cannotimply any very greatmystery. If its weakness renderit obscure, 'tis our business to remedythat defect, as muchas possible, by keepingthe idea steadyandprecise;and till we have done so, 'tis in vain to pretendto reasoningandphilosophy.6 The second qualityof distinctionfor active reasoningis introducedby way of a differencebetween"thought"and"perception." All kindsof reasoningconsist in nothingbut comparison,anda discovery of those relations,eitherconstantor inconstant,which two or more objectsbearto each other.This comparisonwe may make,witherwhen bothobjectsarepresentto the sense, or when neitherof themis present, or when only one. Whenboththe objectsarepresentto the senses along with the relation,we call this perceptionratherthan reasoning;nor is there in this case any exercise of the thought,or any action, properly speaking,but mere passive admission of the impressionsthro' the organs of the sensation.7 6
Hume, Treatise,73.
7
Ibid.
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We are given thereforethree kinds of situationsunderwhich the mental processes of reasoning(or "comparison")may, in general,occur:eitherwhen both objectscomparedarephysicallypresent,so thatthe mind,accordingly,registers (compares)themtogether;when only one of the objectscomparedis physically present;or finally, when no objects of the combinationis physically present, such thatthe associationis purely mentaland abstract.Notice that"[w]hen [as in the firstcase] boththe objectsarepresentto the senses along with the relation, we call this perceptionratherthanreasoning;nor is there in this case any exercise of the thought,or any action,properlyspeaking";what we have is a case of "merepassive admissionof the impressionthro'the organs"of the senses. These passages, in additionto showing what is meantby active as opposed to passive processes of mind, reveal thatonly one type of the threeprocesses of combinationmay be characterized,unequivocally,as "reasoning"or "exercise of thought ... or ... action." Therefore, when Hume claims that no "Negro" is
capableof"eminent ... action or speculation,"he is relying on these theoretical assumptionsto state that the person is incapableof making active uses of reason. Curiously,this incapacityis supposedto be a "permanent" condition,determined by no less thanmother"nature."8 As we saw, Hume would not deny all mental, psychological, or cognitive functions to the Negro; he simply insists that in comparisonto the white the Negro is naturallyendowed with a passive and thereforeinferiorlevel of mind. The Negro would lack the realm of higher mental, moral self-constitutionas well as the cognitive aptitudefor sciences which dependupon ideas ("Thisis all I thinknecessaryto observeconcerningthose fourrelations,which arethe foundation of science; ... the other three ... depend not upon ideas"9). Because ca-
pable of only passive ideas,the Negro enjoys mereperception,passive reception of impression,presentin the mindbecause of simultaneoussensualpresenceof the objectsof the impression.Remove these sensualobjectsandthe Negro mind is at a loss actively to deduceor inferin the abstractthe relationsamongobjects, throughconceptsand logical demonstrations.This would be like a child, but for ever so, who can accuratelycount the fingers on each andboth handsbut could not solve mathematical problems such as: 5 + 5 = x; 10 - x = 5; or x + 5 = 10.
When Hume wrote about animals, he arguedthat non-humananimals are certainlycapableof perceivingthe sortof relationsthatdemandno combination of ideas. The animals, for example, are capable of mentally establishing the three lower, non-strictlyphilosophical relations of resemblance,identity,and time and space. But accordingto Hume, "Weought not to receive as reasoning
8 When he thought about a counter-example,Hume seemed to protect his theory rather than the evidence: "In JAMAICA ... they talk of one Negro as a man of partsand learning;but 'tis likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments, like a parrot,who speaks a few words plainly." 9 Hume, Treatise,73.
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any of the observationswe may make concerningidentity,and the relationof time andplace; since in none of them the mind can go beyond what is immediatelypresentto the senses, eitherto discoverthe realexistence or the relationsof Yet, as we saw, these are nearlyall the experienceof relationHume objects."10 would allow thatthe Negro race may have as well as the white. Thereis evidentlythe samerelationof ideas, andderivedfromthe same causes, in the minds of animalsas in those of men. A dog thathas hid a bone, often forgetsthe place;but when broughtto it, his thoughtpasses easily to whathe formerlyconceal'd, by meansof the contiguity,which producesa relationamong his ideas. In like manner,when he has been heartilybeatin anyplace, he will trembleon his approachto it even tho' he discover no signs of any presentdanger.The effects of resemblance arenot so remarkable,butas thatrelationmakes a considerableingredient in causation,of which all animals shew so evident a judgment,we may conclude that the three relations of resemblance,and continuity and causationoperatein the same mannerupon beasts as upon human creatures."
If the mentalcapacityof the Negro-which is to say the level of humanity-is more nearlyanimalthanwhite, is thereany reasonwhy the Negro could not be sold like a horse or, to stay with Hume's example, a dog? Is it possible that Humeaddedthis footnoteto the essay "OfNationalCharacter"as a statementof principledphilosophicalposition on the debate currentat the time in England andAmericaaboutwhetheror not the Negro is a legitimate"articleof trade."12 Furthermore,if Negroes lack naturallyand permanentlythe capacity for self-and social-constitution throughthe arts and the sciences and through relatedprojectsof culture,government,andcivilization,thenslaveryandsubsequentlycolonialism might indeedhave been viewed by Hume as forms of containmentin defenseof civilization,ratherthanthe usuallyasserted"educational" value of slavery (Hegel) or the "missionto civilize" (Lugard). 10Ibid. 1 Hume, Treatise,327. Elsewhere Hume is far more explicit: in the section "Of the Reason of Animals,"he notes, "experimentalreasoningwhich we possess in common with beasts, and on which the whole conductof life depends, is nothingbut a species of instinctor mechanical power thatacts in us unknownto ourselves, and in its chief operationsis not directedby any such relations or comparisonof ideas as are the properobjects of our intellectualfaculties." 12 According to David Livingston, "Althoughhe [Hume] undertookno substantialliterary project during the last decade of his life, he took the opportunityto correct and change new editions of his works in order to address the issues of thatperiod," Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium: Essays in the Philosophy of David Hume (Chicago, 1998), 281, italics added. Could the same motive "to addressissues of that period"explain the revisions of the 1748 "Of National Characters"?
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Conclusions One could attemptto offer a differentinterpretationof Humeon this latterpoint. "Look,"this interpretermightsay, "Humewas only suggestingthathumansand animalsshare"brotherly"bondsbecausethey sharea good deal of sentimentsin common,for naturetreatsbothalike in theirsensitive bodiedness.""Thereare," says Hume himself, "instancesof the relationof impressions,sufficientto convince us, thatthereis a union of certainaffectionswith each otherin the inferior species of creaturesas well as in the superior."'3Thus,if boththe "superior"and "inferior,"humanand non-humananimalsshare,i.e., enjoy and suffer,similar emotionalandaffective life, why shouldone be concernedthatHumehappened to classify the Negro among the "inferior"ratherthanthe "superior"(human) animals?Could not emotions and affections, such as pain,joy, and fear,which Hume states afflict both beast and humansbe regardedas a common basis for affirmingthe "humanity"alike of both white and black peoples? In fact Hume himself seems to point in this directionin his notionof sympathy:the foundation of sympathyis the relation,at the affective levels of perception,between ourselves and others.14 Thisinterpretation, however,runsintoquitea few hardlysurmountable problems. For instance, how could one speak of a common "humanity"between humansand dogs or by extension, in Hume's philosophy as well, between the whites andblacks-separated by an "originaldistinction"which "naturehad ... made,"supposedlyas fixed and final as thatbetween humansand animals?To arguethatfor Humethe blackandthe white races sharea commonhumanityon the basis of"sympathy"ratherthan"reason"would be to rejectthe fuller complexity andconsequencesof Hume'stheoryof mind.Is it conceivabletojettison active "reason"or "mind"or "science"and "art,"as basis for a universalhumanity,simply because (assumingHume would say so) "real"humanfeatures shouldconsist of passive "sympathy"? In summary,if Hume is "aptto suspect the Negroes ... to be naturallyinferior to the whites.... No ingenious manufacturersamong them, no arts,no sciences...," we should ask: what does this statementmean in light of a detailed expositionandanalysisof Hume'spsychologyandepistemology?Frommy view of the question,it seems thatthe Negro personis capableof"no arts,no science" becausethe Negro displayedno mental"ingenuity"in culture,manufacture,or, generally,civilization.Why?Because these activitiesdependuponhighermental "speculation,"the sort of rationalcapacityoutlinedby Hume as philosophi13 14
Hume, Treatise, 327.
See Treatise,II: "Of the Passions,"especially Section IX, 316-18, and all of Section XII. For Hume, passion and custom, ratherthan "reason,"are, in fact, the most durablebases of social solidarityand political cohesion.
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cal relationsand as active reasoning.If the Negro is naturallyincapableof arts and science-and we know that for Hume artsand science are possible or produced only throughthe mental activities of the highest relations-then, inherently, we are told by Hume, the Negro is epistemologically,which means also psychologically,deficient as a knowerand humanbeing. The Negro is capable of, grosso modo, only the three, inferiorsorts of philosophicalrelations,plus passivereasoning.This crucialepistemologicalfoundationof Hume's"remarks" about the Negro, pointing to the significance of the idea of the Negro in the constitutionof the problemsand progressof modem philosophy,need not remainimplicit. MountHolyoke College.
Notices Call for papers:a conference on the theme of "The Moral Cosmos, Themes and Variations,"is planned for 11-15 June 2002, underthe sponsorshipof the Traditional Cosmology Society, Edinburgh,and the University of St. Andrews, Fifeshire, Scotland. We welcome papers on the relationshipof humankindto the divine, cosmology in moralphilosophy,adjustingsociety and its rules to the universe (and its rules), and the economic cosmos and the moral dimension (doing good, doing well); otherpossibilities includemoralrelativismand the cosmos (from the Sophistson), literarygenres and their revealed moral cosmos, morality and war, and the morality of the nationstate. Presentationswill be allowed forty-five minutes.Deadline for abstractsis 1 June 2001. Send abstract (250 words) to Dean A. Miller, 10848 South Hoyne Avenue, Chicago, IL 60643, U.S.A. E-mail:
[email protected]. Call for papers: the Winter 2001-2002 issue of The American Journal of Economics and Sociology will offer a selection of paperson the "New" Political Economies from a varietyof perspectiveson the connection(s)between economics and politics. Send your proposals in the form of 250-word abstractsto the editor by 15 April 2001 (targetdate for deliveringthe papersis 15 July 2001). Editor:ProfessorLaurence S. Moss, Babson College, Babson Park,MA 02457, U.S.A. Tel.: (617) 728-4949; email:
[email protected]. Call for papers: The ShakespeareanInternational Yearbook,volume III (2001); theme:where arewe now in Shakespeareanstudies?Paperlimit:20 typewrittenpages. Deadline: Spring2001. Please submitproposalsto ShakespeareanInternationalYearbook, Ph.D. Programin English, The GraduateSchool, The City University of New York, 365 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10016, U.S.A. (fax: 212-817-1607) or GrahamBradshaw,Facultyof Literature,ChuoUniversity,742-1 Higashinakano,Hachiojishi, Tokyo 192-03, Japan. Correction:we regretthat in GeraldHolton's "The Rise of Postmoderisms and the 'End of Science,' " (April 2000, volume 61, number2), an erroroccurredon page 338, footnote 22. In that footnote the sentence "For example, see Nagel, Die Westeislehre"should be replacedby the following sentence:T. Schieder,in Hermann Rauschnings, "Gespraechemit Hitler" als Geschichtsquelle(Opladen, 1972), attributed to the book value as a historical source, whereas it was accused of being fabricated by W. Hanel, in Hermann Rauschnings, "Gespraeche mit Hitler," eine Geschichtsfaelschung(Ingolstadt, 1984). On page 339, footnote 23, the word "ibid." should be replacedwith Nagel, Die Welteislehre.
699 Copyright2000 by Journalof the Historyof Ideas,Inc.
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Alcoff, LindaMartin,and EduardoMendieta,eds. Thinkingfromthe Undersideof History:EnriqueDussel s PhilosophyofLiberation.Lanham,Md.:Roman& Littlefield, 2000. ix, 352p., ill., index, $22.95. Thirteeninterpretiveessays. Ameriks,Karl.Kant and the Fate of Autonomy.Problemsin the Appropriationof the Critical Philosophy. New York:CambridgeUP, 2000. xiii, 35 lp., index, $54.95. Kant, Fichte, Reinhold, and Hegel. Anselmof Canterbury. CompletePhilosophicaland TheologicalTreatisesofAnselm of Canterbury.Minneapolis:TheArthurJ. BanningP, 2000. xxxiv, 574 p. $11. Sixteen treatisesrevised from volumes publishedby the editors in 1976 and 1986. Bataille, RobertR. The WritingLife of Hugh Kelly. Politics, Journalism,and Theater in Late-Eighteenth-Century London. Carbondale:SouthernIllinois UP, 2000. ix, 206p., bibl., index, $44.95. Intellectualbiography of the Anglo-Irishjournalist and theatercritic. Bayle, Pierre.Bayle. Political Writings.Ed. Sally L. Jenkinson.Cambridge:CambridgeUP,2000. lxiii, 367p., bibl., index.Twenty-sevenselectionsfromtheDictionnaire historiqueet critique,with introduction,chronology,bibliography,and notes. Benardete,Seth. TheArgumentof the Action: Essays on GreekPoetry and Philosophy.Ed. and intro.by RonnaBurgerand Michael Davis. Chicago:U of Chicago P, 2000. xxi, 434p., bibl., index.$39. Twentynew andreprintedessays on Plato,Aeschylus, Homer, Sophocles, Euripides,and Aristotle. Benz, August. Die Moralphilosophievon ThomasReid zwischen Traditionund Innovation(St. GallerStudienzurPolitikwissenschaft,23). Bern:Haupt,2000. ix, 276p., bibl., index. Hume's skepticism,utopia, and Stoicism. Bodeis, Richard.Aristotle and the Theology of the Living Immortals(Ancient GreekPhilosophy,ed. Anthony Preus).Trans.by JanGarrett.Albany: State U of New YorkP, 2000. xi, 375p., bibl., index. ConnectsAristotle to popularGreekreligion. Bozovic, Miran.An UtterlyDark Spot. Gaze and Body in Earlv ModernPhilosophy (The Body in Theory:Historiesof CulturalMaterialism).Ann Arbor:U Michigan P, 2000. ix, 139p., bibl., $39.50. Lacanianinterpretationof the mind-bodyproblemin classical and early moder thought,with a forewordby Slavoj Zizek. Brogan,Walter,andJamesRisser,eds.AmericanContinentalPhilosophy.A Reader (Studiesin ContinentalThought,JohnSallis, gen. ed.). Bloomington:IndianaUP,2000. viii, 396p., index. $45. Anthology of writingsby Americanthinkerswho adaptedEuropean existentialismand phenomenology. Brown, Guy Story.Calhouns Philosophyof Politics: A Studyof A Disquisitionon Government.Macon, Ga.: MercerUP, 2000. xi, 435p., index. $45. Calhoun'stheories abouthumannature,empire,government,and progress. Buckley,WilliamJoseph,ed. Kosovo. ContendingVoiceson BalkanInterventions. GrandRapids,Mich.:Eerdmans,2000. xix, 528p., bibl., index. $30. Academics,policymakers,and diplomatssound off on Kosovo. 703 Copyright2000 by Journalof the Historyof Ideas,Inc.
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Gallagher,Catherine,and Stephen Greenblatt.Practising New Historicism. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2000. ix, index, 249p. Six interpretiveessays seeking to represent the "touchof the real." Galle, Roland,andRudolfBehrens,eds. Konfigurationender Machtin der Friihen HorstNeuzeit (Neues Forumfir allgemeineund vergleichendeLiteraturwissenschaft, and Maria JiirgenGerigk Moog-Grinenwald,eds.). Heidelberg:UniversitatsverlagC. Winter,2000. xi, 356p., index. Essays by thirteen scholars on Hobbes, Machiavelli, Shakespeare,et al. Garver,Eugene, and RichardBuchanan,eds. Pluralism in Theoryand Practice: RichardMcKeonandAmericanPhilosophy.Nashville:VanderbiltUP,2000. vii, 312p., bibl., index, $39.95. Eleven scholarlyessays. Gaus, Gerald F. Political Concepts and Political Theories. Boulder, Colo.: Westview,2000. xiv, 288p., index. $20. Conceptsof freedom,justice, and democracy in political and social context. Glazebrook,Trish.Heidegger s Philosophy of Science (Perspectivesin Continental Philosophy,n.12). New York:FordhamUP,2000. xi, 277p., bibl., index. Heidegger's understandingof science. Gracia, Jorge J. E., and Pablo De Greiff, eds. Hispanics/Latinos in the United States: Ethnicity,Race and Rights. New York:Routledge, 2000. 28 p., bibl., index. Essays by thirteenscholars. Gustafson, SandraM. Eloquence is Power. Oratory and Performance in Early America.ChapelHill: U of NorthCarolinaP, 2000. xxv, 287p., app., ill., index. Performance semiotics, with attentionto gender,AmericanIndians,and the emergentnation. Haas,Andrew.Hegel and the Problemof Multiplicity(SPEP Studies in Historical Philosophy,David Kolb and John McCumber,eds.). Evanston,Ill.: NorthwesternUP, 2000. xxxii, 355p., bibl., index. $29.95. Philosophicalmultiplicitysupersedingcategories of identityand differencein the Science of Logic. Hammerstein,Notker,andGerritWalther,eds. Spdthumanismus:Studienilberdas Ende einer kulturhistorischenEpoche. Gottingen:WallsteinVerlag, 2000. 312p., index. Fifteen essays on topics includingGerman,Jesuit,Neoclassical, and Renaissance humanism. Hammill, GrahamL. Sexuality and Form. Caravaggio, Marlowe, and Bacon. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2000. xi, 219p., bibl., index. Study of sexuality,aesthetics, and epistemologywhich combines queertheoryand psychoanalysiswithin the context of the Renaissance. Hankins,James.RenaissanceCivicHumanism:ReappraisalsandReflections(Ideas in Context, Quentin Skinner,gen. ed.). Cambridge:CambridgeUP, 2000. x, 314 p., index. $59.95. Ten scholarlyessays in the wake of Hans Baron'swork. Hedley, Douglas. Coleridge,Philosophyand Religion: Aids to Reflection and the Mirrorof the Spirit.New York:CambridgeUP, 2000. xiv, 330p., bibl., index. $64.95. controColeridge'sphilosophicaltheology in the context of the Unitarian-Trinitarian versy and Germanthought. Heidegger,Martin.Introductionto Metaphysics(Nota Bene). Trans.by Gregory FriedandRichardPolt. New Haven:YaleUP 2000. xxx, 255p., gloss., index. $30. New translationof Einfuhrungin die Metaphysik. Hill, Claire Ortiz, and GuillermoE. Rosado Haddock.Husserl or Frege? Meaning, Objectivity,and Mathematics.Chicago:Open CourtPublishing,2000. xiv, 315p., bibl., index, $39.95. Reconciles phenomenologicaland analyticalschools of philosophy.
Books Received
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Hinde, JohnR. Jacob Burckhardtand the Crisis of Modernity.Montreal:McGillQueen's UP, 2000. xii, 327p., bibl., index. Intellectualbiography. Hoffman,Ronald,and Sally D. Mason.Princes of Ireland,Planters of Maryland: A CarrollSaga, 1500-1782. ChapelHill: U of NorthCarolinaP,2000. xxvi, 429p. app., ill., index. History of the Carrollfamily, from the early-modemGaelic chiefs through the long life of the Signer. Homza, Lu Ann. ReligiousAuthorityin the SpanishRenaissance.Baltimore:John Hopkins UP, 2000. xiii, 312p., bibl., index. $39.95. Ecclesiasticalpower and intellectual vacillationsbetween humanismand scholasticism. Izenberg, Gerald N. Modernism and Masculinity: Mann, Wedekind,Kandisky through WorldWarI. Chicago:U of Chicago P, 2000. xii, 257p., bibl., ill., index. Argues that a crisis of masculinityamong Europeanwritersand artistsplayed a key role in the modernistrevolution. Jacobitti,EdmundE., ed. ComposingUsefulPasts: Historyas ContemporaryPolitics. Albany: State U of New York P, 2000. xii, 176p., index. Essays by six scholars, includingworks on Nietzsche, Burckhardt,and Jacques-LouisDavid. Jager,Eric, The Book of the Heart. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2000. xxii, 270p., bibl., index, $32. The concept of self as text fromAntiquityto the digital age. Jonas,Raymond.France and the Cultof the SacredHeart. An Epic Talefor Modern Times. Los Angeles: U of CaliforniaP, 2000. xv, 308p., bibl, ill., index. $40. A study of the history cult of the Sacred Heart and the part it played in constructing FrenchCatholicismand Frenchnationalidentity. de Jorio,Andrea.Gesturein Naples and Gesturein Classical Antiquity.Intro.and notes by Adam Kendon. Indianapolis:IndianaUP, 2000. cvii, 517p., app., bibl., ill., indices. A translationof La mimica degli antichi investigata nel gestire napoletano, GesturalExpressionof the Ancients in the Light of Neapolitan Gesturing. Kassim, Husain. Aristotle and Aristotelianismin Medieval Muslim,Jewish, and ChristianPhilosophy. Lanham,Md.:Austin & Winfield Publishers,2000. 217p., bibl., index. The medieval encounter of Aristotle with Avicenna, Plotinus, Proclus, Maimonides,andAquinas. Kojima,Hiroshi.Monadand Thou.PhenomenologicalOntologyof HumanBeing (Series in ContinentalThought,27). Athens:Ohio UP, 2000. xii, 247p., index, $39.95. Bubervia Husserl, Heidegger,and haiku. Kraye, Jill, and M. F. W. Stone, eds. Humanismand Early Modern Philosophy (LondonStudiesin the Historyof Philosophy).New York:Routledge:2000. xiii, 270p., index. Twelve essays. Lefort, Claude. Writing:The Political Test. Ed. and tr. by David Ames Curtis. Durham:DukeUP, 2000. xxxix, 312p., index, $54.95. Translationof Ecrire.A I 'epreuve du politique (1992). Lerner,Ralph.Maimonides'EmpireofLight. Popular Enlightenmentin an Age of Belief. Chicago:Chicago UP, 2000. Selected writingsof Moses Maimonides,many of which are newly and more accuratelytranslated. Levy, Lia. L 'automatespirituel:La naissance de la subjectivitemoderned 'apres l'Ethique de Spinoza. Assen: Van Gorcum, 2000. xii, 365p., bibl., index. Revisionist interpretationsof Spinoza'sEthics in terms of self-consciousness. Liiceanu,Gabriel.ThePaltinis Diary:A Paideic Model in HumanistCulture(Central EuropeanLibraryof Ideas, Sorin Antohi, ed.). Budapest:CentralEuropeanUP, 2000. xxxii, 227p., app.$49.95. TranslationofJurnalulde la Paltinis;ConstantinNoica's intellectualresistanceagainstCeausescu, in the form of his student'sjournal.
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Low, Douglas.Merleau-Pontys Last Vision:A Proposalfor the Completionof The Visibleand the Invisible (Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy,John McCumberandDavid MichaelLevin,gen. eds.). Evanston,Ill.:NorthwesternUP,2000. xv, 124p., bibl., index. $75. A possible completion of the unfinished work, based on outlines, lectures,and late essays. Lupoi, Maurizio.TheOriginsof the EuropeanLegal Order.Tr.by AdrianBelton. New York:CambridgeUP,2000. xiii, 641p., app.,bibl., index.Translationof Alle radici del mondogiuridico europeo (1994). McCracken,C. J., andI. C. Tipton,eds. Berkeleys Principlesand Dialogues. BackgroundSourceMaterials(CambridgePhilosophicalTextsin Context).New York:Cambridge UP, 2000. x, 300p., index. Selections from works that influencedBerkeley and reactionsto his doctrines. Miller, Peter N. Peiresc s Europe: Learning and Virtuein the SeventeenthCentury. New Haven:Yale UP, 2000. xv, 234p., index. Mesland, G. M. De Verlichtingder Romantiek:De Psychofysiologische Idee in West-Europa.Rotterdam:ErasmusPublishing,2000. 261p., bibl., index. Physiology in the eighteenthcenturyin religion, philosophy,and aesthetics. Mori, Gianluca.Bayle philosophe (La vie des Huguenots, 9, Antony McKenna, ed.). Paris: Honore Champion, 1999. 416p., bibl., index. Bayle's transformationsof Cartesianism,Malebranchism,and Protestantism. Muller,John, and JosephBrent, eds. Peirce, Semiotics,and Psychoanalysis (Psychiatryand the Humanities,vol. 15). Baltimore:Johns Hopkins UP, 2000. xi, 184p., index, $38. Essays by ten scholarsand clinicians. Nadler,Steven, ed. The CambridgeCompanionto Malebranche.New York:Cambridge UP, 2000. xi, 319p., bibl., index. $54.95. Eleven scholarlycontributions. Newell, WallerR. Ruling Passion. TheErotics of Statecraftin Platonic Political Philosophy.Lanham,Md.:Rowman& Littlefield,2000. vii, 205p., bibl., index. $24.95. Eros, tyranny,and statesmanship. Newport,KennethG. C. ApocalypseandMillennium.Studiesin BiblicalEisegesis. Cambridge:CambridgeUP, 2000. x, 252p., app., bibl., index. $54.95. Interpretations of Revelations fromAnglicanism to Seventh-dayAdventism and beyond. Neumer, Katalin. Die Relativitdt Der Grenzen: Studien Zur Philosophie Wittgensteins.Atlanta,Ga.: Rodopi, 2000. xi, 288p., bibl. $51. On the questionof relativism, understandingothers,and the unity of languageand thoughtin Witt-genstein's late philosophy. Norris,Christopher.Mindingthe Gap:Epistemologyand Philosophyof Science in the TwoTraditions.Amherst:U of MassachussetsP, 2000. ix, 297p., index. Husserlian phenomenology'spossibilities for philosophy of science, throughreadingsof Quine, Kuhn, Canguilhem,Derrida,and others. Offen, Karen. European Feminisms, 1700-1950: A Political History. Stanford: StanfordUP, 2000. xxviii, 554p., bibl., index. $60. Europeanfeminist traditions,especially in France. Ireland:Kingdomor Ohlmeyer,JaneH. Political Thoughtin Seventeenth-Century Twelve index. 2000. xvii, scholarlyessays. UP, Colony.Cambridge:Cambridge 290p., Overhoff,Jiirgen.Hobbes s Theoryof the Will:Ideological Reasons and Historical Circumstances.Lanham,Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,2000. x, 266p., bibl., index. $24.95. This book revealsthe religious,ethical,andpoliticalconsequences of ThomasHobbes's doctrineof volition.
Books Received
709
Park, Mungo. Travelsin the Interior Districts of Africa. Ed. by Kate Ferguson Marsters.Durham:Duke UP, 2000. 407p., bibl., ill., index. The complete text, with originalmaps and illustrations,and a new introduction. Peirce, Charles S. The Writingsof Charles S. Peirce: A ChronologicalEdition. Volume6: 1886-1890 (Peirce EditionProject,NathanHouser,gen. ed.). Bloomington: IndianaUP,2000. lxxxiv, 697p., app.,index. $49.95. A new volume in the series,marked by Peirce's interestin speculativephilosophy. Pettegrew,John,ed. A Pragmatist'sProgress? RichardRortyand AmericanIntellectual History. Lanham,Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. vii, 22p., index. $24.95. Seven scholarlyessays, with an afterwordby Rorty. Plaut,EricA., and KevinAnderson.Marxon Suicide (Psychosocial Issues, EricA. Plaut, gen. ed.). Trans.by Eric A. Plaut, Gabrielle Edgcomb, and Kevin Anderson. Evanston:NorthwesternUP, 1999. 147p. Essays by Marxand critical interpretations. Prendergrast,Christopher.The Triangleof Representation.New York:Columbia 2000. UP, xiii, 196p., index. $42.50. Theoryand representation,touchingon Williams, Said, Proust,and Matisse. Ranasinghe,Nalin. The Soul of Socrates. Ithaca:Cornell UP, 2000. xvii, 196p., index, $35. Plato's complicatedrelationshipwith Socrates, documentedthroughexegesis of Platonictexts. Ricuperati,Guiseppe.La reinvenzionedei lumi:Percorsistoriograficidel novecento (FondazioneLuigi Einaudi,Studi 38). Florence:Leo S. Olschki, 2000. xvi, 233p., index. Essays by six scholarson Yates, Lovejoy, and Gay, et al. Roberts,Brian.AmericanAlchemy. The California Gold Rush and Middle-Class Culture.Chapel Hill: U of North CarolinaP, 2000. xii, 328p., ill., index. The fortyniners in culturalcontext and in reactionto respectability. Roff, SandraShoiock, Anthony M. Cucchiara,and BarbaraJ. Dunlap. From the Free Academyto CUNY:IllustratingPublic Higher Educationin New YorkCity,18471997. New York:FordhamUP, 2000. viii, 146p., bibl., index. $27.50. Essays and images from 150 years of CUNY history. Rowe, Christopher,and Malcolm Schofield, eds. TheCambridgeHistoryof Greek and RomanPolitical Thought.New York:CambridgeUP,2000. xx, 745p., bibl., index. $125. Thirty-onechapters. Rudnytsky,PeterL., Antal B6kay, and PatriziaGiamperi-Deutsch,eds. Ferenczis Turnin Psychoanalysis.New York:New YorkUP, 2000. xiv, 292p., index, $20. Fifteen essays by academicsand psychoanalysts. CultureofArt.Princeton: Siegel, Jonah.Desire andExcess: TheNineteenth-Century PrincetonUP, 2000. xv, 352p., index. The museum, the artist,the object, the critics. Singer, Irving. George Santayana, Literary Philosopher. New Haven: Yale UP, 2000. xiii, 217p., index, $25. A portraitof Santayana'sthought, work, and complex personality. Slomp, Gabriella. ThomasHobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory. New York:St. Martin'sP, 2000. xii, 194p., bibl., index. Rationality,glory, and absolutismin Hobbes. Smith, Anthony D. The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicityand Nationalism (The MenahemSter JerusalemLectures).Hanover,N.H.: UP of New England,2000. xi, 106p., bibl., index. $35. Spitz, Jean-Fabien.L 'amourde I'egalite: essai sur la critique de I'egalitarisme republicainen France 1770-1830. Paris:Editionde l'Ecole des HautesEtudesen Sci-
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ences Sociales/LibrairiePhilosophiqueJ. Vrin,2000. 286p., 170FF.Originsand developmentof Rousseauistideas of individualliberationand equality. Stiker,Henri-Jacques.A Historyof Disability. Tr.by WilliamSayersand foreword David T. Mitchell.Ann Arbor:U of MichiganP,2000. xix, 239p., app.,bibl. $52.50. by Translationof Corps infirmeset societes (1997). Stroll,Avrum.Twentieth-Century AnalyticPhilosophy.New York:ColumbiaUP, 2000. ix, 312p., bibl., index. $32.50. Competingtheoriesin logic, epistemology,metaphysics, and ethics, drawingon Russell, Wittgenstein,Quine, and Moore, et al. Strum,Shirley C., and Lisa Marie Fedigan, eds. Primate Encounters:Models of Science, Gender,and Society. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2000. xvi, 652p., bibl., index. $35. An intellectualhistory of primatologyin twenty-fouressays by Harroway,Jolly, Latour,et al. Sztompka,Piotr.Trust:A Sociological Theory.Cambridge:CambridgeUP, 2000. xii, 214p., bibl., index. $24.95. A comprehensivetheoreticalaccountof trustas a fundamentalcomponentof humanactions. Thiher, Allen. Revels in Madness: Insanity in Medicine and Literature (Corporealities:Discourses of Disability, David T. Mitchell and SharonL. Snyder, eds.). Ann Arbor:U of MichiganP, 2000. 354p., bibl., index, $57.50. Madnessand literature fromAntiquityto the present. Thompson,Norma,ed. InstillingEthics. xv, 239p., index. Fifteen scholarlyessays fromAristotle and Cicero to the present. de Tocqueville,Alexis. Democracy in America. Ed., trans.,and intro.by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop.Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2000. xciii, 722p., bibl., index. $35. Anew andaccuratetranslationof the seminalworkby Alexis de Tocqueville. Utz, Richard,andTom Shippey,eds. Medievalismin the Modern World.Essays in Honourof Leslie Workman(Makingthe MiddleAges, 1, GeraldineBarnesand Margaret Clunies Ross, series eds.). Turhout: Brepols, 1998. xiv, 452p. Essays and documents on medievalismpast and present. Voegelin, Eric. The Collected Worksof Eric Voegelin,Vol.15. Orderand History, Vol.II: The Worldof the Polis. Ed. by AthanasiosMoulakis.Columbia:U of Missouri P, 2000. 477p., index. $39.95. Anothervolume in the series, on ancientGreeksymbolization of humanreality. Wang,Aihe. Cosmologyand Political Culturein Early China. New York:Cambridge UP, 2000. xiv, 241p., bibl., index. Political evolution and transformationsof cosmology from the Shang to the Han empires. Weiner,Robert Paul. Creativityand Beyond: Cultures, Values,and Change. Albany,N.Y.: StateU of New YorkP, 2000. xii, 353p., bibl., index. $24.95. A study of the ways the concept of creativityhas been defined and will be defined in the past, present and future. Wetzell, RichardF. Inventing the Criminal. A History of German Criminology, 1880-1945. Chapel Hill: The U of North Carolina P, 2000. xiv, 348p., bibl., index. $39.95. Nature versus nurturein moder criminology, complicated by eugenics and Nazism. White, Stephen K. SustainingAffirmation. The Strengthsof WeakOntology in Political Theory.Princeton:PrincetonUP, 2000. xii, 158p., index. An explorationand elaborationof the idea of "weakontology"used in political theory.
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Wilks, Michael. Wyclif:Political Ideas and Practice. Papers by Michael Wilks. Oxford:Oxbow Books, 2000. Intro.by Anne Hudson.xvi, 272p. ?14.95. Twelve new and reprintedessays. Winchell, MarkRoyden. WhereNo Flag Flies: Donald Davidson and the Southern Resistance. Columbia:U of Missouri P, 2000. xi, 385p., bibl., ill., index, $29.95. Intellectualbiographyof the fugitive poet and literarycritic. Wright,T. R. D. H. Lawrenceand the Bible. Cambridge,CambridgeUP, 2000. x, 274p., bibl., index. Argues that the Bible played a key role in almost all of D. H. Lawrence'swork. Yeazell, Ruth Bernard.Harems of the Mind. Passages of WesternArt and Literature.New Haven:Yale UP, 2000. xii, 314p., index. The idea and image of the haremin art, literature,and opera. Yamada,Yuzo. WritingunderInfluences:A Studyof ChristopherMarlowe.Japan: Eihosha, 1999. vii, 214p., bibl., index. Marlowe's influence on Shakespeare. Zimmermann,Reinhard,and Simon Whittaker.Good Faith in EuropeanContract Law (CambridgeStudiesin Internationaland ComparativeLaw.The CommonCoreof EuropeanPrivateLaw, MauroBessani andUgo Mattei,gen. eds.). xxxiii, 720p., index. Historicalorigin and possible situationsin terms of fifteen legal systems.
Contents
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Volume
61 No. Page
Adkins, GregoryMatthew:When Ideas Matter:The Moral Philosophy of Fontenelle .................... ........................ Angle, Stephen C.: Should We All Be More English? Liang Qichao, Rudolf von Jhering,and Rights .............................. Armitage,David: EdmundBurke and Reason of State ................ Bates, David: The Mystery of Truth:Louis-Claudede Saint-Martin's EnlightenedMysticism .................................... Bates, Don: Machina Ex Deo: William Harvey and the Meaning of Instrument........................................... Blum, Paul Richard:FrancescoPatrizi in the "Time-Sack": History and RhetoricalPhilosophy ............................ Boone, Rebecca: Claude de Seyssel's Translationsof Ancient Historians.. Bourke,Richard:Liberty,Authority,and Trustin Burke's Idea of Empire.. Brient, Elizabeth:Hans Blumenbergand HannahArendt on the "UnworldlyWorldliness"of the Modem Age ................... Claeys, Gregory:The "Survivalof the Fittest"and the Origins of Social Darwinism ........................................ Eze, EmmanuelC.: Hume, Race, and HumanNature ................ Fontana, Benedetto:Logos and Kratos: Gramsci and the Ancients on Hegemony ........................................... Gaiger,Jason: Schiller's Theory of LandscapeDepiction ............. Gass, Michael: Eudaimonismand Theology in Stoic Accounts of Virtue ... Gorton,Lisa: The ParadoxTopos ............................... Gucer,Kathryn:"Not heretoforeextant in print":Where the ... Mad RantersAre ............... ...................... Gurstein,Rochelle: Taste and "the ConversibleWorld"in the EighteenthCentury....................................... Hecht, JenniferMichael: Vacherde Lapouge and the Rise of Nazi Science Holton, Gerald:The Rise of Postmoderisms and the "Endof Science"... Hunter,Ian: ChristianThomasius and the Desacralizationof Philosophy.. Ianziti, Gary:A Life in Politics: LeonardoBruni's Cicero ............. Kelley, Donald R.: JHI 2000 ................................... Kemp, Catherine:Two Meanings of the Term"Idea": Acts and Contentsin Hume's Treatise......................... Kinna, Ruth:William Morris:Art, Work,and Leisure ................ Kress, Jill M.: ContestingMetaphorsand the Discourse of Consciousness in William James .........................................
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Kukkonen,Taneli:Plenitude,Possibility, and the Limits of Reason: A Medieval Arabic Debate on the Metaphysicsof Nature .......... Laursen,John Christian:Spinoza in Denmarkand the Fall of Struensee, 1770-1772 ............................... Lynch,Jack: Betwixt Two Ages Cast: Milton, Johnson, and the English Renaissance ...................................... Masroori, Cyrus:EuropeanThought in Nineteenth-CenturyIran: David Hume and Others................................... Nelles, Paul: Sainte-Beuvebetween Renaissanceand Enlightenment .... van Ruler,Han: Minds, Forms, and Spirits:The Nature of CartesianDisenchantment ................................. Runia, David T: The Idea and the Reality of the City in the Thoughtof . Philo of Alexandria...................................... in the Cameron: The of Folk Influence Shelley, Meteorology AnaximanderFragment ................................... Sinkoff,Nancy: Benjamin Franklinin Jewish EasternEurope: CulturalAppropriationin the Age of the Enlightenment .......... Soll, Jacob: Amelot de La Houssaye (1634-1706) AnnotatesTacitus...... Southgate, Beverley C.: Blackloism and Tradition:From Theological Certaintyto HistoriographicalDoubt .......................... Wolloch,Nathaniel: ChristiaanHuygens'sAttitudetowardAnimals ......
4 539 2 189 3 397 4 657 3 473 3 381 3 361 1
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Volume
to
ADKINS, GREGORY MATTHEW, on Fontenelle's moral philosophy, 433-52 Anaximander,see Shelley ANGLE, STEPHENC., on LiangQichao and Rudolf von Jhering,241-61 Arabic metaphysics, see Kukkonen Arendt, Hannah,see Brient ARMITAGE,DAVID,on EdmundBurkeand reason of state, 617-34 BATES, DAVID, on Louis-Claudede SaintMartin'senlightenedmysticism, 635-55 BATES, DON, on William Harvey and the meaning of instrument,577-93 Blacklo, see Southgate BLUM, PAUL RICHARD, on Francesco Patrizi, 59-74 Blumenberg,Hans, see Brient BOONE, REBECCA,on Claudede Seyssel's translationsof ancient historians, 56175 BOURKE,RICHARD,on EdmundBurkeand Empire, 453-71 BRIENT,ELIZABETH,on HansBlumenberg and HannahArendt, 513-30 Bruni, Leonardo,see Ianziti Burke, Edmund,see Armitage;see Bourke Cartesianism,see van Ruler CLAEYS, GREGORY,on the origins of Social Darwinism, 223-40 Dante, see Gorton de La Houssaye, Amelot, see Soll Egginton, William, see Gorton English Renaissance, see Lynch Eudaimonism,see Gass EZE, EMMANUEL C., on Hume, race, and humannature,691-98 FONTANA, BENEDETTO,on Gramsciand the Ancients, 305-26 Fontenelle,Bernardle Bouyer de, see Adkins GAIGER,JASON, on Schiller's landscapes, 115-32
GASS, MICHAEL,on Eudaimonism,theology, and Stoic virtue, 19-37
61
(2000)
GORTON,LISA, on William Egginton and Dante, 342-46 Gramsci,Antonio, see Fontana GUCER, KATHRYN,on Ranters,75-95 GURSTEIN,ROCHELLE,on Tasteand "the conversible world," 203-21 Harvey,William, see Don Bates HECHT,JENNIFERMICHAEL,on Vacher de Lapouge and Nazi Science, 285-304 HOLTON,GERALD,on postmodernismand the "end of science," 327-41 Hume, David, see Eze; see Kemp; see Masroori HUNTER,IAN, on ChristianThomasiusand the desacralizationof philosophy, 595616 Huygens, Christiaan,see Wolloch IANZITI,GARY,on LeonardoBruni, 39-58 Iranianthoughtin the nineteenthcentury,see Masroori James, William, see Kress Jewish Enlightenment,see Sinkoff Johnson, Samuel, see Lynch KELLEY,DONALD R., on the JHI in 2000, 153-56
KEMP, CATHERINE,on Hume's Treatise, 675-90 KINNA, RUTH, on WilliamMorris,493-512 KRESS, JILLM., on WilliamJames, 263-83 KUKKONEN,TANELI,on medievalArabic metaphysics, 539-60 LAURSEN,JOHNCHRISTIAN,on Spinoza in Denmark, 189-202 LYNCH,JACK,on Milton, Johnson,and the English Renaissance, 397-413 MASROORI,CYRUS, on Europeanthought in nineteenth-centuryIran, 657-74 Milton, John, see Lynch Morris, William, see Kinna NELLES, PAUL, on Sainte-Beuve,473-92 Patrizi, Francesco, see Blum Philo of Alexandria,see Runia Postmodernismand science, see Holton
715 Copyright2000 by Journalof the Historyof Ideas,Inc.
716 Qichao, Liang, see Angle Ranters,see Gucer RUNIA, DAVID T., on Philo of Alexandria, 361-79 Saint-Beuve,Charles-Augustinde, see Nelles Saint-Martin, Louis-Claude de, see David Bates Schiller, Friedrich,see Gaiger Seyssel, Claude de, see Boone SHELLEY, CAMERON, on Anaximander and folk meteorology, 1-17 SINKOFF, NANCY, on Jewish Enlightenment, 133-52 Social Darwinism, see Claeys
Index to Volume 61 SOLL, JACOB, on Amelot de La Houssaye and Tacitus, 167-87 SOUTHGATE,BEVERLEYC., on Blacklo's Pyrrhonism,97-114 Spinoza, see Laursen Stoicism, see Gass Tacitus, see Soil Taste, see Gurstein Thomasius, Christian,see Hunter Vacherde Lapouge, see Hecht VAN RULER,HAN, on Cartesiandisenchantment, 381-95 von Jhering,Rudolf, see Angle WOLLOCH, NATHANIEL, on Christiaan Huygens and Animals, 415-32
Quarrels,Polemics, and Controversies An internationalconferenceorganizedby The InternationalSociety for IntellectualHistory TrinityCollege, Cambridge,UnitedKingdom 26-29 July 2001 FromAntiquityto the present day, no field of knowledge, no area of learning, no discipline has escaped quarrels,polemics, or controversiesduringits formationor diffusion;and yet there is no modern,comprehensivestudy of this phenomenon.The focus of this conference is on the status,place, and functions of quarrelsin the intellectualworld. Among specific topics are: Historiography: ancient works reportingor describingquarrels,concepts of polemics, quarrels, controversies,the vocabularyand the discursive modes of quarrels. Modes and Forms: the dynamics of quarrelsfrom outbreakto conclusion; difference of names and of forms;rituals;the place and role of violence; literary genres producedor linked to quarrels. Questions of Power: as a means of quarrels controlling a discipline or an institution; the role of national and nationalisticclaims; priorities;personalpride and glory; financial or economic stakes. Actors and Judges: formationof parties;culturaland intellectualmilieux; the roles of peers, learned institutions(e.g., academies), external institutions(e.g., law courts). Ordersof Knowledge: debates over the positive or negative role of quarrels;quarrelsand "tradition"; quarrelsand "official science"; quarrelsand truth;quarrelsand authority; polemic and proof; quarrelsand ethics. Interestedscholars from any field are welcome to submitproposalsfor papersand panels. We particularlyencourageproposalsfrom younger scholars, for whom a limited numberof residentialgrantswill be available. Papersmay be in English, French, German,Italian,or Spanish, with English r6sumes. Proposals for a panel should include the names of 3-4 speakersand of the moderator;and a summaryof each paper.Proposals for an individualcontributionshould be an outline (1-2 pages) for a 20-minute talk. Deadline: 31 December 2000. Organizers:Francoise Waquet,36, rue de la Glaciere, 75013, Paris, France;e-mail:
[email protected] (no attachments).EdoardoTortarolo,e-mail:
[email protected] (attachmentsaccepted as RTF or TXT files). Furtherdetails at http://www.trin.cam.ac.uk/quarrels/
Explorationsof Chinese IntellectualHistory InternationalConferenceof the Journal of the History of Ideas The JohnsHopkinsUniversityNanjing Center for Chinese and AmericanStudies 31 May- 2 June 2001 Keynotespeakers. Li Xueqin, History Institute,Chinese Social Science Academy Susan Mann, Departmentof History,University of Californiaat Davis
Panels: Philosophy Chair: Kwong-loi Shun, University of California,Berkeley Joel Kupperman,University of Connecticut Antonia Cua, Catholic University of America Chen Lai, Beijing University Wan Junren,Qinghua University
Political Thought Chair:William Rowe, Johns Hopkins University Joan Judge, University of California,Santa Barbara TheodoreHuters,University of California,Los Angeles Xiong Xuezhi, Instituteof History,ShanghaiAcademy of Social Sciences Lei Yi, Instituteof Moder History,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing
Historical Studyof Womenand Gender Chair:Dorothy Ko, RutgersUniversity Du Fangqin, Classics Research Institute,TianjinNormal University Deng Xiaonan, Beijing University Bonnie Smith, RutgersUniversity JudithBennett, University of North Carolina,Chapel Hill
Issues in ModernIntellectualHistory Chair:Julia Ching, University of Toronto RichardLynn, University of Toronto Wing-cheukChan, Brock University He Weifang, Centerfor Judicial Studies, Beijing University Rong Jingben, CentralTranslationInstitute,Beijing
Social History of the Book Chair: CynthiaBrokaw Lucille Chia, University of California,Riverside Uan Zuozhi, East China Normal University Wu Ge, FudanUniversity, Shanghai For more informationcontact Elizabeth D. Knup: eknupgnhc.nju.edu.cn Nanjing Center website: http://www.sais-jhu.edu/nanjing
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Pluralism in Theory and Practice andAmerican McKeon Richard Philosophy Editedby EugeneGarverand RichardBuchanan "Thisoutstandingcollectionof essaysestablishes RichardMcKeonas perhapsthe most important philosopher of his generation and the thinker most fitted to ours. It is the most articulateand intelligent statement of true philosophical pluralismto date." -THOMAS CONLEY McKeonwas one of the most profound "Richard and brilliant philosophers of the twentieth centuryPluralismin Theoryand Practiceoffers and appreciationsof the workof this undulyneglected valuableclarifications but major thinker." -ALANGEWIRTH
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Hartshorne and Brightman on God, Process, and Persons TheCorieorncce, 1922-1945 Editedby RandallE.Auxier and MarkY A. Davies "Thecorrespondence between Brightmanand Hartshornehas significanthistoricaland philosophical value for what it does to enhance our understanding of their work and its implications for both their time and ours. It is rare good fortune that these letters have been
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Three Critics of the Enlightenment Vico, Hamann, Herder Isaiah Berlin Edited by Henry Hardy Here, for the first time under one cover, are Isaiah Berlin'sessays on Vico, Hamann, and Herder.These essays are among Berlin'smost important studies in the history of ideas. They are integral to his central project: the critical recovery of the ideas of the Counter-Enlightenment and the explanation of its appeal and consequences. Individually, these fascinating intellectual biographies reveal Berlin'sown great intelligence, learning, and generosity, as well as the passionate genius of his subjects. Together, they constitute an arresting interpretation of romanticism's precursors. "Anyoneinterested in Berlin or those he studied will find this an essential volume." -Mark Lilla, University of Chicago Paper $16.95 ISBN 0-691-05727-3 Cloth $45.00 ISBN 0-691-05726-5 Due October Not available from Princeton in the Commonwealth (except Canada) and the European Union
Expanded Edition
Karl Marx's Theory of History A Defence G. A. Cohen First published in 1978, this book rapidly established itself as a classic of modern Marxism. In the ensuing twenty years, the book has served as a flagship of a powerful intellectual movement-analytical Marxism. In this expanded edition, Cohen offers his own account of the history, and the further promise, of analytical Marxism. From reviews of the original edition: "Anadmirable and formidable book."-E. J. Hobsbawm "Aclear, definite, and well-reasoned interpretation of what the theory really is.... Admirably argued and generally exhilarating."-Anthony Quinton, The Times Literary Supplement Winnerof the Isaac Deutscher Memorial Prize Paper $24.95 ISBN 0-691-07068-7 Due December Not available from Princeton in the Commonwealth (except Canada)
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The Aspiring Adept RobertBoyle and His Alchemical Quest Lawrence M. Principe The AspiringAdept presents a provocative new view of Robert Boyle (1627-1691), one of the leading figures of the Scientific Revolution, by revealing for the first time his avid and lifelong pursuit of alchemy. "LawrencePrincipe's book goes a long way toward recovering the complexity of Boyle's mind and work.... [His] ability to reconstruct Boyle'slaboratory practices, ascertain the relations between Boyle and a large community of like-minded practitioners, and retrieve, fully or partially,some of Boyle's alchemical writings is ... remarkable." -Mordechai Feingold, American Scientist Paper $19.95 ISBN 0-691-05082-1 Due November
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Kant and the Fate of Autonomy
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MODERNISM
MOSAIC
Pragmatism,
Anarchism,
DAVID
"Afascinating book, ambitious in its arguments and innovativein its approach to literaryand culturalanalysis. Kadlec argues very convincinglythat extraliteraryconcerns, adopted from anarchist social thinkersand pragmatistphilosophers, were central to the vision and craft of key modernistauthors." BrianLloyd,Universityof California, Riverside,author of LeftOut "MosaicModernismcombines the precision and densely woven detail of a historianwith the sensitive attentionto nuance and aesthetics of a literarycritic.Among Kadlec's most importantclaims are, first,that Europeanbased modernistslike Pound, Joyce, and Lewis develop their aesthetics from the base of a radicallydifferentunderstandingof race and class than American-based modernistslike Williamsand Moore, despite some common philosophical and political sources; and, second, that AfricanAmericanwriterslike Lockeand Hurstonare as thoroughlygrounded in the philosophies of pragmatismand culturalpluralismas are Williamsand Moore. This book is rich in informationand insights." CristanneMiller,Pomona College
Culture KADLEC
David Kadlec examines the anarchist and pragmatistorigins of modernismas a literary/ culturalphenomenon. Treatinga wide range of historicalsources and materials, many of them previouslyunpublished, Kadlec argues that the formal experimentsof leading modernistswere spurred by German, French,and Britishanarchists. He thus offers a dramatically new account of modernism's political genesis and the mosaic, improvisationaltendencies of modern literature. The antifoundationalistimpulse that lay beneath modernism'sformal innovations, Kadlec argues, eventuallyspawned its own foundation in the notion of cultureas an indeterminateand contingent measure of American identity.The orthodoxyof this new culturalmeasure received challenge in the later modernistinnovations of the African Americanfolkloristand novelist Zora Neale Hurston.In restoringthe centralityof anarchism and pragmatismto a range of modern writersand movements, Mosaic Modernism provides a welcome historicalperspective on contemporaryconceptions of identitypolitics. New Studies in American Intellectualand CulturalHistory:DorothyRoss, Series Editor $42.50 hardcover
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Journalof the History of Ideas, Inc. The American Philosophical Society and the American Council of Learned Societies (throughits Committeeon the Historyof Ideas) have both contributedto the initiation,promotion, and planning of the project.
Boardof Directors HANS AARSLEFF ANTHONY GRAFTON,Vice-President CONSTANCEBLACKWELL DONALD R. KELLEY JOHN F. CALLAHAN, Vice-President FRANCIS L. LAWRENCE MARCIA COLISH I. LEONARD LEEB, Treasurer WILLIAMJ. CONNELL,Secretary JOSEPHM. LEVINE, President RICHARDFOLEY HELEN NORTH J. B. SCHNEEWIND
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The SustainingFund of the Journal of the History of Ideas consists at presentof an initial fund providedby the Research and Publication Fund of the College of the City of New York (the fund establishedin 1939 by the Class of 1912 and increasedby the Hon. MarkEisner),and of contributionsprovidedby individualsor institutions.All contributionsto the SustainingFundof the Journalof the Historyof Ideas, Inc. will be gratefullyacknowledged,and are exempt from income tax since the Journalis a nonprofit, educational enterprise, under Sec. 101 of the Internal Revenue Law. For informationaboutcontributingto the sustainingfund,please contactProfessorDonald R. Kelley, RutgersUniversity, 88 College Avenue, New Brunswick,NJ 08901. Contributorsto the Sustaining Fund Research and Publicationfund establishedby the Class of 1912, C.C.N.Y. ClaremontGraduateSchool, Co-sponsor of the SustainingFund Trustees of Smith College University of Cincinnati SustainingMembersand Life Subscribers Dr. Adrien Ver Brugghen James Eugene Bacigalupi Hugh S. Bonar, Jr. HarcourtBrown Dennis C. Chipman,M.D. Anthony W. Deller Sebastiande Grazia Miss Helen Katsanou Dr. Joseph J. Klein Douglas Raymond Lacey Dr. HarryB. Lee Howard G. Macmillan
RichardMartin Johan F. Naeser S. A. Russell Dr. Gerald Sabath Alexander Sachs Alfred Leon Ster LaurentStern Ashley J. Tellis Yoshiaki Watanabe Lynn White, Jr. Dr. Henry von Witzleben Charles S. Yanikoski
ForthcomingArticles: Peter Adamson on Aristotelianism in the Arabic Plotinus Amy M. Schmitter on the Representation of Royal Power in French Academic Painting Lisa Hill on Adam Ferguson and the Sociology of Conflict Eric MacPhail on the Plot of History from Antiquity to the Renaissance Christopher S. Celenza on Historiographical Parallels in Late Antiquity and the Florentine Renaissance Douglas Howland on Liberty in Nineteenth-Century Japan David Hawkes on the Politics of Characterin Milton's Divorce Tracts Jotham Parsons on Money and Sovereignty in Early Modem France
Journal of the History of Ideas The Morris D. Forkosch Prize ($2000) is awarded for the best first book in intellectual history each year. The awards committee favors first books which are published by any author in English and which display some interdisciplinary range, demonstrate sound scholarship, and make an original contribution to the history of thought and culture. Annual deadline for submission: 31 December. Winner for 1999: Mara Beller, QuantumDialogue: The Making of a Revolution (University of Chicago Press).
The Selma V. Forkosch Prize ($500) for the best article published in this Journal each year. Winner for 1999: Yanfang Tang, "Language, Truth, and Literary Interpretation: A Crosscultural Examination," volume 60, number 1.
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