New Zealand's Muslims and Multiculturalism

New Zealand's Muslims and Multiculturalism

Muslim Minorities Series editors

J0rgen S. Nielsen, University of Copenhagen Felice Dassetto, University of Louvain-la-Neuve Aminah McCloud, DePaul University, Chicago

VOLUME9

New Zealand's Muslims and Multiculturalism By

Erich Kolig

BRILL

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2010

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kolig, Erich. New Zealand's Muslims and multiculturalism I by Erich Kolig. p. em. - (Muslim minorities, ISSN 1570-7571 ; v. 9) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-17835-9 (hardback: alk. paper) 1. Muslims-New ZealandSocial conditions. 2. Muslims-Cultural assimilation-New Zealand. 3. MuslimsNew Zealand-Ethnic identity. 4. Multiculturalism-New Zealand. 5. Group identity-New Zealand. 6. Islam-New Zealand. 7. New Zealand-Social conditions. I. Title. II. Series. DU424.5.M87K65 2009 305.6'970993-dc22 2009033919

ISSN 1570-7571 ISBN 978 90 04 17835 9 Copyright 2010 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

CONTENTS Chapter One Introduction Allah is Everywhere, Even in New Zealand Field Research Acknowledgements

1 1 15 17

Chapter Two Community, Identity, Diversity The Beginnings Muslim Representation Organisational Functions and Aims Outreach Programmes The Myth of Muslim Unity Living among Infidels Orientalism and Islamophobia Converts Students

20 20 28 35 39 42 49 59 66 70

Chapter Three

The Right to Be Different: Muslims in the

~&~~

n

The New Zealand State and Multiculturalism Secularisation and the Right to Religion Legal Instruments 'Racial' Harmony through Interfaith Activity Education and Policy Framework Democratic Participation and Public Visibility of Muslims The Difficulty in Standardisation of Islamic Ex:ceptionalism Rivals for Custodianship of Public Morality

73 89 95 111 120 123 124 127

Chapter Four Integration and Conflict Discourses 'When in Rome Do as the Romans Do' The Necessity of Minority Integration Conflict Discourses Blasphemous Libel and Islam Danish Cartoons Rock the World The Pope's Gaffe ............................................................................

132 132 145 148 158 160 174

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CONTENTS

Chapter Five Gender Issues: Women are Equal but Different Of Gender Separation and Inequality Concepts of Decency and Modesty The Burqa Case Hijab versus Burqa Whose Authority? The Burqa's Challenge to Multiculturalism Chapter Six Globalisation, Political Islam and the Rise of Fundamentalism Is Extremism Rising in New Zealand? 'Fundamentalists' and 'Moderates' Fighting over the Christchurch Mosque and Halal Meat Muslim Firebrand Preachers Re-Islamisation and Fundamentalisation in the World Fundamentalism Is Not All the Same The Radical Concept of Jihad The Spectre of Terrorism The Zaoui Case Conclusion Chapter Seven

Epilogue: Muslims in the World

Index ....................................................................................................

178 178 190 195 200 206 208

212 212 225 234 236 242 247 252 256 261 263 269

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION Allah is Everywhere, Even in New Zealand It seems appropriate to start with a remark a Muslim friend made

who wanted to express the thought that God through his omniscience and omnipresence is also highly relevant to New Zealand despite its geographic isolation and its secularised 'godlessness'. To underline the fact that there is a sizeable and devout Muslim minority now in this country, committed to the worship of Allah, he said: 'Allah is everywhere, even in New Zealand'. Another Muslim friend, when I told him about this remark, disputed it vehemently. Personalising tawhid (the Oneness of God) by giving 'him' a location is almost blasphemous. God has no location, he said, that is exactly what omnipresence means; the Almighty eludes being 'nailed down' at a particular location or country. I hope this friend will forgive me for beginning this book with a chapter entitled with such a contested and theologically flawed statement, but I could not resist the temptation. It expresses so very neatly the recent vast expansion of the global Muslim diaspora to the 'very end of the world'. Islam and Muslims today command the world's attention. Islam appears to be in crisis and Muslimhood in a state of turmoil. The whole civilisational project of the world seems to be set back by the presence of radical Muslims, Islamic fanaticism, and its aggressive values manifested in acts of stunning barbarity. In trying to put Muslims' present-day global importance in perspective, it is necessary to bear in mind the root cause why Muslims and Islam do, in fact, command so much attention in political and ideological discourse. Most of this attention is unfavourable in the Western world, and often totally overlooks the fact that belligerent fanaticism and terrorism are a minority phenomenon among the world's 1.3 billion Muslims. It also overlooks the fact that many countries where Muslims live are totally untouched by the more unpleasant features of Islam. New Zealand is a case in point. However, while the peaceful and relatively harmonious conditions prevailing at this time between the Muslim minority and the

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wider society can be called exemplary, they are not amenable to projection into the future. Globalisation has brought about a close intermeshing of Western and Islamic worlds. They are inextricably linked now through globalisation and the shrinking effect it has on the world. Not only globalised commerce, economy, banking, and strategic interests, but also communication, international organisations, and, above all, ideological agendas such as universal human rights and international laws and conventions are binding previously disparate nations firmly together and demanding some form of common modus vivendi. On another level, the close proximity between the West and Islam has been brought about by millions of Muslims who, having migrated, are now living in 'diaspora' in the West. As their coexistence in the world is heightened, literally, to face to face contact, the two sides, the West and the Islamic world, can no longer be neatly separated, either physically or ideologically. Islam has become part of the West. North America and Europe host significant Muslim minorities who are no longer immigrants, but second and third generation descendants, now residents and citizens. Australia and New Zealand also have growing Muslim minorities. There, too, integration of cultural non-Western minorities is beginning to become an important issue, having a bearing on national identity and the cultural implications of citizenship. Their presence is beginning to demand a re-definition of the concept of 'the West', as well as a refutation of the traditional notion of what constitutes cultural alterity. In a cultural sense, it is no longer the traditional Occident poised against the Orient in the reassuring self-definition based on fundamental differences. Muslims no longer provide that comforting foil against which the 'we' and 'they' can be defined. The issues are also beginning to move beyond simple laissez-faire tolerance of cultural difference and reluctant accommodation. Conceding cultural spaces for Islam to unfold reveals further reverberations. Integration raises subtle issues of cultural blending, mutual adaptation, and changes in national identity. The presence of Muslims, perhaps more than other ethnic or religious minorities, tends to bring such issues forcefully to the fore, and, in the process, Muslims have attracted suspicion, in many cases disproportionate to their numbers as a diasporic minority. As Western secularism meets Islamic theocentrism, concerns, not only about cultural incompatibility, but also security, have fired up the debate. A plethora of highly controversial and widely publicised events have not only strongly militated against a smooth ideological incorporation of

INTRODUCTION

3

a Muslim identity into national awareness, but have made minority integration a strongly contested issue. The viscous process of creating a culturally multichromatic society, engendering officially recognised differentiated forms of citizenship and embracing difference as enrichment, not a burden, has hardly gained momentum. Islam is sometimes singled out for its apparent resistance to the forces of secularisation. However, central to the 'exceptionalist' position Muslims occupy today is what has been called the 'bin-Laden effect'. 1 There can be no doubt; Muslims and Islam have been enormously problematised through the events of 9/11. Additionally, following the public transport bombings in London-the so-called 7/7 attacks in 2005-and other expressions of Muslim extremism, suspicion has turned particularly on Muslims living in the West, even, and especially, on those educated and raised and perhaps even born there. Burning banlieues, assassinations in broad daylight, blown up trains and public transport vehicles, and ruined, burning buildings have become monuments to terrorism, fuelling growing suspicion. Such episodes, aside from bringing Islam into disrepute, have tended to problematise Muslim immigration and their gaining citizenship in the West. The flamboyant rhetoric of the English politician Enoch Powell embodies extreme advocacy of that suspicion. In an epic speech he warned that unbridled immigration of cultural aliens to Britain will result in 'rivers of blood'. The bloody 'race riots' -they might have been better described as ethnic riots-in northern English cities in early 2001 were seen by some as the realisation of his prophetic vision. Even though such flamboyancy has faded from political discourse, it has been echoed more recently by the anti-immigration, xenophobic rhetoric of right-wing political parties in various European countries. A major concern is the apparent unwillingness of some Muslims to adapt to Western conditions. What may in fact be only a hesitation to leave the comfort of the home culture behind can be exaggerated by an unsympathetic observer to an unwillingness to adjust and integrate, or worse as a signal of a proclivity toward hostile Islamism. Mustafa Malik, 2 optimistically predicting that Muslims will eventually assimilate into the Western mainstream and change Europe's monochrome

Jocelyne Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and the United States (New York & Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); 35. 2 Mustafa Malik. 'Muslims Pluralize the West, Resist Assimilation,' Middle East Policy 11 (Spring 2004): 70-84.

4

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into a truly multicultural melange, also feels assured enough to write: 'Islam has well and truly found a place for itself within the social fabric of contemporary European society'. 3 Objectively, one can only take this with a grain of salt. A constant complaint of host societies is that Muslims refuse to assimilate, and even reject attempts to integrate them on terms that would allow them considerable cultural freedom. As one British writer expresses it rather deftly:' .... many [British Muslims] do not accept the terms on which minorities must relate to the majority culture in a liberal democracy. Instead of acknowledging that Muslim values must give way wherever they conflict with the majority culture, they believe that the majority should instead defer to Islamic values .. .'. 4 This sentence naively harbours many problems a modern, democratic, liberal, and multicultural society inspired by the global agenda of human rights faces nowadays. But terrorist attacks aside, demonstrations expressing Muslim intolerance, calling vociferously for the death of Islam's 'enemies', book burnings, preaching violent jihad, and the like have done much to put the doctrine of freedom of expression, so cherished in the West, to the test. No matter that this may be the expression of a minority within the minority; it has done much damage to Western Muslims as a whole, and even more generally to the reputation of Islam. Not surprisingly, multiculturalism has come under critical review in Europe. Have policies of cultural recognition for immigrants gone too far? Even tolerant Holland, following the gruesome murder of Theo van Gogh in broad daylight in the centre of Amsterdam (on 2 November 2004), has begun to wonder whether it is embarked on the right course with its cultural tolerance and liberal multiculturalism. People like the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn (murdered not by a Muslim, but by an animal rights activist on 6 May 2002) suggest that massive Muslim immigration is altering Holland's national culture and in fact endangering its tolerant climate in favour of Islamic medievalist harshness and illiberalism. He denounced Islam as a 'backward culture' and achieved stunning electoral popularity with it, bringing his party into government as a coalition partner. Geert Wilders seems poised to step into his footsteps. Now, cultural tolerance in Europe is

This is a quote attributed to Peter Mandaville (Malik, ibid.; 71). Melanie Phillips, Londonistan: How Britain is Creating a Terror State Within (London: Gibson Square Books, 2006): xix. The book can hardly be called a dispassionate assessment of the situation. 3

4

INTRODUCTION

5

inching towards the question: how much are the West's social, political, and moral dimensions altered by the presence of a sizeable Muslim minority? When Muslim numbers rise and they gain citizenship, through birth or naturalisation, how much influence will they gain in the democratic process and thus achieve significant cultural change? Meanwhile, European Muslims feel increasingly unwelcome and have begun to harbour a victim mentality. Australia, under the stewardship of former Prime Minister John Howard, was moving away from liberal immigration policies and the granting of citizenship. Blaming some Muslims for not wanting to accept Australian values and trying to bring in Islamic law (sharia), he introduced new hurdles for prospective immigrants and those seeking Australian citizenship. 5 Most Western nations strive for a complete integration of immigrant Muslim minorities. Both British multiculturalism and Dutch Verzuiling have come under attack for having neglected integration goals and permitted minorities to lead lives parallel to majority society, rarely intersecting and far from intertwined and incorporated. Separate schools with ethno-culturally and religiously loaded curricula, segregated residential areas often exacerbated to effective ghettoisation, overly tolerant laws allowing latitude for inappropriate customary forms of behaviour, and the like create a society within a society. Often immigrant groups not only bring with them their customs, but also their prejudices and dislikes for others. Mixed with home-grown xenophobia, it creates a powder keg situation as demonstrated by the North English riots of 2001 and those in the French banlieues in 2005. But openly criticising these conditions as separatist and worse isolationist, rightly or wrongly, is taken as advocacy of enforced assimilation and a violation of international human rights. Indeed, insisting on assimilation would be a breach of human rights provisions, both global and domestic, in most Western countries. However, following some highly publicised outrages perpetrated by Islamic extremism, the pendulum appears to be slowly swinging in the direction of setting somewhat narrower limits to cultural freedom.

5 See Erich Kolig and Nahid Kabir, 'Not Friend, Not Foe: The Rocky Road to Enfranchisement into Multicultural Nationhood in Australia and New Zealand,' Immigrants and Minorities 26, no. 3 (2008): 266-300. Under the present administration in Australia a somewhat different course seems indicated. New Zealand did not follow Howard's lead.

6

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It is useful to orientate social studies of Muslims and Islam in the global discourse. Globalisation has brought about commonalities no nation can escape. Having addressed, though not exorcised, the demons in Muslimhood, let us turn to New Zealand and its Muslim minority. Despite its splendid isolation-from a Eurocentric point of view, at the opposite end of the world-New Zealand as a nation is facing very similar issues as the rest of the Western world. The majority of Muslims are relatively recent immigrants, even though the presence of Muslims goes back more than a hundred years. Until recently, there were only a few, forming a very small diaspora of a few dozen and later a few hundred. This small minority was hardly noticed by, or noticeable in, majority society, which may have been just as well, as nineteenth century and early twentieth century New Zealand society, like most European societies, was far from culturally tolerant and 'racially' accommodating. Chinese, who came to this British colony to seek their fortune mostly as gold diggers, were not welcome, were highly discriminated against and decried as the 'yellow peril'. Indigenous people were politically emasculated and their culture despised. The few Muslims who initially came ashore kept their religion to themselves. Even today, with a community of about 40,000, it is easy to overlook their presence-unless one comes near a mosque around the time of Friday midday prayers, the important salat al-jummah. Especially when near one of Auckland's bigger mosques, one cannot fail to notice a stream of hundreds of the faithful converging on the characteristic Middle Eastern architecture. While it is early days to praise New Zealand's irenic conditions, it is certainly true to say that the country has remained untouched by Muslim fanaticism. Vice versa, there are few signs of an unfavourable, hostile preoccupation of majority society with this diasporic minority. But even here, despite the conspicuous absence of Muslim radicalism, university courses on terrorism enjoy great popularity and reveal a morbid fascination with the more sinister side of Islam. Students admit readily to the fact that fewer people in the world die from attacks by Muslims than from car accidents, criminal shootings, or the long-term effects of tobacco smoking. Yet, the extremist's violence and cunning is what attracts them to an, admittedly, rather superficial study of this religion. So far, no one has been harmed by Muslim extremists in this country. And vice versa, a latently slumbering suspicion has not escalated to spectacular action by officialdom. Consequently, New Zealand, unlike Australia, has not seen raids by armed police on Muslim

INTRODUCTION

7

homes, arrests of imams, or the banning of radical preachers visiting from overseas. There was a case of a Muslim becoming a cause celebre because he was denied refugee status for security reasons and he came to symbolise the human rights' fight against misplaced prejudice, suspicion, and mindless terrorism fears. He is still a resident in New Zealand, enjoying the company of his large family and the hospitality of Catholic brethren. This case will be described later. Significantly, the first major attempt by the police to apply anti-terrorist legislation was not to justify action against Muslims engaged in some sinister plot, but to round up gun-toting Maori and Pakeha (European) individuals apparently for breaching firearms regulations because of their penchant for 'survival skills'. 6 Ironically also, the law proved singularly ineffective for indictment purposes in this case as, according to legal experts, it was specifically designed for organised Islamic extremism, but too blunt an instrument for anything else. New Zealand's borders are not porous. The country's global geographic isolation works in its favour, allowing the government to exercise strict control in matters of immigration. 7 Authorities can also easily control the inflow of refugees and asylum seekers. Controversial issues such as so-called 'boat-people' and others seeking illegal entry do not normally arise, or at least not with the same frequency as, for instance, in neighbouring Australia. In this way, not only individuals, but also pernicious ideological influences can more easily be kept at bay, at least those attached to and disseminated by actual persons, than would be the case under different circumstances. But how often rigorous screening methods are successful in eliminating undesirable immigration and how often it may not work is open to speculation. The press at one stage suggested that Aiman al Zawahri, al-Qaeda's number two man, may have visited to spy out the possibility of creating a safe haven for jihadis. At other times, allegations were raised by politicians that undesirables had actually been admitted as migrants or refugees. 8 The fact that individual cases are reported in the media is probably an indication of their rarity. The relatively small number

6 The police raid was carried out in 2008. At the time of writing, the court cases are still pending. 7 For practical purposes, immigrants and refugees/asylum seekers are not dearly distinguished here. 8 For instance, accusations of a person having served in Saddam Hussein's guard led to speedy extradition

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of non-European and non-Polynesian ethnic groups in the country presumably makes surveillance easier. The topic of asylum seekers and refugees throws light on the ambiguous, often contradictory signals New Zealand sends to Muslims. While there is undoubtedly a degree of distrust, suspicion, and even hints of Islamophobia, there are also many expressions of sympathy for Muslims. A case in point was the Tampa affair. 9 In August 2001, a boatload of mainly Afghans was taken on board a Norwegian freighter, the Tampa, to rescue them from their badly leaking, sinking ship in the Indian Ocean. Reports concerning numbers vary between 4 to 700 persons. They had embarked from Indonesia and were attempting to enter Australia illegally. When the freighter captain requested authorisation to land the people in an Australian port, he was denied permission by Australian authorities. They maintained that the refugees should be returned to Indonesia, as they had been picked up in the Indonesian sea rescue zone. The Australian government was adamant that it did not want to extend preferential treatment to 'queue-jumpers' who had tried to sneak into the country instead of going through ordinary immigration channels. A long standoff ensued-with the humanitarian situation deteriorating on the Norwegian ship-until Australia, somewhat stung by international criticism, decided to remove the asylum seekers to detention facilities on the island of Nauru where they could be slowly and gradually processed. (The Australian government's intransigence, by and large, was welcomed by the press and public opinion and may have played a role in subsequent elections returning the conservative government of John Howard to office.) Without further ado, New Zealand agreed to take about 150 of them, mainly Hazara Shi'ites. Presumably reflective of public interest, it was reported by the news media a few years later that they, or most of them, had integrated successfully in New Zealand society. Pictures were published and footage shown on television of some of them proudly receiving their certificate of citizenship. Tragically, in December 2008, there was another reminder of the Tampa affair. One of the refugees, who had become a taxi driver in Christchurch, was murdered by two youths while on the job. He left behind a wife and five children, most of whom had been on the Tampa. In one

9 Nahid Kabir, Muslims in Australia: Immigration, Race Relations and Cultural History (London, New York, Bahrain: Kegan Paul, 2005): 295-305.

INTRODUCTION

9

of the newscasts, it was commented that he had come 'to find peace and instead he found death'. The news was met with an outpouring of public sympathy. Donations of money and flowers were received, and hundreds, both Muslims and non-Muslims, attended the Islamic funeral. Through this tragic event, people's righteous indignation at a cowardly act, and the resultant wave of public sympathy, New Zealand showed once more its kinder side. New Zealand's Muslim minority has been extremely peaceful. Accordingly, the country, by comparison with Europe or Australia, has paid comparatively little attention in the past to issues of the Muslim diaspora. It felt secure in the sense of being far removed from the troubles of the world and fortified in this belief by the low profile of its tiny-by international standards-Muslim community. The community has not reached spectacular proportions and, despite growing perceptibly in recent years, it still amounts to only about one percent of the total population. Yet it has at times come under some suspicion. But leaving aside the odd sensationalist media report, cries of alarm by some incorrigible letter writers to the press, and Islamophobic warnings from some politicians of minor political parties, New Zealand's Muslims, by and large, have enjoyed benevolent indifference from the state system. It can hardly be denied that the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11 for short) have created a new perspective on the presence of Muslim communities living in the West. New Zealand, despite its tolerance, could not stand aloof. But I was still justified to write shortly afterwards of an 'accord of cautious distance' between Muslims and the wider society prevailing in New Zealand; and I could still praise the fair-mindedness of its people. 10 No significant hostile action against Muslims was recorded by the media. Surprisingly, the bomb attacks in Bali (12 October 2002, 1 October 2005) in which three New Zealanders died seemed to provoke equally little reaction. And so did the bomb terror of Madrid ( 11 March 2004), the Beslan massacre (in the same year), and various attacks in the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Africa, Iraq, and Afghanistan. A perceptibly greater impact was made by the attacks in London (of 7 July 2005; and the abortive bombings

10 Erich Kolig, 'An Accord of Cautious Distance: Muslims in New Zealand, Ethnic Relations and Image Management,' New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 5, no. 2 (2003): 24-50.

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of 21 July 2005)-probably due to awakening old loyalties between (former) motherland and (former) colony. One gauge of public sentiments aroused by this incident was the occurrence of some attacks on Muslims and their property. In the aftermath of the London attacks, some mosques suffered damage through vandalism and there was an apparent increase in cases of verbal abuse of Muslims in the streets. In such incidents, usually women, easily identified by their dress, became the targets. Although leaving New Zealand untouched, overseas events did change the domestic situation. In the longer run, they generated a subliminal, if usually unspoken, wariness of the national Muslim minority-or so many Muslims perceive it. It also awakened among New Zealand politicians an awareness of the country's Muslim minority. While some criticised their presence, others tried to emphasise majority society's inclusiveness. There was also a growing realisation that Asia's Muslims are 'neighbours' and, as actual or potential trading partners, they have an eye on the treatment New Zealand's Muslims receive. The Regional Interfaith Conference at Waitangi in February 2007 brought this awareness to the point when (then) prime minister, the Rt Hon. Helen Clark, assured New Zealand's Asian neighbours that the country respected all religions equally. The polite bow towards Islam was well received in this forum. However, domestically this wellmeaning expression of the nation's tolerance created a stir. It generated some ill feeling among fundamentalist Christians who would have liked to see New Zealand's Christian heritage emphasised and elevated to pre-eminence. The (then) prime minister's gesture of inclusiveness was no idle boast. Although officially bicultural-by officially recognising a partnership between European-Pakeha (of effectively Anglo-Celtic background) and Maori cultures-New Zealand is practically multicultural. Aside from its politics of reconciliation 11 towards its indigenous minority, it extends far-reaching freedom of religious and cultural expression to its immigrant minorities. Going vastly beyond laissez-faire tolerance, there are human rights-based legal instruments in place ensuring these freedoms. Whether it is this tolerance, enshrined in law and enacted

11 See The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies, ed. Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

INTRODUCTION

11

by benign indifference in a largely secularised society, that has bought the country ethnic and racial harmony is anyone's guess. There have been few signs of disturbance in ethnic-religious relationships on a larger scale. The few domestic incidents that slightly bestirred the calm of New Zealand's ethno-religious harmony are described here. Also in matters of national identity there are no fears, as there may be elsewhere, such as that a massive Muslim immigration might change the cultural composition of the nation and bring on an identity crisis. Francis Fukuyama's warnings 12 about the West's loss of identity through massive Muslim immigration do not resonate in New Zealand. In a similar vein, Huntington 13 bemoaned the watering down and imminent passing of the American 'creed' -what less sympathetically one might call the WASP ethos-through the massive immigration from Latin America. It is well understood in this country that the traditional Anglo-Celtic national identity is declining, but it is simply not politically correct to openly mourn its passing. Feelings about the integrity of a nation's identity can arouse many anxieties. Yet, ' ... defining national identity in a multicultural society is an exceedingly difficult enterprise. It cannot, and should not be ethnically and culturally neutral, as it then satisfies nobody and lacks the power to evoke deep historical memories, but neither should it be biased towards a particular community as it then de-legitimises and alienates others, nor should it be culturally eclectic as it then lacks coherence and focus.' 14 New Zealand has no such anxieties. Its Muslim minority is too small to influence the cultural and ethnic composition significantly in the foreseeable future. The reduction of the prominence of Anglo-Celtic cultural legacy is well underway, having conceded equal status to Maori culture. It is expected that the inclination towards growth of a Polynesian cultural identity will increase even further through a relatively strong immigration of Pacific islanders

12 Francis Fukuyama, 'A Year of Living Dangerously,' The Wall Street Journal (2 November 2005): A14; and 'Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy,' Journal of Democracy 17 no. 2 (2006): 5-20. 13 Samuel Huntington's book Who Are We?: The Challenge ro America's National Identity, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004) argues in a similar mould, bemoaning the loss of American 'creed' through the massive immigration of cultural aliens. 14 Bhikhu Parekh, 'Defining National Identity in a Multicultural Society,' in People, Nation and State: The Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism, ed. Edward Mortimer (London, New York: Tauris, 1999): 66-74; 73.

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and their high fertility rate. This, in turn, appears to have opened this society to a mentality of cultural tolerance of which Muslims now become the beneficiaries. 15 It is debatable whether in this matter it is justified to speak of resignation to the inevitable or of the splendid outcome of a deep-seated sense of tolerance. This book does not aim at elucidating general Islamic tenets or describe the beliefs and practices of New Zealand's Muslims. It is not a book about Islam, but about Muslims. It aims at describing the national Muslim diaspora, in particular as it is affected by multicultural policies and legislation relating to the freedom of religio-cultural expression. The nation likes to see itself in the forefront of applying and living up to the best current standards of human rights, especially in relation to the acceptance of different lifestyles and openness towards any religion and culture. Despite a basic openness toward the cultural other, there are discrepancies-becoming quite apparent at times-between what Muslim immigrants may wish and what is permitted. Boundaries, flexible as they may be, do exist and are enforced at times-though this is usually done with much apology and by seeking compromises. Conflict discourses that arise occasionally have yet to escalate to violent proportions that seriously undermine the relative harmony. And although Islamophobia has a home in this country too, its cacophony has not drowned out the sweet tune of goodwill. There is much to be found out yet. In general, the incorporation of Muslims in large numbers into the West culturally, socially, and politically raises many questions. As Europe knows best, Islamic canonical law, the sharia, and regional customs brought along by immigrants do not always sit neatly among Western conditions. The issue of integration, the political relevance of the concept of governance, and the issue of the religious dimension of citizenship inevitably emerge, demanding answers. In particular, a focus will fall on the ways in which the Muslim community embedded in New Zealand society produces new forms of citizenship and political participation on the basis of their religious identity. To what extent does religious affiliation matter in the way Muslims define themselves individually and collectively as citizens and New Zealanders? Traditional majoritarian models of democracy produce difference-blind models of national citizenship. The human

15

See Kolig and Kabir, ibid.

INTRODUCTION

13

rights revolution in the question of citizenship now tends to demand more differentiated forms. A further issue arising from multiculturalism, among others, is the question oflegal pluralism on the basis of ethnicity or religion. In praising New Zealand society's acceptance of cultural otherness, one should not idealise. It is a cultural openness with limitations. On 7 February 2008, the archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams, in a public lecture (2008) 16 seemed to suggest that in the UK official recognition should be granted to sharia, 17 thus acknowledging a strong Muslim presence. To no one's surprise, the lecture generated an immediate and overwhelmingly acrimonious response, which culminated in the assertion that recognising the sharia would dangerously undermine the monopoly of British law. Despite widespread tolerance, indifference to religious otherness, and multiculturalism, New Zealand would undoubtedly evince the same reaction to such a proposal. Although many cultural and also judicial concessions have been made to the indigenous minority (the Maori), the willingness to grant similar privileges to immigrant minorities does not exist. Clearly, it is important to explore and understand the framework for the organisation of community life, and also the self-defining process of every ethnic and cultural group's identity. A clearer understanding of the structure and internal organisation of the Muslim minority will help in the dialogue between Muslim community leaders and public administration. This may clarify in what sense Islam can be a vehicle for either conflict or cooperation with national institutions. This question is part of a more general inquiry into the status of religion in civil societies characterised by advances in pluralistic contexts as well as being highly secularised. New forms of religious influence in the public arena pose new challenges to pluralism in liberal democracies, since a balance must be reached between the tolerance of differences and conformity for the sake of maintaining an ordered civil society and a cohesive polity. In this context, the presence of Islam in the West has resulted in an intensification of the controversies surrounding religious freedom, tolerance, and the public expression of faith-and conversely, the freedom of expressing disapproval or even

16 Rowan Williams Archbishop's Lecture-Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective. (2008) http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/157 5. 17 It needs to be recognised that sharia is not just a code of legal prescriptions in the Western sense, but a complex canonical blueprint of human society.

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ridicule of religion. As a result, any comprehensive analysis of transnational Islam must deal with the issue of how differences in religious status across Western democracies influence the conditions faced by each Western Muslim minority group. In other words, every Western country defines Islam in relation to the notion of 'religion' that they have already established legally and institutionally. This may be in conflict with the notion Muslims have globally of their faith as being more than a religion. Their view of Islam as a whole way of life, governed by ritualistic observations and meeting divine obligations, may be at odds with Western laws, aesthetics, and values. Critical here in this process of increasing mutual exploration and understanding are the public discourses produced by journalists, academics, politicians, and Muslim community leaders. This will clarify whether there are specific constraints to integration-like the institutional inclusion of Islam in the religious pluralism of the public domain and its influence on the social building of the nation. Closely linked are other areas of exploration, for instance, the illumination of internal aspects of the Muslim community, guiding or resulting from integration. How do Muslims organise their community on a pluralistic basis as a small minority? How do they interact with other religious groups in an organisational regard or, for instance, in a matrimonial sense? How are internal differences managed: secularised versus observant, gender differences, sectarianism, etc.? The establishment of different types of dialogue with different segments of New Zealand society, such as religious groups, representatives of social and political institutions, etc., needs to be explored; and last, but not least, the formation of Muslim political mobilisation for internal purposes as well as purposes of interfacing with the 'majority society', the forms of Islamic leadership, and the modes of production of Islamic knowledge and its transmission in a minority diasporic context. Clearly this is an agenda that cannot be entirely fulfilled in this book. Its ambition by necessity must be more modest. It is a first attempt to delineate, roughly, the cultural and socio-political presence of the Muslim minority in New Zealand. Its aim, rather modestly, is to give an answer to the question: to what extent can Muslimhood be expressed in New Zealand, given current multicultural policies, laws, and human rights provisions that secure a certain degree of cultural freedom?

INTRODUCTION

15

Field Research Most of the available empirical research on Muslims in the West is not of a New Zealand-specific nature. Australia, for instance, has accumulated vastly more information material and scholarly analysis on its Muslim minority. However, the Australian situation is, in many respects, not directly extensible to New Zealand conditions. Yet, there is little information about Muslims in New Zealand, if one ignores the often sensationalist and distorting media presentations. The rather sparse academically published output so far available-by, mainly, William Shepard and Erich Kolig-has been referred to in this work at the appropriate places. The research undertaken for this volume was meant to fill this lacuna. From the middle of the 1990s, I have, beginning with the Muslim community in Dunedin in an ever-widening focus, endeavoured to illuminate the essential issues around the presence-in global terms-of a small, yet significant, Muslim minority in this country. The research, undertaken intermittently over more than ten years, enjoyed only limited financial support. Muslim issues seemed to attract little attention in the nation's research agenda, provoking little peer interest unless combined with issues of terrorism. This limited degree of interest did little to do justice to the multicultural, pluralist condition of New Zealand and its policies of cultural recognition. One gained the distinct impression that Muslim issues were considered far removed from these 'fair shores'. Indeed compared with violent and bloody events elsewhere in the world, New Zealand had little to offer of similar fascination and spectacularity, which might have stung more research funding into action. My interest, from the beginning, lay not so much in Islam itself, its adaptability or otherwise, the rigidity and flexibility of beliefs divorced from the lives of believers. On the contrary, my interest focused on the Muslims themselves, as agencies of change, adaptation or resistance, their communal involvement, and how their interpretation of Islam guided their existence in a non-Muslim, highly secularised society. My fascination was with the particular expression of being Muslim under New Zealand's conditions. As is commonly known, there is a trenchant gender division in Muslim society, a social condition demanded by Islamic doctrine. It narrows free interaction between the genders, formalises inter-gender

16

CHAPTER ONE

contacts, and, in many ways, places severe restrictions on contacts between men and women who are not closely related. It effectively locks men and women into largely separate, autonomous life worlds. I have referred to this condition as homosociality. Clearly, it does not apply to all Muslim families to the same extent of severity. But no matter whether this condition is strictly adhered to or treated more liberally, it has a bearing on social investigation. My information, therefore, is inevitably slanted towards the male point of view and men's experience. Academic permission to undertake social research is contingent on submitting to a rigorous code of ethics that protects the interests of research participants as well as of the university, but does little to make life easier for the researcher. One of the most stringent ethical criteria is the preservation of anonymity unless its lifting is specifically asked for and granted. Because of relatively small population numbers and the small size of the Muslim community, it is especially difficult to preserve the required anonymity of participants. Veiling the identities of participating Muslims to meet the demands of research ethics, yet render the degree of specificity of information that lends authenticity and authority to findings and data-and enlivens the ethnographic description-is not an easy task. Adhering to these ethical requirements necessitates the construction of information on a level of abstraction that at times seems far removed from real life and the 'adrenalin flow' of field work. Exciting information, confidentially given, may be embarrassing to the source or be compromising to a larger number of people, and, as it could be traceable, has to be omitted. Another ethical criterion the researcher must adhere to concerns the discussion and publication of information that may be damaging to the community that has been researched. In case this may arouse suspicion or lead to wrong conclusions, I hasten to add that no one I had contact with would, in my mind, fall into the category 'extremist'. Some may have held radical ideas, but none to the extent that one would have to fear they might engage in criminal action. Admittedly, these are very subjective labels applied to subjective experiences. But it can be presumed as a given that persons with extremist leanings-and those very likely do exist among New Zealand's Muslim community, have avoided coming into contact with my research. There is also some suspicion Muslims have vis-a-vis social investigation in general because they are well aware of widely held prejudices, and this at times gets in the way.

INTRODUCTION

17

Acknowledgements My fascination with matters Islamic grew out of research I conducted in Afghanistan as a graduate student at the University of Vienna. (The late) Dr. Assadullah Baha, a co-student and companion in Afghanistan, introduced me to Islam and his warmth and humanity rubbed off indelibly on my perception of this religion. Since then, the many cases of friendship, hospitality, and kindness I experienced-together of course with the inevitable less felicitous experiences-while travelling in the Islamic world have impressed on me the positive side of this religion. Later, research in Indonesia, if anything, deepened my interest in Islam further. I am indebted to my former student, research assistant, and later colleague Dr. Joko Susilo, who also helped me to understand more of Islam, and to get to know its more radical interpretations in Indonesia. I thank him especially for his thoughtful guidance when we participated in the 2nd Mujahidin Kongres at Surakarta in August 2003. 18 Otago University, through several avenues, provided some research funds. And of course I feel indebted to the leadership of the Muslim community for its ready cooperation and patience with my enquiries. In particular, I owe a debt of gratitude to the leadership of the Otago Muslim Association (OMA) who supported the initial phase of my research in the 1990s; here above all thanks are due to the association's former presidents Dr. Fawzi Jadallah, who welcomed and encouraged my research, and Dr. Mohanned Hassanin. He and his wife Mona offered their friendship and their support was crucial. My thanks also to Dr. Taha el Hassan and his wife. Taha was my research assistant for a short while before he and his wife relocated to the Middle East. Steve Abu Ali Johnston, current president of OMA, put up with my questions for a considerable length of time. My colleague, retired Assoc. Prof. William Shepard (formerly of Canterbury University) was always unstinting with advice and ready cooperation. His contribution to my course on 'Islam and Globalisation' was extremely valuable and much appreciated. I am grateful to Professor Rex Ahdar of the Law School at Otago University for

18 My conclusions from this experience have been published in the European Journal of East Asian Studies, 2005, 4 (1): 55-86; and in Understanding Indonesia, ed.

S. Epstein (Wellington: Asian Studies Institute, 2006): 43-66.

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CHAPTER ONE

supplying me with relevant juridical material and advice, and for being a splendid and informative conversation partner over coffee and cake. I value the friendship of Dr. Najibullah Lafraie, lecturer in Political Studies at Otago University, and appreciate the readiness he showed in helping my students. Abdullah Drury, a Kiwi convert (or revert as Muslims call them), kept me supplied with a steady stream of valuable information. My research has certainly benefited from his vast store of information and his keen interest in collecting all manner of data. Dr. Ian Clarke, not only my graduate student, but also for a while my rather poorly remunerated research assistant, also made a vital contribution. Some of my graduate students, by embarking on work with Muslims for their theses or class projects, helped me to clarify my own thoughts and expand my horizons. Last, but not least, I thank the many Muslims, who have willingly submitted to interviews, withstood the tedium of answering my questions even when they made no sense to them, and corresponded with me via email. I can only mention a few, as the complete list would be far too long: Javed Khan (president of the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand), Mohammed Amir (imam of IMAN, the main Muslim organisation in Wellington), Ola Kamel (of the Canterbury Muslim Association, MAC), Anjum Rahman, Husain Benyounis (MAC), Dr. Khalid Sandhu, Nasreen Hanif (Islamic Women's Council), Tariq Ashraf, Anwar Ghani, Mustafa Farouk, Mohammed Thompson, lsmael Waja, Umarji Mohamed, Firoz Patel, Hazet Adam, Dr. Ashraf Chaudhary, Rehanna Ali, Mohammed Aliyan, Abdul Rahim and AarifRasheed, and Mohammad Hidayat Brian McCormack. None of them, individually or collectively, are responsible for the contents of this book. While I have no ambition to be their mouthpiece-Muslims can well speak for themselves and in any case I am not a convert-! do hope that they will not turn from this book in anger and disgust. Of great help was a symposium at Canterbury University, which, in February 2006, brought together for a couple of days several New Zealand scholars discussing Islam and Muslims, and presenting papers to the public. As the symposium's main organiser I should mention Dr. Ghazala Anwar, then a lecturer in Religious Studies at Canterbury University in Christchurch. She unflinchingly shouldered the burden of organising the event and making it a success. My own involvement consisted in rallying several university-based scholars and motivating them to contribute to the symposium-not an easy task in itself. Most

INTRODUCTION

19

of the contributors then supplied their lecture in essay form for a volume, which I edited and which was published as a special issue of the New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies (vol. 8 (2), 2006) under the title 'Muslims in New Zealand'. I am also appreciative of the fact that the University of Vienna and its Department of Cultural and Social Anthropology bestowed on me a Visiting Professorship several times, which enabled me to undertake comparative studies about Muslims in Austria. The comparative angle certainly added a useful dimension to my research. I also wish to thank my wife Nicole for her forbearance and for being a patient listener when I thought I had to tell her all about Islam.

CHAPTER TWO

COMMUNITY, IDENTITY, DIVERSITY

The Beginnings On the international scale of the worldwide Muslim diaspora, the Muslim community in New Zealand-of about 40,000 to 45,000 people-is very small, comparable only to the smallest national communities in some Western European countries. 1 Not only because of New Zealand's geographic remoteness, but also because of the restrictive immigration policies that have been implemented for decades, it had grown very little until about 15 years ago. The 'White New Zealand' policy was abandoned in 1974, opening up the country to multi-ethnic and multi-religious immigration, based largely on criteria other than nationality, ethnicity, and race. A quota system favouring immigrants from European countries was applied at first, but now immigration is mainly determined by a skill-based scheme. 2 Becoming recently more numerous as well as a little more vociferous, the Muslim community has gained greater attention compared to minorities of other religionists. However, the deeper reason for this increased attention is not its sudden growth or its attention-seeking, but mostly a result of events overseas. Domestically, the Muslim minority has kept a low profile, but due to unfortunate events far from these shores the limelight has been shone on New Zealand's Muslim minority against their will. Undeservedly coming at times under some suspicion, the community has done nothing to warrant such attention. Leaving public sentiments aside, for serious scholars, New Zealand's Muslims are of great interest for another reason: they are prime examples of the workings of a nation's cultural recognition policies and the integration of distinct religious and cultural minorities. In the world today New Zealand can be regarded as one of the culturally most lib-

1 Compare this with the estimated numbers of Muslims in France (up to 6 million), Germany (about 4 million), the UK and Italy (each up to about 2 million). 2 There are exceptions as immigration from several Pacific island nations is subject to a quota system that ignores skill

COMMUNITY, IDENTITY, DIVERSITY

21

eral countries, assuring cultural tolerance and reasonable equality, both in law and public discourse, to its minorities. This is certainly an achievement of more recent years and has not always been true. Even today, there are voices of dissent arguing that cultural liberalism has gone too far, leading to a weakening, if not total abrogation, of New Zealand's essential, traditional identity. But these voices, determined to turn a blind eye to the reality of globalisation, are being largely ignored. The Muslim presence in New Zealand goes back about 130 years, although the exact beginnings are shrouded in the mists of a past in which Muslims were hardly recognised by majority society. It seems public attention was initially drawn to these religionists only because they were Chinese, then a mistrusted and vilified immigrant minority. The census records of 1874 contain the earliest mention of Muslims in New Zealand. These records list 17 'Mohamatans' (in some rendition 'Mahometans'), all males, of whom at least 15 were Chinese working in the Otago goldfields, at Dunstan near Dunedin. 3 Their religious proclivities and needs were not recorded or remarked upon. We do not know whether they were devout, in which way they worshipped, or how they expressed their piety or otherwise. It is not known whether they eventually decided to stay permanently or whether they returned to China. It is also unknown whether they, or some of them, founded families in New Zealand and passed on their faith to their offspring. The latter seems rather unlikely, since there is no information of Muslims among the present-day New Zealand-Chinese community. The Chinese phase of the Muslim presence passed without leaving a trace. The records also mention the first Muslim to be buried in New Zealand, a Javanese sailor by the name of Mohamed Dan, who died in Dunedin in 1888:~ It is to be expected that there were a few Muslim sailors (probably of Southeast Asian or South Asian provenance) who,

3 Much ofthis information is gleaned from: William Shepard, 'New Zealand Muslims and Their Organisations' in 'Muslims in New Zealand', ed. E. Kolig, special issue, New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 8, no. 2 (2006): 8-44; Alxlullah Drury, Islam in New Zealand: 1he First Mosque (Christchurch: Xpress Printing, 2006); and a paper by Hidayat Brian McCormack produced for Islamic Awareness week in Dunedin 30 October [actually September] 1999 as part of the Public Forum on 'Islam in Your Community'. 4 This information is from the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand Silver Jubilee booklet 'Muslims in New Zealand' (2005); 34.

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CHAPTER TWO

jumping ship, may have decided to stay on in New Zealand, permanently or temporarily. A better historically profiled Muslim immigrant is Ismael Ahmed Bhikoo, a Gujarati man, arriving in the country in 1909-although this is by no means certain. He seems to have been on the way to Fiji, but decided to stay. He set up as a shopkeeper in Auckland and later brought his sons-according to another source, his brothers-from India to help in the business. The fact that we know of the individual identity of two or three Muslims today speaks to how few of them chose to settle in this British colony or were allowed to do so. A year after Bhikoo, it seems, Essop Moosa (or Essup or Isap Musa, soon anglicised to Joseph Moses) arrived, also from India, to live in Auckland as well. Shortly after that, Muhammad Suleiman Kara 5 chose Christchurch as his new residence. Both Bhikoo and Moses maintained their family links with India for years, going back and forth and leaving it in the balance where they might decide to settle for good. In a sense they represent the modern phenomenon of internationalism and lack of sedentarism that is still prominent in New Zealand's Muslim community today. Daughtersin-law of Moses and Bhikoo came in 1936 and 1940 respectively. As of 1981, there were at least 44 descendants of Bhikoo and Moses in New Zealand. Bhikoo and Moses are acknowledged today as the founding fathers of the Muslim community in New Zealand. They eventually brought wives and relatives from India and, with their descendents, produced dynasties that are still at the core of the Muslim community today. 6 Just how confusing the information is about the early beginnings is borne out by a short precis about the Canterbury Muslim Association contained in the Silver Jubilee issue of the Federation of Islamic

5 William Shepard, 'Muslims in New Zealand', in Muslim Minorities in the West: Visible and Invisible, ed.. Y. Haddad and J. Smith (Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press, 2002): 233-54; 250. He surmises that Kara may have come as early as 1907, predating even Bhikoo. 6 Shepard (ibid.) maintains that Bhikoo probably arrived between 1909 and 1914. Moses came between 1920 and 1923 according to information from his descendants, although later than 1920 seems unlikely in view of the "White New Zealand" immigration policy adopted at that time. The above three were the only Gujarati Muslims to enter New Zealand before 1920. Tiwari, however, mentions other Indian Muslims, such as Muhammad Khan and Gulam Kedarmia, for the inter-war period. (K. Tiwari (ed..), Indians in New Zealand, (Wellington: Price Milburn, 1980); 83, fn. 42, and 151).

COMMUNITY, IDENTITY, DIVERSITY

23

Associations of New Zealand. 7 There it states that the first Muslim to arrive in Canterbury was a Sheikh Mohamed Din from the Punjab in India, who is believed to have arrived in 1890 with a wave of other Punjabi Muslim immigrants. In 1905 a Turkmen, Saleh Mohamed, and his father, Sultan, are supposed to have settled in Christchurch; and then in 1907 Ismail Kara arrived. Considerably more research, impeded no doubt by the lack of accurate records, will have to be done to introduce more clarity into the slow, embryonic inception of today's Muslim community as it built up from the sporadic migration of a few individuals. In 1920 the government adopted what amounted to a 'White New Zealand' immigration policy, though it was not officially called such. This precluded further significant Asian immigration for many years to come. The Muslim population of New Zealand remained at less than a hundred until after World War II. After World War II, in 1951, a small number, fewer than 50, of Muslims arrived, mainly from the Balkans (Albanians and Bosnians), but also from Turkey and other adjoining countries. Before 1950 there were still fewer than 100 Muslims in New Zealand. Mostly boosted by this group of immigrants, the community increased from 67 in 1945 to 205 in 1951. The close cooperation between European and Indian Muslims began at that time, with new arrivals being assisted by Muslims from both sides. By 1961 there were 260 Muslims living in New Zealand. The majority was male and only later and gradually was the gender imbalance addressed with female immigrants in more appreciable numbers. As far as can be ascertained with some certainty, it was mainly Muslims from South Asia who started off organising the Muslim community as it is today. 8 Thus, it is fair to say that it was the Indian brand of Islam-a minority religion in India-that lies at the cradle of Islam in New Zealand. The relatively moderate Islam of European provenance (Albanian and Bosnian) inculcated by the founding members also made a lasting impression on FIANZ's (Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand, the national Muslim organisation) orientation. It was to be perpetuated by the later dominance of Fiji Indians

7

Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand, Silver Jubilee, 'muslims in

new zealand [sic]' (2005); 32. 8 This is not to ignore the Balkanese input. The first FIANZ president was an Albanian, Haji Shukri Krasniqi.

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CHAPTER TWO

and their pragmatic leanings, born from their minority status, both religiously and ethnically, in Fiji's profoundly Christian nation. It can be expected that their double minority status as Indians as well as Muslims bred the need to adapt into the Fiji Indian-Muslim mind. Under the leadership of Dr. Ashraf Choudhary, a Pakistani by origin, the pragmatic and flexible orientation of FIANZ was perpetuated. The Muslim community is rooted mainly in South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Fiji Indian) immigration, with Fiji Indians being particularly prominent. It now includes, however, at least 35, possibly even 40, different nationalities. A more recent wave of immigration includes Arabs from the Middle East and Maghreb (North Africa), Malaysians, Indonesians, Iranians, Afghans, Somalis and sub-Saharan Africans, as well as people from the Balkans fleeing the recent political turmoil there. There are also some 'Kiwi' converts whose exact number is a matter of speculation. 9 Some apparently are motivated by a short-lived curiosity about Islam, but do not sustain this interest in the long run. The number of Muslims reported in the censuses between 1961 and 1971 trebled, from 260 to 779. Rapid growth in relative terms continued in the 1970s and 1980s with Muslim numbers, as recorded in the census figures, reaching 2,500 by 1986, while the actual number may have been higher than the census indicated. Though still small in numbers, this minority has increased almost ten-fold in the last twenty years, and more than doubled in the last five. The rapid increase is reflected in the latest census figures: in 2001, there were 23,500 persons identifying as Muslims and in 2006 there were nearly 36,000. According to the latest census of 2006, Muslims represent nearly one percent of the population. Muslim leaders today estimate a figure of well above the official census count and as many as 40,000 to 45,000,10 which is not unlikely in view of the most recent trends in growth. The majority of Muslims-allegedly between 25,000 to 30,000-live in the Auckland area, while most of the rest live in Wellington. There are smaller local communities in other major cities such as Hamilton, Christchurch, 9 Estimates vary greatly, from a few hundred to two thousand. Among them is a number of Maori, some of them having converted in prison. However, exact figures are not available. Nor can there be exactness in determining who has seriously committed to the faith of Islam or only shows some passing interest. 1° Figures are only approximate as the census does not make it obligatory to answer the question of religious affiliation.

COMMUNITY, IDENTITY, DIVERSITY

25

and Dunedin. Meanwhile, very small local communities comprising only a few individuals have formed in yet smaller towns. Ghettoisation is not a characteristic Muslim residential phenomenon in New Zealand, although Muslims may prefer certain suburbs in Auckland and Wellington. Auckland's 'banlieues' of Mangere and South Auckland are occupied mainly by Maori and Pacific island people and have certainly not reached the squalor, or the density, of European conditions. Income and employment (or unemployment) figures for Muslims as a whole, though showing a tendency to be slightly lower, are not alarmingly below the national average. The figures are more varied if one breaks them down according to ethnicity, gender and educational standard. The rapid rise of the Muslim population in recent years is partly the result of political upheavals and crises elsewhere and partly owing to changes in the government's immigration policy. The 1987 coup d'etat and others since in Fiji caused a considerable influx of Fiji Indians, many of them Muslims, particularly to the Auckland area. Wars and economic crises in some Middle Eastern and Asian countries contributed significantly. The Russian invasion and then the era of the Taleban regime in Afghanistan drove millions into exile, some of them seeking a new home in New Zealand. Since 1993 at least two thousand refugees, usually through family unification programmes as family groups, have come from Somalia. Somalis currently form easily identifiable Muslim ethnic groups mainly in Christchurch and Hamilton. Groups of Bosnians, Kosovars, and Kurds have also come as refugees. Apart from refugee resettlement programmes, at one point immigration regulations favoured immigration by wealthy or well-educated people from any ethnic or national background. Under this system, a number of well-educated, Muslim professionals entered, especially from the Middle East. Many of these found to their dismay that, despite previous assurances, their qualifications were not fully recognised and quickly moved on to countries where opportunities were more congenial, rather than going through the cumbersome, and, for some, humiliating process, of adjusting their professional credentials. Those professionals who arrived under the 'point system', but whose qualifications are not recognised, have to earn their living in some other way, by driving taxis or working in ethnic restaurants, or relying on unemployment benefits while they seek to pass the necessary professional exams or train for some other occupation.

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CHAPTER TWO

'The recent-immigrant character of most of the community is reflected in the fact that only about 23 percent of Muslims were born in New Zealand (compared with over 80 percent for the general population, and 26 percent of Muslims in 1986)'.U Males still slightly outnumber females, 12 but much less so than was once the case. The Muslim population is also younger than the population as a whole. Almost 60 percent of Muslims in 2001 were under thirty years of age, in contrast to about 50 percent in 1986. In the general population, the percentage was 42.3 in 2001. The number of Muslims over 65 years of age is particularly low, at 2.1 percent, compared to 0.7 percent in 1986 and 12.2 percent for the general populationY While for some recent immigrants the culture difference is very traumatic, others have little difficulty fitting in. Shepard, going mostly on his Christchurch experience, surmises that Fiji Indians on the whole have the least difficulty since there is already a strong community here. At the opposite extreme are the Somalis, who have suffered particularly severe trauma prior to arrival, and have a high incidence of health problems and gaps in the education of their young people. 14 Moreover, the gulf between their culture and the majority culture is greater than it is for most other Muslim immigrants. Better off are groups such as the Bosnians and the Kosovars, who have some countrymen in New Zealand and whose culture (excepting religion) is basically European. However, whatever their background and regardless of how much they wish to fit in, many Muslims are concerned with the retention of their Islamic heritage. 15 For some new arrivals the loss of status in becoming an unemployed refugee has been difficult. Shepard mentions the case of one Somali who, characteristically, commented, 'Somehow you can

Shepard, ibid.; 12. According to the 1996 census, 55 percent of Muslims were male, as compared with 49 percent for the New Zealand population as a whole. By contrast, the male population among Muslims was over 60 percent in 1981 and dose to 90 percent in the 1950s (Shepard, ibid). 13 Shepard, ibid. 14 The attempt at highjacking a flight en route from Blenheim to Christchurch (on 8 February 2008), by a Somali woman, as reported in the papers and on television is, however, not a typical event. An article (Waikato This Week 19 August 1999: 3) earlier had revealed some of the woman's troubled history and resulting mental health issues. 15 See Qamer Rahman, 'Muslim Women in New Zealand: Problems and Prospects', Al-Nahda 16, no. 1-2 (1996): 34-5. Leila Adam, 'A Muslim Community in New Zealand', Al-Nahda 19, no. 1 (1999): 38-41. 11

12

COMMUNITY, IDENTITY, DIVERSITY

27

turn from a hero at home to a fool here. I mean I was a very important man in my village at home and here I cannot get a job'. 16 Shepard, in some brief reflections on integration, observes: 17 'In moral and cultural terms, Muslims have some problems adjusting to a society that has traditionally prided itself on "rugby, racing and beer"' Betting and gambling is not sanctioned by the sharia (Islamic law), and New Zealand's 'drinking culture' is equally anathema to this religion. Just as beer and racing are clearly in conflict with Muslim moral values, there are also other difficulties with popular culture for Muslims. Few Muslims relate to rugby; other sports such as cricket and soccer are popular in Muslim countries. An occasionally skimpy dress sense of the young generation and the abundance of sex and violence in movies and on television require careful parental guidance in Muslim families. As is true elsewhere, Islamic clothing, and particularly women's clothing, has been an issue. Children and young people show conflicting responses to the various cultural pressures they are exposed to. It has been observed that some Muslim girls have to be pressured to put on the hijab and take it off as soon as they are outside their parents' control; others insist on wearing it, perhaps even contrary to their parents' wishes. Generalisations are difficult. Many, but not all, Muslim women wear distinctively Islamic garb, or at least a headscarf in public, and more do so now than in the past. Reasons given include greater cultural confidence arising from the increased size of the Muslim community and the arrival of people from more conservative areas. One might add to that a strengthening Muslim identity and increased pride in being Muslim-both globally observed phenomena. One woman remarked to my research assistant that she found the dress sense here distasteful and she considers herself superior and more civilised than the 'half-naked savages'. That thought steels her against the stares, not always friendly, from people in the streets and in the supermarket. There will be more on sartorial issues later. I remember once seeing a woman dressed in a black burqa, 18 leaving only a narrow slit for her eyes, at Auckland's domestic airport. While in front of the woman, as she was bestriding the departure hall, and within range of her visibility people tried to politely ignore her appearance, behind her there was

Shepard, ibid.; 13. Shepard, ibid.; 14. 18 The burqa is a tent-like covering from head to ankle that leaves only a narrow slit for the eyes. 16

17

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CHAPTER TWO

a noticeable commotion as people stopped in their tracks and stared after her. I was reminded of a boat calmly plying the waters, but leaving a sizeable wave in its wake. Muslims suffer occasional discrimination and even verbal and physical attacks. Somalis, conspicuous on account of their physique as well as their clothing, have suffered harassment in particular; but others have also fallen victim to 'racism'. Often the reasons are not religious, but have to do with racial prejudice and a diffuse xenophobia that is directed in equal measure towards Asians. Police are usually sympathetic to complaints, and so is the Human Rights Commission, while Muslim organisations handle such cases in a very low-key manner, obviously aware that fanfare in this matter may be counter-productive. While occasionally there may be resistance to the erection of characteristic Middle Eastern architecture, on the whole, local Muslim communities struggle more with finances than building permits for mosques. At present there are six major mosques of more or less distinctive architecture, as well as a number of smaller or architecturally less conspicuous structures. Vandalism against mosques can also be a problem, with frequency rising steeply at times when attacks by Muslim extremists happen overseas. An arson attack in 1998 against the mosque in Hamilton was-so far at least-an isolated incident in its severity. It had the effect of pulling together various religious groups and others, including the City Council, to come to the aid of the local Muslim community. The incident showed New Zealand at both its worst and its best in this respect. Graffiti and smashed windows, unfortunately, are a more frequent occurrence. But using the mosque grounds in Dunedin-conveniently placed in the student quarter-as a toilet has more to do with an irreverent and inebriated student culture rather than hostility. Muslim Representation

Muslims are, to some extent, represented at the parliamentary level. Yet, there are problems with that and most Muslims will dispute that their interests are in fact faithfully represented. The more polite ones will have faint praise for this representation to hide their disappointment; the less polite will condemn it as falsehood. The cause is a disagreement about moral issues in which a general Islamic perspective deviates too strongly to be hidden from the government's otherwise multicultural policy direction.

COMMUNITY, IDENTITY, DIVERSITY

29

The Pakistan-born university academic Dr. Ashraf Chaudhary assumed a political career when he entered parliament as a Labour list MP (Nr. 40) in 2002. 19 It was assumed, in particular by New Zealand's Muslims, that his role would be to represent the Muslim point of view. It is unclear whether he himself or his party had the same perception. In any case he is reported as having said: 'I'm not here [in parliament] because I am a Muslim-I'm here on my own merit. I just happen to be a Muslim'. 20 While there might have been confusion in the Muslim community about his original presence in parliament, he has clearly distanced himself from his originally ascribed role as representative of Muslim interests. The reason for the mutual disenchantment lies in his voting in favour of legislation that enshrines in law what Muslims regard as morally reprehensible phenomena. He incurred heavy criticism from his Muslim 'constituents' when, through his absence, his proxy vote became the casting vote for the passage of the Prostitution Law Reform Bill (now Act). With some leniency, it could have been interpreted as simply an oversight on Chaudhary's part. However, after he cast his vote in favour of the Civil Union Bill (also now an Act which in effect permits same-sex marriage) it became clear to Muslims that there was method to his actions. While in the first case he defended himself with the argument that his pro-vote was accidental, when he voted again for another sexualliberalisation bill he admitted that his rationale was deliberate and he intended to methodically vote for minority interests out of a sense of solidarity. His press statement of 1 December 2004 states: 'if the law allows one minority group in our society to be discriminated against then all minorities are vulnerable'. Quite plausibly, he argues that favouring minority interests in the wider perspective is beneficial to Muslims who also constitute a minority in New Zealand society espousing non-mainstream lifestyle interests. Following his exposure to heavy criticism from Muslims, he now sees himself as generally representing and looking after the 'ethnic' vote. This has left a majority of New Zealand Muslims feeling that they have no voice in parliament.

19 This coincided with a legislative period in which Labour formed a minority government. In November 2008 Labour became the leading party of the opposition. 20 The New Zealand Listener, 23 November 2002: 26-27; 27.

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In an interview I had with him in his chambers in parliament, where he received me in a friendly manner, he became visibly irritated when confronted with Muslim criticism and their disappointment with him, which I had quite unequivocally gleaned from my contacts. His reaction indicated that he was deeply affected by this rejection, which he considered not only unfair, but contrary to the best interests of Muslims. A committed Muslim who takes the Quran seriously, but obviously no religious hardliner, he experiences firsthand the collision between actively engaging with Western politics and remaining faithful to Islamic moral conservatism. Seeing himself as a realist, he prefers to pursue a pragmatic strategy rather than a narrow interpretation of Islamic principles. However, at this stage it is too soon to interpret this as symptomatic of the gradual rise of a New Zealand form of Islam. How a reconciliation between conservative Islamic morality and ethical-political reality in many Western countries will be brought about remains very uncertain-all the more so as many observers have noticed a process of Islamic 'remoralisation' among Western Muslims. 21 In other respects, Muslims are well organised and in more recent years have managed to have their voice heard in the highest political circles. Muslims have formed several regional and local organisations, of which most are associated with one national umbrella organisation, the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ henceforth). In addition there are several Islamic trusts and Islamic centres in all major cities, some with a mosque attached, as well as student and youth organisations and two schools (Al-Madina(h) and Zayed College for girls)/ 2 which are loosely affiliated to FIANZ. Seven regional organisations and several trusts are also affiliated with FIANZ, while a few Muslim organisations have not sought affiliation. Auckland alone has about 15 centres, trusts, and mosques. Most Islamic centres run courses in religious and language subjects, maintain library facilities, and hold regular meetings. Since the 1990s there has been a national Islamic periodical, al-Mujaddid, as well as several local newsletters and pamphlets that seek to increase the flow of communication and information within the Muslim community. The Muslim community

21 See, for example, Jocelyne Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet (New York: Palgrave, 2004); 143. 22 Al-Madina(h) school was established in 1990, Zayed College in 2000. Both ran into difficulties with education authorities over their curriculum.

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gives the outward impression of having built a complex and well oiled machinery to maintain internal communication, interest representation, and lay the foundation for an expansionist dynamic. Despite the absence of a centralised hierarchy similar to the Catholic Church and proportionate to the number of its adherents, Islam is organisationally well integrated and effective in New Zealand society. The various Islamic organisations not only cater to Muslims' spiritual needs, but attempt to instil communality and a common identity by embracing them in a sinuous, braided bond of information flow and religious activities. FIANZ was founded in 1979 under the presidency of an Albanian, Haji Krasniqi. Its orientation since has been benevolently liberal, open to adaptation to New Zealand conditions, more or less relaxed, and mainly South Asian. As far as its characteristics go, FIANZ leadership has been described to me as a conservative businessmen's club of relaxed Muslims, well integrated in New Zealand society and benignly sexist. Not surprisingly, this image does not sit well with the stricter kind of Islam that has been introduced more recently by immigrants from Arab countries and Africa. There also seems to be some differences with the affiliated Ulama Council, a shura board of people with theological degrees, some of whom have a somewhat more conservative view of Islam. Not surprisingly, at times power struggles arise over assets, sectarian differences, and representational matters between FIANZ leadership and local communities. Challenging the leadership role of the FIANZ administration, as sometimes happens, clearly conveys a picture of an underlying theological controversy between liberal, adaptation-ready Islam and a sterner Wahhabi-influenced orientation. This, however, does not mean that extremist leanings sneak in under the guise of this ideological-sectarian 'brand'. Despite the relatively large number of organisations, they do not appear to cover the vast majority of Muslims. According to some Muslims, 50 percent or more of Muslims are not members of either FIANZ or regional associations. They may come to the mosque for salat al-jummah (the important Friday midday prayer), but have no interest in the functioning of any organisation. Therefore, mosque attendance, which may at times be spectacular, is no direct indication of membership in any of these organisations. Some Muslims strictly reject FIANZ in particular, but in some cases also regional associations, as too laissez-faire and concessionary, jeopardising the purity of faith. Others are simply not interested in paying membership fees or being represented by an organisation.

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The oldest local association is the New Zealand Muslim Association (NZMA), which was established in 1950 in Auckland. Initially, its membership consisted of the few Gujarati families present at the time, joined shortly thereafter by a few families coming from Turkey and the Balkans. Fiji Indians and others joined in the 1960s. By the mid-1970s three other Muslim groups had also been formed in Auckland. The Anjuman Himayat al-Islam was a mainly Fiji Indian group. The New Zealand Council of the World Muslim Congress was led by an Albanian businessman. Another early organisation was a 'Sufi' group, which was only partly Islamic in orientation and recruited its membership mainly from non-Muslim New Zealanders.23 The multitude of organisations in a relatively small national community seemed confusing and a visiting delegation from Saudi Arabia in 1976 advised them to unite. As a result, the Anjuman and the New Zealand Muslim Association (NZMA) did unite that year and started to collect funds to build a mosque. The structure was raised in stages over several years, apparently as funds came to hand, but the main prayer hall was completed in 1982. 24 The Ponsonby Mosque is revered as the oldest in New Zealand. Beginning as an offshoot of the NZMA in the early 1980s, the South Auckland Muslim Association (SAMA) became a separate association in 1989. Several other centres have been established since the late 1980s. The Mount Roskill Islamic Centre (Masjid Umar) is run by an Islamic trust, formed in 1992, independently of the other associations and of FIANZ. It appears to attract the largest congregation for Friday jummah. There are a number of other Muslim communities and organisations in the North Island: the Waikato-Bay of Plenty Muslim Association, which built a mosque in 1997; the Muslim community of Palmerston North and the Manawatu Muslim Association, which has its activities in a mosque on the campus of Massey University. In addition there are small, incipient associations in Tauranga, Wanganui, Nelson, Blenheim, and other towns. One of the largest and most influential associations is the International Muslim Association of New

23 See Art Buehler, 'Modes of Sufi Transmission to New Zealand', in 'Muslims in New Zealand', ed. E. Kolig, special issue, New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 8, no. 2 (2006): 97-109. 24 According to Drury, Islam in New Zealand; 34. Other sources give different dates.

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Zealand (IMAN), which was established in Wellington in 1966. Initially, it was established mostly for visiting university students, but this is no longer the case. The centre and mosque house the hub of Islamic activity in the capital, including the spiritual leadership, which at the moment is probably the most respected in New Zealand. In the South Island, somewhat more significant Muslim communities exist in Christchurch and Dunedin. The Canterbury Muslim Association (MAC) was established in Christchurch in 1977 and, though a relatively small group, was able to build a mosque, named Al-Noor, in 1985. In recent years, for a while, it was seriously disrupted by internal wrangling over the management of the mosque and centre. In Dunedin, the Otago Muslim Association (OMA) was incorporated more recently, in 1995. Independently of it, there is also a students' association at the University of Otago (MUSA), which predates OMA. Both work closely together, though under different leadership, and both groups are served by a mosque, Masjid al-Huda, near the university campus. Most of these centres and associations also run a programme of Quran classes (tafsir), sports events, youth and family camps, Arabic language courses, and other social activities (for instance, for Ramadan (the fasting month) and eids (Islamic festivals)). Some have evening schools with madrasa-type instructions, inspired by the concern to pass the faith on intact to the next generations. This concern has also led to the establishment of Islamic schools offering a mainstream education in addition to a thorough grounding in religion. The regular public school curriculum, befitting a secularised education system, provides neither an Islamic education nor is it congenial to conservative Islamic social expectations. Not surprisingly, many Muslims want a Muslim day school that will provide for their intellectual as well as spiritual needs and respect Muslim social conventions. For that purpose, backed by the Islamic Education and Dawa Trust, Al-Madinah School was established in 1990 in Auckland and became a government supported 'integrated' school in 1996. However, government funding brings not only a measure of financial security, but also a goodly dose of government control. Several times education authorities have been highly critical of the running of the school and its curriculum. Too much time, it was said, was spent on prayer and not enough on a modern information-based and scientifically informed education. Another school, Auckland Muslim School for younger students operated for a

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short period of time, but soon closed, owing to financial problems. A girls' school, Zayed College for Girls, opened in 2000 in Auckland, but has also run into difficulties with education authorities over its heavy emphasis on religious matters in its curriculum. The larger Islamic centres usually have full-time imams, most of them foreign trained. Imams, intrinsically spiritual advisors and ritual leaders, also generally serve in the capacity as Islamic educators. Critical voices both within and without Muslimhood have pointed out that none are deeply rooted in New Zealand culture and are unqualified by their upbringing and training to mediate between two cultures when the need arises. Without exception, they have been 'imported' from overseas and usually, at least initially, have a limited grasp of Western cultural requirements. Some may even have little desire to mediate and compromise culturally, and instead insist on strict orthodoxy and orthopraxy. Some organisations and centres also organise the supply of halal meats. This was particularly important in previous years, but much less so today as halal-processed meat is now often offered in supermarkets. In recent years, many of the associations, as well as the national federation, have adopted a shura (consultation) type system of decision-making, in some cases abandoning the previously used Western mechanisms. It is considered more in tune with the Islamic ideal of relying on consensus (ijma); a consensus that is guided by strong and respected leadership. Western ways of democratic decision-making through balloting and majority determination are not considered appropriate. They are seen as generating divisions and antagonism, while persuasion and negotiation are not only considered less divisive, but also more in tune with the Islamic spirit. However, practical reality shows that this cannot always be relied upon. Befitting the Islamic gender division, women do not fully participate in the official affairs of the organisations. This does not mean that women are excluded from decision-making, but their role is more subdued and is conducted along lines parallel, but not integrated with men. The National Islamic Women's Council is affiliated with FIANZ, but is only thinly represented on the leadership board. At least from an outsider's viewpoint, here the Islamic notion that allocates less of a managerial and leading role to women seems to get in the way of complete gender integration.

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Organisational Functions and Aims

Although FIANZ was created independently, it is in one sense the sum total of regional associations, insofar as these are its constituent parts. Under its present structure, the local associations select representatives to its council and this in turn chooses the officers and executive committee. However, FIANZ's official policy and some decisions can at times deviate substantially from the wishes of constituent organisations. Nationally and on an organisational level, FIANZ represents the most important arm of Muslimhood in New Zealand. Fundamentally, it has a three-pronged function: managing intra-Muslim national affairs, organising relationships between national Muslimhood and Muslims abroad, and providing at times an interface between the wider society and the national Muslim community. Among FIANZ's diverse missions is to remedy and mitigate cultural dissonance between the common Islamic orientation of FIANZ and its realistic assessment of the Muslim position in New Zealand society, and to moderate possible individual cultural conservatism of new immigrants. If there is a buffer zone between the wider society and its culture and Muslims, mediating and mitigating in a cultural sense and channelling the effects of multiculturalism, then it is occupied by this federative association. Equally important in the functional repertory of FIANZ is its task of organising and supervising inter-Muslim relationships, both nationally and internationally. That is to say, it represents New Zealand's Muslims vis-a-vis the world, a function some Muslims and organisations consider an unjustified arrogation. Whether by self-appointment or not, in this capacity it organises contacts with Muslims and Islamic organisations abroad, invites speakers on lecture tours for the edification of the Muslim community, solicits donations for overseas communities, and organises representation abroad. Another major ingredient in FIANZ's manifold purposes is the spiritual task of encouraging Muslims to adhere to Islam: but what Islam? This is not only a problem for FIANZ and its Ulama Board,25 but

25 Ulama is the Arabic term for Islamic scholars or jurist-scholars as they are often referred to in recognition of the fact that Islam is intrinsically a system of canonical law.

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more broadly concerns all Muslim leadership. Unification of Muslims on a national and international level is one of the most challenging tasks of Islam in a globalised world. Islam is deeply divided between moderates and radicals, conservatives and modernists, secularised and devout, split along sectarian and doctrinal and many other dividing lines. Uniting New Zealand's Muslims under one umbrella of common worship and maintaining a strong link with global Muslimhood is an impossible task, given the profound divisions, of which more will be said later. Increasingly, as the Muslim population in the country grows, a trend appears of Islam threatening to drift further apart as it replicates the rifts in the global umma. Geographic distance from the traditional realm of the Islamic world no longer works as a uniting factor. It creates the challenge to counter this trend, at least nominally, by uniting Muslims under a vaguely common rubric and through a superficial acceptance of basic doctrine. Achieving this in the Western diaspora, which brings together Muslims from all corners of the Islamic world, is not easy. An Islamic melting-pot situation produced by large-scale migration to the West and globalisation in general has produced pressures for unification-especially as the vast majority of Muslims appear to wish to remain religiously distinct from majority society. Researchers have recognised certain embryonic developments and trends towards the creation of nationally distinctive forms oflslam in Europe. In New Zealand, for the moment, this momentum does not work very well, despite the best efforts of FIANZ. Important as this challenge to unite may be on a national level, it is however only obliquely referred to in the organisation's mission statement. Its objectives are currently described in the following terms: 26 * To establish and maintain the highest standard of Islamic practice in accordance with the teaching of the Holy Quran and Sunna. * To undertake dawah (proselytising), education, welfare and other Islamic activities. * To strengthen Islamic unity and assist in the development of the Muslim community of New Zealand. * To establish and foster good relationships with Muslim countries and international Muslim organisations.

Among the various other tasks are such functions as assisting local associations in fund raising and undertaking 'trouble-shooting' when

26

Taken, and lightly edited, from the website www.fianz.co.nz.

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disputes arise. However, the difficulties arising in the Christchurch community over management of the mosque's financial affairs demonstrated the limits of such interventions. FIANZ was told in no uncertain terms to mind its own business. The absence of statutory powers and the independence-mindedness of local associations limit the prospects of success severely. A less controversial task is to organise annual Quran recitation competitions for children. FIANZ also sees it as its role to determine the important dates of eids and Ramadan. But in these matters there is not universal acceptance of FIANZ's authority. It distributes books, videos, and other literature both to Muslims and to non-Muslims, issues press releases to convey a Muslim point of view to the wider society and otherwise seeks to publicise Muslim concerns and positions both in national and international affairs. It keeps its distance, however, from political party issues, other than encouraging Muslims to exercise their democratic right to vote. In some religious matters in which there has been some diversity of opinion in the past, FIANZ's Ulama Board is charged with advising and recommending, but is not generally accepted to have the power of issuing fatawa (rulings). Even if it had the authority to deliver fatawa, they would not generally be recognised by all of New Zealand's Muslims. An important function of FIANZ is to deal with the media in matters that concern Islam per se or the Muslim community in particular. To broadcast Muslim concerns is not always a pleasant or, in the wider society, well respected enterprise. FIANZ protested vigorously against the screening of such films as Death of a Princess (in 1980)-in which case it was successful, but probably not by the strength of its political clout. Instead trade considerations may have been the determining factor. The Last Temptation of Christ was also a film of some concern. Protests were made about an article in the New Zealand Listener titled 'The Sword of Islam' in 1987. FIANZ initiated a defamation suit worth several million dollars, which was settled out of court. It also won the right of reply. Subsequently, a bid to gain an injunction against the screening of a television documentary with the same title was unsuccessful. The Federation also had considerable concerns over Salman Rushdie's book The Satanic Verses. 27 Not surprisingly, over the years several such cases occurred where FIANZ, on behalf of the

27

See Shepard, 'New Zealand's Muslims'; 28-9.

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whole Muslim community, expressed irritation and protest. Some of these controversies were conducted publicly through the media, others behind the scene through lobbying and negotiations. In some cases, FIANZ sought the withdrawal or suppression of offending content, in others, more low-key, it simply wished to make its sentiments known to the wider society. Probably the biggest ructions happened more recently in regards to the Danish cartoons affair. It will be looked at in more detail later. In this case, too, FIANZ took a leading role in representing the Muslim point of view. When such matters arise, the irritation expressed by FIANZ may be considerable, but the cause is not always a lack of sympathy for Islam. A certain degree of cultural insensitivity arising simply from ignorance on the part of the dominant society may be to blame. This does lead occasionally to gross offence without this being the intention. 28 The multiculturally appropriate response, which was usually employed in the past, was a willingness to withdraw such material, and/or when appropriate to apologise. Not only in inner-New Zealand concerns, but also in international matters of concern to Muslims collectively, FIANZ assumes the role of megaphone for this minority. In my estimation, it has been fairly accurate in gauging collective sentiments in international political matters. At various times it voiced opinions about the Palestinian issue, Palestinian-Israeli relationships, about Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Muslim views are disseminated through press releases and air time on radio and television, while at other times lobbying the government is preferred, with varying success. Other FIANZ functions, together with regional associations, relate to fundraising for various Muslim matters, but above all cater to library needs, mosque-building, and education programmes. While Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the more usual financial sources, support may also occasionally come from the Muslim World League, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, the Islamic Development Bank and the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of South East Asia and the Pacific. Support offered from al-Haramain, a global Islamic charity organisation, proved to be very controversial because of its alleged al-Qaeda links, and in the end was declined.

28 Two examples of inadvertently giving offence are given by Erich Kolig, 'An Accord of Cautious Distance: Muslims in New Zealand, Ethnic Relations and Image Management', New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 5 no. 1 (2003): 24-50; 35 and 37.

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Another aspect of FIANZ activities is the supervision of halal meat processing. It requires a procedure dictated by Islamic doctrine such as a certain directional orientation of the actual slaughter action (i.e. towards Mecca), a prayer component in various forms, as well as a degree of piety in the private life of the slaughterer himself. The heavy commercial emphasis on halal in New Zealand's meat industry is a relatively recent phenomenon. It was necessitated when the United Kingdom entered closer economic relations with continental Europe in the 1970s and New Zealand consequently was forced to find new markets urgently. Iran and other countries in the Middle East offered themselves under the proviso that the meat be processed under Islamic rules. The new slaughter method involved stunning of the animals-to allow extensive bleeding-rather than spontaneous killing. It invoked initial opposition by Christian farmers, which, however, was soon overruled by economic necessity. Today meat export to Muslim-majority countries, though not the biggest, is a vital part of the primary industry. Control in this trade, by way of certifying the ritual acceptability of the procedure, to some considerable extent is in the hands of New Zealand's Muslims. FIANZ, as well as another smaller certifying agency, handle most of it, although Iran has its separate arrangement. It is an important source of income for FIANZ. Presumably for that reason, it is occasionally the cause of disputes, although they are framed in religious terms. More of this will be considered later. A majority of meat processing plants use this method, often even for supply of the domestic market. Slaughterers have to be Muslim and for that reason in the past they were hired from overseas. Today there is a predominance of local slaughterers in the industry. Occasionally in the industry, Muslim ritual conservatism collides with modern industrial methods. Disputes arise over the difficulty of maintaining a steady throughput in this assembly-line work and meeting quota because of the impediment posed by the ritual obligations Muslim slaughterers have to observe. While industry management perceives Islamic etiquette as a problem, some Muslims express dissatisfaction with the hurried and sloppy ritualism work pressure seems to impose.

Outreach Programmes The world over, there are initiatives among Muslims to renew and re-invigorate their faith. While some of them clearly are designed to

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generate a fervour that easily leads to fanaticism and even extremism, others are emphatically peaceful in intent. Among the latter are initiatives termed dawa and tabligh, which are practised in New Zealand. Dawa refers in a more general sense to proselytisation, which may target Muslims as well as non-Muslims.lt operates more opportunistically and diffusely, as any attempt to gain converts, or to stimulate a stricter adherence to the doctrines of Islam terminologically is called dawa. Tabligh, originally an Indian invention, is aimed exclusively at Muslims and seeks to renew their commitment to Islam. Both programmes operate in New Zealand. In more or less regular intervals tablighi gatherings (ijtema) are held, some of them run by overseas visitors. The success rate in terms of stimulating devotion is debatable as the degree of commitment to Islam is not a measurable quantity. Thus whether this initiative is able to turn laissez-faire Muslims into dedicated ones in large numbers is a matter of speculation. A more reliable factor is the conversion rate among non-Muslim New Zealanders. However, in this aspect also on balance no firm view can be sustained, as the durability of conversion is very open-ended. Tabligh lessons, from hearsay, are pitched at a very basic level and, as some Muslims say, appeal more to the less-educated. Congregations are conducted by lay people-not professional imams or maulanas, who are theologically trained teachers-and many undertake this work, at their own expense, as a duty that is believed to invoke metaphysical rewards rather than for monetary gain. In fact it sometimes entails a degree of hardship, especially for overseas visitors, who are dependent on the charity of the communities they visit. In my experience, welleducated Arab Muslims are somewhat dismissive of tabligh for two reasons: they ascribe a specifically Indian-Islamic slant to it-which means to them it is lacking in Islamic purity-and because of the simplicity of the teaching, which is sometimes not even in Arabic, the language of God, but in Gujarati or Urdu. Dawa can take many forms in practical life. All organisations and local communities are involved in it in one form or another. Dawa, both in the sense of spreading the faith among non-Muslims and reminding other Muslims of their religious obligations, is considered a basic duty of every Muslim. The guiding principles for this duty are contained in the Quran (2/256)-there is no compulsion in religion'and (16/125)-'Invite (mankind) to the way of your Lord (i.e. Islam) with wisdom and fair preaching and argue with them in a way that is better'. Normally, explicit strategies such as door-knocking, loud pro-

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paganda, letter-dropping, etc. are shunned by Muslims in the West, probably being aware that this would be counter-productive. Strategies in Muslim-majority countries are somewhat different. The subdued kind of dawa practised by New Zealand Muslim organisations includes organising lectures by visiting Muslim preachers and teachers, running library services, and other education programmes. After the initial example of the Dunedin community,29 Islam Awareness weeks have been organised by some local communities, with radio programmes, newspaper articles, interviews, displays, movies, public forums, and interfaith activities. However, advertising Islam for the sake of making converts is a subsidiary aspect. Usually associated with universities, their intrinsic function is to assure the public of the peaceful character of Islam. World events, a tendency to portray Islam as a danger, and the perceived need for orchestrated image management have certainly been important motives in starting this tradition. If this activity should lead to conversion of some, it is considered an added bonus. Another aspect of dawa is a vigorous programme of inviting overseas preachers on lecture tours. This activity, however, has raised some controversy. Not only in New Zealand, but above all in other countries, suspicions have emerged that through this activity radical and extremist ideas are propagated and circulated in the umma, the Muslim community worldwide. Such accusations have been raised by branches of the press in New Zealand with questionable justification. Certainly some of the visiting preachers had radical credentials, but this does not automatically mean that they were spreading subversive ideas on their lecture tours. In my experience, some of them went to great pains in their public lectures to avoid controversial subjects or to air ideas that may be construed as a call to radicalism. Overall, to what extent such visits may support a tendency toward radicalisation of the Muslim community is open to debate. But it certainly has raised suspicion, despite FIANZ's repeated assurances that in inviting speakers it is not its intention to stir Muslims up.

29 The first Islam Awareness Week was held on the Otago University campus in Dunedin in 1999. It was a joint undertaking by OMA and MUSA, with the cooperation of the university administration.

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The Myth of Muslim Unity

Primarily because of the small size of the national Muslim community, there is more cohesion, at least in its outward appearance, at the organisational level than in other countries with larger Muslim minorities. This seemingly irenic situation, however, masks a multitude of internal rifts of which the public is normally unaware. With few exceptions, Muslims normally conduct disputes internally with official organisations having a self-interested proclivity to present a smooth facyade of unanimity to the outside. This coincides with the preconception of majority society, where there is a lazy tendency to lump all Muslims together, seeing them as one monolithic bloc. This is a misconception of which political and governmental circles are not exempt. The popular conception is simply that all Muslims not only share a religious label, but really do adhere together, show a great degree of internal solidarity, and are united by a strong sense of being fellow Muslims. This is only partly true, as Islam, despite a relative degree of unity in the very basic doctrinal matters, does not have the expected centripetal force. Practically, there are many different layers in a Muslim's religious self-awareness that interact and can cause surprising results, including strong antagonism towards other Muslims. This is certainly true for the division, generally not always appreciated in the West, between radical and moderate Muslims. Yet, beyond that fundamental cleavage created by different views on life 'among infidels', strong divisions also exist in several other respects. Unlike the situation in many other countries, the New Zealand Islamic associations and mosques are not differentiated along, or determined by, ethnic lines. Ethnic particularism does exist however and is mainly expressed in the formation of specific ethnic associations that operate independently of regional Islamic organisations and FIANZ. Ethnic awareness is clearly reflected in an array of nationally and ethnically based associations of Egyptian, Pakistani, Somali, Iranian, Bangladeshi, Indian, etc. provenance. So far, ethnic particularism has not led to open and public rifts as has happened elsewhere. Leaders do recognise the possibility that in the future, with more growth of the Muslim minority, the ethnic division may deepen and ethnically based mosques may appear, but this is deemed neither desirable nor completely unavoidable. Discontent does exist at a quasi ethnic level insofar as there is some resentment at the perceived predominance of South Asians at the

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highest organisational level, although this is far from universal and the leadership does make an effort to be ethnically inclusive. A more serious antagonism exists in another respect. In several places, there is an underlying rift between Muslims of South Asian-Indian origin and Arabic speaking Muslims, who may be ethnic Arabs or Arabic speaking Africans. Mutual recriminations concern the allegedly all-too relaxed Islam of Indians and vice versa, what is seen by its detractors as the all-too unbending strictness of Arabs, which usually carries overtones of 'extremism'. This has been responsible in Christchurch for the publicly conducted feud among the local community (to be discussed below). Sometimes, linguistic issues come into it too, insofar as South Asian Muslims generally have a better command of English and therefore are better placed to assume leadership roles, as well as being generally better placed in employment issues and thus gaining a slightly better socio-economic position. Arabs sometimes are found to console themselves with 'speaking God's language' and on this basis having a better grasp of the subtleties of the Quran. From this, some derive a sense of superiority that drives them to become prominent in mosque affairs. This points to an unwelcome difficulty. In part due to every organisation's mixed background, even within one and the same organisation there is hardly a degree of unanimity and conformity. Ethnic, cultural, and sectarian differences do clash at times, despite the best efforts of leadership. Disputes about assets, finance and management, relationship with the wider society, appointment of imams, even about the khutba (sermon) and what language it should be conducted in can escalate into open antagonism. Such a situation was described by a member of MAC as a burning building: 'exciting to watch from the outside, but very unpleasant when you are on the inside'. Linguistic divisions are important when it comes to the Friday sermon, the khutba, and whether it should be held in Arabic, even if the majority of congregants do not understand it, or whether it can be held in Urdu, Gujarati or English. Unsurprisingly, Arab speakers usually insist that only God's language should be used in spreading and considering the divine message. Such differences can also occur over which language should serve as the official one in conducting an organisation's business. Fissures along ethnic and linguistic lines are aggravated by fractures along sectarian and doctrinal differences, from the basic division between Sunni and Shi'a, to doctrinal differences between 'relaxed'

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Muslims and Wahhabi-influenced ones, to Sufis or Sufism-influenced Muslims, whose beliefs in faith-healing and charismatic phenomena are considered bida (heresy, unbelief) and superstition by others opposed to them. Another doctrinal division exists between Miladis, to whom the birthday of the Prophet (maulid) is a major celebration (mulid-al-nabi), and anti-Miladis, who hold fast to the concept that Islam sanctions only two festivities or eids-the eid al-adha and the eid al-fitr. 30 The rift between Miladis and anti-Miladis may at times be even more pronounced than ethnic differences, although both are intertwined insofar as the majority of Miladis tend to be South Asians and anti-Miladis tend to be predominantly Arabs. At least one local organisation has written Miladism into its constitution, effectively driving away anti-Miladis. FIANZ uncomfortably tries to mediate, but with little success. There are also more subtle doctrinal differences arising from the existence of four basic 'law schools' in Sunnism, the madhahib of Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafii; and two major Shi'i schools, Jafari and Zayidi. However, their potential to bring about antagonism is less apparent as it is subsumed in the ethnic situation and, of course, in the basic division between Sunni and Shi'i. There is a strong sense of solidarity among the often fractious organisations and groupings only when a threat is perceived to come from outside the Islamic religion. In the shifting sands of opportunistic allegiances, rings of solidarity radiate outward from a sectarian centre to Islam in general and to other monotheistic-or Abrahamicreligions in times of crisis. In order to stem the tide of secularisation and atheism, a temporary inclusiveness may even be forged with non-monotheistic religions. All of this amounts to a total falsehood in the common perception by outsiders that Muslims form one cohesive, integrated bloc, which, like a fortress, is defending itself against intrusions by the infidels. An especially deep rift exists between the Sunni, who form the vast majority, and Shi'i (or Shi'ites). Sunni tend to perceive Shi'a as a seriously flawed heresy (bida), which for some is even worse than belonging to another religion altogether. The latter are mainly Iranian expatriates and more recently Shi'i Afghans. These are usually of the

30

The first commemorates Abraham's sacrifice and coincides with the end of the

haj; the second celebrates the end of Ramadan.

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Hazara minority, traditionally a little respected minority of Mongolian origin. In Afghanistan they traditionally suffer from the stigma of belonging to the despised Shi'a and through their Mongoloid appearance are usually identifiable as Hazara. Especially under the fanatical Sunni Taleban they have suffered heavily. Shi'i in general are rarely welcome in Sunni mosques in New Zealand and if so they have restrictions imposed on their worship by the mosque leadership. Many Shi'i have a tendency to consider themselves musefer, travellers, i.e. nonautochthonous, non-rooted persons in a transitory state. This selfdefinition allows them to take shortcuts in their worship by shortening or combining prayers, skipping salat al-jummah or avoiding going to the mosque altogether. Anecdotally, it may be said that some practise taqiya, dissimulation, vis-a-vis Sunni, i.e. downplaying their religious identity or even denying it. 31 In New Zealand, official multiculturalism is their best protection, more effective than the scant tolerance they enjoy in some Sunni-majority countries. In Auckland, a Shi'a institute, the Imam Ali lnstitute32 in Epsom, was formed ostensibly to cater to the spiritual needs of Shi'i. Another sect, the Ahmadis (adherents of Ahmadiya), who, as rumour has it, are also represented here, do not enjoy recognition as Muslim at all, although for the rest of the world they are. lsmaelis and Druze, if there are any in New Zealand, would also face difficulties in being recognised as fellow Muslims. Another interesting division occurs at times when supporters of different regimes or people fleeing from different regimes in one country meet each other in the diaspora. Iranians fleeing the Shah's dictatorialsecularised regime may meet refugees from the present ayatollah-run theocracy. Afghans living in New Zealand may have fled the Russian invasion of their country, or the Taleban regime, or even the current upheavals. Iraqis may have been driven away by Saddam Hussein's brutal regime, while newer arrivals flee the current post-Saddam mayhem. Similarly, the immigration of previous European Muslims from the Balkans may have been motivated by escape from communism, while more recent immigrants tried to flee the genocidal antics of other

31 Taqiya is a specifically Shi'a concept, traditionally developed to allow them to survive Sunni persecution in places where they formed a minority. 32 It also appears to be registered as a mosque (Imam Ali Mosque) and a charitable trust

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religionists. Such conflicting reasons for migrating have, however, not led to any antagonism that would be noticeable in the wider society. As indicated above, such divisions are counter-balanced by another development. An emphatically Islamic identity and defensive attitudes seem to be on the rise among Muslims in the West in general. The worldwide 'resurgence' of Islam undoubtedly has contributed to this. It has been noted by several researchers that in the second generation of Muslim immigrants an Islamic identity is stronger, and held with greater conviction, than in the actual migrant, parental generation. In diaspora conditions, as has been observed worldwide, 'Muslim' becomes a deliberately chosen identity of major importance where it may have been of subsidiary use in the home country. (In this self-identification, 'Muslims' meet the classification of the host society although the category 'Muslim' has different meanings for the two sides.) Second and third generation immigrants choose an identity that is different from their parents' and the host society's. It follows that an important social indicator appears in the form of maintenance of strong identity boundary markers, setting one group off against another. Thus an ethnic identity is successively eroded over time and replaced by a more inclusive sense of Muslimness (at least among Sunnis, while Iranian Shi'i retain a strong national sense as it is bound up largely with their religious identity). In tandem with a tendency to downgrade ethnic origin vis-a-vis a generic Muslim identity, on a theological level a development towards re-interpretation of Islam so as to shed culture-specific baggage and make doctrines more universal becomes noticeable in the West generally. Olivier Roy3 3 has called this process the Protestantisation of Islam, characterised by an increasing abstraction and de-emphasis on culture-specific ritualism. This occurs together with a shift in the meaning of 'Islam'. Normative diasporic Islam becomes more scriptural, purged of culture-specific accretions, de-ethnicised and de-territorialised. One could call it a new form of fundamentalism based on the internationalisation of Islam by ridding it of the cultural baggage that stands in the way of universal acceptance.

33 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

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A second generation Muslim immigrant identity, therefore, is very strongly, though not exclusively, based on religious considerations rather than on geographic, ethnic, or linguistic criteria.l~ The valorisation of Islam, however, necessitates a rethinking of its dogmatic principles to develop a truly shared identity based on a New Zealand brand of Islam. 35 National !slams seem to be appearing in diasporic conditions while some leaders propound a supra-national form of Islam. For instance, Tariq Ramadan 36 argues for the development of a European Islam, based on a process of essentialisation that emphasises basic abstract principles teased from the faith, which can then be shaped and modified in details to suit Western, or specifically European conditions. Whatever the purpose of essentialisation will be, in this process the traditional concept of ijtihad (interpretation)3 7 will play an important role, as this exegetical method allows some flexibility in the understanding of dogma. The dynamic between essentialisation of Islam, adaptation to Western conditions and the refusal to do so will also transform the face of Islam in the West, while at the same time dividing Muslims along the lines of those ready to compromise and those refusing concessions.38 The latter are represented by the prophetic words of the British Islamic leader Zaki Badawi. His words are characteristic of an attitude of compromise and adjustment, yet combined with the attempt to purify Islam of ethnic, culture-specific accretions:

34 F. Husain and M. O'Brien, 'Muslim Communities in Europe: Reconstruction and Transformation', Current Sociology 48, no. 4 (2000): 1-14; 4. 35 In Europe researchers believe they have noticed tendencies to develop national !slams: E. Bartels, '"Dutch Islam": Young People, Learning and Integration', Current Sociology 48, no. 4 (2000): 59-74. Saphinaz-Amal Naguib, 'The Northern Way: Muslim Communities in Norway', in Muslim Minorities in the West: Visible and Invisible, ed Y. Haddad and J. Smith, (Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press, 2002): 161-174; 168-169. Johannes Jansen, 'Islam and Muslim Civil Rights in the Netherlands', in Muslims in Europe, ed. B. Lewis and D. Schnapper (London, New York: Pinter, 1994):

39-53; 51. 36 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 37 Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1982); 8. 38 See Erich Kolig, 'Interfacing with the West: Muslims, Multiculturalism and Radicalism in New Zealand', New Zealand Sociology 21, no. 2 (2006): 215-46. Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), predicts that Europe will become the ideological battleground between modernism and fundamentalism.

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Our adjusbnent is inevitable. The first sacrifice we shall make is parts of the individual cultures within the faith-Nigerians, Egyptians, Pakistanis all carrying bits of their culture around their necks like a dead weight. slowing down progress. That will be shed, allowing a return to the basics of our religion ... The position of women will become different. more liberalized. We shall lose our suspicion of science and technology, fears which hold back so many Muslim nations. We shall acquire the idea of democracy, the clever balance of responsibility and freedom. 39 These words echo the necessity to adjust Islam to new conditions. But equally strongly, there is the felt need to renew the faith by purging ethnic and culture-specific components, eliminating regional cultural traditions with which Islam has become saturated and which prevent a unified worship and strong common identity. To the extent that this identity is one that emphasises exclusiveness, Islamic orthopraxis may become a convenient instrument of self-other distinction:~ 0 Neofundamentalism may in fact stress life as a kind of ritual, the sacralisation of daily life and emulating the Prophet's example. However, the self-other distinction must be kept within bounds and be balanced by a perceived need to stress inclusiveness and some degree of adaptation to the host society, or at least an image must be created which to the outside presents an Islam of a kind that fits into the fabric of the host country. Success in this campaign hinges on the discouragement, if not suppression, of 'unreasonable' traditions and above all the denial of a fanatical brand of Islam or its 'radical fundamentalisation'. Eastern European Muslims, who have a slight advantage in diaspora conditions in the West, seem to stand apart from this development. This would indicate a certain degree of opposition from younger Muslim generations whose parents or grandparent migrated to the West towards their host society; caused possibly by the fact that they find the host national identity is not available to them. It may also point to the cultural difference being more important than a religious division. Perceived discrimination and prejudice may be responsible for that.

39 John Wol:tfe, 'Fragmented Universality: Islam and Muslims', in The Growth of Religious Diversity, ed. G. Parsons (London: Routledge/Open University, 1993): 133172; 164. See also Steven Vertovec and Ceri Peach, 'Introduction', in Islam in Europe: The Politics of Religion and Community, ed. S.Vertovec and C. Peach (Houndmills:

Macmillan. 1997): 3-47; 39-41. 4° Cf. Christiane Timmerman, 'The Revival of Tradition. Consequence of Modernity: The Case of Young Turkish Women in Belgium', Folk 42 (2000): 83-100; 89.

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This could lead to an undesirable, exaggerated sense of a continued diaspora beyond the actual migrant generation. A new modus of being Muslim, based on an understanding of a revised form of Islam, can be expected to emerge. But it remains to be seen to what extent a modern Muslim identity will draw on, and emphasise, boundary markers that set it apart from a New Zealand identity4 1 or to what extent such boundaries will be de-emphasised to move closer to a self-awareness of being New Zealanders. It will be interesting to see when, if ever, a New Zealander who prays five times a day towards Mecca will no longer be considered an anomaly. However, future Muslimness will not define itself in relation to a New Zealand identity as it exists now. At this time, Muslims by and large consider it too exclusivist and too much bound still to an Anglo-Celtic and Maori ethno-cultural awareness. However, younger generations of Muslims seem more inclined to accept a hyphenated identity.42 1his too is subject to flux and changes in self-definition, which in turn is likely to draw on new cultural images, codes, and values. If, as predicted, a Maori-Pacific component should either become more accentuated or even dominant by 2050 or earlier, the formation of diasporic Muslimness will define itself in relation to salient features of that majority society and its culture. If that culture, for example, incorporates more conservative Christian values, and adopts more exclusionary features, the parameters of Muslim self-definition will also change drastically and lead to a much sharper delineation than appears to be indicated at the moment. Living among Infidels

Today's cultural and religious differences, often exacerbated by political reasons, may mask the common human desire to make a better life. Pragmatism, following a common trope of humanity, certainly pervades the early period of Muslim immigration. A majority of early immigrants came mainly for the economic opportunities held out by

41

See Erich Kolig, 'Freedom, Identity Construction and Cultural Closure', in Pub-

lic Policy and Ethnicity, ed. E. Rata and R. Openshaw (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006): 25-39. 42 For a useful discussion on this topic see Adis Duderija, 'Literature Review: Identity Construction in the Context of Being a Minority Immigrant Religion', Immigrants and Minorities 25, no. 2 (2007): 141-162.

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this British colony. This is true also for Muslims. At first, Chinese miners, Indian small traders, the odd sailor jumping ship; then Lebanese, though mostly Christian, Muslims from the Balkans, and Fiji Indians came to gain better quality of life. Their motivation was first and foremost to improve their material circumstances. Later, flight from war and political upheaval became a major motivation for migration to New Zealand. Even when Arabs, especially Palestinians, came in more recent years the economic factor was still important. Mainly living in countries in the Middle East, the major motivational factor was the belief that a better life was to be had here. Also, educational prospects, for themselves or their children, beckoned. The motivations were somewhat different for refugees such as Iraqis, Afghans, and Somalis, who clearly had safety concerns foremost in mind. As Shepard43 remarks, Muslims are not deeply rooted in New Zealand. The comment leaves it unclear whether their shallow-rootedness refers to their residential mobility and their transnationalism, the emotional attachment Muslims have en bloc to the society and country, or their relatively late emergence as a sizeable community in which recent immigrants form the majority. In any case, it is an interesting observation that requires further elaboration to link it with the global myth of the transnational Islamic community. There is a universalist orientation in being Muslim, and therefore by definition a member of the global umma, the community of believers.44 It is an imagined community a la Benedict Anderson, its cohesiveness formed by ideological skeins, which tend to be activated only in crisis situations when external threats arise. However, when perceived from a non-Muslim and nationalistically inspired perspective, the existence of such ideological bonds raises questions of loyalty and solidarity. The internationalism of Muslimhood finds its expression in a wide spectrum of observable action. At one end is the diffuse sense of brother- and sisterhood common among Muslims, while another striking feature is the existence of political associations of Muslim or 43 William Shepard, 'Muslims in New Zealand', in Muslim Minorities in the West: Visible and Invisible, ed. Y. Haddad and J. Smith (Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press,

2002): 233-254; 248. 44 See for instance Sami Zubaida, 'Islam in Europe', Critical Quarterly 45, no. 1-2 (2003): 88-98; and 'Islam and Nationalism: Continuities and Contradictions', Nations and Nationalism 10, no. 4 (2004): 407-20. Ralph Grillo, 'Islam and Transnationalism', Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30, no. 5 (2004): 861-78.

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Muslim-majority countries, which have no equivalent in the Christian or Buddhist world. Built on a vague sense of solidarity, such bonds lie dormant for the most part, undetectable, but spring into action when mutual support of some sort is called for. This is clearly demonstrated in the lobbying and demonstrations and other public utterances organised by New Zealand's Muslim organisations in matters concerning other Muslim countries or Muslims in other countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, etc. On the radical end of the spectrum we may find political aspirations culminating in the attempt to create a worldwide caliphate (khilafa) that unites all Muslims in one political-ideological entity and draws on that underlying sense of commonality. (This is meant to correspond with the historical khilafa that in previous centuries encompassed much of the 'known world' and was poised to aggressively expand even further. It came to a crushing end with the conclusion of World War I and the truncation of Ottoman Turkey.) While this may appear to be no more than a pipedream, there is evidence that some extremist action may be inspired by it. While possibly some New Zealand Muslims may harbour very private dreams of the resurrection of a caliphate, no such aspirations have ever entered the public domain. The vast majority of New Zealand Muslims live here by choice or preference. Some may see their presence as of an interim nature, either en route to a more prosperous country with better economic prospects or in the hope of eventually returning to their home country. Many are well integrated and see little problem in their existence among a vast majority of non-Muslims. Few seem to conceive of their existence in New Zealand in terms of a crisis that can be resolved only by physical relocation. Attitudes offeeling victimised as a minority of believers in an overwhelming majority of religious others appear to be exceedingly rare. However, seen in a different light, their existence in this country, from their point of view, may appear problematic. Devout Muslims for whom living in an infidel society is an issue of disquiet theoretically may face a theological dilemma. The sizeable Muslim diaspora in the West is certainly a new phenomenon. Ignoring the minority status Muslims had in some Southeast and East European states (former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Poland, Finland, and Russia), Muslims being a relatively small-yet conspicuous-immigrant group in the West is a new phenomenon. However, historically seen, it is not an entirely new situation for Muslims to

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reside as a minority in a non-Muslim majority country as they now do in increasing numbers in Western societies.45 In India and China of course Muslims are not immigrants, but part of the indigenous population; and in Pakistan, where many are immigrants, they are not in a minority. But, overall, Muslims have rarely been under direct non-Muslim rule. This opens up questions of 'infidel' governance and its legitimacy. Islam is problematic when a situation arises in which Muslims are subject to 'infidel' rule. While some Islamic jurists have claimed that 'a just infidel is preferable to an unjust Muslim ruler', others assert that 'even the worst Muslim is preferable to the best of infidels'. 46 This points to the highly contested nature of the legal, moral, and philosophical condition when Muslims form minority enclaves under non-Muslim rule. An historical precedence of sorts is provided by the dhimma-system by which tolerated minorities of monotheists (dhimmi) were embedded in a majority-Muslim context under guarantees of religious freedom. Although possessing limited selfgovernance, they were not granted equal rights as Muslims and had to accept certain restrictions and social disadvantages.47 It is doubtful that Muslims living in the West now would be satisfied with a reversed dhimmi status. Nor is it conceivable that modern democracies would want to foist such a position on them, even if it were not in breach of global and national human rights conventions and laws. The idea of a second-class citizen status for any minority would be simply preposterous to countenance under a regime of liberal, democratic multiculturalism-nor would New Zealand Muslims embrace it. Some of them may complain about unfair treatment in individual cases and some may not avail themselves of the democratic right to vote (whether for 45 Muslims in India and in the Balkans, for instance, or earlier on in Abyssinia during the Prophet's time and for some time in Spain. Cragg (Kenneth Cragg, 'The Finality of the Qur'an and the Contemporary Politics of Nations', in Islam and the West Post 9/11, ed. R. Geaves, T. Gabriel, Y. Haddad and J. Smith (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004): 51-61; 58, surmises that roughly one quarter of Muslims traditionally live as a minority outside Muslim majority states, while Olivier Roy (Globalized Islam; 100) puts the figure as high as one third. Perhaps the difference lies in whether one includes India before and after partition. 46 Bernard Lewis, 'Legal and Historical Reflections on the Position of Muslim Populations under Non-Muslim Rule', in Muslims in Europe, ed. B. Lewis and D. Schnapper (London, New York: Pinter, 1994): 1-18; 4. 47 See for instance Donna Arzt, 'The Treatment of Religious Dissidents under Classical and Contemporary Islamic Law', in Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Religious Perspectives, ed. J. Witte and J. van der Wyver (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1996): 387-453. Bat Ye'or, The Dhimmi (Rutherford NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson, 1985).

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reasons of inertia or because of reservations about infidel governance), but the withdrawal of full participatory democratic rights would certainly create a storm. FIANZ, in the past, has repeatedly issued exhortations urging members to vote. The traditional Islamic world-view divides the world into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb (the realms of Islam and of Strife). Even though this dichotomy of almost Manichean proportions is not supported by the Quran, it traditionally is a potent way of ordering the world conceptually. However, today only Wahhabis and very conservative-minded Muslims continue to rely on this classical distinction. 48 For most other Muslims this dichotomy has been watered down by various and widely divergent interpretations by the four schools (madhahib). Where exactly is Dar al-Islam? Which preconditions have to exist to qualify a place as the abode of Islam? Islamic jurisprudence on this point differs according to the four schools. Does the sharia have to apply in all its traditional severity in the realm of Islam? Is it where Muslims hold power and/or form the majority, or where the government is truly Islamic? Not surprisingly, opinions are divided about whether there is even one country that qualifies as the undisputed abode of Islam. Not infrequently have I encountered the view that there is no Dar al-Islam anywhere in the world as no country espouses the true spirit of Islam. There was even surprise that one could assume this concept has any currency in the modern world. An even sharper philosophical distinction between the West and Islam is made through the concept of jahiliya. It generically refers to ignorance, chaos and non-Islamic (or pre-Islamic) conditions.49 It is especially prominent in the works of the Muslim social philosopher Sayyid Qutb,50 where it is taken to refer to the modern West and its cultural and social conditions, most of which are anathema to true Islam. Qutb was certainly familiar with the West through his stay as a student in the USA and he felt repulsed through his first-hand experience. Yet, many Muslims in the third world who condemn the West as jahiliya take their experience from the one-sided, mendacious 48

Jocelyne Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet (New York: Palgrave, 2004);

160. 49 Ignorance not in the sense of devoid of general knowledge, but ignorant of God and Islam in a theological and moral sense. In other words, an abode of disbelief and barbarism. 50 See for instance William Shepard, 'Sayyid Qutb's Doctrine of Jahiliyya', International Journal of Middle East Studies 35 (2003): 521-45.

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information that may be filtering through from Hollywood movies, American sit-coms, pornography, and other dubious sources that give a distorted view of Western cultural reality. It is through those fragments of popular culture that Muslims-and others in non-Western countries-form a picture about the West as a haven for immorality, lewdness, all-too liberal sex mores, rampant adultery, an obsession with material wealth, inordinate consumerism, violence, crime, preoccupation with one's body, the quest for mindless and soulless beauty, parading half-naked women in beauty contests, a shallowness of aspirations and concerns, and the like. While by Western standards these are only aspects of Western culture, and not even the best, and may be widely considered to be morally dubious, their broadcasting and magnification is doing damage to the image non-Westerners, reliant on a trickle of popular culture information, have. Lack of education, which deprives people of a sound faculty for critical thinking, combined with faulty information can be more damaging than total ignorance. There is no recognition of the complexity of Western society and the multitude of sub-cultures that co-exist. In the age-old misperception of pars pro toto, some aspects are taken to stand for the whole entity. When elevating some exaggerated aspects of popular culture as representative of the whole and combining them with a view of the political and military power relentlessly wielded by the West-or some parts of it-which, again, are taken to be representative of the whole, one is driven to arrive at a perfect picture of jahiliya, evil incarnate. Theoretically, when seen from an arch-conservative viewpoint, Muslims living in the West are residents in the House of Strife, culturally and morally subject to the rule of jahiliya and under 'hostile' infidel domination. For French Muslim scholar-jurists, this seems to have been a sufficiently serious issue to proclaim that France holds an intermediary position: it constitutes Dar al-Ahd (the realm of treaty, pact or covenant). 51 Philosophical tendencies among contemporary Muslim thinkers to develop a concept of Euro-Islam also seek to incorporate a concept of the legitimacy of non-Muslim authority over Muslims. 52 The related legal concepts of classical Islam Dar al-Sulh

51 Gilles Kepel, Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997); 151. 52 For instance, Bassam Tibi, 'Muslim Migrants in Europe: Between Euro-Islam and Ghettoization', in Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization, ed. N. Alsayyad and M. Castells, (Lanham MD/Berkeley:

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(realm of truce) and Dar al-Aman (realm of peace, safety, grant of safe conduct) also offer themselves as means to rationalise a peaceful and integrative role of Muslims in the West. 53 Tariq Ramadan proposed the concept of Dar al-Dawa (realm of proselytisation, mission or invitation to Islam), drawing on an image of opportunity for Muslims to convert the West. Ramadan, one of Europe's leading Islamic scholars, argues that there is nothing wrong with Muslims living under Western secular rule. 54 He argues that it guarantees five fundamental rights: the rights to practise Islam, to knowledge, to establish organisations, to autonomous representation, and to appeal to law (which I presume to mean equality before the law and absence of whimsical, discriminatory rule). As long as such conditions are being met by a liberal, democratic form of society, Muslims have no reason not to acquiesce to the political dominance of majority society. This philosophical debate, however, does not seem to pose a strong intellectual challenge for New Zealand Muslims. The reason may be an enduring dominant sense of pragmatism in their self-awareness. Characteristically, my enquiry in this regard encountered indifference and even non-comprehension. Quite obviously these overly theological considerations are not foremost in people's minds, though imams, as one might expect, are familiar with them. Overwhelmingly, respondents argued that Dar al-Harb, the realm of war or strife does not apply to New Zealand and therefore is irrelevant to Muslims. A leader of OMA articulated the thought that these various realms or abodes are historical and jurisprudential concepts, rather than being theological, and as present-day realities have superseded classical legal definitions they have become irrelevant. And while a very few Muslims I interviewed might hesitantly have agreed with the notion that jahiliya conditions apply in New Zealand, it did not seem to be of great concern to them. Others argued it was insulting to extend this concept to New Zealand and should be avoided. It is a Muslim-friendly country and does not deserve such a derogatory label. In any case, whether one applies such labels to New Zealand or not, I was told, it cannot

Lexington Books/ Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of California. 2002): 31-52.; Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future ofIslam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 53 Lewis, Legal and Historical Reflections ...; 6-17. 54 Ramadan, Western Muslims; 70.

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be taken as an excuse to ignore New Zealand laws. There seems to be unanimity in the view that if, on religious grounds, acceptance of the country's laws and its governance are a problem, then one should simply leave. While calling it a sense of gratitude may be an exaggeration, Muslims do acknowledge that they can live in peace and are free to practice their religion without (much) hindrance. As one Muslim said to me, Muslims are freer here to be Muslims than in many Muslim-majority countries. Others argued that harb simply does not apply to the West as Islam is not at war with it, nor is there an acute antagonism between them. (Significantly this was combined with a rejection of Huntington's thesis, as well as a rejection of the Bush administration's world politics.) Views that come close to a conservative interpretation of Dar al-Harb and which argue that New Zealand is a state of kuffaar [sic] (unbelievers) and al-zoor [sic] (falsehood) from which Muslims must disengage seem to be rare. 55 Conversely, those tending towards conceding a philosophical point to the traditional dichotomy, at the same time maintain that there is actually no real Dar al-Islam, an abode of true Islam, anywhere in today's world as nowhere in the so-called Islamic world is there complete compliance with Islamic principles. Even fundamentalist regimes such as the Taleban's and in Saudi Arabia are not considered to espouse desirable principles of Islam. For instance, lopping off a thiefs hand, as commanded by the Quran (5/38) would be justified only if an Islamic society would totally eliminate hunger and poverty, thus highlighting the dimension of wilfulness and lack of necessity of such criminal acts. The provision of a peaceful society devoid of shortcomings of a material kind and enriched by an appropriate Islamic education is a precondition for the introduction of Islamic forms of retribution and punishment (hudud). Extremely devout Muslims may be expected to prevaricate between two poles: the 'myth of return' to their home country-which in their absence meanwhile is supposed to have mysteriously changed into Islamic splendour-and the unrealistic expectations that New Zealand can be transmogrified into something resembling an Islamic society. In both imaginary scenarios Muslims can be returned to a state of pure Islamicness and the nagging issue of living as a pious Muslim among crass infidels is solved. Meanwhile, this thought of the pre-

55

New Zealand Dawa electronic newsletter, 4 December 2003.

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sumed intrinsic impermanency of the present existence in New Zealand gives peace of mind. In one scenario a better state of affairs can be achieved through a physical move, possibly back to one's place of origin or to another Muslim-majority country, thus removing oneself from an undesirable presence among infidels, no matter whether they are religionists of another persuasion or atheists. The other possibility is offered through gradual changes by gaining influence through the democratic process and successful proselytisation (dawa) so as to change the ideological balance. This kind of Islamic existential philosophy tends to attach a considerable degree of ephemerality to Muslim minority status. Either conversion or emigration provides a resolution. Preserving one's Muslimness may necessitate following the example of the Prophet and engaging in hijra (emigration) to a Muslim majority country, thus becoming a muhajir(un). While this may be considered a virtue, worthy of divine reward, realistically it does not enjoy much popularity in the diaspora. It is befitting at this stage to quote a very reflective reply I had to my enquiry from a Muslim woman, who is active in the Islamic Women's Association, about her thoughts on the issues of jahiliya, personal and religious freedom (hurriya(t)) and similar issues. In her email response she wrote: To my own personal way of thinking jahiliya connotates [sic] a sense of intellectual and spiritual being that denies the truth. In this respect I believe that every individual, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, has the inner drive to seek out truth and when they deny this human impulse or choose delusion and untruth in its place then this is wilful ignorance or jahiliya. In terms of jahiliya used as a descriptive term on a societal level, I feel this is a collective state of being where the untruths we propound as individuals manifest themselves on a communal level as injustice, oppression, corruption, lawlessness, tyranny, etc. Applying this definition I would say that many societies have aspects of jahiliya running through them including those characterised by Muslim majority populations and/or self defined Islamic systems of governance. Again, applying this definition I would not classify Aotearoa NZ as a jahiliya society; however I would say that aspects of jahiliya are present. as indicated for example by our extremely high youth suicide rate, increasing violent crime, growing materialism, currents of racism, etc.

To my question 'Do you feel that hurriya(t), freedom, is applicable to your existence in New Zealand?' her reply was this:

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On an external level absolutely. Being a part of the extremely diverse Aotearoa NZ Muslim community, many members of which are recent immigrants or refugees, has enabled me to come into contact with some wonderful people and also to be exposed to some truly heart rending, first-hand accounts of human suffering and oppression. I would hope that such exposure would prevent me from ever taking for granted the daily peace, security and basic freedoms I am privileged to experience here in Aotearoa NZ. It also serves to make me aware that such freedom is a precious commodity that as well as deserving of extension to all peoples also deserves protection. This as I begin to see new trends emerge in many countries towards the narrowing of pluralism, the limitation of religious freedom, the increase of nationalism, the re-emergence of racism and the rampage of materialism. On an internal level I feel that Aotearoa NZ has accorded my spirituality a sense of freedom in that it has not developed as the result of societal norms, peer pressure, enforced expectations, education systems or other influential elements which may be more prevalent in societies with significant Muslim populations. I realise that this aspect has as many disadvantages as benefits but I am nevertheless grateful for this sense of freedom which I feel has lead to the development of a very distinct form of "intention" which constitutes the basis of Islamic belief and action.

She continued on to state that she does not think of herself as a muhajir: ... not in terms of national identity. In that sense I tend to think of myself as a Muslim of Aotearoa New Zealand rather than as a Muslim in Aotearoa New Zealand. In a spiritual sense however I do feel that I have experienced and continue to experience the hijra [emigration] of the soul. A decision to leave one way of life for another which entails a migration of the heart and mind rather than a physical relocation.

These reflections stick out due to their thoughtfulness. Not all Muslims I contacted were so eloquent on the subject. The absence among them of widespread concern relating to these issues, in a positive sense, may be taken as an indicator of a mood of relative complacency and satisfaction with their existence in New Zealand. If the need for selfdefinition and philosophical self-orientation is felt at all among New Zealand Muslims, in my experience, it seems to be adequately covered by the trope of darura (necessity). It seems to adequately encompass conditions of exile motivated by the desire to be free from persecution or for purposes of economic and educational improvement. My investigation among New Zealand Muslims has certainly highlighted a very pragmatic way of thinking, in which generally the orthodox dichotomy of the world, with all the attendant consequences of thought and

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action, is not considered an important issue. Only a very few, upon being pressed, saw darura as the necessary rationalising agency to justify philosophically their continued stay.

Orienta/ism and Islamophobia Cultures, almost like organisms, have a tendency to replicate themselves, endeavouring to pass themselves on from generation to generation. This process does not exclude substantial and sometimes even cataclysmic changes, without jeopardising continuity and authenticity. Conservative forces within society may resist, to prevent change from occurring or to ensure that such change occurs only at a glacial speed, but it cannot be prevented completely. Cultures simply are no stable, inert entities. In this sense Muslims in the West have the disadvantage of being easily perceived as agencies of change. Especially an ideologically and politically conservative view may see them as catalysts of unwanted change. Representing defined cultural otherness, Muslims may be perceived to endanger the West's cultural continuity or through their presence in sizeable numbers to induce rapid and unwanted change in the host culture. Arriving not only in large numbers, but resisting speedy assimilation and insisting on the maintenance of their cultural and religious traditions, Muslims can easily create the impression that by their very presence they prevent the undisrupted replication of the indigenous culture, or at least induce change that transforms it beyond recognition. Muslim immigration in the West thus may create fears that Western culture stands to lose its authenticity. Reflex-like prejudice towards the alien, culturally or physically different other is deeply ingrained in the human psyche. On this basis, discrimination of any kind comes easily and naturally to the species, while overcoming it takes a conscious, concerted and moral effort. Fear and disrespect of the alien, the racial and cultural other are rampant in human history and endemic in virtually all cultures. In European colonial history racial and cultural alterity was stigmatised as hardly human, ungodly, and, following the Darwinian paradigm, was seen to be closer to animals than true man. And although the social significance of religion has considerably lessened in Western society, religion is still creating boundaries, which may be hard to ignore or set aside. While-according to Emile Durkheim-in humanity's past

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sharing a religion provided a useful, firm bond among people that enabled society to come into existence, outsiders with different religions, conversely, were not only out-groups but hardly entitled to any 'civilised' consideration. Humankind has come a long way from the crude days when racial aliens, hardly known and dwelling in the terra incognita of the geographic or even cosmological periphery, were seen to be afflicted with grotesque deformities or smitten with God's curse, mentally sub-human and incapable of intelligent reflexion. Yet prejudice and uninformed discriminatory attitudes have not been totally overcome and eliminated from social discourse. In Western society the Islamic world and its people have been the recipients of this attitude for centuries. Edward Said coined the term Orientalism to refer to this prejudicial paradigm deeply embedded in social, political and intellectual discourses of the West. It is a style of thought that represents and uses an asymmetrical ideological relationship between the West and what is designated as 'Oriental'. Expressive of domination, it is a paradigmatic style replete with innuendoes of power legitimately assumed or arrogated and relentlessly exercised by the West. In short, it is a pervasive discursive formation in the Foucauldian sense, while yet retaining a flavour of the uni-directional nature of all power relations in the traditional Marxist mould. Said explains, '[Orientalism] depends for its strategy on the flexible positional superiority which puts the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand ... .'56 'Additionally, the imaginative examination of things Oriental was based more or less exclusively upon a sovereign Western consciousness out of whose unchallenged centrality an Oriental world emerged, first according to general ideas about who or what was an Oriental, then according to a detailed logic governed not simply by empirical reality but by a battery of desires, regressions, investments, and projections ... .'57 Orientalism is an instrument for 'dealing with the Orient [and its people]-dealing with it by making statements about it, authorising views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in

56 57

Edward Said, Orientalism, (London, New York: Routledge and Kegan, 1978); 7. Said, ibid.; 8.

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short, Orientalism is a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient ... ' 58 These features are well enough displayed in New Zealand by the media, public opinion, and political comments. As far as the Islamic world is concerned, moral judgments are made from a high ground, which admits to no hesitation or understanding for the relativity of such positions. Relationships, of any kind, between the West and the Islamic world remain unexamined as to their effect on the cultural other, in fact this other is rarely examined, except when highlighting its imputed inferiority in some respect or other. The discourse is one of unreflected and very one-sidedly rationalised domination. Somewhat ambivalently, while it continues to exist in practical, political, and economic matters, in more intellectualised circles it has meanwhile been largely supplanted by a self-reflective, self-conscious, and at times self-flagellatory Western Zivilisationskritik. 59 This now forms an integral part of the postmodernist discourse-of which the Western media cannot stay aloof, despite their natural propensity to adhere to Orientalist attitudes. This is so for several reasons. Western society as a whole is vitally influenced by post-modernism nurtured by an inner ideological reform in the post-colonial era; and also because of a third and fourth world driven discourse, which the Western hegemon cannot ignore. This latter discourse, taking its cues from Western post-modernism, has absorbed the notion of the existence of Orientalism in dominant Western society and of the need to resist it as a source of ideological evil. While it remains ostensibly unaware that once again it is adopting a Western ideological stance and falling under the spell of it, it manages adroitly to make it the basis of its own claim for power by playing on the West's bad conscience. New Zealand does not have the brutal history of xenophobia that mars European history, ranging from Nazism in the twentieth century to pre-modern times with their religiously based pogroms and on to culturally intolerant ancient tribalism. 'Strangers' were outside accepted laws and norms and unprotected. Only briefly was that litany of brutal intolerance interrupted by laissez faire Roman universalism and its religious and cultural tolerance under Pax Romana. As a nation,

Said, ibid.; 3. Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion, (London, New York: Routledge, 1992). 58

59

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New Zealand is not encumbered with such a heavy burden, although some immigrants carried some of that baggage individually. In the ideological make-up of today's New Zealand, with its superficial predominance of diffuse tolerance, some of it ideologically underpinned and some purely based on vague indifference, a variety of features interact: post-modernist cultural relativism, its formalised product 'political correctness', Orientalism and old-fashioned xenophobia though unbloodied by national history. Islamophobia, inasmuch as it is present, however, does not appear to be linked to the paradigm-shift, much-trumpeted by Huntington,60 of a belief in the implacable antagonism between the secularised West and the zealotous Islamic world. New Zealand society episodically shows both trendspost-modernist self-consciousness and even self-denigration as well as Orientalist leanings-in considerable clarity. The reasons are manifold. For instance, the need to accommodate the views of a sizeable indigenous ethnic minority (of approximately 15 percent of the total population), as well as a traditional cultural self-deprecation vis-a-vis the 'mother country' Britain, support post-modernist and anti-colonialist tendencies. On the other hand, a lingering sense of superiority vis-a-vis the people of the Pacific supports 'Orientalist' leanings. In the case of Islam, of course, the New Age tolerance, even respect, for other than traditional Western forms of religiosity also plays a role. It results in the willingness to give religious otherness the space for a separate identity, a religious freedom borne from indifference probably more than from genuine respect. The media express this ideological bi-polarity well. On the one hand, the portrayal of Islam and the Islamic world in general is largely informed by Orientalism-in the form of a rather one-sided moralism and sense of superiority. This entails a tendency to associate Islam with radicalism, militancy, and fanaticism, and ascribe to Islamic fundamentalism the face of Osama bin Laden, which needless to say is a gross caricature of reality. On the other hand, the treatment Muslims living in New Zealand receive is relatively benign and largely informed by religious, ethnic, and racial tolerance. Some examples demonstrate this relatively clearly.

60 Samuel Huntington, 'If Not Civilizations, What? Samuel Huntington Responds to His Critics', Foreign Affairs, (November/December 1993), online. http://www .foreignaffairs.org.

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Early in 2001, for instance, a Muslim family in Hastings felt wronged by a fast food company. A supposedly vegetarian pizza was delivered to them. After eating part of it, they discovered bacon had been hidden in it. From the family's viewpoint, which they proclaimed loudly, they had accidentally broken one of the strongest Islamic interdictions: the consumption of pork is specifically prohibited and made haram (forbidden) in the Quran. 61 The press and television in picking up the story were overwhelmingly sympathetic to the plight of the family, although one might have expected indifference or perhaps even ridicule given the general ignorance about halal prescriptions. On the contrary, the food company profusely apologised and offered compensation. The benevolent tone of the media did not waver, even when the family claimed compensation in the form of a fully paid trip to Mecca for the whole family (reportedly, five persons), so that they could cleanse themselves of their sin. (In the end, the demand for a trip to Mecca for the whole family to purify themselves was apparently not met, but some smaller compensation was offered and accepted.) Muslim authorities came out denouncing this compensation claim as exaggerated, pointing out that a sin unknowingly committed is no sin and that purification could be done in ways other than through a trip to the holy shrine of Mecca. Even though a close reading of events would have raised suspicion about the family's motives in involving the media and making exaggerated compensation demands, the media generally did not cast aspersion on this family or Islam per se. Despite a strong whiff of extortion-like and fraudulent opportunism emanating from the family's claim, no suspicions were voiced by the media. While the media treatment of the family's seemingly unreasonable and theologically unsupported demand was presumably inspired to some extent by a nonchalant, and somewhat condescending curiosity about such quaint food taboos and outlandish religious customs, it could hardly be disputed that to some extent it was occasioned by a genuine cultural tolerance extended by a highly secularised society to something which only with a good deal of naive benevolence might be construed to be religiously motivated anguish.

61

Sura 2/173 and 5/3: 'Forbidden to you are: [carrion], blood, the flesh of swine .. .'.

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When, a few years ago, in 1998, a mosque in the city of Hamilton was torched by unknown assailants, again reportage was overwhelmingly favourable towards Islam, extolling the virtues of religious freedom and the rights of minorities. Moreover, there was apparently strong local authority and public support for the Muslim community to rebuild the mosque. Donations and practical support from the city and private individuals and assistance from other religious groups came to the rescue. Shepard remarks: the event showed 'New Zealand at both its worst and its best .. .', and 'one Muslim leader commented that [it] ... showed them how many friends they have'. 62 A case similar in principle occurred in Dunedin when abuse and dung was thrown at some Muslim women in July 2005. A few days later, in a well orchestrated and publicised action, a women's deputation apologised and presented flowers to Muslim women at the mosque to expunge the collective guilt. Characteristically, both incidents were accorded generous publicity by the local daily newspaper 63 and surrounded with a warm sentiment of sympathy for Muslims. Acts of crass Islamophobia inevitably seem to engender the opposite response by signalling tolerance and inclusiveness. Comments, made occasionally by politicians, about Muslims being generically a security risk and Islam having a 'militant underbelly' are then countered by support and sympathy offered to Muslims because they appear victimised and persecuted. The Ahmed Zaoui case, which will be described in the last chapter, is a case in point. In the West in general, Orientalism in mild form codes almost all forms of discourses. It is the virulent xenophobia directed towards Muslims and abstractly Islam per se, usually referred to as Islamophobia, that poses the greatest problem and attracts wide attention. While ancient and endemic in Europe-underpinned by theological roots that denigrated 'Mohametanism' as heresy and abominationfor New Zealand it is a relatively new phenomenon. Xenophobia historically was directed towards the Chinese in the form of the poll tax, taunts and insults, satirising the 'yellow peril', and even the occasional physical attack. Muslims traditionally, due to their extremely small number, were not seen as a danger and were overlooked as the proverbial hostile cultural other, quite in contrast to what was the case in

62

63

William Shepard, 'Muslims in New Zealand'; 237-238. The Otago Daily Times, 30-31 July 2005; 1; and 11 August 2005; 5.

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Europe. It seems an Islamophobic attitude was not imported to this country through colonisation. As Muslims practised Islamic orthopraxy privately in the early days, they escaped unfavourable attention. They assumed a more public profile only relatively recently with the erection of the first mosque in Ponsonby in the early 1980s, showing off its Middle Eastern style to good effect. Smaller political parties, which sometimes assume an anti-immigration stance, usually target all Asians, but at times single out Muslims, and often blame Islam per se for all kinds of evil in the world. The New Zealand First party traditionally is hostile to non-European immigration, but has not gone so far as to make Islamophobia a specific ingredient of the party-platform. 64 ACT party MPs, who were part of the parliamentary composition previously, also have at times come out strongly with anti-Islamic remarks or warned against unbridled Muslim immigration. Incidents of religiously motivated violence are extremely rare. Due to the infrequency of their occurrence and difficulty in establishing such motivation, the police do not attempt to maintain data on crimes that may have been motivated by religion. The occasional cases of vandalising Jewish cemeteries fall outside the framework of this book. In November 2005, a man was convicted and sentenced to fifteen months' imprisonment for abuse directed at Muslims at a bus stop and on a bus in South Dunedin. Also in November 2005, a court sentenced two former members of the National Front, a white supremacist group, to twelve months' imprisonment for vandalising mosques in Auckland following the July 2005 public transport bombings in London. In July 2005, the person charged in 2004 for sending racist letters to members of Wellington's Somali community and other Muslims was convicted of harassment, and in September 2005 he was sentenced to six months' imprisonment. Lesser cases of verbal abuse or harassment do occasionally occur, in particular towards Muslim women wearing distinctive clothing (such as hijab. chador or burqa). Such attacks, which may occur infrequently at any time, show a tendency to gain in frequency after spectacular atrocities overseas such as 9/11, or 717 in London (but not when atrocities occur in non-Western countries).

64 As in Queensland (Australia) Pauline Hanson's latest attempt at resurrecting her political fortunes has reportedly done.

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In Race Relations Commissioner Joris de Bres' assessment Islamophobia does not exist in New Zealand. 'Generally speaking the degree of acceptance [of Muslims] ... is good', he is reported as saying. 'There were instances of harassment but in general New Zealanders had welcomed Muslim refugees and migrants'. 65 This glowing view was not shared by a senior member of the Auckland community, Mohamed Mussa, who, speaking from personal experience, maintained that' being a Muslim in New Zealand 50 years ago was easier ... than it is today'. 66 Speaking at the first national Muslim conference at Mangere, Auckland, he averred that the position of Muslims in society had deteriorated from his childhood days. It is certainly true that suspicion fell heavily on Muslims living in the West in the aftermath of 9/11. New Zealand is no exception. It had displays ofislamophobia. The 7/7 attacks in London evoked the strongest hostile response so far. But, by and large, without erring on the side of optimism, it must be said that reactions were much more muted than elsewhere.

Converts From the palette of individual motivations I have encountered among converts to Islam, it is difficult to elicit common and overarching factors. Islam certainly has an appeal as a universal faith that provides not only a strong purpose and meaning to human existence, as any religion does, but also supplies a firm structure and reglement of social action. This may be important to individuals who not only experience spiritual emptiness, but who feel that modern Western society lacks guidance of action, underpinned by moral imperatives, and that its sense of right and wrong is too diffuse, even too liberal, to offer a robust framework for social interaction. The rules of social conduct have softened, lacking not only in legal robustness, but also in moral metaphysical justification, to the extent that available liberties become confusing. Thus, paradoxically, freedom, the absence of stringent boundaries, can come to be experienced as a burden. Conversion to Islam may seem to have the answer. Other, perhaps subsidiary, more mundane motivations for conversion may be partner selection or travel in Islamic countries. In addition there may be other motivational factors of a very personal

65 66

The Otago Daily Times, 16 April2004; 24. The New Zealand Herald online, 15 April 2004.

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nature, giving an individualistic flavour to conversions. Some converts seem to derive a sense of personal purity from the self-discipline and even self-denial that strict commitment to Islamic principles demands. The intrinsic concern of Islam on a social, non-metaphysical level is social order. But equally appealing to converts may be the other major emphasis of Islam: social cohesion, a cohesion that goes far beyond the national or ethnic and extends to the global community of all believers, the umma. In other words, it renders an identity more congenial to an era of globalisation than nationalism or ethnicity. The firmness of rules for social conduct, and their detailed nature, which is so characteristic of Islam, enhances the predictability and reliability of social action among Muslims. At least in some historical cases this seems to have been one of the main reasons for conversion. In Southeast Asia the greatest readiness to embrace Islam was shown in the merchant class, presumably for the reasons that Islam facilitated social intercourse among believers and provided security in trade. Of course, it is the function of the modern state to provide these features without the need for an encompassing religion. However, in the modern globalising world a transnational identity may seem alluring to some. For others the egalitarian message of Islam, uniting all believers as equals, is the main attraction. Theological misgivings about the Christian Trinity concept or the divinity of Jesus Christ, not uncommon in modern Western society, may be channelled not into individual secularisation and a turning away from all religions, but may be energised in the search for an alternative. Islam's strict and explicit monotheism, tawhid, offers that alternative. Among the multitude of possible forms of cultural alienation, this appears a more usual religious reason for conversion, rather than eschatological worries (about an afterlife). However, more published research is needed to throw light on conversion to Islam in New Zealand. 67 The research on which this book is based was not primarily designed to do so. My notes on the subject are therefore rather sketchy and predominantly anecdotal; they are not based on methodical and purposeful data gathering. Being rather haphazard, my comments here cannot claim to be exhaustive or have some finality.

67 So far the most detailed study of conversion to Islam is Cheryl Hill, Kiwis on the Straight Path (Bachelor of Arts thesis, University of Canterbury, 2001). In this section

I am also drawing partially on student projects conducted under my supervision.

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Muslims call conversion 'reversion' in accord with the doctrine of fitrah. It holds that everybody is born with an innate proclivity to be a Muslim-i.e. created with the inherent ability to worship God-but not always is there realisation of this fact. 68 Nurture may corrupt nature, in the form of culture guiding the child towards another religion or even atheism. It is a kind of 'salvation on earth' to become conscious of this disposition implanted by divine creation and 'revert' to it. Formal conversion to Islam is easily accomplished through a few simple ritual steps. Among them the recitation of the shahada (the main article of faith) is crucial. Enunciating with pure intent 'La Illaha ilia Allah-(wa) Mohammad rasul Allah'69 (There is no god but God, (and) Mohammad is God's messenger) is theoretically sufficient for official conversion. The shahada is the first of five so-called pillars of Islam, together with performing five prayers (salat) a day, observing the fast (saum) of the holy month of Ramadan, paying the religious tithe zakat, and performing the haj, the pilgrimage to Mecca, at least once in one's life (if health and finances allow). Theoretically, it does not require a profound knowledge and understanding of doctrines or a detailed comprehension of the Quran, but further sincere studies to deepen their theological understanding are expected of the convert. There is an Islamic Dawah and Converts Association operating on the North Island. Its function and modus operandi is not clear to me. Serious converts who do more than just sniff at religious options tend to show a great deal of devotion. Female converts display a predilection for the most serious forms of Islamic dress. One gains the impression that both genders usually express commitment to very strict forms of Islam, going beyond the average Muslim who has been born into this faith. I have no firm evidence, but intuitively it seems that Wahhabism70 or Islam influenced by it provides the biggest attraction for Western converts. Adopting a Muslim (commonly an Arabic) name is the usual procedure signalling the change in identity. Occasionally one hears about proselytisation success among the Maori prison population. It seems more anecdotal than real. Muslims 68 The nounfitrah means divine creation. In the sense referred to here, the doctrine offitrah is often called the opposite of the Christian doctrine of original sin. In Islamic belief humans are born pure and inclined towards virtue. 69 There are several slightly different renditions; for instance: La ilaha illa1lah, wa muhammadan rasulu-llah. 70 W ahhabism is the official denomination in Saudi Arabia and is known for its conservative strictness. See the chapter on fundamentalism.

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have repeatedly emphasised to me that Islam prefers to attract welleducated, socially well-adjusted, 'straight' people rather than deviants and people with a criminal past who may be trying to escape from a previous dubious identity. On Hill's evidence71 there seems to be a disproportionally high percentage of tertiary-educated people among converts. The Islamic conversion experience lacks highly emotional features of great spontaneity: the so-called 'Road to Damascus' metamorphosis. The act of surrender of the self to a higher, almighty authority in benign charge of human affairs seems to occur gradually. It is hardly ever following a spontaneous charismatic revelation, but normally seems to grow proportionally to a sense of alienation from a person's 'home environment'. The conversion experience of Neil Armstrong, the first man on the moon, seems to be rare-and not only because few have set foot on the moon. Anecdotally, it is said that by identifying the call to prayer of the muezzin he heard while visiting Egypt with a strange sound he had heard on the moon, he took it as an omen that Islam was calling him. This type of spontaneous conversion caused by an 'unearthly' experience is unusual and in Armstrong's case most probably is just anecdotal. Conversion to Islam is not as incisive a matter as joining a modern 'cult' (more appropriately termed NRM, New Religious Movement). There is no requirement that one cut oneself off from family and friends, even though the convert gradually assumes a new identity in a process of rebirth. Rearrangement of pastime and socialising may lead to a loss of some old friends. However, the common experience seems to be that even in the event that family support is not forthcoming and social bonds with friends may be impaired, no one seems to have experienced profound social trauma. None seems to have suffered total rejection from their close friends and family. Any trauma they may have had to endure was no greater than the degree of alienation from New Zealand (or in some cases Australian) 'mainstream' society they had experienced prior to conversion. Most also seem to have found their employers understanding and ready to compromise in work duties to accommodate employee needs. This may not be every convert's experience. However, on the whole, the data obtained, impressionistic as they may be, do signal a certain readiness of New

Kiwis on the Straight Path.

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Zealand society to embrace multiculturalism. The idea of embracing an immigrant religion-a religion still considered 'exotic' -despite their being 'native' in New Zealand does not seem to faze converts, nor does it seem paradoxical to them. One convert, when I asked him how he felt about having embraced a religion of immigrants, jokingly said that Maori propaganda is impressing on Pakeha (Europeans) anyway that they are manuhiri, late-comers, immigrants and only visitors in this country, not deeply rooted. Thus all Pakeha have something in common with Muslims. Students New Zealand's tertiary education system realises the lucrative potential of receiving international students for education purposes. In addition to the kudos to be earned as a desirable centre of learning, there are financial rewards to be gained for the country as well as the university system. The previously heavy preponderance of students from Southeast Asia has more recently been replaced by larger numbers coming from the affluent countries of the Middle East. This has increased the percentage of more conservative Muslims who are used to a stricter observance oflslamic prescriptions. However, regardless of a student's devotion to Islam, whether intense or more relaxed, Muslim students from overseas face considerable difficulties in interacting and living in a New Zealand environment. There is, of course, the inevitable culture shock to be overcome by those who are in a Western country for the first time. The language ability required to follow lessons and produce the required written works are another major difficulty, taking some considerable effort to master. In addition to the cultural and practical problems that all devout Muslims living in New Zealand face, there is the sometimes tricky and undesirable situation of being ensconced in a specific 'student culture', which from an Islamic point of view exhibits some features that cause revulsion. These features in the Muslim mind can only be described as excessive lewdness and debauchery to a degree that goes beyond that normally shown by the rest of secular society. A drinking culture that revolves around inordinate consumption of alcohol, alcohol-fuelled excesses, frequent pub visits, drunken brawls, or even the moderate consumption of alcohol proscribes Muslim participation. Alcohol consumption is strictly forbidden in Islam and few Muslim students appear to feel tempted to experiment with

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it in situations in which they are free of parental supervision. A brief survey of 55 Muslim students revealed that only two or three seem to have experimentally tasted alcohol, out of pure curiosity, but found the experience not to their liking. 72 Learning and striving for knowledge is highly recommended in Islamic doctrine. A hadith for instance says: 'For the sake of knowledge go to China', which metaphorically urges believers to seek knowledge even if it requires going to the end of the world. However, in the composition of the student culture this maxim is not necessarily the most prominent guiding motif and Muslim students seem to be very aware of the peculiarities of New Zealand student culture. Other salient features often displayed, apart from the alcohol consumption mentioned above, are 'immoral' behaviour, strong orientation towards sexual activity and the use of foul language. The less than standard dress code frequently observed by students and the occasional nudity (for instance, on so-called 'nude days') are highly objectionable to Muslims. All this places great obstacles in the way of Muslims immersing themselves in New Zealand's tertiary life. This is not to say that they experience moral anguish or outrage, but it impedes social intercourse with fellow students and forces Muslim students into an enclave situation where they interact more among themselves than with nonMuslims. The sense of isolation is reinforced by such hurdles as unavailability of prayer facilities on most campuses or absent recognition of their obligation to interrupt lectures to observe the prescribed prayer times. More recently a few residential colleges have begun to offer halal food for boarders and of course in most urban centres there are now halal restaurants. Years ago, this was not the case. I remember a Malaysian student who was very active in the student organisation of MUSA on the Otago campus. He told me once that he couldn't wait to get back to Kuala Lumpur for his summer vacations. The first thing he would do upon arrival at the airport was to buy himself a Big Mac because there he could be sure that it would be halal beef. Much as he would like, he could not indulge his craving in Dunedin.

72 This ignores of course the possibility that more had tried, but felt inhibited to confess to it to the surveyor, my research assistant, who himself was a Muslim.

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One of the surprising and somewhat unexpected features among Muslim students I found was a high degree of suspicion towards social research (anthropological or sociological).73 Among Muslim students there appears to be a tendency to think of social research as being in cahoots with police and intelligence services, or, if not working hand in hand with them, directed towards the same goal of finding evidence that is compromising for Muslims. This suspicion, though by no means shared by all, is baffling. Overseas Muslim students seem to have an image of social research as an instrument of the state to gather information on its citizens. Thinly disguised as science, it is a pragmatic, hostile tool of surveillance in their mind. This seems certainly related to the perception, widespread in the third world and among indigenous minorities that anthropology traditionally is a hand-maiden of colonialism, its data-gathering assisting the colonial administration. Following the events of9!11, the subsequent increased, and not always favourable, interest of Western authorities in the doings of Muslim minorities lends some justification to this perception. State surveillance has undoubtedly increased. Unfortunately, among Muslims in general it seems to have led to a degree of distrust towards research.

73 This is also evident, for instance, in the findings by Ben Eckman, A Multicultural Society: Muslim Students at the University of Otago (Bachelor of Arts (Hons.) thesis,

University of Otago, 2006).

CHAPTER THREE

THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: MUSLIMS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE The New Zealand State and Multiculturalism

Although New Zealand has declared its bicultural status in several forms, enshrining a partnership between Pakeha Anglo-Celtic culture and Maori culture (tikanga Maori), for practical intents and purposes the nation is cautiously multicultural.~ It is simply a reasonable reaction to the fact that with the removal of race-based and race-restrictive immigration policies, New Zealand has quickly become a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, culturally diverse, highly pluralised society. The fastmoving process of globalisation maintains a momentum that cannot be stopped, all the more so as the international human rights agenda and the dynamic groundswell creating a pervasive ideological climate prevent any sudden volte-face. Several international human rights conventions directly or indirectly refer to the right to culture and religion, and freedom from discrimination on this basis. Few nations, however, have embraced the globalisation of anti-discrimination laws and human rights conventions with such fervour as New Zealand has. 2 It is a signatory to virtually all of the United Nations sponsored human rights declarations and conventions. Its commitment to them internationally is rarely in doubt. 3 Although one culture is clearly dominant in New Zealand, and a second one is elevated to a more privileged status, there is a search for a modus of coexistence that allows all ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities to preserve their identity not only as

See, for instance, Mervin Singham, 'Multiculturalism in New Zealand-The Need for a New Paradigm', Aotearoa Ethnic Network Journal 1, no. 1 (2006): 33-37; also Erich Kolig, 'A Gordian Knot of Rights and Duties: New Zealand's Muslims and Multiculturalism', New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 8, no. 2 (2006): 45-68. 2 A cynical view may hold that a small, politically unimportant nation, depending on international trade and the goodwill of world powers, is virtually forced into this position. 3 Exceptions are issues relating to the indigenous minority, which have, at least temporarily, incurred the United Nations' unfavourable attention. See below.

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individuals, but also as communities, to a notable degree. But there is also a balancing awareness that different ethnicity and religiosity must not stand in the way of common citizenship or embracing national identity. The search for this elusive optimal compromise provides for an ongoing and stimulating socio-political dynamic. In the past when the Anglo-Celtic cultural identity dominated the national identity, vastly overshadowing the minority Maori identity, New Zealand's monochrome was hardly in doubt. This has undergone a considerable change in more recent years as cultural, ethnic, and religious plurality asserts itself. In the debates surrounding the gradual formation of a culturally multichromatic society, Muslims, because of their relatively small number, feature prominently only in the most xenophobic versions. Considerations about the shifting focus of identity usually relate more to the strong presence of Polynesian culture in and around New Zealand and the country's geographic position in the Pacific. However, at times Muslim insignificance in the society's total composition turns into considerable actuality. Such events that bring to the surface a debate between cultural freedom and 'fitting in' in terms of an adaptive framework will be discussed in the chapter on 'Conflict Discourses'. It is hardly surprising that, as the country's erstwhile ethnic and cultural homogeneousness fades, the common dialectic between cultural and religious liberty and shared national identity comes to the fore. Even more strongly, occasionally, it is debated which alien cultural features fall within acceptable boundaries and may be tolerated and which are clearly outside. After some general considerations, we shall look at the effect multiculturalism in its official state-supported form has on the resident Muslim community-allowing them to express their Muslimhood-and also, vice versa, how Muslims can mould the debate around such a policy. New Zealand's confrontation with a new ethnic and cultural reality is neither unique in the world, nor-in a narrower sense-in the Western world. It shares many specific features-especially with regard to the presence of a new Muslim minority-with Western Europe, North America, and Australia. In particular in the search for a workable multiculturalism in relation to a sizeable Muslim minority in Europe, there are many parallels allowing for interesting comparisons. Cultural plurality is also not unusual in many third world countries; a case in point is Malaysia with very distinct cultural differences among its citizens and a specific state response. But in the majority of cases, third

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world cultural pluralism is caused by the coexistence of tribal cultures, which do not differ very profoundly from each other.4 Therein lies an important distinguishing aspect. While in the third world cultural differences have usually co-existed for long periods of time, in the case of the Western world (mainly Europe)-leaving aside the case of indigenous populations in modern settler-states-until recently the status quo was a relatively stable kind of cultural homogeneity. 5 The new phenomenon of cultural pluralism is unprecedented and caused by immigration from various, culturally very distinct parts of the world. 6 Enforced cultural homogeneity of the past-often achieved through rather brutal methods-had to be quickly replaced with new, effective forms of legally enshrined tolerance. The objective of multiculturalism in a liberal, democratic society is to accommodate different cultural values, beliefs, and behaviours on a basis of shared premises so that diverse communities and groups can be encompassed in a sustainable environment of mutual respect and common citizenship. Multiculturalism is not, in principle, antagonistic to successful integration, nor does it practically negate or cancel out integration. It does not necessarily culminate in highly differentiated forms of citizenship that touch little on each other, although this may be a result. Basically, it is simply an intelligent and human rights-consonant accommodation of a state to the reality of cultural variety and diversity among its citizens and legal residents. In fact, most European countries, for instance, have policies in place that try to achieve a harmonious combination of multiculturalism and integration. Despite much goodwill and high-sounding liberalist ideals, this can have its pitfalls and rarely satisfies everybody. Suggesting integration as a desirable policy goal without allowing at least a modicum of multiculturalism smacks of assimilation-a widely denigrated policy option-and

4 However, even in third world countries, as well as Russia, where Muslim populations meet with other religionists (Nigeria, Sudan, India, Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar, to mention only a few) cultural plurality tends to produce enormous tensions. 5 I am ignoring here the usually sad historical story, reaching deep into the twentieth century, of suppressing cultural minorities such as Jews, Roma, Sam!, and others who have chosen not to assimilate to engulfing dominant cultures. Their distinctiveness was not officially recognised until recently, persisting on the cultural margins. 6 In the Western world, Canada-with its heavy mix of indigenous and semi-indigenous (French speaking) populations, settlers and waves of more recent immigrants from all corners of the world bringing very different cultures with them-has been leading in formulating multiculturalism and policies of cultural recognition. (See Amy Gutman, ed., Multiculturalism, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994)).

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runs the risk of going against human rights provisions. Yet, erring on the side of multiculturalism and near total acceptance of cultural difference threatens to hinder integration. It may create an incoherent society of cultures isolated from each other, existing parallel to each other and united by nothing more than physical proximity and a nominal citizenship. Striking a viable balance is notoriously elusive. Strategies can differ widely. The question is unresolved whether cultural enclaves can be permitted within the wider society or culturally different communities have to be absorbed by the phantom 'mainstream society', which may be proverbial, but is statistically non-existent. Whether individuals or families should still be allowed to preserve their customs to some extent and in the private sphere, while in the public discourse they should mirror everybody else, is the subject of an ongoing debate. Absolute assimilation as a declared policy is no longer enforceable under the human rights aegis, but various degrees of identity changes are still expected. One view holds that the maintenance of culturally autonomous inward looking communities is inimical to an integrated society, while the opposing view argues that if people feel well in their customary environment they will tend to integrate better. It is difficult to find examples that will unambiguously support one or the other view. Because of its practical political and social relevance, it is not surprising that multiculturalism has sparked a vigorous debate on theoretical, philosophical, and sociological levels. Diametrically opposed in theoretical terms, there are two approaches. The atomistic and contractarian approach sees individuated people exercising personal and conscious choices, interacting socially and choosing the type of interaction they wish to engage in; while communitarianism sees selfidentity and self-awareness shaped by socialisation and by being part of a social group, and therefore largely beyond conscious questioning. 7 One might paraphrase this dichotomy as one view that emphasises a

7 The first approach to minority rights and liberal equality combined with individual choice is the preferred political choice in the Western world. See Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). Also W. Kymllka, ed., The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). For a critique of the liberalist, contractarian approach see, e.g., Chandran Kukathas, 'Are There Any Cultural Rights', in The Rights of Minority Cultures, eel. W. Kymlikca, ibid.: 228-256. According to Kukathas' critical appraisal, it is the presumption of the moral unity of humankind underlying this approach that makes it questionable.

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certain degree of detachment and autonomy of self from society and another that alternatively sees the self as a product of society that is nothing by itself. These highly abstracted views are useful as 'ideal types', to understand the world in abstracted contours and inspire highly animated academic debates, but are not conformist enough to real life to be practically applicable in the cut and thrust and hard decisions of socio-political discourse and policy decisions. One view would tend to place individuals in front of personal, ad-hoc choices, for which they are solely responsible; the other would not see that individuals could ever rise above themselves as products of socialisation to make detached and informed choices. The first, aligned to liberal theory, will create liberal institutions that anyone of normal human potential can avail themselves of as a matter of free choice. The disadvantage is that such institutions, even with the greatest of flexibility, are not culturally neutral and, even more seriously, as critics have pointed out, this approach is based on the idea of the universality of human needs and motivations. This assumption may be flawed by a serious misjudgement of the intensity and indeed the presence of species-typical features. Despite all good intentions, it may still provide a cultural straitjacket, violating the mantras of cultural freedom. The danger of the collectivist approach, on the other hand, is that in the pursuit of defining and securing cultural difference it casts cultural identity in concrete, freeze-framing it and thus hinders change or takes no notice of it. The Islamic ethos by itself, intrinsically, has practical problems with the culturally liberalist choice when it comes to apostasy. New Zealand appears to pursue, whether by conscious policy or haphazardly so, a mixed course. While the perseverance of indigenous culture is defined and aided by inscribing it to some extent in law and statute, other minority cultures' freedom of manifestation is guaranteed and circumscribed by the relative degree of diffuse liberality of human rights law and some social institutions. In other words, cultural Maoriness is officially defined and reflected in law and statute (also in many charters and mission statements of public institutions), whereas Muslimness is undefined and there is no codified response to this identity. As far as Muslimness or other minority ethnic-religious identities are concerned-leaving aside the rather vague premise offered by the Bill of Rights-public responses are piecemeal and only deal with a particular event at the discretion of the relevant authority at a particular time.

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Moral theory too has a place in this debate. Multiculturalism, whether it is conscious of it or not, is a child of predominantly post-modernist liberalism-although there are obviously forms of multiculturalism that do not subscribe to the basic equality of all cultures. Apartheid was also a kind of multiculturalism, but it was not backed up by a moral theory of ethnic and cultural equality. (Malaysia too, for instance, cultivates a climate of multiculturalism, but heavily favours the bumiputera, the indigenous, dominant Malay-Islamic element.) 8 It was also untouched by a post-modernist attitude of respect towards non-Western cultures and religions. Apartheid instead presumed the inherent superiority of one culture, giving it the right to dominate, but conceded the right of the 'inferior' culture to exist, albeit only to serve the interests of the politically dominant group. (In this it was different from crass forms of cultural nationalism that seek to eliminate cultures considered alien or inferior-and often find a quasi cosmic justification for doing so.) Regulative limitations on the 'inferior' culture are derived from the values and priorities of the dominant culture. Clearly this is not the model to be emulated by a modern, democratic, liberal state. Even though regulative impulses are sent out by the liberal state, they are, or should be, flexible enough to accommodate multiculturalist recognition. That is to say, ideally they should be accommodating enough to respect cultural difference. However, in practical reality this is not a hundred percent achievable. The dominant culture still defines the common wellbeing of all and sets its priorities. Exaggerating this reality, a negative, cynical perception appears at times in the argument of Muslim propagandists, who claim that the state is being exploitatively regulative for one purpose: to cement the dominance of the host society. This view informs the criticism that Europe allows immigration for purposes of obtaining cheap labour without the intention of enfranchising these groups. 9 Obtaining citizenship is made difficult

8 Seeing parallels with the traditional Islamic dhimma-system may not be farfetched. 9 See e.g. Bashy Quraishy, 'Immigration, Integration and Islam', Aotearoa Ethnic Network Journal 2, no. 2 (2007) online. Mustafa Malik, 'Islam in Europe: Quest for a Paradigm', Middle East Policy 8, no. 2 (2001) online; and 'Muslims Pluralize the West, Resist Assimilation', Middle East Policy 11, no. 1 (2004): 70-84.; Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason, 'Tolerance, Freedom, Justice and Peace? Britain, Australia and Anti-Muslim Racism since 11 September 2001', Journal of Intercultural Studies 27, no. 4 (2006): 365-391; and 'The Resistible Rise of Islamophobia', Journal of Sociology 43, no. 2 (2006): 61-78.

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by this strategy, and passive voting rights are not granted to residents so as to minimise the political influence of immigrants and asylum seekers. It is no wonder this biased conviction generates and inspires a victim mentality. There are opposing voices that claim this is a vicious smear campaign that, through shaming the host, aims at achieving a further softening of current policies. On the other end of the spectrum, there is the multiculturalist state that, in its pursuit of liberality and equality of cultures, refuses to be regulative in imposing its own norms when from an humanitarian viewpoint it might seem highly desirable. Cases of enforced underage marriage among some ethnic groups, enforced genital mutilation, and inflicting minor forms of punishment may often be overlooked by this type of state in the name of cultural freedom for minorities. Because of a misplaced sense of cultural sensitivity, common interpretations of the Convention of Human Rights may be set aside and domestic laws abrogated. 10 It could be argued that even in enlightened, liberal multiculturalism the notion of superiority has not been totally suppressed. No public space is culturally neutral. All states and national societies, consciously or unconsciously, as a matter of policy or not, prioritise one culture over others. The difference lies in the degree of recognition of difference and its legitimisation. When minorities demand equality and recognition, they want to end marginalisation, subordination, and exclusion, and an end to the privatisation of their identity while the dominant culture has its identity universalised. Giving a minority group a public status means conceding the right to be different in a visible and legal manner. Does this entail a differentiated form of citizenship? Leaving aside illegitimate conditions of discrimination, this condition already exists: the diminished rights of prisoners, not-yet-matured rights of minors, diminished responsibility of mentally impaired persons and the like. A difference in rights is also signalled by the recognised right of religious groups to waive en bloc their democratic right to vote, to refuse the

10 Various cases of clashes between state law and customary law are also described in Richard Shweder, Martha Minow and Hazel Markus, eds., Engaging Cultural Differences: The Multicultural Challenge in Liberal Democracies, (New York: Russell Sage, 2002).

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draft to military service, or to practice gender discrimination. 11 Can Muslims be accommodated under similar provisions? Modood, as an illustration, compares Muslims with gays and their position in liberal societyY Gays no longer want to be tolerated or told that homosexuality is not illegal. They want to be accepted as gay in the public discourse and to occupy the same place as heterosexuals, enjoying the same rights, free even of clandestine discrimination. Similarly, as they demand recognition of their lifestyle choice, Modood demands equal respect for, and acceptance of, Muslims and equal rights in terms of recognition of their culture. Do different forms of citizenship make a difference in the degree and kind of allegiance a sovereign nation-state expects from its citizens? While monoculturally based nationalism may still persist with considerable strength, 13 blind patriotism, especially of the self-sacrificing and aggressive kind, increasingly disappears from the (Western) world, gradually replaced by instrumental-rational and self-indulgent calculations of cost benefit relations. Loyalty and solidarity decrease in their foundation on inherited or emotional grounds. Belongingness becomes increasingly a matter of conscious choice. Multiple allegiance as a consequence of globalisation, social and geographic mobility, and the like is increasingly common: double and triple citizenships, being Muslim and New Zealander, being a Palestinian with New Zealand citizenship and close ties to family in Jordan, Kuwait, and Lebanon, or recognising the Pope as supreme spiritual leader and being a loyal citizen of a country that may have a non-Catholic majority and be highly secularised. Only autocracies continue to have problems with what they see as divided loyalties. The question whether acceptance of national identity and loyalty can be 'mechanically' gauged through a knowledge test of language, history, socio-political system etc. or whether a probationary type of citizenship is useful remains as yet unanswered. There is no ready formula to assess to what extent ethnicity,

11 The obvious example is Catholicism in New Zealand, which is exempted from gender equality provisions. 12 Tariq Modood, 'Remaking Multiculturalism after 7/7', Open Democracy (online) (2005): 1-7; 4. 13 This is the sentimentally protective kind that regrets the infusion of cultural aliens, as expressed, for example, by right-leaning, anti-immigration parties in Europe. Sentiments of this kind can be found in Samuel Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenge to America's National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).

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religion, rote learning, and economic choice have to combine to make a good citizen. Multiculturalism, as a policy goal in many Western societies, is not without detractors, and for good reason. So far it has not led to easy and plausible successes. Or perhaps it has, but the successes have been overshadowed by what may be judged as stunning failures. The failure of multiculturalism-manifested in the absence of successful integration-has been seen in murderous attacks by Muslims and the race riots (in some of the urban centres of the northern UK in 2001 and in France's banlieues in 2005 and to some extent two years later). The problem may be seen, as has been suggested by detractors of multiculturalism, to lie in 'too much freedom for immigrants and their descendants to adhere to their culture'! The question is: has the officially supported tolerance opened the door for an unwillingness of cultural-other immigrants to accept Western values and viewpoints, allowed refusal to acquire the ability to speak the language of the land, encouraged the formation of tight-knit inward oriented communities that lead parallel lives, and purposely do not interact, with the majority society? Defenders cite alienation as the cause, engendered by rejection, non-availability of the host country's identity, economic disenfranchisement, ghettoisation, poverty, and the like. When 'race riots' broke out in the northern UK early in 2001 (before 9/11) this nation asked itself whether it had permitted multiculturalism to go too far. As groups of 'ethnic' and 'British' youths battled each other and the police in a baffling and brutal show of mutual hostility, multiculturalism must have seemed a tragic cul-de-sac. Subsequently, the Cantle report (2001), 14 commissioned by the then home secretary, David Blunkett, intimated that British multiculturalism and its best intentions of providing a maximum of freedom of cultural choice and identity construction, had failed. This policy, conspicuous by the absence of a concerted effort to develop an awareness of comman citizenship, had apparently led to the entrenchment of ethnic communities with strongly exclusivist identities. Residential, physical, and emotional segregation, and lack of day-to-day interaction with cultural others, led to the formation of 'parallel lives' in which people were rarely confronted with cultural alterity. Single-faith schools and

14 T. Cantle, Community Cohesion: a Report of the Independent Review Team Chaired by Ted Cantle (London: the Home Office, 2001).

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educational segregation, as much as ghettoisation, reinforced preexisting parochial ethnic identification among immigrant groups. The maintenance of, as one must surmise, mutually hostile, inward-looking, ethnic identities created a powder keg situation. Little was done to inculcate commonalities such as a sense of common citizenship and common national interests. 15 One can read this report to mean that the maintenance of strong ethnic and sub-national identifications has led to this crisis. However, France's road of being more aggressively assimilationist and placing an emphasis on the inculcation of a French identity above all else, also seemed spectacularly unsuccessful. In both countries Muslims were not the only group causing the mayhem, but they were disproportionately well represented. As reported in the world media, the Netherlands soon followed the path of hand-wringing self-analysis over the agonising question whether its almost proverbial cultural liberalism had opened the door for illiberal attitudes among its immigrant Muslim community, heralding severe strains in the ideological make-up of the nation. Above all, very conservative minded Moroccan migrants seemed to be in the forefront of attacking the liberal sexual mores and relaxed style of the Dutch and demanding the introduction of harsher Islamic views. The resulting soul-searching produced the counter-phenomenon of Pim Fortuyn, a homosexual who worried that in his own birth country, through an Islam-influenced moral climate, he would become a second-class citizen, or even worse. (Interestingly, homosexuality and Islam have not openly crossed swords in New Zealand.) It also heightened the debate on whether the identity of a nation changes by allowing immigrants too much freedom and the democratic right to propagate their values and beliefs, and whether the expected changes in fact produce a desirable outcome. Should the old adage be enforced: 'when in Rome do as the Romans do', forestalling the possibility of change insinuated by an emboldened immigrant minority? This issue of integration and adaptation, and the effects on national identity shall be addressed in the next chapter.

15 Other factors such as unemployment, drugs and biased newspaper reporting were also blamed by the report. France was facing a similar situation in even more severe form. Other socio-economic factors besides unemployment, such as discrimination in the economic infrastructure, ghettoisation, and crime are equally important. However, ethnic-cultural identification and identity distinction do play a significant role, especially in exacerbating the sense of alienation and disenfranchisement.

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Another impressive example, though on a different scale, of the flaws of an exaggerated multiculturalism and of impasses created by excessive cultural liberalism is supplied through Unni Wikan's 16 description of how the rights of a Norwegian citizen were trampled on by the Norwegian state in the name of the cultural rights of immigrants. A young, underage woman of Moroccan immigrant parentage tried to resist being shipped off to North Africa by her father, a refugee in Norway, to be married to an older man in Morocco according to local custom. Unwilling to consent, she, as a Norwegian citizen by virtue of birth in the country, applied for help to the authorities, but failed in her bid to enlist the protection of the state. The outcome was tantamount to an abrogation of Norwegian law in favour of Moroccan traditional custom 17 and resulted in a massive violation of the girl's human rights. One must wonder: did she become a victim of exaggerated multiculturalism? The murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004 put the seal on this question and gave it a new twist. The deed was perpetrated by a Dutch-born and raised Muslim of immigrant Moroccan parentage. He was angered by a film van Gogh in cooperation with the Somali-born Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali, herself a (former) Muslim, had made, which he saw as insulting to Islam. Similarly, and falling into the same groove, 7/7 in London was also carried out by young British born and/or raised Muslim men. More recent attacks in 2007 seem to have been perpetrated by foreign-born Muslims who were working in sound professional jobs in the UK and had seemed well adjusted. The far-reaching consequence was that people and politicians began to ask, does integration work, and is Muslim immigration desirable? Proponents of multiculturalism who are Muslims, pushed into the defensive by these events, seem at a loss to come up with sound arguments to counter rising Islamophobia. Prevailing conditions only seem to strengthen their 'victim mentality'. 18

16 Unni Wikan, Generous Betrayal: Politics of Culture in the New Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). 17 As distinct from Islamic canonical law, sharia, which does not explicitly support under-age marriage. 18 See for example Bashy Quraishy, 'Immigration, Integration and Islam'; Mustafa Malik, 'Muslim Pluralize the West, Resist Assimilation', and, 'Islam in Europe's Quest for a Paradigm'. In two books and various other writings Tariq Ramadan, a leading European Muslim leader and academic, admonishes his fellow religionists to drop this mentality. See Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim (Leicester UK: Islamic

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Multiculturally instigated freedoms of religion and cultural tradition, underpinned by human rights legislation, may produce conflicts with rules, laws, and conventions of the host state and the majority society. This in itself is not an entirely new phenomenon. In the course of globalisation, the integrity and sovereignty of the nation-state and its hitherto unchallenged right to make coercive rules and enforce them rigorously are increasingly being undermined. As immigration by culturally diverse populations brings about an ever greater diversity of cultures and religions coexisting in close national proximity, the laws, norms, and conventions of host societies face new challenges. This affects immigrants as much as the host societies and the state framework. Strict religious adherence of minorities in secularist societies may be one major source of problems in which the civil liberties of some are pitted against the liberties or rights of others. Multiculturalism, through the freedom it offers, has the capacity to magnify these issues and to create a situation within a national framework in which the cultural liberties of some will openly grate against the civil liberties of others. Potential sources of conflict in the case of Islam are everpresent. The right to blaspheme, to be openly homosexual, to worship 'false gods' or none at all may create issues for people who themselves can express their religiously grounded objections under the same aegis of freedom to be what they are. To what extent can or should a liberal democracy constrain some citizens so as to preserve liberties for all and even defend itself against attacks on the very principles and values that inspire it? Karl Popper's 'The Open Society and its Enemies' grappled with the problem of to what extent an open democratic society can defend its liberal values without becoming illiberal itself. The images of the enemy Popper had in mind were of an infinitely more pernicious kind than the issues referred to here. Even the image of bin Laden and the absolutist theocratic state pales into insignificance when compared with the excesses of the political ideologies Popper was arguing against. The accent under multiculturalism is somewhat different though: it is not so much how a liberal democracy can defend itself against a powerful ideological adversary, but how can its liberal

Foundation, 1999); and Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

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attitude do justice to all and remain intact in the face of another culture's illiberalism?19 Multiculturalism in New Zealand is not articulated in either law or statute, but is inherent in the abrogation of the assimilation policy and the state-decreed cultural homogenisation. 20 (If pressure towards assimilation exists, it is not through law or policy, but is woven into the discourses of daily life.) Multiculturalism is also reflected in various official institutions such as the Ethnic Affairs Office within the Department of Internal Affairs, Human Rights Commission, the office of the Race Relations Commissioner, government-sponsored interfaith activities and some legal instruments that guarantee religious freedom and a degree of acceptance of cultural diversity. These institutional and legal instruments serve the purpose of securing a high degree of cultural and religious freedom, and ensure absence of discrimination. They also seek to ensure equal participation in the public sphere of cultural others and to avoid marginalisation of minority groups. Of course they cannot guarantee absolute practical adherence to this doctrine in the social discourse and eliminate all kinds of discriminatory and disparaging expressions towards cultural aliens in the wider society. In a liberal democratic society a minority also has the right to self-segregation if it so desires. This is the case, for instance, with some Christian sects who waive their right of democratic participation and other Christian groups who choose to physically withdraw from majority society. A certain inward-looking attitude has also been intimated about recently immigrated Somalis, but this is probably not a lasting phenomenon. The current debate surrounding multiculturalism and state responses was not occasioned by Muslim immigration-as is the case in Europe-but was originally stimulated by the numerous presence of Polynesian Pacific islanders. The 'White New Zealand' policy was officially abandoned in 1974 with the formulation of a non-racist immigration policy, but had been undercut for many years prior to that by

19 See Chandran Kukathas, 'Cultural Toleration', in Ethnicity and Group Rights, ed. I. Shapiro and W. Kymlicka (New York, London: New York University Press, 1997): 69-104. 20 Only aspects of Maori culture and political participation of the Maori minority (about 15 percent of the total population) are written into statute and enjoy active government support.

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some Pacific Islander immigration. Polynesians have for some time had an exceptional status in the interest of good neighbourly relations and traditional ties. A strong Dutch immigration in the 1950s did not instigate a desire for multiculturalism, as they, as much as Scandinavians and Germans had done before, assimilated easily to the point of practically disappearing as an ethnic entity within a generation or two. A dribble of Lebanese also had little effect in creating a multicultural debate. It is an unfortunate truism that Muslim immigrants are considered problematic wherever they form sizeable minorities in Western societies. New Zealand Muslims have had their share of unfavourable attention, although serious conflict as experienced in other countries has been avoided. It is not the low economic position or social isolation that causes concern, but there are issues of national security. Equally prominent in current concerns is the underlying undisputable potential of Islamic conservatism to create barriers to successful integration despite even the most vigorous multicultural policy encouragement. Muslims, as well as other minorities, are now undoubtedly beneficiaries of greater acceptance in this area, which has been stimulated by the Pacific immigration. The degree of tolerance in the official and public discourse of cultural otherness is notable. Practically, however, in the social discourse, Muslims, more than any other minority, are suffering to some extent from an image distorted by the actions of a tiny global extremist minority. Although this negative perception is not supported by any action of the national New Zealand Muslim minority, it is for the largest part responsible for acts of discrimination and attack on Muslims. These sporadic expressions of Islamophobia sit uneasily in the usual behaviour of mainstream society. They are all the more paradoxical as New Zealand completely lacks any bad experience with its Muslim minority. Leaving aside the incorrigible racism of white supremacism and the sad reality of a universally ubiquitous sense of xenophobia, it is simply the-in New Zealand's case, unfounded-fear of a dangerous potential inherent in 'Islam' that leads to Islamophobic acts. Such acts, when they occur, also have the effect among Muslims of putting the official protestations of multicultural openness to shame. When I addressed this issue with Muslims, most maintained-for reasons of courtesy, I presume, at least as much as for reasons of sincere conviction-that such events do not shake their belief in the fundamental tolerance of New Zealand society. No one

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expressed serious doubt concerning the good intentions of the current policies of multiculturalism. Official recognition in New Zealand of the importance of multiculturalism took hold some time ago: an awareness that with increasing pluralisation of the population and strong globally drawn immigration, now going substantially beyond the confines of Europe and the Pacific, ethnic and cultural diversity not only has to be allowed and 'managed', but fostered and supported by law. Laissez-faire tolerance is not enough. The value of a strategic approach that seeks to preserve and respect the culture of minorities yet achieves harmonious integration is clearly recognised. New Zealand subscribes tacitly to the view that when migrants' cultural choices are respected, including the choice to maintain important aspects of their religion, they can feel included in the host society. New Zealand's multiculturalism is of a very cautious kind in that it is unspecific and not clearly enunciated in policy or law. It is implicit in a number of institutions and statutes, but perhaps more clearly revealed in the willingness in actual cases to strike cultural compromises. Multiculturalism simply represents a national microcosm of cultural and ethical globalisation in that it is based on a loose sense of a tolerant pluralism and a vague consensus about mutually binding rules. It assumes rational goodwill on the part of immigrants to reconcile themselves with the fact that cultural tolerance does not entail total freedom for cultural others to live entirely in accord with their customs, rules, and traditions. Concessions to cultural peculiarities are made as the need arises, as long as these do not deviate too distinctly from the civil and penal code. New Zealand has been fortunate in encountering few disturbances so far. (Some examples are referred to later.) As with other minority groups-with the exception of the indigenous minority-Muslims are not targeted by policy, 21 either advantaging or disadvantaging them, or deliberately curbing their religious and cultural traditions. Cultural pluralism is accepted as a fait accompli and Muslims and Islam are tacitly subsumed. Some laws may seem oppositional to conservative Islamic beliefs and particular customs practised in specific regions. Only a very few may come in direct

21 One exception is the current police policy to alert staff to cultural sensitivities, as discussed later. Another is the law proscribing genital mutilation.

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conflict with what one rather vaguely and conveniently might call 'mainstream' Islam. It is only when one highlights aspects of a theoretical, highly dogmatic form of sharia or a few exotic customs-of which it is debatable whether they are actually part of the sharia-that contradictions and conflicts with Western customs and laws emerge. This allows Muslims, by and large and with few modifications, to live comfortably in the New Zealand social context. This is so despite the fact that indirectly, as far as the Muslim minority is concerned, Sebastian Poulter's dictum,22 which he articulated for the UK, applies: viz., that Muslims can only practice Islam as a religion and not as a total way of life. For a majority of New Zealand Muslims this does not appear to pose a practical problem. Liberal attitudes and religiously neutral policies of the secularist state allow the creation of private as well as officially sanctioned spaces for Muslims to practise their religion with few obstacles. The life world of a 'mainstream' orthopractical Muslim usually runs up against few boundaries limiting their ability to manifest their beliefs. The liberal official stance in cultural and religious matters is fairly clearly reflected in a diffuse sense of tolerance in the New Zealand public. A newspaper's summer poll of 1,003 persons concluded that New Zealanders are fairly evenly split in considering New Zealand's Muslims a part of 'mainstream society' (with all the ambiguities that go with this concept) and, what is more, in considering it appropriate for Muslim women to wear the burqaY While this is not an overwhelming majority acceptance, in international comparison this is not necessarily a bad result. Indirectly, it also reflects a certain degree of acceptance of the policy of multiculturalism. Again, nearly half of 22 Sebastian Poulter, Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: the England Experience, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1998); 236.: "... it is inevitable, however, that they [Muslims living in Britain] will have to accept that in England Islam can only be followed as a religious faith and not pursued as an all-embracing way of life'. See also Poulter, 'Multiculturalism and Human Rights for Muslim Families in English Law', in God's Law versus State Law, ed. M. King (London: Guy Seal, 1995): 81-90. 23 The New Zealand Herald, 2January2007, online. The Otago Daily Timesof3/ll07 placed a more negative emphasis on this information by writing: "The poll .... found that that 47% of the 1003 people interviewed felt that Muslims were not everyday people living within the community, against 41% who felt they were'. The phrasing of the poll question placed emphasis on the concept of 'mainstream society', which may have inclined the result slightly towards the negative. However, considering someone not mainstream is not necessarily an indicator of hostility or rejection. It possibly indicates only a slight eccentricity of Muslims as members of society. Twelve percent did not respond, did not care, or refused to answer.

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respondents accepting Muslim women wearing the all-covering burqa in public is a reasonably good result, considering that this garment is a potentially divisive issue. It not only goes against Western aesthetics, but is often assumed to be an indicator of fundamentalism and an unwillingness to 'fit in'. The diffuse practical sense of ethnic and cultural tolerance extant in the general public is reflected in a statement on the Human Rights Commission website: 24 'New Zealand is a secular society with a record of tolerance for religious diversity, and no specific legal restriction on religious groups'. This rather vague sense of tolerance is undergirded by legal instruments, which in combination secure cultural and religious rights and de facto produce a climate of multiculturalism although it is not officially declared as such. Religious and cultural freedom is guaranteed within the limits of criminal law. The Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993, above all, secure a relatively extensive degree of freedom, expressly allow for the manifestation of one's culture (and religion) in actual practice, and protection against discrimination.

Secularisation and the Right to Religion From its very beginnings as a political entity New Zealand was secularised to a considerable extent. Although post-modernist religious tolerance had not yet descended, the country did not import religious fanaticism from Europe, nor did Maori traditionally have a taste for sectarian infighting. (For them tribal conflicts and likes or dislikes for European settlement were the major reasons for engaging in war-like action.) By and large, with few and small-scale exceptions, there were no pressing religious reasons for immigrants to seek the distant shores of New Zealand, although some did come as small religious communities seeking a new beginning. This distinguishes New Zealand from the USA and its pioneer beginnings. Following Max Weber's argument presented in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, one could therefore argue that this was the reason why ideologically New Zealand is now quite different from the US, where the Puritan

24

www.hrc.co.nz

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spirit shaped the national identity,25 and also why it was seen necessary to create a constitutional 'fire wall' (the First Amendment) separating politics from religion in America but not in New Zealand. Typically, the Treaty ofWaitangi of 1840-probablyNew Zealand's most important historical document-has little to say about religion. Through the brevity of a mention of it in a footnote it reveals that early secularist tendency. Rating no more than a few lines in the Maori version, the note was a hastily added afterthought at the request of the Catholic bishop Pompallier who was afraid his missionary activity might be elbowed aside by Protestantism. It refers to several religions, including ritenga Maori,26 with distinct equanimity as equals. Probably contrary to the wishes of his missionary advisors, Hobson did not see it as his political business to regulate religion. 27 It is clear that giving religion, whether Christianity or a particular denomination, a privileged status was far from Hobson's agenda. In mid-nineteenth century, religious divisions and antagonisms within Christianity had lessened in Europe as the importance of state-supported Christianity had declined to the extent that other religions were no longer considered objectionable or contemptible. Religious fervour existed here and there in early New Zealand in the form of localised religious movements or cults, but spasmodic sectarian feuding characteristically was carried out in the courts and not the streets. There was of course the ubiquitous missionary activity to convert the 'heathens', but in general it was not of a fanatical fire-brand version. Consequently, in developing the country constitutionally there was no need for secular politics to protect itself, the state, and its business from church influence. Nowadays, Christian

25 See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (several editions at various times). 26 Ritenga in the context of its mention in the treaty means Maori religion, although in the understanding of the day it may have had the connotation of'superstition'. In a political context today ritenga is understood in a much wider sense as Maori culture. The term ritenga has been replaced in the official language with the word tikanga, which lacks the derisory undertone of the early missionaries. 27 A favourable reading of the Maori version of the Waitangi Treaty of 1840, by some stretch of the imagination, might see this as a guarantee of religious freedom in principle. (See Claudia Orange, The Treaty ofWaitangi (Wellington: Allen & Unwin, 1987); 53; Erich Kolig, 'Coming through the Backdoor? Secularisation in New Zealand and Maori Religiosity', in The Future of Christianity, ed. J. Stenhouse and B. Knowles (Adelaide: ATF Press, 2004): 183-204; 196. However, one could also interpret this passage as an exclusionary clause. In that it makes reference to quite specific religions (some Protestant denominations, Catholicism and Maori religion) it may imply that other religions, not named, are prohibited.

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symbolism is retained in the public discourse only in vestigial form in a very few religious ritualistic gestures carried out in association with state functions and parliament. While Christian church protocol and references to Christianity may continue to be used at times (for example, in parliamentary prayers,28 the national anthem, and swearing an oath on the Bible) nowadays for many ceremonial occasions Christian ceremony is often set aside for the sake of ceding ceremonial prominence to tikanga Maori, which may or may not involve Christian elements. 29 At times committed Christians have complained about the lack of reference to Christianity in the public discourse, but, on the whole, mainstream churches have acquiesced into their rather insignificant social-political role. In February 2008, in the spirit of religious pluralism, Islamic prayers were held at the opening of a Dunedin city council meeting of the city of Dunedin. There are no Muslims on the city council nor was anything specifically concerning Muslims on the day's agenda; it was simply a gesture of goodwill towards the local Muslim community and a demonstration of multicultural openness. The recent government pamphlet on religious diversity-.3° states that 'New Zealand has no official or established religion', although it does not mention its secularised status. The rejection of society's religious roots, faint as they were from the beginning, is certainly conducive to the laissez-faire tolerance exhibited today towards all religions. Islam does not have to contend against the established ideological force of a state religion or deeply entrenched Christian traditionalism. For Muslims, by far the greater problem is the fact that a highly secularised society does not provide the religious reference points and stimuli for a committed Muslim as a Muslim majority society would. This makes living as a devout Muslim a matter of constant vigilance and purposeful planning. It also creates communities of religionists that are more cohesive than they would be otherwise. In matters of morality, in many instances, Muslims differ from a highly secularised society, and in some instances share a common ground with a minority of fundamentalist Christians: for instance in their opposition to the 28 In May 2007, members of parliament were polled by the speaker, Margaret Wilson, whether they wanted to retain the prayer that starts each sitting, and if so, whether they wanted the wording changed with a view to making it more religionneutral Surprisingly, the outcome encouraged retention of the status quo. 29 The Otago Daily Times, 19 February 2008, 5. It caused some caustic comments in letters to the editor of the local newspaper. 30 Religious Diversity in New Zealand: Statement of Religious Diversity (2007).

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liberalisation of sexuality and sexual mores, such as prostitution, the legalisation of homosexuality, same-sex marriage, and abortion; a strong interest in strengthening the institution of heterosexual marriage and the family; and other issues of conservative morality. As a matter of principle, the idea of human agency in devising laws and changing rules of human conduct at will is contrary to Islam's theacentrism and its overriding doctrine of the immutability of divine law. This emerges strongly in cases of enactment of laws designed to liberalise sexual matters. These concerns create a common bond with other religions or rather their conservative wings that hold similar views. 31 There is, however, a paradox built into this situation, insofar as conservative and fundamentalist Christianity is not usually a supporter of multiculturalism that enshrines equal rights for other religionists to practise their faith. That makes Muslims in many instances a 'bedfellow' with radical political agendas, which, together with cultural liberalism, push for ethicalliberalisation and the rejection of conservative moralism. Secularity of state and government, though not constitutionally engraved in stone, is one of the most prominent canons of New Zealand. Benign indifference-or euphemistically expressed: neutralitycharacterises the usual approach of the state towards religious matters. Somewhat incongruous with that, former Prime Minister Helen Clark and her Labour-led government showed a distinct interest in interfaith affairs, frequently maintaining an official, highest-level presence at national and international interfaith activities and religious festivities (Divali, Islamic eids, etc.). For instance, Prime Minister Clark was present at the last international interfaith meeting-officially titled 'the Third Asia-Pacific Regional Interfaith Dialogue' -at Waitangi on 29th to 31st February 2007. It was cosponsored by New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, bringing together faith and community leaders from fifteen Southeast Asian and South Pacific countries. Declarations made by Clark at this occasion to the effect that all 31 While one may be tempted to regard Muslims as morally conservative, it may not be true that they en bloc pose the strongest opposition to ethicalliberalisation (according to Christchurch Central MP Tim Barnett, pers. comm. to my research assistant, Dr. Ian Clarke, November 2004). Labour Party conferences are usually attended by several Muslim delegates, their number being proportionately far above the percentage of Muslims in the total population. They are attracted, according to Barnett, by the multiculturalist, culturally liberal agenda of the party.

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religions are equally respected in New Zealand-obviously aimed at appeasing Muslim neighbour states (Indonesia and Malaysia)-were resented by some fundamentalist Christian churches. They perceived the New Zealand government to be going out of its way to assure its neighbours-in particular with regard to Islam-that the nation has no official religion and to confirm that all religions are deemed equal. As a result there were protest demonstrations by Christian fundamentalist organisations condemning this official line and demanding that Christianity be declared the official religion of New Zealand. Needless to say, the government showed no inclination to follow this demand and countermand its own initiatives aimed at further reducing the influence of Christianity in political and social affairs, while at the same time emphasising the equality of all religions. The Statement on Religious Diversity-32 reads: New Zealand is a country of many faiths with a significant minority who profess no religion. Increasing religious diversity is a significant feature of public life. At the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, Governor Hobson affirmed, in response to a question from Catholic Bishop Pompallier, "the several faiths (beliefs) of England, of the Wesleyans, of Rome, and also Maori custom shall alike be protected" This foundation creates the opportunity to reaffirm an acknowledgment of the diversity of beliefs in New Zealand. Christianity has played and continues to play a formative role in the development of New Zealand in terms of the nation's identity, culture, beliefs, institutions and values. New settlers have always been religiously diverse, but only recently have the numbers of some of their faith communities grown significantly as a result of migration from Asia, Africa and the Middle East. These communities have a positive role to play in our society. It is in this context that we recognise the right to religion and the responsibilities of religious communities. International treaties including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights uphold the right to freedom of religion and belief-the right to hold a belief; the right to change one's religion or belief; the right to express one's religion or belief; and the right not to hold a belief. These rights are reflected in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and Human Rights Act. The right to religion entails affording this right to others and not infringing their human rights.

32

'Religious Diversity pamphlet; also www.hrc.eo.nz/religiousdiversity.

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The following statement provides a framework for the recognition of New Zealand's diverse faith communities and their harmonious interaction with each other, with the government and with other groups in society: 1. THE STATE AND RELIGION. The State seeks to treat all faith communities and those who profess no religion equally before the law. New Zealand has no official or established religion. 2. THE RIGHT TO RELIGION. New Zealand upholds the right to freedom of religion and belief and the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of religious or other belief. 3. THE RIGHT TO SAFETY. Faith communities and their members have a right to safety and security. 4. THE RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. The right to freedom of expression and freedom of the media are vital for democracy but should be exercised with responsibility. 5. RECOGNITION AND ACCOMMODATION. Reasonable steps should be taken in educational and work environments and in the delivery of public services to recognise and accommodate diverse religious beliefs and practices. 6. EDUCATION. Schools should teach an understanding of different religious and spiritual traditions in a manner that reflects the diversity of their national and local community. 7. RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES. Debate and disagreement about religious beliefs will occur but must be exercised within the rule of law and without resort to violence. 8. COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING. Government and faith communities have a responsibility to build and maintain positive relationships with each other, and to promote mutual respect and understanding.

New Zealand, both in its public sphere and in terms of religious commitment of the wider society, is highly secularised. It may be said that the nation's indifference towards its own religious roots allows it to be easily tolerant of religious persuasions of all kinds. Benign indifference towards any kind of religious belief is the hallmark of the secular, liberal democratic state. All forms of religious belief are tolerated up to the point when they may openly and alarmingly conflict with existing criminal laws. Some Christian religious leaders have been legally arraigned for using coercion, or practising child and drug abuse. There have, for instance, been cases when parents denied their children 'the necessaries of life' for religious reasons, such as surgical intervention, blood transfusion, and the like. In doing so they either believed that prayer would effect a miraculous cure or fatalistically accepted 'God's will'. In recent years there were also cases when in the attempt to exorcise a person's demons, the person in question was killed. When human life is lost or gravely endangered, the law shows little sympathy for such religious practices, whether they be Christian or of any

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other faith (even tikanga Maori would come under close scrutiny). A related Muslim case of invoking miraculous, curative, and charismatic powers was a Sufi act of ratif(self-mutilation) in 2001. It went wrong, leading to serious injury. The police became involved, but in the end no charges were brought. In accord with a strict separation of church and state, the state does not expect religious denominations to intervene in state matters, or even ascend to prominence in the social discourse. Conversely, it normally abstains, as the rarity of interventionist cases shows, from interfering in religious matters. One might even say that religious belief in abstracto is freer than in Europe, where in some countries, for instance, Scientology and other 'cults' do not enjoy that freedom, either because of a lack of official recognition or because their very existence represents a breach of the criminal code. In New Zealand no such restrictions exist. Religious organisations do not require state approval to function. The Bill of Rights Act 1990 not only guarantees freedom of all belief, but also the right of manifesting this belief in actual conduct. Necessarily and logically there are potential conflicts arising out of this guarantee in actual social life. In particular Islam shows a potential for conflict as will be shown later in some concrete cases. Customary Muslim practices-which the practitioners regard as quintessentially Islamic-and the canonical sharia, i.e. the code of conduct anchored in the sacred scriptures, may contain aspects that in some instances may conflict with New Zealand law.

Legal Instruments An ideological climate of recognition of human rights and, as an integral part of them, the freedom of religion and culture, pervades the whole world as it is being carried on the wave of globalisation. Since the United Nations-sponsored Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted on 10 December 1948, New Zealand has dutifully signed and ratified several agreements along these lines: the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1963), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1967), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1967) and the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981). These are all instruments, which in one form or another, directly or

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indirectly, underpin the right and freedom to religion and culture. New Zealand prides itself on its exemplary record in the area of supporting human rights and living up to the expectations raised by the United Nations engendered human rights agenda. A fly in the ointment was that the United Nations Committee on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination found in 2005 that the Foreshore and Seabed Act breached the convention. Another blot on New Zealand's previously unblemished human rights record occurred when the United Nations Rapporteur on the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples visited New Zealand in 2005 and found significant failings, which he highlighted in his report. 33 Islamic human rights formulations emulating and designed to rival the United Nations agenda-such as, above all, the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (1981) and the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam adopted by the 19th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Cairo on 5 August 1990-have a different tenor. Although superficially similar to the United Nations sponsored charters, the Islamic declarations introduce a cryptic emphasis that slants them away from Western anthropocentrism and individualism towards theocentrism and collectivism. While the Western inspired conventions prefer to speak of rights and protections, the Islamic stress duties and responsibilities to the divine. Not surprisingly, New Zealand shows neither interest in nor recognition of these Islamic instruments. The Islamic world is not considered paradigmatic in observance of the international human rights charters. Muslims enjoy a number of protective devices in New Zealand, which, as some recognise and applaud, create more personal security for them as Muslims than they would enjoy in a number of Muslim majority countries. Most Muslims of my acquaintance appear satisfied with the protection and freedoms accorded them and guaranteed through the country's well functioning legal system. One man commented, for instance, that here he is free to visit the mosque as often as he likes, whereas in his home country all too frequent visits would arouse the suspicion of security forces.

33 Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, on

his mission to New Zealand (16-26 November 2005), United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission of Human Rights; E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3, 13 March 2006.

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Briefly in 2005, the question arose whether the government should legislate to criminalise so-called hate speech. A parliamentary select committee process was set in motion. It was not meant primarily to protect Muslims against religious taunts, but they may have become beneficiaries of such legislation. In fact, the proposers of such law may have thought they would be able to curb Islamic extremist utterances in this way. Then Justice Minister Phil Goff, however, cast doubt on the appropriateness of such legislation and rejected the idea, saying it would go against freedom of expression. While freedom of speech and expression is a cherished public good (and is encoded in the Bill of Rights Act sections 13 and 14), it is rarely recognised that it is limited by the existence of several laws that all seek to eliminate extremist and excessively destructive language from public discourse. Actionable are such utterances that can be construed as incitement to violence or breaking the law, or the use of words to encourage someone to commit an offence. There are also defamation laws. These are all part of the criminal law code to provide protection from hateful utterances. The Broadcasting Act 1993 prohibits denigration of individuals on the basis of gender, race, age, disability, occupation, or because of religious, cultural, or political beliefs. Aside from these notable examples that clearly seek to enforce a civilised discourse in an acceptable style of rhetoric by knocking off the roughest edges of negative prejudices, it seems the argument prevails that socially it is preferable that hateful thoughts be permitted to be vented in the public discourse, not simply for the sake of the ideal of freedom of expression, but for more practical reasons, namely that by exposing such views to public scrutiny they may, hopefully, be rejected. Putting in place restrictive legislation runs the risk that it would unjustifiably limit political debate in a democracy. Presumably, the premise here is that any legally permissible view, however repugnant, is less dangerous when it is promulgated than when banned. 34 In reality of course this ideal of far-reaching freedom of expression is very much hemmed in not only by laws but also by conventions, traditions, and social tastes.

34 In Europe this principle does not seem to universally apply to Holocaust denial, which is a criminal offence in several European nations. Hate speech restriction in Victoria, Australia, probably intentioned to muzzle Islamic radicalism has recently been turned on its head by Muslims when they used this law to bring a fundamentalist Christian group before the court for 'Islam-bashing'.

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The Human Rights Act 1993 (sections 61 and 63), which prohibits words that are likely to excite hostility or bring into contempt any group on the grounds of colour, race, ethnicity or place of origin, does not mention religion and thus would be useless from an Islamic viewpoint to protect this religion and its practitioners. It is, however, useful to Muslims from another point of view. New Zealand has no specific law against incitement to religious hatred or vilification or against insulting religion (as some European countries have). While enacting such legislation may be seen as in conflict with the cherished doctrine of freedom of speech, sacrilegiously caricaturing or satirising religious belief or offending a religious group does at times have consequences to the 'offender' When it happens, it usually demonstrates the collision between the right of expressing openly an opinion without fear, as befits an open democratic society, and bad taste and lack of compassion. However, there are also cases of gratuitous insults, such as when a factory in Germany produced toilet paper emblazoned with 'Koran' or the Italian case of toilet seat covers imprinted with Quranic verses. Here clearly the intent was to offer an insult to Islam and Muslims. Such acts, for example flushing a copy of the Quran down the toilet, as was reported from Guantanamo, speak a universally understood, albeit 'symbolic', language that expresses insult and ill-will. The sacrilegious association of divine contents with the function of excretion carries a very clear meaning. One wonders how New Zealand would deal with such a case. Nothing of this nature has occurred yet, or at least not been reported. 35 Blasphemy laws, which are still on the statute books, have not been used in decades (see the next chapter). If they were, it could be expected that in a society as highly secularised as New Zealand's the respective case would literally be laughed out of court. There may be a paradox contained in the blasphemy issue: committed Christians have complained that there is more understanding and sensitivity when it involves non-Christian denominations, while in fact blasphemy laws were designed in the first instance to protect Christianity. However, since then they have been rendered toothless through secularisation. Of more importance in a practical sense is the government's commit-

35 The reverse situation happened in Australia in December 2006, when Muslim boys in a Sydney Muslim school demonstratively urinated on the Bible. No charges were brought, although there was a wave of outrage going through the media

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ment to upholding complete religious freedom and guaranteeing freedom from discrimination. Religious intolerance and discrimination is kept at bay, among other things, by New Zealand being a signatory to the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981). Even though a declaration in international jurisprudence is of a lesser status than a convention or agreement, it appears to be of some gravity in forming a nation's international profile. New Zealand Muslims have had occasion only a very few times to touch on the issue of blasphemy in cases of grave importance to them. (For instance, the ructions of the Danish cartoon affair, and the ripples of the Rushdie affair reaching New Zealand.) There are of course other, less severe cases of blasphemy that seemed to have caused no stir among New Zealand's Muslim community: giving a teddy bear the name of Mohammad in Sudan in November 2007, for which an English teacher was sentenced and then pardoned; and imprinting fast food paper bags with Quranic verses-for which McDonald's apologised. Beyond laissez-faire tolerance and the laws mentioned before that may or may not indirectly provide protection to Muslim sensitivities, New Zealand provides two specific legal instruments of major importance that enshrine in principle religious and cultural freedom in law. Following the globalised human rights ideology, and now widely adopted in Western-style liberal democracies in particular, the country's parliament has enacted the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (1990) and the Human Rights Act (1993). Both together form the cornerstones of the country's pluralist society and underpin practical multiculturalism.36 While both protect freedom of culture and custom, the Human Rights Act seems primarily aimed at guarding against private discrimination in education, accommodation, and employment matters, while the Bill of Rights Act is more designed to preserve freedom of belief and worship from state interference for both individuals and minority communities.

36 See, for example, Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth, ed., Rights and Freedoms: The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993 (Welling-

ton: Brooker's, 1995); 226. For the practical workings of these legal instruments see Erich Kolig, 'New Zealand Muslims: The Perimeters of Multiculturalism and Its Legal Instruments', New Zealand Sociology 20, no. 2, (2005): 73-97.

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Secularised New Zealand officially proclaims indifference towards religion in any form. 37 Benign neglect is probably an apt description to characterise the state's and government's attitude towards religion. On the other hand, however, the previous government's Prime Minister Helen Clark and Ethnic Affairs Minister Chris Carter have been in the habit of making demonstrative appearances at some religious meetings and interfaith activities. This was clearly for the sake of promoting ethnic harmony. Normally the state, as well as society at large, show a conspicuous disinterest in religious engagement, which forms quite a useful background for officially promoting and advocating a laissezfaire sense of tolerance vis-a-vis all religious beliefs. It is hardly likely to stir great passions in large numbers of citizens. 38 An atmosphere of equanimity is politically seen as the best solution to demonstrate the kind of religious even-handedness required by multiculturalism. This is underscored by an official tendency to subsume religion under the rubric 'culture' and thus easily accede to religious freedom under an implicit heading of multiculturalism. Looking at the legal framework in New Zealand supporting religious freedom and multiculturalism, we find legislation based heavily on secular liberal universalist values of the kind that also inspires much of the legislation in the European Union. It is primarily designed to protect the rights of all minorities, religious or otherwise, from oppression or discrimination by the dominant society, and to minimise what has been called 'the terror of majority society' The Human Rights Act essentially seeks to prevent unlawful discrimination (part II section 21) in areas such as employment, education, residence, etc. against individuals, based on ethnicity, race, religion, nationality, gender, etc. 39 Internationally, Human Rights conventions and legislation are probably the best instrument for Muslim

37 Rex Ahd.ar, 'Endorsement, Neutrality or Suppression: What is the Best Government Policy for Christianity', in The Future of Christianity, ed. J. Stenhouse & B. Knowles (Adelaide: ATF Press, 2004): 105-130. Rex Ahd.ar and John Stenhouse, ed., God and Government: the New Zealand Experience (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2000). 38 Large-scale demonstrations and hikois (marches) relating to Maori cultural issues are outside our scope. Fundamentalist churches (such as the Destiny Church) may sometimes be able to rally a larger congregation in a particular political cause, but this has not caused a national disruptioiL 39 For a summary see the website of the Human Rights Commission, which acts as the gatekeeper of this law. For the year ending June 30, 2005, the Human Rights Commission received 1,862 complaints having an element of unlawful discrimination

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minorities to assert religious freedom and recognition and defend themselves against discrimination. 40 These conventions and relevant legislation have much traction in Western society, even though they are impinged upon nowadays by anti-terrorist legislation.41 Potentially there could be issues over the pragmatic effects of religious practice: for example, refusal to employ a Muslim if they insisted on taking Friday midday off to attend salat al-jummah (Friday noon prayer), refusal to allow a Muslim employee to celebrate the eids (the two fundamental holidays of eid al-adha and eid al-fitr), or to undertake the haj (pilgrimage to Mecca)-all fundamentally required expressions of Islamic piety. Similar problems could arise if an employer were to discriminate against a woman wearing the hijab-if an employer would be unwise enough to state a reason-or if the education system forbade Islamic dress. An employer seemingly objecting to the veil of a female employee or an applicant is certainly an issue that appears to arise frequently, as Muslim women often complain that they got the feeling it was their hijab that made them unsuccessful in job applications and personal interviews. Conversely, a Muslim employer might insist on all-male or all-female staff to prevent gender mixing, or insist on appropriate clothing of female staff and dismiss females for inappropriate dress. However, among the actual cases brought before the Human Rights Commission under the act, there seem to have been very few involving Islam. An older examination (pre-dating the current Human Rights Act) of the legality of employing only Muslim slaughterers for halal killing chains found the practice to be legal. 42 Disputes over school uniforms, including girls who wished to wear the hijab, have arisen in the past. The complainants and the Human Rights Commission decided to

under the Human Rights Act; 43 percent of these complaints were classified as unlawful discrimination on the grounds of religious belief. 40 H. Bielefeldt, 'Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate', Human Rights Quarterly 17 (1995): 587-617; 589. 41 In New Zealand the 'security risk certificate', for example, seems to allow human rights to be set aside. Earlier in 2004, the SIS Inspector General, Mr. Laurie Grieg, in reviewing the Ahmed Zaoui case, came to the conclusion that he did not have to take Mr. Zaoui's human rights into account. 42 When a Christchurch service station tried to advertise for active Christian employees, citing the Muslim slaughterer as a precedent, it was rejected. Peter Lineham, 'Government and Support for Churches in the Modern Era', in God and Government: the New Zealand Experience, ed. R. Ahdar and J. Stenhouse (Dunedin: Otago University Press, 2000): 56-57.

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pursue just one complaint as a test case, involving a 13 year old boy who wanted to wear long trousers rather than shorts. The case was found in his favour. 43 A landlord in dispute with Muslim tenants erected a sign advertising a (fictional) supplier of pork products, complete with a picture of a pig, in order to put pressure on the tenants. The commission found that this was a breach of the act and ordered the sign removed, although the tenants had already done that by the time of the order. 44 In a more recent website, the Human Rights Commission acclaims the '10 Human Rights cases that made a difference'. 45 It includes two Muslim complaints, which the Commission deems successfully resolved and exemplary. One is the Danish cartoon case, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. The other concerns the case of a devout Muslim who was treated poorly on an Air New Zealand flight because he was wrongly considered a security risk. Titled 'Religious leader on plane', the website describes the case in the following words: Mr Adam was a Muslim religious leader aboard a plane waiting to go overseas, where he would be speaking at a conference. He was a New Zealand resident but had dual citizenship and was not travelling on a New Zealand passport. He was dressed in traditional religious attire, and went to the toilet to perform some ritual ablutions before takeoff, as he intended reading some religious texts on the flight. Mr Adam took about ten minutes in the toilet, taking time to tidy it before leaving. After leaving the toilet, the flight attendant asked to see his passport, and escorted him off the plane. Airport security and police had been called, and had been conferring with flight staff about him. The officials questioned the validity of Mr Adam's passport which had an unfamiliar irregularity. The passport was then security checked while Mr Adam waited, and was cleared as valid. Despite this, Mr Adam was not allowed back on the flight to attend the conference, because he had "upset the staff" He was not given any information on how he had upset the flight staff beyond the passport query, and made a complaint to the Commission on the grounds of race and national origin. The Disputes Resolution Process: When contacted by the mediator, the airline confirmed that the time Mr. Adam had spent in the toilet was the cause of the "upset", and had caused Mr Adam to be viewed as a security risk. After Mr Adam's departure from the plane, the toilet

43 44

45

C149/94 Human Rights Commission 17 August 1994. C232/92 Human Rights Commission 22 March 1993. December 2006, Human Rights Commission online, 16pp.

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and the aisle in which he had been seated was searched. The decision to prevent Mr Adam from reboarding the flight was made jointly between airport security, police, and flight staff, but had been based on the flight staffs concern about Mr Adam's unusual "behaviour" The airline said that it had been following security protocols. Upon receiving the complaint, and with it, context about Mr Adam's actions and community standing, the airline agreed that he was not a security threat, realised the gravity and harmful impact of their actions, and were eager to resolve the issue through mediation. Outcome: The settlement of the complaint included a written apology to Mr Adam, a replacement air ticket, monetary compensation, a gift to his religious association, an agreement that Mr Adam's religious association would give a training session for airline staff on matters of religious and cultural practices, and a promise of a review of the airline's methods for dealing with possible security threats. Highlight: Mr Adam was satisfied with the level of engagement. His primary aim in taking the complaint was to prevent the same thing happening to other people. A Muslim was denied a service in a humiliating way because he was thought to be a security threat-but he initially complained to the Commission on the grounds of race rather than religious belief, as his nationality documents and physical appearance seemed to play a role in the incident. This case demonstrates the difficulties of multiculturalism very well. Both sides have acted correctly within their respective culture and within the context, but fall short of mutual sensitivity. While the airline staff handled the cultural aspect of the case poorly, probably more out of ignorance than malice, Mr. Adam's behaviour was not without problems either. Staff has a duty to ensure the safety of the flight and within the context would be remiss in this by ignoring Mr. Adam's behaviour. But a less embarrassing solution might have been found. On the other hand, Mr. Adam had apparently lived in New Zealand long enough to realise that his behaviour would arouse suspicion and under the circumstances the wisdom of engaging in it was questionable. Multiculturalism is based on the expectation that cultures display a certain flexibility and preparedness to make reasonable concessions. Islamic law does allow for such concessions. For instance, while encouraging ablutions (wudud) before one addresses important religious matters, it does not insist on elaborate physical cleaning and preening in all circumstances. The fact that it grants exceptions for travellers (and also in the absence of water) would have been known to the complainant who seems to be an expert in sharia. He might have chosen to avail himself of these exceptions.

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One interesting aspect of the Human Rights Act is that it allows for exemptions to the act on religious grounds for individuals and groups: for example, the Catholic Church in New Zealand cannot be prosecuted for gender discrimination. Its refusal to ordain women is not challenged as this is deemed to be an integral aspect of the religious creed. It will be interesting to see whether Islam will make similar claims with regard to issues conventionally regarded as gender-discriminatory by the majority culture.46 The Human Rights Commission decides on such exemptions in consultation with 'the appropriate religious authorities', which for Islam at present appears to be FIANZ (more specifically, its Ulama Board) and its affiliated regional associations. Somewhat differently, in the debate over whether two Afghan women could appear fully veiled in court to give evidence, the judge seems to have formally sought the opinion of a professor of religious studies, a non-Muslim, rather than Islamic authorities. Perhaps the question needs to be clarified whether the proper application of multicultural provisions in such cases should entail the formal recognition of culture-specific authorities. Most of the religious cases brought before the Commission, on cursory reading, involve fringe movements outside mainstream society, and which are unlikely to grow into large minorities strong enough to decisively influence legislation in the foreseeable future. They appear to be precisely the groups that religious provisions in the Bill of Rights and Human Rights Act were designed to protect. While Islam is in the same position in New Zealand at the moment, it will not necessarily remain so. Indeed, given European, US, and Australian examples, it is likely to grow into a far more significant community in the medium term. This raises the point that Islam may at some future time challenge the current legislative framework, raising issues beyond the scope of the context in which it was envisaged, and quite possibly contrary to the purpose envisioned by the Western secular humanism that largely inspired and shaped this legislation. Thus the potential for conflict may arise between liberal secular values and a politically active Muslim minority, using the multicultural framework established by these values to contest their universal validity.

46 To my knowledge Muslims have not sought exemption from the Crimes Amendment Bill (1994) to perform female circumcision. Presumably, only the relatively small Somali community may possibly be interested in this, but has so far chosen not to contest the law.

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In this vein, Paul Rishworth47 sees the decline of the official position of religion (i.e. Christianity) in New Zealand as a (potential) source of conflict over religious freedom. The source, as envisaged by him, seems to be the increased assertiveness of minority religions and the legal instruments they have at their disposal. In Europe, Islam has become involved in legal debates over a number of areas of daily life where what are considered to be important Islamic practices conflict with the pre-existing social norms, primarily in such matters as the construction of mosques, holidays, dietary laws, and dress codes.48 If this is a trend consequent to Muslim immigration it has not yet reached New Zealand. One outcome may be that the state, to preserve majority values, may begin to restrict the fledgling legal pluralism. Perhaps a hint of this was foreshadowed in the case of a Muslim preacher advocating the killing of homosexuals in a lecture on television in September 2003. While the reaction was that he is entitled to hold his religious views, the television station was found in breach of broadcasting standards.49 Thus freedom of religion may eventually have to be tempered more decisively with the right of the state to defend itself and to preserve the peace and civil liberties of others. 50 Let us turn to the other major piece of legislation that guarantees freedom of religion and culture. The New Zealand Bill of Rights is a statement of high-sounding ideals written in brief, straightforward language. It seems largely to have been modelled on the Canadian Bill of Rights, since Canada has a similar (English derived) legal system and a culturally pluralist society. Thus some of the legal debate surrounding the bill in Canada is generally applicable to New Zealand. A very important, indeed crucial, difference is section four of the New Zealand Bill, which in effect gives both pre-existing and new legislation

47 Paul Rishworth et al., The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2003); 280-1. Paul Rishworth, 'Coming Conflicts Over Freedom of Religion', in Rights and Freedoms: The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993, ed. G. Huscroft & P. Rishworth (Wellington: Brooker's, 1995); 226. 48 S. Ferrari. 'Islam and the Western European Model of Church-State Relations', in Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam in the European Union, ed. W.A. Shadid and P. van Koningsveld (Leuven; Sterling, Va: Peeters, 2002): 12-16. 49 The New Zealand Herald, 8 March 2004 online. The Broadcasting Standards Authority decision no. 2004-001 26/2/04. 50 B. Dickson, 'The United Nations and Freedom of Religion', International and Comparative Law Quarterly 44, no. 2 (1995): 327-357; 329.

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passed by parliament precedence over the Bill of Rights. Bills of rights are generally designed to provide a fundament of basic rights to protect individuals from persecution by the state, including the possibility of the 'tyranny of the majority' by a democratically elected legislature. This is not the case with the New Zealand Bill of Rights, in which parliament reserves the right to pass legislation that violates the bill at will. State bureaucracy, the legal system, etc. are bound to follow the bill only to the extent that specific legislation does not exist countermanding this. 51 The Bill contains two sections relating directly to religionP The relatively unproblematic Section 13 relates to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion-which also guarantees the right to freedom of belief, including the right to adopt and to hold opinions without interference. The more contentious section 15 refers to manifestation of religion and belief. Every person has the right to manifest their religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, or teaching, either individually or in community with others, and either in public or in private. This clause has been used to try to claim the right not to work on religious holidays, the right to refuse customers or dismiss employees and recently the right to give evidence in court while totally veiled (i.e., wearing the Islamic burqa). 53 For an orthopractic religion like Islam, this is potentially the most potent tool in their armoury to enforce the liberty to document their belief in actual social conduct in all sorts of manners. There are also section 19 (freedom from discrimination, for instance, on the grounds of religious belief) and section 20 (rights of minorities who as communities shall not be deprived of professing and practising their religion), which with some redundancy underpin the above sections. An attempt to limit freedom of expression for hateful speech in the name of religious teaching and articulating a theological point, as in the television case mentioned above, may in future cause problems. Virtually identical sections appear in the Canadian Bill of Rights, and indeed virtually identical positions on religion are found in a host

51 Paul Rishworth, 'The Birth and Rebirth of the Bill of Rights', in Rights and Freedoms: the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993, ed.

G. Huscroft & P. Rishworth (Wellington: Brooker's, 1995); 22. 52 See Rex Ahdar, 'Religious Liberty in a Temperate Zone: A Report from New Zealand', Emory International Law Review 21, no. 1 (2007): 205-238; 214. 53 This case will be explored more fully in the chapter on gender issues.

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of other documents such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the constitutional provisions of many EU member states. In this respect New Zealand is very much in line with other Western liberal democracies. There is an important difference with regard to the Canadian model and religion however. The Canadian courts have ruled that the religious provisions of their bill of rights amount to an implicit 'anti-establishment' clause, prohibiting the state from establishing any official religion. This may be explicit, i.e. declaring a state religion, or implicit, by favouring any particular religion over another. The second case is far more contentious, and this opinion has been used to prohibit any form of religious education in schools, prevent state funding to religious schools (except a number of Catholic schools as part of a 'historic tradition' rather than a precedent for any religion) and religious displays on state property. 54 New Zealand courts have never been asked to rule on whether the New Zealand Bill of Rights similarly contains an implicit 'anti-establishment' clause,55 largely because the legislative override enjoyed by the parliament has rendered many of these contentious issues moot. The education act specifically provides for limited religious education in state schools, and for the funding of the state curriculum component of religious schools. 56 This legislation would effectively prevent any objections to religious bias in state education based on the Bill of Rights. 57 The Muslim community has been able to take advantage of these provisions, allowing for the establishment of at least one statefunded Islamic school in Auckland, and the temporarily contentious Muslim prayer room at Hagley High School. We can then say that in New Zealand the Bill of Rights allows for more flexibility in the relationship between the state and various religions including Islam, limiting the transfer of power from the legislature to the judiciary, which has often been the effect of bills of rights in other countries. At the same time, it fails to provide a floor of rights in the event of a

Rishworth, 'Coming Conflicts'; 237-243. Rex Ahdar, 'New Zealand and the Idea of a Christian State', in God and Government: The New Zealand Experience, ed. RAhdar & J. Stenhouse (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2000): 59-76; 73-75. 56 Peter Lynch, 'Religious Education', in God and Government: The New Zealand Experience, ed RAhdar & J. Stenhouse, (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2000): 93-103; 98-99. 57 Rishworth, ibid.; 239. 54

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mainstream backlash against multiculturalism, theoretically allowing for persecution of religious minorities by a 'tyranny of the majority' Both the New Zealand and Canadian Bill of Rights were written by highly secular liberal interests with the intention of protecting the rights of minorities with different values from mainstream society. This may be relatively unproblematic when such minorities form a very small part of the population, but when they become larger there is the possibility that they will use this legislation to contest the cultural dominance as well as the secular liberal values of the host society (as has happened occasionally in the Netherlands or the UK for instance with regard to blasphemy laws, homosexuality, etc.). 58 It is to be expected that Islam will engage itself ever more vigorously in controversial moral issues (such as blasphemy, homosexuality, abortion, etc.). It would appear that the two major pieces of legislation described above provide, at least for the time being, a framework that makes sufficient allowance for practical multiculturalism, or more properly described, religious pluralism to unfold. Given the relatively small numbers of Muslims and the prevalent general desire among them to uphold Islamic doctrine without challenging the dominant system, for the moment a reasonable compromise between adaptation and religious freedom seems assured. If and when a more assertive form of Islam should emerge-which in the European experience seems to be linked with steeply rising numbers-the need for further negotiation of social space for the Islamic identity may become necessary. As the Muslim community in New Zealand grows in numbers and influence, some issues are becoming of increasing interest: to analyse reformulations of ideological systems associated with Muslim minorities in the West; the possible need for adaptation of Western legal systems to Muslims demands; 59 the impetus towards formal or informal reinterpretations of Islam to achieve a better fit within a Western cultural context (e.g. the creation of Euro-Islam as proposed by Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan) and to adapt to Western legal and

58 See, for instance, Johannes Jansen, 'Islam and Muslim Civil Rights in the Netherlands', in Muslims in Europe, ed B. Lewis and D. Schnapper (London, New York: Pinter, 1994): 39-53; and Michael King, 'Introduction', in God's Law versus State Law: The Construction of an Islamic Identity in Western Europe, ed M. King (London: Grey Seal, 1995): 1-10; 5. 59 See for instance Sebastian Poulter, 'Multiculturalism and Human Rights'.

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political frameworks; or alternatively, the use of a secular liberal legal framework by Muslim minorities to promote ideological positions that conflict with these values (on homosexuality, capital punishment, blasphemy, apostasy, gender equality, the right to preach an aggressive form of jihad, etc.). Alternatively, all-too vociferous challenges to Western liberalism may lead to the reformulations of secular human rights-based policies. The force of numerically strong and politically powerful internal minorities with distinctly different values that are perceived to be menacing may lead to restrictive initiatives to contain this influence while at the same time struggling to remain faithful to the values of liberty (e.g., in anti-terrorist legislation), or the use of liberal legislation by members of Muslim communities to attack, and enforce changes in, Islamic doctrine (e.g. by Muslim feminists against Islamic gender-discrimination and perceived misogyny, or by Muslim homosexuals against traditional attitudes to homosexuality). These social and ideological forces, which already make their presence felt in Western Europe, will direct and shape the forms of multiculturalism in the medium term. Aside from establishing liberty of religion in principle, multicultural society may also bring in specific laws supportive of specific religious requirements. In the UK, for instance, laws exempt Sikhs from wearing safety helmets; laws may exempt members of religious communities from military duty and the like. Some assistance laws60 may be possible under a regime of Western secular law, which, however, cannot be expected to grow into legal pluralism. What may be possible, and is already partially happening in New Zealand, is the recognition of Islamic marriage and divorce. The formation of sharia courts with limited jurisdiction (family law: marriage, divorce, inheritance mainly) as is happening in some European countries is not under consideration here. As experience shows, even when confined to family matters, the juxtaposition of two legal systems brings its own difficulties, for example, in mixed marriages. Other concessions to the Muslim community may be rendering assistance by extending, strengthening or re-interpreting blasphemy laws to suit Islamic needs, even though

60 See for instance Jacob Levy, 'Classifying Cultural Rights', in Ethnicity and Group Rights, ed. Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka (New York and London: New York Uni-

versity Press, 1997): 22-65. Levy distinguishes eight dusters oflaw, among them assistance laws, self-government, recognition and enforcement of customary law. It would be interesting to speculate to what extent Muslims may benefit from those.

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the difficulty here is to infringe as little as possible on freedom of speech and media. The reality is the secularist nature of New Zealand society, disinclined to make concessions to Christian sensitivities, is even less prepared to bend to accommodate strict Islamic notions. Some exemption laws would be conceivable: for instance, the wearing of veils for drivers, similar to the dispensation from helmet laws Sikhs enjoy in the United Kingdom. However, New Zealand is very sparing with such exemptions. Muslims may wish to have the right of home slaughter of sacrificial animals for eid al-adha celebrations, or may demand changes to Sabbatarian laws to allow Muslim shop owners to open on Christmas Day and Easter Sunday. Some adjustments are easily made, such as amendments to the Holiday Act, which would allow Muslims to celebrate eids, haj, salat al-jummah, etc. without having to depend on an employer's generosity. In New Zealand, disputes regarding such issues can in fact be dealt with under the aegis of the Human Rights Commission. Minority culture supportive legislation is a tricky business. The New Zealand example shows that such laws tend never to be considered enough. Maori culture is protected to some extent by legislation and policy. In December 2007 following a botched-up makutu (curse) lifting ritual that led to the death of a woman, the court's authority, which from an outsider's view may have appeared sympathetic enough to the accused, was challenged by Maori exponents, the gatekeepers of Maori culture, as culturally inappropriate. The charge was that the legal and court system is ill equipped to deal with Maori cultural issues, and some even questioned the authority of the courts to deal with Maori cultural issues at all. Legal pluralism to satisfy multiculturalism is a very tricky business. So one must wonder whether the creation of sharia courts would satisfy the gatekeepers of Islam. It speaks for the moderation of the Muslim community that it has not as yet demanded special consideration in the justice system. While at times Muslims have voiced their disappointment with outcomes in New Zealand society, there has been no orchestrated demand that the law be modified or amended to accommodate their culture or that a separate judicial system be set up for them. 61

61 Such demands were made, for instance, in the UK to change blasphemy laws to give protection to Islam, but with little success.

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'Racial' Harmony through Interfaith Activity

The generally amicable relationship between religious groups in society enhances this state-guaranteed religious freedom. Especially the three major monotheistic religions, Christianity, Judaism and Islam, express in various forms their common 'Abrahamic' bond. At the organisational level they routinely stress their solidarity, in particular in defence of the integrity of their shared beliefs. When it comes, for instance, to blasphemous insults offered by secular society to fundamental aspects of the dogma that all three religions share, even be it only vaguely, or when so-called 'racist' slurs are hurled at their religionists, a united front is presented. Statements of mutual support and solidarity expressing a common stance against discrimination and insults abound. Characteristically, not only Christian but also Jewish organisations have repeatedly come to the aid, practically as well as morally, of Muslims in injurious cases of discrimination or attack. The common denominator here is provided by the solidarity of minority groups, especially when they share a belief in what is seen, rightly or wrongly, as their common persecution or discrimination by majority society. Vice versa, the (previous) government recognised this bond and, drawing other non-monotheistic religions represented in New Zealand into it, utilised this commonality to strengthen its role in creating ethnic and racial harmony. 62 This official and strikingly strong support of interfaith activity may be surprising for a constellation in which the governing political party had repeatedly emphasised its decidedly secularist stance. Its paradoxical nature is, however, better understandable when one realises that interfaith support is grounded in a thorough basis of religious indifference, or neutrality to use an official euphemism, and is solely motivated by a utilitarian, if well-meaning, desire to engender social cohesion. Profound secularisation of state business offers few obstacles to a beneficent lip-service for religious recognition. All the more so, as benevolent government involvement is seen as well justified in fostering ethnic harmony and fits well into the unofficial multiculturalist policy.

62 At the time of writing, the change from a Labour-led government to a conservative one (at the end of 2008) was too recent for a discernible pattern to emerge. No significant changes have been signalled.

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Apart from governmental efforts to promote cultural and religious understanding and secure religious harmony, there are also local government initiatives to harmonise religious communities. Dunedin, for instance, has an Abrahamic Religions Committee that brings together delegates of the Christian, Jewish and Islamic religion-interestingly set up under the (former) mayoralty of Sukhi Turner, herself of Indian Sikh origin. Muslims themselves have made efforts along these lines, establishing formal contacts with exponents of other religious communities. Islamic Awareness Week, for instance, usually incorporates discussion meetings with other religionists. There are also other initiatives. In September 2007 the Islamic scholar Professor Abdullah Saeed from Melbourne University was invited by the Dunedin Abrahamic Interfaith Group and the University of Otago chaplaincy to give a public lecture. He chose the appropriate title: 'Towards a More Inclusive View of the Religious Other: A Muslim Perspective'. Living up to expectations, the lecture was a feel-good exercise in demonstrating Islamic religious tolerance based on scriptural evidence. In drawing on appropriate texts, he was careful in elevating concessionary passages to primary significance while avoiding controversial issues. The government's endeavours at religious inclusiveness make good sense in terms of raison d'etat. Historically, there are no insurmountable obstacles to achieving religious inclusiveness and, through it, lessen the possibility of religiously based antagonisms. Despite the country's ideological roots being at least vaguely anchored in Christianity, as said before, at no point has a particular church enjoyed a privileged position in state affairs-much to the chagrin of committed Christians. From the beginning, parliament and government kept religion at bay in the decision-making process, thus there is no need to remove a power-sharing situation involving state and a particular state church that might stand in the way of acceding symbolic significance to religions other than Christianity. This allows for easier recognition of present-day statistical realities that indicate the gradual, but proportionately significant growth of religious minorities. Demographically the country is predominantly Christian, but is increasingly becoming religiously diverse. The Statement on Religious Diversity [in New Zealand]1991-200663 declared Christians as demo-

63 Statistics New Zealand: QuickStats about Culture and Identity 2006 Census. New Zealand Statistics website.

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graphically declining, but still by far the largest category, hovering between two million to two and a half million in a population of somewhat over four million. The 'no religion' category is rising noticeably from below one million to approaching one and a half million now. Other major (non-Christian) religions also show a rising tendency, though being still far behind at around 200,000. A comparison of data from the 2001 and 2006 censes shows a more differentiated picture. The no religions category has increased from 1,028,000 to 1,300,000. Some Christian denominations show a slight increase (Catholics from 484,000 to 507,000; Baptists from 50,000 to 56,000; Methodists from 116,000 to 120,000; Pentecostals from 30,000 to 36,000) and others show a decline (Anglicans from 584,000 to 554,000; Presbyterians from 417,000 to 385,000). The relative growth in some Christian numbers may be due to Pacific and Asian immigrants, although they tend to have separate church organisations. The Maori Christian churches, which integrate Christian tenets with pre-colonial Maori beliefs, and including Ratana and Ringatu, experience increases (from 48,000 to 50,000 and from 15,000 to 16,000 respectively). During the same period, non-Christian religions continued to show strong growth rates, driven primarily by immigration. In New Zealand, Muslims do not constitute the largest religious minority behind the significant majority of Christians of all denominations and people with undeclared confessional affiliation or no religious affiliation. 64 Muslims (at between 35,000-45,000) are numerically surpassed by Hindus, who are nearly twice as numerous, and Buddhists (from 38,000 to 63,500 and from 41,000 to 52,000, respectively). 65 For mainstream Christianity (as opposed to fundamentalist splinter groups), which by and large has abandoned aggressive claims to theological superiority over other religions, interfaith activity does not pose a problem. For Islam dialoguing with other religions, no matter whether they are monotheistic or not, poses a problem over whose gravity one can argue endlessly. There is an international convention that no interfaith communication is allowed to question a religion's

64 All census figures are approximate only, as answering the question of religious affiliation is not mandatory in contrast to other questions. 65 According to the 2006 Census, the exact number of Muslims (not including Sufi) is 35,973. But Muslim organisations maintain the actual number is much higher.

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internal coherence or attack its integrity. 66 While all religions involved in dialogue of this kind abide by this rule, especially if it is sponsored by the government, breaches do occur occasionally. I remember an occasion at Otago University in the 1990s when a Christian exponent, who was teaching medical ethics, debated with the Muslim president of the Otago Muslim Association. The setting was a hall in which routinely Islamic services were held in the absence of a dedicated mosque (which now exists). In the vigorous debate that ensued, the Muslim, a Palestinian, had to rally all his language skills, but despite his eloquence clearly was at a disadvantage. The Christian exponent sought to gain the upper hand by playing on Islam's 'faulty reasoning' -similar to Pope Benedict's argument years later. His attempts to demonstrate Christianity's intellectual superiority were not well received by the Muslims present, foreshadowing the effects of Pope Benedict's remarks. In Islam Awareness Week and its discussion sessions too, it happens that committed Christians, venting their spleen, attack Islam and force Muslims into the defensive. Such events are not appreciated by Muslims, most of whom believe that in open discussion Christianity should be treated with respect, as it is the religion of the host society, but vice versa they expect that this courtesy should also be extended to their religion. The rules of vigorous and unrelenting academic debate-without fear or favour-seem to be suspended on such occasions when Islam and Christianity meet head to head. It seems missionary zeal is supposed to be kept in check as the protocols of hospitality apply requiring host and guest to show consideration towards each other. From a Western viewpoint this may seem strange. Islam is not normally known for religious tolerance; even the freedom for Muslims to argue alternative points of view is usually rather limited. The charge of bida (heresy) is always ready to be flung against an 'unorthodox' viewpoint, thus putting severe limits on theological debate. In New Zealand theological debate is not highly charged, but bigotry does exist in subdued shades. Shi'i are often not allowed to use Sunni mosques or face restrictions on their worship, which may drive them away. Miladis and anti-Miladis have little taste for each other and while pitched battles are not fought about such finer points

66 Jocelyne Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); 171.

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of dogma, people are discouraged from joining organisations if they do not fit into the locally dominant Miladi or anti-Miladi framework. Muslims are protected by the general ignorance of the wider majority society when they use such derogatory terms as mushrikun (idol-worshippers, polytheists) to refer to Christians or generally to non-Muslim New Zealanders. The term mushrikun refers primarily to the doctrinal concept of Trinity, which from an Islamic viewpoint puts Christianity, strictly speaking, outside the bounds of monotheism, a condition called shirk. And even though the Madonna worship of Catholicism from an Islamic theological angle is even worse-it is considered idolatry and ishrak, inappropriate companionship with God-there have been cases in which Muslims have come out in support of demanding respect for this Catholic imagery. In other cases in the spirit of interfaith solidarity, Muslims have spoken out in support of Christianity as a whole. They have also condemned attacks on synagogues and Jewish cemeteries. This reflects the solidarity of the religious section of society closing ideological ranks in an increasingly secularised society. One must remain sceptical though as to whether Muslims would be prepared to support Buddhism and Hinduism with equal fervour, as they are not considered monotheistic and are outside the circle of solidarity among 'people of the book' (ahl al-kitab). The previous Labour-led government made every effort to enhance interfaith dialogue in the interest of ethnic harmony (or as it is often called, 'racial' harmony). The then prime minister ostentatiously and publicly very visibly participated in such events. The rather elaborate text of the last Interfaith Dialogue's official declaration shall be reproduced here in full: Building Bridges: The Third Asia-Pacific Regional Interfaith Dialogue Waitangi, Bay of Islands 29-31 May 2007 W AI TAN GI Declaration Third Regional Interfaith Dialogue ACTION PLAN We, the participants in the Waitangi Asia-Pacific Regional Interfaith Dialogue-from Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Fiji, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Vietnam, gathered in Waitangi, New Zealand to "Build Bridges" on 29-31 May 2007.

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This Dialogue builds on the commitments from the Yogyakarta Dialogue in December 2004 and the Cebu Dialogue in March 2006. We welcome the statement made by New Zealand Prime Minister, Rt Hon Helen Clark, who, acknowledging the rich diversity in our region "where all the world's major religions are represented," called on "responsible nations and people of good will to build bridges across the divides" of our societies. President of the Philippines, H. E. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, stated that "as co-sponsor of the Waitangi Interfaith Dialogue, the Philippines looked forward to creating deeper interfaith ties within the region as together we work towards building bridges for a culture of peace." Foreign Minister of Australia, Hon Alexander Downer, noted that although "each faith may walk alternative paths to explore the human and the divine ... this is a shared journey that demonstrates the diversity and openness of our societies." New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rt Hon Winston Peters commented that never before had so many representatives from such a diversity of communities of faith gathered in Waitangi to create "greater mutual understanding and respect for each other." Director-General for Information and Public Diplomacy of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Andri Hadi, representing Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr Hassan Wirajuda, highlighted the role of regional dialogue in connecting religious leaders and faiths across the region and called for bridges to be built at all levels of society. This Dialogue "has now taken root in history." We support their statements on the significance of interfaith activities and cooperation to enhance better understanding in our Asia Pacific region and to collectively address the challenges to peace in our region. We express deep appreciation to the Government of New Zealand for hosting and co-sponsoring the Third Regional Interfaith Dialogue, which was preceded by the moving powhiri by Ngapuhi on the historic marae at Waitangi. We also express our appreciation to the Governments of Australia, Indonesia and the Philippines as co-sponsors of the Dialogue process. We welcome the offer by the Government of Cambodia to co-host with Australia the meeting of the fourth Asia Pacific Regional Interfaith Dialogue next year. We call for an increased number of women delegates in subsequent Dialogues. We encourage the participation of youth delegates in subsequent Dialogues.We note and were encouraged by the national reports on the wide

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range of interfaith initiatives building on the commitments made during the Cebu Dialogue on Interfaith Cooperation. We acknowledge the importance of interfaith dialogue and cooperation in the building of bridges between faith communities and between them and governments; in learning about each other through public education, religious education and media; and in the promotion of regional peace and achieving security. We welcomed the opportunity to learn about the discussion at the Auckland Symposium on 23-24 May 2007 on the Alliance of Civilizations Report and to comment on the Report's recommendations. We agree to adopt the following Plan of Action: We ask that faith groups and civil society develop partnerships with each other and with governments to work for social and economic justice, minority empowerment and reconciliation among conflicting groups within society. We recommend that faith leaders and governments establish and facilitate faith and interfaith points of contact at the local and national levels. We endorse further exchanges between people (e.g. youth, students, teachers, religious leaders, academics) of different faiths, within and between countries, and at the grassroots communal levels. We endorse the strengthening of intra-faith dialogue and call for intrafaith dialogue sessions to become a formal part of the Asia Pacific Regional Interfaith Dialogue process. We encourage dissemination of information about interfaith activities to address concerns about these activities in some religious communities. We recommend that a regional database, accessible on the internet, be established identifYing the range of local, national and regional religious activities in every region, including faith and interfaith groups, faithbased organisations, charities and N GOs, and best practices of interfaith activities. We recommend that faith leaders and governments explore the establishment of an Asia- Pacific Regional Interfaith Dialogue network for the exchange of information about interfaith projects. We encourage public and private donors to expand funding for interfaith activities and community development. Education We support education about religions in the public curricula of all schools, including religious schools.

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We encourage governments in the region to ensure through curriculum review that curricula meet guidelines for fairness, accuracy, and balance in discussing religious beliefs and that they do not denigrate any faith or its adherents. We recommend that schools should promote non-formal interfaith education such as community service, twinning projects and community immersion. We request interested governments to implement pilot projects in religious education to be trialled in more than one country in the region. We encourage religious leaders, education policy makers, and interfaith civic organizations to work together to develop consensus guidelines for teaching about religions. We support the inclusion of education about religions in the training of faith leaders. We call for support for research projects exploring any nexus between religion and conflict; perceptions of security among different faith groups; and religious education in the region. Media We advocate the implementation of media literacy programmes in schools, to help develop a discerning and critical approach to news coverage about religions by media consumers. We call for leaders in academia, religion, politics, civil society, and culture to generate media content that help to deepen inter-cultural understanding, and promote community values. We call on the media to include the coverage of religion in their voluntary codes of conduct. We recommend journalist exchange programmes around the region. Alliance of Civilisations Report Delegates welcomed the Alliance of Civilizations Report to the UN Secretary General. A plenary session introduced both the Alliance of Civilisations Report and Recommendations and a report-back on the Auckland Symposium. The workshops were invited to discuss the recommendations and their relevance to the Asia- Pacific region. A number of the recommendations have been incorporated in the Waitangi Declaration above. Waitangi, New Zealand 31 May 2007 Such efforts are not universally appreciated by devout religionists, and least of all by fundamentalist Christians. Race Relations Commissioner

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Joris

de Bres responded to voices of discontent among Christians, in particular to Destiny Church founder Brian Tamaki's complaint, by saying: 'The State seeks to treat all faith communities and those who profess no religion equally before the law. New Zealand has no state religion'. Not surprisingly also in the Muslim community, there are voices critical of interfaith initiatives. An electronic piece circulated among Muslims on the occasion of the latest interfaith event in 2007 reflects a highly critical attitude that chastises the government and even more so Muslim 'collaborators' for their insincerity. Calling them in thinly veiled language quasi infidels and hypocrites, it proclaims that the true intention of the meeting was not to enhance and stimulate inter-religious understanding, but to identify and weed out, or at least isolate, extremism. It is not clear how the author thought this may have been meant to be achieved in this context. He seems to suspect this may have been intended to be achieved solely by creating a governmental climate in neighbouring states that is intolerant towards devout Muslims and what falsely may be labelled their extreme views. This circular reads: The" Asia Pacific Interfaith Dialogue" meeting hosted by the New Zealand government had nothing to do with religious tolerance, understanding or reconciliation. Quite the contrary, it was a congress of hypocrites, the avowed intention of which was to "counter religious extremism" (Australian Federal government Minister Alexander Downer) and to "defuse religious radicalism" ("New Zealand Herald" May 31). In other words this was no exercise in religious inclusiveness. Its sole purpose has been to contain, isolate, and exclude all those whose faith and commitment is at best an embarrassment, and at worst a material threat, to the political regimes which put together this so-called "Interfaith Dialogue" Of those hosting and attending the event, many, such as [then] New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark, are devoid of any religious belief. Others are the representatives of military regimes (Fiji and Myanmar) and political oligarchies (Indonesia and the Philippines) notorious for their gross abuses of human rights and utter contempt for the religion of God. The one thing that all these assorted secularists, militarists and religious hypocrites have in common is their fear and loathing of true belief, which they choose to characterise as "extremism" "radicalism" or "fundamentalism" It is sad, but not surprising, that Helen Clark had no difficulty in dredging up compliant Muslims who were willing to collaborate in this disgraceful attempt to isolate and denigrate true believers of every religion, just as they have collaborated, and continue to collaborate, with

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Downer and Clark in the bloody occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan by infidel military forces. This event has demonstrated once again that the Muslim community in New Zealand remains riddled with corruption and hypocrisy. Which begs the question of who will be saved on the day of God's judgementthese fraudulent Muslims, or decent and sincere men and women of any faith?' 67 The solidarity among religions is also evidenced by the Zaoui case (described later): after Ahmed Zaoui's release from imprisonment, a Christian temporary refuge was found for him. The fact that Dominican friars were looking after him and providing him with shelter did not raise any eyebrows in the Muslim community. It was yet again a demonstration of the solidarity among religionists in each others' defence against the non-religious world. A degree of solidarity is also shown in those cases in which church groups support Muslims and converts to Christianity in seeking to protect them from deportation to countries with a track record of discriminating against or even punishing apostates. While apostasy is considered a crime under Islamic law and is forbidden and severely punished in Muslim majority countries, in these cases FIANZ or other Muslim associations have not come out in condemnation of these persons. Nor, however, do they seek to help them.

Education and Policy Framework The law provides for freedom of religion, and the government actively respects this right in practice. The state apparatus protects this right and does not inertly tolerate its abuse, either by its own functions or the private sector. In the education sector this specifically means that state and government exercise neutrality. The Education Act of 1964 specifies in its 'secular clause' that teaching within public schools 'shall be entirely of a secular character'; however, it also permits religious instruction and observances in state schools within certain parameters, which apply equally to all religions. If the school board in consul-

67 The author shall remain anonymous although he/she expresses a point of view well within the law and under the right of free expression. I have not sought the author's permission to reproduce this circular. However, as it is a semi-public communication common research rules of confidentiality do not apply. Typographical errors have been edited out.

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tation with the principal so determines, religious instruction may be given by voluntary instructors. Attendance at religious instruction or observances is not compulsory. The Legal Division of the Ministry of Education does not record data on how many schools permit religious instruction or observances. In any case, religious instruction must not be at the expense of the 'secular' curriculum and the time devoted to it. It is in this regard that the Islamic schools in Auckland have repeatedly run into difficulties. Whether by choice or necessity, the vast majority of Muslim children receives religious instruction in a mosque-related setting in evening and weekend classes, separated from secular education. Under the Private Schools Conditional Integration Act of 1975, the government, in response to its burgeoning general school role and to financial difficulties experienced by some Catholic parochial schools, permitted the incorporation of private schools into the public school system. Designated as 'integrated schools', they were deemed to be of a 'unique character' and were permitted to receive public funding provided that they also enrolled non-preference students (students who did not fit within the 'unique character' of the school; for example, non-Catholic students who attended a Catholic school). A total of 326 of the 2,607 schools of all levels were integrated schools with this designation. As of July 2005 there were 238 Catholic schools, 75 schools with other religious affiliation, and 13 schools with no religious affiliation integrated into the public school system. (A student cannot be required to attend an integrated school; admission to such a school is based on a student's request.) In the spirit of religious equality and integration, St. Mary's College in Wellington, a Catholic school as the name suggests, appointed a Muslim student as head girl. It caused some irritation, but in the best tradition of Christian tolerance, this did not cause the school board to waver. 68 The two Islamic schools in Auckland seem to be beset with problems whose origins lie in an all-too conservative Islamic application of education strategies. Al-Madina(h) co-ed school and Zayed College for girls both seem to have had difficulties with the acceptance of an Islamic curriculum. Al-Madinah had a somewhat troubled history. Opened in 1992, it became integrated in the state education system in 1996, but was reviewed repeatedly-reportedly, up to six times-since

68

The Dominion Post. I 5 February 2006, online.

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1998. A limited statutory manager was installed in 2002 and the following year it came under direct government control. From what little information was publicly reported, the school's curriculum had prioritised religious teaching at the expense of other material. So much time was lost on prayer that eventually the school agreed to extend teaching hours in order to make up for lost time. Problems were compounded by gender issues. Grating against New Zealand norms, the school's strict discipline was combined with gender segregation among staff and students. An impressive victory for Muslims occurred in recent years in the Hagley Community College incident in Christchurch. It demonstrated that interfacing Islam with the secular education system can be done with considerable success. The local Muslim community together with the college school board had managed to organise a grant from the Christchurch office of the Ministry of Education, to provide a prayer facility for the (then) 130 Muslim students at this college. The school's stated reason was to be responsive to the needs of the immigrant Muslim community in Christchurch. When news broke (in September 2003), the (then) minister of education stepped in to denounce the use of NZ$120,000 of 'taxpayer money'-a magic formula to garner public interest-for a religious purpose. In the interest of protecting the state-sponsored secular education system the bureaucratic mistake and the school's errant ways appeared to be in need of exposure. However, it quickly turned out that the funds had not been obtained under false pretences, as had initially been suspected, but had been applied for specifically for this purpose and with the full approval of local education authorities. The school board had been asked by the Ministry of Education to enrol more refugee students and had acted legally in accordance with the Bill of Rights Act, the Human Rights Act and the Education Act in providing for the religious needs of its students-although perhaps acting inappropriately in another sense, namely under the secular provisions of the Education Act 1989. College leadership threw its weight behind this project and rebuffed the ministerial interference, forcing the minister to apologise. As it was pointed out, Catholic schooling is also in receipt of public moneys, so denying funds to support Islam in this way would have looked like discrimination. 69

69 All this does not take into account the fact that the government actively supports traditional Maori religion (or 'spirituality') in various ways, for instance by hosting

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Democratic Participation and Public Visibility of Muslims Vertovec and Peach 70 point out that since the late 1980s European Muslims 'have collectively engaged with, and had considerable impact upon, the European public sphere'. The second part of this statement is certainly not true for New Zealand Muslims. Somewhat more applicable to New Zealand conditions is Grillo's 71 comment that there was an increase of Muslim initiatives in Europe since the 1970s and 'a more open expression of a collective Islamic identity' increasingly articulated through mosques and Islamic centres. He noticed an increasingly pronounced refusal to restrict Islam to the private sphere and concomitantly a collective public affirmation of Muslim identity. This is at least partly true for New Zealand, though to a much more moderate degree. For the most part, Muslims' engagement with the public sphere is aimed at the pursuit of specifically Islamic or ethnic Muslim interests in which these diverge from majority society. It is not uncommon that immigrant and indeed indigenous minorities' most intensive political involvement is designed to serve the specific interests in which they diverge from majority society. Shows of public discontent with policy or governmental politics are not unusual and are usually taken as legitimate expressions, falling under the aegis of freedom of expression. New Zealand's central government or local authority has not sought to curb Muslim expressions of discontent. And vice versa, official Muslim organisations show great restraint, if not reluctance, in broadcasting issues of Islamic unhappiness with current policies. This may be due to the moderation in Muslim leadership as well as to the intelligent recognition that too much exposure may be counter-productive, too vociferous propagation of Muslim views may diminish public sympathy, and too loud and too frequent protests may cause a backlash. Maori rituals at official functions, including spiritual beliefs in legislation and the like (see Erich Kolig, 'Coming Through the Backdoor?'. It could of course be argued that the Crown is under obligation to support Maori religion and culture under (the current interpretation of) the terms ofthe Waitangi Treaty. However, to add yet another dimension to the debate, the minister also railed against the use of Maori karakia (prayers) in some schools, which is against the secular character of schooling and also can be regarded as culturally unfair as English language prayer is not permitted. 70 Steven Vertovec and Ceri Peach, 'Introduction: Islam in Europe and the Politics of Religion and Community' in Islam in Europe: The Politics of Religion and Community, ed. S. Vertovec and C. Peach (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997): 3-47; 6. 71 Ralph Grillo, 'Islam and Transnationalism', Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30, no. 5 (2004): 861-878 (online version).

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Extreme views are rarely heard in the public discourse, to the extent that Muslims or Muslim organisations engage in it. This seems to differ from the European situation where Muslims are much more vociferous, and often much more effectively represented, in political affairs. A researcher claims to have observed that although Muslim leadership generally is located on the political left, there is a shift in political allegiance among Muslims away from socialist parties to smaller parties such as the Greens. 72 The reason, she surmises, is the increasing antiimmigration stance-or immigration-sceptical stance-among major parties, including socialist or labour parties. New Zealand does not appear to follow that trend, at least not at the moment. One gains the impression that among New Zealand Muslims democratic participation by and large remains unrecognised as emancipatory potential. Although there seems to be a certain appreciation of the government's multiculturalist stance, religious loyalties and the perceived lack of specific Muslim representation at the parliamentary level tend to alienate many Muslims from party politics and the associated electoral process. Consequently, there is a propensity for New Zealand's political culture to be somewhat alien to Muslim immigrants. Some have no personal background in democratic participation of the kind practised in New Zealand and the idea of sharing in governance, however indirectly, through electoral democracy is not deeply rooted. Even those whose background is more familiar with an electoral process seem to perceive themselves in a different relationship with party politics. The customary practise is that voting is done on the basis of religious, ethnic, and group loyalties and not on the basis of personal appraisal of party agendas. The absence of such a mechanism seemingly leaves many bewildered and unwilling to become democratic stakeholders. This then becomes an additional factor in the reluctance to fully embrace a New Zealand identity.

The Difficulty in Standardisation of Islamic Exceptionalism How is the state to deal with Islamic exceptionalism? Who should be dealt with to negotiate special or exemptive conditions in concrete

72 Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); 24-25.

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cases, or work out assistance clauses in policy? Parliamentary Muslim representation is obviously not widely recognised within the Muslim minority, nor does the sole Muslim parliamentarian claim to represent Islamic religious viewpoints or to speak for the Muslim minority. Some European countries have tried to cut through the complexity of the diverse Muslim minority by sponsoring the creation of representative Muslim bodies. This has not happened in New Zealand. Defining multiculturalism in relation to Islamic needs for recognition is a theme of a thousand and one nights. Islam is riven by internal differences; it is barely, and in some cases not at all, held together by name and a general belief in the sanctity of the Quran. Ambiguities of spiritual leadership and authority, profound sectarian differences, and customary, culture-specific, and ethnic peculiarities enforce divisions in the nominally Islamic religion that are nearly as unbridgeable as those between Islam and other monotheistic religions. Druze and Ahmadis are not even recognised as Muslims and appear to be so only from a non-Muslim perspective. Islamic dogma is far from unambiguous. Having spread over a vast geographic expanse and engulfing a multitude of local and regional cultures, Islam has in effect incorporated many local and historical customs that are now accepted by some Muslims as essentials, but rejected by others as unnecessary accretions. Hence the differentiation between what is essential sharia and what is cultural tradition (that is, culture-specific and time-specific custom) is not universally and unanimously accepted in Muslimhood. In fact, the distinction between essential Islam and historical and cultural/regional accretions is a hotly debated issue within the Muslim world community. Especially according to Salafism (which preaches a return to what it sees as the purity of Islam as it existed at the time of the Prophet and the original Muslim community), this religion has become encrusted with historical traditions and unnecessary additions that represent bida (illicit innovations or heresy). In the Salafiya's view, Islam and its jurisprudence are in need of reform (islah) and purification to shed such false doctrines. Another difficulty is the fact that many rules of conduct are not clearly and unambiguously spelt out in the scriptures (the Quran and the Sunna containing the ahadith, the Prophet's comments). Muslim efforts to clarify the texts have led to the formation of numerous sects and several schools of thought, usually referred to as 'law schools'

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(madhahib), 73 with widely differing interpretations of Islamic rules and laws. In principle, mainstream Islamic jurisprudence recognises four main sources74: Quran, Sunna (and especially the ahadith), quiyas (analogical reasoning), and ijma (consensus). To add to the complexity, ijma may refer to the patterns of coexistence in the original Muslim community or, in another interpretation, may also be a contemporary form of consensus among experts-a very unlikely event. In addition, there is the method of ijtihad (interpretation). Some Muslims discount it as a legitimate contemporary method of interpreting and clarifying Islamic law, believing that this method was concluded centuries ago, while others believe it is an ongoing and valid procedure of synchronising Islamic doctrine with the modern age. Even more controversial is the view that customary practice, if not considered contrary to Islamic doctrine, also has legitimately been incorporated into law.75 Salafism tends to dismiss all of them as post-Prophet developments. The need to extract the required directives from the scriptures has prompted the development and application of a variety of techniques and traditions leading to a multitude of interpretations of the sharia, which differ in greater or lesser detail from each other. At various times in the past, as well as in the contemporary Muslim world, there have been moves to wipe away this complexity and return to the clarity and simplicity of the original Muslim community. The contemporary movement, loosely labelled Salafiya, demands a close reading of the scriptural evidence (tafsir), together with an intense scrutiny of the Prophet's example (as given in the Sunna) and thoughts collected through stringent methods by a small number of outstanding classical scholars (above all, al-Bukhari and al-Muslim), who have collated and recorded hundreds of ahadith. 76 Another relevant issue is the right of enunciation offatawa (rulings) by authorised scriptural scholar-experts. There are several categories of lettered scholars and experts in some specialised fields, trained and

73 Four Sunni madhahib and three Shi'a Salafism tends to dismiss all of them as post-Prophet developments. 74 J. Esposito, Islam and Politics, 2nd ed. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,

1998); 20.

Esposito, ibid; 21. The Salafi ideology, which takes an overriding recourse to the Prophet and his example, is derived, among other things, from the Quranic verse (33/21): "Indeed in the messenger of Allah you have a good example to follow ... " and other similar ones (such as, 3/32, 48/10, 4/80, 33/36). 75 76

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entitled to interpret the scriptures (such as ulama, sheikh al-islam, fukuha, mujtahid, mufti, ayatollahs, imams, mullahs, maulanas (teachers), qadis Qudges), etc.). Generally, there is no unanimity as to who exactly is competent and entitled to issue a binding ruling (fatwa) or authoritative opinion in a particular case or on a particular issue. 77 There is also an ethical five-tier categorisation that underlies all laws and rulings. Imperatives and ordinances range in fortitude from obligatory to forbidden, with intermediary positions of recommended, permissible, and reprehensible, but not forbidden. Islamic jurisprudence also recognises a tradition of secular authority-as long as it is Muslim-to issue ordinances and regulations that are not part of canonicallaw. 78 Whatever the particular interpretation of law and correct conduct may be that a Muslim accepts as guiding in his or her existence, it potentially could impede life in a Western society or come in conflict with Western laws and conventions. Western multiculturalism calling on Islamic jurisprudence rarely leads to conclusive settling of issues. Thus the codification of Islamic exceptionalism in law is not only extremely difficult, but well-nigh impossible, even if it were desirable. Rivals for Custodianship of Public Morality

In the course of an ever deeper church-state division, and the ever stricter separation of the two sides, there occurs a very noticeable decline of organised religions' influence on society's social discourse. This decline is generally assumed to be a motor as well as phenomenological result of advancing secularisation. But this brings with it

77 Such rulings are binding only through voluntary acceptance of the authority of the issuing source or alternatively when they are enforced by a secular power. For instance, many Muslims challenge Osama bin Laden's fatwa against Jews and Crusaders, which calls for a worldwide jihad. They see this fa twa as illegitimate-not in terms perhaps of its substance-but on the point that bin Laden is not entitled to issue fatawa or to call for a jihad. In New Zealand, a ruling by the FIANZ Ulama Board, for instance, would not be considered authoritative enough by Shi'i, as the ulama are Sunni. In some cases, communities may select an expert to give an opinion on the basis of ijtihad, in the expectation that his ruling will be in tune with what they wish for; see Erich Kolig, 'Allah Is Everywhere: The Importance of Ijtihad for a Muslim Community in New Zealand', The Islamic Quarterly 45, no. 2 (2001): 139-159. Alltoo blatant opportunism in such matters would, however, be widely condemned as unethical and such a ruling would not find general acceptance. 78 Esposito, Islam and Politics; 22-23.

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another effect rarely fully explored. The custodianship of public morality, though not passing directly from one to the other, becomes increasingly shared between church and its declining sphere of influence on the one hand, and the state and its secular institutions on the other. The ascent of the state as guardian of a society's ethics is made apparent through the laws it passes and enforces, its assemblage of bills and statutes, parliamentary examples of value options, and political formulations of morals. Previously, while the state (unless a distinct theocracy) enacted laws and determined political action, the controlling and sanctioning authority lay with the church and its elites. Now more and more secular law and secular law-makers, supposedly expressing popular wishes, exercise that controlling function. As religion retreats from public discourse, increasingly, moral guidance is provided minus the underpinning divine rationale used by the erstwhile clerico-ideological elite and ecclesiastical moral grail keepers. In the dialectic of state and governmental leadership and public will, to the extent it is recognised by, and realised in, the democratic process, lies a momentum that the churches, no matter whether they are bogged down in conservatism or are more liberalised, find difficult to match. Fighting a rear-guard action against state-sponsored changes and the inbuilt ephemerality of legislative functions, the churches' interpretation of canonical law and cultural tradition holds diminishing sway. Individual politicians may have a personal background of religiosity, but it rarely intrudes openly into the political discourse. (If it does, it usually serves to the disadvantage of the respective politician. This is so at least in New Zealand, while religious credentials of sorts stand an American politician in good stead.) As the citizenry's ability to shape and define public and individual morality is manifested in the state's and government's assumption of authority over ethics, values, moral goals, and their formulation and control, this agenda is more and more wrested from the church. Moral truths are not pronounced from the pulpit any more, but are offered as public good in secular state school curricula and from the mouths of politicians. A harsh evaluation of present-day trends and their dynamics may well concur with Max Weber's verdict hailing from the sociological past of the beginning of the twentieth century. In his classical appraisal of modern capitalist and rationalist society, and despite his clear personal preference for it, he is able to foresee the looming shadows of a dark future: the iron cage, the soulless perfectionist society, devoid of

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a creative spark, bereft of charisma, is inhabited with 'Fachmenschen ohne Geist, Genussmenschen ohne Herz' (experts without wisdom, hedonists without heart). It is a society whose ethical benchmarks lie in the degree of efficiency at achieving worldly, functional goals and in which hedonistic consumption is more important than ethical imperatives of sacrifice and self-denial and striving for transcendence. How do Muslims react to this reality, to the apotheosis of the self in the form of an anthropocentrism hitherto unexperienced in human history? If one can essentialise Islam, for argument's sake, it does have, first and foremost, a problem with Weber's exaggerated characterisation-possibly a caricature-of the future of Western society. The future enshrined in Weber's vision is anathema to all religion, not just Islam. It violates the essentially ascetic nature of Islam, although the denial of 'earthly' pleasures is not paramount in the sacred scriptures. The Prophet is recorded as having enjoyed perfume, food, the company of women, even sex. Here and there, there are glimpses of a not totally abstemious lifestyle as prescribed by the agenda of piety. But clearly spiritual duty and divine command are to be placed above the satisfaction of all too human wants and the pursuit of hedonistic desires. That there should be no hardship in worship may be an oft-quoted hadith, but in the list of priorities it may not rank at the top. In the conflict between the two sides of human wants and divinely commanded duty, the choice for a good Muslim is clear. Ease of life and satisfaction of bodily wants have to be set aside when more important issues beckon. In the rich tapestry of Ramadan's symbolism, this aspect is metaphorically exemplified. Mindless consumerism and the crass anthropocentrism of Western lifestyles are often quoted as among the main reasons for the revulsion devout Muslims feel towards the West and its capacity to spread its pernicious influence on the Islamic world. Secondly, the canonicity of the sharia and the ethics implied in it are not open to flexibility. Their divine source does not allow for the recognition of other forms of legislation and formulation of ethics. In other words, the dynamics of ethics procured by the democratisation of their formulation, control, and revision, are diametrically opposed to the fundamental canon of the immutability of divine law and its associated ethics. Its irreplaceability by different systems is without question. The doctrines of literality and inerrancy of the sacred scriptures in themselves create a barrier to ethical flexibility. A further important question is this: given these intrinsic truths of essentialised Islam, how do diasporic Muslims react and adapt to

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socio-political realities in the West? And although this may be far from a realistic prospect in New Zealand, will they be able to influence the future direction of Western society with regard to dominant ethics, given that as citizens and legal residents they will be in a position to influence the parliamentary legislative process democratically. CesarF9 as well as others have remarked on the 'remoralisation' of Islam in the West. Whether this is a direct reaction to the 'immorality' of the West or is linked with the global fundamentalisation of Islam is open to debate. There is one immediate outcome: the alliance between conservative and even fundamentalist Christianity and Judaism, comprising the ahl al-kitab, people of the book or monotheists. Although interfaith activities often bring not only these but also Buddhists, Hindus and Sikhs together, only religions with a monotheistic faith are seen as natural allies against the forces of secularisation, atheism, and xenophobia or whatever the source of the perceived threat may be. Lawful conduct, commensurate with divine command, propriety, values governing social action, respect for spiritual values, and transcendency of ethics are shared concerns. Some European nations have tried to ameliorate the problem for Muslims by conceding the regulation of family affairs and the ethics associated with it to Islamic law. Sharia courts have been created with the authority to adjudicate in some kinds of family matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, succession, etc. with the delegated authority to settle disputes in a binding way. Yet, non-Islamic influence remains in an overarching position in the application of the national penal code as well as international conventions on human rights. It is in the state's and its executive organs' discretion to what extent they wish to apply these, regardless of how intrusive this may be in the Muslim family sphere or how much it may emasculate Islamic law. Multicultural policies may encourage state authorities to look the other way in cases regarded as slight infringements, but the possibility of interference is always present. Clear and categorical exclusions are of course the settling of family honour conflicts through so-called honour killings, discipline enforcement through corporal punishment, and-again not in all countries-female genital deformation. Non-

79

Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet; 143.

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physical forms of discipline and under-age marriage constitute grey areas where Western law may or may not intervene. The question has been briefly posed to what extent Muslims may be able to influence the ethical direction of a Western host society by engaging in the democratic process. This question can also be turned on its head. What influence will the hedonistic, anthropocentric, consumerist West exercise on its Muslim minorities living in a diasporic situation, especially where they form a very small and well-integrated group such as in New Zealand? The French example of Beur culture has shown that concessions have been made by Muslims in the interest of integration and adoption of French identity. Alcohol consumption and the reduction of the fasting period of Ramadan, which should last a full lunar month, to three days are some of the more obvious examples. 80 Whether ascetic features of Islam will be toned down in favour of the elasticity of ethics of the dominant hedonism and consumerism cannot be foreseen. It is anyone's guess what will happen to the amenities of modern life and their embracement by devout Muslimhood. What will happen to the abstemiousness and self-denial of strict Islamic observance shunning things ranging from alcohol, tobacco, drug-taking, indulgence in eroticism (from music performances to print publishing and the internet), to opulent lifestyle, swearing, premarital sex, mixing of the genders, betting, indiscriminate television watching, video gaming and the like?

80

Olivier Roy, 'Islam in France: Religion, Ethnic Community or Social Ghetto', in

Muslims in Europe, ed. B. Lewis and D. Schnapper (London, New York: Pinter, 1994): 54-66. See also Gilles Kepel, Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997).

CHAPTER FOUR

INTEGRATION AND CONFLICT DISCOURSES 'When in Rome Do as the Romans Do'

New Zealand prides itself on being on the cutting edge of the modern human rights agenda, offering a level of acceptance of cultural otherness that ranks with the best in the world. The image it seeks to portray of itself in the international discourse is to a large extent reflected domestically. In this of course New Zealand does not stand alone. In a very generalised sense, the old colloquial adage, 'When in Rome, do as the Romans do' (or more accurately: 'si vivis Romae Romano vivitur more') 1 has lost much of its power in the Western world. In a legal sense, it certainly is no longer enforceable, although it may still be tacitly expected in daily social discourse. Despite measures to facilitate the ready inclusion of immigrants into the host society, cultural absorption into the dominant host culture cannot be legally enforced. State powers to coercively mould one form of citizen and treat minority expressions as deviance have been curtailed by human rights legislation. Nor does the modern democratic state see it as its primary function to achieve cultural and religious homogenisation at any price. Its function may be harmonisation among cultures, but not by way of cultural suppression. Emphatic and open retention of separate cultural identity is a legal and practical reality and is entirely permissible as long as some fundamental preconditions are met. The social rigidity and sociological certainties of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have disappeared. Characteristic and presumed eternistic patterns dividing social classes, 'lifestyles', races, and ethnic groups have become blurred to the point of disappearance in a modern pluralist, multicultural society. Traditional dividing lines of discrimination, exclusion or suppression, and supra- or subordination of socio-cultural groups have largely disappeared. The liberal democratic society and state allow citizens to live in so many different

When you are living in Rome, live according to Roman custom.

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subcultures, and indeed different life worlds, enjoying political and legal equality as long as customs and practices do not come in conflict with the principles of the civil or criminal code. Accustomed expectations of'appropriate' behaviour, conduct, and values have considerably broadened. Certainly civil liberty may be enjoyed only up to a point, but some of the permissible subcultures-legalised, tolerated, decriminalised, whatever the case may be-would have severely pushed the envelope of tolerance in the Western world only a few decades ago. Ethnic, linguistic, cultural, sexual, and religious orientations have become acceptable and enjoy equal rights, when they may have been severely discriminated against or even criminalised only a few years ago. The straight, middle class, suburban-dwelling, proverbial 'mainstream' is disappearing into the mythical distance of the half-forgotten past, together with the traditional nuclear family, the 'pillar of society', as new forms of hitherto undreamt family constellations and a host of new subcultures and immigrant cultures emerge and clamour for recognition. Bemoaned only by inveterate conservatives, these new forms will be the commonplace of tomorrow, together with multiple citizenships and complex webs of loyalties. In a globalised world and an increasingly pluralistic Western society, different cultures, no longer separated by geographic distance and mutual ignorance, are meeting face to face. It is not within the purview of this book to consider the effects on a global level as the world's different cultures have to work out rules of ordered interdependency and mutual engagement in terms of the norms, laws, conventions, and values all can agree to. The effects on the level of nation-states involved in rapidly increasing pluralisation are equally trenchant. Human rights provisions make the recognition of cultural difference mandatory and severely proscribe the ability of a majority or dominant culture to enforce unwarranted adjustments in a minority culture. Of course, pressures on client cultures continue to exist, but only outside legally enforceable mechanisms in the cut and thrust of daily life. Cultural nationalism, although still alive, has retreated to the very conservative, right-wing margins of the political discourse. Totally unacceptable in today's Western world is the normalisation of legal and social rules that may culminate in the disappearance of distinct cultural minority identities. In principle this holds true for autochthonous cultures, so-called indigenous cultures (to distinguish them terminologically from the engulfing later arrivals in settler-states), as well as for distinct immigrant cultures.

•

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Despite these conditions, Islam tends to stick out. It represents an exceptionalism that is the subject of much debate. Its inherent tendency to prescribe a total, distinctive way of life contains a potential for conflict in the Western world. Muslims are not just a group with a few special interests and cultural needs that can either be ignored or easily accommodated in modern Western society. This is not to say that Islam is incompatible with modern society, but rather that in order to accommodate very strict variations of this religion, certain adaptations on both sides, devout Muslims and 'host society' (or majority society), are necessary and not always easily accomplished. However, it must not be overlooked that conciliatory arrangements serve mutual benefits. Failure to achieve compromise would lead to avoidable tension and social disintegration. Even though, because of the small size of the national Muslim community, this danger would be minimal, New Zealand is by no means exempt from this prospect. It is hardly surprising that on a theoretical and political level, multiculturalism-the practical approach of cultural recognition and legitimation of cultural difference-has become the field of a vigorous and sometimes antagonistic debate. In the policy debate of pluralist nation-states, an atomistic and contractarian approach (based on the assumption of a pre-socially individuated person interacting with others by conscious choice) and communitarianism (the view that identity is shaped by being part of social groups and partaking of culture regulated by normative authority) oppose each other as absolutes. 2 The purist implementation of one or the other has profound policy implications and shapes the relationship a minority immigrant culture has with the majority culture. Most policy stances take a reconciliatory, more balanced position vis-a-vis the two perspectives, though leaning more to one or the other side. On a bridging ground multiculturalism as a matter of liberal choice offers to the primacy of an individual's autonomy, constituted by the contextuality of his/her socialisation, a degree of freedom defined by his/her own culture. Interestingly, New Zealand has chosen to bestride both options with regard to different ethnicities or cultures: while indigeneity is defined in relative detail and engraved in law and statute, more or less all other cultural difference 2 See, for instance, Paul Kelly, ed., Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Culture and Equality and Its Crisis (Cambridge, Polity, 2002). Chandran Kukathas, 'Are There Any Cultural Rights', in The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. W. Kymlicka (Oxford, New

York: Oxford University Press, 1995): 228-256.

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remains amorphous, undefined, and open to the vicissitudes of individual determination. As said earlier, moral theory and conceptions of equality de rigeur are part of the multiculturalist debate. Being especially based on, and constrained by, the ethics and moral philosophy implicit in the global human rights agenda, practical multiculturalism must be cognisant of such issues-in particular when it aims at the integration of the cultural other. Multiculturalism per se is not necessarily or logically based on the recognition of the equality of cultures. South African apartheid was one kind of multiculturalism, but a particularly illiberal kind, bereft as it was of individual choice. Ossified in the formation of cultural and ethnic categories-and even more repulsively, grounded in racial difference-it compelled people to live parallel lives, hardly ever touching and confined to their pre-determined spaces, hierarchically as well as spatially, in society. 3 It was totally out of step with modern (Western) thinking about social justice. Above all, it was not designed, nor intended, to foster integration. A sense of equality is especially important for the policy of integration in a modern Western sense. This is clearly the kind of multiculturalism New Zealand aspires to, the kind in which equality, a wide range of freedom of choice, and mutual interaction as equals are guaranteed. The price is that certain regulative limitations have to be imposed to facilitate interaction and to preserve a degree of social cohesion. The version of multiculturalism the Netherlands has chosen (referred to as Verzuiling, pillared system) has been considered for some time to be among the most culturally liberal systems. It is known as offering a maximum of cultural freedom under one national umbrella. Though applied for recent immigrant minorities, it was originally designed to emancipate autochthonous Dutch religious and social groups. Today this system comes under critical scrutiny for its perceived failures. One is that it rather rigidly ascribes ethnic and religious groups to certain pre-determined categories and rubrics, which shows a tendency to negate individual freedom of choice; and although the human rights discourse is sensitised to cultural and religious needs, it lacks the liberty of individual mobility. In this aspect, by an unsympathetic

3 The traditional Islamic dhimma system shows similar features. Some modern nations of the third world, while recognising the right to cultural difference, have discriminatory practices and laws in place.

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reading, it resembles apartheid, despite the fact that it was introduced with the best of intentions to protect the cultural needs of minorities. Klausen4 argues that Muslims-or rather the political leaders she had contact with-do not want this system. The reason seems to be that strict categorisation on cultural grounds can aid discrimination. Cultural protectionism, assistance laws, and exceptionalist categorisation appear that they can easily transmute into discrimination. There is another flaw inherent in this and similar systems: they do not seem to facilitate integration. The existence of cultural and religious prescriptions, customs, or practices that are in violation of human rights or the nation's criminal law code poses a particular problem. Even the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act imposes certain limitations on cultural and religious freedom. Illiberal practices inherent in a religion or custom, paradoxically, have to be kept in check or suppressed-though this may be in violation of the doctrine of cultural freedom-in order to preserve the freedom and rights of others. Sometimes even the human rights of members of a particular cultural or religious group are threatened by the group's actions. Let me cite some brief examples that have cropped up in my research. A good example is the treatment of apostasy in (conservative) Islam. While New Zealand's rules and laws aim at making sure that Muslims are free to exercise their right to be Muslim, some Muslims may deny that right of choice to a member of their own group under the Islamic doctrine that prohibits apostasy. Other clashes may occur in the area of the freedom to blaspheme under the aegis of freedom of expression and the Islamic duty to punish this offence. The perceived duty to engage in jihad in the belief that Islam is in need of defence may also severely test the right of religious freedom. How should integrative multiculturalism deal with expressions of illiberalism and violations of human rights if these can arguably be seen as integral elements of a particular culture or religion? Fortunately, few of such cases have occurred in New Zealand and none involving loss of life or threat to it. Generally speaking, today's liberalism in the West allows a relative and, in terms of human history, unprecedented cultural and religious

4

Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); 199.

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freedom,5 the realisation of which demands a two-pronged approach. While suppressing illiberal elements, supportive and exemptive laws and regulations6 may be desirable in order to realise cultural freedom on the other hand. Such an ambidextrous approach may be necessary in facilitating a desirable degree of integrative multiculturalism. The decision of which cultural element needs or is deserving of support and which deserves to be suppressed is made of course on the basis of the dominant culture's value system and laws. One outcome, for instance, is the fact that in settler nation-states such as New Zealand, at least in the foreseeable future, a sharp distinction will continue to be made between supportive laws for the indigenous minorities and those for immigrant minorities. The rights of cultural expression granted to the latter are unlikely to ever be as extensive as those of the former. The fine balance between support and suppression, between indigenous versus majority and versus immigrant rights is poised to be a struggle well into the foreseeable future. There is, however, no reason to conceive of it in terms of the catastrophic fault-lines proposed in Huntington's thesis. Nor is there a sensible call to solve the issue with one ingenious 'final solution'. Any solution achieved can only be piecemeal and is unlikely to last forever. This is not only because of shifting tastes and the fast-changing political moods in majority society; since cultures and religions change over time, this argues against inscribing them, even if it is for the sake of protection, into law. It has occasionally been pointed out to me by Muslims that the Islamic world had a legally prescribed climate of cultural and religious tolerance long before the modern process of legal globalisation, driven by the West, began. The emergence of legislation and conventions that promote the idea that humans possess inalienable, inherent rights are a result of globalisation. Contained in this human rights agenda is the right to culture and religion. What my Muslim friends tend to overlook is that the modern global concept of a-priori rights inherent in the human condition is alien to Islam. Rights have to be earned in the eyes of God and are awarded by God according to merit. There is

5 Chandran Kukathas, 'Cultural Toleration', in Ethnicity and Group Rights, ed. I. Shapiro and W. Kymlicka (New York, London: New York University Press, 1997): 69-104. 6 Jacob Levy, 'Classifying Cultural Rights', in Ethnicity and Group Rights, ed. I. Shapiro and W. Kymlicka (New York, London: New York University Press, 1997): 22-65.

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no a-priori entitlement. However, on the whole, Muslims are happy to accept the cultural and religious rights guaranteed by international and domestic legislation so far as it provides them with a religious and cultural protection mechanism. Content in the knowledge that global human rights are not a new concept, Muslims tend to overlook one aspect. The dhimma-system also enshrined the idea of cultural or religious rights, but what made it flawed according to a modern value system is that it was not linked with the concept of equality. 7 But then, do New Zealand's Muslims see themselves embraced as equals by majority society? Hardly. For most, their equality is an abstract ideal, unmatched by daily reality that is full of small prejudices and injustices. Generalised compliments about the tolerance and fair-mindedness of New Zealand are balanced by stories of discrimination in the job market, insults suffered, prejudicial reporting in the media and other irritations that send a signal to them that they are not as equal as they should be. From these experiences it would seem that the notion of cultural freedom and equality exists on a more abstract plane, somewhat divorced from daily reality. Foundational in this respect of the essential juncture of freedom and equality are the United Nations-sponsored conventions and declarations that underpin the interaction between culturally different groups. The idea of cultural and religious freedom as basic human rights must logically be premised on the equal worth of all cultures. A plethora of national acts and statutes (such as the European Union Convention on Human Rights) support these global instruments, recognising the right to the culture and religion of one's choice and offering freedom from discrimination as a right. These rights are not annulled by migration. The resultant policies have the effect (especially in Western democratic societies) of softening assimilation pressures. While many countries still restrict immigration of cultural aliens, and the human rights agenda is often selectively applied, immigration policies in the West no longer insist on a total and rapid absorption into dominant host cultures, instead they only expect a certain degree of adaptation of immigrant minorities, and allow for the retention of distinct cultural identities. Immigrants and cultural minorities are no longer expected to shed their distinctive traditions in order to adopt the dominant

7 See, for instance, Bat Ye'or, The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam (Rutherford NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985).

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cultural and national identity. Variations do exist of course: the United States and France are still more assimilation oriented and adhere to the melting-pot theory more strongly than do other Western countries. However, following what has been termed the spectacular failings of cultural liberalism and the kind of multiculturalism that allows a maximum of cultural retention, the idea of cultural rights is undergoing some revision. In particular the van Gogh murder in Holland and 7/7 in London were blamed on the exorbitant cultural freedom for immigrants that allows them to cultivate an emotional distance from majority society. This is an incentive behind recent trends to re-introduce more stringent screening processes to ensure potential immigrants from the Islamic world are au fait with, and accept, secularised conditions, civil liberties, which allow criticism and even ridicule of religion, and sexually-liberalised social features that create a so-called 'permissive' society. Greater emphasis is also placed-and New Zealand has followed this trend-on whether migrants possess the requisite language skills to ease their incorporation into the social fabric of the host country and to allow them meaningful employment. New Zealand, a signatory to virtually all international human rights conventions, is strongly influenced by the global human rights ideology. It has created domestic legal instruments to secure minority rights that safeguard and enshrine in principle religious and cultural freedoms and the collective rights of minorities vis-a-vis the state. The Human Rights Act practically outlaws phenomena of discrimination in the social discourse and appears to be wielded with considerable success. The other major instrument, the New Zealand Bill of Rights, goes further than comparable instruments elsewhere, inasmuch as it not only allows for freedom of belief, but also its manifestation in actual social conduct. New Zealand thus conforms to the characteristic configuration of Western liberal democracies that have embraced the human rights ideology: the retention of cultural identity, religious freedom, and cultural choice are no longer subject to the vicissitudes of laissez-faire tolerance that can be easily withdrawn. Liberal Western democracies, however, still tacitly or overtly expect integration. This underlying philosophy is not necessarily inspired by a high-flying moral attitude, but a very pragmatic one: integration is preferable to minorities forming marginalised, disenfranchised groups who are prone to creating social upheavals. The particular understanding a nation has of integration and its importance in the national discourse has a direct bearing on immigration policy. In this sense,

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occasionally, Muslims have come under the spotlight in New Zealand as examples of an 'all-too liberal' or 'open-door' immigration policy favouring groups with little integrative potential, as some politicians have charged. Despite the relatively low numbers of Muslims in New Zealand, alarmist voices have predicted dire consequences of the culture-indiscriminate immigration policy, which allows into the country people who possess little skill in overcoming cultural differences and equally little desire to adapt. The supposition is that with some people their cultural difference is so deeply ingrained as to create a barrier rendering them incapable of adapting; whether knowingly or involuntarily, it makes them 'integration-resistant'. Orientalist thinking creates the tendency to perceive Muslims especially in this way, more so than East Asians or Pacific islanders. In a more general sense, this has thrown up the question: to what extent can the host society accommodate cultural plurality by allowing different religious traditions and customs to be exercised relatively fully, without losing its own character and putting in jeopardy its own principles? Does 'endless tolerance' and acceptance of all cultural values lead to 'valuelessness', and ultimately to the denial, or worse loss, of one's 'own identity' -a kind of value vacuity that is then easily filled with the vigorous and assertive minority culture. And what is potentially even more dangerous: does this lead on a practical level to an undermining and loss of social cohesion? The suggestion of highly differentiated forms of citizenship based on distinct cultural differences and the perceptible weakening of loyalty to the nation in the traditional sense renders a certain acuteness to conservative Western thinking. As 'Kiwiness' has ceased to be tantamount to Anglo-Celticness and experiments with inclusiveness of Maoriness, the liberal society begins to marvel at the meaning of New Zealand identity. Still confused by the recent emphatic embracement of a Maori-Polynesian identity and not so long ago by having reluctantly severed its apron strings with Britishness, a genuine New Zealand identity is still much in flux. When Muslims say they want to be part of New Zealand, not just living in New Zealand, what identity are they aspiring to? What are the icons and markers of a New Zealand identity that need to be accepted to qualify? The current instability may work in Muslims' favour as it admits to a certain plasticity in identity formation. However, certain problems remain. It has been argued that the recognition among young Muslims that the national identity of the host country is not fully available to them drives them into the arms of an exaggerated

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Muslim identity and, bound up with it, into fundamentalist beliefs. Yet, while this may be applicable in some Western countries, there is no indication that this is the case in New Zealand. Pluralism can also lead to concerns in unexpected ways. Identity concerns of the majority society are epitomised in Fukuyama's problem:8 is majority culture in need of protection from a minority culture? Is a Muslim minority in a position to change the national identity over time? So far in history it has been the hallmark of a fascist political system to take vigorous protective measures to curb the (usually imaginary) intrusions of an unwanted cultural other and the 'bastardisation' of the national identity. Marginal political parties in Europe on the right of the political spectrum continue to pursue this ideological course with greater or usually lesser electoral success, preaching anti-immigration sermons and not shunning the ignominy of being labelled fascist. New Zealand at times also exhibits this phenomenon. But in a democratic state the official national identity should not be exclusionary. If Asians and Muslims live here in significant numbers, that fact should be reflected in the national identity. Not surprisingly, from the Muslim point of view, integration and its difficulties are quite different. The emphasis for them has to lie on the minority fighting for the survival of its identity in a very alien majority culture and a highly dominant host society. The Dutch academic Wasif Shadid9 suggests that integration on the systemic and collectivist level amounts to the granting of provisions that allow a collective minority to become incorporated into the host society without essentialloss of substance of culture, belief, and identity. Practically speaking, this means free observance in all aspects of religious duties for Muslims. But what exactly are the indispensable observances in order to be truly faithful to Islam? Given the many sectarian and regional variations, this requires the devising of a consensus among Muslims. Above all, Shadid defines integration in terms of a duty on the part of the host society to respect cultural and religious sensitivities, and to permit all religio-cultural practices of an immigrant minority. The host society in his view has a responsibility to recognise the presence

8 Francis Fukuyama, 'A Year of Living Dangerously', The Wall Street Journal, 2 November 2005, online; and 'Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy', Journal of Democracy 17, no. 2 (2006): 5-20. 9 W. A. Shadid, 'The Integration of Muslim Minorities in the Netherlands', International Migration Review 25, no. 2 (1991): 355-374; 363.

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of a cultural and religious minority, make provisions for its religiocultural needs, and, if necessary, extend protective measures to it. This raises the question: how far can the protection of a minority's religious needs go? The transformation of Western society so as to adjust fully to Islamic canonical law has to remain an impossible dream. It can be predicted that the sharia in any form, whether harshly literalist or moderated and modernised, will not be enfranchised into state law in Western societies in the foreseeable future. The creation of an Islamic minority society in the form of self-ruling Muslim enclaves within a wider Western society, including the sweeping dispensation of Muslims from certain Western laws, similarly seems to lie within the realm of pure fantasy. Somehow excusing the minority from dominant law and custom is not a realistic expectation either, given the practical, social intermeshing of the two sides. Any support and compromise on the scale accorded to indigenous minorities in settler states, such as New Zealand, seems equally out of the question. Most theoreticians on multiculturalism, presumably on moral grounds, draw a line between indigenous minority rights and immigrant minority rights. Thus special rights (assistance, autonomy, protective) to the extent indigenous people may enjoy in an enlightened liberal democracy carried by a sense of historical obligation (not to say guilt) are unlikely to be extended to Muslims under present ideological and emotional conditions. The required kind of legal pluralism is unlikely to be proposed or accepted by the political system, even though in time sharia courts with limited jurisdiction may be established (after the European example). Such courts can adjudicate on a voluntary basis and are restricted to private and family matters. Concessions in this area currently made by the state and legal system in the attempt to achieve a rapport with the Islamic sense of justice and to enfranchise individual Muslims are whimsical and few and far between. While polygamy is illegal in New Zealand, multiple relationships including more than one partner seem to be permitted by property laws under de facto provisions. New Zealand law recognises Islamic marriage (if the wedding is conducted in this country the marriage celebrant has to be registered, but he does not need to be an imam) and divorce. But this is not cast in concrete. The Ulama Board associated with FIANZ does sometimes act in an advisory capacity in attempts to synchronise New Zealand jurisprudence with Islamic notions, although it cannot make binding and enforceable decisions. This flexibility in the attempt to adjudicate is not unusual in Islamic jurisprudence where fatawa (rulings) by expert

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boards or individuals (mufti. sheikhs, or persons of similar standing) may or may not be recognised by affected parties. When Shadid demands provisions to allow the minority identity to become incorporated into the host society without essential loss of culture and belief substance, it conjures up Fukuyama's angst that traditional (Western) national identities might be in peril of being swamped or changed beyond recognition. Not surprisingly, exaggerated expectations for cultural recognition are bound to fail-as they normally do in Western countries. This may create a victim mentality that especially characterises some leading European Muslims. It appears to be less well expressed in New Zealand. In addressing this issue, the leading European Muslim thinker Tariq Ramadan 10 advocates a viable rapprochement between European culture and Islamor expressed on a practical level, Western countries and their Muslim immigrants. Entreating his co-religionists to leave behind their victim mentality, he suggests that integration means partnership and the recognition of the identical universality of values on both sides. To be open to mutual enrichment-not meant in the materialist sense, Ramadan argues, means for Muslims not only to learn to function within the framework of secularised democratic societies and use the opportunities offered by Western civil liberties for their private purposes, but to use the democratic process to make a positive contribution. One prerequisite in his view is a new form of allegiance to Islam while Muslims simultaneously distance themselves from the culture of their origins. One presumes that the kind of Islam he has in mind has undergone a process of individual moralisation and is less focused on the collectivist enforcement of rules that grate against Western sensitivities. If one takes a realistic view, the onus of adaptation, despite multiculturalist provisions and legally prescribed tolerance, rests to a considerable extent on the immigrant minority. Successful or attempted integration does not completely lift the responsibility of adaptation from migrants. The expectation that the host society profoundly reorganise itself so as to better absorb immigrants is unrealistic. A 'Kiwi Muslim', Abdullah Drury, has clearly recognised that. In a newspaper

10 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

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article he admonishes his fellow religionists with the following exhortation: 'Integration Effort Needed' the headline says: 11 There has been a vast immigration of Muslim migrants and refugees into New Zealand over the past 15 years. Unfortunately there has been far too much emphasis placed on preserving foreign cultures, customs and languages that have little or no practical application in New Zealand and serve only to perpetuate a psychological or mental ghetto mentality. While this may be very nice and will no doubt please the tree-hugging hippies and liberals, it does little to help the new migrants settle in and assimilate into mainstream New Zealand society.

At this point is should be said that while his thought is well-intentioned, Drury's use of the concept of assimilation is incorrect here; and so is the idea that unassimilated-yet hopefully integrated-Muslims could not be mainstreamed in a multicultural New Zealand society. Drury continues: 'There has been a serious failure to provide adequate or thorough English language tuition. Consequently, many of the new Muslim migrants congregate around mosques, rarely mix socially outside their own ethnic group and struggle to find proper employment.' He addresses a very practical problem. Especially migrants from the Middle East and Africa often lack the required language skills and therefore find it difficult to enter meaningful employment in the wider society. Accusations of being discriminated against in the labour market often have their roots in this language problem and not necessarily in the prejudices of potential employers. The article continues: New Muslim migrants urgently need to improve their English language and communication skills. They need to actively open up to non-Muslim neighbours and friends, and forget any religious prejudices and communal hostilities rooted in their home countries. In order to speed up assimilation, integration and acceptance by the general (non-Muslim) public we need to see more young New Zealand Muslims in public service careers ... The general public needs to appreciate that distributing citizenship papers and passports to new migrants and refugees will not transform people overnight into dark-skinned New Zealanders. New Muslim migrants and refugees need a period of transition, and in turn they need to actively try to adapt to their new lives in New Zealand.

The [Christchurch] Press, 2 August 2005; A9.

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There is also a need for Muslim institutions, especially the mosques, to move away from being primarily forums for ethnic minority expression and activity. The mosques and Muslim organisations need to actively emulate existing New Zealand social systems where religious institutions are primarily spiritual in focus, not ethnic-communal. One anomaly that always strikes me is the close association between the Muslim organisations and the government department of ethnic affairs. Why? Muslims are a religious minority, not an ethnic one. Our ulema, the Muslim clergy, need to play a more pro-active role in the future development of the New Zealand Muslim community. They need to engage, exert and motivate young Muslims in New Zealand to take part more fully in mainstream New Zealand society. This enumeration of 'things to do' addresses several important issues. The fetishisation of cultural distinctiveness can have decidedly undesirable consequences. The deliberate maintenance of an exaggerated diasporic consciousness can lead to fragmentation, unproductive separation, even encapsulation-but this is not to deny that selfsegregation may be a democratic right. Religious sects, such as the Amish in the USA and Christian seclusionist groups in New Zealand, may use this device to retain their distinctive identity vis-a-vis the absorptive and assimilationist power of the dominant society. The right of self-segregation is closely linked with plural ways of being a citizen in which distance from the elusive mainstream society is not an exclusionary factor. Belongingness to nation may not be contingent on socio-cultural participation in what in a statistical sense often is wrongly perceived to be the mainstream, but may be presumed to be present even at a distance from this ill-defined yet proverbial epicentre. Post-national forms of citizenship may assume variations not as yet experienced.

The Necessity of Minority Integration While issues of adaptation and the need to fit in while remaining faithful to a religion that is not common in the West loom large especially from the Muslim point of view, Western host societies also face issues of accommodating to the presence of distinctly different cultural minorities. The West's changing identity is facing challenges of how to integrate this (for the most part) immigrant population into its secular political structures, guaranteeing freedom of religion and opinion, yet containing problems of maladjustment and failure to integrate. On a

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terminological level, a redefinition of 'minority' is required that does not connote exclusion or separation. New Zealand shows an extraordinary degree of good will by international standards, but some aspects of Islam do reinforce the isolation of Muslims. The main obstacle Western societies in general stumble over when dealing with the integration of Muslim immigrants is that Islam is not a religion in the limited sense of the word, but is rather a complete and comprehensive code of life. It is also a culture-producing factor. Through the strong regulative character of the religion, the Islamic world is basically culturally different from the rest of the world and from the West in particular. Muslim culture profits from all available sources, local and international, but its unique characteristic is that it has grown from the foundation of Arab culture of the seventh century, which still provides the basic template of Muslim life. What we see nowadays in Western countries is the marginalisation of the role of religion. Aside from Christianity becoming an 'inner religion', today in the West religion is associated more with historical and cultural traditions that are more and more assuming the trappings of folklore. Its regulative function is being increasingly lost. Among the problems arising from differences in the respective religion's functionality is the possibility of imported Islamist radicalism and the resultant potential for violence and support for extremist causes. This poses not only the practical problem of containing criminality, but opens up issues of how far democratic freedoms of thought and expression may be extended to tolerate radical religious views considered unacceptable due to their political or ethical consequences. Leaving aside such extremes, undoubtedly growing demands for political representation of Islamic values, advocated through the normal democratic process, conceivably will have an effect. These effects will be noticeable even in the short term, and to some extent are already noticeable, in the social and cultural landscape of most Western societies with sizeable Muslim populations. New Zealand, mainly because of the small size of the Muslim immigrant population, has not reached the point where such issues move to the forefront of the host society's consciousness as they do in parts of Europe. However, Europe and New Zealand-if in the latter's case only embryonically so-do develop features in which, despite some distinguishing characteristics, they resemble each other in the process of forging a workable multiculturalism.

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While Europe at the beginning of Muslim immigration in the 1970s did not start from a point of being prepared for multiculturalism and the possibility of differentiated citizenship, the situation in New Zealand, in keeping with the character of an immigration-based country like Australia, the USA, and Canada, was more open to a situation in which immigrant communities would retain their cultural traditions, at least to some degree. France inclines more strongly towards assimilation of all immigrants, while Germany, Austria, and Switzerland initially saw the Muslim presence as a passing phase in the shifting fortunes of the labour market and saw no need to be pro-active. 12 As the realisation has grown that so-called Gastarbeiter (guest workers) and their families are here to stay and the ranks of asylum seekers and refugees (from poverty and lack of economic opportunity as much as from political persecution) have swelled enormously, the distinctly multicultural future of Europe encompassing not only intra-European, but very clearly exogenous cultures, the need to come to grips with it has sunk in. The development from a multi-community society into a multicultural society, in which all diverse cultures share a position of equality and equal participation in the democratic process, has come to be one of the foremost social issues in the European Union. Western Europe shows a divided history in terms of the Muslim presence: while countries such as France and the UK, and to some extent the Netherlands and Italy, as a legacy of their former colonial empire, felt constrained to accept a massive Muslim immigration as a situation of considerable permanency, in other countries like Germany there was originally hardly any realisation that Muslims were arriving as immigrants. They were seen as a required work force in a booming economy, but amenable to removal when no longer needed. Therefore initially little thought was given to their integration while the issue of their possible expulsion when their presence was no longer seen as either useful or unproblematic was raised. However, whatever the starting position may have been, the reality is now a sizeable Muslim population in virtually all Western European countries and a great similarity in all aspects of this presence. The New Zealand situation is quite different. Labour needs are satisfied with Pacific island immigration

12

Hans Entzinger, 'A Future for the Dutch "Ethnic Minorities" Model?' in Muslims

in Europe, ed. B. Lewis and D. Schnapper (London; Pinter, 1994): 19-38; 20.

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(or temporary work permits), while Muslims arrive theoretically at least under quite different terms.

Conflict Discourses New Zealand currently does not expect-let alone, enforce-assimilation in terms of a complete surrender of immigrants' home customs or culturally based identity. The acquisition of residence status or citizenship does not hinge on demonstrated adoption of the host society's customs, values, and mores, even though proof of a minimum of language skill for immigration purposes is required and knowledge of the political institutions is expected for 'naturalisation'. However, religious adaptation in terms of embracing an officially acknowledged religion has never been an issue. From the beginning, New Zealand had no mandatory religious requirement. 13 It is debatable, however, how concerted proselytisation of non-Christian religions would have been regarded in earlier days. There are no known historical records of such attempts to spread Islam, Buddhism, or Judaism pre-dating most recent years. Enforced conversions in Europe ceased centuries ago, although instituted religious intolerance persisted for much longerin some places well into the nineteenth and early twentieth century. In the United States, the First Amendment secured religious freedom from the moment of the nation's foundation. No such statute seemed necessary in New Zealand's climate of religious indifference. Very liberal laws and tolerant discourses notwithstanding, in reality New Zealand society expects of Muslims a modicum of adaptation to the norms and standards of behaviour, as well as complete acceptance of secular laws, participation in the democratic process, and use of democratic institutions for their own as well as the collective good. A set of values, so-called unifiers, appears to be non-negotiable in order to ensure the emergence of a minimal degree of social cohesiveness. However, beyond that very general, broad agreement, there is wide divergence on exactly what these shared values have to be to achieve this effect. There appears to be more consensus about, and emphasis

13 As mentioned before, a footnote in the Maori version of the Waitangi Treaty of 1840, is ambiguous and might be interpreted either as a guarantee of total religious freedom or as an exclusionary clause that prohibits religions not explicitly named Given Governor Hobson's indifference towards religion, the former is more likely.

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on, those values where Muslims seem to have difficulties in co-existing with majority society. I shall briefly outline why for Islam, in abstracto, there may be philosophical and theological problems in satisfying such expectations. In doing so, I emphatically distinguish this hypothetical consideration from existing reality in which the vast majority of Muslims obviously do not consider this a serious hurdle to living in New Zealand. As experience shows quite clearly, only very few seem to lack the will to integrate and through their actions demonstrate their refusal to live by the essential laws and values of the host society. In Europe the acceptance of non-Muslim rule seems to be an issue for some sections of the Muslim community. Integration may be a problem for some because of a literalist notion of the doctrinal view 'You are the best community created by God for the benefit of mankind ... and you rule as to what is right and suppress what is unjust .. .' (Quran 3/110). Salafist literalism and fundamentalist tendencies that seek to implement the purity of the original Muslim community in modern life and wish to be guided by historical Islam's intent appear to have difficulties accepting governance that follows 'infidel' rules, both politically as well as culturally. Democratic participation is often cited as a problem for Muslims since they are routinely portrayed as deficient in the appreciation of modern Western participatory democracy. This issue, however, is more complex than usually appreciated. Islam does not in principle reject parliamentary democracy, although it exhibits a preference for ijma (consensus) over the rule by majority. It also tends to be elitist as it weights the influence of experts (theological jurist-scholars) over the uneducated in the political process. However, Western political systems should be flexible and robust enough to accommodate that. Democratic participation is voluntary and non-enforceable. If Muslims want to forgo their democratic rights of active and passive participation and ignore the parliamentary process, this in itself may be regarded as their democratic right. More problematic is the accommodation of the more fanatical view that if social and political features are contradictory to Islamic dogma, Muslims have a duty of violent resistance. This is the kind of alienation from the political system that culminates in the active rejection of democracy to the point of violent opposition. It may not be obvious to these Muslims that positive engagement may have long-term benefits since on the basis of active democratic participation they may in fact have the ability to bring about changes in their host societies, which is more effective than

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attempting to apply extremist pressure that only invokes retribution. However, in either case, expectations that the (post-) modern Western state could be run along sharia lines with the full force of its canonical, conservative ethics are so unrealistic as to be confined to a very small hard-core minority. The overwhelming reality in Europe seems to be that Muslims wish to be politically involved. In fact a recurrent complaint is that in some countries they have no voting rights as residents until they have obtained citizenship. New Zealand does not have this problem as full voting rights are not tied to citizenship. But other obstacles remain, at least for devout Muslims, that divide them from majority society. Friction occurs in situations where compromises or tolerance by the majority society seems unlikely. Let me outline what appear to be the usual points of discord between Western host societies and Muslims. I arrange this in the form of a short resume of contentious issues debated in many Western European countries with sizeable Muslim minorities. New Zealand is not confronted with these issues, at least not to the same degree of urgency as Europe seems to be. Whether rightly or wrongly in majority society there is the prevalent perception that Muslims have, at best, divided loyalties, and, at worst, none. It is considered wrong for Muslims to place solidarity with the umma above their allegiance to their chosen host country, rejecting responsibility as citizens or permanent residents. Although this is an important issue in a global scenario in which the interests of the West are frequently not aligned with those in the Islamic world, this is rarely an accurate assessment. Some Muslim attacks in the West may have been motivated by a misplaced sense of solidarity with the Islamic world and by misguided loyalty to Islam, causing a misperception of Western society as the enemy, but there is by no means overwhelming evidence that this is generally the case. It may be true that solidarity with an imagined worldwide religious community/4 although transcending a narrow nationalism, through its religious exclusiveness falls short of what one may consider a desirable future goal, viz. a globalised sense of solidarity encompassing all of humanity. But as argued before, divided loyalty does not mean absence of loyalty. A sense of solidarity with one side provides no forceful grounds for

14 See, for instance, Mustafa Malik, 'Muslims Pluralize the West, Resist Assimilation', Middle East Policy 11, no. 1 (2004): 70-84; 71-72.

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attack on the other. Future social patterns will increasingly come to rely on multiple and more complex patterns of collective loyalties than was traditionally the case. It is often argued that Islam lacks an openness towards secularism to the same extent as Christianity does. If it had, it would allow the relativisation of Islam so that it could be perceived as one religion of basically equal value with others, sharing equal status in a secularised society. Recognising Islam as one among several religions would also allow for a more ready embracement of a separation of, on the one hand, religion and, on the other, state, governance, and politics. Cultivating a profound sense of equality with other religions would address in a positive way the thorny question of Muslim apostasy and intolerant Islamic responses. Equally, recognition of 'secularised' (or nominal) Muslims to whom Islam has become of secondary importance and who can divorce private ethics from collective social conduct would be important. In a more general sense, this would require 'loosening up' the perception of what it means to be a Muslim and lowering the threshold of individual responsibility to meet the criteria of being Muslim. Doing so would undermine dangerous exclusivist notions ranging from aggressive notions of the superiority of Islam to violent jihad ism. An aggressive su periorist notion has no place in a multicultural, pluralist society built on the ideal of basic equality and the equal worth of all humans. In line with equalising the status of Islam in the eyes of believers, it follows that expectations, or demands, be abandoned that liberal democratic society, by placing the political doctrine of freedom of religion and culture above all else, respond with liberalism to illiberal acts by Muslims who may be inspired by a belligerent or all-too conservative understanding of Islam. Western host countries expect an effort to purge gender discriminative, apparently misogynous elements from the espousal of Islam and mitigate the extreme homosociality of some Muslim customary practices. For host societies it does not matter whether this is achieved by Islam's theologically based recognition that gender inegalitarian customs are not part of Islam proper, or by purging Islam of such elements through a concerted redefinition and recalibration of doctrine, or by simply ignoring such rules. Also expected is an effort towards emphatically reconciling Islam with universal human rights, rather than vice versa, as has been done by positing an alternative based on the sharia (as the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights purports to do). Reconciliation would lead to a profound appreciation of personal

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freedoms not only of choice of religion (including apostasy) and lifestyle (more tolerance of 'permissiveness' in non-Muslim society), but also of freedom of speech and expression. 15 This would entail tolerance of irreverence vis-a-vis, and critical scrutiny of, Islam and, concomitant with it, dropping the kind of strict interpretation of blasphemy and sacrilege that demands an extremely harsh, divinely prescribed response. This has led several times in the past to a very unfavourable perception of Islam in the West. The right of protest notwithstanding, book burnings-which tend to conjure up horrific visions of Nazism-and demands that personae non gratae be assassinated create an extremely poor perception of Islam in the non-Muslim public. For instance in the Danish cartoon affair, violent demonstrations and colourful demands for the murder of the cartoonists only provoke the portrayal of Islam as a violent, intolerant, un-self-critical religion. Calls for restraint on both sides and greater respect for religious sensitivities have in all cases been issued by the authorities, but seem destined for failure. Freedom of speech in the West, imperfect as it still is, is widely considered among the pinnacle of liberal and democratic achievement, hard won after centuries of church authoritarianism and political autocracy. The deliberate and provocative re-publication of the Danish cartoons in several European papers in March 2008 is clear evidence of that attitude. In this issue, two profound values-freedom of personal expression and religious devotion-highly cherished in the respective culture meet head to head. Various controversies revolving around these values have provided a stark, essentialised perspective on the clash of advanced secularisation and its absence. Both values, because of their close proximity to the respective cultural core, will prove recalcitrant to the attempt to find compromises. The issue of freedom of expression and Islam's apparent opposition to it moved into the limelight of public awareness in January 1988 through the publication of Salman Rushdie's novel The Satanic Verses. Muslim response to it tempted the public to see this as an expression of the basic and paradigmatic incompatibility between the West and the Islamic world. It drew sharp attention to Muslim sensitivities over

15 In a wider sense this harks back to Bassam Tibi's verdict that Muslims are only prepared to accept the fruits of science, but not the intellectual culture-freedom of opinion, enquiry and criticism, including satire and ridicule-from which it has grown This will be discussed later. Bassam Tibi, Islamischer Fundamentalism us, moderne Wissenschaft und Technologie, (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1992).

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matters considered blasphemous by them and how seriously this is taken in the Islamic world. What is more, it seemed to demonstrate the narrow and intolerant definition of religious insult and the harshness of retribution such infringements demand. Through the Bradford demonstrations and book burnings in several places, it projected to the host society a shocking picture of intolerance reminiscent of loathsome Nazi ideology and medieval religious fervour. Critically, the episode touched on issues of democratic freedoms of artistic expression and the right to satirise religious contents. The disinclination of secularised British society to offer religious protection-limited by law to a rather ineffective and rarely activated protection for Christianity-was strongly criticised by Muslims. To many Westerners it demonstrated that while Muslims were keen to demand freedom of religion for themselves, they seemed reluctant to accord freedom of expression and belief, or disbelief, to others. Supreme Ayatollah Ruollah Khomeini's death fatwa against the author, forcing him to seek police protection and to go into hiding, did nothing to mellow the growing negative perception of Islam. The Rushdie affair presented the first major challenge to reconciling cultural differences and provided an example of the concept of blasphemy, demonstrating just how far apart the two cultures can be in some respects. Although Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa was issued for political as much as for theological reasons and had a rather counterproductive effect in the West, it did underline Muslims' demand for respect for their religion beyond anything Western society is used to in dealing with Christianity. In the wake of the New Age and postmodernism, tribal religions are usually treated with more respect or at least with more circumspection to avoid the labels of 'racism' or intellectual imperialism. Black Golliwog dolls have been removed from sale; cartoons of missionaries being cooked in large cauldrons have disappeared-all in the name of political correctness and cultural sensitivity. With some justification, Muslims may feel that they have not become recipients of such consideration. On the other hand, crosses have disappeared from classrooms across Europe as much in recognition of secularism as to avoid offending Muslims. Islamic tuition has been introduced into the school curriculum in countries in which the state sponsors those religions that enjoy official recognition. Countries in which young men are conscripted into the army have incorporated Muslim chaplains, halal food, and time off for prayer to accommodate Muslim soldiers. Yet, freedom of expression-enshrined in the

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European Convention of Human Rights-including the freedom to blaspheme is a sacred cow that cannot be sacrificed. Western society, never in the past particularly tolerant vis-a-vis immigrant or minority cultures, has to be prepared to soften its conservative and traditionalist stances, and to make significant concessions to accept Islamic expectations and sensitivities in the social, legal, political, and ideological fabric of society. However, there are limits to tolerance, and phenomena of cultural closure appear in various forms. The rise and brief peak of the French Nationalist Front with its xenophobic and anti-immigration platform under Jean-Marie Le Pen, and the emergence of other right-wing political parties with anti-immigration propaganda in various European countries give an indication of the problem. A conspicuous phenomenon was the sudden popularity of the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn who gained influence with his radical message that Islamic culture-a 'backward culture' -was threatening to swamp the traditionally liberal climate of the country and to replace secular tolerance with Islamic intolerance. 16 New Zealand has in recent years experienced some cases in which Islam has conflicted with the country's usual customs though not necessarily with the letter of the law, or other cases in which Islam, Islamic observance, or individual Muslims have come to public attention. Some cases have tested the level of tolerance and provided a good gauge of public acceptance or otherwise provided fuel in the everlooming presence of conflict discourses. The Zaoui case, the arson of the Hamilton mosque, the occasional accusations of terrorist connections, a letter campaign against Jews and Muslims in November 2004, the 'hate' sermon by a Muslim scholar, a certain Dr. Quick, against homosexuality on Triangle television in September 2003 17 are a few examples. 18 The events of 9/11 may be the prime reason for Muslim issues coming to the attention of the nation more frequently now than in the past. As a consequence, Muslims may also have suffered some

16 More recently, in 2007 and early 2008 (at the time of writing), the Dutch lawmaker Geert Wilders seems to have taken up the baton to test the limits of free speech by deliberately insulting Islam. 17 Broadcasting Standards Authority, decision no. 2004-001 (26 Feb 2004). 18 None of these cases however, has had the degree of gravity and impact of the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States, the Rushdie affair in the UK in the 1980s, the affaire du foulard in France recently, or the Islamically inspired murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in November 2004.

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discrimination, as the Human Rights Commission reports suggest. 19 In terms of race relations, Muslims in particular have encountered some negative attitudes in school, at work, and in the community because of their dress, their requirements for religious observance, and because of a degree of association in the public mind between Islam and terrorism. A prominent source of conflict is the freedom of expression generally enjoyed in Western society that allows the liberty to satirise and to criticise religious content. Not surprisingly, Muslim demands to proscribe this freedom, which allows Islamic beliefs to be insulted and ridiculed, by and large, fall on deaf ears. What many Muslims tend to overlook in their rage is that it is exactly the kind of freedom that allows Islam to be insulted that also provides them with the liberty to express their views and adhere to customs some of which are unpalatable to a majority of non-Muslims. When Muslims demand harsh punishment for insulting Islam and call for retribution, demand intolerance towards homosexuality or adultery, and criticise the permissiveness of New Zealand society, the legal system finds itself on their side in protecting their right to hold and freely express a view that may not be in tune with Western majority sentiments. Of course the carrying out of harsh Islamic forms of punishment is not permitted, even within the Muslim community. National criminal law remains paramount. New Zealand has not been faced with the conundrum of what a liberal democratic state is to do when its liberalism is used to express minority illiberalism. Many a European court has excused intolerant expressions as genuinely held Islamic religious beliefs although they may have advocated murder or harsh physical forms of punishment. The paradox grows into a problem when murder is advocated under the mantle of a moral religious standpoint; a problem that can only be resolved post-hoc, when the deed is executed, and words have become actionable. However, while hateful speech in the name of defending Islam has rarely drawn punitive action from Western society in the past, laws relating to 'hate speech' and preaching jihad have been tightened more recently to curb the spread of terrorist propaganda. The situation seems reversed lately in this issue. While once the state did not seem to wish to be drawn into a stance protective or critical of religion, now, conversely, European authorities are attempting

19

http://www.hrc.co.nz/report/chapters/chapterl8/race03.html#rel; (25/11/04).

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to curb the proselytising activities of radical mosques and clerics in the interest of public safety and national security. Muslims look at this with suspicion. While for Muslims this appears to be a problem of discrimination, for the wider society there are significant ramifications as well. These attempts by the state to protect itself and liberal democracy create the risk of infringing on cherished democratic freedoms of expression and opinion, and what is more-and is incipiently dangerous-they even make these tendencies of declining civil liberties acceptable to the public. The arrest of the cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri in North London-and since then other Muslim clerics-has caused the press to question the extent of 'British liberalism' and the 'scrupulous fairness of the legal system' that allowed him to attack those liberal values that 'he so despises' and to preach against them with impunity for so long. 20 Again, there are parallels emerging with the situation in New Zealand. The Ahmed Zaoui case also hints at a clash between the civil liberty of holding any political view and the perceived duty of the state paradoxically to protect its liberal values by infringing on some basic human rights traditionally held in high regard. To Muslims in New Zealand it appears as if Islam and its potential for violence are coming in for a much closer, and unfair, scrutiny than any other religious, political, or ethnic group would be exposed to. One of the most chronic areas of friction between Western law and society and Muslim religious sensitivities concerns perceived insults through satire and socio-critical art. In New Zealand, the Madonnain-a-condom affair, the Danish cartoons, and the South Park episode brought to the surface what appeared to be Islam's incapacity to tolerate blasphemy. Muslims not only tried to defend their own beliefs against ridicule through artistic license, but also strongly sympathised with the Catholic and in a wider sense Christian sense of outrage about blasphemous insults. The causes were a piece of art exhibited in the national museum, Te Papa, in 1998 and a television programme in 2007, respectively. In this case too freedom of the arts and of expression in general-guaranteed by a religiously disengaged society-and its potential for being insulting with impunity to religious sentiments was made painfully obvious to devout people. 21 Muslims felt

Reported in The Otago Daily Times 29-30 May 2004; 12. See Erich Kolig, 'Of Condoms, Biculturalism, and Political Correctness', Paideuma 46 (2000): 231-252. 20 21

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directly aggrieved in the Danish cartoon affair. The Rushdie ruckus had already demonstrated conundrums generic to Islam similar to the later Madonna-in-a-condom, South Park and Danish cartoons affairs: they made obvious the difficulty that Muslims have in reconciling themselves to the fact that freedom of (artistic) expression was given a higher value over religious integrity, although this was done not so much because this freedom is protected by the state and its laws, but because a secular state and a majority of citizens felt little sympathy with aggrieved religious feelings. It is hardly surprising that Muslims feel they are unfairly singled out for insult as Western society recognises certain sensitive areas that are taboo to ridicule, in an artistic fashion or otherwise. The cherished freedom of speech and the artistic freedom to satirise, criticise, and lampoon has its limitations even in the supposedly free and liberal Western society. 22 In secularised Western society, however, these boundaries are not defined or policed by religion. What is acceptable and tolerable, or not, is defined by other sensitivities and laws. To satirise Judaism or criticise Jewish or Zionist interests has to be reconciled with events of recent history as well as with laws current in some European countries (where Holocaust denial is a criminal offence). Much to most people's surprise, the world news reported in November 2007 that two Spanish cartoonists were convicted and fined for insulting the Spanish crown prince, Felipe, in a cartoon. Happily for the cartoonists, lese-majeste is not a capital crime any more. Nonetheless it demonstrated, again, that the belief that 'nothing is sacred' and 'everything goes' in secularised Western society does not hold true in all cases. Not everything can be a legitimate target for satirists and critics. Only the conception of what is off limits and beyond ridicule and what can be lampooned with impunity has changed. It needs to be pointed out that New Zealand Muslims have never issued any death threats against specific persons, although protests and

22 On a more juridical level, the European Human Rights Convention, for example, has provisions that limit free speech (in the wider sense of free expression; see article 10). Among such limitations are defamation, national security, law enforcement, protection of public morality, injury to the feelings of a religious community (which has a low priority). Blasphemy laws are tailored to protect Christianity, but not other religions. Also domestic laws of EU member states may set aside freedom of speech. Generally, political speech enjoys the greatest degree of freedom, artistic expression somewhat lower, and commercial expressions yet lower. (I thank Prof. Laurence Lustgarten, Southampton University, for this information.)

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demonstrations were held in which harsh slogans may have been used. However, unlike demonstrations in Europe in the wake of the Danish cartoon affair, placards did not advocate assassination or murder. Punishment by death was demanded once, though in an impersonal, generic sense in relation to homosexuality, but as it turned out the claim that Islam demands the stoning of homosexuals was erroneous and based on a misunderstanding of the Quranic prescription (as will be discussed in the chapter on fundamentalism). Blasphemous Libel and Islam

A precis of some blasphemous cases that have inflamed the feelings of Muslims in this country is in order. Blasphemous libel is on the statute books as a criminal offence (Crimes Act 1961). This law has been used once in a prosecution dating back to 1922, and, significantly, was unsuccessful then. 23 If it were capable of being successfully wielded at all, no doubt it would be more potent in the service of Christianity than for Islam. The fact that it was not used relatively recently in the Madonna-in-a-condom affair because it was seen as ineffectual and helping to further ridicule religion as outdated, narrow-minded bigotry, shows the degree to which secularisation has advanced in New Zealand. Trying to stem the tide in almost King-Canutian fashion, Muslims have rallied consistently to the defence of monotheistic religion and not just of Islam. 24 Showing a rare sense of solidarity with conservative Christianity, they have sided with it in several high-profile cases of blasphemous insults aimed at, especially, Catholicism. The Madonna-in-a-condom case mentioned above was one. Clothing a small statuette of the Madonna in a condom and displaying it at the national museum Te Papa was too insulting even for Muslims. Islam has a certain degree of reverence for Mary (or Maryam), despite its misgivings about the apparent apotheosis of a worldly figure. Known as ishrak (illicit association with the oneness of God, tawhid), the exalted status and veneration of 'the mother of God' is taken to corroborate further what a strict interpretation of Islamic doctrine holds to be the polytheistic and idolatrous nature of Catholicism. Mary

23 Rex Ahdar, 'Religious Liberty in a Temperate Zone: A Report from New Zealand', Emory International Law Review 21, no. 1 (2007): 205-38; 212, fn 52. 24 For instance, protesting against films such as Death of a Princess.

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worship comes close to idolatry in the Islamic view, making Catholics deserving of the label mushrikun, polytheists. Nonetheless, Mary is a person of respect in Islam. As it says in the Quran (3/45): '0 Mary [Maryam in Arabic]. Allah gives you glad tidings with a word from him: ... his name will be Messiah Isa [Jesus], son ofMaryam ... and he will be one of those near to Allah'. Muslims thus shared the pain over the insult with Catholics. When all-too obvious ridicule is threatening Christian sensitivities, the inter-denominational solidarity of monotheism is mobilised in the common cause of defending religion and its dignity vis-a-vis secularism. A similar grave insult to Catholicism was offered a few years later on television. On 27 February 2006, the television channel C4 aired a programme whose controversial and grossly insulting nature had been trumpeted well in advance-which was probably meant to enhance its newsworthiness and attract the interest of advertisers. Advance protests did not move Canwest TVW arks, the channel owners, to remove the offending item. In this episode in the cartoon series South Park, dubbed 'The Bloody Mary', there was a rather grotesque portrayal of the Catholic Madonna 'cult' and the associated miracle expectations. In a contrived tale, a life-size Madonna statue spurted blood in explosive bursts from its anal region, which came to be believed to have curative powers for the devout thus 'anointed' with its blood. The ancient belief in the magical property of blood, the Christian stigmata, the act of baptism, and the gullibility of believers were thus ridiculed in one fell swoop that was designed to make fun of the iconic Catholic worship of Mary as the 'mother of God'. Further insult was heaped on Catholicism when the cartoon story went on to show the Pope character testing the miracle and then, splattered with blood, debunking it by pronouncing the equally ridiculous verdict that there is nothing miraculous about it, because the blood in question issued from menstruation and 'chicks do menstruate'. The crude satirising of religious belief seems to have offended feelings well beyond the circle of devout Catholics. However, the point to be made here is that the satire was within the law, although in the area of legal ambiguity. An unsympathetic understanding of the event was inclined to invoke the long dormant blasphemy law and also argue that a breach of broadcasting standards occurred-unsuccessfully as it turned out. Despite vigorous protests mainly by the Catholic Church and the bishop synod, with which Muslims openly sympathised, CanWest did not remove the item from the programme. Immediately, connections

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were made with the Danish cartoons and the lamentable lack of respect for religious matters shown in both incidents. The (then) Prime Minister Helen Clark was reported as saying that she found the content tasteless and revolting. 'Menstrual blood blowing up in the face of the Pope, what is so funny about that?' she wondered. However, issues of free speech and the Bill of Rights were mentioned in support of the television channel. The Catholic bishop synod urged Catholics to boycott channel C4 and its sister channel TV3 as well as the products advertised on these channels. The Broadcasting Standards Authority in June 2006 declined to uphold the complaints, arguing that the episode was so obviously absurd and farcical that it was beyond a breach of good taste and decency. A High Court appeal, similarly, was lost in August with costs awarded against the Catholic Church. The outcome can be taken as an indication of how far advanced secularism is.

Danish Cartoons Rock the World The situation was decidedly different in another matter that caused ructions throughout the Islamic world, considerable disturbance in the Western world, and also made some waves in New Zealand. Clearly the most controversial issue affecting Islam-West relationships globally in recent years, aside from terrorism, was the Danish cartoon affair. The ructions it created reverberated throughout the world, signalling Muslim sensitivities in an impressive manner. In 2006, the Islamic world, including its Western enclaves, found itself in uproar over the publication in a Danish newspaper of a small number of cartoon-like artistic drawings, which in various ways portrayed the Prophet Muhammad. On 30 September 2005 the right-leaning Danish daily paper ]yllands Posten published twelve cartoon-like drawings with an Islamic theme. The pictures focused mainly on the figure of the Prophet Muhammad. The motivation behind them was posted as a competition, allegedly with the purpose of stimulating debate about Islam and the Muslim minority in Denmark. As it was stated post-hoc, the intention had not been to insult Islam or to provoke Muslims into violence in order to show them up in a bad light. The main controversial characteristic of this series of caricatures was the connection of the image of the Prophet with compromising and degrading issues. One caricature that gave particular offence showed the Prophet Muhammad with a turban in the form of a bomb, with a lit fuse sticking out of it. This

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symbolic configuration associating the Prophet's image with terrorism is of course extremely sacrilegious. By extension it draws Islam per se into the orbit of extremism. It could hardly be surpassed by anything more insulting. Another, no less offensive drawing depicted dishevelled suicide bombers arriving at heaven's door, but being turned away by the Prophet with the words: 'we have run out of virgins'. Only a few of the drawings were clearly designed to ridicule Islamic doctrine, while others did not signal gross disrespect or could be construed as ad hominems towards the Prophet. Yet, the uproar was deafening. Following publication in the ]yllands Posten, relations between the West and the Islamic world-and that includes the sizeable Muslim minority now living in Western countries-deteriorated dramatically. Relations, already strained, took a noticeable turn to the worse. Although the accents of this antagonistic relationship over the course of history have changed several times, the cartoon affair added yet another ingredient. It created a new crisis between the two ideological blocs by showing in glaring clarity and through unpleasant hyperbole that there is a potentially ever-present clash of two fundamentally different world views: a strongly theocentric, religiously devout one on the Islamic side and an anthropocentric, highly secularised one on the other. It demonstrated once again that in the Muslim world, as a sweeping generalisation, religious issues have a significance and an emotional and intellectual gravity that by and large is unmatched in the West. Residual groups in the West that may share the sentiment with the Islamic world that freedom of expression should be strongly bounded by respect for religious content have largely been pushed aside and lost social influence. In contrast, journalists and writers, artists and even cartoonists in Muslim (or Muslim-majority) countries have to be careful not to transgress. Religious content can only be approached with considerable caution. If artists and writers do overstep the religious mark, they get hounded and occasionally even killed. (It is not well known in the West that Salman Rushdie's fate is far from unique.) This fact in itself does not support Huntington's notion of a clash between civilisations as an inevitable and catastrophic event. However, the event served as a reminder that profound differences in the valuation of individual expression are dividing the two worlds. Aside from the intended ridicule, even the artistic representation of the Prophet alone would have been enough to cause violent controversy. In strict Islam the representation of the human form is forbidden because it is seen as an imitation-a very poor one at that-of God's

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creative act and an attempt to arrogate to humans a power that is not theirs. In extreme views even the photograph of humans is forbidden. Shi'a Islam is somewhat more relaxed about it as religious processions traditionally carry large pictures of the martyred Hussein, imaginatively reconstructed and idealised, and other exalted personages-but never the Prophet's image. But especially in the iconoclastic Wahhabi view there is much emphasis on the hadith: 'angels will not enter a house where there are pictures', from which is derived the reason for forbidding any kind of human representation, whether threedimensional statues or two-dimensional images, and even realistic depictions of animals. In its severest form (as practised by the Taleban), it prohibits even the taking of pictures of people. To give the historical figure of the Prophet Muhammad-an exalted and exemplary human being, touched by God-human form is an even stronger violation of this general religious taboo. Not only is it a violation of the prohibition on human representation, by virtue of the extraordinary position of the Prophet in a conservative interpretation, it constitutes idolatry. In Islamically sanctioned movies, for instance, the figure of the Prophet is never shown, only his voice may be heard. Even more aggravating with this series of cartoons was the fact that it not only portrayed the Prophet, but some pictures were clearly designed to ridicule him. The picture showing the Prophet at heaven's door telling a ragged group of suicide bombers to stop doing their deeds because paradise had run out of virgins refers to the belief that martyrs (shahidin, mustashhidin) would be rewarded in paradise (jannah) 25 with a specified number of virgins placed at their disposal. The cartoon relates more to the simplified, satirised version of Islamic doctrine that is in this primitive form hardly shared by a majority of Muslims. More sophisticated believers perceive this promise of heavenly rewards in more abstract terms. Spiritual rewards are believed to await the martyr rather than sexual or sensual pleasures. The NZ Dawa eNewsletter of 31 January 2008 gives the following description of paradise: Paradise: There is Nothing Like It The delights of Paradise surpass the imagination and defy description. They are like nothing known to the people of this world; no matter how

25 There is an even higher gradation, the highest heaven (firdaws) reserved for prophets, martyrs, and the very pious.

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advanced we may become, what we achieve is as nothing in comparison with the joys of the Hereafter. As is mentioned in several reports, there is nothing like Paradise: "It is sparkling light, aromatic plants, a lofty palace, a flowing river, ripe fruit, a beautiful wife and abundant clothing, in an eternal abode of radiant joy, in beautiful soundly-constructed high houses" [Ibn Maajah, AsSunan, Kitaab Az-Zuhd, Baab Sifaat al-Jannah, 2/1448, no. 4332. Ibn Hibbaan narrated it in his saheeh]

The Sahabah [companions] asked the Prophet (saw)2 6 about the buildings of Paradise and he replied with a wonderful description: "Bricks of gold and silver, and mortar of fragrant musk, pebbles of pearl and sapphire, and soil of saffron. Whoever enters it is filled with joy and will never feel miserable; he will live there forever and never die; their clothes will never wear out and their youth will never fade." [Ahmad, At-Tirmidhi, ad-Daarimee, Mishkaat al-Masaabeeh, 3/29, sahih]. Allah (swt)2 7 indeed spoke the truth when He (swt) said:" And when you look there [in Paradise] you will see a delight [that cannot be imagined]. And a great dominion" [76:20] What Allah (swt) has kept hidden from us the delights of Paradise is beyond our ability to comprehend: al- Bukhaari reported from Abu Hurayrah [...] that the Prophet (saw) said that Allah (swt) said, "I have prepared for My slaves what no eye has seen, no ear has heard and no human heart can imagine" Recite if you wish, "No person would know what is kept hidden for them of joy as a reward for what they used to do." (32:17). In the version reported by Muslim from Abu Hurayrah, there is the addition, "Never mind what Allah has told you; what He has not told you is EVEN greater" Cleansed of its colourful, metaphorical language, this text reveals a somewhat different conception of paradise. While at first glance it may still seem sensual and even materialistic, it conjures up an image quite different from a sex romp. Appealing to an imagination of the concrete, it refers to unimaginable delights in which the magnitude of abstract prospects is hinted at by metaphorical images of incredible riches and beauty.

26 The abbreviation 'saw' stands for sallalahu alayhi wasallam, a formula that follows the mention of the Prophet 27 'Swt' is the usual formula following a mention of God It stands for subhanahu wa ta'ala (glorious and exalted is he).

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In the cartoon affair's aftermath, it has variously been pointed out that the term huri used for the heavenly maidens may not in fact refer to virgins but to white raisins. What is implied here-adding further oil to the fire-is that this belief of heavenly rewards is nothing but a perverted misconstruction of a harmless delicacy, thus revealing a streak of lechery in Islam. Insinuating that there are flaws in the doctrine is insulting to Islam, which is based on the conviction that it faithfully and exactly preserves the revelations from God, clearly laid down, and since handed on without flaws and mistakes. At first the Danish Muslim leadership demanded an apology not only from the paper, but also from the government for its inaction. When this was not forthcoming, some leading persons took it upon themselves to tour Muslim countries in the Middle East, showing off the cartoons to prove how poorly Muslims are treated in Denmark. For maximum effect, other cartoons-among them one showing the Prophet as a pig-that had not been part of the original collection had been added to the portfolio. As the scandal gradually built, other European newspapers printed the cartoons, adding oil to the growing flames. They denied that they were driven by sensationalism. Instead they insisted that it was their duty to inform their readership thoroughly about the growing crisis. Not long after in the early months of 2006, as news spread, the Muslim world erupted in violent protests. Flags were burnt and embassies attacked. According to world press reports some 50-in other reports 150-people lost their lives in protest actions. Some attacks on Western targets were allegedly managed for political effect. Worldwide, trade was affected, as a boycott of Danish and other countries' products was announced. Belated, reserved apologies made little difference. The affair reverberated around the world, stoking Muslim hostility vis-a-vis the West. Eventually the flames died down, leaving the lingering evil smell of severely damaged relationships. The cartoonists are reported to be still under constant police protection and, according to press reports in February 2008, a murder conspiracy against one of them-the one who drew the Prophet with the dangerous headgear-had been uncovered and prevented. Three Danish Muslims were arrested. Throughout the world, the episode also triggered a profound debate on press freedom, freedom of expression, and religious freedom, the three vital ingredients in this multicultural saga.2s

28

The cartoons were available in full on several websites.

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In New Zealand the scandal was kept in bounds; protests were comparatively low-key. The Dominion Post, Christchurch's The Press, and the Nelson Mail could not resist the temptation to publish the cartoons in full. TVNZ and TV3 showed excerpts. 29 Their explanation was that they felt they had a duty to inform their readership and viewers about a topical issue. As they stated, their reason was not demonstratively to reject censorship, or to strike a blow for press freedom or, morally repulsively, to exploit opportunistically a sensationalist issue to improve sales or ratings. Nonetheless, the publication incurred (then) Prime Minister Clark's displeasure. She was reported calling the editorial decision 'ill-judged' and reiterating the government's 'respect for all religions'. Abstaining from publishing would not have been a question of liberty, she said, but of 'plain and good manners'. The responsible editors apologised for causing offence, but not for having published the material. Muslim reaction was muted, with only one larger demonstration of about 500 persons in Auckland on 2 February 2006. Though noisy, it remained peaceful. An informally conducted poll showed that 66 percent of New Zealanders opined against publication and only 34 percent for it. Thus a surprising degree of solidarity with Muslims was declared by a majority of respondents. The Human Rights website posted the following media release [slightly edited here] on 8 February 2006: New Zealand Muslim communities protested, and a wide variety of people complained to the Commission, including Christians. TV One and TV 3 news broadcasted the images in the context of the local reaction. The complaints did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Act, but the Race Relations Commissioner became involved as part of the Commission's wider mandate to encourage harmonious relations in society. The Commissioner publicly questioned the usefulness of publishing the cartoons, and was able to convene a meeting between religious leaders and media institutions to discuss the issues. The resolution attempted to overcome Muslim alienation from the mainstream media by committing to better channels of dialogue, and committing to informing the community about diverse cultures and beliefs. The Dominion Post and The Press did not resile from their decision to publish the stories in the context of the news, but apologised for offence caused and undertook not to publish the cartoons again. All parties

29 The three papers are owned by the Australian company Fairfax. As was subsequently pointed out repeatedly by media commentators, Fairfax papers in Australia abstained from re-printing the offending cartoons. Only one paper in Australia, Brisbane's Courier-Mail, did so.

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affirmed the importance of freedom of the media, but also acknowledged that responsibilities that come with that freedom [which) includes sensitivity to diverse cultures and beliefs. The industry participants agreed that the Commission should facilitate further discussion, that the Journalists Training Organisation should address training issues that arose from this debate, and that a directory of Muslim spokespeople would be compiled and made available to the media to facilitate a better flow of information. The Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand was happy with the outcome, and considered that the matter had been dealt with appropriately. It called off any further protests. A month later, after a further meeting between FIANZ, the Race Relations Commissioner, and the Freedom Committee of the Commonwealth Press Union, an opinion piece written by the FIANZ President was published in several newspapers throughout the country ... In his opinion piece, the FIANZ President said: "That meeting epitomised for me what New Zealand is all about-that despite our diverse backgrounds, we can work together in good faith to build a strong and cohesive society. This debate also provided the Muslim community with an opportunity to open a dialogue with the broader New Zealand community and address a number of the myths and stereotypes that some people have about Muslims" The Human Rights Commission determined 'that Muslims are from a wide range of ethnicities and cannot be defined as an ethnic group, or a group defined by racial or national origins. The cartoon issue could therefore not be dealt with under Section 61 of the Human Rights Act. The Human Rights Act makes it unlawful to publish or broadcast material which is threatening, abusive or insulting and is likely to excite hostility against groups of people, or bring them into contempt, because of their race, colour, ethnicity, or national origin. This provision has to be read in conjunction with the right to free speech provided for in the Bill of Rights Act. This creates a high threshold for this category of complaint.' However, the complaints were an important gauge of the intensity of Muslim feeling, although acts of violence were scrupulously avoided. Under government and Human Rights Commission supervision a dialogue about offensiveness, community engagement, and press responsibilities was initiated. The Human Rights Commission website listed the following agreement between the participating parties, which was not joined by the television channels: Positive outcome from meeting over cartoon controversy: The following statement was agreed to by all participants at a meeting held today between media and religious representatives to discuss issues surrounding the publication ofcaricatures of the ProphetMahommed [sic]. The meeting was convened by Race Relations Commissioner, Joris

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de Bres, and held at the offices of the Human Rights Commission in Wellington. 1. We agree that New Zealand's dramatically increased diversity of

cultures and faiths raises new challenges for the media and the New Zealand community. 2. We believe that it was groundbreaking for this range of people to meet to discuss this issue. 3. The meeting affirmed without dissent the importance of freedom of the media. 4. Equally, such freedom is not absolute, and comes with responsibilities. Among these were listed: respect for cultures and beliefs, responsibility to inform about diverse cultures and beliefs, and provide dialogue and channels of communication between the media and faith communities. Strangely, not listed was the duty to inform the public without fear or favour. In reference to increasing globalisation of information and cultures, it said: 6. The meeting acknowledged that the media has to make difficult calls

on such issues on a daily basis and these need to be considered in an international context of conflict. The statement further stresses the need for continuing public discussion and the role of the Human Rights Commission to facilitate that. The media should facilitate a better flow of information. The meeting affirmed: a) The media who published the cartoons did not set out to insult or offend, only to inform b) They apologised for the offence caused c) They did not resile from the decision to publish, based on the context at that time. Two newspapers that published the cartoons- The Dominion Post and The Press-undertook not to publish them again. Apparently, the Nelson Mail stood its ground and did not join the accord. The uproar that a few cartoons, originally published in a largely unknown Danish newspaper, could cause showed very clearly just how different the 'worlds' are in which Muslims and Westerners live. In the Western (and ex-Christian) highly secularised world, religious issues do not arouse such passions from large numbers of people. Few people in New Zealand stir when Christian symbols get violated or caricatured. Few non-Muslim New Zealanders, including committed

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Christians, could imagine the extent of Muslim passion prior to these events. Reminders of this fact came when global Muslimhood learned that the Quran had (allegedly) been physically mistreated in Guantanamo and worldwide mass demonstrations and protests led to several deaths. It seems the lesson from years before, when sacred beliefs had been lampooned in Salman Rushdie's book, The Satanic Verses, had been forgotten by this time. It led to massive demonstrations, book burnings, at least one assassination, and earned Rush die a death fa twa from the Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Khomeini-a threat which in principle has not been revoked (even though opinions are divided on its legitimacy or continuing relevance). To no one's surprise, these events were hotly debated among New Zealand's Muslims. The solidarity, ukhuwa, among the umma, the world community of believers, kicked in powerfully. The more thoughtful ones saw beyond the immediate insult. What they saw was the raw force of Western global hegemony at work. For them the violation of Islam's religious symbols by the West was not only blasphemous, but a blatant exercise of the West's ideological power over the Muslim world. In their eyes incidents like these constituted a flagrant and calculated abuse of its might. And especially as the affair played out after the initial publication, when several other papers in Europe followed suit, demonstrated for them yet again the West's arrogance and its corrosive influence on the Muslim way of life. To Muslims this was not done for the sake of information as the papers claimed, but to offer a calculated insult. It is worth noting that, despite some rumblings of discontent, among Muslims there was some satisfaction regarding the generally restrained way New Zealand's government and the press handled the matter. Muslim criticism, however, was not slow on another level, in pointing out gross inconsistencies in Western legal standpoints. On closer inspection, they argued, what is touted as freedom of expression and the unfettered freedom of the press is actually applied very selectively. For instance, when a New Zealand cartoonist likened Israel's treatment of the Palestinians to apartheid, he lost his job, ostensibly because the Jewish community found that offensive and had protested. 30 A few years earlier, the Madonna-in-a-condom affair had excited the nation.

30

'Closeup' TVNZ. 3 February 2006.

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When loud protests arose-from Christians supported by Muslims, the museum's management responded by insisting on the freedom of the arts in a secularised society, which would allow them to injure religious feelings with impunity. On that occasion Catholics and other committed Christians were quick to point out that such blasphemous acts could not be inflicted on cherished Maori cultural and spiritual symbols. Such things enjoy total sacrosanctity. The Holocaust also constitutes a taboo subject that may not be satirised. Muslims argue this is owing to the power and influence of the Jewish lobby, while by comparison they are bereft of such influence to ensure that their sensitivities are treated with equal respect. When in 2005-06, David Irving, a prominent British 'Holocaust-denier', was arrested and imprisoned as he visited Austria (where the promulgation of such views is a criminal offence), Muslims saw further justification for their view: the right to free speech and freedom of expression may be a public good, but it is applied very selectively. A further example held up as corroborating evidence was that in 2006 a British Muslim preacher en route to New Zealand was denied even a brief stopover in Australia. The official reason seems to have been that his views were deemed unacceptable. When I added that in Spain two caricaturists were fined in 2007 for lampooning the Spanish crown prince, it was seen as further evidence that the West's much-touted track record of freedom of expression looks rather patchy. Even in cases where there are no specific laws to protect esteemed cultural elements, there are boundaries of good taste and conventions that may not be breached and which are commonly observed. Even though no laws may be broken, there is an expectation that some issues will be shown such respect as to place them beyond satire. For instance, the suffering of the Jews in the Holocaust cannot be satirised. Genocide in general is not regarded a fit subject to poke fun at. When the Iranian newspaper Harnshahri announced a competition on just that topic, it was obviously pointedly aware of breaking an unwritten taboo of Western society. Some of my Muslim friends readily agreed that satirising the Holocaust was in poor taste, but thought Iran's move was useful in highlighting the West's hypocrisy. Some reflections would be useful. Not only have some taboos become so ingrained in Western society that they no longer appear to contradict the mantra of free speech, people should also realise that Muslims are entitled to the same consideration as Jews. The power of satire and mockery, in their various expressive forms, is a human universal that is often hedged in and hemmed in by rules

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and conventions, allowing its release only in certain circumstances. Ridicule as a potent agency of addressing wrongs or diminishing an adversary ranges from the Inuit custom of substituting physical fighting with mocking song to the function of cabaret in former communist countries. During the time of the cold war, lampooning the regime was an important avenue for keeping the spirit of insurrection alive. In dictatorial and totalitarian regimes usually satire, especially in its extreme form of outright, irreverent mockery, is regarded a serious offence and is heavily proscribed. It is a powerful tool of social and political critique and is conceived by the authoritarian state to be a potent and dangerous tool in inspiring opposition. It is by pursuing this tangent that one is led back to a contemplation of the differences between Islam and the West. Although Islam has a diminished sense of the grotesque or of absurdity as a means of social critique, when it happens in the religious sphere it is not perceived as harmless fun. Mockery becomes a horrendous sacrilegious insult striking at the heart of Muslimness. A comparison has been made between sanctity of the person of the Prophet and the sanctity of free speech, both representing supreme values in their respective cultures. On one level they certainly are comparable as values of extraordinary standing, their observance considered moral virtues, and respected as public goods in their respective cultures. However, the comparison breaks down on another level. The sanctity of free speech and freedom of expression can be questioned, belittled, criticised, ridiculed, and even contravened, the sanctity of the Prophet never or only at the risk of life and limb. Bassam Tibi, a Syrian Muslim and a leading Muslim intellectual teaching at German universities, has consistently chastised Islam for allowing only the absorption of what he calls 'the products of Western culture', i.e. the technology, the practical know-how, the Western standard of living, the ease of physical life; but rejecting the 'intellectual culture' that made all this possible. 31 The achievements of science and technology, medical advances, and comforts of practical life are blended into Islam without a thought that they, in their evolution, are contingent on the unfettered spirit of enquiry, the (relative) freedom of scientific rationality to explore and argue. Free enquiry depends on

31 For instance, Bassam Tibi, Der Islam und das Problem der kulturellen Bewaeltigung sozialen Wandels (Frankfurt aM.: Suhrkamp, 1985).

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the freedom to be irreverent vis-a-vis tradition and authority, religious or otherwise, on the liberty to transcend and break societal taboos, on the ability to be disrespectful towards and hold up to critique and even ridicule everything that is dear, and to question even the holiest of divine truths. Science and technology in European culture experienced its steep rise after they had thrown off the shackles of rigid church dogma and thus opened the way for the Enlightenment ideal of unfettered enquiry based on reason alone, and if necessary in open contravention of religious belief. This culture of intellectual freedom has propelled the West to its dominant position where it is lording over the Islamic world, a condition that Muslims find so objectionable. One is reminded of Karl Popper's theory of the rational method, 32 which proposes that growth of knowledge not only depends on rational enquiry, but thrives on a critical spirit that disrespectfully doubts and rejects received wisdom and throws it wide open to fearless scrutiny and testing. 33 In the armament of that rational-critical spirit one does not only find temperate critique and reasoned criticism, but also ridicule as a vital ingredient. Muslims have little taste for this point of view: science and its rationality must be used in the service of God, not to undermine belief in him. Even the most scientifically committed Muslims among my friends could see no contradiction in this proposition. In Western law there is a disjuncture between it and morality and religion, which is not shared by the Islamic world. Just as the West is often quite candid in its criticism of Muslim practices, Muslims have a right to criticise the West and to express their concern that in the West law, morality, and religious faith no longer coincide. But for Muslims who have chosen to live in the West, the ethical picture is even more complicated. Are they to accept the dominant culture's value system around which law and morality should revolve, but actually does not? Is harmonious coexistence not contingent on accepting some focal 'unifiers', values that should be shared with majority society and culture, but are unacceptable? Without it is integration even thinkable? One argument that seems to be gaining in strength-as a reaction

Laid out above all in his Conjecture and Refutation and Objective Knowledge. Despite the wide spread of theories in the philosophy of knowledge and science, not even the theories of Thomas Kuhn (The Structure of Scientific Revolution) and Paul Feyerabend (Against Method) fundamentally contradict this notion of the usefulness of continuing challenge to established dogma. 32 33

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to terrorism and growing so-called 'fundamentalism'-is that if Muslims choose to live in a Western country-and especially if they wish to be enfranchised-they have to accept its core values. Among these is not only the need to rid oneself of religious servitude, but even more importantly to respect freedom of expression, which is held as a high public good, and epitomised in the somewhat naive belief in freedom of the press. (In this argument it is often overlooked that there are still shackles of libel laws and conventional taboos, as mentioned above. The freedom to protest is also often sacrificed by government edict and surrendered to political expediency.) Another core value in which compromise is difficult to achieve is the right to be free of threats and violence from ideological opponents. Though not enshrined in this form in law, it is clearly understood under the rubric of freedom. Muslims have, and do appreciate, the democratic right to express disapproval of these freedoms and their products in a non-violent way-but accepting it as part and parcel of the same fundamental concept of freedom that they share with the press and cartoonists is a difficult trick to master. While these viewpoints do not seem unreasonable, the questioncentral to multiculturalism-is whether the onus, or most of it, should be entirely on Muslims. The (former) minister of ethnic affairs, Hon. Chris Carter, appeared on television and sensibly suggested that in a pluralistic society and in taking a multiculturalist stance, as New Zealand does, one should not go out of one's way to hurt the feelings of a minority, religious or otherwise. That seemed to refer specifically to the decision of the newspapers to publish (some of) the offending cartoons. Putting aside the question of voluntary self-censorship, be it for moral or for practical economic considerations, for a liberal democratic society to enact legislation to protect religious feelings is very difficult. The reactivation of blasphemy laws and revision of them so as to better protect non-Christian religion is hardly likely to receive popular support. Cocooning Islam against satire and critique is as impossible as protecting Christianity against insult, if not more so. And privileging it in this regard is simply inconceivable. The values of free expression and secularism form a mutually supportive constellation that are too deeply ingrained to retreat gracefully in the face of Islamic ire. In fact, the stronger the terms in which Islamic displeasure is expressed, the more it seems to reinforce esteem for the value of free expression.

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Multiculturalism evidently cannot mean for devout Muslims the total surrender of their sensitivities to Western irreverence. In a globalised world, the intermeshing of cultures has to find rules and conventions that are acceptable, or at least tolerable, to everybody. Cultural isolation does not work, nor does the careless arrogance of the stronger party. On the other hand, precious values should not be jettisoned in obsequious submission to another tradition or sacrificed for the sake of post-colonial guilt feelings. New modes of ideological coexistence have to be explored and, if found satisfactory, workable, and tolerable, have to be adhered to. New Zealand has taken a step in that direction. That such issues have become a concern in the advancing process of globalisation was underlined by the fact that the United Nations also involved itself in the cartoon dispute. An appeal to Muslims to forego violence and an invitation to dialogue was made by the UN, the European Union, and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). The UN in New York published a declaration to express its 'deep concern' about 'the consequences of the publication of these offensive caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed'. While effectively no more than a gesture, its very existence pointed the way to a future of global multiculturalism. In this cartoon affair, there has been a lesson for New Zealand about the new responsibilities arising from multiculturalism. The traditional cultural other is no longer at a safe distance. The domestic situation represents a microcosm of the international, highly globalised condition. Despite a difference in global magnitude, globalisation and multiculturalism show the same effects of placing different cultures side by side, thus making concessions and compromises necessary. A state's recognition of a minority culture and conceding the freedom to practise it also entails recognition of taboos and sensitivities inherent in it. This is not only a dictate in the interest of internal peace and harmony and social cohesiveness, but a matter of legal principle. If Muslims are citizens and residents they have a right to their sensitivities and these must be taken into account. To what degree this happens practically may be contingent on diverse issues such as political influence, commensurate with and proportional to a minority's numbers according to the rules of a democracy. At the very least, awareness of such sensitivities should be increased so that the media and others do not commit blunders by mistake. It does not, of course, liberate Muslims from the risk of being deliberately targeted for satire. But if Muslims

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choose to live in a Western country like New Zealand it will behove them to learn to accept or at least tolerate relevant Western values and viewpoints. Alternatively, such viewpoints and values should be changed by persuasion and democratic means, not by violence or the threat of it. Change will not happen overnight, as it will take time for 'mainstream' New Zealand society to develop the kind of sensitivity and respect toward Muslim issues that is reserved at the present time for matters such as the centrality of the British monarchy, patriotism surrounding the ANZAC issues, the Holocaust, and the like.

The Pope's Gaffe Contributing to New Zealand Muslims' discomfort, in 2006, Pope Benedict XVI used his spiritual authority to launch what by a stretch of the imagination appeared to be an unprovoked attack on Islam. Those Muslims taking note of it felt betrayed, especially as they had shown solidarity with Catholicism in several instances-despite their disapproval of Catholicism's 'Madonna cult'. On 12 September 2006 the newly elected Pope, Benedict XVI, gave a lecture in the Aula Magna of the University of Regensburg in southern Germany, on the occasion of a tour of that region. One must assume that he was still in the habit of lecturing to theology students-or as one might say: preaching to the converted-and being used to doing so unmolested under the protection of academic freedom, he seems to have been carried away in the university environment. Consequently, unaccustomed to his new role, he forgot the necessary deployment of diplomacy befitting the office of the papacy. The lecture, titled 'Faith, Reason and University', was about the Christian rejection of violence in matters of faith, using reason instead to spread the message. In this respect Christianity is closely akin to the sciences, he argued, but distinguishes itself from Islam's opposite disposition. Drawing on Islamic material, Pope Benedict was less than circumspect in making his point. A careful reading of his lecture leaves it open to conjecture whether his intention was, in the best of dialectic method, to use Islam as a rhetorical counterpoint to highlight the enlightenment of Christianity, or whether his disputation was specifically aimed at painting Islamic extremism as the bogeyman in today's world. In any case, he was holding up Christianity as an example of enlightened peacefulness, in contrast to which the concept of jihad sticks out by advocating violence

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to attain Islam's goals. Somewhat incongruously, in order to illustrate his point, he drew on an obscure episode from the distant Christian past, ignoring countless other possibilities that would probably have been better suited to underline his argument. In this cameo appearance, the Pope drew on the episode of the disputation of the Byzantine emperor Manuel II Palaeo logos and a Persian visitor in 1391. This debate was recorded by the emperor years later, most probably with considerable poetic licence and at a time when he was certainly not a neutral observer of Islam. His views on Islam can hardly be rated as dispassionate and objective as he was defending his Christian empire against the advancing Islamic armies of the Ottoman Turks who gradually pushed him out of Asia Minor and eventually would cost him his throne. The key sentence [translated here from the original German] in the Pope's lecture that gave much offence, is this: the Byzantine emperor is recorded as saying, 'show me what new things Mohammed has introduced and you will find only evil and inhuman (things) like his command that the faith he preached should be spread by the sword'. The Pope's intention perhaps was to show that proselytisation should use logos, reason, and the word (which in classical Greek are one and the same), and not force. The Byzantian seemed to have assumed force was essential to Islam. This may have been Palaeologos' fault, but it became the Pope's when he referred to it. By drawing on this historical incident, the Pope certainly managed to make the Byzantian's view his own, and in doing so, thoroughly implicated all of Islam in extremism. The German word Benedict XVI used was 'Gewalt' which translates not only as violence, but in a more general sense can connote power, might, force, and possibly even coercion. In this sense it may have related to his mention of the Quran (2/256) where it remonstrates that 'there is no compulsion in religion'. Benedict linked this pronouncement to the early part of the Prophet's career when the faith he preached was still under threat from hostile outsiders and he was keen to emphasise peacefulness. The lecture ends by inviting Muslims to a dialogue and to leave violent jihad behind. In this generic and broad sense of the argument as presented by Benedict, the lecture fails to narrow the argument down to those Islamic sections that incline to extremism and instead offers the supposition that the experience of the fourteenth century Byzantine emperor still prevails in today's world because Islam's essential nature, one of violence, has not changed.

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The lecture was offensive to Muslims in two senses. In one sense the Pope's argument seemed to underline the view that Christianity is superior to Islam, which from a devout Christian point of view may be well understood, but in the interest of religious coexistence is rarely expressed so brazenly. Mainstream New Zealand churches have been careful to avoid giving this impression. Needless to say, this tacit self-aggrandisement is fully reciprocated in Islam. The lecture further claims that Islam, incapable of logos, has to revert to violence and coercion to proselytise. In this sense, this claim can be read as an outright condemnation of Islam as a violent and unreasonable religion. The naivete shown in using an obscure historical episode in order to illustrate a difficult and highly topical issue was astonishing and all the more striking as it breaks with recent Vatican policy. It seems to contradict the previous Pope's ecumenicalist attempts at reconciliation with other churches including, to some extent, Islam. It was claimed in the press that presumably the Pontifical Council for Inter-Religious Dialogue, with its experience in diplomacy, had not been consulted. In any case, the event demonstrated a shift in papal focus. The previous Pope's favourite target for criticism had been communism. Benedict's appears to be radical Islam, thus reflecting the ideological shift on the world political scene from 'the cold war' to 'the war on terror'. It reveals the ideological connection the papacy has with the real world and the West's current political preoccupations, despite its other-worldly concerns. It also reflects-seemingly uncritically adopted-common biases extant in the Western world. The latter aspect predictably was of greater concern to Muslims. Much to Muslims' chagrin, Benedict XVI succeeded in underlining the Christian perspective of its superiority at the expense of Islam. As far as the link he established between reason and Christianity is concerned, it must have struck a familiar chord with Islam. In his introduction, the Pope stressed the unity of science and Christianity in elevating reason to the highest, God-pleasing principle. Thus the two sides are linked not just by the practicality of academic habit, as he stressed, but by a transcendental purpose. Ironically, this reflects Islam's view of itself. Islamic exegesis similarly insists that faith does not contradict science and its empirically based reason. Islam also sees no opposition, but rather complementarity between science (ilma) and (Islamic) faith (aqida). Seen in the context of other utterances of the Pope, this lecture must have appeared not just as a grave but essentially innocent faux pas,

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but, much worse, as an outright and deliberate attack on Islam. Benedict XVI is known to have invited the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, a well-known Islamophobe and author of anti-Islamic books, for a meeting. The symbolic significance was well understood by Muslims. He had also commented on Turkey's application to join the European Union and, rejecting its membership aspirations, had argued that its Islamic culture is incompatible with Europe's Christian heritage. The gravity of his views as the spiritual head of (approximately) a billion people was not lost on Muslims. Thus his reputation as an Islamosceptic had already been hardened, making it almost impossible to construe his lecture in a more innocent light. Add to this his reputation as a hardliner when as Cardinal Ratzinger he was overseeing the dogmatic ideological purity of Catholicism and the excuse of having made an honest mistake must sound rather hollow in Muslim ears. To Muslims' chagrin, calls for an apology remained essentially unanswered, although statements were issued by the Vatican saying that the Pope's argument had been misconstrued, which was regrettable. No offence to Islam had been intended. Protests were made by several Muslim spiritual leaders in the world, but to no avail. In the aftermath of this affair the news media reported that several Christian churches were burnt down or damaged in some other way in the Middle East and a nun was shot to death in Somalia. Muslims whose opinion I asked condemned these actions. Yet, not many New Zealand Muslims were sufficiently stirred by this incident to engage in demonstrations. There was little reaction from any of the Muslim organisations. Some Muslims were disappointed about this lack of any worthwhile reaction from their official representation, blaming it on the appeasement policy of the leadership. Certainly FIANZ has stayed clear of a confrontational policy, protesting only when it felt it had been severely provoked. The fact that there were no demonstrations of any kind, hardly a murmur of discontent, is apt to evidence the peaceful attitude of the majority of New Zealand Muslims. Perhaps it was also the Abrahamic spirit of solidarity that prevented Muslims from openly and loudly condemning Catholicism. However, as someone suggested, it could have been the revenge of the wise: ignoring the affair meant reducing the Pope to insignificance.

CHAPTER FIVE

GENDER ISSUES: WOMEN ARE EQUAL BUT DIFFERENT Of Gender Separation and Inequality

Islamic canonical law, the sharia, regulates human conduct in every aspect from the sublime to the trivial, demanding close attention of the devout Muslim to the ubiquitous doctrines of their faith. Everpresent in daily life, and extending vastly beyond the ritual sphere, Islam demands orthopraxy as much as orthodoxy. Following the correct sartorial code, food etiquette, and physical propriety is as much part of Islamic doctrine as the belief in the oneness of God (tawhid). In some respects draconian, and often strict and uncompromising, the sharia tends to conflict in spirit as much as in substance with many of the features of modern Western society, many of which are unprecedented in human history-such as highly liberalised sexual morals, flexibility in and wide tolerance of diverse behaviour patterns, and a radical secularism, which denies divine omnipotence and supervision, replacing it confidently with a view of the power of human agency. For Muslims living in the West, the secularised juridical ethos with its doctrine of indifference towards religion and rejection of immutable, divinely ordained laws provides as much succour as it poses difficulties. What must also be remembered is that for devout Muslims a breach of canonically prescribed behaviour-even if this seems 'trivial' from a non-Muslim point of view such as casual interaction between the genders or the aesthetics of appropriate dress-is in principle much more serious than most Westerners can imagine. Gender relations in Muslim society are also covered by canonical law, divine ordinance, or prescription. These rules tend to create social patterns that differ distinctly from those created by Western laws and customary forms of behaviour, in many respects creating impressions of gender discrimination. Some of the basic legal perspectives underlying these rules are reminiscent of earlier Western, or European, customs and laws that have long since been repealed. In other respects, Islamic laws at the time of their pronouncement by the Prophet

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represented a distinct advance in female rights. For example, the idea that women had rights of property ownership and inheritance was remarkably modern for the seventh and eighth century. However, as Western society underwent dramatic changes, quite a few Islamic legal viewpoints relating to gender now appear decidedly outdated. Today, the West's perception of Islamic gender relations is a stereotypically very poor one. Islam is perceived to be extraordinarily misogynous, a view for which the evidence is derived not only from a vague and often misinformed knowledge of this faith, but more concretely from a multitude of highly controversial incidents, which have been widely reported in the world media. One of the internationally most repulsive examples of Islamically inspired treatment of women was delivered by Afghanistan's Taleban regime, fortifying the widespread prejudicial conviction of Islam's 'medievalism'. New Zealand is no exception within the Western world. Even in religiously tolerant perspectives, the perceived misogyny of Islam per se is held as a black mark against this religion. The nation has taken a series of gender equality affirming initiatives in recent years, creating a particular ideological climate in which this perception of Islam sits particularly badly. Here is not the space to review misogynistic cases that moved the world and created headlines everywhere. But, briefly, one of the most drastic examples in recent years was the case of a Nigerian woman, in 2003, who nursed a child born out of wedlock, and who was to be stoned to death. Nigeria's legal pluralism recognises the legitimacy of sharia law in the country's Muslim north. Sentenced by a sharia court, this woman was found guilty of adultery, inexplicably so as she seems to have been unmarried at the time of conception. Engaging in illicit sexual acts by unmarried persons is punishable only by a hundred lashings, not by stoning, according to the Quran (24/2). 1 But perhaps the reason for the harsh sentence was that she had seduced a married man and thus became responsible for his adulterous act. One can only speculate, as the father of the baby, the corpus delicti of the crime, seems to have remained totally out of the frame, apparently not held accountable in any way. Little sensible information filtered through

Stoning as a divinely ordained form of punishment for adultery is prescribed only for married persons having sex outside marriage. In any case, to be punishable, the 'crime' has to be witnessed by four men or the culprits have to confess.

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the media that could shed more light on the case and the particular sense of justice that underpinned the sentence. In the end it was not through a judiciary review that Nigeria's sharia system relented, but by a political decision. It was probably the international outcry that followed the publicity surrounding this case and the political elite's fear of a sullied national reputation that moved the Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, to commute her sentence. While FIANZ did not seem to take any official position in this matter, nor did it join in the chorus of condemnation of this harsh sentence, Muslims of my acquaintance condemned the treatment of this woman. A Dunedin Muslim in a conversation with me called it 'a miscarriage of justice' and rather subjectively added that most New Zealand Muslims would agree with him. The scriptural example (Quran 24/2 and Sunna), he explained, stipulates that an adulterous woman's conviction has to be based on either a confession or clear eyewitness accounts of four men who have seen the act to provide certainty beyond reasonable doubt. Neither seems to have applied in this case. He could not understand why FIANZ could not rally itself to express an opinion in this matter, condemning in the strongest possible terms the sentence as a travesty of Islamic justice. Another Dunedin Muslim dismissively called this case 'Nigerian justice', revealing a good deal of prejudice vis-a-vis his African co-religionists and their understanding of sharia. These responses confirmed to me, once again, the wide variety of scriptural interpretations and the wide variety of understandings of what constitutes proper Islamic justice. This case also showed that, as in all cases, Islamic practice and thought is located within the three-pronged polarity between first, normative Islamic teaching, which in itself is wide open to interpretation; second, customary practice in the home country; and third, in the case of Western Muslims, individual inclination to adjust to Western conditions. This creates a condition of bewildering, contradictory responses, a multitude of opinions and practices, which makes it impossible to predict an outcome with accuracy and hard to understand it post-hoc. What is important in principle is not necessarily the harsh treatment of women in many cases or the severity of hudud (harsh physical punishment for serious crimes) punishments, even though this is repulsive to normative Western aesthetic and juridical regimes, but the differential treatment the genders receive under customary or sharia

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rule. Despite scriptural protestations of total gender equality,2 both Quran and Sunna are replete with numerous examples of asymmetrical gender issues. Unsurprisingly, Islamic doctrine is a reflection of the patriarchal and androcentric social forms traditionally extant in the Middle East. In some cases, this is added to and greatly exacerbated by customary misogynous practices and ideas that predate Islam or have originated independently of Islam. But, as always, the level of general knowledge in New Zealand makes it impossible to differentiate between custom and sharia law codified as fiqh. Thus the worst cases are taken as expressions of the misogyny characteristic of Islam per se. Most Muslims I spoke to, however, were utterly condemnatory of the Taleban's treatment of women and adamant that this was not proper Islam. And not a few in private conversation were disgusted at the idea of stoning women for sexual misdemeanour. Even the denial of a proper education to women was explained to me as thoroughly un-Islamic. The treatment of women in Islam and scriptural attitudes towards them are subject to much debate, in particular in relation to the universal human rights agenda. 3 It is on the basis of gender comparison that the treatment of women seems to be in violation of the Human Rights Charter, especially article 2, which stipulates absolute gender equality. It also tends to fall foul of Western domestic legislations. However, the New Zealand public becomes aware of such issues only in relation to spectacular incidents overseas, which make disproportionally large headlines and tarnish Islam's image. No spectacular cases of gender inequality or harsh treatment of Muslim women in this country have shocked New Zealand's public. However, this calm on the domestic scene exists not only because a more gender egalitarian attitude is prevalent among New Zealand Muslims as a whole, but in equal measure because such matters, even if they go beyond the privacy of a family, are dealt with internally, within the community. Such matters as Muslim women being allowed

2 For example, a hadith says poetically: 'All people are equal, as equal as the teeth of a comb. There is no claim of merit ... of a male over a female.' Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, al-Musnad, vol. 6 (Cairo: [no publ.], 1930); 411. 3 See Riffat Hassan, 'Rights of Women within Islamic Communities', in Religious Human Rights in Global Perspectives, ed. J. Witte and J. van der Vywer (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1996): 361-385.

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to exercise their voting rights, perceived breaches of marital fidelity, and domestic violence rarely go beyond the closed confines of the family sphere. Among hidden issues that never enter the domain of the public, are, for example, Muslim women's duty of submissiveness to the respective men in charge of them, men's control over female sexuality, and gender-specific sexual physiology, which are some of the major doctrinal sticking points of which the wider society is normally unaware. The Islamic view of flawed female sexuality, for instance, makes women impure at times and unfit to engage in sacred activity (such as observing Ramadan, salat, attendance in the mosque, or even touching the Quran). Women cannot be imam or lead men in prayer. In the scriptures there are even references to women's deficiency of intellect, which has jurisprudential consequences and makes them unfit for higher office. But such doctrinal issues rarely if ever enter the public discourse. No cases of Muslim women making a complaint to the Human Rights Commission about gender discrimination or mistreatment by their men folk have been recorded. Islamic doctrine contains a number of ambiguities on the social position of women, gender inequalities, and gender relations. Even scriptural references, which on the surface are supportive of women's rights, can be interpreted as condescending, in effect underlining the inferior status of women and their practical subordination. When the hadith seems to place a high value on women and calls them mata, a valuable,4 it is not necessarily a compliment. It can be seen to objectify them. Or when it orders men to treat women nicely, it allows also a negative interpretation to the effect that women are dependent on the goodwill of men. Such commands, well-intentioned as they may be, can be seen as based on the conservative view that men are the protectors and maintainers of women, which gives men the right of supervision, some degree of jurisdiction and the right of punishment; and conversely they put the onus of submissiveness on women. Conflating with these notions, there is the point that men occupy a position of superiority over women. To cite just one example: the Quran (4/34) says: ' ... because Allah has made one of them [men] to excel the other ... ' From this follows the command, again in several and various form, that women be obedient to men. This is counterpoised by several scriptural mentions that both genders are equal and count the same

4

Alfred Guillaume, The Tradition of Islam (Beirut: Khayat, 1966); 124.

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before God. From an Islamic point of view, men and women may be equal in the eyes of God, but it is nonsensical to deny their inherent differences, which entail different social roles in society and different types of responsibility. In that this condition is divinely ordained, it is theoretically not amenable to change or evolution. Western gender equality laws at best make little sense to conservative Islam and at worst are tantamount to sacrilege. Not surprisingly, there is some friction between Islamic notions of gender and the international human rights ideology that outlaws any form of gender based distinction resembling discrimination. The rival declaration of an Islamic human rights agenda has done little to alleviate this problem on an international level. In New Zealand, the issue of gender equality, or inequality, does not appear to be a huge problem in the Muslim community. Scriptural ambiguities are usually not interpreted in such a way as to accentuate gender inequalities and female dependency. Thus New Zealand law has no reason to intervene or in fact to notice anything amiss. Most Muslims seem to take pride in the educational achievements of their children, male and female. Muslim women by and large appear to be free to join the work force to contribute to the family's economic fortunes. Perhaps the most conservative Muslim families show a tendency to shun workplaces in which there is gender mixing, a tendency that may, for instance, exist among recent Somali immigrants or refugees and account for the low employment ratio of Somali women. But this could also be attributed to language problems and in any case such information is anecdotal rather than based on research findings. 5 Female subordination in the privacy of the family sphere, if it exists, assumes the appearance of a voluntary and individualistic gesture. In any case, it is not so prominent as to be very noticeable in the wider society. If inter-gender domestic violence occurs, it has not entered the public domain in spectacular fashion. Thus the notion of female submissiveness and gender issues in general do not openly grate against domestic New Zealand law or common gender sensitivities. Conversely, Islamic feminism-a 'rebellious' agitation to reform Islam

5 See e.g., Erich Kolig and Nahid Kabir, 'Not Friend Not Foe', Immigrants and Minorities 26, no. 3 (2008): 266-300; 276.

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and custom to give equal rights and respect to women-has little traction in New Zealand. 6 Fanatical adherence to gender-discriminative practices and beliefs have in some Western countries-as well as elsewhere-led to criticism from the ranks of Muslims themselves, especially from the rising movement of Islamic feminism. Most prominently the ex-Bangladeshi author Taslima Nasreen, the (former) Somali Dutch MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali (The Caged Virgin, Infidel) and the Canadian broadcaster Irshad Manji (The Trouble with Islam) come to mind. (Whether the guarded feminism of the Moroccan sociologist and author Fatimah Mernissi can be subsumed in this class is debatable.) Needless to say, the Muslim men of my acquaintance neither knew of them nor appreciated the kind of ideological movement they represent. They saw nothing discriminatory in gender relations and hardly perceived of a reason to criticise or revise Islamic doctrine. To them Islam was both modest and moderate, in no need of being turned upside down for the sake of appeasing a few radical, misguided women. By the same token, they also unreservedly condemned as totally un-Islamic aggressive genderdiscriminatory practices, such as domestic violence and so-called honour killing. The concept of honour killing is based on the notion that the family's collective pride and honour is lodged to a large extent in the piety and impeccable conduct of its females. While these men agreed with this sentiment in a general sense, its harsh application in extremis was repugnant to them. It is one of the many ambiguities of Islamic practice: while being in a sense complimentary to women in entrusting to them the collective honour, it also places an impossible burden on them. While this may not always be appreciated, the notion to resolve ethical problems by killing women-be it through sentencing in a sharia court or individual action-was seen as more than just a little dubious. In the eyes of tradition-minded Muslims, Islamic feminism is not only a contradictio in se, it is also a sign of a pernicious Western ideological influence that addles the mind of some women. It may also be a result of the 'scourge' of lesbianism perniciously insinuated by

6 Feminist issues were addressed to some extent by a former religious studies lecturer at Canterbury University, Dr. Ghazala Anwar, but with her departure in 2006 this area of initiative has become dormant. The Islamic Womens [sic] Council of New Zealand is not known for feminist radicalism that would challenge basic Islamic gender patterns.

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a Western lifestyle. Islam of course takes a dim view on any form of homosexuality or transgender orientation. In Muslim majority countries such expressions when public are either suppressed by inflicting the death penalty (e.g., in Iran) or punished with lengthy jail terms or lashings (e.g., Egypt). In a conservative Islamic view Islam has clearly outlined and prescribed the proper expression of sexuality and regulated gender roles, which does not permit any blurring of strictly defined boundaries. Gender norms do not permit trans-sexuality. Consequently also surgical sex-change, as made increasingly possible by modern medicine, is rejected. Muslims of my acquaintance, by and large, seemed to agree with these tenets, with the exception of the application of the death penalty. Female circumcision, infibulation, cliterodectomy, introcision, and similar practices pose another issue touching on gender relations. Such forms of genital modification for religious purposes are uncommon in most Muslim societies and specifically outlawed in some, but seem to be widely practised in parts of Eastern Africa (especially Muslim Somalia, but are also practised among non-Muslim communities). Somali migrant communities seem inclined to adhere to this practice. Ayaan Hirsi Ali's description of the situation in the Netherlands makes fascinating reading. 7 Even women apparently freed from the shackles of this practice by migrating to Europe are often desperate to have this operation done, or to bear the evidence of it, to gain or maintain respect in their ethnic community. It is important to note that a majority of Muslims I discussed this with-because of the delicacy of the subject there were not too many-utterly rejected this practice. An Afghan friend even insisted that prior to coming to New Zealand he had not even heard of it. Termed female genital mutilation, it is forbidden by New Zealand law. 8 I remember a television interview some years ago with Australian-Somali women who were adamant that their daughters receive this operation. They said that if it was illegal in Australia, they would take their daughters back to Somalia to have the operation performed there. New Zealand law makes all accessories in this illegal act liable for prosecution.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali. The Caged Virgin (London: Free Press, 2006); esp. 109-110. Elizabeth McDonald, 'Circumcision and the Criminal Law: The Challenge for a Multicultural State', New Zealand Universities Law Review 21 (2004): 233-267. 7

8

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While undoubtedly abhorrent to a Western sense of human physical integrity and aesthetics-a view clearly shared by a majority of Muslims-it poses a particular legal conundrum. The operation clearly is against New Zealand domestic law, but this proscription is also open to charges of violation of human rights, in particular religious and cultural rights. If the operation is freely desired, its proscription limits the personal choice to adhere to a cultural practice; or if seen to be religiously significant, its prohibition constitutes a violation of religious freedom (under The Bill of Rights Act). Also, strictly speaking, the mere existence of this law that outlaws female circumcision but specifically allows male circumcision also constitutes a breach of the human rights agreements about the absolute (legal and practical) equality of the genders. Although this is not necessarily the main target of Islamic feminism, Islam does have difficulties with female leadership. Conservative Islam feels justified by the hadith 'a people who put women in charge of their affairs will never prosper'. Female leadership is also discouraged by other scriptural references to female differences from men, making them unsuitable for higher office and leading roles: their emotionality, their physical weakness, their intellectual immaturity, and hence the fact that they have to place themselves under the supervision of men. 9 Despite this undisputable fact, there is the paradox that some staunchly Muslim countries have, or had, female political leadership. This contradiction inevitably proved to be an interesting conversation topic. While some New Zealand Muslims do clearly sympathise with this edict and would reject being represented by a woman, I have not heard anyone criticising the (former) premiership of Helen Clark on gender grounds. The policies represented by her or her party may have been considered objectionable, but never the fact that the country was led by a woman. If there was criticism it was rather of the fact that some (fictitious) Muslims have not gone with the time; their conservative attitude with regard to women belongs to a time when women were disadvantaged by lack of education and kept pampered and iso-

9 The Moroccan author and sociologist, Fatima Mernissi, has advanced the argument that women in Islam's history could hold responsible and powerful office, implying that the present-day barrier is a perversion of true Islam. See Fatima Mernissi, The Forgotten Queens of Islam (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993). The scriptural basis most often cited for barring women from attaining high office or influential positions is the hadith: 'a people who entrust their affairs to a woman will never prosper'.

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lated from the real world, which made them weak. Under modern conditions, women have educational opportunities similar to men and could obtain leading roles in society on the strength of their education. However, the reality is that none of the current Muslim organisations in New Zealand are led by women (excepting the ones set up specifically for women). Some European countries have instituted sharia courts to operate in family, divorce, and inheritance matters and in minor cases of gender relations issues. In criminal cases, however, Islamic law may not be applied as it is not unusual for it to be in contradiction with Western legal notions. To give one example in the area of gender relations: supervision of a woman's behaviour is incumbent on male relatives. A woman is always under the jurisdiction of men. Leaving aside more flamboyant issues such as izzat (honour killing), under certain circumstances 'wife beating' is allowed or even made obligatory. The Quran (for instance, 4/34) specifies a woman's ill-conduct, such as failing to guard her chastity, disobedience, failing to guard her husband's property, and the like, which should be punished at first with admonishment, then refusal to share their bed, and lastly, as the final resort, by beating them. The official (translated) Saudi Arabian version adds in brackets 'lightly', and adds further the qualifier: 'if it is useful'. However, other interpretations range from severe physical chastisement to a symbolic beating with a miswak toothbrush (afatwa allegedly by alAzhar scholars). Ayaan Hirsi Ali in her books claims to have routinely heard the sounds of women being beaten emanating from her Muslim neighbours' houses in Somalia as well as Holland, an occurrence happening with the disturbing regularity of the daily sunset. 10 An imam in Spain, a few years ago, was reported to have come into conflict with Spanish law for writing a pamphlet, which, mindful of Western laws concerning domestic violence, advises on how a real beating can be administered and the consequential injuries be concealed. (For instance, by avoiding hitting and bruising the face or the hands, the parts of the body that can be seen in public.) In relation to such issues, Sebastian Poulter's conclusion about Muslims living in Britain seems

10 Ayaan Hirsi Ali, The Caged Virgin (2006); 113. She claims that the Dutch police were reluctant to intervene on the basis of cultural freedom. This policy seems to assume that wife-beating is part of Muslim culture. Domestic violence is not condoned by any Western domestic legal system, and yet, as in New Zealand, it is not confined to the Muslim minority, but unhappily tends to occur in all religious groups.

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quite apposite: 'it is inevitable, however, that they will have to accept that in England Islam can only be followed as a religious faith and not pursued as an all-embracing way of life'.H In other words, in his view religious freedom cannot entail the application of Islamic law,fiqh, in its totality in such cases. Western criminal law prevails. In this (hypothetical) case of applied male superiority, New Zealand laws against domestic violence as well as gender equality would be brought into an analysis of the application of Islamic canons. Leaving aside public apathy, jurisprudence would presumably show little sympathy for this practice despite multiculturalism. On a less severe note, conservative Muslim society's extreme homosociality predictably may pose some problems in a Western context. The gender separation prescribed by conservative Islam and practised in most Muslim majority countries is only set aside in the bedroom and at the celebration of major eids in which nuclear and extended families and sometimes whole groups of people celebrate together and family members mix in a relaxed atmosphere. New Zealand Muslims of South Asian extraction use the term purdah for gender separation, but the term is less well known among Arabs, despite sharing similar social patterns. Both groups are well aware that this condition occupies a central position in Islamic orthopraxy, even though it appears to be less strictly enforced among South Asians. It would be wrong to claim that all Muslims in New Zealand strictly adhere to it, but there is an ideological substratum that prevents even less conservative Muslims from gender mixing to the extent commonly practised in non-Muslim society. Yet, the strictness of this separation is open to interpretation and the clandestine, yet ubiquitous, assimilationist pressure produces all kinds of concessionary behaviour and compromises. Older conservative patterns of gender interaction in New Zealand society may have shown faint similarities with Islamic precepts, but have changed. The proverbial picture of women clustering together in social gatherings at one side of the room to discuss babies and cooking, while men, beer in hand, stood together earnestly analysing rugby games, cricket, or hunting, hardly ever occurs today with the same reliable frequency as before. The faint resonance that once existed between Muslim patterns and older New Zealand patterns of gender

11 Sebastian Poulter, Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: The English Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); 236.

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interaction has almost completely disappeared, leaving little sympathy in majority society with what are seen as the gender idiosyncrasies of conservative Islam. When Muslim women for instance upon mutual introduction refuse to shake hands with men, it often leaves a kind of embarrassment that reinforces negative stereotypes. Few people seem to remember that such behaviour was not too unusual in polite society in New Zealand a few generations ago. Muslims go about glossing over this discrepancy in customary courtesy in different ways. Some explain in apologetic tone the Islamic requirement of keeping the genders strictly separate and free from mutual bodily contact, while others temporarily suspend this requirement for the sake of avoiding giving offence. Typical was my meeting with the wife of a leading member of the OMA in Dunedin, a conservative Arab and devout Muslim. When he took his wife (or rather one of his wives) along to my office and introduced her-she was also an Arab and her head was covered by an ample hijab-momentarily forgetting proper protocol, I made the mistake of automatically extending my hand. It was taken by the woman with noticeable hesitation, while her husband smilingly explained: 'we normally don't do that'. The friendly spirit in which the explanation was offered and the fact that a concession in behaviour was made at the spur of the moment completely diffused the potentially embarrassing situation. I have heard about cases of Muslim men refusing to shake a nonMuslim's hand. The refusal to shake hands, even among men, may arise from the notion that non-Muslims are in a constant state of impurity. Most Muslims recognise that this is implicitly insulting to non-Muslims and for that reason abstain from this custom. I have no indication that such refusal, if it does happen among men, is widely practised. The traditional Islamic gender separation is, on the whole, contradictory to New Zealand's social practice as well as the commonly accepted value of total gender equality. Not surprisingly, in many Muslim families conservative attitudes have been mitigated by discarding the strictest forms of the gender barrier. The influence of Western lifestyle as well as work patterns and the necessity of fitting into employment have drastically reduced this barrier. Very conservative families, such as the Somali community in Christchurch, appear to have difficulties in finding suitable employment as few employers can guarantee that work will be gender divided. Going to work unescorted by a male relative or mixing of genders at the workplace still poses a difficulty with

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extremely conservative Muslims. Such unchaperoned activity of dignified Muslim women constitutes a strong deviance from customary social patterns practised in their home societies. The press mentioned a case of an Iraqi man, a recent immigrant, before court for having abducted from the street and raped a young woman. In his defence the man had claimed that according to his cultural background he had believed an unescorted woman was 'available for sex'. 12 As a defence strategy this seems rather disingenuous. Such mendacious explanations do not help the defence before court, and also potentially do much damage to the idea of multiculturalism. On the whole, conservative Muslims try to avoid having their children in co-ed schools, preferring to instil the gender barrier early. Other issues that frequently arise from the attempt to fit gender-barriers into the reality of life in New Zealand include how to conduct female sports and use swimming pools. Reserving facilities for Muslim women, and hiring female trainers and lifeguards can at times be problematic. An indication of the strength of the gender division is the fact that in general it is agreed that training and supervision has to be done by women even if they are non-Muslims, rather than by Muslim men-let alone non-Muslim men. Stereotypes majority non-Muslim society may have about Islamic gender separation can be quite exaggerated, perceiving Muslim women as uneducated, oppressed, and unhappy. Thus emancipated Muslim women's behaviour may be a matter of surprise to non-Muslim New Zealanders who have such stereotypes in mind. Anjum Rahman, prominent in the Muslim Womens [sic] Association and a qualified chartered accountant, said in one of her public addresses that when she reveals to New Zealanders that she is a professional accountant she often notices people's surprise that 'there is a brain under her hijab'.

Concepts of Decency and Modesty Customs and features of the sharia that specify gender roles and that may suggest, at least to Western comprehension, not only profound gender differences, but gender inequality and gender discrimination, are not easily reconciled with Western practices. This difficulty is per-

12

The Otago Daily Times, 22 February 2008; 25.

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haps best exemplified with Islam's sartorial code. The Islamic concept of female modesty demands that a woman not flaunt her physical form. A loose dress that conceals the female form and a scarf that covers head and hair are generally prescribed.U Innocuous as it may seem, this practice within Western society provides one of the most conspicuous cultural markers dividing (immigrant) Muslims from majority society. Universally, dress is bound up less with pragmatic considerations than with aesthetics, ideas of social status and highly artificial notions of decency and sexual propriety. However, few people seem to be aware of the highly artificial nature of this sense of decency, believing instead that their culture-specific way is somehow 'natural'. On reflection, Western society, despite its self-professed liberalism, abounds in-and is absorbed with-rules concerning decency. Some are enshrined in law; others are given over to 'good taste', aesthetic conventions or are simply customary. The borderline between decency, or at least acceptability, and indecency is fluctuating, depending on sub-culture and often on circumstances. While in public the absolute line is drawn at the exposure of the genitals (but even that is breached at times), in other circumstances it is permissible as well as acceptable by law and custom. While in a red-light district partial or perhaps even full nudity may be tolerated (such as in brothel windows), at a state banquet an all-too conspicuous show of cleavage-or in the male case, of chest hair-may be considered more than just a little risque. Some church authorities insist that women wear long-sleeved, unrevealing dresses and avoid shorts when in sacred precincts. A 'butt-crack' may be offensive in some situations, while being hilarious and acceptably funny in others. The all-too revealing display of the female form in certain circumstances may also cause revulsion even in liberal Western society. New Zealand, unexpectedly, was confronted with this issue a few years ago in the case of a high level civil servant. 14 This controversy shook the ranks of the public service, giving a hint of the social

13 This prescription in its conservative and most common variant is presented in the form of a concealing hijab, which covers the head and neck and leaves only a small part of the face exposed, and the cloak-like, loose jilbab that completely obscures body contours. 14 This was the then head of WINZ (Work and Income New Zealand), Christine Rankin. The Otago Daily Times (5 July 2001; 2) reported that she was found by her superior to have 'shown too much breasf and that he called her outfit 'indecent and offensive'.

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significance of the sense of decency, as well as opening vexing questions about prudery, the right of choice, and sartorial 'permissiveness' in a liberal, democratic, and highly secularised country. It is easily forgotten that not so long ago in polite European society a 'decent' woman also covered her head and hair, a custom that was retained in rural areas well into the twentieth century (and continues to be observed in south eastern Europe). In medieval society married women, at the risk of otherwise damaging their reputation, had to cover their hair. The German language idiomatic expression for a woman getting married of 'unter die Haube kommen' (to get under the bonnet) still refers to this situation. In some cultures, the paradigm of decency and good taste is reversed in that men are more heavily covered than women, and even veiled. Basically, the difference between Islam and the West in this matter is that the criteria of decency are doctrinally fixed in Islam. An even more trenchant difference between the modern, liberal West and Islam seems to be that one is pushing the envelope (or a sense of acceptability) in one direction (increasing liberality), while the other is doing the same in the opposite direction (an almost faddish insistence of young, educated Muslim women to cover up). But both are uniquely human motivations to express an aesthetic sense of propriety, quite irrespective of pragmatics. Both dynamics nowadays are in competition to spread themselves through the avenues of globalisation. Thus both modes can be taken as symbols of a present-day cultural and ideological dynamic, both in an internal as well as external sense. However, in New Zealand the respective views have not publicly clashed to the extent that Australia has experienced recently, when an imam rather controversially uttered a rather derisory comment about Australian women's attire. 15 Australian women, presumably for climatic reasons (but not only), are often rather 'scantily' dressed, which tempted him to compare them to 'uncovered meat' that, just like a cat is attracted to eating it and cannot be blamed for it, seduce men to rape them. This caused a public uproar, attacking as it does a national custom, and, on a higher level of abstraction, the cherished freedom 'to dress as one likes' -and predictably did much damage to the image of Islam. In a worst case scenario, it seemed to confirm Islam's and Muslims' bad reputation in matters of gender relations.

15

Kolig and Kabir, 'Not Friend, Not Foe'; 278.

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It is a common mistake to assume that only women in Islam are constrained by a restrictive dress code. It is less well known that doctrine prescribes that men also, though less severely restricted, have to be properly attired at all times. That means in public, at a minimum, a covering from the navel or just above it down to the knee is mandatory. Theoretically, this barely allows so-called Bermuda shorts and excludes skimpy bathing trunks. Total or near-total nudity for men is allowed only in the privacy of the bedroom or bathroom. Some spectacular expressions of the difficulty to comply with Islamic concepts of decency and religious demands in the dress code, and to reconcile that with Western practice have been reported through the world media-but of course these cases represent only the tip of the proverbial iceberg. In 2004, for example, the so-called head-scarf affair (/'affaire du foulard/voile) erupted in France as the state moved to curb too-overt religious expressions in the secular public education system. Not only the Muslim hijab, but also the Jewish skullcap, large crosses as necklaces, and the Sikh turban all became victims of the new legislation. Apparently, openly expressed religious allegiances are not only feared because they challenge the secularity of state education per se-a very much revered icon of French identity-but more importantly because they endanger the process by which all young French are socialised into a strong sense of a Frenchness. Both, identity and education are based on the ideology of the supremacy of a secular world view. Reports of vigorous protests by Muslim women, some sporting hijabs in the French national colours, saturated the world media for some time. The incident also showed clearly how much the sartorial code is enmeshed with identity and concepts of personal integrity. The world over, Muslim women have gone to court to gain acceptance of their distinctive Islamic dress, sometimes successfully so, while at other times suffering rejection. On the whole and with notable exceptions, Western conceptions of cultural and religious freedom and human rights related legislation make it difficult for authorities to ban the hijab. 16 In Western countries, there seems to be a growing Islamic pride that insists on signalling itself in this way. In the resulting ideological tug of war between it and secularised

16 While France has banned the hijab for students but not teachers, five German states and Berlin have chosen the opposite approach: teachers and public servants may not wear the hijab, while students may. Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

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society, the policy of multiculturalism usually assists the resurgence of conservative preferences. The Islamic female sartorial imperative is open to some interpretation. In the view of some Muslims, who probably are numerically a minority, it demands complete veiling, which leaves no part of the body, except perhaps the eyes, uncovered. Next to Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan's former Taleban regime applied perhaps the strictest dress code. Women who showed the slightest non-conformity risked a beating. Revealing an ankle or a bit of the forearm beyond the hand was enough for brutal retribution meted out on the spot by religious police. Beyond state enforced standards of decency, individual strictness may even go as far as wearing gloves to conceal even the skin and shape of the hands. As far as I could gauge it, the general consensus among New Zealand Muslims was a sad bemusement about such ideological excesses. Perhaps the most glaring contrast is provided by the very liberal Western beach culture, often pushing the boundaries of public decency. Most Muslims are ill at ease in this environment and for the most part avoid it altogether. The common picture is that of Muslim women standing uncomfortably on the beach in baggy clothes, perhaps dipping their toes in the water and generally appearing totally out of place. Given the social importance of participating in the beach culture to some extent, an interesting sartorial concession has been made in Sydney following the so-called Kronulla riots that erupted in 2006 about beach use by different ethnic groups. The main rival groups were White Australian youths and youths of Lebanese-background who clashed in several riots. It seemed, however, to have a cathartic effect leading to greater peaceful participation of young Muslims in Sydney's beach relaxation. To allow Muslim women to make use of the Australian beach culture and even have female Muslim life-guards, a new form of bathing suit, the so-called burqini, has been developedY Australian Islam has legitimated the wearing of this more concealing version of a female swimsuit on the beach as an obvious concession to the national leisure culture.

17 A total of 17 male and female young Muslims have been trained as lifeguards. A special all-covering swimsuit, the burqini, has been developed for females and endorsed by the Australian Islamic Council (NZDawa newsletter February 2007, online).

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While the Islamic dress code does not usually constitute a problem in New Zealand, insofar as the wearing of the hijab is not forbidden, nor openly discouraged, in any public sphere and discrimination on this basis is against the law, it can emerge at times as an issue. Muslim women wearing distinctive dress have the dubious distinction of becoming the window to Islam in Western society. Thus easily marked out, they can become the target of abuse by Islamophobes. Such attacks, mostly verbal rather than physical, usually happen after some terrorist outrage somewhere in the world when some people out of a misguided sense of Western loyalty take retaliatory action against a very 'soft target' close at hand. Sometimes hijab-wearing women may even be exposed to some form of physical abuse. A more common complaint is that they find it difficult to obtain employment, but few cases have come before the Human Rights Commission as it is difficult to prove discrimination in such cases. Within the New Zealand context, Somali women migrants experience one of the highest rates of unemployment. Their Islamic clothing, appearance, and religious practices have been blamed 18 for posing some significant barriers in their job search, but other factors (such as the language barrier and reluctance to engage in mixed-gender work situations) may play a role too. Islamic dress does not seem to pose a problem in New Zealand's education system. Muslim pupils are free to wear Islamic clothing. Although some schools or headmasters may frown on it, it seems generally understood in the education system that Muslim girls have the right to adhere to their, or their parents', preference in dress. Modifications in school uniforms are therefore allowed, such as lengthening the uniform skirt, combining it with a head scarf and using special unrevealing clothing for sports.

The Burqa Case Multiculturalism in liberal Western democracies sometimes entails peculiar complexities and dilemmas, escalating at times to problematic, even antagonistic, discourses. Female dress may at times become

18 H. A. Jelle, P. GuerinandS. Dyer, 'Somali Women's Experiences in Paid Employment in New Zealand', New Zealand Journal ofEmployment Relations 31, no. 2 (2006): 61-70.

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the reason for such problems. In New Zealand no severe problems of this kind have arisen so far, but when and if they do, compromises have to be achieved to accommodate cultural and religious peculiarities consistent with the Bill of Rights Act, the international human rights agenda, and an implicit policy of multiculturalism. Freedom of religion and adherence to culture, and the practical requirement to comply with the dominant cultural, political, and juridical conventions of the nation may not be easy to accomplish at times. Religiously prescribed dress can also become a riveting controversy in certain situations and even under the most liberal of circumstances. The issue came up in a defended hearing in an insurance matter before the Auckland District Court, in 2004, in which two Muslim women were supposed to appear as witnesses. The so-called burqa case of 2004 and early 2005 was quite prominently covered in the media. 19 It gave a hint of the complexities of multiculturalism. When two Afghan women were called as witnesses in a civil case before the Auckland district court, they initially refused to publicly unveil. They were wearing burqa-type clothing and argued that under the Bill of Rights Act 1990 their religious right to adhere to Islamically prescribed clothing should be preserved. They maintained that it is a religious requirement for them to stay concealed from the public gaze. They wished to be able to wear a type of clothing, which was referred to by the media as a burqa, an all-covering cloak that only provides a narrow slit for the eyes-although judging from news photographs at times the term niqab may have been more appropriate for the way they seemed to dress. Burqa refers to a type of loosefitting cloak that covers the whole body of a woman including her face. Reaching from head to ankle and made in one piece, it is rather tent-like. This is the type of clothing that was enforced by the Taleban regime in Afghanistan: a rather heavy dress, usually of blue fabric with additional gauze or netting over the eye slit to leave only the feet and hands exposed. Niqab more generally refers to a facial covering or more abstractly to a sartorial usage of clothing, which conceals the face. The women did not appear to wear the heavy Afghan-type of

19 This case is also described in Erich Kolig, 'Muslim Traditions and Islamic Law in New Zealand', in Asia in the Making of New Zealand, ed. H. Johnson and B. Moloughney, (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2006): 204-224.

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burqa, and judging from the press photographs and television footage seemed to prefer a more light-weight, almost more 'fashion-conscious' type of clothing. As the media rather dramatically reported, the two women, refugees from Afghanistan, staunchly appealed to their religious duty to remain veiled in public and at least one was reported to have claimed that she would rather die than unveil. Situations in which witnesses do not show their faces in court and are granted the right to conceal their personal identity do happen, but it is often claimed by lawyers that these exceptions impede the course of proper judicial process and should be granted only in very exceptional circumstances. In this case, defence counsel wished to cross-examine the women and maintained it was important to be able to see their facial expression. The defendant's right to a fair trial, the defence insisted, would be placed in jeopardy if their faces stayed hidden. The defence's right thus came in conflict with the unassailable right to religious freedom, enshrined, primarily, in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, but also in other legal instruments and United Nations declarations. The case demonstrated the conundrum that the juxtaposition of a Western liberal and secularised ideology with a strong religious commitment can create. In the interest of maintaining Western court protocol and to conduct a fair trial, allowing this dress in court clearly had to be seen as problematic. Defence counsel, in objecting to the veil, claimed that this would prevent a fair trial and thus the stage was set a-priori for a lengthy appeal. Challenging the women's claim to remain concealed for reasons of sincere religious conviction, there was also reference to their having previously had their picture taken for their driver's licences, for which of course they also had to remove their veils in public. In this way a suspicion of the women's capriciousness was also added into the mix. A lengthy enquiry followed. It introduced the notion of a difference between customary cultural/religious, region-specific features and sharia-prescribed, i.e. canonical law-like, ones, not unlike the debate in Islamic scholarly reformatory circles themselves. After a lengthy consultative process, lasting for several months, during which the court case was suspended, a fifty-page, tightly argued legal verdict on the issue (on 14 January 2005) ruled that the women unveil. But it allowed them to remain behind a screen to shield them from the public gallery and most of the court staff. Only a select few present at the court

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could see the women. It was made clear that no precedent was meant to be set and future cases should be dealt with on individual merit. The women accepted this ruling and the case could proceed. The UK seems to bestride a similar path now in terms of conceding the religious significance of the hijab. There is, however, a greater preparedness to arrive at a more generalised strategy. Official guidelines issued by senior judges recommend that 'the right for Muslim women to choose to wear the niqab as part of their religious beliefs' be upheld. Forcing them to remove the veil, for instance, before court of law, could 'impact on their sense of dignity' and 'could serve to exclude and marginalise' them.20 Although the Auckland court finding did not refer to judicial views overseas, it seems to have been inspired by similar sentiments. But it refrained from enshrining its findings as a generic recommendation. Insofar as this case was the first relatively spectacular demonstration in New Zealand of the cultural difference, it was instructive to the public about the nature of Islam. It also brought an important aspect that distinguishes Islam from Christianity and the working of multiculturalism to public attention. It showed to the astonished public that Islam is emphatically not purely an 'inner' religion. Belief, faith, and rapport with the divine entity have to be manifested in actual conduct. In this case the testimony of faith was claimed to be a particular concealing type of dress. In fact, the question arose in the case of the burqa whether the women's claim that Islamic law commands them to conceal their faces is just that, canonical law, or is simply a regional custom. Such a custom may be based on a particular interpretation of doctrine, not shared by other Muslims. Far from being sharia and despite its being sincerely held, it may only be a tradition. Although strict and all-encompassing, the clear definition of the substance of sharia (and its systematic codification in fiqh) poses considerable difficulties. It may even lead to what Muslims would consider serious error or bida, putting in doubt the practice based on it. The case of the two Afghan witnesses' refusal to unveil before a court of law, despite its relative obscurity when compared with prominent and highly controversial cases overseas, exemplifies the difficulties for Western multiculturalism in trying to accommodate Islam in certain circumstances. It is debatable whether seeing the facial expression of

20

Times 24 April2007; online.

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a witness is really vital for the defence, or whether Islamic veiling is comparable to the screening of witnesses for the sake of preserving a degree of anonymity (such as under-age persons who may otherwise be severely inhibited or others who might be acutely endangered if publicly recognised). None of that seems to apply in the case of two adult women who appear to have unveiled previously to have their photos taken for passport and driver's licence photos. As commentators have pointed out, their lives were not endangered by a third party nor can they claim to suffer the emotional inhibition a child may experience in the courtroom. Their justification in refusing to unveil was based purely on religious grounds and on the right to religious integrity and unhindered observance of their religion under the Bill of Rights Act. This incidence has been described as a case of religious freedom versus the right to a fair trial. It is, however, not just a clash of two (Western) legal constructs or a conundrum in purely juridical terms. It has implications also for the 'philosophy' and practicality of multiculturalism. One can construe this case as a demonstration of a conflict generated by multiculturalism: namely, a (perceived) Islamic duty to observe a doctrinally prescribed rule and a legally guaranteed right conceded by the dominant/host society to adhere to it against a Western juridical custom (established in terms of court protocol), which constitutes a cultural feature of the host society. Thus, the case raises the question of whether a host society should abrogate or curtail its own (dominant) traditions in order to accommodate the religious needs of a minority. While the ruling in this case, allowing the women to testify behind a screen, has been described as a 'happy compromise' and the women expressed satisfaction with the outcome, a compromise resolution in the name of tolerance and multiculturalism may not always be possible. One question relating to the outcome of this dispute can only be mentioned here in passing. It raises issues of legal pluralism, which may flow from a more intense application of multiculturalism. The ruling that the women may remain hidden to the public while giving testimony has conceivably accepted veiling as a requirement not only of a regional customary practice, but more importantly as part of Islamic law. Has it thus implicitly accepted the in-principle validity of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) as applying to New Zealand Muslims? It conjures up shades of the suggestion by the archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams, to accede to the sharia an official position in

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English society. If one would infer that from the judgment, it would constitute yet another jurisprudential conundrum, as well as creating another human rights problem, since according to Islamic jurisdiction the testimony of a woman is worth only half that of a man (Quran 2/282). Perhaps in the future New Zealand's multiculturalism will have to deal with this issue. Hijab versus Burqa There clearly is a preponderance in the Muslim world for women to wear some kind of head covering or head scarf, even though this custom is not universally observed. There are many women who consider themselves observant Muslims yet neglect or even refuse to cover their hair or head. Such decisions are evident not only among Muslim minorities now living in the West, who, one might argue, make concessions in their dress so as to avoid discrimination or ridicule, or who may have adopted Western tastes. The exact way in which hair, head, or face is covered varies in the Muslim world according to regional or tribal customs or domestic laws. Only a few countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran insist on the fullest cloaking of women. In its extreme form it leaves only a slit for the eyes. In most of the Muslim world a lighter covering of the head, usually referred to as hijab, and sometimes reduced in size to a mere gesture of piety, is preferred. Hijab is often combined with loose-fitting clothes that conceal the shape of the female body. Regardless of dress style such as chador, abaya, burqa etc., clothing is meant to cover the whole body. Tight and more revealing clothing such as blue jeans is usually avoided, but is becoming more popular among Muslim teenagers of both sexes. Living in the West has offered Muslim women freedom from the coercions of conservative Islam. Yet, social commentators have observed that wearing the hijab is increasing worldwide. Although statistics are not available on this issue, the consistency of these observations makes it difficult to ignore this development. Wearing a hijab-even though it may be reduced to mere tokenism and may not be accompanied by the traditional baggy clothing-appears to have become fashionable in the well-educated middle classes, which previously had largely relinquished this head dress. It also is becoming popular among younger Muslim women living in the West, who presumably have emancipated from the blunt coercion of Islamic conservatism. Yet, despite a seem-

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ingly greater choice in dress styles and growing 'fashion consciousness' there appears to be a recognisably increasing preference for a return to the traditional head dress. Some commentators see the mounting popularity of the hijab as a very visible expression of a general and global strengthening of the Muslim identity. It seems sensible to see in this phenomenon a signal of subliminal opposition to the overwhelming homogenising forces of globalisation and Westernisation. It is also interesting to observe that distinct fashion trends emerge with the hijab. Hijab a la mode blends the Western inclination of subjecting clothing to rapidly changing fashion tastes with Islamic traditionalism. In the Islamic world, veiling is rooted in a particular philosophy of morality combined with very strict views of female modesty. 21 The underlying cultural motivation is a particular notion of feminine beauty and the irresistible sexual attraction it is supposed to exert. Strong female sexual attraction is seen to reside particularly in the beauty of the hair, the neck, and in the gaze; even the ankles or the hands may be seen in some regional cultures as being a locus of sexual attractiveness and should be covered so as to minimise the unwanted effects of uncontrolled sexual attraction. Spontaneity aroused by such eroticism is considered socially disruptive. Depending on the emphasis placed on certain body parts as exerting a particularly strong attraction, female modesty is construed accordingly and the demand for cover of a more or less complete kind may be appropriately strong. A notion closely and logically associated with that of female modesty is that of the weakness of men whose carnal desire is thought to be easily aroused by female beauty and that, once aroused, is irrepressible. (In a Western reading of this supposition it hints at an astonishing lack of male self-control.) Quite possibly, as has been argued, the underlying motivation for curbing sexual attraction-by lessening the dangers posed by the impact of irresistible female beauty-may have originally been to reduce temptation and thus to prevent illicit and unregulated sexual relations that may seriously disrupt society. Therefore, adopting and enforcing an appropriate cover sustained orderly social relationships, ensuring both family stability and regulating inheritance of

21 A discussion of the concept of female modesty and resultant dress requirements from an Islamic point of view is provided in the special issue of The New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 8, no. 2 (2006) in an article by Aisha Wood Boulanouar ('The Notion of Modesty in Muslim Women's Clothing': 134-156).

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property, entitlements, name, status, etc. Fearing chronic social friction, the Prophet and the original Muslim community's founding fathers may have conceived sexual licentiousness and promiscuity as a hindrance in forming a cohesive and strong community of believers (umma). The strict definition of female modesty-so as to minimise the effects of physical beauty and the social disruption it may cause-is crucial as it is this aspect that is clearly-if not unambiguously-referred to in the sacred scriptures. Indulging the anthropological temptation of hypothesising, it may be said that there is a human universal involved in Islamic veiling. Concealing something, holding it secret, and revealing it as a privilege, reward, or bonus may be a universal cultural language. Doing so is a method of attributing value to something. The concealed content may oftentimes be devoid of practical use value. But treating it in a special way is a highly symbolic behaviour meant to convey its inherent high value; for secrecy, if not to conceal guilt, signals a special importance. Esoteric secrets, which without secrecy and decorum would be trite, perhaps even ridiculous, require special initiation to be ceremoniously revealed. By instilling awe and often exacting from the novice some sacrifice, the exalted value of that which is revealed is underlined. From this perspective, open display and easy accessibility signal the exact opposite, that of commonness, even cheapness, something of little value or even trashy. Indeed, this is the view taken by many conservative-minded Muslims with whom I discussed this issue, though none of them expressed agreement with the views of the Australian imam mentioned before, who rather disingenuously likened women to so much meat. Although critical of Western licentiousness in matters of women's dress, they not only denied sympathy with his views, but also emphasised that he could not speak on behalf of New Zealand Muslims. Some people's claim that he was also speaking as mufti of New Zealand and venting New Zealand's Muslims' views were false, they said. Their argument was instead that they felt they had to conclude that the loose dress sense of Western women was a sign that Western men do not value their women and that women themselves have low self-esteem. In contrast, Muslim women are kept hidden like precious jewels, as one Muslim man told me. You do not go around flaunting the family jewels, he admonished; you'd only invite trouble. It has been argued that complete veiling (especially in an all-covering cloak) is not part of Islamic canonical law, but is only a regional

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tradition or custom; in other words, an unnecessary appendage. Needless to say, this distinction is meaningless for those Muslims adhering to this custom, as they consider their way of life as espousing Islamic principles in their purest form. However, making this distinction may make a difference in the perception of the significance of veiling. This may be relevant in cases similar to the burqa case related above. Even though, according to the Bill of Rights Act, cultural custom and religious belief appear to have equal validity and weight and are equally protected as personal freedoms, a clearly prescribed religious rule may very likely meet with more understanding and have a better chance of being accepted. 22 The question of sincerity of belief has been raised in judging whether the Islamic veil merits official recognition under the rubric of religious freedom. However, whether wearing the veil (no matter whether in the form of a heavy burqa or a light hijab) is grounded in a sincerely held religious conviction or is just an affectation is almost impossible to ascertain. A person's claim that veiling was a religious necessity could in fact be opportunistic, as it could spring from motives other than religious devotion. It could come, for instance, from the wish to make a statement (of opposition to the legal system or of refusal to integrate into the host society), or it could be the result of enforcement by male relatives-in which case it might represent an infringement of individual freedom and may be prosecuted under the Crimes Act. If veiling is not seen as a religious duty, but as a personal statement of identity, in other words as the secular maintenance of personal pride, it would also allow some interesting interpretations. For instance, it has been argued that the personal dignity of the two Afghan women was at stake, and that unveiled they would suffer acute embarrassment that would inhibit them while giving evidence. Whether this would lead to the acceptance of the veil in a court of law remains to be seen. Clearly, neither the law nor outside observation is equipped to make this determination about a woman's real motives without a lengthy investigation, probing into personality, background, family circumstances,

22 In a New Zealand Listener article (N. Smith, 'Lifting the Veil', New Zealand Listener, 27 November 2004: 14-17) it is claimed that the religious argument has been

'scotched', but the cultural defence is 'intact'. However, if classed as a minor, regional cultural variant, veiling would hardly have the same gravity in the eyes of multiculturalism as if it is considered part of canonical law.

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and the like. Case-by-case multiculturalism could indeed become very cumbersome. The judgment in the burqa case wished to avoid setting a legal precedent, but inadvertently set the course for a more generic multicultural approach to similar cases in the future. Unfortunately, it did not make clear the premise on which it was based. A decision in the spirit of genuine multiculturalism must address the question of whether veiling is prescribed by Islamic canonical law. Individual rationalisations are beside the point, as are sinuous theological speculations. Trying to 'second-guess' God, as it were about the reasons for such a sartorial requirement may exercise Muslim scholars, but is irrelevant from a multicultural point of view. In this vein it is sometimes argued that women when fully covered not only feel safer from molestation, but as they are distanced from men, feel nearer to God. According to this argument, God prescribed veiling for the benefit of women: it created a practical gender barrier, which protects women from unwanted male attention; it adds dignity to women who without it may be judged on appearance and not personality; and it prevents women from being viewed as sex objects. This may excite the theological mind, but hardly satisfies the spirit of multiculturalism. The relevant question must be whether facial veiling is required by Islamic law and prescribed by doctrine. Closely associated with it is the question about whether a decision made in the spirit of multiculturalism should involve the respective religious authority, the experts who possess the authority to judge whether something is required by the sharia, and whose views-even if they do not have the weight of fatawa (rulings)-are accepted both by the Muslim community and by the court. Let us put aside the fact that Muslim feminists reject the edict of veiling altogether, by claiming that veiling of any kind-regardless of whether it is commanded on the basis of scriptural interpretation or enforced by family tradition or because women have been 'brainwashed' into believing that this is for their benefit-is a misogynistic expression. What is the scriptural evidence? In considering this we need to be mindful that these rules are considered divine revelations recorded in the sacred texts and to Muslims are laws and sacrosanct rules of conduct laid down by God. Total obedience is demanded and open questioning borders on sacrilege. Some Muslims do not even accept the validity of ijtihad, the reasoned interpretation, to increase the current relevance of these ancient rules.

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Among several verses, 23 there are two major references to female veiling in the Quran (24/31 and 33/53, 55) usually invoked by Muslim scholars. The first (24/31) refers to female modesty, the need to cover the body, and it lists the male kin categories who may licitly see more of a female's body: And tell the believing women to lower their gaze ... and protect their private parts ... and not to show off their adornment except only that which is apparent... and to draw their garment all over juyubihinna ...

As Quran-versed and native-Arabic speaking Muslims explained to me, one of the crucial issues here is the interpretation of the Arabic word juyub(ihinna) and whether its semantic meaning of 'body' refers also to the face. The interpretation that insists on total veiling takes as the precedent a hadith that records that when this verse exhorting women to draw their garments over their bodies was revealed to them, on hearing it, they tore their clothes and covered their faces. The other references (33/53 and to some extent aya 55) refer to the approach Muslims should take to the Prophet's wives and how they should behave in the Prophet's home: 'and when you ask [the Prophet's wives] for anything you want, ask them from behind a screen .. .' This was clearly uttered in view of the fact that the Prophet's home must have been a very public place indeed. As spiritual as well as political and military leader, his home was frequented by the general public asking favours, handing in petitions, and expecting guidance as well as hospitality. Under such circumstances maintaining privacy was difficult. The relevant verses refer to the requirement that the Prophet's wives should remain behind a screen or curtain unless in the presence of their (male) relatives. The reference is gender-ambiguous in the sense that it contains regulations for the wives just as much as it spells out rules of conduct for men in their presence and in the Prophet's home in particular. According to one interpretation, these rules refer only to the Prophet's wives and take into account their exalted nature and unusual social position as the Prophet's most intimate companions and confidants. In other words, they derive their meaning from the specific historical circumstances. Following this view, the rules are not intended to be generally applied to all women. According to

23

Leaving aside other relevant verses in the Quran such as 7/26, 33/59.

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another interpretation, however, this has set an example, and as the Prophet himself and all his actions are exemplary, it must be closely followed; thus, this is not to be understood as simply an ideal to be emulated if possible and something vaguely to be aspired to, but constitutes a law to be obeyed by the whole umma. Interestingly, as some Muslims holding to the opposing view in the burqa case pointed out, during the haj women are forbidden to cover their faces, despite the fact that they are very visible to the public. This was interpreted to mean that in special circumstances-and a court of law may be seen as such-it is proper to appear unveiled. Whatever the reasoning may be, it is clearly the majority viewpoint that women should cover their heads and hair more lightly or at least leave their face (and their hands) visible in obedience to the Quran where it says: ' ... except what must normally be seen thereof' A more 'liberal' stance in this matter, overriding as it were the above prescriptions altogether, was reflected in the opinion of some Muslims who certainly did not lack in devotion, but argued that if Muslims had come to the West voluntarily to live here, they should be prepared to adjust to the land's customs and abide by its laws. Implied in this view there is often the proviso that Western laws and conventions are to be obeyed only so long as doing so does not seriously compromise principles of the Islamic faith. What constitutes a serious breach or unacceptable compromise is open to much debate. Remaining faithful to one's religion or committing serious error is subject to a wide variety of interpretation, as is the question of whether covering the face is essential to being a true Muslima. The liberal view in this matter touches perilously on the fundamental problem of whether Western authority is to be recognised over the integrity oflslamic requirements and the extent to which compromises can be permitted in order to bow to 'infidel rule'.

Whose Authority? The burqa case gave a glimpse of the multi-facetted problems the pursuit of multiculturalism can open up. Given that the scriptures are ambiguous and require interpretation with regard to the issue of veiling as much as in countless other issues of a practical conduct-regulating kind or of a purely moral order, whose interpretation is to be accepted as binding? Who is the authority from a Muslim point of

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view and who should be recognised as expert by New Zealand's legal system and legitimately influence the court's decision? The Muslim community has no dearth of Western-trained lawyers who are able to use the legal instruments provided in order to protect the religious interests of the women. But who, given the multitude of theological views, should be the authority to decide whether this issue is grounded in the sharia and, if so, in what way? The official Islamic umbrella organisation, FIANZ has an Ulama Board, consisting of religious scholars of impeccable reputation, that administers advice on religious matters. This group of men can issue a collective opinion, which does not have the status of a fatwa, but is more in the nature of a recommendation or advice. Nonetheless, an opinion expressed by the board will still have some influence: exactly how much will vary from case to case. Overall, the board's authority is diminished by the fact that it is not unreservedly recognised by the New Zealand Muslim community as a whole. Sectarian and other issues intervene strongly. Shi'i, for instance, will hardly recognise its authority as the board consists only of Sunni Muslims. In the past, FIANZ's authority to speak for the whole Muslim community has also been challenged on various occasions by regional Islamic organisations as well as by the member of parliament, Dr. Ashraf Choudhary. At least in the beginning of his political career, he was considered in political circles, as well as by some Muslims, to represent Muslim interests in parliament, but has fallen out with FIANZ over several issues. Perhaps not surprisingly, a variety of opinions were expressed by exponents of the Muslim community in the burqa affair. A Shi'i cleric of the Imam Ali Institute in Auckland declared that 'the burqa should "definitely" be removed in court', while Javed Khan, president of FIANZ, is quoted as saying that the women should be allowed to remain veiled. 24 A similar opinion seems to have been expressed by the Islamic Women's Council. In this context, it was interesting to hear Mr. Ahmed Zaoui's opinion in this matter. 25 At that time a minor celebrity (his case will be briefly explained later), he added his voice to the multivocal chorus. Himself a religious scholar of North African provenance, he averred that the judge should 'respectfully' ask the

24

25

The Otago Daily Times, 19 April2004; 17. On the Zaoui case see the last chapter.

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women to remove their burqa. But what if they refused? The total lack of unanimity among the experts was reflected in the circle of Muslims with whom I discussed this matter. While some strongly suggested that the women's wish to remain veiled must be respected, others were much less sympathetic. Equally divided were the views whether the women are correct in seeing total veiling as a religious duty. The court seemed to rely much on the information supplied by a religious studies scholar of Victoria University who was called as an expert witness to help the judge's deliberations. 26 The problem with this procedure is two-fold. A non-Muslim expert suffers from a major deficiency: he does not hold the authority to issue fatawa (rulings) in socio-religious matters and any view he may express has no influence in the Muslim community. It cannot enhance a court's ruling based on it, in the eyes of Muslims. At worst, it may just cause derision. In other words, a non-Muslim expert can give a general opinion on matters of fact such as that veiling of this kind or another is widely practised among Muslims or is confined to some regions. He can attest to the fact that Muslim scholarly opinion is strongly divided as to which kind of veiling is doctrinally prescribed. But he cannot assert theologicallegal authority of a kind that would be recognised by Muslims. In strict Islamic terms, it would be inappropriate for the judge to base his ruling on the unauthoritative view of a non-Muslim. The involvement of a non-Muslim expert also raises the question whether true multicultural policy would require that in contentious issues the respective, relevant religious authority should be consulted. The drawback possibly would be that it throws back the issue to the uncertainties described above over who exactly the communally respected authority in such matters of religio-cultural etiquette is in the absence of a clearly constituted spiritual leadership and hierarchy.

The Burqa's Challenge to Multiculturalism In Western society, rightly or wrongly, the hijab, and in particular the burqa, bear a grave stigma as a political symbol to which the West has become sensitised through the events of 9/11. Distinctly Islamic dress is loaded with negative connotations in the West-and despite

26

New Zealand Herald, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/ (27 October 2004; 30 October

2004).

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its sense of tolerance, New Zealand hardly forms an exception. Wearing these conspicuous garments, like a burqa or heavy hijab, is now often construed as a political statement: a sign of refusal by the wearer to integrate with majority society. Even worse, it may be seen as an expression of sympathy with Islamic extremism. Not unusually also, the head covering is taken as a highly visible symbol of the subordination of women in Islam, marking them as victims of this religion's alleged misogyny. But instead of inciting sympathy for Muslim women, it only serves to portray Islam as a 'backward' religion. Not surprisingly, the burqa has been described in such unflattering terms as a 'body bag for the living'. Often this item of female clothing becomes the litmus test for a society's tolerance as hurled insults, open derision, and physical attacks illustrate. And it may come to delineate, as France has shown, the extent and limits of instituted multiculturalism. This is all the more remarkable as this garment-if freely chosen by women-does not prima facie touch or infringe upon core values of a Western liberal democracy. Of course, France has demonstrated clearly its perception of what its core values are by banning the hijab from its state schools and by thus placing the laicite (secularity) of the state education system above freedom of religion. But, in principle, the hijab in itself (by representing the concept of female modesty) does not advance a religious value that conflicts with cherished civil liberties, such as the freedom of opinion to be critical of Islam, to freely blaspheme, or to claim homosexual liberties. However, by extension, a hijab may come to symbolise all that, inextricably tied up as it is with an unflattering perception of Islam. In this way it does raise the issue of what compromise may be struck under the aegis of multiculturalism that does not diminish a host society's core values and yet still preserves the integrity of a minority religion. Freedoms of religion and cultural tradition, instigated by a policy of multiculturalism and underpinned by human rights legislation, may conflict with rules, laws, and conventions of the state and the dominant society. This in itself is not an entirely new phenomenon. Globalisation is increasingly undermining the integrity and sovereignty of the nation-state, its hitherto unchallenged right to make coercive rules and enforce them rigorously. As immigration by culturally diverse populations brings about an ever greater diversity of cultures and religions coexisting in close national proximity, the laws and conventions of host societies face new challenges. This affects immigrants as much as the host societies and the state framework. Strict religious adherence

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in secularist societies may be one major source of problems in which the civil liberties of some are pitted against the liberties or rights of others. Multiculturalism has the capacity to magnify these issues and to create a situation in which the civil liberties of some will openly come in conflict with the liberties of others. The right to blaspheme, to be openly homosexual, to worship 'false gods' or none at all may create issues for people who themselves can express their religiously grounded objections under the same aegis of freedom, and do so vociferously and sometimes in ways injurious to the feelings of others. Or on a lesser scale of the need to reconcile cultural differences, there is the right of jurists to adhere to the sanctified court etiquette colliding with the need to take religious sentiments and exotic customs into account. And even more gravely, does the burqa affair signal the beginning of a legal pluralism that enshrines the religious rights of Muslims in the judicial discourse? New Zealand's biculturalism has already engendered a degree of openness and sensitivity vis-a-vis cultural otherness in the juristic profession as well as in politics. The limits will be tested in individual cases and thus determined over time rather than through ad-hoc legislation. A deepening and increasingly complex multiculturalism becomes a necessity as the socio-cultural monochrome assumes a multichromatic hue through migration and the dislocation and transference of cultures. New Zealand's pluralistic character is only just emerging in the public discourse as cultural otherness is no longer content with a quiet modus vivendi, but is clamouring for official recognition. As an afterthought to the burqa affair, the New Zealand police responded on 5 April 2006 by announcing a policy on how to deal with burqa-clad drivers. In order to respect religious sentiments, only female officers would be called upon to verify the driver's identity. The police association, however, made its objections publicly known, arguing that a burqa is not fit clothing for the driver of a vehicle as it severely limits the driver's vision, reducing especially the important peripheral vision, and thus enhances the risk of accidents. It also suggested that criminals may take advantage of this concession and hide under a burqa. However, it was also moved to admit that this was not a huge problem at the moment as very few women are wearing a burqa in New Zealand, and even fewer of those were driving. In all of New Zealand there would probably be no more than a dozen women who are wearing a heavy face-concealing garment and who may also

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wish to drive a motor vehicle. At that time, a conservative politician added his voice, pointing out what he saw as the unfairness of allowing Islamic clothing. Security issues in banking have led to certain restrictions. While motorcycle helmets and balaclavas are banned, burqaclad women are allowed to enter a bank. FIANZ issued a statement that there are no objections to identity checks of burqa-wearing women drivers, as long as they were allowed in principle to drive a car. It needs to be remembered that countries that by law demand heavy veiling in public, do not expect women, or may even expressly forbid them, to drive a car. Thus, paradoxically, this conflict is more likely to arise in Western society than in conservative Muslim ones. In my experience, even some Muslims agree that visibility, especially peripheral vision, under a burqa is impaired and that it is unwise to drive so attired. If required to preserve the privacy of a woman driver, a car's windows should be tinted instead of swaddling the driver in concealing garments. The issue of a very concealing Islamic form of clothing having posed a security risk has not arisen in New Zealand. But as long as virtually in the whole world the main criterion for individual recognition lies in the visual identification of facial features (and not in fingerprints, DNA, or iris identification or other highly individually distinguishing features) face-concealing clothing will pose problems. It is interesting to note that European Union rules stipulate that for official photographs (passports, driver's licences, ID cards) no facial or head covering even of the smallest kind may be used. In tightening existing rules, Sikhs have to remove turbans, Jews yarmulkas, and Muslim women have to do the same with any form of head covering. Whether in identity checks, such as border controls, concealing headgear or facial veils have to be removed has not been standardised as yet. But by and by, Muslim conservatism will have to acquiesce in the fact that for official documentation and legitimate controls facial features cannot be claimed to fall under privacy rules, but are decidedly an object of public scrutiny.

CHAPTER SIX

GLOBALISATION, POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE RISE OF FUNDAMENTALISM Is Extremism Rising in New Zealand?

New Zealand is fortunate in having remained untouched by extremist Islam. The few incidents that suggested a degree of conflict between majority culture and Islam, or Muslims' interpretation of it, have not escalated into violence or provoked an atmosphere of dangerous antagonism. Yet, a concern with national security cannot remain completely oblivious to some fundamental questions. Globalisation has not occurred to the exclusion of the internationalisation of radical ideas and extreme methodologies that may be entailed. Some surely have the capacity to disturb even the tranquillity of New Zealand. What are the dangerous trends in contemporary Islam that make it a suspect ideology in the West to which it feels compelled to respond with vigilance and by waging the 'war on terrorism'? While participating to some extent in the sharing of intelligence, New Zealand, under the previous government, has stood somewhat aside from this USled initiative. 1 It chose not to participate in the Iraq invasion and its military contribution in Afghanistan is now under a UN mandate. Its function there is mainly in the area of peaceful reconstruction. While the events of 9/11 had caused shock and empathy with the US, and New Zealand, in a modest way, followed its lead in Afghanistan-not unwillingly, as the Taleban regime appeared thoroughly repulsive to public sentiment-further American actions provoked scepticism. On the whole, among the Muslims I interviewed the (previous) government's reluctance to embrace American leadership (of the Bush administration) in global politics, widely perceived as anti-Islamic, was

At the time of writing, the very recent change in government in November 2008 allows for no prediction as to the country's future political course in this matter. The previous Labour-led coalition had a somewhat distant relationship with the USA, which was not completely shared by the conservative opposition that has now formed a coalition-government. Not much later the USA also had a profound change in administration

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appreciated and much welcomed. As a sweeping generalisation, this has given New Zealand some credit in the eyes of Muslims. Yet the question does emerge: what are the ideas and actions emanating from radical Islam that may pose a danger to New Zealand's communal wellbeing? Before beginning to consider this question, it is appropriate to quote the words-only slightly altered to eliminate speech idiosyncrasies-of an Arab Muslim, a leading personality in his local religious community in New Zealand. A highly educated and thoughtful man, he was visibly annoyed at the prejudice he believed he had encountered. Clearly, the 'vibes' he thought he was receiving from the wider society were hurting his sensibilities. 'Why are New Zealanders always suspicious of us Muslims', he wondered, sadness and irritation clearly imprinted on his face. 'No Muslim has committed murder or violence, or vandalism in this country. We are all very law abiding, minding our own business. Look who is violent, who commits murders. Nine out of ten times it is Maori or Pacific islanders, but no one says «we don't want them here, because they are violent and they commit murder". It seems to me the whole of New Zealand society is violent; it is geared towards violence. Their idea of good fun is to vandalise something or bash someone. It's all to do with physical prowess that is so valued here, so revered. Rugby, sports, everything that is physical, that takes strength and endurance. They glorify war on ANZAC day. We Muslims do no one any harm.' 2 It was significant that in demonstrations protesting the Danish cartoons, when Muslim temper was at boiling point, placards carried by the demonstrators did not demand the killing of those responsible. Demonstrations in Auckland and elsewhere were characteristically peaceful and devoid of flamboyant, homicidal demands. This was quite a contrast to demonstrations in European centres if the pictorial evidence circulated on the internet is to be believed. In London, for instance, demonstrators apparently carried homemade placards with demands such as 'butcher enemies of Islam', 'behead those who 2 The predictive, sweeping quality of this comment was unfortunately diminished by an attempt at hijacking an airplane by a Somali Muslim woman in February 2008. In the course of this failed crime, three people were injured. The perpetrator was reported to have mental health issues (see e.g. New Zealand Listener, 23 February 2008: 28). There are other crimes and misdemeanours committed by Muslim immigrants. But statistically there are no data about Muslims committing offences since offenders' religion is not recorded.

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mock Islam', and 'slay those who insult Islam'. According to the press, demonstrators shouted proclamations threatening violence and murder. Waving placards with rhymes such as 'Europe you will pay, your extermination is on its way' and shouting threatening proclamations had a certain theatrical effect, but hardly served to portray Muslims in a sympathetic light. The publicly advanced exhortations to engage in violence and homicide, no matter how seriously it was meant, is hard on the edge of freedom of speech and will unsettle even the most liberal state. Vigilante action is treated as a crime even when majority sentiment may be in favour. The public summons to killing is the prerogative of the state in a time of war. Even the most liberal, democratic state has not abrogated that right or surrendered it to special interest groups, no matter how justified their grievance may be. It is worth noting that New Zealand Muslims, always careful not to push the envelope despite their obvious fury, abstained from using such provocative sloganeering. In March 2003 New Zealand Muslims expressed their anger about the invasion of Iraq, as did other religious groups in the country's main centres and as indeed Muslims did the world over. For the Muslim minority there was some consolation in that the government did not show any appetite to supply troops for the invasion force or to become embroiled in any other way. In the month before, an anonymous letter threatening retaliatory attacks was received by the embassies of the USA, Australia and UK in Wellington. Rather ominously, it threatened the use of 'weapon grade cyanide'. The letter ended with the standard Islamic formula 'Allahu Akbar' [God is the Greatest], and was signed with 'AbdAllah [slave of God] September 11'.3 No arrests were subsequently made. Suspicion fell heavily on Muslims, but there is no hard evidence that they in fact were responsible. Even though the letter demonstrates a modicum of knowledge of the Arabic language, the use of some standard phrases does not constitute cogent proof. The letter's dangerous capriciousness does not fit into the general picture of the Muslim minority's demonstrated peacefulness and the complete absence of militancy among them. There are few signs of extremist views and illiberal, violent tendencies among New Zealand's Muslims. Therefore the question of how the state should deal with such phenomena-if they should suddenly

3

As reported by The Otago Daily Times, 27 February 2003: 4.

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appear-without violating the mantras of free speech and religious freedom has not seriously arisen. Incidents that would seriously test the limits of practising Islam under the aegis of religious freedom do not arise in New Zealand-neither with alarming frequency nor with the dangerous acuteness as they do elsewhere. At times the performance of radical Muslim clerics and preachers giving public addresses or television appearances does raise some temporary, fleeting concern. But so far, authorities have not deemed it necessary to ban lecture tours by firebrand preachers from overseas in order to shield the country from dangerous influences. Consequently, issues concerning the exact boundaries of free expression with regard to Muslims' rights to articulate radical thought have not had to be debated. Neither state nor government has seen fit to intervene to challenge this freedom beyond subtle suggestions to the country's main Muslim organisation, FIANZ, to monitor its activities. Nonetheless, the Muslim community has at times come under suspicion. It is usually the type of sensationalist press or populist politicians of minor political parties who feast on suspicions that Islamic extremism is spreading and Muslims cannot be trusted. While it may be premature to praise New Zealand's irenic conditions, any reason to fear that extremist or radical jihadist ideas are about to take hold seems very remote at this point in time. The flow of ideas in the course of the intensifying globalisation of ideologies may occasionally wash extremist notions up onto these tranquil shores, but there are no indications that they have taken roots. Clearly, in the flow and ebb of ideological globalisation and its rapidly shifting foci, there can be no certainty that this will continue to be the case. There is, of course, the ever-present potential for 'home-grown' radicalism, perhaps stimulated by examples overseas, springing up suddenly. Whether this faint possibility of what might happen in future is justification enough to harbour suspicions now, as some suggest, is highly debatable. The popular media play an important role in the portrayal of Islam and Muslims. It does not require utter cynicism to be aware that the media's role-especially television's-is not to educate, but to captivate the attention of as large an audience as possible for commercial reasons. Clearly downplaying the information function, the news services on television befittingly are called 'news shows', underlining their entertainment purpose. This is a reality even as, as behoves an 'open' democratic society, the media are 'free', i.e. unfettered of state or other political interference. Ideally, they should also be independent

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of gross political partisanship and massive collusion with commercial interests, despite the general wisdom that they are not free of biases subtly, or sometimes not so subtly, insinuated by editorial guidance. As any human perception, they can never be completely objective, i.e. they can hardly be expected to render a completely balanced picture of the situation. Above all, and despite the best of intentions of rising above them, the media for the most part do reflect popularly held preconceptions and biases. While the media are not en bloc guilty of gross Islamophobia and lack of good faith towards Muslims-especially New Zealand's Muslims-Orientalist notions do creep in. They exploit ambiguities inherent in Islam and, exaggerating their influence, at times make excessive and distorted claims. Through the abundant use of violent images, loaded terminology, and the implicit values they draw on, stereotypical imaginary connections between Islamic dogma, violence, and fanaticism are reinforced. Especially in television, the available information is reduced to two-minute-or even shorter-'sound bites', which routinely exacerbate the 'juicy', attention-getting news aspects at the expense of a balanced presentation with information value. Hostile expressions by Muslims, for instance, since they are not contextualised, are construed not as the individual failings, isolated asocial phenomena, personal rages, and misguided idiosyncrasies that they often are, but as revelations about the true character of Islam. The sensationalist insinuation is clear in these cases: normally cryptic and hidden from the eyes of unwary Westerners, the horrible side of Islam thus is supposed to stand revealed through the professional cleverness of journalism. In this way this religion may be 'unmasked' as a potent and dangerous political ideology in pursuit of its evil design: to achieve world domination and the destruction of the (erstwhile Christian) West. In this illusory agenda of political Islam, the most important instrument is terrorism, the belligerent power of the powerless, undergirded by the doctrine of jihad. By subtle insinuation Osama bin Laden's tentacles can be made out to encircle the globe, potentially reaching even into the farthest corner of this country. And if it is not terrorism itself that can be portrayed as an imminent danger, then it is its harbinger: the fundamentalisation of Muslims. Quite wrongly, the two concepts are usually conflated so that the word fundamentalism assumes the flavour of murderous intentions or, at the very least, a sinister plan to enforce the sharia, complete with hand amputation, stoning, and enslavement of women.

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The spectre of these dangerous features of Islam as emerging in New Zealand occasionally arises when it is conjured up by the media. Particularly alarmist was a television programme (60 Minutes on TV3, on 4 July 2005) reporting on fanatical ideological features spreading among New Zealand Muslims. These features, ascribed to 'Islamic fundamentalism', were supposedly taking roots in the country, signalling a sinister process of 'shariatisation' of the local community. In grossly hyperbolic fashion, the report portrayed this so-called fundamentalism as replete with repulsive attitudes and unacceptable moral stances, allegedly based on the sharia, such as advocating a subservient social status for women and dealing with homosexuality harshly according to conservative Islamic judiciary standards. This kind of Islam, it was asserted, would demand the stoning of homosexuals and, grating against majority society's strong sense of gender equality, relegate women to the status of second-class citizens. It was made to appear as if New Zealand Muslims en bloc had been radicalised and were working for the implementation of this intolerant ideology:~ Appropriately edited for maximum effect, the presentation gave the impression that fanatical Islam was seriously on the rise in the country, threatening to engulf not only Muslims, but posing a threat to the liberal values of New Zealand society at large. In this and other ways, the whole programme was given a spin with which a majority of New Zealand Muslims would have been unhappy. Through innuendo rather than clear evidence, it was unnecessarily alarmist, presenting Islamic fundamentalism not only as sinister and dangerous, but also as seriously on the rise in New Zealand's Muslim community when in fact there is no such evidence. In this context, the number of New Zealand converts was also vastly overstated to add, through hyperbole, to the perception that Islam, presumably of the dangerous kind, was quickly spreading by way of conversion. Another highly prejudicial connection was made by screening this item together with a brief documentary on Theo van Gogh's murder in Amsterdam by the hand of a Muslim fanatic. This set a rather biased stage, insinuating that Muslims in this country pose a similarly pernicious, if at the moment unrecognised, danger. Of course fanaticism that escalates

4 I was later told that a Muslim woman apparently revealing this clandestine development had a personal axe to grind and a radical Muslim preacher who had been interviewed was resident overseas and, contrary to the impression given, was certainly not speaking on behalf of any group of New Zealand Muslims.

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to murderous lunacy does exist among Muslims, as may occur in any other group of people. In a free society little can be done proactively to prevent a fanatical and homicidal mindset from emerging. Ruthlessly suppressing extreme or unusual views, unless already manifested in extremist action or unless direct, unlawful threats are being made, is not the accustomed way of a liberal democracy. Some Muslims of my acquaintance, perhaps unwisely, admitted to being 'fundamentalists'. What they meant was that they strive to adhere as closely as possible to the scriptural commands and to live as pure and pious a life as they possibly can in a society that has little taste for that. It also meant that they were seeking guidance not so much in Islamic traditions and customs, but in the fundamental scriptures (the Quran and the Sunna) themselves. I can only speculate that in self-labelling themselves in this way, they were oblivious to the fact that the concept of 'fundamentalism' in the popular discourse has quite different connotations. A confluence of fundamentalism, political Islam, and an extreme understanding of jihadism is far from the mind of the few Muslims who seemed happy with the label fundamentalist. In the wider society, in tune with popular misconceptions, the label 'fundamentalism' is apt to easily evoke images of extremism and radicalism that tend to merge seamlessly with terrorism. In fact, fundamentalism, or neo-fundamentalism,5 is a very vague and varied concept, even among Muslims. It may refer simply to the wish, individually or collectively, of the very devout to apply Islamic principles to their personal daily life, seeing life as a kind of ritual and as a duty to fulfil doctrinal obligations in all aspects of personal affairs. On a level of slightly greater commitment, it may lead to the condemnation of laissez-faire Muslims as deficient in virtue and piety. Consequently, more encompassing, 'fundamentalism' may engender the wish to actively influence the Muslim community to take a more 'righteous' path. This could be achieved in a completely democratic, peaceful way through education (dawa, tabligh) to encourage Muslims to live more in accord with dogmatic principles, especially in the moral sphere. In a wider sense, the parliamentary process and lobbying may be put to use

5 As Olivier Roy calls it. Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: 1he Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). Other descriptive terms used

are Islamic revivalism, Islamic revitalisation, and re-Islamisation.

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to achieve some influence on society at large, though in New Zealand this has little chance of success in the present circumstances. What most non-Muslims seem to have in mind is so-called Islamism: a kind of political Islam that rejects the Western-type separation between church and state. Islamism promotes the idea, enshrined in the slogan din wa daulah (belief and state), that religion and state, belief and politics, are coterminous. This ideological programme refutes the secularist distinction between politics-and especially so-called Realpolitik-and religious belief and demands that politics be inspired and guided by religious doctrine. More extreme aspirations may wish to establish a global caliphate (khilafa) to unite the umma, the global Muslim community, under one leadership-a leadership that is spiritual as well as political in nature. This could be seen in terms of a restoration of the times of the Prophet and the original Muslim community in which temporal and spiritual leadership was coextensive. This may give rise to another geopolitical vision, so-called Salafism (Salafiya), which aims specifically at the implementation of socially and ideologically authentic conditions that are believed to have existed among the original umma and are based faithfully on the example set by the Prophet. The exact contents of this agenda depend on the respective understanding of the conditions of the Prophetic phase and the time of the companions (sahaba) and the rashidun, the 'rightly guided caliphate'. All this does not necessarily draw on the notion of a violent jihad and does not come inextricably packaged with terrorist strategies. But Salafism, as it filters through to the wider society and is screened through the limited understanding of Islam, gives this religion as a whole the tinge of medievalism. One of the reasons for the wider public's loathing of Islamic 'fundamentalism' concerns the harsh edicts of Islamic law, the sharia. 6 The television programme mentioned before made some highly provocative as well as dubious statements about Islamic law, which predictably caused quite a stir. It was claimed that fundamentalism not only has no tolerance for homosexuality, it imposes the death penalty on it. Dr. Ashraf Chaudhary, Labour list MP and a Muslim, was shown confirming this view. Entrapped by the interviewer and seemingly uncertain,

6 Sharia is the summary term for all rules and aspects of divinely prescribed human conduct as laid out in the Quran and to some extent elaborated on in the Sunna (the recorded tradition). The concept of sharia enshrines the .fiqh, the sharia in codified form, and the concept of hudud, physical forms of punishment.

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he suggested that the Quran demands this harsh punishment. This politically rather unwise remark subsequently caused the (then) Prime Minister Helen Clark to issue a quick response distancing the government from such views. Presumably her concern was that this remark could potentially do much harm to the policy of multiculturalism. Other Muslims were also shown in this programme expressing the view that homosexuality is not only strongly condemned by Islam, but that the Quran prescribes the death penalty by stoning. 7 In the context it appeared particularly disturbing that some of the interviewees seemed to regard the application of this harsh law as necessary because they were convinced that it was commanded by the Quran. It was even more alarming when it was insinuated that they deemed this punishment desirable, which in the current political climate of radically removing rejection of homosexuality from the social discourse sits particularly badly. 8 The view expressed in the television programme-that according to Islam homosexuality, as much as adultery, must be punished by stoning the offenders to death-is an oversimplification. In several lengthy discussions with a Muslim spiritual leader, the complexity of the issue was explained to me. In a very general sense Islam does severely frown upon sexual activity-of any kind-outside (heterosexual) marriage. The Quran (29/28; 27/54; 7/33; 6/151) speaks of illegal sexual intercourse as al-fahisha [al-fawahish], a cardinal sin (also translated as evil, sodomy, every kind of unlawful sexual intercourse),9 which deserves the death penalty (for instance Quran 4/15). 10 Homosexuality, as well as adultery (fornication; Quran 24/2), is most probably subsumed under this category of sin, but it does not explicitly say so, nor does it say that stoning is the appropriate, divinely commanded punishment. Some versions of the Quran-such as the authorised Saudi Arabian Wahhabi version-do mention stoning as the prescribed punishment for adultery, but it is contained in a footnote that draws on the Sunna (Quran 24/2). That indicates it is a matter of interpretation and

7 To the best of my information Iran imposes the death penalty on homosexuality and appears to carry it out occasionally by hanging. 8 The Civil Union Act makes same sex marriage legal. Discrimination on the basis of a person's sexual preferences also is illegal 9 Authorised Saudi version of the English translation of the Quean (27/54). 10 Women who have engaged in illegal sexual intercourse are to be incarcerated in the house until presumably death occurs through starvation. Slave women suffer half the punishment of free women; Quean 4/25.

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was not part of the original Quranic formulation.U The Quran also condemns lust or lewdness, luwat, and implicit in it, again, is illegal, sinful sexual activity. In this context the Quran refers to the story of Lot, and Sodom and Gomorrah (7/80-82). It links the destruction of these cities as divine punishment to the sinful sexual practices of their inhabitants. It is noteworthy that in this case the punishment for the mujrimun (criminals, sinners) is meted out by God, not men (7/84; 26/160-173; 27/54-58; 29/28-29). The rain of stones from heaven may be seen as a magnification of the individual punishment meted out by men, but nowhere does it say that the divine act is meant to set an example for men to follow. For a sentence of death to be passed in a sharia court, in all cases, it requires proof of culpability, either in terms of self-incrimination or through the testimony of four men (or eight women) who must have been eyewitnesses to the act of homosexuality-a very unlikely scenario. Leaving aside regions in which so-called 'tribal justice' is practised, and as far as official justice systems go, only Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the former Taleban regime in Afghanistan are known to implement the sharia in such matters with varying degrees of extreme severity. At least one major Islamic 'law school' (the Hanafi version) does not consider homosexuality as warranting the death penalty. 12 There is a similar diversity of views in relation to adultery. But, as the numerous condemnation of illicit sexual activity in the Quran indicates, it can be said with some certainty that Islam takes ordered sexual conduct extremely seriously, presumably not purely for reasons of abstract morality, but to create an orderly form of society in which succession, inheritance, and other property matters do not arise as a problem due to illegal procreation and promiscuity. In a modern Western context these prescriptions for Muslims, in addition to regulating sexual relations, are usually taken to be a stern reminder to abstain from pornography and overt eroticism in any form, usually on ubiquitous offer in Western society. By and large, Muslims' antagonism to homosexuality,

Scholars have speculated 'stoning' was incorporated into Islam later, under Jewish and Christian influence. 12 In certain regions of the Islamic world, traditionally, homosexuality and transgenderism were instituted as a social role and quite tolerated in the grey area between normative Islam and actual social practice. (Unni Wikan, Behind the Veil in Arabia: Women in Oman (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982).) Arguably, this is a survival of a pre-Islamic social pattern. It can be expected that current trends in Islam will force the disappearance of this custom.

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adultery, and what may be loosely called sexual licentiousness in New Zealand is expressed in a rejection of the liberalisation of laws and the incremental creation of a highly 'permissive' society, but not in the demand to introduce the death penalty. So-called fundamentalism does tend to have a more 'conservative', literalist understanding of the Islamic scriptures, including the moral code and the harsh penalties prescribed in them. On that basis it strives to bring about a coincidence of Islamic divine law and ordinances with Muslims' daily life and, in a general sense, does tend to give primacy of divine law over man-made laws. However, it does emerge quite clearly that the majority of Muslims living in Western countries realise that the strictest application of sharia in their personal lives, let alone in society at large, cannot be realised in a secularist state and in a Christian-derived majority society. Most Muslims seem to be realistic enough to conceive of the futility to try to install the sharia to a position of regulative and morally and legally normative function in a Western country. There is also realism about the difference between eternistic divine law and present-day reality governed by the parliamentary process and its powers of enacting new laws.U For instance, as Muslims have pointed out to me, the Bible also contains edicts like 'an eye for an eye' and strongly condemns homosexuality, yet this is not applied in social practice or secular law. While one should remain conscious of divine command, it remains a diffuse guiding plan in the background; it cannot be applied with direct immediacy, but it should remain a constant source of inspiration. This may not be the ideal situation, but would have to suffice for Muslims living as a minority in the West. A conciliatory view, obviously designed to bring about a reconciliation between social reality and divine law, which I have encountered among New Zealand Muslims, can be briefly described in this way: Quranic prescriptions, consistent with the belief in scriptural infallibility, have to be taken seriously. The Quran is simply God's unalterable word. But the full severity of sharia (especially its hudud aspects) should only be applied in a truly Islamic form of society. For instance, theft should only be punished by hand amputation, as the Quran clearly commands (5/38), when hunger and poverty have been com-

13 Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams' suggestion (in February 2008) to accommodate the sharia in British justice caused an adverse public reaction.

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pletely eradicated by Islamic charity provisions, and when profound Islamic education has taken hold so that there is general agreement about Islamic values. Not only is the removal of need a precondition, but also the collective acceptance of the Quranic principles is necessary. There is also the fundamental realisation that New Zealand as a nation abides by laws different from the sharia, and that these laws also apply to them as Muslims. With few exceptions and apart from a very few instances in which there may be a direct and profound confrontation between these laws and the sharia, Muslims, on the whole, feel they have no reason to complain. This is not to say that if Muslims should gain greater influence in the democratic and parliamentary process there would be no attempt to change laws to better suit Islamic morality. Multicultural provisions in New Zealand allow Muslims to live by some sharia rules in the family sphere to some extent and to conduct their private lives in accordance with Islamic values-up to the point where such practices may come in direct conflict with New Zealand laws. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 can be invoked in matters where Muslims feel that they are unfairly inhibited in the free practice of their religion. There have been no public, concerted initiatives among Muslims-fundamentalists or otherwise-to change the status quo and to push for official recognition of the sharia in some form, although as citizens and residents they are fully entitled to express their views openly and to engage in the democratic process in order to influence the situation. Such demands were made by Muslims in Australia and, as could be predicted, invoked a very critical response. 14 Despite the obvious moderation of Islam in New Zealand, on occasion suspicions are being vented in the media. It was quite damaging when a business paper 15 in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 accused the imam of Hamilton, Anwar Sahib, a Fijian by origin and a graduate of al-Madina University in Saudi Arabia, of having terrorist links. In the same article, it was hinted that fundraising among the country's Muslims would benefit the coffers of al-Qaeda. These allegations of terrorist involvement were obviously the product of an 14 Leaving aside rather unrealistic calls for the introduction of sharia in its entirety, debating issues of female clothing and calling for the official recognition of polygamy for Muslims involved aspects of Islamic canonical law. 15 The National Business Review, 5 October 2001: 1 and 3.

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overheated imagination and a frenzied search for culprits immediately after the terrorist attack. They were beyond anything normally vented in the New Zealand media, which even in the aftermath of9/11 did not reach the shrill hysterics displayed in other countries. Even so, innuendo and open allegation had a serious impact on the life of the person so named. However, the allegations were so extraordinary and implausible that they received no further attention from other branches of the media. Inadvertently, this case does point at another issue. New Zealand's imams are overseas trained and usually are not New Zealand born. This state of affairs, which also seems to be prevalent in other Western countries, was raised as a serious problem in Australia by the (previous Howard) government, arguing that these spiritual leaders have little familiarity with local Western conditions and therefore represent viewpoints quite alien and unadjusted to the Australian way of life. In other Western countries too concerns have been raised at times that Saudi-trained and Wahhabi-influenced imams are not useful in the process of Muslim integration, if they do not in fact actively hinder it. Some have openly been accused of being 'fellow-travellers' of al-Qaeda. In New Zealand, although this issue has not been vented openly, the criticism is raised among Muslims that imams are often unable or unwilling to give the khutba (the Friday sermon at the mosque) in English. In a condition of multilingualism, as all New Zealand local Muslim communities are, a sermon given in Arabic (or in Urdu or in any other regionally confined language)-even if it is supported with English-language handouts-may miss a sizeable number of the congregation and perhaps inadvertently can be quite exclusionary. Mosque congregations are strongly ethnically mixed and the only common means of communication is English. In the wider society, overseas-trained spiritual leaders are easily prey to the suspicion that they have been indoctrinated with dangerous ideas, which they import to their congregation in New Zealand. Perhaps in view of that, initiatives have been taken recently to bring about a publicly visible rapport between the government and Islamic spiritual leadership. The first conference of New Zealand imams was held in Auckland on 27 to 28 October 2007 under the auspices of FIANZ and the Ministry of Ethnic Affairs. The purpose was for spiritual and other leaders to dialogue with government representatives and organisations, but also to affirm their commitments to a peaceful coexistence with the wider

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society. The chairman of the FIANZ-affiliated Ulama Board, Sheikh Amir, is reported to have reiterated the peaceful nature of Islam and condemned violence and extreme acts perpetrated in the name of religion. Obviously this was to allay fears about a possible radicalisation of the Muslim minority through the leadership exerting a bad influence. Such concerns have their origin in the situation overseas. While apparently a majority of Muslims living in the West seems to embrace-and perhaps in the new environment develop-a 'modernist' and 'relaxed' perception of Islam that facilitates integration with Western host societies, there are also, as the European (and incipiently also the Australian) example shows,t6 noticeable reactionary phenomena: attitudes that national Islamic community status should not be negotiated with an infidel state. Such initiatives seem to have, for the most part, their origin in fanatical circles in the Islamic world proper and get transported by spiritual leaders who were trained in overseas Islamic centres.

'Fundamentalists' and 'Moderates' Fighting over the Christchurch Mosque and Halal Meat In New Zealand's more sedate conditions, two affairs in particular were perceived from the outside as a collision between fundamentalist and more moderate religious positions. By an even more alarmist interpretation, these cases were seen as indicators of the rise of a dangerous, fanatical fundamentalism. In reality, while religious views had a role to play, this was only part of a rather more complex truth. Ethnic differences and economic considerations were also causally involved. In 2003, an argument over the control of the Al-Noor mosque in Christchurch led to warnings in the popular press of alleged links to terrorism and Islamic extremism among some factions within the Muslim community. This was unusual insofar as the affair had been carried into the limelight of public scrutiny by Muslims themselves. Without this agency, none of this would have reached the attention

16 The best known cases are those ofHamzah al-Masri, imam of the Fishbury Park mosque in London. who was indicted under British common law for incitement to violence; and on a less sinister note, Sheikh Taj Din al-Hilali, Austalian mufti in Sydney, for his comments (in September 2006) on scantily dressed Australian women inviting to be raped. See Erich Kolig and Nahid Kabir, 'Not Friend, Not Foe', Immigrants and Minorities 26, no. 3 (2008): 266-300.

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of the wider society. In this case sections of the local Muslim community sought a resolution by an appeal to non-Muslim authorities, which indicates two aspects: a lack of internal community cohesion contrary to popular misconceptions about the homogeneousness of the national Muslim minority, and self-monitoring initiatives in the interest of supporting integration and peaceful and mutually respectful coexistence with the wider society. Despite the strong unitary impulse of Islam, a majority of Muslims are suspicious of extremist views, or what they see as such, within their own ranks and object to any association with them. Ian Clarke17 who witnessed the unfolding of the episode from close quarters, wrote: On Friday 24 October 2003, Christchurch awoke to find that" ... a Saudi Arabian-based charity with claimed links to Al-Qaeda is trying to gain control of Chistchurch's mosque" (The Christchurch Press, 24 October 2003, 'Terror Link Warning', p. Al). Credence was given to these claims because they were not from the usual critics of multiculturalism, the political right. but from within the Muslim community itself. Under the headline "Terror Link Warning", readers were told that the Muslim Association of Canterbury was negotiating the transfer of ownership of the mosque to "foreign interests", described as being associated with the Saudi-based Al-Haramain Foundation. Two branches of the Foundation, those operating in Somalia and Bosnia, had been identified by several Western governments, including New Zealand's, as being involved in the funding of terrorism. However, no such allegations had been substantiated against the Saudi branch involved in the negotiations over the ownership of the mosque. Several prominent Muslim community members had issued public warnings condemning the transfer of ownership, saying it risked providing "a channel for importing mayhem and chaos into New Zealand", and that the move would create dangers and a threat to peace in New Zealand society. The story fell nicely into a simplistic understanding of tolerable and intolerable aspects of Islam, typified by Mayor Gary Moore's comments describing the dispute as one between moderates and extremists. While some mention was made of the cultural diversity of the Christchurch Muslim community, little attention was paid to the importance of this in terms of this dispute. Beneath this apparently simple conflict between Islamic extremists and moderates, however, is a complex political discourse, in which different

17 Ian Clarke, 'Essentialising Islam: Multiculturalism and Islamic Politics in New Zealand', in 'Muslims in New Zealand', ed. E. Kolig, special issue, New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 8, no. 2 (2006): 69-96; 84. The information on which the paper is based was collected while Dr. Clarke had tenure as my research assistant.

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culturally based understandings of Islam were being mobilised as part of a political dispute over both control of the strategic asset of the mosque and related ideologies for the development of the Muslim community in Christchurch. The affair signalled tensions, which had developed within the local Muslim community. South Asian Muslims have historically formed the majority of this small, but significant community, and due to their relative numerical strength had exerted the most influence over the community's affairs. However, in recent years Somalis and Arabs have settled in the city and managed to secure effective control of the Muslim Association of Canterbury (MAC) that owns the mosque. Clarke surmised that: This was achieved, despite their relatively small numbers, principally as a result of the greater importance of the mosque, and hence the Association which owns it, in the social lives of the members of this community. Many of the Somalis and Arabs have faced considerable difficulty adjusting to New Zealand society. Unemployment, and related financial hardship, is very high. Their ability to speak English is generally low which severely limits their ability to relate to wider New Zealand society. Under these circumstances, many gravitate towards the mosque as "their space" in a largely foreign social environment. This is in stark contrast to the South-Asian community, which possesses the linguistic, social and economic skills to function effectively in New Zealand society. In the lives of this section of the Muslim community, the mosque, and MAC, plays a far less central role; and, until this crisis, there was a somewhat apathetic attitude towards formal control of the organisation and mosque. 18 Ethnic differences are underlined by economic differences, creating and intensifying divisions within the Christchurch Muslim community. In addition to the fact that South Asian, Somali, and Arab Muslims have very different, culturally based understandings of the religion, they occupy different socio-economic positions in New Zealand society. Arab and Somali religionists perceive the religiosity of South Asians as flawed, corrupted by cultural practices that are alien to Islam, and in any case distinct from their 'purer' understanding. Vice versa, South Asians tend to regard Arab and Somali versions of Islam with some suspicion as profoundly conservative and rigid and even tainted with Wahhabi fanaticism if not extremism. Asian Muslims, in a sweeping generalisation, have good language command, are

18

Clarke, ibid.; 84-85.

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well integrated into the wider society and are economically successful-much the opposite of Arabs and Somalis. These, having arrived more recently and feeling socio-economically more disadvantaged, in turn begrudge the fact that they are not as well supported by their Asian brethren as they would wish. While there was a change of the guards in the control of the mosque and leadership of MAC, passing the relevant positions into the hands of the Arab faction, unsurprisingly and one may want to believe innocently, Arab connections were activated to assist the community financially. It did not help that the major Arab charity, al-Haramain, that promised to come to the financial assistance of the local community and was about to assume financial control of the mosque was tainted by accusations that some of its branches had an al-Qaeda connection or at least harboured al-Qaeda sympathies. It is easy to see the reasons why this constellation could lead to claims that leadership and mosque affairs had fallen into the hands of extremists. Contrasting partisan views and interests had militated in a power struggle to form an explosive atmosphere. Latent and simmering ethnic tensions, combined with religious mutual recriminations, and perceptions of the influence of a sectarian orientation suspected of extremist leanings, all seem to have fired up suspicions by one sector of the community that financial assistance might come with strings attached, swaying local Islam in favour of sterner Saudi traditions. Ultimately, the deal, which seems to have been against the wishes of most Muslims in Christchurch, had to be abandoned under the glare of wider public scrutiny. But when looked at dispassionately from afar little substance supporting the fear of an extremist take-over can be discerned in this publicly displayed drama. Ian Clarke's insightful description leaves little doubt that this was a storm in a tea-cup and did not herald the beginnings of New Zealand's deadly embrace by extremist agendas. On the bright side, this case highlighted the vigilance of Muslims themselves to thwart what they took as the attempted intrusion of fanatical and extreme forms of Islam into the country. It shows how much value the majority of resident Muslims place on a harmonious and peaceful relationship with the wider society and how they strive to keep at bay anything that might upset this situation. Passing control of the mosque to a pro-Wahhabi organisation would have meant in their eyes that the mosque, which they saw as a resource for the whole Muslim community in Christchurch, would become hostile to all but a minority in the community who were in line with this 'funda-

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mentalist' Islamic agenda. They also held deep-seated concerns about the Wahhabi form of Islam, seeing it as an unacceptably severe and fanatical version of the religion, with the potential to promote discord and violence in New Zealand society. From the other side, the issue looked quite different: for the then MAC leadership, the plan to transfer ownership of the mosque so as to receive Saudi financial aid would not only ensure their own control of the institution as proxy for the Saudi sponsors, it would also promote what they saw as being the correct form of Islam in New Zealand, and, as an added bonus, help bring economic development to a particularly impoverished section of the Christchurch Muslim community. The decision to attack this plan through the media and thus involve wider New Zealand society was an extremely effective tactical move on the part of the South Asian community leaders. Paranoia over the possibility of Islamic extremism in New Zealand, stoked by the ongoing 'war on terror' and its excessive propaganda in the world media, ensured a blaze of publicity for this episode. The claims, from within the Muslim community itself, of a connection between Christchurch Muslims and al-Qaeda were certain to quash the plans. However, while effective in thwarting these plans, it may have been detrimental to collective Muslim interests in the medium term. It reinforced the wider public's suspicion about Islam and Muslims in general without the finer distinction that a better understanding of the background might have brought. The political discourse going on within the Muslim community is rarely understood in its subtleties by outsiders. 19 Some media commentators might have appreciated the underlying difference between Muslim 'hard-liners' and 'moderates', which is not totally removed from the rather more complex truth, but for the general public the case simply reinforced the prejudicial views generally held about Muslims. The result was moving the essentialised image of Muslims-if temporarily only, given the short memory span of the public-a notch closer to the extreme conceptual position of terrorism. Only a few months later, in August 2004, the Christchurch Muslim community made headlines again. This time a serious dispute had erupted over the certification of meat as halal. The seriousness of this episode can be gauged when one appreciates the economic impact that

19 In this sense Ian Clarke's article (ibid.) is a major contribution, bringing light into the darkness of general misapprehension and oversimplification.

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could potentially have been made on the export of meat so certified to the Islamic world. Worth into the hundreds of millions of dollars, it is a major revenue earner both nationally and for the meat industry.20 Internal wrangling within the Muslim community was putting this trade in jeopardy. 21 For Islamic countries to accept New Zealand meat it was, and still is, essential that it is certified as halal by a credible and accredited authority. FIANZ, as the main national Muslim organisation in the country, had taken on this role in co-operation with the Meat Industry Association (MIA), a trade association, which represents major New Zealand meat processors, marketers, and exporters. There is also a smaller Auckland based authority run by an Egyptian, which also performs this function of halal certification. Shi'a Iran, not relying on Sunni dominated FIANZ, has its separate arrangement. There are often difficulties with Islamic markets over the correct slaughter procedure, as conceptions can vary considerably. For instance, Malaysia banned the importation of New Zealand beef for a while in 2006 and 2007. In this case the problem was the method of stunning the animals. 22 Under this agreement, FIANZ monitors the slaughter process and assesses whether the ritualistic requirements have been met as a precondition of making the meat halal. 23 This function, carried out by FIANZ-appointed inspectors, involves supervising and checking the credentials of halal slaughterers, checking on the slaughter position and procedure as to their ritual correctness and, if satisfied, certifying the processed meat as meeting the appropriate criteria, thus effectively making the product halal. Slaughterers, who should be impeccable Muslims, are employees of the various meat companies, while inspectors are employed by FIANZ. The fees FIANZ receives from the various meat-processing companies for this service represent the main source of revenue for FIANZ.

20 The estimated value of the total (global) halal market is US$150 billion. This is predicted to grow to US$500 billion by 2010. (New Zealand Farmers Weekly, 3 September 2007: 13). New Zealand's part is worth NZ$ c.200 million per annum (Clarke ibid.; 88). 21 Ian Clarke's article (ibid.) also sheds light on this complex case. 22 Stunning the animals must not kill them so that blood can drain from the carcase. This can cause a collision with animal rights groups. 23 In a wider context beyond consumption, the term halal can connote attributes such as pure, acceptable, consumable, correct, or permissible.

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Accordingly, when the Muslim Association of Canterbury (MAC), one of the major component associations of FIANZ, announced that it was withdrawing its support for FIANZ's halal certification, alleging that meat was being wrongly certified as halal, it created a major stir. 24 Questioning the validity of the certification process was seen as undermining international confidence in the conformity of New Zealand meat to halal standards and endangering the lucrative halal meat export market. Muslim slaughterers work like other meat workers in a chain gang. When they stop for ritual reasons such as performing prayers, ritual ablution, etc., work slows down or worse grinds to a halt. The meat industry therefore applies pressure in various ways to keep ritual obligations to a minimum. At the centre of MAC's public objection was the allegation that slaughterers, in collusion with FIANZ inspectors, had compromised Islamic obligations too much, thus rendering the meat from the animals they killed non-halal. MAC claimed that FIANZ was turning a blind eye to this practice out of a desire not to rock the boat and endanger the considerable fees it received for certification. Other complaints raised were that slaughterers did not have the required credentials of being faultless Muslims in their private life. Both FIANZ and the meat industry vigorously disputed these allegations. While they admitted that previously there had been a problem with some slaughterers' contracts, denying them time to pray, they insisted this problem had been resolved. FIANZ was reluctant to conduct this dispute through the media, mindful of the very damaging fallout that might accrue both to itself and the meat industry. Muslims close to FIANZ regarded MAC's allegations as nothing but a cynical attempt to capture the revenue for halal certification by setting itself up as the sole certifying authority for the South Island. It was suspected that by undermining public confidence in FIANZ's halal certification, MAC could force FIANZ to provide it with a greater share of the profits or possibly create a regional monopoly of certification for itself with even greater earnings. Money and prestige, rather than legitimate concerns over halal standards, were seen as the main cause of MAC's objections.

24

The Christchurch Press, 15 September 2004, 'Mosque and Meat Divided Mus-

lims': Al5.

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The second controversy in the Christchurch community shows some remarkable similarities with the first. For most non-Muslims this dispute also seemed to be occasioned by a clash between 'extremist', or 'fundamentalist', and 'moderate' positions. One side was seen as insisting on an overly 'strict' understanding of what constitutes halal, while the other had a more 'flexible' view, which allowed a more expedient approach to halal slaughter. Both conceptions of the ritual requirements emanated from the same source, but one seemed adjusted to modern conditions while the other appeared to be inspired by a fanatical adherence to an outdated pattern. This interpretation is not totally incorrect, but again is only the partial truth. A closer examination of this dispute reveals a far greater complexity that cannot be reduced to a simple emergence of fundamentalist patterns, which would pose a threat to the New Zealand way of life. Different understandings of Islam, developed in different cultural contexts, have combined with socio-economic issues, weaving a complex fabric in a political discourse among individuals and interest groups. At the root of this dispute is a genuine religious difference over understandings of the requirements of halal. For Somalis and Arabs, in order for meat to be considered halal, the slaughterer must perform the prescribed salat prayers at exactly the appropriate time of the day, as well as pronouncing the ritual formula over every animal killed. Among South Asians, however, understandings of halal (and indeed obligations to perform the salat) are considerably more flexible and more easily adapted to modern work requirements. The occasional omission of a prayer, praying after the appointed time to make up for a missed prayer, or one individual praying on behalf of a larger group are all regarded by many members of this community as perfectly valid forms of Islamic practice. Accordingly, they do not regard the failure of all slaughterers on a particular killing chain to pray at the officially prescribed time as endangering the halal status of the meat produced. Such religious differences may not have come to a head without the coincidence with socio-economic conditions and with power politics within the Christchurch Muslim community. As Clarke25 sets out, clearly ethnic divisions are underlined by socio-economic differences.

25 Clarke, ibid. This matter is dealt with in considerable detail and therefore need not be repeated here.

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For Somalis, economically poorer than their Asian co-religionists, employment in the meat industry was one of the few opportunities open to them. But the preference of the meat industry for foreign slaughterers with more flexible views on halal requirements was a galling obstacle. By attacking liberal practices, they tried to secure a foot in the door. In this they found the Arabs' conceptions about halal requirements made them natural allies. As Arab interests had taken control of MAC and mosque affairs, the strategy assumed the proportion of an official dispute between a regional and the national organisation and hence attracted much more outside attention than it would have had otherwise. As in the dispute over the mosque, a superficial reading of the situation could easily lead to being fooled into believing that it was the hostile infusion of fundamentalism into New Zealand affairs that was responsible for sparking off the controversy. If one can give this abstruse complexity a religious twist at all, it can be seen as a regional variant of Islam trying to create a support base through which a challenge to the official structure of New Zealand Islam could be issued by utilising ethnic and socio-economic tensions. To what extent this initiative was essentially caused by taking doctrinal differences of Islam to the extreme and transposing them onto an economic plane, or simply was a power play between organisations or possibly even individuals is open to debate. Even if one may be inclined to accept that in its innermost nucleus the ruction was a theological dispute, it certainly was not a phenomenon of rising 'fundamentalism', let alone an indicator of dangerous extremism seeping into the country. Giving little succour to conspiracy theorists who see Islamic extremism lurking behind every corner, the two cases sketched here also demonstrate that Muslims do not espouse a high degree of solidarity among themselves. The differences among them are sufficient that they would act as an 'early warning system' if extremism was seriously on the rise. It is usually Muslims who are in the forefront of criticising 'wrong' beliefs and practices; be it intolerant or radical phenomena or the opposite, excessive laxness and unorthodoxy in their faith. Real events show that very clearly. The proposal of a take-over of mosque matters by an Arabic charity suspected of al-Qaeda sympathies was castigated and eventually thwarted from within the local Muslim community, not through any outside intervention. The halal debate was driven by a very conservative view of the proper slaughter method and led to a tightening of the procedures. The television documentary mentioned above was partially fronted by Muslims both for and

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against so-called fundamentalism. In any case, the overall innuendo was that Muslims had alerted the media to a dangerous development in their midst. In other cases too Muslims have raised suspicions about extremist views being propagated. No matter whether this is the result of the government-recommended process of self-monitoring or the outcome of vigorous internal Muslim power politics, it has the same effect of making it difficult for hostile ideologies to surreptitiously gain a foothold.

Muslim Firebrand Preachers New Zealand has no specific laws against so-called 'hate-speech' that relates to religious matters. 26 There are laws against sedition and incitement to violence, but they seem almost reluctantly invoked and have not been used so far against Muslims. No Muslim has been indicted or extradited on charges of inciting violence or murder. When, for example, an illiberal lecture by a Muslim preacher was aired on television, a complaint resulted in censure of the television channel for breaching broadcasting standards. This was a lecture by Dr. Hakim Quick, an international preacher and well-known jihadist/7 in which he railed against homosexuality and argued that offenders should be killed in accordance with Islamic law. In similar circumstances, in European countries, the usual response to such incidents in past years seems to have been to concede to Islamic scholars the right to enunciate religious doctrine without fear of punishment. They were not charged with incitement to violence. In shifting responsibility for propounding illiberal ideas from an individual to Islam per se, it was not only a matter of juristically absolving them of blame, it meant implementing a communitarian view, which perceives individuals as products of their society and culture. On the negative side, such decisions seem to presuppose an essentialised notion of Islam in which illiberalism is seen as inherent and individuals are not to blame. This tolerant view seems slowly to be undergoing change now. Some preachers and imams propounding hateful messages have been arrested in very recent times

26 'Hate speech' is covered in the Human Rights Act 1993, sections 61 and 63, which refer to inciting racial disharmony on grounds of colour, race, ethnic, or national origin. It does not refer to religion 27 This at least is what Olivier Roy (Globalized Islam; 150, 235) calls him.

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and brought before court under various laws. The implication seems to be that-either through the force of necessity or because of an ideological change-there is a gradual shift to so-called 'liberal political theory', which tends to hold individual persons fully responsible for their actions. In the case of Dr. Quick, the sensationalist press did not seem to take up the challenge, as one might have expected, to subject Islam to a critical review. This was not to be repeated. The latest offering of this kind was an article in the journal InvestigateMagazine of March 2007. 28 Under the stirring subtitles of 'Al-Qa'ida's [sic] men in New Zealand' and 'Helen [Clark, then Prime Minister] hoodwinked by preachers of hate', it presents a litany of overseas Islamic preachers with allegedly radicalist credentials who have been invited on speaking tours to New Zealand and could spread their message unhindered. The innuendo is not only that the government has been hoodwinked and is remiss in holding at bay such dangerous influences, but that New Zealand's Muslim associations bear a heavy burden of blame. They are not simply deceived as the government is; rather they are actively in collusion with such preachers, enabling them to spread their poison. There is a wider background to this accusation. Suspicions that visiting preachers from overseas are spreading a radical and hateful message of Islam-whether or not this is seen as consistent with the true character of this religion-have been emerging for some time. For instance, in February 2007, 1he[Christchurch] Press 29 under the headline 'Visiting Clerics preached hate' drew attention to the visit of two Muslim preachers. Not long after, in July 2007, InvestigateMagazine took the occasion of the Australian Baptist preacher Stuart Robinson conducting Islamophobic seminars to warn again of the dangers of radical Islamic ideas penetrating this country. 30 This time the list of the dangerous ideologues was narrowed down to two who were alleged to have represented radical and hostile views while visiting the country. The article also took the opportunity to thoroughly vilify a controversial former British MP, George Galloway, who had in the past spoken out in various form in favour of Islam.

28

Ian Wishart, 'Helen wears hijab while Preachers of hate slip into NZ', Investi-

gateMagazine 7, no. 74 (March 2007): 24-41. Online edition, 13 February 2007. Ian Wishart, 'Disrespect: NZ Mosques Flexing Muscles in Support of Radical Agenda', InvestigateMagazine 7, no. 79 (August 2007): 42-47. 29

30

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In general in such reportage it is insinuated that visiting preachers expressing views of dubious ideological and political value have, prior to their visit here, already been known as peddlers of hateful and extremist ideas. New Zealand's Muslim organisations, in inviting such people, have either been remiss in informing themselves about the true nature of these men's perception of Islam or are deliberately trying to spread a dangerous form of Islam. Given free rein in New Zealand, and infiltrating mosques and youth camps, they are able to spread their poisonous ideas under the guise of being credible exponents of Islam. This kind of journalism is criticising government inertia and stressing the culpability of New Zealand Muslim organisations, in particular FIANZ, in inviting such dangerous individuals. Ironically, sensationalist journalism represents a paradox commonly involved in such cases: the free speech, and the right to it, of some is condemned and demanded to be curtailed, while the press in principle is stretching freedom of speech to the point of slander. Social and ideological critique are vital ingredients of an open society. Libel laws of course can be activated and may at times provoke caution, but editorial policy has never been shy in candidly broaching Islamic issues. It needs yet to be convincingly argued why Muslims should not exercise the right to criticise Western society, its morals, and politics. The 1970s and '80s saw waves of West-critique, largely inspired by Marxism, anarchism and partly also by exotic religious philosophies, wash over Europe and North America. Only when it clearly escalated to sustained violence and terrorism did states find a legitimate reason to suppress these phenomena. Culpability, however, was only rarely extended to the social philosophers and ideologues behind these movements. Re-Islamisation and Fundamentalisation in the World

Even if one doesn't attribute much weight to the idiosyncratic Islamic interpretations peddled by a handful of radical preachers, one nevertheless gains the distinct impression that Islam the world over has been greatly invigorated in most recent years. It appears to have gained enormously, not only in theological or spiritual fervour, but it has also forcefully moved into the area of politics where it shows a degree of militancy that Western religiosity left behind centuries ago. Thus a spiritual reawakening seems to be strikingly combined with an ideological and tactical radicalisation that is so manifestly absent from

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a Western understanding of religiosity. Violence seems to occur in several religions, 31 but nowadays hardly to the degree and intensity in which it seems to spring from Islam. Is Muslim radicalisation a reaction to processes and dynamics that accompany globalisation? Or is Islamism a consequence of, rather than a reaction to, globalisation, as Roy3 2 has argued? Are Muslims entrapped in an identity crisis to which they respond with extremism? The puzzle of what has been called Islam's 'exceptionalism' and its inability to adapt to secularisation to the same extent as Christianity suggests few convincing answers, and none that would fit New Zealand conditions specifically. Islamic studies have taken up the challenge to produce plausible explanations for this phenomenon, giving the perception of a surprisingly revitalised Islam hard and quasi scientific contours. Consequently, the literature has produced several hypotheses about the reasons for the global rise of Islamic 'vigour' and what appears to be the concomitant radicalisation of Muslimhood. Among them are the views that fundamentalism is motivated by resistance to the overpowering strength of the West's hegemony, its imperialism, and predatory economics; others argue that it is an answer to failed modernisation and Muslim nationalism, in other words a fault located within Muslimhood; for others the explanation lies in that re-Islamisation is a resistance phenomenon trying to stem the tide of globalisation and its forces of cultural homogenisation; others hold an Islamic identity crisis responsible. Yet other hypotheses pin the reasons more concretely on actual events such as the Palestinian crisis, on American post-colonialist interventionism in the Middle East and its imperialism-usually seen as manifested in its rapacious search for oil. Another perspective seeks the reason for the strengthening of Islamic fervour in the fact that belligerent Islam managed to vanquish the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, thus boosting the myth of Islam's invincibility and its world-domination mission. Bassam Tibi, more abstractly, has called the rise of fundamentalism 'a cultural answer to techno-scientific

31 See Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 2003). 32 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

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modernity of the West'. 33 But that was before 9/11 and it has turned out that this touches on only one aspect of a much more complex problem. What is equally conspicuous, and has raised alarm in the West, is Islam's emphatic connection with aggressive political designs and its preparedness to utilise militant tactics to realise them. Some scholars emphasise the politicisation of Islam as a new phenomenon and deny that this kind of 'fundamentalism' is religion at all in the traditional sense, but rather a political ideology that rides on the back of a religion. Others see Islamism as a nostalgia-induced return to the original ethos of the past, not only in terms of moral purity, but also in terms of the close intertwining of belief and action. TibP 4 has demanded that Islam uncouple itself from political aspirations if it wishes to fit into the modern world. Gilles KepeP 5 predicts that the ideological battleground where the future of Islam and its place in the world is going to be decided lies in Europe, not the Middle East. Here the ideological extremes, represented by the best minds who have intensively been exposed to Western modernism will battle it out-one can only hope this happens by arguing in lecture halls and meeting places and not in the streets. This means that the answer to what direction Islam will take lies in its global coexistence with the West. On a sobering note, it is difficult to see that New Zealand's Muslim minority, because of its small size and the absence of outstanding and globally respected theological and philosophical leadership, is in a position to make a significant contribution to this process. Its possible example may, however, lie in the relative harmony with which it coexists-and integrates-with society at large. Roy36 argues that the radicalisation of Muslims is not a reaction to globalisation, but its inevitable consequence. In other words, deterritorialisation of Islam removes the bearings of being Muslim, leading to an extreme and possibly violent reaffirmation of Muslimness. 37 All the more so since Muslims who have moved to the West may find that the identity of the host country is not available to them and their

33 Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the World Disorder (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); 33.

Tibi, ibid. Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 36 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam. 37 See also Francis Fukuyama, 'Identity, Immigration and Liberal Democracy', Journal of Democracy 17, no. 2 (April2006): 5-20. 34

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Muslimness is not appreciated. However, if this were totally true, we should not find radicalism and identity-related extremism in traditional Muslim societies where globalisation has not led to a radical loss of personal identity and does not seem to have radically altered collective Muslimness. In countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, a Muslim identity has never been seriously in question, despite the vagaries of politics and political regimes. Yet it is precisely from these societies that the radical ideas that are now beginning to seep into the West and their Muslim minorities originally emanated. This in turn may explain why young Western Muslims, the sons of immigrants, may adopt these radical ideas, namely as a reaction to a personal identity crisis in which the parental identity no longer assuages the problem and the monocultural citizenship-identity may seem unattainable. But it also raises the question: does this hypothesis not in fact exaggerate the significance of a disaffected minority at the expense of a well-adjusted majority?38 If the hypothesis that young, partly assimilated Muslims of immigrant parentage are most readily affected by radical ideas has validity, it may supply a hint why extremism is absent in New Zealand. In the national Muslim minority, the percentage of teenage and young adult offspring of recent immigrants is proportionately very small, which diminishes considerably the chance of radical ideas gaining momentum. Let me further outline what I see as some of the major differences that may divide New Zealand's Muslim minority from others in the West. Some social scientists, already some years ago, have described a strengthening of an ostentatious Islamic identity in Europe, especially among younger, second-generation immigrants. 39 With many this may express itself solely in embracing conspicuous Islamic cultural signals (such as the head scarf and regular mosque attendance), and clearly is a search for a strong personal identity, seeing perhaps that the national identity is not easily available to them. Some may, however, now tend towards more radical views of Islam and perhaps embrace a jihadist and antagonistic attitude toward the host society. However, the concerns 38 See Giry, for example, about French Muslims and their high degree of integration Stephanie Giry, 'France and its Muslims', Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (2006): 87-104. 39 See, for example, Halleh Afshar, 'Strategies of Resistance among the Muslim Minority in West Yorkshire', in Gender, Ethnicity and Political Ideologies, ed. N. Charles and H. Hintjens (London and New York: Routledge, 1998): 107-126. Christiane Timmerman, 'The Revival of Tradition, Consequence of Modernity', Folk 42 (2000): 83-100.

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expressed by New Zealand Muslims seem to point in the opposite direction. According to views expressed to me by some Muslims, many are concerned that devotion to Islamic doctrine among young New Zealand-born Muslims is waning; and although an awareness of being Muslim may be relatively strong, it is not based on a punctilious performance of ritualistic duties. Whether such a decline of ritualism and commitment to it-yet preserving a spiritual rapport-could be called a 'Protestantisation' of Islam is open to debate. It seems also premature to debate whether this indicates a shift in religious devotion to a more 'inner' kind in the sense outlined by Max Weber-which may signal 'fundamentalisation' and not be adverse to radicalism-or whether this indicates a growing secularisation. Young Muslims behind a facyade of being enculturated in the host society may be completely alienated.40 While in some cases economic disenfranchisement and exclusion from the economic infrastructure may have played some role, it does not appear to have been the strongest motive. Economic motives were contributive factors in the French youth riots of 2005, but seem to be relatively unimportant in drawing young Muslims to specific radical ideological causes and to follow the call to a violent jihad. It would be overly simplistic though to look for just one overarching motivating factor. At the heart is certainly an exaggerated personal identification with Islam and especially a version of Islam that rejects peaceful coexistence with a strong and dominant cultural other. In a very generalised sense, the appearance of 'fundamentalism' in Western society signals a statement of demarcation-an identity of separatism-made by immigrant Muslims (or even converts) for a variety of reasons. In some cases it may be a signal of protest, spurning integration by rejecting fundamental norms and values of the host society. The formulation of an identity based emphatically on a cultural heritage that is not even dominant in the traditional geographic precincts of the Islamic world signals not only opposition, but quite possibly

40 If one is to believe the media, many more attacks-in addition to the 'successful ones-have been planned, but were thwarted in time. For the most part the prospective perpetrators were largely assimilated Muslims, leading ordinary middle class lives, pursuing ordinary careers, with ordinary backgrounds and up bringing. Jonathan Randall (Osama: The Making of a Terrorist (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004).) warns that these men are the human material sought after by al-Qaeda for their ability to infiltrate the hated West and blend in better to plot and carry out attacks.

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hints at a form of activism that goes beyond the normal engagement in the political process open to all members of a participatory democracy. Thus the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in immigrant communities may be an autonomous phenomenon of resistance to homogenising pressures issued, however subtly, by the host society, but may also be the uncritical acceptance of a radical agenda that has developed in the 'Islamic world' proper. While the first scenario may be involved to some degree, analysis of radical Islamic thought in most cases allows it to be traced back to within the boundaries of the traditional Islamic world. Apart from real or imagined discrimination and a sense of rejection by the host society that provides a major barrier to developing a sentiment of attachment, a Muslim identity in itself exerts a strong trans-nationalist pull. Solidarity with a global moral community is an essential part of being Muslim. For Muslim migrants more so than for others, this is a reason to remain transnational and to retain strong emotional links with the worldwide umma. This may impede shifting the focus of solidarity and commitment to the host society. In order to move from a notion of belonging to global Muslimhood to a sense of commitment to the host society, a rapprochement with its moral position is necessary. The Western secularised position does not make this easy and the acquisition of a completely shared moral position is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. Equally, a total acceptance by Muslims of the anthropocentric, human-needs based, morally opportunistic position of the West, which is seen to entail some diminution of true belief, is unlikely in the near future. The concept of 'secular Muslim' from a devout Islamic viewpoint for the time being remains somewhat of a contradictio in se. As recent experience clearly shows, the aspect of transnationalism in a Muslim identity is one of the potentially strongest stimuli towards radicalisation. Identification with a global umma and its fate as commanded by Islamic doctrine contains the seeds for extremist positions. That is to say, solidarity (ukhuwa) with Muslims who are seen as oppressed and mistreated by Western hegemony is apt to act as a stimulus to adopt radical stances. In this context, broadly, New Zealand is globally perceived by Muslims to be relatively Islam- and Muslim-friendly, or at least not hostile to them. Evidence for this belief is seen in New Zealand's steering an independent course politically and internationally. Especially through its distance from aggressive US policies, the country escapes the stigmatisation of being anti-Muslim

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and anti-Islam, which other Western nations may suffer despite their domestic policies of tolerance and religious inclusiveness. Although this possibility seems remote in New Zealand at the moment, a younger generation infused with a sense of their Muslimness and the transnationalism that goes with it may seek an outlet to violently express their identity. For this to happen, however, it requires a sense of alienation from majority society to a degree that is unlikely to arise under current conditions. Fundamentalism Is Not All the Same It is not my purpose here to critique, or advance, a theory of global

Islam and its radicalisation. Instead let me outline some thoughts that came up in conversations with Muslims-always bearing in mind that none of them showed any strong affinity with extremism even though some of the views that were expressed may appear radical. They, like me, were trying to look in from the outside to understand the extremist mindset. In other respects, though, they were clearly better equipped to judge Islamic motivations. A Muslim point of view would share the idea that Islam is in crisis, but in a specific sense. The thought that God's word may be in crisis and is in need of adjustment to modern realities is reprehensible to a Muslim understanding. If there is a discrepancy, then it is empirical reality that requires adjustment, or alternatively it requires an improved understanding of doctrine through ijtihad (reasoned interpretation). Hence, the crisis for Muslims lies in something other than Islamic doctrine and its supposed recalcitrance towards adjusting to modern reality or to giving way to secularisation. It is a crisis caused by external forces creating an empirical reality that is at odds with what is taken as an essential message of Islam: its being a beacon in the world that outshines everything else. And secondly, if there is now a problem it lies with Muslims and their imperfect understanding or lack of will to apply doctrine. However, the West is not blameless. It is not threatening Islam-as God's message is beyond human interference-but Muslims. They are being harassed, subdued, and forced, or enticed, to abandon their faith. Where Muslims collide with the interests of 'infidels' -such as the Jews in the Middle East or the American cosmopolitical power play-they are being brutally subdued. On the other hand, it is the allurement and expansionism of the West's lifestyle and tastes that imperil a pious Islamic existence.

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This crisis calls for a new perception within Islam, to create an ideology of strength, resistance, and spiritual empowerment, an ideology that creates a new identity of pride and firm conviction. It underlines the close connection of an ideologically newly constituted Islam that produces an invigorated identity. For some this may entail a proclivity to violence to achieve concrete aims in the real world, for others only an inner resistance to withstand Western seduction and spiritual inertia. From this premise it becomes understandable why some New Zealand Muslims have no objection to being 'fundamentalists', yet renounce violence as a legitimate means to improve the conditions of Muslims in the world. There are many and varied expressions of modern political Islam: ranging from reforming present-day Muslim society to achieve a higher degree of morality, to initiatives that seek to fully implement the Islamic doctrine of the coextensiveness of state and religion. Behind these ideas, it is the fantasy of realising the full, God-decreed potential of Islam that provides a fertile matrix for radical ideas. These may aim at the forceful shariatisation of society and state to install divine rule, hakimiya, and implement the sharia as a canonical, unalterable law that cannot be tampered with or modified and must be established in its entirety in the life of a whole society. Some megalomaniacal visions go beyond the plan of establishing a national theocracy and envisage a grander scheme such as the establishment of a global caliphate (khilaja). This in turn hinges not only on the political supremacy over the West, but also on Islam's spiritual ascendancy and defeating the West's jahiliya, rooting out its decadence and ignorance, which, if unchecked, threatens to draw Muslims into its vortex. At the very extreme there may be the view-not articulated openly among New Zealand Muslims-that the complete realisation of the Islamic society is only possible through the destruction of the West: only when the West has been vanquished can Islam assume its divinely ordained, pre-eminent position in the world. At various times New Zealand's Muslim community has taken steps against what it saw as undesirable influences creeping in. The events outlined before speak to a certain alertness of this minority to radical undercurrents that may extend their influence to this country. What are the pernicious Islamic influences-in terms of a harsher form of sharia or even extremist leanings-that a majority of New Zealand's Muslims fear may take hold in New Zealand? (Let us ignore the warnings of some who try to convince us that they are already

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surreptitiously spreading here.) As indicated above, so-called fundamentalism and the re-invigoration of Islam in general do not form a uniform phenomenon and in fact show much internal diversity. One of the major vehicles for radical thought is Wahhabism, a most actively dynamic fundamentalist sect. It is a puritanical and iconoclastic eighteenth century Sunni version,41 which is based in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabis, who prefer to call themselves muwahidun, upholders of true tawhid, the unity of God, reject interpretations of the Quran, taqlid, and traditions accrued after about 950 AD as bida (heresy). It is also known for its ruthless iconoclasm that has led to the destruction of art and artefacts previously tolerated in Islam. 42 Today Wahhabism is widely held responsible for the spread of radical thought throughout the world. It seems to act as a vector on which radical thought, even extremism, piggybacks. As the official state religion in Saudi Arabia, it is intertwined with all spiritual and financial help this country may offer to Muslims in the world. It is frequently claimed that Saudi oil money and its support for legitimate Islamic causes throughout the world facilitates, in a practical sense, the spread of radical ideas hatched in the donor country. Wahhabism is, however, not the only source of inspiration for radical ideas. Taleban theology was inspired by Indian Deobandism in addition to Saudi Wahhabism. Both were at least indirectly and unwittingly given support by the West through assistance provided to the mujahidin who were fighting the Soviet occupation.43 The political philosophy of Maulana Mawdudi may be equally seminal, as may be the writings of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, both founding members of the Muslim Brotherhood. There is also a Shi'a version of Islamism, the legacy of Ayatollah Ruollah Khomeini. It is interesting that among some New Zealand Muslims the label 'Wahhabi' is an insult, which not unusually is used by South Asian Muslims to refer in a generic sense to Arab Muslims. The label alludes to what are perceived to be the Arabs' intolerable features such as rigidity in matters

41 Founded by Muhammad Ibn Abd ai-Wahhab (1703-1791). It is Saudi Arabia's official religion and as such state-supported. 42 Under its influence on the Taleban regime, it led to the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddha statues in the Hazara province. 43 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords (London: Pan Books, 2001).

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of faith, baseless arrogance and a tendency to extremism in doctrinal interpretations. It does not go down well with non-Arabs that Arab Muslims, especially in situations when ethnic tensions arise, like to emphasise that they were chosen to receive the word of God, they are the people who speak the language of God, and hence they know best. When other Muslims refer to them as Wahhabis it may have some truth in individual cases (either in a religious sense or in attitudinal terms), but does not accord with sectarian reality: not all Arabs belong to the W ahhabi sect. A major and discrete dimension that suffuses to a greater or lesser degree other forms of fundamentalism becomes evident in the category of Salafism. It is best described as a spiritual and philosophical orientation in Islam that seeks an emphatic return to the pure example of the Prophet. This version of Islam incorporates conservative customary forms of behaviour and thought attributed to Mohammad's example. Through its extreme interpretation of heresy it rejects every Islamic renovation after the four rightly guided caliphs, the Rashidun, and does not acknowledge the four basic Islamic law schools, madhahib, because they are post-Prophetic and therefore illicit innovations or heresy (bida). Salafism is based on the idea that the Prophet's infallibility and his immediate successors' wisdom legislated every aspect of social life, thus in effect largely freeze-framing Arab culture of the seventh century for all eternity. Enslaving the minds and wills of devout Muslims for hundreds of years and encoding the literalism of religious dogma, it has sprung up forcefully in the Muslim world time and again, as now in recent years. It is based on the belief of the strength of the Prophet's ability to communicate directly with God and through his inspired guidance the purest form of Islam has been revealed to humanity. It constrains followers to live out in the twenty first century a replica of the example set by the Prophet Muhammad and the early Muslim community that had the benefit of his leadership. This may be accepted in principle by most New Zealand Muslims, but as far as I can tell the idea that a return to the past is desirable or even possible does not enjoy much popularity. While the political wish in its purest form may provoke tolerant amusement, when combined with violent strategies, it is unambiguously rejected. However, some form of Salafism occurs in that some Muslims-in my experience new converts-emphatically rely exclusively on the scriptural texts of Quran and Sunna and reject later developments.

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Islam, traditionally, has not deliberately devised an agenda that would specifically and easily allow it to coexist with other theological views on an equal basis. Its tolerance expressed in the concepts of dhimmiya and ahl al-kitab (people of the book, viz. monotheists), or in the aya, 'There is no compulsion in religion', do not express true enfranchisement of other religionists or concede equality to them. Modernist thought propounded by Mohammed Abduh or the Mutazilah school is designed to maintain the integrity of Islam in the face of external pressures and by selectively assimilating Western conditions to preserve Islam's superiority. The technique of ijtihad, (interpretation) looking for clues in the scriptures so that doctrinal understanding may be adjusted to modern conditions, sets a tight framework for liberalism.44 It allows Islam to maintain relevance and Muslims a degree of convenience in accordance with the hadith that there should be no hardship in religion. As mentioned before, Tariq Ramadan argues for a renovation of Islam to suit diasporic conditions. In this vein, Roy-4 5 speaks of the Protestantisation of Islam. By this he refers to exegetical efforts to essentialise Islam, purify it of culture-specific baggage, and re-spiritualise it. This thrust may underlie the development of so-called fundamentalism: the return to basic Islamic principles cleansed of later accretions and may assume the shape of Salafism, or it may come to produce an entirely new version of Islam. But the term 'Protestantisation' is misleading insofar as it clearly draws a parallel with Protestant Christianity and its historical development. Islam is not embarked on a fast trajectory of becoming an emphatically 'inner religion', nor is it undergoing a rationalisation process-in Max Weber's sense46 -as Christian Protestantism has done. It may do that in confined enclaves, elite circles, or as a programme of wishful thinking, but globally or in Western society such a trend is not strongly tangible as a majority phenomenon. In New Zealand the process of 'internationalisation' of worship is at best in an embryonic phase and totally absent when ethnic and sectarian interests come in conflict.

44 I have described a case of applying ijtihad in the Dunedin community. Erich Kolig, 'Allah is Everywhere: The Importance of Ijtihad for a Muslim Community in New Zealand', The Islamic Quarterly 45, no. 2 (2001): 139-159. 45 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam. 46 See Max Weber's classical work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. (Various editions)

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On the other hand, New Zealand does not produce strongly contradictory discourses within Islam, as is the case in Europe. Yet it is true here also that not all opposition to the 'fundamentalisation' of Islam is emanating solely from the Western host society. Fundamentalist and conservative trends-represented at least sometimes by ethnic background-are occasionally arraigned against more modernist positions. Fierce criticism is often traded between the two opposing ends of the Islamic spectrum; one side accusing the other of apostasy or inflexibility, as the case may be. The chance of a quick rapprochement then is lost when majority society is drawn into the dispute and identifies one side as dangerous extremism. The possibility of creatively addressing ideas within a dialogue among Muslims is lost. New Zealand, though, is perhaps unusual within the Western world as the opposing positions, which sometimes emerge, are not so deeply entrenched as to cause violent rifts. On the whole the inter-Muslim dialogue is conspicuously lacking in the piquanteries of the spiky and acrimonious debates that flavour the Islamic debate in Europe. The Radical Concept ofJihad47

A consideration of radical Islam would not be complete without giving some thought to the concept of jihad-a word that has assumed a sad currency in today's world. It is hardly surprising that it prominently exercises the mind of the leading exponents of Islam in New Zealand. Islam has an inherent tendency, as most religions do, to transcendentalise the meaning of human existence, proposing a kind of otherworldliness that relativises and diminishes individual human life in comparison with God's grandiose design plan. An excessively strong religious devotion tends to magnify the transcendence of the meaning of human existence by downplaying the importance of this life as just a transitory phase to be replaced with something of greater durability and significance. Untempered by secularism, the brevity and ephemerality of this life is ranged in unequal contest against the prospect of divine judgment, and subsequent eternal paradisiacal reward or hellish damnation. This makes for an easy departure for oneself and others. 47 John Esposito's, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) presents a good overview on the subject

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The anthropocentric world view of the West, which has long weaned itself of medievalist religious fervour, finds it difficult to accommodate to this devotion to metaphysical values. They seem so divorced from the empirical, practical world. In the zealot's world comforts of physical being and solidarity with a host society count for nothing when measured against the cosmic size of true faith, its duty, and its rewards. Much of this perception is epitomised in the concept of jihad, which according to some sits close to the inner core of Islam. Usually translated as holy war-or by Christianising the concept: crusade-it means struggle rather than war, harb, a word that is associated more with unjust fighting as the 'unbelievers' do. Although it is also translated as 'fighting' (or 'fighting in the cause of Allah') and 'striving with your life', jihad does not necessarily refer to armed or violent struggle. It is a hallmark of radicalism that this aspect was put in the foreground of teaching. Tradition and scriptures distinguish between Lesser and Greater Struggle, the latter by implication being the more demanding. This struggle-a fight with one's inner enemies as it were-refers to personal growth and the endeavour to become a better Muslim through self-discipline and a faithful and painstakingly correct adherence to Islamic articles of faith and to prescribed behaviour. Only when one has achieved the prescribed piety, moral excellence, and commitment in practical life is one ready for the lesser jihad. In this sense it refers to the duty of every Muslim-here opinions are divided on whether it is gender inclusive or exclusive-to rise to the defence of Islam when it is seen to be in peril. It is a consequence of this article of faith that Islam-specific morality not only demands self-sacrifice, but may even come to excuse murder as a legitimate defence of the faith. Naturally, the perception of how and why Islam is in peril and by whom is open to wide interpretation. What the Prophet had apparently considered to be the more exacting and morally higher form of a Muslim's duty has retreated into the background in the course of Islam's politicisation and especially its radicalisation. Extremist interpretations of jihad, inspired by the view that Islam is in peril or that Muslims are suffering oppression, have led to the more violent aspect of the concept gaining pre-eminence. Thus the role of mujahidin (the people carrying out jihad) is predominantly understood now in terms of armed struggle, and, in garnering world attention, it has led to the neologism of jihadist, a word synonymous with terrorist.

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I remember some Muslims visibly cringing at the mention of Osama bin Laden and his call to jihad. The concept of jihad, made oddly familiar in the West by bin Laden's declaration of a 'Jihad against Crusaders and Jews' in 1998, is perceived, by Westerners as much as by radical Muslims, to be of the Machiavellian type: in the interest of attaining the goals the end justifies any means. The more temperate view on this theological point holds that this Machiavellianism is not supported by the scriptures. The Quran (2/190-193, 9/36) takes care to spell out rules of engagement. For instance, non-combatantswomen, children and elderly-held to be innocent are to be spared; the opponent's means of sustenance are not to be destroyed and the like. In this sense, by itself, the legitimacy of jihadism was questioned and its unwillingness to make distinctions rejected. However, theoretically at least, some justification was recognised in the extremists' view that there are no innocents in the West; all are equally responsible for the attack on Islam because people have the governance and leadership they 'deserve'. Even Muslims who do not follow the call to attack become guilty of contravening divine command and fall under the rubric of 'enemies of Islam'. It is easy to understand why a peaceful, relatively well integrated Muslim community would have difficulties in embracing this viewpoint, yet may have some understanding of why some may come to this conclusion. Another philosophical question sprang up in the aftermath of Muslim attacks in the West. Some Muslim leaders seem to have condemned these attacks on the grounds that while jihad in principle is good, it is un-Islamic to attack Western host-countries. Islam orders a Muslim to honour the host, among other things by abstaining from acts of violence. It caused some mirth that a Norwegian imam seems to have opined that European Muslims should only perpetrate acts of terror in countries that have not given them shelter. The jihadist's radical view that focuses on the transcendence of human purpose does not result in equanimity towards the world-immanent evils. On the contrary, the world view of a jihadi is a deeply cleft one. It encompasses a cosmos of Manichaean proportions in which good and evil are engaged in an eternal battle until judgment day, a battle conceived to be between Islam-Islam of the jihadist kind-and the infidels, idolaters, devil worshippers, and apostates, in short: the West. The definition of true faith is narrow and strict. It is of a clarity that does not admit to subtle nuances. In this image of irreconcilable

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contrast there is no room for a grey area, not even for Muslims of other sects, modernists, or secularised ones. In this world ruled by a moral polarity, Osama bin Laden is a protagonist of good, a defender of true Islam, a saint, and not an 'evil-doer'. ]ihadists find encouragement and incitement in ambiguities contained in the Islamic scriptures. In particular some passages can be interpreted to contain exhortations of the superiority of Islam and harsh commands regarding how unsatisfactory relationships with 'infidels' need to be rectified. For instance, and perhaps most impressively, Quranic verses contain thoughts such as 3!110, which says 'You are the best community created for mankind, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong';48 and '0 believers, fight the unbelievers who are near to you, and let them find in you a harshness; and know that God is with the God-fearing' (Quran 9/123). Also: 'So be not weak and ask for peace while you are having the upper hand. Allah is with you .. .' (Quran 47/35). Such exhortations clearly carry a message of a kind of supremacy that denies the need for adjustment and instead impresses the command to dominate and judge, and seek domination if necessary by force. When this edict appears to be violated in the present-day political discourse of the world and its power dynamics, it may provide an incentive for a jihad in order to restore the imperative nature of the Quran and its veracity. The parts dealing with al-]ihad in the Quran, to the believer, speak a language loud and clear. The Quran (9/38) demands: '0 you who believe! What is the matter with you, that when you are asked to march forth in the cause of Allah (i.e. Jihad) you cling heavily to the earth? Are you pleased with the life of this world rather than the Hereafter? But little is the enjoyment of the life of this world as compared to the Hereafter.' Islam does not encourage or condone a quietist attitude when it is in peril (see Quran 4/95) or when parts of the umma are under attack. As the hadith commands: 'he who does not care about the state of the Muslim umma, is not part of the Muslims'. To the attackers ' ... announce ... a painful torment' (3/21) and for the Muslims: 'Fight against them so that Allah will punish them by your hands and disgrace them and give you victory over them and heal the breasts of a believing people' (9/14).

48 3/104 has a similar tenor: 'Let there arise out of you a group of people inviting to all that is good (Islam), enjoining what is al-Ma'ruf [good, lawful] and forbidding al-Munkar [evil, disbelief]. And it is they who are successful'

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In the attempt to address unsatisfactory conditions, protect embattled Islam, and help it to its rightful place in the world, there may be found in the Quran even harsher imperatives, such as 'kill the mushrikun [unbelievers, idolaters] wherever you find them, and capture and besiege them, and lie in wait for them in each and every ambush' (Quran 9/5); and: 'fight against the mushrikun ... collectively as they fight against you collectively" (9/36), and: 'Fight the unbelievers until there is no longer any fitnah (sedition, disbelief, polytheism) and religion is all for God' (2!193; 8/39) and 'cast [the disbelievers] into hell[fire]' (8/37). All this, when isolated from the context of calling Muslims to the defence of Islam in times of dire need as existed at the Prophet's time, may seem to convey a message of implacable and eternal hostility. By a stretch of the imagination such a situation oflslam's need might be perceived to exist as the West militarily, economically, and ideologically appears to lord over Muslims now, creating the impression of oppression despite a general climate of global de-colonisation. Self-sacrifice 'in the way of Allah' is considered a virtue. The martyrdom of the shahid, dying in pursuit of 'the just cause' is promised much reward (Quran 22/58-59; 2/154; 3/157-8, 169-71). In this respect Islam posits a contradiction inherent in its tenet: it condemns suicide (intihar) as a sinful act-as it says in a hadith: 'your body has rights over you', and in the Quran (2!195) 'do not bring about your own destruction'-the willing death of the person or persons (mustashhidin) on a suicide mission, though in both its design and effect tantamount to suicide, may represent the virtue of ultimate self-sacrifice (istishhad) of the jihadi. Present-day terrorist methods do not spare the attacker's life: is this condemnable suicide or virtuous selfsacrifice? Not surprisingly, when I raised these issues with Muslims in New Zealand (and overseas), invariably it was pointed out to me that only a small minority would understand the verses in this literalist, decontextualised, and aggressive way. Only by grossly lifting these scriptural commandments out of their proper context could they become the rationale for extremism. In any case such issues would not arise in the reality of life in New Zealand, I was assured, where it is apposite to have only a very abstracted discussion in these matters.

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The Spectre of Terrorism The events of 9/11 elicited a mixed response in the Muslim community of New Zealand. Open condemnation of the terror act, however, was officially pre-eminent. Muslim leadership obviously recognised the sensitivity of the situation and abstained from issuing controversial or ambiguous statements, which by playing on Muslim solidarity might have given a cryptic hint of sympathy for the terrorists. If there was satisfaction with these attacks in some circles it was hidden. But Schadenfreude (joy at the hurt inflicted), even if openly expressed, does not constitute criminality and in fact arguably is protected under freedom provisions. Anecdotally, rumours went around that some younger Muslims were unsure how to respond, but were told in no uncertain terms by their elders that this was no occasion to rejoice. On the whole, a frank discussion was scarcely possible as no Muslim dared openly express sympathy for the terrorists or solidarity with their cause. It was conspicuous though that conspiracy theories seemed to exert some attraction for Muslims, blaming dark, cryptic forces such as Mossad or the CIA for orchestrating the attacks so as to turn sympathies in Israel's favour. World opinion had been turning against Israel after its brutal and sustained crackdown on the Palestinian intefadah and the attacks were supposedly meant to shift sympathies in Israel's favour. Fearing repercussions, the then chairman of OMA, Mohanned Hassanin, published an open letter in the Otago Daily Times, assuring the New Zealand public that Muslims are not terrorists and asking that no retributions be meted out against them. 49 'The world should not rush to judgment' and condemn Muslims or Islam wholesale, he wrote. And New Zealand did not. Although there was reportedly some verbal abuse, directed mainly towards women who were easily identifiable as Muslims, there were no physical attacks. Later, after the 717 attacks in London, some Muslims sporadically suffered the same kind of low-level abuse and an Auckland mosque was vandalised. It may be well to remind ourselves what apparently an Indian Muslim, Muqtedar Khan, living in the USA said about the 9/11 attacks and the West's reaction: 'if 9/11 had happened in India, thousands of Muslims

49

The Otago Daily Times, 20 September 2001; 13.

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would have been slaughtered'. 50 Given India's tension between Hindus and Muslims, which not only engenders terrorist attacks but also periodically erupts into pogrom-like atrocities, such a response would be entirely conceivable. It is comforting to know that something like this is unthinkable in New Zealand. Two years after 9/11, FIANZ posted the following declaration on its website: NZ Muslims' Declaration Denouncing All Kinds Of Terrorism Press Release 13 January 2003 NZ Muslims' Declaration Denouncing All Kinds Of TerrorismEndorsed in Auckland/New Zealand on the 13th of January, 2003. WE, concerned Muslims of New Zealand, have continuously expressed our commitment, as an integral part of this nation, to preserve peace and stability. FIANZ (The Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand), for example, made a number of press releases to that effect in the last 15 months. It is felt that the present circumstances warrant a reconfirmation of this commitment by means of this declaration. Declaration WE, concerned Muslims of New Zealand, being Islamic in faith, feel that it is our duty to announce our viewpoint regarding recent major world events. We believe that Islam promotes peace and security to all mankind and salvation from fear and terror. It does not allow any lawless action against innocent people, no matter when, where, or under what pretext such action might be taken. Islam denounces all kinds of terrorism at all levels, whether perpetrated by governments, organisations or individuals. This spirit has been clearly shown in the Quran, the holy book of Islam, stating that to kill one innocent person is akin to killing the whole of mankind and calling upon all nations to live in peace and harmony together in this world, being the creation of the one and only one God. These recent events have led many people around the world to consider Islam as a doctrine of terror. The true spirit of Islam is so far from this and it explicitly states to the contrary. The Holy Quran calls upon the Prophet Muhammad to:

Call the people to the way of your Lord by wisdom and fair preaching.

50 Marcia Hermansen, 'The Evolution of American Muslim Responses to 9/11 ', in Islam and the West Post 9/11, ed. R Geaves, T. Gabriel, Y. Haddad and J. Smith (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004): 77-96; 84.

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Islam advocates for peace and invites us to pursue happiness in this world and the hereafter; to resist whimsical desires and encourages dialogue between nations: 0 Mankind, We created you, from male and female, and made you into

nations and tribes, that you may know one another. Within the context of New Zealand society, WE, Muslim citizens of New Zealand, feel that we are an integral part of the nation and consider all citizens as partners in the cause of peace and prosperity, irrespective of race, faith, or ethnicity. We are determined to honour our obligations to defend this nation and its fabric, well inspired by the spirit of our National Anthem which we aspire to see made true: God of Nations at

thy Feet In the bonds of Love we Meet. It is noticed that [a] few individuals, groups and agencies, contrary to the long established traditions of New Zealand society, possibly driven by a wider anti-Muslim sentiment elsewhere in the world, are following a track that is very likely to incite religious hatred and discrimination. It is regretted that this has led to baseless and unjustified attacks on the sacred symbols of Islam: the personality of Prophet Muhammad and the Holy Quran, without any sound knowledge of the matter. The spirit of this unacceptable trend is indeed not much different from that which justifies terror in the name of religion. Both must be considered unfair and harmful. Fuelling anti-Muslim sentiments only serves the purposes of fanatics and extremists more than anything else.

The Muslim community of New Zealand is determined to live in peace and abide by the law. We clearly pronounce our commitment to the welfare of our nation, as much as we feel entitled to live in peace, and be respected as citizens of New Zealand. We declare that our commitment to the welfare of our country shall be unquestionable.

God save our New Zealand. [original emphasis] Endorsed in Auckland/New Zealand on the 13th of January, 2003 by: The Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ) which includes: New Zealand Muslim Association Inc., (NZMA), Auckland. South Auckland Muslim Association Inc., (SAMA), Auckland. Waikato Bay of Plenty Muslim Association Inc., (WBPMA), Hamilton. Manawatu Muslim Association Inc., (MMA), Palmerston North. International Muslim Association of New Zealand Inc., (IMAN), Wellington. Muslim Association of Canterbury Inc., (MAC), Christchurch. Otago Muslim Association Inc., (OMA), Dunedin. Islamic Ahlulbayt Foundation of New Zealand, Auckland. Islamic Information Services, Auckland. Al-Manar Trust, Auckland.

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Despite its ideological liberalism, New Zealand stirs from its apathy when it comes to suspicions about someone's terrorist leanings. The nation has joined the 'war on terror' and enacted, one suspects through US pressure, anti-terrorist laws in the wake of 9/11. New Zealand has a Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 and Terrorism Amendment Act 2003, which names individuals and groups to be regarded as terrorist. There is now a more recent Terrorism Suppression Amendment Act 2007, which when it was debated in public occasioned disquiet among Muslims and human rights defenders because of its power of seemingly arbitrarily labelling groups and individuals as terrorists and the difficulty in removing them from the list once they are on it. As a Greens Party spokesperson on civil liberties pointed out in a speech, this act would tend towards suppressing initiatives that later on are universally acknowledged as liberation movements. 51 For instance, under the aegis of the revised act, the anti-apartheid movement could have been labelled terrorist and protesters locked up as terrorists. Better than anything else, this exemplifies the well-known adage that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' 'Terrorism' conjures up the relativism this label implies. In it there are lurking fundamental differences between a Western perception and Islamic viewpoints. From a Muslim point of view-and it may not even be the most radical one, some of the movements and initiatives labelled terrorist may be considered legitimate jihads. Consider this: the Security Council Resolution 1566 from 2004 defines terrorism as an action 'with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public .. .' Compare that with al-Qaradawi's 52 definition of a legitimate jihad and istishad (self-sacrifice). In the defence of self-martyrdom in the course of jihad and delineating it against suicide (which is forbidden in Islam), he wrote: '[by] jeopardising the life of the mujaheed ... it is allowed to jeopardise your soul and cross the path of the enemy and be killed if this act of jeopardy affects the enemy, even if it only generates fear in their hearts, shaking their morale, making them fear Muslims. If it does not affect the enemy then it is not allowed .. .'53 This seems to condone, if not encourage, the terrorist's objective of instilling

Keith Locke; New Zealand Green Party website, August 2007. Yussuf al-Qaradawi is a Qatar-based and widely respected mufti whose fatawa (legal opinions) enjoy international acceptance. 53 Quoted in Malise Ruthven, Islam in the World, 3rd ed. (London: Granta Books, 2006); 417-8. 51

52

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a climate of fear in non-combatants, while the Security Council's definition condemns this course of action and declares it as the reason why terrorism is intrinsically unacceptable. This definitional delineation of the conduct of war clearly signals a clash between more radical religious interpretations of jihad and the Security Council's understanding of illegal activity.

The Zaoui Case54 It is impossible in a discussion of the (illusory) rise of fundamental-

ism and radicalism in New Zealand not to take note of the case of the Algerian refugee, Ahmed Zaoui. For a while he was in danger of irreversibly becoming a victim in the slow dialectical grinding of the state's responsibility to provide national security and the intrinsic Islamophobia this engenders. His case generated great public interest, much of it unexpectedly favouring Zaoui. Initially he gave terrorism a face, rather falsely as it turned out, and instead he later came to humanise Islam. Inimical to state process, the face turned out to be rather sympathetic, far from the visage of a fearsome fanatic. The case, as it was handled by the authorities, allowed Zaoui to appear as an innocent victim rather than a sinister perpetrator; at the same time it gave 'the war on terror' the unpleasant varnish of a modern-day witch-hunt. Not surprisingly the case aroused much passion among New Zealand Muslims. 55 So far, paradoxically, Zaoui has become the only well-publicised victim of terrorism inside New Zealand. Accused of being a terrorist, or at least having a terrorist past, the accuracy of this contention was not proven to the public's satisfaction and instead put in doubt the state's image of terrorism that underlay its actions in this matter. An Algerian citizen, Islamic scholar, and imam seeking refuge in New Zealand, he thus became a kind of cause celebre. For some he became an example of the country's wrong-minded indulgence of a dangerous criminal, for others an embodiment of the threat of anti-terror laws

54 For a preliminary account see Najib Lafraie, 'Ahmed Zaoui, a Victim of 9/11: Impact ofthe Terrorist Attacks in the United States ofNew Zealand Refugee Policies', in 'Muslims in New Zealand', ed. E. Kolig, special issue, New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 8, no. 2 (2006): 110-133. 55 In several demonstrations Muslims, joined by Christian clerics and defenders of human rights, demanded his release.

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wrongly drafted and applied and thus infringing on the civil liberties and human rights of innocents. For many New Zealand Muslims, his fate has come to manifest what they think are the deep-seated, unfair, underlying suspicions this country harbours towards them that can easily escalate to open persecution. Unwittingly, however, Zaoui has done much to mellow the image of Islam in the public perception. Perceived as a victim of persecution-both in his homeland Algeria and in New Zealand-he aroused images of a David fighting the Goliath of the New Zealand state apparatus. As a family man suffering separation from his wife and children for years, he touched the heart strings of many New Zealanders. In this way, he succeeded in attracting much sympathy, not only for himself and his misfortune, but also for Islam per se, mobilising positive sentiments that may not have been forthcoming otherwise. The New Zealand Listener credited Zaoui with 'the humanising of Islam'. The journal went on to say: 'the likeable Zaoui has probably done more for cross-cultural relations than any amount of official bridge-building could. We gave him a hell of a powhiri,56 but he's one of us now.' 57 In this effusive editorial Zaoui is portrayed as an avuncular giant whose charm and appeal as an underdog has found a niche in New Zealand's heart, a media-friendly, democracy-loving, Euro-friendly Muslim celebrity who 'if he hadn't existed, would have to be invented'. Zaoui's fate has come to symbolise the misfortune of an individual being ground up in a suspicious state system, which in observing its duty to provide national security is in danger of losing sight of the very human rights it endeavours to uphold. Arriving in Auckland in December 2002 by plane, having boarded the flight in Malaysia with a forged passport, he applied for asylum. However, after a brief interview with police, in which Zaoui became entangled through making contradictory statements,58 he was arrested and indicted on charges of terrorist associations. Subsequently he was incarcerated for over two years on the advice of the Secret Service. A long legal battle followed to free him. Despite having been cleared of involvement in terrorism and

A traditional Maori welcoming ceremony. Editorial, 'Late Entry', The New Zealand Listener, September 29 2007: 5. 58 According to news reports, the interview was conducted in English. As an Algerian, Zaoui is proficient in French and at that point was deficient in his command of English. 56

57

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declared a genuine refugee by the New Zealand Refugees Authority, he continued to be held in custody-some of it in solitary confinementowing to government intervention. Here is not the space to review his case in its entirety. The most disturbing aspect of this case was not Zaoui's imprisonment, but the total lack of transparency in the judicial process. One could only surmise that national security seems to have dictated an extremely parsimonious broadcasting of the incriminating evidence and of the reasons for Zaoui's incarceration. Without this evidence no convincing argument could be made in public why he was supposed to pose a danger to New Zealand. Nor was it evident what his association with terrorist activity had been. Neither the public nor the accused and his counsel had any, or at best only very limited, access to the arraignment and the evidence it was based on. The publicly available SIS statement is a shining example of explanatory juridical paucity. 59 Keeping even the defendant and counsel in the dark about the true nature of the allegations could only be seen to fly in the face of established jurisprudential tradition. Zaoui was released at the end of 2007, not cleared, but under bail conditions and in virtual house arrest with a Catholic order that was happy to provide him with support. (This demonstrates the Abrahamic solidarity discussed earlier.) The security risk certificate originally issued against him was withdrawn on 13 September 2007, making him a genuine asylum seeker. His family has been allowed to join him in New Zealand, despite his case still being technically undecided. 60 The presentation of Zaoui as likeable hero figure enshrines a cryptic paradox. The evidence published concerning this case offers a somewhat ambiguous, if not contradictory picture about Zaoui's past. He undoubtedly was a democratically elected parliamentarian. In the brief era of relaxation in Algerian politics in the late 1980s, he stood for the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front). In this capacity he was elected in 1991 to the Algerian parliament in relatively free elections. Seemingly pluralist and moderate, according to political

59 E. R Woods, director of security, 'SIS Summary of Allegations against Ahmed Zaoui'. 27 January 2004; online. 60 Deportation is possible under the Immigration Act, which provides for immediate expulsion without appeal of a person deemed to be a threat to national security. At least one such case was reported in the press in 2006 as a suspect of al-Qaeda associations and implicated in events surrounding 9/11.

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analysts, the party was Saudi-backed, essentially Islamic revivalist and built on conservative values. However, by all accounts, the FIS contained a hard core of Salafis. Both factions of the party, moderates and Salafis, had in common the intention to shariaticise Algerian society. The only difference between them seems to have been that the latter wanted to carry it further than the more moderate and slightly more modernist wing, the jaza'irs. Shortly after its being declared illegal and the election results nullified by a militarist coup d'etat, there emerged out of this party the AIS (Arme Islamique du Salut), a more militant wing dedicated to armed struggle. Another group was also formed, the GIA (Groupement Islamique Arme), which was pursuing an even more militant and brutal action programme, whose tactics can only be called terrorist. This clandestine group is suspected of having recruited some of its following from the disbanded FIS, especially its Salafi wing. However, there is no clarity as the reports on the political situation are both confusing and contradictory. What seems beyond doubt is that Zaoui, hounded from parliamentary office by a militarist, dictatorial regime, had to flee for his life as many other like-minded Muslims were forced to do. It is unclear which course Zaoui chose to take from there. As an earlier Listener article61 maintained, armed struggle did not fit the peaceful character of the man, which however appears to be inconsistent with the evidence of his treatment in France and Belgium, where he was denied asylum because he was branded a terrorist or as someone maintaining an association with terrorist organisations. Switzerland too did not make him welcome, but rather than simply expelling him it assuaged its humanitarian feelings by sponsoring his exile in Haute Volta. To what extent slanderous allegations by a vindictive Algerian secret service had a role in this sad saga can only be guessed at. How on such terra infirma a judicial system operating under the basic motto of 'innocent until proven guilty' (beyond reasonable doubt, one might add) can arrive at a firm guilty verdict must remain unclear. It certainly did little to reassure Muslims of the impartiality and even-handedness of New Zealand's judicial process. What is easily overlooked is the broader political context in which Zaoui emerged as a politician. Democratically elected, the FIS, for which Zaoui stood, would have sought to impose a theocratic regime in Algeria,

61 Alistair Bone, 'The Running Man', The New Zealand Listener, 16 August 2003: 20-23; 21.

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in many respects similar to Iran's Shi'a regime. Both the party's moderate and Salafi wings supposedly pursued that goal, although to different degrees of intensity. Despite the fact that it is of Sunni persuasion, it would predictably have shared political features with Shi'a Iran. Whether an Algerian theocracy would have enjoyed continued popular support through the ballot box is a moot point. Similar patterns elsewhere suggest that once installed it would have found ways to justify its continued existence. This in itself does not impugn Zaoui, for he may well be innocent and a democrat at heart, but the party he represented, one has every reason to suspect, apparently had ideas for which sympathy in New Zealand would have quickly evaporated. An Algerian theocracy and its politicians would be regarded with the same distaste as Iran is currently. It represents exactly that political system that most New Zealanders, including probably a majority of Muslims, loath. Since Zaoui's case, the legal definition of terrorism and devising and applying effective legislation have proved to be a quagmire of whimsicality, uncertainty, and inefficiency. It was not only the Zaoui case that severely tested this issue and the sensibleness of state responses. The first attempt, in 2007, to apply the Terror Suppression Act 2002 in its entirety resulted in failure. Interestingly, it was not directed against Muslims and according to some expert views this was the reason why it failed. The law was designed, in particular with 9/11 in mind, to deal with organised Islamic terrorism. In its application to non-Muslims (considered to be 'dissidents') it turned out to be woefully misplaced and wholly inconsistent, as the solicitor-general termed it. Not surprisingly, this legislation is widely considered-not only by Muslims-to be anti-Muslim in intent. Its biased design appears to make it unsuitable for the purpose of dealing with other violent and threatening groups. An underlying distrust of Muslims leading to anti-terrorist legislation had unforeseen consequences in another respect. It caused reverberations in the academic sphere: a concern for academic freedom. Examples reported mainly from the USA seemed to show that vigorously representing an 'Islamic viewpoint' in the academic debate was able to arouse the interest of Homeland Security. 62 1t engendered fears

62 The refusal to allow Tariq Ramadan to take up a position in the USA also aroused questions about academic freedom.

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that in further consequence such interest could become inimical to an academic's career. Consequently, the question was raised, though entirely hypothetically at that stage, among New Zealand university staff about the effects a free and frank discussion of 'Islamic issues' or of terrorist topics might have in this country. An AUS (Association of University Staff) 63 circular speaks of concerns among university staff about the state's responses to terrorist threats and possible effects on academic freedom. 'Following last week's reports that discussions are taking place at universities between the Security Intelligence Service and vice-chancellors about possible terrorist threats, the AUS has sought a meeting with [then] Minister of Disarmament and Arms Control, Phil Goff, to discuss the content of those meetings and their implications for universities and their staff. AUS National President, Professor Nigel Haworth, says that university staff have [sic] raised concerns about the ramifications on academic freedom and the autonomy of universities of discussions between the SIS and vice-chancellors .. .' Little has happened since to further fuel academic concerns of this kind. Academic teaching of Islamic topics does not appear to have attracted negative attention or suffered restrictions. To what extent the state through its intelligence arm might keep a wary eye on mosquebased teaching is beyond the scope of this book. Electronic surveillance presumably is happening, as groups concerned with human rights are claiming. The diminution of privacy is only one of the effects that global terrorism has had on the entire New Zealand society. Conclusion

Although second generation immigrant Muslims and converts move this assertion closer to the truth, it is still premature to pronounce that Islam is no longer an immigrant religion, but a religion that has found its place in the social fabric of contemporary New Zealand society. 64 Muslims in New Zealand appear to be exposed to episodic outbursts of prejudice and lingering suspicion, and at times and in some instances may require the protection of legislation. It is true to say that Muslims occupy, and have failed so far to leave, that no man's land between

63

Tertiary Update 9, no. 16 (18 May 2006), (online).

64

As Mustafa Malik expresses it with regard to Europe ('Muslims Pluralize the

West, Resist Assimilation', Middle East Policy 11, no. 1 (2004): 70-84).

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being appreciated as a valued minority, embedded in unquestioned citizenship, and being a suspect and resented group festering in hostile surroundings. They are still perceived as representing a radically different cultural alterity, and at times are being singled out for 'special attention'. It may be well to remind us that some so-called mainstream New Zealanders do indeed think of 'ethnic' relations with Muslims as embroiled in a hostile, war-like encounter: Islamic jihadism versus 'the war on terror'. Muslims, by virtue of their religion, all-too readily come to suffer the stigma to be entirely on the jihadi side or at least to be guilty by association. The reality is that the vast majority of Muslims do not wish to share in the ideals of an extremist and fanatical minority who believes it has to defend Islam by violence, nor do they want to share in the zealots' -or Huntington's-belief that the worlds are colliding. Yet, deeply ingrained suspicions and a sense of collective guilt of all Muslims are difficult to overcome in the wider society. Normally not impervious to world events and injustices, New Zealand majority society, in cases involving Muslims, sometimes shows an uncharacteristic lack of empathy and interest. In March 2008, a columnist in the daily paper, the Otago Daily Times, 65 writing about the wave of unrest gripping Tibet then, 66 also cast a wary eye on the Chinese province ofXinjiang,just to the north of Tibet. There the nonHan, Uighurs, Turkic speaking people, are in a predicament similar to the Tibetans': they feel they are being colonised by China and their culture, in which Islam features prominently, is being suppressed. The columnist writes: ' ... no-one in the west ever seems to bang a drum for Xinjiang. Could it be because the indigenous population of Xinjiang is not nicely peaceable Buddhist, with a charismatic leader in exile who knows how to handle the media, but Muslim?'

65

Joe Bennett, 'Why do we care what is happening to Tibet?,' The Otago Daily

Times, 20 March 2008; 21. 66 In March 2008, demonstrations in Tibet against Chinese rule made headlines in the Western media

CHAPTER SEVEN

EPILOGUE: MUSLIMS IN THE WORLD Writing about Muslims in today's world-be it in the form of the most innocent 'ethnography' or be it anything else-is encumbered with unwanted baggage, a ghost-like spectre that lurks in every line, every sentence one may write. It may be well to bring it out into the open and exorcise it. The sad reality is that the image of Islam widely held in the West today can only be called a caricature. It is contorted by the misleading notion that fanaticism and extremism are driving Islam's ethos and spurring Muslimhood. It has invited a kind of demonisation of Islam that knows no finer nuances, adverse even to the recognition of a profound distinction between 'mainstream' and extremism. In this demonology Islam is believed to be ruled by a Manichaean mindset that divides the world in the simplistic terms of good and evil; and this would drive Islam to pit itself against what it sees as the satanic evil represented by the West. Islam's self-righteous misperception would give the relevant impulses towards extremism. Thus misperception meets misperception. The rise of Islamism and its fanaticism inspired by the writings of Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Sayid Abu'l Ala Mawdudi is falsely portrayed as Islam in its entirety. Thus the question arises: is this violent antagonism to the West to be blamed on Islamic doctrine per se? It seems sensible to me to argue that Islam is what Muslims make it to be. As they mould the ambiguities of doctrine, Islam can be an instrument of peace, in the service of the best of humanitarian values, but it can also inflict abject terror and the grossest violations of human decency. Is Islam at fault if people are prepared to throw away their lives and, worse, to kill others in the name of jihad? Are cultures-and religions as vital ingredients of culture-clashing with law-like inevitability; or are people misinterpreting, using, and twisting culture and religion to suit their ends? Again, no easy answer suggests itself. Aren't people's personal ends and their motivations derived from the culture in which they are embedded, and from the religion that inspires them?

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Where does that leave free will and individual independence from mindless socialisation? Max Weber's theory of social action-human motivation and freedom of will on the one hand rubbing against the control a cultural and economic system has over that motivation on the other-tries to straddle the two schools of thought, although it is debatable whether it has really succeeded in reconciling them. These basic issues are reflected in theories of multiculturalism. In the ideological landscape of the modern world Muslims stick out as an anachronism. It is not because they do not fit into the modern world, or that their religious beliefs and practices are incompatible with modern, current life patterns and global aspirations. The reason is because they are conspicuous in the sense that the preoccupation with them as Muslims inspires a provocative agenda in which religion assumes a dimension of acuteness and danger that appears out of place in the twenty-first century. It is fair to say that no other religion has commanded so much interest and attention in the Western world since the Crusades, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the Thirty Years War and the witches' persecution. If one wants to conjure up the terrible shadows of fascist policies, the Holocaust and the EndlOsung also elevated a religious group to catastrophic importance, but in that case the crux of the atrocity was not a visceral hatred of a religion stricto sensu, but a horribly warped, and at that time already outdated, concept of biological race. The anachronism lies in that we seem to be relegated back in time to an age in which, almost like in medieval times, cultural and religious issues seem to cause practical, existential, and material issues to pale into insignificance. Fascination with the 'Muslim issue' and 'the problem with Islam' tends to overshadow many objectively much more pressing issues of universal importance. These are issues that in a practical sense affect the very existence of all of humanity and may determine its survival in the long run. As humankind gains a global understanding, it begins to see its existence embedded not in a beneficent divine context, cradled in benevolent divine providence, but contained in a coldly scientific universe in which unfortunate species can be wiped out without mercy. As the vision of divine intervention and foresight fades, and an awareness of the far-reaching effects human activity may have on the world gains traction, the practical mastery of new problems becomes imperative. Global warming, pollution, health and human nutrition, environmental degradation and sustainability, and overpopulation in relation to available resources

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are all immensely urgent problems. On a lesser scale of species survival, there is the alarming and depressing contrast between starvation and abject poverty on the one side and on the other overindulgence and affluence-caused malaises, such as life-threatening obesity, in the developed Western world. Nonetheless, practical problems of species survival have for years been relegated to a place lower down in the list of priorities of the most powerful policymakers. In the global socio-economic discourse, until very recently, practical strategies have received less attention than they deserved. Instead, Islamic terrorism occupied centre stage, leading to a preoccupation with national security issues (in America's case) and the perceived failings of liberal multiculturalism (in Europe's case). There has been a war on terrorism, but not a war on hunger or poverty. As the policies of the previous US administration exemplified to all the world: keeping a wary eye on the 1.3 billion Muslims of the world was considered so important that two wars were started, civil liberties of the public seriously eroded in the name of national security, and human rights provisions massively breached. But these concerns paled into insignificance by comparison with the alleged magnitude of the Islamic threat. As experts have not failed to point out, an unfortunate side effect of these strategies was that they rallied thousands of Muslims to the cause of radical Islam. This unwitting recruitment drive contributed substantially to the 'problem' that was to be combated in the first place. In the meantime, Westerners have become victims-not so much victims of Islamic extremism, but of the West's peculiar response to this perceived threat. Westerners collectively have fallen victim to a reduction in civil liberties caused by the frantic search for national security. For the sake of providing safety for citizens, a commendable goal in itself, the state, within its borders and beyond, has sharply increased the rules of detention, surveillance, house searches, and police powers in increasingly severe violation of the doctrines of an open, liberal democratic society. Enfeebled democracy and weakened civil liberties are the fruits of this response. The rationale seems superficially plausible. The state in recourse to its obligation to provide peace and security promotes a trade-off between liberty and security. Virtually every Western nation has a terrorism suppression act, or homeland security act, or something of this nature that surrenders rights of the citizenry, contradicts human rights conventions, and puts to shame the achievements of centuries of struggle against totalitarianism and authoritarian regimes.

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An anti-Muslim perception was propagated and given scholarly credibility in its ideological foundations by Samuel Huntington's major thesis 'The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order'. 1 It managed to outshine all other issues among the world's most important and globally powerful policymakers. 'Civilisations' are allegedly poised to cataclysmically clash and thus rearrange the face of the world. And the most dangerous of the global ideological fault lines divides the West from 'Islamic civilisation'. Extrapolated from this, and reduced to its na'ive and most simplistic implication, it is commonly understood that a major show-down between the West and the so-called Islamic world is looming; or, in its most alarmist version, is already upon us in the form of a vicious jihadist battle, which justifies the most drastic and belligerent counter-measures. Fomenting 'the war on terror', a religiously driven ideological confrontation, has become a household notion in both the Islamic and the Western world. One wonders whether in political circles it has sunk in that Huntington's thesis has been criticised widely for its lack of finer nuance, oversimplification and, plainly, for its distortion of reality. Edward Said2 has called it a 'gimmick' and paraphrased the book's title as 'the clash of ignorance', sniping at Huntington personally as a 'clumsy thinker' and an 'inelegant writer'. This misperception of Islam as an imminent and present danger to the West was further compounded by Bernard Lewis' influential article 'The Roots of Muslim Rage'/ which earned the author much kudos in Washington's political circles during the George W. Bush administration. It too had the compounding effect of elevating the extremism of a few to a general characteristic of Islam and Muslims. Vice versa, it must be said, on the 'opposite side' -that of radicalised Muslims-there is some misperception too, culminating in the paranoid belief that the West wants to rule the world. This is a vast exaggeration of the Saidian paradigm4 that all Western perception of the Orient is flawed, imbued as it is with hostility and the desire to rule

1 New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. John Esposito's, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) where he presents a more Islam-

sympathetic argument did not receive the same worldwide attentioiL Events of 9/11 then seemed to bear out Huntington's contention. 2 Edward Said, The Clash oflgnorance', The Nation, 22 October 2001: 1-3. 3 Bernard Lewis, 'The Roots of Muslim Rage', 1he Atlantic Monthly (September 1990): www.theatlantic.com. 4 Edward Said, Orientalism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978).

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over it. Undeniably, Islam and Muslims for centuries have served as a foil to profile the cultural otherness for Europeans. Yet in a way this perception of a fundamental, deep-seated rift is shared by both sides of the divide among proponents of extreme views. It is perhaps no more than an exaggerated vision of a common reality. The West's perceived traditional hostility towards the Islamic world is not, as Muslims' misperception holds, a conscious stratagem cunningly pursued, but an impersonal dynamic that accompanies the forces of globalisation. Huntington's thesis is capable only of hinting obliquely at this. Essentialisation of a culture, a religion, or a people is a dubious enterprise, much decried in anthropology, but if one would venture it nonetheless, one could claim that the two sides, the West's and the Islamic ethos are indeed locked in a power struggle. But the reason does not lie in their 'civilisational' difference or overt power ambitions, but in a fundamental similarity. The 'traditional' antagonism between Islam and the West arises out of the fundamental fact that they are rivals with the same prize in mind. What the extreme perceptions hint at, without coming to terms with, is that both sides are contenders in the race towards universal ideological hegemony and the goal to globalise the world on their specific terms. Both have the potential in abundance to drive globalisation and embrace the world under their respective banner by creating a universal culture, and of course they do so, or would do so if unchecked, entirely on their own terms. Both 'worlds' (the Islamic and the West) have the innate cultural vigour to extend themselves to the rest of the world. Both have the 'missionary' zeal to bring the whole world into the embrace of their values and world view. Prior to the age of European colonialism that set the stage for today's globalisation, Islam seemed set on a course to assume world power of the kind that could culturally unite humankind. And then the West rose from the ashes of medievalism and by building on the intellectual remains of classical times became the standard-bearer of globalisation. The effects stir a great many Muslims. Even Muslims of the meanest education are aware of the fact that Islam had once launched itself on the road of world domination. And many rue today's reality in which the Islamic world is reduced to third-world status and, as they see it, has to dance to the West's tune. It would be wrong to conceive of the fundamental difference simply in terms of a difference in religious creed-Christianity versus Islam, locked in a theological power struggle. Today's competitiveness goes much deeper, harking back to even more fundamental issues of the perceived purpose of human existence.

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For one side represents a strongly secularised, anthropocentric world perception in which human wants and needs are the measure of all things; and the other a deeply committed theocentric one that diminishes these very things to secondary importance. In the West, since the Reformation and the Industrial Revolution, progress towards an undefined material utopia on earth has replaced eternal salvation as the rationale of human existence. The Islamic world has only insufficiently followed this move. To reduce the cleavage to its most simplistic slogan: it is a tension between hedonistic levity, an apotheosis of limitless human desire versus religious humility that seeks its ultimate fulfilment in the attainment of divine grace. Not surprisingly, they share the potential to experience difficulties in inhabiting a rapidly shrinking world. However, if one narrows the scope from the plane of global aspirations, world-spanning theology, and transcendental ideologies to the mundane level of everyday social interaction in a climate of liberal multiculturalism, one may find seemingly irreconcilable fronts softening and melting away, and high ideals overwhelmingly shrinking to the concerns of people who try to live with their religious canons rather than by them.

INDEX 9/11 3, 9, 65-66, 72, 81, 154, 208, 212, 224, 238, 252-253, 255, 258 n. 60, 260,266 n. 1

Abduh, Mohammed

246

Affaire dufoulard 154 n. 18, 193 Ahdar, Rex 17 Ahmadiya 45 Al-Banna, Hassan 244, 263 Al-Haramain 38, 226, 228 Al-Qaeda 7, 38, 223-224, 226, 228-229, 233, 240 n. 40, 258 n. 60 Ali, Ayaan Hirsi 83, 184-185, 187 Amish 145 androcentric(ity) 181 Apartheid 78, 135-136, 168 Arabs 24, 43-44, 50, 188, 227-228, 232-233, 244-245 Archbishop of Canterbury 13, 199, 222 n 13 Assimilation 5, 59, 75-76, 85, 138-139, 144, 147-148

Bali bombing 9 Bat Ye'or 52 n 47, 138 n 7 Bida 44, 114, 125, 198, 244-245 Bill of Rights Act 89, 93, 95, 97, 99, 122, 136, 166, 186, 196-197, 199, 203, 223 Bin Laden effect 3 Bin Laden, Osama 62, 84, 127 n. 77, 216, 249-250 Blasphemy 98-99, 108-109, 110 n. 61, 152-153, 156, 157 n. 22, 159, 172 Burqa 27, 65, 88-89, 106, 196-198, 200,203-204,206-211 Cantle report 81 Catholicism, Catholic 7, 31, 80 n. 11, 90, 93, 104, 107, 113, 115, 121-122, 156, 158-160, 169, 174, 177, 258 Cesari, Jocelyne 130 Chinese 6, 21, 50, 64, 262 Choudhary, Dr Ashraf 18, 24, 29, 207, 219 Christchurch 8, 18, 22-26, 33, 37, 43, 92 n 31, 101 n. 42, 122, 165, 189, 225-229, 232, 254

Christianity 90-93,98, 105, 111-115, 120, 130, 146, 151, 153, 157 n. 22, 158, 172, 174, 176, 198, 237, 267 Circumcision 104 n. 46, 185-186 Citizenship 2-3, 5, 8, 12-13, 74-76, 78-82, 102, 133, 140, 144-145, 147-148, 150, 239, 262 Clark, Helen, Prime Minister 10, 92, 100, 116, 119, 160, 165, 186, 220, 235 Communitarianism 76, 134 Contractarianism 76, 134 Conversion 40-41, 57, 66-69, 148, 217 Converts 18, 24, 40-41, 55, 66-70, 90, 120, 217, 240, 245, 261 Cultural homogeneity 75 Danish cartoons 38, 99, 102, 152, 156-158, 160, 213

Dar al Islam, -Harb, -Aman, -Ahd, -Sulh, -Dawa 53-56 Darura 58-59 Dawa(h) 36, 40-41, 57, 68, 162, 218 Democracy 4, 12, 48, 84, 94, 97, 124, 142, 149, 156, 173, 209, 218, 241, 265 dhimmi 52 Diaspora 1-2, 6, 9, 12, 20, 36, 45-46, 48-49, 51, 57 Discrimination 28, 48, 59, 73, 79-80, 82 n. 15, 85-86, 89, 94, 99-101, 104, 106, 111, 122, 132, 136, 138-139, 155-156, 178, 182-183, 190, 195, 200, 220 n 8,241,254 Druze 45, 125 Dunedin 15, 21, 25, 28, 33, 41, 64-65, 71, 91, 112, 180, 189, 246 n. 44, 254 Durkheim, Emile 59 Education 26, 30 n. 22, 33-34, 36, 38, 41, 54, 56, 58, 70, 94, 99-101, 107, 117-118, 120-122, 181, 186-187, 193, 195, 209, 218, 223, 267 Eid (al-Fitr, al-Adha) 44, 101, 110

Fatawa

37, 126, 127 n. 77, 142, 204, 208,255 n. 52 Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ) 18, 21 n 4, 23, 30, 166, 253-254

270

INDEX

female genital mutilation 185 Fennn~m 183,184,188,204 Fet~h~ation 145 Fiqh 181, 188, 198-199, 219 n. 6 First Amendment (in USA) 90, 148 Fortuyn, Pim 4, 82, 154 France 20 n 1, 54, 81-82, 139, 147, 154 n. 18, 193, 209, 259 Freedom of speech and expression 97, 152 Fukuyam.a, Franc~ 11, 141, 143 Fundamentalism 46, 48, 62, 68 n 70, 89, 119, 158, 172, 216-219, 222, 225, 233-234,237-238,240-241,244-246, 256 Gellner, Ernest 61 n 59 Gender role 185, 190 Globalisation 2, 6, 17, 21, 36, 67, 73, 80, 84, 87, 95, 137, 167, 173, 192, 201, 209, 212, 215, 237-239, 267

Hadith 71, 129, 162, 181 n. 2, 182, 186, 205,246,250-251

Haj 44 n 30, 68, 101, 110, 206 Halal 34, 39, 63, 71, 101, 153, 229-233 Halal certification 230-231 Hate-speech 234 Hazara 8, 45, 244 n. 42 Hijab 27, 65, 101, 189-190, 191 n. 13, 193,195,198,200-201,203,208-209 Hijra 57-58 homosexuality 80, 82, 92, 108-109, 154-155, 158, 185, 217, 219-222, 234 homosocialtty 16, 188 Honour 130,184,187,249,254 Hudud 56, 180, 219 n. 6, 222 Human rights 2, 4-5, 7, 12, 14, 52, 73, 76-77,83-84,93,95-96,99-100,101 n. 41, 119, 130, 132-133, 135-139, 151, 156, 165, 181, 183, 186, 193, 196, 200,209,255,256 n 55,257,261,265 Human Rights Act 89, 93, 98-101, 104, 122, 139, 165-166 Huntington, Samuel 11, 56, 62, 137, 161,262,266-267

Ijma 34, 126, 149 Ijtihad 47, 126, 127 n. 77, 204, 242, 246 Immigration 3-5, 7-8, 11, 20, 22 n. 6, 23-25, 45, 49, 59, 65, 73, 75, 78, 83-87, 105, 113, 124, 138-141, 144, 147-148,209

Integration 2-3, 5, 12, 14, 20, 27, 34, 75-76, 81-83, 86-87, 121, 131, 135-136, 139, 141, 143-144, 146-147, 149,171,224-226,240 Interfaith 41, 85, 92, 100, 111, 113, 115-119, 130 International Muslim Association of New Zealand OMAN) 32-33, 254 Islamophobia 8, 12, 62, 64-66, 83, 86, 216,256 Ismaeli 45

Jahiliya (jahiliyya) 53-55, 57, 243 Jihad 4, 109, 127 n. 77, 136, 155, 174-175, 216, 219, 240, 247-250, 255-256, 263

Kabir, Nahid 5 n 5, 8 n. 9, 12 n. 15, 183 n. 5, 192 n 15, 225 n 16 Kepel, Gilles 238 Khilafa 51, 219, 243 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruollah 153, 168, 244 Khutba 43, 224 Kronulla riot 194 Kymlicka, Will 10 n 11, 76 n. 7, 85 n. 19, 109 n. 60, 134 n. 2, 137 nn. 5-6 Lewis, Bernard 266 Liberalism 21, 78, 82-83, 92, 109, 136, 139, 151, 155, 191, 246, 255 London 7/7 bombing 3, 9, 65-66, 83, 139,252 Madonna-in-a-condom affair 157-158, 168 Malaysia 74, 75 n. 4, 78, 93, 115, 230, 257 Malik, Mustafa 3, 261 n. 64 Maori (indigenous people) 7, 10-11, 13, 24-25, 49, 68, 70, 74, 77, 85, 89, 93, 100, 110, 113, 122-123, 140, 148, 169, 213, 257 Marriage 29, 79, 83 n. 17, 92, 109, 130-131, 142, 179 n. 1, 220 Martyr 162 Mawdudi, Maulana Ala 244 Miladi(sm) 44 Misogyny 109, 179, 181, 209 Modood, Tariq 80 n. 12 Morocco 83 Mujahidin 17, 244, 248 Multicultural~m 4-5, 13, 35, 45, 52, 70, 74-76, 78-79, 81, 83-89, 92,

INDEX

99-100, 103, 108-110, 125, 127, 134-137, 139, 142, 146-147, 172-173, 188, 190, 194-196, 198-200, 203 n. 22, 204,206,209-210,220,226,264-265, 268 Muslim Association of Canterbury (~C) 226-227,231,254

Netherlands 82, 108, 135, 147, 185 New Age 62, 153 Niqab 196, 198 Orientalism 60-62, 64 Otago Muslim Association (OMA) 33, 114, 254

17,

Pacific islands (islanders) 11, 85-86, 140,213 Paradise 162-163 Parekh, Bhikhu 11 n. 14 Phillips, Melanie 4 n. 4 Piety 21, 39, 101, 129, 184, 200, 218, 248 Pluralism 13-14, 58, 75, 87, 91, 105, 108-110, 141-142, 179, 199, 210 Pope Benedict XVI 174 Popper, Karl 84, 171 Postmodernism 153 Poulter, Sebastian 88, 187 Powell, Enoch 3 Prophet Mohammad 173 Protestantisation 46, 240, 246

quiyas 126 Quraishy, Bashy 78 n. 9, 83 n. 18 Quran 30, 33, 37, 40, 43, 53, 56, 63, 68, 98, 125-126, 149, 159, 168, 175, 179-182,187,200,205-206,218,219 D. 6,220-222,244-245,249-251, 253-254 Qutb, Sayyid 53, 244, 263 Race Relations Commission(er) 66, 85, 118, 165-166 Race riots 3, 81 Racism 28,57-58,86,153 Radicalism 6, 41, 62, 97 n. 34, 119, 146, 184 n. 6, 215, 218, 239-240, 248, 256 Rahman, Fazlur 47 n. 37 Ramadan 33, 37, 44 n. 30, 68, 129, 131, 182 Ramadan, Tariq 47, 55, 83 n. 18, 108, 143, 246, 260 n. 62

271

Rishworth, Paul 105 Roy, Olivier 46, 52 n. 45, 234 n. 27, 237-238, 246 Rushdie, Salman 37, 99, 152-153, 154 D. 18, 157, 161, 168 Said, Edward 60, 266 Salat 68, 182, 232 Salat al-Jummah 6, 31, 45, 101, 110 Sartorial code 178, 191, 193 Secularisation 3, 44, 67, 90 n. 27, 98, 111, 127, 130, 152, 158,237,240, 242 Sexuality 92, 182, 185 Shadid, Wasif 141, 143 Shahada 68 Sharia 5, 12-13, 27, 53, 83 n. 17, 88, 95, 103, 109-110, 125-126, 129-130, 142, 150-151, 178-181, 184, 187, 190, 198-199, 204, 207, 216-217, 219, 221-223,243 Shepard, William 15, 17, 26-27, 50, 64 Shfa, Shi'i, Shi'ites 8, 43-46, 114, 126 n. 73, 127 n. 77, 162, 207, 230, 244, 260 Solidarity ukhuwa 168 Somalis 24-26, 28, 50, 85, 227-228, 232-233 South Asians 21, 24, 31, 42-44, 188, 227, 229, 232, 244 Students 6, 17-18, 28, 30, 33, 53, 67 n. 67, 70-72, 117, 121-122, 174, 193 n. 16 Sunna 36,125-126,180-181,218,219 n. 6, 220, 245 Sunni 43-46, 114, 126 n. 73, 127 n. 77, 207, 230, 244, 260

Tabligh 40, 218 Taleban 25, 45, 56, 162, 179, 181, 194, 196, 212, 221, 244 Tampa affair 8 Taqiya 45 Tawhid 1, 67, 158, 178, 244 Terror Suppression Act 260 Terrorism 1, 3, 6-7, 15, 155, 160-161, 172, 212, 216, 218, 225-226, 229, 236, 253,255-257,260-261,265 Third world 53, 72, 74-75, 135 n. 3 Tibi, Bassam 108, 152 n. 15, 170, 237-238 Tikanga Maori 73, 91, 95 Treaty of Waitangi 90, 93

272

INDEX

UK 13, 20 n 1, 81, 83, 88, 108-109, 110 n. 61, 147, 154 n 18, 198,214 Ulama 35 n. 25, 127 Ulama Board 35, 37, 104, 127 n. 77, 142, 207, 225 Umma 36, 41, 50, 67, 150, 168, 202, 206, 219, 241, 250 United Nations 73, 96, 173, 197

Wahhabi(sm) 68, 244 'War on Terror' 176, 229, 255-256, 262,266 Webe~~ax 89,128,240,246,264 Wikan, Unni 83 'White New Zealand' policy 20, 22 n. 6, 23,85 Wilders, Geert 4, 154 n. 16

Van Gogh, Theo 4, 83, 139, 154 n. 18, 217 Verzuiling 5, 135 Violence 6, 27, 54, 65, 94, 97, 146, 156, 160, 166, 172-176, 182-184, 187-188, 212-214, 216, 225, 229, 234, 236-237,243,249,262

Zakat 68 Zaoui, Ahmed 64, 101 n. 41, 120, 154, 156,207,256-260