New Security Issues in Northern Europe: The Nordic and Baltic States and the ESDP (Routledge Uaces Contemporary European Studies)

New Security Issues in Northern Europe

This book examines and places in perspective the policies of the Nordic and Baltic states concerning the European Security and Defence Policy. New Security Issues in Northern Europe examines the contribution the northern states of Europe – the Baltic and the Nordic states – can make and have made to the European Union’s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and what the ESDP means for them. It provides a strategic background to the defence and security policies of these countries and covers the security policies of the seven states – Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – and their reactions and contributions to the EU’s ESDP. The contributions by these states to ESDP operations are viewed in a critical light, although their positive political interventions to the policy are also noted. In particular, the contributors bring together fresh material on the security policies of the seven states, the way they are made, the effect on these policies of the ESDP and their input into the ESDP. It makes a contribution to the debate about the development of what has become one of the most dynamic elements of the European Union. This book will be of particular interest to students and researchers of European integration, Strategic Studies and International Relations. Clive Archer is a research professor in the Department of Politics and Philosophy at the Manchester Metropolitan University, UK. His research interests and areas of publication include the Nordic and Baltic region and European integration and security.

UACES Contemporary European Studies Series

Edited by Tanja Bo¨rzel, Free University of Berlin, Michelle Cini, University of Bristol, and Roger Scully, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, on behalf of the University Association for Contemporary European Studies Editorial Board: Grainne De Bu´rca, European University Institute and Columbia University; Andreas Føllesdal, Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo; Peter Holmes, University of Sussex; Liesbet Hooghe, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; David Phinnemore, Queen’s University Belfast; Mark Pollack, Temple University; Ben Rosamond, University of Warwick; Vivien Ann Schmidt, University of Boston; Jo Shaw, University of Edinburgh; Mike Smith, University of Loughborough and Loukas Tsoukalis, ELIAMEP, University of Athens and European University Institute. The primary objective of the new Contemporary European Studies series is to provide a research outlet for scholars of European Studies from all disciplines. The series publishes important scholarly works and aims to forge for itself an international reputation.

1. The EU and Conflict Resolution Promoting Peace in the Backyard Nathalie Tocci 2. Central Banking Governance in the European Union A Comparative Analysis Lucia Quaglia 3. New Security Issues in Northern Europe The Nordic and Baltic States and the ESDP Edited by Clive Archer

New Security Issues in Northern Europe The Nordic and Baltic States and the ESDP

Edited by Clive Archer

First published 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business. This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

# 2008 Clive Archer All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data New security issues in Northern Europe : the Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP / edited by Clive Archer. p. cm. – (UACES contemporary European studies series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-415-39340-9 (hardback : alk. paper) – ISBN 978-0-203-946824 (ebook : alk. paper) 1. Scandinavia–Military policy. 2. Baltic States– Military policy. 3. National security–Scandinavia. 4. National security– Baltic States. 5. Europe–Military policy. 6. National security–Europe. I. Archer, Clive. II. University Association for Contemporary European Studies. UA646.7.N48 2007 355’.033048–dc22 2006102751 ISBN 0-203-94682-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN13: 978-0-415-39340-9 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-94682-4 (ebk)

Contents

List of tables Notes on contributors Preface List of abbreviations

vii viii x xi

1

Introduction Clive Archer

1

2

The security situation in Northern Europe after the Cold War Erik Ma¨nnik

15

3

Northern Europe and the ESDP: the case of Sweden Lars Wedin

38

4

Finland and the ESDP: ‘obliquely forwards’? Hanna Ojanen

56

5

Denmark and the ESDP opt-out: a new way of doing nothing? Henrik Larsen

78

6

Norway between Europe and the US Nina Græger

94

7

European Security and Defence Policy: the Latvian perspective Zˇaneta Ozalin¸a

115

8

The role of the ESDP in Estonia’s security policy Erik Ma¨nnik

139

9

Lithuania’s evolving security and defence policy: ‘not only consumer, but also contributor’ Grazina Miniotaite

155

vi

Contents

10 Hard questions about European defence Jaan Murumets

174

11 The ESDP and Northern Europe: conclusions and projections Clive Archer

193

Bibliography Index

212 233

List of tables

2.1 2.2 2.3

National ceilings outlined in the adapted CFE treaty Territorial ceilings outlined in the adapted CFE treaty Changes in the balance of forces between the Russian Federation and NATO in Northern Europe from 1994 to 2004 2.4 Crime in Northern Europe 2.5 HIV/AIDS infection rates in the countries of the region in 2002 2.6 Per capita gross national income of states in the region and some neighbouring states from 1991 to 2003 2.7 Per capita ecological footprint of the countries in the region in 2001 4.1 Finnish contributions to EU military capabilities 4.2 Finnish participation in ongoing international operations 7.1 Institutional and security policy-makers’ threat priorities 7.2 Latvian armed services personnel 7.3 Latvian assistance to EU neighbouring and Central Asian states 9.1 Components and main tasks of the Lithuanian armed forces 9.2 Participation of Lithuania in major military operations in 2005 11.1 Nordic and Baltic deployments abroad

20 21

22 25 26 31 34 65 67 126 134 135 169 171 200

Notes on contributors

Clive Archer is a research professor and Jean Monnet Ad Personam Chair in the Department of Politics and Philosophy at the Manchester Metropolitan University, England. He has led international academic networks on the Northern Dimension of the EU and on the ESDP and Northern Europe. His research interests and areas of publication are the Nordic and Baltic region and European integration and security. He authored Norway Outside the European Union (Routledge, 2005). Nina Græger is senior researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, and has published several articles on Norwegian, European and US security and defence policy. She is acting head of the US hegemony research programme at NUPI, and co-editor of International Peacekeeping. Henrik Larsen is associate professor in International Relations and Jean Monnet Chair in European Foreign and Security Policy Integration at the University of Copenhagen. He has previously published Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe (1997), The ESDP and the Nordic Countries: Four Variations on a Theme (2002) (with Nina Græger and Hanna Ojanen) and Analysing Small State Foreign Policy in the EU: the Case of Denmark (2005). Erik Ma¨nnik has been Chair of Strategy at the Estonian National Defence College, Tartu, since October 2005. He worked in the Estonian Ministry of Defence and completed his doctoral thesis at the Manchester Metropolitan University. His main research interest is the security and defence of small states in the modern world, and he has published on this and on Estonian security. Grazina Miniotaite is Senior Research Fellow at the Culture, Philosophy and Arts Research Institute, Lithuania. Her research interests include paradigm shift in international relations theories, identity and security issues. She has published widely, with recent publications including ‘‘Normative Power Europe’’ and Lithuania’s Foreign Policy (2006) and Search for Identity in Modern Foreign Policy of Lithuania: Between the Northern and Eastern Dimensions (2005). Jaan Murumets has been an associate professor in the Estonian National Defence College since 2002. He has also served as a policy advisor to the

Notes on contributors

ix

Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces and has undertaken extensive consulting and training programmes in Central and Eastern Europe. His research and publication field is civil-military relations and defence planning. Hanna Ojanen is a senior researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, where she heads the programme on European Foreign and Security Policy. She is adjunct professor of International Politics at the University of Helsinki, and has been a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Security Studies in Paris. Her research interests and publications are in the area of foreign, security and defence policies of the EU, EU relations with NATO and the UN, defence integration and Nordic EU policies. ˇ aneta Ozolin¸a is professor of International Relations at the University Z of Latvia, Riga, and also chairs the Strategic Analysis Commission under the auspices of the President of the Republic of Latvia. Her research interests cover international and regional security issues, foreign and security policy of the Baltic states, as well as CFSP and ESDP issues, and she has extensive publications in these areas. Lars Wedin received his naval commission in 1969 and has worked in the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in the EU Military Staff and as acting professor in military strategy at the Swedish Defence College, Stockholm. He is active in research in strategy for the College and at the French Institut d’Analyse Strate´gique. He has written about strategy and also French military thinking.

Preface

This work is the result of a collaborative effort of an international network covering the Nordic and Baltic states and the United Kingdom. It was brought into being after discussions between Erik Ma¨nnik and myself in Manchester at a time when the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were about to join both NATO and the EU. It became clear that the defence and security policies of these states would have a new context not just in NATO but also within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Furthermore the links that these states had developed with the Nordic countries, not least in the security realm, would be seen anew in this framework. We contacted security experts from the Nordic and Baltic states to join a small network to examine the national responses in Northern Europe of both the widening and deepening of the ESDP. Any collaborative effort depends on the willingness of individuals to cooperate. I am particularly grateful to the authors for their spirit of cooperation, and I wish to thank Frank Mo¨ller for his participation in the network’s discussions and the support he gave the project. The Lithuanian Military College, the Conference of the Nordic Security Policy Research programme and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) provided us with meeting points where we could discuss our work. Alyson Bailes, the Director of SIPRI, proffered excellent advice and was an enthusiastic supporter of the project. The editors of the Contemporary European Studies series, especially Roger Scully, and the staff at Taylor & Francis, in particular Harriet Brinton and Heidi Bagtazo, gave practical advice and assistance, as well as encouragement. Elizabeth Archer helped index the book and supported me during all the stages of its production. Thanks are due to these and to others, unnamed but not forgotten, who have assisted the network. Clive Archer

List of abbreviations

ACV AFSOUTH AIDS AMIS II AMM AU BALTDEFCOL BALTBAT BALTNET BALTRON BALTSEA BSR CAS CBSS CFE CFSP CIMIC CIS CME02 CMO CRM CSCE DIB DKK DN DRC EAPC EC ECAP EDA EDF EEA

armoured combat vehicle Allied Forces South (of NATO) Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome African Union Mission in Sudan II Aceh Monitoring Mission African Union Baltic Defence College Baltic Battalion Baltic Air Surveillance Network Baltic Naval Squadron Baltic Sea Assistance Group Baltic Sea region close air support Council of the Baltic Sea States (Treaty on) Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Common Foreign and Security Policy Civil–Military Cooperation Commonwealth of Independent States Crisis Management Exercise crisis management operations crisis management Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Danish International Brigade Danish kroner(s) Dagens Nyheter Democratic Republic of Congo Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council European Communities European Capabilities Action Plan European Defence Agency Estonian Defence Forces European Economic Area

xii

Abbreviations

EEC EFTA EMU ENP EOD ESDP ESS EU EUCAP EUFOR EUFOR RD Congo EUJUST Themis EUMC EUMS EUPM EUSEC DR Congo EUSR FinCEN FINEFTA FOC FRONTEX FYROM GATT GDP HIV IFOR ISAF ISTAR KFOR LFNSL LFPG LGB LNSC LNSL LTL MCM MD MEP MFA MIB

European Economic Community European Free Trade Association Economic and Monetary Union European Neighbourhood Policy explosive ordnance disposal European Security and Defence Policy European Security Strategy European Union EU Capability Action Plan European Union Force European Union Force in the DRC EU EU EU EU

rule of law mission to Georgia Military Committee Military Staff Police Mission (Bosnia-Herzegovina)

EU military operation in the DRC EU special representative Financial Crimes Network (US Treasury) Finland–EFTA agreement full operational capability European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade gross domestic product Human Immuno-deficiency Virus NATO-led Implementation Force (Bosnia) International Security Assistance Force (in Afghanistan) intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance NATO Kosovo Force The Law on Fundamentals of National Security (Lithuania) Latvian Foreign Policy Guidelines laser-guided bomb Latvian National Security Concept Latvian National Security Law Lithuanian litas mine countermeasures military district Member of the European Parliament Ministry of Foreign Affairs motorized infantry brigade

Abbreviations MoD MoU MSRL NACC NATO NBG ND(I) NGO NLI NORDCAPS NRF NSSRL NUPI OCCAR OHQ ONUC OSCE PARP PCC PfP PRT PSC RRB SAF SF SFOR SHAPE SHIRBRIG SIPRI SP SPM SV TEU TLE UN UNDP UNEF UNFICYP UNIFIL UNMEE UNMIK UNMIL

xiii

Ministry of Defence memorandum of understanding The Military Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania North Atlantic Cooperation Council North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nordic Battlegroup Northern Dimension (Initiative) of the EU non-governmental organization Neoliberal Institutionalist Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support NATO Response Force The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Organisation Conjointe de Coope´ration en Matie`re d’Armament operation headquarters Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (UN Operation in the Congo) Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Planning and Review Process Prague Capabilities Commitment Partnership for Peace (with NATO) Provincial Reconstruction Team (of ISAF) Political and Security Committee (EU) rapid response battlegroup Swedish Armed Forces Socialist People’s Party (of Denmark) NATO Stabilization Force (former Yugoslavia) Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO) Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (UN) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Centre Party (of Norway) security policy makers Socialist Left Party (of Norway) Treaty on European Union treaty-limited equipment (of the CFE) United Nations UN Development Programme UN Emergency Force (in the Middle East) UN Force in Cyprus United Nations Interim Force in the Lebanon United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea United Nations Administrative Mission in Kosovo United Nations Mission in Liberia

xiv Abbreviations UNMIS UNMOGIP UNTSO UNOMIL UNPROFOR WEAG WEAO WEU WMD WTO

United Nations Operation in Sudan United Nations Military observer Group in India and Pakistan United Nations Truce Supervision Organization UN Observer Mission in Liberia UN Protection Force (former Yugoslavia) Western European Armaments Group Western European Armaments Organization Western European Union weapons of mass destruction World Trade Organization

1

Introduction Clive Archer

Background This book is about a particular region of Europe – Northern Europe, especially that part covering the Nordic and Baltic states – and a discrete policy area of the European Union (EU), the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The examination of this relationship will elucidate the security concerns of the region and the problems and potential of the policy. It will also shed light on some of the wider concerns of the study of international relations and on how security issues are being viewed by governments, elites and the public. ‘Northern Europe’ can be seen to stretch from Iceland down to the North German Plain. In this case, the centre of concern is more the Baltic Sea region, with particular consideration being given to the Nordic countries (except Iceland)1 and the Baltic states. The Nordic region of Europe has often been described as ‘the quiet corner of Europe’. This suggests that it has been sheltered from many of the whims and demands of the Great Powers (at least for the last half-century) and it implies that the occupants of the region have managed to keep a level of quietude themselves, though not so much in the early 1980s. The same cannot be said for the Baltic states, whose arrival on the post-war scene as, once more, independent states was accompanied by the noise of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The three countries – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – found help in economic, social and security policies from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland and the European Communities (later European Union, EU). Perhaps most of all, they received assistance, and some guidance, from the Nordic states, and bringing the Baltic states to a sea of tranquillity seems to have been a major Nordic project in the 1990s (Archer 1998). At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union and in the following few years, the Baltic Sea region and the Baltic states themselves were seen from both within the region and from outside as a potential area of conflict (Arnswald 2000: 90–3; Baranovsky 1996; Godzimirski 1998). It was home to the remnants of Soviet power that provided the wherewithal for future military activity, whether in state hands or those of rogue military elements.

2

Clive Archer

The new states had to build the infrastructure of properly functioning internationally recognized states, with failure bringing the promise of economic and social collapse and possible outside intervention. All three states had sizeable minorities, many of whom looked to Moscow or at least were subject to intermittent attention by Moscow. The borders between the new countries and the Russian Federation were not properly established on the ground and were matters for dispute, while the enclave of Kaliningrad provided another possible subject for disagreement (Holtom and Tassinari 2002; Joenniemi and Prawitz 1997; Trenin 2000). The Nordic governments were aware that the region to the south-east of the Baltic Sea could be potentially a source not just of conflict but of newer insecurities and challenges such as international crime, including drug and people trafficking, transmissible diseases and even international terrorism (see Chapter 2). Much of the cooperation that they helped build within the region was aimed at preventing these fears from materializing. On the more positive side, the Baltic states could see the beacons of NATO and the EU, membership of which not only could bring certain economic and security benefits but also would display an acceptance of and by the West. The present security perspective in the Baltic region is one of relative calm. Few if any of the fears of the early 1990s have materialized, though there is still an acute awareness of the dangers posed by the newer insecurities and challenges. Denmark, Finland and Sweden have been joined by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (and Poland) in the EU and those last four states have also become NATO members. The Nordic states, the Baltic states, Germany, Poland and Russia are members of the Council of Baltic Sea States. Though some frontier issues remain unresolved, a modus vivendi has been reached on the practicalities of borders, including access to Kaliningrad by Russians from the rest of the Federation. On becoming members of the EU on 1 May 2004, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed up to the European Security and Defence Policy of the EU, the ESDP. Already Denmark (with reservations), Finland and Sweden were part of the ESDP, and Norway associated itself with its activities (Archer 2005), as did Iceland to some extent (Thorhallsson and Vignisson 2004). Within the Nordic–Baltic region, Germany was an established subscriber and Poland a novice. Only Russia stood outside. From 1998, the ESDP has become a growth area in EU policy and activity, and its rise and relationship with other policies and institutions will be covered on pp. 9–13.

Aims of the book The central theme of this book is the security policies of the Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP. Definitions, context, concepts and questions are provided by this chapter and Chapter 2 but the main aim is to provide certain information and insights about the four Nordic states (Iceland is not included) and the three Baltic states. Each of the national chapters will have

Introduction

3

material on the defence policy, plans and provisions, especially the extent to which these are affected by or impinge on ESDP, and will provide a country-specific estimation of the overlap of the military and civilian aspects of security. They will also outline the developing defence and security debates in the states, thus providing a new body of information and evidence about the attitudes there of the decision-makers and institutions to security issues and the ESDP, including both its formulation and implementation. This information will allow a comparative description of the policies of the Nordic and Baltic States towards European security issues and the ESDP that covers the current situation, ranging from the dominating political discourse to practical steps taken, the means applied in military structures and the economic, political and constitutional limitations on military activity. As can be seen on pp. 5–9, the implications for concepts of security will be tested and developed. Northern Europe, with the emphasis on the Baltic–Nordic region, has been chosen for a number of reasons. The first is that it is the only area on the borders of the EU and NATO with a sizeable military and nuclear power, Russia, sitting on its doorstep. The significance of the Russian presence depends on the condition of Russia itself – its economic, environmental, social and political well-being – and on the perception of Russia by the states under consideration (Joenniemi and Sergounin 2003). Second, the region has seen a considerable shift of security issues from the traditional ones to the variety of ‘new’ security concerns. As well as experiencing a readjustment of traditional military power from the divisions of the Cold War, the governments around the Baltic Sea have had a growing concern about the security of their economies and societies. Issues such as people and drug smuggling, as well as environmental threats, have climbed up the security agenda. In this, the area is typical of many others in Europe, though these ‘new’ security concerns are probably more marked in this region compared with the larger EU states, where the issue of international terrorism is more dominant. Third, all the states selected are comparatively small and it is now these small states that constitute a majority of the EU member states. Investigating the ESDP policies of the Northern European small states should therefore provide insights into the development potential of the ESDP as a whole. Fourth, it is also a region where four larger powers have distinct interests. Russia has already been mentioned, and Germany has a presence in the region by virtue of being a Baltic Sea state. The United Kingdom has been strongly involved in filling the security vacuum in the Baltic Sea area in the post-Cold War period. Also, it should not be forgotten that since 1991 the United States has played an active, though sometimes understated, role in the region (see, for example, Park and Kornfehl 1999). Fifth, the Nordic states, in particular, have traditionally had an engagement in peacekeeping across the globe. As this task and associated ones of crisis management and peacemaking are central to ESDP, the involvement of the Nordic states, and also the Baltic states, will be an indicator of whether

4

Clive Archer

ESDP operations outside Europe will attract participation from EU states other than the former ex-colonial countries. Finally, as will be seen on pp. 5– 9, the Nordic and Baltic states in particular provide a good testing-ground for a number of theoretical approaches to security. In general, three main sets of broad research questions guide this book: politics, the resource and military aspects, and ideas. These will now be examined in brief.

The political context Any understanding of a European Union policy must consider politics at three levels. The first is the international framework that provides the wider context for the policy. In the case of the ESDP the international conditions are indeed of crucial importance. A security and defence policy must consider the current, and expected, global security issues, such as the general distribution of power, security threats, risks and opportunities. These factors should also be considered in the European context and regionally. Are there particular issues facing the European Union and the northern part of Europe? The second level is that of the European Union. An EU policy has to be seen in the context of the relevant treaties and agreements that created it, the institutions provided and its relationship to other policies and EU institutions. These elements provide the limits and opportunities for the policy within the EU, though it should be noted that they themselves are open to change by the member states. In the case of the ESDP, it came into being, on paper, with the Maastricht Treaty, was considerably enhanced in the Treaty of Amsterdam, but started to develop in reality after 1998 (see pp. 10–13). One important factor is the developing relationship between ESDP and the EU cooperation in police and judicial matters, formerly known as Justice and Home Affairs, Pillar Three of the Maastricht Treaty. As security has increasingly become associated with internal security matters, the sharp difference between ESDP and ‘Pillar Three’ matters has seemed somewhat artificial. The third level is that of the member states. In considering the stages of policy-formulation, policy-making, policy-taking and policy implementation, recognition should be given to the elements of government, and of civil society, active in security and defence policy. Which government departments have an input? What are the views of the military and the civilians and where is advice sought? What political priorities does each state have in dealing with the ESDP? How are these expressed and pursued? In considering the politics of the ESDP, it will not be enough to glue together the relevant factors for the above three levels. All three interact and therefore produce a momentum of their own, not always apparent by examining only one element. Each of the country chapters will thus have to consider the strategic background of the state involved, as well as its general involvement with the EU security-related policies.

Introduction

5

Resources and military issues A second set of issues reflects the potential of the ESDP for action and its impact. Consideration will be given to the tools available and the extent to which the countries covered have contributed to these and may benefit from them. What resources – economic, military, diplomatic and political – will each state put into the ESDP? Is military personnel and hardware available? How have the diplomatic activities of the seven countries contributed to EU security and defence policies? How will the ESDP activities be formulated in terms of output, such as policy statements, exercises and activities, and how might these affect the seven countries? What will be available when and where and what elements will be missing? It is not possible to see this aspect in isolation. The military and other resources available to the ESDP reflect the security policies of the countries more generally, not least whether they are members of an alliance or not. What is ring-fenced and what is earmarked, and for what purpose? What national constraints are placed on the use of resources for the ESDP?

Ideas Theoretical considerations are sometimes seen as a luxury in policy-relevant studies. After all, the aim is to clarify ‘what is’ and to tease out any policy considerations in a fashion that those involved in policy formulation may understand. However, this does not produce atheoretical studies, merely ones where the theoretical implications are hidden, to a greater or lesser extent. The broadly empirical accounts given in the central chapters of this work will not just give information. They will also provide either an implicit or an explicit test of some of the approaches to the European integration process. After all, if the ESDP is part of that process, then the way that governments and other entities approach it and its development may tell us something about the theoretical understandings of the integration process. Furthermore, the ideas may help us to understand what is going on. Getting a handle on the concepts allows decision-makers to see whether they are making progress or turning into a blind alley. The three major approaches towards a theoretical understanding of European integration can be broadly defined as Realist, Liberal Institutionalist and Constructivist, reflecting approaches to the wider study of international relations (Baylis and Smith 2001: pt 2). The Realists, and their more contemporary Neo-Realist successors, place the emphasis on the role of states and on power in international relations and, thus, in any explanation of European integration. The earlier Power Politics school saw the development of Europe in grand strategic terms, with it either being sandwiched between two vast land powers, the US and Russia, or saved by its naval power (see Chapter 3, pp. 52–3, and Tunander 1997: 2–6). In the Realist perspective, the state is the major actor; survival is its main aim and self-help its best

6

Clive Archer

tool. European integration is thus seen as, originally, a means by which continental West European states, weakened by the Second World War, made better use of their economic resources in order to effect ‘the European rescue of the nation-state’ (Milward 1992). Neo-Realists became dominant as the Cold War progressed and they claimed to define more carefully than their Realist predecessors the attributes of an anarchic and bipolar world. They tried to quantify the importance of structural incentives to, and costs of, cooperation in the international system and considered that ‘states in cooperative arrangements also worry that their partners might gain more from cooperation than they do’ (Grieco 1993: 118). States’ concerns were also determined by their position in the international system. Mouritzen (1998: 284–5) placed emphasis on the regional environment of states in Northern Europe, showing that they existed between the poles of bandwagoning and balancing with the dominant power in the region. Thus any estimation of a Northern European state’s attitude to the ESDP would have to take into account its geo-strategic position. A Liberal Institutionalist approach emphasizes interdependence as the main condition of world politics. The norms, rules and institutions of world society facilitate cooperative outcomes to states’ relations (Keohane 1989). Indeed membership of international institutions such as the EU shapes the preferences of states, though domestic politics needs to be examined to understand how preferences emerge and common interests are identified (Keohane et al. 1993: 401). Thus European integration can be seen as a result of the failure of national decision-making to deal with European-wide issues, the role of bargaining in which no one state has a permanent advantage and the incentives for European-wide stability (Baldwin 1993). This approach towards the Northern European states and the ESDP will thus examine domestic politics within those states as well as the institutional framework of the ESDP, within which national preferences can be negotiated. The Constructivist approach does not take states’ interests and identities as given or automatic, but considers them to be created and open for change. However, as institutions are often well entrenched, it is often difficult to change them without a change in beliefs (Smith 2001: 242–5). Thus attention is paid to the various discourses within a state to see how these may change the public understanding of that state’s position in the international system or in relation to other states. Here the emphasis is less on structures and more on how these are perceived, which is often affected by ideology and culture. According to Alexander Wendt (1999: 309), ‘the most important structures in which states are embedded are made of ideas, not material forces’, and it may well be the case that the dominant idea involves a view of the world that mixes together a recognition of power, as advocated by Realists, and the importance of institutions, as seen by the Liberal Institutionalists. A Constructivist view of the Northern European countries and the ESDP would see how these competing discourses affected policy outcomes.

Introduction

7

The idea of security is central to the chapters in this book. A traditional Realist view of security has seen it in military terms and associated with states and alliances. Even before the end of the Cold War, this restrictive view of security was being challenged, with a wider perspective on security being provided by Buzan (1983), who challenged the close association of the term with the state. Since the end of the Cold War, in the debate on security the traditional view has been challenged in three ways. First, the referent of the term is no longer just the state. The security of society, of groups and of individuals has become a greater part of the debate about international security. Second, there has been an increased emphasis on cooperative security. States had to recognize that ‘excessively self-referenced security policies . . . are ultimately self-defeating’ (Buzan 1983: 208) and concern themselves with the security of other states. Finally, security has lost its mainly military aspect: the notion of comprehensive security has led to it including societal, economic and environmental security (Buzan et al. 1988). While ‘(m)ilitary threats still retain a theoretical primacy in security thinking’ (Buzan 1991: 133), there has been a shift towards a consideration of a range of other threats, as seen in the European Security Strategy (ESS) (European Union 2003). This has also brought a widening in the range of instruments used to treat security issues, as well as the traditional diplomatic and military means. Economic, development assistance, welfare and environmental policies are now more likely to be involved. This broadening of the concept of security – and how to deal with it – has brought with it a division of the notion of security into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, with the former referring more to military aspects and the latter to the non-military (Knudsen 1998). The former Danish foreign minister, Niels Helveg Petersen, saw the EU as a central actor in tackling ‘soft’ security risks around the Baltic Sea such as ‘political and economic instability, ethnic conflict, minority problems, border disputes, the influx of refugees, trans-border environmental problems and organised criminality’ (Petersen 1996: 9). These are some of the main issues around which the Baltic states, as new EU members, have had to navigate, and the ESS has confirmed their saliency. The following chapters will show that both the Nordic and Baltic states have pursued the new security agenda alongside the more traditional military security concerns. However, the discourses can be seen to have differed both between states and over time, even since the end of the Cold War. The Nordic states, especially Denmark and Sweden, have always been comfortable with a wider definition of security that included nonmilitary elements, while the Baltic states were originally concerned with their own defence, though over time their security agenda broadened out. One concept that has frequented writings on the Nordic region is that of a ‘security community’. The original notion was advanced by Karl Deutsch and others, who noticed the development between a number of states of a relationship based on the expectation that they would not fight each other ‘but will settle their disputes in some other way’ (Deutsch et al. 1957: 6). In

8

Clive Archer

the case of pluralistic security communities, which included the Nordic region, independent states had a compatibility of core interests, mutual responsiveness and common institutions (such as the Nordic Council) and ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’ (ibid.: 5). The ‘sense of community’ between the states, and their societies, was built up by intense communications and transactions. With intense relations across frontiers and the growth of a ‘we-feeling’, trust is inspired, as is the expectation of peaceful change. Adler and Barnett picked up Deutsch’s work and examined the conditions under which ‘the development of a transnational community might translate into pacific relations’ (1998: 17) and tested these in the cases of some potential candidates for the security community description. In particular, they identified three stages in the development of a security community: nascent, ascendant and mature (ibid.). Particular attention has been paid to the Baltic Sea region in the literature on security communities. Unto Vesa and Frank Mo¨ller picked up on Adler and Barnett’s work and saw a ‘movement towards a security community in the region’ and had as a main finding, of relevance to this book, ‘the valuable role of international institutions and organizations in the process towards a security community’ (Vesa and Mo¨ller 2003: 167–8). This is important for the Baltic Sea region given the close relationship with and then membership of NATO and the EU by the Baltic states, and the links with and/or membership of these organizations by the Nordic countries over the years. This has been supplemented by membership of all the region’s states on the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). Though Russia may seem to be the ‘odd state out’, it was included in the CBSS and has a partnership with NATO and the EU. In the latter case, the Northern Dimension has been of particular interest in Northern Europe, as Russia has been given a partner role in its development. However, Tassinari (2004: 228) has noted that the region is also divided as far as the ‘finalite´ politique’ of the EU is concerned between those who want EU cooperation deepened and the intergovernmentalists, and, in relations with the US, between ‘Old Europe’ and ‘New Europe’. The main implication of ideas about security communities for the states of Northern Europe covered in this book is that those forming a security community (the Nordic states) and a potential security community (the Baltic states and the Nordic countries) can content themselves with not just a peaceful relationship between themselves but one blessed by a degree of trust and ‘the ties that bind’, a range of transnational links and international institutions. This gives them the option of a broader cooperation within the ESDP. One factor that may help in the process of building a common approach to the ESDP is that of Europeanization of the elite dealing with the subject (see Bo¨rzel and Risse 2000; Vink 2003: 1; and Featherstone 2002: 19). Vink’s definition is the simplest: Europeanization is ‘domestic change caused by European integration.’ In this case, it takes the form of members of the elite changing their outlook and their approach by increased dealings with the ESDP. They become more socialized by participation in the European

Introduction

9

institutions, such as those of the ESDP. This can affect the discourse on defence and security within a country and feed into policy changes over time. Europeanization on a wider scale, whereby interest groups or even sections of the population start to change their belief systems and their expectations as a result of the process of European integration, could lead to the building of a security community between the states involved in European integration – if the domestic changes have been positive ones. The various interpretations of security – cooperative and comprehensive security, and security communities – explained on pp. 7–8 and mentioned throughout the chapters in the book on the whole are those with particular salience for the European democracies of Northern Europe. Indeed it may be the case that relations between countries in the Nordic region, in particular, have become ‘desecuritized’ to an extent where they are in a state of ‘a-security’ (Wæver 1998: 69, 71), whereby security matters are no longer an issue between them. However, further engagement in the ESDP by the Nordic states may see a securitization of certain issues at the ‘soft’ end of the security spectrum, such as immigration, environment and crime. As yet, ESDP operations have been outside the more postmodern, Kantian world of Northern Europe, where force plays a limited role, and have involved the more Hobbesian regions of Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus, where force is still an important element in politics (Cooper 2004: 35–7). Ideas thus provide not just an organizing framework but also indicators of the importance of particular variables in the political and military sphere of ESDP compared with others. There is a certain amount of overlap between several theoretical approaches and some authors have noted a move from one to another. Generally, what is the relative weight given in evaluations of the ESDP to ‘material’ factors (such as interests) and the ‘non-material’ (such as values or identity)? Answers to this question will throw light on the elements which make the ESDP important: the relationship of the ESDP to wider strategic considerations, not least US policy; the material outcome of policies such as contributions to the progress of the Headline Goals; the relation of the ESDP to other EU policies; the role of the ESDP in identity-building; and the understandings of security implicit in the ESDP.

Background to the ESDP The ESDP is, of course, the EU’s Security and Defence Policy and its genesis can be found in the EU’s treaties. Furthermore, it has had a maturing process of changing from paper to practice and from aspirations to operations. These developments have reflected outside opportunities matched by a certain willingness of member states to accept a greater role for the EU in defence and security matters. This section will provide the context of the development of the ESDP, to which the Nordic and Baltic states have sometimes contributed and have often had to react.

10

Clive Archer

The sections in the Maastricht Treaty dealing with the ESDP were crafted against the background of the weakness of the European Communities and the parallel European Political Cooperation in dealing with crises, not least that of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the collapse of Yugoslavia from 1990 to 1991. Nevertheless the tentative nature of the paragraphs on ESDP in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) reflected divisions among members, especially between France, who wanted a stronger EU input in defence, and the ‘Atlanticists’ such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, who did not wish to see NATO overshadowed (Haine 2004: 38). There was little to suggest that the two camps would rapidly agree on a development of the ESDP, especially as NATO, and to a much lesser extent the Western European Union (WEU), fulfilled tasks in the Balkans during the 1990s. The situation changed with a new Labour government in the United Kingdom, elected in May 1997, and the realization of Mr Blair, the British prime minister, of Europe’s dependence on the US in any major crisis in the Balkans. This led to a more receptive British response to the Finnish–Swedish initiative to bring the WEU’s Petersberg tasks into the ESDP’s range of activities in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997).2 The WEU was left with the Article 5 duty of collective defence of its membership, while the EU adopted specific tasks where force could be needed. The St Malo meeting of Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac in December 1998 and the Kosovo crisis in spring 1999 led to the operationalization of the Petersberg tasks. The St Malo agreement stated that the EU ‘must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1998, emphasis added). There was still an emphasis on acting in conformity with NATO and a realization that in many cases little could be done without at least the tacit consent of the US. But a beginning had been made. At the Cologne European Council in June 1999, the EU transformed the Anglo-French agreement into a multilateral intention ‘to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence’ (European Union 1999). Institutions were planned: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee, giving advice and recommendations to the PSC and the European Council, and EU Military Staff (EUMS). In December 1999, the Headline Goals were adopted at the Helsinki European Council, setting out how flesh might be put on the institutional bones. The aim was to have at the EU’s disposal up to 60,000 troops that could be deployed within sixty days, and sustainable for a year. The Washington NATO summit in 1999 meant that the EU could have recourse to NATO resources and capabilities to conduct operations. However, there were clearly gaps in the capabilities that the EU could expect, even if the Helsinki Headline Goals were achieved, and nineteen Working Groups were established to look at how the gaps identified by the Headline Goal Task Force might be

Introduction

11

plugged. The European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), launched at Laeken in December 2001, aimed at enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of military capability efforts on a voluntary basis (Rutten 2002: 130– 5) and ECAP panels issued their final report in March 2003. The Laeken European Council also agreed that the EU could ‘take on progressively more demanding operations’ as the ESDP was declared operational, claiming that ‘the Union is now able to conduct some crisismanagement operations’ (Annex II to Presidency Conclusions European Council, Laeken, 14–15 December 2001, cited in Rutten 2002: 120). The EU started to build up its potential capabilities in the civilian sphere, with commitments in police forces, support for the rule of law, civil protection and civil administration. The EU also approved procedures for crisis management and exercised these starting with the Crisis Management Exercise (CME02) in May 2002. In November 2002 an EU Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference pressed forward with the civilian aspects of crisis management (Haine 2003: 145–6). The first ESDP operation was launched on 1 January 2003 as the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), which took over from a similar United Nations (UN) operation. Other operations followed, some military, others civilian, some from a standing start, others taking over previous operations. Perhaps the most significant was that in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Operation Artemis) in June to September 2003, which represented the first autonomous military operation conducted by the EU, and the first outside Europe. Meanwhile, events had altered perceptions of security. The attacks on New York and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 and subsequent bombings in Madrid and London demonstrated the enhanced presence of a non-state challenge to Western countries in the form of Al Qaeda and its associates. This led to the attack in October 2001 on the Taliban government of Afghanistan, its removal and a heavy NATO involvement in subsequent operations there. It also involved the US-led attack on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in March 2003 and his replacement. Despite disagreement within the EU about the Iraq operation, progress was still made with the ESDP. In December 2003, the European Security Strategy was adopted, with its emphasis on threats to Europe being ‘more diverse, less visible and less predictable’ (European Union 2003). This indicated that the response would have to reach beyond the purely military and would embrace all three pillars of the EU, those of the European Community and the single market, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and justice and home affairs. However, there was political commitment that the EU would have to be ‘more active, more coherent and more capable [a]nd we need to work with others’ (ibid.: 331). One way that the EU could help achieve these desiderata was through the Treaty on the Constitution, agreed in 2004, which was intended to remould the constitutional basis for the EU. The Barnier Report of the working group on defence of the Constitutional Convention suggested updating the Petersberg

12

Clive Archer

tasks, improving crisis management tasks, creating more flexible decisionmaking and inserting a solidarity clause in the Constitution (Haine 2003: 249). Even with the failure of the Constitution, a number of the suggestions of the report have been adopted, such as the creation of a European Defence Agency (EDA). The EDA is an important development in the area of armaments cooperation. Previously, cooperation has been ad hoc between European defence companies on the ground, and penetrated by US defence companies, and institutionally complex at an official level. There were a number of arrangements, including Organisation Conjointe de Coope´ration en Matie`re d’Armement (OCCAR), the Letter of Intent Framework Agreement, the Western European Armaments Group/Western European Armaments Organization (WEAG/WEAO), and it was the intention to ‘assimilate their principles and practices in due course, as appropriate’ in the creation of EDA (General Affairs and External Affairs Relations Council, Brussels, 17 November 2003, cited in Missiroli 2003: 265). The aims of the Agency are to develop defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, promote and enhance European armaments cooperation and help strengthen the European defence industrial and technological base, including research activities (ibid.: 263–4). Other important developments have been seen. It was decided that nonEU European NATO members could participate in ESDP operations. The December 2002 Berlin-Plus agreement was an attempt to set out the EU relationship with NATO. Norway (and Iceland) became engaged in ESDP operations and Norway made contributions to the likes of Concordia and the EUPM. In November 2003 the EU and NATO ran their first joint crisis management exercise. Meanwhile an autonomous EU Civilian-Military Planning Cell had been agreed. Perhaps the most important development was the acceptance in early 2004 of the creation of nine battle groups, each of 1,500 soldiers, capable of being rapidly deployed beyond the EU’s borders at UN request. The move towards more qualitative ambitions was seen in the adoption of the Headline Goal 2010 in May 2004, which was largely based on the battle group concept. Emphases on effective forces were seen in the ECAP ‘road map’ and Capability Improvement Chart 2004. Another important development has been that of 2004 EU enlargement, run almost in parallel with NATO enlargement. The overlap was by no means complete but the end product means that the countries of Eastern and Central Europe – the former Warsaw Pact states outside the Soviet Union and the three Baltic states – have become members of the EU and of NATO. This change in status was important not just for the countries involved but also for the Nordic states, who had advocated, in particular, Polish and Baltic state membership of the EU and their right to join NATO. With enlargement, the Nordic EU members had to deal with these countries as fellow EU members, rather than as advocates of them joining.

Introduction

13

The future challenges to the ESDP have been set out by Nicole Gnesotto (2004: 27–31) and, based on these, key questions can be formulated for the Nordic and Baltic states:  Between collective legitimacy and the effectiveness of the few. How can consensus be balanced with the management of a crisis? How might burden-sharing and leadership issues be dealt with? Does the involvement in the ESDP of the seven Nordic and Baltic states add to the problem, especially with the institutional complexity of the Nordic states in the security field and the smallness of the Baltic states?  Between global security and fragmentation of resources. There is a need to be coherent in dealing with global issues, but ESDP resources are seen as being dissipated between institutions with differing aims, interests and policies. Are the Northern states just adding to this confusion?  Between the South and the East. Enlargement has shifted the EU’s interest to its eastern boundary and the issues presented there, but the international agenda suggests a focusing to the South and the issues of terrorism, nuclear proliferation and regional conflicts. Does the involvement of the Northern states encourage such tension?  Between internal and external security. Many of the new threats such as terrorism and organized crime blur ‘the traditional frontiers between defence and security’ (ibid.: 29). Developing ESDP and internal security will need careful coordination. Are the Northern states willing to see such coordination at the EU level?  Between alliance and influence. The assumption here is that Europe and the US need each other’s power; however, this relationship has become more ambiguous. How do the Northern states see the relationship developing?  Between defence and policy. There is a gap between the development of the military side of ESDP and the slow emergence of an EU foreign policy. What means can be used to what end and how can the Nordic and Baltic states contribute to effectiveness of means and clarity of ends? Some tentative answers to these dilemmas and puzzles will be sought in Chapter 11.

Outline of the book The next chapter will provide the context for the study. Chapter 2 will concentrate on external politics. It looks at the strategic context of the area as it has moved from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period. It will note how the security situation of the region and the states within the area has changed and will offer an outline of the strategic and security position in the mid-2000s. In particular, reference will be made to the reduction of external military power in the region, the deliquescence of the lines of political division and the transition from old to new threats.

14

Clive Archer

Chapters 3–9, inclusive, are the national chapters. While each chapter will reflect the individual situation, especially from the mid-1990s to 2006, of the state involved, a number of common themes will be observed. The national chapters will mostly include the following elements:  A security context of the country, with a brief introduction mentioning how its security policy developed through the Cold War and into the post-Cold War period.  A short appreciation of the current security policy of the country, including concepts of threat assessment and risk assessment, and noting any points of domestic disagreement, debate or contention.  A further section will outline the current defence plans and provisions, the main armed forces of the country and how they reflect (or otherwise) the security policy of the state.  A substantial section reflecting how the state authorities (and others in the state) have responded to the rise of the ESDP (if at all), their contributions to its development and their main points of concern about the policy. The ESDP will be placed in the context of national defence policies and those involving alliance partners, where appropriate. This section can also look at differences between ministries and other authorities, should these exist.  Finally, authors can speculate on the extent to which the security outlook of the government can be understood in more theoretical terms. The final two chapters offer some responses and conclusions. Chapter 10 will examine the military issues in the light of the requirements from the European Security Strategy Headline Goal 2010 and the information presented in the country chapters, asking questions about the sinews of security. Are the forces that are earmarked for action outside national frontiers actually available? Can they be sustained in theatre? Can they do what they are expected to do? Chapter 11 will bring the information from all the chapters together with research conducted in Brussels among the decision-makers there. It will examine the extent to which the expectations of both sides – the Nordic and Baltic states and the EU – match each other or what gaps may be appearing. Furthermore, it seeks to answer the questions outlined in the section on ‘Background to the ESDP’ (see p. 13) and to contribute to the debate on ideas about the ESDP.

Notes 1 Iceland, together with Greenland and the Færoe Islands (both parts of the Danish realm), has been regarded in security terms as more part of North America than Europe since the Second World War. However, the US withdrawal from its base in Keflavik perhaps opens up new possibilities for Iceland. (See Thorhallsson and Vignisson 2004.) 2 Article 17.2 of the Treaty of Amsterdam enshrined the Petersberg tasks as ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making’.

2

The security situation in Northern Europe after the Cold War Erik Ma¨nnik

Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the changes in the security situation in Northern Europe after the Cold War. It will focus mainly on such changes in security risks that have already strongly influenced or have a considerable potential to influence the conceptual and practical approaches of the investigated states to their security. Thus, the term ‘security risks’ could mean a number of things. In military-strategic threat assessments, ‘risks’ could be defined as potential threats, while ‘threats’ are more tangible and can, in some cases, be detected objectively (Visuri 1997: 223– 4). A broader approach to security that deals with many factors, processes and circumstances having a potential to affect security regards ‘threats’ as being intentional, ‘risks’ as almost everything (unintentional) that could affect security and ‘challenges’ as a wider term covering both ‘risks’ and ‘threats’.1 As the task of this chapter is to provide an overview of the security changes in Northern Europe and not to delve into a very detailed threat and risk assessment, the term ‘risk’ will be used specifically at the end of the chapter, though ‘threats’ and ‘challenges’ will be used interchangeably. In geographical terms, Northern Europe has traditionally been seen as consisting of five Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden – and the neighbouring northern parts of the Russian Federation (Kola Peninsula, Murmansk oblast and the Republic of Karelia). The Baltic Sea has separated this region from the Central and Eastern European countries. In Cold War military terms, Norway and Iceland constituted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) northern flank, which faced the Leningrad Military District of the Soviet Union. Sweden and Finland found themselves between these opposing parties. To the south of the Baltic Sea, dominated by the Soviet power, there was the Central Front between the East and West. After the end of the Cold War, the Baltic Sea transformed from a mare clausum dominated by the military power of the Soviet bloc to a status where Russia was left with only 200 km of sea border by 2006. NATO

16

Erik Ma¨nnik

gained four new members in the region and the European Union (EU) got six. Out of the nine countries located around the Baltic Sea, six were members of NATO and eight of the EU by 2006. The EU’s border with the Russian Federation (including borders with Kaliningrad) constituted 2,300 km in the region, whereas NATO’s common border with Russia grew from 196 km in the High North to a total of 1,100 km. In addition, NATO and the EU established a 900 km border with Belarus and a 526 km one with Ukraine. Such geopolitical changes and changing security risks (see pp. 29–33) suggest the need to view Northern Europe more widely. Northern Europe can be seen as stretching from Iceland down to the North German Plain. This means that analysis focusing on the security of Northern Europe must cover also the countries in the vicinity of the Nordic states and especially countries that have become closely integrated with the latter during the last decade. In particular, that means the Baltic states. Therefore, in order to provide a comprehensive overview of the security developments in the northern part of Europe, the present analysis will cover the developments in Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden. In the case of the Russian Federation, the analysis will touch upon the situation in North-west Russia, St Petersburg, and the Kaliningrad Pskov oblasts. Iceland is excluded from this account, as its security concerns are Atlantic rather than North European. But first, a few words must be said on the categorization and presentation of security challenges discussed on pp. 17–35. There are several possible ways of categorizing the security challenges in the post-Cold War period. For example, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) have discerned threats to security in military, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors. On the practical side, the European Security Strategy lists the following key threats to the security of the European Union: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. These threats are outlined with the background of major challenges such as globalization, poverty, disease and competition for natural resources. Energy dependence is mentioned as a special concern for Europe (European Union 2003). The academic approach to security risks provides for a more comprehensive analysis, whereas setting the risks outlined in the European Security Strategy as the basis for analysing security changes in Northern Europe enables the reader to see where the region is on the security map of the EU. However, there is also a third condition to be considered when examining strategic changes in the region. It is the focus of this book on the analysis of the policies of the countries toward the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In this context, a historical presentation of security changes in Northern Europe appears to be most suitable for this chapter. It will enable the reader to see how the situation has changed and to compare these changes with those in the national chapters. Hence, various security

Security in Northern Europe post-Cold War

17

challenges will be discussed in their chronological order of occurrence. The chapter will end with a brief evaluation of security risks in the region in terms of their correspondence to the categories outlined in the academic approach and the challenges outlined in the European Security Strategy.

The military dimension of strategic change in Northern Europe Historically, the military component of security has been very prominent in the region. Several great powers have fought there – out of the eight most important wars, the Germans and Swedes initiated six, and the Russians and French one each. Between 1198 and 1945 there were in total 173 years of war in the region (Nordberg 1994: 7); thus, on average, there was one year of war in every 4.7 years of history between 1198 and 2006. The distribution of years of war has not been even, as the Cold War years and the post-Cold War period have been peaceful. Nevertheless, there have been military changes and tensions in the post-Cold War period. Arms control agreements influencing the military situation To introduce the military changes that have taken place since the end of the Cold War, it is worth examining the arms control agreements influencing (and determining) the military balance in the region. The most important of these is the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which sets concrete limitations on the quantities of military equipment states can possess. Measures outlined in the Vienna Document provide for a better understanding of the intentions of other states without establishing limits on the amount of military equipment. The initial purpose of CFE was to secure the balance of conventional forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Signed in November 1990, it limited the number of tanks, artillery, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters (treaty-limited equipment, TLE) in an area stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals. It allowed each of the opposing blocs to have 20,000 battle tanks, 30,000 armoured combat vehicles, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft and 2,000 attack helicopters. The CFE also set important sub-limits to the military equipment in flank zones that covered Norway, Iceland and Leningrad Military District (MD) in the north, and Turkey, Greece, Odessa and Transcaucasus MDs, Bulgaria and Romania in the south. Each side was allowed to keep in the flank zones 2,350 tanks, 3,000 artillery pieces and 2,850 armoured combat vehicles. Moreover, the flanks were interconnected; that is, each side had the right to deploy simultaneously all permitted TLE to northern or southern flanks. These force levels were to be achieved and force reductions completed by 1995. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union left the Russian Federation with very high TLE entitlements in the Kaliningrad region

18

Erik Ma¨nnik

(Bolving 2001: 46, 76), whereas the Baltic states became, with Sweden and Finland, the only members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) not to be parties to the CFE. As the Russian Federation was unable to comply with the limits in the flank because of the TLE used in the Chechen War, the area of the flank zones was reduced, and the flank limitations applied to smaller areas in 1996 (Davis 1997). These changes were agreed largely without paying attention to the opinion of the Baltic states. In practical terms, the exclusion of the Pskov oblast from the flank zone meant that Russia gained a legal right to increase the number of armoured combat vehicles from 180 to 600 in the vicinity of the Baltic states (Lachowski 2002: 23). So far Russia has shown no intention of using this right (Ivanov 2004a). The CFE Treaty was brought into concordance with the new security realities in Europe in 1999. The adapted CFE reflected the shift in European security arrangements from Cold War collective defence to post-Cold War cooperative security. References to blocs of states were removed, as well as the bloc limitations for the TLE. Instead, each state-party to the Treaty was given national ceilings; that is, a numerical upper limit of allowed TLE. At the same time, the adapted CFE outlined territorial ceilings that defined the total amount of equipment each state could hold (possess and host) on its territory. The adapted CFE did not contain references to the flank zones, but in reality the flank regime was still applied (Bolving 2001: 65–75). The Leningrad MD (from which the Pskov oblast was excluded) and the North Caucasus MD (except the Volgograd oblast, the Astrakhan oblast, part of the Rostov oblast) formed, in the military sense, Russia’s northern and southern flanks. Simultaneously, the adapted CFE Treaty did not change the permitted TLE quantities for the Kaliningrad oblast. At the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit, the Russian Federation pledged not to increase significantly its air and ground forces in the oblast (Lachowski 2002: 30). The comparison of agreed territorial and national ceilings (Tables 2.1 and 2.2) demonstrates that Norway, Denmark and Poland have agreed not to station foreign (Alliance’s) troops on their territory (Norway has only symbolic headroom for foreign deployment – 7 armoured combat vehicles and 66 artillery pieces). Germany has larger headroom as it has traditionally hosted the troops of many countries. Russia, being the largest country in the region, has the highest ceilings. The ceilings agreed with regard to the flank zones limit Russia’s ability legally to station large troop numbers on the borders with Turkey and Norway.2 The agreed national ceilings of NATO members (in the region) and Russia (as a whole) reflect Russia’s slight numerical superiority: main battle tanks 1:1.1; armoured combat vehicles 1:1.9; artillery pieces 1:1.3; combat aircraft 1:2.4; and attack helicopters 1:1.9. Certainly, these calculations/ratios primarily characterize a formal approach by states to the required force levels (that they consider necessary for their military security) and not the actual balance of forces and combat

Security in Northern Europe post-Cold War

19

power. As a rule, countries tend to have less equipment than national ceilings permit (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2002: 338). The figures presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 do not include five countries in the region; that is, three new NATO members (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania – their TLE is included in Table 2.3) and two former neutral countries (Finland and Sweden). Whereas the Baltic states, as NATO members, are likely to join the CFE once the adapted Treaty enters into force, Finland and Sweden have maintained a more reserved position. They have argued that the level of secrecy required for their mobilization systems could not be maintained under the intrusive inspection regime of the CFE. Therefore, Finland, Sweden and the Baltic states have used the provisions of the Vienna Documents 1992, 1994 and 1999 to enhance their military security. These documents, while also aimed at reducing the dangers of military conflict, have provided the framework for confidence- and securitybuilding measures. However, they do not include imposing strict limits on military equipment. The Vienna Document is, rather, aimed at strengthening security and stability by providing for additional military transparency. The most important confidence- and security-building measures include the annual exchange of information on military forces and major weapon systems, the annual exchange of information on defence planning, compliance and verification inspections and evaluations, and the prior notification and observation of certain military activities. In addition to these measures, the Vienna Document has provided an excellent framework for establishing bilateral confidence- and security-building measures between the states in the region. For example, Lithuania has thus gained additional insight into the military developments in the Kaliningrad oblast, whereas Estonia and Russia have agreed to carry out one additional evaluation visit annually (Lachowski 2002: 24, Republic of Estonia 2003: 14). The changing military balance in Northern Europe At the time of the destruction of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, Northern Europe was characterized by extremely high force levels. The Soviet bloc and NATO had over 70 divisions on the territories of the countries around the Baltic Sea and in Norway. The Soviet bloc totally dominated the Baltic Sea as it had 51 submarines (including 4 ballistic missile submarines) and 68 major surface combatants, against NATO’s total of 27 submarines and 17 major surface combatants (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1989: 40, 47, 49, 58, 63). In 1989 the Kola Peninsula hosted the most powerful fleet of the Soviet Union. It included 171 submarines (of these, 39 were nuclear-fuelled ballistic missile submarines) and 70 major surface combatants (including two aircraft carrier vessels). The two militarily non-aligned countries in the region – Sweden and Finland – had at that time defence establishments capable of mobilizing 500,000 and 725,000 men, respectively. Sweden also had 11 submarines

20

Erik Ma¨nnik

supported by coastal combatants and patrol vessels, whereas Finland was permitted to have only smaller surface vessels (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1989: 86–9). The force levels in the region were reduced drastically after the end of the Cold War. The Russian Federation withdrew its troops from Germany, Poland and the Baltic states by the end of 1994. The Kaliningrad oblast became the westernmost territory of the Russian Federation (being separated from mainland Russia by Belarus and Lithuania), while the sea border of Russia on the Baltic Sea around St Petersburg and Kaliningrad was shortened to just 200 km (Sergounin 1998: 18). The Russian Federation lost its ports, airfields and air defence positions in the Baltic states. The Baltic Fleet was redeployed to Baltiysk and Kronstadt (respectively, near Kaliningrad and St Petersburg) and the Russian naval defence became coastal (Finnish Council of State 1997). Table 2.3 reflects the changes in the military balance between NATO members (including Poland the Baltic states) and the Russian Federation in the region. For clarity, the analysis starts from 1994 – the year when all Russian troops were withdrawn from the Baltic states, remaining in the region mainly in the Kaliningrad oblast and the Leningrad MD.3 These figures show that, since 1994, NATO has become numerically superior in major categories of military equipment. The naval forces of regional NATO members have become numerically even more dominant in the Baltic Sea than were the Soviet bloc navies back in 1989. This has happened mainly because of the extensive scale-down of the Russian Baltic Fleet. Russia’s Northern Fleet stationed on the Kola Peninsula has remained the most powerful fleet of the Russian Federation, although also in a dramatically scaled-down form. The number of submarines has decreased from 171 in 1989 to 43 in 2005 (of which 11 were nuclear-fuelled ballistic missile submarines), whereas the number of major surface vessels has gone down

Table 2.1 National ceilings outlined in the adapted CFE treaty Country

Main battle tanks

Armoured combat vehicles

Artillery pieces

Combat aircraft

Attack helicopters

Denmark Germany Poland Russia Norway

335 3,444 1,730 6,350 170

336 3,281 2,150 11,280 275

446 2,255 1,610 6,315 491

82 765 460 3,416 100

18 280 130 855 24

Source: Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1999: 20.

Security in Northern Europe post-Cold War

21

Table 2.2 Territorial ceilings outlined in the adapted CFE treaty Country

Main battle tanks

Armoured combat vehicles

Artillery pieces

Denmark Germany Poland Russia Norway

335 4,704 1,730 6,350 170

336 6,722 2,150 11,280 282

446 3,407 1,610 6,315 557

Source: Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in

from 70 in 1989 to 11 in 2005 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2005: 66). The changed military situation and the balance of forces in the region are very clearly reflected in the Swedish defence establishment, which reduced its mobilization reserves from 725,000 men in 1989 to 262,000 men in 2005. Finland, however, has been more reserved with regard to scaling down its defence. As of 2004, its mobilization reserve remained at the level of 435,000 men, with plans to reduce it to 340,000 men (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2004: 118, 127). To sum up, the overall changes in force levels in Northern Europe closely parallel the theoretical assessment that, already in the middle of the 1990s, the combined offensive power of all NATO member states superseded by far Russia’s ability to mount a successful defence with the forces subject to CFE Treaty (Hammersmith 1998). The 2:1 to 3:1 numerical superiority in TLE, while not always guaranteeing success, is, nevertheless, a strong argument in favour of a successful ground offensive (Beach 1986: 155). However, these figures do not necessarily reflect all aspects of the situation. It has been estimated that European armies have experienced serious problems in deploying their forces to operations abroad (Clarke and Cornish 2002: 78). During the same period, NATO’s air and sea power became dominant in the region. Russia lost most of its former bases and its forces relied increasingly on mobilization to achieve their full combat strength. Under these circumstances – being acutely aware of the imbalance in conventional forces – Russian strategists and planners initiated an intensive discussion on the possibility of using nuclear weapons to equalize Russian military power with that of NATO and to de-escalate potential conflicts (Yost 2001: 534–5). The concept of de-escalation means, first of all, demonstration of resolve to use nuclear weapons to halt any aggression. It can start from a single nuclear strike and end with a massive nuclear onslaught (Kipp 2001). For these purposes the applicability of Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons4 was also discussed. Russia demonstrated its approach to the concept of de-escalation during a theatre-level military exercise, ‘ZAPAD-99’, held in June 1999. The exercise

22

Erik Ma¨nnik

involved the headquarters of five military districts: Leningrad, Moscow, Caucasus, Trans-Volga and Volga MDs; and the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. The exercise scenario envisioned an attack by NATO’s forces against the Kaliningrad oblast and Belarus (similar to the operation ‘Allied Force’ in Kosovo). According to the exercise scenario, Russian conventional forces were able to ‘hold’ their positions only for three days. In such a situation, Russia ‘responded’ with limited nuclear strikes by ‘launching’ nuclear-armed cruise missiles from strategic bombers against Poland and the US (Kipp 2001; Sergounin 2003; Yost 2001: 538–9). ‘ZAPAD-99’ has been the largest Russian military exercise in the region based on a scenario foreseeing the use of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War period. There have also been reports of several smaller Russian exercises in the region with scenarios envisioning the use of nuclear weapons against NATO (Nezavissimoe Voennoe Obozrenie 2004). In conclusion, the military situation in the region has been in transition. NATO enlarged in 1999 without stationing additional troops on the territories of the new members. The accession of the Baltic states to NATO led to the deployment of four fighter planes to Lithuania for the air policing of the skies of all three Baltic states (SHAPE News 2004). After NATO’s enlargement to include the Baltic states, Russia’s main concern has been achieving the Baltic states’ accession to the CFE and a maximum transparency with NATO (Ivanov 2004b, 2005; Lavrov 2004).

Non-military dimension of strategic change: security challenges arising from transition The political changes in the Central and Eastern European states and the withdrawal of some half-million Russian troops from Germany, Poland and the Baltic states have given rise to a number of new security challenges in Northern Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union created large Table 2.3 Changes in the balance of forces between the Russian Federation and NATO in Northern Europe from 1994 to 2004 Year

Main battle tanks

Armoured combat vehicles

Artillery pieces

Combat aircraft

Attack and armed helicopters

Principal surface combatants/ submarines*

1994 1998 2002 2004

1:1.6 1:1.7 1:3.3 1:3

1:2.5 1:3.8 1:2.3 1:2.1

1:1.5 1:1.8 1:3.4 1:3.5

1.1:1 1:1.2 1:2.2 1:2

1:1.5 1:2.7 1:3.1 1:3.5

2.1:1/1:2.5 1:3/1:8 1:3.5/1:11 1:3.3/1:10

Notes: The ratios shown were calculated on the basis of figures given in International Institute for Strategic Studies 1994, 1998, 2002, 2004. * The comparison of naval power covers the assets in the Baltic Sea; hence Norway’s naval assets are not considered. The analysis includes only principal surface combatants and submarines, as they are instrumental for carrying out major naval operations.

Security in Northern Europe post-Cold War

23

Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia. The sudden change of political order, values and what was permitted and what not, combined with initial loopholes in legislation and reorganization of law enforcement structures, led to an immediate surge of violent criminal activity that was only gradually controlled. However, that was not the only new threat to security that emerged in the region after the end of the Cold War. Other types of crime occurred as the barriers to the movement of people and goods were removed between the countries in the region. Economic activity in the region has become so intensive that it began to threaten life in the Baltic Sea; restructuring of formerly authoritarian societies has led to a proliferation of drugs, HIV/AIDS and some other diseases. The risk of large-scale technological disasters has grown considerably. In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, other minority groups have gained political weight and become actors influencing regional security. Illegal arms trade The illegal arms trade became an immediate new security concern after the Cold War in the region. The Russian troops leaving for Russia from Eastern Germany, Poland and the Baltic states sold illegally very large quantities of their weapons. Weapons trafficking not only took place with the departing troops, but also in units stationed in other places on the territory of the Former Soviet Union (Holtom 2003: 52, 63; Rawlinson 2001: 11). Such trade in arms occurred in different forms and followed different routes. The first of these routes involved – paradoxically – thousands of illegally sold Russian weapons (mainly small arms), as well as more modern guns which were smuggled from the Western countries back to Russia through the Baltic states (Jamestown Monitor 1995). The second route constituted illegal export of military equipment from the Russian Federation through the Baltic states and Poland to unknown destinations. This type of smuggling has involved larger items and parts of weapons systems (Holtom 2003: 31, 41). The third type of arms smuggling involved international arms dealers, government officials and sophisticated and wide criminal networks in the Baltic states and Poland. One thoroughly investigated case of such trade in arms involved two Polish state-owned companies that sold tens of thousands of items of surplus military equipment to Somalia and Croatia in 1992 using mediators in the Baltic states. The same network of dealers delivered thousands of illegal weapons to Russia, Germany, other parts of Europe and even Japan (Holtom 2003: 64–8). A more sinister aspect of the smuggling of arms has been related to nuclear and dual-use materials. Although so far no weapons-grade material has been seized, there have been cases of smuggling of other radioactive materials and various dual-use goods (Holtom 2003: 52–3, 81).

24

Erik Ma¨nnik

Overall levels of crime and related risks in the region As a consequence of such an extensive illegal arms trade, the Baltic states themselves became saturated with legal and illegal small arms. The combination of loopholes in legislation, the extensive reorganization of law enforcement agencies and the situation on the ‘arms market’ had devastating consequences at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1993, Tallinn was declared one of the world’s most violent capitals, with the highest murder rate in Europe (Rawlinson 2001: 10). This was largely due to fighting between various organized crime group members, mostly originating from various parts of the Former Soviet Union. In 1994, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs estimated that 5,600 criminal groups were active within the Russian Federation (Shabalin et al. 1995). Similar problems with organized crime groups with members from the various regions of the Former Soviet Union were experienced in Latvia. Organized crime groups became extensively involved there in the banking sector (Rawlinson 2001: 15). Estonian banks have also served as channels for money laundering. The documented cases show that tens of millions of dollars of diverted funds moved from the Russian Federation through smaller Estonian banks to offshore accounts (Pihl 1999). In Lithuania, the situation was somewhat different as the majority of organized criminal groups were made up of ethnic Lithuanians. Echoing the complicated situation in Estonia and Latvia, Lithuanian groups became extensively involved in the smuggling of all sorts of goods across the borders with Kaliningrad and Belarus. The figures presented in Table 2.4 below show that the highest growth in crime in the region occurred in the countries in transition: the Baltic states, Poland and the Russian Federation. The homicide rates in the Baltic states peaked in 1995–6. After that the combination of the economic development of the Baltic states and reform of criminal justice systems contributed to a reduction in crime levels. However, as of 2001, the capitals of the states in transition still remained considerably more violent than those of the ‘old’ democratic states in the region. Decreasing violent crime has given way to new types of criminal activity. One of the most worrying is drug trafficking. The number of these crimes has risen sharply in the Baltic states, the Russian Federation, Poland and even Finland. The end of authoritarian regimes has led to relaxed border controls in these states in addition to extensive reorganization of criminal justice systems (with the exception of Finland). Consequently, a new drugtrafficking route – the so-called ‘Silk Route’ – from Central Asian states through Russia, Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states was created. It has increased the supply of narcotics to North European states’ as well as to the transit states’ markets. At the same time, relaxation of state control over various sectors has created opportunities for the illegal manufacturing of

Security in Northern Europe post-Cold War

25

drugs in Poland and the Baltic states (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 2003: 29). Close contacts between countries in the region have facilitated the spread of drugs. The increased supply of narcotics to Northern Europe has increased the spread of certain diseases, one of which is HIV/AIDS. Table 2.5 shows the infection rates in the regional countries as of 2002. The highest infection rate was in Estonia, where an epidemic was declared in 2001 (Agence France-Presse 2001). The World Health Organization has stated that the actual number of people infected with HIV/AIDS in the Russian Federation could be ten times higher than the figure reflected in official statistics (Pursiainen 2001: 12). The spread of HIV/AIDS had already reached the scale of an epidemic in Kaliningrad by the end of the 1990s (World Health Organization and Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 2003: 15). The relaxed border controls, visa regimes and economic disparities described on pp. 29–30 have facilitated the evolution of another previously unknown type of crime in the region, trafficking in human beings. This has taken different forms and followed different routes. The Baltic states have been a source of people transported illegally to other states. According to the International Organization for Migration, about 2,000 people are smuggled out of the Baltic states annually, most of them young women and girls (Baltic Times 2002). The destination countries have mainly been the developed countries of Western Europe. The Finnish experience shows that Table 2.4 Crime in Northern Europe Country

Change in number of crimes recorded, 1991–2001 (%)

Change in number of drug-related crimes, 1997–2001 (%)

Homicides per 100,000 population; average per year, 1999–2001, in capital cities

Denmark Estonia Finland Germany Latvia Lithuania Norway Poland Russian Federation Sweden

9 84 –7 n/a n/a 76 28 61 37 1

–2 1,993* 79 15 81 55 32 121 160 –32

1.81 9.4 2.18 2.34 n/a 8.9 1.7 4.00 18.38 2.77

Source: Barclay et al. 2003. Note: * The figure reflecting the overall growth of drugrelated crime in Estonia from 1997 to 2001 can be contested on the basis of figures presented by the Director of Estonian Security Police Board (Pihl 1999). In this case, the respective growth would constitute 450 per cent.

26

Erik Ma¨nnik

Estonia has become one of the two main areas where sex workers are recruited to work in Finland (Lehti and Aromaa 2002: 31). The other human trafficking routes involve the Baltic states and Poland as transit countries. The migrants originate from/pass through the Commonwealth of Independent States countries. Russia is the most notable ‘gate’ to the region. It has been estimated that some 700,000–1,000,000 illegal immigrants live in Russia, among them people from Afghanistan, Africa, Vietnam, China and other distant countries and regions (Pursiainen 2001: 14–15). Security challenges associated with ethnic minorities in the region The collapse of the Soviet Union changed radically the status of different ethnic groups in the territories of the former Baltic Soviet Republics. According to the results of the 1989 census, Russian-speaking minorities constituted 38.5, 48 and 20.4 per cent of the total populations, respectively, in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Zaagman 1999: vi). A majority of these people were not accepted as citizens in Estonia and Latvia after these states regained their independence. Lithuania provided the possibility for all permanent residents to acquire Lithuanian citizenship regardless of their duration of residence, political views and knowledge of the Lithuanian language. An exception was made in the case of the Soviet military personnel and their families, who were not given such a possibility (Zaagman 1999: 45). Relations between different ethnic groups in Estonia and Latvia became initially quite tense as Estonians and Latvians saw Russian-speaking minorities as a product of Soviet occupation. The influx of Russian-speaking people from other parts of the Soviet Union was perceived as a threat to the national identity of local populations and, consequently, strongly influenced the minority policies of Estonia and Latvia after 1991. At the same time, Table 2.5 HIV/AIDS infection rates in the countries of the region in 2002 Country

Number of people Population in ’000s Infection rate with HIV/AIDS of people among population* (%)

Denmark 3,800 Estonia 7,700 Finland 1,200 Germany 41,000 Latvia 5,000 Lithuania 1,300 Norway 1,800 Poland N/a Russian Federation 700,000 Sweden 3,300

5,333 1,377 5,178 82,007 2,406 3,689 4,488 38,577 144,664 8,833

0.07 0.6 0.02 0.05 0.2 0.04 0.04 n/a 0.5 0.04

Source: World Health Organization 2002: 190–201.Note: * Figures calculated by the author.

Security in Northern Europe post-Cold War

27

Russian populations in the Baltic states had to get used to a situation in which they were not representatives of the dominant nation of the state any more. The danger of conflict in Estonia and Latvia was highest in the first few years of independence as both countries granted citizenship immediately only to people who had been citizens of Latvia and Estonia before 1940 and their descendants. In Estonia the situation became very serious in summer 1993 when the parliament adopted the law on the status of aliens in Estonia. Partially in response, radical representatives of the Russian communities tried to hold referendums on the autonomy of two cities in north-east Estonia (Estonian Review 1993c). The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later OSCE) played a very important role in preventing events in Estonia from escalating, and in defusing them. The CSCE High Commissioner on Human Rights made several suggestions to amend the Law on Aliens, with which President Meri agreed (Estonian Review 1993a, 1993b). The process of bringing the minority situation in Estonia up to internationally accepted standards proceeded subsequently under tight supervision by the CSCE, and later the OSCE. In Latvia, the OSCE also monitored the development of legislation on citizenship, naturalization and aliens (non-citizens). In addition, the OSCE was involved in monitoring the agreement between the Latvian and Russian governments on operating Skrunda radar station, which was an important component of Russia’s strategic warning system (Zaagman 1999: 20–1). The Russian Federation did little to solve problems related to the minority situations in Estonia and Latvia. Though it took an active interest in the Russian-speaking minorities, Russia was driven instead by military-strategic considerations. Russia exerted considerable pressure on Estonia and Latvia by linking the issues of withdrawal of its troops and demarcation of borders to the treatment of Russian-speaking minorities and retired military personnel in these countries. The energy embargo of all three Baltic states in 1993 and economic sanctions against Latvia in 1998 also did little to increase mutual trust (Zaagman 1999: 16, 24). Since the two countries regained independence, the demographic situations of Estonia and Latvia have changed. The proportion of the Russianspeaking minority in Estonia’s population fell from 38.5 per cent in 1989 to 31.4 per cent in 2006, whereas the number of Estonian citizens who gained citizenship through naturalization exceeds the number of residents with undetermined citizenship (and having internationally recognized aliens’ passports). In 2006, 83.6 per cent of Estonia’s residents were Estonian citizens, 7.4 per cent were citizens of other countries (mostly Russia) and 9 per cent had undetermined citizenship (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006: 1).

28

Erik Ma¨nnik

The proportion of the Russian-speaking minority in the general population has also dropped in Latvia: from 48 per cent in 1989 to 41.3 per cent in 2004. In 2004 Russians having Latvian citizenship exceeded for the first time the number of Russians living in Latvia and having undetermined citizenship. As of 2004, 78.2 per cent of Latvia’s residents were Latvian citizens, 1.5 per cent were foreign citizens and 20.3 per cent5 had undetermined citizenship (Muiznieks 2004; Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). The overall situation regarding Russian-speaking minorities has stabilized considerably since the beginning of the 1990s. The Baltic states have done much to harmonize their legislation and treatment of minorities with international norms, and successful economic development has been a serious argument in favour of opting for citizenship of the Baltic states. This is not to say that all problems have been solved. For example, the issue of secondary school reform and the envisioned shares of teaching in minority and state languages led to demonstrations by the Russian-speaking population in Latvia in 2003 (Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies 2004: 24). The Russian-speaking population perceived the planned decrease in teaching in Russian as a threat to their identity and reacted strongly. Therefore the existence of unsolved issues associated with the identities of the Russian-speaking minorities makes the latter susceptible to outside manipulation, in particular from the Russian Federation, which has used the minority issues in Baltic states to advance its own interests. As of 2007, the unsolved problems associated with Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states still have the potential to become challenges, though on a much lesser scale than a decade ago. The second set of security challenges associated with ethnic minorities in the region arises from the immigrants originating from distant regions. Such minorities are noteworthy in the Nordic countries and in Germany. The attractiveness of these countries for migrants can be explained by their high living standards and, in the case of Nordic countries, their adherence to humanitarian principles leading to participation in various humanitarian activities in distant regions. The different cultural backgrounds and educational levels of migrants from other continents and distant regions have complicated their integration into societies in Northern Europe. This has been accompanied by high unemployment rates among immigrants, which help create the conditions for crime and either ethnic or religious radicalism. The report of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2005: 11, 45) has shown that in Finland in 2004 the unemployment rates among Iraqi citizens and Iraqi-born Finnish citizens were 72 and 64 per cent, respectively; in Germany unemployment levels were highest among people from Turkey; and in Sweden among immigrants from Iraq and Africa. Sweden and Denmark have been noted for ethnic segregation in cities and schools (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 2005:

Security in Northern Europe post-Cold War

29

56, 69), while immigrants tend to form large communities, particularly in cities. For example, in 2004 one-fifth of Oslo’s population consisted of immigrants (Aftenposten 2004a). In the context of events of 11 September 2001, the size of Muslim communities in different countries is of special interest. Unfortunately, it is difficult to provide a detailed quantitative overview of these communities because the statistical data available vary considerably by country. Thus, for example, in Denmark no detailed register of the Muslim population exists at all (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006: 1). The existing estimates indicate that Muslim communities tend to be very small in the Baltic states, Poland and Finland, that they do not exceed a few per cent in other Nordic countries and that the Muslim population is largest in Russia, constituting some 15 per cent of the population.6 The security challenges associated specifically with Muslim communities in the aftermath of 11 September will be discussed on pp. 33–5. Security concerns posed by and associated with economic activity in the region The collapse of the socialist regime in the Soviet Union and Poland and the transition to the free-market economy were accompanied by a tremendous economic setback. In the Baltic states the decline in industrial production was over 30 per cent, the fall in real wages was 45 per cent, the rise in fuel prices over 10,000 per cent, and an inflation rate of 1,000 per cent per year was seen in 1989–92 (Lieven 1993: 317). The situation in the Baltic states was not made any easier by the energy embargo established by the Russian Federation in 1993. The freeing of prices in the Russian Federation on 2 January 1992 brought a ten- to twelve-fold increase (Shevtsova 1999: 26). Economic recession in Russia also caused a deep crisis in Finland. Such a dire economic state in the early 1990s gave rise to all sorts of new and unexpected economic activities. Using still-functioning contacts in the Former Soviet Union (especially in the Russian Federation), the new private entrepreneurs sought maximum profits in the shortest possible time by exporting various goods. For example, in 1992 Estonia became the sixth highest exporter of non-ferrous metals in the world without being a producer of that commodity (Rawlinson 2001: 10). Table 2.6 reflects the development of the economies in the region in the post-Cold War period. It shows that the Baltic states and Poland generally reached and even exceeded their 1991 per capita income level by 2003, whereas the Russian Federation remained far below its 1991 figure. Table 2.6 shows that there was still a large disparity of income between the transition states (the Russian Federation, the Baltic states and Poland) and the ‘old’ democratic states in 2003, though the transition states made serious progress in closing the income gap considering their problems in the early 1990s.

30

Erik Ma¨nnik

The Russian Federation has been considerably less successful. Per capita income across the Norwegian–Russian border was sixteen times higher on the Norwegian side than the Russian in 2003, compared with the approximately five times in 1991. The other borders in 2003 with considerable welfare imbalances were those between Finland and Russia (ten times), between Poland and Ukraine (five times), between Poland and Belarus, and between Lithuania and Belarus (three times in both cases). In addition, according to some sources residents of Kaliningrad were sixty-five times poorer than EU citizens and ‘considerably poorer’ than people living elsewhere in Russia. Almost one-third of the Kaliningrad oblast inhabitants are claimed to live below the subsistence level (Beyond Transition 2001: 41–2). These differences in economic well-being have facilitated trans-border crime and crime in general. However, economic development is also associated with other sorts of security risks, in particular those of technological disasters and the overall environmental degradation in the region. As to potential technological disasters, one should look, first of all, at the situation in the north-west of Russia. The Russian Federation has nine operational nuclear plants, with a total of twenty-nine nuclear reactors. Two of them, in Sosnovyi Bor and in Polyarnye Zori, are located in the vicinity of Estonia, Finland and Norway. These power plants produce 40 per cent of the energy required by the north-west of Russia. The Sosnovyi Bor power plant has four reactors of the same type as the infamous Chernobyl nuclear power station. The safety of these two power plants has been, according to Western experts, questionable. Similarly, the storage conditions of the spent nuclear fuel were below required standards (Pursiainen 2001: 6). The second source of risks associated with nuclear technologies is related to nuclear reactors in military use. The Kola Peninsula is home to about 18 per cent of the world’s naval nuclear reactors. The huge scale-down of the Northern Fleet and a shortage of funds have left some 200 of these reactors awaiting decommissioning. They are poorly guarded and, in fact, virtually abandoned in the city of Murmansk, which has a population of 500,000. The situation regarding the storage of nuclear waste is no better. According to Russian officials, moving the spent nuclear fuel from the Kola Peninsula to reprocessing plants would be too expensive. Paradoxically, the Russian Federation is developing plans for import and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from other countries. Hence, Russian nuclear objects remain hostages to the struggling economy of the state (Pursiainen 2001: 5–8). The severity of the risk posed by, for example, a reactor meltdown (similar to that in the Chernobyl plant) in Sosnovyi Bor under the most unfavourable conditions can be characterized as threatening the very existence of the small states located in the immediate vicinity. In order to introduce the risks to the environment (primarily to the Baltic Sea) created by the economic activity in the region it is necessary to redefine the region geographically. The Baltic Sea is one of the largest brackish

Security in Northern Europe post-Cold War

31

Table 2.6 Per capita gross national income of states in the region and some neighbouring states from 1991 to 2003 Country

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

Denmark Estonia Finland Germany Latvia Lithuania Norway Poland Russian Federation Sweden Belarus* Ukraine*

25,217 5,982 23,738 22,286 6,176 6,377 26,935 2,006 5,375 28,662 4,838 3,355

26,283 1,074 16,117 24,292 835 734 26,508 2,235 1,145 21,702 653 615

34,043 2,469 24,470 29,945 1,792 1,735 33,505 3,376 2,258 27,386 1,207 707

31,628 3,178 23,366 25,598 2,352 2,675 35,279 3,850 2,850 27,281 1,384 973

32,361 3,693 24,360 25,463 2,775 2,960 35,092 4,149 1,271 28,109 1,207 613

29,421 3,932 23,153 22,446 3,303 3,356 37,567 4,709 2,112 24,556 1,239 758

38,994 6,212 30,681 28,986 4,494 5,107 49,152 5,312 2,999 33,513 1,771 957

Source: United Nations National Accounts Main Aggregates Database. Notes: The figures are at current prices in US dollars. * Belarus and Ukraine are added for the purposes of comparing the welfare differences across the EU borders.

water systems in the world. The actual Baltic Sea catchment area extends over 1.7 million km2 and is home to 85 million people. Hence, parts of Belarus, Ukraine, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and Norway also belong to the catchment area. The population densities in the catchment area vary from 500 inhabitants/km2 in Poland, Germany and Denmark to less than 10 inhabitants/km2 in northern Finland and Sweden. There are eleven cities with more than 500,000 citizens in the catchment area and almost 15 million people live within 10 km of the coastline. The Baltic Sea has a unique ecosystem and is inhabited by a mixture of marine and freshwater species. Such a mixture of species makes the Baltic Sea very sensitive to external influences, as the disappearance of key species could undermine the whole ecosystem (Helsinki Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission 2005; Committee on the Environment and Agriculture 2002). The main risks confronting the Baltic Sea are eutrophication,7 discharges of hazardous substances, risks associated with shipping, and excessive fishing. Discussing eutrophication and shipping in detail should provide a deeper insight into the major effects of human activity on the status of the Baltic Sea. By its very nature as a brackish water system with a considerable share of freshwater species, the Baltic Sea is sensitive to substances causing eutrophication. The main sources of phosphorus and nitrogen are wastewaters of municipalities, agriculture on the shores, and pollution from factories and airborne depositions (Committee on the Environment and Agriculture 2002). The largest polluter of the Baltic Sea has been the Russian Federation, where twenty- to thirty-year-old sewage systems have been unable to

32

Erik Ma¨nnik

process all the waste coming from St Petersburg and Krasnyi Bor. As a consequence 1,000,000 m3 of untreated sewage a day have been dumped in the Neva River and the Gulf of Finland (Herd 1999: 11), though the opening of a wastewater plant in St Petersburg in 2005 may ease the situation. Similar problems have occurred in the Kaliningrad oblast. The overall situation in the Baltic Sea has evolved to the stage where one of the latest assessments of the state of eutrophication of the Baltic Sea outlined two interpretations of the situation in 2004–5. The first of them saw the reductions in pollution achieved in the region as sufficient to slow down the eutrophication process and bring about some improvements. The second scenario envisaged a vicious cycle where eutrophication already had changed the Baltic Sea ecosystem so extensively that particularly drastic measures are required to reverse the deepening degradation of the Baltic Sea (Rantaja¨rvi et al. 2005). A recent study by the Finnish Institute of Marine Research demonstrated that the oxygen content of deep waters of the Baltic Sea has been critically low in large areas for two consecutive years (Norkko and Lumiaro 2006). Another source of risks associated with increasingly intense human activity in the region is shipping. Baltic Sea maritime traffic is one of the densest in the world. Among the ships moving on the Baltic are many tankers. It has been calculated that if all the ports in the Baltic Sea were to work at their maximum capacity the amount of oil transported annually would increase from the 40 million tons carried in 2000 to 190 million tons of oil in 2010. Such a transport volume is likely to increase considerably the risk of accidental oil spills on narrow Baltic shipping routes. The seriousness of that risk is amplified by the sensitivity and vulnerability of the Baltic ecosystem. Especially dangerous is the Gulf of Finland, which has very dense sea traffic, including large oil tankers, and hard ice conditions in winter (Rytko¨nen and Vasilyev 2005: 1–2, 9). In addition to accidental oil spills, intensifying shipping brings along deliberate (illegal) oil spills. Estimates show that these spills have so far constituted an even bigger source of oil pollution than accidental spills in the Baltic Sea (Committee on the Environment and Agriculture 2002). The latest development in the transport of fossil fuels from the Russian Federation to Western countries has been the start of construction of the 1,200 km-long North European Gas Pipeline from Vyborg in Russia to Greifswald in Germany (and continuing from there to the Netherlands and Britain) (Kulikova 2005). Construction was launched in September 2005. The work has been undertaken by a consortium consisting of the Russian company Gazprom and German companies BASF and E.On and led by the former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. The pipeline will run along the Baltic seabed, bypassing the Baltic states and Poland, and its completion is scheduled for 2010. The project has been strongly attacked on environmental grounds by the then Swedish and Estonian prime ministers ´´htuleht 2006). Go¨ran Persson and Andrus Ansip (RIA Novosti 2005; SL O

Security in Northern Europe post-Cold War

33

The fear is that construction of such a pipeline on the seabed could harm the fragile ecosystem of the Baltic Sea as well as potentially release toxic agents from dumped containers with chemical weapons. To sum up the discussion of the environmental aspects of economic activities of the countries in the region, it is worth taking a look at their per capita global ecological footprint. This reflects people’s consumption of natural resources (including from the distant regions) and, although the ecological footprint cannot be directly connected to the status of the Baltic Sea, it can be used to compare the amount of resources consumed to achieve existing living standards. Table 2.7 shows that four of the regional states belong to the world’s top ten consumers of natural resources in per capita terms and five states are among world’s top twenty. As the sustainable global ecological footprint is estimated to be 1.8 hectares per capita, all states in the region exert strong pressure on the environment to maintain and increase their living standards. Interestingly, the North European Gas Pipeline project has brought to the fore some fears deeply rooted in history. Some analysts have seen similarities between the decision on pipeline construction made by Russia and Germany and the pre-Second World War division of the region between the spheres of interest of Germany and the Soviet Union. Although the immediate security concern is environmental, the lack of consultation with neighbouring smaller states by Russia and Germany has been seen as a worrying sign (Radio Polonia 2006). The export of fossil fuels from the Russian Federation to the European Union could also be related to the issue of leverage over each other’s policies. In 1999, 53 per cent of Russian oil and 63 per cent of Russia’s natural gas exports went to European markets. Russian exports provided 16 per cent of the EU’s oil and 19 per cent of the EU’s natural gas consumption. By 2030 EU energy imports are expected to increase from 50 to 70 per cent (Lynch 2003: 63). This trend has been seen as a sign of growing Russian leverage over the European NATO members and the EU countries (Valasˇek 2004). In turn, Russia’s extensive oil and gas exports to European markets can be viewed as increasing Russia’s dependence on the EU. It would be justified to assume that the evolving energy politics in the region will increase its importance and make it more visible on the security map of the EU.

The aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001 The events of 11 September strongly influenced the security policies of the North European states. The attack on the World Trade Center signified the collision between the Western world and a type of terrorism that is based on a worldview radically different from that of its targets. This type of terrorism does not recognize the terms ‘nation’, ‘neutrality’, ‘negotiated solution’

34

Erik Ma¨nnik

and ‘non-combatant’ or the United Nations Organization and international legitimacy (Archer 2004: 49). Hence, the regional states have been forced to make hard choices about their policies. The regional NATO member states, with the exception of Germany, have been fully supportive of the US-led ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan and Iraq. Germany has not supported the operation Iraqi Freedom and has limited itself to participating in operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Finland and Sweden have also participated in ISAF. The Russian Federation has experienced grave domestic problems with terrorism. The main source of these problems is the Northern Caucasus. There is evidence of a foreign terrorist presence in Chechnya, but a majority of the terrorist activity was still home grown. Some 90 per cent of terrorist acts carried out in the Russian Federation were committed in the North Caucasus as of 2003 (United States Department of State 2004: 35–7). The scale of some terrorist acts in Russia has been simply stunning. On two occasions close to 1,000 hostages have been taken by terrorists – in Moscow in October 2002 and in Beslan in September 2004. In addition to dealing with terrorism and its causes externally, the EU and NATO member states have had to pay attention to their domestic situations. Germany was the first country to convict a terrorist in connection with the attacks of 11 September 2001, and while Norway has investigated the activities of the suspected Ansar al-Islam leader Mullah Krekar (United States Department of State 2004: 47, 52), Germany has banned the activities of radical Islamic organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, which has also been active in Sweden and Denmark. Although this organization has not been implicated in committing acts of terror, it is known actively to recruit disillusioned Muslims in Europe and its stated goal has been to establish a worldwide caliphate governed on the basis of Sharia law. Al Muhajiroun, another radical Islamic organization, has been recruiting volunteers to fight in Afghanistan and Table 2.7 Per capita ecological footprint of the countries in the region in 2001 Country

Total ecological footprint (global, ha/person) Rank among world states

Denmark Estonia Finland Germany Latvia Lithuania Norway Poland Russian Federation Sweden

6.4 6.9 7.0 4.8 4.4 3.9 6.2 3.6 4.4 7.0

Source: World Wildlife Fund 2004: 30–1.

9 7 6 21 25 29 11 32 26 5

Security in Northern Europe post-Cold War

35

Kashmir and is rumoured to have expanded its activities to Denmark (Archer 2004: 59–61). Finland has experienced fewer of this kind of problem, but it may be indicative of the changing situation that the Finnish Security Police established a unit concentrating solely on fighting terrorism in January 2004 (Archer 2004: 65; United States Department of State 2004: 45). The Baltic states have so far had to be concerned mainly with the risk of terror acts against the citizens and diplomatic representations of other states actively involved in the ‘War on Terror’ (Helsingin Sanomat 2004). However, as the probability of terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction seems to be growing (Postimees 2005a) and the ‘new terrorists’ make no distinction between humanitarian missions and military interventions, the possibility of regional countries becoming the targets of extremely destructive terror acts has to be taken seriously. Similarly, the possibility of suffering the effects of the use of weapons of mass destruction against any other country must be considered. The new and growing role of a Muslim population as a security actor in Northern Europe was very clearly revealed after the publication of cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper JyllandsPosten in September 2005. What followed was beyond any expectation. The protests held by Muslim organizations in Denmark spread very quickly to other countries and resulted in the burning of Danish and Norwegian embassies in Syria (BBC 2006), and the Danish embassy was attacked and set on fire also in Lebanon, whereas several countries in the Middle East boycotted Danish goods. Hence, a section of the Muslim minority constituting a few per cent of the Danish population has become a serious political actor capable of influencing the status of Denmark in the Muslim countries of the world. Importantly, the anger of Muslims was not only directed against Denmark, but also extended to Norway, also an active participant in the ‘War on Terror’. This suggests that participation in the ‘War on Terror’ could entail considerable domestic security ramifications and that the Northern European states have become truly multi-ethnic and multicultural states in the twenty-first century.

Conclusions: a change in the security paradigm across Northern Europe? Having described in the previous sections various changes that have taken place in the region, it is time to evaluate how Northern Europe fits into the threat matrixes described in the introductory part of this chapter (p. 16). From the perspective outlined by Buzan et al. (1998), since the end of the Cold War the most acute regional security challenges seem to have shifted from the military sphere to the environmental and societal sectors. Whereas

36

Erik Ma¨nnik

Russia has staged in the region its largest military manoeuvres in the postCold War period, the enlargement of NATO has caused no direct military confrontation, nor escalation of military tensions. Simultaneously, there have been some ethnic tensions in Estonia and Latvia associated with Russian-speaking minorities. A new type of ethnic tension has surfaced and can be associated with the participation of some states in the ‘War on Terror’. The regional countries have their share of 15 million Muslims living in Europe and it has been seen in the Danish example that sections of the Muslim community can react very strongly to what they perceive as an insult to their religious beliefs or an undermining of their identity. It was also shown in the chapter that the Baltic Sea experiences grave environmental problems and that the economical and technological activities around it give rise to a risk of various disasters. Of the risks outlined in the European Security Strategy, organized crime has evolved most visibly during the transition period of the post-Communist states. In general, Northern Europe has been remarkably stable and the Baltic states and Poland have experienced considerable economic growth. There have been no acts of terror in the region despite the presence of some radical Islamists. Considering the peaceful development of the region and the dominance of non-military security challenges after the end of the Cold War, the relevance of the analysis of the military dimension of security in the region could be challenged. After all, in 2006 the Baltic Sea was a mare clausum of the EU, and NATO seemed to be the absolutely dominant military force in Europe. It was as if a miniature ‘end of history’ had arrived in Northern Europe. The arguments against such views consider the Russian Federation as a state in transition (and therefore to a certain extent unpredictable) and stress the necessity of dealing with Belarus – the last dictatorship in Europe. Thus, there still seem to be reasons to maintain the inclusion of military aspects in the overall regional security calculus. The export of fossil fuels from Russia to the EU through the region and the growing dependence of the EU on imported fuels give the region a considerable strategic value that may even increase in the future. All in all, it can be said that the region has not posed serious security problems for the EU and seems not to require the application of European crisis management assets. However, the events of 11 September removed the last doubts about whether the region’s security should be treated in a different context. Northern Europe, while it has been and still is peaceful, is located in an increasingly turbulent and interconnected world where a state’s activities in distant regions will inevitably be reflected at home and domestic developments can influence a country’s status abroad. This is the security puzzle against which the regional states have had to develop their security policies, one component of which has been and is the ESDP.

Security in Northern Europe post-Cold War

37

Notes 1 I would like to express my gratitude to Alyson Bailes, director of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, for a very fruitful discussion on the subject. 2 The Russian Federation is entitled to hold in the flank zones a total of 1,300 main battle tanks, 2,140 armoured combat vehicles and 1,680 artillery pieces (Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1999: 22). 3 The numbers of ‘combat aircraft’ and ‘attack and armed helicopters’ also include the equipment for naval aviation of the respective countries; the category ‘armoured combat vehicles’ also includes numbers of ‘look-alikes’ (e.g. International Institute for Strategic Studies 2002: 72, 93). This approach explains the differences between the figures presented on p. 21 and the officially declared holdings. 4 Non-strategic nuclear weapons include nuclear weapons of the front aviation; naval aviation; air defence aviation; missile and artillery complexes of the ground forces; nuclear mines of engineering troops; the missiles, torpedoes of the conventional navy; air defence complexes; naval helicopters carrying out antisubmarine warfare missions (Kipp 2001). 5 Figures calculated by the author on the basis of figures provided in the presentation of Special Assignments Minister for Social Integration Nils Muiznieks (2004). 6 Such an estimate can be found in the web-based encyclopaedia Wikipedia under the heading ‘Islam by Country’ (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_by_country), but such a source has to be treated with caution. 7 Eutrophication is a process where an ecosystem becomes saturated with nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus, promoting intensive plant growth.

3

Northern Europe and the ESDP The case of Sweden Lars Wedin

Introduction During the Cold War, Sweden followed ‘a policy of neutrality’ according to the concept ‘non-aligned in peacetime with a view to stay neutral in wartime’. As a consequence, Sweden could not, it was said, be a member of the European Communities, later the European Union (EU). However, the end of the Cold War meant a new security landscape and, against the background of an economic crisis, Sweden applied for membership of the European Union in 1991. At that time, it was understood that this move would not be significant regarding the ‘policy of neutrality’. Indeed, at that stage the EU did not have any role in defence and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was just in its beginning. In 2004 the government proposed a White Paper on defence to the parliament, leading to important consequences for Swedish security and defence policy. The EU and its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) are here declared as the prioritized arena for Swedish Armed Forces (SAF). Obviously, there has been an important development since 1991. However, there seems to be a discrepancy between words and deeds when it comes to actual defence planning. This discrepancy could also be discerned in other areas regarding CFSP and ESDP. This chapter strives to explain why this is so through an overview and analysis of Swedish policy concerning the ESDP. The chapter starts with a short description of the development of Swedish security and defence policy in order to give a background for the analysis which follows. The subsequent section contains a description and analysis of current policy as promulgated by official documents. This analysis is followed by a discussion regarding defence reform in order to find out to what extent Sweden is honouring its commitments to the ESDP. Then comes a more general discussion on ESDP in Swedish policy. A short theoretical discussion and conclusions close the chapter.

The case of Sweden

39

Security context To begin with, it is worth pointing out that Sweden has not been to war since the end of the wars of Napoleon. Since then, Swedes have not needed to fight for their freedom. This experience, or lack of such, is unique among citizens of the European Union and no doubt marks the Swedish view on defence. Even if Russia today is portrayed as relatively benign, the Swedish geopolitical situation – in the rimland between the Atlantic and Euro-Asia – with regard to this country will always be of great importance. This has at least two consequences. The first is the importance of the presence of the United States in Europe and in the Nordic region. Even if Sweden often criticizes US policy on moral grounds, mutual friendship is important. The second is the insistence on the principle of the indivisibility of security. The Nordic area, with its Russian neighbour, cannot, regarding hard security, be seen as a region apart. Instead, it must be understood as a part of Europe as a whole. These factors suggest that Swedish policy is based on a Realist approach to security. During the Cold War, Sweden followed a policy of ‘non-participation in alliances’ or ‘non-alignment’, with the aim of ‘be[ing] neutral in case of war’. This policy was called a ‘policy of neutrality’, not to be confused with ‘neutrality’ in the word’s legal meaning. The policy was based on the existence of a strong total defence. The requirement of strength, however, was based on the formula ‘strong in relation to our situation’ (Andre´n 1996: 188). Whether ‘situation’ meant perceived external threats or internal finances was never explicitly explained. In Swedish a direct translation of the rather neutral term ‘non-aligned’ is not used – the Swedish expression translates into ‘freedom/liberty from (military) alliances’. This implies that the fact that Sweden is not a member of an alliance has a positive value in itself.1 Consequently, this policy has often been seen as giving Sweden a moral higher ground than North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations. In 1961, then prime minister Tage Erlander stated that membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) would not be compatible with Swedish neutrality policy (Andre´n 1996: 136). From that moment on, the issue was more or less dead until Sweden applied for membership in 1991. In this context, the prime minister, Ingvar Carlsson (Social Democrat), told the parliament that ‘a stable and consequent policy of neutrality forms the basis for the Swedish security policy’, implying that Sweden indeed could become a member without changing this policy. He continued by stating that ‘Sweden cannot, without forgoing its policy of neutrality, take part in a common defence policy’ (Carlsson 1991: 24, 27). Some months later, in December 1991, the then new minister for foreign affairs, Margaretha af Ugglas, declared that ‘the term ‘policy of neutrality’ does not adequately . . . [describe Swedish policy]’(af Ugglas 1991: 115). The

40

Lars Wedin

government now started to use the formula ‘militarily non-aligned’ instead of the broader ‘non-aligned’ (Andre´n 1996: 163–5). In less than a year, the basis for the Swedish foreign policy had changed remarkably. However, there was very little debate and it is open to doubt whether Swedish citizens really understood what happened. Regarding defence, however, the transition was rather slow.2 It took several years before it was recognized that the threat of an invasion by the Soviet Union (or, later, Russia) was over. During this period two trends can be discerned. One is the successive drawdown of the armed forces. In 1990, the SAF proposed a long-term goal of 21 army brigades plus 400, 000 territorial troops (including home guard), 12 squadrons of surface combatants, 14 submarines and 21 squadrons of ¨ verbefa¨lhavaren 1990: 28–9). Fifteen years later, what is combat aircraft (O left is around six battalions, and weak naval and air forces. The other trend could be called Europeanization. This term, having several definitions, is here used to describe key developments: institutional adaptation, policy transfer, restructuring of the strategic opportunities available to domestic actors, and shifts in cognition, discourse and identity affecting policy (Featherstone 2002: 19). When the period after the Cold War started, the SAF had rather little experience of international cooperation except within the context of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping. Gradually, the forces became more and more involved. The first step was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Stockholm Conference in 1984–6 and then the introduction of its Vienna Document (1990), with its notion of openness and transparency – contrary to existing doctrine (J. Tunberger, Expert in the Swedish delegation to the Stockholm Conference 1984–6, interview 4 April 2006). The arms control negotiations within the then CSCE forced the SAF HQs to think strategically and internationally in a completely new way.3 The second step was the participation in UN Protection Force (former Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR), where Swedish soldiers, to the horror of some, left the blue-helmet concept of UN peacekeeping. The third step was Partnership for Peace (with NATO, PfP), which made it possible to co-operate with NATO. The old ideal of a Swedish profile regarding standards and doctrines gave way to interoperability. The Swedish military became more and more active in Brussels, in NATO and somewhat later in the Western European Union (WEU). Since the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the ESDP has gradually become the priority. Membership in NATO, however, is still ruled out. To conclude, Swedish policy seems to have changed fundamentally since the end of the Cold War. The defence policy has been Europeanized and military forces have been scaled down to a fraction of their former strength as they are being optimized for international crisis management operations (CMOs). Non-membership in NATO seems to be the only ‘holy cow’ still in the field. However, as will be shown on pp. 43–6, such a conclusion needs to be qualified.

The case of Sweden

41

Current security and defence policy This section builds on two important official policy documents: the yearly Foreign Policy Declaration from the Government to Parliament of 15 February 2006 (‘Declaration’) and the Government White Paper for defence reform from September 2004 (‘White Paper’), now being implemented. The section focuses on aspects of relevance for the ESDP. It should be noted that the Declaration is much shorter and of more current interest than the lengthy White Paper, which has a horizon of several years. Consequently, one should be careful when comparing the two texts. Swedish foreign policy builds on a broad concept of security: ‘The foreign policy of the Government takes its point of departure from the understanding that security, development and human rights are each other’s prerequisites and mutually reinforcing’ (Regeringskansliet 2006: 1). It is also stated that the threats of today may strike against ‘us’: something the terrorist actions in Bali, the 2004 tsunami catastrophe and the attacks against Swedish embassies have shown.4 The importance of co-operation is mentioned several times in both documents. The Declaration states: ‘These threats [the ones just mentioned] must be met by an increased readiness to handle crisis and by a much broadened co-operation, as within the EU or UN’ (Regeringskansliet 2006: 4). The White Paper states that Sweden supports the reinforcement of cooperation in the field of security and defence policy in accordance with the EU Security Strategy (ESS) (Regeringen 2004: 15). The Foreign Policy Declaration never uses the Swedish equivalent of the term ESDP. It is, however, alluded to in several ways, such as: ‘The government wants to strengthen the European Union as a global actor in foreign and security policy’ (Regeringskansliet 2006: 3). In this context, it is noted that Sweden will lead one of the EU battlegroups and the Declaration adds that Sweden intends to organize civilian rapid response groups (Regeringskansliet 2006: 3). Interestingly – for internal political reasons – battlegroups are, in official Swedish parlance, alluded to as ‘rapid response forces’. The White Paper clearly emphasizes the ESDP and its importance for Sweden, including as an engine for change (Regeringen 2004: 24, 27). Swedish security and defence are linked to the EU. The White Paper states that the EU is a political alliance with a growing role as a global actor in the fields of economy as well as of foreign and security policy. A reinforced capability for the EU is also a reinforcement of Swedish capability (Regeringen 2004: 15). The Declaration states that ‘[w]hen the EU works for peace, the Union also talks for us. When we contribute to [CFSP actions] we also reinforce our own [security]’ (Regeringskansliet 2006: 3). A satisfactory defence capability forms a central part of Swedish security policy. This policy aims at keeping peace and independence for Sweden; it should contribute to stability and security in Sweden’s neighbourhood and reinforce international peace and security (Regeringen 2004: 23). One notes

42

Lars Wedin

that ‘satisfactory’ is not that precise a term, but it certainly sounds weaker than the old formula ‘strong in relation to our situation’. The then Social Democrat government assessed that the current favourable situation would become even more positive in the years to come. Nevertheless, it was not possible to exclude a future military threat against Sweden (Regeringen 2004: 31). It was not then, or now, possible to say what form such a threat could take. In this perspective, long-term freedom of action in the field of security policy is fundamental: ‘Sweden shall in each and every case be able to take decisions based on its own analyses’ (Regeringen 2004: 24). This emphasis on the importance of freedom of action returns later: ‘It is of great importance that our defence and our crisis management capability are developed to give long-term freedom of action regarding future needs and menaces’ (Regeringen 2004: 28). Defence is still national business. In the White Paper, the Baltic area is described as calm and stable, and characterized by close co-operation. Russia co-operates with the EU, NATO and in regional settings. Sweden’s geostrategic situation has been improved, in particular through enlargement of the EU and NATO. There is a broad co-operation between the Nordic countries about lessons learned, co-ordination and common actions in international settings. This co-operation should be broadened to encompass also the three Baltic states. Generally, there is a good base for co-operation regarding the challenges of today, such as organized crime, illegal migration and threats against the environment, as well as trafficking (Regeringen 2004: 18). It is notable that there is no mention of military aspects regarding the region. The Declaration states that Sweden wants to increase co-operation with Russia but is worried about the situation for non-governmental organizations and the media. Regarding Belarus, that country is ‘governed by a hard and authoritarian regime’ (Regeringskansliet 2006: 4). There is no mention of ESDP and its possible contributions in this regard. There are threats and challenges but these are not in the military field – the area is, one could argue, desecuritized. When the Declaration mentions Sweden’s upcoming chairmanship of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), it highlights sustainable development and trafficking (Regeringskansliet 2006: 4). Here an explanation may be needed. Sweden has persistently argued that the principle of the indivisibility of security should apply to the Nordic region; that it is a matter for the whole of Europe and the US (cf. OSCE 1990: 5). Hence, co-operation regarding regional ‘hard security’ should be avoided. In particular, ideas regarding a regional security system consisting of Sweden and Finland and the three Baltic states have been rejected (Hurd 1996: 6). Second, defence is still seen as a national issue and military threats in this area would certainly have defence implications. Third, there are no military threats – this is the very basis for the defence reform. Swedish policy regarding its ‘non-participation in military alliances’ is a difficult issue to explain. The White Paper states that ‘Sweden is not a

The case of Sweden

43

member of any military alliance. This line in security policy, which makes neutrality possible during conflicts in our neighbourhood, has served us well’ (Regeringen 2004: 23). One notes the word ‘neutrality’. Further down it states: ‘It is difficult to imagine Sweden staying neutral in the case of an armed attack on another EU Member State. It is equally difficult to imagine that other EU Member States would not act in the same way’ (Regeringen 2004: 23). This fits with a statement in the next chapter: ‘In the EU, there is a marked solidarity between Member States. It is in the interest of Sweden that the new constitution enhances this solidarity’ (Regeringen 2004: 27). Later the White Paper states that, for a reasonable period of time, the threats that could be directed against Swedish security are also threats against other EU Member States. Conversely, threats against the common security of the EU are also threats against Sweden (Regeringen 2004: 34). Solidarity yes, but no membership in NATO: ‘Swedish security policy is safe, active and [built on solidarity]5 and rests on the basis of non-participation in military alliances’ (Regeringskansliet 2006: 3). The White Paper states: ‘Contemporary threats against international peace and the security of Sweden are best warded off in . . . co-operation with other countries, with non-membership of military alliances as a base’ (Regeringen 2004: 23). The same theme is found in the Declaration when it states that ‘the military freedom of alliances gives us both the independence our international engagement needs and the possibility to take part in international cooperation for freedom and security’ (Regeringskansliet 2006: 5). On a more general level, the Declaration notes that increased co-operation in foreign and security policy will take place ‘on the basis of non-participation in military alliances’ (Regeringskansliet 2006: 4). Is there a clear line in this? One should note that the White Paper is a product of a compromise between the then Social Democrat government and its supporting leftist parties, both with regard to the EU and, in particular, NATO. In a way, that text could be seen as ‘creative ambiguity’. The Declaration was proposed in an election year, when the government presumably wanted to avoid attacks from its supporting parties on the left on its foreign policy, while warning against those opposition parties that have expressed an interest in future membership in NATO (Regeringskansliet 2006: 5). The issue is, however, not just a question of today’s domestic policy. More generally, non-membership in military alliances is perceived as giving a higher degree of freedom of action in external relations and from a higher moral ground. Solidarity yes – but Sweden decides when that concept would apply as it is a legally weaker concept than a treaty-based alliance. This point is illustrated in an interview in September 2005, when the Social Democrat prime minister spoke of ‘our unswerving defence of the nonparticipation in alliances, which is a token of our idea that we can play a role outside the big military alliances’ (Albons 2005). (Incidentally, one wonders to which alliances besides NATO he was alluding.)

44

Lars Wedin

Despite non-membership in military alliances, Sweden wants a broad cooperation with NATO – ‘within the context of the partnership [PfP] we take part in’ (Regeringskansliet 2006: 5). The White Paper notes that this cooperation underpins all-European security and constitutes concrete support for the transatlantic link. PfP is the most important instrument for the creation of interoperability, which is necessary for international crisis management. The strategic partnership between EU and NATO implies that Sweden’s relations with NATO increasingly will be defined by its EU membership (Regeringen 2004: 17). From a Swedish perspective it is very important that this relationship does not ‘single out’ Sweden among EU members – it should have the same rights and obligations as all other members. In reality, this is not easy as Sweden, as a non-member of NATO, is excluded from the day-to-day work of the Alliance. ‘The Government increases the ambition regarding Swedish participation in international operations’ (Regeringskansliet 2006: 3). This statement regards both military and civilian instruments. One notes that nothing is said about capabilities. This, however, was the major theme of the White Paper as it attempts to finalize the transformation from Cold War territorial defence to international crisis management: leaner, more mobile and more ready. Already in the preamble, it is stated: ‘International peace and security for Sweden, EU and our neighbourhood will be reinforced by the strengthening of Sweden’s capability to take part in international co-operation and crisis management operations’ (Regeringen 2004: 1). The armed forces constitute an important resource in support of an active foreign and security policy. Through taking part in international operations, Sweden strengthens international peace and security and thereby its own security. This link has been made more evident by current threats and conflicts. The reform of the armed forces will make them more able to support the development of the crisis management capability of the EU and Swedish opportunities to take part in peace support operations within the context of the UN and other international organizations (Regeringen 2004: 12). Priority will be given to the Swedish element of the rapid reaction capability of EU. There will, however, also be a need for sustained stabilizing operations; that is, operations with less emphasis on rapid reaction than on long duration, such as in the present-day Balkans (Regeringen 2004: 12). It is important to note that the White Paper also deals with civilian aspects of defence. The EU is seen as having an advantage in comparison with other actors through its broad set of instruments. Through participation in co-operation regarding civilian crisis management, it is said, Sweden supports international security. There should be a closer relationship between the UN and the EU in this regard, and the EU–NATO relationship should be developed as well (Regeringen 2004: 222). The national capability will greatly benefit from increased co-operation in, and experiences from, participation in international civilian crisis management (Regeringen 2004: 221).

The case of Sweden

45

The armed forces should have the capability of keeping intruders away from Swedish territory and of supporting international peace and security. They should also keep a basic level of capability and competence to defend the country (Regeringen 2004: 1). Clearly, international crisis management is their prime mission. Sweden should be able to participate in peace-support operations on the same level as other comparable European states, which would imply a sharp increase on the present rather low figure – less than 1,000 troops on the ground in various missions and no naval or air units. National and international missions are two sides of the same coin, it is stated (Regeringen 2004: 32). One notes that this statement seems to be somewhat at odds with the idea of defence as a national issue. Regarding Sweden’s commitment to the EU Headline Goal 2010, it is stated that this ‘should form the basis for the development of the international capability’ of the SAF (Regeringen 2004: 69). There is, however, no such statement regarding civilian capabilities. So far, the White Paper seems to be in line with the commitment, in accordance with the ESS, to increase capabilities. This picture changes drastically when the actual development of the SAF is discussed. Here it is argued that international security makes it possible to reduce ambitions in several areas. Hence, there will be important reductions in the volume of active forces. The savings that stem from these reductions may to some extent be used to finance an increased ambition regarding the capability of carrying out international missions (Regeringen 2004: 32). In reality, this implies priority for the Nordic Battlegroup (NBG) project at the expense of other parts of the armed forces. The document later outlines the future development of the armed forces in some detail. Issues regarding procurement, however, are not dealt with in detail – this is left to a later publication. After the October 2006 elections a new centre-right coalition government came into power. In his statement of government policy to parliament, the new prime minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, stated that ‘Sweden must have a clear and unquestioned place at the heart of European cooperation’ (Government 2006a: 8). Regarding the ESDP, he said: Europe has a decisive role to play in managing international challenges. We want to see a stronger Europe step forth as a voice for peace, freedom and reconciliation even in the parts of the world that are dominated by war and conflicts. (Government 2006a: 8–9) He reiterated the old formula that ‘Sweden does not participate in military alliances’ and added: ‘The future security of our country is based on community and cooperation with other countries. The Government attaches importance to the EU’s common security strategy’ (Government 2006a: 9).

46

Lars Wedin

Hence, the EU seems to have a more central place in the policy of the new government, although, on the whole, there is continuity rather than change.

Defence reform ESDP is clearly the priority for the SAF. The Commander-in-Chief, General Syre´n, underlined in 2006: ‘If we are going to be able to take part in the concept now being developed by the EU, it is important that we understand that everything is interlinked and that we must adapt the whole organization [the SAF]’ (Unsigned 2004). The government has ordered that the capability of the armed forces regarding multinational interoperability should be based on standards and norms developed by the EU and, when such standards do not exist, on NATO standards. It could be noted that the Operational Staff within the SAF Headquarters is organized in accordance with NATO’s concept of a ‘Combined Joint Task Force’ (Carlsson 2006: 48). There is a stated objective to increase Swedish participation in Crisis Management Operations (CMOs) to 2,000 men and women, which is very ambitious compared with the present. However, the new system is based on the assumption that at least 30 per cent of the conscripts volunteer to take part in such operations (Carell, interview 2005). As less than 10 per cent were doing so in 2005, this is a risky hypothesis. The NBG is the real engine for transformation. It will reach full operational capability (FOC) by 1 January 2008. Thereafter, present plans would make it possible to set up one battle group every third year. The balance between mobility and protection is a major issue. The present standard Swedish combat vehicle, CV 90, is not transportable except by sea or by wide-body strategic airlift. For rapid reaction, the NBG will need a new, lighter armoured combat vehicle (ACV), which now seems to be in the pipeline, though not in sufficient numbers (K. Engelbrektson, Swedish leader of the NBG project, interview 14 November 2005). The NBG will be able to take on the full range of combat tasks. It will be trained in accordance with the ‘Three Bloc War Concept’ (Engelbrektson, interview 2005).6 The priority, however, is rapid reaction, and at the lower spectrum of combat tasks (A. Carell, Head Army Section, Armed Forces Headquarters, interview 8 November 2005). This development has highlighted the need for a number of new skills. Swedish ground and air forces, for instance, have had to learn to use close air support (CAS) (T. Karlsson, Head Air Force Section, Armed Forces Headquarters, interview 8 November 2005). There must be an intense cooperation with the British, who are expected to provide the operation headquarters (OHQ) in the case of a deployment of the NBG (Engelbrektson, interview 2005). Obviously, there must also be full co-operation with the other participants in the NBG: Estonia, Finland and Norway. Furthermore, the SAF must learn to operate in Africa, not least regarding the gathering of intelligence (Engelbrektson, interview 2005).

The case of Sweden

47

The ESS emphasizes international co-ordination and pooling in order to get greater effect from European defence budgets. Except for the NBG, Sweden has so far not participated in such endeavours. Furthermore, there are no projects aimed primarily at covering shortfalls in the Headline Goal 2010 (Carell, interview 2005). Consequently, in spite of the demands on adaptation to the requirements of the EU, procurement is prioritized according to national views. All operational units are earmarked for international crisis management. At present, the SAF does not need to keep any operational forces ready to defend Swedish sovereignty, as there is, according to the government, no threat. There is, however, some readiness to guard territorial sovereignty against minor intrusions. The Commander-in-Chief’s official assessment is that ‘the capability to defend our territorial integrity and to take part in international peace support operations is to a large extent in line with the requirements’ (Fo¨rsvarsmakten 2005: 7). In other words, the armed forces are up to the very low requirements made of them. In fact, according to the White Paper, military aggression against Sweden is improbable during at least a ten-year period (Regeringen 2004: 12). However, developments in Russia are creating worries, as any serious rearmament of the SAF would take a very long time (Unsigned 2006: 2). The present strength of the SAF is the absolute minimum required for the training of the 2,000 (Carell, interview 2005). The Commander-in-Chief, at a yearly conference in January 2006, stated that after the reductions made in the budget since year 2000 – totalling 20 per cent – there could be no fur¨ verbefa¨lhavaren ther reductions without abandoning whole systems (O 2006). Regarding procurement, very little is in the pipeline. Even more worrying, according to a recent government study, investment in education, research and development will be heavily reduced (Regeringen 2005). The army will have officers to man six battalions plus the Swedish part of the NBG. It will be able to train ten battalions per period of eighteen months. Its main objective regarding procurement is an air transportable ACV. Swedish soldiers have a good reputation from their participation in CMOs. There are, however, risks as there is a lack of force protection, in particular regarding protected vehicles (Carell, interview 2005). This shortfall led to losses in Afghanistan (ISAF) on 25 November 2005. The small navy is internationally considered expert in coastal operations, although the endurance of its ships is too weak. The lease of a submarine with its crew from Sweden by the US Navy is proof of the former (O. Werin, Head, Navy Section, Armed Forces Headquarters, interview 8 November 2005). It plans to acquire bigger ships after 2015 but expects to continue its present focus on ‘extreme littorals’.7 The air force has two operational squadrons of the latest version of the JAS 39, as well as two divisions for training. It meets very high international standards and the latest version of the JAS 39 is fully compatible with NATO standards. Ground-attack ammunition has been acquired.8 Hence, the air force will have the capability of giving close air support to the

48

Lars Wedin

NBG (Karlsson, interview 2005). The air force and the navy are acquiring NATO-compatible data link systems (Karlsson, interview 2005; Werin, email to author 2006). A significant shortfall, which Sweden shares with nearly all other EU states, is a lack of strategic transport capabilities. A move to acquire two US C17 wide-body aircraft was stopped by the Left and Green parties (Brink 2006). Lack of tactical transport – the new transport helicopter NFH 90 will not be delivered before 2008 – is another important shortfall for the NBG (Holmstro¨m 2006). Other common strategic shortfalls include air-toair refuelling and strategic intelligence, as well as ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance). So far, Sweden has not entered into any co-operative endeavours to fill these gaps. In the case of Operation Artemis, the Swedish government and parliament showed that they are able to take quick decisions. The system will be refined in time for the NBG becoming operational in January 2008 (A. Bjurner, Head of the Department of European Security Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, interview 16 November 2005). This objective will require a system for strategic planning and decision-making that has not existed previously and, hence, in itself will constitute an important part of the transformation. Regarding military readiness, the new training system just mentioned is expected to give a sufficient level. Sweden also participates in the development of an ‘EU strategic culture’. The Swedish National Defence College puts great emphasis on issues regarding the EU and NATO in its research and teaching. It also takes part in the European Security and Defence College project (B. Jifa¨lt, Swedish National Defence College, interview 19 December 2005). To conclude, Sweden seems to have taken the statement of the ESS that ‘it is abroad that the first line of defence will lie’ (European Union 2003) quite literally, as it concentrates on international crisis management operations and leaves the defence of the country aside. However, SAF capabilities have hardly strengthened in accordance with the ESS: ‘To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary’ (European Union 2003: 12). Certainly, the SAF will be able to be more active, albeit in comparison with an extremely low level. It is being transformed in the sense that the old territorial defence built on general mobilization is, in principle, abolished. But it is less clear that it will become ‘a flexible force, able to address new threats’. Resources for defence have been drastically reduced, not increased. Indeed, voices in parliament now warn that the NBG project is in danger (Brink 2006).

ESDP in Swedish policy The Eurobarometer shows Swedes to be rather Eurosceptic. During the period from 1992 to 2004 between 30 and 35 per cent of Swedes believed

The case of Sweden

49

that membership in the EU ‘is a good thing’, while between 33 and 41 per cent believed that ‘it is a bad thing’ (EU 2005). Nevertheless, the Helsinki Headline Goal of creating a rapid reaction capacity of 60,000 men met with the approval of 74 per cent, the same average as the EU as a whole (Manigart 2001). Swedish security and defence policy seems to be Europeanized to a large extent. Membership of NATO is the main missing link. Furthermore, Sweden does not see itself as committed to strengthening its military capabilities in accordance with the ESS or the Headline Goal. Arguably, the EU is not responsible for the collective defence of its members. Indeed, in accordance with Article 17 of the Treaty (EU 2002), Sweden could continue its policy of not accepting or giving security guarantees. The EU does, however, require solidarity (EU 2002: Article 11), a requirement which, as mentioned, is mirrored in the White Paper. It seems to be understood that globalization and EU integration imply that an attack against one is an attack against all – treaties on collective defence or not. Hence, while keeping its political freedom of action, Sweden would presumably only in exceptional circumstances abstain from showing solidarity. As mentioned, the Swedes joined the European Union assuming that this step would not change their sacrosanct policy of neutrality. Although Swedish policy during the Cold War aimed at neutrality in wartime, most Swedes defined Sweden as ‘neutral’, and some still do. Miles (2004) argues that non-alignment was an integral part of Sweden’s political culture and one of the tenets of the so-called Swedish model. Furthermore, non-alignment made Sweden more prominent in the international environment. Hence, Sweden could pursue an active international role in relation to its resources. It is also felt that non-alignment kept Sweden outside the two world wars of the last century (Miles 2004). This neutralist logic can still be seen in contributions to the journal of the General Defence Organization (Allma¨nna Fo¨rsvarsfo¨reningen). Here it has been argued that Sweden should not participate in the Afghanistan operation as this constitutes support for the ‘power politics of the imperial United States’ (Palm 2005: 14) and that Sweden only should take part in UN ‘blue-helmet’-style operations, leaving more robust operations to the ‘great powers’ (Linder 2006: 21). Furthermore, and more important, the Left party has declared that Sweden, after a referendum, should leave the EU (Nandorf 2006). So far, however, Sweden has appeared determined to keep its international commitments. This was demonstrated by the 2005 incident in Afghanistan described on p. 47. In spite of the losses, the parliament, with a great majority, voted for the enlargement of its mission to Afghanistan, where the SAF took over the responsibility for the Mazar-e-Sharif area from the British in March 2006 (Riksdagen 2005). Certainly, there have been some media voices proposing the abandonment of this mission as too dangerous, but these have had little effect.

50

Lars Wedin

It is interesting to note that it was Sweden together with Finland who proposed the insertion of the so-called Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty.9 Why was this done? The official answer is that this would make the EU a more efficient actor in international crisis management. There were other likely reasons. One was that Sweden needed to show that, in spite of its non-membership of NATO, it was a country also to be trusted in military matters. After all, Sweden had taken part in UNPROFOR, the NATOled Implementation Force (Bosnia, IFOR) and the NATO Stabilization Force (former Yugoslavia, SFOR) with significant forces, which had been proven in combat. To allow this proposal to fit with non-participation in military alliances, it was argued that there is a clear difference between territorial defence and crisis management. Another reason was that there was talk of creating a fourth pillar handling common defence. Without changing its basic policy, Sweden would not have been able to participate in such an endeavour, meaning that Sweden would be excluded from two important areas: common currency and defence. Consequently, the objective was to have an acceptable clause about defence within the main treaty.10 At the time, few believed that the provisions in the Amsterdam Treaty would translate into action. After the St Malo summit, the ESDP became more operational and, after discussions with friends, Sweden took part. Sweden seems to have been put under very hard pressure to accept the Cologne European Council decisions on the ESDP.11 As the 1999 Helsinki European Council came closer, Sweden tried to diminish the military aspects and any resemblance to NATO by arguing, for instance, for a mixed ‘Petersberg Committee’ instead of the future EU Military Committee. At an interview after the summit, the prime minister downplayed the agreement, saying it ‘would only involve military hospitals or mine clearance’. When the details became clear, however, the government acted rapidly in order to influence the development from the very beginning.12 This development set the tune for the coming years. Often Sweden agreed reluctantly to new ideas in order to act quickly when they became reality. One example is co-operation in armaments. Initially, Sweden took a negative attitude. When it was clear that there would be a European Defence Agency (EDA), Sweden quickly acted to secure one of the top jobs.13 Nevertheless, it should be underlined that Sweden did everything it could in order to further the development of the ESDP during its Presidency. That there was a meagre result, in particular regarding EU–NATO co-operation, was beyond Swedish power; the time was not ripe. Regarding the civilian capabilities, the Foreign Policy Declaration of 2005 stated that after the experiences of the tsunami catastrophe the Union should have rapid reaction forces (not necessarily military) to support its citizens during crises in foreign countries (Regeringskansliet 2005: 2). On a more general level, Sweden is prepared to participate with experts in civilian crisis management and conflict prevention. In its proposal for a domestic

The case of Sweden

51

security strategy, the government has underlined that the high ambitions of the government in this regard should be mirrored by the actions of Swedish authorities (Regeringen 2006: 70). Is there a Swedish strategy with regard to ESDP? The answer seems to be in the affirmative. As noted, the White Paper advocates participation in ESDP operations as an investment in solidarity, making collective defence less important. On a more general level, ESDP is seen as a way of strengthening UN and international security in general and, consequently, also Swedish security. Furthermore, ESDP, which is to be pursued in accordance with the UN Charter, strengthens multilateralism, international rules and humanitarian law – all parts of traditional Swedish foreign policy. Finally, Sweden is very active regarding development assistance, which, in order to achieve success, requires stability and peace. Hence, CMOs could be seen as an important tool in this regard (Bjurner, interview 2005). Sweden has generally actively taken part in ESDP operations. In particular, it is worth mentioning its participation with Special Forces integrated in the French force during Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in spring 2003. The force was engaged in some intensive fighting. To some, this was a rather surprising development. The operation, however, did fit Swedish policy very well: it was a UN-mandated operation to stop genocide and the UN requested it. It was also an operation in Africa – important in Swedish policy. Furthermore, it showed that ESDP operations are not restricted to 4,000 km from Brussels, as is sometimes argued, a limitation that Sweden does not support (Bjurner, interview 2005). Against this background, it was a surprise that Sweden participated with a very small force in Operation Althea, the most important ESDP operation so far. If, as appears to be the case, the money had already been spent on participation in the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), this prioritization could be the sign of a continued struggle between promoters of the UN and EU, respectively, in the government. Otherwise, the Swedish government does not have a policy regarding the priority per se of UN-, EU- or NATO-led operations. There is a general objective to participate with all these organizations Each case will be analysed individually from both strategic and political points of view and will depend on the available financial and military resources (Bjurner, interview 2005). The NBG project should of course be seen in light of the experience of Artemis. The EU needs a capacity for rapid reaction and combat, as well as a capacity to pursue long-term stabilization operations. The NBG is also a driving force in the transformation of the Swedish armed forces (Bjurner, interview 2005). Sweden may also wish to show that it is not shy regarding the use of military force, in order to make its insistence on civilian crisis management capacities more credible. At the capability conference for civilian resources in autumn 2005, Sweden offered rather substantial resources in all domains, such as Civil Response Teams, civilian observers, police and rescue teams. In most cases,

52

Lars Wedin

the numbers had gone up since 2004 (C. Hartzell, Swedish Delegation to the EU, interview 25 June 2006). To sum up, Swedish participation in ESDP has been characterized by reluctance during negotiations and quick implementation after agreement. Also the armed forces have been rather slow in adjusting to the new setting. It was when the present Commander-in-Chief took office in 2004 that ESDP first became a central theme. Today, ESDP forms the basis for the transformation of the Swedish armed forces and it is the main framework for the development of Swedish security policy. There is, however, still some reluctance to promote this policy with a general public known to be very EU-sceptic. There is also little talk about the EU as ‘we’. The main problem, finally, is the fact that resources and policy do not match. The political priority given to ESDP is not translated into budgetary terms and, hence, not into military capability. The new government has declared: ‘The demand from the UN, the EU and NATO for Swedish participation in international operations has never been greater. Sweden should have an increased potential to take part in different international peace missions’ (Government 2006a: 9). This is to be translated into an increase of the defence budget during 2006–9, ‘with the objective that in a longerterm perspective, Sweden should be able to make 2 000 women and men available for such operations.’ (Government 2006b: 38) One could discern certain hesitancy regarding the relative importance of the UN and EU. This is probably due to the existence of two political schools. One, the traditional and/or more Liberal, tends to give priority to the UN, while the other, newer and generally more Realist, emphasizes the EU and, within the limits of non-membership, co-operation with NATO. Traditional Social Democrats, the Left and the Green parties tend to prefer the former, while the parties to the right are more inclined towards the latter. These two different views are also represented in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.14 Hence, documents like the Foreign Policy Declaration tend to be a compromise between these two views.

Final comments and conclusions From a theoretical point of view, Swedish policy regarding the ESDP contains some interesting points. First, Swedes normally portray themselves as pragmatists. Decisions are taken as required by the political agenda and/or to pursue practical objectives. This might mirror an understanding of the limits of power of a small state like Sweden. But it also implies a lack of vision. Swedish policy may be analysed through the prism of geopolitical theory. Interestingly, the inventor of the term ‘geopolitics’ was a Swede, Professor Rudolf Kjelle´n (1864–1922). The term, however, is seldom used in Sweden because of Hitler’s misuse of the theory (that is, his ideas on Lebensraum). Harold Mackinder (1861–1947) launched a theory that the one who controls

The case of Sweden

53

the Heartland will, ultimately, dominate the World Island (Chauprade 2003: 45). The opposite theory was formulated by A.T. Mahan (1840–1914), who argued that in the end sea power would triumph. Seen in this way, Sweden is situated on the rimland between the Euro-Asian landmass and the Atlantic Ocean – between Mackinder and Mahan. For Sweden, as a small country and a non-member of military alliances, it is important that the world is, as much as possible, governed by international law and multilateralism, including the UN, thus creating stability and predictability for a small country. This Liberal Institutionalist outlook, however, is balanced by the acceptance that global governance is still less than perfect. Therefore, when it comes to hard issues Sweden rather takes a Realist approach. The insistence on preservation of freedom of action is perhaps the most obvious example – preferring political solidarity to treaty-based mutual security guarantees. As a consequence, a certain discrepancy between words and deeds can be discerned; the former are often very Liberal Institutionalist, while the latter are more Realist. Swedish doctrine has, since the Cold War, gone through a ‘first-order change’, to use the terminology of Sten Rynning (2002: 6). During the Cold War, it was constituted by a strategy of deterrence by denial; that is, an attack against Sweden should not be worth the effort, to use the taxonomy of the French General Poirier (1987: 132). Today, it could be characterized, again in the parlance of Poirier, as a strategy of active defence of Sweden’s interests in the context of international crisis management, particularly within the EU, fully in line with the ESS view that the first line of defence is abroad. This ‘first-order change’ has not been the result of a coherent political effort but rather a successive adaptation to changing circumstances. When, for example, Sweden engaged in international crisis management operations during the 1990s, this was often depicted as a way of using the forces and keeping them operational while Russia was weak and did not constitute a danger (cf. Hederstedt 1998). A result of this change is that the securitized area could be seen as having been enlarged. Simultaneously, it has also been diluted – the threats are less vital, the character much less military. The centre is desecuritized as there are, allegedly, no military threats in the Nordic–Baltic area. Perhaps as a consequence, defence – an important political area during the Cold War – is virtually absent in the contemporary political debate. However, the rosy picture of the strategic situation in the Baltic area is now slowly being challenged due to developments in Russia. If a military threat resurfaced, what would Sweden do? Would it retreat to its policy of neutrality? Would ESDP become even more important or would it finally try to join NATO? The OSCE concept of comprehensive security (OSCE 1992: 5) has for a long time been in vogue in Sweden. The lessons of the Asian tsunami catastrophe have enlarged further this concept towards an acceptance of functional security or human security as the government has accepted that it

54

Lars Wedin

also has a responsibility for Swedish citizens far away from home (cf. Ekengren 2003). Is Swedish defence policy Europeanized?15 There has been an institutional adaptation, as, for instance, the ESDP clearly constitutes the focus for the development of Swedish armed forces. Furthermore, clear shifts in cognition, discourse and identity can be discerned as standards and doctrines are adapted to NATO standards, as much as is possible taking Swedish non-membership into account. That the battle group concept is serving as an engine for the transformation of the armed forces from a territorial defence force dependent on mobilization to a modern agile force for international CMOs is an example of the restructuring of strategic opportunities. On the other hand, the insistence on maintaining national freedom of action means that policy transfer has been rather limited. The continuation of the policy of non-military alignment is also a case in point in this regard. It is clear that Swedish adaptation to the ESDP constitutes a huge transformation from the past. At the same time, when it comes to the really hard issue – money in this case – the national agenda is much more important than European solidarity. However, Sweden is not unique in this regard. To conclude, the ESDP plays a significant role in Swedish security and defence. It constitutes the main engine for defence transformation. Old neutralist tendencies are being replaced by an understanding of the requirement for international co-operation also in the field of hard security. Beneath the surface, however, there is still a reluctance to engage and trust in European security. UN and soft security are seen as very important. Security guarantees are still not accepted and the defence budget is based on national considerations – where defence issues play a very small role – and not on the need to show solidarity with the requirements of the European Union. Political freedom of action is still a major policy goal. These characteristics are probably natural, taking Sweden’s geopolitical situation, EU-scepticism and history into account. Whether the policy of the centreright government will translate into significant changes, it is too early to say.

Notes 1 That is why some Swedish debaters use the expression ‘lack of alliance’ instead of ‘freedom from’. 2 The author vividly remembers the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, which happened during a command post exercise of the main headquarters. The reaction was ‘OK, the game is over – what do we do now?’ 3 Author’s reminiscences. The designation (names) of Swedish brigades was top secret until the first information given in accordance with the Vienna Document 1990. The author was working with CSCE/OSCE issues from 1990 to 1998 in HQs, in the Swedish Delegation to the CSCE in Vienna and in Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The case of Sweden

55

4 It is the attacks by Muslim extremists against Nordic embassies in the context of the caricatures which are alluded to. 5 The Swedish text uses ‘solidarity’ as an adjective. 6 High-intensity combat, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations pursued more or less simultaneously in an urban area. 7 This term implies the operationally very difficult environment close to coastlines and with small depth. 8 This includes LGB (laser-guided bomb) Paveway II with FLIR/Laser DesigNATO Pod Lightning G-III. 9 This proposal was made in an article by the Swedish and the Finnish Foreign Ministers Lena Hjelm-Walle´n and Tarja Halonen (1996). The article (TEU 17.2) reads: ‘Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’ (TEU 17.2). 10 The author’s experience of service in the Department for European Security in Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1995–8. 11 Information received from a German diplomat, autumn 1999. 12 The author was ordered on 1 March 2000 to go to Brussels in order to ‘be the first staff officer in the future military staff’. 13 The author’s reminiscences as Chief Concepts Branch EU Military Staff, 2000–3. 14 The author’s reminiscences from the ministry. 15 This issue will be the main theme of a forthcoming dissertation thesis by PhD candidate Arita Ericson of the Swedish National Defence College.

4

Finland and the ESDP ‘Obliquely forwards’? Hanna Ojanen1

Introduction: joining the EU, joining a security community? Creating compatibility between non-alignment and EU membership Finland joined the EU for reasons of security, but in a rather special sense. It did not join in order to enhance its security;2 it joined because it felt safe enough to do so. The late 1980s had changed Finland’s political environment in many ways. The Soviet Union softened its view on the European Communities and talks about closer relations between the European Communities and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)3 started, eventually leading to negotiations on the European Economic Area (EEA). In such circumstances, neutrality was no longer needed as the device with which Finland had positioned itself outside the East–West struggles. It was safe for Finland to stretch out to the European Communities that no longer were at the edge of political confrontation in Europe. Thus, membership was no longer politically controversial, or a security matter for Finland: Finland was able to join because membership no longer affected its security. Between 1988 and 1992, Finland established in a rapid cascade of government reports a wholly new course, first to the EEA, then to membership of the EU. Finland’s neutrality had been the reason why EC membership had never even been considered; the two were incompatible. Prime Minister Harri Holkeri even compared the task of combining neutrality and EC membership with that of squaring a circle (see Government Report 1990). Thus, redefinitions were due. Compatibility between the two was created on two parallel tracks: by reducing the political significance of neutrality and by depicting the EU in a problem-free way. From a broad conception of neutrality, Finland switched over to a narrow notion of military non-alliance,4 compressing the notion into its ‘core’ – much as did Sweden. The change was perhaps easier than in Sweden in that neutrality was, for the political elite, less identity-related and more instrumental in nature. Or, as Tiilikainen (2006a: 54) puts it, the Finnish experience of neutrality was less positive than the Swedish one. For Finland, neutrality had been a necessity in the same sense that being part of

Finland and the ESDP

57

strong institutions now seems to be, while for Sweden neutrality was a question of voluntary differentiation from others (Ojanen 2002a: 164).Also, compatibility was created through describing the EU’s security political consequences as positive for Finland. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was seen to enhance Finnish security, to complement it. This compatibility was based on the following interpretations: first, the goals and values behind the policies of the Union were found to be identical with those of Finland, which implied that the interests of Finland and the EU would also be the same. The government stressed the very general aims of the CFSP – peace, security and promotion of human rights. Second, the CFSP did not imply a need to alter bilateral relations with neighbours. Third, unanimous decisions and continued national responsibility for defence were underlined. The envisaged common defence policy – unlikely to materialize – would in any case be based on a unanimous decision and on respect for the basic security and defence arrangements of the member states (Ojanen 2000a: 97–8). The problems of compatibility were sensed within the EU, too. A neutral past was perceived as at least potentially problematic for the Union: the previous incompatibility between EC membership and neutrality was seen to reappear as incompatibility between the new policy of non-alignment and the expectation of mutual solidarity that characterizes a political union (see Chapter 3, p. 43). The countries that aimed at further integration did not necessarily wish to take in members who might not wholeheartedly embrace the goal of a common foreign and security policy. It was, and perhaps in some circles still is, an open question whether Finland could be a credible member of a common security and defence policy.5 Some may have worried over the possibility of the non-allied countries to mould the defence dimension according to their security and defence political idiosyncrasies (Ferreira-Pereira 2006: 105). The Maastricht Treaty was already in force when the membership negotiations of Finland, Sweden, Austria and Norway started, and thus set the scene for them. Even with the reduced new doctrine of military non-alignment, the European Commission expressed its worries in its avis of November 1992 on Finnish (but also Austrian and Swedish) EU membership. It noted that military non-alignment could be a hindrance to Finland accepting the Union’s foreign policy in its entirety, including the development towards common defence. Finland, in turn, emphasized that it was joining the EU as a militarily non-aligned country whose credible independent defence capability is an important contribution to the Union’s common security (Defence White Paper 1995: 56–61). It underlined that it would actively and constructively participate in common policies and specified that military non-alignment does not imply restrictions as to its participation in European cooperation. In the actual negotiations, foreign and security policy was talked about for only twenty-one minutes. Yet Finland feared that the European Parliament

58

Hanna Ojanen

would turn down the application. There was a large and well-organized group within the Parliament that opposed the enlargement without accompanying institutional reforms6 (Ranta and Vierros-Villeneuve 2006: 301). Once a member, Finland quickly diminished the ‘lead’ of the old member states and positioned itself in institutional questions close to the Benelux countries and Germany, who were for deeper integration. Finland adopted an open mind on qualified majority voting in foreign and security policy, even in other than implementation matters (Ranta and Vierros-Villeneuve 2006: 305), and also appeared open to the application of flexibility or enhanced cooperation in security and defence political cooperation (ibid.: 306).7 The EU as a security community Early on, Finland emphasized the security dimension of the Union. One reason for this was linked to the referendum on membership. In an opinion climate sceptical about accession and predicting a negative vote, security came to play a role as an important argument for membership. The opinion polls showing a majority for ‘no’ to EU membership about a month before the referendum seemed to make the political elite change strategy and bring in the positive influence of the EU on Finnish security (see also Taivalsaari 2002: 75). The government took the stand that the EU was indeed a security community where through solidarity among the members the security of each was strengthened. It even noted in 1995 that ‘Union membership will help Finland to repel any military threats and prevent attempts to exert political pressure’ (Defence White Paper 1995: 57–8). Within the EU, this was more than what it was generally thought the CFSP or the Union could deliver. The EU had only just invented the CFSP and linked itself to the Western European Union (WEU). Not many really believed in a development towards a common security and defence policy, after decades of different views on foreign policy. In Finland, however, it was soon confirmed as a fact that membership had strengthened Finnish security. Whether remnants of neutralism or a sign of a deep-rooted alliance aversion,8 the change in Finnish security policy was not complete. The three new EU members all changed, as one analyst puts it, from ‘neutrocentrism’ to ‘eurocentrism’ as the central tenet of foreign policy. But ‘neutrocentrism’ left a remnant: the countries stayed outside mutual defence obligations, making the change resemble more a mere adjustment, if not an ‘evolving continuity’ (Ferreira-Pereira 2006: 100–3, 115). Continuity was expressly underlined (cf. Raunio and Tiilikainen 2003: 130–1). Military non-alignment was still seen as the best option, motivated by concern for stability in the neighbouring regions. It was then declared that Finnish security policy was aimed at furthering stability and at avoiding the formation of new political or military dividing lines in Europe. Integrated in the EU but remaining militarily non-allied, Finland would

Finland and the ESDP

59

best contribute to stability ‘in the prevailing conditions’ (Defence White Paper 1995: 19; similarly in the Defence White Paper 1997). An example of continuity – while also fuel for suspicions about the sustainability of Finnish commitment – was the hesitance in reacting to WEU. WEU, a military alliance that was according to the Maastricht Treaty an integral part of the development of the Union, did pose a problem. The Finnish government wanted to take its time and decide on relations with WEU later on (Government Report 1992: 8–10, 25; Government Report Appendix 1992: 35–7). The Commission criticized Finland for viewing WEU as an organization concerned only with crisis management and not as one with clear political objectives. The government reconsidered the matter and saw that it was best to settle the question immediately: as early as January 1995 Finland became a WEU observer. A Finnish European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) profile started to emerge. Finland was ready to accept the practical side of security cooperation, but not the principle of mutual defence. Together with other ‘exneutrals’, it came to be seen as having signed under ‘solidarite´ effective’ but not ‘solidarite´ de principe’ (de Schoutheete 2004: 65). It seemed that Finland was early on conscious of the potential harm caused by such a gap. Repeatedly, it has sought to compensate in practice for what it might have harmed in theory (cf. Ojanen 2005), by activism and generous troop commitments (see pp. 64–6). At home, efforts at propagating appropriate definitions still continue as a means of convincing the public of the sustainability of the choices made. ‘Non-alignment’ has been deprived of any doctrinal suppositions. It is said to mean very simply that Finland is not a member of a military alliance. In foreign policy, as the prime minister has put it, Finland is ‘anything but non-aligned’ (Vanhanen 2004a). ‘[A]s a member of the European Union, Finland is neither neutral nor non-aligned; rather, Finland is committed to the Union’s objectives and activities’ (Vanhanen 2004b). He is echoed by civil servants who argue that the traditions of neutrality and non-alignment become void of content when Finland clearly signs up to the defence of the Union’s common interests and of its member countries against, e.g., terrorism and ‘fully participates’ in the development of a common security and defence policy (Luoto and Pesonen 2006: 298). At the same time, the accompanying definitional effort to maintain that the EU is not a military alliance, whatever turns the ESDP might take, also continues. The early years in the EU: foreign and security political activism The doubts about neutral, or ex-neutral, countries’ intentions of adapting and their capacity to adapt, led, on Finland’s part, to noticeable activism in foreign and security policy in order to repel the suspicions. Moreover, it was seen that if it was supportive of the others, support would also be received. As the 1995 Defence White Paper put it, ‘by sharing in these collective

60

Hanna Ojanen

efforts, Finland can expect support from other members for its own aspirations and for its position’ (Defence White Paper 1995: 6, 13, 57–9). In part, Finland acted together with Sweden. Swedo-Finnish security political cooperation within the EU took the form of joint initiatives, among which was the compromise proposal delaying the merger of WEU and the EU, but adding the Petersberg tasks to the Union in the Amsterdam Treaty (see Chapter 3, p. 50). Their shared emphasis on the non-military sides of crisis management first also included a stricter reading of Petersberg tasks: the two would have preferred to leave out the upper-end tasks of peace enforcement (Ojanen 2002a: 165). As their representatives put it, civilian and military crisis management complement each other; the former should be developed since there are shortcomings, and the EU should concentrate on fields where it works best, complementing other actors, for instance with its police force (Lindh and Tuomioja 2000). The countries have cooperated also in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) structures, notably working within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) to strengthen the position of non-NATO contributing countries. Cooperation such as in the formation of the battlegroups has been yet another example of close ties between Finland and Sweden, but also with Norway and Estonia. Finland has also eagerly supported defence industrial cooperation within the EU. It became an observer in the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) in 1997. Bringing defence industrial cooperation into the Union enables, in Finland’s view, countries with no significant armaments industry of their own to participate, which in turn perhaps implies a better outlook for domestic industry. The European Defence Agency (EDA) has therefore also been of immediate interest to Finland. The foreign and security political activism of Finland has also to be placed in a broader political context. In the early years of Finnish EU membership, the pursuit of a place in the ‘core’ of the Union was visible across the field. The Finnish government was consciously trying to move from the periphery to the core in order to maximize its political influence (Antola 1999). Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen came to be seen as the personification of this policy (Forsberg 2001: 10). The decision on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was a good example of the ‘top of the class’ attitude. Whereas in Sweden, the decision was postponed and EMU was interpreted as a separate question to be decided later on in a separate referendum, the Finnish government took the view that EMU had already been consented to by the people in the referendum on EU membership. A vote in the Parliament would suffice. The vote was taken on 17 April 1998, even though 40,000 names had been gathered in a petition for a referendum (Ojanen 2004: 162). The first Finnish EU Council presidency in the latter half of 1999 was a watershed in this policy. From 2000 onwards, signs of a different stand were emerging. The lengthy strife with Italy on the location of the new Food

Finland and the ESDP

61

Safety Agency drew much of Finnish political energy and contributed to the general decrease in the popularity of the Union. Clashes between small and large member states, but also the new steps forward in the ESDP, also contributed to a policy reorientation from ‘pro-’ to ‘anti-core’, something that became visible during 2003 in Finnish statements about the need to keep the Union together, particularly as regards the foreign and security policy.

Current Finnish security and defence policy Defence doctrine and external inputs Finland has kept to its traditional conception of a country that takes care of its defence itself. Its doctrine of ‘credible national defence’ is based on conscription, and defence is understood as essentially territorial defence. Along with the ‘core of neutrality’, military non-alignment and independent defence, EU membership has been lifted to the central elements of Finnish security policy.9 There were twists over the precise choice of words: the ‘independent defence’ a` la 1997 turned into ‘credible national defence’ in 2001. Currently, the tasks of the defence forces are the following: territorial surveillance, safeguarding territorial integrity, defending national sovereignty, the state, its judicial system, the living conditions and basic rights of the people; keeping up and developing the defence capacity, military training, supporting voluntary defence training, official assistance to public authorities to maintain public order,10 taking part in rescue and taking part in peacekeeping (Sallinen 2005: 53). The threat scenarios used in defence planning are: regional crisis with potential implications for Finland; political, economic and military pressure which may include a threat of using military force and its restricted use; and use of military force in the form of a strategic strike or an attack aimed at seizing territory (Defence White Paper 2004: 102). It is seen that there is no direct military threat towards Finland now or in the near future. Among the Nordic countries, there are differences: while Sweden and Denmark are dismantling their systems of preparedness, Finland and Norway emphasize that there is potential for the use of military force in the region and therefore national defence will be maintained (Sallinen 2005: 115). The most powerful external inputs to Finnish international crisis management capabilities and capacities have been NATO troop and performance requirements through the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP). The Finnish observer status in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) since 1992, its membership in the EAPC since its establishment in May 1997, participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) since 1994 and PARP since 1995 have in concrete terms guided the development of Finnish defence through specific ‘Interoperability

62

Hanna Ojanen

Objectives’ and ‘Partnership Goals’, of which there are currently fifty-five (Kerttunen 2005: 78). Today, however, Kerttunen argues, it is the EU battlegroups that have the greatest influence on troop development. When it comes to doctrine, one of the most striking novelties in Finnish defence policy is that international cooperation has come to be seen not only as a way to enhance the ability to participate in crisis management, but also as strengthening Finnish defence. As was noted earlier, EU membership was seen as having clear security, even military, implications, as it was argued that Union membership would help Finland to ‘repel any military threats’ (Defence White Paper 1995: 57–8). Similarly, the advantages of growing cooperation within the NATO partnership structures and NATO’s high standards were underlined: the defence forces’ international cooperation is said to reinforce the credibility of the country’s national defence capability (Defence White Paper 2001: 26). Another novelty is the overt recognition of the fact that increased interoperability will make it easier for Finland to receive outside help (cf. Ja¨r¨venpa¨a¨ 1997). Thus, Finland’s defence comes to be seen in a context of cooperation, with the active intention of making it easier for outsiders to help Finland should help be needed. The Finnish Defence White Papers from 1995 onwards refer to Finland’s right ‘as a UN member’ to receive assistance if it is attacked. The creation of specific capabilities for receiving such assistance is taken up as part of the development of Finnish defence in the form of ‘host nation support’ in PfP cooperation (Ojanen 2002a: 166–7). Finally, one can also note elements of a certain change in the way territory is perceived. The earlier national or regional focus is broadened at least in theory: Finnish security policy is no longer limited to Finnish territory. One of the tasks of the defence forces is said to be a capability for ‘managing crises in unstable regions outside Finland’s borders’ (Defence White Paper 2001: 43–4). Changes in the making Two broader trends in the defence forces and defence thinking, internal and exogenous in nature, merit closer consideration: first, the broadening of the concept of security and defence towards what could be called functional security, reflected also in legislative changes, and, second, the change in size of the armed forces. ‘Functional security’ is not new in Finland, in that it has been customary to think in terms of ‘total defence’. Finnish ‘total defence’ encompasses all the military and civilian measures taken to safeguard the independence of Finland and the population’s capacity to act, as well as the security of the citizens against threats caused by states and other external threats – it is stressed that total defence has always been there also to counter other threats than war – by bringing together the public sector, local administration, private sector and private citizens. Thus, total defence would include

Finland and the ESDP

63

military territorial defence, economic defence or security, civil defence, social and health care, the functioning of the technical systems of the society, public order and safety as well as defence information (Sallinen 2005: 36; Government Decision 2003). In November 2003, a special strategy for the safeguarding of the vital functions of society was published, bringing this broad thinking more to the fore. ‘Vital functions’ comprise state leadership, external capacity to act, the military defence of the national territory, internal security, functioning of the economy and society, securing the livelihood of the population and its capability to act, as well as their ability to tolerate a crisis. Furthermore, ‘security of supply’11 is central (Sallinen 2005: 36–7). The strategy also delineates threat models – the order of which seems significant: threats to information systems, illegal immigration and population movements that endanger security; environmental threats; economic threats; organized crime and terrorism; disaster situations; international tension; serious violation of Finnish territorial integrity and a threat of war; and, finally, armed attack and war.12 The legislation on the national defence forces is also changing and reflects this broad thinking on threats and security. Proposals for a new law on conscription and for a law on voluntary national defence are ready. In autumn 2006, a proposal for the law on the defence forces was presented to Parliament. All these should enter into force in the beginning of 2008.13 The new legislation in preparation on the role of the armed forces will bestow the armed forces with three main tasks: territorial defence, support for civilian authorities in the context of internal security, and international operations. The law on conscription allows for the possibility of ordering conscripts and reservists to help in natural catastrophes and similar exceptional circumstances. The conscripts might also be sent to crisis management training and assistance abroad, even though they would not be participating in international crisis management operations. The general conscription system is regularly debated and in 2004 the Ministry of Defence published a study on the conscript army. There have been changes, but the pace of change is slower than in the other Nordic countries. It is argued that Finland cannot afford a ‘picky’ form of conscription as it needs all the available persons (Sallinen 2005: 55). Downsizing of the army is also taking place, but slowly. The 1997 Defence White Paper introduced a trend towards smaller and more efficient systems and increased international cooperation. The wartime defence forces will by the end of 2008 comprise 225,000 regional troops and 60,000 operational troops (army), the total strength of the navy being 20,000 and of the air force 35,000 (Defence White Paper 2004: 112–15), totalling 350,000 instead of the earlier 450,000. By the year 2012 the defence forces will save E50 million per year, closing down four garrisons and several depots, and reducing the personnel by 1,200 (see also Kerttunen 2005: 90). The total wartime size will probably be further reduced to 250,000, but

64

Hanna Ojanen

remains comparatively large. Cuts in the resources of the armed forces and defence administration frequently lead to questioning of the continued capacity of Finland really to defend its territory.

The impact of the ESDP Refocusing and increasing international participation A traditionally strong Finnish input in UN peacekeeping operations (since 1956) changed in the 1990s into a more pronounced input in crisis management operations led by NATO and the EU, starting with participation in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It has been stressed with a certain pride that Finland has been the country with the larger per capita contribution to NATO operations.14 Notably, contributions to the EU now outweigh those to the UN (cf. also Raunio and Tiilikainen 2003: 138–9) as a result of the overall political significance of the EU for Finland and the link between influence and commitment. The start of the EU’s own crisis management operations in 2003 importantly redirected Finnish participation. Finland took part in the first EU military operation EUFOR (European Union Force) Concordia in Macedonia in 2003 with a small contingent of nine staff officers (see Table 4.1). Finland took an early positive stand towards the battlegroups. Having started the examination of the resources available in April 2004, Finland announced in the Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels on 22 November 2004 its decision to take part in two battlegroups. Finland did not have the capacity to be a framework nation for a battlegroup. Taking part instead in two has been acknowledged as being of clear political significance. For Kerttunen, the signal might be that both are set up by countries that emphasize the role of the United States and NATO in European security. The Swedish–Finnish–Norwegian–Estonian unit furthermore underlines Nordic cooperation; participation in the German–Dutch Battlegroup offers a good opportunity to cooperate with two strong and experienced EU and NATO countries. Still, such a choice might also add to the dualism or the ambivalence that for some observers characterize Finnish security policy: stressing both the United States and Europe, both soft and hard security (Kerttunen 2005: 73–6). Another rationale would be to enable an even flow of trainees every year, to optimize the running of the education and training system (ibid.: 82).15 Speculations about further participation in a third one have also circulated. The Finnish peacekeeping legislation has over the years been changed several times to suit the changing realities. The most recent change in early 2006 was also a politically relevant change of direction from an emphasis on the UN to an emphasis on the independent role of the EU (but also of other regional organizations, even ad hoc groups) (see Ojanen 2006).

Finland and the ESDP

65

Essentially, Finland wanted to remove all national hindrances to its full participation, notably the requirement of a mandate by the UN or by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which has been part of the law. Further changes were needed in the harmonization of rules concerning the use of force, allowing it not only in self-defence but also in order to reach the goals of the mission (cf. Kerttunen 2005: 86), as well as to enable more rapid decision-making nationally. The earlier multilateral UN profile was linked to the Finnish wish not to grant individual (great) powers the possibility to define their own code of conduct and rules of international engagement, something that could jeopardize the position of small nations such as Finland (Kerttunen 2005: 86). A Cold War legacy, the provision of a UN mandate was without doubt also part of the policy of neutrality. It was safe for Finland to take part in operations which were agreed to by both superpowers: a UN mandate would guarantee that the operation was uncontroversial enough for Finland to participate. In general terms, the legislation allows for 2,000 troops to serve in international operations at any given time. Usually, however, some 1,000 troops per year have been sent abroad (Kerttunen 2005: 86–7) and this seems to be Table 4.1 Finnish contributions to EU military capabilities Rapid reaction capability (HHG 2003)*

German–Dutch– Finnish Battlegroup

Swedish–Finnish– Norwegian– Estonian Battlegroup

180–220 Combat 120–60 Military 2000** Mechanized support; police, infantry staff officers; medical battalion; protection; company; a headquarters reconnaissance; electronic and signal company; military police, etc. reconnaissance; an engineering battalion, military police, units specialized in etc. CIMIC, a medium truck (transport) company; a minelayer, staff officers, military observers Notes: * Kerttunen 2005: 78–9; Defence White Paper 2004: 125. The forces in this column are earmarked not only for the EU Helsinki Force Catalogue, but also for the NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Arrangement and the UN Stand-By High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), as well as the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS). ** Finland increased its commitment to 2,000 men in November 2001 after Sweden had committed about 1,900 troops (Ojanen 2002a: 172).

66

Hanna Ojanen

the upper limit in practice, for economic reasons. In contrast the Swedish plans, not all Finnish troops are trained for international duties (ibid.: 78). Thus far, only the army has taken part in operations abroad. A novelty from the year 2008 onwards will be to enhance the Finnish contribution with air force units (yet with a separate executive order) (Kerttunen 2005: 79). Either for reasons of doctrine whereby the defence of the country is limited to its own territory or for reasons of equipment (the Finnish F-18 Hornets are not equipped to fire from the air to the ground), using the air force internationally has not been considered possible before. The Finnish air force is currently allowed to participate only in international exercises, not operations, and it was only through the PfP that the air force started participating in exercises abroad (and foreign fighters came to Finland, for the first time in 2001) (Ojanen 2002a: 173). The expansion of the EU’s crisis management operations has an impact on Finland’s participation in other organizations’ operations (see Table 4.2). In relative terms, the UN commitment decreased considerably as Finland ended its large UN missions with its departure from Cyprus in 2005 and from Lebanon in 2001, except for observers. In budgetary terms, it is seen that the battlegroup expenditure would further lead Finland to limit its participation in other operations, to reallocate existing funds or to increase the overall defence budget (Kerttunen 2005: 90). A way of dealing with the resource problem might be to develop certain niche capabilities in crisis management that centre around civil–military cooperation on the one hand and training on the other.16

Threat and risk assessment Finland has often been characterized as a country with a very traditional and outdated threat perception, one that emphasizes territorial defence and takes the threat scenario of an enemy attempting to seize its territory as a central starting point in its defence planning. In this, it also differs from its otherwise so close Nordic neighbours. Some have claimed that while these have been turning their focus at least in principle away from Russia, in Finland the security focus would still be almost totally on that country – also reflected in force structures, equipment and doctrine ‘suitable to fight an outdated type of war against an invader, rather than preparing itself for a flexible and joint war of manoeuvre that would be more likely in the future’ (Hopkinson 2004: 32, 39). Finnish security thinking seems, however, considerably broader in scope and is also increasingly influenced by its European context. The security policies of all Nordic countries have since the end of the Cold War converged around the concept of comprehensive security, with a shift of focus from the narrower notion of military defence to the goal of safeguarding the basic functions of society. Threats are to a lesser degree than before

Finland and the ESDP

67

Table 4.2 Finnish participation in ongoing international operations (as of August 2006) Organization

Operation

Location

Number of troops

Type of troops

NATO

KFOR

Kosovo

400

Command and control, communication, reconnaissance

ISAF/NATO

ISAF

Afghanistan

100

CIMIC, PRT; staff officers, liaison officers, firefighters

EU

EUFOR Althea

BosniaHerzegovina

180

Signal company, staff officers, liaison officers, medical and engineering company, military police, service

EUFOR RD Congo

Democratic Republic of Congo

14

Staff officers (3), medical personnel, surgeons

UNTSO

Middle East

13

Military observers

UNMOGIP

India–Pakistan

5

Military observers

UNMEE

Ethiopia and Eritrea

7

Military observers

UNMIK

Kosovo

2

Military observers

UNMIL

Liberia

2

Military observers

UNMIS

Sudan

2

Military observers

AMIS II

Sudan, Darfur

1

Military observers

UN (30 in all)

AU/UN

Source: *www.mil.fi/rauhanturvaaja/operaatiot

country or region specific, but global and domestic in character and essentially the same for all (cf. Ries 2004). There is also a blurring of the division between internal vulnerability and external security visible in the EU’s security field. In particular, the proposed EU Constitution’s solidarity clause17 codifies the interface of internal and external EU security. It commits to the safeguarding of the functions of democratic institutions and protection of the populations also ‘in the territory of the Member States’,

68

Hanna Ojanen

which points to a new kind of international security and defence cooperation (Ekengren 2006: 274, 283).18 The influence of the EU on the formulation of Finnish security and defence policy has been growing also in threat perception. The European Security Strategy (ESS) has clearly been the basis for the threat perception in the Defence White Paper of 2004 – in particular as regards its first part. Thus, the threats mentioned are terrorism, proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and global and cross-border security problems (organized crime, drugs and human trafficking, economic and technological risks, environmental problems, population growth, population movements, epidemics) (Defence White Paper 2004: 16–30). Yet, when discussing the blueprints for the ESS, the government and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish Parliament underlined the importance of listing both traditional19 and new threats, instead of concentrating only on the latter.20 The regional context Even the regional context of Finnish security policy is newly defined by EU membership as it colours relations with neighbouring countries. Earlier on, Nordic cooperation was central for Finland as the only international framework where security questions could be tackled. Nordic security cooperation was for a long time limited cautiously to cooperation in UN peacekeeping, but from 1998 onwards also took the form of defence ministers’ meetings, as well as increasing defence materiel cooperation. Despite the fact that Finland was drawn into the EU by its neighbour Sweden, the early years of Finnish EU membership were characterized by a distance-taking from Nordic neighbours. Signs of any vibrant Nordic or Baltic security community were scarce, if they existed at all, in Finnish policies. On many occasions, Finland’s positions differed from that of the other Nordic EU countries, such as in the question of NATO enlargement to the Baltic states (cf. Ojanen 2002a: 184). Also, in discussions on EU enlargement Finland differed from Sweden and Denmark as it supported the earlier entrance of Estonia – in order to be in line with the Commission (Ojanen 2002b: 200–1) or for reasons of national security (stability in its vicinity) and to calm Estonia’s interest in joining NATO (Antola 1999: 8). With EU membership, the Nordic countries no longer qualified as a suitable reference group. Sweden soon seemed to resemble Denmark in being more EU critical and more intergovernmentally oriented than Finland. The differences in style mattered: Finland started as a loyal EU member, while Sweden continued in the role of a ‘big’ country with regional functions and a tendency to adopt normative positions (Ojanen 2002a: 164). Practical instances of disagreement with Nordic EU neighbours were the Danish–US surprise initiative in April 1997 on a model where the Nordic countries would assume responsibility for regional security to enhance the security of the Baltic countries. Finland opposed such ‘sphere of interests’

Finland and the ESDP

69

thinking (Luoto and Pesonen 2006: 290–1). The Finnish Northern Dimension initiative21 was looked at with some suspicion also by Denmark and Sweden, in turn surprised at the lack of preceding consultations or coordination with them. Prime Minister Lipponen’s initiative in his speech in September 1997 on the need for the EU to have a Northern Dimension surprised Sweden in particular, who even wanted to modify the conclusions of the summit in 1997 to water down the initiative and erase mention of Finland (Luoto and Pesonen 2006: 291). EU membership has also changed the context for Finnish–Russian relations. The attempted coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the dismantling of the Soviet Union in December that year increased the sense of insecurity and the attraction of membership. ‘Multilateralization’ of Finland’s relations with Russia became the leading idea: Finland would no longer be alone but supported by the larger Union. It was good to be in company, provided that company did not require one to change the foundations of one’s policy. Thus Finland took a proactive role: through activism in shaping a common policy on Russia for the EU it would ensure that its views were adopted.22 Thus, when asked in 2000 whether bilateral relations still were important, the president of the Republic commented that the two were the same, as the EU had adopted the Finnish policy on Russia (Pursiainen and Saari 2002: 22). Influencing the EU’s policy on Russia was at the time relatively easy: Russia was mentally and geographically peripheral to most member countries, and Finland’s expertise on that country was welcomed. With enlargement, the views on Russia within the Union have become more variegated and the expertise more evenly spread. Bilateral relations have in the end not lost their significance, while efforts to influence the EU–Russia relations continue, be it in the form of the Northern Dimensions’ ‘long-term approach for promoting sustainable security’ (Defence White Paper 2001: 20) or in the preparation of the ESS, where one of the Finnish emphases was on the strategic partnership between Russia and the EU.23

Attitudes towards the ESDP Public opinion and the link to NATO debate As membership has matured, domestic public opinion in Finland has shown an increasingly negative view towards the EU. One-third of the population is negative about the EU. Finnish scepticism has relatively few channels of influence, as Kite (2006: 108) notes: the strong elite support to the EU is not challenged by organized and powerful EU scepticism in the Parliament. Even though the general image of the EU is not very positive, its role in security and defence is quite widely accepted: developing a common defence in the EU is what is considered to have the greatest impact on enhancing Finnish security. Two-thirds of the population also see that defending the EU is part of the tasks of the Finnish defence forces, and over half see that

70

Hanna Ojanen

participation in crisis management around the world is part of these tasks. As many as 60 per cent of Finns were in favour of including security guarantees in the EU Constitution (Raunio and Tiilikainen 2003: 135). As such, what the Finns generally perceive as threats to their security do not directly correspond with the ESS threat perception, and even less so with a traditional military threat perception. The general public sees the most pressing security concerns as related to the environment and climate change as well as to organized crime. Military conflicts in the European neighbourhood and terrorist attacks on Finland are seen as the least likely security threats.24 Threat perception is, however, an important factor in the general debate on the ESDP. Characteristic of Finnish ESDP debate is also the intertwining – sometimes deliberate, sometimes accidental – with the debate on NATO. Official Finnish NATO policy is expressed in the following way in the Defence White Paper of 2004: Finland considers NATO to be of key importance for military transatlantic security policy and security cooperation. It ‘continues to advance its cooperation’ with NATO, and considers ‘the development and functioning of EU–NATO cooperation’ essential. ‘Applying for membership of the alliance will remain a possibility in Finland’s security and defence policy also in the future’ (Defence White Paper 2004: 81–2). Instead of membership, Finland has tried to improve the conditions for its involvement as a partner country in NATO activities. In particular, the idea of giving some partner countries, such as Finland and Sweden, the right to participate even in planning and decision-making in NATO’s crisis management operations has been welcomed in Finland.25 For a non-member, the Finnish government has been a remarkably warm supporter of NATO and a firm believer in its capacities and efficiency. For Finland, the United States’ presence in (the Northern parts of) Europe is important both for reasons of counterbalancing Russian influence in the region and for the credibility of security commitments (see Raunio and Tiilikainen 2003: 134). In this, Finland resembles Sweden (see Chapter 3, p. 43). Particularly in the early phases of ESDP development, Finland also laid stress on keeping the development of the EU’s military role clearly linked to NATO. Tiilikainen (2006a: 58) notes that in the Helsinki summit of 1999 Finland wanted to base the EU’s capabilities even more firmly on cooperation with NATO than was indicated by the final Presidency Conclusions. The condition for EU independent action, ‘when the alliance as a whole is not engaged’, was interpreted to mean NATO’s primacy. It was only in 2003 that independent EU operations were understood in Finland to be a real possibility (Ranta and Vierros-Villeneuve 2006: 310). The emphasis on strong transatlantic links in the Defence White Paper of 2001 gave way in the 2004 edition to listing differences in American and European approaches. The, at times, strong NATO emphasis can be linked to differences in the socialization processes between the ministries concerned. The Ministry for

Finland and the ESDP

71

Foreign Affairs (MFA) is more EU-minded, while the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has been, since the start of NATO cooperation in the early 1990s, more oriented towards NATO. NATO cooperation made the MoD a more central player in Finnish security policy than before. In February 2003, the MoD established a committee to assess the implications of a possible alliance membership on the development of Finnish defence and defence administration, including an evaluation of the costs of membership (Ministry of Defence (Finland) 2004). Illustratively, this upset the MFA, which noted that these matters – and taking such initiatives – did not belong to the remit of the MoD at all. In the ESDP, as Tiilikainen points out, the responsibilities of the ministries are not necessarily clear: crisis management would belong to the MoD, ‘for what is not in the domain of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but what exactly is the domain of that ministry has not been defined’ (Tiilikainen 2006b: 226). The increasing centrality of the ESDP, and closer involvement of national defence administration, no doubt also changes the pattern of socialization within the MoD. Public opinion is against to NATO accession. Around 20 per cent are in favour of membership, and between 50 and 60 per cent are against. Twothirds of the respondents, however, approve of the PfP cooperation with NATO and over half also agree to taking part in NATO-led operations and to interoperability with NATO.26 Its unpopularity notwithstanding, NATO membership regularly figures on the security political agenda. Even the possibility of a referendum has also been debated. The Social Democratic Party understands that if membership comes to be seen as the best option for Finland there should be a referendum on membership unless NATO membership becomes a question in parliamentary elections.27 The National Coalition Party urges further debate.28 The different views expressed on what the link between the ESDP and NATO is and whether membership of the latter is a requirement of full European participation influence the perception of the ESDP. The Finnish security debate is coloured by concepts and arguments that have a distinctly homemade flavour. These include ‘NATO option’, ‘defence core’, ‘security deficit’ and ‘security guarantees’, terms frequently used perhaps because they are devoid of precise meaning (Forsberg 2005). Arguments in favour of NATO tend to be linked to national history more than to future challenges (Vesikansa 2006). Discussions involving the search for the right reference group and twists over what ‘military alliance’ means are also frequent. NATO is often drawn into the debate on the ESDP by way of an explicit comparison of their respective ‘credibility’. Particularly confusing for general opinion-building was the debate over the mutual defence commitment in the draft Constitutional Treaty. Finland worked to water down the defence clause with the (post-hoc) motivation that such EU ‘defence guarantees’ would not have been credible (see also p. 67). Yet once the treaty was voted down in the referenda in France and in the Netherlands

72

Hanna Ojanen

the view changed. Suddenly, the ‘guarantees’ would indeed have been credible had the treaty been ratified. An explicit link to NATO, the ‘credible’ guarantor, was made. While at first some referred to the inability of the EU to provide credible security guarantees as an argument for NATO membership, after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty they saw NATO membership as the only way out since EU guarantees had not materialized. Similarly, the practical standards and training links between the battlegroups and NATO’s Response Force have stirred debate, in particular during the presidential election campaign in January 2006. Eventual NATO membership might in practice limit the Finnish possibilities for participating in EU operations, or cause debate over the proper balance between the two, as it is likely that Finland would join as an equally eager and active member as it did when it joined the EU, a member for which the threshold for saying ‘no’ to a demand to commit troops is very high. It would also seem that, should membership materialize, the reason would be, once again, that Finland is safe enough to join – as it felt safe enough in 1992 to apply for EU membership. This would confirm the Finnish tendency to join organizations once the environment or the political conditions are safe enough, or when the organization itself no longer is part of an international (East–West) conflict pattern, or once the organization no longer is politically controversial. Concerns over the ESDP Finnish elite opinion is overall very positive about the ESDP, and the differences between the main political parties are very small. During the broad coalition governments of Prime Minister Lipponen, the parties in opposition – the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats – were critical, but since 2003 the Centre Party has in government been more positive to security political developments, and the opposition, the National Coalition Party, has been very positive towards the Europeanization of Finnish defence policy (Tiilikainen 2006b: 213). There are, however, two concerns over the ESDP that even the pro-EU elite feels. These are a split on views over the EU’s policies and too strong an emphasis on defence or on defence capabilities, leading to a possible overstretch of resources. The greatest Finnish concern of all would be that core groups form within the EU in foreign, security and defence policy. Finland has worked against the blueprints of permanent structured cooperation that would have been limited to the most willing and able members only. Any divisions and rifts of views in the EU are unsettling for Finland: where would Finland belong in such a case, unwilling as it is to disagree with any of its EU partners? Similarly, Finland was not willing to agree to the article on mutual defence in the draft Constitutional Treaty. The concern over rifts is

Finland and the ESDP

73

a fairly new one, as only some years earlier Finland was still actively aiming to be at the ‘core’ of the Union itself. The second problem, too much defence, was illustrated first at the level of political commitment in the introduction of the defence article in the Constitutional Treaty – which came as a surprise to Finland. It sought a compromise that would remain somewhere below real mutual defence. The Finnish foreign minister maintained that the Convention’s proposals risked splitting the Union and thus weakening the CFSP. Instead, he argued for some kind of ‘enhanced solidarity’.29 As an extraordinary measure, Finland convened a group of non-aligned countries (Austria, Ireland and Sweden), which had not been active as a group earlier, to sign a letter in which they proposed a totally different wording for the common defence clause: If a Member State is victim of armed aggression, it may request that the other Member States give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with art. 51 of the UN Charter. This was not accepted. Instead, the then presidency country, Italy, drafted a compromise stating that member states had an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, but adding that ‘this shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States’. In addition to referring to the unity of the EU, it was also claimed that Finland could not agree to the clause because the so-called defence guarantees it offered are not credible. The vocabulary used was thus high-flown: it was a question of actually guaranteeing each other’s security. More tangible reasons for rejecting a defence clause were, first, that Sweden and Ireland would have opted out, causing a rift, and, second, that the potential defence burden was feared: in a worst-case scenario, Finland would have to defend the Baltic states against Russia. Yet the Defence White Paper notes straightforwardly that this agreement ‘represents an important step forward in deeper integration and also strengthens Finland’s security’ (Defence White Paper 2004: 56). It is, in all, not surprising if the image of Finland’s security policy is somewhat unclear: speaking about non-alignment, it first offered a compromise to solve the question about WEU–EU merger so that the merger would not take place. Second, referring to the need to keep all countries on board, it opposed the mutual defence clause. However, it seems that Finland could well have accepted both the merger and the defence clause. Luoto and Pesonen (2006: 280) say that the Finnish negotiating team in Amsterdam had instructions in the end not to obstruct this should some of the member countries wish to advance within the EU towards a common defence. The authors characterize the Swedish–Finnish compromise as pointing forwards, but obliquely so (ibid.: 281–2), thus the title of this chapter.

74

Hanna Ojanen

The sometimes unclear commitment to common defence in principle is thus compensated by activism in practice, with the consequence that resources directed to participation in joint international operations might not suffice in the end. The compensation of doctrinal doubts with practical capabilities commitments manifested itself in the way the blueprint for European crisis management troops was welcomed in Finland. Finland did not seem to be a driving force behind the decisions taken on the EU’s military capabilities during its own EU presidency term in 1999. On the contrary, the Finnish political leadership seemed sceptical about the possibilities of achieving such a decision, and the minister for foreign affairs maintained as late as November that a decision on troops could not yet be made in Helsinki.30 As the decision was taken, however, Finland, in a characteristic way, soon declared that the decision taken was, in a sense, a Finnish initiative, a logical continuation of the initiative on the Petersberg tasks.31 It was also a good way to further the Finnish aim of efficient crisis management.32 Finland also managed to get its representative, General Gustav Ha¨gglund, to lead the EU’s new Military Committee from 2001 to 2004, something that was interpreted as an acknowledgement of the merits of non-alignment and of equality between EU member states (Ojanen 2002a: 160). After the December 2003 event, the president and the prime minister took the corrective steps of carefully underlining solidarity and giving assurances that Finland for one would assist a country which was the victim of an attack (yet deciding itself about the means by which to do so) (Luoto and Pesonen 2006: 282). And when it was decided in November 2004 to build the original thirteen battlegroups (now eighteen), Finland profiled itself as one of the most active countries as it decided to divide its resources to participate in two different groups.

Conclusion: changing security identity Security is taken seriously in Finland. Credibility rather than empty words, contributing rather than free-riding guide the Finnish stand towards the ESDP. This gravity of tone makes the question of common defence hard to approach directly. Rather, Finland has been moving obliquely forwards in its ESDP policy: pulling the brakes on more doctrinal issues and accelerating on tangible commitments. Its national characteristics, the national security political language and conceptions still play a role and lead to the necessity of the political leadership actively trying to influence the definition and image of the EU. Security discourses are still quite national in character – something that is understandable in the light of the relatively short integration history of security and defence compared to other policy domains. National definitions, peculiar use of words and concepts such as ‘security guarantees’ or ‘security

Finland and the ESDP

75

deficit’ may render the Finnish security political debate opaque for outsiders. Like Sweden, Finland is pragmatic and not visionary (cf. Chapter 3, p. 51–2). The two also share a strong belief in multilateralism and a ‘Realistic’ approach to security. Even though membership pulled the two apart on their general view on the EU, they still find links in pragmatic security political cooperation. Together, they have had some impact on ESDP development – perhaps even paradoxically so, bringing the defence dimension forward on several occasions. As a first instance one might speculate that even the wording of the Maastricht Treaty took into account the membership applications of ex-neutral countries – a stricter security policy discipline seemed to be needed. Second, by helping with their compromise proposal for the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks into the Amsterdam Treaty, they pushed the EU to take an important step forward as an independent actor. Third, they have been generous in their capabilities commitments, perhaps even slightly competing with each other. They have also influenced the ESDP through their active efforts at creating compatibility between their traditional policies and the joint EU stands. Thus, they have brought forward civilian crisis management. Finnish security policy has, however, changed more because of the ESDP than the ESDP has changed because of Finland. National conceptions change through increasing involvement and socialization. The EU grows in importance in relation to the UN and also NATO. Threat perceptions change: full participation in the ESDP implies sharing a certain threat perception as it also implies sharing a view on the means used for enhancing security, ‘hard’ equally as well as ‘soft’. In the Finnish case, doctrinal changes are also clearly visible. Joint operations come to be defined as an important part of defence; the ‘first line of defence’ might be abroad even for Finland. Signs of a ‘common defence’ in what used to be a national defence conception are thus not hard to find. In the end, the case of Finland and the ESDP is also a case of a decrease in the regional, Nordic dimension of security. While confirming the validity of close scrutiny of how security is and can be perceived, it questions the existence of a specific Nordic security conception, be that Nordic post-security or a-security (see Chapter 1, p. 9). Finland now shares both the threats against security and the means for increasing security in a setting much broader than the Nordic one, as it is this very sharing that constitutes common security at the EU level.

Notes 1 The author would like to thank EU Advisor Anu Sallinen, Ministry of Defence, and Colonel Juha Pyyko¨nen, National Defence College, for their comments on an earlier draft.

76

Hanna Ojanen

2 Commonly, though, it is claimed that security political considerations were important for the decision to join. The then president of the Republic, Mauno Koivisto, argued in 1995 that, in comparison to security, economic arguments were only of secondary importance (quoted in Forsberg 2000: 267). 3 Finland had joined EFTA as a full member only in 1986, even though it had taken part in it practically as a member through its particular Finland–EFTA agreement (FINEFTA) treaty with the EFTA members since 1961. 4 First, the term ‘non-alignment’ was in use. 5 See, for instance, de Schoutheete‘s (2004: 65–6) claims that the positions of the four neutral members have been a major obstacle to the adoption of the clauses of principle about political and military solidarity between the countries, and a serious but not insuperable obstacle to putting in place the structures of enhanced cooperation. Yet, he also recognises the significant Finnish and Swedish contributions to ESDP operations. 6 Finally, 377 votes were cast for, 21 against, and 61 were abstentions. 7 This was the view at least of Secretary of State Antti Satuli, a central person in the forming of Finnish EU policy, who died in 2003. 8 See Chapter 3, where Wedin recalls the argument that it is morally good to stay out of military alliances. 9 An early example was the speech by President Martti Ahtisaari at Freie Universita¨t Berlin in November 1994 (see Jalonen 1995: 109). 10 The military forces cannot independently take part in countering non-military threats; this is forbidden by law in all Nordic countries. They can help only upon request. The modalities for requesting help are now being further developed (Sallinen 2005: 21). 11 This concept refers to the crisis preparedness of society, provisions for securing, for example, critical infrastructure and basic commodities, including energy in crisis situations. Finland has been actively pushing the issue on the EU’s agenda. 12 The strategy, which was updated in 2006, is supported by a programme for internal security from September 2004 (Sallinen 2005: 87, 119). 13 Helsingin Sanomat, 13 April 2006. 14 The Finnish NATO ambassador, Antti Sierla, notes that the high point of some 1,000 Finnish contributions has come down to 500. Uutispa¨iva¨ Demari, 1 September 2006. 15 The battlegroup personnel will consist of 40 per cent enlisted personnel and 60 per cent professional soldiers (Kerttunen 2005: 80–1). 16 Civil–military cooperation and civil–military coordination were a central ESDP theme during the second Finnish EU presidency in 2006. Training has come to the foreground in particular as regards missions in Africa. 17 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Article I-43. 18 An important player in the future might also be the new European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX), established in 2004, which is led by a Finn, Brigadier General Ilkka Laitinen (see http://www.frontex.eu.int/). 19 No direct reference was made to armed attack or anything similar; as examples of traditional threats the Committee instead mentioned human rights violations and various obstacles to a transition to democracy and well-functioning government. 20 Ulkoasiainvaliokunnan lausunto 2/2003vp. Valtioneuvoston selvitys Euroopan unionin turvallisuusstrategiasta. UaVL 2/2003 vp – UTP 15/2003vp (4 November 2003) at http://www.eduskunta.fi/fatkatmp/utatmp/uavl_2_2003.htm. 21 See Ojanen 2000b; see also Chapter 7, p. 130 and Chapter 9, p.161. 22 On the EU’s Common Strategy on Russia, see Haukkala 2003.

Finland and the ESDP

77

23 The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament disagreed with the decision to place Russia in the same category as Japan and Canada. Ulkoasiainvaliokunnan lausunto 2/2003p. Valtioneuvoston selvitys Euroopan unionin turvallisuusstrategiasta. UaVL 2/2003vp – UTP 15/2003vp (4 November 2003) at http://www.eduskunta.fi/fatkatmp/utatmp/uavl_2_2003.htm. 24 Suomalaisten mielipiteita¨ ulko-ja turvallisuuspolitiikasta, maanpuolustuksesta ja turvallisuudesta. Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta (MTS), tiedotteita ja katsauksia 1/2005, marraskuu 2005 (www.defmin.fi =  MTS); Kai Torvi and Pentti Kiljunen, Ikkunat auki maailmaan. EVA: n Suomi, EU ja maailma–asennetutkimus 2006 (www.eva.fi). 25 Such a strengthened partnership, originally proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom, might open up the possibility to participate in the NATO Response Force (NRF). Helsingin Sanomat, 4 April 2006. 26 Suomalaisten mielipiteita¨ ulko-ja turvallisuuspolitiikasta, maanpuolustuksesta ja turvallisuudesta. Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta (MTS), tiedotteita ja katsauksia 1/2005 (November 2005) (www.defmin.fi =  MTS); Kai Torvi and Pentti Kiljunen, Ikkunat auki maailmaan. EVA: n Suomi, EU ja maailma–asennetutkimus 2006 (www.eva.fi). 27 Eero Heina¨luoma, chairman of the Social Democratic Party, in a speech at the Paasikivi Society on 5 June 2006. 28 Jyrki Katainen, chairman of the National Coalition Party, in his Party Congress speech on 10 June 2006 urged the other parties to answer the question of why Finland would be the only European country that would be harmed if it joined NATO. 29 ‘For a genuinely European defence’; address by Mr Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, at the Western European Union Parliamentary Assembly, Paris, 2 December 2003 (at http://www.formin.fi). 30 Tarja Halonen on 15 November 1999 in Brussels. This might have prompted the United Kingdom and France in their bilateral summit of 25 November to ask for clear decisions and dates in Helsinki (Helsingin Sanomat, 26 November 1999). 31 See the interview with the late Finnish EU ambassador Antti Satuli in Suomen Kuvalehti 49, 10 December 1999. 32 See, for example, communication by the Finnish prime minister to the Parliament on European security and defence policy on 26 November 1999 (‘Kriisinhallinta Suomen puheenjohtajuuskaudella’. Pa¨a¨ministeri Lipposen ilmoitus eduskunnalle Euroopan turvallisuus-ja puolustuspolitiikasta, Helsingin Sanomat, net edition).

5

Denmark and the ESDP opt-out A new way of doing nothing? Henrik Larsen

Introduction The dominant understanding of the European Communities (EC)/European Union (EU) and Denmark after 1945 has been an instrumental one which presented the EC/EU in terms of the concrete interests it could fulfil for the country (Østerga˚rd 1993: 168). The development of Europe was primarily legitimized by its utility for Denmark. Europe has been presented in nonmythical terms – the development of ‘Europe’ was not seen as something natural and organic, and certainly not something that Denmark was naturally part of. Some analysts have seen this understanding as based on a feeling of indifference towards Europe (Hedetoft 1995: 254), whereas others identify a Danish hostility to Europe linked to fear of Germans and Germany (Hansen 2002: 54–5). Few political actors have since 1945 argued for ‘Europe’ in cultural terms (in particular the right-wing liberal party Venstre). Even political actors who may be inclined to draw on arguments of a cultural kind have found themselves constrained to arguing along instrumental lines. The main question in the traditional Danish debate on Europe has not been what Denmark should do in the EU as a culturally based member state, but whether alleged instrumental advantages have significantly affected national sovereignty (Larsen 1999: 456). The main political parties, such as the Social Democrats, the Conservatives and the Radical (social) Liberals, which (with the Liberal Party) have at different times formed the government, have traditionally drawn on this understanding. The same has been the case for the Socialist Peoples Party (SF), the left-wing Unity Party and the right-wing Danish People’s Party. Popular movements against the EU (the June Movement and the People’s Movement against the EU) have also drawn on the same basic understanding. The signs are that it can be found among large parts of the population (Larsen 1999: 458). Political differences have been played out within this understanding. During the Cold War, European defence outside the context of NATO was not seen as an aim in Danish foreign policy. The sceptical Danish approach was representative of the general transatlantic view during the Cold War.

Denmark and the ESDP opt-out

79

At a deeper level it can be argued that the reticence towards Europe and fear of abrogating sovereignty lie in the particular Danish construction of the relationship between the state, the nation and the people. The core of the nation is the ‘people’. The dominant Danish discourse links the state and the nation so that the state is seen as acting on behalf of the nation. At the same time the nation is also attributed strong cultural and ethnic features which go together with a high degree of overlap between state, nation and society (Hansen 2002; Østerga˚rd 1993: 176). The Danish state has, furthermore, from 1945 been seen as inherently a welfare state. A central reason why European integration has been seen as threatening by many is that it challenges the presumed organic discursive relationship between people and (welfare) state (Hansen 2002; Larsen 1999: 460–1). In the post-Cold War period Danish foreign policy has widely been seen as different from that in the Cold War period before: it has become more active in most areas. A primary expression of this higher level of activity is an increased use of military means in Danish foreign policy. While Danish forces’ participation in peacekeeping was high compared to the size of the country during the Cold War, the level has further increased in the postCold War period. While the use of military means in the Cold War period was restricted to peacekeeping, the post-Cold War period has seen a deployment of Danish forces in enforcement operations (see pp. 81–2). The perception in official accounts of Denmark’s international environment is that Denmark has in a historical perspective never been as as safe as it is today (Forsvarsministeriet 1998 2004a). The post-Cold War period has seen a considerable increase in the resources allocated to military forces which could be deployed abroad rather than to territorial defence. A very considerable transfer of resources from conscription to international operations took place in the 2004–9 Danish five-year defence budget. While Denmark has been active within EU foreign policy in general (Larsen 2000), it has been an extremely reluctant participant in the development of the EU defence dimension since its launch with the Maastricht Treaty. This has also been the case with regard to EU decisions or operations in this field, which have been close to Danish preferences in other contexts. The fundamental question examined in this chapter is why there is this difference between the extensive military participation outside the EU and the absence of participation in the EU The idea in this chapter is that the main lines in Danish policy towards the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) can be explained with reference to the domestic framework of meaning within which Danish policy towards the EU as a security actor takes place. This dimension is here conceptualized as discourse, and competing meaning systems as competing discourses.1 The way in which the dominant discourse and the competing discourses read the international developments in these fields contributes to shaping and constraining Danish policy towards the ESDP. In the next section (pp. 81–4) the central Danish political discourses with

80

Henrik Larsen

regard to the EU as a security actor will be presented after some introductory remarks about Danish security and defence. Subsequently, the Danish policy towards the EU defence dimension from 1991 is outlined (see pp. 84–8), followed by a section (pp. 88–90) which attempts to explain Danish policy towards the ESDP in the light of the competing discourses on the EU as a security actor. Finally, some concluding reflections, including theoretical ones, are offered (see pp. 90–2).

The background Security, understandings of Europe and the ESDP In the 1990s the Danes came to regard armed force as a useful tool for achieving security. At the same time they redefined the nature of their security from being able to defend the Danish territory to a much broader concept of threats to Danish security (Græger et al. 2002: 95). Danish forces’ participation in peacekeeping was high compared to the size of the country during the Cold War, and the level has further increased in the post-Cold War period. While the use of military means in the Cold War period was restricted to peacekeeping under a UN mandate, the post-Cold War period has seen a deployment of Danish forces in ‘Chapter 7’ operations in the former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s and in actual war fighting in Kosovo, Afghanistan2 and Iraq. In the two latter cases Danish forces were part of a relatively restricted group of countries, and in the cases of Kosovo and Iraq the UN mandate was extremely controversial. The post-Cold War period has seen a considerable increase in the resources allocated to Danish forces which could be deployed abroad rather than to the territorial defence of Denmark. An important milestone in this development was the establishment of a Danish International Brigade (DIB) in 1992 matching a higher and more permanent level of engagement abroad. The DIB also provided contributions to NATO’s Rapid Response Force. The DIB has been engaged in Bosnia, Macedonia, Afghanistan and Iraq in the post-Cold War period. This trend towards a broader international involvement has been continued in the Danish five-year Defence Agreement for 2004–9 between five political parties (the Liberals, the Social Democrats, the Danish People’s Party, the Radical Liberals and the Christian Democrats). Direct conventional threats to Danish territory are described in the premises of the agreement as non-existent for the foreseeable future, in particular after the enlargement of NATO and the EU. But new and unpredictable threats such as international terrorism and the spreading of weapons of mass destruction are seen as having entered the scene, not least after 11 September 2001. Danish defence should primarily be aimed at countering these threats where they emerge, within or beyond Danish borders (Forsvarsministeriet 2004a: 2).

Denmark and the ESDP opt-out

81

This situation is seen as requiring a strengthening of Danish defence in two central areas: internationally deployable military capacities and the ability to counter acts of terrorism and their consequences (Forsvarsministeriet 2004a: 1). In the 2005–9 Defence Agreement, a transfer of resources from territorial defence based on conscription to international operations and total defence is planned to take place. As to the first area, the Agreement concluded that the size of internationally deployable military capacities should be increased. Whereas Denmark was able to deploy approximately 1,150 soldiers in international operations at the same time in 2005, the target in the Defence Agreement is that in 2009 it would be able to deploy approximately 2,000 soldiers, including in NATO’s Rapid Response Force (1,500 from the army and 500 from the navy and the air force). The increased capacity for international involvement is the result of additional resources allocated to this field (an extra DDK 900 million out of a budget of DKK 19 billion3) and organizational restructuring. Where the balance between operational structures and support structures is 2:3, the aim is to reverse the ratio. The Defence Agreement also contains a general reference to the preparation for the possibility that the EU defence exemption of 1993 would be lifted and thus for Danish participation in EU operations. This demonstrates that the majority of the parties behind the Defence Agreement would like to see the exemptions lifted (the defence exemption is treated on pp. 84– 6). However, this has not yet had any concrete effects on defence structures or acquisitions. As to the second area, the aim is to enhance the ability to counter acts of terrorism. This will primarily be achieved through increasing the immediate military readiness for total defence. Mobilization defence will be abolished and the number of annual conscripts will be reduced by two-thirds (from 6,000 to 2,000). Training for conscripts will be for a four-month period (hitherto it had been eight to nine months). No conscripts will take part in international operations, but they will be trained only for total defence. There will thus be a significant distinction between the training of units aimed at total defence and units earmarked for international tasks (Forsvarsministeriet 2004a, 2004b). Danish EU political discourses The two main political discourses within the Danish debate about the EU as an external actor after the Cold War will now be described.4 These are based on fundamental understandings about Europe and the state, nation and people just outlined. The first perspective can be called the ‘non-privileged cooperation discourse’ and the second the ‘essential cooperation discourse’. These discourses cut across parties, organizations and the population, although the second discourse outlined is increasingly drawn on by the political elite after the Cold War. While political understandings

82

Henrik Larsen

differed along the lines of these two discourses, there were also important similarities on which both were based, as I have already outlined: the EU was understood in both discourses in instrumental terms. It was legitimized with reference to its beneficial effects for Denmark or Europe rather than in mythical terms which saw a European project as the embodiment of a natural and desirable destiny. According to the non-privileged cooperation discourse, the EU does not play a beneficial political or security role, although it has taken on competence in these areas. Danish foreign policy should therefore not build on the EU as an essential forum. According to this discourse, the EU does not strengthen European security; it is not a ‘project of peace’. The EU structures are seen as imposing undue restrictions on member states. It is the ‘federal European super-state’, complete with a defence capacity that poses a threat to Denmark and its foreign policy. The defence exemption is seen not only as a way of preventing Denmark from contributing to a super-state but also as a way of showing that Denmark has established clear limits to EU influence on national affairs. While the EU’s access to military means is seen as a general problem within this discourse, the left-wing adherents of this discourse focus on the military means as part of illegitimate power politics conducted by an illegitimate unit and adherents on the right wing fear for the detrimental effects on NATO. For them, Danish military engagement should be with NATO or the US. Adherents to this discourse can be found across the political spectrum, in the June Movement and in the People’s Movement against the EU, although it is strongest on the political extremes (the Unity Party on the left and the Danish People’s Party on the right). There are signs that important parts of the population adhere to elements of this understanding, at least judging from their attitudes towards the EU in general (Græger et al. 2002: 97–100). Adherents to this discourse often draw on elements of the four cornerstone understandings of Danish foreign policy which were dominant during the Cold War. Danish foreign policy was seen as based on participation in four forums (NATO, UN, Nordic cooperation and the EC/EU) or cornerstones. Each was ascribed equal weight and there was a functional compartmentalization between them, limiting the functions that each one could take on. According to the essential cooperation discourse, the EU is a central economic and political actor with a role to play in the field of security and a role in the defence of liberal values. The EU is seen as an anchor for European security and hence the EU is an essential forum for Danish security policy. In this discourse the functions which during the Cold War had been attributed to other cornerstones in Danish foreign policy are after the Cold War also attributed to the EU – and the EU cornerstone is presented as being the most important one in Danish foreign policy. The functions of the other cornerstones meet in the EU, which therefore plays a central political and security role in Danish foreign policy. At the same time, within this

Denmark and the ESDP opt-out

83

discourse there are limits to the degree to which the EU can assume functions from the other cornerstones. NATO is still seen as the one that safeguards Denmark’s territorial integrity and undertakes major military activities in Europe. Within this discourse, cooperation involving defence guarantees should not take place in the EU but in NATO. Even so, there is openness towards EU cooperation on Petersberg operations, which are seen as beneficial to European security and to the wider world (Græger et al. 2002: 95–7). The ESDP is a positive process even if Denmark cannot participate in the military aspects. Until the year 2000, adherents of the essential cooperation discourse would understand the essential role of the EU as naturally being played out within a world with the US as the only superpower. This characterized the dominant discourse in the Social Democrat/Radical Liberal government (1993–2001) as well as the Liberal/ Conservative opposition. However, from 2000 a new articulation and variant could be discerned which claimed that the EU was also essential in order to counter what was seen as the excesses of US power and even as furthering a multipolar world (Larsen 2003). Within this variant of the discourse the basic understanding of the ESDP as beneficial was therefore placed in the context of a new understanding of the role of the EU with regard to the US. It was not a break with the central link to and positive identification with the US in the field of security, but the EU was now conceived as playing both with and against the US in the field of security. This change within the essential cooperation discourse could be discerned during the office of the Social Democrat foreign minister Lykketoft (2000–1). But it became clearer after the departure of the Social Democrat/Radical Liberal government in 2001 and was expressed in the Social Democrats’ new foreign policy programme in 2003, in which the aim of the EU was to play both with and against the US, furthering a global multipolarity (Larsen 2003). The unipolar world order was, in other words, not naturalized as the context for the EU. This change could also be found in the parts of the SF, which drew on elements of this discourse. Amongst the adherents of this discourse within the SF, the essential role of the EU was strongly linked to the idea that the EU was the only unit at that point through which Denmark could go against the strong US. The dominant discourse within the government with regard to the EU as a security actor after 2001 remained the old version of essential cooperation. The EU was presented as an essential security actor within unipolarity as expressed in the 2003 Government White Paper on priorities in Danish foreign policy (Regeringen 2003; Larsen 2003). But within this understanding the roles of the US and NATO in safeguarding Danish sovereignty have been upgraded at the expense of the EU in some contexts (see, for example, the prime minister Fogh Rasmussen’s article in the newspaper Berlingske Tidende [Rasmussen 2003]). The EU, including in the field of the ESDP, is still articulated as an essential security actor within unipolarity. However, the ultimate role of the US and NATO as the guarantors of

84

Henrik Larsen

Danish security and the central partners in Denmark’s hard security endeavours is emphasized more strongly than before 2001. In this sense the role of the ESDP has been placed in a somewhat different context since then. While there was agreement within the two variants of the essential cooperation discourse that the EU should be an essential security actor, there were, however, disagreements about what the EU was essential for. These were based on more fundamental disagreements about the desirability of the present unipolar system. Proponents of the old version of the essential cooperation discourse stressed the importance of Denmark taking part in frontline battles with the US in the new main line of global conflict today: the war against terrorism (Rynning 2003a).5 The adherents of the new version of the essential cooperation discourse, on the contrary, were sceptical towards Denmark participating in this battle. They did not find that a close relationship to the US would always be of value in itself, or that it always served substantial Danish interests.

A Danish ESDP policy? The following will outline the main features of Danish policy towards the ESDP since 1991. During the 1990–1 intergovernmental conference the Danish government had opposed having both a common defence policy and defence in the EU. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) included both concepts with a common defence as a possible future aim. After the Danish ‘no’ to TEU in the 1992 referendum, a so-called National Compromise based on agreement between the Radical Liberals, the Social Democrats and the Socialist People’s Party stated that Denmark should ‘stay outside the so-called defence policy dimension which implies membership of the WEU and a common defence policy or common defence’ (Ryborg 1998: 255). A decision by the European Council in Edinburgh, in December 1992 (the so-called Edinburgh Decision), based on the Danish National Compromise became the basis of a new Danish referendum in May 1993, which produced a ‘yes’ to the TEU. The Edinburgh decision stated: The Heads of State and Government note that . . . [a]ccordingly Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications, but will not prevent the development of closer cooperation between Member States in this area. (European Council 1992) Crucially, Denmark could not, through the Edinburgh Decision, stop the other member states from developing a defence dimension. Just as importantly, the Danish government would itself decide (as in the other exempted areas) whether to lift the Edinburgh Decision and take part as a normal member state. This meant that the concrete implications of the defence

Denmark and the ESDP opt-out

85

exemption largely rested on the Danish government’s interpretation of it as long as this did not prevent the development of this policy area for the other member states. The Danish government subsequently interpreted the Danish defence exemption to mean that Denmark should not participate in decisions and actions which had defence implications and were made with reference to TEU Article J.4.2 in the Maastricht Treaty (and, later, Article J.7.2 in the Amsterdam Treaty), irrespective of the substance of the particular decision. This was due to the wording in this article, which closely resembled the language of the Edinburgh Decision. In the 1990s Denmark opted out of eight EU decisions made with reference to this article. This meant that there was no Danish participation in (J.4.2 part of) the actions, but no Danish veto of the decisions either. All eight decisions were areas where Copenhagen had few problems with the actual substance of the decisions. The problem was the legal basis and its reference to defence. Danish policy in the EU in this area became very passive and low key. While this is the most appropriate general characterization of Danish policy, from the mid-1990s a gap or bifurcation could be discerned in Danish policy with regard to the defence dimension within the EU, a gap that persists to the present day. It was between the government’s policy towards the EU defence dimension in general (the framework) and the concrete policies within this field that Denmark was (not) able to take part in, given the terms set by the defence exemption. From 1995 the Danish government increasingly supported a defence role for the EU with regard to Petersberg military tasks. This support was very low key but the trend was increasingly noticeable and clear. While Denmark opted out of concrete decisions and actions in this area due to the exemption, it was the government’s interpretation that it could take part in general political discussions in this field and support the setting up of a defence dimension in general terms. The Danish defence exemption arguably had a very limited impact in the 1990s as the concrete development within this area was very modest. With the St Malo dynamism from 1998, the Danish defence exemption acquired greater significance as it prevented Denmark from participating in the substantial aspects of the build-up of the ESDP. The motion of 8 December 1999 in the Folketing (parliament) urged the government to take part in the creation of the new ESDP structures while fully respecting the defence exemption. This further widened the above-mentioned gap between what Denmark supported in general (although low-key) terms and the concrete decisions and actions in which it could (not) take part and from which it opted out. However, in October 2001, a year before the Danish EU presidency, the Danish government presented a report on the consequences of the Danish defence exemption in the light of the coming Danish presidency to the EU foreign ministers’ meeting of 8–9 October 2001.6 In the report, the scope of the Danish defence exemption was defined in more precise terms with

86

Henrik Larsen

reference to military decisions. It was now made clear that the exemption applied to situations where the measures considered had concrete defence implications (Udenrigsministeriet 2003: 20), whereas the opt-outs had previously mainly been applied to the use of particular articles in the TEU. The background to this was the expectation that future decisions about the ESDP within the Nice Treaty would be taken with reference to Article 14 on joint actions rather than Articles 13 and 17, which made explicit reference to both defence policy and defence. This new interpretation of the scope of the exemption made possible a judgement by the government about whether the substance of the individual decisions related to defence issues where the defence exemption would apply. The consequence of this was that Denmark could now take part in the non-military aspects of the ESDP (such as policing) when these were decided according to Article 14. The report thus broadened Copenhagen’s possibilities of participating in the ESDP on non-military issues if these were not decided by Article 13 and 17. The 2001 report was not controversial domestically, where proponents seemed satisfied with the new opportunity to take part in civilian tasks. In spite of the government’s general support for the St Malo process, the concrete contribution as far as the military substance of the ESDP is concerned has been very limited. As the most material indication of the defence exemption, Denmark has not registered forces with the EU’s capabilities catalogue, which was set up in 2000. There has been no Danish participation in the first three EU military operations, in Macedonia (2003), Congo (2003) and Bosnia (2004). In fact in the cases of Macedonia and Bosnia Danish forces which were part of the preceding NATO forces were withdrawn when the EU took over from NATO in order to comply with the exemption in spite of the similarities in the tasks at hand. Moreover, Denmark opted out of the decision, establishing a satellite centre in July 2001, although it participated in setting up the civilian parts of the centre (Udenrigsministeriet 2003: 20). Copenhagen did not participate in the EU Council decision on the so-called Athena mechanism on 23 February 2003 on the principles governing common expenditures for EU operation which have implications in the military field. It also opted out of the joint action setting up a European Defence Agency (EDA) on 12 July 2004. Altogether the Danish defence exemption was applied to twelve EU decisions from 1993 to the end of 2005. On the whole, the more generally political the context in which the ESDP is discussed in the EU, the larger the room for manoeuvre the Danish government perceives itself as having within the government’s interpretation of the defence exemption (Udenrigsministeriet 2003). The opposite is the case for concrete elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. Denmark thus participates in more general political discussions about security in the EU and the drafting of documents such as, for example, A Secure Europe in a Better World (Solana 2003), but Copenhagen has a very low political profile in the military field.

Denmark and the ESDP opt-out

87

The Danish defence minister – although present – does not participate in discussions about military issues in the EU. In the EU Military Committee (EUMC) the Danish representative rarely takes the floor on military issues and does not take part in votes (Græger et al. 2002: 118–25). The Danish representative in the EU Military Staff (EUMS) was responsible for coordination between the civilian and the military crisis management instruments in the period 2000–5 – an area that Denmark has prioritized. At the establishment of the EUMS in March–April 2000, Denmark made an arrangement with the Council which ensured that the seconded Danish officer could function in his work while respecting the Danish defence exemption. This was confirmed in an exchange of letters between High Representative Solana and the Danish foreign minister (Udenrigsministeriet 2005). The implication is that Copenhagen is not able to participate concretely in the development of the military dimension of the ESDP that has been going on especially since St Malo in 1998. However, Denmark has taken part in the civilian part of the ESDP with a relatively high profile. It has put forward several proposals in this field. Copenhagen has strongly supported close coordination between the military and civilian aspects of the ESDP. Danish representatives have taken part in all the civilian operations under the ESDP so far, apart from operations in Congo (the monitoring mission in Aceh, help with the legal build-up in Iraq, Georgia, Macedonia and Bosnia). A significant reason for Danish participation in this field is also diplomatic – a way of compensating for the lack of military engagement. The concrete development of the ESDP in the early 2000s has increased the tension between the general Danish support of the EU’s role in the field of security including the ESDP and the Danish ability to take part in this development concretely. First, the ESDP now has an apparent military content. Second, it is becoming increasingly difficult to separate civilian parts of the ESDP from the military parts – a development that is very much in line with the preferences of Copenhagen. The aim of integrated crisis management, central in the EU’s approach, makes it, paradoxically, more difficult for Denmark to participate, unless practical solutions distinguishing between civil and military elements can be found. The integrated approach will in the future most likely make it difficult for Copenhagen to insulate military decisions from civilian ones. The 2005 reorganization of the EUMS, which included the establishment of a civilian–military cell with an operation centre, made it necessary for the seconded Danish officer to cease work with Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in the ESDP. Before the issue of whether the Danish officer could undertake this new task in the light of the defence exemption had been considered in Copenhagen (the officer in charge of this area may be sent out on operations), developments in Brussels made it difficult for Denmark to ask for this post at all. Head of the new civilian–military cell was seen as an attractive post by many member states due to the positive political attention paid to this field. As Denmark

88

Henrik Larsen

was viewed in Brussels as a member with difficulties in undertaking tasks in the core military areas in the EUMS, it was clear to Copenhagen that the Danish officer would not be a strong candidate. The Danish officer is now the chief administrator of the military cell, where he is in charge of the administrative support for the military activities – a task that has been judged legally to be within the limits set by the defence exemption. Third, the anti-terror dimension in the EU will increasingly draw on a mix of civilian and military components, making it difficult for Copenhagen to participate, as has already been mentioned. This is due not only to the defence exemption but also to the exemption in justice and home affairs (Udenrigsministeriet 2003). Fourth, as NATO and EU procedures in the field of defence acquisitions are moving closer, there are signs that the defence exemption now also affects Denmark’s possibilities in NATO, as Denmark cannot participate on the EU side. While this had long been expected to happen, there are now more firm indications to this effect (Udenrigsministeriet 2005). Thus while the ESDP is becoming more operational and based on firmer administrative and political structures with open Danish support (Udenrigsministeriet 2005), Danish possibilities of participating in central areas are becoming increasingly firmly ruled out or circumscribed. The lack of a perspective for this to change after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, together with other reasons (see pp. 89–90), has contributed to an ever lower profile for the Danish endeavours in Brussels in this field. Denmark’s status in this field in the foreseeable future is then as a member with a semipermanent opt-out. The next section will explain the forces that have shaped and constrained Danish policy towards the ESDP as already outlined.

Discourses on the EU as a security actor and Danish policy towards the ESDP The two main discourses, outlined on pp. 81–4 (from around 2000 the essential cooperation contained two variants), constitute the competing frameworks of meaning for Danish policy towards the EU as a security actor and hence also the ESDP (Græger et al. 2002: 95–100). As shown, they framed and shaped Danish policy. The Danish policy line towards the ESDP can be considered as divided: there has been a split between what governments, since at least 1995, have supported in general terms (the development of an EU defence dimension) and what Denmark can(not) take part in due to the defence exemption. This is due to the existence of two discourses in Danish policy-making towards the EU defence dimension, where one dominates the general EU policy line and the other constrains the policy line in relation to the defence dimension (and the areas of the other exemptions): the essential cooperation discourse and the non-privileged cooperation discourse.

Denmark and the ESDP opt-out

89

The split policy line emanates from the now well-established Danish political convention to the effect that major changes in Denmark’s formal relationship to the EU should be decided by referendum, which is based on Article 20 in the Constitution. The referendums have contributed to the continued politicization of EU issues in Denmark. Broadly speaking this has been opened up for influence by discourses other than the ones that dominate the government and the parliament (Folketing) and this has meant that there is a link between public debate and the general Danish EU policy line (Larsen 1999; Græger et al. 2002). In the 1990s, two referendums led to the four Danish exemptions and in 2000 a referendum confirmed the euro opt-out. This has meant that the non-privileged cooperation discourse has played a political role in Danish ESDP policy. Although it is not dominant in the Folketing or the government, directly through the voting of the population at the referendums the non-privileged cooperation discourse frames the logic behind the exemption. Indirectly, through the consideration being paid by the government to its adherents in the Folketing, the stances of the latter towards the day-to-day government interpretation of the exemption are of importance for the shape of the debate in future referenda. The government must therefore pay attention to the arguments within the non-privileged cooperation discourse (Græger et al. 2002: 100). The essential cooperation discourse, on the other hand, has framed the overall government approach to the EU as a security actor. The background of the general support for the EU’s development in this field is based on this discourse, including the general support for concrete developments within the ESDP – even though Denmark could not take part in many of the concrete decisions and operations. It is also the logic behind the support for an integrated crisis management approach, which may increasingly make Danish ESDP participation difficult. The background of the bifurcated line is thus the presence of two competing political discourses in Denmark with regard to the ESDP (and the other areas where there are Danish exemptions). This is the basic reason why Danish policy in this field has been different from other areas where Denmark’s military engagement has been high profile compared with the Cold War. There is broad support for military contributions in all international forums (if not bilaterally with the US), but not for military contributions making the EU a military actor. However, the divisions within the essential cooperation discourse from around 2000 have arguably also shaped Danish ESDP policy – if in a somewhat airy way. Danish ESDP policy since then has been the same as policy since the start of the St Malo process, a bifurcated line. The policy output looks similar. The post-2001 Liberal/Conservative government has drawn on the variant of the essential cooperation discourse which places the EU and the ESDP very firmly within US unipolarity. In the context of the Iraq debacle and its aftermath, where Denmark has firmly sided with the US, visions for the ESDP seem to be more confined and the role of the US

90

Henrik Larsen

upgraded. There is arguably less trust in the EU as an actor in the post2001 dominant discourse. From 2005, Danish attempts to get a seat on the important ESDP forums (still without being able to take part in much surrounding the military aspects) seem to have been replaced by less political zeal and a degree of resignation amongst civil servants (interviews, Ministry of Defence and Prime Minister’s Office). Although in autumn 2003 the government floated the idea of putting the defence exemption to a referendum in relation to the Constitutional Treaty, very little has been said about this since then. The simple reason might be that the insecurity surrounding the status of the Constitutional Treaty does not make a very good basis for another referendum on the exemptions. From this point of view, the Constitutional Treaty has to be finally declared dead and buried before any Danish Government would dare to put the exemptions to another referendum. A broader interpretation (which may supplement the former) is that the bilateral security relationship with the US has become so important for the present government that considerations about possible Danish participation in the ESDP have been downgraded as reflected in less interest in the ESDP. Although the ESDP is gaining momentum, this may be less significant than the increased intensity in the Danish–American bilateral relationship. So although the ESDP policy looks the same as before 2001, the background is different in that the balance in Danish foreign and security foreign policy between the US and the EU has shifted towards the US. If this is correct, the implication must also be that if adherents of the other variant of the essential cooperation discourse came to dominate, this might again change the discursive foundation of Danish ESDP policy, as the balance between the EU and the US might again be shifted.7 While it has been widely assumed that the defence exemption contributes to pushing Denmark closer to the US politically, it does, of course, not follow that the affiliation with the US in itself keeps Denmark away from the ESDP (as the case of the UK shows). So the question of which discourse dominates is of fundamental importance for the emphasis on the ESDP. However, changes at this very fundamental discursive level may not have very visible effects on the ESDP due to Denmark’s low-key role in this area based on the defence exemption.

Conclusions The fundamental question examined in this chapter was why there is a difference between the extensive Danish military participation outside the EU and the absence of participation in the EU. With the background of the assumed role of discourse, the chapter has shown that this is due to the presence of two competing discourses in the Danish political environment, which leads to a split, low-key policy line. It is not a question of Denmark rejecting the ESDP en tout, but rather that the government has supported the general ESDP process since 1995 and would like to join it fully but is

Denmark and the ESDP opt-out

91

prevented from doing so due to the defence exemption, which is based on a different logic from its own. Diverging views on the role of the EU vis-a`-vis the US since 2000 may give rise to different emphases in relation to the ESDP, which will, however, only have noticeable policy effects if the defence exemption is lifted. To the extent that there is a Danish concept of security, this can be said to be a broad concept. In this sense it follows the general trend towards a broadening of the concept of security as outlined in Chapter 1 (see p. 97). While the military aspects of security play a very significant part in Danish foreign policy after the Cold War, there is also a strong emphasis on the broader non-military aspects of security. The very significant resources in relative terms spent on development aid, which are increasingly legitimized within a security viewpoint, bear witness to that. But, in more narrow terms, Denmark has been amongst the primary movers of non-military crisis management international organizations. Within the EU Denmark, together with the Netherlands and Sweden, has been prominent in putting forward proposals in this field. This chapter has drawn on a discourse approach in the analysis of Danish ESDP policy which can be placed within a broadly constructivist approach to international relations. As mentioned in Chapter 1 (see pp. 6–9), issues of ideology and culture have entered international relations from the late 1980s, and the approach in this chapter is in line with that. It has therefore focused on how Danish ESDP policy has been formulated within competing Danish discourses and how these discourses interpret international developments. Other theoretical approaches can, of course, be drawn on to analyse Danish policy towards the ESDP. A Neo-Realist approach would emphasize Denmark’s position within the polarity of international politics. The argument from this perspective would be that Denmark’s low-profile approach to the ESDP was not so much a result of discourses about Europe and the EU, but rather an expression of the strong position of the US in Danish security historically and at present. The unipolar world provides pressures towards close security cooperation with the US. Given Denmark’s strong links with the US, the Neo-Realist approach does not find it surprising that Denmark chooses not to place its military eggs in the EU basket. A NeoRealist approach to analysing foreign policy (in its neoclassical version) does not exclude an analysis of domestic factors, but structural forces will provide pressures towards certain outcomes which are likely to prevail in the long-term (see, for example, Rose 1998). From the point of view of this approach, the different ESDP approaches of other countries in this book can be seen as a reflection of their different positions within the unipolar structure. An approach drawing on local polarity will focus on the impact of EuroAtlantic polarity. The decentralized nature of this polarity (Washington and Brussels) allows a certain variation in the attraction of the different parts of

92

Henrik Larsen

the pole to different states. That allows Denmark to be closer to Washington regarding some aspects of security than to the EU. This is, indeed, likely given Denmark’s status as a near-core member (and not a core member) of the EU (see Mouritzen and Wivel 2005).8 To some extent the discourse approach in this chapter can be said to downplay such structural pressures or external factors. However, the main point about the discourse approach used here is that such structural pressures are translated or read by discourses. So a study of discourses is in any case an appropriate level for analysing Danish ESDP policy. Moreover, different structural positions may be difficult to identify clearly amongst the Northern European countries in this book. ESDP policy, rather than a result of structural pressures, can be seen as an expression of countries’ understanding of their role in European politics and in international relations. From a Neoliberal Institutionalist (NLI) point of view it is not surprising either that Denmark takes a lukewarm approach to the ESDP. Within an NLI perspective it is not obvious that the EU should take on a significant role in defence, or at least not build up institutional structures in this field, as it is not clear what the added utility value would be from permanent EU structures in this field (Wagner 2003). Defence is not a necessary EU task which creates pressures for national support. This naturally opens up to the influence of domestic and ideational factors on foreign policy towards which an NLI approach is open (see Keohane and Milner 1996; Goldstein and Keohane 1993). This allows an analysis of the domestic background of Danish ESDP policy. However, from the perspective taken in this chapter, issues of utility and of ideational support or lack of support for the ESDP cannot be separated. It is all part of the general discourse on the EU and the place of defence therein.

Notes 1 For a presentation of the use of discourse analysis for the analysis of foreign policy, see Larsen (1997). 2 Although official reports say that the Danish special forces have not been engaged in actual shooting in Afghanistan. 3 Approximately E130 million and E2 billion, respectively. 4 This draws heavily on Græger et al. (2002: 95–100). 5 This was a new emphasis in the stress on the necessity of Denmark placing itself firmly as part of the main line of conflict, whereas previous emphases had often been on mitigating this line of conflict (Rynning 2003a). 6 The concrete background was the upcoming Danish presidency, for which a clarification of where Denmark could carry out its presidency function was necessary, and the case of the vote on the chairman of the EU Military Committee (see Græger et al. 2002: 118–25). 7 Here it is presented as if one or the other was dominant within the government. However, these two variants of the essential cooperation discourse both have their strongholds. While the ‘original’ essential cooperation discourse is dominant

Denmark and the ESDP opt-out

93

within the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Defence, the new variant appears stronger in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 8 The approach of Mouritzen and Wivel is based on neoclassical Realist assumptions. It also attributes a role to domestic factors such as ‘lessons of the past’ in the way states react to the pressures of local polarity (Mouritzen and Wivel 2005: ch. 2).

6

Norway between Europe and the US Nina Græger

Introduction The geopolitical context of Norway has been formulated in a triangular fashion, with Russia, the US and Europe representing each of the three corners (see Neumann 2002; and also Chapter 2, pp. 17–22). Since 1999, the European corner of this triangle has gained increased attention in the Norwegian defence policy debate. Europe’s ambitions in the international arena and efforts to establish relevant military capabilities have unleashed a set of questions in Norway, some of which this chapter will discuss. What challenges are facing Norway as a result of the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)? To what extent has the ESDP affected Norway’s security concerns, as seen in the political debate? How is cooperation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expected to be affected by the ESDP and what role is the US likely to play in this? Norwegian security and defence policy is modestly concerned with the European Union (EU) and ESDP. The Norwegians have voted ‘no’ to the European project twice: in 1972 and in 1994. An opinion poll of early May 2006 showed a 51.4 per cent majority against Norway joining the EU had there been a new referendum (Aftenposten 2006a). The prevalent view among Norwegian politicians, authorities and public opinion is that the Norwegian people in 1994 gave the government a mandate to keep Norway outside the EU. This has not been interpreted by subsequent Norwegian governments, of different political colours, as an obstacle against the closest possible attachment to the EU in several policy areas, including that of security and defence. Here, ‘possible’ not only refers to the Norwegian interpretation of the mandate given by the referendum but also to the limits to Norway’s participation set by the EU.1 During 1999–2000, the Norwegian authorities tried to obtain the best possible formal arrangements for Norway in the ESDP structures. Failing to achieve any substantive influence, Norway adjusted its strategy towards force contributions (Græger 2002). During the last few years, Norwegian military and civilian personnel have participated in several EU-led operations. NATO, not the EU, however, has been the major driving force of

Norway between Europe and the US

95

defence reform, which has enabled Norway to offer troop contributions. Norway’s security and defence policy is still anchored in NATO, and to some extent the EU is seen as a competitor to NATO. This chapter will first look at Norway’s security policy and its political stance towards the ESDP and the EU in this policy field, and it will show how the current plans and provisions of Norwegian defence have accommodated the ESDP. The main section (pp. 97–101) will deal with how Norway has responded to the rise of the ESDP, reflecting the position of the EU in the Norwegian security and defence debate, the role of NATO and Norway’s relations with the US. The chapter will use Norway’s invitation to join the Nordic EU Battlegroup in 2004 as a case when analysing the spectre of the Norwegian ESDP discourse (see pp. 101–7). The conclusion (pp. 111–12) speculates about the degree of Europeanization of the Norwegian security discourse.

Norway’s security context Certain concepts have defined and are put to work in national debates about Norwegian security and defence policy. During the Cold War, these concepts were, first, Norway’s geographical location – the proximity to the Soviet Union; and second, Norway’s NATO membership and close bilateral relationship with the US (Tamnes 1997). Territorial defence and the need for allied assistance in the case of an attack (meaning an invasion) on Norway have governed Norwegian security and defence policy. Hence, NATO is still the cornerstone of Norway’s security and defence policy. The commitments under Article 5 are one of the pillars of the Norwegian defence concept. The end of the Cold War brought about changes in NATO’s strategic concept, command structure, tasks and identity. NATO has transformed itself from a territorial defence alliance into a politico-military instrument with a global reach. To a considerable extent, Norway’s participation in the transformation of NATO is based on the view that Norwegian security depends on the continued relevance of NATO. Apart from the link to territorial defence, the idea that if only NATO were to become modern and efficient the EU would no longer be a genuine alternative also seems to have been present. The Defence Plan for the period 2005–8 states: Norway’s most important contribution in this respect [to maintaining NATO’s relevance] will be to follow up on the allied intentions realised through the work with NRF [NATO Response Force], a new command structure and PCC [Prague Capabilities Commitment], to ensure NATO remains an efficient security political tool seen from both sides of the Atlantic. (Ministry of Defence [Norway] 2004a: 11)2

96

Nina Græger

Defence reform is thus legitimized and explained with reference to NATO transformation and territorial security. Consequently, while important to Norway’s international reputation and its access to European decisionmakers outside the NATO framework, participation in the ESDP is not tightly coupled to territorial defence. The EU does not have a security guarantee like NATO’s.3 Due to the essential role of NATO, the EU has traditionally not been considered relevant in a Norwegian security policy context. Most Norwegian political and military elites never really believed that the EU would reach political agreement on a common policy in this area. When the Europeans did, the ESDP unleashed considerable Norwegian diplomatic activity.

Political cooperation with the ESDP During 1999, the Norwegian government sought influence in the ESDP through a combination of direct claims vis-a`-vis the EU and indirect claims through NATO and through bilateral, primarily Nordic, channels (Græger 2002). The government proposed arrangements for the inclusion of the nonEU allies in the new EU structures modelled on the relationship between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU), and on Norway’s WEU associate membership (since 1992). Despite its efforts, Norway’s participation in the various organs within the ESDP is quite limited. The mechanisms of consultation within the ESDP, established by the Nice European Council in 2000, consisted of at least two joint meeting between the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the six European NATO countries outside the EU (at the time in a 15 + 6 format), of which at least one meeting should be on the ministerial level, as well as one meeting including the candidate countries plus Norway and Iceland (15 + 13 + 2 format) in each presidency. Since the last EU enlargement the imbalance has grown, with twenty-seven countries on one side of the table, making the future of this format highly questionable.4 The institutional arrangements offered by the EU did not fulfil Norway’s requirements. More important, they did not attract the interest of the EU and were generally not filled with political substance. From the viewpoint of the EU it is neither rational nor effective to engage in meetings with countries not presenting any problems to the EU.5 This problem was intensified by EU enlargement, increased coordination of the various EU policy areas and the depth of cooperation within ESDP, which has made internal policy development in the EU increasingly resource and time consuming. Hence, the Nice arrangements are expected to have even less substance than before and also are facing an uncertain future. In addition, the EU rationalized the informal dialogue with third countries, as well as the political dialogue about foreign and security issues at ministerial level established within the European Economic Area (EEA) framework in 1995 (Ministry of Foreign

Norway between Europe and the US

97

Affairs 2005: 3.2.3).6 Although there are other practices, such as two meetings with each new EU presidency, one for the Norwegian prime minister and one for the foreign minister, the developments in the EU have made it ‘more difficult for Norway as a non-member to be heard both when it comes to formal and informal consultations in the EU’, according to the evaluation report of the 2001–5 centre-right government (ibid.). To strengthen the relationship between the EU and NATO, the Swedish EU presidency proposed in 2001 that non-EU allies be invited to an orientation after the EU defence minister meetings. These meetings are held in a ‘Troika + 5’ format,7 the five being those NATO European members not members of the EU, Norway and Iceland, as well as the candidate countries of Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey. Due to the lack of political influence provided by these meetings, the Norwegian defence minister showed limited interest in participating in them until the autumn of 2004.8

‘Troops-for-influence’ and defence reform Discontent with the state of affairs, the Labour government taking over in March 2000 adjusted Norway’s strategy from claims to contributions. The idea was to stress Norway’s role as an ‘external resource’ to the EU, rather than as a country seeking ‘special arrangements’ all the time. This policy was part of an approach to the EU that could be called a ‘troops-for-influence’ strategy, where the aim is to convert military contributions into political access and influence (Græger 2002). This was also reflected in a change of bureaucratic practices in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Balkans were a high profile policy area during Norway’s Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) presidency in 1999, partly because of the Kosovo war. The Labour government in 2000 wanted to redefine the Balkans portfolio from the OSCE to the EU policy area, to be able to follow up at a time when the EU took on a leadership role in the Balkans (e.g. the Stability Pact for South East Europe).9 This was also probably one way of compensating for Norway’s reduced international position in the Balkans after leaving the OSCE presidency and Troika. Furthermore, to strengthen its European policy focus the government established an operative Department on European Policy and a Europe Department, dealing with economic and bilateral issues. However, the next government, from October 2001, changed this back into a less EU-focused departmental structure. Between 2000 and 2001 the government put substantive efforts into reforming the Norwegian armed forces, a process that had been moving forward at a much slower pace in Norway than in the rest of Europe (Græger 2006). With Parliament’s adoption of the Defence Plan for 2002–5, the transformation from invasion defence to more flexible, rapid reaction forces assigned for international operations, including warfare, was up and running (Ministry of Defence [Norway] 2001).

98

Nina Græger

Norway was among the first non-EU countries to designate forces (the entire international response force of 3,500 personnel) to the European force catalogue (Helsinki Headline Goal) in 2000 and has participated in the Capabilities Commitment Conferences since. The Norwegian government also made available to the EU an 80-personnel-strong police force for civilian crisis management operations. In 2003 a standby group for civilian crisis management was established, which currently consists of up to 45 judges, public prosecutors, police lawyers and prison guards with international experience.10 Norway’s participation in EU operations requires a UN mandate, as stressed in the present government’s inaugural declaration: ‘The government will only contribute with forces to the EU battlegroups when there is a crystal clear mandate from the UN’ (Office of the Prime Minister 2005). As regards the use of Norwegian forces in EU-led operations, Norway signed separate contracts for each operation the country has participated in until 3 December 2004, when the EU and Norway signed a framework agreement for Norway’s participation in EU crisis management operations (Ministry of Defence [Norway] 2004b). As regards the military participation of third countries, the Nice European Council (2000) decided that non-EU states which contribute forces shall in principle enjoy the same rights and commitments in the implementation of an EU operation (e.g. access to command structures and certain planning and other related activities). Countries making ‘significant contributions’ will get a place in the committee of troop-contributing nations, which is responsible for the daily running of the operation (European Council 2000).11 What is considered significant, however, will depend on the type of operation, and will be discussed and decided upon by the EU. In operations where the EU draws on NATO assets, however, non-EU allies have the right to participate and to exercise operational influence. This was laid down in the Berlin Plus arrangements between the EU and NATO, establishing the conditions on which the EU is granted access to NATO’s capabilities and resources, and for institutional and military cooperation between the two. During the negotiations, which were completed in December 2002, Norway pushed, as did Turkey, for increased influence for non-EU NATO countries based on their former associate membership in the WEU (for Norway, since 1992). In the initial phase of the negotiations, Norwegian authorities referred to paragraphs in the Washington Summit Communique´ (1999)12 and in the Communique´ from NATO’s foreign ministers meeting in December 200013 in support of their claims. Norwegian military and civilian personnel have been deployed to EU missions in Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.14 Norwegian experience of participation in the committee of troop-contributing nations is, not surprisingly, that this gives little to no influence to third countries: ‘The arrangement is, however, a channel which leaves minor opportunities

Norway between Europe and the US

99

for real influence’ (Ministry of Defence [Norway] 2004c: 20). For example, in Operation Concordia the EU and NATO disagreed on the role of NATO regional headquarters, AFSOUTH (Allied Forces South), and on the EU chain of command. Consultations between the two did not function satisfactorily for third countries. Norway did not receive documents prior to the meetings, was not consulted before decisions were made, but was in practice informed afterwards.15 Other parts of the military cooperation under Berlin Plus have worked better. As part of the arrangement the EU established a ‘planning cell’ in NATO and liaison officers in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). NATO established corresponding arrangements with the ESDP and the military structures. Because the EU drew on NATO assets in Operation Concordia, SHAPE was allowed one liaison officer to the EU Military Staff (EUMS). As part of the SHAPE liaison team, Norway was able to negotiate a military representative ‘on the inside’ in the EUMS for a period of time (Norway and Turkey rotate this place), which was very useful for information as well a general understanding. This arrangement has become permanent.16 Norway and other third countries can participate in autonomous EU operations by invitation only. These are contributions which the EU is not able to cover itself and which thus need reinforcements. A challenge facing Norway is to access information about which contributions the EU would possibly request from third countries, since Norway is not admitted into those organs dealing with force planning. As an associate member of the WEU Norway enjoyed full membership rights in the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG). On 1 January 2005 this was replaced by a new agency, the European Defence Agency (EDA). EDA assists EU countries in developing military capabilities for use in crisis management operations, identifying common needs and encouraging cooperation to find mutual solutions. Participation in this forum was regarded as vital in order for Norway to be able to offer a relevant and ‘significant’ military contribution to EU operations, as noted on p. 98. But the EDA represented yet another policy area where Norway experienced the consequences of its ‘outsideness’. While the EU gave assurances that it would pursue a policy of openness towards non-EU states who were members of WEAG (Turkey and Norway), Norway was not let in on the preparatory deliberations, but was consulted when these were completed.17 The agreement between the EDA and the Norwegian Ministry of Defence (MoD), signed in March 2006, gives the Norwegian defence industry access to international cooperation and to new markets. As with the ESDP, the agreement provides no political influence for Norway, only access to information, and participate in specific and ad hoc projects and programmes.18 It is up to Norway to propose to the EDA how it may contribute to various projects and programmes.

100

Nina Græger

Despite the disappointments and setbacks since the ESDP was established, Norway still pursues a policy where support for, and the wish to participate in, the ESDP is exercised through the practices of military and civilian force contributions. In the autumn of 2004, Norway also accepted the invitation to participate in a Nordic EU Battlegroup together with Finland, Sweden and Estonia. Sweden is ‘lead nation’ with a contribution of around 800 personnel. A memorandum of understanding was signed between the parties in 2005 (Ministry of Defence [Norway] 2005). The agreement between the Nordic and Baltic participating countries in the Nordic EU Battlegroup clearly states that deployment ‘will be in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and other provisions and principles of international law’ (Memorandum of Understanding 2005: section 6, para. 2). Despite some opposition there (see pp. 104–5), Parliament nevertheless voted in favour of Norway’s participation. To sum up, the ESDP has to some extent ‘Europeanized’ the Norwegian security discourse since 1999 (Græger 2002; Rieker 2003; Archer 2005). This is first of all a result of new military practices, where Norwegian forces have been assigned to the EU force catalogues, with annual updates, and the deployment of civilian and military personnel, though so far in modest numbers, to EU-led operations. Due to the essential role of NATO in the defence of Norway and as an arena for European and transatlantic security, the Europeanization of Norwegian policies and practices is potentially stronger within the civilian pillar of the ESDP, where there is less at stake for Norwegian security. This is also one way in which Norway’s EU engagement may be easily coupled with its high international profile as a promoter of aid and development and its role in crisis management (see Ministry of Labour and Government Administration 2003). If we look at internal ministerial practices for the handling of the ESDP and EU security-related issues, however, the degree of Europeanization is less convincing. For example, since October 2001 ESDP has been part of the section for security policy and bilateral relations with the USA and Canada within the Department for Security Policy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). In the MoD similar practices have been established. The ESDP is part of the section for transatlantic and European security policy within the Department of Security, which generally is called the ‘NATO section’.19 In both ministries, only one or two civil servants are responsible for following the ESDP, at least until 2005. These practices may reflect the fact that the ESDP is still treated as a pillar in transatlantic relations and seen in relation to NATO in Norwegian security and defence policy. However, there are also administrative developments which point in the direction of Europeanization. The above-mentioned refocusing of the Balkans portfolio in the MFA from an OSCE to an EU area and the strengthening of the departments dealing with the EU as the exception are

Norway between Europe and the US

101

two obvious examples, although they were changed back again by the next government. Furthermore, in 2001 the position of defence counsellor with a special responsibility to follow up on the ESDP was established at the Norwegian Mission to the EU in Brussels. Whether to place the defence counsellor at Norway’s Mission to NATO or to the EU was an issue of debate between the MFA and the MoD. The MoD claimed that it was natural that the counsellor was located in the NATO mission, which is of vital importance for Norwegian security and defence policy. The MFA argued, on the other hand, that the physical location of Norway’s Mission to the EU, which is situated within five minutes’ walk of the Council Secretariat, which deals with ESDP, and of other EU institutions at Place Schumann in Brussels, had to be decisive. The symbolic value of the decision to place the defence counsellor at the Norwegian Mission to the EU is probably more important than its practical value. Nevertheless, it shows that the ESDP is also seen as increasingly important in its own right by Norwegian authorities.

The EU in the Norwegian security and defence debate The weak footprint of the EU in Norwegian defence policy and debate may seem odd from an outsider’s viewpoint, especially at a time when the EU is strengthening its role as a security actor, which will influence Norwegian security, and when the United States’ foreign policy clearly challenges core elements of Norway’s foreign policy tradition, as exemplified in the case of Iraq. Should not the EU’s focus on multilateralism, the United Nations and a broad approach to security make the EU more appealing to Norway? This is not the case, because the security and defence dimension of the EU is incorporated into policy areas, such as the Norwegian–EU relationship, NATO and Norway’s relationship with the United States. As a result, the EU appears less relevant to Norwegian security and defence policy. The Norwegian–EU relationship There is a tendency for issues pertaining to EU defence policy cooperation, whether they are about contributing forces to the EU or participating in EU-led operations, to be forced into the debate about Norwegian membership of the European Union. The debate about membership stretches across all other debates. It is about the constitutional limits of Norwegian adaptation of policy towards the EU, and to a lesser degree about whether it is desirable or potentially advantageous for Norway to make forces available to the EU, for example in terms of strengthening Norway’s reputation as a contributor to peace (see Ministry of Labour and Government Administration 2003). This was the focus of the deliberations on Norwegian participation in the Nordic Battlegroup. Marit Arnstad, a member of Parliament from the

102

Nina Græger

Centre Party (SP), a clear anti-EU party, framed the issue of Norwegian participation in the EU battlegroups into a membership discourse: a majority of the Norwegian people in 1994 said no Norwegian membership in the EU. And the question concerning participation in the EU’s military battlegroup goes straight into a debate about how we relate to the fact that people said no to Norwegian membership. (Parliamentary Proceedings 2004–5: 765) The core of the debate was to what degree national control of Norwegian forces in EU operations could be retained. Paragraph 25 in the Constitution states that it is illegal to deploy military forces ‘in the hands of foreign powers’. Several constitutional experts presented relatively strict interpretations of this paragraph (Aftenposten 2004c) and of Paragraph 93 in the Constitution, which concerns the transfer of national sovereignty, from the viewpoint of what is constitutionally justifiable. In the constitutional interpretation from the government, however, the relevance of Paragraph 25 was rejected on the basis of its historic context. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004), the paragraph was issued to meet the need for controlling mercenaries, which was quite common in the nineteenth century, and consequently not relevant to today’s context. The government also stressed that the paragraph had been tested against several previous cases, for instance regarding Norwegian participation in the Gulf War (1991), in the Balkans (1995, 1999), in Afghanistan (2001) and in Iraq (2003) (ibid.). A third argument proposed by the government was that ‘[t]he Constitution needs to be understood from a modern reality of security policy and security cooperation’ (ibid.). Defence Minister Devold also focused on realities: ‘We must . . . relate to the collective crisis management and security arrangements that are being developed’ (Devold 2004b). The EU-led operations in the Balkans and in the Congo (DRC) are examples where the EU has developed such arrangements. The new role of the EU was also recognized by Jagland: ‘NATO’s tasks now lay outside NATO’s traditional area of operation, while the EU will take over [responsibility for] security in Europe’ and ‘play a larger role with the field of security policy, whether we like it or not’ (Jagland 2004). Another core argument in the debate was whether the Norwegian government would have the opportunity – in practice, enough time – to make a national decision on Norwegian participation in an operation where the Nordic Battlegroup was to be deployed. The EU plans for operations within fifteen days of the operational concept being decided in the Council of the EU, a timeframe that has to be executed very tightly. The defence minister was crystal clear that there would be enough time, because ‘the paramount part of the decision making process happens in reality before final decisions are made in the Council of the EU’ (Devold 2004c).

Norway between Europe and the US

103

The Ministry of Defence also added that ‘clear conditions for Norwegian participation have been that decisions on participation shall be made on a national level, the force shall be under national control, and participation requires a clear mandate based on international law’ (Ministry of Defence [Norway] 2005). The defence minister said this herself: As with participation in other international operations, any decision on deployment of Norwegian forces in EU-led operations will be made on a national level. Complete control of Norwegian forces entered into EU battlegroups will be achieved through formal arrangements between Norway and the EU, and with our partners Sweden and Finland. (Devold 2004c) Speaking about the right of reservation against participation in such operations, she added that this right was not only the concern of Norway: since many already have alluded to the fact that all the other EU countries have the same wish for national control of their forces. This means there will be parallel processes in each EU country before the Council of the EU makes a decision on whether one should support or not support that the EU is to be engaged in an operation, and in the Council one is dependant on unanimity. (Parliamentary Proceedings 2004–5: 771). However, she stressed that this would probably not present any problems to Norway, due to the traditional consensus in Norwegian foreign policy: ‘Based on experience from NATO Norway has generally shown the ability to arrive [more] quickly at a national conclusion than many of those colleagues who also are sitting at the EU table’ (ibid.). The agreement on the Nordic Battlegroup also leaves room for ‘substantial consultations’, according to the Ministry of Defence (Ministry of Defence [Norway] 2005). Under the principles of the decision to deploy the Nordic Battlegroup, the agreement assumes a national decision-making process: ‘any commitment by the Participants to deploy their forces will only take place after a decision by the respective and competent national authorities in accordance with their national Constitution, legislation and policy decisions’ (Memorandum of Understanding 2005: section 6, para. 1). Furthermore, ‘decisions to deploy the battlegroup will be made by consensus among the participants’ (ibid.: para. 3). Norwegian officials later expressed renewed hopes that participation in the Nordic EU Battlegroup will provide better access to the ESDP. Due to parallel decision-making structures, Norway will at least have access to information in the ‘upstream’ planning of an operation. Whether this will materialize remains to be seen.

104

Nina Græger

Another feature of Norwegian governments’ EU adaptation policies – and the Nordic Battlegroup was no exception – is to present it as ‘businessas-usual’: ‘participation in the EU’s reaction forces is [therefore] a natural continuation of Norway’s active relationship with the development in the EU’, according to the state secretary in the MoD (Eidem 2004). The ministry also gave assurances that joining the battlegroup ‘represents a furtherance of the government’s support to the EU’s security and defence policy’ (Ministry of Defence [Norway] 2005). The reasoning behind these formulations was probably to avoid constitutional debates, which could complicate things. The political opposition parties were not satisfied with these assurances, however. In the parliamentary debate following the defence minister’s statement to Parliament on Norwegian participation in EU battlegroups, the Socialist Left Party (SV) was concerned that the government was trying to keep the question of the battlegroup outside the debate. Kristin Halvorsen, the leader of SV, made this point: The debate we are having here today was not intended by the government. The government had thought that this question was of such little principle interest that it was enough to consult the enlarged committee on foreign affairs in Parliament a few days prior to this meeting. It was a parliamentary majority that in the end said that is was not the way to treat an issue like this, it was an unanimous enlarged committee that thought this needed to be brought forward to an open parliament. (Parliamentary Proceedings 2004–5: 760) She explained that her party’s view on this issue was ‘partly political and partly constitutional’ (ibid.). SV also made a point out of not being the only parliamentary party to believe that the constitutional aspect is important: ‘But even those who politically wish to see a tighter cooperation with the EU on defence issues want the constitutional aspects to be thoroughly dealt with’, referring to the handling of the issue in the Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs in Parliament by chairman Thorbjørn Jagland (Labour Party). SV stressed that the party was not in principle against Norwegian participation in military peace operations, or making personnel available for single operations in cooperation with the EU: ‘But there is an important difference between this, and a request for a permanent contribution to a battlegroup; that is, an issue which will not be decided upon each time’ (ibid.). A more existential framing of Norwegian adaptation to the EU within security and defence policy has been promoted by proponents of the EU, too: ‘Norwegian participation in reality means that Norwegian forces would go to war for the EU . . . . Killing is the nature of war, including the killing of the innocent. Are Norwegians really going to participate in war even if they do not have to?’ (Børresen 2004a). According to this view this should

Norway between Europe and the US

105

at least wait until Norway is a member of the EU with full rights to ‘participate in the planning and development of concepts and doctrine[s] for the use of forces, and in the formulation of the basis for the decision to deploy them’ (Børresen 2004b). Resistance to Norway’s adaptive policy also came from other parts of the ‘pro-EU public’, partly because it meant Norway not relating to the developments within the EU. The editor of Norway’s biggest daily newspaper argued thus against Norwegian participation in the EU battlegroups: A Norwegian ‘no’ to participation in the battlegroups will make it clear what a difficult position Norway finds itself in. We believe it could be useful. There are limits to how long governments of various colours can pretend to diminish the inconveniences of Norway’s European ‘outsideness’ through half-hearted solutions. (Aftenposten 2004b) The efforts on the part of government parties and other ‘pro-EU’ actors to frame the issue into a UN discourse did not prove successful, either. The battlegroups will be deployed on request from the UN, and the forces will more or less be earmarked for operations in Africa (European Council 2004). This was highlighted by Defence Minister Devold: ‘That we [by participating] indirectly also will strengthen the UN’s ability to prevent conflict, should make this initiative relevant for Norway’ (Devold 2004a). In the parliamentary debate on Norway’s participation in the battlegroups the defence minister tried to lend authority to her arguments by referring to statements made by Kofi Annan: ‘When the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, has welcomed the establishment of EU battlegroups, this is because he knows that these may become an important instrument to the UN’ (Parliamentary Proceedings 2004–5: 770) She also referred to the EU battlegroups as ‘part of the encompassing cooperation within crisis management which is being developed between the UN and the EU’ (ibid.). The EU–UN link was also emphasized by a representative from another government coalition party, Jon Lilletun of the Christian Democratic Party: There is a great need to strengthen the UN’s crisis management ability, not least in Africa. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has said that the battlegroups now being established by the EU will be decisive – he actually says decisive – to reach the UN’s goals. He points to the EU being in the position to provide specialized capabilities, which the UN’s largest single contributors cannot, and [the EU] will be able to respond quicker than the UN normally can. (Parliamentary Proceedings 2004–5: 763)

106

Nina Græger

The idea of supporting the UN through the EU is new in the Norwegian context, however. The UN–EU link was believed to provide sympathy for the case and to contribute to the necessary backing from Parliament for Norway’s participation. Support for the United Nations, human rights and democratization go a long way back in the Norwegian foreign policy tradition, and are also central components in Norway’s branding strategy (see Ministry of Labour and Government Administration 2003). However, the opponents of Norway’s engagement in the EU battlegroups rather saw this as an effort to turn attention away from the UN and NATO. As regards the EU’s role as a global actor within conflict prevention and crisis management, or post-conflict reconstruction, there is consensus in the Norwegian discourse that this is positive. Norway has supported the activities of the EU in the Balkans through economic contribution and participation, for instance in the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (1999) and in several police missions.20 This is an area in which competition with NATO is not an issue. The chairman of the Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs in Parliament, Thorbjørn Jagland, also called for a debate on the consequences for Norway of EU dynamics on a general level, for instance the enlargement, the Constitution and the development of EU–NATO relations: ‘the attitude of the government towards these issues is ad hoc, from one case to another’ (Nettavisen 2004). This critique was directed towards the centreright government (2001–5), which consisted of two anti-EU parties, the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party. To some extent, however, the Labour Party government from 2000–1, in which Jagland was foreign minister, suffered similar challenges. The Labour Party was split on the issue in 1994, although there was a clear majority in favour of membership, and the opinion polls showed no lasting majority for Norwegian EU membership during 2000–1 either. In the current centre-left coalition government, the Centre Party and the Socialist Left Party are against Norway joining the EU. Consequently, changing governments seems not to have had any influence on Norway’s relation to the ESDP. The Norwegian parliamentary situation and coalition governments with ‘suicide clauses’ have blocked the situation. ‘Suicide’ refers to a situation where the government adopts a policy where issues which could put the EU membership question on the agenda are avoided, because this could lead to that government’s dissolution. Nonetheless, all governing constellations since the adoption of the ESDP have claimed to have an ‘active European policy’ (see Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005; Office of the Prime Minister 2005). Despite its announced ‘active policy towards the EU’, however, the centre-left government from 2005 may potentially render Norway’s participation in EU-led operations more difficult. In its inauguration declaration the government warned that the current practice of designating Norwegian forces to EU operations will not necessarily continue: ‘The government will

Norway between Europe and the US

107

evaluate Norway’s commitments to EU and NATO missions, and other international organisations’ (Office of the Prime Minister 2005: 11). This was, however, related not only to the government being a coalition of proand anti-EU parties but to its intention to stress the UN and NATO as legitimate and desirable frameworks for international operations. EU as NATO’s competitor The Norwegian debate on ESDP is also about NATO. Even after the ESDP became a reality, the dominant view was that it would have few direct security and defence policy implications for Norway. As a result of NATO’s central role the EU and ESDP are caught in a transatlantic discourse. Norway’s initial support for the ESDP was based on the idea that a stronger European defence capability would strengthen the transatlantic relationship and the total Euro-Atlantic crisis management capacity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001). Jan Petersen, then foreign minister, expressed similar attitudes in response to the European Security Strategy: It is positive that the EU develops such a strategy. But it is important that the strategy is further developed in dialogue with the USA and NATO. In that case it could become a useful contribution to improve transatlantic relations. (Petersen 2003) This transatlantic framing of ESDP in the Norwegian security discourse has to a large degree been ruled by the simple fact that the country is not a member of the EU. The government therefore works hard to keep security and defence issues within NATO and – where this is not possible – to obtain the best possible access (cf. the ESDP and the EDA negotiations mentioned on pp. 97–100). Neither Norway nor NATO has supported a development where EU and NATO would develop competing structures, as expressed by then NATO secretary-general Lord Robertson: ‘Europe knows it can and must do more to take on a greater share of the defence effort. It can never replace NATO – and doesn’t want to’ (Robertson 2001). At the same time, the EU has formulated this as being only unnecessary duplication that needs to be avoided (Knutsen 2003: 68). The questions of which capacities need to be built and which are already possessed by NATO and ready to be lent to the EU are part of the political struggle between the two organizations, and between different positions among allied countries. The duplication argument has been essential for the Norwegian government’s legitimization of its cooperation with the EU. One primary objective has been to calm those who fear that the EU is going to replace NATO and, eventually, NATO’s role as the main forum for transatlantic consultations.

108

Nina Græger

Those who resisted Norway’s participation in the Nordic EU battlegroup ˚ slaug Haga, Centre Party (SP), expressed the view put forward this worry. A that Norwegian participation in the EU battlegroups would be unfortunate. As a member of NATO, Norway should contribute to upholding NATO’s relevance instead of supporting competing projects. This would not be achieved by handing over Norwegian forces to the EU’s rapid reaction forces, according to Haga (NRK 2004). She claimed that it was not in Norway’s interest to be part of the controversial EU army and that by supplying forces to this rapid reaction force (the battlegroups) Norway would signal that it supported the EU’s ambitions (ibid.).21 SP’s focus on NATO’s importance for Norwegian security can be interpreted as resistance to bringing the EU into the security and defence debate at all. This is not entirely a reflection of the party’s opposition to Norwegian EU membership and adaptation, however. It probably also relates to the fact that the Nordic EU battlegroup represents an additional framework for assigning Norwegian forces abroad, which SP considers are more required for national purposes. The Norwegian contribution to the Nordic Battlegroup, about 150 personnel, will be listed every third year for six months at a time (Ministry of Defence [Norway] 2004b), This will tie up personnel because of preparedness (the rotation system) and joint training and exercises, Marit Arnstad (SP) claimed (Arnstad 2004). These are personnel that otherwise could have been used in UN operations or in national defence in Norway, especially in the High North, which both SV and SP believe are more important. Marit Arnstad stressed this in the parliamentary debate on the EU battlegroups: We also ought to have spent more of our military and defence political capabilities in our own backyard in the High North. There we have a great responsibility, both in relation to asserting sovereignty and in relation to stability. And we will soon have to face that point, I believe, as regards capacities – and I see the Armed Forces are already warning against it – where we need to ask ourselves how far we are to [reach] internationally, before we harm our commitments to ensure defence and military issues in our own area. (Parliamentary Proceedings 2004–5: 765–6) The government answered the criticism by admitting that the EU is also having an effect on the role of NATO: in the future the EU will play an increasing role in European security and stability . . . .For all practical purposes, it is NATO which has adjusted to the developments within the EU in the last decade, even though NATO’s well established role and tasks set certain limits on which tasks the EU can take on. (Ministry of Defence [Norway] 2004c: 19)

Norway between Europe and the US

109

The last quotation refers to territorial defence, where NATO is dominant, of course. The emerging EU security actor also is recognized by Norwegian authorities as useful: The development of a unitary European security and defence policy is positive, also seen with Norwegian eyes. A strengthened ESDP leads to a strengthened European pillar in the transatlantic security community. Norway wishes to contribute to Europe appearing as an effective, unitary and visible actor. By developing European capabilities Europe will to a greater extent be able to take responsibility for European, as well as global, security and stability. (Ministry of Defence [Norway] 2004c: chs 1, 2) This indicates that while Norwegian security and defence policy has been Europeanized as of late 2004, the ESDP to a large extent still is seen as subordinated to the transatlantic relationship, by virtue of being a ‘pillar’. A third Norwegian referendum on EU membership seems to be far away, which has made it important for the Norwegian authorities to stress that NATO is Norway’s first priority and that the EU should develop in close cooperation with NATO and the United States. The primary concern in most political circles has been that NATO will become irrelevant and that transatlantic relations will increasingly become embodied in the EU, with potentially tighter connections between the EU and the United States. As long as Norway is not a member of the EU, this will potentially weaken Norwegian security and certainly its influence on European security matters. The relationship with the United States A third aspect of Norwegian debates about support for and participation in the ESDP is about how this will affect the relationship with the United States. In the context of Europeanization, the main question is how far Norway can adapt to the EU in security and defence issues without hurting the relationship with its foremost ally. Certain military and political environments have expressed concern that cooperation with the EU can be misinterpreted among allies. The dominant Norwegian view has been that Norway cannot choose between the two, as stressed by the foreign minister in the aftermath of the debate on the war in Iraq: Our security political approach must [thus] be anchored through our cooperation in both Europe and across the Atlantic. We say, as Winnie the Pooh: ‘Yes, please – both, please.’ Not because we are demanding or naı¨ve, but because this is the best protection we can muster against the security threats of our time. (Petersen 2003: 7)

110

Nina Græger

As long as Norway not is a member of the EU, this has for all practical purposes been the Norwegian view, independent of which government has been in power. Then state secretary in the Ministry of Defence gave assurances in 2004 that ‘Norway’s active relationship with the developments in the EU . . . supplements our relationship with NATO and the United States; there is no competition but reciprocal complimentarity’ (Eidem 2004). Foreign Minister Petersen made similar reassurances: ‘the historically strong ties between Europe and the United States have secured our own and Europe’s security and freedom through most of the twentieth century’ (Petersen 2004). There is thus ‘room for both a strengthened NATO and a more active European cooperation within foreign and security policy’ (ibid.). Norwegian authorities have been worried that the EU’s new role ‘will [also] affect transatlantic cooperation, which to a larger degree possibly will happen in the shape of a strengthened dialogue between the EU and the United States. Such a development will also have consequences for NATO’ (Ministry of Defence [Norway] 2001: 23–4). In earlier debates about burden-sharing the US supported a division of labour where the EU could take on a greater responsibility for low-scale conflicts on the European continent, as has already been noted. After 9/11, however, an independent EU military capability that could also conduct high-scale military operations in Europe would probably be both useful to and desirable for the US, given its military engagements in Afghanistan, Iraq and possibly also in future in operation theatres elsewhere (Kupchan 2005). This evoked worries in the Norwegian government and the defence community that NATO would become irrelevant. This worry was confirmed when the German chancellor Gerhard Schro¨der stated in February 2005 that NATO was no longer the primary arena for transatlantic consultations and coordination and called for reform of Europe–US relations (Aftenposten 2005a). This statement triggered negative reactions in Norway, not least from the Norwegian foreign minister: The moment we get an axis between Washington and Brussels within security policy, it means that the four NATO-countries, which stand outside [the EU] . . . fall completely on the sideline in the efforts to put their mark on this transatlantic cooperation. It means a further marginalization of Norway. (quoted in Aftenposten 2005b) However, a year later, the new German chancellor, Angela Merkel, stressed the need to strengthen NATO as a political forum, also for transatlantic relations. This shift probably made the Norwegian government breathe a sigh of relief.22 Norway’s close cooperation with the United States within security and defence policy is likely to continue, but most probably with a lower threshold

Norway between Europe and the US

111

for expressing criticism and/or reservations on the part of Norway.23 This threshold was crossed when Norway decided not to support or participate in the military intervention in Iraq. Deviant positions may also be reflected in a change of military practices, such as the centre-left government’s decision to withdraw Norwegian forces from Iraq24 and to complete Norway’s military engagement in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan before 2006. For the near future, Norway’s military engagements are likely to be in NATO operations (such as the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF] in Afghanistan) and in UN operations (such as in Sudan and Lebanon), rather than ‘coalitions of the willing’.

Conclusion Norwegian security and defence policy has been anchored in NATO since 1949. The continued relevance of NATO and a close relationship with the USA are still seen as vital for the territorial defence of Norway, and territorial defence still means a lot in the Norwegian security discourse. However, over the past ten to fifteen years events and developments in both the EU and the US have called transatlantic relations into question. There is an increased awareness of the role of the EU as a security actor with a growing ability to underpin its political ambitions with credible means, such as military capabilities.25 A European security actor with regional and global reach (e.g. Africa) outside NATO represents constant small crises for Norway. Norway has tried to obtain, but not succeeded in obtaining, political influence in the ESDP. Hence, the ESDP enters the Norwegian political sphere when new initiatives are promoted, or when situations occur where the EU wants to take action. Norway’s response has been to bend the rules for participation in the EU’s security and defence cooperation as far as the EU has permitted. As a result, Norwegian security and defence policy has been Europeanized, though consecutive Norwegian governments with ‘suicide clauses’ have generally not wanted any debate about it. Participation in EUled operations is acceptable as long as it does not endanger the relationship with NATO and the United States. The EU’s focus on multilateralism and UN-mandated military interventions is central for Norway. Consequently, this could make the EU increasingly relevant as a framework for conducting future operations, alongside the UN and NATO. Despite this, Norwegian debates about the ESDP or EU battlegroups tend to end up in a debate about Norwegian EU membership. On the other side of the Atlantic, US foreign policy under President Bush has become more globally than European oriented (i.e. NATO). NATO is struggling to survive as a relevant security organization and forum for transatlantic political consultations, despite its efforts at transformation.

112

Nina Græger

The wider implications of these developments for Norway’s security context and policy are only slowly trickling down into the political discourse. There have been few principal public debates about the impact of these events for Norway’s traditionally Atlantic security policy orientation, for instance. The close relationship with the US is likely to be continued, although the 2005 centre-left government has expressed that it intends to voice its concerns and criticisms of the US administration if necessary. If it is Norway’s strategy to try to convert force contributions into political influence, which seems to have been the case vis-a`-vis both NATO and the EU, then a better coordinated use of Norway’s defence policy tools with its foreign policy goals is necessary (Græger 2005a, 2005b). Norway simply may have to lean more on the EU, with which the country shares values and visions about how to meet terrorism and other security threats, than on a transatlantic ‘community of destiny’ that appears to be withering away, partly due to the foreign policy shift of its most powerful member.

Notes 1 Norway is part of the internal market through the EEA agreement (since 1994), and participates in the EU justice cooperation (since 1999). Norway has agreements with the Schengen cooperation and with Europol. Norway also has joined the EU’s Dublin cooperation and also seeks to participate in Eurojust (www.europaportalen.no). 2 This and other quotations are translated from the Norwegian by the author. 3 When the WEU was merged with the EU, the Article V of WEU, which is similar to Article 5 of NATO, was excluded. The Draft Constitution of 2003 has a solidarity clause that has been interpreted as some sort of security guarantee, at least in the case of ‘a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster’ in an EU member state (Article 42). Furthermore, Article 40 (para. 7) pleads for tighter cooperation on mutual defence, whereas Article 39 (para. 5) calls on member states to ‘show mutual solidarity’. The European Council postponed the ratification process in June 2005, and existing treaties do not have these formulations. In any case, as long as Norway is not an EU member these articles are not relevant. 4 The meeting with non-EU NATO countries is now at 27 + 3 (Norway, Iceland and Turkey), while that with the candidate countries, together with Iceland and Norway, is 27 + 3 + 2 (Turkey, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] and Croatia, and Iceland and Norway). 5 Source in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), interviewed by the author on 12 September 2005. 6 The dialogue includes meetings at the foreign minister level twice a year, preparatory discussions at bureaucratic and expert levels twice a year, as well as direct contact and coordination with the capitals in third countries. 7 The Troika consists of the outgoing and incoming EU presidency, the Council secretariat and an observer from the Commission. 8 In a newspaper interview, the then head of Norway’s Mission to the EU, Bjørn Grydeland, admitted that the most important time of the day is during lunch:

Norway between Europe and the US

113

The time between one and three [p.m.] are the most important working hours, when all the lunches are taking place . . . .We have to go out in the fields and suck information, keep up with things. Here one must be willing to throw oneself at it. But we cannot invite the same [people] every time, but constantly search for new ones. (Aftenposten 2004d)

9 10

11

12

13

14

15 16 17 18

19 20 21

22 23

This picture has been confirmed by civil servants in the MFA (author’s interview, February 2005). According to former state secretary in the MFA Espen Barth Eide (author’s interview with Eide, 1 September 2005). Internal paper from the MFA, ‘Prosjekt Styrkebrønn’, from 2003. The standby group attracted a certain interest in the EU, and in June 2004 Norwegian State Secretary Kim Traavik gave an introduction to the standby group to the EU’s Political and Security Committee. As regards the decision-making chain of command, the EU’s Political and Security Committee is responsible for the political coordination of the operation, the operation commander has military responsibility, while the Troop Contributing Committee is placed in the middle. According to Paragraph 9b of the communique´, ‘NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU’. The formulation in Paragraph 20 was: ‘[W]e underline, as we did at the Washington Summit, the importance of finding solutions satisfactory to all Allies, for the necessary involvement of non-EU European Allies in these [ESDP] structures’. Norway had five officers at most, of a total of about 350 in the EU military operation in Macedonia, Concordia; 5 civilian police (numbers from November 2004) in the EU police operation in Macedonia, Proxima; 9 civilian police at most, of a total of 400 in the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) (as of February 2006, only 4 were left); and 15 military, mostly intelligence officers, in the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Althea (Numbers from the European Commission in Norway, February 2006). Source in the MFA, interviewed in February 2005. Interview with the Norwegian liaison officer in January 2005. Norway was not invited to participate in the ‘Ad Hoc Preparation Group’, the ‘Agency Establishment Team’ or in any of the three steering meetings (source in the MoD, interview by the author on 15 February 2005). As part of the arrangement, an MoD representative was invited to participate in the Consultative Committee and a Liaison Officer/Point of Contact was to be established. The Norwegian representatives may be invited to the Steering Board, ‘as appropriate’ (see Provisions for consultations, para. 9). Interview with a centrally placed source in the MoD, August 2004. Cf. note 14. Haga also referred to an opinion poll in the Norwegian paper Dagsavisen taken on 3 December 2004, which showed that 56 per cent of Norwegians were against Norwegian participation in the EU army, while only 34 per cent were in favour. Intervention on 4 February to the 42nd Munich Conference on Security Policy, http://www.securityconference.de/ (accessed on 12 September 2006). Norway and the US renewed the agreement concerning US reinforcements plans and pre-stocking of military material in 2005, with the presence of Defence Secretary Rumsfeld in Norway.

114

Nina Græger

24 Norway deployed an engineer contingent (Telemark battalion) to occupied Iraq, which operated under British command but was not part of the occupation forces. 25 The non-governmental organization People and Defence publishes polls twice a year on Norwegian attitudes towards NATO, and more recently also towards the EU, which confirm this picture. In a 2005 poll 87 per cent responded that ‘European security cooperation’ is important (www.folkogforsvar.no/left6678l).

7

European Security and Defence Policy The Latvian perspective1 ˇ aneta Ozalin¸a Z

Over the last decade, Latvian foreign and defence policy has been dominated by the race for European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. Latvian accession to both organizations in 2004 is indicative of the success of the substantial domestic reforms that resulted in the consolidation of democracy and a market economy and the establishment of a society based on the rule of law. Since accession, the internal Latvian debate on security and foreign policy issues reflects that of other member states. Thus contemporary Latvian concerns largely coincide with those of regional and international organizations. At the same time Latvia and the other Baltic states are, from time to time, criticized for living within the old security paradigm while Western democracies make the transition from a modern to a postmodern security agenda (see Chapter 1, pp. 7–8). However, in recent years Latvia has been put into the category of ‘new’ Europe. The concepts of ‘new’ and ‘old’ have become a stable part of political discourse since Donald Rumsfeld’s now famous speech on Europe’s divisions in the run-up to the Iraq war. While France, Germany, Belgium and other older EU member states were identified as ‘old’ Europe, recent (or soon to be) NATO and EU member states were categorized as ‘new’ Europe. Nevertheless, more than two years later Rumsfeld’s description is ever more relevant, as all EU states strive to revise and change their defence and security policy thinking because of new political realities: new policymaking procedures, a new international order and the aim of developing a dynamic and competitive union of states that can influence global processes. Thus ‘new’ is a key word in unlocking the EU’s global potential, because old policies, old economic systems and old political instruments constrain the future growth of the EU. From the Latvian perspective, all features of the EU are new. Although the EU and NATO accession process allowed Latvia to familarize itself with the structure and workings of the EU, this took place at a time when there was sharp debate on reforming the EU and developing new policies such as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).2 Following accession, Latvia had to be able

116

ˇ aneta Ozalin¸a Z

both to blend into the existing mechanisms and policies and to simultaneously formulate its position on new policies, based on national interests as well as its foreign and security priorities. The ESDP is a new policy area in which Latvia actively engaged both before and after becoming an EU member state, largely because it had accrued a great deal of peacekeeping experience over the previous few years. However, Latvia’s support for ESDP was overshadowed by its support for the USA and its own participation in the Iraq War. Latvia was simultaneously cast as both Atlanticist and a divider of the EU, even though a number of established EU countries such as Italy, Spain and Denmark had followed a similar policy. This has led to Latvia prioritizing NATO above the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Latvia and the other post-communist states have developed their security and defence policies in constantly changing conditions. As a result, national and regional adaptation actually allows for the adoption of progressive security solutions without the need for radical announcements, or fundamental changes in policy. The ability to balance participation in both NATO and European security structures has actually allowed Latvia to be a mediator in divisive situations (Ozalin¸a 2005a). From the Latvian perspective, the ESDP is a regional and partly national security policy that also influences international stability and security.

Background Latvia (as well as Estonia and Lithuania) makes an interesting case study of security policy in Northern Europe. Between 1940 and 1990 Latvia did not have an independent defence and security policy or an armed forces capability. On regaining independence in 1991, Latvia inherited the baggage of fifty years of Soviet occupation in forming its defence and security policy. The formation of Latvian security policy in the modern era can be divided into a number of phases that reflect the changing perception of threats and the accompanying search for appropriate policies (cf. Chapter 9, pp. 158–62). After independence was regained de jure and de facto in 1991, there were two major issues that guided security and defence policy: the geopolitical situation and the presence of Russian troops on Latvian soil, both of which hampered the development of a transparent and independent security and defence policy. From August 1991 to August 1994, the security agenda was dominated by the issue of the Russian troop withdrawal and debate on security policy options based on the geopolitical situation: Should Latvia go the way of Finland and Sweden and opt for neutrality, or form a rationalpragmatic relationship with Russia and other neighbouring states, or integrate with the institutions of Western Europe? At this early stage, policymakers avoided talking about accession to the EU and NATO in order to avoid provoking Russia before troop withdrawal had been completed. However, as Russian opposition to troop withdrawal grew, and Russian

European Security and Defence Policy

117

policy-makers began to talk about bringing Latvia into its sphere of interest, the first two options were cast aside and integration with the structures of Western Europe became the only valid aim. In the second stage, which lasted from 1995–9/2001, successive Latvian governments formulated Latvia’s road to the EU and NATO. In contrast to the post-communist Central European states, which had to restructure their military structures for accession to these organizations, Latvia actually had to build its armed forces, purchase equipment and persuade EU and NATO member states to accept Latvia as a potential member. Rather than throwing their energy into the needed reforms to prepare Latvia for NATO membership, policy-makers had to devote their time to persuading the member states that Latvia really was a valid candidate country. The lack of clarity about the status of candidate countries also left a mark on security and defence policy formulation, direction and financing that still affects the contemporary discourse. One still current question asks: how ready are Western states to defend the Baltic states in the face of aggression if they were so reluctant to take them as members? Thus this second stage was also dominated by geopolitical issues and Russia. After Latvia finally began negotiations with first the EU and then NATO, the discourse on Latvian security and defence policy changed. Most particularly, geographical location changed from being a negative factor to an advantage. And national security was more frequently brought into a regional, and sometimes international, framework. Negotiations with the EU saw ‘hard’ security concerns replaced with ‘soft’ security ones, and cooperation became a central part of the Latvian security agenda. While the security adaptation process up to 2004 can be regarded as successful, the first results can only be seen after 2004.

Latvian security policy after 2004 Both politicians and commentators have frequently observed that Latvia’s security situation has changed in several respects since EU and NATO accession. The most salient change is that Latvia’s national security policy is now a part of a wider regional and international security context. This means that membership of NATO and the ESDP has given Latvia additional policy instruments to strengthen national security and the security environment in which it finds itself. The regional and international security context for Latvia has widened and strengthened considerably. At the same time, however, there are a number of indications that currently unanswered questions will need to be tackled soon. For example, the Baltic Sea region (BSR) has served as a multidimensional and multilevel environment for developing integration and securing Latvia’s accession to the EU and NATO.3 However, it is now experiencing a certain amount of confusion, because as the region integrates, its identity is not deepening, but rather weakening. Diffuse organizational membership and a lack of clarity about

118

ˇ aneta Ozalin¸a Z

the future have encouraged regional tension. This is strengthened by the EU losing focus on the BSR, as well as Russia’s reluctance to encourage further regional projects. The new circumstances of Latvian security policy have been determined by an increase in the complexity of regional threats and risks. Until accession to the EU and NATO, Latvian security policy was primarily organized around two points: reducing external risks, which could be achieved by becoming a member state of these organizations; and the legal, institutional, financial and governance organization of the security policy process. This policy could be described as self-centred, rather than contextual. As a result, after the double accession there needs to be a reevaluation of threats and risks, because of the change in the environment as well as new challenges in the regional and international system. For example, Latvia, developing its security policy in the 1990s, did not know that within a few years one of the major global security issues would be international terrorism. Two years is a rather short period of time to give a conclusive answer on continuity and change in Latvian security policy after EU and NATO accession, as well as Latvia’s perspective on the developing ESDP. However, there are a number of approaches that can identify tendencies revealing existing and future policy-makers’ perspectives on the security dimension – official documents, political statements, as well as practical evidence from the security and defence sector. First, National Security Concept documents define national priorities and positions and allow for a comparison between the conceptual and the actual output. Official documents reflect not just the aims but also the policy process in the security sector, revealing the main actors, the coordination, the emerging national identity in state and society, as well as the decisionmaking culture. The Latvian National Security Law (LNSL 2004) was adopted at the end of 2004; it stated that the Latvian National Security Concept (LNSC) was based on an analysis of threats to Latvia, and identified priorities, methods and principles to divert these threats. The LNSC is prepared by the cabinet, debated in the National Security Council and approved by the parliament at least once in each session, and within one year of the new parliament sitting. This meant that the LNSC had to be hurriedly prepared because the LNSC 2002 had lost salience after accession and a new parliament had also been elected in October of that year. Thus the new LNSC (2005) was passed by the Latvian parliament on 2 February 2005. Both Latvian programmatic and conceptual documents have recently been read with great interest at home and abroad. This is because the aims set out in 1990 have been achieved, meaning that new aims, and policy instruments to achieve them, need to be formulated. However, in many ways LNSC 2005 is a step back in comparison to LNSC 2002. One of the biggest problems is the incompatibility of the domestic and international components. LNSC 2005 states that Latvia’s international environment has changed, that Latvia

European Security and Defence Policy

119

respects the core principles of the UN and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and also that Latvia is a member state of the EU and NATO. However, the document later reduces a number of important security issues to the domestic level. For example, the section on terrorism does not mention cooperation with NATO and the EU (LNSC 2005). The advantages of regional cooperation on security issues are also reduced to a minimum, with the document referring to cooperation as historical experience, not as a contemporary tool for security policy. As a result, LNSC 2005 creates the impression that Latvia does not plan to use the new opportunities offered to it as a member state of EU and NATO, and that national security is a self-centred process.4 The second key problem with LNSC 2005 is the contradictory way in which membership of the EU and NATO is understood. While the document states that accession to these organizations has changed the Latvian security environment, it does not explain how. LNSC 2005 fails to mention that the EU is an international organization with its own security and defence policy, and which participates in security issues at both the regional and global level, and which as a result also had an impact on the domestic formulation of defence and security policy. The document does not cover the ESDP, except in the section on national defence, where it mentions that Latvia must participate in the formulation of European Union defence policy. However, it does not define Latvia’s contribution. The EU is characterized as an economic and political grouping of states (LNSC 2005). Indeed, the acronyms CFSP and ESDP do not actually appear in the document.5 As a result, the document leaves the impression that the Latvian discourse on security policy takes place outside the EU and NATO context, and that membership of these organizations was needed to change the security environment, but not as a long-term, multi-functional security working environment that provides domestic stability. Another key difference is that the section on regional security is much smaller than that in 2002. Regional cooperation has been a key part of Latvian security for fifteen years, especially in defence, where there are countless regional projects (BALTNET, BALTRON, BALTSEA, BALTDEFCOL, etc.) that allowed Latvia to edge closer to NATO membership and were then continued after accession. LNSC 2005 indirectly questions whether this regional cooperation will be continued. However, there have been no changes in Latvia’s security policy, and regionalism is still a key component. But the discourse in LNSC 2005 is vague, and does not consider migration, crime, border control or terrorism in a regional context, but rather relies on domestic institutions. This gives the impression that cooperative instruments are not crucial to Latvia’s defence identity.6 However, LNSC 2005 does have a number of innovations that were not found in previous documents. At the same time it should be noted that the notion of societal security has grown in importance in Latvia in recent years

120

ˇ aneta Ozalin¸a Z

(see chapter 1, p. 7). This has left an impact on the way in which national security is formulated and expressed. Thus LNSC 2005 states that Latvia’s national security is both state and society’s opportunity to defend, strengthen and develop society’s and any individuals security interests and the basic values of Latvia – national independence, democracy, territorial integrity, human rights, state security and the social well-being of its inhabitants, societies’ free development, as well as political and economic stability. (LNSC 2005) At the same time, national interests are defined as securing conditions that allow both state and society to grow in the long term, including language and cultural identity, the defence system, research and technological development, defending them and important infrastructure and technology (LNSC 2005). These definitions show that LNSC 2005 marks a big change in the security language discourse, places defence of the state on the margins of the security conception, and the individual and society at its centre. Although LNSC 2005 is not emblematic of Latvia’s new security identity, certain chapters do use new terms, concepts and approaches that enrich an understanding of security policy and the complexity of its realization. The document tackles such issues as ecological, societal and environmental security stability. However, the process of writing the LNSC 2005 did not reflect the changes in security thinking and the policy process. One of the biggest contradictions is that while the document emphasizes the interests of society and the involvement of society in improving the security situation, the document does not reveal an elementary understanding of basic principles of democratic states – that without the support and understanding of society, in terms of aims and basic principles, the execution of security policy may not be possible. This, in turn, can lead to a situation where in the defence of national interests, state and society at crucial moments consultation with civil society is not possible, and unpopular decisions, rooted in accepted security and defence positions, have to be taken. A serious oversight in LNSC 2005 is the failure to include ESDP. While its existence is mentioned in a few places, it does not become a part of Latvian security policy; nor does the LNSC involve Latvia in the Europewide debate on the future of ESDP. LNSC 2005 also fails to make reference to strategies that form the basis for security policy aims, principles and trends in the transatlantic space. Bearing in mind the short timeframe in which it had to be adopted, LNSC 2005 does reflect security policy, but it has not become the new foundation for Latvia’s security identity, and it did not reflect the complex nature of security issues in which the regional and international dimension is of increasing importance. Another document that sketches a few national security problems in an EU and NATO context is the draft Latvian Foreign Policy Guidelines for

European Security and Defence Policy

121

2005–10 (LFPG 2005).7 These point out that in an ESDP context Latvia will contribute to solving contemporary threats and problems in frozen conflicts or civil crisis and to strengthening the rule of law in coordination with the United Nations and NATO (LFPG 2005). In parallel, it also emphasizes strengthening the relationship between the EU and NATO, strengthening the EU–Russia relationship through the ENP, as well as cooperating with the EU in Asia, Africa and Latin America (LFPG 2005). This foreign policy document presents a wider perspective on security issues than the LNSC 2005. These findings are particularly interesting in terms of institutional ownership of security policy. NATO accession has undoubtedly influenced Latvian security policy more than EU integration. The international dimension of security was delegated to the Defence Ministry for ten years, which also played the lead role in developing Latvia’s NATO policy, although the Foreign Ministry was also involved. As a result, NATO policy was divided between two ministries but EU issues were based in the Foreign Ministry. The EU accession process revealed that defence and security are the by-products of other policy areas that receive less attention. This can be illustrated by the EU accession negotiations process, during which the chapter on the CFSP was opened and closed in just a few hours and was concluded in the opening round of negotiations, together with other straightforward chapters. Even though debates on EU policies and their impact on Latvia after accession have taken place for at least ten years, issues centred around the CFSP have not been a key part of these debates. Despite the fact that there was an agreement on the ESDP from late 1998, from early 1999 onwards Latvian policy-makers were tentative in formulating a policy. There are two key arguments for this. First, Latvia did not have the financial, political and military resources to develop two separate defence and security policies. Moreover, at that time it was important to focus Latvia’s meagre resources on NATO accession. Second, interviewees pointed out that the EU itself had adopted unclear positions on the development of the ESDP, and that it has weak military forces and contradictory national positions that complicated decision-making in this sphere.8 This guarded attitude towards the ESDP, which appeared in interviews, only partly explains why the regional and international dimension appears in Latvian security policy. Another factor is the institutional division of policy in the security sector. Any effective policy area requires institutional ownership, a division of responsibility and instruments for realizing the policy. The ESDP is divided between the Foreign and Defence Ministries, where the first deals with realizing political projects but the latter with their defence component. Occasionally the situation is complicated in that one ministry may have two differing approaches to ESDP – both transatlantic and Eurocentric.9 This makes its development rather difficult. Indeed, a serious security policy problem since independence has been a lack of coordination between ministries involved on these issues. This relates

122

ˇ aneta Ozalin¸a Z

to both the CFSP and the ESDP. While some coordination in terms of ‘hard’ security, which NATO requires, does exist, it is much weaker in terms of ‘soft’ security. As Magnus Ekengren and Bengt Sundelius argue, ‘policy coherence is a pre-requisite for asserting influence abroad and protecting the state from unwanted foreign influence at home’ (Ekengren and Sundelius 2004: 110). As there is no domestic agreement on realizing Latvian foreign policy at a number of levels, participation in debating the ESDP, not to mention the wider security environment, is made difficult. This lack of coordination results in different formulations of Latvia’s ESDP priorities at the ministry level. Thus the Defence Ministry has announced that it will focus on Kosovo and Georgia through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), support for the European capability initiative and participation in the European Defence Agency (Latvian Ministry of Defence 2005a). Latvia has also announced that it will participate in the EU Rapid Reaction Force with Germany, Slovakia and Lithuania, under Polish command. However, the Foreign Ministry has named other priorities: realizing the ENP; participation in crisis resolution; and political dialogue on the further development of ESDP. It is unfortunate that the Latvian Foreign Ministry’s position paper does not mention which countries it would like to focus on in the context of the ENP. The problems with synchronizing ESDP is largely because of the overlap between it and the CFSP. The ESDP is regarded as an extension of the CFSP, but cannot be separated from it. Thus it is important for Latvia to define its sphere of national interest. The ESDP is a large policy area dominated by the larger member states. It encompasses Africa, South America, the Middle East, as well as neighbouring states. In contrast, ENP is connected to states that have security-related issues – border controls, organized crime, conflict and so on. Thus Latvia’s interest is in the overlap between the ESDP and CFSP in the security realm.

Threats to Europe and Latvia: are they the same? An effective security policy can identify real, objective threats and risks, and construct appropriate solutions. Thus a successful Latvian security policy will not just be conscious of changes in the international system, but will also have the capacity to analyse external and internal threats. This is particularly important at the moment, because all states and organizations are in the midst of change and institutional adaptation – including NATO, as well as the CFSP and ESDP. Thus we can conclude that it is not enough for states to have the capacity to evaluate risks; they must compare them to threats at the regional and international level, and use national and international instruments to avert them. A key part of contemporary security policy is early warning and risk prevention. As a result, both NATO and the EU pay increasing attention to factors that enhance the appearance of new threats and to those policies

European Security and Defence Policy

123

that are preventive by character. These tactics envisage a greater international participation of states and organizations than in the case of classical threats. This also changes the essence of national policy. The ESDP, in essence, is structured as an international instrument. Another key feature of contemporary threats is that it is increasingly difficult to divide external threats from internal ones, prioritize them, and separate domestic security instruments from regional and international ones. Indeed, the divide between one type of threat and another is now so small that even the intellectual exercise of identifying these threats is complicated. This, in turn, influences the formation of an effective security policy. The timing issue further complicates this situation. The complex and all-encompassing nature of threats is increased by their multiplication in all sectors. As a result, security policy-makers have problems formulating diversionary tactics and instruments, because situations may arise where there must be a simultaneous reaction to both internal and external threats in combination with hard and soft security agendas. As a result, the bigger the investment in threat analysis at the policy process level, the bigger the opportunity to respond effectively at the operational level. The past five years have seen significant changes in the perception of threats in Latvia. Society and the political elite no longer believe in the classic threat of external aggression. Rather, they are increasingly concerned with internal stability, the global economy and its impact on Latvia, ecological catastrophe and an inability to influence global processes (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 24). The Latvian discourse has thus moved from a modern to a postmodern defence agenda. Social surveys confirm this. A 2004 survey by the Latvian Foreign Ministry found that while 7.8 per cent (4.7 per cent in 2002) of the population believed that external threats were the greatest to Latvian security and defence, 40.8 per cent (58.3 per cent) believed that internal threats were the greatest and 42.9 per cent (26.7 per cent) replied that both were threats (Latvian Ministry of Defence 2004). One of the best examples of these changes is the transition from seeing Russia as a threat to seeing Russia as a neighbouring state with large internal problems that can indirectly touch Latvia. Comparing the 1994 and 1995 surveys of threats to Latvia, we can see that in 1994 Russia was placed by respondents in the second and in 1995 the third place among all threats. However, in 1995, after the Russian military had withdrawn from Latvia, Russia was only ranked as the fifth most significant threat (Jundzis 1995: 2–5). Social surveys from the last four years reveal new tendencies. For example, one historical legacy from the past that intermittently enters public discourse is the threat of renewed occupation. This is enhanced by the fear that neither NATO nor other countries would rush to defend Latvia against aggressors. NATO accession was driven by the narrative that accession would ensure that occupation could not take place again. The UN Development Programme Human Development Report (UNDP 2002) on human

124

ˇ aneta Ozalin¸a Z

security indicated that occupation was not the major concern of the Latvian population. Indeed, military conflict on Latvian territory (with a 2.38 coefficient) and Latvian occupation (2.29) were in the last two places on the list of threats (thirtieth and thirty-first). The fact that Russia is no longer a major Latvian security consideration was also shown in a survey simultaneously undertaken in Latvia by the polling firm SKDS and in Russia by Vserosijskii centr izucenija obscestvennogo mnenija (VCIOM). The way in which Latvians and Russians regard each other is clearly different. While 50 per cent of Latvian respondents had a positive response to Russia, only 20 per cent had a negative response. But the Russian response to Latvia was 16 per cent and 41 per cent, respectively (SKDS 2005a). In terms of future Latvian–Russian relations, Latvians were far more positive. While 41 per cent of Latvian respondents believed that relations would improve, only 13 per cent of Russian respondents did so. In a more recent survey, 65 per cent of Latvian respondents disagreed with the idea that Russia was a threat to Latvian independence (SKDS 2005b). Following accession to the EU and NATO, changes have also affected security policy-makers’ attitudes towards Russia, which largely falls into line with society’s opinions. Official documents, comments from politicians and interviews confirm this assertion. Indeed, LNSC 2005 does not list Russia as a potential military threat, but rather indicates sensitive domestic areas that can be affected by events in Russia – the economy, the financial sector and energy security (see Chapter 2, pp. 29–33). An example of this can be seen in events in the Latvian banking sector in spring 2005. The US Treasury Financial Crimes Network (FinCEN) pushed for an American law banning American banks from opening correspondent accounts with two Latvian banks.10 Despite the fact that the Latvian Finance and Capital Market Commission denied oversight problems in the Latvian banking sector, these events pointed towards a number of issues. First, Latvian banks have liberal conditions for opening non-resident bank accounts in order to attract clients, accompanied by lax regulations controlling possible money-laundering activities. Second, Latvia’s twenty-three banks had $23 billion deposited in non-resident accounts in 2004. Moreover, these deposits were primarily from Russia and other states from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). US estimates place this at half of all deposits in Latvian banks. This hints at possible illegal activity within these non-resident accounts (LETA 2005). In the last few years Latvia has mentioned two tendencies, in the context of Russia, as potential threats. One that appears in both the elite and general discourse is the use of Russian–Latvian relations as an electoral strategy. Moreover, this rhetoric can swing sharply from positive to negative in just a few days.11 However, Russia was not considered a primary threat by those policy-makers interviewed who did not face elections (see Table 7.1). Indeed, Russia raises concerns in economic and political, rather than any other, terms.12

European Security and Defence Policy

125

Internal threats generally rank above external ones. For example, in the Foreign Ministry survey the Latvian population’s perceived threats were ranked as follows in 2004: 1 crime 51.9 per cent 54.3 per cent in 2002 2 drugs 44.2 per cent 68.9 per cent in 2002 3 economic crisis 41 per cent 43 per cent in 2002 4 terrorism 36.8 per cent 22.5 per cent in 2002 5 ethnic conflict 24.6 per cent 15.2 per cent in 2002 6 ecological catastrophe 24.6 per cent 21 per cent in 2002 7 social unrest 19 per cent 9.6 per cent in 2002 8 military threats 11.8 per cent 9.6 per cent in 2002 (Latvian Ministry of Defence 2004) How do these perceived threats compare to risks defined by the EU? The European Security Strategy names the following threats: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, failed states and organized crime (European Union 2003; see also Chapter 2, esp. pp. 22–33). LNSC 2005 particularly focuses on terrorism and organized crime. Security policy papers dated pre-2002 ignored the threat of terrorism. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Latvia’s active participation in anti-terrorism efforts, terrorism now often appears on the security agenda. It is considered important by both the political elite and society. A survey from February 2005 shows that 49.1 per cent of respondents (39.5 per cent in 2002, 44.4 per cent in 2003 and 38.5 per cent in 2004) believed that terrorism was a threat to Latvia, 31.2 per cent said that it was not, while 19.7 per cent doubted it (SKDS 2005c). This shows that while Latvia has not yet been the victim of terrorism, society considers it a major potential threat. As with other states, Latvia is simply adapting to new challenges and seeking effective methods to limit them. Interviews with Latvian security policy-making public servants sketched in two major concerns. First, Latvia is not a primary terrorist target and over-concentration on this issue takes focus away from more immediate risks. Others argued that it was just a question of time until terrorism touched Latvia, precisely because it had not yet been affected by terrorism but was a member of the anti-terrorism alliance.13 As a result, security policy in this sphere should focus on preventive policies, which that might not deter an act of terror but would at least prepare institutions, actors and society for the eventuality, and thus make them better prepared to deal with it.14 Latvian security policy in terms of terrorism is rather contradictory. First, terrorism is not regarded as a threat emanating from domestic actors, but rather an external, international act. However, policy papers place the onus on domestic security structures. Of course, domestic agencies need to be ready to cope with terrorist acts, but terrorist acts in Latvia could be committed by external actors, thus international cooperation should be central to dealing with this potential problem. Second, while Latvia has developed

126

ˇ aneta Ozalin¸a Z

Table 7.1 Institutional and security policy-makers’ threat priorities Threats

ES LNSC 2005 SPM A SPMB

Terrorism WMD proliferation Regional conflict Failed atates Organized crime Security of society Russia Internal threats Natural catastrophe Uncontrolled migration The economy

1 2 3 4 5

X

1

X X

2

1

3 2 X X X

SPM C SPM D 2

2 1 1 3 3

Note: X indicates that priorities are not ranked

the legal base for dealing with terrorism, little has been done to prepare for this eventuality. Thus Latvia has been lauded for what it has achieved in this sphere: ‘Latvia has completed all its commitments at the national level, in relation to introducing legal instruments in accordance with EU documents in the sphere of fighting terrorism’ (Valsts Kanceleja 2005). The Latvian government has also developed an action plan for fighting international terrorism (accepted in October 2001)15 that is re-evaluated every year. However, experts have also concluded that at the practical level16 Latvia is not ready to prevent or deal with a terrorist act.17 There are a number of problems with involving the state in dealing with regional and international security issues. The first is the classic dilemma of identifying the threat at the domestic or European level, and the ability to actually tackle the threat. This is why security concepts are oriented towards tackling the most obvious threats. However, every state can face unexpected situations that are difficult to resolve. One threat is the uncontrolled flow of transit goods, including those of strategic importance (see also Chapter 2, pp. 29–30). As a transit country, Latvia must be prepared to deal with this challenge. One example of an expected, but nevertheless ignored, situation was the transit of four tanks from Belarus to Angola in 2005. Latvia, as a NATO and EU member state, has undertaken to control the flow of military and semimilitary goods (under the control of the Foreign Ministries Strategic Goods Control Committee). An inter-institutional discussion on whether these goods could legally enter Latvia stretched on for half a year, without reaching a resolution. It acted as a warning that institutions involved in the control of strategic goods (the Strategic Goods Control Committee, Constitutional Defence Bureau, police, security police, tax service, radiation security centre, etc.) could not respond to a situation that posed a potential risk to Latvia. The Latvian perspective on contemporary threats only partly coincides with the defined risks of its partner institutions. But security policy-makers

European Security and Defence Policy

127

do not take into account the regional and international context of national security, which is rather important following accession to the EU and NATO. Table 7.1 reflects this situation. It indicates that the discourse on Latvian security does not focus on the regional and international dimension, and that the importance of internal threats has grown. On the one hand, this means that Latvian security policy is not fully compatible with the ESDP because the threats raised in the EU strategic document have low salience in Latvia. On the other hand, the security policy-makers’ focus on internal threats is indicative of a sea change in the domestic threat hierarchy, with a focus on the security of society (see Chapter 1, p. 7). This indicates that Latvia is closing in on the European security discourse, because European countries have also increasingly focused on internal threats to security.

Latvia’s contribution to the ESDP Latvia’s investment in the ESDP is proportional to this policy’s development and its compatibility with Latvia’s own domestic and regional security agenda. In fact, Latvian security policy and the ESDP are not really linked together, and this promotes mutual criticism. As a result, Latvia’s position on the ESDP, which the EU regards as unenthusiastic, is largely based on Latvian scepticism regarding the EU’s ability to formulate and enact mechanisms to make the ESDP an effective security policy. For example, bearing in mind the way in which the ESDP was put together, it is difficult to imagine how it will ‘build an international order based on effective multilateralism’ (European Union 2003). Latvia’s official stance on the ESDP appears in position documents. They can be grouped into five primary arguments. First, EU and NATO cooperation is an essential element of the Latvian position, appearing in both Latvia’s first position paper in 2004 and also in the draft on Latvia’s foreign policy position (LFPG 2005). Numerous documents and speeches emphasize that overlapping functions can be dangerous and that there needs to be a clear division between the two organizations. The primary document on the ESDP states that ‘Latvia regards developing cooperation and consultation between the EU and NATO, based on issues of mutual interest, related to security, defence and crisis management, as developing effective crisis solutions using both civil and military methods’ (Valsts Kanceleja 2004a). Second, Latvia has a precisely formulated opinion on the financing of the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force. Bearing in mind that at the start of the European debate there were two differing opinions, it was important for Latvia to define its own stance. Latvia did not support the viewpoint that transportation costs were included in the Athena joint costs,18 but, rather, thought that there should be an ad hoc approach depending on the type of missions and states involved. This was because of concerns that national

128

ˇ aneta Ozalin¸a Z

contributions to the Athena budget would rise, which Latvia could ill afford as it restructured its military to NATO standards (Valsts Kanceleja 2004b). The third argument is based on the weak organizational structure of the ESDP, the EU’s complicated and intergovernmental approach to decisionmaking procedures in security and defence issues, and the inability quickly to respond to contemporary challenges. In actual fact, the policy is slowly defined post-factum, while new challenges simultaneously appear in the international system, which, in turn, the EU is not ready to tackle because of its weak ESDP. Sten Rynning commented: the EU is ill prepared to counter this type of threat [terrorism] for two reasons: it is too loosely structured to find it easy to agree on threats in their early phases (thus, before they materialize in full), and it is poorly prepared for the military engagements that follow (thus the need for coercive power). (Rynning 2003b: 488) Fourth, the EU, other international organizations and a number of EU member states are in the process of reforming their security policy. This is particularly the case with the new EU and NATO member states, who have found that the organizations that they have recently joined are rapidly transforming. Thus membership of the EU and NATO makes this adaptation process even more difficult. A clearly formulated ESDP policy is therefore made more difficult not just by Latvia’s security identity, but because the EU has not yet constructed its own security identity. Fifth, Latvia is wary of Russia’s reaction to the ESDP. Russia initially supported the ESDP, in stark contrast to its reaction to the enlargement of NATO. Had Russia accepted these international security instruments? Rather, Russia’s initial support was a reaction to American scepticism that ESDP could undermine NATO unity and credibility. The idea of ESDP as a divisive force was certainly supported by the initial Franco-German discourse that envisaged ESDP as an exclusively European project with only a small NATO component. However, Latvia is interested in a strong ESDP that develops in close cooperation with NATO, avoiding unnecessary duplication and developing mutually beneficial security structures that are unlikely to meet with the approval of the Russian elite. Bearing in mind that ESDP is a part of the CFSP, a contradictory situation arises in the ENP, because the countries in this space have a significant Russian influence. Of course, it is in the interests of the EU increasingly to involve Russia, but both sides have different perspectives on the ESDP and the CFSP. Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen perceptively wrote: one of the main problems for the EU can be said to lie in the fundamentally different views on the future role of the CFSP and the EDSP found within the EU and Russia. While in Brussels this policy area is

European Security and Defence Policy

129

seen essentially as a pillar designed to uphold the Post-Cold War status quo, in Moscow – though this is not stated explicitly – it is instead regarded as a possible means of overturning the present order, undermining the ‘unipolar trend’ and changing the distribution of power in the international system in favour of Russia. (Splidsboel-Hansen 2002: 448) Latvia, together with other new EU member states, was harshly criticized for joining the coalition of the willing and supporting the US in the Iraq War. However, this policy was partly determined by membership of NATO, and it has also had a positive impact on Latvia’s absorbing ESDP. Until Latvia was undertaking missions in Iraq, security policy in Latvia had a regional context. Foreign Ministry representative Ja-nis Garisons (2005) accurately called this as an exit from ‘regional centrism’. Participation in various missions in Iraq has raised the understanding that national security is connected to international security and commitments outside one’s own geographic area. This is particularly important in considering the area that ESDP has defined as its own, stretching well beyond the borders of the EU. As already discussed in the first section (pp. 117–22), Latvia is most interested in the policy areas where the ESDP and CFSP interconnect, and which are executed across the EU’s eastern border. Latvia is also involved in both policy areas. It participates in the Althea EU military operation, which is the continuation of the NATO mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it provides three soldiers. Latvia also contributes to the missions’ joint budget (Latvian Ministry of Defence 2006). It also participates in a variety of missions in Georgia (a representative of the Ministry of Justice is involved in the Rule of Law mission; since 2005 Latvia has sent one representative to the OSCE mission in South Ossetia). The tipping point in Latvia’s policy towards the ESDP was the EU’s decision to form battlegroups.19 This demonstrated the transition from abstract paperwork to an operational unit capable of dealing with contemporary threats. Thus Latvia has formulated a clear position, explaining this in ‘Participation in the EU Rapid Reaction Battlegroup’, position number 1, adopted on 16 November 2004. First, participation in the battlegroup allows Latvia to participate in debates on EU defence policy at all levels. Second, the rapid reaction battlegroup (RRB) was formed in close cooperation with NATO, and as a member of both organizations Latvia believes it to be important in all levels of decision-making. Moreover, the RRB is being formed in cooperation with the NATO Response Force (NRF); thus participation is important at both the political and military capacity levels. Third, it gives the opportunity to influence EU defence policy to prevent a crossover of functions or pushing NATO out of Europe. Latvia has stated that it will not support initiatives that undermine NATO (Valsts Kanceleja 2004c). Thus it should be noted that Latvia expressed a negative opinion of the Dutch Presidency’s offered RRB formula, which

130

ˇ aneta Ozalin¸a Z

would have seen the RRB constituted of two large and one small state (2 + 1), and those states that did not immediately join would be on a list of contributors and could join later on the basis of the decisions made by their respective governments. The Latvian position paper points out that this formula would hinder interoperability, equipment and transport issues, and leave open the question of how far those on the list of contributors would participate in a structured dialogue. Also, this would undermine the role of small states in the decision-making procedure (ibid.). Latvia also lists its contribution to the project: a warship with ten days’ readiness from the end of 2006; a military police unit with thirty days’ readiness from the end of 2005; and an anti-mine unit with thirty days’ readiness from the end of 2005 (ibid.). Latvia has also formed an undertaking to participate in the ESDP, and has formulated the operational resources that it can offer. Latvia is already active in the ENP, which has a number of security-related policy areas. Participation in the ENP has tended to grow in terms of sectors but become more focused in terms of countries and expertise. The Latvian Defence Ministry’s position paper on the EU Rapid Reaction Force draws attention to a number of problem areas that the EU has experienced. For example, the Northern Dimension, which was originally envisaged as a strategically important policy aimed at promoting growth, stability and security in Northern Europe, has now been demoted to a mercantilist project, being reduced to a list of projects, thus losing its potential as a democratization tool, and with dim prospects for future growth. Thus, as regards the ESDP and the CFSP, these policies must be further developed and enacted, and more people should be involved. Because Latvia has already gained a lot of experience in the use of the financial instruments, it is important to ensure a transparent and straightforward financial flow from the European neighbourhood and partnership instrument (ibid.). A problematic issue is the ESDP geopolitical space. In all the years of European Political Cooperation, and later the CFSP, member states had a clear formulation of European foreign policy and security interests – cooperation in international organizations, the Middle East and Africa. The first evidence from the ESDP is that this space is being maintained.20 However, Latvia’s primary interest is in its neighbouring countries to the east. To a certain extent, the interests of both the EU and Latvia coincide. However, the difference is also relevant because the ENP is a priority for Latvia, while other EU states have a greater interest in North Africa. The EU is wary of Russia’s reaction to an intensive ENP. For example, while Latvia, together with Estonia, Lithuania and Poland, proposed taking over election monitoring activities from the OSCE, other countries expressed concern over the Russian reaction. A similar situation developed with Latvia’s proposed position on EU involvement in the Transdniestr conflict. Eventually the EU agreed merely to send a representative.21 Thus there is a visible conflict between Latvia and the EU on both the ESDP geographic space and policies.

European Security and Defence Policy

131

Although Latvia is sometimes referred to as a passive ESDP member, this is not because of a misunderstanding of the possibilities of ESDP, but because of lack of confidence in the EU’s capability to implement new policy effectively. The first actions in the ENP have already indicated a few potential pitfalls in the longstanding EU conflict between national interests and developing a supranational European policy with shared resources. On the one hand, a state gradually develops its sphere of interest and the expertise that it can offer. While this process takes place at the national level, it is mostly an issue of internal cohesion and coordination. But when it is operationalized to the ESDP level, a competition on the quality and effectiveness of the service begins there. Currently there is competition in the ENP between the new member states which have gained experience in political, social and economic transformation. The Baltic states have an additional advantage as former Soviet Republics, and with relevant transition state experience of strengthening economic, political and institutional independence in response to external Russian pressure. As long as states such as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and, partly, Armenia and Azerbaijan have not completed the process of democratic consolidation, many EU states are uninterested in EU-supported projects in these areas. Thus Latvia has the opportunity to carve out a niche in ESDP and CFSP policies here, in competition with the two other Baltic states and Poland. However, for the ESDP to be successful and, most importantly, longlasting, there must be domestic agreement on supporting certain countries. It is clear that Latvia will not be able simultaneously to operate in all the countries hoping for assistance. Latvia’s attitude to ESDP has developed gradually, from defining its general position to listing concrete actions. One of the main documents in which Latvia formulates its position is the paper on Latvia’s Basic Position on participation in the ENP (31 August 2004), which states that Latvia’s priorities are Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the South Caucasus (Latvian Cabinet of Ministers 2004). As has already been discussed, initially Latvia’s wish to encompass all important states was not balanced with existing practices, which have actually only been developed in Georgia, through working with NATO partner states in planning Georgia’s defence system and security policy. There was a chance to support democratization in Belarus in the first half of 2006, when the EU asked Latvia to represent the EU Presidency in Belarus (Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006).

Latvian security policy: coping with new tasks and challenges Latvia’s accession to NATO and participation in the ESDP are connected to changes in national security and adapting to working in a new context. If security policy is compared to defence policy it can be seen that the former has developed gradually and has not experienced any major reforms. However,

132

ˇ aneta Ozalin¸a Z

the latter has been affected both by NATO accession and membership and by changes in the international security system. From the first days of the modern Latvian state, defence policy has been based on the principle of total territorial defence, which saw the introduction of compulsory national service. With the transition to collective defence and accession to the international security organizations, this principle lost salience and new challenges began appearing on the Latvian defence agenda. In 2003, shortly before NATO accession, a new National Defence Concept was passed, formulating the main principles of Latvia’s defence policy: participation in collective defence; establishment of professional armed forces; cooperation between armed forces and society; international military cooperation (Latvian Ministry of Defence 2003). The development of the Latvian armed forces has been deeply affected by the NATO integration process. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme began the adaptation process of restructuring the military and harmonizing Latvian defence with regional and international interests. NATO integration has influenced Latvian defence in both individual and collective senses. However, while Latvia was unclear about its accession to the alliance, there were two parallel interpretations of Latvian defence policy: first, that existing defence policy should be maintained and based on territorial defence with minimal participation in defence missions; second, that the transition to a professional army and participation in international missions should begin. These two perspectives have characterized the complicated nature of Latvian defence based on historical experience, geopolitical location and weak rooting in international organizations. On the one hand, the state has limited resources to realize national and international tasks. On the other hand, being located in a geographic space with many potential threats means that it is not possible to rely on just one of these principles. Accession to NATO reduced this duality pressure in Latvian defence policy, allowing Latvia to move towards collective defence policy principles but to keep national defence resources. In order to fulfil NATO commitments, there were additions to the Latvian National Defence Concept that emphasized fulfilling collective defence obligations above national defence considerations. More emphasis was placed on developing modern equipment and specialized units which will become operational in 2007. Even though Latvia’s defence policy and the development of its armed forces were motivated and directly influenced by the NATO integration process, Latvia is prepared to operate in both NATO and the ESDP. Thus, for example, the tasks of the national armed forces reflect the dominance of the cooperative element: defending Latvian national sovereignty, its territorial integrity and residents from military aggression; high combat readiness of national armed forces units and their capability to participate and be deployed in international operations on their own; efficient command and control of the national armed forces; continuous national armed forces

European Security and Defence Policy

133

modernization and enhancement of professional combat training; cooperation with state civil institutions and society, providing assistance in natural catastrophes and emergency situations (ibid.). The Latvian national armed forces have naval and air capacity, a national guard, logistic command, training and doctrine command, communications and information systems, military police, the security service of the parliament and the state president, units established on order of the Minister of Defence for conducting of special tasks. As of December 2005 the national armed forces consisted of 4,700 professionals, 1,043 conscripts, 10,600 national guards and 1,000 civil employees (Latvian Ministry of Defence 2005b). Big changes are anticipated in the next four years, in terms of not only the shift to a professional army, but also specialization and arms. Changes in national armed forces personnel can be seen in Table 7.2 (Latvian Cabinet of Ministers 2005). In terms of niche capabilities, Latvia has undertaken to develop an infantry battalion with support and logistic units, a military police platoon, an explosive ordinance disposal platoon, to modernize its anti-mine and coastguard boats, and with one readied for international commitments. These are suitable for the type of missions that have been defined by the ESDP and NATO. As the Latvian Ministry of Defence wrote, ‘Latvia supports harmonized NATO and EU military forces, and plans to delegate the same military options to both organizations’ (Latvian Ministry of Defence 2005c: 11). In forming and developing its armed forces, Latvia gained significant experience, which it shares with countries through bilateral relations. These include communication, command, control; air defence; consumer logistics; peacekeeping; military education, training and doctrine. In terms of advising ESDP countries, Latvia gives assistance to strengthening the defence sector in a number of areas. These are reflected in Table 7.3. While Latvia plays an increasing role in the Balkans, its assistance is still centred on Ukraine and Georgia.

Latvian security from a theoretical perspective Since 1991 Latvia has been classified as an old-fashioned ‘Realist’ state from an international relations perspective, being much criticized by the Constructivist school for an inability to keep up with the rapid changes in the contemporary security agenda and for a weak analysis of the international system. Latvia, together with Estonia and Lithuania, has been particularly criticized for ignoring Russia’s progress in democratization and for a failure to utilize the mutual cooperation and new identity opportunities presented by a postmodern interpretation of security. This would be an acceptable criticism if the formulation of security policy were an abstract intellectual pursuit based on a normative approach, and if policy-makers based their

134

ˇ aneta Ozalin¸a Z

decisions on the constructions of intellectuals, not objective facts. However, security policy is a concept that cannot be developed in isolation from the realities of the international system, because it mirrors the contemporary situation (Chapter 1, pp. 5–6). The security concept in Latvia is not based on what Realists call state egoism in the comparative environment, but on the egoism of its neighbouring country, to be more precise – Russia’s ambitions to renew its influence in the international arena. Latvia’s security policy is based on regional and international security structures. A postmodern agenda is reflected in the security agenda, and it plays an increasing role. However, its dominance is based on the fact that not all of Latvia’s neighbours work with the same agenda. The Western European hope that Russia’s involvement in international relations would be based on the principles of democracy has noticeably declined since the Ukrainian presidential election in 2004. An uncooperative treaty was signed in an uncooperative manner on a Russian–German gas pipeline, with no sign of liberalism. This was capped in late 2005 and early 2006 by breaks in the flow of gas to Ukraine and Moldova. It can be concluded that, despite criticism, Latvia’s security concept interpretation is in line with developments in the international security order and that discourse in other countries is slowly falling into line with this. Latvia has made notable progress in desecuritizing its security agenda, in terms of hard security, state competition in international relations and securitization of the soft security agenda (see Chapter 1, p. 7). Internal security, with a significant societal integration component, is growing. It could be concluded that issues relating to internal security in Latvia are based on Liberal Institutionalism and Constructivism, but regional and international security on a Neo-Realist and Liberal Institutional basis (see Chapter 1, pp. 5–6). This interpretation helps Latvian security policy to react with a wide spectrum of security instruments, which, in turn, allows Latvia to react quickly to contemporary events and challenges. There is plenty of evidence that the criticism that Latvia has an outmoded thinking on security is unfounded: security policy is no longer centred around the Table 7.2 Latvian armed services personnel

Conscripts Professionals Total Reserve (total) Specialists Participants in international operations Total Source: Latvian Cabinet of Ministers 2005.

2005

2006

2007

2008

1,032 5,339 6,371 11,646 0 0 18,017

500 5,600 6,100 11,646 420 120 17,746

0 5,700 5,700 11,646 500 120 17,346

0 5,800 5,800 11,646 500 120 17,446

European Security and Defence Policy

135

Table 7.3 Latvian assistance to EU neighbouring and Central Asian states

NATO integration experience Armed services reform Environmental defence Defence planning Material assistance Civil control Peacekeeping Mine and explosives sweeping Education programmes

Georgia

Ukraine Central Balkan Asia states

X X

X X X X

X 188 SEM-70 radio stations X X X X

X X X X X X X

X

Russian threat; Latvia, as a full member of the EU and NATO, participates in various cooperative missions and initiatives; Latvian security policy is based on societal security; and the national security agenda is comparable to that of other NATO and EU member states. Even those states that utilize Constructivist language and ideas in their discourse can be more Realist in their actual policies than those countries traditionally seen as Realist. This is well reflected in the chapter on Swedish security policy (see Chapter 3, pp. 52–4). A key part of the Latvian security concept is alliance theory. The interpretation of alliances also reflects the dynamic changes that have taken place in forming the security identity. The primary motivation for joining NATO was the guarantee of collective defence principles. In 1990 NATO’s security interpretation was based on the Cold War model. But Latvia’s perspective on NATO changed along with the alliance’s transformation and an increase in the number of out-of-area operations and conflict-resolution activities. NATO is now perceived as an international security mechanism that works in parallel with other instruments, notably international law and other international institutions. NATO is not exclusively interpreted in Latvia through a Realism school lens, but also via the Liberal Institutionalism paradigm. The alliance as a threat-preventing measure is not current in traditional NATO member states or in the countries that joined in the last two waves of enlargement. Its investment in the future international security agenda is more important in terms of supporting political stability in those states and regions where its functioning is accepted than in terms of its military potential, which is mainly one of maintaining the credibility of its policies. The cooperative security experience that has been gained through PfP, PfP Plus, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), as well as regional projects and negotiations, created the basis for a cooperative Latvian security identity. This, in turn, can be exported to other countries, thus undermining the so-called state egoistic working principle in international relations and widening the security community. Extending the security concept from the national self-centric approach to the regional and international

136

ˇ aneta Ozalin¸a Z

context, as well as enlarging the meaning of societal security in inner and outer security, sketched a new security identity for Latvia, related to the dominance of solidarity, cooperation development and human assistance (see Chapter 1, p. 7). Latvia’s new security identity is connected to supporting former Soviet Republics. If other EU and NATO member countries have mixed emotions on enlarging these organizations further and making relations more intensive, then Latvia, based on an internal consensus, has presented itself as a long-term and multidimensional cooperation partner. The development of a Latvian security identity based on a modern agenda was largely due to its commitment to regional cooperation. Regionalization was a part of the security concept that Latvian developed, and by the mid-1990s it had created the image of being a regional leader. Even when political leaders in Estonia and Lithuania doubted the relevance of regional initiatives, Latvia always held it high on its agenda. Even after EU and NATO accession, when political parties in the Baltic states doubted the utility of further regional cooperation, Latvia believed that the regional network should be maintained and that new forms of regional cooperation and potential should be developed, for example parliamentary, governmental, international and non-governmental organizations. Regional development in the NATO and EU space makes it possible to export the accrued knowledge of regional experience.

Conclusion Even though this chapter has been largely critical of changes in Latvian security policy after 2004 and involvement in the ESDP, this is not so much because of an individual Latvian failure to develop and enact positions and policies. Rather, it is because of the blurred, changing and rapid transformation of the regional and international security system, in which Latvia is not just an observer but a participant. Latvian security policy’s sluggishness and slow adaptation are connected to the large number of security challenges that have to be resolved simultaneously, and which are complicated for even those states that have a long experience in the international organizations. The continuing competition (albeit more intellectual than practical) between the EU and NATO on which organization can best resolve regional and global security issues also influences Latvian debates on the future of the ESDP. Even though the official position is that competition should not exist and that coordination is the best policy option, this debate still frames Latvian security policy. It hinders Latvian policy-makers in viewing the security picture in a more comprehensive and complex way that would help to adapt policy instruments to the new security environment. Therefore, whenever debate on the EU and NATO competition arises, preference is given to NATO because the behaviour of member states within the alliance is more credible and predictable than within the EU.

European Security and Defence Policy

137

The security debates in Latvia, as elsewhere, reflect the political reaction to domestic and international politics. Thus official speeches, announcements or comments made as regards EU or NATO accession, or in an election campaign, influence how policy-makers frame the security issue. The importance lies in ‘the context and the power position of the agent that utters them; . . . the relative validity of statements for which the acquiescence of the audience is requested, and . . . the manner in which the securitizing actor makes the case for an issue’ (Balzaq 2005: 190). Thus the security debate of the Latvian elite does not always objectively reflect the essence of security policy, because it is targeted at specific audiences or is adapted to a specific event or fact that does not take into account the wider context. Therefore external understanding and interpretation of Latvian security policy are not based on security policy that is implemented but on the statements made by policy-makers. The development of Latvia’s security identity is taking place in complicated circumstances, because both transatlantic relations and the EU are also experiencing significant changes following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005. However, the crisis of identity in a wider context is creating a favourable environment for developing a new identity, particularly in terms of the CFSP, ESDP, ENP, the Northern Dimension, developing the regional and international security agenda, and other things. The key question is how far these opportunities will be utilized not just in Latvia but in its wider security interest space.

Notes 1 Interviews were conducted with representatives from the main Latvian security institutions : Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Constitutional Defence Bureau, Parliament, on 31 August 2005, 2 September 2005 and 6 September 2005. 2 Before accession Latvia had a chance to participate in the formation of some ESDP instruments, such as participation in the European Defence Agency, European Capability Action Plan groups, discussions on EU operations. However, these actions cannot be treated as policies but mostly as a formulation of Latvia’s position. 3 Denmark, Sweden and Finland are EU member states, Norway and Denmark are members of NATO, but only the three Baltic states and Denmark are members of both. While Finland and Sweden have not expressed their attitudes to NATO policy, Russia has followed the traditional policy of divide and rule. Besides, Denmark, though an EU and NATO member state, does not participate in the defence aspects of the ESDP. 4 The latter LNSC is a much weaker document than its predecessor. It is badly structured, with an uneven discussion of the major issues, reflecting the manner in which the concept was adopted. The first concept involved experts, non-governmental organizations, a number of institutions, and public discussions. However, LNSC 2005 was developed by the Constitutional Defence Bureau, which also defined its closed style and limited number of participants. The main objections are towards the chapter on the principles of tackling threats, which did not actually discuss these principles. For instance, foreign policy, terrorism and crime are defined as principles.

138

ˇ aneta Ozalin¸a Z

5 LNSC 2005 does not refer to the European Security Strategy that was announced in December 2003. 6 It should be mentioned that the document does once make reference to the need for society’s participation in fighting crime, but regional cooperation is not mentioned. 7 Work on the document began in 2004, but by the end of 2005 it had still not been debated or adopted. 8 Author’s interviews with the Latvian security policy-makers, 31 August and 2 September 2005. 9 The first document that the Latvian Foreign Ministry prepared before the first round of debates on the European Constitutional Treaty was Eurocentric. However, the last document revealed a transatlantic dimension in the context of European defence policy. 10 These were VEF Bank and Multibanka. Reaction from these banks was emotional because the Latvian banking sector had already suffered two financial crises in 1995 and 1998 and they would not be able to survive another crisis. 11 On 8 December 2005 the Latvian foreign minister, Artis Pabriks, met his counterpart Sergej Lavrov and agreed to put back contentious issues and focus on solving pragmatic and economic issues. At the same time, the deputy Russian foreign minister, Grigori Kasarin, speaking in the Russian parliament, commented on the continuing abuse of ethnic Russian civil rights in Latvia and Estonia, stating that this may lead to a review of Russian foreign policy towards these countries 12 Interviews with Latvian security policy-makers, 31 August and 2 September 2005. 13 Interviews with security policy-makers, 2 September 2005 and 6 September 2005. 14 Interview with security policy-makers, 2 September 2005. 15 The Latvian Government Action Plan for Fighting International Terrorism, adopted 16 October 2001. 16 A special services unit has been formed to fight terrorism, one for weapons of mass destruction is in the process of being formed and an anti-terrorism group from the National Guard is being considered. 17 Interview with security policy-makers, 2 September 2005. 18 With the introduction of the Athena budget, which envisages joint financing of EU operations, EU is ahead of NATO, which is not able to agree on the same issue. 19 The CFSP and ESDP became a formal part of the Latvian agenda on 16 April 2003 when Latvia signed the Accession Treaty. 20 Completed and planned ESDP operations are in Congo (Artemis), Palestine (EUPOL-COPPS), Indonesia, Sudan and Rafa. There have been European missions in Macedonia (Concordia) and there is a planned mission in Moldova/ Ukraine (EU-BAM). 21 The particular Georgian case demonstrated the logic of ESDP. Georgia invited the EU to take over the border-monitoring mission. The EU responded with three proposals: 1 To enlarge the mandate of EU’s special representative. 2 To include the border-monitoring mission within the ESDP framework. 3 To train border guards as a part of border monitoring mission. However, after a debate among member states, the EU agreed to send a small group of EU representatives to Georgia.

8

The role of the ESDP in Estonia’s security policy Erik Ma¨nnik

Introduction Estonia’s security policy became orientated towards integration into various international organizations fairly soon after Estonia regained independence in 1991. The first Estonian government after the September 1992 elections set integration into the European Communities/European Union as Estonia’s long-term goal. The joint statement of the presidents of the Baltic states, declaring membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a main guarantee of their security, followed a year later in December 1993. Estonia officially applied for EU membership in November 1995. In July 1997, the Commission of the European Communities recommended inviting Estonia to EU accession negotiations. In December 2002 Estonia concluded accession negotiations with the EU, and in April 2003 the president of the Republic of Estonia, Arnold Ru¨u¨tel, and the minister of foreign affairs, Kristiina Ojuland, signed Estonia’s Accession Treaty with the European Union in Athens. Estonia became a full member of the EU in May 2004. Estonia’s integration into NATO began to pick up speed after the announcement of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia in 1994. The then president of the Republic of Estonia, Lennart Meri, called for a straightforward and quick integration of Estonia into NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) in September 1994. Estonia participated in the first NATO military exercise, Cooperative Spirit ‘94, in October 1994, sent the first officer to the Partnership Coordination Cell in November 1994 and presented its first Individual Partnership Programme to NATO in March 1995. Estonia officially opened its mission to NATO in June 1998 and participated in the Membership Action Plan initiative after its announcement in 1999. NATO invited Estonia and six other Central and Eastern European countries to start accession negotiations at its Prague Summit in November 2002. Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia became full members of NATO in April 2004.

140

Erik Ma¨nnik

Thus, the year 2004 marked for Estonia as well as for other Baltic states the beginning of a unique period in their history. They became members of the EU, which unites 450 million people and constitutes 25 per cent of world’s economy, and NATO, the strongest military alliance in the world. It was a dramatic change in the status of the small Baltic states and presented them with the challenge of realizing the full meaning of the terms ‘solidarity’ and ‘collective defence’. Moreover, the Baltic states had to complement their understanding of their new position with participation in international operations, structuring their defence forces in accordance with NATO requirements, and striking the balance between their military commitments to the EU (European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP) and NATO. This chapter will take a closer look at how Estonia’s security policy has evolved with regard to the European foreign, security and defence policies and how Estonian policy-makers have sought to balance Estonia’s NATO membership and participation in the evolving ESDP. An insight will be provided into the sources of Estonia’s policy regarding the ESDP (primarily the connection between participation in the ESDP and the nation’s threat perceptions will be investigated) and into the role that various political parties and state institutions have played in crafting these policies. The chapter will end with a theoretical evaluation of the findings.

The main traits of Estonia’s approach to the CFSP and ESDP Estonia’s ESDP policy evolved up to 2004 in close connection with national efforts to become a member of the EU and NATO. Achieving EU and NATO memberships required Estonia to satisfy certain criteria, and as a small state with very limited resources Estonia had to coordinate and harmonize its ESDP policy with and in support of the main integration activities. In this process Estonia created and presented to the EU and NATO a certain view of itself and took practical action to support this image. Adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union, according to the EU’s Copenhagen criteria,1 meant that Estonia had to adopt the acquis communautaire – the existing body of legislation of the EU. Article 11 of Title V of the most fundamental of these laws – the Treaty on European Union – stipulated five main principles of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (European Union 2004b):     

to to to to to

safeguard the common values and fundamental interests of the Union; strengthen the security of the Union; preserve peace and strengthen international security; promote international cooperation; develop democracy and the rule of law, including human rights.

The EU criteria overlapped to a large extent with the views expressed in the ‘Study on NATO Enlargement’ carried out by NATO (North Atlantic

The ESDP in Estonia’s security policy

141

Council 1995). Hence, candidate countries were required to demonstrate their adherence to democratic values and principles as well as their willingness to strengthen the security of the EU and NATO. Such requirements expected a generally activist stance from the candidate countries of both organizations. In the case of Estonia, they conditioned Estonia’s approach also to the ESDP, although no direct integration requirements were associated specifically with the ESDP. Estonia monitored the development of the ESDP closely and participated in it actively. European defence became a regular topic in the biannual speeches of Estonian foreign ministers to the Riigikogu (Parliament) on main foreign policy developments from mid-2002. In quantitative terms, the ESDP has been mentioned or discussed in 10 out of 15 biannual speeches given by Estonian foreign ministers between January 1999 and September 2006. In 1999, the Estonian minister of foreign affairs, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, described the relationship between the CFSP and Estonia as follows: Our work in this area is facilitated by the fact that Estonia is already part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Indeed, for a number of years our Foreign Service has been part of a dense web of foreign policy co-operation and co-ordination. We participate in CFSP working groups, we associate ourselves with EU declarations and we exchange information with member states on a regular basis. (Ilves 1999) In June 2000, as foreign minister Ilves welcomed the development of the ESDP in the framework of CFSP and saw NATO and ESDP as complementing each other: the EU was to develop its crisis management capabilities, whereas NATO was to retain its function of collective defence (Ilves 2000). That view was repeated in 2002 with an addition that ‘significant increasing of [EU’s] civilian and military rapid response capability is seen as playing a large future role in the struggle against terrorism’ (Ilves 2002). The view has persisted that ESDP ought to deal with crisis management, whereas the collective defence provided by NATO is the main guarantee of Estonia’s security.2 Despite such an enthusiastic reception of the ESDP by Estonia, there have always been two important provisions in Estonia’s policies. The first of them has been connected to the relationship between the transatlantic link and the ESDP. In particular, Estonia has been very concerned about the possible weakening of the transatlantic link by the evolving ESDP. The second provision has been associated with the development of European military capabilities and the need for an active coordination of efforts between the EU and NATO. Deep concerns over the possibility that the development of the ESDP could weaken the transatlantic link or duplicate NATO were voiced in Estonia in 2003. As stated, Estonia’s policy supported the development of

142

Erik Ma¨nnik

the ESDP in a manner that complemented NATO and welcomed the EU and NATO (Berlin Plus) agreement. Hence the proposal to create a European Security and Defence Union was rejected out of hand.3 Estonia adhered strictly to the view that it was only possible to tackle security risks successfully with close cooperation by the European Union and the United States (Ojuland 2003a, 2003b). The matter of maintaining good transatlantic relations was declared to be one of the most important priorities in the development of CFSP (Ojuland 2004). Estonia’s willingness to participate actively in ESDP operations has been stated publicly on many occasions (Ojuland 2003b; Paet 2005a). However, Estonia’s activism has been overshadowed by concern over perceived insufficient coordination between the EU and NATO in the defence field (Paet 2006). The reasons for such a concern lay in the fact that the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF) were developed from scratch and in the framework of NATO integration. Therefore, from the Estonian perspective the issue of NATO–EU military coordination was actually related to the overall possibility for Estonia to participate in the EU operations. Questions arising were: what capabilities would be needed? What standards and procedures would the European force adopt? Would NATO and EU priorities for defence development overlap? The full reliance of Estonia on security guarantees provided by NATO was stipulated in the National Security Concept of Estonia, adopted in 2004 after joining NATO. It stated that Estonia’s defence was primarily based on membership in NATO and respective military activities were planned as NATO’s Article 5 operations (Eesti Vabariigi Riigikogu 2004: 14). Therefore, Estonia simply could not but support achieving a proper coordination and introduction of standards and procedures identical to those in NATO in the framework of ESDP.

Estonia’s integration structures and the national ESDP policy Estonia’s tight association with the CFSP required the national structures engaged in the EU and NATO integration processes to deal with the ESDP. It was not a simple task as the ESDP covered ‘hard’ security issues, whereas EU integration as a whole was seen as providing for the ‘softer’ aspects of security. Estonia established two different sets of structures to facilitate its strivings toward NATO and EU membership, and it would be informative for policy analysis to look at how Estonia dealt with the ESDP, which at first glance fell between the EU and NATO integration efforts. Estonia’s EU integration structure was headed by the prime minister, who had overall responsibility for Estonia’s EU integration efforts. This structure was comprised initially of the following (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001): 1 The Council of Senior Civil Servants was the main body for general coordination of all European integration activities. It consisted of senior officials of all ministries, except the Ministry of Defence.

The ESDP in Estonia’s security policy

143

2 The Office of European Integration was administratively placed at the State Chancellery and functioned as a permanent secretariat for the Council of Senior Civil Servants. 3 The Riigikogu formed the European Affairs Committee in January 1997 and monitored closely the government’s European integration activities and accession negotiations. 4 The Estonian Delegation for accession negotiations to the EU was headed by the foreign minister, who was directly responsible for conducting Estonia’s EU accession negotiations. The delegation included representatives from all ministries (with the exception of the Ministry of Defence), the Office of European Integration and the Estonian Mission to the EU in Brussels. 5 Diplomatic representations to EU member states were established in all the fifteen EU capitals except in Luxembourg (Estonia’s ambassador to Luxembourg resided in Brussels). In the first half of 2002, the representatives of the Estonian Ministry of Defence were included in national EU integration structures. The deputy secretary-general for defence policy of the Ministry of Defence was appointed to the Council of Senior Civil Servants and thus the Estonian government acknowledged the growing importance of the EU’s evolving defence dimension. In addition, the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs formed a special working body to evaluate and analyse various requirements, consequences and ramifications of Estonia’s participation in the ESDP. Estonia’s NATO integration structure was very different. At the top was the Ministerial Commission headed by the prime minister and consisting of ministers of foreign affairs, defence, interior, finance and justice. The commander of the Estonian Defence Forces was also a member of that commission. The Ministerial Commission was assisted by the Interagency Specialist Commission, headed by the deputy secretary-general for defence policy of the Ministry of Defence and including representatives of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, general staff of the EDF, Ministry of Interior, Border Guard, Rescue Board, Ministry of Finances, foreign policy and defence committees of the Parliament and President’s Chancellery (Eesti Vabariigi Kaitseministeerium 2000). Furthermore, Estonia’s NATO and ESDP efforts were initially planned and coordinated at the political level inside the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs by departments subordinated to the deputy under-secretary for security policy affairs, whereas the EU integration efforts were led by the deputy under-secretary for European integration affairs. Such a division of labour characterizes Estonia’s ESDP and EU policies as being initially two separate, although connected, pillars. When it came to the implementation of the ESDP, the various elements of the defence structures were called in

144

Erik Ma¨nnik

on an ad hoc basis by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the government. In time, the Estonian EU and ESDP policies became increasingly intertwined and interconnected. The inclusion of the Ministry of Defence in the EU integration structures created an additional link between Estonia’s EU and NATO integration efforts through the defence dimension.

Estonia’s practical contribution to the ESDP Previous sections describe Estonia’s ESDP policy as consisting of four aspects: support for the development of ESDP in general; support for maintaining and preventing the weakening of the transatlantic link; stressing the need to avoid duplication of effort with NATO in the development of concrete capabilities; and making a practical contribution to the achievement of the EU Headline Goals. Clearly, Estonia has been active and eloquent in the first three areas. Now it is time to look at the fourth aspect of Estonia’s ESDP policy – the practical contribution to the ESDP. At the first Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2000, Estonia contributed one military police platoon, one mine-clearing unit, some civil–military cooperation specialists, two minesweepers and one auxiliary vessel, and one full infantry battalion to the force pool of the Helsinki EU Headline Goal adopted in 1999. It was a very extensive contribution for a small state to make. Thus, for example, the regular component of the Estonia’s land forces is planned to consist of only one light infantry brigade. Committing one battalion to the long-term ESDP operation would mean commitment of the full brigade to that operation because of the rotation requirement. Estonia’s initial contribution should also be characterized as ‘double-hatted forces’ because of the commitment to both the ESDP and NATO. By March 2003, Estonia excluded one minesweeper from its initial contribution.4 Such an adjustment did not mean an actual reduction in the Estonian contribution, but was, rather, a recognition of the facts of life: Estonia was continuously able to deploy only two ships to operations simultaneously. However, while adjusting, Estonia kept working on improving the quality of its contribution to the ESDP in the framework of its NATO integration efforts. The EDF were largely developed in the frameworks of NATO Partnership for Peace Planning and the Review Process and Membership Action Plan. The Interoperability Objectives and later Partnership Goals proposed by NATO and agreed by Estonia were the milestones and benchmarks the EDF worked to achieve. The EU Headline Goal 2010, adopted in 2004, posed much more serious problems for Estonia in terms of participating. Making a contribution to the EU’s battlegroups capable of beginning to implement their mission (potentially involving high-intensity conflict) at a distance of up to 6,000 km from Brussels5 no later than ten days after the EU’s decision has been made has been very demanding for a small state. The situation was complicated

The ESDP in Estonia’s security policy

145

further by the fact that such high readiness and availability requirements of allocated forces prevent their ‘double-hatting’. Despite these difficulties, Estonia made a contribution to the Nordic Battlegroup which Sweden, Finland and Norway declared they would establish. The declaration was made at the Military Capabilities Conference in Brussels on 22 November 2004. Estonia accepted the invitation to participate in the Nordic Battlegroup and has committed itself to contributing a contingent of forty-five men whose task in the Battlegroup is to be force protection. Estonia’s contribution has been made fully considering the readiness requirements, which strongly recommend avoiding declaring the same unit for NATO. This way, a growing share of the EDF is becoming committed and engaged in international operations.6 The Nordic Battlegroup is to achieve full readiness in the first half of 2008 and there are many issues that must be solved before that date. One of them (and it is of particular importance for Estonia) is its readiness and deployment to the area of operations. Considering the limited time available for transporting the unit from Estonia to the theatre, it looks as if some sort of cooperative solutions with other participants in the battlegroup must be found for transporting troops. Perhaps one way to solve this problem for Estonia lies in the fact that Nordic Battlegroup is the only battlegroup where no medium or large state participates. Hence all participants lack strategic airlift assets and the discussed deployment plans of the battlegroup foresee the deployment of only some (entry) units in the ten-day period mentioned (Andersson 2006: 42). Thus Estonia’s unit may arrive in the theatre later. However, allocating forces to the Nordic Battlegroup has not been the only contribution Estonia has made to the ESDP. On 9 December 2005 Estonia deployed an infantry platoon formed on the basis of the Estonian Defence League (home guard organization) to the EU operation Althea. It has been a remarkable development for the EDF as the Defence League was previously engaged solely with the tasks of territorial defence. Estonia has also participated in various EU (non-military) operations with much smaller contributions and contingents. In 2003, Estonia sent one staff officer to the EU military operation Concordia in Macedonia. Simultaneously, Estonia started to participate in the EU Police Missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina (two police officers) and Macedonia (one police officer). One Estonian advisor took part in the EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia and two Border Guard officers participate in the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (Eesti Vabariigi Kaitseministeerium 2005).

The sources and perspectives of Estonia’s ESDP policy The impression already given is of a state that has strongly supported and actively implemented the ESDP. Simultaneously, Estonia’s main defence

146

Erik Ma¨nnik

policy priorities have been associated with carrying out NATO integration and achieving NATO membership. The variables that have shaped Estonia’s approach to the ESDP – threat perceptions, views of various political parties, the role of various national political institutions in crafting the Estonian ESDP policy, and associated public perceptions and opinions – will now be touched on. Estonia’s threat perceptions Taking a closer look at perceived threats that might be tackled by Estonian participation in the ESDP provides a deeper insight into the question of the place of the ESDP among Estonia’s security instruments. Chapter 2, discussing strategic change in the region, showed that there are various security challenges in the region that could be reflected in Estonia’s threat perceptions. Furthermore, some of these perceived security challenges could be seen by Estonia through the lens of historical experience and associations. For the purposes of evaluating Estonia’s threat perceptions the basic security and defence policy documents will be analysed first. Second, an insight will be provided into public threat perceptions reflected in public opinion polls. Estonia has adopted two National Security Concepts (in 2001 and 2004) and two National Military Strategies (in 2001 and 2005) since regaining its independence. Estonia’s National Security Concept adopted in 2001 saw no direct military threat to Estonia, and considered it unlikely that Estonia would yield to outside pressure and thereby change its internal or external policies. The document outlined a number of non-military risks, such as ethnic conflicts, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and volatile social and economic situations in different parts of the world. Estonia was seen as being affected by a growing socio-economic gap among its population and potentially threatened by international terrorism, manmade and natural disasters, crime, and smuggling of narcotics and arms (Eesti Vabariigi Riigikogu 2001: 9). The National Security Concept adopted in 2004 presented a geographically much wider perspective on Estonia’s security interests. It stated: Changes in the security environment, and belonging to NATO and the EU, have significantly expanded Estonia’s security policy interests into regions in which Estonia previously had no direct interests. These regions affect the security of Estonia and its allies as well as the international security environment and its stability. Therefore, special attention should be focused upon them. (Eesti Vabariigi Riigikogu 2004: 5) Whereas the area of concern widened, the list of perceived threats did not change remarkably in comparison with the previous document. As was the

The ESDP in Estonia’s security policy

147

case three years earlier, no direct military threat or that of external coercion was perceived. The only possible military threats were seen to be various crises in the vicinity of Estonia arising from the lack of military transparency or from violations of sea and land borders or the air space of the state. Non-military threats were given much more attention than in the previous document. Terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were mentioned as serious challenges and complemented by social, environmental and economic risks, crime, and the risk of various disasters. The document mentioned in detail (that is, associated outlined risks with particular geographical location, activity or source) only the risks arising to the Baltic Sea region from older-type nuclear power plants, and stated that the threat of catastrophe is primarily associated with large enterprises handling dangerous chemicals and with the intensifying tanker traffic in the Baltic Sea, especially in the Gulf of Finland (Eesti Vabariigi Riigikogu 2004: 5–8). Estonia’s Military Strategy adopted in 2001 repeated the views expressed in the National Security Concepts regarding the lack of direct military threat in the foreseeable future, but outlined three scenarios forming the basis for the development of the Estonian Defence Forces: intimidation of Estonia by military means, coup attack against Estonia and full-scale military attack on Estonia (Eesti Vabariigi Valitsus 2001: 3). The absence of a direct military threat against Estonia (as against a NATO member state) was repeated in the Military Strategy adopted in 2005. The most likely military threats to Estonia’s security were considered to be various crises of a military nature in Estonia’s vicinity as outlined in the National Security Concept and already mentioned (Eesti Vabariigi Valitsus 2005: 3). The threat of direct aggression has been perceived less and less also by Estonia’s population, but has not totally disappeared. In 1992, 70 per cent of Estonians and 30 per cent of non-Estonians considered a direct attack against Estonia probable. In 2000, 33 per cent of Estonia’s population considered such an attack very or fairly probable, and in 2002, when Estonia received the invitation to join NATO, 14 per cent (Postimees 2002). In 2003, 15 per cent of respondents shared this view, in 2004 15 per cent and in 2005 17 per cent (Eesti Vabariigi Kaitseministeerium 2003: 5; Faktum Uuringukeskus 2004: 4; 2005: 6). In addition, by the end of 2005, 44 per cent of respondents believed that the risk of military conflicts was going to grow in the world in the coming years (Faktum Uuringukeskus 2005: 4). These figures indicate that there has been a small but clear difference between the official threat perceptions and what Estonia’s population has perceived as a threat. Despite the government’s assessment (and agreement with the EU and NATO views on the strategic security environment) that there was no direct military threat to Estonia, 15–17 per cent of the Estonian population perceived it and/or believed in its presence. It has been shown elsewhere that Estonia’s historical experience has played a very important role in shaping the threat perceptions of the population

148

Erik Ma¨nnik

and that the Russian Federation has been seen as a source of threats to Estonia (Ma¨nnik 2002). Furthermore, it was shown in Chapter 2 how easily the construction of the North European Gas Pipeline without consulting the Baltic states brought forward views about historic parallels between the German–Russian behaviour in 2005 and the Great Power behaviour in the region before the Second World War. Therefore, it is possible to argue that Estonia’s views on threats represent a mixture of the realization of risks prominent at the present time complemented by much deeper-rooted fears of history being repeated. In terms of policy-making such a duality could be expected to have a certain effect. It will be examined in the discussion of the perspectives of the Estonian ESDP policy (see pp. 149–52). ESDP in the political parties’ programmes Since 1999 there have been three elections to the Parliament and eight different parties have been elected: the Estonian Centre Party, Res Publica Party, Pro Patria Union, People’s Party Mo˜o˜dukad, Estonian Reform Party, Estonian Coalition Party (which ceased to exist in 2001), Estonian Country People’s Party (later merged with several smaller parties to become the People’s Union of Estonia on 18 October 1999) and the Estonian United People’s Party. All these political parties have supported Estonia’s aspirations toward EU membership. People’s Party Mo˜o˜dukad (Moderates: in February 2004 its name changed and it became the Social Democratic Party) has been the most pro-European and it saw the European Union as ‘Estonia’s place in the world’7 (Rahvaerakond Mo˜o˜dukad 1999: 20). The Estonian Centre Party was quite ambiguous in its 1997 programme, stating that the aim of Estonia’s security policy was joining ‘European and international structures on the basis of clear agreements’ (Eesti Keskerakond 1997: 5).8 However, the second programme of the Centre Party, adopted in 2005, was much more specific as it supported the European Security Strategy, the development of ESDP in cooperation with NATO and participation of Estonia in the EU and UN crisis management missions (Eesti Keskerakond 2005: 9). The views regarding the role and purpose of the EU of Res Publica Party, Pro Patria Union and People’s Union of Estonia have varied somewhat – it has been seen as primarily an economic organization, a political-economic union that would increase Estonia’s reach and influence, and a union of democratic states, stable economic union and cultural space (Erakond Res Publica 2002: 61–2; Erakond Isamaliit 2002; Eestimaa Rahvaliit 2003). The Reform Party has favoured a strong and active EU with a truly common foreign policy. The party has stressed the need to continue and strengthen defence cooperation with other states in NATO and in the ESDP framework (Eesti Reformierakond 2005). All the parties mentioned, with the exception of the Estonian United ¨ hendatud Rahvapartei 1994), have supported People’s Party (Eestimaa U

The ESDP in Estonia’s security policy

149

joining NATO and have seen NATO membership as a main security guarantee for Estonia. The dominating views on Estonia’s national defence have envisioned it as territorial and/or total defence based on conscription and receiving 2 per cent of GDP annually. The brief review of the programmes of political parties elected to the Parliament shows that the ESDP has received fairly limited attention and it has been treated in very general terms. The EU has been treated more as a political-economic than a security actor. NATO membership has been seen as a primary security guarantee for Estonia. Similarly, the general and mostly reactive approach to the ESDP is visible in the parliamentary debates that have touched upon the ESDP. For example, the report on the effects of Estonia’s joining the EU compiled by the European Union Affairs Committee of the Parliament contained only one paragraph on the ESDP. It considered it important that the EU develop one voice in foreign and defence policies and avoid conflict with transatlantic security structures (Eesti Vabariigi Riigikogu Euroopa Asjade Komisjon 2003: 30). Consequently, political parties and Parliament have had a rather moderate role in shaping Estonia’s ESDP policy. This has been limited to supporting the overall integration policy in the EU and initiatives arising from the EU, discussing various initiatives and legislation proposed by the government and making decisions on the use of the EDF abroad. These findings support the conclusions of Raik (2002) on the leading role of civil servants and government in crafting Estonian EU integration policies. Perspectives on Estonia’s ESDP policy To assess the perspectives on the Estonian ESDP policy, an insight is required into the official views of the Estonian government (as a main body shaping the EU and ESDP policies), practical aspects related to the implementation of these views and public perceptions in the background. It must be noted right away that not much has been said on the ESDP. The document titled ‘The Estonian Government’s European Union Policy for 2004–2006’ does not shed considerably more light on Estonia’s views regarding the ESDP. It mostly repeats the same basic statements of foreign ministers: the transatlantic relationship is crucial for European security, as is cooperation between the EU and NATO; a stronger CFSP and ESDP are welcomed, but duplication of NATO must be avoided; and Estonia’s practical participation in the ESDP is deemed important (Government of the Republic of Estonia 2004: 36–7). The outline of the most important aspects of Estonia’s security policy provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2006 prioritizes in general terms participation in all sorts of international missions and activities in the framework of CFSP with the aim of promoting stability and democracy, and it also mentions participation in the European Neighbourhood Policy

150

Erik Ma¨nnik

as a field of activity in Estonia’s security policy. In this respect the document stated that in 2005 Estonia achieved some success in Georgia (it received 36 per cent of Estonia’s development aid), in Ukraine (23 per cent of Estonia’s development aid) and in Moldova (Eesti Vabariigi Va¨lisministeerium 2006). However, not much is said in addition to the views expressed in the ‘The Estonian Government’s European Union Policy for 2004–2006’ with regard to the ESDP. Following the policy prioritizing an active participation in various international missions, Estonia has been constantly increasing the number of EDF personnel deployed to various missions. In June 2005 there were 128 military personnel deployed to various missions abroad, and only a year later the number was practically double that, at 244 (Paet 2005b, 2006). Such growth seems to exceed official plans, according to which the EDF was expected to achieve the ability to sustain simultaneously 250 men on foreign missions beginning in 2008 (Eesti Vabariigi Kaitseministeerium 2004: 6). It has been said that the number of EDF personnel deployed to various missions around the world could actually reach 300 by the end of 2006 (Postimees 2005b). As of mid-2006, the most important mission for the EDF was considered to be the NATO operation in Afghanistan (Paet 2006). Public opinion in Estonia has reflected a slightly differing set of priorities. Only 15 per cent of respondents saw strengthening the national defence and Estonia’s cooperation in NATO as among the three most important tasks facing the Estonian state at the end of 2005. Some 50 per cent supported the participation of EDF personnel in international missions and 41 per cent were against it (respectively, 51 per cent and 43 per cent in 2004). Also, 52 per cent of respondents were against the Estonian presence in Iraq by the end of 2005. Intriguingly, the share of the population who saw the EU as one of Estonia’s three most important security guarantees grew from 2003 to 2005. In 2003 it was 31 per cent, in 2004 39 per cent and in 2005 42 per cent. The share of respondents who saw NATO as among the three most important security guarantees for Estonia were 52, 61 and 61 per cent, in the corresponding years (Faktum Uuringukeskus 2003: 2, 9; 2004: 6, 13; 2005: 7, 15). In summary, the picture regarding perspectives on Estonian ESDP policy is mixed. The views of political parties and policy-makers seem to be fairly ambiguous or reactive. Apparently, the primary aspiration of Estonia in the field of defence and ‘hard’ security is to pursue its ‘NATO first’ policy and do its utmost to avoid jeopardizing the transatlantic link. However, as Estonia has striven to avoid being marginalized in the EU it has been participating actively in the ESDP. One of the most illustrative examples of Estonia’s desire to stay on the ESDP train is its participation in the EU’s Nordic Battlegroup despite the previous lack of such high readiness units in the EDF.9 However, at this point strong historical influences on national threat perceptions and the views of political parties on defence organization must be kept in mind. The facts that some 17 per cent of the population have

The ESDP in Estonia’s security policy

151

considered a military attack on Estonia possible and that the majority of political parties have preferred a territorial/total defence based on conscription show that there could be a certain resistance to the ramifications of the ESDP regarding national defence developments. Estonia’s doubling of its deployments abroad in one year is a telling sign. It underlines the seriousness of Estonia’s commitment, but the full impact on Estonia’s policies remains to be seen. It is clear that doubling the number of EDF personnel deployed to missions abroad two years ahead of the planned readiness date must have serious consequences on overall defence planning. On the one hand, more and more extensive commitments of EDF units to international operations accelerate the transition of defence planning from territorial defence to collective defence stipulated by Estonia’s military strategy (Eesti Vabariigi Valitsus 2005: 5) and by expeditionary operations that are the current focus of the EU and NATO. On the other hand, they have the potential to create considerable dissatisfaction among more traditionally minded people and officials in Estonia who still have strong historical threat perceptions. In this context, the problems of policy designers in the Estonian government become apparent – Estonia’s focus on expeditionary operations to a certain extent runs contrary to public views on security concerns and the respective defence solutions expressed in the programmes of political parties. It is not easy to strike the balance between the policy of active participation in the EU (and NATO) operations and the intuitive desire to allocate resources to defence ‘at home’. This circumstance could be one explanation of the ambiguity present in Estonia’s policy documents. One more problem related to the growth of activities abroad is their rapidly growing cost. Estonian defence minister Jaak Jo˜eru¨u¨t has argued that it would be more advantageous to deploy larger contingents to fewer operations than many small contingents to many operations (Eesti Vabariigi Riigikogu 2005). How exactly such practical considerations will be balanced with the Estonian policy of maintaining maximum political visibility (including through participation in international operations) remains to be seen. Public opinion is another factor that may become very important in shaping the future of Estonian ESDP policy. The gradual but steady growth of the view of the EU as a security guarantee combined with dissatisfaction with the ongoing deployment to Iraq may transform the ESDP into the preferred instrument of choice for military crisis management abroad. Clearly, it will not replace NATO as a primary military security guarantee in the near future, but under certain circumstances it may become more acceptable to the Estonian public for forces to be deployed in the ESDP framework. To conclude, one can say that Estonia is likely to continue its activist course in practical terms, coupled with fairly cautious policy statements in the framework of the ESDP. It seems unlikely that Estonian policy-makers

152

Erik Ma¨nnik

would follow recommendations of some researchers to make the CFSP/ ESDP Estonia’s main priority of national EU policy with the aim of securing the assistance of EU states in case of conflict with the Russian Federation (Made 2004: 18). Policy-makers are acutely aware of the very limited military capabilities of the EU and see it primarily as a crisis management tool.10

Conclusions and theoretical implications of findings This chapter has shown that Estonia has been successful in creating an image of itself as a state that has adopted the EU’s view on security matters, welcomed the establishment of the ESDP and been an enthusiastic contributor the ESDP. It has been shown, however, that in the background of this image there are strong historical influences that could slow down Estonia’s efforts and cause internal political friction. That is why Estonia has stressed at every step the importance of maintaining and securing the transatlantic link. Government, especially civil servants, has had the primary responsibility for shaping and crafting Estonia’s EU and ESDP policies, whereas the political parties and Parliament have had a secondary role in the respective discourses. Of all parties elected to the Parliament, the People’s Party Mo˜o˜dukad (currently the Social Democratic Party) has been the most pro-European in its programme and it is of little surprise that its former chairman Toomas Hendrik Ilves became the vicechairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament in 2004. What are the theoretical implications of this chapter? At first glance, in the theoretical concepts of security used for formulating security policy, one can see that threats outlined in the National Security Concepts of 2001 and 2004 can be categorized in accordance with the views of Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998). Military, environmental, economic, societal and political threats to Estonia’s security are all discussed. In this sense, Estonia’s security thinking has adapted to the wider definition of security. Another issue is to what extent such an approach has been accepted at the deeper level. As has been shown, there is a slight discrepancy between the official and public threat perceptions, which has also been confirmed by the deeper analysis of speeches of Estonian foreign ministers. The latter has shown that despite the adoption of the Security Concept outlining non-military threats to security the speeches of foreign ministers have tended to focus on military and economic risks and threats (Va¨ljaru 2005: 1,647–8). Hence one can argue that at the deeper level Estonia’s approach to security changed only a little in the decade after the Cold War. Estonia’s strong connection to history indicates the existence of a specific perception of the role and position of Estonia in the world (i.e. an Estonian identity) and supports Wendt’s statement that identities are relatively stable and the process of identity change could be very slow (Wendt 1992: 419; see also Chapter 1, pp. 6–7).

The ESDP in Estonia’s security policy

153

Therefore one can view Estonia as a modern state traditionally concerned with its ‘hard’ security, as defined by Cooper (2004: 21–3), that has joined a postmodern EU where military force plays only a limited role (Cooper 2004: 35–7). The case of Estonia is also intriguing from the perspective of small state theory. Estonia, a small state with limited resources for defence development, has participated extensively in operations abroad. Simultaneously, a majority of political parties have considered the development of traditional territorial defence as an appropriate way to go about defence. This could be interpreted as a special case of difficulties related to perceiving opportunities and constraints associated with various policies, as suggested by Reid in his work on small states (Reid 1974: 46). In particular, it seems that political parties and the population have perceived there to be far fewer constraints to defence development posed by the smallness of Estonia than have government officials having to work with these issues on daily basis. As a consequence, the official policies of Estonia envision more active participation in foreign operations than do the political parties. At the same time, Estonia’s participation in the ESDP has not been directly connected to the regional security challenges outlined in Chapter 2. Most of these challenges are acknowledged in general terms in Estonia’s security documents, yet Estonia’s rhetoric regarding participation in the ESDP has not been expressed in the regional context. Therefore, a question can be asked: why has Estonia made such an effort to contribute to the Nordic Battlegroup? One answer can be found in small states theory, according to which small states are concerned about their security and, having very limited resources to do something on their own, they try opting for the status of ‘loyal allies’ of larger members of alliances and attempt to remain the focus of attention of the latter (Keohane 1971: 167–8). Being ‘loyal allies’ is expected to increase the chances of small states receiving security assistance in times of dire need and crisis. According to this logic, Estonia could use the ESDP to remain within the sphere of attention of other members of the EU in order to avoid becoming isolated and thus open to external coercion. The goal of avoiding becoming marginalized in the EU and NATO after accession was actually stated in the development plan of the EDF (Eesti Vabariigi Kaitseministeerium 2004: 3). To conclude, on the role of ESDP in Estonia’s security policy this chapter has shown that active participation in the ESDP was started during integration into the EU and NATO, and hence it served the purpose of demonstrating the readiness of Estonia to work to enhance European security. After Estonia became an EU member, it used the ESDP to stay in the core of political developments in the EU and the ESDP has provided for a closer alignment of the country with the EU’s perspective on security. Internally, the ESDP seems to have been the focal point of the processes of realizing Estonia’s limitations (defined by the smallness of a state) in taking care of its own security as well as realizing the full implications of being a

154

Erik Ma¨nnik

member of the EU and NATO. Participation in the ESDP and going along with the developments of the ESDP have had clear resource implications which have turned the EDF more towards international operations.

Notes 1 These included the following, from the applicant state’s side:  stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;  the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;  the ability to take on the obligations of membership including the adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. (European Union 2004a) 2 Interview with an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3 The plan was advanced by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in 2003. See http://www.diplomatie.be/en/press/homedetails.asp?TEXTID = 6453 4 Interview with an official of the Estonian Ministry of Defence. 5 The figure 6,000 km is used purely to illustrate the EU battlegroups’ readiness and deployment requirements. It has been noted that this limit no longer officially applies and the EU battlegroups can theoretically be deployed and used anywhere in the world (Andersson 2006: 36). 6 Interview with an official of the Estonian Ministry of Defence. 7 Author’s translation. 8 Author’s translation. 9 Interview with an official of the Estonian Ministry of Defence in 2004. 10 Discussions with officials of the Estonian Ministry of Defence.

9

Lithuania’s evolving security and defence policy ‘Not only consumer, but also contributor’? Grazina Miniotaite

Introduction After obtaining membership of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004, Lithuania was actively engaged in the activities of both institutions. In 2004 it was the first EU member state to ratify the EU Constitution and among the first of the new member states to seek entrance to the euro zone. Both its population and its political elite are positively disposed towards Lithuania’s membership of the EU and NATO and optimistic about its prospects. Claims are often made that by decisively turning towards the West in 1994 Lithuania has developed an optimal foreign and security policy reflecting the aspirations of its people. One may wonder, however, whether such optimistic claims do not sound an ‘end of history’ note. Is it not the case that the sovereign state has become a mere consumer of EU funds, diligently complying with EU and NATO directives? Does Lithuania’s being in the space of the EU leave any room for the country’s independent foreign and security initiatives? These questions, widely discussed in Lithuania’s media debates, are of particular urgency in studying the relation of Lithuania’s security and defence policies to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and NATO. Taking the Constructivist assumption that foreign and security policies are the main instruments of state-building and enforcement, answers to these questions should also help reveal the importance of issues of political identity in Lithuania’s political discourse. It was the quest for security conceived as ‘the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and the functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile’ (Buzan 1991: 432) that was the driving force behind Lithuania’s foreign policy in 1991–2004. Membership of the EU and NATO was treated as a means to this end. Why has the security dimension played such an important role in Lithuania’s political development after the restoration of independence in 1990? Does Lithuania feel safer being a member of the EU and NATO? How have these changes been reflected in Lithuania’s security and defence conceptions? Has this influenced Lithuania’s view of, and participation in, ESDP and NATO?

156

Grazina Miniotaite

We may look for the answers by starting with an analysis of the specific conception of security and defence developed in Lithuania’s official discourse.

Security and defence conceptualization in the official discourse of Lithuania Lithuania was the first republic of the former Soviet Union to declare its independence.1 On 11 March 1990 a mere 1.5 per cent of the Soviet population – inhabiting only 0.3 per cent of Soviet territory – posed a fundamental challenge to the vast empire and its powerful apparatus of repression. The world had indeed noticed the challenge, though at first with little formal engagement yet plenty of (if at times condescending) sympathy. Only after the bloody events of January 1991 and the failed hardline August 1991 Moscow putsch did Lithuania receive widespread international recognition (Miniotaite 2002). On 17 September 1991 Lithuania was granted membership of the United Nations (UN). With Lithuania becoming an actor in international politics, its statebuilding proceeded in complicated circumstances. Like other post-communist states Lithuania had to implement ‘a triple transition in which it was attempting simultaneously to create a new state and nation, to establish new political institutions based on the rule of law, and to build the foundations for an effective and productive market economy’ (Kanet 1998: 293). From the very beginning this triple transition process has been conceptualized in security terms. This is evidenced by the profusion of official documents related to security and defence policies.2 The shifting international environment and the changing status of Lithuania on the road to NATO and EU constantly demanded new reviews of the security situation and adjustments in state policies. The documents constitute a kind of condensed history of the state after the restoration of independence. They reflect not only the story of Lithuania’s integration in NATO and EU, but also the processes of the country’s Westernization and Europeanization, accompanied by shifts in security conceptualizations. Let us consider the dynamics of security conceptualizations by attending to the contents of two major documents, the Law on Fundamentals of National Security 1996 (LFNSL 1997) and the National Security Strategy (NSSRL 2002). The Law on Fundamentals of National Security of Lithuania (LFNSL) Adopted late in 1996, the LFNSL was a product of three years of preparation, which started in 1994 when Lithuania officially declared its willingness to become a NATO member. The document is not entirely consistent. On the one hand, it manifests a tendency towards the securitization of the environment; on the other hand, it also reflects the fact that in the years between the first draft of the law and the document’s adoption by the

Lithuania’s security and defence policy

157

Seimas (parliament), Lithuania’s foreign and security policy acquired a distinctly pro-Western orientation. Membership of NATO and the European Union came to be seen as the primary means of ensuring national security. The most prominent feature of the document is the partition of the security space into the zone of peace and the zone of potential conflict. Membership of the EU, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) are seen as the main means of ensuring Lithuania’s security and the country’s habitation in the zone of peace. Security is conceived as preservation of the permanent and unchanging entity (the nation-state) by discovering the threats it faces and neutralizing them by political and military means. An analysis of the document shows that Lithuania’s security concept of the early 1990s is based on the Neo-Realist assumption that the state’s priorities and threats can be easily and unambiguously defined and that they remain the same despite interactions with other states and institutional dynamics. Security thus conceived incites enmity in foreign policy and lays the grounds for the practice of securitization in domestic policy (Miniotaite 2003a). This conception of security, exploiting the image of unpredictable Russia, means Lithuania’s integration with NATO and the EU is grounded mainly on the needs of national security. National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania (NSSRL) While Lithuania made strenuous efforts to meet the requirements for membership of NATO and the EU, doubts came to be voiced, particularly after the Washington Summit of 1999, as to the compatibility of the concept of national security assumed in the document with the concept of cooperative security developed in NATO strategic documents. In 2002 the Seimas approved a new document, more congruent with the evolving security situation, the National Security Strategy.3 In the new document the referent object for security remains ‘state sovereignty and territorial integrity’, while the main objective of security arrangements is threat prevention, to be achieved by joining the ‘common European security and transatlantic defence systems’. In delineating the security threats, dangers and risks, the document blends together the conceptions of cooperative security and national security. On the one hand, it is stressed that under conditions of globalization security is ‘indivisible’, that ‘the fight against terrorism, corruption, organized crime, trade in people, drug trafficking, illegal migration, smuggling’ is a high priority for Lithuania. The document emphasizes that ‘the Republic of Lithuania does not observe any immediate military threat to its national security and as a result does not regard any state as its enemy’. Poland and the USA are identified as Lithuania’s strategic partners; in relations with Russia the intention is ‘to enhance mutual confidence in the area of international security’; the stance towards Belarus is ‘the policy of pragmatic selective co-operation’. On the other hand, the document is indirectly aimed

158

Grazina Miniotaite

at Russia’s securitization, derived from the ‘overwhelming dependence of the Republic of Lithuania on the strategic resources and energy supplies of one country [Russia]’. In order to reduce the threats latent in this economic dependence it is suggested that strategically vital sectors of the economy be identified and the state given a ‘controlling decision power’ over them. The prevalence of the national security conceptualization is most prominent in the way Lithuania’s defence policy is defined. Both in the National Security Strategy (NSSRL 2002) and in the Fundamentals of National Security (LFNSL 1997), national defence is bound to total unconditional territorial defence, comprising military and civil resistance components (Miniotaite 2004). On the whole, a comparison of the documents of 1996 and 2002 shows a turn towards the concept of cooperative security (see Chapter 1, p. 7). Yet the remaining securitization of Russia and the continuing attachment to territorial defence show that national security and defence are conceived as a problem for the individual state rather than a common or regional concern. This ambiguity in the concept of security finds its reflection in Lithuania’s security and defence policies.

Lithuania’s security and defence policy in 1990–2004 The security policy pursued by Lithuania since the country’s admission to the UN in September 1991 can be conveniently divided into three periods: the first, from 1991 to 1993, culminating in the withdrawal of Russian troops; the second, from 1994 to May 2004, constituting the period of striving for accession to NATO and EU; and the third, starting May 2004, in which Lithuania obtained full membership of NATO and EU. Lithuania is part of the emerging European security complex and its security inevitably rests on particular interdependencies within the system. With the European security system losing its bipolarity, the cultural divide between the East (Russia) and the West (the EU) has nevertheless remained and it still has the potential to be transformed into a political and even military confrontation. As a small nation Lithuania does not exert a significant influence on the security dynamics in the region; yet because of its geopolitical situation Lithuania (as well as Estonia and Latvia) is ‘the most important zone of contact’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 343) between Russia and the EU. This was and remains a major factor in Lithuania’s security policies. Theoretically, in terms of political and military security arrangements, after regaining independence Lithuania could choose from: (1) non-alignment, or neutrality; (2) an alliance of two or several small states; and (3) membership of a multilateral alliance around one or more major powers. All three options were considered in Lithuania’s security and defence debates (Miniotaite 2003a); however, the first and the second options remained at the level of debates, never to be institutionalized. So discussion here will concentrate mostly on the third.

Lithuania’s security and defence policy

159

The Western option: membership of NATO and the EU Neutrality and Baltic states alliance as security policy options attracted some attention in 1990–5, mostly under the influence of the model of interwar Lithuania. Lithuania’s foreign and security policy in the interwar period was a manoeuvring between Moscow and Berlin with the aim of regaining the Vilnius region occupied by Poland in 1920. The conflict over Vilnius prevented the formation of a strong alliance of the Baltic states, and Lithuania’s position of neutrality adopted in 1939 under conditions of severe international instability failed to provide security. Any attempt to revert to these ideas after regaining independence would have brought the stereotypes of interwar politics back into the political discourse of the newly emerging state. In fact, mere rehearsal of the conflicting interpretations of interwar Polish–Lithuanian relations led to tensions between the two countries in 1991–2. At the time, however, the presence of Russia’s troops in the country made the option of a pro-Western security policy difficult to embrace openly. Thanks to the joint endeavours of Lithuania and some Western states and international bodies, Russian troops were withdrawn from Lithuania in autumn 1993. This made it possible for Lithuania to proclaim in 1994 its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, membership of NATO and the EU, as the main goal of Lithuania’s foreign and security policy. In January 1994 Lithuania applied for full membership of NATO. In the same year Lithuania became an active participant in the Partnership for Peace programme. In May 1994 Lithuania became an associate partner of the WEU and signed the European Agreement in June 1995. The pro-Western turn in Lithuania’s political discourse was portrayed as a ‘return to Europe’ and its membership of NATO and the EU was presented as the guarantee of an irreversible integration with the West, finally shielding Lithuania from Russia’s threats to its sovereignty. Like any attempt at a rational control of social processes, European integration faces the inertia of social matter, the resistance of historical stereotypes, of social identities already in place and, sometimes, of disappointed expectations. The Western world that Lithuania so much wants to enter is hardly homogeneous; it is characterized, in part, by marked differences between the socially oriented Western European welfare states and the more market-oriented British and American models. Lithuania, like Estonia and Latvia, by focusing on economic growth has been leaning towards the Anglo-Saxon model (Miniotaite 2003b). In a relatively short time it has indeed achieved impressive rates of economic growth;4 however, progress has been accompanied by a growing gap between the well-off and the poor, feelings of insecurity and even some nostalgia for Soviet times. This creates conditions for political instability, left–right pendulum voting, support for populist parties and leaders, political cynicism and corruption, as well as Euroscepticism and anti-globalism. All political forces in

160

Grazina Miniotaite

Lithuania agree that these phenomena pose serious threats to Lithuania’s domestic security. In the security policy documents reviewed on pp. 156–8 the reduction of social exclusion and the development of civil society are proposed as important means of preventing internal instability. In Lithuania’s foreign and security policy, compliance with membership criteria has been linked to good relations with neighbouring countries, to the military capability of defending the state’s territory and effective contribution to NATO collective defence. Consistently seeking good relations with neighbouring states, Lithuania scrapped its interwar stereotypes and established warm relations with Poland, since 1997 considering Poland a strategic partner on the road to NATO and the EU. In relations with Belarus, Lithuania has pursued the policy of pragmatic selective cooperation, taking account of the EU stance towards Belarus after the establishment of its authoritarian regime in 1997. The idea is that political cooperation with Belarus should be minimal (there have been no exchange of visits between official heads of states or high-ranking officials since the end of 2000), while contacts with some power structures of Belarus should be maintained and bilateral cooperation developed in areas that are important for the region’s security and stability. The area of cooperation includes demarcation of state borders, illegal migration, local cooperation and energy issues. Remarkably, judging by formal criteria, Lithuania has better relations with Belarus than with neighbouring Latvia. Lithuania and Belarus have signed the Agreement on Good Neighbourhood and Cooperation (1995) and the State Borders Treaty (1995). By contrast, a sea border treaty with Latvia was signed as late as 1999 but it has still not been ratified by Latvia’s parliament. Yet this has not prevented Lithuania’s and Latvia’s acceptance into NATO and the EU. Lithuania’s most powerful and most troublesome neighbour is Russia. This is related not only to the fact that Russia has difficulties in reconciling itself to the break-up of the Soviet Union and the loss of the Baltic countries, but also to its peculiar relations with the EU and USA. In an effort to help with the democratization of Russia and thus to secure a trustworthy partner in energy supplies and in the war on terror, some Western powers (Germany and France, in particular) were prone to sympathize with Russia’s resistance to Baltic states’ membership in NATO. The stance found its reflection in the NATO Madrid Summit (1997) decisions, when Poland was invited to join NATO while Lithuania was only characterized as an aspirant country. Despite Russia’s resistance to Lithuania’s transatlantic integration, its relations with Lithuania developed much more smoothly than with the other Baltic states. Lithuania is the only Baltic state to have signed and ratified the border treaty with Russia.5 This is so not only because Russia has no complaints about Russian minority rights in Lithuania, but also because of the peculiarity of the Russia–Lithuania border. Lithuania has a 247 km border with Kaliningrad region, an enclave of 15,100 km2; with a

Lithuania’s security and defence policy

161

population of 930,000. It is the northern half of the pre-war German province of East Prussia, with the centre at former Konigsberg, annexed by Russia in 1945. Since 1991 it has been separated from the rest of the Russian Federation by Lithuania and Belarus and is now wholly dependent on transit via Lithuania. Lithuania is thus very important for Russia as a transit country.6 Besides, Russia’s oil and gas pipelines to Western Europe run via Lithuania. Lithuania, for its part, is wholly dependent on Russia’s oil and gas supplies. Still, Lithuania has held Russia to be a dormant source of threats – military (because of the militarization of the Kaliningrad region), political (because of Russia’s potential interference in Lithuania’s political processes), economic (because of energy dependence on Russia) and cultural (because of the influence of Russia’s mass media). The position of Lithuania on the issue underwent changes because of changes in NATO–Russia relations as well as in EU policies towards the region. At first, the militarized Kaliningrad region was perceived as a direct military threat to Lithuania’s independence. In 1994 the issue of the Kaliningrad threat was made particularly acute. However, this position of ‘hard’ security was gradually replaced by a ‘soft’ one: in the National Security Strategy (NSSRL 2002) the issue of Kaliningrad was conceptualized not as a threat to Lithuanian security but as a common problem of the region. One can agree with the authors of a study on the Kaliningrad region who stated: during the last decade, the region underwent transformation in the foreign policy of Lithuania: from the main threat to security into an advantage – an opportunity to play an independent role of the leader in the south-east of the Baltic Sea region, truly contributing to promotion of stability in the area. . . (Sirutavicˇius and Stanyte-Tolocˇkiene 2003: 186) The changes were brought about in part by Lithuania’s joining the EU Northern Dimension (Initiative) (ND[I]). In the framework of the ND(I), Lithuania actively participates in the integration of the Kaliningrad region into Northern European projects dealing with problems of energy, transport, border control and environmental protection.7 After NATO and EU Summits in 2002 that acknowledged Lithuania’s eligibility for membership in both organizations, Lithuania’s foreign and security policy in relation to Russia mostly lost its independence by becoming a part of EU–Russia relations. After signing the EU–Russia Agreement on Russian transit from the Kaliningrad enclave through Lithuanian territory at the end of 2002, Russia ratified the long-delayed Treaty on the Lithuanian–Russian State Border and signed a readmission agreement in 2003. Stricter regulation of travel to and from the Kaliningrad region via Lithuania (a visa regime) came into effect on 1 July 2003. This brought Lithuania closer to the Schengen Treaty space without causing a

162

Grazina Miniotaite

major deterioration of relations with Russia. The troubling issue of Kaliningrad has been transformed into a ‘window of opportunity’ for regional cooperation. Lithuania proved to be capable of creatively implementing the cooperation model proposed by the EU. While striving for membership of NATO and the EU, Lithuania not only diligently complied with the requirements of membership, but also embarked on some independent security policy initiatives contributing to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. Among the more important ones were the so-called Vilnius Conferences organized since 1997. Lithuania has established itself as a forum for discussing the issues of developing friendly relations among neighbour states and of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. In May 2000 the Vilnius 9 group (V-9) was formed: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia decided to join efforts in seeking NATO membership. In 2001 the V-9 was enlarged to Vilnius 10 (V-10) by admitting Croatia. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States the V-10 stood firm behind the US. They issued a joint statement expressing solidarity with the United States and the Alliance. In 2003 the Vilnius 10 issued a similar statement in support of the US position on Iraq. By linking national security to membership of NATO and the EU Lithuania’s security policy has thus achieved its proximate goal. Its security policy is now part of a common EU foreign and security policy, and Lithuania’s politicians are eager to make that part a highly visible one.

Lithuania’s security policy after dual enlargement: extending the zone of security With accession to the European Union and NATO, Lithuania faced the task of reformulating key foreign and security policy issues and finding its place in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Nekrasas 2005). During the period of candidacy, Lithuania’s domestic and foreign policy, like that of other candidate states, was inevitably adaptive in character. The character remained much the same even after the change in Lithuania’s status. As the new edition of National Security Strategy puts it, Lithuania perceives its national security as a constituent part of the security policies of these organizations and follows the provisions of NATO strategic concept, those of the European Security Strategy and other strategic documents of NATO and the EU, and takes into consideration the threat analysis, strategic goals and measures laid down in these documents. (NSSRL 2005). On the other hand, the activities of the Vilnius 10 and the country’s early involvement in the EU New Neighbourhood Policy have created the pre-

Lithuania’s security and defence policy

163

mises for the realization of Lithuania’s ambitions to become a state that is ‘active, visible in the world, and regionally influential’ (Resolution . . . 2005). In laying the foundations for Lithuania’s new foreign and security policy the emphasis has been on the revitalization of the image of Lithuania as the centre and the leader of the region. My vision of Lithuania is that of a country which through the quality of its membership of the European Union and NATO and good neighbourhood policy has become a leader of the region. I have a vision of Lithuania as a centre of the region with Vilnius as a regional capital. (Paulauskas 2005: 12–13) Thus spoke the then acting president of Lithuania, Arturas Paulauskas, when presenting a draft of the Lithuanian Foreign Policy Conception. Indeed, in the period 2004–6 nearly all documents and official statements dealing with foreign and security policy put an emphasis on Lithuania’s aspiration to become ‘an active and an attractive centre of interregional cooperation promoting Euro-Atlantic values, and the spirit of tolerance and cooperation between cultures and civilizations’ (Agreement . . . 2005a). It should be noted that the region of which Lithuania aspires to become the centre has not been defined in the official documents and statements. This is because the region does not in fact exist; it is, rather, a social construct still to be implemented by Lithuania’s foreign and security policy. In the spirit of theories of new regionalism, the region is conceived not so much as a common geographic space, but as a space of common values creating regional identity by economic, political and military cooperation and leading to the extension of the Western security community (Adler and Crawford 2004). Regional identity is not merely a derivative of national identities; it is, rather, something based on common norms and values constituting what Ju¨rgen Habermas calls ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Habermas 1998: 225–6). In promoting regional cooperation and aspiring to become its driving force, Lithuania is ipso facto creating it. The idea of Lithuania as a regional centre and regional leader is a discursive construction, a narrative on which Lithuania’s international identity is to be based (Miniotaite 2005). As the new edition of National Security Strategy puts it, by constructing its identity as a political leader promoting ‘freedom and democracy in the neighbouring European regions’ Lithuania is creating stronger foundations for its own security (NSSRL 2005). This is the reason why Lithuania is strengthening its relations with Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasian states. Lithuania supports these states’ quest for membership in NATO and the EU and offers them (Ukraine and Georgia in particular) practical assistance in meeting the criteria of membership in these institutions. In its relations with Belarus, Lithuania has followed a policy of ‘pragmatic selective cooperation at a practical level’ while strengthening support for democratic forces in Belarus.8

164

Grazina Miniotaite

Lithuania considers the strengthening of the EU Eastern dimension its main task as a participant in the EU New Neighbourhood policy. This was the major topic at the international conference Common Vision for Common Neighbourhood held in Vilnius in 2006.9 The conference focused on the ‘frozen conflicts’ in Moldova, Georgia, Karabach and Chechnya and appealed for a more active involvement by NATO and the EU. All these conflicts were related to the alleged interference of Russia in the former Soviet space. In the view of some commentators, insistence on the internationalization of the ‘frozen conflicts’ as well as Dick Cheney’s statement in which he accused Russia of using gas and oil as ‘instruments of intimidation and blackmail in order to manipulate supplies and monopolize transit routes’ (Cheney 2006) gave the conference an anti-Russian flavour. How much have Lithuanian–Russian relations changed since Lithuania joined NATO and the EU? Have the tendencies to securitize Russia remained in place? First, as has already been mentioned, with Lithuania’s borders becoming external EU borders some major issues in Lithuanian– Russian relations (e.g. visa and border control) became issues in EU–Russia relations. In Lithuania this prompted ambivalent reactions. Nationalist forces are fearful of new threats to national sovereignty generated by proRussian policies from the EU. The prevailing attitude, however, is that Lithuania’s membership of the EU and NATO has finally eliminated Russia’s military threat. Nevertheless, Russia’s securitization remains an observable issue in Lithuania’s political discourse. There are incessant attempts at bringing Russia to account remorsefully for Lithuania’s occupation and its tragic consequences. There are also fears concerning Lithuania’s dependence on Russia’s energy supplies and possible manipulations of Lithuania’s domestic policies by Russia’s secret services. This image of Russia has been manifested by the Seimas making a claim on Russia for the damages of occupation; by the Lithuanian president’s refusal to participate in the sixtieth anniversary celebration of Russia’s victory over Hitler’s Germany, held in Moscow in 2005 (Janeliu-nas 2005); and by the declaration of Vytautas Landsbergis, MEP, in the European Parliament which holds Russia (Soviet Union) responsible for ‘the loss of millions of lives, burnt in the flames of World War II’ and demands ‘to preserve a place for these tragic facts in Europe’s collective memory’.10 Lithuania, together with other Eastern European nations, the new EU member states, is intent on nudging the ‘Old Europe’ to have a new look at Russia, to stop romanticizing its virtues of ‘spontaneity and unpredictability’ and to consider, in real terms, the potential threats implied in Russia’s clampdown on democracy. It seems that the United States was the first to take notice of the EU newcomers’ concerns, as Dick Cheney’s speech in Vilnius demonstrated. Even when Lithuania was still knocking at the door of the EU and NATO, it made its pro-American stance quite clear; then it was further demonstrated by the Vilnius 10 support for the US war on terror, and by Lithuania’s military involvement in the Iraq war. Politicians

Lithuania’s security and defence policy

165

in Lithuania are nearly unanimous in rejecting any attempts at creating divisions in the European and American understanding of international security, as they consider them as threats to Lithuania’s own security. This is explicitly stated in the White Paper of Lithuanian Defence Policy: ‘A strong transatlantic link between the US and Europe is an essential precondition to the long-term security of Lithuania’ (Lithuanian Ministry of Defence 2006). So it seems that, on the whole, Lithuania’s security policy has evolved in the direction of global security concepts. This is also evidenced by the development of a new agenda for Lithuania’s defence policy.

The new agenda of Lithuania’s defence policy: towards the ESDP? Since becoming a part of a collective defence system, Lithuania’s defence policy has set itself two main tasks: building and extending a secure environment and ensuring a reliable military defence. In pursuing the former goal, it is guided by the European Security Strategy, while in pursuing the latter it relies on NATO’s strategic concept. In Lithuania’s political discourse the EU and NATO play different roles. The EU is treated as possessing normative or civil power,11 which, in the words of Andrew Moravcsik, is grounded not on the ‘number of battalions and bombs’, but on ‘peaceful promotion of democracy by trade, foreign aid and peacekeeping’ (Moravcsik 2002: 12). NATO, on the other hand, is seen as a provider of security based on military power. Supplementing the ‘soft’ EU power with ‘hard’ military power is Lithuania’s preferred option (see Chapter 1, p. 7). The tendencies, in the wake of the Iraq War, of downplaying NATO’s importance are worrying for Lithuania’s politicians. Judging by the content of Lithuania’s latest strategic documents, they fully endorse former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright’s three famous Ds, which outlined American expectations from ESDP: ‘no duplication of what was done effectively under NATO, no decoupling from the US and NATO, and no discrimination against non-EU members’. In the White Paper a strengthening of the transatlantic link is a top priority in defence policy; its formulation reflects all the three Ds, particularly the first and the second: ‘The principle of non-duplication of capabilities’ and ‘new capabilities instead of new structures’ (Lithuanian Ministry of Defence 2006). Being a member of the EU and thus becoming a part of a whole subject to common rules, Lithuania’s security policy has nevertheless maintained a measure of independence and used Lithuania’s unique experience of integration to get a foothold in the new environment. One can say that on security matters Lithuania does not merely comply with the common EU foreign and security policy policies, but makes efforts at influencing them, particularly in trying to strengthen the Eastern dimension of EU security policy. In aspiring to become the political centre of the region, Lithuania feels confident enough to be able to contribute to the strengthening of Europe’s normative power.

166

Grazina Miniotaite

Lithuania’s defence policy has always been linked to NATO. Since the start of the period of candidacy for NATO in 1994 Lithuania has considerably altered its defence objectives, accommodating them ever more to changes in NATO security strategy. Neither NATO’s security strategy, nor the requirement for the interoperability of the country’s defence forces with those of NATO was ever in doubt in Lithuania. Though now a full member of NATO, Lithuania remains merely an obedient and diligent executor of orders from above, exerting little influence on decision-making. The most serious challenge to Lithuania’s defence policy has been the transition from territorial to collective defence. Lithuania’s conception of territorial defence, based as it was on the principle of total and unconditional defence, was in full accord with Lithuania’s political quest of nationstate building. In the framework of this conception NATO was primarily associated with Article 5, obligating member states to collective defence. NATO was perceived as the guarantor of Lithuania’s territorial integrity. This image of NATO was in line with Lithuania’s conception of territorial defence as formulated in the Law on Fundamentals of National Security (LFNSL 1997). Noticeable changes in defence policy began with Lithuania’s involvement in the NATO Membership Action Plan in 1999–2001. Defence reform: building modern armed forces Lithuania began building its system of national defence immediately after the declaration of independence on 11 March 1990. In April of that year the State Department of Defence was established (renamed the Ministry of Defence in October 1991). However, a more systematic build-up of national defence started with the withdrawal of Soviet troops in August 1993 and with Lithuania joining the NATO Partnership for Peace programme early in 1994. Though the build-up of Lithuania’s armed forces has proceeded for merely twelve years, the conception of defence has already undergone several revisions. Lithuania’s invitation to join NATO late in 2002 was a new impetus for the restructuring and modernization of its defence system. The process continued after Lithuania became a full member of NATO. By becoming a full NATO member, Lithuania joined a system of collective defence. However, one should note that the alliance Lithuania joined in 2004 now differs from the alliance NATO was in 1994. The new vision of NATO sees the alliance as willing to take and capable of taking pre-emptive and preventive actions against potential threats. Although Article 5 remains intact, with the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF), the alliance now envisions ‘out of area’ operations. The NRF is expected to be a technologically advanced, interoperable and sustainable force, with land, sea and air units ready to move quickly wherever needed (Paulauskas 2003: 129). Faced with this new reality, Lithuania has undertaken a revision of the concept of total and unconditional self-defence upon which the whole strategy of deterrence and credible defence was initially built. Lithuania has

Lithuania’s security and defence policy

167

revised those principles of national defence (such as territorial defence, a large standing conscript army, a mobilization system ready for total war, and civilian training for guerrilla warfare) that are no longer relevant in the new security environment and are no longer consistent with Lithuania’s armed forces upgrading to NATO standards. In the case of aggression, the envisaged role of the armed forces came to be seen as reinforcement of NATO’s collective defence operations rather than territorial defence. Accordingly, territorial units had to be restructured, standing conscript forces reduced, and the concept of total mobilization revised. The restructuring and modernization of the Lithuanian armed forces was thus brought into line with the new vision of a transformed NATO. NATO has been developing the so-called Force Goals; that is, specific capability requirements that every country is asked to develop and commit for the alliance. Having joined the NATO force planning process, Lithuania began developing the capabilities needed for the strengthening of the whole alliance, abandoning the development of those that NATO as a whole has in abundance.12 The process of reforming the armed forces, which started in 2002, has not yet finished. Priority in the development of Lithuania’s armed forces has been accorded to the creation of highly deployable and sustainable infantry units for the full range of NATO-led operations. Lithuania’s restructured armed forces are now envisaged as a relatively small, modern, well-equipped, well-trained, mobile, deployable and sustainable force able to participate in the full spectrum of NATO operations (see Table 9.1). Upon the completion of these reforms, Lithuania will be able to field armed forces that will be able to react more rapidly, be more mobile, easier to deploy, better equipped and better trained to be able to contribute to any kind of NATO-led operation inside or outside the country. Defence expenditures The conformity of Lithuania’s armed forced to the requirements of collective defence is largely dependent on the amount of funds the government is able to spend on their modernization. In 2000 all parliamentary political parties of Lithuania signed an agreement committing them to spend 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence (for comparison, only 0.7 per cent of GDP was spent on defence in 1993). In March 2004 the agreement was extended until 2008. The percentage level has not in fact been reached, for real expenditure on defence has never exceeded 1.8 per cent of GDP, even though in absolute numbers defence outlay has nearly tripled since 2003 (from 342 million LTL in 2003 to 961.1 million LTL in 2006). The Ministry of National Defence complained that the sum constituted a mere 1.28 per cent of GDP, which was in breach of the agreement. The issue was debated in the State Security Council, whose decision early in 2006 was to recommend to the government that it increase yearly defence allotments so that the level of 2 per cent GDP allotment is reached in the nearest

168

Grazina Miniotaite

future. NATO officials have also complained about insufficient funding of Lithuania’s defence system.

Lithuania and the European defence policy These facts and figures testify that Lithuania’s system of defence has been developing as a part of NATO’s system of defence. Lithuania has linked its own security to the preservation of ‘a strong transatlantic link between the US and Europe’ (Lithuanian Ministry of Defence 2006). The movement by the EU to create an autonomous European defence system has had a lukewarm reception in Lithuania. The Security Strategy (NSSRL 2005) and the latest White Paper are quite explicit about Lithuania’s view: the basis of European defence should be multinational NATO and EU forces formed according to the following principles: (1) A single force for two organizations – i.e. the principle of non-duplication of NATO and EU assets and procedures or assigning and using the same units to fulfil commitments to both organizations; (2) coordination of force planning and operational planning – Lithuania does not consider it necessary for the EU to develop structures and capabilities that NATO already possesses; and (3) decision-making coordination – NATO and EU countries must closely coordinate decision-making on issues of vital importance to the EuroAtlantic community (Lithuanian Ministry of Defence 2006). In essence, the principles merely refurbish the EU–NATO partnership principles stated in the EU–NATO joint declaration of 2002 and, specifically, in the Berlin Plus agreement (2003). So it seems that the repetitious emphasis on them is a way of saying that Lithuania approves the instituting of the European Defence Agency and the strengthening of European military capacities only as a European pillar within NATO. Lithuania actively contributes to the development of the EU battlegroup, consisting of Polish, German, Slovak, Lithuanian and Latvian troops. Yet even more emphatically Lithuania supports NATO aspirations to take greater responsibility for international security and more actively engage in peacekeeping, in peacemaking and, if necessary, in combat missions anywhere in the world (see Table 9.2). Table 9.2 shows that only two Lithuanian soldiers took part in ESDP military operations in 2006. Much more importance has been accorded to the participation of Lithuanian experts in various conflicts. These were sent on the ‘rule of law mission’ to Georgia and on border monitoring missions to Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, all EU missions. Lithuania is also supportive of EU plans to extend crisis management missions from neighbouring to more remote regions. In 2005 Lithuanian experts participated in EU missions to Indonesia and Palestine, and they took part in the training of Iraqi police. Overall, in 2005 there were 17 Lithuanian experts taking part in EU civilian missions and 33 Lithuanian observers involved in mon. itoring elections (see Lietuvos respublikos vyriausybes 2005 metu; veiklos ataskaita 2006).

Land forces

All armed forces

Main tasks of the Lithuanian armed forces Deterrence and collective defence

Source: Lithuanian Ministry of Defence 2006.

Logistics command

Air force

Navy

Engineer battalion Special Operations Unit

National defence volunteers

MIB ‘Iron Wolf’

Components of the Lithuanian armed forces

specialized units

MIB units

Assistance to civilian authorities

battalion units Special Operations Squadron Naval special warfare unit, mine division of patrol ships, countermeasure ship group of cutters transport aircraft 2 helicopters on stand-by, Air Defence Battalion’s platoon at Ignalina Nuclear Power plant logistics battalion, specialized units specialized units

infantry company, specialized units engineer platoon, EOD platoon Special Operations Squadron

Battalion Task Group

International operations

Table 9.1 Components and Main Tasks of the Lithuanian armed forces

170

Grazina Miniotaite

During the last ten years, more than 2,000 Lithuanian soldiers have participated in ten international operations and two Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) missions. Lithuania has been annually increasing its input to international operations. In 2005 the number of Lithuanian soldiers serving abroad reached 230. In 2005 Lithuania assumed the leadership of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan as a part of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Lithuanian soldiers assist the central government of Afghanistan in strengthening its control over the Ghor province, in reforming its security forces, and they help maintain the dialogue between central government, international organizations and local leaders. Lithuania continues its participation in the coalition-led operations and in a NATO-led training mission, both in Iraq. Since late 2004 Lithuania has been involved in the EUled operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and continued participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping mission in the Kosovo province (KFOR). In 2005 Lithuania assisted Pakistan in the aftermath of a disastrous earthquake and deployed its troops as part of the NRF (Lithuanian Ministry of Defence 2006). Thus in tracing the influence of EU defence strategy on Lithuania’s defence policy there is inevitably a far greater influence of NATO; and this again shows that Lithuania wants to see the defence policies of NATO and the EU as mutually reinforcing each other. From conversations with officials of the Defence Ministry, one gets the impression that they are worried about certain tendencies in the European defence policy. As Kestutis Paulauskas noticed, the first concern is that the EU and NATO military standards and defence planning system might diverge. In that case Lithuania’s efforts at reaching NATO standards would have been in vain. Besides, the ever more noticeable duplication between the military bodies of NATO and the EU would force a split in two of Lithuania’s modest defence capacities (Paulauskas 2006: 37–8). The second concern relates to the stance of the European Defence Agency. Its pursuit of a common European procurement policy could cost Lithuania a great deal, for in complying with its insistence on procuring European armaments Lithuania would lose American armaments supplies purchased on quite favourable terms.13 So it is natural that Lithuania wants the European armament policies to remain open to transatlantic cooperation.

Concluding remarks ‘Not only consumer, but also contributor’ – a phrase used in many official documents, statements and speeches – is an apt description of the official stance of Lithuania, as member of both EU and NATO, on matters of security and defence. Does the foregoing analysis confirm this ambitious claim? Both NATO and the EU have always had a two-sided interpretation in Lithuania’s political discourse, the instrumental and the normative one. The

Lithuania’s security and defence policy

171

instrumental view prevailed with respect to NATO, for NATO was primarily perceived as a security umbrella against threats from the East. A much more symbolically charged role was accorded to the EU, since the prospect of joining the EU was like a return to the lost El Dorado, not only bringing national security, but restoring Lithuania to Western identity. The accession negotiations and the process of coming into conformance with the criteria of the EU and NATO membership led to a thorough transformation of the state and society. In security policy this meant the overcoming of negative attitudes towards neighbouring states and the embrace of the conception of cooperative security. This in turn led to adjustments in defence policy, including the switch from the idea of territorial defence to that of a common defence. Since the accession to NATO and the EU Lithuania’s formerly uniform security/defence policy has begun to come apart, splitting into foreign/ security policy and defence policy components. The former is associated with the expansion of Europe’s normative power, encapsulated in the appellation of the EU security strategy, ‘a secure Europe in a better world’. In contributing to the realization of the strategy Lithuania has assumed the ambitious role of a leader, urging the rest ‘to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East’. The annual Vilnius conferences have become a forum for post-Soviet states seeking membership in the EU and NATO. Table 9.2 Participation of Lithuania in major military operations in 2005 Operation

ESDP operations

Concordia* Artemis Althea KFOR**

1 staff officer 1 staff officer

ISAF Pakistan relief operation Iraqi freedom

Enduring Freedom

NATO operations

US-led operations

1 company (100); 1 platoon (30) within Polish-Ukrainian battalion 1 provincial reconstruction team (120) 10 specialists 2 platoons with Polish and Danish contingents (110); Staff officers (12) 1 staff officer

Source: Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania. Notes: * The operation was terminated in 2003. ** The three Baltic states have rotated a companysize unit (the Baltic Squadron) every six months within a Danish battalion in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2000.

172

Grazina Miniotaite

Lithuania’s defence policy has been developing as part of NATO defence policy. In making its contribution to the attainment of NATO strategic goals, Lithuania has sought to become a trustworthy member of the alliance. The specific role that Lithuania envisions for itself in the alliance is Lithuania’s active promotion of NATO enlargement to the East. Lithuania supports the strengthening of the military dimension of the EU, but opposes the possible duplication of EU and NATO defence capacities. Thus a twofold answer can be given to the question of whether Lithuania’s ambitions to have a high-profile role in EU security and defence policy are justified. Lithuania has indeed played an active and creative role in implementing EU security strategy by strengthening its Eastern dimension. However, up to now Lithuania’s participation in the strengthening of the military dimension of the EU has been merely symbolic.

Notes 1 The state of Lithuania (the Grand Dukedom of Lithuania) has its roots in the thirteenth century. In the fifteenth century the country was among the most powerful European states. In 1565 the Lublin union treaty between the Grand Dukedom of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland created the Commonwealth of Lithuania and Poland. In 1793–5 the Commonwealth was broken up and absorbed by Russia, Prussia and Austria. The entire Lithuanian ethnic area fell under Russian rule. It remained so until the end of the First World War. The interwar Lithuanian republic spanned the period 1918–40. 2 The Law on Fundamentals of National Security 1996 (LFNSL 1997), the National Security Strategy (NSSRL 2002; NSSRL 2005), the Military Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania (MSRL 2004), Agreement among Political Parties of the Republic of Lithuania on the Defence and Security Policy for 2005–2008 (Agreement . . . 2005b), Guidelines of the Minister of National Defence 2006– 2011 (GMND 2005), White Paper of Lithuanian Defence Policy (Lithuanian Ministry of Defence 1999; Lithuanian Ministry of Defence 2002; Lithuanian Ministry of Defence 2006). 3 The document notes that ‘[t]he National Security Strategy is a flexible and open document and it will be amended on a regular basis when major changes occur in the internal or external security environment’. The most recent edition of the National Security Strategy was approved in 2005 (NSSRL 2005). 4 In 2006 Lithuania’s GDP reached 47 per cent of the average GDP of EU states, starting from the low point of 33 per cent in 1997. 5 The Lithuanian–Russian border treaty was signed in 1997 and ratified by Lithuania in 1999 and by Russia in 2003. 6 The Agreement between the Lithuanian Republic and the Russian Federation on Long-Term Economic and Socio-Cultural Cooperation in the Development of the Kaliningrad Region was signed on 29 July 1991. The latest agreement on long-term cooperation between Lithuania and the Kaliningrad region was signed on 26 June 1999, and it prescribed that the transit of goods will take place on a non-discriminatory basis according to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/ World Trade Organization (WTO) principles. The railway and airborne military transit are regulated by a temporary agreement, which is extended each year.

Lithuania’s security and defence policy

173

7 In 1998 a working group for promoting cooperation between Lithuania and the Kaliningrad region was formed under the Lithuanian–Russian Intergovernmental Commission, and in 2000 the Council for Long-Term Cooperation between Lithuania and the Kaliningrad Region was established. Lithuania and Russia put forth joint proposals for the first and the second ND(I) action plans. They were called the ‘Nida Initiatives’ and are financed from public funds by each country as well as from funds of mutual assistance and EU programmes. 8 In particular, during presidential elections in Belarus in 2005 Lithuania supported the opposition by offering it facilities to operate in Vilnius, as it did for the European Humanitarian University that was ousted from Minsk. These actions on the part of Lithuania led to tensions in relations between the two states. The Belarus president accused Lithuania’s foreign minister of interfering in Belarus’s internal affairs. Nevertheless, the democratization of Belarus, and its involvement in EU New Neighbourhood Policy, remains an important item on Lithuania’s security policy agenda. 9 Presidents from nine states of the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions – Lithuania, Poland, Moldova, Romania, Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Latvia and Estonia – took part in the conference. Among the participants were also US vice-president Dick Cheney and Javier Solana, the EU high representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 10 Declaration on the anniversary of 17 September 1939, submitted by MEPs Vytautas Landsbergis, Bronislaw Geremek, Valdis Dombrovskis and Toomas Hendrik Ilves. The declaration was not adopted since only eighty MEPs signed it. 11 The term ‘normative power Europe’ has been used for some years. The term is an attempt at a new conceptualization of the power of ideas in international politics. ‘Normative power Europe’ is defined as a discursive practice, as a narrative shaping the EU as a unique political institution which, by realizing itself via free exchange of ideas and opinions, is capable of changing the ‘normalcy’ perception in international relations (Manners 2002; Diez 2005). 12 The NATO air-policing mission in the Baltic states is the best proof of credible collective solidarity. NATO members, on a rotational basis, provide their jets, pilots and supporting personnel for the air-policing mission in the Baltic states, which do not possess air-policing capabilities. For their part, the Baltic countries are not procuring jets; instead they are investing their resources in other areas important for NATO. For example, Lithuania trains units that specialize in water purification, petroleum services, transportation, etc. 13 In 2001–3 Lithuania purchased from the United States 75 anti-tank missiles, 60 surface-to-air missiles, 8 launchers and 15 Humvees (Paulauskas 2006: 38).

10 Hard questions about European defence Jaan Murumets

In democratic societies, the employment of military force is always a matter of political decision-making. At the national level, there are usually legal frameworks and procedures in place that ensure the responsiveness of the national military organization to political guidance in general, as well as in the context of planning for, and conduct of, any particular operation. Similar decision-making processes and procedures and the necessary legal framework have been established and exercised within the North Atlantic Alliance for more than half a century. To a somewhat lesser degree of uniformity, similar procedures have been exercised within the United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations framework. From the perspective of the rapidly evolving defence dimension of the European Union (EU), it is relevant to take a look at the overall political guidance of the EU, the capability and operational requirements for the military at the EU’s disposal derived from this guidance, as well as at the capabilities and procedures developed by the EU member states in response to this guidance. This chapter intends to look at the complex of European defence and crisis management issues from the perspective of a defence planner, using some appropriate analytical and planning tools from the defence planner’s toolbox. The focus of this chapter is on the capabilities and configuration of the military instrument at the disposal of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

The security situation The primary source to describe the security situation is the European Security Strategy (ESS). This document outlines a number of security threats to its member states. First of all, the Strategy draws a baseline, stating that ‘large-scale aggression against any Member State in now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable’ (European Union 2003: 3). The Strategy specifies the key threats as follows: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime (ibid.: 3–4). In sum, it concludes that

Hard questions about European defence

175

taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatization of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed. (European Union 2003: 5) Further, the Strategy (ibid.: 7) compares the current security situation with that of the Cold War period: In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments . . . . Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order . . . . Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. (European Union 2003: 5) This passage serves well as a transition to look for another key component of broader political guidance – the doctrinal basis for defence planning and execution. The doctrinal basis One of the most important planning assumptions provided by the European Security Strategy is the focus on preventive measures. It says: ‘With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic . . . . This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early’ (European Union 2003: 7). Or, in more concentrated fashion, ‘Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future’ (European Union 2003: 11). With regard to the complex nature of security challenges, the Strategy states: ‘As a Union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities’ (European Union 2003: 11). From the defence planner’s perspective, the concept of integrated rapid reaction crisis management capabilities – defined in the Headline Goal 2010 document as ‘civil crisis management instruments, and notably police components, that can be deployed together with military components and temporarily under military responsibility . . . foreseeing also an integrated planning process’ (European Union 2004: 5, fn.) – gives another important planning assumption to generate command and control arrangements for crisis response operations.

176

Jaan Murumets

In a broader doctrinal context, two additional sets of principles should be brought forward. ‘The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management’, the Strategy says, ‘but if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable’ (European Union 2003: 11). What, then, is meant by activism, coherence and capability in the given context? More active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention. (European Union 2003: 11) Activism, hence, underscores the ground-laying nature of the concept of preventive engagement. Further, coherence should be understood within the notion of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act together . . . . The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. (European Union 2003: 13) Or otherwise, taking into account the complex nature of security challenges, the matching response to any particular crisis should also be a wellbalanced combination of political, economical and military instruments. And, finally: capability. The Strategy sets an objective: to transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary. Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities. (European Union 2003: 12) Again, the importance of multinational cooperation and coordination is underscored here. Moreover, it could also be said that ESDP in general – and the concept of battlegroups (discussed on pp. 177–8) in particular – is envisaged to be a tool for the transformation of the European military. The second set of principles, outlined in the EU concept papers, addresses important issues of interoperability, deployability and sustainability.

Hard questions about European defence

177

Interoperability but also deployability and sustainability will be at the core of Member States’ efforts and will be the driving factors of this goal 2010. The Union will thus need forces which are more flexible, mobile and interoperable, making better use of available resources by pooling and sharing assets, where appropriate, and increasing the responsiveness of multinational forces. (European Union 2004: 3) The same requirement was reiterated during the Capability Commitment Conference in Brussels in November 2004 (Military Capability Commitment Conference 2004: 2). Though well defined within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) framework, these concepts had also to be defined for the European Union, since not all its members are members of NATO: Interoperability can be broadly defined as the ability of our armed forces to work together and to interact with civilian tools. It is an instrument to enhance the effective use of military capabilities as a key enabler in achieving [the] EU’s ambitions in Crisis Management Operations. Similarly, deployability involves the ability to move personnel and materiel to the theatre of operations, while sustainability involves mutual logistic support between the deployed forces. (European Union 2004: 3, fn.) Finally, the EU documents provide a general doctrinal approach to meeting capability requirements for deployment. ‘The Ministers of Defence also agreed on the Global Approach on Deployability. This initiative will aim at more effective use of available assets, mechanisms and initiatives for strategic transport, a key enabler for Rapid Response’ (Military Capability Commitment Conference 2004: 1). This concept has been refined further in the document, which states that ‘it envisages the co-ordination of all strategic lift assets, mechanisms and initiatives in support of EU-led operations, in particular for the EU Battlegroups’ (Military Capability Commitment Conference 2004: 7). The important concept of battlegroups is one of the key doctrinal approaches to the EU military instrument. The Headline Goal 2010 document defines battlegroups thus: These minimum force packages must be militarily effective, credible and coherent and should be broadly based on the Battlegroups concept. This constitutes a specific form of rapid response, and includes a combined arms battalion sized force package with Combat Support and Combat Service Support . . . . Relevant air and naval capabilities would be included. The need for reserves should be taken into account. (European Union 2004: 3)

178

Jaan Murumets

During the Capability Commitment Conference in Brussels, in November 2004, the battlegroup concept was further enhanced: A Battlegroup could be formed by a Framework Nation or by a multinational coalition of Member States. In all cases, interoperability and military effectiveness will be key criteria. A Battlegroup must be associated with a Force Headquarters and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers, such as strategic lift and logistics. (Military Capability Commitment Conference 2004: 3) To ensure connectivity with NATO, the declaration on European military capabilities stressed: The EU Battlegroups concept is complementary and mutually reinforcing with the NATO Response Force (NRF) documents while taking into account the characteristics of both organizations. Standards, practical methods and procedures will be compatible with those defined within NATO (NRF), wherever possible and applicable. (Military Capability Commitment Conference 2004: 5)

The level of ambition Within the commonly accepted view on the security situation and the developed doctrinal basis, the European Union has set a level of ambition for the military forces at its disposal. These ambitions address the interaction requirements for the military instrument vis-a`-vis broader crisis management, time constraints for decision-making processes and the initiation of deployment, as well as the scope of operations, readiness and sustainability requirements for established force packages – the battlegroups. First of all, the 2010 Headline Goal document states as its key element ‘the ability for the EU to deploy force packages at high readiness as a response to a crisis either as a standalone force or as a part of a larger operation enabling follow-on phases’ (European Union 2004: 3). It goes on to set the time constraints: Rapid reaction calls for rapid decision making and planning as well as rapid deployment of forces. On decision-making, the ambition of the EU is to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the Council. On the deployment of forces, the ambition is that the forces start implementing their mission on the ground no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation. (European Union 2004: 3)

Hard questions about European defence

179

With regard to the scope of operations and sustainability requirements, the ambition has been articulated as follows: Member States have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union . . . this might also include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The EU must be able to act before a crisis occurs and preventive engagement can avoid the situation deteriorating. The EU must retain the ability to conduct concurrent operations, thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement. (European Union 2004: 2) The latter clause was refined during the Capability Commitment Conference, in November 2004, in the context of the full operational capability to be reached in 2007: ‘The Union should have the capacity to undertake two concurrent single Battlegroup-size rapid response operations, including the ability to launch both such operations nearly simultaneously’ (Military Capability Commitment Conference 2004: 10). Capability requirements Based on an assessment of the security situation, the doctrinal basis and the level of ambition, some key capability requirements for the EU military instrument can be derived. In the military operational sense, from the battlegroup’s perspective these requirements were identified during the Capability Commitment Conference: Battlegroups will be employable across the full range of tasks listed in the Treaty on European Union Art.17.2 and those identified in the European Security Strategy, in particular in tasks of combat forces in crisis management . . . . Battlegroups need to be sustainable until mission termination or until relief by other forces. They should be sustainable for 30 days initial operations, extendable to 120 days, if re-supplied appropriately. (Military Capability Commitment Conference 2004: 4) However, from the defence planner’s perspective, to ensure that the whole international mechanism of political and military planning and execution is operational more aspects must be taken into account. The first deals with political planning and decision-making. Assuming the policy is articulated and approved both at the EU and national levels, the main challenge is the time factor. The 2010 Headline Goal sets the level of ambition at fifteen days between the approval of a crisis management concept

180

Jaan Murumets

and forces starting to implement their mission on the ground. To what extent all national and EU political and military entities involved can comply with that tense timeframe remains to be seen. The second aspect deals with defence planning and management of troops assigned to EU operations. Policy guidelines have identified a need for the military to plan and coordinate joint actions not only with other military but also with civilian crisis management agencies, in particular with police forces. In defence planning language, this means preparing for combined joint operations, with a strong civil–military cooperation dimension. This task brings forward at least two supporting tasks: to ensure the civilian component of the Task Group is procedurally interoperable with the military; and, more importantly, to ensure that national legislation allows civilian personnel to be put temporarily under military responsibility. It would hence be appropriate to underscore the fact that civil–military cooperation at all levels of planning and execution – that is, definitely beyond ‘traditional’ Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) at the tactical level – is a paramount current requirement, although one which is very difficult to achieve. Moreover, this planning has to accommodate early, rapid and robust military intervention as a means of preventive engagement. The latter requires maintaining assigned troops in high readiness, and with pre-identified strategic lift and logistics support capabilities, which, in turn, underscores the need to establish, and exercise on a routine basis, appropriate multinational cooperation and coordination mechanisms. The guidance to be prepared for launching two battlegroup-sized rapid response operations nearly simultaneously raises even higher the requirements for planning and management capabilities, to include a critical enabler – an EU-owned intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability, some components of which should be standing and some deployable in support of an operation. The third aspect deals with contingency and operational planning, and mission-essential requirements. Political guidelines have tasked the military with preparing for a wide spectrum of operations, from low-intensity humanitarian and rescue tasks to peacekeeping tasks and support to combating terrorism, to forcible entry in support of peacemaking efforts. The scope of military operations sets high requirements for training, equipment, command and control arrangements, and sustainability, including logistic support. It is important to underscore here that combating terrorism is seldom a solely military task and the possible involvement of military capabilities in any counter-terrorist operation should therefore be seen in the broader context of military support for civilian authorities. Summary In the framework of the ESDP, policy guidance has been defined and the doctrinal basis and level of ambition established. Based on these, the following essential capability requirements for the military instrument can be derived.

Hard questions about European defence

181

The EU should have the capability to ‘deploy 60,000 soldiers within 60 days and sustain them for one year for peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, and to build up 13 battle groups deployable at short notice’ (European Parliament 2006: 7). For the battlegroups, the readiness requirement to start implementing their mission on the ground is set at ‘no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation’ (European Union 2004: 3), whereas the sustainability requirement is set ‘for 30 days initial operations, extendable to 120 days, if re-supplied appropriately’ (Military Capability Commitment Conference 2004: 4). The military instrument at the EU’s disposal should be capable of conducting ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks for combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’ (European Union 2004: 2). Out of this array of missions, tasks for combat forces in crisis management are specifically assigned to the battlegroups. The latter should consist of ‘a combined arms battalion sized force package with Combat Support and Combat Service Support’ (European Union 2004: 3), reinforced with air and naval assets as required. ‘A battlegroup must be associated with a Force Headquarters and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers’ (Military Capability Commitment Conference 2004: 3).

Hard questions Derived from the identified security situation, the doctrinal basis and established level of ambition, and in light of established capability requirements, several hard questions should be asked in order to assess capabilities and the responsiveness of the decision-making mechanism designed and the forces assigned. What national policy guides the provision of capabilities in support of the ESDP? Are the capabilities assigned or earmarked for action outside national frontiers actually available? Have the strategic enablers – lift and ISTAR capabilities – actually been identified? Has the Force Headquarters been assigned, and does it have the capability to conduct an overseas operation? Can the force package be sustained in theatre? Can they do what they are expected to do? Naturally, each of these questions could be further detailed. Some of the questions are answered based on the empirical data provided in the country chapters of this study. Other questions are formulated, but this study itself does not provide sufficient data to address all the concerns identified. Therefore, additional questions and possible sources for seeking answers, beyond the empirical data of this study, are identified at the end of this chapter to provide initial food for thought for a possible separate follow-up study. There are two aspects to examine regarding the availability of forces. The first is the aspect of political availability. In other words, what is the estimated relative importance of ESDP compared with defence of national sovereignty, collective defence and other possible NATO-led operations,

182

Jaan Murumets

UN crisis response operations and the like, as reflected in national legislation and/or available political guidance? Another aspect of the availability of forces is their technical availability, that dealing with possible, or even projected, conflicts between EU assignments and other declared commitments of forces – for NATO or UN crisis response, for example. In the case of conflicting requests, which would prevail? Finally, one key question remains: can the forces earmarked for and assigned to EU operations do what they are expected to do? Or, in defence planner’s language: do the operational capabilities of the EU battlegroups and other force packages meet estimated mission requirements? Are they capable of conducting operations within the whole range of established military missions – carrying out humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, combat tasks in crisis management, including peacemaking, also joint disarmament operations, and support in combating terrorism? In brief, there are three critical questions to be asked regarding the commitments of Northern European countries to the ESDP in the context of established capability requirements:  What is the place of ESDP in the broader security and defence policy of a given country?  What capabilities, if any, are earmarked or assigned in support of the ESDP?  Are these capabilities actually available? The next section of this chapter will specifically look at the empirical data provided in previous country chapters to provide answers to these questions. Denmark Chapter 5 provides the basis for ascertaining the place of the ESDP in the overall security and defence policy of Denmark. Henrik Larsen noted that while Denmark has been active within EU foreign policy in general, it has been an extremely reluctant participant in the development of the EU defence dimension. In spite of the government’s general support of the ESDP process, commitment of military assets has been extremely limited. For instance, Denmark has not declared any forces for the EU Force Catalogue. Denmark has not participated in EU operations in the Balkans and Africa. Moreover, although Danish contingents were part of NATO-led forces in Macedonia and Bosnia, they were withdrawn when the EU took over. Also, Denmark opted out of the decision to establish a satellite centre, though it contributed to the civilian part of the project. In terms of broader security and defence policy, then, Denmark participates in general discussions about security in the EU, including drafting the EU Security Strategy of 2003, but maintains a very low profile

Hard questions about European defence

183

in the military field. In Larsen’s words, Denmark’s status in this field for the foreseeable future is as a member with a semi-permanent opt-out. There is broad support for military contributions in all international forums but not for military contributions making the EU a military actor. In sum, then, Denmark participates in the conceptual development of the ESDP but does not contribute any assets to implement that policy. With this statement, the questions regarding capabilities assigned in support of the ESDP, as well as actual availability of these capabilities, could be dismissed as not applicable. Finland The next Nordic country to look at is Finland, with the policies described by Hanna Ojanen (in Chapter 4). The influence of the EU on the formulation of Finnish security and defence policy has been growing and the ESDP has acquired increasing significance. The central position of the EU has been clearly stated in the White Paper of 2004, which commits Finland to strengthening the EU both as a security community and as an international actor. This policy has been reflected in national legislation, where the missions of Finnish armed forces clearly include participation in international operations; and, alongside professional military personnel, conscripts may be sent abroad to participate in crisis management training and assistance, although not directly to participate in crisis management (CRM) operations. More importantly, the Finnish legislation has dropped the prerequisite of a clear UN or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mandate for participating in peacekeeping or crisis management, thus underscoring the Union’s independence and making Finland an equal partner. This harmonization of rules regarding the use of force will definitely foster interoperability, as well as speed up the decision-making process at home, claims Ojanen. In terms of the allocation of military assets, Finland has declared for the EU Force Catalogue a mechanized infantry battalion, a headquarters and signals company, an engineer battalion, several specialized CIMIC units, a transport company, a minelayer and number of staff officers and military observers. From 2008, according to Ojanen, air force assets will also be made available for multinational operations. With regard to battlegroups, Finland has declared its participation in two. For Finland, Ojanen wrote, the Swedish–Finnish–Norwegian–Estonian unit embodies Nordic cooperation; participation in the German–Dutch Battlegroup poses a good opportunity to work together with two experienced EU and NATO countries. The Finnish contingent in the Nordic Battlegroup will be of 180–220 personnel, mainly combat support; in the German–Dutch–Finnish Battlegroup, 120–60 troops of military police, medical support and the like. Looking at the availability of these forces, it should be said, first, that in terms of political availability Finland has made sure that the declared forces

184

Jaan Murumets

are available without any major hindrance – the national legislation and decision-making processes have been adjusted accordingly. Second, in terms of technical availability there will likely be no problems with assets assigned for battlegroups, for these projects have their own development schedule, organized amongst participating countries, which should ensure timely achievement of the required readiness. With the forces declared for the EU Force Catalogue the situation is different, for the same forces are also earmarked for the NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Arrangement, the UN Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) and the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS). Hence, there could be a situation where more than one employer may request the deployment. What might happen in this case is perhaps a subject for future study. To sum up, for Finland the ESDP occupies a central position in its national security and defence policy. In support of the implementation of that policy, Finland has assigned military assets for both components of the EU military instrument – Headline Goal 2010 forces and battlegroups – and made these politically available. A problematic situation may arise regarding the technical availability of earmarked forces when several designated end-users request these forces simultaneously. Norway As seen in Nina Græger’s chapter (Chapter 6), Norwegian governments have promoted the closest possible attachment to the EU, without Norway being a member. In general, the EU has not been considered of high importance in Norwegian security policy, although it is seen in a positive light when it comes to the civilian side of the EU’s role as a global actor, for instance in conflict prevention or crisis management. The main effort of the Norwegian security policy, however, is focused on maintaining NATO’s relevance through the development of NRF, the new command structure and the Prague Capabilities Commitment. The ESDP enters the Norwegian political debate and the decision-making process when new initiatives are advanced or situations occur where the EU claims a leading role. Norway’s response has been to bend the rules for participation in the EU’s defence cooperation as far the EU can tolerate, at the same time without endangering its relations with NATO and the United States. Græger has called this strategy ‘troops-forinfluence’, where the aim is to convert military contributions into political influence. In the implementation of this policy, Norwegian military and civilian personnel have participated in several EU-led operations (Macedonia and Bosnia). In 2004 the EU and Norway signed a general agreement for Norwegian participation in the crisis management operations of the EU that provided the legal foundation for Norwegian participation, with about 150 troops, in

Hard questions about European defence

185

a Nordic Battlegroup together with Sweden, Finland and Estonia. All in all, Norway has declared 3,000–3,500 troops for the EU Force Catalogue. The picture is more complicated in terms of the availability of this force. The above-mentioned EU–Norwegian participation in crisis management states that there should be a UN mandate for Norway to participate. As the Norwegian Ministry of Defence stated on the matter, the decision on participation shall be made at a national level, the force shall be under national control, and participation requires a clear mandate based on international law. Also, the memorandum of understanding (MoU) on the Nordic Battlegroup requires consensus among the participants to deploy the battlegroup, and any decision on deployment should be made first by the respective and competent national authorities in accordance with their national constitution, legislation and policy decisions. To sum up, the ESDP is not seen in the context of national security policy in Norway, but rather as a means to acquire some influence in allEuropean matters. To that end, Norway has participated in several EU-led operations, has declared troops for the EU Force Catalogue and participates in the Nordic Battlegroup. However, in terms of availability, the employment of earmarked and assigned forces is restricted by a specific requirement for the UN mandate, and is clearly tied to a case-by-case national decision-making procedure. Sweden Chapter 3 by Lars Wedin serves as a basis for examining established policies regarding the ESDP in the broader context of the security and defence policy of Sweden. Sweden’s security policy tradition is deeply rooted in non-alignment, believed to guarantee a higher degree of freedom of action in foreign relations. Defence, in turn, has always been seen as a national issue. As a reflection of this approach, Sweden has taken one of the ESS basic assumptions – that the first line of defence will often be abroad – quite literally, for it focuses on international crisis management and leaves the defence of the country aside. Wedin maintains that Swedish security and defence policy is largely ‘Europeanized’ but with caveats. Though the ESS and its objectives are mentioned several times, Sweden does not see the ESS as a commitment. Instead, Swedish policy is ‘in line with’ and ‘supportive of’ the ESS, which again underscores the importance of freedom of action in the Swedish security policy paradigm. The ESDP is seen as a means of strengthening the UN, and consequently also multilateralism, international rules and humanitarian law – traditional components of Swedish foreign policy. Although it is plausible to claim that the ESDP plays a significant role in Swedish security and defence, beneath the surface, however, there is still a reluctance to engage and little trust in European security. Yet Swedish troops provide no alternative security arrangement. Moreover, in political

186

Jaan Murumets

statements the importance of ESDP is seldom referred to; and Swedes, including government officials, largely do not consider the EU as ‘us’. In the case of Sweden, the ESDP also has an important internal dimension, for the armed forces are seen as an important resource to support an active foreign and security policy. Through participation in multinational operations, Sweden seeks to strengthen international peace and stability, and through that its own security. To reflect this approach, existing policy guidance defines international crisis management as the primary mission for the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF), with priority given to the Swedish element of the rapid reaction capability of the EU. According to Wedin, the ESDP forms the basis for the transformation of SAF. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) annual guidance of 2006, for instance, directs that the development of multinational interoperability should be based on the standards and norms of the EU; when such standards do not exist, applicable NATO standards should be employed. Hence, it is clear that the ESDP – or, more precisely, Sweden’s commitment to Headline Goal forces – became the basis for the development of future capabilities. Sweden shares with nearly all other EU states the critical capability gaps here, those concerning strategic lift, air-toair refuelling, strategic intelligence and ISTAR capabilities. Wedin identifies the main problem as being that policy and resources do not match. The political priority given to the ESDP is not translated into budgetary terms. Regarding the capabilities earmarked or assigned in support of the ESDP, Sweden announced that all operational units are earmarked for international crisis management. The national ambition is to increase Swedish the participation capability to 2,000 troops. Specifically for the EU Force Catalogue, Sweden has declared two mechanized battalions, a Special Forces unit, several Combat Support and Service Support elements, staff officers and observers, as well as naval and air force elements in two stages of readiness for deployment. With regard to the Nordic Battlegroup (NBG), Sweden as a framework nation provides the bulk of its manpower – about 800 troops. The NBG is envisaged to be able to fulfil the whole rage of combat tasks; it will be trained in accordance with the ‘Three Bloc War’ concept (high-intensity combat, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations conducted nearly simultaneously in urban areas), with the priority on rapid reaction at the lower-intensity spectrum of combat tasks. Full operational capability of the NBG will be reached by 2008, after which it will be possible to field one battlegroup every third year. The pre-identified operation headquarters for NBG will be provided by Great Britain. What about the availability of earmarked and assigned capabilities? With regard to the NBG, the problem is presumably solved in the framework of an internationally established and coordinated project plan. Regarding earmarked capabilities, the situation is twofold. On the one hand, Wedin refers to Operation Artemis, when the Swedish government and parliament showed their ability to take quick decisions. On the other hand, the Swedish government does not have a policy of prioritizing between UN-, EU- or

Hard questions about European defence

187

NATO-led operations. There is a general will to cooperate with all these, and consequently each case will be decided individually, taking into account both political and strategic considerations, as well as available financial and military resources. In sum: the ESDP is the main framework for the development of Swedish security policy, though it is seldom publicly admitted to be such. Internally, the ESDP is in fact the driving force behind the transformation of the Swedish military, although there is a recognizable disconnection between policy statements and actual resource allocation. Sweden has made a substantial commitment to the formation of the Nordic Battlegroup, providing the bulk of its capabilities. Regarding the capabilities earmarked for international crisis management, although formally these consist of all operational units of SAF, the lack of established government policy prioritizing between international actors may lead to conflicting requests from more than one designated end-user. Estonia Chapter 8 by Erik Ma¨nnik provides information concerning an overview of the ESDP policy of Estonia, capabilities Estonia has contributed to the ESDP and their potential availability. Estonia’s ESDP policy has since its inception envisioned an active participation in ESDP operations, but with concerns over insufficient coordination between the EU and NATO. Estonia’s policy-makers are aware of the limited capabilities of the EU and see it as primarily a crisis management tool, whereas the collective defence provided by NATO is seen as the main guarantee of Estonia’s security. The primary policy goal of Estonia is to pursue its ‘NATO first’ policy and do its utmost to avoid jeopardizing the trans-Atlantic link. This stance is clearly reflected in practical decision-making, where the most important mission for the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF) is considered to be the NATO operation in Afghanistan. However, Estonia does not want to be marginalized in the EU and, thus, is actively participating also in the ESDP. In short, Estonia has an active involvement in the ESDP while its defence policy priorities have been associated with NATO integration and membership. The original commitment to the EU Force Catalogue that Estonia made in 2000 consisted of a military police platoon, a mine-clearing unit, some CIMIC specialists, two minesweepers and one auxiliary vessel, and a full infantry battalion. All these forces were double-hatted, that is, at the same time were also declared for NATO. In 2003 one of two minesweepers was excluded from the pool to bring the commitments in line with actual capabilities – to recognize the fact that the Estonian navy was capable of deploying only two ships simultaneously. With the emergence of the concept of battlegroups, meeting the policy guidance became more difficult for the EDF, for the high readiness and availability requirements for a contingent assigned to a battlegroup prevented their double-hatting. However, in 2004

188

Jaan Murumets

Estonia joined the Nordic Battlegroup with forty-five troops, whose primary mission will be force protection. Most importantly, Estonia’s policy in making this commitment was to avoid declaring the same unit for NATO. In availability terms, then, the Estonian contingent to the Nordic Battlegroup is available without restrictions. When it comes to capabilities declared for the EU Force Catalogue, all of them are double-hatted for both the EU and NATO. In sum: Estonia, according to Ma¨nnik, has adopted the EU’s view on security matters, welcomed the establishment of the ESDP, been an enthusiastic contributor to the ESDP, but always stressed the importance of maintaining and securing the trans-Atlantic link. Capabilities earmarked for and assigned to the ESDP comprise combat and support elements, land and maritime components, with the support element in Estonia’s contribution to the battlegroup. The latter is unconditionally available, whereas other listed capabilities are earmarked for both the EU and NATO. Given the prevailing ‘NATO first’ policy, there are some doubts whether in case of conflicting requests these capabilities would actually be available for the EU operation. Latvia Regarding Zaneta Ozalin¸a’s contribution (Chapter 7), Latvian security policy has over the last decade been dominated its striving for NATO and EU membership. Recent developments have shown that Latvia’s support for the ESDP was overshadowed by its support of the US war on terror and participation in the Iraq operation. Criticism from ‘old’ Europe for this support led Latvia to prioritize NATO over the EU. Latvia has stated that it is interested in a strong ESDP that develops in close cooperation with NATO, avoiding unnecessary duplication and developing mutually beneficial security structures, and will not support initiatives that undermine NATO. Hence, from the Latvian perspective the ESDP is a regional security policy that influences international stability and security. Most recent Latvian security policy guidelines do mention that Latvia must participate in the formulation of EU defence policy but fall short of defining its contribution. Hence, although the ESDP is mentioned in few places in these documents, it did not become a part of Latvian security policy. According to Ozalin¸a, Latvian security policy and the ESDP are not linked, and Latvia’s position on the ESDP is largely based on its scepticism regarding the EU’s ability to formulate and enact mechanisms to make ESDP effective. Finally, day-to-day management of the ESDP in Latvia is divided between the foreign and defence ministries (whereby the former deals with the implementation of political projects and the latter with their defence component), with the lack of coordination between these two effectively derailing any unity of effort. With regard to the contribution to the ESDP, besides participation in a battle group together with Germany, Poland, Slovakia and Lithuania, Latvia has

Hard questions about European defence

189

declared a warship, a military police unit and an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team for the EU Force Catalogue. These capabilities constitute part of a larger deployable force package that Latvia is obliged to develop. This package would consist of an infantry battalion with support and logistics components, military police platoon, EOD team and mine countermeasures (MCM) vessel, all capable of conducting the full range of NATO and ESDP missions. In terms of availability, one can plausibly assume that the German-coordinated project plan for the development of a multinational battlegroup would make sure these capabilities are developed in time and become available as planned. With regard to capabilities declared for the EU Force Catalogue the picture is darker, for Latvia officially pursues a ‘single force for two organizations’ policy, similar to that of Lithuania. As a consequence, all Latvian forces earmarked for international operations are double-hatted – for both NATO and EU operations. To sum up, the ESDP and its eventual efficiency are not highly regarded in the broader security policy of Latvia, the ESDP is not linked to the mainstream of Latvia’s security policy development and even the day-to-day management of the ESDP is divided between two ministries who seldom coordinate their actions. The highest priority, in terms of both the development of military capabilities and ad hoc decision-making, undoubtedly belongs to NATO. Capabilities earmarked for the EU are not combat but support capabilities; and even the availability of these is questionable due to doublehatting and the far higher priority of NATO in the case of conflicting requests. Lithuania An examination of Lithuania’s relationship with the ESDP, in Chapter 9 by Grazina Miniotaite, starts by looking at policy provisions. In Lithuania’s policy discourse, EU and NATO play different roles. The EU is treated as possessing civil power, based on peaceful promotion of democracy by trade, foreign aid and peacekeeping. NATO is seen as a provider of security based on military power. Lithuania sees the two powers as complementing each other. Since its accession to NATO and the EU, Lithuania’s policy has begun to split into a foreign/security policy component, associated with the EU’s ‘soft’ power in the form of an application of the ESS, and a defence policy component that has been developing as part of NATO defence policy. In this context, priority in the development of Lithuania’s armed forces has been given to the deployable infantry units for the full range of NATO-led operations. Lithuania supports the strengthening of the military dimension of the EU, but opposes duplication of NATO and EU military capabilities, hence seeing EU military capacity as a European pillar within NATO. While discussing the Lithuanian contribution to the ESDP, it should be noted that, in total, Lithuania has earmarked for international operations a battalion task group, a logistics battalion, a special operations squadron, some support units, as well as naval and air assets. Lithuania also participates

190

Jaan Murumets

in a battlegroup together with Germany, Poland, Slovakia and Latvia. In 2005 the total number of deployed military personnel was more than 380 troops; the share of EU-led operations was one officer in operation Althea. However, in terms of availability, Lithuanian defence policy fosters the principle of ‘a single force for two organizations’, meaning that the same units should be assigned to and used to fulfil the commitments of both NATO and the EU. In summary, for Lithuania the ESDP is perceived as an instrument of ‘soft’ power, complementing the ‘hard’ power of NATO (see Chapter 1, p. 7). With regard to the development of military capabilities, Lithuania generally supports the strengthening of the EU military instrument but opposes any duplication with NATO. Besides troops participating in a battlegroup, all other capabilities earmarked for international operations are double-hatted. With the high priority given to NATO, there is little doubt which of the organizations – NATO, the EU, UN or OSCE – would prevail if there were conflicting requests for additional capability.

Further questions The following section deals with some military aspects of the ESDP which are all too often overlooked at the political level of decision-making. Answers to these questions, however, have a substantial impact on the actual capabilities fielded in support of political decisions. In the end, capability gaps – the differences between required and existing capabilities – may undermine the whole strategic approach to the management of the crisis at hand. The political availability of capabilities has been examined from the perspective of competition between different consumers – homeland defence, NATO-led operations, UN peacekeeping and the like. No less important a feature of political availability is the time consumed by the internal decisionmaking process in every country. Obviously, there are established procedures to prepare and take decisions on the application of military force. In some countries it is the sole prerogative of the parliament, whereas in other countries it is left for the executive to decide. In the light of the EU ambition to launch an operation within fifteen days, it is relevant to look at the estimated standard time needed to process the request for action according to national procedures. Questions to be examined are the existence of procedural ‘shortcuts’ in times of crisis, pre-drafted parliamentary decisions or cabinet decrees, authority already delegated to ambassadors, collective decisionmaking bodies or international organizations, and other measures to speed up the decision-making process. The motto of this line of study could be formulated thus: ‘When at last it’s decided, isn’t it too late to deploy?’ The issue of technical availability of capabilities has already been addressed in terms of possibly conflicting requests to commit capabilities in support of different national and international missions. The level of readiness

Hard questions about European defence

191

of earmarked or assigned capabilities is another context for studying technical availability. The EU has clearly formulated its requirements: sixty days readiness for Headline Goal 2010 forces and ten days for a battlegroup. The question remains to what extent the actual state of readiness of earmarked or assigned capabilities complies with EU requirements. As a rule, information regarding states of readiness of active duty and reserve units is classified in every country, and this study will not breach such considerations. However, broader political guidance and decisions to assign particular units for particular missions, as well as, for instance, ceremonies on the occasion of declaring some units operational, are quite often in the realm of public information and could, therefore, be used as a valuable source to ascertain the probable level of readiness. The doctrinal basis of the EU military instrument underscores the key importance of deployability and sustainability of the forces assigned for EU disposal. The next set of questions tackles these very issues. Regarding deployability, questions should be asked about the presence of airlift and sealift capabilities. Have these been pre-identified? Are these capabilities owned by the military? Are they based on contracts with commercial carriers or pooled with partners or allies? For the battlegroups, the political guidance has established a sustainability requirement for thirty days, to be extended to 120 days if appropriately resupplied. In this respect, questions should be asked regarding whether this requirement can be met by national support capabilities in full or whether some nations have only limited support capability, closing the capability gap by pooling theirs with partners’ or allies’. Though the exact information on numbers, composition and performance of the lift assets and support capabilities could be classified, for the purposes of this study open sources like policy papers and public statements by defence officials and the military could provide sufficient data.

Conclusions Member states of the European Union have agreed that in order to implement the policy outlined in the European Security Strategy, including preventive engagement, the Union will need a military instrument of 60,000 troops deployable within sixty days and sustainable for one year. In addition, thirteen battalion-sized battlegroups, reinforced with air and naval assets as necessary, will be established to undertake a task of rapid reaction – to be able to implement their task no later than ten days from the EU decision to launch an operation. A defence planner would place the existing policy and guidance from the EU in these terms, or something close to them. This study has looked at seven countries in the Nordic–Baltic region – some of which are members of the EU and some not, some members of NATO and some non-aligned – in order to establish what place the ESDP occupies in the broader scope of their national security policies; what capabilities, if

192

Jaan Murumets

any, these countries have allocated to support the ESDP; and to what extent these declarations would survive the first contact with reality. Policy-wise, national approaches towards the ESDP range from ‘intellectual support but no material commitments’ (Denmark) and ‘troops-forinfluence’ (non-EU member Norway), through the Baltic Three, who make no secret of their trans-Atlantic preferences, to Sweden, which builds its security policy on ESDP but does not admit it, and Finland, which wholeheartedly supports and develops the ESDP. Interestingly enough, this array of policies does not reflect to a remarkable degree on national force allocations. All countries, with the exception of Denmark, whose position was earlier portrayed as a ‘semi-permanent opt-out’ (see Chapter 5, p. 88), have committed in support of the ESDP quite substantial forces compared to the overall strength of their respective military. These contributions consist of combat and support land force units, as well as select air and naval assets. All countries, again with the exception of Denmark, also participate in battlegroups (Finland in two of them). The common shortfall for all countries is the lack of strategic enablers – lift and ISTAR capabilities. Regarding the availability of earmarked and assigned capabilities, there will probably be no problems with the internationally organization and programmed development of the EU’s rapid reaction capability – the battlegroups. With the earmarked forces the situation is different. Only Finland has adjusted its national legislation and procedures to make decision-making on launching an EU operation as quick as possible. Sweden does not have a policy of prioritizing between UN-, EU- or NATOled operations, and each operation needs therefore to be thoroughly discussed and decided individually. All three Baltic countries are pursuing a ‘NATO first’ policy, and Norway has established a firm requirement for a UN resolution before it will consider deploying its forces under the EU lead. As if the situation is not convoluted enough with national decisionmaking priorities (or lack of them) and caveats, it is even more complicated by the fact that all capabilities countries in the region listed in the EU Force Catalogue are double-, triple- or even quadruple-hatted. That is to say that the same forces are declared for NATO, UN or regional crisis management besides the EU. In the end, then, there is no assurance that in the case of conflicting requests the EU will prevail and receive the capabilities it needs. The overall conclusion is rather grim: despite seemingly broad political support for the ESDP, the capabilities allocated to make the ESDP a reality are very limited. From the EU’s perspective, besides the three battlegroups to which the Nordic and Baltic countries belong (and in the case of the Nordic Battlegroup, which will become operational only every third year), the larger pool of Nordic–Baltic forces on which to draw is burdened by different clauses and caveats to the extent that these forces are virtually unavailable.

11 The ESDP and Northern Europe Conclusions and projections Clive Archer

Introduction This book has considered what contribution the northern states of Europe – in this context the Nordic and Baltic states – can make to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and what the ESDP means for them. As has been shown by the various national chapters, there is a degree of variety in both aspects for each of the states. This chapter will consider any overall patterns, and variations, and will also include material from interviews with those dealing with the issues. First, some consideration will be given to the nature of the ESDP, especially as reflected in the chapters in this book. It is the various perceptions of this nature that alter the utility of the policy, and its institutions, for Northern Europe.

The nature of the ESDP In particular, the ESDP is a policy, with a set of institutions, that exists at three levels: the international, the European Union (EU) and the national. It is engaged at the international level and therefore has been subject to some of the major changes that have taken place at that level, especially since the policy was fleshed out in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. In many ways, the development of the ESDP has reflected the last conflict in the minds of the key decision-makers. At the time of the St Malo meeting, when the French president and British prime minister pressed ahead with the idea of a European policy that ‘must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces . . . in order to respond to international crises’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1998), the experience of the Balkans was fresh in their minds. The dependence on US air power in the Kosovo operation, and American reluctance to place troops on the ground, led the European powers to push ahead with the institutionalizing of St Malo quite quickly from 1999 to 2001. Likewise the European Security Strategy seems a response to the events of 9/11 and also the United States’ own strategy. The move to battlegroups reflects to some extent the relative success of the French-led ESDP operation in the Democratic Republic of

194

Clive Archer

Congo (DRC) in 2003. In other words, world events have played an important role in setting up the opportunities for ESDP action but also in shaping the response of the major decision-makers behind the policy. By its very name the ESDP is a policy of the European Union. It is also part of a wider set of policies, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), though the relationship to that is not always clear. In theory, the ESDP should be one of the instruments that implements the CFSP, and it should fit in, not only with other instruments such as diplomacy, but also with national foreign, security and defence policies. Especially since the events of 9/11, the CFSP and ESDP have been meant to work closely with the justice and home affairs aspect of the European Union, especially when dealing with issues of international terrorism (Gnesotto 2004: 29–30). In practice, there are a number of opportunities for disjointedness. The ESDP also involves several institutions, intergovernmental and transgovernmental in nature, which nevertheless are Brussels-based and offer the opportunity to Europeanize national participants and policies. The policy has, during the 2000s, involved actions by member states that have necessitated cooperation in what is, after all, one of the very basic activities of the nationstate, defence and security. This in itself presents other opportunities for change. It also means that there is a rich vein of transnational activity that could possibly involve certain aspects of Europeanization, in particular the change in attitude of national representatives involved in regular meetings in Brussels, and the moulding of national policies to contribute to the formulation of ESDP and also to suit the emerging trend of the policy. Such a trend can be seen in the number of agreed statements associated with the ESDP, with the most important being the European Security Strategy. These documents provide some indication of the intentions and aspirations of the ESDP. While the ESDP is a European Union policy, it is one that is firmly based on intergovernmental agreement. It is therefore necessary to understand the national inputs to such a policy and also the response of the EU member states to the policy’s development. The importance of the United Kingdom and France in lifting the policy from the pages of diplomatic agreements and allowing it life cannot be overestimated. However, other EU states, not least some of those covered in this volume, have also made their contributions. How, and why these seven states fit in to the ESDP, or stand out from it, will now be considered.

Northern Europe and the ESDP: politics, resources and ideas As was mentioned in Chapter 1 (see pp. 4–9), consideration will now be given to the Northern European states and ESDP under three main headings, those of politics, resources and ideas. In order to examine where the Northern European countries fit in to the ESDP (if at all), the policy itself should be examined under these headings in the light of previous chapters.

The ESDP and Northern Europe

195

The politics of the ESDP involves a consideration of its nature. It was a relative newcomer on the defence and security scene in Europe at a time (the 1990s) when there were already a number of institutions and arrangements there dealing with security: NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN) being the major ones. Any new set-up would have to find ‘territory to occupy’ if it was to survive. At the start, there did not seem to be such common ground among the EU’s members and even in the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations it seemed that it might just take over the area newly, and fairly unsuccessfully, adopted by the WEU, that of the Petersberg tasks. These activities were seen as necessary after the negative experience of involvement in former Yugoslavia had shown the EU states that something was needed between traditional UN peacekeeping and the harsh application of US air power. An opportunity had opened up with one of the negative events at the end of the Cold War, but it took some manoeuvring in the form of the Finnish–Swedish initiative and a change in government in London to bring about a willingness to accept even the modest transposition of the Petersberg tasks from the WEU to the EU. As shown by the chapters on Sweden (Chapter 3) and Finland (Chapter 4), both governments were keen to remain under the EU helmet on security matters and also saw their initiative as a positive contribution to the EU by new members. The two Nordic states thus made a crucial contribution to what came to be regarded as a very important part of the EU’s development. The events in the Balkans provided further opportunities for the creation of a space for a security vehicle that was not successfully being occupied in 1998–9. The St Malo meeting and the EU meetings from the Po¨rtschach defence ministers’ meeting to the Helsinki European Council demonstrated that there was a willingness to develop the ESDP into something operational. Both Sweden and Finland were strongly in favour of such moves and Finland played its role, acting as an efficient midwife to the Helsinki Headline Goals. The adoption of these goals and the creation of ESDP institutions provided a sort of bureaucratic momentum to the ESDP. From 2000 onwards there were posts and individuals in Brussels whose task was to ensure the achievement of the Headline Goals and to enhance the development of the ESDP. Again, both Swedes and Finns were active in this advanced echelon: Gustav Ha¨gglund of Finland was the first head of the EU Military Committee, and one of the chapter authors in this book – Lars Wedin of Sweden – was one of the first uniformed officers working in the EU buildings. The Nordic states have been particularly active in two other developments within the ESDP. The first of those has been the move towards battlegroups. A key element in the development of these battlegroups was that they were not going to be purely national. They would have to be either based on previous cooperation or created from scratch. This presented the

196

Clive Archer

Nordic states with a dilemma, both individually and collectively. The two countries that were most used to pooling their troop resources were the NATO members Denmark and Norway. Norway had seen its armed forces work closely with those from other NATO states (Archer and Sogner 1998: 103–5) and Danish troops had been under a NATO unified command with those from the Federal Republic of Germany. As far as Sweden and Finland were concerned, their cooperative efforts had been through UN peacekeeping, Nordic cooperation in that area and working with NATO in former Yugoslavia. The latter experience had convinced the leadership in the two countries that to be effective in international operations they had to integrate more with other NATO states. However, their policies of nonmembership of alliances limited the security integration opportunities to such operations as the NATO-led Implementation Force (Bosnia) (IFOR)/ the NATO Stabilization Force (former Yugoslavia) (SFOR) or to Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises. ESDP battlegroups opened up a new opportunity to cooperate hand-in-glove with NATO states of their choice under a political umbrella very much of their own making, yet keeping national control. This had the added advantage of supporting an aspect of the EU that they wished to enhance, the Petersberg tasks. For Norway, being part of a Nordic Battlegroup had the advantage of tying together three elements of its security policy. It built on NATO resources, not least if the battlegroup was headquartered in the United Kingdom, it had a Nordic element (though with Estonia and without Denmark) and it gave Norway a firmer footing within the practice of ESDP, albeit as a non-EU member. The other area of Nordic activity has been the development of the civil– military aspects of the ESDP. When first introduced, this was seen as a Swedish proposal and indeed the stress on civilian aspects, especially in crisis planning, is a common strand in the Nordic states (see, for example, Christensen 1983). With the Asian tsunami of December 2004, bomb explosions in Madrid and London and the effects of increasingly extreme weather throughout the whole of Europe, the need for civilian crisis planning on a scale beyond the national became more obvious. This is also an area that allows for Danish participation, as long as it does not involve military decisions, as was pointed out in Chapter 5 (see pp. 87–8). The Baltic states’ engagement with the ESDP came later than that of Sweden and Finland. Furthermore, as shown by the three Baltic national chapters in this book (Chapters 7, 8 and 9), their approach has been different. For them, there was little security ground that could be occupied that should not have the NATO flag on it. This meant that the move towards an autonomous European defence system ‘has had a lukewarm reception’ in these states, as mentioned by Miniotaite in the case of Lithuania (see Chapter 9, p. 168). Their Atlanticism has been strong and clear and they have viewed the ESDP as being more about ‘soft’ security than defence. There has been what Ozalin¸a (p. 121) called ‘the institutional division of policy in the security sector’: internal bureaucratic configurations have suggested that

The ESDP and Northern Europe

197

the ESDP has been left to rather reluctant foreign ministries. However, it does seem from Chapter 8 that Estonia has managed to overcome this gap between a Defence Ministry that dealt with NATO and a Foreign Ministry that led on the ESDP (see pp. 143–4). Indeed, it is noticeable that Estonia was also prepared to join up with its Finnish ‘big brother’ in the Nordic Battlegroup. The ESDP has been about the opening up of a political space in the security scenery of Europe. That has needed both opportunities for action and a willingness to occupy the space. In terms of the politics of the development of ESDP operations, it seems that both Finland and Sweden have politically ‘punched above their weight’ both in the original decision to include the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty and in the creation of a Nordic Battlegroup. The Baltic states have had neither the ability nor the inclination to make a meaningful addition to the politics of the ESDP, and their involvement so far on the military side has been ‘merely symbolic’, to use Miniotaite’s words (see p. 172). However, they have signalled an interest in an active ESDP by contribution to the battlegroups, perhaps inspired by what Ma¨nnik (p. 153) describes as ‘the task of avoiding becoming marginalized’, a theme seen in Norwegian ministerial speeches (see pp. 101–7). Chapter 10 includes material from the national chapters and other information about the resources available to any ESDP operation from the Northern states of Europe. It is clear that these are not big contributors like the UK, France or Germany. Perhaps only Sweden can enter the tail end of a second group, led by Italy and Spain and including the Netherlands and Poland (Schmitt 2004: 104–8). All the others have relatively little to offer, with the Baltic states constrained by their very small populations, as well as any political factors, already noted. Indeed Murumets concludes Chapter 10 on a ‘grim’ note that ‘the larger pool of Nordic–Baltic forces on which to draw is burdened by different clauses and caveats to the extent that these forces are virtually unavailable’ (p. 192). It is difficult to dispute this conclusion, based as it is on the hard facts of contributions. Nevertheless, some mitigating circumstances may be entered. First, the battlegroups are still, at the start of 2007, in the making, and the Nordic–Baltic involvement is no worse than that of other EU members and possibly, in the case of Sweden, Finland and Estonia, better than that of other similar-sized member states (Schmitt 2004: 104–8). In the actual operations under the ESDP flag, Finland, Norway and, maybe, Estonia have made contributions perhaps above their size (see Table 11.1b). By January 2004 the five Nordic states were contributing 56 of the 529 personnel in EU Police Mission (Bosnia-Herzegovina) (EUPM) (just over 10 per cent), 29 of the 357 personnel in Concordia in 2003 (about 8 per cent) and Sweden was the second largest contributor to Operation Artemis in 2003 (Lindstrom 2004: 112–17). Considering that Denmark, Finland and Sweden only provided 2.6 per cent of the EU’s deployed armed forces in

198

Clive Archer

2003 (Schmitt 2004: 110) and that Denmark did not contribute to the military operations, it would seem that the Nordic states alone have made an ‘above par’ contribution to the ESDP. This has reflected a common satisfaction among these states – even in Norway, which has less of an institutional tie to the ESDP (see Chapter 6) – with the sort of operation that has been undertaken under the ESDP banner. The Nordic states have also not been so obviously burdened here with caveats and clauses as Murumets (Chapter 10) noted about their commitments to the battlegroups. Second, the Nordic effort is undermined by Denmark’s position, explained in Chapter 5. However, while the Danes do not contribute to the military side of the ESDP, they do make an input to the civilian side and they make an important contribution to other peacekeeping and similar activities which, though outside the ESDP, help to contribute to the general aims of the EU. Third, the contribution is perhaps greater than might have been expected when the Finns and Swedes joined the EU. While the two promised not to interfere with the development of the ESDP, few considered that they would make much of a contribution to that particular part of the EU. Swedish and Finnish diplomatic involvement in building the foundations of the ESDP has been matched by contributions to operations (see Chapters 3 and 4). The Baltic states have had less of an opportunity to become involved in the resources of the EU and, with the possible exception of Estonia, have devoted what military (and diplomatic) resources they have to NATO- and US-led operations. Some comparisons of the raw statistics of the Nordic and Baltic states’ commitments to the military side of ESDP perhaps show the intricacies of the situation. In the pre-ESDP forces period (see Table 11.1a) deployments were fairly straightforward. All the Nordic states had serious UN commitments and the two NATO states had sizeable numbers of troops involved in NATO-led operations, as did the three NATO candidate Baltic states. Using two other states for comparison, Slovakia, which became a NATO member at the same time as the Baltic states, placed its eggs in the UN basket, a reflection of internal politics; Switzerland, a neutral state that had just joined the UN, made a modest contribution to the UN and to the Korean observer group, but nowhere else. The deployment of forces in 2006 shows a picture complicated by more opportunities (Iraq, two sets of operations in Afghanistan and EU operations) but also a change in willingness among the countries involved. Finland and Norway have seemingly shifted forces from the UN to the EU banner, and this partly reflects the EU establishment of EUFOR (European Union Force) Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also a drawing down of Nordic forces in Macedonia and the removal of troops from the United Nations Interim Force in the Lebanon (UNIFIL) by both states. The three non-NATO states of Finland, Sweden and Switzerland are fully engaged in NATO-led operations in Afghanistan and Serbia and Montenegro, but are more than matched by the contributions by the NATO states in Table 11.1.

The ESDP and Northern Europe

199

Denmark and the countries of ‘New Europe’ have made a sizeable contribution to the US-led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of the group covered, Finland and Sweden, two non-NATO states, are the largest contributors, by far, to EU military operations. Furthermore, a comparison of the two periods shows that, while in 1998 Norway and Denmark had signed up to the peacebuilding operation of SFOR/IFOR, by 2006 Denmark had accepted a more interventionist role in Iraq and both had been engaged in war conditions in Afghanistan. The Baltic states also provided forces for both operations. The range in terms of ‘hardness’ of operations undertaken by the NATO members had been extended, primarily as a response to the ‘war on terror’. Although this is a snapshot that has changed and will continue to alter, the figures reflect what has been said in the national chapters and also show that there are national shades of ‘grimness’ when it comes to contributions by the Nordic and Baltic states to the ESDP’s military side. On ideas, the varied nature of the term ‘security’ was noted in Chapter 1 (see pp. 7–8). The security offered by the ESDP in both conceptual and everyday terms reflects this nature and attempts to engage with it. In conceptual terms, having a ‘security and defence policy’ lays bare a supposed distinction. Is defence taken to be the military aspect of the wider concept of security (which could also include ‘offence’)? This would be close to what traditionalists considered should be covered by the term ‘security’ anyhow: the role of military force (Walt 1991: 222), with perhaps the economic and diplomatic infrastructure needed to support it. Yet the history of the ESDP depended on a distinction between defence policy, which could not be discussed in the European Communities or even the parallel structures of European Political Cooperation, and ‘security’, which could. Indeed, the EC states formed a caucus within the OSCE in the 1980s and took a common approach to what were regarded as security issues. In the Maastricht Treaty defence policy seemed to be a sub-set of security policy, which in itself was harnessed to foreign policy in the phrase ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’. After all, the new Union was to ‘include all questions related to the security of the European Union’ but ‘including the eventual framing of a common defence policy’ (Article J.4.1). This left EU defence policy unformed and subject to future action. The Nordic states have had a longer experience of melding defence and security as concepts. Even in the Cold War period, countries such as Denmark and Sweden took a comprehensive view of security, much more inclusive than that advocated by Walt. This tended to be not so much a theoretical construct (though some Nordic writers such as Nils Andre´n (1972) conceptualized it thus), but more a matter of practice. Security was rooted in the nation and was not just a matter to be left to the military. It not only involved military defence but also included the diplomatic effort, the wider public services and the economy generally. There was also a ‘minor key’ in the varied defence and security policies of the Nordic states in the Cold War that can be typified by the terms comprehensive and

200

Clive Archer

cooperative security. This was the effort by those states to lower tension in their region and to build bridges across the divide of the East and West. In the post-Cold War period, there was an attempt by the Nordic states to transfer some of their security thinking to the Baltic states, and this met with some limited success (Archer 1999). The notions of cooperative and comprehensive security were passed over the Baltic Sea, and the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) was built with Nordic assistance to participate in peacekeeping operations and to bring together the armed forces of the three states. However, this seems to have represented a high point of both Baltic military cooperation and commitment to peacekeeping as such. The three Baltic states have gone their own way in the battlegroups, and, as shown by Chapters 7, 8 and 9, have been interested in the hard defence of NATO more than the softer version of the ESDP. Nevertheless, there have been detectable shifts in the security discourse in the Baltic states, with new Latvian and Lithuanian approaches to the security of their ‘neighbourhood’ and Estonia changing the way it speaks about security matters in the 2000s. A further important aspect of the ESDP is the way that it is changing attitudes, especially of the elites, in the Baltic and Nordic countries in a form of Europeanization.1 This has been mentioned in a number of chapters, Table 11.1 Nordic and Baltic deployments abroad Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Estonia Latvia Lithuania Switzerland Slovakia

a. 1998 UN 87* operations

709

670

114

–

–

–

4*

35

UN 31 observers

24

18

34

1

–

–

18

3

NATO