Nested Games of External Democracy Promotion

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Rainer Thiel Nested Games of External Democracy Promotion

Rainer Thiel

Nested Games of External Democracy Promotion The United States and the Polish Liberalization 1980 –1989

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.

Zugl. Dissertation an der Freien Universität Berlin, 2009

1st Edition 2010 All rights reserved © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH 2010 Editorial Office: Dorothee Koch / Tanja Köhler VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften is a brand of Springer Fachmedien. Springer Fachmedien is part of Springer Science+Business Media. www.vs-verlag.de No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Registered and/or industrial names, trade names, trade descriptions etc. cited in this publication are part of the law for trade-mark protection and may not be used free in any form or by any means even if this is not specifically marked. Cover design: KünkelLopka Medienentwicklung, Heidelberg Print and binding: STRAUSS GMBH, Mörlenbach Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany ISBN 978-3-531-17769-4

Acknowledgements

This publication is a revised version of the PhD dissertation that I submitted at the Freie Universität Berlin in February 2008 and defended in June 2009. I gratefully acknowledge financial support received in the form of a PhD scholarship from the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes (German National Academic Foundation), which also covered my research in the United States. In Berlin, most of all I would like to thank my supervisor Eberhard Sandschneider. Even though he was at the time on leave from the Otto Suhr Institute for Political Science, he encouraged me to pursue my dissertation and gave me the opportunity to complete my thesis. Over the course of years, his great enthusiasm and trust in my capacity and skills were constant motivators – which, as the life of a Stipendiat, has its particular meaningfulness. During his time at Heidelberg University, Wolfgang Merkel kindly accepted the role of my second supervisor, and eventually became an external member of my PhD commission (from Humboldt University Berlin). His critical remarks were much appreciated, and his truly supportive and pleasant manner facilitated this thesis’ completion to a large degree. The dissertation profited from the invaluable comments by Dirk Leuffen. He not only commented on large parts of the thesis, but helped shape and formulate the ultimate research design – my most sincere thanks. I owe many thanks to Thomas Sattler for commenting on the design of my model and to Manuel Schmitz for proof-reading key sections – and providing an anchor to the nonformal world of political science. Without Stefan Petri’s excellent coaching, this lengthy enterprise might not have proceeded as smoothly as it had. His time management consulting and coaching support were of immense significance, especially considering the degree of freedom both my supervisor Eberhard Sandschneider and the Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes granted me. Helpful were the comments of the discussants at the research colloquium of Wolfgang Merkel at Heidelberg University, the participants in three PhD colloquia of the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes, and in the postgraduate Conference on Central and Eastern Europe, University College London. In Washington, D.C., I am grateful for the assistance and comments of the following individuals: to Helga Flores-Trejo, for hosting me as guest researcher at the Heinrich Böll Foundation, special thanks; to Thomas Carothers from the

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Acknowledgments

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for sharing with me some of his unmatched knowledge about democracy promotion; to Carl Gershman from the National Endowment for Democracy for providing me with internal documents; to Marc Plattner, Michael Szporer, Michael Domber, and Vojtech Mastny for lengthy discussions about democracy and Poland; and finally to Zerxes Spencer for having made my stay in Washington, D.C., as always, a real pleasure. Radek Sikorski recommended that I read Nathan Sharonski’s book about how he survived psycho-torturing KGB interrogations by applying game theory in his mind. This book truly inspired the pursuit of this thesis, both theoretically and historically. Arch Puddington provided me with a personal copy of his then unpublished biography about Lane Kirkland; Ronald Bachman at the US Library of Congress offered excellent research guidance on Poland. I am much obliged to Ambassador John R. Davis Jr for having received me for an interview at his home in Charlottesville, VA. During the final draft, the Europa Library at the University of Edinburgh provided me with an outstanding workspace. Much of the reasoning behind this book emerged into a full picture in Edinburgh. I also wish to thank my interviewees for their interest in my research topic, for providing me with documents and sharing their insights with me. Yet I alone am responsible for any errors of fact and of the opinions expressed herefrom. My wife Ana did not only read the entire manuscript, safeguarding a spotless text, and improving my English, but she also deserves the sole credit for this work having ultimately come to completion. Without her unlimited support and energy this lengthy and, at times, troublesome enterprise could have taken a very different road. Words are not sufficient to express my gratitude. My sincere and special thanks finally goes to my father, Richard Thiel, without whom neither my entire studies nor the idea and realisation of this work would have been possible. This book is devoted to them both.

Rainer Thiel Bonn, January 2010

Contents

List of Figures and Tables .................................................................................. 13 List of Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. 15 1 Regime Transitions and External Democracy Promotion....................... 17 1.1

Research Design and Summary of the Argument ............................. 18

1.2

The Nested Games Model................................................................. 21

1.3

Central Contribution ......................................................................... 26

1.4

Outline .............................................................................................. 33

2 The International Dimension of Regime Change ..................................... 35 2.1

Domestic Causes of Regime Transitions .......................................... 36

2.2

International Framework................................................................... 39 2.2.1 The Internationalist Argument ............................................... 40 2.2.2 Outside Conditions: Diffusion Effects, Contagion and Socialization........................................................................... 43

2.3

External Democracy Promotion........................................................ 45 2.3.1 Strategies, Instruments and Targets........................................ 45 2.3.2 Democracy Promotion versus Democracy Protection............ 50

2.4

Quantifying International Factors ..................................................... 52

2.5

Democratization and International Relations Theories..................... 54 2.5.1 International Organizations and Domestic Politics ................ 54 2.5.2 Uncertainty and Crises: Deterring Authoritarian Repression ....................................... 58

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Contents

3 Strategic Transitions................................................................................... 63 3.1

The Positional School ....................................................................... 64 3.1.1 Transition Politics as Rational Choice ................................... 64 3.1.2 Formal Theories of Democratization ..................................... 68 3.1.3 A Question of Life and Death? Uncertainty about Government Repression............................ 74

3.2

Transitions as Distributional Conflict: The Economic School.......... 78

3.3

Rationality and Democratization Actors........................................... 80 3.3.1 Why Game Theory? ............................................................... 80 3.3.2 Rationality and its Critiques................................................... 83 3.3.3 Limitations ............................................................................. 86

4 Nested Games of External Influence on Strategic Regime Transition ... 91 4.1

Modeling the International Dimension ............................................. 92 4.1.1 Internal-External Linkages: Scope of Theory and Analysis... 92 4.1.2 Constructing Games ............................................................... 96 4.1.3 Basic Assumptions of the Nested Games Approach ............ 100

4.2

Regime, Opposition, and Foreign Power ........................................ 106 4.2.1 Principal Arena I: Game of Transition ................................. 106 4.2.2 Principal Arena II: Outcomes............................................... 112 4.2.3 International Arena I: Foreign Pressure Game ..................... 117 4.2.4 International Arena II: Outcomes......................................... 122

4.3

Nested Games of Transition and Foreign Pressure ......................... 130 4.3.1 Formalization ....................................................................... 130 4.3.2 Discussion and Interpretation............................................... 138

Contents

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4.4

The Model’s Implications and Generating of Hypotheses.............. 146 4.4.1 Preference Change of the Regime ........................................ 147 4.4.2 Weighing the Games ............................................................ 149 4.4.3 Temporal Dimension............................................................ 153 4.4.4 Impact on the Opposition and the Democracy Promotion Dilemma ............................................................. 154 4.4.5 Summary .............................................................................. 158

5 Methodology .............................................................................................. 161 5.1

Empirical Research Design............................................................. 161

5.2

Case Selection................................................................................. 167

5.3

Data Basis ....................................................................................... 172

5.4

Structure of the Empirical Part ....................................................... 176

6 U.S. Democracy Assistance in the Polish Liberalization Process, 1980-1989 ................................................................................................... 179 6.1

The United States Policy Toward Poland ....................................... 180

6.2

Poland’s Path to the Round Table Negotiations ............................. 185 6.2.1 The Birth of Solidarity, Strikes, and Martial Law, 1980-1981................................................ 185 6.2.2 Underground and Ostensible Stability, 1982-1988 .............. 187 6.2.3 Induction and Negotiations of the Round Table, 1988-1989 ............................................................................ 192

6.3

Supporting Solidarity...................................................................... 194 6.3.1 Sustaining the Underground................................................. 195 6.3.2 Communications and Propaganda ........................................ 199 6.3.3 The Logistics of External Influence ..................................... 202 6.3.4 Advice and Influence on Opposition Strategy...................... 206 6.3.5 How to Elect Jaruzelski without Voting for him? ................ 212

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Contents

6.4

Pressuring the Jaruzelski Regime ................................................... 216 6.4.1 Sanctions as Policy Instrument ............................................ 216 6.4.2 The Post-Martial Law Sanctions Regime............................. 219

6.5

Sub-Actors and Mechanisms of Democracy Promotion in Poland ... 222 6.5.1 National Endowment for Democracy................................... 222 6.5.2 Waging Underground Political Warfare: The CIA............... 227 6.5.3 A Foreign Service of Its Own: The AFL-CIO...................... 230 6.5.4 Department of State and USIA............................................. 233

7 Correspondence between Theory and Facts ........................................... 237 7.1

Effect on Communist Regime......................................................... 237

7.2

Effect on Solidarity......................................................................... 242 7.2.1 Professionalizing the Underground ...................................... 243 7.2.2 Underground Press ............................................................... 244 7.2.3 Morale Boosting................................................................... 246

7.3

Costs of Repression ........................................................................ 250 7.3.1 Impact of Opposition Assistance on the Regime’s Cost Structure............................................ 250 7.3.2 Timeline: Nested Costs of Authoritarianism........................ 253

7.4

Strategy Shifts and Trajectories of External Influence ................... 255 7.4.1 Repression 1981 ................................................................... 257 7.4.2 Opening 1986....................................................................... 257 7.4.3 Negotiations 1988/1989 ....................................................... 260 7.4.4 The Juncture of Jaruzelski’s Election to President in 1989.. 262

8 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 265 8.1

Democracy Promotion as Nested Games........................................ 266

8.2

Key Implications for External Democracy Promotion.................... 271

8.3

Future Research .............................................................................. 275

Contents

11

Bibliography.................................................................................................... 281 Appendix 1: Derivations Repeated Play of Non-nested Games ....................... 311 Appendix 2: Derivations of Nested Game with Varying Frequencies.............. 315 Appendix 3: List of Interviews ......................................................................... 317

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Figure 2: Figure 3: Figure 4: Figure 5: Figure 6: Figure 7: Figure 8: Figure 9: Figure 10: Figure 11: Figure 12: Figure 13:

Table 1: Table 2: Table 3: Table 4: Table 5: Table 6: Table 7: Table 8: Table 9: Table 10: Table 11:

Przeworski’s Model of Political Liberalization........................... 72 Internal-External Linkage in Regime Changes ........................... 94 Simple Tripartite Interaction ..................................................... 102 Nested Games Approach........................................................... 103 Simple Two-Level Game .......................................................... 103 Strong and Weak Degree of Pressure by the External Actor .... 118 Changing of Preference Structure in Transition Game ............. 137 Development of Reform and Discount Factor .......................... 142 Asymmetry of Frequencies in Foreign Pressure Game ............. 144 The General Theory’s Chain of Causality................................. 145 Timeline Correspondence of U.S. Sanctions with Regime Moves .................................................................. 241 Effect of U.S. Move on Regime’s Cost Structure ..................... 252 Timeline Nested Costs of Authoritarianism and Level of k ...... 254

Scope of Theory and Analysis .................................................... 30 Generic Payoff Matrix Transition Game................................... 111 Numeric Payoff Matrix Transition Game ................................. 112 Instruments of the External Actor’s Moves .............................. 120 Generic Payoff Matrix Foreign Pressure Game ........................ 122 Numerical Payoff Matrix Foreign Pressure Game .................... 122 Costs of Suppression and Costs of Toleration........................... 125 Numeric Payoff Matrix Transition Game with Updated Preference Structure ........................................... 137 Financial Aid Funneled through Solidarity Office Abroad ....... 198 Empirical Indicators for Morale Boosting................................. 249 Effect of U.S. Move Strong Pressure and Testable Implications ......................................................... 251

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFL-CIO C3I

American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence

CC

Central Committee

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CPSU

Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CSCE/OSCE

Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe/ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

DGB EC

(Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) Federation of German Trade Unions European Community

EU

Expected Utility

EU

European Union

FPG

Foreign Pressure Game

FTUI

Free Trade Union Institute

GAO

General Accounting Office

GDR

German Democratic Republic

IDEA

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

IDEE

Institute of Democracy in Eastern Europe

IGO

International Governmental Organization

IMF

International Monetary Fund

INGO

International Non-governmental Organization

IPA

International Polish Agency

KGB

(Komitet Gossudarstwennoy Besopasnosti) Committee for State Security, Russian Intelligence Service

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

KOR

(Komitet Obrony Robotników) Workers’ Defence Committee

KPN MFN

(Konfederacja Polski Niepodlegej) Confederation for an Independent Poland Most-favored-nation (Status)

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NED

National Endowment for Democracy

NGO

Non-governmental Organization

NSC

National Security Council

NSDD

National Security Decision Document

NSZZ “S”

(Niezaleny Samorzdny Zwizek Zawodowy “Solidarno”) Solidarity Independent Self-governing Trade Union

ODIHR

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

OKNO

(Owiata, Kultura, Nauka) Education, Culture, Science

OKP OSS

(Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny) Citizens’ Parliamentary Club Office of Strategic Services

PAC

Polish-American Congress

PO

Payoff

PZPR RFE

(Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza) Polish United Workers’ Party Radio Free Europe

SB

(Suba Bezpieczestwa) Security Service

TASS TG

(Telegrafnoe Agentstwo Sowjetskowo Sojusa) Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union Transition Game

TKK NSZZ “S” USAID

(Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna NSZZ “Solidarno”) Temporary Commission of Coordination NSZZ “Solidarno” United States Agency for International Development

USIA

United States Information Agency

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VoA

Voice of America

1 Regime Transitions and External Democracy Promotion

Promoting democracy has become a foreign policy goal for all major Western democracies. Its effects are expected to improve international security, create regional stability, protect human rights and contribute to economic development. Some of the dominating issues of present world politics relate more or less directly to external democratization. To mention only a few: military intervention in Iraq was legitimized as a democratic intervention, with unforeseen consequences; in Kosovo, the European Union will govern a de facto protectorate and is tasked with institution- and nation-building; failed states (e.g. Afghanistan, Sudan, Pakistan, ex-Yugoslavia) and their consequent resistance to rule of law have long been identified as the harbor of organized crime and terrorism. For some, however, promoting democracy from abroad is just another experiment by “international ‘mad scientists.’”1 The range of opinions whether democracy assistance programs work after all is as wide as is the scope of the diverse international factors that is assumed to be helping democracies to emerge and to last. The most optimistic write manuals such as “How to oust the world’s last dictators by 2025” (Palmer 2003). More nuanced critics of the “mad science” theory argue that efforts at democracy building are probably futile (Dalpino 2000) or even counterproductive (Kumar 1998). Academic attention to the issue of transition and longevity of democracies centers chiefly on identifying conditions that lead to the emergence of democracy. Research accounting for how democratic institutions historically varied and how different they are from one country to the next have a long tradition. The most prominent effort is Lipset’s (1959) “social requisites” hypothesis, which governed Western development aid policies for decades. Lipset argues that a society’s level of development influences its prospects for democracy. All dominant explanations in the democratization literature differ considerably from each other. These works suggest quite different ideas as to why some countries be1

Lawson (1999: 23). Published in the area studies journal Commonwealth and Comparative Politics.

R. Thiel, Nested Games of External Democracy Promotion, DOI 10.1007/ 978-3-531-92606-3_1, © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH 2010

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come stable democracies while others are caught up in authoritarianism (for a comprehensive review, see for example Vanhanen 1990; Merkel 1999; Stein Ugelvik 2000). Despite their differences, the explanations all have one common starting point: they relate a country’s necessary conditions for democratization and consolidating democratic rule to domestic economic, societal and political factors. Unfortunately for practitioners of democracy promotion, the weight assigned to international factors in the democratization process is quite meager. The prevailing belief among the seminal publications until the 1990s was that external actors play an indirect and usually a marginal role (Schmitter 1986: 5). With the lack of the study of international factors for the prospects of democracy, neither activists nor researchers would know what role forces outside a country would play in democratization. How to best achieve democracy, how to oppose dictatorships in the first place (apart from military intervention), which instruments, tools, and measures are most promising – in sum: what are the consequences of external democracy promotion – is relatively ambiguous. Subsequent to the Eastern European revolutions, more and more scholars have focused their interests towards international factors. The realization took place that a host of international or transnational forces are simultaneously affecting how people act (Pye 1990) and that it is hard to believe that foreign influences of one kind or another have not affected the survival of authoritarian governments (Geddes 2002; Whitehead 1996). Studies focusing on the international dimension have at this stage been published for most regions of the world, but this literature has not proposed core theories or general findings about how international factors are associated with the transition and consolidation of democracy. The lack of analytical attention itself is still truly surprising. One could turn to broader theories of international relations for help. But the majority of the internal-external linkage literature has focused on the effects of international institutions on international outcomes (Keohane 1984). The body of literature that does focus on domestic ramifications only deals with established Western democracies (Milner 1997; Drezner 2003). In the end, neither scholars nor policy-makers can turn to theoretical or empirical research when asking questions related to the emergence or stability of democracy around the globe.

1.1 Research Design and Summary of the Argument The purpose of this study is to fill the gap by contributing a theoretical model that can evaluate the association between a foreign power promoting democracy

1.1 Research Design and Summary of the Argument

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and regime transition2. The proposition developed and tested here is that external democracy promotion by a foreign power can facilitate transitions to democracy. This study (1) proposes a theory and develops a game-theoretic model that captures the political logic of external democracy promotion. It explains how a democratic power can influence the interaction between an authoritarian regime and a democratic opposition who are struggling over their most favored regime type; it (2) derives direct hypotheses and empirical implications from the model; and (3) tests the hypotheses with an empirical case study. In the case study, the influence United States democracy assistance had on the Polish liberalization process between 1980 and 1989 is reconstructed. The central question concerning international democracy promotion is whether domestic factors or international factors are more conducive for the development of democracy. Do external factors in general contribute to the level of democracy? If yes, how do they influence the politics of democratization? Ultimately, the relation between internal and external causes of democratization can be approached by simply inferring counterfactually what would have happened anyway without external support (Crawford 2002: 3). It is essential to first ask through which causal mechanisms an external actor impacts the transition path. The exposition of this process frames the central question of this study: What are the consequences of an external actor influencing the contingencies of action between a regime preferring the status quo dictatorship and an opposition fighting for democracy? When evaluating external democracy promotion, the focus can be either on particular actors who further democracy, on their instruments and measures, or on the concrete target of democratizing efforts. Moreover, the effect of democracy promotion depends on the country’s phase in the transition process. This study examines the effects the pressures and the support for democracy of an external actor have on the durability of authoritarian regimes. With respect to the external actor, the independent variable can be defined as an individual, aggregate actor outside the domestic and national process who attempts to interfere directly with the democratization process, but is unclear about the immediate or indirect consequences and effects of his actions. In an authoritarian country, democracy promotion actors can target government actors with diplomatic and economic pressure, and civil society with democratic sup-

2

Regime transition can be defined as the establishment of democratic institutions. Further, the distinction between government and regime is that the former concerns institutions, the latter relations between state institutions and civil society (see O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Merkel 1996: 10; Merkel 1999: 70).

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port including financial and material assistance, training, strategy advice, and public endorsements. As for the transition phase, democracy promotion matters most fundamentally when it brings down dictatorial regimes. For breaking the inertia of closed societies, the literature suggests that the countries need triggers like economic crisis (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 1996; Gasiorowski 1995), rapid economic growth (Huntington 1968), or splits in the ruling elite (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).3 In other words, regardless of external pressures for regime change, the country must first be primed for change. As absolute dictatorships are hard to penetrate and few local allies are available, the antecedents for a theory to be valid assume that the authoritarian country has opened to a certain degree and some signs of opposition formation have already emerged.4 The focus of this study is on the breakdown of authoritarian regimes, which can be defined by regime and opposition concluding a pact on democratic reform (Linz and Stepan 1996). More specifically, the dependent variable is political liberalization5. Liberalization can be defined as the extrication of the authoritarian regime from its dominant rule but does not necessarily have to include democratic transition (see also Dalpino 2000: 4). The research design is guided by asking the question as to what the effect of the external promotion of democracy is on the course of regime change. As priority is given to estimate the effect an external actor can produce, this study follows the so-called x-centered approach to research design (Ganghof 2005; Bennett and George 2005).6 Firstly, in order to estimate the effect, the relative weight between internal and external factors needs to be established. This is complicated by the fundamental problem of how to measure the effect of exter3

4

5

6

The problem of this literature is, however, that it is mixed as to how splits in the regime occur. O’Donnell and Schmitter argue that economic success causes the splits while for Gasiorowski (1995) economic crises trigger the split of the ruling coalition. Tilly (1997) belongs to a wider research context which claims, on the other hand, that democratic institutions are responsible for economic development (see also Sen 1999). For a discussion that hybrid regime types provide the best opportunity for international actors to make a political difference see Chapter 2.2.1. The term political liberalization refers to both the procedurally defined transition phase before democratization occurs and to the substantially defined breakdown of an authoritarian regime. First of all, in the literature, the term is frequently used interchangeably. Secondly, it can be argued that the end point of political liberalization as a phase is analytically very close to the extrication of the ancien régime. The x-centered approach allows an examination to focus on the effects the independent variable can produce, that is, the factor under investigation. It carries also the belief that scholars at first need a more strongly secured knowledge about precisely defined causal mechanisms before being able to arrive at credible answers to bigger questions.

1.2 The Nested Games Model

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nal factors. It is a particular challenge for a student of democratization to study a single actor who promotes democracy since many authors believe that, among all international factors, direct external democracy promotion plays the least important role, and that its success is similarly difficult to measure (see Sandschneider 2003). Recent treatments of democratization do identify pathways and propose necessary conditions for international factors but fall short of specifying causeeffect relations. Tilly (2000: 1) remarks therefore that “the next round of research and theory on democratization requires identification, verification, and connection of the relevant causal mechanisms”. By initially focusing on some of the underlying mechanisms with which outside intervention in the democratization process works, one can analyze what variables could be potentially useful for measurement. How can such causal mechanisms be investigated? Transitions are a time of flux, its causal mechanisms are characterized by “numerous surprises and difficult dilemmas of accident and unpredictability, of crucial decisions taken in a hurry with very inadequate information” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 3). Since at the basis of this “hurry” lie crucial decisions, an “interactive decision theory” (Aumann 1998) suggests itself for exploration, that is, game theory. When employing this formal methodology of rational choice theory, the study hopes to conceptualize the intuition that strategizing and decision dilemma lie at the heart of a democratization process.7 As a consequence of their strategic decisions, actors can lose or gain influence in a process of regime change. The assumption that the agency of political forces determines the ultimate outcome of regime transitions suggests examining the behavior of actors as the driving property behind democracy promotion.

1.2 The Nested Games Model Along with the mainstream of political science, this study assumes that human activity is goal oriented and instrumental. Political actors maximize their goal achievements. Game theory only makes the rationality assumption explicit. The 7

A common justification for actor theories in the transition literature is that similar socioeconomic conditions and levels of development “have been compatible with different sets of relevant actors promoting different models of political transition” (Colomer 2000: 46). For example, the structural antecedents of different Warsaw Pact states are not sufficient to explain divergent paths to democracy. Structural and cultural factors do have effects on the transition path, but are not sufficient to understand why, how, and when regime change occurs.

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game-theoretic approach has the advantage over other approaches that, (1) through its parsimony and formalizations, it increases conceptual clarity, and (2) through building simple models, it facilitates generating testable hypotheses. What did scholars applying game theory to regime transitions contribute to our understanding? First, they sharpened our understanding of the mechanisms (see Przeworski 1992; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Second, some results are “surprising” in that the predicted behavior runs counter to the intuition, but, as developed from formal models, they become completely plausible (Colomer 2000; Blaydes 2003).8 The idea behind the model of nested games of external democracy promotion is imaginably simple and therefore just as traceable: a third, external actor is added to the classical two-player game. Essentially the study’s model refines existing transition models because it formalizes the strategic interaction between an authoritarian regime, a democratic opposition, and an external actor promoting democratization. Since only a focus on the major lines of interaction and strategies can provide insights into the dynamics of this game, any transition model needs reducing and simplifying. In essence, the model consists of two games: a transition game and a game of foreign pressure. In the transition game, the opposition fights with the regime about democratization. It can demand full democratization or accept only limited reforms. Overall the authoritarian regime wants to continue its authoritarian rule. It represses the opposition. At the maximum, it would accept liberal reforms, but these fall short of democracy. Given the typical strategy preferences and resources of a stable authoritarian regime, the model predicts the outcome of this game to be the continuation of dictatorship. How can the game ever arrive at political liberalization? Political actors can reach decisions that, at first sight, are either incomprehensible or surprising to the outside observer. This is often the case with successful regime transition. One approach while looking into the breakdown of authoritarian regimes is to understand that here we find a situation which “is so complicated that reference to exogenous factors is required” (Tsebelis 1990: 61). Tsebelis (1990) suggests that, in this case, one of the actors might be entangled in a different game which the observer has previously ignored. The interference of a democracy promotion actor can be one exogenous factor. One way to integrate this external actor is to design a tripartite game. Yet the integration of third parties conflicts with the theory’s advantage of parsimony. Another road that can be taken is the nested games approach. 8

For instance, in certain situations, the wider the conflicts of interest, the more likely transition can be (Colomer 2000); or, the higher the repressive capacity of a country, the more likely transition can be (Blaydes 2003).


23

The center of this study is to transfer Tsebelis’ idea of nested games to the international context of regime change: in the principal arena, the strategic negotiations between regime and opposition cause the outcome of transition. This is the transition game. The regime is, however, simultaneously involved with an external actor in the international arena. This is a game of foreign pressure. Again, in order to keep the model tractable, the interaction requires a reduction to the very basic strategies. The outside actor appears on the stage and demands from the regime that it introduces democratic reforms. It can do so by exerting weak pressure or strong pressure. Strong pressure encompasses both targeting the regime and supporting the opposition. The regime can react by remaining intransigent or accommodating the reform demands. What happens here is that the pressure of the external actor from the international game raises the regime’s costs to repress the opposition in the transition game: firstly, the external actor can punish the regime for repressing democratic opposition groups. Secondly, the democracy support of the external actor makes is more difficult for the regime to control successfully the opposition through repression. The higher theses costs are, the less attractive it is for the regime to continue holding on to its power. The model predicts (a) the threshold where the increased costs to repress the opposition lower the regime’s payoff to a point that a reform pact with the opposition becomes as attractive as the continuation of its rule and (b) how much the regime needs to discount the future in order to change its strategy and eventually accept a reform pact. The ultimate goal of theories on international influence is to develop a concept under which the linkage of domestic transition and the international dimension improves the understanding of democratic reform in an authoritarian political system. The key linking both levels is that the regime interacts simultaneously in two separate games, in the transition game with the opposition, and in the international game with the external actor. This solution resolves two problems when studying international factors: (1) The design to have the domestic process determine the ultimate result of regime change reproduces the common assumption that external factors are facilitating rather than central causal variables. The influence of the external actor is conceptualized as being indirect and working through the national agents, who ultimately decide which strategies to follow and how to deal with the new conditions. (2) As transition game and foreign pressure game constitute two separate games, the design permits estimating the effect of external influence. Substantially, the outcome of the domestic transition game without external influence allows for a counterfactual comparison with the outcome of the game affected by external influence, that is, with the nested version of the game. Comparing the

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outcomes of the standard domestic approach to democratization with the version nested inside the international dimension can yield new hypotheses about the mechanisms of international factors. From the model, hypotheses can be derived about when and how a transition is influenced by an external actor. In the empirical part of this study, they are applied to the ‘real world’ and subjected to plausibility tests. The objective thereby is to explore the causal mechanisms at work.

Empirical Validation This study is also about American democracy promotion. Using a case study that focuses on the United States’ influence in Communist Poland between 1980 and 1989, the model’s hypotheses will be empirically tested. Evidently, the case study approach, “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (Bennett and George 2005: 5), belongs to the general typology of small-n research. Small-n research is often used as a strategy when the causal mechanisms are not well understood (Leuffen 2007: 149), and when causal inferences are drawn by process tracing causal chains within cases across time. This relationship between theory and the empirical world is then captured largely in narrative form (Lieberman 2005: 436). The aim of the study’s empirical part is to phrase the partial explanation of the Polish case within the frame of game theory so precisely that observations can be made as to how external democracy promotion works. Predictions from the nested game model about how observed behavior should change as the underlying conditions change are a starting point for investigating the hypotheses. Inductive, theory-guided predictions provide a potential means for going beyond the conflicting accounts of contemporaries. New sources of evidence can thereby be attained to discriminate among hypotheses (see also Weingast 1996). Certainly, for a case to meet the model’s necessary antecedents, a prior evaluation needs to establish if U.S. influence on the Polish Communist regime and the opposition movement Solidarity can be observed at all. The selection of the Polish liberalization accounts for the fact that, in comparison to more recent or present attempts at democracy promotion, a relatively broad spectrum of data is available. After two decades, interlocutors are more willing to share candid insights and observations, and more documents have been made available. However, more important for the selection of Poland is that the case accounts for the preliminary findings that the United States spent considerable resources on democracy promotion. With a case of strong influence by


25

an external actor, the exploration of the model’s hypotheses should be greatly facilitated. The case hence attributes to the idea of pathway cases (Gerring 2007: 233). The idea is that this kind of case study serves for the intensive analysis of an individual case in order to elucidate causal mechanisms and clarify theories in their infancy. Finally, Poland, as the ‘ice-breaker’ in the fall of Communism, isolates intervening external factors such as diffusion and contagion effects; this case “rightly belongs at the center of any transnational analysis of the fall of communism” (Kenney 2003: 208). As to the validity of the findings, the Polish regime transition just about fits into the category of Eastern European transitions, and more broadly into transitions with a peaceable nature of elite-driven negotiations. With the method of process tracing, the hypotheses the model generates are tested by reconstructing how the United States exerted influence on the Polish regime transition process (see also Chapter 5).9 The time span of this case study stretches from the emergence of the trade union movement Solidarity in 1980 to the round table negotiations in 1989. The empirical analysis is based on selected primary Polish and American government and NGO sources, on secondary literature and the memoirs of participants as well as on a newspaper analysis. For further corroboration, between November and December 2004, 15 explorative interviews with participating actors and close observers were conducted in Washington, DC. A detailed list of the interviewees is attached in Appendix 3, and the transcripts of the taped interviews are available upon request. With regard to further antecedents of the model, as early as 1980, Poland’s prolonged transition can clearly be delineated into the specified actors, requiring a split regime (otherwise it would be a full dictatorship), a unified opposition, and, with the United States, an influential external agent of democratization. The case of Poland also received little attention in systematic investigations on the effect of foreign influence. In a study on foreign assistance in Poland, Kubik and Ekiert (2000) assess the cultivation of Western contacts with Solidarity with no comparative or theoretically guided indicators, leaving the reader with the vague conclusion that moral support had a “tremendous effect” on boosting the movement’s morale and staying power (Kubik and Ekiert 2000: 268). The bottom line is that, on an aggregate level, the nested game model should contribute to answering the main guiding question for the empirical part: 9

The complexity and number of variables for observing international influences entails, for the present, neglecting a quantitative macro comparison. Additionally, a preliminary cross-country testing for any identified variation on political liberalization is difficult to achieve when studying the international dimension of regime changes. As any systematization of indicators with which to retrieve data is still missing, no appropriate data is available.

26


Can indications be found that without American influence the establishment and the results of the Polish round table – the ultimate outcome of agreeing to democratic reform – would have been of a different character or taken another path? The study finds evidence that United States financed programs and operations did in fact not cause the induction of the Polish round table, but accelerated actor behavior of both the Communist regime and the opposition movement Solidarity susceptive to a modicum of democratic reform. The U.S. used an intense network of covert CIA operations and overt forms of financial and material assistance to keep the Polish trade union movement Solidarity alive. Printing equipment, anti-government propaganda material and communications equipment worth several million U.S. dollars was smuggled into the country. The U.S. strategy to focus its activities on the liberal group around Walesa – in order to weaken the more radical elements inside the opposition – proved successful as a democracy promotion instrument. Finally, the sanctions imposed against the Jaruzelski regime proved effective because lifting these was based on clearly framed and well-communicated conditions: the release of political prisoners, entering into a dialogue with Solidarity, and lifting martial law. This study argues that without this support, the induction of the round table talks in 1989 would have been highly unlikely. Evidence has been found that Solidarity’s capacities and survival strategies resulted partly from U.S. support and were directly related to making repression ever more expensive for the regime. At this point it is suffice to say that the strategic behavior of the Polish actors was indeed consistent with the predictions of this study’s model. Furthermore, in the Polish democratization debate only the Western pressure on the Communists to engage in a dialogue are a topic of discussion within the literature. The empirical section of this study, however, produces different results: the opposition support was more important for the induction of the round table.

1.3 Central Contribution This study’s theory is based on literature dealing with international factors in the process of democratization as well as with external democracy promotion as foreign policy. Apart from existing transition theories and game-theoretic tools, the development of the model further benefited by transferring theoretical ideas from the following fields: the comparative study of party politics (Tsebelis 1990); genocide studies (Verwimp 2004); international security studies (Fearon 1994; Snyder 1997); new institutionalism (Lohmann 1997; Putnam 1988); and the economic sanctions literature (Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott 1990).

1.3 Central Contribution

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The study seeks to enrich the sub-field of the international dimension in democratization studies. The topic of the study addresses not only open questions about regime change, but also has wider implications for the interaction of the international level with the domestic state level. Some of the causal mechanisms have been recurring in the broader context of how international factors shape transition politics, but no theory in democratization studies has yet formally modeled international influence on regime breakdown.10 The theoretical aim is to contribute to two debates: the relative importance of external causes versus domestic causes for democratization, and the effects and impact of external democracy promotion. In order to lay the foundation of the study’s theory, in the following I will briefly turn to both debates which are then further discussed when reviewing the literature within the main section. Work in comparative politics on the determinants of democratic transitions has largely ignored influences outside the unit of the nation-state. Most attempts to draw general conclusions about what causes a country to democratize have given foreign influence little attention. Where the international dimension has been granted more weight, the focus was limited to empirical case studies on three more particular aspects: the fading of authoritarian pressures associated with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union (see Zielinski 1995; Whitehead 1996; Brown 2000); the incentive for democratization in Southern and Eastern Europe through political conditionalities attached to possible future membership in the European Union (see Pridham 1999; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007) and the impact of development aid conditionalities, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa (see Crawford 1997; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Knack 1999). Witnessing the domino effect of Communist regime breakdown (Starr 1991; Whitehead 2004), regime transition and democratization theory have acknowledged factors other than those found inside a country, although typically ascribed a modest role. Schmitter (1996: 51) notes that the causal effects of the international dimension work often indirectly through “ostensibly” national agents (see also O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 5). In the transition literature, many observers of the so-called “third wave” of democratization, including Huntington (1991), have acknowledged the importance of various kinds of foreign pressure for both the initiation and the course of regime transitions. Foreign intervention, pressure, and support are discussed in the case study literature about specific transitions in which observers believe it has played an important role (see Che10

Sutter (2000) alludes to the influence of foreign nations, but does not specifically include the actor in his model. Zielinski (1995) incorporates a “Soviet factor” into his game of the Polish transition.

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babi and Linz 1998). In the end, despite widely held beliefs about the effects of foreign pressure and intervention on the durability of dictatorships – by both government advisors and academic scholars –, the prominent studies of democratization and political liberalization are still overwhelmingly oriented toward domestic conditions and actions (Przeworski 1992; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2000; Linz and Stepan 1996). Most larger comparative studies assess the effects of domestic wealth, economic growth, institutions, religion, and cultural values (Vanhanen 1990; 1997). In a macro-quantitative comparison of foreign pressure on authoritarian regimes, Geddes (2002) argues what can account for all attempts to verify quantitatively international factors: although foreign pressures can encourage transitions, they do not overwhelm the domestic sources of authoritarian fragility or strength. By focusing exclusively on domestic processes, most theories effectively examine democratization as if political institutions developed in a vacuum and countries acted independently of each other. 18 years into the post-Cold War era, not only the international dimension of democracy promotion, but the general association between international factors and the development of democracy is as yet poorly understood. On the other hand, democracy promotion as a field of foreign policy is a relatively recent phenomenon and, until the 1980s, was discussed under the aegis of development aid. International support for democracy as a major part of foreign policy doctrines (Smith 1994) above all concerns questions of strategy and instruments to countervail illiberal countries. Although often based more on rhetoric, in order to roll back Soviet influence, the Reagan administration was the first government to call for a Project Democracy and thereby formulate regime change as a foreign policy goal (Robinson 1996). While governments have been increasingly regarding the spread of democracy as inseparable from national security (see Talbott 1996; Rose 2000)11, the academic community is short of constructing insightful recommendations on what should constitute the strategies for this aim. The actual drafting of external democratization strategies is a subject of only limited concern to the regime transition literature. Academic consultants such as Carothers (2004) and Diamond (1997), who do reach out to the practitioners’ community, even though often exclusively to just the U.S. 11

The extrinsic argument for democracy promotion as a matter of security interests stems from the democratic peace hypothesis (see Russett 1993). With regard to the policy of democracy promotion, the most convincing critique of the democratic peace hypothesis argues that the historical record shows democratizing states to be more likely to fight wars than stable states of any regime type (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; 2005). Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch (2002) extends the latter argument to account for civil wars, too.


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community, are the exception. At times, the character of the exchange among scholars and practitioners of the ‘democracy promotion industry’ surprises and exhibits an inherent normativism (see also Sandschneider 2003: 3). It impedes theory development. These normative tendencies originate from a strong moral imperative that often resonates with a research question that is politically so contested, such as for example democracy engineering from abroad. In an edited volume by Schraeder (2002), the author reaches the conclusion that the success of democracy promotion is most of the time compromised when the normative goal of spreading democracy clashes with competing foreign policy interests. Schraeder (2003: 28) is more optimistic. After having “codified” the historical record of democratic intervention along the state of the art in international democracy promotion, he sets out three guidelines that can “enhance the possibility for success”:

Determine the degree of support of the target population; Seek majority support within the region and the international system; Legitimize democratic intervention by constructing policy within the framework of international law.

In sum, there seems to be a wide consensus among scholars that international influences on political liberalization, be they direct or indirect, remain starkly under-researched, and are therefore under-theorized. Moreover, there is a curious discrepancy between widely acknowledging the importance of international factors in regime transitions and the lack of analytical attention. The same applies to promoting democracy from abroad. One explanation for the paradox that, on the one hand, the relevance of international factors for the process of democratization is often emphasized, and, on the other hand, few have translated this realization into theory, can be explained by the complexity of state transformations and state failures. It is no wonder that authors concerned with external factors or questions of democracy promotion were faced with the “depressing resiliency of Dahl’s thirty year old argument” (Rose 2000: 202): In the early 1970s, Dahl was pessimistic about theory advancement in the light of “our lack of knowledge about the long causal chains running from outside help to internal conditions to changes of regime” (Dahl 1971: 209). These causal chains do make it difficult to measure influence and to establish unequivocal relationships (Pridham 1994: 11). But other political phenomena bear complex causal concatenations, too, and they have been treated more vigorously. Another reason for this paradox might lie in the obstacle of bridging the sub-disciplines of comparative politics and international relations.

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The dividing gap shows how the epistemologies of a discipline can limit the discourse and bias the selection of research topics. Given the, by now, extensive literature analyzing the prerequisites of democracy on the one hand and the nature of foreign policy formulation and international politics on the other hand, why has so little research been undertaken on the interplay of democratization and international politics? The topic is of interest to both scholars analyzing the effects of state-state interactions and to the field of comparative politics. Table 1:

Scope of Theory and Analysis

International Dimension Theoretical Approach

Domestic Level

Hypothesized Net Impact on Democratization Low

high Democracy Protection

Agency

Structure

Consolidation Democracy Phase Power Conditionality: Promotion Military ConstellaDevelopment Intertion of EU Liberalization/ Aid vention Elites or MemDemocratization Masses berPhase Assistance ship Programs Conditionality

Zeitgeist/ Globalization

Diffusion and Contagion/ Socialization

Geo-Political Conditions

Economic Development/ Cultural Values

As the direction of research questions posed in the literature is not always unequivocally framed, this study will be subjected to a more specific qualification. The literature on democratization can be broadly differentiated by its theoretical


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approach and by its level of analysis. With regard to the theoretical approach, democratization is studied by either focusing on structural factors or on agencydriven factors. As for the level of analysis, the interest lies in the international causes or in the domestic causes of democracy. As Table 1 condenses, the international dimension consists of external factors that can be arrayed along the hypothesized impact they have on democratization, for structural and agency factors, respectively. Firstly, within the agency approach this study employs, factors range from the commonly assumed weak effect of aid conditionality to the direct effect of military intervention. Secondly, depending on the qualitatively different phases of liberalization and consolidation, external democracy promotion consists of distinctive measures and targets, so that during the consolidation phase the term democracy “protection” (Schmitter and Brouwer 1999) seems more adequate. This study’s object under investigation is the agency-driven democracy promotion in the transition phase of political liberalization, targeting political organizations and the ruling elite. No parsimonious model of regime breakdown can naturally tell the whole story. Both reductive and configurative approaches need to coexist, with each contributing insights and the respective notes of caution for the other. To satisfy the standard that partial truths in regime transitions studies should not be sold as the big picture (Merkel 2007: 431) and would only insufficiently map the logics of regime changes (Merkel 1996: 326), this study treats the international context as a necessary but not sufficient constraint that strategic actors face. Adhering to the cumulative approach to social sciences (see Geddes 2003), the study’s results add a mosaic stone to the picture of regime transitions.

Summary of Results To summarize the results, the study finds that external democracy promotion can have a positive impact on the strategy of authoritarian regimes. On the conditioning factors for an external actor to induce successfully transition, this study contends the following: the higher external pressure to democratize is, the higher the costs for an authoritarian regime to continue repressing a democratic opposition. If the costs to repress rise to a level where the regime’s payoff from authoritarian rule are equal to its payoffs from entering into a reform pact, the regime needs to value the future low to reach an outcome of political liberalization. For a regime to reach the point where repression becomes more expensive than tolerating and accommodating the opposition, democracy promotion needs to combine these efforts:

32 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.


exert costly sanctions on the regime that comprise both punitive and incentive measures, attach the lifting of sanctions to well-defined, gradually satisfiable conditionalities, support the opposition with sustainable, well-targeted assistance for solving the collective action problem, attach conditionality on opposition assistance to moderate democratic claims and provide strategic advice for moderation, and promote and finance with the aim of establishing a coherent group among the opposition.

Although the theory’s test cannot serve as conclusive confirmation, the nested games approach advances the analysis of external influence. The model identifies new empirical hypotheses that improve measuring and testing the impact of democracy promotion. This study addresses the issue of when and how external democracy promotion matters in four ways: 1.

2.

3.

4.

it shows in detail how the strategic preferences of an authoritarian regime change as a result of the external actor driving up its costs when it comes to further repressing a democratic opposition. The way the model is configurated accounts for (a) how and also (b) when support for an opposition and foreign pressure exerted on the regime reaches a point where the costs to repress exceed the benefits of authoritarian rule; the nesting of the domestic transition arena inside the international arena allows one to derive specific parameters that indicate the relative weight of external causal factors and domestic factors for regime breakdown; given that democracy promotion changes the exogenous conditions of a domestic transition, the study shows how and when the actors change their strategic preferences. New preferences cause strategy shifts and strategy shifts in turn change the transition path. with its dynamic game stages, the model implies that critical junctures and their consequent trajectories become observable. Through process tracing, they can be applied to real histories of regime changes.

The purpose is not only to refine current theoretical frameworks, but also to enhance the transition literature in game-theoretical reasoning. Empirically, the level of penetrating a case of external democracy promotion through process tracing the causal mechanisms is extensive and builds on data previously not recorded. With regard to Cold War history, new light is brought into U.S. American policies and strategies behind the Iron Curtain.

1.4 Outline

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1.4 Outline The main body of this study can be divided into three parts. Part I, which comprises Chapters 2 and 3, presents a literature review in order to develop the theoretical reference framework. Part II develops the theoretical argument in Chapter 4. Part III, comprising Chapters 5 to 8, represents the empirical analysis. Chapter 2 reconnects the study to the existing research on international influences on regime change, and shows that only few works lead to results that are convincing when explaining the causal mechanisms behind external influences. Chapter 3 more specifically links the selected theoretical approach to literature from the rational choice school. As the transition models that this school develops are rarely compared or coherently integrated in the research body as such, the literature review attempts to provide an extensive overview over what those models have in common. This step will point out some of the benefits of applying rational choice theories to the study of regime transitions and will also enable a better evaluation of the nested games model. The summary of Chapters 2 and 3 also has the methodological purpose to exhibit stylized facts, without which any model building would become a very lengthy enterprise. Stylized facts are statements and generalizations that are widely accepted in the literature. Chapter 4 represents the core of this study. A nested game of external democracy promotion will be developed and formalized, then interpreted and discussed. Where relevant, the formalization encompasses a discussion on how particular assumptions connect to the literature. As part of the model’s development, the starting point of the discussion will focus on underlying assumptions about how to generally formalize the international dimension and, in particular, how to design nested games. This chapter concludes by generating empirically testable hypotheses from the model. Theses hypotheses will be discussed and summarized for an application to the real world. The empirical part begins in Chapter 5 with a documentation on how the study is methodologically operationalized. The purpose of the chapter is to endow the reader with knowledge of how the abstract theoretical concepts are linked with the case study on Poland. The contribution of qualitative work to knowledge is often questioned as the difference between historical and social scientific research can be quite fluid. To reflect that this study’s theory generation and empirical analysis are two distinct steps, the methodological approach to the empirical analysis is granted ample space. The empirical analysis of the model’s hypotheses itself proceeds in two steps. In Chapter 6, the process tracing of U.S. democracy assistance in Poland focuses on what the instruments, tools, and strategies of external influence were.

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A reconstruction of how the Polish Communist regime, the Solidarity opposition, and U.S. organizations interacted explains the mechanisms of influence and serves as the basis in order to gauge the explanatory value of the nested games model. Chapter 7 investigates on a more formal level the consequences of U.S. influence. Guided by the model’s parameters and concepts, this section attempts to measure the effects on the Communist regime and Solidarity, respectively. This chapter looks at how the support of an opposition and the sanctioning of an ancien régime change their respective strategic behaviors. It subsequently draws conclusions on how the Polish transition path was influenced by the United States actors and evaluates the model’s fit with the case at hand. In order to control for the magnitude of U.S. influence and its effects on the transition, the role of Polish endogenous causes for change as well as the Soviet Union are finally taken into account. The concluding Chapter 8 summarizes the results and critically evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the theory in light of the empirically produced evidence. It also considers how the key ideas deriving from this study can be applied to other areas and how the overall results are instrumental for future research. Although external actors may not play a determining role in the process of democratization, the study argues that their impact is of importance. Models that omit these actors paint an incomplete picture of the process.

2 The International Dimension of Regime Change

In order to better reconnect the purpose of this study with the state of the art in transition studies, firstly, one of the central arguments of this study should be summarized: In terms of rational choice, institutionalizing methods for sharing power and establishing political and civil rights become rational options when political actors are unable or unlikely to have their unrestricted preferences prevail. Moreover, there is no inherent reason why such struggles over influence and applicable resources should be fully confined within the boundaries of individual countries. The balance of power or the resources and influence that particular social and political actors can mobilize are altered decisively not only by domestic factors and processes, but also through interference and opportunities for assistance from outside actors. Such groups of actors will rarely alone undermine ruling elite coalitions or influence non-democratic policies directly. They can exert critical indirect and facilitating effects through altering the existing distribution of resources or influence that groups within states can muster (see also Gleditsch 2000: 4). By offering an introduction into the literature on the international dimension in regime transition, already existing hypotheses on the general level will be discussed. The focus is on statements and generalizations that are widely accepted in the literature and that complement the underlying assumption of this study’s theory. A sample of results from these studies suggests that questions arising from the above economic argument are not fully answered. This chapter proceeds as follows: Firstly, a summary of the domestic causes for democratization accentuates that, at the bottom of any analysis, the outcome and inauguration of regime transition takes place in the domestic arena. Secondly, the problems and questions deriving from the international framework having been introduced, results from studies on the subfield of the international dimension, external democracy promotion, will be discussed. Next, efforts at quantifying international factors are presented, whose main difference, in comparison to other approaches, is that they are less useful for understanding causal mechanisms, and, therefore, also less useful for this study as well. Because the study’s topic lies in between two disciplines, the chapter concludes with highlighting the heuristic value of selected approaches from international relations theory for the study of external factors.


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2.1 Domestic Causes of Regime Transitions Studying regime transitions means studying macro phenomena. The complexities of societies transforming politically has not yet allowed for a middle-range theory, let alone for a grand theory of transformation – it is thus questionable if this can be an epistemological goal after all. Fragmented theories are nothing that can particularly be attributed to the study of regime transitions. However, the weaknesses and shortcomings, if considered broadly for the contributions, shed a light on how few connecting elements we find. Most importantly, though, is what these missing connections mean for the theory presented in this work. Theories of regime transition can be differentiated by the comparative politics paradigms of structure, culture, and rationality (see Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997). Correspondingly, the “region of indeterminacy” (Marks and Diamond 1992: 6) that lies between the functional, structural, and international constraints and the outcome of regime changes (Merkel 1996: 325) is addressed from quite diverse angles. With the presumption that democracy can be created anywhere by committed actors, Przeworski and Limongi (1997: 176) condense this premise into the dictum that regime changes are “an outcome of actions, not just conditions”. Agency theory suggested that the actor-centered approach to democratization “constitutes the most appropriate paradigm” (Grugel 2002: 62). Through the theorem of “all transitions are negotiated” (Przeworski 1992: 116) – without action there is no democratization – processes of regime breakdown and political change in such apparently dissimilar countries as Spain, Nigeria, Mexico, China, Poland, or the former Soviet Union can be analyzed. Dismantling democracy of its structural prerequisites, and with the inflation of global democratic struggles after 1989 seemingly proving the agency approach right, agency and actor theories studying political transformation have become synonymous with transition studies and transition theories (Grugel 2002: 62). The agency reconstruction approach was first established by the work of O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), after Linz and Stepan (1978) was decisive in reorienting the literature towards the idea that the breakdown of democracy was a result of specific choices by relevant actor. Theories of transitions to democracy specifically stress factors such as the timing of national development, negotiated pacts between elites, and critical junctures or forms of path dependence in political development (e.g. Casper and Taylor 1996; Przeworski 1992; Linz and Stepan 1996). The “mode of transition” made a significant difference and is stressed to be an important intervening variable, too. Karl and Schmitter (1991) distinguishes four: pact, imposition, reform, or revolution. However, democracy by imposition can hardly be compared with pact, reform and revolution. More-

2.1 Domestic Causes of Regime Transitions

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over, modes of transition as a causal factor are highly susceptible to circular explanations. From the agency perspective, regime changes proceed through elitemanaged, top-down collective actions that are largely independent from general attributes of the population (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 19; Karl and Schmitter 1991: 270). As a consequence, regime changes can only be understood by reconstructing the contingent actions of the agents who actually manage them (Rustow 1970; Marks 1992; Przeworski 1992). The claim that “democracy appears exogenously as a deus ex machina” (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 159) thus overlooks these patterns. The structure-agent debate intersects with the debate about democracy and development, often interchangeably used to describe modernization. Advocates of the agency approach, including this study, do not necessarily question structural approaches that relate the prevalence of democracy to various aspects of modernization (Lipset 1959; Inglehart 1997), and do not deny that underlying structural factors are of some significance. They do deny that they determined outcomes (Cohen 1994; Colomer 2000). They claim that modernization, class coalitions, civil society and other structural factors only explain the maintenance of democracy but not the processes that inaugurate democracy (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 177). Despite evidence that democracy arises more likely in countries with high levels of development (Vanhanen 1997; Barro 1999), that economic crisis and low levels of growth all make regimes more likely to break down (Haggard and Kaufman 1997), and that particular cultural norms or values favor the formation and consolidation of democratic rule (Almond and Verba 1963; Muller and Seligson 1994; Inglehart and Welzel 2005), there seems to be no significant relationship between the level of development and the probability of democracy emerging from authoritarianism. The failure of modernization theory to explain the lack of democratization in wealthy Gulf States or the vibrancy of democratic life in impoverished countries like India and Bangladesh (Blaydes 2003: 1) were among the reasons that led scholars develop alternative theories for the failure of certain regions to adopt democratic practices. Colomer (2000: 124) regards Eastern European transitions as the perfect counter example to the structural view that democracy comes with improving economic circumstances:

They took place in stagnant and unfavorable economic circumstances, and were associated with the inability of regimes to fulfill economic expectations they had created;

38


Different sets of actors with different preferences forming different alliances existed in Eastern-bloc countries similar from a structural point of view; Similar structural circumstances led to very different transitions, or, in some cases failures to achieve transition, as in the case of some former Soviet republics; Subjective factors mattered, e.g. intentions, trust, suspicion, standards of fairness and willingness to compromise; Structural factors and cultural beliefs were mediated by actors’ perceptions of their bargaining power and opportunities; individuals’ gestures mattered, but in ways that depended on perceptions of the power balance.

Structuralists also recur to such determinants like social class constellation and its power relations, originating from – although subsequently refined (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992) – the classical paradigm “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” (Moore 1966: 418). Further determinants are distributional aspects such as economic inequality or the relative strength of societal classes, civil society and social movements (Foweraker and Landman 1999; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001), thresholds for mass participation in revolution (Kuran 1989) or the articulation of dissidence through meaning formation (Wydra 2007). Structural theories like Moore (1966) and Rueschemeyer at al. (1992) are additionally plagued by the double character with which social classes are assigned: they are simultaneously constraint und actor, Klasse an sich (structure) and für sich (actor). This applies equally to the role of state and obfuscates establishing causalities. From an institutionalist perspective, military regimes are in particular highly susceptible to economic shocks, while, simultaneously, the value of unity and efficacy among professionalized military regimes is higher than holding on to authoritarian rule (Chebabi and Linz 1998). On the other hand, “sultanistic” (Linz and Stepan 1996) and single-party systems seem much less affected; they try to co-opt challengers (Geddes 1999). The inherent optimism of transitology – democracy can be created independent of structural and economic context – has been attractive to many scholars reinvigorating Lasswell’s definition of political science being a democracy science: the chances for spreading democracy in the present world are good. Today, watching how regime breakdown by no means resulted in democracy, but in a flourishing of relatively stable political system types that are neither democratic nor authoritarian (to mention only a few, Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Nigeria) a new realism among scholars replaced the normative note that crept into the transition approach during the early 1990s.

2.2 International Framework

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The latest critique on the type of analyses that were dominated by Huntington’s (1991) overarching concept of the “third wave” led to a pessimistic rethinking in classifying the results of liberalization processes and the political regimes that have evolved ever since (Merkel, Puhle, and Croissant 2003; Carothers 2002; Diamond 1999, 2002; Huntington 1997). Regime change not necessarily results in democratic installation (Casper and Taylor 1996: 4). Countries arrive successfully at democracy, but then fail to reach democratic consolidation. In particular among the former Soviet states, the most common regime form was a hybrid of democracy that featured power struggles between communists, illiberal nationalists, and few liberal opposition forces (Ottaway 2003). Hybrid regimes that combine the façade of electoral democracy with the simultaneous abuse of democratic procedures should thus not be approached as “illiberal democracies” (Zakaria 1997) but rather as a new form of authoritarianism (Schedler 2002a).12 Although the purpose of this study is not to revisit the debate on democracy and economic development and discuss the agent-structure cleavage, a theoretical and empirical consensus emerges: However tentative, there seems to be an interaction effect between structural conditions, such as the level of development necessary for regime survival, and strategic behavior by political actors. Structural explanations might also apply better to the consolidation of democracies, but are less suitable for explaining democratization. Crucial for the development of this study’s argument, however, is that most studies of political liberalization have in common to referring to economic or political exogenous shocks and confrontations as the impetus for entering into a transition process. Depending on such factors as the type of regime, economic conditions, military capacity, and legitimacy, the ruling elites can take action to survive the crisis, or they simply liberalize in an attempt to regain legitimacy. This study’s contention is that a potent source of this shock can derive from a strong foreign power assisting liberal groups and exerting pressure to liberalize on the regime elites.

2.2 International Framework What initially stirred the recognition of research into the international dimension were conditional variables such as colonial heritage, contagion effects of a democratic neighborhood, or the observation of a wave-like increase in the global number of what can be constituted as democracy. Studying these outside conditions as well as diffusion processes of democratization cannot explain, however, 12

Diamond (1999: 20) describes this form of democracy as appearing to be “stuck in a twilight zone of tentative commitment, illiberal practices, and shallow institutionalization”.

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why and when authoritarian regimes break down. Nevertheless, recourse to the literature as to why and how external factors are studied emphasizes that efforts at systemization exist, but produce few hypotheses which can be operationalized for empirical investigations.

2.2.1 The Internationalist Argument By exclusively focusing on domestic factors, the majority of scholars fail to account effectively for the so-called “globalization of democracy” (Diamond 1999; Im 2002). The prominent explanations for democratization given in the literature cannot offer coherent answers because they take off from a nativist bias (Schmitter 1996). So far, most democratization students – transitologists, and, but less so, consolidologists – have paid little attention to the international effects on democratization at the domestic level. Theoretically, the international dimension entails many factors from specific external agents to structural, difficult to measure variables. Analyzing inside-outside linkage can not only help in identifying the agents of political change and factors and their different influences in given cases, but also in examining interactions between domestic elements and external contexts. Even though concern in recent literature has moved to external variables, many studies could not fully support their arguments with sufficient empirical evidence. Vanhanen (1997: 161), for example, could simply not identify a reliable empirical indicator for that purpose. Naturally, this excludes the more obvious cases where transitions indeed were determined by the efforts of external actors: Panama (Stepan 1986: 65), Grenada, Haiti (Carothers 1991), or Iraq (Dawisha 2004). Since the early 90s, there have been a number of systematic studies about the international dimension of democratization (e.g., Pridham 1991; Pridham and Vanhanen 1994; Pridham, Herring and Sanford 1994; Whitehead 1996; Mangott, Waldrauch, and Day 2000). Whitehead (1996), for example, suggests some fruitful distinctions; the hypotheses he derives, however, are rather scarce. Whitehead distinguishes three international dimensions of political democratization: contagion from other cases; control from some dominant powers; and consent in interaction with the internal actors. Schmitter (1996) adds conditionality, which he defines as being the imposition of conditions by multilateral institutions. The four dynamics of interaction between, on the one hand, the international subcontexts of power and influence and, on the other hand, the national cases of democratization are distinguished into: adjustment to trends in the wider context; the impact of discrete events; democratization waves; and the influence of the


41

international context upon different stages of the democratization process (see also Schmitter and Brouwer 1999). The dimension of conditionality is commonly studied when accounting for democratic pressures attached to foreign aid. Bratton and van de Walle’s (1997) study of African transitions, one of the few quantitative efforts to test the effects of external pressures, leads to contradictory results. They find that aid dependency in African countries increases the likelihood that the countries will move in a democratic direction, but that explicit conditionality attached to loan agreements has the opposite effect. Knack (2000), in a multivariate analysis of the impact of aid on democratization, finds no evidence that aid promotes democracy. Examining the impact of aid on the quality of democratic rule, using indexes of corruption and rule of law, Knack (1999) even finds a negative effect. Studies generally find conditioning aid to democratic policy reform largely ineffective (Collier 1997). Aid reserved purely for economic development, at least in Africa, is even associated with a decreased democratic quality of governance (Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle 2006). From qualitative case studies of democracy promotion in Africa, Clinkenbeard (2002: 41) is more explicit and derives empirical hypotheses. For political conditionality on development aid to have a positive impact on democratic transition in sub-Saharan Africa, three conditions need to be fulfilled: the target regime must be susceptible to external influence; the donors must implement a coherent policy of influence, in which, importantly, conditionality is only one major part; and the domestic opposition must be strong, coherent and indeed democratic. As will be shown, these factors are similar in nature to what the nested games model of external democracy promotion predicts, and thus, at this point already, can indicate the wider applicability of the study’s model. Within the context of post-Communist transitions, Dawisha and Turner (1997) offers a systematization of the international dimension and taxonomizes the openness of states along three axes (agency, permeability, mutability) as an indicator for strength of external influences. Dawisha and Turner (1997), however, does not allow for any predictions or few policy driven and derived hypothesis. Those are, at best, too vague for any empirical application. Pridham and Vanhanen (1994: 46) points to the requirement that forces and events influencing political systems from outside should be differently interpreted and thus react differently in various countries. The historical context in which international factors were embedded and constrained must be part of the analysis. Therefore, the internal-external linking approach should be subject of individualcase scrutiny through “path-dependent” analyses (Karl 1990: 7). This processdriven analysis emphasizes “descriptive diachronic reconstructions of individual cases of regime transition” (Kitschelt 1992: 1028).

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Pridham (1994: 11) systemizes the effects of external factors on democratization based on South and Eastern European experiences and suggests a distinction between background or situational variables, type of external actors and forms of external influence. Background and situational variables include the foreign policy patterns of the authoritarian era and the changes within these patterns in the course of transition: the geo-strategic environment, trends in the international system, the state of the international economy, and major international events in the transition period. State and non-state actors such as different international organizations and trans-national actors are grouped in the category of different external actors. Forms of external influence comprise political, diplomatic, economic, monetary and cultural, as well as covert and subversive or open, direct or indirect, coercive or persuasive means. A recent effort to introduce a framework for analyzing the international dimension through linking development and democracy is Levitsky and Way (2006). The concept of “linkage” in the international dimension of democratization describes broadly “the density of ties and cross-border flows between a particular country and the U.S., the EU, and western-dominated multilateral institutions” Pridham (1991: 383). These ties are created through economic development: it increases economic integration, cross-border communication, education, and travel, but also more extensive ties to a transnational civil society. Ideas such as integration – economic, cultural, or regional – with democratic states being a major force for democratization are not new. Others would summarize this reasoning as the effects which globalization has on democracy. Levitsky and Way (2006) claims that direct forms of western intervention, be it military coercion, diplomatic pressure, or democracy assistance programs, have not consistently produced democratic outcomes and do not explain for the variation in democratic consolidation across differing regions. With extensive linkage to the West, however, international pressure can outweigh unfavorable structural conditions. Linkage “blurs the distinctions between international and domestic pressure for democracy, transforming international or regional democratic expectations into powerful domestic demands” (Levitsky and Way 2006: 396). In this regard, the authors believe that the soft effects of strong ties with the West “may be the most important international cause of democratization”. Unfortunately, the study remains ambiguous about whether democratization means a breakdown of authoritarianism or a democratic consolidation. In particular, while it is ascertained that the effects of linkage rather belong to the realm of subtle actions and diffusion, and are different from mechanisms of “leverage”, “such as […] diplomatic pressure, and conditionality” (Levitsky and Way 2006: 385), nonetheless, the yielding of direct financial and organizational support for opposition groups is subsumed under the concept of linkage. Ultimately,


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in countries where both leverage and linkage can be observed as being “high”, international influences are most pronounced. Understanding the mechanisms through which linkage and leverage shape regime outcomes would, hence, not only contribute to the authors’ claim but would also add a decisive feature to the overall picture of the international dimension in regime changes.

2.2.2 Outside Conditions: Diffusion Effects, Contagion and Socialization After the observation that the more democratic neighbors a country has, the more likely it is to democratize, and that the spread of democratic countries proceeded in waves, many authors have moved their attention toward a focus on the international aspects of democratization. In this respect, the explanations of modernization theory, however, are “restricted within sovereign borders” (Wu 2001: 2). In fact, domestically biased approaches are unable to offer a proper explanation as to why democratization has often expanded in the form of regional clusters and then waves. Within the framework of modernization theory, some studies have pointed to the institutional path-dependence of the colonial heritage (Rustow 1970; Dahl 1971; Stepan and Linz 1996). Welzel (2002) conceptualizes values and “human development” as a promoter of democracy more directly than the earlier works by Inglehart (1997) did. Even though these explanations compound the international dimension, they remain on a structural basis. Within the context of geopolitical conditions, the changing nature of hegemony and the position of the United States on democracy (see Robinson 1996) are referred to for explaining the spread of democracy. Others refer to global communication networks that cause cross-fertilization effects for democracy (Segal 1991: 38). Such studies cannot provide any explicit hypotheses as to why and how the balance of ideologies, hegemony change, or globalization favor democracy. Regional clusters of countries democratizing can be explained with a domino effect (Starr 1991), under which stable authoritarian regimes fall under democratization pressure (Whitehead 2004) through the diffusion of values and practices into societies (Thiel 2001), or simply through contagion. O’Loughlin et al. (1998: 557) find that “even controlling for GDP per capita, there remains strong clustering of the political democracy scores”. Two studies controlling the level of democracy for diffusion are crucial as their findings underscore that democratization cannot be studied without international factors being taken into account:

44 1.

2.


Przeworski et al. (2000) finds that democracy is more likely to survive in a country that is in a more democratic region and becomes more likely to survive as the total number of democracies in the world rises, even controlling for important domestic variables; Brinks and Coppedge (2006) claims to have found spatial effects of democratization which are so robust that any large-N analysis would be underspecified when international factors are omitted.

In an earlier attempt toward a theory of diffusion for the study of the international dimension, Gleditsch (2000: 6) asserts that external influences “can exert critical indirect effects through altering the existing distribution of resources or influence”. The diffusion process is, hence, a process of regional or local clustering of authority structures. This, however, still leaves open any explanation about how the distribution of resources and influence is taking place. Gleditsch’s claim is powerful: “there is a strong association between a country’s authority structures and the extent of democracy in the surrounding regional context. […] Since the regional context is more permeable to changes in the short term than socio-economic factors, international influences on democracy appear to be as important as the domestic ‘social requisites’ (Gleditsch 2000: 35). Empirical tests about how much influence neighboring democracies have appear trivial at first, but since they attempt to evaluate the degree of influence this variable can exert, further external factors can, in turn, be better estimated. In comparison to other East European countries, for example, domino effects can be applied to Poland with limitations. Yet Brinks and Coppedge (2006: 484) admits, and this applies to all diffusion studies, that the nature of testing naturally precludes any empirical examination of the causal mechanisms. From a social movement perspective (Tarrow 1998; Oberschall 2000), the diffusion of goals and strategies among opposition networks (Kenney 2003) can be closely associated with a growing body of political science and legal literature concerned with another diffusion effect: international norm promotion and internalization (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Schimmelfennig 2007; Kubicek 2003). “International socialization” is a process with which states aim to induce countries to adapt the basic patterns and rules of the international system (Schimmelfennig 2003: 406). Risse et al. (1999: 273) regard the liberalization process as being of rather strategic nature as compared to the consolidation process. In the consolidation process, different analytical perspectives come into play. Between liberalization and consolidation, two methodologically different interactive patterns are identified: 1) An early phase of denial and tactical concessions is characterized by strategic behavior and allows modeling through rational choice theories; and 2) the different logic of interaction in a later phase,

2.3 External Democracy Promotion

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where strategic behavior is, at the minimum, enhanced by communicative rationality and persuasion of values. Merely attributing democratization or autocratization to some ‘international context’ – whether taking effect through diffusion, contagion, or socialization – explains little if we have not clarified the empirical relevant context and the hypothesized mechanisms that influence the emergence of democracy.13

2.3 External Democracy Promotion Democracy promotion is a salient feature of external influence. Contextual factors, somewhat self-speaking, never determine the process of transition. The progression of political opening would have to be actualized by human undertaking, that is, by the strategic interaction of various political actors and forces, and by the exertion of political leadership and its decision-making. To understand the links between agency and institution, and between the domestic and international level, we need to specify the key explanatory variables and the indispensable agents of political change. The literature on direct democracy assistance examines the various instruments that individual states, NGOs and international organizations use to promote democracy. This literature has similar shortcomings as the research on the general influence of the international dimension.

2.3.1 Strategies, Instruments and Targets Research to measure the effects of democracy assistance has been limited in scope and in producing generalizable conclusions. Obviously, the complexity of defining how best to achieve democracy is overshadowed by the need for articulating clear and consistent standards for what at all constitutes democracy. It is therefore no surprise that both practitioners of democracy promotion and governments lack the analytical considerations on which any aid effort could rest. In addition, few works draw on established theories from international relations or comparative politics for approaching the question as to how effective strategies are, what instruments lead to what consequences, and which targets to choose in which phase of a democratization process. The exceptions are Carothers (1997; 2000) and Diamond (1999).

13

See also self-critically Gleditsch (2000).

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As Carothers (2000; 2002; 2004) broadly discusses, among the reasons for the lack of general analysis, at least for the U.S. democratization strategies, is firstly a tendency for explanatory approaches rather than predictive approaches. Wherever, for example, empirical studies about the effects of democratization projects are undertaken, any results are not translated into policy-oriented hypotheses. Carothers further observes that although some promotion organizations conduct “lessons learned” exercises, these tend to be superficial, often subjective and lack systematic empirical research. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)14 has begun preparing analytical reports on the effectiveness of their democracy and governance assistance programs, and realized the importance to emphasize the fallacy of set sequences for reform (e.g. USAID 2000). An exception to the lack of systematic empirical research is a quantitative report commissioned by USAID on the effects of U.S. assistance programs (Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson 2006; 2007). The report measures the effect of U.S. external democracy promotion by using a dataset covering 195 countries, for a period from 1990 through 2003. While other U.S. and non-U.S. forms of assistance had no significance, the authors find, although of modest nature, “clear impacts of foreign assistance on democratization” (Finkel et al. 2006: 1) by USAID programs.15 Based on the Freedom House measure of democracy, the report goes so far to conclude that “ten million USAID dollars […] would produce – by itself – about a five-fold increase in the amount of democratic change that the average country would be expected to achieve” (Finkel et al. 2006: 2). The simple underlying assumption that the more money you invest on democracy promotion the higher level of democracy will develop seems to hold for Finkel et al. (2006). Earlier evaluation reports by USAID show no significant changes in the target country’s macro structures, e.g. governance and rule of law (Heinz 1994: 22). Positive effects were found among particular actors that directly participated in the democracy assistance programs (Lauth 1996). A major weakness of these reports, however, is that they are often prepared on an in-house basis by a contractor with long-standing ties to the organization. They thus rely, to a significant extent, on information provided through USAID, and a possible conflict of interest is at hand. Mission produced annual reports often lack credibility, too. Their

14

15

In 2003, USAID spent worldwide some $830 million on its democracy and governance programs, with the largest share provided to the Middle East and Europe (Finkel et al. 2006: 26, 29). By regional categorization, the least effects of USAID programs were measured for the Middle East and the Mediterranean as well as for the post-Soviet states.


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evaluation section is likely to be compromised by the fact that they also serve as budget requests for future programming. Outside the academic forum, the Swedish think tank IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) publishes a handbook that aims at providing policy-makers, and even political leaders, with tools for democratization, although IDEA has traditionally been specialized on election related engineering and the technical aspects of election operations (IDEA 1998)16. Equally, the election and human rights wing of the OSCE, ODIHR (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights), has been constantly reediting their election handbook, which, however, cannot entirely be treated as a handbook for democratization proper (OSCE 2005). The academic literature on comparative democratization produces a wide range of opposing ideas that “does not facilitate easy answers for strategy construction” (Brodin 2000: 75). Quigley (1997) has high expectations in that political science is to deliver insights that can readily be applied to programs designed to assist democracy. He concludes that practitioners who look to political science for a grand theory explaining how democracies are constructed come away with disappointment. Not only the range of opposing ideas but also opposing research outcomes complicate any guidance. There are also few authors assessing and bridging the field with regard to conveying academic results for policy-actors. Among those prescribing promotion measures, many – such as Allison and Beschel (1992) – have a strong U.S. bias. For Burnell (2000b: 51), the problem derives from the fact that the motives, instruments and targets of democracy promoters, ranging from international organizations and ministries to NGOs, are incoherent and follow no master plan. Pinder (1994) criticized early the lack of coordinated efforts by the European Union (EU). At a minimum, democracy promotion needs to be defined more narrowly, excluding from the menu human rights issues or economic questions (Burnell 2000a: 19). Alexander (2003: 4) goes further. Because the democratization policies of international organizations are potentially different from the policies pursued by any one state unilaterally, and because of the increasing unilateral “sway” of the United States, he reduces international influence to the foreign policy of the U.S.17 and the EU. Opposition structure, state capacity, and U.S. or EU influence is measured, but not in the interplay of the three variables,

16

17

The editors claim – without irony – that the handbook “outlines options negotiators can draw upon when trying to build or rebuild democracy”, and that it “is designed as a quick reference tool containing numerous case studies, fact sheets and practical examples” (IDEA 1998: 1). An overview of democracy as American foreign policy provides Rose (2001).

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which would yield results allowing specifying what the consequences on the actor’s respective behavior are. Chalmer (1993) defines an “internationally based actor” as any actor who stays involved in a country’s domestic politics, becomes built into the political institutions, and is identified with international sources of power (see also Yilmaz 2002: 70). This involvement leads to coalitions between external and internal actors being likely to exert the “most dramatic effects” on authority structures when there are shifts in the coalitions that hold power in neighboring entities. These tend to be associated with large changes in the resources or means of influence that actors can mobilize (Gleditsch 2000: 5). Many studies invoke variations on Schelling’s (1971) “tipping model” to exhibit how even small shifts in external context can suffice to yield cascades of individual participation, thereby generating a critical mass in political contestation (e.g. Kuran 1989, 1991; Lohmann 1994). Such processes are often held to have played out in the fall of socialism in Eastern Europe, where the initial political changes in Poland and Hungary changed the relative influence of actors and constraints on feasible actions, which spurred subsequent changes in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. In one of the few scholarly works that postulates an explicit definition of democracy promotion, the list of activities that are expected to have positive effects on democratization contradicts with the empirical evidence this study found. Schmitter and Brouwer (1999: 11), for instance, exclude covert activities by external actors, “e.g. ‘quiet’ diplomatic efforts or activities of secret services”. The justification for exclusion is that it “should not be interpreted as implying that they have no impact on political liberalization, democratization, or consolidation of democracy, but just that they are qualitatively different in intent and origin”. It is not clear, however, how the difference can be sustained. Since democracy promotion consists of “all overt activities adopted […], and (directly or indirectly) implemented by foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes”, the exclusion of covert activities seems analytically superficial. The authors, moreover, claim that the effects of these activities upon regime change are generally very hard or impossible to observe or analyze. With the events at the demise of Communist Eastern Europe being history by now, however, recent declassifications and the willingness of insiders to share their knowledge has facilitated the collection of data, as will be shown later. Closely connected to the observation that hybrid regimes, not authoritarian systems, present the actual empirical puzzle is the subsequent reorientation to questions of how external inducements support smooth transitions to full democracy. A “return to state” debate followed, refocusing on structural factors and the importance of a functioning state and rule of law for the process of transitions


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(O’Donnell 2002). Contrary to Sutter (2000: 77), who argues that “aid must be tied to holding elections, not liberalization, or it can impede democratization”, for the democracy promotion debate, Carothers (2007) argues that the presently inherent sequencing in the assistance strategy overlooked the establishing of strong institutions before the introduction of elections and further attempts of democratization. More pessimistically, Dalpino (2000) suggests entirely abandoning the idea to move dictatorships toward democracy, and instead concentrating on human rights protection and aiming at only liberalizing and opening regimes. For democracy promoters, an assumption has been that hybrid regimes provide the best opportunity for external actors to make a political difference. Recent analyses of the diffusion of democracy support this view (Brinks and Coppedge 2006). The logic is inescapable: “while full-scale democracies need little assistance, full-scale dictatorships are hard to penetrate, lack democratic assets, and provide few local allies” (Bunce and Wolchik 2005: 7). Likewise, instead of conceptualizing international influence as structural variable, critiques of the transition literature which focuses on modernization and pact theory turn on the interplay of state capacity, opposition, and external influence as potential determinants for regime transition (Levitsky and Way 2002; Alexander 2003). Smith (1994: 279) points out the centrality of the elite-approach for external actors. All cases of U.S. democracy promotion indicate that, while the United States can make a difference in the transition to democracy, the most important actors are the local political elites, “for whose strength and commitment there can be no substitute” (279). Here a strategy can be formulated where the academic theoretical knowledge comes into play: to target the elites by undermining the ruling elite’s power grip with pressures of various kinds and to ally with and support local oppositional elites. The identified necessary splits in the authoritarian regime and the preconditions of exogenous shocks are central for understanding how external influence can penetrate into the domestic conflict. Diamond (1999) realizes the strategy’s virtue for external democracy promotion. He notes (1999: 277): Concerted international pressure on authoritarian elites could reinforce domestic pressures and persuade authoritarian elites that the costs of resisting demands for democracy exceed the benefits they expect to reap.

What tools are used to pressure a regime? How do they reinforce domestic pressures? In order to understand this causal mechanism, this study asks (1) why the costs to resist democracy rise and (2) how and when these costs exceed the gains “they expect to reap”. Advocating immediate democratization in countries where

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political change is a complex and volatile process can, at worst, exacerbate the instability that is inherent in political change by upsetting delicate internal dynamics (Dalpino 2000: 3). How can the internal dynamics be shifted towards liberal reform without creating instability? These are all fundamental questions the nested games of external democracy promotion attempts to give answers to. Because the above given brief codification of guidelines are still vague, in concluding this chapter, it could be said that the missing links in the literature underscore the value of further investigating the mechanisms under which external influences play a decisive role in the transition to democracy.

2.3.2 Democracy Promotion versus Democracy Protection The overwhelming literature on external democracy promotion concentrates on the consolidation phase of regime transitions. At least, it does not explicitly distinguish between the extensively differing activities in the liberalization, transition, or consolidation phase. Because the selection of strategies, instruments and internal recipients of democracy assistance depend significantly on the respective phase, Schmitter and Brouwer (1999) distinguish between democracy promotion and democracy protection. After authoritarianism has broken down and democratic institutions evolved, that is, during the consolidation of the new regime type, democracy can rather be protected than promoted. The focus of both the policy community and academic scholarship on the consolidation phase is partly a result of them having witnessed the contradictory trends that, while the spread of liberal democracy stagnated, forms of “electoral” or “defect” (Merkel et al. 2003) democracies continued to grow. Diamond (1999: 64) summarizes the consequences for both scholars and practitioners by concluding that today the “overriding imperative is to consolidate those democracies that have come into being during the third wave and to reconsolidate those that have lost their institutional effectiveness in this period”. From a foreign relations perspective, the United States policy reorientation to reinvigorate regime change by force further enhanced the debate about how effectively to consolidate democracies. The use of force for affecting the breakdown of authoritarian regimes has become a renewed topic of analysis for students of democratization and it occupies increasingly more of the thinking about how to extend and consolidate democracy in the early transition phases after democratic occupation (see Dawisha 2004; Stradiotto 2006). The limitation of an analysis to conditionality or control as most promising (Whitehead 1996) reduces the spheres in which democracy promotion efforts can be implemented to problems of consolidation. Among the major types of effec-


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tive instruments that Carothers (1997: 112-115) and Diamond (1997: 335-342) earlier identified, for example, “election assistance”, “political institution building”, and “assistance to civil society”, only the sphere of civil society could be simultaneously a target of democracy assistance during consolidation as well as during earlier phases of transition. In a similar vein, Whitehead (1996) identifies three international dimensions of democratization. The dimensions reflect three ways for external actors to engage in democracy promotion abroad: control, contagion, and consent. Control, what Schmitter (1996) and Schmitter and Brouwer (1999) also term conditionality, is a concept widely employed in developing studies with regard to the conditionality of foreign aid (Crawford 1997; Brodin 2000). Control entails sanctions on target governments that do not comply with policy prescriptions. Contagion is the unintended act referring to the diffusion of experiences. Consent, finally, involves the promotion of norms and the use of dialogue. Since conditionality includes the support for opposition, and Schmitter and Brouwer (1999), apart from military coercion, reasonably depict this dimension as the only “nonconsensual” activity, it is also the sole dimension under analysis in the study of external influence on the breakdown of authoritarian regimes. In the literature, under the aegis of democracy promotion, the accession to membership in the European Union is also discussed as an incentive for democratization. However, when countries come within reach of signing even the stabilization and association agreement with the EU, their democratic institutions are certainly in the process of consolidating. Some studies regard the European Union as a promoter of democracy that has been very conducive for the Eastern European transitions (Kubicek 2003; Papadimitriou 2002; Sedelmeier and Wallace 1996). The most significant effect does thereby not originate from the EU’s direct democracy promotion assistance, but from the pressure to democratize that accompanies the conditionnalities of prospective membership in the European club (see Schimmelfennig 2007). Vachudova claims that, of all international actors in Europe, the EU “had by far the greatest leverage on domestic political change” (Vachudova 2006: 6).18 The problem is that this line of research only infrequently differentiates between the transition phases when estimating the EU’s effect. As for the phase before the first free elections in Eastern Europe, that is, the liberalization phase, the EU’s role was quite distinct and quite the opposite of having exerted much lever18

Membership conditionalities of the EU as incentive to foster democracy do not always have the strong effects as witnessed in the post-Communist settings. In post-conflict areas such as the Yugoslav successor states, the promise of membership leads to rather mixed results when assessing this tool of democracy protection (Reljic 2008: 4).

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age. There was, for example, an observable difference between the West European governments, which were rather hesitant in actively promoting democratic reform, and the United States. This holds in particular for the Polish liberalization process. This study’s empirical findings on Poland throughout the 1980s concur strongly with Rachwald (1990: 56): The West European capitals once more perceived Polish events as destabilizing and hopeless, and they were willing to witness the termination of the free union experiment since it seemed inconsistent with the prevailing international order.

Ultimately, the instruments and actors of democracy promotion (with the aim to democratize) are so different that, in the liberalization phase, Dalpino (2000: 21) suggests the policy itself can only be called “liberalization”. Along with Schmitter and Brouwer (1999) this differentiation could improve the conceptual clarity in the democracy promotion debate. However, the terminological confusion might surpass the analytical benefits. Promoting democracy in the liberalization phase is qualitatively close to strategies about how to, normatively speaking, oust dictatorships and “break the axis of evil” (Palmer 2003). Analytically, the form of assistance and the use of instruments are much more reduced than the array of democracy programs that are commonly associated with democracy protection during consolidation. Forms of assistance for the promotion of democracy during liberalization center on the conditionalities, the “non-consensual” activities, with the targets predominantly being “civil society” groups. To target the authoritarian regime directly with diplomatic, economic, and political pressures is of less interest to the democracy promotion industry and is rather studied under the heading of foreign policy. Conceptually, however, both targets need to be integrated into the framework of comparative democratization.

2.4 Quantifying International Factors Through identifying specific external agents and factors, quantitative research to measure the influence of international factors confirms the influences of the external dimension on the processes of democratization. Yet specifying the comprehensive impact with which factors outside the system influence the course of internal events still poses both theoretical and empirical challenges. This problem lies not only in the complexity of the task. Although the international context is “almost by definition omnipresent since very few polities in the contemporary world are isolated from its effects” (Schmitter 1991: 4), more specifically qualitative work has always assumed its causal impact to play an indirect and

2.4 Quantifying International Factors

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usually marginal role (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 5). On the other hand, analyzing its real impact or influence in the process of transition empirically is somewhat difficult. Much of the internationalist literature still lacks empiricism, although some quantitative studies on the effect of diffusion exist that have fairly recently been published (see Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Brown 2001). The Przeworski et al. (2000) study of democratization and development, “the current state of the art for quantitative studies of regime change” (Geddes 2002: 5), includes only one indicator of international influence. It is the proportion of all regimes currently democratic, which is treated as an indicator of the general world opinion about democracy. This variable is used as a proxy for the pro-democracy international context of the 1980s and 1990s, a variable often cited as an important source of pressure and contagion. But their statistical analysis fails to confirm its importance. Apart from single foreign powers, various other international factors have, however, been empirically studied. Some studies have focused on an empirical test of several internationalist arguments pertaining to democratization: international organizations (Pridham 2000; Reiter 2001; Cooper 2001; Barnes and Kurtz 2001; Wu 2001), regional international organizations (Pevehouse 2002, 2005), economic globalization (Brown 2001; Barnes and Kurtz 2001; Przeworski et al. 2000), foreign aid (Feyzioglu 1996; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Moore 1998; Knack 2000), international financial transfers and foreign direct investments (Al-Momani 2003), the end of the Cold War (Pridham 2000), or multitudes of various international factors (Im 2002; Geddes 2002). In a macro-quantitative comparison of foreign pressure on authoritarian regimes, Geddes (2002) argues what can account for all quantitative verifications of the international factors: although foreign pressures can faciliate transitions, they do not outweigh the domestic sources of authoritarian weakness or durability. Geddes’ evaluation of findings does not address the endogenity concern directly, but shows how any interpretation of results requires careful weighing against the domestic and intrinsic evolution of institutions. Most studies on the effect the EU has as a democracy promoter come to similar results (e.g. Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007). Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 12) review many of the claims about international influences on political change in Africa and assert in conclusion the priority of the domestic sources of political reform. Newer studies differentiate clearer among the particular forms of foreign economic assistance as external democracy promotion. In a study covering 174 developed and developing countries from 1976 through 1994, Al-Momani (2003) argues that international financial variables have less impact upon the level of democracy than the literature hypothesized. “Foreign assistance” even

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correlates negatively with economic development levels and has no direct effect on democracy levels. More specifically, Al-Momani found that only foreign direct investment associates positively to economic development levels and, through increased economic development, contributes to democracy. In a quantitative effort to explore the causal mechanisms behind the influence of economic liberalization and international aid conditionalities, Barnes and Kurtz (2002) find that economic development “may not be the force for democratization that many had hoped” (2002: 548) and that only positive democratic conditionality from external actors can play an important role in regime transition dynamics.

2.5 Democratization and International Relations Theories The framing of the argument in this study builds, in part, on literature from the study of international relations. Some theoretical concepts are thus worth further exploration for the purpose of their application in studies of comparative politics in general, and the international dimension of democratization in particular. Among the broader theories of international relations, two theories could be helpful in addressing the internal-external linkage of democratization: theories of international institutions and theories of war, which debate the role of uncertainty and deterrence in international crises. The vast majority of theories on international institutions and organization have focused on their effect for the outcomes of international politics such as war or cooperation between states (Keohane 1984) rather than on domestic dynamics.19 Unfortunately, only few ideas are transferable from those “linkage politics” (Rosenau 1969) to democratization politics. The study of deterrence in international politics centers on the uncertainties that arise with international crises. Uncertainty is the driving force behind both international crises and the bargaining of regime and opposition over the path of regime type.

2.5.1 International Organizations and Domestic Politics Among the theories of international relations, the second image reversed literature provides one of the starting points for thinking about the linkages of the international dimension and democratization. This framework encompasses theories that analyze the influence of international factors on domestic political out19

On integrating domestic politics studies with international relations theory in general see Jacobsen (1996).

2.5 Democratization and International Relations Theories

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comes. Gourevitch’s initial summary of this literature with regard to regime change centered on the influence of the international economy and the state system (Gourevitch 1978).20 Gourevitch (1978: 911) emphasizes what this study argues, too: any theory that purports to explain how international factors change originally domestic decisions must contain references to the domestic political process. Different to the study of democratization is that the dependent variable in these studies is foreign policy behavior. Internal penetration in transition politics, however, is often the choice of elites (Pevehouse 2005: 6). Domestic actors allow the penetration for strategic reasons. The purpose of studying exogenous factors in democratization processes is anchored in the wider context of how domestic politics are intertwined with international relations, a field in which “our theories have not yet sorted out the puzzling tangle” (Putnam 1993: 431; see also Hartmann 1997). Building on the works of the second image literature, more formalized views have evolved debating the question as to whether institutions matter. The new institutionalism in particular, as well as Europeanization studies, link international organizations to domestic politics through the causal mechanisms of commitment enhancement, for example, in order to limit the pressures arising from a pluralist society (Pevehouse 2002: 518; Zangl 1995). Pevehouse (2005) is a unique example of how the second image literature can be combined with developing widely applicable theories in democratization studies. He shows convincingly how both membership and accession to international organizations such as the European Union can be used strategically in the domestic arena of transitions to democracy. One prominent example of the so-called new institutionalism is Putnam’s (1998) two-level framework. Putnam suggests how a domestic actor’s “win-set” could be constrained by international organizations and institutions. Because this approach shares some similarities with the later introduced theory, this chapter will include references to this study’s theoretical design. The literature on “two-level” games of domestic politics and international relations provides a theoretical fundament for the observation that states often exploit the presence of domestic veto players for enhancing their international bargaining power and vice versa (see Tsebelis 2002). Putnam’s initial examples were domestic ratification requirements for international treaties. Similar to the literature on “nested games” (Tsebelis 1990), this literature makes explicit how the actions of domestic players are embedded in an international game that limits the contingencies of action on the domestic game and vice versa.

20

In comparative politics, Gasiorowski (1995) explains regime change with economic crises.

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Nevertheless, the emphasis on reciprocal interaction between international and domestic level has not received much attention in the formal literature on two-level games.21 Furthermore, most studies following the approach are interested in understanding the effects of domestic politics on international outcomes. Most prominent are models of negotiation within the context of the European Union; Pahre (1997) for example, uses the two-level game to explain variation in parliamentary oversight across EU member states. The prevalence of this second image design pays tribute to the fact that domestic structures – within democratic countries – tend to be relatively more stable, making them more suitable for cross-country studies (see also Zürn 1993). The international influence on domestic politics (the second image reversed) is, on the other hand, more difficult to capture. Additionally, with regard to theory itself and the finding of equilibria, an analysis of the reciprocal interaction between the two levels would present a complex undertaking. Even though the two-level framework could present an excellent take-off point for a theory connecting international organizations with democratic transitions, few works in this tradition approach that particular linkage. In the literature on regime transitions, Schedler (2002b) develops a two-level framework which he calls a “nested” game. He analyses how, in authoritarian systems, electoral competition is embedded inside electoral manipulation. However, Tsebelis’ (1990) concept of nested games is only used as a departure for a descriptive systemization, since Schedler neither develops a formal argument nor solves any game he puts forward.22 In how far is the two-level framework of value to the study of external influence on regime transitions? Milner (1997) models each of the two levels, the domestic and the international, differently “to reflect their particular characteristics” (1997: 69): the domestic level reflects the bargaining between regime and opposition; the “international level” the interaction between regime and international actor and both are treated as interdependent. Milner applies a soft rational choice approach. With regard to formal complexity, the international dimension in regime transitions poses the same analytical dilemma as the reciprocal impact between the domestic level and international agreements poses. To include, for example, the interaction of a third player, the external actor, in the regime-

21

22

Lohmann (1997) being an exception. There are, however, a number of empirical case studies, see for example the contributions in Evans, Jacobs, and Putnam (1993). For a critique of Schedler (2002b) see also Pevehouse (2005).


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opposition game would obfuscate the general idea of choosing the gametheoretic approach, namely to lay bare the fundamental causal mechanisms.23 In addition, Putnam (1998) uses simple sequential games, which would unrealistically defragment the continuous and prolonged interaction we often observe in processes of political liberalization. According to Putnam, in a first round, the elites interact on the international level; in the second, the followers, such as the national parliaments, approve or disapprove (ratify or do not ratify) the reached outcome. Yet, as opposed to two-level games, nested games do reflect games with simultaneous moves stronger (Tsebelis 1990: 244). At the least, to unravel the empirical puzzle of clearly separating each stage in a transition process is flawed with inaccuracies. It might also be intrinsically cumbersome to define which of the multiple actors moved first. The overlapping of tactical moves by one or the other side, for the observer hidden signals and communication pattern, and minor interactions on a variety of different hierarchical levels, all point to a plethora of interactions difficult to analytically limit to only two rounds (or levels) of games.24 In the repeated version of games, discount factors are being incorporated (Lohmann 1997), integrating the necessary temporal variable. This discount factor, however, does not rely on the clear separation of game stages. Yet the factor does pay tribute to the fact that interactions in strategic transitions are taking place over prolonged periods of time. In conclusion, the metaphor of the two-level games is indeed close to the nested game approach selected for this study – it is the particularities of their respective formalizations that account for the major distinctions.

23

24

In a game between Defender and Challenger, Casper and Taylor (1997) introduces a third player, the “mass public”, but the tools of game theory are only touched upon in the introduction. Their theory, however, provides an interesting starting point to think about additional levels and contextual factors in the regime-opposition interaction. Colomer (2000: 76) maps a three-player game on the transition scene in the Soviet Union, but the solution to his games is not straightforward and is difficult to reproduce. Another underlying assumption connected to the sequential design of the game is relevant: in Putnam’s model, the elites are caught inside a principal-agent relation that they entertain with their national parliaments. Tsebelis (1990: Ch. 6) examines a similar case in his study of Belgian ethnic elites negotiating over compromises that they, in a second step, have to sell to their respective followers. Regime elites during any transition period, however, obviously do not have a similar relationship with either the opposition or an external actor.

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2.5.2 Uncertainty and Crises: Deterring Authoritarian Repression From the perspective of how valuable theoretical arguments from different schools are for generalization across fields, literature that focuses on uncertainty as the driving force behind crises and wars (Fearon 1994; Morrow 1989; Schultz 2001)25 becomes interesting. Regime transitions are clouded with uncertainty about the moves and tactics the actors plan next. The integration of uncertainty into rational choice models of domestic transition usually describes the limited knowledge the actors have about two aspects: the type of regime the opposition is facing (Colomer 2000); and, after the ruling coalition split, the probability the liberalizers in the regime attach to successful repression (Przeworski 1992; Gates and Humes 1997; Blaydes 2003). A particular research field in international politics produces some additional ideas about how to capture both the relation between uncertainty and the role of a third nation in international conflicts. External factors in the breakdown of authoritarianism prima facie do not exhibit typical features we find in international conflicts. But some basic strategies are similar. Ultimately, the domestic conflict over the direction a political system takes is internationalized in the moment a foreign democratic power appears on the stage. The study of deterrence in international politics treats the way subjective beliefs of the actors are used in games of limited information for addressing general questions that arise with international crises (see Wagner 1989). Deterrence, in the broadest sense, relates to Diamond’s (1999) proposed democracy promotion outlined in Chapter 2.3.1. In international relations theory, deterrence is “the attempt by one nation, called the defender, to forestall anticipated actions by another nation, called the challenger, by a threat to impose costs on the second nation” (Morrow 1994a: 38). The lessons about how threats and bluffs work that can be drawn from models of deterrence do also apply to other situations where actors use threats against one another. Clearly, external pressure or the degree of resolve in domestic negotiations belongs to those. The logic of deterrence in international politics is a simple example of how utility theory can be applied to a variety of strategic situations. The role of deterrence is a much-used concept in understanding states’ actions in international crises (Morrow 1994a: 242; see also Kilgour and Zagare 1991; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992).26 Based on Morrow (1994: 41), a simple model that 25

26

This literature builds on earlier arguments about the role of uncertainty as a cause of war, such as Schelling (1960). Moreover, the very logic of deterrence covers many situations in politics, to mention but a few: the threat of economic sanctions, the use of force to defend allies, the deterrence of nuclear


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reflects the logic of deterring and threatening in politics could be applied to a strategic situation between a regime that “challenges” the democratic existence of the opposition, which “defends” its right for an all-inclusive, pluralistic political system. A variant of this simple deterrence model poses the so-called extended deterrence, or, in wider terms, the “composite security dilemma” (Snyder 1997), where the defender is an ally of a third party, that is, of a protégé. The basic assumptions and logics of such a model intuitively draws the attention of a student of regime change: In one way or the other, an external actor in the regime change game reflects some of the constellations in which a defender finds itself when supporting an ally – the opposition – against a crisis it faces with a challenger – the Ancien regime. The opposition is faced with the regime challenging its legal status and existence as a democratic force. Consider one of the typical strategic dilemma a defender finds itself in games of extended deterrence, for instance, and compare it with the confrontation of a demanding opposition after the regime indicated its willingness to open the authoritarian structures, but only to a certain degree: A defender (the external actor) attempts to forestall a crisis between two other states, one of which is an ally or protégé (the opposition), and the other a challenger (an authoritarian regime). A “deterrence-versus-restraint dilemma” (Zagare and Kilgour 2006) arises. The hypothetical example captures the delicate situations regarding how the defender should best behave. It resembles the dangers of assisting oppositional groups in dictatorships which could exacerbate instability and crisis: if the Defender makes too strong a commitment to its ally, it creates a moral hazard: feeling secure, the Protégé may behave irresponsibly, thereby provoking the very confrontation the Defender had hoped to avoid. But if the Defender’s commitment is too weak, the Challenger may be emboldened to address its grievance too aggressively and preclude a peaceful resolution of the dispute (Zagare and Kilgour 2006: 624).

Similarly to the uncertainty resilient to the regime’s resorting to violent repression if it feels pushed too hard during political opening, the balancing of the opposition’s moves often decide about what the opponent perceives as provocation or not. The defender has then to choose optimally between both deterring the challenger and restraining the ally simultaneously. Therefore the success of deterrence does not only depend on the objective damage that the defender can war, but also, domestically, the threat of parliaments overseeing executive agencies and trying to control their policies.

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impose on the challenger, but also on how the challenger reacts to the possibility of that damage (Morrow 1994a: 40). The uncertainty about how the regime estimates the chances for a successful repression, and, additionally, the costs this move would ensue, could change the probability calculation as outlined by Ahn (2002) and Gates Humes (1997; see also Chapter 3.1.4). For example, the probability p that the regime carries out the threat to use violence for repression is, hence, reduced by the defender’s (the external actor’s) commitment to its protégé, the opposition. The regime’s belief comes to the fore when predicting any of its behavior and how these change through bluffing and deterring. The challenger regime cannot ascertain the defender’s resolve. Instead, it has beliefs about the defender’s resolve, which it updates as the game progresses. How serious are the foreign power’s actions and the leverage of its pressure to compel democratic reforms? Are the threats to impose sanctions, aimed at forestalling repressive crackdown of the opposition, merely bluffs? Zagare and Kilgour’s (2006) “deterrence-versus-restraint dilemma” also draws attention to the strategic dilemma the external actor itself may as well face. Our picture of external democracy assistance is enlarged because it forces us to think more about the implicit, negative consequences a foreign commitment to the opposition poses. They run somewhat counterintuitive and should hence be treated with particular attention. Namely, through its external support and assistance, the opposition might act with increased risk, feeling too secure. In the worst case, its action could provoke a backlash to a narrower dictatorship that precludes the otherwise possible negotiation of a systematic process of liberal reform. Only in rare instances, the external actor will have an interest in an outcome that an overly confident opposition could induce: a potential destabilization of the entire country with difficulty to predict the overall consequences. Deterrence theories can thus be helpful in pointing out strategic dilemmas that arise from the international dimension in democratization. The phenomena can be called the democracy promotion dilemma. Chapter 4.4.4 will show how the nested game approach reflects this strategic basic by making predictions about which forms of external support can result in which moves in the nested transition game.

Transferal of Tools from International Relations Theory Before moving further to the actual rational choice theories of democratization in the subsequent chapter, certain formal conceptualization from international relations theory can be distilled. Game theory is a tool most commonly used in the


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study of international politics. Hence, the application to comparative studies, all the more to phenomena touching heavily on internal-external linkages, is challenging in a pure methodological interest. Somewhat related is the idea that a cross-field approach acknowledges the fact that the topic of the international dimension in political regime transitions most certainly touches questions that are, by its underlying logic, similar to those in international relations. Apart from those practical overlaps, scholars in the conflict and war studies apply a higher level of formalization due to the strategic nature their object of interest has. Of course, game-theoretic model building is facilitated by the more straightforward identification of the unit state as actor. Bargaining in a crisis is comparable to the situation where an opposition challenges the regime in a pre-transition phase to democracy. States bargaining in an international crisis as well as the interaction between opposition and Ancien regime face similar conditions:

Actors are uncertain about their rival’s preferences and may take actions that bring about escalation leading, in the one case, to war, and, in the other, to either violent repression, civil war, or revolutionary overthrow; strategically bargaining in a crisis situation is driven by efforts to communicate resolve for the use of force; threats and displays of power are primary means of communication (Schultz 2001: 4); when states bargain in a crisis, their expectations about the outcome and the costs of conflict determine the range of negotiated settlements that are acceptable ex ante – a condition of incomplete and asymmetric information that is similarly characteristic of the uncertainty inherent to the processes of democratization. Regarding the factors determining the evaluation of conflict, it arises whenever at least one actor has information which others cannot observe.

The frameworks of international crises employed see war as a result of a bargaining failure. Borrowing from literature in economics, a central feature of studying international conflict is arguing that bargaining can fail due to asymmetric information combined with conflicting preferences over the allocation of disputed goods.

3 Strategic Transitions

The strategic approach to the study of democratization is based on assumptions about the nature of the actors that compete in defining the future of the regime type and about what their goals are. As introduced above, many of the authors rely on O’Donnell and Schmitter’s (1986) framework, in which strategic groups are arrayed along political dimensions: from radical democratic reformers through moderate reformers, from moderates inside the authoritarian regime through right wing or hardline regime extremists. O’Donnell and Schmitter made extensive use of rational choice arguments, but did not formally apply game theory or develop formal models. Departing from here, game theorists often focus on whether the moderates in both camps emerge as dominant. From there the analysis circles around the question if they can bargain their way towards some democratic opening without provoking repression or military intervention. Coppedge (2008) aptly terms this framework based on where the actors are placed in a political dimension the positional school. This constitutes Chapter 3.1. A much higher degree of formalization for studying democratization is applied by theories based on economic arguments. This economic school is rarely referred to in most standard texts on democratization. Similar to the historicalsociological school, but building on Dahl’s (1971) definition of democracy, it defines the actors according to their resources, usually wealthy ruling elites versus poor non-elites, that is, the general population. Chapter 3.2 introduces transition models of the economic school. Since the explanatory value of gametheoretic approaches is frequently questioned, and its tools are applied with reservation in German comparative politics, a separate chapter (Chapter 3.3) emphasizes the benefits of studying regime transitions formally. This chapter seeks to connect this study’s own theory with the existing literature on strategic regime transitions and place it into a wider research context of, particularly, theories of strategic democratization. The purpose of this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive review of these models but, rather, to set out some of the basic intuitions that are crucial for the argument of this book. The gap this study aims to fill can only be side accounted for by ascertaining that,


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apart from Zielinski (1995), so far no study has applied game-theoretical tools to understand the international dimension in regime transitions.27 Zielinski (1995) regards the Eastern European transitions as unique due to the „Soviet factor” and models the Polish transition based on the veto power of the Soviet Union.28

3.1 The Positional School In the positional school, theories usually rank the possible regime types by preference order, and the actors’ preferences and position in the existing regime defines who they are: hardliners, softliners, moderates, or radicals, to name a few elite groups commonly referred to. They assume that the actors think about political regimes as ends in themselves. At the center of this chapter are the main arguments deriving from both soft and hard formal models of democratization, further separated to account for the treatment of uncertainty and repression as crucial factors for understanding the outcomes of transition. Before, however, the subsequent chapter serves to underline generally the usefulness of capturing transitions politics as a process of making strategic decisions.

3.1.1 Transition Politics as Rational Choice Notwithstanding its limited receptions among transitologists, transitions to democracy have generated a considerable rational choice literature. Rather than arguing that democratization has cultural or structural bases, rational choice theorists29 would argue that the strategic choices of political actors shape regime transitions and that democracies can operate in even extremely unfavorable circumstances. Scholars using such an approach to study democratization in Eastern Europe and Latin America have argued that democracy has to be a self-enforcing equilibrium of the strategic interactions between a country’s political players. As a way of introducing the general concepts of rational choice studies of democra27

28

29

Papadimitriou (2002) uses an informal application of Tsebelis’ (1990) nested games approach to the European Community’s enlargement strategy towards Eastern European and the effect the EC had on the consolidation in the early 1990s. Sutter (2000) makes only allusions to foreign nations potentially increasing the government payoff. Though being very close to Przeworski (1992) (and remaining comparably under-complex), Zielinski (1995) does not refer to Przeworski. Referring to “rational choice theory” means a reference to the theory of games and decisions. Other alternative forms commonly applied in political science, such as new institutionalism (North 1990) or collective action theories (Olson 1965), are mostly omitted here.

3.1 The Positional School

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tization, this chapter argues that (1) the politics of transition are about strategy, and that, consequently, (2) laying bare the causal mechanisms of regime transitions requires theories that capture the dynamics of strategic interaction. If the strategic moment of regime transition requires decisions about life and death, within the context of this study, we can well ask why Polish strikers were shot at in 1970, only arrested in 1980 and invited to co-govern in 1988. Przeworski’s (1992) model of a transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy highlights the strategic interaction between members of the Ancien regime and members of civil society. Asked recently why, in the early 1990s, he turned to game theory for his work on transitions to democracy – in a time when it was not at all a common tool in the profession – Adam Przeworski replied: I was extremely struck by the degree to which Polish Communists thought strategically. By that time I was going to Warsaw very often, and it was clear to me that the Communists were strategizing very carefully […]. Indeed, whether you went to Spain in the mid 70s or Poland in the mid 80s, over drinks, people analyzed politics in strategic terms. This doesn’t mean that everybody knew everything, that everybody could anticipate all the consequences of their choices. But I was struck from the beginning that people were thinking strategically. I started to think, maybe I’ll put myself in their shoes, try to understand the situation strategically, model it, and then see what I come up with.30

After Rustow (1970) triggered the actor-driven approach, Przeworski (1991; 1992) was the first political scientist to put forth a model of political liberalization that embodies these propositions. He consolidated agency-driven analyses as an indissoluble part from the study of political regime transition.31 The strategic approach to democratic transition separates the interaction process of competing groups from the catalysts of transition, the international dimension, and the economics of reform. This study’s model, therefore, departs considerably from both Przeworski’s original conceptualization and subsequent exchanges based on his initial ideas. Drawing on theories of political action, transition studies offer an explanation of democratization as being a process. The process consists of choices that are “caught up in a continuous redefinition of actors’ perceptions of preferences 30 31

Qtd. in Munck and Snyder (2007: Chapter 13). The first game-theoretic modeling of the strategic situation between an authoritarian regime and an opposition was published by Brams and Hessel in 1984 (Brams and Hessel 1984). Their analysis of the Polish situation 1980-1981 was intended as an illustration of the inherently abstract concepts they developed earlier, called “sequential games”. Brams later summarized the ideas as the Theory of Moves (Brams 1994).

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and constraints” (Kitschelt 1992: 1028). The task is to trace and explain these processes. It is in the nature of strategic analyses that the international dimension is conceptualized to study external influence on actors and their preferences rather than on structures and contextual variables. The focus on agents of democratic change implies, first of all, the comparable salience of elites featuring prominently for understanding political processes of regime change. Higley and Gunther (1992) as well as Linz and Stepan (1996) point to the role of political incentives and leadership decisions, and thereby hope to explain the “attainments of elites’ compromises leading to the establishment of democratic regimes” (Colomer 200: 137). Revolutionary challenges come from competing elites. The challenge to ruling elites does not come from the destitute, who are too busy trying to survive. The inclusion of “civil society”32 as political elite in the transition process and as an interactive actor is fundamental. Rather than interpreting democratization as a pure unilateral, elite-driven process that is controlled top-down, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Huntington (1991), and Sutter (1995) assign civil society a role of more than just a catalyst. Mac Adam et al. (1996) and Oberschall (2000) discuss intensively the problems of collective oppositional action and mobilization within political reform processes. Sutter (2000) posits a model with a unitary regime and opposition actors. Rather than confront the unilateral action of top-down or bottom-up transition, he argues that transitions are the outcomes of mutually agreed upon changes. While he seeks to define the conditions necessary to lead to founding elections, the utilities derive from the “gains from transition” (Sutter 2000: 70). He mentions but ignores the liberalization effect of the opposition that gains power during the process of transition, especially if the regime cracks.33 Huntington (1991) claims that top-down regime initiated transitions are more likely to be successful and peaceful. In rational choice modeling, during the interaction between civil society and varying regime types, civil society is commonly not well-defined or developed but it is only required to exhibit some coherency, i.e. a capability for unified 32

33

For further discussion on the concept of “civil society”, including the normative ideas behind it, see Cohen and Arato (1992) as a summary. For the purpose of modeling strategic transition, the concept is used for referring generally to all non-state actors, that is, any form of organized opposition. Accounting for the heterogeneity of protest movements, some empirical studies confirm that protesters possess, first of all, different thresholds of participation. The evidence here is closely connected to Kuran’s attempt to capture the social composition of a protest movement in a threshold model (Kuran 1995; Kuran 1989). However, Kuran’s model cannot explain when revolutions under the same structural conditions happen. For more on social movement studies with regard to Communist Europe and Polish Solidarity see (Osa 2003).


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action (Ahn and Loveless 2004). To reach an outcome of democratization, civil society is not seeking to replace the state, only to create the opportunity for a political opening. Therefore the idea to overthrow the incumbent regime has not likely been an ex ante facto dominant strategy. This point will be picked up later. Since research on external influence for political liberalization is predominantly interested in how opposition groups are established and develop, although under non-democratic state structures, social movement research promises mutual information gains. One relevant dimension and central variable from social movement theory refers to which “political environment” (Osa 2000: 15) creates an opportunity for “insurgency,” if studied under authoritarian structures. “Political opportunity” is the “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimension of the political environment that provides incentives for collective action by affecting people’s expectations for success or failure” (Tarrow 1998, 76-77). Political opportunity consists of the following cluster of variables: (1) elite divisions; (2) changes in the media and information flows; and (3) state capacity. State capacity can be affected by the loss (or gain) of external allies and international support, by systemic economic problems, or by bureaucratic breakdown and/or political corruption. Any significant loss of state capacity will negatively affect the regime’s ability to apply strong repressive controls, even if it should wish to do so (Osa 2000: 16). At a first glance into the social movement theories, the key notions do strongly interrelate with concepts applied to the strategic analysis of regime transition processes. Of particular relevance, and emphasizing the agency-driven approach focusing on actors’ preferences, is Tarrow’s definition of a political opportunity as being a subjective variable. It is the actors’ subjective beliefs – “their expectations for success or failure” – that form the incentive for action. In descriptive studies, one of the consequences for opposition groups of a change in their beliefs stems from an ill-defined intuition of ‘morale boosting’. When an authoritarian regime opens and liberalization or even democracy appears on the political horizon, a full range of scenarios for different stages in that process need to be examined. As Przeworski argues that democracy is ultimately an equilibrium for self-interested players, his use of game theory is valuable for examining the interactive and interdependent strategies of political transition. The actors find themselves in negotiations that equal a bargaining process; however, negotiation should not be considered as participants virtually sitting down at a table, but as the idea of actors competing for the advancement of their most preferred outcome at different points in time. Given the goals, resources and beliefs of the main political forces as well as the setting that structures their contingencies for action, several outcomes are possible. They can encompass either open, violent conflict, or unstable install-

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ments of some democratic institutional framework, or a durable, full democracy, or, simply, the status quo dictatorship. On the heels of Przeworski’s model, others have made the original conceptualization more relevant and robust in understanding the player’s actions and decisions during the transition process. Transition games are always modeled as non-cooperative games because they explicitly model the means of enforcement of agreements (see Harsanyi and Selten 1988). It is the appropriate tool since there are no binding rules in transition games. These games are about changing rules. With regard to the transition actors regime, opposition, and external actor, it is simply unreasonable to assume that the players find a common arrangement to coordinate their strategies, as is the definition of cooperative games. There is no institution punishing non-compliance in a process of political liberalization. In non-cooperative games theory, cooperative behavior can be obtained in iterated games (Axelrod 1984: 87). However, for the study of democratization, Colomer (2000: 51) believes that the effect of repeated games does not exist in games of political transition. How is it possible to generalize about the actors in a process as complex and diverse as democratization? Given the variety of circumstances and constraints faced by both oppositions and authoritarian regimes, it is reasonable to conclude that it is nearly impossible to specify a set of preferences that are universal or at least universally held across the same region. Yet some assumptions are obvious. Even though they can barely be treated as stylized facts, some of them have been recurring in the literature in one or the other form (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1992; Colomer 2000; Blaydes 2003; Geddes 1991) and have found inclusion in the definitions of this study’s own game moves.

3.1.2 Formal Theories of Democratization What makes theories of democratization formal? They clearly define actors, their goals, and the choices they face, and make use of deductive logic (Geddes 2003: 177). Using game theory to analyze the strategic interaction of the competing groups of transition is an analytical tool that helps clarify the strategies and beliefs of the actors from which explanations and eventually even predictions can be constructed. While, at the time, Laitin (1992: x) remarked that such studies did not present theories of “the mathematical and formal elegance of game theory as demonstrated in current economic models”, in the meantime, the application of those theories has both in number and in quality gained momentum. Yet, by standards of game theory, Przeworski (1992) builds on an incomplete model and prevents formal analysis of equilibria. The use of formal methodology


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in rational choice underlies a distinction between formal and ‘soft’ versions. Soft rational choice theorists do not construct formal models and are even more prone to problems of under-specication than the existing game-theoretic models already are. Existing formal models of democratization remain strictly reconstructive because they solely model the processes as such, leaving aside factors that are exogenous to them. After rational actor approaches to the study of domestic regime changes were introduced, in the literature, extensions of these models to include exogenous factors have been scarce. Nearly all the developed games are isolated from international forces and modeled as a purely domestic process. For the study of transitions, it still remains unsatisfying that these works have not attempted to relate their findings to similar studies of and arguments about the subject. A canon of game-theoretical achievements for researching regime transitions has not yet been established. This section picks up from a point raised in the introduction to this study, adding to it the following claim: As more and more models have been proposed to study transitions, analysts would be hard pressed to show whether these models are competing models or partial but complementary efforts to grasp the same phenomena and, if the latter, how they might all fit together and provide the basis for the cumulation of knowledge. Rather, we are left with a large number of models that conceptualize key elements – the actors, their choices, and their payoffs – in a range of different ways that are rarely compared and never coherently integrated (Munck 2001: 195).

Other scholars have, explicitly or implicitly, sought to operationalize Przeworski’s model of liberalization. Some of the subsequent modifications proposed minor variations to Przeworski’s model (Zielinski 1995; Crescenzi 1999)34, others present more significant modifications, but in clear reference to Przeworski’s model (Sutter 1995; Swaminathan 1999). With a different perspective, the work of Colomer (1995; 2000) does not state if his models are competing or partial but complementary efforts to the body of literature. Colomer (2000: 37) analyzes regime transition decisions as prisoner’s dilemma games35. The main actors – hardliners of the regime and radical revolutionaries – are plausibly assigned with the strategic categories: democratic rupture, reform, and continuity of authoritarian rule. Colomer (2000: 53) says, “priority has been given here to developing an intuitive analysis that avoids relatively awkward formal frameworks”. By this, he 34

35

Gates and Humes (1997) as well as Blaydes (2003) are among those authors, but because their variation of Przeworski further specifies the role of uncertainty about repression, both will be discussed in Chapter 3.1.3. For prisoner’s dilemma in transition studies see also Marks (1992: 56).

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refers to the fact that he is not using the standard way of solving games through finding the appropriate equilibria. Colomer relies on the theory of moves36. In this approach, the reasoning that leads to the prediction of cooperation on reform is quite different from standard game theory. Certain equilibria in the theory of moves are not regarded as the Nash concept to solving equilibria suggests. It relies heavily on hypothetical threats to collapse cooperation. This study’s model will make use of the concepts of threats, too, but only to a limited degree, as will be seen later. For game theorists, providing no formal analysis, and solving no equilibrium, could be defined as merely redescribing situations. One could also say that, by standards of game theory, it is awkward to change preferences in a model. However, it might not be awkward at all to specify an already complex process with more complexity, which could lead to a better understanding and eventually surprising results of analysis. Other points of critique on Colomer could relate to the issue of repetition. In Colomer’s view, transition games cannot be repeated. However, repetition is, on the one hand, a way of introducing the very threats he invokes, on the other hand, he says that people are future-oriented. Yet the tool for capturing temporal factors in game theory is the introduction of repeated games. Przeworski (1992) modeled the ‘Games of Transition’ technically less formally than Colomer (2000), but, in fact, more sophisticated by introducing uncertainty into an extensive-form game. Przeworski tries to formalize some of the arguments he has derived from the work carried out with O’Donnell and Schmitter by modeling the sequence of moves in a game between liberalizers among the authoritarian ruling elite and the moderates within the democratic opposition. According to Colomer, reaching outcomes by bargaining and agreeing on intermediate reform, with both sides adopting the strategy of intermediate reform, are only possible under two conditions: 1) Maximalist actors (without single peaked preferences) are absent, weak, or controlled by gradualists, as they prefer confrontation over even limited reform, so they cannot reach any agreement on intermediate reform; 2) the actors must be diverse enough in their preference orders to be able to threaten each other with credibility. At least one player, by virtue of choosing his second best option, must be able to force down the other player’s payoff from the starting point. That non-violent transition is more likely when the two players of the game have dissimilar-enough preferences to deter credibly each other from their dominant strategy is indeed a surprise result. Many conflict studies assume, quite the 36

For a critique on the theory of moves see Stone (2001).


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contrary, that agreement is easier between players with similar interests. This constellation is plausibly not easily developed from mere intuitive reasoning about the transition process. The methodological question is whether game theorists like Przeworski and Colomer are just fitting games to particular cases, rather than attempting to produce a more general theory of transitions that would lead to testable implications. Much of the subsequent literature has used sophisticated games of incomplete information to deal with this issue. With the way Przeworski (1992) assigns the payoff structures in the game, the following part shows that, from a theoretical view, any agreement leading to democracy is unlikely. That means that the presented domestic model still leaves some dissatisfaction regarding the explanation of how certain outcomes are at all possible. Przeworski’s (1992) interaction sets in at the moment in which an authoritarian regime considers to open politically. Liberalizers hope to broaden the social base of the regime by allowing a limited autonomous organization of civil society. Ultimately, liberalizers hope that civil society elites might serve as future allies for them against regime hardliners. Civil society’s decision to organize, that is, to demand democratization, depends on its belief about the regime’s ability to repress successfully political organization in the event the softliners are not committed. When looking at Figure 1, it could be seen that, if repression r succeeds, the result may be a new regime, a “harder” form of authoritarianism, or an insurrection, but there remains uncertainty about the likelihood of this path taking effect. Game theory is described as most useful, even by its critiques, when it yields to “surprises” that run counter the intuition about a political phenomenon and hence brings light into mechanisms eventually telling the story very differently. Przeworski’s surprising finding is the paradox that, if each side has full information about each other’s moves, and even if reformers prefer a broadened democracy most, they are unable to find deals with the democratizers and bring the foot into the door towards democracy. If the reformers prefer a full transition to either of the two possible outcomes deriving from repression, the opposition knows that, if they organize, the outcome will be a transition to democracy. Hence they organize if the reformers open. In turn, knowing this, the reformers do not open, because they prefer the status quo to transition. The other possible outcome while having full information is if reformers in the regime like transition less than harder dictatorship: They prefer to repress as a balance against the risk of insurrection; then the opposition accepts what merely represents a more liberal dictatorship, because it knows, if it organizes, it will be suppressed.

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Figure 1:

Przeworski’s Model of Political Liberalization Liberalisers

stay

open

SDIC

Civil Society enter

organize

BDIC

Liberalisers repress reform Nature r

NDIC

1-r INSURRECTION

TRANSITION

Note: SDIC is status quo dictatorship, BDIC is broadened dictatorship, NDIC is narrower dictatorship, and r is the probability liberalizers attach to successful repression. The model is taken from Przeworski (1991: 62).

This formal analysis leaves us with the conclusion that full transition will never occur. Przeworski remedies his sobering results by leaving the game-theoretic framework and referring to an interpretivist explanation, thus depriving his model of its previous transparent argumentation. One storyline of strategies features the liberalizers putting a higher value on repression succeeding because they think they thereby deter the opposition from organizing if they open. The opposition, however, puts a lower value on repression succeeding and hence organizes. Facing this, the liberalizers now put a lower value on repression succeeding and accept transition, because, in the end, they prefer insurrection to transition even less. Przeworski (1991: 61) mentions signals that the liberalizers are sending, but provides no mechanism for incorporating the concept into his analysis. Earlier (Przeworski 1986: 55), he also argues that citizens would not protest until a sig-


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nal occurred to them that (1) increased their confidence in protesting and (2) that protest would not be successfully repressed. Przeworski, again intuitively, expects this momentum to be potentially affected by external factors. Namely some of these signals can be economic crisis, but also “strong foreign pressures”. To identify these signals, reference to the historical context is needed to define if they are effective. To sum up, the basics of simple transition games are built on several factors that determine the outcome of the game between an opposition group bent on obtaining the gains from its planned mobilization and a regime bent on deterring mobilization. One of them is the opposition’s relative payoffs from winning or losing, depicted with cardinal preference orders. The greater the relative gains from winning are, the more likely the opposition will choose to mobilize and fight. This point is crucial since it opens the model for asking the question as to how and from which effect the relative gains can be influenced. In principle, for a successful transition to happen, the formal models in the democratization literature build upon one of the following implicit assumptions (which are closely connected to the soft version of Przeworski 1992; Linz and Stepan 1996; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986): a.

b. c.

information among the actors about each others’ intentions must be incomplete, otherwise the liberalizers within the regime would not dare to negotiate with the opposition; the interaction takes place under the false assumption that the regime softliners are in control of the liberalization process, or the payoffs of the players are modified through exogenous variables.

The role of information and beliefs, commonly defined as the rules of the game, however, cannot simply be expected to change “over night”. In other words, strategic equilibria can only be left when exogenous conditions change; in the formal language of rational choice, understanding the “why” of preferences – in this case the “why” of preference change – can be improved through “endogenizing variables that have been regarded as exogenous before” (Opp 1999: 187). In these models, the international context, if at all, was treated as exogenous. The standard approach to democratic transition and modeling authoritarian withdrawal divorces the process of strategic interaction among competing groups from other potential causal effects such as the international dimension.

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3.1.3 A Question of Life and Death? Uncertainty about Government Repression The central problem of successful democratization is the uncertainty about “how to get to democracy without either being starved by those who control productive resources or killed by those who have arms” (Przeworski 1992: 105). Starting from here, the focus of game theorists is predominantly on whether the moderates in each camp can bargain a path towards a democratic opening. For them do be successful, the fine but crucial prerequisite is to avoid provoking military intervention: the moderate reformers and the moderates in the authoritarian regime need to unify against the hardliners, against those that carry the guns and make use of them. Uncertainty is not only inherent in the exogenous reasons of democratization; uncertainty is also inherent in the grey zone of collective actions that eventually settle regime changes to democracy (Kuran 1989; 1991), so that one can do little more than precisely reconstruct these uncertainties (Marks 1992: 65). Incorporating uncertainty, Gates and Humes (1997) examines Przeworski’s model while still adhering to the underlying theoretical principles. They are in particular interested in the role of complete and incomplete information in the transitions to democracy. As a formal introduction of incomplete information, they introduce the notion of Nature, a concept originating from Harsanyi (1967). Introducing the tool of incomplete information addresses the key problem of studying political transitions: political transitions violate game theory’s assumption that the rules of the game are constant and well known to all players. Munck (2001: 189) spells this out clearly: There remains the challenge that the ‘rules of transition’ may differ from normal science; such that the process, players, actions (or strategies), and ‘rules’ of transition lay at the margins of theories explaining what causes transition and what consolidates the resulting regime. For game theorists, this liminal stage between more continuous political modes of existence challenges their assumption of rule and, ultimately, game constancy. A collective response of game theorists has been to incorporate some of these deficiencies in the form of players’ possession of incomplete information. Incomplete information impacts the outcome of the game as both civil society and elite devise strategies that account for their uncertainties about the game.

In most of the studies of strategic transitions that take off from Przeworski’s original game, the behavior of the opposition is a salient feature. Given the expected behavior of the regime, when will the opposition organize and when will it arrange with the regime and enter into a broadened dictatorship? If the opposition organizes, it might risk to be repressed, causing a situation in which it is worse off than before, commonly referred to as narrow dictatorship. Thus, the


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willingness of the regime to, indeed, make use of repressive, violent measures and, ultimately, the probability of this repression being successful is the central variable in understanding the outcomes of strategic games of transition: based on the subjective calculations the opposition conducts about these probabilities and capabilities, it makes the crucial decision about where the game leads to. Formalizations of the risk that is inherent to demanding reform lead to pointing out what the risk constitutes. The risk is closely related to uncertainty about the outcome of a particular action chosen. The uncertain event for the agents in negotiating democracy that is most decisive in the course of organizing is the success of repression as a means of controlling the entire process. The second uncertainty can be attributed to the estimation of each other’s preferences. For instance, the democratizers from the opposition will not know the degree to which the regime softliners are committed to reform. The prior beliefs about the success of repression, for both the opposition and the regime, furthermore, the belief about the type of player one is confronted with, are altered in the light of incoming information (such as signals sent, or signals sent by a third party outside of the domestic framework). Crescenzi (1999: 204) extends Przeworski’s model to allow for incomplete information, because „of particular importance here are changes in the uncertainty regarding the type of regime“. He, however, assumes that the regime’s decision to liberalize is costly. Further, his model offers the possibility of civil society mobilization in the absence of regime liberalization. Crescenzi’s model, therefore, departs considerably from Przeworski’s original conceptualization. Przeworski’s intuitive approach is plausible enough to be continued by Gates and Humes (1997). Gates and Humes (1997) translates Przeworski into the formal language of games of incomplete information, but add significant variations to it. From there on, the role of beliefs, preferences and incomplete information become clearer for a deeper exploration into how external factors are causally intertwined with the strategic results in transition games. The authors build into the model two uncertainties: 1) about the chance of successful repression, 2) about other players’ preferences. Gates and Humes (1997) accounts for the previously unknown value of r (which is the probability of successful repression), as uncertain outcomes somewhat pivot on the liberalizer’s (and the opposition’s) assessment of r. When the value of r is linked to the signaling Przeworski referred to, it becomes possible for the beliefs about r to change during the game. Przeworski does this intuitively, Gates and Hume logically, through applying the Bayes’ rule. Factors as to why these beliefs can change – for both the opposition and the regime – are one of the central points of departure for extending the theoretical knowledge about transition processes. Changing the beliefs about the prospects

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of repression, that is, changing the beliefs about r if an opposition starts to organize, are accounted for by employing the so-called Bayesian information updating.37 Gates and Humes (1997) solves Przeworski’s model for two types of liberalizers. Central to the designing of a game is the problem that the opposition does not know with which type of liberalizer from the regime it is playing. Depending on the type being soft or hard, variance in the use of repression is the central indicator for predicting the outcome of the transition game. When and why a regime resorts to violence when some opposition starts to organize and demand more than just a few seats at the power table of the dictatorship, however, is, at least within the strategic studies of transition, seldom researched. Understanding when a regime violently hits back on a liberal movement could add a relatively new feature to the understanding of the game – as a matter of fact, in many instances, it is more compelling to find out why the regime actually did not repress a movement. The question as to when repression is successful has received more attention in the literature on government repression than the question when governments choose to repress in the first place (Beissinger 2002). Ahn and Loveless’ (2004) theoretical discussion of repression and uncertainty specifies diverse thresholds for a particular behavior of an opposition in an authoritarian context. The relation between violence, the regime’s most likely future behavior, and what the opposition does with that information explains the strategic contingencies in much detail and adds new understanding to the underlying mechanisms of regime transition. A valuable result, for example, lies in the idea that, when the probability r of successful repression by a regime is calculated with the probability z of the regime liberalizers not being very committed to democracy, it is rational for the opposition to enter into a broadened dictatorship instead of getting organized (Ahn and Loveless 2004: 10). With the payoff structure from Gates and Humes (1997), the opposition only enters into broadened dictatorship if z, the probability of the liberalizers being least committed to reform, because they are more likely to repress. Blaydes (2003) is another work that extends the original game structure of Przeworski. It further sophisticates Gates and Hume (1997). By applying the Bayes’ theorem to the initial payoff structure Przeworski assigned to the actors, the only way transition can come as a result is in a semi-separating equilibrium, when the likelihood of successful repression is relatively high and civil society believes that the liberalizers are likely of the soft type. Her equilibrium discussion reveals that countries with a lower repressive capacity have no choice but to 37

The modus of how information is transmitted as well as received is the topic of signaling games in strategic situations (Fearon 1994; Bates, de Figuerido et al. 1998).


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maintain the status quo of dictatorship. They would not survive any political opening. When a country’s repressive capacity is relatively high, however, it becomes important to examine if the opposition believes that the liberalizers in the regime are soft or tough with regard to exerting repression. When the opposition then believes it is dealing with the soft regime type – a type favoring democratization over violent repression – actors will play a mixed strategy38 where the outcome of transition can be either narrow dictatorship or democracy. Blaydes’ (2003) theory shows how formal models can be carefully weight, that straightforward predictions are seldom, but that evolutionary probabilities can be better limited and specified. A further variation of the classical transition game is the introduction of risks the actors are willing to take in following their strategies. Because regime change can hinge upon survival or physical welfare of the political forces, actors can deal with uncertainties by simply risking behavior with unknown consequences. The variable of changes in risk behavior is sufficiently abstract to be connected with the international level in domestic transition game. One assumption derived from common observation is, for example, that regimes are biased to place a value on internal threats that is higher than “normal” and a value on external sanctions or rewards that is lower than “one would normally expect” (Yilmaz 2002: 81). Empirically assessing the value a regime places on internal threats as opposed to the value it places on external sanctions or rewards could present the observer with difficulties. Variances in the degrees of risk-aversion and riskinsensitivity, or historical memories, however, can be formalized with gametheoretic tools assigning the players with cardinal preference orders.39 Increasing a particular payoff represents the risks an actor is willing to take in order to obtain preferred outcomes. Risk is then captured in the utility function (e.g. Zielinski 1999). Munck (2001: 189) believes that risk-acceptant actors consistently overestimate their capabilities and underestimate their costs. (Swaminathan 1999: 189) presents some ideas on what risk-averse and risk-acceptant behavior mean in political transitions, in that he shows that degrees of risk-taking strongly relate to the timing of particular decisions. Timing can be as important 38

39

The second player’s estimate about what strategy the first player will play is represented through probabilities denoting the degree of uncertainty. His or her best replay to this so-called mixed strategy of the other player can be calculated with expected utilities, multiplying the expected payoff with the probabilities. For example, instead of ranking four possible outcomes ordinally from 4 for most preferred to 1 for least preferred, with cardinal payoffs this could become 10 for most preferred, and 3, 2, or 1 for the lesser preferred.

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as the decisions themselves because it often determines the availability of choices.

3.2 Transitions as Distributional Conflict: The Economic School In the economic approach to democratization, the actors ultimately want to defend or improve their economic interests. This school elaborates on Dahl’s definition of democracy as polyarchy which arises when the costs of repression exceed the costs of toleration (Dahl 1971: 15). Commonly two actors are modeled, an elite and the poor. What differentiates the approach from the mainstream of game-theoretical transition models is that it proposes actors strictly choose the regime type that maximizes their economic returns. A further differentiation lies in a higher degree of formalization through mathematical deductions. Policies such as tax rates and distribution of the economic surplus account for a situation when the poor start a revolution and start demanding democracy. Feng and Zak (1999) specified what the benefits of a regime to rule authoritarian are by translating the costs of repression as spending on the police, and the costs of tolerating opposition as the tax rate. For example, demonstrations can destroy economic assets. They reduce the tax base and force the ruling elite to pay the security and police apparatus. Transitions occur when the regime cannot any longer raise police spending in order to exert repression successfully. Even though the focus is overall on economic growth and income inequality, their translation of reaching polyarchy into changes in cost structures adds considerable new mechanisms for investigation as compared to previous models of democratization. Boix (2003) formalizes and synthesizes several ideas from comparative historical research on democratization. In general, he criticizes earlier research for being too general in scope, and for remaining on the level of simple correlations when the role of other, theoretically more relevant variables is ignored. He focuses on three key variables: inequality, asset specificity, and repression costs. In essence, political regime types and transitions are the outcome of the preferences and resources of actors in a given society. Given that inequality and growth rates affect decisions about redistributive taxes and spending on repression, the domestic actors prefer the regime that best serves their economics. For understanding what best serves the economies of transition actors, Boix (2003) isolates income inequality, mobility of assets, and distribution of political resources as the key variables driving the emergence of democracies: highincome equality and capital mobility are characteristics of a democracy, whereas high-income inequality and asset specificity (for example, the presence of oil)

3.2 Transitions as Distributional Conflict: The Economic School

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provide support for an authoritarian regime. The regime is defined as wealthy elite that knows how much repression costs them, but the “poor”, the opposition, does not. On the other hand, the poor have better information about how well organized they are, and, therefore, about their ability to revolt successfully. Boix (2003) consequently argues that sudden shifts in the distribution of information about the chances of successful repression or revolt explain the timing of regime changes. Boix (2003) does not only derive a variety of predictions about how in detail economic development favors democracy, but also makes predictions about the timing of transitions and integrates the behavior of actors with empirical indicators of macro-variables. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) illustrate how the process of constructing an integrated theory can be achieved and propose an economic theory of transition and survival. This study attempts to overcome the methodological problems they see with the “reduced form” game models of Przeworski (1992). Przeworski’s approach creates an artificial difference between strategic and structural approaches as he does not give explanations as to why certain interactions occur here and not at any other point. Due to their level of abstract generalizations about strategic behavior caused by economic variables, Acemoglu and Robinson’s assumptions also have the advantage of being able to explain the stability of any regime type, whether democracy or dictatorship. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006: 161) works in the analytic narrative tradition of scholarship and develop some innovative suite of formal models that lead to counterintuitive results: democratization is a lesser threat when citizens are better organized and more powerful because the future threat of a revolution also enables more credible promises by the regime. In a non-democratic regime, the regime elite governs and maintains stability by keeping taxes low. The poor masses could start a democratic revolution, but a revolution is costly and risky. The expected gains and losses from coups and democratization enter into each actor’s calculations. To simplify strongly their argument, the poor will lead a democratic revolution when the economic benefits of expropriating the elite, raising taxes, and increasing transfer payments outweigh the expected costs of organizing a revolution. A different assumption of assumption of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) to Feng and Zak (1999) is that an authoritarian regime does not normally prevent a democratic revolution by investing in repression but by redistributing tax receipts more generously. Taxes and redistribution of economic income are seen as carrots the regime employs to continue authoritarian rule. Some of Acemoglu and Robinson’s perspectives may be wrong, and the mathematically complicated models do not always favor to follow their arguments closely. Nevertheless, it is clear just what theoretical assumptions and premises for argument underlie the

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claims, and it is also clear how the conclusions are reached. The models and their implications are prone to stir debate. Unlike many other studies, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) succeed to fruitfully provoke discussion and represent a good basis for future refinements from a broader audience. From the economic approaches to regime transition, there are two particular insights that provide a potential starting point for an inquiry into the effects of external action on political liberalization: (1) resources of the actors influence the outcome of transitions; changes in the resources available are caused by economic factors. These can be reasonably assumed to become a target of democracy promotion (e.g. external sanctions or externally induced income raises of the “poor” opposition); (2) repression costs are a central variable in the timing of transitions; specifying the composition and variation in the regime cost structure to repress serves to identify how exactly they can be modified by external factors.

3.3 Rationality and Democratization Actors As theory innovation is one of this study’s central contributions, the assumption of rationality and how the approach relates to the study of democratization actors is worth further exploration when reviewing the available literature. This chapter finds answers as to why and how formal models add explanatory power to the comparative politics field, with a particular focus on democratization studies. This is best achieved when the major lines of critique of the rationality assumption in social behavior are simultaneously addressed. In the same vein, a brief discussion concludes with answering what the limits of game-theoretic tools are.

3.3.1 Why Game Theory? Whilst in the economic sciences game theory has become a standard tool for analysis, in the social sciences fundamental debates about its validity dominate the research program. There is merit to Levi’s observation that “empirical rational choice [research] in comparative [politics] is in its relative infancy” (Levi 1997: 36)40. In addition, the rational choice approach created a geographical cleavage, with the American political science being much more receptive for its development than its German pendant. Schneider (2007) recently discussed in 40

It is frequently overlooked that game-theoretic analyses combine two elements: rational choice theory and a formal methodology. Game theory is an extension of rational choice theories.

3.3 Rationality and Democratization Actors

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detail the reasons for the hesitance of German political science to make friends with the rational choice methodology.41 A common answer to the critiques of rational choice, however, is unlikely to prove convincing, and rather hardens the fronts: In an earlier debate among scholars of international relations, Schneider (1994) defended game-theoretic tools by saying that its understanding often rests simply on an “incomplete reading” of rational choice literature. Game-theoretic concepts are heuristics that guide the developing of a generalizable model of regime transition negotiations and add to the understanding of path dependence of this process (see Casper and Taylor 1997). At the outset, often general descriptions provided the basis and inspiration for more rigorous and, consequentially, modeling possibilities. For example, in his comparably sketchy ideas, Putnam observed that “perhaps every science must start with metaphor and end with algebra; and perhaps without the metaphor there would never have been any algebra” (Putnam 1988: 435). The idea of algebra and mathematical proof in social science is nothing but the careful use of words (Morrow 1994a: 331). Numbers are just a careful way of discussing quantities. The algebra serves to define exactly what words mean and what exactly can be deduced from definitions. Arguments are required to demonstrate what follows from a set of assumptions and definitions.42 In that sense, a mathematical proof is a formal argument. Formal models can sometimes offer important insights into strategic interaction. However, because detailed knowledge of individuals and the histories in which they are caught up are often missing in the analysis, formal models are criticized for their canvass being narrow. Even worse, “many are hopelessly far removed from ever being applicable to real-life situations, for either explanatory, 41

42

Schneider’s (2007: 11) critique as to why, in continental Europe, the rational choice approach is not being discussed is fundamental: “Meiner Meinung nach liegen die Gründe […] darin, wie der politikwissenschaftliche Wissenschaftsbetrieb in den meisten europäischen Ländern organisiert ist – nämlich als eine insgesamt gemütliche Veranstaltung in welcher die Anreize, die kostbare Zeit ins Verfassen von marginalen Texten oder in langfädige Gremiensitzungen zu investieren, überdurchschnittlich groß sind, während der Druck zum Erlernen von avancierten Methoden und, in der Konsequenz, zum Publizieren von viel beachteten Aufsätzen klein bleibt“. Formal theories have characteristics that make them different from inductive approaches: they have clear and explicit assumptions. Coppedge (2008 forthcoming) explains more precisely: “Explicit assumptions therefore provide a way to achieve theoretical integration. Lacking this guidance, the more inductive approaches are harder to integrate. They end up with conclusions that are confined to provisionally bind temporal-spatial domains that rarely coincide perfectly with the domains of other studies. Second, formal theories also have a heuristic: a hypothesisgenerating procedure that is logically rigorous, or ‘truth preserving.’ It allows the theorist to say with perfect confidence what must be true if the theory is true. It is invaluable for generating hypotheses for testing the theory.”

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predictive, or prescriptive purposes” Brams (1994: 5). Therefore game-theoretic concepts should rather be understood and applied as a way to formalize social structures and examine the effects of social structure on individual decisions. If one can define social theories as accurate descriptions of the world, game theory then can tell us what behavior we should expect as a consequence of various social theories (Morrow 1994a: 1). Research frequently starts with an idea or an intuition about a particular problem. Besides merely describing this intuition, the translation of this intuition into an empirical research design is the most difficult step. Formal language is a simple tool to capture initial ideas, hence “models help discipline our intuition” (Morrow 1994a: 301). Intuition is central to any understanding, even in rational choice applications of formal models. Reviewing the recent work that has been done on the impact of non-domestic factors in regime changes, intuition ranks as a particularly salient feature in this realm of research. Seldom explicit, but often implicit and clustered in vague assumptions, stringent argumentation based on testable causal links does not dominate the field. The narratives of international influences are only strong on the historical side of scientific enterprises. In addition, the hereby eventually derived taxonomies could be described as stemming from interpretivist, at times not coherently understandable, generalizations. For instance, Whitehead (1996) classifies the international dimension along the number of actors and the basis for action into control, contagion, conditionalities, and consent. These are useful categories. However, it does not become clear what the causal mechanisms of these effects are and to what consequences they can exactly lead. Pridham (2000) attempts to measure international influence, but instead of verifying any variance and magnitude of particular variables, he rather offers heuristically useful elements for further investigation. These authors are guided by intuitive reasoning which cannot always be supported by a model and their work often plagued by producing unreliable results. However, the results of many models agree with our intuition. If the results of a model differ from our intuitive first expectations, they do redefine the intuition on which they are based. Theoretic models in the social sciences should aim to capture some general characteristics of a situation, as opposed to the specific interactions and decision of a particular event.43 From general considerations, one can always construct a 43

Von Beyme (1994: 43) comments the advantage of agency-driven theories over systemic theories for political science in the following way: “Der rational-choice Ansatz übt auf Politologen große Anziehungskraft aus, weil er die Szientifizierung der Disziplin erlaubt, ohne von Akteursansätzen lassen zu müssen. Die Politikwissenschaft sucht ihren eigenen Weg zwischen historischer Deskription von Akteuren und soziologischer Theoriebildung auf der Makroebene,


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model that reflects what really and in detail happened. Naturally, formal models are more rewarding when they address general questions that are recurring in politics. For constructing the moves and choices available to an opposition and a ruling authoritarian regime in situations of political breakdown, however, the real situation of the Polish case serves as an orientation. The idea at hand is to mingle empirical data with the developing of the game, in the hope of more realism being added to the theory’s assumptions.44 Through generalizing about this particular situation as much as possible, the expectation is to make the game reflect more questions that are applicable to different cases. Usefully applying game theory hinges on the perspective that is employed. Zintl (1995: 10) distinguishes two approaches: “behavioral theory” and “constitutional theory”. The behavioral approach produces prescriptions with which the decisions and moves of real actors are forecasted. The researcher implicitly takes on the role of instructing a real-life actor as to what the wisest behavior in a given situation is, rendering the theory normative and ultimately overstretched. Science, however, can gain more from the constitutional theory approach: namely, to firstly aim at the precise localization of gravity points in an interaction constellation, and from thereon, to identify the problem the actors face. Prognoses based on such theory are not sets of particular behavior but a set of evolutionary possibilities, at best evolutionary probabilities. By limiting the scope of game theory’s application, this study follows closely the general ideas of Zintl (1995: 10).

3.3.2 Rationality and its Critiques Rational choice and its subset game theory are frequently contended by empirical scientists for its explanations being irrelevant to the real world. This mistrust and questioning whether the rational-choice approach is realistic, at this point, leaves the normative realm of describing what real political actors should do because the argument only touches the inner coherence of game theory. It is not difficult to agree with the normative value of the prescriptions of expected utility. If people do behave according to rational-choice requirements is yet a different issue.45

44 45

bei der alle Katzen grau werden und individuelle politische Prozesse und Systeme im Licht der autopoietischen Götterdämmerung ohne Gott in einem subjektlosen Evolutionsprozess verschwimmen”. Morrow (1990: 52), for example, makes explicit use of this approach. Works on violation of utility theory are found in psychology. Kahneman (1982: 136) for example says that “most people are also very sensitive to the difference between certainty and high probability and relatively insensitive to intermediate gradations of probability”. Kahne-

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Does rational choice have a descriptive value? Does the rational-choice approach make good predictions? The question if, after all, the approach is realistic is often answered by saying: “It does not matter; people behave ‘as if’ they were rational”. The idea is that a fundamental explanation is important even if it is not true because it reveals important mechanisms that influence the phenomenon under examination. Friedman’s “methodology of positive economics” (Friedman 1953) – introducing the above view – is exemplified by what Samuelson (Samuelson 1963) calls the “as if” theses. One of them concerns expert billiard players who execute their shots “as if” they knew the complicated mathematical formulae describing the optimal path of the balls. In his defense of the rational-choice approach, Tsebelis defines rationality as “nothing more than an optimal correspondence between ends and means” (1990: 18). In other words, “to recapitulate, the rational-choice approach assumes the individual’s behavior is an optimal response to the conditions of her environment and to the behavior of other actors” (1990: 46). The definition that actors pursue their goals may indeed seem tautological and trivial. However, the rational-choice approach is not the only possible approach to study political phenomena. One can distinguish two broader categories of theories that do not rely on any assumption that means and ends correspond in politics. One is primarily unconcerned with actors as units of analysis; the other studies actors but does not assume they are rational. The most prominent representatives among theories which do not employ actors as unit of analysis are system analysis, structuralism, functionalism, or, more particularly, modernization theories. Theories with non-rational actors originate mainly from psychology, with affective behavior motives explaining actions (revolutions explained through “relative deprivation” theory) (Gurr 1971), or with non-rational behavior as a theoretical construct. Among those, most influential for political science is the “political culture” approach (Almond and Verba 1963). From examples of military intervention in Latin America, Cohen (1994) can be consulted for summarizing the general problems and objections to non-actor explanations in the study of regime transitions:

A full explanation involves showing how structures limit choices, then showing that choices are made within the feasible set, and finally how different agent’s choices interact to produce an outcome. Structural explana-

man’s work (1984; 2000) has the advantage of empirical accuracy but has been presented so far as an objection to specific claims of the rational-choice program and not as a theoretical alternative.


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tions, however, falsely claim that there is only one choice, short-circuiting this process; Structural arguments only establish a correlation. They do not exhibit how and why events occur. Structuralists may capture important aspects of processes without being able to say why they occurred. Non-actor approaches argue that results of major historical events are not intended by anyone, so that reference to intentions is not necessary in moving from structures to outcomes. Nevertheless, we still need to explain what was intended when people acted.

This study follows Tsebelis (1990) in arguing that the mere ‘rationality-asmodel’ assumption is not satisfactory. The assumptions of a theory are also conclusions of the theory. It is inaccurate to use false assumptions as the basis for explanations, because from false assumptions anything follows. A different answer to questioning the realism of rational choice theories is more apt. Tsebelis (1990: 32) offers as his argument for using game-theoretic tools more modesty in explanatory reach: Instead of the concept of rationality as a model of human behavior, I propose the concept of rationality as a subset of human behavior. The change of perspective is important: I do not claim that rational choice can explain every phenomenon and that there is no room for other explanations, but I do claim that rational choice is a better approach to situations in which the actors’ identity and goals are established and the rules of the interaction are precise and known to the interacting agents.

Hereby, the study of political actors under the assumption of rationality and allowing for the political game to structure the situation are a legitimate approximation of realistic situations, calculations, and behavior. Even though there is an understanding among rational-choice sympathizers that the validity of the approach mainly stems from its predictive power, to say that it simply depicts social phenomena more realistically attracts also the non-sympathizer. The assumption of a rational actor constitutes a good approximation of reality: demonstrating why certain decisions were or were not made, and thereby indicating the realm of possibilities for different actors, has an important heuristic role for political science. From what can a scientist know what an actor’s goals are? In general, actors’ goals are deduced from observing their prior behavior (Morrow 1994a: 17). Suffice it to say, on the methodological question, causal rational choice explanations must adduce evidence for goals and beliefs independent of actions that make an agent’s choice of an action rational (Elster 2000: 693).

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In his critique of this methodological flaw, Munck (2001: 193), curiously enough, lists Colomer’s (1991; 1995) modeling of political transitions as an example of the very approach to translate merely existing knowledge into gametheoretic language: Colomer’s model is based on the assumption that players have accurate information about each other’s preferences. This is implausible partly because it may pay to pretend to be more extreme than you actually are in order to get further concessions out of others. […] Much of the subsequent literature has used sophisticated forms of incomplete information to deal with these sorts of issues.

It may, indeed, not be too harsh to say that simple matrix games (like Cohen 1994) yield little extra insights, at least in comparison to informal, soft rational choice models as introduced by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), and, with limitations, Przeworski (1992). However, game theory receives more explanatory weight when, in its design, it assumes a more complex game structure. Through the way Colomer’s work conceptualizes preference structure, one can, however, argue against Munck (2001): It provides more insight than the rather simple splits in earlier soft approaches which only differentiated between opposition, regime hardliners and regime softliners. In that way, Colomer’s results are more surprising – they are intuitively not obvious but appear, with hindsight, plausible.

3.3.3 Limitations In the following section, some of the weaknesses of game theory are assessed. It is obviously pertinent to ask how much additional explanatory value game theory has. Even from this brief literature review it is clear that, ever since O’Donnell and Schmitter’s framework, both soft and hard approaches of game-theorists typically take much as given. The specifications for game-theoretic analysis of democratization – the rules of the game – remain on the following: 1. 2.

3. 4. 5.

There is a political conjuncture in which democratization seems possible; Certain well-defined groups can be identified and they are organized to a point where leaders are able to bargain and control their members, that is, unitary actors become the opposing players; Unitary actors are capable of conceiving political possibilities; Actors have well-defined ideas about what strategies are contingent to them; The notion of a rational actor leads to assuming that groups know what they want in terms of outcomes. Among other things, that includes some conception of the design of the political institutions a group favors, if any.


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One of the problems with these assumptions is that rules of the game are taken as exogenous in one context (the “why” a game is played), but might be investigated in another. There are limitations to that effort (see Kitschelt 1993: 415). For instance, Marks’s (1992) chicken game of transition starts from the assumption that hardliners and softliners already exist and have different goals. So the origins and the nature of the split are assumed, not explained. Moreover, what makes it rational for citizens to protest against a dictatorship? For so-called pragmatists like Munck (2001: 181), models should, therefore, be considered as a useful approximation of the manner in which actors make decisions in some contexts but not in others. A commonly levied criticism is also that, although it is “obvious” that players with one or the other preference cannot cooperate, players with these preferences are merely the slaves of their own desires – and, presumably, behind that, the slaves of the structural forces that conditioned their preferences. Many of the rules of the game, among others the actors’ preferences, the game tree and the moves they can make, or the information they have about each other, are accounted for and implicitly explained by reference to structural factors. At this point, the critique sets in with asking what explanatory value then remains, if not in deriving at least “surprising” results that are founded on empirical support. Rational choice analysis typically take the overall definition of the choice situation and the options that actors perceive as given and cannot account for the “frames” (Renwick 2006: 53; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 888) within which rational choices are made. Moreover, methodologically, game theorists often fail to acknowledge that their approach requires a complete political anthropology (Bates, De Figuerideo and Weingast 1998: 628). It requires detailed knowledge of the values of individuals, of the expectations that individuals have of each others’ action and reactions, and of the ways in which these expectations have been shaped by history. Along the lines of restricting game theory to certain narrow domains of research in order to address the limits of its tools, scholars of comparative politics have acknowledged the incomplete nature of game theory and suggested how other approaches might be used to supplement it. Embracing Elster’s (1999: 415) call for a “historical psychology”, one is to merge interpretivist and structural approaches with game theory. Bates, Figuerideo and Weingast (1998: 630) make methodological points about the potential for merging games of transition and interpretivist approaches to transitions, built on ideas, worldviews, culture and identity. The emphasis on “symbols”, “meaning” and “worldviews” suggests a sincere and energetic effort to demonstrate complementariness between game

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theory and a hermeneutic approach to rational choice. In doing so, Bates, Figuerideo and Weingast (1998)46 adopt Follesdal’s (1994: 244) position that game theory can be thought of as a hermeneutic tool for understanding rational strategic action. Similar to what Levi (1997) has shown, rational choice can be integrated with discourse theory and non-rational choice forms of institutionalism. For instance, because of “different cognitive mappings of actions to outcomes” (Schiemann 2002: 4), in a game of the Zambian transition, a party headquarter was burned down and was perceived as an attack on a political shrine, and hence counted more than any of the other moves in a game of incomplete information (Bates, Figuerideo and Weingast 1998: 14). When democratization is understood as a complex, contingent and prolonged process, it is clear that no parsimonious model can tell the whole story. In studying the international dimension of democratization, reference to the theories of democratization that provide the frames is fundamental. When testing gametheoretical explanations, a complementarity of interpretivist approaches and formally guided parameters needs to be brought into historical process tracing. In order to explicate the underlying assumptions inherent to this study’s analytical model, it is necessary to address the general theoretical assumptions of rational choice thinking in regime transitions. Certain weak points do exist in the basic pre-conditions, but through incorporating sufficient control variables and explicating from where exactly certain implicit postulates derive, they, nevertheless, improve our view of the big picture. To bring the work of game-theoretic pragmatists into conformity with their assumptions, they would have to (1) apply game theory to a restricted domain, (2) acknowledge and recognize that even in those domains where game theory can legitimately be applied, it may not provide the basis for a coherent explanation, and (3) be aware that even when the theory does generate a coherent explanation, the value added has to be carefully weighed and treated with the necessary control variables attached (Munck 2001: 191). 46

The contribution of Bates, Figuerideo et al. (1998) is the following salient messages, which, in sum, might be conducive to the critiques of game theory: a) A detailed knowledge of actors’ beliefs is necessary to complete rational choice, and these are deduced from standard methods of interpretists; b) “meaning” is constructed through a process of strategic interaction and thus is part of the equilibrium of the game itself; c) the interpretations have to relate to actions in a plausible and empirically sound way. In that regard, they are not merely an issue of culture and belief, but must show a certain consistency with the observation of others’ behavior; d) as will be re-iterated at a later stage with more precision, sudden shifts in behavior are not necessarily evidence for irrationality. They can be regarded as shifts from one equilibrium to another. These shifts are caused not only by the classical game-theoretic idea of interaction and moves, but also through the interaction of events, rhetoric, and political iconography.


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In short, these are the rules of the game rational choice approaches typically take as given. Methodologically speaking, they are treated as stylized facts. Since many of the ‘rules’ of transition games disclose the very limits of game theory, these facts need closer consideration. Hence the stylized facts will be reiterated and discussed when applying the framework to this study’s model in Chapter 4.

4 Nested Games of External Influence on Strategic Regime Transition

This chapter represents the theoretical core of the study. It will develop a tripartite game of strategic transition between a democratic opposition, an authoritarian regime, and a foreign democratic power as a nested game. The objective of the nested games approach is explaining the change in outcome of a negotiated transition between an authoritarian regime and an opposition movement when an external actor intervenes and demands democratic reform. More specifically, the dependent variable is regime change, which is the result from the interaction between regime and opposition. The basic idea behind formally studying external influence on domestic regime transitions is that the strategic oppositionregime game is embedded in a larger game encompassing the international dimension. If successful, we should be able to formulate empirically insightful hypotheses. Applying them to the real world of the Polish liberalization process, we are in the position to conduct a test of the theoretical model’s explanatory value. The model relates to the existing literature on strategic transitions. The variant of taking into account the international dimension goes beyond both Przeworski’s (1992) original conceptualization and the extended and modified models. It formalizes more precisely how agents interact with the costs and benefits attached to transition negotiations. Furthermore, it solves the game as nested inside an enlarged picture which incorporates an external actor affecting the actors’ cost structures, thus changing the strategies by the authoritarian regime. I will try to show that, similar to Schelling’s “tipping model” (Schelling 1971; see also Gleditsch 2000: 5), in situations of high uncertainty, small changes can lead to very different political outcomes. The chapter is divided into four parts. Firstly, the general idea behind the nested games approach will be introduced by outlining the scope of the theory, how, in broader terms, games are constructed, and what the basic assumptions behind the model are. The second part will present two simple non-nested games. The first model is a game between an Ancien regime and a mobilizing opposition movement on the domestic level, termed transition game. The game ends in confrontation and continuity of the status quo dictatorship. The game of


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transition, both formally and methodologically, constitutes the principal arena and hence deserves a more detailed outline. The second game is termed foreign pressure game, capturing the interaction between a regime and a foreign power that intervenes in order to demand democratic reform. In the third part, the picture will be broadened in order to develop the transition game as being nested inside the wider foreign pressure game. It is subsequently played out in order to find the game’s solution. The result will exhibit the conditions under which foreign pressure causes the regime to enter into transition negotiations with the opposition. The chapter concludes with a discussion about the empirical implications of the model. Based on the model’s predictions, hypotheses are generated that will then be tested in the empirical part.

4.1 Modeling the International Dimension The task at hand for the present study is to formalize the external actor as a third player in the regime-opposition transition game. Unfortunately, the literature on game-theoretic transition models provides no guidance in this respect. Moreover, formal games with more than two players tend to become increasingly intractable. Either they generate little insights or the equilibrium discussion becomes so highly mathematical, that it may possibly exclude the non-technically inclined readers.47 The following chapter will, at first, specify how this study intends to limit the theory’s scope of analysis.

4.1.1 Internal-External Linkages: Scope of Theory and Analysis In the studies of external influence on political regime change from autocratic to democratic regimes but also in the general study of domestic regime change, three qualitatively different processes need to be distinguished: (1) political liberalization – in a Communist setting, the “erosion” (Brown 2000: 181) of the system –, (2) democratization (or transition), and (3) consolidation (Rustow 1970; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 65; Przeworski 1992; Merkel 1999: 47

A case in point is Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). Even though the authors are advancing pioneering research and are generating a host of new hypotheses, transparency in the research process is sacrificed by limiting their readership to economists or experts in the field of game theory. By the same token, “although theoretical developments in game theory will continue to be made by the mathematically gifted and trained”, in the conviction that many authors share, this study intentionally limits itself to a low level of formalization, not the least since “interesting substantive insights can arise from quite simple and tractable games” (Geddes 2003: 205).

4.1 Modeling the International Dimension

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119).48 As aforementioned, the focus is exclusively on the process of political liberalization. As opposed to the processes of democratization and consolidation, evidently, the phase of political liberalization can be more readily separated from democratization49. As for external democracy promotion, two core elements define the efforts during a political opening: (1) increasing quantity and quality of political liberties – “the process of redefining and extending rights” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 7); and (2) encouraging destabilization or eventual breakdown of autocratic regimes (Schmitter and Brouwer 1999). As the theoretical focus of this study is the introduction of democracy – more specifically the breakdown of authoritarianism – and not the maintenance of democracy, I assume that contextual factors never determine the process of transition. Regime changes proceed through elite-managed collective actions, and largely leave aside other agency-driven factors such as the general population (O’Donnell et al. 1986: 19; Karl and Schmitter 1991: 270)50. As a consequence, regime changes can only be understood by reconstructing the contingent actions of the agents who actually manage them (Rustow 1970; Marks 1992; Przeworski 1992). Democracy emerges as an outcome of enduring social conflict when no single actor possesses sufficient resources to impose itself upon others (Olson 1993, Vanhanen 1990). Therefore, it is reasonable, when studying external influences on regime change, to concentrate at first on the external agents of political change and do not take into account structural forms of influence. We need to break down the international, contextual factors of regime change into units that are observable as one element of the human undertaking of political liberalization. The focus of analysis is limited to a single external actor, exemplified by a foreign, Western power, for both theoretical and practical purposes. Theoretically, Whitehead (1996) explains the global spread of democracy as being related nearly exclusively to the success of strong foreign policy actors. Excluding the interpretations, roles, motives, and actions of those external actors is “bound to produce a highly distorted image of the international dimension of democratization, however good its statistical performance may seem” (1996: 9). Defining the 48

49

50

The Sequentiation is purely analytical and, in particular, the phases of democratization and consolidation do, more realistically, overlap (Merkel and Puhle 1999; Linz, Stepan, and Gunther 1995). The threshold to democratization is often observed by the conduction of founding elections (Przeworski 1991) or, at least, when “the substance of political decisions slip out of control of the Ancien regime and is being transferred to the uncertain outcome of democratic competition [my own translation]” (Rüb 1994: 115). However, Casper and Taylor (1997) assign “the people” a larger role and study the “mass public” as a central, third actor in negotiated democratisations.

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power of the external actor with commanding over high degrees of leverage naturally depends on more empirical detailing. For example, in the literature on international influence on democratization, regional international organizations like the European Union or NATO rank among the most studied actors.51 The concentration on the EU pays tribute to the fact that most authors treat international influence as external democracy promotion and preservation. Preservation, obviously, lends itself exclusively to the consolidation phase. In general, fewer studies exist about the impact of international actors on the breakdown of authoritarian rule, in other words, on the initial liberalization phase. Figure 2:

Internal-External Linkage in Regime Changes Background Social conflict between authoritarian Regime-Opposition over degree of democracy

Structural Forms of Influence • Diffusion of political culture • Contagion • Economic integration

Domestic Game

Agency-Driven Weak Influence Public diplomacy Symbolic Conditionalities

External Influence

• •

Agency-Driven Strong Influence Military coercion/invasion Economic, costly sanctions • Direct assistance and support of opposition groups •

International Dimension

•

Structural Factors • Geostrategic situation • Major events econo-political order • Alliance regime • „Globalisation“ External Actors Unilateral Foreign government Foreign regional or global power • INGO • •

External Actors Multilateral IGO Coalitions/Alliances

• •

More specifically, in a general framework of analyzing the linkage between the international dimension and the domestic constellation, as depicted and summa51

For a critical view of NATO’s effect on democratization see Reiter (2001).


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rized in Figure 2: it is the unilateral action of a foreign government that is under investigation here. The internal-external linkage can be reduced to consist of the domestic transition game, which is characterized by a social conflict between regime and opposition over the direction of the political system. The international dimension exerts influence on this game to a certain degree. For pointing out the focus this study’s theory takes, the international dimension is composed of three general elements: (1) structural factors; (2) unilateral external actors such as a single foreign country; (3) multilateral external actors such as international organizations or alliances. Consequently, the forms of external influence can take the following shape: on the one hand, structurally induced impacts like diffusion effects, on the other hand, more direct, agency-driven influences. Those can be further distinguished into relatively weak attempts and relatively strong attempts at influencing the transition game. The latter two will be considered in greater detail when constructing the nested game. The reduction to a single player as external factor in the inside-outside linkage of democratization is the analytical framework the consequently developed theory of external influence is based on. In a relatively under researched field, it makes sense to concentrate on a single external actor as the form of influence under investigation, as opposed to a coalition of foreign governments or an international organization. Agency-driven influence that can be defined as weak, like actions such as educating foreign constituents, educating authoritarian governments, or monitoring government behavior (Kümmel 1999: 94; Smith 1996), can be excluded. Their nature is of very indirect influence, and, analytically, they can be reasonably summarized rather as belonging to structural elements of influence. The distinction between explicit democracy assistance and other forms of structural development assistance is also relevant for broader reasons. It is one of the central debates in the field whether democratization is better explained by agency or by the necessary structural prerequisites. This relates to the question if democratization is a purely domestic process or whether external forces such as regional organizations or diffusion processes influence the countries’ democratic trajectories as well. External democracy assistance seeks to empower key domestic agents in order to induce democratic changes in the recipient country. Other forms of more general development assistance attempt to promote the transformation of social, economic, or structural forces that are conducive to the establishment and survival of democracy (see also Finkel et al. 2007: 405). It can be further assumed that, given the external actor has the means to exert influence on the domestic game, this government is most likely some global or regional power. Thereby, at the theoretical level, a formalization is avoided by which the external strategic impact becomes too unmanageable, and at the meth-

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odological level, the empirical analysis becomes difficult to operationalize. The theory focuses on a very narrow unit of investigation – a single foreign power against the background of pacted transitions, with a single case study. In doing so, the study concentrates on the mechanisms in an understudied area of research.

4.1.2 Constructing Games This chapter’s subject is to endow briefly the reader with the concepts and definitions necessary for understanding game-theoretic models. Only those refinements and tools are discussed that eventually find inclusion in the later developed model of external influence on strategic transitions. Even the reader inexperienced in formal models should thereby be able to follow the main arguments presented later, without having to refer to the standard text books on game theory. Game theory is the formalization of utility theory, a mathematical theory for representing decisions, and, in turn, is closely connected to probability theory. Game theoretic models assume utility maximization, which is used as a way to model observed behavior. Game theory does not claim that people actually calculate utilities of alternative actions (Binmore 1992: 98). It is the rationality inherent in utility theory that defines the elements of a formal decision problem: preferences and outcomes. Game theory is a tool for exploring the strategic logic of situations. In game theory, two specifications can be distinguished: the extensive form and the strategic form. The extensive form of a game details what the player’s choices are, the order and outcomes of their choices, how they can evaluate the consequences of their choices, and what they know at the point when they choose. The extensive form is commonly depicted as a game tree, including all information necessary for the basic specification of a game. The strategic form of a game is a reduced account of the extensive form game that does not capture the sequence of strategic interaction, but is often useful in identifying the major strategic situations actors are confronted with.

Decision Theory According to utility theory, rational actors have specified goals and a set of actions from which they can choose. Thus knowing what the actors’ goals are and consequently formalizing them represents the most central stage in building a


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model. In order to formalize these goals as the first step in building the model, the definition of preferences and outcomes is required. Utility theory assumes that actors have preferences over a set of outcomes, which the modeler designs. To meet the concept of rationality, the actor’s preferences need to fulfill three criteria: (1) they are fixed, and the preference ordering is (2) complete and (3) transitive. Otherwise the theory would be undermined of its actual explanatory significance. After introducing the meaning of game-theoretic outcomes, this point will become clear. A game-theoretic outcome is the consequence of a possible final result of what the actors decide. It is a situation that is collectively produced by the different actors if they follow a strategy or action. In other words, it is the result of strategic interaction between the actors. It is important to distinguish between, on the one hand, outcomes which are final results and, on the other hand, strategies (or actions) that are choices that could produce several outcomes. The outcome is what was above called the goal of an actor. For example, the goal of an opposition in a cracking-up authoritarian country could be complete democratization, which is only one of the possible outcomes of the opposition interacting with the authoritarian regime. For the strategy or action to get to the outcome democratization depends on the background situation – it could be either a violent overthrow, or mobilizing civil society, or entering the institutions of the regime. The distinction between outcomes and strategies explains how a model generates causal hypotheses: changes in behavior are caused by changes in the situation and the information available to the actors, not by the actor changing his or her goals. Therefore the actors’ preferences over outcomes (the goals) are assumed to be fixed52; preferences over actions can change as the actors gain new information about the usefulness of different actions. The variation in their action stems from a change in the situation they find themselves in, or from information previously not available – received directly from the other actor or exogenously. Shifts in preferences mean shifts in preferences among actions, rather than outcomes. Preference shifts over outcomes are not allowed, “because they rob the theory of its explanatory power” (Morrow 1994a: 19).53 52

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A few exceptions to the requirement that preferences have to be fixed exist in the literature, but are so far limited to legislative processes. A legislation writing policies is confronted with the effects of policies being uncertain. Outcomes combine both policy and factors that are far beyond the actors’ control. “Policy preferences can change as members learn about the exogenous factors that influence the outcomes that policies produce. In this sense, the actors’ preferences can change” (Morrow 1994: 228); see also Gilligan (1987). Since preferences are unobservable, preferences are inferred by observing action. It will be very difficult to interview any real actor about his or her true intentions and goals. Additionally, it would be simply impossible to test empirically the model’s predictions, because when-

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Completeness means that an actor can make comparisons across all pairs of consequences; he can say that he prefers one outcome to the other or that he is indifferent between the two. Transitivity means that the actor can distinguish between outcomes and make consistent choices. Transitive preferences avoid illdefined cycles like Oi is preferred to Oj and Oj is preferred to Ok and Ok is preferred to Oi. Games of Strategy Strategic situations as a subgroup of social situations are shaped by the interaction of individuals or entities making consistent choices. The consistency of choices is one of the cardinal requirements of rational behavior: it means choosing the best means to gain a predetermined set of ends. These choices, however, are constrained by the individuals’ settings, or, what some authors call structure. Game theory provides for specifying and formalizing the structure in which choices are taken and examines the effects of these constraints on the individuals’ choices. The structure of a game is then nothing more and nothing less than specifying what contingencies players face for making their choices, in what outcome which choices result, and what the players make out of this outcome. If the choices that an actor sees or does not see in a situation are structural, the game specifies the choices the actors perceive. A standard phrase in game-theoretic papers54 is “solving the game” or “solving the equilibrium”. What does it mean, “to solve the equilibrium”? First of all, the idea of equilibrium is the central feature of a rational choice approach for understanding political phenomena. In an outcome of equilibrium, no actor wishes to change his or her behavior on his or her own. When behavior is at equilibrium, it is stable in the sense that no actor, given his knowledge and current position, can improve his position of his own. Only externalities, like new information or situational variables, can become a reason for an actor to leave the equilibrium. Equilibria serve as the predictions of a model – in any given strate-

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ever behavior changes that is in variance with the model, any evidence refuting the model could be ignored. Then shifts in preference cannot be confirmed. When we can choose the goals of an actor to fit his actions, it is very easy to produce circular explanations. Anything could then be assumed away by claiming that the preferences have changed. When only superficially browsing across the last 15 years of the American Political Science Review, the advance of formal modeling becomes very obvious. Formal modeling is very often about solving the equilibrium of one game or the other. In the field of international relations, the Journal of Conflict Resolution publishes a wide range of game-theoretic work. See also Munck (2007).


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gic situation finding the equilibrium is finding the prediction about what actors will act upon in order to most rationally reach their aims.55 Designing the extensive (and the strategic) form is probably the most critical step in any game theory model. A host of assumptions about the real world phenomena under investigation is reflected in the ultimate game tree on which the modeler will base his or her research. It determines the players’ choices and how they strategically interact, thus condensing structural variables, motives of the actors, and realistic consequences into a very simplified representation. These simplifications establish the central point about modeling: Every argument is a simplification of actual events. Formalization though “forces us to choose our assumptions and makes us aware that other reasonable alternative models exist” (Morrow 1994a: 57). Certainly, the common approach to game-theoretic modeling is associated with a tendency to ignore much of the unavoidable complexity of political phenomena. As Gates and Humes state, simply “fitting the structure of some pre-existing game-theoretic model to a particular situation […] does not generate new explanations or predictions” (Gates and Humes 1997: 7). What formal theory alerts us to is the plethora of possible mechanisms. Different models allow capturing the differences between them, and permit to see if those differences have interesting consequences for the actors’ behavior (Morrow 1994a: 57). In this fashion, game theorists would claim that we may be able to determine differences about social science theory which may not be easily resolved by verbal descriptions of the competing views. Any individual model cannot reproduce the complexity of any real situation and no model should be expected to match reality. Through a succession of models, however, one can judge what the consequences are when some assumptions of a simple model are relaxed or complications are added. In this vein, game theory is just an elegant tool for exploring the strategic logic of situations, not for reflecting reality. In concluding, each game-theoretic model has an underlying theory. It is social science theories that are the basis of what is modeled with the help of formal tools (Morrow 1994a: 304). Political science theory is what answers such question as: Who are the actors? What are their choices? What consequences depend on what choices? Game theory does not tell us how political situations can be characterized, but is a way to be more specific about the characteristics of political situations. Therefore, no matter how abstract a model about regime 55

Nash’s (1951) conditions for “bargaining” define why strategic transitions can be modeled as equilibria situations: (a) parties involved have the possibility of concluding a mutually beneficial agreement; (b) there is a conflict of interests about which agreement to conclude; (c) no agreement may be imposed on any party without its approval (Osborne and Rubinstein 1990: 1).

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transition might occur, the same applies here: it is the research conducted in transition or democratization studies that governs any model, not the assumptions behind game theory or its related concepts. Admittedly, due to the immense reduction of social processes inherent to formal models, game-theoretic models require a wide host of assumptions to be fulfilled. Yet, for reasons of space and brevity, it is nearly impossible to specify each of them in detail. In order to manage and deal with this dilemma, for designing a model, it is crucial and common to make use of stylized facts. Stylized facts are broad generalizations abstracted from context. They can be defined as “statements that hold not only on the average but also most of the time so that they can be considered legitimate approximations of reality” (Tsebelis 1990: 122)56. They serve as assumptions that do not require extensive elaboration. It is sufficient, if they are proven by being widely accepted either in the literature or by common sense.

4.1.3 Basic Assumptions of the Nested Games Approach For the analysis of exogenous factors in transition negotiations, this study applies what Kitschelt (1992) calls in actor-centered approaches, the “manipulation of the cognitive frame” through modeling an external actor affecting the payoff structures of regime and opposition. When addressing the role of external factors, most studies of regime transition conclude with rather intuitive remarks than with guidelines for deeper analysis. Przeworski touches an element in his model which he calls the “psychological approach”: because of “foreign pressure”, amongst others, the liberalizers in the regime are no longer able to act rationally (Przeworski 1991: 65). This could be one explanation in his model for liberalizers not acting according to his expectations (see Chapter 3.1.2). However, where he stops, the nested games model will start delving into further. Rational choice models applied to revolutions have found that, when misperception and soft incentives, such as institutional or international constraints, become major factors, it is reasonable to begin the analysis with assumptions of a narrow theoretical version, that is, in the first place, strict egotistic behavior (Opp 1999: 196; Kuran 1994; Kiser and Levi 1996).

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For a critique of the concept see King et al. (1994: Ch. 5). Stylized facts are in particular criticised as being arguments that are intentionally impressionistic.


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With the design of “nested games” Tsebelis (1990) pioneered a rational choice theory in comparative politics.57 He demonstrates how our understanding of what constitutes rational action is often constrained by excluding the context in which political players interact. Many studies, indeed, share the characteristics that one or two other parties influence the way political elites interact with each other. Even though Tsebelis’ aim was to find theoretical solutions for the cases where the observer would perceive an actor’s decision as being sub-optimal and not rational, the principal idea behind nested games is well suited for its application to strategic regime transitions. As the observer in Tsebelis’ empirical examples considers the game in the “principal arena” without taking contextual, external factors into account, most analyses of regime transition predominantly focus on the exclusively domestic interaction. For the actor, the game is nested inside a bigger game. Contextual factors – “the other arenas” – thus influence his payoffs and those of the other players. With particular focus on the Eastern European revolutions, Kuran (1995: 315), for example, argues that the surprise of Communist breakdown was ubiquitous, but it comprised only people with deep insights into information. Why should an external actor matter? An external actor who influences the payoffs of the actor in the principal arena leads to the choice of different strategies. During a transition, choices are caught up in a continuous redefinition of actors’ perceptions of preferences and constraints (Kitschelt 1992). Therefore, the outcomes of the strategic transition game are different when external factors are taken into account. Substantively, nested games are a way of transplanting context into game theory (Tsebelis 1990: 245). Instead of assuming that people play games in a vacuum, it shows that these games are embedded in some higher order network. Likewise, the same argument can be put forward for studying strategic transitions: focusing exclusively on the domestic interaction between authoritarian regime and civil society, we assume the players to act in a vacuum. Applying the nested games approach, the network of games determines the players’ payoffs and the political outcome. Because of its practicability in comparison to conventional game theory, the approach has methodological advantages, too. The conventional design of games in multiple arenas is to consider all the actors involved – in our case external actor, opposition, and regime –, write down all their available strategies, add all

57

Tsebelis seems to have been unaware of the earlier uses of his term, particularly Heckathorn (1984), who explicitly discusses the “Theory of Nested Games”.

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the possible innovating strategies, and solve a giant game with an additional multitude of subgames.58 Figure 3:

Simple Tripartite Interaction Opposition

Regime

External Actor

For practical purposes, a single game comprising all the factors is simply not tractable and will produce few empirically valid insights. Since it can also be assumed that the role of the third actor, the foreign power, is of rather indirect influence to the domestic game, its incorporation into a three-person game is, as in Figure 3:, empirically less adequate. If external factors are negligible, then the interaction between two actors can be studied in isolation, and predictions about each actor’s behavior can be accurate – “if, however, externalities are important, and if third parties react to the game between the two players, then these externalities have to be studied” (Tsebelis 1990: 59). One way of studying the interaction between regime and opposition (between two players) with externalities is by focusing on the impact of third parties to the interaction of the main players. This is the case in the figure below, and this is the nested game approach. Figure 4: presents a nested game as a domestic transition being embedded in a wider game at the international level and taking into account an external actor.

58

In simple terms, a subgame is game between two or more players that can be completely isolated from the games around it and can be solved on its own (Tsebelis 1990: 55).

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Figure 4:

Nested Games Approach

Regime

Opposition

External Actor

In fact, this is essentially a comparative statics problem: outside conditions change the payoffs of the actors, and the equilibria of two different games have to be calculated and compared. So the payoffs vary from game to game. The common problem that the rules of the game which are taken as exogenous in one context cannot be easily investigated in another – ultimately, the question of why the game is being played – can thereby be overcome as well (see Kitschelt 1993: 415; Munck 2001: 184). Figure 5:

Simple Two-Level Game

International Level

x1

Domestic Level

x1

x2

x3

Within the context of strategic transition studies, the approach constitutes an attempt to endogenize variables that have been regarded as exogenous before (Opp 1999: 187), that is, the why of preferences. The advantage becomes more articulate when further comparing the approach with Putnam’s two-level model (1998): Here, the two levels are treated as interdependent, but structurally as two

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separate entities (see the graphic summary of the two-level game in Figure 5:). Embedding the domestic level into the international dimension, as the nested game approach does, reflects more accurately than the two-level approach how interwoven the mechanisms of external influence on regime change are. From a different angle, namely under the assumption that “suboptimal” action is often nothing but a disagreement between observer and actors, the nested games approach also proves useful. The surprise of a scholar seeing political actors behave apparently non-rationally is, as has been said, the original peg for Tsebelis’ book. In general, a sudden agreement between actors with opposite preferences, like the example of the Polish round table talks, often brings about some degree of surprise. Many authoritarian regimes enter into negotiations simply because it is the sole means to safeguard their future power, only to find themselves in an unexpected, accelerated process of disempowerment. With regard to the – for the Polish Communists – fatally designed electoral system in the round-table-agreement, Kaminski (1999: 10) studies “the apparent suboptimal actions of the Communist party leaders because they are cases of disagreement between actor and observer [italics in original]”. The observer focuses attention on only one strategic decision-making situation, but, in Kaminski’s view, the Polish Communists were involved in a whole network of games. This leads to the observer’s perspective being incomplete: “The observer considers the game in the principal arena without taking contextual factors into account, whereas the actor perceives that the game is nested inside a bigger game that defines how contextual factors (the other arenas) influence his payoffs and those of the other players” (Tsebelis 1990: 8). One of the other arenas is the international dimension, exemplified here by an international power altering what is optimal as strategy. If we accept this view of the Polish events, the formalization of the interaction between opposition and regime can explicate behavior that in a way seems “random to observers but rational to game theorists” (Rasmusen 1995: 68). The transition arena is connected to the international arena, and the international arena affects the payoffs of the domestic players in the transition arena. In the form of a repeated game, we can formalize the interconnectedness between the levels as iterative cycles of conflict fluctuating between international arena and the domestic arena. The variance in the payoffs to the regime influences the optimal strategies of the regime. Because of the strategic nature of the game and interdependence of moves, this variance, in turn, affects the optimal strategies of the opposition, too. Note that there is a difference between preferences over outcomes and preferences over strategies: a strategy is how actors try to obtain theoretically preferred outcomes; actors can only change their strategy as they


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gain information that alters their assessment of the best possible outcome they are likely to obtain (Casper and Taylor 1996: 17; see Chapter 5.1.2). In short, the addition of a third player, an international power, changes the economy of strategic action. We witness a different cost structure attached to attaining a particular outcome. In Dahl’s words (1971), “the more the costs of suppression exceed the costs of toleration, the greater the chance for a competitive regime” (1971: 15).59 Because of the nature of dictatorships, what is threatening to authoritarian regimes is not the loss of legitimacy, but the organization of counter-hegemony (Przeworski 1992: 107). In addition, if benefits the opposition receives from an external democratic nation (e.g. political support, finances, transfers, legitimacy) pay off for the costs of repression, it could exceed the cost of tolerance for the regime (Yilmaz 2002: 75). In a cost-benefit analysis, tolerating the opposition in the sense of finding power sharing arrangements could become more and more attractive to the regime. The game subsequently developed is similar in structure to Verwimp (2004).60 This study profited from the idea, originally developed by Lohmann (1997), of how, by discounting payoffs, certain strategic situations can cause the regime to democratize. The nested games model assumes that the players have complete information. With few parties to the conflict it makes sense to assume that players know each other’s payoff functions, which is central to a game of complete information.61 A game of complete information requires the actors to have common knowledge about each other’s preference order. Tsebelis points out, game theory is best applied “to situations in which the actors’ identity and goals are estab59

60

61

Refining Dahl’s model, Marks (1992: 51) defines the costs of toleration as “the costs of losing monopolistic control of the government multiplied by the probability of losing that monopoly as a result of liberalizing the regime”. Verwimp (2004), employing the nested games approach, studies the strategic behavior of parties in the Rwandan genocide by applying a multiple arena scenario. He constructs the genocide committed against the Tutsi minority as a strategy to redesign the rules of the domestic game. By redrawing the institutional design, the Rwandan, Hutu dominated, regime changed and improved its payoffs through a strategy of simply and brutally eliminating one player – an extreme case of manipulating the actor space. The political leaders realized that they could not bear the costs of fighting the ethnic Tutsi opposition anymore, while they were also entangled in a larger, nested game of civil war by a rebel movement. Instead of surrendering part of their power, after the entire elimination of the opposition, they altered the overall structure of the game, reducing it to a simple confrontation with the rebel movement. The assumption that players have accurate information about each other’s preferences could well be regarded as implausible partly because it may pay off for one player to pretend to be more extreme than he actually is in order to get further concessions out of others. For example, in Cohen’s transition games (Cohen 1994), the main theme is distrust and it certainly seems pertinent to the transitions.

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lished and the rules of the interaction are precise and known to the interaction agents” (Tsebelis 1990: 32). Information in games must further be differentiated into a) the information a player has about its opponent’s preferences and b) information about the power of its opponent. Hardly concealable problems such as a lack of exact information about actors’ preferences, the theoretic requirement to know the endpoint of a negotiation, and potentially changeable rules during transition politics make the process challenging for the actors, but they do not make game-theoretic concepts inapplicable. Casper and Taylor (1996: 18) argue that, since the outcome of the process can literally be a matter of life and death to the players, politicians spend whatever energy is necessary to acquire information. Thus, it can be assumed the agents will attempt and succeed to overcome their initial lack of information, satisfying the tight theoretical requirement that the actors’ preference orders are common knowledge. In the remainder of this chapter, at first, the non-nested game of domestic politics and the foreign pressure game, respectively, will be presented. Subsequently the nested version of the transition game and the foreign pressure game will follow. Here, an iteration of the game, allowing correlated strategies, will be introduced. Finally, this game will be formally solved and its results discussed.

4.2 Regime, Opposition, and Foreign Power For developing the nested game of external influence on strategic regime transitions the interactions in their simple form, the non-nested versions, need to be introduced first. The games serve to explore, in a reduced form, the major strategic situations the actors face. As mentioned, due to their lack of enforcement mechanisms, theses transition games are non-cooperative games. Firstly, on the domestic level, a game of transition represents the confrontation between a democratic opposition and the authoritarian regime. This level is the principal arena. On the international level, a game of foreign pressure captures the regime’s interaction with an external actor. Once the outcomes of both games have been analyzed, they can be compared with the outcome generated by the nested version of the games. Methodologically, the transition game without an external actor provides a perfect exercise of counterfactuals to nested transition situations.

4.2.1 Principal Arena I: Game of Transition Consider an authoritarian regime facing a domestic opposition movement. Both players have two options in the game; they either cooperate with each other or do

4.2 Regime, Opposition, and Foreign Power

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not cooperate. Regime and opposition compete in strategic negotiations concerning the movement towards political liberalization. Each side wants an outcome as close as possible to its ideal regime type. The regime and the opposition are both what Ordeshook (1992), in game-theoretic terms, calls a “coalition” engaging in the negotiations. Only mutual cooperation leads to an agreement on democratic reform. Since the game represents the political choice between authoritarianism and liberalism, it can be called the transition game. As discussed earlier, the strategic definition of players and their interactions presented here is only relevant for a narrowly defined transition phase. This study focuses on the breakdown of authoritarian regimes, rather than democratization. Similar to Geddes’ quantitative macro study on the effect of foreign intervention (Geddes 2002: 3), the model seeks to assess the effect of a single foreign power on the durability of dictatorships, regardless of whether their breakdown results in a consolidated democracy or not. Pre-breakthrough authoritarian countries can be subcategorized into: (a) truly closed societies where all institutions independent of the state are repressed, (b) systems that tolerate elements of civil society but where democratic development can only be viewed as a long-term prospect. The antecedents necessary for the theory to work are defined with the later subcategory. Transition phase (b) can historically be placed after some form of loosening of the absolute authoritarian rule took place, but before a democratic electoral period.62 In the end, the players find themselves in a situation in which the regime has marginally opened to the degree that, in civil society, some organized form of resistance has already emerged. A certain freedom of speech and a limited tolerance of freely associated groups may be allowed so that a gradual formation of actors with differing strategic options can be observed. We can rely on the stylized facts that, once a regime decides to open up the system, whether forced by externalities or as a consequence of a domestic oppositional threat (or both), tensions may rise, leading to splits and provoking the emergence of “the classic four-player game of transition” (Linz 1996: 265):63 The authoritarian incumbents split into hardliners and softliners, while the opposition splits into moderates and radicals. More generally, due to the protracted and confrontational political fights, the opening phase is rather characterized by polarization than by pluralization, reducing the number of actors to an analytically very small number. The variance of real actors in each transition phase is

62 63

For a similar periodization see also Casper and Taylor (1996: 19) For the original formulation of the 2-2 scheme of transition actors, see O’Donnell et al. (1986: 15-17, 24, 63, 71).

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thus reduced to ideally collective actors, who confront each other in dichotomous constellations of action.64 This constellation implies that a prior split in the regime made liberalizers, as opposed to regime hardliners, control the government. Such a situation creates a period with the most intense interactions and bargaining and thus resembles little the period after the first free and competitive elections. At this point, political institutions should be able to constrain the actors, canalize their power more predictably, and render their moves to become much clearer and more transparent. When studying the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and not democratization, any analytical model needs to remain open to account for an outcome of potential backlash into authoritarian behavior of the Ancien regime. Evidence from the new democracies suggests that levels of electoral competition do not have linear consequences. The search for democratic legitimacy via controlled elections, using the logic of minimal concessions, may well backfire and become self-defeating (Schedler 2002b: 114); it may motivate true reform as well as closure on behalf of the incumbents, and protest as well as acquiescence on behalf of the opposition. Electoral routes to democracy tend to unfold as “protracted transitions” (Eisenstadt 2000), and inaugural democratic elections too often lead not straightforward to democracy but to systems of semi-democracy or semi-authoritarianism (Diamond 2002; Carothers 2002; Merkel and Puhle 1999). One way to account for this non-linearity is to construct the actors’ moves in a form which allows for outcomes only short of democratization. Before assigning regime and opposition with moves and preferences and moving on to the actual modeling, some introductory remarks concerning both empirical and theoretical assumptions are necessary. The game starts against the background of authoritarian rule being the status quo equilibrium. The basis for analysis is a simple model of strategic transition that builds on the original ideas of Przeworski (1991; 1992), and it resembles the formalizations by Colomer (2000), Colomer and Pasqual (1994), and Zielinski (1995) of the Polish situation in 1980-1981. Colomer denies that there is a time dimension in which the threats he assigns to the players could be carried out, treating the game as a one-off interaction. This study’s first non-nested game of transition is also without a temporal dimension, however, only to serve the purpose of outlining the major strategic situations in a more intelligible approach. The model is then, in a second step, extended to a repeated game in order to integrate a temporal dimension. 64

At this point, intra-actor games are excluded in the model because, even though e.g. Colomer (2000) makes extensive use of them, these subgames generally concern not strategic choices on broad issues but rather tactical choices on narrow operational questions (see Brams 1990: 169). However, these games are further discussed in the Conclusion.


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In comparison to Colomer (2000), the nested games model further omits variances in the game depending on whether the regime is dominated be either liberalizers or hardliners, which can be further taxonomized into subgroups of moderates and radicals respectively. Yet, the model relies on his and other authors’ assumption that, to fulfill the conditions of pacted transitions, only the type of player softliner would yield any chance to democratic reform. In the nested game of external democracy promotion, thus, the regime is synonymous with the regime softliners having the controlling power inside the authoritarian government. Under the assumption of rationality, the players – the regime and the opposition – are capable of attributing probabilities between an action and its consequences. Since it is the interaction of the different players’ strategies that determines what happens, the modeler focuses on the strategic outcome (Rasmusen 1995: 14). Among the hypothetical outcomes, an equilibrium can be found, which is defined as “a strategy combination consisting of a best strategy for each of the players in the game” (1995: 15). In deciding what “best strategy” means, the standard concept of the Nash equilibrium can, at this point, be introduced: a strategy combination is a Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to deviate from his strategy given that the others do not deviate. For our purposes, it is important to notice that this equilibrium even exists if all the actors receive lower payoffs in this way than they would with some alternative strategies. In a strategic analysis, the participants in the struggle for or against democratic reform are treated as unitary actors. These actors are then defined as a formation and change of their strategic preferences. This definition allows subsuming real actors with varying individual goals under one common denominator. In order to obtain a typology of actors that could also be widely applied to the comparative analysis of real processes of regime change, a distinction is made among the strategic collective actors to which the same preference order can be attributed. In most pacted transitions, Linz and Stepan (1996) have observed that the interaction between the rulers and the opposition is likely to produce a relatively small number of relevant actors. Other observations are that “relatively strong, internally differentiated rulers tend to be either unchallenged or confronted by a united opposition, while a relatively strong plural opposition tends to be faced by united, hard-line rulers” (Colomer 2000: 47). The variance of real actors in each transition phase is thus reduced to ideally collective actors, who confront each other in dichotomous constellations of action. For an assumption of a unitary opposition, it can be defined procedurally. At this point, rather than to identify its constituent parts, we can define the opposition along the dimension of its common enemy and its role as a non-governmental player, or buffer to the state (Ahn and Loveless 2004: 8).

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To sum up, the transition game is played by two actors: 1.

2.

an authoritarian regime that is dominated by softliners and wants to continue its rule (if hardliner dominated the regime, any outcome resembling democratization would be unattainable); a democratic opposition that is united by its opposing the incumbent regime and demanding political liberalization.

Design of the Game Having introduced the actors, what are the options the players face? Since content and number of salient issues during a process of political liberalization differ too much from one country to another, the theoretical analysis is limited to a stylized one-dimensional issue space. A simple preference order reflects the objective to generalize (Casper and Taylor 1996: 21). For political actors living under authoritarianism, we can distinguish three general strategies available to them: 1. 2. 3.

continuity of the authoritarian governance (C), moderate and limited reforms of the authoritarian system (R), and full democratization of the institutional framework and the rupture with the existing political system (D), e.g. the complete breakdown of authoritarianism.

C means the maintenance of undisputed rule by the status quo regime, and neither civil nor political liberties are granted to the opposition movement. The intermediate strategy R would mean the opening of the regime, thus, a form of official, limited acceptance of any opposition movement and eventually its integration into the authoritarian system. Finally, D stands for the introduction of free elections and a private market economy eventually leading to democracy. Students of Latin America and Southern Europe also coined this break ruptura (rupture), while further “agreed rupture” (ruptura pactada) indicates a successful democratization, “agreed reform” (reforma pactada) an intermediate project dominated by regime softliners (Linz and Stepan 1996: 61). Modeling the actors’ interaction as games requires defining their preference orders regarding outcomes, that is, the states collectively produced by the different actors’ strategies. Only those outcomes created by choices made between each actor’s first two preferences will be considered. The inclusion of an actor’s last preference would not add any more insightful developments because it could

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be considered as complete surrender to the other actor (Zielinski 1995; Sutter 2000; Colomer 2000: 48). It can now reasonably be assumed that the two players can only choose between continuity (C) and reform (R) for the regime; and democratization (D) and reform (R) for the opposition. The interaction of the two players can be reproduced in a more formal way with the strategic form game in the four-cell-matrix in Table 2:. For conveying the strategic contingencies at hand, assume a one-shot game with complete information and a discrete strategy space in which both players have two possible actions available. To employ a single-shot game is appropriate for understanding how actors confront an important issue. The reason being that, for a vital issue, the stakes are very high, so the quintessentials cannot easily be traded off against some promises about future behavior or against other issues. Here, the ordering of payoffs, not the actual values, is the decisive factor (see Tsebelis 1990: 171). Only the ranking of payoffs determines the optimal strategies. Whilst the players, actions and outcomes are collectively referred to as the rules of the games, the preference orders become payoff structures in Table 2:, through which the equilibrium is determined and the outcome of the game as such can be predicted. The choice of strategy will depend on the payoffs of the actions. By combining the pairs of alternatives, we can derive four possible outcomes in the game between regime and opposition: CR, CD, RD, RR. The players have opposite preferences in their first and last places, but it makes sense to assume that they can concur in their intermediate rankings. The available strategies to the players can be explained more in detail during the discussion about the outcomes of their moves. Table 2:

Generic Payoff Matrix Transition Game Opposition

Regime

D(emocratization)

R(eform)

C(ontinuity)

B-p , R

B, 0

R(eform)

0, B

B/2, B/2

B, borrowing the economical term budget, is the highest possible payoff; p is the cost for the regime to repress the opposition, that is, the cost to stay in power, and R is some undetermined payoff the opposition receives for keeping the movement alive while the regime is repressing it. By convention, the first value

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in each cell indicates the payoff to the row player, the regime. The second value indicates the payoff for the column player, opposition. For a better understanding of the game’s outcome, the payoff matrix with numerical outcomes is depicted in Table 3:. The ranking goes from 1, being the lowest payoff, to 4 for the highest payoff. The payoffs are only ordinal, i.e. they indicate an ordering from best to worst, not the degree to which a player prefers one outcome to another. It has to be kept in mind that the presentation with numerical payoffs does not reflect the real payoffs to the actors but simply serves as an additional illustration helping, at a later point, to follow the equilibrium discussion more closely. For example, in cell four, the result of B/2 generates the second worst outcome for the player regime and the second best outcome for the player opposition. Table 3:

Numeric Payoff Matrix Transition Game Opposition D(emocratization)

R(eform)

C(ontinuity)

3,2

4,1

R(eform)

1,4

2,3

Regime

4.2.2 Principal Arena II: Outcomes What are the possible outcomes given the strategic moves the players have as options? (1) In the outcome CR, the regime chooses continuity while the opposition chooses reform. The opposition asks for limited, intermediary reforms and accepts the limited role it has in changing the existing political system. It reinforces the stability of the regime and maintains some form of social peace. The regime receives the payoff B, the budget available to the regime, e.g. to cover personal consumption or privileges derived from being in power, since there is no real threat and cost to its rule. This situation, most preferred by the regime, gives the outcome the lowest payoff 0 to the opposition since it could mean its total annihilation when it surrenders or is absorbed into the authoritarian system. Accepting the continuity of the regime by raising few protests and posing no challenge to the regime’s authority is hence similar to a move of withdrawal. Such a move


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would clearly mean a betrayal of the democratic ideals which lay at the very foundation of most opposition movements when they are initially formed. (2) In the outcome CD, the regime chooses continuity and the opposition democratization, or “democratic rupture” (Colomer 2000: 58). The payoff to the regime is B-p, as we consider B the budget available to the regime, and p the cost of staying in power. The opposition threatens to mobilize (or, indeed does mobilize), the move Francisco and Lichbach (2001) plastically calls “fight”, which gives them the reward R for upholding the democratic fight and not ceasing to exist by entering into the authoritarian governance arrangement. The situation is one of confrontation, closely representing a culmination of conflict.65 As the regime will not yield to any democratic reform that the opposition is voicing, in order to continue its authoritarian rule, it has to resort to repression, making it more expensive to stay in power by the cost of p. The costs can encompass those of financing the repressive apparatus but also more indirect costs of a waning legitimacy in society when violence is employed. When the opposition is acquiescing, p is low. It is zero when hardly any opposition exists at all – resistance thus increases the cost of staying in power. With a high value of p, the situation means a clash of actions or, at least, a confrontation between the two players. Here, the disparity of forces between the two actors becomes fatally obvious. However, it can also be assumed that the regime would prefer gaining social peace through the satellization of the opposition or through offering transitory payment rather than through using violent and repressive means. For achieving to do so, it nonetheless has to spend on buying the opposition with similar cost p to their authoritarian rule. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue in their game design that a current regime under threat of revolution will nearly always be better off offering concessions and side payments. The coup (or full democratization) may occur anyway, if the existing regime fails to devise a credible means of guaranteeing the compensation once the coup threat dissipates. (3) The outcome RR suggests an agreement on a modicum of reforms between the two players. Both players are interested in finding some power sharing agreement. Since the opposition does not demand full democracy it will not attempt to replace the regime but rather to share power, thereby half of the budget B/2 goes to the regime, the other half B/2 to the opposition (the multiplication of B by one-half also simplifies the conditions derived later). We can assume that B is equally divided between the two players not only for reasons of analytical simplicity: the move to enter into some form of coalition with the regime is risky for the opposition. Because the opposition knows that the aim of 65

The outcome could also lead to a situation of violent conflict, even civil war (Crescenzi 1999; Zielinski 1999), consequently changing the regime’s preference order.

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the regime is, ultimately, not to surrender power, the regime’s move may likely be interpreted as one of manipulation. It could merely want to absorb civil society’s resistance but not to seriously offer anything politically substantial to the opposition in return. The opposition will want to make sure not to enter into such a scenario by securing a well-balanced power sharing arrangement and asking for guarantees to receive a prominent status in the new governing arrangement – that is, receiving its payoff B/2. The regime makes offers to liberalize, however, but does not intend to move to democracy. We cannot assume the regime to be dominated by, in fact, protodemocratizers66 as opposed to, more realistically, liberalizers. Liberalizers simply prefer limiting their absolute power rather than resorting to possible bloodshed, but their goal, nonetheless, is to stay in power.67 The further opening of the system through, for example, the legalizing of the opposition and the entering into negotiations as equal partners could present, notwithstanding, successful pre-conditions for an eventual subsequent transition. (4) Finally, in the outcome RD the regime offers reform and receives the payoff 0 while the opposition plays democratization and receives payoff B. Major concessions that the regime grants, speaking within the context of Eastern Europe, “would not have been matched by a reciprocal acceptance of Communist power but by a reinforcement and increased political activity of the opposition” (Colomer 2000: 93). The opposition could directly embark on coming to power and overthrowing the regime. Non-violent revolution is another term to describe this outcome, when the opposition takes the chance of the regime making offers and attempts to take over the government entirely. The regime loses everything, receiving zero, the opposition is in power, receiving the entire budget B for governing alone.

66

67

Blaydes (2003) points out that this is yet exactly what is implied in Przeworski model’s outcome of “transition” (1991: 111). There is sufficient proof to discard the idea that dictatorial regimes could become convinced of democratic values through “communicative rationality”, in a process of persuasion, as Risse et al. (1999: 273) suggest for possible logics in regime change.

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Equilibrium and Preference Orders Before discussing how the game will be played, for reasons of simplicity and comparative statics in the subsequent sections, we can again define the outcome in which both actors choose reform, outcome RR, as an outcome of cooperation. Finally, how is the game of transition played, that is, what is the equilibrium outcome? The outcome is determined by the ordering of the payoffs to the players. The general assumption governing the game is that the regime wants to stay in power and that the opposition’s resistance increases the costs to rule, and thus decreases the payoffs of the regime. These assumptions are strong (i.e. it is unlikely that they are met in the real world), but, at this point, there is doubt that more general preferences do produce greatly different results. Two orderings are possible for the regime. Firstly, consider that it is cheaper to repress the opposition than to share power. Then, for the regime

(1)

Formally, this ordering is true under the condition that repression is cheaper than power sharing with the opposition p < B/2

(2)

As the game starts against a background in which the incumbent authoritarian regime has only opened to a minimum degree so that an opposition formation is at all possible, it is reasonable to assume the regime has control over the opposition. The costs of resistance are such that the regime is not forced to consider giving up half of its power in order to bear the costs of opposition activities. The second possible order is the opposite of condition (2), when B/2 < p, repression is more expensive than cooperating, that is, to sharing power with the opposition instead. This implies the following order of the payoffs for the regime The cost p has risen to such a degree that the regime loses more by financing the repression than by offering reform to the opposition and sharing half of the benefits it receives from governing. For this condition to hold we have to expect a powerful opposition movement that is capable not only to seriously harm the governing elites but, moreover, to threaten the continuity of the present political system. This assumption and the consequent preference order, at this point, are

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discarded. It is more likely that, after the aforementioned initial opening of the regime, any democratic opposition will not be in the power to cause so much damage as to drive p above B/2. For now, in the non-nested transition game, the preference order from equation (1) will be applied. Next, the payoff orderings for the opposition can be ascribed. The opposition would want to take part in any governing arrangement, and, once a democratic polity is established, its part of the budget would be larger than any benefit it would gain from either resistance or entering into the existing authoritarian structures. We can also assume that resistance pays off because the opposition proves how expensive they are for the regime, and the regime might have to give them a larger share of the budget if it were to cooperate and accept the opposition. This implies why the reform agreement generates B/2 and why R can be regarded as reward. Yet one could also argue that being locked up in prison, payoff R, can hardly be better than accepting the fate of living under authoritarianism, payoff 0. Earlier though, the actors were defined as being unitary and covering a onedimensional issue space. This, for the actor opposition, is its enmity against the authoritarian regime. It is a common observation in real politics that democratic oppositions in repressive systems do not emerge because of some common policy goals but rather because of their shared animosity towards the government. Thus, we have to regard the opposition not as a group of individuals, rather as the idea behind the movement. However, more importantly, as already indicated in the strategy outcome CR, the very existence of the actor depends on its struggle for more freedom. Given that the regime is, through arrests and detention, very unlikely to eradicate physically the entire opposition (remember, the game’s antecedent was that the liberalizers have control over the regime hardliners), the movement’s spirit continues. Yielding to the regime’s power, however, could become closer to a state of extinction. Consequently, the payoff ordering is for the Opposition

(3)

Equilibrium Each player has a dominant strategy, which means a strategy that gives the player a higher payoff no matter what strategy the other player chooses. Given the players’ preference orders, we find the dominant strategy equilibrium in the strategy pair of continuity; democratization. Consider the following: if the regime would want to reach its highest payoff B by playing continuity, the opposi-


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tion would receive its lowest possible payoff playing reform; instead, it consequently moves to democratization. If the opposition would start and wants to attain its highest payoff B by playing democratization, the regime would receive its lowest payoff by playing reform, inducing it consequently to play continuity. In sum, the regime plays continuity, receiving its second most preferred payoff B-p, which is its highest payoff minus the costs it has to spend for either buying off the opposition or repressing it. The opposition plays democratization, receiving its payoff R, which is only a low reward for continuing its fight and not ceasing to exist, and therefore its second most preferred. The outcome is one of confrontation and repression, and is highly stable.

4.2.3 International Arena I: Foreign Pressure Game On the international level, the authoritarian regime, already caught in the domestic transition game, faces a foreign democratic country that demands certain democratic reforms. The very existence of this interaction implies that we can reasonably assume this actor, external to the transition game, having the power and resolve to put real pressure on the regime. Diplomatic and economic “pressures” are major potential causal mechanisms that, in combination with internal forces, can “compel autocratic regimes to liberalize” (Pevehouse 2002: 519). Otherwise the game would be of no relevance to the regime, and there would be no need to integrate these externalities. This game can be called foreign pressure game. Practical efforts to move foreign societies toward democracy may be roughly divided into two kinds: (1) dealing with social forces, (2) working with the organization of government (Smith 1994: 343; Schmitter and Brouwer 1999). Dealing with social forces and supporting an opposition movement against the regime is commonly seen as having high value in comparison to directly influencing the government (Carothers 1997). Because there is a belief that external actors “work in unintended ways through ostensible national agents” (Schmitter 1986: 5), analyzing its real impact is difficult. This point as well as the selection criteria for the external actor being a foreign state was discussed in chapter 4.1.1. When analyzing the elements of foreign pressure in this game, however, both actions towards the forces outside the government and the government itself have to be taken into consideration. The external actor being a foreign power, the contingencies of action can analytically be reduced to an action space of two moves. Similar to Levitsky and Way’s (2006) systematization of international effects in bringing about democracy into “low leverage” and “high leverage” (2006: 387), in this international

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game, the external actor can follow a soft and a hard approach against the regime. Ultimately, he will, through various means, want to pressure the regime that is forming the government into taking measures to reform democratically. By adhering to parsimony, we can summarize the moves independently of the real external actor’s power: he can impact the regime with either strong or with weak pressure, reflecting, respectively, low or high leverage for pressure.68 Both moves also imply how closely the foreign pressure game is connected with the transition game. Figure 6:depicts the differences between the two moves.69 Figure 6:

Strong and Weak Degree of Pressure by the External Actor Weak Pressure

Strong Pressure

External Actor

External Actor

Government

Government

Domestic opposition

Domestic opposition

The strategies behind the players’ moves in the foreign pressure game are, starting with the external actor:

68

69

Francisco and Lichbach (2001: 2) itinerate a game along “weak regime” and “strong regime”, with the opposition not knowing what type it is facing. The introduction of incomplete information could also be discussed for my itineration along “weak” and “strong” pressure. However, it is unrealistic to assume that, in this case, the regime would not have complete information about the type of influence the external actor is applying. I explicitly exclude one source of pressure on authoritarian regimes from international influence: through its commitment in a country’s development, a foreign power can heighten the international salience of autocratic abuse. Although often referred to as a major source of international influence (Levitsky and Way 2006: 384), at this point, it would be too cumbersome for empirical exploration.


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(1) The external actor can exert strong pressure, which is characterized by enacting most or all of the following:

as negative instruments: the imposition of serious, costly sanctions, and the lifting of sanctions being conditioned upon fulfilling particular demands for democratic reform and the legalization of the opposition (the sanctions carry the potential to seriously harm the regime and/or the economy); credible threats for further punitive measures; as positive instruments: overtly and covertly supporting the opposition.

These elements need to be understood as being additive rather than integrative. Only in their totality it is justified to term the move as strong pressure. (2) The player can exert weak pressure, which is characterized by: employing forms of public diplomacy calling for reform, but, due to the level of commitment, lacking the future credibility of threats; making press statements condemning the regime’s actions; general diplomatic support of civil society. Table 4: presents a more detailed overview of which action elements feature the respective move by the external actor. In order to avoid complicating the picture unnecessarily, assume that the regime’s strategy space exists of being either (1) accommodating or showing (2) intransigence to the external actor’s behavior. This choice of moves for the external actor corresponds well to some of the results Geddes (2002) found in her quantitative study about the effect diverse forms of foreign pressure have on the collapse of authoritarian regimes. Most relevantly she shows that only the “least subtle” forms of pressure tend to destabilize authoritarian regimes, which she subsumes under the label of “costly sanctions”. Indeed, scholars in international relations have shown that sanctions, as a particular form of economic international pressure, are, as a matter of fact, able to destabilize governments (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990).70 Economic pressure is broadly defined to include economic coercion and positive democratic conditionality. The former refers to punishing countries for not being democratic, the latter to the policy of rewarding states with representative institutions. These can be considered together because, as the model will show, they are closely related (see also Marinov 2005).

70

However, Hufbauer et al. (1990) has been primarily interested in the conditions under which sanctions are effective, and not in their effects on authoritarian regimes, see Geddes (2002: 5); see Baldwin (1999) for a useful general review of the role of sanctions.

120 Table 4: Target


Instruments of the External Actor’s Moves Strong Pressure

Weak Pressure

Imposition of costly punitive ecoDiplomatic protest: public annomic sanctions; lifting conditioned nouncements condemning regime upon fulfilling of well-defined reform steps – sanctions have potential to seriously harm regime/economy Regime

Political sanctions with the potential to undermine the political legitimacy of the regime

Soft financial inducements

Credible threats for future punishment

Level of commitment lacks future credibility of threats to punish

Overt and covert, direct assistance to opposition groups or key players

Support of opposition only of declaratory character

Clear identification of recipients among opposition

General promotion of a vaguely defined civil society

Opposition

In the sanctions debate, the willingness to incur costs is “widely regarded as a standard indicator of one’s resolve” (Baldwin 1985: 107). However, the literature on the impact of sanctions on democratization often remains on very general levels. Few hypotheses exist for the evaluation. A related, but analytically different external factor, the role of conditionalities as incentive to democratization, is a typical field of studies on the role of the European Union (see Kubicek 2003). In the regional context of Eastern European, Kubik and Ekiert (2000: 271) believe that the pressure of sanctions and condemnation by the West in general was quite effective in restraining the Communist governments and moderating repression. For Whitehead (1996: 13), aid and economic concessions of the United States were, in general, able to encourage and direct certain elements but not to control. In a broader approach, Geddes (2000: 5) found out that only economically costly sanctions help to bring down authoritarian regimes. Costly sanctions are thus one element of the move strong pressure in the game above. Moreover, since for Geddes (2002) “foreign policy carrots” do not have the expected effect, it is perfectly reasonable to regard the direct supporting of a democratic opposition as an entirely different set of foreign pressure tools, and


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thus yet another element of a strong foreign pressure. Similarly, soft financial inducements need to be distinguished from sanctions which are lifted upon conditionalities.71 The former can rather be defined as an element of the foreign policy carrot approach, thus belonging to the move weak pressure. Conditionality in a sanctions regime can be understood as “the idea […] to use the fulfillment of stipulated obligations as a prerequisite for obtaining economic aid, debt relief, most-favored nation treatment, access to subsidized credit or membership in coveted regional or global organizations” (Schmitter 1996: 26). The game assumes away, however, the possibility of a second foreign power, of which the regime could be a protégé, thus counterbalancing the impact of the external actor’s moves in the original game. In the real world, a situation where regional or global powers compete over the influence in a given country is, without doubt, imminent. One can easily imagine political spheres of influence, which should therefore be of immediate concern to our model. The entire Cold War era making a case in point, but, in more recent history, consider also the examples of Taiwan or Lebanon. With respect to the empirical application of the model pertinent to the European cases, the Soviet Union was certainly a factor, in particular in the Polish game. I do not introduce the Soviet Union as a separate player since it is not clear to what extent the Polish Communists preferences differed from the Soviet ones.72 It is thus not clear, at least it is difficult to verify empirically, to what extent the Polish regime’s preferences would have been changed if the Soviet influence, whether real or perceived, had been absent (see also Brams 1990: 169). To sum up, just as the transition game, the foreign pressure game has a discrete action space, with the players having two moves available. The external actor can choose between strong pressure (S) and weak pressure (W), and the regime’s moves are simply the reaction to each of the external actor’s moves: to accommodate (A) or to behave with intransigence (I). Again, consider a one-shot game of complete information. The interaction between the two players is formalized in Table 5:

71

72

The effect and categorisation of sanctions is debated more in detail in the empirical part, Chapter 6.4.1. See more on this point in Chapter 7.5.3.

122 Table 5:


Generic Payoff Matrix Foreign Pressure Game External Actor S(trong pressure)

W(eak pressure)

A(ccommodate)

B/2, G/2

0, G

I(ntransigence)

B-psS, R

B, 0

Regime

pSS is the cost for the regime to sustain power under a sanctions regime and foreign support for the opposition; B is the budget to the regime for ruling; G is the gain to the external actor from the regime reforming democratically; R is some undetermined benefit to the external actor for building reputation. The regime’s payoffs are listed first, the external actor’s payoffs second. In Table 6:, just as before, for facilitating finding the solution to the game, the payoff matrix with ordinal outcomes is exhibited, with the ranking from 1 for the lowest payoff to 4 for the highest payoff. Table 6:

Numerical Payoff Matrix Foreign Pressure Game External Actor S(trong pressure)

W(eak pressure)

A(ccommodate)

3,3

1,4

I(ntransigence)

2,2

4,1

Regime

4.2.4 International Arena II: Outcomes Again, before discussing possible outcomes of the game, I will first define the cooperation outcome as an outcome when the regime chooses accommodate and the external actor chooses strong pressure. We can speak of cooperation in this strategy pair since, as will be shown, both players are better off than in any other


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strategy pair. The regime, by accommodating the external actor’s demands, indicates its willingness to cooperate with its strategic opponent. This terminological definition should also facilitate the analysis of the players’ strategy spaces at a later stage. Given the strategies of the players, the possible outcomes to the game of foreign pressure can be summarized as follows: (1) The outcome AS is an outcome in which the regime yields to serious reform after explicit demands were raised by external actor. The regime receives payoff B/2, which again reflects that it enters a power sharing arrangement with the opposition as equal partners. The regime chooses to accommodate after it has foreseen that the external actor’s strong pressure induced such a rise in cost that the continuation of its authoritarian rule is no longer possible. The external actor has invested such resources for pressure against the regime to reach a strong level: for simplification, he receives half of the gain, G/2, of what he could have earned had the regime accommodated to reform with him investing less resources, as expressed by the move weak pressure. (2) In the outcome AW the regime partially fulfils the demands the external actor has raised. The situation typically resembles an authoritarian regime bending to international public criticism that was voiced against its curtailing political liberties or repressing a democratic opposition. The regime receives its lowest payoff, equaling 0, because it has given in to a minimum of pressure to which it, most probably, could have shown intransigence, and it has shown signs of weakness the opposition could easily exploit for its own purposes. In the real world of democracy promotion, this outcome can be assumed to be occurring in a majority of cases. We can think of international appeals to democracy in countries that, ultimately, remain hybrid regime types. However, since this constellation would give the regime its least preferred outcome, it will either introduce reform steps that, once the international storm has calmed, can quickly be reversed, or will take measures that have great symbolic effect and publicity but are irrelevant in terms of democratic substance – a phenomenon commonly observed on the world stage. In this regard, elections, for example, have great symbolic effects and, especially in recent times, are rigged in a sophisticated manner, or are held while serious political activity is more or less subtly suppressed.73 Even though, in general, it means that the status quo dictatorship with limited acts of reform or minor concessions to the opposition might likely persist, 73

Schedler (2002) provides an impressive “menu” (104) of electoral manipulation. A point in case for the latter being Russia under Putin, for the former being Montenegro, and, with limitations, Mexico; or “the strange combination of remarkably competitive elections and harsh repression” (Diamond 2000: 107) that characterizes contemporary Iran.

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the external actor reaches its highest payoff in the gain G: through its influence it has achieved some reform, though investing only few resources and taking a limited risk in its actions. (3) If the regime chooses intransigence and the external actor strong pressure, the outcome IS, the regime is resolved to hold on to its authoritarian display of power, bearing the costs of strong external pressure for not legalizing any opposition. It receives the payoff B, reduced by the cost to sustain the external foreign pressure psS. Although dissatisfied, the external actor still receives a minimal reward from building a reputation of opposing dictatorship; he receives the payoff R for gaining or maintaining the reputation of being tough when a country is violating democratic principles. Sanctions, as an element of the strong pressure by the external actor, will have an impact on the economic situation. Additionally, the foreign assistance to the opposition will encourage its resistance further, driving up and contributing to the cost psS. (4) Finally, in the outcome IW, the full status quo dictatorship with no signs of accommodating continues while the external actor half-heartedly demands reforms. This is most convenient for the regime because staying intransigent to the foreign pressure will not incur many costs, if at all. It thus receives the payoff B, the full benefits of staying in power. The external actor gains barely anything as he organizes certain actions, albeit few and at low costs, but cannot induce any change in behavior. However, since he could risk loosing some of his threat power and reputation for not playing seriously the democratization card, and since he has also invested some of his resources, he is worst off and reaches his lowest payoff 0. The outcome IW we can expect in most cases where democratic foreign nations exhibit no real interest in promoting democracy in a given authoritarian country, but feel obliged to introduce certain symbolic measures either to adhere to their domestic audiences or to maintain a particular reputation.

Preference Orders For understanding how the game will be played, we again need to have a closer look at the actors’ payoffs. The most likely ordering for the actors’ preferences is as follows. At first, consider the regime. The regime prefers most to stay in power and to continue its authoritarian rule, and it can do so most easily if the external actor employs only limited pressure, giving it the highest payoff B. It prefers least to accommodate and offer the opposition reform when the external actor does not even exert strong pressure on it, giving it the payoff of zero. Otherwise, concerning the intermediary rankings, two orderings are possible.

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First, assume that resisting the external actor’s strong pressure is more expensive than realizing the demanded reforms. In short, if: psS > B/2

(4)

then for the regime

(5)

In order to sustain its power the regime needs to spend much of its resources for alleviating the negative effects from the foreign power’s interference into the domestic affairs. The country’s economy will suffer under the imposed sanctions regime, rendering it difficult to deliver a sufficient output in order to satisfy society’s basic needs. Additionally, it has already been spending repressive resources to keep the opposition down, but the external democracy assistance leads to a further strengthening of anti-regime activities. Table 7:

Costs of Suppression and Costs of Toleration

Costs of suppression Economy

Political

Society

Costs of toleration

loss of western foreign credits/foreign aid productivity suffering from strikes risk of revolution/elites’ personal security threatened expansion of repressive apparatus

personal benefits at risk

creeping loss of power potential hardliner revolution from within the regime bloc in Eastern Europe: threat of Soviet intervention/invasion

waning legitimacy

collective action problem reduced: escalating mobilization

The regime is predominantly occupied with fighting off these externally induced crises. When a level is reached where psS > B/2, the cost of repressing the democratic opposition starts exceeding the cost of tolerating it. To specify psS more clearly, Table 7: exhibits possible factors which can amount to the total cost of repression; in contrast, what constitutes the cost of toleration is included and

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allows eventually finding better empirical indicators for when psS is outgrowing the benefits from receiving the payoff of B/2. Second, assume, contrary to condition (4), that the external actor’s strong pressure is less expensive for the regime than to accommodate reform. If psS < B/2

(6)

then (7) If the foreign pressure were not strong and sufficiently harmful to the regime, psS would be low and become smaller than B/2, making it cheaper to resist against the external actor’s move and not implement democratic reform. The level of foreign pressure would not be high enough as to cause serious concern to the regime. We can think of situations in which a foreign nation imposes sanctions and even finances opposition activities. But the ruling elite simply commands over major repressive means to firmly stay in control of the domestic situation, thus requiring psS to reach very high levels before it can possibly exceed the value of sharing power, B/2. In addition, the level of B/2 could be very high, making it again difficult for psS > B/2, when the regime elites hold assets from the country’s wealth they can only exploit if their rule is untouched. What describes this condition can often be found among highly corrupted regime clans in oil rich countries such as, for example, Nigeria. As long as psS remains below the level of B/2, the regime has no incentive to accommodate any democratic reform the external actor attempts to induce. His actions are ineffective in changing any of the regime’s behavior. Recall that we defined the external actor’s move of strong pressure as employing both costly economic sanctions and direct assistance to the opposition fighting the regime from the inside. The differentiation in the external actor’s strategies between weak and strong pressure thus indicated that strong pressure is meant to have an effect. On the other hand, this can be questioned from the impact of exerting only weak pressure. In the game, however, the cost psS reflects the cost to the regime when the external actor plays strong pressure. Still, for solving the game and keeping any solution as simple as possible, preference order (5) will be applied, under the assumption that psS is large enough so that psS > B/2. This assumptions means that we should expect the foreign pressure not only to be strong but, as a matter of fact, effective and very harmful to the regime’s rule. Nevertheless, we can conclude that, for the empirical discussion, we do need to find proof for which possible preference order meets our expectations.


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The external actor prefers most that the regime accommodates his demands for democratic reform; after all this is the major force for him to enter the game. Accomplishing reform with weak pressure, that is, investing few resources, gives him the highest payoff G, while achieving democratic reform with exercising strong pressure is naturally still ranked highly, providing the second most preferred result of G/2. The player gains some international reputation R for being tough on human rights violation – for using strong pressure – which he would not receive when making only weak demands that could, for future, similar interactions, be defined as incredible threats.74 We do not need to specify closer the value R. It is sufficient to know and reasonable to assume that R > 0 and R < G/2. Therefore the preference order is: for the external actor

(8)

Equilibrium Discussion How will the foreign pressure game be played? By standard game theory, this game does not have any stable equilibrium. Under the – yet discarded – assumption of incomplete information, the solution would lie in defining the so-called minmax-criteria. Minmax-criteria define the probability distribution with which each move would lead to an equilibrium. The setup of the foreign pressure game, under strict and classical formality, would turn into a rather complex reasoning. Since theoretical elegance is often to the detriment of empirical concerns, and is often criticized as turning into some form of “baroque modelling” (Allan 1999), I choose to weigh possible trade-offs between theoretical over-complexity and empirical robustness and decide for the latter. An alternative approach to solving the game that promises empirical robustness, as suggested by the non-standard theory of moves, is that some players can have “moving power” (Brams 1994: 87).75 Brams has an unorthodox application of rational calculation: instead of deriving the choices the players make from the players’ preferences, that is, mental, inductive calculations of optimal behavior, he prescribes the choices and then traces out their step-by-step consequences (1994: 187-189). The consequences that are based on “physical moves that play74

75

In a more formal language, the role of reputation comprises the disclosing of information, and the manipulating of the adversary’s belief. A player’s belief about the other player’s payoff is the second player’s reputation. A reputation can deter the first player from taking actions against the second player’s interests (Morrow 1994a: 242). See also the “theory of social situations”, as proposed by Greenberg (1990).

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ers might plausibly make over time” (190) are meant to improve the understanding of enlarged negotiations. He claims that, in this way, the most salient remedy can be achieved for the inability of the players’ calculations when e.g. they lack the information about the preferences of their opponents. This argument will be applied comparably. For theoretical reasons, as mentioned above, the calculation of the foreign pressure game equilibrium with conventional tools would lead to overly complex and non-robust equilibria. On empirical grounds, if we are able to construct reasonably a transition process as consisting of certain stages, this modification of standard theory adjusts the model in a way that is closer to reallife situations. Among the particularities, rule one of Brams’ theory of moves differs from the corresponding rule of play in the standard theory, in which players simultaneously choose strategies that determine an outcome: “In fact, however, most real-life games do not start with simultaneous strategy choices but commence at outcomes. The question then becomes whether a player, by departing from an outcome, can do better not just in an immediate or myopic sense but, instead, in an extended or nonmyopic sense” (Brams 1994: 23). Here, instead of starting with strategy choices, Brams assumes that players are already in some state at the start of the play and they also receive payoffs from this state if they stay. Based on these payoffs, they must decide, individually, whether or not to change this state in order to try to do better. Commencing with already existing outcomes from previous interactions, the history behind a certain strategic situation is much clearer reflected in the design of a new game. “Put another way, almost all outcomes of games that we observe have a history; the players do not start from a tabula rasa” (Brams 1994: 25). An additional aspect, then, lies in the possibility to account for a period characterized by stalemate or a persisting repression by the regime as a longlasting equilibrium outcome. Once a renewed organization of opposition groups challenges this state, the continuous outcome from an earlier period can be called the initial state for a repeated game under new conditions. Explaining strategically the progression of temporary states that lead to a (more permanent) outcome is thus enhanced. In light of the foreign pressure game, if either regime or external actor dispose of moving power over the other, the player can transform a game with unstable equilibria into a game of cycling, aiming for a stable outcome. In such a game, the player with the weaker threat power – “weak” meaning that his opponent can more likely enforce certain outcomes upon him – still has the moving power to have the game repeated, revisiting the suboptimal outcome over and over again. At the core of the concept of moving power lies the idea that the player with the weaker threat power is still able to impose his preferred strategies


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onto the other player by simple transforming the game into a cycling game. This so-called cycling only terminates when the actually more powerful player76 – he could easily win the game and leave the outcome of conflict – finally realizes that the weaker player (the defeated, but still with more threat power) has the resolve and wherewithal to revisit the status quo of conflict again and again. As an illustrative example, Brams cites the war-torn relationship Israel had with Egypt: even though in 1973 Egypt was defeated heavily by Israel, it had moving power towards Israel, prompting a joint recognition by the players. It was able to break the cycle of renewed wars starting from 1948. In a non-myopic sense, the equilibrium solution of this game points to being intransigence; strong pressure: an outcome in which the external actor interferes with quite some resources in the domestic liberalization process and the regime shows resistance. Based on Brams, a game does not commence at some tabula rasa. Most likely, the foreign pressure game will start with the external actor initially exerting weak pressure, and the regime – not yet very impressed – correspondingly answers with intransigence. This asymmetrical state can be found in the lower right cell in Table 5: {B; 0}, with the external actor receiving its worst payoff and the regime receiving its highest payoff. The external actor, induced to improve his situation, will move to exert strong pressure. As we can assume that the regime elites – their personal lives profoundly depending on their political future – put a higher value on staying in power than the external actor on inducing reform, the player regime can be considered a more powerful player. According to the moving power concept, only he can terminate the cycling of revisiting the inefficient outcome of intransigence; strong pressure. This outcome is inefficient because the outcome accommodate; strong pressure would give both players a higher payoff. Both would receive their second best payoff, while in the former, inefficient outcome both only receive the third best payoff. However, it might not be in the regime’s interest: a formal symmetry in outcomes does not imply actors’ symmetry with regard to the value of their real payoffs. Even if both actors receive the same value in an outcome, e.g. given their preference structure, it is their second less preferred outcome, that only means that each actor is worse off than in the alternative outcome with symmetrically higher payoffs. We can reasonably expect, as 76

Standard theory pays little attention to possible differences in the power of players. There may be incomplete information about the relative power of two players. The concept of power receiving relatively little attention in game theory most likely stems from its tradition as a theory in economics. In the vocabulary of political scientists, it is also one of the most suggestive concepts: barely tractable and full of apparently different meanings and testable implications. Powell (1989) defines the “resolve” of players to use threats in his models, which may be considered as one indicator approaching the concept of power in game theory.

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aforementioned, that the regime elites place a higher real value on playing intransigence than the external actor places on playing the move strong pressure. They are better off in the inefficient outcome than the external actor is because they have more to loose in the end. In Brams’ definition of non-myopical equilibria, it is more farsighted for the regime to stay at the sub-optimal outcome of intransigence; strong pressure. The regime has less interest in breaking the cycle, making the intransigence; strong pressure outcome more likely. Summing up: finding the equilibrium in the foreign pressure game is not straightforward. The discussion showed, however, that the most likely equilibrium is to be found in the strategy pair intransigence; strong pressure; a state of dictatorship status quo while the regime suffers cost from the strong pressure for democratic reform the external actor uses. If observed in the real world that the external actor plays strong pressure, the identified equilibrium can ultimately be expected to be a stable outcome.

4.3 Nested Games of Transition and Foreign Pressure Having outlined, with two simple games, the fundamentals of a strategic transition incorporating an external actor, we can now advance the theoretical assumptions into a nested game of transition and foreign pressure. In the first step, the general idea of the nested game is introduced and formalized. Then, in the second step, the game will be played out and interpreted.

4.3.1 Formalization Since the opposition is, strictly speaking, not a player in the game with the foreign power, it simply either receives or does not receive his support, only the regime is playing in two arenas at the same time. Therefore, with the nested games approach we can, at this point, only study what and which variables cause the regime to change its behavior, which will be the centre of the following nested game of transition and foreign pressure. However, the domestic game becoming nested in the international arena will most certainly have its consequences for the opposition’s behavior. For reasons of clarity, I will formally study only the preference change of the regime. Since we need not understand only the behavior of the regime but the entire strategic interaction of the domestic transition game, references about the opposition’s behavior will nonetheless be deduced, too. A more detailed, but less informal discussion of how likely the opposition itself undergoes a preference change will be treated in Chapter 4.4.4.

4.3 Nested Games of Transition and Foreign Pressure

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The nested games model assumes that the regime and the opposition have some certainty as to the preferences of the foreign power. The very reason it is participating in the process is to promote liberalization. Therefore, regime and opposition are endowed with common beliefs about the external actor’s preferences. After discussing how the game will be played, later in the chapter, it will be shown how to interpret those preferences. The nested game can be described as follows. First, assume that the regime is playing the two games at the same time. It follows that the payoff to the regime of the one-shot nested game is a linear combination of the payoffs in the two arena games77 (Tsebelis 1990: 166):

(9) PO stands for payoff; suffix r for regime, tg for transition game, fp for foreign pressure game. k is a parameter in the [0,1] interval and indicates the weight of the transition game in the decisions of the regime. (1-k) indicates the weight of the foreign pressure game in the decisions of the regime; k also indicates if the foreign pressure has any relevance at all. If k = 1, the foreign pressure game has no relevance. The relative weight of the domestic arena and the international (external actor) arena is reflected in the value of the parameter k, which indicates the influence the external actor’s pressure has on the decision-making process as such. Before discussing what analytical value equation (9) has, in the second step, we need to introduce a temporal dimension, that is, the formal element of repetition. Only then the playing of the nested game reveals empirically insightful generalizations.

Infinite Repetition of Nested Game Even though, for Przeworski, situations are not repeatable in which regime change is at stake (1991: 72), it can be argued that a liberalization process is a protracted process. In line with Gates and Humes (1997), it is possible to develop a game-theoretic model of political liberalization that maintains Przeworski’s spirit of the statement but is technically a repeated game. The issue at stake for the players is so important that one could argue it, indeed, happens only once. In a process of regime change, the real world actors’ opportunities to repeat a game 77

Formally correct it is a convex combination, and the linear combination is chosen for reasons of mathematical simplicity (Tsebelis 1990: 167).

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of regime transitions seem remote. However, analytically, games of repetition aim to reflect that the interaction in both arenas is a prolonged, dynamic process. Further, in iterated games, calculations over time are possible, rendering actual payoff values important. The players’ moves in each round determine not only their payoffs in that round, but also the game they will play in the next round. Each of these games is called the state of the repeated game. Changes in the state of the game can reflect changes in the players’ payoffs or available options from prior plays of the game. The players generally know the current state of the game and the transformation rules from one state to another. This is crucial not only for technical reasons, as, in that way, the consequences of the regime’s moves fluctuating between the international level and the domestic level can be analyzed. Furthermore, this theoretical argument is not only limited to a transition game embedded in an international context, but also applies to the game played solely in the domestic arena. By examining comparative statics results through what happens to the frequency of choice of different strategies when these games are iterated, explanatory power can be appended to the nested games approach (see also Tsebelis 1990: 12). Since the aim of this study’s model is eventually to integrate with the existing body of regime transition theories, and since the model departs from existing theories by treating regime transition as a repeated game, this approach needs justification. This design differs in two points: firstly, even though Gates and Humes (1997) defends the repeated version in their games of strategic transition, it is treated as a variation only. Their conclusion is that repeating the game does not have significant implications. Secondly, the introduction of a time dimension through repeating the game, in general, runs counter to the design of most existing studies that build upon Przeworski (1992). Central to the nested games approach to studying externalities is the assumption that a game in a second arena can change a player’s preference order in the principal arena. Recall, however, that, since preferences are unobservable, we only infer preferences from observed actions. Allowing preference shifts would rob the theory of its explanatory powers (Morrow 1994a: 19). Any disconfirming evidence can be ignored by claiming that preferences have changed. Instead, changes in behavior are caused by changes in the situation and the information available to the actors. Only in this sense, the actors’ preferences can change. Adding context in the form of introducing a third player presents such a change in situation, too. Preferences over outcomes are assumed to be fixed; however, preferences over actions or strategies can change as the actors gain new information about the efficacy of different actions. The adaptation of the game to a


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change in the information available to the actors can only be achieved by adding the element of repetition. More evidence from the real world suggests not limiting the game to a oneshot form. Students of the world’s democratization processes – after an initial euphoria surrounding the “third wave” (Huntington 1991) in the 1990s – observe a plethora of countries taking regime paths that show elements of some reform being introduced but fall short of democracy. As long as liberalizers choose to “stay with the hardliners” (Gates and Humes 1997: 137), which is another way of saying the regime is rebutting reform, the game ends and can be repeated. In the nested game, the regime resists the cost pressure that is accumulating. This is not the only possible repetition: the outcome is not always transition, but reform which consequently can, but not necessarily will, result in transition. Supposing that, even after the players agreed upon reform and the regime offers democratic reform, a backlash towards dictatorship or a semi-authoritarian political system is possible. With the outcome in the transition game closest to regime change being an agreement on nothing more than intermediary reform, this assumption is reflected in the game’s structure. A similar argument that can be made for adding the repeated, temporal dimension is that a move in the game can be anything from signals to a non-move. The staging of the game into small historical bargains, tactical maneuvers, and negotiations behind closed doors is what comprises the transition game and is what constitutes a realistic portrayal of regime transition as such. Any move thus signals information: the players infer from moves in repeated games what type of player they deal with (what the preferences of this player are).78 In rare cases, the democratic reforming of an authoritarian political system happens over night. These cases indeed do belong to the study of democratization, but are rather an object for studies of revolution, a field, for reasons mentioned earlier, quite distinct. Poland, in this respect, was by far not the only country, where we can reasonably say that the process of regime transitions lasted ten years. In an empirically interesting argument, in the Polish regime transition, Zielinski (1995: 148) sees the transition from one political arrangement to another as a shift from one equilibrium to another. He finds three distinct gametheoretic equilibria: (1) dictatorship from 1981-86, (2) broadened dictatorship 1986-89, and (3) “negotiated” democracy 1989. In an equal manner, every round of an iterated game could reflect a distinct political arrangement, eventually leaving more leeway for interpreting and understanding minor tactical shifts and 78

For a general introduction to signaling games see Banks (1991) and Rasmussen (1995: Ch. 9). For signaling in international relations see Fearon (1994), for the role of signals in studying the radicalization of opposition movements see Gavious and Mizrahi (2003).

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negotiations. In Russia, it has not been entirely clear which outcome the transition game will reach, a game that started in 1991. Additionally, constructing the nested game by adding repetition, the model opens up to include into future applications demonstration effects from other regime changes. In a long liberalization process, the actors might find after every round of the game the chance to learn from other, similar transition games. How can the element of repetition be formalized? Assume the regime interacts with the opposition more frequently than it interacts with the external actor. More specifically, in the foreign pressure game, the players interact only every two periods, and, in the transition game, every period (the consequences of assuming that the players interact with equal frequency or more asymmetrically in both games will be discussed later). It is an assumption of asymmetric frequencies. It is reasonable to assume so as the regime, simply due to its physical proximity to the domestic affairs, interacts more often with the opposition. The opposition is most likely to engage the regime with tactical moves more often than any new initiative the external actor launches. This idea is similar to Lohmann (1997) who, in the linkage of domestic and international conflicts, applies the reasoning that in repeated games the domestic game occurs every period (or round) while the game in the international arena only every second period. Consider the payoffs to the regime from the nested game when it is repeated. We can calculate the regime’s expected utility (EU) by multiplying the expected payoffs with a time discount factor: (10) 79 with being the discount factor in interval [0,1] Firstly, the discount factor needs clarification. A discount factor is commonly introduced in the repeated versions of games in order to discriminate between outcomes preferred earlier and outcomes preferred later. Actors can behave differently in their preferences over time when the interaction lasts for more than a one-time period. Desirable outcomes are preferred earlier; discount factors represent the decider’s impatience for rewards. The higher the discount factor, the more patient a player is for receiving his or her payoff. Ultimately, discounting introduces a variable into the game which emphasizes that outcomes are time79

For avoiding notational cluttering, the formal derivation and a discussion hereabout can be found in Appendix 2.


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dependent. An actor’s discount factor usually falls between 0 and 1. The smaller it is – expressed in a higher value –, the more the actor prefers an outcome now to an outcome any time later. If the expected utility EU(x) of an outcome is, for example, now, the discounted value of that outcome one time period from now is EU(x). Its discounted value two times a period from now is 2EU(x), and so on (Morrow 1990: 38). In other words, a low discount rate means that an actor loses more for an outcome in the future than with a high discount rate for that same outcome.80 He would want it now. is the simple mathematical formula expressing discounting. When interpreting equation (10), at first, we can see that during their varying negotiations over time the foreign power changes the contextual factors: it increases the external costs of suppression for the regime, and reduces the risk of suppression for the opposition. Though the foreign power thus plays a relevant role in the process as a source of information and for updating the actors’ perception of each other, it does not take part in any of the negotiations between regime and opposition. Its role, in another arena, is to change the strategies the actors follow during the negotiations. The support of the foreign power can be important to the two domestic actors because it can influence their chances of obtaining the most preferred outcome of democratization for the opposition and status quo maintenance for the regime. In other words, the actors’ assessment of their bargaining positions is re-evaluated through this influence. The idea of a nested game as in equation (10) is that, over time, the external actor’s foreign pressure has a direct effect on the magnitude of the payoffs and, consequently, the payoff orderings in the transition game. The opposition sees that the regime is being challenged by the foreign power. It is itself being strengthened and is increasing resistance through (a) receiving direct external support as a result of the foreign pressure game, and, more indirectly, (b) by watching the regime being challenged by the external pressure, which adds further encouragement. In order to survive, the regime has to spend more on repression.81 It does not want to do this, since it is already spending many resources against the external actor, fighting off economic sanctions and the external intrusion into its domestic affairs. This will result in a change in the magnitude of

80

81

For example, if d=.80, then a player values 1€ received one period in the future as being equivalent to €0.80 right now. The regime could also spend more on accommodating measures to the opposition – equally raising the costs –, buying it into some form of national coalition, which resembles a situation of broadened dictatorship. This, however, carries some risk as to regime hardliners toppling the regime liberalizers.

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payoffs for the regime, that is, in the rise of cost for sustaining power, leading to different outcomes. Therefore, when the cost of repression increases to a level where p > B/2, the magnitude of the payoffs and the ordering of the payoffs to the regime change. Summarized, if p > B/2

(11)

then the new preference order for the regime is (12) Figure 7: presents this change graphically. Through the iteration of the game, we can imagine the game to be played in an indefinite number of stages. The regime repeatedly feels the effect of the pressure. At a particular point in the timeline (stage tx), represented by the stages of the game, the preference order of the regime changes. Without the external actor compelling the regime to be confronted in an additional game, the occurrence of the preference change seems highly unlikely. With the new preference order, the transition game becomes a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, and the outcome of cooperation (reform; reform; that is, an agreement on a modicum of reform) is still very difficult to develop. Informally, what happens here is that it was already more expensive to suffer from sanctions and the opposition being externally supported than to accommodate some reform steps demanded by the external actor. Now, with the resistance from the domestic opposition continually and furthermore increasing, autocratic rule becomes more expensive than democratizing. The regime suffers from economic deterioration exacerbated by sanctions and, simultaneously, has to finance repressing the domestic opposition. If it fails, the country either can experience economic ruin or, in a revolutionary fashion, can be toppled by the opposition. In addition, the former accelerates the latter.

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Figure 7:

Changing of Preference Structure in Transition Game Stage t ...

Stage t 1 International Level

Domestic Level

Stage t x

Foreign Pressure

Foreign Pressure

Transition Game

Transition Game

Regime Preferences 1

Regime Preferences 2

Consider the regime in the transition game with the updated preference order (12). In order to facilitate discussing the new payoffs, we can make use of the ordinal payoffs, as depicted in the transition game without the updated preference order in Table 8:. The new payoff matrix looks as following: Table 8:

Numeric Payoff Matrix Transition Game with Updated Preference Structure Opposition D(emocratization)

R(eform)

C(ontinuity)

2,2

4,1

R(eform)

1,4

3,3

Regime

The payoffs change consequently in the following way. C is the dominant strategy for the player regime. If the opposition chooses R (the strategy of only demanding reforms), the regime faces a payoff of 4 if it chooses C (the strategy to continue its rule without concessions). This is higher than the payoff 3 that would be reached with strategy R (the lower right cell). If the opposition chooses D, the strategy C gives the regime the payoff 2, higher than the payoff 1 that would be reached with strategy R.

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This is a typical prisoner’s dilemma game, and the Nash equilibrium for the regime-opposition game we find in the strategy pair continuity; democratization. The two dominant strategies, C for the party and D for Solidarity, produce the outcome 2;2, that is, both players receive the second least preferred outcome (the upper left cell). This is a dominant-strategy equilibrium, a strongly stable equilibrium. No player can improve his payoffs without the other punishing and making him worse off. Note that the outcome (reform; reform) has the advantage that it is Pareto-superior to the dominant-strategy equilibrium, hence more efficient: (3;3) is uniformly higher than (2;2). However, the “strength” of an equilibrium outcome is not defined through Pareto-superiority or higher payoffs (Rasmusen 1995: 25). The more efficient outcome, on the other hand, would mean an agreement on reform. To summarize, in a transition game with the new preference order to the regime, as caused by condition (11), the equilibrium of status quo authoritarianism cannot easily be left by an actor on its own.

4.3.2 Discussion and Interpretation How the nested game is ultimately played depends on the values of p , ps S, k, and in equation (10). How does the regime weigh the games? Which variables influence the value of k? Consider, at first, a possible approximation to the discount factor . How does the regime discriminate between an outcome in which it agrees to reforms with the opposition now and the same outcome later? Based on the calculation of the regime’s combined total payoff from the non-iterated games in equation (9), we can calculate the discount rate necessary for cooperation in the repeated version of the nested game. This step should allow for making direct comparisons with the expectations we derived in the non-nested games earlier in Appendix 1. It should, firstly, give us a better idea about how likely the regime will be ending the game with introducing some form of democracy in the nearer future as compared to a more distant future. Secondly, and more importantly, calculating and comparing the discount rate between the non-nested and the nested version of the games constitutes the heart of the model’s explanatory value: to integrate the variable into the model means to compare explicitly the outcome with the variance of a game model that excludes the foreign influence. In other words, the non-nested transition game is the theoretical counterfactual to the nested game of transition and foreign pressure. For calculating k, that is, how the regime weighs the foreign pressure game with regard to the domestic transition game, consider the following. In the first


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step, assume that, for the regime, the cost of repressing the opposition is similar to the cost of enduring the external actor’s pressure:

thus P being the cost of authoritarian rule. Arguably, to set the cost p equal to ps S could represent a heavy simplification. To assume that the external actor can incur costs on the regime that are as high as the domestic opposition’s protests, strikes, or other forms of cost the regime suffers needs explanation. This step can be justified substantially: Since the foreign pressure game’s outcome is one where the external actor plays strong pressure, we can reasonably argue that the cost psS hereby incurred on the regime approximates, or is even to, the cost p of repressing the opposition. The move strong pressure was earlier defined as consisting of both direct assistance to the democratic opposition and systematic sanctions against the regime. The regime will have less control over these externally induced costs than it has over the domestic sources of its costs to govern, additionally approximating both variables. Still, the measures taken by the foreign power need to be effective by the standards of what the literature on external democracy promotion deems as such. Any empirical application of the model’s outcomes has consequently to take this strong assumption into consideration. Returning to how the nested game is being played, it is firstly important to note that, in the preference order, B/2 is the payoff to the regime for cooperating, that is, for sharing power. It is the same in both arenas because the foreign pressure game is nested inside the transition game and does not represent a separate game anymore. With repeated play, if the regime continuously plays intransigence – the dominant strategy in the foreign pressure game – the external actor might want to wish improving his second less preferred outcome. In game-theoretic terms, it can achieve so with the following strategy that can be deduced from a simplified solution to the iterated prisoner’s dilemma: The regime may be punished by the external actor with a trigger, that is, the breakdown of any possibility for the regime to reach an agreement on reform in the indefinite future. The trigger suggests that, over time, the foreign power realizes that its pressure towards reform appears futile; it might switch to a more aggressive punishing strategy of ousting the regime entirely. One way is to signal this information, the other to increase its pressure in its moves even further. The external actor would thereby forsake the regime to conclude an agreement with the opposition for good. The regime might, over time, realize that it is wasting its chance to ever improve its payoffs

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(recall the matrix in Table 8:) by playing accommodate and giving in to implementing reform steps. Providing for the nested game in which the regime is consequently trapped, punishment dominates the regime’s temptation to continue its authoritarian rule, in other words, to reach the highest possible payoff. In the language of the prisoner’s dilemma, aiming for the highest payoff is to defect and not to cooperate. Punishment, then, can be formalized: as the difference between, on the one hand, the future benefits from agreeing to reform, and, on the other hand, the future benefits under the situation that the regime suffers from paying additional costs. These costs increase because the external actor invests larger resources for democracy promotion. The game is dependent on the regime’s behavior if we want to find an outcome of reform. We thus focus on the conditions necessary for the regime to change its behavior. As suggested, assume again that regime and external actor interact every two periods, and regime and opposition interact every period. With equal weight k=½, cooperation (to agree on reform) in the nested game will develop if the total sum of the difference between the future benefits of non-cooperation and the future benefits of cooperation exceeds the value of the regime’s most wanted payoff B. In order to do so, at first, deduct the payoff for reform (which is the payoff for cooperation, B/2) from the cost (punishment) of staying in power with authoritarian rule (the cost P). (1) In the transition game, the difference between future non-cooperation and future cooperation is equal to:

(2) In the foreign pressure game, it is equal to:

In the nested game, cooperation by the regime to coordinate on democratic reform is therefore sustainable if:


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(12) If we are able to calculate equation (12) by isolating the discount factor , it will be possible to compare more closely the conditions under which the regime is likely to change its behavior towards offering the opposition democratic reform. Solving for , no fixed values can be found but approximations for the value of , we are able to . Since we know from conditions (4) and (11) that approximate what is necessary for the equation to hold. 82 We can do so by substituting in equation (12) approximations of B/2 and B with P, respectively. Therefore, a)

if

then the left hand side of (12) and (12) cannot be satis-

fied; then the left hand side of (12) 4 and (12) is satisfied if > b) if 0.74 ( means approaches) The equation holds if > 0.74 and assuming that P is approaching the upper bound of B. Having specified the discount factor necessary for the regime to cooperate and offer reform, we need to interpret this result. Comparative statics allow intramodel comparisons about the variable discount factor. Accordingly, we need to examine how the non-nested version of the transition game and the foreign pressure game are played when the formal element of repetition is introduced. Remember that, so far, the non-nested games were introduced as one-shot games only. To keep the mathematical level at minimum and the argument more readerfriendly, the calculating of the discount factors in the repeated versions are included in Appendix 1. They are here introduced as a summary only. Based on these results, cooperation in the repeated form of the non-nested games develops as follows: 82

These conditions were the basis to derive the preference order for the regime in the foreign pressure game and the transition game after the regime realized it is playing in two arenas at the same time. From this follows that the cost of authoritarian rule P must be in the range between the payoffs B/2 and B.

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In the transition game, the regime will never cooperate (choose to reform). The opposition cooperates (gives up to claim full democratization) only at a discount rate of 0.66; in the foreign pressure game, cooperation develops under the following condition: the discount factor is in the [0.81;1] interval. is close to 1 if psS reaches its lower bound B/2; if psS approaches its upper bound B, the discount factor is at least 0.81.

The variance in the respective discount factors can now be correlated and summarized graphically. Figure 8:

Development of Reform and Discount Factor Discount Factor

0

0.5

neither player will play reform

0.66

0.74

Opposition plays reform in TG only

0.81

Regime plays reform in nested game

1

Regime plays reform in non-nested FP game

As Figure 8: shows, in order to reach reform agreements in the nested game, the discount factor does not need to be as high as in the non-nested version of the foreign pressure game. The more reasonable discount rate of 0.74 is enough, and the discount rate space [0.74;1] is larger than the discount rate space in the nonnested foreign pressure game of [0.81;1]. The regime does not have to value the future as high. Note, however, in order for the discount space [0.74;1] to satisfy equation (12), the combined cost for staying in power P is also required to be fairly high, nearly reaching the value of the highest possible payoff, the upper bound B. Therefore, when P, the cost of authoritarian rule, is lower than its upper bound B (it is in the [B/2;B] interval), cooperation needs a higher discount rate . For a given discount rate in the [0.74;0.81] interval, agreement on reform is easier to occur when P is approaching B (the case where the regime is starting to loose control over the country). From the equation we can further deduce, that the longer this condition takes, the more the cost of authoritarian power is increasing. Given this situation, in the long run, P will approach B. A more indepth interpretation of these results will follow further below and in a separate chapter where the empirical hypotheses will be generated.


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Interaction in TG and FPG with Equal Frequency Repeating the nested game of external influence on regime transition allows introducing additional variance to the model as in the above discussion. Depending on the frequency of how often the regime interacts with the foreign power, we can expect the range of the time discount factor for which reform is possible to change. Thereby, the frequency is nothing but a variable enabling a better capturing of the degree to which the external actor is engaged in the domestic process of liberalization. For example, the regime-external actor interaction could take place more often than only every second period of each round of the transition game; we should then observe it to be taking place both in every period in the transition and the foreign pressure game. Alternatively, it could take place less often than every second round. Formally speaking, the interaction on the international level can be played every r period, so that the game is subject to the discount factor of r. Given equal weight k=½ and the cost to authoritarian rule P approaching its upper bound B, in the nested version, an agreement on reform is sustainable if

(13)

The parameter r reflects the asymmetry between the transition game and the foreign pressure game. An external actor characterized by a low r interacts frequently in the foreign pressure game at the international level. Conversely, a high r stands for infrequent interaction. Empirically speaking, the parameter r should indicate the degree to which the external actor is interfering in the liberalization process, that is, in the transition game. The more active the foreign power is in taking measures to work against the regime and assisting its opponent, the lower is r. In the case of r = 1, the games are symmetrical. In every round in which the regime interacts with the opposition it also interacts with the external actor. It is easy to calculate from equation (13) that with r = 1 the discount factor is in the interval [0.67;1], and the regime would offer reform for a larger set of discount [0.74;0] (as played in the previous section in the model with rates than with the assumption r = 2). The point is that the discount factor does not need to be as

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high as in the game played with asymmetric frequency. This indicates of course that the more interested the external actor is in the domestic transition game, the more the rounds in the game are synchronized and the lower the discount rate necessary for the regime to embrace reform. In the other extreme, r = , it can be calculated that the regime would offer [0.76;0]. This discount rate apreform in a smaller set of discount rates, plies to all r > 2. Figure 9:

Asymmetry of Frequencies in Foreign Pressure Game Discount Factor

0

0.5

neither player will play reform

0.67

0.74

Reform in nested game, FPG every round played

Reform in nested game, FPG every 2nd round

0.76

0.81

Reform in nested game, FPG every 3d round

1

Reform in non-nested FPG, every 2nd round

Figure 9: shows, in determining when the regime agrees to democratic reform, how the time discount factor interacts with the frequency of rounds the foreign [0;0.67] no reform agreement pressure game is played. In the first region, is possible because the discount factor is too low. This is independent of the nonnested versions of the transition game or the foreign pressure game, and independent of how symmetrical the foreign pressure game is played along the transition game. In the next region, [0.67;0.74], the discount factor is sufficiently high that, when in the nested game the number of rounds played in each game is symmetrical, reform is possible. In the third and small region, [0.74;0.76], reform is sustainable when the foreign pressure game is played [0.76;0.81], reform is sustainable every second round. In the fourth region, when the foreign pressure game is played every third round or more. In the last region, [0.81;1], reform is sustainable also in the non-nested foreign pressure game alone, assuming it is played every second round as compared to the domestic game alone. The reason here is that the regime cares very strongly about the future. [0.74;0], we can Since the model’s assumption with r =2 yields that draw an additional conclusion: varying the frequency of the foreign pressure game to more than every second period (again, in comparison to the transition


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game) has little effect on the discount factor, in particular when directly compared to the nested and non-nested versions. There is no difference in the likelihood of the regime playing reform between the external actor being engaged in every second round or the external actor being engaged in significantly fewer rounds. This result is surprising: as long as the external actor exerts its influence to a certain minimum degree, as expressed by frequency of interaction, for the regime’s behavior it does not matter if he does so few times or very few times. One interpretation therefore is that in order to influence the transition game at all, it is crucial to do so with strong and effective pressure. Therefore constructing and limiting the ultimate model with applying r = 2 has not only empirical, as aforementioned, but also theoretical underpinnings. Summing up, it is possible to draw conclusions about what impact the international arena has on the principal arena of the transition game. By specifying the discount factor, we are in a better position to approximate the consequences of how the foreign influence weighs on the transition game: with unequal weight k given to the transition game and the foreign pressure game, and based on the underlying assumption of the game in the international arena taking place only every second round, (1) when k < 0.5, the minimal discount rate for reform in the nested game is higher than 0.74, and (2) when k > 0.5, the minimal discount rate for reform in the nested game is lower than 0.74. The more weight the regime gives (or, is forced to give) to the foreign pressure game, the higher the minimal discount necessary for cooperation to develop (to achieve an agreement to reform). Remember that high discount rates devalue the future, which consequently translates into the willingness to concede more for an immediate resolution, and, that, in equation (12), the resolution is one for cooperation and offering the opposition democratic reform. Any modicum on reform is then to happen rather sooner than later. When interpreting the relationship between the cost P and the discount factor , we also see that – even after the regime finds itself in the nested game with very high costs to sustain its power and perfectly likely to play the reform move – this situation is still not sufficient to ultimately explain agreeing on reform. We still need a time factor because, no matter how high the total cost P is rising, we cannot expect the regime immediately to play the reform card. The discount factor allows us, however, to discriminate between the likelihood of a reform outcome emerging rather sooner and a reform outcome to emerging rather later.

146 Figure 10:


The General Theory’s Chain of Causality Economic Performance

Personal Consumption Cost of Regime to rule

External Actor

x Degree of pressure

Change Preference Order Regime

Strength Opposition x Endogeneous Strength

Negotiated Transition

x Discount Factor

Note: x indicates conditional variables. Finally, even though the main purpose of the nested games model is examining the more detailed causal mechanisms, the prime hypothesis framing the relationship between independent and dependent variable needs readdressing. The model’s general causation is therefore summarized in Figure 10:. The general theory’s explanation can be condensed by arrow diagramming the chains of causation between the causal factor external influence and the caused factor of agreement on democratic reform, that is, negotiated transition.

4.4 The Model’s Implications and Generating of Hypotheses Generating testable hypotheses is the very rationale behind modeling social behavior. The following section is a summary of what can be inferred from the nested game model and its equilibria. Because we may be able to relate the utilities developed in the nested game of transition and foreign power to observable indicators, we should also be able to derive testable hypotheses for this model. What is the purpose of the model? Does it have explanatory or predictive power? Ultimately, we should establish what the model’s potential for making predictions is, and how these predictions can be translated into an eventual empirical testing of their plausibility. The relationship between payoffs and strategies indicates that predicting the behavior of the regime – in a probabilistic way – is possible if some evaluations with regard to the payoffs and the value of k in each round could be made. Although changes in the behavior of the opposition are not explicitly studied in the nested game, it nonetheless provides us with valuable assumptions hereabout, too. Chapter 4.4.4 is devoted to likely preference changes the opposition undergoes and how these allow us to deduce hypotheses. Predicting social and politi-

4.4 The Model’s Implications and Generating of Hypotheses

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cal behavior through a model is ambitious. Naturally, it is more appropriate to make some comparative statics statements about what behavior would be more likely under what conditions. The aim is to elaborate what scenarios between opposition and regime on the one hand, and between the regime and the foreign power on the other hand, are likely or required for a certain outcome to happen. For convenience, these scenarios will be repeated in short later again, when the empirical plausibility of the model’s predictions is tested with the United States’ engagement in the Polish liberalization process in Chapter 7. The chapter will conclude with a summary of the main points.

4.4.1 Preference Change of the Regime Central to the model is the assumption that, when the regime is entangled in both the transition and the foreign pressure game, it should change its behavior. This change is expressed in the regime’s preference structure. It now values sharing power with the opposition more than sustaining its authoritarian control through exercising repressive measures, thus bringing about a different outcome of the domestic transition game. Given condition (11) in Chapter 4.3.1, we were able to deduce that, for the new preference order to hold, the cost to repress the opposition p has to reach the point were it becomes larger than the gain from sharing power B/2 ( p > B/2). Sharing power is then cheaper than repression. We have also seen that the new preference order of the regime transforms the transition game into a prisoner’s dilemma game. The result is a dominant-strategy equilibrium of status quo dictatorship. Only after playing the nested game by combining the regime’s payoff from the two arenas, we have found the conditions necessary to reach an outcome of democratic reform. The question remains: How can modifications in strategic preferences during political regime changes be studied? Formally speaking, two assumptions commonly applied in game theory govern the strategic approach as presented here: (1) through the historical reconstruction of the actors’ preferences, critical junctures for the respective transition phases (or political arrangements) can be identified for closer analysis; the junctures allow us to observe if and why the actors change their strategies. (2) A somewhat normative aspect inherent to game theory is to determine what the best decision for each actor in a pre-defined situation is. These games, what Binmore terms “games-as-they-are” (Binmore 1990), are able to point out any change in the game’s equilibrium that lies off the expected path. The transition, then, from one political arrangement to another is a shift from one equilibrium to another.

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While it will be difficult to interpret transitions from political arrangements as shifts in equilibrium – in the nested transition game, only the type of equilibrium changes, not the outcome itself – we need to look for traces whether the preference change’s pre-condition can be fulfilled. We can translate the condition p > B/2 into empirical terms: The opposition’s power, whether real or perceived, needs to cause the regime such headaches that it spends major parts of its energies and resources, not for running the economy or governing society, but for developing and executing strategies how to clamp down on the opposition and to fight off the effects of its protest actions83. Finding evidence for concluding that the political situation, indeed, resembles the narrated scenario is not sufficient though. Most salient to the model is that it prescribes the rise in p to derive from the external actor’s moves in the foreign pressure game. Accordingly, any observed strengthening of opposition forces must be dissoluble from the domestic sources of its growing internal threat to the regime. Remember though, in the empirical antecedents of the modeled situation, the regime had opened so that, in civil society, some organized form of resistance had already emerged. It implied that a prior split in the regime had made liberalizers, as opposed to regime hardliners, control the government. This setting limits the testing of those implications that lead to the change in preferences in that the opposition’s emergence per se is not required to be a direct and initial consequence of the foreign pressure game. For the opposition to force higher costs onto the regime, in our case, we need to look for sources of external assistance being the cause of this increment. We should observe that the opposition receives direct external support from the foreign power. Forms of external democracy assistance to support oppositions in authoritarian systems can take on a variety of forms. Crucial is the extent and the scope of the effect that these forms of assistance have on the opposition’s behavior and to which extent it causes headaches to the regime. Also, and more indirectly, as the opposition watches the regime being challenged by the foreign power through sanctions and public diplomacy, it feels further mobilized. We should thus observe, what some call, “morale boosting” (Capoccia 1999: 2; Interview Plattner), yet others call more risk-seeking behavior (Swaminathan 1999). 83

However, social movement theories alert us to the fact that the relationship between the resources invested to repress and the demobilisation of society does not always have to be linear. The resources mobilized by the regime may deter collective action, but can also create a radicalization effect where the level of participation in collective action actually increases parallel with the amount of resources mobilized by the regime to counteract the opposition movement (Mizrahi and Gavious 2003: 2; see also Mason 1989).


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What furthermore characterizes the preference order change is that differences between internal threat evaluations – about the strength of the opposition – may come from inconsistencies of information, but may also be due to the variances in ideologies, or value judgments, that condition the decision-making process of political leaders (Yilmaz 2002: 78). Even though norms play a major part in human being’s choices (North 1990: 23), ideology and values are difficult to incorporate into any analysis. The traditional way of dealing with ideology in the rational-choice research program is exogenously, as an information costcutting device (Downs 1957; Tsebelis 1990: 156). Practically, for our purposes, this implies taking into consideration the difference between real and perceived threat that the opposition poses to the regime’s rule.

4.4.2 Weighing the Games The central independent variable deduced from the model is external costs of repression. What effect does the increase of external costs have on the regime’s ability to employ repression as a tool for sustaining its power? Why are these costs causing the regime to change its strategy and contemplate democratic reform? How does such a process go ahead, in other words, what are the causal mechanisms? The relationship between payoffs and strategies indicates that behavior could be predicted if evaluations are possible regarding the payoffs, the value of k, and the value of . As mentioned, answers to these questions can be found by making comparative statics statements about what type of behavior would be more likely under what conditions. The relative weight of the domestic arena and the international arena is reflected in the value of the parameter k, which indicates the external actor’s influence on the decision-making process. Considering that the regime is only likely to accept reform when the cost of authoritarian rule P approaches its upper bound B, studying what influences the value of k and is preconditioned by finding proof that P has indeed reached a high level. Having said this, it is not sufficient for the regime only to suffer under immense costs incurred by the foreign pressure, or to repress unsuccessfully the opposition, in order to find it being compelled to offer reform. The temporal discount factor, then, also needs to be sufficiently high (which will be discussed in the subsequent chapter). When the regime weighs the foreign pressure game highly, so that k < 0.5, an outcome of reform can be expected sooner than when the regime weighs the game low, k > 0.5 (recall that the lower k is, the larger the discount factor space is, and the more likely the regime is to regard the future to be dark). However, what does it mean for the regime ‘to weigh the foreign pressure game higher’? In

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more simple terms, the higher the foreign pressure on the regime’s behavior, the more the international arena is growing in relevance, the less the strategic bargaining with the opposition can be analyzed isolated and as purely domestic interaction. Clearly, the impact of the external actor’s moves is felt stronger over time. The regime does not really have a choice, rather, it is confronted with the consequences of the game, while, in comparison, the transition game is more under its control. For making the point clearer as to how the value of k can be comprehended, and what it contributes to explanatory value, it is worth returning to one of Tsebelis’ original applications of the nested game approach. Tsebelis (1990: 167) uses a simple idea from Sartori (1976: 143) – the distinction of visible and invisible politics – to describe a nested game in which elites interact in a parliamentary (invisible) arena and the electoral (visible) arena. The difference is connected to the relative weight of the two arenas, and is reflected in the value of parameter k. It could similarly be said that, for most observers of the breakdown of authoritarianism, the conflict between regime and opposition is relatively visible (it is the principal stage), while the international context, in which this process is taking place, becomes much more difficult to watch. The context, though, is nothing but a second arena in which either or both of the principal stage’s actors are simultaneously engaged in as well. As aforementioned, heuristics applied in the two-level game approach might prove useful for finding realistic approximations to the level of P. Studying influences in an external-internal linkage environment, Milner (1997) suggests to look first for the terms of influence, then for the probability of influence. As for the terms of influence, under the move strong pressure of the external actor, we understood broadly distinguished actions that are, on the one hand, directed against the regime itself and, on the other hand, focused on social forces inside the country working against the regime. Economic sanctions are the central element of the foreign power’s strategy directly aimed at the regime, causing an increase in cost to authoritarian rule P. To list only a few of the consequences, sanctions could bring about the lack of access to credit, or could burden debts that become impossible to amortize and that minimize the international credit standing, which, at least in Communist Eastern Europe, was a constant worry. In order to understand the probability of influence that economic sanctions have, we need to find evidence about the magnitude of this effect under the conditions of externally induced attempts to political liberalization. Similarly, the opposition is growing in strength by its knowing about the regime’s involvement in the other arena, and is directly profiting from the international arena by being the recipient of one of the two possible strategic moves by


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the external actor. This effect is mutually enforcing: it not only increases the regime’s costs for sustaining power in the international arena but it also strengthens the opposition, hence directly escalating yet other costs the regime has to pay if it wants to stay in power in the principal arena. More specifically, the terms of influence include the amount of assistance the opposition’s fight benefited from, which contributes to the value of P. Since the value of P is dependent on k, we again need to find ways to measure in how much this assistance added to the overall resistance and resilience of the opposition. By establishing how relevant the actors themselves perceive the external assistance, we are in a better position to specify k, that is, to what degree the regime weighs the foreign pressure game in the nested version. The set up of the nested games model leads to further indicators highlighting the strategic mechanisms behind a domestic transition game entrenched in a higher order network: Since the necessary condition for the regime to embrace a solution of reform requires the cost to authoritarian rule P to approach the payoff B, the external actor might then think, why not reducing this interval between P and B from the other end? The external actor knows that, in the nested version of the transition game, it is driving up the costs for the regime to stay in power. Since this is a game of complete information, he will further know that there must be some limit to these costs from whereon it becomes increasingly difficult for the regime to bear the costs of ruling autocratically. The external actor will also likely know how to estimate the value of B to the regime. If he would also be able to lower this limit, his actions intended to increasing P will become more effective. Thus, a strategy to reduce the magnitude of B, in order to move B closer to P instead of P closer to B, indeed constitutes a rational strategy. Accordingly, in a non-technical language, the foreign power’s strategy should aim at reducing the attractiveness of what it means for the regime elites to stay in power. These elites will regard their present power not merely as the only way to maintain their privileges. They will also fear that losing their power could threaten their existence. Likely scenarios range from public disappearance to facing lawsuit, and even worse to come. If the foreign power seriously signals it is interested in and capable of saving and guaranteeing the principal interests of the regime elite, this could provide an exit strategy and facilitate the extrication of the regime.84 The authoritarian regime may initiate the transition or it may voluntarily agree to exit, after gaining concessions from the opposition through the negotiation of a pact (Przeworski 1992; Marks 1992; Casper and Taylor 1996). Pacts 84

For exit strategies in general see Oberschall (2000).

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increase the probability that the regime will surrender power because they stipulate guarantees for the authoritarian actors. This is, one can also generalize, the most salient inducement for an authoritarian regime to opt for negotiation in the first place (see also Przeworski 1992: 119). One way to achieve this is to influence the opposition towards a behavior by which, once they share the power, they accept the regime as a partner and do not intend to take political revenge or enact similar scenarios of legal prosecution. Another is to communicate unmistakably to the elites that their personal status is not under debate, but their system of government. In a similar strategic attempt, the regime might want to gain control over the cost of its authoritarian rule and find ways how to reduce the cost p and psS. In the real world, what are the options? Within the theoretical framework, admittedly, this seems difficult. As suggested for reasons of parsimony, the model assumes away any second foreign power counterbalancing the external effect of the external democratic power. But we can imagine that, given the transition country is a part of some international network that is in opposition to the external actor’s alliances, the regime could ask for external, countervailing support in reducing the overall cost to authoritarian rule P. Economic loss the regime might suffer from a sanctions regime could be outweighed by economic and credit assistance the second foreign power offers, thus reducing psS. Helping to reduce p is less straightforward, but the historical example of the Soviet Union’s role in Eastern Europe immediately comes into mind. In 1981, the Polish Communist regime could make use of an imminent Soviet military intervention as a credible threat to deter the opposition movement Solidarity from radicalizing. In a much broader context, other studies suggest that the “relative weight of domestic and international factors varies across cases and regions” (Levitsky and Way 2006: 396) and that this weight could be measured through the concept of “linkage to the West”. Apart from the variable discount factor and the criteria for what constitutes the move strong pressure, a subsidiary variable could be added. The concept, though, rests on largely exploratory ideas that serve as useful in an initial, intuitive classification of cases. It is, however, not translated into empirically valuable hypotheses for testing or into meaningful operationalizibility, other than assigning descriptively and intransparently high or low linkage to particular cases. In the tradition of modernization theory, what dominates for Levitsky and Way in the “difficult-to-measure effects of linkage” (396) concept is the structuralists’ belief that economic integration with the West “is the most important international cause of democratization in the post-cold-war era” (396). By contrast, the nested games approach specifies more explicitly which conditions need to be fulfilled in order to expect cooperation between a domestic


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opposition and the regime to become more likely, that is, in order to expect a scenario of democratization.

4.4.3 Temporal Dimension The frequency of interaction, expressed by the parameter r, but moreover the time discount factor , play a major role in the nested game model of external democracy promotion. Once the condition is met that P reaches a sufficiently high level, a reform outcome of the game becomes more likely, and time is on the opposition’s side. The later the regime cooperates in this game, the more it loses, which is demonstrated through the discount factor . A cooperative agreement in the form of introducing reform needs to fulfill two conditions: the regime must believe that defection (to stay in power) is a punishment that triggers the breakdown of any reform agreement in the future (which, given the design of the game, gives it a higher payoff); and the negative shadow of the future, reflected in the time discount factor and the frequency of the play, must be sufficiently strong. We did assume, however, the frequency of interaction in the foreign pressure game to be asymmetrical, with the game taking place only every second round. In empirical applications, the frequency of interaction is readily observed or measured. We do not need the actor’s preferences to deduce hypothesized numbers of rounds, we should merely look for encounters which are more obvious to identify for the observer. As is reflected in the model by setting frequency parameter r = 1, it is unlikely that, in the real world of external democratization, any foreign power would invest such resources so that the number of interactions can be comparable to the interaction the regime is facing with its domestic actors. To be able to positively observe this dimension might not be true for the discount factor though. One testable variant of the regime’s discount factor is to interpret it as a composite time discount factor. It could comprise a true discount factor which is unobservable (and can be assumed to be constant over time), correlated with the probability that the government or regime remains in power (Lohmann 1997: 64). In a democracy, this probability would depend on the electoral cycle: the closer a government is to the next elections, the lower the discount value. In an authoritarian system, this is more difficult to assess. The observer cannot easily find indicators for the timing when the regime breaks down (which, of course, is nothing but the general topic of this study). What will define this probability is the regime’s own belief about how long it is capable to survive. One empirical tool to approximate those beliefs is to examine the main

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actors’ statements at different points in time. Based on the regime’s belief, taking its lowest value just before the regime would collapse, we would expect the composite discount factor to decrease towards the end of a reign. Regime elites who believe they cannot for much longer sustain their power rather search for an outcome that prevents their total removal from the political scene. On the surface, this expectation seems trivial. But it is (1) exactly what we often do not observe regimes to act upon, and (2) our model accordingly treats this behavior as a necessary sub-variable, but not as a sufficient one. To recapitulate, the variation in the model of nested games through the time discount factor is a comparative statics exercise: Holding k constant, it predicts that reaching agreement on reform in the transition game is more likely to happen when the interaction is repeated and less likely to happen than in the nonnested transition game alone. Further, the more often the regime interacts with both opposition and external actor, the sooner we can expect reform. But if it is possible to reconstruct from the actors’ statements the beliefs the regime holds about its own strength, we are in a better position to find testable, temporallyrelated hypotheses that go beyond just observing the frequency of the actors’ interactions.

4.4.4 Impact on the Opposition and the Democracy Promotion Dilemma As many hypotheses derived from the nested game model revolve around the combined payoffs to the regime, the change of the opposition’s behavior resulting from the embedded game is not explicitly modeled. The regime is the only player directly involved in the nested game. However, it has become clear from the model how the domestic game is intertwined with the foreign pressure game on the international level, so that the foreign pressure game causes the regime to change its preferences order. We can expect an impact on the opposition’s behavior, too. In the foreign pressure game, it is receiving support from the external actor; this was the definition of the move strong pressure, which represents the equilibrium strategy. Furthermore, it was mentioned that watching the pressure on the regime exacerbating, the opposition is likely to feel additional encouragement in their strife. In the transition game, this impact should be reflected in the opposition’s preference order. Two likely scenarios can be conjured: (1) The external support (ES1) provided by the foreign power adds some gain to the payoff of R, so that R+ES1 > B/2, leading to the new preference order


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Since the strategic interaction is a game of complete information, the regime would know of the opposition’s change in preference structure and of its opponent’s adding a higher value on the conflict outcome continuity; democratization than before. For an authoritarian regime typically controlling the entire state apparatus, it will not be difficult to update its information by watching how the external actor supports the opposition. The opposition would therefore present a credible threat in sustaining the state in which the regime runs into higher costs if it wants to continue repressing the movement successfully. Recall that the nested game is a repeated game: the regime could thus be deterred to repress further the opposition because it believes that the opposition can now resist longer than it has previously been expected. Kaminski (1991: 180) also remarks that, concerning real actors in the Polish setting, it was not present threats by the opposition to increase resistance that triggered reconciliation, but the fear of the situation getting utterly out of control in the future. As suggested in Chapter 4.4.2, promoting an opposition could, furthermore, lend more weight to a risk-seeking behavior, which most likely translates into the payoff R also receiving attractiveness. In this case, the added gain of ES1 is not a simple addition, but includes behavior that the generic preference structure from the transition game does not express. Put differently, when looking at the sheer values, the observer might not expect the opposition to make certain moves. They could only be explained by it overestimating its capabilities, leading to apparently suboptimal behavior. The most obvious consequence for the transition game in the nested version is that p, the cost for the regime to repress the opposition, will increase. This serves as an additional argument that condition (11) – p > B/2 – holds, which is necessary for the preference change of the regime to take place. This variable is yet another point where existing theories make reference to the effect external factors have on strategic transitions, but fall short of explaining it or integrating it analytically. For example, Colomer (2000: 59) states that for the opposition to coerce the regime in acceding to a formula of democratic reform, the opposition’s threat must be credible; and that one of the two ways to attain credibility is “if some foreign power unequivocally indicates its willingness to intervene in favor of change”. (2) Sponsoring much of the opposition’s possibilities, the external actor could make its contributions conditioned upon, at a certain point in time, the idea that attaining limited reform now is more valuable than attaining an uncer-

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tain democratization in an unknown future. For the opposition to receive democracy assistance, the external actor sets the pre-condition to avoid radical demands for democratization. This is what earlier, in Chapter 2.5.2, was termed the democracy promotion dilemma and relates to the “deterrenceversus-restraint dilemma” from security studies. Favoring then accepting reform, the opposition’s payoff B/2 for a power sharing arrangement could receive some additional gain ES2. If B/2 + ES2 > B, then the new preference order is

Consider the opposition leaving its most preferred strategy of democratization and becoming satisfied with a lesser degree of reform. One reason for doing so could be that it foresees that achieving reform has now come within an easier reach than ever before, and ever-attaining democratization is still very uncertain. All the more, this very behavior could be more closely associated with the external actor’s behavior: as part of his move strong pressure, he supports the opposition with consulting and advising into a direction he values to be most successful in bringing the regime down. Assume the external actor values a stable but protracted transition higher than an uncertain, radical outcome which could plummet the country into chaos or into an extended period of instability. The argument is consistent with theories of hegemony, under which the foreign power could be classified, given its involvement in the domestic struggle in the first place. Accordingly, it is not the promotion of democratic values but geopolitical interest in stability and integrity of a client state which is the motor behind democracy promotion. The change from dictatorship to democratic regime can therefore, above all, be interpreted as a mechanism for preserving the state (Petras 1990: 113; see also Robinson 1996), not as a mode of promoting democratization and its inherent values. If this definition of what constitutes an outcome of successful democratic reforms excludes the – violent or non-violent – overthrow, it might be in the external actor’s interest that the opposition accepts reform as opposed to full democracy. One form of external support could consequently lie in the fact that the external actor is recognizing this and is adapting his strategy towards the opposition by advising it to curb its demands comprising full democratization. The curbing of far-fetched demands can be achieved through focusing on the moderate elements, as opposed to more radical fractions inside the opposition, and selectively promoting this group inside the opposition. With regard to the interaction in the game, the threat of the opposition to move to D, leaving the regime with either its worst preference (after it moved to


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R) or the next to worst outcome, is alleviated by the international game: central to external actor’s tactics is to help reduce the level of internal threat facing the regime; the external actor is influencing the opposition towards moderating its claims and controlling the radical elements. In doing so, the opposition fulfils a theoretical claim that features as a common concept in the transition literature (Przeworski 1992: 110; Linz and Stepan 1996): radical eruptions undermine the position of liberalizers within the authoritarian bloc, making further democratization become more unlikely. The contribution thus lies in helping reduce the level of internal threat the regime faces if it starts tolerating the opposition. As the empirical evidence in the Polish case will suggest, this predicted tactics can be indeed observed. In concluding, we can compare the two possible scenarios for preference change. The transition game, with the opposition now preferring to play reform to playing democratization, is the opposite of what outcome we can expect under the earlier scenario (1). As a matter of fact, when comparing the change in the opposition’s strategies that emanate from the two different scenarios, we can easily see that they contradict each other. Ultimately, introducing variance into the model could enhance more genuinely our understanding about the underlying mechanisms of strategic transitions. When we add complexity through studying also the effect the foreign pressure game has on the opposition’s change in behavior, the strategy space for the three actors – regime, external actor, and opposition – is enlarged, eventually rendering it more realistic. As suggested before, the apparent contradiction between scenario (1) and scenario (2) could rather derive from the fact that the observer’s perspective is incomplete, while, for the real actors, the strategy space is simply more complex. One reason could be that the liberalization process itself cannot be assumed to follow a linear path. What seems to be the strategy at one point can become a tactical maneuver at a later point, which, from a short-term, myopic perspective, appears erratic. Linking the two strategy scenarios rests on the following assumption: the opposition, by deciding to play the move democratization, in essence, does not intend for radical action which could be interpreted as the attempt to oust the regime. One possible result could thus consist of insurrection or even civil war. Knowing the costs repression causes to the regime, the opposition could merely use the thought of total confrontation as a threat to provoke the regime take on a more cooperative attitude. By adding uncertainty, “preference falsification” (Kuran 1995) is a common tactic to achieve a goal in revolutionary settings. There are yet two more reasons for the contradiction between scenario (1) and (2) that, it has to be said, could stem directly from the model’s deficiency. The model does not capture possible internal rifts inside the opposition between

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moderates and radicals, keeping a blind eye to the role the moderates and radicals play and what that means for influencing the ultimate behavior of the opposition. Gavious and Mizrahi (2003) provide a game-theoretical analysis of how to calculate the point on the relevant dimension that distinguishes between extreme radical activists (that have to send signals representing their true type) and activists with no clear orientation (sending signals of moderate demands, making it easier for the regime to become cooperative). Yet, understanding the difference between the likelihood of change in behavior being either moderate or radical in the opposition can be employed as an empirical indicator to subject the nested game’s assumptions to a test. If either scenario outlined here can be observed in the real world, we should be able to address this contingency accordingly.

4.4.5 Summary The equilibria derived from the nested game allowed making inferences based on two factors: (1) the likelihood of democratic reform and (2) the mechanisms of external influence by a foreign power. We could determine when the regime acquiesces to the foreign pressure and introduces reform if we knew the values of all the terms in the above equation (10). However, these terms are difficult to measure because we cannot ask historical figures to give us their complete preferences over all possible strategies. Instead, we derive hypotheses about when democratic reform is more likely to occur. Moreover, the model does not only provide a host of possible explanations and predictions, but also allows the complex aggregate variable external influence to be broken down into sub-variables, making any study on the topic more manageable. The production of subvariables is per se significant since many studies about external democracy promotion are criticized for remaining at a purely descriptive and non-operational level (see also Sandschneider 2003). If P is held constant at a level approaching B, a decrease in k – the weight the regime attaches to the transition game – makes reform more likely to succeed, and, vice versa, increases in k make it less likely to succeed. Even more specifically, if is higher than 0.74, the regime is more likely to accept an outcome of reform any time sooner than any time later. Through the time discount factor the model reflects that even if these conditions are met, we still cannot expect imminent democratic reform. It is in addition necessary for the regime’s evaluation about its future, that is, its beliefs, to reach a certain level. These relationships between the variables underline the theory’s very general assumption for explaining regime change: external actors are an intervening and facilitating variable, rather than the central causal force that brings about regime change.


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They can have a very strong facilitating role, but our picture of the full causal mechanisms is most certainly incomplete without the domestic processes. At this stage, we are able to summarize the points we should expect to happen for the model to hold, or have any explanatory or even predictive power. Having discussed the variables inter-relatedness, what are the testable hypotheses? How, in a real world scenario, does the regime weigh the transition and the foreign pressure arena? In other words, which variables influence the value of k? There are several crucial factors, some of which are inter-related. It is one of the central tasks of this study to investigate their impact. For the subsequent empirical part of the study, the hypotheses can be outlined in brief points and serve as a folio: For P to approach its upper bound B, both psS and p have to be sufficiently large. Naturally, the external actor’s behavior directly influences the level of k, because k is dependent on p, but, moreover, dependent on psS: 1.

2.

3.

The more directly the foreign pressure is aimed at the regime with e.g. economic sanctions, and the more direct and tangible the external assistance to the opposition is, the stronger the negative effect on the regime’s cost to continue its authoritarian rule is. The higher the organizational degree and coherence or resolve of the opposition (or the combination of those), that is, the higher the opposition’s power is, the sooner the level is reached where the regime cannot anymore ignore thereof resulting negative effects on its power basis. There should be a proof that the opposition’s power is not entirely caused by purely domestic or idiosyncratic developments, but that it, to a large extent, stems from its external assistance. In order to bring P closer to B, the foreign power can help reduce the level of internal threat the regime is facing by moderating the opposition and providing credible exit strategies to the regime.

The value of k we can expect to be influenced by the subsequent: 1.

2.

The management of economy is impeded through the economic sanctions imposed by the foreign power. Based on an output-centered concept of legitimized rule, the broader the magnitude and resolve of sanctions limit the regime’s maneuverability, the lower the value of k will be. The larger the degree of external support to the opposition is, the more it adds to the opposition’s potential of causing a serious threat to the regime’s power, further decreasing k.

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The discount factor – in combination with the frequency parameter r – is crucial for understanding the timing of reform: 1.

2. 3. 4.

If all variables are held constant at a level where the regime’s cost to survive are sufficiently high, the regime might not immediately make offers for real power sharing. If only some of the variables reach the necessary level for reform, the regime will need longer to accommodate reform. The lower k is, the larger the discount factor space is, and the more likely the regime regards the future of its authoritarian rule to be dark. The stronger a foreign nation is interfering in the domestic struggle for democracy, the more often we should find it interacting with either the regime or the opposition. This, in turn, lowers the regime’s discount factor, accelerating the chances for a power sharing agreement with the opposition.

In concluding and foreshadowing the subsequent first empirical test of the model’s plausibility, in the Polish liberalization, we can now process-trace how the authoritarian Communist rulers weighed their costs. On the one hand of the scale, we have the costs that the purely internal, domestic threat of Solidarity caused; on the other hand, we have the costs caused by the external sanctions imposed on the country and the external financing of Solidarity by the United States.

5 Methodology

Before moving to the empirical analysis, at first, methodological questions will be introduced and discussed. They concern the design of the empirical research, questions about how the case study was selected, problems of data collection and measurement, and the data employed. The theory-guided nature of the narration necessitates a detailed outlining of the empirical part, too. Because, in simple terms, “measurement concerns the problem of linking abstract concepts to empirical indicants” (Zeller and Carmines 1980: 2), the more abstract a concept is, the more this link, the research design, needs to be explicit. This chapter represents the bridge between the theoretical part and the empirical investigation.

5.1 Empirical Research Design The broad idea behind the nested games model developed in the theoretical part is the prediction that an external actor can lead to a change in the payoffs of regime and opposition. Outcomes different from a domestic focus emerge. While other models have apparently failed to predict, for example, any of the outcomes in Communist Europe, the presented model attempts to explain these very deviations. This study’s discussion of the Polish liberalization is meant to be a first test of the explanatory power of this study’s model and its inferred predictions. Naturally, it is the predictions you derived from a model that you test, and you cannot subject the model itself to a test (see Lindenberg 1991). Empirically, then, you only examine the application of the predictions on particular cases or categories of cases (see Gerring 2004; Snidal 2004; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). This investigation is an exercise to advance theory building. The particular purpose of the study is to seek the effect a foreign actor can have on the strategic interaction between an authoritarian regime and a democratic opposition, thus on the durability of dictatorship. Arguably, in defining what constitutes the dependent variable in studying democratization, multi-category regime type scales work better than dichotomous ones (Elkins 2000). They serve better seeking to explain political liberalization or movement in the direction of democracy. On the other hand, the nested games model rests on its parsimony, making the binary equilib-


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5 Methodology

ria of either reaching or not reaching a power sharing agreement sufficient for explaining a movement to democracy. For the subsequent empirical analysis, the guiding and aggregate hypothesis is: Given the right amount of pressure exerted by a foreign power, the contingencies of action for regime and opposition are affected. A strategic constellation arises where it is more likely that a power sharing agreement can be reached.

In short, this study will explore the mechanisms leading to the Polish round table through linking the micro-choice variables of interaction between the opposition movement Solidarity and the Polish Communist party, PZPR, with the influence the United States had on both party’s contingencies of strategic action. The primary objective of this analysis is oriented more towards advancing further hypotheses in the study of international influences on regime transitions than towards providing a well-grounded narration of recent Polish history. Nevertheless, the study also aims at fathoming the “sources of political chaos” (Marks 1992: 55) in Eastern Europe’s latest history. The empirical analysis is designed not to test if the country meets all the model’s basic assumptions, but to find out if the assumptions are helpful in reducing some of the complexities of regime transitions. In this respect, the nested game model can afford to simplify away from ideological, historical, or the actors’ personal differences, in order to focus just on the dynamics of transition negotiations.85 Answering questions about the impact an external actor has on the process of regime breakdown is facilitated by a factor-centric, as opposed to an outcomecentric, case study. The interest behind factor-centric research designs lies predominantly in better understanding and estimating the factor under question as well as the contingent variables that modify its effect (George and Bennett 2005: 80; Ganghof 2005) – that is, external influence. By employing only Poland, the case study falls under the classical flaw that, characteristic of small-n studies, inferred generalizations are limited in their validity. Yet, there are methodological justifications. Ganghof (2005) develops suggestions in support of small-n studies: one of them claims that x-centered or factor-centered studies often have the merit that they can be designed more flexibly; instead of, for instance, investigating comparatively two to four cases in equal depth, it might be more effec85

The point being that this study does not aim to be an area study. Munck (2007) points out that the difference between area studies and non-area studies concerns the choice of producing descriptions or causal accounts. Area studies, rather than non-area studies, are more likely to have as their sole or primary objective the production of descriptions. Descriptions are an important goal of the social sciences, but are opposed to causal accounts.

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tive to begin with developing a complex explanation of one case. Only then, a particular causality can be cemented through focused, yet less detailed case comparison. The x-centered approach is thus adequate when large processes are broken down into smaller steps, which is reflected in the nested games model not attempting to solve the entire political process of regime change.86 Since this study is clearly oriented towards a form of basic research, and due to its early stage, it will rely on x-centered and small-n research. Another characteristic of empirically testing formal arguments needs mentioning: the tendency to simply re-describe history through game theory rather than explain it. Moreover, in particular with the study of regime transitions being marred with a high number of complicatedly intertwined variables, the field is often characterized by narratives obscured as theory. In researching the state of the art in contemporary comparative politics research, Munck and Snyder (2007) express this tendency in more general terms: the problem, then, is that a considerable number of studies seem not to distinguish clearly between theory generation and empirical analysis as two distinct steps in the research process and thus offer illustrations of theory or plausibility probes rather than real tests of theory (Munck and Snyder 2007: 20).

The problem is that, for empirical analyses, a “plausibility probe” (Eckstein 1975: 108) often remains the first choice when either theory-innovation is at the heart of research or the dependent variable is a part of a complex causal chain. Although the term plausible is vague and righteously evades objective methods for falsification, it remains a first measurement.87 At a minimum, it indicates the caution with which results are presented. Geddes, for example, in testing her game-theoretic model for Latin American transitions is just “protocoling” the observable implications (1991: 372). Opp (1999: 197) defends rational choice theorists who conduct qualitative analyses even when hard data is lacking; they should also use evidence that does not provide clear tests but simply lends more plausibility to certain assumptions than others. 86

87

Geddes (2003: 43-64) exemplified what the approach achieves when conducting a basic gametheoretical study of regime transitions. Some authors, however, critically term it the “Lego strategy” (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 717). Eckstein (1992: 147) says: “At a minimum, a plausibility probe into theory may simply attempt to establish that a theoretical construct is worth considering at all, that is, that an apparent empirical instance of it can be found. There is no reason why empirical plausibility probes should not take the form of modest or rather diffusely designed comparative studies, as preludes to more ambitious and tighter ones. Indeed, most systematic comparative studies in macropolitics make more sense as plausibility probes (or as ‘heuristic comparative studies’) than as what they are generally claimed or regard to be: that is, works presenting definitive results.”

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The logical concept of “plausible worlds” (Hawthorn 1991) is, in turn, connected with a relatively new term in political methodology88: counterfactual reasoning. An explanation of an event is plausible if we cannot imagine it to have come about otherwise: The force of an explanation turns on the counterfactual which it implies. If suchand-such a cause or combination of causes had not been present, we imply, or if such-and-such an action or series of action had not been taken, things would have been different. If we do not believe they would have been, we should not give the causes or actions in question the importance that we do (Hawthorn 1991: 14).

Put another way, the nested game model’s prediction would imply a rather strong counterfactual in the causal claim that, without the United States, Poland would not have had a democratic breakthrough.89 Specifying the counterfactual implicit in a model’s causal claim is a central element to clearly identifying what question is actually being asked. Hence, when analyzing the United States assistance in the Polish liberalization, we need to find sufficient proof that this counterfactual claim is, at a minimum, reasonably plausible. To imply that Poland would not have democratized if it had not been for the United States democracy assistance is certainly strong. In such a case, to better specify and thereby alleviate the claim, Fearon (1991; 1996) reminds us to employ the correct “contrast space” (1996: 56).90 Many studies rest on one or another form of implicit counterfactual. With the example of contrast space, it will become comprehensible in what way oftenobscure assumptions can be rendered into more explicitness. When conceptualizing the framing and reach of a scientific investigation, it makes a difference which states of the world are compared with each other. It is vital to specify the implicit counterfactual by stating which contrast space forms the foundation of the causal claim: analogously, when pinning variation on the dependent variable, do we contrast Poland democratized in 1989 with Poland would have democra88

89

90

Counterfactuals in historical investigations have increasingly been treated with methodological vigour in the political science literature. See, for example, with a focus on game theory, Bueno de Mesquita (1996) and Weingast (1996); for “diversionary behavior” in international relations, Clark (2003); for the study of revolutions, Kiser and Levi (1996). Ideally, nomothetic counterfactuals are not constrained by the historical plausibility. These predictions follow from context-free logic theory – in our case, rational choice or transition theories (Tetlock 1996: 9). In judging what else could plausibly have happened, game theorists use nomothetic laws to answer the idiographic question: how much history do I have to rewrite to undo a particular policy? (11) Fearon (1996) bases his concept on Merton’s discussion of “middle-range theories” (Merton 1958) and Paul Lazarsfeld’s notion of a “property space” (see Barton 1955).

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tized any other time, or, do we contrast Poland democratizes at some time with Poland would never democratize? As was outlined, the model assumed that the impact of the external player for regime breakdown is necessary but not sufficient. A particular domestic actor constellation is still a pre-requisite. Our contrast space, therefore, cannot start with the assumption that Poland would have never democratized. More realistically, it should be placed against the onset that Poland would have democratized at some time in any case. Any other than as early as May 1989 would have been more improbable without the democracy assistance of the United States. Counterfactual statements cannot provide a substitute for empirical observation. However, they can support an explanation and test the robustness of general propositions: “’I claim x caused y; to clarify my claim, let me explain my image of a world absent of x’” (Van Evera 1997: 48). Alternatively, would general cause x (e.g. the strength of Solidarity) still have produced the general effect y (e.g. the breakdown of the regime) even if particular historical features such as z (e.g. U.S. support) had been different (see also Kiser 1996)? What follows is that the task for this study’s empirical investigation lies in exhibiting that the Polish world of liberalization absent of the external actor United States would have lead to a different outcome. The function of a research design is to alleviate insecurities about the magnitude and direction of causalities. Since testing further variables is beyond the scope of this study, a comparative solution that would control for spurious causality must remain a future project. Therefore the insecurities will be addressed in Chapter 7.2. Alternative explanations that are counterfactual to the model’s identified causal processes will be discussed there. As Kiser and Levi (1996: 200-201) argue, counterfactuals hold an advantage over standard comparative methods: comparisons are per se complex and compound counterfactuals that are much more difficult to judge than the simple counterfactuals produced by a clear theoretical strategy. Thus, Chapter 7.5 is devoted to briefly taking into consideration the opposition structure of Solidarity as a strictly endogenous movement; the impact of the Soviet Union as external actor; and the general role the Cold War had on Poland’s democratization path.

Empirical Hypotheses What predictions does the model generate? Promotion efforts alone were not sufficient for Poland to democratize. But were they essential? How essential? For observing the regime’s preference change, but also the discussed preference structure of the opposition, we need to reconstruct historically when political

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changes occurred. They represent important conjunctions and stages in the bargaining process. At these points, the following behavioral patterns could become observable: 1. 2.

3.

in general, either a strategy change of one of the actors or even the realization of an unexpected political outcome; the regime could provide signals that it is departing from the hitherto and in the non-nested game predicted strategy of confrontation towards the opposition; the opposition could show intra-actor signs of changing from more radical demands for democratization to more modest demands of limited reform, but also vice versa.

Building on the summary of the model’s implications from Chapter 4.4.5, in order for the model to have explanatory value in a case study of Poland, we should also be able to observe the following antecedents and predictions: 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

strategic interaction between the Polish Communist regime, the Solidarity opposition, and actors affiliated with the United States was essential to the course of events; strategy changes by the regime or Solidarity can, at least partly, be attributed to the involvement of the United States; through economic sanctions and assistance to Solidarity, the United States could exert a high degree of pressure on the regime; the external assistance to Solidarity contributed to a large extent to its power, survival, and tactics, posing a serious threat to the regime’s power; United States economic sanctions did hurt the country’s economic performance and caused the regime true headaches; the Polish Communist regime did not value the future highly, but the discount rate necessary to reach an agreement on reform was within reach.

External assistance as part of the move which was earlier defined as strong foreign pressure can take effect for the Solidarity opposition in the following forms; it can be broken down into sub-levels and constitutes:

motivation and mobilization through recognition and moral support; organizational strength and professionalism through financial and material aid; improved bargaining power through short-term tactical and long-term strategic advising.

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The following empirical hypotheses guide the main question as well as contribute to the structuring of the subsequent empirical part: The United States engagement in Poland considerably increased the cost for the Jaruzelski regime to repress Solidarity. The cost reached a level where the regime realized that alternative arrangements could become more beneficial. This hypothesis is based on two assumptions: 1.

2.

The United States sponsored financial, logistical, and moral support, and thereby contributed to Solidarity’s organizational degree, wherewithal, and self-confidence. Without the support, the opposition could not have forced the Communist regime into negotiating a power sharing arrangement in 1988/1989. Political signals, economic sanctions, and financial inducements from Washington additionally compelled the Communist regime to enter into a dialogue with the Solidarity. The costs of repression increased further.

5.2 Case Selection Before explaining why the United States influence in Communist Poland constitutes a case suitable for a testing of this study’s model, first, the typical methodological problems that generally arise when selecting empirical case studies will be addressed. As the rational choice revolution moved beyond its application in American politics, rational choice theory confronted comparative questions of regime transition, democratic stability, and international governance. The application to these macro phenomena creates analytic and methodological problems that were not so apparent when applied to micro-questions. In the 1990s, King et al. (1994) as well as Green and Shapiro (1994) caused a debate about how to test theories that claim a more general application. While Green and Shapiro – and other pathologists of formal modeling – took the position that rational choice theory has poor empirical support, Bates et al. (1998; 2000) faced this claim by giving extensive thought on how to link theory with data, and, in particular, how to build and test systematic explanations based on case studies. The authors believe in generalizations and the development of analytical tools for the task of studying unique cases. Bates et al. (1998; 2000) address in Analytic Narratives these novel applications and set out suggestions how to overcome methodologically the problems. Analytic narrative, or “rationalist historical narrative” (Francisco and Lichbach 2001: 11), is understood as a method to deductively explain individual historical facts. Through an analytically guided narration, game theory can

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serve as an “axiomatically grounded explanation of history” (Bueno de Mesquita 1996: 213). Ultimately, Analytic Narratives centers around the problem of how to develop systematic explanations based on case studies. In the following, I will discuss some critical but also useful conceptions that will be employed for tracing the process of political liberalization in Poland. In his critique of Bates et al. (1998), Elster (2000), a rational choice theorist himself, asserts that any social scientific explanation should be limited to identifying the causal mechanisms; but since human behavior underlies dozens of potential mechanisms that vary from case to case, they are themselves not comparable. Elster’s approach is in some respect sobering since it would mean the elimination of any possible ex ante prediction. However, behavior cannot at all be interpreted as action without a simple explanatory model. A “mechanism” is then, generally, an often unobservable process which, however, generates a particular, observable pattern of behavior (Ganghof and Manow 2005: 13). Patterns, in turn, can hold over a variety of cases. Studying causal mechanisms through process tracing – or analytic narratives – is an attempt at reducing the narrowly positivist claim that a research program must establish comprehensible correlations between independent and dependent variable. The difference between a law and a mechanism is that between a more static correlation (‘if X, then Y’) and a process (‘X leads to Y through steps A, B, C’) (Bennett and George 2005: 141). Process tracing is one attempt at getting closer to the mechanisms. As a matter of fact, King et al. (1994) concede that the concept of causal mechanisms can also create causal hypotheses to investigate; but they warn, on the other hand, that “we should not confuse a definition of causality with the non definitional, albeit often useful, operational procedure of identifying causal mechanisms” (1994: 86). However, Bennett and George (2005) regard process tracing and its systematic identification of sub-causalities as more than an operationalization or methodological procedure. Causal mechanisms and causal effects are both theoretical entities that are central to notions of causality and explanation. The aim of interpretative causal mechanisms analyses is less the postulation of general hypotheses than a theoretically controlled analysis of historical events. Referring to causal mechanisms, “which in principle requires consistency with the finest level of detail observable” (Bennett and George 2005: 149), provides a source of causal inference based more on studying the intermediate steps and forces that originate from a correlation. It is the expected magnitude and signs of the expected effect the researcher is looking for (Bennett and George 1997: 16). The “intimacy with detail” (Bates at al. 2000: 698) is the foundation of how the model is selected and specified to be tested. Since it is nearly impossible to reconstruct realistically the actors’ beliefs and true intentions, a close

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historical and theory-guided narration should nonetheless give a good sense of the beliefs and intentions. With this in mind, “rational choice theory tells us what to look for, not what we will find” (Elster 2000: 695). In contrast to the Humean model, in whose tradition authors like King, Keohane and Verba can be placed, scholars concerned with causal mechanisms argue that the exploration of the black box connecting independent and dependent variable is essential to social scientific work. With regard to qualitative studies, “the black box problem thus refers to the difficulty of explaining why a given causal variable exerts an effect on a given outcome variable” (Mahoney 2003: 2).91

Selecting the United States and Poland How does the case fit to test the model? It is, at first sight, methodologically unsound to infer a theory from a set of cases, and then use that theory to explain the very cases you started with (Van Evera 1997: 27; King et al. 1994: 107, 187). On the other hand, pure deductive reasoning can never be a social science enterprise; it rather belongs to the realm of philosophy. The right game to use, that is, the appropriate individuals, their preferences, and the structure of their environment, is an inductive process much like the one used in comparative politics or history. Once that inductive process is complete, a deductive method is used to study behavior within this very game (see Bates et al. 2000: 697). When thereby using deductive theories for inductive purposes, shifting back and forth between the data and the model is only natural and it is a constant process of testing ideas against reality. It is sound as long as the possibility to falsify the model always exists and it is developed in a sufficiently transparent way and rigor, and as long as, when a theory is tested, it can and does fail. The nested game model is, first of all, used to explain the historical event of a foreign democratic actor influencing a transition process. By reference to causal mechanisms, this study will attempt to test the model’s inferences through process tracing, which examines processes within a single case in detail.92 Thereby the research design follows Bennett and George’s (2005) approach of combining typological theorizing with

91

92

For studying causal mechanisms in international relations theory see the critical realist debate in Patomäki (1996). The approach of combining formal work to help unravel the causal mechanisms in authoritarian breakdown with subsequently testing the inferred hypotheses with case study evidence can be called a multi-method or mixed method research program (Bennett and George 2005: 54; Liebermann 2005; see also Sprinz 2004).

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process tracing as an attempt to make use of both generalizing and particularizing explanations. This study’s theory is, by virtue of employing a single empirical case for testing, marred with the risk of engaging in an eventual over-ambitious project of generalizations. Yet, in the following, two methodological justifications will be given for selecting United States democracy assistance in Communist Poland as a single case study. (1) At the minimum, this study avoids the inference problem of selecting a case based on the dependent variable (King et al. 1994: 108-109, 137). Choosing a case on the dependent variable runs the risk of inserting a bias in the study’s outcome (Leuffen 2007; Geddes 1990: 131). Quite to the contrary, the selection of Poland’s liberalization process was motivated by pre-research results showing the United States as having played a widely underestimated role in opposition financing and supporting in Poland. Simultaneously, Western democracy assistance in Poland was not expected to have had any effect on the country’s transition path, that is, the dependent variable. The case seemed ideal by choosing along the causal explanatory variable, as King et al. (1994: 137) plead, and not by the fact of Poland’s eventual democratization being initiated by foreign intervention. The basic hypotheses of the nested game model should therefore have been amenable to relative falsifiability. (2) The U.S. influence in Poland can be defined as a pathway case for this study’s theory. Gerring (2007: 233) refers to a pathway case as “a new kind of case study in which the purpose of an intensive analysis of an individual case is to elucidate causal mechanisms (i.e. to clarify a theory) rather than to confirm or disconfirm a general theory”. In order to confirm a theory, Eckstein’s classical method of choosing a crucial case requires the case to be of least-similar nature to the dimensions of theoretical interest (Eckstein 1975). Gerring (2007) believes that Eckstein’s method is of use only in restricted and quite rare circumstances. Rather, the point crucial for selecting a case does not rest on the empirical properties of the case but also on the formal properties of the theory that is being tested (2007: 233). This study selected the empirical case so that a “penetrating insight” (238) into mechanisms is achievable. A case like Poland, where the United States spent considerable means into the political liberalization process – which became evident only upon finalizing the research –, is such a pathway case. Here, the predicted strong external influence facilitates the exploration of the nested game’s hypothesized causal mechanisms. Geographically, the focus of this study is limited to Communist Eastern Europe. Yet the case study of Poland is treated as an instance of a class of regime transitions, fulfilling the criteria of external validity (King et al. 1994) and attributing it representativeness for further cases of regime change. It is common for

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comparative politics scholars to focus on one region when studying democratization. The same applies to the study of international influence on democratization: the vast majority of those concentrate on regional organizations, as opposed to players acting more globally (see Pridham 1994; Whitehead 1996). It can be agreed with Whitehead (Whitehead 1996: 395) and Pevehouse (2002: 520) that the relevance of the international dimension seems much clearer at the regional level than at some worldwide level of analysis. It is further useful to define the theory’s assumptions and necessary antecedents within the region more specifically. Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, and Toka (1999) defines three modes of pre-transition Communist political organizations in Central and Eastern Europe. The modes not only affected the posttransition trajectories but also the nature of transition itself (see also Linz and Stepan 1996: 65); and thus need consideration in how far the effect of external influence could be dependent on the organizational character of the regime. The modes of political organization are (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 36): 1.

2.

3.

Patrimonial Communism: charismatic, personal relations of the leaders in the state and within the party, with extensive patronage and clientilist networks (Bulgaria and Romania); National-accommodative Communism: more formally developed formalrational bureaucratic governance structures that partially separate party rule and technical state administration (Hungary and Poland); Bureaucratic-authoritarian93: in essence a formalized authoritarian, if not quasi-totalitarian system (Czech Republic and East Germany – with few historical characteristics in Poland).

As expected, the more authoritarian a Communist organization is, the less open a society as such is for general contagion effects (see Welzel 2002: 100; Diamond 1993: 58), and the less it is permeable for outside, agency-driven influence. Consequently, to specify external validity of the Polish case, we should expect external influence to have a greater effect on the forms of national-accommodative systems as opposed to the bureaucratic systems, and also to the patrimonial forms of Communist party rule. The case of Poland fits also into a category of cases that suggest the hypothesized peaceable nature of elite-driven negotiations 93

O’Donnell coined the term bureaucratic authoritarianism in the Latin American context, which became established in the typologies of regime types beyond the terminological region of origin. This type of governance seemed to be intrinsic to the socio-economic structure of the Cono Sur (O’Donnell 1973). For Origins and phenomena of Latin American authoritarianism, see also Linz (1978).

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(Huntington 1991). Finally, intervening diffusion effects can be better isolated in Poland because of the country’s ice-breaking regional nature of its transition. The influence of diffusion effects from neighboring democracies (see Gleditsch 2003; Thiel 2001) is much less significant than in other post-Communist countries.

5.3 Data Basis The case study was conducted through (1) an analysis of relevant and available documentation on the American-based policies and efforts towards the Polish regime and the opposition as well as documentation on how regime and opposition reacted to these efforts. The documentation is based both on primary and secondary literature, it includes the memoirs of key actors such as General Jaruzelski, martial law Prime Minister, Communist party leader and head of the military council; Polish Prime Minister Rakowski; or Solidarity leader Walesa. U.S. American and, where possible, Polish government and NGO sources as well as a newspaper analysis provided a further base. The study was conducted (2) through interviews with both American and Polish actors active in the political history between 1980 and 1989. The interviews were structured along a questionnaire based on open-ended questions (see McCracken 1988). All interviews were taped and transcribed; the questionnaires and transcriptions of the interviews are available upon request. To improve reader-friendliness, citations are abbreviated with Interview, to be followed by last name of the interviewee. A full list of the interviewees may be found in Appendix 3. The interviewees were asked to name those they believed played an important role, to assist in identifying further relevant respondents. The open-end approach facilitated for respondents to provide exploratory and unstructured replies, although within the set frame of establishing strategic preferences and considerations leading to those preferences as well as of tracing both the how and why of influence. Since the topic of the case study is somewhat under-researched and hardly any guidance could be found in the existing literature, the open-end approach was necessary to at all establish a picture and for the first time gain inside into the mechanisms of the respondents’ activities. Two aspects limited the depth of historical investigation: (1) It was possible to access only very few official American records. Due to the sensitivities surrounding the Cold War times, the majority of documents relating to the foreign policy towards Communist Poland are secret and have not yet been declassified. These concern documentation about measures to assist Solidarity and to harm the

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Communist regime. Even though records are subject to the Freedom of Information Act and requests can be made under the provisions of the Presidential Records Act, this process can take up years. (2) Both on the American and the Polish side, the non-government community and the government branches alike, as one interviewee put it, actors “have not made a business of making history” (Interview Chenoweth) about the secrecy of smuggling money and equipment into Poland. This all the more accounts for the covert CIA-sponsored support for Solidarity. Some participants in the events even reclined interviews. At last, with the unit of investigation reaching back nearly 30 years, many valuable interview candidates have passed away. Information attained through an interview that was not confirmed by any other source will only then be cited or integrated into this study if it has anecdotal value and hence raises the study’s attractiveness for the more historically inclined reader. Explicitly the findings on the details of covert operations to fund and support Solidarity aim at triangulation (Lummis 1998)94 or, where impossible, are indicated as not being confirmed by other sources.95 In this regard, to my knowledge, no documents originating either from the intelligence community or from other government branches have been declassified yet. The author encountered with his interview partners a still persisting reluctance to share information about anything distantly related to covert operations or the elaborate networks of secret contacts that reached into the Polish underground. On the Polish side, the repressiveness of the regime prevented contemporary observers or participants from leaving behind more sources. In this regard, PZPR (Polish United Workers’ Party) Central Committee member Ciosek explains:

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95

The triangulation in oral material with other evidence says that if three different sources report the same story, it can with high probability be estimated to be true (Lummis 1998: 274). A word is noteworthy on some of the sources for the remainder of this chapter: some of the empirical picture relating to covert U.S. operations assisting Solidarity builds on a much criticized publication by Peter Schweizer (1994). The main argument is that his book rests too much on rumours from Washington circles (Interview Sikorski). Nevertheless, the book provides a host of valuable details and information previously not published.

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The documents that remained from those years, party documents, I mean, but I believe the same is true about the Solidarity documents, those formal documents were not written for history, but only to present some order, but in reality, decisions were made in circles, which [...] would leave no trace.96

But most importantly, Solidarity actors are short on admitting much of the role Americans held in the process that retrospectively could be stylized into a myth – which is frequently part of national social movement struggles such as Solidarity’s was. As one interviewee put it, when you are asking about foreign money forwarded to Solidarity, “you going to have problems with that in Poland” – “you do not want to ask him [Geremek97], he will not tell you anything” (Interview Szporer). Solidarity and its success in eventually overthrowing the Communist regime have become part of national identity and an iconography of heroism. In this historical achievement of a domestic worker’s movement any acknowledgement of being influenced by foreign support would diminish the picture of a self-sustained, national revolution. The reservation to reveal the extent of support from the United States on behalf of Solidarity activists can also be found in the fact that both Soviet and Polish Communist propaganda frequently painted Solidarity as being entirely financed by foreign intelligence services and by the U.S. based National Endowment for Democracy (The New York Times, 18/12/1981; 02/12/1985). Pravda, for example, wrote in 1981 “the CIA declared full-scale secret war against Poland, that all contacts between Solidarity, all supplies and donations is part of a web spun by the CIA”98. Conversely though, another reason why interviews with Polish actors proved futile might stem from the ignorance about where exactly the assistance stemmed from; former CIA Director Gates writes that, because of “deniability” (1996: 237), Solidarity was never told that the source of the assistance was the CIA (Gates 1996: 450). My research into the finance trails had to rely on the granting side of this relationship, not on the grantee side. To trace some of the international money trails with the help of personal accounts of Solidarity activists was for similar reasons unpromising: either because the origin of money or goods was unbeknownst to the vast majority of activists99, and only very few in the leading circle 96

97 98 99

Qtd. in University of Michigan, 1999: Communism’s Negotiated Collapse: The Polish Round Table, Ten Years Later. A Conference at the University of Michigan, April 7-10, 1999. English transcript of the conference proceedings, trans. by Kasia Kietlinska, ed. by Donna Parmelee, The University of Michigan Center for Russian and East European Studies, Ann Arbor, MI. Bronislaw Geremek, key advisor to Walesa, imprisoned 1981-1982. Qtd. in The New York Times (26/12/1981). Within this context, Bielecki, Solidarity advisor, allegedly ran a major clandestine publishing house; its equipment and supplies was provided by U.S. government funds without Zbigniew

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would distribute and receive any funding100; or because the very actors who personally received funds were and still are not supportive in any statements that could corroborate their dependence on foreign sponsored, covert operations. Evidence on the scope of finances thus had to rely for most part on American sources. After a bulk of American and Soviet documents became only declassified over the last few years, the so-called Polish Crisis, 1980-1982, with the threat of Soviet intervention clinging in the air, has recently attracted increased historic research (see MacEachin 2002). Much of this research touches the role of the Polish opposition only distantly, if at all. The exception, however, are wellinformed National Intelligence Estimates about Poland compiled by the CIA101. For obvious reasons, more data, both from American and Polish sources, is nowadays available for the period after the Communist regime opened in 1988, and in particular for the year of change 1989. Among those are valuable cables from the United States Embassy in Warsaw.102 In general, this allows us to gauge the inner dynamics of this “deal cutting stage” (Casper and Taylor 1996: 22) of the transition more in depth than the other process stages.

100

101

102

Bujak’s knowledge (Schweizer 1994: 225). Bujak was one of the four heads forming the official Solidarity underground leadership. Radical fractions within Solidarity also have voiced criticism about the tight hold on funds by Walesa and the union leadership (see Interview Chenoweth and http://rightweb.irc-online.org/groupwatch/ftui.php#P4843_1032510). Moreover, the most powerful contacts had been developed by representatives of the liberal political orientation (centered, for example, around the former KOR members) and their critics often pointed out the partisanship in the distribution of Western assistance among various political options (Kubik 2000: 280). Bujak had complained about never having received “a single dollar” (Interview Chenoweth). On the other hand, and this may confirm the second reason for the reluctant statements by Solidarity activists, Bujak was indeed responsible in the underground for overseeing the bank accounts. Director of Central Intelligence, 1981: Poland’s Prospects Over the Next Six Months, Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 12.6-81, 30 January 1981, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC; Director of Central Intelligence, 1982: Poland’s Prospects Over the Next 12 to 18 Months, Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 12.6-82, 1 September 1982, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC. The authors from these reports, with hindsight, have for most cases proven to be of precise and well-informed, detailed knowledge of the Polish internal constellations in which the actors found themselves. In general, where interviews by the author with the contemporary actors were not feasible, sources from intelligence services often were the only material available. The depth of analyses, and in particular the strategic and tactical analyses of Polish domestic movements, is difficult to be matched by any other source – at least in the English language, but also in the general literature on the topic. The referred to and subsequently cited cables are all available at the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsaebb/nnsaebb42.htm.

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As long as the authoritarian state controlled access to information and exhibited a penchant to imprison troublemakers, systematic data collection was stymied. Consequently, extant studies tend to focus on the narrow period of transition to democracy – when, in the cases of pacted transitions, it becomes easier to obtain data (see also Oberschall 2000; Osa 2000; 2003).103 Assessing the effect of democracy promotion means also assessing the finances spent in a given country. General targets of financially induced democracy promotion allow concluding in how far foreign policy considerations influence the choice of strategies (Burnell 2000: 50). However, most strategies are often the simple result of specialized foreign political interests; and even of competing departments within the foreign policy of a nation. Given the departmentalization, but also for other reasons, the volume of invested resources is difficult to measure. Nevertheless, it represents a good quantitative parameter for measuring the degree of influence a foreign actor exerted. For additional resources deriving from the U.S. Department of State or the White House, estimates are given based on calculations from secondary literature and, to a limited degree, on interviews.

5.4 Structure of the Empirical Part Bates et al.’s (1998; 2000) method of analytic narrative is more than just a historical case study method. Through the method’s theory-guided narration, the structuring of the empirical analysis requires to reflect the nested games model’s main propositions. To begin with, the focus is historically on the grey area between Rustow’s (1970) democratization phases of liberalization and transition: the extrication of the old Communist regime rather than the institutionalization of the new, democratic regime under Prime Minister Mazowiecki since June 1989. To understand the success of the 1989 agreement, we can interpret the Polish transition process as a succession of iterated games. The theoretical introduction of iteration into the nested game of transition and foreign pressure served to capture the general dynamics of a multitude of small moves and negotiations. To apply those to the Polish case, a broader classification of stage games is, however, necessary. To 103

One reason for the availability of data for the year 1989 is that much historic research and source editing concentrated on the break-through events at the outset of Communism’s breakdown; another being that any prior year was still in the heyday of cold war confrontation, with both West and East engaging mostly in secret and behind-closed-doors activities. The constraints that hampered activists also restrict academic research.

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begin with, junctures can be identified post hoc and, for the Polish liberalization process, broken into three stages. Those serve, firstly, to structure the introductory historical account in Chapter 6.2. Secondly, they provide distinct phases for evaluating the model’s predictions better; the number of observable units is thus increased. Beyond its intuitive fit, this process approach increases the sub-level variance for observation in our case study (King et al. 1994: 218; Gerring 2004). In doing so, we should be able to observe more individual strategic decisions, and interpret and measure them under the light of the external actor’s effect on them. In identifying critical junctures, we can again distinguish between a research design based on an x-centered approach and a design based on a ycentered approach. Choosing the analytical junctures based on purely the outcome of the domestic Polish liberalization process would ignore variation in the factor under investigation. Having applied an outcome- and y-centered approach, as was introduced earlier, Zielinski (1995: 148) sees three distinct game-theoretic equilibria that structure Poland’s path to the round table negotiations: (1) dictatorship 1981-1986; (2) broadened dictatorship 1986-1989; (3) “negotiated” democracy from 1989 onwards. Transitions from one political arrangement are seen as shifts from one equilibrium to another. The final outcome of the game played during 1981-1986 is the initial state of the final game played in 1989. The strategy combination of the Communist party seeking to maintain the authoritarian regime, and of Solidarity, to democratize the system, is thus the starting point for analyzing how the game ended in finding an agreement between the two actors. Although the categorization of these stages is a matter of discussion, they roughly concur with parameters that are based on the degree of opening. However, for the origination and development of the Solidarity movement, they do not reflect junctures critical to understanding Solidarity’s evolution, delegalization, and ultimate success. In this case, different criteria apply. It can be argued that these criteria – still, from an outcome-centered approach – are more instrumental when studying external influence on the Polish process. The movement rose in 1980 and gained far-reaching autonomy with the August agreement 1981, but was soon crushed after the declaration of martial law in December 1981. From 1982 until the starting of direct talks with the regime in late 1988, Solidarity only existed in the underground and was de facto struggling to survive. The period of 1988-1989 is characterized by a phase of negotiations that actually stretched longer than the two months of round table negotiations in March and April 1989. Therefore, the following stages can by suggested for analysis: 1.

Birth of Solidarity and martial law, 1980-1981

178 2. 3.

5 Methodology

Underground, 1982-1988 Induction and Negotiation of the round table, 1988-1989.

The above periodization has the virtue that it also corresponds to a factor- and xcentered definition of stages: Solidarity’s situation under dictatorship is functional to the degree of pressure and assistance the United States invested throughout the 1980s. Two intuitive arguments will also hold in the Polish case: (1) the more an opposition is repressed, the more an external actor committed to democracy will invest, and, (2) at critical junctures, where the regime is already weakened (as was the case in 1988-1989), we can expect the external actor’s democracy promotion efforts to rise, too. Finally, the subsequent analysis is further subdivided into two broader parts. The literature on internal-external linkages suggests to first describe the terms of influence, then the probability of influence (Milner 1997), which will be analogously applied here. This procedure seems useful in order to distinguish between, on the one hand, how support to Solidarity was organized and what measures were taken against the Polish regime, and, on the other hand, what resulting effect can be observed. Correspondingly, the empirical part will first look into how influence was exerted (Chapters 6.3 and 6.4), then, in a second step, evaluate the probable effect of influence and compare it with the predictions the nested game model generated (Chapter 7). Moreover, the nested games approach alerted us to the difference associated with the relative weight of the domestic and the international arena, which is reflected in the value of parameter k. One empirical implication was that, for most observers of the breakdown of authoritarianism, the conflict between regime and opposition is relatively visible (it is the principal stage), while the international context in which this process is taking place is much more difficult to observe. This is commensurate with our lack of understanding about how the causal mechanisms in the international dimension work. This study’s empirical analysis will consequently focus more on the process tracing of the U.S. strategies, measures, and instruments and their effects than on the domestic arena of conflict.

6 U.S. Democracy Assistance in the Polish Liberalization Process, 1980-1989 It was brilliant money. For the price of one F-16 we undermined Communism from inside! It’s a good deal.104

In Communist Poland, contraband financed by the United States sometimes lead to curious levels of professionalism that the opposition developed: The Polish trade union movement Solidarity possessed the first fax machine in Eastern Europe, even before the Communist apparatus had one, and certainly “long before the National Endowment for Democracy ever had one, too” (Interview Haig). Are smuggling operations merely historical anecdotes of external democracy promotion? While it is beyond the scope of this investigation to account conclusively for the complexities surrounding the external influence on regime transitions, in the following part, the model’s predictions and hypotheses are subjected to a first empirical test. As argued earlier, among the countries that meet the basic assumptions of the nested game of transition and foreign pressure, Communist Poland provides a valid case for gaining insight into international contextual variations and the strategic actions of regime and opposition. Against the backdrop of U.S. democracy promotion, this chapter attempts a rational reconstruction of the interaction between the Polish Communist regime and the Solidarity opposition from the August strikes in 1980 to the round table negotiations in 1989. Applying the examination of the nested games model to Communist Poland allows us to gauge its utility for explaining the mechanisms and the outcomes of domestic strategic interaction. Most of the empirical part cannot stand as an all-inclusive test of the specific assumptions derived from the model. It rather confirms the scope and impact the United States interventions had on the Polish actors, and that there is good reason to believe they hence changed their strategic behavior: their payoffs 104

Former Solidarity activist and now Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski commenting from Washington on the value of the United States Assistance to Solidarity (Interview Sikorski). The price of one F-16 fighter jet can be assessed at $12 million.


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6 U.S. Democracy Assistance in the Polish Liberalization Process, 1980-1989

can reasonably be assumed to have altered and lead to a new, different game of transition, namely a game nested inside an international arena. The strategic contingencies of action for the Polish actors can be better understood, when, in a first step, the details of interaction between the unitary actor United States and the domestic actors are being traced. This is the content of Chapter 6. It is subdivided into outlining first the general U.S. policy towards Communist Poland (Chapter 6.1), to be followed by a broader historical introduction into Poland’s path to the round table agreements (Chapter 6.2). Chapters 6.3 and 6.4 present an analytical narrative of the U.S. influence on Solidarity and the Jaruzelski regime, respectively. By following the factor-centered approach of this study, the United States can be usefully differentiated into sub-actors which were active in Poland; in order to expose the causal mechanisms of external influence more in detail, their motivations, strategies, and instruments will be discussed in Chapter 6.5. In an attempt to more rigorously evaluate the correspondence between the theory of this study and the empirical facts, the model’s predictions will be more formally tested in Chapter 7. This chapter will look into how the interaction of the domestic transition game with the international arena lead to the regime changing its behavior and how the opposition’s resolve and strategy was affected.

6.1 The United States Policy Toward Poland Dear Mr. President, Your address on the direct communications link has made all the more pressing the necessity of calling upon you and the government of the USA to end at last the interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state – the Polish People’s Republic. This interference in the most diverse forms – overt and covert – has been underway for a long time, already. CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in a letter to President Ronald Reagan, December 25, 1981105

105

Secret letter from Brezhnev to Reagan dated December 25, 1981, Papers of Donald P. Regan, White House Chief of Staff, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 214, Washington, DC.

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At the time Brezhnev called upon Reagan to cease the interferences in Poland, martial law had been declared only two weeks ago. The consequential phase of repression, however, should only spark the real U.S. democracy campaign to follow. The links of the Polish dissident world to Western organizations and individuals had always been rich and diverse. Moreover, their density increased over time and in the late 1980s became “truly massive in comparison to other countries of the region” (Kubik and Ekiert 2000: 266). After the crisis of 1981, with an “extensive underground connection working through the Vatican and the Polish church” (Bernstein and Politi 1997: 257), the United States was the central coordinator of support for the crushed Solidarity movement (Kubik and Ekiert 2000: 267; Smith 1994: 299). “The special relationship” (Hutchings 1997: 214) between the United States and Poland owed to a number of factors: Poland’s geo-strategic weight and its significance for the entire region; a large and effective Polish-American community (see Garrett 1978) representing some eight million votes; and finally, in terms of democracy assistance, the identification of a unified mass movement against the authoritarian establishment through the rise of Solidarity facilitated to concentrate attention. The following outline deals with the general principles on which the United States based its democratization policy towards Poland.

The Reagan Administration’s ‘Project Democracy’ In the model’s foreign pressure game, practical efforts to move foreign societies toward democracy were divided into two targets which structure the instruments of democracy promotion: (1) dealing with social forces, (2) working with the organization of government. Likewise, two instruments can be distinguished for the United States influencing the Polish liberalization process: sanctions and pressure to have an impact on the policy of the Polish regime on the one hand, and openly and covertly supporting the Solidarity opposition on the other hand. In this area, the United States and Western European countries followed different strategies. Dissimilar, for example, to Germany or France, in the U.S., the main strategy was to give direct assistance to civil society organizations, bypassing governmental bureaucracy (Wedel 1998: 85; Kubik and Ekiert 2000: 277). As mentioned earlier, the assumption that no external incentives would convince an authoritarian government to undertake democratic reform if it estimated that reform would unleash insurmountable potential danger to the survival of the regime causes a dilemma for the use of an external actor’s policy instruments. For the United States as democracy promoter, two strategies can be derived: firstly, to help reduce the (perceived) level of internal threat the Polish regime is

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facing through Solidarity; and secondly to make external sanctions and rewards more certain, visible, and immediate. As will be shown, elements of these strategies can be observed. The so-called Reagan Doctrine to promote democracy abroad was born late in 1981 with the presidential approval to fund insurgents against the Sandinista in Nicaragua. Clandestine efforts to aid Solidarity in Poland through collaboration with the Vatican were included in the same policy package, although in this case the use of force was ruled out. In 1982, the President signed a secret National Security Decision Document (NSDD) 32106 that authorized a range of economic, diplomatic and covert measures to “neutralize efforts of the U.S.S.R.” to maintain its hold on Eastern Europe. During the Reagan administration, any major decisions arrived at by the administration would formally become a, in most cases secret, policy when written in the NSDD (Mitchell 2005: 106; see also Simpson 1995). These documents directed the President’s senior advisors on major foreign-policy matters. NSDD 32 cited the need to defend democratic reform efforts throughout the Soviet empire and outlined a number of principal objectives:

Covertly support for underground movements in Eastern Europe, in particular, operations involving propaganda and organizational aid to Solidarity; intensification of psychological operations directed at the region, particularly radio broadcasts such as Voice of America and Radio Free Europe; diplomatic isolation of the Communist regimes that are under the rule of Moscow.

In the last strategy pillar of NSDD 32, Reagan authorized U.S. aid to Solidarity for the explicit purposes of creating clandestine Polish newspapers and broadcasting operations. The primary purposes of NSDD 32 were to destabilize the Polish government through covert operations involving propaganda and organizational aid to Solidarity, economic pressure, and diplomatic isolation of the Communist regime. In a 1982 speech at Westminster Parliament, Reagan dreamed up the idea of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and outlined, with hindsight, what should eventually become the cornerstone of American democracy promotion ever since: “to foster the system of free press, unions, political parties and universities” (Reagan 1982a) – everywhere. Reagan’s speech was drafted by 106

National Security Decision Document 32, May 20, 1982, source: National Archives, College Park, Maryland, declassified in 2002.

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Marc Palmer,107 who was also authoring NSDD 75. NSDD 75 called for the United States not just to coexist with the Soviet system, but to change it fundamentally.108 As enunciated in the speech, NSDD 77, drafted soon after, stipulated the “management of public diplomacy relative to national security”.109 It was the specification of the earlier approved NSDD 32. The directive puts into policyaction the promotion of democracy abroad and authorized “Project Democracy”. Project Democracy recommended special committees to be created, “for planning, coordinating and implementing international political activities in support of United States policies and interests relative to national security”.110 Among those activities are “aid, training, and organizational support for foreign governments and private groups to encourage the growth of democratic political institutions and practices”. In the same document, a direct comment is given on the challenges these efforts face with regard to Eastern Europe: these special committees “will initiate plans, programs and strategies designed to counter totalitarian ideologies and aggressive political action moves undertaken by the Soviet Union or Soviet surrogates”; in short, “to build up the U.S government capability to promote democracy”. These three presidential directives are the chain linking a clear and wellprepared policy with both the foundation of organizations such as NED and the increased spending of resources and ideas on covert operations to implement the defined goals. Many of the present day pro-democracy interventionist camp in the United States would repeatedly refer to this period of strategically developing democracy promotion in 1982 to 1983 as the most significant learning example for contemporary foreign policies (Interview Palmer)111. On a broader scale, however, other authors claim that, during the Cold War era, the United States did 107

108

109

110

111

Palmer, until today, remains one of the staunchest supporters of democratic intervention and publishes books in the tradition of the neo-conservative political wing (see Palmer 2003). See National Security Decision Document 75, January 17, 1983, source: National Archives, College Park, Maryland, declassified in 2002. National Security Decision Document 77, January 14, 1983, source: Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security, A Declassified Summary presented to the Subcommittee on International Operations of the House of Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on International Operations, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, First Session on H.R. 2915, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1984, National Archives, College Park, Maryland. National Security Decision Document 77, Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security, p. 131. On the other hand, the policy remained controversial and some cases ambiguous. For example, the Reagan administration’s global policies toward authoritarian regimes were underpinned by the Kirkpatrick Doctrine. The doctrine maintained that left regimes (Communist regimes) were incapable of reforming and the right-wing regimes offered greater hope for benign regime reforms (Dalpino 2000: 22).

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not have a global strategy to promote democracy apart from anti-Communism (Dalpino 2000: 12; Robinson 1996). Reagan’s “democratic revolution” (Smith 1994: 274) was based on the concept of “constructive engagement”112, which, in principle, meant creating a climate of confidence, and assuring American commitment to the regimes in the process of a transition to democracy. Foreign policy generally turned to local elites to effect change. The essential message was that these elites’ principal interests could be secured with American help so long as they undertook a process of political reform (Smith 1994: 284). In contrast to President Carter’s approach to the Communist world, the Reagan administration was to work for the transition through authoritarian regimes rather than against them. However, this was not always possible and made the policy dependent on political activists in a region. On the other hand, the Reagan administration did not revive the Sonnenfeldt doctrine (Shevis 1981: 32) – to advocate subsidies to East European Communist regimes as a means of stabilizing the region, and, in the long run, encouraging its emancipation from the Soviet Union.113 As a consequence, Reagan did not interfere with the AFL-CIO114’s Polish aid efforts, as the Carter administration had done previously. The official position of the Carter administration was that “these several thousands dollars [the AFL-CIO contributed to Solidarity until 1980] could do a great deal of harm” (The New York Times, 10/09/1980) to the overarching strategy of détente and the prevention of Soviet counter-reactions provoked by Solidarity.

112

113

114

The term was first used by Chester A. Crocker, assistant secretary of state in the Reagan administration, to describe the policy guidelines to be used towards apartheid regime in South Africa: “The innovative feature of constructive engagement is its insistence on serious thinking about the sequencing and interrelatedness of change. Priority ought to be given to those arenas of change that logically lead to and make possible further steps. We must avoid the trap of an indiscriminate attack on all aspects of the system – as though each were equally odious and none should be addressed first” (Crocker 1980: 346). Regarding Eastern Europe, two schools of U.S. foreign policy making existed: Dissolutionists sought to maximize the economic strain on the Soviet Union by depriving its satellites states of Western trade and finance. Through economic means, the burden on the Soviet Union was meant to cause changes to the system. Transformationists, in contrast, argued that economic modernisation may widen the differences within the Eastern bloc and emancipate the countries from imperial ties (Gordon 1987: 89). Along these lines lay also the conflict behind the controversy about Poland in the early days of Reagan administration (Haig 1984: 239). The American Federation of Labor was founded in 1886, the Congress of Industrial Organization in 1935. In 1955, both merged into the AFL-CIO.

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6.2 Poland’s Path to the Round Table Negotiations Poland’s liberalization could rely on a high organizational degree of its leading opposition members, in particular, as compared to the already in place Communist networks of labor unions. Solidarity benefited from the Roman Catholic Church’s support, but also from international support. Eventually, Solidarity became the prototype of Polish civil society. The leader of Solidarity, Lech Walesa and his circle of advisors, after being moderated by pressure and advice from the United States Department of State, managed to get invited to round table talks with the regime. These final negotiations in a long process of back and forth in terms of the regime opening resulted not only in a power sharing arrangement, but due to the strategic miscalculations of the Communists to the ousting of the regime from the state power. The narration of Poland’s path that lead to the round table negotiations in 1989 does not intend to give a comprehensive account of how the opposition movement Solidarity developed let alone of how recent Polish national history took its course. Nevertheless, outlining in brief the key stages from the birth of Solidarity to the induction of the round table negotiations provides some historical background. This section also aims at proving two essential elements of the theoretical model: first of all, that the Polish actors were interacting strategically; secondly, that the unitary actor approach with its stylization of regime and opposition also holds empirically.

6.2.1 The Birth of Solidarity, Strikes, and Martial Law, 1980-1981 When in the summer of 1980 consumer good prices rose yet again, meaning an ever lower standard of living, workers in the Baltic ship building firms decided to strike and occupy their working places.115 A simple tactical shift from earlier strikes taking place between the 1950s and the 1970s paralyzed the state: the workers reasoned that the Communist authorities could not challenge them in factories and shipyards since these represented the means of production in the Polish economy. Within a month, a nation-wide general strike swept the country, and by agreeing to certify Solidarity as a free trade union, the regime acceded to the previously unthinkable in the Communist world. On August 31, 1980 an understanding between the authorities and the Inter-factory Striking Committee in Gdansk was signed, opening the way for the birth of NSZZ Solidarno. 115

For a more detailed account of Solidarity’s origin before 1980 see Bernhard (1993). The most comprehensive bibliography on the Polish crisis up to 1986 is provided by Lakos (1987).

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Over the course of the next months, among ongoing and countless strikes, Solidarity built up an organizational strength with up to 12 million members. A national force had emerged that seriously threatened the Communist control of Poland. Under increased pressure from the Warsaw Pact, and under the – nowadays historically debated – Soviet threat to intervene militarily (Byrne, Machcewicz and Ostermann 1997; Kramer 1998; MacEachin 2002), the army under General Jaruzelski took over and imposed martial law on December 13, 1981. Solidarity was declared illegal, and nearly the entire leadership of Solidarity was imprisoned over night, including Walesa. Strikes and protests were violently suppressed. In Wujak, miners were killed by anti-riot police. At one time in 1982, more than 10,000 people (The New York Times, 11/12/1982) were detained for political reasons, charged mostly with “strike terrorism” (The New York Times, 26/01/1982). A law passed by the Sejm in October 1982 ultimately dissolved Solidarity. In what Casper and Taylor (1996: 22) term the “sorting out stage” of regime transition – after a potential democratic challenger realizes that there is an opportunity for change – Solidarity approached and assessed the positioning of the other player, the regime, by probing. The probing player could offset an unforeseen, stronger reaction than the already existing uncertainty caused by waves of strikes would not even cover, for example violent repression or civil war in the form of mobilization of the streets. Reflecting the scenario, with the example of the Polish crisis before the crackdown of Solidarity, this type of strategic setting is well understood by outside observers – in this case, by an external actor part of the game, the CIA: “It is difficult to believe, however, that in such a potentially volatile setting, and with the authority of both the party and the union diffused, such a situation can last. Miscalculations by the regime or the union could occur as either pressed its position in an attempt to probe the other side’s position”116. During the early stage of the crisis, the American ambassador in Warsaw from 1980 to 1983, Meehan, saw only a limited role the United States was able to exert on the events: “My judgment was that while there were useful things we could and should do to help the Polish reformers, we remained marginal on the basics: the power struggle in Poland itself” (Meehan 1998: 45). In equal manner, in the beginning of the strikes in 1980, a CIA national intelligence estimate describes Solidarity as an

116

Director of Central Intelligence, 1981: Poland’s Prospects Over the Next Six Months, Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 12.6-81, 30 January 1981, p. 15, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington.


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Unwieldy aggregation of 6 to 10 million Polish workers born of years of frustration and a shared sense of economic and social grievance. The average Solidarity member is probably motivated above all by the desire to improve his standard of living. His goals, improved pay and emoluments, tend to be immediate and his time horizon short117.

However, the gains from the August agreement and the ability to pressure the Communist authorities have altered the nation’s political climate. The movement no longer remained a trade union only. In its heyday before the martial law crackdown, observers emphasized that rank-and-file Solidarity “demands for general political liberalization have been notable for their absence”118 and that leaders have refrained from articulating a program of political reform. It is likely that some in the movement harbored ambitions for fundamental political changes but had them held back in order to fend off charges that Solidarity ultimately aspired to become a political opposition. The change to eventually becoming a political weight might simply be explained through Solidarity’s economic objectives resulting in demands that are essentially political. Since there is hardly any evidence, we remain in the field of speculation when crediting the external dimension for the increasing politicization of demands. However, it is reasonable to assume that the encouragement from the West and the attention with Western governments and media accelerated Solidarity’s political transformation. Some pride the workers developed in their organization partly stems from the interest the West found in the Polish developments.

6.2.2 Underground and Ostensible Stability, 1982-1988 After the imposition of martial law, a period of continued repression mixed with small steps of accommodation followed. For most of the time, but particularly in 1982, Jaruzelski followed a dual-track approach. By mid-1982 he had disposed some parts of martial law that was no longer needed and promised more concessions if society at large maintained disciplined and supported the economic reform measures introduced. In a speech on July 21, he consequently announced the lifting of the curfew, the easing of restrictions on internal travel and communications, and the release of over 1,200 internees. 400 of those were resettled in the United States (The New York Times, 05/05/1983). In 1984, a further 600 political prisoners were conditionally released. In this way, Jaruzelski intended 117 118

Director CIA (1981: 15). Director CIA (1981: 8).

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to minimize the risks of being challenged by a resurgent underground movement, to split the opposition, and also to “coax Western governments into lifting or easing their economic sanctions and Western bankers into rescheduling Poland’s debts”.119 At the same time, he did not hesitate to re-impose measures that had been lifted earlier. Neither did Jaruzelski parole the several thousand political prisoners that were jailed since December 1981 nor release Solidarity’s national leaders and advisers until 1986120; the regime further continued to detain suspected resisters and re-arrest people, among them peaceful demonstrators. The suspension of martial law in December 1982 was a means to force normalization, but did little to reduce the oppressive power of the regime. When citing one of the remaining provisions, it becomes clear that certain legislation renders civil law tougher than the earlier martial law provisions; e.g. the penal code was changed to make “preparing, collecting, keeping, carrying, sending, or distributing letters or printed leaflets, tapes, or films against basic state interests” liable to a six-month to five-year prison term (Stefanowski 1985: 169). By the end of 1982, Jaruzelski consolidated his position within the leadership, displaying “more bureaucratic savvy than we earlier attributed to him121”. He removed some hardline opponents like his reputed rival and new Foreign Minister Olszowski, and, in a move obviously intended to placate Moscow, he further removed some liberal party figures from the Communist party secretariat. Concomitantly, he placed military figures loyal to him in key administrative and party positions. Even though most of the leadership was interned, some members of the Solidarity National Commission avoided capture and soon regrouped to form a temporary coordinating commission, the TKK, announced on the clandestine Radio Solidarity on April 22, 1982 (see Lopinski, Moskit and Wilk 1990; Sabbat-Swidlicka 1983). Its four original members were said to have met at a secret location to coordinate the union’s underground activity until its elected national leaders are released from internment. All four were former regional Solidarity leaders and represented Warsaw (Bujak), Gdansk (Lis), Wroclaw (Frasyniuk), and Krakow (Hardek). The most prominent figure, Bujak122, leading his life in secret, avoided being interned until 1986. The TKK did manage to maintain some contact with the rank-and-file members through couriers, underground 119

120 121 122

Director of Central Intelligence, 1982: Poland’s Prospects Over the Next 12 to 18 Months, Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 12.6-82, 1 September 1982, p. 6, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC. Walesa was released in December 1982, but then put under house arrest. Director CIA (1982: 5). Zbigniew Bujak, one of the Solidarity leaders 1980-1981, chief in Warsaw, captured May 1986, to be released soon after during the general amnesty.


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publications, and Radio Solidarity. Bujak was handling funds for the underground and “distributing foreign support to various groups” (Schweizer 1994: 145). He maintained contact with the leaders from other regions to coordinate the general strategy. In order to deal with administrative tasks, a bureau had been established. These tasks included lining up apartments, cars, and false credentials for member of the underground. CIA informants reported in 1982 about a number of regions like Gdansk and Wroclaw, where the union organization functioned as a network of five-member clandestine cells linking large enterprises.123 However, the underground organization was marred by internal disputes, and a visible TKK strategy for challenging the regime did not emerge. Considerably the question of calling for a general strike caused controversy both within the TKK as well as between it and some of the interned Solidarity leaders and advisers (Lopinski et al. 1990). Some smaller strikes in May and August of 1982124 have even been attributed to more radical fractions of Solidarity like the Committee for National Defense or leftovers of the banned National Student Organization, thus organized entirely without consent or planning by the TKK. These internal disputes and fractionalizations would continue up to the roundtable negotiations, and, as shall be seen, is one of the features American diplomacy would attempt to influence in the course of the 1980s. An example from the repressive phase illustrates well the previously mentioned theoretical contingencies of action – in other words, with how much strategic thinking and planning the actors were involved. It concerns the question of Solidarity’s delegalization in the years following martial law. The nuances in the issue surrounding the legal status of the union highlight the interdependence of rational moves by the actors125: in contrast to what became the fate of numerous smaller organizations in the wake of martial law, Solidarity’s charter, as a matter of fact, was not formally revoked but only suspended. TKK leaders were apparently motivated by the belief that, so long as Solidarity had not entirely been delegalized, the underground should not provide the authorities with the excuse to ban the union forever. The reluctance by the TKK not to call for extended general strikes or other protest action was thus influenced by that very thinking. The strategic complexity and interdependency, however, crystallizes around the regime’s realization of the situation and its instrumentalization of the Solidarity underground’s thinking. Namely, Jaruzelski “and some of his pragmatic advi123 124

125

Director CIA (1982: 7). The regime claimed that 65,000 people took part, 4,050 persons were detained, and three demonstrators were killed (Director CIA 1982: 8). The empirical evidence for the example does not derive from interviews with the actual participants, but from lengthy discussion in the CIA national intelligence estimates cited above.

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sors”126 were apparently aware of this sentiment and it can be strongly assumed that it was the reason why the regime refrained from delegalizing the union. By the terms of an 11 September 1986 decision by Minister of Internal Affairs Kiszczak127, all political prisoners were freed. In December 1986, following the government’s announcement of an amnesty of political prisoners, the Chairman of the Council of State, Jaruzelski, created a Consultative Council. “The creation of that consultative body with very limited powers was the first halfmeasure by the authorities to broaden the scope of social dialogue within the political system created by the martial law declaration” (Machcewicz 1999). The regime’s strategy during that period was clearly one of cooptating the opposition and attempting to absorb Solidarity representatives into a façade institution. This implicit legitimization of the Jaruzelski regime was doomed to fail after the mainstream oppositionists around Walesa refused to cooperate. Walesa raised his concerns against this strategy in a letter to the Council of State, urging, “it is high time to put an end to those temporary regulations”128. In the light of the transition game, in this phase, the opposition refused cooperation with a regime offering some degree of reform. Given the “mistakes” Solidarity committed in 1981 (Michnik 1985; Walesa 1991) and the subsequent repression of the movement that led to “these seven wasted years”129, a strategy combination of confrontation and the risk of a repeated repression could, on the other hand, be considered as the one least preferred for Solidarity. However, it is more likely that the impelling strive of Solidarity for more civil and political liberties created such a situation that, if the movement were absorbed and integrated into the Communist system, it could have meant its final dissolution. In Poland, there was a historical precedent of accommodating civil society groups: Since 1957 the independent Catholic group Znak (Sign) was allowed limited independent participation in parliament. Referring to Znak, in 1985, Solidarity advisor Michnik130 highlighted the dangers of engaging with the regime: “the Znak parliamentary group offers telling evidence that concluding pacts on totalitarian basis is a step on the road from agreeing compromise to being compro126 127

128

129 130

Director CIA (1982: 8). General Czeslaw Kiszczak, Minister of the Interior (1981-1989), Prime Minster (2 Aug 1989 24 Aug 1989). Letter of Lech Walesa to the Council of State, October 2, 1985. Source: Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw (also available at Cold War International History Project, Bulletin No. 12/13). Bronislaw Geremek, qtd. in Bransten (2005: 1). Adam Michnik, historian and publicist, imprisoned 1968-1970, 1977-1980 founding member of KOR (Worker’s Defence Committee), since 1980 Solidarity advisor, and closest advisor to Walesa, imprisoned 1981-July 1984 and 1985-1987.


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mised”131. This reasonably was not preferred over a survival under repression. Moreover, this strategy would most likely have found no support with an external actor, thus depriving the opposition of valuable support, be it through diplomatic means, financing, or logistics. Why the Consultative Council failed in 1986 and yet the regime decided to seek a new understanding with the opposition in the first half of 1988 is the topic of a report prepared for the regime leadership by the so-called “experts”132, dated August 1987 and only recently declassified.133 It reads that the catastrophic economic situation and the political deadlock in which the party found itself are indicative of the regime’s shift in strategy. Furthermore, “as far as the adversary [Solidarity] is concerned, it is the calm before the storm”, and Solidarity had undertaken specific preparations in these directions. Among those preparations, the report lists energetic efforts to increase and institutionalize financial grants from the West, and that communication systems between the underground and Solidarity centers in the West are being “perfected”134. The fear of protest resulting from rising prices caused the regime in November 1987 to hold a referendum to approve price increases, as part of economic reforms and a vague opening. Solidarity urged a boycott, and the referendum failed. After the first waves of renewed strikes broke out in April and May 1988, the regime still believed in making the opposition share responsibilities through a “pro-reform coalition” or an “anti-crisis pact”135, that is, cooperation was sought, but without restructuring the system or even restoring any form of legality to Solidarity. A “pro-reform coalition” evidently refers to a shift in the regime’s preferred strategy from continuation of authoritarian rule to reform; the model’s predicted outcome of an eventual power sharing arrangement short of democracy. Under the condition that the regime would start negotiating over serious political reform, Solidarity agreed to help stopping the worker unrest and restore stability. 131

132

133

134 135

Adam Michnik 1985, Takie czasy… Rzecz o kompromisie [Such other times... Concerning Compromise], London, Aneks, p. 139, qtd. in Renwick (2006: 51). Government spokesman Jerzy Urban, Communist party secretary Stanislaw Ciosek, Interior Ministry official Gen. Wladyslaw Pozoga. [Polish Government] Report, “A Synthesis of the Domestic Situation and the West’s Activity”, Warsaw, August 28, 1987, Private Collection of Andrzej Paczkowski (also available at Cold War International History Project, Bulletin No. 12/13). [Polish Government] Report A Synthesis of the Domestic Situation and the West’s Activity. Member of the Politbureau and the Sekretariat of the Central Committee Josef Czyrek in a speech given at a founding meeting of the Polish Club of International Relations, May 11, 1988, source: Private Collection of Andrzej Stelmachowski (also available at Cold War International History Project, Bulletin No. 12/13).

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6.2.3 Induction and Negotiations of the Round Table, 1988-1989 The “inevitability thesis” (Kaminski 1999: 83) of the breakdown of Communism in Europe, when applied to Poland, produces a range of questions. Neither did the politicians or dissidents in Eastern Europe (Walesa 1991; Jaruzelski 1993; Rakowski 1995)136, nor did the experts137 predict the fall of the Communist regime in general or the scope of the agreements reached in the 1989 pact in Poland. Barring the upheaval in other parts of Eastern Europe in late 1989, the Polish Communist regime could probably have survived the two waves of strikes in 1988 without seeking to open the political system in the round table negotiations. The strikes were limited to a relatively small number of factories. In 1980, for instance, more than 700 enterprises comprised the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee while during August 1988, only five percent proved active (Kaminski 1991b: 180). The breakdown of the Polish regime ushered in with a landmark powersharing agreement between the Polish Communist government and a longoutlawed opposition movement in April and an all-but-surprising election victory of Solidarity in the June 4 and 18 Sejm and Senate elections that led to the first non-Communist government in Eastern Europe for 50 years. From the American view, the strategy towards Eastern Europe during that year was characterized by President George Bush as being one of a “responsible catalyst” (Bush 1998: 117; see also Domber 2001). While the first half year was dominated by pushing for change, after the election, the priority was to prevent Poland from plunging into chaos and restraining the actors. Apparently, it was not the present threats to political stability that triggered the reconciliation of the regime with Solidarity, but fears of the situation getting out of control in the future (Kaminski 1991b: 181). The 1988 strikes served as a warning to the ruling elite that reaching a compromise with a new generation of militant leaders (as opposed to the “self-limiting revolution” [Staniszkis 1984] from 1980) would be impossible. Based on the assumption of elite driven transitions, the Polish round table was a pacted transition, with the wider population 136

137

University of Michigan, 1999: Communism's Negotiated Collapse: The Polish Round Table, Ten Years Later. A Conference at the University of Michigan, April 7-10, 1999. English Transcript of the Conference Proceedings, trans. by Kasia Kietlinska, ed. by Donna Parmelee, The University of Michigan Center for Russian and East European Studies, Ann Arbor, MI. The transcripts contain statements by, among others, Solidarity activists Michnik, Bujak, Hall; members of the regime Prime Minister Rakowski, Ciosek, Reykowski; and U.S. Ambassador Davis. For a self-critical summary about how social scientists failed in predicting any of the outcomes from 1989 see von Beyme (1994), Lipset (2000) and Goldstone (1994).


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playing a minor role. Marciniak, a close observer of the events, argues that, within the triangle of governing elite, opposition elite, and society, it was evidently not the pressure of masses that lead to regime change, but the negotiations between the two elites (qtd. in Kaminski 1991b: 174). However, in the first move, resembling the move reform of the transition game, the Communist party did not seek any outcome of democracy, but a state resembling intermediate reform. They had different ideas when accepting Solidarity’s role in Polish society: “The initial post-strike negotiations”138 saw more of an attempt to incorporate the forces of opposition than a readiness to accept principles of pluralism or express tolerance of areas of social and political autonomy. The original offers with which the leadership persisted for some time did not embrace the possibility of free, competitive elections but offered rather an extension of reserved non-Communist representation in elected bodies (Lewis 1990b: 26). The unexpected landslide-victory for Solidarity in the June elections created a situation of highly unpredictable outcomes. As Solidarity leaders were in dispute with the Communist party PZPR for control of the office of the president and, subsequently, prime minister, a still existing, radicalized fraction of Solidarity and an euphoric public remained on the one side, while an increasingly anxious conservative wing inside the PZPR felt betrayed by the round table agreement. With unforeseeable consequences, this wing prepared for an intra-party coup against Jaruzelski and his reformist supporters. In general, within the government, the number of actors with different opinions was much smaller than compared to Solidarity. The more liberal Kwasniewski, Minister of Youth and Sports, and later succeeding Walesa as President, might have had certain ideas not consistent with Jaruzelski, but they were either never articulated or never recorded. The PZPR was, indeed, no homogenic bloc. Intense intra-party conflicts had been fought before the softliners along Jaruzelski were able to undertake new political initiatives (Lewis 1990b; Mazkow 1992). Prime Minister Rakowski139,

138

139

A first clandestine meeting on proposing roundtable talks took place on August 31, 1988 in Warsaw, with Kiszczak, Ciosek, Walesa and archbishop Dabrowski. In that meeting the “authorities” promised not to repress striking workers anymore and to annul repressive measures (Memorandum by Lech Walesa, „On Starting the Roundtable Talks“, September 4, 1988, source: Private Collection of Andrzej Stelmachowski (also available at Cold War International History Project, Bulletin No. 12/13). Solidarity advisor Stelmachowski continued to hold confidential meetings with party representatives about the start of roundtable talks all through September 1988. Mieczysaw Rakowski, Prime Minster (1988-1989).

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on the other hand, does not speak of a realistic chance of party hardliners having been able to oust the acting leadership (Rakowski 1995). On July 19, Jaruzelski won the Presidential election in the Polish Sejm by a margin of one vote. His result became only possible after seven OKP140 members deliberately turned in invalid votes. Less than two weeks before Mazowiecki’s designation as prime minister of a coalition government, the Solidarity deputies did not consider their participation in the government – much less forming the government and presenting the premier – a serious possibility. It was seen as premature and even highly risky, as Mazowiecki himself warned at the time.141 In the meantime, after Jaruzelski indicated his reluctance to accept the Presidency from the hands of Solidarity, President Bush tried to talk the very person who crushed the democratic opposition into taking office as President (Bush 1998: 117; see also Buhler 1997) – and succeeded.

6.3 Supporting Solidarity With the imposition of the 1981 martial law, the Polish regime reacted radically to the ever-rising costs to deter Solidarity from becoming a threat to its absolute power. The repression was successful. Thousands were arrested and the trade union capital was confiscated. Solidarity almost ceased to exist, and it appeared that the continuation of the regime was guaranteed with limited costs attached. In the transition game, a new stage was entered in which the opposition fought for its mere survival, causing B to have such levels that the equilibrium of authoritarian rule was very stable. At this point, however, the external actor did not only moderately support the opposition anymore. It began to punish the regime and safeguard what remained of Solidarity. The United States moved from exerting weak pressure to exerting strong pressure. Financing and supplying the underground was one element of this move. The subsequent first two chapters of this section find sufficient indicators that this form of support contributed considerably: (1) to Solidarity’s survival from 1982 to 1986, but also (2) to a degree of organizational strength and professionalism of Solidarity, what made it ever more difficult for the regime to sup140

141

On June 23, 1989, the deputies and senators of Solidarity formed a Citizens’ Parliamentary Club (OKP). Minutes of the Meeting of the Presidium of the Citizens’ Parliamentary Club [Solidarity’s parliamentary club], August 1, 1989, source: Archives of the Bureau of Senate Information and Documentation, Warsaw, also available at Cold War International History Project, Bulletin No. 12/13.

6.3 Supporting Solidarity

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press the movement further. Strategic advising (at times pressuring) the Solidarity leadership to act towards the government constitutes an additional instrument of influence (Chapter 6.3.4). For the later, the particularly well documented strategic situation of Jaruzelski’s election as President in 1989 provides a case in point and constitutes a chapter of its own.

6.3.1 Sustaining the Underground The bulk of United States support centers chiefly on financing and equipping the Polish opposition. Depending on which source consulted, between 1980 and 1989, the leadership and fractions of Solidarity received direct financing or equipping worth some ten million dollars.142 This seems minor, considering that, in 2006, only the National Endowment for Democracy spent on democracy programs alone in Iraq some nine million dollars.143 However, the sum outreaches by far the resources invested in any other Communist country at the time (Interview Simons). Itemizing the financial support and listing in detail the sums that were granted and smuggled into Poland is not meant to imply that democracy support can be simplistically measured. Disclosing financial figures about the aid Solidarity received, however, does yield the most revealing index about the weight of democracy aid (see Carothers 2004: 57). Since the effectiveness of democracy promotion programs can by no means be evaluated by the amount of money invested144, the variable can hardly be used for comparative case studies. Yet, it does provide a more exhaustive guide for a first assessment of a foreign power’s nested game move strong pressure. The narration further allows estimating the indirect effects of boosting the opposition’s morale and the direct effects of raising the regime’s costs in the domestic game arena. Evidently, in January 1982, in a secret National Security Council (NSC) meeting, the idea was raised to fund Solidarity covertly, in order for the movement to survive “the cold winter of martial law” (Schweizer 1994; see also Reagan 1982b). The covert funding continued throughout the 1980s, and the actual mechanisms of how best to assist Solidarity were based on intelligence 142

143 144

For a better estimate of the money’s value, according to Williamson (2007), $1 from 1985 is worth $1.87 in 2006 (using a Consumer Price Index). Even though these estimates should be treated with caution, it was said that, expressed in power purchase parity, in 1985, $1 in the United States was worth $100 in Poland (Heston, Summers and Aten 2006). NED Annual Report 2007, http://www.ned.org/grants/06programs/grants-mena06.html#iraq. Altough, on the contrary, this relationship is precisely what Finkel et al. (2006) analyze and base far-reaching conclusions on.

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findings from the “ground” (Interview Simons; see Cannon 1992: Ch. 14). The covert assistance was then authorized by the NSC, with the involvement of Department of State staff who reviewed these findings. As some of the key figures in the planning and implementation of the programs later told, only a few members of the NSC were informed (Schweizer 1994: xix). For establishing a chronology, two interviewees confirm that, before martial law, state sponsored support for Solidarity was in place (Interview Palmer; Interview Simons). However, other actors point in the direction that direct covert U.S. government assistance was given only after martial law was imposed. Brzezinski145 as well as Pipes146 affirms that no covert operations to support Solidarity were conducted in Poland before 1982 (Garthoff 1998: 4; Brzezinski 1983). The trade union AFL-CIO (see Chapter 6.5.3) assisted the movement ever since its evolution in early 1980 with several hundred thousand dollars (Puddington 2005: 171). Established is the fact that a few days before the military crackdown on December 13, 1981, Solidarity treasurer Pinior managed to withdraw 80 million zlotys – $940,000 at official exchange rates – from the union’s coffers. He is believed to have spent the money in the underground campaign to restore Solidarity (Buhler 1997: 652; see also Stefanowski 1985: 13). There is speculation if the money’s origin was from foreign support or from collected membership fees. Speculations are also made regarding the source of information that made Pinior know or anticipate the due announcement of martial law: Both from statements and the factual success of the operation to arrest Solidarity activists, the crackdown as such and its date was highly secret. Buhler describes that the move to hide the money in time was due to a mysterious “presentment” (Buhler 1997: 652). When in the 1990s it became public that the senior CIA supplier Colonel Kuklinski, a high-ranking Polish officer, provided sufficient information about the declaration of martial law being imminent (Weiser 2004; Lewis 1990b: 30; Tittenbrun 1993), the United States administration received widespread criticism for not having warned Solidarity beforehand. On the other hand, Kuklinski’s information could be the reason that something was leaked to Solidarity activists, causing Pinior to deduct the Solidarity money in time.147 In his memoirs, Brzezinski proudly points out that he, too, privately phoned Solidarity leaders two 145

146

147

Zbigniev Brzezinski, Polish native, National Security Advisor to President Carter and member of the National Security Council in the Reagan administration. Richard Pipes was senior Soviet and Eastern European affairs National Security Council staff officer in President Reagan’s administration in 1981. This money, as was revealed in 2004, was in the meantime hidden secretly by the Archbishop of Wroclaw (Interview Sikorski).


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weeks ahead of the crackdown, “so that they could take personal precautions so as to avoid being swooped up during the night” (Brzezinski 1983: 290).148 Sikorski speaks of other Polish regions where Solidarity sections withdrew their money from the bank before martial law (Interview Sikorski). At the point when the Jaruzelski regime started easing the repression, parts of the financial assistance shifted from the clandestine to the overt. In 1987, the United States Congress earmarked money for the Polish opposition, and the name “Solidarity” was for the first time being stipulated in an official document, confirming U.S. assistance.149 For two consecutive years, 1987-1988, $1 million were amended to the foreign operations bill.150 The Coordinating Office Abroad of Solidarity insisted on this procedure of having the word “Solidarity” included in the earmark, in order to better deflect claims of secret funding sources. The previously secret financing the Communists knew well to exploit, by painting Solidarity as being nothing else but puppets of Western intelligence agencies. Because of a strong reaction by the Jaruzelski regime, Walesa reacted quite to the opposite. He did not want to use the Congress money, but to have it put into a social fund. Eventually, among other things, ambulances were purchased. However, since he was subsequently criticized within Solidarity for not having used the money for the union work, “they [the Solidarity Coordinating Office abroad] went back to Congress, and they got a second million dollars. […] That was great! You know, we ended up with twice the money because of the division within Solidarity” (Interview Gershman).

148

149

150

At the time of Brzezinski’s (1983) publication, however, the intelligence he relied on was that a Soviet invasion into Poland was imminent, and not that a declaration of martial law would be executed by solely Polish security forces (290) – as historians of the Cold War have lately come to more and more agree upon (see Kramer 1998). United States House of Representatives, Conf. Rep. No. 475, 100th Cong., 1 Sess. at 175 (1987), Bill H.R. 3100, Amendment H.AMDT.520; and H.R. Rep. No. 283, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. at 84 (1987). In order not to affront the Polish regime too directly, the U.S. government put pressure on Congress not to spend the money directly on Solidarity. The funds should have been allocated for humanitarian aid. The so-called International Rescue Committee was set up for the very purpose of functioning as the grantee of the funding through NED. The technicalities of this earmarked money were complicated, too: the two million dollar went through the Foreign Operations budget, which left the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) the only recipient, because Congress-money had to be paid to a government agency, which NED is not. However, USAID did not want to administer this money, for the reason of not provoking strained relationships with foreign governments. They additionally refused bearing the auditive supervision, so that inter-governmental transfers needed to be explored, forwarding this money first to the United States Information Agency (USIA), which then, in a second step, granted this money to NED (Interview Plattner).

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A real figure for the total money channeled into Poland is difficult to establish. Few documents of avail have yet been declassified. Most accounts originate from personal interviews with senior officials from the time. Campbell, in the early 1980s chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to the President, is cited that, at the peak of covert operations to support Solidarity (1982 to 1984), $8 million per year were being transferred (Schweizer 1994: 76). Without naming sources, Bernstein and Politi (1997: 258) allude to the CIA having spent the same figure annually for the period between 1982 and 1983 on assisting Solidarity. The New York Times notes that, from 1985 through 1988, the United States has provided more than $5 million in cash assistance to Solidarity and other groups in Poland (The New York Times, 10/07/1988). However, the sources of this figure the journalist presents are unclear as well as what agencies are subsumed under the heading “the United States”. In a different publication, Bernstein (1997) reveals his sources as members of the Intelligence Committees of the U.S. Congress; there, he speaks of a total of $30 million in CIA aid to Solidarity in 1980s. Another figure is that from 1988-1990, the total sum of U.S. support amounts to $4.6 Million (Rachwald 1990: 89). Additionally, U.S. Department of Labor appropriations through the AFL-CIO averaged about $200,000 per year, from the creation of the Coordinating Office of Solidarnosc Abroad in 1982 through 1989 (Wasiutynski 1994)151. Based on Solidarity archives, financial help that was, in total, transferred through the Coordinating Office in Brussels accumlates to several millions dollars (see Table 9:)152. With the origin of this sum being far dominated by U.S. money, the exact sources, however, are not clear. Table 9: Year Income in U.S Dollars

Financial Aid Funneled through Solidarity Office Abroad 1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

109.800

348.700

49.500

554.400

589.700

669.000

As a separate unit, NED, one of the pillars of Reagan’s project democracy, also made considerable grants to Solidarity. In financial terms, NED granted a total151

152

Wasiutynski was staff worker of the Coordinating Office Abroad of NSZZ Solidarity in Brussels and representative of that office in the United States. Source: Office Report “Financial Aid for the NSZZ Solidarity”, 3 August 1987, Hoover Institution, Dep. III, Box 5, qtd. in Cwiek-Karpowicz and Kaczynski (2006: 53).


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ing of $6.1 million to intermediaries that funneled money or acquired equipment for the movement153. After all, in 1985, NED’s budget was slightly curtailed by the U.S. Senate. Upon this occasion, Polish government spokesperson Urban felt provoked to remark that protests from “Polish freedom fighters” about this reduction in help prove that “the underground in Poland [...], its very existence, is based on assistance from governmental sources from abroad” (The Washington Post, 2/12/1985).

6.3.2 Communications and Propaganda Besides the financial aid to sustain the underground, technical equipment and assistance were meant to guarantee Solidarity‘s survival. One tool to survive repression lies in protecting the underground opposition. A second is to confirm the very existence of resistance to both the regime and the public: “It was about getting the message out and resisting”154. Propaganda through secret publishing and the high-tech interruption of state news broadcasting often remained the only proof for Solidarity’s existence, but was also employed for the mobilization of society. Above all, the contributions from abroad were meant for Solidarity to maintain its underground printing press. Puddington (2005: 185) suggests that “western assistance financed the entire publications structure, from the printing presses to the people who operated the presses, to the journalists who wrote articles, and on down to those who distributed the publications”. Referring to foreign assistance in general, Kulerski, member of the TKK, described the role of publishing: “the printing presses we got from the West during martial law might be compared to machine guns or tanks during a war”155. The role of the vital samizdat underground publishing can be understood best when comparing it with the advantages mobile phones and the internet had in coordinating the recent democratic revolutions in the Ukraine, Georgia, or Serbia (see Aslund and McFaul 2006: 1). At the time of the strikes in 1980 and in 1988, the only way to know what was happening in other cities in Poland was through the underground press that was circulated nationwide. There was no electronic communication, and international and domestic telephone lines were commonly cut.

153 154 155

Own calculations, based on NED Annual Reports from 1984 through 1989. Interview Brzezinski, qtd. in (Bernstein 1992: 7). Interview Wiktor Kulerski, qtd. in Puddington (2005: 185).

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It is one thing to hold demonstrations, which do not incur many costs. It is a different endeavor, however, actually producing newspapers and books – with at one time 800 different underground publications – which required hard materials such as ink, materials, and printing presses. These items were short and restricted on the Polish market as well as financially unattainable. First of all, the distribution of ink, for example, was strictly regulated by the authorities (attached to the thought that private persons do not need ink); secondly, if at all available, it was, in relative terms, exceptionally expensive to purchase (Interview Potocki). At the time, devices interrupting state television and radio broadcasts were certainly high-tech equipment that by far exceeded what an opposition group in Eastern Europe would have been able to afford. Solidarity used the transmitter equipment for interrupting programs and sending messages as well as calling for strikes or demonstrations.156 On April 12, 1982, the inaugural broadcast of Radio Solidarity was heard (Michajlowicz 1982: 1; The Washington Post, 10/05/1982). On May 9, Romaszewski157 managed to broadcast a brief appeal for a general strike (The Washington Post, 10/05/1982). Radio Solidarity broadcasted for 33 seconds during which the Executive Committee of the Warsaw region of Solidarity appeals to participate in a 15-minute protest strike on May 13, calling on motorists to honk their horns for one minute at noon to mark the fifth month of martial law (Stefanowski 1985: 88). The survival of Radio Solidarity was made possible with the CIA’s funding the purchase of fifteen portable radio transmitters (Schweizer 1994: 89). Another example of how Solidarity employed the communications equipment took place in April 1985 upon an occasion that was also reported in the Western media. A video transmitter was smuggled onto the roof of a Warsaw building flashing the message “Solidarity survives” onto the TV screens of Polish viewers of the government controlled evening news (The New York Times, 24/04/1985). Both Radio Solidarity and TV Solidarity used this method, whereby both were not an actual station but “it was just an interruption of broadcasts on state frequencies” (Interview Chenoweth). They would start broadcasting their 15-minute program, interrupting the official news shows, leave the transmitter on the roof and run. It would take the authorities no less than 15 minutes to find the transmitter, however, sufficient time to have the message broadcasted.158 156

157

158

Radio Solidarity broadcasted also longer, regular programs, in particular before the East German Stasi provided technical support to the Polish secret police (Wyrwich 2007). Zbigniew Romaszewski, co-founder of the underground Radio Solidarity, imprisoned from 1982-1984. At other times, Solidarity would interrupt the television programming in the very moment the whistle of the national football championship sounded for halftime. A Solidarity banner went up the screen followed by a tape calling for resistance (Bernstein 1992).


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Transmitters that were hidden before the confiscations in the wake of the martial law crackdown were largely antiquated and of limited range. The Solidarity office abroad most likely initiated the smuggling of at least one transmitter through a Belgian citizen on behalf of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, who was arrested along with Romaszewski, the head of Radio Solidarity (The New York Times, 30/08/1982). The smuggler was alleged to have smuggled radio-transmitting equipment into Poland in a shipment of medical supplies (Stefanowski 1985: 168). Robert Gates, deputy CIA director in the 1980s, recalls how the operations to provide Solidarity with communication and media equipment progressed (Gates 1996: 451): As traditional avenues of communication became more heavily watched, we tried new approaches. One such was to use a technique for clandestine television broadcasting that we had developed earlier for use in Iran. We provided a good deal of money and equipment to the Polish underground for this – actually to take over the airwaves for a brief time. The effort was effective, and in June 1987 included the underground overriding Warsaw’s evening television news on the eve of the pope’s visit with a message urging Solidarity activists to participate in public demonstrations. In October 1988, CIA arranged the first satellite telecast into Poland from Western Europe, a ten-minute program covering recent labor unrest in Poland. We got a strong, positive reaction from Solidarity leaders.

The result of continuous support was also that “as Solidarity’s activities increased, so, too, did the aggressiveness of the Jaruzelski regime in cracking down on underground publishing and opposition activities” (Gates 1996: 450). The CIA’s expertise in covert operations was one source of aid. The underground strategies were so perfected that the TKK had established a security and intelligence bureau, which was referred to as the Bureau of Hygiene and Safety. This was the command, control, and communications unit of the underground. The communication system was in place in the fall of 1982. Security and intelligence experts, some of which were trained by the CIA in the West, checked out reports of infiltrators and penetrations by the Polish secret police. The unit maintained the secret communications equipment smuggled in by the CIA and inspected apartments to ensure they were suitable hideouts (Schweizer 1994: 145). Although the CIA did not tell Solidarity who was the source of most assistance, infiltration by the regime’s security apparatus was a constant problem. Via the Sweden-based International Polish Agency (IPA) (more to follow in Chapter 6.3.3), electronic equipment was sent that Solidarity used to scan police radio frequencies and to communicate among themselves when they were surrounded by police, or when the telephone lines were cut (Interview Chenoweth).

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This type of equipment clearly stems from CIA sources, and because IPA was also financed by NED, this could further indicate that NED-funded assistance cannot always be separated from covert programs. According to McFarlane, at the time National Security Adviser, the equipment “gave them the means of communicating with their own membership and the country at large and the means of staying in touch with each other and avoiding compromise. It was a C3I program, to give them an infrastructure of command and control”159.

6.3.3 The Logistics of External Influence Practically, the challenge to sustain Solidarity’s underground life was how to smuggle either money or goods into a police state, as Communist Poland was for most of the 1980s. This operation was described as being so sensitive that it “was handled ‘off the books’” as Pipes recalls (Schweizer 1994: 69). “No formal intelligence action was taken, it was feared it would leak. This was a highly secret operation”160. From the interview with Simons, who, at the time, had access to intelligence documentation, there is no doubt that the majority of operations to smuggle money and goods into Poland was sponsored and executed by the CIA. Among those who played a consulting role in planning the logistical operations was Brzezinski. “I got along very well with [CIA Director] Casey”, recalls Brzezinski, “he was very flexible and very imaginative and not very bureaucratic; if something needed to be done, it was done. To sustain an underground effort takes a lot in terms of supplies, networks, etc., and this is why Solidarity wasn’t crushed”.161 The money ran predominantly through a complex web of international financial institutions and private European companies that owned legitimate bank accounts in Poland (The New York Times, 10/07/1988). There were functional, security related requirements for dispersing the channels through which money and materials were smuggled into Poland. Finding conclusive empirical evidence about the covert financial, intelligence, and logistical support to Solidarity thus remains until today a difficult task. For the sole purpose of coordinating help from the West and officially representing the trade union abroad, in July 1982, the underground leadership of Solidarity, the TKK, set up on office in Brussels. In Solidarity’s own words:

159 160 161

Qtd. in Schweizer (1994: 87). Qtd. in Schweizer (1994: 69). Qtd. in Bernstein (1992).


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The Temporary Coordinating Commission’s mandate stated that the Office will function as its foreign affairs department in representing the interests of NSZZ Solidarnos in relations with other trade unions and will coordinate the securing of material, political and moral aid162.

From early on, Solidarity realized the importance of maintaining an international “advocacy network” (see Risse et al. 1999: 29-31) and a cross-national network as a capacity for change (see Tarrow 2005). Foreign outposts of Solidarity like the Brussels office functioned as information centers for the Western media, academics, potential supporters and contributors. They also served as a clearinghouse for the circulation of ideas between the movement’s leaders and intellectuals and Western opinion-making circles, “contributing to the vibrancy of the underground cultural and political disputes” (Kubik and Ekiert 2000: 268). When it comes to the transfer of support, Brussels, however, was only one of the channels used for smuggling money and goods into Poland. The office claims that all decisions on how to spend the funds were being made by the underground leadership. Even though President Reagan personally received Milewski, the head of the Brussels office in 1985163, there is dispute about the office’s integrity. Milewski is clouded with allegations of having been an agent of the Polish secret police (SB), even having been a KGB agent (Interview Szporer). At least, the office is believed to have been infiltrated by Polish authorities (Interview Chenoweth).164 Grant making institutions estimate that some one third of the clandestine shipping was intercepted and seized. The only explanation the organizers of the shipments have for these seizures is that the Solidarity networks were infiltrated and that the head of the Brussels office was one among them. The level of infiltration by the SB went so far that some of the shipments allegedly were equipped with tracking devices, thus not being confis-

162

163

164

Press release Coordinating Office Abroad of NSZZ Solidarnosc, March 17, 1983, source: Carl Gershman private collections/National Endowment for Democracy Archive, Washington, DC. See Statement Following a Meeting with Solidarity Movement Representative Jerzy Milewski on the Situation in Poland, Ronald Reagan Presidential Archives, October 21, 1985, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/102185c.htm “Because I understood there were only two channels from Brussels: Sweden and Paris. And both of them were definitely infiltrated. Because we know this, we know this because shipments were seized. And not only did they seize shipment. In one shipment, there were tracking devices – in the printing machines. These were the machines that weren’t confiscated” (Interview Chenoweth). In 1986, a Swedish truck driver was arrested and sentenced to three years in prison for having smuggled printing equipment in the value of $300.000 (Interview Lebenbaum, qtd. in Heino 2006: 29).

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cated but exploited for tracing the secret shipping routes (Interview Chenoweth).165 For the same reason, at the AFL-CIO, Tom Kahn […], although wanting to maintain protocol, understood all of the things that might be happening, could be happening, were happening. So he supported, and by extension so did Lane Kirkland[166], independent funding, additional independent funding for underground Solidarity. And they then developed a few more channels. (Interview Chenoweth)

Much of the equipment destined for Solidarity came to Poland by ship in mismarked containers sent mainly from Sweden. They were then unloaded at Gdansk and other ports by dockers secretly working with Solidarity. Swedish labor unions played a crucial role in arranging the transshipment of goods to Poland. From the Polish harbors, the material moved to its destination in trucks and private cars driven by Solidarity sympathizers. Churches were often used as point of contact for deliveries and pickups (Bernstein 1992: 7). Other sources report of small fisher boats being used to land on the Baltic Coast harbors, where the customs offices would be subverted by Solidarity sympathizers (Interview Chenoweth). Specifically IPA, based in Lund, Sweden, coordinated and specialized in smuggling printing equipment, radio equipment and other high-tech gadgets into and out of Poland. This channel and the supporting of the Agency were recommended directly to NED by Jan Nowak, who had personally visited the Agency earlier.167 Nowak, head of Polish-American Congress, was appointed as a special consultant to advise the Reagan administration on questions relating to Solidarity.168 Lebenbaum, international coordinator for the Conference of Solidarity Support Organizations founded IPA and ran the Lund route by using a network of couriers and drivers to carry books, printing presses, ink, video equipment, photographic equipment, microfiches and microfiche readers, radios 165

166 167

168

Speculations about who was secretly cooperating with the SB and who might have been on their payroll are still a matter of some discussions. In this regard, Chenoweth associates the failure of a smuggling route the AFL-CIO endeavoured via Adrian Karatnycki (Interview Chenoweth), who, at the time, was Lane Kirkland’s assistant on Poland. There is, however, no evidence. President of the AFL-CIO, 1979-1995; see also Chapters 6.5.3 and 6.5.1. See Speech given by Nadia Diuk, Senior Program Officer NED, at the event of the 2002 NED Democracy Service Medal to Jan Nowak, http://www.ned.org/events/demservice/ demservice02b-diuk.html. Nowak says that he was not involved in organizing the covert channels into Poland, but “I was trying to get money for the secret press, illegal media, for printing presses and Xerox machines” (qtd. in Bernstein and Politi 1997: 265).


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and electronic equipment, and even self-defense aids like gas weapons169. The Lund route was additionally used to send secret correspondence between Walesa and other underground cells, while the CIA provided security coverage on these routes (Heino 1996: 27, 31).170 In an interview, Lebenbaum said he had sent 32 shipments weighing a total of 4.8 tons in 1987 alone (The New York Times, 10/07/1988). Western funds, on the advice of Solidarity activists in the West, were “directed primarily” to NOW-a, the largest underground publishing house. In January 1982, it began printing the newspaper Tygodnik Mazowsze, the voice of Solidarity in Warsaw, with a circulation of 50,000 (Kolodziej 1985: 13). The production required workers in 37 secret locations throughout the entire country (Schweizer 1994: 90). The Washington based Committee in Support of Solidarity171 would make use of innovative methods that came into play when smuggling goods into Polish territory. They would ship goods, and, for example, make packages with chocolate syrup bottles refilled with ink (Interview Haig). The AFL-CIO, too, relied on the Committee in Support of Solidarity (Puddington 2005: 182). The Committee did not make much use of the channel into Poland via the Brussels office of Solidarity Abroad or the covert operations of the CIA, but ran some additional, alternative routes, for example via Paris. Other émigré Poles ran smuggling operations from London. In London, the supply of used and therefore inexpensive printing equipment that was compatible with the standards used by Poles was abundant. Polish bus drivers would then be found for smuggling printing presses and equipment on visits of elderly Poles to their homeland (Puddington 2005: 183). Schweizer (1994: 35) reports that the smuggling of equipment involved the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, too. Mossad provided another secret channel that ran through Albania into Poland and further into the Soviet Union, expanding the CIA’s network with an additional route in and out of Poland. It appears that a contact from the Israelis was a manager at the shipyard in Gdansk, receiving shipments of communications equipment from Sweden as a part of a ship-

169

170

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“I thought it was quite okay to send that kind of things. They were no real weapons and they could give one the precious minute to get out of an underground printing house if the police found it,” Interview with Lebenbaum, qtd. in Heino (2006: 20). Lebenbaum was at one point warned by “Washington” that the Polish secret police is planning to assassinate him (Heino 1996: 31). Such information most probably stems from intelligence services. The organization was led by a Polish émigré who fled Poland after the 1968 student protests and maintained a wide range of contacts within the Solidarity structure.

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ment of machine tools for tractors and securing them for further transport before customs could intercept (1994: 87).

6.3.4 Advice and Influence on Opposition Strategy Your next task is to promote and ensure the realization of economic prosperity in Poland, to include stable growth, full employment, low inflation, high productivity and a Mercedes (or equivalent) in every garage. 172

Between 1981 and 1989, the leadership of Solidarity received strategic advice that reflected U.S. estimates about the most successful path to weaken the regime while simultaneously avoiding instability. The advice was conveyed mostly in secret, via agents operating inside Poland, American labor experts working underground, priests (Bernstein 1992), or the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw. Consulting centered on tactics of resistance and underground life (as described above) as well as the broader strategic behavior toward the regime. Empirical evidence for the later exists predominantly for the period leading up to the round table talks. While the first half year of 1989 was dominated by the Department of State pushing for change, after the election, the priority was to prevent Poland from plunging into chaos and restraining the actors. As mentioned in Chapter 6.2.3, after the Solidarity election victory, an intra-party coup against Jaruzelski and his reformist supporters could not be excluded (Rakowski 1995; Jaruzelski 1993). The Warsaw Embassy’s prior analysis of an outright Solidarity victory included the scenario of Poland plunging into a military coup d’état, or even civil war.173 Before the June elections to the Sejm and Senate, public-diplomacy efforts were directed towards pressuring the regime into a dialogue with civil society. Once Solidarity leaders found themselves in the situation in which they de facto were able to take over the government entirely, the American diplomatic channels, this time, were used to pressure Solidarity into staying in dialogue with the Communist government officials.

172

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Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger’s response to Ambassador Davis’ request for instructions after Mazowiecki was elected first non-Communist Prime Minister, qtd. in Cable from Secretary of State to Warsaw Embassy, “Ambassador’s Instructions”, August 24, 1989, Department of State. Cable from American Embassy in Warsaw to Secretary of State, “Election ’89: Solidarity’s Coming Victory: Big or Too Big?”, June 2, 1989.


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With hindsight of the unfolding events in Poland, history tends to neglect the off-stream factors shaping events. After 1989, it has received particularly little attention in Western publications that Solidarity throughout the 1980s was always split along political lines, and that the internal rift before reaching the round table agreement was only the harbinger for the final divisions of Solidarity. Mostly ignored, remained the fact that other groups not belonging to the Walesa-Geremek liberal group were a constant threat to the induction and the process of the round table negotiations. These groups regarded Walesa almost as a traitor and did not fall into the well-discussed cleavage liberal-intellectual-left versus national-catholic. The factionalism in the trade union ranks had been known from early on to the Reagan administration, a point that had repeatedly been elaborated in national intelligence estimates dating from 1981 and 1982. One such estimate reads that “the main factors which now sustain the protracted crisis – persistent union demands, factionalism and indiscipline among the union ranks”174 lead to the promotion of a particular group within Solidarity that emphasized the will to negotiate. Through urging moderation and restraint, the aim was to convince the Solidarity leadership of lowering some of its union demands and of avoiding confrontation. The Department of State was deliberately not participating in any material support or bringing in of clandestine material for Solidarity. Priority was to maintain close contacts, with both the regime and the opposition. Otherwise it could have brought Solidarity into the position where the Polish government would have been able to accuse its leadership of being Western agents, tainting Solidarity as authentic representation of domestic Polish voices. The Soviet Union and the Polish regime would have used any traceable aid to slander the movement as a prolonged arm of the CIA. One of central figures in the channels the Solidarity leadership had with U.S. officials was the American Embassy in Warsaw, and in particular the Ambassador, Davis175. From his own statements (Interview Davies), from the acknowledgments of Solidarity activists176, and from the descriptions of leading Polish Communists177, the latest by 1989, he assumed the role of close confidant and advisor to the inner circle of Solidarity. The attempts of the Department of 174 175

176 177

Director of Central Intelligence (1981: 5). John R. Davis, U.S. Embassy in Warsaw Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, 1983-1987, Ambassador 1988-1990. See Conference Communism’s Negotiated Collapse. Statements made by General Kiszczak, in: Cable from American Embassy in Warsaw to Secretary of State, “Conversation with General Kiszczak”, August 11, 1989, Department of State.

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State, during regular meetings of opposition activists inside the U.S. Embassy,178 were directed towards moderating the radicals among Solidarity and restraining the claims for the round table negotiations. The American Embassy in Warsaw maintained intensive direct contacts with the opposition. It became a “custom”179 that United States congressional delegates met with opposition leaders in the embassy. Between 1986 and 1990 “two thirds of the entire U.S. Senate came to Poland”.180 In these talks, the moderation of “the more enthusiastic” was a central element in American diplomacy. Exemplary of the United States-Solidarity exchanges are the weekly dinner parties arranged in the ambassador’s residence. Here, Solidarity activists often found their only possibilities to exchange ideas, both amongst themselves and with Americans, under the assumed conditions of the location not being bugged or of not running into risks of detention. Davis speaks of his residence as a place where the Solidarity leadership was able to have undisturbed meetings (Interview Davies): They valued this most as an opportunity to meet with each other. To get together and speak freely; we always assumed that the place was bugged, so we played music that they couldn’t hear. But in fact it wasn’t bugged as we found out later. Anyways, there was such an uproar that couldn’t be sorted without […]. So it came about that our residence became the place where Solidarity had its meetings for a lot of them. It wasn’t easy for them to get together. But they all came to our house.

Illuminating for fathoming the relevance of these gatherings, Michnik came to lunch there on his very first day out of prison in 1986.181 One aspect of these regular meetings in the embassy was, through raising public attention of certain figures, to deter the regime from arresting opposition activists (Interview Davis). The general strategy of advising Walesa was to control the more radical elements throughout 1988, as repeatedly outlined to him by Ambassador Davis. In the period leading up to the talks in 1988, the main element the Department of State used to exercise influence was to persuade the solidarity leaders – “we urged them”182 – that they could receive major concessions from the regime if only they talked to the government. President Reagan himself instructed to re-

178 179 180 181 182

John R. Davis, qtd. in Conference Communism’s Negotiated Collapse. John R. Davis, qtd. in Conference Communism’s Negotiated Collapse. John R. Davis, qtd. in Conference Communism’s Negotiated Collapse. Helen Davis, wife of U.S. Ambassador, qtd. in Conference Communism’s Negotiated Collapse. John R. Davis, qtd. in Conference Communism’s Negotiated Collapse.


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mind the close advisor to Walesa, Onyszkiewicz183, thereof while meeting him in September 1988.184 The activities of what officials called radical within Solidarity, and others merely called more critical groups, was a constant concern to the United States policy-makers. For the majority of policy-makers185, maintaining the non-violent approach and not risking putting too high pressure on the regime was of utmost importance in order to keep the dialogue with the Communists. Dialogue was regarded as the most efficient strategy for causing the Jaruzelski regime to liberalize, and ultimately render itself useless. However, referring to groups more radical than the circle around the Walesa leadership, “they had a tough time to keep them in line and to its philosophy” (Interview Davis). For both the regime and the moderate leadership of Solidarity, the main strategic task was “to neutralize radical groups within Solidarity” (Kaminski 1991b: 181). The radicals among the opposition could be assigned to young workers during the May 1988 strikes; these “wild cats’ strike” (Interview Simons) were formed by “a new generation”186, “one that carried with it a revolutionary potential” and created uncertainty as to how they could be controlled by the more senior generation of leaders. Because violence, as a matter of fact, had at moments been an option – as Davis said, “I used to say you have a lot of kids that were underground” (Interview Davis) – the embassy staff was clear in conveying the strategy to moderate to the Solidarity circles around Walesa and Geremek (Interview Davis): I had to keep telling them that our support was one hundred percent and that they must not under any circumstances ever assume that if they resort to violence they would get support […].

183 184

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Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Solidarity activist since 1980, in charge of foreign affairs. Memorandum of talking points from National Security Advisor Colin Powell to President Reagan, September 7, 1988, source: Papers of Donald P. Regan, White House Chief of Staff, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 214. During his visit, Onyszkiewicz also appeared before a U.S. Congressional Committee. He was the first Solidarity member appearing publicly in the United States, causing far-reaching grievances from the PZPR against Solidarity. Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee Czyrek would later vehemently protest against Onyszkiewicz in the preparatory talks for the round table. The case was voiced by Czyrek in a meeting with Solidarity advisor Stelmachowski (see Letter from Andrzej Stelmachowski to Lech Walesa, October 1, 1988, source: Private Collection of Andrzej Stelmachowski; also available at Cold War International History Project, Bulletin No. 12/13). Inside the White House, a group existed that believed in more radical strategies not only for changing the regime, but also for ultimately toppling the regime. It remains difficult to assess how dominant the group was; see also Chapter 6.1. PZPR central committee member Reykowski, qtd. in Osiatynski (1996: 23).

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A meeting of representatives from the main Solidarity movement around Walesa with the outside-Solidarity opposition like Fighting Solidarity187 and KPN188, (a group proclaiming Polish independence from the Soviet Union) took place in October 1988 (Machcewicz 1999: 126). This meeting “was aimed at making sure that those groups would not undermine the idea of the round table meeting and the position which Solidarity intends to take at it. It is also a fact that Solidarity representatives at that meeting were rather under attack”.189 Fighting Solidarity departed in the second half of the 1980s from the main Solidarity movement. NED made grants to Fighting Solidarity even though the underlying political decision clearly deviated from the Department of State’s political line to control the more radical elements inside the movement. “They [the U.S. Embassy staff] hated Fighting Solidarity” (Interview Chenoweth). NED senior program manager Haig admitted that, when the highly critical decision was taken to make a grant to Fighting Solidarity, strategic thinking on behalf of NED as a matter of fact played a role (Interview Haig): If Solidarity had had a single line, the Polish government would have had less incentive to enter into talks with the opposition. Therefore the threat arising from a radical group would render the circle around Walesa even more worth talking. Gershman, Director of NED, outlines the strategic thinking behind the support of less moderate Solidarity groups (Interview Gershman): At the January 1989 board meeting for Fighting Solidarity, we had at the board [AFL-CIO president] Lane Kirkland, [National Security Council member] Brzezinski, and so forth. I remember Brzezinski’s comment – and he said: ‘we don’t know how these negotiations are gonna go. They could fail. And we need a group that has the ability, if they do fail, to survive in a tough period. If they are gonna fail, the government is going to come down hard on the opposition. You would want a group like Fighting Solidarity to stay alive in that period’. […] But there was also a reason, as Brzezinski expressed at the meeting, that we should make a grant to a group like 187

188 189

Fighting Solidarity (Solidarnosc Walczaca) was a radical group with strongest support in the Kattowice and Wroclaw region, estimated membership from 2,000 to 20,000, with the objectives “to regain independence for Poland and create a democratic republic” (Pehe 1989: 21). The group thought of Walesa and his circle as showing too much willingness for compromise with the Communists. Unlike among the Solidarity leadership, demands for radical regime change were common. Confederation for an Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodlegej). Qtd. in Letter from A. Stelmachowski to Jozef Glemp, Primate of Poland, October 24, 1988, source: Private Collection of Andrzej Stelmachowski, also available at Cold War International History Project, Bulletin No. 12/13. Stelmachowski was a key advisor to Solidarity and the liaison for the preliminary talks with the Communist party on how to open the round table negotiations.


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this in this period because we don’t know how it is turning out. And we should be supporting different forces, some of which could be – I think his words were: ‘had the ability to somehow a tougher ability to survive the underground’.

The implicit strategic game was to have the moderates of each camp finding an agreement. The consequences of radical or hardline elements dominating the course could convince the moderates of the need for negotiations. In a sense, the solidarity leaders faced “grass-root pressures” (Renwick 2006: 50). They were thus, both in 1988 and during the round table in 1989, playing a two-level game in their own regard: The threat of radicalized and prolonged strikes played in the hands of the leadership to demand from the regime more than societal corporatism, and to aim for real pluralism. The nested game model predicted this possibility: The opposition is sacrificing its most preferred outcome of full democratization in the far future in exchange for cooperative agreements in the near future by steering clear of radical demands. The thinking of the American Embassy is clear – the role of threat power was an obvious tool (Interview Davis): And then came the strikes from a whole new generation. […] This was a great opportunity, because the church and Solidarity always could say: we can only stop these strikes if you will agree to sit down. We do not have the power anymore to control these people and its going be an explosion unless you are willing to sit down.

When observing the strategic situations that the United States government coshaped in the Solidarity camp, a closer look into the decision-making process for lifting most of the U.S. sanctions against Poland in 1986 is another case in itself. The most rewarding way of enacting the lifting of sanctions would have been if Walesa had come out beforehand to publicly demand the very same. That, in turn, could have been utilized for making Reagan change his personal, undetermined opinion on the matter, and convincing other branches of government that opposed the lifting of sanctions (Interview Simons). For once, Walesa was convinced to do so. He could expect to find himself in the position to take credit for the lifting. The maneuvering coincides with Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead being on an official visit to Poland in 1986, the first visit of a highranking member of government since the declaration of martial law, during which he also met with Walesa (Interview Simons). The splits inside the Solidarity leadership highlight that Walesa did change his strategy as a consequence of the United States involvement. Both the TKK, the underground Solidarity council headed by Bujak, and the Solidarity regional commissions did not at all times regard Walesa as the undisputed leader of the movement. Most of the underground leadership believed in the sanctions as a tool for breaking the regime. Walesa, however, stood under American pressure to

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endorse publicly the administration’s decision to lift the sanctions, and the TKK was subsequently threatening to oppose openly some of the shifts he performed under the Department of State’s influence. Under the risk of confronting a majority of the movement, Walesa ultimately gave his support to the lifting. Close observers of the United States-Solidarity interaction would portray the exchanges U.S. officials had with the Solidarity leadership as exerting pressure by linking the continuation of support for Solidarity with Walesa aligning with the American position on lifting sanctions (see Puddington 2005: 180). Chenoweth, one of the main organizers of Solidarity support in Washington, has the theory that Walesa’s changing his mind about publicly supporting the lifting of sanctions was connected with the two million dollars earmarked by the U.S. congress, which followed soon afterwards (Interview Chenoweth). Romaszewski, another Solidarity leader, recalls that, at this moment, Walesa prepared two letters: one supporting the maintaining of sanctions and the other calling for the lifting (Puddington 2005: 180). Where did the power to influence come from? What Ambassador Davis termed only as “making clear” where the United States support would end, Chenoweth describes the act of diplomacy differently: “Bribery – by Bribery or threat. Basically, ‘if you don’t go along with this, we are going to cut off the money for Solidarity’. That was the basic threat” (Interview Chenoweth).

6.3.5 How to Elect Jaruzelski without Voting for him? A “rather stunning example of the type of close, advisory position the [U.S] ambassador had earned within Solidarity” (Domber 2001: 4) was the critical situation after the June 1989 parliamentary elections. The round table agreement from April foresaw an implicit agreement that Jaruzelski would be president for the coming six years. With the unexpected defeat of the regime’s coalition in elections and the expected defections of several Communist-coalition deputies, Jaruzelski could only unite the necessary votes for the presidency in the National Assembly (combined Senate and Sejm) with Solidarity legislators either voting for him or abstaining. Concerns were also raising high due to a possible radicalization among the population; voter turn out was low, and the public disregarded Walesa’s plea to accept the Communists’ National List190.

190

The National List was a ticket of high-ranking Communists who ran unopposed in their constituencies. The only requirement in order to be elected was to combine the absolute majority of votes.


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Would Jaruzelski not be elected president, Solidarity leaders were convinced that “there is a genuine danger of civil war, ending, in most scenarios, with a reluctant but brutal Soviet intervention”191. In communication protocols between the PZPR and the Church, Kiszczak is recorded having said that if Jaruzelski “was not elected president then we would be facing a further destabilization and the whole process of political transformation would have to end. No other president would be [listened to] in the security forces and in the army”192. Politbureau members told the U.S. Embassy “military and militia officers indicated that they would feel personally threatened if Jaruzelski were not president and would move to overturn the Round-Table and election results”193. The potential scenarios are important for understanding the impact of strategy advice. The counterfactual reasoning that, after the round table negotiations and the successful June elections, a backlash into authoritarianism was still possible is not entirely implausible.194 Close observers of the Polish developments in 1989 like Brzezinski came to similar reasoning, namely that a repressive backlash could by no means be excluded.195 The U.S. ambassador did not only lobby strongly for Jaruzelski to be elected president. Because “they are very reluctant to vote for him and are receptive to suggestions on how the task might be managed without them having to do so”196, he, furthermore, gave close advice on how to implement technically the voting. Davis suggested how to vote for Jaruzelski without Solidarity legislators losing face in front of their constituencies and, at the same time, preventing a confrontation with the hardliners in the PZPR or with the Soviet Union. The American Embassy cabled on June 23, 1989 to Washington, DC: 191

192 193

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195 196

Opinion of an unknown Solidarity leader that was raised in a communication with the U.S. Embassy, qtd. in Cable from American Embassy in Warsaw to Secretary of State, “Election ‘89: Solidarity’s Victory Raises Questions”, June 6, 1989, Department of State. qtd. in Blanton and Byrne (1999: 20). Cable from American Embassy in Warsaw to Secretary of State, „Politbureau Member warns that U.S. has been ‚Dragged into the War’ over Election of Jaruzelski as President“, June 16, 1989, Department of State. A prominent example is the Algerian elections in 1990. Algeria’s regime closed down the democratic experiment after the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was close to winning the absolute majority in the parliamentary elections in June 1990. By 1992, the FIS was banned and its leadership arrested (Quandt 1998). The country fell into a period of violence. Quandt (1998: 39) demonstrates conclusively how the Algerian civil society believed that the regime was very unlikely to suppress violently the populace, in particular, once the regime had already agreed to free elections. See Interview Gershman on page 210. Cable from American Embassy in Warsaw to Secretary of State, “How to elect Jaruzelski without voting for him, and will he run?”, June 23, 1989, Department of State.

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I had dinner last night with some leading Solidarity legislators who had better remain nameless, and jotted down a few numbers for them on the back of an embassy matchbook. I also reviewed for them an arcane western political practice known as head-counting. […] Ergo, if a large number of Solidarity Senators and Sejm deputies are ill or otherwise unable to attend the election session, there will still be a quorum and one in which the government coalition majority is so great that only a truly major defection from party discipline could prevent Jaruzelski’s election. […] My interlocutors left for home saying that the numbers were indeed interesting […].197

The second complication surrounding the head counting for Jaruzelski’s election to president was General’s personal reluctance to run at all. If he were to miss the necessary votes, he would have had to accept yet another humiliation after his reform wing was defeated in the Sejm elections. A close aide to Jaruzelski is recorded having said, “he will not creep into the presidency”198. The fear was widespread among both reformers in the party and in Solidarity, and certainly had merits to it, that if Jaruzelski was not to become elected president, the party hardliners would not much longer watch the election experiment199. Even worse, Soviet hardliners would not forgive Gorbachev allowing a Communist Party to be crushed in such way (see also Chapter 7.5.2). The situation was overshadowed by the upcoming visit of President Bush to Poland in July. In a later interview, Kiszczak is cited having said that, as a matter of fact, under the very influence of Bush’s visit Jaruzelski later on ran as presidential candidate (Buhler 1997). One of the main purposes of Bush’s trip, says Kiszczak, was to convince Jaruzelski to run for president. Then Prime Minister Rakowski provides a similar view about the effect of Bush’s visit (Rakowski 1995: 330-332). Rakowski further believed that the timing of the visit – it was the White House’s prerogative – was very well chosen, in the midst of talks about both forming a government and choosing a president. President Bush confirms in his memoirs (Bush 1998: 117): 197

198

199

Cable from American Embassy in Warsaw to Secretary of State, “How to elect Jaruzelski without voting for him, and will he run?”, June 23, 1989, Department of State. It has to be said, though, that Ambassador Davis believed to have had relatively free hands during the first half of 1989, and that, in his personal assessment, he had not been instructed very much in detail by Washington (Interview Davis); see also Conference Communism’s Negotiated Collapse and Domber (2001). A “close aid” of Jaruzelski as qtd in Cable from American Embassy in Warsaw to Secretary of State, “How to elect Jaruzelski without voting for him, and will he run?”, 23, 1989, Department of State. An indication of the tensed atmosphere was the murder of a Reverend who was closely linked with Solidarity. It created the suspicion that party hardliners and security forces were involved and that the murder was to torpedo an understanding between the authorities and the opposition (Machcewicz 1999: 128).


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Jaruzelski opened his heart and asked me what role I thought he should now play. He told me of his reluctance to run for president and his desire to avoid a political tug-of-war that Poland did not need. I told him his refusal to run might inadvertently lead to serious instability and I urged him to reconsider. It was ironic: Here was an American president trying to persuade a senior Communist leader to run for office.200

Jaruzelski himself describes the encounter with Bush and confirms “[…] I certainly believe that the appreciation he offered to me facilitated my election to the Presidency [own translation]” (Jaruzelski 1993: 335). On the other hand, the suspicion among leaders of the Communist party about the Department of States’ close ties with Solidarity leaders ran deeply. In a meeting with the U.S. Ambassador on August 11, 1989, General Kiszczak, who was initially meant to become prime minister201, “strongly hinted that ‘everyone in Poland’ assumes Solidarity is acting under Western orders or influence”202, and that the U.S. government had inspired Solidarity’s latest tactical moves. He continues that “the opinion is widespread in Poland, almost universally, that the opposition receives its principal support and financing and its orders from the West”.203 As a side note, the regime was aware of the fact that, in the up-run to the elections, the AFL-CIO handed over to Geremek, during a visit in the United States, $100,000 in cash to smuggle into the country for Solidarity’s election campaign.204 The topic of the conversation, however, was Kiszczak – implicitly – seeking that the United States take advantage of its good contacts with the Solidarity leadership and discourage Walesa from forming an overly Solidarity dominated government instead of a coalition-government with a PZPR prime minister. Since Walesa did indeed deviate from earlier made, more conciliatory, statements with regard to forming an all-inclusive government205, to later with200

201

202

203

204 205

To adjust the argument, however, U.S. ambassador Davis believes the actual effects this conversation had are a matter of interpretation (Domber 2001: 5). The implicit agreement that both the prime minister and the president were to be nominated from the PZPR ranks started to be questioned by Solidarity leaders around early July. In Rakowski’s opinion, the incising move was a publication by Michnik on July 3 in the Gazeta Wyborcza, titled “Your President, Our Prime Minister” (Rakowski 1995: 329). Cable from American Embassy in Warsaw to Secretary of State, “Conversation with General Kiszczak”, August 11, 1989. Cable from American Embassy in Warsaw to Secretary of State, “Conversation with General Kiszczak”, August 11, 1989. Interview with Geremek, qtd. in Puddington (2005: 189). As Davis reports, Geremek called Walesa’s temporary intention to form a government without the PZPR “too aggressive and dangerously threatening”, qtd. in Cable from the American Em-

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draw his position again, one can only speculate on how far the U.S. ambassador Davis’ role as mediator went in the eventually successful formation of the government. In the meantime, Secretary of State Baker cabled to Davis “to do what you can with the Solidarity leadership, including Walesa, to emphasize to them our view of the importance of maintaining a dialogue with government officials”206. Nonetheless, the very fact of politburo member Kiszczak, who was seeking the premiership, protesting to and consulting an U.S. Ambassador about Solidarity’s plans for forming a government, is in itself indicative of the United States’ role in this late stage of the political liberalization game.

6.4 Pressuring the Jaruzelski Regime While the history of U.S. support to Solidarity provides ample material for studying the mechanisms of supporting a suppressed civil society, the history of U.S. diplomacy toward the Jaruzelski regime offers less in terms of scope and detail. The leverage of pressuring the regime directly cannot be underestimated, however. Since a sanctions regime belongs rather to the policy instrument of public diplomacy, tracing the terms of external influence is greatly facilitated. This section firstly describes the political strategy of the United States behind imposing sanctions and then moves to outline historically what these consisted of. A more formal evaluation of the effect the sanctions had on the Polish regime’s cost to sustain their power follows within the general discussion of the model in Chapter 7.1.

6.4.1 Sanctions as Policy Instrument On a diplomatic, state to state level, the United States instruments to raise the Polish regime’s cost to sustain its authoritarian rule can be limited to two: (1) public diplomacy condemning the regime and internationalizing the Polish crises surrounding Solidarity; and (2) exerting pressure by imposing sanctions. The latter is obviously more effective than the former in causing a change in policy and behavior. As discussed, for moving an authoritarian regime towards democratic reform, sanctions can either perform a punitive function (the stick) or,

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bassy to Secretary of State, “Bronislaw Geremek explains next Steps toward a Solidarity government”, August 19, 1989, Department of State. Cable from Secretary of State to Warsaw Embassy, “Solidarity-Government Dialogue”, August 12, 1989.

6.4 Pressuring the Jaruzelski Regime

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through attaching conditionalities to their lifting, create positive incentives (the carrot). As will be subsequently shown, (1) in their application on the Jaruzelski regime, stick and carrot can become virtually the same, and (2) the incentivebased ending of sanctions proved more effective for the United States to its policy goals than the actual implementation (see also Dorussen and Mo 2001). 207 The general sanctions debate cannot provide much guidance in estimating the influence of the U.S. sanctions, because the importance of sanctions as a tool of statecraft is largely discussed as a result of its threat power (Drezner 2003: 654; Baldwin 2000). In the Polish case, there was no threat to impose sanctions. They were purely punitive and a posteriori. Poland’s economic ties with the United States were generally closer than of any other East European country. The total volume of U.S.-Polish economic transactions in 1980 amounted to $7.5 billion, dropping to $1 billion in 1983 (Rachwald 1990: 53, 118). Moreover, until martial law, it was official U.S. policy, based on the Sonnenfeldt doctrine, to reduce Poland’s dependence on the Soviet Union through economic aid; as the August 1980 agreement with Solidarity was viewed in Washington as a step towards Poland’s emancipation, the regime was rewarded with particularly generous credit packages. Still, by the end of 1981, the United States was trying to encourage dialogue between the regime and Solidarity by postponing 90 percent of Poland’s financial obligation due the same year. With its heavy borrowing from Western banks in the first half of the 1970s, Brown (2000: 7) summarizes what described the Polish situation in the aftermath of martial law: Poland exacerbated its economic problems and found itself more dependent both on the West, to which it was indebted, and on the USSR, which was prepared to bail it out at a political price – the price of greater regime responsiveness to Soviet political pressures.

Coming under increased control of the Soviet Union, throughout the 1980s, was for the leading Polish Communists an option as hard to bear as their dependence on Western credits (Rakowski 1995). Through public diplomacy, a special feature of Polish history was, to some extent, “side-accounted” for (Rachwald 1990: 64): The international isolation of the regime after imposing martial law was also

207

Compared to the amount of research on the effectiveness of sanctions, scant attention has been paid in the literature on the effect of how and when sanctions end. Dorussen and Mo (2001) is an exception. It argues that governments clearly obtain political gains from the opportunities for side payments that are provided by sanctions.

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meant to frustrate Jaruzelski, who was always ambitious to shake off the image of a Soviet general in Polish uniform (see Jaruzelski 1993: 266).208 Possibly the most significant goal of the Jaruzelski government after the proclamation of martial law was the lifting and abolition of economic sanctions directed against Poland by the United States (Paczkowski 2003: 127). In addition to the covert funding of Solidarity, the Reagan administration was trying to pull the levers of its diplomatic service to link the survival of Solidarity with economic benefits for the Polish regime. The sanctions were also coordinated with the Special Operations209 division of the CIA, because, shortly after martial law, the first objective was to keep Solidarity alive by supplying money and equipment.210 By further internationalizing the Polish affairs and reserving the use of additional economic measures, the Reagan administration intended to restrain the regime from formally delegalizing Solidarity. With sanctions in place after the December 1981 martial law, the aim was a step-by-step strategy of concessions and benefits ultimately being connected to the Polish regime fulfilling in return any of the United States political preconditions. Administration officials communicated frequently in public that, for every condition met by the Poles, the U.S. had set forth, “something can be done by the U.S.” (The New York Times, 11/12/1982). Under martial law and during the post-martial law period, the United States had two public and overt objectives: (1) punitive sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union to apply economic pressure to the entire Soviet bloc211, (2) using the economic leverage to press the Polish regime toward moderation and dialogue (Rachwald 1990: 64). The leverage was intentionally meant to consist of the carrot and stick approach (Interview Simons). The objective to offer incentives when the Polish regime changed its policy was exemplified by the U.S. deciding against declaring the country bankrupt in 1982. This measure was being discussed but was finally discarded: With the payment of millions in interest to U.S. banks which had earlier made government-guaranteed loans to Poland

208

209 210 211

During a TV-interview in December 1982, it was U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger who called Jaruzelski “a Russian general wearing a Polish uniform” (Stefanowski 1985: 138). The Division of Special Operations supervises the covert task forces. Richard Pipes, qtd. in (Bernstein 1992). In a special NATO meeting on the Polish crisis in January 1982 in Brussels, however, the United States could not convince the allies of their position: unconditional sanctions on both Poland and the Soviet Union. After a “major controversy” (Interview Simons), the compromise was reached that each country could individually decide on which sanctions to apply and whether or not to support the American imposed sanctions.


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(Congressional Record, 09/10/1982), a clear signal was sent that relations were not beyond repair. More specifically, the conditionality of the U.S. sanctions regimes hinged upon the Polish Communist regime’s fulfillment of three demands: (1) dialogue with civil society, that is, with Solidarity and the Church; (2) the release of political prisoners; (3) and the legalization of Solidarity; On the national level and in comparison to the political conditionality often attached to foreign aid in non-democratic countries – demanding a general respect of human rights – these were rather specific conditions. This aim was operationalized at the National Security Council by making continuous comparisons of moves undertaken by the regime and responses available for lifting specific sanctions212. The description of this scheme in a graphically maintained matrix (see Schweizer 1994: 121) reminds of a scientific enterprise to establish variance on a dependent variable. In deciding about the list of sanctions, the priority was not to “go very far down the list” (Interview Palmer) and risk cutting off all relations with the Jaruzelski regime. The political and diplomatic presence in Poland could thereby be continued and “would allow us in addition to the sort of normal diplomatic things to support Solidarity” (Interview Palmer).

6.4.2 The Post-Martial Law Sanctions Regime The United States political and economic sanctions, introduced two weeks after martial law, were first announced in a letter by Reagan to Brezhnev, December 22, 1981. The sanctions included the suspension and termination of numerous bilateral agreements. Among those were (The New York Times, 22/07/1984; 11/12/1982; Rachwald 1990: 60): 212

denial of most-favored-nation (MFN) status for tariffs on Polish exports to the United States; ban on commercial flights to the United States; Polish fishing rights in U.S. coastal waters; U.S. government-guaranteed credits; ban on credits for food and other commodity purchases; Interview with Roger Robinson, NSC staffer, qtd. in Schweizer (1994: 121).

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Export-Import Bank and other credits; refusal to support Poland’s admission to the IMF; and curbs on American-financed scientific exchanges with Poland.

Only the withdrawal of Polish fishing rights in American waters, one of the less severe sanctions, is estimated to have resulted in a loss of $20 million annually (The New York Times, 13/03/1982). The decline in grain and fodder imports is estimated to have caused a shortfall of 350,000 tons of poultry in Polish markets in 1982, nearly destroying the entire industry (Jaruzelski 1993: 296). By July 1983, a decision in the wake of a more general policy was taken to link the relaxation of two specific sanctions to the release of prisoners. A few months before another round of political amnesty, the Reagan administration told the Polish regime “that if substantial numbers of political prisoners were released, the United States would agree to join with […] the Paris Club, to consider rescheduling Poland’s outstanding debt to Western nations” (The New York Times, 13/07/1983). The move would allow Poland to become eligible again for Western loans. By further internationalizing the Polish affairs and reserving the use of additional economic measures, the Reagan administration intended unsuccessfully to restrain the regime from formally delegalizing Solidarity. Shortly before Solidarity was eventually dissolved and declared illegal in October 1982, Polish trade union minister Ciosek admitted that the choice was between legalizing Solidarity and “finding $28 billion [Poland’s foreign debt]” (The Times, London, 16/02/1982). Two weeks after the Polish decision to abolish Solidarity, reserve measures were taken to counteract the regime’s steps to repress the movement any further: Reagan suspended Poland’s most-favored-nation status, which increased import tariffs by 300-400% (Rachwald 1990: 71). Estimates speak of about $40 million costs a year for Poland in lost sales because of higher tariffs (The New York Times, 30/10/1982; Gordon 1987: 126, Fn 74). After Walesa was released from prison in November 1983, a statement by Reagan was meant to raise the possibility of an easing of sanctions; he said that such moves would lead the United States to take “equally significant and concrete actions of our own” (The New York Times, 11/12/1982). In July 1984, the toughest sanctions were still in force: bans on U.S. commodity, Export-Import Bank and other credits, denial of MFN status for tariffs on Polish exports to the United States, and the prohibition of regularly scheduled Polish airline flights to the United States (The New York Times, 22/07/1984). 213 213

See also Draft letter by President Reagan to Brezhnev, Papers of Donald P. Regan, White House Chief of Staff, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 214.


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The direct effect of sanctions is minimal, however, compared to the economic ramifications that came from Poland’s inability to raise new credits. An investment decision of not supplying new loans is strongly related to Poland’s poor credit rating. All the more, when the United States’ decided to withhold any new loans, any Western bank or government became hesitant to issue new credits to Poland. The overall debts of the Polish government to the West can be pinpointed at $25.5 billion in the early 1980s (The New York Times, 13/03/1982). Out of this, in 1986, $21 billion were owed to the United States alone (Interview Simons), climbing to $39.2 billion in 1989, with great difficulties to repay any credit or interests.214 The 1986 release of 255 political prisoners can be seen as a direct cause of the credit talks with the European Community and the United States, and the apparent hope of lifting economic sanctions further (The New York Times, 22/09/1986). After the general amnesty from late 1986 and after Solidarity’s going aboveground and announcing so in a public press conference, speculations circulated in the White House that a renewed crackdown was due. Jaruzelski relented, then, only because of the desperate need for credits, that is, lifting of the sanctions (Schweizer 1994: 266). Schweizer speculates that, had not “the Reagan administration negotiated for the survival of the opposition by using American sanctions, the crackdown of Solidarity might very well have succeeded” (Schweizer 1994: 283). Eventually, during Vice-President Bush’s visit to Poland in September 1987, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern Europe Simons made it clear what the talking points between Bush and Jaruzelski were: “Then we went, I and the NSC staff did the talking points, and those were the talking points he used with Jaruzelski. If there is continued political liberalization, there will be economic benefits” (Interview Simons). One of the sanctions to hit the regime hardest, the revocation of the most-favored nation status, was restored in 1987. On the side, but in close association with economic benefits, diffusion effects of democracy assistance came into play as initiator for the 1988 negotiations. In the 1980s, American Fulbright scholarships were granted not only to academics but also to young PZPR party activists (Interview Richmond; Richmond 2003). Cwiek-Karpowicz and Kaczynski (2006: 28) argue that the effect of the scholarship program was “one of the most recognizable instances of Western influence upon the round table talks” because members of the Communist apparatus would see and internalize the “positive effects of the future systemic 214

With regard to foreign credit borrowing, before 1980, Poland could borrow up to $8 billion annually; in 1981, it received $4.9 billion, $1.1 billion in 1982, $560 million in 1983 and $300 million in 1984 (Rachwald 1990: 119).

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transformation in Poland”. Through their experience in the U.S., Polish government officials were approaching Solidarity’s economic reform ideas. The example reconnects the structural external factor of socialization with democratic values with the agency approach of democracy promotion. An effect was instrumentalized by the U.S. accelerating its long-term consequences.

6.5 Sub-Actors and Mechanisms of Democracy Promotion in Poland Under the conceptually same unitary actor, not only the U.S. administration itself can be subsumed. As with any subset of domestic policy-making, the actions of the American government, with regard to foreign policy, result from interests and behavior of many different groups and organizations. The same applies to formulating national security goals, which is central when discussing the United States actions towards the Communist world. Department of State, Department of Defense, the CIA, or White House officials, and, in general, presidential “advisory systems” (Mitchell 2005: 34), all seek influence over what finally the President comes to decide as national strategy (see Halperin 2006: 26). In their effort to assist the Polish opposition and react effectively to the Polish regime’s moves, various government branches and the non-government community alike required coordination. They are an integral part in understanding, in general, the mechanisms of democracy promotion, and, in particular, how a foreign power’s move in the nested game is configured.

6.5.1

National Endowment for Democracy

President Reagan’s speech before Westminster Parliament was the onset for the U.S. Congress in 1983 calling for the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). As mentioned, the institutional and budgetary arrangements foreseen through the Reagan administration’s “Project Democracy” envisaged the founding of NED. NED was not only influential in financing Solidarity. At least in its early days, it had also a history of being an integral part of a wellcoordinated U.S. effort to professionalize external democracy promotion. When observing the non-governmental activities inside Poland, often informal networks performed the role of grounding the decision-making process, and NED played a role herein, too. After the CIA had to a great extent lost its role as the only U.S. actor providing democracy assistance by the 1970s – for reasons of transparency and after embarrassing publications about which kind of private institutions had been

6.5 Sub-Actors and Mechanisms of Democracy Promotion in Poland

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supported –, a new foreign policy institution was required. The statutories of USAID ruled out any aid to politically active groups. On the other hand, the AFL-CIO did have a long history of assisting free institutions in foreign countries (internationally promoting free trade unionism and pluralism), but could both in scope, finances, and for political reasons not step in as a substitute for the prior CIA activities in that field. A new model was needed.215 With the creation of NED in 1983, “the sugar daddy of overt operations”, American democracy promotion was transformed into a “new world of spyless coups” (Ignatius 1991: C1). After having observed how the German Politische Stiftungen (political foundations) assisted democratic party development in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, the creation of NED was inspired by the characteristics of this institutional model (Interview Gershman; see also Pinto-Duschinsky (1991).216 Apart from Kirkland having been a member of the commission responsible for NED’s creation, he lobbied strongly for Gershman to become NED’s president, because he was “sharing similar political views” and because “Lane wanted someone who understood and supported labor’s objectives” (Puddington 2005: 224). Since the AFL-CIO would be the major recipient of NED grants throughout the 1980s (the AFL-CIO receives approximately 40 percent of available funding)217, 215

216

217

Critics of NED write that it was the exposure of CIA criminal activities that prompted the shift of interventionary activities to a new organization “with a nice sounding name – The National Endowment for Democracy“. It was hoped, thus, to “to eliminate the stigma associated with CIA covert activities” (Blum 2000: 179; see also Cavell 2002). Conry (1993) criticizes the private nature of the NED institutional structure, which, as a matter of fact, is registered in the District of Columbia only, just like any other private enterprise: „The controversy surrounding NED questions the wisdom of giving a quasi-private organization the fiat to pursue what is effectively an independent foreign policy under the guise of ‘promoting democracy’”. Conry points in particular to the “the inherent contradiction of a publicly funded organization that is charged with executing foreign policy (a power expressively given to the federal government in the Constitution) yet exempt from nearly all political administrative controls”. Furthermore, Project Democracy entailed a high ranking research group which met directly with representative of the Stiftungen in Germany to learn their institutional settings (see United States General Accounting Office, 1984: Report to Senator Malcolm Wallop on the Events Leading to the Establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy, GAO/NSIAD-84121, July 6, 1984, Washington, DC). In Walter Raymond’s personal files, who served as director of International Communications and Information at the NSC from 1982 to 1987 – a “psychological warfare expert” and the administration’s “public diplomacy point man” (Parry 2004) – a special folder on the Stiftungen is until today kept classified (see Presidential Records, Walter Raymond Jr. Files, 1982-1987, Box 91165, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, California.). For a full account of NED’s history of financial management, see United States General Accounting Office, Promoting Democracy: The National Endowment for Democracy’s Management of Grant Needs Improvement, March 1991, Washington, DC; and United States Informa-

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the linkage between labor and democracy promotion is apparent (see also Conry 1993). The two institutions can, nevertheless, not be understood as identical in their foreign policy strategies. On the other hand, for comprehending the institutional arrangement of American democracy promotion, the two cannot be treated separately either. NED did not become a replacement for and ultimately did not transform the covert CIA operations for supporting democratic ideas into overt grant making for pro-democracy groups. Throughout the 1980s, NED and CIA continued to co-exist in democracy promotion efforts, and both funded, at times, the same groups – even though NED’s program directors would have pre-assessed potential overlaps, simply because “we did not want to be co-mingled with them” (Interview Haig). Curiously enough, with Gershman answering questions about the legal basis on which NED operated in Poland, a working mode comparable to intelligence services emerges: “We are not obligated to obey by the laws of a government that would not respect its own people. And that was the policy. And nobody in our government knew about that” (Interview Gershman). From a letter to NED by Jan Nowak, temporarily President of the PolishAmerican Congress, former Director of the Polish Section of Radio Free Europe (RFE), and a main activist for Solidarity in the United States, some of the mechanisms of assistance become clear218. The letter from 1984 contained detailed instructions as to how and whom in Poland to support with exactly what sum of money. The list served as one of the foundations to outline the future grants made by NED to Solidarity groups (Interview Gershman). A broad variety of American based Solidarity organizations were used for funneling the aid to yet another plethora of groups more directly linked with Solidarity. It was a general policy of NED not to directly finance underground opposition groups, since it was deemed necessary not to endanger the target groups that had already been in hiding. The employment of a diverse range of help groups, from professionalized NGOs in New York or affiliates of the AFL-CIO to private persons in France or Poland, mirrors the cell structures the TKK acquired in order to effectively protect itself from persecution. Ultimately, granting funds through a complicated system of subsidiary groups served the Polish underground’s security interests, but, even more, it covered up the NED involvement in the affair, that is, the official U.S. involvement.

218

tion Agency, Office of the Inspector General, Review of National Endowment for Democracy, Its Core Grantees and Selected Discretionary Grantees, March 31, 1993, Washington, DC. Letter by Jan Nowak to President of NED, May 31, 1984, source: Carl Gershman private collection/ National Endowment for Democracy Archive, Washington, DC.


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The discretion the NED sought was thus based on avoiding any direct grants to Polish non-legal groups, while simultaneously staying well-informed about where the money would finally be spent. Even though the budgets and documents were not public, they still remained subject to the Freedom of Information Act. As Gershman explains: We did not want to have in our files this information, because we are subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and that information could have then got into the hands of the Polish government, the people could have been arrested. So we did not want to have in our files names of people who were getting support. That is one of the reasons why it was also good to have these groups handling the grants (Interview Gershman).

The circumvention to enumerate Solidarity groups by name was accomplished through transferring grants to proxy institutions. The Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI), for example, whose very existence was to manage the grants made to the AFL-CIO, would forward the money to groups in Europe which in turn had direct links into Poland. Additionally, the language describing the purpose of the grants was deliberately kept in a clouded jargon that is typical of vague human rights project proposals. For instance, the description “support is provided to the Independent Polish Agency of Lund, Sweden, to expand its dissemination of information among democratic forces in Poland”219 meant that covert operations to smuggle printing and radio equipment through previously established CIA channels into Poland were financed.220 Was NED indeed an independent, non-governmental organization, only accountable to its bipartisan board? The Department of State was, as a matter of fact, highly critical about some of the grants NED made into Poland. As mentioned, NED made a particular grant in early 1989 to a more radical sub-group of Solidarity, of which “the state department was terrified” (Interview Gershman). This would serve as some vindicating of NED’s independence. In the same vein, however, two elements have to be considered when assessing if NED can be identified as a United States foreign policy tool. Firstly, even though the Department of State, and in particular the embassy in Warsaw, were opposing to some decisions taken by NED, the Department of State does not necessarily reflect the full scope of opinions in the executive branch. Moreover, the United States foreign policy retains a tradition of deep 219 220

National Endowment for Democracy, Annual Report 1986, p. 21. The Lund route and the CIA involvement were confirmed by several interview partners. See also Puddington (2005: 184).

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running cleavages between the Department of State and foreign policy agencies that are closer to the President. While the NSC and CIA tend to harbor most ‘hawks’, the Department of State has all but too often been criticized for its soft stand on a diverse range of foreign policy questions. That officials from the NSC took part in the initial talks in creating an organization such as NED (Interview Potocki) reflects that certain political circles mistrusted the competencies of the Department of State in certain areas. It was regarded as being too soft on supporting groups critical of dictatorial regimes (Interview Baldyga). For instance, one reason for the founding of NED and its establishing as an independent organization was that NED could be better “protected” from the influence of the Department of State. The reasons for Palmer (Interview Palmer) being that I felt very strongly that it needed to operate independent of the state department because, historically, diplomats had been too cautious about support for groups like Solidarity. And I didn’t want, and Lane Kirkland and others like […], all of us wanted to protect NED from the state department.

As for the example of NED’s grant to Fighting Solidarity, it was NSC member Brzezinski who argued strongest in favor of going ahead (Interview Gershman) with the very grant the Department of State became nervous about. Secondly, throughout the 1980s, NED coordinated its grant-making policies with the White House and the Department of State, respectively (The New York Times, 10/07/1988). There was a regular exchange of opinions with the desk officer on Poland from the political affairs office in the Department of State (Interview Haig), in particular after Congress demanded increased coordination.221 Later, then NSC member Brzezinski became an active member of the supervisory board of NED. Financial oversight of NED was executed by the United States Information Agency222 (USIA), which was the pass-through organization since Congress-appropriated money could not be transferred directly. USIA is a government agency, engaged mainly in public diplomacy, promoting American values abroad. However, NED insists on their reporting to USIA having been entirely and solely audit-related (Interview Plattner).

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See United States General Accounting Office, Statement of Joan M. McCabe, U.S. GAO, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Operations, House of Representatives on The National Endowment for Democracy’s Administration of Its Grants Program, May 14, 1986, Washington DC, p. 9. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is a separate agency, although since April 1, 1999, as stipulated by law, the USAID administrator would report to and be under the direct authority and foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State.


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Finally, as exemplified by the democratization strategy in the run up to the Polish round table, NED fitted well into a dual-track approach. When the U.S. Congress wanted to forward the granted one million dollar made available to Solidarity, the issue was raised not to interfere with the official support for the negotiation process, since the Department of State was involved in working with the Communist government. Supporting, on the one hand, Solidarity while, on the other hand, establishing relations with the Jaruzelski regime in order to convince them of dialogue could have caused frictions. With NED not being part of the government, “this was sort of a classic moment as to why we were independent” (Interview Gershman). From the Polish regime’s side, the assessment of the role NED played in Solidarity’s survival is straightforward. The Polish press embroidered upon the earlier mentioned cut in NED’s budget, claiming, “President Reagan’s Endowment has been the main, if not the sole, source of aid for the underground” (The Washington Post, 2/12/1985).

6.5.2 Waging Underground Political Warfare: The CIA The strong CIA focus on Poland remained both in the media and in historical research largely unnoticed, because, at the time support for Solidarity was intensified, other stories in Nicaragua and El Salvador were more perking and controversial. Initially, NED was set up as the overt pendant to what the CIA had done covertly before: destabilizing authoritarian regimes inimical to the U.S.223 Before NED began operating with its first funding in 1984/1985, covert operations were almost with certainty underway in Poland to assist certain groups of the Polish opposition.224 However, after NED had launched its first grants for Poland, the NED staff was keen on not “co-mingling” (Interview Haig) with CIA-operatives, thereby confirming the ongoing covert activity. This point needs emphasis since both the existing literature and most participants interviewed (by the author) – 223

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Very few publications exist on the CIA’s impact and role in supporting Solidarity. Research on primary sources such as interviews proved futile, too. Much of this chapter therefore needs to rely on the memoirs of Robert Gates (1996), the most elaborate account yet published. Gates, present U.S. Secretary of Defense, was, for most of the time throughout the 80s, deputy director of the CIA; from 1991 to 1993 he served as its director. Confronted directly about the point, Barbara Haig did neither confirm nor deny (Interview Haig). Haig can be judged to have had more insights than her position with NED would imply. Her father, Alexander Haig, served as US Secretary of State from 1981 to 1982, and as Supreme Allied Commander Europe for NATO from 1974 to 1979; Haig also recalls having met then CIA Director Casey personally.

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who commanded contacts into the Washington foreign policy circles at the time – would neither provide information nor disclose any details concerning the existence of other assistance besides the instruments originating from labor, NED, or USIA.225 Observers do state, however, that in comparison to the several million dollars NED contributed to Solidarity throughout the 1980s, a lot of CIA money must have been running parallel into Poland (Interview Potocki). Gates reveals that, of all Communist countries, the CIA was most active in Poland, mainly by providing printing equipment and other means of communication to the underground (Gates 1996: 450). For the New York Times, the U.S. Congress appropriations for Solidarity in July 1987 and December 1987 as well as the inherent public nature of these grants were unusual only for the very reason that, in the past, much of the American support was sent secretly by the CIA (The New York Times, 10/07/1988). Observers judge that the CIA would not have wanted to aide Solidarity. However, Brzezinski could have been in a position to force them simply “because he was obsessed with this issue” (Interview Fairbanks), in particular after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As Gates (1996: 237) describes: In keeping with Casey’s [then CIA director] unease, serious conversations about covert action in Poland did not begin until after the imposition of martial law. Partly, this was due to Casey’s view that Lane Kirkland and his AFL-CIO were doing a ‘first-rate’ job in Poland helping Solidarity – better, he thought, than CIA could do.

The CIA’s original reluctance to become involved more aggressively in Eastern Europe and especially in Poland over time diminished, and eventually the CIA “became more active in supporting the underground resistance movement in Poland and dissidents in other East European countries” (Gates 1996: 450). In the end, “almost everything having to do with Poland was handled outside of 225

A compelling account of a NED program officer who helped identifying groups that had not been already supported by the CIA illustrates the coordinating processes and is worth full citation: “Well, it wasn’t easy, one thing would be if something that shouldn’t be glossy and much better quality than everybody else’s, then you would have to figure out if either it was getting covert funding or it simply had enough sources of other support. Then why should it get this precious little funding. And we would tell the state department if we thought something was maybe a question. They would simply let us know whether this group needs our funding or not. There was an office at the state department, it was in the political affairs office, and they would get back to us sometimes and say: ‘ooooh, aaah, you know…’. There was never an explicit, you know, ‘that is funded by the CIA’ or anything. We did watch out for that, but nothing explicitly knowing. But I think prior to our existence, whether anything was done there, you know, with [CIA Director] Bill Casey around, you never knew what was going on […]” (Interview Haig).


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normal State Department channels and would go through [CIA Director] Casey and [National Security Advisor] Clark,” says McFarlane, who served as a deputy to both Clark and Secretary of State Haig and later as National Security Adviser to President Reagan.226 For example, Brzezinski personally received from the CIA a suitcase with 18,000$ in late 1982 (Gates 1996: 238).227 Gates was always told that the CIA had no direct link with Solidarity and that, in fact, the union did not know in specific terms what, if anything, it was getting from the CIA. At the same time, as he goes on (Gates 1996: 237): Our people thought that deniability was important for Solidarity, and so we worked through third parties or intermediaries in Western Europe. Most of what flowed out of CIA and through the intermediaries to Solidarity were printing materials, communications equipment, and other supplies for waging underground political warfare.

Most of the CIA activities were kept so secret that the principal figures behind the NGO Committee in Support of Solidarity used identical channels for smuggling goods into Poland as the CIA did, unaware, until today, of the intelligence agency’s involvement (Interview Chenoweth). The earlier mentioned smuggle route to Poland via Sweden was not only supported and kept by the AFL-CIO and the Swedish labor; apparently, with the consent and support of the Swedish government and Swedish customs officials mislabeling crates, this channel was, from 1982/1983 on, used by the CIA for the funneling of communication goods like computers and fax-machines. The attractiveness of using Swedish harbors for these operations lied in the fact that Sweden was anyhow a busy transshipment point for goods destined for the Soviet Union, that the country was neutral, and that the Gdansk harbor was geographically close. From the assessment of the internal conditions and the needs of the undergrounds structures inside Poland, the U.S. administration was well aware of some key targets for support, as a national intelligence estimate from 1982 pointed out: The underground Solidarity organization is clearly handicapped by lack of funds, by slow and cumbersome means of communication among the various units, by the fact that many of the more experienced activists have either been interned or imprisoned

226 227

Qtd. in Bernstein (1992: 8). Brzezinski declined an interview with the author, during which Gates’ claim could have been corroborated.

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[…], and by the need to maintain extreme vigilance against infiltration by the security police.228

The report continues with stating that a clear TKK strategy for challenging the regime was not yet formed, amongst other reasons, because of the operating restraints the underground cells endured. Apart from the tactics and financing of underground “political warfare”, the CIA engaged in information propaganda, too. Voice of America (VoA) was the official radio instrument of U.S. foreign public diplomacy, while Radio Free Europe (RFE) was supposed to represent independent journalism for objective news reporting. Yet Michnik attributes the CIA’s role in funding RFE as its most valuable contribution: There is one area where I really credit them [the CIA] with a huge role, and that is Western broadcasting. I have in mind Radio Free Europe, where the CIA’s role seemed obvious. Even if, in reality, it was not the CIA. These were people controlled by the CIA but very often, these were Polish patriots who used the CIA as an instrument without being an instrument in the CIA’s hands themselves (Michnik 1999: 11).

Other intelligence contributions such as a high ranking CIA informant inside General Jaruzelski’s National Defence Committee in 1981 should not be overestimated (see Lewis 1990b: 30; Garton Ash 2002: 359; Weiser 2004). With new intelligence sources recently declassified, MacEachin (2001) on the other hand describes this informant, a leading Polish military, as even having directly supported Solidarity with the help of Americans.

6.5.3 A Foreign Service of Its Own: The AFL-CIO With the case of a workers’ movement constituting the opposition in Poland, the American labor movement, represented by a trade union which has been active in international affairs since World War II, the American Federation of Labor (AFL-CIO), deserves special attention. Through the 1980s, the AFL-CIO maintained extensive direct contacts with leading personalities of Solidarity. With its charismatic head Lane Kirkland, it was at the forefront of both mobilizing support for their Polish counterpart and contributing aid. Fairbanks (Interview Fair228

Director of Central Intelligence, Poland’s Prospects Over the Next 12 to 18 Months, Special National Intelligence Estimate, Secret, 1 September 1982, p. 8, source: National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC.


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banks) might not even hyperbolize when summarizing the labor movement’s stand on foreign policy: They were militants for destroying the Soviet Empire. And they had their agents in the State Department. Because the people who worked in international labor affairs, though they were paid by the U.S. government – and they were foreign service officers […] –, they really worked for Lane Kirkland.229

The AFL-CIO demanded, for instance, much harsher sanctions against the Communist Polish regime than the U.S. administration. It went so far as to suggest that the United States should withdraw from the immensely vital CSCE (Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe) process. The AFL-CIO’s influence on the American policy towards the Solidarity movement seems far reaching (Interview Fairbanks). Gordon (1987: 97) believes that “paradoxically enough, the AFL-CIO’s influence on the foreign policy of an administration [the White House] it strongly opposes on domestic issues has been greater than that of the less well organized traders and bankers”. Throughout its history, the AFL-CIO has developed a corps of international specialists almost constituting a foreign service of its own (Gordon 1987: 97). Many of the staff who worked in the 1980s in the international affairs section nowadays fill leading position in the community of democracy promotion NGOs. The reason for the AFL-CIO’s influential role in the Washington foreignpolicy circle was twofold: an ideologically driven enthusiasm and a “moral duty” (Kahn 1982)230 to spread free, independent, and moderate trade unions on an international level; but also the existence of well-maintained contacts into branches of government (Interview Simons231; Karatnycki 1999). With particular regard to the democratization policy toward Poland, eventually yet another reason counts: “The mechanism was very simple and simplistic: the idea was Solidarity is a trade union. Therefore, AFL-CIO is the proper institution to coordinate this” (Interview Chenoweth). Since NED was made up of four core institutes, one of which represented labor, most of the money for Solidarity went to the AFL-CIO. Washington policy-makers “had a lot of respect for the AFL-CIO 229

230

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The statement, in this regard, does not reflect some personal aversion of the interviewee since Fairbanks also repeatedly stated how positively impressed he was by Kirkland and the AFLCIO’s methods and successes. Kahn was an assistant to Kirkland and called the assistance policy towards Poland after martial law a “moral duty”. In 1987, Simons, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State, had to phone ahead Kirkland when the public announcement to lift the sanctions against Poland was imminent (Interview Simons).

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as an organization, as the only organization amongst the core institutes that had experience operating abroad” (Interview Chenoweth). Although there are conflicting statements concerning the level of cooperation between the CIA and the AFL-CIO, it is not difficult to establish that both organizations were well aware of the synergy effects and had made use of each other’s resources. Starting from right after World War II, the AFL-CIO has a long and proven record of its international covert and overt operations in Western and Eastern Europe. Throughout the 1950 to the 1970s, some leading figures of U.S. international trade union assistance, such as Irving Brown, senior official in the AFL-CIO International Department, have a traceable record as CIAagents.232 Former NSC staff Poindexter recalls that, until 1986, he or CIA director Casey would meet on a regular basis with Brown to discuss the internal situation in Poland. The agenda of these meetings was “to find out what intelligence he has as to what was happening”233. The AFL-CIO was valuable to the CIA because it had direct staff going into Poland and had teams that were set up inside the country (Interview Lenard). Since the CIA thought that deniability was important for Solidarity, most covert actions were worked through third parties or intermediaries in Western Europe. Additionally, serious conversations about covert action in Poland did not begin until after the imposition of martial law, the reason being partly CIA director Casey’s view that Lane Kirkland and his AFL-CIO “were doing a ’first-rate’ job in Poland helping Solidarity – better, he [Casey] thought, than the CIA could do“ (Gates 1996: 237). However, the trade union was active before martial law, up to the degree that the Carter administration tried to persuade the AFL-CIO to cease its activities, after the Soviet Union reacted furiously at the AFL-CIO’s support for Solidarity. Participants who, in the later half of the 1980s, had access to secret documents do prove the close ties, speaking of a “quite close cooperation” (Interview Simons). After the imposition of martial law, Kirkland met with Reagan to discuss U.S. reactions (Gordon 1987: 97). Fairbanks confirms in a similar vein that the CIA assisted Solidarity through the AFL-CIO (Interview Fairbanks). U.S. 232

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For instance, American labor organization members, such as Irving Brown and Jay Lovestone, helped rebuild the German trade union DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund), with the main objective of cleaning the union’s ranks from Communists having infiltrated it. At this point, Brown and Lovestone had already been famous for their adventurous missions while serving the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) during Word War II, and, later, the CIA. Based on the descriptions of contemporary observers, their tactics involved a mix of “furious antiCommunist agitating and spy games” (Powers 2004: 102); see also Morgan (1999) and Puddington (2005). Qtd. in Schweizer (1994: 61).


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ambassador to Poland, Davis, has the assumption that “the CIA was basically financing and passing the money on to the AFL-CIO – and most of the stuff that came in, in terms of printing equipment, paper, ink, a few gadgets, bright ideas […]” (Interview Davis). In 1982, Davis was participating in a task force on Poland, in which the USIA, Department of State, White House, and AFL-CIO took part. He goes on to say (Interview Davis): “I know that the President made it pretty plain that he wanted to support Solidarity. And the AFL-CIO were willing to do it and they did it. And ‘they were able from their own funds.’ That is what we say [laughter by Davis]”. No documentation is yet available assessing the total sum of money being funneled to Solidarity by the AFL-CIO. The scope of this support can be glimpsed from several available figures: by mid-January 1981, the AFL-CIO had raised $160,000 for Solidarity, the money coming from contributions and donations (Puddington 2005: 171). Karatnycki, special assistant for international affairs at AFL-CIO and today director of Freedom House, speaks of a totality of “several million dollar” that the AFL-CIO granted in aid to the opposition between martial law and the June 1989 elections. The grants took the form of printing presses, mimeographs machines and direct financial assistance to “support thousands of activists and hundreds of clandestine anti-Communist publications” (Karatnycki 1999). Gershman speaks of some $300.000 the trade union made in grants per year to the Solidarity Abroad Office (Interview Gershman) and $100.000 per year through other channels. Puddington, close associate of Karatnycki and biographer of Kirkland, reports that over 4 million dollars were channeled to Solidarity, with an extra $500,000 being raised during martial law’s initial period by the AFL-CIO Polish worker’s fund (2005: 189); again, no documentation of the sources is provided. Through the FTUI, a special sub-chapter set up for worker movements in Eastern Europe, $1.7 million were additionally sent to Solidarity using NED grants.

6.5.4 Department of State and USIA The strategies on U.S. foreign policy of the main organizational sub-actors, the Department of State and the White House, have traditionally been at opposing ends when it comes to the means for achieving a particular goal. The White House would push ahead with more radical announcements and methods, while the tactics of the Department of State rather relied on dialogue and moderation. The same applies with regard to support for the Polish opposition. A clear split existed between the National Security Council and the Department of State over the goals of supporting the opposition: “If it was the State [Department], nothing

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had ever happened in Eastern Europe. There were definitely people in the White House who had the overthrow of the Communists in mind” (Interview Sikorski). Fairbanks goes so far as to say that the one million dollar earmarked by the U.S. Congress for Solidarity expressed that Congress interfered to change the executive policy by the Department of State. After the successful lobbying by more extreme groups like labor and Polish-American organizations, the money “was compensation for the bad policy of the executive branch” (Interview Fairbanks). In general, the declassified cables from the Warsaw Embassy reveal that, despite the public confrontational jargon of the White House throughout the Reagan years, the Department of State was keen on maintaining contact with their Communist counterparts. The limited discussions with the Communist key figures that were entertained by the embassy’s staff during the Cold War times would eventually prove valuable. With the events in 1989 falling head over heels, a “healthy working relationship” (Domber 2001: 2) with the PZPR enabled the United States to be extremely well informed, and, consequently, take advantage of it when pursuing American interests in Poland. The active diffusion of very particular values has been conducted for decades through RFE, the Voice of America, or other activities of USIA. Since, among the instruments and media for morale boosting and political communication they require the least costs of external democracy aid, they are most frequently employed. Hanisch (1996: 42) believes that “they dominate the international discourse” of democracy promotion among the transnational actors. In the case of Poland, the use of radio stations as democracy promotion instrument coincided with a reverse flow of information and consulting. Nowak is said to have had a high degree of influence on the Department of State, over actors like Brzezinski, and over the Polish community as such (Interview Fairbanks). The deputy assistant secretary of state Marc Palmer confirms that in the early 1980s he “relied heavily on him [Novak] for guidance on Solidarity”, and that he received Nowak in his office “almost every week I would say” (Interview Palmer). Throughout the 1980s, Brzezinski was a keen supporter of RFE. During his tenure as National Security Advisor he used his office to both enlarge the budget of RFE considerably and to cut it looser from political censor control (Brzezinski 1983: 300): I felt strongly that the Radio offered us the best means for influencing the internal political transformation of Communist systems and that more use should be made of this vital instrument. Accordingly, I pressed for larger financial support and I also used my White House office to free the Radio of excessive political control, notably from State [Department]. While the Radio should not be used to foment insurrections in the East, it should, in my judgement, serve as an instrument for the deliberate encouragement of political change.


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In the early 1980s, RFE received $100 Million annually from the federal budget (Gordon 1987: 103). In practice, the program included extensive broadcasts of underground or samizdat writings originating in the countries concerned. Individuals would comment on Polish events, and the appreciation of Solidarity’s evolution would be broadcasted. For example, the text of letters by Adam Michnik smuggled out of prison would be broadcasted promptly (see Garton Ash 2002). Baldyga (Interview Baldyga), senior officer from the second, competing U.S. sponsored radio program, VOA, administered by the USIA, says that RFE operations are entirely different. RFE was a radio operation funded by the U.S. government but denied it was funded by the U.S. government. Because you ostensibly were supposed to be an operation set up independently. But everybody knew that the money was coming from CIA. It was a CIA funded operation, or at least, coming from that side of the government. So I can imagine well that Jan Novak would be meeting with [CIA director] Casey or people from the White House. I know because they told me with Casey and other people from the White House. […] it was supposed to be an independent institution. But everybody knew its funding was coming from the U.S. government.

However, RFE would, up until the 1990s, deny that it had been funded by the U.S. government. Similarly, although abusing the radio station for sending intelligence signals was prohibited by the Voice of America charter, VOA was used for instructing and informing the Solidarity underground. Acquired American intelligence about impending crackdowns, special shipments or meeting places served as an early warning system for Solidarity, as the then VOA director Wick confirmed (qtd. in Schweizer 1994: 89). The Soviet press also raised the issue of VOA broadcasting instructions in cipher to the Polish underground (The New York Times, 26/12/1981). In conclusion, this chapter shows that, through process tracing the strategies and instruments of individual sub-actors behind democracy promotion, details can be reconstructed that improve the systemization of the factor external influence. In turn, the more mechanisms are uncovered, the better the terms of influence are described, and the more conclusive the respective and resulting effects can be estimated.

7 Correspondence between Theory and Facts

At this point, it should be possible to filter the stylized facts of the historical narrative through the lens of the strategic model and attempt to test more closely the hypotheses the theory offered. Following the analytic narrative approach, the style of analysis represents a middle ground between ideographic and nomothetic reasoning (see Bates et al. 1998: 12). At a minimum, the game-theoretic model forces us to think more carefully about how the strategic choices of the Polish regime, Solidarity, and the United States shaped the evidence we can observe. This chapter also serves as the summary of the empirical investigation into the role the United States played in the breakdown of the Polish Communist regime. We should be able to answer the question how probable the external influence of the actor United States was and what resulting effects can be observed. This second section of the empirical part is arranged as follows: At first, the external actor’s effect on the Polish Communist regime (7.1) and on Solidarity (7.2) is treated separately. The two subsequent chapters focus mainly on testing the model’s predictions about what causes the payoffs of regime and opposition to change, and as a result, how the international arena was upgraded when weighing the impact of domestic and external factors. Chapter 7.3 analyzes the mechanisms of how the external effects on the domestic actors are related to the regime’s costs to stay in power, that is, to the actors’ magnitude of payoffs. Along the different game stages that are empirically identified through the Polish historical junctures, a more comprehensive and formal assessment of the observed strategy shifts will be presented in Chapter 7.4.

7.1 Effect on Communist Regime This chapter is to determine the extent to which the Jaruzelski regime exerted restraint toward oppressing Solidarity as a result of the United States pressure and the need for the regime to restore financial relations fully. It should be possible to assess the dimension of damage incurred on the regime. Polish government spokesperson Jerzy Urban notes that, in 1985, American sanctions had


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done $15 billion damage to the Polish economy234 (qtd. in Gordon 1987: 50) – an economy that, by the end of the 1980s, would eventually have reached a gross domestic product of a developing country. Jaruzelski writes in his memoirs that “these measures were very much hurting us, cost us a lot of money, and paradoxically, pushed us into the arms of our allies in the Warsaw Pact” (Jaruzelski 1993: 296). Even though some of the sanction measures appeared to be symbolic, the Polish economy was in desperate need of hard currency so that the loss of any revenue was highly detrimental. Furthermore, there is evidence that, firstly, the U.S. sanctions were indeed costly as defined in the move strong pressure of the external actor; secondly, that the sanctions were harmful enough so that psS, the cost of suppressing the democratic opposition in the FPG, started exceeding the cost of tolerating. Thereby the value B/2 is being approached, at which level the Polish regime could be expected to realize that it gains more from accommodating the conditionalities than from holding on to arresting activists and refusing dialogue with Solidarity. It is possible to associate the most important motives for the change in preferences of the Polish regime with external actors and the financial problems of the country, which “is testified to by numerous documents” (Paczkowski 2003: 128).235 Additionally, between 1981 and 1987, the regime repeatedly demanded the sanctions to be lifted, and Jaruzelski admitted that the timing of many domestic steps (easing of martial law, release of political prisoners) was dictated by the very expectations of the U.S. lifting the sanctions early. The role of U.S. sanctions was, through Poland’s desire of lifting the sanctions, that the ending of formal martial law in 1982 was accelerated and that it helped contributing to the breadth of amnesties for political prisoners in 1984 and 1986. By July 1983, a decision in the wake of a more general policy had been taken to link the relaxation of two specific sanctions to the release of prisoners. A few months before another round of political amnesty, the Reagan administration told the Polish regime “that if substantial numbers of political prisoners were released, the United States would agree to join with […] the Paris Club, to consider rescheduling Poland’s outstanding debt to Western nations” (The New 234

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However, Jacek Kuron, “one of the most influential Solidarity advisors” (Paczkowski 2003: 143), believes the government’s official estimates were highly overblown, “presenting the Americans with a bill for everything that has gone wrong” (qtd. in The New York Times, 21/02/1987). Among those are: Note on Experiences so far with the Model of Visits by Western Politicians, Polish Foreign Ministry, September 1987, source: Archive of New Acts, Central Committee PZPR, vol. VII/285, pp. 374-385 (Paczkowski 2003: 130), and Excerpt from the Protocol of the Session of the Secretariat of the CC of the PZPR, October 19, 1987, source: Archive of New Acts, Central Committee PZPR, vol. VII/285, pp. 362-367 (Paczkowski 2003: 130).

7.1 Effect on Communist Regime

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York Times, 13/07/1983). The move would allow Poland to become again eligible for Western loans. After the conditional release of 600 political prisoners by a declaration of amnesty in July 1984, Jaruzelski “did not hide the fact that a major objective was to break out of the straitjacket of economic sanctions imposed by the West, above all by the United States“236. The first major move of relaxation to fulfill the conditionalities attached to the United States sanction regime took place in September 1986. The key issue for the United States earlier that year was indeed how to pressure and develop incentives for the regime to release the remaining political prisoners (Interview Simons). Both Polish and American observers at the time believed that the 1986 amnesty would have not occurred without the American pressures (The New York Times, 15/02/1987). Michnik, who was released from prison two weeks ahead of the amnesty, says, “if not for the U.S. sanctions I and hundreds of others would still be in prison”.237 Chenoweth, observing from the outside, comments in this way: The sanctions mechanisms and the release of the political prisoners, year after year: yes, yes. Absolutely, absolutely. It is very clear to me. And it is also very clear to me that the pressure on Jaruzelski built to the point that he had felt he had to negotiate. You know those protests in 88 were not that significant. (Interview Chenoweth)

During Vice-President Bush’s visit to Poland in September 1987, the carrot approach was articulated to Jaruzelski ever more unmistakably and straightforwardly: in exchange for political liberalization, economic relief would immediately follow. In a direct fashion, for the observer valuable proof of the Polish actors’ strategizing in the nested game, in an internal strategy report, the regime is weighing the costs to repress further with the cost of sustaining power under the impact of the sanction regime. The 1987 report prepared by the Polish foreign ministry discussed the benefits of having ended the official discouragement of visits by Western governments. Among those benefits is the creating of “closer perspectives for a normalization of finance-credit relations”238. Upon weighing those with the negative effects, the report assumes “with a great degree of probability” that those include “the stimulation and maintenance of the destructive 236 237 238

Qtd. in The New York Times (22/07/1984). Qtd. in The New York Times (27/02/1987). Qtd. from Note on Experiences so far with the Model of Visits by Western Politicians, Polish Foreign Ministry, September 1987, source: Archive of New Acts, Central Committee PZPR, vol. VII/285, pp. 374-385, Appendix to Paczkowski (2003: 130).

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activity pursued by representatives of the opposition”.239 In comparing and concluding, the report says that the international effects of allowing the meetings of the opposition with Western representatives indicate a “preponderance of the benefits”. The interpretation is clear: the need for attracting Western credits and ending the sanctions regime is valued as more pressing than the potential opposition’s mobilization of its “destructive activity”. The document is a further indicator that, in 1987, the cost ps S exceeded the cost p , thus reducing k, the weight of the isolated transition game as compared to the game of foreign pressure. An example of how closely the sanctions were connected with the releasing of opposition activists can be found in the case when the withdrawal of the United States opposition to Poland’s membership in the IMF – which had become a kind of supplementary sanction – was directly bargained against the release of several prominent dissidents (Gordon 1987: 117). These were the same individuals later taking leading roles for Solidarity in the planning of the round table. Some observers believe that Prime Minister Rakowski’s returning from a trip to the West in early 1989 and his unsuccessful efforts to raise foreign credits was decisive in leading Jaruzelski to the immediate opening of the round table talks. Reiter, observer at the round table talks and later Polish ambassador to Germany, reports the following: It was said, [prime minister] Rakowski promised Jaruzelski to render the round table unnecessary through foreign credits. […] From Germany he returned with empty hands. This was one of the reasons why Jaruzelski gave his green light for the round table. The only chance to receive support from abroad was the round table. Apparently – that is not verified –, hints from the American side had been received that a domestic opening would be honored. The fiasco of Rakowski’s efforts and the signals from abroad were probably the most important reasons for the emergence of the round table.240

Elster (1996: 5) recognizes the underlying cause for the round table in the introduction of a “modicum of democracy in exchange for social peace and foreign aid”. In Figure 11:, the individual U.S. sanctions imposed are juxtaposed with the regime’s strategy moves towards reform steps in a timeline. By virtue of graphically mapping the temporal and succinct events, a correspondence between the imposing and the lifting of sanctions with the behavior of the regime along political liberalization can be observed. Utterly, the timeline does not serve as a 239

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Qtd. in Note on Experiences so far with the Model of Visits by Western Politicians, Polish Foreign Ministry, September 1987. Qtd. in Kundigraber (1997: IV); own translation from German.

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7.1 Effect on Communist Regime

proof of causality, but it is still valuable for exploring the causal mechanisms at hand. The detailed focus on this particular mechanism of foreign pressure has the methodological side effect that it exemplifies how to create new units of observation within a small-n study. Figure 11:

Timeline Correspondence of U.S. Sanctions with Regime Moves

Moves by Polish Regime

Martial law

Delegalisation of Solidarity

Limited Amnesty for Political Prisoners

Formal End of Martial Law

1981

1982

Mild Sanctions

1983

MFN-Status suspended/ Denial of Credits GuaranteesIMF Accession

1984

Signal to Link DebtRescheduling/ Paris Club upon Release of Prisoners

General Amnesty for Political Prisoners

1985

1986

Opening of Credit Talks Withdrawal of Opposition to IMF Membership

Decision to Negotiate with Solidarity

1987

1988

MFN-Status restored

1989

Failed Foreign Credit Talks

Most Sanctions lifted

Moves by United States

Previously, having described the working of the U.S. sanctions regime, the analytic narrative about the impact of the sanctions exhibited that, in Milner’s terms (1997), the U.S. external influence on the regime’s behavior was very probable. Now, we can summarize the effects of diplomatic and economic pressure that caused the cost of suppression to rise into empirical indicators we observed. In their entirety, they allow to interpret in how far the U.S. coercive diplomacy of sanctions caused the level of k to decrease, that is, the weight of the domestic interaction in relation to the international arena. The nested game’s domestic and international arena are closely connected; it is thus not always clear how to separate the immediate change of the regime’s cost structure in the foreign pressure game from a consequent preference change of the opposition in the transition game. Solidarity certainly benefited and was able to exploit the regime’s weakness. In the end, both account for driving the overall cost of the regime to stay in power closer to the level, where leaving the intransigence equilibrium becomes only a matter of time. The observable effects of the sanctions in the Polish postmartial law era are:

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The release of political prisoners to have sanctions lifted; as a result, Solidarity’s leadership and organizational capacity strengthened; Restraining the use of force and brutality in arresting activists; The lack of credits and cumulating debts kept investors out of the country, spiraling the economic downturn; A self-enforcing and circular rise in the prices of commodities leading to renewed demonstrations that, in turn, undermined the economic reform proposals; Solidarity was able to raise its profile after calling for the lifting of sanctions in 1986; The substitute of lacking Western credits through Soviet aid strengthened an unfavorable dependence on the Soviet Union, both among regime liberalizers and the populace; The renewed dependence on the Soviet Union facilitated reconsidering the fulfilling of U.S. sanctions conditionalities.

7.2 Effect on Solidarity The Soviet Union assessed the general Western influence on Poland’s Solidarity unambiguously: “Socialism’s enemies in Poland would have ceased to exist long ago were it not for moral and material support from abroad”241. Still in 1988, the pre-Glasnost device of propaganda was used to pin the strength of Solidarity on “Western anti-Polish centers” (Times Magazine, 16/05/1988). After deducting the usual exaggerating elements of propaganda, how can the effect of support be more systematically assessed? The analytic narrative about the support for Solidarity allows to differentiate the resulting effects into how the underground was professionalized (Chapter 7.2.1) and what role morale boosting and risk played (Chapter 7.2.2). Among the effects of professionalizing, two aspects can be further subsumed: the underground publishing and a more promising strategy direction. Since Solidarity’s strategy fine-tuning had an immediate impact on the course of the transition interaction, this effect will be analyzed more closely when comparing the trajectories at critical strategic junctures in Chapter 7.4.

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Pravda (29/04/1984), qtd. in Gerrits (1990: 193).

7.2 Effect on Solidarity

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7.2.1 Professionalizing the Underground With the martial law crackdown, almost the entire infrastructure of Solidarity was confiscated. Aside from rare regional exceptions, there were no provisions made for continuing action under clandestine conditions. A Radio Free Europe report describes the organizational disorder the trade union found itself in (Kolodziej 1985: 2): The disorganization that ensued within Solidarity clearly showed that the leaders of the union were in no way prepared for the possibility of the introduction of martial law, so that in practice the entire union structure was destroyed by the internment of the great majority of those previously active as open representatives of Solidarity.

How was Solidarity able to survive? Moreover, how was it able to enter into a pact with a regime that, only a few years earlier, had nearly destroyed it? This section claims that external assistance played a significant role for the survival and capability to sustain a decisive minimum of mobilization. The technical expertise of Solidarity activists is said to have been a trademark for how well Solidarity survived the underground as well as how powerful the movement remained in the dark days of martial law (see Francisco and Lichbach 2001: 13). Here, the picture is presented that Solidarity’s original skills lead to such actions. It can be reasonably assumed that without the knowledge of external financing of opposition movements, in this case as in many other studies of opposition movements, the role of external support is widely underestimated. As outlined, Solidarity would not have been able to entertain such operations as Radio and TV Solidarity simply because they lacked the equipment. This study comes to the conclusion that nearly all of the radio and general communication equipment, as well as the printing machines and ink that were decisive in managing the underground resistance, was either financed or provided by U.S. services and money. The example has wider implications. It underlines the necessity to invest more into incorporating the international dimension. After extensive research on case related sources, area or country experts would come to empirical conclusions that rest on firmer ground. Yet the earlier mentioned reasons impede a true account of the causal mechanisms: dependence on external actors, no matter to what degree, diminishes the success and the role the transition game has for the national history. In particular during the Cold War, the Eastern European dissident movements could thus be reduced to the role of an aide in nothing more than United States global strategy to counter Soviet influence. Secondly, equipping and financing oppositions in Eastern Europe was a dangerous endeavor and was predominantly conducted in secret, with a great share of either direct involvement of intelligence

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services or clandestine paths through which public money went. Still today, accession to declassified documents as well as statements by actors is very limited.

7.2.2 Underground Press By 1985 it became apparent that the regime could not suppress the activities of Solidarity anymore. According to Karatnycki, an aid in the AFL-CIO’s campaign in Poland, more than 400 underground periodicals appeared, some of them had a circulation that exceeded 30.000; thousands of books and pamphlets were printed, and in churches and secret homes, “millions” of viewers watched documentaries produced and screened on the equipment smuggled into the country.242 The Samizdat raised the regime’s cost to control the opposition movement significantly: Together with the repeated and continuous ability of Solidarity to make use of transmitters and video equipment for interrupting TV and radio broadcasts, Brzezinski regards this media and publicity capability as the first time instance in which Communist police suppression did not succeed (qtd. in Bernstein 1992: 9). The contribution from Western sources meant above all the ability to maintain and run a vibrant underground press, even in the peak times of repression. By most accounts, it seems not exaggerated that the Western assistance and U.S. assistance in particular financed nearly the entire publications structure. This financed structure included the hardware like printing presses and ink, the salaries of people operating the presses, the journalists who contributed to the newspapers, journals, or newsletters, “and on down to those who distributed the publications” (Puddington 2005: 185). Claiming that nearly the entire illegal printing businesses were a result of the CIA’s financing and smuggling, Gates (1996) expressed his satisfaction as to what the campaign lead to: By November [1998] we were advised that nearly every factory committee in Poland had the capability to publish a newsletter and that recent labor unrest had led to increased publishing requirements that were pushing the equipment to the limit (Gates 1996: 451).

Complementary to the fact that the Samizdat printing created a public crucial for Solidarity to survive, the RFE broadcasting into Poland contributed to raising the 242

Interview with Adrian Karatnycki, qtd. in Bernstein (1992: 9).


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regime’s costs for successful repression. The reports RFE broadcasted into Poland would often consist of reading out illegal Solidarity publications or their content would be based on Solidarity opinions. As one consequence, the impact of the Solidarity Samizdat was amplified. An explanation for the increased costs of repression, however, is that RFE’s influence on policy matters became such that “it got to the point where after about [19]85, the government had to start openly responding to what they were saying” (Interview Davis) – even though, in the earlier years, RFE was attacked by the Communist regime as an American propaganda tool. With Solidarity declared illegal, its members could not perform as democratic opposition anymore. Periodic strikes proved not effective, partly because Polish society fell into apathy at some point, and partly because the members of the TKK were split over the usefulness of strikes and demonstrations. The importance of the press – what Michnik called “the living symbol of the opposition’s survival”243 – lies predominantly in the fact that it served as the sole communication link between members of the active opposition and society as such. One of the main Polish actors organizing assistance in the United States, Irena Lasota, describes the role of the press thus: The press quite simply allowed Solidarity to survive during martial law. It kept people informed. It also gave Solidarity activists a sense of unity and comradeship and a purpose. If you couldn’t write, you could contribute as a printer. If you couldn’t write or print, you could help in the distribution. For some in Poland, the only sign that Solidarity was alive came through the press. And in some regions, it was the only source of real news.244

Through its publications Solidarity proved to be alive and kept some latent mobilization and hope for the future (see also Albright 1983). The publishing activities also reminded the regime how unsuccessful it was in repressing the opposition and that sustainable peace would not be possible as long as Solidarity was illegal (Puddington 2005: 185). Decisive for what can be summarized under the term ‘professionalizing’ a democratic opposition working underground was what Solidarity advisors wrote to Walesa in 1986: “Treating Solidarity just or predominantly as an idea will weaken the chances for the future for both the trade union and the society”.245 243 244

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Qtd. from Gates (1996: 237). Interview with Irena Lasota, qtd. in Puddington (2005: 185). Lasota is a Polish émigré, who, along with Chenoweth, ran the influential U.S.-based Committee in Support of Solidarity. Letter from Cywinski, Najder and Pomian to Walesa and the TKK, January 1986, qtd. in Cwiek-Karpowicz and Kaczynski (2006: 55).

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Providing assistance was thus coordinated and centralized around a leadership, weakening the tendencies to split the opposition. The consolidation of Solidarity was the strategic aim of U.S. support. Only a consolidated opposition movement was able to employ measures and strategies that caused harm to the Jaruzelski regime.

7.2.3 Morale Boosting The rather intangible effect of democracy promotion through raising Solidarity’s morale is difficult to measure. The effect cannot easily be separated from effects deriving from the financial or the organizational external assistance. However, in the Polish case, better empirical sub-variables can be derived when the effect is translated into changing behavioral patterns and their impact on the strategies in the transition game: a sturdier resolve not to accept the regime’s continuation of rule and a heightened readiness to assume risk. Although the nested game model does not formally capture the role of risk, it is closely connected to the opposition’s resolve, thus possible to be interpreted as an external addition to Solidarity’s move power in the domestic interaction. One causal mechanism of how additional costs to the regime were incurred by the opposition’s strategy is the influence strike and prison funds of Solidarity had on the opposition’s resolve to demand political reform. Via émigré organizations in France and the U.S., aid was funneled through intellectual groups to help for political prisoners and their families (Interview Potocki). Grants allocated to the so-called social funds of Solidarity might have had the salient effect of contributing to the degree of risk an individual activist was willing to take. These grants were meant to support the families of detainees. In the 1980s, $200 could make a whole family survive for one year. If a person was arrested for political activism, his or her family would be taken care of so that other forms of support for the family were available (Interview Haig). Financial assistance also served to keep workers who were fined for participation in demonstrations out of prison, and thereby sustain them as “democratic forces” and help maintain the “refusal front”246. For further empirical examples about how external Western assistance increased the actors’ degree of risk seeking, one needs to comprehend details of 246

NED Summary of Proposal, Assistance to Polish Political Prisoners and the Intellectual Opposition, no date, attachment to letter by Jan Nowak to President of NED, May 31, 1984, source: Carl Gershman private collection/National Endowment for Democracy Archive, Washington, DC.


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life in the underground. As mentioned, the role of underground publications for keeping a suppressed movement alive and for coordination purposes cannot be underestimated: Due to the social funds, activists involved in the distribution of these illegal underground publications would know that, if for example their car would be confiscated, as did happen, the movement would be able to refund you the car (Interview Sikorski). In a similar fashion, the role of strike funds can capture what lies behind the collective action problem of individuals accepting the risk of taking oppositional demands to the streets. Earlier, it has already been described that the strike waves in 1988 by far did not attract as many demonstrators as the August strikes from 1980. The 1988 strikes were, however, of greater determination and came at a time when the Polish economy was in a critically ill condition. After years of continued failure of economic or even political reform, and with the majority of both the population and the workers thus being exhausted and politically apathetic, methods of mobilization became crucial for the Solidarity leadership. Even small-scale strikes were decisive as a threat tool the Solidarity leadership could use: ‘If you do not negotiate with us, we cannot stop these strikes’. One such method to overcome problems of collective action with the strike funds was to alleviate for strikers the loss of income incurred through either losing theirs jobs or losing the strike days’ salaries. The local Solidarity leadership was able to build up strike funds for compensating the financial sacrifices work stoppages would cause. Since the membership fees of Solidarity would by far not match the revenues collected during the time before martial law, other means had to be used for maintaining the funds. The channels were already in place: The contributions of AFL-CIO and NED were critical, and as it happened, U.S. Congress appropriated an additional $2 Million through the AFL-CIO to Solidarity in 1987 and 1988. Some observers come to the conclusion that, without the strike fund, overwhelmingly financed from NED and the AFL-CIO workers, the Polish workers would not have agreed to make the financial sacrifices that work stoppages could have caused (Puddington 2005: 188). On a more psychological level, Kubik and Ekiert (2000: 268) refer to “gestures” as significant moral support that boosted the opposition’s staying power. Among them is the refusal by U.S. actors to recognize Solidarity’s delegalization (unlike some Western European governments)247; the cultivation of connections 247

The West German government is also said to have had a poor record of supporting Solidarity (see Mazkow 1992: 275). Von Dönhoff, a prominent West German intellectual, refused to sign a letter in support of Solidarity. Her justification for the decision in the Polish émigré journal Kultura (Nr. 10/1981) exemplifies the West German political thinking: “you should not provoke the Soviet Union”; she further welcomed the fact that the “entire West”, with the excep-

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to the underground per se; the membership of Solidarity in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions; or Walesa’s Nobel Peace Prize in 1983248. In a similar vein, an internal Polish government report from August 1987 comes to the conclusion that American donations to Solidarity were meant to show “who is the master here” and that the U.S. operations were successful in making Solidarity “so sure of its power” in the underground “that it steadily extends the underground’s range of tasks”.249 Close observers agree on the role the support had for the Solidarity leadership’s stamina: “I think what was even more important than this [the financing] was the perception on the part of the underground that there are people outside, like Lane Kirkland, who were with them. He stood with them” (Interview Palmer). Plattner, who coordinated the support for Solidarity with NED, went on to say that (Interview Plattner) more important support we provided was the earlier support, in the sense of 84, 85, 86, when its fortunes were low and they might have got discouraged, abandoned things. My sense is that had, both the fact that there were bids of money coming in, but also a sense of people in the West really caring and supporting this, that it probably was important both in terms of the concrete aspects of assistance but also morale boosting.

One could further link the effect of morale boosting with the opposition’s selfconfidence when entering into negotiations with the regime. Arguably, the negotiation power of the Solidarity caused the Communist negotiators to accept deals which would have been unlikely without Solidarity’s self-confidence. The, for the regime, fatally designed election law, for instance, was not only due to the Communists acting irrationally, or due to a lack of information and expertise as suggested by Benoit (2001), but was partly created by the interaction of U.S.

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tion of “the Americans,” behaved with restrain towards the developments in Poland (qtd. in Mackow 1992: 275). With regard to West Germany’s reluctance to impose sanctions on the Jaruzelski regime after martial law, a Polish journalist was cited as saying that “they [West Germany] are more interested in [Moscow’s] pipelines and gas than in the Polish people” (The New York Times, 23/07/1984). Polish authorities would even claim that the award was clearly motivated and influenced by Western politicians (Times Magazine, 17/10/1983). [Polish Government] Report, A Synthesis of the Domestic Situation and the West’s Activity (Poland), source: Andrzej Paczkowski Papers, in: Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, Document Reader compiled for the International Conference “The End of the Cold War,” Paris, 15-17 June 2006, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.documents&doc_id =188014&group_id=187963, January 2007.

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diplomats encouraging Solidarity to push for well-balanced, but ultimately bolder demands.250 Hence the international dimension in the liberalization process is inextricably linked with the subsequent democratization. The path by which the early democratization process was entered had an effect on the speed and scope of what the regime change finally resulted in. The effects of assistance to the opposition en detail and how morale boosting can be operationalized is summarized in Table 10:. Table 10:

Empirical Indicators for Morale Boosting Morale Boosting

Risk-Seeking

250

Activists become more risk-seeking through the social funds; in case of arrest, their families would be taken care of; in case of losing the job, financial support would be paid as well as court fines for illegal activities. Money lost through cars used for smuggling samizdat being confiscated by the police could be reimbursed Underground publication proving the livelihood of the movement for passive sympathizers High-tech radio equipment allowed illegal TV and radio broadcasts proving to the general population that Solidarity is still alive The continued support during Solidarity existence as underground movement created a feeling of not being abandoned Financial aid helped the movement to conduct strikes and other actions

Resolve

Sustaining of the underground publication served as crucial means of communication and mobilization High-tech communication devices allowed the underground to coordinate and survive, to professionalize its administrative tasks The use of Voice of America for coded signals and other CIA initiatives allowed an early warning system and the sharing of intelligence about the regime’s secret police operations against the underground Funds enabled the expensive operation of hiding activists from arrest over years through the constant change of apartments and vehicles Open and public support of Solidarity raised attention in case of arrest Self-confidence permitted to introduce more far-reaching reform proposals into the negotiations

See John R. Davis, as qtd. in Conference Communism’s Negotiated Collapse.

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Roughly, the effect of morale boosting can be distinguished into contributing to more risk-seeking behavior and contributing to the opposition’s resolve when facing the regime. In concluding, Jan Nowak, one of the most insightful players in the international game to support Solidarity, can be employed for subsuming: “Without the policy of Reagan there would be no victory for Solidarity”251.

7.3 Costs of Repression The traced conjunctions of the external actor’s effect on the Communist regime and Solidarity allowed observing some causal mechanisms. At this point, a more formal examination can be completed of how useful the strategic implications and causal hypotheses derived from the nested game model are. When did the costs of repressing Solidarity exceed the costs of toleration? The following chapter is to analyze the narrative of the case study’s historic details against the background of the model’s assumptions that were derived concerning the magnitude of payoffs.

7.3.1 Impact of Opposition Assistance on the Regime’s Cost Structure For a test of the nested game model, at first, it is necessary to examine the predicted cost structures. The model’s central antecedent for a regime to surrender eventually its power is that (1) the overall cost P to rule needs to be sufficiently large, and, moreover, (2) that the level of P is the result of externally induced pressure by a foreign power. Did the United States exert strong pressure as designed in the nested game? The influence and pressures of the United States are not to be discounted, but authors such as Pipes have exaggerated their causative, as distinct from facilitating role in bringing about democratization in Eastern Europe (see Pipes 1995: 158). This claim is also reverberated by Brown (2000) and Carothers (2004). It is also not possible to subscribe to the propagandist claim of the Polish regime that “Solidarity’s political successes were attributed to activities of United States special forces inside Poland”.252 The result of the previous empirical investigation, nevertheless, confirms that the United States employed considerable means to foster democratization in the Polish crises between 1981 and 1988. 251 252

Qtd. in Bernstein and Politi (1997: 265). Qtd. in Rachwald (1990: 66).

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7.3 Costs of Repression

With regard to the effect the United States Assistance had on Solidarity, the overview in Table 11: provides a summary of how the testable implications from the model can be condensed into more focused empirical variables. Table 11:

Effect of U.S. Move Strong Pressure and Testable Implications Testable Case Implications

Effect on Solidarity

Strategy Change

For U.S. move strong pressure

For Solidarity’s behavior

Publicly announced support Official and covert contacts Continuous financing and equipping

Collective action/freerider problem reduced Motivation for underground-life/resistance Stronger demands for pluralization

Resolve

Financing and equipping Advising on subversion-strategies

General survival secured: resources and expertise for underground structures/ press and samizdat Mobilization of society (“we are alive”) Leadership structure consolidated Lobbying for international attention

Moderation and balancing of claims

Strategic advising/consulting Diplomatic pressure on opposition leadership

Leadership strengthened/ centralized influence over splitter groups Willingness to dialogue Confidence-building with regime

More riskseeking Morale boosting

Organizational coherence and professionalism

We should have been able to observe those in the empirical analysis. This is the content of the previous Chapter 7.2. Having first outlined the broader categories of what the immediate effect for the opposition meant, the case implications are

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translated into possible behavioral variables which could have caused Solidarity to change its preferences for outcomes. Recall that, in the nested game model’s equilibrium solution, the impact of the foreign pressure game on the opposition resulted in two potential effects on the preference structure: (1) an increased threat power lending credibility to demanding democratization, while simultaneously (2) recognizing when critical junctures for compromise have arisen and subsequently acquiring the virtue of moderating political claims and accepting preliminary power sharing arrangements. Which elements of the United States policy caused what effect on Solidarity’s behavior highlights some of the causal mechanisms. The policies should reflect the definitional variables for the move strong pressure in the foreign pressure game (see Chapter 4.2.3). The consequences of Solidarity’s behavior listed in the table contribute to the overall cost of repression to rise. This rise, in turn, is the cause for the foreign pressure game to gain in weight, reducing the impact of the purely domestic transition game. Figure 12:

Effect of U.S. Move on Regime’s Cost Structure

Pressure on Regime ps S

U.S.

1-k Support Solidarity

pƴ

Furthermore, the change in Solidarity’s behavior is related to an increase of the costs the regime has to spend on continuing to govern. As the external actor being embedded in the regime’s confrontation with the opposition is a feature of the nested game model, this relation can be distinguished and causes two effects:

7.3 Costs of Repression

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As Figure 12: shows, Solidarity had an impact on the Polish regime’s costs in both the foreign pressure game (psS) and the transition game (p). The U.S. support to Solidarity spreads over the two games. What is possible to observe though is that (1) the total cost P is raised through Solidarity’s testable behavior, and (2) the costs to repress are plausibly large enough to cause the regime to change its preferences, that is, to enter into reform talks and offer some form of pluralism. For the same reason, the effect the sanctions had on the regime’s cost structure is connected with Solidarity’s breakthrough at the round table talks. Intensifying the effect of sanctions, the preconditions to the aid (and the lifting of sanctions) to Poland formed a base on which the opposition was able to add demands of their own (Osiatynski 1996: 26). The strategic reasoning can go along the following lines: Based on the information Solidarity has about the intentions of the government, it decides whether to cooperate or challenge to overhaul immediately the Communist system. More specifically, the opposition did not know the extent of reforms acceptable to the party. The predicament is that, if liberalizers are not in charge of controlling the party and Solidarity follows the strategy of only demanding moderate reforms, the regime might return to this policy with repression. If, however, the reform wing in the party prevails over the hardliners, the opposition could use the opportunity and opt for limited reforms in its strategy. In short, a mutually reinforcing effect can be assumed: the economic sanctions and incentives made the party inclined to look favorably on reformers, while the support of Solidarity mobilized the movement insofar as to both acquire the role of a serious political opposition and to be successful in controlling its radical elements.

7.3.2 Timeline: Nested Costs of Authoritarianism The initial phasing of the Polish liberalization process was earlier defined as consisting of (1) the rise of Solidarity and martial law, 1980-1981; (2) life in the underground, 1982-1988; and (3) the induction and negotiations of the round table, 1988-1989. The model’s central variables that capture the interplay between foreign pressure and the rising costs to repress can be represented across a timeline, mapping the above phasing. The timeline in Figure 13: shows how the regime’s combined cost to rule is related to the role of foreign pressure. Since the model’s parameters reflect probabilities, they cannot take on absolute numbers. The purpose lies in illustrating the trend how the Polish regime’s costs of authoritarianism developed under strong U.S. pressure. The higher this cost (P) is,

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and the higher the weight of the foreign pressure game in the nested game is, the lower the weight of the transition game (k) is. Figure 13:

Timeline Nested Costs of Authoritarianism and Level of k P

k k

Nested cost of authoritarianism

0,5 k < 0,5

0

0 1980

1981 Martial Law

Solidarity rises p

1982

Underground

1988

Negotiations

1989

psS

Note: k = weight of the transition game; p = cost to repress opposition; psS = cost to sustain power under strong foreign pressure; P = total cost of authoritarian rule. The area below the line of psS represents the cumulative total of P.

During 1980, the domestically originated cost to repress the opposition (p ) was the dominant component of the overall nested cost to govern. psS, the cost deriving from U.S. democracy assistance was marginal. With the successful crushing of Solidarity, after martial law, the purely domestic cost component slightly decreased, while, at the same time, the U.S. only started to impose the sanctions regime and launched the Solidarity support. Subsequently, the underground years would have been marked by a stagnation of costs, if it had not been for the assistance to Solidarity being at its peak. The cost to sustain power under this effect continued to rise steadily. Only after renewed strikes had broken out in a variety of Polish cities, did a threat to the Communists’ rule re-emerge from predominantly domestic sources, driving up p. With the example of this rise in 1988, it becomes clear how difficult an analytical separation based on the origin of the costs remains. The strikes formed as

7.4 Strategy Shifts and Trajectories of External Influence

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a reaction to the poor domestic economic situation, which was also affected by the imposed sanctions regime. However, the timeline’s heuristic element is to demonstrate general tendencies and mechanisms from a different angle. By the end of 1988, the cumulative total costs arising from both the transition game and the foreign pressure game – the nested costs of authoritarianism – reached a level that was sufficient for the Communist regime to give up its most preferred strategy. The development of k, indicating the relative weight the U.S. democracy assistance had on the regime’s decision-making process, mirrors the scissor-like effect that the growing gap between p and psS depicts. The larger the area between p and psS grows, the stronger the downward slope the line of k takes. When, soon after martial law, the U.S. began allotting resources to Solidarity and punished the Jaruzelski government with economic sanctions, the regime’s welfare was negatively affected. Without these externally induced extra burdens, the total cost structure of the regime would have slightly sloped downwards, as the line for p indicates. Through external assistance, the nested costs stagnated. Consequently, the gradient of k’s line begins to slope downwards, because the relative weight of psS in the total, nested costs P increased. The juncture of 1988 is characterized by the external influence being largely responsible for the regime to offer serious talks to the Solidarity leadership. At this point, the level of k falls below 0.5: the domestic struggle alone is not anymore sufficient to explain the subsequent trajectory. Between the first realizations of the regime that it cannot continue to maintain its power indefinitely and the signing of the round table agreements, the weight of the foreign pressure game, in which it is caught, begins to dominate the entire nested game. k, the weight of the transition game, falls below 0.5, so that k < 0.5 as indicated on the right handed y-axis.

7.4 Strategy Shifts and Trajectories of External Influence Strategic negotiations are path dependent. In the language of game theory, they are stages in repeated games. Decisions which are made at one stage affect the moves available to the actors at later stages, as well as the longer-lasting, final outcome. The final transition outcome, then, is an outcome from one political arrangement to another, that is, a shift from one equilibrium to another (Przeworski 1992: 106). At certain historical junctures of the political liberalization process, we should be able to observe the contingencies in strategy shifts, and, from thereon, should be able to narrow down the host of causalities leading to the ultimate outcomes of regime transition. Implicit in identifying historical junc-

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tures is the attempt to create counterfactual comparisons at different points in time and thus increase the number of observations. How would the Polish liberalization have proceeded at a particular historical turning point in the absence of the external actor’s influence? This approach, in turn, implies the potential to mitigate the missing methodological step of macro-comparisons by examining frequencies of association across cases (see Fearon 1996: 48). Turning points or “critical junctures” in political development are commonly defined as “major watersheds in political life [that] establish certain directions of change and foreclose others in a way that shapes politics for years to come” (Collier 1991: 27; see also Przeworski 1992; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; O’Donnell et al. 1986). A turning point is a period that bridges two trajectories, before and after the turning point. The empirical puzzle is to identify turning points in order to compare a trajectory under external influence with a trajectory absent of external influence.253 This study defines junctures narrowly as strategy changes of the actors’ behavior and not, for example, as the commonly associated junctures such as breakthrough elections. As demonstrated, both the expected update of preferences for the Communist party and the strategy moderation of Solidarity allow the identification of turning points on the path to negotiations. Signals of reward and the external sanctioning of the players’ behavior, whose impact is difficult to observe, thus become more readily testable. In this regard, it is reasonable to assume that choices and interaction under uncertainty made the Polish actors conducive to a foreign power providing information, resources, and pressure. These tools and instruments thereby altered, (a) for the regime, the perceptions about the costs and benefits of repression, (b) for the opposition, perceptions about mobilization and what constituted successful strategies for change. Based on the empirical findings and for this section’s purpose, the phasing in the timeline of costs and foreign pressure (chapter 7.3.2) can be further adjusted along the degree of repression into: dictatorship 1981-1986, broadened dictatorship 1986-1989, and negotiated democracy from 1989 onwards. As a consequence, three critical junctures can therefore be identified: repression (1981), opening (1986), and negotiation (1988/1989). Each of these junctures

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Eisenstadt (2000), however, methodologically criticizes the reduction to studying strategic junctures of democratizations. When the researcher’s attention is limited to “critical junctures”, a blind eye is left on the extensive patterns of protracted transitions. For example, Geddes (1991), Przeworski (1991), or Bratton (1997) are criticized for searching for mid-level theoretical mechanisms by merging macro-historical patterns of change with micro-institutional steps of strategic negotiations.


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can be investigated in order to see if strategy shifts at these points resulted in trajectories caused by external influence.

7.4.1 Repression 1981 Both the short-lived moment of Solidarity’s legal recognition and the subsequent failure to agree to reforms through the imposition of martial law in 1981 were a process with a low level of U.S. influence. In order to be in a better position to compare the outcome of repression with the opening in 1986, we can first play this game stage. Consider again the non-nested transition game from Chapter 4.2.1. It becomes clear that for the Communist party and Solidarity to attain a common agreement (in the eventual case of the lower right cell) is rather unlikely. The historical initial state of the game, before Solidarity had the capacity to endanger the regime with massive strikes, was the outcome continuity;reform. The beginning of the strikes in summer 1980 can be regarded as the attempt of Solidarity to move from the right column in the matrix to the left column, from reform to democratization. That leaves the party with a payoff of 2, which it could try to improve by changing its behavior to a reformist strategy and receive a payoff of 3. In fact, the necessary withdrawal of Solidarity to adopt also a reformist, instead of a more radical, strategy was reached with the signing of the August 1980 agreement, which temporarily legalized Solidarity. However, looking again at the matrix, it can be observed that neither Solidarity nor the party had sufficient incentives to remain in that strategy. Unilateral shifts, again towards their dominant strategies, which would pay 4 respectively, are too tempting. With the arrests of thousands of Solidarity activists after December 13, 1981, the dominantstrategy equilibrium prevailed and the phase of renewed dictatorship began. With the preference order as identified above, a strategy combination allowing the opening of the path to transition seems remote.

7.4.2 Opening 1986 The year 1986 was marked by the general amnesty for political prisoners and the regime’s reluctant recognition that all attempts for economic reform were doomed to fail without public support. Still, on a political liberalization scale, the political system would clearly be categorized as authoritarian. In the eyes of participants, the changes that year were of immediate nature to the opposition’s

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future behavior. Litynski, Solidarity participant in the round table talks, explains the juncture as he saw it: The amnesty of 1986, on the other hand, was very different; it was impossible not to treat it seriously. It was certainly a major step from the government, but in what direction, actually? […] Therefore, in 1986, a major substantive discussion within Solidarity begins, and with the tactics of the government not to repress anymore, not to put people into prison.254

Another indicator is the fact that, for example, Res publica, a monthly published in the ‘second circulation’, the term used for illegal publications run by the opposition, was the same year given permission by the authorities for legal publication. This is seen as an “unprecedented move” by the authorities (Machcewicz 1999: 124). These observations are the key that connects the empirical situation in the Polish liberalization with the nested game’s change in payoff structure and with the discount factor becoming relevant: The Communist regime has changed its strategy to a more accommodative approach, but would not necessarily offer any power sharing arrangements to the opposition. The foreign pressure, however, would reduce the necessary discount factor. With continued interaction of the regime in the international arena, a trajectory including a possible democratic pact with the opposition should be observable earlier. Before discussing how the Polish regime discounted the future at this turning point, the concept’s further antecedents need to be addressed. For the model’s temporal dimension to have meaning, the assumption was that the frequency of interaction (r) between regime and opposition on the one hand, and between regime and foreign power on the other hand is asymmetrical. Looking for the numbers of encounters, it is indeed obvious that the Jaruzelski regime exchanged more moves and signals with Solidarity than with any of the measures taken by the United States. In the real world of Polish conflict, the formalization of interactions into an iteration of games is difficult to achieve. The empirical effect of either imposed sanctions or particular elements of support to Solidarity is more characterized by the effect of this payoff from the foreign pressure game overshadowing the future domestic interaction (see Appendix 2). For example, the built-up of Solidarity’s underground structures might have been one decision or move by the U.S. The resulting long-term effects of making it more expensive for the regime to fight the opposition, however, stretch into the future across many of the subsequent domestic encounters. 254

Jan Litynski, Solidarity activist, participant in the round table negotiations, qtd. in Conference Communism’s Negotiated Collapse, panel 6, no pages.


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The situation after the 1986 general amnesty resembles the equilibrium in which the cost P is sufficiently high to expect that “time is on the opposition’s side” (Chapter 4.4.3): The Jaruzelski regime realized that continual reprisals can no longer guarantee the highest payoff. It started to contemplate how much worth a dialogue with Solidarity could be. Because the discount factor in the game nested inside the U.S. democracy assistance arena is lower than in the purely isolated fight against Solidarity, we expect the regime not to contemplate for very long about the benefits an understanding with the opposition would bring about. For the time when the foreign pressure game was already overshadowing the trajectory from 1986 onwards, the nested game’s temporal dimension presents a tool for better understanding the causal mechanism. What was the Jaruzelski regime’s composite time discount factor255? At the critical juncture around 1986, what was the regime’s own belief about how long it was capable to survive? Statements from leading Communist party members contradict with the actual rate at which the regime’s reform pact at the round table was finally negotiated. Instead of interpreting the actors’ assessment, references to interpreting the observable behavior are necessary. The suddenness in the shift to accept a power sharing agreement is exemplified in a government statement from May 1988, only four months before the first preparatory talks between Walesa and Minister of the Interior Kiszczak began: The regime “had not, does not and will not talk” with union leaders (Time Magazin 16/05/1988). Yet, with ramming home the approval of the round table talks on the 10th plenum of the PZPR’s Central Committee in January 1989, the actual same persons – representatively Generals Jaruzelski and Kiszczak – became different players. As Lewis puts it, in Polish and East European terms all this (the round table) did represent a significant political change and, what is more, it proceeded under the aegis of essentially the same leadership that introduced martial law, interned thousands of activists, purged the party and embraced some involved in diverse acts of brutality including the Popieluszko[256] murder (Lewis 1990b: 26).

However, the interpretation of events in 1986 by Litynski above and the failure of the referendum in 1987, indicate that the regime believed in its time horizon to shrink. In 1988, Jaruzelski suggested a “pro-reform coalition” and admitted that the failure of the referendum made him “realize that without popular support we 255 256

See Chapter 4.4.3. In October 1984, the Polish secret police SB kidnapped and murdered the prominent priest and dissident Popieluszko. After he had been missing for two weeks, his body was found in a river.

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would be unable to follow the Communist route any further” (Time Magazin, 31/12/1990). If the counterfactual claim – that the actual situation in Poland 1988 was too premature for expecting regime change – can be sustained, then the study of why the strategies of the political actors were modified and resulted in mutual agreements seems to be a point of departure. However, the analytic narrative so far provides no clear-cut answer. With regard to the magnitude of the contrasting space between potential outcomes, one of the crucial junctures with high uncertainty was the election of Jaruzelski as president by the newly formed Sejm in August 1989. At first though, a look into the mechanisms of the transition negotiations follows.

7.4.3 Negotiations 1988/1989 After strikes had spread to several cities during summer 1988, by August, Minister of the Interior Kiszczak invited the Solidarity leadership around Walesa to inductive talks about a possible round table (Buhler 2005: 6). Because of mutual distrust and Solidarity’s insistence on all-encompassing reforms as a precondition for entering into the talks, the round table itself was formed only in February 1989. Two months later, an agreement was signed that, de facto, stands as a power sharing arrangement, giving the transition actors each their payoff B/2. For the ultimate outcome of regime transition, apart from the tactical advising about how to elect Jaruzelski to the presidency in 1989 (see Chapter 6.3.5), one move by the external actor that the nested game model implied was particularly significant: the moderation of excessively radical claims for democratization or reform. The moderation served two strategic purposes: Firstly, with Solidarity pressing for full democratization, no agreement on reform would ever be possible; secondly, as was mentioned before as potential strategy, in order to bring P closer to B, the foreign power can help reduce the level of internal threat the regime is facing. By moderating the opposition, credible exit strategies can be offered to the regime. The regime could not have been certain about Solidarity not choosing to move the game to an outcome of open confrontation, by changing from the 1988 strategy reform to democratization. One indicator for the assumption is that radical wings of Solidarity were still active on the political scene. Rozplochowski, a leading head of Fighting Solidarity, would be cited in 1987 saying, “the reparation of Communism is none of my interest”, and “I intend to overthrow the totalitarian dictatorship.”257 Further, Walesa himself trav257

Qtd. in Bachmann (1987), own translation.


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eled intensively to convince strikers in halting their activities and refraining from expressing their anger (Walesa 1991). Given the findings that the U.S. Embassy exerted moderating influence on the process, it was not Solidarity as such that was being aided by the United States, but rather a very particular liberal group inside Solidarity that was softer on their strategy towards the Communists. Among the U.S. community that was active in the Solidarity assistance, disputes as to what strategy to follow against the Jaruzelski regime existed. Thereby the argument about which Solidarity group should be supported serves as an example of the deliberate strategy to influence the opposition. On this note, the support of the Walesa group to the United States to lift the maintaining sanctions in 1987 conflicted with parts of the TKK underground leadership. Chenoweth (Interview Chenoweth) notes that Geremek was for negotiations, and [U.S. Ambassador] Davis played the trick to try to… – he believed that, if you soften the sanctions, that you would get to negotiations. Most of the people in the underground, most of the people who kept Solidarity alive, it was not Geremek and it was not Walesa – they were not keeping it –, it was the others who were keeping it alive. And also groups like us, sort of independent groups, were very, very strong that you had to maintain the pressure – or the regime would not break.

On part of the opposition, therefore not an actual preference update can be observed, but a willingness to abandon the most preferred strategy. Strategically, Solidarity firstly had to create a momentum of mobilization through the strike waves erupting in the summer of 1988. This threat is one element in the Communist party’s decision to reshuffle its most preferred strategy from continuity to reform. However, the equilibrium of final agreement could not have been attained, had it not been for Solidarity controlling that dynamic of mobilization and thereby signaling to the party that it will refrain from its dominant strategy. A connotation inherent to the claim is that the Polish Communist party would, plausibly, have not entered into negotiations with a more radicalized opposition group. It will certainly be difficult to find proof for the assumption. However, the example enhances the validity of process tracing for (1) identifying counterfactuals and (2) emphasizing how a minor, relatively unknown detail of international influence would have been able to modify the course of the Polish democratization process. These aspects corroborate with the theoretically derived assumptions: for the opposition, reaching democratization is the most preferred strategy; the departure from this dominant strategy to the less preferred preference of moderate reforms combines both the promotion to a professional and coherent opposition and the curbing of its democratic claims.

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If it, indeed, had been for the pressure and assistance to influence which fraction within Solidarity would eventually become the dominant group facing the regime, the entire liberalization path, that is, the transition game would have been played very differently. Consider applying the corresponding interaction to the game matrix of the original non-nested transition game (Table 3:, Chapter 4.2.1): A stable dominant-strategy equilibrium exits in the upper left cell, where the regime receives payoff 3 and the opposition payoff 2. In order to attain the reform equilibrium in the lower right cell, Solidarity would have to give up aiming for its highest payoff of 4, that is, to give up following the strategy of demanding full democratization instead of demanding intermediate reforms. This case is exactly what happened through the efforts of the Solidarity leadership to moderate the radical wing in the movement.

7.4.4 The Juncture of Jaruzelski’s Election to President in 1989 As a negotiated pact, the signing of the round table agreements constitutes the equilibrium of the regime transition. The result of the elections in 1989, the consequent rapid decline of the Communist party, and the first free election in 1990 introducing full democracy is, in so far, of no interest to our original question as the game was a game of agreement. In this game of agreement, a sufficient first step was reaching only a power sharing reform agreement. The reforms and the negotiations during the round table caught their own thrust and is a separate question about the substance of democracy that was finally agreed upon. The provisions of the round table agreement should still have guaranteed the Communists a major stake in power and were, at the time, not perceived as introducing full democracy. The process of liberalization itself was not touched. With hindsight, it appears to have been of only short temporal value. In a theory of moves, likewise, the bargained agreement on intermediate reform need not entail full transition at the next stage. The case might arise in which the Ancien regime might win elections, but does not receive enough support, and becomes induced to start bargaining with the democratizers all over again. By narrow terms, the critical maneuvering around Jaruzelski’s election to the Polish presidency in August 1989 still represents a juncture with a counterfactual, unobserved trajectory. There is strong indication that, without the U.S. interference, a rollback to hard-line dominance was a risk. Commonly, the velvet revolutions of 1989 easily impart flair of irreversibility of the processes and inevitability of the outcome. Regarding the breakdown of Communism as such, this thesis was mentioned earlier. Social scientists and historians alike tend to fall into “illusions of retrospective determinism” (Garton Ash 1993: 44). In the


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spring of 1989, few believed that Solidarity could win the election that was negotiated at the round table – this misperception applies to the Solidarity leaders themselves, too – and even fewer still thought at the time that the Jaruzelski regime would honor such an outcome (Garton Ash 2002). According to primary sources from the Polish Communist Party, as outlined in chapter 6.3.5, but also confirmed by senior officials from the U.S. National Security Council, had the Polish opposition not decided to support General Jaruzelski’s election as president – ultimately secured by the margin of a single vote – the history of the next several months might have been one of retreat and repression rather than democratic triumph (Hutchings 1999: 51).

Even later in the year, no one could have been certain how the Soviet Union would react – it was one thing for Gorbachev to support greater liberalization in Eastern Europe, and another to preside over the dissolution of the Soviet empire and the Warsaw pact. The deliberate move by Solidarity not to have Jaruzelski elected president would, with all likelihood, have provoked a reaction from Moscow. It is, therefore, plausible to assume that, at this often ignored and terminally critical juncture, the hitherto Polish liberalization process could have taken an entirely diverging transition path. What are the indications for Solidarity having taken decisions in conjunction with the strategic advising by the United States? It is important to remember that interpreting observable actions, in this regard, is only a first test of the derived assumptions. They are inasmuch tentative as any solid empirical findings that attempt at explaining the moves of Solidarity actors in, more or less, probabilistic terms. “How to elect Jaruzelski without voting for him”258 was the advice to the new Solidarity deputies the U.S. Embassy was assigned with. What is recorded is that those deputies were deeply divided on the issue, and that there was a probability for its majority not to adopt the strategy.

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Title of a cable from American Embassy in Warsaw to Secretary of State, June 23, 1989.

8 Conclusion

Recent elevations of democracy promotion as a central objective of foreign policy agendas have not resulted in more people living in freedom. According to Freedom House (2008), “as the second consecutive year that the survey has registered a global decline in political rights and civil liberties, friends of freedom worldwide have real cause for concern”259. In spite of the massive resources invested and twenty-five years of experience since Reagan’s ‘Project Democracy’ in engineering democracy abroad, serious doubts arise as to whether external democracy promotion matters after all. The real concern of policymakers and “friends of freedom” is that democracy promotion has seemingly no impact on the global spread of democratic regimes. This sobering net effect of efforts at external democratization allows two interpretations. First of all, democracy promotion should not be pursued because democratic transitions are so complex that they cannot be shaped by external actors. Democracy promotion should therefore be removed from foreign policy priorities (see Snyder 2000). This conclusion goes hand in hand with a false impression the war in Iraq has fostered. Namely, at least from the U.S. view, military force is the only instrument of regime change. Yet, it is the rarest used and least effective way to promote democratic change abroad (Fukuyama and McFaul 2007). The second interpretation is that the failure of democracy promotion to deliver the promised benefits comes as a consequence of nothing else but applying wrong strategies. At the minimum, there is a wide gap between objectives and strategies. This study shows that external democracy promotion is not a hopeless undertaking and that its research is not a project of political science having gone mad, as Lawson (1999) argues. By analyzing in more detail the mechanisms of democracy promotion, the gap between objectives and strategies can be narrowed. The developed nested games of external democracy promotion theory presents a model that encapsulates the causal mechanisms about how an external 259

Arch Puddington, qtd. in Press Release ‘Freedom in the World 2008: Global Freedom in Retreat’, 16/01/08, Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=612.


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actor is able to change the outcome of political liberalization. This model provided a host of hypotheses that could be derived and which were empirically tested in a pathway case study. The analytic narrative of the United States involvement in the interactions between the Polish opposition movement Solidarity and the Polish Communist party between 1980 and 1989 proved the plausibility and usefulness of this study’s theory for further application and eventual refinements. In its depth, this study presents details about the scope and methods of U.S. democracy assistance to Poland that have previously not been published. It offers a rational choice approach to the international dimension of democratization. Substantively, the study deals with two issues: external democracy promotion and the relative weight of domestic and external causes for authoritarian regime breakdown. Against the background of what relevance the herein presented propositions have, I firstly summarize and discuss the nested games approach, then highlight the key empirical implications of this study for democracy promotion. I conclude by briefly outlining how the nested games model can be applied in future research and offer a final remark.

8.1 Democracy Promotion as Nested Games The approach chosen to explore the mechanisms and effects of democracy promotion is as elegant as it is simple: Using elementary game theory, this study modeled in Chapter 4 the strategic interaction between authoritarian regime and democratic opposition as games in multiple arenas.260 The principal transition arena is embedded inside an international arena in which the regime is simultaneously entangled with an external actor, who represents a democratic nation promoting democracy and reflecting, in general, the international dimension. The measures or actions of a third player (an agent of democracy promotion) in one arena (the international dimension) influence the payoffs of the players (regime and opposition) in the principal arena (the domestic situation), and the magnitude of the payoffs determines the players’ strategies. External factors are usually treated as an intervening or facilitating variable rather than a central cause that brings a democratic transition. As only the regime is involved in the two arenas, the influence of the democracy promotion agent is of indirect nature. It leaves the direction of the transition path in the hands of the regime, and the internal struggle is thus referred to as the principal arena. 260

Games in multiple arenas, as pioneered by Tsebelis (1990), describe situations in which one actor is simultaneously involved in two or more games and, mutually not exclusive, in situations where externalities count.

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This conceptualization leads to a convenient exercise in counterfactual reasoning because it resolves some of the complexities inherent to regime transition: the transition game can be studied as purely domestic, that is, in its non-nested version, and then be compared with the nested version. Moreover, by turning the standard perspective on democratization upside down, we do not look into what happens when we add to the picture the international dimension. The incipient assumption that a country’s political opening never proceeds in a vacuum suggests asking how this process would look like absent of any external influence. The initial impetus to theorize about democracy promotion was to explicitly understand what the consequences are when an external actor is influencing the strategies of domestic agents who make contingent and interdependent choices; on the one hand, we have a regime safeguarding the status quo dictatorship and, on the other hand, social groups fighting for more democracy. The thesis of this study is that external democracy promotion shapes the benefits and costs of autocratic rule. Marks (1992) elaborated on Dahl’s (1971: 15) proposed correlation between the costs of toleration and the costs of repression. Marks (1992: 51) proposition is that the costs of toleration for the ruling elite are the costs of losing monopolistic control of the government multiplied by the probability of losing that monopoly as a result of liberalizing the regime. Targeting regime elites and allying with opposition leader is also a point raised by Diamond (1999). The nested game model goes further and translates this intution into theory. The costs of authoritarianism can be formalized and thus serve as a starting point not only for investigating what conditions the costs to rise or fall but also for linking external factors with domestic causes of transition. Democracy assistance to a democratic opposition raises the regime’s costs to repress successfully pluralistic activities; pressure exerted directly on the regime can reduce its benefits, thus exacerbating the impact of the increased costs to stay in power. It is the combined household of payoffs from the domestic game and the international game that, ultimately, makes an authoritarian regime decide how much democratic reform it is willing to accommodate. Though we may not be able to predict transitions and how political systems evolve over time, considering the nexus between domestic processes and international dimension allows a better delineation of plausible and observable trajectories of external influence. Usually, games are studied and solved for their equilibria and no attention is paid to variations in payoffs. In that way, strategy changes of the actors cannot be reproduced. Since the basic intuition behind selecting a game-theoretical approach was that the interdependence of negotiating strategies determines transition politics, the measuring of external influence on strategy shifts would not be impossible. This study adopted a different approach. It demonstrated that

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payoff orderings determine the likelihood of different strategies being adopted.261 Through nesting the regime’s political strategies inside the international dimension, the regime can revise the benefits of its possible moves and update the attached payoffs of each move. Different payoffs redefine what approach toward the democratic opposition and liberalization the regime, in general, prefers. Chapter 4.4 related the abstract findings of how the preference changes of regime and opposition provoked different strategies to the real world of democracy promotion strategies. The applicability of the nested games approach was exemplified by the Polish liberalization process. I do not claim that a gametheoretic model can explain the entire Polish regime change, let alone the international dimension of this process or, furthermore, the American influence on the Polish transition path. The Polish transition is a result of the combined presence of a uniquely strong trade union movement, the failure of Communist economic planning, Perestroika, and U.S. Cold War policies. Yet a theoretical model can help to look carefully at some of the most important elements of transition dynamics and its participants. A detailed account of the evolution of political attitudes within the Polish government obviously requires an in-depth historical investigation. The analytic narrative of U.S. influence on the behavior of the Jaruzelski regime suggests that such evolution was indeed consistent with the predictions of this model. All of the important points that have been made through game-theoretic models can be understood without a model. However, a model can make grasping them easier. As stated, the concern of this study is not to explain the consequences of the Soviet Union’s collapse or the role of economic deterioration among the Communist world. These factors are important, but they cannot per se explain the timing and course of political liberalization. The design of this study, the testing of a model with a single historical case, necessitates a positioning on how far the results can be generalized. As suggested, the study opts for a complementary approach. In the same vein as fashioning theories can be importing and borrowing from one domain and adapting them to explain phenomena in another context (see Shively 2004), the tools for analyzing cannot be simply streamlined. The bottom line is that, through process tracing the Polish liberalization, a valuable first test of how the external dimen261

This result is proven by Tsebelis (1990) through the possibility of correlated strategies. The term correlated strategies refers to the concept that the interaction between the two arenas is linked. Since the literature on external democracy promotion seems, rather, to borrow terms from the international relations theories, in this study the correlation was consequently termed as linkage. In the case of iterated games, when the time horizon is sufficiently long, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) proved the relevance of payoff size with the folk theorem.

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sion is connected with the domestic democratic developments has been achieved. The general findings from this test form the explanatory value of the nested games approach. A general conclusion is that democratization and the breakdown of authoritarian regimes should be understood as a complex, contingent and prolonged process. It is still adequate to develop parsimonious models of democratization, because it is likely that many aspects of the process are systematizable in the way simple models suggest. Although a common critique is that such analyses typically take the overall definition of the rational choice situation and the options that actors have as given, the nested games model attempts to account for a missing frame within which the rational choices of domestic actors are made (see also Renwick 2006: 53). It enlarged the picture by including in the analysis the international arena. The analysis of international, structural conditions is important, but it cannot capture the complexity of the process through which these conditions shape and influence the outcomes of strategic regime transitions. Not surprisingly, the empirical results are not convincing inasmuch as they lack a clear conclusion for measuring the extent to which the United States’ engagement did influence the outcome of the liberalization process in Poland. Yet the theoretical results point to the conclusion that external democracy promotion matters in ways that are predictable. The correct strategies and instruments of intervention influence different actors’ payoffs in nested games. Payoffs tell us what political choice transition actors will most likely make and will lay bare the mechanisms of external influence on strategic transitions. Moreover, in comparison to existing domestic transition models as introduced by e.g. Colomer (2000), Gates and Humes (1997), Geddes (1991), Marks (1992), Zielinski (1995, 1999) and Sutter (2000), the nested games approach is more realistic in mapping the time factor. Through the iteration of the nested games, we can estimate when transition actors make which political choice. For example, the model could tell that a change in the regime’s payoff by itself is not sufficient for explaining that external democracy promotion facilitated negotiated transition. Comparing the time horizons of the regime, as was formalized by discounting the future benefits of dictatorship in Chapter 4.3.1, (a) accounted for how protracted transitions are, but moreover, (b) added an indicator to grasp the dynamics of influence on the actors’ contingent and interdependent transition strategies. One attribute governing the quality of a theory is parsimony. Gaining parsimony, however, often requires sacrifices of explanatory power and detail. For instance, the Polish and American participants probably were concerned with many more issues and dimensions, such as the relationship of the state towards the Soviet Union, and the role of the Catholic Church in state affairs. It would be

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difficult to decide in a general model how many dimensions to include and whether all should be weighted equally. Some behavioral patterns, mostly regarding tactical shifts and moves, by all three actors, cannot easily be captured by the model’s simplification. A point in case is the moderation that United States officials were attempting to exert on both the regime and Solidarity, depending on the timing of the transition process. In the foreign pressure game, one of the necessary strategies by the U.S. is to threaten the regime with foreclosing any common agreement in the future. The threat of preventing this agreement serves as a punishment in order for the regime to cooperate eventually with the opposition. Once a dialogue begins unfolding, the reward could consist in guarantying the safe extrication of the ruling Communist elite. The result of the round table agreements and the design of the new political system was clearly leaning toward assuring the continued dominance of the regime, in particular, since the first free elections were originally planned for 1993 only (Kaminski 1991b: 182; Lewis 1990b: 26). In the formal terms of the nested game, an implication for the external actor was to reduce the magnitude of B (the regime’s continuation of authoritarian rule) as one strategy to bring P closer to B, the condition necessary for the game to end with the reform equilibrium. Guaranteeing the extrication of the Communists was one such strategy. Here, the U.S. moved B closer to P instead of moving P closer to B. Therefore, the threat to punish seems unrealistic. Providing an exit strategy for the Communists was clearly based on a strategic concept within American foreign policy (Smith 1994: 274) that was applied earlier than in the transition phase, ahead of the round table planning. The predicted shift, then, to support the moderates and softliners in the regime (moving B to P) is, to some degree, in conflict with the observed action. In sum, there are conflicting patterns between the provision of exit strategies and the equilibrium discussion of the foreign pressure game. At this point, it suffice to say that either the model requires further refining in future research or one simply has to accept the limits of formal modeling. In this study, further sacrifices of theoretical explanatory reach concern, among others, intra-actor conflicts and bargaining (see Przeworski 1991; Blaydes 2003); the uncertainty and risk surrounding, in general, the consequences of particular decisions (see Swaminathan 1999; Gates and Humes 1997) and, in particular, the use of violent repression (see Crescenzi 1999; Zielinski 1999); as well as the role of coordination strategies of a multitude of external democratization actors and programs (see Burnell 2000; Hook 2002). The former two omissions will be addressed as an avenue for future research in the last section. As to the last point, the consequences of applying inconsistent strategies and instruments of democracy promotion have not been a prominent topic of theoretical considerations in

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the literature. As intuition would tell that the more external actors coordinate the more effectively democracy promotion influences the transition actors, few gains can be expected from integrating this variable. It would be ostentatious to disguise that there is also a practical motivation behind researching how international actors have a say in the process of authoritarian and repressive regimes moving towards more liberal regimes. While the overall goal of this investigation is to understand the causal mechanisms behind regime changes in their extension to non-domestic factors, a politically practical value arises. If conclusions can be drawn about how, where and when democracy assistance is applied best to foster liberalization, then there is modest hope that policy-makers can turn yet again to theoretical research for help.

8.2 Key Implications for External Democracy Promotion The objective of this study is to develop and present a parsimonious framework to analyze the politics of external democracy promotion. The analysis is mostly aimed at understanding a relatively abstract picture of a complex part of democratization. Although predictions from simple frameworks run the risk of resting on false assumptions, it is useful to consider the consequences of effective strategies of democracy promotion, given the developed framework, and given the empirical evidence as presented. Several issues are pertinent to thinking about whether democracy promotion has an impact on political liberalization and how external influence facilitates the emergence of democracy. In the course of data collection, many aspects about American foreign policy institutions and their involvement in Poland, but also the related intra-government decisionmaking processes were revealed and they supported the hypotheses generated from the theoretical model. Retrospectively, many say the success of the Polish Solidarity movement was inevitable. However, it must be recalled that at the time, many doubted its success. Therefore, not a few observers in the United States, in Central Eastern Europe, and even some in Russia, would argue that the third country that should be credited with causing the democratization of Eastern Europe was not the Soviet Union at a certain, late phase of its history, but the United States. Some even go so far as to claim de facto crucial credit for the Reagan administration (Pipes 1995). Others chime in with the conviction that, had it not been for both overt and covert policies of the Reagan administration, it is highly unlikely that Solidarity would at all have survived the decade (Schweizer 1994: 283). This claim is supported by contemporary witnesses such as General William Odom, Chief of U.S. Army Intelligence from 1981 to 1982 (Garthoff 1998: 4). However,

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claiming that in Eastern Europe the downfall of the Communist party dominated regimes, including the Polish one, was an “American victory” (Schweizer 1994), which was, to a large extent, accomplished through its “prudent” anti-Soviet diplomacy (Hutchings 1997), seems, at best, provocative. Polish participants from both camps in the country’s liberalization and most Russians would disagree. As outlined in Chapter 6.1, the Reagan administration’s ultimate goal behind ‘project democracy’ was not regime change. The model raised the question if successful external democracy promotion in the phase of regime opening is more likely when a regime is not pushed too hard for change.262 An interview partner’s experience with the Reagan and Bush Sr. administrations was that “maximum pressure was fine, but it did not have a specific objective to change the regime” (Interview Simons). Simply, the argument evolves that, if external pressure reaches a certain level, the probability increases that a regime radicalizes. When radicalizing, regime hardliners win over the softliners and, consequently, resort to repress with a higher probability. Understanding the cost structures a regime attaches to (a) tolerating opposition and (b) repressing opposition helps identifying thresholds where the external pressure to democratize requires a strategy update on behalf of the external actor. At one point, the benefits from cooperating with a democratic opposition need noticeably to outweigh the benefits from continued authoritarian rule. A revised democracy promotion strategy thus needs to account for these cost levels. As was indicated in the model, no set of external incentives would convince an authoritarian government to undertake democratic reform if it estimated that reform would unleash insurmountable potential danger to its survival. Therefore, two strategies for democracy promotion can be derived: 1.

2.

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a shift to providing credible exit strategies for the regime elites by helping to reduce the perceived internal threat facing the regime, a point similar to Yilmaz’s (2002) results. For example, sanctions and rewards need to be made credible and visible. Closely related to the reducing of internal threats to the regime, the external actor needs to channel the opposition’s behavior towards internalizing the regime’s cost-benefit analysis. Once the external actor comprehends how the regime weighs its nested costs of authoritarianism, as was introduced in Chapter 7.3.2, this knowledge can be transferred to the opposition leaders. Consequently, this should place the opposition in a better position to find International security studies refer to this democracy promotion dilemma as “deterrenceversus-restraint dilemma” (Zagare and Kilgour 2006).

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and implement strategies for successfully reaching democratic reform and avoiding repeated repression. At the bottom of how external democracy promotion facilitated regime transition was the assistance in creating a favourable climate for the Polish negotiated transition. The successful implementation of United States assistance in Poland helped achieve negotiated transition. Among the ingredients of assistance worth mentioning are, in particular:

extensive CIA-operations to destabilize the Polish regime throughout the 1980s as well as several spy games surrounding the covert support for Solidarity; the positive impact of the U.S. assistance strategies on the Communist regime’s and Solidarity decision-making process, their cost-benefit analysis and risk-assessment; a post-martial law sanctions regime imposed by the U.S. government whose salient effect was not the mere economic damage incurred, but the installation of a realistic incentive system that links gradual steps the regime undertakes towards liberalization with the gradual easing of sanction instruments; a relatively minor amount of total US$ and goods funneled secretly to the Solidarity leadership between 1980 and 1989 contributed decisively to the opposition’s survival during its forced underground life.

Some key instruments from the democracy promotion toolbox have proven successful in the Polish case and can help practitioners select strategies for facilitating negotiated transitions. Some of them reconnect with the literature on democracy promotion strategies. For example, in his analysis of potential regime changes in the Arab world, Byman (2005) concludes with the recommendations to Western states that direct interference in the transformation of power structures frequently does not result in success. Instead, long-term strategies to induce and maintain contacts to civil society groups seem more promising with regard to regime change. Haaß (2005) argues that the limits for regime change lie predominantly in the pace and speed with which a foreign state can have an impact on regime change. While the strategy of influencing the regimes in Communist Eastern Europe was paying off, an accelerated strategy to topple regimes can release forces that can possibly no longer be kept under control. In line with this study’s results, the relevance of diplomacy and negotiations is emphasized, no matter how protracted and longsome they are. That the diplomacy of democracy promotion needs also to target opposition groups is often a strategy underestimated in the policy debates. Already Hunting-

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ton (1991: 45) observed what precisely plagued the inductive process to negotiate in Poland: “Almost always some opposition circles are against negotiations with the government. They are afraid that negotiations will bring about bad compromises, and they hope that continuing the pressure will cause the regime to crumble and fall. […] The government, for its part, had to acknowledge the opposition groups as the rightful representatives of a large part of the society. It was easier to achieve this when those groups did not resort to violence”. Cinkenbeard (2002) identifies as central in the diplomacy of democracy promotion that external influence itself needs to be coherent, but that, furthermore, the aim needs to be assisting the evolution of a coherent opposition. The Polish case study confirmed a condition derived from the model: exerting foreign pressure should not be limited to the regime’s behavior; it should stimulate the opposition to develop a moderate, cohesive anti-government front that, by refraining from radical and violent tactics, can find acceptance as a partner of the regime. Among the instruments commonly discussed in the literature and in the policy community alike, most striking is the absence of intelligence services and their contribution to strengthening democratic forces.263 Although impeded by most documentation still being locked under classification, the analysis of CIA programs in Poland tentatively highlights the value of covert operations for democratization. The dynamics of negotiating democratic transition between regime and opposition constitutes a qualitatively different process than the earlier steps towards liberalization. As the crises observed during the Polish round table in Chapter 7.4.3 and 7.4.4 showed, policy recommendations need to build on the understanding that this window can be very narrow. The tactical behavior of opposition and international actors is all the more crucial. For example:

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The U.S. was well aware that its contacts with the Catholic Church did not only have the benefits of supporting the opposition but that the church served as a credible mediator respected by both sides during the negotiations. Mediators are essential in maintaining trust while bargaining about democratic reform. One can think of the role Polish authorities could occupy in opposition-regime deals in Belarus, or the role the EU had in the Ukrainian Orange Revolution (see Aslund and McFaul 2006). The authoritarian country’s society as well as the international public opinion should be able to see clearly that the opposition is the de facto protodemocratizer. Schmitter and Brouwer (1999: 11) refer to covert activities as part of democracy promotion but discard its effect.

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Democratization actors need to influence the opposition towards providing a security guarantee for the outgoing dictatorship authorities. Renouncing universal retribution against the functionaries of the outgoing authoritarian regime by representatives of the democratic opposition is an essential condition for negotiated transition.

Some of the featured recommendations were found in the successful liberalizations of Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, where external opposition support is believed to have played a relatively large role. Irrespective of geographical proximity, in the Eastern European group of pre-1989 types of political situations, Belarus is the country closest to the Polish antecedents of regime change. Emulation effects are certainly facilitated by the Polish transition having proceeded in the direct neighborhood. For example, the wife of Belarus’ leading opposionist Milinkevich formed a Solidarity Committee for the Defense of the Prosecuted, in an open reference to the Polish Solidarity’s KOR264 and social funds. Yet, foreign financing of the fund is limited, and moreover, the country lacks a longterm strategy by both the U.S. and the EU for supporting the development of Belarusian civil society groups (Jarabik 2006).

8.3 Future Research This study, looking at the single remaining superpower’s involvement in Communist Europe, is very limited in its scope. The expectation, nevertheless, lies in catalyzing a chain of thought that is eventually valuable enough for a wider application to different settings and antecedents. Implicitly, this argument can claim to justify the level of abstractness in this study: the more theoretical the model, the wider its application. One way for a wider application of this study’s results is to turn for help to the recently thriving method market. As Lieberman (2005) suggests a mixed method approach for comparative research, an initial large-N analysis (or quantitative analysis) serves to make an assessment about the robustness of a theory. Subsequently, one proceeds to a model-building small-N analysis. By highlighting the specific utilities of each analytic strategy, the approach reduces inferential problems ordinarily carried by case study approaches or quantitative ap-

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The Polish Workers’ Defence Committee, inaugurated in the 1970s and eventually merged with Solidarity.

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proaches when performed on their own.265 Since this study’s primary theoretical drive is the development of a model, the first step in this nested analysis program was skipped. However, it still represents a valuable methodological follow-up for future research programs. A nested research design implies that scholars will pose questions in forms such as “What causes social revolutions?,” while simultaneously asking questions such as “What was the cause of social revolution in France?” (Liebermann 2005: 436). This study only attempted to give some answers to the second type of question, comprising the hope of contributing to the general question of what role has the international dimension in authoritarian regime breakdown. For a fuller assessment of this research complex, the nested research approach suggested by Liebermann seems useful in confronting the findings with either additional case studies or quantitative comparison across a larger number of countries. The design of this study should allow incorporating the assumptions of Lieberman’s nested analysis for comparative research: namely, the objective of a mixed-methods research program is the interest in both the exploration of general relationships and the specific explanations of individual cases or a cluster of cases. From the onset, one methodological goal was to open this study for both theoretical interest and the understanding of U.S. democratization efforts. The accumulation of research continues to expand the scope of available datasets that may be used for quantitative purposes. For example, in the area of democratization research, the Freedom House or Polity datasets provide timevarying indicators across a large number of countries. If some international variables are found to have had significant impact, it both serves as an introduction into why Poland democratized, but also alleviates the more general problem of presenting a one-N study. As the role of sanctions to pressure the Polish regime to democratize has shown, one such international variable that can likely be codified relatively precisely is the economic impact of external democracy promotion on an authoritarian regime. Given the more ready availability of financial datasets for more recent cases of regime transitions, the approach of such studies as Al-Momani (2003), Dorussen and Mo (2001) or Marinov (2005) can be configurated so that the interplay of sanctions and democracy promotion can become more comprehensive. From an intra-model perspective, that is, comparative statics, more control variables can be incorporated into the nested game model. For operationalizing the theory’s implications, again, intuition serves as useful guidance: introducing degrees of risk assessment on behalf of the domestic transitions actors adds a 265

In an impressive research program, Schultz (2001) combines this mixed method into one work when exploring the effects of democratic politics on the success of coercive diplomacy.

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natural bias to the model’s predictions and eventually renders them more realistic (see Calvert 1985; Yilmaz 2002). Useful to consider is that the regime attaches more weight to the transition game than to the foreign pressure game, increasing the level of k (the parameter indicating the relative weight between international dimension and domestic interaction). Since the central question driving the theoretical exploration is what impact the introduction of an external actor has on regime change, a regime which is biased away from external influence fulfills an important methodological role: It serves as an intra-model variable for controlling some of the predicted change in behavior we initially would assign to the effect of the external actor’s intervention. The nested games model has not formalized such a control mechanism, but addressing the point serves as a reminder to be cautious when assessing external effects through the study’s model. Moreover, the actor’s risk assessment carries different connotations in ethnically split societies. Under external pressure, the risk of a dictatorial regime to resort to violence in order to curb its citizens’ opposition is overshadowed by worse outcomes commonly associated with repression. In ethnically divided countries, with regimes coming under increasing internal and external pressure, the probability of genocide or civil war increases (King 2007). For instance, a form of repressing domestic opposition is to eradicate it as a player. In terms of the nested games approach, the number of arenas the regime is forced to play in is reduced (see Verwimp 2004). The results of nationalistic regimes in exYugoslavia, and even starker, Rwanda, that came under increased pressure from inside and outside to reform are just but two examples in case here. Gurr (2000) has collected data on the position of minorities, and one of the conclusions from the data is exactly the probability increase as described above. Further refinements of the study’s theory concern adding more complexity, for example, with the design of a tripartite game of incomplete information. Recall that, for reasons of simplicity, this study’s nested game of external democracy promotion is a game of complete information. In a tripartite game of incomplete information, the external actor is incorporated directly into a larger game. Extending transition models like this study’s model to become games of incomplete information is an attempt to render them more accurate. It means to enlarge the unit of analysis. Simply adding an external actor who changes the outcome of strategic interaction between the old regime and an opposition into existing games of transition in the literature could prove to be a worthwhile complication. By enlarging the transition game in order to integrate incomplete information – where some people know things others do not know –, other authors have already improved our understanding of the nexus between uncertainty and external intervention. After applying a game of incomplete information to political

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liberalization in the Middle East, Blaydes (2003: 20) asks for future studies to address the following question: What effect does an external actor have for the prospects of a transition from authoritarianism when modeled as a two-sided incomplete information structure? A clear extension of the literature would be to solve the two-sided incomplete information version of her game and look for variances that make the actors susceptible for outside influence and a changing of their preferences or values they attach to outcomes. Without dwelling further on this particular refinement, Gates and Hume (1997: 124) suggest for future research to study in how far the “Nature” move to choose between committed and not committed reformer inside the regime camp could be influenced by external factors. The idea is that the concept of “Nature” is not purely analytical but captures pre-determined external constraints that reduce the contingencies for Nature. Merging the basics of the nested games approach with Games and Humes (1997), we can briefly think of a game of incomplete information, in which an external actor serves as the Nature move, and then point to the difficulties such a model would cause for tracing equilibrium paths. The Chance move could fulfill the function of a move determining the resolve and willingness to risk the opposition is taking, as was raised relatively informal in Chapter 4.4.4. Thinking about such a design is important because uncertainty is a characteristic of many political situations and has become a commonly applied concept in formal transition games. Building upon Przeworski (1991), in the first move – substituting the Nature move – an external actor can either support or not support the opposition. This move will define with which type of opposition the regime is playing in the domestic transition game. It can be either soft or hard, as a reference to the degree of its wherewithal and resolve for fighting for democracy. The soft type is an opposition that does not receive any support by an external actor; in the opposite, the hard type of opposition is strongly supported by the external actor. The basic idea in introducing this move by the external actor is that the opposition’s subjective probability assessment about how likely the regime will repress changes and, moreover, with what success it will exert repression. With democratization support from a foreign nation, it could become more risk-prone, evaluating the parameter r for successful repression more positively. Knowing that if r is low the regime will run into an extended conflict, the opposition could expect that the regime prefers to reform, which leads to the outcome of transition. The type of opposition that is supported by the external actor would then, with a higher probability, organize, instead of entering into a broadened dictatorship with the regime. For example, implicit in Przeworski’s (1991: 62) discussion is the key idea that civil society does not know what type of regime liberal-

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izers it faces; a point which, for reasons of parsimony, was not introduced into this study’s theory. Creating competing groups within the larger unitary actors of the nested games actors could clarify the impact of the moderating strategies on the opposition’s behavior as discussed in Chapters 7.2.2 and 7.4.3. Within the regime, two types could exist: the type that is “soft” and prefers transition to democracy over the use of repressive force or the type that is “tough” and is willing to use force to control and put down civil society’s autonomous organization. One independent variable could thus be “the belief of A about B’s type” (Bueno de Mesquita 1996: 217). In a tripartite game of incomplete information with an external actor, the model puts that perspective upside down. It reverses the player who does not know the type it is confronting, so that, instead of the opposition not knowing the type it is facing, the regime does not know what type of opposition it is facing. The type of opposition changes as the external actor is providing either moral support or direct financing, thus increasing the opposition’s willingness to fight for its most preferred outcome of democratization. With particular emphasis of outside changes to the economy of information, the role of uncertainty and the flow of information come to the fore. The uncertainty about the course in the liberalization process creates a situation in which the strategies of the actors are strongly influenced by the subjective perception of power between regime and opposition. Hence a change in strategy cannot be investigated only as real change in power relations but as a change in what the actors believe their respective power is and what they believe their resources at hand are. Note that, from this perspective, the integration of an external actor still remains a difficult task, but, through refined tools, hitherto unobserved processes of influence might be conceptualized and, subsequently, applied comparatively to further case studies. It could prove to be a more accurate representation of reality when, as above, we include more choices left to regime and opposition than in the more reduced nested games model. Empirically, a central assumption of this potential approach for the future seems flawed: the regime does not know the type of opposition it is playing with, which is nothing else than saying that the regime cannot ascertain which move the external actor has made. This is unrealistic since it is difficult to imagine any governing regime that will be unable to watch how much assistance flows into the country, either covert or overt. Finally, according to the equilibrium solutions in games of incomplete information, the beliefs of the players have to be specified. Because of the central role of beliefs the regime holds, empirical tests of this more complicated model would entail detailed historical data concerning internal, difficult to establish decision-making processes within both the ruling authoritarian elites and the democratic opposition groups.

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This study was limited to the supply side of agency-driven external democracy promotion. The structural, historical and cultural dimensions of authoritarian target countries have not been referred to. Democracy promotion works through national agents whose only strategies are to maximize their goal achievements. Once an authoritarian regime realizes that its grip to power has become as expensive as tolerating democratic reform, it will not bemoan the loss of its weak and all-consuming power. Strategies to promote democracy from abroad can feed the downside of ruling as dictator: professional, moderated and sustainable opposition forces harm the benefits of absolute power; output legitimacy depends on the economic cooperation and access to foreign markets. Only in its comprehensiveness do the costs of authoritarianism become nested inside the international context. Pacted transition have long been regarded as the most sustaining and peaceful mechanism for the emergence of democracy. Compromise is facilitated when the future expectations of regime elites about the value of governing can be lowered. There are sufficient practical theses that the testing of the abstract implications from the nested games model with the Polish case generated. This study might have added a small piece to our fractured understanding of external democracy promotion. Ultimately, the study demonstrated that democracy promotion requires patience. A country is ready for democracy when its people decide they are ready. For the democracy promotion industry that means it needs to be willing to work on long-term changes and not simply on short-term reform. Many questions remain open, which, for the academic field of comparative international democratization, presents a plethora of topics awaiting future exploration.

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Appendix 1: Derivations Repeated Play of Non-nested Games

Repeated Play of the Transition Game Cooperation (mutual agreements on reform) in the repeated version of the transition game will develop if the total sum of the difference between the future benefits of non-cooperation and the future benefits of cooperation will exceed the value of the most preferred outcome B. In other words, punishment dominates the temptation to reach the highest possible payoff, that is, to defect. For the regime, in order to do so, deduct the payoff for reform (or cooperation) from the cost (punishment) of staying in power while repressing the opposition. For the regime

Since p is in the [0;1] interval and we assumed that p < B/2 (condition (2)), the equation can never be satisfied. Therefore, condition (2) captures the following: as long as repression is cheaper than power sharing, the regime will never share power. The domestic opposition would cooperate and enter into a power sharing agreement if


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Appendix

Since R is in the [0;B/2] interval and we assumed R < B/2 (condition (3)), the equation is satisfied if is in the [0.66;1] interval with at least (and higher than) 0.66 if R approaches its lower bound 0 and close to 1 if R approaches its upper bound B/2. With the assumed payoff ordering, in order for the opposition to cooperate with the regime and seek limited reform instead of democratisation the discount factor needs to be larger than 0.66. Given the orderings, reform will never occur in the repeated transition game. The opposition needs to value the future very high for agreeing for a reform solution but the regime would never agree, no matter what the value of the discount factor is.

Repeated Play of the Foreign Pressure Game Cooperation (mutual agreements on reform) in the repeated version of the foreign pressure game will develop if the total sum of the difference between the future benefits of non-cooperation and the future benefits of cooperation will exceed the value of the most preferred outcome B. With the parameter r = 2 (as is the assumption in the mode in which the foreign pressure game is repeated every second round and the transition game every round), for the regime

(14) Since in condition (4) we assumed psS > B/2, equation (14) is satisfied if is in the [0.81;1] interval with at least 0.81 if psS approaches its upper bound B (the right hand side approaching 2) and close to 1 if psS approaches its lower bound B/2. With r = 1 (both foreign pressure game and transition are repeated every round symmetrically), for the regime

(15)

Appendix

313

Since in condition (4) we assumed ps S > B/2, equation (15) is satisfied if is in the [0.67;1] interval with at least 0.67 if ps S approaches its upper bound B (the left hand side approaching 2) and close to 1 if ps S approaches its lower bound B/2.

Appendix 2: Derivations of Nested Game with Varying Frequencies

Symmetric Frequencies266 Assume that interaction in the foreign pressure game takes place every round, and the payoff of each round stays the same: POfp,0 = POfp,1 = POfp,2 …. That means if a strategy in period 0 is in equilibrium, than it is also in equilibrium for all the following periods. The payoff will remain the same in each round. The players have a common discount factor . Equation (10), the expected utility of the combined payoffs in the nested game, is derived in the following way:

Asymmetric Frequencies A maximization problem that would define the optimal set of the nested game under the assumption of asymmetric frequencies of stage rounds becomes quite intricate if we add further complications such as specific frequencies of interaction that characterise external democracy promotion. These specifics refer to the fact that once the regime receives a payoff from the foreign pressure game in one 266

I am indebted to Thomas Sattler for pointing out the mathematical calculation.


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round, its effect should be felt in the next round which is only played in the transition game, too. For example, the regime has to bear the cost of a strengthened opposition as the outcome of one round in the foreign pressure game and would, empirically speaking, feel this cost also in the next round of the transition game. Even though, as assumed in the asymmetric frequency, in this round, the regime does not interact with the external actor, the effect of this payoff still overshadows the domestic interaction. The main difference is that the status quo can only be changed every two periods. To express this pattern mathematically may be very complex. However, even if formalised, these specific and mathematically correctly derived frequencies would clearly lead to the discount factor being higher than in the simplified formalisation I applied in chapter 5. The model itself would therefore be further strengthened. However, its application would eventually insert more bias towards the effect of the foreign influence. The model anyhow suffers under the inherent methodological danger to overstretch its results. The choice to discard the correct derivation has the side effect of alleviating some of this bias. What follows is (1) the outline of the mathematically correct derivation (without solving it), and (2) the derivation in the form as actually applied in my model. (1) The two player have a common discount factor . Assume POfp,0 = POfp,2 = POfp4 …

(2) The simplification is the result of omitting the time subscripts. This is a common approach to thereby avoid “notational cluttering” (see Lohmann 1997: 42):

Appendix 3: List of Interviews

The list contains the citation form of the interviews in the text, the relevant position every person interviewed held at any point throughout the 1980s, and the date of the interview. Unless otherwise stated, all interviews were conducted in Washington, DC. Citation Form Interview Baldyga

Interviewee and Date Leonard Baldyga, United States Information Agency, Director for Soviet Union and Eastern European Affairs 1979-1981; Director of European Affairs 1981-1983. December 17, 2004.

Interview Carothers

Thomas Carothers, Vice President for Studies-International Politics and Governance, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. December 16, 2004.

Interview Chenoweth

Eric Chenoweth, Vice Director Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe; Vice Director Committee in Support of Solidarity, 1981-1989. December 16, 2004.

Interview Davis

Ambassador John R. Davis Jr., United States Ambassador to Poland, 1987-1989; Political Attaché United States Embassy in Poland 19831987, U.S. State Department Director of Eastern European Affairs (1981-83). December 01, 2004, Charlottesville, Virginia.

Interview Fairbanks

Charles F. Fairbanks, Member of the Policy Planning Staff United States Department of State, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, 1981-1984; foreign policy advisor to the Reagan election campaign in 1980 and to the 1988 Bush campaign. December 20, 2004.

Interview Gershman

Carl Gershman, Director National Endowment for Democracy, since 1984. December 08, 2004.

Interview Haig

Barbara Haig, Senior Program Officer Eastern Europe, National Endowment for Democracy, since May 1985; daughter of Alexander Haig Jr., United States Secretary of State, 1981-1982. December 13, 2004.


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Appendix

Interview Lenard

Casimir Lenard, President of the Polish-American Congress, Washington Division, 1984-1987, 1988-1992. December 15, 2004.

Interview Mastny

Vojtech Mastny, Senior Fellow, U.S. National Security Archives. December 15, 2004

Interview Palmer

Marc Palmer, United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia, 1982-1986; Special Assistant to President Reagan, Ambassador to Hungary 1986-1990. December 16, 2004.

Interview Plattner

Marc Plattner, Director of the International Forum for Democratic Studies/ National Endowment for Democracy; Senior Program Director NED, 1985-1990. December 13, 2004.

Interview Potocki

Rodger Potocki, Senior Program Director Eastern Europe, National Endowment for Democracy, since 1989, 1984-1987 student in Poland. December 08, 2004.

Interview Sikorski

Radek Sikorski, Polish Foreign Minister since 2007, Polish Minister of Defense, 2005-2007, Chair Solidarity student strike committee in Bydgoszcz, 1981, political refugee in the United Kingdom, 1981-1989. December 15, 2004.

Interview Simons

Thomas W. Simons, United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia, 1986-1989; State Department Director of Soviet Union Affairs 1981-1985. December 14, 2004.

Interview Szporer

Michael Szporer, Solidarity Advisor, Author of the “Solidarity Oral History Project”; interviewed all leading figures of Solidarity. December 13, 2004.

Interview Richmond

Yale Richmond, through the 1970s Director of the Office of Soviet and East European Exchanges, U.S. State Department, Bureau of Cultural and Educational Exchanges, 1984-1988 Program Officer National Endowment for Democracy. December 16, 2004.

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